Local Government Energy Assurance Guidelines

Public Technology Institute

The resource for technology executives in local government

The

Table of Contents
I. Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................................1 II. Overview and Introduction ........................................................................................................... 3
Purpose of this Document....................................................................................................................................3 Project Timeline, Goals and Tasks ......................................................................................................................4 The Evolution of Energy Assurance Planning ...................................................................................................4 Mission Critical Operations .................................................................................................................................7 Understanding Energy Interdependencies: Electric Power System Basics for Local Government Policymakers ..................................................................................................................................9 F. Legal Authority and Statutes ............................................................................................................................. 11 G. Top 10 Things Local Governments Can Do to Improve Energy Assurance Efforts ........................................ 11 A. B. C. D. E.

III. Partnering......................................................................................................................................................17
A. B. C. D. Utilities ...............................................................................................................................................................17 The State ............................................................................................................................................................18 The Federal Government ...................................................................................................................................19 National Associations ........................................................................................................................................20

IV. Regional Cooperation and Collaboration ...................................................................21
A. An Action Plan for Regional Disaster Resilience .............................................................................................22 B. Mutual Aid Agreements .....................................................................................................................................23

V. Federal Energy Assurance Initiatives ...............................................................................................25
A. The National Response Framework/ESF 12, Sample ESF 12 Template for Local Governments ..................25 B. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), “Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection,” and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8), “National Preparedness” ....................................................................................................................................31 C. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) .......................................................................................34 D. The Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinator (EEAC) System....................................................................37 E. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) .........................................................................................39

VI. Local Government Energy Assurance: Preparation and Assessment ...............................41
A. Suggested Components of Critical Infrastructure Protection ...........................................................................41 B. Energy Efficiency ..............................................................................................................................................45 C. Renewable Energy .............................................................................................................................................47 D. Financing Energy Options .................................................................................................................................52

VII. Local Government Energy Assurance: Response and Recovery .......................................... 59
A. Best Practices ...................................................................................................................................................... 59 B. Lessons From Natural Disasters ......................................................................................................................... 59

VIII. Significant Research Findings ................................................................................................................ 61 IX. Bibliography .................................................................................................................................................. 63 X. Appendices .................................................................................................................................................... 67 Appendix A: National Database of Incentives for Energy Efficiency (DSIRE)................ 67 Appendix B: The Local Government Energy Assurance Assessment Tool....................... 69 Appendix C: Model Intrastate Mutual Aid Legislative Language ........................................ 85 Appendix D: Ohio Emergency Power Planning and Intervention Tool.............................. 92

I. Acknowledgements

T

he U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) funded the production of this publication. The OE is the primary DOE office responsible for energy emergency planning and response. This office is dedicated to ensuring a robust, secure, and reliable energy supply to local governments. Protecting and enhancing the resiliency of the energy sector from natural and human caused disasters requires that local governments be vigilant and aware of the interdependencies of the system. Fortunately, officials within OE’s Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration (ISER) Division recognize the value of assisting local governments with the development of their energy assurance plans. Our deepest thanks are extended to Alice Lippert and her staff for embracing and empowering a committed group of local government leaders and associations. These local government energy assurance guidelines were developed by Public Technology Institute (PTI). PTI is a national non-profit technology research organization for city and county governments. As the only technology organization created by and for cities and counties, PTI works with a core network of leading local government officials—the PTI membership—to identify opportunities for technology research, to share best practices, to promote technology development initiatives, and to develop enhanced educational programming. PTI shares the results of these activities and the expertise of its members with the broader audience of the thousands of cities and counties across the U.S. For additional information see the PTI web site at www.pti.org. We gratefully acknowledge the National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO) and the work of their Energy Data and Security Committee. This NASEO Committee was funded by the U.S. Department of Energy to produce a State Energy Assurance Guidelines document which served as the template for this local government energy assurance publication. Before the oil price surge of 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy was committed to assisting local governments build resilient energy systems. Because of this effort, it is possible that resilient energy supplies can supplant the most vulnerable oil-related supplies that we now depend on for our most basic energy and, energy emergency needs. To move toward more dependable, cost-effective energy supplies it takes focused attention and thoughtful planning by local government officials. There has never been a more important time in American history for local governments to begin the drive toward energy resiliency, with a strong energy assurance plan; this document will assist in taking the first steps toward the development of such a plan.

The PTI local government energy assurance advisory committee

Erik Kropp, The City of Phoenix, AZ Brian Boerner, The City of Fort Worth, TX James Gorby, Fairfax County, VA Doug Yoder, Miami-Dade County, FL Margaret Downey, Barnstable County, MA

Larry Alford, The City of Austin, TX John Morrill, Arlington County, VA Kent Koehler, Sedgwick County, KS Mike Armstrong, The City of Portland, OR

A noteworthy thank you is extended to Kevin Magner, Utilities Administrator, City and County of Denver. Kevin embraced this effort from the outset by not only sharing the project vision but also by helping to shape this vision.

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He did this by seeing the relevance of this work to Denver’s overall ESF 12 effort and by providing PTI project staff with access to key city and county decision-makers. This publication would not have been possible without the hard work, dedication, and extraordinary research and analysis skills of Steve Foute, Ph.D. formerly of the City and County of Denver, and George Burmeister, President of the Colorado Energy Group. This work was managed by Ronda Mosley, Senior Director for Research and Governmental Services, Public Technology Institute.

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a c Kn oW ledgement s

II. Overview and Introduction
A. Purpose of This Document
These guidelines were compiled to help local governments understand the importance of preparing energy assurance plans, and to help local officials assess the state of their readiness. Assessing the current state of readiness is a positive first step for any local government, and this document will help in this regard. This guide is also designed to help link to other cities and counties, and link to the resources necessary to move forward on energy assurance plans. More specifically, these guidelines are written to help: ■■ Assess the readiness of a local jurisdiction to an energy emergency; ■■ Identify dozens of national and local government experts that can help with energy assurance planning needs; ■■ Build organizational relationships and responsibilities within local government, the private sector and the region; ■■ Discover actions that can ease the impacts of short-term energy disruptions; ■■ Define long-term strategies and options for dealing with sustained disruptions or outages; ■■ Identify pertinent government and industry contacts that can help with energy assurance planning; ■■ Identify steps necessary to work with industry minimizing and resolving the impacts of an energy supply disruption; ■■ Identify mitigation measures to improve the energy distribution systems and enhance supply delivery; ■■ Elevate the awareness of energy security and assurance issues; ■■ Introduce new, valuable energy assurance resources; ■■ Improve all hazards emergency preparedness through regional collaboration; and ■■ Learn about innovative and traditional financing mechanisms for energy assurance needs. This resource guide is a compilation of information from more than three hundred written sources and personal interviews with local government energy and emergency officials who have experienced and responded to energy emergencies. Information in this document also came from important tabletop energy (and water) exercises and training seminars for state and local governments provided by the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. A distinction between preparing for an energy emergency and responding to one needs to be made here. At the request of PTI’s National Local Government Energy Assurance Advisory Committee, the majority of text within these guidelines is devoted to preparation efforts. Preparation involves proactive planning, investment, coordination, communication, and monitoring and assuring energy supply, whereas responding is usually driven by a specific event and involves mitigating damage while restoring the energy supply. In addition, adequate planning is crucial and necessary for an adequate response.

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An All-Hazards Approach

Community leaders have the responsibility of deciding which assets need to be protected. Scarce resources, including time, money, personnel, and materials, make this a very tough job. Therefore, an “all hazards approach” is used in this document. An all hazards approach involves adequately preparing for numerous hazards across many categories, including sabotage and terrorism, civil disturbances, flooding, natural disasters, infrastructure failures, and public health emergencies. Due to the intricate interdependencies of the U.S. energy industry, preparing for one type of hazard will often also be adequate for others. Energy assurance efforts generally involve three primary areas, energy security, emergency preparedness, and critical infrastructure protection. The three are often intertwined and linked. For example, an understanding of infrastructure and security will help in updating an emergency preparedness plan. Importantly, this document contains an Energy Assurance Assessment Tool (Appendix B) that can help identify and prioritize mission critical facilities, while protecting key energy operations, components, and systems. Use this tool to help calculate where energy assurance efforts are currently and where they could be based on local government goals. It is recommended that this entire document be reviewed to understand its contents and determine its relevance before embarking on using the assurance assessment tool. This is meant to be a living document, which will be updated and changed regularly as new research sheds light on what it is that local governments actually want, and need to accomplish in the energy assurance area. It is a broad, general document used to help launch a multi-year outreach effort to local governments. Many important emerging issues identified in this document will be covered in more depth in subsequent publications and training sessions as part of this U.S. DOE multiyear effort.

B. Project Timeline, Goals and Tasks
The following timeline indicates the project’s goals, tasks and their associated year of completion. For example, Goal #1, Energy Assurance Guidelines, Task 1.1 indicates that although it will be completed in 2008, it will continue to be improved through 2011. Likewise, Goal #3, energy finance (task 3.1) will be a stand-alone document in 2009 even though it is contained in this document under Section 6.D. as a preliminary work product. There are three goals/work products associated with this project: energy assurance guidelines, an educational/ dissemination plan, and supplemental educational papers.

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Timeline
PROjECT GOAL GOAL #1 Energy Assurance Guidelines TASkS 1.1 use the city and county of denver as a mechanism for developing the guidelines and for mentoring other jurisdictions 1.2 develop energy assurance guidelines and assessment tool GOAL #2 Education/ dissemination Plan 2.1. conduct educational technical assistance workshops/exercises 2.2 select 2-3 pilot cities for on-site assistance GOAL #3 Educational policy and technical papers 3.1 local government energy finance 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

* * * * *

* * * * *

* * * *

* * *

3.2 energy basics for local policy-makers 3.3 energy and water interdependency 3.4 renewable and distributed generation applications 3.5 sustainability 3.6 regional energy assurance coordination 3.7 Facility risk, vulnerability and consequence 3.8 Best practices

* * * * * * * * * *

C. The Evolution of Energy Assurance Planning
Local governments are on the front lines of virtually all energy emergencies. Experts agree that these governments are going to be faced with an ever increasing number of energy-related emergencies. The reasons for the rise in these numbers are at least three-fold: (1) aging energy infrastructure (2) these aging energy systems are not matched to the complicated demand profile of today’s user and (3) all-hazard events are increasing in number, severity, and length. Supporting these points are the following facts: ■■ The average generating plant was built in 1964 using 1959 technology, and more than one-fifth of U.S. power plants are more than 50 years old. ■■ On any given day more than 500,000 U.S. customers are without power for two hours or more. ■■ Today’s high voltage transmission lines were designed before planners even considered security measures or imagined that electricity would be sold across state lines, therefore, the lines are subject to overloading and blackouts..

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■■ Line losses have increased from five-percent to 10 percent since the 1980s, placing a little recognized $12 billion “tax” on consumer that didn’t exist 20 years ago. (Let Energy Innovation Thrive, Richard Munson, NE-MW Economic Review.) ■■ Most of the equipment that guides the flow of electricity dates back to the 1960s and 1970s. Real time tracking of disturbances and interruptions does not, and cannot, occur in most places—the information is usually relayed 30-seconds after the fact. ■■ Smart, “self healing” power grid that anticipates problems before they happen are non-existent. While the technology needed to make the power grid smarter is available, due to a number of factors, including overwhelming costs and varying utility regulations across state lines, these technologies are years away from implementation. So, blackouts and power outages are not only likely to happen in the future, they are guaranteed. Energy interdependencies are increasing in complexity, and the economic stakes are huge. A May 2007 Scientific American article noted that the estimated cost from all U.S. electrical outages ranges from $70 to $120 billion per year. It is no longer simply about keeping the lights on at the local factory or the corner drug store. It is about keeping internet businesses accessible to consumers, ensuring that high tech factories have guaranteed back-up power, and guaranteeing that the banking and financial industries have reliable power round-the-clock. Literally, billions of dollars are at stake. Therefore, energy assurance planning requires careful thought and preparation. Energy assurance planning has evolved from the relatively simple state energy office petroleum shortage analysis and scenario responses in the 1970s, to state public utility commission electricity and natural gas supply reliability analysis and planning in the 1980s and 1990s to government-wide energy analysis and planning since September 11, 2001. Emergency preparedness and the quality of a response to interrupted energy depend largely on the first responder’s energy supply. Local governments are the first responders, so energy supply and energy back-up systems are crucial. Energy assurance planning is back on the forefront of local government agendas for a number of very compelling reasons: ■■ Substantially higher energy prices outstripping the ability of many local governments to deliver basic services ■■ Hurricane Katrina and the documented disarray and loss of life which resulted from the lack of adequate energy planning; ■■ Major “economy-freezing” electrical outages in the northeastern U.S.; ■■ Unusually severe weather and associated heavy flooding throughout the U.S. in recent years; ■■ Concerns about how to address possible climate change and the accompanying emphasis on minimizing carbon use at the local government level; ■■ Drinking water and wastewater treatment plant service issues arising from knocked-out power supplies and failed back-up systems; ■■ A coordinated outreach effort by key federal agencies to educate local governments about local and regional energy assurance planning benefits; ■■ A national trend toward more sustainable planning and development, including calls for much more green building, energy efficiency, and renewable energy development; and ■■ Sustainability—preparing for numerous hazards through energy assurance planning will move government toward sustainability goals. Linking energy assurance planning with sustainability efforts can be a crucial link in capturing the hearts and imagination of City and County leaders and the general public. Folding energy assurance plans into sustainability planning increases the likelihood that key buildings, transportation, utility, public infrastructure, and industrial-related issues are addressed.

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There are dozens of other contributing factors for the renewed interest in energy assurance, but these are the most salient. Energy assurance is about building resilience and redundancy into energy systems, so cities, counties, regions and citizens can survive without help for three days…or longer if necessary. Cities and counties would be wise to carefully examine links in their energy system and see where they are most vulnerable, and then build redundancies into those areas. It involves saving lives and maintaining economic competitiveness. Start with a few simple questions such as how do energy assurance plans relate to other energy-related initiatives underway and how do these plans complement, or contradict, other energy-related initiatives? The answer is that an energy assurance plan fits neatly into most any other energy initiative underway. It is often better to piggyback on an existing initiative, than to start a new initiative; consider adding an energy assurance component to any existing energy plan. Energy assurance is also about guaranteeing citizens that reliable services (power cannot be guaranteed) will be there when they are needed. It is about assuring citizens that planning for energy emergencies is occurring while partners are engaged. Energy assurance generally involves three key areas: ■■ critical infrastructure protection (CIP); ■■ energy security; and ■■ emergency preparedness. Each of these will discussed in the pages to follow.

D. Mission Critical Operations
It is crucial that mission critical operations (which are jointly comprised of facilities, systems, and components) be identified, data be collected on how they are powered, and notes made of any available back-up power systems. This document contains a newly developed “PTI Local Government Energy Assurance Assessment Tool” that can help with this important task (Appendix B). The practice of identifying critical operations is new to most local government officials—a changing world demands that locals consider undertaking this task as soon as possible. By prioritizing operations now, a jurisdiction will be better prepared for decision making during an actual energy event. When identifying mission critical operations the security and protection of drinking water and wastewater protection should also be considered. The health effects associated with a widespread water distribution problem are potentially catastrophic. Water is important in many manufacturing processes, as well as for drinking and ice for preserving food and medicine and for fighting fires. As much as twenty percent of energy costs are from simply moving water to where it is needed; there are significant interdependencies. Critical water customers should be identified and a priority established on which ones will be given first priority for restored service.

Restoration Priorities….

It is important to establish energy (electric and natural gas) infrastructure priorities, independent of, but in concert with the local utility. Identify essential customer services and ensure that these customers are considered priority customers by the utility. It is easy to look over this last point. If the jurisdiction and utility do not discuss priority customers (like the emergency operations center) then when a brown-out occurs for example, they may not direct power to the facilities that are deemed as important and essential! Generation capacity is usually repaired first by utilities, along with high-tension transmission lines. Local distribution lines usually are repaired next. Local governments are important but only one of a long list of priorities. The Florida Public Service Commission supports the following Florida Power and Light (FPL) order of restoration (Florida

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State’s Energy Emergency Response to the 2004 Hurricanes, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, NASEO, June 2005), and it may help establish a new priority list: ■■ Hospitals; ■■ Public service entities including, emergency operations centers, critical government facilities, and Red Cross facilities; ■■ Communications with emergency responders including police and fire, telecommunications and the media; ■■ Water and sewage facilities; ■■ Transportation infrastructure; ■■ Gas supply utilities; ■■ Electric company facilities; ■■ Other essential entities such as schools, nursing homes, and critical care facilities; and ■■ Others as designated in coordination with government and the emergency operation centers. The Chicago Metropolitan Area Critical Infrastructure Protection Program published an excellent document, Planning for Electrical Power Disruptions: Critical Infrastructure Assurance for Municipal Governments (February 2001), which lists the following typical critical facilities and criteria for determining their criticality.

Typical Critical Facilities and Criteria
TyPE OF FACILITya Emergency Services Water System
Transportation Medical

EXAMPLEa Police stations, Fire stations, Paramedic stations emergency communication transmitters Water supply pumping stations Wastewater pumping stations and treatment plants traffic intersections, aviation terminals and air traffic control, railroad crossings, electric rail systems specialized treatment centers (out-patient surgery, dialysis, cancer therapy), rehabilitation and Blood donation centers

TyPICAL CRITERIA ThAT CAN BE APPLIED TO DETERMINE CRITICALITyb
all facilities considered critical Facilities needed to provide sufficient pumping capacity to maintain minimum flow rates and minimum pressure

major traffic intersections, aviation facilities, protected rail crossings, electric rail systems operate, Facilities with any patients on electrically powered life support equipment
all schools when in session

Hospitals, nursing homes, mental health treatment facilities, all facilities that require a state license to

Schools Day Care Senior Social Service

nursery schools, kindergarten, elementary schools, high schools, colleges, business and trade schools senior citizen centers, retirement communities Homeless/transient shelters, missions and soup kitchens, youth, family, and battered person shelters, Heating & cooling shelters Jails, youth detention centers libraries, civic centers, recreational facilities sports stadiums, concert auditoriums, theaters, cinemas, religious facilities, shopping malls, conference centers, museums, art centers
Hotels, motels, boarding houses

day care facilities, sitter services, after school centers Facilities requiring state license to operate Facilities requiring a state license to operate Facilities that require regular municipal fire safety inspections
all facilities Facilities that require regular municipal fire safety inspections

Detention Centers Community Centers Public Assembly hotels

Facilities that require regular municipal fire safety inspections
Facilities required to register under tax laws

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TyPE OF FACILITya (cont.) EXAMPLEa (cont.)
high-rise Buildings Food Service apartments, condos, office buildings

TyPICAL CRITERIA ThAT CAN BE APPLIED TO DETERMINE CRITICALITy (cont.)
Buildings seven stories or higher

restaurants, grocery stores, supermarkets, Food processing facilities
Hazardous material handling

Facilities required to register under tax laws Facilities with significant food quantities stored on the premises
all facilities

Industry
a

b

The types of facilities and examples are illustrative rather than comprehensive. These specific criteria are illustrative. There is no universal agreement on the numbers or types of facilities shown here. Municipalities must adjust these criteria to meet local needs.

E. Understanding Energy Interdependencies: Electric Power System Basics for Local Government Policymakers (note: Much of this information is gleaned from Planning for Electrical Power
Disruptions: Critical Infrastructure Assurance for Municipal Governments, Chicago Metropolitan Area Critical Infrastructure Protection Program, February, 2001.)

Electric Power System Basics

source: HttP://WWW.oe.energy.gov/inFormation_center/electricity101.Htm

The United States has more than 6,000 power plants nationally with 54% owned by utilities and the other 46% owned by non-utilities. Fifty percent of these are coal powered, nineteen percent are nuclear, nineteen percent are natural gas, seven percent are hydro, three percent are oil, and three percent are other (solar, wind, geothermal). (Energy, Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources, Sector-Specific Plan As Input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Department of Energy, Page 11, May 2007.) No single entity, public or private, can ensure that energy is delivered to the end user. Due to the interdependency of the energy infrastructure, collaboration at all levels is necessary. During the last half of the 20th century, technical innovations and developments in digital information and telecommunications dramatically increased interdependencies among the Nation’s critical infrastructures. Disruptions in a single infrastructure can generate disturbances within others over long distances and the pattern of interconnections can extend or amplify the effects of a disruption.

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Energy infrastructure provides essential fuel to all of the other critical infrastructures, and in turn is dependent upon transportation, communications, finance, and governmental systems to remain viable. For example, coal shipments are highly dependent on rail. There are also independencies within the energy infrastructure itself, particularly the dependence of petroleum refineries and pipeline pumping stations on a reliable electricity supply and backup generators and utility maintenance vehicles to be supplied with diesel and gasoline fuel. (Energy: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, May 2007, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Energy, page 17). The electric power system is generally described in terms of three components: generators, transmission, and distribution. Generators are power stations that produce electricity. Electricity is usually generated through various technologies, including coal, gas, oil, hydro, and nuclear. While increasing in importance, as noted earlier, renewables such as wind and solar do not account for a significant portion of generated electricity (<3%). Generators come in many power output sizes ranging from 1 MW (1 million watts, which is expressed as 1 megawatt or 1 MW) to 1,200 MW. Some plants called base load units run continuously, while others called peakers run only during times of high demand. Transmission systems are composed of high-voltage equipment (lines) that move large quantities of electricity from the generator to the distribution system. The distribution system takes the power from the transmission lines and sends it to the retail customer. Together, these transmission lines form the electric power “grid.” The grid is the interconnected group of power lines and associated equipment for moving electric energy at high voltage between points of supply and points at which time it is delivered to other electric systems or transformed to a lower voltage for delivery to customers.

Electric Power Service Disruptions

There are several types of disruptions to electric power service that local government officials need to understand. One needs to distinguish between an “energy shortage” and a generally less severe interruption or short-term loss of services. An energy shortage can be a significant shortage of any energy resource (coal, petroleum, natural gas, etc.) which results in a loss of fuel for space heating, emergency, and health care service thereby endangering both life and property. An interruption of service power (utility failure) is an interruption of power for a few hours or less and can be a simple nuisance to some, but it can also be a very serious event for others. Interruptions to computer equipment can result in a loss of information. Interruptions to manufacturing processes can result in loss to a batch process. Interruptions to people who rely on life support equipment can result in a medical emergency. Some of the relevant terms used in this industry follow.

Fluctuations:
Voltage fluctuation—a change in the voltage of the electricity provided to customers, either up or down, without loss of power to customers. Also known as “brownouts,” voltage fluctuations often occur during peak demands for electricity, and are used by utilities to avoid a power outage. Frequency fluctuation—change in the frequency of alternating current (AC) power that is supplied to customers. This is extremely rare. The nominal frequency is 60 cycles and normally varies only slightly.

Interruptions:
Intentional (scheduled) interruption—some interruptions are intentional and can be scheduled in advance, such as when equipment is taken off line for normal maintenance. Intentional (unscheduled) interruption—some intentional disruptions must be done “on the spot.” For example, a fire department may request that power be cut-off during a fire or accident.

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Intentional interruption (demand-side management)—some customers enter into agreements with their utility to curtail their electricity use during times of peak demand. In return for lowering their electricity use, these customers usually benefit from lower rates. Intentional interruption (load shedding)—when the power system is under heavy stress, it is sometimes necessary to intentionally cut off power to some customers to keep the entire system from collapsing. One form of load shedding is called a “rolling blackout”—where service is cut to key customers for a predetermined amount of time, usually no more than two hours. As power is restored to one block of customers, another block of customers is usually cut off, to better manage the situation. Unplanned interruption—these are outages that come essentially with no advance notice. These are interruptions that are the most problematic, and the ones that are of the highest concern in this document. Preparing for these interruptions is an important part of energy assurance efforts. Some utilities use the following categories to classify unplanned interruptions: ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ Accident caused by utility or one of its contractors; Digging accident caused by the utility or one of its contractors; Malfunction or equipment failure due to age, improper operation, or defect; Overload on utility’s or customer’s equipment; Reduced capability of equipment (operating beneath its design criteria); Tree contact other than from storms; Vandalism, or intentional damage (inc. terrorism); Weather; Wildlife; Other causes; and Unknown causes.

F. Legal Authority and Statutes
Any energy assurance plan should include a section referencing the appropriate legal authorities. The goal for this section is to clarify and document exactly what authority the jurisdiction has to implement the strategies that are outlined in the plan. It is not necessary to include all of the legal language. There should, however, be a list of applicable local legal authorities and references which provide the framework and necessary legal authority. Understanding exactly what the jurisdiction can and cannot do from a legal perspective in an emergency will help avoid most legal repercussions. Both the state and federal governments have specific mandates in relation to emergency management systems during a proclaimed disaster or emergency. The national mandate is the National Incident Management System (NIMS) as described in the National Response Framework. A local government plan should provide a section that documents how the plan complies with these and any other applicable mandates. (“Energy Assurance Planning Handbook for Local Governments”, May 2008, California Energy Commission, Draft Report)

G. Top 10 Things Local Governments Can Do To Improve Energy Assurance Efforts
Former Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Director James Lee Witt and his firm James Lee Witt Associates reviewed the emergency response capabilities of the City of Philadelphia for almost one year, and made

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valuable suggestions for improvement in a July 2006 Emergency Preparedness Review Committee Report. Other local government leaders around the United States can benefit from the eight major Strategic Themes: Assessment and Recommendations in the report that emerged after working with several hundred Philadelphia-area experts across multiple committees. These eight themes contain what many believe to be the core of effective local government energy assurance planning: ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ Enhance Emergency Management Capacity; Enhance Emergency Communications; Integrate Health and Human Services Into Emergency Management; Enhance Federal, State, Regional and Local Partnerships; Promote Transparency and Community Engagement in Emergency Management; Ensure Continuity of Government and Continuity of Operations Planning; Protect Critical Infrastructure and Promote Public-Private Partnerships; and Develop Comprehensive Evacuation Plans.

From these eight themes come many of the ideas found below in Top 10 Things Local Governments Can Do to Improve Energy Assurance Efforts. 1. Designate an Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinator (EEAC) and establish an Emergency Preparedness Review Committee or Task Force a. Designate an Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinator (see page 37, Section D. for a description of the Federal EEAC System) Begin the energy assurance planning process by designating an Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinator (or equivalent title). This designation could be done by the County Board of Supervisors/Commissioners, the City Council, or other appropriate government body. This usually does not mean creating a new position within the local government or emergency structure. Instead, designate energy emergency coordinator responsibilities to existing personnel who have a working knowledge of emergency services, a broad-based knowledge of local government infrastructure, and established working relationships with all levels of government and the private sector. Examples of possible Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinators include:  Director or Designee, Sheriff’s Office of Emergency Services  Coordinator, Emergency Operations, General Services  Director or Designee, Public Works Department  Emergency Support Function for Energy (ESF 12) Coordinator The Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinator (EEAC) will have primary responsibility for developing the energy assurance plan. The EEAC will also have overall responsibility of coordinating essential supplies during an energy supply disruption and providing energy support operations during a disaster. The EEAC’s primary duties during an emergency are:  Monitor the progress of the energy emergency by obtaining information via established communication lines and prepare an analysis of the probable effects;  Assist in procuring and distributing essential energy resources to support emergency response operations;  Monitor the distribution of essential energy supplies;  Coordinate energy suppliers to support emergency restoration of disrupted services;  Attend all emergency staff briefings and keep other appropriate management and staff up to date as needed;

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 Recommend actions to be taken (if any) by the local government to mitigate the emergency; and  Assist the Public Information Officer (or equivalent position) with the development of public information messages and briefings. To prepare for these duties, the Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinator should:  Form a task force (see 1.b below);  Determine the jurisdiction’s energy profile;  Know key government and industry contacts;  Be familiar with emergency response measures;  Know and understand laws pertaining to energy emergencies;  Be prepared for questions from the media; and  Train staff and regularly update the energy assurance plan. b. Establish an Emergency Preparedness Review Committee or Task Force Depending on the size of the jurisdiction, the EEAC may want to form a task force composed of members from both the public and private sectors to help during the plan development process. This task force may already exist within the local government organization as another type of planning committee such as a disaster council or an emergency preparedness committee. The purpose of the task force is to provide general input, direction, and information on departmental functions and to identify the general nature of critical energy needs and vulnerabilities to an energy disruption. Seek advice on county or city policies which may affect the development of the plan. For example, the status of any interagency emergency fuel agreements within the jurisdiction or neighboring jurisdictions such as an agreement between a city and its unified school district to share motor fuel during shortages.

Potential Task Force Members
PUBLIC SECTOR general services Fleet management Facilities management Fire law enforcement Public Works/engineering utilities Health services/emergency management system transportation emergency management energy conservation/management PRIVATE SECTOR electric utilities natural gas utilities Petroleum industry transit operators Pipeline operators

The Mayor of Philadelphia established a Review Committee and appointed 45 members including the Commissioners of Police, Fire, and Public Health, leaders from the private sector and academia, leaders from the critical non-profit sector, representatives of the special needs population, and state and federal government representatives. Most energy assurance and energy emergency labor will likely come from committed professionals willing to volunteer their very limited time. It is important to cast a wide net at the beginning of the process. Since critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector (Energy Assurance: State Stakeholder Meeting III, April 7, 2005, U.S. Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery

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and Energy Reliability), it is important to involve many of these stakeholders on the Emergency Review Task Force. 2) Prepare a “Gap Analysis” of where the jurisdiction is now versus where it should be based on generally accepted standards and best practices Identifying strengths and weaknesses and designing a plan to address those weaknesses with concrete implementation deadlines is a productive early step for any jurisdiction. The local government energy assurance assessment tool contained in Appendix B will help in discovering and documenting gaps in the planning process. 3) Identify energy assurance best practices Unfortunately, energy assurance best practice data are hard to find. State data exists through the National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO), the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), the National Governors Association (NGA)-Center for Best Practices, but this information is tailored to state officials. The U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability’s (OE’s) Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration (ISER) Division is aware of this lack of data and is funding PTI and others to fill this gap. For now, one of the best places to find best practices is through Ronda Mosley, Senior Director for Research and Government Services at PTI at rmosley@pti.org. 4) Build people redundancy into the energy emergency and energy assurance systems; train staff and regularly update the energy assurance plan One of the primary recommendations made by an OE-funded October 2005 Energy Assurance Stakeholder meeting in Washington, DC was to ensure that valuable information currently housed only in the minds of a few people is moved to more people through both person-to-person verbal communication and also through hard copy. A recurring energy assurance issue across the country is the dwindling number of qualified energy assurance staff and the fact that the information they possess has not been documented. If such a person is unavailable during an energy emergency, the jurisdiction is more vulnerable. Systems need to be put in place that will address this important issue. 5) Identify and track the location of, and fuel needed for, all generators Research over the past two years has shown that a significant portion of firefighters across the country do not know how to start their emergency power generators! This alarming finding is a relatively easy one to address. Embarking on a “Generator Identification Program” will result in the location of all known generators and the specific fuel needed to power them. This can be combined with a training program to ensure that the fuel and people needed to power the generators are readily and easily available when needed. The Energy Industries of Ohio organization has experience in working with firefighters in communities in the Cleveland, Ohio area to identify generators. They can be found at http://www.energyinohio.com/. A report outlining their activities and an assessment tool for generator identification can be found in Appendix D of this document. 6) Organize and/or participate in regional disaster planning exercises As noted in the regional cooperation section, one of the most important trends in both the energy

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emergency and energy security areas is regional collaboration and the need for regional solutions to energy emergencies. Energy emergencies are not likely to be confined to one jurisdiction. Sharing lessons learned and establishing close working relationships with regional public and private sector partners is crucial to advancing energy assurance efforts. The scale of some emergencies may even exceed the capacity of a region to respond, and can require the cooperation of the federal government and national partners. Designing a regional energy assurance action plan is a good idea. 7) Establish a Continuity of Government Operations Energy Assurance Committee The public expects great things from local governments during energy emergencies. One of the most important responsibilities is simply keeping the local government operating during times of crisis. This will not happen without a proactive effort. Creating a Continuity of Government Operations Energy Assurance Committee is an excellent way to build consensus. This committee, whose work is focused solely on delivering government services continuously and seamlessly during an emergency, can be a subcommittee of the larger Emergency Preparedness Review Committee (EPRC) mentioned earlier. 8) Establish a priority list for fuel end users based on your profile One of the noteworthy recommendations in NASEO’s State Energy Assurance Guidelines worth replicating by local governments is to establish a “Priority End User Program” which requires that suppliers provide police, fire, and emergency medical services 100% of their current requirement upon certification to their suppliers. The list of priority users should be kept as short and clear cut as possible to avoid disputes on the question of whether some service is a priority. The priority uses may also need to be tailored to the particulars of an event. For example, diesel fuel for backup generators to support water systems may need to be included in the priority list in the event the petroleum shortage is coupled with a power outage. After identifying the priority list, “pre-event” contracts and mutual aid agreements can be entered into with fuel suppliers. This action can be completed in concert with other regional local governments and with the active involvement and advice of state government. A checklist to assist in fuel supply issues is found in Appendix B. A list of priority uses could include:  Police, fire, and emergency response units;  Life and health care facilities;  Water and sanitation services;  Telecommunications;  Mass transit;  Agriculture and food services;  Critical industry and commerce; and  Other priority users as determined by the local government. Therefore, it is recommended that fuel use demographics, fuel delivery routes, and the possible impacts of a short- or long-term emergency on the government, residential, commercial, industrial, and transportation sectors be determined. This information will be useful at the time of an emergency. 9) Design and implement exercises and drills The key to successfully managing a human-caused or natural disaster for local and state governments is preparing in advance of the event through training exercises. Preparation can include utilizing many training programs and emergency scenario tabletop exercises offered through the U.S. Department of Energy (see http://www.oe.energy.gov/our_organization/iser.htm). One state energy emergency official interviewed

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during the development of these guidelines commented, “Energy assurance training is crucial if you expect to respond effectively. It is like running a marathon—your body needs to know what to expect when it is running for 26 miles. The same thing applies to getting ready for an extended energy emergency—your local government needs to know what to expect when you lose power to its critical facilities, operations, or systems. For now the best way to learn what to expect is through training exercises.” Information learned and best practices obtained during these tabletop exercises can be brought back to the local government and shared. 10) Know the energy fuel and use profile An energy profile can be composed of two elements. The first is a description of the local government energy sources. The second is a description of how and where energy is used in the government including an assessment of vulnerability associated with that use and its location. Be sure to know how much energy is consumed for critical operations (see Appendix B). Ensuring city operations continue to operate for a minimum of 72 hours requires such information. Fuels: This topic is covered in NASEO’s State Energy Assurance Guidelines document. Useful energy emergency planning begins with knowledge of the fuels used. Knowledgeable staffs within government understand the sources, volume, import routing of these fuels, and location of facilities (power plants, major transmission lines, natural gas pipelines, and petroleum infrastructure, refineries, pipelines, distribution terminals, retail facilities, etc.). As the NASEO document suggests, it is important to know the relationship of local energy markets to regional and national markets. Make sure all of the energy and fuel types are covered:  Electricity;  Natural Gas;  Motor Gasoline;  Aviation Fuels;  Propane;  Heavy industrial fuels;  Distillates; and  Renewables. A working knowledge of seasonal supply, demand, and price trends for energy is also helpful. Use: Since local governments vary considerably in geographic size, population and many other areas, this use profile needs to be tailored for each specific jurisdiction. Examples of items of interest to consider are 1) the amount of electricity, natural gas, and petroleum products normally used in the city and 2) where this energy is used (facilities, transport etc).

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III. Partnering
A. Utilities
It is important that excellent relations with the electric, gas, and water utilities exist so that when a disaster occurs quick access to reliable, accurate data and information is possible. City and county leaders should be on a first name basis with key utility contacts, and contact information should be shared with a handful of other local government “back-up” contacts. Utilities have a vested interest in energy assurance and most are more than willing to foster new energy assurance-focused relationships with local governments. Understanding energy supply routes is crucial. The U.S. has enough natural gas distribution lines to wrap around the equator 15 times. The U.S. has enough transmission lines to go around the globe 12 times. Many of these lines may be local. Accurate information as to the precise location of these local lines, where they are most vulnerable and which routes trucks take to deliver diesel and natural gas to local facilities is all important.

Request Pertinent Utility Information

Illinois’s Commonwealth Edison prepares an excellent “Summer Emergency Preparedness Plan” which is filed with the City of Chicago every year. Commonwealth Edison is one of the leading utilities in the country on energy assurance issues and is known for its close relationship with the City of Chicago. Commonwealth Edison makes the following suggestions for partnering with the local electric utility. Acquiring this same information from the local utility would be prudent. Due to security concerns, some of this information will only be able to be shared with a few qualified government officials: ■■ Identification and analysis of potential system vulnerabilities in terms of worst performing or overloaded feeders and overloaded substations; ■■ Communications protocols with the City and public during energy emergencies; ■■ Location of portable emergency generators, emergency trailers, and emergency response vehicles; ■■ A list of critical repair materials and storage locations; ■■ A location of spare transformer cable and replacement equipment; ■■ A listing of siting availability for portable substations; and ■■ Deployment and routing plans for the above-mentioned equipment. Commonwealth also suggests that city governments should: ■■ Install back-up generator interconnections at critical city facilities, with maps of both generator and interconnection locations; ■■ Perform annual, or semi-annual, walking inspections of utility substations to verify that the utility has completed maintenance activities at its substations; and ■■ Purchase of renewable energy-supplied portable generators.

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NASEO’s State Energy Assurance Guidelines reference an important list suggested by the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC). Taken from the perspective of electric and gas utilities, NARUC suggests questions to explore with the local utility. ■■ Have key energy assets been identified, digitally mapped, and ranked from a security and vulnerability perspective? ■■ Have critical physical and cyber risks and vulnerabilities been identified? ■■ Have interdependencies, such as the linkage between natural gas supply and the reliability of gas-fired generation been quantified? ■■ What is the planning horizon and geographic scope of the energy assessment process? Does it accurately characterize and quantify extended and multiple contingencies? ■■ Have appropriate options for response to these vulnerabilities been developed and tested? ■■ Have downstream impacts on other sectors (e.g., water, transportation, and telecommunications) and societal impacts been identified? ■■ Has the energy sector presented an appropriate business case for making security investments and sought to recover prudent critical infrastructure investments? ■■ Has the energy sector implemented changes that will enhance reliability and security, including business continuity? ■■ How has security been integrated into the ongoing business strategy of the energy sector? ■■ Have investments in utility and end-user efficiencies or alternative energy sources been investigated to minimize the adverse impacts resulting from an energy shortage or emergency? ■■ Has a mechanism been established to update planning and response plans? ■■ “Post-event” to improve the energy sector’s best practices? Utilities often have the human and financial resources available to assist with energy assurance planning efforts. They are a valuable ally in order to move forward on these efforts.

B. The State
State Energy Offices (SEO) can assist with energy assurance efforts. Much of the federal funding over the last five years for state and local energy assurance education has gone to the National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO), so the organization and its members have significant information and resources that can help: http:// naseo.org. SEO officials typically coordinate responses to energy emergencies, develop energy emergency plans, and conduct training exercises with local governments. NASEO’s State Energy Assurance Guidelines point out that all states are presumed to have legal authority for general emergencies, and most have laws pertaining to energy emergencies. Many states depend upon their emergency management (or civil defense) organization for energy emergency planning and response. Others may focus energy emergency responsibilities for some or all entities that might be involved. These can be grouped into four broad categories. 1. Monitoring the energy supply system for the purpose of detecting any unusual imbalances that indicate the potential for an energy emergency and, if so, to advise the appropriate state officials. 2. Developing, administering or coordinating energy emergency contingency plans. 3. Communicating with federal, state and local agencies related to energy emergency planning and management. 4. Maintaining ongoing contact with stakeholders in the energy industry including regulated utilities, cooperatives, municipally owned and unregulated providers.

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State emergency and/or disaster plans are designed to delineate responsibilities among state agencies and between the state and local jurisdictions. These efforts are managed through the federal government and relevant agencies, which are described in the federal government section.

C. The Federal Government
There are a number of federal agencies that can help provide a safe and secure energy supply, including the following: (Energy Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as Input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, May 2007, Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Energy): ■■ Department of Agriculture (USDA). DOE coordinates with USDA’s Rural Utilities Service, which provides funding and support for rural electric utilities. ■■ Department of Defense (DOD). The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) serves the Armed Forces and the Nation by providing vital engineering services and capabilities, as a public service, across the full spectrum of operations—from peace to war—in support of national interests. DOE coordinates with USACE regarding maintenance of the nation’s dams. ■■ Department of Energy (DOE). The US Department of Energy (DOE) leads the Federal Government’s efforts to advance the energy security of the United States. This function is accomplished in partnership with the Energy Sector security partners in Federal, State, local tribal, and Territorial governments. Importantly, it is accomplished in close cooperation with private sector asset owners and operators which represent more that eighty five (85) percent of the Nation’s energy sector assets ■■ Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DOE works with DHS, which leads, integrates, and coordinates Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) activities across the Federal Government. As previously noted, certain segments of the Energy Sector are directly coordinated by DHS and DOD, including nuclear power and hydroelectric power (dams). The DHS Transportation Security Administration oversees pipeline safety and security and works closely with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMS) to address natural disasters and security issues related to the provision of energy and public safety. The United States Coast Guard (USCG) has protective responsibility for offshore oil and gas facilities, and for implementing regulations under the Maritime Transportation Security Act that impact Energy Sector facilities. DOE also coordinates with USCG regarding problems at terminals and waterways. DOE is working with DHS to coordinate current and future threat identification and assessment, mapping threats against U.S. vulnerabilities, issuing timely warnings, and taking preventive and protective action. DOE is also working with the DHS Office of Cyber Security and Communications to address and enhance the security of the sector’s cyber infrastructure through such efforts as the Control Systems Security Program. DHS is responsible for implementing chemical security regulations that will impact some important Energy Sector assets. ■■ Department of the Interior (DOI). The Mission of the Department of the Interior is to protect and provide access to our Nation’s natural and cultural heritage and honor our trust responsibilities to Indian Tribes and our commitments to island communities. DOE, through the Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs), coordinate power generation and river operations with DOI hydro generation projects. DOE also coordinates with DOI’s Minerals Management Service (MMS), which manages the Nation’s natural gas, oil, and other mineral resources on the Outer Continental Shelf.

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■■ Department of State (DOS). Energy is imported and exported each day. DOE works with other agencies on energy movements across U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico, and cooperates through international agreements led by the DOS and DHS. ■■ Department of Transportation (DOT). The Energy Sector relies on pipelines, barges, tankers, railways, and highways to transport all raw and refined energy products. DOE is already coordinating activities regarding oil and natural gas pipelines with DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), and is a member of the interagency committee charged with developing a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to facilitate prompt repair of oil and natural gas transmission pipelines. ■■ Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). EPA is responsible for the enforcement of the Clean Air Act. DOE coordinates with EPA during energy emergencies and supply disruptions to assess the availability of transportation and boutiques fuels and the need for environmental fuel waivers. DOE also coordinates with EPA on air quality and fuel-related emissions. ■■ Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). FREC is an independent agency that regulates the interstate transmission of natural gas, oil, and electricity, as well as natural gas and hydropower projects. FERC oversees approval of electric reliability standards and enforcement of those standards, which are developed by NERC in its capacity as the Energy Reliability Organization (ERO) under the Energy Policy Act of 2005. FERC can also impose safety requirements to ensure or enhance the operational reliability of LNG facilities within its jurisdiction. DOE coordinates with FERC on energy security issues. ■■ Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). DOE will continue to coordinate with NRC on energy security issues related to electricity generated by nuclear fission, relying on the experience gained from DOE’s own operation of numerous nuclear facilities.

D. National Associations
PTI works with several national associations that can be valuable partners and resources for to assist in energy assurance efforts. These include the National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO), the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), and the National Governors Association (NGA)–Center for Best Practices, United States Conference of Mayors (USCM), International City/County Managers Association, the National League of Cities, and the National Association of Counties. All of these organizations have unique expertise and/or information to offer local governments in the energy assurance area. Since disasters usually involve more than one local government, regional cooperation is desirable. In the electricity sector regional cooperation between utilities has been taking place for decades. Regional cooperation among cities and counties has occurred for as many years, but this cooperation typically has not been centered on energy, and certainly not energy assurance issues. While focused mostly on communications and IT issues, regional Y2K efforts are sometimes credited with starting earnest energy assurance collaboration. The complicated nature of the energy delivery system came to light for many local public policy makers as they prepared for Y2K. Although the data from Y2K may in some cases be outdated, much of it is still relevant and has not changed. Depending on the jurisdiction’s file retention policies, mining this information source can prove very beneficial.

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IV. Regional Cooperation and Collaboration
Collaboration during energy emergencies often occurs through regional energy organizations. These organizations include Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs) that operate large hydropower dams under Department of Energy jurisdiction. Bonneville Power Administration in the Northwest and the Tennessee Valley Authority in the Southeast are two such PMAs. Regional state energy policy organizations such as the Southern States Energy Board (www. sseb.org) and the Western Interstate Energy Board (www.westgov.org) may provide valuable coordination services during emergencies also. Regional cooperation is almost always necessary after an emergency event. Fuel and food supplies usually need to be transported across highways to affected areas, often requiring close collaboration and communication. A major event that knocks out power to many grocery stores and wholesale food supplies for an extended period of time can require importing generators from neighboring jurisdictions. It is important to know the locations of these generators and to have the contact numbers available to multiple people.

A. An Action Plan for Regional Disaster Resilience
Small and/or rural communities often benefit from a regional approach since many of these communities cannot afford and/or do not have the resources available to implement energy assurance plans by themselves. One regional resource available to rural and large communities is the Infrastructure Security Partnership (TISP), a national publicprivate partnership. TISP promotes collaboration to improve the resilience of the nation’s critical infrastructure against the adverse impacts of natural and man-made disasters. TISP can be found at http://www.tisp.org. TISP members (representing the design, construction, operation, and maintenance communities; local, state, and federal agencies; academe; and other organizations concerned with disaster preparedness) work together to develop and implement cost-effective solutions to enhance the resilience of the nation’s critical infrastructure by leveraging their collective resources, experience, technical expertise, research and development capabilities, and knowledge of public policy regarding natural and man-made disasters. Their objectives are to: 1. Raise awareness of the importance of achieving national and regional disaster resilience for critical infrastructure; 2. Create effective, task-focused, multi-disciplinary work groups to improve regional disaster resilience for critical infrastructure; 3. Foster creation and development of regional public-private partnerships to address infrastructure interdependency and interoperability; 4. Disseminate knowledge on infrastructure security and disaster preparedness; 5. Mobilize TISP members to respond to significant issues and events; 6. Promote the improvement and application of risk assessment and management methodologies; and 7. Promote development and review of national and regional plans and policies.

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TISP suggests in their publication, Regional Disaster Resilience: A Guide for Developing an Action Plan, The Infrastructure Security Partnership, June 2006, which regional energy assurance planning is critical today, and they provide 29 fundamental assumptions that should underlay any regional action plan. Below is an abbreviated list of eight of the 29 assumptions particularly relevant to local governments. 1. The creation of regional public-private partnerships is necessary to bring together key stakeholders to build trust, to foster information sharing and coordination, to identify and assess vulnerabilities and other preparedness needs, and to develop and implement solutions. Such partnerships should include all levels of government. 2. Security and disaster resilience should be incorporated into cyber and physical systems in the development phase on the basis of assessed risk under various scenarios. Resilience can include system hardening, building in redundancies, implementing backup systems, and other mitigation measures. 3. A major challenge is obtaining the necessary data on infrastructure interdependencies to enable the development of assessment and decision tools to provide greater understanding of associated cyber and physical vulnerabilities and how best to minimize them. 4. Development of maintenance and mutual assistance agreements, user agreements, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), and other types of cooperative arrangements are essential to sound preparedness planning and disaster management. 5. Sorting out and defining roles and responsibilities—including determining who is in charge of particular functions—is fundamental to ensuring effective disaster preparedness, response, recovery, and restoration. 6. Assuring supply chains and the delivery of critical products, materials, and components is essential to disaster resilience and the vitality of the industrial base and has a direct and profound impact on regional/ national economies and national security. 7. Where useful, codes, standards, and guidelines should be applied within and across organizations and jurisdictions to enhance security and preparedness and to minimize costs. 8. Costs for technology solutions, maintenance, and upgrades must be affordable to states, localities, and private-sector organizations.

B. Mutual Aid Agreements
In the vast majority of incidents, local and state resources and regional mutual aid will provide the first line of emergency response and incident management support. The overwhelming majority of emergency incidents are handled daily by a single local government at the local level—and many of these incidents involve energy. Tribal and local authorities, not federal, have the primary responsibility for preventing, responding to, and recovering from energy-related emergencies and disasters. Mutual aid agreements can help line-up resources far in advance of a human-made or natural disaster. Unprecedented intergovernmental collaboration and planning are necessary as part of any energy assurance effort. A sample mutual aid agreement in provided in Appendix C. It was prepared by the well-respected Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) (http://www.emacweb.org/?150). Mutual aid agreements are needed between local governments. Indeed, in a recent edition of State Government News, the author wrote: “Through the National Strategy on Homeland Security, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) placed a new focus on state and local (emphasis added) mutual aid as a key to the nation’s emergency response capabilities for all hazards, man-made or natural. The National Incident Management System (NIMS), currently under development by DHS, provides an operational framework for the response by federal, state and local agencies. In the NIMS, mutual aid is emphasized as an indispensable tool for the swift and coordinated response to disasters of all kinds.”

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In mid-July 2003, a request was sent to all state Emergency Management Agencies by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) asking for copies of existing mutual aid legislation/agreements, enabling legislation and other supporting documents. Preliminary responses were received from 16 states and the District of Columbia confirming that legislation/agreements were or were not in place. Over the summer, additional responses were received; documents were sorted and reviewed, then condensed into a monograph summarizing legislation and agreements which served as a starting point for development of a model intrastate mutual aid agreement. “Many local jurisdictions have agreements in place, but they vary widely across the country. Moreover, many are not formal agreements, and do not address key issues such as liability and compensation; and encompass multidisciplines. To be able to move assets effectually between local jurisdictions and across state lines, mutual aid agreements should be robust, inclusive, demonstrate an effective relationship to EMAC and address liability and compensation issues in a manner consistent with state law.” As part of a grant awarded NEMA by FEMA in 2003, NEMA agreed to develop and market model intrastate mutual aid legislation along with several other related tasks. Local government experts reviewed the information and the model mutual aid agreement available in the Appendix C is the final product that resulted from this process. One of the most important aspects of the model is that adoption by jurisdictions is entirely voluntary. The model is meant to be a tool and resource for jurisdictions to utilize in developing or refining regional or statewide mutual aid agreements. It is anticipated that states and jurisdictions may wish to modify the model to conform to their own laws and authorities, or to address unique needs and circumstances. Further, the proposed articles and provisions in the model are complementary to the recommended minimum elements to be included in mutual aid agreements that are a part of the draft National Incident Management System Plan.

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V. Federal Energy Assurance Incentives
A. The National Response Framework (NRF)/ESF 12
The National Response Framework (NRF) is designed to establish a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management. Required by a Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, the NRF provides the structure and mechanisms for the coordination of federal support to state, local, and tribal incident managers and for exercising direct federal authorities and responsibilities. The NRF uses an “all hazards approach” to assist in the homeland security missions of preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing the vulnerability to all natural and human caused hazards, and minimizing the damage and assisting in the recovery from any type of incident that occurs. Appropriately, the NRF is built on the premise that incidents are generally handled best at the lowest jurisdictional level possible. In the vast majority of incidents, local and state resources and interstate mutual aid will provide the first line of emergency response and incident management support. The NRF is built on the template of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which is designed to provide a consistent framework for incident management at all jurisdictional levels regardless of the cause, size, or complexity of the incident. The NRF is designed to be a flexible mechanism that local governments can use to partially, or fully, implement in preparation for an anticipated event, or in response to an incident, which may ultimately require a federal response due to national implications. Examples of such events include public health emergencies, cyber incidents and longterm energy disruptions. This “selective implementation” through the activation of one or more NRF elements theoretically allows local governments with maximum flexibility in any situation that requires interaction with local, tribal, state, federal and non-governmental entities. State emergency or disaster plans are designed to delineate responsibilities among state agencies and between the state and local jurisdictions. Beyond this definition, these plans seek to define the relationship of both state and local response mechanisms to the federal emergency management system. The NRF establishes a comprehensive approach to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents. The plan incorporates best practices and procedures from incident management disciplines—homeland security, emergency management, law enforcement, firefighting, public works, public health, responder and recovery worker health and safety, emergency medical services, and the private sector—and integrates them into a unified structure. It establishes protocols to help: ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ Save lives and protect the health and safety of the public, responders, and recovery workers; Ensure security of the homeland; Prevent an imminent incident, including acts of terrorism, from occurring; Protect and restore critical infrastructure and key resources;

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■■ Conduct law enforcement investigations to resolve the incident, apprehend the perpetrators, and collect and preserve evidence for prosecution and/or attribution; ■■ Protect property and mitigate damages and impacts to individuals, communities, and the environment; and ■■ Facilitate recovery of individuals, families, businesses, governments, and the environment.1 The NRF contains five sections, including the Basic Plan, Appendices, the Emergency Support Function Annexes, Support Annexes and Incident Annexes. The Basic Plan presents the policies and concept of operations that guide how the federal government will respond and coordinate with state and local governments and provides a compendium of National Interagency Plans. Appendices provide more detailed supporting information, including terms, definitions, acronyms, authorities, and a compendium of national interagency plans. The Emergency Support Function (ESF) Annexes describe the roles and responsibilities of primary and support agencies for key response functions, like transportation and communications, which supplement state and local activities. The “Emergency Support Functions” under the National Response Plan provide guidance on these relationships.

Emergency Support Functions

The Emergency Support Function Annexes group capabilities and resources into functions most likely needed during an incident and describe the responsibilities of primary and support agencies involved. As noted above, the key response function of energy is outlined in Emergency Support Function 12 (ESF 12). Support Annexes provide the procedures and specific administrative requirements common to most incidents (e.g. Public Affairs, Financial Management, and Worker Safety and Health). Incident Annexes describe protocols and agency roles and responsibilities for specific contingencies (e.g. bioterrorism, radiological response, catastrophic incidents). In many cases, these annexes are supported by more detailed operational supplements or standard operating procedures.

Emergency Management Agencies
The primary emergency response agency in most states is the state emergency management agency, civil defense office, or similar authority. Since the federal deregulation of petroleum prices, several state ESF–12 annexes assigned the energy emergency functions to the Public Service Commission or Public Utility Commission (PUC) because planners perceived energy issues to be associated with regulated utility power. In some states such operations are assigned to the state police or other civil defense-related agencies.

Sample ESF 12 Template for Local Governments
There are many ways that local governments can fulfill their responsibilities under ESF 12. One PTI member city chose to formalize these responsibilities into their standard operating procedures, and to share their results. This template may be a useful approach that can be modified to suit unique government needs. To use this template, simply replace the word CITY with the name of the governmental entity and make any other changes deemed appropriate.

Emergencies & Disasters: National Response Plan. Department of Homeland Security Web site. http://www.dhs.gov/ dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0566.xml .
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ESF 12. A Sample Template for Local Governments
The purpose of Emergency Support Function (ESF) 12 is to provide guidance to governments support agencies and organizations in responding to and recovering from shortages and disruptions in the supply and delivery of electricity, natural gas, and other forms of energy and fuels that impact or threaten significant numbers of citizens and visitors. ■■ ESF 12 involves close coordination with electric and natural gas utilities operating in the jurisdiction to ensure the integrity of the power supply systems are maintained during emergency situations and that damaged infrastructure is repaired and services restored in an expeditious manner. As such local governments have four (4) primary responsibilities to their constituents. In descending order they are: assuring that communications are maintained or re-established; ■■ employing necessary life saving strategies; ■■ assuring life sustaining activities are implemented and; ■■ re-habilitating critical facilities.

Emergency Support Function 12—Energy
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of Emergency Support Function (ESF) 12 is to promulgate the policies and procedures to be used by City, support agencies and organizations in responding to and recovering from shortages and disruptions in the supply and delivery of electricity, natural gas, and other forms of energy and fuels that impact or threaten significant numbers of citizens and visitors. Shortages and disruptions in the supply of electricity may be caused by such events as unusually cold or hot weather, storms, power generation, fuel supply disruptions, and electric transmission and distribution disruptions. Other energy and fuel shortages affecting the private sector may be caused by such events as severe weather, flooding, and labor strikes. ESF 12 involves close coordination with the electric and natural gas utility operating in the City to ensure that the integrity of the power supply systems are maintained during emergency situations and that damaged utility infrastructure is repaired and services restored in an expediential manner. The Department of ______ (Department) will have primary responsibility to monitor and coordinate the availability and supply of natural gas, and the supply and transportation of generation fuels and emergency power. ESF 12 will have primary responsibility to monitor and coordinate with private sector petroleum fuel suppliers to ensure that adequate supplies of transportation fuels (diesel and gasoline) are available and deliverable.

II. SITUATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
■ Emergencies or disasters could occur in or near the City at any time causing significant human suffering, injury and death; public and private property damage, environmental degradation, loss of essential services, economic hardship to businesses, families and individuals, and disruption to local and other governmental entities. ■ The City is vulnerable to many natural, technological or man-made hazards such as the damaging effects of hazardous materials and chemical incidents, power failures, transit incidents, energy failures, civil disorders, dam failures and acts of terrorism.

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■ Primary and secondary effects of hazards must be considered. ■ The occurrence of an emergency or disaster incident can destroy or damage portions of the energy supply, production and distribution systems. ■ Widespread and prolonged electric power failures can occur in a major disaster. ■ The transportation, media, telecommunications and utility infrastructure will be disrupted. ■ Delays in the production, refining, and delivery of petroleum-based products can occur as a result of transportation infrastructure problems and loss of commercial electric power.

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS A. General
1. When electric utility operating reserves are nearly exhausted and there is an imminent possibility of curtailment or loss of firm load, threat of distribution service disruptions due to an emergency or disaster incident, or when other energy supplies such as natural gas or automotive transportation fuels are disrupted, an appraisal of the situation is made by designated authorities and personnel, and action is taken is accordance with ESF 12. ESF 12 personnel are notified and mobilized to direct and coordinate relief efforts, communicate with the public and appropriate governmental agencies, and restore normal service as soon as possible. These response actions are carried out to maintain energy system integrity and to minimize the impact on the City, citizens and visitors. 2. Activities during an emergency or disaster incident include but is not limited to: a. Coordinating closely with local jurisdiction officials for safety and energy providers and establishing energy restoration priorities for essential public services. b. Assessing fuel and electric power damage. c. Assessing energy supply and demand. d. Assessing the requirements for restoration. e. Coordinating temporary, alternative, or interim sources of emergency fuel and power.

B. Organization
1. The Department of ________ is the lead agency for ESF 12. A critical support agency is_______________. During an emergency or disaster, the primary and support agencies of ESF 12 will assign personnel to the City’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC). ESF 12 will report to the Operations Section Chief.

C. Notification
1. The Office of Emergency Management (OEM) shall notify the ESF 12 primary agency, when an area of the City is threatened or has been impacted by an emergency or disaster incident. The Department will notify ESF 12 support agencies as appropriate. 2. ESF 12 will identify respective support agency, private sector personnel to assist in coordinating response activities associated with utility infrastructure damage and restoration needs. Per the request of ESF 12, support agency personnel will report to the EOC.

D. Actions
1. Preparedness a. All Department personnel designated to serve as emergency operations center representatives shall be trained on all related Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) associated with ESF 12. b. All staff responsible for interacting with the OEM and EOC shall complete a review of SOPs during each 6-month period to ensure their familiarization with any changes in procedures and/or data.

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c. Maintain communication with utility representatives to determine response and recovery needs. d. Maintain communication with major fuel providers to determine response and recovery needs. e. Maintain coordination for back-up power generation needs for key City facilities. f. Assist the American Red Cross and other relief agencies to identify emergency shelter power generation needs for emergency shelters. 2. Response a. ESF 12 procedures shall be implemented when notified by the OEM. The Department and other support agencies and organizations will cooperate with City, state and federal agencies and public or private entities in achieving the purposes or activities of ESF 12. b. The assets available to ESF 12 will be used to assist other ESFs with their emergency response and recovery efforts to provide power and fuel and other resources as necessary. c. ESF 12 shall coordinate with support agencies and organizations to ensure sufficient power and fuel supplies to City agencies, emergency response organizations, and areas along evacuation routes. d. Maintain communication with utility representatives to determine response and recovery needs. e. Maintain communication with major fuel providers to determine response and recovery needs. f. Assist the American Red Cross and other relief organizations to identify emergency shelter power generation needs for emergency shelters. g. Complete an initial assessment that identifies necessary recovery actions. Develop strategies for meeting local energy needs, monitor utility repair actions; and communicate with and monitor state and utility response actions. h. Receive and assess requests for aid from City, state and federal agencies, energy offices, energy suppliers and distributors. i. Work with the OEM and other ESFs to establish priorities to repair damaged utility systems. j. Update ESF 15 with assessments of energy supply, demand, and requirements to repair or restore energy systems for public information. 3. Recovery a. Upon request, coordinate the provision of resources to assist City agencies in restoring emergency power and fuel needs. b. Review recovery actions, develop strategies for meeting City energy needs, and continue to monitor utility actions, and communicate with and monitor utility response actions. c. Receive and assess requests for aid from City, state and federal agencies, energy offices, energy suppliers and distributors. d. Work with the EOC Incident Commander and other EFS to establish priorities to repair damaged energy systems. e. Update ESF 15 with assessments of energy supply, demand, and requirements to repair or restore energy systems. f. Keep accurate logs and other records of emergency response activities and costs. 4. Mitigation a. ESF 12 will work collaboratively with other ESFs, private energy suppliers and fuel companies to ensure adequate supplies and resources are available to meet demand created by potential emergencies or disasters.

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E. Command and Control
1. In the wake of a disaster, many of the local resources will be unavailable due to damage, inaccessibility, or insufficient supply. The Department will coordinate a response to electric and natural gas energy related requests with assistance from the ESF 12 support agencies and organizations. 2. When the Department is notified by the OEM that the EOC has been activated, it will staff ESF 12 in the EOC. The Department will identify which support agencies for ESF 12 are needed, and take the necessary steps to ensure that these agencies are activated, or at least placed on alert status, as appropriate. 3. The Department will coordinate a response to non-utility sector energy and transportation fuel related requests with assistance from other ESF 12 support agencies and organizations as well as assistance from other ESFs.

IV. RESPONSIBILITIES A. Primary Agency—Department of ____________________
1. Address issues pertaining to emergencies affecting electric and natural gas utility services to the public. 2. Upon activation of the EOC, ensure that energy concerns are addressed. 3. Maintain communications with electric utilities and other support agencies and organizations in response to and recovery from emergencies regarding electric generating capacity shortages, electric generating fuel shortages, transmission and distribution line outages, and electrical service outages affecting the public. 4. Make contact with electric, gas and water utilities and industry coordinating groups serving the emergency area to obtain information about damage and/or assistance needed in their area of operations. 5. Monitor the procedures followed by utility companies during a generating capacity shortage on their system and the procedures followed to ensure coordinated action and communication. 6. Coordinate and communicate with the utility companies and report to the EOC information regarding City and state electric generating capacity, expected electric peak load, geographic areas and number of customers that are expected to be most severely impacted, if available. 7. Provide information regarding status of major generating unit outages, expected duration of event, explanation of utility company’s planned actions and recommendations of agency actions in support of the utility company. 8. Administer legal authorities for energy priorities, communicate and coordinate with City, state and federal agencies and organizations in responding to energy emergencies and energy restoration. 9. Coordinate with ESF 15 on city issues to keep them apprised of energy shortfalls. 10. Ensure that energy concerns are addressed upon activation of the EOC. 11. Maintain communications with non-utility sector providers of transportation fuels, the OEM, and other support agencies and organizations in responding to and recovering from emergencies regarding shortages and disruptions in the supply of other private sector energy and transportation fuels affecting the public. 12. Communicate and coordinate with City, state and federal agencies and organizations in responding to energy emergencies and energy restoration. 13. Direct efforts to obtain needed fuel supplies in case of a shortage of automotive transportation fuels. 14. Coordinate the activities of industry trade groups and associations in this effort.

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B. Support Agencies—Department(s) of ___________________________
■ As necessary, coordinate with Department to co-locate officials and City operations to retain operations, and facilitate assessing and repairing damaged infrastructure. ■ All agencies shall document all expenses related to their emergency and disaster response and recovery activities to include individual expenses as well as overall operating costs. These records will be used for documenting expenditures for potential cost recovery after the incident. ■ Personnel, Equipment and Vehicle Records—All organizations shall keep detailed records of all personnel time, equipment and vehicles use to include mileage, fuel consumption, equipment / vehicle maintenance, damage, etc., and report this information to the OEM.

V. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

VI. ESF DEVELOPMENT, MAINTENANCE, SUPPORT, AND TRAINING
■ The primary responsibility for coordinating the development and maintenance of ESF 12 rests with the Manager of the Department. Other agencies supporting this ESF will assist the Manager through the development and maintenance of their own agencies Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and mutual aid agreements, in support of this ESF. ■ A periodic review (no less than annually) will be conducted of this ESF for revalidation and necessary changes. Appropriate signatures and approval dates will identify revisions to this plan. The revision process will include incorporation of changes based upon periodic tests, drills and exercises, as appropriate. All revisions will be submitted to OEM for updating the EOP and distribution to all agencies. In coordination with support agencies and organizations, the primary agency will schedule and conduct training and drill activities that ensure a comprehensive understanding of all ESF roles and responsibilities. The Department will at least annually, coordinate with the OEM Exercise and Training Officer to develop and conduct an exercise of the ESF. The exercise will focus on the execution of all roles and responsibilities including those of supporting agencies and organizations, and their respective SOPs that support the ESF to ensure they are prepared to readily respond when activated. All exercise activities will be documented in an After Action Report (AAR) that will identify necessary improvements and potential changes to the ESF document. The ESF will be updated as necessary and revisions distributed to update the EOP.

B. homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (hSPD-7), “Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection,” and homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (hSPD-8), “National Preparedness”
What follows are Presidential Directives seven (7) and eight (8) as published by the US Department of Homeland Security. They are presented here to help local governments with understanding the Federal context for emergency preparedness and assurance. In so doing, it is hoped that locals will be better able to formulate their own energy assurance plans that are consistent with this overarching Federal policy direction by using these Directives as a frame of reference and resource. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 7 establishes a national policy for federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize U.S. critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist attack. HSPD-7 identifies 15 sectors that require protective actions to prepare for, protect, or mitigate against a terrorist attack or other hazards.

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Purpose

This directive establishes a national policy for Federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize United States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist attacks.

Background

(1) Terrorists seek to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit critical infrastructure and key resources across the United States to threaten national security, cause mass casualties, weaken the economy, and damage public morale and confidence. (2) America’s open and technologically complex society includes a wide array of critical infrastructure and key resources that are potential terrorist targets. The majority of these are owned and operated by the private sector and State or local governments. These critical infrastructures and key resources are both physical and cyber-based and span all sectors of the economy. (3) Critical infrastructure and key resources provide the essential services that underpin American society. The Nation possesses numerous key resources, whose exploitation or destruction by terrorists could cause catastrophic health effects or mass casualties comparable to those from the use of a weapon of mass destruction, or could profoundly affect national prestige and morale. In addition, there is critical infrastructure so vital that its incapacitation, exploitation, or destruction, through terrorist attack, could have a debilitating effect on security and economic well being. (4) While it is not possible to protect or eliminate the vulnerability of all critical infrastructure and key resources throughout the country, strategic improvements in security can make it more difficult for attacks to succeed and can lessen the impact of attacks that may occur. In addition to strategic security enhancements, tactical security improvements can be rapidly implemented to deter, mitigate, or neutralize potential attacks.

Definitions

(5) In this directive: (a) The term “critical infrastructure” has the meaning given to that term in section 1016(e) of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)). (b) The term “key resources” has the meaning given that term in section 2(9) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(9)). (c) The term “the Department” means the Department of Homeland Security. (d) The term “Federal departments and agencies” means those executives departments enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, and the Department of Homeland Security; independent establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1); Government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C. 103(1); and the United States Postal Service. (e) The terms “State,” and “local government,” when used in a geographical sense, have the same meanings given to those terms in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101). (f) The term “the Secretary” means the Secretary of Homeland Security. (g) The term “Sector-Specific Agency” means a Federal department or agency responsible for infrastructure protection activities in a designated critical infrastructure sector or key resources category. Sector-Specific Agencies will conduct their activities under this directive in accordance with guidance provided by the Secretary. (h) The terms “protect” and “secure” mean reducing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or key resources in order to deter, mitigate, or neutralize terrorist attacks.

Policy

(6) It is the policy of the United States to enhance the protection of our Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources against terrorist acts that could:

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(a) cause catastrophic health effects or mass casualties comparable to those from the use of a weapon of mass destruction; (b) impair Federal departments and agencies’ abilities to perform essential missions, or to ensure the public’s health and safety; (c) undermine State and local government capacities to maintain order and to deliver minimum essential public services; (d) damage the private sector’s capability to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy and delivery of essential services; (e) have a negative effect on the economy through the cascading disruption of other critical infrastructure and key resources; or (f) undermine the public’s morale and confidence in our national economic and political institutions. (7) Federal departments and agencies will identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources in order to prevent, deter, and mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit them. Federal departments and agencies will work with State and local governments and the private sector to accomplish this objective. (8) Federal departments and agencies will ensure that homeland security programs do not diminish the overall economic security of the United States. (9) Federal departments and agencies will appropriately protect information associated with carrying out this directive, including handling voluntarily provided information and information that would facilitate terrorist targeting of critical infrastructure and key resources consistent with the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and other applicable legal authorities. (10) Federal departments and agencies shall implement this directive in a manner consistent with applicable provisions of law, including those protecting the rights of United States persons.

Roles and Responsibilities of Sector-Specific Federal Agencies

(11) Recognizing that each infrastructure sector possesses its own unique characteristics and operating models, Sector-Specific Agencies are designated, including: (a) Department of Agriculture—agriculture, food (meat, poultry, egg products); (b) Health and Human Services -- public health, healthcare, and food (other than meat, poultry, egg products); (c) Environmental Protection Agency—drinking water and water treatment systems; (d) Department of Energy—energy, including the production refining, storage, and distribution of oil and gas, and electric power except for commercial nuclear power facilities; (e) Department of the Treasury—banking and finance; (f) Department of the Interior—national monuments and icons; and (g) Department of Defense—defense industrial base. (12) In accordance with guidance provided by the Secretary, Sector-Specific Agencies shall: (a) collaborate with all relevant Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, and the private sector, including with key persons and entities in their infrastructure sector; (b) conduct or facilitate vulnerability assessments of the sector; and (c) encourage risk management strategies to protect against and mitigate the effects of attacks against critical infrastructure and key resources.

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Coordination with the Private Sector

(13) In accordance with applicable laws or regulations, the Department and the Sector-Specific Agencies will collaborate with appropriate private sector entities and continue to encourage the development of information sharing and analysis mechanisms. Additionally, the Department and Sector-Specific Agencies shall collaborate with the private sector and continue to support sector-coordinating mechanisms: (a) to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources; and (b) to facilitate sharing of information about physical and cyber threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, potential protective measures, and best practices.

National Security Events

(14) The Secretary, after consultation with the Homeland Security Council, shall be responsible for designating events as “National Special Security Events” (NSSEs). This directive supersedes language in previous presidential directives regarding the designation of NSSEs that is inconsistent herewith.

Implementation

(15) Consistent with the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary shall produce a comprehensive, integrated National Plan for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection to outline national goals, objectives, milestones, and key initiatives within 1 year from the issuance of this directive. The Plan shall include, in addition to other Homeland Security-related elements as the Secretary deems appropriate, the following elements: (a) a strategy to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources, including how the Department intends to work with Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, the private sector, and foreign countries and international organizations; (b) a summary of activities to be undertaken in order to: define and prioritize, reduce the vulnerability of, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources; (c) a summary of initiatives for sharing critical infrastructure and key resources information and for providing critical infrastructure and key resources threat warning data to State and local governments and the private sector; and (d) coordination and integration, as appropriate, with other Federal emergency management and preparedness activities including the National Response Plan and applicable national preparedness goals.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, “national Preparedness” (HSPD-8)

Also on December 17, 2003, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, “National Preparedness” (HSPD-8). The purpose of HSPD-8 is to establish policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State and local governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, State, and local entities.

The National Preparedness Goal

The goal will guide federal departments and agencies; state, territorial, local and tribal officials, the private sector, non-government organizations and the public in determining how to most effectively and efficiently strengthen preparedness for terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.

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C. The National Incident Management System (NIMS)
The Secretary of Homeland Security released the National Incident Management System (NIMS) in March 2004. In a September 8, 2004, letter to the nation’s governors, DHS outlined a phased approach to local government implementation of the NIMS, with full compliance required by September 30, 2006. Notably, local jurisdictions are required to meet NIMS implementation requirements put forward in the federal fiscal year 2006 as a condition of receiving federal preparedness funding assistance in FY 2007 and beyond. Therefore, it makes sense to learn about NIMS and to move forward on NIMS implementation at the local government level. Some states have taken actions to ensure that the NIMS are integrated into the state’s emergency management system. California did this through an Executive Order. The Executive Order required the state’s Office of Emergency Services to report on the status of NIMS implementation of the National Incident Management System by a date certain. Pennsylvania mandated that NIMS be utilized for all incident management issues within its borders through a Proclamation. The NIMS is a comprehensive system that improves local response operations through the use of the Incident Command System (ICS) and the application of (new) standardized procedures and preparedness measures. The NIMS promotes cross-jurisdictional, statewide and interstate regional mechanisms for coordinating responses and obtaining help during complex incidents. Who Oversees NIMS Implementation? The NIMS Integration Center The NIMS Integration Center oversees all aspects of the NIMS, including the development of NIMS-related standards and guidelines and the provision of guidance and support to incident management and responder organizations as they implement the system. The Center also will validate compliance with the NIMS and National Response Plan responsibilities, standards and requirements. The NIMS Integration Center is a multi-jurisdictional, multidisciplinary entity made up of federal stakeholders and over time state, local and tribal incident management and first responder organizations. It is situated at the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The list of NIMS-related local government needs can be overwhelming to some jurisdictions. (For a federal fiscal year 2006 NIMS Implementation Matrix for Tribal and Local Jurisdictions please see http://www.fema.gov/txt/ emergency/nims/nims_tribal_local_compliance_activities.txt.)

Implementation Timeline: A Long Way to Go…

NIMS compliance should be considered and undertaken as a community-wide event. (Footnote: Tribal Government and Local Jurisdiction Compliance Activities: Federal fiscal year 2006, The NIMS Integration Center, DHS/FEMA, October 4, 2005). The federal government desired full-scale local government implementation by the start of the federal Fiscal Year 2007 (October 1, 2006). However, most local governments were substantially behind on this target date. By the end of the federal Fiscal Year 2006 (September 2006), DHS/FEMA required that NIMS be adopted at the community level for all government departments and agencies. This could be done through a formal Executive Order, a proclamation, resolution, or legislation. This was to be done in concert with NIMS local government outreach to associations, utilities, non-governmental entities and private sector incident management and response organizations. The NIMS Integration Center is responsible for managing a helpful “NIMS On-Line” web site at http://www. nimsonline.com/.

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Incident response organizations are numerous, and include: ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ Public health organizations Medical service organizations Private sector entities (especially energy utilities) Law enforcement officials Fire officials Public works officials Emergency management officials Others

Local Government Goals for NIMS

When NIMS is fully implemented, the local community or jurisdiction will be able to: ■■ Ensure common and proven incident management doctrine, practices, and principles are used to plan for, protect against, respond to, and recover from emergency incidents and preplanned events; ■■ Maintain a response operation capable of expanding to meet an escalating situation and the ability to integrate resources and equipment from intrastate and interstate mutual aid agreements, state-provided assistance, and federal government response; ■■ Order and track response assets using common resource typing and definitions, and draw on mutual aid agreements for additional assistance; ■■ Establish staging and allocation plans for the re-distribution of equipment, supplies, and aid coming into the area from other localities, states, or the federal government through mutual aid agreements; ■■ Conduct situational assessments and establish the appropriate ICS organizational structure to effectively manage the incident; and ■■ Establish communication processes, procedures and protocols that will ensure effective interoperable communications among emergency responders, 9-1-1 centers, and multi-agency coordination systems (Emergency Operations Centers).

Key Features of NIMS

■■ Incident Command System (ICS). NIMS establishes ICS as a standard incident management organization with five functional areas—command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration—for management of all major incidents. To ensure further coordination, and during incidents involving multiple jurisdictions or agencies, the principle of unified command has been universally incorporated into NIMS. This unified command not only coordinates the efforts of many jurisdictions, but also provides for and assures joint decisions on objectives, strategies, plans, priorities, and public communications. ■■ Communications and Information Management. Standardized communications during an incident are essential and NIMS prescribes interoperable communications systems for both incident and information management. Responders and managers across all agencies and jurisdictions must have a common operating picture for a more efficient and effective incident response. ■■ Preparedness. Preparedness incorporates a range of measures, actions, and processes accomplished before an incident happens. NIMS preparedness measures including planning, training, exercises, qualification and certification, equipment acquisition and certification, and publication management. All of these serve to ensure that pre-incident actions are standardized and consistent with mutually agreed doctrine. NIMS further places emphasis on mitigation activities to enhance preparedness. Mitigation includes public education and outreach, structural modifications to lessen the loss of life or destruction of property, code enforcement in support of zoning rules, land management, and building codes, and flood insurance and property buy-out for frequently flooded areas.

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■■ Joint Information System (JIS). NIMS organizational measures enhance the public communication effort. The Joint Information System provides the public with timely and accurate incident information and unified public messages. This system employs Joint Information Centers (JIC) and brings incident communicators together during an incident to develop, coordinate, and deliver a unified message. This will ensure that Federal, state, and local levels of government are releasing the same information during an incident. ■■ NIMS Integration Center (NIC). To ensure that NIMS remains an accurate and effective management tool, the NIMS NIC will be established by the Secretary of Homeland Secutrity to assess proposed changes to NIMS, capture, and evaluate lessons learned, and employ best practices. The NIC will provide strategic direction and oversight of the NIMS, supporting both routine maintenance and continuous refinement of the system and its components over the long term. The NIC will develop and facilitate national standards for NIMS education and training, first responder communications and equipment, typing of resources, qualification and credentialing of incident management and responder personnel, and standardization of equipment maintenance and resources. The NIC will continue to use the collaborative process of Federal, state, tribal, local, multi-discipline and private authorities to assess prospective changes and assure continuity and accuracy.

D. The Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinator (EEAC) System
The Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) maintains a passwordprotected Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinators (EEAC) website through which authorized state energy emergency coordinators may access valuable energy security information, including daily news summaries, emergency situation reports, lessons learned from other states, links to outage and curtailment information, and the ability to email messages to up-to-date listings of colleagues in other jurisdictions. The EEAC is a cooperative effort among NASEO, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the National Governors Association-Center for Best Practices, Public Technology Institute, and OE’s Infrastructure Security and Energy Reliability Division (ISER). It establishes a secure cooperative communications environment for state and local government personnel with access to information on energy supply, demand, pricing and infrastructure. Designated members have expertise in electricity, petroleum and natural gas. The current membership of approximately 180 people is made up of representatives from state energy offices, public utility organizations, state legislators, emergency management agencies, homeland security offices, and Governors’ offices. Local governments will be added, by PTI, to the system soon. Until that time, locals can benefit from a fundamental understanding of how this system operates. Each state has designated at least one primary and one secondary designee per energy source, up to six individuals per state, for the EEAC list. In the event of an energy supply disruption or emergency, OE relies upon the EEAC contacts to provide an up-to-date assessment of energy markets in the affected states. During these emergency situations, as well as other non-emergency situations in which the list may be used, the EEAC serves as the link between the state, industry and OE. In an energy emergency, OE may need to disclose sensitive and privileged information, and in these situations, may contact only the primary coordinator. From that point, it is the primary coordinator’s responsibility to follow the state’s plan for disclosure of information. In most other non-emergency or less sensitive emergency or disruption situations, both the primary and secondary coordinators may be contacted. Communications can be sent directly to the OE via email; an EEAC can use the listserves to send information to different regions and the EEAC bulletin board is available and provides a great way to share information.

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An EEAC should keep in touch with the state’s key energy sector contacts, including key players in the state’s primary energy supply and energy consuming sectors, as well as key emergency or energy-related personnel in other agencies of state government and local governments. Additionally, it is important to keep in contact with other EEACs in the state. The types of events that warrant communication with the EEAC network include: ■■ Large-scale events, such as an attack on the power grid, international oil disruption, hurricane, major ice storm, etc.; ■■ Emerging problems, such as the spring gasoline change in non-attainment air quality areas that cause a significant increase in the number of terminals without a supply; very cold weather with requests for fuel driver hour waivers; price spikes; and other indicators of stress on the supply/distribution system’s ability to supply fuel; ■■ Routine summer and winter energy assessments; and ■■ Simulations and exercises. The types of non-proprietary information that should be shared include: ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ Information that quantifies the size, scope and potential duration of the problem; Geographic area affected; Effects upstream and downstream in the energy supply/distribution system; Public statements by state officials; Specific actions taken by state or local governments to mitigate impacts; Requests from industry for assistance and response; and In-state media reports that accurately describe the problem.

An EEAC should consider sending information out to the EEAC list when market indicators suggest the potential for supply problems and monitoring will be stepped up. In addition, information should be sent when an event occurs that affects energy supply, demand or price, or when an energy emergency or state of disaster is declared which affects energy supply. In the case of an international event that affects energy supply, OE will likely communicate its analysis to the EEAC list and the states, or the states may request such information from OE. The EEAC list may also be used by OE to request information from a state in which there are reports of energy problems. States should use the list to communicate regionally to counterparts, because problems are often not limited to a single state. Too much information is often better than little or no information—if in doubt, use the list. A brief message can go a long way and communication is key to a successful outcome. If a message is received from another EEAC, and the state has information to lend further insights to the problem, all those who received the message should receive a response. The response should indicate whether or not similar problems are being observed in the state. The information should be verified—it is probably not wise to rely solely on personal knowledge. An EEAC must be a credible and timely source of information. If answers are immediately available, they need to be obtained from previously established contacts in state government and industry. The EEAC website needs to be checked regularly for postings on the bulletin boards and additional information should be added as warranted. An EEAC should also “exercise” the list periodically by sending status information to states in the region, just to get in the habit of using it. It is also a good idea to check contact information on the list and update it as necessary.

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It’s important to know the EEACs in the region, and have their names and numbers on an emergency contact list rather than relying solely on the website. On the secure ISERnet website (http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/isernet), there are several communications tools for exchanging information, including the EEAC listserves, the EEAC member list, and the bulletin board. Only designated EEACs have access to the secure website; designation determinations should be reviewed with the State Energy Office, or by contacting the ISER Division of the OE office. Designated EEACs can obtain the URL for the website by contacting EO’s contractor at 703-676-8308 and asking for technical assistance.

E. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and supporting Sector-Specific Plans (SSPs) provide a coordinated approach to critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) protection roles and responsibilities for federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector security partners. The NIPP sets national priorities, goals, and requirements for effective distribution of funding and resources that will help ensure that our government, economy, and public services continue in the event of a terrorist attack or other disaster. A full copy of the NIPP may be found at: http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/editorial_0827.shtm#1. The plan is based on the following :(http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/editorial_0827.shtm#0): ■■ Strong public-private partnerships that will foster relationships and facilitate coordination within and across CI/KR sectors. ■■ Robust multi-directional information sharing that will enhance the ability to assess risks, make prudent security investments, and take protective action. ■■ Risk management framework establishing processes for combining consequence, vulnerability, and threat information to produce a comprehensive, systematic, and rational assessment of national or sector risk. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) describes the NIPP as providing a unifying structure for the integration of existing and future critical infrastructure and key resources into a single national program that result in a more resilient America. The NIPP promotes building security partnerships, and local governments are key partners in implementing the objectives of the NIPP. Specifically, the DHS expects local governments to build regional partnerships across jurisdictions while also developing formal, tailored CI/KR plans as part of the own homeland security efforts. The DHS wants jurisdictions to incorporate the NIPP into their existing security initiatives where possible. Consistent with HSPD-7 (mentioned earlier) the NIPP attempts to delineate specific roles and responsibilities for local governments implementing CI/KR programs. It is designed as an over-arching risk management framework from which to measure progress in CI/KR areas. DHS is serious about providing local government training, exercises and education opportunities, and funds for energy assurance efforts. They oversee a Competitive Training Grant Program (CTGP) for local governments and others. For information about the CTGP and fiscal year 2007 CTGP award recipients, please see: http://www.dhs. gov/xgovt/grants/gc_1191005841137.shtm.

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VI. Local Government Energy Assurance: Preparation and Assessment
A. Suggested Components of Critical Infrastructure Protection
NASEO’s State Energy Assurance Guidelines document contained 10 excellent suggested components of critical infrastructure protection. The following 10 components were taken from this document. However, most of the accompanying information with each component is new and tailored to apply to local governments. They include: 1. Critical (physical) Assets 2. Threat Environment; 3. Policies and Procedures; 4. Physical and Cyber Security; 5. Operations Security; 6. Information System Network Architecture and Penetration Testing; 7. Consequence Analysis; 8. Risk Characterization; 9. Protection of Sensitive Information; and 10. Alternative Energy Sources.

1. Critical (Physical) Assets

The primary assets usually identified for energy preparedness include energy generation and delivery infrastructure. Other assets often judged critical include large publicly- and privately-owned buildings (for assembling and distributing emergency supplies). Some examples of these include:

■ Electric generation, transmission and local distribution facilities; ■ Natural gas wells, collection systems, gas processing plants, inter- and intra-state pipelines and storage; and ■ Petroleum production, refining, inter- and intra-state pipelines plus over-the-road delivery systems and storage. In a few states, municipal governments own and operate utilities and in some cases, states own or exercise authority over these energy production facilities. Opinions vary about what level of detail government needs to know with regard to physical assets, however, from an emergency planning perspective, knowledge of major assets, location, and impact on the delivery of energy assists in the local government’s ability to respond.

2. Threat Environment

Most cities and counties have emergency preparedness plans that address redundancy of operations, provide public notification, acknowledge chain of command, provide media response, provide emergency response, and provide emergency water, communication, and energy supplies. These plans can provide the

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backbone for preparedness planning for an attack for natural disaster, but should be seriously reviewed and updated to include a checklist to prepare for a threat. Threat has many meanings in local government energy assurance and preparedness. While much of the current focus remains on the threat of terrorism, the national strategy for the physical protection of critical infrastructure takes an all hazards approach. Understanding these threats is a part of a sound vulnerability analysis. Knowing what may cause a disruption can increase defensive steps to enhance assurance as well as create a more efficient response. Categories of attacks or threats to consider in an all-hazards approach include: ■ Deliberate attacks caused by people (e.g. terrorists, criminals, hackers, delinquents, employees); ■ Natural attacks caused by nature (e.g., hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, wildfires, earthquakes); ■ Accidental attacks caused by technological failure (e.g., pipeline rupture, levee breaches, chemical spills, nuclear, or biological contamination); and ■ Systemic threats caused by the physical inability of energy delivery systems tomeet demand.

3. Policies and Procedures

Refining policies, understanding and practicing procedures are all traditional components of comprehensive energy preparedness planning. For example, an aggressive and strong energy-efficient building code for all county and/or city buildings and requiring back-up power for all critical facilities can help ensure that buildings are fuel efficient and ready for emergencies. If building codes have not been updated recently, energy assurance provides another reason to revisit codes. All viable energy emergency plans should be updated regularly to assure that current policies are included and that all responders are acquainted with how response and mitigation systems are designed to work. Lack of sound physical and cyber security means increased vulnerability. Energy providers are primarily responsible for their own security. However, government can help by working with energy industries to understand the extent of need, constraints to improvement and the costs of developing adequate security. Government can then have an effect on viable policies and rules for support. Some examples are:

4. Physical and Cyber Security

■ Government has existing natural gas pipeline safety rules. Continuing to work with the industry to assure that these rules are followed increases energy assurance. ■ Government has extensive rules pertaining to the reliable delivery of electricity. Energy emergency planning can include general descriptions of existing physical security measures as well as illustrative descriptions of the steps energy companies take to restore power or supply. This information will help planners respond to a disruption efficiently and assist officials with their explanation to the public. ■ The infrastructure of the petroleum markets is usually understood in general terms only. However, the more that is known about the location of pipelines, storage, loading terminals, preferred highway delivery routes and the nature and location of retail outlets, the more can be done to assist in a shortage. Knowledge of regional refining facilities and competing finished product markets are other pieces of the physical structure with potential security issues affecting vulnerability.

5. Operations Security

Local government officials are unlikely to need extensive knowledge of energy company operations security. It is useful to know that this security is in place and that energy companies train personnel in its implementation. The role of government regarding operational security should be to ask questions and require site-specific security measures. Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) may include operational security requirements in a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity, or other rules, for energy entities regulated

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by the state. It is useful to be familiar with these requirements at critical facilities. Industry can assist state emergency responders by explaining their operations security process and practices. This will help public officials to plan and respond accordingly during a shortage.

6. Information System Network Architecture and Penetration Testing

The realization that delicate and expensive critical infrastructure computerized support systems are vulnerable clearly focuses the needs to assure that cyber security concerns need to be an integral part of the planning process. Fortunately, many utilities, petroleum production and local delivery companies use proprietary software or systems that are less vulnerable than off-the-shelf software. Local governments may wish to have their own information technology specialists work with the energy industry and the federal government to improve such systems, thus increasing energy assurance. Due to the sensitivity of such detailed information, it may not be prudent to include such information in an emergency plan, however policy makers and planners will benefit by having up-to-date knowledge of information networks and their operating characteristics (architecture).

7. Consequence Analysis

Consequence analysis means understanding the effects of an energy disruption. Some consequences are impacts on related energy systems; others are societal impacts such as people displaced from their homes and/or jobs, costs to state and local government, and loss of business income. Widespread energy outages, such as the power failure in the Midwest and Northeast in August 2003, clearly highlight the need to consider the consequences of not only energy disruptions, but also actions taken to alleviate them. A detailed knowledge of the energy profile and the impacts associated with an energy disruption is suggested. This should be part of a thorough vulnerability assessment. It is strongly recommended that this be undertaken in close coordination with large power and energy providers whose emergency response actions can lead to devastating downstream system failure. Some potential downstream effects might be:

■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■

Failure of petroleum supply infrastructure to function when electric power is interrupted; Failure of water supply and purification systems to operate when power is lost; Loss of power to buildings’ critical air handling or environmental equipment; Outages at refineries and gas processing plants due to electric outages or curtailments in natural gas supply; Secondary utility system time-to-failure when back-up storage is exhausted; and Failure of information system networks.

The response to downstream impacts may be to alter operational and emergency procedures, provide alerts and warnings where none have been given in the past, or seek to assure that automatic alternatives and backup are understood and acquired.

8. Risk Characterization

Up-to-date state energy emergency plans often contain a vulnerability analysis associating state energy infrastructure with demographics. Risk is also associated with operating any type of energy power system or energy delivery system, and better understanding of this will allow planners to pre-determine the magnitude of possible damage for any given geographical area of impact. Most states already prioritize energy user risk through utility outage and restoration rules or sometimes through a critical user list contained in a state petroleum set-aside. It is strongly suggested that all

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local planners re-examine existing state priorities, help make them more relevant, and update them periodically. Adequate planning may also determine which prioritized energy end users can best protect them with backup supply or access to energy alternatives.

9. Protecting Sensitive Information

Much of the information for critical infrastructure preparedness will either be proprietary for private companies or sensitive for the protection of the city or county. Common sense dictates not publishing detailed location maps that could be used by criminals and terrorists. Less apparent is imparting too much detail about information system architecture, consequence analysis, or other vulnerability assessments that seem less direct. A local government energy emergency plan may be developed with more knowledge about these characteristics than actually needs to appear in the plan. Most of the emergency protocols contained in a state energy emergency plan are already public knowledge. Since a major purpose of such a plan is to organize these items in a meaningful way for efficient response, it may be prudent to keep some response information general rather than specific. It may be better to keep secure information stored outside of the plan for use by authorized individuals only. In addition, because of the Freedom of Information Act and sunshine laws in many states, there is a question as to whether sensitive information can be protected from disclosure. In the final analysis, accomplishing this is a delicate task and will require careful coordination and cooperation among stakeholders. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/PCII_Program_Fact_Sheet_8-22.pdf

10. Alternative Energy Sources

Alternative energy is a useful if somewhat dated term. Alternative energy resources tend to be the nonfossil fuel resources, such as solar, wind, geothermal, biomass and hydroelectricity. Many consider these technologies to be main stream, integral components of the energy future. Energy efficiency is considered by some as an alternative energy resource. However, most local government energy experts consider energy efficiency to be more of a traditional energy resource since it usually relies on human-made equipment and technologies.

This document goes beyond NASEO’s Energy Assurance Guidelines by providing important details about specific technologies, financing options, and policies available to (local and state) governments interested in promoting alternative energy as a means to energy assurance. These details can be found in the text immediately following this section (Sections B. Energy Efficiency and C. Renewable Energy). First it is necessary to provide some background information on these resources and their role in energy assurance efforts. Many local governments have promoted energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy since the early 1970’s. When tracing the modern-day genesis of local government efforts in the alternative energy area, most historians point to the Arab oil embargo in 1973, the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 and the resulting second oil price shock. During this time, the Carter Administration emphasized moving federal funds to cities and states for energy efficiency and renewable energy. It was also during this time that the National Renewable Energy Laboratory and the four regional solar energy centers were formed to assure research and development and the market development of renewable energy technologies. Petroleum overcharge funds levied on oil companies were also used to fund innovative local and state government energy efficiency and renewable energy efforts in the 1970s. A little known fact is that these

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funds were still funding local government efforts well into the 1990s. Separate U.S. Department of Energy State Energy Program (SEP) funds flowed through state energy offices to local governments in the mid1990s, and most of these efforts targeted energy efficiency improvements. Interest in renewable energy has expanded significantly over the last decade, and much of this interest can be traced to the sustainable development movement and more recently, extremely high energy prices. While the cost of oil has continued to climb, the cost of renewables has plummeted thanks to more than 30 years of research, development, and demonstration programs. For example, the cost of wind energy has fallen by more than 500 percent over the last thirty years (The Stella Group, personal conversation, May 2007). At a minimum, the increased use of alternative energy resources is beneficial to the public for national security, environmental, and fuel diversity reasons. These resources tend to be located locally and not dependent upon vulnerable fuel delivery systems and/or price swings due to external factors, ranging from weather to war. A significant share of renewable energy in the electricity generation fuel mix can dampen potential electricity price swings caused by fossil fuel price volatility. These resources can also offset the potential disruption of other generation sources. Most importantly, when combined as part of any energy assurance effort, energy efficiency and renewable energy can help diversify and improve the resiliency of the energy supply. Local government officials should continue to promote these resources, recognizing the importance of their role in emergency preparedness and response.

B. Energy Efficiency
Energy efficiency refers to actions that are aimed at reducing the energy used by specific end-use devices and systems, typically without affecting the services provided. Energy efficiency is not lowering comfort standards such as temperature or lighting levels to reduce energy use. Energy efficiency investments should be considered a cost-effective complement to investments in other more traditional energy supplies. In addition to assisting in managing day-to-day operations, energy efficiency programs can be effective resources for reducing electricity and peak demand. Rapid increases in the capabilities of metering and communications (e.g. “smart meters”) can yield lower costs for the local government. Energy efficiency can also lower the cost of power when the power grid is most stressed. (Examining the Peak Demand Impacts of Energy Efficiency: A Review of Program Experience and Industry Practices, February 2007, American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy). Many efficiency technologies, including LED traffic lights, efficient compact fluorescent electric lighting—as well as the use of design elements such as daylighting and passive solar heating and natural ventilation—reduce the amount of electricity needed to operate facilities in all situations. In an emergency, efficient facilities need less backup power. Energy efficiency programs are proven now with decades of utility and government experience behind them. New energy efficiency technologies come to the market almost weekly. For example, some consumers participate in new time-of-day programs in which they voluntarily reduce consumption upon receipt of a utility signal. These “smart meter” programs will be much more common soon, such as the $100 million investment in mid-2008 by Excel Energy into new and existing homes in the City of Boulder, Colorado. The program will allow Excel to manage the energy used in thousands of homes in the next year. The obvious potential for such systems to assist in an energy emergency is huge.

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Energy Efficiency Technologies and Policies That Work….

New energy-efficient technologies now enjoy significant market share in many areas. For example, the sales of ENERGY STAR-qualified compact fluorescent lights (CFLs) nearly doubled last year, according to estimates by the Environmental Protection Agency; in 2007, 290 million CFLs (which use approximately 75 percent less energy) were sold and now account for about 20 percent of the U.S. light bulb market. Many communities purchase and/or sell CFLs in formal campaigns to raise energy efficiency awareness. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s “Change a Light, Change the World” campaign involved local governments and encouraged them to distribute CFLs. This campaign is credited with improving CFL market share. CFLs generally use around 1/3 the electricity of traditional incandescent bulbs while lasting 8 to 10 times as long. Lighting can account for 60 percent of the energy consumed in commercial buildings (State Energy Alternatives website, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2004.) As gas prices continued to climb, U.S. registrations of new hybrid vehicles rose 38 percent in 2007 to a record 350,289, while fuel cells continue to make inroads in the transportation and building sectors – e.g., 12 fuel cells totaling 4.8 MW (megawatts) will help power the Freedom Tower and three other new towers under construction at the World Trade Center site in lower Manhattan. Energy-efficient heating, ventilating and cooling (HVAC) systems can save the city considerable money. One in four furnaces is more than 20 years old (State Energy Alternatives website, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2004). New heating systems can achieve efficiencies as high as 97 percent, whereas older furnaces and boilers typically have efficiencies in the 60-70 percent range.

Energy Performance Contracting

Energy Performance Contracting is a construction method that allows a facility to complete energy-saving improvements within an existing budget by financing them with the money saved through reduced utility expenditures. Energy Performance Contracting can be used to tap into energy savings from existing public buildings. Local government facilities make no up-front investments and instead finance projects through guaranteed annual energy savings. To enter into a guaranteed energy savings performance contract (ESPC), a local agency must usually issue a Request for Qualifications, and select a performance contractor, usually an energy service company. After identifying eligible projects, the contractor designs and installs the needed improvements. The agency pays for the financed project out of savings realized by the improvements. By law in some states (e.g. Texas) the contractor must guarantee that the savings will always be at least equal to the payments for the cost of the improvements. Local governments in many states are allowed to enter into energy service performance contracts (ESPCs). More on the financing of back-up systems can be found in section VI.D.

Strong Building Codes

One of the easiest ways to improve energy efficiency is to make sure that buildings of all types (residential, commercial and government) are as efficient as is possible. The stakes are huge. California’s building efficiency standards (along with those for energy efficient appliances) have saved more than $56 billion in electricity and natural gas costs since 1978. It is estimated the standards will save an additional $23 billion by 2013. (CEC website, July 25, 2008) Building codes were originally designed with health and safety in mind first, but the energy component has become increasingly important in recent years. Building codes in the commercial buildings sector are especially important since commercial buildings can include retail and wholesale service stores, offices, hotels, restaurants, hospitals, warehouses, public and private schools and universities, correctional institutions and religious organizations. Building codes for new residential construction are also important, especially where substantial growth in the number of new homes is expected.

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Of course, after adopting new energy codes they need to be enforced. Experts agree that California’s aggressive Title 24 energy codes work because they are enforced. Codes are usually developed at the national level and adopted at the local level. Voluntary above-code construction can be spurred by offering incentives such as fee deferrals and waivers, density bonuses and special recognition such as Mayoral Breakfasts, “Caught Being Good Awards” and other special events targeted at above-code builders.

The Ice Bear Energy-Efficient Energy Storage Technology

Located in Windsor, Colorado. Ice Energy, Incorporated manufactures a proven “Ice Bear” technology that allows onsite, energy-efficient distributed energy storage for local governments. The Ice Bear unit (pictured below) is approved for Title 24 compliance in California and supported by the California Energy Commission and California public and private utilities. It was tested and proven successful in Anaheim, Victorville, Burbank, Glendale, Riverside and Los Angeles and many other jurisdictions. Essentially, the Ice Bear product works with off-the-shelf AC units to eliminate on-peak energy demand by shifting the condensing unit hours of operation to offpeak hours. The condensing unit runs during the (cheaper) evening hours freezing about 500-gallons of ice in an insulated tank, and the AC refrigerant is later circulated through the tank during the hotter (more expensive peak) hours. The Ice Bear technology is a thermal energy storage system, which are particularly cost-effective when buildings are on time-ofIce Energy, Inc., Windsor, Colorado, 2006 use rates.

Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED)

Governments can encourage sustainable, energy-efficient construction by encouraging LEED for new and existing residential and commercial construction and city-owned buildings. LEED is an acronym that stands for Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design. It is the Green Building Rating System developed by the U.S. Green Building Council. LEED certification is a recognition that a construction project or building can attain by utilizing environmentally friendly building practices during construction or remodeling. The model was developed in 1998 to encourage environmental awareness amongst government agencies, architects, engineers, developers, and builders. Generally, LEED certification can be attained on four different levels, which are determined by a credit, or point, system. The levels of LEED certification are Certified, Silver, Gold, and Platinum. A building or project can attain LEED certification by submitting an application that documents compliance with the requirements set for in the LEED rating system. The U.S. Green Building Council issues LEED certification upon satisfactory application, review and compliance verification. Long criticized for its weak energy provisions, LEED has new, stronger energy requirements across many of their rating systems. There are significant fees associated with LEED certification, and the process can take significantly longer than advertised. However, the benefits are usually worth the wait.

C. Renewable Energy
Renewable energy is called renewable because the sources used to harness the energy renew themselves constantly over short periods of time—months or years, instead of centuries. These sources of energy usually include water,

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Battery Backup Systems
legislation passed in california sets aside $10 million in matching grants to help pay for battery backup systems for traffic signals. newly installed traffic signals use more efficient, led lamps that cut the amount of electricity used by each light from as much as 150 watts to between 10 and 25 watts. since the electricity needed to operate led lights can be 85 percent less than that needed by incandescent lamps, it’s now technically possible to provide backup power for critical intersections. Battery systems cost between $1,800 and $3,000, depending on the number of lights at the intersection. each system provides enough electricity to operate the traffic signals in the normal, fully functioning mode or as red flashing lights for two hours. after that time, the signals will flash red for another two hours, alerting motorists that the intersection is operating as a four-way stop.

wind, solar, biomass, and geothermal heat from the earth’s interior. While quickly replenished, these resources tend to be intermittent (e.g., the wind does not always blow and the sun does not always shine), on either a daily or seasonal basis. Local governments have moved toward renewable energy technologies more recently because of one major benefit: relative price stability. The supply of renewable energy resources is virtually unlimited and the price of extracting or harnessing these resources is relatively low with more predictable and less dramatic price swings than traditional fossil fuel resources. While some renewables are intermittent, there are energy storage technologies that can be installed to improve the ability of renewables to meet demand when it arises. While promising and proven, renewable energy can help meet demand but will in most cases not come close to satisfying all demand during an energy emergency. Critical facilities that can benefit from renewable energy and energy-efficient technologies include “911” call centers, airports, emergency shelters, hospitals, first responder facilities, water pumping and communications equipment (cellular). While still minor for most local governments, renewable energy technologies such as photovoltaics (direct conversion of sunlight to electricity) are starting to replace or complement traditional back-up power supplies for local governments, especially the fuel of choice for most back-up systems, diesel fuel.

This growth in renewable energy technology use is spurred by many factors including significant cost declines associated with economies and scale, and the very important increase in the price of oil, which has forced local governments to reconsider and reconfigure energy assurance and energy emergency plans. Fuel routing challenges have proved formidable for many local governments during recent hurricanes—these governments had stockpiled ample supplies of diesel fuel but found it difficult to get the fuel to the place where it was needed. For example, in Louisiana streets turned to rivers during Katrina and boats were needed to transport the fuel instead of trucks. Therefore, on-site distributed renewable energy technologies are now being considered more than ever before. City energy planners are probably the most familiar with renewable technologies, especially trend-setting cities such as Portland, Oregon, Boulder, Colorado, Chicago, Illinois and Austin, Texas. Renewables have progressed to the mainstream thanks to the efforts of these cities and more. On-site electric power generation markets are expanding by more than twenty five percent per year. Primarily these markets are addressing power quality for businesses that utilize digital controls or equipment (computer, transmitters, and sensors) and for power reliability (back-up power beyond the usual 3 minutes to 3 hours for battery banks). Since September 11th, greater concerns about hardening the nation’s infrastructure to make it less vulnerable to terrorism (as well as acts of nature) resulted in Congress sending hundreds of millions of dollars to states for critical infrastructure protection. Experts say that more than one-third of these “first responder” funds are used for training, protective equipment, and hiring specialized personnel. The remaining funds can be used to harden critical

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infrastructure which includes sensors at reservoirs, ports, bridges and tunnels and back-up power for emergency personnel (police, fire, rescue, hospitals) and first-responder transmitters and field equipment and potentially back-up schools, including Federal infrastructure. This market represents a robust opportunity for clean distributed power (advanced batteries and controls, energy efficiency, fuel cells (and co-generation/combined heat and power), heat engines, micro hydro power, minigas turbines, modular biomass, photovoltaics, small wind, and solar thermal). But this emerging industry lacks standardization that keeps costs high as well as more complicated installation and repairs because it is still a “custom” industry. In addition, large energy and security companies and larger potential commercial and industrial users seek to have distributed generation aggregated and have the performance wirelessly monitored. Monitoring systems that alert users to a systems’ functioning ability, degree of performance, whether electric output matches energy resources, whether batteries hold charge, and other indicators are increasingly important.

Distributing and Diversifying Local Government Energy Supplies

Distributed energy (DE) is the use of small generating facilities situated near the customer or on-site with the customer. Distributed energy encompasses a range of technologies, including renewable energy, fuel cells, microturbines, reciprocating engines, load management, and energy efficiency technologies. Distributed energy has the potential to: ■ provide consumers with greater reliability; ■ provide adequate power quality; ■ allow participation in competitive electric power markets; ■ mitigate congestion in transmission lines;

Solar Power Basics

reference: http://www.solar4power.com/solar-power-basics.html using solar power to produce electricity is not the same as using solar to produce heat. solar thermal principles are applied to produce hot fluids or air. Photovoltaic principles are used to produce electricity. a solar panel (Pv panel) is made of the natural element, silicon, which becomes charged electrically when subjected to sun light. solar panels are directed at solar south in the northern hemisphere and solar north in the southern hemisphere (these are slightly different than magnetic compass north-south directions) at an angle dictated by the geographic location and latitude of where they are to be installed. the intensity of the sun’s radiation changes with the hour of the day, time of the year and weather conditions. to be able to make calculations in planning a system, the total amount of solar radiation energy is expressed in hours of full sunlight per m², or Peak sun Hours. this term, Peak sun Hours, represents the average amount of sun available per day throughout the year.

the four primary components for producing electricity using solar power, which provides common 120 volt ac power for daily use are: solar panels, charge controller, battery and inverter. solar panels charge the battery, and the charge regulator insures proper charging of the battery. the battery provides dc voltage to the inverter, and the inverter converts the dc voltage to normal ac voltage.

Components used to provide solar power

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■ ■ ■ ■ ■

smooth price fluctuations; strengthen homeland energy assurance; provide greater stability to the electricity grid; lead to lower emissions; and improve energy efficiency particularly in combined heat and power (CHP) applications.

Distributed energy also has important implications for homeland energy assurance and reliability. A number of small, dispersed energy resources are less vulnerable to disruption than large systems. This is true whether the disruption is the result of natural disaster, human error, or act of terrorism. Distributed energy relies on effective but not cumbersome interconnection standards. In the case of backup power for emergencies, having the ability to automatically (or at least quickly) disconnect from the grid and employ alternative, on-site power is critical. Some utilities raise the concern that DE may reduce utility revenues. Others, however, point out that utilities benefit from distributed generation by delaying the need for major capital investment in to additional generating capacity, transmission upgrades, and other improvements. (See State Energy Alternatives Web Site) Combined heat and power (CHP) systems are among the many emerging technology choices for cities interested in diversifying fuel supplies. One attraction of CHP is that it may be used as a distributed generation resource. Some cities such as New York, Atlanta, and Portland have had success with CHP. CHP is widely used in the chemical, petroleum refining, and paper industries. Commercial buildings, college campuses, hospital complexes, and government facilities are also good candidates. Local governments planning for effective and reliable backup power during emergencies are using the following technologies successfully:

Fuel Cells

Fuel cells are similar to batteries. Fuel cells can be used in a variety of applications ranging from powering cars, trucks, and buses to powering portable devices such as cell phones and laptop computers. Today, fuel cells are used most widely as a stationary source of backup power and are often fueled with natural gas. Of course, natural gas is susceptible to price fluctuations. A few municipal water treatment facilities are experimenting with fuel cells using methane-rich gases that are by-products of the sewage treatment process.

Fuel Cell Backup
the municipal wastewater treatment plant in Portland, oregon, uses a methanepowered fuel cell and four microturbines to provide emergency backup for critical treatment plant operations.

Fuel cells potentially could help reduce greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution. The only by-products created by fuel cells are heat and water, making them a cleaner alternative to traditional internal combustion engines and power plants. Fuel cells are not yet cost competitive with traditional technologies. In 2005, the most widely deployed fuel cells cost about $4,500 per kilowatt; by contrast, a diesel generator costs are $800 to $1,500 per kilowatt, and a natural gas turbine can cost even less.

However, fuel cells can be a cost effective replacement for battery backup systems. Batteries can fail without warning, and they require regular expensive maintenance to provide reliable backup power. Increasingly, communication network operators are using fuel cell systems in critical communication applications in the wireless, wireline, utility and government sectors.

Microturbines

Microturbines are small combustion turbines, approximately the size of a refrigerator, with can generate outputs of

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Distributed Generation
a 30-kilowatt natural gas-powered microturbine system, installed by Pacific northwest national laboratory, at applied Process engineering laboratory can be started remotely by Bonneville Power administration to produce electricity for the building during times of peak electrical demand. this on-site production, called distributed generation, helps reduce stress on transmission lines by supplying some of the power for the building directly instead of pulling from the regional power grid.

25 kW to 500 kW of electricity, and can be located on sites with space limitations for power production. Microturbines are composed of a compressor, combustor, turbine, alternator, recuperator, and generator. Waste heat recovery can be used in combined heat and power systems to achieve energy efficiency levels greater than 80-percent. Microturbines use natural gas to produce electricity, and, especially compared to other on-site backup power technologies like diesel generators, have very low pollution emissions. Microturbines evolved from automotive and truck turbochargers, auxiliary power units for airplanes, and small jet engines. Microturbines offer a number of potential advantages compared to other technologies for smallscale power generation. These advantages include: a small number of moving parts, compact size, light weight, greater efficiency, lower emissions, lower electricity costs, potential for low cost mass production, and opportunities to use waste fuels. These advantages and small footprint lead to non-disruptive, fast installation. They are being used successfully for peak power generation as well as backup power generation applications in facilities around the world. Visit www.eere.energy.gov/de/pdfs/microturbine_ advanced_systems_program.pdf to download a pdf of the Advanced Microturbine Systems Program. Using renewable energy, cities and rural communities can: ■ diversify power sources; ■ distribute power generation to where it is needed; ■ offset high energy use during peak power times; and ensure that backup power is available during emergencies. Inverters, necessary to convert power generated by renewable sources to useable electric power, are available that are compatible with utility power and can also operate independently with a battery bank. As a result, system owners can now have the best of both worlds: They can sell excess power when the grid is working and rely on renewable backup power when it’s not. The renewable energy source, be it solar, wind, or micro-hydro, recharges the battery bank to provide continuous power for as long as the grid is down. Safety disconnects are also part of the system to prevent dangerous back feeding into the de-energized utility grid. It is also still an option to install a completely autonomous back-up system that always functions independently of the grid. The homes with power following the Northridge Earthquake had such systems.

Renewable Energy Backup Systems

kBET Radio
KBet radio, with assistance from southern california edison and the u.s. department of energy, plans to install a 10-kW gridconnected Pv system at its new station building in santa clarita, 35 miles north of downtown los angeles. if a power outage occurs, the system will instantaneously become an emergency power source for the station’s am radio transmitter. KBet is a key local emergency operations center communications facility, providing a critical link between police, fire, and other disaster response contacts.

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Regardless of the type of system chosen, renewable energy systems should be carefully sized to keep costs down. (Nature’s Power on Demand: Renewable Energy Systems as Emergency Power Sources, U.S. Department of Energy (EERE), October 1995.

Hardening Facilities Through Renewables

The term “hardening” refers to the process of strengthening the infrastructure of facilities—so that when natural disasters or other emergencies occur, communities are minimally disturbed and have use of critical operations, security functions, and communication devices. Hardening can also be viewed as closing the security gap in a facility where vulnerability is perceived such as tightening up on access to a secure facility. Strengthening the envelope of a facility to withstand a hurricane or bomb blast, or elevating critical equipment and power supplies to withstand flooding, are other typical examples of how local governments and communities can prepare for emergencies. Hardening the energy infrastructure in cities, communities, and individual facilities—often the most critical need for emergency situations—can be approached in a variety of reliable, effective and energy-efficient ways. With respect to energy hardening, power backup systems must be effective and reliable so that public broadcast systems, hospitals, water/waste treatment plants, and decision-making networks, at the very least, remain in operation. Though backup systems are critical if all other systems fail, distributing and diversifying the power supply is the most effective way to protect against emergencies. This is typically referred to as distributed energy (DE). A building that generates its own power all the time using photovoltaics, with a fuel cell and battery backups for emergency situations, will allow building operation to continue even when the grid goes down. In addition, an energy-diverse community that harvests at least some of its energy from wind, large- or small-scale solar technologies, and hydropower—in addition to coal and natural gas—may be less affected in the event that one, two, or even three of these facilities become inoperable in an emergency.

D. Financing Energy Options
The purpose of this section is to provide some basic information on the various finance instruments, and how jurisdictions might use them in order to make cost-effective investments in energy back-up systems. In future versions of these guidelines, specific examples of how various financing options can be used to underwrite back-up systems will be addressed. Barriers to implementation and how to best address them will be included. In addition, loan programs (conditional sales agreements, installment purchase agreements etc), tax increment financing, certificates of participation and the like will be presented. We thank Neil Zobler, President of Catalyst Financial Group, Inc. for his keen insights and assistance in preparing this section. Neil can be reached at nzobler@catalyst-financial.com. A final area under development is the utility finance market. Two of these are “on-bill” and tariff-based financing (typically termed “pay as you save”). Both offer potential for local governments. An excellent resource for this information is “Paying for Energy Savings Through Utility Bills” and is authored by Matthew H. Brown, President of InterEnergy Solutions. This document is to be published in 2008 by the Alliance to Save Energy. Generally speaking, financing options are relevant to energy assurance in the context of these guidelines due to the fact that many jurisdictions will find that a number of their critical facilities are lacking adequate back-up power. Distributed and renewable energy systems are likely candidates for the financing options listed in this section. In today’s political and economic environment, assuring energy security and mitigating energy shortages is no easy task. According to The National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO), “while there are many similarities and sharing of energy resources on regional bases, each state has its own unique set of needs, response mechanisms, laws and experience.”

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Energy assurance deals with a variety of hazards including natural disasters, infrastructure failures, civil disturbances, and terrorism or sabotage. This section on financing alternatives for energy assurance is limited to suggestions that local governmental organizations can implement in order to lighten the load on the energy infrastructure by reducing the amount of energy being used and by providing on-site backup power generation and/ or renewable energy sources. It does not address financing energy infrastructure needs or the hardening of the energy assets (from a security perspective). It does not address EPA state revolving loan funds for water and waste water (which can include energy improvements), local incentives or grants. The financing suggestions mentioned below are related to equipment acquisition rather than funding behavioral modifications or training. When financing these energy projects it is helpful to think about them as belonging to three different asset type groups: (1) energy efficiency, (2) renewable energy, and (3) backup power supply, on-site or distributed power generation. Traditional debt financing vehicles available to public sector organizations (e.g., loans, bonds, etc.) can be used to finance energy assets in all three groups. However, over the years, the financial community has developed financing structures that can take advantage of parameters that may be unique to energy projects and, even more specifically, the type of asset or project being financed, particularly energy efficiency and renewable energy projects. Implementing energy efficiency projects (lighting, HVAC, motors, energy management systems, etc.) is a good place to start energy planning; it is always important to reduce the total KwH or therms consumed, which will immediately reduce utility bills. Not many local governments allow the operating budget dollars saved by installing these measures to be used to pay for the energy efficiency assets being installed. This makes implementing energy efficiency projects problematic for Energy Performance Contracting which can be funded in any number of ways including Tax Exempt Lease Purchasing Agreements. However, renewable energy projects that offer certain federal and local tax incentives are not attractive for local government self-financed projects because most local governments can not take advantage of them by definition, because they are tax exempt. In such cases financing vehicles like Power Purchase Agreements that can reflect the tax savings benefits in the pricing will be of interest to public sector organizations. Renewable energy projects (e.g. photovoltaic cells, fuel cells, wind power, etc.) typically replace the energy being purchased directly off of the grid (i.e. from the local utilities) by energy being produced locally. Any energy savings comes from the ability to manufacture energy more efficiency and at a lower cost than if it had to be purchased from the local utility. Emergency back-up power (i.e., generators) are typically financed using traditional financing structures while on-site or distributed power generation (e.g., co-generation assets) lends itself to more flexible financing structures, which vary depending on who wants to own the asset. When the end-user owns the asset, leasing and loans may be appropriate, assuming they are not running into debt ceilings issues. Having a third party own the asset lends itself to having the end-user purchase output from the equipment, which may keep the asset off of the balance sheet of the end-user and avoid debt ceiling

Pricing and Term in Today’s Market

In most instances, a financial institutions’ willingness to underwrite an energy project is tied to the credit rating of the borrower rather than the nature of the project. Naturally, the pricing of the financing is directly tied to the borrowers’ financial strength, demographics and term of the obligation. Term is further limited by the useful economic life of the asset being financed. While all sectors are feeling the pinch of tightening credit markets, public sector clients are perhaps the least affected of all sectors. While the Federal Reserve System’s (“FED”) recent actions have lowered the cost of funds, lender’s pricing models will continue to reflect their profitability, tax appetite, liquidity, and risk tolerance. Mergers and acquisitions among the lenders reduce the competitive forces that helps keep pricing low. Poor historical performance (especially for those lenders in the sub-prime market) is forcing some lenders to look

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towards new obligations to improve earnings, which means that the FEDs efforts to lower the cost of borrowing may not be trickling down to the borrower.

Financing Vehicles for Energy Projects

There are two basic approaches to funding projects: “pay-as-you-go” and “pay-as-you-use.” Pay-as-you-go means paying for the project out of current revenues at the time of expenditure, in other words, paying cash. If cash is not available, the project gets postponed until it becomes available. Pay-as-you-use means borrowing to finance the expenditure with debt service payments being made from revenues generated during the useful life of the project. Because energy efficiency projects generate operating savings over the life of the project, the pay-as-you-use approach makes good sense. Major capital projects are funded by some form of debt, which is categorized as either short term (for periods of less than one year) or long term (for periods greater than one year). Most borrowings by public sector organizations require citizen approval, either directly through referendum or indirectly through actions of an appointed board or elected council. However, revenue bonds and tax-exempt lease-purchase agreements may not require local voter approval (see details below). Frequently used short-term debt instruments include bank loans (term loans or lines of credit), anticipation notes (in anticipation of bond, tax, grant or revenues to be received), commercial paper (taxable or tax-exempt unsecured promissory note that can be refinanced or rolled over for periods exceeding one year), and floating-rate demand notes (notes that allow the purchaser to demand that the seller redeem the note when the interest rate adjusts). Long-term debt is frequently in the form of bonds. In the public sector, bonds fall into two categories: general obligation (GO) bonds and revenue bonds. GO bonds are backed by the issuer’s full faith and credit and can only be issued by units of government with taxing authority. Because the issuer promises to levy taxes to pay for these obligations, if necessary, these bonds have the lowest risk of default and, therefore, the lowest cost. Interest paid on GO bonds is typically exempt from federal income taxes and may be exempt from state income taxes. Revenue bonds are also issued by local governments or public agencies. However, because they are repaid only from the specific revenues named in the bond, they are considered to be riskier than GO bonds. Revenue bonds may not require voter approval and often contain covenants intended to reduce the perceived risk. Typical covenants include rate formulas, the order of payments, establishing sinking funds, and limiting the ability to issue new debt. Small municipalities that have difficulty issuing debt often add credit enhancements to their bonds in the form of bond insurance or letters of credit. In the case of most energy efficiency projects, the source of repayment is the actual energy savings (considered part of the operating budget) realized by the project. When the approval process to obtain the necessary debt is a barrier, public sector organizations may be able to limit the repayment of the financing costs to their operating budget by using a tax-exempt lease purchase agreement. This solution may avoid the capital budget process altogether.

Tax-Exempt Lease-Purchase Agreements

Tax-exempt lease-purchase agreements are the most common public sector financing alternatives that are paid from operating budget dollars rather than capital budget dollars. A tax-exempt lease purchase agreement is an effective alternative to traditional debt financing (bonds, loans, etc.) because it allows a public organization to pay for energy upgrades by using money that is already set aside in its annual utility budget. When properly structured, this type of financing makes it possible for public sector agencies to draw on dollars to be saved in future utility bills to pay for new, energy-efficient equipment and related services today.

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A tax-exempt lease-purchase agreement, also known as a municipal lease, is closer in nature to an installmentpurchase agreement than a rental agreement. Under most long-term rental agreements or commercial leases (such as those used in car leasing), the renter or lessee returns the asset (the car) at the end of the lease term, without building any equity in the asset being leased. In contrast, a lease-purchase agreement presumes that the public sector organization will own the assets after the term expires. Further, the interest rates are appreciably lower than those on a taxable commercial lease-purchase agreement because the interest paid is exempt from federal income tax for public sector organizations. In most states, a tax-exempt lease-purchase agreement usually does not constitute a long-term “debt” obligation because of non-appropriation language written into the agreement and, therefore, rarely requires public approval. This language effectively limits the payment obligation to the organization’s current operating budget period (typically a 12-month period). The organization will, however, have to assure lenders that the energy efficiency projects being financed are considered of essential use (i.e., essential to the operation of your organization), which minimizes the non-appropriation risk to the lender. If, for some reason, future funds are not appropriated, the equipment is returned to the lender; and the repayment obligation is terminated at the end of the current operating period without placing any obligation on future budgets. Public sector organizations should consider using a lease-purchase agreement to pay for energy efficiency equipment and related services when the projected energy savings will be greater than the cost of the equipment (including financing), especially when a creditworthy energy service company (ESCO) guarantees the savings. If your financial decision makers are concerned about exceeding operating budgets, they can be assured that this will not happen because lease payments can be covered by the dollars to be saved on utility bills once the energy efficiency equipment is installed. Utility bill payments are already part of any organization’s normal year-to-year operating budget. Although the financing terms for lease-purchase agreements may extend as long as 20 years or more, they are usually less than 12 years and are limited by the useful life of the equipment. There may be cases, however, when tax-exempt lease-purchase financing is not advisable for public sector organizations; for example, when (1) state statute or charter may prohibit such financing mechanisms; (2) the approval process may be too difficult or politically driven; or (3) other funds are readily available (e.g. bond funding that will soon be accessible) or excess money exists in the current capital or operating budgets.

How is Debt Defined in the Public Sector?

It is important for managers to be aware of the different interpretations of “debt” from three perspectives— legal, credit rating, and accounting. As mentioned above, most tax-exempt lease-purchase agreements are not considered “legal debt,” which may prevent the need to obtain voter approval in your locality. However, credit rating agencies, such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, do include some or all of the lease-purchase obligations when they evaluate a public entity’s credit rating and its ability to meet payment commitments (“debt service”). These two perspectives (legal and credit rating) may differ markedly from the way leasepurchase agreements are treated (i.e., which budget is charged) by your own accounting department and your organization’s external auditors. In general, lease-purchase payments on energy efficiency equipment are small when compared to the overall operating budget of a public organization. This usually means that the accounting treatment of such payments may be open to interpretation. Because savings occur only if the energy efficiency projects are installed, the projects’ lease-purchase costs (or the financing costs for upgrades) can be paid out of the savings in the utility line item of the operating budget. Outside auditors may, however, take exception to this treatment if these payments are considered “material” from an accounting perspective. Determining when an expense is

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“material” is a matter of the auditor’s professional judgment.2 While there are no strictly defined accounting thresholds, as a practical guide, an item could be considered material when it equals or is greater than 5% of the total expense budget in the public sector (or 5% of the net income for the privtl rarely be considered “material” using this practical guideline.

What are Energy Performance Contracts?
In most parts of the United States, an energy performance contract (“EPC”) is a common way to implement energy efficiency improvements. It frequently covers financing for the needed equipment, should the organization chose not to use internal funds. In fact, every state (except Wyoming)3 has enacted some legislation or issued an executive directive to deal with energy efficiency improvements. Properly structured EPCs can be treated as an operating, rather than a capital expense. The definition of a performance contract may be found in some state statutes; however, in general, it is not clearly defined and usually includes a variety of services such as energy audits, designing, specifying, selling and installing new equipment, providing performance guarantees, maintenance, training, measurement and verification protocols, financing, indoor air quality improvements, and more. One major benefit of using a performance contract is the ability to analyze the customer’s needs and craft a custom agreement to address the organization’s specific constraints due to budget, time, personnel, or lack of internal expertise. This includes choosing the financing vehicle that best suits the organization’s financial and/or tax strategies. Designed for larger projects, performance contracting allows for the use of energy savings from the operating budget (rather than the capital budget) to pay for necessary equipment and related services. Usually there is little or no upfront cost to the organization benefiting from the installed improvements, which then frees up savings from reduced utility bills that would otherwise be tied up in the operating budget. An energy performance contract is an agreement between the organization and an ESCO to provide a variety of energy saving services and products. Because these improvement projects usually cover multiple buildings and often include upgrades to the entire lighting and HVAC systems, the startup cost when not using an EPC may be high and the payback period lengthy. Under a well-crafted EPC, the ESCO will be paid based on the verifiable energy savings. The ESCO will identify energy saving measures through an extensive energy audit, and then install and maintain the equipment and other upgrades. This includes low- and no-cost measures which contribute to the projects overall savings. The ESCO works closely with the client throughout the approval process to determine which measures to install, timing of the installations, staffing requirements, etc. The energy savings cover the costs of using the ESCO and financing for the project. The most common type of performance contract is called a “Guaranteed Savings Agreement,” whereby the ESCO guarantees the savings of the installed energy-efficiency improvements (equipment and services). The ESCO assumes the performance risk of the energy-efficient equipment so that if the promised savings are not met, the ESCO pays the difference between promised savings and actual savings. If the savings allow, a performance contract may include related services such as the disposal of hazardous waste from the replacement of lighting systems, or from the removal of asbestos when upgrading ventilation systems. The ESCO usually maintains the system during the life of the contract and can train staff to assist or to continue its care after the expiration of the contract period. The ESCO can also play a major role in educating the customer organization about its energy use and ways to curb it.
According to Dr. James Donegan, Ph.D. (Accounting), Western Connecticut State University, an amount is “considered material when it would affect the judgment of a reasonably informed reader when analyzing financial statements.” 3 http://www.ornl.gov/info/esco/legislation/
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In summary, performance contracts typically contain three identifiable components: a project development agreement indicating which measures will be implemented to save energy (and money); an energy services agreement indicating what needs to be done after the installation to maintain ongoing savings; and a financing agreement. Organizations may choose to finance the projects independently of the ESCO, especially when they can access lower cost financing on their own (as in the case of public sector organizations when accessing tax-exempt funding). It is important to note that savings are measured in kWh and therms, and then translated into dollars at the current market price for electricity and natural gas. Regardless of the type of energy services agreement, it is important to remind the reader of two critical components that are needed to ensure that the energy performance and operational goals are met: (1) Commissioning, and (2) Measurement and Verification. Commissioning is the process of making sure new buildings function as intended and communicating the intended performance to the building management team. This usually occurs when the building is turned over for occupancy. Ongoing and carefully monitored measurement and verification protocols are vital to ensure the continuing performance of the improvements, especially when the energy savings are the source of the financing repayment. Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs), also know as Design–Build–Own–Operate Agreements, are ones in which the customer purchases the measurable output of the project (e.g., kilowatt hours, steam, hot water) from the ESCO or a special purpose entity established for the project, rather than from the local utility. And they purchase at lower rates or on better terms than they would have received by staying with the utility. These agreements work well for on-site energy generation and/or central plant opportunities. PPA’s are frequently used for renewable energy and Cogeneration projects (also known as Combined Heat and Power projects). Due to the complexities of the contracts, projects using PPAs are typically very large. PPA’s are frequently considered “off balance sheet” financings.

Commercial Leasing

Energy efficiency equipment that is considered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as personal property (also known as “movable property” or “chattels”) may be leased. The traditional equipment lease is a contract between two parties in which one party is given the right to use another party’s equipment for a periodic payment over a specified term. Basically, this is a long-term rental agreement with clearly stated purchase options that may be exercised at the end of the lease term. Commercial leasing is an effective financing vehicle and is often referred to as “creative financing.” Leases can be written so the payments accommodate a customer’s cash flow needs (short-, long-, or “odd-” term; increasing or decreasing payments over time; balloon payments; skip payments, etc.). Leases are frequently used as part of an organization’s overall tax and financing strategy and, as such, are mostly used in the private sector. From a financial reporting perspective, however, commercial leases fall into only two categories (an operating lease or a capital lease); each has substantially different financial consequences and accounting treatment. The monthly payments of an operating lease are usually lower than loan payments because the asset is owned by the lessor (“lender”), and the lessee’s (“borrower’s”) payments do not build equity in the asset. The equipment is used by the lessee during the term, and the assumption is that the lessee will want to return the equipment at the end of the lease period. This means that the lease calculations must include assumptions that the residual value of the leased asset can be recovered at the end of the lease term. In other words, equipment that has little or no value at the end of the lease term will probably not qualify under an operating lease. For example, lighting systems would not qualify, while a well maintained generator in a cogeneration project might. Operating leases are considered “off balance sheet” financing, and payments are treated as an operating expense. A common capital lease is a “finance lease,” which is similar to a conditional sales agreement because the asset must be reflected on the lessee’s (borrower’s) balance sheet. A finance lease is easily recognized because the customer

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can buy the equipment at the end of the lease term at a stated price that is less than its fair market value (“bargain purchase option”). For example, a lease with a one dollar purchase option is clearly a capital lease. Other conditions that define a capital lease deal with the term of the lease, transfer of ownership, and lessor’s equity in the asset.4 Public sector organizations frequently lease equipment. However, because most public sector organizations are taxexempt, tax strategies are not usually a consideration when deciding which type of lease to enter into. In addition to the traditional commercial lenders, financial institutions, and local community banks, a number of states do provide access to special funds designed to promote the installation of energy efficiency and renewable energy projects. In states where the electricity industries without regard to whether they have been restructured, or not system benefits charges (also know as public benefits funds) may be added to the utility bills in order to create a pool of funds that are earmarked to help support renewable energy, energy efficiency, low-income customer programs, energy R&D, or other functions that the competitive market is unlikely to provide after deregulation. This may translate into rebates, subsidized, low cost or zero interest financing programs, and technical support. When available, energy projects should take advantage of these incentives. A good place to find a listing of these benefits is at www.dsireusa.org (DSIRE), an acronym for Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Energy, is “a comprehensive source of information on state, local, utility, and federal incentives that promote renewable energy and energy efficiency.” (See Appendix A for more information). Also, the Alliance to Save Energy is publishing (2008) “State Energy Efficiency Financing Policies” by Matthew H. Brown, President of InterEnergy Solutions. If energy savings is an important source of repayment of financing, ENERGY STAR has developed a tool using Microsoft EXCEL® called the Cash Flow Opportunity Calculator (“CFO Calculator”) that is helpful when structuring financing. It was developed to help decision-makers address three critical questions about energy efficiency investments: (1) How much of the new energy efficiency project can be paid for using the anticipated savings? (2) Should this project be financed now, or is it better to wait and use cash from a future budget? (3) Is money being lost by waiting for a lower interest rate? In addition, this set of spreadsheets helps create a sense of urgency about implementing energy efficiency projects by quantifying the costs of delaying the project implementation. It is in the public domain and can be downloaded from www.energystar.gov/ia/business/cfo_calculator.xls.

Sources of Funds and Resources

Federal Government (IRS): Clean Renewable Energy Bond (CREB) Program

Unlike normal bonds that pay interest, tax-credit bonds pay the bondholders by providing a credit against their federal income tax. In effect, this tax-credit bond provides interest-free financing for certain renewable energy projects. CREBs provide an effective new financing tool for public power companies, which are non-profit and cannot directly benefit from other tax credits. These tax-credit bonds may be issued by qualified bond lenders, cooperative electric companies, and government bodies (including public power systems). The borrower must be a cooperative electric company or a government body, and must use the financing for wind, biomass (including landfill gas), geothermal, or solar energy projects, or for hydropower expansions, trash combustion facilities, or refined coal production facilities. The act allows, in total, government bodies to borrow up to $500 million for such projects, with at least $300 million set aside for cooperative electric companies. Since the federal government essentially pays the interest via tax credits, the IRS must allocate such credits in advance.
See Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 13 for more information. Note that the financial treatment of Operating Leases is currently under review and may change.
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VII. Local Government Energy Assurance: Response and Recovery
A. Best Practices:
Best practices are being compiled which are unique to local government. They will be included in a future version of these guidelines. One such example is the establishment of a local Medical Reserve Corps. The Corps’ function in Colorado can be found at http://www.bouldercounty.org/health/Volunteer/MRC.htm. The usefulness of such a volunteer corps is that most often locals are short of human resources for response and recovery activities. A corps can fill needed gaps and may make the difference in a successful response and recovery effort. Although it was developed for state government, the Governor’s Guide to Energy Assurance is also a very helpful document: http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0612GOVGUIDEENERGY.pdf. It recommends that preparedness and mitigation include conducting periodic infrastructure assessments, investing in infrastructure, building effective relationships, updating energy assurance plans, developing coordinated risk response and exercising plans and procedures. With respect to Response, the Guide suggests monitoring conditions, communicating with the public, reducing energy demand, declaring a state of energy emergency, and requesting federal assistance. Finally concerning Recovery it discusses facilitating resupply, assessing infrastructure and conducting after-action reports and lessons learned. Certainly most if not all of these e finding are germane to local governments as well. Over time, PTI will investigate the applicability of these findings for inclusion in this local government energy assurance guidelines document.

B. Lessons from Natural Disasters
One excellent source of lessons learned comes from the New York City World Trade Center experience of 9/11. These lessons can be read at: www.colorado.edu/hazards/publications/sp/sp39/sept11book_ch9_zimmerman.pdf.

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VIII. Significant Research Findings
Many surprising facts while researching and preparing this document. The local government energy emergency community talks about renewable energy technologies and distributed generation technologies occasionally, and most of these officials believe there is a role for these technologies in energy assurance plans. However, renewable energy technologies and non-diesel back-up applications are precious few. Diesel back-up power is still the fuel of choice for most local governments, and solar technologies and applications are desirable, yet insignificant for the time being relegated to the background…for now. Utility partnerships are crucial for local government energy assurance efforts. After extensive research, it was found that there continues to be a large gap between what local governments know about power outages during these outages, versus what the utilities know during this same time. Information is available, yet not shared in many cases. Establishing strong, first name relationships with utility representatives in advance of an event is time well spent. It was also discovered that local government officials are often generally aware of energy use and water consumption numbers; however there is very little awareness of the tremendous energy expense associated with moving and treating drinking water and waste water. Twenty-percent of the energy used in California is related to moving and treating water. Other (non-hydro) states can expect similar numbers. In addition, there are significant health risks associated with not checking and testing back-up generators for wastewater treatment plants. It is quite common for untreated sewage to back-up into public waterways due to a failed back-up generator after power outages to occur due to lightning strikes and other causes. Monthly testing of these generators is a simple, yet underutilized practice. Surprisingly, local government wastewater plant staff is often unaware of the energy required by their own pumps. This leads one to believe that huge efficiency opportunities are available in water and wastewater treatment plants. These energy savings should be tapped as soon as possible. But intelligence officials have already recognized the importance of studying how crises caused by concerns over global warming are also motivating local governments to look at energy assurance more closely. A 2007 report written by several retired generals and admirals concluded that climate changes posed a “serious threat to America’s national security,” and could further weaken already unstable governments in developing countries. Extended heat waves and resulting power outages, extreme droughts and water shortages due to less volume in snow pack-fed rivers and streams are but a few of the effects that local governments may experience due to the changing climate. The PTI Local Government Energy Assurance Advisory Group and management team uncovered many significant issues during months of research. ■■ Locals have considerable responsibilities under Emergency Support Function 12, Energy ■■ Locals need to increasingly collaborate with states, utilities, and regulatory bodies with respect to Energy Assurance (EA)

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■■ Locals have a mandate and mission to deliver customer-driven services with acceptable levels of performance on EA ■■ Locals do not know the many benefits that come from energy assurance ■■ Locals do not know how to or have means by which to assess the energy hardness of their critical facilities, components, and systems collectively termed critical operations or infrastructure ■■ Local governments need financial assistance for energy assurance plans, and they need help finding innovative funding for their plans ■■ Knowledge of the National Response Framework is extremely limited—local governments want to align with the NRF, but they need assistance ■■ There are “pockets of excellence” out there where good things are getting done in the EA area, but word is not quick to spread. There is interest in learning from existing, successful EA plans and/or new models ■■ EA self-assessment is needed at the local government level ■■ Fuel-supply routing and fuel-efficient vehicle use is a growing part of EA plans ■■ Emergency back-up generators are important, and mass procurement of the same may be helpful ■■ Based on our survey results, ~40 percent of local governments do not have emergency plans in place for a major energy disruptions ■■ Training is necessary and desired, but funding is limited ■■ Renewable technologies are becoming more important in EA plans ■■ Rising energy costs are changing traditional ways that local governments view EA ■■ There exists a significant lack of understanding of the magnitude of the number of critical facilities under each local government’s jurisdiction Generally speaking, local government officials spoken to who were uninvolved in energy emergency activities were under the incorrect impression that the amount of critical facilities in their jurisdiction numbered in the dozens, rather than the hundreds or thousands. Local officials tended to think of city-owned facilities first, along with medical, police, and fire facilities. However, privately owned and county facilities are usually numerous. For example, the City of Chicago identified more than 9,000 critical facilities that the City deemed must remain operational during any energy emergency. Of these 9,000 facilities, 181 were hotels, 921 were day care facilities, 591 were senior facilities, 1259 were schools, 118 were fire stations, 305 were colleges or universities, 3,255 were high-rise buildings, 69 were police stations, 150 were medical facilities and around 3,000 were intersections and/or bridges.

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IX. Bibliography
2005 Winter Fuels Outlook Conference, Update on State Energy Assurance Activities, A PowerPoint Presentation by Alice Lippert, U.S. DOE, October 12, 2005. America’s Energy Straightjacket, R. Neal Elliott, PhD, P.E., ACEEE, April 2006. Energy and Environment Best Practices, U.S. Conference of Mayors, May 2006 Energy Assurance Daily, U.S. DOE, Wednesday, May 24, 2006. Energy: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources, Sector-Specific Plan As Input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Department of Energy, May 2007. Energy Security and Emergency Preparedness: How Clean Energy Can Deliver More Reliable Power for Critical Infrastructure and Emergency Response Missions—An Overview for Federal, State and Local Officials, Clean Energy Group, October 2005. Energy Security: Evaluating U.S. Vulnerability to Oil Supply Disruptions and Options for Mitigating Their Effects, GAO Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives, GAO/RCED-97-6, December 1996. Energy Security, National Conference of State Legislatures, April 2003. Enhancing the Safety, Security, Reliability of our Energy and Water, Les Shephard, Vice President Energy and Infrastructure Assurance, Sandia National Laboratory, undated. Florida State’s Energy Emergency Response to the 2004 Hurricanes, U.S. DOE, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, June 2005. Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration (ISER) web site, U.S. DOE, http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/. Keeping the Lights On, A Primer for Local Governments on Utility Industry Restructuring and Competition, PTI, 1996 Keeping the Lights On, A Resource Guide for Local Governments on Utility Industry Restructuring and Competition, PTI, 1996 Keeping the Lights On, Case Studies, Local Government Experiences in Preparing for a Competitive Electricity Market, PTI, 1998

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Let Energy Innovation Thrive, NE-MW Economic Review, Richard Munson, Fall 2005. Municipalization in a New Energy Environment: It Doesn’t Work, Solem and Associates for the Edison Electric Institute (EEI), 2002, 2005. The National Response Plan, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, May 2006. Northeast-Midwest web site, Energy Emergencies, http://www.nemw.org/energy.htm. NIMS Basic, Introduction and Overview, FEMA, March 29, 2006. The NIMS Integration Center web site, http://www.fema.gov/nimcast/index.jsp. Office of Energy Assurance web site, U.S. DOE, http://www.ea.doe.gov/. Planning for Electric Power Disruptions, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Guidelines for Municipal Governments Chicago Metropolitan Area Critical Infrastructure Program, February 2001 Planning for Natural Gas Disruptions, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Guidelines for Municipal Governments, Chicago Metropolitan Area Critical Infrastructure Protection Program, December 2002 Prudent, Cost-Effective State Actions to Mitigate Volatile Energy Prices and Prepare for Potential Natural Gas Supply Problems, John Nunley, Chairman of the National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO), undated. Quick Reference Guide for the National Response Plan, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, May 22, 2006. Regional Disaster Resilience: A Guide for Developing an Action Plan, The Infrastructure Security Partnership, June 2006. Renewable and Distributed Energy as a Security Tactic, Presentation by Scott Sklar, the Stella Group, EE World Engineering Conference, October 2002. A Secure Energy System, Solar Today, by Scott Sklar, undated. State Energy Assurance Guidelines, National Association of State Energy Officials, Version 2, November 2005 The State of Maine Emergency Management Agency web site, http://www.state.me.us/mema/hazards/energy.htm. Statement (on Y2K evaluation) of Dr. Roger Molander, Senior Researcher, RAND Corporation, for the Joint Economic Committee, February 23, 2000. The State Energy Assurance Planning Workshop, Using the Energy Assurance Guidelines, 110-page PowerPoint presentation, June 30, 2004 State of Florida Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, February 1, 2004. State of Florida State Emergency Operations Center, Responders Page, http://www.FloridaDisaster.org.

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State Initiatives in Energy Assurance, PowerPoint Presentation by Alice Lippert, U.S. Department of Energy, Critical Infrastructure Resilience, Infrastructure Security for the Built Environment, ISBE 2006 Congress and Exp, February 16, 2006. Tribal Government and Local Jurisdiction Compliance Activities: Federal Fiscal Year 2006, the NIMS Integration Center, DHS/FEMA, October 4, 2005. U.S. Fire Administration web site, What is CIP and Why is it Important?, http://www.usfa.fema.gov/subjects/ emr-isac/what_is.shtm.

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APPENDIX A

National Database of Incentives for Energy Efficiency
Contact: Susan Gouchoe, NC Solar Center, DSIREinfo@ncsu.edu Website: http://www.dsireusa.org The national Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy (DSIRE, www.dsireusa.org) is the one-stop source of information about government and utility renewable energy incentives and policies. DSIRE has now expanded to include state and federal incentives for energy efficiency upgrades, purchases of energy efficient products or systems, and construction of new energy efficient buildings. Incentives include: ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ tax credits and deductions; rebates; low-interest loans; grants; property tax exemptions; sales tax exemptions; and bond programs

Users can search for efficiency incentives by state, by technology (lighting, insulation, etc.), by incentive type (tax credit, rebate, etc.), and by other criteria. Established in 1995, DSIRE is an ongoing project of the Interstate Renewable Energy Council (www.irecusa.org) managed by the North Carolina Solar Center and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy. For details for any state, please refer to the DSIRE website at www.dsireusa.org.

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APPENDIX B

Local Government Energy Assurance Assessment Tool
Executive Summary
This document provides energy assurance guidelines designed to assist local governments in preparing for energyrelated disruptions to their key facilities, systems and components. The primary means by which a local government can provide for its own needs in times of emergency is to assure that: 1) adequate backup generation is available; 2) fuel to operate these backup devices is in place; and 3) assigned personnel are adequately trained to operate and maintain these devices. In order to address these three items, a systematic assessment and response plan needs to be developed. These guidelines will assist decision-makers and operational personnel in formulating such a plan. Local governments are encouraged to reduce their sole dependence on their local utility. They should not just put into place stop-gap energy systems for emergency situations but rather go through a strategic, sustainable energy market transformation for their key facilities, systems and components. These guidelines include three checklists—aligned with the three emergency-related topics presented above--that local governments can use as a guide to determine and assure that any energy emergency will result in the least amount of disruption possible to the essential functions that customers and citizens have come to expect from government. Essentially, being aware of and addressing these three checklists prepares local government for such an energy emergency and gives them a sense of their “readiness” for such an emergency. The focus of theses guidelines is not to avert an energy shortage resulting from failed generation, transmission and/or distribution of energy across the electric grid or gas pipeline network. Rather, they have been developed to mitigate the impact of such a shortage by empowering the local government to provide for its own needs until the grid or network can be returned to normal service. These guidelines are a recommended and useful approach to enhancing local government energy assurance. They have been designed to be flexible. As such they should be modified and adapted according to local needs, policies, politics, and energy systems.

Table of Contents
I. Overview II. Energy Assurance Plan Steps Checklist A: Facility Analysis
1. Inventory facilities 2. Identify facility ownership/management 3. Determine facility criticality

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4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Prioritize facilities based on their functions/impacts Identify required operations for critical and essential facilities Identify energy sources for required operations Calculate energy demand for required operations Identify Low Cost: No Cost back-up alternatives Estimate energy demand contribution for alternatives Identify current back-up systems, locations and energy output Calculate energy shortfall for each facility Calculate reduced energy demand from alternatives and options Identify and evaluate opportunities for meeting shortfall Develop a strategic investment plan to harden facilities

Checklist B: Fuel Supply

1. Onsite generators are routinely exercised, fueled, and in stand-by mode 2. Fuel storage capacity (diesel and gasoline) for multiple days for required operations 3. Numerous storage facilities located strategically around the city are regularly consumed and refreshed 4. Capability to deliver fuel citywide via numerous tanker vehicles 5. Refueling routes in place and current 6. Identified personnel (primary and alternate) to operate the refueling equipment and trucks 7. Inventory of roll-up generators with fuel are routinely exercised 8. Fuel Reserve Sensors in place to automatically alert suppliers and city personnel of impending needs 9. Facilities with mission required operations have uninterruptable power supply (UPS) 10. Required operations fuel priority decisions are in place 11. Diverse portfolio of back-up energy technology in place (renewables, etc.) 12. Plans for facility consolidation are in place and staff is aware of these alternate work sites 13. Communication plans for all energy emergency operations are in place 14. Emergency purchase authorizations are in place for fuel acquisition 15. Contracts with fuel suppliers address that the city gets top priority, tankers can be located onsite, and fuel for a minimum of 72 hours of operation is mandatory 1. Onsite generators are routinely exercised including fueling, start-up, checking for functionality of stand-by mode etc. 2. Plans are in place and practiced to deliver fuel citywide (i.e., numerous tanker vehicles, adequate number of trained personnel, etc) 3. Refueling routes are in place, current, known and practiced if necessary 4. Primary and alternate personnel have been identified to operate equipment (refueling, trucks, etc) 5. Personnel routinely exercise inventory of roll-up generators if applicable 6. Personnel are aware of what fuel reserve sensors are and how they function 7. Personnel are aware of how required operations fuel priority decisions are made 8. Plans for facility consolidation are in place and staff is aware of these alternate work sites 9. Communication plans for all energy emergency operations are in place and personnel regularly review and exercise these plans

Checklist C: Personnel

I. Overview
This appendix offers the city a tool with which to develop a comprehensive energy assurance plan. It draws upon the rich information contained in the Critical Facilities Energy Assurance Guidelines. Throughout this document, the term energy will be used to refer to electric power and all types of fuel whether they are natural gas, diesel, fuel oil

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or other, and whether or not they are used directly or converted to electricity for power to maintain operations. The term city is used as an all-inclusive term to mean local government. There are several principles important to increasing the likelihood of project success: ■■ Be clear on the objectives and expected outcomes for the project: A clear statement of objectives and what is expected and by when will enhance the probability that others will align themselves with the overall vision for the project. ■■ Be as inclusive as possible: A department or agency that may have a role to play or information to share should be invited to a kick-off meeting. Any relevant agencies external to city operations should be invited and encouraged to participate. Narrow this group/team down to a working group as soon as possible. This smaller group/team will do most of the planning and communication with the larger group. ■■ Select a champion: Any city-wide project of this sort needs a champion who will advocate for the project and who can command the necessary resources to see it through to completion. ■■ Select team members who can speak for the agency and/or have access to agency subject matter information. Many projects fail because the wrong people are involved. Select subject matter experts to the extent possible but not agency heads as they will not have the time to be meaningfully involved. ■■ Communicate with the team members only when necessary (e.g., email) and be reasonable in expectations to avoid the perception that there is not sufficient time to fully engage. ■■ Provide regular project updates and success stories. It has been found that many projects die due to lack of inertia. Ensure superior project organization and clear objectives for any meetings: any project will succeed or fail based on how well they perceive it is being managed and that the objectives are clear and obtainable. There are other principles but these few will allow the project to get off the ground and build early successes to keep it moving. The project may benefit from management by a person or persons who stand to gain the most from its success and who has the necessary project management skills. The person or agency responsible for maintaining energy utilities to buildings, emergency management or like vested interest should be selected. This could be the utilities manager who may also be involved with the city’s franchise agreement and have ESF 12 planning responsibilities.

II. Energy Assurance Plan Steps
These energy assurance Steps are not one-size-fits-all. The Steps should be performed in sequence but if another approach works better for a unique situation it will not disrupt the final outcome. Every effort has been made to assure that each Step builds on the previous one and that there are no gaps or redundancies. Although the Steps are facility neutral (they can be applied to any facility) they do need to be taken with a certain facility in mind. Each of the Steps in the three (3) checklists is explained in this document. In most cases, there are simple tables that can be adapted and utilized to assist the city in moving through the process. These checklists can be printed out and used as a guide. Each step can be checked off when the associated task has been completed.

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Checklist A: Facility Analysis
STEP NUMBER
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15

TASk
inventory Facilities identify facility ownership/management determine facility criticality by identifying its functions and impacts: communication, life saving, life sustaining, maintaining orderly functioning Prioritize facilities based on their functions/impacts identify required operations for critical and essential facilities identify energy sources for required operations calculate energy demand for required operations identify no-cost: low cost alternatives to reduce demand estimate energy demand reduction for alternatives identify demand reduction options estimate energy demand reduction from options identify current back-up systems, locations (stationary or mobile/roll-up) for each facility and record their energy output calculate energy shortfall for each facility identify and evaluate opportunities for meeting this shortfall including costs, benefits from renewables (e.g., emissions) etc develop a strategic investment plan to stage facility hardening.

DONE? √

Each of these steps is described in the section that follows. 1. Inventory facilities There are two aspects to assembling the necessary information on facilities. The first is the name of the facility and the second is its address. The inventory needs to include city facilities and any non-city facilities that may be important in maintaining essential or required city services. The city may not own or operate such facilities. Note that Step 2 requests information on which entity owns or manages the facilities in the inventory. That Step allows the city to declare that although a facility may be deemed a key asset, it may not have responsibility for its energy assurance and thus may not be investing limited capital into its hardening. If non-city key facilities are not listed here as part of Step 1, there will be a lost opportunity in pointing out that such a facility needs to be hardened in order to assure key public services are maintained.

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The facilities listed below are for illustration only.
STEP 1A Facility Name emergency operations command center Primary data center/primary internet secondary data center/primary voice trunks Primary data center for dept of safety, Primary 911/citywide radio Primary data feed for dept of safety, office of emergency management electronic engineering Bureau main Fire station Police station Headquarters state Health department laboratory others STEP 1B Facility Address

2. Identify ownership/management Identify the entity having primary responsibility for each key facility in an emergency such as the city itself for facilities it owns and/or operates, and for any other non-city facilities such as a regional hospital, state/ federal government for high level laboratory analyses, or a private sector entity from whom the facility is being leased. The city may need to work with the responsible party to implement the hardening. This information will be important in Step 14 when investment strategies are being contemplated (for example, the type of financing and staging these investments), developing partnerships, determining lead roles etc.). 3. Determine facility criticality by identifying its functions and impacts: communication, life saving, life sustaining, maintaining orderly functioning. Once the key facilities have been identified and the owner/manager noted, an assessment of the impacts on city operations and the public can occur next. This can be accomplished by looking at the functions that each facility performs and the associated impacts were these functions to become compromised. There are four (4) functional areas in need of consideration: a) insuring communications; b) saving lives; c) sustaining lives; and d) systems rehabilitation to maintain orderly functioning. Communication services are those which allow systems and individuals to freely communicate. Public Health and Safety: Life saving services would be those where the loss of electricity or other fuel (natural gas, heating oil etc.) would aversely affect the ability to save lives. Examples would include emergency room operations and some police and fire services (EMT operations). Public Health and Safety: Life sustaining services are those which are not likely life threatening but necessary to for life support. Examples are police and fire stations, hospitals, nursing homes, water pumping

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stations, railroad crossings, and industrial facilities that handle hazardous materials. Systems Rehabilitation to maintain orderly functioning includes bringing key facilities back on-line to re-establish normal operations and order. Examples include restoring traffic intersection operations, assuring elevators serving high rise buildings are operational and seeing that security alarms are functional. Other functional categories should be discussed and included as necessary. It is left up to the city as to how these functions as they relate to a specific facility are recorded. Some options are: ■■ yes or no; ■■ a simple check mark; or ■■ prioritize the importance of each function using a scale such as 1-5. The following table is one way of recording the facility functions.1
STEP 1. Facility information Step 1a Facility name Step 1b Facility address responsible party/ ownership STEP 2 STEP 3. Functions Step 3a communications Step 3b Public Health and safety: life saving Step 3c Public Health and safety: life sustaining Step 3d systems rehabilitation to maintain orderly functioning

Whatever method is chosen, the next Step (4), will involve prioritizing the facilities based in part on this functional assessment. So, the more thought that goes into this Step, the easier and more accurate the prioritization will be. 4. Prioritize facilities based on their functions/impacts.
STEP 4. PRIORITy (1-5) Critical (1), essential (2), important (3), moderate (4), low (5) 3 2 1 5 4

In order to cost-effectively allocate scarce resources to maximize local government energy assurance, the identified key facilities need to be prioritized so that investments can be staged. It is recommended that a five level system be used: critical, essential, important, moderate and low. ■■ Critical: failure may result in death, injury, severs financial loss or legal liability; impossible or impractical to work around. ■■ Essential: Cannot fail for an extended period of time; cumbersome or unlikely to work around. ■■ Important: Needed and will be evaluated and addressed depending on the event. ■■ Moderate: Can be postponed pending assessment ■■ Low: Would result in an inconvenience.

Step 3 adapted from Critical Infrastructure Assurance Guidelines for Municipal Governments: Planning for Electric Power Disruptions, Chicago Metropolitan Area Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan, Argonne National Laboratory, February 2001, Pages 16-20 and Table 4.1. FEMA has established these categories as the top four priorities in any national emergency.
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These rankings should be assessed without regard to cost which will be factored in later. Any other factors that the city determines it needs to include in this ranking process should be fully considered here. In reality, it is likely that only the two highest priorities (critical and essential) will receive funding and attention so it is important to get the priorities right such that a key city asset (facility, component or system) is not left off the list. 5. Identify required operations for critical and essential facilities
STEP 5 Energy dependent operations during the first 72 hours of an emergency? Kitchenware and showers Fire trucks Heating and cooling Pumping water oven, microwave computers

For each critical and essential facility, identify the operations that would be required to be functional in the first 72 hours of an emergency. These operations should be only those that rely on energy for their function. For example, automatic doors require energy whereas manually-operated doors do not. These operations would be first-in-time to receive back-up energy in an emergency. If not all operations listed are required, the facility manager may need to adopt and enforce policies and procedures to limit the load to required operations. Another way to look at this process is to determine which loads absolutely need to be kept “on-line” in an emergency. Such a determination should be reviewed at least annually to assure that it is up to date due to changing priorities.

6. Identify energy sources for required operations.
STEP 6 Identify existing energy sources for required ops. natural gas diesel, Bio diesel natural gas, electricity electricity electricity electricity

ID current energy source/type for the listed required operations. In many instances, numerous operations rely on the same energy source (e.g., electricity) for their energy needs. A proposed response would look something like: electricity for lights, automatic doors, and elevators, and so on. This is the bottoms up approach and the most time consuming. The top-down approach can also be used such as… the entire building uses 50 kW. The short coming to the top down approach is that some non-required operations may get factored in.

7. Calculate energy demand for required operations This calculation can be based on historical use, or name plate rating of a component or system. For example, assuming the operation of the showers and dishwasher with hot water uses natural gas, the hot water heater input in BTUs would be included here (e.g., 40,000 BTU/hr.) Some of this information could be available is a prior facility energy load calculation has been completed. If not, going through this calculation could be used to properly size an energy back up generator if one is to be ordered. For example, how much of the required load would a 125 kV generator satisfy?

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STEP 7 Energy demand required for operations 40,000 Btu/hr. 10,000 gallons

Although typically fleet vehicles are fueled at a central location, if the city determines that backup fuel is desired on-site, the city needs to know the fuel tank capacity of all vehicles kept on site and size a tank accordingly whether it is diesel or gasoline. The size of that tank would be entered in Step 10, such as 10,000 gallons.

8. Identify Low Cost: No Cost “alternatives” to reduce energy demand
STEP 8 Low Cost: No Cost alternatives to reduce energy demand for these operations. switch automatic doors to manual switch lights to leds change heating set point from 70F to 65F change cooling set point from 68F to 72F consolidate 5 fire station operations into 1 central station Partnerships

List ways the energy demand for the required operations could be met or minimized other than through backup systems such as cycling systems on and off, limiting or ceasing energy flow to “other” nonrequired operations etc. For example, the automatic doors can be placed on manual override saving, say 1kw. A departmental/facility policy and/or procedure would then need to be issued to affect this savings in an emergency. Or, multiple facilities could be consolidated to fewer facilities to centralize operations and reduce the cost of maintaining multiple locations. Another example concerns lighting. Since lighting is required if incandescent lamps are currently in use, they could be switched to compact fluorescents or LEDs to decrease their load. This combined with say, changing the set point for the heating and air conditioning systems during an emergency could result in substantial savings. A thorough discussion of all the potential conservation and other low-cost, no-cost opportunities needs to occur as each unit of energy reduction will reduce the size of the backup system that needs to be installed.

9. Estimate energy demand reduction for alternatives.
STEP 9 Estimate the energy 1kW 2kW (90% savings)

The task now becomes estimating the net reduction in energy use/demand that these non-technology measures offer. It is realized that there is a limit in terms of how precise this process can be and therefore the resulting level of accuracy. Yet, it is important to be as detailed and accurate as possible. One approach is to provide a range of energy saving numbers such as “8—9 kW” for each alternative or to express a level of confidence in any number derived such as “ 9kW” with a 10% uncertainty factor”.

The rationale for going through this process in the face of a limited budget is at least two-fold. First, one never knows when a situation such as policy, politics or budget priorities will shift and the city will need a quick turn-a-round on which facilities are required and the most vulnerable to an emergency and what the costs are to harden it. So, like an insurance policy, it is always best to be prepared. Second, when priorities do shift—as they ultimately always do--the smart energy/facilities manager will be able to capitalize on the opportunity by being prepared and armed with accurate information positioning him/her to take advantage of the funds available.

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10. Identify demand reduction options For each high priority facility, the mission critical operations should be evaluated by identifying energy back-up gaps and needs (e.g., technology) that are capable of meeting any residual energy load. This information will be used during the strategic planning step. The options should be categorized into: a) renewable technologies, c) conventional options, and (c) energy efficiency measures. Soft energy paths can well serve to harden city facilities. They are especially wellmatch for decentralized and remote applications. Conservation and operational policies and procedures should have been addressed under Step 9 as low cost: no cost alternatives. Be reminded that all of these options are to only address the energy demand for mission critical operations (to minimize the fiscal impact) and can therefore be termed back-up power. As such, both a) and b) should be de-centralized by definition and are energy supply options whereas (c) is a demand reduction technique. 11. Estimate energy demand reduction from options for each facility This step should be more executed with more precision and thus result in a higher level of accuracy that step 9 where the ‘alternatives’ were estimated. These figures should be quantitatively derived whereas the alternatives might be better suited to a qualitative analysis. 12. Identify current back-up systems and locations and record their energy output.
STEP 12 What backup systems are in place for each facility? What is their energy source and output in kw, therms, BTUs etc.? Where is it located? 10 (a) system 10 (b) energy type/ source 10 (c) output rating 10 (d) location

Any back-up system needs to be able to meet the energy demand for the required operations for a minimum of 72 hours. If the system is a roll-up generator, enter that in the ‘location’ column. Be careful not to use the same roll-up generator more than once.

In order to assure that any back-up system has an adequate supply of energy for a minimum of 72 hours, an energy supply analysis needs to be conducted. To make conducting this analysis as simple as possible, a fuel supply assurance checklist has been developed. This check list is located in section III. B. 13. Calculate energy shortfall for each facility This step should be executed by taking the energy demand for each facility and subtracting the demand reduction from the alternatives (step 9) and options (step 11) and then the energy contribution from any existing backup generating devices (step 12). This is the unmet energy need for each facility to keep power going to the identified critical operations. Step 14 takes these energy gaps and recommends that a plan be developed to address this need.

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14. Identify and evaluate opportunities for meeting any shortfall (A12) including costs, benefits from renewables (e.g., emissions) etc. The required operations should be evaluated by identifying energy back-up gaps and needs (technology, partnerships, etc) that are capable of meeting any residual energy load. These opportunities should be categorized into: a) renewable technologies, c) conventional options, and (c) energy efficiency measures. Soft energy paths can well serve to harden city facilities. They are especially well-match for decentralized and remote applications. Conservation and operational policies and procedures should have been addressed under Step A8 as low cost: no cost alternatives. Be reminded that all of these opportunities are to only address the energy demand for required (to minimize the fiscal impact) and can therefore be termed back-up power. As such, both a) and b) should be de-centralized by definition and are energy supply options whereas (c) is a demand reduction technique. Cost. Costs need to include first, installation and operation and maintenance costs. Most of the information for traditional backup systems should be readily available from the local utility or vendors and therefore familiar to cities. The costs for renewable and green technologies as well as conservation techniques will need to be gathered or estimated. It is recommended that the normal city bid process be used by the issuance of a request for information (RFI) and/or request for proposal (RFP) processes. 15. Develop a strategic investment plan to stage facility hardening. This document includes a finance paper which should provide assistance in looking at the various options available. The city should consider developing short term (12 months), medium term (12 months to three years) and long term (three to five years) strategies for these high priority facilities to “harden” them over time. Strategies could include staging investment opportunities over multiple years, developing mutual aid agreements, training staff to power down certain non-required operations, developing policies and procedures to maintain continuity of operations followed by exercises to assure precision and expediency so that operations can be maintained for the 72 hour period.

Checklist B: Fuel Supply
Unlike Checklist A, Checklist B does not need to be addressed in any specific order. It can be added to or deleted from at will depending on the nature of the emergency and concerns of the city. The personnel aspects of these items are presented and discussed in Checklist C.

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Checklist B: Fuel Supply
ITEM B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12 B13 B14 B15 TASk onsite generators are routinely exercised, fueled, and in stand-by mode Fuel storage capacity (diesel and gasoline) for multiple days for required operations numerous storage facilities located strategically around the city are regularly consumed and refreshed capability to deliver fuel citywide via numerous tanker vehicles refueling routes in place and current identified personnel (primary and alternate) to operate the refueling equipment and trucks inventory of roll-up generators with fuel are routinely exercised Fuel reserve sensors in place to automatically alert suppliers and city personnel of impending needs Facilities with required operations have uninterruptable power supply (uPs) required operations fuel priority decisions are in place diverse portfolio of back-up energy technology in place (renewables, etc.) Plans for facility consolidation are in place and staff is aware of these alternate work sites communication plans for all energy emergency operations are in place emergency purchase authorizations are in place for fuel acquisition contracts with fuel suppliers address that the city gets top priority, tankers can be located onsite, and fuel for a minimum of 72 hours of operation is mandatory DONE? √

B1: Onsite generators are routinely exercised, fueled, and in stand-by mode Generators are key aspect of energy assurance and would be used as the delivery mechanism for back-up power. However, they need to be routinely exercised to assure they maintain their readiness. In order to accomplish this routine, they need to maintain adequate (full) fuel levels so that they can run for the maximum time possible before being refueled. Assurance also needs to be in place that the stand-by mode is operational. B2: Fuel storage capacity (diesel and gasoline) for multiple days for required operations Each city needs to have adequate storage (topped off) to insure that its key facilities have ample fuel to sustain the required operations for at least 72 hours. B3: Numerous storage facilities located strategically around the city are regularly consumed and refreshed Storage capacity (B2) needs to be located such that reserves can be delivered to their destination with assurance and at notice. In order to maintain the quality of the fuel, it needs to be refreshed as necessary (may require testing) and/or have fuel stabilizer added.

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B4: Capability to deliver fuel citywide via numerous tanker vehicles Even if quality control of the fuel is assured and kept at convenience locations, the demand for fuel at these various locations may exceed the ability to deliver it in a timely manner. As such, a determination needs to be made as to how many tanker trucks would be necessary under a worse case scenario. The city needs to have this many vehicles on hand either through out right purchase, mutual aid agreements, contract or the like. B5: Refueling routes in place and current In order to assure that fuel gets to its intended location as quickly as possible; the routes that drivers are to take need to be explicit and kept up to date. Considerations include the likelihood of any given route being blocked due to unforeseen circumstances during an emergency, unanticipated congestion, railroad crossing schedules and avoidance, optimized routing to numerous locations, and factors of distance, road conditions and the like. B6: Identified personnel (primary and alternate) to operate the refueling equipment and trucks. Required personnel need to be identified in advance and trained (see Checklist C.1.) B7: Inventory of roll-up generators with fuel are routinely exercised If roll-up generators are to be used to assure energy continuity, the same issues that pertain to checklist item B1 pertain to this item as well. In addition, the city needs to assure that the roll-up generator is capable of being transported to the desired location. B8: Fuel Reserve Sensors in place to automatically alert suppliers and city personnel of impending needs Fuel reserve sensors are typically located in the fuel tanks so that fuel levels can be monitored and fuel ordered as necessary. It is critical that these sensors be maintained and are sending accurate information to the fuel supplier. B9: Facilities with mission required operations have uninterruptable power supply (UPS) Facility managers rely on their back-up energy source (generator) to come on-line in the event of an energy emergency. What is sometimes forgotten is that there is usually a downtime before these backup systems become fully operational. During these times, it is probable that important mission critical functions will not be maintained (communications, data etc). In order to preserve these important functions, the value of a UPS should be considered. B10: Required operations fuel priority decisions are in place It is quite probable that not all facilities—even those that are critical—are equal. That is, some critical operations are higher priority than others. For those situations where fuel is limited due to competing needs or extremely high demand (either locally or regionally), a priority list should be developed, published and communicated. This list should not only be available to city personnel but to fuel suppliers and the local utility(s) as well. Importantly, there should be a cityonly list and a regional list. For the latter, partnerships and plans need to be developed and priorities agreed upon. B11: Diverse portfolio of back-up energy technology in place (renewables, etc.) Having a diverse portfolio of technologies certainly is optional. However, given: ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ the vagaries of the fuel market; the precipitous rise in fuel costs,; concerns about global warning; deteriorating air quality; and and the issues raised in item B10 concerning the likely competition for limited fuel in the face of an emergency,

It is certainly prudent and probably wise secure a diverse portfolio.

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In ecosystems, it is a well known documented fact that diverse systems are inherently more stable (will better survive adverse conditions) than simple systems. When adverse conditions like extreme temperatures, toxic chemicals, predators and so on present themselves, a diverse colony of organisms will likely survive whereas a simple system of a fewer organisms way will become extinct. Likewise, a diverse portfolio of investments is one of the better hedges against fluctuations in the economy and the stock market. B12: Plans for facility consolidation are in place and staff is aware of these alternate work sites As presented under Step A8, one low cost: no cost alternative may be to consolidate operations from multiple facilities to fewer facilities. This strategy would likely result in the need for fewer essential personnel during the emergency, simplify communications and reduce the amount of fuel needed to maintain facility operations. There are other benefits as well. A prime example might be to name a primary fire station for every three that exist. Whatever the consolidation goal, plans need to be developed among and between these facilities and their personnel in such areas as primary responsibilities, chain of command, reporting and so on. B13: Communication plans for all energy emergency operations are in place Without an adequate communication plan, fuel may be available, but the need for additional fuel, or necessary re-routing of tanker trucks and the like prevent the fuel from reaching its intended destination or at the very least, arriving too late. B14: Emergency purchase authorizations/contracts are in place for fuel acquisition Emergency purchase authorizations are a very important aspect of assuring adequate fuel supply in an emergency. Some cities have a primary contract and one or two additional secondary contracts in the event the primary contract is insufficient for any number of reasons. These authorizations and/or contracts need to be put in place as soon as practicable. It would be wise to assure what other agreements contractors/suppliers have with other entities. This task is similar to B10 but extends the reach of energy assurance to multiple suppliers. Obviously, to the extent the city has a diverse portfolio of energy technologies—especially renewables--this task becomes easier. And the more efficient the technologies are at converting fuel to power, the less fuel will be needed. B15: Contracts with fuel suppliers address that the city gets top priority, tankers can be located onsite, and fuel for a minimum of 72 hours of operation is mandatory This task is a subset of B10 and B14. It is broken out for the purpose of this checklist because of its importance. Any agreement with fuel suppliers needs to contain specific language which addresses these issues: priority; that tankers can occupy space on city property to deliver fuel and remain there as necessary, and that each site will receive an amount of fuel—spelled out on the contract—to maintain required operations for a minimum of 72 hours. If the city has done a credible job with Checklist A, the amount of fuel required for this time period will have been held to an absolute minimum.

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Checklist C: Personnel Training and Education
STEP C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 TASk onsite generators are routinely exercised including fueling, start-up, checking for functionality of stand-by mode etc. Plans are in place and practiced to deliver fuel citywide (i.e., numerous tanker vehicles, adequate number of trained personnel, etc) refueling routes are in place, current, known and practiced if necessary Primary and alternate personnel have been identified to operate the refueling equipment and trucks Personnel routinely exercise inventory of roll-up generators if available Personnel are aware of what fuel reserve sensors are and how they function Personnel are aware of how required operations fuel priority decisions are made Plans for facility consolidation are in place and staff are aware of these alternate work sites communication plans for all energy emergency operations are in place and personnel regularly review and exercise these plans DONE? √

C1: Exercising of onsite generators These generators need to be routinely exercised including fueling, start-up, checking for functionality of standby mode etc. It is not common practice to routinely have responsible personnel perform these functions. As is commonly known, unless knowledge is kept current though continuing education and practice, skill levels deteriorate and mistakes occur. Each city needs to decide the frequency and depth of these functions but it is recommended that they be included in agency standard operating procedures. Appendix D contains a document—the Emergency Power Planning and Intervention Tool— recently completed by the Ohio Energy Project. This tool addresses the training requirements for exercising backup energy devices. C2: Fuel delivery Plans needs to be in place and practiced to deliver fuel citywide (i.e., numerous tanker vehicles, adequate number of trained personnel, etc). These plans need to include which drivers fill up which trucks at which sites and where the fuel is to be delivered. Drivers also need to know how to load and dispense fuel. Realistically, the city may not have the capability to pick-up and deliver all necessary fuel. In such cases, contracts and/or agreements would be in place to augment city personnel. These contacts need to specify on-going training similar to that being offered by the city. The need for these contracts is discussed in Section III. B. 4, 10 and 14. C3: Refueling routes Routes need to be identified, current, known and practiced. In addition, drivers need to know which routes to take from their primary work location to the place where the trucks are located. Truck drivers need to periodically drive the routes that have been selected to pick up and deliver fuel to designated locations. These designated locations should ideally be the same as the identified critical and essential facilities that were chosen using Checklist A. The alternative routes should also be practiced so that is a primary route is blocked or otherwise

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not passable (e.g., snow, rain, traffic), the drivers would not ne unduly delayed in retrieving and delivering the necessary fuel to the correct locations. C4: Operation of fueling equipment and trucks Primary and alternate personnel need to train on all fueling operations whether they are city or contractor facilities. C5: Roll-up generators Some cities may use roll-up generators for flexibility and economics reasons. These portable units have some different training requirements than stationary units. They often have to be on-and off loaded, tend to be smaller in scale, may run on a variety of fuels, may or may not have fuel tanks aboard and so on. Most importantly, they will need to be ‘connected’ to their load as differentiated from facility-dedicated units. Training must be customized to account for these differences. C6: Fuel reserve sensors Personnel need to know what fuel reserve sensors are and how they function. They need to know how to read the gauges accurately and the mechanics of ordering fuel when necessary. C7: Fuel priority decisions All involved personnel need to be aware of the fuel priority decisions, how they were made and why. This knowledge will build a better emergency response team and limit mistakes. This will likely only be a one-time session repeated for new members of the team. C8: Facility consolidation Facility consolidation, if a part of the energy assurance plan, resulted from Section III.A. 8. The premise behind consolidating operations is to make emergency response more streamlined and to put into place a cost-effective means to reduce back-up energy requirements. Staff involved in energy assurance need to be clear where to report to work if an alternative work site has been identified. They also need to be accommodated in the alternative work site so they can perform their assigned functions efficiently and effectively. C9: Communication plans Communicating is not only the most important energy assurance tasks it is also one of the more daunting ones. Not only are there many forms of communication (e.g., verbal, visual, aural) but there are many communication devices as well (cell, phone, fax, 800 MHz, walkie talkie, email, face-to-face meetings etc). Personnel need to be trained in the use of as many of these devices as practicable and re-trained on a regular time table. Staff who do not regularly use an 800 MHz radio for example, can easily forget how it operates if not trained at least monthly. Training updates need to be tracked, practiced and documented.

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APPENDIX C

Model Intrastate Mutual Aid Legislative Language
SOURCE: http://www.emacweb.org/?150 Developed by the National Emergency Management Association in partnership with National Public Safety Organizations Funding provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, United States Department of Homeland Security Published March, 2004 ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ Introduction Article I: Preamble Article II: Emergency Responders Defined Article III: Participating Political Subdivisions Responsibilities Article IV: Implementation Article V: Limitations Article VI: License, Certificate and Permit Portability Article VII: Reimbursement, Disputes Regarding Reimbursement Article VIII: Development of Guidelines and Procedures Article IX: Workers’ Compensation Article X: Immunity Article XI: Severability Intrastate Mutual Aid Model Legislation Working Group Representatives

Introduction
Over the past two years, emergency disciplines of all types agree there has been a sea change in the country after the terrorist acts committed on United States’ soil September 11, 2001. Excepting that, the everyday concerns of emergency responders do not abate as is demonstrated by recent wildfires, earthquakes, mudslides, hurricanes and floods. In each of these events, the merit of mutual aid between governments, both intra and interstate, has proven its benefit time and time again. As has been repeatedly demonstrated by the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), states can depend on each other to provide manpower and material resources in times of need. EMAC shines as the states mutual aid system; and currently has 48 states, 2 Territories and Washington D.C. as signatories to the compact. For over a decade, EMAC has served its members well.

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Given recent terrorist fears, the Department of Homeland Security has chosen to focus on mutual aid. It is unquestionable that mutual aid systems are needed for state-to-state assistance and, particularly, between local jurisdictions. Indeed, in a recent edition of State Government News, the author wrote: “Through the National Strategy on Homeland Security, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) placed a new focus on state and local (emphasis added) mutual aid as a key to the nation’s emergency response capabilities for all hazards, man-made or natural. The National Incident Management System (NIMS), currently under development by DHS, provides an operational framework for the response by federal, state and local agencies. In the NIMS, mutual aid is emphasized as an indispensable tool for the swift and coordinated response to disasters of all kinds.”1 In mid-July 2003, the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) asking for copies of existing mutual aid legislation/agreements, enabling legislation and other supporting documents sent a request to all state Emergency Management Agencies. Preliminary responses were received from 16 states and the District of Columbia confirming that legislation/agreements were or were not in place. Over the summer, additional responses were received; documents were sorted and reviewed, then condensed into a monograph summarizing legislation and agreements; which served as a starting point for development of a model intrastate mutual aid agreement. “Many local jurisdictions have agreements in place, but they vary widely across the country. Moreover, many are not formal agreements, and do not address key issues such as liability and compensation; and encompass multidisciplines. To be able to move assets effectually between local jurisdictions and across state lines, mutual aid agreements should be robust, inclusive, demonstrate an effective relationship to EMAC and address liability and compensation issues in a manner consistent with state law.” As part of a grant awarded NEMA by FEMA in 2003, NEMA agreed to develop and market model intrastate mutual aid legislation along with several other related tasks. A multi-discipline review group2 was selected to ensure many voices from across the emergency services and the public safety fields were included. The interest shown by various associations and entities further demonstrates the ardent interest in mutual aid by this diverse body. On January 9, 2004, the working group met in New Orleans, LA to review all work. Local perspectives were brought to the forefront by those involved with local government emergency response, and incorporated into the model. At the NEMA Mid-Year Conference, held in Washington, D.C., February 9-13, 2004, the membership unanimously approved the proposed model. One of the most important aspects of the model is that adoption by jurisdictions is entirely voluntary. The model is meant to be a tool and resource for states and jurisdictions to utilize in developing or refining statewide mutual aid agreements. It is anticipated that states and jurisdictions may wish to modify the model to conform to their own state laws and authorities, or to address unique needs and circumstances. Further, the proposed articles and provisions in the model are complementary to the recommended minimum elements to be included in mutual aid agreements that are a part of the draft National Incident Management System Plan.

State Government News magazine, March 2004, by Amy Hughes Senior Policy Analyst, National Emergency Management Association. 2 Comprehensive contact list included on Page 10.
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Model Intrastate Mutual Aid Legislation
Article I: Preamble
The purpose of this legislation/agreement is to create a system of intrastate mutual aid between participating political subdivisions in the state. Each participant of this system recognizes that emergencies transcend political jurisdictional boundaries and that intergovernmental coordination is essential for the protection of lives and property and for best use of available assets both public and private. The system shall provide for mutual assistance among the participating political subdivisions in the prevention of, response to, and recovery from, any disaster that results in a formal state of emergency in a participating political subdivision, subject to that participating political subdivisions criterion for declaration. The system shall provide for mutual cooperation among the participating subdivisions in conducting disaster related exercises, testing or other training activities outside actual declared emergency periods. This legislation provides no immunity, rights or privileges for any individual responding to a state of emergency that is not requested and/or authorized to respond by a participating political subdivision. Participating political subdivisions will be ensured, to the fullest extent possible, eligibility for state and federal disaster funding. Also created in this legislation/agreement is the committee known as the State or Statewide Intrastate Mutual Aid Committee. This committee shall be multidisciplinary and representative of emergency management and response disciplines as well as local government. It shall be the committee’s responsibility to hold, at a minimum, annual meetings to review the progress and status of statewide mutual aid, assist in developing methods to track and evaluate activation of the system and to examine issues facing participating political subdivisions regarding the implementation of this legislation. The committee may be chaired by the State Emergency Management Agency. The committee may prepare an annual report on the condition and effectiveness of mutual aid in the state, make recommendations for correcting any deficiencies and submit that report to the appropriate legislative committee or other governing body. Members of the committee shall serve a maximum two-year term, with recommendation for appointment coming from each respective association. All political subdivisions within the state are, upon enactment of this legislation or the execution of an agreement, are automatically a part of the statewide mutual aid system. A political subdivision within the state may elect not to participate or to later withdraw from the system upon enacting an appropriate resolution by its governing body declaring that it elects not to participate in the statewide mutual aid system; and providing a copy of the resolution to the State Emergency Management Agency. This legislation does not preclude participating political subdivisions from entering into supplementary agreements with another political subdivision and does not affect any other agreement to which a political subdivision may currently be a party to, or decide to be a party to.

Article II: Emergency Responders Defined Emergency Responders Defined
An emergency responder is defined as anyone with special skills, qualifications, training, knowledge and experience in the public or private sectors that would be beneficial to a participating political subdivision in response to a locally declared emergency as defined in any applicable law or ordinance or authorized drill or exercises; and who is requested and/or authorized to respond. Under this definition, an emergency responder may or may not be required to possess a license, certificate, permit or other official recognition for their expertise in a particular field or area of knowledge. An emergency responder could include, but is in no way limited to, the following: law enforcement officers, fire fighters, emergency medical services personnel, physicians, nurses, other public health personnel, emergency management personnel, public works personnel, those persons with specialized equipment operations skills or training or any other skills needed to provide aid in a declared emergency.

Article III: Participating Political Subdivisions Responsibilities
It shall be the responsibility of each participating political subdivision with jurisdiction over and responsibility for emergency management within that certain subdivision to do the following:

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1. Identify potential hazards that could affect the participant using an identification system common to all participating jurisdictions. 2. Conduct joint planning, intelligence sharing and threat assessment development with contiguous participating political subdivisions, and conduct joint training at least biennially. 3. Identify and inventory the current services, equipment, supplies, personnel and other resources related to planning, prevention, mitigation, and response and recovery activities of the participating political subdivision. 4. Adopt and put into practice the standardized incident management system approved by the State Emergency Management Agency.

Article IV: Implementation
A participating political subdivision may request assistance of other participating political subdivisions in preventing, mitigating, responding to and recovering from disasters that result in locally-declared emergencies or in concert with authorized drills or exercises as allowed under this legislation/agreement. Requests for assistance shall be made through the chief executive officer of a participating political subdivision or his designee. Requests may either be verbal or in writing and are not required to go directly to the State Emergency Management Agency but in all cases will be reported to the agency as soon as is practical. Verbal requests will be followed up with a written request as soon as is practical or such number of days as the state in its discretion may dictate.

Article V: Limitations
A participating political subdivision’s obligation to provide assistance in the prevention of, response to and recovery from a locally declared emergency or in authorized drills or exercises is subject to the following conditions: 1. A participating political subdivision requesting assistance must have either declared a state of emergency in the manner outlined in Article I or authorized drills and exercises. 2. A responding participating political subdivision may withhold resources to the extent necessary to provide reasonable protection and services for its own jurisdiction. 3. Emergency response personnel of a responding participating political subdivision shall continue under the command and control of their responding jurisdiction to include medical protocols, standard operating procedures and other protocols, but shall be under the operational control of the appropriate officials within the incident management system of the participating political subdivision receiving the assistance. 4. Assets and equipment of a responding participating political subdivision shall continue under the control of their responding jurisdiction, but shall be under the operational control of the appropriate officials within the incident management system of the participating political subdivision receiving the assistance.

Article VI: License, Certificate and Permit Portability
If a person or entity holds a license, certificate or other permit issued by a participating political subdivision or the state evidencing qualification in a professional, mechanical or other skill and the assistance of that person or entity is requested by a participating political subdivision, the person or entity shall be deemed to be licensed, certified or permitted in the political subdivision requesting assistance for the duration of the declared emergency or authorized drills or exercises and subject to any limitations and conditions the chief executive of the participating political subdivision receiving the assistance may prescribe by executive order or otherwise.

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Article VII: Reimbursement, Disputes Regarding Reimbursement
Any requesting political subdivision shall reimburse the participating political subdivision rendering aid under this system. A participating political subdivision providing assistance may determine to donate assets of any kind to a receiving participating political subdivision. Such requests for reimbursement shall be in accordance with procedures developed by the State Intrastate Mutual Aid Committee. Should a dispute arise between parties to the system regarding reimbursement, involved parties will make every effort to resolve the dispute within 30 days of written notice of the dispute by the party asserting noncompliance. In the event that the dispute is not resolved within 90 days of the notice of the claim, either party may request the dispute be solved through arbitration. Any arbitration under this provision shall be conducted under the commercial arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association.

Article VIII: Development of Guidelines and Procedures
The State Intrastate Mutual Aid Committee shall develop comprehensive guidelines and procedures that address, including but not limited to, the following: projected or anticipated costs, checklists for requesting and providing assistance, record keeping for all participating political subdivisions, reimbursement procedures and other necessary implementation elements along with the necessary forms for requests and other records documenting deployment and return of assets.

Article IX: Workers’ Compensation
Personnel of a participating political subdivision responding to or rendering assistance for a request who sustain injury or death in the course of, and arising out of, their employment are entitled to all applicable benefits normally available to personnel while performing their duties for their employer. Responders shall receive any additional state and federal benefits that may be available to them for line of duty deaths.

Article X: Immunity
All activities performed under this agreement are deemed hereby to be governmental functions. For the purposes of liability, all persons responding under the operational control of the requesting political subdivision are deemed to be employees of the requesting participating political subdivision. Neither the participating political subdivisions nor their employees, except in cases of willful misconduct, gross negligence or bad faith shall be liable for the death of or injury to persons or for damage to property when complying or attempting to comply with the statewide mutual aid system.

Article XI: Severability
Should a court of competent jurisdiction rule any portion, section or subsection of this legislation invalid or nullified, that fact shall not affect or invalidate any other portion, section or subsection; and all remaining portions, sections or subsections shall remain in full force and effect.

Checklist of Best Practices:
■■ Closely tie legislation/agreement to EMAC member states’ legislation and SOP’s for seamless escalation of disaster response and execution of mutual aid. ■■ Encourage participation by a broad range of emergency responders. Include other definitions as appropriate. Consider global perspective, e.g., public works, private entities, medical personnel, public transportation and others. ■■ Make legislation opt-out. Most states have several hundred municipalities and other jurisdictions within their borders. To attempt to get everyone on board on an opt-in agreement could take years and never achieve a plurality of participation. By making legislation opt-out, everyone is a part of the system the day it becomes law.

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■■ To the extent permitted by applicable law, include automatic renewal language if agreement instead of legislation. ■■ Agreements/legislation should mandate joint planning, training and exercise with liability immunity as if it were an actual emergency. ■■ Develop forms to facilitate requests for aid, record-keeping regarding movement of equipment and personnel and reimbursement. ■■ Require use of a standardized incident command/management system consistent with that used by the state. ■■ In addition to not affecting any existing agreements, should also allow for supplemental agreements between participants. ■■ Have a liability/immunity article. ■■ Consider arbitration of disputes concerning reimbursement. ■■ Be as concise as possible. Guidelines and procedures should be developed separately, but become part of the legislations/agreement when adopted. ■■ Establishment of a committee representative of all emergency preparedness and response disciplines and other stakeholders to examine continual changes in emergency preparedness and insure legislation/agreements meet the needs of disciplines/stakeholders. Committee may have standing and authority to refer needs to legislature for rectification. Consider existing committees representative of all stakeholders to determine if they may perform this function. A reimbursement provision. This provision may include an offset for any insurance proceeds applicable to the costs claimed by the responding political subdivision. The insurance claims process should not delay reimbursement. Reimbursement shall not duplicate any state or federal assistance available for the costs. Representing the Intrastate Mutual Aid Model Legislation Working Group: Terrence (Terry) M.I., Egan, Ed.D. Mitigation, Analysis and Plans Unit Manager EMAC Executive Task Force Chair Emergency Management Division Washington Military Department Building 20 Camp Murray, WA 98430 (253) 512-7041 Email: T.Egan@EMD.WA.GOV Alfred (Al) O. Bragg Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 (850) 922-1576 Email: Al.Bragg@dca.state.fl.us Jack Jowett EMAC Executive Task Force Chair Elect State Emergency Management Office 1220 Washington Avenue Building #22, Suite 101 Albany, NY 12226-2251 (518) 457-2222 Email: Jack.Jowett@semo.state.ny.us Tamara (Tammy) Little Assistant Attorney General EMAC Legal Committee Chair 2855 West Dublin-Granville Road Columbus, OH 43235 Tel: (614) 336-7150, Fax: (614) 336-7488 Email: tlittle@dps.state.oh.us David E. Maxwell Deputy Director Arkansas Department of Emergency Management Immediate Past EMAC Executive Task Force Chair P.O. Box 758 Conway, AR 72033 Tel: (501) 730-9750, Fax: (501) 730-9754 Email: david.Maxwell@adem.state.ar.us

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Eve Rainey Bureau Chief-Compliance Planning and Support Division of Emergency Management 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399 Tel: (850) 413-9914, Fax: (850) 488-1739 Email: eve.rainey@dca.state.fl.us Representing the International Association of Chiefs of Police: Richard Cashdollar Executive Director of Public Safety City of Mobile P.O. Box 1827 Mobile, AL 36633-1827 (251) 208-7699 Email: cashdollar@cityofmobile.org Representing the National Association of State EMS Directors: Stephen Hise NASEMSD Program Advisor 19818 North 43rd Drive Glendale, AZ 85308 (623) 434-5489 Email: hise@nasemsd.org Representing the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials: Dick Raymond, MD Chief Medical Officer Nebraska Health and Human Services System (402) 471-8566 Email: dick.raymond@hhss.state.ne.us Secondary Representative for the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials: Tim Stephens Senior Director of Preparedness Policy Association of State and Territorial Health Officials 1275 K Street NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 371-9090, ext. 1673 Email: tstephens@astho.org

Representing the International Association of Fire Chiefs: James P. Reardon Chief (NEMA Terrorism Committee Member) Northbrook Fire Department 740 Dundee Road Northbrook, IL 60062 (847) 272-2141 Email: reardon@northbrook.il.us Representing the National Association of County and City Health Officials: Christa-Marie Singleton, MD, MPH Chief Medical Director Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response Baltimore City Health Department 210 Guilford Avenue Baltimore, MD 21202 (443) 992-8363 Email: cmsing@aol.com Representing the International Association of Emergency Managers: Daniel Alexander Director of Emergency Management City and County of Denver OEM 1437 Bannock Street, Room 3 Denver, CO 80202 (720) 865-7600 Email: daniel.alexander@denvergov.org Representing the National Sheriff’s Association: John Thompson Deputy Executive National Sheriff’s Association 1450 Duke Street Alexandria, VA 22314-3490 (240) 508-7965 Email: jthompson@sheriffs.org Representing the American Public Works Association: Chris W. Yarnell, P.E. Director Cole County Public Works 5055 Monticello Road Jefferson City, MO 65109 (573) 636-3614 Email: cyarnell@colecounty.org
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APPENDIX D

Ohio Emergency Power Planning and Intervention Tool

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The

Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability

Presents:

Emergency Power Planning and Intervention
A Report Outlining Community Guidelines for Energy Emergency Planning for Distributed Energy resources
June 2008 Report Prepared by: Energy Industries of Ohio 6100 Oak Tree Boulevard, Suite 200 Cleveland, OH 44131-6914

Sponsored by: United States Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability National Energy Technology Laboratory 3610 Collins Ferry Road Morgantown, WV 26507-0880

Acknowledgements
Energy Industries of Ohio greatly appreciates the assistance of those who have made contributions to these guidelines, reviewed the comments and offered helpful additions. In particular, we recognize the contributions of the Public Technology Institute (PTI), and the Northern Ohio Fire Fighters (NOFF). The project builds on related Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) and National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sponsored activities conducted by Energy Industries of Ohio (EIO). We acknowledge the longstanding vision and continued leadership of the Department of Energy in working with states and local governments to help us be better prepared in the event of an energy emergency.

DOE: Charting the Course

VISION 2020 The United States will have the cleanest and most efficient and reliable energy system in the world by maximizing the use of affordable distributed energy resources.
Excerpt from page 2 of: DOE Strategic Plan for Distributed Energy Resources September 2000

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Table of Contents Project Overview EIO Charter and Activities I. Project Objective II. Background III. Implementation Plan 1. Annual Fire Inspection Survey Checklist for Annual Visit Eminent Domain Maintenance of City Database 2. Operating Instructions Quick Start Trouble Shooting 3. Training IV. Conclusion Attachment A: Framework for Community Action Community Implementation Tool for Emergency Power Planning and Intervention

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Project Overview
The purpose of this project “Emergency Power Planning and Intervention” is to promote Energy Assurance at the local level by offering communities a straightforward approach to collecting and maintaining data related to Distributed Energy Resources (DER) within their communities. The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissions (NARUC) describes Energy Assurance as “The ongoing and collaborative effort among federal, state, and local governments and the private sector to ensure robust, secure, and reliable energy infrastructure.” In a Homeland Security incident or extended power outage, emergency power is vital for community safety and stability. Beyond the obvious concerns for hospitals and safety forces, there are numerous other circumstances that are more easily overlooked. Facilities such as community centers, schools and auditoriums may become emergency shelters. Municipal centers must ensure Distributed Energy continuity of public operations over and above fire and police. The Distributed energy refers to small–scale economic viability of some energy systems that are located close to businesses and industries may where customers use the electricity. require emergency power for Distributed energy is small, usually less than proper shut-down of computers 10 megawatts (although definitions vary), and and/or equipment, as well as for stands in contrast to central station power ongoing operations, some that may generation techniques. even be necessary from a national security standpoint. Finally, some The benefit of these smaller, distributed businesses may require resources is that they offer an alternative to emergency power to provide public the power grid. If the electricity transmission access to goods and supplies not grid goes down, customers do not lose power the least of which are food, water if they have an on-site generator. Distributed and blankets. resources provide diversity and decentralization to the electricity delivery In an extreme case, such as a system. They benefit the customers who Homeland Security incident have installed them but do not replace the involving an interruption in electric bulk power system. power from the grid, emergency personnel such as firefighters or Excerpt from Energy Security (page 73) other first responders may be the only people allowed passage on Published by the National Conference public roads precluding qualified of State Legislatures April 2003 emergency power generation technicians from reaching their respective facilities to turn equipment on or troubleshoot non-functioning equipment. Therefore, local governments have a vested interest in knowing the locations, types and functionality of Distributed Energy Resources (DER) in their communities, and having key personnel, including firefighters, trained to operate such equipment.

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The training component has been addressed through a separate effort also funded by DOE. To insure a community’s emergency Distributed Generation (DG) (note: DG and DER are generally used interchangeably in the trade and herein) systems are capable of being brought on-line as soon as possible after a grid interruption, the education and training needed for first responders was assessed through curriculum developed by Energy Industries of Ohio (EIO) in conjunction with Cuyahoga County, Ohio Homeland Security and Fire Officials. This training enables local firefighters and first responders to be capable of: 1) connecting mobile power generators to buildings with “plug & play” power ports 2) bringing emergency power (EP) equipment on-line when manual intervention/start-up is inherently required, and 3) light troubleshooting when automatic start-up fails to happen. This phase of the project addresses the related issue of identifying location, type and functionality of DER within a community. By collecting this information in advance of an emergency, local governments can take steps to support greater functionality of this equipment, while ensuring first responders are adequately trained to react in the event of an emergency. The report includes Attachment A “Community Implementation Tool for Emergency Power Planning and Intervention” which provides specific guidance for conducting an annual DG inspection (as part of the annual fire inspection) and creating an accompanying database to be retained in the community. Through efforts associated with the first phase of this project, it was learned that during the Northeastern United States blackout in August 2003, many local mayors and fire departments did not have knowledge of those places where DG devices might be employed, and moreover that a significant percentage of emergency DG systems failed to operate due to improper maintenance, testing and/or operation. Discussions with State and County Homeland Security officials, Mayors, County Anti Terror (CAT) and Fire Chief’s Associations among others determined that these issues (presence, location and operability of DG devices) are capable of being addressed through ongoing, existing community practices and personnel, and proactive partnerships with local residents. Engaged Partnership “Engaged partnerships are essential to preparedness. Effective response activities begin with a host of preparedness activities conducted well in advance of an incident. Preparedness involves a combination of planning, resources, training, exercising, and organizing to build, sustain, and improve operational capabilities. Preparedness is the process of identifying the personnel, training, and equipment needed for a wide range of potential incidents, and developing jurisdictionspecific plans for delivering capabilities when needed for an incident.’ Excerpt from: The National Response Framework Published by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (January 2008, page 9)

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The recommendation of this report is to expand upon the regular annual fire inspections of facilities to include a survey and inspection of DG equipment and maintenance logs to enhance the separate training module that prepares first responders for emergency action. The main objectives of such an annual DG Inspection include: 1. 2. 3. 4. Determining whether DG/emergency power capacity exists at the site Identifying potential public safety applications Inspecting the maintenance logs for conformance to routine requirements Gaining system specific information to facilitate emergency firefighter intervention 5. Sharing relevant information about DER with local business owners and facility managers to enhance community preparedness. The collected information would then be entered into a secure database within the community for emergency planning and response. With a more complete picture of community resources, opportunities for better serving citizens can be woven into community action plans noting vulnerabilities and a means by which these vulnerabilities can be addressed ( for example, by seeking additional DG resources). It is envisioned that initially, participation in the community program would be voluntary while the implications of changes in legislation and regulations required to possibly include this practice as part of a statewide capability and preparedness activity can be evaluated. These Community Guidelines have deliberately been kept simple and straight forward to facilitate implementation. They are designed to stand alone or work as an annex or addendum to other documents and/or processes such as those under development by the Public Technology Institute (PTI) www.PTI.org and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) - www.DOE.gov.

“It has been dramatically demonstrated that local governments need to be and are the first line of response and preparedness for emergency and disaster situations. Deficiencies have been noted in all critical infrastructure areas: energy, transportation, banking, finance, telecommunications, emergency response systems and water supply. A common theme among these deficiencies is the lack of adequate information and communication protocols to support effective preparation and response options. Neither civilian nor military agencies can completely protect the population from the many threats facing the nation, but greater awareness, planning, communication, detection and prevention can significantly reduce the consequences and expedite the response. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has an interest in engaging local governments more fully to identify, to prepare for and to minimize any emergency and/or disaster situations.” Excerpt from: The Public Technology Institute (PTI) Website www.pti.org/index.php/ptiee1/more/126/

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EIO Charter and Activities
Energy Industries of Ohio (EIO) is a 501(c) 3 non-profit organization founded in 2000 with the charter to facilitate the development and deployment of energy efficient technologies and practices that assist both the energy producers and energy intensive industries of Ohio. In response to the needs highlighted by 9/11 and the August ’03 blackout, EIO expanded the scope of its activities to include key facets of energy assurance for Ohio’s citizens and energy intensive industries. EIO accomplishes its mission by managing programs, building and coordinating project teams, providing technical and/or financial reporting resources and preparing grant proposals for itself, corporate partners and industry consortia. Ohio, is both a major generator of electric power and consumer of electricity, oil and natural gas based energy. Among all states, Ohio was recently ranked: 3rd for production of electricity, 5th for all energy consumed, 2nd for industrial electrical use, 4th for total electricity consumption, 3rd for all manufacturing output, and in the top ten for use of both oil and natural gas. Ohio has significant energy intensive industries that are the backbone of its economy and are vital to the overall US economy. Energy Industries of Ohio has been working with a variety of organizations, including the US Department of Energy, US Department of Homeland Security, Ohio Department of Development and Ohio Department of Public Safety to address some of Ohio’s critical energy needs. Currently, EIO is providing technology development, training and program management services for a number of projects of both state and federal importance. EIO’s current projects include: work supporting advanced technologies for coal fired power plants; future fusion reactors; industrial energy efficiency to Ohio’s energy intensive user industries; energy assurance efforts utilizing emergency power generation; and first responder training to reduce the threat and potential impact of power outage based on Homeland Security incidents. For further information see: www.energyinohio.com

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I. Project Objective
The objective of this project is to support efforts to boost Energy Resiliency* by offering local communities, including elected and public safety officials, tools for improving awareness of existing energy resources and enhancing their ability to capitalize on these resources in an emergency. Based on the case study of a recently completed Cuyahoga County, Ohio project, this report provides an appraisal of basic vulnerabilities and opportunities related to Distributed Energy Resources (DER) within a community and outlines the necessary steps for implementation of Energy Emergency Planning for local governments. The document includes an attachment entitled “Community Implementation Tool For Emergency Power Planning and Intervention.” The attachment provides specific instructions for developing a database of existing resources (e.g., generators, generator-ready facilities, fuel sources) needed during a response to an energy emergency (e.g., power outage). In addition, the attachment addresses: (1) basic training needs for quick starting emergency generation devices by first responders, (2) instructions for using portable generators, and (3) an outline of on-the spot, simple trouble shooting of failed devices. *Energy Resiliency - “The capability to cost-effectively and expeditiously prevent and protect against significant risks from all hazards, including terrorist attacks; mitigate and minimize impacts in the event of incidents and disruptions; and, recover and reconstitute energy services with minimum damage to public confidence, safety and health, the economy, and national security.” Energy sector resiliency requires: • “An understanding of impacts and consequences of internal and external factors, including infrastructure interdependencies and dependencies, and risk-based prevention and mitigation measures;” • “Appropriate information sharing with customers, suppliers, and service providers, across sectors and with all levels of government and key regional stakeholders;” and • “Flexible, prudent, and informed decision-making on energy needs and policies to assure the availability of energy sources, supplies, and services.” Energy resiliency applies to systems, organizations, infrastructures, communities, tribes, regions, States, and countries.
Excerpt from: “Building Resiliency Into Energy Assurance Planning” Workshop Summary April 22-23, 2008 – pages 5 & 6 Sponsored by: The U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, the National Conference of State Legislatures, and the Pacific Northwest Economic Region

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II. Background
Energy provides the operational foundation to nearly every process at work in American society today. It is essential to our economy, national defense, and quality of life. Almost every form of productive activity — whether in businesses, manufacturing plants, schools, hospitals, or homes — requires electricity, natural gas or oil fuels. Electricity is also necessary to produce other forms of energy, such as refined oil; while oil and natural gas are also used to produce electricity. When a widespread or long-term disruption of the power grid occurs, most of the activities critical to our economy and national defense — including those associated with response and recovery — would be impossible. If grid power is significantly disrupted and alternate sources of emergency power are not adequately provided for, the impact would be debilitating in affected jurisdictions as well as producing broadly cascading economic implications. Our modern civilization and economy is predicated on the power being there when we flick the switch. The electricity sector is highly complex, and its numerous component assets and systems span the North American continent and in particular, energy intensive regions and states such as the industrial Midwest and Ohio. Many of the sector’s key assets, such as generation facilities, key substations, and switchyards, present unique protection challenges. While the electricity industry has a history of taking increasingly proactive measures to assure the reliability and availability of the electricity system, an enhanced number of strategies and actions must be implemented to assure the continuation of this reliability and availability during this time of heightened threats. This is equally true for our oil and natural gas sectors. While elevating efforts to reduce the vulnerability to our existing energy infrastructure — we must also expand energy response and mitigation planning in the event major disruptions in grid power supply occur. Energy sector resources are generally addressed from the strategic category of Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets; however a much broader set of perspectives covering the range of disruption ramifications are also necessary. At the local level, energy supply and distribution are critical to our economy and to the well-being of our citizens. In conjunction with national, state and private activities addressing emergency energy needs1 communities and local governments can play a central role in providing grass roots measures and response activities tailored to their populations. Communities will benefit from an honest and thorough
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Some key reference documents include: published by the US Department of Homeland Security http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/ The Energy Sector Specific Plan developed in response to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan , coordinated by the Department of Energy http://www.oe.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/Energy_SSP_Public.pdf “A Governor’s Guide to Energy Assurance” published by the National Governors Association (NGA) http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0612GOVGUIDEENERGY.PDF “State Energy Assurance Guidelines” developed by the National Association of State Energy Officials, http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/docs/prepare/EAGuidelines.pdf

 The “National Response Framework” (and related documents)   

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evaluation of response mechanisms to mitigate incidents involving widespread or long-term disruptions in the supply of grid power, natural gas and oil. Reducing vulnerability and providing appropriate response efforts that mitigate long-term outages lessens the likelihood of serious economic or safety consequences. The need to plan explicitly for emergency energy supplies of electric power, oil (especially gasoline and diesel fuels) and potentially natural gas – is critical. Furthermore, the need to insure adequate supplies of energy resources to key municipal buildings, missionNASEO on the Nature of Energy critical services and emergency Assurance Planning operations centers is a cornerstone of continuity. As a consequence of “Any energy emergency planning emergency power resource needs, effort should be based on good data incident based mechanisms for the acquisition and information management. However, the response steady supply of requisite fuels must be to an energy shortage – no matter how established. Finally, provisions must be it is caused – is as much an art as it is made to furnish shelters that have a science. Hence, the nature of energy adequate energy sources (e.g. electric emergency preparedness is seen as power and heating/cooling) to provide good data management and response for basic human needs for a sizable planning as well as the identification of multiple stakeholders, their portion of displaced populace. While interests and the definition of how such facilities are not typically defined their energy interests affect energy as primary critical infrastructure, they emergency planning. “ may become “downstream critical infrastructure” subsequent to an event. Excerpt from: State Energy Assurance Guidelines dated November 2005, Identifying greater capacities for page 8 emergency shelter via additional Published by NASEO – National prospective facilities – among not only Association of State Energy Officials government but also private infrastructures, should be addressed and the respective cooperative use agreements must be established in advance. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) as well as the private and public energy providers are undertaking a number of efforts for investigating and assessing current technologies. These will provide increased protection and detection of intrusions to our energy infrastructure. In addition, a number of programs are aimed at developing new and improved means of providing physical security of such critical infrastructure and also for training of designated first responders for mitigating incident based longterm energy outages. These top down measures provide security to the broadest range of needs.

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This project, “Emergency Power Planning and Intervention” for Distributed Energy Resources, (DER) provides a bottoms up approach that is easily implemented at the local level. The program is designed to:

- provide first steps for local governments to open a dialogue addressing wide spread outages that may cause significant disruptions to life and property prepare communities to capitalize on the current DER infrastructure already existing in the community provide community officials with a mechanism to collect data about the existing DER and ensure those resources are operational in the event of an emergency, and enable communities to identify and correct vulnerabilities through a big picture view of their resources, and compliment related projects sponsored by DOE for training of first responders and fire fighters in operation of DER.

In certain emergencies, qualified emergency power (EP) generation technicians may not be able to access their respective facilities to turn equipment on or to troubleshoot non-functioning equipment. One means for insuring this capability is to have a trained cadre of first responders who can connect and start EP devices during the initial emergency response times and a team of trained volunteers to monitor the devices once operating. Local firefighters should be trained to be capable of: 1) connecting mobile power generators to buildings with “plug & play” power ports 2) bringing (EP) equipment on-line when manual intervention/start-up is inherently required, and 3) providing light troubleshooting when automatic start-up fails to happen. These “First Responder Training” and “Community Assessment of DG Capability” projects were conceived after it was discovered that a significant percentage of emergency DG failed to operate during the August 2003 blackout in the Midwest, many due to improper maintenance and testing. In order to facilitate operability of nearly all such devices required in any future blackouts, the Community Guidelines contained in this report provide a mechanism to enable expansion of the regular annual fire inspections of facilities to include a survey and inspection of DG equipment and maintenance logs (see insert below for excerpt from the survey). The main objectives of such annual DG Inspections would be threefold: 1. Determine if DG/emergency power capacity exists at the site (identify potential public safety applications such as emergency shelter during blizzards, etc.); 2. Inspect the maintenance logs for conformance to routine requirements; 3. Gain system specific information to facilitate emergency firefighter intervention. As an additional benefit, the survey will enable communities to ascertain other emergency planning needs (such as fuel requirements), while uncovering potential alternatives for community shelter should the need arise. 11

III. Implementation
Effective energy emergency planning and response are enhanced through community knowledge, participation and cooperation. Emergency DG systems not only represent a critical resource for the facility owner, they also present an opportunity for community service. For example, it may be necessary to heat or cool a facility to preserve valuable equipment. That same facility could have unused warehouse or auditorium space that could serve other purposes to the community such as temporary housing or emergency team dispatch. Organizations might be willing to voluntarily offer their facilities to the community in exchange for higher priority first responder services and higher priority access to fuel supplies for long term outages. Communities could work with the utilities to offer further incentives for DG services supplied to the community during an outage. Finally, in a severe crisis, communities could be assured that locations exist at which the safety and welfare of the citizens can be met. Knowing where the resources are and the associated requirements for their use strengthens a community’s emergency response plan.

The first step in implementation of energy emergency planning for local governments is data collection.
The collection of DG data at the local level is one step a community can take to increase their knowledge and wherewithal to respond to an energy outage. By knowing the number, type and locations of such resources, a community can determine the best ways to ensure this back-up system is fully functional and utilized, including the extent to which such facilities could be used for other purposes in an emergency. Fuel requirements to support functionality within the community could be assessed and plans for provisions coordinated with utilities and state and federal agencies. Where appropriate, the local officials could seek partnerships with DG owners regarding potential public use of those facilities in a crisis.

1. Annual Fire Inspection
Based on assessments conducted during previous phases of this project, it has been concluded that routine annual fire inspections offer a simple, straightforward mechanism for the collection of data on DER. An instruction sheet, a survey form and the corresponding spreadsheet have been developed to assist in the collection and maintenance of DER data and are included in Attachment A - Community Guidelines package. These tools cover key information necessary for local governments to understand the capabilities of each facility specific DER, determine training and facility access requirements for first responders and ensure operability in an outage.

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Survey for Annual DER Inspection The survey is in the form of a checklist and was prepared in collaboration with generator manufacturers. The data to be collected will permit fire fighters and first responders to seek both the necessary skills and the knowledge to facilitate equipment startup and maintenance should this be required. This preparation may be in the form of a general “quick start” type of training offered through the local fire academy or a training class offered by a particular manufacturer if there are significant numbers of that manufacturer’s equipment located in the community. The checklist also was designed to provide other key information to the community including data related to equipment location, methods for access, system back-up generation requirements and overall facility capacity. It is expected that during the annual fire inspection, the inspecting firefighter would go through the survey with each respective building maintenance or facility manager. Simply knowing if there is DG power capacity is beneficial because many such installations do not require special permitting and thus, the respective local government unit (city, town or village) may be unaware of the generator’s existence and consequent potential resource for use during an emergency. Full awareness of where emergency power exists in a community is also beneficial to have from a public safety perspective. Inspecting the maintenance logs for DG according to certain criteria would spur the appropriate attention required to further reduce DG failures in future emergency situations. Finally, the information obtained from the surveys would assist firefighters in being more capable of later intervention, if necessary.

Excerpt from the Emergency Power Survey (see Attachment A for the complete survey)

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Initially, the collection of such data would be considered voluntary and facility owners would be given the option to decline the review with the understanding that first responder support and resources may not be provided because little advance knowledge of their system will reside in the knowledge-base of the safety forces. This alone should encourage owners of DG systems to participate. Over time, as other incentives are introduced, it is anticipated that further voluntary participation would occur and as the benefits of having a knowledge-base of a community’s backup generation become apparent, a more formal system, including supporting laws or regulations, and system-wide testing, could be created for implementation on a broader scale. Eminent Domain Communities benefit by knowing where DER are located. These resources can be part of their overall contingency plan should a crisis escalate to such a level. Furthermore, local governments have a broader view of what will be required to protect property and mitigate impacts to individuals, communities and the environment. Most importantly, such information ensures local governments make the best decisions for each particular incident. In severe cases, this could include a government exercising its responsibilities (including eminent domain) to assure Public Safety with the knowledge that the back-up generation is available. It is envisioned that in a certain type of crisis, where primary emergency back-up systems have been compromised, (e.g. local community shelters, school buildings, etc) some atypical facilities (such as office buildings, auditoriums, cafeterias, etc.) could be transformed into emergency shelters or alternative security centers. Having advance knowledge would make such a selection/decision more obvious and expedient. “The Nation’s homeland security system is highly complex, with multiple objectives, partners, and needs. Plans help make sense of this complex homeland environment. Planning is a methodical way to think through the entire life-cycle of a potential crisis. Good planning repays the investment of time and effort in development and rehearsal by shortening the time required to gain control over an incident and by providing favorable conditions for rapid and effective exchange of information about a situation, its analysis, and alternative responses. Planning helps Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial governments reorient capabilities and resources to be more agile and ensures organizational structures, processes, and procedures effectively support the intended strategic direction. As stakeholders learn and practice their roles, they can reduce uncertainty, expedite response, and improve effectiveness during the critical initial stages after an event. This effort is a key to success in protecting people and property in crises.” Excerpt from: National Preparedness Guidelines (September 2007, page 20) Published by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security

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Maintenance of City Database The survey and resulting data base have been designed with simplicity and convenience in mind. The survey can be conducted clipboard style with paper and pen, and subsequently entered into the database by a data entry clerk at a later time. The paper copy is then retained on-file as back-up. As an alternative, the survey can be conducted directly on a laptop using a template that is set-up to automatically sort and store the data. In this case, communities may still want to retain paper copies on file. Once the initial survey is completed, subsequent annual surveys would be focused primarily on recording only those changes to the data that may have occurred between the survey periods. It is recognized that many organizations consider their internal resources highly proprietary and it is expected and understood that local governments will take all necessary precautions in handling and storing such data. By utilizing a city’s existing annual fire inspection process, the same protection guarantees these data receive would be afforded to the survey data. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet has been created to compliment the survey form. This spreadsheet allows the user to sort the data by different elements including business or organization location within the city, type of generator, facilities that could serve as emergency shelters/dispatch centers, among others. This provides the big picture that can help local governments determine the breadth of their local resources as well as the need for servicing such units during an emergency.
The Data Collection Spreadsheet provides a quick overview of DG resources Org Name/ Address Emergency Contact Number Type of DER Fuel Sources Size/ Amps Loads to Run on DER Available Space for Shelter/ dispatch center Public Access to Building

Sample Section of Excel Spreadsheet included with Attachment A It is anticipated that communities will customize the database to best serve their interests and operating styles. It is recognized that the amount of data to be collected and recorded will vary significantly depending upon size of the locale and number of business entities. Larger communities with more DG resources may need to specifically address and strategize the most advantageous way of storing and retrieving their data.

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2. Operating Instructions
During previous assessments, it became clear that there are standard features in all DER. Basic operating instructions were identified and documented for use by fire fighters and first responders. Those instructions have been included in the Community Guidelines found in Attachment A. It was also determined that a 4-6 hour overview course was very helpful in addressing the initial “hands-on” experience for fire fighters. A course developed under an earlier module to this project was found to be well received by the first-responder community. Said course (available through Energy Industries of Ohio) or other DG training is recommended for implementation as part of this planning process (see Section 3 of this report). It is important to note that in all cases when first responders are uncomfortable or unfamiliar with a particular piece of equipment that they not proceed further and NEVER undertake any action unless they are certain that it can be performed safely. It is also recommended that a complete set of manufacturer operating instructions be kept with the equipment. This is included on the survey to ensure that whoever takes responsibility for starting and monitoring the DER has specific and clear “do’s and don’ts” to avoid any further consequences beyond the original disruption. The following generic instructions are included as an example of simple instructions that can be provided to fire fighters and first responders to supplement those instructions found at the site.

View of An Automatic Transfer Switch

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Quick Start The vast majority of emergency power applications have standard means of operation, e.g. generator to facility connections, start-up, transfer switch operation, fundamental troubleshooting etc. Each of these facets tend to have some two to five most common variations and can thus be addressed in a relatively generic format. While each manufacturer’s units and components may collectively have dozens of slight variations even for each system element, a fundamental understanding can be applied rather effectively to the majority of cases. (This compares roughly with the operation of an automobile. All have ignition switches, gear selectors, accelerator and brake pedals with many variations to the radio placement, volume control etc. This project is to merely assist first responders in identifying those fundamental aspects of DG devices in order to be used as a resource). There are roughly a half dozen items on the quick start checklist which can lead a novice responder to take action to start most facility generators. By ensuring that complete instructions are retained with the equipment, operators should be well equipped to ensure start-up of functioning equipment.

View of Outdoor unit on a Caterpillar Generator

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Trouble Shooting Troubleshooting failed start-ups for both mobile generators and stationary units is also addressed in the Community Guidelines. Several common and easily addressed problem areas are identified and solutions described. Implementation is easily managed by novice operators. During previous studies, it was found that the number one critical troubleshooting area for generators that will not start is dead batteries. Where the dead batteries are easily accessible (e.g. mobile unit located outdoors) jump-starting with another vehicle or battery – in the same manner one jump-starts a car with a dead battery – is required. While more detailed instructions are available in a training course, these items are deliberately only minimally addressed on the trouble shooting checklist as the first responder is to take only rudimentary trouble shooting and repair activities. If there are other minor problems (ones less obvious than a battery cable being disconnected, dead battery, etc.), operators are instructed to contact the local dealer for assistance and if unavailable to refrain from further troubleshooting of the device. The annual survey should ensure that emergency numbers for facility managers and equipment manufacturers are available, verified and posted at the site.

3. Training
It is recommended that communities implement data collection with a comprehensive DER training program. A training program is currently in-place in Northeast Ohio which could be easily adapted and offered to other localities. Course participants are provided with a concise “quick reference” document (i.e. 2 –5 pgs for each area) of basic operating instructions, quick connect instructions and troubleshooting. Such a document will attempt to cover the most common types of equipment versions so as to provide useful quick-reference guidelines, tips etc. for the majority of equipment and systems scenarios firefighters can be expected to encounter.

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Conclusion
In addition to many large undertakings that state and local governments have been pursuing to be more proactive during an energy emergency, this document outlines some rather simple, straightforward and inexpensive mechanisms for immediate implementation. Data collection on DER in a community, coupled with DG training for fire fighters and other first responders, enables communities to capitalize on equipment that already exists, thus reducing the negative consequences of an extended outage. Furthermore, the project promotes collaboration between the public and private sector, with the potential for opening other areas of dialogue and exchange. This should serve to facilitate implementation of other more complex or controversial programs down the line. A pilot project was conducted in Northeast Ohio from 2005 - 2007 to demonstrate that the training and data collection can be easily implemented at the local level. Both aspects of the project have been well received by local governments and first responders. The materials created during the pilot were designed so that they could be easily adapted to fit the unique needs of other communities, ultimately transitioning from a pilot project to an on-going standard operating procedure. The framework for Community Action set forth in Attachment A entitled “”Community Implementation Tool for Emergency Power Planning and Intervention” was designed using this same approach. These activities, combined with numerous other activities at the local, state and federal level are serving to promote safe and reliable energy continuity during an emergency.

Vision Statement for the Energy Sector
The Energy Sector envisions a robust, resilient energy infrastructure in which continuity of business and services is maintained through secure and reliable information sharing, effective risk management programs, coordinated response capabilities, and trusted relationships between public and private security partners at all levels of industry and government.

Excerpt from: “Energy: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Redacted)” May 2007 Published by: The Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, U.S. Department of Energy

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Attachment A
FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY ACTION

Community Implementation Tool
for

Emergency Power Planning and Intervention
June 2008

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Attachment A FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY ACTION

Emergency Power Planning and Intervention Tool
Introduction: Energy provides the operational foundation to nearly every process at work in American society today. It is essential to our economy, national defense, and quality of life. Almost every form of productive activity — whether in businesses, manufacturing plants, schools, hospitals, or homes — requires electricity, natural gas or oil fuels. Electricity is also necessary to produce other forms of energy, such as refined oil; while oil and natural gas are also used to produce electricity. When a widespread or long-term disruption of the power grid occurs, most of the activities critical to our economy and national defense — including those associated with response and recovery — would be impossible. If grid power is significantly disrupted and alternate sources of emergency power are not adequately provided for, the impact would be debilitating in affected jurisdictions as well as producing broadly cascading economic implications. Our modern civilization and economy is predicated on the power being there when we flick the switch. Effective energy emergency planning and response/intervention are enhanced through community knowledge, participation and cooperation. Emergency Distributed Generation (DG) systems not only represent a critical resource for the facility owner, they also present an opportunity for community service. Organizations might be willing to voluntarily offer their facilities to the community in exchange for higher priority first responder services and higher priority access to fuel supplies for long term outages. Purpose: This Emergency Power Planning and Intervention Tool provides instructions for developing a database of existing locally-owned (both public and private) back-up distributed energy resources (e.g., generators, generator-ready facilities, fuel sources) available within the community for potential useduring an energy emergency (e.g., power outage). First Responders should have basic training for quick starting emergency generation devices. These instructions provide information about how to obtain such training. The packet also includes basic instructions for using portable generators, and a checklist of on-the spot simple trouble shooting of failed devices. Approach: The routine annual fire inspections conducted by the Community offer a simple, straightforward mechanism for collection of data on DER. An instruction sheet, a survey form and the corresponding spreadsheet have been developed to assist in the collection and maintenance of Distributed Energy Resources (DER) data. These documents can be further customized at the local level to meet the unique needs and requirements, including Information Technology (IT) capabilities, of each community.

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Attachment A FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY ACTION

Implementation Instructions: As part of the annual fire inspection, Fire Fighters are instructed to complete the survey form contained in these guidelines for each establishment reviewed. Participation in the DER program is voluntary, but as consideration for participation, communities will endeavor to assist local businesses and organizations with their efforts to ensure that DER equipment is operational during an outage. A Quick Start Checklist, along with Trouble Shooting Instructions are included with the survey. During the annual inspection, Fire Fighters should conduct a service review and system check following the instructions on the checklists. This will help them to become familiar with the procedures and the equipment. Reviewers are expected to include notes and unique features of a particular unit on the survey and update the check list instructions as necessary to keep them relevant and useful. In the event such equipment is not operational during an outage, communities are well prepared to support trouble shooting activities to minimize shut downs. Examples of such support could include dispatch of trained first responders to assess operability during an outage, where needed implementation of basic trouble shooting techniques, and/or assistance in ensuring facility managers are contacted and involved. Each community should determine the specific opportunities based on available resources and overall community interest and response to the program. To complement the collection, storage and retrieval of relevant data, it is recommended that communities also implement a comprehensive DER training program for fire fighters and other first responders. One such program was developed under a Department of Energy grant and is available through Energy Industries of Ohio (EIO). This training enables first responders to ensure proper operation of DG equipment and troubleshoot malfunctioning equipment in the event of an emergency. For further information about the aforementioned training program or for clarifications and questions about this document, please contact:

Energy Industries of Ohio Park Center Plaza, Suite 200 Attn: DER Program Manager 6100 Oak Tree Boulevard, Cleveland, OH 44131-6914 Phone: 216-643-2952

Or visit the EIO Website at www.energyinohio.com.

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Attachment A FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY ACTION

Annual Fire Inspection Emergency Power Survey Business or facility name: ___________________________________________ Location Address: __________________________________________________ Location City: _______________________________ Zip Code: _____________ Normal use of Facility: ______________________________________________ Building Contact: Name\Title: _______________________________________ Phone Number(s): Office___________________ Cell____________________ Does facility have an existing generator(s)? If NO: Does building have Manual Transfer Switch? OR: External mobile generator hook-up? YES  NO  YES  NO  YES  NO 

Size of Generator_____________(kW) Manufacturer__________________ Model Name/Number:______________________________________________ Serial Number:_____________________________________________________ Are Operator Instructions & Dealer #’s posted?
*If no, make recommendation to post them at the site

YES  NO* 

Approximately when was the unit installed: ________________(mm/yyyy) What is the voltage _______ 3 Phase  or 1 Phase  AMPS________ Run time hours _________________ Fuel source: Natural Gas  Diesel*  Other  ______________

*If Diesel, where is fuel located?_________________________________________

How many gallons does tank hold________ How many hours__________ Is Transfer Switch in Manual  or Automatic  operation? Transfer switch manufacturer: ______________________________________ AMPS _________ Voltage_____ Where is Transfer switch located ____________________________________
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Attachment A FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY ACTION

What is the estimated building square footage? ___________________ Are their any areas that could serve as emergency shelter and/or central dispatch? YES*  NO  *If yes, describe & note on the sketch with a  ____________________ _________________________________________________________ Sketch building layout below, indicate location of transfer switch (TS), generator (G), Fuel tank (F) Emergency Entrance (EE):

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Attachment A FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY ACTION

Loads that are to be run on Generator: _______________________ Entire building? YES  NO* 
*If NO, list the circuit breakers that are to be kept/switched off when running on emergency power (list according to each electric panel): ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________

Is the generator exercised regularly: YES*  NO  *If yes: Weekly  Monthly  Other  (state frequency)______________ Is the generator exercised under load:
*Maintenance log must be presented by facility:

YES*  NO  YES  NO 

Maintenance log verification:

Last maintenance service performed: ___________________(mm/yyyy) Frequency of maintenance service performed according to log: Quarterly  Semi-annually  Annually  Other specify________

Emergency Phone # for Local Dealer____________________ Other Notes:

Date: _________________ Name of Inspector: ______________________________________________________ Signature: _______________________________________________________

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Attachment A FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY ACTION

Quick Start Checklist
Step 1 Locate Generator and Check to see if Generator is Running  YES – Go to Step 2

 NO – See Trouble Shooting Checklist
Step 2 Is Power on to building, lights etc. YES – DONE!  NO – Go To Step 3 Step 3 Check Generator Meters for voltage. Is Voltage OK? (compare to listed values)  YES – Go to Step 4  NO – Contact Local Dealer for Assistance Step 4 Is Gen Circuit Breaker (CB) closed? YES - Go to Step 5  NO - Close Gen CB (NOTE: If CB tripped due to a fault, it will not close until reset. Be careful when closing CB after resetting) Step 5 Are Voltage and Frequency OK?  YES – Go To Step 6  NO – Contact Local Dealer for Assistance Step 6 Go To Automatic Transfer Switch (ATS) and Check:  Did ATS Transfer?  Are there meters or lights on ATS?  Do the meters indicate Voltage?  Do the lights indicate Switch Position?  NOTE: The ATS can usually be manually transferred to a running generator, however, for safety reasons, never do this with the Gen CB closed.  If ATS does not transfer, Contact Local Dealer for Assistance

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Attachment A FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY ACTION

Trouble Shooting Checklist Trouble Shooting should be conducted by trained technicians. If operator does not have prior training or in the case of any problems implementing these trouble shooting instructions, Operators are instructed to CONTACT THE LOCAL DEALER FOR ASSISTANCE.
Emergency numbers should be posted at the site. If not, refer to the annual survey report.

Generator is NOT Running – Control Panel Lights ARE on!

Will Generator Over Crank? YES  Place engine control switch in MANUAL position- and see if engine will start?  Did engine start? If YES- Check Automatic Transfer Switch (ATS)  Did ATS Transfer?  Are there meters or lights on ATS?  Do the meters indicate Voltage?  Do the lights indicate Switch Position? NOTE: The ATS can usually be manually transferred to a running generator, however, for safety reasons, never do this with the Gen Circuit Breaker closed.  NO  Check for Low Battery or Fuel problems  If low battery, connect another battery set (24 volt), if available and try manual start. If over crank occurs, check fuel.  Is there fuel in the tank?  YES – Check to see if fuel filters are plugged? (The fuel could be bad- jelled, if cold and not winterized fuel or it could be due to old fuel)  NO - Check to see if fuel is available

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Attachment A FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY ACTION

Trouble Shooting Checklist (Continued)

   

Generator NOT Running - No Alarm Lights on Panel
Place engine control switch in MANUAL position- did engine start? If Yes, Did ATS transfer to generator? YES – Problem is in ATS start wiring or internal engine start wiring, CALL SERVICE TECHNICIAN. ATS did not transfer to Genset. Is the Voltage and Frequency OK? –YES NOTE: The ATS can usually be manually transferred to a running generator, however, for safety reasons, never do this with the Gen Circuit Breaker closed.

         

Generator NOT Running - Unit will NOT crank
Verify battery disconnect switch is in closed position. Verify starting battery connections are tight

Generator NOT Running - Unit cranks but will NOT start
Verify fuel level is satisfactory Verify fuel valves are open to unit Hand prime fuel system with hand priming pump if available Check fuel pressure gauge if available

Unit starts but NO power to loads
Verify generator breaker is closed

Visually inspect cables if applicable to ensure connected and undamaged “This must be performed with generator breaker in the open position to prevent electrical shock”!!!!!! 28

Attachment A FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY ACTION

Database: The data collected in each survey are entered into a master database. A Microsoft Excel template is available to facilitate this process; however each user should determine the storage approach that complements other existing internal operating systems. The database will help to highlight key pieces of information including the most common types of equipment, (to assist in determining first responder training needs), fuel requirements (to determine any considerations for deliveries during an emergency), citywide location of resources (to assist with other emergency planning needs including temporary housing/shelter) etc. The spreadsheet provides a quick overview of resources. Key Database Elements from Excel Spreadsheet
Org Name/ Emergency Type of Address Contact DER Number Fuel Sources Size/ Amps Loads to Run on DER Available Space for Shelter/ dispatch center Public Access to Building

As mentioned above, the use of columns in the database allows users to sort the data for various interests. For example, in the expanded spreadsheet, the street address is a single column. Users can sort data by address, thus showing areas of the city with coverage/servicing needs and those without coverage and potential vulnerability. Information like the emergency contact numbers, provide critical information at a quick glance. Sorting by type of DER can help users recommend and establish the necessary training for their city fire fighters and first responders. Sorting by available space for shelters and/or dispatch centers aids in advance planning and coordination. Follow-up: The first time data is collected and entered will be the most time intensive. Reviews during later annual fire inspections should serve to update/correct any information that has changed since the last inspection. These reviews also serve to enhance the experience and on-the-spot training of fire fighters, offering them an opportunity to: discuss the equipment with the primary operator; learn “tricks of the trade” while they become familiar with the operating techniques; and conduct system-wide tests. Over time, operation of this equipment will become second nature to the fire fighters. Communities should further capitalize on the opportunity for identifying additional spaces for emergency shelter – among not only government facilities, but also private infrastructures and where practical, establish cooperative use agreements in advance of any potential need.

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