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Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

Team #2 Intelligence Collection, Analysis, Management, Oversight and Resources

Team Members: Kevin Scheid Gordon Lederman Bruce Berkowitz

Item #1: Item #2: Item #3: Item #4:

Key Questions of the Investigation Suggested Unclassified Readings for Commissioners and a Briefing Plan Categories of Documents Interviews


Team #2: Intelligence Collection, Analysis, Management, Oversight and Resources Key Questions of the Investigation
Intelligence Collection: Was there an effective intelligence collection strategy for global terrorism prior to September 2001 and is there one today? 1. How does the Intelligence Community collect information on global terrorism? 2. How did global terrorism rank among competing intelligence collection priorities and who identified these priorities? What was the significance of the changes in priorities to our efforts against global terrorism? 3. What was the Intelligence Community's collection strategy regarding terrorism? Who had responsibility and authority for the strategy? Was this strategy approved by the DCI and the interagency process and when? How and when was it reviewed for its effectiveness? 4. What steps did the Secretary of Defense take to ensure that collection was appropriately focused on the priorities identified by the DCI, particularly counterterrorism? How was the IC's collection strategy coordinated with our traditional foreign reporting conducted by the Department of State, Treasury and Justice? How effective was this strategy in countries such as Pakistan, Germany, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia? 5. How did the IC's collectors implement the counterterrorism collection strategy? Which collection assets have proven effective? 6. How and when was collection focused on al Qaeda? What was the collection strategy on UBL? What specific intelligence triggered the establishment of the Usama bin Laden (UBL) Task Force at CIA in 1996? How did the Task Force improve collection on this target? 7. How did events such as military action in the Balkans, Northern and Southern Watch in Iraq, Rwanda, the Middle East, and peacekeeping missions worldwide impact the IC's collection strategy against global terrorism? Intelligence Analysis: Was there an effective intelligence analysis strategy for global terrorism prior to September 2001 and is there one today? 1. How does the Intelligence Community analyze global terrorism? How should it? 2. How did global terrorism rank among competing topics, and who established the ranking? 3. How and when was analysis focused on al Qaeda? What was the analytic strategy toward ul Qaeda? How did the IC's manner of focusing its collection and analysis on UBL impact the analysis itself? How did the DCI's declaration of "war" on al Qaeda impact the analytic resources'1

DRAFT 4. The DCI's Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) was apparently intended to be the focal point of all counterterrorism analysis; how has organizational placement of the CTC in the Directorate of Operations impacted its ability to perform strategic analysis of global terrorism? How effective has the CTC been at coordinating intelligence across the 1C and throughout the government? 5. Did the DCI effectively obtain relevant information and analysis from other agencies related to terrorism? Did the CTC get the information it needed from across the government to effectively analyze the potential terrorist threats to the United States, and how did it use this information? 6. How was intelligence about threats provided to policymakers? One of the DCI's basic responsibilities is to warn of attack upon the United States; was warning (strategic and tactical) performed effectively prior to September 2001? Who performed it? 7. What were the conclusions of the DCI's "Hard Target" study on terrorism and what did it conclude? Who performed the study? Who was responsible for implementing its recommendations? What follow-up was performed? 8. What analytic methods are most promising to improve our assessments o f the terrorist danger and who is the government uses such analytic methods. Red Teaming? Means of attack? Mapping vulnerabilities? Risk assessments? 9. What government entity maintains the authoritative list of terrorists? 10. How will the new Terrorism Threat Integration Center operate and what challenges will it face? Intelligence Management: Who in the government has the responsibility, authority and accountability for the collection, analysis and warning of global terrorist threats? 1. What is the NSC's role in managing the Intelligence Community? In particular what is its role over intelligence collection and analysis on terrorism? 2. What are the respective roles of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General and the DCI regarding counterterrorism intelligence? How has the bifurcated nature of the Intelligence Community's chain of command affected its management of counterterrorism intelligence? 3. What were the respective leadership roles of the DCI, DDCI, DDCI for Community Management, the Assistant DCI for Collection, and the Assistant DCI for Analysis and Production in the conduct of the Intelligence Community's counterterrorism programs and in management? How was their management direction implemented and reviewed? 4. To what extent did the Intelligence Community learn from each of the successive terrorist attacks during the 1990s and apply those lessons learned to improving its collection and analysis' 7

DRAFT Intelligence Oversight: How did congressional oversight affect the Executive Branch's ability to conduct effective counterterrorism programs? 1. How has congressional oversight led to better performance in the Intelligence Community? How effective were the House and Senate intelligence committees in overseeing US Intelligence, particularly regarding counterterrorism? 2. What priority did the six congressional oversight committees give to counter terrorism activities of the Intelligence Community? How was this priority manifested in program direction in their report language (and classified annexes) and in their budget marks? 3. What findings and recommendations resulted from congressional investigations into the Intelligence Community's counter terrorism efforts prior to the Joint Inquiry investigation? How were these recommendations implemented? 4. How did the Intelligence Community keep Congress aware of the threats to the United States from terrorism, and how did Congress respond? How was warning intelligence provided to the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate, and what actions resulted? Intelligence Resources: Did the Intelligence Community have sufficient resources to counter global terrorism effectively? 1. Is there an effective budget process within the Intelligence Community to ensure that resources are allocated to the highest priorities identified by the President, the NSC, the DCI and the Secretary of Defense? 2. What has been the analytic basis for requesting intelligence funding for counterterrorism activities in the intelligence community from 1985 to 2003? How have counterterrorism programs been examined and audited for their effectiveness? What adjustments were made? 3. What efforts have been made by the DCI and Secretary of Defense to properly balance resources across the Intelligence Community to align resources for the greatest impact, particularly after the DCI had declared war on al Qaeda in 1998? 4. How have intelligence budget requests for counterterrorism activities been scrutinized by the Office of Management and Budget? What has been the impact of this scrutiny on these programs? What are the roles of other Executive Office of the President oversight entities? 5. How has counterterrorism funding changed, and why? How have CT resources been invested in human source collection? Signals collection? Imagery collection? Open source collection? CT analysis? 6. Did the relevant House and Senate authorizations and appropriations committees uphold the President's request for counterterrorism funding' 7 If not, why? Did the Congress add funding to the President's request for resources? If so, why? 7. Why did the Intelligence Community receive supplemental funding for counterterrorism and not request these funds through the normal budget process'.'


Team #2: Intelligence Collection, Analysis, Management, Oversight and Resources
Selected Bibliography Highest Priority (Arranged By Date, With Topic Noted).
4 Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC): The White House, "Fact Sheet: Strengthening Intelligence to Better Protect America" (2003), http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2003/01/20030128- 12.html. * U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy: National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), * U.S. Response to the 9-11 Attacks: Steven Brill, After: How America Confronted the September 12 Era (Simon & Schuster, 2003). * Radical Islamic Terrorism: Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America (Random House, 2002). * Intelligence Reorganization: September 11 and the Imperative of Reform in the U.S. Intelligence Community: Additional Views of Senator Richard C. Shelby. Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2002), * Reference Work on U.S. Intelligence: Jeffrey Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community 4th ed. (Westview Press, 1999). * Overview of U.S. Intelligence: Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Congressional Quarterly Books, 1999). 4 British Perspective on U.S. Intelligence: Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge University Press, 1996). * Warning: Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective (Harvard University Press, 1988). Other Sources (Arranged By Date). * William Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America (Yale University Press, 2003). * Findings and Recommendations of the Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11. 2001 (2002),


DRAFT * Yonah Alexander, ed., Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries (University of Michigan Press, 2002). 4 Markle Foundation Task Force, Protecting America's Freedom in the Information Age (Markle Foundation, 2002). * Michael Warner, ed., Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution (Government Printing Office, 2001). * Bruce Berkowitz and Allan Goodman, Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age (Yale University Press, 2000). * Ernest May, "Intelligence in the Fall of France, 1940," available from Commission staff, and ideally, Ernest May, Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France (Hill and Wang, 2000). + Amy Zegart, Flawed bv Design: The Evolution of the CIA. JCS. and NSC (Stanford . University Press, 1999). 4 L. Britt Snider, Sharing Secrets With Lawmakers: Congress as a User of Intelligence (Government Printing Office, 1997). * Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence (Government Printing Office, 1996). * Staff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century (Government Printing Office, 1996). * Roy Godson, Ernest May, and Gary Schmitt, ed., U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform (Brassey's. 1995). * Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (HarperCollins, 1995). * Frank Smist, Jr., Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947-1994 2nd ed. (University of Tennessee Press, 1994). * "CIA and the Fall of the Soviet Empire: The Politics of 'Getting it Right'" (Kennedy School of Government case, 1994), available from Commission staff. * "Prelude to War: U.S. Policy toward Iraq 1988-1990" (Kennedy School of Government case, 1994), available from Commission staff. * "Lebanon and the Intelligence Community" (Kennedy School of Government case, 1988), available from Commission staff.


DRAFT 4 David Kahn, "United States Views of Germany and Japan in 1941," in Ernest May, ed., Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars (Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 476-502. 4 Roberta Wohlstetter, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight," 43 Foreign Affairs (1965), pp. 691-707, and ideally, Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor Warning and Decision (Stanford University Press, 1962). in. National Strategies (Arranged By Date).

4 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (2003), 4 National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (2003), * National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (2002), 4 National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002), 4 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002),



Team #2: Intelligence Collection, Analysis, Management, Oversight and Resources Categories of Documents to be Requested
1. President's Daily Brief (July, August, September 2001) 2. Presidential Transition Briefing Papers (Briefing by Mr. Tenet to President Bush and Dr. Rice on global terrorism and the threat posed by UBL) 3. Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (July, August, September 2001) 4. National Strategic Watchlist (1995 to 2003) 5. National Intelligence Estimates related to Terrorism 6. Global Terrorism Situation Reports and Warning Intelligence a. July/August/September 2001 b. November / December 2000 c. May / June / July 1998 7. After Action Reports a. CIA 9-11 After Action Report / Analysis (2001) b. Kansi Shooting Investigation reports, related materials to his capture in Afghanistan / Pakistan (1993) c. Intelligence Community WTC Bombing after action report (1993) d. Intelligence Community Khobar Towers after action report (1996) e. Intelligence Community Nairobi and Dar es Salaam after action report (1998) f. Intelligence Community Millennium Attacks after action report (2000) 8. National Security Agency a. SIGINT Counterterrorism Reporting b. SIGINT Assessments (2001 to 2003) c. Warning reporting prior to major terrorist attacks (1985 to 2003) d. Counterterrorism Product Line charter, mission, funding, etc. 9. Presidential Directives and Related Papers on Intelligence and Terrorism a. Presidential Decision Document #35 (President Clinton. 1995) b. Presidential Transition Papers on Intelligence (Bush to Clinton (1992) and Clinton to Bush (2000)) c. Annual Report on Counterterrorism Resources of the Government (1998 to 2003)

DRAFT 10. Annual Report of the US Intelligence Community, Classified Annex (1998 to 2003) 11. Classified annex to the Intelligence Authorization Act (1985 to 2003) 12. Classified annex to the Defense Appropriations Act (1985 to 2003) 13. Office of Management and Budget, "Budget Passback" to the DCI and Secretary of Defense (1985 to 2003) 14. Director of Central Intelligence program guidance on terrorism (1985 to 2003) 15. Office of the Secretary of Defense a. Program Guidance on counterterrorism efforts b. Department of Defense Intelligence Production Priorities 16. Covert Action a. Presidential findings related to terrorism b. Memoranda of Notifications related to such terrorism findings (1985 to 2003) 17. DCI Directives a. Related to terrorism, funding for counterterrorism, warning processes b. Budget, Oversight of Counterterrorism efforts, Congressional relations 18. Counterterrorism Center a. Charter, mission, funding, related start-up documentation b. CTC global terrorism collection strategy (1986 to 2003) c. CTC global terrorism analysis strategy (1986 to 2003) 19. UBL Task Force charter, mission, funding, related start-up documentation, performance, reporting (1996 to 2003) 20. Assistant DCI for Collection a. 1C collection strategy b. Terrorism related studies 21. Assistant DCI for Analysis & Production a. Analysis strategy b. Terrorism related materials 22. Organization Charts a. Office of the DCI. CIA. NSA, NIMA, DIA, CTC, UBL Task Force 23. Collection Strategies a. CIA HUMINT strategies against terrorism (1985 to 2003) b. NSA SIG1NT s t r a t e i e s against terrorism (1985 to 2003)

DRAFT c. NIMA MINT strategies against terrorism (1985 to 2003) d. FBIS Open Source strategies against terrorism (1985 to 2003) 24. President's Budget for the US National Foreign Intelligence Program a. Vol. 1 CBJB, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 25. Finished intelligence produced by the Counterterrorism Center from 1995 to 2001 on al Qaeda, UBL, the use of airplanes as weapons, threats against building in the United States, and related topics. 26. Chronologies of terrorism events provided to policymakers 27. NSC Tasking memoranda resulting from NSC Deputies Committee or Principal Committee meetings a. Global terrorism b. Al Qaeda c. Warning of terrorist attacks on the United States


Team #2: Intelligence Collection, Analysis, Management, Oversight and Resources Candidates for Interview (Work in Progress)
National Security Council • National Security Advisor, Dr. Rice • Deputy National Security Advisor, Mr. Hadley • Former National Security Advisor, Mr. Berger • Former National Security Advisor, Mr. Lake • Former Deputy National Security Advisor, Mr. Steinberg • Senior Director, Intelligence Programs, Ms. McCarthy • Senior Director, Intelligence Programs, Ms. Sturtevant • Senior Director and National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Mr. Clark Intelligence Community Leadership • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Tenet Former Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Deutch Former Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Woolsey Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McLaughlin Former Deputy Director of Centra! Intelligence, Mr. Kerr Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Community Management, Ms. Dempsey Assistant DCI for Collection, Mr. Allen Assistant DCI for Analysis & Production, Mr. Lowenthal Former Assistant DCI for Administration, Mr. Simon Executive Director, Intelligence Community Affairs, Mr. Kindsvater Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld Former Secretary of Defense, Mr. Cohen Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Wolfowitz Former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Hamre Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, Mr. Haver Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I), Mr. Stenbit

National Intelligence Council • • • • • • Chairman, Amb. Hutchings Vice Chairman. Mr. Cohen Former Vice Chairm;9/1.1 closed by statute National Intelligence Officer for Warning National Intelligence Officer for Middle East National Intelligence Officer for Global Issues


CIA Leadership • • • • • • • • • Executive Director, Mr. Krongard Deputy Director for Operations, Mr. Pavitt Former Deputy Director of Operations, Mr. Downing Former Deputy Director of Operations, Mr. Cohen Deputy Director for Intelligence, Ms. Misick Former Deputy Director of Intelligence, Mr. Wiley Former Deputy Director of Intelligence, Mr. Gannon Former Director, Counterterrorism Center, Mr. Black Director. UBL Task Force
9/11 Closed by Statute I

, I

National Security Agency Leadership • •

Director (Hayden, McConnell,?) Deputy Director. Mr. Black
DireCtOrJ 9/ll Closed by Statute

National Imagery and Mapping Agency • Director, Mr. Clapper

Defense Intelligence Agency • Director, Mr. Jacoby

Department of Justice • • Attorney General, Mr. Ashcroft Office of Intelligence Policy Review, Mr. Lee

Federal Bureau of Investigation • • Director (Mealier, Freeh, Sessions, Webster) Deputy Director for Terrorism

Congressional Oversight • • • • • Chairman, HPSCL Mr. Goss Ranking Member. HPSCI Chairman, SSCI, Mr. Roberts Vice Chairman. SSCI Staff Director. HPSCI

DRAFT Staff Director, SSCI SSCI Investigations staff Overseas • • • US Mission to Pakistan US Mission to Saudi Arabia US Mission to Malaysia US Mission to Germany
9/11 Classified Information