SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. L-34952. July 25, 1975.] THE HONORABLE RAMON D. BAGATSING, JESUS L. CARMELO and FRANCISCO L.

PIMENTEL, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE A. MELENCIOHERRERA and VICENTE S. PULIDO, respondents. Antonio P. Coronel, Vicente P. Valenzuela, Santiago F. Alidio, Benigno T. Dayaw and Felix C. Chavez for petitioners. K. V. Faylona & Associates for respondent Vicente S. Pulido. SYNOPSIS On February 1, 1972, private respondent, who was an appointee of Mayor Villegas, was charged with partisan political activities and, thereafter, was suspended by Mayor Bagatsing. In view thereof, he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction for his reinstatement and a preliminary preventive injunction to restrain the administrative investigation. The lower court issued both writs on the ground that the suspension would impair the court's normal functioning and that the administrative investigation conducted by Mayor Bagatsing is violative of due process because he occupied the dual role of the offended party and the investigator. Petitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition to annul the orders of the lower court. Meanwhile, pending this petition, private respondent tendered his resignation with the Secretary of Justice, in compliance with the Letters of Instruction Nos. 14 and 14A, which resignation the Secretary of Justice forwarded to and was accepted by Mayor Bagatsing. The Supreme Court ruled that since private respondent was appointed by the Mayor whose salary was paid out of city funds, he was a city employee subject to the mayor's disciplinary jurisdiction. The mayor is invested with the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and remove him. Hence, his, resignation, having been validly accepted by Mayor Bagatsing, rendered the petition moot. Case dismissed. SYLLABUS 1. PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES; EXECUTIVE SHERIFF; POWER OF REMOVAL BY MAYOR. — Private respondent, as an executive sheriff and court liaison officer appointed by the mayor and receiving compensation out of the city funds, is a city employee subject to the Mayor's disciplinary jurisdiction. The Mayor is invested with the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and remove him (See Secs. 11 (g) and 22, Charter of Manila). The power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint (Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil, 740, 749). 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF REMOVAL SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE. — The Mayor's exercise of the power of removal is subject to review by the Commissioner of Civil Service as provided in Section 33 of the Civil Service Law and in Presidential Decree No. 6 dated September 27, 1972 which amended certain rules on discipline of government employees. (68 O.G., 7971) 3. ID. ID.; POWER OF MAYOR TO ACCEPT RESIGNATION OF CITY EMPLOYEES; INSTANT CASE. — Resignation of an executive sheriff and court liaison officer who is considered a city employee could be validly accepted by the Mayor. More so, where the resignation which was tendered with the Secretary of Justice was forwarded by the latter to the Mayor, an admission that said officer was under the mayor's administrative control and not an employee of the Department of Justice. 4. ID.; ID.; DISTINGUISHED FROM DEPUTY SHERIFF. — The executive sheriff and court liaison officer should be distinguished from the deputy sheriffs attached to the salas of the Court of First Instance who are appointed by the Secretary of Justice and who obviously are under the Secretary's disciplinary jurisdiction.

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discipline. FERNANDO. October 30. If there was something objectionable then where there was executive supervision. Pacis vs. ID. DUTY. 106) 8. Vergara. — An executive sheriff is different from that of the deputy clerk of the municipal court (now City Court) of Manila who is appointed by the Secretary of Justice and is therefore under his administrative supervision. Certainly a sheriff cannot be considered as exempt from such exclusive competence. ID. ID. or town executive is kept fully informed through an executive officer and liaison officer. ID." "From a very remote period in English constitutional history. ID. — Also to be distinguished from an executive sheriff are the employees of the City Fiscal's Office of Manila... Chapter 9 of that Code dealing with courts of superior jurisdiction. ID. — Implicit in the status of a sheriff as functionary of a court is that he be subject to its orders.. the Mayor has no power to appoint the employees therein. like the sheriff. ID.. . the shire had had another officer. A reeve is "an ancient English officer of justice inferior in rank to an alderman .. J. 708. ID. JUDICIARY. ... Villafranca 114 Phil. It would be an unjustified departure from the course of history if such functionary were considered as being excluded from the personnel of a court of justice and counted as a minor official of a local government unit. The Court of First Instance may control the conduct of an executive sheriff in the sense that.. DISTINGUISHED FROM DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT. November 29. — A city. 5.. if he fails to comply with the Court's orders. ID. It is absolutely essential to the proper administration of justice that courts have full control over the official actions of those through whom the administration of the affairs of the court proceeds. — Private respondent's contention that he was subject to the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Justice who had "supervision and control of the provincial sheriffs" (Section 83. Averia. ID. concurring: 1. SHERIFF.. — Since the earliest times up to the present Constitution. L-16174.. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Sangalang vs.. 1966. ID. (People vs. ID. it does not mean that the Mayor cannot investigate. . .. 52 Phil. The municipal court of Manila is not included in any of the departments of the City of Manila. ID. Hence. ID. and put the laws in execution. According to the city charter. ID. namely the shire reeve or as we say sheriff. Ocacha. is a Saxon word signifying a division later called a county... ID. SUPREME COURT SUPERVISION OVER SHERIFF. he may be adjudged in contempt of court and punished accordingly. (Lacson and Aquino vs.. ACCEPTANCE OF RESIGNATION OF EXECUTIVE AND COURT LIAISON OFFICER BY MAYOR RENDERS INSTANT CASE MOOT.' . the situation is infinitely worse if it could be deemed 2 . ID. provincial. keep the King's peace. and was also called the 'shire reeve. 1962).. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MAY CONTROL CONDUCT OF EXECUTIVE SHERIFF. ID. the City Fiscal's Office is under the Department of Justice. L-25526. 6. a sheriff has continued his status as an adjunct of the court and not of a municipal corporation. SHERIFF IS A JUDICIAL OFFICER.5. ID.. 2. 704.. DEFINED.. Revised Administrative Code) is untenable..) 7. DISTINGUISHED FROM EMPLOYEE OF CITY FISCAL'S OFFICE.. SECTION 83 OF REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE NOT APPLICABLE. the duty of obedience being cast upon him. The Revised Administrative Code makes a distinction between the sheriff of Manila and the provincial sheriffs as may be readily discerned from Article XI (Office of the Sheriff). ID. He is not a provincial sheriff. in English law. 3." 4. appointed to process. suspend. — Even though the executive sheriff. or remove him. is a ministerial officer of the Court of First Instance. ID. — A sheriff is "an officer of great antiquity." A shire. — The present Constitution leaves no doubt of the power of the Supreme Court to exercise supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

Pulido on March 9. — For judicial independence to be a reality the least interference by or influence from other governmental department is of the essence. 1972 eight employees charged Pulido administratively with having engaged in partisan political activities in behalf of Mayor Villegas during the 1971 elections. 1972. 86437). His prior position was branch clerk of court in the Court of First Instance of Manila. On December 23. The motions of Bagatsing. Pulido in his petition prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for his reinstatement and a preliminary preventive injunction to restrain the administrative investigation (Civil Case No. Carmelo and Francisco L. WORDS AND PHRASES. who had vanquished Villegas in the 1971 mayoralty race. 1969 Mayor Antonio J. It was a commendable innovation then for the present constitution to provide explicitly for the Supreme Court's administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. it would seem at the very least unorthodox for one so designated to be strict law a sheriff.to be legally permissible for a local government to have a hand in the appointment of an executive sheriff serving as court functionary. This practice of using loosely certain terms which have acquired both traditional and legal meaning should not be tolerated further. Villegas appointed Pulido as chief deputy sheriff and chief of division of the sheriff's office in Manila (Item 2 of Budget Ordinance No. J p: This case involves the reinstatement of Vicente S. It could reflect in the judiciary itself. suspended Pulido. of the complaints. On February 1. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE UNDER THE 1973 CONSTITUTION. the creation of which was indefensible in theory and likely to be deleterious in practice. the incumbent chief and assistant chief. 65 dated February 24. There are strong policy considerations that militate against it. The lower court in its order of March 11. TERM "SHERIFF" MUST NOT BE LOOSELY USED. Pulido to the position of executive sheriff and court liaison officer of the sheriff's office in Manila. the boundary line may be tenuous at times. 1972. it is not only essential that impartiality be the rule but also that so it must appear. investigation and public assistance division of the Mayor's office. — Although in a spirit of cooperation. On February 15. 1972 filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition against Mayor Bagatsing and his investigators. Bagatsing. (The Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Manila is the ex-officio sheriff). 1970 changed Pulido's designation to executive sheriff and court liaison officer (assistant chief of office) and increased his salary to twenty thousand pesos per annum. Pimentel. The acceptance of the resignation of the executive sheriff and liaison officer by the respondent mayor which rendered the case moot affords no warrant for the latter to appoint a successor to such a position in the city government. Jesus L. 6. The Municipal Board in Resolution No.. 3 . 1972 directed Mayor Bagatsing to reinstate Pulido and temporarily restrained the administrative investigation. ID. Such function was formerly in the hands of the Secretary of Justice.. Moreover. In view of that preventive suspension. ID. respectively. local government units could help facilitate the enforcement of court orders. Carmelo and Pimentel for the reconsideration of that order were denied by the lower court in its order of April 6. While it is true that the judicial and administrative spheres do not occupy the same terrain. It is productive of confusion. 7. Mayor Villegas approved that resolution. 1972 Mayor Ramon D. the lower court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and a temporary restraining order both dated March 13. 6651). DECISION AQUINO. it is a truism that when it comes to the administration of justice. After Pulido had posted bonds in separate amounts of five hundred pesos.

Pulido moved for the reconsideration of the Mayor's action. 1972 Bagatsing. They cite the provision that "heads of chartered cities shall have original jurisdiction to investigate and decide on matters involving disciplinary action" (Sec. 1972. The Mayor and his investigators invoke sections 11 (q) and 22 of the City Charter which empower the Mayor to appoint and remove city employees whose appointment is not vested in the President of the Philippines. The order was amended on May 10. Pulido contends that the City Mayor has no jurisdiction over the sheriff's office and its personnel and that only the Court of First Instance or the Department of Justice can exercise supervision and control over him. The case was duly heard. And in enjoining the administrative investigation. The Mayor said that Pulido's resignation should have been submitted to his office because Pulido "is a city employee. A to A-24 and B to B-5 attached to petitioners' memorandum) and that those employees should not be confounded with the deputy sheriffs attached to the Courts of First Instance who were appointed by the Secretary of Justice (Annexes E to E-9). in justifying its order of reinstatement. On receiving it. This Court issued a temporary restraining order on April 27. The parties submitted memoranda. in compliance with Letters of Instruction Nos. 5[a]. Carmelo and Pimentel concluded that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering Pulido's reinstatement and in restraining the administrative investigation because the Court of First Instance of Manila is not vested with any inherent power to control Pulido's conduct and is devoid of any power to investigate and remove him and that even the Secretary of Justice does not possess such powers over Pulido. He alleged that his resignation could not be accepted because the 4 . 1973. whose conduct can be controlled by the court (Sec. 1973 the Secretary transmitted Pulido's letter of resignation to Mayor Bagatsing. In a letter dated December 28. Counsel for Bagatsing. On the other hand. Rules of Court). 4 of the Decentralization Law). 1972 Bagatsing requested the Secretary to forward Pulido's letter of resignation to the Mayor's office. The petition was given due course. Pulido tendered his resignation as executive sheriff to the Secretary of Justice (See Letter of Instruction No. his appointment having come from this (the Mayor's) office". implies that the Secretary does not have that power under existing law. On January 3. 33 of the Civil Service Law. They point out that House Bill No. On October 9. Pulido filed his answer. 1972. See Sec. the Mayor accepted Pulido's resignation effective February 6.On April 11. 1972 and which sought to amend section 183 of the Revised Administrative Code by placing the Sheriff. 1972. 1972). Mayor Bagatsing and his two investigators contend that the employees of the sheriff's office in Manila have always been appointed. Rule 135. The lower court. 1972 in the sense that the administrative investigation may proceed but no decision should be rendered until further orders from this Court. which was reported by the Judiciary Committee on April 6. Carmelo and Pimentel filed in this Court the instant special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition to annul the lower court's order of March 11. 4688. the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction reinstating Pulido and the order suspending the administrative investigation. reasoned out that inasmuch as the executive sheriff is a ministerial officer. the lower court observed that it was violative of due process because the Mayor occupied the dual role of offended party and investigator. his suspension would supposedly impair the court's normal functioning. his deputies and the personnel of his office under the administrative supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice. 14 and 14-A. 14-B dated November 9. He argues that the lower court did not gravely abuse its discretion in ordering his reinstatement and in restraining the administrative investigation. investigated and removed by the City Mayor and not by the Secretary of Justice nor by the Judges of the Court of First Instance of Manila (see the 31 Annexes.

That objective was attained by the acceptance of his resignation. were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence by the Court of First Instance of Manila. in ordering Pulido's reinstatement and in enjoining the administrative investigation. Pulido asked Mayor Bagatsing to dismiss the administrative case. 1975 an urgent motion for the lifting of the amended temporary restraining order dated May 10. "is entitled to the amnesty granted in Presidential Decree No. considering that the petition herein was filed for the specific purpose of preventing Pulido's reinstatement. He said that such power includes the appointment and discipline of court personnel. They argued that Pulido's action was premised on the continuity of his tenure as executive sheriff and court liaison officer but that his employment was terminated by the acceptance of his resignation. Jose M. At this juncture. That motion has not been resolved. He added that because the Supreme Court under the new Constitution has administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof the status quo in his case should have been maintained.. He filed a motion in this Court praying that the Mayor be declared in contempt of court. is clothed with authority to investigate. They further contended that the lifting of the restraining order would render the instant case moot. composed of Fernando R. Petitioners Bagatsing. 1. if the Constitution would not be applicable to his case because the position of executive sheriff could not be included in the term "personnel of the court". discipline and remove him. alleged that the acceptance of Pulido's resignation rendered moot his certiorari and prohibition actions against them in the lower court (Civil Case No. 1972 so that he could be reinstated. 185 dated May 7. Madarang. 1974 the Comelec's Amnesty Special Division. The trial court's questioned order was predicated on the assumption that it possessed the prerogative to control the conduct of Pulido. Veloso. Art. In view of that amnesty order. who appointed Pulido. This Court in its resolution of June 8. Inasmuch as the Mayor did not act on that request. the same charge which was ventilated in the administrative case. 433". 1973 required the parties to show cause why the case should not be considered moot in view of the Mayor's acceptance of Pulido's resignation. His alternative contention is that. Jr. The ostensible issue in this case is whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion. amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. as 5 . As indicated in the pleadings and memoranda. X of the Constitution. Mendoza and Casimiro R. 86437 from which the instant case arose). the legal issue is whether the Mayor of Manila. They opined that only a reappointment could restore him to the position from which he had resigned and that an amnesty or pardon does not automatically restore to the service a dismissed or suspended public officer. then the instant case should be dismissed on the ground that it is the Secretary of Justice who has administrative supervision over him. lift the order of suspension and reinstate him. Mayor Bagatsing. He averred that the instant case had become moot by reason of the transfer to this Court of the administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel (Sec. Pulido reiterated his contention that the Mayor's acceptance of his resignation contravened the restraining order issued by this Court. as respondent in the administrative case pending in Mayor Bagatsing's office. in their comment on Pulido's urgent motion. Pulido apprised this Court that the five criminal cases filed by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) against him for electioneering. 6. issued an order declaring that Pulido. Sec.question of whether it was the Mayor or the Secretary of Justice who could remove him was sub judice. Pulido filed in this Court on January 8. Carmelo and Pimentel. it is apropos to state that on December 4. 1973). Carmelo and Pimentel manifested that because of the acceptance of Pulido's resignation the instant case had become moot and should therefore be dismissed. suspend. Pulido took a different view.

000. 749). But when Mayor Bagatsing succeeded Villegas. should investigate Pulido. Romero. extending to local officials the coverage of Letter of Instruction No. 1972 which amended certain rules on discipline of government employees (68 O. The irony in Pulido's case is that as long as Mayor Villegas was in power he apparently wanted to be categorized as a city employee. The Mayor's exercise of the power of removal would be subject to review by the Commissioner of Civil Service as provided in section 33 of the Civil Service Law and in Presidential Decree No. Generally. they assign divergent grounds to support their conclusions. 11[q] and 22.600 per annum was raised to P20. the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint (Lacson vs. his resignation could be accepted by the Mayor (See Letter of Instruction No. and that it was unfair that Bagatsing. transmitted to him Pulido's letter of resignation is an admission by that high official that Pulido was under the Mayor's administrative control and was not an employee of the Department of Justice. Caldea where a deputy sheriff of the Manila CFI and two deputy sheriffs of the Manila sheriff's office were investigated by Judge Serafin Cuevas. He is an officer of the Manila Court of First Instance. 14-A). The fact that the Secretary of Justice. Charter of Manila). when requested by Mayor Bagatsing. 68 O. as an executive sheriff and court liaison officer appointed by the Mayor and receiving compensation out of city funds. to avoid being disciplined by Bagatsing. which was engaging in partisan political activities. 14-B. The Revised Administrative Code makes a distinction between the sheriff 6 . 1974 in Administrative Matter No. P17. Pulido's contention that he was subject to the administrative jurisdiction of the Secretary of Justice who had "supervision and control of the provincial sheriffs" (Sec. His original salary of P9. 83. suspend.a ministerial officer of the court. As already noted. Pulido. he should logically be under the administrative supervision of the Secretary of Justice. His appointment was never submitted for approval to the Secretary of Justice. Whichever viewpoint is followed. G. By virtue of that power of removal. However. He was appointed by the Mayor to a position provided for in the city budget. wanted to submit to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Secretary of Justice. had no connection with his judicial duties. In that sense he is a city employee. But his work is essentially judicial. ** We are of the opinion that Pulido. That issue cannot be evaded. the parties agree that the instant case had become moot. now this Court. Revised Administrative Code) is untenable. The supervening issue is whether Bagatsing's acceptance of Pulido's resignation rendered the instant case moot. 84 Phil. For that reason. As Pulido was a city employee. He took pains to establish that he was a judicial officer or court functionary who could only be removed by the Secretary of Justice although the ground for removal. 7971). And the designation of his position was modified so as to give the impression that he was not a mere deputy sheriff but also a liaison officer between the City of Manila and the Court of First Instance. 8864-7. The Mayor is invested with the power to investigate. Madera vs. who reported his investigation to this Court as the successor of the Secretary of Justice). was a city employee subject to the Mayor's disciplinary jurisdiction. the fact is that to declare this case moot it is necessary to resolve the issue of who has the power to remove Pulido. G. as the aggrieved party. two deputy sheriffs in the Manila sheriff's office were dismissed by Mayors Villegas and Bagatsing. The difficulty in resolving that issue lies in the dual character of Pulido's position. He is not a provincial sheriff. Pulido's case is distinguishable from the deputy sheriffs attached to the salas of the Courts of First Instance who were appointed by the Secretary of Justice and who obviously were under the Secretary's disciplinary jurisdiction (See Resolution of this Court dated January 15. 6 dated September 27. 740. discipline and remove him (See secs.

more fully in accord with the cardinal concepts of separation of powers and independence of the judiciary. His status then as a functionary in the judicial department under the then supervision of the Secretary of Justice is undeniable. continue the administrative investigation and ultimately remove him. discipline or remove him. to my mind. L-16174. I am in agreement. 1. On the other hand. the acceptance by Mayor Bagatsing of Pulido's resignation had rendered the instant case moot. J. Jr. concur. Nonetheless. the Mayor has no power to appoint the employees therein (Sangalang vs.00 to P20. WHEREFORE. he may be adjudged in contempt of court and punished accordingly (People vs. the executive sheriff. that the opinion penned by Justice Aquino is notable for its lucidity of presentation and adequacy of treatment of the issues involved. while no doubt impressed with merit.600. by reason of the duties of his office.. and in connection with this case. Antonio and Concepcion. the instant case is dismissed. To be more specific. 52 Phil. I am persuaded to file this brief concurrence in view of my belief that the same result could be reached from another standpoint. concurring: With the conclusion reached by the Court that this petition for certiorari and prohibition. 1962. JJ. the instant petition of Mayor Bagatsing and his investigators for certiorari and prohibition is meritorious. The Court of First Instance may control the conduct of an executive sheriff in the sense that.. Thereafter. According to the city charter. if he fails to comply with the court's orders. like the sheriff. 6 SCRA 295). however. Also to be distinguished from Pulido are the employees of the City Fiscal's Office of Manila. one. October 30. Hence. As already stated. And the circumstance that. The municipal court of Manila is not included in any of the departments of the City of Manila (Lacson and Aquino vs. Inasmuch as Pulido was a city employee subject to the Mayor's disciplinary jurisdiction.. 18 SCRA 907). in view of the increase in pay from P9. to my way of thinking. 1966.00. SO ORDERED. Chapter 9 of that Code dealing with courts of superior jurisdiction. 708. Barredo. Averia. he had himself appointed by the then City Mayor 7 . The lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion when in its order of March 11. and as noted in the opinion. suspend. Pulido's case is different from that of the deputy clerk of court of the municipal court (now City Court) of Manila who was appointed by the Secretary of Justice and was therefore under his administrative supervision. What strikes me as a significant fact in this litigation is that respondent Pulido was originally a branch clerk of court of one of the salas of the Court of First Instance of Manila. November 29. Separate Opinions FERNANDO. This is not to deny.of Manila and the provincial sheriffs as may be readily discerned from Article XI (Office of the Sheriff). L-22526. Vergara. The purpose of the petition herein was to maintain Pulido's suspension.000. 106). Pacis vs. No costs. 114 Phil. Covacha. that objective was encompassed when his resignation was accepted. the City Fiscal's Office is under the Department of Justice. 704. under the present Constitution where the exercise of the judicial power by the men on the bench and the enforcement of their orders by the minor officials in that branch of government should be fully and effectively insulated from extraneous influences. Villafranca. is a ministerial officer of the Court of First Instance does not mean that the Mayor cannot investigate. 1972 it ordered Pulido's reinstatement and restrained the administrative investigation. basic postulates of the constitutional system even more imperatively calling for observance. need not require further action as the acceptance by petitioner Mayor Bagatsing of the resignation of respondent Pulido had terminated his right to the office of "executive sheriff and court liaison officer" of the City of Manila. I refer to that which could come from the head of a local government unit.

Summers." 5 A shire. There are strong policy considerations that militate against it. a sheriff has continued his status as an adjunct of the court and not of a municipal corporation. the duty of obedience being cast upon him. 6 A reeve is "an ancient English officer of justice inferior in rank to an alderman . It is productive of confusion.: 18 Implicit in his status as functionary of a court is that he be subject to its orders. While the common law as such. I can see that in a spirit of cooperation. 2. principles. so it has been in the Philippines from the time of the organization of the judiciary upon the cession of the Philippines from the United States. and was also called the 'shire reeve. namely the shire reeve or as we say. impressive for their unanimity.Antonio Villegas in what I consider to be the rather anomalous position of a socalled "Chief Deputy Sheriff and Chief of Division" of the Sheriff's Office in Manila." 7 "From a very remote period in English constitutional history. Manalo." 9 Similarly. whose work on English constitutional history is likewise noteworthy. As will be more fully discussed. 14 More specifically. It is a matter of history that the judiciary. For one in the service of the judiciary to be beholden to a local government executive is not to be tolerated. hence. 12 Justice Moreland. . 2 "is not in force. Taswell-Langmead. now with the present Constitution. appointed to process. certainly did not change matters. and put the laws in execution. This principle was emphasized by Justice Moreland in his extended opinion in United States v. This practice of using loosely certain terms which have acquired both a traditional and legal meaning should not be tolerated further. I find it difficult to accept the view that a sheriff. 17 "involves both [discretion] and personal liability .' . in United States v. 16 His competence. keep the King's peace. could be other than a court functionary in the service of the national government and not of a municipal corporation." as set forth by Maitland in his classic work. he is. The present Constitution leaves no doubt of the power of this Court to exercise supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. but it would seem at the very least unorthodox for one so designated to be in strict law a sheriff. and doctrines of the common law under whose protecting aegis the prototypes of these institutions had their birth. Manalo 19 in this wise: "It is 8 . according to Justice Torres in Uy Piaoco v. "to breathe the breath of life into many of the institutions introduced [here] under American sovereignty recourse must be had to the rules. Osmeña. 15 "the executive officer of the Court of First Instance. both under the 1935 Constitution and the present Charter. local government units could help facilitate the enforcement of court orders. emphasized that the sheriff "was the special representative of the regal or central authority. both in England and the United States. . considering both historical antecedents as well as a long line of decisions of this Court. is a Saxon word signifying a division later called a county. It would be therefore an unjustified departure from the course of history if such functionary were considered as being excluded from the personnel of a court of justice and counted as a minor official of a local government unit. Now for the precedents. . v. ." 10 The very term "common law" implies that it is the law applied throughout England by the King's courts. . 3. Since the earliest times. sheriff. is an inheritor of the Anglo-American legal tradition. it could reflect on the judiciary itself. As it was there. common to all found within the territorial domain. A sheriff." 3 in this jurisdiction. to quote from the 1912 decision of Alzua v. and as such usually nominated by the King. Artacho. 13 varied the phraseology somewhat by referring to him as "an officer of the court. 11 is "a judicial officer. . Johnson. according to Justice Street in Bachrach Motors Co. The change of status to a Commonwealth under the 1935 Constitution and thereafter to an independent Republic. It is to be hoped that what is set forth in this decision would put an end to such an aberration. likely to be attended with deplorable consequences. Chief Justice Arellano categorically affirmed in Quesada v. in English law. 1 Certainly a sheriff cannot be considered as exempt from such exclusive competence of this Tribunal. 8 "the shire had another officer." 4 A sheriff is "an officer of great antiquity.

its field of operations covered the entire Philippines. 22 "to act in accordance with the law . the successor in the mayoralty post. For judicial independence to be a reality. the decision arrived at is far from objectionable.absolutely essential to the proper administration of justice that courts have full control over the official actions of those through whom the administration of the affairs of the court proceeds. there is likewise his loyalty to the head of a local government to consider. Thus for me. . He was picked by the then City Mayor for that choice plum. the creation of which was indefensible in theory and likely to be deleterious in practice. the least interference by or influence from other governmental departments is of the essence. Ramayrat. Moreover. Justice Fisher pointed out in Campomanes v. however. the future. it is not only essential that impartiality be the rule but also that so it must appear. "It is the duty of a sheriff" as an officer of the court. If. to achieve what he thinks is good for his unit of government. 5. It could have been avoided had he not succumbed to the goad of ambition. for respondent Pulido. and the judge alone. he could not resist the temptation. One last word. or town executive stands on a different footing. He is concerned with a much smaller area. it certainly would not be extremely difficult to detect in respondent's previous actuations evidence of proscribed partisan activity. it is clearly a step in the right direction. To be more specific. petitioner Bagatsing. who has full control of his actuations. subtle and not too ostensible. A city. Then too." 20 That explains why. the boundary line may be tenuous at times. certainly has less obstacles when it is the judge. Such function was formerly in the hands of the Secretary of Justice. as Justice Mapa stressed in United States v. The possibilities are appalling. Bartolome. It would interpret then the decision arrived at today as likewise a clear enunciation of the principle that the acceptance of the resignation of respondent Pulido which rendered the case moot affords no warrant for petitioner Mayor to appoint a successor to such a position in the city government. the situation is infinitely worse if it could be deemed to be legally permissible for a local government to have a hand in the appointment of an executive sheriff serving as a court functionary. That leads me to the policy considerations." 23 The due observance of such a basic principle. of what certainly for a salaried individual was the generous offer of a fabulous increase in stipend. He is then a victim of the exercise of his own free will. it is a truism that when it comes to the administration of justice. provincial. It thus easy for him to concentrate. pay close attention to every nook and corner of the land. through an executive sheriff and liaison officer. It could very well be that the probabilities are much less. . for this Tribunal's administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. he is kept fully informed. Then again. Viewed in that light. he would have attained a higher rank and position. a sheriff may be swayed by other factors. 21 it is the sheriff and not a private individual who is to be held accountable for failure to carry out a writ of execution. at least in some other branch of the government. Hence the difficulty he now finds himself in. on the other hand. It seems to me though that obsta principiis should be the rule. He transferred to the City administration. as noted. he could take steps. The sad fate that now befalls respondent Pulido elicits a degree of sympathy. As a result. is not foreclosed by the manner this case is terminated. his predicament is of his own making. What is more. was of a different mind about his suitability for the position. assuming his competence. It was a commendable innovation then for the present Constitution to provide explicitly. 9 . If there were something objectionable then where there was executive supervision. even if its officials were so minded. It was not likely then that it could. 4. Moreover. not always fully complied with. when the Department of Justice exercised such competence. Presumably he was a career man in the judicial service. In the usual course of events. Politics being what it is and his sense of gratitude impelling respondent to act the way he did. While it is true that the judicial and administrative spheres do not occupy the same terrain.

Ibid. Ibid. concurring: 1. Ibid. 11. Cf. 5. Mercado. 38 Phil. 22 Phil. 119 (1908). 23 Phil. "If an execution against one man would excuse the sheriff for taking and selling the property of another. 20. 9 Phil. Ibid. 10. 7. Cf. 1961 and up to 1967 the seven promotional appointments of Mendoza as chief deputy sheriff were made by the Mayor and were approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service. Cf. 40. Artadi. 14-15 (1905). Ibid. 747 (1909). 308. 2. 203 (1912). 19. Ibid. 158 (1906). 106.Footnotes ** Up to 1958 the original and promotional appointments of Alberto B. 104 (1907). Real v. English Constitutional History. Ibid. 14. Waite v. Ibid. Maitland. 39 Phil. Ibid. every citizen would he at his mercy and none could call his estate his own. 332. Peterson. FERNANDO. Mendoza (Pulido's predecessor) as chief deputy sheriff of Manila were made by the Mayor and approved by the Secretary or Undersecretary of Justice. Mallari. 444. Black's Law Dictionary. 21 Phil. Osorio v. 6 of the Constitution: "The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. 34 Phil. McMicking. Babasa. J. 3 (1921). 42 Phil. 8." Codesal v. 16. 13 Phil. 34 Phil. Pio de Roda. 1547. Cf. 13. 462 (1919) and Ituvalde v. Navarro. 17. 653 (1912). 814. 22. 4th ed. 129 (1914). But beginning July 19. 23. 299 (1907).. 654 (1909). 902. 904 (1918). X. Cortez. 15. 186 (1909). Banes. Ibid. 3. The Constitutional History of England (1908). 1543 (1951). 38 Phil. 9 Phil. Manotoc v. Ibid. 41 Phil. This ruling was affirmed in Puig v. Aldecoa and Co. 10 Phil. 331. Also: Moreno v. The approval of the Secretary of Justice was not secured. v. 307. 29 Phil. Standard Oil v. 449 (1907). 656. 183 (1912). 4. 808 (1918). Sec. Cf. 7 Phil. 6. 12. 16 Phil. 9. Reyes. 14 Phil. Ascue. 178 (1914) and Alagar v. 547 (1916). 354 (1916). 18. 8 Phil. Taswell-Langmead. 886 (1920). 10 . According to Art. Velasquez. 10. 21.. Chua Doc De v. Gonzales v. 28 Phil. 24 Phil.