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TeamS Immigration, Nonimmigrant Visas"and Border Control Monograph outline (April 2004) BORDER SECURITY The September

11th Attacks and U.S. Borders Foreword Executive Summary Introduction I. TERRORIST ENTRY AND EMBEDDING TACTICS 1993-2001 • • • • II. Red Book on pre-90's terrorist travel AQ organizational structure for travel and travel tactics Terrorist entry tactics WTC 1 through Embassy Bombings Terrorist embedding tactics WTC 1 through Embassy Bombings

MIGRATION AND BORDER SECURITY EVOLVE 1993-2001 • • • • • The White House The intelligence community State Department's Consular Affairs INS screening from port of entry through naturalization Immigration law enforcement: Justice, State, FBI, INS

III.

PLANNING AND EXECUTING ENTRY FOR THE 9-11 PLOT • • • • • AQ planning Passports Visas Entry Immigration status

IV.

SUCCESSES AND LOST OPPORTUNITIES FOR BORDER AUTHORITIES (includes summer of threat material) • • • • • Watchlisting Travel document scrutiny Visa decisions Entry screening Migration status enforcement

V.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND RESPONSES • • • • • • • Slowdown at the borders and military assistance Refugees and asylees; Saudi flights Counterterrorism and immigration enforcement Terrorist mobility intelligence Watchlisting Visa process DHS (andHSC) Biometric borders

VI.

BORDER SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS o Border security policy o open and secure borders o virtual borders: from visa to naturalization o immigration and counterterrorism • Terrorist mobility o targeting terrorist travel facilitators o watchlists o travel document awareness • Biometric borders o verification o breeder documents in the U.S. o regional and international linkages • Denying terrorist access o screening and analysis o counterterrorism and immigration law enforcement policy • Organization for border security o terrorist mobility strategy o screening abroad o DHS today and tomorrow o crisis management

APPENDICES

Team 5 Immigration, Nonimmigrant Visas and Border Control Monograph outline (February '04) Foreword Executive Summary Introduction AL QAEDA'S TACTICS FOR ENTERING THE UNITED STATES 1. The September 11th Conspirators a. What is a visa and who needs one? b. Visas granted to 9-11 hijackers i. in Saudi Arabia ii. inUAE iii. in Berlin Similar to Staff Statement #1 with more discussion of agency decisionmaking, references to earlier knowledge, and new points noted below. c. Visas denied to 9-11 conspirators

Similar to Staff Statement #1 with more conspirators, and discussion ofAQ entry tactic: keep sending operatives until they got them through; more discussion of sequence of operatives entry. d. Entry at the ports of entry i. Immigration admission through U.S. Ports of Entry ii. Primary inspections - process; time; indicators; iii. Technology support - watchlists; other databases; document, iv. Non-immigrant visa length of stay, v. Immigration history violations at the time of entry: the four pilots and Midhar. vi. The secondary inspections: Al Shehi (2), Atta (1), Waleed al Shehri (1), Saeed al Ghamdi (1). vii. Customs inspections, viii. Removal of alKahtani. ix. Watchlisting by INS of Hazmi and Midhar e. Immigration status and identity in the U.S. i. Delayed status determination (al Shehhi and Atta) ii. Enforcement risk iii. Access to fraudulent documents

2. Al Qaeda Travel Tactics Before and Since the September 11th Attacks a. U.S. government knowledge about Al Qaeda and associated terrorist travel tactics before the September 11th attacks i. FBI terrorist investigations/prosecutions (WTC1 - Ressam) ii. DOS files (Saudi cable, SEIBs, TIPOFF?) iii. INS-NSU/Intel Unit iv. 1C travel-related intelligence (Red Book, hard drives, IDs, walk-ins etc) v. NSA Note: this section likely -will be topically organized rather than by agency, but will note agency knowledge. We anticipate laying out most if not all of the AQ 9/11 techniques, as well as a variety of other entry tactics and experiences with US immigration law. 3. Current Knowledge About Al Qaeda and Associated Terrorist Travel Tactics a. Detainee information on AQ mobility tactics b. Saudi Arabia and other reporting on country passport issuance factors c. Loopholes and vulnerabilities by modes and borders Note: to be topically organized, likely some info will remain classified

WHY AL QAEDA SUCCEEDED IN GAINING ENTRY FOR THE HIJACKERS 1. National Leadership and Oversight of Border Agencies a. The White House and NSC i. Border policy priorities: economic migration issues ii. PDDs 9, 35, 39, 62 iii. impact of '90s terrorism incidents on the perceived role of border agencies in counterterrorism iv. Dick Clarke on student tracking v. INS/DOS input into CSG and IWGs after the Ressam arrest and northern border issues that arose from that incident vi. DOS and INS knowledge/response to chatter of 2001 b. Secretary of State on: i. CA role and resources ii. visa policy generally iii. visa policy for Saudi Arabia iv. resources and budget c. Attorney General on: i. INS mission: immigration ii. INS mission: enforcement iii. INS role: counterterrorism 1. resources and budget d. Congress i. Visa issuance pressures ii. Legislation 1. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (1996)

9/11 Classified Information

2. 3.

4. 5.

(a) 1996 enhancements to the exclusion process (1) members of terrorist organizations inadmissible (2) expedited exclusion (3) expedited exclusion as applied to aliens who enter without inspection (4) ATRC (5) Section 641 student tracking - full account Immigrant Responsibility and Illegal Immigration Reform Act (1996) Data Management Act (2000) (a) Oversight (b) GAO reports (c) hearings (1) appropriations International agreements and relationships Critiques and proposals (GAO, IG, CRS, Commissions, groups)

2. The Intelligence Community and Border Agencies a. Terrorism intelligence generally pre-9/11 i. Community Counterterrorism Board/IICT: State and INS ii. CIA-CA relationship [classified] iii. INR and Consular Affairs iv. CIA-INS Intelligence and National Security Units v. INS-FBI 1. Terrorist travel intelligence pre-9/11 \) Watchlisting and TPOFF; Viper; [classified] (b) Blind Sheik episode (c) Hazmi-Hazmi-Midhar \) CIA-INS/FDL/CA/FPP relationship (discussed more fully in fraud section below) 2. Details and liaison relationships \) DIA-INS \) INS-FBI-CIA 3. Border Management: Visas a., The consular offices- structure and purpose, including^ i. Jeddah ii. Riyadh iii. UAE iv. Berlin v. Intending immigrant standard vi. Refugee system? b. Terrorist standard c. Counterterrorism policy and CA i. Blind Sheik, lessons learned d. Visas, visa waiver, and pre-clearance cos: Saudi Arabia

e. f. g. h. i. j.

Security issues before Sept. 11, 2001 Other country policies Applications Document scrutiny Interviews Resources

4. Border Management: Entry Screening and Related Enforcement a. Overview i. Introduction ii. Background iii. INS identity and mission, cf Coast Guard iv. INS roles and organization v. Technology support b. At the Borders: [Pre-clearance,] Entry Screening, and Border Patrol i. Inspections at the ports of entry 1. Inspection practice 2. Inspection practice as to counterterrorism (a) TIPOFF records used by INS (b) Lookout Unit (c) Secondary inspections 3. Profiling: INS, Customs, airlines compared 4. Information and supporting technology (a) Watchlist/lookout (b) Document fraud detection ii. Law enforcement at the ports of entry 1. Detention rules and resource realities 2. Expedited removal 3. Lack of uniform standards iii. Benefits adjudication at the ports of entry 1. Length of stay 2. Correction of status c. Outside the U.S.: [Pre-clearance], Office of International 5. Inside the U.S.: Immigration Benefit Adjudications and Related Enforcement a. Immigration benefit adjudications b. Immigration law enforcement 6. Counterterrorism Initiatives at the Former Immigration and Naturalization Service a. Introduction b. Early counterterrorism deterrence and prevention initiatives i. Arab Nonimmigrant Overstay Program of 1972 ii. The 1986 Alien Terrorist Contingency Plan iii. Lookouts and adoption of TIPOFF in 1992

c. Terrorist-related immigration law enforcement i. field offices ii. JTTFs d. The National Security Unit i. Strategic plan and priorities ii. Resources iii. Intelligence and information access 1. Liaisons? Informal 2. JTTF reporting 3. Activities (a) terrorist advisories to ports of entry (b) special interest cases (c) naturalization process intervention (d) CSG and the Millenium (e) Chatter of 2001 e. The interest in students 1. Registration and termination of study of special interest aliens c. Origin of student tracking d. CIPRIS and the 1996 legal mandate 7. Terrorist-related Fraud and the U.S. Border Authorities' Response a. Types of fraud used by terrorists i. Foreign passport and other travel document fraud 1. Lost and stolens; aliases and legends 2. Altered passports ii. Feeder document fraud iii. Corrupt travel agents iv. Corrupt border officials v. Alien smugglers and human traffickers vi. Visa fraud 1. Applicants 2. Issuance vii. Benefits fraud b. Analysis, information, and enforcement policy and resources i. CIA [classified] ii. DOS Consular Affairs 1. training 2. forensic facilities and practice iii. Diplomatic Security 1. statutory authority 2. investigative resources and case mix iv. INS 1. facilities and practice (primary, secondary) 2. Training

3. Forensic Administrative and enforcement priorities and resources: status violations and benefits fraud v. Forensic Document Laboratory 1. U.S. Customs 2. U.S. Secret Service (?) 3. FBI 4. US Attorneys - referrals and prosecutions 8. Findings and Conclusions (to be integrated into the previous sections) a. Al Qaeda learned by probing our border system, and exploiting its vulnerabilities. By the time of the 9/11 plot, al Qaeda had considerable experience gaining entry through subverting the legal entry system. We have no evidence of land or sea border entries without inspection. b. With respect to borders, policy leaders during the 1990's were principally concerned with globalization and challenges from economic migration, including alien smuggling and potentially significant migration crises (Haiti, Mexico,Cuba). They did not see the border agencies as having a pivotal role in counterterrorism, and did not highlight or even include the border agencies in national security-related policy discussions about the border. c. (Still assessing CA and INS access to critical intelligence.) Both State and INS were part of the (IICT) and Community Counterterrorism Board, and thus midlevel officials (nominally) had access to all intelligence community warning products. To a large extent the border agencies failure to anticipate terrorist attacks and take countermeasures is a product of the larger White House and national security system leadership's failure to highlight the strategic threat and direct comprehensive countermeasures. d. The national security establishment and border agencies did limited analysis of successful terrorist entries for lessons learned; what analysis was done (e.g. Blind Sheik) provided valuable lessons for both State and INS. Minimal thorough analysis was done after Ressam's arrest in 2000, despite NSC interest, with less follow through. e. The intelligence and federal law enforcement communities, including INS, had information that Islamic terrorists hid their identities and/or histories in multiple aliases and passports and fraudulent documents and cover stories, assisted at times by criminal networks and governmental corruption. Information on such travel fraud was not systematically collected, analyzed, and disseminated to policy, visa, and border officials for use in prevention or deterrance. At best it was used in targeting terrorists and to some extent to support the DOS S/CT TIP program and [classified] program. Intelligence and law enforcement information about illegal travel was collected and integrated to produce analysis on alien smugglers and human traffickers. In the case of alien smuggling and human trafficking, the White House, State Department INL, and INS tasked and/or cooperated closely with the 1C to obtain and operationalize intelligence. Significant amounts of analysis were produced. f. Terrorists identities are difficult to learn, and were not well-targeted by the 1C (HHM, and Al Shehhi). Even if the 1C acquired knowledge of them, weak

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watchlisting policy and practice did not guarantee their being communicated to visa and border officials. Watchlisting was a "bottom-up" program originated by DOS, not directed by a FDD and resisted by the 1C and LE. Partially known terrorist identities could not be shared with border officials due to lack of counterterrorism priority/resources (CLASS-IBIS gap). For the September 11 plot, AQ kept pushing operatives into the U.S. until enough got in to act. Immigration regulation and practice (the "screen") prevented some participants from entry, thereby perhaps shrinking the scale of the attack, and in the case of al Kahtani, perhaps helping to prevent the hijackers of flight 93 from reaching their intended target. However, not a single terrorist was stopped or prevented entry due to actions or information supplied by the counterterrorism or intelligence community. That information arguably could have existed in the WL system had the 1C and LE community used it optimally. The State Department saw itself as the outer ring of border security including counterterrorism, but did not seek to acquire regional or terrorist group intelligence to assist in preventing terrorists from acquiring visas. The INS did not see itself as having a pivotal role in counterterrorism. The border security system before September 11 had as its primary focus the screening out of intending economic migrants. To the extent prospective travelers were exempt from close scrutiny at either the visa or port of entry, this exemption generally was based on the belief that they posed a low risk of becoming immigrants. Absent a tiered system of border screening keyed to risk of terrorist activity, the system was particularly vulnerable to terrorists who were perceived as economically well-off. Saudi citizens and citizens of the UAE were presumed to have overcome the presumption of INS section 214(b), that a visitor intended to stay in the U.S. Even though there were troubling signs about the misuse of Saudi passports and a decline in Saudi living standards, U.S. foreign policy interests with regard to Saudi Arabia - their treatment as allies ~ made it extremely difficult for consular officers to reevaluate a longstanding policy favoring granting Saudis visas with little scrutiny, and indeed favoring Saudi royals who sought admission to the U.S. for third country nationals working in Saudi Arabia. Nor was concern about growing Saudi extremism, which was reflected in embassy activities, translated into heightened visa scrutiny. Regardless of policy, outlook, or knowledge, visa and border officials had little ability to discover fraudulent documents or uncover terrorist histories due to the level of resources appropriated to border screening. Pressure from the travel industry, and business and education interests, limited anti-fraud infrastructure, rendered the visa process vulnerable to terrorists. The border screens that did exist were porous: WL; visa; entry; status compliance. INS' limited engagement with counterterrorism, lack of modernization, lack of resources, low regard within the government and impotence vis-a-vis private interests favoring unfettered admission to the U.S. rendered the border entry points vulnerable to terrorists.

m. The immigration regulation requiring an automatic six month permitted length of stay for tourists enabled all the operational hijackers to gain legal access to the U.S. for a sustained period of time to prepare for the attacks. n. Immigration law placed the burden of showing admissibility on the applicant. INS culture, however, in effect switched the burden of proof to the INS to show that the applicant was inadmissible. Therefore, in circumstances where the admission was questionable, such as in the cases of al Ghamdi, Atta and al Shehhi, it appears that admission was granted because there were no indicators, from the inspectors' point of view, that were grounds for inadmissibility. o. INS had a decentralized management structure, which fostered different standards and practices at different ports or entry, and may have contributed to the different outcomes in adjudicating the entries of Kahtani (strict) and Atta in Orlando and Al Shehhi at JFK (permissive) respectively. p. Border officials could determine if someone had entered the U.S. but not whether they had left. Border officials could not verify whether students adhered to visa requirements. Despite interest by the NSC, INS leadership did not fully commit to developing and implementing two Congressionally authorized programs, student tracking and entry/exit record systems, which would have given border officials this information. A combination of lack of priority by the White House, Congressional ambivalence and lack of funding, and intense private pressures, contributed to the fact that neither program was close to national deployment during the time period the hijackers were entering and re-entering the U.S. Information from these programs could have provided U.S. immigration inspectors key information that could have prevented the -reentries of Atta, al Shehhi and Jarrah. q. Sidebar: The inception of trusted traveler programs to accommodate increased global trade and travel r. Sidebar: the role of student exchange programs in U.S. foreign policy from the Cold War through the Dirigean report s. During the time the hijackers were entering the U.S. and violating some immigration laws, and for a long time before that, there has been no credible immigration enforcement policy in the U.S. Consumers, business, human rights groups, the federal, state and local governments, and ethnic communities have all supported this non-enforcement policy. With an official estimate of 8 million illegal immigrants, and an unofficial estimate closer to 11 million, individuals with short overstays like Nawaf al Hazmi and al Suqami would not have been a priority for detention and removal, even if their overstays had been noticed, which they weren't. INS' 2,000 special agents were focused on removal of criminal aliens, employer sanctions, and alien smuggling. State and local law enforcement did not play a role in immigration enforcement. t. With respect to the administration of laws governing foreigners in the U.S., the White House/ DOJ/ INS priority of the mid to late 1990s was to eliminate the backlog on the processing of naturalization applications, which had built up since the immigration act of 1986 (?). Since Congress did not supply adequate resources, this meant that the applications for all other immigration benefits, such as applications for changes of status from tourist to student, developed

huge backlogs of their own. Immigration backlogs placed immigration status violators in a gray area free of enforcement risk, because the authorities deemed it unfair to force valid applicants to leave the U.S. when backlogs were so unreasonably long. Thus, the pilots Hanjour, Atta and al Shehhi could legally remain in the U.S. because their applications remained pending past their permitted length of stay. u. Fraudulent documents, known as feeder or breeder documents, which enable people to hide identity or immigration status are easily accessible in the U.S. [Who] hijackers easily obtained fraudulent U.S. documents which were used in furtherance of the September 11 plot. Consistent with the U.S. approach to immigration enforcement generally, and faced with a lack of consensus on a national identification card, the federal government has left this problem to the states. Regardless of immigration status, it is easy to disappear in the U.S. GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS TO SAFEGUARD THE U.S. FROM TERRORIST ENTRY ON AND SINCE SEPTEMBER 11TH 2001 1. At the Borders on and Immediately After September 11,2001 a. Direction from senior government officials on 9/11 b. Identification of the hijackers by INS and Customs and development of immigration histories on each hijacker c. INS and Customs actions and aftermath i. Command and control at INS ii. Command and control at Customs iii. Institution of Threat Level One iv. Border Patrol brought to airports v. operational initiatives to assure infrastructure protection from malafide employees, etc. d. Department of Defense assistance i. National Guard at airports and land borders e. Refugee program suspension f. Asylee detention? 2. Law enforcement focus and process changes affecting immigrants in the U.S. aimed at September 11th suspects and general deterrence in ethnic communities a. INS-JTTFs b. Detainees as part of Penttbom; c. permanent procedural changes d. Voluntary interviews e. Absconder initiative f. NSEERS g. USA PATRIOT Act 3. Terrorist Identity and Mobility Intelligence and Information a. immediate watchlisting enhancements - Ryan again

b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j.

Condor and FBI watchlisting path; Tripwire [CIA new analytic branch] CIA Tiger and the triggering incident [NSC collection and assessments] [S/CT-CIA] [CIA collection] [CIA other] TTIC/Terrorist Identities Group/TSC FBI lab

4. Border Screening: Visas and Ports of Entry a. visa policy, process, resources - net gain/cost i. mandatory interviews for visa applicants (8/03) b. visa waiver countries review c. Mandatory biometric data on visa waiver passports (10/04) d. U.S. Port of entry screening e. US VISIT: entry biometrics and fingerprints for visa holders f. SEVIS g. other information improvements h. travel document fraud resources and structure: DOS and INS/DHS i. Pushing the borders out: Mexico; Canada (trusted traveler etc); Europe; multilateral and regional policy initiatives j. Land borders: Border Patrol and DOD k. Sea borders: Coast Guard and Navy 5. Counterterrorism in Immigration Law Compliance and Enforcement a. DOS: diminishing fraud enforcement resources b. DOS: visa fraud prosecutions and new information systems c. DOS/DHS/FBI domestic document fraud prosecutions d. DOS: Multilateral and regional terrorist mobility policy initiatives: G8, OAS etc e. DOJ: International terrorist travel enforcement assistance: alien smuggling and travel facilitators (intel; attacking illegal supply) f. USA PATRIOT Act g. State and local role h. DHS: enforcement re-organization; flat enforcement resources i. DHS: SEVIS compliance and enforcement j. DHS: Backlog catastrophe 6. Borders, Migration and National Security Strategy a. HSPDDs b. Homeland Security Strategy- DHS c. National Security Strategy d. NSC directives and Counterterrorism Strategy e. [humint intel directives, DO/DI strategy] f. President Bush's immigration proposal

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7. Borders, Migration and the National Security Structure and Budget a. HSC established b. DHS established c. State CA lost visa authority d. 1C augmented terrorist mobility units e. State and locals f. Congressional oversight structure and topics g. Proportional funding of borders in national security budget RECOMMENDATIONS a. Current threat b. Key issues: opportunities, vulnerabilities, and national problems c. Recommendations

Appendices Classified version -will include all primary travel docs Spreadsheets with entry data Major documents Unclassified version will include pages noting what travel docs are missing and, if unclassified, why (e.g. FBI Moussaoui materials)

Cross cutting issues with other teams • whether HHM disclosure could have stopped plot - Team 1 and 2 • Al Shehii - Team 1 and la • Saudi departures - Team 7 • Feeder documents - Team 7 • U.S. detainees; due process issues - Team 6 • DHS assessment - Teams 6 and 7 • Visa waiver/watchlisting - Team 7

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Monograph Outline Immigration, Nonimmigrant Visas and Border Control August 22, 2003 Note: This outline has been drafted in the early stages of document review and before interviews have been conducted. Accordingly, it is subject to revision. I. Principles and Goals of the US Border Security System Prior to Sept. 11,2001 A. What were the principal broad purposes of the US immigration system before the Sept. 11 attack? What border security issues were recognized over time and how did the system address them? How did immigration laws and policies address Islamic and other terrorism? B. What agencies directed our border security system, and what were their mandates and activities? How well did the agencies involved in the system work to fulfill their mission as they understood it? To what extent was counterterrorism a real element of border security policy and programs? 1. Department of State 2. Department of Justice 3. Immigration and Naturalization Service 4. FBI 5. CIA and other intelligence agencies 6. Department of Defense and military 7. Congress 8. State and local authorities 9. Coast Guard II. The Encounter Between the Al Qaeda Plotters and the US Border Security System A. Intelligence about terrorist mobility and access to the US 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Al Qaeda's view of entry into the US as understood today Intelligence agency knowledge before Sept. 11 Law enforcement agency knowledge before Sept. 11 Intelligence and information disseminated to border security authorities Border security agencies' own intelligence capabilities and knowledge

B. Intelligence about individual terrorists: watchlisting 1. Intelligence and law enforcement agency identification of terrorists a. CIA, NSA, DIA terrorist identification information b. FBI information c. Foreign participation in terrorist identification

2. The development of terrorist watchlisting by the Dept. of State a. Islamic fundamentalist terrorists watchlisted prior to Sept. 11 b. The Sept. 11 plot and watchlisting 3. Lookouts by federal inspection services (INS, APHIS, and Customs) 4. FAA and airline company listings (with Team 7) 5. Assessment and accountability C. Terrorist acquisition of international travel documents 1. Al Qaeda's view of the role of travel documents 2. Terrorist travel document practices known prior to the Sept. 11 plot 3. US policy and security practices concerning travel and supporting documents. a. International and US standards for documentation b. Enforcement policy, programs, and resources prior to Sept. 11 4. Characteristics of the Sept. 11 hijackers' international travel documents D. The visa process 1. The US visa process encountered by al Qaeda in the Sept. 11 plot a. b. c. d. e. f. g. 2. Statutory authority Policy direction Budget, personnel, training Consular access to terrorist intelligence Applications, other forms, interviews, and technology tools Adjudication clearances and advisory opinions Internal controls and evaluations of posts

Visas issued to the Sept. 11 hijackers a. Saudi Arabia i. Visa Express and interview policy ii. the 15 Saudi hijackers iii. Saudi runner-up hijackers b. United Arab Emirates i. AlShehhi ii. Banihammad c. Germany - Berlin i. interview policy ii. Atta iii. Jarrah d. Yemen i. Binalshibh ii. Essabar

3. Visas issued to terrorists prior to the Sept. 11 plot 4. Visas issued to U.S. associates of the hijackers 5. Assessment and accountability E. Federal inspections upon entry 1. The federal inspection process encountered by al Qaeda a. b. c. d. Statutory authority Policy direction Watchlist/lookout information Primary inspection i. inspections of the 19 hijackers ii. inspections of other plotters e. Secondary inspection i. inspections of certain hijackers ii. inspections of plotters and associates

2. Border crossing by previous Islamic terrorists 3. Assessment and accountability F. Detection and interior immigration enforcement of terrorists 1. Statutory authority 2. Policy direction 3. Enforcement agencies, missions, and resources 4. 1996 mandated student tracking system 5. 1996 mandated exit-entry system 6. Biometrics 7. Identification document standards 8. Technology 9. Assessment and accountability III. Terrorism, US Immigration and Border Security After Sept. 11 A. How did border security authorities respond on Sept. 11 and in the immediate aftermath? (duration of "immediate aftermath " tbd) 1. 2. 3. 4. Consulates Airports Land borders Sea borders

5. Foreigners in the US B. How do we now assess the terrorist threat? Since Sept. 11, 2001, how have those involved in our immigration and border security system redefined its goals to address Islamic and other terrorism? 1. Borders and the terrorist threat a. Vulnerabilities exposed by al Qaeda and others b. Terrorist mobility's relationship with other transborder crimes c. Access to the US as a dimension of national policy 2. Redefined goals of the immigration and border security system a. Immigration and border security framework b. Intelligence and watchlisting c. Identity documents d. Screening prior to entry e. Screening at entry f. Border enforcement - north, south, sea g. Internal regulation, compliance, and enforcement h. International cooperation C. Key participants and their contributions to the redefined mission. How has the US immigration and border security system changed to address Islamic and other terrorism? 1. The White House a. Immediate response and its impact b. Current role c. Recommendations 2. The CIA and other intelligence agencies a. Immediate response and its impact b. Terrorist identity intelligence c. Terrorist mobility intelligence d. Watchlisting and terrorist tracking e. Recommendations 3. Department of State a. Immediate response and its impact b. Current role c. Opportunities and vulnerabilities d. Recommendations 4. Department of Justice

a. Immediate response and its impact b. Current role c. Opportunities and vulnerabilities d. Recommendations 5. Department of Homeland Security a. Immediate response and its impact b. Transformation at the nation's borders c. Key achievements d. Key weaknesses e. Recommendations 6. Department of Defense and other military [tbd] a. Immediate response b. Current role c. Recommendations 7. State and local authorities a. Immediate response b. Current role c. Recommendations 8. Private sector and citizens a. Immediate response b. Current role c. Recommendations IV. Conclusion