Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 80599 September 15, 1989 ERNESTINA CRISOLOGO-JOSE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RICARDO S. SANTOS, JR. in his own behalf and as Vice-President for Sales of Mover Enterprises, Inc., respondents. Melquiades P. de Leon for petitioner. Rogelio A. Ajes for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.: Petitioner seeks the annulment of the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals, promulgated on September 8, 1987, which reversed the decision of the trial Court dismissing the complaint for consignation filed by therein plaintiff Ricardo S. Santos, Jr. The parties are substantially agreed on the following facts as found by both lower courts: In 1980, plaintiff Ricardo S. Santos, Jr. was the vice-president of Mover Enterprises, Inc. in-charge of marketing and sales; and the president of the said corporation was Atty. Oscar Z. Benares. On April 30, 1980, Atty. Benares, in accommodation of his clients, the spouses Jaime and Clarita Ong, issued Check No. 093553 drawn against Traders Royal Bank, dated June 14, 1980, in the amount of P45,000.00 (Exh- 'I') payable to defendant Ernestina Crisologo-Jose. Since the check was under the account of Mover Enterprises, Inc., the same was to be signed by its president, Atty. Oscar Z. Benares, and the treasurer of the said corporation. However, since at that time, the treasurer of Mover Enterprises was not available, Atty. Benares prevailed upon the plaintiff, Ricardo S. Santos, Jr., to sign the aforesaid chEck as an alternate story. Plaintiff Ricardo S. Santos, Jr. did sign the check. It appears that the check (Exh. '1') was issued to defendant Ernestina CrisologoJose in consideration of the waiver or quitclaim by said defendant over a certain property which the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) agreed to sell to
2

the clients of Atty. Oscar Benares, the spouses Jaime and Clarita Ong, with the understanding that upon approval by the GSIS of the compromise agreement with the spouses Ong, the check will be encashed accordingly. However, since the compromise agreement was not approved within the expected period of time, the aforesaid check for P45,000.00 (Exh. '1') was replaced by Atty. Benares with another Traders Royal Bank cheek bearing No. 379299 dated August 10, 1980, in the same amount of P45,000.00 (Exhs. 'A' and '2'), also payable to the defendant Jose. This replacement check was also signed by Atty. Oscar Z. Benares and by the plaintiff Ricardo S. Santos, Jr. When defendant deposited this replacement check (Exhs. 'A' and '2') with her account at Family Savings Bank, Mayon Branch, it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. A subsequent redepositing of the said check was likewise dishonored by the bank for the same reason. Hence, defendant through counsel was constrained to file a criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 with the Quezon City Fiscal's Office against Atty. Oscar Z. Benares and plaintiff Ricardo S. Santos, Jr. The investigating Assistant City Fiscal, Alfonso Llamas, accordingly filed an amended information with the court charging both Oscar Benares and Ricardo S. Santos, Jr., for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-14867 of then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City. Meanwhile, during the preliminary investigation of the criminal charge against Benares and the plaintiff herein, before Assistant City Fiscal Alfonso T. Llamas, plaintiff Ricardo S. Santos, Jr. tendered cashier's check No. CC 160152 for P45,000.00 dated April 10, 1981 to the defendant Ernestina Crisologo-Jose, the complainant in that criminal case. The defendant refused to receive the cashier's check in payment of the dishonored check in the amount of P45,000.00. Hence, plaintiff encashed the aforesaid cashier's check and subsequently deposited said amount of P45,000.00 with the Clerk of Court on August 14, 1981 (Exhs. 'D' and 'E'). Incidentally, the cashier's check adverted to above was purchased by Atty. Oscar Z. Benares and given to the plaintiff herein to be applied in payment of the dishonored check. 3 After trial, the court a quo, holding that it was "not persuaded to believe that consignation referred to in Article 1256 of the Civil Code is applicable to this case," rendered judgment dismissing plaintiff s complaint and defendant's counterclaim. 4 As earlier stated, respondent court reversed and set aside said judgment of dismissal and revived the complaint for consignation, directing the trial court to give due course thereto. Hence, the instant petition, the assignment of errors wherein are prefatorily stated and discussed seriatim.

1. Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that private respondent, one of the signatories of the check issued under the account of Mover Enterprises, Inc., is an accommodation party under the Negotiable Instruments Law and a debtor of petitioner to the extent of the amount of said check. Petitioner avers that the accommodation party in this case is Mover Enterprises, Inc. and not private respondent who merely signed the check in question in a representative capacity, that is, as vice-president of said corporation, hence he is not liable thereon under the Negotiable Instruments Law. The pertinent provision of said law referred to provides: Sec. 29. Liability of accommodation party an accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder, at the time of taking the instrument, knew him to be only an accommodation party. Consequently, to be considered an accommodation party, a person must (1) be a party to the instrument, signing as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, (2) not receive value therefor, and (3) sign for the purpose of lending his name for the credit of some other person. Based on the foregoing requisites, it is not a valid defense that the accommodation party did not receive any valuable consideration when he executed the instrument. From the standpoint of contract law, he differs from the ordinary concept of a debtor therein in the sense that he has not received any valuable consideration for the instrument he signs. Nevertheless, he is liable to a holder for value as if the contract was not for accommodation 5 in whatever capacity such accommodation party signed the instrument, whether primarily or secondarily. Thus, it has been held that in lending his name to the accommodated party, the accommodation party is in effect a surety for the latter. 6 Assuming arguendo that Mover Enterprises, Inc. is the accommodation party in this case, as petitioner suggests, the inevitable question is whether or not it may be held liable on the accommodation instrument, that is, the check issued in favor of herein petitioner. We hold in the negative. The aforequoted provision of the Negotiable Instruments Law which holds an accommodation party liable on the instrument to a holder for value, although such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation

10 Corollarily. she actually had no transaction directly with said corporation. 7 This is because the issue or indorsement of negotiable paper by a corporation without consideration and for the accommodation of another is ultra vires. or the nature of the transaction. Since such accommodation paper cannot thus be enforced against the corporation. . If the form of the instrument. is such as to charge the indorsee with knowledge that the issue or indorsement of the instrument by the corporation is for the accommodation of another. as hereinbefore explained. have no power to execute for mere accommodation a negotiable instrument of the corporation for their individual debts or transactions arising from or in relation to matters in which the corporation has no legitimate concern. while it was the corporation's check which was issued to her for the amount involved. Petitioner. Be that as it may.party. but should render personally liable. undertaking or purpose and the creditor was aware thereof. the inescapable conclusion in law and in logic is that the signatories thereof shall be personally liable therefor. as well as the consequences arising from their acts in connection therewith. he cannot recover against the corporation thereon. The fact that for lack of capacity the corporation is not bound by an accommodation paper does not thereby absolve. corporate officers. Inc. the value of the check. If we indulge petitioner in her aforesaid postulation. 8 Hence. Benares who merely prevailed upon respondent Santos to act as co-signatory in accordance with the arrangement of the corporation with its depository bank. such as the president and vice-president. 9 By way of exception. then she is effectively barred from recovering from Mover Enterprises. The instant case falls squarely within the purview of the aforesaid decisional rules. does not include nor apply to corporations which are accommodation parties. petitioner is not without recourse. an officer or agent of a corporation shall have the power to execute or indorse a negotiable paper in the name of the corporation for the accommodation of a third person only if specifically authorized to do so. one who has taken the instrument with knowledge of the accommodation nature thereof cannot recover against a corporation where it is only an accommodation party. especially since it is not involved in any aspect of the corporate business or operations. was evidently charged with the knowledge that the cheek was issued at the instance and for the personal account of Atty. That it was a personal undertaking of said corporate officers was apparent to petitioner by reason of her personal involvement in the financial arrangement and the fact that. the signatories of said instrument where the facts show that the accommodation involved was for their personal account.

Benares and respondent Santos. as the other co-surety. With the dishonor of the check. liable for the value of the check.There should be no legal obstacle.00 is the final plaint of petitioner. petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the consignation of the sum of P45. Benares and respondent Ricardo S. president and vice-president.00. Petitioner's submission is that no creditor-debtor relationship exists between the parties. Q-14687 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City filed against private respondent for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 3. and which would be subject to such issues or claims as may be raised by defendant and the counterclaim filed therein which is hereby ordered similarly revived. therefore. hence consignation is not proper. by holding that no criminal liability had yet attached to private respondent when he deposited with the court the amount of P45. for which reason it has advisedly been directed by respondent court to give due course to the complaint for consignation. A co-maker or co-drawer under the circumstances in this case is as much an accommodation party as the other co-signatory or. Oscar Z. 2. there was created a debtor-creditor relationship. of Mover Enterprises. therefore. We interpose the caveat. This circumstance enables respondent Santos to resort to an action of consignation where his tender of payment had been refused by petitioner. That respondent court virtually prejudged Criminal Case No. and petitioner. as between Atty. Q-33160. for that matter. respectively. Jr. Inc. to petitioner's claims being directed personally against Atty. Concomitantly.000.000. on the one hand. we do not thereby rule that all the operative facts for consignation which would produce the effect of payment are present in this case. Santos. . made by private respondent after his tender of payment was refused by petitioner. supra. Aruego. As previously discussed. assume solidary liability ex lege for the debt involved. The fact that he was only a cosignatory does not detract from his personal liability. however. Under the doctrine in Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. 22. this argument was premised on the assumption that private respondent Santos is not an accommodation party. Those are factual issues that are not clear in the records before us and which are for the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to ascertain in Civil Case No.. as a lone signatory in an accommodation instrument. respondent Santos is an accommodation party and is. however. on the other. that by holding that the remedy of consignation is proper under the given circumstances. he is in effect a co-surety for the accommodated party with whom he and his cosignatory. was proper under Article 1256 of the Civil Code. On her second assignment of error.

P. Thus. No. and August 14. 1981. respondent court went beyond the ratiocination called for in the appeal to it in CA-G. 22 establishes the prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit.We sustain petitioner on this score. the date when the debt due was deposited with the Clerk of Court (a Saturday and a Sunday which are not banking days) intervened.R. for instance. in the process determining whether notice of dishonor should be reckoned from any prior notice if any has been given or from receipt by private respondents of the subpoena therein with supporting affidavits. These are matters alien to the present controversy on tender and consignation of payment. Hence. where no such period and its legal effects are involved. whether or not the period of five banking days had expired. when the drawer pays the holder the amount due or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. the criminal trial court has to grapple with such factual issues as." Yet. 1981. Q-14867. 1981. the crime does not exist. 1981. In the latter case. It will be noted that the last part of Section 2 of B. 05464. it declared that "(t)he lone issue dwells in the question of whether an accommodation party can validly consign the amount of the debt due with the court after his tender of payment was refused by the creditor. Based on the foregoing consideration. the date when plaintiff-appellant receive (sic) the notice of non-payment. 11 That said observations made in the civil case at bar and the intrusion into the merits of the criminal case pending in another court are improper do not have to be belabored. this Court finds that the plaintiff-appellant acted within Ms legal rights when he consigned the amount of P45.P. or from the first day of actual preliminary investigation. . 1981. it digressed into the merits of the aforesaid Criminal Case No.000. 22 provides that the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit is not present and. drawing and issuance of a check. if any. between August 7. CV. from the commercial and civil law aspects determinative of said issue. therefore. and whether there was a justification for not making the requisite arrangements for payment in full of such check by the drawee bank within the said period. payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank is prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit. no criminal liability has yet attached to plaintiff-appellant when he deposited the amount of P45.00 on August 14. The fifth banking day fell on August 14. In its own decision therein.00 with the Court a quo on August 14. the making. Indeed. thus: Section 2 of B. when the check is presented within 90 days from the date of the check.000.

These are aside from the considerations that the disputed period involved in the criminal case is only a presumptive rule. SO ORDERED. the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Consequently. that payment of civil liability is not a mode for extinguishment of criminal liability. juris tantum at that. to determine whether or not there was knowledge of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank. the foregoing matters are properly addressed to the trial court in Criminal Case No. 05464 by setting aside and declaring without force and effect its pronouncements and findings insofar as the merits of Criminal Case No.R. CV No. the resolution of which should not be interfered with by respondent Court of Appeals at the present posture of said case. WHEREFORE. . subject to the aforesaid modifications. Q-14867. and that the requisite quantum of evidence in the two types of cases are not the same. we modify the decision of respondent court in CA-G. To repeat. much less preempted by the inappropriate and unnecessary holdings in the aforequoted portion of the decision of said respondent court. Q-14867 and the liability of the accused therein are concerned.

L-17845 April 27.746.00 with interest at 8% per annum. in favor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands. Varona failed to reimburse Sadaya despite repeated demands. 1952.500. jointly and severally.R. SANCHEZ.00. Victor Sevilla. Intestate estate proceedings were started in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 1957. Belen Law Offices for petitioner. Victor Sevilla died. Special Proceeding No. In Special Proceeding No. amount of P15. together with interest. vs.00. plus attorneys fees in the sum of P1.12. FRANCISCO SEVILLA. proceeds of the promissory note. The entire. On October 6.00. Oscar Varona and Simeon Sadaya executed. No. petitioner.: On March 28.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.000. .746. 1518. the outstanding balance stood P4. totalled P5. No payment thereafter made.12." but signed it only "as surety for Oscar Varona".416. the trial court issued an order admitting the claim of Simeon Sadaya in the amount of P5. respondent. the bank collected from Sadaya the foregoing balance which. 1518. SIMEON SADAYA. a promissory note for P15. As of June 15. or its order. Cruz & Nazareno for respondent. Victor Sevilla and Simeon Sadaya signed the promissory note as co-makers only as a favor to Oscar Varona.850. 1967 INTESTATE ESTATE OF VICTOR SEVILLA. was received from the bank by Oscar Varona alone.000.12. Payments were made on account. On June 5. The administrator resisted the claim upon the averment that the deceased Victor Sevilla "did not receive any amount as consideration for the promissory note. 1950. payable on demand. Poblador. 1949. and directing the administrator to pay the same from any available funds belonging to the estate of the deceased Victor Sevilla. Sadaya filed a creditor's claim for the above sum of P5. J. Francisco Sevilla was named administrator.

that contract by Oscar Varona. in respect to each other? Surely enough. as amongst the three.746. Varona could not have had reason to seek reimbursement from either Sevilla or Sadaya. On principle. The least that can be said is that.000. He paid the bank because he was a joint and several obligor. against the intestate estate of the deceased Victor Sevilla. indeed.2 Better yet. in the absence of . Oscar Varona. And the fact is that one of the last two. Varona received full value of the promissory note.00-peso promissory note in favor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands. the individual obligation of each of them to the bank is no different from. 4. we repeat. For." be approved. Simeon Sadaya. 15. is that of joint and several obligors. the obligation of Varona and Sevilla to Sadaya who paid can not be joint and several. or P2. voted to set aside the order appealed from and to disapprove and disallow "appellee's claim of P5. But can the same thing be said about the relations of the three consigners. they executed the same with. After all. Their liability to the bank upon the explicit terms of the promissory note is joint and several.1 The Court of Appeals. instead of Simeon Sadaya. Sadaya's brief here seeks reversal of the appellate court's decision and prays that his claim "in the amount of 50% of P5. paid that balance. from his co-accommodation maker. there is an implied contract of indemnity. and no greater and no less than. had payment been made by Oscar Varona.873. need not be essayed. as between Varona and Sadaya. while these two did not receive value on the promissory note." The case is now before this Court on certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals. For. the bank could have pursued its right to collect the unpaid balance against either Sevilla or Sadaya. we first look into the relations inter se amongst the three consigners of the promissory note. As such accommodation the makers.4 3. in a decision promulgated on July. Their relations vis-a-vis the Bank. or both.06. the proceeds of the loan went to Varona and the other two received nothing therefrom.746. the Bank of the Philippine Islands.3 Sadaya received nothing therefrom. 1. This is but right and just. the administrator appealed. And Varona is bound by the obligation to reimburse Sadaya. That Victor Sevilla and Simeon Sadaya were joint and several accommodation makers of the 15.12.12 against the intestate estate. a solidary accommodation maker — who made payment — has the right to contribution. now out of the way. 1960. It is beyond debate that Simeon Sadaya could have sought reimbursement of the total amount paid from Oscar Varona. 2. The common creditor. and for the purpose of lending their names to.The motion to reconsider having been overruled.

"their deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code". contraida por todos ellos. and subject to conditions imposed by law. se han extremado sus consecuencias hasta el punto de que estas son contrarias.5 For having lent their signatures to the principal debtor. su origen de una acto posterior. como tenemos ya dicho. por virtud de esta todos los cofiadores vienen obligados a contribuir al pago de parte que a cada uno corresponde. entienden que.agreement to the contrary between them. Manresa. dicho acto redunda en beneficio de los otros cofiadores los cuales se aprovechan de el para quedar desligados de todo compromiso con el acreedor. en efecto. como ha dicho Laurent. In misfortune.ñët . their burdens should be equally spread. el hecho de afianzar una misma deuda no crea ningun vinculo juridico. By Article 18 of the Civil Code in matters not covered by the special laws. y la equdad. on this point stated: Otros. En efecto. no solo a la logica. they clearly placed themselves — in so far as payment made by one may create liability on the other — in the category of mere joint grantors of the former. pero es consecuencia del beneficio o del derecho de division. que igualmente estaban estaban obligos a dicho pago. como Pothier.7 which is substantially reproduced in Article 20738 of our Civil Code. si.1äwphï1. Esa accion — sostienen — no nace de la fianza. y si bien este no hizo mas que cumplir el deber que el contracto de fianza le imponia de responder de todo el debito cuando no limito su obligacion a parte alguna del mismo. commenting on Article 1844 of the Civil Code of Spain. Lo cierto es que esa accion concedida al fiador nace. Perforce. no permite que los denias fiadores. que debe ser el alma del Derecho. De ese obligacion. This right springs from an implied promise between the accommodation makers to share equally the burdens that may ensue from their having consented to stamp their signatures on the promissory note. pues. to the requisites before one accommodation maker can seek reimbursement from a co-accommodation maker. Not one of them benefited by the promissory note. we must go to the Civil Code. cual es el pago de toda la deuda realizado por uno de ellos. se libran los que no han pagado por consecuencia del acto realizado por el que pago. por el contrario. sino que trae. sino tambien a la equidad. ni ninguna razon de obligar entre los fiadores. And now. They stand on the same footing. del hecho del pago. si bien el principio es evidente enestricto concepto juridico. Nothing extant in the Negotiable Instruments Law would define the right of one accommodation maker to seek reimbursement from another. se aprovenchen de ese acto en perjuico del que lo realozo.9 5.6 This is as it should be.

sancionado por el art. cual es la de evitar que por la mera voluntad de uno de los cofiadores pueda hacerse surgir la accion de reintegro contra los demas en prejuicio de los mismos. the one among them who has paid may demand of each of the others the share which is proportionally owing from him. The provisions of this article shall not be applicable. repitiendo despues por ellas contra el deudor con la imposicion de las molestias y gastos consiguientes. cuya justificacion resulta evidenciada desde luego. es de todo punto indudable que ejercitando esta accion pueden quedar libres de toda responsabilidad los demas cofiadores si. just quoted. . If any of the guarantors should be insolvent. in themselves. indemniza el fiado a aquel en los terminos establecidos en el expresado articulo. Says Manresa:12 c) Requisitos para el ejercicio del derecho de reintegro o de reembolso derivado de la corresponsabilidad de los cofiadores. their case comes within the ambit of Article 2073 of the Civil Code which reads: ART. 1. 2073. pues teniendo en primer termino el fiador que paga por el deudor el derecho de indemnizacion contra este.Because Sevilla and Sadaya. a consecuencia de ella.10 As Mr. Article 2073. are but co-guarantors of Varona. in the same proportion. y esa limitacion este debidamente aconsejada por una razon de prudencia que no puede desconocerse. Justice Street puts it: "[T]hat article deals with the situation which arises when one surety has paid the debt to the creditor and is seeking contribution from his cosureties. — La tercera de las prescripciones que comprende el articulo se refiere a los requisitos que deben concurrir para que pueda tener lugar lo dispuesto en el mismo. reclamando de los confiadores en primer lugar el oportuno reintegro. El perjuicio que con tal motivo puede inferirse a los cofiadores es bien notorio.838. are devoid of cogent reason. es un beneficio otorgado por la ley solo ell dos casos determinados."11 Not that the requirements in paragraph 3. estos en tendrian mas remedio que satisfacer sus ductares respectivas. including the payer. Ese derecho que concede al fiador para reintegrarse directamente de los fiadores de lo que pago por ellos en vez de dirigir su reclamacion contra el deudor. unless the payment has been made in virtue of a judicial demand or unless the principal debtor is insolvent. his share shall be borne by the others. Por el contrario de prescindir de dicho derecho el fiador. When there are two or more guarantors of the same debtor and for the same debt.

The Court of Appeals found that Sadaya's payment to the bank "was made voluntarily and without any judicial demand." For the reasons given. la ley no ha podido menos de reducir el ejercicio de ese derecho a los casos en que absolutamente sea indispensable. Y para evitar estos perjuicios. and (2) a joint and several accommodation maker who pays on the said promissory note may directly demand reimbursement from his co-accommodation maker without first directing his action against the principal debtor provided that (a) he made the payment by virtue of a judicial demand. sin excepcion alguna. y en la practica quedaria reducido el primero a la indemnizacion por el deudor a los confiadores que hubieran hecho el reintegro. All of the foregoing postulate the following rules: (1) A joint and several accommodation maker of a negotiable promissory note may demand from the principal debtor reimbursement for the amount that he paid to the payee. a soportar siempre los gastos y las molestias que anteriormente homos indicado." and that "there is an absolute absence of evidence showing that Varona is insolvent". puesto que mucha mas garantias de solvencia y mucha mas seguridad del cobro ha de encontrar en los fiadores que en el deudor. No costs. This combination of fact and lack of fact epitomizes the fatal distance between payment by Sadaya and Sadaya's right to demand of Sevilla "the share which is proportionately owing from him. el de indemnizacion por el deudor y el del reintegro por los cofiadores. . indudablemente optaria siempre y en todo caso por el segundo.No es aventurado asegurar que si el fiador que paga pudiera libremente utilizar uno u otro de dichos derechos. or (b) a principal debtor is insolvent. the judgment of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed. obligando a estos.13 6. So ordered.

petitioner sold and delivered various airline tickets to respondent at a total price of P278. with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and attorney's fees. The writ of attachment was granted by the court a quo. L-56169 June 26.00.201. TravelOn further alleged that in March 1972.000. and thereafter issued six (6) postdated checks amounting to P115. ("Travel-On") is a travel agency selling airline tickets on commission basis for and in behalf of different airline companies. as he had in the past accorded similar favors to petitioner. private respondent contested several tickets alleged to have been erroneously debited to his account. respondents..000. however. 1992 TRAVEL-ON. He argued that he had issued the postdated checks for purposes of accommodation. The complaint. Travel-On filed suit before the Court of First Instance ("CFI") of Manila to collect on six (6) checks issued by private respondent with a total face amount of P115. MIRANDA. that to settle said account. On 14 June 1972. Private respondent Arturo S. private respondent admitted having had transactions with Travel-On during the period stipulated in the complaint. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTURO S. Inc.57. petitioner. Private respondent.00 which were all dishonored by the drawee banks. INC.R. private respondent made another payment of P10. private respondent paid various amounts in cash and in kind.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G. claimed that he had already fully paid and even overpaid his obligations and that refunds were in fact due to him.000. In his answer.00. He procured tickets from petitioner on behalf of airline passengers and derived commissions therefrom. During the proceedings. He claimed reimbursement .: Petitioner Travel-On. Miranda had a revolving credit line with petitioner.00 reducing his indebtedness to P105. No.000. RESOLUTION FELICIANO. averred that from 5 August 1969 to 16 January 1970. J.

but reduced the award of moral damages to P20. Elita Montilla. Elita Montilla. private respondent testified that he bad issued the checks in the name of Travel-On in order that its General Manager.91 representing net overpayments by private respondent. In its decision dated 31 January 1975. denied by the trial court. . but that these were dishonored and were subsequently returned to him after the accommodation purpose had been attained. private respondent is still liable thereunder considering that petitioner is a holder for value.00 for the wrongful issuance of the writ of attachment and for the filing of this case.000. could show to Travel-On's Board of Directors that the accounts receivable of the company were still good. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.000. with interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the Answer on 28 August 1972.00.000. plus litigation expenses. Petitioner further argues that even assuming that the checks were for accommodation. which in fact then increased the award of moral damages to P50. without success. it is urged that the postdated checks are per se evidence of liability on the part of private respondent. on the other hand explained that the "accommodation" extended to Travel-On by private respondent related to situations where one or more of its passengers needed money in Hongkong. Travel-On's witness.00.of his alleged over payments. He further stated that Elita Montilla tried to encash the same. the court a quo ordered Travel-On to pay private respondent the amount of P8. The trial court ruled that private respondent's indebtedness to petitioner was not satisfactorily established and that the postdated checks were issued not for the purpose of encashment to pay his indebtedness but to accommodate the General Manager of Travel-On to enable her to show to the Board of Directors that TravelOn was financially stable.000. P5.894.00 for attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration that was. The passenger then paid Travel-On upon his return to Manila and which payment would be credited by Travel-On to respondent's running account with it. and exemplary and moral damages by reason of the allegedly improper attachment of his properties. In support of his theory that the checks were issued for accommodation. however. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeal's' decision. and upon request of Travel-On respondent would contact his friends in Hongkong to advance Hongkong money to the passenger. In the instant Petition for Review. On appeal. moral damages of P10.

the total unpaid account of private respondent amounted to P239. it failed to give due importance to the most telling piece of evidence of private respondent's indebtedness — the checks themselves which he had issued. It must be stressed that private respondent's account with petitioner was a running or open one. It is important to stress that a check which is regular on its face is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration and every person whose signature appears thereon is deemed to have become a party thereto for value. which explains the varying figures in each of the statements rendered as of a given date.432. We have. the figure — P239. 1 Thus.74 was still used as basis in the accounting of 7 April 1972 considering that according to the table of transactions for the year 1969 and 1970. The appellate court made much of the fact that the figures representing private respondent's unpaid accounts found in the "Schedule of Outstanding Account" dated 31 January 1970 did not tally with the figures found in the statement which showed private respondent's transactions with petitioner for the years 1969 and 1970.Both the trial and appellate courts had rejected the checks as evidence of indebtedness on the ground that the various statements of account prepared by petitioner did not show that Private respondent had an outstanding balance of P115. that there was no satisfactory explanation as to why the total outstanding amount of P278.74 and from it deduct P38. the mere introduction of the instrument sued on in evidence prima facie entitles the plaintiff to recovery.57. The appellate court erred in considering only the statements of account in determining whether private respondent was indebted to petitioner under the checks.638. By doing so.57 will be obtained.17 which represents some of the payments subsequently made by private respondent. however. examined the record and it shows that the 7 April 1972 Statement of Account had simply not been updated. they did not satisfactorily establish the amount of the outstanding indebtedness of private respondent. Further.00 which is the total amount of the checks he issued. that these checks clearly established private respondent's indebtedness to petitioner.794. this Court finds that the checks are the all important evidence of petitioner's case. Also. It was pointed out that while the various exhibits of petitioner showed various accountabilities of private respondent. the fact alone that the various statements of account had variances in figures. that private respondent was liable thereunder.794. that if we use as basis the figure as of 31 January 1970 which is P278. the rule is quite settled that a negotiable .432. simply did not mean that private respondent had no more financial obligations to petitioner. Contrary to the view held by the Court of Appeals.000.

Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value. receives or realizes full value which the accommodated party then must repay to the accommodating party. placed the burden of proving the existence of valuable consideration upon petitioner. In the first place.instrument is presumed to have been given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration unless otherwise contradicted and overcome by other competent evidence. the accommodating party has warranted to the holder in due course that he will pay the same according to its tenor. an accommodating party lends his credit to the accommodated party. and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Having issued or indorsed the check. We are unable to accept the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the checks here involved were issued for "accommodation" and that accordingly private respondent maker of those checks was not liable thereon to petitioner payee of those checks. The latter. 3 . This cannot be countenanced. 29. it was up to private respondent to show that he had indeed issued the checks without sufficient consideration. or indorser. The fact that all the checks issued by private respondent to petitioner were presented for payment by the latter would lead to no other conclusion than that these checks were intended for encashment. at the time of taking the instrument. without receiving value therefor. contrary to these established rules. the Court of Appeals. unless of course the accommodating party intended to make a donation to the accommodated party. 2 In the case at bar. Liability of accommodation party. while the Negotiable Instruments Law does refer to accommodation transactions. by issuing or indorsing a check which is held by a payee or indorsee as a holder in due course. who gave full value therefor to the accommodated party. In accommodation transactions recognized by the Negotiable Instruments Law. drawer. Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides as follows: Sec. no such transaction was here shown. acceptor. It must also be noted that those checks were issued immediately after a letter demanding payment had been sent to private respondent by petitioner Travel-On. The Court considers that Private respondent was unable to rebut satisfactorily this legal presumption. But the accommodating party is bound on the check to the holder in due course who is necessarily a third party and is not the accommodated party. notwithstanding such holder. in other words. There is nothing in the checks themselves (or in any other document for that matter) that states otherwise. — An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker. knew him to be only an accommodation party.

appears merely contrived and quite hollow to us. If anyone was in bad faith. The only evidence aliunde that private respondent offered was his own self-serving uncorroborated testimony. Travel-On was payee of all six (6) checks. but rather the circumvention of then existing foreign exchange regulations by passengers booked by Travel-On.000. Travel-On was entitled to the benefit of the statutory presumption that it was a holder in due course. which incidentally involved receipt of full consideration by private respondent. 4 that the checks were supported by valuable consideration. it presented these checks for payment at the drawee bank but the checks bounced. Since the checks constitute the best evidence of private respondent's liability to petitioner Travel-On.00 which Travel-On admitted in its complaint to have been paid by private respondent sometime in March 1992. that explanation. the "accommodation" or assistance extended to Travel-On's passengers abroad as testified by petitioner's General Manager involved. it was private respondent who issued bad checks and then pretended to have "accommodated" petitioner's General Manager by assisting her in a supposed scheme to deceive petitioner's Board of Directors and to misrepresent Travel-On's financial condition. not the accommodation transactions recognized by the NIL. Travel-On obviously was not an accommodated party. reduced only by the P10." It will be seen that this claim was in fact a claim that the checks were merely simulated.In the case at bar. Thus. for the reason that Petitioner's application for the writ of attachment rested on sufficient basis and no bad faith was shown on the part of Travel-On. it realized no value on the checks which bounced. He claimed that he had issued the checks to Travel-On as payee to "accommodate" its General Manager who allegedly wished to show those checks to the Board of Directors of Travel-On to "prove" that Travel-On's account receivables were somehow "still good. Upon the other hand. Only evidence of the clearest and most convincing kind will suffice for that purpose. Those checks in themselves constituted evidence of indebtedness of private respondent. that private respondent did not intend to bind himself thereon. . The award of moral damages to Private respondent must be set aside. evidence not successfully overturned or rebutted by private respondent. the amount of such liability is the face amount of the checks. we believe and so hold that private respondent must be held liable on the six (6) checks here involved. 5 Private respondent maker of the checks did not successfully rebut these presumptions. in any case. 6 no such evidence was submitted by private respondent. The latter's explanation was denied by TravelOn's General Manager.

. and to enter a new decision requiring private respondent Arturo S. Jr. as well as the Decision dated 31 January 1975 of the trial court. the Court Resolved to GRANT due course to the Petition for Review on Certiorari and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated 22 October 1980 and the Resolution of 23 January 1981 of the Court of Appeals. and Romero. Bidin. concur. JJ. Jr. Davide.00 with legal interest thereon from 14 June 1972.. Miranda to pay to petitioner Travel-On the amount of P105. Costs against Private respondent..000. Gutierrez. plus ten percent (10%) of the total amount due as attorney's fees.ACCORDINGLY.

1986. 1990. CV No. respectively. in Civil Case No. the loan would be payable.96 as of July 31.4 respondent Bank alleged that on October 3 and 9. DECISION AZCUNA. respondents. On August 28.638. respondent Bank claimed that the defendants failed and refused to settle their obligation. the defendants obtained a loan of P50. dismissing the complaint filed by respondents for collection of a sum of money. 20. J. DVO-78-390. subsequent amendments5 to the promissory notes as well as the disclosure statements6 stipulated that the loan would earn 14% interest rate per annum. Despite repeated demands for payment. on Antonio Ang Eng Liong and Tomas Ang. and attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the outstanding obligation.: This petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules on Civil Procedure seeks to review the October 9.R. 146511 September 5.R. on January 31. 1% penalty charge per month from due date until fully paid. evidenced by a promissory note bearing PN-No.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G. No. Branch 16. broken down as follows: . 1990. 1979 and December 8. resulting in a total indebtedness of P539. 1996 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court. ASSOCIATED BANK AND ANTONIO ANG ENG LIONG. jointly and severally. evidenced by a promissory note bearing PN-No. the latest of which were on September 13.000. respectively. respondent Associated Bank (formerly Associated Banking Corporation and now known as United Overseas Bank Philippines) filed a collection suit against Antonio Ang Eng Liong and petitioner Tomas Ang for the two (2) promissory notes that they executed as principal debtor and co-maker. vs. In the Complaint. 1978. petitioner. 53413 which reversed and set aside the January 5. Davao City. respectively. 2% service charge per annum. As agreed. DVO-78-382. 1978.299-90. 1988 and September 9. 2000 Decision1 and December 26.000. and P30. 2000 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. 2007 TOMAS ANG. In addition.

98 P11. PN-No.89 P125. instructions. his signature in PN-No. much less a holder for value or a holder in due course. the bank imposed new and additional stipulations on . which was allegedly collecting excessive interest.34 P42. the bank granted his co-defendant successive extensions of time within which to pay.21 In his Answer.75 None P204.00 P174.000.952.00 Add PN-No.75 14% Interest 2% Service Charge 12% Overdue Charge P69. without his (Tomas Ang) knowledge and consent.199 Past due charges for 4.8 He interposed the affirmative defenses that: the bank is not the real party in interest as it is not the holder of the promissory notes. with only the printed provisions and the signature of Antonio Ang Eng Liong appearing therein.000.952.34 Total Less: Charges paid Amount Due P285. For his part.334. and attorney's fees despite knowledge that his business was destroyed by fire. hence.days (from 12-8-78 to 0731-90) 31-90) P203.530.983.088.538.686. He pleaded though that the bank "be ordered to submit a more reasonable computation" considering that there had been "no correct and reasonable statement of account" sent to him by the bank.186. he accepted the promissory notes in blank.00 P334.7 Antonio Ang Eng Liong only admitted to have secured a loan amounting to P80. DVO-78390 was procured through fraudulent means when his co-defendant claimed that his first loan did not push through.21 P500. the bank knew that he did not receive any valuable consideration for affixing his signatures on the notes but merely lent his name as an accommodation party. petitioner Tomas Ang filed an Answer with Counterclaim and Crossclaim.00 Past due charges for 4.000 from the bank. the promissory notes did not indicate in what capacity he was intended to be bound. DVO-78-382 was completed in excess of or contrary to the authority given by him to his co-defendant who represented that he would only borrow P30.253 days (from 01-31-79 to 07.41 P7. it was the bank which completed the notes upon the orders. or representations of his co-defendant. he had no source of income for several years. penalty charges.PN-No. DVO-78-382 Outstanding Balance P50. DVO-78-390 P30.000.663.

The penalty charge. the bank posited that absence or failure of consideration is not a matter of defense. it said that the same would not relieve Tomas Ang from liability as he would still be liable for the whole obligation less the share of his co-debtor who received the extended term. certainly he is not so naïve as to sign the notes without knowing or bothering to verify the amounts of the loans covered by them. Moreover. he is considered as a solidary debtor who is primarily liable for the payment of the promissory notes. Further.interest. The bank also asserted that there were no additional or new stipulations imposed other than those agreed upon. The fact that Tomas Ang never received any moneys in consideration of the two (2) loans and that such was known to the bank are immaterial because. it should be held liable for the amount of P50. as an accommodation maker. services charges and attorney's fees more onerous than the terms of the notes. Granting that such were the case. Furthermore. the bank caused the inclusion in the promissory notes of stipulations such as waiver of presentment for payment and notice of dishonor which are against public policy. in the absence of legal and factual basis and in violation of the Usury Law. without his knowledge and consent. and attorney's fees. It was denied by the bank that there were extensions of time for payment accorded to Antonio Ang Eng Liong. it is presumed that one who has signed as a maker acted with care and had signed the document with full knowledge of its content.000 for moral and exemplary damages. Regarding his counterclaim. P20. penalties. Assuming that such was not the case.000 and P50. he averred that he should be reimbursed by his co-defendant any and all sums that he may be adjudged liable to pay. and the notes had been impaired since they were never presented for payment and demands were made only several years after they fell due when his co-defendant could no longer pay them.000. neither is the fact that the holder knew him to be only an accommodation party. The bank noted that Tomas Ang is a prominent businessman in Davao City who has been engaged in the auto parts business for several years. 14 of the NIL provides that the bank has the prima facie authority to complete the blank form. and attorney's . service charge. hence.000. he is already in estoppel since despite receipt of several demand letters there was not a single protest raised by him that he signed for only one note in the amount of P30.9 respondent Bank countered that it is the real party in interest and is the holder of the notes since the Associated Banking Corporation and Associated Citizens Bank are its predecessors-in-interest.000 for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. plus P30. on his cross-claim against Antonio Ang Eng Liong. Sec. In its Reply. Tomas Ang argued that by reason of the bank's acts or omissions. Respondent Bank likewise retorted that the promissory notes were completely filled up at the time of their delivery. respectively. Citing Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL).

judgment is rendered against defendant Antonio Ang Eng Liong and in favor of plaintiff. and 3) P34. 4. The overdue penalty charge and attorney's fees were. Lastly. reduced for being excessive. For his supposed bad faith and obstinate refusal despite several demands from the bank.663. the bank filed an ex-parte motion to declare him in default. the trial court issued a preliminary pre-trial order directing the parties to submit their respective pre-trial guide. In fact. 1983 with 2% service charge and 6% overdue penalty charges per annum until fully paid.000 plus 14% interest per annum and 2% service charge per annum. 1990. the hearing nonetheless proceeded. the court granted the motion and set the ex-parte hearing for the presentation of the bank's evidence.89 as accrued service charge. 2) P11.00 representing the principal obligation with 14% interest per annum from June 27. 1991. ordering the former to pay the latter: On the first cause of action: 1) the amount of P50. 3[c.10 When Antonio Ang Eng Liong failed to submit his brief. interest can be charged depending on the agreement of the lender and the borrower. a decision15 was rendered by the trial court on February 21. Antonio Ang Eng Liong was ordered to pay the principal amount of P80.000.].12 Despite Tomas Ang's motion13 to modify the Order so as to exclude or cancel the ex-parte hearing based on then Sec. thus: WHEREFORE. there is even no necessity therefor since being a solidary debtor he is absolutely required to pay and primarily liable on both promissory notes. at present. . however.00 (sic) representing the principal account with 14% interest from June 27. Rule 9 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure). Rule 18 of the old Rules of Court (now Sec.000.14 Eventually. the bank contended that the provisions on presentment for payment and notice of dishonor were expressly waived by Tomas Ang and that such waiver is not against public policy pursuant to Sections 82 (c) and 109 of the NIL. On the second cause of action: 1) the amount of P50.11 Per Order of November 23. Reference to the Usury Law was misplaced as usury is legally nonexistent. 1983 with 2% service charge and 6% overdue penalty charges per annum until fully paid. 1990.fees were reflected in the amendments to the promissory notes and disclosure statements.991. On October 19.67 as accrued overdue penalty charge.

17 Thereafter. 1991.2) P7. in turn. the court set the pre-trial conference between the bank and Tomas Ang.00 as litigation expenses and to pay the costs. 26332. the court accordingly issued a writ of execution on April 5. on June 3. the Decision dated February 21.24 When Tomas Ang was about to present evidence in his behalf.23 Trial then ensued between the bank and Tomas Ang. he filed a Motion for Production of Documents. 4. The court denied the motion as well as the motion for reconsideration thereon. Rule 18 of the old Rules sanctions only one judgment in case of several defendants. he is now precluded from asserting his cross-claim against Antonio Ang Eng Liong. however. Moreover.000. which. one of whom is declared in default. 1991.22 In accordance with the prayer of Tomas Ang. the appellate court promulgated its Decision on January 29. 1990 setting the ex-parte presentation of the bank's evidence against Antonio Ang Eng Liong.34 representing accrued service charge.00 as accrued overdue penalty charge. 4) the amount of P10.088. 1992 in CA G.265. 1991 rendered against him based on such evidence. and 5) the amount of P620.16 The decision became final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom. filed a Motion to Dismiss19 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the case in view of the alleged finality of the February 21. upon whom a final and executory judgment had already been issued. SP No.20 Tomas Ang maintained that he is released from his obligation as a solidary guarantor and accommodation party because.25 reasoning: xxx .21 Tomas Ang subsequently filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before this Court. Upon the latter's motion during the pre-trial conference. 3) P21.18 who.R. in his Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. Upon the bank's ex-parte motion. 1991 Decision. by the bank's actions.00 as attorney's fees. SO ORDERED. and the Writ of Execution issued on April 5. He contended that Sec. Antonio Ang Eng Liong was again declared in default for his failure to answer the cross-claim within the reglementary period. resolved to refer the same to the Court of Appeals. 1991. which annulled and set aside the portion of the Order dated November 23.

f. 1994. income tax returns. Loan Applications of Antonio Ang Eng Liong or borrower relative to PN Nos.A. 470.the bank is not a holder in due course when it accepted the [PNs] in blank. d. DISCHARGE ON NOTE. e. Application of [Articles] 2079. 470. 3.The real borrower is Antonio Ang Eng Liong which fact is known to the bank. DVO78-382 and DVO-78-390 (supra). viz: . withdrawal slips. Other supporting papers and documents submitted by Antonio Ang Eng Liong relative to his loan application vis-à-vis PN.] b. etc. Statement or Record of Account with the Associated Banking Corporation or its successor. 470.] there is [a] need for him to examine original records in the custody and possession of plaintiff. relative to his overdraft. 470 (cf.2. . of Antonio Ang in CA No. pursuant to the previous ruling of the court. 2080 and 1249 of the Civil Code. the Statements or Records of Account of Antonio Ang Eng Liong in CA No. No. other papers and relevant dates relative to the overdraft of Antonio Eng Liong in CA No. DVO-78-382 and DVO-78-390 such as financial statements. as in fact he has already copies of the same. the latter may raise against such payee or holder or successor-in-interest (of the notes) PERSONAL and EQUITABLE DEFENSES such as FRAUD in INDUCEMENT. notices. O) including bank records. as required by the Central Bank or bank rules and regulations.26 In its Order dated May 16. and/or preparatory or incident to his testimony[. original of Disclosure Statement in reference to PN # DVO-78-390. That the above matters are very material to the defenses of defendant Tomas Ang. That corroborative to. . original Promissory Note (PN for brevity) # DVO-78-382 dated October 3. Nos. NEGLIGENCE in delaying collection despite Eng Liong's OVERDRAFT in C. viz: a.27 the court denied the motion stating that the promissory notes and the disclosure statements have already been shown to and inspected by Tomas Ang during the trial. g. 1978. etc. original of Disclosure Statement in reference to PN # DVO-78-382. he is being sued for the notes and not for the overdraft which is . Exh. are immaterial since. c. 1978[.That the PAYEE not being a holder in due course and knowing that defendant Tomas Ang is merely an accommodation party. original of PN # DVO-78-390 dated October 9.

conveyed and assigned by way of trust unto the Asset Privatization Trust said non-performing assets.31 All the documentary exhibits were admitted for failure of the bank to submit its comment to the formal offer. 34840 before the Court of Appeals. 34840. Tomas Ang offered in evidence several documents. the Court of Appeals denied the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. SP No. which was then granted. which included a copy of the Trust Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the Asset Privatization Trust.32 Thereafter. the National Government in turn and as TRUSTOR. collection and enforcement of the receivables. Tomas Ang elected to withdraw his petition in CA G. 1994. [which] took title to and possession of.33 On January 5.30 After the trial. the Trust Agreement dated 27 February 1987 for the defense shows that: the Associated Bank as of June 30. and news clippings from the Manila Bulletin dated May 18. transferred and conveyed their non-performing assets to the National Government.R. transferred. [to] conserve.29 Meanwhile. however. 1994. or any other claim or demand which the government may have against any person or persons[. 1994 and May 30. both financial institutions assigned. 1987 through Deeds of Transfer executed by and between the Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines and the National Government.] of said assets identified for privatization or disposition. the trial court rendered judgment against the bank. When the motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was denied.personal to Antonio Ang Eng Liong.] . "9" and its [sub-markings]. SP No. the trial court decided to continue with the hearing of the case.R. on February 27. provisionally manage and dispose[. 1986 is one of DBP's or Development Bank of the [Philippines'] non-performing accounts for transfer. as certified by the notary public. notwithstanding its initial rulings that Tomas Ang was deemed to have waived his right to present evidence for failure to appear during the pendency of his petition before the Court of Appeals. to bring suit to enforce payment of the obligations or any installment thereof or to settle or compromise any of such obligations.34 It held that: Exh. Tomas Ang filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and restraining order before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA G.28 On August 17. one of the powers and duties of the APT with respect to trust properties consisting of receivables is to handle the administration. and besides its non-existence in the bank's records. dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action. there would be legal obstacle for the production and inspection of the income tax return of Antonio Ang Eng Liong if done without his consent. 1996.

As regards the Deed of Transfer and Trust Agreement. 1994. which showed that it was between the Government of the Philippines.35 Respondent Bank then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. "ASSOCIATED BANK.3945 billion subject to a buy-back arrangement over a 10 year period. and "9-D". which was created . Exh. show that the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas approved the rehabilitation plan of the Associated Bank. "9-B". TOMAS ANG. it would readily appear that at the time this suit for Sum of Money was filed which was on August [28]. 1990. 1994 and May 30. "9A". which was not even legible. In the appellant's brief captioned. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING DEFENDANT ANTONIO ANG ENG LIONG AND DEFENDANT-APPELLEE TOMAS ANG LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT ON THEIR UNPAID LOANS DESPITE THE LATTER'S DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS PROVING THE SAID OBLIGATIONS. which was empowered to bring suit to enforce payment of the obligations.36 The bank stressed that it has established the causes of action outlined in its Complaint by a preponderance of evidence. Plaintiff-Appellant versus ANTONIO ANG ENG LIONG and TOMAS ANG.86 at 25% discount. it contended that the same were never authenticated by any witness in the course of the trial. the bank is not a party to the Agreement. The PDIC had approved of the rehab scheme. the notes were held by the Asset Privatization Trust by virtue of the Deeds of Transfer and Trust Agreement. II. defendant Tomas Ang has sufficiently established that plaintiff at the time this suit was filed was not the holder of the notes to warrant the dismissal of the complaint. This will then be paid by AB within a 10-year period plus a yield comparable to the prevailing market rates x x x. Defendant-Appellee. Based then on the evidence presented by the defendant Tomas Ang. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT ON THE BASIS OF NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS WHICH WERE COMPLETELY HEARSAY IN CHARACTER AND IMPROPER FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE. acting through the Committee on Privatization represented by the Secretary of Finance as trustor and the Asset Privatization Trust.The Manila Bulletin news clippings dated May 18. One main feature of the rehabilitation plan included the financial assistance for the bank by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) by way of the purchase of AB Assets worth P1." the following errors were alleged: I. Consequently. Defendants. did not mention the promissory notes subject of the Complaint. which included the purchase of AB's bad loans worth P1. "9-C". the Agreement.

00 representing the principal amount of the loan under PN-No.299-90 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering defendant-appellee Tomas Ang to pay plaintiff-appellant Associated Bank the following: 1. SO ORDERED. The Court of Appeals observed that the bank. 20.by virtue of Proclamation No. It concluded that despite the execution of the Deeds of Transfer and Trust Agreement.37 On October 9. 2000. and the Agreement did not reflect the signatures of the contracting parties. the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's ruling. did not indorse the notes to the Asset Privatization Trust despite the execution of the Deeds of Transfer and Trust Agreement and that the notes continued to remain with the bank until the institution of the collection suit. No pronouncement as to costs. The dispositive portion of the Decision38 reads: WHEREFORE.000.39 The appellate court disregarded the bank's first assigned error for being "irrelevant in the final determination of the case" and found its second assigned error as "not meritorious. P50.000. P30. it posed for resolution the issue of whether the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for collection of sum of money for lack of cause of action as the bank was said to be not the "holder" of the notes at the time the collection case was filed. 1979 until the full amount thereof is paid. the Court of Appeals held that the bank is a "holder" under Sec. 2. premises considered." Instead.00 representing the principal amount of the loan under PN-No. DVO-78390 plus 14% interest thereon per annum computed from December 8. the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. All other claims of the plaintiff-appellant are DISMISSED for lack of legal basis. as the payee. 1978 until the full amount thereof is paid. Defendant-appellee's counterclaim is likewise DISMISSED for lack of legal and factual bases. . DVO-78382 plus 14% interest thereon per annum computed from January 31. the Asset Privatization Trust cannot be declared as the "holder" of the subject promissory notes for the reason that it is neither the payee or indorsee of the notes in possession thereof nor is it the bearer of said notes. 191 of the NIL. 50. Lastly. in Civil Case No. the bank averred that the news items appearing in the Manila Bulletin could not be the subject of judicial notice since they were completely hearsay in character. Branch 16. In answering the lone issue.

as of July 31. 29 of the NIL. at the time of taking the notes. 1990. service charges at 2% per annum and overdue penalty charges at 12% per annum in the prayer of the complaint as of the time of its filing. Moreover. paying a total of only P640.373. or that he merely acted on the belief that the first loan application was cancelled. the Court of Appeals agreed with the bank that the experience of Tomas Ang in business rendered it implausible that he would just sign the promissory notes as a co-maker without even checking the real amount of the debt to be incurred.39 (which is actually compounded and capitalized) in both causes of action and the total service and overdue penalties and charges and attorney's fees further amount to P239. the time of filing of the complaint. 1990. the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court had been increased to .With the bank as the "holder" of the promissory notes. the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case and the same may not be now corrected by the filing of deficiency fees because the causes of action had already prescribed and more importantly. Citing Sec. appellant bank fraudulently failed to specify the amount of compounded interest at 14% per annum. Further. as stated in the notes.566. he is liable to the bank in spite of the latter's knowledge. penalty and overdue charges as well as attorney's fees on the ground that the promissory notes made no mention of such charges/fees. it is apparent that he was negligent in falling for the alibi of Antonio Ang Eng Liong and such fact would not serve to exonerate him from his responsibility under the notes. as a co-maker who agreed to be jointly and severally liable on the promissory notes. According to the appellate court. defendant-appellee Tomas Ang has recently discovered that upon the filing of the complaint on August 28. Tomas Ang cannot validly set up the defense that he did not receive any consideration therefor as the fact that the loan was granted to the principal debtor already constitutes a sufficient consideration.75 including 20% attorney's fees.36 in both causes of action. describing the 14% imposition as interest. In fact. the Court of Appeals held that Tomas Ang is accountable therefor in his capacity as an accommodation party. under the jurisdictional rule laid down in BP Blg. that he is only an accommodation party. Significantly. In his motion for reconsideration. the stated interest in the body of the complaint alone amount to P328.00(!!!) as filing and court docket fees although the total sum involved as of that time was P647. the Court of Appeals denied the claims of the bank for service. 129. appellant fraudulently misled the Court. Nonetheless.40 Tomas Ang raised for the first time the assigned errors as follows: xxx 2) Related to the above jurisdictional issues.193. In view thereof. when in fact the same was capitalized as principal by appellant bank every month to earn more interest.

the Court of Appeals denied the motion in its Resolution dated December 26. as of today.000. Tomas Ang's right of subrogation against Ang Eng Liong. AS AGAINST ENG LIONG. meritorious?43 Petitioner allegedly learned after the promulgation of the Court of Appeals' decision that. 4) This Court may have erred in ADDING or ASSIGNING its own bill of error for the benefit of appellant bank which defrauded the judiciary by the payment of deficient docket fees. jurisdiction over the subject falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC. The above is related to the issues abovestated. the payee's grant of additional burdens. and section 31. Accordingly. 3) BY FAILING TO GIVE NOTICE OF ITS APPEAL AND APPEAL BRIEF TO APPELLEE ANG ENG LIONG.42 Petitioner now submits the following issues for resolution: 1. respondent Eng Liong? 2. In other words. 2080 of the Civil Code.P100. Is [A]rticle 2080 of the Civil Code applicable to discharge petitioner Tomas Ang as accommodation maker or surety because of the failure of [private] respondent bank to serve its notice of appeal upon the principal debtor. Are petitioner's other real and personal defenses such as successive extensions coupled with fraudulent collusion to hide Eng Liong's default. Book I of the 1987 Administrative Code. HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. section 5 of RA No. is now SEVERAL TIMES foreclosed because of the fault or negligence of appellant bank since 1979 up to its insistence of an ex-parte trial. Did the Court of Appeals [commit] error in assigning its own error and raising its own issue? 4. particularly if the bank foregoes capitalization of the stipulated interest.647. and now when it failed to serve notice of appeal and appellant's brief upon him. and the defense of incomplete but delivered instrument.41 Finding no cogent or compelling reason to disturb the Decision. THE APPEALED JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH LEFT OUT TOMAS ANG'S CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST ENG LIONG (BECAUSE IT DISMISSED THE MAIN CLAIM). pursuant to SC Circular No. expressed in his cross-claim. appellee Tomas Ang should be released from his suretyship obligation pursuant to Art. the interest on the promissory notes as of July 31. Accordingly. 1990 should have been only P81. coupled with the insolvency of the principal debtor.22 for PN No.00 in principal claims last March 20. Did the trial court have jurisdiction over the case at all? 3. 1999. pursuant to the parties' agreement on the compounding of interest with the principal amount (per month in case of default). 21-99. DVO-78- . 7691. 2000.

receiver. contending that no question should be entertained on appeal unless it has been advanced in the court below or is within the issues made by the parties in the pleadings. where a corporation or a bank is under receivership.216. petitioner maintains that when respondent Bank served its notice of appeal and appellant's brief only on him. 2031]). and impaired the notes. By such act. prevented a surety like petitioner from being subrogated in the shoes of his principal (Article 2080. DVO-78-390 (instead of P125. NIL [Act No. The petition is unmeritorious.334. Consequently.618. Civil Code). and (3) it is not entirely accurate to say that the payee who has not indorsed the notes in all cases is the real party in interest because the rights of the payee may be subject of an assignment of incorporeal rights under Articles 1624 and 1625 of the Civil Code. thereby. he opines that the appellate court's decision that the bank is the real party in interest because it is the payee named in the note or the holder thereof is too simplistic since: (1) the power and control of Asset Privatization Trust over the bank are clear from the explicit terms of the duly certified trust documents and deeds of transfer and are confirmed by the newspaper clippings. 902-A or the General Banking Act. Petitioner contends that the bank may not now pay the deficiency because the last demand letter sent to him was dated September 9.33 for PN No.538.382 (instead of P203. and. it rendered the judgment of the trial court final and executory with respect to Antonio Ang Eng Liong. At any rate.30 and not P614. allegedly discharged a simple contract for the payment of money (Sections 119 [d] and 122. the bank. 1990 was P2.566.00 or a shortage of 71%. the bank was held by Asset Privatization Trust as trustee. Lastly.75 (instead of P539. or more than twenty years have elapsed such that prescription had already set in. trustee or conservator) who may properly act for said entity. foreclosed petitioner's cross-claims. . 1986. Civil Code). conservation or rehabilitation. released him (Antonio Ang Eng Liong) from any and all liability under the promissory notes and. the bank's claim must be dismissed as the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case. No. (2) even under P. Petitioner also argues that the Court of Appeals should not have assigned its own error and raised it as an issue of the case. in this case. in effect. According to him.D. even if it be the "holder" of the promissory notes.638. it is only the representative (liquidator. which. He submits that the bank carefully and shrewdly hid the fact by describing the amounts as interest instead of being part of either the principal or penalty in order to pay a lesser amount of docket fees. producing the effect of payment (Article 1249.96).98) and P49. the total fees that should have been paid at the time of the filing of the complaint on August 28.41) while the principal debt as of said date should increase to P647.

Questions that may be decided. Bautista. this maxim is subject to exceptions. thus: As a rule. if it deems proper under the circumstances obtaining. or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief. as with most procedural rules. In Mendoza v.44 this Court recognized the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned. Indeed. error/s not assigned on an appealed case. unless stated in the assignment of errors. Thus. but ventilated for the first time only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal. our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned. Section 8 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice. (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned. 8. — No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered. and (f) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned is dependent.Procedurally. no issue may be raised on appeal unless it has been brought before the lower tribunal for its consideration. (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored. an appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter. Higher courts are precluded from entertaining matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below. However. it is well within the authority of the Court of Appeals to raise." the issue of whether the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for collection of sum of money for lack of cause of action (on the ground that the bank was not the "holder" of the notes at the time of the filing of the action) is in reality closely related to and determinant of the resolution of whether the lower court correctly ruled in not holding Antonio Ang Eng Liong and petitioner Tomas Ang liable to the bank on their unpaid loans despite documentary exhibits allegedly proving their obligations and in dismissing the . (Citations omitted)45 To the Court's mind. save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors. even if the Court of Appeals regarded petitioner's two assigned errors as "irrelevant" and "not meritorious. (b) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law.

acquired assets and other assets) and liabilities (consisting of deposits. were entrusted to the Asset Privatization Trust. and the DBP and PNB. 1987. among the powers and duties of the Asset Privatization Trust with respect to the trust properties consisting of receivables was to handle their administration and collection by bringing suit to enforce payment of the obligations or any installment thereof or settling or compromising any of such obligations or any other claim or demand which the Government may have against any person or persons.49 As provided for in the Agreement. other liabilities and contingent guarantees) of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Philippine National Bank (PNB). powers. which would. 1992. on the other. 1987 between the National Government. Now. 14 on February 3. among others.47 In accordance with the provisions of Section 2348 of the proclamation. As one of the twin cornerstones of the program was to establish the privatization of a good number of government corporations. and privileges of ownership that an absolute owner of the properties would otherwise have the right to do. equity investments. its original term was extended from December 8. the existence of the Asset Privatization Trust would have expired five (5) years from the date of issuance of Proclamation No. and to do all acts. on one hand. which approved the identification of and transfer to the National Government of certain assets (consisting of loans. a brief history on the creation of the Asset Privatization Trust is proper. the DBP's equity with respondent Bank. 1991 up to August 31. the more relevant question is: who is the real party in interest at the time of the institution of the complaint. institute all proceedings. is it the bank or the Asset Privatization Trust? To answer the query. 1995. 1986. no error could be ascribed to the Court of Appeals on this point. whereby the non-performing accounts of DBP and PNB.50 Incidentally. the National Government designated the Asset Privatization Trust to act as its trustee through a Trust Agreement.51 However. 50. borrowings. then President Corazon C.complaint based on newspaper clippings. 1993 until June 30. for the benefit of the National Government.52 and again from December 31. In turn. Taking into account the imperative need of formally launching a program for the rationalization of the government corporate sector. including. Hence. Aquino issued Proclamation No. The transfer of assets was implemented through a Deed of Transfer executed on February 27. then President Aquino subsequently issued Administrative Order No. and to exercise all other rights.53 and then from July 1. conserve. provisionally manage and dispose of transferred assets that were identified for privatization or disposition. 5046 on December 8. 1995 up to . accrued interest receivables. the proclamation created the Asset Privatization Trust. take title to and possession of.

an accommodation party is one who meets all the three requisites. both in the pleadings as well as in the evidence presented during the trial and up to the time this case reached the Court. the powers. or indorser. he receives no part of the consideration for the instrument but assumes liability to the other party/ies thereto. Significantly. he is deemed an original promisor and debtor . In fact. as if the contract was not for accommodation. at present. which should have been represented by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. Leonardo Ty. Atty. acceptor. the Privatization and Management Office was established and took over. respondent Bank does not appear to be the real party in interest when it instituted the collection suit on August 28. openly admitted that it was under the trusteeship of the Asset Privatization Trust.60 The accommodation party is liable on the instrument to a holder for value even though the holder. the bank reclaimed its real and actual interest over the unpaid promissory notes.57 The Asset Privatization Trust. at the time of taking the instrument. Roderick Orallo. or indorser. counsel for the bank.62 As such. viz: (1) he must be a party to the instrument. signing as maker. (2) he must not receive value therefor.54 and further from January 1. the relation between an accommodation party and the accommodated party is one of principal and surety – the accommodation party being the surety. 2000. readily subscribe to petitioner's insistence that the case must be dismissed. 1990 against Antonio Ang Eng Liong and petitioner Tomas Ang. The foregoing notwithstanding.59 An accommodation party lends his name to enable the accommodated party to obtain credit or to raise money. drawer. among others.61 As petitioner acknowledged it to be.55 Thenceforth.56 Based on the above backdrop. duties and functions of the Asset Privatization Trust under the proclamation. 1999. Notably. that the issue had been rendered moot with the occurrence of a supervening event – the "buy-back" of the bank by its former owner. 2000 until December 31. this Court can not. By such reacquisition from the Asset Privatization Trust when the case was still pending in the lower court. during the pre-trial conference. knew him or her to be merely an accommodation party. Section 29 of the NIL defines an accommodation party as a person "who has signed the instrument as maker. and (3) he must sign for the purpose of lending his name or credit to some other person." As gleaned from the text. sometime in October 1993. without receiving value therefor. hence.December 31. At the time the complaint was filed in the trial court. it was the Asset Privatization Trust which had the authority to enforce its claims against both debtors. drawer. had the authority to file and prosecute the case. it could rightfully qualify as a "holder"58 thereof under the NIL. and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. it stands without refute. acceptor.

even though they be solidary. Book IV of the Civil Code must be observed. Article 2080 of the Civil Code which provides that: "The guarantors. called the guarantor. I/we.64 Although a contract of suretyship is in essence accessory or collateral to a valid principal obligation. Philippines the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND ONLY (P50. constituted a release of his obligation.66 Contrary to petitioner's adamant stand. Jr. are released from their obligation whenever by come act of the creditor. for value received." A solidary or joint and several obligation is one in which each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Accordingly. the surety's liability to the creditor is immediate. Chapter 3. The case of Inciong. This is patent even from the first sentence of the promissory note which states as follows: "Ninety one (91) days after date. the provisions of Section 4. and against Pantanosas. his co-maker. 2047 of the Civil Code states that if a person binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor.from the beginning. Article 208067 of the Civil Code does not apply in a contract of suretyship. JOINTLY and SEVERALLY promise to pay to the PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS at its office in the City of Cagayan de Oro. binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so. especially because the dismissal of the case against Pantanosas was upon the motion of private respondent itself. . CA69 is illuminating: Petitioner also argues that the dismissal of the complaint against Naybe.68 Art. he is directly and equally bound with the principal. a surety becomes liable to the debt and duty of the principal obligor even without possessing a direct or personal interest in the obligations nor does he receive any benefit therefrom. and preferences of the latter. they cannot be subrogated to the rights." It is to be noted. v. Articles 1207 up to 1222 of the Code (on joint and solidary obligations) shall govern the relationship of petitioner with the bank. mortgages. On the other hand. together with interest x x x at the rate of SIXTEEN (16) per cent per annum until fully paid. Title I. however. primary and absolute.65 As an equivalent of a regular party to the undertaking.000.00) Pesos. that petitioner signed the promissory note as a solidary co-maker and not as a guarantor. the principal debtor. and each creditor is entitled to demand the whole obligation. Article 2047 of the Civil Code states: "By guaranty a person.63 he is considered in law as the same party as the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching the obligation of the latter since their liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable. however. He cites as basis for his argument. Philippine Currency.

when there are two or more debtors in one and the same obligation. (Citations omitted)70 In the instant case. In such a case the contract is called a suretyship.) While a guarantor may bind himself solidarily with the principal debtor. actions and benefits which pertain to him by reason of rights of the fiansa. although no notice of appeal and appellant's brief were served to Antonio Ang Eng Liong. petitioner. some or all of the debtors. as an accommodation party. Under Art. bars his (petitioner's) cross-claims against him: First. Chapter 3.If a person binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor. Chapter 3. the trial court's judgment. despite including in the . There is a solidarily liability only when the obligation expressly so states. thereby.71 It is plainly mistaken for petitioner to say that just because the bank failed to serve the notice of appeal and appellant's brief to Antonio Ang Eng Liong. any one. Title I. Nonetheless. The choice is left to the solidary creditor to determine against whom he will enforce collection. outside of the liability he assumes to pay the debt before the property of the principal debtor has been exhausted. Because the promissory note involved in this case expressly states that the three signatories therein are jointly and severally liable. Book IV of the Civil Code. the liability of a guarantor is different from that of a solidary debtor. the provisions of Section 4. he was nonetheless impleaded in the case since his name appeared in the caption of both the notice and the brief as one of the defendants-appellees. petitioner agreed to be "jointly and severally" liable under the two promissory notes that he co-signed with Antonio Ang Eng Liong as the principal debtor. The later. 1207 thereof. became final and executory as against the latter and. when the law so provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires. in effect. This being so. being the party accommodated." (Italics supplied." Section 4. Book IV of the Civil Code states the law on joint and several obligations. while a solidary co-debtor has no other rights than those bestowed upon him in Section 4. Tolentino explains: "A guarantor who binds himself in solidum with the principal debtor under the provisions of the second paragraph does not become a solidary co-debtor to all intents and purposes. Title I of this Book shall be observed.72 Second. it is completely immaterial if the bank would opt to proceed only against petitioner or Antonio Ang Eng Liong or both of them since the law confers upon the creditor the prerogative to choose whether to enforce the entire obligation against any one. title I. retains all the other rights. There is a difference between a solidary co-debtor. may seek reimbursement from Antonio Ang Eng Liong. some or all of them may be proceeded against for the entire obligation. the presumption is that obligation is joint so that each of the debtors is liable only for a proportionate part of the debt. Chapter 3. Thus. and a fiador in solidum (surety).

he did not deny such liability but merely pleaded that the bank "be ordered to submit a more reasonable computation" instead of collecting excessive interest. Antonio Ang Eng Liong. already lacked jurisdiction over his person or over the subject matter relating to him because he was not a party in CA-G.75 Likewise. this Court rejects the contention of Antonio Ang Eng Liong.73 Third.000. the consideration for the note as regards its maker is the money advanced to the accommodated party. that the Court of Appeals.80 It is no defense to state on his part that he did not receive any value therefor81 because the phrase "without receiving value therefor" used in Sec. already waived his right to take part in the trial proceedings and had to contend with the judgment rendered by the court based on the evidence presented by the bank and petitioner. CV No. it is immaterial . In his Answer to the complaint. Antonio Ang Eng Liong was expressly named as one of the defendants-appellees. As the promissory notes were not discharged or impaired through any act or omission of the bank. penalty charges. and attorney's fees. in not filing his answer to petitioner's cross-claims. in his "special appearance" through counsel.74 and Fourth. much less this Court. a judgment on the pleadings76 would have also been proper since not a single issue was generated by the Answer he filed. Antonio Ang Eng Liong even categorically admitted having secured a loan totaling P80. in not filing a pre-trial brief and another. Stress must be laid of the fact that he had twice put himself in default – one.caption of the appellee's brief his co-debtor as one of the defendants-appellees. it was only in his motion for reconsideration from the adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals that petitioner belatedly chose to serve notice to the counsel of his co-defendant-appellee. petitioner as accommodating party warranted to the holder in due course that he would pay the same according to its tenor.83 As in the instant case. petitioner did not also serve him a copy thereof. Again. being a party declared in default. in issuing the two promissory notes. "without receiving payment for lending his name. Moreover. even without considering these default judgments."82 Stated differently. Consequently.R. For failing to tender an issue and in not denying the material allegations stated in the complaint. hence. 124979 of the Civil Code would necessarily find no application. a sum of money was received by virtue of the notes. Sections 119 (d)77 and 12278 of the NIL as well as Art. neither was petitioner's right of reimbursement barred nor was the bank's right to proceed against Antonio Ang Eng Liong expressly renounced by the omission to serve notice of appeal and appellant's brief to a party already declared in default. 29 of the NIL means "without receiving value by virtue of the instrument" and not as it is apparently supposed to mean. It is enough that value was given for the note at the time of its creation. 53413. in the caption of the Court of Appeals' decision. As a matter of course. when a third person advances the face value of the note to the accommodated party at the time of its creation.

if applicable. he is a solidary co-debtor. but it must be born in mind that it is a recognized doctrine in the matter of suretyship that with respect to the surety. the defendant. Sellner.L. petitioner cannot now claim that he was prejudiced by the supposed "extension of time" given by the bank to his co-debtor.84 Under the law. or delay in proceeding against the principal debtor. particularly petitioner.C. or the fact that he did not enforce the guaranty or apply on the payment of such funds as were available. and dispose of it to his benefit.87 In Clark v. none of these were prudently done by petitioner. the creditor is under no obligation to display any diligence in the enforcement of his rights as a creditor. which is not the case in the present action..88 this Court held: x x x The mere delay of the creditor in enforcing the guaranty has not by any means impaired his action against the defendant. is not generally accepted and the courts almost universally consider it essentially inconsistent with the relation of the parties to the note. It should not be lost sight of that the defendant's signature on the note is an assurance to the creditor that the collateral guaranty will remain good. since the liability of an accommodation party remains not only primary but also unconditional to a holder for value. will be personally responsible for the payment. such an act would have wholly or partially released the surety.85 Regrettably. passiveness. (21 R.so far as the bank is concerned whether one of the signers. that if the creditor had done any act whereby the guaranty was impaired in its value. however. There is in some decisions a tendency toward holding that the creditor's laches may discharge the surety. he lackadaisically relied on Antonio Ang Eng Liong. or discharged. instead of directly communicating with the bank for its settlement. if there be any. Furthermore. 1032-1034)89 . the latter is still liable for the whole obligation and such extension does not release him because as far as a holder for value is concerned. True. or. meaning by laches a negligent forbearance. and that otherwise.86 Thus. a surety may pay the debt. His mere inaction indulgence. who represented that he would take care of the matter. subrogate himself in the place of the creditor with the right to enforce the guaranty against the other signers of the note for the reimbursement of what he is entitled to recover from them. he. This theory. constitute no defense at all for the surety. upon the maturity of the note. unless the contract expressly requires diligence and promptness on the part of the creditor. has or has not received anything in payment of the use of his name. demand the collateral security. When he was first notified by the bank sometime in 1982 regarding his accountabilities under the promissory notes. even if the accommodated party receives an extension of the period for payment without the consent of the accommodation party.

To sanction his theory is to give unwarranted legal recognition to the patent absurdity of a situation where a co-maker. 53413 are AFFIRMED. Assuming it to be true. evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties all over again. the Court notes that these were the very same questions of fact raised on appeal before the Court of Appeals.Neither can petitioner benefit from the alleged "insolvency" of Antonio Ang Eng Liong for want of clear and convincing evidence proving the same. No costs. Save for the most cogent and compelling reason.91 WHEREFORE.90 In sum. It is doctrinal that only errors of law and not of fact are reviewable by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. it is not our function under the rule to examine. can escape liability by the convenient expedient of interposing the defense that he is a merely an accommodation party. Further. . Suffice it to say that the same. The fact that petitioner stands only as a surety in relation to Antonio Ang Eng Liong is immaterial to the claim of the bank and does not a whit diminish nor defeat the rights of the latter as a holder for value. being factual. he also did not exercise diligence in demanding security to protect himself from the danger thereof in the event that he (petitioner) would eventually be sued by the bank. whether petitioner may or may not obtain security from Antonio Ang Eng Liong cannot in any manner affect his liability to the bank. the said remedy is a matter of concern exclusively between themselves as accommodation party and accommodated party. although at times couched in different terms and explained more lengthily in the petition. 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. when sued on an instrument by a holder in due course and for value. have been satisfactorily passed upon and considered both by the trial and appellate courts. CV No. as regards the other issues and errors alleged in this petition.R. The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. 2000 Decision and December 26. SO ORDERED. the October 9.