Public Interest vs. ElmaG.R. no. 138965 March 5 2007 PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER INC., LAUREANO T. ANGELES, and JOCELYN P.

CELESTINO, vs. MAGDANGAL B. ELMA, as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel and as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, and RONALDOZAMORA, asExecutive Secretary, Accused Appellant Facts: For consideration is the omnibus motion, dated 14 august 2006, whererespondent Magdangal Elma sought the following: 1. The reconsideration of the decision in the case Public Interest Center Inc., et al. vs. Magdangal Elma, ( GR. NO. 138965), promulgated on30 June 2006; 2. The clarification of the dispositive part of the decision ; and 3. The elevation of the case to the court en banc.The solicitor general, in behalf of the respondent, filed an omnibus motion,dated 11 august 2006 with substantially the sameallegation.R e s p o n d e n t E l m a w a s a p p o i n t e d a s C h a i r m a n o f T h e P r e s i d e n t i a l Commission on Good Government (PCGG) ON 30 October 1998. Thereafter,during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief Presidentiallegal counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second appointment, but waived anyrenumiration that he may receive as CPLC. Petitioners sought to have bothappointments declared as unconstitutional and therefore, null and void.In its decision, the court declared that the concurrent appointments of the respondents as PCGG chairman and CPLC were unconstitutional. It ruled that theconcurrent appointment to these offices is in violation of section 7(2) OF ARTICLEix-b of the 1987 constitution, since these are incompatible offices. The duties of CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the action of theh e a d s o f v a r i o u s e x e c u t i v e d e p a r t m e n t s a n d a g e n c i e s a n d r e v i e w i n g inves tigations involving heads of executive depart6mnets. Since the actions of thePCGG Chairman, a head of an executive agency, are subject to the review of theCPLC, such appointments would be incompatible.The court also decreed that the strict prohibition under section 13 Article VIIof the 1987 constitution would not apply to the present case, since neither the PCGG chairman nor CPLC is a secretary, under sectary or assistant secretary.However, had the rule hereunder been applicable to the case, the defect of thesetwo incompatible offices would be made more glaring. The said section allows theconcurrent holding of position only when second post is required by the primaryfunction of the first appointments and is exercised in an exofficio capacity.Although respondent Elma waived receiving remuneration for the secondappointment, the primary functions of the PCGG chairman do not require his appointment as CPLC. Ruling 1.After reviewing the arguments propounded in respondents’ omnibusmotion, we find that the basic issues that were raised have already beenpassed upon. No substantial arguments were presented. Thus, the courtdenies the respondents’ motion for reconsideration. 2.In response to the respondents’ request for clarification, the court ruledthat respondents Elma’s concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairmanand CPLC are unconstitutional, for being incompatible offices. This rulingdoes not render both appointments void. Following the common-

law ruleon incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated hisoffice as PCGG Chairman when he accepted the second office as CPLC. 3.There also is no merit in the respondents’ motion to refer the case toc o u r t e n b a n c . W h a t a r e i n q u e s t i o n i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e a r e t h e constitutionality of respondent Elma’s concurrent appointments, and nott h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f a n y t r e a t y , l a w o r a g r e e m e n t . T h e m e r e application of the constitutional provisions does not require the case tob e h e a r d a n d d e c i d e d e n b a n c . C o n t r a r y t o t h e a l l e g a t i o n s o f t h e respondent, the decision of the court in this case does not modify theruling in Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary. It should be notedthat Section 3 of Supreme Court Circular No. 2 -89, dated 7 February 1989 clearly provides that the court en banc is not an appellate court towhich decisions or resolutions of a division may be appealed.WHEREFORE, the respondents’ motion for consideration and for elevation of thiscase of court en banc is hereby DENIED.

Flores vs. DrilonG.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993 FACTS: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Said provision provides the President the power to appoint an administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as chairman and chief of executive of the Subic Authority. Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," The petitioners also contend that Congress encroaches upon the discretionary power of the President to appoint. ISSUE: Whether or not the provision Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 is constitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional prescription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts. RULING: The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold multiple functions since they are accorded with a public office that is a full time job to let them function without the distraction of other governmental duties. The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it cannot limit by providing the condition that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of Olongapo City shall assume the Chairmanship. The court points out that the appointing authority the congress gives to the President is no power at all as it curtails the right of the President to exercise discretion of whom to appoint by limiting his choice.

Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate. On the other hand. maintain the constitutionality of Mison’s appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison’s salaries and emoluments. in unconstitutional? Held: No. the President appoints. The first group is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. (2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are nototherwise provided for by” and similar malpractices. and thus. al. the 1973 Constitution. the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and the petition in intervention. ambassadors. It is an accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated. as can be determined through the recorded proceedings of Constitutional Commission. seek to enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague. one. Given the above two in extremes. and (4) officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. who are taxpayers. and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption. In the 1935 Constitution. without costs. lawyers.other public ministers and consuls. if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. the commission was frequently transformed into a venue of “horse.Sarmiento v. Issue: Whether the appointments of Mison et. members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional Law. as Secretary of the Department of Budget. on the other hand. consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successive amendments. The Supreme Court held that the President has the authority to appoint Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. in the . (3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. The respondents. officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonelor naval captain. Thus. Section 16. almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature. Mison Case Digest Facts: Petitioners. on the ground that Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in thisConstitution. Under the 1935 Constitution. the latter is entitled the full authority and functions of the office and receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. In the case at bar. A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and. Article VII of the 1987 Constitution empowers the President toappoint 4 groups of officers: (1) the heads of the executive departments.

Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed. those in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group. more than anything else. too” besides “in like manner” which meanings could stress that the word “also” in said second sentence means that the President. The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. as a literal import from the last part of par. And. the appointment of other officers. the second sentence speaks only of appointment by the President. The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. Thus.. Article VII of the 1935 Constitution.e. In the 1987 Constitution. officers of lower rank. a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.e. words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word “also” as used in the context of said second sentence. the Court has chosen to derivesignificance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by the Presidentand appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. contrary to the interpretation that the President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence. the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (RA 1937. with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Art. or in the courts. in the 1973 Constitution. This redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments. The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. The word “also” could mean “in addition. the first sentence of Sec. in the second sentence. except those mentioned in the first sentence. appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence. 16. In the case at bar. Consequently. the Court found the use of the word “alone” after the word “President” in said third sentence of Sec. without such confirmation. Moreover. i. VII clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments. or in the heads of departments. Article VII is. 16. can appoint (without such consent or confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence. struck a “middle ground” by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President. this use of different language in 2 sentences proximate to each other underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established. except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence. The word “alone” in the third sentence. the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Tarifff and Customs Code of the Philippines. 3. . in addition to nominating and. it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it. besides. there was no reason to use in the third sentence the word “alone” after the word “President” in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone. i. appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of “heads of bureaus” from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. as well. because the power to appoint officers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in him.. without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.1935 Constitution and the other. section 10.whereas.After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.

Art. as amended by PD34 on 27 October 1972). however. with the result that.pinoycasedigest. like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. appoint the heads of with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. RA 1937 and PD 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec.html . RA 1937 and PD 34 were approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. VII. http://www. 16. while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President. such appointment. as anappointment he is authorized by law to make. under which the President may nominate and.Section 601. After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. no longerneeds the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. however.

VII of the Constitution. Petitioner insists on a mandatory compliance with RA 6715 which has in its favor the presumption of validity and which he contends that the law is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive as provided for in the Constitution. by law. subject to confirmation by the Commission onAppointments. Art. in addition to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President. workers and employers sectors. series of 1989. Issue: Whether or not Congress may. by law. as Congress may. require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law). then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued Administrative Order No. amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was approved. require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments ofappointments extended by the president to government officers.Calderon vs. Carale Facts: Sometime in March 1989. designating the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners. without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to RA 6715 as amended. 16. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor. .” Pursuant to said law (RA 6715). 161. The appointments stated that the appointees may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office. After said appointments. It provides in Section 13 thereof as follows: “The Chairman. Petitioner questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and Members of the NLRC. President Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public.

The Supreme Court held that the provisions of RA 6715. VII of the Constitution by adding theretoappointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.Held: No. Art. by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. VII of the Constitution is exclusive and cannot be expanded by mere act of legislation. and 2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts. 16. Even the Solicitor-General stated that the provision of that law appertaining to the confirmation by the Commission on Appointmentstransgresses the Constitution and is therefore.” Thus.blogspot. VII of the Constitution. 13 is unconstitutional because: 1) it amends by legislation. Art. by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments onappointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President. The NLRC Chairman and Commissioners are among those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The Court further stated that “the legislature cannot. the Supreme Court said the appointment to NLRC positions do not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. upon passing law which violates a constitutionalprovision. 16. as the provision in RA 6715 isdeclared unconstitutional. Sec. http://coffeeafficionado. without any legal basis. the first sentence of Sec. Art.html . The provisions of first paragraph Art.

there are four groups of officers of the government to be appointed by the President: . Aquino. Drilon. through Executive Secretary Franklin S.Manalo vs Sistoza Facts: On December 13. Pres. Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition. (2) The PNP is akin to the Armed Forces where the Constitution specifically requires confirmation by the CA. The said Act states that the PNP Chief. Aquinosigned into law Republic Act 6975. and (3) Respondent Secretary in allowing and/or effecting disbursements in favor of respondent officers despite the unconstitutionality and illegality of their appointmentsis acting without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments. Pursuant thereto. Under Section 16. He contents that: (1) RA 6975 requires confirmation of the appointments of officers from the rank of senior superintendent and higher by the CA. Chief Superintendent and Director General shall be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. the Department of Budget and Management. of the Constitution. as a taxpayer suit. The said police officers took their oath of office and assumed their respective positions. former President Corazon C. to assail the legality of subject appointments and disbursements made therefor. creating the Department of Interior and Local Government. Enriquez III. 1990. Article VII. Issues: 1) Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation 2) Whether or not the PNP is akin to the AFP 3) Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 areconstitutional Held: 1. under the then Secretary Salvador M. promoted 15 police officers to permanent positions in the Philippine National Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. Thereafter.

ambassadors. no less. It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the confirmation by the Commission onAppointments.” The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. the heads of the executive departments.First. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of the State. and other officers whoseappointments are vested in him in this Constitution. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law. Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation ofappointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. such as the herein respondent police officers. sets forth the distinction. Third. The appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first category. Thus. Second. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Fourth. other public ministers and consuls. which shall be national in scope and civilian in character to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission onAppointments. all other officers of the Government whose appointmentsare not otherwise provided for by law. as may be provided by law. The Constitution. Under Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution. Singson. “The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and service. Section 6 of the same Article of the Constitution ordains that: “The State shall establish and maintain one police force. officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain. . need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. 2. directors and chief superintendents of the PNP.” On the other hand.

The rest of Republic Act 6975 It is well-settled that when provisions of law declared void are severable from the main statute and the removal of the unconstitutional provisions would not affect the validity and enforceability of the other provisions. Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the Commission not on Appointments to confirm the appointments ofpublic officials whose appointments are required by the Constitution to be confirmed are unconstitutional.R. Sistoza.3. 107369. No. the statute remains valid without its voided sections. (Manalo vs.html . G.blogspot. 1999) http://eightsubjects. August 11.

149036. 2000. 2 0 0 1 . as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC. Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim a p p o i n t m e n t s i s s u e d b y t h e P r e s i d e n t a m o u n t s t o a t e m p o r a r y appoint ment prohibited by Section 1 (2). OnMarch 2001. Article IX-C of the Constitution. ISSUES: Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo. BENIPAYOG. respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandumaddress transferring petitioner to the Law Department. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 2001.During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department. 2002 FACTS: On February 1999. and other pertinent administrative and civil servicelaws. petitioner filed theinstant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo. No. Borra and Tuason violatethe constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC. W h i l e o n s u c h a d i n t e r i m appointment. RULING: We find petitioner’s argument without merit. 7 dated April . April 2. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.MATIBAG VS. 3 3 0 0 d a t e d November 6.Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC enbanc. alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h)o f t h e O m n i b u s E l e c t i o n C o d e .scribd. Benipayo denied her request for r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o n A p r i l 1 8 . http://www. 07. petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelec’sEID by then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular. c i t i n g C O M E L E C R e s o l u t i o n N o . The Constitution itself makesan ad interim a p p o i n t m e n t p e r m a n e n t i n c h a r a c t e r b y m a k i n g i t e f f e c t i v e u n t i l di sapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. S h e a l s o f i l e d a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a n d c r i m i n a l c o m p l a i n t 16 w i t h t h e L a w Department 17 against Benipayo. C O M E L E C R e s o l u t i o n N o . respectively. 3 2 5 8 . 001. reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period. Petitioner requested Benipayo tor e c o n s i d e r h e r r e l i e f a s D i r e c t o r I V o f t h e E I D a n d h e r r e a s s i g n m e n t t o t h e L a w Department.Borra and Tuason. An ad interim a p p o i n t m e n t i s a p e r m a n e n t a p p o i n t m e n t b e c a u s e i t t a k e s e f f e c t immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee hasqualified into office. s. rules and regulations. C i v i l S e r v i c e Memorandum Circular No. respondent Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman tog ether witho t h e r c o m m i s s i o n e r s i n a n a d i n t e r i m a p p o i n t m e n t .R.Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo.

Issue: Is President Arroyo’s appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session. Romulo. Jr. the exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. On August 2004. Villa. Defensor. Yap (“respondents”) as acting secretaries of their respective departments. Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments.. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. On 23 September 2004. Abad. and the legislature may not interfere with theexercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature. Avelino J. constitutional? Held: Yes. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. Gonzalez. Cruz. President Arroyo issued ad interimappointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.Pimentel vs. The scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. and Arthur C. Ermita Facts: This is a petition to declare unconstitutional theappointments issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (“President Arroyo”) through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. Michael T. Rene C. Alberto G. . Raul M. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office. Durano. However. The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidentialappointments. Joseph H. even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress. Ermita (“Secretary Ermita”) to Florencio B.

it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary. as long as the President deems that person competent. Title I.” The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. petitioners claim that the issuance ofappointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse. An alter ego.Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents as acting secretaries because “in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary. Section 17. through a law. such as the office of a department secretary. In case of vacancyin an office occupied by an alter ego of the President. the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Title I. in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office. like the use of acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission onAppointments. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses. Chapter 5. the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee. holds a position of great trust and confidence. Chapter 5. Book III of EO 292. Book III of EO 292 states that “*t+he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch.” Thus. the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President. Finally. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. whether temporary or permanent. . Petitioners fail to consider that actingappointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in Section 17(3). Congress. but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee. cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be. Congress. The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. by the very nature of the office of a department secretary. Thus. The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session.

Actingappointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but. http://coffeeafficionado. However.html . whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a way before the lapse of one year. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointmentsare extended only during a recess of Congress. we find no abuse in the present case. acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress. they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished fromappointments in an acting capacity. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection. if abused.blogspot.

only n term. y election by majorityvote entirely vacant may the Presidentof the Phil. The original founding trusteeswere all pointed municipalpublic corpor members to 9. 6 (b) of PD 15 is free from ambiquity.Aquino . 139554. EO 1058 issuedin 1985 increased 9 to 11. Dismissing case against TantocoSecond case. Endriga Case: Section 16 Article 7: Facts: Two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under rule 45 of the 1997 rules of civil procedure. except respondent Tantoco.Endriga vs. acting in consultation with ranking officers of CCP. Thus Rufino group took respective oaths of office and assumed performance of their duties in 1999. Aquino asked incumbent CCP trustees for courtesy resignation andappointed new trustees to the of 4 years to replace the Endriga group. collectively known as the RUFINO group seeks toset aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals and the Resolution denying the motion for the reconsideration. Y 4-year term can onlybe wasunnecessary because 10 incumbent trustees had the statutory power to fill up by election any vacancy of the board. Declaring petitioners. after People Power Resolution.First case. seeks to assail the Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals insame case insofar as it denied their Motion for Immediate Execution of the 30 oard of Trustees of 7 members to preserve and promote Philippine culture. Rufino group. ENDRIGA group to have a clear right to their respective offices elected by the CCPboard up to expiration of 4-year term2. Sec. GR No. fill such vacancies. GR No. 1. the Endriga group. Estrada Y Endriga group files Petition for memberof CCP board. 139565.1986. represented by the Solicitor General.Rufino vs. Ousting respondents. Y Y eclared Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as CCP trustees and ousting Rufinogroup from board.supervision and control over governmentcorporations restrict or modify application of CCP Charter. Y that the law could onlydelegate to the CCP board the power to appoint officers lower in rank . In the case at bar. except forTantoco. from their respective offices andexcluding them therefrom3.

Appointments vested by Consti in Supreme Court and Constitutional CommissionAppointment of Heads of Departments. MAIN ISSUE OF 1 St case: Whether or not Section 6 paragraph B of PD 15 in which gives authority to CCP trustees toelect or appoint fellow officers of equal rank. agencies. that only thePresident has the appointing powers of appointing heads of executive departments)Important Issues related to lesson:1. by law. Agencies. is unconstitutional (as it is against Sec. Makes CCP a self-perpetuating entity.5. Others such power are the Supreme Court en banc and Consti Com Chairperson of CCP Board is Head of CCP:Chairperson. Only can the President exercise his/her power to appoint if the board becomes entirelyvacant. Consti2. Vacancies shall be filled by election of majorityvote by the trustees.Section 16 of Article 7 of Consti:-source of gives President legislature authority to delegate power to appoint. staff andpersonnel of the Centersamerights and privileges and obligations as Exempted from coverage of Civil Servi - . Heads of Executive department (with consent from Commission of Appointments)2. specifically from the Pres. Section 4 of the rules of court. Lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may. Congress may. by the law. SUCH and of control. with: oCongress o Batasang Pambansa can also appoint inferior officers. vest in the heads of departments. Y Hence the consolidated petitions. virtually outside the control of the Pres. commissions or boards.Section 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15: has the power and authority of the corporation. has the power to appoint all officers. without consent of Comm of App)3. Commissions.Power to appoint to heads is a matter of legislative grace. and Boards:Appointing powers belong to President. -executing vested by Consti thus not subject to legislative limitations orconditions. vest upon the appointment of other officers lower in President appoints 5 groups of officers:1. Officers of the Government (if the law is silent or head appointing declared unconsti)4.However.than trustees of Board officers of equal y decision. with confirmation from the Board. on over CCPMAIN ISSUE OF 2 Nd ase: whether or not a writ of quo warranto involving public office such as CCP should bedeclared a self-executing judgment and deemed immediately executor under Rule 39. Those whom President may be authorized by law to appoint (and 3.16 of Article 7. ate the CCP from political influence and pressure.

6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 are unconstitutional.Presindent. 6 talks about independent appointing powers which conflicts with the Presid two system of appointing powers are recurring anomalies and controversies inappointment every time new President assumed office.Limitations: o -judicial bodies. 6 empowers remaining trustees to fill vacancies of Board. by majority vote. o supervision HOLDING: .While Sec. shall elect another Chairperson Y Chairperson and has power to appoint lower ranked officers Y Under PD 15. agencies. 6 (b) (c) vs.Appoint. allowing them to elect fellowtrustees. since proceedings and decisions are judicial in natureand subject to judicial review. 16 of Article 7:HOLDING: Sec. Control:Applies to acts or decision of all officers in the Executive Branchexercise of discretionact directly whenever a specific function is entrustedby law or regulation of subordinateExecutive branch is unitary thus only the Presindet had executive power exercising control over entireExecutive Branch.scribd.What is the CCP?agency. discipline all officers and personnelPerform duties until Board. commissions or boards to appointonly officers lower in rankSec. Sec.. http://www. remove. only admin power of Pres. CCP is a public corporation governed by the Board thus not an agencySec. Sec. we grant the petition of the 1stcase wherein we find Sec. And wefind it unnecessary to rule 2ndcase. notplaced or order creating them under President controls CCP-judicial functions. 16 allows only the heads of departments.. 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it authorizes remaining trustees to fill by election vacancies of the Board.

challenging Castillo’s right to exercise the powers of the Governor of the Central Bank. He issued Administrative Order No. 1962. withdrawing and canceling all ad interim appointments made by President Garcia after December 13. Case 2 on December 31. http://www. made last minute appointments while the Commission on Appointments was not in session. who was appointed as ad interim Governor of Central Bank. who was still President that time. Castillo then contended that Aytona’s appointment had already been revoked by Administrative Order No. 1961 recalling. 2.mylegispinoy. 1961. However. 2 issued by President Macapagal. 1961. 1961. President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office. RULING: Upon the ground of separation of powers. both exercised the powers of their office. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank and the latter qualified immediately. which was the date when Macapagal was proclaimed President by the Congress. Garcia even after the appointees had already qualified. Garcia. Aytona was prevented from holding office the following day and thus instituted a quo warranto proceeding. canceling such “midnight” or “last-minute” appointments. On January 2.Aytona vs Castillo Case Digest FACTS: On December 29. Aytona claims that he was validly appointed and had qualified for the post. He then appointed Andres V. ISSUE: Whether President Diosdado Macapagal had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by President Carlos P. therefore making Castillo’s appointment void. Said last minute appointment included Dominador R. Aytona. Carlos P. the court resolved that it must decline and refuse jurisdiction in disregarding the Presidential Administrative Order No. At noon on December 30. The latter took oath on the same day.html .

except temporary appointments toexecutive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice publicservice or endanger public safety. The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. in view of Secs. respectively.In Re Appointments of Hon. there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointmentsduring the period of the ban http://cofferette. VII. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest. during the period of the ban on appointmentsimposed by Sec. These appointments appear prima facie. They come within the operation of theprohibition relating to appointments. 1998 of Hon.html . 15.blogspot. Placido Vallarta Facts: Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30. Art. the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary. The saidconstitutional provision prohibits the President from making anyappointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term. VII of the Constitution“two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President is neither required to makeappointments to the courts nor allowed to do so. 4(1) and 9 of Art. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacanciesin the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. Art. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City. Issue: Whether or not. VIII Held: During the period stated in Sec. and that at least. VII of the Constitution. Art. 15 of Art. 15. 15. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6 years. to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VII of the Constitution.

the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose of clarification and emphasis. Still others. They would have easilyand surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15. That such specification was not done only reveals that theprohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within twomonths before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or ActingPresident’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. Section 4(1) –are clear and speak for themselves on what the Constitution covers in banningappointments during the election period. Article VII to theappointment of Members of the Supreme Court. have all been resolved by the decision of March17. does not lead to an interpretationthat exempts judicial appointments from the express ban on midnight appointments RULING: The court denies the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit. Issues: Whether or not Section 15. appeal to the principles of interpretation and latin maxims to prove their point. andaccordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela ruling. repeating their originalarguments. Nonetheless.Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling. not being new. Article VII of the Phil Consti.scribd.De castro vs JBC FACTS: The movants present their arguments on the main issue at several levels. mostlikely in Section 4 (1).It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are resolvingthat because all the Members of the present Court were appointed by the incumbentPresident. for all the matters beingthereby raised and argued.We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended pointin order to suit the purposes of any quarter http://www.24 although the effect is to deny the sitting President the option to appoint in favorof a deferment for the incoming President’s action. Theycould not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the . Article VIII.23 One even posits that there is no conflict becauseboth provisions can be given effect without one detracting against the full effectiveness of the other. they could have explicitly done so. 2010. Article VII as being equallyapplicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself. a majority of them are now granting to her the authority to appoint the successorof the retiring Chief JusticeHad the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15. Some argue thatthe disputed constitutional provisions – Article VII. Section 15 and Article VIII.


In this context. LMC averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. too. Exec Sec Pajo ruled in favor ofPaño. The said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone. is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. So. And control simply means “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. Thus it is. his.Lacson-Magallanes Co. He also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power. confirm. Parenthetically.” . too. is his control of all executive departments. His is the power to appoint them. vs Paño & Executive Secretary Pajo FACTS: Political Law – Delegation of Control Power to the Executive Secretary Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. he controls and directs their acts. HELD: The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. The Constitution. The Director of Lands denied Paño’s request. LMC asserts. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter. that department heads are men of his confidence. it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President’s power of control over the executive departments. ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Exec Sec and may it be further delegated by the Exec Sec. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President. Paño was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. Magallanes then ceded his rights to LMC of which he is a co-owner. Implicit then is his authority to go over. it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary. Naturally. modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries.

http://www. Not as correct. or even reverse any order” that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions.uberdigests. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that “under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to . modify. is it to say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person. may issue.It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must exercise in person. including the Director of Lands. however. Reason is not wanting for this view.

has in its favor conformity with the policy of the law as reiterated in a host of cases. had applied for the disputed lot as a homesteader as far back as 1935. Petitioner.: The appealed decision of the lower court. There would be no justification both in law and in conscience for a reversal. THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT and JOSE FACUN.. 1976 IRENEO ROQUE. as respondents. etc. arbitrarily disregarding the sales award of the land in question in favor of the herein petitioner having already paid is for the price of the same.. on the other hand.. Barredo and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for respondents-appellees The Director of Lands. Antonio M. Executive. through respondent Assistant Executive Secretary. vs. Arias. the order of the respondent Honorable Director of Lands . The nature of the case was set forth in the decision thus: "This is a special civil action for certiorari filed by Ireneo Roque.." 3 As was further stressed by him: "Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments. The prevailing party. petitioner-appellant. No. the Honorable Director of Lands. after due hearing.. J. highly unorthodox We affirm. To put the matter thus is to indicate the fate in store for this appeal. Respondent Jose Facun. lacks the power to overrule the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources is to betray lack of awareness of the implications of what Justice Laurel referred to in Villena v. to put it at its mildest. consisting of unqualified reliance and the biased report and recommendation of the Assistant Public Land Inspector Andres V. 1 dismissing a certiorari petition against the Assistant Executive Secretary of the President for sustaining the award by the Director of Lands of a homestead application and thus overruling the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. . be set aside on the alleged ground that the said order of the Director of Lands was issued with grave abuse of discretion. himself a previous beneficiary of the statute. . To contend that the Office of the President. 4 What was asserted then by petitioner. L-25373 July 1. Cipriano A. . and praying further that the decision of the Honorable Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources be sustained. Orara for petitioner-appellant.. et al. THE HONORABLE. through Atty. respondents appellees.R. and on the factual allegation that the said decision of the Honorable Executive Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction and committed a grave abuse of discretion. v. and the decision of the respondent Honorable Assistant Executive Secretary. Secretary of the Interior as 2 the establishment [in the Philippines] of a single. and had submitted his final proof in 1948.. would seek to add to his holding by a sales application. not plural. Solicitor General Antonio P. private respondent Jose Facun.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS. the Honorable Assistant Executive Secretary to the President and Jose Facun. is. as petitioner. FERNANDO. Tan for respondent-appellee Jose Facun. Cipriano . THE HONORABLE. now appellant. praying that.. their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President.

then the investigated would not have recommended the issuance of a patent to the appellant for the whole of Lot No. who inspected appellant's entire homestead a year earlier and recommended the issuance of a patent herefore. after taking note of the conclusion arrived at by respondent Director of Lands. 4507. through his counsel Atty. 9 decided in 1919. 4507. " 7 There should then be conclusiveness of such finding." 10 If it were otherwise. If it were true that he had occupied the disputed portion since 1937. the appellee [Roque] submitted his sales application for the disputed portion in 1948. it appearing that he is also the applicant of another lot adjoining Lot No." 12 That "paramount public purpose 13 should not be nullified by the courts. Ernesto B. filed an answer denying specifically the alleged paragraphs 3. Tan. "when approved by the Office of the President. The Honorable Director of Lands. only during the course of the investigation of his protest. quoted from the order of respondent Assistant Executive Secretary This is the relevant portion: "It is noteworthy that Lands Inspector Cruz who investigated the case in 1948 was the same investigator. and the personification of the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines. asponente. in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution no less. 10. stressed that homestead applicants. there is no justification for a reversal. the result would be agrarian troubles and internal strife 11 because of the natural discontent of the masses. Moreover. by the better considered decisions. Director of Lands. and excess of jurisdiction." 8 As set forth at the outset. with the intention . and specifically denying petitioner's aforequoted allegations Re: abuse of discretion. de Castro. They alleged the following affirmative defenses: (1) Petition states no cause of action. the order of the Director of Lands reversing the order of the District Land Officer is in violation of Lands Administrative Order No. "is to encourage residence upon and the cultivation and improvement of the public domain. 1. in Aquino v. filed an answer to the petition denying specifically the allegation of paragraph 6 of the petition." 6 The appealed decision. through Assistant Solicitor General Pacifica P. it was verified during the reinvestigation of this case that the appellee [Roque] entered upon the disputed portion in 1951 only. that a person who takes possession of land in the erroneous belief that it is public land. On the other hand. the decision of the Assistant Executive Secretary is perfectly valid. It would be a plain defiance of the settled policy of the law if the homestead application of private respondent Facun would not be honored and the sales application of petitioner Roque sustained. If it is true that the appellee [Petitioner Roque] had been in occupation of the disputed portion since 1937. arbitrariness. is on the side of private respondent Facun. hence. he could have filed his application earlier. through his Executive Secretary. 12 and 13 of the petition. Likewise." according to him. and likewise denying emphatically and specifically petitioner's assertion of abuse of discretion. Justice Malcolm. Franco. arbitrariness and excess of jurisdiction. [representing] the Highest Magistracy of the Land." 14 This Court has even gone so far as to rule in Government of the Philippine Islands v. That approach has commended itself to this Tribunal in all subsequent cases. but the better doctrine. it is significant to note that the appellant [Respondent Facun] filed his homestead application in 1935 and submitted the final proof therefore in 1939. 6 . Borromeo." 5 The contention of petitioner was then set forth: "Petitioner's counsel maintains that the order of the District Land Officer had already become final and executory. 15 speaking through Justice Street: 'There is indeed some authority for this point of view. The facts argue against it and the law. and it is now held. or Assistant Executive Secretary. Llaguno submitted an answer specifically denying paragraphs 3 and 12 of the petition and its averments concerning abuse of discretion. 44 poor men with a legitimate ambition to acquire homes are [not to be discouraged.A. recently promoted as Assistant Solicitor General. and (2) Assuming arguendo that it states a cause of action. arbitrariness and lack of . jurisdiction. and then Solicitor Isidro C. revealing the drift of the later cases is to the contrary. The Honorable Assistant Executive Secretary to the President. "The object and purpose of the homestead law. according to the appealed decision.

under the law. he came out with the theory that can only be characterized as a constitutional heresy." 22 It cannot be otherwise. There is. we have decided to sustain the contention of the government in this case on the broad proposition. the land covered thereby is deemed private property. it is understandable why he would seize on what could be a legal loophole. With such formidable. It can also be disposed of quite easily. unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is in the Government. . That is all there is then to his case. Even without a patent. are. 17 it was held: "A perfected valid appropriation of public lands operates as a withdrawal of the tract from the body of the public domain and. and the acts of the secretaries of such departments. It is his contention that respondent Assistant Executive Secretary. bureaus or offices. There is quite a number of cases where precisely from a decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources." 18 The strength of the claim of private respondent Facun is thus quite obvious if deference be paid to previous authoritative pronouncements of this Court. except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally. a perfected homestead is a property right in the fullest sense. acting for the President. Neither is it to rely merely on logical inferences to a constitutional concept of major dimension. Tecson v. so long as such appropriation remains valid and subsisting." 16 Earlier. 21 concerning the broad executive authority is still good law. or offices of the national government. as well as to act in lieu of such officers. which may be sold and conveyed and will pass by descent. one other error assigned. could not reverse a derision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Salas. A valid and subsisting perfected homestead." 25 This is not to dabble in generalities. the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive. obstacle confronting petitioner Roque.. What was said in a 1970 decision. if it may be called that. unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive. He would impress finality on the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reversing the award made in respondent Facun's favor by the Director of Lands. section 12. of our Constitution. "the Villena ruling applies with undiminished force. 3. Farrales. and. 2. has the effect of a grant of the present and exclusive possession of the land. 26 To argue as petitioner Roque did then is to indulge in a futile endeavor. No such error could possibly be imputed to the lower court as no such question was therein raised As noted in the opening paragraph of the appealed decision . the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments." 23 What is signifies was enunciated in categorical language by former Chief Justice Concepcion in Pelaez v. presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Article VII.of holding and claiming it under the homestead law. that under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1. That was what happened in this case. A perfected homestead. The doctrine so clearly and emphatically announced by Justice Laurel in the aforecited Villena decision 19 is precisely the opposite. however tenuous as an avenue of escape Unfortunately for him. performed and Promulgated in the regular course of business. considering the plain and explicit command of the 1935 Constitution that the President has "control of all the executive departments. there is nothing to prevent the President to disapprove or reprobate the act of a department head. Such land may be conveyed or inherited. in Balboa v. an appeal was taken to the Office of the President. in addition.. is property in the highest sense. Auditor General: 24 "The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments. Thus: "After serious reflection. all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department. may acquire title thereto by adverse position as against the true owner.. not to say insurmountable. albeit not suggested. It has the effect of a grant of the right to present and exclusive possession of said land. made and kept up in accordance with the provisions of the statute." 20 Clearly then. bureaus. That was all that the lower court did.

inadvertence. they do not show that the said order has become he raised as one of the legal questions the finality of the order of a district land officer. asserting that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion. http://www. order. during the trial. what he cited was Section 14 of Lands Administrative Order No. the appealed decision is affirmed. with the proviso that the application for that purpose should be made within a reasonable time. only two months elapsed from the date the appeal was taken to the Office of the President. He still had then a period of ten months within which to k a reconsideration of the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. found against him: "All the exhibits of the petitioner do not show when Jose Facun and Ines Yarcia received copies of the said order. a reversal of the appealed decision cannot in law or in conscience be justified. From his own computation. which was reversed by the Director of Lands. but in no case exceeding one year. 27 Apparently. the order of the Director of Lands reversing the order of the District Land Officer is in violation of Lands Administrative Order No. Even if such were not the case. default. after considering the matter." 28 The lower court. Costs against petitioner Ireneo Roque. Thus. when matters are seen in their true light.Officer had already become final and executory. hence. or other proceeding if there be a mistake.lawphil. WHEREFORE. 6. however. This decision is immediately executory." 29 How then could it be plausibly contended that the lower court was in error in not according finality to the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources when that was never an issue before it? There can be no relevance therefore to that portion of petitioner's brief making reference to the dates as to when such decision was all received by respondent Facun. petitioner Roque objected to the order of the Director of Lands. 6. it becomes apparent why. or executive neglect.herein cited. surprise. which would allow the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to relieve the party or his legal representative from a decision. Hence. characterizing it as the result of an "unqualified reliance [on the] report and recommendation" of a certain public lands inspector. as was made clear at the start. who made the award in favor of respondent Facun: 'Petitioner's counsel maintains that the order of the District Land.html .

one of the issues raised and submitted for reso was whether or not the Office of the President can set aside the award made by SBMA in favor of HPPL and if so. Again. Issued a memorandum to conduct a rebidding. In a memorandum. ICTSI filed an appeal with SBMA and also before the Office of the President. can the Office of the President direct SBMA to conduct rebidding of the proposed project? . Issue: Can the President set aside the award made by SBMA in favor of HPPL? If so. considering that SBMA had repeatedly declared and confirmed that HPPL was the winning bidder. Nothwithstanding the SBMA’s board recommendations. SBMA advertised an invitation offering to the private sector the opportunity to develop and operate a modern marine container terminal within Subic Bay Freeport Zone. Out of 7 bidders. the President ordered SBMA Chairman Gordon to revaluate the financial bids together with the COA. then Exec Sec Reuben Torres submitted a memorandum to the Office of President recommending another rebidding. During the pre-trial hearing. the SBMA Board issued another reso declaring that HPPL is selected as winner. HPPL filed a complaint against SBMA before the RTC and alleged that a binding and legally enforeceable contract had been established between HPPL and SBMA under Article 1305 of the civil code. However.Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited (HPPL) v Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority Facts          Petition to suspend or hold in abeyance the conduct of SBMA of a rebidding. 3 were declared as qualified: 1) ICTSI 2) RPSI and 3) HPPL SBMA-PBAC first awarded to HPPL. Consequently. the Office of Pres. can the Office of the President direct the SBMA to conduct re-bidding of the proposed project. 1997. On July 7. since it has a realistic business plan offering the greatest financial return to SBMA and the most advantageous to the government.

http://www. agencies and instrumentalities including GOCCS involving P2M and . the same was within authority of the President and was a valid exercise of his prerogative. overturn or reverse any award made by the SBMA Board of Directors for justifiable reasons. 620 mandates that the approval of the President is required in all contracts of the national government offices.scribd. The President may. Though SBMA Board of Directors may have declared them as winner. All projects undertaken by SBMA require the approval of the President under Letters of Instruction No. awarded through public bidding or negotiation. within his authority. When the President issued the memorandum setting a side the award previously declared by SBMA in favor of HPPL. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. said award is not final and unassailable.Held:        Yes HPPL has not sufficiently shown that it a has a clear and unmistakable right to be declared the winning bidder. 620 Letters of Instruction No. The SBMA Board of Directors are subject to the control and supervision of the President.

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