AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION -X MARCUS ISAIAH WASHINGTON, Claimant, CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR -against W I L L I A M MORRIS ENDEAVOR E N T E R T A I N M E N T , L L C , foraierly known

as the W I L L I A M MORRIS AGENCY, INC., JEFF M E A D E and S A R A H V A N H O V E N , Respondents. X For the following reasons below, I , pro se litigant Marcus Isaiah Washington, submit this Motion to present the arguments that will be raised and need to be addressed at an oral hearing for the clarification and modification of Arbitrator David L. Gregory's July 15, 2013 Interim Decision. In order to correct this manifest injustice and prevent further harmful delay, I ask that an expedited oral hearing take place at the New York office of the American Arbitrafion Association no later than August 5, 2013 so that my objections and the Respondents' testimony regarding "Exhibit 31" can be preserved on the record. C L A R I F I C A T I O N AND M O D I F I C A T I O N OF ARBITRATOR DAVID L. G R E G O R Y ' S J U L Y 15,2013 I N T E R I M DECISION. EXPEDITED ORAL HEARING DEMANDED. A A A Case N o . 13 160 01426 12

I.

Procedural History

On December 21, 2010, I commenced a civil suit against my former employer, William Morris Endeavor Entertainment (formerly known as the William Morris Agency) - a private company that sits at the epicenter of Hollywood and is the oldest literar)' and talent agency in the world. Based on a pyramid of evidence demonstrating the company's deep-rooted racial animus and continuing practice of engaging in intentional employment discrimination against African Americans and other people of color since its inception in 1898, I filed a detailed, 80 page complaint with the Southern District of New York, alleging claims of systemic disparate treatment (pattern and practice), disparate impact, pre and post-hiring individual disparate treatment, failure to promote, retaliation and aiding & abetfing in violation of Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981"), Title V I I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as codified, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 ("Title VIT'), the New York State Human Rights Law, New York Executive Law §§ 290 el. seq. (the "NYSHRL") and the New York City Human Rights Law, New York Administrative Code §§ 8-101 el. .seq. (the "NYCHRL"). In a letter to Judge P. Kevin Castel dated February 8, 2011, counsel for the Respondents - Michael P. Zweig of Loeb & Loeb LLP - stated that my "claims [were] wholly without merit, legally or factually" and also informed the judge that "the claims and allegations set forth in plaintiffs complaint are subject to an arbitrafion agreement." On February 25, 2011, the Respondents filed a motion seeking dismissal of the complaint or a stay pending arbitration because o f two Arbitration Agreements (the "2008 Arbitration Agreement" and the "2009 Arbitrafion Agreement") that were signed by myself Both "agreements" stated that "any claim, dispute and/or controversy" including "discrimination" and "retaliation" had to be "submitted to and determined exclusively by binding arbitrafion under the Federal Arbitration Act." In the 2009 Arbitrafion Agreement, it additionally stated: "The Arbitrator, not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute

relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of this Agreement, including but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable." ("Delegation Provision") Relying on the literal language contained within the four corners of the "agreements" and my signature, the Respondents asked that Judge Castel uphold the contracts. In my Opposition, filed on March 21, 2011,1 stated at the outset: "[T]he arbitration agreements on its face appear reasonable. However, when scrutinized flirther[,] one will notice that the terms [pertaining to "discrimination" and "retaliation"] are unconscionable and are in direct violation o f Section 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." [Claimant 0pp. Arbitration, 3-4] I raised a very narrow challenge: I f it could be established by employment discrimination law that the drafter and/or issuer of an arbitration agreement had a flagrant "pattern and [existing] practice" of engaging in intentional racial discrimination towards African Americans and other minorities - a violation o f Section 1981, Title V I I , NYSHRL and NYCHRL - are the provisions which state that "discrimination" and "retaliation" claims must be arbitrated "unconscionable" to the African American who signs the agreement and is unaware that no other African Americans exist in the workplace? I then answered that question in the affirmative by presenting a substantial amount of historical, statistical and circumstantial evidence to establish that the language within the arbitration agreements were substantively and procedurally unconscionable, as well as tainted with illegality due to the company's unlawful, immoral and unethical discriminatory practices, policies and procedures. [Claimant 0pp. Arbitration, 3-12.] First, I demonstrated that "discrimination" is only "applicable to race, color and/or national origin" by analyzing William Morris' historical treatment of other protected groups (e.g. sex, religion and age). Second, I argued that because of the modern day "inexorable zero," the "terms, conditions or privileges" were unequal based on the employee's race, color and/or national origin because statistically, it was "impossible for White employees at William Morris to be discriminated against on the basis o f their race, color and/or national origin because Whites were significantly overrepresented" in the workplace. [Claimant. 0pp. Arbitration 5-6, 11; Claimant SDNY Complaint % 7, 37, Exhibit C ] Furthermore, I provided specific evidence spanning eight decades which showed William Morris' racial animus and discriminatory "state of mind" in order to demonstrate that the company has always been conscious "of their issues of racism and discrimination, both internally and externally," yet have remained intent on maintaining a discriminatory organizational structure, institutional practices and a work culture defined along racial lines to exclude qualified minorities from employment and advancement opportunities. [Claimant 0pp. Arbitration, 7-8] I then demonstrated that procedural unconscionability existed due to William Morris' superior bargaining power over its employees, the one-sidedness of the contract's oppressive terms, lack o f meaningful choice and other explanations showing that the contract only benefited the Respondents. [Claimant 0pp. Arbitrafion, 11-13] I also argued that the Agreements were also signed under "undue influence and economic duress" as a condition of employment and a condition to remain employed. [Claimant 0pp. Arbitrafion, 13-15.] Thus, I concluded that the unconscionable provisions within the Agreements were "highly deceptive" and I believed that the Arbitration Agreements were a pretext and "sav^'y legal loophole" for William Morris to continue engaging in its egregious discriminatory practices, policies and procedures without the scrutiny of both the Court and the public. [Claimant 0pp. Motion 3-12; Claimant SDNY Complaint ^\, 55, 62-67.] Without providing one iota of evidence that could dispute my claims, the Respondents continued to employ empty rhetoric in their Reply filed on April 5, 2011, stating that my "opposition [was] filled with outrageous, selfcontradictory, and utterly unsubstantiated allegations about WME and its employees." [Res. Rep. Arbitration, 2.] They then isolated my third claim and misapplied case law to say that my signature was not signed "under undue influence and economic duress." [Res. Rep. Arbitration, 3 ] On July 20, 2011, Judge Castel granted the Respondents' motion by staying the case, pending arbitration. ("Stay Order") Nowhere in his order is there any mention of William Morris' 112 year pattern and practice of unlawful discrimination which existed before 1 signed the mandatory, pre-dispute contract nor was there any discussion of Congress' intent in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in his section titled "Congressional Intent." Therefore, he concluded that "[b]ecause the Delegation Provision is enforceable and the Agreement sets forth clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties intent to arbitrate issues of arbitrability, plaintiffs other arguments are for the arbitrator to decide." [Stay Order, 15.] As a result of intentionally ignoring my arguments, the proper context in which to determine unconscionability was lost -2-

and the historical, statistical and circumstantial evidence establishing intentional systemic disparate treatment against African Americans was treated as if it were insignificant and inconsequential. On September 28, 2011,1 submitted an expedited Motion with the Second Circuit to appeal the erroneous decision of Judge Castel. I argued the following: 1.) Judge Castel ignored my argument entirely, omitted pertinent facts and applied the wrong legal standard by failing to incorporate antidiscrimination law within the framework of the Federal Arbitration Act to determine unconscionability of the "discrimination" and "retaliation" provisions located in William Morris' Arbitration Agreements; 2.) there was an "extraordinary public interest" that this case remain in the Southern District of New York to address insidious and institutional racism in the American workplace, the ineffectiveness of the Civil .Rights Act of 1964 and additional civil and human rights laws in eradicating these intentional barriers, and how Hollywood's cabal-like practices play a direct role in perpetuating racism through powerful mediums of persuasion and influence such as television and film; and 3.) further delay would create additional irreparable harm given my dire economic circumstances and deteriorating health. I concluded the motion by introducing a small portion of evidence which strongly suggested that the real reason why my appeal was before the Second Circuit, was due to the extreme bias, prejudice and impropriety of both federal judges assigned to the case, thus forcing me to seek the disqualification of both Judge Castel and Magistrate Judge James C. Francis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 and 2106. The Respondents' submitted their opposition on October 7, 2011 and argued: 1.) it is "well-established" that "the Federal Arbitration Act does not create a right to appeal interlocutory orders compelling arbitration"; 2.) procedurally, the Second Circuit has no jurisdiction to hear this appeal because I didn't receive permission from the District Court to appeal this "unappealable order"; (3) my motion was "moot" because there was no "good cause" shown; and 4.) my "reckless claims" of "collusion between Judge Castel and Judge Francis" were "wholly unsubstantiated." On October 17, 2011, I submitted my reply which direcfiy countered their arguments. Instead of providing an objective and well-reasoned judicial opinion. Judges Lynch, Hall and Chin issued a one-sided, five sentence decision on December 13, 2011 which mirrored the two main arguments of the Respondents. In their oneparagraph decision upholding Judge Castel's Stay Order, the Court stated that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal, and flirther denied the appeal as "moot." On December 27, 2011, I submitted my Emergency Petition for Rehearing, Rehearing En Banc and/or Petition for a Writ of Mandamus ("Petition for Rehearing") to demonstrate that given the exceptional circumstances o f the appeal and the "strong public interest" of the case, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the collateral order doctrine and the All Writs Act, codified as 28 U.S.C. §1651, each supported "immediate appellate review" of Judge Castel's decision even i f "non-final" orders were typically "unappealable." On February 3, 2012 this appeal was denied without reason or explanation. No judicial opinion was provided. In January 2012,1 read an article on CNN titled "Corruption in Our Courts" which discussed the history of racial injustice throughout the U.S. judicial system and shed light on a sinister conspiracy that took place in Rowe Entertainment et al. v. William Morris Agency et al. (98-8272). In 1998, a class of black concert promoters, including Leonard Rowe (head of the Black Promoters Association) filed a $700 million lawsuit in the Southern District of New York alleging racial discrimination, as well as antitrust violations pursuant to federal and state laws. According to Mr. Rowe, his former attorneys of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal LLP ("SNR") (now known as Dentons LLP) conspired with counsel for the Defendants - which included Michael P. Zweig of Loeb & Loeb LLP - to conceal smoking gun evidence obtained during discovery. This evidence consisted of the racial slur summary results list ("Exhibit 31") and its underlying e-mails, which showed executives from both the William Morris Agency and Creative Artists Agency ("CAA") referring to African Americans as "nigger," "nigga," "coon," "monkey," "Uncle Tom" and other racially derogatory' terms hundreds of times. Miraculously, Mr. Rowe discovered "Exhibit 31" on the desk of his former attorney Raymond Heslin. Although the class of black concert promoters paid Electronic Evidence Discovery ("EED") (now known as Documents Technology, Inc. or "DTT' ) $200,000.00 to conduct this search in or around September 2002, the underlying e-mails were never produced to the black concert promoters or the Court. On January 5, 2005, Judge Patterson deemed "Exhibit 31" to be an "unidentified and unauthenticated document" and prevented a jury from deciding "genuine issues of material fact" by granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. A few months after reading the article, I discovered that, Mr. Rowe -

now a pro se litigant - filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 Motion to have his case reopened due to "fraud upon the Court" on March 2, 2012. On May 3, 2012,1 filed an Expedited Motion to Recall Mandate, Vacate Improvident Order and Articulate Reasoning in the Form of a Judicial Opinion, Pending the Filing and Disposition o f a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. ("Motion to Recall") This Motion challenged the second part of the Second Circuit's erroneous decision: mootness. I demonstrated that according to the applicable law, neither "personal stake mootness," nor "issue mootness" existed with my appeal. Additionally, I requested that the Second Circuit articulate its reasoning in the form of a "judicial opinion" i f they were going to ignore the law and uphold Judge Castel's clearly erroneous Stay Order, so that I would have a fair opportunity to argue against their decision in my pending petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. I also presented the newly acquired informafion regarding Rowe to the Court to fijrther support my beliefs that a "pattern" of fi-aud, corruption and collusion existed with the unethical attorneys and law firm representing the Respondents and raised additional claims that William Morris and Hollywood's monopolistic and anticompetitive practices against African Americans and people of color have also violated federal and state antitrust law under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 el seq. and Donnelly Act, General Business Law §§ 340 et seq. As a result, I argued that "[t]hese compelling arguments should have demonstrated to an impartial Court that not only were the 'discrimination' and 'retaliation' provision[s] unconscionable and tainted with illegality, but arbitration was an inappropriate forum to achieve the public policy objectives of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and various other statutes." [Claimant Recall Mandate, 10.] In the Appellees' Oppositional Mofion filed on May 16, 2012, the word "moot" was mentioned once and used in a footnote. Instead of countering the substantial case law that I presented to the Court, they instead argued that no "exceptional circumstances" were raised to warrant recalling the mandate. Also, the Respondents never specifically acknowledged or denied any of the allegations concerning their involvement in concealing smoking gun evidence in Rowe. On May 23, 2012, the Second Circuit prematurely ruled in favor of the Appellees without allowing me a chance to submit a reply and for the third time in nine months, refused to provide a written judicial opinion. After helping Leonard Rowe obtain possession of "Exhibit 3 1 " on May 15, 2012, See Exhibit A, I submitted my fourth appeal, titled Emergency Petition for Rehearing En Banc to Introduce Evidence o f Appellees' Corrupt Conspiracy to Collude and Commit "Fraud Upon the Court," And Additional Request to Vacate Improvident Order and Impose Sanctions Against Michael Zweig, Loeb & Loeb LLP and William Morris Endeavor Entertainment on June 6, 2012. ("Fraud Upon the Court Petition") I argued that this smoking-gun evidence "confirm[ed] that the arguments raised throughout the [Respondents'] various Motions [in Washington were] frivolous, legally insufficient and made in considerable 'bad faith.'" The remainder of the pefition demonstrated "why the Second Circuit - and not the Supreme Court as erroneously stated by the Appellees - should have decided 'whether the District Court acted appropriately in enforcing the parties' binding arbitration agreement' since my appeal was not 'moot' and the Court had jurisdiction to consider the appeal." [Claimant Fraud Upon the Court Petition, 2-3] As a result of the "pattern" of unethical and unlawful conduct engaged in by Michael Zweig, Christian Carbone, Loeb & Loeb LLP and other officers of the Court, I asked that monetary and disciplinary sanctions, including Michael P. Zweig's disbarment, be imposed. On June 12, 2012,1 received a "Non Jurisdiction" letter from the Clerk of Court, along with my returned petition. This act constituted a complete obstruction of justice and flirther denied me due process and equal protecfion under the law. I decided against filing a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, and instead, filed my Demand for Arbitration with the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") on June 15, 2012. In addition to filing the Demand, I included ten key pleadings and exhibits that were filed with the federal court. Unaware that I submitted "Exhibit 31" and nine other documents to the A A A , the Respondents continued to submit vexatious pleadings in extreme "bad faith" and denied all claims in their Answer and Counterclaims on July 30, 2012. As a result, I filed for summary judgment on August 15, 2012 and stressed that before the merits of my case were decided, the arbitrator first had to determine the issues surrounding the arbitration agreement's enforceability and/or whether or not arbitration was an appropriate forum for this case to effectuate the greater public policy goals of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and additional statutes, pursuant to the 2009 Arbitrafion Agreement and Judge Castel's

July 20, 2011 Stay Order. During a conference call with Arbitrator Gregory on August 24, 2012, both parties agreed that they were amendable to having this matter resolved solely through motion practice.^ On November 6, 2012, the .Respondents submitted their Opposition and Cross Motion to Dismiss. On January 31, 2013, I submitted a 97-page reply (not including Exhibits A through AA) in support of my Motion for Summary Judgment. Based on newly discovered information contained in the November 8, 2012 decision of Judge Patterson denying Mr. Rowe's FRCP 60 Motion, I demonstrated that although "Exhibit 31" was deemed "unidentified and unauthenticated," "irrelevant" and "inadmissible" by Judge Patterson in his January 5, 2005 decision, William Morris, Loeb & Loeb LLP and/or Michael P. Zweig were in possession of hundreds of concealed e-mails that pertained to this document. I stated: "To come full circle and explicitly make the connection as to why the underlying e-mails to "Exhibit 31" need to be produced: this "smoking gun" evidence will prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the allegations made in both discrimination and antitrust cases against William Morris." [Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 87,] As a result, 1 argued that if the underlying e-mails to "Exhibit 31" were not produced, the arbitration agreement should be deemed unconscionable and the case should be allowed to proceed in the federal court or default judgment should be granted in my favor on all claims. On March 13, 2013, the Respondents submitted a 20 page reply to their Cross Motion to Dismiss. In regards to "Exhibit 31," they argued that this document "ha[d] already been discredited by a Federal court and is wholly irrelevant to Washington's claims." [Resp. Rep. Cross Motion Dismiss, 17.] On April 18, 2013, Arbitrator Gregory issued his first Interim Decision. See Exhibit B. He asked both parties to provide more information regarding "Exhibit 31," wanting to "know what Exhibit A is, and who authored it. Is it genuine? Is it relevant? I want to know the context." [April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 11.] Unlike Judge Patterson, Arbitrator Gregory then compelled William Morris, Loeb & Loeb LLP and/or Michael P. Zweig to produce the concealed, underlying e-mails that were to accompany "Exhibit 31." He stated, " I am persuaded that a particular document ["Exhibit 31" and the underlying e-mails are] critically important and should be produced and truthfully explained by both parties to the extent that they are realistically able to do so."^ [April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 5.] Additionally, he stated: "Claimant may stand in political solidarity with Mr. Leonard Rowe but Claimant is not foreclosed by judicial decisions regarding Mr. Rowe's past proceedings...I do not find Judge Patterson's decision regarding Exhibit A in the Rowe matter to have res judicata or collateral estoppel or other preclusive influence on the status of Exhibit A in this arbitration." [April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 14.] He concluded and warned that " i f the above memos [were] not forthcoming, [he would] be amendable to drawing adverse inferences." [April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 13.] The Respondents' request for a protective order was also denied. On June 14, 2013, both parties submitted their replies to the arbitrator's April 18, 2013 Interim Decision. In a 12 page, double-spaced reply, which included exhibits totaling 296 pages (mostly copies of motions and judicial opinions from Rowe), the Respondents argued that they: 1.) "never received or saw any such 1998-99 emails, as allegedly referenced by ["Exhibit 31"]"; 2.) "ha[d] no reason to believe such emails exist or even existed"; and 3.) ' "During this conference call. Arbitrator Gregory stated that he did not have authority to remove Loeb & Loeb LLP as representation for the Respondents although I raised claims that Zweig and Carbone were engaging in systematic pattern and practice of serious [unjethical and criminal conduct on William Morris' behalf However, [Arbitrator Gregory] did state that in order to 'guarantee the integrity of the arbitration,' if I continued to persist in making these allegations against Respondents' counsel, I would be 'entitled' to have that 'issue resolved' by the courts because he did not have the authority to do so. In Michael's delusional mind, these were 'ad hominem attacks' and responded, ' I ' l l state for the record that the allegations and accusations [of unethical and criminal conduct] are absolutely false, scurrilous and disreputable.' Regarding his involvement in the corrupt conspiracy to commit "fraud upon the Court" in Rowe he stated: 'It appears that he claims - I would note that without any personal knowledge or any knowledge at all - that somehow, everyone conspired against the plaintiffs in that case to effectuate the result of a summary dismissal. Obviously, those allegations are wholly false and beneath my dignity to respond to.' Eight months later, your Interim Decision suggests otherwise." [Claimant Rep. April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, footnote 2 5 ] Elsewhere in the Interim Decision, Arbitrator Gregory states: " I would prefer the production of the original documents constituting Exhibit A" [April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 12.] and " I assume that Respondents are the custodians of the email and other communication archival records." [April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 13.] -5-

"notwithstanding Washington's false assertion, never received copies of such emails from the Rowe plaintiffs, their attorneys or their e-discovery expert ("EED") during the Rowe Litigation, or at any time thereafter" [pg. 2.] As a result, they claimed that there were "no such emails to be 'produced' by WME or its counsel." [pg. 3.] In my 31 page, single-spaced reply (not including Exhibits A through CC), I presented a pyramid of clear and convincing evidence spanning ten years which demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that "Exhibit 31" was authentic, and explained in detail why this document was relevant to all of my claims, including the allegations that William Morris, Loeb & Loeb LLP and Michael P. Zweig were engaging in a "pattern" of "conspiracy, collusion and fraud, thus violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), as codified, 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., the Organized Crime Control Act ("OCCA"), as codified N.Y. Penal Law § 460.00 et seq.; 18 U.S.C. 1506 which addresses tampering with evidence in a federal case, obstruction of justice and additional laws." [Claimant Fraud Upon the Court Petition, 16-17.] On July 15, 2013, Arbitrator Gregory issued his second Interim Decision.^ Making little to no mention of the pyramid of evidence I presented which established "Exhibit 3 r s " authenticity. Arbitrator Gregory stated for the second time: "In this case before me at this Arbitration, I continue to need to know more about proposed Exhibit A. The parties' assessments of Exhibit .A dramatically vary, to say the least. The author(s) have not been definitively identified. I still want to know who authored it. Is it genuine? Is it relevant?" [July 15, 2013 Interim Decision, 12.] As a result of this alleged "continually troubling indeterminacy" regarding "potentially very important possible evidence ("Exhibit A")," he compelled William Morris to produce the underlying e-mails to "Exhibit 31" for a second time. [July 15, 2013 Interim Decision, 3.] He then claimed that before he would be able to make a decision on whether or not the arbitration agreement should be enforced and/or i f arbitration was an appropriate forum for this case to achieve the public policy goals of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, both parties should conduct discovery exclusively pertaining to "Exhibit 31" for two months, followed by an oral hearing held at the A A A no later than December 10, 2013. He cited Rivera v. Rochester and Genesee Regional Transportation Authority. F 3d, No. 11-762 (December 21, 2012) as precedential authority to support his new claim that absent a hearing, "employment law issues rendered solely via Summary Judgment papers" was not appropriate for this case. [July 15, 2013 Interim Decision, 3.]

11.

Given That the Respondents Produced None of the E-Mails Received From Electronic Evidence Discovery and Intentionally Failed to Comply With the

Arbitrator's April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, Any Further Discovery Re: "Exhibit 31" Should Be Made In A Public Court of Law Due to the Adverse Inference That Should Have Been Created Due to Respondents' Contempt. [There's Little to No Mention of Claimant's Pyramid of Evidence Used to Authenticate "Exhibit 31"! In a strange turn of events, after submitting extensive motions and pleadings to the AAA in
support of my claim that the arbitration agreement I signed as a condition of employment should not be enforced due to historical, statistical, circumstantial and other forms of compelling evidence demonstrating William Morris' 115 year pattern and continuing practice of engaging in unlawful discrimination against African Americans and other people of color. Arbitrator Gregory now suggests that it will take another five months (potentially) before he will be able to make a decision on this issue. For the following reasons discussed below, no fijrther discovery pertaining to "Exhibit 31" should be had in this proceeding due to the adverse inference that should have been created against the Respondents for failing to produce any of the e-mails received from EED. Furthermore, based on the cumulative

Ahhough the date on the Arbitrator's second Interim Decision reads July 12, 2013 and both parties received the decision on July 16, 2013,1 was told by A A A Case Manager Carol Placella on July 17, 2013 that Arbitrator Gregory e-mailed the decision to A A A on July 15, 2013. -6-

evidence that has been provided, a "final" decision should be made to prevent fijrther harmful delay.'* See Exhibit C. In your July 15, 2013 Interim Decision, you state once again: " . . . I continue to need to know more about proposed Exhibit A. The parties' assessments of Exhibit A dramatically vary, to say the least. The author(s) have not been definitively identified. I still want to know who authored it. Is it genuine? Is it relevant?" [July 15, 2013 Interim Decision. 12.] Cumulatively, both parties submitted more than 500 pages of testimony and documentary evidence in an attempt to answer questions raised in your April 18, 2013 Interim Decision regarding the authenticity of "Exhibit 31." In your April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, you stated: "...Claimant may have pertinent relevant information to helpfially elucidate the particulars of Exhibit A." This was true and I presented this "pertinent relevant information" to you, however, you make little to no mention it in your July 15, 2013 Interim Decision. After spending two months collecting discovery and weighing the competing and sometimes conflicting testimony of five parties involved in Rowe - William Morris and CAA (also known as the "Booking Agency Defendants"), Sonnenschein Nath & .Rosenthal, the Willie Gary Firm (now known as The Gary Law Group), Leonard Rowe and Judge Robert P. Patterson - my Reply unequivocally answered all of the questions you falsely claim remain unanswered.' [Claimant Rep. April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 3.] Although the Respondents claim that they "have no reason to believe such e-mails [pertaining to "Exhibit 31"] exist or even existed," the following facts which are discussed in my Reply cannot be disputed at this stage of the proceeding: 1.) attorneys from SNR hired and the class of black concert promoters paid Electronic Evidence Discovery (now known as Documents Technology, Inc.) $200,000.00 to search and retrieve e-mails from the hard drives of William Morris and CAA in or around September 2002 [pg. 6-7.]; 2.) Charles Kellner, former Eastern Region Vice President of EED, stated in his October 26, 2001 Affidavit: "For cases in which e-mail production involve[d] a large volume of responsive materials, E E D favorledl processing, electronic review and production in native digital format., rather than printing to paper." (emphasis added) [pg. 4.]; 3.) Kellner additionally stated: " E E D routinely gives its clients the ability to search and review on-line millions of e-mails and other computer files in a completely secure manner, without any need for T I F F conversion. E-mail produced in this fashion can easily be printed with a bates number, or confidentiality stamp." (emphasis added) [pg. 4 ]; 4 ) between January and December 2002, SNR (via attorney Richard Primoff) exclusively conducted electronic discovery on behalf of the class of black concert promoters; 5.) In an e-mail dated August 14, 2002, SNR attorney Richard Primoft" provided the names of 10 music Agents employed at William Morris and CAA that he intended on searching. He then stated, "with respect to periods being examined, plaintiffs will restore and retrieve all email communications between and/or among these users" and provided the Defendants with a list of more than 60 search terms, including words like "black promoter," "[list of racial slurs]," "antitrust" and others (emphasis added) [pg. 6.] See Exhibit D.; 6.) Magistrate Judge Francis' e-discovery protocol was violated when SNR allowed EED to provide the Booking Agency Defendants with the results of the search first in order to assert privilege [pg. 6.]; 7.) On the day the search results were received, SNR informed Mr. Leonard Rowe that no derogatory terms were found [pg. 7.]; 6.) A few weeks later, during a meeting at the New York offices of SNTl, Leonard Rowe discovered

* In the process o f writing this motion. Christian Carbone submitted an e-mail to the AAA on July 24, 2013 stating: "We do request that Arbitrator Gregory proceed with and decide the motions for summary judgment, a process to which both parties have consented. We respectfijlly submit that under the prevailing Second Circuit standard for summary judgment, and the status of the parties' respective submissions, there is no disputed issue of material fact and summary judgment would be permissible in these circumstances." ^ "Based on the pyramid of evidence and totality of circumstances I've presented throughout all of my motions, it is without question that "Exhibit 31" is a genuine and authentic document obtained by SNR in or around September of 2002 - surreptitiously or not - as a result of Electronic Evidence Discovery's search into the databases of two of Hollywood's biggest talent agencies - the William Morris Agency and Creative Artists Agency." [Reply to April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 12.] -7-

"Exhibit 31" on the desic of attorney Raymond Heslin [pg. 7]; 8.) Although SNR faxed "Exhibit 31" to Mr. Rowe's co-counsel, the Willie Gary Firm, on October 15, 2002, SNR never provided the Gary Firm with the underlying emails to "Exhibit 31" [pg. 7 ] ; 9.) On October 29. 2002. "[alfter reviewing the e-mails produced by E E D , counsel for WMA. Helen Gavaris fof Loeb & Loeb LLP1. provided Plaintiffs with hard copies of the e-mails that WMA regarded as 'nonresponsive' and designated as 'attornevs-eyes [sic] only.' as well as a privileged log indicating the e-mails WMA designated as privileged." (emphasis added) [pg 8 ] See Exhibit E.; 10) On December 4. 2002. Helen Gavaris sent another letter to Richard Primoff stating: "We received today a C D containing the Lotus Notes e-mails from E E D . which reflects the deletions of all documents listed on our privilege log and two non-responsive logs. We have instructed Geoff Bogie to release this CD to you." And on December 10, 2002, Helen Gavaris stated: "We received today a CD containing the Macintosh e-mails from E E D , which reflects the deletions of all documents listed on our privilege log and non-responsive logs. We have instructed Geoff Bogie to release this CD to you." (emphasis added) [pg 8.] See Exhibit F.; 11.) In violation of Magistrate Judge Francis' e-discovery protocol, SNR never provided William Morris or CAA with emails they felt were material to the litigation, in "hard copy with bates stamps." This was later cited by the Defendants as a reason for why "Exhibit 31" was an "unauthenticated" document, [pg. 8.]; 12.) On January 22, 2003, Leonard Rowe received a memorandum from Jose G. Baquero of Electronic Evidence Discovery stating that "[t]his shipment consists of 1 box of printed W M A and CAA Non-Privileged Racial Slur emails and their respective attachments in the Rowe matter." [pg. 14.] See Exhibit G.; and 13.) The e-mails o f only ten music Agents were supposed to have been searched. "Exhibit 31" contains more than 195 user names of various W M A and CAA employees and departments. Majority of the usernames are non-music Agents - individuals and departments the class of black concert promoters did not know. [pg. 14.] In addition to these facts, 1 provided more than 20 additional reasons explaining why "Exhibit 31" was an authentic document and that a conspiracy took place in Rowe to conceal this smoking-gun evidence from reaching a jury. See Exhibit H . None of the testimony or documentary evidence presented in the Respondents' reply refuted these facts. In flirther attempt to create the false impression in the reader's mind that lingering questions still remain concerning the authenticity of "Exhibit 31," you state: "... ("Exhibit A") may be more thoroughly and, hopefliUy, finally resolved by sworn testimony in a hearing."^ (emphasis added) [July 15, 2013 Interim Decision, 3-4.] This is false because sworn testimony has already been provided. You, however, make no mention of the fact that I included the four Declarations of Leonard Rowe's former attorneys at SNR and the June 13, 2013 Affidavit o f Mr. Rowe in my Reply. Like Judge Patterson in his November 8, 2012 Order which denied Leonard Rowe's FRCP 60 Motion as being "meritless" and "based on nothing more than hot air and paranoid suspicions," you also make no

"By pure fortuitous circumstance in another case (Rowe) more than a decade ago, the "N-word" list was inadvertenfiy seen on the desk of SNR [Sonnenschein, Nath, and Rosenthal] attorney Raymond Heslin." [July 15, 2013 Interim Decision, 8.] ^ "The Fax I D on 'Exhibit 31' is the biggest indicator of who sent the Gary Firm this document. It's completely consistent with Leonard Rowe's testimony. I retrieved various faxes from the record submitted by Leonard Rowe's former attorneys - before and after RubinBaum LLP merged with Sonnenschein to become Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP in or around May 2002. Before September 19, 2002, Sonnenschein's fax ID header still contained RubinBaum LLP's information. By October 11, 2002, the fax ID read: 'SNR New York.' 'Exhibit 3 1 ' was faxed on October 15, 2002 and it appears identical to October l l " ' and November 1, 2002 faxes I obtained, the latter fax being a partial copy of the settlement agreement that was between the class of black concert promoters and Monterey Peninsula Artists ("MP A"). The Respondents also made this observation in the Reply to their Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs filed on June 6, 2005. In footnote 18, they state: ' A closer examination of Exhibit 31 reveals a facsimile line at the top of all pages from "SNR" which, we believe, refers to Sonnenschein, Nath and Rosenthal. Thus, it would appear that Sonnenschein prepared this document in violation of the Court's Order.' It is without question that the Gary Firm could have only received 'Exhibit 31' from SNR...and SNR could have only received 'Exhibit 31' from Electronic Evidence Discovery." [Claimant's Reply to April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 13.] ^ Arbitrator Gregory also states: "The possible testimony of Messrs. Raymond Heslin, Esq. and Mr. Leonard Rowe seems essential in clarifying the chain of custody and control regarding Exhibit A." [July 15, 2013 Interim Decision, 12.] However, my Reply answers any questions regarding the chain of custody and control regarding Exhibit 31. -8-

mention of the four perjurious Declarations of Mr. Rowe's former attorneys from SNR that were submitted to the Southern District of New York between May 14-15, 2012. Knowing that Mr. Rowe did not have possession of "Exhibit 31" at the time of filing his FRCP 60 Motion, these unethical attorneys continued to state that "no derogatory terms were located in the emails of the defendants" and that "the email production Plaintiffs received from defendants yield[ed] nothing of use in proving Plaintiffs' case against Defendants." [Claimant Rep. April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 11.] Based on the fact that "Exhibit 31" was faxed from the New York office SNR and sent to the Willie Gary Firm on October 15, 2002, the perjurious Declarations of Mr. Rowe's former attorneys demonstrate that this conspiracy to interfere with the civil rights of African Americans^, is still "on-going." [Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 10-17.] Regarding Leonard Rowe's sworn testimony, you incorrectly state that this Affidavit was produced from "another proceeding." Without question, this is false. See Exhibit 1. This Affidavit was created specifically in response to your April 18, 2013 Interim Decision.'" Had this Affidavit and additional evidence been discussed throughout your July 15, 2013 Interim Decision, it's obvious that a "final" decision should have been made regarding my motion for summary judgment.

[Adverse Inference Should Have Been Created Due To Respondents' Contempt] Ahhough you vaguely stated that you were "amenable to drawing adverse inferences" i f your various requests weren't complied with, 1 find it strange that no adverse inference was made after the Respondents failed to produce anj; of the e-mails, compact discs (CDs) or privilege logs acquired during electronic discovery after being compelled to do so in your April 18, 2013 Interim Decision and they continued to refer to the deceptively wriften opinions of Judge Patterson, although you stated that you did "not find that Judge Patterson's decision regarding Exhibit A in the Rowe matter to have res judicata or collateral estoppel or other preclusive influence on the status of Exhibit A in this arbitration." [April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 13-14.] The pyramid of evidence that I presented supported that it is quite possible that under the direction of SNR, EED conducted two or more searches on the hard drives of William

When Congress first enacted the conspiratorial provision of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (now § 1985(3)), it was created to punish individuals v/ho engaged in collective action to deprive blacks and Republicans of their federal rights. Today, Section 1985(3) prohibits conspiracies undertaken "for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection under the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws" and provides for "an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators." 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). To state a cause of action under § 1985, a plaintiff must allege "(1) a conspiracy (2) for the purpose of depriving a person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or the equal privileges and immunities under the lava's; (3) an overt act in fijrtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to the plaintiffs person or property, or a deprivation of a right or privilege of a citizen of the United States." Thomas v. Roach. 165 F.3d 137, 146 (2d Cir. 1999). A plaintiff must also allege that the conspiracy was motivated by "some racial or perhaps other\vise class based, invidious discriminatory animus." Id. {quoting Mian v. Donaldson. Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp.. 7 F.3d 1085, 1088 (2d Ch.l993)). [Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 15-16.] In the first paragraph of Leonard Rowe's Affidavit, he states: " I , Leonard Rowe, have been a concert promoter for 37 years I am fully familiar with the matters set forth herein and respectfully submit this Affidavit in support of the Claimant's reply to the Arbitrator's Interim Decision which requests more information concerning "Exhibit 31," and most importantly, compels the Respondents to produce the underlying emails which contain racially inflammatory language in reference to African .Americans by executives and other employees at two of Hollywood's biggest and most influential talent agencies in not only Hollywood, but throughout the world - the William Morris Agency (now known as William Morris Endeavor Entertainment) and Creative Artists Agency ("CAA"). Aside from the corrupt attorneys involved in this conspiracy to interfere with the civil rights of myself and all individuals of African descent, I am probably the most knowledgeable person that can discuss this document and vouch for its authenticity. I personally paid S200,000.00 for this evidence to be retrieved during the electronic discovery phase of my case, but the underlying emails have been concealed from me and the court for nearly eleven years by my former attorneys, Michael Zweig, Loeb & Loeb LLP, and others in a conspiracy that is still on-going. In the interests of justice, these emails must be brought forward and all involved in this sinister conspiracy must finally be held accountable for their egregious and morally reprehensible actions." (emphasis added) -9-

Morris and CAA. Even i f SNR liad EED "surreptitiously" search the hard drives o f William Morris and CAA, that's irrelevant to my case. This theory can only be proven or refuted by William Morris, Loeb & Loeb LLP and/or Michael P. Zweig's production of any and all e-mails received by EED, along with the compact discs (CDs), privilege logs and additional documents exclusively in their possession. As stated in my Reply, the usernames that appear on "Exhibit 31" were not the usernames that the class of black concert promoters asked their attorneys at SNR to search. [Claimant Rep. April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 14, 16, 23-25.] Based on the documentary evidence - e-mails and letters between SNR attorney Richard Primoff and counsel for William Morris and CAA in August 2002 - only 10 usernames were supposed to be searched. See Exhibit D. Yet, the 195-plus usernames that appear on the current version of "Exhibit 31" - which is mysteriously missing two pages - reflect that this did not happen. Given that William Morris, Creative Artists Agency and their counsel received the e-mails from EED before SNR, sent SNR physical copies of non-responsive e-mails and never raised any objections to the usernames that were searched, William Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP should have produced the e-mails obtained by EED to confirm that the e-mails of music Agents Peter Grosslight, Cara Lewis, Richard Rosenberg, Jeff Frasco, and Shelly Shultz were actually searched as claimed - especially since allegations were made that William Morris and its counsel engaged in conspiracy, fraud upon the Court and serious unethical and criminal conduct in an effort to conceal this evidence.'' I have reason to believe that these e-mails were never searched because i f "Exhibit 31" is in fact the resuhs of a "master search," why does "Exhibit 31" include the names of a few music Agents from CAA, but none of the music Agents from WMA? I have demonstrated that Michael P. Zweig's words can only be trusted with a grain of salt. For that reason, Zweig's testimony regarding "Exhibit 31" can never be believed to be truthfijl without producing any of the e-mails and other documents that were retrieved by Electronic Evidence Discovery. After asking the Respondents to come clean about "Exhibit 31" and they continued to stick to their most prized alibi,'"' an adverse inference should have been created against the

"Upon closer inspection of the names that appear on "Exhibit 31," I \M\\\e in the next section that it's quite possible that SNR surreptitiously had EED conduct two or more searches on the hard drives of William Morris and CAA and that "Exhibit 31" contained the results of a "master" or hill search of W M A and CAA's backup t (although none of the five W M A music Agents names appear). It's also quite possible that SNR never received the actual e-mails to "Exhibit 31." That doesn't change the fact that the underlying e-mails to "Exhibit 31" do exist and that William Morris should be responsible for paying the costs of having these documents produced during discovery of this case i f the arbitration agreement is enforced or summary judgment isn't granted in my favor." Claimant Reply April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 16.] ' "What's strange is that out of the five W M A music Agents that were agreed to be searched - Peter Grosslight, Cara Lewis, Richard Rosenberg, Jeff Frasco and Shelly Schultz - zero are listed on "Exhibit 31." EED, like any company hired to conduct electronic discovery, only searched the e-mails of those they were ordered to and delivered the resuhs accordingly. Given that the Respondents didn't raise any objections to the names listed on the e-mails that were provided to them before SNR had an opportunity to view them, William Morris, Loeb & Loeb LLP and Michael Zweig should produce the e-mails, and compact discs (CDs) they received, as well as privilege logs, because it should only contain the names of the five Agents that were "agreed" on. Given that "Exhibit 31" appears to be the resuhs of an exhaustive search and these five names are not on this list, I have reason to believe the e-mails of Lewis, Grosslight and the three other music Agents were not searched at all. SNR also never raised any objections that none of these Agents were searched after taking $200,000.00 from the black concert promoters to pay EED for this search. Therefore, it will be very interesting to see which Agent's names appear on the e-mails that William Morris has been compelled to produce." [Reply to April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 23-24.] "In a conspiracy of this caliber, there are going to be many unanswered questions. Fortunately, I don't have to provide all of the pieces of the puzzle to this criminal conspiracy in arbitration, nor would I attempt to try because only those involved know what really happened. It is clear that the inconsistent and contradictory testimony provided by the Respondents and their co-conspirators over the last decade is not credible and cannot be accepted as truth." [Claimant Rep. April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 22.] I explain in my Reply that even though Judge Patterson deemed "Exhibit 31" to be an "unidentified and unauthenticated document," it didn't mean that the document itself was inaulhentic " A n important point to always remember is this: Just because the document was 'unauthenticated,' doesn't mean that "E.xhibit 31" is not genuine or inaiilhenlic. Big difference. The document was deemed an 'inadmissible and unauthenticated document' because the -10-

Respondents and a final decision should have been made. Instead, at my expense, you have harmfijlly delayed this case from being resolved in an expeditious manner by unfairly giving the Respondents yet another opportunity to produce spoliated evidence that attorneys from SNR and counsel for the Booking Agency Defendants have, for eleven years, adamantly maintained doesn't exist.

[By Compelling Respondents to Produce Underlying E-mails to "Exhibit 31" Proves That Spoliation of Evidence & Fraud Occurred in Rowel Due to the immense fraud that occurred in Rowe,
I stated in my Reply that it was "naive" for the arbitrator to believe that the Respondents would produce the underlying e-mails to "Exhibit 31" - even afer being compelled to do so.'' As predicted, I was correct. I f the Respondents vt^ould have produced any of the e-mails pertaining to "Exhibit 31," this would have proven that spoliation of evidence occurred in Rowe. [Claimant Rep. April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 20-21; Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 12-17.] However, the fact still remains that William Morris has and was always in possession of the concealed e-mails that never had the chance to be presented before a jury. "Destroying evidence can destroy fairness and justice, for it increases the risk of an erroneous decision on the merits of the underlying cause o f action." Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1. Spoliation of evidence "offends notions of fair play and substantial justice and therefore, the lav,-, in one way or another, seeks to deter it."'^ It has its roots in the evidentiary doctrine of "adverse presumption," which allows for the presumption that the destroyed evidence contained information detrimental to the party who destroyed the evidence unless such destruction is adequately explained. Little v. Boston Scientific Corp.. 8 So. 3d 591 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2009), writ denied, 6 So. 3d 801 (La. 2009). The intentional spoliation or destruction of evidence relevant to a case raises an inference that the evidence would have been unfavorable. Aramburu v. Boeing Co.. 112F.3d 1398, 1407, 6 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1217, 77 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 238, 71 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ^144836 (10th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he general rule is that bad faith destruction of a document relevant to proof of an issue at trial gives rise to an inference that production of the document would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction."). This presumption or inference arises only when the act was intentional and indicates fraud and a desire to suppress the truth. [Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 12.] Although you may not have realized this at the time of issuing your first Interim Decision, but compelling William Morris, Loeb & Loeb LLP and/or Michael P. Zweig to produce the underlying e-mails to "Exhibh 31" after Judge Patterson denied Mr. Rowe's FRCP 60 Motion to reopen his case, supports the fact that "fraud upon the Court" occurred in Rowe. [Claimant Rep. to April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 17-18.] And it is well established that "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final." Kenner v. C.I.R.. 387 F.3d 689 (1968); see also The People of the State of Illinois v. Fred E. Steriing. 357 111. 354; 192 N E 229 (1934) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to judgments as well as to contracts and other transactions."); Allen F. Moore v. Stanley F. Sievers. 336 III. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters ..."); In re Village of Willowbrook. 37 III. App.2d 393 (1962) ("It is axiomatic that fraud vitiates everything ") (emphasis added).

protocol set forth in Magistrate Judge Francis' January 16, 2002 decision was improperly followed by SNR without the knowledge or consent of the black concert promoters or the Gary Firm. However, that is also irrelevant to my case because I'm not bound by the protocol set forth by Judge Francis. Additionally, your determination that res judicata and collateral estoppel [doesn't] apply fijrther support[s] this fact. Therefore, the fact that the document was deemed 'inadmissible' by a formalist district judge in Rowe. does not mean that "Exhibit 31" is not admissible in Washington." (emphasis in original) [Reply to April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 16.] Nowhere in your most recent Interim Decision is this mentioned. Supra note 4. '^ Rebecca Devlin and Jeffrey M . Pincus. "Spoliation of Evidence: When In Doubt, Don't Throw It Out." Transportation Lavv'yers Association. http://www.lewisjohs.com/pdfs/Spoliation.pdf -11-

[Any Further Discovery re: "Exhibit 31" Should Be Made in Public Court] For various reasons, "Exiiibit 31" serves a number of different purposes for my case as compared with Rowe. Regardless of the e-mail's contents, by simply compelling William Morris to produce this spoliated, smoking gun evidence after Judge Patterson erroneously deemed "Exhibit 31" to be an "unidentified and unauthenticated document," was enough to support my claims of systemic disparate treatment, pre hhing individual disparate treatment and that William Morris and others have engaged in a sinister conspiracy to maintain a race-based monopoly throughout Flollywood, the entertainment industry and the "marketplace of ideas." With regards to my claims of post-hiring individual disparate treatment, the underlying e-mails do not need to be produced since William Morris refused to produce any of the emails and none of the usernames worked in the New York office during my dates of employment. [Claimant Rep. April 18, 2013, 23-25.] Additionally, "Exhibh 31" supported my contention that before the Respondent's Cross Motion to Dismiss could ever be granted, 1 should be allowed discovery to conduct a contemporary electronic search into the e-mails of employees that 1 worked with and William Morris should pay the costs of that additional search. I also presented this evidence to help justify why I am seeking $125 million in damages against William Morris due to their malice and/or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of African Americans and other people of color. [Claimant Rep. April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 16-22; Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 90]
In your July 18, 2013 Interim Decision, you state: " I am...amenable to a more specific, narrow, carefully focused, and cost effective request by Claimant for EED materials (including, but not limited to, emails) within Respondent's custody and control that may helpfully elucidate and answer current and continuing questions regarding Exhibit A." [July 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 11.] You then propose that I conduct depositions with Leonard Rowe and his former attorneys, but this is not necessary because you make no mention of the fact that I have already submitted sworn testimony from those individuals. Furthermore, how successfial do you think a pro se litigant would be conducting depositions involving veteran attorneys who have lied about "Exhibit 31" and its underlying e-mails for nearly eleven years? Just like I got nowhere when I tried to meet and confer or propose stipulations in "good faith" whh the Respondents, trying to conduct these depositions on my ovm will be futile. More likely than not, these attorneys will rely on their attorney-client privilege'' to prevent any fruitflil discussion regarding any ediscovery related matters that took place in Rowe. At this stage in the proceeding, since the Respondents have refused to produce any of the e-mails and additional materials obtained from electronic discovery, no farther discovery pertaining to "Exhibit 31" should be conducted in this privatized judicial forum without first deciding whether or not the arbitration agreement should be enforced."* My reason for concern is only intensified by the fact that after denying the Respondents' request for a protective order in your April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, you have now asked the Respondents to "draft and submit a proposed Protective Order."'^ [April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 8; July 15, 2013 Interim Decision, 14.] I f I am to Ahhough 1 did not include this in my Reply, I made a couple attempts to contact the Willie Gary Firm but was unsuccessful. I did, however, get an opportunity to speak with attorney Bill Campbell on June 6, 2013. Campbell, who is no longer with the Gary Firm, was very hesitant to speak about "Exhibit 31" and mentioned that he couldn't discuss details with me because of "attorney-client privilege." I didn't include this in my Reply because he told me nothing more than I already knew. I have also made numerous attempts to get information from past and current employees from Electronic Evidence Discovery (now known as DTI). Charles Kellner - former Vice President mentioned earlier - was the most helpful, but left the company before EED conducted the search on W M A and CAA's backup tapes. Other employees that I communicated with were Jeff Jacobs - Associate General Counsel and Brandon Leatha. A major reason used by all involved for not being able to provide information about "Exhibit 31" is that discovery occurred more than ten years ago. They would not confirm whether or not "Exhibit 31" mirrored the template for their summary search results. '* In my Reply to Summary Judgment filed on January 31, 2013, I did ask for an expedited discovery to obtain the underlying e-mails to "Exhibit 31" and additional documents exclusively in the possession of William Morris that pertained to my personal suit. This was a strategic decision to prevent my claims from being dismissed erroneously because the Respondents failed to meet their heightened burden of persuasion and production and these documents would demonstrate pretext. In the April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, Arbitrator Gregory stated: "Were h not for the following evidentiary issue [re: "Exhibit 31"], I would have granted the requested protective order in part, i f not in whole." [pg. 9] This is -12-

conduct depositions involving any of the attorneys involved in this corrupt conspiracy, this testimony can't be kept from Leonard Rowe given that this evidence originated from his case. Mr. Rowe paid $200,000.00 to acquire this evidence in Rowe and therefore, this property belongs to him. He has been trying to expose this sinister conspiracy for more than 8 years and now that he has new legal representation that will be filing a complaint against his former attorneys, Michael P. Zweig, Loeb & Loeb LLP and other parties for claims of malpractice, conspiracy, fraud, obstruction of justice and other causes of action, discovery and any subsequent attempts to retrieve this smoking gun evidence should occur in a public forum. Last but not least, due to the criminal actions of those involved, any deposifions and further investigation into this criminal conspiracy to interfere with the civil rights of Afi-ican Americans should be conducted by the US Attorney General, FBI, Department of Justice - Civil Rights Division and other government agencies - not dpro se litigant.

[Enforceability of Arbitration Agreement Has Never Been Dependent on "Exhibit 31"] It is
clear as day that the arbitration agreements I signed as a condition of employment are unconscionable, tainted with illegality and malum in se. However, you mislead the reader into believing that a decision cannot be made on this preliminary matter until after the underlying e-mails to "Exhibit 31" are produced.^" This is false for a number o f reasons. My employment discrimination and antitrust claims have never been reliant on "Exhibit 31.""' I did not know about "Exhibit 31" or any other details surrounding e-discovery in Rowe until 13 months after I filed my complaint with the Southern District of New York and 11 months after I raised this unique defense to the enforceability of William Morris' arbitration agreements. Having never known about "Exhibit 31," Judge Castel stated in his July 20, 2011 Stay Order, that "plaintiffs' other arguments are for arbitrator to decide." [Stay Order, 15.] The conspiracy to conceal "Exhibit 31" and its underlying e-mails only buttresses the fact that Judge Castel should have unenforced the agreement and allowed the case to be decided by a jury. Furthermore, it supports my claims that although I was hired, I worked in an insidiously discriminatory work environment and had no chance to rise above the company's glass ceiling because of my race, color and/or national origin. Had I been White/"Jewish," I would have immediately been hired as an Agent based on my academic and professional accomplishment. See Exhibit J . After discussing my concerns with senior management that I was being "set up to fail" by employees, including Jeff Meade and Sarah Van Hoven in Human Resources, I was told the company "would never" discriminate against people of color and was made to believe that I was the problem. I've demonstrated pretext from a 360 degree angle throughout all of my complaints and motions, particularly my "voluminous" motions for summary judgment, and there's nothing more I should be required to do to receive judgment. As expressed to the Second Circuit, due to the circumstances surrounding both parties entering into this agreement and the uniqueness of my arguments to oppose arbitrating this landmark civil and human rights case, determining unconscionability requires the finder of fact to apply both the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") and Civil Rights Act of 1964, with the latter antidiscrimination statute[s] serving as the "lens" to detennine whether or not the arbitration agreement and/or its provisions should be upheld or whether arbitration was an appropriate forum

contradictory because according to Arbitrator Gregory's July 18, 2013 Interim Decision, evidentiary issues still exist regarding "Exhibit 31." However, he is now willing to grant a protective order after ordering us to conduct discovery and compelling the Respondents to produce the underlying e-mails for a second time. ^° "While rhetorically rich, this language uhimately is merely conclusory rote, however, unless and until the larger factual context explicates Claimant's adjectival cascade with tangible, credible, objective facts sufficient to authenticate "Exhibit A" and establish its relevance." [July 15, 2013 Interim Decision, 4.] "Although I have always asserted that I could prove my initial claims of pattern and practice ("systemic disparate treatment"), disparate impact, pre and post-hiring discrimination, failure to promote, retaliation, aiding & abetting and conspiracy to maintain this racialized monopoly throughout Holl>'wood without "Exhibit 31," I would be a fool not to use this smoking gun evidence to my advantage, especially in support of my claims antitrust." [Claimant Reply April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 16] -13-

to achieve the public policy goals of Title VIL^^ [Claimant Em. Appeal, 5-12.] Title V I I prohibits intentional acts of employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin (disparate treatment), 42 US.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), as well as policies or practices that are not intended to discriminate, but have a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities (disparate impact), § 2000e-2(k)(I)(A)(i). In a Title V I I action, a plaintiff is not required to provide direct proof of disparate treatment. United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens. 460 U.S. 711, 714, 31 EPD Par. 33,477 (1983). In most disparate treatment cases, intent to discriminate is established inferentially, through circumstantial evidence. In such cases, the initial step in proving intent is to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine. 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 25 EPD Par. 31,544 (1981). This simply means that the plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence from which a legal inference of discrimination can be drawn. I have demonstrated this (as well as pretext) throughout my motions for summary judgment. I f such inference is left unexplained - as done by the Respondents with regards to claims of systemic disparate treatment (pattern and practice) and pre-hiring individual disparate treatment - it can be concluded that the adverse action complained o f was more likely than not motivated by unlawftil bias. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States. 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977). I f the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case through the four-part approach set out in McDonnell Douglas. [s]he will have raised an inference that the employer acted with a discriminator}' motive. Burdine. 450 U.S. at 252-3. This is because, as stated by the Court in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters. 438 U.S. 567, 579-580, 17 EPD Par. 8401 (1978), a prima facie showing "is simply proof of actions taken by the employer from which we infer discriminatory animus because experience has proved that in the absence of any other explanation it is more likely than not that those actions were bottomed on impermissible considerations." With regards to disparate impact, the Respondent provided no reasons to justify maintaining "facially neutral" employment practices, policies and procedures that adversely impacted qualified African Americans, including myself and other people of color from having an equal opportunity to be hired and/or promoted to higherstatus, higher-paying positions such as Agent and Coordinator. See Exhibit K . It is impossible for the Respondents to reflite statistical evidence demonstrating occupational segregation or the company's historically "frozen" "inexorable zero."^"* Further support that my arguments are legally sufficient are found in O'Regan v. Arbitration Also, I discuss this in great detail in the Reply to my Motion for Summary Judgment on pages 26 through 29. Additionally, I included these pages as an exhibit in my Reply to the April 18, 2013 Interim Decision. See Bert I. Huang. "The Tnexorable Zero," 117 Har\'. L. Rev. 1215, (February 2004). ("The intuition relies on the fact that zero is the lowest number or proportion of women or minorities that an employer can have. A court that views employment discrimination law as a means for society to root out employment practices based on prejudice (whether of workers, of customers, or of eniployers themselves) might rationally infer that the employers with the most egregious practices would be among those near this lower bound.") See also Barner v. City of Harvey. No. 95 C 3316, 1998 WL 664951, at '*50 (N.D. 111. Sept. 18, 1998) ("In cases, such as this one, the 'inexorable zero' speaks volumes and clearly supports an inference of discrimination."); Ortiz-Del Valle v. National Basketball Ass'n. 42 F. Supp. 2d 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (recognized that evidence of an inexorable zero can support a jury's finding of discrimination against a motion for judgment as a matter of law); Victory v. Hewlett-Packard Company. 34 F. Supp. 2d 809 (E.D.N. Y. 1999) (read Teamsters as holding that an inexorable zero standing alone could support a disparate impact claim of sex discrimination in promotions, asserting that "[t]he Supreme Court has repeated countenanced the use of statistical evidence, and evidence of the absence of a single minorhy employee being hired, labeled the 'inexorable zero,' would in and of itself support an inference of discrimination."); Ewing v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.. No. 00 CIV. 7020(CM), 2001 WL 767070 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2001) (the court found a claim nofing that the inexorable zero was sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss because a near-zero promotion rate of minorhies into higher-skilled jobs reflected de facto segregation, and therefore supported an inference of intentional discrimination.); Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff. Inc.. 711 F.2d 647, 662 (5th Cir. 1983) ("To the noble theorefician predicting the collisions of weightless elephants on frictionless roller skates, zero may be just another integer, but to us it carries special significance in discerning [ ] policies and attitudes."); Loyd v. Phillip Bros.. 25 F.3d 518, 524 n.4 (7th Cir. 1994) ("100% sex-segregated workforce is highly suspicious and is sometimes alone sufficient to support judgment for the plaintiff"); Compare Reynolds v. School Dist. No. 1. Denver. Colo.. 69 F.3d 1523, 1535, 104 Ed. Law Rep. 1004, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 485, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1143828 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Reynolds was the only white employee in the otherwise all- Hispanic Bilingual/ESOL Department, and Hispanic -14-

Fomms. Inc.. 246 F.3d 975 (7th Cir.2001) and Miriam A. Cherry's "Not-So-Arbitrary Arbitration: Using Title V I I Disparate Impact Analysis To Invalidate Employment Contracts That Discriminate" published in the Harvard Women's Law Journal. [Claimant Em. Appeal, 11-12.] See also Desert Palace. Inc. v. Costa. 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003) ("The reason for treating circumstantial and direct evidence alike is both clear and deep-rooted: 'Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.'"); Rosen v. Thornburgh. 928 F.2d 528, 533 (2d Cir. 1991). ("[E]mployment discrimination is oflen accomplished by discreet manipulations and hidden under a veil of self-declared innocence. An employer who discriminates is unlikely to leave a 'smoking gun,' such as a notation in an employee's personnel file, attesting to a discriminatory intent."). With the mountain of evidence of discrimination and other anticompetitive behavior before you, the Arbitrator should not have to wait on the production of concealed, smoking gun evidence in order to determine that "the 2008 and 2009 arbitration agreements [I] signed [were] unconscionable, tainted with illegality, malum in se, and signed under duress in the depths of the Great Recession."^'' [July 15, 2013 Interim Decision, 4.] "In determining whether a contract is unconscionable, a court should take a 'flexible' approach, examining 'all the facts and circumstances of a particular case.'" See Brennan v. Bally Total Fitness. 198 F. Supp.2d 377,383 (SD.N.Y. 2002) iqiioling In re: Estate of Friedman v. Egan. 64 AD.2d 70 (2d Dept. 1978) (emphasis added). I'd never heard the word "arbitration" before signing the arbitration agreement. The only thing on my mind during the first hour of employment - when we were handed a stack of papers to sign - was that I was going to be working at one of the most prestigious talent agencies throughout the world. I knew nothing about the company's history of intentional, race-based discrimination. I also didn't know that there were no African American Coordinators or Agents employed in the New York office or that I would be the only African American Agent Trainee before signing the 2008 Arbitration Agreement. After the first arbitration agreement was signed, I had no meaningful choice but to sign the 2009 Arbitration Agreement if I wanted to remain working at the new company, William Morris Endeavor Entertainment. Under New York law, a contract is unconscionable when it "is so grossly unreasonable or unconscionable in the light of the mores and business practices of the time and place as to be unenforcible [sic] according to its literal terms." Gillman V. Chase Manhattan Bank. N.A.. 73 N.Y.2d I , 537 N.Y.S.2d 787, 534 N.E.2d 824, 828 (1988). Generally, there must be a showing that such a contract is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Id. "The procedural element of unconscionability concerns the contract formation process and the alleged lack of meaningfijl choice; the substantive element looks to the content of the contract, per se." State v. Wolovvitz, 96 AD.2d 47,468 N.Y.S.2d 131, 145 (1983); See also Desiderio v. National Ass'n o f Sec. Dealers. Inc., 191 F.3d 198,207 (2d Cir. 1999) ("A contract or clause is unconscionable when there is an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.") [Claimant Em. Appeal, 5-6.] As Fve previously stated, when I filed my complaint with the EEOC on June 3, 2010,1 knew nothing about the law regarding antidiscrimination or the Federal Arbitration Act. I also knew nothing about William Morris' 115 year history of employment discrimination against African Americans and other people of color. I did not understand the impact this industry (now proven to be racist) has had in the inferiorization and exploitation of African Americans since 1898. However, over the last three years, I have uncovered a pyramid of evidence that officially supports that my gut-instinct while employed was true and claims of systemic disparate treatment (pattern and practice), disparate impact, pre and post-hiring individual disparate treatment, failure to promote, retaliation, aiding and abetting and violation of federal and state antitrust laws based on my race, color and/or perceived national origin are also true.. Therefore, it becomes glaringly obvious that no "deep genuine disputes of material

super\'isors made most of the employment decisions of which Reynolds complains."). [Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 24; Claimant 0pp. Arbitration, 6-8.] "William Morris failed to dispel the prima facie case showing that the provisions within the arbitrations agreement are tainted with illegality, are substantially unconscionable and ultimately serves as a legal pretext to for the company to continue its atrocious discriminatory actions without any serious ramifications. By default, the judge must find and conclude that these terms are substantially unconscionable -so much so that they are extremely 'outrageous.'" [Claimant Em .Appeal, 11.] -15-

facts between the parties" actually e x i s t . [ J u l y 15, 2013 Interim Decision, 3.] Even i f they did, you are the sole finder of fact and as someone who claims to be "neutral," it is your job to impartially determine which side is telling the truth based on all of the evidence that has been generated in support of each party's arguments. The Second Circuit stated in Rivera v. Rochester and Genesee Regional Transportation Authority. F. 3d, No. 11-762 (December 21, 2012), "When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version o f the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." {citing Scott v. Harris. 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) I f you truly believed the Respondents' testimony to be credible, why would you, for the second time, compel William Morris to produce the underlying e-mails to "Exhibit 31" and additional evidence obtained from EED, even after 90 year old. Republican appointed federal Judge Patterson stated in Rowe that "Exhibit 31" was an "unidentified and unauthenticated" document and regarding Mr. Rowe's claims of "fi-aud upon the Court," they were "based on nothing more than hot air and paranoid suspicions"? I f our pleadings were read by any objective person or heard during jury trial, there is no question the Respondents' version of facts would be rejected for the purposes of deciding the merits of my claims.

[Conclusion: There's Nothing More For Me To Prove] In your April 18, 2013 interim Decision that you "emphasize the axiom that a party seeking equity must do equity and come to this arbitration with clean hands." [April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 13.] 1 went over and beyond to prove that "Exhibit 31" was an authentic document and that the underlying e-mails are contained on the hard drives of William Morris and CAA. Why would I come to you with unclean hands if the law and truth are on my side? Since filing this case against William Morris, Jeff Meade and Sarah Van Hoven, my hands have always been clean and every action I have taken in this action in pursuit of justice has been done in extreme "good faith." The same cannot be said for the Respondents. For 11 years, the Respondents and their co-conspirators have continued to lie under oath, falsely stating that "Exhibit 31" "may be bogus" and pretending that the underlying e-mails to this document are actually contained on the hard drives o f William Morris and CAA. However, the Respondents have not been able to counter the compelling evidence I've proffered. Given that the Respondents intentionally failed to produce any of the e-mails received, the issue regarding the arbitration agreement's enforceability should be decided based on the pyramid of evidence I've submitted over the last two and a half years, coupled with the adverse inference that should have been created following their contempt to truthfully explain "Exhibit 31" and produce the underlying e-mails to this document.
This adverse inference should have immediately allowed the arbitrator to determine that the arbitrafion agreement I signed was unconscionable and/or grant summary judgment in my favor on all claims. However, knowing my dire economic circumstances^*" and stress related health issues,^'' you propose conducting discovery and "To think that William Morris will produce the underlying e-mails to "Exhibit 31" after maintaining a lie for more than a decade that derogatory terms were never discovered and/or existed is extremely naive and will only cause further harmful delay in my quest to receive a verdict based on the merits so 1 can attempt to move on with my life." [Claimant Rep. April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 22.] Arbitrator Gregory states in April 18, 2013 Interim Decision: "Claimant most recently represents his dire personal circumstances, living out suitcases and contemplating the looming spectre of possible homelessness." [pg. 10.] Since my public exit from William Morris Endeavor in April 2010, I have been unemployed. My unemployment benefits were exhausted nearly a year ago. My main source of income right now comes from my parents, who give me $400 a month and I receive $200 month in food stamps. 1 give my aunt $100 a month for allowing me to live with her rent-free since moving to New York to pursue my dreams. That means I ' m left with $500 a month or approx. $16.65 a day to survive in New York City. Over the last few months, my food stamps have been threatened to get cut off because they believe 1 am an "Abie-Bodied Adult without Dependents" (ABAWD), therefore I should be working. On three separate occasions, I've had to demonstrate that I should be exempt from the AWAWT) status because as a pro se litigant challenging institufional racism in Hollywood and employment discrimination throughout America, I consider my occupation to be that of a "civil and human rights activist" and 1 work more than 80 hours a week committed to eradicating racism, which is ultimately for the greater good of society. They have accepted this argument. However, proving that I ' m poor enough to qualify for food stamps is humiliating and embarrassing especially for an overachiever and hard worker like myself September 2, 2013 would have marked my fifth year -16-

having an oral hearing exclusively on the issue of "Exhibit 31" - a process that will potentially delay this case another five months. Given that William Morris is in possession of these e-mails and has refused to produce this spoliated evidence, there's absolutely nothing more I can or should be required to do with regards to authenticating "Exhibit 31." Closure is needed in this matter. I f you are going to ignore compelling evidence and misapply the law to rule against me because it runs counter to your ideological beliefs regarding the "superiority" of your "race,"

being employed at William Morris as an Agent - if the company had not intentionally maintained its discriminatoi^ organizational structure, institutional practices and work culture defined along racial lines that have created a glaring disparate impact against qualified African Americans and other people of color. I would be making a salary of more than $75,000.00 a year, which breaks down to $6250 a month or approx. $208.30 a day. That's $191.65 a day less than what I am making today. I have not and will never seek to be reinstated at a company that has and continues to engage in this type of racism and discrimination against African Americans and people of color and believes that it is doing nothing wrong. .This is why affirmative relief must be granted - to help qualified African Americans and people of color looking for job opportunities and advancement at William Morris (and throughout Hollywood and America at large) will have an equal opportunity. [July 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 13.] "Based on a rough guestimate, my back pay and front pay relief should amount to a minimum of $15,000,000.00 based on the average number of years Whites/"Jews" of Eastern European descent [remain employed] at the company." [Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 78.] I have presented extensive medical records demonstrating that for the last four years, I have been experiencing gastrointestinal and urinary problems that are not typical for someone of my age and health, and largely the result o f stress. Exhibh U in my Reply to Summary Judgment has majority of my medical records. The more the Respondents' counsel engage in unethical and criminal conduct on behalf of William Morris, the more stress I feel. The longer this case proceeds unnecessarily, the more stress I feel. My health is only worsening and I don't know i f I will be able to make it to the end of the year under these mentally and physically oppressive conditions. I have no longer been able to afford acupuncture - something that actually did wonders for my body. See also Tim Wise, Colorblind: The Rise of Post-Racial Politics and the Retreat From Racial Equity, p. 116-26 (2010) (More than a hundred studies have been conducted over the past several years documenting the effects of racial discrimination on the health of African Americans in a variety of settings. Research has found that "experiences whh racial discrimination increase stress levels among persons of color, thereby, elevating blood pressure and correlating directly v/ith worse health."); Bruce S. McEwen and Eliot Stellar, "Stress and the Individual: Mechanisms Leading to Disease," Archives of Internal Medicine 153, pp. 2093-2101 (1993); Carl V. Hill, Harold W. Neighbors and Heiene D. Gayle, "The Relationship Between Racial Discrimination and Heahh for Black Americans: Measurement Challenges and the Realities of Coping," African American Research Perspectives 10:1, pp. 89-98 (2004); "Racism's Cognitive Toll: Subtle Discrimination Is More Taxing on the Brain," ScienceDaily (September 24, 2007), www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/09/070919093316.htm ("Studies have found that overt racism is less distressing, mentally, than more subtle forms of bias. When the brain has to expend valuable cognitive resources merely determining whether or not a racially discriminatory act has occurred, there is more stress associated with the process than in those cases where the cognitive analysis of a situation is far easier."); National Geographic's "Stress: Portrait of a Killer." (2010). Race is a social and legal construct that doesn't determine ones' abilities or capabilities. See e.g., J. A. Rogers, Sex & Race, Vol. 1. p. 1. (1952). ("One writer has called it [race] a Frankenstein monster. But that comparison is far too feeble. However, h has this point of resemblance: Frankenstein's monster was built of scraps - scraps of corpses, a hand from this one, an eye from that, a path of skin from this other. The evil genie of race is also created from scraps - scraps of false philosophies of past centuries; a quotation from this or that prejudiced traveler; lines from this and that semi-ignorant divine of colonial days; excerpts from Gobineau, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, the Bible; passages from this or that badly mixed-up ethnologist, all jumbled together with catch-phrases from greedy plantation owners, slave-dealers, and other traffickers in human flesh. The purpose was to create 'pure' race, a 'superior' race, a race that like the philosopher's stone of the ancients, excelled all excellence - a race so meritonous that it had the right to enslave and use the rest of humanity."); Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness and Transformation, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1659 (1995) (In America, "[t]he concept of race has no natural truth, no core content or meaning other than those meanings created in a social system of white privilege and racist domination."); Rogers M . Smith, Black and White After Brown: Constructions of Race in Modern Supreme Court Decisions, 5 U . Pa. J. Const. L. 709, 710 (2003) ( " I view racial classifications fundamentally as invented labels embraced by political actors to help assign different statuses to different populations, generally for purposes of economic exploitation and consolidation of group power") [Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 35-36, footnote 9 1 ] -17-

then there's no need to drag this case out another five months. I respectfully ask that, in the interests of justice, you rule against me now, so 1 can, within the next three months, seek to have your judgment vacated pursuant to the grounds enumerated in § 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act. See Exhibit C .

III.

Highlighting the Numerous Factual Errors and Inaccuracies That Must Be 15, 2013 Interim Decision.

Discussed at Oral Hearing and Clarified and/or Modified In the Arbitrator's July

Immediately after reading the July 15, 2013 Interim Decision, I notified the A A A that I believed "fraud was officially occurring in this proceeding." See Exhibit L . On July 18, 2013, I sent a Notice to the AAA and counsel for William Morris that I would be filing this mofion. I also attached your July 15, 2013 Interim Decision, which contained the handwritten notes I made after sitting with your decision for two days. See Exhibit M . As you can see, there are an overwhelming amount of factual errors and inaccurate statements contained in your decision. I have highlighted some of the gross errors that need to be clarified at oral hearing and modified in a written decision: • "He has yet to meet with any success whatsoever in the federal courts; they have unequivocally repudiated all of Claimant's initiatives to avoid arbitration and instead obtain a jury trial in federal court." [pg. 1.] [Yes, this is true. But you make no mention of the fact that I have demonstrated that the predominantly all-vv'hite federal judges that have overseen this case throughout the Southern District of Nevv' York and Second Circuit have violated numerous Canons under the Judicial Code of Conduct to deny me due process, equal protection under the law and most importamly, the right to a jury trial. Although I didn't meet any success in the federal court, it's clear that both arbitration agreements I signed while working at William Morris are unconscionable and should be unenforced. Any further discovery should take place in the Southern District of New York and a hearing should be held in front of a jury reflecting the diversity of New York City OR summary judgment should be granted in my favor on all claims.] • "In early 2011, Claimant unsuccessfully sued Respondents in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and unsuccessfully appealed to the Second Circuit." [pg. 2.] [This sentence is entirely misleading. It makes it appear to the reader that whh regards to my various causes of action - systemic disparate treatment (pattern and practice), disparate impact, pre and posthiring individual disparate treatment, failure to promote, retaliation, aiding & abetfing and violafion of federal and state antitrust laws - a judge or jury actually heard my claims and I was "unsuccessful" in obtaining a favorable verdict on the merits. As stated. Republican appointed federal Judge .P. Kevin Castel of the Southern District of New York "ignored my argument, omitted pertinent facts and misapplied the law" in order to erroneously compel this landmark civil and human rights case into arbitration. This formalist judge relied on the "Delegation Provision," which is only contained in the 2009 arbitration agreement, to enforce the agreement. This allowed him to make no mention of the evidence demonstrating William Morris' pattern and practice of engaging in intentional race-based discrimination, and shifted responsibility to the Arbitrator to decide my legally sufficient unconscionability argument. Since Judge Castel's order was not "final," the Second Circuh stated they did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Therefore, the merits of my claims have never been decided, or properly heard by the court for that matter. Additionally, you state in your April 18, 2013 Interim Decision: " I do not believe that the decisions of the federal courts in the Southern District of New York or in the Second Circuit in re this case necessarily have any res judicata or collateral estoppel influence." [pg. 14.]]

"Subsequent to the August 24, 2012 conference call, on December 21, 2012 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated a District Court's grant of Summary Judgment to defendant employer without a hearing and expressed jurisprudential unease with decisions regarding employment law issues rendered solely via Summary Judgment papers. Rivera v. Rochester and Genesee Regional Transportation Authority. F . 3d, No. 11-762 (December 21, 2012)." [pg. 3.] You additionally state: "...the Second Circuit expressed jurisprudential apprehensions about the propriety of Summary Judgment on submitted papers alone serving as the instrument to resolve employment disputes." [pg. 4] [This is dishonest and an inaccurate assessment of the Second Circuit's opinion. In any employment discrimination case where a plaintiff seeks to have a jury trial and a motion for summary judgment is filed, the judge is supposed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. In Rivera, this did not happen because although the plaintiffs raised claims of discrimination and retaliation and proffered smoking gun evidence demonstrating that they were called "nigger" and "spic" by their predominately all-white coworkers, summary judgment was granted in favor of the employer as a result of the judge's clear ignorance and disregard for antidiscrimination law. The Second Circuit remanded the case back to the district court. Nowhere in the 21 page opinion does appellate judge Lohier "express[] jurisprudential apprehensions about the propriety of summary judgment on submitted papers alone." He simply recognizes that like Judge Patterson in Rowe. the district judge for the Western District of New York overstepped his boundaries and a jury should have determined the merits of the case. Given that we are in arbitration, there is no opportunity for a jury trial so this case law is not applicable on multiple grounds.] "The facts respectively marshaled thus far make Summary Judgment rendered exclusively by Motion practice not viable. There are deep genuine disputes of material facts between the parties." [pg. 3.] [As long as the Respondents and other coconspirators have denied that these e-mails ever existed for more than a decade, there are always going to appear to be "deep genuine disputes of material fact." I have demonstrated that "Exhibit 31" is an authentic document and the spoliated emails are contained on the hard drives of William Morris and CAA, never reaching a jury in Rowe. In the same way that the Respondents have failed to meet their heightened burden of persuasion and production with regards to my employment discrimination and antitrust claims, they have not proffered enough credible evidence to demonstrate that "Exhibit 31" is inauthentic. It is your job as a "neutral" arbitrator to determine who's telling truth and make an impartial decision based on the merits and evidence proffered] "Furthermore, the continuing troubling indeterminacy of potentially very important possible evidence ("Exhibit A") may be more thoroughly and, hopefully, finally resolved by sworn testimony in a hearing." [pg. 3—4.] [As stated, "sworn testimony in a hearing" is not necessary because you make no mention of the "sworn" Affidavit of Leonard Rowe and four perjurious Declarations of Leonard Rowe's former attorneys at SNR, along with additional documentary evidence, in your July 15, 2013 Interim Decision. Had this evidence been discussed, there is no way you could claim that there is "continuing troubling indeterminacy" regarding "Exhibit Si 's" authenticity. The fact that you have compelled the Respondents to produce the underlying e-mails to "Exhibit 31" for a second time buttresses this fact.]

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"While rhetorically rich [my argument that "the 2008 and 2009 arbitration agreements [I] signed [were] unconscionable, tainted with illegality, malum in se, and signed under duress in the depths of the Great Recession"], this language ultimately is merely conclusory rote, however, unless and until the larger factual context explicates Claimant's adjectival cascade with tangible, credible, objective facts sufficient to authenticate "Exhibit A" and establish its relevance." [pg. 4.] [This sentence is a taie red flag. As discussed above, my claims regarding the enforceability of the arbitration agreements I signed were argued have never been dependent on "Exhibit 31." 1 did not know about the conspiracy to conceal this document and its underlying e-mails until 13 months after I filed my 80 page complaint with the SDNY. When I have presented historical, statistical, circumstantial, anecdotal, documentary and direct evidence of William Morris' 115 year pattern and continuing practice of race-based discrimination, along with evidence that this cabal has engaged in a corrupt conspiracy to maintain a race-based monopoly throughout Hollywood, my assertions are not "rhetoric[al]" or "conclusory rote." I f anything, my claims are factually and legally rich, and the case law, sociological jurisprudence, law literature, books and other sources cited throughout my pleadings establishes without question that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 needs to be strengthened due to pervasive and widespread employment discrimination happening in the present.] "A facially legitimate employment arbitration agreement could be rendered unconscionable if the agreement is used to obstruct, rather than 'allow for adequate discovery.'" [pg. 5.] Then, on page 7, you also cite Armendariz v. Foundation Health Sych-Care Services. 24 Cal. 483 (2000), and highlight the quote: "the [arbitration] agreement must allow for adequate discovery." [Neither party has argued that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable because it doesn't allow for adequate discovery, .Pursuant to the arbitration agreement, I have a right to discovery before the Respondents' Cross Motion to Dismiss could ever be entertained. The 2009 Arbitration Agreement states; "Pre-hearing discovery shall be permitted and conducted sufficient to arbitrate and defend adequately any claim, including access to essential documents and witnesses, as ordered by the Arbitrator and consistent with applicable law." Also, A A A Rule 9 states that the Arbitrator has the authority to order "discovery, by way of depositions, interrogatories, document production or otherwise as the arbitrator considers necessary to a flill and fair exploration of the issues in dispute, consistent with the expedited nature of arbitration " (emphasis added) Therefore, this demonstrates you have misapplied Armendariz in order to harmfully delay this case from being resolved. The Arbitrator must now determine whether or not arbitration is an appropriate forum for this case to effectuate the larger public policy goals of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and additional antidiscrimination and antitrust laws, before any discovery regarding "Exhibit 31" or the merits of my case can take place or summary judgment is decided. See Exhibit C . Something to ponder; i f an arbitration agreement can be deemed unconscionable if it doesn't "allow for adequate discovery," how can it not be deemed unconscionable if it suppresses a landmark civil and human rights case from being decided by a jury and obstructs the larger public policy goals of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 from being effectuated?]

"In 2009 in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett. 129 S,.Ct. 456 (2009), the United States Supreme Court upheld an arbitration agreement quite similar to those in this arbitration. See, David L . Gregory, Mandatory Labor Arbitration of Statutory Claims and the Future of Fair Employment, 19 Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 429—458 (2010) (with E . McNamara)." [pg. 5] [There are only four cases cited throughout your July 15, 2013 Interim Decision. This is the third case in which you have either misapplied the law or inaccurately summarized the case to fit your agenda. Regarding the similarity of the arbitration agreements, 1 have decided to quote the article you co-wrote and cite which further demonstrates that you are not being truthful. You state; "In Pyett, the plaintiffs,

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all over the age of fifty, were longtime employees of Temco Services Industries. They were originally employed as night watchmen in a commercial office building. The plaintiffs were also members of Local 32BJ of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), and were subject to a CBA ["collective bargaining agreement"] between the Union and the Realty Advisory Board (RAB) on Labor Relations, Inc., the bargaining association for the real estate industry in New York City. The 2002 "Contractors Agreement," governing the period from January 1, 2002 through September 30, 2004, covered the events giving rise to this matter." [pg. 440.] Given that you co-wrote this 28 page article and then cited it in your July 15, 2013 Interim Decision, you are very aware that the arbitration agreements signed in both cases were not "similar" and thus, are not comparable. I did not sign collective bargaining agreement, nor was I represented by a union. There was no "Delegation Provision" contained in the collective bargaining agreement as well. This is just another example of your dishonesty. The facts of the two cases are not comparable as well. These were claims raised under the federal age discrimination statute, which is nowhere near analogous to the issue of race-based, employment discrimination in America. Therefore, counsel for the plaintiffs in Pyett could never argue that due to a historical pattern and continuing practice of age discrimination, the agreement to arbhrate was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.] "The parties' Mutual Arbitration Agreement provides that if any provision of the Agreement 'is held by a court to be invalid, the remaining provisions shall be severable and continue in full force and effect.' I need not address the potential nonviability of this portion of the Agreement at this time, since there has not been any Hnding of the Agreement's purported 'Unconscionability.'" [pg. 5-6.] [There was no finding of the Agreement's purported unconscionability because Judge Castel made no mention of the pyramid of evidence demonstrating William Morris' 112 year (at the time) pattern and continuing practice of engaging in unlawful discrimination against African Americans and people of color. Had he done so, the "Delegation Provision" would have been deemed substantively unconscionable and he would have come to the conclusion that arbhration was not an appropriate forum for a civil and human rights case of this magnitude. Since Judge Castel upheld the "Delegation Provision," it is clear that he wanted the arbhrator to decide the unique arguments that I have raised in opposhion to arbhration. After arbitrating this case for a year in which both parties have submitted voluminous motions for summary judgment and pleadings regarding "Exhibit 31's" authenticity, the arbitrator has still refijsed to decide this issue of whether or not the arbitration agreement should be enforced.] "Claimant remains free throughout continuing discovery and at the forthcoming arbitration hearing to continue to try to provide credible information about Exhibit A." [pg. 6.] [ I provided 30 pages of credible information, not including Exhibits that went fiom A to CC, to comply with your April 18, 2013 Interim Decision and have already demonstrated that "Exhibit 31" is an authentic document. I f that evidence wasn't credible, it would make absolutely no sense for you to compel William Morris to produce these e-mails for a second time.] "Federal Judges Patterson and Castel have issued rulings adverse to Claimant. In 2003, Judge Patterson found Exhibit A, in its earlier incarnation aka Exhibit 31, 'unidentiPied and unauthenticated,' 'irrelevant' and 'inadmissible.' On page 2 of his 43 page decision of November 8, 2012 denying Mr. Rowe's Motion to reopen his case, Judge Patterson unambiguously says 'Mr. Rowe's claim is meritless.'" [pg. 6.] [In your April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, you state; " I do not find Judge Patterson's decision regarding Exhibit A in the Rowe matter to have res judicata or collateral estoppel or other preclusive influence on the status of Exhibit A in this arbitration." Three months later, after I have submitted a pyramid of evidence demonstrating "Exhibit 3 r s " authentichy.

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you now make it appear that Judge Patterson's rulings are "adverse" to me. Even after knowing that Judge Patterson once deemed "Exhibit 31" to be "unidentified and unauthenticated," "irrelevanf and "inadmissible," as well stated that Mr. Rowe's claims of "fraud upon the Court" were "meritless," you determined otherwise. After reading the compelling evidence presented in the reply to my motion for summary judgment vvhich demonstrated that "Exhibit 31" was authentic and the underlying e-mails were contained on the hard drives of William Morris and CAA, you did something Judge Patterson never did - compel William Morris, Loeb & Loeb LLP and/or Michael Zweig to come forth with the electronic evidence they received from Electronic Evidence Discovery. Also, Judge Patterson was never presented with all of the evidence contained in my reply to your April 18, 2013 Interim Decision. Therefore, Judge Patterson's erroneous decision has only been "adverse" to M r Rowe ajid the class of black concert promoters, not myself] "Respondents emphasize that after 55 depositions and over two million documents produced in the Rowe litigation, Respondents and their lawyers continue to adamantly maintain that they never saw or knew of such emails and never received any such email from Rowe litigants." [pg. 7.] [Even if the Respondents "never saw" the underlying e-mails to "Exhibit 31," it doesn't change the fact that this summary results list was produced by EED after select hard drives from W M A and CAA were searched. Given that Leonard Rowe's former attorneys have lied as recently as May 14-15, 2012 by stating that "no derogatory terms" were ever found, the only way to determine i f William Morris, Loeb & Loeb LLP and Michael P Zweig are telling the truth is through the production of various documents and other materials received or produced during electronic discovery in Rowe. Given that they continue to withhold key evidence and state that it doesn't exist, an adverse inference should be created and a final decision should be made, at least with regards to whether the arbitration agreements should be enforced] "Claimant is not Mr. Rowe. Claimant is entitled to have this proceeding on Claimant's merits. Likewise, although Claimant openly considers Mr. Rowe an ally. Claimant must present Claimant's case." [pg. 7-8] [ I presented a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the 80 page complaint filed with the Southern District of New York. 1 did not have to do that, but I did because I discovered so much historical evidence and case law demonstrating that my race, color and/or perceived national origin played a motivating factor in my inability to be hired and/or promoted to Agent. I am the one who initiated summary judgment and submitted a pyramid of evidence to establish my claims of systemic disparate treatment (pattern and practice), disparate impact, pre and post-hiring individual disparate tteatment, failure to promote, retaliation, aiding & abetting and violation o f federal and state antitrust laws. I f not, summary dismissal should be granted in favor of the Respondents even though they have not met their heightened burden of persuasion and production.] "Mr. Leonard Rowe, in an Affidavit in another proceeding, affirms: 'I personally saw [the] Exhibit ... in its entirety. It contained all pages including 1 and 17....At that time, it contained the word "nigger" 349 times.' Exhibit A may have become both considerably more, and less, informational than in previous incarnations." [pg. 8-9.| [Leonard Rowe's Affidavit was not from "another proceeding." See Exhibit I. It was notarized on June 13, 2013 and the A A A Case Number is also listed on the Affidavit. Why lie about something that can easily be proven? By stating such that this Affidavit came from "another proceeding," it allowed you to omit any discussions throughout your Interim Decision about additional examples of fraud William Morris, Loeb & Loeb LLP, Michael P. Zweig and their co-conspirators engaged in throughout his case and pretend that I haven't demonstrated "Exhibit 31" is authentic, as well as explained its relevance to my case - in writing.]

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"In response to Claimant's persistence that Respondents and their lawyers must have the infamous "nigger" emails, thus involving more than a dozen lawyers and three law firms suppressing evidence—Respondents reiterate: 'This is utter nonsense.' (Respondents' Response at pages 2-3, footnote 2, to Interim Decision 1) 'Claimant's persistent contention that Rowe's expert and Rowe's counsel produced to WMA (and its counsel Loeb & Loeb) what Claimant now refers to as "nigger" emails, and then concealed such documents for two years, is calumny. It is, demonstrably, an outright and knowing lie. Not a single such email was ever produced, or is even known ever to have existed.' (Respondents' Reply at page 5 to Interim Decision 1)." [pg. 9.] [Based on the pyramid of evidence that has already been submitted, my claims cannot be "nonsense" i f you are now proposing that we spend two months conducting discovery and having another electronic discovery expert retrieve the underlying emails to "Exhibh 31 " This fijrther demonstrates the only party telling "outright and knowing lie[s]" are the Respondents.] "Within a few days of receipt of my Interim Decision 1, Claimant expressly states in his email writing to Mr. Michael Zweig, Esq. that 'I [Claimant] refuse to communicate any further with him [Mr. Christian A. Carbone, Esq., a lawyer colleague of Mr. Zweig at Loeb & Loeb, the law firm representing Respondents ] '....' Based on Christian's arrogant and defiant response to my request to "meet and confer," coupled with the fact that he was not involved in Rowe and clearly knows nothing about what actually occurred in electronic discovery.' (Respondents' Reply to Interim Decision 1, Exhibit 2) Each party has the right to be represented by the person(s) of their choosing. Neither party has a veto regarding the opposing party representatives. Claimant, not Respondents, summarily truncated this most recent opportunity to potentially authenticate Exhibit A." [pg. 10.] [Of course you make no mention that in the very first section of my Reply, titled "Good Fahh Efforts to Meet & Confer," 1 demonstrate that Michael P. Zweig and Christian Carbone were uncooperative and unwilling to have any meaningfijl discussions about "Exhibit 31" with me. See Exhibit N. To try to make it appear that 1 somehow prevented amicable discussions from being had regarding this document is dishonest, deceitfiji and disingenuous. You know that that is false and 1 submitted all of our e-mail correspondences to prove so. For more than a year, William Morris and their counsel were never compelled to respond specifically to these allegations regarding "Exhibit 3 1" and when they did, they only referred to Judge Patterson's decision. After Carbone intentionally made misrepresentations about the document's authenticity, suggesting that "Exhibh 31" "may be bogus," 1 was within my rights to state that 1 would no longer discuss "Exhibit 31" with him since they'd already been compelled to produce the e-mails. See Exhibit O. The attorney with first-hand knowledge about electronic discovery in Rowe and "Exhibit 31" - Michael P. Zweig - knew that Carbone's statement was false, but allowed him to speak on his behalf to be vexatious and minimize his risks of being caught in a lie like his co-conspirators - attorneys from SNR. There is also no mention that Carbone replied to my initial e-mail to meet and confer stating that instead, I should send over stipulations. After 1 submitted the stipulations, they rejected the document without discussion and this fact is not mentioned in your July 15, 2013 Interim Decision. See Exhibit P.] "The (non)admissibility of Exhibit A in the present arbitration could have significant influence." [pg. 10.] [The Federal Rules of Evidence state that evidence is relevant i f h has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401 Based on the evidence I've submitted to authenticate "Exhibit 31," coupled with the adverse inference that should have been created after the Respondents refused to produce an^ of the documents received from Electronic Evidence Discovery after you compelled them to do so in your April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, there's no way "Exhibit 31" can been deemed inadmissible in this case.]

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"Claimant asks that Respondents and their lawyers provide S200,000 to cover the ediscovei-y costs incurred in prior litigation. That request is denied." |pg. 11.| [Not once have 1 ever asked for "$200,000 to cover the ediscover>' costs incurred in [Rowe]." 1 did state on January' 31, 2013 in the Reply to my Motion for Summary Judgment: "At no point should William Morris have deleted or tampered with the actual emails that were to underlie "Exhibit 31" or the CDs containing ESI. Now that Respondents' silence can no longer create the impression that these e-mails never existed, those documents need to be produced or William Morris needs to pay the costs to have a third party electronic expert of my choice retrieve the hundreds of underlying e-mails for a second time, as well as pay for the costs of a contemporary electronic search of the company's e-mails focusing on dates in or around my employment." [pg. 90-91.] This is just another example of you misrepresenting my claims and distorting the facts. Additionally, 1 should not be required to pay the costs of retrieving spoliated evidence. I have informa pauperis status with both the federal court and the AAA. I f 1 can't afford eating two full meals a day, there's no possible way I would be able to pay the costs associated with electronic discovery.] "There is less than a handful of named persons meeting all of the conditions set forth in Interim Decision 1, with the consequence that Exhibit A appeai-s to be losing some of whatever possible evidentiai-y traction it may have previously had, in the absence of a critical mass of current employees who were also named on both the earlier, and the more contemporai-y, versions of Exhibit A." [pg. II.J [Given that the Respondents have not produced the underlying e-mails to "Exhibh 31" or any of the e-mails received from EED and you have now compelled William Morris to produce the underlying e-mails for a second time, there is no possible way this evidence could be "losing some of whatever possible evidentiary' traction it may have previously had." On page 24 of my Reply to your April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, I state: " I can confirm that none of the names listed on "Exhibh 3 1 " worked in the New York office during the time that 1 was employed at William Morris - between September 2008 and April 2010. Honestly, this fact is irrelevant to my overall claims. My allegations of conspiracy and racism are not as narrowed and specific as those made in Rowe. As a Floater, 1 worked throughout all divisions of William Morris and I am making the claim that discrimination is company-wide, pervasive and not specific to any one department. Given that music was my expressed area of interest when I applied to William Morris and I have presented substantial evidence demonstrating William Morris' conspiracy to exclude qualified African Americans from higher status, higher paying positions such as Agent[s], "Exhibit 31" is also pertinent to my claims of discrimination and conspiracy to discriminate because one of the e-mails of a music Agent that I worked with and for was allegedly searched [Cara Lewis] and 1 argue that based on my qualifications and skills before joining the company, I should have been hired as a music Agent."] "Further as to Exhibit A, Claimant is to provide with specificity by August 9, 2013 via AAA a list of additional persons, if any, situated analogous to Tom Ross through Paola Palazzo as set forth on page 34 of Claimant's Reply to the First Interim Decision." [pg. 14] [My Reply to the April 18, 2013 Interim Decision is only 31 pages....]

Since there has been a pattern of omitting pertinent facts, taking my words out of context and ignoring the pyramid of evidence I've presented almost in hs entirety, I believe that these issues can only be resolved at an oral hearing. This will force the Respondents to speak about "Exhibit 31" on the record and will additionally setfie the Arbitrator's expressed unease of making "decisions regarding employment law issues...solely via Summary Judgment papers." I f the Arbitrator clarifies and modifies his July 18, 2013 Interim Decision, the Arbhrator should then make a "final" decision regarding the enforceability of William Morris' arbhration agreement and depending on that decision, decide summary judgment. See Exhibit C .

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IV.

I f Oral Hearing Is Not Granted and Gross Errors Contained Throughout Impropriety and Pattern of Corruption Will Exist.

Interim Decision Are Not Modified, An Appearance and/or Actual Bias, Prejudice,

Inquiring minds want to icnow; Have you been threatened, intimated or bribed by the Respondents to wrhe this deceptive Interim Decision which ignores the pyramid of evidence I've presented and pretends that genuine issues of material fact still exists regarding the authenticity of "Exhibit 31"? At this stage in the proceeding, I have a hard time believing that for a man of your intelligence and experience, the gross number of factual errors and inaccuracies contained throughout your July 18, 2013 are accidental, due to chance or the result of human error. You have done a complete about-face and any "reasonable person" that reads both Interim Decisions, as well as the evidence submitted in my Reply, can tell that something nefarious has occurred between April 18, 2013 and July 15, 2013.^' What I noticed is, although I have submitted an overwhelming amount of evidence to establish the authentichy of "Exhibit 31," you make no mention of three key words throughout the July 18, 2013 Interim Decision: "conspiracy" (with regards to "Exhibh 31"), "unethical" (whh regards to conduct of Michael P. Zweig and Loeb & Loeb LLP) and "civil rights." First, you niake no mention that with regards to "Exhibit 31," I have alleged that Leonard Rowe's former attorneys and counsel for the Booking Agency Defendants were engaged in a "sinister conspiracy" to conceal not only "Exhibh 31," but the underlying e-mails which i f ever produced, would have demonstrated the "unvarnished racial animus" of William Morris, Creative Artists Agency and its employees. Under New York law, civil conspiracy is not an independent cause of action. It may only be used to tie the defendants to an existing tort claim. Noble V. Creative Technical Services. Inc.. 126 A.D.2d 611, 511 N.Y.S.2d 51 (2d Dep't 1987); Sacks v. Stewart. 75 A.D.2d 536, 427 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1st Dep't 1980). To plead a claim for civil conspiracy, a party must allege an underlying tort, plus: "(1) an agreement between two or more parties; (2) an overt act in furtherance of the agreement; (3) the parties' intentional participation in the furtherance of a plan or purpose; and (4) resulting damage or injury." Ebusinessware. Inc. v. Tech. Servs. Grp.. No. 08 Civ. 9101, 2009 W L 5179535, at •*15 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.29, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cofacredit v. Windsor Plumbing Supply Co.. Inc.. 187 F.3d 229, 240 (2d Cir. 1999) ("To prove a conspiracy, a plaintiff must show a corrupt agreement, an overt act in furtherance of that agreement, and membership in the conspiracy by each defendant."). The purpose of a civil conspiracy claim is to "connect the actions of separate defendants with an otherwise actionable tort." Alexander & Alexander of N.Y.. Inc. V. Fritzen. 68 N.Y.2d 968, 969, 510 N.Y.S.2d 546, 503 N.E.2d 102 (1986). Essentially, the actions of one are the actions of all. Therefore, it should not be surprising that the testimony of Leonard Rowe's former attorneys and the Respondents whh regards to "Exhibit 31" is essentially identical. The first lie was told when attorneys stated to Leonard Rowe that "no derogatory terms" were found and tried to conceal "Exhibit 31" from the class of black I had a feeling that something was wrong, after 1 e-mailed the A A A and asked for Arbitrator Gregory clarify certain statements contained in his April 18, 2013 Interim Decision. I stated in my Reply: "On May 28, 2013, 1 requested a four day extension because my stress related gastrointestinal health issues temporarily put me out of commission and I was unable to adequately work on my case. My request was immediately granted by Arbitrator Gregory For the third time. I reiterated to the Respondents that the "nigger" e-mails needed to be produced with their reply on June 7. 2013 and for the first time. Carbone stated that they "disagreed with [my] interpretation of Arbitrator Gregory's interim decision." On that same day, I asked the Arbitrator to clarify his Interim Decision so that any "difference" would be resolved and to make sure there was a meeting of the minds on producing the e-mails that were received from E E D . The next day, Carbone stated: "As we do not perceive that Arbitrator Gregory's Interim Decision was written in an ambiguous manner, we see no need for clarification." I insisted on the clarification since it was obvious the Respondents felt they were not obligated to produce the e-mails they received from E E D . The Arbitrator never responded. Given that the deadline was approaching and no answer was provided, I requested a second extension of time. The Arbitrator also didn't respond to this request and according to the AAA, he could never be reached. Therefore, the A A A had to grant my second extension, in which the new date to submit our replies became Friday, June 14, 2013." (emphasis added) [pg. 2-3.] -25-

concert promoters. Additionally, since Leonard Rowe filed his FRCP 60 Motion, the responses o f SNR and Loeb & Loeb LLP have essentially been the same. First, they claim that no derogatory terms exist or they have no reason to believe they do and then they rely on their most prized alibi, the Judge Patterson's January 5, 2005 decision, and argue that since a federal judge considered "Exhibit 31" to be an "unidentified and unauthenticated document," you should ignore evidence to the contrary and think so too. Not surprising, there is also no mention that you have compelled William Morris, Loeb & Loeb LLP and/or Michael P. Zweig to produce spoliated evidence. Given that ten years have elapsed and the Respondents have reftised to produce any of the e-mails received from Electronic Evidence Discovery, spoliation of evidence occurred not only in Rowe. but in this case as well.''" I f this case remains in arbitration, I should be allowed full discovery to retrieve additional evidence exclusively in their possession that will allow me to demonstrate pretext (e.g. resumes of my similarly situated White/"Jewish" co-workers, evaluations, work file. Agent contracts, etc.) for my personal causes of action. Secondly, nowhere in either Interim Decision do you address the evidence which establishes that Loeb & Loeb LLP and Michael P. Zweig have been engaged in a "pattern" of serious unethical conduct on behalf of their clients, William Morris.'" .Although an arbitrator may not be able to issue disciplinary sanctions to attorneys that engage in unethical conduct, attorneys must act ethically at all t i m e s . I have already listed numerous rules that

Sanctions for willful spoliation can include striking a pleading, adverse inference or presumption against the spoliator, as well as disciplinary and monetary sanctions including default judgment to name a few. Determination of the appropriate sanction for spoliation is confined to the sound discretion of the judge and the statute's proposed penalties are not intended to be exhaustive. DiDomenico v. C&S Aeromatik Supplies. Inc.. 252 AD2d 41, 49 (2d Dept. 1998). Although a trial court has broad discretion in crafting the proper sanction for spoliation of evidence, the sanction should be molded to serve the "prophylactic, punitive, and remedial rationales underlying the spoliation doctrine." West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.. 167 F.3d 776, 42 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1161 (2d Cir. 1999). [Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 91.] "" "[I]n deciding this case, the Arbitrator must also weigh the evidence which establishes that the attorneys and law firm claiming William Morris' innocence has engaged in a "pattern" of'serious unethical and criminal conduct' on behalf of their client for more than a decade." [Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 4.] See Kristen M . Blankley. "Taming the Wild West of Arbitration Ethics." 60 Kansas Law Review 925. 2012. She States, on pages 982-983: "Current perjun' and tampering law does not adequately cover the arbitral forum. Almost none of the tampering laws explicitly apply to arbitration, and the perjury laws that could apply to arbitration might only apply through creative lawyering. While attorney ethics rules apply to arbitration, the criminal law has lagged behind with respect to applicability in ADR forums—particularly arbitration. This Article recommends amending the definition of "official proceeding" to include the arbitral forum. This simple legislative change would then apply the perjury, witness tampering, and evidence tampering statutes to the arbitral forum. In other words, a simple change to the definitions section would, in one fell swoop, cause three or more statutes to apply to the arbitral forum. Sound policy underlies this recommendation. First, the perjury and tampering laws are outdated and do not consider the changing nature of arbitration — especially the changing nature of the types of claims commonly considered by arbitrators today. Second, arbitration is often considered a quasi-judicial forum. As such, the protections against perjury and tampering afforded to other quasi-judicial forums should apply to the arbitral forum. Third, courts now routinely extend absolute immunity to arbitration participants. This immunity makes arbitration participants immune from civil claims — such as defamation. Unless the perjury and tampering laws apply, arbitration will become a forum in which participants are ultimately immunized from both civil and criminal repercussions for misbehavior in the arbitral forum. Fourth, the marketplace, to date, has not regulated arbitration participant conduct. Extending the criminal law to the arbitral forum will fill a gap that the marketplace has left open. Finally, the limited judicial review available to arbitration parties supports the extension of the criminal law to the arbitral forum. For all of these reasons, a simple legislative change would help legitimatize arbitration as a fair forum and give participants protections against misbehavior that they might have already thought they had " (emphasis added). -26-

Zweig, Ciiristian Carbone and Loeb & Loeb LLP have violated under the New York Code of Professional Conduct, due to their mere presence in this proceeding now that light has been shown on this diabolical conspiracy.'''' [Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 13-17.] Although I didn't make any mention of Rule 3.3 in my Reply for Summary Judgment, it is most applicable rule to this proceeding. Appropriately titled "Conduct Before A Tribunal,"'''' it states: a A lawyer shall not knowingly: make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunaP^ or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer: 2. fail to disclose to the tribunal controlling legal authority known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or 3. offer or use evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. I f a lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, i f necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refijse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. A lawyer who represents a client before a tribunal and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the 1

b

Each attorney, without question, engaged in fraudulent conduct with the "purpose to deceive" and involves moral turpitude. Their unethical and criminal behavior contains elements of "scienter, deceit, intent to mislead" and they "knowing[ly] fail[ed] to correct [their] misrepresentations." Rule 1.0 (i). A lawyer shall not "counsel a chent to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is illegal or fraudulent." Rule 1.2 (d). The Rules clearly state that a lawyer shall not "suppress evidence that the lawyer or client has a legal obligation to reveal," "conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which the lawyer is required by law to reveal," "knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence" or "knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to these Rules." Rule 3.4 (a)(1), (3), (4) and (6). Each lawyer had the opportunity to "refijse to aid or participate in conduct that the lawyer believe[d] to be unlawful," but chose to engage in these unlawful acts anyway. Rule 1.2 (f). And even i f William Morris "made" Loeb & Loeb LLP and Michael Zweig engage in criminal activity on their behalf a lawyer "is bound by these Rules notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person." Rule 5.2 (a). •''' According to Rule l.O(w), a "tribunal denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter." "Throughout the Respondents' Opposition, they have continued to make duplicitous statements in 'bad faith' such as: 'While filled with unsupported accusations and invective, Washington's 54-page "Reply and Request For Full Summary Judgmenf is little more than a compendium of conclusory, incendiary, and speculative statements, lacking any concrete evidentiary support whatsoever' (pg. 1)....'Claims are utterly implausible and without factual support' (pg. 2)....'In sum, Washington has presented and can present no factual basis to support any of his claims. Based largely on vast conspiracy theories, discredited allegations of institutional racism and his own animus, his claims are not only utterly implausible, they are such that no reasonable finder o f fact could rule in his favor' (pg. 4)....'Washington's Complaint, even supplemented by his Motion, is devoid of concrete facts showing any intentional discrimination, or any incident of racial animus' (pg. 5).... 'Washington's Complaint and Motion is woeftilly devoid of hard facts, relying instead on supposition, stereotyping and generalization. His broad assertions and conclusory accusations fail to establish any issue of material facts and should be dismissed on all counts' (pg. 6) and 'Washington has not - and cannot - point to any instance of direct discrimination or any circumstantial evidence to support his claim that he was treated different from other Trainees.' (pg. 16)" [Claimant Reply Summary Judgment, 89.] The pyramid of evidence I've presented to both the federal court and the AAA, particularly "Exhibit 31," proves that all of these statements of fact are false. -27-

c. d.

e. f.

proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) apply even i f compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse. In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose, unless privileged or irrelevant, the identities of the clients the lawyer represents and of the persons who employed the lawyer. In appearing as a lawyer before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not: 1. fail to comply with known local customs of courtesy or practice of the bar or a particular tribunal without giving to opposing counsel timely notice of the intent not to comply; 2. engage in undignified or discourteous conduct; 3 intentionally or habitually violate any established rule of procedure or of evidence; or 4. engage in conduct intended to disrupt the tribunal

Michael P. Zweig and Loeb & Loeb LLP's habitual misrepresentations on behalf of William Morris demonstrates their compulsive nature to lie and their complete lack of empathy for humanity. For more than a decade, the Respondents and their counsel have committed perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621 - without any repercussions. In fact, one prestigious legal publication named "Best Lawyer" in Labor & Employment Litigation this year.'*^' In white America, this elite attorney praised and av/arded accolades for engaging in this type of diabolical behavior behind-the-scenes in cases against victims of racial discrimination. Instead of pacifying these racists and giving them yet another opportunity to make sure this spoliated evidence doesn't see the light of day, an adverse inference should have immediately been created. This is why I asked that monetary sanctions be imposed against William Morris, Loeb & Loeb LLP and Michael P. Zweig in an amount no less than SlOO million and requested that you recommend that the federal court issue disciplinary sanctions against Loeb & Loeb LLP, Michael P. Zweig and Christian Carbone for their "bad faith" conduct. Of course, there is also no mention of this throughout any of your Interim .Decisions as well. [Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 92.] Last, and most importantly, there is no mention of words such as "civil rights," "human rights," "the Civil Rights Act of 1964" or "conspiracy to interfere with civil rights"" anywhere throughout your July 15, 2013 Interim Decision. Like Judge Castel's Stay Order which erroneously compelled this case into arbitration, there is no mention of the historical^*, statistical, circumstantial and other types of evidence which demonstrates that William Morris was engaging in unlawfijl employment practices, policies and procedures - violations of Title "VII, Section 1981, NYSHRL and NYCHRL ~ before I began working at the New York office in September of 2008.^^ Given that this

The Best Lawyers in America, published by Woodward White, Inc. (2013). http://www.loeb.com/michael_zweig/. " Supra not 9. Peter Charles Hoffer. Blind To History: The Use of Histor)' In Affirmative Action Suits - Another Look At City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 23 Rutgers L . I 271, 278. (Winter 1992) (Stating that the "mode of historical analysis" I used "widens the scope of the historical record before the court, exploring deep connections and proximate causes. It does not categorize rights or obligations so much as try to reveal and understand real harms. These may be suffered by individuals not at the bar. One may characterize this approach to historical reasoning as 'humanistic,' in that, like all humanistic studies, it is flexible and probes behind fixed categories to find actual relationships. Humanistic historical reasoning is horizontal, moving outward Irom the claims of the parties at the bar to take in a larger piece of social reality. Humanistic history goes further back in time than the claim brought by the parties at the bar, to enrich the context of their complaint or defense.") Yet, in Judge Castel's July 20, 2011 Stay Order, he states: "Plaintiff has not shown that Congress intended to preclude arbitration for claims asserted under either Title "VII or 42 U.S.C. § 1981." [pg. 18.] Although I never -28-

case challenges institutional racism in Hollywood , how could any decision made by you be impartial i f there is no mention of the "Civil Rights Act of 1964"or demonstration that you are aware of or have an understanding of Title VII's legislative history? Since this case deals with a "complex, social issue" and neither the Respondents nor the Arbitrator "face bigotry and discrimination on the basis of color or a legacy of oppression and unequal opportunity dating back generations," I have no choice but to relate Thle V I l to the historical "social problems that generated the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and that continue to be a structural part of our economy and society Title V I I was a direct legislative byproduct of the black-led civil rights movement''^ and the larger struggle o f African

specifically mention "Congress" in my very first motion ever written, it is clear that based on the cumulative evidence that I presented demonstrating a prima facie case of systemic disparate treatment, disparate impact and prehiring individual disparate treatment, any impartial finder of fact could determine that arbitration was an inappropriate forum for a civil and human rights case of this magnitude because the greater public policy goals of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 1981 and the NYCHRL - which stated provisions of state and federal civil rights statutes are to be viewed "as a floor below which the City's Human Rights law cannot fall, rather than a ceiling above which the local law cannot rise " - could not be effectuated in a privatized forum. See also, N.Y.C. Local Law No. 85 of 2005 (Oct. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Restoration Act]. The Restoration Act is found in New York City, Legislative Annual (2005). The text of the Restoration Act was signed into law on October 3, 2005 and available at www.antibiaslaw.com/RestorationAct.pdf Found in Craig Gurian, " A Return to Eyes on the Prize: Litigating Under the Restored New York City Human Rights Law," Fordham Urban Law Journal, 255 (2006). [Claimant 0pp. Arbhration, 8-9] Neal Gabler, "Jews, Blacks and Trouble in Hollywood," New York Times, (September 2, 1990) http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/02/movies/film-view-jews-blacks-and-trouble-in-hollywood.html; Latoya Peterson. Fade In Talks Racism in Hollywood. (April 21, 2009) http://www.racialicious.com/2009/04/21/fade-inmagazine-talks-racism-in-hollywood/; Benjamin Hooks. "Report Says Blacks Are Underhired In Hollywood." New York Times. September 24, 1991. http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/24/arts/report-says-blacks-are-underhired-inhollywood.html. (The study, titled "Out of Focus - Out of Sync," says that blacks are unable to make final decisions in the motion picture process and that only a handful of blacks hold executive positions whh film studios and television networks. Although blacks purchase 25 percent of domestic movie tickets, black-owned businesses are frequently excluded from the entertainment industry, the report said."); Ron Walters. Hollywood's Racism Factory. FinalCall. March 28, 2006. http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/article_2515.shtml. ("The bottom line is that since the positioning of racial images is about money, Hollywood thinks it must play to the racial stereotypes, making it the most powerfiil purveyor of global racism that exists. It educates and reinforces the demeaning racial role that is in the heads o f both Americans and foreigners, through the economic power, to commercialize these images through the distribution network of movies and advertising outlets. We should put more of a spotlight on the producers and financiers of these movies who keep alive the negative images of Black people before the world."); Jennifer Armstrong and Margeaux Watson. "Diversity in Entertainment: Why Is TV So White?" Entertainment Weekly. June 13, 2008. http://www.ew.com/ew/article/0„20206185,00.html. ("After a period of making a public effort to focus on diversity in their casting — kickstarted by an NAACP outcry over the white TV landscape in 1999 — the networks have clearly started to lose that focus, and not just when h comes to African-Americans. Today the current prime-time lineup, including fall's 14 new scripted shows, is looking alarmingly pale."); Stephen Galloway, "Diversity in Hollywood," The Hollywood Reporter. March 7, 2006. ("While blacks are notching up new victories on a consistent basis, they still remain underrepresented in key areas such as producing and directing and are woefijlly absent from the executive front. Incrementalism, rather than, revolution, seems to the order of the day... At higher levels, the absence o f black executives is even more notable. While there are some prominent black leaders in television (among them, BET's [Debra] Lee), they're almost invisible at the highest studio echelons. Their absence is in stark contrast to that of another 'minority' group, women, who have made enormous strides in the past decade, whh two current female studio chairmen and many more executives and producers") Merrick T. Rossein. Employment Discrimination Law and Litigation (2012); see also Peter Charles Hoffer, "Blind to History": The Use of History In Affirmative Action Suits: Another Look at City of Richmond v, J.A, Croson Co, 23 Rutgers L,J, 271, 273 (Winter 1992) (makes the argument "that judges should read historical evidence and assess historical argument the way that historians fashion historical evidence and construct historical arguments. To do otherwise is to render any claim to historical validity chimerical") ''^ Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years (PBS television broadcast, 1986), Each episode of this six part series can be viewed on Youtubecom,; see also, Daniel B, Rodriguez and Barry R, Weingast, The Positive Political -29-

Americans to live free from both invidious and institutional racism in all areas of life in America. [Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 19.] Having a grasp of the "bigger picture" is fundamental.'*'' A l l o f my claims are interconnected and cannot be separated, then isolated in a vacuum. Once referencing me with the likes of prolific civil rights activists Martin Luther King, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall, I am now being told that my arguments are "rhetorically rich" and are nothing but "conclusory rote." [April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 4 ] How could anyone with 30 years' experience as a professor specializing in labor and employment law''^ make this comment with a clear conscience, after I discussed the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 throughout my motions for summary judgment? Are you trying to suggest that the historical, statistical, circumstantial, anecdotal, documentary, direct and other forms of evidence, as well as the law Iherature'"', sociological jurisprudence'*', books"** and current events'" I've used to buttress my individual claims of

Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation. 151 U . Pa. L. Rev. 1417, (2002). ''^ Adjoa Artis Aiyetoro. Can We Talk? How Triggers For Unconscious Racism Strengthen The Importance of Dialogue. 22 NatT Black L. J. 1, 21 (Fall 2009) ("During slavery and Jim Crow h was not unusual for African descendants to be treated in debasing ways, including being addressed with demeaning labels such as "nigger." Race and racism were part of the very fabric of the society, and although other racial groups were treated in a discriminatory fashion, the premier story of racism in the United States has been the treatment of African descendants."); S. Con. Res. 26, 11th Cong. (2009) (Apologizing for the enslavement and racial segregation of African-Americans.) (Whereas the system of de jure racial segregation known as "Jim Crow", which arose in certain parts of the United States after the Civil War to create separate and unequal societies for Whites and AfricanAmericans, was a direct result of the racism against people of African descent that was engendered by slavery; Whereas the system of Jim Crow laws officially existed until the 1960s—a century after the official end of slavery in the United States-until Congress took action to end h, but the vestiges of Jim Crow continue to this day;).
44

For the complete text of the House Congressional reports, including hearing testimony, and the House and Senate debates recorded in 110 Cong. Rec. (1964), see U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Legislative History of Title Vn and XI of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1968) (reprinted 1988). For examples of congressional concern for the economic plight of black people, see 110 Cong. Rec. 6547-6550 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). Sen. Humphrey, one of the floor managers of the bill expressed this concern: "The Negro is the principal victim of discrimination in employment. According to Labor Department statistics, the unemployment rate among nonwhites is over twice as high as among whites. More significantly, among male family breadwinners, those with dependents to support, the unemployment rate is three times as high among nonwhites as among whites. And although nonwhites constitute only 11 percent of the total work force, they account for 25 percent of all workers unemployed for 6 months or more. Discrimination also affects the kind of jobs Negroes can get. Generally, it is the lower paid and less desirable jobs which are filled by Negroes." (emphasis added) ''^ David L. Gregory. St. John's University - School of Law. Accessed on July 24, 2013. http://www.stjohns.edu/academics/graduate/law/faculty/Profiles/Gregory. ("David L. Gregory is the Dorothy Day Professor of Law and the Executive Director of the Center for Labor and Employment Law. Prior to joining the St. John's Law faculty in 1982, Professor Gregory was an equal employment opportunity counselor whh the Postal Service, a labor relations representative with Ford Motor Company, and an attorney with a prominent management labor and employment law firm in Detroit... He has over two hundred academic and professional publications, including more than one hundred articles and book reviews in leading law reviews") On Title VII & Critical Race Theory: See e.g., Merrick T. Rossein. Employment Discrimination Law and Litigation. WestLaw. (2012); Charles J. Olgetree, Jr. From Dred Scott to Barack Obama: The Ebb and Flow of Race Jurisprudence. 25 Harv. Blackletter L. J. 1, (2009); Michele Goodwin, Nigger and The Construction of Citizenship, 76 Temp. L. Rev. 129 (2003); Randall L. Kennedy. "Nigger!" As A Problem In The Law. 2001 U. 111. L. Rev. 935, 944 (2001). ([I]n the mouths of whites, except perhaps in very special circumstances, 'nigger' is still widely used and perceived as a watchword for white supremacy. It is precisely because "nigger" is thought to indicate the presence o f racist beliefs or sentiments that many people take such strong objection to it."); Michael Evan Gold. Disparate Impact Is Not Unconstitutional. Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights. Spring 2011; Girardeau A. Spann. "Disparate Impact." The Georgetown Law Journal. Volume 98: 1133, 1134. (2010); Ramona L. Paetzold and Steven L. Willborn, The Statistics of Discrimination Using Statistical Evidence in Discrimination Cases (2011).; Abraham L. Wickelgren. Affirmative Action: More Efficient Than Color Blindness. 10 Tex. J. on Civil Liberties and Civil Rights 165, (2005). On Discrimination in the Workplace: See e.g., Tristin K. Green. Discrimination in -30-

Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Stmctural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory. Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review. Vol. 38, p. 91. (2003). ("In the nearly forty years since Title VTI of the Civil Rights Act was enacted to combat discrimination in employment, we have seen a shift in the ways in which discrimination operates in the workplace. As traditional social norms permitting overt racism and segregation give way to a modern norm of egalitarianism, and as well-defined, hierarchical, bureaucratic structures delineating clear paths for advancement within institutions give way to a globalized workplace of flexible governance and movement between institutions, discrimination often operates in the workplace today less as a blanket policy or discrete, idenfifiable decision to exclude than as a perpetual tug on opportunity and advancement. It often takes form in a fluid process of social interaction, perception, evaluation, and disbursement of opportunity. It creeps into everyday impressions of worth and assignment of merit on the job, lurking constantly behind even the most honest belief in equality, perpetuating the very injustice that we decry."); See also Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title V I I As A Tool for Institufional Reform, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 659 (2003); Green, Work Culture and Discrimination. Vol. 93, No. 3. May 2005; Green, A Structural Approach As Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 Vand. L . Rev. 849 (2007); Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law (2011); Jason Bent, The Telltale Signs of Discrimination: Probabilities, Information Asymmetries, and the Systemic Disparate Treatment Theory, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 44 (2011); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L.. Rev. 1161, 1187 (1995); Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological Research Related To Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 Mo. L. Rev. 83, 102 (Winter 2008);; Pat .K. Chew. Seeing Subfie Racism. 6 Stan. I Civ. Rts. & Civ. Liberties, 183, 186 (October 2010). ("Racism is not always ostentatiously egregious, explicit, or even conscious. Indeed, in contemporary American society, it is often more subtle and understood only when studied within the context in which it occurs. Ongoing empirical research helps to explain modern racism, including the ways in which social and organizational norms affect its occurrence."); Charles R. Lawrence, III. The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism. 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, (1986); Justin D. Levinson. "Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decision-Making and Misremembering. Duke Law Journal 57 (November, 2007); Americans for American Values, "What is Implicit Bias? Bias by Any Other Name." http://americansforamericanvalues.org/unconsciousbias. On Arbitration: See e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl. The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law. 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1420 (.November 2008); R. Bruce Allensworth, Irene C. Freidel, Phoebe G. Winder, William G. Potter, Robert W. Sparkes, III. That's Unconscionable: An Update Regarding the Enforceability of Arbitration Provisions in Form Contracts. 42 No. 1 UCC L. J. ART 3, Summer 2009; Gerald M.. Levine, Challenging Arbitration Agreements for Unconscionability: An Uphill Battle for Employees and Others. Dispute Resolution Journal. November 2010/January 2011; Stephen Friedman. Arbitrafion Provisions: Litfle Darlings and Little Monsters.79 Fordham L. Rev. 2035 (April 2011); Larry A. DiMatteo and Bruce Louis Rich. A Consent Theory of Unconscionabilhy: An Empirical Study of Law in Action. 33 FSU L. Rev. 1067, (2006); Imre S. Szalai. The Federal Arbitrafion Act and the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. 12 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 319, (Spring 2007); Jean R. Stemlight. Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just? 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1631, (April 2005); Christopher R. Drahozal. "Unfair" Arbitrafion Clauses. 2001 U. fll. L. Rev. 695, (2001); Miriam A. Cherry's "Not-So-Arbitrary Arbitration: Using Thle V I I Disparate Impact Analysis To Invalidate Employment Contracts That Discriminate" ("advocate[es] the use of a Thle V I I disparate impact claim[s] against employers with a history of discriminatory workplace practices choosing to insfitute pre-dispute mandatory arbitration policies" and believes this litigation strategy holds promise invalidating arbitration contracts.); Geraldine Szott Moor. Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law. 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 395 (1999) (arguing that although the "Supreme Court assume[s] that the public policy goals of ending workplace discrimination is achieved when individual employees arbitrate their claims....arbitration is not an appropriate forum in which to satisfy the public policy goals of the employment discrimination statutes, even when employees are accorded a fair hearing."); Mary Rebecca Tyre. Arbhration: An Employer's License To Steal Title V I I Claims? 52 Aabama L. Rev. 1359 (2001) ("Title V I I is a prophylactic statute intended by Congress to prevent and deter discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. By giving employees who have been discriminated against a door to federal courts. Title V I I provides the fairest forum for discrimination suits to be redressed. The majority's decision in Gilmer did not thoroughly address all issues that compelling arbitration of individual rights in employment contracts raises. Furthermore, the decision should not be broadened to include claims arising under Title VII."); Jean R. Stemlight. Dreaming About Arbhration Reform. 8 Nev. L.J. 1 (Fall 2007); Martin H. Malin. The Arbitration Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should Not Be An All Or Nothing Proposition. Indiana Law Journal (Winter 2012). On Antitrust: See e.g., Thomas E. Kauper. Section Two

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of the Sherman Act: The Search For Standards. 93 Geo. L. J. 1623, 1624 (June 2005); Louis Altman and Malla Pollack, Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies (4th Edition). (December 2012); Marcus Philip. Civil Rights and the Anti-Trust Laws. 18 U. Chi. L. Rev. 171, 171-2. 1950; Gary M . Shaw. Retaliatorily Discharged Employees' Standing To Sue Under The Antitrust Laws. 67 Or. L. Rev. 331, (1988). On Conspiracy To Interfere with Civil Rights: See e.g., Catherine E. Smith. The Group Dangers of Race-Based Conspiracies. 59 Rutgers L. Rev. 55, 68. (Fall 2006). On Judicial Corruption: Various judges have hidden their corruption under their robes by undermining the law and taking advantage of a system that is supposed to ensure justice for all. [Claimant Fraud Upon the Court, 20.] This further reflects the obvious fact that there is a "conspiracy to eviscerate many of the gains made during the civil rights movement" within America's judicial system and these ideologically conservative. Republican appointed judge should be impeached and/or disqualified for doing everything in their power to subvert the law and deny us due process and equal protection under the law. [Claimant Recall Mandate, 12-20.] See e.g. Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle. 94 Cornell L. Rev. 341, 342 (2008). http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/teachout-final.pdf ("Corruption derives from the Latin cornimpero: to break up, to spoil. Rumpo means 'to break, to shatter, to burst open, destroy, violate,' and CO means "with,"- instead of two things breaking apart (dlnimpo), or one thing breaking open (erumpo), corruption is when something breaks within itself the apple rots on the shelf narcissism corrodes the soul; government internally disintegrates. The integrity of the object of corruption is threatened by internal decay."); Charles Gardner Geyh. Judicial Disqualification: An Analysis of Federal Lav/. Federal Judicial Center, 2nd edhion. (2010); Paul M . Perell. The Disqualification of Judges and Judgments on the Grounds of Bias or the Reasonable Apprehension of Bias. 29 Advoc. Q. 102, (2004); Michael W. Martin. Current Issues in Judicial Disqualifications. 30 Review of Litigation 639, (2011); Jay Wilson. The Definitional Problems With "Moral Turpitude." The Journal of the Legal Profession. 1991. See e.g., Hana Shepherd and Devah Pager, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets. 34 Annu. Rev. Sociol 181 (2008); Alicia Luke. Employment Discriminafion Litigation: Social Science Evidence And A Solution For The Problems of Presumptions. 29 Temp. J. Sci. Tech. & Envtl. L. 75, (Spring 2010); Richard Langone. The Science of Sociological Jurisprudence As A Methodology For Legal Analysis. 17 Touro L. Rev. 769 (2000); Stanford M . Lyman. Toward A Renewed Sociological Jurisprudence: From Roscoe Pound to Herbert Blumer and Beyond. 25 Symbolic Interaction 149, (2002); Roscoe Pound. The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence. 10 Crime & Delinquency 385, (October 1964). Studies: See e.g., Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan, "Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment in Labor Market Discrimination." (June 20, 2004). http://w\\'w.nber.org/papers/w9873; African-Americans without criminal records are viewed as less desirable than v/hites with such records, (finding that fictitious resumes with African-American sounding names receive markedly fewer callbacks for job interviews than comparable fictitious resumes with White sounding names and that higher quality resumes for African-American names also elicit substantially fewer callbacks than comparable resumes for White names) (finding that ficthious resumes whh African-American sounding names receive markedly fewer callbacks for job interviews than comparable fictitious resumes with White sounding names and that higher quality resumes for African-American names also elicit substantially fewer callbacks than comparable resumes for White names); Kevin Stainback and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey. Discrimination & Desegregation: Equal Opportunhy Progress in U.S. Private Sector Workplaces Since the Civil Rights Act. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, p. 63 (2007). (The researchers conclude: "...from documenting these basic trends...while almost all workplaces have incorporated women and racial/ethnic minorities as employees, status segregation within workplaces remains very high, white males continue to have advantaged access to the best quality jobs, most racial progress in EEO stalled after 1980, and white women seem to have benefited the most from the struggles for EEO."); Irene V. Blair, Dana R. Carney, Nilanjana Dasgupta, Jack Glaser, Curtis D. Hardin, ,John T. Jost and Laurie A. Rudman. The Existence of Implicit Bias is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies That No Manager Should Ignore. 29 Research in Organizational Behavior 39 (2009) (discussing "the most important achievements that have emerged from the last 30 years' worth of social psychological research on implicit bias as well as its ramifications for our evolving understanding of the nature of prejudice"). See e.g., Cheikh Anta Diop, The African Origin Of Civilization: Myth or Realty (1957); Yosef A.A. benJochannan, African Origins of the Major 'Western Religions' (1970); Tom Burrell, Brainwashed: Challenging the Myths of Black Inferiorhy (2010); Jack Gratus, The Great Whhe Lie: Slavery, Emancipation and Changing Racial Atthudes (1973); Michael J. Klarman, Unfinished Business: Racial Equity in American History (2007); Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White (2005); J.A. Rogers, Nature Knows No Color-Line (1952); -32-

discrimination are now "rhetorical" and "rote"?' Human beings are not born racist. Racism is a learned behavior. So when you factor in the role Hollywood has played in "the overall inferiorization and genocide of American citizens of African descent," the arbitration agreement I signed becomes even more unconscionable and further supports that arbitration is an inappropriate forum to effectuate the public policy goals of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. [Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 52-87.] 1 have presented evidence establishing that the racial makeup of Agents in the New York office in 1898 was essentially the same during the time 1 was employed - September 2008 to April 2010. I have demonstrated that when 1 began working, there were zero African American or Hispanic Agent Trainees, Coordinators or Agents employed. I have demonstrated that there hasn't been an African American music Agent in the New York office since 1990. 1 have demonstrated that William Morris' reliance on word-of-mouth, referrals and the Agent Trainee program created a disparate impact against qualified African Americans and other people of color due to the company's all-White/"Jewish" workforce.^' 1 have demonstrated that I was considerably more qualified than all of my White/"Jewish" counterparts in the Agent Trainee program and they all advanced above me. I've demonstrated these things and many more throughout my pleadings. This is not due to chance - it's intentional. The Respondents have not met their heightened burden of persuasion and production to reflite these facts. I f this much evidence has been proffered to demonstrate that an institution - in this case, William Morris Endeavor Entertainment (formerly known as the William Morris Agency) - with considerable influence over the concert promofion business, powerfijl communicative mediums such as television & film and the collective consciousness o f society has engaged in egregious race-based employment discrimination spanning 115 years and engaged in a sinister conspiracy - with the help of Michael P. Zweig and Loeb & Loeb LLP, amongst others - to "freeze" its race-based monopoly throughout Hollywood, at what point, i f ever, would a pre-dispute, mandatory agreement to arbitrate claims of racial discrimination be considered unconscionable, tainted with illegality or malum in se? After 125 years? 150 years? 500 years? It's beginning to appear that i f the judge, arbitrator or finder of fact is a white male, the answer is

Rogers, Sex & Race Vol. 1 (1952); Carter G. Woodson, The Mis-Education of the Negro (1933); Dr. Frances CressWelsing, The Isis (YSSIS) Papers: The Keys to the Colors. ; Malcolm X, The Autobiography of Malcolm X (1964). Ted Johnson. "Comcast, NBC U Pledge More Diversity." Variety. June 7, 2010. ("As a congressional committee holds a Los Angeles hearing today devoted largely to the impact of the Comcast and NBC Universal transaction on diversity, the companies are unveiling a new series of public interest commiitments designed to boost minority representation on and off screen."); Nikki Finke. "Hollywood Minorities Complain To Me: 'We Are Not That Hard To Find.'" Deadline. June 21, 2006. http://www.deadline.com/2006/06/we-are-not-that-hard-to-find/. '° The best definition for "rote" that 1 found online was: "a memorizing process using routine or repetition, often without full attention or comprehension." Very insulting. No matter what Gregory thinks, efforts in Congress to pass the .Arbitration Fairness Act additionally supports my "conclusory rote": William Morris' pre-dispute, mandatory arbitration agreement should not be enforced. In the article "Mandatory Labor Arbitration of Statutory Claims and the Future of Fair Employment," which is co-written by Gregory and ched in his July 15, 2013 Interim Decision, he states that "[mjuch of the reform legislation is, despite benign titles, in fact hostile to labor and employment arbitration" and described the proposed legislation as "pernicious populist legislative fires." (emphasis added) Clearly, this arbitrator is pro-arbitration, even in situations when an employer with superior bargaining power engages in intentional race-based employment discrimination and compels its token minority employees to waive their right to a jury in pre-dispute, mandatory arbitration agreements as a condition of employment, pg. 457-8.] ^' See, e.g., H.R. Rep. 92-238, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971); see also id. at 22 ("[l]f the use of the test acts to maintam exisring or past discriminatory imbalances in the job, or tends to discriminate against applicants on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, the employer must show an overriding business necessity to justify use of the test."); id. at 8 ("showing of an overriding business necessity for the use of such criteria."). Although no one suggested in the debates of the 1972 amendments that the employer's burden was merely that of articulating a legitimate reason for engaging in practices that systematically excluded minorities or women. Congress was clear that the employer's burden was substanfial. For instance. Sen. Dominick explained that under Griggs, "employment tests, even if fairly applied, are invalid if they have a discriminatory effect and can't be justified on the basis of business necessity " 118 Cong. Rec. 697 (1972) (citafion omitted) (emphasis added). -33-

never"^ I didn't pull these logical arguments out of thin air. Clearly, after 115 years have elapsed, conclusions can be made. I f the cumulative evidence that sits before you isn't a shock to your conscience and/or doesn't disgust or offend you, that means you have a high tolerance for racism and your bias - conscious or unconscious - is clouding your judgment. The tone of your writing has changed from that of a neutral arbitrator to an attorney representing the Respondents and any objective obserx'er would conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely. The more we collectively ignore histor)' in our "post-racial society," the more history will rear its ugly, racist head and find more covert and insidious ways to repeat itself again. Although this is already happening. - a rise in white racism - there must be a counterattack from the African American community and those interested in racial equality to create consequential balance. After becoming more knowledgeable about the true history of my ancestors^'', I realized that if the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was not strengthened to combat institutional racism and discrimination occurring in the present, the African American community would experience unprecedented setbacks in the fijture. This prediction has also come true, as things have only worsened for the African American community as a whole in the three years since filing a complaint with the EEOC on June 3, 2010. Aside from Barack Obama's individual achievement of being reelected to a second term as President of the United States, some of things that have negatively impacted the African American community include, but are not limited to: the unemployment reached a 27 year peak at 16.7 percent in August 2011^" and has historically remained double that of whites, recent decisions by the conservative, majority Republican appointed Supreme Court have deemed a substantial portion o f the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to be unconstitutional which will make it tough for blacks to

See e.g., Humility, Humanity and Judicial Diversity, (quoting Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.405, 423 (2000).) (""[T]he most important and elusive benefit of white racial identity is the ability of whites to deny the existence of whiteness at all. Thus, an important privilege o f whiteness may be the ability to think of oneself without regard to race-to see oneself instead as neutral, unbiased or impartial."); Byron R. White, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1215, 1216 (1992) (quoted in James Andrew Wynn, Jr. and Eli Paul Mazur, Judicial Diversity: Where Independence and Accountability Meet,67 Alb. L. Rev. 775, 788 (2004)). ("Even the most conscientious judge will have difficulty in imagining the thoughts and feelings of people who have grown up in groups that [the judge's] culture has trained him to see as outsiders."); Joe R. Feagin, Costs of Slavery, Segregation and Contemporary Racism. 20 Harv. Blackletter L. J. 51-52 (2004) ("White privilege entails the array of many benefits and advantages inherhed by each generation of those defined as 'white' in United States society. These racialized advantages are both material and symbolic, and they penetrate and encompass many interactions among whites and between whites and others over the course of lifetimes. White privilege is ubiquhous and imbedded even where most whites cannot see it; h is the foundation of this society. It began in early white gains from slavery and has persisted under legal segregation and contemporary racism. Acceptance of this system of white privileges and black disadvantages as normal has conferred advantages for whhes now across some fifteen generations."). " Supra note 46. See also, Ivan Van Sertima, "African Science Before the Birth of the 'New' Worid." 22 Black Collegian 69, (January/February 1992); Documenting Costs of Slavery, Segregation and Contemporary Racism, p.64. ("...the United States government has been ven,' active in its efforts to force the German government to make reparations to the victims of Nazi atrocities. As Richard Delgado has noted, 'The United States required that Germany make reparations to Israel and the victims of the Holocaust, even though the Nazi government had been disbanded and most of its leaders executed or imprisoned.' For twelve years the Nazis inflicted extreme repression and cruelties, and millions of deaths, on the Jews in Germany and other Nazi-controlled territories. Later German governments have paid more than $60 billion in reparations to individual victims of the Holocaust, as well as to the nation of Israel on behalf of those victims, even though that nation did not exist at the time of the atrocities."); See e.g, Andy Knoll, "What We Don't Talk About When We Talk About Jobs." The Nation. July 5, 2011. (Even though this was a "27-year peak," the statistic provided is actually underreported because it doesn't take into account those who are underemployed - like myself - or prisoners. As for the latter group, "Incarceration amounts to a double whammy when it comes to African-American unemployment. Rarely mentioned in the usual drumbeat of media reports on jobs is the fact that the Labor Department doesn't include prison populations in hs official unemployment statistics. This automatically shrinks the pool of blacks capable of working and in the process lowers the black jobless rate. In the mid-1990s, academics Bruce Western and Becky Pettit discovered that the American prison population lowered the jobless rate for black men by five percentage points, and for young black men by eight percentage points.") -34-

vote in upcoming elections, the court has also punished schools for using affirmative action in higher education, and the racially motivated murders of Trayvon Martin and other young black men. Cumulatively, these ugly events have exposed harsh truths: blacks still remain second class citizens in our own country. The acquittal of George Zimmerman highlights the exact issue that was raised in my opposition to arbitration: "race is relentlessly relevant and continues to play an inevitable role in the allocation of societal benefits and burdens."^' [Claimant 0pp. Arbitration, 9.] As a result, a new civil rights movement is underway. Seeing video of these protests serve as a confirmation for me that I am not the only one fed up with how African Americans are treated. On July 20, 2013, more than 100 marches took place at federal buildings throughout the country.'* August 28, 2013 will mark the 50 year anniversary of the prolific March on Washington for "Jobs and Freedom"^' and it is no surprise that various civil rights organizations have planned demonstrations and marches in the upcoming months for the exact same reasons.^* These endemic issues that plague the African American community - "poverty and joblessness, health care, crime and incarceration, barriers to civic participation, the administration's record, education, and black progress against long odds" - need solutions and in the area of employment discrimination, I am "using the legal process as an instrument [for] social justice." [April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 9.] Not only am I seeking to vindicate my inalienable rights, I'm trying to be a catalyst for positive change" and correct this systematic wrong. By doing so, I'm addressing and challenging key social issues, including but not limited to, "race," pervasive and widespread employment discrimination throughout the American workplace,*"" vertically integrated judicial corruption and the dangers of Hollywood's race-based monopoly on the African American community, society and marketplace of ideas. Naturally, in a white supremacist society, the odds have been stacked against me from the beginning to prevail because a case of this magnitude has the potential to forever disrupt the status quo and white power structure in America. But we must no longer allow our future to be defined by myths. As nation's racial demographics continue to change''', historically all-Whhe/"Jewish" industries like Hollywood, Wall Street, advertising, fashion, Silicon Valley, the media and our judicial system to name a few must also begin to diversify in the workplace. Although I have been blacklisted from Hollywood and my career and livelihood in jeopardy, I have devoted the last three years of my life fighting this case as a pro se litigant. Why? Anonymous juror known as B37 stated: " I think all of us [on the jury] thought race did not play a role. We never had that discussion." Bill Barrow. "'Justice for Trayvon' Rallies Gather in 100 Cities." HujfinglonPosL July 20, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/20/justice-for-trayvon_n_3627985.html. " Freddie Allen. "The 'Forgotten Goals' of the 1963 March on Washington." The Final Call July 2, 2013. http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/National_News_2/article_10025.shtml. Nick Chiles. "Black Leaders Put Obama On Notice By Crafting A Black Agenda." Atlanta Blackstar. December 6, 2012. http://atlantablackstar.com/2012/12/06/black-leaders-put-obama-on-notice-by-crafting-a-black-agenda/. This is why I called my blog chronicling this case Me Against Iniquity. "Iniquity/' according to Merrian-Webster means "a gross injustice: wickedness." Arthur Delaney. "Black Unemployment Drives 'Perpetual, Slow-Moving Recession.'" HuffinglonPost. July 22, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/22/black-unemployment_n_3624725.html?utm_hp_ref^black-voices ("Blacks bear a disproportionate share of the unemployment burden. The national jobless rate is 7.6 percent; for African Americans, it's 13.7 percent. Since 1979, the unemployment rate for blacks has tracked the same ups and downs as the overall rate, but it's usually been at least twice as high. At the same time, h gets half the attention. In the fall of 2009, the U.S. unemployment rate topped 10 percent for the first time in a quarter century, causing policymakers and analysts to lament the catastrophe that had befallen the American public. Yet throughout that entire prior period the average rate of African American unemployment had been 12.2 percent, according to the Economic Policy Institute, a liberal think tank. And while the gap between poverty for blacks and whites has narrowed over decades, at 27.6 percent the black poverty rate is nearly double the overall rate of 15 percent. In other words, as EPI scholars wrote in a 2012 book on working America, 'African Americans have essentially been living through a perpetual, slow-moving recession.'") *' Stephanie Siek and Joe Sterling, "Census: Fewer White Babies Being Born," CNN. May 17, 2012. http://inamerica.blogs.cnn.eom/2012/05/17./census-2011-data-confirm-trend-of-population-diversity/. ("U.S. minorities now represent more than half of America's population under the age of 1, the Census Bureau said, a historic demographic milestone with profound political, economic and social implications.") -35-

Because 1 believe that with God on my side, the truth will ultimately prevail. He equipped me with an arsenal of antidiscrimination case law and a mountain of compelling evidence, so I had faith that justice would be served. That is.... i f "all men are [truly] created equal." Regardless of the outcome, I know that what Fm doing will ultimately benefit the greater good of society - even i f it does not happen in my lifetime. William Morris' must be held accountable for their unlawful and immoral actions and their crimes against the African American community, and humanity as a whole, must finally be acknowledged, addressed and remedied.

V.

Conclusion

Clearly, it should not take an Arbitrator with 30 years' experience as a professor of law to make a decision on whether or not the arbitration agreements I signed as a condition of employment while working at the William Morris Agency (now known as William Morris Endeavor Entertainment) should be enforced based on the pyramid of evidence that's before you. At this present moment, 1 am not going to seek your disqualification. Instead I am going to request that an oral hearing take place with the goal of clarifying these issues and having the Respondents speak about "Exhibh 31" on the record, h is my hopes that this hearing will fulfill the Arbitrator's desire to have an oral hearing before making a final decision. [July 15, 2013 Interim Decision, 3.] Prior to receiving the Arbitrator's second Interim Decision, plans were already made for me to leave New York Chy for approximately three weeks to spend time with my family. .As a result, I am asking that the Respondents reply be submitted no later than Wednesday, July 31, 2013 and request that an expedited oral hearing take place at the New York office o f the American Arbitration Association no later than Monday, August 5, 2013. I f my request for an oral hearing is not granted and the gross errors mentioned above are not clarified and/or modified, this will undoubtedly demonstrate that an appearance and/or actual bias, prejudice, impropriety and a "pattern" of corruption exists and 1 will have no choice but to seek your disqualification under A A A Rule 16. I f and once these issues are clarified and modified in your July 15, 2013 Interim Decision, a decision should be made with regards to whether or not the arbitration agreement should be enforced, and based on that decision, you should either dismiss all of my claims, allow the case to go back to the federal court for discovery and a jury trial or grant summary judgment on all claims in my favor. See Exhibit C. In the interests of justice, I ask that any and all discovery be stayed until these issues are properly addressed and resolved

Dated: New York, New York July 26, 2013

Marcus I . Washington Pro Se Claimant 54 Boerum St. Apt. 6 M Brooklyn, N Y 11206 (646) 504-6497 humanrights.areamust@gmail.com

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