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UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM To: Witness File From: Scott H.

Allan Date: May 21,2003 RE: Policy/Intelligence Witnesses

On March 31, 2003, Abraham Sofaer, Daniel Byman, Brian Jenkins and Magnus Ranstorp appeared before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "Commission"). During this open hearing, the witnesses described, in both verbal and written statements, their views of Al-Qaeda, the intelligence community and the USG's counter-terrorism policy. They recommended, either explicitly or implicitly, areas on which the Commission should focus and-improvements the USG should make. Listed below are the issues they identified and which the Commission should be mindful of as its work progresses. Did the USG possess a comprehensive counter-terrorism policy before 9-11? What policy changes have been made since 9-11? (Byman) • Was there an overall lack of leadership in connection with counter-terrorism policy? (Byman) • Did counter-terrorism policy vary between agencies? (Byman) • How is the USG currently measuring success against Al-Qaeda? Is it too concerned with strict "body counts" as opposed to measuring other aspects, such as reducing morale within Al-Qaeda? (Byman) • To what extent are we cooperating and coordinating with other countries in the fight against Al-Qaeda? (Ranstorp)

Were the proper resources (and attention) directed to the USG's counter-terrorism efforts before 9-11? (Byman) • • Was enough priority given to fighting terrorism or was it eclipsed by the USG's focus on China, the Balkans, etc.? (Byman) What percentage of the intelligence community's budget was directed towards counter-terrorism and was this amount sufficient? (Byman)

Did we understand Al-Qaeda well enough? (Ranstorp) • How did the USG educate itself about the philosophy/motivations of the AlQaeda movement and the nature of its threat? What did the USG know about

Al-Qaeda's recruitment and fundraising methods? Which agencies were most involved in these areas? (Ranstorp) • Did the USG understand the "root causes" (i.e. political, economic and social factors) of Islamic extremism and how did it address them? (Jenkins and Ranstorp) • Were there any efforts by the USG to delegitimize the Wahhabi sect of Islam and the martyrdom associated with suicide bombings? (Byman and Ranstorp) • Did the USG study the prior Al-Qaeda attacks closely enough? Did the USG fail to learn lessons from the prior attacks? (Byman) • Did the USG consult with other nations that had experience with Al-Qaeda? (Ranstorp) Did the USG fail to confront terrorist sanctuaries such as the Sudan and Afghanistan? (Byman and Ranstorp) • • What agencies were responsible for monitoring Al-Qaeda in those countries? (Byman) ~ What actions were taken against those countries and were they effective? (Byman)

Did the USG approach terrorism as a criminal problem (i.e. employing FBI investigations, arrests and trials) as opposed to a military one that required the use of force? If so was this the wrong approach? (Sofaer and Byman) • Why was preemption not a major focus in the USG's pre 9-11 counterterrorism policy? (Sofaer and Ranstorp)

Was the intelligence community properly organized to combat terrorism, and specifically Al-Qaeda? (Byman and Jenkins) • Was the intelligence community too "reactive" in connection with counterterrorism? Did it fail to keep pace with the fluid structure of Al-Qaeda? (Jenkins) • How did the intelligence community change its operations after it learned that Al-Qaeda had "declared war" on the United States and vowed to attack it? (Jenkins) • Did the USG focus its intelligence efforts too heavily on Al-Qaeda's foreign activities as opposed to monitoring Al-Qaeda's stateside operations? (Byman) • Were too many agencies taking parallel courses in monitoring Al-Qaeda while failing to acknowledge gaps in intelligence coverage? (Byman) • To what extent did the culture of secrecy in the intelligence community restrict it from sharing information? (Byman, Jenkins and Ranstorp) • Did the FBI's mandate (requiring it to prepare evidence for criminal cases) restrict it from collecting and sharing intelligence with other agencies? (Byman, Jenkins and Ranstorp)

Before 9-11, how was threat information shared: 1) within the agencies of the intelligence community and 2) between the entire intelligence community and local law enforcement? (Jenkins) Was there any intelligence gathered by local law enforcement groups and how was it shared with federal agencies? Should local intelligence play a larger role in the future? (Jenkins) Why did the 9-11 threat warnings not get the proper response? Were there any attempts to create defensive protections after the threat warnings? (Byman) What improvements should be made to enhance intelligence capabilities? (Sofaer) Have quality changes been made in this area since 9-11? (Byman)