SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.HON. MAXIMO A.

MACEREN CFI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA, GODOFREDO REYES, BENJAMIN REYES, NAZARIO AQUINO and CARLO DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellees. AQUINO, J.: This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by "using their own motor banca, equipped with motor; with a generator colored green with attached dynamo colored gray or somewhat white; and electrocuting device locally known as sensored with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or equipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace" (Criminal Case No. 5429). Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-36). The case is now before this Court on appeal by the prosecution under Republic Act No. 5440. The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful. As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing. Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five years. It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing." Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. The order is quoted below: ñé+.£ªwph!1 SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN ALL WATERS ñé+.£ªwph!1 OF THE PHILIPPINES. Pursuant to Section 4 of Act No. 4003, as amended, and Section 4 of R.A. No. 3512, the following rules and regulations regarding the prohibition of electro fishing in all waters of the Philippines are promulgated for the information and guidance of all concerned.ñé+.£ªwph!1 SECTION 1. — Definition. — Words and terms used in this Order 11 construed as follows: (a) Philippine waters or territorial waters of the Philippines' includes all waters of the Philippine Archipelago, as

defined in the t between the United States and Spain, dated respectively the tenth of December, eighteen hundred ninety eight and the seventh of November, nineteen hundred. For the purpose of this order, rivers, lakes and other bodies of fresh waters are included. (b) Electro Fishing. — Electro fishing is the catching of fish with the use of electric current. The equipment used are of many electrical devices which may be battery or generator-operated and from and available source of electric current. (c) 'Persons' includes firm, corporation, association, agent or employee. (d) 'Fish' includes other aquatic products. SEC. 2. — Prohibition. — It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in electro fishing or to catch fish by the use of electric current in any portion of the Philippine waters except for research, educational and scientific purposes which must be covered by a permit issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which shall be carried at all times. SEC. 3. — Penalty. — Any violation of the provisions of this Administrative Order shall subject the offender to a fine of not exceeding five hundred pesos (P500.00) or imprisonment of not extending six (6) months or both at the discretion of the Court. SEC. 4. — Repealing Provisions. — All administrative orders or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Administrative Order are hereby revoked. SEC. 5. — Effectivity. — This Administrative Order shall take effect six (60) days after its publication in the Office Gazette. On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963). Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was changed by the amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of fresh water." The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that electro fishing is punishable under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under section 76 thereof), which provides that any other violation of that law "or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200), or in t for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court." That assumption is incorrect because 3 of the aforequoted Administrative Order No. 84 imposes a fm of not exceeding P500 on a person engaged in electro fishing, which amount the 83. It seems that the Department of Fisheries prescribed their own penalty for swift fishing which penalty is less than the severe penalty imposed in section 76 and which is not Identified to the at penalty imposed in section 83. Had Administrative Order No. 84 adopted the fighter penalty prescribed in on 83, then the crime of electro fishing would be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior court (Sec. 44 [f], Judiciary Law; People vs. Ragasi, L-28663, September 22, We have discussed this pre point, not raised in the briefs, because it is obvious that the crime of electro fishing which is punishable with a sum up to P500, falls within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the inferior courts and the Court of First instance (People vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531 and the cases cited therein).

And since the instant case was filed in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a provincial capital, the order of d rendered by that municipal court was directly appealable to the Court, not to the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Sec. 45 and last par. of section 87 of the Judiciary Law; Esperat vs. Avila, L-25992, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596). It results that the Court of First Instance of Laguna had no appellate jurisdiction over the case. Its order affirming the municipal court's order of dismissal is void for lack of motion. This appeal shall be treated as a direct appeal from the municipal court to this Court. (See People vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67). In this appeal, the prosecution argues that Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 were not issued under section 11 of the Fisheries Law which, as indicated above, punishes fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance. This contention is not well-taken because, as already stated, the Penal provision of Administrative Order No. 84 implies that electro fishing is penalized as a form of fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance under section 11. The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro fishing in fresh water fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department Secretary under section 4 of the Fisheries Law; (2) the function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Law and the regulations Promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules and regulations consistent with the purpose for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and for the development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic Act No. 3512; (3) the declared national policy to encourage, Promote and conserve our fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 3512), and (4) section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that "any other violation of" the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder "shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court." As already pointed out above, the prosecution's reference to section 83 is out of place because the penalty for electro fishing under Administrative order No. 84 is not the same as the penalty fixed in section 83. We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations. Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the category of "other violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11 32).

Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all waters. Later, the ban against electro fishing was confined to fresh water fisheries. The amendment created the impression that electro fishing is not condemnable per se. It could be tolerated in marine waters. That circumstances strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all forms of electro fishing. However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive revolution because Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt water areas. That decree provides: ñé+.£ªwph!1 SEC. 33. — Illegal fishing, dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products . — It shall he unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of Section 3 hereof: ... The decree Act No. 4003, as amended, Republic Acts Nos. 428, 3048, 3512 and 3586, Presidential Decrees Nos. 43, 534 and 553, and all , Acts, Executive Orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with it (Sec. 49, P. D. No. 704). The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro fishing is a clear recognition of the deficiency or silence on that point of the old Fisheries Law. It is an admission that a mere executive regulation is not legally adequate to penalize electro fishing. Note that the definition of electro fishing, which is found in section 1 (c) of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 and which is not provided for the old Fisheries Law, is now found in section 3(d) of the decree. Note further that the decree penalty electro fishing by "imprisonment from two (2) to four (4) years", a punishment which is more severe than the penalty of a time of not excluding P500 or imprisonment of not more than six months or both fixed in section 3 of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84. An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative agencies and, in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural Resources) under the Fisheries Law sustains the view that he ex his authority in penalizing electro fishing by means of an administrative order. Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125; Director of Forestry vs. Muñ;oz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712). The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing U.S. vs. Grimaud 220 U.S. 506; Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. vs. Coll. of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6). The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondeleption of legislative, powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law" Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726; People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeñ;a, 68 Phil. 328). Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By

such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del March vs. Phil. Veterans Administrative, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349). There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making powers. Section 4 of the Fisheries law provides that the Secretary "shall from time to time issue instructions, orders, and regulations consistent" with that law, "as may be and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof." That power is now vested in the Secretary of Natural Resources by on 7 of the Revised Fisheries law, Presidential December No. 704. Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the Co of Fisheries "to prepare and execute upon the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, forms instructions, rules and regulations consistent with the purpose" of that enactment "and for the development of fisheries." Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "the Department Head shall have the power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit do so, all rules, regulates, orders, memorandums, and other instructions, not contrary to law , to regulate the proper working and harmonious and efficient administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his Department, and for the strict enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to matters under the jurisdiction of said Department; but none of said rules or orders shall prescribe penalties for the violation thereof, except as expressly authorized by law." Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with law have the force of law (Valerie vs. Secretary of culture and Natural Resources, 117 Phil. 729, 733; Antique Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco, L- 20051, May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 316). As he exercises the rule-making power by delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he should not transcend the bound demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be improperly exercising legislative power in his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body. Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution." As noted by Justice Fernando, "except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a public office must be in the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it." "department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute." (Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Santiago, L-29236, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 493, 496-8). "Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are oftentimes left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law." The rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victories Milling Co., Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558). In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People vs.

Lim, 108 Phil. 1091). This Court in its decision in the Lim case, supra, promulgated on July 26, 1960, called the attention of technical men in the executive departments, who draft rules and regulations, to the importance and necessity of closely following the legal provisions which they intend to implement so as to avoid any possible misunderstanding or confusion. The rule is that the violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the government in conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such regulation constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the provisions of the law (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 124). In other words, a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can constitute a crime punishable as provided in the authorizing statute and by virtue of the latter (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125, 1132). It has been held that "to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished is a power vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body or agency" (1 Am. Jur. 2nd, sec. 127, p. 938; Texas Co. vs. Montgomery, 73 F. Supp. 527). In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing. The instant case is similar to People vs. Santos, 63 Phil. 300. The Santos case involves section 28 of Fish and Game Administrative Order No. 2 issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the aforementioned section 4 of the Fisheries Law. Section 28 contains the proviso that a fishing boat not licensed under the Fisheries Law and under the said administrative order may fish within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military reservations authorities of the United States only upon receiving written permission therefor, which permission may be granted by the Secretary upon recommendation of the military or naval authorities concerned. A violation of the proviso may be proceeded against under section 45 of the Federal Penal Code. Augusto A. Santos was prosecuted under that provision in the Court of First Instance of Cavite for having caused his two fishing boats to fish, loiter and anchor without permission from the Secretary within three kilometers from the shoreline of Corrigidor Island. This Court held that the Fisheries Law does not prohibit boats not subject to license from fishing within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon recommendation of the military and naval authorities concerned. As the said law does not penalize the act mentioned in section 28 of the administrative order, the promulgation of that provision by the Secretary "is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him, it being expressly reserved" to the lawmaking body. "Such an act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary but also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and therefore" the said provision "is null and void and without effect". Hence, the charge against Santos was dismiss. A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make ranks and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it. (Glustrom vs. State, 206 Ga. 734, 58 Second 2d 534; See 2 Am. Jr. 2nd 129-130). Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate

and enforce reasonable rules and regulations governing and/or prohibiting the taking of the various classes of game. For that act. it must clearly appear that the order is one which falls within the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body. prize or compensation for the hunting. pursuing. taking. it could have readily said so. 1970 is set aside for lack of appellate jurisdiction and the order of dismissal rendered by the municipal court of Sta. he was charged with a violation of the rule Promulgated by the State Game Commission. The Miles case is similar to this case. Wash. do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate (State vs. which have the effect of extending. promulgate.rules to carry out an express legislative purpose. If the lawmaking body desired to prohibit the display of game. killing or displaying of any game animal. Cruz. the indictment against Miles was quashed. 5429 is affirmed. It was not lawful for the administrative board to extend or modify the statute. the owner of a sporting goods store. In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order. Laguna in Criminal Case No. 105 Pac. Miles. amend and/or repeal. the rules of administrative officers and boards. regularly offered a ten-down cash prize to the person displaying the largest deer in his store during the open for hunting such game animals. SO ORDERED. What the statute penalized was the taking of game. the Game Commission promulgated a rule that "it shall be unlawful to offer. pay or receive any reward. Hence. Miles supra). 2nd 51). 2nd 322. the lower court's decision of June 9. (State vs. It was held that there was no statute penalizing the display of game." Beryl S. Costs de oficio. . game bird or game fish or any part thereof. Miles. and the order will be scrutinized with special care. Under that statute. or which conflict with the authority granting statute. WHEREFORE. The Miles case involved a statute which authorized the State Game Commission "to adopt.

No. 16.) Pursuant to the above DOLE circular. the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. all DOLE Regional Directors and the Bureau of Local Employment's regional offices are likewise directed to coordinate with the POEA in maintaining a manpower pool of prospective domestic helpers to Hong Kong on a regional basis. PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA. Thereafter. Only those DHs in said list will be allowed processing outside of the HWPU manpower pool. On June 1. processing of employment contracts which have been attested by the Hong Kong Commissioner of Labor up to 30 June 1991 shall be processed by the POEA Employment Contracts Processing Branch up to 15 August 1991 only. 4.. 37. In view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong.EN BANC G.: This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was filed by the Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI. those who failed to have themselves accredited in Hong Kong may proceed to the POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit in Manila for accreditation before their recruitment and processing of DHs shall be allowed. through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE. SARMIENTO. the following guidelines and mechanisms shall govern the implementation of said policy. RUBEN D. DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong shall submit to the Philippine Consulate General in Hong kong a list of their accepted applicants in their pool within the last week of July. 30. 30. filed this petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the following reasons: . as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment. For strict compliance of all concerned. temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong" (p. providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers. INC. 1991. Series of 1991. Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong who have some accepted applicants in their pool after the cut-off period shall submit this list of workers upon accreditation. Negotiations with and Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies Manpower Pooling Worker Training and Briefing Processing and Deployment Welfare Programs II. Documentary Requirements and Other Conditions for Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies or Principals Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong intending to hire Filipino DHs for their employers may negotiate with the HWPU in Manila directly or through the Philippine Labor Attache's Office in Hong Kong. respondents. Philippine Consulate General where a POEA team is posted until 31 August 1991. As such. Creation of a joint POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit (HWPU) An ad hoc. the recruitment of the same by private employment agencies is hereby temporarily suspended effective 1 July 1991. After the exhaustion of their respective pools the only source of applicants will be the POEA manpower pool. 16. dated July 10. xxx xxx xxx X. 1991. p. 5. 36. as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION. to engaged in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino landbased workers. In support of this policy. For strict compliance of all concerned. (Emphasis supplied.) On August 1. series of 1991 pertaining to the government processing and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong. The last day of acceptance shall be July 31 which shall then be the basis of HWPU in accepting contracts for processing. 31-35. all Hong Kong recruitment agent/s hiring DHs from the Philippines shall recruit under the new scheme which requires prior accreditation which the POEA. Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong may apply for accreditation at the Office of the Labor Attache. Thereafter. the DOLE through the facilities of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration shall take over the processing and deployment of household workers bound for Hong Kong. 30. one stop Household Workers Placement Unit [or HWPU] under the supervision of the POEA shall take charge of the various operations involved in the Hong Kong-DH industry segment: The HWPU shall have the following functions in coordination with appropriate units and other entities concerned: 1. Rollo. petitioner. all contracts shall be processed with the HWPU. PASEI. subject to guidelines to be issued for said purpose. the petitioner. for short). 1992 PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS. Interim Arrangement All contracts stamped in Hong Kong as of June 30 shall continue to be processed by POEA until 31 July 1991 under the name of the Philippine agencies concerned. as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong. Effective 16 August 1991. on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong. I. Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. For compliance. GRIÑO-AQUINO. 16. 3. p. the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. Subject: Guidelines on the Temporary Government Processing and Deployment of Domestic Helpers to Hong Kong. the task of processing and deploying such workers. J. 1991. (Emphasis ours. to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and implementing DOLE Department Order No. and JOSE N. through the facilities of the POEA. 2. 1991.R. TORRES. 30 and 37. 30. vs. Series of 1991.HON.) On September 2. Torres issued Department Order No. Rollo. Series of 1991. Rollo). series of 1991 and in order to operationalize the temporary government processing and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong resulting from the temporary suspension of recruitment by private employment agencies for said skill and host market. TO: All Philippine and Hong Kong Agencies engaged in the recruitment of Domestic helpers for Hong Kong Further to Memorandum Circular No. The DOLE itself. Pursuant to Department Order No. (pp. Rollo. Series of 1991. including domestic helpers. 101279 August 6.

. . 1991. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation. Labor Code. Chapter 2. that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution.. 13. . are unreasonable. . Maceren. as it is conducted today. intended to curtail. first and foremost. 177 SCRA 72. . 79 SCRA 450). Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4.) . . Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte. The Solicitor General. xxx xxx xxx The alleged takeover [of the business of recruiting and placing Filipino domestic helpers in Hongkong] is merely a remedial measure. as amended.e.) The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional. which was created by Executive Order No. .) On the other hand. the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA. (Emphasis supplied. other than the recruitment and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers for Hongkong.1. unfair and oppressive.) (p. 2. Rollo.) 3. the National Seamen Board. Rollo. is affected with public interest. (Art. Art. Payawal. and expires after its purpose shall have been attained. 79). It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. (Civil Code. 13. locally and overseas . foster. aptly observed: . the justification for the takeover of the processing and deploying of domestic helpers for Hongkong resulting from the restriction of the scope of petitioner's business is confined solely to the unscrupulous practice of private employment agencies victimizing applicants for employment as domestic helpers for Hongkong and not the whole recruitment business in the Philippines. To "restrict" means "to confine. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. Rollo) and whereas the power to "regulate" means "the power to protect. valid and justified under the general welfare clause of the Constitution.) 2. 16 that recruitment of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hongkong by private employment agencies are hereby "temporarily suspended effective July 1. 24 SCRA 898). "Specialized in the particular field assigned to them. 17. (p. Rules and Regulations. 62. then of the utility and of its patrons" (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. 2. Court of Appeals. preserve. rampant violations of the rule against excessive collections of placement and documentation fees. To establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and placement of workers.). 15. More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society's ramified activities. limit or stop" (p. 16] merely restricted the scope or area of petitioner's business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong till after the establishment of the "mechanisms" that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. [They are reasonable. — The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. being confined to recruitment of domestic helpers going to Hongkong only. that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with. It has been necessitated by "the growing complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes. Inc. To recruit and place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract workers on a government to government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate . petitioner may still deploy other class of Filipino workers either for Hongkong and other countries and all other classes of Filipino workers for other countries. 180 SCRA 218). . that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars. and control with due regard for the interests. 1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board. unreasonable and oppressive. is broad and farranging for: 1. . unless it is otherwise provided. — The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title. Regulatory Power. In fine. the POEA took over: 2. promote. (Art.) The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government. 20. The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power (City of Naga vs. Said administrative issuances. . 36. . if not to end. 62-65. since the recruitment and deployment business. Among the functions inherited by the POEA from the defunct Bureau of Employment Services was the power and duty: "2. From the National Seamen Board. defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Alcuaz. and secure the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and secure compliance therewith. they are legally invalid. of the public. Said Administrative Order [i. . they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice" (Ibid. travel fees and other charges committed by private employment agencies recruiting and deploying domestic helpers to Hongkong. Nevertheless. Emphasis supplied). There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition. Rollo. and 3. 797 on May 1. It assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment Development Board the power and duty: 3." (Art.) Art. and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services. 5. DOLE Administrative Order No. Labor Code. (pp. in his Comment. This is evident from the tenor of Administrative Order No. vs. Labor Code. xxx xxx xxx ." The alleged takeover is limited in scope. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents (People vs. (Emphasis ours. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment. Labor Code. Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide: Art.

— (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center. safety and welfare. each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law. . Chapter 2. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (Emphasis supplied. Effectivity. (p. need not be published. (p. (p. 30 and 37. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. . Filing. more we advert to our ruling in Tañada vs. 447.) Sec.) Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature. SO ORDERED. Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987. 448. (Emphasis supplied.) For lack of proper publication. or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health. Tuvera. the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. WHEREFORE. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. Series of 1991. by the public respondents is hereby SUSPENDED pending compliance with the statutory requirements of publication and filing under the aforementioned laws of the land. The implementation of DOLE Department Order No. 146 SCRA 446 that: . the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented. 3. 448. Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).Sec. and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 16. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. that is. Chapter 2. 4.) We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws. the writ of prohibition is GRANTED. . regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public. three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it . — In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book. Once. Series of 1991.

respondents. 499. as already noted. 1015. ET AL. 573. Camarines Norte. the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette. 1982. providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another. Batangas. Regional Trial Court. Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos among twenty-five farmers of Basud. 626-A which provides "that henceforth. a 1968 law which superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2. 37 SCRA 230 and Philippine Blooming Mills vs.R. 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot. 1971. they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive order. it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14. SO ORDERED. WHEREFORE. 1984 ANSELMO L. (People vs. now presided over by JUDGE NICANOR ORIÑO. Que Po Lay." Indeed. Miranda. se comprenden tambien los reglamentos. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. Lim Hoa Ting vs.) In the instant case. cited by the respondents. 104 Phil. p. the trial court's order of dismissal and the confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos are reversed and set aside. DRA. do not involve the enforcement of any penal regulation. PESIGAN. 150. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby. BELLA S. Zenarosa.000. to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit. The replevin order could not be executed by the sheriff. The cases of Police Commission vs. the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having general applicability should be published in the Official Gazette.JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES. as the destination. acting for REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Camarines Norte.) The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that "bajo la denominacion generica de leyes. The confiscation was basis on the aforementioned Executive Order No. the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Norte and the head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order No. In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates. in the case of carabaos" (78 OG 3144). L-64279 April 30. The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for replevin for the recovery of the carabaos allegedly valued at P70. petitioners. It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia. who as owners are entitled to possess the same. No. issued under the Revised Administrative Code and Presidential Decree No. Daet Branch 40. were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. Neither can they recover damages. Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are ordered to restore the carabaos. The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. 110 Phil. one from the LIvestock inspector. Commonwealth Act No. a person. Bello.000. Caloocan City Branch 129. the carabaos. to the petitioners. No costs. January 30. . 533. Camarines Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot. one from the Constabulary command attesting that the carabaos were not included in the list of lost. Social Security System . 626-A. 1982. 1983 Judge Domingo Medina Angeles.) Thus. Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that even bureau "regulations and orders shall become effective only when approved by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or otherwise publicly promulgated". 1980. regardless of age. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code. Reales decretos... MIRANDA. 7th Ed.000 and damages of P92.. Anselmo L. transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in the evening of April 2. and to a farmer from the Vinzons municipal nursery (Annex 1). in the Que Po Lay case. physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. Secretary of Education. The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 25 of the Interim Rules and pursuant to Republic Act No. (2) a permit to transport large cattle issued under the authority of the provincial commander. provincial veterinarian. vs. carabao dealers. no carabao. Balbuna vs. dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. while passing at Basud. 94 Phil. Pesigan. with the right to dispose of them in Basud or Sipocot. J. was acquitted by this Court because the circular was published in the Official Gazette three months after his conviction..: At issue in this case is the enforceability. L-29960. and by Doctor Bella S. They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Sur. and (3) three certificates of inspection. (See Commissioner of Civil Service vs.. of Presidential Executive Order No. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. ARNULFO V. sex. 640. AQUINO. ZENAROSA. In his order of April 25. 122 Phil. Doctor Miranda and Zenarosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos. convicted by the trial court of having violated Central Bank Circular No. 124 Phil. 626-A dated October 25. with the requisite documents. 1982 because. before publication in the Official Gazette of June 14. However. 146. 5440.SECOND DIVISION G. Camarines Sur. The summary confiscation was not in order. Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad (1 Manresa. Cruz. who heard the case at Daet and who was later transferred to Caloocan City. It provides that "every order or document which shag prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect. 20 and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P1. The Pesigans could not have been expected to be cognizant of such an executive order. Pesigan and Marcelo L. He was not bound by the circular. stolen and questionable animals. Central Bank of the Phils. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L. Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan. Instrucciones. the town's police station commander. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed . Codigo Civil.

As amended. INC. II IN REFUSING TO HOLD THAT RESPONDENT COMMISSIONER'S REVENUE MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR WHICH PURPORTS TO DECLARE PETITIONERS LIABLE FOR THE AFORESAID INSPECTION FEES. 1985 LA SUERTE CIGAR AND CIGARETTE FACTORY. denying petitioners' claims for the refund of P1. carried the following explanatory note: EXPLANATORY NOTE . AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 4(j) AND 338 OF THE NIRC. IS WITHOUT ANY BINDING FORCE AND EFFECT ON THE LATTER.. however. whenever it shall be deemed expedient. Section 6(c) of Act 2613 (Tobacco Inspection Law).. VERA. vs.877. the inspection of and affixture of inspection labels to tobacco removed from the province before such removal or to tobacco for domestic sale or factory use. respondents. 1985 ALHAMBRA INDUSTRIES.L. AND HENCE. L-36131 January 17. INC. INSULAR-YEBANA TOBACCO CORPORATION.19 during the period from September 1967 to April 1969. MISAEL P. over the latter's vehement protests. 194(m) of the Tax Code intended for domestic sale. 30-67 2 requiring the inspection of (a) all locally produced leaf tobacco and partially manufactured tobacco intended for domestic sale. and IV IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE TOBACCO INSPECTION LAW (SEC. and (c) all imported foreign leaf tobacco and partially manufactured tobacco for domestic sale or factory use. REFER ALONE TO LEAF TOBACCO FOR DOMESTIC SALE OR FACTORY USE. BUT ALSO BY SEC. (by RA 31) said Section 6.COURT OF TAX APPEALS and HON.406. INC. CONSOLIDATED TOBACCO INDUSTRIES OF THE PHILIPPINES. On September 28. AS REQUIRED NOT ONLY BY ART. 2048 and 2031.SECOND DIVISION G. INC.: Petition for Review on certiorari of the decisions 1 of the Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Cases Nos.R. in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 2031 was submitted by petitioners for summary judgment. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall have the power and it shall be his duty: xxx xxx xxx (c) To require. 1967. ASSOCIATED ANGLO-AMERICAN TOBACCO CORPORATION. MISAEL P. BECAUSE OF THE EQUALLY ADMITTED FACT THAT IT HAS NEVER BEEN PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE. (Emphasis supplied) The amendatory bill (House Bill No. 31. 6. TERUEL TOBACCO CO. petitioners. 3 1.19. No. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall have the power and it shall be his duty: . Petitioners in two separate cases. vs. petitioners moved for a reconsideration thereby praying that in case of a denial. LA PERLA INDUSTRIES. 6. Republic Act No. INC. 79(b) OF THE REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE. provides: Sec.632. LAS BUENAS FABRICA DE CIGARILLOS. 1971. In a decision dated November 28.. for factory use or for export. the CTA on December 15. L-36130 January 17. whenever it shall be deemed expedient. These two cases were heard jointly by the Court of Tax Appeals the parties being represented by one and the same counsel and involving as they do. 2031 be reopened for the reception of evidence in support of their argument that there was no inspection made by the BIR nor were inspection labels affixed to the boxes and packages containing the cigars and cigarettes which would warrant the imposition and collection of the disputed tobacco inspection fees... 2048. After hearing. 1970. On August 22. G. INC. (b) 1... SHOULD BE REFUNDED TO THEM. Pursuant to said Memorandum respondent collected from petitioners. STANDARD CIGARETTE MANUFACTURING CO. CUEVAS. xxx xxx xxx (c) To require.. III IN DISREGARDING THE FACT BORNE OUT BY UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE THAT NO INSPECTION OF THE CIGARS AND CIGARETTES AFOREMENTIONED WAS ACTUALLY CONDUCTED FOR WHICH REASON NO COLLECTION OF INSPECTION FEES WAS LEGALLY WARRANTED. in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue. INC.. VERA. PIONEER TOBACCO CORPORATION. 31 (October 1. (b) all manufactured products of tobacco contemplated in Sec. petitioners. 6[c]) UNDER WHICH THE SAID REVENUE MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR PURPORTS TO DECLARE PETITIONERS' CIGAR AND CIGARETTES FOR DOMESTIC SALE OR CONSUMPTION SUBJECT TO INSPECTION AND THE PAYMENT OF INSPECTION FEES. and D.64 during the period from September 1967 to August 1969. 735) which later on became Republic Act No.509. before its amendment by Republic Act No. No. in CTA Case No. INC. THE SAID FEES WERE COLLECTED. 2048 and 2031 be heard jointly. the inspection of and affixture of inspection labels to tobacco removed from province of its origin to another or other provinces before such removal or to tobacco for domestic sale or factory use. BATAAN CIGAR AND CIGARETTE FACTORY. 2031. BECAUSE OF THE ADMITTED FACT THAT IT IS NOT A REGULATION PROMULGATED BY THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE. INC. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION.. respondents.83 imposed and collected by respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue as tobacco inspection fees on cigars and cigarettes manufactured for domestic sale and/or consumption. in CTA Case No. AND FURTHER. 2 OF THE CIVIL CODE. NOT TO CIGARS AND CIGARETTES FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION. the same legal issues. CTA Case No... LA CAMPANA FABRICA DE TABACOS. INCORPORADA and COLUMBIA TOBACCO COMPANY. the CTA granted petitioners' motion to reopen but denied the motion for reconsideration.. Petitioners contend that the CTA erred: I IN REACHING A CONCLUSION CONTRARY TO PETITIONERS' POSITION THAT INSPECTION FEES COLLECTED FROM THEM BY RESPONDENT ON THE CIGARS AND CIGARETTES MANUFACTURED BY THEM FOR DOMESTIC SALE OR CONSUMPTION WERE SO COLLECTED ILLEGALLY AND HENCE. CTA denied the claim for the refund of the amount of P199. 1972 denied both claims. Before the finality of the said decision. AND IN VIRTUE OF WHICH.632. Said court likewise ordered that CTA Cases Nos. The amounts involved are not disputed. LA DICHA CIGAR & CIGARETTE FACTORY.R. BAGUMBUHAY CIGAR AND CIGARETTE FACTORY. LA FLOR DE LA ISABELA. J. respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued Memorandum Circular No.COURT OF TAX APPEALS and HON. 1946) now reads: Sec. the following inspection fees: (a) 199. THE SAID MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR IS ULTRA VIRES AND VOID. sought the refund of the aforementioned inspection fees collected from them CTA Case No. and the collection of the corresponding inspection fees.606.

1946. Inc. causing damage to the financial stability of the Government as the inspection fees due on cigars and cigarettes for domestic sale and imported leaf and partially manufactured tobacco for factory use were not collected for more than twenty (20) years. said circular needs no publication in the Official Gazette as erroneously argued by the petitioners. Furthermore. The omission of the word "leaf" is a clear indication that Congress intended to include within the purview of the law a new item. 17 and 47.. For the Court to adopt petitioners' construction that tobacco means 'leaf tobacco' would be engaging in unauthorized judicial legislation by rewriting the law and inserting words and phrases not found in it. Hernandez was perfectly in accordance with eating law. the word "leaf". (Emphasis supplied) It was petitioners' contention that the amendatory portion reading "or to tobacco for domestic sale or factory use" in Sec. V-27 and to interpret the phrase "tobacco for domestic sale or factory use" with the view of arresting huge losses of tobacco inspection fees which were not collected and imposed since the said Circular (No. or the manufactured products from tobacco leave smoking or chewing tobacco cigar cigarette etc . V-27 dated October 29. Thus. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx Under the present law only leaf and manufactured tobacco for export to the United States are subject to inspection. as amended. As a result thereof. The basis for the issuance of said Memorandum Circular was so stated in Resolution No. 2-67 of the Tobacco Board. more particularly Sec. the pertinent portions of which read: xxx xxx xxx WHEREAS. the standard type and packing of all leaf and manufactured tobacco for export to any foreign country will come under the regulatory power of the Collector of Internal Revenue. 1967 prompted respondent Commissioner to promulgate Memorandum Circular No. in order to limit the scope of the term tobacco under the law originally passed in 1916 and its implementing Regulations Nos. it could have easily inserted the word "leaf" to modify "tobacco" contained in the amendatory law. 30-67 is now being assailed by petitioners on the ground that it is not a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Finance (now Minister of Finance) and that it has never been published in the Official Gazette as required by the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code. Under the proposed amendment. wherein petitioners as members of the Manila Tobacco Association. tills original recommendation of Mr. However. 2653 defines tobacco as the leaves of the tobacco plant. the assailed Revenue Memorandum Circular was issued to rectify the error in General Circular No. Since our la g body used the word tobacco in the general sense without any qualification. refers to leaf tobacco whether for local sale or factory use and does not include cigars and cigarettes for domestic sale or consumption. manufactured tobacco products for domestic sale and imported tobacco for factory use. the questioned Revenue Memorandum Circular was also issued to apprise those concerned of the construction and interpretation which should be accorded to Act No. has been substantially complied with. this Court is powerless to give it a restrictive meaning. namely. 6(b) and 7. it is clear that the word "tobacco" refers both to leaf and manufactured tobacco such as cigars. collectively From the above definition. 2613 or the amendatory law does not make a distinction as to the meaning of the word "tobacco". misleading. and use either for smoking or chewing. although used to modify the term "tobacco" only in the Explanatory Note to then House Bill No. 735 was omitted when the Bill was signed into law (RA 31). but perhaps thru oversight by the former Commissioners and officers of the Tobacco Inspection Service the property and legality of effecting the inspection of tobacco products for local sales and imported leaf tobacco for factory use might have overlooked resulting in huge losses of tobacco inspection fees . As herein earlier mentioned. which took effect on October 1. 1946. 1967 and not contingent on its publication in the Official Gazette. the Philippine Tobacco Board. no such qualification was made by Congress. If the intention of Congress was to apply the amendment to those items already covered by Act 2613. 1946 was issued by then Collector of Internal Revenue Bibiano L. 2613). adopted Resolution No. (Emphasis supplied) As admitted by counsel for petitioners. An examination of Sections 6(a). when General Circular No. 6 and 7 thereof. . reveals that. already covered the inspection of leaf tobacco. were duly represented. xxx xxx xxx Settled is the rule that where the law does not distinguish. if our lawmaking body intended to limit the coverage of said sections to either leaf or manufactured tobacco. 1 of Republic Act No. The approval of this Resolution on May 31. it qualified the word 'tobacco' with such antecedent words. 2613. the word "leaf" was erroneously included therein. In Section 6(c) of Act 2613. prepared by drying and various manufacturing processes. marking and packaging of leaf tobacco for domestic sale or for exportation in order to insure the use of leaf tobacco of good quality and its handling under sanitary conditions. the Collector of Internal Revenue is authorized to promulgate rules relative to the classification. xxx xxx xxx If Congress of the Philippines really intended to restrict the meaning of the word 'tobacco' under Republic Act No. the latter were each furnished with a copy of the Revenue Memorandum Circular in question and the purpose of the law. and which respondent is duty bound to enforce. As aptly held by the CTA: xxx xxx xxx Petitioners' contention that the phrase 'tobacco for domestic sale' refers to leaf tobacco alone is restrictive. We do not agree. Prior to the amendment of said Act. or as snuff. It is an opinion on how the law should be construed and there was no attempt whatsoever to enlarge or restrict the meaning of the law. supra. Meer to implement the provisions of Sections 6. we should not distinguish. and cigarettes It is to be noted that either Section 6(c) of Act No. then the word "leaf" should have been easily included to modify the term "tobacco". 31 which took effect since September 25. 7 and 14 of Act 2613 (Tobacco Inspection Law). 30-67 which was approved by then Secretary of Finance Eduardo Z. 6(c) of Act 2613. 3 The validity and efficacy of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. Such error was only discovered when an Assistant Chief of the Tobacco Inspection Service of the BIR appeared in a public hearing of the Joint Legislative-Executive Tax Commission. p. a policy making body of the National Government on Tobacco Authority. 31. V-27) took effect. Sec. Romualdez and the effectivity of which is specifically dated September 1. partially manufactured tobacco or local sale and leaf tobacco and its products for export. Section 1 of the attached bill seeks to extend this regulatory power of the Collector of Internal Revenue to leaf tobacco intended for factory use. Webster's New International Dictionary 2nd Edition. thereby showing the broad scope and meaning of the word tobacco.. Since it was further admitted by petitioners that said Memorandum is but a "Memorandum Circular for purposes of the internal administration of the BIR and not a regulation within the contemplation of Sections 4 and 338 of the NIRC and Section 79(b) of the Revised Administrative Code". and against sound statutory construction. that is to inform or notify those who may be affected. as amended. 2-67 interpreting the phrase "tobacco for domestic sale" as referring to wholesale disposal of tobacco products by cigar and cigarettes factories to its dealers while the phrase "tobacco for factory use" meant "imported leaf tobacco" intended for use by cigar and cigarette factories in the manufacture of tobacco products.Under Section 6 of the Tobacco Inspection Law (Act No.

and in the process of manufacture. the revenue agents checked the cigarette bobbins strip stamps and saw to it that cigarettes removed were properly recorded in the books. strip stamps affixed. 88. Costs against petitioners. NIRC) Under the circumstances. and no publication is necessary for its validity. manufacturer or redrying plant and from the customs custody in case of imported leaf tobacco. even without inspection. however. as amended and the other fifty percentum to the Cultural Center of the Philippines.. and in such case said circular shall not be required to be published. Accordingly. they were invoiced by the revenue agents assigned there to check on the number of cases of cigarettes to be removed. 5 The promulgation of Revenue Memorandum Circular No." The CTA held that the foregoing belie petitioners' assertions that no actual inspection was conducted to justify the collection of the tobacco inspection fees. (Production Manager of La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factory) testimony shall be considered as the Procedure of inspection followed in all factories of petitioners. before the cigarettes were removed from the factory. quantity of cigarettes removed. they being one of the miscellaneous taxes provided for under the Tax Code. It is within the power and duty of the Commissioner to collect the same. and early in the morning before the start of the operation. . having been issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with the approval of the Secretary (now Minister) of Finance for the implementation of the Tobacco Inspection Law. Chapter VII. Tobacco Inspection fees are undoubtedly National Internal Revenue taxes. the party-litigants agreed that Mr. 4 Construction by an executive branch of government of a particular law although not binding upon courts must be given weight as the construction come from the branch of the government called upon to implement the law. As disclosed by the records. should tobacco products be removed clandestinely or surreptitiously from the establishment of the wholesaler. all tobacco products found unfit for sales were segregated by the factory employees thru the supervision of the revenue agents. omissions or flaws committed by BIR inspectors and representatives while in the performance of their duties cannot be set up as estoppel nor estop the Government from collecting a tax legally due. the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. it was shown that revenue agents and tobacco inspectors "saw to it that an raw materials for use in the manufacture of the finished products were duly recorded. revenue agents checked the quantity of cigarettes manufactured. thus: 7 . From the testimonies of other witnesses for petitioners. They are therefore binding on this Court. SO ORDERED. Section 228 (formerly Section 302) of Chapter VII of the Code specifically provides for the collection and manner of payment of the said inspection fees. Vicente Chua's. The findings of the Tax Court are duly supported by evidence.Section 79(b) of the Revised Administrative Code so provides: Chiefs. When an administrative agency renders an opinion by means of a circular or Memorandum. We find no cogent reason to disturb the same. 12 of Act No. a refund of the tobacco inspection fees collected from petitioners is not legally warranted.. 6 Tobacco inspection fees are levied and collected for purposes of regulation and control and also as a source of revenue since fifty percentum (50%) of said fees shall accrue to the Tobacco Inspection Fee Fund created by Sec. has therefore the force and effect of law. Errors. 2613. be authorized to promulgate circulars or information or instructions for the government of the officers and employees in the interior administration of the business of each bureau or office. of bureaus or offices. 30-67 being in accordance with the Revised Administrative Code. (Sec. it merely interprets a pre-existing law. may.

On June 17. ‘labas. On October 29. LENGTH OF SERVICE NOTED IN CASE AT BAR. On May 26. Lucas shouted at the affiant. that what transpired was that he accidentally brushed Linatok’s leg when he reached for his shoes and that the same was merely accidental and he did not intend nor was there malice when his hand got in contact with Linatok’s leg. We note that respondent has been in the service for twenty (20) years and this is his first offense. Department of Agriculture.”[7] The Court of Appeals further ruled that “a basic requirement of due process on the other hand is that a person must be duly informed of the charges against him (Felicito Sajonas vs. clear intent to violate the law or . In its petition to the Supreme Court. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. respondent. Raquel described the incident in the following manner: “While standing before a mirror. an assistant information officer at the Agricultural Information Division. assistant head. BASIC PRINCIPLES. petitioner. denying the charges. respondent Lucas submitted a letter to Jose P. Mr. DA. Mr. Civil Service Commission. Petitioner anchors its position on the view that “the formal charge against a respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. In the instant case however. BOPI. 1993. Lucas. The former is punishable by dismissal while the latter is punishable either by suspension (one month and one day to six months). such as the right to due process in investigations and proceedings. a recital of the facts is necessary. Lucas came to know of the modification of the charge against him only when he received notice of the resolution dismissing him from the service. She was shocked and suddenly faced Mr. — Of course. National Labor Relations Commission. Raquel noticed a chair at her right side which Mr. Even in jest. 1992. JOSE J. J. In the case of Landrito vs. The Supreme Court held that administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles. Nitullano. Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles.: The petition for review on certiorari before the Court assails the decision of the Court of Appeals[1] which set aside the resolution of the Civil Service Commission[2] and reinstated that of the Board of Personnel Inquiry (BOPI for brevity). On May 31. At that moment she felt Mr. it issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of simple misconduct and recommending a penalty of suspension for one month and one day. DA. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. The Secretary of Agriculture approved the recommendation. But Lucas touched her again and so she hit Mr. found him guilty of grave misconduct and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service. After a formal investigation by the Board of Personnel Inquiry. 1994.— There is an existing guideline of the CSC distinguishing simple and grave misconduct. there is an existing guideline of the CSC distinguishing simple and grave misconduct. however. respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. and (b) whether the act complained of constitutes grave misconduct. the elements of corruption. 3. clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule. the CSC issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of grave misconduct and imposing on him the penalty of dismissal from the service. Civil Service Commission. Department of Agriculture (DA for brevity). bent on literally throwing the affiant out of the office. In due time. 1996. her both hands protected her face from smashing upon the door. we held that “in grave misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct. 49-89 dated August 3. 1992. Raquel Linatok. if it is the second. The CSC. Raquel P.[6] Respondent moved for reconsideration but the CSC denied the motion. we do not in any way condone respondent’s act. In the case of Landrito vs. The Court of Appeals set aside the CSC resolution and reinstated that of the board and ruled that respondent was denied due process as he came to know of the modification of the charge against him only when he received notice of the CSC resolution dismissing him from the service. 1999]CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. — We sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals that: (a) a basic requirement of due process is that a person must be duly informed of the charges against him and that (b) a person can not be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged. vs.”[9] We deny the petition.”[8] Hence. respondent appealed the decision to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). This is clear from a perusal of memorandum circular No. Suddenly Mr. Lucas. DA. There is. PARDO. Lucas. if it is the first offense. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS NOT EXEMPT THEREFROM. 1992. at that very instant used to sit upon. Linatok. petitioner contended that a formal charges in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. he had no right to touch complainant’s leg. and not the designation of the offense. Lucas.”[4] On June 8. but the CSC deprived him of his right to due process by convicting him of grave misconduct. the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision setting aside the resolution of the CSC and reinstating the resolution of the BOPI. 127838. this petition. a photographer of the same agency. According to Lucas. Mr. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. x x x while doing all this. or by dismissal. 2. the elements of corruption. grabbed her the second time while she attempted to regain her posture after being pushed the first time. Lucas bent to reach for his shoe.EN BANC [G. we held that “in grave misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct.R. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. for simple misconduct. Jose Lucas. no question that these offenses fall under different categories. On July 7. filed with the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture an affidavit-complaint against respondent Jose Lucas. However. such act is not constitutive of grave misconduct. under the circumstances. DUE PROCESS. 1992. such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. less grave and light offenses. a photographer of the same agency for misconduct. Thus. January 21. Thereafter. an assistant information officer at the Department of Agriculture. Office of the Secretary. must be manifest. near the office door of Jose J. As well stated by the Court of Appeals. The issues are (a) whether respondent Lucas was denied due process when the CSC found him guilty of grave misconduct on a charge of simple misconduct. 183 SCRA 182). The charge of grave misconduct falls under the classification of grave offenses while simple misconduct is classified as a less grave offense. filed with the office of the Secretary. the Board of Personnel Inquiry. Lucas shouted at her saying ‘lumabas ka na at huwag na huwag ka nang papasok dito kahit kailan’ A verbal exchange then ensued and respondent Lucas grabbed Raquel by the arm and shoved her towards the door causing her to stumble. DA. Lucas and admonished him not to do it again or she will kick him. LUCAS. 1989 (also known as the guidelines in the application of penalties in administrative cases) itself which classifies administrative offenses into three: grave.[3] suspending respondent for one month. The complaint stemmed from the alleged act of Jose Lucas of touching and caressing complainant’s thigh running down to her ankle. Lucas’ hand touching her thigh and running down his palm up to her ankle. for misconduct. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS. an affidavitcomplaint against respondent Jose J. what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of. in the absence of proof that respondent was maliciously motivated. stating thus: “It is true that the Civil Service Act does not define grave and simple misconduct. the board issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of simple misconduct[5] and recommending a penalty of suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day. issued a summons requiring respondent to answer the complaint.” which is obviously lacking in respondent’s case. however. To provide a factual backdrop of the case. within five (5) days from receipt. huwag ka nang papasok dito kahit kailan’. CIRCUMSTANCES IN CASE AT BAR NOT CONSTITUTIVE OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT. Then. they should be treated as separate and distinct offenses. he did not touch the thigh of complainant Linatok. It sustained the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent was denied due process as he was charged with simple misconduct. saying. SYLLABUS 1. after a formal investigation by the BOPI. GUIDELINE DISTINGUISHING SIMPLE AND GRAVE MISCONDUCT. not to file a motion to dismiss. No. SYNOPSIS On May 26.

under the circumstances. R. We note that respondent has been in the service for twenty (20) years and this is his first offense. we do not in any way condone respondent’s act. IN VIEW WHEREOF. the CSC deprived him of his right to due process by convicting him of grave misconduct. such act is not constitutive of grave misconduct. SO ORDERED.[14] The right to substantive and procedural due process is applicable in administrative proceedings. he had no right to touch complainant’s leg. However. in the absence of proof that respondent was maliciously motivated. We sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals[11] that: (a) a basic requirement of due process is that a person must be duly informed of the charges against him[12] and that (b) a person can not be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged. must be manifest.flagrant disregard of established rule. Even in jest. Respondent maintains that as he was charged with simple misconduct.”[10] which is obviously lacking in respondent’s case. 37137. No costs. . such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. SP No.[15] Of course.[13] Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles. the Court hereby DENIES the petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.

.ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD. 1990 (E. except itself from these rules and apply such suitable procedure as shall promote the objectives of the Order. 1990. 90382 and 90-384). the Board win do it on an industry wide basis. On September 21. 90-106. November 23. respondents. 60 and 62. RENE LEDESMA. ERB. 152).O. in any particular matter. under Section 8. INC. the three oil companies filed their respective motions for leave to file or admit amended/supplemental applications to further increase the prices of petroleum products. whether to accept. Hearing for the presentation of the evidence-in-chief commenced on November 21. at the last hearing. J. or (3) to deny the application. (pp. CALTEX (Philippines). vs. Petitioner Maceda failed to appear at said hearing as well as on the second hearing on October 17.1991 CEFERINO S. PILIPINAS SHELL." pp. respondents.R. He points out that this relaxed procedure resulted in the denial of due process. The Board. CALTEX (Philippines). . No. as it did here. 1990. We disagree. We have.R. To afford registered oppositors the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. the cross-examination will come later. the best way to have ( sic) the oppositors and the Board a clear picture of what the applicants are asking for is to have all the evidence-in-chief to be placed on record first and then the examination will come later. the ERB issued an order granting a provisional increase of P1. 1991 EUGENIO O. subject to the requirements of notice and hearing.. is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional authority-which is of course.S. vs. hearing. practice and procedure before the Energy Regulatory Board in all matters of inquiry. previously taken judicial notice of matters and events related to the oil industry. Dickenson v. reaffirming ERB's authority to grant provisional increase even without prior hearing. STEVE ABITANG.R. G. 1990 at the same time requiring applicants to publish the corresponding Notices of Public Hearing in two newspapers of general circulation (p. 90-106. 90-382 and 90384.. ERB Cases Nos. . subject to the final outcome of the proceeding. it has been traditional and it is the intention of the Board to act on these applications on an industry-wide basis. On November 5. 162. (p. 74 S. et al. The Solicitor General has pointed out: . so. 1990. No. Rollo). 98 L. TIPON. Nos.. United States. of course. ORIGINAL. clarifying as follows: What must be stressed is that while under Executive Order No. 172. it may order. However. 1991 ERNESTO M. petitioners. Maceda v. however. Rollo and Annexes "F" and "G. in G. the better procedure — however. Public Service Act. it is not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings (Sec.. 4. petitioner. 96266. operate exclusively of the other. . Rollo) (Emphasis supplied) In the same order of September 21. (Emphasis supplied) In fact. AND PETROPHIL CORPORATION. in that the Board may resort to one but not to both at the same time. Rule I of the Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing Hearings Before the ERB provides that — These Rules shall govern pleadings. which are given ex-parte and which are subject to the resolution of the main case.. 1990. RUFINO DE LA CRUZ AND JOVELINO G. ROLANDO VALLE.R. St. The facts of the case are as follows: Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August 2. 132. G. tsn. PAREDES. Section 3(e) outlines the jurisdiction of the Board and the grounds for which it may decree a price adjustment.ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD. function As such administrative agency. MACEDA. study. 8 of E. seeking to nullify the provisional increase.42 per liter. investigation and/or any other proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Board. (pp. ex-parte. in the broader interest of justice. 129-130. 1990. as follows: . 172. RESOLUTION MEDIALDEA. Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies. NUMERIANO CAJILIG JR. respondents. Pending that. modify or whatever. vs. 1990 with ERB ruling that testimonies of witnesses were to be in the form of Affidavits (p. petitioner Maceda seeks nullification of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) Orders dated December 5 and 6. as follows: CHAIRMAN FERNANDO: Well. Section 2. This was postponed to November 5. 346.J. 206-207). not quasi-judicial. 163-164.R. 1990. it does not preclude the Board from ordering. Section 3. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND PETRON CORPORATION. on written notice of petitioner Maceda. Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition on September 26. JR. 1990.. 96349 July 18. paragraph (e) is akin to a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary attachment issued by the courts. petitioner. INC. Section 3. No. applicant Caltex presented its evidence-in-chief and there is an understanding or it is the Board's wish that for purposes of good order in the presentation of the evidence considering that these are being heard together.S. 6. 95203). RENATO BORRO. reject. private respondents oil companies filed with the ERB their respective applications on oil price increases (docketed as ERB Case Nos. . No. NERI JINON. a hearing is indispensable. 1990. RODRIGO DE VERA. IRENEO N. 96266 July 18. 95203-05. The ERB admitted the respective supplemental/amended petitions on November 6. it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one. No. ERB subsequently outlined the procedure to be observed in the reception of evidence. (2) to reduce or increase it further. Rollo) Petitioner Maceda also claims that there is no substantial evidence on record to support the provisional relief.:p In G. 1990 on the ground that the hearings conducted on the second provisional increase in oil prices did not allow him substantial cross-examination. No. JR.EN BANC G. paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not negate each other. 389. G. the ERB set the applications for hearing with due notice to all interested parties on October 16. U. JESUS MELENDEZ. Rollo). in effect. .. an authority to increase provisionally.R. 1990. 96284 July 18. AARON. allegedly. INC. the Board may. we will defer the cross-examination of applicant Caltex's witness and ask the other applicants to present their evidence-in-chief so that the oppositors win have a better Idea of what an of these will lead to because as I mentioned earlier. ed. WILFREDO DELEONIO. (pp. Rollo) Petitioner Maceda maintains that this order of proof deprived him of his right to finish his cross-examination of Petron's witnesses and denied him his right to cross-examine each of the witnesses of Caltex and Shell. a provisional increase. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND PETRON CORPORATION. the ERB set the continuation of the hearing to October 24. authorizing provisional increase. INC. 1990. such as the ERB which in matters of rate or price fixing is considered as exercising a quasi-legislative . The order of testimony both with respect to the examination of the particular witness and to the general course of the trial is within the discretion of the court and the exercise of this discretion in permitting to be introduced out of the order prescribed by the rules is not improper (88 C. a denial of due process. without need of a hearing. pursuant to Sec.ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD. 5-6. ORLANDO MONTANO. We dismissed the petition on December 18. or otherwise. CALTEX (Philippines). respectively). 29. ALVIN BAYUANG. subject to its final disposition of whether or not: (1) to make it permanent.

as pointed out by Justice Padilla. Rollo). G. G.O. 40 Phil.4717 P4. supra). which as earlier mentioned. 95119-21. the decision of the government to discontinue subsidizing oil prices in view of inflationary pressures.3318 per barrel at $25.3713 P5. this Board is left with no other recourse but to grant applicants oil companies further relief by increasing the prices of petroleum products sold by them. (p. 1990. 495. 95203-05. 1. 96349.0896 Subsidy on Sales to NPC 0. as We note that the Order of December 5.4100 Fuel Oil/Feedstock 0.R.1269 Net Price Increase Applied for 2.8123 Forex Risk Fee -0.R.0719 -0.00. 96284). Rollo) Petitioner Maceda together with petitioner Original (G." In this regard.1 Billion.S. the OPSF has incurred a deficit of P6. crude cost peso differentials. 1970. 137.855 Billion as of the first nine months of the year. 167. 172. the huge OPSF deficit which. Original et al.3900. forex risk for a subsidy on sale to NPC (p. Reyes. The ERB was likewise guided in the determination of international crude oil prices by traditional authoritative sources of information on crude oil and petroleum products. ACCORDINGLY. (4) our trade deficit is at P2. (3) the country's balance of payments is expected to reach $1 Billion. 25 Phil. therefore. petitioner Original additionally claims that if the price increase will be used to augment the OPSF this will constitute illegal taxation.2405 LPG 1. In the Maceda case. 1990.9600 and P6. brought back the increases in Premium and Regular gasoline to the levels mandated by the December 5.R.3333 Specific Tax (per Oct. . Nos. 96349) also claim that the provisional increase involved amounts over and above that sought by the petitioning oil companies.5669 1. No. (2) the exchange rate has fallen to P28.0685 0.7 Billion (based on filed claims only and net of the P5 Billion OPSF) as of September 30. 32 SCRA 261 citing Rosales v.O.R.0590 0. the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. .2200 Asphalt 2. have become moot and academic.R." except that there is no law at present authorizing the same. L-28297. The Solicitor General has pointed out that aside from the increase in crude oil prices . of the rise in crude oil importation costs.551/US $ in September-October 1990. supra) this Court has already ruled that "the Board Order authorizing the proceeds generated by the increase to be deposited to the OPSF is not an act of taxation but is authorized by Presidential Decree No. Rollo) The Solicitor General likewise commented: Among the pieces of evidence considered by ERB in the grant of the contested provisional relief were: (1) certified copies of bins of lading issued by crude oil suppliers to the private respondents.6264 . these findings "are not final. (p. 161. 1990 granting a provisional price increase on petroleum products premised on the oil companies' OPSF claims. such as Platt's Oilgram and Petroleum Intelligence Weekly.1523 Peso Cost Diffn'l 2. The petitions of E. all the applications of the respondent oil companies filed with the ERB covered claims from the OPSF. Povedas. in response to the President's appeal. 5. has amounted to P5." especially on a matter as transcendental as oil price increases which affect the lives of almost an Filipinos. No. (G. March 30. Aguilar v. SO ORDERED. Perhaps. No.0790 -0. 158.42 Actual Tax Reduction: Ad Valorem Tax (per Sept.1747 1.3900 Avturbo 4. 1990. Nos. the ERB. Rubiato..5000 In G. We have stated that this "is a question best judged by the political leadership" (G. despite its being a quasi-judicial body. 95203-05. as reported by the Office of Energy Affairs. reached an average of $30. No.11 P3. D. 150. (1) as of June 30. .O. and (3) OPSF status reports of the Office of Energy Affairs.9248 P3. 8 of E. Nos. Rollo) Thus. 1990 Order (P6. 1990 price build-up) . as follows: Product In Pesos Per Liter OPSF Premium Gasoline 6.5203 1. . our lawmakers may see the wisdom of allowing presidential review of the decisions of the ERB since. We also note the Solicitor General's comments that "the ERB is not averse to the idea of a presidential review of its decision.9600 Regular Gasoline 6. (p. 1990 explicitly stated: in the light. and is estimated to further increase to over P10 Billion by end December 1990. it is relevant to point out that on December 10. 1990 price build-up) P1. We lament Our helplessness over this second provisional increase in oil price.1089 -0. Inc. . .1955 0.8685 Nonetheless. (2) reports of the Bankers Association of the Philippines on the peso-dollar exchange rate at the BAP oil pit. We shall thus respect the ERB's Order of December 5.R. since the oil companies are "entitled to as much relief as the fact alleged constituting the course of action may warrant. the apparent inadequacy of the proposed additional P5. 96349) and C. 470) as follows: Per Liter Weighted Petron Shell Caltex Average Crude Cost P3. 1956.9950 Kerosene 1.6047 P2. respectively).4100 Diesel Oil 1. (G. No. We concede ERB's authority to grant the provisional increase in oil price. insofar as they question the ERB's authority under Sec.1203 Total Price Increase Applied for P59.R.00 to $1.R. and it is up to petitioners to demonstrate that the present economic picture does not warrant a permanent increase..7069 2.1216 P4.5000 Thinner 2.1 Billion government appropriation for the OPSF and the sharp drop in the value of the peso in relation to the US dollar to P28/US $. Jr. as amended by Executive Order No. We wish to reiterate Our previous pronouncements therein that while the government is able to justify a provisional increase." (Javellana v. Plaza Enterprises.9954 Less: September 21 Price Relief Actual Price Increase P1. (G. it is still "an administrative body under the Office of the President whose decisions should be appealed to the President under the established principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Smart filed a Complaint[16] with public respondent NTC. the government regulated the entry of pricing and operation of all public telecommunications entities. On 4 June 1999. refused to grant Smart’s request for the interconnection of SMS. And its rulings are traditionally accorded respect even by the courts. Section 8 of the PTA sets forth the regulatory logic.[31] seeking to reconsider only the portion of the Decision that upheld NTC’s finding that Globe lacked the authority to provide SMS and its imposition of a fine. to operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System (“CMTS”). 8-9-95) the implementation of SMS interconnection is mandatory pursuant to Executive Order (E. pointing out that the matter was not raised as an issue before it at all. and their respective implementing rules and regulations. Executive Order No. And propitiously. respondents.[11] Review may also be warranted to ensure that the NTC or similarly empowered agencies act within the confines of their legal mandate and conform to the demands of due process and equal protection. stressing therein that Globe indeed lacked the authority to provide SMS. on the same day Globe and Smart voluntarily agreed to interconnect their respective SMS systems. Short Messaging Service (“SMS”)[8] or “text messaging. The Complaint arose from the inability of the two leading CMTS providers to effect interconnection.[1] Telephone companies have historically been regulated as common carriers. Globe. in violation of Section 420 (f) of MC No.” which has attained immense popularity in the Philippines as a mode of electronic communication. COMMISSIONER JOSEPH A. the United States Federal Communications Commission has chosen not to impose strict common regulations on incumbent cellular providers. July 26. particularly their respective SMS or texting services. choosing instead to let go of the reins and rely on market forces to govern pricing and service terms.” which has been transformed from a mere technological fad into a vital means of communication. (“Smart”) are both grantees of valid and subsisting legislative franchises. NTC refrained from issuing a Show Cause Order with a Cease and Desist Order. Globe filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration .[23] The NTC also declared that both Smart and Globe have been providing SMS without authority from it. as a check on the unique powers vested unto these instrumentalities. informing Globe of the Complaint. NTC issued a Show Cause Order.[10] Review is available to reverse the findings of the specialized administrative agency if the record before the Court clearly precludes the agency’s decision from being justified by a fair estimate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its informed judgment on matters within its special competence. specifically the allegations therein that. “among others…despite formal request made by Smart to Globe for the interconnection of their respective SMS or text messaging services. 59. interposing grounds that the Complaint was premature. In its Memorandum. On 22 November 1999. vs. and instead directed the parties to secure the requisite authority to provide SMS within thirty (30) days. Both Smart and NTC filed their respective comments. a Decision[28] was promulgated by the Former Special Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals[29] affirming in toto the NTC Order. The NTC is at the forefront of the government response to the avalanche of inventions and innovations in the dynamic telecommunications field. experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters. owing traditional deference to administrative agencies equipped with special knowledge. DECISION TINGA. It reiterated its previous arguments that the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to comply with conditions precedent and the nonforum shopping rule. on 21 December 1999. Globe also reiterated that it has been legally operating its SMS system since 1994 and that .R. a similar paradigm shift can be discerned with the passage of the Public Telecommunications Act of 1995 (“PTA”). UMALI and NESTOR DACANAY. THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION.”[22] NTC held that since SMS falls squarely within the definition of “value-added service” or “enhanced-service” given in NTC Memorandum Circular No.[19] and its omission of the mandatory Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. Interestingly. 2004] GLOBE TELECOM. Smart alleged that Globe.[15] also known colloquially as “texting.[26] The Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order on 31 August 1999.[17] On 7 June 1999. after noting that both Smart and Globe were “equally blameworthy” for their lack of cooperation in the submission of the documentation required for interconnection and for having “unduly maneuvered the situation into the present impasse.” along with other common carriers. the case allows the Court to evaluate the role of the National Telecommunications Commission (“NTC”) in this day and age. utilizing the Global System for Mobile Communication (“GSM”) technology. As noted by one of the law’s principal authors. with evident bad faith. Sen. in violation of the mandate of Republic Act 7925.O. and SMART COMMUNICATIONS. INC.[4] In the Philippines. replace government control on price and income with market instruments.00) “from the date of violation and for every day during which such violation continues.[27] Globe alleged that its departure from its ruling in the Islacom case constitutes a denial of equal protection of the law. allegedly holding that SMS is a deregulated special feature of the telephone network and therefore does not require the prior approval of NTC. No. subject to the payment of fine in the amount of two hundred pesos (P200.[5] Towards this goal.: Telecommunications services are affected by a high degree of public interest. with evident bad faith and malice.”[7] The present petition dramatizes to a degree the clash of philosophies between traditional notions of regulation and the au corant trend to deregulation.. among others. petitioner. there has been a marked reevaluation of the traditional paradigm governing state regulation over telecommunications. NTC issued the Order now subject of the present petition.[9] At the same time. In the Order. refused to grant Smart’s request for the interconnection of their respective SMS or text messaging services. Every regulatory action it undertakes is of keen interest not only to industry analysts and players but to the public at large. Yet. SANTIAGO. J. Globe also called the attention of the appellate court to the earlier decision of NTC pertaining to the application of Isla Communications Co.[12] Antecedent Facts Globe and private respondent Smart Communications. Finally. Inc. The intensive scrutiny is understandable given the high financial stakes involved and the inexorable impact on consumers. The new law proposed to dismantle gradually the barriers to entry.”[18] Globe filed its Answer with Motion to Dismiss on 7 June 1999. Smart’s failure to comply with the conditions precedent required in Section 6 of NTC Memorandum Circular 9-7-93. one in which telecommunications carriers are free to make business decisions and to interact with one another in providing telecommunications services. 8-9-95 (MC No.[14] Among the inherent services supported by the GSM network is the Short Message Services (SMS). Globe asserted that the more salient issue was whether NTC complied with its own Rules of Practice and Procedure before making the finding of want of authority and imposing the fine.[21] On 19 July 1999. and that with those voluminous documents the interconnection of the SMS systems could be expedited by merely amending the parties’ existing CMTS-to-CMTS interconnection agreements. efficient and responsive market to stimulate growth and development of the telecommunications facilities and services. it involves the most ubiquitous feature of the mobile phone. 143964. (“Islacom”) to provide SMS. Article II.[30] Yet..”[24] Globe filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[25] to nullify and set aside the Order and to prohibit NTC from taking any further action in the case.[20] Smart responded that it had already submitted the voluminous documents asked by Globe in connection with other interconnection agreements between the two carriers. the 1936 Public Service Act has classified wire or wireless communications systems as a “public service. and shift the focus of government’s intervention towards ensuring service standards and protection of customers. DEPUTY COMMISSIONERS AURELIO M. 39. with the end in view of encouraging their financial viability while maintaining affordable rates.[32] In reply. praying that NTC order the immediate interconnection of Smart’s and Globe’s GSM networks. and the interconnection was effected at midnight of that day. under prior laws. Inc.[3] Yet with the advent of rapid technological changes affecting the telecommunications industry. It also claimed that NTC acted without jurisdiction in declaring that it had no authority to render SMS. in view of what it noted as the “peculiar circumstances” of the case.[2] and indeed. INC. or both. malice and to the prejudice of Smart and Globe and the public in general. mandating that “a healthy competitive environment shall be fostered. For example. Appropriately. John Osmeña. judicial review of actions of administrative agencies is essential.[13] authorizing them.”[6] The statute itself defines the role of the government to “promote a fair.SECOND DIVISION [G. 8-9-95 which requires PTEs intending to provide value-added services (VAS) to secure prior approval from NTC through an administrative process. Globe alleged that the Order is a patent nullity as it imposed an administrative penalty for an offense for which neither it nor Smart was sufficiently charged nor heard on in violation of their right to due process.) No.

Smart has deviated from its original position. In fact. directing instead the parties to secure the requisite authority within thirty days. The principles. 89-95) to justify its claim that Globe and Smart need to secure prior authority from the NTC before offering SMS. 14-11-97 (“MC No. and separate books of accounts are maintained for the VAS. Also. provided that they do not put up their own network. the issue raised purely one of law. The transmutation has become necessary due to the rapid changes as well within the telecommunications industry. the traditional boundaries between computers. Globe notes that in a 7 October 1998 ruling on the application of a) prior approval of the Commission is secured to ensure that such VAS offerings are not cross-subsidized from the proceeds of their utility operations . electronic mail. Globe invokes it in support of its claim that it need not secure prior authority from NTC in order to operate SMS. international carriers and operators of mobile radio services are required to provide local exchange service in unserved or underserved areas. the motion for reconsideration was a useless or idle ceremony.[36] Another issue is also raised – whether Globe should have first filed a motion for reconsideration before the NTC. For example. It is also the law that governs all public telecommunications entities (“PTEs”) in the Philippines. 14-11-97 is a deregulated service that needs no prior authorization from NTC. other providers of VAS are not discriminated against in rates nor denied equitable access to their facilities. 14-11-97. Generally.”[51] Section 11 recognizes that VAS providers need not secure a franchise. After the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Globe further contends that NTC’s requiring it to secure prior authorization violates the due process and equal protection clauses. offers enhanced services beyond those ordinarily provided for by such carriers. It reads. guidelines. or special feature under NTC MC No. skipping the standard motion for reconsideration. and the twin rulings therein that SMS is VAS and that Globe was required to secure prior authority before offering SMS. and personal communications services.[45] On the other hand. There are other faces – such as data communications. the law imposes strictures that restrain within reason how PTEs conduct their business. The statutory basis for the NTC’s determination must be thoroughly examined. The Merits Now. a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Instead. and. and so on. subject to the additional requirements that: Globe deliberately did not file a motion for reconsideration with the NTC before elevating the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. Smart has also chosen not to make any submission on Globe’s claim of due process violations. cellular radio. Our first level of inquiry should be into the PTA. Necessity of Filing Motion for Reconsideration Islacom for the operation of SMS. the assailed NTC Decision invokes the NTC Implementing Rules of the PTA (MC No.[49] At the same time. Voice telephony is perhaps the most popular face of telecommunications.” which the law defines as “an entity which relying on the transmission. the circumstances adverted to are among the recognized exceptions to the general rule. (2) whether SMS is a VAS under the PTA. It is the authority behind MC No. viz: Telecommunications entities may provide VAS. 14-11-97”). 14-11-97. The section unequivocally requires NTC approval for the operation of a value-added service. deregulation is not a magic incantation that wards off the spectre of intrusive government with the mere invocation of its name. As noted by Senator Osmeña in his sponsorship speech: [D]ramatic developments during the last 15 years in the field of semiconductors have drastically changed the telecommunications sector – worldwide as well as in the Philippines.[44] Under this ruling. Globe contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the NTC has the power under Section 17 of the Public Service Law[34] to subject Globe to an administrative sanction and a fine without prior notice and hearing in violation of the due process requirements. and broadcasting are increasingly becoming blurred.[50] One of the novel introductions of the PTA is the concept of a “value-added service” (“VAS”). the general thrust of the PTA is towards modernizing the legal framework for the telecommunications services sector. NTC effectively denominated SMS as a “special feature” which under MC No.[33] Globe elevated the controversy to this Court. it requires that any access charge/revenue sharing arrangements between all interconnecting carriers that are entered into have to be submitted for approval to NTC.[46] Public Telecommunications Act The PTA has not strictly adopted laissez-faire as its underlying philosophy to promote the telecommunications industry. switching and local distribution facilities of the local exchange and inter-exchange operators. video conferencing. radio paging.[39] yet chose anyway to rule on the merits as well. the appellate court erred in holding that any possible violation of due process committed by NTC was cured by the fact that NTC refrained from issuing a Show Cause Order with a Cease and Desist Order. and (3) whether NTC acted with due process in levying the fine against Globe.[43] The implementation must likewise be fair and evenhanded.[37] In opting not to file the motion for reconsideration. Globe’s election to elevate the case directly to the Court of Appeals. NTC declared that the applicable circular for SMS is MC No.[35] As presented during the oral arguments.[52] However. the Order is a patent nullity. mobile radio services like trunked radio. it being violative of due process. the central issues are: (1) whether NTC may legally require Globe to secure NTC approval before it continues providing SMS. According to Globe. telecommunications.[41] Besides. New technologies have fundamentally altered the structure. Globe hinges its claim of exemption from obtaining prior approval from the NTC on NTC Memorandum Circular No. on to the merits of the petition.[38] The appellate court in the questioned Decision cited the purported procedural defect. the issues presented are of relative importance and novelty[42] so much so that it is judicious for the Court to resolve them on the merits instead of hiding behind procedural fineries. that specifically due process was denied Globe because the hearings actually conducted dwelt on different issues. After all. Section 11 of the PTA governs the operations of a “value-added service provider. rules and regulations that govern a deregulated system must be firmly rooted in the law and regulations that institute or implement the deregulation regime.[40] Indeed. voice mail. since earlier it had exempted the similarly situated Islacom from securing NTC approval prior to its operation of SMS. The claim has to be evaluated carefully. a different rule is laid down for telecommunications entities such as Globe and PLDT. 8-9-95. Deregulation is the mantra in this age of globalization. (Emphasis supplied)[53] b) c) . is not a mortal mistake.[47] Each “telecommunication category”[48] established in the PTA is governed by detailed regulations. The case was called for oral argument on 22 March 2004. and. It no longer prays that the Court affirm the assailed Decision and Order.SMS being a deregulated special feature of the telephone network it may operate SMS without prior approval of NTC. the economics and the nature of competition in the telecommunications business. Globe asserted before the Court of Appeals that the case fell within the exceptions to the general rule. facsimile transmission. but this relatively minor question can be resolved in brief. Significantly. Because of the mind-boggling developments in semiconductors. Smart now argues that SMS is not VAS and that NTC may not legally require either Smart or Globe to secure prior approval before providing SMS. and overseas carriers. it is alleged. but it is no longer the only one. Globe also contends that in treating it differently from other carriers providing SMS the Court of Appeals denied it equal protection of the law.

contained in MC No. It is clear that the PTA has left open-ended what services are classified as “value-added. informing the agency that “it will be offering the special feature” of SMS for its CMTS. method of charging rates. Islacom wrote a letter to the NTC. enhanced security features.” Globe invokes this circular as it had been previously cited by the NTC as applicable to SMS. and citing therein that the notice was being given pursuant to NTC Memorandum Circular No. is still too sweeping. Still. is clearly reposed with the NTC. On 2 October 1998.”[58] for the purpose of ensuring availability of reliable and affordable telecommunications service in both urban and rural areas of the country. It shall not put up its own network. states in full: VALUE ADDED SERVICES (VAS) (a) A non-PTE VAS provider shall not be required to secure a franchise from Congress. Rather than enumerating what possible features could be classified as VAS or enhanced services. To our knowledge. The Pertinent NTC Memorandum Circulars showing.[57] and mandated to perform certain public service functions. lease agreement with the PTE. Still.e. storing and forwarding messages in whatever format for the purpose of providing enhanced or augmented telecommunications services. (Emphasis supplied. (f) PTEs intending to provide value added services are required to secure prior approval by the Commission through an administrative process. which after all. there is MC No. local exchange services are to be cross-subsidized by other telecommunications services within the same company until universal access is achieved.O. (g) VAS providers shall comply strictly with the service performance and other standards prescribed commission.[54] The validity of this standard set by Section 11 is not put into question by the present petition. (c) The provision of VAS shall not in any way affect the cross subsidy to the local exchange network by the international and national toll services and CMTS service. non-PTEs are not similarly required to secure prior approval before offering VAS. The definition laid down in the Implementing Rules may validly serve as a guide for the NTC to determine what emergent offerings would fall under VAS. the regulatory attitude of the State towards VAS offerings by PTEs is to treat its provisioning as a “business decision” subject to the discretion of the offeror . but merely supplementary to the basic service.) Instead of expressly defining what VAS is. computer processing.”[66] The clear implication of the letter is that NTC considers the Circular as applicable to SMS.[65] In response. 14-11-97. the Implementing Rules defines what “enhanced services” are. so long as such services do not interfere with mandatory public service requirements imposed on PTEs such as those under E. Ultimately. There is an implicit recognition that VAS is not strictly a public service offering in the way that voice-to-voice lines are. we examine the regulatory framework devised by NTC in dealing with VAS. 109. and instructed Islacom to “adhere to the provisions of MC No. “to ensure that such VAS offerings are not cross-subsidized from the proceeds of their utility operations . is the statutory premise for the assailed regulatory action. The application form shall include documents For the purpose of exempting specific telecommunications service from rate or tariff regulations if the service has sufficient competition to ensure fair and reasonable rates or tariffs. This failure is but a mere indicia of the pattern of ignorance or incompetence that sadly attends the actions assailed in this petition. 109. 14-11-97 further highlights the state of regulatory confusion befalling the NTC.Oddly enough. the Implementing Rules instead focuses on the characteristics of these features. mode of operation. the NTC acknowledged receipt of the letter “ informing” it of Islacom’s “offering the special feature” of SMS for its CMTS. and the like.. for example. For the purpose of this Circular. which mandates that “international gateway operators shall be required to provide local exchange service. (b) A non-PTE VAS provider can utilize its own equipment capable only of routing. Special Feature shall refer to a feature inherent to the telephone network which may not be ordinarily provided by a Telephone Service Provider such as call .”[63] and its implications of analogy. Section 11 should be seen in relation to E. among others. More pertinently to the case at bar. It shall use the transmission network. Such expectation is especially demanded if the NTC is to penalize PTEs who fail to obtain prior approval in accordance with Section 11 of the PTA. etc.” The reason is related to the fact that PTEs are considered as public services.O. of the authorized PTES. presumes that a whole myriad of technologies can eventually be subsumed under the definition of “enhanced services. The relevance to VAS is clear: public policy maintains that the offer of VAS by PTEs cannot interfere with the fundamental provision by PTEs of their other public service requirements. including the implementation of the standards set therein. (e) The application for registration shall be acted upon by the Commission through an administrative process within thirty (30) days from date of application. (d) Entities intending to provide value added services only shall submit to the commission application for registration for approval. 14-11-97.[61] Due regard must be accorded to this attitude. Section 1.O. the language of the Implementing Rules is unnecessarily confusing. owing to the general nature of the definition laid down in the Implementing Rules.” The NTC should not be necessarily faulted for such indistinct formulation since it could not have known in 1995[64] what possible VAS would be available in the future. The use of the phrase “the like.”[62] Given that the PTA defines VAS as “enhanced services. No. as they are not burdened by the public service requirements prescribed on PTEs .[60] Section 10 of the PTA specifically affirms the requirements set by E. 109. the NTC has yet to come out with an administrative rule or regulation listing which of the offerings in the market today fall under VAS or “enhanced services. entitled “Deregulating the Provision of Special Features in the Telephone Network.” prescribing instead a general standard. NTC relied on Section 420(f) of the Implementing Rules of the PTA (“Implementing Rules”) as basis for its claim that prior approval must be secured from it before Globe can operate SMS.[59] Under E. encryption. namely: “a service which adds a feature or value not ordinarily provided by a public telecommunications entity such as format. i. No. the qualification highlights the fact that the legal rationale for regulation of VAS is severely limited. the Commission hereby deregulates the provision of special features inherent to the Telephone Network . and there is no need to inquire into its propriety. 14-11-97.O. The relevant portions thereof are reproduced below: SUBJECT: DEREGULATING THE PROVISION OF SPECIAL FEATURES IN THE TELEPHONE NETWORK. media conversion. system configuration. Next. Section 420 of the Implementing Rules. Thus. The definition of “enhanced services” in the Implementing Rules.[55] The power to enforce the provisions of the PTA. An examination of MC No. while more distinct than that under the PTA.[56] It can also be gleaned from Section 11 that the requirement that PTEs secure prior approval before offering VAS is tied to a definite purpose. Much trouble would have been spared had the NTC consistently used the term “VAS” as it is used in the PTA.” Still. toll or local distribution. 109. set forth as a matter of principle and fundamental policy by the legislature. No. the expectation arises that the NTC would promulgate further issuances defining whether or not a specific feature newly available in the market is a VAS. neither the NTC nor the Court of Appeals cited the above-quoted provision in their respective decisions. 8-9-95. which is in consonance with the general philosophy of deregulation expressed in the PTA.” the definition provided in the Implementing Rules may likewise be applied to VAS.

Moreover. “special features” are also “not ordinarily provided” by the telephone company.” However. NTC has unnecessarily complicated the regulatory framework to the detriment of the industry and the consumers. Such rule also promotes harmony within the service or industry subject to regulation. SMS fits in to a nicety [sic] with the definition of “value-added-service” or “enhanced-service” under NTC Memorandum Circular [8]-9-95 (Rule 001. including the charging of rates therefor. First.” and it cannot be denied that the liberalization ethos was introduced by the PTA.” then subsequently held that it was a “VAS. It provides indubitable opportunities to weed out the most frivolous conflicts with minimum hassle. namely. But does that translate to a finding that the NTC Order subjecting Globe to prior approval is void? There is a fine line between professional mediocrity and illegality. shall be deregulated. Item [15]).[68] While NTC counters that it did issue a Certificate of Registration to Smart. even after the Order to that effect was promulgated against Globe and Smart.waiting. Only the thinking of NTC did. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right. rule. Globe and Smart are Entitled to Corresponding Protections It is essential to understand that the assailed Order was promulgated by NTC in the exercise of its quasijudicial functions. authorizing the latter as a provider of SMS. Unfortunately for NTC. Thus. While this may be so. the Court of Appeals affirmed the rationale bereft of intelligent inquiry. Given the abstract set of rules the NTC has chosen to implement. Section 2. The very rationale adopted by the NTC in its Order holding that SMS is VAS is short and shoddy. it can be assumed that the authors of the Circular were well aware of the regulatory scheme formed under the PTA. and special features offered to customers with PABXs such as direct inward dialing and number hunting. call forwarding. With the dual classification of SMS as a special feature and a VAS and the varying rules pertinent to each classification. there is no requirement that a PTE seeking to offer “special features” must secure prior approval from the NTC. especially in light of the similarities between “special features” and VAS. Globe’s SMS involves the transmission of data over its CMTS which is Globe’s basic service. malicious call ID. this should come as no surprise. Neither does it sufficiently explain the reasons for the decision rendered. “enhanced service. The administrative process will best be vindicated by clarity in its exercise. the effect may prove ruinous to the sector it regulates.[67] NTC’s treatment of Islacom. and certain footing in deciding more substantive claims. no double connect. regulation or international convention on telecommunications is circumvented or violated. Therefore. it is not relevant to this case that the process for obtaining prior approval under the PTA and its Implementing Rules is administrative in nature. much less comment. wake-up call. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion. even the NTC is unsure. it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded.[69] This inaction indicates a lack of seriousness on the part of the NTC to implement its own rulings. Yet no matter how content the NTC may be with its attitude of sloth towards regulation.[73] They are synthesized in a subsequent case. SMS is not ordinarily provided by a CMTS operator like Globe.” or a “special feature”? Apparently. NTC’s byzantine approach to SMS regulation is certainly inefficient. owing to the failure of the NTC to adopt clear rules and regulations to that effect. xxx Section 4. such Certificate of Registration was issued only on 13 March 2003. and since SMS enhances Globe’s CMTS. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing. Authorized Telephone Service Providers shall continue to charge their duly approved rates for special services for 3 months from the effectivity of this circular. enacted after it promulgated the adverse order against Globe and Smart. 14-11-97 is to add to the haze beclouding the NTC’s rationale for regulation.” which is not provided for in the PTA just adds to the confusion. of the objective standards that have to be met. call pick-up. as Smart admitted during the oral arguments. Every party subject to administrative regulation deserves an opportunity to know.[72] The initial controversy may have involved a different subject matter. NTC never required ISLACOM to apply for prior approval in order to provide SMS. This fact was admitted by NTC during oral arguments. and the like. caller ID. 14-11-97 repeatedly invokes the word “deregulation. Moreover. recorded announcement. such price is worth paying if it also results in clarity and consistency in the operative rules of the game. or nearly four (4) years after Smart had made its request.[71] NTC issued a Show Cause Order requiring Globe to answer Smart’s charges. the legal basis invoked by NTC in claiming that SMS is VAS has not been duly established. the pertinent laws and regulations had not changed from the time of the Islacom letter up to the day the Order was issued. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing. after which they may set their own rates. Yet. the net effect of MC No. xxx (Emphasis supplied) Just like VAS as defined under the PTA. speed dialing. MC No. through reasonable regulations promulgated by the agency. all the requirements of due process attendant to the exercise of quasi-judicial power apply to the present case. warm line. as enumerated in Ang Tibay v. puts into question whether or not NTC truly believes that SMS is VAS. or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Hearings were conducted. 14-11-97 was promulgated after the passage of the PTA. In fact. that of having something to support its decision. but the evidence must be substantial. The fault falls squarely on NTC. provided that in the provision of the feature. call transfer. voicemail. Also.[70] In short. as shown in the ensuing elucidation. “special feature. Considering that MC No. More significantly. it tends to indicate the lack of belief or confusion on NTC’s part as to how SMS should be treated. signed by the three Commissioners of the NTC. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. Penalized Via a Quasi-Judicial Process. Such rule is integral to due process. The NTC Order is not supported by substantial evidence. the assailed NTC’s determination and corresponding penalty were rendered in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions.[75] The Court usually accords great respect to the technical findings of administrative agencies in the fields . Is SMS a VAS. hotline. sitting as a collegial body. Our earlier discussion pertained to the lack of clear legal basis for classifying SMS as VAS. which is no longer contested. Muddled as the legal milieu governing SMS already is. affirming the newly-arrived determination that SMS is VAS. Among them are the seven cardinal primary rights in justiciable cases before administrative tribunals. and a decision made on the merits. while it did comply with the NTC Order requiring it to secure prior approval. If this results in a tenfold in administrative rules and regulations.[74] NTC violated several of these cardinal rights due Globe in the promulgation of the assailed Order. A duly authorized Telephone Service Provider shall inform the Commission in writing of the special features it can offer and the corresponding rates thirty (30) days prior to launch date. its actions have also transgressed due process in many ways. call barring. apart from being obviously discriminatory. it was never informed by the NTC of any action on its request. It cannot be denied though that the findings and penalty now assailed before us was premised on the same exercise of jurisdiction. The introduction of a new concept. as follows: There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character. NTC is unable to point out any subsequent rule or regulation. charging information. It had told Islacom that SMS was a “special feature. interconnection. as it protects substantive rights. the relevant portion of the NTC Order reads: xxx Getting down [to] the nitty-gritty. CIR. Astoundingly. The case arose when Smart had filed the initial complaint against Globe before NTC for interconnection of SMS. conference calling. Stated in full. The Commission shall periodically update the list of special features in the Telephone Network which. no law. which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. NTC’s attempt to apply its confusing standards in the case of Globe and Smart is even more disconcerting.

NTC has not offered any sensible explanation why Islacom was accorded to a less onerous regulatory requirement. Neither was the matter ever raised during the hearings conducted by NTC on Smart’s petition. though expected. No. This is wrong-headed considering the governing law and regulations. which reads thus: Sec. is desirable. under the penalty. as in this case. decisions or regulations of the Commission shall be subject to a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos per day for every day during which such default or violation continues. regulation. variations or impulses. of the revocation and cancellation of any acquired rights. it must first establish that SMS is VAS. tied as at is to the scientific and technological application of the service or feature. and the Commission is hereby authorized and empowered to impose such fine. after due notice and hearing. as the case may be. encryption. this Court stands athwart. and require existing public services to pay the fees provided for in this Act for the issuance of the proper certificate of public convenience or certificate of public necessity and convenience. or upon complaint in writing. paragraph (a). force. [83] Such explanation is warranted in order to sufficiently establish a decision as having rational basis. Moreover. Judicial fact-finding of the de novo kind is generally abhorred and the shift of decisional responsibility to the judiciary is not favored as against the substantiated and specialized determination of administrative agencies. order or other requirement of this Act or of the Commission. to enforce compliance with any standard. Globe in its Consolidated Reply before this Court challenged NTC to produce the transcripts of the hearings it conducted to prove that the issue of Globe’s authority to provide SMS was put in issue. Globe claims that the issue of its authority to operate SMS services was never raised as an issue in the Complaint filed against it by Smart. which defines “enhanced services” as analogous to “format.” a phraseology that evinces no causal relation to the definition in M. Neither could it be said that the requisite of prior authority was indubitable under the existing rules and regulations. To this blatant violation of due process. the parties were sufficiently notified that the authority to operate such service was a matter which NTC could look into. as decisions must be rendered on the evidence presented. [Emphasis supplied. 17. for the sake of clarity and intellectual honesty. and stations for transmission and reception of messages by means of electricity. that it explain thoroughly why a different result is warranted. rule. whether conveyed by wires. Unfortunately.[88] The requirement that agencies hold hearings in which parties affected by the agency’s action can be represented by counsel may be viewed as an effort to regularize this struggle for advantage within a legislative adversary framework. The Court similarly ordered the NTC to produce such transcripts. any eventual resolution of that issue on substantive grounds despite the absence of evidence is flawed. media conversion. or if need be. On the other hand. as the case may be. in its assailed decision.[89] It necessarily follows that if no evidence is procured pertinent to a particular issue.C. simply by citing the provision of the Public Service Act[90] which enumerates the instances when NTC may act motu proprio.[78] Smart is authorized under its legislative franchise to establish and operate integrated telecommunications/computer/ electronic services for public domestic and international communications.C. either in the hearing. However. And any decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity . This claim has been repeatedly invoked by Globe. and proper service as the public interest may require and warrant. the Court is unable to find how exactly does SMS “fits into a nicety” with NTC M. It is borne out by the records or the absence thereof.[79] while Globe is empowered to establish and operate domestic telecommunications. upon its own initiative.[84] Any inconsistent decision lacking thorough. if the parties did have evidence to counter the ruling but were wrongfully denied the opportunity to offer the evidence. Neither did the NTC endeavor to explain why the “transmission of data” necessarily classifies SMS as a VAS. no such opportunity arose and no such arguments were raised simply because Globe and Smart were not aware that the question of their authority to provide SMS was an issue at all. radiated through space or transmitted through other media and for the handling of any and all types of telecommunications services. In fact. ratiocination in support may be struck down as being arbitrary. The provision states: Sec. Yet at the same time. Considering the prior treatment towards Islacom. In fact. unsupported by substantial evidence. cites Section 21 as the basis for its imposition of fine on Globe. That is Section 17. Moreover. adequate. subject to established limitations and exceptions and saving provisions to the contrary: (a) To investigate. the above-quoted “finding” is nothing more than bare assertions. Globe (and Smart. 21. upheld the power of NTC to impose a fine and to make a pronouncement on Globe’s alleged lack of operational authority without need of hearing. Globe and Smart were denied opportunity to present evidence on the issues relating to the nature of VAS and the prior approval. NTC itself. NTC has not asserted that the matter of Globe’s authority was raised in any pleading or proceeding.[76] The Order reveals that no deep inquiry was made as to the nature of SMS or what its provisioning entails. and the like. to require any public service to furnish safe. It is clear that before NTC could penalize Globe and Smart for unauthorized provision of SMS. why the previous standards should no longer apply or should be overturned. any matter concerning any public service as regards matters under its jurisdiction. without previous hearing. The imposition of fine is void for violation of due process The matter of whether NTC could have imposed the fine on Globe in the assailed Order is necessarily related to due process considerations. neither Globe or Smart was afforded an opportunity to present evidence in their behalf on that point. it is not opportunely proper for the Court to make its own technical evaluation of VAS. Nor did NTC ever require Globe to justify its authority to operate SMS services before the issuance of the Order imposing the fine.[82] However. computer processing. Thus. NTC asserts that since Globe and Smart were required to submit their respective Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity and franchises. Yet strikingly. it deserves its own extensive discussion. particularly in the business field. As a result. The Commission shall have power. in the discretion of the Commission. Since there was no express rule or regulation on that question. Proceedings of [the National Telecommunications Commission] without previous hearing. or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. we think it essential.[85] Second. it would seem that this is already sufficiently covered by Globe and Smart’s respective legislative franchises. and to prohibit or prevent any public service as herein defined from operating without having first secured a certificate of public convenience or public necessity and convenience. NTC could have easily rebuffed this claim by pointing to a definitive record.[87] The opportunity to adduce evidence is essential in the administrative process. electromagnetic waves or any kind of energy. Every public service violating or failing to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders. While stability in the law. that if an administrative agency decides inconsistently with previous action. Since this question would also call to fore the relevant provisions of the Public Service Act. in the Order. the Order does not explain why the NTC was according the VAS offerings of Globe and Smart a different regulatory treatment from that of Islacom. 8-9-95. The Court of Appeals. In fact. No.[86] NTC failed to produce any.”[77] The NTC merely notes that SMS involves the “transmission of data over [the] CMTS. had it chosen to do so) had every right to rely on NTC’s disposal of Islacom’s initiative and to believe that prior approval was not necessary. the comical. Indeed.[80] The question of the proper legal classification of VAS is uniquely technical. if “the transmission of data over [the] CMTS” is to be reckoned as the determinative characteristic of SMS.of their expertise.] . 8-9-95. the result would be embarrassing on the adjudicator. Globe and Smart would be well within reason if they submitted evidence to establish that SMS was not VAS. this absence of substantial evidence in support of the finding that SMS is VAS already renders reversible that portion of the NTC Order. even if they are infelicitously worded. [81] With greater reason should this be the standard for the exercise of judicial review when the administrative agency concerned has not in the first place come out with a technical finding based on evidence. to this day. enhanced security features. Another disturbing circumstance attending this petition is that until the promulgation of the assailed Order Globe and Smart were never informed of the fact that their operation of SMS without prior authority was at all an issue for consideration. Third. there is no demand that the NTC slavishly follow precedent. nor have they compelled Islacom to suffer the same burdens as Globe and Smart. especially in relation to SMS. result of a definitive order which is totally unsupported by evidence. Owing to the dearth of substantive technical findings and data from the NTC on which a judicial review may reasonably be premised.

and in an even-handed manner. The records also indicate that the issue of Globe’s authority was never raised in the subsequent hearings on Smart’s complaint. and issuing a corresponding fine on. Concurrently. Otherwise put. Globe despite the absence of due notice and hearing which would have afforded Globe the right to present evidence on its behalf. The right to notice and hearing is essential to due process and its non-observance will. Thus.”[93] As a result. Section 17 does not include the power to impose fine in its enumeration. or any person operating without authority from NTC. the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.[101] In this case. since the very basis for the fine was invalidly laid.”[99] The Show Cause Order served on Globe in this case gave notice of Smart’s charge that Globe. NTC effectively concedes the necessity of prior notice and hearing. whenever practicable. the lack of Globe’s authority to operate SMS was not raised in the Complaint.Sections 17 and 21 of the Public Service Act confer two distinct powers on NTC. as in the case of Section 21 of the Public Service Act. This does not imply though that NTC lacks authority to regulate SMS or to classify it as VAS. The statutory affirmation of the requirement serves merely to enhance the fundamental precept. the lack of authority to operate SMS was not adverted to in NTC’s Show Cause Order. By the explicit language of the provision. and basic fairness. at all times. the right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. the provisions of law or regulation violated. and any subsequent determination by the NTC on whether SMS is VAS should be made with proper regard for due process and in conformity with the PTA. to any penalty or a disciplinary or other measure shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint. acting in bad faith and contrary to law. There is an established procedure within NTC that provides for the steps that should be undertaken before an entity such as Globe could be subjected to a disciplinary measure. Quite noticeably. refused to allow the interconnection of their respective SMS systems. by way of its broad grant. Further. jurisdiction over Globe and Smart’s SMS offerings. The issue before the Court is only the prior approval requirement as imposed on Globe and Smart. and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. Consequently. or other requirement imposed by law or the regulations promulgated by NTC. As the Court held in Central Bank of the Phil. the Court is convinced that prior to the promulgation of the assailed Order Globe was never notified that its authority to operate SMS was put in issue. but more so on its intellectual strength. Much complication could have been avoided had the NTC adopted a proactive position.[97] While a complaint was indeed filed against Globe by Smart. maintain a due regard for the constitutional rights of party litigants. the Order effectively discriminatory and arbitrary as it is. It did not produce any transcript. As earlier stated. regulation. No cost. NTC may not legally require Globe to secure its approval for Globe to continue providing SMS. Rule 10 of the NTC Rules of Procedure provides that any action. Inherently. the NTC’s role will become more crucial than at any time before. the object of which is to subject a holder of a certificate of public convenience or authorization. But it is essential to emphasize the need for a hearing before a fine may be imposed.[94] That particular argument of the NTC has been previously disposed of. NTC is to serve a Show Cause Order on the respondent to the complaint. for being unsupported by substantial evidence. including questions of rates and customer complaints.[92] In citing Section 21 as the basis of the fine. By no means should this Decision be interpreted as removing SMS from the ambit of jurisdiction and review by the NTC. Indeed. both parties were sufficiently notified that this was a matter that NTC could look into in the course of the proceedings. The credibility of an administrative agency entrusted with specialized fields subsists not on judicial doctrine alone. But it is ignominious if the spirit is defeated through a crazy quilt of vague. Cloribel:[95] [T]he necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. NTC may exercise the power without need of prior hearing. notice and hearing are indispensable for the valid exercise by an administrative agency of its quasi-judicial functions. However. Notice and hearing are the bulwark of administrative due process. regulatory and even punitive in character. and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective. the fine imposed by NTC on Globe is also invalid. and in a manner that contravened express provisions of law. “it may very well look into the issue of whether the parties had the requisite authority to operate such services. adherence to law. invalidate the administrative proceedings. and for imputing violation to. the Court realizes that the PTA is not intended to constrain the industry within a cumbersome regulatory regime. the move should be implemented properly. With the persistent advent of new offerings in the telecommunications industry. v. as well as its Resolution dated 29 July 2000. and the assailed Order of the NTC dated 19 July 1999 are hereby SET ASIDE. Yet the agency contends that the sanction was justified by arguing that when it took cognizance of Smart’s complaint for interconnection. . In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings. The NTC will continue to exercise.[103] It is disappointing at least if the deregulation thrust of the law is skirted deliberately. WHEREFORE.[91] The right is guaranteed by the Constitution itself and does not need legislative enactment. containing therein a “statement of the particulars and matters concerning which the Commission is inquiring and the reasons for such actions. the fine is necessarily void. as well as require compliance if necessary.[102] The policy as pre-ordained by legislative fiat renders the traditionally regimented business in an elementary free state to make business decisions. the Court fears the resultant confusion within the industry and the consuming public. order. The parties subsequently attended at least five hearings presided by NTC. through unequivocal regulations applicable to all entities that are similarly situated. avowing that it is under this atmosphere that the industry would prosper. was issued with grave abuse of discretion and it must be set aside. Section 21 requires notice and hearing because fine is a sanction. as it is clearly a punitive measure undertaken by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 November 1999. It is Section 21 which adverts to the power to impose fine and in the same breath requires that the power may be exercised only after notice and hearing. NTC should. (ii) the assailed Order violates due process for failure to sufficiently explain the reason for the decision rendered. solely predicated as it was on Globe’s refusal to interconnect with Smart. Yet caution must be had. Conclusion In summary: (i) there is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars promulgated by the NTC to denominate SMS as VAS.[100] Again. Globe in its Consolidated Reply before this Court challenged NTC to produce the transcripts of the hearings it conducted to prove that the issue of Globe’s authority to provide SMS was put in issue. the respondents themselves have never asserted that the matter of Globe’s authority was raised in any pleading or proceeding. the requirement is the essence of due process. the complaint should state. overlapping rules that are implemented haphazardly. administrative. rule. In fact. Being an agency of the government. or legislative functions. Section 1. NTC blindsided Globe with a punitive measure for a reason Globe was not made aware of. Hon. NTC has the power to investigate a PTE compliance with a standard. it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive.[96] The requirement of notice and hearing becomes even more imperative if the statute itself demands it. SO ORDERED. as a rule. If NTC’s behavior in the present case is but indicative of a malaise pervading this crucial regulatory arm of the State. promulgating the necessary rules and regulations to cope up with the advent of the technologies it superintends. the petition is GRANTED. Under Section 17. but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter. However.[98] Under the NTC Rules of Procedure.

The instant petition is devoid of merit. 68-76). but the same was denied in a Resolution dated February 29. entitled "Victorias Milling Co. petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the said Court. and are binding on all persons dealing with that body. These contentions are untenable for while it is true that neither Presidential Decree No. in holding that the recourse first to the Court of Tax Appeals and then to this Court tolled the period to appeal. 79-81). 857 empowers the PPA to promulgate such rules as would aid it in accomplishing its purpose. 1984. 1984. which do not and can not include the power to legislate on procedural matters. Presidential Decree No. petitioner filed its reply to respondents' Comment ( Ibid. 1986 praying that it be granted leave to file a reply to respondents' Comment. 3466. The Second Division of this Court. among others. procedures. the same was denied on the sole ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period. petitioner was required to file a reply ( Ibid. Petitioner.. 17 SCRA 316.FIRST DIVISION G. wherein it maintained that it is exempt from paying PPA any fee or charge because: (1) the wharf and an its facilities were built and installed in its land. A motion for Reconsideration was filed. construction.. 505 nor Presidential Decree No. and (4) at no time has the government ever spent a single centavo for such activities. 73705 August 27. (2) repair and maintenance thereof were and solely paid by it. 505. On October 8.. Inc. On July 18. the same was denied ( ibid. PARAS. on March 31. 13-77 was duly published in full in the nationwide circulated newspaper. respondents. specifically its Section 131. p. maintenance. Andrada. Petitioner further added that the wharf was being used mainly to handle sugar purchased from district planters pursuant to existing milling agreements. pp. 1984 (Record. including private ports in the country. on November 9. the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Rejoinder. PPA enacted Administrative Order No. No. The corporate duties of the Authority shall be: xxx xxx xxx (III) To prescribe rules and regulations. p. so that it is but reasonable to seek recourse with the Court of Tax Appeals. 857. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. 1986. likewise. On the other hand.1977 (ibid. petitioner. which justified the PPA's demands. among others. creating the PPA on July 11. 61) but before receipt of said resolution. The Second Division of this Court. pp. and guidelines governing the establishment. the latter filed a motion on July 1. nevertheless. 1986. 62). 1986. customs duties. like PPA Administrative Order No. 1981.. On April 28. 1981. PPA. et al. To these demands. 857. petitioner filed a Petition for Review with this Court. Section 6 of the said Decree provides — Sec. among others. 1981.. requiring petitioner to secure a permit for cargo handling operations at its Da-an Banua wharf and remit 10% of its gross income for said operations as the government's share. have the force and effect of law (Valerio vs. Petitioner. On March 29. v. As to petitioner's contention that Administrative Order No. 1982. both dated June 2. ( Ibid. No. p. 1986 within which to file the same. in a Resolution dated June 2. 1982. On January 10. "The Times Journal". On January 23.. 6. the instant petition. and accordingly. requiring it to have its tugboats and barges undergo harbor formalities and pay entrance/clearance fees as well as berthing fees effective May 1. with the clarification that the assailed PPA Administrative Order No. It recommended that the appeal be addressed to the Office of the President. p. 13-77 precisely to govern. submits that it was guided. stating. 1985. It is now finally settled that administrative rules and regulations issued in accordance with law. 1987 VICTORIAS MILLING CO. 857 provides for the remedy of appeal to the Office of the President. AND THEN WITH THIS HONORABLE TRIBUNAL.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the July 27. 31 SCRA 126). pp. (3) even the dredging and maintenance of the Malijao River Channel from Guimaras Strait up to said private wharf are being done by petitioner's equipment and personnel. Philippine Ports Authority. 1125 (creating the Court of Tax Appeals) was passed in 1955. 50-59). Further request for reconsideration was denied on January 14. among others..R. In a Resolution of July 2. the Court of Tax Appeals had exclusive appellate jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs regarding. in good faith. petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President.OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY. only provides for . p. 1984 Decision of the Office of the Presidential Assistant For Legal Affairs dismissing the appeal from the adverse ruling of the Philippine Ports Authority on the sole ground that the same was filed beyond the reglementary period. shows that the PPA is vested merely with corporate powers and duties (Sec.. 1981. The sole legal issue raised by the petitioner is — WHETHER OR NOT THE 30-DAY PERIOD FOR APPEAL UNIDER SECTION 131 OF PPA ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. but in a Decision dated July 27. the Iloilo Port Manager of respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA for short) wrote petitioner Victorias Milling Co. 13-77. 1982. It contends that when Republic Act No.. 1986 as their memorandum. petitioner served notice to PPA that it is appealing the case to the Court of Tax Appeals. and Macailing vs. Corporate Powers and Duties — a. and an extension of time up to June 30. vs. and operation of all other ports. revising its charter (said decrees. 22). and under the said law. 6). neither in Presidential Decree No. much less to effectively take away from the Court of Tax Appeals the latter's appellate jurisdiction. 1984. In reply. fees and other money charges concerning the use of ports and facilities thereat) is there any provision governing appeals from decisions of the PPA on such matters. J. in a Resolution dated August 25. the Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioner's action on the ground that it has no jurisdiction. merely transferred to the PPA the powers of the Bureau of Customs to impose and collect customs duties. 1986. 7 SCRA 719. INC. 1377 WAS TOLLED BY THE PENDENCY OF THE PETITIONS FILED FIRST WITH THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS. Maximo Dumlao. 78). resolved to require the respondents to comment (ibid. PPA Iloilo sent petitioner a memorandum of PPA's Executive Officer. Inc." and docketed therein as CTA Case No.. but in an Order dated December 16. Zayco. the Solicitor General filed his Comment on June 4. 3-21): Hence. 1984. docketed as G. xxx xxx xxx Pursuant to the aforequoted provision. Antique Sawmills. appeals from PPA decisions. 66381. pp. by considerations which lead to the assumption that procedural rules of appeal then enforced still hold true. 1986. fees and other money charges imposed by the Bureau under the Tariff and Customs Code. petitioner sent two (2) letters. vs. 13-77. resolved to give due course to the petition and to require the parties to file their respective simultaneous memoranda ( Ibid.. likewise. 1974 nor in Presidential Decree No. contends that an analysis of Presidential Decree No. 1986 (Ibid. PPA was not yet in existence. On April 2. 45). that respondents are adopting in toto their Comment of June 3. and in compliance therewith...R. on November 3.

rates. that any party aggrieved by the decision of the General Manager as affirmed by the PPA Board may appeal said decision to the Office of the President within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof. and Santiago vs. Furthermore. it must be stated that as correctly observed by the Solicitor General. This is because the government maintains bodies of water in navigable condition and it is to support its operations in this regard that dues and charges are imposed for the use of piers and wharves regardless of their ownership. of entering and leaving public harbors and berthing on public streams or waters. it is evident that the above contention has no basis. this Court laid down the rule that berthing charges against a vessel are collectible regardless of the fact that mooring or berthing is made from a private pier or wharf. Aguila vs. the Solicitor General correctly pointed out that said Administrative Order was duly published in full in the nationwide newspaper. or any organization concerned with port operations. petitioner even assailed the PPA's rule making powers at the hearing before the Court of Tax Appeals. 857 authorized the PPA "To levy dues. Actg. 4 SCRA 138. Navarro. that if within thirty (30) days from receipt of the record of the case by the General Manager. the facts of this case show that petitioner's failure to appeal to the Office of the President on time stems entirely from its own negligence and not from a purported ignorance of the proper procedural steps to take. and reviewed by. the result would still be the same as it does not present a substantially meritorious case against the PPA." This 10% government share of earnings of arrastre and stevedoring operators is in the nature of contractual compensation to which a person desiring to operate arrastre service must agree as a condition to the grant of the permit to operate. 1985 Order of the Office of the President. and if the Port Manager's decision would be affirmed by the General Manager. "The Times Journal". Provided further. the General Manager of the authority. — If in any case involving assessment of port charges. the Port Manager/OIC renders a decision adverse to the government. such decision shall be subject to further affirmation by the PPA Board before it shall become effective. As to the requirement to remit 10% of the handling charges. the fees and charges PPA collects are not for the use of the wharf that petitioner owns but for the privilege of navigating in public waters.1977. 898. 056-057). As correctly stated by the Solicitor General. constructed and maintained at no expense to the government. Valenzuela. pp. worth mentioning is the observation of the Solicitor General that petitioner misleads the Court. As to petitioner's allegation that to its recollection there had been no prior publication of said PPA Administrative Order No. Supervisory Authority of General Manager and PPA Board. works. even if petitioner's appeal were to be given due course. or charges for the use of the premises. as embodied in the December 16. 137 SCRA 346. 397). no decision is rendered. 131. Petitioner had been aware of the rules governing PPA procedures. or for services provided by or belonging to the Authority. Provided. (Emphasis supplied). It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provision of law (United CMC Textile Workers Union vs. citing the cases of Bello vs. . Fernando. In fact. facilities. Commissioner of Customs (23 SCRA 600). the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. on November 9. however. Said Section 131 provides — Sec.appeal when the decision is adverse to the government. SO ORDERED. Petitioner maintains and submits that there is no basis for the PPA to assess and impose the dues and charges it is collecting since the wharf is private. appliances. (Rollo. 55 Phil. such decision shall automatically be elevated to. Clave. From a cursory reading of the aforequoted provision. Moreover. Section 6B-(ix) of the Presidential Decree No. the decision under review shall become final and executory. PREMISES CONSIDERED. 78 Phil. 13-77. and that it exists primarily so that its tugboats and barges may ferry the sugarcane of its Panay planters. In Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs.

respondent-appellant. The appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption by respondent Board and intervenorsappellants that the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination should be limited to allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a penal liability being subsequently incurred. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Respondent-appellant. that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals. Such a motion was granted and an answer in intervention was duly filed by them on March 23. Court of Appeals . Castillo. counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness herein petitionerappellee. Kapunan could thus distinguished. Respondent Board. stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed. They likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing. a charge for contempt was filed against him in the sala of respondent Judge.EN BANC G. 10 In the language of Justice Douglas: "We conclude . Upon petitioner's refusal to be sworn as such witness. The constitutional guarantee. vs.. JR." It was noted in the opinion penned by the present Chief Justice that while the matter referred to an a administrative charge of unexplained wealth. J. for some an even greater deprivation. we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony. along with other rights granted an accused. The case before us is not dissimilar.BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS.. unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority. in their opinion. 8 In that proceeding for certiorari and prohibition to annul an order of Judge Kapunan. the Board of Examiners. 1965. but. on February 12.5where it was held that a respondent in an administrative proceeding under the Anti-Graft Law 6 cannot be required to take the witness stand at the instance of the complainant. stating that petitioner-appellee's remedy is to object once he is in the witness stand. whether physical or mental. he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice. L-25018 May 26. With his assertion that he was entitled to the relief demanded consisting of perpetually restraining the respondent Board from compelling him to testify as witness for his adversary and his readiness or his willingness to put a bond. there is clearly the imposition of a penalty. we find for the petitioner-appellee. at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing..lawphi1. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case 7 for alleged immorality. the Board of Examiners was guilty. for respondent "a plain. from the power to compel a witness to incriminate himself.R. Petitioner-appellee then alleged that in thus ruling to compel him to take the witness stand. current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. as doubtless it was designed. manifestly out proportion to his salary and his other lawful income." Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. So it must be in this case. to be distinguished. therefore. through counsel. 1965 sustaining the power of respondent Board." We reiterate that such a principle is equally applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession. in Chavez v. made of record his objection. Kapunan. The answer of respondent Board.: The broad. We affirm the lower court decision on appeal as it does manifest fealty to the principle announced by us in Cabal v. was quite categorical. He filed a motion to quash and upon its denial. not only to answer incriminatory questions. all-embracing sweep of the self-incrimination clause. we had occasion to declare: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt. denied that it acted with grave abuse of discretion. "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ." 14 It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated. petitioner-appellee. 1. would be construed with the utmost liberality in favor of the right of the individual intended to be served. that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth. Jr. On February 9. is the recent case of Cabal v. asking that they be allowed to file an answer as intervenors. to remain silent. 1965. of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination. unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted. precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion. 1 whenever appropriately invoked. which for them is limited to compelling the witness to take the stand. 11 is the protection against "any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used. 1969 ARSENIO PASCUAL. The proceeding for forfeiture while administrative in character thus possesses a criminal or penal aspect. We found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse. to follow the language of another American decision. and that it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it. More and more in line with the democratic creed." 4 Even more relevant." If that were all there is then it becomes diluted. which could result in forfeiture or loss of a privilege.. for a writ of prohibition. to await the judicial disposition of the matter upon petitioner-appellee posting a bond in the amount of P500. SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA GATBONTON. petitioner-appellee would be called upon to testify as such witness. 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. he initiated this proceeding. has been accorded due recognition by this Court ever since the adoption of the Constitution." As phrased by Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion: "The provision. As we there stated: "This Court is of the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter. 13 speaking through Justice Sanchez. we affirm it on appeal. now respondent-appellant. being quasi-criminal in character. FERNANDO. the complainants in the administrative case for malpractice against petitioner-appellee. while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner-appellee to the witness stand and interrogate him. Thus according to ." Hence this appeal both by respondent Board and intervenors.3 decided in 1937. such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. intervenors-appellants. To the argument that Cabal v. relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. filed on February 1..00. to take the witness stand. As far back as 1905. That was a correct decision. who was the respondent in such malpractice charge. He could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. it appeared that an administrative charge for unexplained wealth having been filed against petitioner under the Anti-Graft Act. the lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the respondent Board commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case. It further elaborated the matter in the affirmative defenses interposed. There was a motion for intervention by Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton. the right against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. 2 Bermudez v. which request was granted. the Gatbontons. petitioner-appellee. Kapunan. considering the precise point at issue. the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will. it suffices to refer to an American Supreme Court opinion highly persuasive in character. To quote from Chief Justice Warren. petitioner-appellee. 1965. 2. where petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the complainants. must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. at the very least. petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. also. Thereupon." precluding the issuance of the relief sought.. took note of such a plea. It is true that one aspect of such a right. with the Anti-Graft Act authorizing the forfeiture of whatever property a public officer or employee may acquire.ñet The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. No." 12 Only last year. finding the claim of petitioner-appellee to be well-founded and prohibiting respondent Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself.9the complainant requested the investigating committee that petitioner be ordered to take the witness stand. he prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction and after a hearing or trial. A decision was rendered by the lower court on August 2. Arsenio Pascual. it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it. the administrative proceeding against him. As noted at the outset.

consistently with the self-incrimination clause.Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment." 15 So also with the observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. . That right is the hallmark of our democracy. WHEREFORE. respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot. 1965 is affirmed. the decision of the lower court of August 2. it could thus clearly appear that no possible objection could be legitimately raised against the correctness of the decision now on appeal. compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent." 16 In the light of the above. We hold that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Decision 1834. and directing his reinstatement as quarry superintendent.appellant from his position of quarry superintendent to the office of the Provincial Engineer sufficiently warranted. on April 9. m. 1985. declaring the one-year suspension improper. 1989 GOVERNOR FELICISIMO T. On October 15. In the interim. 1979. Decision 1834 was allowed. ALL OF LAGUNA. the court a quo rendered its decision finding the transfer of petitioner. L-80160 June 26. d. attorney's fees and expenses of suit. and opposed the therein application for preliminary injunctive relief for immediate reinstatement. the development of events may be briefly encapsulated as follows: a. (ref. 1978. e. and ruled the one-year suspension illegal. The trial Court further decided "that none of the respondents should be held personally liable in their private capacity to the petitioner because their actuations are not at all tainted with malice and bad faith" [Rollo. it nevertheless ordered his reinstatement to an equivalent position as a matter of equity. P 100.P. 1979. THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN. conduct prejudicial to the best interest of duty and abandonment of office. [on May 27. In an Order of December 1. On petitioner-appellant's motion for reconsideration. On January 23. until after the trial. The said motion for reconsideration was denied on November 6. 38].00 each per court appearance.000." On December 15.00 by way of moral damages. 1974 the Civil Service Commission reiterated its October 25. c. Series of 1976. i. 1973.00 as exemplary damages and P 10. J. 1959. petitioner-appellant denounced graft and corrupt practices by employees of the provincial government of Laguna.R.00 as attorney's fees plus P 300. respondent-appellant provincial governor issued an Order of April 27. l973. the CSC Merit System Board denied said motion for reconsideration in its Resolution No. other litigation expenses which may be incurred as may be proved in due course. and ordering payment of back salaries to Berroya. No. 1977 dismissing Berroya for alleged neglect of duty. RA 2260. vs. then suspended. 1979. instead of complying with the CSC directive that Berroya be reverted to his regular position. f. On December 12. BERROYA. On July 20. the petition for relief being the third such motion filed by petitioner. CORTES. Thereafter. 1980] the antecedent Civil Case No. setting aside OP Decision 954. On February l4. Dismissing the Complaint and denying the prayer for Preliminary Injunction. SAN LUIS. 1978. PROVINCIAL ENGINEER JUANITO C. RODIL AND PROVINCIAL TREASURER AMADEO C. 1980. h. SC-1834 for mandamus to compel his reversion to the position of quarry superintendent at the Oogong Quarry.000. and finally dismissed following his expose of certain anomalies and irregularities committed by government employees in the province. 1981 petitioner provincial governor filed a petition for relief from O. Series of 1974 reversing the CSC rulings without prejudice to the decision of the Local Review Board [which had in fact already sustained the one-year suspension under date of May 6. His summary dismissal was likewise found to be a justified exercise of the authority granted under LOI 14-B. with back salaries for the entire period of his suspension and dismissal (exclusive of leaves of absence with pay). Declaring petitioner to have been legally separated or dismissed from the government service. the trial court denied the application for preliminary injunctive relief "until after the parties shall have adduced evidence. 1974]. his one-year suspension was found to be proper under LOI 14-B and unassailable upon affirmation by the Local Review Board. 1976. which order of dismissal was appealed by Berroya to the Civil Service Commission on May 12. 1979 declaring Berroya's dismissal unjustified.P. 1. This was denied on November 27. 1976. supra). k. petitioners. g. the Office of the President rendered OP Decision 1834. respondents. 1977. 1980. Petitioner-appellant's formal demand for reinstatement to the position of quarry superintendent having been disdained despite the factual antecedents aforestated. On May 29. the Civil Service Commission resolved said appeal by declaring the dismissal unjustified. JR. ROMEY. The Office of the President dismissed said motion on March 27. Decision 1834 with the Office of the President. 567. However. Respondents-appellees moved to dismiss said petition for mandamus. #h. herein respondent-appellee provincial governor suspended Berroya for alleged gross discourtesy. and ordered that Berroya be reverted to his regular position of quarry superintendent. On that basis. reconsideration of the CSC directive that Berroya be reverted to the position of quarry superintendent was sought as academic (sic). and similarly deferred its resolution on the motion to dismiss "for lack of merit for the present . 1981. The background facts. dated May 19. 1984 on the ground that only one motion for reconsideration of O. although the trial court upheld the validity of Berroya's dismissal. Hence. Order petitioner to pay each of them the sum of P 200.. An amended office order invoked LOI 14-B for said transfer. and prayed for moral and exemplary damages. On May 17. 2. after trial. Respondent-appellee provincial governor appealed to the Office of the President from the CSC rulings alluded to. 72 transferring Berroya to the office of the Provincial Engineer. 3. pro and con the grant of injunctive relief". p.THIRD DIVISION G.COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIANO L. there issued OP Decision 954. Furthermore. 1973. Respondent-appellant moved for reconsideration of OP Decision 1834 on June 14. b. In April and May of 1973.: The instant petition for certiorari and mandamus and/or appeal by certiorari assails the appellate court's ruling that mandamus lies to compel the reinstatement of a quarry superintendent in the provincial government of Laguna who was initially detailed or transferred to another office. 35-37]. he filed. and to pay the costs of suit [Rollo. as amended. pp. respondent-appellee provincial governor moved anew to set aside O. petitioner-appellant (private respondent herein) had been the quarry superintendent in the Province of Laguna since his appointment as such on May 31. the Civil Service Commission ruled the same violative of Section 32.000. Series of 1976-the first motion for reconsideration of which had been denied on November 6. During the pendency of the civil case for mandamus.P. 1974. On February 26. Thereafter. herein respondent-appellee provincial governor (one of the petitioners herein) issued Office Order No. 1973 directive for the immediate reversion of Berroya to his former position. Berroya challenged said transfer. inefficiency and insubordination. respondent-appellee provincial governor sought relief from the CSC decision of January 23. frequent unauthorized absences. j. respondents-appellees answered the petition for mandamus and prayed that judgment be rendered1.. exonerating Berroya of charges. as narrated by the respondent Court of Appeals are: Records show that at all pertinent times.. the dispositive portion of its decision reads as follows: . and on October 25.

the decretal portion of which states: WHEREFORE.00 as and for attorney's fees.000. However. 1985. (c) Respondents-appellants (sic) are ordered. to pay petitioner-appellant the further sum of P 20. AND NOT ADVERTED TO IN THE DECEMBER 15. p. plus costs and expenses of suit. 1987.000. Accordingly. AND IN HOLDING ALL THE PETITIONERS HEREIN SOLIDARILY LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF AFORESAID BACK SALARIES AND DAMAGES [Rollo. AS WOULD MILITATE AGAINST ATTENDANCE OF GOOD FAITH IN THE ABOLITION OF SAID OFFICE. 1987 filed by respondent-appellee merely reiterates the grounds and arguments already discussed. 35]. 2.00 as and for moral damages. exclusive of that corresponding to leaves of absences with pay. Thus. pp. DOES NOT FALL UNDER THE CATEGORY OF "NOTORIOUSLY UNDESIRABLE" AND THAT THE "APPLICABILITY OF LOI 14-B TO RESPONDENT BERROYA IS OPEN TO QUESTION AS HE WAS NEVER ASKED TO RESIGN AS BEING NOTORIOUSLY UNDESIRABLE". A thorough perusal of the assailed resolution of the respondent CA denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration reveals clearly its legal basis. (b) Respondents-appellees are ordered to pay the back salary of petitioner-appellant corresponding to the period of suspension and of illegal dismissal from the service. the Court noted the manifestation/motion filed by petitioners stating. 43. Hence. 1977 to September 1. 1987 and docketed as G. in a resolution dated November 16. Fourth THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AS WELL AS EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION OF THE LOCAL BOARD OF REVIEW UNDER LOI 14-B MAY BE REVIEWED UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT TO SUPERVISE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS. No. jointly and severally. IN GROSS VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION'S EXPRESS MANDATE AND WHEN IT STATED AND HELD IN SAID RESOLUTION "THAT NO NEW REASON HAS BEEN ADDUCED [IN SAID MOTION] TO JUSTIFY A REVERSAL OR MODIFICATION OF [ITS] FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS". No. that the petition docketed as G.00 IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT BERROYA.WHEREFORE. among other things.] Another petition for review of the Court of Appeals' decision was filed with this Court on October 8. 1987. The appeal was resolved by the respondent Court of Appeals in his favor in a decision which was promulgated on April 30. which is "both or alternatively an original action for certiorari and mandamus and an appeal by certiorari" [See Rollo. With costs against respondents-appellees. SO ORDERED. the instant petition docketed as G. STATING NO LEGAL BASIS THEREFOR. MODIFY OR REVERSE DECISION INVOLVING SUSPENSION OF LOCAL OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES. 80160 contains the following assignment of errors: First THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AS WELL AS EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BY MEANS OF A MERE MINUTE RESOLUTION. MENTIONED ONLY IN THE TESTIMONY OF PETITIONER PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR. On June 6. the parties were required to submit their respective pleadings in G. The petition in G. AND IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES IN THE SUM OF P50. (d) Respondents-appellants (sic) are ordered. p. 1987 docketed as G. Ordering respondents to reinstate petitioner to any position equivalent to that of a quarry superintendent which has been abolished in the present plantilla of the provincial government of Laguna as reorganized pursuant to PD 1136 without diminution in rank and salary. Fifth THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AS WELL AS EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN CONCLUDING IN RATHER STRONG LANGUAGE THAT THE "ABOLITION OF THE POSITION OF QUARRY SUPERINTENDENT FROM THE PLANTILLA OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF LAGUNA MUST BE VIEWED WITH (sic) ABERRATION AND AN ANOMALY.R.00 AND ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE SUM OF P20. AND IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT BERROYA COMMITTED ABANDONMENT OF OFFICE. 79985 be considered withdrawn and the petition dated October 16. No. The first error assigned in the instant petition is not well taken.R. JR. as soon as this decision becomes final. UNFORTIFIED BY ANY WRITING THEREOF.000. Dismissing all claims and counterclaims of both parties for other damages including attorney's fees [Rollo. p." Sixth THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AS WELL AS EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS BACK SALARIES FOR THE PERIOD OF HIS SUSPENSION AS WELL AS DISMISSAL UNTIL REINSTATEMENT AS QUARRY SUPERINTENDENT. Ordering respondents to pay the back salary of petitioner from April 26. No. judgment is hereby rendered: 1. et seq.R.] Petitioners moved to reconsider the decision of the appellate court but their motion was denied. [Rollo. in Civil Case No. and that no new reason has been adduced to justify a reversal or modification of the .R. the present appeal is accordingly resolved as follows: (a) Petitioner-appellant is ordered to be reinstated to the position of quarry superintendent of the Oogong Quarry in Laguna or to the position which said office may now be called pursuant to the reorganization of the plantilla of the Provincial Government of Laguna under PD 1136.000. 80160. WHICH INCLUDES THE AUTHORITY TO REVIEW. p. 13-14]. No. thoroughly analyzed and passed upon by this Court. 1987 which was filed on October 19. without diminution in rank and salary. No. SC-1748 is accordingly set aside forthwith. The decision of May 17. 80160. 1985. Second THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AS WELL AS EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT MARIANO L. 79985 by the same petitioners. its resolution stating that Considering that the motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 30. jointly and severally. 1985. 1980 ANSWER FILED IN THE ANTECEDENT mandamus ACTION. 1977 only and appropriating funds therefor. herein private respondent Berroya appealed from the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated May 17. 80160 be considered as the main and real petition [Rollo. BERROYA.R. IN THE LIGHT OF UNCONTROVERTED SHOWING THAT QUARRY OPERATIONS AT THE SAME SITE CONTINUE TO DATE.R. to pay petitioner-appellant the sum of P 50. Third THE RESPONDENT COURT BLATANTLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AS WELL AS EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THE "RECALL" OF THE DISMISSAL ORDER IS ITSELF ATTENDED BY A TOUCH OF MYSTERY. 50]. 1. 3.

this Office rules that the suspension order was unjustified. G. Castro. 1. p. in exceptionally meritorious cases.P. his performance ratings from the period ending December 31. 102-103]. The Office of the President categorically ruled as follows: xxx xxx xxx It is not disputed that the Governor. Such being the case. of the charges against him. This petition was finally denied in a resolution of the office dated November 27. Vol. the filing of the second petition for reconsideration could not have stayed the finality of the aforesaid decision. the same does not fall within the scope of Section 40. without justifiable basis. 99 Phil. 1834. for exceptionally meritorious causes. this Board finds the order of dismissal dated April 27. he is not notoriously undesirable under the standard laid down by the President. 1979. 1976 which was denied for lack of merit in a resolution of the Office of the President dated November 6. it is hereby ordered that he be entitled to the payment of his back salaries corresponding to the period of his suspension [Folder of Exhibits. 1976 reversing its earlier ruling in O. 40. like the Merit Systems Board of the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President. the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. The Office of the President denied such petition in a resolution dated March 27. 175-176]. Vol. Decision No. Foregoing premises considered. provided that only one petition for reconsideration by any party shall be allowed [Emphasis supplied. 1834 had already attained finality upon denial of the first motion for reconsideration in view of the clear provisions of the applicable law at the time. decides to act thereon. 9 SCRA 72. B. On the contrary. during the pendency of the mandamus case. p. Jr. still this fact alone does not justify the drastic action taken against the petitioner in this case. in issuing his Order of Suspension. this board is convinced that there is no strong evidence of guilt against Berroya.] The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public. VIII. 1973 are all very satisfactory. Wherefore. 1984. have upon their finality. 1981. 1977. [Folder of Exhibits.findings and conclusion of this Court. From this decision of the Office of the President.P. Castro. Presidential Decree No. 1975 as erroneously indicated in O. This decision was therefore already final when Berroya instituted suit in 1980 to compel petitioner to reinstate him to his former position and to pay his back salaries. 1975 or after a lapse of one year and forty seven (47) days from the date when the said decision was rendered.. On the other hand. Decision No. Decision No. Although the said statements. 1. The motion for reconsideration from this decision was denied in a resolution of the Board dated October 15.P. the Merit Systems Board held as follows: After carefully perusing the records of this case. but it extends to all bodies upon whom judicial powers had been conferred. 2). 1963. A review of the records discloses that the only act of the governor which was sustained by the Local Review Board was his imposing the suspension on Berroya for alleged discourtesy. Hence. is as conclusive between the same parties litigating for . it is hereby directed that he be reinstated to his position as Quarry Superintendent of Laguna immediately.P. it was shown that Berroya's motion for reconsideration was filed on July 15. pp. 210] on the strength of Executive Order No. Emphasis supplied]. 1974. a petition for relief was filed by herein petitioners on April 9. Series of 1966. 1979. No.] Accordingly. 1. 1834) dated May 19. Decision No. which provides: xxx xxx xxx 5. Hence. executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers [Brillantes v. . it can be seen that OP Decision No. The resolution of the remaining assigned errors hinges on a determination of the effect of the decisions rendered in favor of Berroya by two administrative agencies. 1974 and not on July 15. It must be observed that the said statements were made in the course of a pending case before the Civil Service Commission. to wit: "the test of being notoriously undesirable is two-fold: whether it is common knowledge or generally known as universally believed to be true or manifest to the world that petitioner committed the acts imputed against him. 954 only on July 15. Inc. 19. Executive Order No. In fact. petitioner governor filed a second petition to reconsider O. 1834 on the main ground that the disputed decision is null and void ab initio allegedly because Berroya filed his motion for reconsideration of O. Consequently. 1981 [Folder of Exhibits. and in defense of the position of the petitioner. Vol. WHEREFORE. for instance. Mariano Berroya. L-15430. par. by themselves. tribunal or person is by law vested with authority to judicially determine a question. even if filed late. Petitions for reconsideration filed after the lapse of the aforesaid period (fifteen days from receipt of the decision) shall not be entertained unless the Office of the President. September 30. the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit [Rollo. rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority. petitioner Governor filed a petition for reconsideration dated June 14. Said Office further pointed out that upon review of the records of the case. there is not even sufficient evidence to maintain the charges against him. the validity of Berroya's dismissal was already passed upon by the Merit Systems Board of the Civil Service Commission in MSB Case No. p. but it must not be an unbridled exercise of such authority. Series of 1966 which empowers said office to act upon petitions for reconsideration. whenever any board. From the foregoing. the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of resjudicata [Brillantes v. the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily known as courts. Decision No. supra at 503]. On the contrary he should be given recognition for his efforts in exposing the irregularities allegedly committed by some authorities of the Laguna Provincial Government which led to the filing of criminal as well as administrative cases against such officials. 45. 170]. The same are not present in the case of Berroya. Court of Tax Appeals. v. Sec. In a last ditch attempt to assail the validity of O.R. 954 dated May 29. It is unfortunate that the Local Review Board took it as an infraction of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations. In a decision promulgated on January 23. 1973 had already been passed upon in a decision of the Office of the President (O. A. In view of the foregoing. constitutes sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate that no motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be denied without stating the legal basis therefor (1987 Constitution. p. 1. 807. This Office is prone to adopt a contrary stand on the matter taking into consideration the circumstances leading to the writing of the so-called "dishonest' statements of the petitioner... 1969 to the period ending June 30. Vol. when it has become final. 19. the Board hereby exonerates Engr. pp. 497 (1956). Art. 1834 [Folder of Exhibits. such determination. Ipekdjian Merchadising Co. On July 3. . 1979. 14. Indeed. It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies. Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had long become final and executory..P. . may be considered as lacking in refinement. Vol. and whether he had contracted the habit for any of the enumerated misdemeanors".P. 1. It is worth noting that the issue of legality of the order of suspension by petitioner Governor dated December 12. was exercising an authority legally endowed upon (sic) him by LOI 14-B. Considering that respondent Berroya has already served the suspension order and that his suspension was not proper. 213]. Decision No. 1978 [Folder of Exhibits. The record does not show that Berroya is notoriously undesirable.

194 (1929).] This is in line with our previous ruling in Remo v. 1. despite the orders of Malacanang to do so (Exhs.113 SCRA 477. Berroya. thus prompting respondent Berroya to secure an indorsement from the Minister of Local Government and Community Development dated November 15.R. L-21905. the petitioners Juanito Rodil and Amado Romey must be held liable only in their official capacities as Provincial Engineer and Provincial Treasurer. is not immune from damages in his personal capacity arising from illegal acts done in bad faith [Tabuena v. that respondent. and therefore. [At pp. he. G. Court of Appeals. Legaspi. supra. Deogracias Remo. as correctly adjudged by respondent court. Provincial Treasurer and Provincial Engineer of Laguna. Court of Appeals. In this regard. The general rule. is that decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts. No. 1961. Court of First Instance of Capiz. No. . as respondent Berroya can no longer be reinstated because he has already reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty five years on December 7. L-23670. instituted a suit for mandamus to compel petitioners to comply with the directives issued by the two administrative agencies. his reinstatement becomes a plain ministerial duty of the petitioner Provincial Governor. G.R. in view of the .the same cause as though the adjudication had been made by a court of general jurisdiction [Ipekdjian Merchandising Co. supra at p. 81 SCRA 408] and also all the retirement and leave privileges that are due him as a retiring employee in accordance with law [Tanala v. L-40846. Court of Appeals. Since private respondent Berroya had established his clear legal right to reinstatement and back salaries under the aforementioned final and executory administrative decisions. supra. or with grave abuse of discretion. Remo. L-28353. Balquidra v. CFI of Capiz.152 SCRA 80]. Laganapan v. Court of Appeals. The Minister's directive having been ignored. 1969. supra]. v. supra at 76]. Palacio [107 Phil.R. in defiance of the orders of the Office of the President and the Ministry of Local Government and in palpable disregard of the opinion of the Civil Service Commission. Gementiza v. Lianto v. 866 (1925). willfully acted in bad faith. Court of Appeals. Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Legaspi. January 31. Court of Appeals.000.R. Wright. L-44591. L-46096. G. refused to reinstate the petitioner to his former position in the police force of Goa. the Court sustains the appellate court's finding that petitioner San Luis must be held liable to Berroya for moral damages since justice demands that the latter be recompensed for the mental suffering and hardship he went through in order to vindicate his right. 1979 for his reinstatement [Annex "Y-9". 1969. July 30. Nos. Court of Appeals. Laganapan v. a duty whose performance may be controlled and enjoined by mandamus [Ynchausit and Co. No. Gementiza v. October 31.R.. 16 SCRA 599]. 1987. Gementiza v. L23966. the Court cannot ignore the undisputed fact that the decisions rendered by the Office of the President and the Merit Systems Board had attained finality without petitioners having taken any timely legal recourse to have the said decisions reviewed by the courts. trust or station" [Section 3. March 31. Correa v. 1. 92 SCRA 312]. No. The established rule is that a writ of mandamus lies to enforce a ministerial duty or "the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office. No. the Court holds that petitioner Felicisimo T. as Mayor of Goa. Where. must be held personally liable to Berroya for the consequences of his illegal and wrongful acts. July 16. G. in Mendoza v. No. p. 1982. Rama v.148 SCRA 496.R. 3 SCRA 413.R. which have been fixed by said court at P 20. Berroya was compelled to bring an action for mandamus. Finally. petitioner San Luis must likewise answer to Berroya for attorney's fees plus costs and expenses of suit. supra. 1966. G.R. Court of Tax Appeals. March 31. 5061]. Gray v. De Leon [33 Phil.** he should be paid his back salaries [Salcedo v. this Tribunal upholds the appellate court's judgment for the reinstatement of respondent Berroya and payment of his back salaries corresponding to the period of suspension and of illegal dismissal from service.000. G. 28 SCRA 268]. 1965. L-16290.] It is well-settled that when a public officer goes beyond the scope of his duty. by virtue of his office alone. et seq. September 30. the appropriate administrative agencies having determined with finality that Berroya's suspension and dismissal were without just cause. the Provincial Governor of Laguna who has been sued both in his official and private capacities. Nos. September 30.' ** are liable for back salaries in case of illegal termination of a civil service employee finds support in earlier decisions of this Court [Balquidra v. G. Court of Appeals. Thus. . On the other hand. v. 80 SCRA 123. 1978. That petitioners Provincial Governor. L-44894. October 28. the trial court's act of reviewing and setting aside the findings of the two administrative bodies was in gross disregard of the basic legal precept that accords finality to administrative findings of facts. and inspite of the opinion of the Secretary of Finance (Exh. it was held: Nor are officers or agents of the Government charged with the performance of governmental duties which are in their nature legislative or quasi-judicial liable for the consequences of their official acts. supra. will not be disturbed by this Tribunal Enciso v. No..R. We agree with the appellate court that the sum of P 50. Findings of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial] evidence. Wright. Furthermore. The same does not hold true for petitioner provincial governor who was found by the appellate court to have acted in bad faith as manifested by his contumacious refusal to comply with the decisions of the two administrative agencies. G and I). De Vera. except when the former have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction. G. Inc. apart from the back salaries legally due him [Rama v. 207].. L22537.44842. Accordingly. as in this case. G. However. However. Thus. L-30637. Lopez Enage. Berroya. Branch II. Asedillo. supra at 576].R. 1987. Tee and Co. May 22. 1. unless it be shown that they act wilfully and maliciously and with the express purpose of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff [at 513. G. Angel Enciso. in his capacity as Mayor of Goa. he is not entitled to protection on account of his office. According to settled jurisprudence. formally impleaded herein. The appellate court was clearly warranted in awarding moral damages in favor of respondent Berroya because of the obstinacy of petitioner Governor who arbitrarily and without legal justification refused Berroya's reinstatement in defiance of directives of the administrative agencies with final authority on the matter. 1979. applying the principle that a public officer. v. Emphasis supplied]. No. Salcedo v. L-40490. exclusive of that corresponding to leaves of absences with pay. it became a clear ministerial duty on the part of the authorities concerned to comply with the orders contained in said decisions [Tanala v. p. L-41717-33. 508 (1916)]. the provincial governor obstinately refused to reinstate the petitioner. 47 Phil. Finally. No. 53 Phil. 154 SCRA 377]. Folder of Exhibits. 803 (1960)] that xxx xxx xxx (i)t having been clearly shown by evidence. G. respectively since they had been expressly sued by Berroya as such [Petition for mandamus with Preliminary Injunction. the appellate court's finding of bad faith cannot be faulted and accordingly. March 16. et al.R. April 12. supra]. H). L-44484. Vol. . 99 Phil. Record. Court of First Instance of Bulacan.00 for moral damages is a reasonable award considering the mental anguish and serious anxiety suffered by Berroya as a result of the wrongful acts of petitioner Governor in refusing to reinstate him. 1. Branch II. should pay for damages caused to the petitioner. the respondent Mayor of Goa.00. Asedillo. in order to enforce his right to reinstatement and to back salaries pursuant to these final and executory administrative rulings. Asedillo. as an illegally terminated civil service employee is entitled to back salaries limited only to a maximum period of five years Laganapan v.13 SCRA 566 at 574-575]. 1977. 1986. 807-808. the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and the Province of Laguna. Inc. under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction. In this case. R. [Lianga Bay Logging Co. No. San Luis. 72 (1956)]. Graciano. Vol. 29 SCRA 580. particularly when acting tortiously. but is liable for his acts like any private individual [Palma v. v.. 1987. G. Mohamad Ali Dimaporo.

he should instead be paid all the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law. the sum of P 20.00 as and for attorney's fees plus costs and other expenses of suit. in his personal capacity. the assailed decision of the appellate court is hereby MODIFIED as follows: (1) the petitioners.000. WHEREFORE. SO ORDERED. his back salaries for a maximum period of five years. p. (2) since the reinstatement of Berroya can no longer be ordered by reason of his having reached the retirement age.000. This decision shall be IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.wrongful refusal of petitioner provincial governor to afford Berroya his plainly valid and just claim for reinstatement and back salaries [Rollo. 42]. San Luis. and (3) petitioner Felicisimo T.00 as and for moral damages. in their official capacities. is further ordered to pay Berroya the sum of P 50. are ordered to pay private respondent Berroya. .

Lanao del Sur. Lanao del Sur be accorded to DATU JAMIL DATU MULOK DIMAPORO whose proclamation was aimed by the Commission on Elections as aforestated. 1988. The annulment of the proclamation and the canvass on which it was based was sought in two (2) separate petitions filed by defeated mayoralty candidates: one filed on February 15. 1988 a memorandum to "All Concerned on the subject. in contempt. "Vice Governor-OIC Governor. 5 A copy of this memorandum was furnished Governor Saidamen Pangarungan. Considering that a injunction for reconsideration was timely filed by the OIC 8 the decision of the Division is not final and executory. 3-d. to impede. in contempt . were later referred to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur by 3rd Indorsement dated August 1.: By Resolution dated October 28. together with the preceding indorsements thereof. with the conformity ("conforme") of Provincial Fiscal Salic B. Office of the Mayor of Marogong." The memorandum precisely took account of said petitions. Article IX of the Constitution which mandates that motions for reconsideration from a decision of a Division of the Commission on Elections shall be decided En Banc by the Commission. and (b) a motion for contempt of the Commission (against) Provincial Fiscal Salic B. 1988. Lanao del Sur. NARVASA. dismissing their petitions and affirming the proclamation of Jamil Dimaporo as the duly elected municipal mayor of Marogong. MARANAO C. 3-c.. that are now challenged in the instant special civil action of certiorari. 1988. directly or indirectly." In exposition of this thesis. and to ensure that the democratic process is respected throughout the transition period. designating Maclis Balt "Officer-in-Charge. 1988.. for legal opinion as to who between Datu Jamil . 1988. this province. of Atty. so that the issue. Motions for reconsideration thereof were seasonably presented by both petitioners. The opinion sought was communicated to the Vice Governor by 4th Indorsement dated August 5. Mangurun Batuampar sent a formal communication to Provincial Governor Saidamen B. paragraph C. Dumarpa. of Atty. It stated that the designation of the OIC was made "(i)n view of the election controversy that has arisen over the mayoralty race of Marogong. as well as Vice-Governor Alauya. He. pronounced respondents "Provincial Fiscal Salic Dumarpa." As regards the motion for contempt. Sa-Aduden Alauya. Dimaporo and Maclis Balt should be recognized as the Municipal Mayor and/or OIC-Mayor of Marogong. The facts are not complicated. All concerned are hereby advised to recognize the said designation of the Secretary of Local Governments. 1988. petitioners.1988.. from a decision of the Commission (First Division) promulgated July 11. vs. the herein attached 3rd Indorsement together with its enclosures.1989 denying the respondents' motion for reconsideration. the Secretary of Local Governments issued on May 1-. pursuant to Sec. While these petitions were pending adjudgment by the COMELEC First Division. 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Maranao D. Rule 71) . inter alia drew attention to the inaccuracy in the 4th Indorsement -. Dimaporo with a xerox copy of the Resolution dated July 11. They have to be gone into in some detail. and is also an unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of this Honorable Commission en banc (Sec. dated August 22. the 'RESOLUTION' of the Honorable First Division of the Commission on Elections . Lanao del Sur. 1988. counsel of Datu Jamil .R.9. the order issued by this Office suspending the processing of vouchers and other financial matters as well as the encashment of pertinent checks for said towns is hereby lifted." The 3rd Indorsement reads as follows: 7 Respectfully forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal. cannot file a motion for reconsideration in the above-entitled cases not being a party therein. DANGANAN and SAADUDDIN ALAUYA. Lanao del Sur by the Secretary of Local Governments on different dates pending final resolution by the Commission on Elections of the mayoralty poll disputes therein. Lanao del Sur vice Abdullah Imam. and other related documents collated by the Office of the Governor. 3 It is this aspect of the Resolution and the Order subsequently promulgated on January 12. 1988. Evidently on the strength of the designation of the Secretary of Local Governments and said memorandum of Governor Pangarungan.EN BANC G. his counsel." The motion theorized that the act of Vice-Governor Alauya in seeking legal opinion of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. The indorsement reads as follows: Respectfully returned to the Honorable Vice Governor-OIC Governor. on February 17... dated July 18.. Dumarpa. Marogong.00) each . (and) imposed (on them) a Fine of Five Hundred Pesos (P 500. the Resolution declared them to be without merit. of the First Division of the Commission on Elections. however. 3.. this province. 1988 by Datu Abdulmadid Panondiongan Maruhom (docketed as SPC No. the herein attached basic communication. Revised Rules of Court). albeit simple.. These were brought up to the Commission en banc for resolution. where the above-entitled cases are now pending for decision .. 4 For compliance. by decision rendered on July 11.JAMIL DIMAPORO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS. as confirmed by the First Division's Decision of July 11. "transmitting .. Early action on the matter is desired. by Monabai Panondiongan Balt (docketed as SPC Nos. and the comment thereto by OIC-Mayor Maclis Balt with a xerox copy of the motion for reconsideration filed in behalf of Monorabai Panondiongan Balt on July 1988." This letter. Mangurun Batuampar." reading as follows: 6 In view of the designation of OIC-Mayors in the municipalities of Bacolod-Grande and Marogong. 9 His motion. the motion made the following assertions: . Under date of July 18.. As regards the motions for reconsideration. among others. 1989 SALIC B. The decision of the Commission En Banc is not yet even final until and after 5 days whenever no restraining order is issued by the Supreme Court.1988. Datu Dimaporo filed with the COMELEC en banc a motion to hold Fiscals Dumarpa and Danganan. obstruct. respondents. 1988 a memorandum addressed to the Regional Director. and the formulation and communication of the requested opinion by Fiscals Dumarpa and Danganan.." and praying "that communications and other official matters involving the affairs of the Municipality of Marogong. and Vice-Governor Saaddudin Alauya. On February 3. No. may be more accurately defined. Datu Jamil Dimaporo was proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers Mayor-elect of Marogong. Rule 71. "Lifting of Suspension Order. said Resolution found the charge to have been duly substantiated. issued on May 23. Maclis Balt assumed the position and discharged the functions of OIC. Pangarungan. Madarang for private respondent. 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Maranao Danganan and Vice-Governor Saaddudin Alauya . Datu Dimaporo lost no time in seeking official recognition of his status as mayor-elect of Marogong. in turn. all of the Province of Lanao del Sur. DUMARPA. 1988. Region XII of the Department of Local Governments. 88-646). constituted "indirect contempt as it is clearly an improper conduct tending. The petitions seeking annulment of Datu Dimaporo's proclamation were ultimately dismissed by the First Division of the COMELEC. 87014-16 September 13. J. and the other. and "sustain(ed) the decision of the First Division on all cases. Nancy H. Danganan. It was signed by 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Maranao C. 1988 local elections and therefore. or degrade the administration of justice (Sec.that OIC Maclis Balt had filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the First Division of the COMELEC 10 --and pointed out that the respondents should have known "that M ACLIS BALT has never been a candidate for Mayor in Marogong during the February 1. On learning of this legal opinion. 1988.. Lanao del Sur. Office of the Mayor.. The Provincial Fiscal acted promptly on the request. with the legal opinion that Datu Maclis Balt is still the Mayor of the Municipality of Marogong.. 88-697 and 88-697-A). 1 the Commission on Elections en banc 2 passed upon and disposed of--(a) two motions for reconsideration filed by Datu Abdulmadid Panondiongan Maruhom and Monabai Panondiongan Balt. Danganan.

Comelec First Division in the sense that the defendant-Fiscals did not affirm or reverse said resolution. Suffice it to state that the herein defendant acted honestly.. possibility is not remote that he will be charged of negligence of duty.considerable time and effort to resolve the controversy-.. Inc.00. and had not as yet "been accorded recognition as elected mayor . It is a rule so consistent and well established in this jurisdiction that even the Commission itself cannot disturb a proclamation made by a Board of Canvassers without notice and hearing. the Commission en banc condemned the fiscal's conception of "the First Division's jurisdiction of the pre. 1988.Governor's "Opposition" above adverted to): 12 1) in their written opinion. an unlawful interference with its processes and proceedings. Actually." Stressing that under the law "it is solely the Commission that can suspend or annul any proclamation made. obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in this case. 13 in which. Talisay-Silay Mining Co. that such statements. and pave the way for the appointment of or assumption to office by an Officer-in-Charge..confronted by the letter of Datu Dimaporo's counsel requesting recognition by the Office of the Governor as Mayor of Marogong pursuant to the Decision of the COMELEC First Division..10. In a pleading entitled 'Vigorous Opposition to Motion . 88-697 and 88-697-A has reached its boiling point so volatile that without settling the legal issue the mayorship of Marogong could have been contested by the sound of guns and thus a resultant bloodshed.. dedicatedly and without any iota of malice or evil motive in his heart and mind.. too. That the aforesaid improper conduct of the defendant if not timely corrected by severely punishing them in contempt of this Honorable Commission will be establishing a very bad precedence because such improper conduct amounts to a REVIEW by a Provincial Fiscal of whatever resolution. They did not even say anything against it.. 3) said legal opinion has not disputed or contradicted the force and effect of the said resolution (of the First Division) . resulting to damage. Alauya was faced with a case needing 'urgent action because both parties are claiming the fund releases of Marogong and the tension between the protagonists in SPC Nos." had never been paid his salary as mayor. considering the conflict of the defendants' legal opinion and the 'Resolution' of the COMELEC Division. who is the wife of one of the parties to the instant petitions' which are acts constituting 'unauthorized and illegal assumption of powers that pertain exclusively to the Commission.500.proclamation controversy" as a "distortion of the law and jurisprudence. the comment of OIC Mayor Balt. 11 Vice." In its Resolution of October 28. powers and responsibilities of the mayor of the town until the final adjudication of the mayoralty election cases. he indorsed ." and could not be deemed a contempt thereof. is at all mistake and. the respondent fiscals asserted the following pertinent propositions in their Answer dated September 12. they expressed the view that since the First Division had assumed jurisdiction over the petitions questioning the proclamation of Datu Dimaporo indeed. and therefore the same was not directed against the authority and dignity of the Commission" as being "devoid of merit." It said: "The propriety and legality of proclamations already made or about to be made are precisely the issues in pre-proclamation controversies over which the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction. Dumarpa and Danganan in effect did was to suspend the effects of the proclamation of intervenor Dimaporo made by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Marogong.." the Resolution declared the respondents guilty of contempt and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P 500.. it is not true that defendants' act causes chaos and confusion in said Municipality. these are the off-shoots of the letter of movant's counsel to the Governor . and the motion for reconsideration filed by defeated candidate Monarabai Balt and in his desire to act safely and correctly and to be in good faith all along. hence. as aforesaid. are not directed against the authority. v... to him." Brushing aside. and 3) the counsel for the complaint has put down the Commis sion to the level of the Provincial Fiscal in alluding to a conflict of the defendants' opinion and the Resolution of the COMELEC Division. injury and prejudice upon anybody in said Municipality of Marogong... "long before the query for legal opinion was lodged.' dated September 15. the respondents' argument "that they were merely seeking and rendering an opinion . injury and prejudice not only upon the complainant but to public service. causes chaos sand confusion among the National. Provincial." the Resolution pointed out that the respondents Alauya. Responses to the motion for contempt were separately filed by the fiscals and by the Vice-Governor. "the most appropriate under the circumstances. The fiscals also submitted a Memorandum. order or decision of this Honorable Commission. 4) the opinion . That defendants are good lawyers and know very well that resolutions. Balt was already designated as Officer-in-Charge.00) with the Provincial Election Supervisor in Marawi City as and by way of penalty if finally adjudged guilty without prejudice to ventilate their rights in the appropriate forum . (thus) displaying his apparent oblivion of the bureaucratic set-up and the jurisprudence prevailing in this country. (o)n the contrary. by the provincial and national government. indeed. does not constitute a review of the aforesaid resolution of the .1988. 1988. among other things. which act did not constitute contempt (citing Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay.. otherwise it "could not have acquired (assumed) jurisdiction over the . Inc. orders or decisions of this Honorable Commission can only be reviewed by the Supreme Court as indicated in Exhibit '2' (legal opinion)...." . 2) said opinion "has no punitive values that could interfere with the process or proceedings of the Commission.Governor Alauya declared that--1) Datu Maclis Balt as an OIC Mayor of the Municipality (of Marogong) is religiously performing the prescribed duties." and this left them "no other option than affirm the jurisdiction of the First Division over the cases by stating the law sanctioning its authority and that is article IX of the Constitution. and improper conduct that tends directly or indirectly to impede. (the) documents . then it has not become final and executory. If the herein defendant did not take such an appropriate action. then said resolution has not become final and executory. This rule we hold respondents bound by judicial notice. if at all such decision is due for implementation. "it took the Honorable First Division . 2) in the situation that he had found himself--. . "his act of referring the legal controversy to the legal adviser of the province" was. 12. cases because the remedy of the petitioners-appellants was a regular protest before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur. (and the) act of not implementing the decision of the Commission. particularly the people of Marogong. 246 of the Omnibus Election Code. That the aforestated improper conduct . bearing the same date as their answer. 1988 (in addition to substantially the same arguments set forth in the Vice. 11. hence. 1988 anent the contempt incident. to prevent him from discharging the duties of his office... to the Provincial Fiscal in his capacity as a legal counsel of the province in the absence of the Provincial Attorney for legal opinion. It is hoped with defendant's prayer to Allah that all his action will not help throw this province into blood bath. Lanao del Sur. Municipal officials and the general public on who is really the legal Mayor of Marogong. 2) no suspension of the effects of Dimaporo's proclamation was or could have been effected by them since Dimaporo had never "enjoyed the powers and functions appurtenant to the Office of the mayor. and the issuance of the legal opinion is indeed with evil motive and tainted with malice. Lanao del Sur. 88 SCRA 294). 88-646. depositing at the same time "the amount of One Thousand Five Hundred (P l. The fiscals and the Vice-Governor filed a motion for reconsideration dated November 9.. the defendants recognize and respect the force and effect of said resolution and because a motion for reconsideration was timely filed on July 19. it is not true that the defendants' act resulted to damage.." 14 They stated among other things that-1) Acting Gov.. dignity and majesty of the Commission on Elections so as to constitute a contumacious attitude and flouting or arrogant belligerence against it that the act may constitute contempt.." They "were forced to assume that the proclamation of Jamil Dimaporo was irregular because the First Division heard the petition to annul the said proclamation. 3. they had "just humbly stated in three sentences the provision of law on the subject of the query of the Office of the Provincial Governor. For their part.the presumption was that the proclamation must have appeared invalid to the First Division." Thus. paragraph c of Article IX thereof in relation to See. They merely opined that because a motion for reconsideration was timely filed. This is known to any student of law. briefly stating the provision of the Constitution particularly Sec.

Municipal officials and the general public on who is really the legal Mayor of Marogong. or should have known. as the questioned Resolution declares.(in order to) pave the way for the appointment of or assumption to office by an Officer-inCharge. the opinion simply paraphrases --. the views therein expressed are clearly wrong. or otherwise attended by serious error of one kind or another. or a criticism of the First Division's judgment. could still be recognized as the Mayor of the Municipality. which conflict had to be swiftly and legally resolved to prevent its resolution by arms and bloodshed." or (3) that the latter 'is the wife of one of the parties to the instant petitions. or anywhere else in the record. Lanao del Sur. in view of the judgment by the First Division of the COMELEC upholding the proclamation by the Board of Canvassers of Datu Dimaporo as MayorElect of Marogong. The inquiry had been made necessary in view of the conflict in claims to the mayoralty then being asserted by both Datu Dimaporo and Datu Balt. resulting to damage. for movants knew." 16 This Court granted the request and accorded to "the respondent COMELEC itself a period of ten (10) days from notice within which to file the required comment. The essential accusation against the petitioners was that the rendition by the petitioner fiscals of a legal opinion upon request of petitioner Vice Governor had caused "chaos and confusion among the National. "Maclis Balt would still (have) continue(d) discharging the duties of the mayor. 1989 the COMELEC en banc not only denied the motion for reconsideration. or the fiscals for advising him on such matters. by the provincial and national government. Section 1682. Nor may the Acting Governor be faulted for consulting the lawyers of the province as to the effects of a judgment on the authority and actuations of municipal or provincial officials. Lanao del Sur. paragraph C. Datu Maclis Balt. a scheme to shroud with doubt the validity and force of a proclamation while trifling with public respondent's discretion on when to annul a proclamation or suspend its effects. It thus appears that the Resolution in question not only lacks factual foundation of any sort but is contradicted by such of the relevant facts as may be discerned from the record. particularly the people of Marogong. submit his opinion in writing upon any legal question submitted to him by any such officer or body pertinent to the duties thereof. But even if. if not totally prevent. there being no need to do so.correctly.19 What respondents Alauya. for the failure or refusal to do which they could appropriately have been called to account. Municipal officials and the general public. the Court is constrained to nullify and set aside the conviction by the COMELEC en banc of the petitioners for contempt. it would appear the COMELEC's own Rules of Procedure 20 on the subject it addresses. at least. As already observed. there is nothing in the challenged Resolutions of the COMELEC en banc. 15 the Office of the Solicitor General begged to "be discharged from the duty to . petitioners' pretensions to good faith recede to a wantonly subtle interference with matters within the exclusive competence of public respondent. despite notice. If clarification had to be made in connection with the proclamation and the decision of the First Division. as aforesaid. sees in the text of the opinion nothing even remotely resembling an affront to the COMELEC. On the contrary. of the Revised Administrative Code provides: SEC. meant to undermine the efficacy of official acts of the Commission from the municipal board of canvassers to the First Division of the Commission and even the Commission en banc which had not in any way issued any restraining order to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate. it cannot. (had been) already designated as Officer-in-Charge" and since then and during an the time material to the inquiry. It may be that the opinion they submitted was erroneous. it should have been sought in the Commission itself. 3. to demonstrate the actuality of the alleged (1) "chaos and confusion among the National." Upon the facts above narrated at some length. and that indeed. first paragraph." that the only perceived purpose of the request for opinion was "to provide an aura of legality to the continuity in office of the designated officer-in-charge. (Maclis) Balt . all that the respondent fiscals did was perform a duty specifically enjoined by law.. including district health officers. (do so as it) maintains a position different from that taken by respondent COMELEC . there are the facts asserted by the petitioners--." Required to comment in behalf of the public respondent. That they attempted to settle the matter among themselves demonstrates the intention to effect disobedience to and defiance of the lawful acts and orders of the Commission. when so requested. had been discharging the functions of mayor of Marogong. the assumption of office by private respondent Dimaporo . The trouble is. but also "rebuked' the movants "for insisting upon an erroneous legal position. 1988 "as regards the findings for contempt.3) the fiscals had merely performed "a legal duty reposed upon them when they rendered the questioned legal opinion. As such he shall. The fiscals' opinion was based on "Sec. "long before the query for legal opinion was lodged. and pave the way for the appointment of or assumption to office by an Officer-in-Charge. The COMELEC counsel submits that the facts "manifest the firm resolve (on petitioners') part to delay. they were a deliberate contrivance that were meant to undetermine the efficacy of official acts of the Commission from the municipal board of canvassers to the First Division of the Commission and even the Commission en banc which had not in any way issued any restraining order to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate." 18 This was implicitly sustained by the COMELEC when it ruled that-.... therefore acting as such." had never been paid his salary as mayor.. the duly designated OIC Mayor. The COMELEC filed its own comment on July 25. considering the conflict of the defendants' legal opinion and the 'Resolution' of the COMELEC Division. The absurdity of such a rule or policy need not be belabored.-The provincial fiscal shall be the legal adviser of the provincial government and its officers. Provincial." 17 Respondent Datu Dimaporo has not done so.. Dumarpa and Danganan in effect did was to suspend the effects of the proclamation of intervenor Dimaporo made by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Marogong." or (4) that the legal opinion was "a deliberate contrivance . and had not as yet "been accorded recognition as elected mayor . liability for contempt would invariably attach to every declared instance of orders or judgments rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Thus. who is the wife of one of the parties to the instant petitions. By Resolution dated January 12. for that matter. quite frankly." that "from an overview of the acts of petitioners and the situation in which all parties found themselves thereafter.. But what transpired in connection with these cases were not innocent acts that were intended to guide official action. though this is by no means certain and is not here fully inquired into. to the exclusion of the proclaimed winner in the election. The convicted contemners have instituted the instant special civil action of certiorari in this Court to bring about the nullification of the Resolution of October 28.. Rather." and 4) with or without the fiscal's opinion." or (2) "suspension of the effects of the proclamation of intervenor Dimaporo . injury and prejudice not only upon the complainant but to public service. Article IX of the Constitution which mandates that motions for reconsideration from a decision of a Division of the Commission on Elections shall be decided En Banc by the Commission." a duty they could not have refused without incurring liability "for dereliction of a defined duty. 1682. The law implicitly authorizes the former to seek such advice and expressly imposes upon the latter the duty to give it on request. to prevent him from discharging the duties of his office. the decision of the Division is not final and executory." According to the COMELEC --Normally." and that petitioners' acts were in fact "a deliberate interference with the process or proceedings before respondent Commission . and of the mayor and council of the various municipalities and municipal districts of the province. that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies. it cannot for that reason alone be considered contumacious otherwise. The decision of the Commission En Banc is not yet even final until and after 5 days whenever no restraining order is issued by the Supreme Court." On the other hand." They declared that since "a motion for reconsideration was timely filed by the OIC. Provincial.. if it so desires. until October 28.. Datu Dimaporo had never yet "enjoyed the powers and functions appurtenant to the Office of the mayor. on the ground of error alone and absent any indication in the ..1988 (when the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc was promulgated)." But what is it in that legal opinion that the COMELEC deemed so offensive to its authority and dignity as to move it to punish its authors? That opinion was rendered in answer to the inquiry of the Acting Governor as to whether or not. Duty of fiscal as legal adviser of province and provincial subdivisions . there is nothing objectionable in seeking a legal opinion and in rendering it." The Court. It appears furthermore that the Fiscals are being sanctioned for rendering an opinion that in the view of the COMELEC en banc was "a distortion of law and jurisprudence.never denied or disputed by respondents --that as of the time that the fiscal's opinion was solicited and even thereafter.1989.

record that it was prompted by a deliberate intent to affront the Commission or ignore or belittle its judgment and orders, be considered contumacious. The Court is somewhat intrigued by the statement in the challenged Resolution which "... hold(s) respondents bound by judicial notice" to the rule "... that even the Commission itself cannot disturb a proclamation made by a Board of Canvassers without notice and hearing." Interpreted in consonance with its context, the statement would appear to charge the respondents with judicial notice of the cited rule. But surely it could not have been meant to be taken in that sense because the rule of judicial notice binds only courts acting as such and, moreover, it is doubtful if the precept referred to is a proper subject of judicial notice. One would, however, be hard put to give the statement any other meaning that would not in one way or another contradict the ordinary intendment of its language. The respondent Commission would have it that if need was felt for any clarification in connection with the proclamation and the Resolution in question, it should have been sought with said Commission itself since the petitioners knew, or should have known, that it has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies. It fails to explain, however, how the Acting Governor could have done this, not being a party to that particular controversy. And even had that step been feasible, it does not appear that said respondent has jurisdiction to render an advisory opinion or declaratory judgment. The power to hold in contempt, it has time and again been held, must be exercised, not on the vindictive, but on the preservative principle. 21 It is not to be meted out of pique, or from an imperial sense of the nature and functions of judicial office. What appears to be an honest difference of opinion has been blown up into something that it is not --- a direct and confrontational challenge to the puissance and prerogatives of the Commission. In a word, petitioners have been found in contempt because, to put it baldly, their opinion did not sit well with the Commission and failed to conform to its own views. Judicial sensibilities should not become too tender or self-protective. All things considered, the contempt ruling here cannot be justified on the preservative principle, there being no clear showing, either in the terms of the allegedly contumacious opinion or from the circumstances that led to its issuance, of any intent to denigrate the authority of the respondent Commission or erode the faith and respect due its decisions, orders or other actuations. Said ruling is, therefore, REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioners are absolved of the contempt charge. No costs. SO ORDERED.


G.R. No. 89425 February 25, 1992 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government), petitioner, vs.SANDIGANBAYAN, Second Division, and REBECCO PANLILIO, respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.: In the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, this Court is asked "to categorically draw the distinctions between i) the Sandiganbayan's exclusive jurisdiction to determine the judicial question of ownership over sequestered properties and ii) the incidents of the exercise by the PCGG of its purely administrative and executive functions as conservator of sequestered properties." It is theorized "that EOs [Executive Orders] 1, 2, 14 and 14-A have never been intended to convert the Sandiganbayan into a super-commission, reviewer, supervisor, much less an overseer of the PCGG" and give it the power to "strike down even mere administrative and conservatory acts of thePCGG . . ." This action originated from a writ issued on May 31, 1986 by Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), placing three (3) firms under sequestration: (a) Silahis International Hotel, (b) Hotel Properties, Inc., and (c) Philroad Construction Corporation. 1 This was followed slightly more than a year later by the filing by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan of a complaint involving said companies and one other, Philippine Village Hotel. The complaint was for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages;" named twelve (12) persons as defendants: Rebecco Panlilio, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Modesto Enriquez, Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez, Erlinda Enriquez-Panlilio, Leandro Enriquez, Don Ferry, Roman A. Cruz, Jr., Guillermo Gastrock, Ernesto Abalos, and Gregorio R. Castillo; and claimed, essentially, that said corporations, "together with their assets, shares of stocks, effects, evidence and records," had been "illegally acquired by the defendants in unlawful concert with one another and with gross abuse of power and authority." 2 The defendants took issue with this claim in the answer filed by them in due course. 3 On July 28, 1989, the PCGG issued a Mission Order (No. AD-89-51) creating a so-called "Management Committee" headed by one Antonio Villanueva and authorizing it, among other things, to "completely take-over the management and operations of Silahis International Hotel, preparatory to calling a Special Stockholders' Meeting in accordance with Sec. 3, Article II of the By-Laws in relation to Presidential Memorandum dated June 26, l986." 4 The mission order stated that the take-over was meant "to protect the interest of the government" in view of "the state of labor/management situation, brought about by the presence of undesirable elements of dubious intentions causing the occurrence of incidents of violence and undue disruption of the business operations of the hotel . . ." On the strength thereof the Management Committee took over the management and operations of the Silahis Hotel. Rebecco Panlilio forthwith filed with the Sandiganbayan a "Motion for Injunction with Application for Restraining Order" under date of August 3, 1989. The motion alleged that such a take-over was not within the scope of the writ of sequestration; that despite its sequestered status, the Silahis Hotel had "achieved a business turn-around at the start of last year and business since then . . . become profitable;" that on July 18, 1989, as a result of a deadlock in CBA negotiations with the union representing its employees, the union declared a strike, but there were on-going negotiations for settlement of the controversy; that the take-over authorized by the mission order was effected with abusive and unnecessary force; and that in truth there was no legal or factual basis for the take-over. 5 The PCGG for its part, asserted that it had acted in the exercise of its "primary administrative jurisdiction" and hence, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the sequestration and takeover of Silahis Hotel. Panlilio's motion was heard by the Sandiganbayan on August 11, 1989 after which, on August 14, 1989, the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) promulgated a resolution "enjoining the PCGG, its Management Committee, or

any of its officers, agents or representatives from further implementing Mission Order No. AD-89-51 or from calling any Special Stockholders' Meeting, effective upon receipt (t)hereof and until further orders . . .," since "otherwise, the Court will be tolerating, if not condoning, an apparent violation of the rights of . . . defendantmovant, not justified by demonstrably tenable grounds, (petitioner being) oblivious of its mandated powers as a conservator, caretaker, watchdog or overseer, and in derogation of this Court's jurisdiction and authority as clearly outlined in the cases of BASECO and PEÑA (G.R. Nos. 75885 and 77663, respectively) . . ." The Sandiganbayan stated that defendant-movant Panlilio had "presented documentary evidence (Exhibits 1 to 3Motion) tending to show that the takeover of the management and operation of the Silahis International Hotel was not due to any disposal or dissipation of its assets, as in fact the Hotel is a highly viable and productive, enterprise despite the fact of its sequestration," and that "the PCGG . . . (had) not presented countervailing evidence . . . but on the contrary, had admitted . . . the factual basis for the issuance of Mission Order No. AD89-51, which is . . . that there was labor unrest among the employees . . .," insisting merely that it had acted and was acting "in the exercise of its primary administrative jurisdiction " and that the Sandiganbayan had "no jurisdiction over the factual and legal issues involved in the instant incident ." 6 That resolution of August 14, 1989 was challenged before this Court on August 16, 1989, through a petition for "certiorari, prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order" filed in behalf of the Republic, represented by the PCGG. The Court required the respondents to file comment thereon, in a Resolution dated August 22, 1989. Before respondents could file their comment, petitioner PCGG presented on August 29, 1989 a "Second Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order" (in reiteration of the application incorporated in its petition). Acting thereon, this Court promulgated a Resolution on September 5, 1989 which, after observing that — a) The motion sets out particular facts demonstrating dissipation on no mean scale of the funds of the (sequestered) Silahis International Hotel by "the respondent Panlilio's group," which controls said corporation . . .; and b) Concededly, these facts could justify the action sought to be taken by the PCGG, i.e., the immediate takeover of the management and operation of the Silahis Hotel with a view to the preservation and prevention of dissipation and wastage of its funds . . . (but) as the Solicitor General acknowledges, with commendable candor, these "facts have not been presented at the Sandiganbayan during the hearing . . . because a thorough examination of the books of accounts of Silahis Hotel had not been completed yet at that time;" (hence, it is) neither reasonable nor fair to set aside or prevent enforcement of the injunctive order dated August 14, 1989 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) on the basis of facts not presented or brought to be proved before it . . ., (while on the other hand) it is needful for the petitioner to be accorded full opportunity to adopt and carry out the measures it deems proper to prevent dissipation and loss of property and assets over which it lays claim, resolved: 1) to refer said urgent motion to the Sandiganbayan "to be considered by the later as a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated August 14,1989" and 2) to "direct said Court to forthwith schedule a hearing, with notice to all the parties, for the purpose of receiving the evidence of the petitioner in proof of the facts set forth in the motion and such others as it may deem material and relevant, as well as such proofs as the respondents may themselves wish to submit on the issue and thereafter, and with all deliberate dispatch, receive such evidence and on the basis thereof, resolve whether or not it will maintain, or lift or modify the Order of August 14, 1989, and then report the action thus taken to this Court as soon as possible." 7 The Sandiganbayan thereupon scheduled on September 15, 1989 a hearing for the reception of PCGG's evidence, conformably with this Court's Resolution of September 5, 1989 — although as it was to point out later, "the evidence appearing in the attachments to . . . (its petition with this Court) had already been submitted (by the PCGG) at the formal resumption of hearing" on August 25, 1989," contrary to its subsequent claim that "a thorough examination of the books of accounts of Silahis Hotel had not been completed yet at that time." 8 In

any event, the matter was heard on September 15, 18 and 20, 1989. PCGG "presented additional testimonial evidence thru . . . Commissioner David Castro and rested its case with the admission of Exhibits I to K, inclusive, with sub-markings (and) defendant Panlilio presented testimonial evidence thru Jocelyn Zuluaga, Chief Accountant of the Silahis Hotel . . . after which (he) rested anew with the admission of Exhibits 6 to 12, inclusive. . . ." 9 The Sandiganbayan thereafter resolved the incident in a Resolution promulgated on October 27, 1989, a copy of which it transmitted to this Court on October 30, 1989. In that resolution the Sandiganbayan set forth the following conclusions, to wit: 1. Mission Order No. AD-89-51 contains no averment whatever "that defendant Panlilio had committed acts of dissipation of the hotel's assets which would justify the takeover," the ground explicitly stated therein being, "the state of labor/management situation, brought about by the presence of undesirable elements of dubious intentions causing the occurrence of incidents of violence and undue disruption of the business operations of the hotel." 2. The strike was however "finally settled on August 19, 1989, with defendant Panlilio and the union agreeing on the latter being granted a total economic package of P19.35 Million." Moreover, "hotel operations during the strike were not seriously affected thereby, with room occupancy averaging 76% daily compared to 77% for 1988." 3. No dissipation of corporate assets has been committed, PCGG's evidence to establish that fact being "completely off-tangent, self-serving, concocted and incredible, if not illogical." 4. Silahis' continuing compliance with its agreement with Hotel Properties, Inc. (HPI) in 1985 "cannot be deemed to constitute dissipation," both firms being "under sequestration and (hence) the interests of the Government . . . are fully and adequately protected," and said compliance never having been "questioned or objected to by PCGG or its Fiscal Agents/Asset Monitors" in either corporation. On the other hand, "(b)etween July 31, 1989 to August 18, 1989, or in less than three (3) weeks, PCGG's representatives had incurred guest check expenses amounting to P149,001.49 . . . (or) P7,400.00 daily." 5. Five (5) vital facts are established by Panlilio's proofs, without denial by PCGG, viz.: a. Both Silahis and HPI are sequestered corporations; b. PCGG had ASSET MONITORS in both corporations; c. PCGG is furnished copies of Silahis' annual financial statements; d. All payments by Silahis to HPI are coursed thru the head of Silahis Asset Monitors; and e. All said payments "are in accordance with the specified schedule of payments reflected in the Agreement between HPI and Silahis." 6. There is no evidence of any irregularity in "the grant of cash advances to Silahis' officers," this "being common business practice among corporate firms;" besides the cash advances "are not substantial enough to warrant jumping to the conclusion that corporate assets were being dissipated. 7. That Silahis' assets were "being carefully protected and nurtured pending judicial determination and disposition" is shown by the fact that it (a) had made payments to HPI totalling P60,000,000.00 as of December 31, 1988, and the additional amount of P26,000,000.00 as of June, 1989; (b) had undertaken capital improvements and renovations during the same period amounting to P29,400,000.00 without incurring additional or new loan obligations or defaulting on obligations due; and (e) had "even managed to settle its on-going strike by granting a total economic package of P19,500,000.00 to the hotel union . . ."

Upon these factual premises, the Sandiganbayan, as it had in its Resolution of August 14, 1989, 10 asserted its "authority and jurisdiction . . . invoked by defendant-movant, contrary to the denial thereof by the PCGG and counsel for plaintiff," and in the exercise thereof ruled as follows: 1) that "Mission Order No. AD-89-51 is . . . null and void ab initio;" 2) that "the takeover of the management and operation by the PCGG's Management Committee of the Silahis International Hotel on July 31, 1989 is . . . arbitrary and illegal;" and 3) that "the PCGG and said Management Committee are . . . to divest themselves of any participation and/or involvement hereafter in the management and operation of said Hotel, except as provided for under the guidelines enunciated in the BASECO and PEÑA cases." PCGG then sought leave to file, as it did file on November 23, 1989, an "Urgent Supplemental Petition" for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Sandiganbayan's Resolution of October 27, 1989 essentially because — . . . instead of confining itself to the Order of this Honorable Court dated September 5, 1989, directing "it to resolve whether or not it will maintain, lift or modify (its) Order of August 14, 1989," rendered a Resolution determining and upholding its jurisdiction over the preservation of the sequestered asset and thus resolving the very issue raised in the petition filed by PCGG before this Honorable Supreme Court, and worse, even declaring the subject Mission Order void ab initio, which declaration is based not only on inferences that are manifestly mistaken and/or on misapprehension of facts, but also significantly on a misappreciation of the law . . ." On this Court's requirement, comment was submitted by the private respondents on February 9, 1990 on the "Urgent Supplemental Petition" and a reply to said comment, by the PCGG. To the reply a rejoinder was, by this Court's leave, filed by the private respondents. The Solicitor General subsequently presented a "Withdrawal of Appearance with Reservation" dated December 3, 1990; and by Resolution dated January 17, 1991, this Court resolved to allow said withdrawal of appearance in the case at bar (and in others specified in the withdrawal), "with the reservation, conformably with PD No. 478, Executive Order No. 292, as well as the doctrine laid down in " Orbos vs. Civil Service Commission, et al .," G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990, to submit his comment/observation on incidents/matters pending with this court, if called for by circumstances in the interest of the government, or whenever so required by this Court." The PCGG's complaint that the Sandiganbayan had gone beyond the task assigned to it by this Court in the Resolution of September 5, 1989 when it declared itself to be possessed of jurisdiction to determine the validity of Mission Order No. 89-51 and did declare the same to be void, is somewhat puzzling. A reading of the Sandiganbayan's Resolution of October 27, 1989 shows that it is merely a substantial reaffirmation of its earlier Resolution of August 14, 1989. In that Resolution of August 14, 1989, the Sandiganbayan (a) overruled the PCGG's theory that it had acted and was acting "in the exercise of its primary administrative jurisdiction and that . . . (the Sandiganbayan) has no jurisdiction over the factual and legal issues involved in the instant incident, and (b) declared that Mission Order No. AD-89-51 had no factual or legal basis to support it since the PCGG had "not presented any countervailing evidence to refute the evidence" of dissipation of assets by which said Mission Order might be justified, or of the absence of a labor unrest among the employees of the Silahis Hotel. These are basically the same dispositions made in the Resolution of October 27, 1989, after the Sandiganbayan had, at this Court's behest, received evidence which the PCGG had represented it had been unable to present at the time of the hearing before the Sandiganbayan of Panlilio's motion for injunction or temporary restraining order. The specific instruction to the Sandiganbayan was to "receive such evidence and on the basis thereof, resolve whether or not it will maintain, or lift or modify the Order of August 14, 1989 . . ." 11 Now, in this Resolution of October 27, 1989, the Sandiganbayan after receiving additional proofs of the PCGG and of Panlilio, and studying, analyzing and weighing them, determined to " maintain" its Order of August 14, 1989, but modified it in the sense that it spelled out in greater detail its reasons for holding itself to be vested with jurisdiction to act on and adjudicate the matters pending before it as well as the evidentiary foundations for its factual

seizure or take-over of the PCGG or other acts done in the exercise of its so-called "primary administrative jurisdiction" are beyond judicial review. and correction or invalidation thereof. can only be undertaken by the Sandiganbayan. It may be. whimsical. Imelda Romualdez Marcos. The rule is in nowise altered by the fact that the sequestration. 150 SCRA 181 (1987) which requires that sequestration. Assets and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand E. It is true. capricious or oppressive exercise of power and discretion on the part of the PCGG. their close relatives. which has exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases regarding the "funds. 1989 shows with equal clarity that said tribunal exhaustively studied. 89-51. that said mission order was null and void because there was no factual or legal basis therefor. PCGG. Moneys. invoking this Court's ruling in PCGG vs. It may not be amiss to stress that Peña is entirely consistent with Baseco v. Inc. or related to. develop and present their arguments. incidental to. as the PCGG contends. that those acts are entitled to much respect. in Civil Case No. . agents or nominees. or beyond the power of the courts to reverse or nullify. But simple error. review of the disputed factual findings of the Sandiganbayan as if on ordinary writ of error is beyond the competence of this Court. dummies. like the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts. and the later Resolution of October 27. . Mrs. the findings and conclusions motivating and justifying them should be accorded great weight "like the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts. 16 The record clearly shows that the parties. Imelda Romualdez Marcos. or provisional take-over of particular property. assets and properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by former President Ferdinand E. if not before the issuance of the first Sandiganbayan Resolution of August 14. subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. it seems. viz. without pronouncement as to costs. whereby private respondent. are lodged within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of. It opines that it may administer the properties placed under its custodia legis.Peña. What has been stated and ruled makes it unnecessary to take up the last motion in the record. nominees. 014 of the Sandiganbayan within the sixmonth period fixed in Article XVIII. Section 26 of the Constitution. dummies. 1989. or with equivalent grave abuse of discretion. But obviously the principle does not and cannot sanction arbitrary. International Copra Export Corporation ." whether civil or criminal. afterwards when at the Court's behest the issue was reheard as if upon a motion for reconsideration." this being the doctrine laid down in Peña. his immediate family. And in accordance with applicable law. 13 " that purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts. without more. . For Peña was quick to add that while "the findings by administrative or quasijudicial agencies like the Commission are entitled to the greatest respect and are practically binding and conclusive. In both resolutions there was a clear declaration of the lack of basis of Mission Order No. in order to be valid must have factual basis and must accord due process to the parties thereby affected — that said remedies are not meant to create a permanent situation as regards the property subject thereof. moneys.e. neither in Peña nor in any other case did this Court ever say that orders of sequestration. business associates. Mrs. has been misread. The PCGG insists that under the law 12 the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to review its acts of sequestration or provisional take-over of property or assets it is charged with recovering as illegally acquired by former President Marcos. and Hotel Properties. which is bound by such findings. subordinates and close associates. i. There can be no doubt that such incidents as arise or result from or are otherwise connected with or related to any such action instituted in the Sandiganbayan include acts of sequestration." 15 In other words. subordinates. except only that what was implicit in the Resolution of August 14.: . agents or. or its performance of acts without or in excess of its authority and competence under the law. assessed and evaluated such evidence and arguments in reaching the same conclusions as in its earlier disposition. "the Sandiganbayan" and all incidents arising from. the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. . 1989. Inc. or divest ownership or rights. of course. their close relatives. seizure. . the petition and supplemental petition are DISMISSED. had the effect of automatically lifting the sequestration on those firms. Marcos. that the Sandiganbayan erred in its weighing of the evidence as supportive of private respondent's contentions rather than those of said petitioner. and the only question it can consider here is whether in making those findings." this." a principle that holds "specially true" in the administrative "sequestration cases affected by the Commission .. relatives. subordinates." and such findings and conclusions of the PCGG may not be superseded and substituted by the judgment of the courts. the PCGG. does not qualify as grave abuse of discretion correctible in a special civil action of certiorari. 17 would also have this proceeding dismissed as already moot and academic on the ground that the failure of the PCGG to implead Silahis International. when called for. seizure or take-over preceded the commencement of action in the Sandiganbayan involving the property subject thereof. business associates. and its acts "may not be interfered with by the courts." those findings may and should be reviewed and reversed or nullified " where they are patently arbitrary or capricious or are not supported by substantial evidence. that they are in fact merely provisional and temporary and subsist only until ownership is finally judicially determined. as well as private respondent had full opportunity to disclose their evidence.conclusions.. review of those acts. 1989 was made explicit in the Resolution of October 22. Given the character of the present proceeding. Marcos. This Court has consistently ruled that it is not a trier of facts. in accordance with the "well-recognized principle adverted to in PCGG vs. all cases of the Commission regarding the "Funds." 14 Peña. such cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original jurisdiction. etc. WHEREFORE.

. 6 Hence. nepotism and favoritism on the part of the Bank president. is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. union busting. Their dismissal. if in furtherance of their interests as such. in the exercise of their right to selforganization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection. A meeting was. 1 After due proceedings. ERIC MENTHA. be a recognition of such letter as an act for the mutual aid. REYNALDO FORMELOZA. in turn. No.SECOND DIVISION G. 2 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal to the NLRC which agreed with the findings of the arbitrator that the petitioners' dismissal was without just and valid cause. then seeking a renegotiation of the collective bargaining agreement. all the more. The petitioners filed an opposition thereto and. since he had prepared the letter. counsel for the labor union filed a case for grave slander against Mr. petitioners. a fact which respondent company does not deny. it disagreed with the arbitrator on the relief granted. wrote the respondent company expressing the grievances of the union and seeking a formal conference with management regarding the previous dismissal of the union's president and vice-president. no unfair labor practice had been committed. At said meeting. It ruled that. for calling the union's lawyer. with full back wages. the labor organization existing in the firm. and restraint or coercion of. "must not be indiscriminately used as a shield to dismiss an employee arbitrarily. without loss of seniority rights. This is the view of some members of this Court. likewise. while the petitioners' dismissal was not for just and valid cause.ROCHE PHARMACEUTICALS. 9 PADILLA. at the same time. instead of discussing the problems affecting the labor union and management. and the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT. ordered to extend to the petitioners all fringe benefits to which they are entitled had they not been dismissed. for which they were suspended. as has been aptly stated. Mentha. For who can stop the employer from filing an the charges in the books for the simple exercise of it. The charge was based on the affidavit executed by the petitioners. labor-management issues and the employees concerned were all officers of the union." Feeling that he was the one alluded to. under the circumstances.: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Office of the President in NLRC Case No. L-45402 April 30. was an unfair labor practice under Sec. Where. GAMIK BARTOLOME. and the contents thereof as "stupid. thus amounting to behavior necessitating their dismissal. vs. hold that respondent company's act in dismissing the Petitioners. CIR. Assuming that the workers acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity. SALVADOR ABESAMIS and MARIANO MALONZO. furthermore. who prepared the letter. as follows: On 1 March 1973. in lieu of reinstatement with back wages. It is an established rule that an employer who commits an unfair labor practice may be required to reinstate. after the union's president and vice-president had been earlier dismiss and when the collective bargaining agreement in the company was about to be renegotiated. The respondent company. the grounds alleged for herein petitioners' dismissal." Breach of trust and confidence. Eric Mentha. the respondent company filed with the NLRC a petition for clearance to terminate their employment. INC. there should. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated.. reinstatement of the dismissed employees should follow as a matter of right. in turn. should extend to petitioners' execution of an affidavit in support of the charge of slander against private respondent. 4 The petitioners appealed to the Office of the President. 3 Both parties appealed to the Secretary of Labor who set aside the decision of the NLRC and entered another one ordering the payment of severance pay only. committed an unfair labor practice. The facts of the case which led to the filing of this petition are. The NLRC ordered the reinstatement of the petitioners with two (2) months salary as back wages." 8 Besides. but that there was no unfair labor practice committed and directed that petitioners be paid separation pay. filed charges of unfair labor practice. The respondent company was. The company and Mentha. the company's Finance/Administrative Manager. 1987 ROMEO DABUET. Mr. In Republic Savings Bank vs. who then constituted the remaining and entire officialdom of the Roche Products Labor Union. allegedly berated the petitioners for writing said letter and called the letter and the person who prepared it as "stupid. and then hide behind the pretext of loss of confidence which can be proved by mere preponderance of evidence. there is nothing in the record to show that the charge of perjury filed by private respondents against the petitioners has prospered in any conclusive manner. back wages from the time of their suspension until actually reinstated. Eric Mentha. the latter rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty of unfair labor practice and directing the reinstatement of the petitioners with . and on 27 April 1976. We have carefully examined the records of the case and we are convinced that the respondent company had committed unfair labor practice in dismissing the petitioners without just and valid cause. in terminating the employment of the petitioners without just and lawful cause. respondents. Eric Mentha. the petitioners in the exercise of their right to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid and protection As the respondent company was guilty of unfair labor practice. 5 The respondent company filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. However.. construed the execution by petitioners of the affidavit as an act of breach of trust and confidence and inimical to the interest of the company. the amount not to exceed back wages for three (3) years. arranged and set for 12 March 1973. 4(a) (1) of the Industrial Peace Act. Consequently. herein individual petitioners who were an officers of the Roche Products Labor Union. and ROCHE PRODUCTS LABOR UNION. C-5190. 7 where the dismissed employees had written a letter decried by the Bank as patently libelous for alleging immorality. thus. ordering the respondent Roche Pharmaceuticals. even by a small group of employees. the compulsory arbitrator found that the petitioners' dismissal was without justifiable cause. and with whom the respondent company had a collective bargaining agreement which was due for re-negotiation that month. We. Inc. This recognition. to pay the individual petitioners separation pay. The determinative issue raised in the petition is whether or not the respondent company. J. filed a complaint for perjury against petitioners alleging that their affidavit contained false statements. the joining in protests or demands. the workers affected by such act. protection and benefit of the employees concerned. Subsequently.R. For. and Reynaldo Formeloza. and harassment against the company. amounted to interference with. and on 16 November 1976. the Office of the President granted the motion and reversed its previous decision of 27 April 1976. the Court declared: . however. accordingly. as in this case. it directed that petitioners be paid only separation pay in an amount double those awarded by the compulsory arbitrator and Secretary of Labor. interference with which constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 4(a) (1). the present recourse to this Court. the company's general manager. the letter written by and for the union addressed to management referred to employee grievances and/or.

also constrained us to review the case on a question of law. The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions' (73 C. Accordingly. Singson Encarnacion. Modes of judicial review vary according to the statutes. That contention is a flagrant error. as it is. the Office of the President is the final appellate authority within the adjudicative machinery for handling labor disputes and no law. Secretary of Labor . severance pay of one (1) month for every year of service based upon the highest salary eceived. 504.The respondents claim however. 506. Judicial review is proper in case of lack of jurisdiction. fraud or collusion (Timbancaya vs. 63 O.J. the accepted view is that the extraordinary remedies in the Rules of Court are still available. Where the law stands mute. hereby reversed and set aside and another one entered. 440). It is part of the system of checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the instant petition. 222. vs. (should be Art. grave abuse of discretion. WHEREFORE. 223) of the Labor Code. 59 Phil. error of law. 11 the Court also ruled that judicial review of administrative decisions is available even if the statute does not provide for judicial review.pressly that decisions of the Secretary of Labor may be appealed to the Office of the president. others are silent. SO ORDERED. Art. The respondent company is further directed to extend to said petitioners fringe benefits they are entitled to had they not been dismissed. the judgment appealed from should be. Secretary of Public Works and Communications. 10 where the same issue was the Court categorically decisive that there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by the statute. with three (3) years back wages and without loss of seniority rights.J. when properly raised. 12 as part of a system of checks and balances. that two varying rulings were rendered by different officials of the Office of the President. in the exercise of its power of judicial review. In the event that reinstatement is no longer feasible. "It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasijudicial or legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute" (73 C. ordering the respondent company to reinstate the petitioners to their former positions. however. appeal petition for review or a writ of certiorari No general rule applies to all the various administrative agencies. Macatangay vs. Andrada. The Court said: In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions. order or regulation provides for any appeal therefrom to the Supreme Court. To be sure. in addition. Ortua vs. the respondent company should pay.G. In Macailing vs. The checkered circumstances under which the decisions in this case were made. note 56). while providing ex.S. does not provide for review of the decisions Of the Office of the President by the Supreme Court. They contend that pursuant to Art. 166). This does not mean. He contends that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC and the Secretary of labor 'under the principle of separation of powers' and that judicial review is not provided for in Presidential Decree No.S. notably. that the power Of judicial review does not extend to decisions of the Office of the President. however. Vicente. . 21. some statutes especially provide for such judicial review. In San Miguel Corp. 11236.G. does not necessarily imply that judicial review is unavailable. we restate that this Court. This does not mean judicial supremacy over the Office of the President but the performance by this Court of a duty specifically enjoined upon it by the Constitution. Sec. may review decisions of the Office of the President on questions of law and jurisdiction. within a short period of time. Mere silence. 223 of the Labor Code. The Court therein said: Yanglay raised a jurisdictional question which was not brought up by respondent public officials. 62 O. 9424.

The case was submitted for voluntary arbitration and the parties selected the herein respondent Jose T. 6 The issue for resolution is whether or not the private respondent Rodito Nasayao was employed as plant manager of petitioner Continental Marble Corporation with a monthly salary of P3. 7 and reiterated in Mantrade FMMC Division Employees and Workers Union vs. Narciso C. prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction. or 25% of the monthly net income of the company. The Court further said: A voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her fucntions acts in quasi-judicial capacity. dismissed the appeal on the ground that the decision appealed from is final. or entitled to receive only an amount equivalent to 25% of net profits. petitioners seek to annul and set aside the decision rendered by the respondent Arbitrator Jose T.00. No. complainant. 262 of the Labor Code.00. the rule on unappealability of awards of a voluntary arbitrator becomes flexible and it is the inherent power of the Courts to maintain the people's faith in the administration of justice. Answering. for the recovery of said unpaid varies.00. whichever is greater. J. in NLRC Case No. he filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. the Court issued a temporary restraining order. the respondent arbitrator refused. Fabie for petitioners. and. Inspite of statutory provisions making 'final' the decisions of certain administrative agencies. and July 1974. versus Continental Marble Corp.000. as contended by the petitioners. Branch IV. he rendered judgment in favor of the complainant.00. on 23 March 1976. we have taken cognizance of petitions questioning these decisions where want of jurisdiction. Administrative officials are presumed to act in accordance with law and yet we do hesitate to pass upon their work where a question of law is involved or where a showing of abuse of authority or discretion in their official acts is properly raised in petitions for certiorari.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC). and when the company failed to pay his salary for the months of May. As prayed for. Bacungan . LR-6151. and Felipe David. respondents.. for respondents.000. Law Center and an academician of unquestioned expertise in the field of Labor Law. should there be any. respondents. however. wherein Rodito Nasayao was to keep the machinery in good working condition and. dated 7 May 1976. Article 262 of the Labor Code making voluntary arbitration awards final. . private respondent was not entitled to any amount. a sort of partnership. COLLADO and RODITO NASAYAO. unappealable and immediately executory. ordered the company to pay Rodito Nasayao the amount of P9. which provides: PADILLA. It is not correct. private respondent Nasayao was to receive an amount equivalent to 25% of the net profits that the petitioner corporation would realize. In his complaint before the NLRC. 8 The Court therein ruled that it can review the decisions of voluntary arbitrators. Jr.R." and the resolution issued by the respondent Commission. Collado as voluntary arbitrator.000. LR-6151. restraining herein respondents from enforcing and/or carrying out the questioned decision and resolution. a monthly salary of P3. May. violation of due process. consequently. and FELIPE DAVID. They claimed that the undertaking agreed upon by the parties was a joint venture.000. as amended. that is. Romero. that the company would realize. and ordered the herein petitioners to comply with the decision of the voluntary arbitrator within 10 days from receipt of the resolution. whichever is greater. vs. the herein petitioners denied that Rodito Nasayao was employed in the company as plant manager with a fixed monthly salary of P3. The respondent arbitrator found that the agreement between the parties was for the petitioner company to pay the private respondent. The respondent Rodito Nasayao now contends that the judgment or award of the voluntary arbitrator is final. herein private respondent Rodito Nasayao claimed that sometime in May 1974. The foregoing pronouncements find support in Section 29 of Republic Act No. Rodito Nasayao. grave abuse of discretion. Benito P. ARBITRATOR JOSE T. in which the company would not interfere. he was appointed plant manager of the petitioner corporation. Acting on the motions. within 10 days from notice. upon the other hand. 876. There is no provision for appeal in the statute creating the Sandiganbayan but this has not precluded us from examining decisions of this special court brought to us in proper petitions. ordering the herein petitioners to pay Rodito Nasayao the amount of P9. In the course of the proceedings.000.: In this petition for mandamus. in a resolution dated 7 May 1976. or erroneous interpretation of the law were brought to our attention. 3 and. entitled: "Rodito Nasayao. 1 Upon receipt of the decision. the respondent Commission. maintain that "where there is patent and manifest abuse of discretion. he would get the contracts from end-users for the installation of marble products." The question of the finality and unappealability of a decision and/or award of a voluntary arbitrator had been laid to rest in Oceanic Bic Division (FFW) vs. 1988 CONTINENTAL MARBLE CORP. His contention is based upon the provisions of Art. Director of the U. June and July 1974. and immediately executory.00 or 40% of paid-up capital of the employer or where there is abuse of discretion or gross incompetence refers to appeals to the National Labor Relations Commission and not to judicial review. The case was docketed therein as NLRC Case No. In addition. and may not be reviewed by the Court. Petitioners alleged that since there had been no profits during said period. petitioner. thusWe agree with the petitioner that the decisions of voluntary arbitrators must be given the highest respect and as a general rule must be accorded a certain measure of finality. that this respect precludes the exercise of judicial review over their decisions.000.. in return. dated 29 December 1975. The petitioners. 2 On 18 March 1976. Rodito Nasayao filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission. This is especially true where the arbitrator chosen by the parties enjoys the first rate credentials of Professor Flerida Ruth Pineda Romero. June. unappealable and immediately executory. a month. L-43825 May 9. with an alleged compensation of P3.SECOND DIVISION G.00 or 25% of its monthly income. the herein petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission on grounds that the labor arbiter gravely abused his discretion in persisting to hear and decide the case notwithstanding petitioners' request for him to desist therefrom: and that the appealed decision is not supported by evidence. But. which dismissed herein petitioners' appeal from said decision. There is no reason why herdecisions involving interpretation of law should be beyond this Court's review. and executory except where the money claims exceed P l 00. the herein petitioners challenged the arbitrator's capacity to try and decide the case fairly and judiciously and asked him to desist from further hearing the case. In due time. or on 29 December 1975. denial of substantial justice. however. unappealable. Parayno. Rodito Nasayao filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the decision of the voluntary arbitrator is final.00 covering a period of three (3) months.P. 5 The petitioners are before the Court in the present recourse. Collado. 4 . inappealable. as claimed by said respondent. if any. otherwise known as the Arbitration Law.000.

The proceedings upon such an appeal. supra. in this case. Besides. or from a judgment entered upon an award through certiorari proceedings. and that they were about to close shop in a few months' time. v. WHEREFORE. like the Labor Department and the National Labor Relations Commission. entitled: "Rodito Nasayao. there was no employer-employee relationship between the parties. respondents. Without costs. that the petitioner Felipe David did not know. no law provides for an appeal from decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission. so much so. an amount which they could illafford to pay. and Rosario Brothers. and the resolution issued by the respondent National Labor Relations Commission in said case on 7 May 1976. it appears that the petitioners had no control over the conduct of Rodito Nasayao in the performance of his work. Collado in NLRC Case No. in his Answer to the petition. or with grave abuse of discretion. The contention is without merit. before resort is made to the Court.Sec. <äre||anº•1àw> In the instant case. When. and (d) the employer's power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. 29. that Felipe David assumed management of the plant. In Brotherhood Labor Unity Movement in the Philippines vs. the writ of certiorari will issue to undo those acts. Hence. . however. to appeal to the President of the Philippines. Since. and finality to. it appears that the Commission has indeed acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of a belated appeal sought to be taken from a decision of Labor Arbiter and thereafter reversing it. 9 also claims that the case is premature for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. As pointed out by the petitioners. vs. hence. that Rodito Nasayao had collected old accounts receivables. On the other hand. Inc. versus Continental Marble Corp. In the recent case of John Clement Consultants. not covered by their agreement. Rodito Nasayao. findings of fact of a voluntary arbitrator 11 and administrative agencies which have acquired expertise in their respective fields. there is nothing in the record which would support the claim of Rodito Nasayao that he was an employee of the petitioner corporation. nor in the list of company employees furnished the Social Security System. v. since the findings of fact of the voluntary arbitrator are conclusive upon the Court. in turn. Ople. Most of all. and do justice to the aggrieved party.000. The private respondent. was compensated according to the results of his own effort. He decided for himself on what was to be done and worked at his own pleasure. SO ORDERED. He was not subject to definite hours or conditions of work and. but such appeals shall be limited to questions of law. of the Phils.00. if they are not satisfied with his decision. it was illogical for them to hire the private respondent Rodito Nasayao as plant manager with a monthly salary of P3. LR-6151. there can be no review and reversal on appeal by higher authority of its factual or legal conclusions. Ople. The Social Security System. we find the version of the petitioners to be more plausible and in accord with human nature and the ordinary course of things. the party thereby adversely affected may obtain a review and nullification of that decision by this Court through the extraordinary writ of certiorari. He had a free hand in running the company and its business. the elements that are generally considered are the following: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee. Mafinco Trading Corp. at the time he was hired. complainant. 13 the Court enumerated the factors in determining whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists." on 29 December 1975. the decision rendered by the respondent Jose T. and Felipe David. until very much later. It is the so-called "control test" that is the most important element (Investment Planning Corp. 10 the Court said: As is well known. Absent the power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which his work was to be accomplished. (b) the payment of wages. (c) the power of dismissal. including the judgment thereon shall be governed by the Rules of Court in so far as they are applicable. Zamora.doings. and. and not findings of fact of a voluntary arbitrator may be reviewed by the Court. to wit: In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship. the finding of the voluntary arbitrator that Rodito Nasayao was an employee of the petitioner corporation is not supported by the evidence or by the law. it decides a case without or in excess of its jurisdiction. He contends that the decision of the respondent Commission should have been first appealed by petitioners to the Secretary of Labor. 12 their findings of fact and the conclusions drawn therefrom have to be supported by substantial evidence. He was not included in the company payroll. Appeals — An appeal may be taken from an order made in a proceeding under this Act. considering that the business was losing. the element of control is lacking. there is no basis for an award of unpaid salaries or wages to Rodito Nasayao. The temporary restraning order heretofore isued by the Court is made permanent. are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING private respondent's complaints. as contended. versus National Labor Relations Commission. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot be invoked in this case. which he converted to his own personal use. Inc. 131 SCRA 72). While the Court has accorded great respect for. 21 SCRA 924. ln that instant case. It was only after Rodito Nasayao had abandoned the plant following discovery of his wrong. We also find no merit in the contention of Rodito Nasayao that only questions of law.

Defendants-Appellants". the tenanted landholding of the herein plaintiff became the share or is now owned by the herein defendant Lecatedra Jonson Agot which is not denied by the latter. 946 which took effect on June 17. Plaintiff-Appellee. 2. (b) the sum of Twenty-Five Pesos (P25. the herein appellee. That has been the consistent ruling of this Court in a long line of cases. The big tract of land was then partitioned among his children and the portion being worked on and tenanted by the petitioner was alloted to Lecatedra Jonson Agot. The Court. Under this rule. Alfredo Bagsican. J. 1975). which reversed and set aside the decision of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations-Branch 111. fruit trees. respondents. was a former tenant of a portion of the big tract of land owned by the late Severo Jonson. cassava. From the aforesaid judgment. the trial court ordered the reinstatement of the petitioner on the basis of the following findings of fact: There is abundance of undenied evidence that the late Juan Bagsican. substantially corroborated by his witness. all that the appellate court has to do. for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief. vs. brother of the defendant Lecatedra Jonson Agot (tsn. 3 This substantial evidence rule was later incorporated in P. 10054-CAR. assisted by the herein petitioner. bananas. No. and (3) that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts. etc. . 2 Petitioner now comes before Us through the instant petition contending among other things. pp. which coincidentally was the year the big tract of land was partitioned among the heirs of the late Severo Jonson. After trial. Section 18 of the said decree provides: The Court of Appeals shall affirm the decision or order or the portions thereof appealed from if the findings ** of fact in the said decision or order are supported by substantial evidence as basis thereof.R. more or less. and as testified to by Felicisima Jonson. Ozamis City. Petitioner's mother on the other hand died in 1940. judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioner with the disposition as herein earlier stated. l986 ALFREDO BAGSICAN. It has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record. all that is required is mere "substantial evidence". It forms part of a big tract of land consisting of 114 hectares. pp. (3) Ordering the defendants to pay. After his mother's death. (2) Ordering the defendants to reinstate immediately plaintiff thereon. Subject matter of the instant controversy is a 4-hectare landholding situated at Buntawan. (2) the Court of Appeals cannot disturb the findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations on the mere issue of credibility of witnesses.:p Petition for review of the Decision of the then Court of Appeals in CA-G. the same being an agrarian case. The aforementioned 4-hectare landholding was originally worked on and tenanted by Juan Bagsican. 4 So much so that. 2-4. PEDRO AGOT and LECATEDRA AGOT.00 every quarter thereafter until reinstated.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. 4-8. After the partition. The records disclose that after the estate of the late Severo Jonson was partitioned in 1948. Enerio for private respondents. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING. he had however. lends more credence to plaintiff's undisturbed claim. herein petitioner nevertheless continued with his occupation and tenancy of the questioned landholding thereby delivering to herein private respondent her share as an owner. is to find out if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. until September. after careful examination of the evidence on record. 1 against herein private respondents before the Court of Agrarian Relations. p. cassava and other root crops. petitioner. but during the lifetime of his mother. (4) Dismissing all other claims and counterclaims for lack of proof. plaintiff shared the harvest with the defendant Locatedra Jonson Agot at a 60-50 sharing ratio since he was the one who planted the coco trees (tsn.00) as actual expenses for transportation and meals. direct or circumstantial. 6 In the case at bar. and the conclusions stated therein are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence. if supported by substantial evidence. August 8. fruit trees. defendant's father. No. Malcolm T. L-62255 January 30. the findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations. After Juan's death. the filing by the petitioner of a complaint for Reinstatement with Damages. during his lifetime. are conclusive on the appellate tribunal.D. to plaintiff the following: (a) The sum of Eighty Pesos (P80.00) for the last quarter of the year 1973 and P80. the lawful tenant on the coconut landholding in question. his wife. We find merit in petitioner's submittal that in agrarian cases. father of the herein petitioner Alfredo Bagsican. bananas. who succeeded also as tenant on the landholding after the death of her spouse. he succeeded and cultivated the landholding and was able to plant 267 coco trees. the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE. that (1) the Court of Appeals erred in adopting the "preponderance of evidence rule" instead of the mere "substantial evidence rule" in the resolution of the instant case. August 21. Oroquieta City. entitled "Alfredo Bagsican. Juan Bagsican (plaintiff's father) who died earlier than his mother. This started sometime in 1940. Severo Jonson died sometime in 1948. 1976 and has been expressly made applicable to agrarian cases. continued tenanting the aforesaid landholding..R.SECOND DIVISION G. 1973 when he was ejected therefrom by the herein private respondent that culminated in . When these trees became fruit bearing in 1948. situated at Buntawan. as is required in an ordinary civil case. and tsn. and from then on herein petitioner continued in working and tenanting the landholding in question thereby planting an additional 267 coconut trees. private respondents appealed to the defunct Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision appealed from. Puertollano for petitioner. judgment is hereby rendered: (1) Declaring the plaintiff herein. Oroquieta City. father of the herein plaintiff. 5 Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence. the year his mother died. Pedro Agot and Lecatedra Agot. CUEVAS. father of private respondent Lecatedra Jonson Agot. as damages. 1975). insofar as the evidence is concerned. . Ruben A. planted 30 coco trees. vs. originally owned by the late Severo Jonson. on a 50-50 sharing basis. August 21. that he succeeded and is in continuous possesion and cultivation of his parents' landholding. 1975.

This is buttressed by the fact that Julio Lagamon. plaintiff has substantially shown that he was indeed ejected by the herein defendants as testified to by Felicisima Jonson (TSN. October 27.R. the judgment of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and that of the Court of Agrarian Relations is hereby REINSTATED. 38-40. to be likewise supported by the evidence on record and very much in accord with logic and ordinary human experience. The observation and conclusion of the trial court that said cassava is bereft of merit appeared to be well taken. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS. 4-5. No. At any rate. father and son. like any man of ordinary intelligence. respectively.Such quantum of evidence cannot be washed away by a mere denial of the existence of tenancy relationship as that set up by the private respondents who claimed that petitioner was never a tenant of theirs in the land folding in question. 1975). Indeed. the plaintiff. 8 The respondent court also took notice of said deficiency in private respondent's evidence. who had been tenanting the landholding in dispute. it would be contrary to human nature if the herein plaintiff would venture on an expensive litigation.. Caret. which runs thus: This confirm the belief of the court that these two tenants. this will indicate that the defense witnesses were not iii collusion with one another. separately described areas and boundaries different from that admitted by the parties 7 and more so when their individual description materially differs from each other. (TSN.. Poor as they are. Finally. August 21. since the persons who testified to be tenants on the said landholding.. and face the rigors of trial if they have not been done any wrong. as so decided in Overo vs. Pagadian City which is located in Zamboanga del Sur. No pronouncement as to costs. father-in-law of the herein plaintiff became a tenant of the defendant only sometime in 1949 after the marriage of his daughter to the herein plaintiff (now petitioner). namely: Julio Lagamon and Brigido Lagamon. because. p. with respect to petitioner's motive in filing the instant case. pp.. CAG. 1971. Besides. would not resort to filing an action in Court for his reinstatement as a tenant had there been no justifiable reason therefore. but it rationalized its stand on this point in the following manner: The supposed discrepancies in the statement of boundaries are understandable. respectively. Various new acquisitions had been made re: the share of the other heirs. We find the trial court's finding on the said subject. the same could not defeat a right which is protected by law. he was arriving in Buenavista. . And it runs thus: The court cannot sustain defendants' view that plaintiff's motive in filing this case is retaliatory in nature due to the former's criminal complaint against the latter's son. father and son. SO ORDERED. et al . It could be informed that this Julio Lagamon came to know of the defendant Lecatedra Jonson Agot only after this marriage for prior to this period. We quote with approval the court's findings and observations on said issue.. Man is presumed to take ordinary care of his concerns. Hearing of October 24. Even if defendants' view were true. Anent private respondent's assertion that it was Julio Lagamon and Brigido Lagamon. 43940-R. 1975). are tenanting other portions of defendant's land other than the land in question.

154. Dagami. Petitioner raised the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies in its appeal before the CA. 2 In the instant case. among other things. including their WHEREFORE. Presidential Decree No.01 was denied on the ground that the work done on the right side of the river was not accomplished. Respondent.90 was paid by NIA. extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties. including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular. To ensure the effective discharge of its functions. its Administrator and its Assistant Administrator for Systems and Operations and Equipment Management. Dagami. What the CA failed to rule upon is. doing business as a contractor under the name LCE Construction. 2000 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. ENCISO. those funded by donations through the government. to define the scope of its audit and examination and establish the techniques and methods required therefor.01 with legal rate of interest of 12% per annum effective on 1 August 1985 until fully paid. Cansamada. COA has been empowered. Petitioner and co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and lack of cause of action. Only petitioner NIA came to this Court via this petition for review raising the following issues for resolution: the court of appeals erred in affirming the ruling of the regional trial court denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss (annex "c" hereof) which averred. Succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals in the assailed decision are the following undisputed facts: Records show that in 1984. must be initially lodged before the COA. are the following: SECTION 26. When the works for the assigned sections are completed to NIA’s satisfaction. In a decision dated February 27. and those for which the government has put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by the government.LEONCIO C. CV No. the NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION. systems and controls. agencies of the Government. worked on a portion of the river from "station 16 + 400 to station 16 + 900". The issue should have been resolved in the affirmative. the RTC rendered judgment for respondent. or any of its subdivisions. The CA. finding no reversible error in the appealed decision which is in accord with the evidence and . No. his second and final billing of P259. and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Leyte more specifically. audit. [Emphasis supplied. Petitioner. 59681 affirming an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. thus: WHEREFORE. SO ORDERED. liable. that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies available to him under the law. however. His first billing of P227.000. is specifically vested with the power. including non-governmental entities subsidized by the government. which is a non-issue. 94-005. respondent interposed that the trial court erred in failing to hold petitioner’s co-defendants personally liable for damages and in adjudging petitioner NIA solely liable based on the face value of the work accomplished in 1985. as one of the three (3) independent constitutional commissions. as and for attorney’s fees. the keeping of the general accounts of the Government. With this arrangement. those required to pay levies or government share. the preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten years. and papers relating to those accounts.154. however. found no reversible error in the appealed decision and affirmed it as follows: 1avvphil.165. [Words in bracket supplied. J. authority and duty to examine. Plaintiff-appellant [respondent] Enciso.R.R. the examination and inspection of the books. on account of respondent’s failure to file his claim before the Commission on Audit (COA) prior to instituting a complaint for collection of sum of money with the RTC. SO ORDERED. General jurisdiction. whether NIA. agencies and instrumentalities. the court of appeals erred in declaring that petitioner is liable to respondent for the alleged work at petitioner’s project though the alleged assignment was done in violation of existing rules and regulations. as defendant. an action for a sum of money with damages thereat commenced by the respondent against the herein petitioner. Among the powers vested upon COA as provided for in Section 26. from station 16 + 400 to station 16 + 900 thereof. 142571 May 5.] COA. and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting funds or property received or held by them in an accountable capacity. 1998. records. 2006 jurisprudential principle on the matter. – The authority and powers of the Commission shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures.: The instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to nullify and set aside the Decision dated March 20. and settlement of all claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions. and other self-governing boards. thereat docketed as Civil Case No. being a government entity disbursing public funds or tax-payers’ money is subject to the jurisdiction of COA such that any claim for collection of sum of money against it.00. given the fact that NIA is a government entity vested with a separate corporate personality from the State. vs. DECISION GARCIA. defendant-appellant [petitioner] National Irrigation Administration (NIA) commenced the widening of the Binahaan River in Brgy. 1445. Both parties went up to the Court of Appeals (CA). the CA discussed NIA’s separate and distinct corporate personality from the government or the State.SECOND DIVISION G. when determining the regularity of disbursement of public funds by the petitioner NIA for the alleged services rendered by respondent in the widening project involving a portion of Binahaan River in Barangay Cansamada. subject to the limitations imposed by Article IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution. and the costs of suit. and expenditures or uses of funds and property owned or held in trust by the government. However. The RTC denied the motion and proceeded to trial. petitioner contended that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss and thereafter holding it liable to respondent. unnecessary. and as herein prescribed. This project was divided into small sections costing not more than P50. judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant National Irrigation Administration to pay plaintiff the sum of P259. On the other hand. as well as the examination. in its Civil Case No. contractors are assigned to work on specific sections without formal contracts. However. Branch 141. specially in this instance where it is not covered by any written contract. Instead of addressing the question. as plaintiff. the same is hereby AFFIRMED. NIA will then prepare the requisite contract and other pertinent documents so that the contractor can collect payment. pre-bidding was nevertheless conducted by NIA and participated in by different contractors to determine the possible lowest bid which shall serve as the cost of the project. 94-005 and eventually raffled to Branch 141 thereof. excessive. The said jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or controlled corporations. For its part. Leyte. agencies or instrumentalities. The Court finds the petition meritorious. audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of.00 each so as not to require public bidding. commissions. P50.000.] Respondent finally instituted a complaint for collection of a sum of money with damages and attorney’s fees with the RTC of Makati City. holding petitioner.

without subjecting said official to administrative and/or personal liabilities and/or accountabilities. such inaction or refusal to pay being tantamount to disallowance of the claim. and respondent’s Complaint before the RTC is DISMISSED for lack of cause of action. Paat vs. (5) when there is irreparable injury. In this light. and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable.accounting and auditing principles. (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. petitioner’s motion to dismiss should have been granted. (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process. Court of Appeals3 wrote: This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court. Hence. if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. considering that there might be factual matters involved therein. Accordingly. for one thing. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons. However. the petition is hereby GRANTED. SO ORDERED. Petitioner had timely raised this ground to dismiss the action before the RTC. forthwith dismissing the case for lack of cause of action. Hence. (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter. (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned. it is highly doubtful whether respondent may compel petitioner NIA’s officers to release payment of his claims without any previously approved contract for the supposed river-widening project in violation of existing COA rules and regulations. which is definitely not within the province of the present petition for review on certiorari. The appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings. Anent the second issue. it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. and since there is no showing that respondent’s case falls under any one of the accepted exceptions. rules and regulations set by COA must be taken into consideration. The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. for the supposed refusal or failure by the concerned public officials to act over respondent’s money claim or even the mere inaction for an unreasonable period. we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. may the injured party invoke judicial intervention by bringing the matter to this Court on petition for certiorari. Be that as it may. the legality or regularity of petitioner’s payment of respondent’s claim may be best addressed in a proper case before the COA. absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. speedy and adequate remedy. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a doctrine of long standing and courts have clear guidelines on the matter. Only after COA has ruled on the claim. . WHEREFORE. (10) when the rule does not provide a plain. with costs against respondent. the proper and immediate remedy of the respondent was to file his claim with the COA. (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case.

Respondent anchors its argument on the general rule that one who brings an action under Rule 65 must show that one has no appeal nor any plain. 110526 February 10. UNREASONABLE AND THEREFORE IN VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW. coconut product processor/factory. 018-93 and the certificates of registration issued under it on the ground that the resolution in question is beyond the power of the PCA to adopt. the Governing Board of the PCA issued on March 24. the lifting of export and commodity clearances under Executive Order No. 1644. The "certificates of registration" issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new coconut mills to operate. National Capital Judicial Region in Makati. As disclosed by the parties' pleadings. coconut desiccator. ADOPTED this 24th day of March 1993. coconut oil refinery. has become a centerpiece of the present dispensation. Despite follow-up letters sent on May 25 and June 2. Inc. a writ of preliminary injunction.000. 1993. petitioner. in general. the registration would be limited to the "monitoring" of their volumes of production and administration of quality standards. vs. Coco Manila. Petitioner alleges: I RESPONDENT PCA'S BOARD RESOLUTION NO. such as marketing of coconut oils pursuant to Presidential Decree No. The . EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. on November 25. that. the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and. 1993 not to approve the resolution in question. administration of quality standards with the corresponding service fees/charges. 3 The PCA then proceeded to issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants. 1 On November 6. FURTHER.R. 018-93 IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING AN UNDUE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY. Metro Manila. at Quezon City. 02. Hence this petition. 1016. SERIES OF 1991. BOARD RESOLUTION NO. Petitioner Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (hereafter referred to as APCD) brought this suit for certiorari and mandamus against respondent Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to invalidate the latter's Board Resolution No. coconut fiber plant or any similar coconut processing plant to apply with PCA and the latter shall no longer issue any form of license or permit as condition prior to establishment or operation of such mills or plants. to enjoin the PCA from issuing permits to certain applicants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants. that the PCA shall limit itself only to simply registering the aforementioned coconut product processors for the purpose of monitoring their volumes of production. BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED. 2 Subsequently and while the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court. 1992. 018-93 IS WITHOUT ANY BASIS. 1993 Resolution No. WHEREAS. and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. WHEREAS. 1993. ARBITRARY. I. 1960. 1992. in addition to answering petitioner's arguments. II ASIDE FROM BEING ULTRA-VIRES. RESOLVED.00. in particular. The full text of the resolution reads: RESOLUTION NO. J. has obviously no application here. The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial review. 1998 ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS. the deregulation of certain sectors of the coconut industry. dated March 24. NOW THEREFORE. providing for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA's Administrative Order No. the Governing Board of PCA has determined to follow and further support the deregulation policy and effort of the government to promote free enterprise. On the other hand. III IN PASSING BOARD RESOLUTION NO.EN BANC WHEREAS. and the coconut industry. prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines on April 26. enjoining the PCA from processing and issuing licenses to Primex Products.. the issuance of permits or licenses prior to business operation is a form of regulation which is not provided in the charter of nor included among the powers of the PCA. Respondent accuses petitioner of forum-shopping in filing this petition and of failing to exhaust available administrative remedies before coming to this Court. RESPONDENT PCA VIOLATED THE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT OF CONSULTATION PROVIDED IN PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. No. series of 1991. of the Philippine Coconut Authority in which it declares that it will no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply to it for a license or permit as a condition for engaging in such business. and to compel said administrative agency to comply instead with the mandatory provisions of statutes regulating the desiccated coconut industry. as the applicants were seeking permits to operate in areas considered "congested" under the administrative order. the facts are as follows: On November 5. respondent. 018-93.: At issue in this case is the validity of a resolution. seven desiccated coconut processing companies belonging to the APCD brought suit in the Regional Trial Court. 1988. While it continues the registration of coconut product processors. 018-93POLICY DECLARATION DEREGULATINGTHE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW COCONUTPROCESSING PLANTS WHEREAS. it is the policy of the State to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. 018-93. G. 1992. speedy.PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY. MENDOZA. 002. henceforth. petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President. respondent PCA alleges that this petition should be denied on the ground that petitioner has a pending appeal before the Office of the President. PCA shall no longer require any coconut oil mill. so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of respondent. 826 AND PCA ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. and relaxation of regulated capacity for the desiccated coconut sector pursuant to Presidential Memorandum of February 11. Superstar (Candelaria) and Superstar (Davao) upon the posting of a bond in the amount of P100.

D. relocate or upgrade the efficiencies of any existing desiccated plant. other circumstances which may affect the growth or viability of the industry concerned.resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule-making or legislative power.D. after writing the Office of the President on April 26.D. 1973. The field would be left without an umpire who would retire to the bleachers to become a mere spectator. underselling and smuggling of poor quality products and ultimately in the decline of the export performance of coconut-based commodities. making it imperative to reduce the number of existing processing plants. the government. 1993 they still had to hear from the President's office. such development and growth. 1987 when the PCA adopted Resolution No. henceforth. by P. 232. and supervised by. the PCA adopted on March 24. such development and growth. 1993. 1993 6 petitioner sent inquiries to that office not once. The Philippine Coconut Authority was originally created by P. 018-93: NOW. inter alia authorized the opening of new plants in "non-congested areas only as declared by the PCA" and subject to compliance by applicants with "all procedures and requirements for registration under Administrative Order No. No. As the PCA provided in its Resolution No. as embodied in Administrative Order No. dated August 28. In effect. that after its promulgation the resolution of the PCA abandoning regulation of the desiccated coconut industry became effective. temporarily prohibited the opening of new coconut processing plants and. four months later. the PCA limits its function to the innocuous one of "monitoring" compliance by coconut millers with quality standards and volumes of production. 1982. PCA shall no longer require any . 961. In any event. only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine. the establishment or expansion of capacity. but in case of violations of standards there would be nothing much it would do. Affirming the regulatory scheme. authorizing the establishment and operation of additional DCN plants. upon proper determination of such need and evaluation of the condition relating to: a. particularly in Germany. 1993 7 and on June 2. 1. In plain disregard of this legislative purpose. On December 6. 002. subject to the approval of the President. on August 28. 1. the level and flow of raw materials." 9 and charged with carrying out the State's policy "to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that the coconut farmers become direct participants in. 5 Indeed. We now turn to the merit of the present petition. 1982. c. 11 Through this scheme. 14 These measures — the restriction in 1982 on entry into the field. dated February 11. . as the opening of new plants was premised on the increased global demand for desiccated coconut products. the President stated in her memorandum: It appears that pursuant to Executive Order No." 15 Contrary to the assertion in the dissent. 8 but petitioner did not receive any reply. phased out some of the existing ones in view of overproduction in the coconut industry which resulted in cut-throat competition. (c) the level and flow of raw materials. — Except as herein provided. 1468. the Netherlands and Australia. Executive Order No. However. 1978. provided: Sec. forsaking controls theretofore placed in its keeping. II. we hold that petitioner was justified in filing this case on June 25. P. the deregulation of the Desiccated Coconut Industry as recommended in Resolution No. 826. (b) the production capacity prevailing in the country or locality." The guidelines promulgated by the PCA. The Authority is hereby directed to determine which of the existing processing plants should be phased out and to enter into appropriate contracts with such plants for the above purpose. but twice. a phase-out of some of the existing plants was ordered by the government after finding that "a mere freeze in the present capacity of existing plants will not afford a viable solution to the problem considering that the total available limited market is not adequate to support all the existing processing plants.D. the PCA would simply be compiling statistical data on these matters.D. The exhaustion doctrine stands as a bar to an action which is not yet complete 4 and it is clear. considering the fact that two months after they had sent their first letter on April 26. and (d) other circumstances which may affect the growth or viability of the industry concerned and that the result of such evaluation favored the expansion of production and market of desiccated coconut products. the production capacity prevailing in the country or locality. 1988. and beneficiaries of. the Philippine Coconut Authority may. Even then. 003. It was only on October 23. in the case at bar. 1982." In addition. and d. it was made "an independent public corporation . it was ordered: 13 Sec. The establishment of new plants could be authorized only upon determination by the PCA of the existence of certain economic conditions and the approval of the President of the Philippines. approve or grant any permit or license for the establishment or operation of new desiccated coconut processing plants. P. This form of "deregulation" was approved by President Aquino in her memorandum. No. the power given to the Philippine Coconut Authority — and before it to the Philippine Coconut Administration — "to formulate and adopt a general program of development for the coconut and other palm oils industry" 16 is not a roving commission to adopt any program deemed necessary to promote the development of the coconut and other palm oils industry. to the PCA. including the importation of machinery or equipment for the purpose. the Philippine Coconut Administration and the Philippine Coconut Research Institute. BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED. the PCA is under the direct supervision of the President of the Philippines but there is nothing in P.D. To be sure. but one to be exercised in the context of this regulatory structure. . 826 providing measures for the protection of the Desiccated Coconut Industry. No. directly reporting to. b." 10 through a regulatory scheme set up by law. and beneficiaries of. series of 1981 and this Order. although the APCD has appealed the resolution in question to the Office of the President. or expand the capacity. Thus. meanwhile respondent PCA was issuing certificates of registration indiscriminately to new coconut millers. authorize or grant the application for. to take over the powers and functions of the Coconut Coordinating Council. on May 26. Prohibition. 058-87. In view hereof and the favorable recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture. the new entrants were required to submit sworn statements of the names and addresses of prospective foreign buyers. the reduction the same year of the number of the existing coconut mills and then the lifting of the restrictions in 1987 — were adopted within the framework of regulation as established by law "to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that the coconut farmers become direct participants in. THEREFORE. No. No. 232 on June 30. 1468 and P." 12 Accordingly. 1993. the opening of new plants was made subject to "such implementing guidelines to be set forth by the Authority" and "subject to the final approval of the President. the Philippine Coconut Authority evaluated the conditions relating to: (a) the existing market demands. series of 1991. In the event of a need to establish a new plant. no government agency or instrumentality shall hereafter authorize. On June 11. in view of the increased demand for desiccated coconut products in the world's markets. that. 1987 (sic) is hereby approved. 1644 defining the powers and functions of the PCA which requires rules and regulations issued by it to be approved by the President before they become effective. 1993 the questioned resolution which allows not only the indiscriminate opening of new coconut processing plants but the virtual dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure whereby. the President of the Philippines. relocation or upgrading of efficiencies of such desiccated coconut processing plant. the existing market demand. The Philippine Coconut Authority is hereby ordered to take such action as may be necessary to reduce the number of existing desiccated coconut processing plants to a level which will insure the survival of the remaining plants. 058-87 adopted by the PCA Governing Board on October 28.

D. In so doing. the PCA now relies entirely on competition — with all its wastefulness and inefficiency — to do the weeding out. cooperatives. It is alleged that members of petitioner complained to the court that the PCA had authorized the establishment and operation of new plants in areas which were already crowded. There can be no quarrel with the elimination of "unnecessary red tape. Without it the PCA will not be able to regulate coconut plants or mills. No. the production of inferior products and the like. the role of the PCA is "To formulate and adopt a general program of development for the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects. petitioner charges the PCA of seeking to render moot a case filed by some of its members questioning the grant of licenses to certain parties by adopting the resolution in question. but not limited to. which badly affected the foreign trade performance of the coconut industry. state: Sec. 1. particularly those of P. . § 3 of P. It would thus seem that instead of defending its decision to allow new entrants into the field against petitioner's claim that the PCA decision violated the guidelines in Administrative Order No. II. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. coconut fiber plant or any similar coconut processing plant to apply with PCA and the latter shall no longer issue any form of license or permit as condition prior to establishment or operation of such mills or plants. At all events. the PCA adopted the resolution in question to render the case moot. No. No. (d) Inspection and survey of export shipments through an independent international superintendent or surveyor. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires . But how can this be done when. ." By limiting the purpose of registration to merely "monitoring volumes of production [and] administration of quality standards" of coconut processing plants. thereafter. 19. and the Revised Coconut Code (P. the following measures: (a) Imposition of floor and/or ceiling prices for all exports of copra. coconut oil and their by-products. Indeed.coconut oil mill. the PCA cannot stop them from doing so. 926. 6. (Emphasis added). the PCA abdicated its function of regulation and left the field to untrammeled competition that is likely to resurrect the evils of cut-throat competition. in its naive belief in survival of the fittest. the Philippine Coconut Authority shall consult with. Its success in doing so will be applauded. 1468 further requires the PCA: (h) To regulate the marketing and the exportation of copra and its by-products by establishing standards for domestic trade and export and. coconut oil and their by-products. 1468). II. The Philippine Coconut Authority shall have full power and authority to regulate the marketing and export of copra. to wit: Sec. (c) Establishment of maximum quantities for particular periods and particular markets. Sec. But free enterprise does not call for removal of "protective regulations. any change in policy must be made by the legislative department of the government. the Regional Trial Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction. the PCA cannot order a cut back in their production. through corporations owned or controlled by them through the Coconut Industry Investment Fund and the private corporation authorized to be organized under Letter of Instructions No.D. 1468). to wit: (m) Except in respect of entities owned or controlled by the Government or by the coconut farmers under Sections 9 and 10. II. so far as pertinent. The result can very well be a repeat of 1982 when free enterprise degenerated into a "free-for-all. 018-93." resulting in cut-throat competition. The dissent seems to be saying that in the same way that restrictions on entry into the field were imposed in 1982 and then relaxed in 1987." 17 The issue rather is whether it can renounce the power to regulate implicit in the law creating it for that is what the resolution in question actually is. under Resolution No. § 3(a) of the Revised Coconut Code (P. shall have the right to own. series of 1991. 19 it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. it is claimed." Our Constitutions. series of 1991. enjoining the PCA from issuing licenses to the private respondent in that case. The regulatory system has been set up by law. Indeed. have repudiated laissez-faire as an economic principle. and operate economic enterprises. FURTHER. 18 Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy. the PCA invokes a policy of free enterprise that is "unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tape" as justification for abolishing the licensing system. Article III hereof. § 3. Individuals and private groups." That is within the power of the PCA to do and indeed it should eliminate red tape. the consumers authorized by the Authority. that the PCA shall limit itself only to simply registering the aforementioned coconut product processors for the purpose of monitoring their volumes of production. underselling and overproduction which in 1982 required the temporary closing of the field to new players in order to save the industry. RESOLVED. Sec. No. This is because the licensing system is the mechanism for regulation. to conduct an inspection of all copra and its by-products proposed for export to determine if they conform to the standards established. . coconut product processor/factory. In the exercise of its powers under Section 1 hereof. There is really no renunciation of the power to regulate. in violation of its Administrative Order No. These allegations of petitioner have not been denied here. and utilized by. including corporations. beginning with the 1935 document. by repudiating its role in the regulatory scheme. XII of the Constitution which. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it. 002. If there is overproduction. 2. in furtherance of the steps being taken to rationalize the coconut oil milling industry. the Authority shall have full power and authority to regulate the production. Art. and similar collective organizations. Trimming down of PCA's function to registration is not an abdication of the power to regulate but is regulation itself. including. the Philippine Coconut Authority may initiate and implement such measures as may be necessary to attain the rationalization of the coconut oil milling industry. the recommendation of the coconut farmers.D. coconut oil refinery. Instead of determining the qualifications of market players and preventing the entry into the field of those who are unfit. underselling.D. The issue is not whether the PCA has the power to adopt this resolution to carry out its mandate under the law "to promote the accelerated growth and development of the coconut and other palm oil industry. subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands . the PCA no longer requires a license as condition for the establishment or operation of a plant? If a number of processing firms go to areas which are already congested. and to require the submission of such reports or documents as may be deemed necessary by the Authority to ascertain whether the levy payments and/or subsidy claims are due and correct and whether the subsidized products are distributed among. 002. they can be totally lifted now without prejudice to reimposing them in the future should it become necessary to do so. This is clear from the following provisions of Art. the PCA in effect abdicates its role and leaves it almost completely to market forces how the coconut industry will develop. Art. and be guided by. In the first "whereas" clause of the questioned resolution as set out above. (b) Prescription of quality standards. the PCA has put at risk other statutory provisions. . In response. 1644. coconut desiccator. distribution and utilization of all subsidized coconut-based products. establish. Under Art. In the exercise of its powers hereunder. administration of quality standards with the corresponding service fees/charges.

1988. In the second place. even if that had been her intention. 21 WHEREFORE. she could not have intended to amend the several laws already mentioned. what President Aquino approved in 1988 was the establishment and operation of new DCN plants subject to the guidelines to be drawn by the PCA . by a mere memoranda to the PCA. the petition is GRANTED. which set up the regulatory system. As already stated. PCA Resolution No. when she issued the memorandum in question on February 11. . she was no longer vested with legislative authority. her act would be without effect considering that. SO ORDERED.The PCA cannot rely on the memorandum of then President Aquino for authority to adopt the resolution in question. 20 In the first place. 018-93 and all certificates of registration issued under it are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine Coconut Authority to adopt or issue.

in view of the failure of the school to graduate Rommel Rosales as valedictorian of his class. 1973 of said decision of December 18. 1973. Rommel Rosales a student of Grade VI. 1973 to the Secretary of Education which appeal was still pending at the time of the filing of their complaint in court. Further. plaintiffs (petitioners herein) confirmed their filing of said appeal with the Secretary of Education. 1972 reconsidered and set aside his decision of May 5. J. No.R. 1 973 and the opposition thereto filed by the plaintiffs and after hearing the oral argument of the plaintiffs during the hearing of the motion. 1972 and instead "approved and/or confirmed the selection and award of honors to the students concerned for the school year 1971-1972 as effected by the school.A. (pp. P15. reported to his parents that he was not listed as Valedictorian of the class but that it was another boy by the name of Conrado Valerie. the Director of Private Schools rendered a decision holding that Rommel Rosales was the rightful valedictorian.COURT OF APPEALS and DON BOSCO TECHNICAL INSTITUTE. 23-24) On appeal. 26-27. On April 20. are as follows: On April 11. 1972. Antonio R. The parents of Rommel demanded for a re-computation of the grades of their son who. 1973. the court a quo incurred in no error when it found that the decision of the Director of Private Schools dated May 5. 1972. p. Myrna Cruz-Feliciano for respondents. the matter was still pending resolution with the Secretary of Education. 1972 but was denied on January 19. The decision of the Court of Appeals reads: . dismissing petitioners' complaint for damages. At the pre-trial. stating. suffice it to say that the dismissal of the complaint was based on the ground that it was premature. the Court of Appeals found that the court a quo incurred no error when it found that the decision of the Director of Private Schools dated May 5. insisted that their motion for reconsideration was regularly filed and the assailed decision was in fact reconsidered as above stated on December 18. Since the complaint does not allege exhaustion of said remedies principally on appeal to the Secretary of Education which was available to him.R. 1972 and January 19. No costs. (It) is clearly evident that plaintiffs were not candid when they maintained that they knew nothing about the school's petition for reconsideration.A. S. (Rollo. 1972 was far from being final and that the administrative remedies availed of by plaintiffs had not yet been exhausted. 1972. 1972 was far from being final and that the administrative remedies availed of by plaintiffs had not yet been exhausted and affirmed the decision appealed from in toto. Rabago for petitioners. Thus. candidate for graduation and likewise candidate for Valedictorian. Hence. . the Court finds that the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to constitute cause of action.. respondent school prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground that the Director of Private Schools acting on its motion dated May 11. pp. on February 7. without costs.00 for attorney's fees.. Rollo) The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals.00 for correctional damages and P5. averred that said motion for reconsideration was mysteriously filed. Respondent school however.000. On November 29. However. In its answer. 1972. they averred. MRS. Section XI of the Manual of Regulation for Private Schools requiring complaints of the kind to be filed not later than ten (10) days before commencement exercises. ROMMEL ROSALES. for short) posted the list of honor students for the graduation of its elementary department which was to take place on April 22. decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto. in their reply. respondents. v. assisted by her husband GODOFREDO MENDOZA and MISS FELICIDAD GORDON. Said comment was made on April 21.000. 1973. petitioners. DON BOSCO TECHNICAL INSTITUTE" which affirmed the decision of the court a quo ** dated September 14. L-47821 September 15. defendant Rector indicated that he would welcome an investigation in order to erase any doubt as to the selection of the honor students of the grade school concerned. the Don Bosco Technical Institute (School. The records show that petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on January 11. the Motion to Dismiss is granted and the complaint is DISMISSED. Petitioners raised the following assignment of errors: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DECISION OF THE BUREAU OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS DATED MAY 5.1972. the Court finds that plaintiffs have not exhausted all administrative remedies against the defendants and that it does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the requirement.00 for moral damages. FR. 1972 HAS ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND CONCLUSIVE. 1988 BENITO ROSALES. there being no original copies of the same in the Office of the Director of Private Schools which would show the date of filing thereof and their corresponding receipt of a copy thereof by the petitioners. the trial court issued an order which reads: Acting on the motion to dismiss dated August 20.. that the complaint had lost its validity because the same was filed on the eve of the commencement exercises of the school. it is likewise clear from the evidence that plaintiffs did seek the review by the Secretary of Education of the Director's ruling. and that at the time the School filed its motion to dismiss. EMILIA R. et al. On September 14. respondent school moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action on the ground of plaintiff's (petitioner's) failure to exhaust administrative remedies. PREMISES CONSIDERED. 1972. As to the claim that plaintiffs have been denied due process. this petition. WHEREFORE." (p. vs. 31]) Petitioners. AGUSTIN LOPEZ. 1977 in CA-G. No. petitioners appealed both decisions of December 18. administrative remedies not having been exhausted. among others. For this reason. and that after all there was nothing 'mysterious' about the School's actuations. MENDOZA. Hence. should be class valedictorian and filed a formal complaint with the Director of Bureau of Private Schools against the school claiming anomalous ranking of honor pupils for the grade school with a request for a review of the computations made by the school. 54674-R entitled "BENITO ROSALES. On May 5. Rollo [R.000. 14. II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMIMSTRATIVE REMEDIES IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS INSTANT CASE. in violation of the provision of paragraph 176.THIRD DIVISION G. 1973.1972. the Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau of Private Schools sent a copy of the complaint by first indorsement to the Rector of herein respondent school.: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals * dated July 26. ROSALES and ROMMEL ROSALES represented by Guardian-Ad-Litem. Rosales filed a complaint for damages itemized as follows: P25. BIDIN.

531 [1979]) we emphatically declared: The main issues in this case are: 1. Precisely. 66). 137 SCRA 56 [19851. pp. 1973 which was denied on January 19. cannot prosper until all the remedies have been exhausted at the administrative level. they appealed to the Secretary of Education and Culture. was filed with the trial court on November 29. MOLE. which in fact they did. (Pacana vs. (citing Cruz vs.1972. SO ORDERED. No costs. Hence. 135 SCRA 167 [1985]) WHEREFORE. The first issue involves findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court which as a general rule are final and may not be reviewed on appeal to this Court. 108 SCRA 631[1981]. Tanco. 10-11. 1972 decision of the Director of Private Schools.III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ACTING AND DISREGARDING THE APPLICATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW TO THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS. Consunji. 1972 has already become final and conclusive. this Office finds no valid cause or reason to modify or disturb its action as embodied in a letter dated December 18. for the school year 1971-72. when they filed a motion for reconsideration and later when the motion was denied. v. 1972. Rabago in behalf of his clients. Rizal. Subject complaint. Court of Appeals. Dyogi. reconsidering its original stand on the matter of the ranking of honor students at the Don Bosco Technical Institute. Rollo). the judiciary shall decline to interfere. Emilia R. . 1973 with the Secretary of Education and Culture had not yet been resolved at the time of the filing of Civil Case No. 63. which gives life to petitioners' cause of action has not yet been reached. The finality of the administrative case When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive Department of the government. 1972. 28-29]. mentioned in the letter of the Director of Private Schools dated January 19. because in the first place. 14). is denied. the said civil case which is an action for damages is premature. 1973. as correctly concluded by the Court of Appeals. please be informed that your request for reconsideration. Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in this case. 16998. this should be resorted to before resort can be made to (the) court. If a remedy is available within the administrative machinery. the contents of aforesaid letter indubitably establish that there was in fact the questioned motion for reconsideration which was acted upon by the Director of Private Schools on December 18. 147 SCRA 238 [1987]). Pestañas et al. claim that they were denied due process. Antonio v. as per letter dated January 11. but nevertheless. Petitioners however. convenience of the party litigants and respect for a co-equal office in the government. 14. in the light of existing rules and regulations on the matter. as contained in a letter dated May 5. Inciong. as a general rule. Manta (90 SCRA 524. After a careful review of the records of the present case. they were made to avail in the same administrative agency. Civil Case No. a litigant fails or refuses to avail himself of the same. 1972. Thus. 1972. v. Rollo [R. 1972. subject to certain exceptions which have been recognized and accepted by this court at one time or another (Manlapaz v. This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only on convenience but likewise on respect. the herein petitioners was dated January 11. Del Rosario. 1973. 65 SCRA 448 [1975]). 81 SCRA 574 [1978]. 119 Phil. Rollo.A. Thus. showing beyond dispute that the request for reconsideration judicially admitted to have been filed by the petitioners on February 7. and that the request for reconsideration written by Atty..APPELLANT. Rosales. IV THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OF THE PLAINTIFFS. recourse through court action. (p. This was still pending as evidenced in the certificate issued by the agency trying the same (Record on Appeal. the opportunity or right to oppose. Petitioners' position is to the effect that there was no motion for reconsideration of the May 5. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Such contention is however untenable. p. 1973 addressed to counsel of plaintiffs (petitioners herein) which reads: This has reference to your request in behalf of Mrs. Whether or not the decision of the Director of the Bureau of Private Schools dated May 5. a motion for reconsideration or appeal is curative in character on the issue of alleged denial of due process (Sampang vs. for reconsideration of the action taken by this Office as per letter dated December 18. reconsidering his stand on May 5. so that the same has become final and executory. The court a quo was thus correct in acting upon the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents on the ground that plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Accordingly. pp. and 2. the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. 1972. that petitioners knew about this reconsidered stand otherwise they would not have written said request for reconsideration of the decision of said Director of December 18.1972. it was however. in Abe-Abe et al. (pp. The Court of Appeals found that although the Record on Appeal does not contain a copy of the alleged motion for reconsideration of the subject decision of May 5. 16998. obviously to show that their case falls within one of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. REMERCO Garments v. Mandaluyong. 53-54. et al.

No. No. L-48649). 1991 CHUA HUAT.R. INC. L-47603) on 8 February 1978 to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals. this Court resolved to consolidate these cases as they are related. Hernandez & Gatmaitan and Oscar Z. 74634 because the said action was one for . a decision was rendered in Civil Case No.00/ " G. 2 is a petition for prohibition. respondents. then presided by Honorable Judge –– now Associate Justice of this Court –– Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. Rufino and Teodora. Fidel Manalo and Rizalino C.R. is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals of 29 February 1980 in C.A. Chua Huat. petitioner Chua Huat filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a complaint for the annulment of the judgment in Civil Case No.00/ " portion subleased by Kho Chong — P 110. For sheer lack of merit. L-63863 July 9. G. the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over it.00/ " ONG CHOAN — P 100. City Mayor of Manila. the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the aforesaid decision. 63863. JR.00/month On 15 November 1978. 1991 CHUA HUAT. respondents. Lourdes Mempin. BAGATSING. upon authority of the respondent City Mayor. Sycip. TEODORA CLEMENTE. No. 1963. which was granted by the trial court (Branch XXVII) on 20 November 1978. petitioners.. JUDGE ELVIRO PERALTA. RUFINO and TEODORA CLEMENTE — P 25. 74634 3 by the Court of First Instance.00/ " portion subleased by Chua Chia — P 55. appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as C. Both complaints were based on the ground that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 74634 became final and executory. Paco. 4 Petitioners.R. RUFINO CLEMENTE. Manila. 09251 SP 1 and its resolutions of 30 April 1980 and 8 July 1980 denying. Petitioner Ong Choan separately filed a similar petition with this Court (G. c) On Ong Choan's Third-Party Complaint.A. respectively. No. INC. 53851.R. No. a) sentencing defendant Dominador Felino. The second case.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. No. to remove their improvements thereon or to abandon them within sixty (60) days from receipt of this judgment.THIRD DIVISION LOURDES MEMPIN — P 30. these cases must be dismissed. Petitioner Ong Choan and others also filed a separate complaint for annulment of judgment which was docketed as Civil Case No. with interest at 6% per annum from the date of this Decision as to the amounts due on May 31. G. Francisco. after the decision in Civil Case No.. ONG CHOAN. concerning the buildings occupied by petitioners at 1271 to 1277 Pedro Gil St.-G. vs. 119751 and was assigned to Branch XXII. petitioners. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. DOMINADOR FELINO. LOURDES MEMPIN.-G. Benares for respondents. and LOURDES MEMPIN.R.00/ " b) Ordering said defendants. as defendants therein.R. G.. with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order.R. 51337-R. City of Manila. 6 Re: G. 1972: DOMINADOR FELINO — P 25. Salazar. No.R.00/ " CHUA HUAT — P 100.HON. Costs against defendants proportionately. and MANUEL UY AND SONS. In its decision of 19 January 1977. and THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA. No. or abandon them in favor of plaintiff within sixty (60) days from receipt of this judgment. MARIA GAMBOA. No.:p In the resolution of 9 January 1984.00/ " FRANCISCO. Rule 39. DEL ROSARIO. herein petitioners. petitioners' first and second motions for the reconsideration of said decision. including Maximo Yambao or anyone claiming under him. the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) filed a motion to execute the same. ROMULO M. L-53851 July 9. After the lapse of said sixty days. 74634. and 1553 to 1557 Paz St. until the date they have vacated the property. directed against the notices of condemnation and the demolition orders issued by the respondent City Engineer. Not satisfied with the said decision. SO ORDERED. RUFINO CLEMENTE. 119884. J. making the decision null and void. On 31 May 1972. filed a Petition for Review on certiorari with this Court (G. with interest at the legal rate on the total amount from the date of payment until fully paid. 5 DAVIDE. City Engineer and Building Official. Branch XVII. SY PUT shall either remove all the improvements he has constructed on the land. 53851 On 21 November 1978. RAMON D. SHERIFF OF MANILA. sentencing third-party defendant SY PUT to reimburse the former for whatever amount he shall pay to UY pursuant to this judgment. The first case. portion subleased by Gamboa — P 38. to vacate the hands respectively occupied by them and to surrender the same to plaintiff UY. to pay plaintiff UY the following monthly sums set out after their respective names beginning January 1. except Ong Choan. arguing that: "the case was actually an unlawful detainer case and therefore. This complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. vs. plaintiff can submit the corresponding motion under Section 14. all surnamed Clemente.. Vineza for petitioners.R. and ONG CHOAN. DOMINADOR FELINO. judgment is hereby rendered." Both petitions for review on certiorari were denied by this Court. and MANUEL UY AND SONS. Ong Choan. The antecedent facts and proceedings are not disputed.

74634. L17476. L-5078.A. no matter in what manner it was raised and Official or not it was the principal issue or merely an incidental one. 74634 but also by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court. not only by the trial court in Civil Case No. Sept. 119751) has been squarely ruled upon. As such. No.C. 1979 which in effect holds that Branch XXII. . WHEREFORE.). for the reason that the ground relied upon was already discussed. pass on the same and on appeal by petition for review to the Supreme Court in L-47603 and L-48649. On 23 February 1979. 51337-R. the decision in said Civil Case No. with costs against petitioners. 1964. Civil Case No. 10 To this comment. taken up and passed upon by the Court. Petitioners claim that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that Civil Case No. 09251 SP. merit in the contention that there is no identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. generally speaking it becomes res judicata or can be made the basis of a plea of estoppel by judgment as between the parties to that litigation. despite the filing of the above cases for annulment of judgment. 28. and it was the court's ministerial duty to execute it. 8 The first and second motions for reconsideration filed by the petitioners were denied on 30 April 1980 and 8 July 1980. or on the ground of res judicata. 20. docketed as C. A cursory reading of the questioned judgment.R. to set aside the order of execution of judgment. 119751 to annul the judgment in Civil Case No. 119751 aforestated was dismissed by the trial court in its Order of 24 September 1979. . L-6166. April 28. and in not finding that the pendency of Civil Case No. The records of the aforesaid two cases will bear it out that the issue of lack of jurisdiction (which is the cause of action in Civil Case No.-G. certainly on the face of the argument. In the Decision promulgated on 29 February 1980. April 29. cannot interfere with this branch in its prerogative to carry out its decision. Civil Case No. stating inter alia: The instant petition must be denied for lack of merit. 74634 and this instant case. Palermo. 1. respectively. 1950. cognizable by the City Court of Manila. however. "the court a quo should have proceeded with the hearing of this case on the judgments and thereafter decide (sic) the same based on the evidence adduced by the parties". 47 O. 74634 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction justifies the stay of execution of said judgment. Blas. Issues raised by the parties in their brief and passed upon subsilencio by the appellate court in a decision which has become final and executory are considered closed and can no longer be revived by the parties in a subsequent litigation without doing violence to the principle of res judicata. Plaintiff-appellant further contends that since the issue of jurisdiction in Civil Case No. the instant petition is hereby DENIED. We find the same likewise untenable. 7 Petitioners then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals. What is involved is not the recovery of physical possession only but the recovery of the right to possess. however. 74634 pending termination of the annulment case which was. escape the application of the principle that the same cause of action may not be litigated twice between the same parties. (Eugenio vs. We required respondents to comment on the petition which private respondents complied with on 14 October 1980. Indanan. L-2185. 74634" (which is for recovery of possession) "and Civil Case No. C. Pascual vs. We find application in the following doctrines: A party may not. the Appellate Court did not. the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit. if to give them time to bring the incident up on certiorari to said superior courts. In the resolution of 3 September 1980. Nov. The Sheriff of Manila. L-8928. denied by the trial court in its Order of 5 April 1979. unless restrained by either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. (Corda vs. of the records of the said two cases. 2. the High Court in its minutes' ( sic) did not rule squarely on said issue. 30. the Court of First Instance of Manila ordered the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. G. 11 On 19 November 1980. shall immediately implement the writ of execution upon the expiration of thirty (30) days from receipt by the defendants of a copy of the order. We find the same to be utterly devoid of merit. 119751 filed by petitioners herein to annul the judgment in Civil Case No. 74634 is undisputedly final and executory. Caspe. 74634 cannot stop the execution thereof because of finality of judgment or res judicata. 1961). 6184. it was rightfully brought before this Court. No. It further appears that Civil Case No. therefore. Tiangco L-2804. 74634 because of the finality of such judgment. petitioners filed a reply on 29 October 1980. 1956). 119751 pending in Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila is finally decided and terminated.C. in its resolution denying said motion.R. Sept. the issuance of a writ of execution thereof becomes the ministerial duty of the respondent judge. for which reason. a coordinate court. and said motion is hereby denied. Del Rosario." While there is. long final and affirmed by the higher courts. there being no finding of a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by the respondent court equivalent to lack of jurisdiction which may be the subject of a writ of certiorari. 76 Phil. upon closer scrutiny. We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit simultaneously their memoranda which petitioners complied with on 12 January 1981 and the private respondents on 20 January 1981. 12 In its Decision of 12 March 1984. discloses that the issue raised in the annulment of judgment case. Herein petitioner Chua Huat appealed from said Order to the Intermediate Appellate Court which docketed the same as A. Barrera vs. No.ejectment and not for recovery of possession ( accion publiciana) which was. Petitioners field a motion for reconsideration of the said order and to suspend proceedings in Civil Case No. Francisco vs. It is only the superior court which can prohibit this branch from executing its decision. .G. 74634. 608. Another aspect of the doctrine is that once an issue has been raised and finally decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. May 4. by changing the form of a lawsuit or adopting a different method of presenting the matter. as follows: A. where the same issue among others was raised. 66303. this petition which was filed on 7 August 1980. . 1953. 13 the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed in toto the questioned order holding: Plaintiff-appellant contends that the principle of res judicata does not apply in the case at bar because "although there may be identity of parties and of subject matter between Civil Case No. Maglinti. 1949. into effect. (Paz vs. This is an accion publiciana and not one for unlawful detainer. 74634 is null and void. Robis vs. No. hence. 119751" (which is for annulment of judgment) "there is no Identity of causes of action between these two cases. which reads: All the points raised in defendants' motion for reconsideration and to suspend proceedings are already thoroughly covered in the order of February 23. 119751 cannot stop the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. has been decided in the prior case when the court then presided by now Supreme Court Justice Ameurfina MelencioHerrera who penned the said decision stated. and to prohibit the respondents from executing the judgment until Civil Case No.R.-GR CV No. The judgment in Civil Case No. 9 Hence. 119751. 74634 was raised in their motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.

53851. Dominador Felino. is still subject to the approval of the Mayor per Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila.R. On 30 July 1986. reviving therein issues which he had squarely raised in C.. this petition be given due course.R. he stated that although the buildings are old. petitioners filed a rejoinder We now resolve these petitions. 29 to the Memorandum of private respondents. 53851. . No. The High Tribunal further pointed out that "Nor is it to be lost sight of that such principle does not apply only to the express terms of decision.3. (d) the power to condemn and remove buildings and structures is an exercise of the police power granted the City of Manila to promote public safety.R. No. Inc. The condemnation orders stated that the subject buildings were found to be in dangerous condition and therefore condemned. whereby they were ordered to vacate and commence the demolition and/or removal of the buildings occupied by them after fifteen days from receipt of the order. by this Court (G. no circumvention or evasion being allowed". in Kabigting vs. SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY. whose decision is final. they are still structurally sound and have a remaining economic life of at least eight years. Acting Director of Prisons (116 Phil. praying that a restraining order or preliminary injunction be issued enjoining respondents from proceeding with the announced demolition of the subject buildings. Lastly. Pursuant thereto. 16 On 19 January 1983. being the court of last resort. he filed a motion in Civil Case No. It alleges that the condemnation orders were not immediately executory. Rufino Clements. first.-G. No. In his evaluation report dated 21 January 1983. and was told to vacate the premises within 15 days from notice. or three months after the notices of condemnation were issued. to condemn the dilapidated structures located at 1271 to 1277 Pedro Gil St. 63863 On 14 September 1982. 28 On 18 January 1987. 15 The orders were based on the inspection reports made by Architect Oscar D. To maliciously stop its execution pursuant to the Order of 20 March 1978. Rule VII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P. A. 25 to Which respondents filed a rejoinder on 14 November 1983. which was affirmed. while petitioners filed theirs on 3 November 1986. It further stated that the notice is not an order to demolish as the findings of the City Engineer is (sic) still subject to the approval of the Mayor. of Manila. the respondent Mayor of Manila confirmed the rest of the condemnation orders issued by the respondent City Engineer. THERE IS NO APPEAL OR ANY OTHER PLAIN. which all showed that the subject buildings suffer from structural deterioration by more than 50% and as much as 80%. for not availing of this remedy.-G. respondents City Mayor and City Engineer filed their Comment 23 praying that the petition be dismissed on the following grounds: (a) that it involves questions of facts which should be ventilated before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Ong Choan. (c) the power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive domain of the City Engineer pursuant to Sections 275 and 276 of its Compilation of Ordinances (also Revised Ordinances 1600). as the finding of the City Engineer/Building Officials. and ask that a re-inspection or re-investigation of the building or structure be made. L26932. No. inspected the abovementioned structures upon the request of petitioners herein. petitioners formally protested against said notices of condemnation on the ground that the buildings are still in good physical condition and are structurally sound based on the abovementioned certification of Civil Engineer Romulo C. petitioner Chua Huat filed with the trial court Civil Case No. 17 On 22 February 1983. under Section 5. 27 Private respondent filed its Memorandum on 3 October 1986. by the Court of Appeals in its decision of 19 January 1977 (C. Dominador Felino and Lourdes Mempin. del Rosario the City Engineer and Building Officials. The decision of the trial court in Civil Case No.R. Manuel Uy and Sons. subject to the confirmation of the Mayor as required by Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila. 14 On 17 November 1982.R. Manila. 119751 to annul the decision. Petitioners filed a Reply on 3 October 1983. Inc. Moreover. and several other persons. and hence beyond their power and authority to alter or modify". No. a private practitioner. petitioners filed the instant Petition for Prohibition. filed its Comment 24 wherein it contends that the petition is premature. Lourdes Mempin. G. requested Romulo M.. private respondent Manuel Uy and Sons. but likewise to what is therein implicit. 51337-R) and second. Maria Gamboa. respondent in G. Manila.. 119751 and of the above action of the Intermediate Appellate Court. neither the Supreme Court nor the Appellate Court is duty bound to discuss the pros and cons of appellant's argument. and (e) administrative decisions falling within the executive jurisdiction cannot be set aside by courts of justice except on proof of grave abuse of discretion. Molas. said official issued notices of condemnation addressed to petitioners Chua Huat. Once its judgment becomes final. and 1553 to 1557 Paz St. Then. was informed of the issuance by the City Engineer of the demolition order with respect to the building located at 1565 Paz St. this case was consolidated with G. fraud or error of law. Paco. 18 On 26 April 1983. Paco. Maria Gamboa. on 12 September 1983. 22 On 18 May 1983. 53851. with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order. this Court directed respondents to comment on the petition and issued a Temporary Restraining Order against the respondents City Mayor and City Engineer restraining them from enforcing and/or carrying out the demolition order on the building occupied by Maria Gamboa at 1565 Paz Street. 74634 to set aside the order of execution and to suspend proceedings therein in view of the pendency of the annulment case. against City Mayor Ramon Bagatsing. had long become firm and final. which must be implemented faithfully.What more. Court of Industrial Relations. 1962) the Supreme Court pointed out: "It need not be stated that the Supreme Court.R. Molas dated 21 January 1983. Andres and the Memorandum-Reports made by the Evaluation Committee of the Office of the City Engineer. On 20 May 1983. No. 1096. the finding or declaration of the Building Officials.R. No. Inc. Petitioners made no attempt to inform the Court of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 74634 of 31 May 1972. petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies.R.D. or to abuse it. No. 21 On 6 July 1983. No. 51337-R. 26 On 4 January 1984.A. is frivolous and is dismally bereft of merit. City Engineer and Building Officer Romulo del Rosario and Manuel Uy and Sons.. (b) the subject buildings were condemned and ordered removed after it was established that they had suffered from defects or deterioration thereby posing perils to the lives and limbs not only of petitioners but also to the public in general. issued demolition orders addressed to Chua Huat. 27 SCRA 490). 20 They allege in their petition that: RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE CONDEMNATION ORDERS. unreasonable and deserves no consideration as petitioners have not exhausted readilyavailable administrative remedies and that the validity of the questioned condemnation and demolition orders entails questions of facts not entertainable in this petition. The antecedent facts stated above unmistakably disclose a clear pattern to make a mockery of the judicial process.A. The first. Ong Choan. 589. the owner of a building may appeal to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. L-47603 and G. and after hearing. 19 On 2 May 1983. the respondent City Engineer. is the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law of that particular case. all occupied by petitioners. L48649). (Sanchez vs. it is binding on all inferior courts. On 9 May 1983. Civil Engineer Romulo C. We gave due course to this petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. respondents be prohibited from demolishing said buildings. one of the petitioners herein. Re: G.

moreover. with respect to dangerous buildings.A. we have left no doubt as to our disapproval of such a practice. 31 We said in no uncertain terms: As officers of the court. is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts. as shown in this case. as his counsel fully knew. G. through a mere subterfuge. the owner or his agent shall immediately proceed to remove the building within fifteen days from the date on which he was notified of such final action. Petitioners failed to show the presence of both elements. should not be permitted to be flied to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. or with grave abuse of discretion. 66303). deciding the case on the evidence presented.-G. We find. also raising the same issues..D. No. nor any plain. more particularly for lawyers.. It is a settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction "when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. deprived of the fruits of the verdict.R. and when he failed again. should fail. This is also true with the respondent Mayor who can approve or deny the condemnation orders as provided in Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila. Respondent City Engineer and Building Official. If the Mayor confirms the action of the city engineer. It is explicitly clear from Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court that for certiorari to be available: (a) a tribunal. the winning party be not. once a judgment has become final. to wit: When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous. to evade the operation of a decision final and executory. speedy. The results of the inspections were set forth in a memorandum dated 16 November 1982 where it was shown that all the buildings had architectural. board or office exercising judicial function acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction. The power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Engineer. He. The protest made by petitioners was submitted only on 22 February 1983. lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. he may condemn the same and shall immediately notify the owner and the Mayor of his action. Condemnation Proceeding. — Whenever in the judgment of the City Engineer any building or portion of building has been damaged by any cause to such an extent as to be dangerous for use. and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that. however. where. provide: Sec. which is burdened enough as it is. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary. they shall be removed . The reason of course is all too obvious. Deterioration and Defects. et al.R. et al. in Banogon. with respect to the dangerous or ruinous buildings. also states the authority of the Building Officials. ." 35 We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent City Engineer because the orders were made only after thorough ocular inspections were conducted by the City's Building Inspectors. fair play and the prompt implementation of final and executory judgments. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case. he may make formal objection within the period of seven days following such notification. We said: This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike: Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere. petitioner went to the Court of Appeals (A. The only issue then is Official or not said officials committed grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their aforesaid powers. or safety. The aim of a lawsuit is to render justice to the parties according to law. Sec. et al. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. In another portion of said decision. once again. At the same time. We must. Romulo M. Should the owner or his agent not comply with the decision of the Mayor the building shall be removed at his expense and the city will proceed to recover against him for the amount expended. it is unquestionable that the Building Officials. validly issue the questioned condemnation and demolition orders.-G. 1096). a 1910 decision. P. such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies. CV No. petitioner cannot be expected to do so. Zerna. 34 B. It is also clear from the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila that the Mayor has the power to confirm or deny the action taken by the Building Officials. or three months after the notices of condemnation were issued.Unfazed by his failure to hold the trial court hostage to his scheme. 276. and in the light of his remarkable effort to frustrate or subvert the ends of justice. 63863 must equally fall. Medina. especially so.D. The Mayor shall hear the owner or his agent and his experts and also the city engineer. far from commendable. remind counsel and litigants. Section 215 of P. (Sec." And. therefore. 119751 was dismissed on 24 September 1979. We must state here for the petitioners and their counsel and on all others similarly inclined to resort to the same or related scheme or stratagem that this Court cannot condone or tolerate any abuse of the judicial process. when Civil Case No. From the abovementioned provisions. and clearly beyond the seven days prescribed under Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila. del Rosario. Procedural rules are precisely designed to accomplish such a worthy objective. vacation or demolition depending upon the degree of danger to life. — All buildings or parts of buildings which show defects in any essential parts shall be repaired and put in safe condition at once. 1096. If the owner or his agent be not willing to abide by this order of condemnation. 32 There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary.C. therefore. shall order its repair. much more so of this Court. 36 The respondent Mayor's act of approving the condemnation orders was likewise done in accordance with law. vs. as estimated by the city engineer. he went to the Court of Appeals (C. otherwise known as the National Building Code. who is at the same time the Building Officials. Villamor. Necessarily. and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. and (b) that there is no appeal. the Building Officials. health. such as this. any attempt to pervert the ends for which they are intended deserves condemnation. or if the deterioration be greater than fifty per centum of the value of the building. 30 that "this Court win ever be vigilant to nip in the bud any dilatory maneuver calculated to defeat or frustrate the ends of justice. Sections 275 and 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila (also Revised Ordinances 1600). deliberately chose not to inform this Court of the unfavorable decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court of 12 March 1984. No. plumbing and electrical defects of up to 80%. 09251 SP) to question the denial by the trial court of his aforesaid motion. the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication. structural. especially this Court. 33 This appeal. had long been laid to rest. can. This is without prejudice to further action that may be taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts. Defendants had to display ingenuity to conjure a technicality. the challenged decision of the respondent Court of Appeals to be in full accord with law and jurisprudence But this should not be the end of this case. he came to this Court via this petition with issues which. 206. vs. We have done so before. has the authority to order the condemnation and demolition of buildings which are found to be in a dangerous or ruinous condition. as We did in Cantelang. We do so again. From Alonso v. therefore. courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.R. is quite obvious and indisputable. sanitary. It is patently obvious that petitioners have no valid grievance for the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to be available to them. 275. et al. predicated as it is on an insubstantial ( sic) objection bereft of any persuasive force.

Certiorari will not he then because petitioners failed to exhaust all the administrative remedies. comity and convenience. appeal was likewise available to petitioners. 5. Within the fifteen-day period the owner may if he so desires. . 37 Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review. (emphasis supplied). board or officer. 1096. 38 There are. — The following steps shall be observed in the abatement/demolition of buildings under this Rule: 5. SO ORDERED. 5. This Court has long upheld the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies because it rests on the assumption that the administrative body. of course. . provide: 5. will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. for reasons of law. . ruinous or dangerous. if given the chance to correct its/his mistake or error.3. The decision of the Secretary on the appeal shall be final. .Moreover. There must be a finding or declaration by the Building Officials. IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING. or reconsideration. judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING these cases for lack of merit with treble costs against petitioners.. 39 but none is available to petitioners. that the building or structure is a nuisance.6. As correctly contended by private respondents. appeal to the Secretary the finding or declaration of the Building Official and ask that a re-inspection or re-investigation of the building or structure be made. Procedure for Demolition of Buildings . . . and provides a system of administrative appeal. under the title Abatement/Demolition of Buildings. exceptions to this rule. No.D. may amend its/his decision on a given matter. the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the then Ministry of Public Works to implement P. the courts.1.

HON. As perspicaciously observed by Justice Moreland. Inc. (pp. Bacolod City. Dr. at the election of the plaintiff. L-40428. If plaintiff opts for the latter. And. issued a resolution dated November 8. 6. he is limited to that place. Teodoro Motus. BEVERLY TAN. Esuerte and Jayme filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals.R. Head Nurse. who was one of those who were present at the time of the incident also sent a letter to the Chief of the Hospital. 1979. As a result thereof. L-29791. of Ilocos Norte. The following reasons were advanced by petitioners for the allowance of this petition: 1) The Court of Appeals committed gross error and grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the petition despite petitioners' overwhelming evidence showing that the venue of private respondent's action (Civil Case No. Her parents live there. There is no question that private respondent as plaintiff in the Civil Case is a legal resident of Cebu City. respondents." "to facilitate and promote the administration of justice" or to insure "just judgments" by means of a fair hearing. involving the same parties. Motus. . . Medicare Department of the said hospital and as a result of the said incident. . 20 Phil. An action for damages was filed by private respondent Beverly Tan against herein petitioners Patria Esuerte and Herminia Jayme with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cebu and docketed as Civil Case No. Beverly Tan. like other procedural rules. Andales & Sisinio M. CA.. The motion for reconsideration of the denial was likewise denied by the court on February 16. The other petitioner. (b) Personal Actions. of the plaintiff or defendants as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence (Dangwa Transportation Co. The rule on venue. Esuerte for petitioners. 81 SCRA 75). 2(b) of Rule 4. Bacolod City. 530). Patria Esuerte. 1975. . 70 SCRA 298. private respondent was advised to explain in writing by the Chief of the Hospital. to comply substantially with the requirements of Sec. It is the contention of petitioners that the proper venue of the action filed by Tan should be Bacolod City and not Cebu City. No.:p This petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G. or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides.R. The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the Regional Trial Court is given to the plaintiff but not to the plaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court ( see Clavecilla Radio System v. are designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice or the impartial and evenhanded determination of every action and proceeding (Sy v. Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides: G. Sec. without any justifiable reason shouted at. The motion for reconsideration of the decision was likewise denied for lack of merit on February 18. She was then employed with the Corazon Locsin . not in domicile or legal residence. MENDOZA. . the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. January 31. In Koh v. J. venue of personal actions should be at the place of abode or place where plaintiffs actually reside. We are fully convinced that private respondent Coloma's protestations of domicile in San Nicolas. Romeo B. January 10. Inc. 19 SCRA 367). 23 and 27. Rollo) Esuerte and Jayme filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue and for being premature for failure of Tan to exhaust administrative remedies. 2) The Court of Appeals committed gross error and grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the petition despite petitioners' overwhelming evidence showing that the filing of Civil Case No. L-22795. L-53485 February 6. The claim for damages arose from an incident involving the parties and summarized by the Court of Appeals. 1991 PATRIA ESUERTE and HERMINIA JAYME. Ilocos Norte. The Discipline and Grievance Committee. 1980. Dr. a Junior Resident Physician of Corazon Locsin-Montelibano Memorial Hospital. However. 1977. then "the administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to criticism. Sarmiento. 523. 75 SCRA 124). 6th Street. "Resides" in the rules on venue on personal actions means the place of abode. Court of First Instance of Cebu and MA.FIRST DIVISION R-17584) was improperly laid. 1979. HON. 2. RAFAEL T. 1978.I. 305. Motus." (Manila Railroad Co. Dr. R-17584.R. is entirely of no moment since what is of paramount importance is where he actually resided or where he may be found at the time he brought the action. the purpose of procedure is not to restrict the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter but to give it effective facility "in righteous action. G. she was a temporary resident of Bacolod City. Tan was actually residing and may be found in Bacolod City. it cannot also be denied that at the time of her filing of the complaint against petitioners. she declared that she is a resident of FRAYU INTERIOR. . on venue of personal actions. . that on September 22. based on his manifested intention to return there after the retirement of his wife from government service to justify his bringing of an action for damages against petitioner in the C. private respondent Ma. No. In fact. 1978. Herminia Jayme. but private respondent instead of explaining only her side of the incident also complained against the petitioners. 19 SCRA 379). Attorney General. — xxx xxx xxx MEDIALDEA. COURT OF APPEALS (Eleventh Division). Iloilo City for appropriate action. informing the latter of what she had witnessed. v. G. the Chief of the Hospital. 1979. Judge. in Hernandez v. No. We ruled: Applying the foregoing observation to the present case. Branch VI. in her "Statement of Assets and Liabilities.F. On September 18. Teodoro P. No. On January 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance. v." submitted by Tan to her employer. Jaro. Corazon Locsin-Montelibano Memorial Hospital. Rural Bank of Lucena. Rules of Court. At the time of the filing of her action in court. 91-92. — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendants or any of the defendants resides or may be found. transmitting the records of the case to the Regional Health Office. December 17. petitioners. Tyson Enterprises Inc. the petition was dismissed without pronouncement as to costs.R. Andales for private respondent. as follows: . The option of the plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the Regional Trial Court is either the place where the defendant resides or may be found or the place where the plaintiff resides.. in writing. Eleno V. humiliated and insulted the petitioner. vs. the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial Hospital. conducted a fact-finding investigation and later. Teodoro P. If the objective is not achieved. 1978. . Section 2(b). whether permanent or temporary.. No. said petitioner complained to the Chief of the Hospital. SP-08999-R.. Antillon. R-17584 is premature due to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Civil Case No. In the civil action for damages. Private respondent as plaintiff in the civil Case for damages has no administrative remedy available to her. . The private respondents were all residents of Bacolod City at the time of the bringing of the action. Bacolod City. The alleged need by private respondent Tan to exhaust administrative remedies before filing the complaint for damages does not apply to the instant case. SO ORDERED. the cause of action in the administrative case is different from that of the civil case for damages. The second ground raised by petitioners is devoid of merit. it is the government who is the aggrieved party and no award for damages may be granted in favor of private persons. the acts complained of were committed in Bacolod City. WHEREFORE.Montelibano Memorial Hospital. However. R-17584 is DISMISSED for improper venue. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The civil action for damages can proceed notwithstanding the pendency of the administrative action. It is true that the same incident complained of in the administrative case filed by petitioners against Tan is the subject of the action for damages filed by Tan against the petitioners in the trial court. as resident physician. Justice would be better served if the complaint were heard and tried in Bacolod City where all the parties resided. Though Tan's employment was only temporary there was no showing when this employment will end. the trial court's concern is whether or not damages. personal to the plaintiff. were caused by the acts of the defendants. the position is GRANTED. Moreover. While the complainant in the administrative case may be a private person.

February 28. It is thus clear that the schemes in the case at bar are not lotteries. No one would be required to pay more than the usual price of the products. . In other words. Poblador.SECOND DIVISION G. Caltex (Phil. Palomar L-23248.) Inc. v. v. plaintiff-appellee. L-29062 March 9. The allegation that the prohibition by the Postmaster General should have first been appealed to the Department Secretary concerned in view of the doctrine denominated as "the exhaustion of administrative remedies" has no application here because one recognized exception to the doctrine is when the issue raised is purely a legal one.R. J. 18 SCRA 247). No. in his capacity as Postmaster General. 1 entitled "Philippine Refining Company v. It appears that the Philippine Refining Company. Hon. 39 Phil.HON. Postmaster-General. both of which envisioned the giving away for free of certain prizes (without additional consideration) for the purchase of Breeze soap and CAMIA cooking oil. herein appellee. Baguio. defendant-appellant. 1969. resorted to two schemes to promote the sale of its products: Breeze Easy Money and CAMIA Lucky-Key Hunt. vs. Enrico Palomar." finding that plaintiff-appellee's promotion schemes ("Breeze Easy Money" and "CAMIA Lucky-Key Hunt") were not in the nature of a lottery and enjoining appellant from issuing a "fraud order" on the aforementioned schemes of appellee. Nazareno & Adaza Law Office for plaintiff-appellee. ENRICO PALOMAR. the participants would get the exact value of the price for the goods plus the chance of winning in the scheme. This Court has consistently ruled that a plan whereby prizes can be obtained without any additional consideration (when a product is purchased) is not a lottery (Uy v. 1987 PHILIPPINE REFINING COMPANY.S. Parades. In view of the foregoing. RESOLUTION PARAS.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 72498. U. 862. the Court RESOLVED to DISMISS this appeal and to AFFIRM the assailed decision of the Court of First Instance.

DR. Azurin. likewise states: SEC. petitioner exercised direct control and supervision over all heads of departments in the Medical Center In 1986. claiming entitlement to the position of Assistant Director for Professional Services at the East Avenue Medical Center (formerly Hospital ng Bagong Lipunan) alleged to be unlawfully held by private respondent. Sosepatro Aguila. petitioner.." (Hospital Order No. Fernandez for petitioner. On 14 July 1987. of Health. Hospital Order No. The Solicitor General. Power to appoint and remove . Dr. Even during her incumbency as Medical Specialist II. Petition). respondent De la Paz. upon the recommendation of the Chief of the bureau or office concerned. Nenita Palma-Fernandez. she continued to exercise direct control and supervision over all heads of departments in the Medical Center. 21 and 22. SOSEPATRO AGUILA. petitioner was already designated as Acting Chief of Clinics since September 1983 up to her permanent appointment to said position. series of 1987. The Solicitor General has aptly framed the issues for resolution as follows: 1. (Annex C. change the distribution among the several bureaus and offices of his Department of the employees or subordinates authorized by law. and THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH.. makes common cause with petitioner and answers the first and third issues in the negative. Adriano de la Paz.. We rule for petitioner. Section 79 (D). J. 22. 21. Since the East Avenue Medical Center is one of the National Health Facilities attached to the Department of Health. as well as to the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Chairman of the Government Reorganization Commission. 807. Annex B. and the Rejoinder of the Solicitor General to said Reply. de la Paz. 1988 DR. was issued by respondent De la Paz. New Structure and Pattern. not the Medical Center Chief. Executive Order No. After considering and deliberating on all Comments. For their part. and the Secretary of Health. and the second in the affirmative. Rollo). 22. As Chief of Clinics. petitioner was extended a permanent appointment to the position of Chief of Clinics at the Hospital ng Bagong Lipunan (now East Avenue Medical Center) by then Minister of Health and Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Center. designating petitioner as Assistant Director of Professional Services (Annex 3.. petitioner. is vested in the Secretary of Health. 2. Said order was purportedly issued "in the interest of the hospital service. Oscar C. The new position structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry shag be prescribed by the Minister within one hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of this executive order subject to approval by the Office of Compensation and Classification and the authorized positions created thereunder shall be filled thereafter with regular appointments by him or the President. issued Hospital Order No. furnishing copies to respondents De la Paz and Aguila. Failing to secure any action on her protest within a month's time. in accordance with the Civil Service Law. petitioner filed on 1 June 1987 a letter-protest with respondent Secretary .. as Medical Center Chief. Dr. occupied the positions of Medical Specialist I in 1978. Whether or not petitioner has a valid cause of action.EN BANC G. and may remove or punish them.R. of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Section 79 (D). This order being issued in the interest of the hospital service. in the interest of the service. the new organizational structure of the Center retitled the position of Chief of Clinics to Assistant Director for Professional Services. Thus. Respondent Medical Center Chiefs argument that petitioner was not appointed but was merely transferred in the interest of the public service to the Research Office pursuant to Section 24 (c) of Presidential Decree No. DR. petitioner filed on 8 July 1987 the instant Petition for Quo Warranto with Preliminary Injunction against respondents Dr. from time to time. Medical Specialist II from October 1982 to April 1985. 119. as Assistant Director for Professional Services "vice Dr. vs. respondents. The latter's function is confined to recommendation. as the case may be as herein provided. declared the case submitted for resolution. Executive Order No. 26. 119 known as the "Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Health" was promulgated. Aguila. Previous to this appointment. series of 1987. 48. No. on behalf of the Secretary of Health. Respondents De la Paz and Aguila uphold the opposite views. and dispensing with memoranda. 78946 April 15. shall appoint all subordinate officers and employees whose appointment is not expressly vested by law in the President of the Philippines." On the same date.: This is a Petition for Quo Warranto filed by petitioner. the Court. Whether or not the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies precludes the filing of the instant Petition. Comment. 1. Resolved to give due course to the Petition. except as especially provided otherwise. Petition). this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the implementation of Hospital Orders Nos. Jesus C. NENITA PALMA-FERNANDEZ. a career physician. on 17 March 1988. Upon receipt of Hospital Order No. Dr. series of 1987. Nenita Palma-Fernandez. respondent Dr. until her appointment as Chief of Clinics on 1 May 1985. or MELENCIO-HERRERA. on 8 August 1986.— The Department Head. whereby petitioner was relieved "of her present duties and responsibilities as Chief of Clinic and hereby transferred to the Research Office. p. Whether or not respondent De la Paz has the power or authority to issue the two Hospital Orders in question. or the Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Health. The background facts follow: On 1 May 1985. Aguila. In partial implementation of this new set-up. as Medical Center Chief. The Solicitor General for respondents. like petitioner. the power to appoint and remove subordinate officers and employees. who will be transferred to the Research Office. On 29 May 1987. designated respondent Dr. the Reply. ADRIANO DE LA PAZ. The Department Head also may.. Series of 1986. On 30 January 1987. As such. who was then Medical Specialist I. 30. and 3.

.R. Series of 1986. 1 986. 2. No. It follows from the foregoing disquisition that petitioner has a valid cause of action. remained effective. 119. therefore. is hereby made permanent. Secretary of Justice L-32818." 2 The Hospital Orders in question were issued only on 29 May. The argument that. And while it may be that the designation of respondent Aguila as Assistant Director for Professional Services and the relief of petitioner from the said position were not disapproved by respondent Secretary of Health. After the said date the provisions of the latter on security of tenure govern. The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued enjoining the implementation of Hospital Orders Nos. Esquerra. New Structure and Pattern. et al. 2 SCRA 715). which is beyond the authority of respondent Medical Center Chief to extend.1987 Constitution). Besides. petitioner's term of office ended on 30 January 1987 and that she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a hold over capacity and could be transferred to another position without violating any of her legal rights. Section 2(3). A removal without cause is violative of the Constitutional guarantee that "no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law" (Article IX. issued by respondent Medical Center Chief did not make her occupancy of that position temporary in character. the transfer was without petitioner's consent. The relevant provision was effective only "within a period of one year from February 25. 31 August 1987). The occupancy of a position in a hold over capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed on 25 February 1987 (under the Provisional Constitution). 3. The subject Hospital Orders violated petitioner's constitutional right to security of in tenure and were. Besides. therefore. quo warranto is the proper remedy. "patently illegal. 78059. but advanced to 2 February 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective (De Leon. No. Where there is usurpation or intrusion into an office. 1974. and the Chairman of the Government Reorganization Commission. neither justifies petitioner's removal. 1987. Benjamin B. but the same remained unacted upon and proved an inadequate remedy. (Lota vs. Series of 1986. on the basis of this provision. and the pendency of administrative remedies does not operate to suspend the running of the one-year period (Cornejo vs.. et al. June 30. was tantamount to removal without valid cause. both dated 29 May 1987. continue to perform their respective duties and responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and benefits unless in the meantime they are separated from government service pursuant to Executive Order No. There was substantial compliance by petitioner with the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies since she had filed a letter-protest With the respondent Secretary of Health. L-19808. The questions involved here are purely legal. September 29. June 24. or the 'Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Health" promulgated on 30 January 1987. Neither can respondent Medical Center Chief rely on Section 2. 17 (1986) or Article III of the Freedom Constitution. is untenable. Petitioner's permanent appointment on 1 May 1985 to the position of Chief of Clinics. vs. 16. Dr. No. in a holdover capacity. The pertinent provision thereof reads: Sec. the Writ of Quo Warranto is granted and petitioner. Court of Appeals. The doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not preclude petitioner from seeking judicial relief This rule is not a hard and fast one but admits of exceptions among which are that (1) the question in dispute is "purely a legal one" and (2) the controverted act is 'patently illegal" (Carino vs. supra. Executive Order No. ACCFA. and as such is invalid and without any legal effect (Garcia. Rule 66. et al.1966." Judicial intervention was called for to enjoin the implementation of the controverted acts. 109 Phil. — Upon approval of this Executive Order. 30. vs. G. Even a transfer requires an appointment. 116). 57 SCRA 663). it by no means implies that the questioned acts of respondent Medical Center Chief were approved by the former official. .18 SCRA 183). WHEREFORE. 26. B. 17. It bears stressing that the positions of Chief of Clinics and Assistant Director for Professional Services are basically one and the same except for the change in nomenclature. et al. the officers and employees of the Ministry shall. Rules of Court). SO ORDERED.the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines 1 will not alter the situation. Lejano. Article III of the Freedom Constitution and its Implementing Rules and Regulations embodied in Executive Order No. Hon. Nenita Palma-Fernandez. is hereby held entitled to the position of Assistant Director of Professional Services of the East Avenue Medical Center up to the expiration of her term. L-14803. 1961. 21 and 22. with copies furnished the Commissioner of Civil Service. an action for quo warranto must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues (Sec. Petitioner's "designation" as Assistant Director for Professional Services on 8 August 1986 in accordance with the organizational structure of the Department of Health under Hospital Order No.

which the Bureau of Customs released on 12 April 1989. .000. PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs 19 contesting the legality of match importations may already take the nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The enforcement of statutory rights is not foreclosed by the absence of a statutory procedure. an usurpation of the prerogative and an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. On 25 April 1989. (which) is a denial to the petitioner of the protection and incentive granted it by Section 36 (l) of the Forestry Code . . . In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. It grows gubas trees in its plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for production of matches. . 11 On 19 March 1990. does not at all diminish the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over the subject matter. 12 thus resetting the new deadline for the petition to 6 April 1990. . On that date. . On 28 July 1989.000. and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered ( Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. In this present recourse. . Sumulong. AJIC's motion to dismiss was denied. On 5 April 1989. where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge." 18 But over and above the foregoing. JR. Jr. hence. subject to the approval of the Secretary of Finance. Presiding Judge Branch 48. "to seek redress of its right which has been clearly violated by the importation of safety matches . 36. Siguion Reyna. Paras & Abano Law Offices for private respondent.000. . PTFI filed a motion for extension of fifteen (15) days within which to file the petition. 10 hence. . 89-48836. and two (2) more containers of matches from Singapore on 19 April 1989. . In other words. PTFI claims that what was brought before the trial court was a civil case for injunction. respondents. Peña. on motion for reconsideration by AJIC and despite the opposition of PTFI. 1207 of the Tariff and Customs Code and not the regular court.e. Alikpala. Sumulong. Factoran. DEMETRIO M. . In consonance with the state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree plantation. "restraining the entry of safety matches into the country . and P50. .) In this era of clogged court dockets.FIRST DIVISION G. 92285 March 28. . J. . 4 (c) The prayer for damages has no basis as the questioned acts of the Commissioner are in accordance with law and no damages may be awarded based on future acts.HON.R. 94 Phil. it has been held that ". . P1. INC. (and over cases of) seizure. 1125 relative to incidents before the Court of Tax Appeals because the instant action is not a protest case where the aggrieved party is not an importer. Batario. J. wood products or wood-derivated products which is to be enforced by the Bureau of Customs since it has. it is the duty of the Collector of Customs to exercise jurisdiction over prohibited importations. Sec. . under the Tariff and Customs Code. the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal. . if true. The only subject of this incentive is a ban against importation of wood. . 1994 PROVIDENT TREE FARMS. of the Revised Forestry Code. this Court granted PTFI a thirty (30)-day non-extendible period to file its petition. the exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases 13 and.. It then argues that since it could not avail of the remedies afforded by the Tariff and Customs Code.: PETITIONER PROVIDENT TREE FARMS. (l). (l). International Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4) containers of matches from Indonesia. (w)here the statute does not require any particular method of procedure to be followed by an administrative agency. PTFI prays for an order directing the Commissioner of Customs to impound the subject importations and the AJIC be directed to pay petitioner P250. No. The Commissioner of Customs has the power to "promulgate all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of this (Tariff and Customs) Code .." 3 (b) The release of subject importations had rendered injunction moot and academic. Secretary Fulgencio S.000. the Court reconsidered its 28 July 1989 order and dismissed the case on the ground that it had "no jurisdiction to determine what are legal or illegal importations. (d) The complaint for injunction cannot stand it being mainly a provisional relief and not a principal remedy.A. detention or release of property affected . On that date the petition was filed.. 20 we held that — ." 8 PTFI asserts the inapplicability of the procedures outlined in R. on 8 February 1990. . 6 PTFI opposed the motion to dismiss. . It was docketedas Civil Case No. Jr. citing Commissioner of Customs v. of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs. 89-48836 and raffled to respondent Judge Demetrio M. par. is clearly an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases. resort to the courts is warranted.. Petitioner anchors his complaint on a statutory privilege or incentive granted under Sec. is a Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. in fact.. as petitioner would. However. 9 On the formal requirements. and the Collector of Customs from allowing and releasing the importations. petitioner.00 in exemplary damages. INC. 5 and. and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and A. Inc. . 941 [1954]. 14 The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. of the Revised Forestry Code 1 confers on entities like PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood and "wood-derivated" products. No. vs. J. The claim of petitioner that no procedure is outlined for the enforcement of the import ban under the Tariff and Customs Code. upon request of PTFI. 36. i. . the agency may adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions.00 as attorney's fees. To allow the regular court to direct the Commissioner to impound the imported matches. has "exclusive jurisdiction to determine the legality of an importation or ascertain whether the conditions prescribed by law for an importation have been complied with . under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . we hold that the claim of public respondent that the petition was filed late has no basis. of the Department of Natural Resources and Environment issued a certification that "there are enough available softwood supply in the Philippines for the match industry at reasonable price. private respondent A. Regional Trial Court of Manila. The records revealed that PTFI received the assailed order of 8 February 1990 on 20 February 1990. PTFI seeks to set aside the 8 February 1990 order of respondent court and prays for the continuation of the hearing in Civil Case No. 932. it had until 7 March 1990 to file petition for review on certiorari. . Samar Mining Co. 36 (l) of the Forestry Code" and for damages. (PTFI). (1). par. par. experience. and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact." 17 Moreover." 7 .. . the reliefs directed against the Bureau of Customs 15 as well as the prayer for injunction against importation of matches by private respondent AJIC 16 may not be granted without the court arrogating upon itself the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. PTFI filed with the Regional Court of Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the latter from importing matches and "wood-derivated" products. Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioner." 2 On 5 May 1989. for the purpose of securing compliance with Sec. BATARIO. 36.00 in actual damages. the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the BELLOSILLO. seize or forfeit must inevitably be based on his determination and declaration of the invalidity of the importation. An order of a judge to impound. On 14 June 1989. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION. AJIC moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that:(a) The Commissioner of Customs under Sec. The records do not disclose when the second shipment was released.

Moreover. if the importations were authorized. . except when in the exercise of its authority it gravely abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. Court of Appeals. subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion. as in Rosales. 23 Hence. there would be no denial of the plaintiff's protection and incentives under the Forestry Code. Otherwise stated. Since the determination to seize or not to seize is discretionary upon the Bureau of Customs. 36 (l) of the Forestry Code. the court cannot compel an agency to do a particular act or to enjoin such act which is within its prerogative." 22 The pendency of petitioner's request to the Bureau of Customs for the implementation of the ban against the importation of matches under the Forestry Code is impliedly admitted. the order of the trial court granting the dismissal of the civil case must be upheld. In Rosales v. WHEREFORE. the claim for damages must await the decision declaring the importations unlawful. however cleverly the complaint may be worded.special knowledge. In the case at bench. the instant petition for review is DENIED. the same cannot be subject of mandamus. experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters. 89-48836 dated 8 February 1990. we categorized a similar case for damages as premature since "(t)he finality of the administrative case which gives life to petitioners' cause of action has not yet been reached. . the ultimate relief sought by PTFI is to compel the Bureau of Customs to seize and forfeit the match importations of AJIC. Necessarily. But this does not preclude recourse to the courts by way of the extraordinary relief of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if the Bureau of Customs should gravely abuse the exercise of its jurisdiction. In other words. The petitioner's claim for damages against AJIC being inextricably linked with the legality of the importations. . has become well nigh indispensable . we have no occasion to rule on the issue of grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction as it is not before us." 21 merely indicates its reliance on the illegality of the importations for its prayer for damages. the same AFFIRMED and. it is apparent from the correspondence of counsel for petitioner that the Bureau is inclined to sustain the validity of the importations. . in fact. must necessarily rise or fall with the main action to bar the question that "(e)very importation of matches by said defendant is a denial to plaintiff of the protection and incentives granted it by Sec. consequently. finding no reversible error in the appealed Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No.

ET AL. respondents. the plaintiffs in the cases pending with the court a quo. TEOFILO E. docketed as G. viz: In the light of the foregoing. JOSEFINA E. against the aforenamed DECS officials.R. 5 From this denial. SO ORDERED. REYNALDO CALLORA. was forthwith granted by the court. 98922 October 18. all government officials. Yap for petitioners. were later also filed with the court below by other public school teachers concerned. shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer.R. MARCELO BACALSO. as well as for an order restraining the defendants from further proceeding with the administrative investigations. Francisco D. petitioners. The teachers were each given five days from receipt of said complaints within which to submit their respective answers and supporting documents. VITUG. again represented by the Solicitor General. Both motions of the plaintiffs and the defendants were denied by the court in its Order of 10 April 1991. a must action. This Court later resolved the petition to be likewise consolidated with G. 1993 DR. No. Presiding Judge of Branch 42. RTC . NIEVA MONTES and GENEROSO CAPUYAN. The school teachers.R. A temporary restraining order. who were administratively charged. 10 Presidential Decree 478. The school teachers pray for actual and moral damages. 7 The issues raised in these consolidated cases are — (1) Whether or not the Office of the Solicitor General may properly represent the defendants in the Regional Trial Court cases. The DECS officials. BRANCH 42. No. No. having inexcusably violated elemental due process. Nos. be yet determined. along with the DECS officials. 1993 DR. and contemplated to be yet taken. SOLICITOR GENERAL'S OFFICE. The root of the cases filed below deals. 1991. which the court similarly denied. petitioners. The contention of the school teachers that the DECS officials are being sued solely in their private capacity certainly is not borne out by their above allegations and prayers. pending a full hearing that would aptly afford all parties an opportunity to ventilate their respective contentions. cannot. 1993 NEMESIO C. prohibition and mandamus was thence filed with this Court. with a prayer for preliminary injunction. These cases were consolidated in this Court's resolution of 28 May 1991. in part. 100300-03. VIDAD. 100300-03 October 18. 8 nd (2) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court should have dismissed outright the said cases. we must presume that official duties have been regularly performed. 98084 October 18. 6 Four other cases. 98922. and LLOYD SIEGFRIED SIA. proceeding. Nieva Montes and Generoso Capuyan. MARCELO BACALSO. It shall have the following specific powers and functions: a) Represent the government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court. and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party (stress supplied). Marcelo Baclaso. MARILYN S. G. 11 . GOMEZ. moved to strike out the appearance of the Office of the Solicitor General and to accordingly declare the defendants in default. starting 19 September 1990 and lasting until 21 September 1990. Culture and Sports (DECS). ABLIR. dated January 7. The teachers' petition. filed motions to dismiss. No. 2 The order not having been heeded. investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. prohibition and damages. later followed by a motion to dismiss. having unjustifiably refused to inform the latter of the nature and accuse of accusation upon which the charges were initiated. the Court of Appeals.R. MARCELO M.R. vs. raising like issues. 4 The defendants filed their answer. on their part. Whether the actions they have taken were proper or improper. JESUS TABILON. G. administrative complaints against the teachers concerned were thereupon filed. 98084 and G. ASTERIA R. No. NOBLE. vs. CRISTETA TEVES. 1991 and defendants' motion to dismiss dated January 23. J. The teachers also assailed alleged corruption in the Department of Education. its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation.R.Dumaguete City. CECILIA P. provides: 1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines. UY. in fact.: A group of public school teachers in Negros Oriental held. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government.. The said complaints charge the defendants. that likewise impleaded as respondent. against public school teachers. LOVELLA E. and having erroneously applied the law. GOMEZ. Constituted to look into the cases was an investigation panel composed of three DECS lawyers. both parties filed with this Court their respective petitions for Certiorari. or a strike from their school classes. HON. When authorized by the President of head of office concerned. xxx xxx xxx The above provisions are basically reiterated in the Administrative Code of 1987.R. prohibiting the defendants from continuing with the administrative investigation. with having illegally withheld their salaries. JESUS TABILON. VILLAREAL. NIEVA MONTES and GENEROSO CAPUYAN. vs. it shall also represent government-owned or controlled corporations. 3 On 13 November 1990. having wrongfully filed administrative charges against the plaintiffs. or whether they have acted in good faith or bad faith. EXUPERIO BANTOTO. to demand the release of their salaries by the Department of Budget. on the performance of official functions by the DECS officials. administrative charges will be filed. RTC-Dumaguete. plus attorney's fees. petitioners. A joint petition for certiorari. EUMAGUE. Until then. No. namely. No. EXUPERIO BANTOTO. Presiding Judge of Branch 42. are all denied for lack of merit.R. plaintiffs' motion to declare defendants in default. 1 A return-to-work order was promptly issued by DECS Regional Director Teofilo Gomez with a warning that if the "striking" school teachers were not to resume their classes within twenty-four hours. 9 It should be conceded that the various complaints against the DECS officials have prescinded from the administrative actions taken. ARBOLADO. GENEROSO CAPUYAN and TEOFILO GOMEZ. NEMESIO VIDAD. a group of school teachers. respondents. TEOFILO E. TAWING. and as such. ELLUMINADA C. was docketed as G. HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS ORIENTAL. the Office of the Solicitor General. 98084 and that of the DECS officials as G. ANITA R. Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. respondents.EN BANC G. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete a complaint for injunction. CRISTITO TEVES and LLOYD SIEGFRIED SIA. MONTES. 98922 in its Resolution of 04 July 1991.

The authority of the DECS Regional Director to issue the return to work memorandum. No costs. (2) In G. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.R. We see. The various complaints filed by the public school teachers allege bad faith on the part of the DECS officials. 12 It was. inopportune for the lower court to issue the restraining orders. (a) the Joint Order of 28 May 1991. in the interest of good order. (3) In G. indeed. inclusive. No. 9789. 98922 (a) the Order of 10 April 1991. On the assumption that the plaintiffs are able to establish their allegations of bad faith. and no longer are they protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions. appealed from is AFFIRMED.R. 98084 is DISMISSED. interlinked. and (c) the lower court is DIRECTED to suspend further hearings in the above numbered civil cases. denying the motions to dismiss Civil Case No. 13 We see the court cases and the administrative matters to be closely interrelated. no cogent reason to deviate from the rule. 100300 — No. (b) the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the lower court in said civil cases is DISSOLVED. to initiate the administrative charges and to constitute the investigating panel can hardly be disputed. No. and we see no reversible error in the denial thereof by the lower court. 9883 is AFFIRMED.R. 9877. No. The defendants' motion to dismiss the complaints have likewise been precipitately sought. until after a final determination on the administrative proceedings would have been made. the public officials may not be said to have acted within the scope of their official authority. it behooves the court to suspend its action on the cases before it pending the final outcome of the administrative proceedings. It cannot be pretended this early that the same could be impossible of proof. until after a final determination would have been made on the administrative proceedings. 9882 and No. (b) the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the lower court is DISSOLVED. 9879. and (c) the lower court is DIRECTED to suspend further hearings in its Civil Case No. 100303. No. in these petitions before us. Public officials are certainly not immune from damages in their personal capacities arising from the acts done in bad faith. While no prejudicial question strictly arises where one is a civil case and the other is an administrative proceeding. if not. a judgment for damages can be warranted.We accordingly hold that the Solicitor General did not act improperly in deciding to represent the DECS officials in the above cases. nonetheless. . WHEREFORE — (1) The Petition in G. No. in these and similar cases.

97. and for the reopening of the case. Consequently. 1997. On August 28. .THIRD DIVISION [G. Dumlao. in light of all the foregoing. Dumlao of Crusaders. BSD-0814-94. Inc. 139583. 1994. Crusaders applied for another renewal of its Temporary Permit. (Crusaders.9 Mhz. 1995 to December 31. Felino Ganal.: At bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC. Mr. by Conamor Broadcasting Corporation (Conamor. Crusaders Broadcasting System. covering the period from January 1. dated August 15. Such motion was followed by a second "Urgent Motion For Extension". The following day. Atty. On July 14. Acting upon such finding. 1997. upon application of Crusaders. for the acquisition of a new transmitter. Petitioner contends further that had the NTC approved its application. vs. the Commission issued an order declaring Crusaders in default. Crusaders presented a motion for reconsideration. In short. Cesar A. 2000] CRUSADERS BROADCASTING SYSTEM. so as to renovate its 20-year old Broadcast Booth and the entire facilities of the station. INC. and (3) Why its station DWCD-FM assigned frequency should not be recalled.9 Mhz. 8091) but it could not yet resume its operation because its transmitter was taken by Conamor by virtue of an order of injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Case No. it could have re-started to operate DWCD-FM despite the Court’s injunction order. and. in an Order dated August 27. 1997. Branch 163. The initial evidence presented in support of the motion for new trial and/or reconsideration was later adopted as Crusaders evidence in the main case. it was only upon the filing of its answer that Crusaders should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Commission. 1997. It was further alleged that Crusaders is a grantee of a congressional franchise (RA No. Inc. and recalling its assigned frequency. dated August 22. on December 12. On July 12. antenna. Ganal filed an Answer. explaining that Crusaders was not able to resume its operations because of the institution of Civil Case No. No. 1997. Crusaders found its way to this Court via the present petition for review. J. dated December 12. Petitioner insists that were it not for the order of injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. Undisputed are the pertinent facts. for brevity).. Again. Atty. 64739 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. the NTC caused the inspection of the radio station of Crusaders and per report of NTC-National Capital Region. thereafter. "A") requesting permission to stop the broadcast of DWCD-FM for around a month starting July 12. as it is. and caused the seizure of its transmitter. sent to the Commission a letter (Exh.R. setting aside of the decision. made a test broadcast. to wit: The petitioner. Chairman of Crusaders. disposing thus: "WHEREFORE. which dismissed its petition for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. averring that the showcause order was served upon him and not upon his client Crusaders and therefore. 1997. 1997 the Commission wrote Chairman Cesar A. DWCD-FM. Subsequently. After hearing. which conducted such ocular inspection on February 21. the station of Crusaders was inoperative. dated December 14."[2] Crusaders’ next step was to go to the Court of Appeals. 1996. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and COURT OF APPEALS. its station could have resumed operations. informing the latter of the denial of his application for the renewal of Crusaders’ Temporary Permit. Acting on subject application. NTC renewed Temporary Permit No. for failure of Crusaders to submit a responsive pleading. the Broadcast Service Division of the NTC recommended the cancellation and revocation of the permit of Crusaders and the recall of its frequency 97. Atty. is hereby withdrawn and recalled. and of the issuance of an order of injunction by the said Court enjoining Crusaders from operating its radio station. against Crusaders Broadcasting System. Undaunted. respondents. petitioner maintains that its failure to operate is not unjustified because the stoppage of its broadcasting was not due to its own fault or negligence. and other equipment. thru its counsel. On September 22. which prohibited it from broadcasting. petitioner. Thus. (2) Why its station. was the grantee of Temporary Permit No. 1994. on April 25. the same to be assigned without reasonable delay to the best qualified applicant. the Commission issued a show-cause Order directing Crusaders to explain: (1) Why its application for renewal of Temporary Permit for station DWCD-FM should not be denied. and a third motion for extension. 1997. to be precise. that it has mobilized its resources towards the operation of its radio station and that it has. respondent’s assigned frequency. Then. 1996. in fact. On August 5. for brevity) denying petitioner’s request for renewal of its temporary permit to operate DWCD-FM. hereby DENIED. 1997. It is petitioner’s submission that the NTC committed a grave reversible error in considering as untenable the temporary stoppage of Crusaders’ broadcast. the Commission came out with its assailed decision. 1994. that it has already applied with Commission for authority to acquire an additional transmitter. for short). 1997.9 Mhz. Crusaders filed an "urgent Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration" praying for the lifting of the order of default. 64739. that the said injunction was already lifted and set aside by the same trial court. BSD-0459-92 to operate 10-KW DWCD-FM at a frequency of 97. the Commission granted the motion for new trial and/or reconsideration and declared the case reopened for reception of evidence by Crusaders in order to afford it ample opportunity to be heard and to substantiate its defense as regards the show-cause order issued by the Commission. Felino Ganal filed an "Urgent Motion For Extension" for the filing of Crusaders’ answer/explanation. 1995. or on February 29. should not be ordered closed. the Commission believes and so holds that respondent’s request for renewal of its temporary permit to operate DWCD-FM should be. handed down its decision recalling the assigned frequency of Crusaders. DECISION PURISIMA. May 31.

Upon execution hereof. That no application for renewal shall be disapproved without giving the licensee a hearing. to regulate the construction or manufacture.. dated February 21. Petitioner theorizes that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the decision of NTC..The full discretion to change the station call letters.The acquisition.O) No... control. citing Section 23.. (Exhibits "E-2" and "E-2-a") It is uncontested as well. (b). (c). Consequently. Metro Manila. slogan or tagline and such other services that bear upon the station’s identity to improve the station’s market position. which indicated that petitioner failed to rehabilitate its broadcast booth and other facilities. the operation of all radio stations and of all form of radio communications and transmissions within the Philippines.. Anent the issue of the shifting of burden of proof. as the case may be. 3.. which is a flagrant violation of Radio laws in that it would allow a non-franchise grantee to operate a public utility... The Secretary of Public Works and Communications is hereby empowered. 209 Dela Paz Street. which provides that "Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Metro Manila to the above Mandaluyong City office of defendant. or operate a radio transmitting station. that under the said Agreement. Conamor was free from any claim arising from employer-employee relationship. in general terms.. that "the findings of the respondent NTC are supported by substantial evidence and. and being performed by. which gave Conamor the following rights and privileges akin to those of an owner.The parties shall equally share in the expenses as well as in the profits or losses. of a new transmitter. firm.In upholding the NTC decision under the so-called "doctrine of primary jurisdiction.. among others.. to wit: (a).... Pasig City. It is not disputed. install. Petitioner does not deny and in fact.A share in the net profit at the rate of 65%. and (d). Emerald Avenue. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.. studio. 1997 was based on the inspection reports. at its expense. possession... use. 3846[3] reads: Section 1.. 2. The issue at bar may be encapsulated thus: Whether or not the NTC properly denied the application for renewal of Crusaders’ temporary permit to operate DWCD-FM. should be "accorded respect and finality". respondent NTC. or a radio receiving station used for commercial purposes. creating the Ministry of Public Works and Ministry of Transportation and Communications.. without having first obtained a franchise therefore from the Congress of the Philippines: xxx While Section 3 of the same Act provides: Section 3. Crusaders and Conamor later entered into a "Compromise Agreement" which superseded the programming and marketing agreement.. In addition to the above he shall have the following specific powers and duties: (1) He may approve or disapprove any application for renewal of station or operator license: Provided. xxx. it appears decisively clear that the assailed NTC decision is anchored on substantial evidence.The sole discretion to determine and implement whatever programs are deemed suitable to make the station competitive.. either. 546... which denied the renewal of its temporary permit to operate DWCD-FM and caused the withdrawal of its assigned frequency. broadcast equipment recording booth.." 2.The plaintiff shall immediately return the radio station’s official transmitter. and validly ordered the withdrawal of the latter’s assigned frequency. Section 1 of Act No. the burden of proof shifted to the petitioner. leaving only 35% to respondent. including cost of construction. or a radio broadcasting station. company.. antenna system and other available equipment of DWCD-FM from the Strata 200 Building. that what prompted Conamor to bring a complaint against petitioner was the latter’s rescission of a "Programming and Marketing Agreement". 1997.. and 3..In upholding the finding of NTC that the "Programming and Marketing Agreement" with Conamor Broadcasting Corporation "to be one for a joint venture. establish. the parties hereby agree to jointly operate DWCD-FM at its original office and Broadcasting Station at No...... In order to settle the civil case. while they are jointly operating the radio station. sale and transfer of radio transmitters or transceivers (combination transmitter-receiver) and the establishment.." Indeed. On the other hand..It is likewise petitioner’s stance that the Court of Appeals erred: 1. through the Office of Solicitor General (OSG).. 1997 and July 11. association or corporation shall construct. It should be noted that by virtue of Executive Order (E. however. when the new facilities of Conamor became operational. respectively.. it alleges that the show-cause order dated July 14.." Crusaders likewise assigned some substantive and procedural errors on the part of the NTC but the same were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. the same being public documents. the regulation of radio communications is a function assigned to. .. Mandaluyong City... uses it as the reason for the stoppage of its broadcast that it was the filing of the aforementioned civil case against it (petitioner) which grounded DWCD-FM’s broadcasting. name. countered that the NTC was justified in denying petitioner’s application for renewal of temporary permit and in recalling its assigned frequency. the NTC. therefore. Respondent also contends that subject inspection reports need not be authenticated and identified by competent witnesses.In finding. No person. The Court approved compromise containing the following conditions: "1.

SO ORDERED. 280 SCRA 297 [1997. That the said ground was not reflected in the show-cause order does not mean that the same cannot be raised thereafter by the NTC. as it has done in the present case. Crusaders can be prevented by the NTC from broadcasting. (Paat v. in this case. assignment or any disposition of the subject radio station to any third party. Naguiat v. 90 SCRA 673 [1990] and Concerned Officials of MWSS v.." (Exhibit "J") The said compromise agreement speaks for itself. Even on this ground alone.In case of sale. As long as its decisions are supported by substantial evidence. 269 SCRA 380 [1987] (sic). the technical matters involved are entrusted to NTC’s expertise. which reiterates the rulings in Ismael. In the first place. even finality.57% of which shall be paid to Atty. Malonzo v. 290 SCRA 690 [1998]). v. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. As held in Villaflor v. the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the said findings are supported by substantial evidence. The said findings were not rebutted by petitioner which kept on harping only on the alleged unfairness of NTC in the application of its procedures as well as on the existence of the said civil case against it and on the refusal of NTC to approve its application for the acquisition of a new transmitter. National Labor Relations Commission .. experience and services to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. and on occasion. especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge. the said case could not have been instituted had petitioner not entered into a programming and marketing agreement with Conamor.. it is in a better position than the courts to determine to whom such privilege should be granted in order that public interest will be served. the written consent of the plaintiff shall be indispensably necessary to give effect and validity to any such sale. to wit: "Moreover. Such a simple step petitioner failed to take. Vasquez. therefore. 240 SCRA 502 [1995]: ‘Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal. the doctrine of primary jurisdiction prevents this Court from "arrogating unto itself" the authority to resolve a controversy which falls under the jurisdiction of a tribunal possessed of a special competence. Court of Appeals.. Felino Ganal a s (sic) his attorney’s fees) while the remaining 21.94% of the proceeds thereof shall go to the defendant (3.. they are entitled to respect from the courts. As to whether or not it should have adopted a policy of leniency is a matter that is addressed solely to its discretion..’"[5] WHEREFORE. . As in the case of other administrative tribunals. Commission on Elections. Manila Central Line Free Workers Union-National Federation of Labor. which need be neither overwhelming nor preponderant (Manila Central Line Corporation v. 269 SCRA 199 [1997]. 78. from the evidence presented by the petitioner itself the substance of the agreement between petitioner and Conamor. On the matter of factual findings by the NTC as to the inoperativeness of subject radio station. and its failure to put up a counterbond engendered the stoppage of its operations for three years and rendered the stoppage of its operation justified.The parties further agree that in the event the subject DWCD-FM would be sold or assigned to a third part. Conamor has been given the right to operate and manage a radio station despite the clear mandate of the Radio Law that only holders of a legislative franchise can do so. What is more. In the matter of issuance of licenses to operate radio stations. The only requirement is that its decisions must be supported by substantial evidence. As aptly stressed upon and ratiocinated by the Court of Appeals: "In the main. No pronouncement as to costs. 269 SCRA 564 [1997]). Court of Appeals. The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) numbers among those administrative agencies discharging specialized functions.."[4] Neither can the Court find merit in the submission by petitioner that the stoppage of its broadcast would not have happened were it not for the case for injunction filed against it.. Jr. it does not dispute the finding of NTC that it (petitioner) could have resumed broadcasting had it complied with the Order of RTC-Pasig to observe the formal requirements for a motion to lift the order of injunction on the basis of a counterbond. ( Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Corporation v. when it gleaned a basis therefor during the administrative proceedings. Deputy Executive Secretary. the regulation of the nation’s airwaves. and Co. by reason of their acquired expertise on specific matters within their particular jurisdiction. assignment or disposition of the said radio station. 5.. the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the petition for review under consideration is DENIED for lack of merit.06% shall belong to the plaintiff.4. National Labor Relations Commission. the findings of the respondent NTC are supported by substantial evidence. As in the case of other administrative agencies.. its findings of fact will be accorded respect. The Court upholds the primary jurisdiction exercised by the NTC and quotes with approval the following opinion of the Court of Appeals. 266 SCRA 167 [1997]).

proceeded. No. On 2 September 1985. J. 85439 (hereinafter referred to as the Kilusang Bayan case). DOMINGUEZ. Dominguez which ordered: (1) the takeover by the Department of Agriculture of the management of the petitioner Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod Ng Mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntilupa. new Muntinlupa Public Market.R.R. namely: Romulo Bunye II. Bunye. LUCIO B. questions the validity of the order of 28 October 1988 of then Secretary of Agriculture Hon. 85439 January 13. G. Onos of the Office of the Special Prosecutor directed Bunye and his co-petitioners to submit within ten (10) days from receipt thereof counter-affidavits. MANUEL and ROLANDO G. TENSUAN. filed by mail an urgent motion for extension of "at least fifteen (15) days from October 22. AGUINALDO. 13966 and denying their motion to order or direct preliminary investigation. Benjamin Bulos and other unidentified persons. incumbent members of the Board. 8 We remanded the same to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as C. under their respective official capacities. they continued holding office in the KBS building..HON. Bunye. disbanding the then . together with other civilians.: These cases have been consolidated because they are closely linked with each other as to factual antecedents and issues.. the following transpired which subsequently gave rise to these petitions: G. management and operation of the New Muntinlupa Market to the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa. at a monthly consideration of Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos (P35. et al. To implement this resolution. Regional Director of Region IV of the Department of Agriculture ROGELIO P. Carlos G. REY E. LOIDA D." 4 Consequently.R. 5 On 22 August 1988." The writ applied for having been denied. PONSONES. BERBANO. 1988" within which to comply 13 with the subpoena. 12 The subpoena and letter-complaint were received on 12 October 1988. respondents. The letter of Hon. THE OMBUDSMAN and ROGER C. two (2) days before the expiration of the period granted to file said documents. NADYESDA B. these agencies urged that appropriate legal steps be taken towards its rescission. Secretary of Agriculture. Amado Perez filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a letter-complaint charging Bunye and his co-petitioners with oppression. however. 3 He sought opinions from both the Commission on Audit and the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) on the validity of the instrument. CONSTANTINO. ROGER SMITH. Muntinlupa. and its Resolution of 1 February 1990 denying the motion to reconsider the former. 85439 In the early morning of 29 October 1988. ESPELETA. RUFINO IBE and NESTOR SANTOS. Jr. 23. INC. the latter approved on 1 August 1988 Resolution No. purportedly to serve upon petitioners the Order of respondent Secretary of Agriculture dated 28 October 1988. LUCES. 13. FAJARDO. No. PEREZ and MA.D.R. DAVIDE. AMADO V. MA. No. Inc. on 19 August 1986. the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa (hereinafter. 1 The KBMBPM is a service cooperative organized by and composed of vendors occupying the New Muntinlupa Public Market in Alabang." and the "patently inequitable rental. by taking over and assuming the management of KBMBPM.R. its articles of incorporation and by-laws were registered with the then Office of the Bureau of Cooperatives Development (thereafter the Bureau of Agricultural Cooperatives Development or BACOD and now the Cooperative Development Authority). abuse of authority and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 10 for taking over the management and operation of the public market from KBMBPM. and JOHN DOES. (KBMBPM). 9 On 26 August 1988. The procedural and factual antecedents are not disputed. the KBMBPM filed with Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati a complaint for breach of contract. 1992 IGNACIO R. FE V. which was docketed as Civil Case No. 45 abrogating the contract. ROMAN E. VICTOR E. contrary to the provision of Section 143. respondents. JOAQUIN.. entered into a contract with the KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA SA BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA. Thereafter. MOZO. 91927 (hereinafter referred to as the Bunye case). Metro Manila. The contract provides for a twenty-five (25) year term commencing on 2 September 1985. DIAZ. AMADO G. Special Prosecutor III. prosecutor Mothalib C. MARTINEZ. 7 the KBMBPM officers resisted the attempts of Bunye and company to complete the take-over. In separate letters. FRANCISCO. allegedly through force. a Saturday. Metro Manila pursuant to Presidential Decree No. Jr. No. BOMBASE. EPIFANIO A. BUNYE. NIEFES. properties and records of the KBMBPM the Management Committee. both in uniform and in civilian clothes. JR. for the latter's management and operation of the new Muntinlupa public market. The matter having been elevated to this Court by way of certiorari. FE V. GARCIA. BOMBASE. and no longer to the KBMBPM.EN BANC G. (3) the disbandment of the Board of Directors. MARIO S. G. Alfredo Bunye. thru its then Mayor Santiago Carlos. (2) the creation of a Management Committee which shall assume the management of KBMBPM upon receipt of the order. and (4) the turn over of all assets.-G. 91927 January 13. thru the Market Commission. (KBMBPM) pursuant to the Department's regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of P. unless sooner terminated and/or rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties. 11 In a subpoena dated 7 October 1988. petitioners. 88-1702. to the public market and announced to the general public and the stallholders thereat that the Municipality was taking over the management and operation of the facility. Tomas Osias. vs. allegedly accompanied by Mayor Bunye and the latters' heavily armed men. vs. and Section 4 of Executive Order No. No. BULAY. JAIME R. NEMESIO O. No. affidavits of their witnesses and other supporting documents. The second case. MADRIAGA. 1992 KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA NG BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA. CARLOS G. TERESITA A. and that the stallholders should henceforth pay their market fees to the Municipality. INC. Elfren Cruz of the MMC even granted the Municipality authority "to take the necessary legal steps for the cancellation/recission of the above cited contract and make representations with KBMBPM for the immediate transfer/takeover of the possession. petitioners. together with his copetitioners and elements of the Capital Command of the Philippine Constabulary. claiming to be particularly scandalized by the "virtual 50-year term of the agreement. L-16930. BUNYE. 175 and Letter of Implementation No. as amended. forcibly broke open the doors of the offices of petitioners located at the second floor of the KBS Building. RECTO CORONADO and Municipal Mayor IGNACIO R.000) to be paid by the KBMBPM within the first five (5) days of each month which shall. FRESNEDI. paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. NOLASCO I.R. 175. Reynaldo Camilon. 337. both in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Muntinlupa. The first case. Benjamin Taguibao. be increased by ten percent (10%) each year during the first five (5) years only. CARLOS G. and to implement the same. petitioner Ignacio Bunye.A. upon representations made by Bunye with the Municipal Council. seeks the nullification of the Resolution of 4 January 1990 of the Sandiganbayan admitting the Amended Information against petitioners in Criminal Case No. 6 The complaint was premised on the alleged illegal take-over of the public market effected "in excess of his (Bunye's) alleged authority" and thus "constitutes breach of contract and duty as a public official. No. Municipality). Metro Manila and as Presiding Officer of Sangguniang Bayan ng Muntinglupa. renewable for a like period. respondent Madriaga and Coronado. 2 Following his assumption into office as the new mayor succeeding Santiago Carlos. ALEJANDRO I. On 20 October 1988. incumbent General Manager and Secretary-Treasurer. harassment. violence and intimidation. Amado Perez. respectively.THE SANDIGANBAYAN. G. RUFINO B. (KBMBPM) represented by its General Manager. specific performance and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Municipality and its officers." directed a review of the aforesaid contract.

in the event that said acts sought to be restrained were already partially or wholly done. respondents. WHEREAS. their agents. as amended. the Department of Agriculture is empowered to regulate and supervise cooperatives registered under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. according to Mayor Bunye. directors or committee members could be done only by the majority of the members entitled to vote at an annual or special general assembly and only after an opportunity to be heard at said assembly. be ordered to stop and/or cancel the scheduled elections of the officers of the KBMBPM on 6 January 1989 and.D. 6. who had assumed the position of Chairman of the Management Committee. So. Jr. WHEREAS. THAT the Management Committee is hereby empowered to promulgate rules of procedure to govern its workings as a body.. preserve the status quo. LOI No. 175. WHEREAS. to cease and desist from unduly interfering with the affairs and business of the cooperative. it is ordered that the Department of Agriculture in the exercise of its regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of PD 175. 175. order respondents to vacate the premises and. arbitrary and despotic manner. 4. 23. Done this 28th day of October. inter alia. Metro Manila is a Cooperative registered under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. (c) The Order is a clear violation of the By-Laws of KBMBPM and is likewise illegal and unlawful for it allows or tolerates the violation of the penal provisions under paragraph (c). including the election of a new set of Board of Director (sic).. Nadjasda Ponsones — KBMBPM e) One (1) from the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa to be designated by the Sangguniang Pambayan ng Muntinlupa. or OIC RD — DA Region IV b) Atty. Dir. assume the management of KBMBPM. cease and desist from enforcing and implementing the questioned Order or from excluding the individual petitioners from the exercise of their rights as such officers and. and/or from removing or replacing the counsels of petitioners as counsels for KBMBPM and for Atty. finally. on 19 January 1989. 5. whimsical. 18 We required the respondents to Comment on the petition. 23. 175. 14 The Order of the Secretary reads as follows: 15 ORDER WHEREAS. the Order served on them was not written on the stationary of the Department. 19 The elections were. Before any Comment could be filed. representatives or persons acting on their behalf be ordered to refrain. Muntinlupa. henceforth. 175. 17 They pray that upon the filing of the petition. to immediately restore the management and operation of the public market to petitioners. As claimed by petitioners. that: (a) Respondent Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Order for he arrogated unto himself a judicial function by determining the alleged guilt of petitioners on the strength of a mere unverified petition. and Section 4 of Executive Order No. Madriaga — BACOD c) Mr. THAT a Management Committee is hereby created composed of the following: a) Reg. as amended. 113." . nevertheless. This Order takes effect immediately and shall continue to be in force until the members of the Board of Directors shall have been duly elected and qualified. WHEREAS. does not bear its seal and is a mere xerox copy. No. as amended.incumbent Board of Directors for that purpose and excluding and prohibiting the General Manager and the other officers from exercising their lawful functions as such. Alabang. and that. so patent and gross that it amounted to a grave abuse of discretion. In the Resolution of 9 October 1988. Rogelio P. 3. the on-going financial and management audit of the Department of Agriculture auditors show ( sic) that the management of the KBMBPM is not operating that cooperative in accordance with PD. desist from scheduling any election of officers or Members of the Board of Directors thereof until further orders on the Court. the challenged Order be declared null and void. petitioners filed the petition in this case alleging. the general membership of the KBMBPM has petitioned the Department of Agriculture for assistance in the removal of the members of the Board of Directors who were not elected by the general membership of said cooperative. thereafter. properties and records of the KBMBPM to the Management Committee herein created. Fernando Aquino. On 2 November 1988. removal of officers. the KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA NG BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA. held and a new board of directors was elected. upon receipt of this Order. Rogelio Madriaga. Section 9 of P. performing or exercising powers as such. THAT the Management Committee shall. the interest of the public so demanding it is evident and urgently necessary that the KBMBPM MUST BE PLACED UNDER MANAGEMENT TAKE-OVER of the Department of Agriculture in order to preserve the financial interest of the members of the cooperative and to enhance the cooperative development program of the government. the Circulars issued by DA/BACOD and the provisions of the by-laws of KBMBPM. THAT the Management Committee shall submit to the undersigned thru the Director of BACOD monthly reports on the operations of KBMBPM. 1988 at Quezon City. petitioners filed a supplemental motion 20 praying that respondent Madriaga and the "newly elected Board of Directors be ordered to cease and desist from assuming. THAT the present Board of Directors is hereby disbanded and the officers and Manager of the KBMBPM are hereby directed to turnover all assets. WHEREAS. INC. 2. 16 by 371 members of the KBMBPM. (KBMBPM). take over the management of KBMBPM under the following directives: 1. (d) The Order is a clear violation of the constitutional right of the individual petitioners to be heard. THAT the Management Committee shall call a General Assembly of all registered members of the KBMBPM within Ninety (90) days from date of this Order to decide such matters affecting the KBMBPM. Recto Coronado — KBMBPM d) Mrs. The so-called petition upon which the Order is based appears to be an unverified petition dated 10 October 1988 signed. the disbandment of the Board of Directors was done without authority of law since under Letter of Implementation No. petitioners filed on 2 January 1989 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion praying that respondent Atty. (b) Respondent Secretary acted in a capricious.

likewise urged that an information be filed against herein petitioners. (c) OSP Case No. in his Memorandum 50 to the Ombudsman through the Acting Special Prosecutor. petitioners move for a reconsideration of the above Resolution. 88-02110 ." 46 Thereafter. this Office. Bunye. The latter was precipitated by the Resolution No. on 14 June 1989. namely: Tomas M. A second ex-parte motion. . the new board insists that it "did not derive authority from the October 28. petitioners filed an urgent ex-parte motion for the immediate issuance of a cease and desist order 34 in view of the new board's plan to enter into a new management contract. 37 petitioners and respondents Coronado . was filed by the latter on 10 February 1989. petitioners filed a Reply to the first Comment of Coronado 25 and an Ex-Parte Motion for the immediate issuance of a cease and desist order 26 praying that the so-called new directors and officers of KBMBPM. 52 We gave the petition due course and required the parties to submit their On 14 August 1989. 48 On 22 August 1989. petitioners filed a motion to strike out improper and inadmissible pleadings and annexes and sought to have the pleaders cited for contempt.Respondent Bunye." the Order is reasonably necessary to correct serious flaws in the cooperative and provide interim measures until election of regular members to the board and officers thereof. 91927 Petitioners claim that without ruling on their 20 October 1988 motion for an extension of at last 15 days from 22 October 1988 within which to file their counter-affidavits. and more particularly the following cases: (a) G. Nevertheless. R. (d) IBP Case No. and that if such motions or notices were already filed. 47 submit a report and file comment. 41 In its traverse to the counter manifestation. rules and regulations. . they claim to have discovered only then the existence of documents recommending and approving the filing of the complaint and a memorandum by special prosecutor Bernardita G. Paulino Moldez. prayed that its Manifestation of 6 June 1989 and Opposition dated 9 June 1989. de la Llana recommended the filing of an information for violation of section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. We set aside the dismissal order and required the new directors to comment on the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss filed by the former. Although We required respondents to comment. the Ombudsman signed his conformity to the Memorandum and approved the 18 January information prepared by Onos. After being granted an extension. (b) Civil Case No.R. On 3 October 1989.. its Memorandum on 11 December 1989. Medina. Moises Abrenica. Atty. be treated as its Comment. The information against the petitioners was attached to this order. noted on 18 October 1989. 175. by himself. which was then filed with the Sandiganbayan. 88-118 for Mandamus. del Rosario. We resolved to dismiss the case and consider it closed and terminated. which was received by the Office of the Special Prosecutor on 3 November 1988. 88-1702. No. A reply thereto was filed by petitioners on 7 February 1989. Petitioners filed a counter manifestation alleging that the instant petition was already given due course on 9 August 1989. 1989. Fernando Aquino. 39 38 while the new board of directors submitted The new KBMBPM board submitted additional pleadings on 16 February 1990 which it deemed relevant to the issues involved herein. and Lamberto Casalla. Bunye and company submitted their comment on 18 May 1989. Consequently. the motion was noted by this Court on 23 August 1989. administrative offices and the Ombudsman and Tanodbayan. the Ombudsman issued a first indorsement on 4 April 1989 referring to "Judge Gualberto J. Reyes. and Civil Case No. and the second. 85439 (the instant petition). Aurora P. 27 On 1 March 1989. 42 Petitioners also claim that they submitted their counter-affidavits on 9 November 1988. Jr. was filed on 19 September 1989 asking this court to consider the "Invitation to pre-qualify and bid" for a new contract published by respondent Bunye. after some petitioners filed a motion for clarification and reconsideration. filed his Comment on 23 January 1989. 44 which was denied by Onos 45 in his 18 January 1989 Order. Osias. . We required the Solicitor General to file his Comment to the petition and the urgent motion for the immediate issuance of a cease and desist order. which is for both him and Atty. of its annual general assembly and election of its board of directors for 1991. the elections conducted on 6 January 1989 are valid.. 33 and Madriaga filed their separate Memoranda on 6 November 1989. It prays for the dismissal of the petition. 24 On 20 February 1989. on 9 January 1991. It then reiterates the prayer that the instant petition be considered withdrawn and dismissed. de la Llana. 88-2110 before the Ombudsman. 19 of the "new" board of directors withdrawing all cases filed by its predecessors against Bunye. who. 43 In their motion dated 2 December 1988. have no right or authority to file this case. nor ( sic) from the elections held in (sic) January 6. 30 Thereupon. 28 A motion to dismiss the instant petition was filed on 30 March 1989. 31 The new board. . serving several pleadings on each other. 49 The case was referred to special prosecuting officer Jose Parentela. a manifestation was filed by the same board on 25 February 1991 40 informing this Court of the holding. earlier submitted it response to petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the instant petition. 1988 Order. Special Prosecutor Onos promulgated on 11 November 1988 a Resolution finding the evidence on hand sufficient to establish a prima facie case against respondents (herein petitioners) and recommending the filing of the corresponding information against them before the Sandiganbayan. Erum proposing the dismissal of the same. existing laws as well as the by-laws of the cooperative itself." but rather from the members of the cooperative who elected them into office during the elections. who were not allegedly elected by the members or duly designated by the BACOD Director. the assailed Order of the Secretary was issued pursuant to P. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture manifested on 22 September 1989 that he is adopting the Comment submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General as his memorandum. 35 In a belated Comment 36 for the respondent Secretary of Agriculture filed on 22 September 1989. the latter did not comply. 32 Both parties then continued their legal fencing. were served arrest warrants issued by the Sandiganbayan. In Our Resolution of 9 August 1989. Reacting. be ordered to immediately cease and desist from filing notices of withdrawals or motions to dismiss cases filed by the Cooperative now pending before the courts. 51 Arraignment was set for 18 October 1989. more particularly Section 8 thereof which authorizes him "(d) to suspend the operation or cancel the registration of any cooperative after hearing and when in its judgment and based on findings. The first was filed on 6 February 1989 23 by his counsel. the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that individual petitioners. 21 He denies the factual allegations in the petition and claims that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Upon submission of the records for his approval. such cooperative is operating in violation of this Decree. respective Memoranda. Ildefonso B. 22 Respondent Recto Coronado filed two (2) Comments. Petitioners filed a rejoinder asserting that the election of new directors is not a supervening event independent of the main issue in the present petition and that to subscribe to the argument that the issues in the instant petition became moot with their assumption into office is to reward a wrong done. Acting Director . the within records of OSP Case No. et al.D. G. No. Jr. NO. Detained at the NBI on 9 October 1989. 29 On 19 April 1989. et al. for further preliminary investigation . Fortunato M. and that the motion to dismiss filed by the new board of directors binds the cooperative. on 28 April 1989. to immediately withdraw and desist from further pursuing the same until further orders of this Court. the acts of the Management Committee. Bunye and company received a subpoena from de la Llana requiring them to appear before the latter on 25 April 1989. Madriaga. 88-0119 before the Tanodbayan. IEO/RSSO.

which the special prosecutor opposed. Under the same article are found the requirements for the holding of both the annual general assembly and a special general assembly. 69 This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. 60 thereby precipitating a rejoinder filed by petitioners. 68 Petitioners. 13966. Article III of the KBMBPM's by-laws.R. Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No. On 21 February 1990. recourse to the courts could be had immediately. defining an action for mandamus. (b) a writ be issued enjoining the Sandiganbayan from proceeding further in Criminal Case No. 56 On 16 November 1989. On 20 March 1990." Respondents challenge the personality of the petitioners to bring this action. arbitrary or oppressive. Their motion to reconsider this Resolution having been denied in the Resolution of 1 February 1990. THE ISSUES AND THEIR RESOLUTION 1. G. as an alter ego of the President. thus: An elected officer. the principal issue in G. 175. 175) provides the procedure for the removal of directors or officers of cooperatives. No. A substantially identical provision. and Section 4 of Executive Order No." 53 Subsequently. the Office of the Solicitor General moved that it be excused from filing comment for the respondents as it cannot subscribe to the position taken by the latter with respect to the questions of law involved. No. 71 Such is the claim of petitioners which. Indubitably then. are questioning precisely the act of respondent Secretary in disbanding the board of directors. 65 We granted this motion in the resolution of 8 May 1990. as amended. to Defer Arraignment and to Suspend Proceedings. 67 On 7 March 1991. the Circulars issued by DA/BACOD and the provisions and bylaws of KBMBPM. Respondent Berbano filed his comment on 10 September 1991 and petitioners replied on 20 December 1990. 85439. special Prosecutor Berbano filed a motion to admit amendedinformation. unless actually disapproved by him. As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies. in effect. It is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express provision on the opportunity to be heard. as in the instant case. 17. — Any elected director or committee member may be removed from office for cause by a majority vote of the members in good standing present at the annual or special general assembly called for the purpose after having been given the opportunity to be heard at the assembly. in compliance with Our Resolution of 1 March 1990. The exordium of said Order unerringly indicates that its basis is the alleged petition of the general membership of the KBMBPM requesting the Department for assistance "in the removal of the members of the Board of Directors who were not elected by the general membership" of the cooperative and that the "ongoing financial and management audit of the Department of Agriculture auditors show (sic) that the management of the KBMBPM is not operating that cooperative in accordance with P. 70 or where the questioned act is patently illegal. the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions. petitioners' counsel filed a motion to drop Epifanio Espeleta and Rey E. there is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of cooperatives.D. We find merit in the petition and the defenses interposed do not persuade Us. respectively. through new counsel. petitioners filed on 17 October 1989 a Consolidated Manifestation and Supplemental Motion 54 praying. material and substantive allegations. petitioners cannot be deprived of that right. Dulay as petitioners. the Sandiganbayan handed down a Resolution 58 denying for lack of merit the Omnibus Motion to Remand the Case To The Office of the Ombudsman. 175. inter alia. for the quashal of the information on the ground that they were deprived of their right to a preliminary investigation and that the information did not charge an offense. 85439 is the validity of the 28 October 1988 Order of respondent Secretary of Agriculture.D. Petitioners claim that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying petitioners their right to preliminary investigation and in admitting the Amended Information. 66 The Sandiganbayan then filed a manifestation proposing that it be excused from filing comment as its position on the matters in issue is adequately stated in the resolutions sought to be annulled. petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan an "Omnibus Motion to Remand to the Office of the Ombudsman. to Defer Arraignment and to Suspend Proceedings. And now on the validity of the assailed Order. Petitioners have the personality to file the instant petition and ask. they state that they do not interpose any objection to the motion. and assert that the Order was lawfully and validly issued under the above decree and Executive Order. 113. as ousted directors of the KBMBPM.R. No. 85439. No. The present dispute revolves around the validity of the antecedent proceedings which led to the filing of the original information on 18 January 1989 and the amended information afterwards. the Sandiganbayan handed down a Resolution 62 admitting the Amended Information and denying the motion to direct preliminary investigation. 57 On 17 November 1989. and (c) respondents be enjoined from pursuing further actions in the graft case. is correct. they then pray that this Court restore them to their prior stations. There was no need then to appeal the decision to the office of the President. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. We resolved to note the manifestation and order the instant petition consolidated with G. such as when the question involved is purely legal. But even without said provision. 61 On 4 January 1990. The Sandiganbayan issued an order on 18 October 1989 deferring arraignment and directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Berbano subsequently filed a Rejoinder thereto on 11 January 1991. LOI 23. Moreover. As adverted to in the introductory portion of this Decision. be annulled. bear the implied approval of the latter. as hereinafter shown. 63 petitioners filed the instant petition on 12 February 1990.However. R. set up the defense of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies. reads: Sec." It is also professed therein that the Order was issued by the Department "in the exercise of its regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of P. on 14 October 1989. 64 and in the Comment they filed on 30 March 1990. 55 which petitioners complied with on 2 November 1989.D. found in Section 17. Petitioners then filed a motion to order a preliminary investigation 59 on the basis of the introduction by the amended information of new. Removal of Directors and Committee Members . They then pray that: (a) the 4 January and 1 February 1990 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. 23 (implementing P. director or committee member may be removed by a vote of majority of the members entitled to vote at an annual or special general assembly. . We required the respondents to Comment on the petition. the rule is well-settled that this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts. to file suit. permits a person who has been excluded from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. for their reinstatement as Section 3. admitting the amended information and denying the motion for reconsideration. The person involved shall have an opportunity to be heard.

84 In the instant case. The need for notice and the opportunity to be heard is the heart of procedural due process. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning directors and officers. There was then a clear denial of due process. the court of first instance should have. 91927. 83 this Court ruled: Independently of the foregoing. its origin is statutory and it exists and the right thereto can be invoked when so established and granted by law. in 1988. nevertheless. lack of preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash or dismiss a complaint or information. 78 In the instant case. No. as well. The same sin of omission is ascribed to Acting Director de la Llana who purportedly failed to consider the comments submitted by the petitioners pursuant to a subpoena dated 13 April 1989. No. or ordered the Provincial Fiscal to make it. An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. (3) take such action as may be necessary for the proper performance of official functions. Be that as it may. 72 These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may to necessary for their just and reasonable execution. however. 79 The affairs of the cooperative are presently being managed by a new board of directors duly elected in accordance with the cooperative's by-laws. administrative supervision is limited to the authority of the department or its equivalent to: (1) generally oversee the operations of such agencies and insure that they are managed effectively. judicial recourse was available. This is consistent with the principle that what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and lack of an opportunity to be heard. and the remaining directors (3) for one year. approve. Casiano. In his Comment. 2. absence thereof may amount to a denial of due process. even granting that the law intended such as postulated. 85 "should merely suspend or hold in abeyance proceedings upon the questioned Amended Information and remand the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for him to conduct a preliminary investigation. It is so specifically granted by procedural law. a plea of a denial of procedural due process does not lie where a defect consisting in an absence of notice of hearing was thereafter cured by the aggrieved party himself as when he had the opportunity to be heard on a subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence. His assessment that a preliminary investigation sufficient in substance and manner was conducted prior to the filing of the information reflects the view of the Sandiganbayan." It is Our view. 175 and the by-laws of the KBMBPM explicitly mandate the manner by which directors and officers are to be removed. and (e) prescribe standards. Court of Industrial Relations . In the landmark case of Ang Tibay vs. Much less does it affect the court's jurisdiction. Much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the court of first instance over the present case. Hence. Secondly. It is most unfortunate that it was done after democracy was restored through the peaceful people revolt at EDSA and the overwhelming ratification of a new Constitution thereafter. It is finally urged that the Sandiganbayan completely disregarded the "glaring anomaly that on its face the Information filed by the Office of the Special Prosecutor" was prepared and subscribed on 18 January 1989. This section does not give him that right. while the records indicate that the preliminary investigation was concluded on 3 October 1989. through Justice Laurel. (b) direct the performance of duty. 74 The power to summarily disband the board of directors may not be inferred from any of the foregoing as both P. Reversion to the status quo preceding 29 October 1988 would not be feasible in view of this turn of events. Sandiganbayan. 76 this Court. there is the requirement of a hearing. Section 8 of P.D. efficiently and economically but without interference with day-to-day activities. laid down the cardinal primary requirements of due process in administrative proceedings. all shall be elected for a term of two years. either conducted such preliminary investigation. that petitioners were not denied the right to preliminary investigation. et al. No. and that a hearing was not expressly required in the law. and had his plea of not guilty upon arraignment not implied a waiver of said right. (2) require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit. 175 which grants him authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. The right of an accused to a preliminary investigation is not among the rights guaranteed him in the Bill of Rights. restrain the commission of acts. had the defendant-appellee been entitled to another preliminary investigation. for the sake of argument. Besides. not even a semblance of a hearing. insist that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor existed more in form than in substance. (d) determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs. however. abuses and other forms of mal-administration. G. plans and programs. standards and guidelines of the department. reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units. The Order was based solely on an alleged petition by the general membership of the KBMBPM. This is anchored on the failure by prosecutor Onos to consider the counteraffidavits filed by petitioners. per Doromal vs. This doctrine was thereafter reiterated or affirmed in several case. vs. elections were held in 1990 and 1991. the absence of such investigation [preliminary] did not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. maintained in both the . In People vs. 80 "the preliminary investigation in criminal cases is not a creation of the Constitution. They. still the Order can be validly issued only after giving due process to the affected parties. there was. The failure of special prosecutor Berbano to conduct a preliminary investigation before amending the information is also challenged. that said power includes the power to disband the board of directors and remove the officers of the KBMBPM. petitioners cannot. No. 175 above quoted to suspend the operation or cancel the registration of any cooperative includes the "milder authority of suspending officers and calling for the election of new officers. Pursuant to Section 13 of the by-laws. in pursuance of section 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code (as amended by Republic Act No. foremost of which is the right to a hearing." Firstly. be restored to their positions.D. If there were genuine grievances against petitioners. performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies. We cannot concede to the proposition of the Office of the Solicitor General that the Secretary's power under paragraph (d). be it in either judicial or administrative proceedings. (c) review. instead of dismissing the case as it did in the order appealed from. there was no notice of a hearing on the alleged petition of the general membership of the KBMBPM. when the board was disbanded. None was conducted.D. He cannot take refuge under Section 8 of P. thereafter. 81 If not waived. herein petitioners. 77 Nevertheless. Or. Likewise. which preserves for the generations to come the gains of that historic struggle which earned for this Republic universal admiration. Due process is guaranteed by the Constitution 75 and extends to administrative proceedings. 732). the Sandiganbayan. including rectification of violations. during the election at the first annual general assembly after registration. (4) review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them. The Secretary should have known better than to disregard these procedures and rely on a mere petition by the general membership of the KBMBPM and an on-going audit by Department of Agriculture auditors in exercising a power which he does not have. Specifically. expressly or impliedly. if such a remedy would be futile for some reason or another. one-half plus one (4) of the directors obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for two years. which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof. neither suspension nor cancellation includes the take-over and ouster of incumbent directors and officers. guidelines. even if it is to be conceded for argument's sake that there was in fact no preliminary investigation. the affected members should have timely raise these issues in the annual general assembly or in a special general assembly. respondent Berbano dispassionately traces the genesis of the criminal information filed before the Sandiganbayan. there was a number of directors whose terms would have expired the next year (1989) and a number whose terms would have expired two years after (1990). R. 82 However. Cruz. thereby rendering their prayer for reinstatement moot and academic. 73 Supervision and control include only the authority to: (a) act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate. otherwise the law itself would have expressly so stated.The procedure was not followed in this case. Their terms expired in 1989. even if We grant. or remanded the record for said investigation to the justice of the peace court. As stated in Marcos.

No. declaring null and void the challenged Order of 28 October 1988 of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture. Yet. No. Administrative Order No. . No pronouncement as to costs. the prayer of petitioners that they be restored to their positions in the KBMBPM. The extension prayed for was good up to 6 November 1988. that prosecutor Onos .D. Due process does not require that the accused actually file his counteraffidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. petitioners were able to file a Motion for Reconsideration on 13 December 1988 requesting that the reviewing prosecutor consider the belatedly filed documents. which. for lack of merit. not acting on the motion. for having become moot and academic.17 November 1989 and 4 January 1990 resolutions. GRANTING the petition in G. under P. in the 18 January 1989 Order of prosecutor Onos. All that is required is that he be given the opportunity to submit such if he is so minded. 85439. in its 17 November 1989 Resolution. Despite the urgency of its nature. they blamed prosecutor Onos for promulgating the 11 November 1989 Resolution and for. Sandiganbayan. was not sustained upon subsequent review. Petitioners then should not lay the blame on Onos. the motion was sent by mail. for the sake of argument. petitioners did in fact. VII. . they moved for an extension of at least fifteen (15) days from 22 October 1988. in relation to Rule 12. Petitioners were provided a reasonable period within which to submit their counter-affidavits. As a result. This notwithstanding. But.R." It may not then be successfully asserted that the counter-affidavits were not considered by the Ombudsman in approving the information. On the contrary. de la Llana took into account upon review. 92 We held that there is no rule or law requiring the Tanodbayan to conduct another preliminary investigation of a case under review by it. there was an ample discussion of the defenses raised by the petitioners in their counter-affidavits. they filed the Counter-Affidavits only on 9 November 1988. . upon review. The prosecution may amend the information without leave of court before arraignment. reverse the findings of the investigator and thereafter "where he finds a prima facie case. allegedly. No. 89 and such does not prejudice the accused. In Gaspar vs. The petition then must fail. . IT IS SO ORDERED. 88 In any event. 87 It is indisputable that the respondents were not remiss in their duty to afford the petitioners the opportunity to contest the charges thrown their way. they did not avail of the original period. and which . 91927. but only after a further extension of fifteen (15) days from the expiration of the original deadline. that there was compliance with the requirements of due process. And now. which also charges petitioners with violating Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft Law. they should blame themselves for presuming that the motion would be granted. 911. thus negating the charge that the issues raised by them were not considered at all. without the necessity of conducting another preliminary investigation. which petitioners did. the Tanodbayan may. such defect was cured when a "Motion for Reconsideration" was filed. 2. 86 thus. there is the recommendation of prosecutor Bernardita Erum calling for the dismissal of the charges on 2 March 1989. failed to consider accused-movants' counter-affidavits. judgment is hereby rendered: 1. however. subpoenas were issued and comments were asked to be submitted." Respondent Sandiganbayan did not then commit any grave abuse of discretion in respect to its Resolutions of 4 January 1990 and 1 February 1990. the petition in G. CONCLUSION WHEREFORE. but denying. DISMISSING.R. Moreover. although belatedly. to cause the filing of an information in court against the respondent. The Sandiganbayan. as admitted by them. Perusal of the factual antecedents reveals that a second investigation was conducted upon the "1st Indorsement" of the Ombudsman of 4 April 1989. the prosecutors concerned considered them in subsequent reviews of the information. succinctly summed up the matter when it asserted that "even granting. 90 Reliance on the pronouncements in Doromal vs. based on the same sworn statements or evidence submitted. as to the protestation of lack of preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the Amended Information. From this submission the matter underwent further review. . submit their counter-affidavits and as a result thereof. particularly in the reinvestigation ordered by the Ombudsman. Sandiganbayan 91 is misplaced as what obtained therein was the preparation of an entirely new information as contrasted with mere amendments introduced in the amended information.