Wittgenstein & Heidegger
UTAS Philosophy Society

Reading Guide
Semester 2, 2013

Isaac Foster Sophie Jarman


 The  life  of  Cicero  is  a   constant  influence  on  how  I  write.  Of  her  tendencies  as  a  reader  and  a  writer:   “The  late  Roman  Republic  is  my  great  passion  and  influence.  More  on  that   Her  focus  is  on  an  intersectional  reading  of  history  and  sexuality  through  Hegelian   dialectics  and  Heideggerian  thought.  in  his  cabin  in   Todtnauberg.  language   and  metaphysics.  which  are  generally  held  to  be  their  best.  the  other.jarman@gmail.  Her  primary  love  is  her  poetry  and  short  prose.  his  inflections.  and  creative   production  (toot  your  horn  if  you’re  into  structuralism  and  post-­‐structuralism).  Neuroscience  and  Zoology  at  UTAS.  in  the  Black  Forest  of  Southwestern  Germany.  his  meter.  in  Ireland.  Martin  Heidegger  (1889-­‐1976).  1859-­‐1938)  and  as  often.  I’m  reading  Philosophy.  and  the   Social/Philosophical  anthropology  of  human  nature.  My  main  interests  are  in  Philosophy  of   Mind.  and  throughout  we’ll  be  directing  you  to  debate   and  engagement  with  these  philosophers  across  multiple  media.  or  in  a  cabin  in  Skjolden.”       Reading Course Description This  reading  group  examines  the  work  and  legacy  of  two  philosophers  tied  for  the  title  of   ‘most  influential  of  the  20th  century’:  one.   Wittgenstein  and  Heidegger  particularly  interest  me  because  of  the  existential   implications  of  their  approaches  to  epistemology  and  ontology.  Being  and  Time  (1927)  and  Wittgenstein’s  second.  yet   it  is  a  work  from  Heidegger’s  first.  up  the  Lustrafjord  branch  of   the  Sognefjord  in  Eastern  Norway.  Both  underwent  two  distinct  ‘turnings’  in  their  career.   2   Contact details Reading Group Coordinators Name | E-Mail | Phone | A little about us   Isaac Foster | iafoster@utas.   Classics.  the  ascetic  Austrian-­‐ British  philosopher  of | 0498 964 521 I’m  a  second-­‐year  undergraduate  from  the  Northwest  Coast.  the  German  philosopher  of  ontology.  who  presided  at  the  University  of  Marburg   and  Freiburg  (following  his  mentor  Edmund  Husserl.  while  we  help  each  other   to  reach  an  understanding  of  their  works.  his  restlessness.  Ludwig  Wittgenstein  (1889-­‐1951).  and  elsewhere   alone  in  Austrian  trenches.  I  hope.  who   worked  sometimes  in  Cambridge  alongside  Bertrand  Russell  (1872-­‐1970).  denotation  of  vocabulary  in  Critical  Theory.   Sophie Jarman | | 0457 120 886 Sophie  Jarman  is  a  second-­‐year  Classics  major.  and  for  their   relevance  to  Philosophy  of  Mind.   Philosophical  Investigations  (1953).  mind  and  language.   hermeneutics  and  gender  theory.nicole.  with  interests  in  postmodernism.  integration.  Language.     Other  works  may  come  during  our  reading.     .

IV. Time. V. Pt. PI. Sat. PI. B&T (312-348) ‘Part I’. Pt. Pt. B&T 7th Sept. III. Pt. § 138-184 30th August 13th Sept. Pt. Sat. § 571-693 ‘Division Two’. (456-488) ‘Part II’. Friday 5th October 6pm. (169-224) 6pm. PI. B&T (149-168) 9am. § 185-242 ‘Division Two’. § 422-570 ‘Division Two’. Pt. and Hegel (Hr) & unarranged thoughts on Mind. Friday 19th October 6pm. Pt. VI. VI. 9am.   3   Content Date   10th August Readings   Topic   The method of B&T (Hr) & The Augustinian picture of language (Wt) The phenomenology of dasein (Hr) & On Understanding: The Augustinian Picture pt.1-66) B&T 6pm Sat. ‘Part I’. B&T (349-382) ‘Part I’. care. B&T. II. I. Friday EXAM PERIOD ‘Division Two’. Pt. § I-IX ‘Division Two’. 67-90) 9am. Pt. V. Friday ‘Part I’. IV. Friday ‘Part I’. 9am. Pt. Sat. § 310-421 ‘Division Two’. PI. language and rules (Wt) Being in the world with others (Hr) & Critique of ‘essentiality’ and ‘logical fixicity’ of language (Wt) More on Being and Thrownness (Hr) & Critique of ‘Understanding’ in Philosophy of Mind Dasein. PI. grammar and ascription (Wt) Venue  (TBC)   Date  (If  TBC)   ‘Introduction’ (pp. B&T (274-311) 6pm. 11th October 9am. PI. PI. ‘Division One’. grammar and ascription (Wt) Dasein. § 243-309 27th Sept. Pt. PI. 25th October 9am. B&T (383-423) ‘Part I’. ‘Part I’. Symptoms: More on Private Language (Wt) Authenticity and Temporality (Hr) & Scattered thoughts on Philosophy of Mind (Wt) Temporality & Dasein (Hr) & Scattered thoughts on Philosophy of Mind (Wt) Dasein and History (Hr) & PI part 2: Unarranged thoughts on Mind. PI. § 1-20 16th August ‘Division One’. B&T (91-148) 6pm. § 21-64 ‘Division One’. II. and truth (Hr) & From Understanding to Rulefollowing: Is there any standard for correctness? (Wt) Dasein and death (Hr) & On Private Language (Wt) Authenticity (Hr) & Criteria vs. B&T (pp. anxiety. Friday ‘Part I’. B&T (225-273) ‘Part I’. B&T (424-455) ‘Part II’. PI. PI. and critique of logical analysis (44-66) (Wt) Worldhood (Hr) & The general form of propositions. § 92-137 ‘Division One’. § XI-XIV Flexible . Sept 21st Sept. Sat. Friday ‘Part I’. III. § 65-91 24th August ‘Division One’. I. PI. II.

B&T (pp. Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought" (24) In what was does this imply that "The meaning of Being must already be available in some way"? (25) What does he mean when he speaks of a "vague average understanding of Being" and why is it worth clarifying? He adds that every question must also be guided by what it is that is asked about (25). § 21-64 In section 43. then? Heidegger says that Dasein is 'in' the world only as a way of being concerned with it (83).   4   Book Readings Monday July 29 th – Sunday August 4th Time and day of meeting: NO MEETING – READING WEEK ‘Introduction’ (pp. says Heidegger. Rocks don't "Exist" in the way he will speak of "Existence". Pt.. Dasein. They are only "present-at-hand". PI." ? (89) . Why is it that Dasein is "in each case mine?" (42). Which way. 67-90) ‘Part I’. "exists".. Why? "Every inquiry is a seeking. what does Wittgenstein identify as the meaning of a word? Which of the following is NOT an objection Wittgenstein raises against logical atomism? (A) It misuses the distinction between "simple" and "composite. Heidegger states that he will begin with a question of the meaning of the question of the meaning of being. What does Heidegger mean when he says that "The essence of Dasein lies in its existence" (42)? "Existence" will take on a special significance for Heidegger. What does this mean? How is our concern with things in the world a way of being in the world that is fundamentally different from the way a bug is 'in' a box? Does the phrase ‘to give a damn' ring a bell here? How is our knowledge of the world a form of being in the world? Why does Heidegger believe our knowledge of the world is founded on a modification of our original concern with the world? Why does he claim "the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone out and grapsed it. Only human beings." (B) It fails to recognise the sharp difference between naming and describing. which is the Being of entitites in this case. § 1-20 On page one. so we must investigate one specific entity –– the inquirer. PI. What does he mean when he speaks of authentic and inauthentic modes? Entities "present-at-hand" in the world can be 'in' one another as a beetle can be 'in' a box. II. (D) Analysed propositions and words are not necessarily more helpful or clearer than their unanalysed counterparts. I. But Dasein is not 'in' the world in that way. (C) The process of analysis can be interminable and is thus impractical.1-66) B&T ‘Part I’. Why? What does Heidegger mean by "Historicality is a determining characterisation for Dasein in the very basis of its being" (42)? What does Heidegger mean when he defines phenomenology as a way of letting "that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself" (58)? Why phenomenology? What is it? Monday August 4 th – Sunday August 11th Time and day of meeting: ‘Division One’.

(D) None of the above. Pt. B&T (169-224) ‘Part I’. PI. § 138-184 What is a grammatical investigation? What purpose does it serve for Wittgenstein? (151) What is Heidegger getting at when he says that Dasein "is itself in every case its 'there'" and "is its disclosedness"? . (C) There is a certain "genetic code" that gives words their meaning. § 92-137 Wittgenstein interrupts his discussion of understanding at 155 to launch an extended discussion of reading. PI. but have no defining characteristics.   Monday August 12 – Sunday August 18th Time and day of meeting: 5   ‘Division One’. to have an identity. B&T (149-168) ‘Part I’. What does Wittgenstein mean by "family resemblance"? (A) All words with the same root share a similar meaning. § 65-91 Which of the following is true of all games? (A) They are amusing. B&T (91-148) ‘Part I’. PI. (C) They are played with a ball. Pt. (B) The different uses of a word share certain similarities. How is this sense of who one is that one acquires through one's involvement in the world in its readiness-to-hand possess an anonymous character that permits Heidegger to describe it as "the they"? Monday August 26 th – Sunday September 1 st Time and day of meeting: ‘Division One’. What significance does this latter concept have for the former investigation? How does our concerned involvement with the world in its readiness-t-hand place me with other persons? How is our being-with-others based "upon what is a matter of common concern"? (159). V. How does one come to be oneself. IV. III. in terms of one's involvement in the world in its readiness-to-hand?. (D) Words from the same linguistic families share many traits. (B) They have a fixed set of rules. Pt. What does Heidegger mean by contrasting the world insofar as it is ready-to-hand from the world present-at-hand? How does he argue that the world is primordially there for us as ready-to-hand rather than present-at-hand? How does the world in which its readiness-to-hand ultimately refer to Dasein itself as "the sole authentic 'for-the-sake-of-which'"? (117) How does the structure of the world in its readiness-to-hand constitute the significance of the world? How without such a structure would the world be empty of meaning? What then is meaning? How does Heidegger distinguish the spatiality of the world in its readiness-to-hand from a 'threedimensional multiplicity of possible positions which gets filled up with Things present-at-hand"? (136) Monday August 19 th – Sunday August 25th Time and day of meeting: ‘Division One’.

as Heidegger analyses it. as Heidegger understands it." In what way does "anxiety".. depend on our understanding interpretation of the world? What does Heidegger mean in speaking of "idle talk"? How is Dasein "as factical Being-in-the-world ." (B) "Meant" in "I meant you should write '1002' after '1000.. our capacity for language. § 185-242 Which of the following verbs is used differently from the other three? (A) "Believe" in "I believe that fire will burn me. How do our moods disclose the world to us insofar as it matters to us? (177). itself an interpretation of the world? How does the assertion of a statement or judgement depend on what he calls "circumspective interpretation"? How does our capacity to speak intelligibly of things. 'is there' Being? (255) Does this mean that things don't exist apart from our human involvement with things (a seemingly silly idea) or else what? What does Heidegger mean when he claims that "Before Newton's laws were discovered they were not 'true' .. something from which it has already fallen away"? (220) How does my concerned absorption in the world constitute a falling away from myself as a unique existence? 6   Monday September 2 nd – Sunday September 8 th Time and day of meeting: ‘Division One’.. it does not follow that they were false .'" (C) "Expecting" in "I've been expecting you all day. Through Newton the laws became true ."? (269) What is the relationship between Dasein and the possibility of 'truth'? . PI." (D) "Thinking" in "I am thinking of a number between one and ten..   How do our moods constitute a way "Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition"? (175).. VI. bring us face to face with the "uncanniness" (234) of our existence and "individualises" (233) us? How is Dasein "ahead-of-itself"? Why does Heidegger characterise the Being of Dasein as "care" and what does he mean by this? What does Heidegger mean when he claims "only as long as Dasein is. Pt. How do moods disclose the way in which I find myself "thrown" into the world and this way disclose what Heidegger characterises as my "facticity"? How does fear illustrate Heidegger's analysis of moods as a way of being-in-the-world? How do we gain a kind of understanding of our Being-in-the-world through our "potentiality-forBeing"? How does this sense of understanding constitute a disclosure of the world to me? How is our understanding in this sense a form of what Heidegger calls "projection"? How is my state of mind wrapped up with my understanding and vice-versa? In what way are they essentially interconnected? How does the interpretation of something qua something constitute a "development of the understanding"? How is understanding. B&T (225-273) ‘Part I’...

PI. B&T (274-311) ‘Part I’. but right now it has nothing to do with us.. section 293 supposed to represent? (A) An insect collection (B) Pain behaviour (C) A person's knowledge of other people's sensations (D) A person's own inner sensations What are the problems that Heidegger sees in grasping Dasein "as a whole"? Why does Heidegger believe that we do not authentically experience death in our experience of the death of the other person? Why does he claim that "death is in every case mine . (C) A language I invent that refers to my own inner sensations. but it would take a great advance in our technology.   Monday September 9 th – Sunday September 15th Time and day of meeting: 7   ‘Division Two’."? (284) Has this changed the way you feel about death? Or how you think about death? In what way is death my "ownmost" possibility? What does Heidegger mean in discussing death as "the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein" (294)? How is my being-towards-death disclosed in anxiety? "One of these days one will die too . § 243-309 What is a "private language"? (A) A code according to which only certain people can communicate." (297) How does this phrase capture our everyday being-towards-death as a way of recognising the fact of death while also denying it as one's ownmost possibility? How does Heidegger distinguish the kind of certainty we have of death as an actual event that will befall us from the kind of certainty we have of death as a possibility that could strike us at any moment? How does our anticipation of death as our ownmost possibility make possible a form of authenticity for us in which "one becomes free FOR one's own death"? (308) Monday September 16 th – Sunday September 22nd Time and day of meeting: ‘Division Two’. Pt.. I. (B) We don't yet know how to apply the word "think" to a machine. B&T (312-348) ‘Part I’. (C) A machine that can calculate already knows how to think on some level.. Pt. § 310-421 What is the "private language argument"? To what extent is it an argument? To what extent does it deal with language? To what extent does it deal with privacy? What are we to draw from this discussion? What is the significance of Wittgenstein's use of criteria? What work does it do for him? What does Wittgenstein say on the question of whether a machine might ever be able to think? (A) It is logically impossible. II. (D) A language used by low-ranking soldiers. What is the "beetle" in the "beetle in the box" analogy of Part I. Which of these questions has no clear application? (A) "Are these books my books?" (B) "Is this foot my foot?" (C) "Is this body my body?" (D) "Is this sensation my sensation?" How does Heidegger analyse the "voice of conscience" as a call to an authentic appropriation of our possibilities for Being? What are the formal characteristics of our experience of guilt. (D) Possibly. (B) The inner monologue in my head. for Heidegger? In what way does Dasein find itself the 'basis of a nullity' and how does this entail that Dasein IS guilty in its very Being in a way which enables us to make sense how our experience of guilt is an experience . PI.

PI."? (377) . PI. which as such has to lay the basis for itself. "I wonder what time it is"? (A) I have a mental picture of a clock. § 422-570 What does Wittgenstein say about the statement. B&T (383-423) ‘Part I’.   of more than just wrong-doing and regret. (D) It is a state of the mind that is implanted at an early age and remains with us continuously throughout our lives. "Temporality 'is' not an entity at all. and yet. (B) There is a feeling of assurance or certainty with which I utter the words. it must take over Being-a-basis"? (330) 8   What does Heidegger mean by "resoluteness" and how does resoluteness answer the call of conscience to assume authentic responsibility for ourselves? Monday September 23 rd – Sunday September 29th Time and day of meeting: ‘Division Two’. Pt. (D) The surrounding circumstances provide the context for determining the difference. III. there goes an unshakable joy in this possibility. can NEVER get that basis into its power. Pt. Temporality is the primordial 'outside-of-itself' in and for itself.. but an experience of a constitutive dimension of human existence? What is Heidegger getting at when he writes: "The Self." (358)? Monday September 30 th – Sunday October 6th Time and day of meeting: ‘Division Two’. § 571-693 What determines that I am genuinely guessing the time and not just reciting empty words when I say. as existing. simply time itself as it is originally lived by Dasein as a matter of being present to the world in terms of its projection it itself into the future of its concerns on the basis of the situation in which it finds itself thrown (namely its past)? What does Heidegger mean when he claims. (C) There is no difference between the two cases. In what way is "care". B&T (349-382) ‘Part I’. What is the "joy" that Heidegger speaks of as parallel with the anxiety of authenticity when he writes: "Along with the sober anxiety which brings us face to face with our individualised potentiality-forBeing. "I believe that fire will burn me"? (A) It is nonsense. understood as the Being of Dasein. (B) It does not state the kind of belief that can be called into question.. (C) It is false. IV.

V. I can never begin moving." (C) "If. Pt. I must cover half that distance first. § I-IX Which of the following can a dog not feel? (A) Surprise (B) Joy (C) Hope (D) Anger Which is an expression of Moore's paradox? (A) "This statement is false. because no matter how small the distance. 2008) Ludwig Wittgenstein – Philosophical Investigations (1953) G. to cover any distance. B&T. 226) What sorts of things are we talking about when we talk about "seeing"? (A) Sense data (B) Objects and people (C) Aspects and interpretations (D) A whole range of experiences that cannot be easily classified Why does Wittgenstein introduce the "duck-rabbit"? (A) To examine the difference between human and animal speech (B) To illustrate what he means by "seeing an aspect" (C) To show us that interpretation is a mental act (D) To examine the relationship between how the eye moves and how we interpret a picture Monday October 14 th – Sunday October 20 th Time and day of meeting: ‘Division Two’. Anscombe standard edition .E. What does this claim mean? What is its significance?   Required texts Martin Heidegger – Being and Time (1927) Joan Stambaugh or Macquarrie & Robinson (1996) (1962. there is always a smaller distance that I must cover first." What does Wittgenstein mean when he says. B&T (424-455) ‘Part II’. but it isn't. VI. PI. "a rose has teeth in the mouth of the beast"? What is the significance of this statement? (XI." (B) "I believe it's raining.   Monday October 7 th – Sunday October 13 th Time and day of meeting: 9   ‘Division Two’." (D) "The concept of a horse is not a concept. Pt. (456-488) ‘Part II’.M. PI. § XI-XIV Stanley Cavell characterises the Investigations as being written in the form of a confession.

R (1999) Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil (generally considered the best biography on Heidegger) (ii) Studies Wittgenstein Braver. T (1982) Wittgenstein’s Nephew (a book recommended to me on a bus by Leo Schofield: true story) Monk. (2002) Heidegger: A Very Short Introduction Polt.   10   Other publications and resources (i) Histories and General reference Wittgenstein Bernhard. (1999) Heidegger: An Introduction (generally considered the best general introduction) Safranski. M (1999) A Heidegger Dictionary Inwood.F. A (1973) Wittgenstein (a short introduction by quite a good philosopher) Kripke. M. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (a fiercely debated but still influential reading of the ‘Philosophical Investigations’) Heidegger Braver. R.J. L (2009) Heidegger's Later Writings: A Reader's Guide . R (1991) Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (the biography of Wittgenstein) Soames. S (2005) Philosophical Analysis in the 20th Century (a wonderful two volume history of the analytic movement) Heidegger Inwood. H (2001) Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader (a very valuable companion of secondary evaluations) Kenny. Saul (1983).H. Lee Groundless Grounds: A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger Glock.

). which will be worth comparing to the later-Heidegger’s critique of modernity and the history of dasein in culture. 1951) (A short book in the mode of the Philosophical Investigations.. and Malpas. which is in part a critique of the Tractatus. from Art and Music to Kierkegaard. ––– (eds.B. Volume 1. Generally considered a very good introduction to the ideas of the PI). Heidegger. still highly relevant. Zimmerman. 2000.H. Heidegger. H. C. Hubert (1991) Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time.E. D.F. Mass. M. Dreyfus. Authenticity and Modernity: Essays in Honor of Hubert L.) On Certainty (c..: MIT Press. the lecture notes written for his students as he was formulating the Philosophical Investigations. Schoenbohm. Companion to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy Wrathall.L. Cambridge. ME (1986) Eclipse of Self: The Development of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity (ii) Other works by our Authors Wittgenstein Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus (1921. Vallega-Neu. Useful to see where Wittgenstein is coming from in the PI) The Blue and Brown Books (1958) (Published after his death. (2001) A Companion to Heidgger's "Introduction to Metaphysics" Polt. C.: MIT Press. the two perhaps had the same existential soul. Place. 2000. Dreyfus. Division I Dreyfus. Volume 2. While their philosophies differed radically. S. R. Perhaps the last philosophy he wrote). & Vallega. World Philipse. (eds. 1922) (A great book possibly rendered redundant by Wittgenstein’s own hand in the Philosophical Investigations. Coping and Cognitive Science: Essays in Honor of Hubert L.. (2006) The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger Malpas. Mass. Cambridge. H (1993) Heidegger's Philosophy of Being Polt. . (2000).H (2006) The Emergency of Being: On Heidegger's "Contributions to Philosophy" Schürmann. R. Jeff Heidegger’s Topology: Being.   11   Dreyfus. (2007) A Companion to Heidegger Guignon. A. R (2008) On Heidegger's Being and Time Scott. Culture and Value (1977) (Various remarks on culture.F. J.).

Contains: "The Question Concerning Technology".) The Concept of Time Written as he was working on Being and Time. Introduction to Metaphysics (1935. The Concept of Time: The First Draft of Being and Time (2011). an approach to the question 'Why are there beings rather than nothing?'.   12   Heidegger Basic Writings (2008) A very fine anthology covering a wide range of his works. 2012) Perhaps Heidegger's second most influential work.” Contributions to Philosophy (1936-8. on the history of ontology and the relation between time as temporality and being. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1929/30. "The Age of the World Picture".     . May be better than buying the werks above if you’re still testing the water to see if you like Heidegger. and history. the meaning and concept of Being. 2000) Not a textbook or introduction to metaphysics. History of the Concept of Time Lectures which are another important companion to Being and Time. 1984. Well known and quite important. Cf. 1999. One of Heidegger's most difficult works. "The Turning". Wittgenstein’s ‘Culture and Value’. intended as the missing division 3 of part 1 of Being and Time. "Science and Reflection". Being and Time. It is said that his lectures are frequently clearer than his books. 1983. translated by Ingo Farin. and are thus engaged in a constant and productive struggle or strife. containing essays and excerpts. toward the grounding of Da-sein as a historical decision of human beings. Covers the key concepts of that work and a little more. The result is a move away from the centrality of the phenomenological analyses of Dasein. to his later preoccupations with language. but along with Basic Problems is a very accessible translation of his thought. Pathmarks and Off the Beaten Track are two further collections of essays which are highly relevant to students of Heidegger. as well as part 2. neither earth nor world can exist without the other. Earth can be understood as the condition of possibilities for world. "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God Is Dead'". 1953. 1995) “Crucial for an understanding of Heidegger's transition from the major work of his early years. Very accessible. The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (1977) Heidegger on culture. by himself. Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1982) (A unit taught at the University of Marburg in 1927. The short first-draft of Being and Time. truth. Basic Concepts Not a great work in and of itself by all accounts.