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\—- b As of February 3, 2004

TEAM 6 WORKPLAN
Based on current deadline of the 9-11 Commission and late March one-day hearing

February • • • • • • • Complete planned interviews (e.g., NYPD, Watson, Edmonds, Townsend) Prepare first draft of issue papers - incorporating statement of issue, preliminary analysis of the evidence, and potential recommendations for commissioners Begin preparations for counterterrorism policy hearings Review of MFRs, documents - including JI, GAO, DoJ/IG documents Identify needed interviews, document requests (e.g, Gorelick, Lamberth) Prepare second draft of issue papers Coordinate with other teams

March Draft staff statement for hearing Prepare briefing materials for commissioners Prepare hearing materials for commissioners Complete remaining interviews, MFRs Continue review of MFR's, documents April - End of Commission • • Draft monograph Duties as assigned

Additional work areas should Commission be extended • • • • • • • Preparations for additional days of hearings Review of homeland security efforts to prevent or respond to WMD catastrophic terrorism Greater scrutiny ofCTC, CTD, IA/IP and TTIC interaction and co-location Interviews concerning FBI/NR interaction Interviews with representatives of foreign services concerning their interaction with FBI, CIA, andDHS Visits to smaller FBI field offices to check the progress of FBI reforms Interviews with other federal law enforcement agencies and A USAs

As of February 3, 2004

Questions for Team 6 Issue Papers
1. What strategic direction was given to the FBI's counterterrorism program prior to 9/11? (Mike) 2. How were the problems of the FBI's counterterrorism program understood prior to 9/11 and what steps were taken to correct those problems? (Mike) 3. What does the Moussaoui story reveal about the FBI prior to 9/11? (Chris)

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/ 4. What does the Hamzi-Midhar story reveal about CT prior to 9/11 ? (h-3, U aft

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5. What has been the role of the analyst at the FBI (including analysts both in the field and at headquarters, as well as analysts in the criminal and national security programs)? (Caroline) 6. What were the problems in the FBI's analytic program prior to 9/11? Will those obstacles be overcome by the FBI's current efforts? (Caroline) 7. What were the problems in the FBI's information technology systems prior to 9/11? Will those problems be remedied by the FBI's current efforts? (Caroline) / / . 8. What were the legal regimes under which the FBI operated prior to 9/11? What is the legal regime today? What impact have these legal regimes had on the FBI's N counterterrorism effort? (Lance) 'oes the Patriot Act go too far in impinging on the civil liberties of U.S. persons? (Lance) 10. What options do or could exist for providing due process to detainees and enemy combatants within US and international organizations?-{TBD)—-, 11. How does the FBI cooperate (or not) with state and local law enforcement agencies? With other federal agencies? With foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies? (Peter) 12. Have the non-legal obstacles within the FBI to effective collection efforts been identified and appropriate remedies put in place? (Peter) 13. What are the appropriate "lanes in the road" for TTIC, FBI's CTD, CIA's CTC, and DHS's IA/IP? (Peter, Chris, Team 2) 14. What models for domestic intelligence and terrorism prevention (including Director Mueller's reform proposals) have been recommended to the Commission and what are the strengths and weaknesses of each model? (Chris)

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NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
TEAM #6 WORKPLAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

Team Members: Barbara Grewe Michael Jacobson Peter Rundlet Lance Cole

Premise Statement Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Key Questions of the Investigation Suggested Readings and Briefing Plan Document Requests Interview Candidates

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Team #6 Premise Statement The September 11 terrorist attacks were carried out by 19 hijackers, who lived openly and freely in the United States for varying periods of time prior to the attacks. The six leaders of the plot spent considerable time training in the United States for the attacks, traveling throughout the country during this time. The U.S. Intelligence Community generally, and the FBI more specifically, were aware prior to attacks that three of these individuals had ties to al-Qa'ida. Although the plot was primarily financed and orchestrated from overseas, the hijackers also had contact with and received assistance from a number of individuals in the United States. Some of the hijackers' associates were known to the FBI prior to September 11 through its counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations. The FBI also had other indications of a possible attack in the summer of 2001, including the Moussaoui investigation, the Phoenix EC, and the U.S. Intelligence Community's heightened state of alert. Based on previous reviews, it is now clear that the FBI did not respond aggressively and appropriately to all of the available intelligence, and failed in many respects to "connect the dots" prior to the attacks. Less closely studied is the extent to which the FBI's inability to detect the hijackers' activities and associations while in the United States represented a systemic intelligence failure. Was the hijackers' ability to avoid detection by the FBI while in the United States an indication of excellent operational tradecraft by the hijackers, or does it represent a failure on the part of the FBI? If the former, can changes be made to detect this type of tradecraft in the future? If the latter, what accounts for these failures? To answer these questions, our team will have to develop a comprehensive understanding of the U.S. Government's efforts pre-September 11 to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence on terrorist activity in the United States. Our review will focus not only on the FBI itself, which had primary responsibility for these matters, but also on the FBI's relationship with other entities with important roles in this process, such as state and local authorities, other federal agencies, and foreign intelligence and law enforcement partners. By understanding the problems with the system pre-September 11, it will be clearer what the specific failures were, why they occurred, and will help us better explain why the FBI was unable to learn about or stop the attacks. Finally, we will review the current state of the U.S. Government's domestic intelligence efforts, to assess whether they are adequate to remedy the pre-September 11 systemic problems identified through the course of our investigation. If not, we will make recommendations to address these problems.

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Team #6 Item 1: Key Questions 1. What relevant information did the FBI have prior to the September 11 attacks? • What information was available to U.S. Intelligence and law enforcement entities prior to September 11 regarding the 19 hijackers and their associates? When was this information known and by whom, and how was this information shared and utilized prior to the attacks? Did the FBI have all of the information about the 19 hijackers available to other U.S. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and their foreign intelligence and law enforcement partners?

2. What was the FBI's approach to combating international terrorist activity in the United States prior to September 11? • How did the FBI collect, process, analyze and disseminate intelligence information about foreign terrorist activity in the United States prior to September 11, and why did the FBI adopt this approach? What were the strengths and weaknesses of the FBI's approach to information collection? How effectively did the FBI collaborate, coordinate, and share information with foreign law enforcement and intelligence partners, local and state law enforcement authorities, and other federal agencies prior to the attacks? How effective was the FBI's leadership and management in directing its counterterrorism program prior to September 11? What role did the White House, Congress, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the various Justice Department components play in the FBI's counterterrorism program, from a policy, budgetary, and investigative standpoint, prior to the September 11 attacks? To what extent did legal authorities and the resultant sensitivities regarding civil liberties impact on the FBI's counterterrorism mission?

3. To what extent was the FBI's inability to prevent the September 11 attacks an intelligence failure, and was the FBI's approach to combating terrorism a critical factor in the overall failure to prevent the attacks? • In what ways did the FBI fail to adequately collect, process, analyze and disseminate information relevant to the September 11 attacks, and what accounts for any failures in this regard?

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In what ways did the FBI fail to adequately collaborate, coordinate, and share information relevant to the September 11 attacks with foreign law enforcement and intelligence partners, local and state law enforcement authorities, and other federal agencies prior to the attacks, and what accounts for any failures in this regard? What particularly glaring or significant failures stand out in terms of the FBI's inability to prevent the September 11 attacks, and what accounts for these failures? Are the FBI's traditional law enforcement mission and resulting organizational structures and cultures incompatible with a successful counterterrorism program?

4. How is foreign intelligence information regarding terrorist activity in the United States collected, processed, analyzed and disseminated today? What has changed since September 11, and how effectively is the system currently working? • What are the ingredients of a successful domestic intelligence/counterterrorism system? What degree of collaboration, coordination, and information sharing is required between the FBI, state and local authorities, foreign intelligence and law enforcement partners, and other federal agencies to have a successful system? What role should private sector entities (e.g., data aggregating and information technology companies) play in this system? Does the current system provide for the adequate collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of counterterrorism-related intelligence, and if not, what are the primary barriers to success? What are the pros and cons, including transition costs and feasibility, of establishing a separate agency to handle counterintelligence and foreign intelligence collection within the United States? What can we learn from other countries' approaches to and experiences with domestic intelligence issues? What additional legal and policy changes, if any, are necessary and appropriate for the U.S. Government to establish a successful domestic intelligence capability?

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Team #6 Item 2: Suggested Readings and Briefing Plan A. Reading List 1. Relevant portions of the Joint Inquiry Classified Final Report, including Senator Shelby's Additional Views [Why it is relevant: The Joint Inquiry has already performed considerable investigation on the performance of the FBI relating to the September 11 attacks. In determining the scope and focus of our investigation, the Commission should be aware of what the Joint Inquiry found and concluded. Senator Shelby's additional views contain important and relevant conclusions about the systemic problems with the FBI prior to the attacks.] 2. Joint Inquiry Unclassified Staff Statements, dated: September 24, 2002 (as supplemented on October 17, 2002) and October 8, 2002. [Why it is relevant: these statements cover a number of topics relevant to our investigation including: the Phoenix Electronic Communication, the Moussaoui investigation, the information regarding aircraft as weapons, and the U.S. Intelligence Community's handling of the information regarding the hijackers prior to the attacks.] 3. Selected portions of the October 2002 Markle Foundation Task Force report on National Security in the Information Age. [Why it is relevant: contains important policy recommendations for the U.S. Government relating to the impact of information and information technology on national security.] 4. Senator John Edwards's February 2003 one page fact sheet on the proposed creation of a Homeland Intelligence Agency. [Why it is relevant: the fact sheet contains some of the arguments in favor of the creation of a new domestic intelligence agency.] 5. Jeff Smith's June 18, 2002 Washington Post Op-Ed, entitled "Haste and the Homeland Plan," on homeland security and domestic intelligence. [Why it is relevant: the op-ed briefly describes the problems with the current system, and his proposals to remedy these problems.] 6. "Mission Impossible," written by Jean Kumagai, published in IEEE Spectrum online Journal, dated April 7, 2003 on the FBI's information sharing and technological problems. [Why it is relevant: the article discusses the well-known problems with the FBI's technology and information systems, and assesses whether the current proposals are likely to remedy these problems.] 7. The Cell, by John Miller [Why it is relevant: the author provides a detailed explanation of why he believes the FBI and CIA failed to prevent the September 11 attacks. He traces the origins of al-Qa'ida in the United States, beginning in the early 1990s, and how the U.S. Government failed to adequately respond to this growing threat.]
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B. Recommended Briefers 1. Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff 2. Glenn Fine, Inspector General, Department of Justice 3. Jeff Smith, former General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency 4. Mike Leavitt, Governor of Utah during 2002 Salt Lake Olympics 5. Jeff Jonas, CEO of Systems Research and Development 6. Bill Crowell, former Deputy Director of NS A 7. Oilman Louie, In-Q-Tel 8. Professor Philip Heymann, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

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Team #6 Item 3: Document Requests 1. In consultation with team #1, requests on hijackers' associates, al-Qa'ida detainees, and updated timelines and lists of pending investigations from the FBI's 9/11 investigation (codenamed "PENTTBOM.") 2. Training curricula from new agent training, counterterrorism in-services, and from FBI College of Analytical Studies. 3. Statistics from select FBI Field Offices, regarding agent assignments to counterterrorism investigations (referred to as "burn rates," which indicate agent man-hours actually spent on particular matters) from 1993-Present. 4. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Manual of Investigative and Operational Guidelines. 5. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Manual of Administrative and Operational Procedures. 6. Internal FBI documents on the post-9/11 counterterrorism reforms, including documents relating to the creation of the Office of Intelligence and the Reports Officer program. 7. Memoranda of Understanding between the FBI and state/local law enforcement agencies in cities where the hijackers resided or operated. 8. In consultation with team #3, written communications from the National Security Council to the FBI or the Department of Justice containing counterterrorism strategy, policy and guidance, 1998-September 20, 2001 9. Written communications from the FBI to the National Security Council on international terrorism matters, 1998-September 20, 2001 10. Any DOJ or NSC briefing materials relating to counterterrorism or domestic intelligence issues created for the Bush-Cheney Transition Team. 11. Any policy statements, directives, or guidance from the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, or Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division to the FBI or to U.S. Attorneys' Offices on Counterterrorism matters from 1998Present, not relating to individual investigations. 12. Annual Field Office Reports or other documents outlining annual counterterrorism priorities and strategies from select from FBI Field Offices, 1998-Present.

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13. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Attorney General Guidelines for Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Investigations. 14. Copy of policy directives regarding the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, and its role in counterterrorism policy, operations, analysis, and collection. 15. Copy of annual report on the FBI's National Foreign Intelligence Program budget, produced by the Director of Central Intelligence's Community Management Staff, FY1995-FY2004. 16. FBI's annual Congressional Budget Justification Books, FY1995-FY2004 17. Department of Homeland Security's budget request for FY2003-FY2004

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Team #6: Item 4: Interview Candidates *List of possible interviews at FBI field office in the areas where the hijackers lived and operated relating to: (1) the hijackers' activities and associations in the United States; (2) the way that these field offices collected, processed, analyzed, and disseminated information about potential terrorist activity prior to 9/11, (3) the offices' focus on counterterrorism and al-Qa'ida prior to the attacks: • FBI agents involved in the investigation of hijackers' activities and associations (in conjunction with team #1), analytic personnel, language specialists, counterterrorism managers.

*List of possible interviews related to pre-9/11 coordination and information sharing between the FBI and state/local law enforcement in the cities where the hijackers resided, and between FBI Legal Attaches and their foreign law enforcement and intelligence partners in countries where the hijackers lived and operated: • State/local law enforcement personnel, including those who have served on FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces in Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Diego, Newark, Miami, Washington, D.C., Tampa, and Jacksonville. Current FBI Legal Attaches inj tma Legal Attaches in place prior to 9/11. |

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*L;'st of possible interviews related to Justice Department leadership in setting FBI counterterrorism priorities, policy, and budget, and in directing FBI investigative activity prior to September 11: • DOJ personnel: Attorney General Ashcroft, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, former Attorney General Reno, former Deputy Attorney General Holder, Jim Reynolds, former Deputy Attorney General Gorelick, Barry Sabin, Chris Wray, David Kris, Assistant Attorney General Viet Dinh, DOJ budget personnel, Ronnie Edelman, former Assistant Attorney General Jim Robinson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Alice Fischer, Counsel David Nahmias, Fran Townsend, Ron Lee, Bruce Schwartz, Mark Richard, Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff, USAs and AUSAs in relevant jurisdictions. FBI personnel: Louis Freeh, Maryanne Woodson, Rose Rudden, Assistant Director Finance Division, Tom Pickard, former Section Chief Michael Rolince, former Executive Assistant Director Dale Watson.
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, : : .. *List of possible interviews related to White House leadership in setting FBI .. ; .. counterterrorism priorities, policy, aad.jh directing FBI investigative activity prior '.-. .to September 11 (in conjunction with team #3): ... • I FBI personnel:] I ""•--•... | I Dale Watson, Louis Freeh, Tom PickardJ

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NSC personnel: Daniel Benjahrin, Steve Simon, Mara Rudman, Mary McCarthy; Jamie Baker, Jim Steinberg, General Kerrick, Dick Clarke.

*List of possible interviews related to the Director of Central Intelligence's leadership in setting FBI CQunterteirorism priorities, policy, budget, and in directing FBI investigative activity/prior to September 11 (in conjunction with team #2): .. / FBI personnel: Dan Colefnan,| Dale Watson, Michael Roiince • |Maggie Gillespie,

CIA personnel:} [George Tenet, Joan Dempsey, Mike S., "Gang of Eight" (FBI and CIA executives' group)

*List of possible interviews to understand and evaluate the effectiveness of the current approach to domestic intelligence/counterrorism.

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• . FBI Executives: Director Bob Mueller, Executive Assistant Director Pat D' Amuro, Larry Medford, Chuck Frahm.

• . Office of Intelligence: IMaureen Bagmski. Information dissemination/reports officer cadre: intelligence unit personnel: customers tor FBI intelligence proauctsi

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• FBI technology Jssues: SCOPE user management group, TRILOGY user management group, FBI Headquarters arid field analysts, former CIO Bob Dies, CIO Darwin John, Mitretek personnel.. 9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive
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Training for agents and analytic personnel: Training Division officials, Office of Intelligence personnel, field and headquarters analysts. ; Centralization of intelligence operations: Selected Special Agents in Charge; Pat D'Amuro, Larry Medford, Chuck Frahm, Mike Fedarchyk, Andy Arena, National Joint Terrorism Task Force personnel. \ Expanded Joint Terrorism Task Force Efforts/Coordination

State/local:

\d pilot projects: Dallas FBI Early Response Network, Housto

Police Department, CATIC, Criminalilntelligence Division, Los Angeles County Sheriff Department's Terrorise! Early Warning Group, St. Louis Gateway Information Sharing Initially^, John Miller, Assistant to L.A.P.D. Commissioner, Ray Kelly, NYPD Commissioner, David Cohen, NYPD • Use of private sector data gathering and mining capabilities: Officials from Choicepoint and Axiom. . Other U.S. Government Agencies • Terrorist Threat Integration Center (in conjunction with team #2): John Brennan, Steve McGraw, relevant NSC officials Central Intelligence Agency: George Tenet, Assistant Director of Central; Intelligence for Homeland Security Winston Wileyl I Department of Homeland Security: Karen Morr, Frank Libutti, Paul Redmond Justice Department, including legal and policy reform: DOJ personnel: Attorney General Ashcroft, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff, Assistant Attorney General Viet Dinh, Barry Sabin, David Nahmias FBI personnel: Director Bob Mueller, Michael Woods, Spike Bowman, Jack Livingston, Ken Wainstein. Legislative branch personnel: Senators: Graham, Shelby, Specter, Grassley, Edwards, Gregg; Congressmen: Sensenbrenner, Goss, Conyers. Current and former staff: Vicki Divoll, Steve Cash, Chris Ford, Bruce Cohen, John Gannon, Suzanne Spalding, Beryl Howard, John Gannon.

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*List of possible interviews related to current and future domestic intelligence policy issues and considerations: ; • Current and former FBI and CM officials: Howard Shapiro, Bear Brvant| John McGaffin, Jeff Smith, Judge Webster, Dale Watson, James Woolscyr ~\ Current and former White House officials: John Podesta, Jim Steinberg, Jamie Baker, Mary DeRosa, Dan Benjamin, Dick Clarke • Civi7 liberties organizations: Jerry Berman, Jim Dempsey, Tim Edgar, Kate Martin, David Cole, Joe Onek, Ann Beeson Other current and former government officials: Brent Scowcroft, James Gilmore, Zoe Baird, John Hamre, Gary Hart, Senator Edwards' staff, Ambassador Bremer, Warren Rudman, former Chief Judge of the FISA Court, Royce Lamberth Officials from other agencies with a role in domestic intelligence collection and analysis:

Foreign intelligence and law enforcement personnel:

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TEAM 6 DRAFT WORK PLAN, April 23, 2003 Barbara Grewe Michael Jacobson Peter Rundlet Lance Cole

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Premise Statement
The September 11th terrorist attacks were carried out by 19 hijackers, who lived openly and freely in the United States for varying periods of time prior to the attacks. The leaders of the plot spent considerable time training in the United States for the attacks, traveling throughout the country during this time. The U.S. Intelligence Communityjaad the FBI more specifically, was aware that three of these individuals had ties ta-ar^Qa'ida.^rior the attacks. Though the plot was primarily financed and orchestfaTMTrorn overseas, the hijackers also had contact with and received assistance from a number of individuals in the United States. Some of these individuals were known to the FBI prior to September 11th through its counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations. The FBI also had other warnings of a possible attack in the summer of 2001, including the Moussaoui investigation, the Phoenix EC, and the U.S. Intelligence Community's heightened state of alert. It is now clear that therejwere -intelligence failures by the FBI, which has the primary authority over domestic intelligence, as well as by other U.S. Intelligence Community agencies. IrHigTiruFtrlisT our team seeks to answer the following broad questions: • • • What accounts for the intelligence failures related to the attacks, and in particular those of the FBI? What reforms has the U.S. Government undertaken to address these failures, and how effective have these reforms been? What additional changes need to be made for the U.S. Government to have an effective domestic intelligence/counterterrorism capability?

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In evaluating why the intelligence failures occurred, our team will focus its efforts on the following three possible broad explanations: The existence of barriers internal to the FBI that prevented it from having an effective counterterrorism program and effectively fulfilling its domestic intelligence function. The existence of external barriers to the FBI that prevented it from having an effective counterterrorism program and effectively fulfilling its domestic intelligence function. The lack of adequate coordination within the FBI, between the FBI and other U.S. Government agencies, state and local law enforcement, and foreign intelligence and law enforcement counterparts.

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I. Key Questions for the Commission
What barriers internal to the FBI contributed to the September 11th intelligence failures and prevented it from having an effective counterterrorism program prior to September 11th? • • • • • • • What internal barriers acaount-for the FBI's failure to detect the hijackers and the ultimate plot? Was the FBI's traditional law enforcement mission incompatible with successful intelligence collection and analysis? Was there a failure in the FBI's leadership and management on counterterrorism issues? Was the FBI's institutional culture a barrier to having a successful national counterterrorism program? .Why did the FBI fail to adequately address the widely reported technology problems prior to the attacks? Why did the FBI fail to adequately address the widely reported analytic problems prior to the attacks? Why was significant counterterrorism information not always adequately shared within the FBI?

What barriers external to the FBI contributed to the September 11th intelligence failures prior to September 11th and prevented it from having an effective counterterrorism program? • • • To what extent did the legal authorities hamper the FBI's ability to have an effective counterterrorism/domestic intelligence capability? To what extent did Congressional and public sensitivities regarding civil liberties hamper zealous counterterrorism investigation? ^ Was there a failure in leadership by Congress, the White House, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Justice Department in guiding the FBI on counterterrorism issues?

Was there adequate coordination and information sharing between the FBI and other U.S. Government agencies, state and local law enforcement, and its foreign intelligence and law enforcement counterparts? • Did the FBI and other U.S. Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies adequately coordinate, collaborate and share information on counterterrorism matters, and what accounts for any failures in this regard? Did the FBI and its foreign intelligence and law enforcement counterparts adequately coordinate, collaborate and share information on counterterrorism matters, and what accounts for any failures in this regard?

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE • Did the FBI and state and local law enforcement entities adequately coordinate, collaborate and share information on counterterrorism matters, and what accounts for any failures in this regard?

What reforms has the U.S. Government undertaken to address these failures? How effective have these reforms and what additional changes need to be made for the U.S. Government to have an effective domestic intelligence/counterterrorism capability? • What internal reforms has the FBI made to address the intelligence failures identified as a result of the September 11th attacks, and how effective have these reforms bgen? What obstacles remain to the successful implementation ot these * reforms? • If the Administration's various planned reforms are implemented, will the U.S. Government have an adequate and effective domestic intelligence counterterrorism capability, and if not, what additional changes are needed? • Should the U.S. Government make wholesale structural changes to the way that~^s counterintelligence and foreign intelligence information collection within the United States is managed, disseminated, analyzed and exploited? • What are the pros and cons, including transition costs and feasibility, of establishing a separate agency to handle counterintelligence and foreign intelligence collection within the United States? What can we learn from other countries' approaches to domestic intelligence issues? • What legal reforms, including changes in the law and Executive Branch policy guidance, have been adopted since the September 11th attacks, and how successful have these changes^been? What additional legal and policy changes are necessary for the U.S. Government to establish a successful domestic intelligence capability? ^^^^^ What are the tradeoffs urclyirfibertie^jf any^ of these legislative ^ad-structural reforms? Are these trade&ffs acceptable?

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II. Briefing Plan for the Commissioners
A. Reading List 1. Relevant portions of the Joint Inquiry Classified Final Report, including Senator Shelby's Additional Views. 2. Joint Inquiry Unclassified Staff Statements, dated: September 24, 2002 (as supplemented on October 17, 2002) and October 8, 2002. 3. Selected portions of the October 2002 Markle Foundation Task Force report on National Security in the Information Age. 4. Selected portions of the January 2001 report by the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, entitled "Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change." (Hart-Rudman Commission). 5. Selected portions of the December 2002 report by the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore Commission). 6. Senator John Edwards' February 2003 fact sheet on the proposed creation of a Homeland Intelligence Agency. 7. Jeff Smith's June 18, 2002 Washington Post Op-Ed, entitled "Haste and the Homeland Plan," on homeland security and domestic intelligence. 8. "Mission Impossible," written by Jean Kumagai, published in IEEE Spectrum online Journal, dated April 7, 2003 on the FBI's information sharing and technological problems. B. Recommended Briefers 1. Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff 2. Glenn Fine, Inspector General, Department of Justice 3. Jeff Smith, former General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency

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III. Description of the Central Categories of Documents
1. Numerous specific requests on hijackers' associates (specific request items are classified, and listed in a separate document). 2. Lists of pending investigations opened based on debriefings of Mohammed Haydar Zammar, Ramzi Binalshib, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Mohammed AlHasawi, Abu Zubaida, and other relevant GITMO detainees (the list is classified). 3. Updated timeline from FBI's 9/11 investigation (codenamed "PENTTBOM."). 4. List of pending PENTTBOM investigations and responsible case agents. 5. Training curricula from new agent training, counterterrorism in-services, and from FBI College of Analytical Studies. 6. Statistics from select FBI Field Offices, regarding agent assignments to counterterrorism investigations (referred to as "bum rates," which indicate agent man-hours actually spent on particular matters) from 1993-Present. 7. Copy of the pre-September 11th and most up4o~date Manual of Investigative and Operational Guidelines. 8. Copy of the pre-September 11th and most up-to-date Manual of Administrative and Operational Procedures. 9. Internal FBI documents on the post-9/11 counterrorism reforms, including documents relating to the creation of the Office of Intelligence and the Reports Officer program. 10. Memoranda of Understanding between the FBI and state/local law enforcement agencies in cities where the hijackers resided or operated. 11. Written communications from the National Security Council to the FBI or the Department of Justice containing counterterrorism strategy, policy and guidance, s /„ , , , - , . ) 1998-Present V^' 12. Written communications from the FBI to the National Security Council on international terrorism matters, 1998-Present 13. Any documents relating to domestic intelligence issues created by the Clinton Administration for the Bush-Cheney Transition Team.

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE 14. Any final recommendations^OfsStudies createtTby the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board regardinjp*h|j)roposals to create a new domestic intelligence agency. 15. Any policy statements, directives, or guidance from the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, or Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division to the FBI on Counterterrorism matters from 1998-Present, not relating to r^n^/ i <-,-•individual investigations. \~ 0^^ 16. Annual Field Office Reports or other documents outlining annual counterterrorism priorities and strategies from select from FBI Field Offices, 1998-Present. 17. Copy of the pre-September 11th and most up to date Attorney General Guidelines for Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Investigations. 18. Copy of Decision Memos regarding^ttiecre tion of the Department of Homeland Security, and its role in counterte rism policy, operations, analysis, and collection. 19. Copy of annual report on the FBI's National Foreign Intelligence Program budget, produced by the Director of Central Intelligence's Community Management Staff, FY1995-FY2004. 20. FBI's annual Congressional Budget Justification Books, FY1995-FY2004

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IV. Interview List (by general topic matter)
*List of possible interviews at selected FBI field offices in the areas where the hijackers lived and operated related to their knowledge and focus on counterterrorism and al-Qa'ida prior to the attacks: FBI case agents for pre-9/11 al-Qa'ida investigations. * List of possible interviews related to pre-9/11 coordination and information sharing between the of FBI and state/local law enforcement in the cities where the hijackers resided; state/local law enforcements' knowledge of hijackers, associations, and al-Qa'ida prior to the attacks: Police officials and state/local law enforcement personnel who have served on FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces in Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Diego, Newark, Miami, Washington, D.C., Tampa, and Jacksonville. * List of possible interviews related to pre-9/11 coordination and information sharing between the FBI Legal Attaches and their foreign law enforcement and intelligence partners in countries where the hijackers lived and operated; foreign partners' knowledge of hijackers, associates, and al-Qa'ida prior to the attacks: Current FBI Legal Attaches in| and Legal Attaches in place prior to 9/11. *List of possible interviews related to Justice Department leadership in setting FBI counterterrorism priorities, policy, and budget, and in directing FBI .investigative activity prior to September 11 th : DOJ personnel: Attorney General Ashcroft, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, Former Attorney General Reno, former Deputy Attorney General Holder, Jim Reynolds, former Deputy Attorney General Gorelick, Barry Sabin, DOJ budget personnel, Ronnie Edelman, former Assistant Attorney General Jim RobinsenJDeputy Assistant Attorney General Alice Fischer, Counsel David Mahmias) Assistant Attorney General Michael Chenoff, USAs and AUSATirTrelevant jurisdictions. FBI personnel: Louis Freeh, Maryanne Woodson, Rose Rudden, Assistant Director Finance Division, Tom Pickard, former Section Chief Michael Rolince, former Executive Assistant Director Dale Watson. *List of possible interviews related to White House leadership in setting FBI counterterrorism priorities, policy, and in directing FBI investigative activity prior to September 11 th (in conjunction with team #3): 9/11 Law E n f o r c e m e n t Sensitive COMMISSION SENSITIVE

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Dale Watson, Louis Freeh, Tom Pickard. WSCpersonnel: Daniel Benjamin, Steve Simon, MaraRudman, Mary McCarthy, Jim Steinberg, General Kerrick, Dick Clark, Ray Mislock. *List of possible interviews related to the Director of Central Intelligence's leadership in setting FBI counterterrorism priorities, policy, budget, and in directing FBI investigative activity prior to September 111 (in conjunction with team #2): x / FBI personnel. Dan Colerhari| Dale Watson, Michael Rolince CIA personnel.] "Gang of Eight" , [Maggie Gillespie,

\e Tenet, Joan Dempsey, Mike S.,

*List of possible interviews related to post September 1 l lh reforms in the Domestic Intelligence arena: FBI specific Reforms , Office of Intelligence:

Information dissemination/reports officer cadre:

FBI technology Issues: SCOPE user management group, TRILOGY user management group, FBI Headquarters and field analysts. Training for agents and analytic personnel: Training Division officials, Office of Intelligence personnel, field and headquarters analysts. Centralization of intelligence operations: Selected Special Agents in Charge, Pat D'Amuro, Larry Medford, Chuck Frahm, Mike Fedarchyk, Andy Arena, National Joint Terrorism Task Force personnel.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

9/11

Closed by S t a t u t e

COMMISSION SENSITIVE Expanded Joint Terrorism Task Force Efforts: Selected pilot projects: Dallas FBI Early Response Network, Houston Police Department, CATIC, Criminal Intelligence Division, Los Angeles County Sheriff Department's Terrorism Early Warning Group, St. Louis Gateway Information Sharing Initiative Other U.S. Government Domestic Intelligence-related Post 9/1 1 Reforms Terrorist Threat Integration Center (in conjunction with team #2): John Brennan, Steve McGraw, relevant NSC officials Department of Homeland Security: Karen Morr, Pat D'Amuro, Frank Libutti, Paul Redmond Justice Department, including legal and policy reform: DOJ personnel: Attorney General Ashcroft, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff, Assistant Attorney General Viet Dinh, Barry Sabin, David Nahmias FBI personnel-. Director Bob Mueller, Michael Woods, Spike Bowman, Jack Livingston, Ken Wainstein. Legislative branch personnel: Judiciary and Intelligence Committee staff and members *List of possible interviews related to future domestic intelligence policy issues and considerations: Current and former FBI and CIA officials: Howard Shapiro, Bear Brvaht John McGaffjn. Jeff Smith, Judge Webster, Dale Watson, James Woolseyl I
*?

Current and former White House officials: John Podesta, Jim Steinberg, Mary DiRosa, Dan Benjamin, Dick Clarke Civil liberties organizations: Jerry Berman, Jim Dempsey, Tim Edgar, Kate Martin, David Cole, Joe Onek, Ann Beeson Other current and former government officials: Brent Scowcroft, James Gilmore, Zoe Baird, John Hamre, Gary Hart, Senator Edwards' staff, Ambassador Bremer, Warren Rudman

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Officials from other agencies with a role in domestic intelligence collection and analysis:

Foreign intelligence and law enforcement personnel:

9/11 Law E n f o r c e m e n t Sensitive

9/11 C l a s s i f i e d Information

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

10

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Premise Statement
The September 111 terrorist attacks were carried out by 19 hijackers, who lived openly and freely in the United States for varying periods of time prior to the attacks. The six leaders of the plot spent considerable time training in the United States for the attacks, traveling throughout the country during this time. The U.S. Intelligence Community, and the FBI more specifically, was aware that three of these individuals had ties to al-Qa'ida prior the attacks. Though the plot was primarily financed and orchestrated from overseas, the hijackers also had contact with and received assistance from a number of individuals in the United States. Some of the hijackers' associates were known to the FBI prior to September 11th through its counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations. The FBI also had other indications of a possible attack in the summer of 2001, including the Moussaoui investigation, the Phoenix EC, and the U.S. Intelligence Community's heightened state of alert. Based on previous reviews, it is now clear that the FBI did not respond aggressively and appropriately to all of the available intelligence, and failed in many respects to "connect the dots" prior to the attacks. Less closely studied is the extent to which the FBI's inability to detect the hijackers' activities and associations while in the United States represented a systemic intelligence failure. Was the hijackers' ability to stay below the FBI's radar while in the United States an indication of excellent operational tradecraft by the hijackers, or does it represent a failure on the part of the FBI, and if so, what accounts for these failures? To answer these questions, our team will have to develop a comprehensive understanding of the U.S. Government's efforts pre-September 11th to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence on terrorist activity in the United States. Our review will focus not only on the FBI itself, which had primary responsibility for these matters, but also on the FBI's relationship with other entities with important roles in this process, such as state and local authorities, other federal agencies, and foreign intelligence and law enforcement partners. By understanding the problems with the system pre-September 11th, it will be clearer what the specific failures were, why they occurred, and will help us better explain why the FBI was unable to learn about or stop the attacks. Finally, we will review the current state of the U.S. Government's domestic intelligence efforts, to assess whether they do or will remedy the pre-September 11th systemic problems identified through the course of our investigation.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

I. Key Questions for the Commission
What was the FBI's approach to combating international terrorist activity in the United States prior to September 11th? • How did the FBI collect intelligence information about foreign terrorist activity in the United States prior to September 11th, and why did the FBI adopt this approach? What were the strengths and weaknesses of the FBI's approach to information collection? How did the FBI process intelligence information it received about foreign terrorist activity in the United States, and why did the FBI adopt this approach? What were the strengths and weaknesses of the FBI's approach to information processing? How did the FBI analyze intelligence information about foreign terrorist activity in the United States, and why did the FBI adopt this approach? What were the strengths and weaknesses of the FBI's approach to information analysis? How did the FBI disseminate intelligence information about foreign terrorist activity in the United States, and why did the FBI adopt this approach? What were the strengths and weaknesses of the FBI's approach to information dissemination? How effectively did the FBI collaborate, coordinate, and share information with foreign law enforcement and intelligence partners, local and state law enforcement authorities, and other federal agencies prior to the attacks? How effective was the FBI's leadership and management in directing its counterterrorism program prior to September 11th? What role did the White House, Congress, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the various Justice Department components play in the FBI's counterterrorism program, from a policy, budgetary, and investigative standpoint, prior to the September 11th attacks?

• •

Why was the FBI unable to detect and prevent the September 11th attacks? • • In what ways did the FBI fail to adequately collect information relevant to the September 11th attacks, and what accounts for any failures in this regard? hi what ways did the FBI fail to adequately process information relevant to the September 11th attacks' and what accounts for any failures in this regard?

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE • • • In what ways did the FBI fail to adequately disseminate information relevant to the September 11th attacks and what accounts for any failures in this regard? In what ways did the FBI fail to adequately analyze information relevant to the September 11th attacks' and what accounts for any failures in this regard? In what ways did the FBI fail to adequately collaborate, coordinate, and share information relevant to the September 11th attacks with foreign law enforcement and intelligence partners, local and state law enforcement authorities, and other federal agencies prior to the attacks, and what accounts for any failures in this regard? What particularly glaring or significant failures stand out in terms of the FBI's inability 1 prevent the September 11th attacks, and what accounts for these to failures? How is foreign intelligence information regarding terrorist activity in the United States collected, processed, analyzed and disseminated today? What has changed since September 11th, and how effectively is the system currently working? • What are the ingredients of a successful domestic intelligence/counterterrorism system? What degree of collaboration, coordination, and information sharing is required between the FBI, state and local authorities, foreign intelligence and law enforcement partners, and other federal agencies to have a successful system? What role should private sector entities (e.g., data aggregating and information technology companies) play in this system? Does the current system provide for the adequate collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of counterterrorism-related intelligence, and if not, what are the primary barriers to success? What are the pros and cons, including transition costs and feasibility, of establishing a separate agency to handle counterintelligence and foreign intelligence collection within the United States? What can we learn from other countries' approaches to and experiences with domestic intelligence issues? What additional legal and policy changes, if any, are necessary and appropriate for the U.S. Government to establish a successful domestic intelligence capability?

• •

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

II. Briefing Plan for the Commissioners
A. Reading List 1. Relevant portions of the Joint Inquiry Classified Final Report, including Senator Shelby's Additional Views. 2. Joint Inquiry Unclassified Staff Statements, dated: September 24, 2002 (as supplemented on October 17, 2002) and October 8, 2002. 3. Selected portions of the October 2002 Markle Foundation Task Force report on National Security in the Information Age. 4. Selected portions of the January 2001 report by the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, entitled "Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change" (Hart-Rudman Commission). 5. Selected portions of the December 2002 report by the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore Commission). 6. Senator John Edwards's February 2003 fact sheet on the proposed creation of a Homeland Intelligence Agency. 7. Jeff Smith's June 18, 2002 Washington Post Op-Ed, entitled "Haste and the Homeland Plan," on homeland security and domestic intelligence. 8. "Mission Impossible," written by Jean Kumagai, published in IEEE Spectrum online Journal, dated April 7, 2003 on the FBI's information sharing and technological problems.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE B. Recommended Briefers 1. Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff 2. Glenn Fine, Inspector General, Department of Justice 3. Jeff Smith, former General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency 4. Mike Leavitt, Governor of Utah during 2002 Salt Lake Olympics 5. Jeff Jonas, CEO of Systems Research and Development 6. Bill Crowell, former Deputy Director of NSA 7. Oilman Louie, In-Q-Tel 8. Professor Philip Heymann, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

III. Description of the Central Categories of Document to be Requested to Supplement the Joint Inquiry's Record
1. In consultation with team #1, requests on hijackers' associates, al-Qa'ida detainees, and updated timelines and lists of pending investigations from the FBI's 9/11 investigation (codenamed "PENTTBOM.") 2. Training curricula from new agent training, counterterrorism in-services, and from FBI College of Analytical Studies. 3. Statistics from select FBI Field Offices, regarding agent assignments to counterterrorism investigations (referred to as "burn rates," which indicate agent man-hours actually spent on particular matters) from 1993-Present. 4. Copy of the pre-September 11th and most up to date Manual of Investigative and Operational Guidelines. 5. Copy of the pre-September 11th and most up to date Manual of Administrative and Operational Procedures. 6. Internal FBI documents on the post-9/11 counterrorism reforms, including documents relating to the creation of the Office of Intelligence and the Reports Officer program. 7. Memoranda of Understanding between the FBI and state/local law enforcement agencies in cities where the hijackers resided or operated. 8. In consultation with team #3, written communications from the National Security Council to the FBI or the Department of Justice containing counterterrorism strategy, policy and guidance, 1998-September 20, 2001 9. Written communications from the FBI to the National Security Council on international terrorism matters, 1998-September 20, 2001 10. Any DOJ or NSC briefing materials relating to counterterrorism or domestic intelligence issues created for the Bush-Cheney Transition Team. 11. Any final recommendations or studies created by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board regarding the proposals to create a new domestic intelligence agency. 12. Any policy statements, directives, or guidance from the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, or Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division to the FBI or to U.S. Attorneys' Offices on Counterterrorism matters from 1998Present, not relating to individual investigations.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE 13. Annual Field Office Reports or other documents outlining annual counterterrorism priorities and strategies from select from FBI Field Offices, 1998-Present. 14. Copy of the pre-September 11th and most up to date Attorney General Guidelines for Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Investigations. 15. Copy of policy directives regarding the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, and its role in counterterrorism policy, operations, analysis, and collection. 16. Copy of annual report on the FBI's National Foreign Intelligence Program budget, produced by the Director of Central Intelligence's Community Management Staff, FY1995-FY2004. 17. FBI's annual Congressional Budget Justification Books, FY1995-FY2004 18. Department of Homeland Security's budget request for FY2003-FY2004

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

IV. Interview List (by general topic matter)
*List of possible interviews at FBI field office in the areas where the hijackers lived and operated relating to: (1) the hijackers activities and associations in the United States; (2) the way that these field offices collected, processed, analyzed, and disseminated information about potential terrorist activity prior to 9/11, (3) the offices' focus on counterterrorism and al-Qa'ida prior to the attacks: • FBI agents involved in the investigation of hijackers' activities and associations (in conjunction with team #1), analytic personnel, language specialists, counterterrorism managers.

*List of possible interviews related to pre-9/11 coordination and information sharing between the FBI and state/local law enforcement in the cities where the hijackers resided, and between FBI Legal Attaches and their foreign law enforcement and intelligence partners in countries where the hijackers lived and operated: • State/local law enforcement personnel, including those who have served on FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces in Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Diego, Newark, Miami, Washington, D.C., Tampa, and Jacksonville. I

• Current FBI Legal Attaches in| \ and Legal Attaches in place prior to 9/11. *Ljst of possible interviews related to Justice Department leadership in setting FBI counterterrorism priorities, policy, and budget, and iirdirecting FBI investigative activity prior to September 11 th : •

DOJ personnel: Attorney General AShcroft, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, former Attorney General Reno, former Deputy Attorney General Holder, Jim Reynolds, former Deputy Attorney General Gorelick, Barry Sabin, Chris \Vray, David Kris, Assistant Attorney General Viet Dinh, DOJ budget personnel, Ronnie Edelman, former Assistant Attorney General Jirn Robinson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Alice Fischer, Counsel David Nahmias, Fran Townsend, Ron Lee, Bruce Schwartz, Mark Richard, Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff, USAs and AUSAs , in relevant jurisdictions. FBI personnel: Louis Freeh, Maryanne Woodson, Rose Rudden, Assistant Director Finance Division, Tom Pickard, former Section Chief Michael Rolince, former Executive Assistant Director Dale Watson.

9/11

Law E n f o r c e m e n t Sensitive

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

,9/11 |

Law E n f o r c e m e n t Privacy

\COlViMISSION SENSITIVE

*List of possible interviews related to Whit& .House leadership in setting FBI counterterrorism prioritdes; policy, and in directing FBI investigative activity prior to September 1 l t f ; (in conjunction with team #3): .. ... FBI oersdnnel. \ Dale Watson. Louis Freeh. Tom Pickard
l j

NSC personnel: Daniel Benjamin, Steve Simon, Mara Rudman, Mary McCarthy, Jamie Baker, Jim Steinberg, General Kerrick, Dick Clarke.

*List of possible interviews related to the Director of Central Intelligence's leadership in setting FBI counterterrorism priorities, policy, budget, and in directing FBI investigative activity.prior to September 11 (in conjunction with team #2): FBI personnel: Dan Coleman| Dale Watson, Michael Rolince • | Maggie Gillespie,

CIA personnel.^ \e Tenet, Joan Deiiipsey, Mike S., "Gang of Eight" (FBI and CIA executives' group)

*List of possible interviews to understand and evaluate the .effectiveness of the current approach to domestic intelligence/counterrorism.

FBI /
• F&I Executives: Director Bob Mueller, Executive Assistant Director Pat D'Amuro, Larry .Medford, Chuck Frahm. Office of Intelligence: L I, Maureen Baginski.

9

Information dissemination/reports officer cadre:

FBI technology Issues: SCOPE user management group, TRILOGY user management group, FBI Headquarters and field analysts, former CIO Bob Dies, CIO Darwin John, Mitretek personnel.
9/11 Closed by S t a t u t e

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

9/11

Closed by Statute

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Training for agents and analytic personnel: Training Division officials, Office of Intelligence personnel, field and headquarters analysts. i Centralization of intelligence operations: Selected Special Agents in Charge, pat D'Amuro, Larry Medford, Chuck Frahm, Mike Fedarchyk, Andy Arena, National Joint Terrorism Task Force personnel. i

Expanded Joint Terrorism Task Force Efforts/Coordination with State/local: \d pilot projects: Dallas FBI E^rly Response Network, Housto Police Department, CATIC, Criminal Intelligence Division, Los Angeles County Sheriff Department's Terrorism Early Warning Group, St. Louis Gateway Information Sharing Initiative, John Miller, Assistant to L.A.P.D. Commissioner, Ray Kelly, NYPD Commissioner, David Cohen, NYPD

Use of private sector data gathering and mining capabilities: Officials from Choicepoint and Axiom] Other U.S. Government Agencies \

Terrorist Threat Integration Center (in conjunction with

John Brennan, Steve McGraw, relevant NSC officials • Central Intelligence Agency: Security Winston • • ^

\e Tenet, Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Homela

Department of Homeland Security: Karen Morr, Frank Libutti, Paul Redmond Justice Department, including legal and policy reform: DOJ personnel: Attorney General Ashcroft, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff, Assistant Attorney General Viet Dinh, Barry Sabin, David Nahmias FBI personnel: Director Bob Mueller, Michael Woods, Spike Bowman, Jack Livingston, Ken Wainstein. Legislative branch personnel: Senators: Graham, Shelby, Specter, Grassley, Edwards, Gregg; Congressmen: Sensenbrenner, Goss, Conyers. Current and former staff: Vicki Divoll, Steve Cash, Chris Ford, Bruce Cohen, John Gannon, Suzanne Spalding, Beryl Howard, John Gannon.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

10

9/11 Closed by Statute COMMISSION SENSITIVE *List of possible interviews related to current arid future domestic intelligence policy issues and considerations: • Current and former FBI and CIA officials: Howard Shapiro, Bear Bryant John McGaffin. Jeff Smith, Judge Webster, Dale Watson, James WoolseyP 1 Current and former White House officials: John Podesta, Jim Steinberg, Jamie Baker, Mary DiRosa, Dan Benjamin, Dick Clarke Civil liberties organizations: Jerry Berman, Jim Dempsey, Tim Edgar, Kate Martin, David Cole, Joe Onek, Ann Beeson Other current and former government officials: Brent Scowcroft, James Gilmore, Zoe Baird, John Hamre, Gary Hart, Senator Edwards' staff, Ambassador Bremer, Warren Rudman, former Chief Judge of the FISA Court, Royce Lamberth Officials from other agencies with a role in domestic intelligence c.nllec.tinn and analvxix:

Foreign intelligence and law enforcement personnel:

9/11 Classified Information

9/11 Law Enforcement

Sensitive

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

11

Team 6: Law Enforcement and Intelligence Collection Inside the United States Proposed Investigative Work Plan
Barbara Grewe Peter Rundlet Michael Jacobson Lance Cole

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Premise Statement
The September 11 terrorist attacks were carried out by 19 hijackers, who lived openly and freely in the United States for varying periods of time prior to the attacks. The six leaders of the plot spent considerable time training in the United States for the attacks, traveling throughout the country during this time. The U.S. Intelligence Community generally, and the FBI more specifically, were aware prior to attacks that three of these individuals had ties to al-Qa'ida. Although the plot was primarily financed and orchestrated from overseas, the hijackers also had contact with and received assistance from a number of individuals in the United States. Some of the hijackers' associates were known to the FBI prior to September 11 through its counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations. The FBI also had other indications of a possible attack in the summer of 2001, including the Moussaoui investigation, the Phoenix EC, and the U.S. Intelligence Community's heightened state of alert. Based on previous reviews, it is now clear that the FBI did not respond aggressively and appropriately to all of the available intelligence, and failed in many respects to "connect the dots" prior to the attacks. Less closely studied is the extent to which the FBI's inability to detect the hijackers' activities and associations while in the United States represented a systemic intelligence failure. Was the hijackers' ability to avoid detection by the FBI while in the United States an indication of excellent operational tradecraft by the hijackers, or does it represent a failure on the part of the FBI? If the former, can changes be made to detect this type of tradecraft in the future? If the latter, what accounts for these failures? To answer these questions, our team will have to develop a comprehensive understanding of the U.S. Government's efforts pre-September 11 to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence on terrorist activity in the United States. Our review will focus not only on the FBI itself, which had primary responsibility for these matters, but also on the FBI's relationship with other entities with important roles in this process, such as state and local authorities, other federal agencies, and foreign intelligence and law enforcement partners. By understanding the problems with the system pre-September 11, it will be clearer what the specific failures were, why they occurred, and will help us better explain why the FBI was unable to learn about or stop the attacks. Finally, we will review the current state of the U.S. Government's domestic intelligence efforts, to assess whether they are adequate to remedy the pre-September 11 systemic problems identified through the course of our investigation. If not, we will make recommendations to address these problems.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE I. Key Questions for the Commission What relevant information did the FBI have prior to the September 11 attacks? • What information was available to U.S. Intelligence and law enforcement entities prior to September 11 regarding the 19 hijackers and their associates? When was this information known and by whom, and how was this information shared and utilized prior to the attacks? Did the FBI have all of the information about the 19 hijackers available to other U.S. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and their foreign intelligence and law enforcement partners?

What was the FBI's approach to combating international terrorist activity in the United States prior to September 11? • How did the FBI collect, process, analyze and disseminate intelligence information about foreign terrorist activity in the United States prior to September 11, and why did the FBI adopt this approach? What were the strengths and weaknesses of the FBI's approach to information collection? How effectively did the FBI collaborate, coordinate, and share information with foreign law enforcement and intelligence partners, local and state law enforcement authorities, and other federal agencies prior to the attacks? How effective was the FBI's leadership and management in directing its counterterrorism program prior to September 11 ? What role did the White House, Congress, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the various Justice Department components play in the FBI's counterterrorism program, from a policy, budgetary, and investigative standpoint, prior to the September 11 attacks? To what extent did legal authorities and the resultant sensitivities regarding civil liberties impact on the FBI's counterterrorism mission?

• •

To what extent was the FBI's inability to prevent the September 11 attacks an intelligence failure, and was the FBI's approach to combating terrorism a critical factor in the overall failure to prevent the attacks? • In what ways did the FBI fail to adequately collect, process, analyze and disseminate information relevant to the September 11 attacks, and what accounts for any failures in this regard? In what ways did the FBI fail to adequately collaborate, coordinate, and share information relevant to the September 11 attacks with foreign law enforcement COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE and intelligence partners, local and state law enforcement authorities, and other federal agencies prior to the attacks, and what accounts for any failures in this regard? • What particularly glaring or significant failures stand out in terms of the FBI's inability to prevent the September 11 attacks, and what accounts for these failures? Are the FBI's traditional law enforcement mission and resulting organizational structures and cultures incompatible with a successful counterterrorism program?

How is foreign intelligence information regarding terrorist activity in the United States collected, processed, analyzed and disseminated today? What has changed since September 11, and how effectively is the system currently working? • What are the ingredients of a successful domestic intelligence/counterterrorism system? What degree of collaboration, coordination, and information sharing is required between the FBI, state and local authorities, foreign intelligence and law enforcement partners, and other federal agencies to have a successful system? What role should private sector entities (e.g., data aggregating and information technology companies) play in this system? Does the current system provide for the adequate collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of counterterrorism-related intelligence, and if not, what are the primary barriers to success? What are the pros and cons, including transition costs and feasibility, of establishing a separate agency to handle counterintelligence and foreign intelligence collection within the United States? What can we learn from other countries' approaches to and experiences with domestic intelligence issues? What additional legal and policy changes, if any, are necessary and appropriate for the U.S. Government to establish a successful domestic intelligence capability?

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE II. Briefing Plan for the Commissioners
A. Reading List 1. Relevant portions of the Joint Inquiry Classified Final Report, including Senator Shelby's Additional Views [Why it is relevant: The Joint Inquiry has already performed considerable investigation on the performance of the FBI relating to the September 11 attacks. In determining the scope and focus of our investigation, the Commission should be aware of what the Joint Inquiry found and concluded. Senator Shelby's additional views contain important and relevant conclusions about the systemic problems with the FBI prior to the attacks.] 2. Joint Inquiry Unclassified Staff Statements, dated: September 24, 2002 (as supplemented on October 17, 2002) and October 8, 2002. [Why it is relevant: these statements cover a number of topics relevant to our investigation including: the Phoenix Electronic Communication, the Moussaoui investigation, the information regarding aircraft as weapons, and the U.S. Intelligence Community's handling of the information regarding the hijackers prior to the attacks.] 3. Selected portions of the October 2002 Markle Foundation Task Force report on National Security in the Information Age. [Why it is relevant: contains important policy recommendations for the U.S. Government relating to the impact of information and information technology on national security.] 4. Senator John Edwards's February 2003 one page fact sheet on the proposed creation of a Homeland Intelligence Agency. [Why it is relevant: the fact sheet contains some of the arguments in favor of the creation of a new domestic intelligence agency.] 5. Jeff Smith's June 18, 2002 Washington Post Op-Ed, entitled "Haste and the Homeland Plan," on homeland security and domestic intelligence. [Why it is relevant: the op-ed briefly describes the problems with the current system, and his proposals to remedy these problems.] 6. "Mission Impossible," written by Jean Kumagai, published in IEEE Spectrum online Journal, dated April 7, 2003 on the FBI's information sharing and technological problems. [Why it is relevant: the article discusses the well-known problems with the FBI's technology and information systems, and assesses whether the current proposals are likely to remedy these problems.] 7. The Cell, by John Miller [Why it is relevant: the author provides a detailed explanation of why he believes the FBI and CIA failed to prevent the September 11 attacks. He traces the origins of al-Qa'ida in the United States, beginning in the early 1990s, and how the U.S. Government failed to adequately respond to this growing threat.]

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE B. Recommended Briefers 1. Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff 2. Glenn Fine, Inspector General, Department of Justice 3. Jeff Smith, former General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency 4. Mike Leavitt, Governor of Utah during 2002 Salt Lake Olympics 5. Jeff Jonas, CEO of Systems Research and Development 6. Bill Crowell, former Deputy Director of NSA 7. Oilman Louie, In-Q-Tel 8. Professor Philip Heymann, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

III. Description of the Central Categories of Document to be Requested to Supplement the Joint Inquiry's Record
1. In consultation with team #1, requests on hijackers' associates, al-Qa'ida detainees, and updated timelines and lists of pending investigations from the FBI's 9/11 investigation (codenamed "PENTTBOM.") 2. Training curricula from new agent training, counterterrorism in-services, and from FBI College of Analytical Studies. 3. Statistics from select FBI Field Offices, regarding agent assignments to counterterrorism investigations (referred to as "burn rates," which indicate agent man-hours actually spent on particular matters) from 1993-Present. 4. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Manual of Investigative and Operational Guidelines. 5. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Manual of Administrative and Operational Procedures. 6. Internal FBI documents on the post-9/11 counterterrorism reforms, including documents relating to the creation of the Office of Intelligence and the Reports Officer program. 7. Memoranda of Understanding between the FBI and state/local law enforcement agencies in cities where the hijackers resided or operated. 8. In consultation with team #3, written communications from the National Security Council to the FBI or the Department of Justice containing counterterrorism strategy, policy and guidance, 1998-September 20, 2001 9. Written communications from the FBI to the National Security Council on international terrorism matters, 1998-September 20, 2001 10. Any DOJ or NSC briefing materials relating to counterterrorism or domestic intelligence issues created for the Bush-Cheney Transition Team. 11. Any policy statements, directives, or guidance from the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, or Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division to the FBI or to U.S. Attorneys' Offices on Counterterrorism matters from 1998Present, not relating to individual investigations. 12. Annual Field Office Reports or other documents outlining annual counterterrorism priorities and strategies from select from FBI Field Offices, 1998-Present.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE 13. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Attorney General Guidelines for Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Investigations. 14. Copy of policy directives regarding the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, and its role in counterterrorism policy, operations, analysis, and collection. 15. Copy of annual report on the FBI's National Foreign Intelligence Program budget, produced by the Director of Central Intelligence's Community Management Staff, FY1995-FY2004. 16. FBI's annual Congressional Budget Justification Books, FY1995-FY2004 17. Department of Homeland Security's budget request for FY2003-FY2004

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

IV. Interview List (by general topic matter)
*List of possible interviews at FBI field office in the areas where the hijackers lived and operated relating to: (1) the hijackers' activities and associations in the United States; (2) the way that these field offices collected, processed, analyzed, and disseminated information about potential terrorist activity prior to 9/11, (3) the offices' focus on counterterrorism and al-Qa'ida prior to the attacks: • FBI agents involved in the investigation of hijackers' activities and associations (in conjunction with team #1), analytic personnel, language specialists, counterterrorism managers.

*List of possible interviews related to pre-9/11 coordination and information sharing between the FBI and state/local law enforcement in the cities where the hijackers resided, and between FBI Legal Attaches and their foreign law enforcement and intelligence partners in countries where the hijackers lived and operated: • State/local law enforcement personnel, including those who have served on FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces in Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Diego, Newark, Miami, Washington, D.C., Tampa, and Jacksonville. /

• Current FBI Legal Attachesjflj I / and Legal Attaches in place prior to 9/1 L *List of possible interviews related to Justice Department leadership in setting FBI counterterrorism priorities, policy, and budget, and in directing FBI investigative activity prior to September 11: •

DOJ personnel: Attorney General Ashcroft, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, former Attorney General Reno, former Deputy Attorney General Holder, Jim Reynolds, former Deputy Attorney General Gorelick, Barry Sabin, Chris Wray, David Kris, Assistant Attorney General Viet Dinh, DOJ budget personnel, Ronnie Edeiman, former Assistant Attorney General Jim Robinson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Alice Fischer, Counsel David Nahmias, Fran Towrisend, Ron Lee, Bruce Schwartz, Mark Richard, Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff, USAs and AUSAs in relevant jurisdictions. FBI personnel: Louis Freeh, Maryanne Woodson, Rose Rudden, Assistant Director Finance Division, Tom Pickard, former Section Chief Michael Rolince, former Executive Assistant Director Dale Watson.

9/11 Law Enforcement

Sensitive

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

9/11 Law E n f o r c e m e n t

Privacy

""'•-•-...

COMMISSION SENSITIVE 19/11 Closed by S t a t u t e

*List of possible interviews related to White House leadership in setting FBI 'qounterterrorism priorities, policy, and in. directing FBI investigative activity prior to September 11 (in conjunction with team #3):..
17 D r «AM«A/*1 f^fjf t}€rSUfiil€l.^^^—_ ' '"-1 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ , _ L ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^_ J |

Dale Watson, Louis Freeh, Tom Pickard

NSC personnel: Daniel Benjamin, Steve Simon, Mara Rudman, Mary McCarthy, Jamie Baker, Jim Steinberg, General Kerrick, Dick Clarke.

*List of possible interviews related to,the Director of Central Intelligence's leadership in setting FBI cbunterterrojfism priorities, policy, budget, and in directing FBI investigative activity p.fior to September 11 (in conjunction with team #2): . / • FBI personnel: Dan Colenianj Dale Watson, Michael Rolince I Maggie Gillespie,

CIA personnel I George Tenet, Joan Dempsey, Mike S., "Gang of Eight" (FBI and CIA executives' group)

^.List of possible interviews to understand and evaluate the effectiveness of the current approach to domestic intelligence/counterrorism.

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\I
\ Executives: , Director Bob Mueller, Executive Assistant Director Pat D'Amuro, Larry Medford, Chuck Frahm.
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JMaureen Bagmski. Information dissemination/reports officer cadre:

FBI technology Issues: SCOPE user management group, TRILOGY user management group, FBI Headquarters and field analysts, former CIO Bob Dies, CIO Darwin John, Mitretek personnel.

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Training for agents and analytic personnel: Training Division officials, Office of Intelligence personnel, field and headquarters analysts. Centralization of intelligence operations: Selected Special Agents in Charge, Pat D'Amuro, Larry Medford, Chuck Frahm, Mike Fedarchyk, Andy Arena, National Joint Terrorism Task Force personnel. Expanded Joint Terrorism Task Force Efforts/Coordination with State/local: Selected pilot projects: Dallas FBIEarly Response Network, Houston

Police Department, CATIC, Criminal Intelligence Division, Los Angeles
County Sheriff Department's Terrorism Early Warning Group, St. Louis Gateway Information Sharing Initiative, John Miller, Assistant to L.A.P.D. Commissioner, Ray Kelly, NYPD Commissioner, David Cohen, NYPD Use of private sector data gathering and mining capabilities: Officials from Choicepoint and Axiom; Other U.S. Government Agencies .

Terrorist Threat Integration Center (in conjunction with team #2): John Brennan, Steve McGraw, relevant NSC officials Central Intelligence Agency: Security Winston W i l e y ]

\e Tenet, Assistant Director of Central Intelligence fo I

Department of Homeland Security: Karen Morr, Frank Libutti, Paul Redmond Justice Department, including legal and policy reform: DOJ personnel: Attorney General Ashcroft, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff, Assistant Attorney General Viet Dinh, Barry Sabin, David Nahmias FBI personnel: Director Bob Mueller, Michael Woods, Spike Bowman, Jack Livingston, Ken Wainstein. Legislative branch personnel: Senators: Graham, Shelby, Specter, Grassley. Edwards, Gregg; Congressmen: Sensenbrenner, Goss, Conyers. Current and former staff: Vicki Divoll, Steve Cash, Chris Ford, Bruce Cohen. John Gannon, Suzanne Spalding, Beryl Howard, John Gannon.

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE *List of possible interviews related to current .and future domestic intelligence policy issues and considerations: • Current and former FBI and CIA officials: Howard Shapiro, Bear Bryant, John McGaffin. Jeff Smith, Judge Webster, Dale Watson, James Woolsey.l | Current and former White House officials: John Podesta, Jim Steinberg, Jamie Baker, Mary DiRosa, Dan Benjamin, Dick Clarke Civil liberties organizations: Jerry Berman, Jim Dempsey, Tim Edgar, Kate Martin, David Cole, Joe Onek, Ann Beeson Other current and former government officials: Brent Scowcroft, James Gilmore, Zoe Baird, John Hamre, Gary Hart, Senator Edwards' staff, Ambassador Bremer, Warren Rudman, former Chief Judge of the FISA Court, Royce Lamberth Officials from other agencies with a role in domestic intelligence collection and analysis:

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Foreign intelligence and law enforcement personnel:

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