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Document Code:
Zach Coughlin,Esq.
NV Bar No: 9473 (currently suspended)
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Plaintiff/Sub-Tenant

IN THE JUSTICE COURT OF RENO TOWNSHIP


IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE, STATE OF NEVADA

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ACG-APMI, INC. DBA NORTHWINDS


)
APARTMENTS; DWAYNE JAKOB,
)
Individually and in his capacity as property
)
manager for NORTHWINDS APARTMENTS; ) CASE NO: RJC Rev2012-001048
NEVADA COURTS SERVICES, LLC (NCS); )
JEFF CHANDLER, Individually and in his
) DEPT. NO: 4
capacity as owner and CEO of NCS;R. WRAY, )
Individually and in his capacity as licensed
)
process server for NCS;NORTHWIND
)
APARTMENT ASSOC LLC 1031 XPRESS )
NORTHWIND LLC 110 110TH AVE NE
STE 550 BELLEVUE, WA 98004 Description
Summary
Fictitious Firm Name Counter 74040 04/01/1997 12:00:00 AM
Expiration Date: 04/01/2002 Business Name:
NORTHWIND APARTMENTS Owners:
NORTHWIND APARTMENT ASSOCIATES,
LLC

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Landlord,

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vs.

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ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN;

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Tenant

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REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF


SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE 27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to
- 1/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

Docket 62337 Document 2013-20762

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Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing Hearing on July
31st, 2011
COMES NOW, ZACH COUGHLIN, ESQ., and files the above titled document and request
that the Motion to Set Aside the June 28th, 2012 Lockout Order by submitted to the Judge for a
decision. he and him and him and him and Jeff Chandler Nevada court services are making of the

court wait a second that's lovely to this they put the word court in the name and their business then

they bang on people's doors and leave out the Nevada bed and just say court services in and allowed

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angry tone while dressed up looking like Sheriffs,,, you really have to hand it to this guy Jeff
Chandler he is a master of manipulation and intimidation upon hapless tenants he has his crew and
himself dress up looking like they're the got damn Sheriff then they'd put the word court in there after

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name who would possibly not do everything they say and even if you do failed to do it they say they

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will try and break into your rental and all were rental as they have on Coughlin on numerous

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occasions will Coughlin got arrested for trespassing various made up charges that the law local law

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enforcement have brought Coughlin whether to afraid to charge in the trespass Nevada court services

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his escape prosecution despite that date and can this captured on tape when behind of a closed

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backyard gate Coughlin's law office and banged on Windows for 30 and 40 min. at a time three times

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a day while they have another guy ringing the doorbell over and over and over and issued taunts to

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anyone inside Coughlin's former law office. Ahen R. WrayJuly 31st, 2012 Hearing was not noticed

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for the purposes of disposing of any such Motion, and further, the Order following that hearing

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purported to rule on matters not connected to Unit 29 (mentioning unit 45 in the Order), which,

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would necessarily make the Order, under NRS 40.400 and NRCP 60(b)(4), void for lack jurisdiction.

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Being that a tolling Motion has not been disposed of in this matter, there may still be an appeal, as

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the deadline to file one has not run. Legislatures make the law. NRCP 11 provides corporations,

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- 2/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

such as the ones that own and run Northwinds Apartments (doing business in 10 states, not some

Mom 'n Pop operation) cannot appear pro se...and nothing in NRS 118A, NRS 118, or NRS 40

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changes that. There might be something allowing a "landlord's agent" to post a notice (maybe,
maybe not), but there is nothing allowing one to practice law. But...if Coughlin's law license is
suspended...does that mean he can open up shop and start representing clients in landlord tenants

matter before the RJC for a fee? Just like Northwinds? Northwind's Web site contains the following

text: " Nevada Court Services...An Eviction, Process Service & Consulting Company,,,Northern

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Nevada Eviction Service Northern Nevada's only Professionally Licensed, Fully Insured and
Uniformed Eviction Agency...Reno / Sparks Eviction Services Professionally Licensed and Fully
Insured Private Agency We provide your property with Workers Comp. Insurance and State of

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Nevada Licensing NON- PAYMENT OF RENT NOTICES Prepare & Service Package We will

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Prepare Serve / Post your notice. We will fax your notice to your office and hold the original or mail

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the original with the affidavit to you upon request. NOTE: You must calendar your Lock Out date

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and call our office should you need the Lock Out. $40.00 per notice + mileage if applicable Full

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Service Package We will prepare your notices. (Including all Types of Notices to meet your needs)

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We will Serve / Post your notice. Prepare the return of service for the court should your Notice go to

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Lock Out. Track by computer the number of days prior to the first available Lock Out date. We will

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prepare your Lock Out Affidavit, pick up your checks if necessary and file with the court . We will

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make the arrangements with the Sheriff's Office and appear on your behalf at the Lock Out.". There

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is nothing wrong with Coughlin. And mincing explanations that these Orders are not "personally...I

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am sorry you are in this situation, its nothing personal...." do not change the fact that Judges apply

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the law, while legislatures enact the law, and that the law must be so applied faithfully and without

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prejudice or conflict, even where Coughlin is currently at odds with some in the Washoe County

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- 3/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

District Attorney's Office and some individual's spent most of their career so far there. Further, it

was impermissible to base Coughlin's bail in the arrest incident to this matter RCR2012-067980 on

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pending criminal charges under some totality of the circumstances theory. Bench Book Courts of
Limited Jurisdiction 2008 and 2010 Supplement. Bail may be for one thing and one thing only, to
ensure the defendant's appearance at trial.

incident to the NOtice served on my rental at Northwind Apartments 1680


Sky Mountin Drive unit 29 on June 28th, 2012. I believe the tenant's
affidavit I filed in response to that 5 day notice should be given a brand new
case number, though the designation by ncs that it was an "Amended
NOtice" pursuant to is is is is is is is isis it is as if the isthe 6/14/12 one (the
one R. Wray lied about effecting "personal service" on me of, which got me
arrested just before I was to fax to the RJC, by noon, a Tenant's Answer or
MOtion to Dismiss for failure to state a cause of action or deficieny of
service of process or something (I arguably needn't have even filed
anything in the RJC where the 6/14/12 notice listed Sparks Justice Court.
Oh, it gets better...Nevada Courts services filed a Landlord's Affidavit
attesting to have rented Coughlin a "dwelling" which is defined as a
"sleeping place or residence" in NRS 118A...and pursued an eviction under
NRS 118A...citing a breach by Coughlin for allegedly using the unit 29 for
a residence or sleeping place, instead of pursuing NRS 40.760 or NRS
118.475 eviction remedies (which, by the way, may result in the Sheriff
evicting Coughlin or forcing him to quit any alleged use of Unit 29 as a
"dwelling place or residence", but YOU WILL NOT THAT UNDER
THOSE STATUTES COUGHLIN WOULD BE ALLOWED, UNDER
THE LAW TO CONINUTE STORING AND ACCESSING HIS
PROPERTY THERE!!!!CAN'T HAVE IT BOTH WAYS ALL THE
TIME, GUYS. Oh, also, who in the hell signed the Landlord's affidavit?
There is no textual indication of whom the solitary letter of a "signature"
belongs to....maybe because it would be a NRCP 11 violation for a
corporation to appear "pro se", especially where represented by someone
committing the unauthoried practice of law?
- 4/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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R. Wray made some interesting statements on the video of the 6/28/12


arrest filmed by Coughlin, especially concerning Coughlin's contention that
Wray and NOrthwind's Dwane Jakob's attempts to break and enter and
trespass into Unit 29 constituted "personally serving" Coughlin a 5 day
Unlawful Detainer Notice on 6/14/12. If NCS did not "personally serve"
Coughlin, then Coughlin would have had until June 28th, 2012 at noon at
the earliest (and arguably until the close of business at 5pm on 6/28/12 to
file a response (ie Tenant's Answer or MOtion to Dismiss, etc), in Sparks
Justice Court OR EVEN in REno Justice Court. Coughlin was arrested at
10:30 am on 6/28/12, thereby, under color of law, the WCSO, NCS and
NOrthwind and Jakob fraudulently prevented Coughlin from filing (if he
did not already previously, espeically in the 6/13/12 faxes that are
mysteriously unaccounted for in rJC files) a Tenan'ts Response (tEnan'ts
answer, or Tenant's AFfidavit or Motion to Dismiss, etc.).

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So, R. Wray and NCS, its kind of a big deal that you lied about effecting
personal service on 6/14/12 of the 5 day notice.

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Coughlin has three different version of that notice or "Declaration of


Srevice by License PRocess SErver" R. Wray. in one, a time of 9:23
(presumably am, but that is not circled, nor is pm) on 6/14/12 is listed, and
a rubber stamp indicating "r. wray", is there, along with a hadnwritten "reg
#r-043948" is there. that Declaration indicates that R. WRay "personally
served" the partey named, Coughlin. Oddly, this first version (and all three
of these are in the RJC file in rev2012-001048) instead of "jennifer
Chandler" being in , I guess, the signature line for the "agent" of the
landlrod (and she always just places a "rubber stamp" of her name
anyways..", instead of Jennifer Chandler, on the one 6/14/12 5 day NOtice
(and all version sof this notice have checks on box 3 and 6, which read "3.
Recieved a 5 day notice of possible unlawful detiner for failure to comply
with the rental agreement....6. Remained in possesion of the premises

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- 5/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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subject to the provision of Chpater 118A of the NRS after having failed to
perform the basic or contractual obligations imposed upon you by that
Chapter, namey (SEE ATTAChed)" though the "attached just seems to
include a copy of the "Rental Agreement" with no real indication of how
Coughlin was in violation of it, and no indication of why NOrthwinds feels
Coughlin remained in violation thereof despite Coughlin's written
communications indicating that he was not in breach. Anyways, rather tha
a rubber stamp indicating "jennifer Chandler" on that one 5 day notice, the
one where WRay actually affixes his actual signature, follow by a handwritt
r-043948 (his licensed process sever number), the spot usually baring the
"Jennifer Chandler" rubber stamp is instead taken up by a signature by
Nevada Court Services resient notary public HB Cedomio....AGain, there is
no time listed on that first version of the NOtice or which includeds at the
bottom the "Declaration of Service...."

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In the second version of the "notice of Unlawful detainer..." served on June 14th, 2012, in his
"Declaration of Service by Licnese process Server" (which, arguably inovkes the "penalty of
perjury dicate of NRS 53.045...) Wray against declares he personally served Coughlin, with a
time of 9:23 indicated, and a rubber stamp of "R. Wray" on the signature line, with a
handwritten "REg #R-043948" (and that version was faxed by the Sparks Justice Court to the
Reno Justice Court on June 28th, 2012 at 11:05 am, (in a 13 page fax, many pages of which are
not in the RJC file, though that fax does included the header from the fax from Coughlin to the
"Sparks Justice Court on 6 26 12 at 12:00pm, which was a 10 page fax, and the versio of the
6/14/12 5 day notice with Declartion of Service by r. Wray indicating a time of 9:23 is page 6 of
10 of Coguhlin's fax to the Sparks Justice Couer (according to the fax hearders) while also being
page 12 of teh June 28th, 2012 fax from the Sparks Justice court to the Reno Justice Court. right
about the moment Coughlin was being placed in WCSO Deputy Machen squad or patrol vehicle
for transprot to the jail, where Coughlin would be forced to fork over some more bail, etc., etc.
IN the Third version of the "Declaration of Service" on the same June 14th, 2012 "NOTICE OF
UNLAWFUL DETAINER FOR FAILURE TO VACATE PREMISES ..This third version of
his 6/14/12 Declaration of Service by Licensed PRocess Serve R. Wray has the typical "jennifer
chandler" rubber stamp for the NOtice half of the page, and has a rubber stamp for "?R.wray",
along with a clearly differt handwrirtn note of "reg# r043" (obviously, aside from the
handwriting "analysis" the handwrittn numberical indication of the process servicer number is
truncated on this third version by 3 numbers). Additionaly this third version indicates it was
"personally served" at 12:54 pm.

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- 6/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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Why all the different versions? why, if personally service was effect at 9:23 am, woud R. Wray
need to return and do it again, all for Unit 29, nmin you only (all the other Declartions of
Service from that date of 6/14/12 , ie for units 45 and 71, indicate that Wray merely posted teh
notice to the rented property (and therefore would entail 3 more days fro mailing to get
"construtive notice" under NRCP 6(e) and NRCP 5(b)(2), which landlord's like Northwinds just
hate.

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Then there is the fact that NCS snuck into the file later a whole nother type
of notice, one under NRS 40.760...which, of course, changes everything..

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OF course, Wray did not "personally serve" Coughlin. Wray attempts to


make some half-baked argument about how he slid (after failing in his
attempts to break and enter and trespass in to Unit 29 on 6/14/29) the 5 day
UD Notice into a crack in the door of the rental, and perceived it to "move"
after he let go of it, thereby, apparently, entitling him to assert that he
effected "personal service" upon tenant Zach Coughlin, or, apparently,
otherwise complied with NRCP 5, and therefore cut short the time for
Coughlin to respond as a tenant and secure a hearing (rather than be
incarcerated after having unknown violent sounding figures (flashbacks to
other interactions with Nevada Court Services) banging on his doors,
refusing to indentify themselves, then ultimately taking a chainsaw (or
sawz-all) to a metal door to a confined windowless rental.

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NRS 40.400 makes NRCP the applicable rules here, not JCRCP, nor
JCRRT:

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RULE 5. SERVICE AND FILING OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER PAPERS

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Rule
Drafters Note
Commentary
(a) Service: When Required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, every order required
by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to the original complaint unless the court
otherwise orders because of numerous defendants, every paper relating to discovery required to
be served upon a party unless the court otherwise orders, every written motion other than one

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- 7/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment,
designation of record on appeal, and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. No
service need be made on parties in default for failure to appear except that pleadings asserting
new or additional claims for relief against them shall be served upon them in the manner
provided for service of summons in Rule 4.
[As amended; effective September 27, 1971.]
(b) Same: How Made.

(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a party
represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney unless the court orders
that service be made upon the party.

(2) Service under this rule is made by:

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(A) Delivering a copy to the attorney or the party by:

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(i) handing it to the attorney or to the party;


(ii) leaving it at the attorneys or partys office with a clerk or other person in charge, or if there
is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place in the office; or
(iii) if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the persons
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion residing
there.

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(B) Mailing a copy to the attorney or the party at his or her last known address. Service by mail
is complete on mailing; provided, however, a motion, answer or other document constituting the
initial appearance of a party must also, if served by mail, be filed within the time allowed for
service; and provided further, that after such initial appearance, service by mail be made only by
mailing from a point within the State of Nevada.

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(C) If the attorney or the party has no known address, leaving a copy with the clerk of the court.

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(D) Delivering a copy by electronic means if the attorney or the party served has consented to
service by electronic means. Service by electronic means is complete on transmission provided,
however, a motion, answer or other document constituting the initial appearance of a party must
also, if served by electronic means, be filed within the time allowed for service. The served
attorneys or partys consent to service by electronic means shall be expressly stated and filed in
writing with the clerk of the court and served on the other parties to the action. The written
consent shall identify:

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(i) the persons upon whom service must be made;

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- 8/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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(ii) the appropriate address or location for such service, such as the electronic-mail address or
facsimile number;

(iii) the format to be used for attachments; and

(iv) any other limits on the scope or duration of the consent.

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An attorneys or partys consent shall remain effective until expressly revoked or until the
representation of a party changes through entry, withdrawal, or substitution of counsel. An
attorney or party who has consented to service by electronic means shall, within 10 days after
any change of electronic-mail address or facsimile number, serve and file notice of the new
electronic-mail address or facsimile number.
(3) Service by electronic means under Rule 5(b)(2)(D) is not effective if the party making
service learns that the attempted service did not reach the person to be served.
(4) Proof of service may be made by certificate of an attorney or of the attorneys employee, or
by written admission, or by affidavit, or other proof satisfactory to the court. Failure to make
proof of service shall not affect the validity of service"
In the legal work drafted and filed by a non-attorney, a criminal violation in NCS's and Jeff
Chandler's committing the authorized practice of law (what happens to people doing plastic
surgery without a license? jail time, lots of it...because something could go badly, badly wrong
and people could get hurt...like Coughlin got hurt, damaged, arrested, financially destroyed, etc.,
etc. here. thin skull plaintiff, consequential damages Winchell v Schiff 2008 case seafood,
storage place lost business and lost profits $300K damages, etc.. while in jail Coughlin was
prevented from filing in matters that ultimately wound up with a $40,050 judgment against
Coughlin, and there's more, for which NOrthwind, and NCS, Chandler and WRay, and perhaps,
some others, will be liable.). In the "Affidavit of Landlord for Breach" filed on June 27th, 2012
by ,well, who knows, given it just says "Lanldord" and has what appear s to be a handwritten
"S" in the signature line...but, lets say it was filed by Jeff Chandler, whom crossed the bar and
argued before Judge Pearson on July 31st, 2011 in REv2012-001048 on behalf of his "client'
Northwind Apartments, Associates LLC (see acg-ampi.com, doing business in 10 states, kinda
seems like they could afford and attorney rather than destroy our community with hack pretend
lawyers who play dress as a Sheriff and bully peopel while attempting to break and enter and
trespass...and then RPD Alan Weaver and SArgent Oliver Miller, and WCSO Deputy John
Machen and Deputy Gomez chip in some Soldal v. Cook County violating 1983 violations as
well....puke, puke. puke... IN the "Affidavit of Landlord for Breach" that Chandler drafted and
filed, he wrote, at paragraph 4. "him and nation surrender of the premises was to have taken
place on or before June 13, 2012. That legal notice has been served on the tenant's in accordance
with the provisions of NRS chapter 40.280 as amended on 6/14/12."

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- 9/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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Chandler's Affidavit of Landlord for Breach demonstrates a lack of candor to the tribunal, which
would be professional misconduct to report to the SBN, but, Chadler aint a lawyer, so,and what
are ya goin' ta do? DDA Yound? DDA Kandaras, isn't that your jurisdiction? That is a
criminal law violation, right, unauthorized practice of law...and in that June 27th, 2012 Affidavit
of Landlord Chandler sneakily lists "N/a" in the blank for the "original period of is (blank)
terminating on o forr transferring to a periodic tenancy on that date. A copy of the written
rental agreement, if any , is attached hereto."....Upon information and belief, chandler failed to
inlcude a copy of the Rental Agreement in at least one of these NOrthwind files (not sure if it
was in the one for unit 29, rev2012-001048, but it woudl make sense, as Northwind's eggs were
all in that basket in a sense.) Anyways, the Rental AGreement makes clear the period is not
"n/a"...why would Chandler do that? Coudl it be that NRS 40.253 has differ atent laws for
tenancies where the rent is reserved by a period of 1 week or less? Coughlin paid for one
month's rent up front at the time the Renal Agreement was signed. Also, see isthe craigslist ad
Coughlin responded to placed by Northwind, and incorporated into an "Rental Agreement",
along with verbal indications, arguably, under NRS 118A.160 (which only applies to "dwelling
places", but the Landlord's Affidavit inidcates this rental was, in paragraph 2 such, as it states
"2. That yor affiant isrented a certain dwelling or apartment to Zach Coughlin, located at 1680
sky mountain dr...#29, Reno, NV on 5/4/12 for an original period of N/a terminating on or
transferrinto a periodic tenancy on that date. a copy of the written rental agreemet if any, is
attached hereto.".. Chandler seems to want to take advanteg of NRS 40.253(2)'s quickie service
approach for week to week rentals, which unit 29, by virtue of the terms of the Rental
Agreement, clearly was not. as him and him and him this but the new the signatures is written
in the amount of $75 is due no later than the first of late after the for every month late is asked
Bob Loblaw clearly this was a periodic tenancy of month to month for variety further one
provision and this one is rental agreements has written 30 days notice to vacate is required or
rental will be responsible the next months rent covered Chandler tends to one characterize this
as a week to week or less type tenancy to take advantage of the lessons service requirements
there and found in NRS 40.253(1)-(2):
Further, the Rental Agreement is not necessarily limited to the document that NOrthwind
Apartments purports to be the "GARAGE / CARPORT RENTAL AGREEMENT" as their
exists no limitation in that document that affirmatively disclaims any incorporation of
statements by then Manage Deede Call (whom mysteriously disappeared upon current Manager
Dwayne Jakob showing up) or incorporated into the Rental Agreement or Lease by virtue of the
advertisements that Northwinds held out to the public on Craigslist, which is how Coughlin
learned of their offer, upon which Coughlin called then Manager Deede Call and met with her in
person. Attached in Exhibit 1 is the Craigslist ad that Northwinds was running at the time, and
it read:
"$75 One Size Car Garage For Rent (Northwest Reno, NV)
Date: 2012-04-02, 10:02AM PDT
Reply to: see below
Welcome to Northwind Apartments. We offer storage units to non-Northwind Residents! If you
need more storage, we offer garages to rent for $75 per month. They are a full size single car
- 10/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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garage. Most public storages would charge over $150 dollars for the same size! Our community
is located in northwest Reno, right
off of McCarran. Please call us at (775) 747-9200 or come by. We are located at 1680 Sky
Mountain Drive in Northwest Reno."
AND IT GETS BETTER: The thing about NRS 40.760 is that it specifically indicates that
it does not apply to "garages". And Judges don't legislate from the bench, they just apply the
law as written, so people can depend on notice provided by precedent and published laws. To do
otherwise is judicial misconduct arguably requiring a Complaint with the Judicial Discipline
Commission.
Further Coughlin asked and then Manager Deede Call (she is listed as the manager on the
"RENTAL AGREEMENT" of May 4th, 2012, and it bears hers and Coguhlin's signature,
numerous questions vis a vis the use of the rental, and clearly, Deede Call gave Coughlin
permission (and actually, Call did not indicate any "special permission" to use the rentals for
something other than parking a car was necessary to obtain anyways, and no one has established
that Coughlin did not use the rentals for parking anyways, and any Fourth Amendment violating
trespass and videoing of Coughlin's rentals is not admissible anyways. Soldal v. Cook Co.
CHAPTER 40 - ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS IN PARTICULAR CASES CONCERNING
PROPERTY SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS FOR OBTAINING POSSESSION OF REAL
PROPERTY, RECREATIONAL VEHICLE OR MOBILE HOME
NRS 40.253 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and exclusion of
tenant for default in payment of rent.
NRS 40.280 Service of notices to quit; proof required before issuance of order to remove.
NRS 40.400 Rules of practice.
CHAPTER 108 - STATUTORY LIENS
LIENS OF OWNERS OF FACILITIES FOR STORAGE

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NRS 108.475
Use of storage space for residence prohibited; eviction; nature of facility;
effect of issuance of document of title for property.
CHAPTER 118A - LANDLORD AND TENANT: DWELLINGS

CHAPTER 197 - CRIMES BY AND AGAINST THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF


THIS STATE
NRS 197.090
Interfering with public officer.
NRS 197.100
Influencing public officer.
NRS 197.110
Misconduct of public officer.
NRS 197.120
False impersonation of public officer; intrusion into and
refusal to surrender public office.
NRS 197.130
False report by public officer.
NRS 197.140
Public officer making false certificate.
- 11/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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NRS 197.160
NRS 197.180
NRS 197.190

Fraudulently presenting claim to public officer.


Wrongful exercise of official power.
Obstructing public officer.

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The arrest of Coughlin at Northwinds Apartments on June 28th, 2012 by the same WCSO
Deputy Machen who filed a false affidavit attesting to have "personally served" Coughlin the
Summary Eviction ORder from Coughlin's former home law office on November 1st, 2011,
when in reality, Machen just posted the Order to the door when nobody was home (and
therefore committed trespass under color of law, as he failed to comply with NRCP 5(b)(2)
(made applicable to landlord tenant matters by NRS 40.400) and NRCP 6(e).

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So, WCSO Machen arrested Coughlin for a violation of NRS 197.190:

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NRS 197.190 Obstructing public officer. Every person who, after due notice, shall
refuse or neglect to make or furnish any statement, report or information lawfully
required of the person by any public officer, or who, in such statement, report or
information shall make any willfully untrue, misleading or exaggerated statement, or
who shall willfully hinder, delay or obstruct any public officer in the discharge of
official powers or duties, shall, where no other provision of law applies, be guilty of a
misdemeanor.

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Yet DDA charged Coughlin in the Criminal Complaint in RJC RCR2012-067980 with
a different crime, NRS 199.280:
"NRS: CHAPTER 199 - CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE
OTHER OFFENSES
NRS 199.280
Resisting public officer.
A person who, in any case or under any circumstances not otherwise specially
provided for, willfully resists, delays or obstructs a public officer in discharging or
attempting to discharge any legal duty of his or her office shall be punished:
1. Where a firearm is used in the course of such resistance, obstruction or delay, or
the person intentionally removes, takes or attempts to remove or take a firearm from
the person of, or the immediate presence of, the public officer in the course of such
resistance, obstruction or delay, for a category C felony as provided in NRS 193.130.
2. Where a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm, is used in the course of such
resistance, obstruction or delay, or the person intentionally removes, takes or attempts
- 12/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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to remove or take a weapon, other than a firearm, from the person of, or the immediate
presence of, the public officer in the course of such resistance, obstruction or delay, for
a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130.
3. Where no dangerous weapon is used in the course of such resistance, obstruction
or delay, for a misdemeanor."

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Why the change from DDA Young? It couldn't be becuase NRS 199.280 is more
damaging to Coughlin's law license, in light of SCR 111(6), than would be a simple
little NRS 197.190 charge, could it? Is that permissible where the WCDA and WCSO
have a vested interest in discrediting and demolishing Coughlin in light of allegation
of misconduct by both of those offices with respect to its treatment of Coughlin, in
addition to misconduct against Coughlin by the WCDC?
Nevada Supreme Court Rule 111(6): "6. Definition of serious crime. The term
serious crime means (1) a felony and (2) any crime less than a felony a necessary
element of which is, as determined by the statutory or common-law definition of the
crime, improper conduct as an attorney, interference with the administration of
justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, willful failure to file an income tax
return, deceit, bribery, extortion, misappropriation,". Convictions of a "serious crime"
require Bar Counsel to file a SCR 111 Petition against the attorney.
Could there be any clear demonstration of the retaliatory animus against Coughlin by
the Washoe County District Attorney's Office? Are prosecutors paid to play out
grudges and sanction misconduct by local law enforcement? Rather than just a
"resisting" charge, DDA Young and the WCDA want to try to glom on a "false
swearing" and "inteferring with the administration of justice" claim, even where the
know of the 6/26/12 written correspondence by Coughlin to both the Sparks and Reno
Justice Courts and the Civil Division of the Washoe County Sheriff's Office. Enough
is Enough. This prosecutorial misconduct must not stand.
But, really Coughlin is hereby complaining to the landlord, pursuant to NS 118A.510
of a violation of the criminal law by one who is arguably an "agent" of the landlord
(not making a bribery allegation here, to be clear, though):
NRS 197.200 Oppression under color of office.
1. An officer, or a person pretending to be an officer, who unlawfully and
maliciously, under pretense or color of official authority:

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- 13/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

(a) Arrests or detains a person against the persons will;

(b) Seizes or levies upon anothers property;

(c) Dispossesses another of any lands or tenements; or

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(d) Does any act whereby the person, property or rights of another person are
injured,
commits oppression.
2. An officer or person committing oppression shall be punished:
(a) Where physical force or the immediate threat of physical force is used, for a
category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130.
(b) Where no physical force or immediate threat of physical force is used, for a
gross misdemeanor.

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Further, this is an officil written complaint against WCSO Deputy Machen and
Gomez, please place a copy of this Complaint in their employment and personnel files,
and please do the same with respect to RPD Officer Alan Weaver, Sargent Dye,
Sargent Oliver Miller, and Officer Welch for their gross misdemeanor, consisting of
doing that which is the domain of the Sheriff under NRS 40.760 in conection with the
matter at Superior Mini Storage on or around September 21st, 2012 under the
following law, in light of teh language in NRS 40.760 and NRS 108.475, which I
made the RPD aware of at the time, and Soldal v. Cook Co. Couldn't be too much of a
budget crunch when local law enforcement acts the way they do, veritably goading
civil rights tenant's right attorney's into suing them through their reckless and tacky
behavior: NRS 197.180 Wrongful exercise of official power. Any person who
willfully takes upon himself or herself to exercise or officiate in any office or place of
another, without being lawfully authorized thereto, is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.

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Also, uner NRS 118A.510, I am complaining of the following violations of criminal


law on Northwind's behalf:
NRS 197.120 False impersonation of public officer; intrusion into and refusal to
surrender public office. Every person who shall falsely personate or represent any
public officer, or who shall willfully intrude into a public office to which the person
has not been duly elected or appointed, or who shall willfully exercise any of the
functions or perform any of the duties of such officer, without having duly qualified
therefor, as required by law, or who, having been an executive or administrative
officer, shall willfully exercise any of the functions of office after his or her right to do
- 14/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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so has ceased, or wrongfully refuse to surrender the official seal or any books or
papers appertaining to such office, upon the demand of his or her lawful successor,
shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
[1911 C&P 67; RL 6332; NCL 10016]
NRS 197.130 False report by public officer. Every public officer who shall
knowingly make any false or misleading statement in any official report or statement,
under circumstances not otherwise prohibited by law, shall be guilty of a gross
misdemeanor.

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NEvada Court Services regularly attempts to mislead tenant's into thinking the act with color of law. From Joel Durden
barking at me in his Sheriff look-a-like getup that he is an "officer of the court" and from "Court Services" to having the
word "Court" in their name,etc., etc. NEvad Court Services impersonates public officers. Additionally, Machen's police
report is false to the extent that it fails to indicate that, at least at some point, Machen and or Deputy Gomez refused to
idnetify themslevs. They don't know what someone is doing inside when they purport to "knock and announce" and the
must reasonably be expected to assume one could have not heard their initial announcing their idnetify (whether because
they had headphones or, were in the bathroom, whatever...and Machen and his cowboy partner Gomez refused to identify
themselves in response to a request that they do so by Coughlin, and similarly refused to slide through the door any
paperwork or warrant describing the purpose of their visit.

WCSO is that Machem's Affidavit of Service indicates that he "personally


served" me, which kind of reminds me of all that robo-signing and MERS
fraud I come across in my day job (and do you wonder how many attorneys
in the foreclosure defense game I am in constant contact with who are
watching and witness the potential RICO violations this writing mentions?),
which includes being a foreclosure defense attorney. So which is it? Did
Machem "personally serve" me the Summary Eviction Order? Richard G.
Hill, Esq. likes to argue that I was "served" in compliance with all time
related rules because it was done in the "usual custom and practice of the
WCSO. What, exactly, is the "usual custom and practice of the WCSO? I
hear a lot about this "within 24 hours" stuff. So, I go hunting for some
black letter law to support what those at the RJC and in the clueless
community at large (which often includes Nevada Legal Services and
Washoe Legal Services, the people you guys had such trouble actually
serving in the lawsuits I filed, which may have actually helped improved
legal services in this community, if they were not dismissed due to
insufficiency of service of process, even where the IFP required the WCSO
to served the defendants....). Anyway, back to the "within 24 hours"
phraseology: "

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- 15/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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This whole business about The court may thereupon issue an order
directing the sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within
24 hours after receipt of the order... is inapplicable to this situation, where
an Order Granting Summary Eviction was signed by October 27th, 2011.
That language is only found in situations inapplicable to the current one.
NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2), and NRS 40.253(5)(a) are the only sections of NRS
40 where this within 24 hours language occurs, and those situations only
apply where, in:
40.253(3)(b)(2): 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must: ...
(b) Advise the tenant: . (2) That if the court determines that the tenant is
guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order for
removal of the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of the
tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant
within 24 hours after receipt of the order
and,
40.253(5)(a): 5. Upon noncompliance with the notice:
(a) The landlord
or the landlords agent may apply by affidavit of complaint for eviction to
the justice court of the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile
home or commercial premises are located or to the district court of the
county in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial
premises are located, whichever has jurisdiction over the matter. The court
may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of the
county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order. The
way these summary eviction proceedings are being carried out in Reno
Justice Court presently shocks the conscience and violates Nevada law.
There is not basis for effectuating a lockout the way WCSO's Deputy
Machem did in this case. The above two sections containing the within 24
hours of receipt language are inapplicable, as those situations do not
invoke the present circumstances, where the Tenant did file an Affidavit
and did contest this matter to a degree not often seen. To require Nevada's
tenants to get up and get out within 24 hours of receipt of the order
(what does that even mean? The use of terms like rendition, rendered,
notice of entry, pronounced, is absent here, and this receipt of the
order language is something rarely found elsewhere in Nevada law-see

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- 16/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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attached DMV statutory citations, and in employment law litigations where


one must file a Complaint within 90 days of receipt of a Right To Sue
Letter, a situation which follows NRCP 5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in imputing
receipt of such a letter, when actual receipt is not shown, by applying a
constructive notice standard that relies upon the days for mailing
extension of time for items served in the mailing, etc.). In Abraham v.
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the
record did not reflect when the plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter. The
letter was issued on November 24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90day period commenced on November 30, 2006, based on three days for
mailing after excluding Saturdays and Sundays. In order to bring a claim
under either Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative
remedies and sue within 90 days of receipt of a right to sue letter. See 42
U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown,
466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)(granting
plaintiff an additional three days for mailing pursuant to Rule 6).
Further, despite what the inaccurate handouts of Nevada Legal Services
may say about this 24 hours and the applicability of the JCRCP to cases
like these, NRS 40.400 Rules of practice, holds that :The provisions of
NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure and Nevada Rules of Appellate
Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals and new trials, so far as they are
not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive,
apply to the proceedings mentioned in those sections. As such NRCP 6(a),
(e) applies to the Order of Summary Eviction that WCSO Deputy Machem
alleged, under penalty of perjury, that he "personally served" upon me on
November 1, 2011. That is a lie by Mr. Machem, unless "personally
served" is defined in a rather impersonal way and or Machem and I have
totally different understanding of the definition of "personally served",
which may be the case. Or, perhaps the Sheriff's Office is busy and doesn't
want to wait around to "personally serve" every tenant it wishes to evict.
Fine, then just use the "mail it and allow three days" rule in NRCP 6(e)...the
landlord's might not like it, but they can use that frustration as an incentive
not to jump to litigating every disagreement about habitability that a tenant
brings to them. You may not realize how ridiculous some landlord's get.
- 17/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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In my case, I offered to fix basic things that clearly implicated the


habitability rules in NRS 118A.290 and the Californian neurosurgeon,
Beverly Hill High School graduate landlord balked and complained then
hired and attorney four days into a dispute.....at which point the rules
against contacting represented parties prevented much in the way of real
settlement discussion, particularly where opposing counsel has
continuously demonstrated a complete indifference to pursuing settlement
(why would he at the rates he bills hours at?). I just don't think the
Sheriff's Office needs to sully its image or damage the citizen tenants of
Washoe County in the name of pleasing people like Dr. Matt Merliss or
Richard G. Hill, Esq.

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I am hereby complaining to Northwind Apartments of a violation of the criminal law by one of


its agents R. Wray and other process servers with NCS (Oh, and RPD Officer Weaver also
threatened to use "hydraulic explosives" to gain entry to one of my three rentals at Northwind,
though no exigent circumstance existed and though he lacked a warrant. I have previously
complained of Lou Cadia, Milan Krebs, both Northwind Maintenance Personnel, and Northwind
Property Manager or Apartment Manager Dwayne Jakob attempt to break and enter into my
rentals (why is it when Richard G. Hill, Esq. calls the RPD and alleges I am trespassing, I get
subject to a custodial arrest and Hill gets the State Bar of Nevada to try to prosecute me for
"breaking an entering", even though WCSO Machen lied in his Affidavit of Service in RJC
rev2011-0010708, and the Court had failed to return to me at the time of arrest the $2,275 it
wasn't permitted to require I deposit in a "rent escrow" account in the first place, and where Hill
and his contractor are caught on video admitting to having remove my ladder from the former
law office (in a video of December 23rd, 2011...why doesn't the RPD arrest Hill and Phil
Stewart for larceny of my ladder? Do I have to be Wal-Mart or Richard G. Hill or Northwinds
Apartments (ie, rich, connected) to get the RPD to enforce the law when I complain of a
violation?
NRS 40.280 Service of notices to quit; proof required before issuance of order to remove.
1. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 40.253, the notices required by NRS 40.251 to 40.260, inclusive, may be served:
(a) By delivering a copy to the tenant personally, in the presence of a witness;
(b) If the tenant is absent from the tenants place of residence or from the tenants usual place of business, by leaving
a copy with a person of suitable age and discretion at either place and mailing a copy to the tenant at the tenants
place of residence or place of business; or
(c) If the place of residence or business cannot be ascertained, or a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be
found there, by posting a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased property, delivering a copy to a person there
residing, if the person can be found, and mailing a copy to the tenant at the place where the leased property is situated.
2. Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manner as provided in subsection 1.
- 18/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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3. Before an order to remove a tenant is issued pursuant to subsection 5 of NRS 40.253, a landlord shall file with the
court a proof of service of any notice required by that section. Before a person may be removed as prescribed in NRS
40.290 to 40.420, inclusive, a landlord shall file with the court proof of service of any notice required pursuant to
NRS 40.255. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 4, this proof must consist of:
(a) A statement, signed by the tenant and a witness, acknowledging that the tenant received the notice on a specified date;
(b) A certificate of mailing issued by the United States Postal Service; or
(c) The endorsement of a sheriff, constable or other process server stating the time and manner of service.
4. If service of the notice was not delivered in person to a tenant whose rent is reserved by a period of 1 week or less and
the tenancy has not continued for more than 45 days, proof of service must include:
(a) A certificate of mailing issued by the United States Postal Service or by a private postal service to the landlord or the
landlords agent; or
(b) The endorsement of a sheriff or constable stating the:
(1) Time and date the request for service was made by the landlord or the landlords agent;
(2) Time, date and manner of the service; and
(3) Fees paid for the service."
[

NRS 118A.430 Failure of tenant to comply with rental agreement or perform basic obligations:
Termination of rental agreement.
1. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, if the tenant fails to comply with the rental
agreement or fails to perform his or her basic obligations under this chapter, the landlord may
deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying the acts and omissions constituting the breach
and that the rental agreement will terminate as provided in this section. If the breach is
remediable and the tenant does not adequately remedy the breach or use his or her best efforts to
remedy the breach within 5 days after receipt of the notice, or if the breach cannot be remedied,
the landlord may terminate the rental agreement.
2. If the tenant is not reasonably able to remedy the breach, the tenant may avoid termination
of the rental agreement by authorizing the landlord to enter and remedy the breach and by
paying any reasonable expenses or damages resulting from the breach or the remedy thereof.
Northwinds and NCS failed to comply with NRS 118A.430(1) (to the extent it even applies her)
in that in no way did it "deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying the acts and omissions
constituting the breach". Northwinds simply wrote "see attached", after paragraph 6 of teh
6/14/12 Notice, which reads "6. Remained in posssession of the premises subject to the
provisions of Chapter 118A of the NRS after having failed ot perfrom the basic or contractual
obligations imposed upon you by that Chapter, namely: (SEE ATTACHED)" and then NCS, at
most, include a copy of the "Rental Agreement" with its filing of this Notice to the RJC, which
in no way specifies what aspect of that Rental Agreement Coughlin is purportedly in breach of,
or what facts supports such an allegation.
Any Order he is void or subject oa NRCP 60b set aside based upon the fraud of NCS and Wray
in lying where he declares (under penalty of perjury) to have "personally served" Coughlin the 5
day notie on 6/14/12, and under NRCP 60b4 void for lack of jurisdiction where NCS failed to
specify in the Lanldord's Affidavit all that required under NRS 40.253. and for so many other
reasons, such at 118A does not apply if the rental is deemed to be not e "dwelling", and that an
illegal lockout is not available even if Coughlin is ruled to have been "using as a residence" the
rental, should the rental be a "storage facility" which City of Reno Code Enforcement does not
view it to be...and Further, by Northwinds very own descriptives, it is a garage, one they held
- 19/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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out to the public for more than mere "parking a car", and as such, under NRS 40.760 and
108.4733, 108.475 and NRS 40.760 are not even available to Northwind. They. Are. Stuck.
Deal With It.

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NRS 108.4733
Facility defined.
storage area in a private residence.

Facility means real property divided into individual storage spaces. The term does not include a garage or

NRS 108.4746
Storage space defined.
occupant who has access to the space.

Storage space means a space used for storing personal property, which is rented or leased to an individual

NRS 108.475 Use of storage space for residence prohibited; eviction; nature of facility; effect of issuance of
document of title for property.

1. A person shall not use a storage space at a facility for a residence. The owner of such a facility shall evict any
person who uses a storage space at the facility as a residence in the manner provided for in NRS 40.760.

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NRS 108.4755 Contents of rental agreement.


1. Each rental agreement must be in writing and must contain:
(a) A provision printed in a size equal to at least 10-point type that states, IT IS UNLAWFUL TO USE A STORAGE
SPACE IN THIS FACILITY AS A RESIDENCE.

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MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

NRS 40.760 Summary eviction of person using facility for storage as residence.

1. When a person is using a storage space at a facility as a residence, the owner or the owners agent shall serve or have
served a notice in writing which directs the person to cease using the storage space as a residence no later than 24 hours
after receiving the notice. The notice must advise the person that:
(a) NRS 108.475 requires the owner to ask the court to have the person evicted if the person has not ceased using the
storage space as a residence within 24 hours; and
(b) The person may continue to use the storage space to store the persons personal property in accordance with the
rental agreement.
2. If the person does not cease using the storage space as a residence within 24 hours after receiving the notice to do
so, the owner of the facility or the owners agent shall apply by affidavit for summary eviction to the justice of the peace
of the township wherein the facility is located. The affidavit must contain:
(a) The date the rental agreement became effective.

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(b) A statement that the person is using the storage space as a residence.

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(c) The date and time the person was served with written notice to cease using the storage space as a residence.

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(d) A statement that the person has not ceased using the facility as a residence within 24 hours after receiving the
notice.
3. Upon receipt of such an affidavit the justice of the peace shall issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of
the county to remove the person within 24 hours after receipt of the order. The sheriff or constable shall not remove the
persons personal property from the facility.
4. For the purposes of this section:
(a) Facility means real property divided into individual storage spaces. The term does not include a garage or
storage area in a private residence.

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- 20/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

(b) Storage space means a space used for storing personal property, which is rented or leased to an individual
occupant who has access to the space.

(Added to NRS by 1989, 213; A 2011, 1830)

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Nevada Process Server Licensing Requirements


It is required that all process servers are licensed and 21, or over, two-years experience as a process server and insurance against
liability to third persons with limits of no less then $200,000. No bonding is required. However, applicants must deposit $750 upon
submitting their application to pay for a background investigation, the maximum an applicant can be charged for a background check
is $1500. Applicants must also pass a written application and may be required to pass an oral exam as well. Licenses are issued by
the Nevada Private Investigators Licensing Board. Nevada is the most expensive state in the nation to get licensed. [Nevada Revised
Statutes 648.110 and 648.135]

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NRS 40.253 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and exclusion of
tenant for default in payment of rent.
"

1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 10, in addition to the remedy provided in NRS
40.2512 and 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive, when the tenant of any dwelling, apartment, mobile
home, recreational vehicle or commercial premises with periodic rent reserved by the month or
any shorter period is in default in payment of the rent, the landlord or the landlords agent,
unless otherwise agreed in writing, may serve or have served a notice in writing, requiring in the
alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the premises:
(a) At or before noon of the fifth full day following the day of service; or
(b) If the landlord chooses not to proceed in the manner set forth in paragraph (a) and the rent is
reserved by a period of 1 week or less and the tenancy has not continued for more than 45 days,
at or before noon of the fourth full day following the day of service.
As used in this subsection, day of service means the day the landlord or the landlords agent
personally delivers the notice to the tenant. If personal service was not so delivered, the day of
service means the day the notice is delivered, after posting and mailing pursuant to subsection
2, to the sheriff or constable for service if the request for service is made before noon. If the
request for service by the sheriff or constable is made after noon, the day of service shall be
deemed to be the day next following the day that the request is made for service by the sheriff or
constable.
2. A landlord or the landlords agent who serves a notice to a tenant pursuant to paragraph (b) of
subsection 1 shall attempt to deliver the notice in person in the manner set forth in paragraph (a)
of subsection 1 of NRS 40.280. If the notice cannot be delivered in person, the landlord or the
landlords agent:
(a) Shall post a copy of the notice in a conspicuous place on the premises and mail the notice by
overnight mail; and
(b) After the notice has been posted and mailed, may deliver the notice to the sheriff or
constable for service in the manner set forth in subsection 1 of NRS 40.280. The sheriff or
constable shall not accept the notice for service unless it is accompanied by written evidence,
signed by the tenant when the tenant took possession of the premises, that the landlord or the
landlords agent informed the tenant of the provisions of this section which set forth the lawful

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- 21/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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procedures for eviction from a short-term tenancy. Upon acceptance, the sheriff or constable
shall serve the notice within 48 hours after the request for service was made by the landlord or
the landlords agent.
3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must:
(a) Identify the court that has jurisdiction over the matter; and
(b) Advise the tenant:
(1) Of the tenants right to contest the matter by filing, within the time specified in subsection 1
for the payment of the rent or surrender of the premises, an affidavit with the court that has
jurisdiction over the matter stating that the tenant has tendered payment or is not in default in
the payment of the rent;
(2) That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may
issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of
the tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours
after receipt of the order; and
(3) That, pursuant to NRS 118A.390, a tenant may seek relief if a landlord unlawfully removes
the tenant from the premises or excludes the tenant by blocking or attempting to block the
tenants entry upon the premises or willfully interrupts or causes or permits the interruption of
an essential service required by the rental agreement or chapter 118A of NRS.
4. If the tenant files such an affidavit at or before the time stated in the notice, the landlord or the
landlords agent, after receipt of a file-stamped copy of the affidavit which was filed, shall not
provide for the nonadmittance of the tenant to the premises by locking or otherwise.
5. Upon noncompliance with the notice:
(a) The landlord or the landlords agent may apply by affidavit of complaint for eviction to the
justice court of the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial
premises are located or to the district court of the county in which the dwelling, apartment,
mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has jurisdiction over the matter.
The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of the county to
remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order. The affidavit must state or contain:
(1) The date the tenancy commenced.
(2) The amount of periodic rent reserved.
(3) The amounts of any cleaning, security or rent deposits paid in advance, in excess of the first
months rent, by the tenant.
(4) The date the rental payments became delinquent.
(5) The length of time the tenant has remained in possession without paying rent.
(6) The amount of rent claimed due and delinquent.
(7) A statement that the written notice was served on the tenant in accordance with NRS 40.280.
(8) A copy of the written notice served on the tenant.
(9) A copy of the signed written rental agreement, if any.
(b) Except when the tenant has timely filed the affidavit described in subsection 3 and a filestamped copy of it has been received by the landlord or the landlords agent, and except when
the landlord is prohibited pursuant to NRS 118A.480, the landlord or the landlords agent may,
in a peaceable manner, provide for the nonadmittance of the tenant to the premises by locking or
otherwise.

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27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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6. Upon the filing by the tenant of the affidavit permitted in subsection 3, regardless of the
information contained in the affidavit, and the filing by the landlord of the affidavit permitted by
subsection 5, the justice court or the district court shall hold a hearing, after service of notice of
the hearing upon the parties, to determine the truthfulness and sufficiency of any affidavit or
notice provided for in this section. If the court determines that there is no legal defense as to the
alleged unlawful detainer and the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a
summary order for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of the
tenant. If the court determines that there is a legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer,
the court shall refuse to grant either party any relief, and, except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, shall require that any further proceedings be conducted pursuant to NRS 40.290 to
40.420, inclusive. The issuance of a summary order for removal of the tenant does not preclude
an action by the tenant for any damages or other relief to which the tenant may be entitled. If the
alleged unlawful detainer was based upon subsection 5 of NRS 40.2514, the refusal by the court
to grant relief does not preclude the landlord thereafter from pursuing an action for unlawful
detainer in accordance with NRS 40.251.
7. The tenant may, upon payment of the appropriate fees relating to the filing and service of a
motion, file a motion with the court, on a form provided by the clerk of the court, to dispute the
amount of the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118A.460 or 118C.230 for
the inventory, moving and storage of personal property left on the premises. The motion must be
filed within 20 days after the summary order for removal of the tenant or the abandonment of
the premises by the tenant, or within 20 days after:
(a) The tenant has vacated or been removed from the premises; and
(b) A copy of those charges has been requested by or provided to the tenant,
whichever is later.
8. Upon the filing of a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court shall schedule a hearing on the
motion. The hearing must be held within 10 days after the filing of the motion. The court shall
affix the date of the hearing to the motion and order a copy served upon the landlord by the
sheriff, constable or other process server. At the hearing, the court may:
(a) Determine the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118A.460 or 118C.230
and any accumulating daily costs; and
(b) Order the release of the tenants property upon the payment of the charges determined to be
due or if no charges are determined to be due.
9. A landlord shall not refuse to accept rent from a tenant that is submitted after the landlord or
the landlords agent has served or had served a notice pursuant to subsection 1 if the refusal is
based on the fact that the tenant has not paid collection fees, attorneys fees or other costs other
than rent, a reasonable charge for late payments of rent or dishonored checks, or a security. As
used in this subsection, security has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 118A.240.
10. This section does not apply to the tenant of a mobile home lot in a mobile home park or to
the tenant of a recreational vehicle lot in an area of a mobile home park in this State other than
an area designated as a recreational vehicle lot pursuant to the provisions of subsection 6 of
NRS 40.215.
(Added to NRS by 1967, 195; A 1969, 263, 575; 1973, 1085; 1975, 1202; 1977, 418, 1346;
1979, 1398, 1879; 1985, 229; 1987, 1239; 1989, 1082, 1232; 1991, 113; 1995, 1851; 1997,
3511; 1999, 981; 2009, 1966; 2011, 235, 1489)
- 23/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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NRS 40.254 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and exclusion of
tenant from certain types of property. Except as otherwise provided by specific statute, in
addition to the remedy provided in NRS 40.251 and in NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive, when
the tenant of a dwelling unit which is subject to the provisions of chapter 118A of NRS, part of a
low-rent housing program operated by a public housing authority, a mobile home or a
recreational vehicle is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the landlord is entitled to the summary
procedures provided in NRS 40.253 except that:
1. Written notice to surrender the premises must:
(a) Be given to the tenant in accordance with the provisions of NRS 40.280;
(b) Advise the tenant of the court that has jurisdiction over the matter; and
(c) Advise the tenant of the tenants right to contest the notice by filing within 5 days an
affidavit with the court that has jurisdiction over the matter that the tenant is not guilty of an
unlawful detainer.
2. The affidavit of the landlord or the landlords agent submitted to the justice court or the
district court must contain:
(a) The date when the tenancy commenced, the term of the tenancy, and, if any, a copy of the
rental agreement.
(b) The date when the tenancy or rental agreement allegedly terminated.
(c) The date when the tenant became subject to the provisions of NRS 40.251 to 40.2516,
inclusive, together with any supporting facts.
(d) The date when the written notice was given, a copy of the notice and a statement that notice
was served in accordance with NRS 40.280.
(e) A statement that the claim for relief was authorized by law.
3. If the tenant is found guilty of unlawful detainer as a result of the tenants violation of any of
the provisions of NRS 453.011 to 453.552, inclusive, except NRS 453.336, the landlord is
entitled to be awarded any reasonable attorneys fees incurred by the landlord or the landlords
agent as a result of a hearing, if any, held pursuant to subsection 6 of NRS 40.253 wherein the
tenant contested the eviction.
(Added to NRS by 1985, 227; A 1989, 1084, 1234; 1991, 115; 1995, 1853; 2001, 1065; 2003,
561)"

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I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHY THE FILE IN RJC REV2012-001048


HAS MY 6 PAGE FAX OF JUNE 30TH, 2012 (AND PLEASE NOTE
THE LIMITED OR SPECIAL APPEARANCE NATURE OF THAT
FILING IN THE NOTE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE FIRST PAGE....YET
IT IS NOT FILE STAMPED, AND I WAS NEVER CALLED, OR
FAXED, OR NOTIFIED IN ANY WAY CONCERNING THE
SCHEDULING OF MY CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED

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- 24/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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HEARING BEFORE A SUMMARY EVICTION OR STATUS OF MY


IFP REQUEST.
MY POSITION IS THAT I AM ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY
EVICTION HEARING ON UNIT 29 AND THAT IT IS LONG
OVERDUE. PLEASE LET ME KNOW WHEN THAT HEARING CAN
TAKE PLACE. I DO NOT BELIEVE ANY JUDGE CURRENTLY HAS
JURISDICTION ON IT, AND THAT THE NEW CASE, WITH A NEW
CASE NUMBER SHOULD BE "RANDOMLY ASSIGNED"
Further in the Reno justice court file for rjc rev2012-001048 is a tenant affidavit and declaration from Coughlin faxed to
the court on June 30, 2012 contain six pages it is unclear why Coughlin was not granted a summary eviction hearing as
required by law and Coughlin is hereby demanding one and a jury trial which he is entitled to one pursuant the 19
Seventies the Court decision and FRCP rule 30 a.m. that Coughlin is requesting one prior to the time set for hearing that's
right folks were going to a jury trial when Nevada court services served an amended eviction notice on June 28 Coughlin
there and had five days to file for an eviction summary eviction hearing and he did so on June 30 just for the Reno PD
managed commit another wrongful arrest of Coughlin further there was County jail failed to transfer Coughlin for the
July 5 hearing on Coughlin's motion to set aside the original June 27 order however the June 27 order in this case was
extinguished by that posting of an amended lockout notice therefore and eight it's not file stamp but it should be by the
Reno justice court the six page fax by Coughlin on June 30, 2012, though Karen Stancil appears to have handwritten in
the case number RJC rev2012-001048
PLEASE NOTE I AM USING AUDIO DICTATION TRANSCRIPTION SOFTWARE FOR THIS
CORRESPONDENCE AND IT MIGHT HAVE SOME ERRORS, WHICH COULD GREATLY ALTER THE
MEANING, AS I DON'T HAVE TIME TO CORRECT THEM RIGHT NOW.
additionaly THERE WAS SEVERAL FAXES TO THE RJC CIVIL DIVISION BY COUGHLIN ON OR ABOUT
JUNE 13TH, 2012, AND COUGHLIN REQUESTS A COPY OF THOSE OR SOME INDICATION OF WHY THEY
WERE NOT FILED AND COUGHLIN WILL CHECK HIS OWN RECORDS IN THAT REGARD WHEN HE HAS
TIME...HOWEVER, TO THE EXTENT ONE OF THOSE FILINGS WAS A TENANT'S AFFIDAVIT DIRECTED
TOWARDS UNIT 29, LOTS OF PROCEDURAL IMPLICATIONS WILL STEM.
NORTHWIND APARTMENT
ASSOC LLC
1031 XPRESS
NORTHWIND LLC
110 110TH AVE NE STE
550
BELLEVUE, WA 98004

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Description Summary
Fictitious Firm Name - Counter
74040
04/01/1997 12:00:00 AM Expiration Date: 04/01/2002
Business Name: NORTHWIND APARTMENTS Owners: NORTHWIND APARTMENT ASSOCIATES, LLC
s Firm Name - Counter - 109351
Filing Information
Filing Number
109351
- 25/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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Filing Date
03/16/2006 12:00:00 AM
Expiration Date
03/16/2011
Business Information
Business Name
RENO RED BOOK
Owner Information
Owner/Corporate Name
JEFFREY G CHANDLER u
Fictitious Firm Name - Counter
104085
12/08/2004 12:00:00 AM Expiration Date: 12/08/2009
Business Name: BOTTS CANDY COMPANY Owners: JENNIFER V CHANDLER, CINDY R VANDERZIEL
Him and him and him and him motion a set of society eviction order of the number of bases one it went unopposed and
hundred Polk case Coughlin wins in that regard to the notice of hearing by the Reno justice court is dated July 31,
2012 are not as of the hearing on July 21, 2012 stated July 24, 2012 and him notices on what the hearing is limited
to quote you may appear on the data show cause why the court should or should not grant motion to stay the eviction
order in the motion for expedited relief following legal lot coverage utility shut off. If you the. Must be prepared
to provide testimonial documentary evidence the court which torture position if he failed to appear karmic
renovation would form a dismiss case. With what the notice does not say is that the hearing will address the motion
to set aside eviction order Coughlin filed on July 24, 2012 and that which and for which now he request the court to
rule in his favor or at least provide hearing or at the very and for or at the very least require Northwind and/or
their qualified attorneys or whoever to file an opposition something under of explaining why their are three
separate notices for her three separate process affidavits of service for the June 14, 2012 personal service of a
five-day unlawful detainer affidavit by Robert Ray of Nevada court services that's right there's three separate ones
and Coughlin's possession now and they bear different things as well isn't that interesting half add to that the
fact that Nevada court services agreed with Coughlin's assessment that its original on June 14 notice of unlawful
detainer failure to vacate premises was ineffective and that it listed the wrong forum is or court for the tenant to
file a tenant at search engines affidavit as required by law under 40.253 that's not something the judge piercing
can excised from the law or legislate from the bench out of existence that is a law. The Reno justice court does not
have jurisdiction with the notice last Sparks justice court the fugitive document for the landlord to file it

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27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

landlord's affidavit and then to manage to get Coughlin arrested based upon a void order that should never issued

judge Shrader particularly where supervisor of the syllable division Karen Stancil was alerted and well in advance

by Coughlin through phone calls and mid-June in that June 26 of written correspondence to the court that included in

the file on the left side of the correspondence and where the Sparks justice court itself fax the Reno justice court

that a fax alerting it to the problematic aspects of the June 14 notice Coughlin was arrested he went to jail he

paid bail he did time incurred massive damages it's appalling for judge piercing to ignore all this while also

sanctioning the unauthorized practice of law by Jeff Chandler Nevada court services who dress up like they are

Sheriff's and managed to the word court into their name and bang on people store and leave off the Nevada part so

much so that it and it seems as though they are actually acting with color of law in the screening you to come out

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of your house and bang on the door parted sounds like they are cost of the Sheriff and have to do exactly what you

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said. Those few who don't Nevada court services has something up their sleeve in the form of attempting to break and

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enter and one's residence or sex service of process by as Nevada court services has done to Coughlin on numerous

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occasions sometimes captured on videotape further Nevada court services is trespassed on numerous occasions like

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office property Coughlin however is the only one who's arrested and convicted trespassing and had reported rehashes

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patent trademark office and had impact his ability to practice his chosen profession for which he has to does have a

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law license and actually did that a lot four. Further there's initial conflict in the judge piercing work to the

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district attorneys office first 12 years of his career and the Washoe County Sheriff and potentially Washoe County

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District Attorney's Office may have it engages the misconduct in connection with the approximately 10 different

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incarcerations Coughlin space this year most all connected one where another To the Way, Reno justice court handles

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landlord-tenant matters or fails to apply the law as written and created by the assembly the Senate i.e. the

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legislature Nevada and Carson City to be clear Nevada court services recognize the validity of Coughlin's argument

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that when he announced to them on June 28 at approximately 10 AM to 10:45 AM is where Coughlin pointed out that
the

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the June 14 notice listed Sparks justice court that Nevada court services responded by serving in the amended
declaration of service by license process server on June 28 thereby vitiate in any order lockout order rescinding
and waving it etc. etc. June 28, 2012 fax from the Sparks justice court to the Reno justice court contains a fax
Coughlin sent the Sparks justice court on June 26 that at 12 PM noon of that date that faction Coughlin was 10 pages
the facts from the Sparks justice court the Reno justice court was apparently 13 pages no number of those pages are

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27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

not included in the file of this matter and the Reno justice court back to the three different notices of unlawful

detainer either stamped by w which doesn't count by the way one needs to sign something attorneys don't get a stamp

things and file them and then later on claim they didn't commit commit misconduct or her perjury or rule 11

violation merely because it is sign something Nevada court services continues to just put stamps instead of actual

signatures and that's an appropriate and under the Aiken case is in Nevada and summary of proceedings the technical

aspects of notice and due process requirements must be strictly adhered to not run out with the bathwater by judge

Pearson because he either doesn't like off-line or thinks Coughlin doesn't deserve due process of the law article

protection because Coughlin's an attorney you know Coughlin's not a license attorney currently needs not able to

make attorney money or do attorney things or even commit the unauthorized practice of law with impunity like Nevada

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court services because know Coughlin you know of Coughlin was to do so the State Bar would find it to be a contempt.

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Further judge Pearson's order for summary eviction of July 31 is void in several respects one it purports rule one

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units 2971 when unit 71 is not properly before the court unit 71 has its own case numbers of rev2012-0067 and

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rev2012-001082 (the multiplicty is due to, as here, THE RJC shortcutting due process aspects of the process,

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whererin "Orders" by Judges paid quite a bit of money are nothing more than handwritten notes on Coughlin's own

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filings...Some of those such "note ORders" by Judge Schroeder resulte in confusing vis a vis whether Coguhlin's

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IFP's were granted, and necessitated the filing of companion cases for units 45 and 71 in rev2012-0067 and rev201-

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0068 in rev2012-001082 and rev2012-00183. To simply make Coughlin scapegoated all medicine blame him for taking
of

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regardless the July 31 order by judge Pearson in rev 2012 00 1048 purports rule on matters not noticed in the July
24 notice specifically in that order which reads the court finds eviction was appropriate motion to stay eviction
order denied motion to set aside eviction order denies motion to contest personal property lien denied motion on
illegal lockout denied tenant have always property removed is 2971 by 5 PM on August 5, 2012 only about half of that
order was properly before the court notice litigants that I'm what was notice to the litigants in the July 24 notice
was that the hearing would be limited to the motion to stay eviction order in a motion for expedited relief
following illegal lockout utility shutoff however the order went on to rule on matters non-there and noticed
including the motion to set aside the eviction order the motion to contest personal property lien and that matters
related to the property of a unit not even involved in a case number unit 71 further there required Coughlin a hub
Allis property removed even earlier than the law requires given that after the 30 day plan under NRS 118 A.460 the

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27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

landlord may not dispose of the property until 14 days of pass from mailing to the tenant last known address a

certified letter. So there and again judge Pearson is violating the law in failing to apply evenly to Coughlin in

fact he's attempting to exCise protections accorded and Coughlin under Nevada's landlord tenant law which is the

most pro-landlord law set of laws in the country but that's not good enough for judge piercing he wants to cut even

more protections out of it when it comes to Coughlin and the reasoning behind that is not clear though Coughlin has

had some issues with Washoe County District Attorney's Office this year in judge Pearson did spend the first 12

years of his career there.

Attached in exhibit a are the three different June 14 declarations of service by license process server Robert (or Ryan?)
Wray ..That's right, Coughlin has in his possession three different NOtice of UD dated 6/14/12 and either "stamped" with
"R. Way" or actually containing a handwritten signature by R. Wray (though the one actually signed lacks a time
indication, and they all lack a "manner of service" or any other particular beyond falsely attesting to have been
"personally served". WRay and NORthwinds manager attempted to break and enter into unit 29 in hopes of effecting
"personal service" upon Coughlin in a unit that had not windows and that had the door closed and locked and or barred.
That is a criminal act and Coughlin is now again hereby complaining about it to the landlrod, so have fun reading NRS
118A.510's and NRS 118A.390 and I'll see you in Court, and WRay, you should probably self report to the process server
licensing body and hope for the best. Check out the video fo the 6/28/12 arrest wherein the WCSO's Gomez and Machen
tell Chandler to "let us do the talking, Jeff", then Chandler, dressed up in an outfit and with a company name intended to
connote color of law type authority, purports to trespass Coughlin from the whole place, ie, the entire premises at 1680
Sky Mountain Dr., depsit Coughlin still having, at the time, one, and perhaps two valid leases, to units 45 and 71.
Further, the Washoe County Detention Center or jail took a tenan'ts affidavit from Coughlin on or aoround July 15th,
2012 for units 45 and another for unit 71 and due to Coughlin's indigency, the jail library indicate it would be filed with
the rjc....WAs it?

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he Court with jurisdiction. NRS 40.253(3)(a). ONe cannot be trespassing in a placwe where they
have a valid reason for being or a lawful right to be. NRS 207.200, RMC 8.10.040.

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Aikins v. Andrews, 91 Nev. 746, 542 P.2d 734 (1975), the Supreme COUli construed the

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predecessor statute to NRS 40.2516 to mean that the alternative five (5) day notice must be given

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before the tenants can be dispossed and a lease can be validly terminated. The court stated that this
five (5) day notice requirement " ... neither can be waved nor neglected." 91 Nev. at 748.

ttp://www.constitution.org/ussc/506-056a.htm

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U.S. Supreme Court


SOLDAL v. COOK COUNTY, 506 U.S. 56 (1992)
506 U.S. 56 SOLDAL, ET UX. v. COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 91-6516

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- 29/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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CONCLUSION
The undersigned hereby request this Court consider these materials presented herein in
deciding upon this matter.

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AFFIRMATION AND DECLARATION


I declare, pursuant to NRS 53.045, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State

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of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct and that this document does not contain any
social security numbers, pursuant to NRS 239B.030, an affirmation to that effect this hereby is.

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DATED this 9th of October, 2012:

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_/s/ Zach Coughlin


Zach Coughlin,
pro se tenant

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- 30/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

PROOF OF SERVICE

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On this date, I caused a copy of the foregoing document s to be served upon the following by
faxing and emailing to those who have consented to such service and or by hand delivery to dropslot
or front desk, and by placing a true and correct copy of the foregoing document in the U.S. mail
addressed to:

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NORTHWIND APARTMENT
ASSOC LLC
1031 XPRESS
NORTHWIND LLC
110 110TH AVE NE STE
550
BELLEVUE, WA 98004
Description Summary
Fictitious Firm Name - Counter
74040
04/01/1997 12:00:00 AM Expiration Date: 04/01/2002
Business Name: NORTHWIND APARTMENTS Owners: NORTHWIND APARTMENT
ASSOCIATES, LLC
Nevada Court Services
Lew Taitel, Esq., Staff Attorney
Jeff Chandler, Owner and CEO
Robert Wray, Licensed Process Server
475 S. Arlington Avenue, Suite 1A
Reno, NV 89501
(775) 348-7560
Lewis S. Taitel, Esq.
Attorney at Law
475 S. Arlington Suite 1A
Reno, Nevada 89501
(775) 322-2272
Fax: (775) 348-7977
Nevada State Bar No. 4397
Not sure who Mr. Taitel represents in this matter, if anyone...

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Nevada Court Services


Lew Taitel, Esq., Staff Attorney
Jeff Chandler, Owner and CEO
- 31/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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Robert Wray, Licensed Process Server


Nevada Court Services
475 So. Arlington Suite 1A
Reno, Nevada 89501
(775) 348-7560
(Toll Free) 800-570-5583
Fax: (775) 348-7977
Email: nevcs@nevcs.com
? unauthorized practitioner of law for Northwinds Apartments?
ACG-AMPI, IN
Northwinds Apartments

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DATED this 9th of October, 2012:

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/s/ Zach Coughlin


Zach Coughlin, pro se tenant

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- 32/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

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index to exhibits:
exhibit 1 55 pages

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- 33/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

exhibit 1

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- 34/34 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION OF JUNE
27TH, 2012; or, plead in the alternative, Supplement to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside Summary Eviction Order and ORder follwing
Hearing on July 31st, 2011

One Size Car Garage For Rent

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$75 One Size Car Garage For Rent (Northwest Reno, NV)
Date: 2012-04-02, 10:02AM PDT
Reply to: see below [Errors when replying to ads?]

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Welcome to Northwind Apartments. We offer storage units to non-Northwind Residents!


If you need more storage, we offer garages to rent for $75 per month. They are a full size single car garage. Most
public storages would charge over $150 dollars for the same size! Our community is located in northwest Reno, right
off of McCarran.
Please call us at (775) 747-9200 or come by. We are located at 1680 Sky Mountain Drive in Northwest Reno.

1680 Sky Mountain Dr. (google map) (yahoo map)


file:///R|/jackieboy/Documents/$75%20garage%20747-9200%201600%20sky%20mountain%20dr..html[10/10/2012 2:50:35 AM]

One Size Car Garage For Rent

Location: Northwest Reno, NV


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I demand my summary eviction hearing, before a jury based


upon 6 28 12 notice and my faxed Tenants Answer of 6 30 12
i
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Wed 10/10/12 5:38 AM
To: stuttle@washoecounty.us; kstancil@washoecounty.us; rjcweb@wasoecounty.us;
037nor2@acg.com; 037nor4@acg.com; nevcs@nevcs.com; chansen@washoecounty.us;
renodirect@reno.gov; rjcweb@washoecounty.us; cwood@washoecounty.us;
william@hornelawfirm.com; pilbinfo@ag.nv.gov; tsegerblom@asm.state.nv.us

Dear Mr. Tuttle and Supervisor, Civil Division Stancil and Supervisor of the Civil
Division at Sparks Justice Court Hansen,
Mr. Hansen, I believe I am entitled to a hearing in your court. I would like one. May I
have a date. Mr. Tuttle and Ms. Stancil, I believe I am entitled to several hearings in
your court, may I have such and a date and time for them?
I am writing to demand respectfully my hearing incident to the NOtice served on my
rental at Northwind Apartments 1680 Sky Mountin Drive unit 29 on June 28th, 2012.
I believe the tenant's affidavit I filed in response to that 5 day notice should be given
a brand new case number, though the designation by ncs that it was an "Amended
NOtice" pursuant to is is is is is is is isis it is as if the isthe 6/14/12 one (the one R.
Wray lied about effecting "personal service" on me of, which got me arrested just
before I was to fax to the RJC, by noon, a Tenant's Answer or MOtion to Dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action or deficieny of service of process or something (I
arguably needn't have even filed anything in the RJC where the 6/14/12 notice listed
Sparks Justice Court.
Oh, it gets better...Nevada Courts services filed a Landlord's Affidavit attesting to
have rented Coughlin a "dwelling" which is defined as a "sleeping place or residence"
in NRS 118A...and pursued an eviction under NRS 118A...citing a breach by Coughlin
for allegedly using the unit 29 for a residence or sleeping place, instead of pursuing
NRS 40.760 or NRS 118.475 eviction remedies (which, by the way, may result in the
Sheriff evicting Coughlin or forcing him to quit any alleged use of Unit 29 as a
"dwelling place or residence", but YOU WILL NOT THAT UNDER THOSE
file:///C|/...012%20email%20to%20stuttle@washoecounty.us%20regarding%20ncs%20rev2012-001048%20etc%20ncs.htm[10/10/2012 6:23:17 AM]

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STATUTES COUGHLIN WOULD BE ALLOWED, UNDER THE LAW TO


CONINUTE STORING AND ACCESSING HIS PROPERTY THERE!!!!CAN'T
HAVE IT BOTH WAYS ALL THE TIME, GUYS. Oh, also, who in the hell signed
the Landlord's affidavit? There is no textual indication of whom the solitary letter of a
"signature" belongs to....maybe because it would be a NRCP 11 violation for a
corporation to appear "pro se", especially where represented by someone committing
the unauthoried practice of law?
R. Wray made some interesting statements on the video of the 6/28/12 arrest filmed by
Coughlin, especially concerning Coughlin's contention that Wray and NOrthwind's
Dwane Jakob's attempts to break and enter and trespass into Unit 29 constituted
"personally serving" Coughlin a 5 day Unlawful Detainer Notice on 6/14/12. If NCS
did not "personally serve" Coughlin, then Coughlin would have had until June 28th,
2012 at noon at the earliest (and arguably until the close of business at 5pm on
6/28/12 to file a response (ie Tenant's Answer or MOtion to Dismiss, etc), in Sparks
Justice Court OR EVEN in REno Justice Court. Coughlin was arrested at 10:30 am
on 6/28/12, thereby, under color of law, the WCSO, NCS and NOrthwind and Jakob
fraudulently prevented Coughlin from filing (if he did not already previously,
espeically in the 6/13/12 faxes that are mysteriously unaccounted for in rJC files) a
Tenan'ts Response (tEnan'ts answer, or Tenant's AFfidavit or Motion to Dismiss, etc.).

So, R. Wray and NCS, its kind of a big deal that you lied about effecting personal
service on 6/14/12 of the 5 day notice.

Coughlin has three different version of that notice or "Declaration of Srevice by


License PRocess SErver" R. Wray. in one, a time of 9:23 (presumably am, but that is
not circled, nor is pm) on 6/14/12 is listed, and a rubber stamp indicating "r. wray", is
there, along with a hadnwritten "reg #r-043948" is there. that Declaration indicates
that R. WRay "personally served" the partey named, Coughlin. Oddly, this first
version (and all three of these are in the RJC file in rev2012-001048) instead of
"jennifer Chandler" being in , I guess, the signature line for the "agent" of the landlrod
(and she always just places a "rubber stamp" of her name anyways..", instead of
Jennifer Chandler, on the one 6/14/12 5 day NOtice (and all version sof this notice
have checks on box 3 and 6, which read "3. Recieved a 5 day notice of possible
unlawful detiner for failure to comply with the rental agreement....6. Remained in
file:///C|/...012%20email%20to%20stuttle@washoecounty.us%20regarding%20ncs%20rev2012-001048%20etc%20ncs.htm[10/10/2012 6:23:17 AM]

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possesion of the premises subject to the provision of Chpater 118A of the NRS after
having failed to perform the basic or contractual obligations imposed upon you by that
Chapter, namey (SEE ATTAChed)" though the "attached just seems to include a
copy of the "Rental Agreement" with no real indication of how Coughlin was in
violation of it, and no indication of why NOrthwinds feels Coughlin remained in
violation thereof despite Coughlin's written communications indicating that he was not
in breach. Anyways, rather tha a rubber stamp indicating "jennifer Chandler" on that
one 5 day notice, the one where WRay actually affixes his actual signature, follow by
a handwritt r-043948 (his licensed process sever number), the spot usually baring the
"Jennifer Chandler" rubber stamp is instead taken up by a signature by Nevada Court
Services resient notary public HB Cedomio....AGain, there is no time listed on that
first version of the NOtice or which includeds at the bottom the "Declaration of
Service...."

In the second version of the "notice of Unlawful detainer..." served on June 14th,
2012, in his "Declaration of Service by Licnese process Server" (which, arguably
inovkes the "penalty of perjury dicate of NRS 53.045...) Wray against declares he
personally served Coughlin, with a time of 9:23 indicated, and a rubber stamp of "R.
Wray" on the signature line, with a handwritten "REg #R-043948" (and that version
was faxed by the Sparks Justice Court to the Reno Justice Court on June 28th, 2012 at
11:05 am, (in a 13 page fax, many pages of which are not in the RJC file, though that
fax does included the header from the fax from Coughlin to the "Sparks Justice Court
on 6 26 12 at 12:00pm, which was a 10 page fax, and the versio of the 6/14/12 5 day
notice with Declartion of Service by r. Wray indicating a time of 9:23 is page 6 of 10
of Coguhlin's fax to the Sparks Justice Couer (according to the fax hearders) while
also being page 12 of teh June 28th, 2012 fax from the Sparks Justice court to the
Reno Justice Court. right about the moment Coughlin was being placed in WCSO
Deputy Machen squad or patrol vehicle for transprot to the jail, where Coughlin would
be forced to fork over some more bail, etc., etc.
IN the Third version of the "Declaration of Service" on the same June 14th, 2012
"NOTICE OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER FOR FAILURE TO VACATE PREMISES
..This third version of his 6/14/12 Declaration of Service by Licensed PRocess Serve
R. Wray has the typical "jennifer chandler" rubber stamp for the NOtice half of the
page, and has a rubber stamp for "?R.wray", along with a clearly differt handwrirtn
note of "reg# r043" (obviously, aside from the handwriting "analysis" the handwrittn
file:///C|/...012%20email%20to%20stuttle@washoecounty.us%20regarding%20ncs%20rev2012-001048%20etc%20ncs.htm[10/10/2012 6:23:17 AM]

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numberical indication of the process servicer number is truncated on this third version
by 3 numbers). Additionaly this third version indicates it was "personally served" at
12:54 pm.

Why all the different versions? why, if personally service was effect at 9:23 am, woud
R. Wray need to return and do it again, all for Unit 29, nmin you only (all the other
Declartions of Service from that date of 6/14/12 , ie for units 45 and 71, indicate that
Wray merely posted teh notice to the rented property (and therefore would entail 3
more days fro mailing to get "construtive notice" under NRCP 6(e) and NRCP 5(b)(2),
which landlord's like Northwinds just hate.

Then there is the fact that NCS snuck into the file later a whole nother type of notice,
one under NRS 40.760...which, of course, changes everything..

OF course, Wray did not "personally serve" Coughlin. Wray attempts to make some
half-baked argument about how he slid (after failing in his attempts to break and enter
and trespass in to Unit 29 on 6/14/29) the 5 day UD Notice into a crack in the door of
the rental, and perceived it to "move" after he let go of it, thereby, apparently, entitling
him to assert that he effected "personal service" upon tenant Zach Coughlin, or,
apparently, otherwise complied with NRCP 5, and therefore cut short the time for
Coughlin to respond as a tenant and secure a hearing (rather than be incarcerated after
having unknown violent sounding figures (flashbacks to other interactions with
Nevada Court Services) banging on his doors, refusing to indentify themselves, then
ultimately taking a chainsaw (or sawz-all) to a metal door to a confined windowless
rental.

NRS 40.400 makes NRCP the applicable rules here, not JCRCP, nor JCRRT:
RULE 5. SERVICE AND FILING OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER PAPERS
Rule
Drafters Note
Commentary
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(a) Service: When Required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, every order
required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to the original complaint
unless the court otherwise orders because of numerous defendants, every paper
relating to discovery required to be served upon a party unless the court otherwise
orders, every written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and every
written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, designation of record on
appeal, and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. No service need be
made on parties in default for failure to appear except that pleadings asserting new or
additional claims for relief against them shall be served upon them in the manner
provided for service of summons in Rule 4.
[As amended; effective September 27, 1971.]
(b) Same: How Made.
(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a
party represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney unless
the court orders that service be made upon the party.
(2) Service under this rule is made by:
(A) Delivering a copy to the attorney or the party by:
(i) handing it to the attorney or to the party;
(ii) leaving it at the attorneys or partys office with a clerk or other person in charge,
or if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place in the office; or
(iii) if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the
persons dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and
discretion residing there.
(B) Mailing a copy to the attorney or the party at his or her last known address.
Service by mail is complete on mailing; provided, however, a motion, answer or other
document constituting the initial appearance of a party must also, if served by mail, be
filed within the time allowed for service; and provided further, that after such initial
appearance, service by mail be made only by mailing from a point within the State of
Nevada.
file:///C|/...012%20email%20to%20stuttle@washoecounty.us%20regarding%20ncs%20rev2012-001048%20etc%20ncs.htm[10/10/2012 6:23:17 AM]

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(C) If the attorney or the party has no known address, leaving a copy with the clerk of
the court.
(D) Delivering a copy by electronic means if the attorney or the party served has
consented to service by electronic means. Service by electronic means is complete on
transmission provided, however, a motion, answer or other document constituting the
initial appearance of a party must also, if served by electronic means, be filed within
the time allowed for service. The served attorneys or partys consent to service by
electronic means shall be expressly stated and filed in writing with the clerk of the
court and served on the other parties to the action. The written consent shall identify:
(i) the persons upon whom service must be made;
(ii) the appropriate address or location for such service, such as the electronic-mail
address or facsimile number;
(iii) the format to be used for attachments; and
(iv) any other limits on the scope or duration of the consent.
An attorneys or partys consent shall remain effective until expressly revoked or until
the representation of a party changes through entry, withdrawal, or substitution of
counsel. An attorney or party who has consented to service by electronic means shall,
within 10 days after any change of electronic-mail address or facsimile number, serve
and file notice of the new electronic-mail address or facsimile number.
(3) Service by electronic means under Rule 5(b)(2)(D) is not effective if the party
making service learns that the attempted service did not reach the person to be served.
(4) Proof of service may be made by certificate of an attorney or of the attorneys
employee, or by written admission, or by affidavit, or other proof satisfactory to the
court. Failure to make proof of service shall not affect the validity of service"
In the legal work drafted and filed by a non-attorney, a criminal violation in NCS's
and Jeff Chandler's committing the authorized practice of law (what happens to people
doing plastic surgery without a license? jail time, lots of it...because something could
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go badly, badly wrong and people could get hurt...like Coughlin got hurt, damaged,
arrested, financially destroyed, etc., etc. here. thin skull plaintiff, consequential
damages Winchell v Schiff 2008 case seafood, storage place lost business and lost
profits $300K damages, etc.. while in jail Coughlin was prevented from filing in
matters that ultimately wound up with a $40,050 judgment against Coughlin, and
there's more, for which NOrthwind, and NCS, Chandler and WRay, and perhaps, some
others, will be liable.). In the "Affidavit of Landlord for Breach" filed on June 27th,
2012 by ,well, who knows, given it just says "Lanldord" and has what appear s to be a
handwritten "S" in the signature line...but, lets say it was filed by Jeff Chandler, whom
crossed the bar and argued before Judge Pearson on July 31st, 2011 in REv2012001048 on behalf of his "client' Northwind Apartments, Associates LLC (see acgampi.com, doing business in 10 states, kinda seems like they could afford and attorney
rather than destroy our community with hack pretend lawyers who play dress as a
Sheriff and bully peopel while attempting to break and enter and trespass...and then
RPD Alan Weaver and SArgent Oliver Miller, and WCSO Deputy John Machen and
Deputy Gomez chip in some Soldal v. Cook County violating 1983 violations as
well....puke, puke. puke... IN the "Affidavit of Landlord for Breach" that Chandler
drafted and filed, he wrote, at paragraph 4. "him and nation surrender of the premises
was to have taken place on or before June 13, 2012. That legal notice has been served
on the tenant's in accordance with the provisions of NRS chapter 40.280 as amended
on 6/14/12."

Chandler's Affidavit of Landlord for Breach demonstrates a lack of candor to the


tribunal, which would be professional misconduct to report to the SBN, but, Chadler
aint a lawyer, so,and what are ya goin' ta do? DDA Yound? DDA Kandaras, isn't that
your jurisdiction? That is a criminal law violation, right, unauthorized practice of
law...and in that June 27th, 2012 Affidavit of Landlord Chandler sneakily lists "N/a" in
the blank for the "original period of is (blank) terminating on o forr transferring to a
periodic tenancy on that date. A copy of the written rental agreement, if any , is
attached hereto."....Upon information and belief, chandler failed to inlcude a copy of
the Rental Agreement in at least one of these NOrthwind files (not sure if it was in the
one for unit 29, rev2012-001048, but it woudl make sense, as Northwind's eggs were
all in that basket in a sense.) Anyways, the Rental AGreement makes clear the period
is not "n/a"...why would Chandler do that? Coudl it be that NRS 40.253 has differ
atent laws for tenancies where the rent is reserved by a period of 1 week or less?
Coughlin paid for one month's rent up front at the time the Renal Agreement was
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signed. Also, see isthe craigslist ad Coughlin responded to placed by Northwind, and
incorporated into an "Rental Agreement", along with verbal indications, arguably,
under NRS 118A.160 (which only applies to "dwelling places", but the Landlord's
Affidavit inidcates this rental was, in paragraph 2 such, as it states "2. That yor
affiant isrented a certain dwelling or apartment to Zach Coughlin, located at 1680 sky
mountain dr...#29, Reno, NV on 5/4/12 for an original period of N/a terminating on or
transferrinto a periodic tenancy on that date. a copy of the written rental agreemet if
any, is attached hereto.".. Chandler seems to want to take advanteg of NRS
40.253(2)'s quickie service approach for week to week rentals, which unit 29, by
virtue of the terms of the Rental Agreement, clearly was not. as him and him and him
this but the new the signatures is written in the amount of $75 is due no later than the
first of late after the for every month late is asked Bob Loblaw clearly this was a
periodic tenancy of month to month for variety further one provision and this one is
rental agreements has written 30 days notice to vacate is required or rental will be
responsible the next months rent covered Chandler tends to one characterize this as a
week to week or less type tenancy to take advantage of the lessons service
requirements there and found in NRS 40.253(1)-(2):
Further, the Rental Agreement is not necessarily limited to the document that
NOrthwind Apartments purports to be the "GARAGE / CARPORT RENTAL
AGREEMENT" as their exists no limitation in that document that affirmatively
disclaims any incorporation of statements by then Manage Deede Call (whom
mysteriously disappeared upon current Manager Dwayne Jakob showing up) or
incorporated into the Rental Agreement or Lease by virtue of the advertisements that
Northwinds held out to the public on Craigslist, which is how Coughlin learned of
their offer, upon which Coughlin called then Manager Deede Call and met with her in
person. Attached in Exhibit 1 is the Craigslist ad that Northwinds was running at the
time, and it read:
"$75 One Size Car Garage For Rent (Northwest Reno, NV)
Date: 2012-04-02, 10:02AM PDT
Reply to: see below
Welcome to Northwind Apartments. We offer storage units to non-Northwind
Residents!If you need more storage, we offer garages to rent for $75 per month.
They are a full size single car garage. Mostpublic storages would charge over $150
dollars for the same size! Our community is located in northwest Reno, right
off of McCarran.Please call us at (775) 747-9200 or come by. We are located at 1680
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Sky Mountain Drive in Northwest Reno."


AND IT GETS BETTER: The thing about NRS 40.760 is that it specifically
indicates that it does not apply to "garages". And Judges don't legislate from the
bench, they just apply the law as written, so people can depend on notice provided by
precedent and published laws. To do otherwise is judicial misconduct arguably
requiring a Complaint with the Judicial Discipline Commission.
Further Coughlin asked and then Manager Deede Call (she is listed as the manager on
the "RENTAL AGREEMENT" of May 4th, 2012, and it bears hers and Coguhlin's
signature, numerous questions vis a vis the use of the rental, and clearly, Deede Call
gave Coughlin permission (and actually, Call did not indicate any "special permission"
to use the rentals for something other than parking a car was necessary to obtain
anyways, and no one has established that Coughlin did not use the rentals for parking
anyways, and any Fourth Amendment violating trespass and videoing of Coughlin's
rentals is not admissible anyways. Soldal v. Cook Co.

CHAPTER 40 - ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS IN PARTICULAR CASES


CONCERNING PROPERTY SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS FOR OBTAINING
POSSESSION OF REAL PROPERTY, RECREATIONAL VEHICLE OR MOBILE
HOME
NRS 40.253 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and
exclusion of tenant for default in payment of rent.
NRS 40.280 Service of notices to quit; proof required before issuance of order to
remove.
NRS 40.400 Rules of practice.
CHAPTER 108 - STATUTORY LIENS
LIENS OF OWNERS OF FACILITIES FOR STORAGE

NRS 108.475 Use of storage space for residence prohibited; eviction; nature of
facility; effect of issuance of document of title for property.

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CHAPTER 118A - LANDLORD AND TENANT: DWELLINGS

CHAPTER 197 - CRIMES BY AND AGAINST THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THIS


STATE
NRS 197.090 Interfering with public officer.
NRS 197.100 Influencing public officer.
NRS 197.110 Misconduct of public officer.
NRS 197.120 False impersonation of public officer; intrusion into and refusal to
surrender public office.
NRS 197.130 False report by public officer.
NRS 197.140 Public officer making false certificate.
NRS 197.160 Fraudulently presenting claim to public officer.
NRS 197.180 Wrongful exercise of official power.
NRS 197.190 Obstructing public officer.

The arrest of Coughlin at Northwinds Apartments on June 28th, 2012 by the same
WCSO Deputy Machen who filed a false affidavit attesting to have "personally
served" Coughlin the Summary Eviction ORder from Coughlin's former home law
office on November 1st, 2011, when in reality, Machen just posted the Order to the
door when nobody was home (and therefore committed trespass under color of law, as
he failed to comply with NRCP 5(b)(2) (made applicable to landlord tenant matters by
NRS 40.400) and NRCP 6(e).

So, WCSO Machen arrested Coughlin for a violation of NRS 197.190:

NRS 197.190 Obstructing public officer. Every person who, after due notice, shall refuse or
neglect to make or furnish any statement, report or information lawfully required of the person by
any public officer, or who, in such statement, report or information shall make any willfully untrue,
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misleading or exaggerated statement, or who shall willfully hinder, delay or obstruct any public
officer in the discharge of official powers or duties, shall, where no other provision of law applies,
be guilty of a misdemeanor.

Yet DDA charged Coughlin in the Criminal Complaint in RJC RCR2012-067980 with a different
crime, NRS 199.280:
"NRS: CHAPTER 199 - CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE
OTHER OFFENSES

NRS 199.280 Resisting public officer.


A person who, in any case or under any circumstances not otherwise specially provided for,
willfully resists, delays or obstructs a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any
legal duty of his or her office shall be punished:
1. Where a firearm is used in the course of such resistance, obstruction or delay, or the person
intentionally removes, takes or attempts to remove or take a firearm from the person of, or the
immediate presence of, the public officer in the course of such resistance, obstruction or delay, for a
category C felony as provided in NRS 193.130.
2. Where a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm, is used in the course of such resistance,
obstruction or delay, or the person intentionally removes, takes or attempts to remove or take a
weapon, other than a firearm, from the person of, or the immediate presence of, the public officer in
the course of such resistance, obstruction or delay, for a category D felony as provided in NRS
193.130.
3. Where no dangerous weapon is used in the course of such resistance, obstruction or delay,
for a misdemeanor."

Why the change from DDA Young? It couldn't be becuase NRS 199.280 is more damaging to
Coughlin's law license, in light of SCR 111(6), than would be a simple little NRS 197.190 charge,
could it? Is that permissible where the WCDA and WCSO have a vested interest in discrediting
and demolishing Coughlin in light of allegation of misconduct by both of those offices with respect
to its treatment of Coughlin, in addition to misconduct against Coughlin by the WCDC?

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Nevada Supreme Court Rule 111(6): "6. Definition of serious crime. The term serious crime
means (1) a felony and (2) any crime less than a felony a necessary element of which is, as
determined by the statutory or common-law definition of the crime, improper conduct as an
attorney, interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation,
fraud, willful failure to file an income tax return, deceit, bribery, extortion, misappropriation,".
Convictions of a "serious crime" require Bar Counsel to file a SCR 111 Petition against the
attorney.

Could there be any clear demonstration of the retaliatory animus against Coughlin by the Washoe
County District Attorney's Office? Are prosecutors paid to play out grudges and sanction
misconduct by local law enforcement? Rather than just a "resisting" charge, DDA Young and the
WCDA want to try to glom on a "false swearing" and "inteferring with the administration of
justice" claim, even where the know of the 6/26/12 written correspondence by Coughlin to both the
Sparks and Reno Justice Courts and the Civil Division of the Washoe County Sheriff's Office.
Enough is Enough. This prosecutorial misconduct must not stand.

But, really Coughlin is hereby complaining to the landlord, pursuant to NS 118A.510 of a violation
of the criminal law by one who is arguably an "agent" of the landlord (not making a bribery
allegation here, to be clear, though):
NRS197.200Oppression under color of office.
1. An officer, or a person pretending to be an officer, who unlawfully and maliciously, under
pretense or color of official authority:
(a) Arrests or detains a person against the persons will;
(b) Seizes or levies upon anothers property;
(c) Dispossesses another of any lands or tenements; or
(d) Does any act whereby the person, property or rights of another person are injured,
commits oppression.
2. An officer or person committing oppression shall be punished:
(a) Where physical force or the immediate threat of physical force is used, for a category D
felony as provided inNRS 193.130.
(b) Where no physical force or immediate threat of physical force is used, for a gross
misdemeanor.
Further, this is an officil written complaint against WCSO Deputy Machen and Gomez, please place
a copy of this Complaint in their employment and personnel files, and please do the same with
respect to RPD Officer Alan Weaver, Sargent Dye, Sargent Oliver Miller, and Officer Welch for
their gross misdemeanor, consisting of doing that which is the domain of the Sheriff under NRS
40.760 in conection with the matter at Superior Mini Storage on or around September 21st, 2012
under the following law, in light of teh language in NRS 40.760 and NRS 108.475, which I made
the RPD aware of at the time, and Soldal v. Cook Co. Couldn't be too much of a budget crunch
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when local law enforcement acts the way they do, veritably goading civil rights tenant's right
attorney's into suing them through their reckless and tacky behavior: NRS197.180Wrongful
exercise of official power.Any person who willfully takes upon himself or herself to exercise or
officiate in any office or place of another, without being lawfully authorized thereto, is guilty of a
gross misdemeanor.
Also, uner NRS 118A.510, I am complaining of the following violations of criminal law on
Northwind's behalf:
NRS197.120False impersonation of public officer; intrusion into and refusal to surrender
public office.Every person who shall falsely personate or represent any public officer, or who
shall willfully intrude into a public office to which the person has not been duly elected or
appointed, or who shall willfully exercise any of the functions or perform any of the duties of such
officer, without having duly qualified therefor, as required by law, or who, having been an
executive or administrative officer, shall willfully exercise any of the functions of office after his or
her right to do so has ceased, or wrongfully refuse to surrender the official seal or any books or
papers appertaining to such office, upon the demand of his or her lawful successor, shall be guilty
of a gross misdemeanor.
[1911 C&P 67; RL 6332; NCL 10016]
NRS197.130False report by public officer.Every public officer who shall knowingly make
any false or misleading statement in any official report or statement, under circumstances not
otherwise prohibited by law, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.

NEvada Court Services regularly attempts to mislead tenant's into thinking the act with color of law. From Joel
Durden barking at me in his Sheriff look-a-like getup that he is an "officer of the court" and from "Court
Services" to having the word "Court" in their name,etc., etc. NEvad Court Services impersonates public officers.
Additionally, Machen's police report is false to the extent that it fails to indicate that, at least at some point,
Machen and or Deputy Gomez refused to idnetify themslevs. They don't know what someone is doing inside
when they purport to "knock and announce" and the must reasonably be expected to assume one could have not
heard their initial announcing their idnetify (whether because they had headphones or, were in the bathroom,
whatever...and Machen and his cowboy partner Gomez refused to identify themselves in response to a request
that they do so by Coughlin, and similarly refused to slide through the door any paperwork or warrant describing
the purpose of their visit.

WCSO is that Machem's Affidavit of Service indicates that he "personally served" me,
which kind of reminds me of all that robo-signing and MERS fraud I come across in
my day job (and do you wonder how many attorneys in the foreclosure defense game I
am in constant contact with who are watching and witness the potential RICO
violations this writing mentions?), which includes being a foreclosure defense
attorney. So which is it? Did Machem "personally serve" me the Summary Eviction
Order? Richard G. Hill, Esq. likes to argue that I was "served" in compliance with all
time related rules because it was done in the "usual custom and practice of the
WCSO. What, exactly, is the "usual custom and practice of the WCSO? I hear a lot
about this "within 24 hours" stuff. So, I go hunting for some black letter law to
support what those at the RJC and in the clueless community at large (which often
includes Nevada Legal Services and Washoe Legal Services, the people you guys had
such trouble actually serving in the lawsuits I filed, which may have actually helped
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improved legal services in this community, if they were not dismissed due to
insufficiency of service of process, even where the IFP required the WCSO to served
the defendants....). Anyway, back to the "within 24 hours" phraseology: "

This whole business about The court may thereupon issue an order directing the
sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of
the order... is inapplicable to this situation, where an Order Granting Summary
Eviction was signed by October 27th, 2011. That language is only found in situations
inapplicable to the current one. NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2), and NRS 40.253(5)(a) are the
only sections of NRS 40 where this within 24 hours language occurs, and those
situations only apply where, in:
40.253(3)(b)(2): 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must: ...(b) Advise
the tenant: . (2) That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an unlawful
detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order
providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of the
county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order
and,
40.253(5)(a): 5. Upon noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the
landlords agent may apply by affidavit of complaint for eviction to the justice court
of the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial
premises are located or to the district court of the county in which the dwelling,
apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has
jurisdiction over the matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the
sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of
the order. The way these summary eviction proceedings are being carried out in Reno
Justice Court presently shocks the conscience and violates Nevada law. There is not
basis for effectuating a lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in this case. The
above two sections containing the within 24 hours of receipt language are
inapplicable, as those situations do not invoke the present circumstances, where the
Tenant did file an Affidavit and did contest this matter to a degree not often seen. To
require Nevada's tenants to get up and get out within 24 hours of receipt of the
order (what does that even mean? The use of terms like rendition, rendered,
notice of entry, pronounced, is absent here, and this receipt of the order
language is something rarely found elsewhere in Nevada law-see attached DMV
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statutory citations, and in employment law litigations where one must file a Complaint
within 90 days of receipt of a Right To Sue Letter, a situation which follows NRCP
5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in imputing receipt of such a letter, when actual receipt is not
shown, by applying a constructive notice standard that relies upon the days for
mailing extension of time for items served in the mailing, etc.). In Abraham v. Woods
Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the record did not reflect
when the plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter. The letter was issued on November
24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period commenced on November 30,
2006, based on three days for mailing after excluding Saturdays and Sundays. In order
to bring a claim under either Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust
administrative remedies and sue within 90 days of receipt of a right to sue letter. See
42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S.
147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)(granting plaintiff an additional
three days for mailing pursuant to Rule 6).

Further, despite what the inaccurate handouts of Nevada Legal Services may say about
this 24 hours and the applicability of the JCRCP to cases like these, NRS 40.400
Rules of practice, holds that :The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil
Procedure and Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals
and new trials, so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220 to
40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned in those sections. As such
NRCP 6(a),(e) applies to the Order of Summary Eviction that WCSO Deputy Machem
alleged, under penalty of perjury, that he "personally served" upon me on November 1,
2011. That is a lie by Mr. Machem, unless "personally served" is defined in a rather
impersonal way and or Machem and I have totally different understanding of the
definition of "personally served", which may be the case. Or, perhaps the Sheriff's
Office is busy and doesn't want to wait around to "personally serve" every tenant it
wishes to evict. Fine, then just use the "mail it and allow three days" rule in NRCP
6(e)...the landlord's might not like it, but they can use that frustration as an incentive
not to jump to litigating every disagreement about habitability that a tenant brings to
them. You may not realize how ridiculous some landlord's get. In my case, I offered
to fix basic things that clearly implicated the habitability rules in NRS 118A.290 and
the Californian neurosurgeon, Beverly Hill High School graduate landlord balked and
complained then hired and attorney four days into a dispute.....at which point the rules
against contacting represented parties prevented much in the way of real settlement
discussion, particularly where opposing counsel has continuously demonstrated a
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complete indifference to pursuing settlement (why would he at the rates he bills hours
at?). I just don't think the Sheriff's Office needs to sully its image or damage the
citizen tenants of Washoe County in the name of pleasing people like Dr. Matt Merliss
or Richard G. Hill, Esq.

I am hereby complaining to Northwind Apartments of a violation of the criminal law


by one of its agents R. Wray and other process servers with NCS (Oh, and RPD
Officer Weaver also threatened to use "hydraulic explosives" to gain entry to one of
my three rentals at Northwind, though no exigent circumstance existed and though he
lacked a warrant. I have previously complained of Lou Cadia, Milan Krebs, both
Northwind Maintenance Personnel, and Northwind Property Manager or Apartment
Manager Dwayne Jakob attempt to break and enter into my rentals (why is it when
Richard G. Hill, Esq. calls the RPD and alleges I am trespassing, I get subject to a
custodial arrest and Hill gets the State Bar of Nevada to try to prosecute me for
"breaking an entering", even though WCSO Machen lied in his Affidavit of Service in
RJC rev2011-0010708, and the Court had failed to return to me at the time of arrest
the $2,275 it wasn't permitted to require I deposit in a "rent escrow" account in the
first place, and where Hill and his contractor are caught on video admitting to having
remove my ladder from the former law office (in a video of December 23rd,
2011...why doesn't the RPD arrest Hill and Phil Stewart for larceny of my ladder? Do
I have to be Wal-Mart or Richard G. Hill or Northwinds Apartments (ie, rich,
connected) to get the RPD to enforce the law when I complain of a violation?
NRS 40.280 Service of notices to quit; proof required before issuance of order to remove.
1. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 40.253, the notices required by NRS 40.251 to 40.260, inclusive, may
be served:
(a) By delivering a copy to the tenant personally, in the presence of a witness;
(b) If the tenant is absent from the tenants place of residence or from the tenants usual place of business, by
leaving a copy with a person of suitable age and discretion at either place and mailing a copy to the tenant
at the tenants place of residence or place of business; or
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(c) If the place of residence or business cannot be ascertained, or a person of suitable age or discretion cannot
be found there, by posting a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased property, delivering a copy to a person
there residing, if the person can be found, and mailing a copy to the tenant at the place where the leased
property is situated.
2. Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manner as provided in subsection 1.
3. Before an order to remove a tenant is issued pursuant to subsection 5 of NRS 40.253, a landlord shall file
with the court a proof of service of any notice required by that section. Before a person may be removed as
prescribed in NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive, a landlord shall file with the court proof of service of any
notice required pursuant to NRS 40.255. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 4, this proof must
consist of:
(a) A statement, signed by the tenant and a witness, acknowledging that the tenant received the notice on a
specified date;
(b) A certificate of mailing issued by the United States Postal Service; or
(c) The endorsement of a sheriff, constable or other process server stating the time and manner of service.
4. If service of the notice was not delivered in person to a tenant whose rent is reserved by a period of 1 week or
less and the tenancy has not continued for more than 45 days, proof of service must include:
(a) A certificate of mailing issued by the United States Postal Service or by a private postal service to the
landlord or the landlords agent; or
(b) The endorsement of a sheriff or constable stating the:
(1) Time and date the request for service was made by the landlord or the landlords agent;
(2) Time, date and manner of the service; and
(3) Fees paid for the service."
[

NRS 118A.430 Failure of tenant to comply with rental agreement or perform basic
obligations: Termination of rental agreement.
1. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, if the tenant fails to comply with
the rental agreement or fails to perform his or her basic obligations under this chapter,
the landlord may deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying the acts and
omissions constituting the breach and that the rental agreement will terminate as
provided in this section. If the breach is remediable and the tenant does not adequately
remedy the breach or use his or her best efforts to remedy the breach within 5 days
after receipt of the notice, or if the breach cannot be remedied, the landlord may
terminate the rental agreement.
2. If the tenant is not reasonably able to remedy the breach, the tenant may avoid
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termination of the rental agreement by authorizing the landlord to enter and remedy
the breach and by paying any reasonable expenses or damages resulting from the
breach or the remedy thereof.

Northwinds and NCS failed to comply with NRS 118A.430(1) (to the extent it even
applies her) in that in no way did it "deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying
the acts and omissions constituting the breach". Northwinds simply wrote "see
attached", after paragraph 6 of teh 6/14/12 Notice, which reads "6. Remained in
posssession of the premises subject to the provisions of Chapter 118A of the NRS
after having failed ot perfrom the basic or contractual obligations imposed upon you
by that Chapter, namely: (SEE ATTACHED)" and then NCS, at most, include a copy
of the "Rental Agreement" with its filing of this Notice to the RJC, which in no way
specifies what aspect of that Rental Agreement Coughlin is purportedly in breach of,
or what facts supports such an allegation.

Any Order he is void or subject oa NRCP 60b set aside based upon the fraud of NCS
and Wray in lying where he declares (under penalty of perjury) to have "personally
served" Coughlin the 5 day notie on 6/14/12, and under NRCP 60b4 void for lack of
jurisdiction where NCS failed to specify in the Lanldord's Affidavit all that required
under NRS 40.253. and for so many other reasons, such at 118A does not apply if the
rental is deemed to be not e "dwelling", and that an illegal lockout is not available
even if Coughlin is ruled to have been "using as a residence" the rental, should the
rental be a "storage facility" which City of Reno Code Enforcement does not view it
to be...and Further, by Northwinds very own descriptives, it is a garage, one they held
out to the public for more than mere "parking a car", and as such, under NRS 40.760
and 108.4733, 108.475 and NRS 40.760 are not even available to Northwind. They.
Are. Stuck. Deal With It.

NRS108.4733Facility defined.Facility means real property divided into individual storage spaces. The term does not include a
garage or storage area in a private residence.

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NRS108.4746Storage space defined.Storage space means a space used for storing personal property, which is rented or leased to
an individual occupant who has access to the space.

NRS108.475Use of storage space for residence prohibited; eviction; nature of facility; effect of issuance of document of title for
property.
1. A person shall not use a storage space at a facility for a residence. The owner of such a facility shall evict any person who uses a
storage space at the facility as a residence in the manner provided for inNRS 40.760.

NRS108.4755Contents of rental agreement.


1. Each rental agreement must be in writing and must contain:
(a) A provision printed in a size equal to at least 10-point type that states, IT IS UNLAWFUL TO USE A STORAGE SPACE IN THIS
FACILITY AS A RESIDENCE.

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
NRS 40.760 Summary eviction of person using facility for storage as residence.
1. When a person is using a storage space at a facility as a residence, the owner or the owners agent shall serve or have served a notice in
writing which directs the person to cease using the storage space as a residence no later than 24 hours after receiving the notice. The notice
must advise the person that:
(a)NRS 108.475requires the owner to ask the court to have the person evicted if the person has not ceased using the storage space as a
residence within 24 hours; and
(b) The person may continue to use the storage space to store the persons personal property in accordance with the rental agreement.
2. If the person does not cease using the storage space as a residence within 24 hours after receiving the notice to do so, the owner of the
facility or the owners agent shall apply by affidavit for summary eviction to the justice of the peace of the township wherein the facility is
located. The affidavit must contain:
(a) The date the rental agreement became effective.
(b) A statement that the person is using the storage space as a residence.
(c) The date and time the person was served with written notice to cease using the storage space as a residence.
(d) A statement that the person has not ceased using the facility as a residence within 24 hours after receiving the notice.
3. Upon receipt of such an affidavit the justice of the peace shall issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of the county to remove
the person within 24 hours after receipt of the order. The sheriff or constable shall not remove the persons personal property from the
facility.
4. For the purposes of this section:
(a) Facility means real property divided into individual storage spaces. The term does not include a garage or storage area in a private
residence.
(b) Storage space means a space used for storing personal property, which is rented or leased to an individual occupant who has
access to the space.
(Added to NRS by 1989, 213; A2011, 1830)

Nevada Process Server Licensing Requirements


It is required that all process servers are licensed and 21, or over, two-years experience as a process server and

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insurance against liability to third persons with limits of no less then $200,000. No bonding is required. However,
applicants must deposit $750 upon submitting their application to pay for a background investigation, the maximum an
applicant can be charged for a background check is $1500. Applicants must also pass a written application and may be
required to pass an oral exam as well. Licenses are issued by the Nevada Private Investigators Licensing Board.
Nevada is the most expensive state in the nation to get licensed. [Nevada Revised Statutes 648.110 and 648.135]

NRS 40.253 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and


exclusion of tenant for default in payment of rent.
"

1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 10, in addition to the remedy provided


in NRS 40.2512 and 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive, when the tenant of any dwelling,
apartment, mobile home, recreational vehicle or commercial premises with periodic
rent reserved by the month or any shorter period is in default in payment of the rent,
the landlord or the landlords agent, unless otherwise agreed in writing, may serve or
have served a notice in writing, requiring in the alternative the payment of the rent or
the surrender of the premises:
(a) At or before noon of the fifth full day following the day of service; or
(b) If the landlord chooses not to proceed in the manner set forth in paragraph (a) and
the rent is reserved by a period of 1 week or less and the tenancy has not continued for
more than 45 days, at or before noon of the fourth full day following the day of
service.
As used in this subsection, day of service means the day the landlord or the
landlords agent personally delivers the notice to the tenant. If personal service was
not so delivered, the day of service means the day the notice is delivered, after
posting and mailing pursuant to subsection 2, to the sheriff or constable for service if
the request for service is made before noon. If the request for service by the sheriff or
constable is made after noon, the day of service shall be deemed to be the day next
following the day that the request is made for service by the sheriff or constable.
2. A landlord or the landlords agent who serves a notice to a tenant pursuant to
paragraph (b) of subsection 1 shall attempt to deliver the notice in person in the
manner set forth in paragraph (a) of subsection 1 of NRS 40.280. If the notice cannot
be delivered in person, the landlord or the landlords agent:
(a) Shall post a copy of the notice in a conspicuous place on the premises and mail the
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notice by overnight mail; and


(b) After the notice has been posted and mailed, may deliver the notice to the sheriff
or constable for service in the manner set forth in subsection 1 of NRS 40.280. The
sheriff or constable shall not accept the notice for service unless it is accompanied by
written evidence, signed by the tenant when the tenant took possession of the
premises, that the landlord or the landlords agent informed the tenant of the
provisions of this section which set forth the lawful procedures for eviction from a
short-term tenancy. Upon acceptance, the sheriff or constable shall serve the notice
within 48 hours after the request for service was made by the landlord or the
landlords agent.
3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must:
(a) Identify the court that has jurisdiction over the matter; and
(b) Advise the tenant:
(1) Of the tenants right to contest the matter by filing, within the time specified in
subsection 1 for the payment of the rent or surrender of the premises, an affidavit with
the court that has jurisdiction over the matter stating that the tenant has tendered
payment or is not in default in the payment of the rent;
(2) That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the
court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order providing for
the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of the county to
remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order; and
(3) That, pursuant to NRS 118A.390, a tenant may seek relief if a landlord unlawfully
removes the tenant from the premises or excludes the tenant by blocking or attempting
to block the tenants entry upon the premises or willfully interrupts or causes or
permits the interruption of an essential service required by the rental agreement or
chapter 118A of NRS.
4. If the tenant files such an affidavit at or before the time stated in the notice, the
landlord or the landlords agent, after receipt of a file-stamped copy of the affidavit
which was filed, shall not provide for the nonadmittance of the tenant to the premises
by locking or otherwise.

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5. Upon noncompliance with the notice:


(a) The landlord or the landlords agent may apply by affidavit of complaint for
eviction to the justice court of the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile
home or commercial premises are located or to the district court of the county in
which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located,
whichever has jurisdiction over the matter. The court may thereupon issue an order
directing the sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours
after receipt of the order. The affidavit must state or contain:
(1) The date the tenancy commenced.
(2) The amount of periodic rent reserved.
(3) The amounts of any cleaning, security or rent deposits paid in advance, in excess
of the first months rent, by the tenant.
(4) The date the rental payments became delinquent.
(5) The length of time the tenant has remained in possession without paying rent.
(6) The amount of rent claimed due and delinquent.
(7) A statement that the written notice was served on the tenant in accordance with
NRS 40.280.
(8) A copy of the written notice served on the tenant.
(9) A copy of the signed written rental agreement, if any.
(b) Except when the tenant has timely filed the affidavit described in subsection 3 and
a file-stamped copy of it has been received by the landlord or the landlords agent, and
except when the landlord is prohibited pursuant to NRS 118A.480, the landlord or the
landlords agent may, in a peaceable manner, provide for the nonadmittance of the
tenant to the premises by locking or otherwise.
6. Upon the filing by the tenant of the affidavit permitted in subsection 3, regardless of
the information contained in the affidavit, and the filing by the landlord of the
affidavit permitted by subsection 5, the justice court or the district court shall hold a
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hearing, after service of notice of the hearing upon the parties, to determine the
truthfulness and sufficiency of any affidavit or notice provided for in this section. If
the court determines that there is no legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer
and the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order
for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant. If
the court determines that there is a legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer,
the court shall refuse to grant either party any relief, and, except as otherwise provided
in this subsection, shall require that any further proceedings be conducted pursuant to
NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive. The issuance of a summary order for removal of the
tenant does not preclude an action by the tenant for any damages or other relief to
which the tenant may be entitled. If the alleged unlawful detainer was based upon
subsection 5 of NRS 40.2514, the refusal by the court to grant relief does not preclude
the landlord thereafter from pursuing an action for unlawful detainer in accordance
with NRS 40.251.
7. The tenant may, upon payment of the appropriate fees relating to the filing and
service of a motion, file a motion with the court, on a form provided by the clerk of
the court, to dispute the amount of the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant
to NRS 118A.460 or 118C.230 for the inventory, moving and storage of personal
property left on the premises. The motion must be filed within 20 days after the
summary order for removal of the tenant or the abandonment of the premises by the
tenant, or within 20 days after:
(a) The tenant has vacated or been removed from the premises; and
(b) A copy of those charges has been requested by or provided to the tenant,
whichever is later.
8. Upon the filing of a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court shall schedule a
hearing on the motion. The hearing must be held within 10 days after the filing of the
motion. The court shall affix the date of the hearing to the motion and order a copy
served upon the landlord by the sheriff, constable or other process server. At the
hearing, the court may:
(a) Determine the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118A.460 or
118C.230 and any accumulating daily costs; and

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(b) Order the release of the tenants property upon the payment of the charges
determined to be due or if no charges are determined to be due.
9. A landlord shall not refuse to accept rent from a tenant that is submitted after the
landlord or the landlords agent has served or had served a notice pursuant to
subsection 1 if the refusal is based on the fact that the tenant has not paid collection
fees, attorneys fees or other costs other than rent, a reasonable charge for late
payments of rent or dishonored checks, or a security. As used in this subsection,
security has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 118A.240.
10. This section does not apply to the tenant of a mobile home lot in a mobile home
park or to the tenant of a recreational vehicle lot in an area of a mobile home park in
this State other than an area designated as a recreational vehicle lot pursuant to the
provisions of subsection 6 of NRS 40.215.
(Added to NRS by 1967, 195; A 1969, 263, 575; 1973, 1085; 1975, 1202; 1977, 418,
1346; 1979, 1398, 1879; 1985, 229; 1987, 1239; 1989, 1082, 1232; 1991, 113; 1995,
1851; 1997, 3511; 1999, 981; 2009, 1966; 2011, 235, 1489)

NRS 40.254 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and


exclusion of tenant from certain types of property. Except as otherwise provided by
specific statute, in addition to the remedy provided in NRS 40.251 and in NRS 40.290
to 40.420, inclusive, when the tenant of a dwelling unit which is subject to the
provisions of chapter 118A of NRS, part of a low-rent housing program operated by a
public housing authority, a mobile home or a recreational vehicle is guilty of an
unlawful detainer, the landlord is entitled to the summary procedures provided in NRS
40.253 except that:
1. Written notice to surrender the premises must:
(a) Be given to the tenant in accordance with the provisions of NRS 40.280;
(b) Advise the tenant of the court that has jurisdiction over the matter; and
(c) Advise the tenant of the tenants right to contest the notice by filing within 5 days
an affidavit with the court that has jurisdiction over the matter that the tenant is not
guilty of an unlawful detainer.
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2. The affidavit of the landlord or the landlords agent submitted to the justice court or
the district court must contain:
(a) The date when the tenancy commenced, the term of the tenancy, and, if any, a copy
of the rental agreement.
(b) The date when the tenancy or rental agreement allegedly terminated.
(c) The date when the tenant became subject to the provisions of NRS 40.251 to
40.2516, inclusive, together with any supporting facts.
(d) The date when the written notice was given, a copy of the notice and a statement
that notice was served in accordance with NRS 40.280.
(e) A statement that the claim for relief was authorized by law.
3. If the tenant is found guilty of unlawful detainer as a result of the tenants violation
of any of the provisions of NRS 453.011 to 453.552, inclusive, except NRS 453.336,
the landlord is entitled to be awarded any reasonable attorneys fees incurred by the
landlord or the landlords agent as a result of a hearing, if any, held pursuant to
subsection 6 of NRS 40.253 wherein the tenant contested the eviction.
(Added to NRS by 1985, 227; A 1989, 1084, 1234; 1991, 115; 1995, 1853; 2001,
1065; 2003, 561)"

I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHY THE FILE IN RJC REV2012-001048 HAS MY 6


PAGE FAX OF JUNE 30TH, 2012 (AND PLEASE NOTE THE LIMITED OR
SPECIAL APPEARANCE NATURE OF THAT FILING IN THE NOTE AT THE
BOTTOM OF THE FIRST PAGE....YET IT IS NOT FILE STAMPED, AND I WAS
NEVER CALLED, OR FAXED, OR NOTIFIED IN ANY WAY CONCERNING
THE SCHEDULING OF MY CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED HEARING
BEFORE A SUMMARY EVICTION OR STATUS OF MY IFP REQUEST.

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MY POSITION IS THAT I AM ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY EVICTION


HEARING ON UNIT 29 AND THAT IT IS LONG OVERDUE. PLEASE LET ME
KNOW WHEN THAT HEARING CAN TAKE PLACE. I DO NOT BELIEVE ANY
JUDGE CURRENTLY HAS JURISDICTION ON IT, AND THAT THE NEW
CASE, WITH A NEW CASE NUMBER SHOULD BE "RANDOMLY ASSIGNED"
Further in the Reno justice court file for rjc rev2012-001048 is a tenant affidavit and declaration from
Coughlin faxed to the court on June 30, 2012 contain six pages it is unclear why Coughlin was not
granted a summary eviction hearing as required by law and Coughlin is hereby demanding one and a
jury trial which he is entitled to one pursuant the 19 Seventies the Court decision and FRCP rule 30
a.m. that Coughlin is requesting one prior to the time set for hearing that's right folks were going to a
jury trial when Nevada court services served an amended eviction notice on June 28 Coughlin there
and had five days to file for an eviction summary eviction hearing and he did so on June 30 just for
the Reno PD managed commit another wrongful arrest of Coughlin further there was County jail failed
to transfer Coughlin for the July 5 hearing on Coughlin's motion to set aside the original June 27 order
however the June 27 order in this case was extinguished by that posting of an amended lockout
notice therefore and eight it's not file stamp but it should be by the Reno justice court the six page
fax by Coughlin on June 30, 2012, though Karen Stancil appears to have handwritten in the case
number RJC rev2012-001048
PLEASE NOTE I AM USING AUDIO DICTATION TRANSCRIPTION SOFTWARE FOR THIS
CORRESPONDENCE AND IT MIGHT HAVE SOME ERRORS, WHICH COULD GREATLY ALTER THE
MEANING, AS I DON'T HAVE TIME TO CORRECT THEM RIGHT NOW.
additionaly THERE WAS SEVERAL FAXES TO THE RJC CIVIL DIVISION BY COUGHLIN ON OR ABOUT
JUNE 13TH, 2012, AND COUGHLIN REQUESTS A COPY OF THOSE OR SOME INDICATION OF WHY
THEY WERE NOT FILED AND COUGHLIN WILL CHECK HIS OWN RECORDS IN THAT REGARD WHEN
HE HAS TIME...HOWEVER, TO THE EXTENT ONE OF THOSE FILINGS WAS A TENANT'S AFFIDAVIT
DIRECTED TOWARDS UNIT 29, LOTS OF PROCEDURAL IMPLICATIONS WILL STEM.
NORTHWIND APARTMENT
ASSOC LLC
1031 XPRESS
NORTHWIND LLC
110 110TH AVE NE STE
550
BELLEVUE, WA 98004
Description
Summary
Fictitious Firm Name - Counter
74040
04/01/1997 12:00:00 AM Expiration Date: 04/01/2002
Business Name: NORTHWIND APARTMENTS Owners: NORTHWIND APARTMENT ASSOCIATES, LLC
s Firm Name - Counter - 109351
Filing Information
Filing Number
109351
Filing Date
03/16/2006 12:00:00 AM
Expiration Date
03/16/2011
Business Information
Business Name
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RENO RED BOOK


Owner Information
Owner/Corporate Name
JEFFREY G CHANDLER u
Fictitious Firm Name - Counter
104085
12/08/2004 12:00:00 AM Expiration Date: 12/08/2009
Business Name: BOTTS CANDY COMPANY Owners: JENNIFER V CHANDLER, CINDY R VANDERZIEL
Him and him and him and him motion a set of society eviction order of the number of bases one it
went unopposed and
hundred Polk case Coughlin wins in that regard to the notice of hearing by the Reno justice court is
dated July 31,
2012 are not as of the hearing on July 21, 2012 stated July 24, 2012 and him notices on what the
hearing is limited
to quote you may appear on the data show cause why the court should or should not grant motion to
stay the eviction
order in the motion for expedited relief following legal lot coverage utility shut off. If you the. Must be
prepared
to provide testimonial documentary evidence the court which torture position if he failed to appear
karmic
renovation would form a dismiss case. With what the notice does not say is that the hearing will
address the motion
to set aside eviction order Coughlin filed on July 24, 2012 and that which and for which now he
request the court to
rule in his favor or at least provide hearing or at the very and for or at the very least require
Northwind and/or
their qualified attorneys or whoever to file an opposition something under of explaining why their are
three
separate notices for her three separate process affidavits of service for the June 14, 2012 personal
service of a
five-day unlawful detainer affidavit by Robert Ray of Nevada court services that's right there's three
separate ones
and Coughlin's possession now and they bear different things as well isn't that interesting half add to
that the
fact that Nevada court services agreed with Coughlin's assessment that its original on June 14 notice
of unlawful
detainer failure to vacate premises was ineffective and that it listed the wrong forum is or court for
the tenant to
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file a tenant at search engines affidavit as required by law under 40.253 that's not something the
judge piercing
can excised from the law or legislate from the bench out of existence that is a law. The Reno justice
court does not
have jurisdiction with the notice last Sparks justice court the fugitive document for the landlord to file
it
landlord's affidavit and then to manage to get Coughlin arrested based upon a void order that should
never issued
judge Shrader particularly where supervisor of the syllable division Karen Stancil was alerted and well
in advance
by Coughlin through phone calls and mid-June in that June 26 of written correspondence to the court
that included in
the file on the left side of the correspondence and where the Sparks justice court itself fax the Reno
justice court
that a fax alerting it to the problematic aspects of the June 14 notice Coughlin was arrested he went
to jail he
paid bail he did time incurred massive damages it's appalling for judge piercing to ignore all this while
also
sanctioning the unauthorized practice of law by Jeff Chandler Nevada court services who dress up like
they are
Sheriff's and managed to the word court into their name and bang on people store and leave off the
Nevada part so
much so that it and it seems as though they are actually acting with color of law in the screening you
to come out
of your house and bang on the door parted sounds like they are cost of the Sheriff and have to do
exactly what you
said. Those few who don't Nevada court services has something up their sleeve in the form of
attempting to break and
enter and one's residence or sex service of process by as Nevada court services has done to Coughlin
on numerous
occasions sometimes captured on videotape further Nevada court services is trespassed on numerous
occasions like
office property Coughlin however is the only one who's arrested and convicted trespassing and had
reported rehashes
patent trademark office and had impact his ability to practice his chosen profession for which he has
to does have a
law license and actually did that a lot four. Further there's initial conflict in the judge piercing work to
the
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district attorneys office first 12 years of his career and the Washoe County Sheriff and potentially
Washoe County
District Attorney's Office may have it engages the misconduct in connection with the approximately 10
different
incarcerations Coughlin space this year most all connected one where another To the Way, Reno
justice court handles
landlord-tenant matters or fails to apply the law as written and created by the assembly the Senate
i.e. the
legislature Nevada and Carson City to be clear Nevada court services recognize the validity of
Coughlin's argument
that when he announced to them on June 28 at approximately 10 AM to 10:45 AM is where Coughlin
pointed out that the
the June 14 notice listed Sparks justice court that Nevada court services responded by serving in the
amended
declaration of service by license process server on June 28 thereby vitiate in any order lockout order
rescinding
and waving it etc. etc. June 28, 2012 fax from the Sparks justice court to the Reno justice court
contains a fax
Coughlin sent the Sparks justice court on June 26 that at 12 PM noon of that date that faction
Coughlin was 10 pages
the facts from the Sparks justice court the Reno justice court was apparently 13 pages no number of
those pages are
not included in the file of this matter and the Reno justice court back to the three different notices of
unlawful
detainer either stamped by w which doesn't count by the way one needs to sign something attorneys
don't get a stamp
things and file them and then later on claim they didn't commit commit misconduct or her perjury or
rule 11
violation merely because it is sign something Nevada court services continues to just put stamps
instead of actual
signatures and that's an appropriate and under the Aiken case is in Nevada and summary of
proceedings the technical
aspects of notice and due process requirements must be strictly adhered to not run out with the
bathwater by judge
Pearson because he either doesn't like off-line or thinks Coughlin doesn't deserve due process of the
law article
protection because Coughlin's an attorney you know Coughlin's not a license attorney currently needs
not able to
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make attorney money or do attorney things or even commit the unauthorized practice of law with
impunity like Nevada
court services because know Coughlin you know of Coughlin was to do so the State Bar would find it
to be a contempt.
Further judge Pearson's order for summary eviction of July 31 is void in several respects one it
purports rule one
units 2971 when unit 71 is not properly before the court unit 71 has its own case numbers of
rev2012-0067 and
rev2012-001082 (the multiplicty is due to, as here, THE RJC shortcutting due process aspects of the
process,
whererin "Orders" by Judges paid quite a bit of money are nothing more than handwritten notes on
Coughlin's own
filings...Some of those such "note ORders" by Judge Schroeder resulte in confusing vis a vis whether
Coguhlin's
IFP's were granted, and necessitated the filing of companion cases for units 45 and 71 in rev20120067 and rev2010068 in rev2012-001082 and rev2012-00183. To simply make Coughlin scapegoated all medicine
blame him for taking of
regardless the July 31 order by judge Pearson in rev 2012 00 1048 purports rule on matters not
noticed in the July
24 notice specifically in that order which reads the court finds eviction was appropriate motion to stay
eviction
order denied motion to set aside eviction order denies motion to contest personal property lien denied
motion on
illegal lockout denied tenant have always property removed is 2971 by 5 PM on August 5, 2012 only
about half of that
order was properly before the court notice litigants that I'm what was notice to the litigants in the July
24 notice
was that the hearing would be limited to the motion to stay eviction order in a motion for expedited
relief
following illegal lockout utility shutoff however the order went on to rule on matters non-there and
noticed
including the motion to set aside the eviction order the motion to contest personal property lien and
that matters
related to the property of a unit not even involved in a case number unit 71 further there required
Coughlin a hub
Allis property removed even earlier than the law requires given that after the 30 day plan under NRS
118 A.460 the
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landlord may not dispose of the property until 14 days of pass from mailing to the tenant last known
address a
certified letter. So there and again judge Pearson is violating the law in failing to apply evenly to
Coughlin in
fact he's attempting to exCise protections accorded and Coughlin under Nevada's landlord tenant law
which is the
most pro-landlord law set of laws in the country but that's not good enough for judge piercing he
wants to cut even
more protections out of it when it comes to Coughlin and the reasoning behind that is not clear
though Coughlin has
had some issues with Washoe County District Attorney's Office this year in judge Pearson did spend
the first 12
years of his career there.
Attached in exhibit a are the three different June 14 declarations of service by license process server
Robert (or Ryan?) Wray ..That's right, Coughlin has in his possession three different NOtice of UD
dated 6/14/12 and either "stamped" with "R. Way" or actually containing a handwritten signature by
R. Wray (though the one actually signed lacks a time indication, and they all lack a "manner of
service" or any other particular beyond falsely attesting to have been "personally served". WRay and
NORthwinds manager attempted to break and enter into unit 29 in hopes of effecting "personal
service" upon Coughlin in a unit that had not windows and that had the door closed and locked and
or barred. That is a criminal act and Coughlin is now again hereby complaining about it to the
landlrod, so have fun reading NRS 118A.510's and NRS 118A.390 and I'll see you in Court, and WRay,
you should probably self report to the process server licensing body and hope for the best. Check out
the video fo the 6/28/12 arrest wherein the WCSO's Gomez and Machen tell Chandler to "let us do the
talking, Jeff", then Chandler, dressed up in an outfit and with a company name intended to connote
color of law type authority, purports to trespass Coughlin from the whole place, ie, the entire premises
at 1680 Sky Mountain Dr., depsit Coughlin still having, at the time, one, and perhaps two valid leases,
to units 45 and 71. Further, the Washoe County Detention Center or jail took a tenan'ts affidavit from
Coughlin on or aoround July 15th, 2012 for units 45 and another for unit 71 and due to Coughlin's
indigency, the jail library indicate it would be filed with the rjc....WAs it? LITIGATION HOLD NOTIE
TO THE JAIL AND THE RJC.
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: chansen@washoecounty.us
Subject: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice Court
Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 09:10:14 -0700

Dear Civil Supervisor Hansen


Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118

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Fax 949 667 7402


ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com

Dear Sparks Justice Court,

I called and received permission to file this by fax...I am indigent and request a fee waiver, and failing
that, an opportunity to cure any filing fee deficiency.
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: sheriffweb@washoecounty.us; lstuchell@washoecounty.us; kstancil@washoecounty.us;
chansen@washoecounty.us; milllerr@reno.gov
Subject: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice Court
Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 07:58:36 -0700
Dear Sparks Justice Court, WCSO, RPD, and Reno Justice Court.
I have received (though not personally served) what appears to be an eviction notice (5 day unlawful
detainer?) for rentals located at 1680 Sky Mountain Drive, Reno, 89523, but the notice indicates that I
must file a Tenant's Answer with the Sparks Justice Court.
Am I mistaken in viewing this matter to be outside the jurisdiction of the Sparks Justice Court, and
rather, a matter to be handled in Reno Justice Court?
Given Sparks Justice Court is open 5 days a week (closes at noon on Fridays) and Reno Justice Court
has 4 judicial days a week, the deadline for filing a special appearance (to contest jurisdiction) and or a
Tenant's Answer of Affidavit is difficult to measure.
I spoke with a Reno Police Department who identified himself as Sargent Miller last week and he
indicated the WCSO planned to come effectuate an eviction on this date, June 26, 2012. I believe that
would be premature, as Nevada Landlord Tenant law provides for filing a Tenant's Answer or Affidavit
by noon after the fifthfullday (judicial days) and Fridays in Sparks Justice Court are notfull daysin that
sense, and regardless, Sparks Justice Court, I believe, is not the appropriate forum where, as here, the
situs is located in Reno (Ward 1-nap?)
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
tel 775 338 8118
fax 949 667 7403

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Civil Division
630 Greenbrae Drive
Sparks, Nevada 89431
(775)353.7603 Phone
(775)352.3004 Fax
Civil Department Supervisor
Chris Hansen
chansen@washoecounty.us
The CivilDivision of Sparks Justice Court is made up of three major functions:
Civil
Civil Complaints for damages in excess of $5000 or if a suit involves a breach of contract, punitive
damages, an action to obtain possession of property, a writof restitution, or other like actions, legal
counsel is suggested for these types of actions.
Evictions
An act or process of legally dispossessing a person of land or rental property.
Small Claims
An action filed in order to obtain a monetary judgment. Claims must not exceed $5000. A small claims
action may be filed with the Sparks Justice Court if one of the following applies to the defendant:
1. They reside within the boundaries of the Sparks Township;
2. They are employed within the boundaries of the Sparks Township; and/or,
3. They do business within the boundaries of the Sparks Township.

Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com

LITIGATION HOLD NOTICE FW: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice Court
9/21/12
Zach Coughlin

To stuttle@washoecounty.us, millero@reno.gov, jmachen@washoecounty.us, brownk@reno.gov, renodire Reply

From: Zach Coughlin(zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)


Sent: Fri 9/21/12 2:36 PM
To:
stuttle@washoecounty.us; millero@reno.gov; jmachen@washoecounty.us; brownk@reno.gov; renodirect@reno.gov;
lstuchell@washoecounty.us; kadlicj@reno.gov; christensend@reno.gov; mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us; apminfo@acg.com;
apminfo@yahoo.com; superior.storage@yahoo.com; 037nor4@acg.com; info@acg-apmi.com; chansen@washoecounty.us;
kstancil@washoecounty.us

file:///C|/...012%20email%20to%20stuttle@washoecounty.us%20regarding%20ncs%20rev2012-001048%20etc%20ncs.htm[10/10/2012 6:23:17 AM]

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Dear Sirs and Madams,

Please accept this as a LITIGATION HOLD NOTICE REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION AND MAINTENANCE OF ALL MATERIALS,
RECORDINGS, DOCUMENTATION, OR OTHER MATERIALS IN ANY WAY RELATED TO ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN AND HIS
TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS WITH LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT, EMERGENCY SERVICES, ET AL WITHIN THE PAST COUPLE
YEARS WITHIN BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES, MATTERS, AND INCIDENTS AND WITHIN ANY OTHER SETTINGS.

Sincerely,

Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com

From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: kbrown@nvbar.org; milllerr@reno.gov; millerr@reno.gov; stuttle@washoecounty.gov; rsilva@washoecounty.us;
stuttle@washoecounty.us; jamchen@washoecounty.us; 037nor4@acg.com; info@acg-apmi.com; rjcweb@wasoecounty.us;
jboles@callatg.com; apminfo@acg.com
Subject: FW: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice Court
Date: Mon, 2 Jul 2012 17:21:54 -0700

NOrthwind and Nevada Court Services served and "amended 5 day notice of unlawful detainer on
July 29th, 2012"...giving me five days to get my stuff out of unit 29 (the one the subject of Judge
Schroeer's Eviction Order, which was effectively rescinded by their serving a new 5 day unlawful
detainer notice....) as well as units 71 and 45...whicih are two units to which i still have valide lease
agreements, ie, I cannot be trespassing for accessing them (the Reno PD has indicated they will
arrest me for criminal trespass for accessing any units in the complex, including those to which I
still have a valid possessory or property interest, in violation of 42 usc 1983).

why does Sargent Miller have to give me a hard time? Isn't it enough for him to have his "Denzel"
file:///C|/...012%20email%20to%20stuttle@washoecounty.us%20regarding%20ncs%20rev2012-001048%20etc%20ncs.htm[10/10/2012 6:23:17 AM]

Hotmail Print Message

good looks and a much higher paying job than I will ever have? What up wit that?

Northwind and Nevada Court Services (which is practicing eviction law without a license) screwed
up and put "Sparks Justice Court on Greenbrae" as the place for the tenant to file a Tenan'ts Answer
or Affidavit. Doing so will make the RJC Order by Judge Schroeder null and void (Karen Stancil,
Chief Civil Clerk at RJC admits this, but really, the fault lies with NCS and Northwind, not the
committed professional at the RJC).
The Notice must identify the Court with jurisdiction. NRS 40.253(3)(a). ONe cannot be trespassing in a placwe
where they have a valid reason for being or a lawful right to be. NRS 207.200, RMC 8.10.040.

In
Aikins v. Andrews,91 Nev. 746, 542 P.2d 734 (1975), the Supreme COUli construed the
predecessor statute to NRS 40.2516 to mean that the alternative five (5) day notice must be given
6

before the tenants can be dispossed and a lease can be validly terminated. The court stated that this
five (5) day notice requirement " ... neither can be waved nor neglected." 91 Nev. at 748.

ttp://www.constitution.org/ussc/506-056a.htm

U.S. Supreme Court


SOLDAL v. COOK COUNTY, 506 U.S. 56 (1992)
506 U.S. 56SOLDAL, ET UX. v. COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 91-6516
Argued October 5, 1992
Decided December 8, 1992

file:///C|/...012%20email%20to%20stuttle@washoecounty.us%20regarding%20ncs%20rev2012-001048%20etc%20ncs.htm[10/10/2012 6:23:17 AM]

10110/2012

11 :27 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

(FAX)775 786 9658

P.001l025

RENO CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE


JOHN J. KADLIC
Reno City Attorney

CRIMINAL DIVISION
DISCOVERY FACE SHEET

City of Reno vs. zachary coughlin


Dept. No.: ....
1.

Case No. 12-12728

Trial Date: 1'914&'12


Defense Attorney:

_________

OJ ,4',..- l'10
I:8J
D
D
D
D
0

Keith Loomis
Henry Sotelo

Roberto Puentes
Lew Taitel

Fahrendoli, Viloria

Additional Discovery:

m""ic""h""el""'le '--Mailed Electronically By: !.!..

_____

Date: 8/15/2012

PROSECUTOR REQUEST FOR RECIPROCAL DISCOVERY


The City of Reno hereby requests that the above-named defendant, or
his/her counsel, provide reciprocal discovery pursuant to NRS 174.245.

Docket 62337 Document 2013-20762

10/10/2012

11 :28 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

DE:PT 1

(FAX) 77 5 786 9658

P.002/025

,teno Municipal Court Notice Setting l"learing

Court

COUGHLIN, ZACHARY BARKER


Language: lL:'<I'CLlSH

12 CR 1242021

Cese#:

BOOKln #:

Agency#: "12728

DaB: 912711976

Case Status:

OPEN

ACCIDENT#:

\0621

ATTORNEY, SOnLO, HENRY

CASE HIS'IORY

FORMAL COMPLAINT FILED WITH rHE COURT


LEGAL DEFeNDER APPOINTED: KEITH LOOMIS
PRESENT IN COURT FOR THe CITY OF RENO: JILL DRAKE FOR T H E DEFeNSe: KEITHN LOOMIS
I THE DEFENDANT APPEARED: WAS EXPLAINED Hlsn ER RIGHTS BY THEJLJDGE & INDICATEO THAT He/SHE
UNDERSTOOD
I PR'ESENTINCOURT FOR THEi::m OF RENO:'PAM ROBERTS FOR TH'EDEFeNse:KEITH LOOMis
'.. LEGAl. 'DEFEND"eR APPOINTED:HENRY SOTELO
. .... .
'"
. . . . . ..
. .
LEGAL DEFENDER RELIEVED

0710312012
0710512012

0710:;12012

0710512012

0711912012

0811312012

08/1312012

DiElp:

FiMSlre8S,

i 07103/2012

Jail: a

Suspended:

Jail'

Suspended

Jtlil'

SuspMdtld:

Note!;!.:

, - ,.

06.14.1308 SECURE LOAOS ANO OOVERS ON LOADS

Plea:

o s

NOT OU,"TY 07/MI2012

DiSp

Finn/Fees

N te :

07/0312012

06.06.666A SECURED VEHICLE (INSURANCE) REQiJlREO OWNER

NOT O U I ,TY 0710512012

PI."

, Finelil/Feea:
I"

"w.,,,,,,",,,,,,"",,_,,

Add'i Fees Owed:

$40.00

i TOTAL:

NotE:ls:

$40,00

07/2112012

0712112012

',}::,iWo 4 :rt'd " '


if:'i' ,,: Iat : ' ;;.... ' m'i':it: :j DR,(C.
,
,

: 0710 5/:2012

"

,,
Am! Paid :

DI.p:

, I

$40,00

Ami Waived:

$0.00

Salane.: $0.00

SAIL SET BY JUDGE


1000.00 CASH ONI.YON Drp CHARGE ONLY
ACTIVE BAIL
B127239/0NLY FOR CHARGE #1 DISTURBING THE PEACE

o7io i2-cii2--"-"--'----- -

PSYCHOLOGICAL eVALUATION
8AILCO r61;:iO'N-S----- '-'

$1,000.00
$1,000.00

CASH ONLY

- ---"-

TotAl Owing 10 Dille: SO.OO

DEFENDANT:
Ontn Date:

8113/2012

12 CR 12421121
1!30 1)111

PI'iI1I D.lI('!:

8/1312012

ilGENCY#, t2tl7:S

1 011 0/2012

P.003/025

(FAX)77 5 786 9658

11 :28 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

CASE DA T A FORM

Name:
Dept.

--,1

Judge:

CaseNo:

hl to)Zac ba.cr

Trial Date:

__

1.
3.

2.

_ __
___

4.

_
_____

Proceedings:
Date:

_ __ _ _ _
_

Date:

_____
_

Sentencing Information:

____ ____

Disposition:

Continved:

__

__
_

__

_
_
_

-----'---

--'_______

________ ___
____

Health Issues:

Education:

___
_

_.__

._--- -_._-- --_.... __.. - ._-

. _..-.

_
___________

_
______

_ _________ __________

_____ __
____ __

Sentencing D a te :

_
______

_
________

____
___________ _______
__________

Case Closed:

___
________

_______

Other Sentencing Inform ati on:

_
__

____________
_
____

Criminal History:

____

4.

_
-__
_____

Family Status:

3.

------_.---_.
---

Age: ___ Employment:

_
_ _ _ _ _ __

2.

.._._

__ __

OcculTence:

______

__

Occun'ence:

cnv OIFFIER

___
..

.l-I <6-r:l.pW\

Ci ty Attorney:

_ _____
_

Charges:

J2 l?..rll,,_'?{ .

______

FTA

_
____

_______
__
_
_
_

_-

lll1positiol1 Date:

_______ ._....

10110/2012

11 :29 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

(FAX)775 786 9658

Washoe Cuunty Sheriffs Offh."e


911 Parr Blvd., Reno, NV 89512

Mugshot Profile
COUGH IN, ZACHARY
Nlcknaml!t:

DOB,
SSN,

Booking #,

310,

1210621
POOUU79
1267:')00

MNI:

Arrc,t DiltG!

BOoking oat.. ,

0703-2012

R2lIce:

WHIU

Helghl,

600

Weight:

200

Iye COlo"!

GR EN

Sex:

Hair Color!

Hair length,

MAL

BROWN

Fat::lal features:

Gla$SI!ISI

SCilr

Ma ...k.$ 8. tattoos:

Sooklng 1. 1 NM'.,

Booking F;rat Namo,

Booking Middle Namel

COUGHLIN
ZACHARY

P.004/025

1011 0/2012

(FAX) 77 5 786 9658

11 :29 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

CASE # 1'Z-\T7Ze

IN TIrE MUNIClPAL COURT OF TIrE CITY OF RENO

COUNTY OF WASHOE, STATE OF NEVADA

CITY OF RENO,

(GENERAL)

CRIMINAL COMPLAJNT

Plaintiff,

v.

C'JvG!l-lbloJ,

2 e-c,\:\

Defen

DOB

I,

!\It I LA,...l 1L. ILtc:g;.5

'2 "' (..\ilt{<.':j

CO'-'I1aHLI,.J

has committed the crime of\) \$tult.i't-lt, TW:: PI!:iA<

______

That said defendant on or about

State of Nevada,

hereby complain and say that

10 wit:

St..1!.cl

.3

20J,1". in the City of Reno,

dJI,{ Af(.ufli W

A!JffIfM ",ltfx
.d-r INfl itt 4--'719-& Rtf. 71115 .,..,/t. (4E ;;.. fb!/dt. !/flViI rtf M 40.,6#10(""
l'I..U'# ",II! bt Nt rf/Q".rf 7'"" -4/1 1Itjf'!,
ol-l..QwfJI THE

IIf(;tf/IJ

",('-k'

....

_ All

of which is in violation ofNRS


1.04.015 of the Reno Municipal Code.
t.

Code.

All of which is ill violation of

fl.

______

1"2. 02', /;;)

as

adopted by section

of the Reno Municipal

I therefore request that said Defendant be dealt with according to law.

I hereby declare upon information and belief under penalty of pcljury pursuant to NRS
171.102, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knOWledge.

(Complainant)
1/00

...

(Dated)

P.005/025

10110/2012

11 :30 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

(FAX)775 786 9658

P.006/025

CASE # 1212728

CITY OF RENO,

IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF RENO


COUNTY OF WASHOE, STATE OF NEVADA

CR.llvfINAL COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,

v.

(GENERAL)

Coughlin, Zachary
Defendant

DOB

SSN

-------/

I. A.J. Weaver, Badge #9469, hereby complain and say that Zachary Coughlin has
committed the crime of Unsecured load to wit:
That said defendant on or about July 3, 2012, in the City of Reno, State of Nevada,
vicinity of Summit Ridge Drive and the McCarran B1. overpass:

in the

Operateq a motor vehicle with a plastic storage tub resting on the rear trunk lid unsecured while
driving eastbound on Summit Ri d ge . The storage tub fell off the rear of the vehicle landing in
the middle of Summit Ridge causing a small SUV to brake and swerve around it.

o All of which is in violation ofNRS


1.04.015 of the Reno Municipal Code.

pted by section

as ado

All of which is in violation of6.14.130.B of the Reno


Code.

Municipal

I therefore request that said Defendant be dealt with according to law.

1. hereby declare upon information and belief IllIder penalty of petjury pursuant to NRS

3
R<vimj 9106

I. m..m

1o

bMI'f

bwWl:,

10110/2012

11 :30 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

(FAX)775 786 9658

CASE # 12-12728
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF RENO

CITY

OF RENO,

COUNTY OF WASHOE. STATE OF NEVADA

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
(GENERAL)

Plaintiff,

v.
Coughlin, Zachary

Defendant

SSN

--------/
I. A.J. Weaver, Badge #9469. hereby complain and say that Zachary Coughlin has

committed the crime of insurance required (owner) to wit:

That said defendant on or about July 3. 2012, in the City of Reno, State of Nevada, in the
vicinity of Summit Ridge Drive and the McCarran BI. overpass:

Operated a motor vehiql\) without current proof of valid vehicle insurance.

All of which is in violation ofNRS


1.04.015 of the Reno Municipal Code.

[8J

as adopte d

by section

All of which is in violation of6.06.S5S.A of the Reno Municipal

Code.

r therefore request that said Defendant be dealt with according to law.

I hereby declare upon info!1!lation and belief under penalty of perjury pursuant to NRS

171,102, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

1- - 11.

(Date)

P.007/025

11 :30 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

10110/2012

A.RRi:ST REI'ORT AND


DECLARATION OF PROnMlU CAUSE

ORIGINAL

P.008/025

(FAX)775 786 9658


r...

c.......)...L.. il='

\""Z. U\ \

RPD 1209974C

/J... IJ. 7')" g


CA!iJ!
nMnO'

______________
__

-;;

RELSTO

'N\.. t-\.

t..rM

IJl8Sl;MlNAl1Q1\1 IS RElmIICTED TO CRIMINAl. JUSl"ICI! AGENCIES ONLY.

WHEREFOf'tE, D00Iarant I\lqU/l8I8 u,.t .. flllCllns bo made by maglstrole "'at probable


felony or
ml$domeanor) or for
eI1arge IS a mlsdamQaro!).

Page

01

IrlaLt

REVlliiWED FOR PROBAaI.E CAUSE

PC FOUND

PC NOT FOUND

(PC)
0

OSFENOANT QRDERED ReLEAS.D, DATE


a-308

(REVISED :lIOS)

ATE
TIDy., TO NO)j.C

J.",;;r.,

SE'CONDAI'IY DI$$];

ttV-

_.

__
_

IMINAl AGENCIES IS PROMlerrEn.

said JlI!l$on lor

prellminar; hearing (if ehal\l8 is "

OECJ.ARANT

DATE

TIME

____

r-+I
{'s

9.
j ::' M1i STRATE
l'!Ji1 1/'

------------+

:r.J
.ri;i

.; STRATE

10110/2012

(FAX) 77 5 786 9658

11 :31 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

DECLARATION SUPPLEMENT

CASE: 12-12728

PAGE
Details:

On July 3, 2012, at approximately 0925 hours, the defendant identified as Zachary Coughlin ,
followed victim Milan Krebs as he comp lete d his daily tasks as a maintenance worker at the
Northwlnd Apartments.

The defendant followed the victim for approximately S-minutes. During the time the defendant
followed victim, he continuously yelled at him. According to the victim, the defendant yelled at
nim, "If you mess with my garage again, you will be sorry." The defendant also yelled at the
victim it would be "a mist ake" to "mess" with him. The victim believed the defendant was
threatening him or attempting to bait him into a fight. The defendant's conduct and words were
calculated to provoke violence or a violation of the law by the victim

The victim believed the defendant was threatenin g him with physic al harm. The victim told me

he is familiar with the defend.ant and believes he regularly displays unstable behavior.

On July 3, 2012, at approximately 1041 hours, the defendant was seen driving a vehicle on a
public street toward the Northwind Apartments. The defendant had two large plastic tubs

(approximately 3-feet by 1.S-feet) riding on the top of his vehicle's trunk. The tub s were
unsecured and fell off the vehicle into the roadway as he drove. The tubs I'osed an immediate
traffic hazard and caused other drivers to swerve to avoid colliding with them.

When the defendant was stopped fo r his traffic violation, he was not able to provide current
proo f of insuranoe.

The defendant was arrested for disturbing the peace, becllme he used conduct to provoke the
victim to fight and caused the victim to feel threatened. He was also charged with unsecured

load because he drove hiS vehicle on III public street Wit11 cargo that was unsecured and actually

fell into the roadway. He was charged \vith insurance required because he did not have proof of

insuranc e inside his

car.

Ov er the past few weeks, the defendant has been involved in mu ltiple contacts with the victim.
The contacts have all been similar in nature to the one the defendant and the victim 011 this date.
The defendant was arrested and booked for the listed charges because he was likely to cont

to commit acts of disturbing the peace upon the victim.

WHEREFORE, Dod"nUlI rcqu<;$1! that a t1 dlng be made by m.gl,trota that probable calise exist, to holo ,aid porson for
p, llmln"y hewing (if ohargo is a felony or gro" misd"",,,,,,,or) or for a tri,l (ifc:h..,go is a ml,domoanor).
R.eVII!WED FOR PROBABLE CAUSE (PC)
PC FOUND
DATB

__

PC NOT FOUND
________

DEFENDANT ORDERED RELEASBD. DATE:

MAGISTR.ATB

____

PAQ!iJ..OF

____

MA O ISTI1ATE

P.009/025

1011 0/2012

12-12728

RENO POLICE DEPARTMENT


P.O.

P.Ol0/025

(FAX)77 5 786 9658

11 :31 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

Suppliminl No
ORIG

epcrled DlIIt.,

07/03/2012

BOX 1900

455 E 2ND ST

NituJ'9 of Call

OUT PEACE
R8no Nv .

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775-334-2175

POLICE

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(FAX)77 5 786 9658

11 :32 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

10/10/2012

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10110/2012

11 :32 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

(FAX)775 786 9658

P.012/025

Supplement No

12-12728

aRIa;

RENO POLICE DEPARTMENT


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1011 0/2012

11 :33 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

(FAX)77 5 786 9658

12-12728

P.013/025

Supplement No

ORIG

'

RENO POLICE DEPARTMENT

Narrative

Narrative written by Officer B. Dye


DETAILS:
Officer WEAVER and I are OJware of recent problems OJt the apartment complex located at 1680 Sky Mountain Dr.
because of someone living in One of the storage garages.
Management had received calls of suspicious activity and a possible garage burglary from the residents, As
employees investigated these calls they discovered garage #45 was locked from the inside, indicating someone
was inside,
Residents could hear a swamp cooler running inside the closed garage, Staff was unable to make contact with
anyone at the garage when it was locked from the inside. Eventually the circuit breaker tripped and power was
turned off to this storage garage.
Storage garage #45 was rented to Zachary COUGHLIN. It was suspected at this time COUGHLIN was living
inside the storage garage, COUGHLIN was registered to three storage units at this apartment complex, #'$ 45,
29, and 71, Without power in #45, COUGHLIN moved into storage garage #29,
Staff would periodically see COUGHLIN near the garages then he would disappear. Upon looking for him they
would discover #29 would be locked from the inside, They were unable to make contact or get inside the garage,
This continued for a few weeks and management noticed COUGHLIN watching the office staff, He would watch
the office until the last employee left work, Office staff suspected COUGHLIN did this so he could go into his
storage garage without them seeing him enter it.
.

The apartment manager Duane JAKOB gave COUGHLIN a notice informing him the storage garages were not fit
for human habitation, After receipt of this notice COUGHLIN became antagonistic tOward staff, COUGHLIN
would yell and make indirect threats to JAKOB and the maintenance worker, Milan KREBS, for gOing near his
storage garage. COUGHLIN would follow KREBS around the grounds, yell at him, and video him working,
At one point other workers witnessed COUGHLIN tampering with the tool bo x in the bed of KREBS' truck
was on 6122/12. KREBS filed a report for this incident. See case #12-10967 for additional information,

This

City of Reno Code Enforcement posted each of COUGHLIN's storage garages as unlawful to OCcupy and
photographed the notice, This took place on June 21st at approximately 1137 hours,
JAKOB flied for eViction on the storage garages, COUGHLIN was evicted from unit #29 on June 28th, The
eviction paperwork was inaccurate on units #45 and #71 and has been re-filed, COUGHLIN was locked inside
unit #29 during the eviction and refused to come out WCeo Deputies had to cut the door open to get
COUGHLIN out.
Over the course of the last month RPO has responded to this location in relation to COUGHLIN ten times. The
dales were 6/4/12,6/5112,616/12,6119112,6/21/12,6/22112, 6/29/12 (3 different calls), and 713/12. This does not
include the eviction and lockout performed by WCSO on 6128/12.
On JUly 3,2012 at approximately 1041 hours Officer Weaver and I were headed to 1680 Sky Mountain Dr. to
meet with the manager Duane JAKOB. He called Officer Weaver and indicated COUGHLIN was following his
employee KREBS around the complex threatening him,
JAKOB reported that COUGHLIN told KREBS (maintenance employee), "If [he] went near his garage again [he'd]
be sorry" and continuing to do so would be a "mistake," COUGHUN said this while following KREBS and was
video recording, KREBS interpreted these statements as threats to his safety, The threats were made around
0925 hours this morning, 7/3/12.
KREBS has had multiple interactions with COUGHLIN throughout the last few weeks, He describes COUGH LIN
as unstable, agitated, and angry. KREBS admitted being fearful for what COUGHLIN is capable of doing based
on his erratic behavior. We were responding to this address to meet with KREBS and JAKOB due to these
threats.

R' 'PQ"r1"offil;-fi'"

R9469/WEAVER

ALAN

10110/2012

11 :42 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

(FAX)77 5 786 9658

1212728

P.014/025

Supplement

No

ORIG

RENO POLICE DEPARTMENT


Narrative
While driving on the McCarran off-ramp to Summit Ridge Dr. we observed a silver Honda Accord with a plastic
storage tub on the trunk traveling east from the four-way stop near the 7-11. The plastic tub fell off the trunk lid
and Into the street. A small SUV had to b r a k e and swerve to avoid striking the tUb. The Honda pulled over and
we activated our lights so we could contact the driver. This occurred around 1041 hours on 7/3/12.
Upon contact with the driver and sale occupant of the vehicle we recognized him as COUGHLIN. He provided a
Nevada drivers lic e ns e confirming his Identity.

Wh ile on the traffic stop COUGHLIN indicated he was moving. We did not know where he was moving to but knew
he had property a t the garages at 1680 Sky Mo u n tain Dr.
Officer MAGEE respond ed to the stop at our request. We asked him to meet with KRESS at 1680 Sky Mountain
Dr. KREBS advised he wanted to press charges against COUGHLIN for making verbal threats to him (disturbing
the peace). KREBS p ro v ided a written statement a n d signed a crimin a l complaint for disturbing the peace against
COUGHLIN placing him under cit iz e n' s arrest.
Based on the prior history with COUGHLIN at 1680 Sky MOuntain Dr. and concerns for continued behavior along
with KREBS' safety, COUGHLIN was taken into custody. He was additionally charged with having an unsecured
load and no proof of valid vehic l e insur ance .

Officer TOPOIAN arrived and transported COUGHLIN to the WCSO Jail for booking.
KREBS was Offered assistance from RPD victim advocates to obtain a protection order against COUGHLIN.
KREBS came to t he main st atioli to facilitate this paperwork. At the time of this report it is unknown is the TPO
was granted.
We took digital photographs of Coughlin's vehicle and completed a RPD Vehicle Tow Sheet. These photos were
booked into RPD Veripic. Big Horn Towing arrived and towed the vehic le to their yard.
Sg!. BRADSHAW and Lt. Wiecking were notified of the detailS of this case.
NO FURTHER.

R,9469

1011 0/2012

11 :42 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

(FAX)77 5 786 9658

P.015/025

FOR POLlCE U$1! ONLY,

RENO POLICE DEPARTMENT


STATEMENT

c:ASJ;; NO: l-z.- I].7Z. 8


TAKeN BY:

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NO PAGes IN STATliMIiIIT:

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FOil rouee USI ONLY, neLS. TO:

DATe:

BY:

PlSSeMINAllON RESTRICTED TO CIUMINALJUmCE AGENCIES ONLY. SECONDARY DISS "INATlON IS PROHIPrnb.

RevId 211/00

RENO POLICE oEPARrMENT


Box 1900, Rono, Navada 89.05
(775) 334.2115
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(AenoPl;ltitlIl'OltPI.)

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VEHICLE REPOI'lT

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P.016/025

(FAX) 77 5 786 9658

11 :43 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

10/10/2012

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C R IMINA L

THE Fo:GLOWING FROM NCJIS


RAC/ W

)512012-14:47:59

CJIS:QH
CJIS:SQCH

NAM/ COUGHLIN,

P.017/025

(FAX) 77 5 786 9658

11 :43 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

10110/2012

07/05/2012-14:48:00

JUSTICE IS A RESULT OF YOUR 5 QC H INQUIRY ON:

ZACHARY

SEX/ M

008/

soc/ 295864380

CN/

********************************************************************************

NCJIS BASE RECORD


BIN/ 1000047015

soc:
604
HAIR:

BROWN

WEIGHT:

220

G REE N

EYES:

ALIAS NAMES:
COUGHLIN,

ZACHARY

COUGJ-ILIN,
COUGHLIN,

ZACHARY BARKER

CAUGHLIN,

ZACHARY

POB:

ZACHARY B

WA

ADDRESS:

PO BOX 3961
RENO,

NV
F PC :

SID:
FBI:

FINGERPRINTS ARE AVAILABLE.

CRIMINAL HISTORy RECORD PCN/WAS000419Sac


FINGERPRINT BASED RECORD

ARREST

DATE:

06/28/2012

NAME

USED:

COUGHLIN,

CHARGE

FALSE

1:

AGENCY:

ST[ T TO/OESTRUCT PUB OFF

NEVADA STATUTE NRS


NO

WASHOE COUNTY SHERIFFS orFICE

ZACH
MISDEMEANOR

197.190

DIS POSITION RECORD ON FUE


ARRESTED:

WASHOE COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE

L OCA L NUMBER:

ORI:

Nv0160000

120004499

RECORD CREATED: 06/29/2012

------------

04:32:29

*.** END Of

--------------

LAST U DATED:

06/29/2012

CRIMINA:G HISTORY RECORD

-------

--------

CRIMINAL HISTORY RE:COF\D

04:33:00

****

--------------

-------

CN/RPD1200020C

fINGERPRINT BASED RECORD


ARREST
NAME

CHARGE

DATE :
USED:
1:

AGENCY:

01/14/2012
COUGHLIN,

RENO

P OLICE DEJ:'AR'rMENT

ZA CHARY aARKER

UNLAWFUL USE OF EMERGENCY TELE?HONE NUMBER


NEVADA STATUTE NRS

207.245

NO DISPosrTION RECORD ON FIL


ARRESTED:

LOCAL, NUMBER:

RENO

POLICE

120000974

DEPARTMENT

- RECORDS

OR!:

NV0160100

- RECORDS

GROSS MISD

--

(FAX) 77 5 786 9658

11 :44 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

10110/2012

RECORD CREATED:

01/15/2012
07:47:29
LAST UPDATED: 01/15/L012
****** END OF C RIM INAL HISTORY RECORD ******

CRIMINAL

07:47:57

HISTORY RECORD PCN/RPD1101921C

rINGERPRINT BASED RECORD


ARREST

DATE: 11/13/2011

NAME USED: COUGHLIN,


1:

CHARGE

AGENCY:

POLICE: DEPARTMENT' - RECORDS

MISDEMEANOR

TRESPASSING
6.10.010

RENO MONICIPAL
NO

RENO

ZACHARY B

DISPOSITION RECORD ON FILE

ARRESTED:
LOCAL

RENO POLICE DEPARTM NT - RECORDS

ORI:

NV0160100

NUMBER: 110022185

RECORD CREATED:

ll/13/2011
******

16:56:16

LAST UPDATED:

11/13/2011

16:56:36

END OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD ******

CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD PCN/RPD1112566C


fINGERPRINT BASED RECORD

ARREsr

DlITE:

NAME USED:
CHARGE

1:

AGENCY:

06/2Q/2011
COUGHLIN,

F ELONY

GRAND LARCENY

NEVADA STATUTE NRS


NO DISPosrrl0N R8cORD ON FILE
ARRESTED:

RENO POLICE DEPARTMENT - RECORDS

ZACHARY BARKER

205.220

RENO POLICE DE: ARTMENT - RECORDS

ORI:

NV0160100

LOcAL NUMBER: 110016399


RECORD CREATED:

08/21/2011

02:17:24

LAST UPDATED:

08/21/2011

02:17:54

****** E:ND OF CR IMINAL HISTORY RECORD ******

CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD PCN/18987625


rINGER RINT BASED RECORD
ARREST

DATE:

10/1412001

NAME

USED:

COUGHLIN,

CHARGE

."GENCY:

LAS VEGAS ME1'ROFOLITAN

1: EVADE/ELUDE/FAIL TO STOP ON SIGNAL or


NEVADA STATUTE NRS

DISPOSITION
CHARGE:

DATE:

POLICE

ZACHARY

MISDEMEANOR

OLICE

484.348

10/30/2001

DISPOSITION:

DENIED

EVADE/ELUDE/FAIL TO STOP ON SIGNAL OF POLICE

NEVADA srATUTE NRS

MlSDEMEANOR

OFFENSE CODE: 01017

484.348

CASE H: OlM23327X
NAME

CHARGE

OSED:

COOGHLIN,

ZACHARY

M I SDS MEANOR

2: OBSTRUCTING PUBLIC OFFICER


NEVADA STATUTE NRS

DISPOSITION DATE:

CHARGE:

197.190
DlSPOSITION:

01/17/2002

OBSTRUCTING PUBLIC

NEVADA STATUTE NRS

197.190

DISMISSED

MISDBMEANOR

OFFICER

OFFSNSS CODE:
CASE #:

00025

01M23327X

P.018/025

10110/2012

11 :44 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

NAME USEP:

(FAX) 77 5 786 9658

COUGHLI

HARY

MISDEMEANOR

3: RES IST PUBLIC OFFICER

C HARG E:

NEVADA STATUTE NRS

10/30/2001

DISPOSITION DATE:
CHARGE:

199.280

RESI ST

PUBLIC

DISPOSITION:

DENIED
MISDEMEANOR

OFFICER
orrENSE

199.280

NEVADA STATUTE NRS

CASE

C OU G H LI N ,

NAME USED:

ARRESTED:
LOCAL NUMBER:
BOOKED:
R CORD

DIRECTLY
H I ST OR Y
IF

?OLICE

OR!:

NVOO:Z0100

CLAR K COUNTY DETENTION CENTER

ORI:

NV002013S

CREATED:

10/16/2001

11:18:08

LAST UPDATED:

10/16/2001

END OF C RIMINAL HISTORY RECORD

EXPLANATION OF A CHARGE OR DISPOSITION IS NEEDED,


WITH THE AGENC Y THAT

FURNISHED THE

DATA TO THE

14:19:07

******

COMMUNICATE

NEVADA CRII INAL

RECORDS REPOSITORY.
DID NOT

R EPO S ITOR Y

INDIVIDUAL
IN

ZACHARY

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN

E'INGERPRINTS

RECORDS

00062

01M23327X

01693548

******
WHEN AN

#:

CODE:

IN

IS

ACCOM ANY THIS INQUIRY,

UNABLE TO GUARANTEE THAT

THE NEVADA CR I MIN AL HISTORY


THIS MATERIAL CONCERNS THE

WHOM YOU ARE INTERESTED.

REGARDS TO THE ABOVE NAM S SUBJECT,

EXISTENCE OF ADDITIONAL MATCHED

THIS

DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE

POSSIBLE

Rl>C ORDS IN LOCAL OR E'BI IDENTIFICATION

FIL ES WHICH ARE NOT INDEXED BY THE NEVADA STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY
IT
THE USE OF TH I S INFORMATION IS REGULATED BY LAW.
IS PROVIDED FOR OFFICIAL U SE AND MAY ONLY BE USED FOR THE PUR P OSE REQUESTED.
NEVADA AGENCIES - REFER TO NRS CHAPTE R 179A.
DIVISION

RECORDS

REPOSITORY.

P.019/025

10110/2012

11 :45 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

(FAX)77 5 786 9658

NV01 60 l l A
NCIC INTERSTATE IDENTIFIC

THIS

NAME
COUGHLIN, ZACHARY
SEX

INDEX RESPONSE

IS THE

RESULT

or YOUR

ON NAM/COUGHLIN, ZACHAR'( SEX/M RAC/W

INQUIRY
!?uR/c

FBI NO,

INQUIRY DATE

57914VB6

2012/07/05

RACE

604
EIRTH

195

GRN

ERO

PLACE:

WASHINGTON

STATE

FINGERPRINT CLASS

PATTERN CLASS
uc

UC

uc

uc

UC UC UC UC UC UC UC
UC UC UC UC UC UC UC UC
uc UC UC UC UC UC UC UC UC UC
uc

ALIAS NAMES
CAUGHLIN,ZACHARY

COUGHLIN,ZACH

COUGHLIN,ZACHARY 9

COUGHLIN,ZACHARY 8ARKER

IDENTIFICATION DATA UPDATED 2012/06/29

l.NIA

THE INTERSTATE IDENTIFI CA T ION


NG TH

END

AP ROPRIAT

NCIC TRANSACTION,

P,020/025

1011 0/2012

(FAX)77 5 786 9658

11 :45 Mark Mausert ,ESQ


JIS:QR

)5/2012-14:49:09

CIC:QR

0'1(05/2012-14:49:09

IS THE RE SUL T OF YOUR

S RECORD WILL BE

M THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:

AN ADDITIONAL RECO RD MAY BE OBTAINED FROM FILES WITHI N YOUR STAT .


END

P.0211025
A

10110/2012

11 :46 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

ORIG:

RNCA16071A RNCA3004

ROUT:

J L CLI ENT

(FAX)775 786 9658


CJIS:QR

(NV0024167b 8

NLET: CAllIOOOO

DRI:

NV016071A

15/2012-14:49:09

NLETS:CR
CTL:

0,/05/2012-14:49:11

NV272EA49E

HDR/ZL01NV00272EA49E

ATN/BRIAN SOOUDl

1.-12728

THE FOLLOWING R ECO RD PERTAINS TO F8I/57914V86

SID/CA243440S0

RESTRICTED - DO NOT USE FOR EMPLOYMENT,

LICENSING,

PLACEMENT OR

CERTIFICATION PURPOSES

III MULTIPLE SOURCE RECORD

cn/A24344050

SEX/M
HGT/604

WGT/200

RAC/WHITE

EYE/GRN

HAl/BRO

POS/WA

NAM/OOl COUGHLIN,ZACHARY BARKER


MNU/FBI-57914VB6
S OC- 2 9 5 86 4 38 0
****

COIN

STATUS: MISDEME:ANOR

******w*w***************w*****************w*****w******

WANTS NOT CHECKED - PLEASE CHECK NCIC WANTS


********** ********************************************
END OF RECORD

P.022/025

1011 0/2012

(FAX)77 5 786 9658

11 :46 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

P.023/025

RENO MUNICIPAL COURT


DEPARTMENT ONE

JAY DILWORTH. JUOGE

CITY OF RENO

NEVADA

Augl) st 13, 2012

MR. ZACHARY COUGHLIN


P.O. BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Re: C as e No. 12 CR 1242021

Dear ZACHARY COUGHLIN;

The above referenced case was set for August 23'd at 1 :00 PM. You r court appointed
attorney, Keith Loomis has withdrawn as council, and t h erefore we have reset your trial
for a new date with a new legal defender. Your trial date is September 4, 2012
at 8:00 am in courtroom B Department One of the Reno Municipal Court. A Co u rt

Appearance slip is attached for your records. Please note that YOLlr Legal Defender on
the above referenced case is Henry Sotelo, Esquire. You may contact your attorney at

(775)

525-1529. Any request for a continuance must be filed in writing no later t ha n ten

(10) days prior to your trial date.

FAILURE TO APPEAR AS SCHEDULED MAY RESULT IN ISSUANCE OF A

WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST.

Sincerely,

A. Carter

Department One Clerk

1'.0. BOX

1900. RENO. NoVADA 89505 1775) 3342$90. fAX 1715) 3265110. 10C-, 11751 33;2298

1011 0/2012

(FAX) 77 5 786 9658

11 :46 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

P.024/025

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to NRCP 5

(b), I certify that I am an employee of the Reno City

Attorney, Reno, Nevada, and that on the 16t h, day of August, 2012, I deposited for mailing at

Reno, Nevada, first class postage prepaid, a tme and correct copy of the foregoing document

addressed to:

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Henry Sotelo, Esq.


930 Evans Street
Reno, NV 89512

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Legal Secretary, Criminal Division \

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City Attorney
P.O. Box 1900

110

teno, NY 89505

1011 0/2012

11 :47 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

(FAX)77 5 786 9658

P.025/025

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to NRCP 5

(b), I certify that I am an employee of the Reno City


16th, day of August, 2012, I deposited for mailing at

Attorney, Reno, Nevada, and that on the

Reno, Nevada, first class postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document

addressed to:

7
8

Henry Sotelo, Esq.

930 Evans Street

Reno, NV 89512

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R,no City Attorn,y
1'.0. lIox 1900
Reno, NV 89505

egal Secretary, Criminal Division

1
2
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4
5

Document Code:
Zach Coughlin
Nevada Bar No: 9473 (temporarily suspended)
1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV
RENO NV, 89512
Tele and Fax: 949-667-7402
pro se TENANT'S/Subtenant
PLEASE NOTE ADDRESS CHANGE

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IN THE RENO JUSTICE COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA


IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
PARK TERRACE TOWNHOMES HOA,
)
WESTERN NEVADA MANAGEMENT, SUE )
KING, GAYLE KERN, ET AL,
)
) Case No: RJC REV 2012-000374
)
LANDLORD,
) Dept No: D3 JUDGE SCHROEDER
vs.
)
)
ZACH COUGHLIN,
)
)
)
TENANT.
NOTICE OF CLERK'S OFFICE AND COURT'S FAILUR TO FILE COUGHLIN'S NOTICE
OF APPEAL, REQUEST THAT IT DO SO NOW, AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT OF 3/15/12 AND ORDER OF 5/15/12 IN LIGHT OF NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE AND FRAUD, AND NRCP 60(B)(4)
COMES NOW, TENANT, ZACH COUGHLIN, by and through his attorney, Zach Coughlin,

20
21

Esq. And hereby moves this Court for the above relief, particularly in light of the void for lack of

22

jursidiction aspect of the Eviction Order in this case, as Couglin pled a commercial tenancy, but the

23

30 day Notice was for No Cause, but, magically, the Landlord's Affidavit, filed the day of the hearing

24

on 3/15/12, suddenly says the eviction was for "non-payment of rent", which is even more curious

25

given the Motion work Coughlin filed prior to the hearing detailing the difficulties under Glazier and

26
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Lippis given the unique employment for rent trade arrangement present herein...

- 1 NOTICE OF CLERK'S OFFICE AND COURT'S FAILURe TO FILE COUGHLIN'S NOTICE OF APPEAL, REQUEST
THAT IT DO SO NOW, AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OF 3/15/12 AND ORDER OF 5/15/12 IN
LIGHT OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND FRAUD, AND NRCP 60(B)(4)
Docket 62337 Document 2013-20762

Also, the 3/15/12 hearing in this matter was was set for 8:30, but the fax of the Order of Eviction

says it was sent at 8:24 am, therefore, there is ambiguity whether Coughlin was even late for the

3
4
5
6

8/15/12 hearing. Also find attached proof of a "Change of Address" being provided to the RJC/Court
Administrator Steve Tuttle on April 16th, 2012 (in addition to numerous filings baring the then
current PO BOX 3961 address for Coughlin, and further, WNM's Sue King has been held out as a

managerial agent and even practitioner of law for Park Terrace and conduit for Gayle Kern, and

providing a change of address to King on May 9th, 2012 makes the fact that Kern's offics apparently

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sent Notice of Entry of Order to a then outdate address, prejudicial to Coughlin's ability to challenge
the 5/15/12 ORder and or responde to the cessation of any tolling that may have been in place (but
really, Coughlin filed a Notice of Appeal on 3/16/12, though the RJC failed to file stamp it, so that

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divested the RJC of Jursidiction, and now the RJC is late in processing the appeal, motion for stay,

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and motion to set appeal bond or supersedeas bond. nrs 40.400 makes NRCP 60b4 applicable here.

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further the lockout of 3/15/12 was done before constructive service was effected (other than by the

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break in with guns drawn bit the wcso does...which is not in compliance with the law...its something

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the Sheriff's office made up)...


LEGAL ARGUMENT

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I. Summary of Facts:
Park Terrace at least by name e-mail from Coughlin to gang sometime in April attached as an
exhibit alerted her and therefore Park Terrace in Gaelic earnest to Coughlin's new PO Box 3961

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address however the notice of entry of order were sent to an old PO Box and Coughlin and Coughlin

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never received it until months later further there is a fraud bases for seeking a new trial and that the

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studio Reno has tempted Coughlin committed by coercive measures directed at his parents further

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Coughlin was 8 min. late to court that day and in the audio of the hearing court staff can be heard

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- 2 NOTICE OF CLERK'S OFFICE AND COURT'S FAILURe TO FILE COUGHLIN'S NOTICE OF APPEAL, REQUEST
THAT IT DO SO NOW, AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OF 3/15/12 AND ORDER OF 5/15/12 IN
LIGHT OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND FRAUD, AND NRCP 60(B)(4)

urging Joe Schrader to call Coughlin's case despite the fact that he was not present despite the fact

that the justice court admits that Joe Schrader had planned to call a different case first and a seeming

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apparent attempt to dispose of Coughlin's case at the first opportunity Coughlin t Kern's voice on the
tape the hearing of 3 15 12 where she alleges how absolutely fair it would be to granted defaul;t
despite the fraud on the part of Ms. Kern Park Terrace townhomes and Western Nevada management

seems apparent to the extent that they filed a nonpayment affidavit on the day of the hearing to go

along with the no cause eviction notice only after being served a motion by Coughlin pointing out the

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difficulty with face glacier and let us pursuing a no cause eviction where arguably Coughlin and/or
any extent that our back and for shared unit of lessor were proceeding as tenants under some sort of
employment for rent relationship such as that set forth in glacier additionally to the extent the

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Coughlin was holding out that address as his home office a no cause eviction against a commercial

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tenant i.e. where rent is not pled is impermissible under NRS 118 a and NRS 40.253 particularly

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where it was not applied nor alleged or proven that the lease is terminated it's just nonsense for Park

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Terrace kerning came and Sheila Lester to the alleging that Coughlin was a squatter when at the

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hearing on March 15, 2012, Lester and or King admitted that former Western Nevada management

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manager Robin Bataldo received express approval from either Lester and/or other members of the

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homeowners Association to enter into the lease agreement it had with Allaback and Foreshee. Further

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Coughlin has an excusable neglect bases rating eight math late today hearing giving the fraud on the

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part of NV energy in the nicest Postal Service apparently in concert with King and/or Kern and

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Western Nevada management in managing to deprive Coughlin about electricity and a key to his

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mailbox where they demanded some sort of written rental agreement even where Nevada law under

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NRS 118A.160 pleasantly provides a leased can be oral.

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- 3 NOTICE OF CLERK'S OFFICE AND COURT'S FAILURe TO FILE COUGHLIN'S NOTICE OF APPEAL, REQUEST
THAT IT DO SO NOW, AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OF 3/15/12 AND ORDER OF 5/15/12 IN
LIGHT OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND FRAUD, AND NRCP 60(B)(4)

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Further at this point Coughlin seeks to have Joe Schrader recuse himself from any cases
involving him getting the statements Joe Schroeder made to Coughlin at the January 31 extension
hearing it Richard Hills protection order where Coughlin sought to address the use of process and
obstruction of justice apparent by Richard Hills making false statements to officer Hollingsworth (a
videotape by Coughlin captures the fact that Hill had told Hollingsworth Coughlin Atari lost Gail one

January 12, 2012 `it was not decided until March 30th, 2012 in CV11-03628 (the appeal of the

summary eviction, now before the Nevada Supreme Court in 60331 and 61383) and where both

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Richard G Hill and his associate Casey Baker filed in NRCP 11 violating motions on November 21,
2011 and January 20th, 2011 (the first in the trial court, the second in District Court) containing
affidavits entered declarations that violate NRCP 56(g), and particularly after viewing the video

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tapes of those incidents clipping those film by Hill himself (Hill and Merliss's fraud is set forth in

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excruciating detail in the attached Motions in 61901 (SCR 111(4) Petition by SBN re: Coughlin's

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trespass conviction) and in 11 cr 26405 (the June 18th, 2012 criminal trespass trial against Coughlin

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wherein HIll and Baker testified).

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Further basis for seeking to Schrader's recusal herein relates to the eviction order he signed in

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Northwind apartments versus Coughlin in inev2012-001048 on June 27th, 2012 despite Coughlin's

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multiple correspondences with both the sparks Reno Justice Court, Washoe County Sheriff's office

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Reno Police Department and the civil division of the Reno justice court (see attache 6/26/12 and

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7/2/12 emails by Coughlin to the RJC and Sparks Justice Court, and Coughlin has learned that a fax

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from the sparks justice court at around noon on June 28 made its way to the Reno justice court and

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apparently Joe Schrader though some pages the facts appear to be missing but suffice to say it alerts

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the Reno justice court as to the fact that Coughlin submitted for filing attendance affidavit to the

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sparks justice court on June 26, 2012 which the Reno justice court was already aware of at bedtime

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- 4 NOTICE OF CLERK'S OFFICE AND COURT'S FAILURe TO FILE COUGHLIN'S NOTICE OF APPEAL, REQUEST
THAT IT DO SO NOW, AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OF 3/15/12 AND ORDER OF 5/15/12 IN
LIGHT OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND FRAUD, AND NRCP 60(B)(4)

on June 27, 2004 Winter Schrader sign the order evicting Coughlin based upon a landlord's affidavit

submitted by Nevada court services which was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law at the

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time and continued to be even at the July 31, 2012 hearing in that matter which spawned an order
which will exceeded the scope of the notice of the hearing and in fact purported to rule upon other
leases. NRCP 11 requires that corporations such as Northwind's apartment Associates Incorporated

not appear pro se and that it must be represented by an attorney court in nothing and the Nevada

statutes allows for anything other than posting eviction notice by landlord's agent and NRS 40.253.

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Further bases for seeking judge Schroeder's recusal from this matter stems from the apparent
fact that he is listed in the docket in a criminal matter against Coughlin in RCR2012-065630 (a
fraudulent arrest based upon retaliatory motives by the Reno Police Department including but not

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limited to that stemming from Coughlin's obtaining a videotaped admission by Sgt. Lopez has

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wrought on the part herself Sgt. Carter Richard Hill and Dr. meritless incidents eviction as set forth in

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detail in the attached filings in 61901 and 11 CR 26405 and in the videos Hill films of the arrest all

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submitted along with the CD attached to this motion and copied to the justice court in digital format

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by electronic transmission is the means of a courtesy copy. As seen in the docket attached in Exhibit

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1 Joe Schrader is listed as presiding over the February 27, 2012 status conference 065630 involving

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right of in in DDA young at 1:30 PM from which judge Clifton signed an order for competency

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evaluation at 1:31 PM which young did not he and his violation of NRS 178 by filing later that day in

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opposition emotion Coughlin's motion appear as cocounsel in which upon information believed and

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upon a reading of judge owns his March 14, 2012 letter State Bar owns was aware of that order

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for competency evaluation in G herself violated NRS 178. 405 by persisting in holding a trial in yet

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another matter where and Richard Hill was able to stick local law-enforcement on Coughlin this time

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a traffic citation three of them issued to Coughlin upon his venturing to Hill's office after being

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- 5 NOTICE OF CLERK'S OFFICE AND COURT'S FAILURe TO FILE COUGHLIN'S NOTICE OF APPEAL, REQUEST
THAT IT DO SO NOW, AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OF 3/15/12 AND ORDER OF 5/15/12 IN
LIGHT OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND FRAUD, AND NRCP 60(B)(4)

released from three days in jail incident to the fraudulent November 13, 2011 criminal trespass

complaint Hill signed an arrest which was predicated upon lies by Hill, Dr. Merliss (and CAsey

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Baker co-opted Hill's lies, in violation of a NRCP 11 given Baker had access as an associate to the
videos Hill and Merliss filmed on scene on 11/13/11) and Reno police on videotape. See a Reno
Marshall Harley just before that trial the Judge Nash Holme's persisted in holding despite her

awareness of an order for competency evaluation being entered or at least being sought by Mr.

Duggan Alaska public defenders and/or Mr. Yong of the District Attorney's Office. Coughlin doesn't

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know Judge Shroeder at all (Coughlin's one appearance in front of Judge Schroeder resulted in Judge
Schroder exclaiming "do you want to go to jail!" at Coughlin and Coughlin first topic of Hill's visa
process at the January 31, 2012 extension. On Hill's fraudulent tax order and he may well be a fine

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jurist and a good man but there's just been too many disturbing coincidences connected with Joe

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Schroeder's rulings. Further bases for setting aside the default stemming from Coughlin means being

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8 min. late March 15 hearing arise from the fact that Coughlin was wrongfully incarcerated for five

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days by Judge Nash Holmes on 2/27/12 to 3/3/12 incidents or her order fining him in summary

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criminal contempt despite the fact that her order rests upon allegations of conduct not occurring

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allegedly an immediate presence of the court but rather in her March 12, 2012 order from the

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owns recounts something a court-martial told her he spied Coughlin doing in a bathroom stall during

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a restroom break something about taking apart a smart phone something something regardless it's not

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appropriate for summary adjudication kind of like all these objections of commercial tenant Coughlin

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where the nonpayment of rent has not been noticed by the landlord such as in the eviction by Richard

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Hill on 1708 and in this seeking Gail Kern deal here in 374. Coughlin's father is John Physician yet

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somehow the city Arena thinks it's okay to send out multiple officers and social workers she can have

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Coughlin committed this despite the fact that the appearance of impropriety arises where the city

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- 6 NOTICE OF CLERK'S OFFICE AND COURT'S FAILURe TO FILE COUGHLIN'S NOTICE OF APPEAL, REQUEST
THAT IT DO SO NOW, AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OF 3/15/12 AND ORDER OF 5/15/12 IN
LIGHT OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND FRAUD, AND NRCP 60(B)(4)

Arena has a vested interest in discrediting Coughlin given the enormous number of wrongful arrest it

is subject to Coughlin to this year. Further the Reno justice court has some issues that Coughlin

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would like to ask it about particularly regarding the failure to file a notice of appeal in this matter
threesome importance by Coughlin faxing 1 Into This Court and other students and talk about this or
that not having a signature but the notice of appeal itself does have a signature on it and it should've

been filed and the same is true of what Coughlin submitted for filing on December 26, 2011 in

rev2012-001708 following the December 20, 2011 hearing on Coughlin's motion to contest personal

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property lien which Hill alleges he was able to control the Reno justice court in its failing to set or
hold that hearing within 10 days required by statute from Coughlin's November 16, 2011 filing of a
Motion to contest personal property lien in a matter. Then there is the fact that in that summary

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eviction from Coughlin's commercial home office where the nonpayment of rent was not pled or

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noticed that Joe Sferrazza ruled at the October 13, 2011 hearing that Coughlin had met his burden of

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establishing a genuine issue of material fact at which point just Rosin noticed him that there would be

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a trial only if Coughlin would deposit into the Reno justice court of rent escrow account which

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Nevada law does not permit the Reno justice court to require and the judges of the Reno justice court

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had a meeting on just this issue back to the fact that large AC under Nevada just core rules civil

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procedure 83 and/or 84 has not followed the appropriate procedure in implementing what is

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essentially a corollary justice court ruled Las Vegas rule 44 which may only be done after publishing

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the rule and receiving approval from the Nevada Supreme Court

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CONCLUSION

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PleasE finally file the NOtice of Appeal and or GRANT A NEW TRIAL OR ALTER OR

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AMEND THE summary eviction order or order of May 15th, 2012 or otherwise reconsider it,
- 7 NOTICE OF CLERK'S OFFICE AND COURT'S FAILURe TO FILE COUGHLIN'S NOTICE OF APPEAL, REQUEST
THAT IT DO SO NOW, AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OF 3/15/12 AND ORDER OF 5/15/12 IN
LIGHT OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND FRAUD, AND NRCP 60(B)(4)

AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B.030

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The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social
security number of any person.

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Dated: 11/4/ 2012

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/S/ Zach Coughlin________


Zach Coughlin,Esq.
pro se tenant/subtenant

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- 8 NOTICE OF CLERK'S OFFICE AND COURT'S FAILURe TO FILE COUGHLIN'S NOTICE OF APPEAL, REQUEST
THAT IT DO SO NOW, AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OF 3/15/12 AND ORDER OF 5/15/12 IN
LIGHT OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND FRAUD, AND NRCP 60(B)(4)

PROOF OF SERVICE

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Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I served a copy of the foregoing document upon the
following party by electronically filing on NOvember 4th, 2012 and therefore serving upon
registered efiler:
sue king, gayle kern western nevada property management, Park terrace towhnhomes HOA
804 Mill Street Reno, NV 89502
(775) 284-4434 and faxed to
kern ad PTTHOA 7753246173
and King and WNM at 7752844465
Gayle A. Kern. Ltd. Address: 5421 Kietzke Lane Suite 200 Reno , NV 89511 Phone Number: 775324-5930 Fax number: 775-324-6173 Email: gaylekern@kernltd.com attoreny for Park Terrace
THOA

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Dated this 11/14/12


/S/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
pro se tenant/subtenant

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- 9 NOTICE OF CLERK'S OFFICE AND COURT'S FAILURe TO FILE COUGHLIN'S NOTICE OF APPEAL, REQUEST
THAT IT DO SO NOW, AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OF 3/15/12 AND ORDER OF 5/15/12 IN
LIGHT OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND FRAUD, AND NRCP 60(B)(4)

INDEX TO EXHIBITS

1. various filings and documentation and videos/audio on cd attached to hard copy and digitally
transmitted to court and oppsoing counsel as well.

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- 10 NOTICE OF CLERK'S OFFICE AND COURT'S FAILURe TO FILE COUGHLIN'S NOTICE OF APPEAL, REQUEST
THAT IT DO SO NOW, AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OF 3/15/12 AND ORDER OF 5/15/12 IN
LIGHT OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND FRAUD, AND NRCP 60(B)(4)

fl:zach coughlin

C)

To:rjc (rJv) (17753256715)

.,.:- _ ,._ . ".


. .
.

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. -;

13:47 03123/12 EST Pg

'STE\JE TUTTLE .
RENOe98Jlf

1Z

Document Code:

Zach Coughlin, Esq.


Nevada Bar No: 9473

PO BOX 60952
RENO NY. 89506

MR 2&' M1 8 \

BY

OEPIJT'i

Tele: 775-338-8118
Fax: 949-667-7402

PRO SE ATTORNEY LmGANT TENANTS A TTORNEY

PLEASE NOIE ADDRESS CHANGE

IN THE RENO JUSTICE COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA


IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

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ARK TERRACE TOWNHOMES HOA,

)
STERN NEVADA MANAGEMENT, SUE )
G, GAYLE KERN, ET AL,
)

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LANDLORD,
VS.

) Case No: RJC REV 20112-000374


)
) Dept No: SCHROEDER

)
)
)

CH COUGHLIN,

TENANT.

I R EV201 2 -000374
. MOT
MoDon Flied

: 4960

II IIIIIIII I IIIII IIII

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'\

OT
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR PLED IN
ALIE
A
NEW TRIAL AND OR MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE SUMMARY EVICTION
ORDER AND THE ORDER FOLWWING HEARING ON MOTION TO CONTEST
PERSONAL PROPERTY LIEN. TOLLING THE DEADLINE TO FILE A NOTICE OF
APPEAL FOR ALL ORDERS
COMES NOW, TENANT, ZACH COUGHLIN, by and through his attorney, Zach COughlin,
Esq. And hereby moves this Court for reconsideration or or FOR A NEW TRIAL, OR TO alter or
amend or otherwise address landlord only served a NO CAUSE eviction notice, then a couple days
before the hearing in this matter (the notice of which RJC filign office supervisor Stancil herself

26

admitted on a voice mail was not reasonably calculated to afford tenant with notice of the hearing

27

pursuant to JCRCP

104), the landlord filed a Landlord's Answer which pled a FAlLURE TO PAY

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- 1 -

i.

Motion for new trial or to alter or amend Summary Ev ction Order and Order on
Personal Property lien and for reconsiderartion

Docket 62337 Document 2013-20762

-10

FI:zach cl in

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C)

To:rjc (rjv) (17753256715)

13:47 93/23/12 EST Pg

RENT OR NON PAYMENT OF RENT, IN AN APPARENT FRAUDULENT ATTEIv1PT TO


CIRCUMANT AITKEN AND THE STRICT REQUlREMENTS THAT ALL SUCH
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS BE STRICTLY FOLLOWED IN SUMMARY EVICTION
PROCEEDINGS ..... THE LANDLORD SOUGHT TO (WHILE PRACTICING LAW WITHOUT A
T Tr.PNP TTP KWr. WTTH THP FlIT T KN()WT pnnp ()P ATI()RNPV rO.PARTV nAvr p

KERN, ESQ) CIRCUMVENT THESE PROCEDURAL RULES BY, AT THE 11TH HOUR,

PLEADING THE NON-PAYMEl\1' OF RENT, HOWEVER, 'IHAT would REQUIRING

SERVING A NEW 30 DAY NOTICE. THEN FILIGN OFFICE CLERK CHRISTINE ERICKSON

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11

WAS EVASIVE WITH REGARD TO QUESTIONING CONCERNIGN WHETHER SHE HAD

12

PREVIOUSLY INDICATED TO TIlE UNDERSIGNED THAT HE MAY NOT FILE BY FAX,

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W HEREASE, ALL OF THE SUDDEN, ABOUT ONE MONTH AGO, BOTH THE CIVIL AND

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AT THE RJC INFORMED COUGHLINT HAT A ''fAX IS AN


CRIMINAL FILING OFFICES
-I

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ORIGINAL" AND TOLD COUGHLIN FILIGN BY FAX IS ACCEPTABLE AND ALWAYS HAS

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BEEN, WHICH IS IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION TO TI:IE RESPONSE 'IHAT COUGHLIN


COULD NTO FILE BY FAX GIVEN TO COUGHLIN BY VARIOUS RJC FILING OFFICE

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EMPLOYEES, INCLUDIGN CHRISTINE ERICKSON. PLEASE PLACE A COpy OF THIS

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FILING (AND COIv1PLAINT) IN ERICKSON'S PERSONNEL FILE.

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INAPPROPRIATE FOR ruooE SCHROEDER TO PRESIDE OVER THIS MATTER GIVEN

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FURTHER, IT MAY BE

TIIAT HE SCREAMED "DO YOU WANT TO GO TO JAIL" AT COUGHLIN AT THE

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EXTENSION HEARING ON RICHARD G. HILL'S ORDER OF PROTECTION ON 1131112,

25

WHEN COUGHLIN ATTEMPTED TO ADDRESS HILL'S ABUSE OF PROCESS AND

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OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE. ADDITIONALLY, JUDGE PRO TEIv1PORE FINLEY MAY NOT

27

HAVB APPROPRIATELY PRESIDED OVER THE 3/22/12 HEARING ON MOTION TO

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- 2 Motion for new trial or to alter or amend Summary Eviction Order and Order on
Personal Property lien and for reconsiderartion

-10

, " . .' .

FI:zach coughlin

C)

. -. ('

:48 /12 EST Pg

To:rJc (rJY) (17753256715)

. '?'
A
W;

<S'>;. d"
(:) <j.
V
'

U'
.
.
D
RETURN pERSONAL PROPERlY AND CONIEST LIEN GIVEN TH
'I'
(la .v'c?
/

'.

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EXHIBITED TIIROUHOUT TIIIS MATTER BY KING AND WNM AND P

COMES' T

BARE ON THE ANALYSIS UNDER NRS 118A.490, 11A.290, 118A.390, AND 11 A.520, ETC..
AND JUDGE FINLEY COULD NOT BE SAID TO HAVE HAD AN ADEQUATE

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OPPORTIJNITY TO APPRISE HERSELF OF THE RECORD IN THAT REGARD GIVEN THE

EXTENT TO WHICH SHE PRESIDING OVER TIllS MATTER ON SHORT NOTICE.

ADDITIONALLY, JUDGE LYNCH WAS "RANDOMLY" ASSIGNED TO TInS MATTER, AND

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UNDER JCRRT 2, SHOULD ARGUABLY BE THE JUDGE TO HEAR IT. TIllS NRCP RULE 59
AND RULE 52 OR JCRCP RULE 59 AND RULE 52 MOTION TOLLS THE DEADLIENTO

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FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL IN lliESE MATTERS, AND ANY PREVIOUS SUBMISSION OF

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A NOTICE TO APPEAL WAS APPARENTLY, ACCORDING TO CHRISTINE ERICKSON, NO

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FILED AND INEFFECTIVE TO THE EXTENT TIlE IFP WAS DENIED AND AN APPEAL FEE

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IS JURISDICTIONAL. NONETHELESS THE ORDER IS LESS mAN 10 DAYS OLD, AND

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THIS MOTION HAS A TOLLING EFFECT. REGARDLESS, RJC'S STANCIL AND ERICKSON

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INDICATE THAT PREVIOUS MOTION SUBMITTED FOR FILIGN BY THE UNDERSIGNED

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BETWEEN 3/15112 AND lliE PRESENT DAY WERE IMPROPERLY NOTE FILED, EVEN

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WHERE THE FAILURE TO PAY AN APPEAL FEE SHOULD HAVE NO BEARING ON

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WHETHER OR NOT THOSE SUCH EXIGENT MOTIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED. A
REVIEW OF lliE MOTION'S FOR STAY IN ANVUI AND ITS ASSOCIATED CASE WILL
DEMONSTRATE THIS.

TENANT FURTHER seeks this MOTION AND RELIEF in light ofthe

continue malfeasance LANDLORD'S AND ITS AGENT, SEEKING TO INTERFERRE WIlli

26

BOTH IDS NY ENERGY ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY AND HIS USPS ACCESS TO MAILS,

27

AND IN LIGlIT of opposing counsel IN RJC 2012-001708 Richard G. Hill in the summary eviction

28
- 3 -

Motion for new trial or to alter or amend Summary Eviction Order and Order on
Personal Property lien and for reconsiderartion

1"

-10

"

.j. i'"

rl:zach coughlin

C)

To:rjc (rjv) (11753256715)

13:48 03/23/12 EST Pg

from the undersigned's commercial tenancy at his home law office where only a No Cause Notice of

Eviction was served (and thus completely violative of the prohibition on summarily evicting

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commercial tenants for other than non-payment of rent) in another matter and ofNV Energy, whom
are now refusing to allow the undersigned to set up electric service to his current location, seemingly
in retaliation for the undersigned reporting the misdeeds ofNV Energy, the behemoth monopoly.

Further, an RPD Officer admitted to the undersigned that he arrested the undersigned for trespass

(despite Hill having sent a written notice that the udnersigned was then being billed for the full rental

value associated with use and occupancy of the premises) because Richard G. Hill, Esq. Paid the

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RPD Officer money. Additionally, Richard G. Hill, Esq was able to get the undersigned arrested
(custodial arrest, $160 bail) again on January 12, 2012 where the undersigned was peacefully
collecting discovery and evidence related to the impending wrongful eviction against Hill and his
California Beverly Hills High School graduate neurosurgeon landlord client The RPD inexplicably
arrested the undersigned (custodial arrest) for ')aywalking", thus intetiering with the collection of
evidence, including that related to Hill's trusty conrnctor Phil Howard, using the undersigned own
plywood to board up the former home law office, whilst submitting a bill in exhibits on file with the

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court for "storage" expenses of $1 ,060 just to "board up the porch" and, strangely, "fix a leak in the

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basemenf'. Two days later the same RPD Officer who ordered the jaywalking arrest had the

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undersigned subjectd to another custodial arrest, this one lasting 2 days, for a gross misdemeanor,

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"misuse of 911", despite the fact that the undersigned returned to his then address, and discovered his
dog missing (and previously had had his tires slashed, coffee thrown on him, been lockout out
ovemight in the freezing cold, etc., etc.) and his domestic batterer housemates laughing malevolently

26

about it and giving menacing answers in response to the udnersigned's querries. Amazingly, the

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same RPD Sargent Sigfree who ordered the jaywalking arrest not only told former domestic violence

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- 4

Motion for new trial or to alter or amend Summary Eviction Order and Order on
Personal Property lien and for reconsiderartion

-10

FI:zach coughlin

C)

13:49 03123/12 EST Pg

To:rjc (rJv) (17753256715)

attorney Coughlin that animal abuse was not domestic violence (though, technically, it is, as its listed

in NRS

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33.010

and elsewhere) but that the RPD was arresting Coughlin because he was a victim.

Nonetheless, Master Edmundson saw fit to grant Protection Orders in FV 12-00 188 and FV 12-00 187
against both of the undersigned's former housemates. Yet, NV Energy shut off the electricity to the
undersigned's location at

1422 E.

9th St.

#2, unnoticed (as they had done at the former law office on

River Rock) and are now demanding all sorts of information and documentation to which they have

no right and further are refusing to restore service, no matter that payment is offered to them.

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Because of this treachery, for which Richard G. Hill, Esq is known far and wide in and out of legal
circles , the undersigned has been unable to perform the discovery needed to prepare this case or trial.

11
12

Also,as noted below,the undersigned believes that it will be necessary to add counterclaims and

13

additional party defendants to this case. The undersigned utilized Starbucks and wi-fi to attempt to

14

get this Motion to Continue in by February 6lh,

15

20 1 1, but a mishap with an anti-virus program

prevented the submission being efiled in time.

16
17
18

various filings and documentation supporting an excusable neglect analysis and providing other basis
for allowing coughlin a new trial or to alter or amend the summary eviction order or for conflicting
out the RIC, as the ruc was conflicted out in Coughlin application for a protecdtion order against

RIC Bailiff REyes two hundred and thirty pages (230) pages.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

19
20

I, Summary ofFacts:

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22
23
24

STANCIL LEFT VOICE MESSAGE ADMITTING SERVICE NOT REASONABLY


CALCULTED TO APPRlSE TENANT OF HEARlNG UNDER JCRCP
showed

104.

futher, coughlin

up for the earing of 3/15112, which apparently start prior to the permissible 8:30

am start

25

time. Additionally, notice of the hearing to coughlin was insufficient, and acdtual knowledge
thereof

26

is not substitue for stirct compliance with the notice requriements, especially in light of Aitken.

27

Additionaly RJC Bailiff at the 3/22112 hearing made inconsistent statements related to when

29
- 5 Motion for new trial or to alter or amend Summary Eviction Order and
Order on
Personal Property lien and for reconsiderartion

-10

FI:zach coughlin

C)

To:rJc (rJv) (11753256715)

13:49 03/23/12 EST Pg

Coughlin actually arrived for that hearing, at one point he thought about it and said 8:45, then he

changed his mind and said 8:40, then he said his watch depended on some things.... Coughlin arrived

3
4
5

for the hearing in a timely manner and any alleged failure to so arrive is subject to an appropriate
excusable neglect analysis to be brief at a later time.
Because of the incredible malfeasance alluded to above, the undersigned simply has not been

6
7

able to prepare this case for trial. In fact, Richard G. Hill, Esq, withheld VARIOUS CLIENT's ftle fa

six weeks, in addition to withholding the undersigned driver's license for over 7 days. Hill made a

masturbatory gesticulation and facial gesture at a 12120/11 Hearing on the undersigned Motion to

10

Contest Personal Property Lien when the undersigned invoked the prejudice and damage to hard

11
12

working middle class Americans like VARIOUS OF cOUGHLIN'S CLIENTS that Hill's incredible

13

lack of character wrought on their legal affairs. Let the sun shine:

14

https://skydrive.live.comJ'lcid=43084638f32f3f28#Cid=43084638F32F5F28&id=43084638F32F5F28%211897

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17
18

NRCP 59(e) Motion to AJter or Amend a Judgment. A motion

to alter or amend the judgmeht shall be filed no later than

10 days after setvice of written notice of entry of the judgment.


Washoe District Court Rule 12(8) incolporates DCR 13(7) and sets forth deadlines for seeking reconsideration.

19
20

CONCLUSION

21

PleasE GRANT A NEW TRIAL OR ALTER OR AMEND THE summary eviction order o r

22

othenvise reconsider it and th e order related t o the personal proeprty lien.

23

AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B.030

24

The undersigned does hereby afftrm that the preceding document does not contain the social

25
26
27
28

security number of any person.

Dated: March23th, 2012

MO

-6-

for new trial or to alter or amend Summary Eviction Order and Order on
Personal Property lien and for reconsiderartion

-10

FI:zach coughlin

1
2
3

C)

To:rJc (rJY) (17153256715)

13:50 03/23/12 EST Pg

lSI Zach Cou&hlin


Zach Coughlin,Esq.
Attorney for pro se attorney litigant

4
5
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7
8 '
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25
26
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- 7 -

Motion for new trial or to alter or amend Summary Eviction Order and Order on
Personal Property lien, and for reconsiderartion

-10

, --- .

fl:zach clin

C)

To:rjc (rjy) (17153256715)

PROOF OF SERVICE

1
2
3

13:59 03/23/12 EST Pg

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I served a copy of the foregoing document upon the
following party by electronically filing on March 23tb, 2012 and therefore serving upon registered
efiler:

4
5
6
7

sue king, gayle kern western nevada property management, Park terrace towhnhomes HOA
804 Mill Street Reno, NV 89502
(775) 284-4434 and faxed to
kern ad PTTIIOA 7753246173
and King and WNM at 7752844465

8
9
10

Date this March 23. 2012:

/s/

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25
26
27
28
- 8 Motion for new trial or to alter or amend Summary Eviction Order and Order on
Personal Property lien and for reconsiderartion

-10

fl:zach coughlin

C)

To:rJc (rJv) (17753256115)

13:50 63/23/12 EST Pg 1 -10

INDEX TO EXHIBITS

1. various filings and documentation supporting an excusable neglect analysis and providing other
basis for allowing coughlin a new trial or to alter or amend the summary eviction order or for
conflicting out the ruc, as the ruc was conflicted out in Coughlin application for a protecdtion order
against ruc BailifI"REyes two hundred and thirty pages (230) pages.

3
4
5
6
7

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
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- 9 Motion for new trial or to alter or amend Summary Eviction Order and Order on
Personal Property lien and for reconsiderartion

FI:zach cl in (lC)

13:46 03123/12 EST Pg 1-19

To:rjc (r jY) (17753256715)

..fff:a-

FAX COVER SHEET\'-

Recipient Information:

To:
rjc (rjv)
Fax#: 1 7753256715
Subject:

.>.
.

Sender Information:
From: zach coughlin (ZC)
Pages: 10
Date:
Mar 23, 2012

\ .:

't:,.t:.,

"" a
.-.&
{<'.A

'Q

Comments:

.\:.
'A

Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel:775 33881 18, fax: 94 96 6774 0 2;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473

If you didn't receive this fax In your email you


need:

myfaxe

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email, online or smartphone.
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MyFax does not tolerate fraud and abuse. If this fax is spam, promotes illegal activity or is abusive, please email
support@myfax.com. To have your fax number placed on a Do Not Fax list, please call1-B66-20B-5903
This fax was delivered by MyFax Free a no cost, send only version of the MyFax Internet Fax service. For more
"perfect for small business" online services visit www.j2.com

--

FEam: zachcough11n

To: 4baS9639-c27b-4b42-ged8-cf4e3de
.

.....

'f

2-27-12

11:32am

p. 1

of 41

FILED

. . i.
12 MAR -8 AtHI: 51

1
2

Document Code:
Zach Coughli n,Esq.

'

STEVE TUTTLE : ..
RENO
JUSTIG COVRT
.

.,..

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4

Tele: 775-338-8118

Fax: 949-667-7402
Attorney for Pro Se Attorney Litigant

.til .

It!..

NV Bar No: 9473


1422 E. 9th St #2
Reno, NV 89512

... ,t6Ell0';rv ,

JUSTICE COURT RENO TOWNSHIP


WASHOE COUNTY. NEVADA

7
8
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10

ARK TERRACE TOWNHOMES ASSN


WESTERN NEVADA MANAGMENT,
C., Gayle Agnes Kern, Esq. and Gayle A.

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12

em. Ltd.; LANDLORD OR DULY


UTHORIZED AGENT;
Landlord,

13

vs.
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15

ACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN;


Tenant.

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!U1/J-tJI ')-tJ03 7,/

CASE NO:

)
)

DEPT. NO:.
(JUDGE SFERRAZZA INDICATED they

)
)
)

WOULD NOT ACCEPT TIllS CASE FOR


HIS CALENDAR OR OTIlERWISE HEAR
ANYTI!ING IN RELATION TO IT)

)
)

JURy TRIAL DEMANDED

)
)
)
)

TENANT'S ANSWER AND TENANTS


AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION TO 30 DAY
NOTICE TO QUIT; MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES

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fOINTS AND AUTI!QRITIES

22

Tenant/Defendant. Zach Coughlin, Esq., hereby files an Answer, or alternatively, an

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Amended Tenant's Answer to the 30 day NOTICE TO QUIT AND ANY SUBSEQUENT 5 DAY

25

NOTICE TO QUIT UNLAWFUL DETAINER NOTICE,

26

Tenant further moves for sanctions against landlord, pursuant to NRS 7.085, for the attorneys' fees

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tenant has needlessly

28 .

REV2012-DDD314
i AOT

ililiiliiliilil Il li

Tenant's Answer and AffidavitlDeclaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

Docket 62337 Document 2013-20762

'1

,;

incurred due to Park Terrace and ET AL's reckless uses of this court's processes. Park Terrace has not

complied with the requirements of the rules of civil procedure they seeks to invoke. His

5
6

motion is fatally flawed and infirm as a matter of law.


This opposition and motion is based on the points and authorities below, the
above-referenced statute and rules of civil procedure, and all papers and pleadings on file
herein.

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NRS 40.310 Issue of fact to be tried by jury if proper demand made. Whenever an issue of fact
is presented by the pleadings, it shall be tried by a jury, if proper demand is made pursuant to
the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure or the Justice Court Rules of Civil Procedure.

13

14

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COMES NOW, the undersigned Tenant and states:


1. I am the tenant of a rental united located at 1422 E. 9th St. #2, Reno 89512.
2. my rent is not subsidized by public housing authority or other governmental agency.

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Glazier v. Justice Court of Smith Valley Tp., 111 Nev. 864, 899 P.2d 1105 (Nev. Jul 27, 1995):
"Summary eviction statute allowing landlord to apply to justice's court for eviction
order based on default in payment of rent did not apply to unlawful detainer action
against tenant who never paid any rent nor was required to pay any and, thus,
summary eviction order was outside jurisdiction of justice's court. N.R.S. 40.253..On
March 1, 1993, Richard Fulstone, president of Fulstone, served Glazier with a thirtyday notice to quit the property. Glazier failed to vacate the premises,and on April 2,
1993, Fulstone served Glazier with a five-day notice. This notice expressly
threatened an action in justice's court for eviction, pursuant to NRS 40.253,FN1 the
summary eviction statute. FN1. NRS 40.253 allows a landlord to apply to the justice's
court for an eviction order based on default in payment of rent. If the tenant can
show, by affidavit, a legal defense to the alleged unlawful detainer, further
proceedings must be conducted pursuant to the more formal eviction procedures in
NRS 40.290 to 40.420. If, on the other hand, the tenant fails to show a legal defense
to the alleged unlawful detainer, then the justice's court may issue a summary order
for removal of the tenant. The justice's court held a hearing pursuant to the provisions
of NRS 40.253 and ordered that Glazier vacate the property within thirty days.
-2Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

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Glazier then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari before the district court, alleging
that the justice's court exceeded its jurisdiction under the summary eviction
provisions of the statute by, inter alia, inquiring into matters beyond the truthfulness
and sufficiency of the affidavits, and failing to dismiss the summary eviction
proceeding once a legal defense had been raised. The district court held a hearing on
the writ petition and denied the petition. On appeal to this court, Glazier argues that,
pursuant to NRS 40.253, once he raised the legal defense that he was a life tenant
under the grant of a life estate, the justice's court was obligated to dismiss the
summary proceeding and to require that the landlord prosecute his unlawful
detainer action under the plenary eviction proceedings provided for in NRS 40.290
to 40.420. **1106 Although Glazier's argument is logically sound, it is simply
irrelevant. It is clear that, despite all the proceedings below and the arguments of the
parties before this court, NRS 40.253 does not apply to this case. The statute is
applicable when the tenant of any dwelling [ ] with periodic rent reserved by the
month or any shorter period, is in default in payment of the rent. (Emphasis *866
added.) All parties to this action concede that Glazier never paid any rent, nor was he
required to pay any. It may be that Fulstone is entitled to have Glazier removed from
the property, but not pursuant to NRS 40.253. There was no case or controversy
before the justice's court based on NRS 40.253, and accordingly, the justice's court
exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing the summary eviction order. Accordingly, we
reverse the judgment of the district court and remand to the district court with
directions to grant the writ. Further, we order that the eviction order entered by the
justice's court be vacated. Nev.,1995. Glazier v. Justice Court of Smith Valley Tp.
111 Nev. 864, 899 P.2d 1105, See, also, Nev.,1996. Lippis v. Peters 112 Nev. 1008,
921 P.2d 1248"

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NRS 40.253 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and exclusion of tenant

18

for default in payment of rent. 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 10, in addition to the

19

remedy provided in NRS 40.2512 and 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive, when the tenant of any dwelling,

20
21

apartment, mobile home, recreational vehicle or commercial premises with periodic rent reserved by

22

the month or any shorter period is in default in payment of the rent, the landlord or the landlords

23

agent, unless otherwise agreed in writing, may serve or have served a notice in writing, requiring in

24

the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the premises: (a) At or before noon of the

25

fifth full day following the day of service; or (b) If the landlord chooses not to proceed in the manner

26

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set forth in paragraph (a) and the rent is reserved by a period of 1 week or less and the tenancy has
not continued for more than 45 days, at or before noon of the fourth full day following the day of
-3Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

service. As used in this subsection, day of service means the day the landlord or the landlords

agent personally delivers the notice to the tenant. If personal service was not so delivered, the day of

5
6

service means the day the notice is delivered, after posting and mailing pursuant to subsection 2, to
the sheriff or constable for service if the request for service is made before noon. If the request for
service by the sheriff or constable is made after noon, the day of service shall be deemed to be the

day next following the day that the request is made for service by the sheriff or constable. 2. A

landlord or the landlords agent who serves a notice to a tenant pursuant to paragraph (b) of

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subsection 1 shall attempt to deliver the notice in person in the manner set forth in paragraph (a) of
subsection 1 of NRS 40.280. If the notice cannot be delivered in person, the landlord or the landlords
agent: (a) Shall post a copy of the notice in a conspicuous place on the premises and mail the notice

13

by overnight mail; and (b) After the notice has been posted and mailed, may deliver the notice to the

14

sheriff or constable for service in the manner set forth in subsection 1 of NRS 40.280. The sheriff or

15

constable shall not accept the notice for service unless it is accompanied by written evidence, signed

16

by the tenant when the tenant took possession of the premises, that the landlord or the landlords

17

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agent informed the tenant of the provisions of this section which set forth the lawful procedures for

19

eviction from a short-term tenancy. Upon acceptance, the sheriff or constable shall serve the notice

20

within 48 hours after the request for service was made by the landlord or the landlords agent. 3. A

21

notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must: (a) Identify the court that has jurisdiction over the

22

matter; and (b) Advise the tenant: (1) Of the tenants right to contest the matter by filing, within the

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time specified in subsection 1 for the payment of the rent or surrender of the premises, an affidavit

25

with the court that has jurisdiction over the matter stating that the tenant has tendered payment or is

26

not in default in the payment of the rent; (2) That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an

27

unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order

28

-4Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of the county to

remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order; and (3) That, pursuant to NRS 118A.390,

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a tenant may seek relief if a landlord unlawfully removes the tenant from the premises or excludes the
tenant by blocking or attempting to block the tenants entry upon the premises or willfully interrupts
or causes or permits the interruption of an essential service required by the rental agreement or

chapter 118A of NRS. 4. If the tenant files such an affidavit at or before the time stated in the notice,

the landlord or the landlords agent, after receipt of a file-stamped copy of the affidavit which was

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filed, shall not provide for the nonadmittance of the tenant to the premises by locking or otherwise. 5.
Upon noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the landlords agent may apply by affidavit
of complaint for eviction to the justice court of the township in which the dwelling, apartment,

13

mobile home or commercial premises are located or to the district court of the county in which the

14

dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has jurisdiction

15

over the matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of the

16

county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order. The affidavit must state or

17

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contain: (1) The date the tenancy commenced. (2) The amount of periodic rent reserved. (3) The

19

amounts of any cleaning, security or rent deposits paid in advance, in excess of the first months rent,

20

by the tenant. (4) The date the rental payments became delinquent. (5) The length of time the tenant

21

has remained in possession without paying rent. (6) The amount of rent claimed due and delinquent.

22

(7) A statement that the written notice was served on the tenant in accordance with NRS 40.280. (8)

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A copy of the written notice served on the tenant. (9) A copy of the signed written rental agreement,

25

if any. (b) Except when the tenant has timely filed the affidavit described in subsection 3 and a file-

26

stamped copy of it has been received by the landlord or the landlords agent, and except when the

27

landlord is prohibited pursuant to NRS 118A.480, the landlord or the landlords agent may, in a

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-5Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

peaceable manner, provide for the nonadmittance of the tenant to the premises by locking or

otherwise. 6. Upon the filing by the tenant of the affidavit permitted in subsection 3, regardless of the

5
6

information contained in the affidavit, and the filing by the landlord of the affidavit permitted by
subsection 5, the justice court or the district court shall hold a hearing, after service of notice of the
hearing upon the parties, to determine the truthfulness and sufficiency of any affidavit or notice

providedfor in this section. If the court determines that there is no legal defense as to the alleged

unlawful detainer and the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary

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order for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant. If the court
determines that there is a legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer, the court shall refuse to
grant either party any relief, and, except as otherwise provided in this subsection, shall require that

13

any further proceedings be conducted pursuant to NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive. The issuance of a

14

summary order for removal of the tenant does not preclude an action by the tenant for any damages

15

or other relief to which the tenant may be entitled. If the alleged unlawful detainer was based upon

16

subsection 5 of NRS 40.2514, the refusal by the court to grant relief does not preclude the landlord

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thereafter from pursuing an action for unlawful detainer in accordance with NRS 40.251. 7. The

19

tenant may, upon payment of the appropriate fees relating to the filing and service of a motion, file a

20

motion with the court, on a form provided by the clerk of the court, to dispute the amount of the

21

costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118A.460 or 118C.230 for the inventory,

22

moving and storage of personal property left on the premises. The motion must be filed within 20

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days after the summary order for removal of the tenant or the abandonment of the premises by the

25

tenant, or within 20 days after: (a) The tenant has vacated or been removed from the premises; and

26

(b) A copy of those charges has been requested by or provided to the tenant, whichever is later. 8.

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Upon the filing of a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court shall schedule a hearing on the

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-6Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

motion. The hearing must be held within 10 days after the filing of the motion. The court shall affix

the date of the hearing to the motion and order a copy served upon the landlord by the sheriff,

5
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constable or other process server. At the hearing, the court may: (a) Determine the costs, if any,
claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118A.460 or 118C.230 and any accumulating daily costs;
and (b) Order the release of the tenants property upon the payment of the charges determined to be

due or if no charges are determined to be due. 9. A landlord shall not refuse to accept rent from a

tenant that is submitted after the landlord or the landlords agent has served or had served a notice

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pursuant to subsection 1 if the refusal is based on the fact that the tenant has not paid collection fees,
attorneys fees or other costs other than rent, a reasonable charge for late payments of rent or
dishonored checks, or a security. As used in this subsection, security has the meaning ascribed to it

13

in NRS 118A.240. 10. This section does not apply to the tenant of a mobile home lot in a mobile

14

home park or to the tenant of a recreational vehicle lot in an area of a mobile home park in this State

15

other than an area designated as a recreational vehicle lot pursuant to the provisions of subsection 6

16

of NRS 40.215. NRS 40.280 Service of notices to quit; proof required before issuance of order to

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remove. 1. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 40.253, the notices required by NRS 40.251 to

19

40.260, inclusive, may be served: (a) By delivering a copy to the tenant personally, in the presence of

20

a witness; (b) If the tenant is absent from the tenants place of residence or from the tenants usual

21

place of business, by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age and discretion at either place and

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mailing a copy to the tenant at the tenants place of residence or place of business; or (c) If the place

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of residence or business cannot be ascertained, or a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be

25

found there, by posting a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased property, delivering a copy to a

26

person there residing, if the person can be found, and mailing a copy to the tenant at the place where

27

the leased property is situated. 2. Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manner as

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-7Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

provided in subsection 1. 3. Before an order to remove a tenant is issued pursuant to subsection 5 of

NRS 40.253, a landlord shall file with the court a proof of service of any notice required by that

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section. Before a person may be removed as prescribed in NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive, a
landlord shall file with the court proof of service of any notice required pursuant to NRS 40.255.
Except as otherwise provided in subsection 4, this proof must consist of: (a) A statement, signed by

the tenant and a witness, acknowledging that the tenant received the notice on a specified date; (b) A

certificate of mailing issued by the United States Postal Service; or (c) The endorsement of a sheriff,

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12

constable or other process server stating the time and manner of service. 4. If service of the notice
was not delivered in person to a tenant whose rent is reserved by a period of 1 week or less and the
tenancy has not continued for more than 45 days, proof of service must include: (a) A certificate of

13

mailing issued by the United States Postal Service or by a private postal service to the landlord or the

14

landlords agent; or (b) The endorsement of a sheriff or constable stating the: (1) Time and date the

15

request for service was made by the landlord or the landlords agent; (2) Time, date and manner of

16

the service; and (3) Fees paid for the service. NRS 118A.100 Landlord defined. Landlord means

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a person who provides a dwelling unit for occupancy by another pursuant to a rental agreement. NRS

19

118A.120 Owner defined. Owner means one or more persons, jointly or severally, in whom is

20

vested: 1. All or part of the legal title to property, except a trustee under a deed of trust who is not in

21

possession of the property; or 2. All or part of the beneficial ownership, and a right to present use and

22

enjoyment of the premises. NRS 118A.150 Rent defined. Rent means all periodic payments to

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be made to the landlord for occupancy of a dwelling unit, including, without limitation, all reasonable
and actual late fees set forth in the rental agreement. (Added to NRS by 1977, 1331; A 1999, 984).

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-8Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

This action is brought to address Federal Fair Housing or Nevada laws prohibiting discrimination. I

am being discriminated against based on impermissilbe characteristics. Further, my lease has not

5
6

expired or terminated yet. NRS 118A.160 Rental agreement defined. Rental agreement means
any oral or written agreement for the use and occupancy of a dwelling unit or premises. (Added to
NRS by 1977, 1331)

NRS 118A.510 Retaliatory conduct by landlord against tenant prohibited; remedies; exceptions. 1.

Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, the landlord may not, in retaliation, terminate a

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tenancy, refuse to renew a tenancy, increase rent or decrease essential items or services required by
the rental agreement or this chapter, or bring or threaten to bring an action for possession if: (a) The
tenant has complained in good faith of a violation of a building, housing or health code applicable to

13

the premises and affecting health or safety to a governmental agency charged with the responsibility

14

for the enforcement of that code; (b) The tenant has complained in good faith to the landlord or a law

15

enforcement agency of a violation of this chapter or of a specific statute that imposes a criminal

16

penalty; (c) The tenant has organized or become a member of a tenants union or similar

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organization; (d) A citation has been issued resulting from a complaint described in paragraph (a); (e)

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The tenant has instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration in

20

which the tenant raised an issue of compliance with the requirements of this chapter respecting the

21

habitability of dwelling units; (f) The tenant has failed or refused to give written consent to a

22

regulation adopted by the landlord, after the tenant enters into the rental agreement, which requires

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the landlord to wait until the appropriate time has elapsed before it is enforceable against the tenant;

25

or (g) The tenant has complained in good faith to the landlord, a government agency, an attorney, a

26

fair housing agency or any other appropriate body of a violation of NRS 118.010 to 118.120,

27

inclusive, or the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., or has otherwise exercised

28

-9Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

rights which are guaranteed or protected under those laws. 2. If the landlord violates any provision of

subsection 1, the tenant is entitled to the remedies provided in NRS 118A.390 and has a defense in

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any retaliatory action by the landlord for possession. 3. A landlord who acts under the circumstances
described in subsection 1 does not violate that subsection if: (a) The violation of the applicable
building, housing or health code of which the tenant complained was caused primarily by the lack of

reasonable care by the tenant, a member of his or her household or other person on the premises with

his or her consent; (b) The tenancy is terminated with cause; (c) A citation has been issued and

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compliance with the applicable building, housing or health code requires alteration, remodeling or
demolition and cannot be accomplished unless the tenants dwelling unit is vacant; or (d) The
increase in rent applies in a uniform manner to all tenants. The maintenance of an action under this

13

subsection does not prevent the tenant from seeking damages or injunctive relief for the landlords

14

failure to comply with the rental agreement or maintain the dwelling unit in a habitable condition as

15

required by this chapter. NRS 118A.380 Failure of landlord to supply essential items or services. 1.

16

If the landlord is required by the rental agreement or this chapter to supply heat, air-conditioning,

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running water, hot water, electricity, gas, a functioning door lock or another essential item or service

19

and the landlord willfully or negligently fails to do so, causing the premises to become unfit for

20

habitation, the tenant shall give written notice to the landlord specifying the breach. If the landlord

21

does not adequately remedy the breach, or use his or her best efforts to remedy the breach within 48

22

hours, except a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, after it is received by the landlord, the tenant may,

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in addition to any other remedy: (a) Procure reasonable amounts of such essential items or services

25

during the landlords noncompliance and deduct their actual and reasonable cost from the rent; (b)

26

Recover actual damages, including damages based upon the lack of use of the premises or the

27

diminution of the fair rental value of the dwelling unit; (c) Withhold any rent that becomes due

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- 10 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

during the landlords noncompliance without incurring late fees, charges for notice or any other

charge or fee authorized by this chapter or the rental agreement, until the landlord has attempted in

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good faith to restore the essential items or services; or (d) Procure other housing which is comparable
during the landlords noncompliance, and the rent for the original premises fully abates during this
period. The tenant may recover the actual and reasonable cost of that other housing which is in excess

of the amount of rent which is abated. 2. If the tenant proceeds under this section, the tenant may not

proceed under NRS 118A.350 and 118A.360 as to that breach. 3. The rights of the tenant under this

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section do not arise until the tenant has given written notice as required by subsection 1, except that
the tenant may, without having given that notice: (a) Recover damages as authorized under paragraph
(b) of subsection 1 if the landlord: (1) Admits to the court that the landlord had knowledge of the lack

13

of such essential items or services; or (2) Has received written notice of the uninhabitable condition

14

caused by such a lack from a governmental agency authorized to inspect for violations of building,

15

housing or health codes. (b) Withhold rent under paragraph (c) of subsection 1 if the landlord: (1)

16

Has received written notice of the condition constituting the breach from a governmental agency

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authorized to inspect for violations of building, housing or health codes; and (2) Fails to remedy or

19

attempt in good faith to remedy the breach within the time prescribed in the written notice of that

20

condition from the governmental agency. 4. The rights of the tenant under paragraph (c) of subsection

21

1 do not arise unless the tenant is current in the payment of rent at the time of giving written notice

22

pursuant to subsection 1. 5. If such a condition was caused by the deliberate or negligent act or

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omission of the tenant, a member of his or her household or other person on the premises with his or

25

her consent, the tenant has no rights under this section. (Added to NRS by 1977, 1339; A 1985, 1416;

26

1987, 314; 1999, 1230; 2007, 1286; 2011, 237) NRS 118A.390 Unlawful removal or exclusion of

27

tenant or willful interruption of essential items or services; procedure for expedited relief. 1. If the

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- 11 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

landlord unlawfully removes the tenant from the premises or excludes the tenant by blocking or

attempting to block the tenants entry upon the premises, willfully interrupts or causes or permits the

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interruption of any essential item or service required by the rental agreement or this chapter or
otherwise recovers possession of the dwelling unit in violation of NRS 118A.480, the tenant may
recover immediate possession pursuant to subsection 4, proceed under NRS 118A.380 or terminate

the rental agreement and, in addition to any other remedy, recover the tenants actual damages,

receive an amount not greater than $2,500 to be fixed by the court, or both. 2. In determining the

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amount, if any, to be awarded under subsection 1, the court shall consider: (a) Whether the landlord
acted in good faith; (b) The course of conduct between the landlord and the tenant; and (c) The
degree of harm to the tenant caused by the landlords conduct. 3. If the rental agreement is terminated

13

pursuant to subsection 1, the landlord shall return all prepaid rent and security recoverable under this

14

chapter. 4. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 5, the tenant may recover immediate

15

possession of the premises from the landlord by filing a verified complaint for expedited relief for the

16

unlawful removal or exclusion of the tenant from the premises, the willful interruption of any

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essential item or service or the recovery of possession of the dwelling unit in violation of NRS

19

118A.480. 5. A verified complaint for expedited relief: (a) Must be filed with the court within 5

20

judicial days after the date of the unlawful act by the landlord, and the verified complaint must be

21

dismissed if it is not timely filed. If the verified complaint for expedited relief is dismissed pursuant

22

to this paragraph, the tenant retains the right to pursue all other available remedies against the

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landlord. (b) May not be filed with the court if an action for summary eviction or unlawful detainer is

25

already pending between the landlord and tenant, but the tenant may seek similar relief before the

26

judge presiding over the pending action. 6. The court shall conduct a hearing on the verified

27

complaint for expedited relief not later than 3 judicial days after the filing of the verified complaint

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- 12 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

for expedited relief. Before or at the scheduled hearing, the tenant must provide proof that the

landlord has been properly served with a copy of the verified complaint for expedited relief. Upon the

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hearing, if it is determined that the landlord has violated any of the provisions of subsection 1, the
court may: NRS 118A.290 Habitability of dwelling unit. 1. The landlord shall at all times during the
tenancy maintain the dwelling unit in a habitable condition. A dwelling unit is not habitable if it

violates provisions of housing or health codes concerning the health, safety, sanitation or fitness for

habitation of the dwelling unit or if it substantially lacks: (a) Effective waterproofing and weather

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protection of the roof and exterior walls, including windows and doors. (b) Plumbing facilities which
conformed to applicable law when installed and which are maintained in good working order. (c) A
water supply approved under applicable law, which is: (1) Under the control of the tenant or landlord

13

and is capable of producing hot and cold running water; (2) Furnished to appropriate fixtures; and (3)

14

Connected to a sewage disposal system approved under applicable law and maintained

15

in good working order to the extent that the system can be controlled by the landlord. (d) Adequate

16

heating facilities which conformed to applicable law when installed and are maintained in good

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working order. (e) Electrical lighting, outlets, wiring and electrical equipment which conformed to

19

applicable law when installed and are maintained in good working order. (f) An adequate number of

20

appropriate receptacles for garbage and rubbish in clean condition and good repair at the

21

commencement of the tenancy. The landlord shall arrange for the removal of garbage and rubbish

22

from the premises unless the parties by written agreement provide otherwise. (g) Building, grounds,

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appurtenances and all other areas under the landlords control at the time of the commencement of

25

the tenancy in every part clean, sanitary and reasonably free from all accumulations of debris, filth,

26

rubbish, garbage, rodents, insects and vermin. (h) Floors, walls, ceilings, stairways and railings

27

maintained in good repair. (i) Ventilating, air-conditioning and other facilities and appliances,

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- 13 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

including elevators, maintained in good repair if supplied or required to be supplied by the landlord.

2. The landlord and tenant may agree that the tenant is to perform specified repairs, maintenance

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tasks and minor remodeling only if: (a) The agreement of the parties is entered into in good faith; and
(b) The agreement does not diminish the obligations of the landlord to other tenants in the premises.
3. An agreement pursuant to subsection 2 is not entered into in good faith if the landlord has a duty

under subsection 1 to perform the specified repairs, maintenance tasks or minor remodeling and the

tenant enters into the agreement because the landlord or his or her agent has refused to perform them.

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(a) Order the landlord to restore to the tenant the premises or essential items or services, or both; (b)
Award damages pursuant to subsection 1; and (c) Enjoin the landlord from violating the provisions of
subsection 1 and, if the circumstances so warrant, hold the landlord in contempt of court. 7. The

13

payment of all costs and official fees must be deferred for any tenant who files a verified complaint

14

for expedited relief. After any hearing and not later than final disposition of the filing or order, the

15

court shall assess the costs and fees against the party that does not prevail, except that the court may

16

reduce them or waive them, as justice may require.

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NRS 118A.170 Tenant defined. Tenant means a person entitled under a rental agreement to

19

occupy a dwelling unit to the exclusion of others. NRS 118A.200 Rental agreements: Signing;

20

copies; required provisions; disputable presumptions; use of nonconforming agreement unlawful. 1.

21

Any written agreement for the use and occupancy of a dwelling unit or premises must be signed by

22

the landlord or his or her agent and the tenant or his or her agent. 2. The landlord shall provide one

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copy of any written agreement described in subsection 1 to the tenant free of cost at the time the

25

agreement is executed and, upon request of the tenant, provide additional copies of any such

26

agreement to the tenant within a reasonable time. The landlord may charge a reasonable fee for

27

providing the additional copies. 3. Any written rental agreement must contain, but is not limited to,

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- 14 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

provisions relating to the following subjects: (a) Duration of the agreement. (b) Amount of rent and

the manner and time of its payment. (c) Occupancy by children or pets. (d) Services included with the

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dwelling rental. (e) Fees which are required and the purposes for which they are required. (f)

Deposits which are required and the conditions for their refund. (g) Charges which may be required

for late or partial payment of rent or for return of any dishonored check. (h) Inspection rights of the

landlord. (i) A listing of persons or numbers of persons who are to occupy the dwelling. (j)

Respective responsibilities of the landlord and the tenant as to the payment of utility charges. (k) A

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signed record of the inventory and condition of the premises under the exclusive custody and control

of the tenant. (l) A summary of the provisions of NRS 202.470. (m) Information regarding the

procedure pursuant to which a tenant may report to the appropriate authorities: (1) A nuisance. (2) A

13

violation of a building, safety or health code or regulation. (n) Information regarding the right of the

14

tenant to engage in the display of the flag of the United States, as set forth in NRS 118A.325. 4. The

15

absence of a written agreement raises a disputable presumption that: (a) There are no restrictions on

16

occupancy by children or pets. (b) Maintenance and waste removal services are provided without

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18

charge to the tenant. (c) No charges for partial or late payments of rent or for dishonored checks are

19

paid by the tenant. (d) Other than normal wear, the premises will be returned in the same condition as

20

when the tenancy began. 5. It is unlawful for a landlord or any person authorized to enter into a rental

21

agreement on his or her behalf to use any written agreement which does not conform to the

22

provisions of this section, and any provision in an agreement which contravenes the provisions of this

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section is void. (Added to NRS by 1977, 1333; A 2001, 1352; 2003, 2968; 2007, 1282) NRS

25

118A.210 Rental agreements: Payment of rent; term of tenancy. 1. Rent is payable without demand

26

or notice at the time and place agreed upon by the parties. 2. Unless the rental agreement establishes a

27

definite term, the tenancy is from week to week in the case of a tenant who pays weekly rent and in

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- 15 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

all other cases the tenancy is from month to month. 3. In the absence of an agreement, either written

or oral: (a) Rent is payable at the beginning of the tenancy; and (b) Rent for the use and occupancy of

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a dwelling is the fair rental value for the use and occupancy. At your eviction hearing, tell the judge
your side of the story. Your job
is to convince the judge that you have a legal defense to the eviction. The Nevada Supreme Court

has determined that legal defense is when you have a genuine issue of material fact. Anvui, LLC

v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 163 P.3d 405 (2007) NRS 40.251

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Unlawful detainer: Possession of

property leased for indefinite time after notice to quit; older person or person with a disability entitled
to extension of period of possession upon request. NRS 40.251 Unlawful detainer: Possession of
property leased for indefinite time after notice to quit; older person or person with a disability entitled

13

to extension of period of possession upon request. 1. A tenant of real property, a recreational vehicle

14

or a mobile home for a term less than life is guilty of an unlawful detainer when having leased: (a)

15

Real property, except as otherwise provided in this section, or a mobile home for an indefinite time,

16

with monthly or other periodic rent reserved, the tenant continues in possession thereof, in person or

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by subtenant, without the landlords consent after the expiration of a notice of: (1) For tenancies from

19

week to week, at least 7 days; (2) Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, for all other periodic

20

tenancies, at least 30 days; or (3) For tenancies at will, at least 5 days. (b) A dwelling unit subject to

21

the provisions of chapter 118A of NRS, the tenant continues in possession, in person or by subtenant,

22

without the landlords consent after expiration of: (1) The term of the rental agreement or its

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termination and, except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (2), the expiration of a notice of: (I)

25

At least 7 days for tenancies from week to week; and (II) Except as otherwise provided in subsection

26

2, at least 30 days for all other periodic tenancies; or (2) A notice of at least 5 days where the tenant

27

has failed to perform the tenants basic or contractual obligations under chapter 118A of NRS. (c) A

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- 16 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

mobile home lot subject to the provisions of chapter 118B of NRS, or a lot for a recreational vehicle

in an area of a mobile home park other than an area designated as a recreational vehicle lot pursuant

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to the provisions of subsection 6 of NRS 40.215, the tenant continues in possession, in person or by
subtenant, without the landlords consent: (1) After notice has been given pursuant to NRS 118B.115,
118B.170 or 118B.190 and the period of the notice has expired; or (2) If the person is not a natural

person and has received three notices for nonpayment of rent within a 12-month period, immediately

upon failure to pay timely rent. (d) A recreational vehicle lot, the tenant continues in possession, in

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person or by subtenant, without the landlords consent, after the expiration of a notice of at least 5
days. 2. Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a tenant with a periodic tenancy pursuant to
paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection 1, other than a tenancy from week to week, is 60 years of age or

13

older or has a physical or mental disability, the tenant may request to be allowed to continue in

14

possession for an additional 30 days beyond the time specified in subsection 1 by submitting a

15

written request for an extended period and providing proof of the tenants age or disability. A

16

landlord may not be required to allow a tenant to continue in possession if a shorter notice is provided

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pursuant to subparagraph (2) of paragraph (b) of subsection 1. 3. Any notice provided pursuant to

19

paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection 1 must include a statement advising the tenant of the provisions of

20

subsection 2. 4. If a landlord rejects a request to allow a tenant to continue in possession for an

21

additional 30 days pursuant to subsection 2, the tenant may petition the court for an order to continue

22

in possession for the additional 30 days. If the tenant submits proof to the court that the tenant is

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entitled to request such an extension, the court may grant the petition and enter an order allowing the

25

tenant to continue in possession for the additional 30 days. If the court denies the petition, the tenant

26

must be allowed to continue in possession for 5 calendar days following the date of entry of the order

27

denying the petition. NRS 40.400 Rules of practice. The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil

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- 17 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

Procedure and Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals and new trials,

so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, apply to

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the proceedings mentioned in those sections. NRS 40.340 Adjournments. The court or justice of the
peace may for good cause shown adjourn the trial of any cause under NRS 40.220 to 40.420,
inclusive, not exceeding 5 days; and when the defendant, or the defendants agent or attorney, shall

make oath that the defendant cannot safely proceed to trial for want of some material witness, naming

that witness, stating the evidence that the defendant expects to obtain, showing that the defendant has

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used due diligence to obtain such witness and believes that if an adjournment be allowed the
defendant will be able to procure the attendance of such witness, or the witnesss deposition, in time
to produce the same upon the trial, in which case, if such person or persons will give bond, with one

13

or more sufficient sureties, conditioned to pay the complainant for all rent that may accrue during the

14

pending of such suit, and all costs and damages consequent upon such adjournment, the court or

15

justice of the peace shall adjourn the cause for such reasonable time as may appear necessary, not

16

exceeding 30 days. NRS 40.350 Trial not to be adjourned when complainant admits evidence in

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affidavit would be given. If the complainant admit that the evidence stated in the affidavit mentioned

19

in NRS 40.340 would be given by such witness, and agree that it be considered as actually given on

20

the trial, or offered and overruled as improper, the trial shall not be adjourned.

21

The landlord is trying to evict me for my exercising my rights as follows: complaining of habitability

22

issues and violations of criminal laws and retaliation.

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I have a lease which has not expired and the landlord has not given me notice that they/she is

25

terminating my lease. My lease allows me to use the premises for a hybrid purpose of a home law

26

office, ie a commercial lease, as such the No Cause type of eviction is not available here, especially

27

where, as her, my lease has not terminated by its terms as of yet.

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- 18 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

I have not received a notice from the landlord telling me to leave the premises. they can talk about

what they told "John Doe" to do, but...Aitken requires they change any "John Doe" notices to reflect

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my actual name one they were apprised of it. The were as early as January 5th, 2011 according to
Sue King, yet they failed to serve appropriate notice.. If I have ever owed the landlord any rent, I
have paid it all or have paid it within the time required by law.

Association's negligence vis a vis Laura and Chris's negligent andintentional torts committed against

me, which have resulted in thousands of dollars of damages. Please copy me on any and all

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correspondence via fax or email as the landlords and or their argents have been or arewithholding my
mail or otherwise interferring with my acces to it, and they have also done with respect to the
essential service of electricity.. Association's negligence vis a vis Laura and Chris's negligent

13

andintentional torts committed against me, which have resulted in thousands of dollars of damages.

14

Please copy me on any and all correspondence via fax or email as the landlords and or their argents

15

have been or arewithholding my mail or otherwise interferring with my acces to it, and they have also

16

d Written complaint to PTHOA'a employees or agents, causing PTHOA to retaliate against Coughlin

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18

was provide on January 8, 2012 in two separate writings, which alleged: "Pursuant to NRS 118A and

19

NRS 40, I am hereby complaining in writing of yours and Laura Harrison's violation of the following

20

criminal laws: A felony conviction for malicious destruction of private property under NRS 206.310

21

and 193.155 must be CIVIL LIABILITY FOR LOSS OR DAMAGE TO PROPERTY NRS 205.980

22

Determination of value of loss from crime; notice to victim; order of restitution deemed judgment to

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collect damages. CHAPTER 206 - MALICIOUS MISCHIEF NRS 206.005 Graffiti defined. NRS

25

206.010 Destruction or damage of property by unlawful assembly. NRS 206.015 Destruction or

26

damage of crops, gardens, trees or shrubs. NRS 206.040 Entering property with intention to damage

27

or destroy property. NRS 206.125 Damage of property used for purpose of religion, for burial or

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- 19 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

memorializing of dead, for education, as transportation facility, as public transportation vehicle or as

community center; damage of personal property contained therein; penalties; restitution. NRS

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206.140 Nuisance in building; trespass upon grounds; disturbing assembly. NRS 206.150 Killing,
maiming, disfiguring or poisoning animal of another person; killing estray or livestock. NRS 206.160
Leading or driving horse away without authority. NRS 206.200 Posting of bills, signs or posters

unlawful. NRS 206.220 Removal, alteration or destruction of monuments or landmarks designating

boundaries. NRS 206.260 Fraudulent and malicious destruction of writings. NRS 206.270 Defacing

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proclamations and notices. NRS 206.280 Tampering with papers. NRS 206.290 Opening or
publishing sealed letter or telegram. NRS 206.300 False signals endangering cars, vessels or motors.
NRS 206.310 Injury to other property. NRS 206.320 Unlawful removal of petrified wood from

13

posted or designated sites; duties of certain officers. NRS 206.330 Placing graffiti on or otherwise

14

defacing property: Fines and penalties; parent or guardian responsible for fines and penalties if

15

person violating section is under age of 18 years; suspension of drivers license. NRS 206.335

16

Carrying graffiti implement at certain locations with intent to vandalize, place graffiti on or deface

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property. NRS 206.340 Graffiti Reward Fund created; administrative assessment to be imposed for

19

certain violations; use of money in Fund. NRS 206.345 Person or entity to be paid if restitution is

20

ordered for violation of NRS 206.125 or 206.330. Zach Coughlin, Esq." The second writing: "This is

21

additional written notice pursuant to NRS 118A and NRS 40 complaining of and requesting repairs

22

and reimbursement for the following: no cgfi outlet near sink in upstairs bathroom. you broke the

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door to my room and the lock and failed to provide a key laura harrison slashed two of my tires,

25

necessitating $150 in repairs. You threw hot coffee on me and ruined my htc G2 smartphone, a $400

26

phone you have breached are deal with respect to my being allowed to be new carpet over the very

27

dirty carpet downstairs. You have repeatedly used force and threat of force to prevent me from

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- 20 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

accessing the washing machine downstairs for doing laundry and prevented my use of the kitchen

You admitted to changing the deadbolts on the front and back door's on New Years day at 12:30 am,

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locking me outside on a night with freezing temperatures, necessitating an expense of $60 for
alternate lodging that night. Further, you and Laura Harrison have unlawfully interrupted an essential
service, my electricity, repeatedly. NRS 118A.390. Please cure these issues or I intend to deduct them

from any future rent. I am complaining of yours and Laura Harrison's violations of criminal law

statutes My dog had chewing gum stuck in its hair in several places, in a manner that suggests it was

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purposefully done. I will remind you that abuse to animals is included in the Protection Order
Statutes. Further, you and Ms. Harrison are in violation of federal law in preventing my access to the
mailbox included in our agreement, as it was agreed that I would be afforded the opportunity to

13

receive mail at the 1422 E. 9th ST. #2 Address and use of the mailbox. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin,

14

Esq."

15

Potential counterclaims in a residential eviction action vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See, e.g.,

16

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1923.061. Some states restrict the counterclaims that a tenant may assert in a

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summary eviction proceeding. Iowa Code Ann. 648.19; Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. 8-402.4 (d).

19

If a property owner used illegal self-help to remove a tenant prior to or during the course of an

20

eviction action, the tenant may have counterclaims for illegal eviction, trespass, or harassment. The

21

tenants prevailed on such a claim in Villeneuve v. Beane, 182 Vt. 575, 2007 VT 75, 933 A.2d 1139

22

(2007), where the tenant family struggled to pay their rent and purchase heating oil after the father's

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serious injury in an industrial accident left him unable to work. Despite the fact that the tenants owed

25

back rent and the property owner had been forced to purchase heating oil to keep the furnace running,

26

the property owner agreed to permit the tenants to remain in the residence for an additional month

27

after expiration of the lease if they paid the rent for that additional month. The tenants paid the rent

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- 21 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

for the additional month, but while the tenants were away at work and school one day, the landlord

began removing their personal property from the residence. When one of the tenants returned home

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from work unexpectedly, he had the police remove the property owner from the residence and the

tenants moved their property back into the residence. During the course of the eviction action filed by

the property owner, the tenants paid rent into court until they vacated the residence. However, the

property owner engaged in a campaign of harassment against the tenants while the eviction action

was pending, including having their utilities shut off and posting signs on the property owner's

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neighboring premises stating that the tenants would not pay rent and would not vacate the residence.

Based on these actions, the tenants asserted a counterclaim for harassment, illegal eviction, and

trespass. The appellate court upheld the trial court's award of $10,000 in compensatory damages and

13

$2,000 in punitive damages against the property owner because the property owner's conduct was

14

outrageous and a violation of the tenants' right to legal process. Villeneuve v. Beane, 182 Vt. 575,

15

2007 VT 75, 933 A.2d 1139 (2007). One common counterclaim is breach of the warranty of

16

habitability. Domen Holding Co. v. Aranovich, 1 N.Y.3d 117, 769 N.Y.S.2d 785, 802 N.E.2d 135

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(2003) (tenant asserted a counterclaim for breach of the warranty of habitability in the landlord's

19

eviction action); Jablonski v. Casey, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 744, 835 N.E.2d 615 (2005) (tenant asserted a

20

counterclaim for breach of the warranty of habitability in the landlord's eviction action). In certain

21

cases, a breach of the warranty of habitability may allow reinstatement of the tenancy even if the

22

property owner already obtained an eviction order. For instance, a Massachusetts provision permits a

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tenant to withhold rent due to conditions in the residence that materially impair or endanger the

25

tenant's safety, health, or well-being. Jablonski v. Casey, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 744, 835 N.E.2d 615

26

(2005) (interpreting Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 239, 8A). If a Massachusetts court renders judgment

27

in favor of the property owner based on the nonpayment of rent, the tenant may reinstate the tenancy

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- 22 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

by paying the amount of the judgment into court within one week. Jablonski v. Casey, 64 Mass. App.

Ct. 744, 835 N.E.2d 615 (2005) (interpreting Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 239, 8A). However, such

5
6

relief is not available unless the tenant proves that the property owner had prior notice of the
conditions endangering the tenant's safety, health, or well-being. Jablonski v. Casey, 64 Mass. App.
Ct. 744, 835 N.E.2d 615 (2005) (denying a tenant's motion for reinstatement of her tenancy because

she failed to notify the landlord of the conditions allegedly endangering her health, safety, or well-

being prior to withholding rent). Failure to afford the property owner the requisite notice prior to

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withholding rent precludes the tenant from asserting the breach of warranty of habitability as a
defense to an eviction proceeding. Jablonski v. Casey, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 744, 835 N.E.2d 615 (2005)
(affirming judgment in favor of the landlord for possession and back rent).Because a tenant's claim of

13

retaliatory eviction is typically asserted as an equitable defense, the usual remedy for its successful

14

assertion is dismissal of the landlord's action for possession of the premises.[72] However, in some

15

cases the tenant may be entitled to damages.[ 73] This may include recovery of a rent abatement for a

16

period of uninhabitability,[74] compensatory damages,[75] damages for emotional distress caused by

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18

the retaliatory eviction,[ 76] and attorney's fees.[77] Most courts have held that punitive damages are

19

not recoverable on a claim of retaliatory eviction,[78] although a few courts have awarded punitive

20

damages in some instances.[79] It is the tenant's burden to prove damages. For example, in Paullin v.

21

Sutton,[80] a Nevada court found that the only evidence of damages consisted of testimony by the

22

tenant that, following her eviction, she purchased a condominium for $25,000 down and $1,552

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mortgage payment (plus $135 association fee) per month. The court held that as a matter of law,

25

damages for retaliatory eviction do not include all or part of the purchase price of a new home by the

26

former tenant. Further, although the tenant's answers to interrogatories indicated that she did incur

27

expenses in moving, she did not introduce any evidence at trial concerning the amount of these

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- 23 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

expenses. Because she failed to carry the burden to prove her damages, the court vacated a

compensatory damage award of $12,000. The court also reversed an $80,000 award of punitive

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damages because, said the court, punitive damages are not authorized without a valid award of
compensatory damages. The court further determined that while Nev Rev Stat 118A.510 clearly
prohibited the non-renewal of a month-to-month tenancy for a retaliatory purpose, the statute was

silent as to whether punitive damages were recoverable for a retaliatory eviction. In Gokey v.

Bessette,[81] a landlord's action for unpaid rent allegedly due when the tenant vacated the premises,

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the defendant tenants counterclaimed for damages based on retaliatory eviction and the landlord's
breach of an implied warranty of habitability. The parties had entered into an oral lease agreement for
rental of a mobile home starting in September 1985 at a monthly rent of $400. The tenants paid for

13

electric service to the mobile home, but the landlord paid for the electricity for a nearby barn, in

14

which the tenants were allowed to store their freezer. The trial court found that during the tenancy a

15

variety of problems developed, including water leakage into the home through the roof (which was

16

repaired by the tenants), power failures due to a faulty transformer, and a furnace breakdown. More

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serious was a break in the sewer line, which caused unhealthy fluids to collect underneath the mobile

19

home and a foul odor to pervade the premises. Despite numerous complaints to the landlord to repair

20

the sewer line break, the problem remained unresolved from February to June 1986, and the tenants

21

stopped paying rent as of June 1, 1986. The court found that final repair to the septic system came on

22

June 17, 1986, only after the tenants prompted a visit from the town health officer. On June 6, 1986,

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prior to the repair, the landlord gave the tenants notice to quit, effective August 1, 1986. The trial

25

court found that after the tenants stopped paying rent, the landlord locked the barn where the freezer

26

was located and shut off the power, causing the loss of $300 worth of food. The tenants vacated the

27

premises on October 31, 1986, approximately one month after the landlord had sold the mobile home.

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- 24 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

[FN78] See, for example, Pohlman v. Metropolitan Trailer Park, Inc., 126 N.J. Super. 114, 312 A.2d

888 (Ch. Div. 1973) (holding that state statute did not authorize recovery of punitive damages for

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retaliatory eviction); Paullin v. Sutton, 102 Nev. 421, 724 P.2d 749 (1986) (holding that state statute

did not authorize recovery of punitive damages for retaliatory eviction). [FN79] See, for example,

Aweeka v. Bonds, 20 Cal. App. 3d 278, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1st Dist. 1971) (holding that punitive

damages are recoverable in a retaliatory eviction action even if the actual damages are nominal). See

also Del Code Ann tit. 25, 5516(d) (allowing a successful tenant to recover three months' rent or

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treble damages, whichever is greater, plus attorney's fees). [FN80] Paullin v. Sutton, 102 Nev. 421,

724 P.2d 749 (1986). [FN81] Gokey v. Bessette, 154 Vt. 560, 580 A.2d 488, 23 A.L.R.5th 887

(1990). [FN82] Pursuant to 9 Vt. Stat. Ann. 4465. Section 23 Footnotes: [FN83] For a general

13

discussion on the use of interrogatories, see DiscoveryWritten Interrogatories, 4 Am. Jur. Trials 1.

14

For interrogatories to discover basic facts in tort actions, see Danner, Pattern Discovery: Tort Actions

15

(2d ed.). For checklists and discussion of the use of expert witnesses, see Danner, Expert Witness

16

Checklists. Regarding depositions, see Pattern Deposition Checklists (2d ed.). On state court practice

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18

with respect to interrogatories, see DiscoveryWritten Interrogatories, 4 Am. Jur. Trials 1. On

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written interrogatories in federal district court, see Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rules 26, 33; see

20

also Federal Procedure, L. Ed. 26:290 et seq.. 45 AMJUR POF 3d 375

21

The landlord's Complaint fails to state facts which would allow him/her to evict me, further King and

22

Western Nevada Management and Shiela Lester have admitted they received nothing pursuant to

23

24

their arrangement with Allaback and Foreshee, as such the Nevada Supreme Court holding in Glazier

25

makes inapplicable a summary eviction proceeding. Further, where, as here, my lease allows me to

26

use the premises for a home law office, and the non-payment of rent has not been alleged, NRS

27

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- 25 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

40.253 makes inapplicable a summary eviction procedure under those circumstances, rather, a

plenary procedure is required. Regardless, a proper jury trial demand is hereby made.

There is perhaps another person against whom this action should be brought, namely Erin Allaback

and Laure Forshee.

I have not been properly named in the notices. Rather, the Notice purportedly posed on January

10th, 2012 only names a "John Doe" despite my numerous writings to Western Nevada wherein my

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name was madse clear. The Aitken case makes clear that the procedural and notice requirements of
summary eviction matters must be stricly adhered to, as such this "John Doe" notice is ineffective.
I have other defenses as follows: retaliation, discrimination, lack of allegation of nonpayment of rent,

13

HOA admitted tenants were not obligated to pay rent, as such, under Glazier, summary eviction

14

procedures unavailable. IMPORTANT: In some cases, the Court has the power to give you time to

15

find a new place to live even if you do not have any of the listed defenses. If you wish the Court to

16

determine whether you are entitled to it, please check below:

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I have provided written request to landlord for an extension of 30 days in light of my disability.

19

I am writing to request the 30 days extension based upon disability. I am invoking my HIPAA and other privacy rights
with respect to divulging anythign further about my disability.

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COUNTERCLAIM

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If you believe that you are entitled to a return of part of your rent payment or other damages from the
landlord, complete the statement below: I here by counterclaim in excess of $10,000 in damages. I
feel that I am entitled to this amount for the following reasons: damages to myself, my clients, and

25

my practice in light of landlord's and landlord's agents actions. Laura and Chris being the

26

Associations employees and therefore you guys or them wanted to settle with

27

me on account of a respondeat superior theory of liability making your

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- 26 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

exposure significant enough to justify doing so. Association's negligence vis a vis Laura and Chris's negligent
andintentional torts committed against me, which have resulted in thousands of dollars of damages. Please copy me on
any and all correspondence via fax or
email as the landlords and or their argents have been or arewithholding my mail or otherwise interferring with my acces
to it, and they have also done with respect to the essential service of electricity.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

FACTS

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NRS 118A.510 Retaliatory conduct by landlord against tenant prohibited; remedies; exceptions.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, the landlord may not, in retaliation, terminate a
tenancy, refuse to renew a tenancy, increase rent or decrease essential services required by the rental
agreement or this chapter, or bring or threaten to bring an action for possession if:
(a) The tenant has complained in good faith of a violation of a building, housing or health code
applicable to the premises and affecting health or safety to a governmental agency charged with the
responsibility for the enforcement of that code;
(b) The tenant has complained in good faith to the landlord or a law enforcement agency of a
violation of this chapter or of a specific statute that imposes a criminal penalty;
(c) The tenant has organized or become a member of a tenants union or similar organization;
(d) A citation has been issued resulting from a complaint described in paragraph (a);
(e) The tenant has instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding or
arbitration in which the tenant raised an issue of compliance with the requirements of this chapter
respecting the habitability of dwelling units;
(f) The tenant has failed or refused to give written consent to a regulation adopted by the landlord,
after the tenant enters into the rental agreement, which requires the landlord to wait until the
appropriate time has elapsed before it is enforceable against the tenant; or
(g) The tenant has complained in good faith to the landlord, a government agency, an attorney, a
fair housing agency or any other appropriate body of a violation of NRS 118.010 to 118.120,
inclusive, or the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., or has otherwise exercised
rights which are guaranteed or protected under those laws.
2. If the landlord violates any provision of subsection 1, the tenant is entitled to the remedies
provided in NRS 118A.390 and has a defense in any retaliatory action by the landlord for possession.
3. A landlord who acts under the circumstances described in subsection 1 does not violate that
subsection if:
(a) The violation of the applicable building, housing or health code of which the tenant
complained was caused primarily by the lack of reasonable care by the tenant, a member of his or her
household or other person on the premises with his or her consent;
(b) The tenancy is terminated with cause;
(c) A citation has been issued and compliance with the applicable building, housing or health
code requires alteration, remodeling or demolition and cannot be accomplished unless the tenants
dwelling unit is vacant; or
(d) The increase in rent applies in a uniform manner to all tenants.

The maintenance of an action under this subsection does not prevent the tenant from seeking damages
or injunctive relief for the landlords failure to comply with the rental agreement or maintain the
28
dwelling unit in a habitable condition as required by this chapter.
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- 27 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

Lost profits, lost goods, such as food, and the benefits of lost services, such as advertising, are

examples of losses that may constitute "actual damages" for illegal eviction. 14 M.R.S.A. 6014(2)

(A). Degenhardt v. Ewe Ltd. Partnership, 2011 ME 23, 13 A.3d 790 (Me. 2011). Being an attorney is

hard enough without dealing with all of Park Terrace's malfeasance. Perhaps if ET AL ever gathers

up the gumption to hang out his own shingle they will more fully appreciate that.

ANALYSIS

Tenant's recovery of damages for emotional distress under Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant

10

Act, 6 A.L.R.4th 528; Right of landlord legally entitled to possession to dispossess tenant without

11

legal process, 6 A.L.R.3d 177; Recovery by tenant of damages for physical injury or mental anguish

12

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occasioned by wrongful eviction, 17 A.L.R.2d 936; 5 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 375, Tenant's Rights
and Remedies Against Retaliatory Eviction by Landlord. 99 Am. Jur. Trials 289, Retaliatory Eviction

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Claims.

16

Evidence supported finding that landlord's eviction of tenant was retaliatory for her complaints

17

concerning persistent plumbing problems and condition of common areas. N.R.S.

18

118A.510. Paullin v. Sutton, 1986, 724 P.2d 749, 102 Nev. 421.

19

By way of analogy to eviction mills for landlords, consider For example, abuse of bankruptcy

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proceedings by renters became so widespread in the Central District of California that [i]n 1991, J.

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Clifford Wallace, Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, established an Ad Hoc

23

Committee on Unlawful Detainer and Bankruptcy Mills to look into possible solutions to the practice

24

of abusive filings to prevent eviction. Judge Geraldine Mund, Updated Report of Unlawful Detainer

25

Task Force 1 (1992). The committee found that bankruptcy mills are a substantial cause of the

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abuse: They churn out large numbers of petitions (which result in an automatic stay, forestalling
eviction), but pursue no further action. Estimates suggest that in the Central District alone, some
- 28 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

20,000 to 40,000 such petitions are filed every year for the sole purpose of delaying the debtor's

eviction. See id. at 7. As those familiar with bankruptcy practice are only too painfully aware, this

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type of strategic manipulation isn't limited to renters' petitions. See generally Marcy J.K. Tiffany,
Crime and Bankruptcy, 24 Bankr.Ct.Dec. (CRR), at A1 (Sept. 2, 1993).
Awarding Attorney's Fees to Pro Se Litigants Under Rule 11, June, 1997, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2308,

Jeremy D. Spector. ET AL cites no authority on this or any other issue that lives anywhere beyond

form motion, template time, turn and burn practice of law. While ET AL did manage to cite the

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Seller's case, they quotes no language from it and seemingly makes not attempt to analyze its ruling.
they should have. Sellers speaks to awards of attorney's fees to prevailing parties in civil actions. It
does not purport to speak to attorney's fees awards stemming from Rule 11 violation, a situation

13

where the granting of attorney's fees to an attorney pro se litigant is far more accepted throughout

14

American jurisprudence. Simply put, the Seller's case is inapplicable and ET AL should stop citing

15

cases where they clearly has a very shallow grasp of what they speak to.

16

To wit:

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states that have considered whether an attorney proper person litigant may be

19

awarded attorney fees are divided, with a slight majority permitting such fees.

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Decisions approving fee awards to attorney proper person litigants generally do so

21

on the basis that an attorney is paid for rendering legal services, and if they renders

22

such services on his own behalf, it results in as much pecuniary loss to him as if

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they paid another attorney to render the same services. So, if a losing party must

25

pay attorney fees anyway, it should make no difference whether the fees are to be

26

paid to an attorney representing himself or another attorney employed by him. In

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short, "a lawyer's time and advice are his stock in trade."...We interpret NRS 69.030

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- 29 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

to require that all proper person litigants, whether attorney or non-attorney, be

obligated to pay attorney fees as a prerequisite for an award of prevailing party

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6

attorney fees. This interpretation gives effect to the Legislature's clear intent that the
prevailing party in justice's court be reimbursed by the losing party for out-ofpocket costs incurred to prosecute the suit. To interpret the statute otherwise would

require us to redefine what is meant by an attorney fee, which is commonly

understood to be the sum paid or charged for legal services. Because Matthews

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represented himself and did not pay or incur any obligation to pay attorney fees, the
justice's court exceeded its jurisdiction by awarding such fees. We therefore grant,
in part, the petition for a writ of certiorari. Sellers v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Ct., 119
Nev. 256, 71 P .3d 495 (2003).

14

NRS 69.030 Prevailing party allowed attorney's fee to be taxed as costs in justice court. The

15

prevailing party in any civil action at law in the justice courts of this State shall receive, in addition to

16

the costs of court as now allowed by law, a reasonable attorney fee. The attorney fee shall be fixed by

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the justice and taxed as costs against the losing party. So, ET AL's big contribution to the legal

19

research required to rule on this case is to cite Seller's, which does not speak to whether a pro se

20

attorney can receive attorney's fees pursuant to a Rule 11 sanction. The statute involved does not

21

apply here, either, where a Rule 11 Sanction motion is in play. Further, even if it did apply, which it

22

doesn't, Coughlin did pay or incur any obligation to pay attorney fees as they has stated in the Fact

23

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section that they paid to and incurred such an obligation to himself. Where Matthews may have not

25

been exact enough in his pleadings, Coughlin has been.

26

Coughlin has actually, reasonably and necessarily incurred $5,000 in the preparation of the pleadings

27

they has put forth so far in this matter, and in dealing with ET AL's regrettable, declasse conduct in

28

- 30 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

this matter. ET AL should be sanctioned in that amount, plus any fees incurred in drafting a reply in

support of this motion, and preparing for and attending any hearing. Further, Coughlin hereby

5
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requests a hearing replete with A JURY (A RIGHT GUARANTEE BY THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT EVEN IN SUMMARY EVICTION MATTERS, AN THERE IS NO LONGER
JCRCP 106, SO I GET AN APPEAL TOO!) on this matter to avoid eviction. There are evidentiary

issues such as the amount of rent deductions agreed to, the amount of damages done by Park

Terrace's landscaping crew, thin skulled tenant issues, etc.

10

WHEREFORE, tenant, Zach Coughlin, prays that this Court rule that a summary eviction proceeding

11

is unavailable to landlord here and award in excess of $10,000 damages to Tenant/Counterclaimant.

12

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Declaration made under penalty of perjury:

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16

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I Declare, pursuant to NRS 53.045 that the foregoing is true and correct and made under
penatly of perjury
AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain
the social security number of any person.

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Dated this: February 27th, 2012

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_/s/ Zach Coughlin


Zach Coughlin
Tenant/Counterclaimant

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26

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- 31 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Zach Coughlin, declare:

On February 27th, 2012, I, Mr. Zach Coughlin served the foregoing Tenant's Answer and
Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim by placing a true and
correct copy hereof in the usps mail, emailing, making all reasonable attempts at personally serving,
6

and faxing true copy thereof to:


5

Park Terrace Townhomes HOA


c/o Gayle Agnes Kern, Esq. and Gayle A. Kern. Ltd.
9

5421 Kietzke Lane Suite 200


10 Reno , NV 89511
Tel: 775-324-5930
11
Fax: 775-324-6173
gaylekern@kernltd.com
8

12

17

Park Terrace Townhomes Assn


c/o Western Nevada Management, Inc.
Residential, Commercial & Association Management
Sue King
President/Broker/Supervising CM
804 Mill Street, Reno, NV 89502
Ph: 775-284-4434
Fax: 775-284-4465
sue@westernnv.com
www.westernnv.com

18

info@westernnv.com

13

14

15
16

19

Reno Justice Court, Civil Division


1 S. Sierra St.
21
Reno, NV 89501
Civil Division Fax
22
(775) 325-6715
20

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24

25
26

Dated this: February 27th, 2012


----------------------------Zach Coughlin, Tenant

27

28
- 32 Tenant's Answer and Affidavit/Declaration to 30 Day No Cause Eviction, Tenant's Counterclaim

JUSTICE COURT, RENO TOWNSHIP

WASHOE County, Nevada


Name of LANDLORDS(s)

Park Terrace Townhomes HOA

c/o Gayle Agnes Kern, Esq. and Gayle A.

Kern. Ltd.

5421 Kietzke Lane Suite 200

Reno , NV 89511
Tel: 775-324-5930
Fax: 775-324-6173
gaylekern@kernltd.com

Case No.
Department No.

DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL

Park Terrace Townhomes Assn


c/o Western Nevada Management, Inc.
Residential, Commercial & Association
Management
Sue King
President/Broker/Supervising CM
804 Mill Street, Reno, NV 89502
Ph: 775-284-4434
Fax: 775-284-4465
sue@westernnv.com
www.westernnv.com
info@westernnv.com

VERSUS
Name of TENANTt(s)

Zach Coughlin,Esq.
NV Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
Reno, NV 89512
Tele: 775-338-8118
Fax: 949-667-7402
Attorney for Pro Se Attorney Litigant

TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT


The TENANT, ZACH COUGHLIN hereby demands that a trial of the above-entitled action be heard before a jury. TENANT
COUGHLIN HEREBY SUBMITS ALONG WITH THIS DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL AN APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN
FORMA PAUPERIS, AND NOTES THAT TENANT COUGHLIN HAS BEEN GRANTED IFP STATUS BY THE RJC WITHIN
THE LAST 6 MONTHS, AND THAT HIS FINANCIAL STATUS HAS ONLY GOTTEN MORE DIRE, LARGELY DUE TO THE
GOON SQUAD ENTRENCHED IN MUCH OF OUR LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LAW ENFORCEMENT. Upon any denial of
IFP status Tender will be made to the RJC in short order for the first day of jury fees and or any other sums required of
ANYBODY else.

February 27th, 2012


(Date)

(Signature)

Original-File

Copy-Plaintiff

Form - 7 Revised 7/11

Copy-Defendant

JUSTICE COURT, RENO TOWNSHIP

Case No.

WASHOE County, Nevada


Name of Plaintiff(s)

Department No.

Park Terrace Townhomes HOA


c/o Gayle Agnes Kern, Esq. and Gayle A.
Kern. Ltd.
5421 Kietzke Lane Suite 200
Reno , NV 89511
Tel: 775-324-5930
Fax: 775-324-6173
gaylekern@kernltd.com

DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL

Park Terrace Townhomes Assn


c/o Western Nevada Management, Inc.
Residential, Commercial & Association
Management
Sue King
President/Broker/Supervising CM
804 Mill Street, Reno, NV 89502
Ph: 775-284-4434
Fax: 775-284-4465
sue@westernnv.com
www.westernnv.com
info@westernnv.com
VERSUS
Name of Defendant(s)

Zach Coughlin,Esq.
NV Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
Reno, NV 89512
Tele: 775-338-8118
Fax: 949-667-7402
Attorney for Pro Se Attorney Litigant
CERTIFICATION OF MAILING
The Undersigned certifies on the 27TH day of FEBRUARY, 2012, a copy of the foregoing Demand for Jury Trial was mailed to :

Park Terrace Townhomes HOA


c/o Gayle Agnes Kern, Esq. and Gayle A. Kern. Ltd.
5421 Kietzke Lane Suite 200
Reno , NV 89511
Tel: 775-324-5930
Fax: 775-324-6173
gaylekern@kernltd.com
Park Terrace Townhomes Assn
3

c/o Western Nevada Management, Inc.


Residential, Commercial & Association Management
Sue King
President/Broker/Supervising CM
804 Mill Street, Reno, NV 89502
Ph: 775-284-4434
Fax: 775-284-4465
sue@westernnv.com
www.westernnv.com
info@westernnv.com
Date:

by depositing a copy in the United States Mail in an addressed sealed envelope, postage prepaid.

FEBRUARY 27TH, 2012

Name:

ZACH COUGHLIN

Per NRS 53.045, "I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct."
(Signature):
(Date):

__________________________________________
____________FEBRUARY 27TH, 2012_______________________________
Original-File

Copy-Plaintiff

form -7 Revised 7/11

Copy-Defendant

ZACH COUGHLIN, ESQ


NV BAR NO 9473
1422 E. 9TH ST #2
RENO, NV 89512
TEL 775 338 8118
FAX 969 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Tenant/Counterclaimant

RENO JUSTICE

PARK TERRACE TOWNHOMES HOA ET AL


LANDLORD

ZACH COUGHLIN
TENANT/
COUNTERCLAIMANT

XXXXXXX
XX

IN FLUX
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WHEREFORE, DecIaranI Alquests that a finding be ITlIdII by magiltrate 1hat probable cause exists 10 hold laid p8raon for prelim. hearing (if c:harge Is a
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DEClARANT

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REVIEWED FOR PAOBABLE CAUSE (PC)


PC FOUND 0
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DATE

DEFENDANT ORDERED ReLeASED, DATE

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NOIIAIVI81D MIl

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TIME

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MAGISTRATE

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MAGISTRATE

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ORIGINAL.

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IN CUSTODY
SCANNED

Docket 62337 Document 2013-20762

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Narrative
thiS report is written by Dep. J.Machen
On 6-28-12 approx. 1015, Dep.J.Gomez and I went to 1680 Sky Mountain Dr. to serve an eviction oreler on
lach Coughlin WhO was living In garag e #29. We met withe Northwind Apt. Mgr., his maintenance guy and two
employees of Nevada Court Se rvices who had previously served him the five day notice.
We knocked several times on the roU-up garage door announcing ourselves. No one answered so J had the Apt
maintenance guy come over and cut the outside lock off so we could lift the door. He told me that the lock was
not one of t h e apartments lOCk, h e then cut the lock off w/a sawull. We tried lifting the door' but we could tell It
was locked from the inside.
As we announced ourselves again when we heard (A-1) Zach Coughlin from the inside asking who we were.
We told hi m and also what we were doing. He kept talking abOut the court system how he was never served and
repeatedly kept asking who we were and what were we doing. eaCh ti me we told h im to open the door, he said
just a mi n u te and never would . This co ntin ued for approx . ten minutes.
I then asked the Apt. Mgt. how he wanted to gain access. He gave the maintenance guy permission to sawzall
a section of the g a rage door. After a section was cut away we were able to see partially Inside, but a large woOden
box was blocking the view of the inside. We kept telling Coughlin to open the door, eac h time he said just a
mi nute and kept asking who we were and what was our reason for being there. This went on for another ten
minutes. I told Coughlin I was going to use the tazer on him if he didn't comply w/our orders. He slowly came
around the corner of the woOClen bOx wlhis hand s out front. He refused to open up the door and came out the
section of door that was cut away . He was placed in handCuffs and temporarily detained.
I was able to move two boards from the Inside that were blocking the door from moving along w/some rOpe that
was around a roller tied to the track. Once the door was open I went inside to make sure no o ne else was there . I
then told the Apt. Mgr. it was safe and the garage and all the contents we re now his responsibility.
Due to the fact that (A-1) Coug hlin kept refUSing our commands over a period of twenty minutes and the
destruction he caused to the apanment complex for uS to execute Ihis eviction order he was arrested on the listed
charge and taken to 911 Parr Blvd. w/out incident.
,

W0696/NaCBBN.

BB

06/29/2012 14:37

page 2 of 2

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Docket 62337 Document 2013-20762

Zach Coughlin, Esq.


PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel: 775 338 8118
Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
David Clark, Esq., Bar Counsel
Patrick King, Esq., Bar Counsel
complaints@nvbar.org
State Bar of Nevada
P.O. Box 50
Las Vegas, NV 89125-0050
600 E. Charleston Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89104
State Bar of Nevada Office of Bar Counsel
9456 Double R Blvd. Suite B, Reno, NV 89521
TEL (775) 329-4100 FAX (775) 329-0522
Washoe County District Attorney:
ZYoung@da.washoecounty.us
MKandaras@da.washoecounty.us
August 21st, 2012
Dear Bar Counsel and Washoe County District Attorney,
Please accept this complaint and grievance against Jeff Chandler and Nevada Court Services,
ACG-APMI.com, Northwind Apartments, Dwayne Jakob, Sue King and her company Western Nevada
Management, and Gayle Kern, Esq., and the Park Terrace HOA. Just today I received a bill from
Northwind Apartments for "legal work" done by their legal counsel from Nevada Court Services
(which is apparently a business partner with an actuall attorney Lew Taitel, or otherwise "associated
with" him, as he is their "Staff Attorney" according to their website, of a substantial amount for the
legal work done by unlicensed non-attorneys. Regardless of the law of the case or res judiciate/claim
preclusion effect of the various Orders that have been entered in the cases involving myself and Nevada
Court Services or Northwind Apartments (doign business in 10 states as acg-apmi.com, and the FDCPA
violations such a letter entails, this unauthorized practice of law has damaged me substantially. I have
had phony protection orders taken out against me by a Northwind Maintenance Man, I have had
Nevada Court Services purporting to trespass me from a location where I still had two valid leases, I
have had the RPD violate Soldal v Cook County, etc., etc. and I have had NCS process servers trespass
upon my former home law office with impunity, all while being arrested by RPD Officers for an
1/14

Docket 62337 Document 2013-20762

alleged trespass of my own, which I reported to Bar Counsel in line with SCR 111. This unauthorize
practice of law is hurting people, and I hope you will address this problem, even where some RJC
Judges are interpreting NRS 40.253 in a way that goes far beyond the simple allowance to have an
"agent" of the property owner (here is is a corporation, ie, not allowed to appear through a non attorney
individual) serve a 5 day unlawful detainer notice, but to the point where NCS's Jeff Chandler et al are
making complicated legal opinions for money on behalf of clients (is it a NRS 40.780 situation or a
breach of lease 40.253?). This is particularly bad where NCS and Chandler are also getting paid to
serve process in these same cases and where NCS's R. Wray lied about conducting personal service on
me on June 14th, 2012 in a way that cut my time to file a Tenant's Answer short by three days
(regardless, NCS's June 14th, 2012 5 day Notice was defective in that it listed to wrong forum for the
tenant to file the Tenant's Answer-it listed Sparks Justice Court for a property located in Reno). I was
arrested by the WCSO due to the confusion attendant to the Sheriff arriving three days early to perform
an eviction (in light of the lies, in a sworn affidavit by NCS's R. Wray) that rested upon a Lockout
Order from a different court than that which was listed as the appropriate forum to file the Tenant's
Answer, (RJC versus SJC).
In Nevada, a corporation may not proceed in proper person before this court. See id.; Guerin v.
Guerin , 116 Nev. 210, 214, 993 P.2d 1256, 1258 (2000). What is funny is that now Lew Taitel, whom
is "associated with" NCS and listed as their "Staff Attorney" and whom accepted my case for
representation when Richard Hill, Esq. got me convicted of criminal trespass from the same former law
office where NCS trespassed behind my backyard gate and banged on windows and looked through
blinds in teams of two, ringing door bells for 40 minutes at a time 3 times a day (of course the RPD
chose not to follow up on my police reports, natch)...Well, Taitel now works for Washoe Legal
Services, even further cutting attorneys and the Sixth Amendment out of the game in some ECR deal
WLS has been trying to get a piece of for years.
Unger v. Landlords' Management Corp. 114 N.J. Eq. 68, 168 A. 229, In Naimo v. Fleming, 95 Nev. 13,
588 P.2d 1025, the Supreme Court of Nevada upheld dismissal of a complaint filed in violation of
NRCP 11, the Nevada rule equivalent of Rule 55.03(a). Out-of-state counsel signed the complaint and
filed it in Nevada court but apparently did not serve defendants. Eighteen months later, plaintiff filed an
amended complaint signed by a Nevada attorney. Defendants did not learn of the lawsuit until the
amended complaint was filed. Further, the statute of limitation expired on the claims before the
amended complaint was filed. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs claims upon defendants motion
finding that plaintiffs out-of-state counsel deliberately violated the rules governing signing of
pleadings and admission of out-ofstate attorneys in an effort to keep their lawsuit viable but avoid the
cost of associating Nevada counsel. Id. at 1026. The trial court also held the case should be dismissed
as the statute of limitations had run prior to the filing of the amended complaint which was signed by
the Nevada attorney. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs claims.
Basic Charging Statute for UPL The Unauthorized Practice of Law is governed by NRS 7.285 A
person shall not practice law in this state if the personIs not an active member of the State Bar of
Nevada or otherwise authorized to practice law in this State pursuant to the rules of the Supreme
Court. First Offense = Misdemeanor Second Offense = Gross Misdemeanor Third Offense = Category
E Felony, punishable by imprisonment of not less than 1 year and not more than 4 years, and a fine of
not more than $5000. The State Bar of Nevada may bring a civil action to secure an injunction and any
other appropriate relief.

2/14

I have recently been involved in several landlord tenant matters in which I am a party, summary
eviction proceedings. In those matters, the Reno Justice Court has allowed a property manager from
Western Nevada Managment, Sue King, (RJC Rev2012-000374) to appear on behalf of Park Terrace
Homeowners Associtation (prior to Gayle Kern's entry), and, in another matter, allowed Nevada Court
Services to appear on behalf of Northwind Apartments (which is owned and operated by ACG-AMPI,
Inc., which does business in ten states, as a corporation, which typically must retain an attorney to
represent it in court.). Nevada Court Services is a process server company, though they list an attorney
as a "Staff Attorney" on their website and as "associated with" their organization. However, in the
summary eviction proceedings in which I was a party, NCS appeared on behalf of clients, crossing the
bar and arguing in court, and, apparently, drafting filings, which they also serve and sometimes
notarize, on behalf of clients. NCS's Jeff Chandler does not have a law license as far as I know, nor did
he go to law school. However, his reckless abuse of court processes resulted in my recently spending
18 days in jail and being arrested twice in a 4 day period. On June 14th, 2012, a R. Wray from NCS
attempted to break into my rental #29 at 1680 Sky Mountain Dr. in Reno at Northwind Apartments. He
then field a sworn affidavit attesting to have effectuated personal service upon me at that time of a 5
day unlawful detainer notice. There is no way R. Wray could have possibly seen through a metal door
and ascertained that someone of "suitable age and discretion" was there to receive that notice sufficient
to effectuate "personal service" and thereby cut down the time to file a Tenant's Answer by 3 days
(NRCP 6(e) accords three additional days for mailing in the computation of time to respond, etc.).
Further, the 5 day notice that NCS prepared and posted (constructive or substituted service) was
insufficient in that it mistakenly listed Sparks Justice Court as the appropriate forum for the tenant,
myself, to file a Tenant's Answer under NRS 40.253(6).
I confirmed with the Reno Justice Court that, even if I did need to file a Tenan'ts Affidavit in
Reno Justice Court despite that insufficient notice, that, given the lack of personal service on June 14th,
2012, I would have until at least noon on June 28th, 2012 to file the Tenant's Affidavit. I submitted one
for filing with the Sparks Justice Court and may have so submitted one with the Reno Justice Court (I
need to do more research, etc...) but I know I further intended to fax file another Tenant's Affidavit with
the RJC before noon on the June 28th, 2012 just to be sure. I am forwarding to you emails I sent the
Sparks and Reno Justice Courts on june 26th, 2012 and July 2, 2012 highlighting the insufficiency of
notice on the 5 day unlawful detainer notice, etc...
NRS 40.253(3), provides that:
"3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must:
(a) Identify the court that has jurisdiction over the matter; and
(b) Advise the tenant:
(1) Of the tenants right to contest the matter by filing, within the time specified in subsection 1 for the
payment of the rent or surrender of the premises, an affidavit with the court that has jurisdiction over
the matter stating that the tenant has tendered payment or is not in default in the payment of the rent;"
I am writing to request a formal opinion as to whether inidividuals who lack a law license (or
someone like myself, who has one that is currently suspended) can represent parties in landlord tenant
matters and otherwise perform legal work, draft filings, appear on behalf of landlords or tenants, etc.,
and if they may not, to file this written grievance against NCS, Richard G. Hill, Esq., and Casey Baker,
Esq., and Western Nevada Management, Sue King, and Gayle Kern, Esq., and Lewis Taitel, Esq.
Additionally, a basis for the grievance against Baker and Hill is that they sought $20,000 worth
3/14

of attorney's fees in a summary eviction proceeding, despite NRS 69.030 precluding it and despite
Baker's citing an attorney's fees statue that related to a complete non-issue, the manufacture of a
controlled substance by an evicted tenant. Additionally, Baker and Hill have no managed to be awarded
some $43,000 worth of attorney's fees on appeal despite the fact that much of that award was
necessitated by the hearing and preparation for such a hearing and filign of documents related thereto,
to undo the attorney's fee/cost award at the summary eviction proceeding level and Baker's submitting a
proposed Order to Judge Sferrazza in RJC Rev2011-001708 that transferred the right to some $2,275
that I was forced to deposit into the RJC as rent escrow (despite the dictates against the Court so
requiring found in NRS 40.253(6)) to their client, Matt Merliss, despite the fact that Judge Sferrazza's
Order as rendered expressly stated that that money should be returned to me, subject to being helf for
some time as an appeal bond.
Justices in the Reno Justice Court have been allowing this from my experience, and I wish to
know if I am able to perform such work while my license is suspended. While NRS 40.253 does seem
to lend some support to the view that a "landlord's agent" is able to do some things (service notices,
etc.), I find no support for the contention that such a "landlord's agent" non-attorney like Jeff Chandler
of NCS is permitted to cross the bar and represent clients in summary eviction proceedings and
otherwise draft legal filings (some of which wind up greatly damaging members of the public, such as
myself in light of the two arrests I face, much less the civil damages and lost time incident to NCS's err
in listing Sparks Justice Court as the forum under NRS 40.253(3)(a)-(b) and in their enabling their
process server R. Wray to lie about effecting "personal service" on June 14th, 2012).
Florida has a case on point: However, an exception exist for evictions. In those cases, a corporation
may not appear pro se and must be represented by an attorney. Johnstown Properties Corp. v. Gabriel,
50 Fla. Supp. 138 (Fla. Polk Cty. court 1980).
Operating an eviction service by providing information to clients concerning eviction procedures
(People v. Landlords Professional Services (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1599); Thus California today
defines law practice as providing legal advice and legal instrument and contract preparation, whether
or not these subjects were rendered in the course of litigation. Birbower, Montalban, Condo & Frank,
P.C . v Superior Court., supra, at 128. Providing legal advice or service is a violation of the State Bar
Act if done by an unlicensed person, even if the advice or service does not relate to any matter pending
before a court. (Mickel v. Murphy (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 718, 721.) This definition of law practice is
broad and non-specific, but that policy choice is one which the California courts have made
consciously. The California court of appeals has summarized the rationale for this broad approach as
follows: [A]ny definition of legal practice is, given the complexity and variability of the subject,
incapable of universal application and can provide only a general guide to whether a particular act or
activity is the practice of law. To restrict or limit its applicability to situations in the interest of
specificity would also limit its applicability to situations in which the public requires protection. 7
People v. Landlords Professional Services (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1599, 1609. In sum, California uses a
broad standard for defining law practice to maximize its ability to protect its citizens from wrongs
arising from the practice or counterfeited practice of law. It constitutes the unlicensed practice of
law for a nonlawyer to represent a third party in an eviction. Generally speaking, a nonlawyer may not
prepare evictions forms for another unless the nonlawyer is merely typing the information provided in
writing by the individual or completing a Supreme Court Approved form with the factual information
provided by the individual. An exception exists for property managers. In The Fla. Bar re: Advisory
Opinion Nonlawyer Preparation of Landlord Uncontested Evictions, 605 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1992),
4/14

clarified, 627 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1993) the Court held that a property manager may sign and file
complaints for evictions and motions for default in uncontested residential evictions for nonpayment of
rent as long as the property manager is using a Supreme Court Approved form.
Jeff Chandler of NCS and Sue King of Western Nevada Management are going far beyond
giving clients forms to fill out. Chandler is advising his clients on complicated legal distinctions
between NRS 40.780 and NRS 40.253, in addition to suborning perjury by his process server R. Wray,
as well as lying to tenants about the import of his "criminal trespass" warnings under NRS 207.200.
At first Sue King decides to pursue an eviction under a No Cause Notice, but then the day
comes to file the Landlord's Affidavit and she figure out it is more advantageous to pursue an eviction
under a failure to pay rent theory. That is fraud where specific notice periods are required for each
different type of Notice pursued.
In the following cases involving allegations that a nonlawyer engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law, the courts held, where it had been asserted that the defendant specifically engaged in
conduct involving real estate matters, that the defendant was in contempt due to such conduct. A
nonlawyer's actions, consisting of filing initial eviction complaints for residential landlords, counseling
landlords about legal matters with regard to tenant eviction actions, typing or printing orally
communicated information on tenant eviction forms set forth in a petition, and appearing in court at
judicial proceedings for tenant eviction, constituted the "unauthorized practice of law" (former Fla.
Stat. Ann. 83.001), punishable by contempt, the court held in The Florida Bar v. Mickens, 505 So. 2d
1319 (Fla. 1987). The Florida Bar filed a petition charging a nonlawyer with the unauthorized practice
of law and contempt of a previous order that enjoined the nonlawyer from the practice of law, the
matter was referred to a referee for hearing, and the state supreme court, on review, approved the
referee's recommended findings and discipline and held that the nonlawyer's actions constituted the
"unauthorized practice of law," and that the unauthorized practice of law justified incarceration, a
$1,000 fine, assessment of costs, and an injunction.
Both NCS and Western Nevada Property Management appear to be going beyond using Nevada
Supreme Court forms. Indeed, WNM serves a 30 day No Cause Notice then files a Landlord's
Affidavit, apparently, that alleged failure to pay rent (and if the subtenant was a commercial tenant,
then such an eviction is impermissible under NRS 40.253). Further NCS is seemingly providing legal
counsel to Northwind Apartments, alternatively counseling it to pursue an eviction under NRS 40.253
under a breach of lease theory, only to subsequently file and pursue such an end under NRS 40.760.
I reported by conviction for criminal trespass to the USPTO and Bar Counsel in Nevada in
RMC 11 CR 26405. In the summary eviction matter incident to that case RJC Rev2011-001708, NCS,
in my opinion, criminally trespassed into my former home law office's gated backyard on numerous
occasions and otherwise harrassed me in attempting to effectuate personal service of various notices in
the context of a summary eviction proceeding (one against a commercial tenant where the failure to pay
rent was neither plead nor notice, in violation of the dictates of NRS 40.253). I realize some of these
things slide in the day to day of a Justice Corut, but when a patent attorney's livelihood is taken away
and it gets litigated on a federal level, as a result criminal conviction, the result may be different.
Regardless, in that same criminal trespass case, the attorney who shares an office space with NCS, a
fax number, apparently a receptionist, and is listed as "associate with" their organization and as their
"Staff Attorney" on NCS's website, Lewis Taitel, Esq., was appointed as my public defender by the
RMC in 11 CR 26405, despite the fact that I had attempted to sue NCS just one month prior
5/14

(apparently his conflicts check failed to catch that, and he subsequently failed to comply with RMC
Rules related to disclosing via written motion to basis for seeking and Order grantign his withdrawal as
attorney of record, only to pass the case to Roberto Puentes, Esq., whom subsequently admitted a close
personal friendship with Taitel and business relationship with NCS).
While Richard G. Hill and others apparently are able to file grievances with the State Bar that
are accorded case numbers and Bar Counsel resources for months, the greivances I filed with respect to
these matters have been rejected, and I would like an explanation of why if I may be provided one.
Simply put, I am pretty sure I cannot hang out a shingle to perform heart surgeries tomorrow with
impunity, and these non-lawyers should not be permitted to have such a dramatic effect on somethign
so primary to the lives of members of the public, ie, the real property they rent for shelter, business
purposes, or storage, etc.
However, the Washoe County Sheriff's Office effecutated a lockout at 10 am on the morning of
June 28th, 2012 with an Order from the Reno Justice Court. Jeff Chandler of NCS was present at that
time an attempted to serve me a notice informing me I was being "criminally trespassed" from the
entire Northwind complex at that time. However, I still had two other valid rentals or lease agreements
to units #71 and #45, and as such, do not believe a criminal trespass warning was possible with respect
to the entire complex.
Real estate relatedHeld in contempt
[Cumulative Supplement]
In the following cases involving allegations that a nonlawyer engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law, the courts held, where it had been asserted that the defendant specifically engaged
in conduct involving real estate matters, that the defendant was in contempt due to such
conduct.
A nonlawyer's actions, consisting of filing initial eviction complaints for residential landlords,
counseling landlords about legal matters with regard to tenant eviction actions, typing
or printing orally communicated information on tenant eviction forms set forth in a petition,
and appearing in court at judicial proceedings for tenant eviction, constituted the "unauthorized
practice of law" (former Fla. Stat. Ann. 83.001), punishable by contempt, the court held
in The Florida Bar v. Mickens, 505 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1987). The Florida Bar filed a petition
charging a nonlawyer with the unauthorized practice of law and contempt of a previous order
that enjoined the nonlawyer from the practice of law, the matter was referred to a referee for
hearing, and the state supreme court, on review, approved the referee's recommended findings
and discipline and held that the nonlawyer's actions constituted the "unauthorized practice of
law," and that the unauthorized practice of law justified incarceration, a $1,000 fine, assessment
of costs, and an injunction.
See New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern New Jersey Mortg. Associates, 22 N.J. 184,
6/14

123 A.2d 498 (1956), where the court held that while the state supreme court has the power to
punish for contempt those engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, here, though an abstract
company was seemingly practicing law in some aspects of its operations, a record of injunction
proceedings against the abstract company and its affiliate was inadequate to warrant a
general peremptory determination against the defendant without a complete record of details
of their method of doing business, buttressed by testimony and records relating thereto.
The court held that one engaged in the business of preparing petitions and precepts in dispossess
cases was practicing law unlawfully and was subject to punishment for contempt (
N.Y. Jud. Law 750(7)) in In re Collins, 169 Misc. 234, 7 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup 1938).
In a presentment charging a defendant with engaging in the unauthorized practice of law,
the state supreme court held that the acts of the defendant, who, under debt pooling plans,
gave advice in connection with, inter alia, the execution of a note and mortgage, and a conditional
sale note, and who undertook to handle litigation against one of these individuals, constituted
the unauthorized practice of law by the defendant, who was not licensed, and who
would be held in contempt for such actions, the court held in In re Pilini, 122 Vt. 385, 173
A.2d 828 (1961). By advising his clients in the instant matters, and in the manner as stated,
the defendant invaded the field reserved for duly licensed attorneys, and his conduct in giving
this legal advice constituted practicing law, the court declared. Such unauthorized practice of
law is a criminal contempt in the court, and the instant defendant would therefore be adjudged
guilty of contempt, the court concluded.
See the following additional cases involving allegations that a nonlawyer engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law, where the courts held, in cases in which it had been asserted that
the defendant specifically engaged in conduct involving real estate matters, that the defendant
was in contempt due to such conduct, where...
Nevada
Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar of Nev., 326 P.2d 408 (Nev. 1958)
As stated in Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, supra [315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 34], 'The actual practices of
the community have an important bearing on the scope of the practice of law.'
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
7/14

Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
MORE RELEVANT LAW
Landlord's Corner - Evictions and Unauthorized Practice of Law
A. Right to Proceed Pro Se

In Ohio, a person can always represent himself in court. This is called appearing "pro se" and is a
common (though unwise) practice where very little is at stake, such as in small claims courts around
the state. Why is it unwise? The two main reasons are that attorneys who regularly perform evictions
will be a great deal more familiar with the ins and outs of the law than the lay person. Secondly, an
attorney will see the case objectively, and a dispassionate eye is a more effective observer of events
than the landlord who may see things subjectively, having his vision clouded by emotions.
B. Representing Other Persons or Entities
But to represent another person or another entity (such as a company, a trust, or an LLC), you must be
certified by the Ohio Supreme Court to practice law or you are engaging in the unauthorized practice of
law. This rule affects landlords whose property is owned by a corporation or managed by a rental
company. Owning a property in a corporate form has become very popular lately as a way of limiting
the landlord's personal liability. This way, if the landlord is sued because of an injury at the property,
the most he can lose is the value of the property (assuming his insurance isn't enough to cover it). His
personal assets cannot be touched.
In the past, some landlords tried to file evictions via their employees, or tried to file the actions
themselves on behalf of the corporation owning the property. They reasoned that since they were the
100 percent owners of all the shares of the corporation, they should be able to represent it in court. The
problem was that these employees and corporate shareholders were not attorneys.
1. Ruling from the Ohio Supreme Court
In the case of Cleveland Bar Association v. Picklo, (2002), 96 Ohio St.3d 195, Lynn Picklo had been
filing complaints in the Cleveland Municipal Court, Housing Division, for forcible entry and detainer
[evictions], as well as for the recovery of past due rents. Picklo was not licensed to practice law in the
state of Ohio, but she nevertheless filed these claims and appeared in court on behalf of the property
8/14

owner since she was the rental manager.


Ms. Picklo argued that R.C. 1923.01(C)(2), which defines "landlord" for the purpose of invoking a
county, municipal, or common pleas court's jurisdiction in most forcible entry and detainer actions as
"the owner, lessor, or sublessor of the premises [or] the agent or person the landlord authorized to
manage premises or to receive rent from a tenant under a rental agreement."
She also cited R.C. 5321.01(B), which, with respect to landlord-tenant remedies in general, similarly
defines "landlord" as "the owner, lessor, or sublessor of residential premises, the agent of the owner,
lessor, or sublessor, or any person authorized by the owner, lessor, or sublessor to manage the premises
or to receive rent from a tenant under a rental agreement." She argued that since she was the rental
manager, she was the "landlord" and thus was entitled to bring the lawsuit on behalf of the owner of the
property.
It was a clever argument, but in the end, it would not wash with the Ohio Supreme Court. Under the
Constitutional doctrine of Separation of Powers, the Ohio Supreme Court has the inherent power to
determine who can practice law before the courts of Ohio. While it was true that the Ohio Legislature
passed laws in conflict with the Ohio Constitution, the Ohio Constitution wins out in the case of such
conflicts. The reason for this is because the Ohio Constitution is the document that set up the Ohio
Legislature in the first place. The Ohio Legislature draws its ability to pass laws from the Ohio
Constitution, and thus it cannot make laws contrary to the Ohio Constitution.
So Ms. Picklo was found to be engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, and since that time, all
evictions filed by persons not the owners of the property require the services of an attorney licensed to
practice in the state of Ohio.
II. Eviction Complexities
There are other good reasons to hire an attorney to do evictions, even if the property is owned in the
landlord's name (thus permitting pro se representation).
A. Three Day Notice Requirement and Issues of Timing
One is the three day notice requirement. Most landlords in Ohio realize that they must post a properly
worded three day notice to vacate upon the rented property before they can file an eviction. But few
landlords have a good grasp of the timing issues as they apply to the calculations of the three days.
Firstly, the three days do not start to run on the day that the three day notice is posted. Secondly, any
day in which the court is not open does not count as a day. Let's look at an example of how this works.
9/14

1. Example of Three Day Notice Timing


Larry Landlord has a tenant who has not paid his rent. On January 12, 2006, he posts a properly worded
three day notice to vacate upon the door. The day of the posting does not count towards the three days.
Friday, January 13, 2006 will be the first day of the three day period which counts. Saturday and
Sunday will not count. Monday, January 16, 2006 will not count either because it is Martin Luther King
Day, a national holiday upon which the court is closed. So Tuesday, January 17, 2006 will be the
second day, and Wednesday, January 18, 2006 will be the third day.
If Larry Landlord has an attorney, that attorney will know that the eviction cannot be filed until the next
Thursday, January 19, 2006, seven days later. But if Larry does the eviction alone, he might think that
filing it on Tuesday, January 17, 2006 would be fine since more than three days will have passed.
If, at the hearing, the error is pointed out by the tenant, the tenant's attorney, or noted by the court, the
eviction action will have to be dismissed. All of the filing fees spent on the eviction will be lost, the
eviction will have to be filed again, and the tenant will walk away from the first eviction hearing with a
new found confidence that he can beat any eviction that the landlord throws at him. Better then to use
an attorney and only have to handle the matter once.
B. Thirty Day's Notice Sometimes Required.
Another timing issue arises in relation to the type of breach that the landlord is alleging. If the landlord
is alleging a breach of the rental contract, then all that is necessary to start the eviction process is the
posting of a properly worded three day notice to vacate. But if the landlord is alleging that the tenant
breached the tenant's duties under Ohio Revised Code Section 5321.05, then the landlord must first
notify the tenant in writing of the problem and give the tenant 30 days to fix it. Only then can the three
day notice be posted on the door to start the eviction process.
Some landlords have tried to be too clever by half. They have inserted the text of Ohio Revised Code
5321.05's duties of the tenant into the lease agreement word for word, which enables the argument that
any breach of R.C. 5321.05 would also be a breach of the lease agreement. But Ohio courts have seen
through this and ruled that if the violation is a breach of both the law and the lease, the landlord must
still give the 30 day notice.
Let's look at two examples.
1. Unauthorized Dog

10/14

Larry Landlord has a lease which prohibits the tenant from having a dog. Larry finds out that the tenant
is violating this portion of the lease agreement. This is not a violation of Ohio Revised Code Section
5321.05 which says nothing about dogs. Thus, Larry Landlord does not need to give 30 day's notice
before posting the three day notice to vacate.
2. Unsanitary Conditions
Larry Landlord has a lease agreement which says that the tenant shall keep all plumbing fixtures (sinks,
toilets, tubs, etc.) in a clean and sanitary condition. During an inspection of the rented premises, Larry
notices that the tenant is living like a complete pig, and that the plumbing fixtures are in an appallingly
unsanitary condition. Larry would love to post the three day notice and get the eviction process going
right away. But Ohio Revised Code Section 5321.05(A)(3) imposes a duty upon the tenant to "Keep all
plumbing fixtures in the dwelling unit or used by him as clean as their condition permits . . .".
Thus the tenant is violating both the lease and R.C. 5321.05(A)(3). Ohio Revised Code Section
5321.11(A) requires 30 days written notice from the landlord to the tenant to remedy any breach of the
tenant's duties under Ohio Revised Code Section 5321.05. So Larry Landlord is going to have to give
30 days written notice to the tenant before he can post the three day notice to vacate. If the tenant
remedies the problem within those thirty days, then the tenant will have a defense to the eviction.
C. Tips for the Wise Landlord
So the wise landlord hires an attorney to perform all of his or her evictions. In this way you can be
more certain that the eviction will be done right and that possession will be returned to you as soon as
possible.
Where can you find such an attorney? There are several places. You can contact your local bar
association and ask to be referred to an attorney who regularly performs evictions. If you call any large
apartment complex, the rental managers there will more than likely refer you to the attorney they use. If
you know an attorney personally, even if he or she does not conduct evictions, he or she will very likely
know someone who does.

Ethics Articles: The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Landlord Tenant Cases
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

11/14

Focus on Professional Responsibility


MBJ September, 1999
By: Victoria V. Kremski, Assistant Counsel State Bar of Michigan
The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Landlord Tenant Cases
Landlord tenant cases comprise a large portion of the dockets of the District Courts in Michigan. Given
the relatively rapid pace at which summary proceedings move and the important interests at stake for
both parties involved, it is important to have a thorough understanding of the relationship between
landlord-tenant actions and the unauthorized practice of law. Confusion sometimes arises regarding
what types of landlords may file and litigate eviction cases on an in pro per basis, without engaging in
the unauthorized practice of law.
In Michigan, landlord-tenant law is governed by statute and specific court rules. In small claims
actions, MCR 4.302(B)(2) allows a corporation or partnership to appear and prosecute the proceeding
through a lay representative. However, no statute or court rule exists in Michigan allowing corporations
or other business entities to file and litigate matters on an in pro per basis in actions other than small
claims court. Accordingly, the general body of case law addressing what constitutes the unauthorized
practice of law applies to all landlord tenant proceedings.
Individual, layperson landlords, i.e. those that own rental property in their individual capacity, may file
and litigate eviction actions, in pro per, as they are acting on their own behalf and only their individual
interests are affected by the proceeding. In contrast, Michigan law views corporations, partnerships and
other legal entities as separate from their individual officers, shareholders, and partners. Lay officers,
directors, partners and employees of corporate or partnership entities may not represent the entity in
court proceedings or sign court documents without engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. Peters
v. Desnick Broadcasting Co., 171 Mich App 283, 429 N.W. 2d 654 (1988). Detroit Bar Association v.
Union Guardian Trust Co., 282 Mich 707, 282 N.W.2d 432 (1938). See also Ginger v. Cohn, 426 F.2d
1385 (1970). Labato v. Pauline, 304 Mich 668 (1943), 8 N.W.2d 873. Yenglin v. Mazur, 121 Mich App
218, 328 N.W.2d 624 (1982).
Michigan statutes are in accord with this case law. MCL 450.681, MSA 21.311 provides that
corporations may not practice law or offer legal services. MCL 660.2051(2); MSA 27A 2051(2)
recognizes partnerships as entities separate from their individual partners.
The above restrictions do not prohibit lay employees of corporations and partnerships from drafting
petitions, orders and other papers to be filed in court, provided the papers are filed under the name of,
and by, an attorney who becomes personally responsible for the filings as if he or she had drafted them
personally. Detroit Bar Association v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 282 Mich 707 (1938).
12/14

Under current statutory and case law, a lay employee of a corporation or partnership cannot sign and
file a complaint for termination of tenancy without engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.
Further, any attempt to litigate the matter, by appearing in court on behalf of the business entity, leaves
the individual open to prosecution for engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. MCL 600.916;
MSA 27A916. The Supreme Court empowers the State Bar of Michigan, with authorization from its
Board of Commissioners, to investigate and prosecute incidents of the unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 16 of the Rules Concerning the State Bar.
Michigan lawyers confronted with a non-lawyer appearing in court for a corporation or partnership
have an ethical duty to bring the fact to the attention of the tribunal. Informal ethics opinion RI-10. The
lawyer may also move for disqualification of the lay representative and to strike the pleadings.
Likewise, Michigan judges are also under an ethical duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law.
Informal judicial ethics opinion JI-26 states, in part,
"Administrative responsibilities of judges require them to instruct court personnel to regularly check
pleadings filed with the court for signature and professional identification ("P" number) to assure the
person representing a party is a member of the State Bar. Judges must instruct court staff to reject
pleadings having no professional identification unless the person is appearing pro se.
"When unauthorized practice of law activity occurs within the presence of a judge, the judge must stop
the proceeding; place as much information on the record as possible; advise the party to seek the
services of a licensed lawyer; and take other remedial action authorized by law."
Given the important interests at stake for both parties in a landlord tenant proceeding, it is important for
all involved to be sensitive to the unauthorized practice of law issue and how it may arise in such cases.
A judge or lawyer who encounters unauthorized practice of law activity should report the incident to
the State Bar of Michigan and its Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of law for investigation and
possible prosecution.
Unauthorized practice of law
The judge cannot hear an eviction case if your landlord is a corporation unless the corporation is
represented in court by a lawyer. The letters Inc. after the landlords name mean that it is a
corporation. The corporate landlords case must be dismissed if someone who is not a lawyer prepared
the complaint and summons. Unfortunately, some courts may bend the court rules and allow property
managers, stockholders, and others who are not lawyers to act for the corporate landlord. This is
improper under New Jersey law (except that a partner in a general partnership may file papers and
appear pro se). Cite: Rule 6:10 and Rule 1:21-1(c).
13/14

CLEVELAND BAR ASSOCIATION v. PICKLO. [Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Picklo, 96 Ohio
St.3d 195, 2002-Ohio-3995.] Unauthorized practice of law Person not licensed to practice law in
Ohio filed complaints in the Cleveland Municipal Court, Housing Division, for forcible entry and
detainer, as well as for recovery of past due rents on behalf of a property owner Engagement in the
unauthorized practice of law enjoined.

14/14

3/17/13

Outlook Print Message

FW: Competency Evaluation SB89 Form


From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 1/18/13 11:04 AM
To: RBRUCELINDSAYLAW@YAHOO.COM (rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com)
32 attachments
1 12 12 00696 RPD Look's Proof of Service 065630 60331 03628 063341 Sifre.pdf (522.4 KB) , 1 13 12 00696 RPD
Look's Proof of Service 065630 60331 03628 063341 Sifre.pdf (154.0 KB) , 12 5 12 0204 email from
sstettner@da.washoecounty.us failure to timely provide Brady material reveal RPD Sifre complicity with RJC Judges
065630 067980 053341 26800.pdf (41.8 KB) , 1 12 12 rpd police report 12 cr 00696 sifre leedy look nash young kandaras
bradshaw 0204 065630 redacted ocrd.pdf (3.2 MB) , 12 6 12 subpoenas 065630 Thew Sifre Schaur Lopez Foreshee
ECOMM.pdf (5.1 MB) , SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY TO OPPOSITION CV08-01709 1 13 12 (Supplemental ...) 11cr00696
king sbn sifre rcr2012-065630 ocrd and tagged jbig2 lossy.pdf (200.9 KB) , 6 26 12 0204 067980 12420 60302 NCS
Taitlel RMC Machen Harley email to RJC Stancil and WCSO Stuchell Sheriff's Web and Sparks Justice Court Hansen.pdf
(25.1 KB) , 7 3 12 12 cr 12420 redacted report bf.pdf (2.3 MB) , 7 3 12 0204 067980 RMC 12420 criminal Complaint
DTP signed by Northwind's Krebs but filled out in RPD Weaver's handwriting.pdf (530.5 KB) , 7 3 12 Krebs TPO 287
RMC 12420 RJC 067980 pages 14 to 25 fax sotelo.pdf (322.4 KB) , 7 3 12 redacted disturbing the peace arrest 12 cr
12420 rmc loomis sotelo mauser weaver dye 00696 26800 sbn 0204 25 page discovery northwind ncs krebs reduced
size.pdf (2.3 MB) , 7 25 12 60302 0204 067980 12420 0435 stamped Coughlin's motion for extensio nto file brief and
exhibit 60302.pdf (148.7 KB) , 8 9 12 Loomis second Motion to withdraw 12 cr 12420 rmc see also 26405.pdf (229.2
KB) , 9 7 12 063341 Order For Competency Evaluation 0204 065630 12420.pdf (1573.5 KB) , 10 11 12 RMC 12 CR
12420 Amended Criminal Complaint nrs 484D.850(2) rmc 1.04.015.pdf (160.4 KB) , 10 19 12 0204 SUBPOENA ON
KEITH LOOMIS FOR 11 14 12 FORMAL DISCIPLINARY HEARING 26405 12420.pdf (1136.6 KB) , 2927_0001
Sotelo Motion to Withdraw and ORder granting it 12 CR 12420.pdf (118.4 KB) , 7 3 12 0204 1048 067980 12420 RMC
Case Summary sheet bail info, Sooudi trespass, three criminal complaints and RPD arrest report and pc sheet.pdf (1971.6
KB) , 1 12 12 Hill TPO application RJC Schroeder 000018 00696 26800 0204 065630.pdf (638.4 KB) , FV12-001872651415 (Application for TPO).pdf (869.8 KB) , 10 4 12 RJC Albright 0204 Docket Krebs 287 Order Denying EPO ruling
on lien 067980.pdf (79.3 KB) , Pages from 7 3 12 Northwinds Apartments Milan Krebs RJC TPO Application rcp2012000287 and Judge Schroeders 7 5 12 Order granting 1048 067980 12420 and docket and 8 7 12 extension hearing
notice.pdf (228.6 KB) , 7 3 12 0204 067980 0148 RMC 12420 handwritten Witness Statement by Northwind's Milan
Kreb's compare to handwriting in TPO application in 287 and criminal complaint for DTP.pdf (308.0 KB) , 7 3 12 0204
067980 1048 RMC 12420 probable cause sheet and Declaration Supplment by RPD A Weaver compare handwriting to
Krebs dtp complaint of same day.pdf (848.3 KB) , 7 5 12 0204 067980 unsecured load Complaint signed by RPD Weaver
12420 Krebs Northwinds RMC RPD 1048.pdf (608.5 KB) , RJC Judge Albright letter for Taitel Albright slows Krebs
TPO hearing down to retain jurisidction rcp2012-000287 hearing on 8 5 12 067980 26405.pdf (832.0 KB) , 8 24 12
COMPLAINTS@NVBAR.ORG GRIEVANCE AGAINST RMC DEFENDERS AND WCPD LESLIE RCP2012-000287
12CR12420 RCR2012-067980 NORTHWIND KREBS WEAVER MILLER ocrd and tagged jbig2 lossy.pdf (36.5 KB) , 8
9 12 RMC defender Loomis motion to withdraw 12420 northwind krebs rmc rpd.pdf (327.2 KB) , loomis motion to
withdraw 12 cr 12420 northwind krebs rmc rpd.pdf (164.7 KB) , krebs rcp2012-000287 rmc 12cr12420 rcr2012-067980
12 page mausert sotelo fax.pdf (220.9 KB) , Request for Audio Copy of Proceedings rjc form krebs v coughlin rcp2012000287.pdf (58.0 KB) , 8 24 12 COMPLAINTS@NVBAR.ORG GRIEVANCE AGAINST RMC DEFENDERS AND
WCPD LESLIE RCP2012-000287 12CR12420 RCR2012-067980 NORTHWIND KREBS WEAVER MILLER.pdf (20.1
KB)

Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402 ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com

From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: rbl@robertbrucelindsay.com
Subject: Competency Evaluation SB89 Form
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2013 15:47:28 -0800

Dear Mr. Lindsay,

Docket 62337 Document 2013-20762


https://bay002.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=e26af83d-ceee-447b-8cd9-fe83c7ea76ec,m,8435fe3e-c569-4108-a888-0ab2ee600809,m,319ee71

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3/17/13

Outlook Print Message

I AGREE WITH YOUR EXPRESS INDICATION MADE DURING OUT IN PERSON MEETING THAT YOU HAVE
A DUTY TO MOVE FOR AN ORDER FOR COMPETENCY EVALUATION OF MYSELF BY IMMEDIATELY
FILING THE SB89 FORM TODAY.

I apologize for not having returned the scanned materials to you yet. I will email them and provide you the hard copies as well
immediatly..

Sincerely,

Zach Coughlin

PS. If you want to discuss anything please just email me a good time to call you or you might be able to reach me at 775 622
9936..

https ://s kydri ve.l i ve.com/redi r?res i d=43084638F32F5F28!118

Pl ea s e fi nd very rel eva nt ma teri a l s to the defens e of thi s ca s e a tta ched a nd a t the a bove l i nk. I ha ve s ca nned everythi ng therei n for vi rus es a nd i t i s 100% s a fe a nd vi rus free.

Sorry for the delay, I am not flaking on you, its just been hectic, i'll get to getting it scanned and returned, very busy addressing a
recent Order of the NNDB seeking to disbar me, but I will get to it.
I don't want much, okay. Just a few simple things.If you get me this stuff, as far as I am concerned, we are straight (assuming
you don't pull a Jim Leslie and insist on remaing on my case as long as possible to purposefully torpedo it....) There was talk of
Cape Fear with Leslie well before he moved to withdraw and got a TPO, and now an EPO (though courthouse sanctuary
doctrine makes the "service" thereof rather suspect. Leslie was not all "terrified" back then...What changed? Oh, that's right, he
was finished puttin' in work for the County (ie, makign sure I got convicted on both counts in 063341, thanks to his making the
NRS 171.136 (or trying to, at least, ...he failed) citizen's arrest arguments that went completely over DDA Young head (or, more
likely DDA Young just couldn't stomach anymore of the farce and chose not to make such arguments to the tirbunal). Can you
serve the WCDA with request for discovery and subpoena the RJC and WCSO for the following (assuming the won't just copy
the stuff an provide it all nice'n'easy like):
certified audio transcripts of the following hearings in the RJC:
1. 7/5/12 in RJC Rev2012-001048 hearing granting a default victory incident to a 6/28/12 motion to set aside the fraudulently procurred 6/27/12 Lockotu Order at the rental
where the 067980 arrest occurred.

2. 7/31/12 hearing in rjc rev2012-001048 before Judge Pearson (this was a hearing noticed on 7/23/12 to address my Motion
to Set Aside the 6/27/12 eviction Order signed by Judge Schroeder despite my 6/26/12 email and fax to the RJC, SJC, WCSO,
and City of Reno regarding my filign the Tenant's Answer in the SJC, and the deficiencies in the 5 day notice. (please see the
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Outlook Print Message

attached police report by the RPD incident to the pretextual (and Soldal v. Cook Co violating, not that it matters, this is nevada
after all) arrest shortly upon my bailing out on the 067980 charge in RMC 12 CR 12420(wherein the "approach" by the RPD (to
which RPD Sargent Sifre incidates some level of complicity between the RPD and RJC in a recording only recently propound by
the WCDA just 2 judicial days before the 12/11/12 Trial stemming from the 1/14/12 misuse of 911 arrest in rcr2012-065630
(a witness just sadly passed away unexpectedly 2 days after the DA complete his direct examination of her, EComm's Kariann
Beechler).

2.1 the a udi o tra ns cri pt of the one hea ri ng i n REV 2012-075658 Za ch Coughl i n vs Jeff Ni chol s . Thi s i s rel eva nt to 067980 beca us e i ts a nother evi cti on s cena ri o a nd es ta bl i s hes a pa ttern a nd
pra cti ce by the RPD, WCSO a nd RJC to refus e to uphol d my ri ghts whi l e a ggres s i vel y a ppl yi ng a n overl y ri gi d a nd formul a i c a ppl i ca ti on of rul es to me a s a pro s e tena nt, a nd even goi ng beyond tha t,
s ome mi ght s a y, a t ti mes . Pl ea s e, thi s one i s i mporta nt, I need i t. A former WCSO Deputy pu

3. I would like you to serve on the WCDA a request for discovery and also a subpoena/FOIA (I know, NRS Open Records
REquest) on ECOMM for any 911 calls, RPD Dispatch calls from civilians, or recordings between the RPD or wcso or Reno
sparks Indian colony Police or dispatch/ECOMM in any way connected to me, Zach Coughlin, or suspected to be connected to
me. I am not going to ask for much more, if you get me all that, I'll be good, if not...I'll be tedious.

4. any and all recordings made by anyone (RPD, WCSO, Northwinds Staff, bystanders, and especially Jeff Chandler or Ryan WRay or anyone else associate with Nevada Court
Services) of ANY interactions with me in any way connected to Northwinds Apartments and my tenancies there (i had three rentals, units 29, 45, and 71). Please have served a
subpoena duces tecum on Nevada Court Services directed to anythign (documentation, recordings, etc) related to Zach Coughlin and serve a witness subpoena on NCS's Ryan Wray
(might have stopped working there, but still subpoena him please) as well as Jeff Chandler.

5. The RMC audio transcript of the (it woudl cost my $35 i don't have, and they probably have to waive the fee for you, the RJC does when Leslie and the WCPD request
recordings) 7/5/12 unnoticed bail hearing in RMC 12 CR 12420 wherein my bail was impermissibly raise from a bondable $1,415 to a cash only $3,000 for charges that were plainly
manufacture anyways.
6. the 12/3/12 Trial audio transcript in RMC 12 CR 12420.
7. the 12/18/12 audio transcript of the hearing in 067980 (the case you are on) wherein Jim Leslie (without DDA Young there) was able to get some things done...you likely are
required to, or at least, might want to, have this anyways.... I dont' necessarily need the hard copies (you can sign up for a free hotmail account at www.outlook.com and skydrive
them to me, its totally easy, or I can pick them up, copy them, and deliver them to you...i just dont' have the money and the court's nickel and dime me like crazy).
8. The 12/6/12 filing in the appeal of an associated RJC prosecution in rcr2012-063341 (it is the Record on Appeal, basically, but I think they titled it "Notice of Appeal" on the
docket...and the RJC has failed to provide me a copy of it...not even the brand new filings listing the index of documents included in that 12/6/12 filing (which is basically a Notice of
Appeal). YES, IT is relevant to this case...it goes to conflicts analysis to both the RJC (even across departments, especially given some admission by Clifton as to looking over
"submission on subpoenas" from that 063341 case before Sferrazza, on the record in 065630...DDA Young is an efiler and could easily email you that 20 mb or so 12/6/12 Notice of
Appeal (804 page) filign in CR12-2025 (the appeal of rcr2011-063341, the first of 10 arrest/incarcerations of me since 8/20/11).

Please subpoena Nevada Court Services Ryan Wray (he may not work there anymore, but he was present at the scene of the arrest and, obviously, along with Northwinds Manager
Duane Jakobs (who testified on that 7/31/12 audio transcript I am requesting you obtain and copy me on in rev2012-001048 about the events in question in 067980) participated in
attempted break in an fraudulent Declaration of Service of the 6/14/12 5 Day UD Notice.

9. Lastly, please serve the RJC Custodian of Records a Subpoena duces tecum for all records/fax logs/information/documentation related to any faxing of Orders by RJC Judges to
the WCSO between October 24th, 2011 and November 2nd 2011 (each fax has a job number, etc. I want a sequential printout or log of those faxes as it goes to whether the RJC,
in accord with its admitted policy, faxed to the WCSO the two different ORders by Judge SFerrazza related to the Eviction (a 10/25/11 "Eviction ORder and Decision" and a 10/27/11
"Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and ORder for Summary Eviction". I need to know if and when such items were faxed or transmitted to the WCSO...it is very relevant given
the same WCSO Deputy Machen conducted the lockout on 11/1/11 from my former home law office, according to the locksmith, REno Carson Messenger receipts, the transcript of
th 6/18/12 criminal trespass trial in RMC 11 Cr 26405 (sworn testimony of Casey Baker, eSq. and Richard G. HIll, eSq.) demonstrates that the WCSO's Office is being obstructive,
as is the RJC (whom failed to comply with my SCR 105(4)/SCR 119 properly issued and served supboena and subpoena decus tecums of 10/30/12 in the formal disciplinary matter
(espeically consiering the 4/11/12 volunteering of information and documents by RJC judges secretary Lori Townsend), and further specify the subpoena duces tecum is for the "file
stamped cover page" of any filign by Couglin in RJC rev2012-000374.

10. the audio transcript of the 8/7/12 TPO Hearing in RJC RCP2012-000287) for Milan Krebs v. Zach Coughlin (Krebs was NOrthwinds Apts maintenance man (the one doing the
sawzalling to the metal door of unit 29 incident to the arrest in 067980...He testified under oath the matters of material direct relevane to the defense of this case. This is a no
brainer, and the fact that Leslie continuously refused to obtain a copy of this hearing (again, the RJC waives the $35 fee for th wCPD...so what was Leslie's excuse? That

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Northwind's Apartments sent him some photgraphs of a microwave? Please. Jim Leslie is a joke. That might be relevant to an evictio hearing, but not to a NRS 199.280 defense.
What Krebs testified to at that TPO extension hearing on cross examination is obviously extremely relevant, particularly where there was extensive questioning directed to the
circumstances of the arrest in 067980.

11. Lastly, a subpoena duces tecum on the Custodian of Records for the Reno muni Court and the Custodian of Records for the City of REno Marshals for any an all documentation,
marshal's reports, or recordings (Thompsons admitted to makign at least on on or about 3/22/12) in any way related to Coguhlin (obviously, there shoudl be an arrest report from the
2/27/12 direct contempt arrest wherein Marshal Harley, as testified to by Judge Nash Holmes at my disciplinary hearing on 11/14/12 via her hearsay of what Harley told her, has
apparently alleged some "disassemblign of a recording device and hiding a component of it in the restroom during arestroom break that was begrudingly granted immediately after
Holmes began interrogating Coughlin about hwether he was "recording the proceedings" and or whether he "had a recording device", upon which, alleged Holmes, Coughlin
immediately got "all squirmy and begged to use the restroom"....Okay, lets see the documentation, marshal's report etc. for anything, but especially including that. IF they move to
QUash I want be copied on it (please copy me on anything anyone sends you ever in any way related to me) as I have some authority and opposition work I woudl like for you to at
least consider incident to any reply you may wish to file....this is relevant. RJC Clifton signed an ORder for Competency eval on 2/27/12 at 1:31 pm...JUDge Nash holmes could nto
be found by her staff at that time, despite the traffic citaiton trial connected to Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s office and the trespass arrest being schedule to occur then...both HOlmes and
Clifton were mysteriously transferred criminal cases involving Coughlin on 2/27/12...both are lifelong prosecutors, formerly Holmes was Clifton's boss from about 91 to 94 ish (not to
mention Linda Gardner was a coworker (see 54844 and 60302), and Nash Holmes 3/14/12 grievance against Coughli nto the SBN admits to communications with the WCPD about
Coughlin.
12. please subpoena duces tecum the WCPD as to anything in any way related to HOlmes admission regarding the WCPD in her 3/14/12 grievance...

13. Lastly, please serve a subpoena duces tecum on the custodian of REcords for Richard G. HIll, ESq. and his former associates new firm in Kentucky, Casey D. Baker, Esq's
Baker and Baker or whatever tey call themsleves narrowly tailored to any documentation, recordings, or information baring on when and if their office provided the two different
eviction ORders to the wcso office (Baker's testimony at the 6/18/12 crimnal trespass trial (there is an oficial transcript at te link) sheds some light on this vis a vis October 28th,
2011...and familiarzie yourslef with the void/stale order concept incident to NRS 40.253's requirement that the lockout be done "within 24 hours" of "receipt of the order"....by the
WCSO...the same deputy makign the arrest in 067980 conducted that lockout and filed a fraudulent affidavit of service on 11/7/11 alleging to have "personally served" me...which his
supervisor was ofrced to admit, in writing, he did not, but rather merely posted the order on the door (hill lied at the 6/18/12 trespass trial in testying "they posted it to the door because
you ran away" despite that being completely false, and where HIll admits he was not even present that day, and his associate completely failes to back up hill's baseless, defamatory
accusation (one of many by Hill).

And that's it. You do all that and provide a reasonable return and attempt to counter all the bs MOtions to Quash sure to ensue, and we are straight. You can move to withdraw and
I will give you glowing review, I promise. Hell, I will even draft all these subpoenas for your approval and the oppositions to the motions to quash if you like, and provide the authority
in support of them. But I need you to issue the subpoenas and have them served, and get the recordings, etc....even if they make you pay for them, none of this adds up to more than
$200 (perhaps you can file a notice of appearance, if an efiler on the cr12-2025 under some justification that is is necessary to the defense herein or I would allow you to appear as
co-counsel provided you dont' insist on hijacking things..., but obviously paying $1 page for all 804 pages hard copy from aint goign to work....

I really appreciate any help you can provide.

Sifre's admissions as to said complicity may provide a basis for your filing a Motion to conflict out the rjc and the wcda's office
(in addition to DDA Kandaras' involvement in the turning over of my smartphone and data card to the City of Reno Marshals and
the RMC in 11 TR 26800, as admitted to by WCSO Hodge to me, in front of local attorney Pam Willmore (I was arrested
incidnet to a contempt finding at the 2/27/12 trial before judge Nash Holmes, and it was not until after my property was booked
into my personal secured property and well after any time for a "search incident to arrest" that the WC Jail released to the RMC
and its Marshals on 2/28/12 my property, which was returned 37 days later wiped of all data incident to an Order of 3/30/12 that
seems to have clearly be responsive to a filing by me in NVB 10-05104 before Judge Nash Holmes and Washoe Legal Services
Exec. Director Elcano 1977 McGeorge SOL classmate, NVB Judge B. Beesley....all three of whom testified at my 11/14/12
formal disciplinary hearing at the SBN, despite SCR 105(2)(c) being desecrated in every way imaginable, another Mirching to
besmirch the judicial system in Nevada. DDA Kandaras is on the NNDB and refuses to deny that she or David Hamilton, Esq.
(Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s best friend) were on my screening Panel. This IS revelvant to what you are getting seven bones for,
under a conflict or disqualification analysis (I would like a reason why this case was transferred on 2/27/12 from Judge Lynch,
same day another case in the RMC was transferred to jUdge Holmes (the 1/12/12 custodial arrest for jaywalkign cuz richard g.
hill said to cas in rmc 12 CR 12420.
7/5/12 in RJC Rev2012-001048 (this is the summary eviction from the very unit #29 rental at Northwinds Apartment, 1680
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Sky Mountain Drive that I was arrested at on 6/28/12 in the matter you were assigned and contracted to handle for $700.00). I
did not attend the hearing because I was rearrested on 7/3/12 by the Reno Police Department just blocks from Northwinds
Apartments in RMC 12 CR 12420 (a custodial arrest involving three charges, one, a simple traffic citation for failure to secure a
load on one's vehicle (they allege an empty plastic storage tub fell off my vehicle), two, no proof of vehicle insurance (despite
RPD Officer Alan Weaver admitting that I showed him a high resolution pdf of my then current USAA auto insurance on a 4.7
inch smart phone screen...he said it had to be a paper printout), and three, "disturbing the peace" based upon the criminal
complaint signed by Northwind's Apartments maintenance man, 23 year old Milan Krebs (whom obtained a TPO against me
from the RJC in RCP2012-000287 on 7/5/12 after the RPD fraudulently urged Krebs to apply for one incident to the 7/3/12
arrest, as further confirmed by the commentary by the same RPD Sargent Sifre (only finally propounded to me following a
12/5/12 email from the WCDA informing me of the availability of such discovery

please let me know, in writing, and with specifics, whether or not you will move, in writing, to obtain the above indicated
materials, and provide an indication of how soon you will do so, with proof thereof. Sorry to have to ask for that, but
time is of the essence and I need to know if this is going to work out with you or not. If it does, I will absolutely credit you
for being a faithful defender of the Sixth Amendment, and maybe more.

Sincerely,
Za ch Coughl i n
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel a nd Fa x: 949 667 7402
Za chCoughl i n@hotma i l .com

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-Forwarded Message Attachment-ClosePrint


RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion?
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 10/12/12 5:51 AM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net
1 attachment
~WRD000.jpg (0.8 KB)
Keith, it sure comes across like you are interrogating indigent criminal defendants, using all experience as the District Attorney for Lyon County, essentially being an
investigator/prosecutor for the City of Reno. You got upset to the extent I didn't permit you to demand answers to any an all question in the trespass case 11 cr 26405, and
grew retaliatory, refusing to subpoena materials witnesses, refusing to make completely valid arguments (ever heard of AB226?). I am disgusted by you.
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118

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ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: keithloomis@earthlink.net
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
Date: Tue, 7 Aug 2012 16:25:40 -0700
You have already had two bail hearings. You are out on bail now. I decline to file a new request for a bail hearing.
I will be out of town on vacation from Friday August 10 and will return on Monday Aug. 20. That makes attendance at a bail hearing problematic and unlikely to be heard
before your trial.
I do think the complaint fails to allege the charge of disturbing the peace. I will make the motion to dismiss it at the time of trial.
The fact that the officer did not observe you committing a misdemeanor means he was not entitled to arrest you. You have a civil claim against RPD and the officer. That
does not mean the charge of DTP is subject to dismissal.
I will review the case involving Mr. Krebs and his request for a temporary protective order.
I need your description of what happened on the 3rd of July. Will you provide it?
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 3:38 PM
To: Keith Loomis
Subject: RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
Are you refusing to file the motions o requested?
-----Original Message----From: Keith Loomis
Sent: 7 Aug 2012 16:55:44 GMT
To: 'Zach Coughlin'
Subject: RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
Zach
Why dont you move to represent yourself. That way you will be completely satisfied with the services you provide yourself and can do all of the things you believe are
necessary.
If you want me to continue to represent you, what I asked you to provide to me was a description of the events which lead to the charge of disturbing the peace. I still need
that description.
Keith Loomis
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Monday, August 06, 2012 3:54 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov
Subject: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
Dear Mr. Loomis and City Attorney Kadlic and Deputy City Attorney Drake,
I am writing to request that you file some motion to alter, amend, reconsider, set aside, or modify my bail in the case stemming from my JUly 3, 2012 arrest for distrubing the
peace, failure to provide proof of insurance, and failure to secure a load. I am writing to request that you file a pre trial motion (Motion to Dismiss, request for a pre trial
motion and bail motion, and motion to supress police report based upon the DTP arrest occuring for alleged conduct outside the officer's presence). If you will not file these
motion (and please provide me a draft of such motions for my review prior to filing them as well as prior to making any communication on my behalf to either the RMC or
the City of Reno Prosecutor), please provide me a written indication of your rationale for so refusing, and then please file a Motion to Withdrawal as soon as practicable. I
ask this respectfully.
The police showed up to the hearing, yet I was not noticed of that fact in advance, or of the hearing itself. Further, Judge Gardner explicilty indicated he was basing his
decision to raise the bail based upon "public safety" and "concern for the defendant's safety", which are impermissible rationale for so increasin one's bail.
NRS
178.498. Many courts use a bail schedule to determine the amount, but note the

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initial amount can be increased if good cause is shown. NRS 178.499. Additionally, in
determining the amount of bail, the judge should look at the following factors (NRS
178.498):
The nature and circumstances of the offense charged
The defendants financial ability to post bail
The defendants character; and
The factors listed in NRS 178.4853.
Bail can not be excessive. U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. It should be limited to a
reasonable amount designed to ensure the defendants presence in court. It should not
be a corrective or preventative detention device.
NRS 178.484. The Court should take care in imposing any restrictions on a defendants constitutional rights (i.e.,
search and seizure) and only imply such restrictions if warranted by the underlying facts
of the alleged crime. Section 11 of NRS 178.484 describes the document that must
be signed by the defendant before he/she can be released on bail.
My bail hearing contained what seems to be an impermissible coercive attempt to condition my release or the possibility thereof upon my providing confidential medical
records (Lake's Crossing etc) to the Reno Municipal Court, even where the same judge presiding over the bail hearing found me competent enough to face a criminal trepass
trial less than two weeks before teh bail hearing in 11 CR 26405.
The friend of mine who posted my bail, Jared Swanson, has a serious form of cancer and a one year old baby. I request a reduction of the bail for his benefit and for the proof
of insurance charge to be dismissed, as (and I am trying to avoid this in any way I can), if I am rearrested, such a proof of insurance charge may present another basis for
imposing an unduly burdensome bail upon me, as it did on July 5th, 2012 where, despite my having produced a legible pdf copy of my proof of insurance card on my large
screened zoomable smart phone, Officers Weaver and Dye still charged me with that violation, and the bail was subsequently increase. Further, none of the events or
accusations forming the basis of the distrubing the police charge occurred in the officer's presence, and the police report contains no indication whatsoever that the arrest
was made based upon NRS 171.1771. I provided Officer Weaver my driver's license prior to the arrest. I did not refuses to give a written promise to appear in court as
provided in NRS 171.1773. When a person is believed to have committed a misdemeanor offense, the peace officer has the discretion to either issue a citation or arrest and
detain the person. NRS 171.1771 states that a person can be arrested if his identity is questionable or if the peace officer does not believe the person will appear in court. A
person can also be arrested for a misdemeanor offense if a warrant has been issued.
Additionally, I am requesting that you file a Motion to Dismiss the Disturbing the Peace charge based upon a lack of evidence and or insufficiency of pleading in that the
allegations do not amount to a prima facie case of a DTP violation. Further, please subpoena and or collect the Protection Order application filed by Milan Krebs on July 5th,
2012, and interview Krebs as to why he mentions Coughlin often carrying around a large knife in a menacing manner in that protection order application, yet completely
failed to mention that in his July 3rd, 2012 police report. Additionally, please determine why Kreb's TPO appliication has a different style of handwriting on the caption
compared to the descriptive sections, indicating someone pushed the filing of the TPO on Krebs, perhaps his employer, Northwind Apartments or the RPD, which has in the
days preceding the arrest threatend to arrest Coughlin for criminal trespass if he returned to any part of the premises of Northwind Apartments, in consideration of
Coughlin's eviction from unit 29, despite the fact Coughlin still had a valid right to go to his other two rentals, units 45 and 71, in addition to the fact that Northwinds
essentially withdrew or rescinded its June 28th, 2012 eviction of Coughlin by posting an Amended 5 Day Unlawful Detainer Notice on unit 29 on June 28th, 2012 shortly after
Coughlin pointed out to Northwinds and Nevada Courts Services that the July 14th, 2012 5 Day notice was not "personally served" (NCS's R. Wray lied about effecting
personal service, as he could not possibly have verified someone of "suitable age and discretion" was within the windowless room with a metal door closed and locked and
where no Wray admits that he received no verbal response from the unit or anyone therein upon his knocking on the door and or attempting to break into the unit, please
see Soldal v. Cook County in that regard, a US S. Ct case) and therefore Coughlin would have had until at least noon on July 28th, 2012 to file a Tenant's Answer, whereas the
eviction/lockout/arrest of June 28th, 2012 took place two hours before noon at 10 am).
Additionally, RPD Officer Weaver had previously attempted to break into one of my rentals at Northwind at a time when he lacked a warrant and or an exigent rationale for
doing so, much less an eviction Order. I just want this case to be dismissed and to try to move on in life, and difuse the tensions incident to this case.
I did not disturb the peace at Northwinds as alleged, nor did I make the threats Kreb's accuses me of or stalk him or follow him in a threatening manner at any time.
Additionaly, I never broke into nor did I ever attempt to break into Krebs' truck, and in fact, I filed a police report in June 2012 reporting extortionate threats by another
maintenance man at Northwinds ("Luke" is his name, I believe) and Northwind's Manage Dwayne Jakob, wherein they threatened to make such a spurious allegation, but
subsuquently refrained from doign so when it apparently occurred to them that I may have excuplatory video evidence disproving such an allegation as well as capturing
their baseless and extortionate threats and accusations. Additionally, please subpoene the police reports I filed with the RPD and any emails I sent to any officers (including
Weaver, Barnes, Sargent MIiller, LIeutenant Brown) and any reports of or recording of phone conversations I had with any of those RPD personnel. Further, please see the
attached june 26th, 2012 email to the RPD, WCSO, RJC, Sparks Justice Court and others pointing out the insufficiency of the 5 day Notice drafted and posted by non-lawyers
Nevada Court Services, in that under NRS 40.253 it listed the wrong forum for the tenant to file a Tenant's Answer, and under the Aiken decision of the Nevada Supreme
Court and NRCP 60(b)(4), any lockout order stemming therefrom is void for lack of jurisdiction.
NRS 171.136 When arrest may be made.
1. If the offense charged is a felony or gross misdemeanor, the arrest may be made on any day, and at any time of day or night.
2. If it is a misdemeanor, the arrest cannot be made between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m., except:
(a) Upon the direction of a magistrate, endorsed upon the warrant;

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(b) When the offense is committed in the presence of the arresting officer;
(c) When the person is found and the arrest is made in a public place or a place that is open to the public and:...
(2) The misdemeanor is discovered because there was probable cause for the arresting officer to stop, detain or arrest the person for another alleged violation or offense;
(d) When the offense is committed in the presence of a private person and the person makes an arrest immediately after the offense is committed;...
(g) When the person is already in custody as a result of another lawful arrest; or
Krebs did not immediately arrest me under NRS 171.136(2)(d), nor was the DTP arrest for an offense alleged to have occurred in the officer's presence.
the attached videos are of the incident on June 5th, 2012, not from July 3rd, 2012, but they support my contentions and the relevancy of subpoening the police incident
reports and other documentation should this case not be dismissed, nolle prosequi, de minimis, etc....
I will forward to you my emails to the RPD et all from June 26th, and July 2nd, 2012. I realize their tone was not a smart one to take or appropriate and am only sending them
in hopes of having this matter dismissed. I do not have any interest in pursuing anything like Wheeler v Cross 344 Fed Apps 420 (? (2008.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com

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Officer Reno Police Department Reno Police Department RE: Motion to Withdra

RE: Motion to Withdraw?


From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 8/21/12 6:27 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net
Dear Mr. Loomis,
Why does your Motion to Withdraw indicate withdrawing was your idea, when on the phone you indicated you withdrew because you say I asked you to?
Are you going ot withdraw from your paycheck too?
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961

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Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: keithloomis@earthlink.net
To: ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: Motion to Withdraw
Date: Fri, 10 Aug 2012 11:07:42 -0700
Motion to Withdraw is attached
Keith Loomis
description of the events relevant to the 7 3 12 arrest?
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Wed 8/08/12 12:41 AM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net
Mr. Loomis,
Nothing in Mr. Krebs witness statement or TPO application contains any truth. I dissected him on cross examination today in the TPO extension hearing, please order the
audio cd. I did not fail to provide Officer Weaver with all necessary contact information sufficient to issue a citation, yet he continued on to make a custodial arrest then
proceeded to show up to an impromptu hearing and deprive me of my freedom for 20 days.
Cause of Action for Malpractice Against Defense Attorney for Ineffective Representation During Pretrial Phase of Criminal Case, 42 Causes of Action 2d 707 Criminal
defendant brought a civil action under 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 against a public defender, alleging that he, the criminal defendant, had been deprived of his civil rights under color
of state law by reason of the public defender's professional malpractice in defending him. Such cases are collected in the annotation entitled "Court-appointed attorney as
subject to liability under 42 U.S.C.A. 1983," appearing at 36 A.L.R. Fed. 594. Attorney's liability for malpractice in connection with defense of criminal case, 53 A.L.R.3d 731 In
each of the following cases, a public defender was held not to be immune from liability for professional malpractice. In Spring v Constantino (1975) 168 Conn 563, 362 A2d
871, an action by a state criminal defendant against a public defender for malpractice, the court held that an attorney occupying the position of public defender and assigned
to represent an indigent defendant did not enjoy immunity from liability for professional malpractice. Stating that a public defender is like any other attorney whose duties
as an officer of the court and to an individual client and whose principled and fearless conduct of the defense are not deterred by the prospect of liability, the court rejected
the contention of the public defender that the doctrine of judicial immunity should be extended to public defenders on the ground that the immunity rule is designed to
promote principled and fearless decisionmaking by removing the fear that unsatisfied litigants might bring harassing actions. The court also rejected the contention that the
common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity which extends to public officials applied to a malpractice action brought against a public defender, saying that a public
defender, in representing an indigent, is not a public official, since even though the state must insure that indigents are represented by competent counsel, it could not be
argued that the actual conduct of the defense of an individual is a governmental act. The court also rejected the third suggested ground of immunity: the statutory immunity
of public officers and state employees. The court said that while it was true that a public defender could be told when he is to work and within what area, those elements of
control were indicia of the master-servant relationship and incidents of a public defender's employment which are not within the scope of the attorney-client relationship.
Stating that the independence of the public defender was a key constitutional underpinning of the public defender system, the court said that other than the source of the
public defender's compensation, the relationship of public defender and client is the same as that of privately employed counsel and client. A public defender was held not
to be immune from liability for malpractice, in Reese v Danforth (1979) 486 Pa 479, 406 A2d 735, 6 ALR4th 758, In holding that the public defender was not a public official
entitled to immunity, the court said that the overriding duty of zealous representation of a client's interest attaches to the role of the public defender and thus the
performance of that duty by the defender was similar to the performance of privately retained counsel. Stating that the relationship between the county and the public
defender was similar to that between an independent contractor and the party contracting his services, the court said that while the availability of court-appointed counsel
to represent indigents is indubitably the public business, once the appointment of a public defender in a given case is made, his state or public function ceases and
thereafter he functions purely as a private attorney concerned with servicing his client, and his professional relationship with his client takes on all the obligations and
protections attendant upon a private attorney-client relationship except that the public pays the attorney's fee. The court also rejected the contentions that not granting
immunity to the public defender would hinder the recoupment of able lawyers to represent indigents, and would inhibit the defender's professional discretion in declining
to press the frivolous, to assign priorities between indigent litigants, and to make strategic decisions with regard to a particular litigant as to how his interest may best be
advanced. In the following case, a public defender was held not liable for the malpractice of one of his deputies. A public defender was held not to be liable solely by virtue
of his office, for the malpractice of one of his deputies, in Sanchez v Murphy (1974, DC Nev) 385 F Supp 1362. Stating that the professional relationship between courtappointed counsel and indigent criminal defendants under public defender systems is no different than that between a client and privately retained counsel, the court went
on to say that the relationship of the public defender and his deputies among themselves was not a partnership relationship, since the economic justification for holding
one partner liable for the misconduct of another partner was grounded on the fact that fees for services are shared, whereas each of the public defender attorneys was
compensated independently by salary for his own services. Stating that a deputy public defender is an independent officer, the court noted that there was substantial
authority in support of the rule that in the absence of statute imposing liability or of negligence on his part in appointing or supervising his assistants, a public officer is not
liable for the default and misfeasance of assistants appointed by him. Related Annotations are located under the Research References heading of this Annotation.
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: Plaintiff's malpractice action against public defender was not precluded by quasi-judicial immunity. Wilcox v. Brummer, 739 So. 2d 1282
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1999). Public defender attorneys were not entitled to sovereign immunity from legal malpractice claims brought by former client convicted in
criminal case and later exonerated.
Please subpoena both RPD Officers Weaver and Dye, in addition to Officer Barnes, who twice came to Northwind with Officer Weaver on two separate occasions to harrass
me.

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Please serve a supboena duces tecum for all the 10 or so incident reports the RPD testified about. They are relevant beyond the bail hearing, they provide context as to the
legitimacy of the disturbing the peace allegations. If you refuse to do this or file a pret-trial motion to dismiss, please move to have yourself removed from the case
immediately.
Stages Of A Criminal Case Pretrial Motions
Pretrial motions arguments concerning what is and is not admissible during a criminal trial are made after the preliminary hearing, yet before the case is taken to trial.
They are presented to the criminal court judge. Pretrial motions can be made by both the prosecution and the defense in criminal cases, and are made in order to set limits
on the trial.
Often, either the defense or the prosecution will make arguments as to what evidence can be used in the criminal trial, or what testimonies should be allowed or
disallowed in the trial. For example, the defense or prosecution may argue that a particular person should or should not be allowed to testify during the trial.
Pretrial motions can also be made to dismiss the criminal trial entirely. For obvious reasons, the defense will make a pretrial motion for dismissal of trial. Generally, there
are two major arguments that are used for a pretrial motion for dismissal: the lack of personal jurisdiction and the lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
A common example of a defense's pretrial motion is the exclusion of a police officer's testimony. For example, if the suspects' responses to the officer were made before
the officer read the suspect his or her Miranda rights, the defense would request that these statements be excluded from the trial proceedings.
In other cases, the defense may request that the trial be dismissed due to the fact that the police officer did not have probable cause to arrest the suspect. If the defendant's
attorney has substantial evidence that the police officer did not have probable cause for arresting the suspect, it is very likely that the trial will be dismissed.
A prosecution's pretrial motion could include the exclusion of a particular witness. For example, the prosecution could argue that an elderly witness with Alzheimer's is not
legally competent to testify, and ask that this witness be excluded at trial.
Some other examples of common pretrial motions include motion for a change of venue, motion for exclusion of physical evidence, motion to suppress a warrantless
search, motion for exculpatory evidence, motion for interpreter, motion to transfer pleadings and motion for continuance.
Pretrial motions set the boundaries of the trial, and can even address the issue of whether or not the defendant should be forced to stand trial. There are nearly endless
possibilities of pretrial motions, but all must be settled before the trial proper can begin.
I had a TPO extension hearing today involving Milan Krebs, a maintenance man at Northwind Apartments. Please order a copy of the audio cd from the hearing and provide
me with a copy of it or email me a link to it or the files. He was a percipient witness, a material one in RCR2012-067980 (he was the person utilizing the sawzall to cut open
the door on the rental). The RJC case number for that TPO is RCP2012j-000287.
I you will not order and provide a copy of that hearing to me, please indicate so immediately. I have sensed from you an utter derision towards me in everything you have
done in any of the cases for which you have sought to appear on my behalf. Further, you have so far failed to reply to most every material inquiry I have made of you, and
when you have, it has unfailingly been to refuse to perform some basic and completely essential task or filing necessary to my defense. I need to know right away if you are
going to go to bat on this or not.; attorneys' duty to client arose independently of their state employment. Johnson v. Halloran, 312 Ill. App. 3d 695, 245 Ill. Dec. 408, 728
N.E.2d 490 (1st Dist. 2000), appeal allowed, 189 Ill. 2d 688 (2000). The court in Dziubak v Mott (1993, Minn) 503 NW2d 771 held that a public defender is immune from liability
for malpractice: In contrast, the court in Veneri v Pappano (1993, Pa Super) 622 A2d 977 noted that a public defender is not immune from liability for malpractice.
Further, I have not met with any response or action from you, Mr. Goodnight, Ms. Rains, Mr. Bosler, Mr. Dogan, or anyone else with your office with respect to the Mental
Health Court breaching the contract I signed with it, causing me reputational damage and prejudice in the eyes of Judges Pearson, Clifton, and Sferrazza. Both Judge Pearson
and Judge Sferrazza indicated to me in open Court that they were told, essentially, that I flunked out of Mental Health Court. That is clearly not the case. Rather, the Mental
Health Court sought to unilaterally alter materials terms of the contract I entered into with it. The materials Joe Goodnight forwarded to me from the Mental Health Court
and the materials provided directly to me by the Mental Health Court made clear what medications were not permissible for participants to take. None of the listed
medications or classes of medications in any way related to stimulant based medications prescribed for treatment of either Adult ADHD or treatment resistant depression.
Only after I agreed to the offer put forth by the Mental Health Court and the matter was transferred there from District Court (and the same could be said for a criminal
trespass case I defended against in the RMC 11CR26405, for which I received a criminal trespass conviction that I reported to both the State Bar of Nevada and the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)).

11. Failure to adequately investigate case [Cumulative Supplement] A criminal malpractice claim may be stated against former defense attorneys by alleging that they
neglected their reasonable duties by, among other misconduct, failing to investigate the criminal case, where the plaintiff's imprisonment was proximately caused by the
neglect and the plaintiff initiated postconviction relief premised on ineffective assistance of counsel, successfully obtaining vacation of the judgment of conviction. Dow v.
Jones, 232 F. Supp. 2d 491 (D. Md. 2002) (applying Maryland law). The issue of whether a criminal defense attorney fulfilled the duty to the client to thoroughly investigate
the facts surrounding the criminal charge may preclude summary judgment in the attorney's favor on the client's criminal malpractice claim. Canady v. Shwartz, 62 Ohio App.
3d 742, 577 N.E.2d 437 (10th Dist. Franklin County 1989). A criminal malpractice claim against appointed defense attorney grounded partly on avowed failures to investigate
victims for impeachment purposes, to locate and interview known witnesses, and to locate experts, has been rejected. Browne v. Robb, 583 A.2d 949 (Del. 1990) (conclusory
allegations regarding former counsel's bad faith and gross negligence were insufficient to overcome statutory grant of qualified immunity). It is typically difficult enough for
a criminal malpractice plaintiff to succeed in avoiding summary judgment for the defendant. Thus, to obtain outright summary judgment in the plaintiff's favor is even more
challenging. For example, a court has denied a former prisoner's summary judgment motion against the defense attorneys who represented him in a murder prosecution,
reasoning that his cause of action, grounded on a failure to locate and interview eyewitnesses, came exceedingly close to demonstrating the attorneys' malpractice as a
matter of law but was just barely lacking. Sullivan v. Wiener, 1989 WL 65163 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (unreported decision) (applying Illinois law). For a discussion of summary
judgment in criminal malpractice actions generally, see 27. Illustration: In an earlier opinion in the course of the Sulllivan case, the court described the actions of counsel
and cocounsel which allegedly constituted criminal malpractice in failing to investigate the case. The state's discovery response and the police reports of the crime disclosed
the names, addresses, and some of the phone numbers of five eyewitnesses to the alleged murder. These reports disclosed that the testimony of each of the witnesses
would be exculpatory. However, before trial defense counsel failed to seek appointment of an investigator to locate the witnesses and did not seek a continuance to have
further time to locate them. Furthermore, the attorney did not claim that he tried once to reach the witnesses by mail and then asked the client's aunt to try to locate them;
however, these efforts were unavailing. Before trial, defense counsel turned the case over to cocounsel who also failed to try to locate the five witnesses. Sullivan v.
Wiener, 1989 WL 18243 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (unreported opinion). A former defense counsel who does not succeed in obtaining summary judgment may nonetheless establish on

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appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support a plaintiff's verdict. Thus, in one case, the plaintiff's evidence, establishing that the attorney failed to call certain
witnesses, to procure certain evidence, and to investigate matters of defense, and that the plaintiff was convicted even though someone else later confessed to the crime,
did not establish a prima facie case. The trial court was thus found to have erred in denying defense counsel's motion for a directed verdict. Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457,
1934 WL 2941 (2d Dist. 1934). Illustration: A court dismissed a convicted criminal's legal malpractice complaint against his former defense lawyer, where the convict had
unsuccessfully moved to vacate his conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance, involving the trial lawyer's purported failure to call two alibi witnesses and to interview
an unnamed witness. The convict alleged only vague and general failure of the lawyer to locate and interview witnesses who would have rendered suitable support for the
defense and failed to identify what these witnesses would have testified to and how they would have supported a defense that would have led to his acquittal. Bigelow v.
Knight, 737 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1990) (apparently ap- plying District of Columbia law). A criminal malpractice claim will not be established on the basis of a failure to
adequately investigate merely because the client was show to have been factually innocent. Thus, a public defender was found to have fully investigated a case prior to
advising a client to enter into a plea bargain and, thus, was not liable to the former client for criminal malpractice, following the client's release from prison after the actual
perpetrators of the robbery confessed to the crime, counsel had reviewed the transcript of the preliminary hearing, received full discovery from the prosecution, and
discussed the case with the client several times before the plea hearing. The attorney's inability to establish the defense was due to the client's insufficient memory as to
his whereabouts at the time of the robbery rather than attorney malfeasance, the court concluded. Pearson v. Sublette, 730 P.2d 909 (Colo. App 1986) (affirming summary
judgment for counsel). CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: Issue of whether attorney's alleged failure to fully explore effect of subordination agreement that was listed in
title insurance commitment, relating to loan transaction between former client and third party, amounted to malpractice was for jury in former client's legal malpractice
action against law firm. Manios v. Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, LLP, 697 S.E.2d 644 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010). [Top of Section] [END OF SUPPLEMENT] 12. Failure to depose
or subpoena witnesses Courts that have addressed legal malpractice claims against a criminal defense attorney for an alleged failure to depose or subpoena witnesses
during pretrial proceedings have usually rejected these claims. Underwood v. Woods, 406 F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1969) (applying Missouri law) (barred by statute of limitations,
but merits addressed); State ex rel. O'Blennis v. Adolf, 691 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1985) (plaintiff was collaterally estopped by guilty plea from relitigating in criminal
malpractice suit the alleged failures to subpoena and call witnesses to establish misidentification and alibi defenses); Alberici v. Tinari, 374 Pa. Super. 20, 542 A.2d 127 (1988)
(a prior ruling that defense counsel had provided effective assistance at a mail fraud prosecution precluded relitigation on the issue of a purported failure to arrange for the
attendance of various witnesses or potential suspects at the criminal trial). Illustration: A former client suing former attorneys for damages for negligence in connection with
their defense of a criminal action against him failed to prove any injury resulting from any negligence of the attorneys in failing to take depositions of certain witnesses for a
criminal case that had been ultimately dismissed. The case explained that even if the statute were not a bar to the action, the purported negligence could not be predicated
on the attorneys' failure to take the requested depositions of persons prior to the time when they were entitled to take the depositions in a criminal action under the thengoverning Missouri rule of practice. The depositions could not be taken as steps in the defense of a criminal action until an indictment or information was filed.
Furthermore, the Missouri criminal rule authorized a defendant in any criminal case pending in any court to obtain the deposition of a witness. Under case law precedent,
a criminal case is not deemed instituted or pending until an information is filed or an indictment returned. Underwood v. Woods, 406 F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1969). A failure to
adequately allege proximate cause may defeat a convict's legal malpractice action against appointed trial counsel for, inter alia, failing to subpoena helpful witnesses. The
complaint must allege how or on what ground the convict would have been successful in securing postrelief relief, including freedom from prison. Ibn-Sadiika v. Riester, 380
Pa. Super. 397, 551 A.2d 1112 (1988) (convict's allegations about witnesses who should have been called were appallingly vague and conclusory). Thus, on review of the
dismissal of a convict's criminal malpractice claim alleging a failure to subpoena witnesses, the trial court may properly exercise discretion to deny leave to amend the
complaint to cure defects, where the convict's appellate brief does not contain additional factual averments demonstrating how defense counsel's omissions affected the
outcome of the trial or would have provided a basis for posttrial relief. Ibn-Sadiika v. Riester, 380 Pa. Super. 397, 551 A.2d 1112 (1988). For discussion of pleading generally,
see 22. In cases displaying quite outrageous conduct of defense counsel relating to pretrial witness issues, however, criminal malpractice plaintiffs have succeeded in at
least stating a claim for relief, if not always or prevailing at trial or even managing to survive summary judgment motions of the defendant. Former clients have been
successful in cases alleging a failure to interview or even try to interview any of the prosecution witnesses. Thus, one court explained that even the untutored eye could
identify the egregious blundering of defense counsel. Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying Massachusetts law). Counsel claimed to have relied on
the police as his sole source of information about the facts surrounding the case which the court described as
asking the fox to guard the chicken coop. Another aggravating factor in this case was that counsel had tried to procure the client's release by engaging, against the client's
wishes, in deal-making with the police rather than requesting a formal hearing before the judge; consulting appropriately with the arrestee; establishing a psychiatric case
for competency; or interviewing witnesses. Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying Massachusetts law) (affirming a $50,000 damages award which had
been reduced by remittitur from $500,000). 13. Failure to appear or to adequately argue pretrial motions Counsel may be sued for failing to properly arrange for a
continuance of pretrial proceedings in a criminal matter. The claim may succeed in a case of egregious misconduct, and indeed, enhanced damages may be appropriate, as
for emotional distress. See discussion generally at 34. For example, in one case, an arrestee who was charged with issuing a worthless check contacted defense counsel
who had assisted him within other legal matters and who purportedly stated that he would take care of an upcoming court appearance. Although defense counsel arranged
for a continuance with an assistant prosecutor, no continuance was arranged for with the trial court, which declared a bond forfeiture and issued an arrest warrant when the
arrestee failed to appear as scheduled. Weeks later, after the arrestee received a sheriff's letter notifying him that he was in contempt of court and would be arrested if he
failed to turn himself in. The arrestee showed the letter to defense counsel who allegedly said that would take care of the matter but then took no action. The arrestee was
taken into custody for the failure to appear and was jailed for up to three hours. Later, when counsel failed to appear at a hearing, the trial judge recommended that the
arrestee hire new counsel who then resolved both of the criminal matters. In evaluating whether emotional damages were warranted, the court noted that the general rule
applicable in cases of unintentional negligencethat mental suffering unaccompanied by bodily injury will not support recoverydoes not apply in cases of wanton or
willful acts or where the act it is committed with malice and intended to cause mental distress, and here the arrestee did not contend that he suffered physical injury but
argued instead that counsel's conduct was wanton. According to the court, counsel should have realized that the bond would be forfeited and his client placed in jail if the
matter was not properly handled. The court explained that someone being negligently deprived of freedom suffers an injury that can cause mental distress and that a
question of fact was presented for the jury to determine on whether emotional distress was caused by counsel's actions. Furthermore, remand was required because the
extent of the arrestee's emotional distress was not fully developed at trial due to a partial summary judgment before trial against the arrestee on the issue. Bowman v.
Doherty, 235 Kan. 870, 686 P.2d 112 (1984). In a Colorado case, the failure to argue a motion to suppress an identification which had been filed with the trial court did not
render a public defender liable to the former client for legal malpractice, following the client's release from prison, where the defender investigated and researched the
motion and believed that it was groundless, and the district attorney had represented to the defender that the plea bargain would no longer be available to the client if the
defender proceeded on the motion. Pearson v. Sublette, 730 P.2d 909 (Colo. App 1986). Collateral estoppel has been applied to bar a plaintiff from asserting in a criminal
malpractice action that trial counsel had negligently failed to make any pretrial, trial, or posttrial motions to suppress evidence concerning a search warrant. Hall v. Barrett,
412 N.W.2d 648 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987). A former client contended that as a direct result of the defendants' negligent acts he was forced to seek substitute counsel to defend
him with short notice and preparation, resulting in his conviction in federal court, a criminal malpractice action was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel where after
a full and fair opportunity to pursue his argument, the federal appellate court had on appeal had determined that his defense of the criminal action was not prejudiced.
Indeed, the Second Circuit had stated that the former client had made only generalized allegations of prejudice and had not shown any specific way in which the defense
was hampered and explained that not only was the continuance not shown to be an abuse of discretion but that, furthermore, the record established that the former client
was represented vigorously and competently by his counsel. Rastelli v. Sutter, Moffatt, Yannelli & Zerin, P. C., 87 A.D.2d 865, 449 N.Y.S.2d 305 (2d Dep't 1982). 213. Handling
criminal defense matters West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Attorney and Client 106, 107, 109 A.L.R. Library Legal malpractice in defense of criminal

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prosecution, 4 A.L.R.5th 273 Public defender's immunity from liability for malpractice, 6 A.L.R.4th 774 Trial Strategy Inadequate Factual Investigation of Case by Attorney, 104
Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 317 Legal MalpracticeInadequate Case Investigation, 16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 549 Actions Against Attorneys for Professional Negligence, 14
Am. Jur. Trials 265 An attorney may incur liability for malpractice through negligence in handling matters of criminal defense.[1] Failure of an attorney to take steps to
reduce a sentence in excess of the maximum penalty,[2] failure to file a petition for certiorari,[3] failure to file a postconviction relief motion,[4] or failure to raise an
appropriate defense may constitute negligence.[5] In criminal cases, the legal standard of ineffective assistance of counsel and the standard for legal malpractice are
equivalent, and where the issue of competent counsel is litigated, collateral estoppel will bar a malpractice action.[6] However, constitutional protections afforded a
criminal defendant through the appellate process and post-conviction filings should not be used by an attorney as a liability shield.[7] A public defender is not protected
from liability for malpractice, because the public de- 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law 213 fender, as advocate, owes a duty to his or her client indistinguishable from that of
privately retained counsel.[8] An attorney may be liable to a prisoner for malpractice where the attorney accepts a fee from the prisoner but does not pursue postconviction relief within the limitations period.[9] While a criminal legal malpractice action requires all the proof essential to a civil malpractice claim, a criminal malpractice
action will fail if the claimant does not allege and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, actual innocence.[10] The statute of limitation for legal malpractice does not
begin to run until the client has been exonerated of the criminal offense through reversal on direct appeal, post-conviction relief, or otherwise.[11] CUMULATIVE
SUPPLEMENT Cases: Where a plaintiff does not claim to be innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, he cannot bring a suit for legal malpractice arising out of the
conviction. Herrera-Corral v. Hyman, 408 Ill. App. 3d 672, 350 Ill. Dec. 173, 948 N.E.2d 242 (1st Dist. 2011). Criminal legal malpractice based on client's claim that his defense
counsel failed to timely file state proceedings related to his convictions in order to toll one-year limitations period governing federal habeas corpus review required client
to prove his actual innocence on charges of conviction. Gaylor v. Jeffco, 999 A.2d 290 (N.H. 2010). There is no cause of action for legal malpractice, arising from the negligent
representation of a client in a criminal proceeding, as long as the determination of the client's guilt for that offense remains undisturbed. Humphries v. Detch, 712 S.E.2d 795
(W. Va. 2011). Attorney appointed by federal court to represent criminal defendant, in a federal criminal prosecution, had absolute immunity from purely state law claims of
legal malpractice that derived from attorney's conduct in underlying criminal proceedings; federal law provided immunity from legal malpractice for lawyers appointed by
Federal Public Defender Office, Legislature provided immunity to appointed defense attorneys, and if appointed attorneys were subject to unbridled legal malpractice
claims, it would have negative impact on quality and number of attorneys who would agree to accept appointment by federal courts to represent indigents. West's
Ann.W.Va.Code, 292120. Mooney v. Frazier, 693 S.E.2d 333 (W. Va. 2010). [END OF SUPPLEMENT] [FN1] Geddie v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App.
4th Cir. 1978), writ denied, 356 So. 2d 1011 (La. 1978). A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Caston v. State, 823 So. 2d
473 (Miss. 2002). [FN2] Geddie v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1978), writ denied, 356 So. 2d 1011 (La. 1978). [FN3] Moultrie v. State, 542
S.W.2d 835 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976). [FN4] Baldayaque v. U.S., 338 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2003). [FN5] Martin v. Hall, 20 Cal. App. 3d 414, 97 Cal. Rptr. 730, 53 A.L.R.3d 719 (2d Dist.
1971). [FN6] McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1980). [FN7] Bailey v. Tucker, 533 Pa. 237, 621 A.2d 108 (1993). [FN8] Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 100 S. Ct. 402, 62 L. Ed.
2d 355 (1979); Sullivan v. Freeman, 944 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1991). [FN9] Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So. 2d 1242 (Miss.
1991). [FN10] Rodriguez v. Nielsen, 259 Neb. 264, 609 N.W.2d 368 (2000); Mahoney v. Shaheen, Cappiello, Stein & Gordon, P.A., 143 N.H. 491, 727 A.2d 996 (1999). [FN11]
Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or. 221, 851 P.2d 556 (1993). AMJUR ATTNYS 213 IV. Remedies or Relief 33. Generally In addition to compensatory damages, plaintiffs in criminal
malpractice actions have been awarded or have at least stated claims for emotional damages ( 34). However, punitive damages may be difficult to establish in light of the
demanding standard of malfeasance that is required ( 35). The fact that a defendant might have a remedy within the criminal justice system under a postconviction hearing
act does not preclude the defendant from pursuing civil remedies based on allegedly negligent conduct of his court-appointed attorney. ei bon ee baya ghananee v. Black,
350 Pa. Super. 134, 504 A.2d 281 (1986) (applying 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 9541 et seq.). One court has described the difference in the remedies that are sought when a
criminal defendant challenges a conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel and when a former criminal defendant brings a civil suit complaining of
ineffective representation that amounts to criminal malpractice. In the criminal context, due process is at stake and the remedy for a failure to provide it is to afford the
defendant new trial. In a civil damages action against the defendant's attorney, by contrast, traditional tort concepts apply, and thus one who claims damages for such
negligence must allege and prove that the malfeasance proximately caused damages for which recompense is sought. Mylar v. Wilkinson, 435 So. 2d 1237 (Ala. 1983)
(holding modified on other grounds by, Morrison v. Franklin, 655 So. 2d 964 (Ala. 1995)). The actual innocence requirement for a criminal legal malpractice case applies
regardless of whether the former criminal defendant is seeking damages for a wrongful conviction or a longer sentence or seeks attorney's fees. Lynch v. Warwick, 95 Cal.
App. 4th 267, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 391 (4th Dist. 2002). 34. Emotional damages Emotional damages may be available in a criminal malpractice suit. Bowman v. Doherty, 235 Kan.
870, 686 P.2d 112 (1984); Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying Massachusetts law) (due to conduct of attorney, client was involuntarily committed to
mental institution and injury was reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances). A criminal defendant stated a legal malpractice cause of action against his courtappointed attorney by alleging that the attorney had a legal duty to represent him, that the attorney failed to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge, and that the attorney's
failure to get his case dismissed resulted in prolonged incarceration and irreversible harm to the criminal defendant's reputation as well as any wrongful imprisonment and
mental, physical, and psychological harm. Hill v. Thorne, 430 Pa. Super. 551, 635 A.2d 186 (1993). An attorney could be found liable for legal malpractice for the emotional
distress suffered by a client from his loss of liberty caused by the attorney's alleged negligent representation, if the client would have obtained release from prison but for
the attorney's alleged legal malpractice. Snyder v. Baumecker, 708 F. Supp. 1451 (D.N.J. 1989) (applying New Jersey law). Furthermore, another court, also applying New
Jersey law, has ruled that a client could recover damages for emotional distress when the relationship with the former attorney was predicated upon a liberty interest rather
than a purely economic interest. Illustration: A client was permitted to prove damages for emotional distress attributable to the extra 20 months of confinement in a
maximum-security penitentiary which were allegedly due to the negligent representation. The client conceded that, on the advice of retained defense counsel, he pleaded
guilty and received a 25-year prison sentence in a maximum-security penitentiary. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel recommended the acquiesced in the guilty
plea without investigating whether a factual basis existed for it, especially concerning an element involving the use of weapons. After obtaining partial relief with the
assistance of a different attorney, the client was released from prison after serving about five years and then contended that absent the negligent representation, he would
have served no more than 40 months in prison. The client brought an action for criminal malpractice, seeking compensation for emotional anguish that he allegedly suffered
during the additional 20 months of confinement. In awarding relief, the court distinguished a case in which damages for the plaintiff clients' emotional distress was denied,
explaining that a merely economic relationship was at stake there rather than an interest in liberty. The court drew an analogy with a case that allowed the recovery of
emotional damages for a failure to inform the parents of a Down syndrome child of the availability of an amniocentesis prior to birth. Lawson v. Nugent, 702 F. Supp. 91
(D.N.J. 1988) (applying New Jersey law). A plaintiff may succeed in a legal malpractice action, recovering emotional distress damages for unlawful confinement, where the
prison confinement was under a sentence that exceeded the maximum penalty for the crime. Geddie v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
1978), writ denied, 356 So. 2d 1011 (La. 1978). In this case, the parties stipulated that the sole issues before the appellate court were the trial judge's method of calculating
the term of excessive incarceration and the amount of the award. Although the court did not examine the propriety of emotional distress damages for wrongful
confinement, in reducing the plaintiff's award, the court implicitly approved the trial court's decision to allow proof of emotional damages. Geddie v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1978), writ denied, 356 So. 2d 1011 (La. 1978). One court has determined that the defense attorney negligence was the failure to
act, causing the client to be placed in jail and deprived of his freedom. The negligent deprivation of freedom causes an injury that could result in mental distress, the court
explained. Bowman v. Doherty, 235 Kan. 870, 686 P.2d 112 (1984) (reversing a lower court's ruling that limited proof of emotional distress damages). Damages for emotional
distress have been awarded to the prevailing party in a criminal malpractice action where the attorney negligently withdrew from the case. Delesdernier v. Porterie, 666
F.2d 116, 9 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1196 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying Louisiana law) (alleging attorney's withdrawal from her case only two months before trial after he had
represented client for 15 years). Although the issue on appeal was whether the trial court acted properly in granting a remittitur, the court found that the evidence

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supported a finding that the plaintiff suffered some emotional distress from counsel's withdrawal and thus, the court implicitly approved the trial court's decision to allow
proof of plaintiff's emotional distress. Ordering a remittitur of the $25,000 verdict to $10,000 was found not to be an abuse of discretion, since the verdict was not clearly
within the range of possible awards supported by the evidence and the record did not indicate a greater award than $10,000. The appellate court was influenced by the
client's admission that she was able to find new counsel to obtain an extension of time for trial shortly after the attorney withdrew. Delesdernier v. Porterie, 666 F.2d 116, 9
Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1196 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying Louisiana law). Illustration: In one case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant refused to render assistance to the decedent
because his fees remained unpaid, had failed to return the plaintiff's phone messages, and did not visit the decedent in jail at any time after his not guilty plea was entered.
The court explained that these facts certainly alleged sufficiently egregious or extraordinary circumstances under the governing judicial precedent, and thus the plaintiff
could proceed to prove damages for the emotional distress suffered by the decedent from the loss of liberty allegedly caused by the defendant's negligent representation.
The court noted, however, that the plaintiff had the formidable burden of proving that absent the malpractice the decedent would have obtained release from prison.
Nonetheless, the court reasoned, whether a recovery is remote or even unlikely is not the standard in determining whether a pleading can withstand a motion to dismiss,
and thus the plaintiff was entitled to offer evidence to prove her claim. Snyder v. Baumecker, 708 F. Supp. 1451 (D.N.J. 1989) (applying New Jersey law). A client's failure to
prove actual innocence may preclude recovery on a legal malpractice claim, even though the client sought compensation not for his or her conviction but only for civil
contempt fines and fees the client paid to attorneys. Thus, in one case, after the client was convicted of numerous felonies in connection with an alleged Medicaid fraud, he
brought a legal malpractice action against the attorneys who represented him during the grand jury investigation that led to his convictions, seeking damages for civil
contempt fines and attorney's fees that he claimed were incurred as result of the attorneys' flawed legal representation. The court reasoned that the attorneys' conduct that
the client challenged consisted of professional judgments intended to avert indictment and ultimate conviction, and this conduct could not be logically disentangled from
the process of representing the defendant in the criminal proceeding. Mahoney v. Shaheen, Cappiello, Stein & Gordon, P.A., 143 N.H. 491, 727 A.2d 996 (1999). 35. Punitive
damages In those somewhat rare cases in which a plaintiff succeeds in establishing liability for criminal malpractice, (having overcome the onerous burdens often imposed
by requirements to demonstrate exoneration or even innocence and the danger of an adverse application of issue preclusion), the facts may evince egregious malfeasance
that will authorize an award of punitive damages against the former defense counsel. The actual malice necessary to recover punitive damages in tort actions means evil
motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud, and this standard applies to criminal malpractice actions. Dow v. Jones, 232 F. Supp. 2d 491 (D. Md. 2002) (applying Maryland law).
Thus, a complaint in a criminal malpractice action against former trial attorneys, stating, without more, that they made intentional misrepresentations to the client regarding
their experience and expertise and that this conduct constituted actual malice sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages, may lack the level of specificity and factual
detail required under state law to state a claim for actual malice. Dow v. Jones, 232 F. Supp. 2d 491 (D. Md. 2002) (applying Maryland law). V. Appendix 36. Sample case COA
Synopsis The requirement that a client asserting a legal malpractice claim against an attorney representing him or her in a criminal matter must prove actual innocence did
not apply to a client who did not challenge any tactical or strategic decision bearing upon his convictions but rather alleged that the attorney's alleged filing of an
unauthorized motion to withdraw the guilty pleain violation of conditions of a plea agreement that would permit the client to petition for a suspension of part of his
sentence resulted in a denial of the client's motion to suspend a portion of the sentence. The client in Hilario v. Reardon, 158 N.H. 56, 960 A.2d 337 (2008), sought to be
compensated for the breach of the plea agreement resulting from the alleged malpractice of his attorney which occurred well after the client accepted criminal
responsibility for his acts. 37. Sample complaint Adapted from Hood and Henry, Alabama Criminal Trial Practice Forms 9:4 (2007 ed.). IN THE COURT OF [NAME OF
COUNTY], ALABAMA [Name of plaintiff], Plaintiff, v. [List of names of defendants], Civil Action No. [civil action number] and A through F, being those attorneys who were
members of Defendant law firm [name of defendant law firm], LLP, whose names are otherwise unknown to plaintiff, but whose names will be substituted by amendment
when ascer- tained, Defendants. COMPLAINT COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through [his/her] undersigned counsel and makes this complaint against Defendants: Parties
1. Plaintiff, [name of plaintiff], is over the age of nineteen years and is a resident of [name of county], [name of state]. 2. At all relevant times hereto, Defendant [name of
defendant law firm], LLP (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Defendant law firm) was a law firm comprised of attorneys licensed to and conducting business in the
State of [name of state]. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, Defendant [name of defendant law firm], LLP had its principal place of business in the City of
[name of city], County of [name of county], State of [name of state]. Defendant law firm and fictitious Defendants A through F are in the legal business of representing
citizens of the State of [name of state] in civil and criminal matters. Upon information and belief fictitious Defendants A through F are over the age of 19 years and residents
of [name of county], [name of state]. 3. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, Defendant [name of defendant attorney], Esq. (hereinafter sometimes referred
to as Defendant attorney) was an attorney licensed to practice law and was an owner, shareholder, partner, employee, agent and/or principal of the Defendant law firm
[name of defendant law firm], LLP. Upon information and belief, Defendant [name of defendant attorney], Esq. is a resident of [name of county], [name of state]. 4. Upon
information and belief, at all relevant times, Defendant [name of defendant private investigator] (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Defendant private investigator)
was a private investigator licensed in the State of[name of state] and/or had [his/her] principal place of business in the State of [name of state]. Upon information and
belief, Defendant [name of defendant private investigator] is a resident of [name of county], [name of state]. FACTS 5. On or about the [date of arrest], Plaintiff was
arrested and charged with armed robbery, carjacking, and destruction of property in the case of United States v. [name of plaintiff], Felony No. [number of felony. Plaintiff
was held without bond in this matter, and thus, was not released from prison until the [date of release from prison]. 6. On or about the [name of defendant attorney],
Defendant attorney was appointed by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama to represent Plaintiff in this serious criminal matter. 7. Defendant private
investigator was hired by Defendant attorney to assume the responsibilities of private investigation for this serious criminal matter. 8. On or about the [date of
commencement of trial], the criminal trial commenced before the Honorable Judge [name of judge] in the U.S. District Court. 9. During the criminal trial, Defendant
attorney's actions were grossly negligent. Furthermore, Defendant attorney's legal representation of the Plaintiff was seriously ineffective and displayed wanton and willful
conduct. 10. Examples of Defendant attorney's ineffective and grossly negligent legal representation of the Plaintiff, include but are not limited to, imbibing in alcohol
during the day while the trial was taking place; failing to properly protect Plaintiff's rights; failing to provide effective assistance of counsel; failing to properly investigate
the case; failing to properly direct or supervise the investigator; failing to file appropriate pre-trial motions; failing to properly inform the Plaintiff of developments in the
case; failing to prepare the Plaintiff to give testimony; failing to prepare witnesses for testimony; failing to properly coordinate with counsel for the co-defendant; failing to
order the preliminary hearing transcript; failing to present corroborating witnesses on behalf of the Plaintiff; failing to exploit concessions and revelations in the
government's case; and failing to provide conflict-free representation of the Plaintiff. 11. On or about the [date of conviction], Plaintiff was convicted by the jury on all
charges, including, armed robbery, carjacking, and destruction of property. 12. Plaintiff was sentenced to 15 years in prison for the convictions in this matter. 13. While
incarcerated Plaintiff suffered numerous injuries and damages, including but not limited to, loss of freedom, liberty and enjoyment of life; being stabbed; fear of violence
against [his/her] person; feelings of fright, humiliation, shame, mortification and indignation; loss of employment, wages and wage earning capacity; and communication
with [his/her] family and loved ones. 14. On or about the [date of granting motion for new trial], almost five years later, the Honorable Judge [name of judge], in a lengthy
opinion, granted the Plaintiff's motion for a new trial based on Plaintiff's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Judge [name of judge] specifically found that Defendant
attorney's legal representation of Plaintiff was so deficient that Plaintiff was denied [his/her] right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Furthermore, Judge [name of judge] found that there was a reasonable probability that, but for Defendant attorney's unprofessional conduct, the result of the
trial would have been different. Judge [name of judge] specifically found, amongst other items, that Defendant attorney made harmful statements in argument to the jury;
failed to present corroborating witnesses; failed to properly investigate the case; failed to prepare Plaintiff and co-defendant for testimony; failed to ask questions on redirect of client; failed to exploit concessions and revelations in government's case; failed to provide Plaintiff with conflict-free representation; imbibed alcohol during the
trial; and that [his/her] consumption of alcohol was a contributing factor towards [his/her] poor performance. 15. Plaintiff was finally released from incarceration on [date].
16. On or about [date of disciplinary action], Bar Counsel of the State of [name of state] disciplined Defendant attorney for [his/her] woeful representation of Plaintiff in the
underlying criminal matter. The discipline is Bar Proceeding No. [number]. COUNT I (Legal Malpractice) 17. The Plaintiff incorporates, by reference, paragraphs 1 through 16,

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and further alleges that Defendant law firm and Defendant attorney, were appointed by the Court to represent Plaintiff in [his/her] criminal matter brought by the United
States, and that the Defendant attorney and the lawyers of Defendant's law firm, had a duty to provide Plaintiff with competent, reasonable and effective legal
representation and advice as required by the applicable standard of care for attorneys acting under the same or similar circumstances. 18. Plaintiff further alleges that
notwithstanding the legal, ethical and contractual duties to the Plaintiff, Defendant law firm and its individual attorneys, including Defendant attorney, breached the duties
to Plaintiff by failing to provide Plaintiff with the competent reasonable and appropriate legal representation [he/she] was entitled to under the circumstances. 19. Plaintiff
further alleges that the Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm's breaches of the duties owed to Plaintiff and the violation of the standard
of care owed by reasonable and competent practitioners under the circumstances include, but are not limited to, imbibing in alcohol during the day while the trial was
taking place; failing to properly protect Plaintiff's rights; failing to provide effective assistance of counsel; failing to properly investigate the case; failing to file appropriate
pre-trial motions; failing to properly inform the Plaintiff of developments in the case; failing to prepare the Plaintiff to give testimony; failing to prepare witnesses for
testimony; failing to properly coordinate with counsel for the co-defendant; failing to order the preliminary hearing transcript; failing to present corroborating witnesses on
behalf of the Plaintiff; failing to exploit concessions and revelations in the government's case; failing to provide conflict-free representation of the Plaintiff; failing to place
Plaintiff's interests primary to [his/her] own; failing to zealously represent the Plaintiff; failing to provide competent representation of the Plaintiff; failing to serve the
Plaintiff with skill and care commensurate with that generally afforded to clients by other lawyers in similar matters; failing to act as reasonable and prudent attorneys
under the circumstances; and otherwise breaching the standard of care owed by attorneys and/or law firms under the same or similar circumstances. 20. Plaintiff further
alleges that as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm's combined negligent acts and/or omissions, the Plaintiff was deprived of
effective assistance of counsel. 21. As a further direct proximate result of Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm's negligent acts and/or omissions, Plaintiff was
unjustly convicted and wrongly imprisoned for a period of nearly five years. 22. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm's
negligent acts and/or omissions, the Plaintiff suffered numerous injuries and damages, including but not limited to, loss of freedom, liberty and enjoyment of life; being
stabbed; fear of violence against [his/her] person; feelings of fright, humiliation, shame, mortification and indignation; loss of employment, wages and wage earning
capacity; and communication with [his/her] family and loved ones. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm, including
Defendants A through F, separately and severally, in such sum of compensatory, special and punitive damages as the jury may assess after a full and fair consideration of the
facts, plus interest and costs, and any equitable relief to which the Plaintiff may be justly entitled. COUNT II (Breach of Fiduciary Duty) 23. The Plaintiff incorporates, by
reference, paragraphs 1 through 22 above, and further alleges that Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm, and its individual attorneys, had fiduciary and ethical duties,
created at the commencement of their undertaking to represent Plaintiff to act primarily for Plaintiff's benefit with an undivided duty of loyalty in all matters connected
with such representation. 24. Plaintiff further alleges that at the time the Court appointed Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm, and its individual attorneys, to
represent Plaintiff in this serious criminal matter, the Defendants, represented to Plaintiff that the law firm and the attorneys in the firm had substantial experience and
expertise in litigating serious criminal matters. 25. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm owed Plaintiff an ethical and fiduciary duty to
provide representation with the requisite legal knowledge, skill and diligence necessary for the representation. 26. Plaintiff further alleges, that notwithstanding the
representations made by the Defendant law firm and its individual attorneys concerning their expertise and experience in handling serious criminal matters, and
notwithstanding the ethical and fiduciary duties the Defendant law firm and its individual attorneys owed to Plaintiff, the Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm
breached the applicable fiduciary and ethical duties owed to Plaintiff. 27. Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm's breaches of the
duties owed to Plaintiff and the violation of the standard of care owed by reasonable and competent practitioners under the circumstances include, but are not limited to,
imbibing in alcohol during the day while the trial was taking place; failing to properly protect Plaintiff's rights; failing to provide effective assistance of counsel; failing to
properly investigate the case; failing to file appropriate pre-trial motions; failing to properly inform the Plaintiff of developments in the case; failing to prepare the Plaintiff
to give testimony; failing to prepare witnesses for testimony; failing to properly coordinate with counsel for the co-defendant; failing to order the preliminary hearing
transcript; failing to present corroborating witnesses on behalf of the Plaintiff; failing to exploit concessions and revelations in the government's case; failing to provide
conflict-free representation of the Plaintiff; failing to hold Plaintiff's interests primary to [his/her] own; failing to zealously represent the Plaintiff; failing to provide
competent representation of the Plaintiff; failing to serve the Plaintiff with skill and care commensurate with that generally afforded to clients by other lawyers in similar
matters; failing to act as reasonable and prudent attorneys under the circumstances; and otherwise breaching the standard of care owed by attorneys and/or law firms under
the same or similar circumstances. 28. Plaintiff further alleges that as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm's breaches of their
ethical and fiduciary duties, the Plaintiff was deprived of effective assistance of counsel. 29. As a further direct proximate result of Defendant attorney's and Defendant law
firm's breaches of their fiduciary duties, Plaintiff was unjustly convicted and wrongly imprisoned for a period of nearly 10 years. 30. As a further direct and proximate result
of Defendant attorney's and Defendant law firm's breaches of their fiduciary duties, the Plaintiff suffered numerous injuries and damages, including but not limited to, loss
of freedom, liberty and enjoyment of life; being stabbed; fear of violence against [his/her] person; feelings of fright, humiliation, shame, mortification and indignation; loss
of employment, wages and wage earning capacity; and communication with [his/her] family and loved ones. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant
attorney and Defendant law firm, including Defendants A through F, separately and severally, in such sum of compensatory, special and punitive damages as the jury may
assess after a full and fair consideration of the facts, plus interest and costs, and any equitable relief to which the Plaintiff may be justly entitled. COUNT III (Private
Investigation Malpractice) 31. The Plaintiff incorporates, by reference, paragraphs 1 through 30, and further alleges that Defendant private investigator was hired by
Defendant attorney to perform the duties of a private investigator in this criminal matter and had a duty to provide Plaintiff with competent and reasonable private
investigation services as required by the applicable standard of care for private investigators acting under the same or similar circumstances. 32. Plaintiff further alleges that
notwithstanding the legal, ethical and contractual duties to the Plaintiff, Defendant private investigator breached the duties to Plaintiff by failing to provide Plaintiff with
the competent reasonable and appropriate private investigation services [he/she] was entitled to under the circumstances. 33. Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendant
private investigator's breaches of the duties owed to Plaintiff and the violation of the standard of care owed by reasonable and competent practitioners under the
circumstances include, but are not limited to, failing to properly investigate the underlying criminal matter; failing to visit the c
rime scene, failing to investigate the Plaintiff's theory
of the case; failing to recognize Defendant attorney's inability to effectively represent the
Plaintiff; and otherwise breaching the standard of care owed by private investigators under the
same or similar circumstances.
34. Plaintiff further alleges that as a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' combined negligent
acts and/or omissions, the Plaintiff was deprived of effective assistance of a private investigator.
35. As a further direct proximate result of Defendants' negligent acts and/or omissions, Plaintiff
was unjustly convicted and wrongly imprisoned for a period of nearly 10 years.

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36. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants' negligent acts and/or omissions, the
Plaintiff suffered numerous injuries and damages, including but not limited to, loss of freedom,
liberty and enjoyment of life; being stabbed; fear of violence against [his/her] person; feelings of
fright, humiliation, shame, mortification and indignation; loss of employment, wages and wage
earning capacity; and communication with [his/her] family and loved ones.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against all Defendants, separately and severally, in
such sum of compensatory, special and punitive damages as the jury may assess after a full and
fair consideration of the facts, plus interest and costs, and any equitable relief to which the
Plaintiff may be justly entitled.
COUNT IV (Punitive Damages)
37. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates, by reference, all of the preceding paragraphs 1
through 36 and further states as follows:
38. The Defendants acted with actual malice toward the Plaintiff or acted under circumstances
amounting to a willful and wanton disregard of the Plaintiff's rights, and/or acted with conscious
indifference towards the rights of and safety of the Plaintiff such that an award of punitive damages
to the Plaintiff to punish the Defendants for their actions and/or omissions, and to serve as
example to prevent others from acting in a similar way, is appropriate here, especially because the
acts necessary for Defendants to have prevented and/or remedied their willful and wanton, and/or
malicious, conduct could have been accomplished at minimal cost to the Defendants.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against all Defendants, separately and severally, in
such sum of compensatory, special and punitive damages as the jury may assess after a full and
fair consideration of the facts, plus interest and costs, and any equitable relief to which the
Plaintiff may be justly entitled.
JURY DEMAND
The Plaintiff respectfully requests a trial by jury on all of the above claims.
___________________
[Name of attorney for plaintiff]
Attorney for Plaintiff
[Address of attorney for plaintiff]
[Telephone number of attorney for plaintiff]
[State bar number of attorney for plaintiff]
SERVE DEFENDANTS:
[List of names and addresses of defendants]
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
FW: respectfully submitted?
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)

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Sent: Tue 8/07/12 11:01 PM


To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; jleslie@washoecounty.us; zyoung@da.washoecounty.us; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov
6 attachments
20120605_101513 Northwind manager handy man attacks from golf cart 6 5 12.mp4 (3.1 MB) , landlord tenant law manual for police in minnesota.pdf (735.1 KB) ,
Police_manual_-_final_as_adopted_by_State's_Attorney.pdf (263.7 KB) , trespass criminal civil evictdion.pdf (69.8 KB) , 6 8 12 fax to northwind with page numbers.pdf (50.7
KB) , northwind fax 6 4 12 habitability retaliation etc.pdf (45.8 KB)
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: weavera@reno.gov; barnesm@reno.gov
Subject: respectfully submitted
Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2012 16:41:49 -0700
Dear Officer Weaver and Officer Barnes,
I am respectfully submitting this supplementary material to the police report I submitted to you in person on June 6, 2012 regarding the assault I was the victim of at the
hands of maintenance staff member Luke of Northwind Apartments on June 5th, 2012, and the attempts at unlawful entry committed by Northwind Manager Dwayne Jakob
on or about June 4, 2012.
I am attaching an article you may find of interest regarding the intersection of landlord tenant law and police work, vis a vis criminal/civil matters and the fine distinctions
that sometimes arise. I didn't see anything in there on Officer Weavers fine hypothetical regarding entry without permission when a burglary may be occurring. That
situation probably does not come up that often because hardly anybody but the police would be brave enough to enter such a dangerous situation.
I appreciate the brave service both of you provide. I am attaching this materials just because they are interesting to me and may be to you and in no way wish for so
attachign these to be interpreted as a criticism of either of your police work.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion?
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 8/07/12 3:38 PM
To: Keith Loomis (keithloomis@earthlink.net)
Are you refusing to file the motions o requested?
-----Original Message----From: Keith Loomis
Sent: 7 Aug 2012 16:55:44 GMT
To: 'Zach Coughlin'
Subject: RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
Zach
Why dont you move to represent yourself. That way you will be completely satisfied with the services you provide yourself and can do all of the things you believe are
necessary.
If you want me to continue to represent you, what I asked you to provide to me was a description of the events which lead to the charge of disturbing the peace. I still need
that description.
Keith Loomis
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]

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Sent: Monday, August 06, 2012 3:54 PM


To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov
Subject: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
Dear Mr. Loomis and City Attorney Kadlic and Deputy City Attorney Drake,
I am writing to request that you file some motion to alter, amend, reconsider, set aside, or modify my bail in the case stemming from my JUly 3, 2012 arrest for distrubing the
peace, failure to provide proof of insurance, and failure to secure a load. I am writing to request that you file a pre trial motion (Motion to Dismiss, request for a pre trial
motion and bail motion, and motion to supress police report based upon the DTP arrest occuring for alleged conduct outside the officer's presence). If you will not file these
motion (and please provide me a draft of such motions for my review prior to filing them as well as prior to making any communication on my behalf to either the RMC or
the City of Reno Prosecutor), please provide me a written indication of your rationale for so refusing, and then please file a Motion to Withdrawal as soon as practicable. I
ask this respectfully.
The police showed up to the hearing, yet I was not noticed of that fact in advance, or of the hearing itself. Further, Judge Gardner explicilty indicated he was basing his
decision to raise the bail based upon "public safety" and "concern for the defendant's safety", which are impermissible rationale for so increasin one's bail.
NRS
178.498. Many courts use a bail schedule to determine the amount, but note the
initial amount can be increased if good cause is shown.NRS 178.499. Additionally, in
determining the amount of bail, the judge should look at the following factors (NRS
178.498):
The nature and circumstances of the offense charged
The defendants financial ability to post bail
The defendants character; and
The factors listed inNRS 178.4853.
Bail can not be excessive.U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. It should be limited to a
reasonable amount designed to ensure the defendants presence in court. It should not
be a corrective or preventative detention device.
NRS 178.484. The Court should take care inimposing any restrictions on a defendants constitutional rights (i.e.,
search and seizure) and only imply such restrictions if warranted by the underlying facts
of the alleged crime. Section 11 ofNRS 178.484 describes the document that must
be signed by the defendant before he/she can be released on bail.
My bail hearing contained what seems to be an impermissible coercive attempt to condition my release or the possibility thereof upon my providing confidential medical
records (Lake's Crossing etc) to the Reno Municipal Court, even where the same judge presiding over the bail hearing found me competent enough to face a criminal trepass
trial less than two weeks before teh bail hearing in 11 CR 26405.
The friend of mine who posted my bail, Jared Swanson, has a serious form of cancer and a one year old baby. I request a reduction of the bail for his benefit and for the proof
of insurance charge to be dismissed, as (and I am trying to avoid this in any way I can), if I am rearrested, such a proof of insurance charge may present another basis for
imposing an unduly burdensome bail upon me, as it did on July 5th, 2012 where, despite my having produced a legible pdf copy of my proof of insurance card on my large
screened zoomable smart phone, Officers Weaver and Dye still charged me with that violation, and the bail was subsequently increase. Further, none of the events or
accusations forming the basis of the distrubing the police charge occurred in the officer's presence, and the police report contains no indication whatsoever that the arrest
was made based upon NRS 171.1771. I provided Officer Weaver my driver's license prior to the arrest. I did not
refuses to give a written promise to appear in court as provided in NRS 171.1773.
When a person is believed to have committed a misdemeanor offense, the peace officer has the discretion to
either issue a citation or arrest and detain the person.NRS 171.1771 states that a person can be arrested if
his identity is questionable or if the peace officer does not believe the person will appear in court. A person
can also be arrested for a misdemeanor offense if a warrant has been issued.
Additionally, I am requesting that you file a Motion to Dismiss the Disturbing the Peace charge based upon a lack of evidence and or insufficiency of pleading in that the
allegations do not amount to a prima facie case of a DTP violation. Further, please subpoena and or collect the Protection Order application filed by Milan Krebs on July 5th,
2012, and interview Krebs as to why he mentions Coughlin often carrying around a large knife in a menacing manner in that protection order application, yet completely
failed to mention that in his July 3rd, 2012 police report. Additionally, please determine why Kreb's TPO appliication has a different style of handwriting on the caption
compared to the descriptive sections, indicating someone pushed the filing of the TPO on Krebs, perhaps his employer, Northwind Apartments or the RPD, which has in the
days preceding the arrest threatend to arrest Coughlin for criminal trespass if he returned to any part of the premises of Northwind Apartments, in consideration of
Coughlin's eviction from unit 29, despite the fact Coughlin still had a valid right to go to his other two rentals, units 45 and 71, in addition to the fact that Northwinds

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essentially withdrew or rescinded its June 28th, 2012 eviction of Coughlin by posting an Amended 5 Day Unlawful Detainer Notice on unit 29 on June 28th, 2012 shortly after
Coughlin pointed out to Northwinds and Nevada Courts Services that the July 14th, 2012 5 Day notice was not "personally served" (NCS's R. Wray lied about effecting
personal service, as he could not possibly have verified someone of "suitable age and discretion" was within the windowless room with a metal door closed and locked and
where no Wray admits that he received no verbal response from the unit or anyone therein upon his knocking on the door and or attempting to break into the unit, please
see Soldal v. Cook County in that regard, a US S. Ct case) and therefore Coughlin would have had until at least noon on July 28th, 2012 to file a Tenant's Answer, whereas the
eviction/lockout/arrest of June 28th, 2012 took place two hours before noon at 10 am).
Additionally, RPD Officer Weaver had previously attempted to break into one of my rentals at Northwind at a time when he lacked a warrant and or an exigent rationale for
doing so, much less an eviction Order. I just want this case to be dismissed and to try to move on in life, and difuse the tensions incident to this case.
I did not disturb the peace at Northwinds as alleged, nor did I make the threats Kreb's accuses me of or stalk him or follow him in a threatening manner at any time.
Additionaly, I never broke into nor did I ever attempt to break into Krebs' truck, and in fact, I filed a police report in June 2012 reporting extortionate threats by another
maintenance man at Northwinds ("Luke" is his name, I believe) and Northwind's Manage Dwayne Jakob, wherein they threatened to make such a spurious allegation, but
subsuquently refrained from doign so when it apparently occurred to them that I may have excuplatory video evidence disproving such an allegation as well as capturing
their baseless and extortionate threats and accusations. Additionally, please subpoene the police reports I filed with the RPD and any emails I sent to any officers (including
Weaver, Barnes, Sargent MIiller, LIeutenant Brown) and any reports of or recording of phone conversations I had with any of those RPD personnel. Further, please see the
attached june 26th, 2012 email to the RPD, WCSO, RJC, Sparks Justice Court and others pointing out the insufficiency of the 5 day Notice drafted and posted by non-lawyers
Nevada Court Services, in that under NRS 40.253 it listed the wrong forum for the tenant to file a Tenant's Answer, and under the Aiken decision of the Nevada Supreme
Court and NRCP 60(b)(4), any lockout order stemming therefrom is void for lack of jurisdiction.
NRS 171.136 When arrest may be made.
1. If the offense charged is a felony or gross misdemeanor, the arrest may be made on any day, and at any time of day or night.
2. If it is a misdemeanor, the arrest cannot be made between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m., except:
(a) Upon the direction of a magistrate, endorsed upon the warrant;
(b) When the offense is committed in the presence of the arresting officer;
(c) When the person is found and the arrest is made in a public place or a place that is open to the public and:...
(2) The misdemeanor is discovered because there was probable cause for the arresting officer to stop, detain or arrest the person for another alleged violation or offense;
(d) When the offense is committed in the presence of a private person and the person makes an arrest immediately after the offense is committed;...
(g) When the person is already in custody as a result of another lawful arrest; or
Krebs did not immediately arrest me under NRS 171.136(2)(d), nor was the DTP arrest for an offense alleged to have occurred in the officer's presence.
the attached videos are of the incident on June 5th, 2012, not from July 3rd, 2012, but they support my contentions and the relevancy of subpoening the police incident
reports and other documentation should this case not be dismissed, nolle prosequi, de minimis, etc....
I will forward to you my emails to the RPD et all from June 26th, and July 2nd, 2012. I realize their tone was not a smart one to take or appropriate and am only sending them
in hopes of having this matter dismissed. I do not have any interest in pursuing anything like Wheeler v Cross 344 Fed Apps 420 (? (2008.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
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NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
To zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
From:
NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent:
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To:
zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
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From:
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Sent:
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To:
zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
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report. Once your report is approved, it will be issued
a case number and you will receive a PDF copy as an attachment
in your email within approximately ten business days.
Thank you for using our online reporting system and please
contact us with any suggestions you have for improving our
system.
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6/11/12
NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
To zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
From:
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Sent:
Mon 6/11/12 4:10 PM
To:
zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
1 attachment
report-120103420-0.pdf (71.4 KB)
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Your report has been approved report and the permanent number of the case is
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6/11/12
NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
To zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
From:
NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent:
Mon 6/11/12 4:11 PM
To:
zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
1 attachment
report-120103420-1.pdf (70.9 KB)
****DO NOT RESPOND TO THIS E-MAIL****
****THIS IS AN UN-MONITORED MAIL BOX****
Your report has been approved supplemental report and the permanent number of the case is
120103420.
the delicate information in his report has been replaced for *** to support isolation in this email.
Thank you for using our online reporting system and please contact us with any suggestions you have for improving our system.
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FW: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice Court?
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Mon 8/06/12 3:55 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; kadlicj@reno.gov; drakej@reno.gov
2 attachments
coughlin v northwind 16_TenantsAffidavit_DeclarationOther_PrivateHousing other than nonpayment of rent.pdf (76.3 KB) , combined northwind v coughlin eviction
filings.pdf (1058.4 KB)
please view this in conjunction with the email I just sent.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com

From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: kbrown@nvbar.org; milllerr@reno.gov; millerr@reno.gov; stuttle@washoecounty.gov; rsilva@washoecounty.us; stuttle@washoecounty.us;
jamchen@washoecounty.us; 037nor4@acg.com; info@acg-apmi.com; rjcweb@wasoecounty.us; jboles@callatg.com; apminfo@acg.com

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Subject: FW: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice Court


Date: Mon, 2 Jul 2012 17:21:54 -0700
NOrthwind and Nevada Court Services served and "amended 5 day notice of unlawful detainer on July 29th, 2012"...giving me five days to get my stuff out of unit 29 (the one
the subject of Judge Schroeer's Eviction Order, which was effectively rescinded by their serving a new 5 day unlawful detainer notice....) as well as units 71 and 45...whicih
are two units to which i still have valide lease agreements, ie, I cannot be trespassing for accessing them (the Reno PD has indicated they will arrest me for criminal trespass
for accessing any units in the complex, including those to which I still have a valid possessory or property interest, in violation of 42 usc 1983).
why does Sargent Miller have to give me a hard time? Isn't it enough for him to have his "Denzel" good looks and a much higher paying job than I will ever have? What up wit
that?
Northwind and Nevada Court Services (which is practicing eviction law without a license) screwed up and put "Sparks Justice Court on Greenbrae" as the place for the tenant
to file a Tenan'ts Answer or Affidavit. Doing so will make the RJC Order by Judge Schroeder null and void (Karen Stancil, Chief Civil Clerk at RJC admits this, but really, the
fault lies with NCS and Northwind, not the committed professional at the RJC).
The Notice must identify the Court with jurisdiction. NRS 40.253(3)(a). ONe cannot be trespassing in a placwe where they have a valid reason for being or a lawful right to be.
NRS 207.200, RMC 8.10.040.

From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: chansen@washoecounty.us
Subject: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice Court
Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 09:10:14 -0700
Dear Civil Supervisor Hansen
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Dear Sparks Justice Court,
I called and received permission to file this by fax...I am indigent and request a fee waiver, and failing that, an opportunity to cure any filing fee deficiency.
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: sheriffweb@washoecounty.us; lstuchell@washoecounty.us; kstancil@washoecounty.us; chansen@washoecounty.us; milllerr@reno.gov
Subject: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice Court
Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 07:58:36 -0700
Dear Sparks Justice Court, WCSO, RPD, and Reno Justice Court.
I have received (though not personally served) what appears to be an eviction notice (5 day unlawful detainer?) for rentals located at 1680 Sky Mountain Drive, Reno, 89523,
but the notice indicates that I must file a Tenant's Answer with the Sparks Justice Court.
Am I mistaken in viewing this matter to be outside the jurisdiction of the Sparks Justice Court, and rather, a matter to be handled in Reno Justice Court?
Given Sparks Justice Court is open 5 days a week (closes at noon on Fridays) and Reno Justice Court has 4 judicial days a week, the deadline for filing a special appearance (to
contest jurisdiction) and or a Tenant's Answer of Affidavit is difficult to measure.
I spoke with a Reno Police Department who identified himself as Sargent Miller last week and he indicated the WCSO planned to come effectuate an eviction on this date,
June 26, 2012. I believe that would be premature, as Nevada Landlord Tenant law provides for filing a Tenant's Answer or Affidavit by noon after the fifth full day (judicial
days) and Fridays in Sparks Justice Court are not full days in that sense, and regardless, Sparks Justice Court, I believe, is not the appropriate forum where, as here, the situs
is located in Reno (Ward 1-nap?)
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin

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PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
tel 775 338 8118
fax 949 667 7403
Civil Division
630 Greenbrae Drive
Sparks, Nevada 89431
(775)353.7603 Phone
(775)352.3004 Fax
Civil Department Supervisor
Chris Hansen
chansen@washoecounty.us ..."

request for a pre trial motion and bail motion?


From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Mon 8/06/12 3:54 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov
7 attachments
20120605_101458 admitting dwayne tried to lift door up 6 5 12.mp4 (498.1 KB) , 20120605_101513 Northwind manager handy man attacks from golf cart 6 5 12.mp4 (3.1 MB) ,
northwind v coughjlin combined for rjc judges chamers vacate summary eviction motion affidavit, amended motion and proposed order.pdf (130.9 KB) , supplement to
tenants motion to dismiss northwind in sparks justice court.pdf (98.3 KB) , 6 8 12 fax to northwind with page numbers.pdf (50.7 KB) , northwind fax 6 4 12 habitability
retaliation etc.pdf (45.8 KB) , emails to weavera@reno.gov.pdf (32.5 KB)

Dear Mr. Loomis and City Attorney Kadlic and Deputy City Attorney Drake,

I am writing to request that you file some motion to alter, amend, reconsider, set aside, or modify my bail in the case stemming from my JUly 3, 2012 arrest for distrubing the
peace, failure to provide proof of insurance, and failure to secure a load. I am writing to request that you file a pre trial motion (Motion to Dismiss, request for a pre trial
motion and bail motion, and motion to supress police report based upon the DTP arrest occuring for alleged conduct outside the officer's presence). If you will not file these
motion (and please provide me a draft of such motions for my review prior to filing them as well as prior to making any communication on my behalf to either the RMC or
the City of Reno Prosecutor), please provide me a written indication of your rationale for so refusing, and then please file a Motion to Withdrawal as soon as practicable. I
ask this respectfully.

The police showed up to the hearing, yet I was not noticed of that fact in advance, or of the hearing itself. Further, Judge Gardner explicilty indicated he was basing his
decision to raise the bail based upon "public safety" and "concern for the defendant's safety", which are impermissible rationale for so increasin one's bail.

NRS
178.498
. Many courts use a bail schedule to determine the amount, but note the
initial amount can be increased if good cause is shown.

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NRS 178.499. Additionally, in


determining the amount of bail, the judge should look at the following factors
(NRS
178.498)
:

The nature and circumstances of the offense charged

The defendants financial ability to post bail

The defendants character; and

The factors listed in NRS 178.4853.


Bail can not be excessive.
U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. It should be limited to a
reasonable amount designed to ensure the defendants presence in court. It should not
be a corrective or preventative detention device.

NRS 178.484
. The Court should take care in imposing any restrictions on a defendants constitutional rights (i.e.,
search and seizure) and only imply such restrictions if warranted by the underlying facts
of the alleged crime. Section 11 of
NRS 178.484 describes the document that must
be signed by the defendant before he/she can be released on bail.
My bail hearing contained what seems to be an impermissible coercive attempt to condition my release or the possibility thereof upon my providing confidential medical
records (Lake's Crossing etc) to the Reno Municipal Court, even where the same judge presiding over the bail hearing found me competent enough to face a criminal trepass
trial less than two weeks before teh bail hearing in 11 CR 26405.

The friend of mine who posted my bail, Jared Swanson, has a serious form of cancer and a one year old baby. I request a reduction of the bail for his benefit and for the proof
of insurance charge to be dismissed, as (and I am trying to avoid this in any way I can), if I am rearrested, such a proof of insurance charge may present another basis for
imposing an unduly burdensome bail upon me, as it did on July 5th, 2012 where, despite my having produced a legible pdf copy of my proof of insurance card on my large
screened zoomable smart phone, Officers Weaver and Dye still charged me with that violation, and the bail was subsequently increase. Further, none of the events or
accusations forming the basis of the distrubing the police charge occurred in the officer's presence, and the police report contains no indication whatsoever that the arrest
was made based upon NRS 171.1771. I provided Officer Weaver my driver's license prior to the arrest. I did not refuses to give a written promise to appear in court as
provided in NRS 171.1773. When a person is believed to have committed a misdemeanor offense, the peace officer has the discretion to either issue a citation or arrest and
detain the person.

NRS 171.1771 states that a person can be arrested if his identity is questionable or if the peace officer does not believe the person will appear in court. A personcan

also be arrested for a misdemeanor offense if a warrant has been issued.

Additionally, I am requesting that you file a Motion to Dismiss the Disturbing the Peace charge based upon a lack of evidence and or insufficiency of pleading in that the
allegations do not amount to a prima facie case of a DTP violation. Further, please subpoena and or collect the Protection Order application filed by Milan Krebs on July 5th,
2012, and interview Krebs as to why he mentions Coughlin often carrying around a large knife in a menacing manner in that protection order application, yet completely
failed to mention that in his July 3rd, 2012 police report. Additionally, please determine why Kreb's TPO appliication has a different style of handwriting on the caption
compared to the descriptive sections, indicating someone pushed the filing of the TPO on Krebs, perhaps his employer, Northwind Apartments or the RPD, which has in the
days preceding the arrest threatend to arrest Coughlin for criminal trespass if he returned to any part of the premises of Northwind Apartments, in consideration of
Coughlin's eviction from unit 29, despite the fact Coughlin still had a valid right to go to his other two rentals, units 45 and 71, in addition to the fact that Northwinds
essentially withdrew or rescinded its June 28th, 2012 eviction of Coughlin by posting an Amended 5 Day Unlawful Detainer Notice on unit 29 on June 28th, 2012 shortly after

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Coughlin pointed out to Northwinds and Nevada Courts Services that the July 14th, 2012 5 Day notice was not "personally served" (NCS's R. Wray lied about effecting
personal service, as he could not possibly have verified someone of "suitable age and discretion" was within the windowless room with a metal door closed and locked and
where no Wray admits that he received no verbal response from the unit or anyone therein upon his knocking on the door and or attempting to break into the unit, please
see Soldal v. Cook County in that regard, a US S. Ct case) and therefore Coughlin would have had until at least noon on July 28th, 2012 to file a Tenant's Answer, whereas the
eviction/lockout/arrest of June 28th, 2012 took place two hours before noon at 10 am).

Additionally, RPD Officer Weaver had previously attempted to break into one of my rentals at Northwind at a time when he lacked a warrant and or an exigent rationale for
doing so, much less an eviction Order. I just want this case to be dismissed and to try to move on in life, and difuse the tensions incident to this case.

I did not disturb the peace at Northwinds as alleged, nor did I make the threats Kreb's accuses me of or stalk him or follow him in a threatening manner at any time.
Additionaly, I never broke into nor did I ever attempt to break into Krebs' truck, and in fact, I filed a police report in June 2012 reporting extortionate threats by another
maintenance man at Northwinds ("Luke" is his name, I believe) and Northwind's Manage Dwayne Jakob, wherein they threatened to make such a spurious allegation, but
subsuquently refrained from doign so when it apparently occurred to them that I may have excuplatory video evidence disproving such an allegation as well as capturing
their baseless and extortionate threats and accusations. Additionally, please subpoene the police reports I filed with the RPD and any emails I sent to any officers (including
Weaver, Barnes, Sargent MIiller, LIeutenant Brown) and any reports of or recording of phone conversations I had with any of those RPD personnel. Further, please see the
attached june 26th, 2012 email to the RPD, WCSO, RJC, Sparks Justice Court and others pointing out the insufficiency of the 5 day Notice drafted and posted by non-lawyers
Nevada Court Services, in that under NRS 40.253 it listed the wrong forum for the tenant to file a Tenant's Answer, and under the Aiken decision of the Nevada Supreme
Court and NRCP 60(b)(4), any lockout order stemming therefrom is void for lack of jurisdiction.

NRS 171.136 When arrest may be made.


1. If the offense charged is a felony or gross misdemeanor, the arrest may be made on any day, and at any time of day or night.
2. If it is a misdemeanor, the arrest cannot be made between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m., except:
(a) Upon the direction of a magistrate, endorsed upon the warrant;
(b) When the offense is committed in the presence of the arresting officer;
(c) When the person is found and the arrest is made in a public place or a place that is open to the public and:...
(2) The misdemeanor is discovered because there was probable cause for the arresting officer to stop, detain or arrest the person for another alleged violation or offense;
(d) When the offense is committed in the presence of a private person and the person makes an arrest immediately after the offense is committed;...
(g) When the person is already in custody as a result of another lawful arrest; or
Krebs did not immediately arrest me under NRS 171.136(2)(d), nor was the DTP arrest for an offense alleged to have occurred in the officer's presence.
the attached videos are of the incident on June 5th, 2012, not from July 3rd, 2012, but they support my contentions and the relevancy of subpoening the police incident
reports and other documentation should this case not be dismissed, nolle prosequi, de minimis, etc....
I will forward to you my emails to the RPD et all from June 26th, and July 2nd, 2012. I realize their tone was not a smart one to take or appropriate and am only sending them
in hopes of having this matter dismissed. I do not have any interest in pursuing anything like Wheeler v Cross 344 Fed Apps 420 (? (2008.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
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Reno Police Department

emergency request for stipulated continuance of Trial in 12-065630


From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 1/22/13 8:33 AM
To: zyoung@da.washoecounty.us (zyoung@da.washoecounty.us); jhelzer@da.washoecounty.us (jhelzer@da.washoecounty.us);
rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com (rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com)

Dear ADA Helzer and DDA Young,


I just submitted for filing a the attached Emergency Motion. DDA Young had an emergency of sorts preventing him from
attending a pre-trial hearing that we had set for weeks on 1/7/13 in rcr2012-078980. I believe holding this Trial today would
not be the best thing for all involved in a general sense and respectfully request that you consider stipulating to a continuance.
Sincerely,

Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402 ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Zach has a file to share with you on SkyDrive. To view it, click the link below.
1 22 13 0204 065630 Coughlin's Emergency Motion for Competency Evaluation.pdf

RE: sorry for the delay


From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Wed 2/20/13 12:16 PM
To: Robert Lindsay (rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com)
1 attachment
2 11 13 Nnahms intake mental health eval proof for now 12-067980 063341 cr12-2025.pdf (781.8 KB)

dont' know if the


I went to Nnahms yesterday for a couple hours of hassle and they asked me to come back today, so I am going there now, then I will check in with DAS at the RJC before 2pm
per instructions. I dont' know if they will arrest me for missing a check in last week or what or for some other epo violation or whatever. i couldn't check in because i was in
jail, ya know?
thanks,
Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402 ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com

Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2013 12:06:00 -0800


From: rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com
Subject: Re: sorry for the delay
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com; rbl@robertbrucelindsay.com

Good Morning: Just checking in with you? Don't forget about the meeting tonight 5:30 Triangle club upstairs. Hope you are well. Thinking about you. Let me know when you
get any documentation from NAMHS. Did you get your phone yet Blah Blah Blah. Call any time ok?
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From: Zach Coughlin <zachcoughlin@hotmail.com>


To: "rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com" <rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com>; "rbl@robertbrucelindsay.com" <rbl@robertbrucelindsay.com>
Sent: Friday, February 8, 2013 2:21 AM
Subject: FW: sorry for the delay
I need to see something out of your office soon. So far I got Bruce failing to file a Motion for Order for Competency Evaluation and stipping to everything to make DDA
Young's routine easier...and generally seeming out of it, and he has provided absolutely zero legal advice so far...zip...nothing. Please respond to my written requests below. I
need to know what your office is willing to do immediately, otherwise its time to refund the $700.00Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949
667 7402 ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.comTo: rbl@robertbrucelindsay.comSubject: sorry for the delayDate: Fri, 11 Jan 2013 14:45:21 -0800

Dear Mr. Lindsay,


https://skydrive.live.com/redir?resid=43084638F32F5F28%21118
Please find very relevant materials to the defense of this case attached and at the above link. I have scanned everything therein for viruses and it is 100% safe and virus free.

Sorry for the delay, I am not flaking on you, its just been hectic, i'll get to getting it scanned and returned, very busy addressing a
recent Order of the NNDB seeking to disbar me, but I will get to it.
I don't want much, okay. Just a few simple things.If you get me this stuff, as far as I am concerned, we are straight (assuming
you don't pull a Jim Leslie and insist on remaing on my case as long as possible to purposefully torpedo it....) There was talk of
Cape Fear with Leslie well before he moved to withdraw and got a TPO, and now an EPO (though courthouse sanctuary
doctrine makes the "service" thereof rather suspect. Leslie was not all "terrified" back then...What changed? Oh, that's right, he
was finished puttin' in work for the County (ie, makign sure I got convicted on both counts in 063341, thanks to his making the
NRS 171.136 (or trying to, at least, ...he failed) citizen's arrest arguments that went completely over DDA Young head (or, more
likely DDA Young just couldn't stomach anymore of the farce and chose not to make such arguments to the tirbunal). Can you
serve the WCDA with request for discovery and subpoena the RJC and WCSO for the following (assuming the won't just copy
the stuff an provide it all nice'n'easy like):
certified audio transcripts of the following hearings in the RJC:
1. 7/5/12 in RJC Rev2012-001048 hearing granting a default victory incident to a 6/28/12 motion to set aside the fraudulently
procurred 6/27/12 Lockotu Order at the rental where the 067980 arrest occurred.
2. 7/31/12 hearing in rjc rev2012-001048 before Judge Pearson (this was a hearing noticed on 7/23/12 to address my Motion
to Set Aside the 6/27/12 eviction Order signed by Judge Schroeder despite my 6/26/12 email and fax to the RJC, SJC, WCSO,
and City of Reno regarding my filign the Tenant's Answer in the SJC, and the deficiencies in the 5 day notice. (please see the
attached police report by the RPD incident to the pretextual (and Soldal v. Cook Co violating, not that it matters, this is nevada
after all) arrest shortly upon my bailing out on the 067980 charge in RMC 12 CR 12420(wherein the "approach" by the RPD (to
which RPD Sargent Sifre incidates some level of complicity between the RPD and RJC in a recording only recently propound by
the WCDA just 2 judicial days before the 12/11/12 Trial stemming from the 1/14/12 misuse of 911 arrest in rcr2012-065630
(a witness just sadly passed away unexpectedly 2 days after the DA complete his direct examination of her, EComm's Kariann
Beechler).
2.1 the audio transcript of the one hearing in REV 2012-075658 Zach Coughlin vs Jeff Nichols. This is relevant to 067980 because its another eviction scenario and
establishes a pattern and practice by the RPD, WCSO and RJC to refuse to uphold my rights while aggressively applying an overly rigid and formulaic application of rules to me
as a pro se tenant, and even going beyond that, some might say, at times. Please, this one is important, I need it. A former WCSO Deputy pu

3. I would like you to serve on the WCDA a request for discovery and also a subpoena/FOIA (I know, NRS Open Records
REquest) on ECOMM for any 911 calls, RPD Dispatch calls from civilians, or recordings between the RPD or wcso or Reno
sparks Indian colony Police or dispatch/ECOMM in any way connected to me, Zach Coughlin, or suspected to be connected to
me. I am not going to ask for much more, if you get me all that, I'll be good, if not...I'll be tedious.
4. any and all recordings made by anyone (RPD, WCSO, Northwinds Staff, bystanders, and especially Jeff Chandler or Ryan
WRay or anyone else associate with Nevada Court Services) of ANY interactions with me in any way connected to Northwinds
Apartments and my tenancies there (i had three rentals, units 29, 45, and 71). Please have served a subpoena duces tecum on
Nevada Court Services directed to anythign (documentation, recordings, etc) related to Zach Coughlin and serve a witness
subpoena on NCS's Ryan Wray (might have stopped working there, but still subpoena him please) as well as Jeff Chandler.
5. The RMC audio transcript of the (it woudl cost my $35 i don't have, and they probably have to waive the fee for you, the RJC
does when Leslie and the WCPD request recordings) 7/5/12 unnoticed bail hearing in RMC 12 CR 12420 wherein my bail was
impermissibly raise from a bondable $1,415 to a cash only $3,000 for charges that were plainly manufacture anyways.
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6. the 12/3/12 Trial audio transcript in RMC 12 CR 12420.


7. the 12/18/12 audio transcript of the hearing in 067980 (the case you are on) wherein Jim Leslie (without DDA Young there)
was able to get some things done...you likely are required to, or at least, might want to, have this anyways.... I dont' necessarily
need the hard copies (you can sign up for a free hotmail account at www.outlook.com and skydrive them to me, its totally easy,
or I can pick them up, copy them, and deliver them to you...i just dont' have the money and the court's nickel and dime me like
crazy).
8. The 12/6/12 filing in the appeal of an associated RJC prosecution in rcr2012-063341 (it is the Record on Appeal, basically,
but I think they titled it "Notice of Appeal" on the docket...and the RJC has failed to provide me a copy of it...not even the brand
new filings listing the index of documents included in that 12/6/12 filing (which is basically a Notice of Appeal). YES, IT is
relevant to this case...it goes to conflicts analysis to both the RJC (even across departments, especially given some admission by
Clifton as to looking over "submission on subpoenas" from that 063341 case before Sferrazza, on the record in 065630...DDA
Young is an efiler and could easily email you that 20 mb or so 12/6/12 Notice of Appeal (804 page) filign in CR12-2025 (the
appeal of rcr2011-063341, the first of 10 arrest/incarcerations of me since 8/20/11).
Please subpoena Nevada Court Services Ryan Wray (he may not work there anymore, but he was present at the scene of the
arrest and, obviously, along with Northwinds Manager Duane Jakobs (who testified on that 7/31/12 audio transcript I am
requesting you obtain and copy me on in rev2012-001048 about the events in question in 067980) participated in attempted
break in an fraudulent Declaration of Service of the 6/14/12 5 Day UD Notice.
9. Lastly, please serve the RJC Custodian of Records a Subpoena duces tecum for all records/fax
logs/information/documentation related to any faxing of Orders by RJC Judges to the WCSO between October 24th, 2011 and
November 2nd 2011 (each fax has a job number, etc. I want a sequential printout or log of those faxes as it goes to whether the
RJC, in accord with its admitted policy, faxed to the WCSO the two different ORders by Judge SFerrazza related to the Eviction
(a 10/25/11 "Eviction ORder and Decision" and a 10/27/11 "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and ORder for Summary
Eviction". I need to know if and when such items were faxed or transmitted to the WCSO...it is very relevant given the same
WCSO Deputy Machen conducted the lockout on 11/1/11 from my former home law office, according to the locksmith, REno
Carson Messenger receipts, the transcript of th 6/18/12 criminal trespass trial in RMC 11 Cr 26405 (sworn testimony of Casey
Baker, eSq. and Richard G. HIll, eSq.) demonstrates that the WCSO's Office is being obstructive, as is the RJC (whom failed to
comply with my SCR 105(4)/SCR 119 properly issued and served supboena and subpoena decus tecums of 10/30/12 in the
formal disciplinary matter (espeically consiering the 4/11/12 volunteering of information and documents by RJC judges
secretary Lori Townsend), and further specify the subpoena duces tecum is for the "file stamped cover page" of any filign by
Couglin in RJC rev2012-000374.
10. the audio transcript of the 8/7/12 TPO Hearing in RJC RCP2012-000287) for Milan Krebs v. Zach Coughlin (Krebs was
NOrthwinds Apts maintenance man (the one doing the sawzalling to the metal door of unit 29 incident to the arrest in
067980...He testified under oath the matters of material direct relevane to the defense of this case. This is a no brainer, and the
fact that Leslie continuously refused to obtain a copy of this hearing (again, the RJC waives the $35 fee for th wCPD...so what
was Leslie's excuse? That Northwind's Apartments sent him some photgraphs of a microwave? Please. Jim Leslie is a joke.
That might be relevant to an evictio hearing, but not to a NRS 199.280 defense. What Krebs testified to at that TPO extension
hearing on cross examination is obviously extremely relevant, particularly where there was extensive questioning directed to the
circumstances of the arrest in 067980.
11. Lastly, a subpoena duces tecum on the Custodian of Records for the Reno muni Court and the Custodian of Records for the
City of REno Marshals for any an all documentation, marshal's reports, or recordings (Thompsons admitted to makign at least
on on or about 3/22/12) in any way related to Coguhlin (obviously, there shoudl be an arrest report from the 2/27/12 direct
contempt arrest wherein Marshal Harley, as testified to by Judge Nash Holmes at my disciplinary hearing on 11/14/12 via her
hearsay of what Harley told her, has apparently alleged some "disassemblign of a recording device and hiding a component of it
in the restroom during arestroom break that was begrudingly granted immediately after Holmes began interrogating Coughlin
about hwether he was "recording the proceedings" and or whether he "had a recording device", upon which, alleged Holmes,
Coughlin immediately got "all squirmy and begged to use the restroom"....Okay, lets see the documentation, marshal's report etc.
for anything, but especially including that. IF they move to QUash I want be copied on it (please copy me on anything anyone
sends you ever in any way related to me) as I have some authority and opposition work I woudl like for you to at least consider
incident to any reply you may wish to file....this is relevant. RJC Clifton signed an ORder for Competency eval on 2/27/12 at
1:31 pm...JUDge Nash holmes could nto be found by her staff at that time, despite the traffic citaiton trial connected to Richard
G. Hill, Esq.'s office and the trespass arrest being schedule to occur then...both HOlmes and Clifton were mysteriously
transferred criminal cases involving Coughlin on 2/27/12...both are lifelong prosecutors, formerly Holmes was Clifton's boss
from about 91 to 94 ish (not to mention Linda Gardner was a coworker (see 54844 and 60302), and Nash Holmes 3/14/12
grievance against Coughli nto the SBN admits to communications with the WCPD about Coughlin.
12. please subpoena duces tecum the WCPD as to anything in any way related to HOlmes admission regarding the WCPD in her
3/14/12 grievance...
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13. Lastly, please serve a subpoena duces tecum on the custodian of REcords for Richard G. HIll, ESq. and his former
associates new firm in Kentucky, Casey D. Baker, Esq's Baker and Baker or whatever tey call themsleves narrowly tailored to
any documentation, recordings, or information baring on when and if their office provided the two different eviction ORders to
the wcso office (Baker's testimony at the 6/18/12 crimnal trespass trial (there is an oficial transcript at te link) sheds some light
on this vis a vis October 28th, 2011...and familiarzie yourslef with the void/stale order concept incident to NRS 40.253's
requirement that the lockout be done "within 24 hours" of "receipt of the order"....by the WCSO...the same deputy makign the
arrest in 067980 conducted that lockout and filed a fraudulent affidavit of service on 11/7/11 alleging to have "personally
served" me...which his supervisor was ofrced to admit, in writing, he did not, but rather merely posted the order on the door (hill
lied at the 6/18/12 trespass trial in testying "they posted it to the door because you ran away" despite that being completely false,
and where HIll admits he was not even present that day, and his associate completely failes to back up hill's baseless, defamatory
accusation (one of many by Hill).
And that's it. You do all that and provide a reasonable return and attempt to counter all the bs MOtions to Quash sure to ensue,
and we are straight. You can move to withdraw and I will give you glowing review, I promise. Hell, I will even draft all these
subpoenas for your approval and the oppositions to the motions to quash if you like, and provide the authority in support of
them. But I need you to issue the subpoenas and have them served, and get the recordings, etc....even if they make you pay for
them, none of this adds up to more than $200 (perhaps you can file a notice of appearance, if an efiler on the cr12-2025 under
some justification that is is necessary to the defense herein or I would allow you to appear as co-counsel provided you dont'
insist on hijacking things..., but obviously paying $1 page for all 804 pages hard copy from aint goign to work....
I really appreciate any help you can provide.

Sifre's admissions as to said complicity may provide a basis for your filing a Motion to conflict out the rjc and the wcda's
office (in addition to DDA Kandaras' involvement in the turning over of my smartphone and data card to the City of Reno
Marshals and the RMC in 11 TR 26800, as admitted to by WCSO Hodge to me, in front of local attorney Pam Willmore (I was
arrested incidnet to a contempt finding at the 2/27/12 trial before judge Nash Holmes, and it was not until after my property was
booked into my personal secured property and well after any time for a "search incident to arrest" that the WC Jail released to the
RMC and its Marshals on 2/28/12 my property, which was returned 37 days later wiped of all data incident to an Order of
3/30/12 that seems to have clearly be responsive to a filing by me in NVB 10-05104 before Judge Nash Holmes and Washoe
Legal Services Exec. Director Elcano 1977 McGeorge SOL classmate, NVB Judge B. Beesley....all three of whom testified at
my 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing at the SBN, despite SCR 105(2)(c) being desecrated in every way imaginable, another
Mirching to besmirch the judicial system in Nevada. DDA Kandaras is on the NNDB and refuses to deny that she or David
Hamilton, Esq. (Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s best friend) were on my screening Panel. This IS revelvant to what you are getting seven
bones for, under a conflict or disqualification analysis (I would like a reason why this case was transferred on 2/27/12 from
Judge Lynch, same day another case in the RMC was transferred to jUdge Holmes (the 1/12/12 custodial arrest for jaywalkign
cuz richard g. hill said to cas in rmc 12 CR 12420.
7/5/12 in RJC Rev2012-001048 (this is the summary eviction from the very unit #29 rental at Northwinds Apartment, 1680
Sky Mountain Drive that I was arrested at on 6/28/12 in the matter you were assigned and contracted to handle for $700.00). I
did not attend the hearing because I was rearrested on 7/3/12 by the Reno Police Department just blocks from Northwinds
Apartments in RMC 12 CR 12420 (a custodial arrest involving three charges, one, a simple traffic citation for failure to secure a
load on one's vehicle (they allege an empty plastic storage tub fell off my vehicle), two, no proof of vehicle insurance (despite
RPD Officer Alan Weaver admitting that I showed him a high resolution pdf of my then current USAA auto insurance on a 4.7
inch smart phone screen...he said it had to be a paper printout), and three, "disturbing the peace" based upon the criminal
complaint signed by Northwind's Apartments maintenance man, 23 year old Milan Krebs (whom obtained a TPO against me
from the RJC in RCP2012-000287 on 7/5/12 after the RPD fraudulently urged Krebs to apply for one incident to the 7/3/12
arrest, as further confirmed by the commentary by the same RPD Sargent Sifre (only finally propounded to me following a
12/5/12 email from the WCDA informing me of the availability of such discovery

please let me know, in writing, and with specifics, whether or not you will move, in writing, to obtain the above indicated
materials, and provide an indication of how soon you will do so, with proof thereof. Sorry to have to ask for that, but
time is of the essence and I need to know if this is going to work out with you or not. If it does, I will absolutely credit you
for being a faithful defender of the Sixth Amendment, and maybe more.
Sincerely,
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Zach Coughlin1471 E. 9th St.Reno, NV 89512Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
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NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
To zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
From:NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent: Wed 9/07/11 9:36 PM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
****DO NOT RESPOND TO THIS E-MAIL****
Your online report has been successfully received and the
temporary report number is T11005956.
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NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
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Sent: Wed 9/07/11 10:51 PM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
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We're sorry the following problem was found during review


of your submitted report T11005956:

THIS IS NOT THE FORUM FOR THIS TYPE OF COMPLAINT HOWEVER THIS REPORT WAS PRINTED AND PASSED ON TO THE OFFICER'S SUPERVISOR AND IT WILL BE ADDRES
Thank you,
Officer WOZNIAK,
Reno Police Department

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SIFRE v. WELLS FARGO BANK: Defendant does not have standing to


foreclose and fraudulently induced him into entering into the mortgage
contract
posted by Moe Bedard on January 3, 2011 in Mortgage News - LoanSafe.org
LoanSafe.org (Source: United States District Court, D. Nevada) -Plaintiff does not allege he is not in default but rather that

Defendant does not have standing to foreclose and fraudulently induced him into entering into the mortgage contract.
He also appears to plead claims for unjust enrichment, quiet title, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, TILA, HOEPA, and RESPA. CourtPAUL SIFRE, Plaintiff,v.WELLS FARGO BANK, Defendant.No. 3:10-cv-00572-RCJVPC.December 29, 2010.ORDERROBERT C. JONES, District Judge.This case arises out of the foreclosure of Plaintiffs mortgage. The Court previously entered a temporary
restraining order and set a preliminary injunction hearing, but the order expired and the Court vacated the hearing when Plaintiff failed to serve Defendant with the notice of the
hearing within the time ordered. Plaintiff has now served Wells Fargo Bank C/O Trustees Corps, in Sacramento, California, and the Clerk has entered default against
Defendant based on this service. The Court reset the preliminary injunction hearing and has heard oral argument. For the reasons given herein, the Court denies the motion.I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORYPlaintiff Paul Sifre owns real property located at 3660 Hawking Ct., Sparks, NV 89436. (Mot. 1:16-17, Sept. 15, 2010, ECF No.
2).1 The gravamen of the Complaint is that Plaintiff was fraudulently induced into signing a mortgage, although most of the Complaint is a generalized grievance against the
mortgage industry. Plaintiff does not allege he is not in default but rather that Defendant does not have standing to foreclose and fraudulently induced him into entering into the
mortgage contract. He also appears to plead claims for unjust enrichment, quiet title, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, TILA, HOEPA, and RESPA. It is not clear from the Complaint whether any entity has in fact foreclosed.II. LEGAL
STANDARDSThe Ninth Circuit in the past set forth two separate sets of criteria for determining whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief:Under the traditional test, a plaintiff
must show: (1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable injury to plaintiff if preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships favoring
the plaintiff, and (4) advancement of the public interest (in certain cases). The alternative test requires that a plaintiff demonstrate either a combination of probable success on the
merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor.Taylor v. Westly, 488 F.3d 1197, 1200
(9th Cir. 2007). These two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success
decreases. Id.The Supreme Court recently reiterated, however, that a plaintiff seeking an injunction must demonstrate that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible. Winter
v. NRDC,129 S.Ct. 365, 374-76 (2008) (rejecting the Ninth Circuits alternative sliding scale test). The Ninth Circuit has explicitly recognized that its possibility test was
definitively refuted in Winter, and that [t]he proper legal standard for preliminary injunctive relief requires a party to demonstrate `that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that
he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest. Stormans,
Inc. v. Selecky,586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374) (reversing a district courts use of the Ninth Circuits pre-Winter, sliding-scale
standard and remanding for application of the proper standard).

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A recent Ninth Circuit ruling relying largely on the dissenting opinion in Winter parsed the language of Winter and subsequent Ninth Circuit rulings and determined that the sliding
scale test remains viable when there is a lesser showing of likelihood of success on the merits amounting to serious questions/ but not when there is a lesser showing of
likelihood of irreparable harm. See Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Coitrell, 622 F.3d 1045, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2010). This case presents some difficulty in light of Winter and
prior Ninth Circuit cases. To the extent Cottrells interpretation of Winter is inconsistent with Selecky, Selecky controls. Miller v. Gammie,335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003)
(en banc) (holding that, in the absence of an intervening Supreme Court decision, only the en banc court may overrule a decision by a three-judge panel). In any case, the
Supreme Court stated in Winter that [a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm
in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374 (citing Munaf v.
Geren,128 S.Ct. 2207, 2218-19 (2008); Amoco Prod Co. v. Gambell,480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982)) (emphases
added). The test is presented as a four-part conjunctive test, not as a four-factor balancing test, and the word likely modifies the success-on-the-merits prong in exactly the
same way it separately modifies the irreparable-harm prong. In rejecting the sliding-scale test, the Winter Court specifically emphasized the fact that the word likely modifies the
irreparable-injury prong, see id. at 375, and the word modifies the success-on-the-merits prong the same way, id. at 374. In dissent, Justice Ginsburg opined that she did not
believe the Court was abandoning the rule that it was permissible to award[ preliminary injunctive] relief based on a lower likelihood of harm when the likelihood of success is
very high. Id. at 392 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). But Justice Ginsburg, like the majority, did not address whether she believed relief could be granted when the chance of success
was less than likely. A lower likelihood is still some likelihood. We are left with the language of the test, which requires the chance of success on the merits to be at least
likely.In summary, to satisfy Winter, a movant must show that he is likely to succeed on the merits. Likely means having a high probability of occurring or being true.
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/likely. Blacks defines the likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits test as [t]he rule that a litigant who
seeks [preliminary relief] must show a reasonable probability of success. . . . Blacks Law Dictionary 1012 (9th ed. 2009). The Court must reconcile the cases by interpreting
the Cottrell serious questions requirement to be in harmony with the Winter/Selecky likelihood standard, not as being in competition with it. The movant must therefore show
that there are serious questions as to the merits of the case, such that success on the merits is likely. A claim can be weaker on the merits if it raises serious questions and the
amount of harm the injunction will prevent is very great, but the chance of success on the merits cannot be weaker than likely.III. ANALYSISBecause there is no evidence of
what entity, if any, has initiated a foreclosure, it is impossible to determine that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits, or even whether he has any chance at all beyond blind
speculation. In order to make such a finding, the Court would have to compare the notice of default against the deed of trust and any intervening substitutions of the trustee to see
whether an improper entity filed the notice of default. See Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.080(2)(c). As to the claims based in fraud, Plaintiff specifically disclaims that any actors had the
intent required to engage in fraud or conspiracy, but only that the real culprit is the system itself. (Mot. 2:42-47).2 Most of the other claims, such as unjust enrichment, breach
of fiduciary duty, and negligence, are almost certainly unmeritorious if grounded purely in a foreclosure and directed against a lender. The only claims that appear possiblenot to
say plausibleare the TILA, HOEPA, and RESPA claims, not all of which support rescission, and none of which can be assessed without examining the loan documents.
CONCLUSIONIT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 2) is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff may re-file the motion with copies
of the deed of trust and notice of default.IT IS SO ORDERED.Footnotes1. Plaintiff attaches no evidence to his motion, which is essentially a reproduction of the Complaint, to
which there is also no evidence attached.Back to Reference2. Some of Plaintiffs criticisms of the dysfunctional system of motivations that currently pervade the mortgage industry
are valid, and perhaps Congress or the State Assembly should address these issues, but unfortunately these arguments do not support a legal claim.Back to Reference
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Tags:banks-ask-questions-of-foreclosure-defendant, Foreclosure Defense, FORECLOSURE FRAUD, Mortgage Modification, produce the note, Wells Fargo Home
Mortgage, wells fargo lawsuits, wells fargo news
Moe Bedard

About Moe Bedard


I am the founder of LoanSafe.org, RealEstateSmart.TV and KnightsTemplar.TV. My work has been featured in the New York Times, LA Times, Fox Business and many other
media publications. My goal is to help people with my websites and restore hope through the internet. I was born and raised in Southern California and currently reside in
Carlsbad, California with my wife and children.
View all posts by Moe Bedard
Treasury Converts Nearly Half of Its Ally Preferred Shares to Common Stock
Todays Wells Fargo Mortgage Rates for 1/3/2011

One Response to SIFRE v. WELLS FARGO BANK: Defendant does not have standing to foreclose and fraudulently induced him
into entering into the mortgage contract
1. Darryl Hutchinsons says:
January 3, 2011 at 11:11 am
Thanks for the site Moe.Heres something for the readers;Stop Foreclosure for the Holidays!Simply look over your loan application (i.e. form 1003). Review it to
determine if the occupancy, employment, income and asset information is the same as you submitted to the loan officer. If not, get out your Deed of Trust and use this link
to join our Group and get details at no cost, are website has all the docs you need to get started: http://www.bigtent.com/groups/mrsc
(Quote) (Reply)Like or Dislike:
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RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion


10/12/12

To: keithloomis@earthlink.net
Zach Coughlin
From:Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 10/12/12 5:51 AM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net
1 attachment
~WRD000.jpg (0.8 KB)
Keith, it sure comes across like you are interrogating indigent criminal defendants, using all experience as the District Attorney for Lyon County, essentially being an
investigator/prosecutor for the City of Reno. You got upset to the extent I didn't permit you to demand answers to any an all question in the trespass case 11 cr 26405, and
grew retaliatory, refusing to subpoena materials witnesses, refusing to make completely valid arguments (ever heard of AB226?). I am disgusted by you.
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: keithloomis@earthlink.netTo: zachcoughlin@hotmail.comSubject: RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motionDate: Tue, 7 Aug 2012 16:25:40 -0700
You have already had two bail hearings. You are out on bail now. I decline to file a new request for a bail hearing.
I will be out of town on vacation from Friday August 10 and will return on Monday Aug. 20. That makes attendance at a bail hearing problematic and unlikely to be heard before your
trial.
I do think the complaint fails to allege the charge of disturbing the peace. I will make the motion to dismiss it at the time of trial.
The fact that the officer did not observe you committing a misdemeanor means he was not entitled to arrest you. You have a civil claim against RPD and the officer. That
does not mean the charge of DTP is subject to dismissal.
I will review the case involving Mr. Krebs and his request for a temporary protective order.
I need your description of what happened on the 3rd of July. Will you provide it?
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 3:38 PM
To: Keith Loomis
Subject: RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
Are you refusing to file the motions o requested?

-----Original Message----From: Keith Loomis


Sent: 7 Aug 2012 16:55:44 GMT
To: 'Zach Coughlin'
Subject: RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion

Zach
Why dont you move to represent yourself. That way you will be completely satisfied with the services you provide yourself and can do all of the things you believe are necessary.
If you want me to continue to represent you, what I asked you to provide to me was a description of the events which lead to the charge of disturbing the peace. I still need that

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description.
Keith Loomis

From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]


Sent: Monday, August 06, 2012 3:54 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov
Subject: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion

Dear Mr. Loomis and City Attorney Kadlic and Deputy City Attorney Drake,
I am writing to request that you file some motion to alter, amend, reconsider, set aside, or modify my bail in the case stemming from my JUly 3, 2012 arrest for distrubing the peace, failure to provide
proof of insurance, and failure to secure a load. I am writing to request that you file a pre trial motion (Motion to Dismiss, request for a pre trial motion and bail motion, and motion to supress police
report based upon the DTP arrest occuring for alleged conduct outside the officer's presence). If you will not file these motion (and please provide me a draft of such motions for my review prior to
filing them as well as prior to making any communication on my behalf to either the RMC or the City of Reno Prosecutor), please provide me a written indication of your rationale for so refusing, and
then please file a Motion to Withdrawal as soon as practicable. I ask this respectfully.

The police showed up to the hearing, yet I was not noticed of that fact in advance, or of the hearing itself. Further, Judge Gardner explicilty indicated he was basing his decision to raise the bail based
upon "public safety" and "concern for the defendant's safety", which are impermissible rationale for so increasin one's bail.
NRS
178.498. Many courts use a bail schedule to determine the amount, but note the
initial amount can be increased if good cause is shown. NRS 178.499. Additionally, in
determining the amount of bail, the judge should look at the following factors (NRS
178.498):
The nature and circumstances of the offense charged
The defendants financial ability to post bail
The defendants character; and
The factors listed in NRS 178.4853.
Bail can not be excessive. U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. It should be limited to a
reasonable amount designed to ensure the defendants presence in court. It should not
be a corrective or preventative detention device.

NRS 178.484. The Court should take care in imposing any restrictions on a defendants constitutional rights (i.e.,
search and seizure) and only imply such restrictions if warranted by the underlying facts
of the alleged crime. Section 11 of NRS 178.484 describes the document that must
be signed by the defendant before he/she can be released on bail.
My bail hearing contained what seems to be an impermissible coercive attempt to condition my release or the possibility thereof upon my providing confidential medical records (Lake's Crossing etc) to
the Reno Municipal Court, even where the same judge presiding over the bail hearing found me competent enough to face a criminal trepass trial less than two weeks before teh bail hearing in 11 CR
26405.
The friend of mine who posted my bail, Jared Swanson, has a serious form of cancer and a one year old baby. I request a reduction of the bail for his benefit and for the proof of insurance charge to be
dismissed, as (and I am trying to avoid this in any way I can), if I am rearrested, such a proof of insurance charge may present another basis for imposing an unduly burdensome bail upon me, as it did
on July 5th, 2012 where, despite my having produced a legible pdf copy of my proof of insurance card on my large screened zoomable smart phone, Officers Weaver and Dye still charged me with that
violation, and the bail was subsequently increase. Further, none of the events or accusations forming the basis of the distrubing the police charge occurred in the officer's presence, and the police
report contains no indication whatsoever that the arrest was made based upon NRS 171.1771. I provided Officer Weaver my driver's license prior to the arrest. I did not
refuses to give a written promise to appear in court as provided in NRS 171.1773.
When a person is believed to have committed a misdemeanor offense, the peace officer has the discretion to
either issue a citation or arrest and detain the person. NRS 171.1771 states that a person can be arrested if
his identity is questionable or if the peace officer does not believe the person will appear in court. A person
can also be arrested for a misdemeanor offense if a warrant has been issued.

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Additionally, I am requesting that you file a Motion to Dismiss the Disturbing the Peace charge based upon a lack of evidence and or insufficiency of pleading in that the allegations do not amount to a
prima facie case of a DTP violation. Further, please subpoena and or collect the Protection Order application filed by Milan Krebs on July 5th, 2012, and interview Krebs as to why he mentions
Coughlin often carrying around a large knife in a menacing manner in that protection order application, yet completely failed to mention that in his July 3rd, 2012 police report. Additionally, please
determine why Kreb's TPO appliication has a different style of handwriting on the caption compared to the descriptive sections, indicating someone pushed the filing of the TPO on Krebs, perhaps his
employer, Northwind Apartments or the RPD, which has in the days preceding the arrest threatend to arrest Coughlin for criminal trespass if he returned to any part of the premises of Northwind
Apartments, in consideration of Coughlin's eviction from unit 29, despite the fact Coughlin still had a valid right to go to his other two rentals, units 45 and 71, in addition to the fact that Northwinds
essentially withdrew or rescinded its June 28th, 2012 eviction of Coughlin by posting an Amended 5 Day Unlawful Detainer Notice on unit 29 on June 28th, 2012 shortly after Coughlin pointed out to
Northwinds and Nevada Courts Services that the July 14th, 2012 5 Day notice was not "personally served" (NCS's R. Wray lied about effecting personal service, as he could not possibly have verified
someone of "suitable age and discretion" was within the windowless room with a metal door closed and locked and where no Wray admits that he received no verbal response from the unit or anyone
therein upon his knocking on the door and or attempting to break into the unit, please see Soldal v. Cook County in that regard, a US S. Ct case) and therefore Coughlin would have had until at least
noon on July 28th, 2012 to file a Tenant's Answer, whereas the eviction/lockout/arrest of June 28th, 2012 took place two hours before noon at 10 am).
Additionally, RPD Officer Weaver had previously attempted to break into one of my rentals at Northwind at a time when he lacked a warrant and or an exigent rationale for doing so, much less an
eviction Order. I just want this case to be dismissed and to try to move on in life, and difuse the tensions incident to this case.
I did not disturb the peace at Northwinds as alleged, nor did I make the threats Kreb's accuses me of or stalk him or follow him in a threatening manner at any time. Additionaly, I never broke into nor
did I ever attempt to break into Krebs' truck, and in fact, I filed a police report in June 2012 reporting extortionate threats by another maintenance man at Northwinds ("Luke" is his name, I believe) and
Northwind's Manage Dwayne Jakob, wherein they threatened to make such a spurious allegation, but subsuquently refrained from doign so when it apparently occurred to them that I may have
excuplatory video evidence disproving such an allegation as well as capturing their baseless and extortionate threats and accusations. Additionally, please subpoene the police reports I filed with the
RPD and any emails I sent to any officers (including Weaver, Barnes, Sargent MIiller, LIeutenant Brown) and any reports of or recording of phone conversations I had with any of those RPD
personnel. Further, please see the attached june 26th, 2012 email to the RPD, WCSO, RJC, Sparks Justice Court and others pointing out the insufficiency of the 5 day Notice drafted and posted by
non-lawyers Nevada Court Services, in that under NRS 40.253 it listed the wrong forum for the tenant to file a Tenant's Answer, and under the Aiken decision of the Nevada Supreme Court and NRCP
60(b)(4), any lockout order stemming therefrom is void for lack of jurisdiction.

NRS 171.136 When arrest may be made.


1. If the offense charged is a felony or gross misdemeanor, the arrest may be made on any day, and at any time of day or night.
2. If it is a misdemeanor, the arrest cannot be made between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m., except:
(a) Upon the direction of a magistrate, endorsed upon the warrant;
(b) When the offense is committed in the presence of the arresting officer;
(c) When the person is found and the arrest is made in a public place or a place that is open to the public and:...
(2) The misdemeanor is discovered because there was probable cause for the arresting officer to stop, detain or arrest the person for another alleged violation or offense;
(d) When the offense is committed in the presence of a private person and the person makes an arrest immediately after the offense is committed;...
(g) When the person is already in custody as a result of another lawful arrest; or
Krebs did not immediately arrest me under NRS 171.136(2)(d), nor was the DTP arrest for an offense alleged to have occurred in the officer's presence.
the attached videos are of the incident on June 5th, 2012, not from July 3rd, 2012, but they support my contentions and the relevancy of subpoening the police incident reports and other
documentation should this case not be dismissed, nolle prosequi, de minimis, etc....
I will forward to you my emails to the RPD et all from June 26th, and July 2nd, 2012. I realize their tone was not a smart one to take or appropriate and am only sending them in hopes of having this
matter dismissed. I do not have any interest in pursuing anything like Wheeler v Cross 344 Fed Apps 420 (2008)
.
Sincerely,

Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
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6/08/12

NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
To zachcoughlin@hotmail.com

From:
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Sent: Fri 6/08/12 4:39 PM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
****DO NOT RESPOND TO THIS E-MAIL****
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To zachcoughlin@hotmail.com

From:
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Sent: Fri 6/08/12 4:45 PM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
****DO NOT RESPOND TO THIS E-MAIL****
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Your online report has been successfully received and the
tracking number is T12004554.
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a case number and you will receive a PDF copy as an attachment
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Thank you for using our online reporting system and please
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Your report has been approved report and the permanent number of the case is
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Your report has been approved supplemental report and the permanent number of the case is
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RE: Motion to Withdraw


8/21/12

To: keithloomis@earthlink.net
Zach Coughlin
From:Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 8/21/12 6:27 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net

Dear Mr. Loomis, Why does your Motion to Withdraw indicate withdrawing was your idea, when on the
phone you indicated you withdrew because you say I asked you to? Are you going ot withdraw from your
paycheck too?
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: keithloomis@earthlink.netTo: ZachCoughlin@hotmail.comSubject: Motion to WithdrawDate: Fri, 10 Aug 2012 11:07:42 -0700
Motion to Withdraw is attached
Keith Loomis

description of the events relevant to the 7 3 12 arrest


8/08/12
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To: keithloomis@earthlink.net
Zach Coughlin
From:Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Wed 8/08/12 12:41 AM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net

Mr. Loomis,
Nothing in Mr. Krebs witness statement or TPO application contains any truth. I dissected him on cross examination today in
the TPO extension hearing, please order the audio cd. I did not fail to provide Officer Weaver with all necessary contact
information sufficient to issue a citation, yet he continued on to make a custodial arrest then proceeded to show up to an
impromptu hearing and deprive me of my freedom for 20 days.
Cause of Action for Malpractice Against Defense Attorney for Ineffective Representation During Pretrial Phase of Criminal
Case, 42 Causes of Action 2d 707 Criminal defendant brought a civil action under 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 against a public
defender, alleging that he, the criminal defendant, had been deprived of his civil rights under color of state law by reason of the
public defender's professional malpractice in defending him. Such cases are collected in the annotation entitled "Court-appointed
attorney as subject to liability under 42 U.S.C.A. 1983," appearing at 36 A.L.R. Fed. 594. Attorney's liability for malpractice
in connection with defense of criminal case, 53 A.L.R.3d 731 In each of the following cases, a public defender was held not to
be immune from liability for professional malpractice. In Spring v Constantino (1975) 168 Conn 563, 362 A2d 871, an action
by a state criminal defendant against a public defender for malpractice, the court held that an attorney occupying the position of
public defender and assigned to represent an indigent defendant did not enjoy immunity from liability for professional
malpractice. Stating that a public defender is like any other attorney whose duties as an officer of the court and to an individual
client and whose principled and fearless conduct of the defense are not deterred by the prospect of liability, the court rejected the
contention of the public defender that the doctrine of judicial immunity should be extended to public defenders on the ground
that the immunity rule is designed to promote principled and fearless decisionmaking by removing the fear that unsatisfied
litigants might bring harassing actions. The court also rejected the contention that the common-law doctrine of sovereign
immunity which extends to public officials applied to a malpractice action brought against a public defender, saying that a public
defender, in representing an indigent, is not a public official, since even though the state must insure that indigents are
represented by competent counsel, it could not be argued that the actual conduct of the defense of an individual is a
governmental act. The court also rejected the third suggested ground of immunity: the statutory immunity of public officers and
state employees. The court said that while it was true that a public defender could be told when he is to work and within what
area, those elements of control were indicia of the master-servant relationship and incidents of a public defender's employment
which are not within the scope of the attorney-client relationship. Stating that the independence of the public defender was a key
constitutional underpinning of the public defender system, the court said that other than the source of the public defender's
compensation, the relationship of public defender and client is the same as that of privately employed counsel and client. A
public defender was held not to be immune from liability for malpractice, in Reese v Danforth (1979) 486 Pa 479, 406 A2d
735, 6 ALR4th 758, In holding that the public defender was not a public official entitled to immunity, the court said that the
overriding duty of zealous representation of a client's interest attaches to the role of the public defender and thus the
performance of that duty by the defender was similar to the performance of privately retained counsel. Stating that the
relationship between the county and the public defender was similar to that between an independent contractor and the party
contracting his services, the court said that while the availability of court-appointed counsel to represent indigents is indubitably
the public business, once the appointment of a public defender in a given case is made, his state or public function ceases and
thereafter he functions purely as a private attorney concerned with servicing his client, and his professional relationship with his
client takes on all the obligations and protections attendant upon a private attorney-client relationship except that the public pays
the attorney's fee. The court also rejected the contentions that not granting immunity to the public defender would hinder the
recoupment of able lawyers to represent indigents, and would inhibit the defender's professional discretion in declining to press
the frivolous, to assign priorities between indigent litigants, and to make strategic decisions with regard to a particular litigant as
to how his interest may best be advanced. In the following case, a public defender was held not liable for the malpractice of one
of his deputies. A public defender was held not to be liable solely by virtue of his office, for the malpractice of one of his
deputies, in Sanchez v Murphy (1974, DC Nev) 385 F Supp 1362. Stating that the professional relationship between courtappointed counsel and indigent criminal defendants under public defender systems is no different than that between a client and
privately retained counsel, the court went on to say that the relationship of the public defender and his deputies among
themselves was not a partnership relationship, since the economic justification for holding one partner liable for the misconduct
of another partner was grounded on the fact that fees for services are shared, whereas each of the public defender attorneys was
compensated independently by salary for his own services. Stating that a deputy public defender is an independent officer, the
court noted that there was substantial authority in support of the rule that in the absence of statute imposing liability or of
negligence on his part in appointing or supervising his assistants, a public officer is not liable for the default and misfeasance of
assistants appointed by him. Related Annotations are located under the Research References heading of this Annotation.
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: Plaintiff's malpractice action against public defender was not precluded by quasihttps://bay002.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=e26af83d-ceee-447b-8cd9-fe83c7ea76ec,m,8435fe3e-c569-4108-a888-0ab2ee600809,m,319ee7

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judicial immunity. Wilcox v. Brummer, 739 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1999). Public defender attorneys were not
entitled to sovereign immunity from legal malpractice claims brought by former client convicted in criminal case and later
exonerated.
Please subpoena both RPD Officers Weaver and Dye, in addition to Officer Barnes, who twice came to Northwind with Officer
Weaver on two separate occasions to harrass me.
Please serve a supboena duces tecum for all the 10 or so incident reports the RPD testified about. They are relevant beyond the
bail hearing, they provide context as to the legitimacy of the disturbing the peace allegations. If you refuse to do this or file a
pret-trial motion to dismiss, please move to have yourself removed from the case immediately.
Stages Of A Criminal Case Pretrial Motions
Pretrial motions arguments concerning what is and is not admissible during a criminal trial are made after the preliminary hearing, yet before the case is taken to trial. They are
presented to the criminal court judge. Pretrial motions can be made by both the prosecution and the defense in criminal cases, and are made in order to set limits on the trial.
Often, either the defense or the prosecution will make arguments as to what evidence can be used in the criminal trial, or what testimonies should be allowed or disallowed in the
trial. For example, the defense or prosecution may argue that a particular person should or should not be allowed to testify during the trial. Pretrial motions can also be made to
dismiss the criminal trial entirely. For obvious reasons, the defense will make a pretrial motion for dismissal of trial. Generally, there are two major arguments that are used for a
pretrial motion for dismissal: the lack of personal jurisdiction and the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A common example of a defense's pretrial motion is the exclusion of a
police officer's testimony. For example, if the suspects' responses to the officer were made before the officer read the suspect his or her Miranda rights, the defense would
request that these statements be excluded from the trial proceedings. In other cases, the defense may request that the trial be dismissed due to the fact that the police officer did
not have probable cause to arrest the suspect. If the defendant's attorney has substantial evidence that the police officer did not have probable cause for arresting the suspect, it is
very likely that the trial will be dismissed. A prosecution's pretrial motion could include the exclusion of a particular witness. For example, the prosecution could argue that an
elderly witness with Alzheimer's is not legally competent to testify, and ask that this witness be excluded at trial.Some other examples of common pretrial motions include motion
for a change of venue, motion for exclusion of physical evidence, motion to suppress a warrantless search, motion for exculpatory evidence, motion for interpreter, motion to
transfer pleadings and motion for continuance.Pretrial motions set the boundaries of the trial, and can even address the issue of whether or not the defendant should be forced to
stand trial. There are nearly endless possibilities of pretrial motions, but all must be settled before the trial proper can begin.

I had a TPO extension hearing today involving Milan Krebs, a maintenance man at Northwind Apartments. Please order a copy
of the audio cd from the hearing and provide me with a copy of it or email me a link to it or the files. He was a percipient
witness, a material one in RCR2012-067980 (he was the person utilizing the sawzall to cut open the door on the rental). The
RJC case number for that TPO is RCP2012j-000287.
I you will not order and provide a copy of that hearing to me, please indicate so immediately. I have sensed from you an utter
derision towards me in everything you have done in any of the cases for which you have sought to appear on my behalf. Further,
you have so far failed to reply to most every material inquiry I have made of you, and when you have, it has unfailingly been to
refuse to perform some basic and completely essential task or filing necessary to my defense. I need to know right away if you
are going to go to bat on this or not.; attorneys' duty to client arose independently of their state employment. Johnson v.
Halloran, 312 Ill. App. 3d 695, 245 Ill. Dec. 408, 728 N.E.2d 490 (1st Dist. 2000), appeal allowed, 189 Ill. 2d 688 (2000). The
court in Dziubak v Mott (1993, Minn) 503 NW2d 771 held that a public defender is immune from liability for malpractice: In
contrast, the court in Veneri v Pappano (1993, Pa Super) 622 A2d 977 noted that a public defender is not immune from liability
for malpractice.Further, I have not met with any response or action from you, Mr. Goodnight, Ms. Rains, Mr. Bosler, Mr.
Dogan, or anyone else with your office with respect to the Mental Health Court breaching the contract I signed with it, causing
me reputational damage and prejudice in the eyes of Judges Pearson, Clifton, and Sferrazza. Both Judge Pearson and Judge
Sferrazza indicated to me in open Court that they were told, essentially, that I flunked out of Mental Health Court. That is clearly
not the case. Rather, the Mental Health Court sought to unilaterally alter materials terms of the contract I entered into with it.
The materials Joe Goodnight forwarded to me from the Mental Health Court and the materials provided directly to me by the
Mental Health Court made clear what medications were not permissible for participants to take. None of the listed medications
or classes of medications in any way related to stimulant based medications prescribed for treatment of either Adult ADHD or
treatment resistant depression. Only after I agreed to the offer put forth by the Mental Health Court and the matter was
transferred there from District Court (and the same could be said for a criminal trespass case I defended against in the RMC
11CR26405, for which I received a criminal trespass conviction that I reported to both the State Bar of Nevada and the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)).
11. Failure to adequately investigate case
[Cumulative Supplement]
A criminal malpractice claim may be stated against former defense attorneys by alleging that they
neglected their reasonable duties by, among other misconduct, failing to investigate the criminal case,
where the plaintiff's imprisonment was proximately caused by the neglect and the plaintiff initiated
postconviction relief premised on ineffective assistance of counsel, successfully obtaining vacation of
the judgment of conviction. Dow v. Jones, 232 F. Supp. 2d 491 (D. Md. 2002) (applying Maryland
law). The issue of whether a criminal defense attorney fulfilled the duty to the client to thoroughly investigate
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the facts surrounding the criminal charge may preclude summary judgment in the attorney's
favor on the client's criminal malpractice claim. Canady v. Shwartz, 62 Ohio App. 3d 742, 577
N.E.2d 437 (10th Dist. Franklin County 1989). A criminal malpractice claim against appointed defense
attorney grounded partly on avowed failures to investigate victims for impeachment purposes,
to locate and interview known witnesses, and to locate experts, has been rejected. Browne v. Robb,
583 A.2d 949 (Del. 1990) (conclusory allegations regarding former counsel's bad faith and gross negligence
were insufficient to overcome statutory grant of qualified immunity).
It is typically difficult enough for a criminal malpractice plaintiff to succeed in avoiding summary
judgment for the defendant. Thus, to obtain outright summary judgment in the plaintiff's favor is even
more challenging. For example, a court has denied a former prisoner's summary judgment motion
against the defense attorneys who represented him in a murder prosecution, reasoning that his cause
of action, grounded on a failure to locate and interview eyewitnesses, came exceedingly close to
demonstrating the attorneys' malpractice as a matter of law but was just barely lacking. Sullivan v.
Wiener, 1989 WL 65163 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (unreported decision) (applying Illinois law). For a discussion
of summary judgment in criminal malpractice actions generally, see 27.
Illustration:
In an earlier opinion in the course of the Sulllivan case, the court described the actions of counsel and
cocounsel which allegedly constituted criminal malpractice in failing to investigate the case. The
state's discovery response and the police reports of the crime disclosed the names, addresses, and
some of the phone numbers of five eyewitnesses to the alleged murder. These reports disclosed that
the testimony of each of the witnesses would be exculpatory. However, before trial defense counsel
failed to seek appointment of an investigator to locate the witnesses and did not seek a continuance to
have further time to locate them. Furthermore, the attorney did not claim that he tried once to reach
the witnesses by mail and then asked the client's aunt to try to locate them; however, these efforts
were unavailing. Before trial, defense counsel turned the case over to cocounsel who also failed to try
to locate the five witnesses. Sullivan v. Wiener, 1989 WL 18243 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (unreported opinion).
A former defense counsel who does not succeed in obtaining summary judgment may nonetheless
establish on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support a plaintiff's verdict. Thus, in one
case, the plaintiff's evidence, establishing that the attorney failed to call certain witnesses, to procure
certain evidence, and to investigate matters of defense, and that the plaintiff was convicted even
though someone else later confessed to the crime, did not establish a prima facie case. The trial court
was thus found to have erred in denying defense counsel's motion for a directed verdict. Olson v.
North, 276 Ill. App. 457, 1934 WL 2941 (2d Dist. 1934).
Illustration:
A court dismissed a convicted criminal's legal malpractice complaint against his former defense lawyer,
where the convict had unsuccessfully moved to vacate his conviction on the basis of ineffective
assistance, involving the trial lawyer's purported failure to call two alibi witnesses and to interview an
unnamed witness. The convict alleged only vague and general failure of the lawyer to locate and interview
witnesses who would have rendered suitable support for the defense and failed to identify
what these witnesses would have testified to and how they would have supported a defense that
would have led to his acquittal. Bigelow v. Knight, 737 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1990) (apparently applying District of Columbia law).
A criminal malpractice claim will not be established on the basis of a failure to adequately investigate
merely because the client was show to have been factually innocent. Thus, a public defender
was found to have fully investigated a case prior to advising a client to enter into a plea bargain and,
thus, was not liable to the former client for criminal malpractice, following the client's release from
prison after the actual perpetrators of the robbery confessed to the crime, counsel had reviewed the
transcript of the preliminary hearing, received full discovery from the prosecution, and discussed the
case with the client several times before the plea hearing. The attorney's inability to establish the defense
was due to the client's insufficient memory as to his whereabouts at the time of the robbery
rather than attorney malfeasance, the court concluded. Pearson v. Sublette, 730 P.2d 909 (Colo. App
1986) (affirming summary judgment for counsel).
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Issue of whether attorney's alleged failure to fully explore effect of subordination agreement that
was listed in title insurance commitment, relating to loan transaction between former client and third
party, amounted to malpractice was for jury in former client's legal malpractice action against law
firm. Manios v. Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, LLP, 697 S.E.2d 644 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010).
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
12. Failure to depose or subpoena witnesses
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Courts that have addressed legal malpractice claims against a criminal defense attorney for an alleged
failure to depose or subpoena witnesses during pretrial proceedings have usually rejected these
claims. Underwood v. Woods, 406 F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1969) (applying Missouri law) (barred by statute
of limitations, but merits addressed); State ex rel. O'Blennis v. Adolf, 691 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. Ct.
App. E.D. 1985) (plaintiff was collaterally estopped by guilty plea from relitigating in criminal malpractice
suit the alleged failures to subpoena and call witnesses to establish misidentification and
alibi defenses); Alberici v. Tinari, 374 Pa. Super. 20, 542 A.2d 127 (1988) (a prior ruling that defense
counsel had provided effective assistance at a mail fraud prosecution precluded relitigation on the issue
of a purported failure to arrange for the attendance of various witnesses or potential suspects at
the criminal trial).
Illustration:
A former client suing former attorneys for damages for negligence in connection with their defense of
a criminal action against him failed to prove any injury resulting from any negligence of the attorneys
in failing to take depositions of certain witnesses for a criminal case that had been ultimately dismissed.
The case explained that even if the statute were not a bar to the action, the purported negligence
could not be predicated on the attorneys' failure to take the requested depositions of persons
prior to the time when they were entitled to take the depositions in a criminal action under the thengoverning Missouri rule of practice. The depositions could not be taken as steps in the defense of a
criminal action until an indictment or information was filed. Furthermore, the Missouri criminal rule
authorized a defendant in any criminal case pending in any court to obtain the deposition of a witness.
Under case law precedent, a criminal case is not deemed instituted or pending until an information
is filed or an indictment returned. Underwood v. Woods, 406 F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1969).
A failure to adequately allege proximate cause may defeat a convict's legal malpractice action
against appointed trial counsel for, inter alia, failing to subpoena helpful witnesses. The complaint
must allege how or on what ground the convict would have been successful in securing postrelief relief,
including freedom from prison. Ibn-Sadiika v. Riester, 380 Pa. Super. 397, 551 A.2d 1112
(1988) (convict's allegations about witnesses who should have been called were appallingly vague
and conclusory). Thus, on review of the dismissal of a convict's criminal malpractice claim alleging
a failure to subpoena witnesses, the trial court may properly exercise discretion to deny leave to
amend the complaint to cure defects, where the convict's appellate brief does not contain additional
factual averments demonstrating how defense counsel's omissions affected the outcome of the trial or
would have provided a basis for posttrial relief. Ibn-Sadiika v. Riester, 380 Pa. Super. 397, 551 A.2d
1112 (1988). For discussion of pleading generally, see 22.
In cases displaying quite outrageous conduct of defense counsel relating to pretrial witness issues,
however, criminal malpractice plaintiffs have succeeded in at least stating a claim for relief, if not always
or prevailing at trial or even managing to survive summary judgment motions of the defendant.
Former clients have been successful in cases alleging a failure to interview or even try to interview
any of the prosecution witnesses. Thus, one court explained that even the untutored eye could
identify the egregious blundering of defense counsel. Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196 (1st Cir.
1987) (applying Massachusetts law). Counsel claimed to have relied on the police as his sole source
of information about the facts surrounding the case which the court described as asking the fox to
guard the chicken coop. Another aggravating factor in this case was that counsel had tried to procure
the client's release by engaging, against the client's wishes, in deal-making with the police rather than
requesting a formal hearing before the judge; consulting appropriately with the arrestee; establishing
a psychiatric case for competency; or interviewing witnesses. Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196
(1st Cir. 1987) (applying Massachusetts law) (affirming a $50,000 damages award which had been
reduced by remittitur from $500,000).
13. Failure to appear or to adequately argue pretrial motions
Counsel may be sued for failing to properly arrange for a continuance of pretrial proceedings in a
criminal matter. The claim may succeed in a case of egregious misconduct, and indeed, enhanced
damages may be appropriate, as for emotional distress. See discussion generally at 34. For example,
in one case, an arrestee who was charged with issuing a worthless check contacted defense counsel
who had assisted him within other legal matters and who purportedly stated that he would take care
of an upcoming court appearance. Although defense counsel arranged for a continuance with an assistant
prosecutor, no continuance was arranged for with the trial court, which declared a bond forfeiture
and issued an arrest warrant when the arrestee failed to appear as scheduled. Weeks later, after
the arrestee received a sheriff's letter notifying him that he was in contempt of court and would be arrested
if he failed to turn himself in. The arrestee showed the letter to defense counsel who allegedly
said that would take care of the matter but then took no action. The arrestee was taken into custody
for the failure to appear and was jailed for up to three hours. Later, when counsel failed to appear at a
hearing, the trial judge recommended that the arrestee hire new counsel who then resolved both of the
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criminal matters. In evaluating whether emotional damages were warranted, the court noted that the
general rule applicable in cases of unintentional negligencethat mental suffering unaccompanied by
bodily injury will not support recoverydoes not apply in cases of wanton or willful acts or where
the act it is committed with malice and intended to cause mental distress, and here the arrestee did not
contend that he suffered physical injury but argued instead that counsel's conduct was wanton. According
to the court, counsel should have realized that the bond would be forfeited and his client
placed in jail if the matter was not properly handled. The court explained that someone being negligently
deprived of freedom suffers an injury that can cause mental distress and that a question of fact
was presented for the jury to determine on whether emotional distress was caused by counsel's actions.
Furthermore, remand was required because the extent of the arrestee's emotional distress was
not fully developed at trial due to a partial summary judgment before trial against the arrestee on the
issue. Bowman v. Doherty, 235 Kan. 870, 686 P.2d 112 (1984).
In a Colorado case, the failure to argue a motion to suppress an identification which had been
filed with the trial court did not render a public defender liable to the former client for legal malpractice,
following the client's release from prison, where the defender investigated and researched the
motion and believed that it was groundless, and the district attorney had represented to the defender
that the plea bargain would no longer be available to the client if the defender proceeded on the motion.
Pearson v. Sublette, 730 P.2d 909 (Colo. App 1986). Collateral estoppel has been applied to bar
a plaintiff from asserting in a criminal malpractice action that trial counsel had negligently failed to
make any pretrial, trial, or posttrial motions to suppress evidence concerning a search warrant. Hall v.
Barrett, 412 N.W.2d 648 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987).
A former client contended that as a direct result of the defendants' negligent acts he was forced to
seek substitute counsel to defend him with short notice and preparation, resulting in his conviction in
federal court, a criminal malpractice action was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel where
after a full and fair opportunity to pursue his argument, the federal appellate court had on appeal had
determined that his defense of the criminal action was not prejudiced. Indeed, the Second Circuit had
stated that the former client had made only generalized allegations of prejudice and had not shown
any specific way in which the defense was hampered and explained that not only was the continuance
not shown to be an abuse of discretion but that, furthermore, the record established that the former
client was represented vigorously and competently by his counsel. Rastelli v. Sutter, Moffatt, Yannelli
& Zerin, P. C., 87 A.D.2d 865, 449 N.Y.S.2d 305 (2d Dep't 1982).
213. Handling criminal defense matters
West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Attorney and Client 106, 107, 109
A.L.R. Library
Legal malpractice in defense of criminal prosecution, 4 A.L.R.5th 273
Public defender's immunity from liability for malpractice, 6 A.L.R.4th 774
Trial Strategy
Inadequate Factual Investigation of Case by Attorney, 104 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 317
Legal MalpracticeInadequate Case Investigation, 16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 549
Actions Against Attorneys for Professional Negligence, 14 Am. Jur. Trials 265
An attorney may incur liability for malpractice through negligence in handling matters of
criminal defense.[1] Failure of an attorney to take steps to reduce a sentence in excess of the
maximum penalty,[2] failure to file a petition for certiorari,[3] failure to file a postconviction
relief motion,[4] or failure to raise an appropriate defense may constitute negligence.[5]
In criminal cases, the legal standard of ineffective assistance of counsel and the standard
for legal malpractice are equivalent, and where the issue of competent counsel is litigated, collateral
estoppel will bar a malpractice action.[6] However, constitutional protections afforded
a criminal defendant through the appellate process and post-conviction filings should not be
used by an attorney as a liability shield.[7]
A public defender is not protected from liability for malpractice, because the public de7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law 213
fender, as advocate, owes a duty to his or her client indistinguishable from that of privately retained
counsel.[8]
An attorney may be liable to a prisoner for malpractice where the attorney accepts a fee
from the prisoner but does not pursue post-conviction relief within the limitations period.[9]
While a criminal legal malpractice action requires all the proof essential to a civil malpractice
claim, a criminal malpractice action will fail if the claimant does not allege and prove, by
a preponderance of the evidence, actual innocence.[10] The statute of limitation for legal malpractice
does not begin to run until the client has been exonerated of the criminal offense
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through reversal on direct appeal, post-conviction relief, or otherwise.[11]


CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Where a plaintiff does not claim to be innocent of the crime for which he was convicted,
he cannot bring a suit for legal malpractice arising out of the conviction. Herrera-Corral v.
Hyman, 408 Ill. App. 3d 672, 350 Ill. Dec. 173, 948 N.E.2d 242 (1st Dist. 2011).
Criminal legal malpractice based on client's claim that his defense counsel failed to timely
file state proceedings related to his convictions in order to toll one-year limitations period
governing federal habeas corpus review required client to prove his actual innocence on
charges of conviction. Gaylor v. Jeffco, 999 A.2d 290 (N.H. 2010).
There is no cause of action for legal malpractice, arising from the negligent representation
of a client in a criminal proceeding, as long as the determination of the client's guilt for that
offense remains undisturbed. Humphries v. Detch, 712 S.E.2d 795 (W. Va. 2011).
Attorney appointed by federal court to represent criminal defendant, in a federal criminal
prosecution, had absolute immunity from purely state law claims of legal malpractice that derived
from attorney's conduct in underlying criminal proceedings; federal law provided immunity
from legal malpractice for lawyers appointed by Federal Public Defender Office, Legislature
provided immunity to appointed defense attorneys, and if appointed attorneys were
subject to unbridled legal malpractice claims, it would have negative impact on quality and
number of attorneys who would agree to accept appointment by federal courts to represent indigents.
West's Ann.W.Va.Code, 292120. Mooney v. Frazier, 693 S.E.2d 333 (W. Va.
2010).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] Geddie v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
1978), writ denied, 356 So. 2d 1011 (La. 1978).
A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate
the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.
Caston v. State, 823 So. 2d 473 (Miss. 2002).
[FN2] Geddie v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
1978), writ denied, 356 So. 2d 1011 (La. 1978).
[FN3] Moultrie v. State, 542 S.W.2d 835 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).
[FN4] Baldayaque v. U.S., 338 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2003).
[FN5] Martin v. Hall, 20 Cal. App. 3d 414, 97 Cal. Rptr. 730, 53 A.L.R.3d 719 (2d
Dist. 1971).
[FN6] McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
[FN7] Bailey v. Tucker, 533 Pa. 237, 621 A.2d 108 (1993).
[FN8] Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 100 S. Ct. 402, 62 L. Ed. 2d 355 (1979); Sullivan
v. Freeman, 944 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1991).
[FN9] Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So. 2d 1242 (Miss. 1991).
[FN10] Rodriguez v. Nielsen, 259 Neb. 264, 609 N.W.2d 368 (2000); Mahoney v.
Shaheen, Cappiello, Stein & Gordon, P.A., 143 N.H. 491, 727 A.2d 996 (1999).
[FN11] Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or. 221, 851 P.2d 556 (1993).
AMJUR ATTNYS 213
IV. Remedies or Relief
33. Generally
In addition to compensatory damages, plaintiffs in criminal malpractice actions have been awarded
or have at least stated claims for emotional damages ( 34). However, punitive damages may be
difficult to establish in light of the demanding standard of malfeasance that is required ( 35).
The fact that a defendant might have a remedy within the criminal justice system under a postconviction
hearing act does not preclude the defendant from pursuing civil remedies based on allegedly
negligent conduct of his court-appointed attorney. ei bon ee baya ghananee v. Black, 350 Pa. Super.
134, 504 A.2d 281 (1986) (applying 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 9541 et seq.). One court has described
the difference in the remedies that are sought when a criminal defendant challenges a conviction
on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel and when a former criminal defendant brings a
civil suit complaining of ineffective representation that amounts to criminal malpractice. In the criminal
context, due process is at stake and the remedy for a failure to provide it is to afford the defendant
new trial. In a civil damages action against the defendant's attorney, by contrast, traditional tort
concepts apply, and thus one who claims damages for such negligence must allege and prove that the
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malfeasance proximately caused damages for which recompense is sought. Mylar v. Wilkinson, 435
So. 2d 1237 (Ala. 1983) (holding modified on other grounds by, Morrison v. Franklin, 655 So. 2d
964 (Ala. 1995)). The actual innocence requirement for a criminal legal malpractice case applies regardless
of whether the former criminal defendant is seeking damages for a wrongful conviction or a
longer sentence or seeks attorney's fees. Lynch v. Warwick, 95 Cal. App. 4th 267, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d
391 (4th Dist. 2002).
34. Emotional damages
Emotional damages may be available in a criminal malpractice suit. Bowman v. Doherty, 235
Kan. 870, 686 P.2d 112 (1984); Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying Massachusetts
law) (due to conduct of attorney, client was involuntarily committed to mental institution
and injury was reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances). A criminal defendant stated a legal
malpractice cause of action against his court-appointed attorney by alleging that the attorney had a
legal duty to represent him, that the attorney failed to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge, and that
the attorney's failure to get his case dismissed resulted in prolonged incarceration and irreversible
harm to the criminal defendant's reputation as well as any wrongful imprisonment and mental, physical,
and psychological harm. Hill v. Thorne, 430 Pa. Super. 551, 635 A.2d 186 (1993). An attorney
could be found liable for legal malpractice for the emotional distress suffered by a client from his loss
of liberty caused by the attorney's alleged negligent representation, if the client would have obtained
release from prison but for the attorney's alleged legal malpractice. Snyder v. Baumecker, 708 F.
Supp. 1451 (D.N.J. 1989) (applying New Jersey law). Furthermore, another court, also applying New
Jersey law, has ruled that a client could recover damages for emotional distress when the relationship
with the former attorney was predicated upon a liberty interest rather than a purely economic interest.
Illustration:
A client was permitted to prove damages for emotional distress attributable to the extra 20 months of
confinement in a maximum-security penitentiary which were allegedly due to the negligent representation.
The client conceded that, on the advice of retained defense counsel, he pleaded guilty and received
a 25-year prison sentence in a maximum-security penitentiary. The plaintiff alleged that defense
counsel recommended the acquiesced in the guilty plea without investigating whether a factual
basis existed for it, especially concerning an element involving the use of weapons. After obtaining
partial relief with the assistance of a different attorney, the client was released from prison after
serving about five years and then contended that absent the negligent representation, he would have
served no more than 40 months in prison. The client brought an action for criminal malpractice, seeking
compensation for emotional anguish that he allegedly suffered during the additional 20 months of
confinement. In awarding relief, the court distinguished a case in which damages for the plaintiff clients'
emotional distress was denied, explaining that a merely economic relationship was at stake there
rather than an interest in liberty. The court drew an analogy with a case that allowed the recovery of
emotional damages for a failure to inform the parents of a Down syndrome child of the availability of
an amniocentesis prior to birth. Lawson v. Nugent, 702 F. Supp. 91 (D.N.J. 1988) (applying New Jersey
law).
A plaintiff may succeed in a legal malpractice action, recovering emotional distress damages for
unlawful confinement, where the prison confinement was under a sentence that exceeded the maximum
penalty for the crime. Geddie v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App. 4th
Cir. 1978), writ denied, 356 So. 2d 1011 (La. 1978). In this case, the parties stipulated that the sole
issues before the appellate court were the trial judge's method of calculating the term of excessive incarceration
and the amount of the award. Although the court did not examine the propriety of emotional
distress damages for wrongful confinement, in reducing the plaintiff's award, the court implicitly
approved the trial court's decision to allow proof of emotional damages. Geddie v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1978), writ denied, 356 So. 2d 1011 (La.
1978). One court has determined that the defense attorney negligence was the failure to act, causing
the client to be placed in jail and deprived of his freedom. The negligent deprivation of freedom
causes an injury that could result in mental distress, the court explained. Bowman v. Doherty, 235
Kan. 870, 686 P.2d 112 (1984) (reversing a lower court's ruling that limited proof of emotional distress
damages).
Damages for emotional distress have been awarded to the prevailing party in a criminal malpractice
action where the attorney negligently withdrew from the case. Delesdernier v. Porterie, 666 F.2d
116, 9 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1196 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying Louisiana law) (alleging attorney's withdrawal
from her case only two months before trial after he had represented client for 15 years). Although
the issue on appeal was whether the trial court acted properly in granting a remittitur, the
court found that the evidence supported a finding that the plaintiff suffered some emotional distress
from counsel's withdrawal and thus, the court implicitly approved the trial court's decision to allow
proof of plaintiff's emotional distress. Ordering a remittitur of the $25,000 verdict to $10,000 was
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found not to be an abuse of discretion, since the verdict was not clearly within the range of possible
awards supported by the evidence and the record did not indicate a greater award than $10,000. The
appellate court was influenced by the client's admission that she was able to find new counsel to obtain
an extension of time for trial shortly after the attorney withdrew. Delesdernier v. Porterie, 666
F.2d 116, 9 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1196 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying Louisiana law).
Illustration:
In one case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant refused to render assistance to the decedent because
his fees remained unpaid, had failed to return the plaintiff's phone messages, and did not visit
the decedent in jail at any time after his not guilty plea was entered. The court explained that these
facts certainly alleged sufficiently egregious or extraordinary circumstances under the governing
judicial precedent, and thus the plaintiff could proceed to prove damages for the emotional distress
suffered by the decedent from the loss of liberty allegedly caused by the defendant's negligent representation.
The court noted, however, that the plaintiff had the formidable burden of proving that absent
the malpractice the decedent would have obtained release from prison. Nonetheless, the court
reasoned, whether a recovery is remote or even unlikely is not the standard in determining whether a
pleading can withstand a motion to dismiss, and thus the plaintiff was entitled to offer evidence to
prove her claim. Snyder v. Baumecker, 708 F. Supp. 1451 (D.N.J. 1989) (applying New Jersey law).
A client's failure to prove actual innocence may preclude recovery on a legal malpractice claim,
even though the client sought compensation not for his or her conviction but only for civil contempt
fines and fees the client paid to attorneys. Thus, in one case, after the client was convicted of numerous
felonies in connection with an alleged Medicaid fraud, he brought a legal malpractice action
against the attorneys who represented him during the grand jury investigation that led to his convictions,
seeking damages for civil contempt fines and attorney's fees that he claimed were incurred as
result of the attorneys' flawed legal representation. The court reasoned that the attorneys' conduct that
the client challenged consisted of professional judgments intended to avert indictment and ultimate
conviction, and this conduct could not be logically disentangled from the process of representing the
defendant in the criminal proceeding. Mahoney v. Shaheen, Cappiello, Stein & Gordon, P.A., 143
N.H. 491, 727 A.2d 996 (1999).
35. Punitive damages
In those somewhat rare cases in which a plaintiff succeeds in establishing liability for criminal
malpractice, (having overcome the onerous burdens often imposed by requirements to demonstrate
exoneration or even innocence and the danger of an adverse application of issue preclusion), the facts
may evince egregious malfeasance that will authorize an award of punitive damages against the
former defense counsel. The actual malice necessary to recover punitive damages in tort actions
means evil motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud, and this standard applies to criminal malpractice
actions. Dow v. Jones, 232 F. Supp. 2d 491 (D. Md. 2002) (applying Maryland law). Thus, a complaint
in a criminal malpractice action against former trial attorneys, stating, without more, that they
made intentional misrepresentations to the client regarding their experience and expertise and that
this conduct constituted actual malice sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages, may lack the
level of specificity and factual detail required under state law to state a claim for actual malice. Dow
v. Jones, 232 F. Supp. 2d 491 (D. Md. 2002) (applying Maryland law).
V. Appendix
36. Sample case
COA Synopsis
The requirement that a client asserting a legal malpractice claim against an attorney representing
him or her in a criminal matter must prove actual innocence did not apply to a client who did not
challenge any tactical or strategic decision bearing upon his convictions but rather alleged that the attorney's
alleged filing of an unauthorized motion to withdraw the guilty pleain violation of conditions
of a plea agreement that would permit the client to petition for a suspension of part of his sentence
resulted in a denial of the client's motion to suspend a portion of the sentence. The client in
Hilario v. Reardon, 158 N.H. 56, 960 A.2d 337 (2008), sought to be compensated for the breach of
the plea agreement resulting from the alleged malpractice of his attorney which occurred well after
the client accepted criminal responsibility for his acts.
37. Sample complaint
Adapted from Hood and Henry, Alabama Criminal Trial Practice Forms 9:4 (2007 ed.).
IN THE COURT OF [NAME OF COUNTY], ALABAMA
[Name of plaintiff],
Plaintiff,
v.
[List of names of defendants], Civil Action No. [civil action number]
and A through F, being those
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attorneys who were members of


Defendant law firm
[name of defendant law firm],
LLP, whose names are otherwise unknown to
plaintiff, but whose names
will be substituted by amendment when ascertained,
Defendants.
COMPLAINT
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through [his/her] undersigned counsel and makes this complaint
against Defendants:
Parties
1. Plaintiff, [name of plaintiff], is over the age of nineteen years and is a resident of [name of
county], [name of state].
2. At all relevant times hereto, Defendant [name of defendant law firm], LLP (hereinafter sometimes
referred to as Defendant law firm) was a law firm comprised of attorneys licensed to and
conducting business in the State of [name of state]. Upon information and belief, at all relevant
times, Defendant [name of defendant law firm], LLP had its principal place of business in the
City of [name of city], County of [name of county], State of [name of state]. Defendant law firm
and fictitious Defendants A through F are in the legal business of representing citizens of the
State of [name of state] in civil and criminal matters. Upon information and belief fictitious Defendants
A through F are over the age of 19 years and residents of [name of county], [name of
state].
3. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, Defendant [name of defendant attorney],
Esq. (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Defendant attorney) was an attorney licensed to practice
law and was an owner, shareholder, partner, employee, agent and/or principal of the Defendant
law firm [name of defendant law firm], LLP. Upon information and belief, Defendant [name
of defendant attorney], Esq. is a resident of [name of county], [name of state].
4. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, Defendant [name of defendant private investigator]
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as Defendant private investigator) was a private
investigator licensed in the State of[name of state] and/or had [his/her] principal place of business
in the State of [name of state]. Upon information and belief, Defendant [name of defendant
private investigator] is a resident of [name of county], [name of state].
FACTS
5. On or about the [date of arrest], Plaintiff was arrested and charged with armed robbery, carjacking,
and destruction of property in the case of United States v. [name of plaintiff], Felony No.
[number of felony. Plaintiff was held without bond in this matter, and thus, was not released from
prison until the [date of release from prison].
6. On or about the [name of defendant attorney], Defendant attorney was appointed by the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama to represent Plaintiff in this serious criminal
matter.
7. Defendant private investigator was hired by Defendant attorney to assume the responsibilities
of private investigation for this serious criminal matter.
8. On or about the [date of commencement of trial], the criminal trial commenced before the Honorable
Judge [name of judge] in the U.S. District Court.
9. During the criminal trial, Defendant attorney's actions were grossly negligent. Furthermore,
Defendant attorney's legal representation of the Plaintiff was seriously ineffective and displayed
wanton and willful conduct.
10. Examples of Defendant attorney's ineffective and grossly negligent legal representation of the
Plaintiff, include but are not limited to, imbibing in alcohol during the day while the trial was taking
place; failing to properly protect Plaintiff's rights; failing to provide effective assistance of
counsel; failing to properly investigate the case; failing to properly direct or supervise the investigator;
failing to file appropriate pre-trial motions; failing to properly inform the Plaintiff of developments
in the case; failing to prepare the Plaintiff to give testimony; failing to prepare witnesses
for testimony; failing to properly coordinate with counsel for the co-defendant; failing to
order the preliminary hearing transcript; failing to present corroborating witnesses on behalf of
the Plaintiff; failing to exploit concessions and revelations in the government's case; and failing to
provide conflict-free representation of the Plaintiff.
11. On or about the [date of conviction], Plaintiff was convicted by the jury on all charges, including,
armed robbery, carjacking, and destruction of property.
12. Plaintiff was sentenced to 15 years in prison for the convictions in this matter.
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13. While incarcerated Plaintiff suffered numerous injuries and damages, including but not limited
to, loss of freedom, liberty and enjoyment of life; being stabbed; fear of violence against
[his/her] person; feelings of fright, humiliation, shame, mortification and indignation; loss of employment,
wages and wage earning capacity; and communication with [his/her] family and loved
ones.
14. On or about the [date of granting motion for new trial], almost five years later, the Honorable
Judge [name of judge], in a lengthy opinion, granted the Plaintiff's motion for a new trial based
on Plaintiff's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Judge [name of judge] specifically found
that Defendant attorney's legal representation of Plaintiff was so deficient that Plaintiff was
denied [his/her] right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Furthermore, Judge [name of judge] found that there was a reasonable probability that, but
for Defendant attorney's unprofessional conduct, the result of the trial would have been different.
Judge [name of judge] specifically found, amongst other items, that Defendant attorney made
harmful statements in argument to the jury; failed to present corroborating witnesses; failed to
properly investigate the case; failed to prepare Plaintiff and co-defendant for testimony; failed to
ask questions on re-direct of client; failed to exploit concessions and revelations in government's
case; failed to provide Plaintiff with conflict-free representation; imbibed alcohol during the trial;
and that [his/her] consumption of alcohol was a contributing factor towards [his/her] poor performance.
15. Plaintiff was finally released from incarceration on [date].
16. On or about [date of disciplinary action], Bar Counsel of the State of [name of state] disciplined
Defendant attorney for [his/her] woeful representation of Plaintiff in the underlying criminal
matter. The discipline is Bar Proceeding No. [number].
COUNT I (Legal Malpractice)
17. The Plaintiff incorporates, by reference, paragraphs 1 through 16, and further alleges that Defendant
law firm and Defendant attorney, were appointed by the Court to represent Plaintiff in
[his/her] criminal matter brought by the United States, and that the Defendant attorney and the
lawyers of Defendant's law firm, had a duty to provide Plaintiff with competent, reasonable and
effective legal representation and advice as required by the applicable standard of care for attorneys
acting under the same or similar circumstances.
18. Plaintiff further alleges that notwithstanding the legal, ethical and contractual duties to the
Plaintiff, Defendant law firm and its individual attorneys, including Defendant attorney, breached
the duties to Plaintiff by failing to provide Plaintiff with the competent reasonable and appropriate
legal representation [he/she] was entitled to under the circumstances.
19. Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm's breaches of the
duties owed to Plaintiff and the violation of the standard of care owed by reasonable and competent
practitioners under the circumstances include, but are not limited to, imbibing in alcohol during
the day while the trial was taking place; failing to properly protect Plaintiff's rights; failing to
provide effective assistance of counsel; failing to properly investigate the case; failing to file appropriate
pre-trial motions; failing to properly inform the Plaintiff of developments in the case;
failing to prepare the Plaintiff to give testimony; failing to prepare witnesses for testimony; failing
to properly coordinate with counsel for the co-defendant; failing to order the preliminary hearing
transcript; failing to present corroborating witnesses on behalf of the Plaintiff; failing to exploit
concessions and revelations in the government's case; failing to provide conflict-free representation
of the Plaintiff; failing to place Plaintiff's interests primary to [his/her] own; failing to
zealously represent the Plaintiff; failing to provide competent representation of the Plaintiff; failing
to serve the Plaintiff with skill and care commensurate with that generally afforded to clients
by other lawyers in similar matters; failing to act as reasonable and prudent attorneys under the
circumstances; and otherwise breaching the standard of care owed by attorneys and/or law firms
under the same or similar circumstances.
20. Plaintiff further alleges that as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant attorney and Defendant
law firm's combined negligent acts and/or omissions, the Plaintiff was deprived of effective
assistance of counsel.
21. As a further direct proximate result of Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm's negligent
acts and/or omissions, Plaintiff was unjustly convicted and wrongly imprisoned for a period of
nearly five years.
22. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm's negligent
acts and/or omissions, the Plaintiff suffered numerous injuries and damages, including but
not limited to, loss of freedom, liberty and enjoyment of life; being stabbed; fear of violence
against [his/her] person; feelings of fright, humiliation, shame, mortification and indignation; loss
of employment, wages and wage earning capacity; and communication with [his/her] family and
loved ones.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm,
including Defendants A through F, separately and severally, in such sum of compensatory, special
and punitive damages as the jury may assess after a full and fair consideration of the facts, plus
interest and costs, and any equitable relief to which the Plaintiff may be justly entitled.
COUNT II (Breach of Fiduciary Duty)
23. The Plaintiff incorporates, by reference, paragraphs 1 through 22 above, and further alleges
that Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm, and its individual attorneys, had fiduciary and
ethical duties, created at the commencement of their undertaking to represent Plaintiff to act
primarily for Plaintiff's benefit with an undivided duty of loyalty in all matters connected with
such representation.
24. Plaintiff further alleges that at the time the Court appointed Defendant attorney and Defendant
law firm, and its individual attorneys, to represent Plaintiff in this serious criminal matter, the Defendants,
represented to Plaintiff that the law firm and the attorneys in the firm had substantial experience
and expertise in litigating serious criminal matters.
25. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm owed Plaintiff an ethical
and fiduciary duty to provide representation with the requisite legal knowledge, skill and diligence
necessary for the representation.
26. Plaintiff further alleges, that notwithstanding the representations made by the Defendant law
firm and its individual attorneys concerning their expertise and experience in handling serious
criminal matters, and notwithstanding the ethical and fiduciary duties the Defendant law firm and
its individual attorneys owed to Plaintiff, the Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm
breached the applicable fiduciary and ethical duties owed to Plaintiff.
27. Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm's breaches of the
duties owed to Plaintiff and the violation of the standard of care owed by reasonable and competent
practitioners under the circumstances include, but are not limited to, imbibing in alcohol during
the day while the trial was taking place; failing to properly protect Plaintiff's rights; failing to
provide effective assistance of counsel; failing to properly investigate the case; failing to file appropriate
pre-trial motions; failing to properly inform the Plaintiff of developments in the case;
failing to prepare the Plaintiff to give testimony; failing to prepare witnesses for testimony; failing
to properly coordinate with counsel for the co-defendant; failing to order the preliminary hearing
transcript; failing to present corroborating witnesses on behalf of the Plaintiff; failing to exploit
concessions and revelations in the government's case; failing to provide conflict-free representation
of the Plaintiff; failing to hold Plaintiff's interests primary to [his/her] own; failing to
zealously represent the Plaintiff; failing to provide competent representation of the Plaintiff; failing
to serve the Plaintiff with skill and care commensurate with that generally afforded to clients
by other lawyers in similar matters; failing to act as reasonable and prudent attorneys under the
circumstances; and otherwise breaching the standard of care owed by attorneys and/or law firms
under the same or similar circumstances.
28. Plaintiff further alleges that as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant attorney and Defendant
law firm's breaches of their ethical and fiduciary duties, the Plaintiff was deprived of effective
assistance of counsel.
29. As a further direct proximate result of Defendant attorney's and Defendant law firm's breaches
of their fiduciary duties, Plaintiff was unjustly convicted and wrongly imprisoned for a period of
nearly 10 years.
30. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendant attorney's and Defendant law firm's
breaches of their fiduciary duties, the Plaintiff suffered numerous injuries and damages, including
but not limited to, loss of freedom, liberty and enjoyment of life; being stabbed; fear of violence
against [his/her] person; feelings of fright, humiliation, shame, mortification and indignation; loss
of employment, wages and wage earning capacity; and communication with [his/her] family and
loved ones.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant attorney and Defendant law firm,
including Defendants A through F, separately and severally, in such sum of compensatory, special
and punitive damages as the jury may assess after a full and fair consideration of the facts, plus
interest and costs, and any equitable relief to which the Plaintiff may be justly entitled.
COUNT III (Private Investigation Malpractice)
31. The Plaintiff incorporates, by reference, paragraphs 1 through 30, and further alleges that Defendant
private investigator was hired by Defendant attorney to perform the duties of a private investigator
in this criminal matter and had a duty to provide Plaintiff with competent and reasonable
private investigation services as required by the applicable standard of care for private investigators
acting under the same or similar circumstances.
32. Plaintiff further alleges that notwithstanding the legal, ethical and contractual duties to the
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Plaintiff, Defendant private investigator breached the duties to Plaintiff by failing to provide
Plaintiff with the competent reasonable and appropriate private investigation services [he/she]
was entitled to under the circumstances.
33. Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendant private investigator's breaches of the duties owed
to Plaintiff and the violation of the standard of care owed by reasonable and competent practitioners
under the circumstances include, but are not limited to, failing to properly investigate the underlying
criminal matter; failing to visit the crime scene, failing to investigate the Plaintiff's theory
of the case; failing to recognize Defendant attorney's inability to effectively represent the
Plaintiff; and otherwise breaching the standard of care owed by private investigators under the
same or similar circumstances.
34. Plaintiff further alleges that as a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' combined negligent
acts and/or omissions, the Plaintiff was deprived of effective assistance of a private investigator.
35. As a further direct proximate result of Defendants' negligent acts and/or omissions, Plaintiff
was unjustly convicted and wrongly imprisoned for a period of nearly 10 years.
36. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants' negligent acts and/or omissions, the
Plaintiff suffered numerous injuries and damages, including but not limited to, loss of freedom,
liberty and enjoyment of life; being stabbed; fear of violence against [his/her] person; feelings of
fright, humiliation, shame, mortification and indignation; loss of employment, wages and wage
earning capacity; and communication with [his/her] family and loved ones.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against all Defendants, separately and severally, in
such sum of compensatory, special and punitive damages as the jury may assess after a full and
fair consideration of the facts, plus interest and costs, and any equitable relief to which the
Plaintiff may be justly entitled.
COUNT IV (Punitive Damages)
37. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates, by reference, all of the preceding paragraphs 1
through 36 and further states as follows:
38. The Defendants acted with actual malice toward the Plaintiff or acted under circumstances
amounting to a willful and wanton disregard of the Plaintiff's rights, and/or acted with conscious
indifference towards the rights of and safety of the Plaintiff such that an award of punitive damages
to the Plaintiff to punish the Defendants for their actions and/or omissions, and to serve as
example to prevent others from acting in a similar way, is appropriate here, especially because the
acts necessary for Defendants to have prevented and/or remedied their willful and wanton, and/or
malicious, conduct could have been accomplished at minimal cost to the Defendants.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against all Defendants, separately and severally, in
such sum of compensatory, special and punitive damages as the jury may assess after a full and
fair consideration of the facts, plus interest and costs, and any equitable relief to which the
Plaintiff may be justly entitled.
JURY DEMAND
The Plaintiff respectfully requests a trial by jury on all of the above claims.
___________________
[Name of attorney for plaintiff]
Attorney for Plaintiff
[Address of attorney for plaintiff]
[Telephone number of attorney for plaintiff]
[State bar number of attorney for plaintiff]
SERVE DEFENDANTS:
[List of names and addresses of defendants]

Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
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Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com

FW: respectfully submitted


8/07/12

To: keithloomis@earthlink.net, jleslie@washoecounty.us, zyoung@da.washoecounty.us, drakej@reno.gov, kadlicj@reno.gov


Zach Coughlin
From:Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 8/07/12 11:01 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; jleslie@washoecounty.us; zyoung@da.washoecounty.us; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov
6 attachments
20120605_101513 Northwind manager handy man attacks from golf cart 6 5 12.mp4 (3.1 MB) , landlord tenant law manual for police in minnesota.pdf
(735.1 KB) , Police_manual_-_final_as_adopted_by_State's_Attorney.pdf (263.7 KB) , trespass criminal civil evictdion.pdf (69.8 KB) , 6 8 12 fax to
northwind with page numbers.pdf (50.7 KB) , northwind fax 6 4 12 habitability retaliation etc.pdf (45.8 KB)

Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.comTo: weavera@reno.gov; barnesm@reno.govSubject: respectfully submittedDate: Fri, 8 Jun 2012 16:41:49 -0700

Dear Officer Weaver and Officer Barnes,


I am respectfully submitting this supplementary material to the police report I submitted to you in person on June 6, 2012
regarding the assault I was the victim of at the hands of maintenance staff member Luke of Northwind Apartments on June 5th,
2012, and the attempts at unlawful entry committed by Northwind Manager Dwayne Jakob on or about June 4, 2012.
I am attaching an article you may find of interest regarding the intersection of landlord tenant law and police work, vis a vis
criminal/civil matters and the fine distinctions that sometimes arise. I didn't see anything in there on Officer Weavers fine
hypothetical regarding entry without permission when a burglary may be occurring. That situation probably does not come up
that often because hardly anybody but the police would be brave enough to enter such a dangerous situation.
I appreciate the brave service both of you provide. I am attaching this materials just because they are interesting to me and may
be to you and in no way wish for so attachign these to be interpreted as a criticism of either of your police work.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin

RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion


8/07/12

To: Keith Loomis


Zach Coughlin
From:Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
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Sent: Tue 8/07/12 3:38 PM


To: Keith Loomis (keithloomis@earthlink.net)
Are you refusing to file the motions o requested?-----Original Message-----From: Keith LoomisSent: 7 Aug 2012 16:55:44 GMTTo: 'Zach Coughlin'Subject: RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail
motion

Zach
Why dont you move to represent yourself. That way you will be completely satisfied with the services you provide yourself and can do all of the things you believe are necessary.
If you want me to continue to represent you, what I asked you to provide to me was a description of the events which lead to the charge of disturbing the peace. I still need that
description.
Keith Loomis

From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]


Sent: Monday, August 06, 2012 3:54 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov
Subject: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion

Dear Mr. Loomis and City Attorney Kadlic and Deputy City Attorney Drake,
I am writing to request that you file some motion to alter, amend, reconsider, set aside, or modify my bail in the case stemming from my JUly 3, 2012 arrest for distrubing the peace, failure to provide
proof of insurance, and failure to secure a load. I am writing to request that you file a pre trial motion (Motion to Dismiss, request for a pre trial motion and bail motion, and motion to supress police
report based upon the DTP arrest occuring for alleged conduct outside the officer's presence). If you will not file these motion (and please provide me a draft of such motions for my review prior to
filing them as well as prior to making any communication on my behalf to either the RMC or the City of Reno Prosecutor), please provide me a written indication of your rationale for so refusing, and
then please file a Motion to Withdrawal as soon as practicable. I ask this respectfully.

The police showed up to the hearing, yet I was not noticed of that fact in advance, or of the hearing itself. Further, Judge Gardner explicilty indicated he was basing his decision to raise the bail based
upon "public safety" and "concern for the defendant's safety", which are impermissible rationale for so increasin one's bail.
NRS
178.498. Many courts use a bail schedule to determine the amount, but note the
initial amount can be increased if good cause is shown.NRS 178.499. Additionally, in
determining the amount of bail, the judge should look at the following factors (NRS
178.498):
The nature and circumstances of the offense charged
The defendants financial ability to post bail
The defendants character; and
The factors listed inNRS 178.4853.
Bail can not be excessive.U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. It should be limited to a
reasonable amount designed to ensure the defendants presence in court. It should not
be a corrective or preventative detention device.

NRS 178.484. The Court should take care inimposing any restrictions on a defendants constitutional rights (i.e.,
search and seizure) and only imply such restrictions if warranted by the underlying facts
of the alleged crime. Section 11 ofNRS 178.484 describes the document that must
be signed by the defendant before he/she can be released on bail.
My bail hearing contained what seems to be an impermissible coercive attempt to condition my release or the possibility thereof upon my providing confidential medical records (Lake's Crossing etc) to
the Reno Municipal Court, even where the same judge presiding over the bail hearing found me competent enough to face a criminal trepass trial less than two weeks before teh bail hearing in 11 CR
26405.
The friend of mine who posted my bail, Jared Swanson, has a serious form of cancer and a one year old baby. I request a reduction of the bail for his benefit and for the proof of insurance charge to be
dismissed, as (and I am trying to avoid this in any way I can), if I am rearrested, such a proof of insurance charge may present another basis for imposing an unduly burdensome bail upon me, as it did
on July 5th, 2012 where, despite my having produced a legible pdf copy of my proof of insurance card on my large screened zoomable smart phone, Officers Weaver and Dye still charged me with that

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violation, and the bail was subsequently increase. Further, none of the events or accusations forming the basis of the distrubing the police charge occurred in the officer's presence, and the police
report contains no indication whatsoever that the arrest was made based upon NRS 171.1771. I provided Officer Weaver my driver's license prior to the arrest. I did not
refuses to give a written promise to appear in court as provided in NRS 171.1773.
When a person is believed to have committed a misdemeanor offense, the peace officer has the discretion to
either issue a citation or arrest and detain the person.NRS 171.1771 states that a person can be arrested if
his identity is questionable or if the peace officer does not believe the person will appear in court. A person
can also be arrested for a misdemeanor offense if a warrant has been issued.

Additionally, I am requesting that you file a Motion to Dismiss the Disturbing the Peace charge based upon a lack of evidence and or insufficiency of pleading in that the allegations do not amount to a
prima facie case of a DTP violation. Further, please subpoena and or collect the Protection Order application filed by Milan Krebs on July 5th, 2012, and interview Krebs as to why he mentions
Coughlin often carrying around a large knife in a menacing manner in that protection order application, yet completely failed to mention that in his July 3rd, 2012 police report. Additionally, please
determine why Kreb's TPO appliication has a different style of handwriting on the caption compared to the descriptive sections, indicating someone pushed the filing of the TPO on Krebs, perhaps his
employer, Northwind Apartments or the RPD, which has in the days preceding the arrest threatend to arrest Coughlin for criminal trespass if he returned to any part of the premises of Northwind
Apartments, in consideration of Coughlin's eviction from unit 29, despite the fact Coughlin still had a valid right to go to his other two rentals, units 45 and 71, in addition to the fact that Northwinds
essentially withdrew or rescinded its June 28th, 2012 eviction of Coughlin by posting an Amended 5 Day Unlawful Detainer Notice on unit 29 on June 28th, 2012 shortly after Coughlin pointed out to
Northwinds and Nevada Courts Services that the July 14th, 2012 5 Day notice was not "personally served" (NCS's R. Wray lied about effecting personal service, as he could not possibly have verified
someone of "suitable age and discretion" was within the windowless room with a metal door closed and locked and where no Wray admits that he received no verbal response from the unit or anyone
therein upon his knocking on the door and or attempting to break into the unit, please see Soldal v. Cook County in that regard, a US S. Ct case) and therefore Coughlin would have had until at least
noon on July 28th, 2012 to file a Tenant's Answer, whereas the eviction/lockout/arrest of June 28th, 2012 took place two hours before noon at 10 am).
Additionally, RPD Officer Weaver had previously attempted to break into one of my rentals at Northwind at a time when he lacked a warrant and or an exigent rationale for doing so, much less an
eviction Order. I just want this case to be dismissed and to try to move on in life, and difuse the tensions incident to this case.
I did not disturb the peace at Northwinds as alleged, nor did I make the threats Kreb's accuses me of or stalk him or follow him in a threatening manner at any time. Additionaly, I never broke into nor
did I ever attempt to break into Krebs' truck, and in fact, I filed a police report in June 2012 reporting extortionate threats by another maintenance man at Northwinds ("Luke" is his name, I believe) and
Northwind's Manage Dwayne Jakob, wherein they threatened to make such a spurious allegation, but subsuquently refrained from doign so when it apparently occurred to them that I may have
excuplatory video evidence disproving such an allegation as well as capturing their baseless and extortionate threats and accusations. Additionally, please subpoene the police reports I filed with the
RPD and any emails I sent to any officers (including Weaver, Barnes, Sargent MIiller, LIeutenant Brown) and any reports of or recording of phone conversations I had with any of those RPD
personnel. Further, please see the attached june 26th, 2012 email to the RPD, WCSO, RJC, Sparks Justice Court and others pointing out the insufficiency of the 5 day Notice drafted and posted by
non-lawyers Nevada Court Services, in that under NRS 40.253 it listed the wrong forum for the tenant to file a Tenant's Answer, and under the Aiken decision of the Nevada Supreme Court and NRCP
60(b)(4), any lockout order stemming therefrom is void for lack of jurisdiction.

NRS 171.136 When arrest may be made.


1. If the offense charged is a felony or gross misdemeanor, the arrest may be made on any day, and at any time of day or night.
2. If it is a misdemeanor, the arrest cannot be made between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m., except:
(a) Upon the direction of a magistrate, endorsed upon the warrant;
(b) When the offense is committed in the presence of the arresting officer;
(c) When the person is found and the arrest is made in a public place or a place that is open to the public and:...
(2) The misdemeanor is discovered because there was probable cause for the arresting officer to stop, detain or arrest the person for another alleged violation or offense;
(d) When the offense is committed in the presence of a private person and the person makes an arrest immediately after the offense is committed;...
(g) When the person is already in custody as a result of another lawful arrest; or
Krebs did not immediately arrest me under NRS 171.136(2)(d), nor was the DTP arrest for an offense alleged to have occurred in the officer's presence.
the attached videos are of the incident on June 5th, 2012, not from July 3rd, 2012, but they support my contentions and the relevancy of subpoening the police incident reports and other
documentation should this case not be dismissed, nolle prosequi, de minimis, etc....
I will forward to you my emails to the RPD et all from June 26th, and July 2nd, 2012. I realize their tone was not a smart one to take or appropriate and am only sending them in hopes of having this
matter dismissed. I do not have any interest in pursuing anything like Wheeler v Cross 344 Fed Apps 420 (2008)
.
Sincerely,

Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
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Your Online Police Report T12004553 Has Been Submitted

6/08/12

NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
To zachcoughlin@hotmail.com

From:NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
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FW: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice Court


8/06/12

To: keithloomis@earthlink.net, kadlicj@reno.gov, drakej@reno.gov


Zach Coughlin
From:Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Mon 8/06/12 3:55 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; kadlicj@reno.gov; drakej@reno.gov
2 attachments
coughlin v northwind 16_TenantsAffidavit_DeclarationOther_PrivateHousing other than nonpayment of rent.pdf (76.3 KB) , combined northwind v coughlin
eviction filings.pdf (1058.4 KB)
please view this in conjunction with the email I just sent. Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.comTo: kbrown@nvbar.org; milllerr@reno.gov; millerr@reno.gov; stuttle@washoecounty.gov; rsilva@washoecounty.us;
stuttle@washoecounty.us; jamchen@washoecounty.us; 037nor4@acg.com; info@acg-apmi.com; rjcweb@wasoecounty.us; jboles@callatg.com; apminfo@acg.comSubject:
FW: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice CourtDate: Mon, 2 Jul 2012 17:21:54 -0700

NOrthwind and Nevada Court Services served and "amended 5 day notice of unlawful detainer on July 29th,
2012"...giving me five days to get my stuff out of unit 29 (the one the subject of Judge Schroeer's Eviction
Order, which was effectively rescinded by their serving a new 5 day unlawful detainer notice....) as well as
units 71 and 45...whicih are two units to which i still have valide lease agreements, ie, I cannot be trespassing
for accessing them (the Reno PD has indicated they will arrest me for criminal trespass for accessing any units
in the complex, including those to which I still have a valid possessory or property interest, in violation of 42
usc 1983).
why does Sargent Miller have to give me a hard time? Isn't it enough for him to have his "Denzel" good looks
and a much higher paying job than I will ever have? What up wit that?
Northwind and Nevada Court Services (which is practicing eviction law without a license) screwed up and put
"Sparks Justice Court on Greenbrae" as the place for the tenant to file a Tenan'ts Answer or Affidavit. Doing
so will make the RJC Order by Judge Schroeder null and void (Karen Stancil, Chief Civil Clerk at RJC admits
this, but really, the fault lies with NCS and Northwind, not the committed professional at the RJC).
The Notice must identify the Court with jurisdiction. NRS 40.253(3)(a). ONe cannot be trespassing in a placwe where they have a
valid reason for being or a lawful right to be. NRS 207.200, RMC 8.10.040.

In
Aikins v. Andrews, 91 Nev. 746, 542 P.2d 734 (1975), the Supreme COUli construed the
predecessor statute to NRS 40.2516 to mean that the alternative five (5) day notice must be given
6

before the tenants can be dispossed and a lease can be validly terminated. The court stated that this
five (5) day notice requirement " ... neither can be waved nor neglected." 91 Nev. at 748.

ttp://www.constitution.org/ussc/506-056a.htm

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U.S. Supreme Court


SOLDAL v. COOK COUNTY, 506 U.S. 56 (1992)
506 U.S. 56 SOLDAL, ET UX. v. COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 91-6516
Argued October 5, 1992
Decided December 8, 1992
While eviction proceedings were pending, Terrace Properties and Margaret Hale forcibly evicted petitioners,
the Soldal family, and their mobile home from a Terrace Properties' mobile home park. At Hale's request,
Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff's Department deputies were present at the eviction. Although they knew that
there was no eviction order and that Terrace Properties' actions were illegal, the deputies refused to take Mr.
Soldal's complaint for criminal trespass or otherwise interfere with the eviction. Subsequently, the state judge
assigned to the pending eviction proceedings ruled that the eviction had been unauthorized, and the trailer,
badly damaged during the eviction, was returned to the lot. Petitioners brought an action in the Federal District
Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that Terrace Properties and Hale had conspired with the deputy sheriffs
to unreasonably seize and remove their home in violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Acknowledging that what had occurred was a "seizure" in the literal sense of the word, the court reasoned that
it was not a seizure as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment because, inter alia, it did not invade petitioners'
privacy.
Held:
The seizure and removal of the trailer home implicated petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights. Pp. 61-72.
(a) A "seizure" of property occurs when "there is some meaningful interference with an individual's
possessory interests in that property." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 . The language of
the Fourth Amendment - which protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures of "their
persons, houses, papers, and effects" - cuts against the novel holding below, and this Court's cases
unmistakably hold that the Amendment protects property even where privacy or liberty is not
implicated. See, e.g., ibid.; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 . This Court's "plain view"
decisions also make untenable the lower court's construction of the Amendment. If the Amendment's
boundaries were defined exclusively by rights of privacy, "plain view" seizures, rather than being
scrupulously subjected to Fourth Amendment inquiry, Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 -327,
would not implicate that constitutional provision at all. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' [506 U.S. 56,
57] position, the Amendment protects seizure even though no search within its meaning has taken
place. See, e.g., Jacobsen, supra, at 120-125. Also contrary to that court's view, Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386 , does not require a court, when it finds that a wrong implicates more than one
constitutional command, to look at the dominant character of the challenged conduct to determine
under which constitutional standard it should be evaluated. Rather, each constitutional provision is
examined in turn. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 . Pp. 61-71.
(b) The instant decision should not foment a wave of new litigation in the federal courts. Activities
such as repossessions or attachments, if they involve entering a home, intruding on individuals'
privacy, or interfering with their liberty, would implicate the Fourth Amendment even on the Court of
Appeals' own terms. And numerous seizures of this type will survive constitutional scrutiny on
"reasonableness" grounds. Moreover, it is unlikely that the police will often choose to further an
enterprise knowing that it is contrary to the law, or proceed to seize property in the absence of
objectively reasonable grounds for doing so. Pp. 71-72.
942 F.2d 1073, reversed and remanded.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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John L. Stainthorp argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners.
Kenneth L. Gillis argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Jack O'Malley, Renee G.
Goldfarb, and Kenneth T. McCurry. [*]
[ Footnote *] James D. Holzhauer, Timothy S. Bishop, John A. Powell, Steven R. Shapiro, Harvey M.
Grossman, and Alan K. Chen filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging
reversal.
Richard Ruda, Carter G. Phillips, Mark D. Hopson, and Mark E. Haddad filed a brief for the National League
of Cities et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

I
Edward Soldal and his family resided in their trailer home, which was located on a rented lot in the Willoway
Terrace mobile [506 U.S. 56, 58] home park in Elk Grove, Illinois. In May 1987, Terrace Properties, the owner of
the park, and Margaret Hale, its manager, filed an eviction proceeding against the Soldals in an Illinois state
court. Under the Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 110, 9-101 et seq. (1991), a tenant
cannot be dispossessed absent a judgment of eviction. The suit was dismissed on June 2, 1987. A few months
later, in August 1987, the owner brought a second proceeding of eviction, claiming nonpayment of rent. The
case was set for trial on September 22, 1987.
Rather than await judgment in their favor, Terrace Properties and Hale, contrary to Illinois law, chose to evict
the Soldals forcibly two weeks prior to the scheduled hearing. On September 4, Hale notified the Cook
County's Sheriff's Department that she was going to remove the trailer home from the park, and requested the
presence of sheriff deputies to forestall any possible resistance. Later that day, two Terrace Properties
employees arrived at the Soldals' home accompanied by Cook County Deputy Sheriff O'Neil. The employees
proceeded to wrench the sewer and water connections off the side of the trailer home, disconnect the phone,
tear off the trailer's canopy and skirting, and hook the home to a tractor. Meanwhile, O'Neil explained to
Edward Soldal that "`he was there to see that [Soldal] didn't interfere with [Willoway's] work.'" Brief for
Petitioner 6.
By this time, two more deputy sheriffs had arrived at the scene, and Soldal told them that he wished to file a
complaint for criminal trespass. They referred him to deputy Lieutenant Jones, who was in Hale's office. Jones
asked Soldal to wait outside while he remained closeted with Hale and other Terrace Properties employees for
over 20 minutes. After talking to a district attorney and making Soldal wait another half hour, Jones told Soldal
that he would not accept a complaint because "`it was between the landlord and the tenant ... [and] they were
going to go ahead and continue to move [506 U.S. 56, 59] out the trailer.'" Id., at 8. 1 Throughout this period, the
deputy sheriffs knew that Terrace Properties did not have an eviction order and that its actions were unlawful.
Eventually, and in the presence of an additional two deputy sheriffs, the Willoway workers pulled the trailer
free of its moorings and towed it onto the street. Later, it was hauled to a neighboring property.
On September 9, the state judge assigned to the pending eviction proceedings ruled that the eviction had been
unauthorized, and ordered Terrace Properties to return the Soldals' home to the lot. The home, however, was
badly damaged. [2] The Soldals brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a violation of their rights
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. They claimed that Terrace Properties and Hale had conspired
with Cook County deputy sheriffs to unreasonably seize and remove the Soldals' trailer home. The District
Judge granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Soldals had failed to adduce
any evidence to support their conspiracy theory and, therefore, the existence of state action necessary under
1983. [3]
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, construing the facts in petitioners' favor, accepted their
contention that there was state action. However, it went on to hold that [506 U.S. 56, 60] the removal of the
Soldals' trailer did not constitute a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment or a deprivation of due
process for purposes of the Fourteenth.
On rehearing, a majority of the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reaffirmed the panel decision. [4]
Acknowledging that what had occurred was a "seizure" in the literal sense of the word, the court reasoned
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that, because it was not made in the course of public law enforcement, and because it did not invade the
Soldals' privacy, it was not a seizure as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment. 942 F.2d 1073, 1076 (1991).
Interpreting prior cases of this Court, the Seventh Circuit concluded that, absent interference with privacy or
liberty, a "pure deprivation of property" is not cognizable under the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 1078-1079.
Rather, petitioners' property interests were protected only by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. [5]
We granted certiorari to consider whether the seizure and removal of the Soldals' trailer home implicated their
Fourth Amendment rights, 503 U.S. 918 (1992), and now reverse. [6] [506 U.S. 56, 61]

II
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30
(1963), provides in pertinent part that the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated... ."
A "seizure" of property, we have explained, occurs when "there is some meaningful interference with an
individual's possessory interests in that property." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). In
addition, we have emphasized that "at the very core" of the Fourth Amendment "stands the right of a man to
retreat into his own home." Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). See also Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 -179 (1984); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 316 (1971); Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 601 (1980).
As a result of the state action in this case, the Soldals' domicile was not only seized, it literally was carried
away, giving new meaning to the term "mobile home." We fail to see how being unceremoniously dispossessed
of one's home in the manner alleged to have occurred here can be viewed as anything but a seizure invoking
the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Whether the Amendment was in fact [506 U.S. 56, 62] violated is, of
course, a different question that requires determining if the seizure was reasonable. That inquiry entails the
weighing of various factors, and is not before us.
The Court if Appeals recognized that there had been a seizure, but concluded that it was a seizure only in a
"technical" sense, not within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This conclusion followed from a narrow
reading of the Amendment, which the court construed to safeguard only privacy and liberty interests, while
leaving unprotected possessory interests where neither privacy nor liberty was at stake. Otherwise, the court
said,
"a constitutional provision enacted two centuries ago [would] make every repossession and eviction
with police assistance actionable under - of all things - the Fourth Amendment[, which] would both
trivialize the amendment and gratuitously shift a large body of routine commercial litigation from the
state courts to the federal courts. That trivializing, this shift, can be prevented by recognizing the
difference between possessory and privacy interests." 942 F.2d, at 1077.
Because the officers had not entered Soldal's house, rummaged through his possessions, or, in the Court of
Appeals' view, interfered with his liberty in the course of the eviction, the Fourth Amendment offered no
protection against the "grave deprivation" of property that had occurred. Ibid.
We do not agree with this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment protects the people from
unreasonable searches and seizures of "their persons, houses, papers, and effects." This language surely cuts
against the novel holding below, and our cases unmistakably hold that the Amendment protects property as
well as privacy. [7] This much [506 U.S. 56, 63] was made clear in Jacobsen, supra, where we explained that the
first Clause of the Fourth Amendment
"protects two types of expectations, one involving "searches," the other "seizures." A "search" occurs
when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. A
"seizure" of property occurs where there is some meaningful interference with an individual's
possessory interests in that property." 466 U.S., at 113 (footnote omitted).
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See also id., at 120; Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328
(1987); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747 -748 (1983)
(STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 , n. 6 (1980). Thus, having
concluded that chemical testing of powder found in a package did not compromise its owner's privacy, the
Court in Jacobsen did not put an end to its inquiry, as would be required under the view adopted by the Court
of Appeals and advocated by respondents. Instead, adhering to the teachings of United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696 (1983), it went on to determine whether the invasion of the owners' "possessory interests" occasioned
by the destruction of the powder was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Jacobsen, supra, at 124-125.
In Place, although we found that subjecting luggage to a "dog sniff" did not constitute a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes because it did not compromise any privacy interest, taking custody of Place's suitcase
was deemed an unlawful seizure, for it unreasonably infringed "the suspect's possessory interest in his
luggage." 462 U.S., at 708 . 8 Although lacking a privacy component, the property rights in both instances
nonetheless were not [506 U.S. 56, 64] disregarded, but rather were afforded Fourth Amendment protection.
Respondents rely principally on precedents such as Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Warden,
Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), and Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), to
demonstrate that the Fourth Amendment is only marginally concerned with property rights. But the message of
those cases is that property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations. The Warden
opinion thus observed, citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), and Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505 (1961), that the "principal" object of the Amendment is the protection of privacy, rather than
property, and that "this shift in emphasis from property to privacy has come about through a subtle interplay of
substantive and procedural reform." 387 U.S., at 304 . There was no suggestion that this shift in emphasis had
snuffed out the previously recognized protection for property under the Fourth Amendment. Katz, in declaring
violative of the Fourth Amendment the unwarranted overhearing of a telephone booth conversation,
effectively ended any lingering notions that the protection of privacy depended on trespass into a protected
area. In the course of its decision, the Katz Court stated that the Fourth Amendment can neither be translated
into a provision dealing with constitutionally protected areas nor into a general constitutional right to privacy.
The Amendment, the Court said, protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion,
"but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all." 389 U.S., at 350 .
As for Cardwell, a plurality of this Court held in that case that the Fourth Amendment did not bar the use in
evidence of paint scrapings taken from and tire treads observed on the defendant's automobile, which had
been seized in a parking lot and towed to a police lockup. Gathering this evidence was not deemed to be a
search, for nothing from the [506 U.S. 56, 65] interior of the car and "no personal effects, which the Fourth
Amendment traditionally has been deemed to protect" were searched or seized. 417 U.S., at 591 (opinion of
BLACKMUN, J.). No meaningful privacy rights were invaded. But this left the argument, pressed by the
dissent, that the evidence gathered was the product of a warrantless, and hence illegal, seizure of the car from
the parking lot where the defendant had left it. However, the plurality was of the view that, because, under the
circumstances of the case, there was probable cause to seize the car as an instrumentality of the crime, Fourth
Amendment precedent permitted the seizure without a warrant. Id., at 593. Thus, both the plurality and
dissenting Justices considered the defendant's auto deserving of Fourth Amendment protection even though
privacy interests were not at stake. They differed only in the degree of protection that the Amendment
demanded.
The Court of Appeals appeared to find more specific support for confining the protection of the Fourth
Amendment to privacy interests in our decision in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). There, a state
prison inmate sued, claiming that prison guards had entered his cell without consent and had seized and
destroyed some of his personal effects. We ruled that an inmate, because of his status, enjoyed neither a right
to privacy in his cell nor protection against unreasonable seizures of his personal effects. Id., at 526-528, and
n. 8; id., at 538 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). Whatever else the case held, it is of limited usefulness outside
the prison context with respect to the coverage of the Fourth Amendment.
We thus are unconvinced that any of the Court's prior cases supports the view that the Fourth Amendment
protects against unreasonable seizures of property only where privacy or liberty is also implicated. What is
more, our "plain view" decisions make untenable such a construction of the Amendment. Suppose, for
example, that police officers lawfully enter a house, by either complying with the warrant requirement or
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satisfying one of its recognized exceptions - [506 U.S. 56, 66] e.g., through a valid consent or a showing of
exigent circumstances. If they come across some item in plain view and seize it, no invasion of personal
privacy has occurred. Horton, 496 U.S., at 133 -134; Brown, supra, at 739 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.). If the
boundaries of the Fourth Amendment were defined exclusively by rights of privacy, "plain view" seizures
would not implicate that constitutional provision at all. Yet, far from being automatically upheld, "plain view"
seizures have been scrupulously subjected to Fourth Amendment inquiry. Thus, in the absence of consent or a
warrant permitting the seizure of the items in question, such seizures can be justified only if they meet the
probable-cause standard, Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 -327 (1987), 9 and if they are unaccompanied
by unlawful trespass, Horton, 496 U.S., at 136 -137. 10 That is because, the absence of a privacy interest
notwithstanding, "[a] seizure of the article ... would obviously invade the owner's possessory interest." Id., at
134; see also Brown, 460 U.S., at 739 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.). The plain-view doctrine "merely reflects
an application of the Fourth Amendment's central requirement of reasonableness to the law governing seizures
of property." Ibid.; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971); id., at 516 (WHITE, J., concurring
and dissenting).
The Court of Appeals understandably found it necessary to reconcile its holding with our recognition in the
plain-view cases that the Fourth Amendment protects property as such. In so doing, the court did not
distinguish this case on the ground that the seizure of the Soldals' home took place in a [506 U.S. 56, 67]
noncriminal context. Indeed, it acknowledged what is evident from our precedents - that the Amendment's
protection applies in the civil context as well. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 -335 (1985); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504 -506 (1978); Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 -313 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528
(1967). 11
Nor did the Court of Appeals suggest that the Fourth Amendment applied exclusively to law enforcement
activities. It observed, for example, that the Amendment's protection would be triggered "by a search or other
entry into the home incident to an eviction or repossession," 942 F.2d, at 1077. 12 Instead, the court sought to
explain why the Fourth Amendment protects against seizures of property in the plain-view context, but not in
this case, as follows:
"[S]eizures made in the course of investigations by police or other law enforcement officers are almost
always, as in the plain view cases, the culmination of searches. The police search in order to seize, and
it is the search [506 U.S. 56, 68] and ensuing seizure that the Fourth Amendment, by its reference to
"searches and seizures," seeks to regulate. Seizure means one thing when it is the outcome of a search;
it may mean something else when it stands apart from a search or any other investigative activity. The
Fourth Amendment may still nominally apply, but, precisely because there is no invasion of privacy,
the usual rules do not apply." Id., at 1079 (emphasis in original).
We have difficulty with this passage. The court seemingly construes the Amendment to protect only against
seizures that are the outcome of a search. But our cases are to the contrary, and hold that seizures of property
are subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny even though no search within the meaning of the Amendment has
taken place. See, e.g., Jacobsen, 466 U.S., at 120 -125; Place, 462 U.S., at 706 -707; Cardwell, 417 U.S., at
588 -589. 13 More generally, an officer who happens to come across an individual's property in a public area
could seize it only if Fourth Amendment standards are satisfied - for example, if the items are evidence of a
crime or contraband. Cf. Payton v. New York, [506 U.S. 56, 69] 445 U.S., at 587 . We are also puzzled by the last
sentence of the excerpt, where the court announces that the "usual rules" of the Fourth Amendment are
inapplicable if the seizure is not the result of a search or any other investigative activity "precisely because
there is no invasion of privacy." For the plain-view cases clearly state that, notwithstanding the absence of any
interference with privacy, seizures of effects that are not authorized by a warrant are reasonable only because
there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity. The seizure of the weapons in Horton,
for example, occurred in the midst of a search, yet we emphasized that it did not "involve any invasion of
privacy." 496 U.S., at 133 . In short, our statement that such seizures must satisfy the Fourth Amendment and
will be deemed reasonable only if the item's incriminating character is "immediately apparent," id., at 136-137,
is at odds with the Court of Appeals' approach.
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The Court of Appeals' effort is both interesting and creative, but, at bottom, it simply reasserts the earlier
thesis that the Fourth Amendment protects privacy, but not property. We remain unconvinced, and see no
justification for departing from our prior cases. In our view, the reason why an officer might enter a house or
effectuate a seizure is wholly irrelevant to the threshold question whether the Amendment applies. What
matters is the intrusion on the people's security from governmental interference. Therefore, the right against
unreasonable seizures would be no less transgressed if the seizure of the house was undertaken to collect
evidence, verify compliance with a housing regulation, effect an eviction by the police, or on a whim, for no
reason at all. As we have observed on more than one occasion, it would be "anomalous to say that the
individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is
suspected of criminal behavior." Camara 387 U.S., at 530 ; see also O'Connor, 480 U.S., at 715 ; T.L.O., 469
U.S., at 335 . [506 U.S. 56, 70]
The Court of Appeals also stated that, even if, contrary to its previous rulings, "there is some element or
tincture of a Fourth Amendment seizure, it cannot carry the day for the Soldals." 942 F.2d, at 1080. Relying on
our decision in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the court reasoned that it should look at the
"dominant character of the conduct challenged in a section 1983 case [to] determine the constitutional
standard under which it is evaluated." 942 F.2d, at 1080. Believing that the Soldals' claim was more akin to a
challenge against the deprivation of property without due process of law than against an unreasonable seizure,
the court concluded that they should not be allowed to bring their suit under the guise of the Fourth
Amendment.
But we see no basis for doling out constitutional protections in such fashion. Certain wrongs affect more than a
single right, and, accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitution's commands. Where such
multiple violations are alleged, we are not in the habit of identifying, as a preliminary matter, the claim's
"dominant" character. Rather, we examine each constitutional provision in turn. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517 (1984) (Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause). Graham
is not to the contrary. Its holding was that claims of excessive use of force should be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due
process test. We were guided by the fact that, in that case, both provisions targeted the same sort of
governmental conduct and, as a result, we chose the more "explicit textual source of constitutional protection"
over the "more generalized notion of `substantive due process.'" 490 U.S., at 394 -395. Surely, Graham does
not bar resort in this case to the Fourth Amendment's specific protection for "houses, papers, [506 U.S. 56, 71] and
effects," rather than the general protection of property in the Due Process Clause.

III
Respondents are fearful, as was the Court of Appeals, that applying the Fourth Amendment in this context
inevitably will carry it into territory unknown and unforeseen: routine repossessions, negligent actions of
public employees that interfere with individuals' right to enjoy their homes, and the like, thereby federalizing
areas of law traditionally the concern of the States. For several reasons, we think the risk is exaggerated. To
begin, our decision will have no impact on activities such as repossessions or attachments if they involve entry
into the home, intrusion on individuals' privacy, or interference with their liberty, because they would
implicate the Fourth Amendment even on the Court of Appeals' own terms. This was true of the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Specht, with which, as we previously noted, the Court of Appeals expressed agreement.
More significantly, "reasonableness is still the ultimate standard" under the Fourth Amendment, Camara,
supra, at 539, which means that numerous seizures of this type will survive constitutional scrutiny. As is true in
other circumstances, the reasonableness determination will reflect a "careful balancing of governmental and
private interests." T.L.O., supra, at 341. Assuming, for example, that the officers were acting pursuant to a
court order, as in Specht v. Jensen, 832 F.2d 1516 (CA10 1987), or Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 , (1972),
and, as often would be the case, a showing of unreasonableness on these facts would be a laborious task
indeed. Cf. Simms v. Slacum, 3 Cranch 300, 301 (1806). Hence, while there is no guarantee against the filing
of frivolous suits, had the ejection in this case properly awaited the state court's judgment, it is quite unlikely
that the federal court would have been bothered with a 1983 action alleging a Fourth Amendment violation.
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[506 U.S. 56, 72]

Moreover, we doubt that the police will often choose to further an enterprise knowing that it is contrary to the
law, or proceed to seize property in the absence of objectively reasonable grounds for doing so. In short, our
reaffirmance of Fourth Amendment principles today should not foment a wave of new litigation in the federal
courts.

IV
The complaint here alleges that respondents, acting under color of state law, dispossessed the Soldals of their
trailer home by physically tearing it from its foundation and towing it to another lot. Taking these allegations as
true, this was no "garden variety" landlord-tenant or commercial dispute. The facts alleged suffice to constitute
a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, for they plainly implicate the interests protected by
that provision. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, accordingly, reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

Footnotes
[1] Jones' statement was prompted by a district attorney's advice that no criminal charges could be brought
because, under Illinois law, a criminal action cannot be used to determine the right of possession. See
Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, 9-101 et seq. (1991); People v. Evans, 163 Ill.App. 3d 561, 114 Ill.Dec. 662, 516 N.E.2d
817 (1st Dist. 1987).
[2] The Soldals ultimately were evicted per court order in December 1987.
[3] Title 42 U.S.C. 1983 provides that:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State ...
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
[4] The court reiterated the panel's conclusion that a conspiracy must be assumed on the state of the record
and, therefore, that the case must be treated in its current posture "as if the deputy sheriffs themselves seized
the trailer, disconnected it from the utilities, and towed it away." 942 F.2d 1073, 1075 (CA7 1991) (en banc).
[5] The court noted that, in light of the existence of adequate judicial remedies under state law, a claim for
deprivation of property without due process of law was unlikely to succeed. Id., at 1075-1076. See Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). In any event, the Soldals did not claim a violation of their procedural rights. As
noted, the Seventh Circuit also held that respondents had not violated the Soldals' substantive due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners assert that this was error, but, in view of our disposition of
the case, we need not address the question at this time.
[6] Under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Soldals were required to establish that the respondents, acting under color of
state law, deprived them of a constitutional right, in this instance, their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
freedom from unreasonable seizures by the State. See Monroe v. Pape, [506 U.S. 56, 61] 365 U.S. 167, 184
(1961). Respondents request that we affirm on the ground that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that there
was sufficient state action to support a 1983 action. The alleged injury to the Soldals, it is urged, was inflicted
by private parties for whom the county is not responsible. Although respondents did not cross-petition, they
are entitled to ask us to affirm on that ground if such action would not enlarge the judgment of the Court of
Appeals in their favor. The Court of Appeals found that, because the police prevented Soldal from using
reasonable force to protect his home from private action that the officers knew was illegal, there was sufficient
evidence of conspiracy between the private parties and the officers to foreclose summary judgment for
respondents. We are not inclined to review that holding. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152
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-161 (1970).
[7] In holding that the Fourth Amendment's reach extends to property as such, we are mindful that the
Amendment does not protect possessory interests in all kinds of property. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 176 -177 (1984). This case, however, concerns a house, which the Amendment's language
explicitly includes, as it does a person's effects.
[8] Place also found that to detain luggage for 90 minutes was an unreasonable deprivation of the individual's
"liberty interest in proceeding with his itinerary," which also is protected by the Fourth Amendment. 462 U.S.,
at 708 -710.
[9] When "operational necessities" exist, seizures can be justified on less than probable cause. 480 U.S., at 327
. That in no way affects our analysis, for even then it is clear that the Fourth Amendment applies. Ibid; see also
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 , at 703 (1983).
[10] Of course, if the police officers' presence in the home itself entailed a violation of the Fourth Amendment,
no amount of probable cause to believe that an item in plain view constitutes incriminating evidence will
justify its seizure. Horton, 496 U.S., at 136 -137.
[11] It is true that Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 (1856), cast some
doubt on the applicability of the Amendment to noncriminal encounters such as this. Id., 18 How. at 285. But
cases since that time have shed a different light, making clear that Fourth Amendment guarantees are triggered
by governmental searches and seizures "without regard to the use to which [houses, papers, and effects] are
applied." Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967). Murray's Lessee's broad
statement that the Fourth Amendment "has no reference to civil proceedings for the recovery of debt"
arguably only meant that the warrant requirement did not apply, as was suggested in G.M. Leasing Corp. v.
United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352 (1977). Whatever its proper reading, we reaffirm today our basic
understanding that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures fully applies in the civil context.
[12] This was the view expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Specht v. Jensen, 832 F.2d
1516 (1987), remanded on unrelated grounds, 853 F.2d 805 (1988) (en banc), with which the Seventh Circuit
expressly agreed. 942 F.2d, at 1076.
[13] The officers in these cases were engaged in law enforcement, and were looking for something that was
found and seized. In this broad sense, the seizures were the result of "searches," but not in the Fourth
Amendment sense. That the Court of Appeals might have been suggesting that the plain-view cases are
explainable because they almost always occur in the course of law enforcement activities receives some
support from the penultimate sentence of the quoted passage, where the court states that the word "seizure"
might lose its usual meaning "when it stands apart from a search or any other investigative activity." Id., at
1079 (emphasis added). And, in the following paragraph, it observes that, "[o]utside of the law enforcement
area, the Fourth Amendment retains its force as a protection against searches, because they invade privacy.
That is why we decline to confine the amendment to the law enforcement setting." Id., at 1079-1080. Even if
the court meant that seizures of property in the course of law enforcement activities, whether civil or criminal,
implicate interests safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment, but that pure property interests are unprotected in
the non-law-enforcement setting, we are not in accord, as indicated in the body of this opinion. [506 U.S. 56, 73]

Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.comTo: chansen@washoecounty.usSubject: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice CourtDate: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 09:10:14 -0700
Dear Civil Supervisor Hansen
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
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ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Dear Sparks Justice Court,
I called and received permission to file this by fax...I am indigent and request a fee waiver, and failing that, an opportunity to cure any filing fee deficiency.
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.comTo: sheriffweb@washoecounty.us; lstuchell@washoecounty.us; kstancil@washoecounty.us; chansen@washoecounty.us; milllerr@reno.gov
Subject: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice CourtDate: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 07:58:36 -0700
Dear Sparks Justice Court, WCSO, RPD, and Reno Justice Court.I have received (though not personally served) what appears to be an eviction notice (5 day unlawful
detainer?) for rentals located at 1680 Sky Mountain Drive, Reno, 89523, but the notice indicates that I must file a Tenant's Answer with the Sparks Justice Court.Am I mistaken
in viewing this matter to be outside the jurisdiction of the Sparks Justice Court, and rather, a matter to be handled in Reno Justice Court?Given Sparks Justice Court is open 5
days a week (closes at noon on Fridays) and Reno Justice Court has 4 judicial days a week, the deadline for filing a special appearance (to contest jurisdiction) and or a Tenant's
Answer of Affidavit is difficult to measure.I spoke with a Reno Police Department who identified himself as Sargent Miller last week and he indicated the WCSO planned to
come effectuate an eviction on this date, June 26, 2012. I believe that would be premature, as Nevada Landlord Tenant law provides for filing a Tenant's Answer or Affidavit by
noon after the fifth full day (judicial days) and Fridays in Sparks Justice Court are not full days in that sense, and regardless, Sparks Justice Court, I believe, is not the
appropriate forum where, as here, the situs is located in Reno (Ward 1-nap?)Sincerely,Zach CoughlinPO BOX 3961Reno, NV 89505tel 775 338 8118fax 949 667 7403

Civil Division
630 Greenbrae DriveSparks, Nevada 89431(775)353.7603 Phone(775)352.3004 FaxCivil Department SupervisorChris Hansenchansen@washoecounty.usThe Civil Division
of Sparks Justice Court is made up of three major functions:CivilCivil Complaints for damages in excess of $5000 or if a suit involves a breach of contract, punitive damages, an
action to obtain possession of property, a writ of restitution, or other like actions, legal counsel is suggested for these types of actions.EvictionsAn act or process of legally
dispossessing a person of land or rental property.Small ClaimsAn action filed in order to obtain a monetary judgment. Claims must not exceed $5000. A small claims action
may be filed with the Sparks Justice Court if one of the following applies to the defendant:
1. They reside within the boundaries of the Sparks Township;
2. They are employed within the boundaries of the Sparks Township; and/or,
3. They do business within the boundaries of the Sparks Township.

request for a pre trial motion and bail motion


8/06/12

To: keithloomis@earthlink.net, drakej@reno.gov, kadlicj@reno.gov


Zach Coughlin
From:Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Mon 8/06/12 3:54 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov
7 attachments
20120605_101458 admitting dwayne tried to lift door up 6 5 12.mp4 (498.1 KB) , 20120605_101513 Northwind manager handy man attacks from golf
cart 6 5 12.mp4 (3.1 MB) , northwind v coughjlin combined for rjc judges chamers vacate summary eviction motion affidavit, amended motion and proposed
order.pdf (130.9 KB) , supplement to tenants motion to dismiss northwind in sparks justice court.pdf (98.3 KB) , 6 8 12 fax to northwind with page
numbers.pdf (50.7 KB) , northwind fax 6 4 12 habitability retaliation etc.pdf (45.8 KB) , emails to weavera@reno.gov.pdf (32.5 KB)
Dear Mr. Loomis and City Attorney Kadlic and Deputy City Attorney Drake, I am writing to request that you file some motion to alter, amend, reconsider, set aside, or modify
my bail in the case stemming from my JUly 3, 2012 arrest for distrubing the peace, failure to provide proof of insurance, and failure to secure a load. I am writing to request that
you file a pre trial motion (Motion to Dismiss, request for a pre trial motion and bail motion, and motion to supress police report based upon the DTP arrest occuring for alleged
conduct outside the officer's presence). If you will not file these motion (and please provide me a draft of such motions for my review prior to filing them as well as prior to
making any communication on my behalf to either the RMC or the City of Reno Prosecutor), please provide me a written indication of your rationale for so refusing, and then
please file a Motion to Withdrawal as soon as practicable. I ask this respectfully. The police showed up to the hearing, yet I was not noticed of that fact in advance, or of the
hearing itself. Further, Judge Gardner explicilty indicated he was basing his decision to raise the bail based upon "public safety" and "concern for the defendant's safety", which
are impermissible rationale for so increasin one's bail.
NRS
178.498
. Many courts use a bail schedule to determine the amount, but note the
initial amount can be increased if good cause is shown.
NRS 178.499. Additionally, in
determining the amount of bail, the judge should look at the following factors
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(NRS
178.498)
:

The nature and circumstances of the offense charged

The defendants financial ability to post bail

The defendants character; and

The factors listed in NRS 178.4853.


Bail can not be excessive.
U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. It should be limited to a
reasonable amount designed to ensure the defendants presence in court. It should not
be a corrective or preventative detention device.

NRS 178.484
. The Court should take care in imposing any restrictions on a defendants constitutional rights (i.e.,
search and seizure) and only imply such restrictions if warranted by the underlying facts
of the alleged crime. Section 11 of
NRS 178.484 describes the document that must
be signed by the defendant before he/she can be released on bail.
My bail hearing contained what seems to be an impermissible coercive attempt to condition my release or the possibility thereof upon my providing
confidential medical records (Lake's Crossing etc) to the Reno Municipal Court, even where the same judge presiding over the bail hearing found me
competent enough to face a criminal trepass trial less than two weeks before teh bail hearing in 11 CR 26405.
The friend of mine who posted my bail, Jared Swanson, has a serious form of cancer and a one year old baby. I request a reduction of the bail for
his benefit and for the proof of insurance charge to be dismissed, as (and I am trying to avoid this in any way I can), if I am rearrested, such a proof
of insurance charge may present another basis for imposing an unduly burdensome bail upon me, as it did on July 5th, 2012 where, despite my
having produced a legible pdf copy of my proof of insurance card on my large screened zoomable smart phone, Officers Weaver and Dye still charged
me with that violation, and the bail was subsequently increase. Further, none of the events or accusations forming the basis of the distrubing the
police charge occurred in the officer's presence, and the police report contains no indication whatsoever that the arrest was made based upon NRS
171.1771. I provided Officer Weaver my driver's license prior to the arrest. I did not

refuses to give a written promise to appear in court as provided in NRS 171.1773.


When a person is believed to have committed a misdemeanor offense, the peace officer has the discretion to
either issue a citation or arrest and detain the person.
NRS 171.1771 states that a person can be arrested if
his identity is questionable or if the peace officer does not believe the person will appear in court. A person
can also be arrested for a misdemeanor offense if a warrant has been issued.

Additionally, I am requesting that you file a Motion to Dismiss the Disturbing the Peace charge based upon a lack of evidence and or
insufficiency of pleading in that the allegations do not amount to a prima facie case of a DTP violation. Further, please subpoena and
or collect the Protection Order application filed by Milan Krebs on July 5th, 2012, and interview Krebs as to why he mentions
Coughlin often carrying around a large knife in a menacing manner in that protection order application, yet completely failed to
mention that in his July 3rd, 2012 police report. Additionally, please determine why Kreb's TPO appliication has a different style of
handwriting on the caption compared to the descriptive sections, indicating someone pushed the filing of the TPO on Krebs, perhaps
his employer, Northwind Apartments or the RPD, which has in the days preceding the arrest threatend to arrest Coughlin for criminal
trespass if he returned to any part of the premises of Northwind Apartments, in consideration of Coughlin's eviction from unit 29,
despite the fact Coughlin still had a valid right to go to his other two rentals, units 45 and 71, in addition to the fact that Northwinds
essentially withdrew or rescinded its June 28th, 2012 eviction of Coughlin by posting an Amended 5 Day Unlawful Detainer Notice on
unit 29 on June 28th, 2012 shortly after Coughlin pointed out to Northwinds and Nevada Courts Services that the July 14th, 2012 5
Day notice was not "personally served" (NCS's R. Wray lied about effecting personal service, as he could not possibly have verified
someone of "suitable age and discretion" was within the windowless room with a metal door closed and locked and where no Wray
admits that he received no verbal response from the unit or anyone therein upon his knocking on the door and or attempting to break
into the unit, please see Soldal v. Cook County in that regard, a US S. Ct case) and therefore Coughlin would have had until at least
noon on July 28th, 2012 to file a Tenant's Answer, whereas the eviction/lockout/arrest of June 28th, 2012 took place two hours
before noon at 10 am).
Additionally, RPD Officer Weaver had previously attempted to break into one of my rentals at Northwind at a time when he lacked a
warrant and or an exigent rationale for doing so, much less an eviction Order. I just want this case to be dismissed and to try to
move on in life, and difuse the tensions incident to this case.
I did not disturb the peace at Northwinds as alleged, nor did I make the threats Kreb's accuses me of or stalk him or follow him in a
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threatening manner at any time. Additionaly, I never broke into nor did I ever attempt to break into Krebs' truck, and in fact, I filed a
police report in June 2012 reporting extortionate threats by another maintenance man at Northwinds ("Luke" is his name, I believe)
and Northwind's Manage Dwayne Jakob, wherein they threatened to make such a spurious allegation, but subsuquently refrained from
doign so when it apparently occurred to them that I may have excuplatory video evidence disproving such an allegation as well as
capturing their baseless and extortionate threats and accusations. Additionally, please subpoene the police reports I filed with the
RPD and any emails I sent to any officers (including Weaver, Barnes, Sargent MIiller, LIeutenant Brown) and any reports of or
recording of phone conversations I had with any of those RPD personnel. Further, please see the attached june 26th, 2012 email to
the RPD, WCSO, RJC, Sparks Justice Court and others pointing out the insufficiency of the 5 day Notice drafted and posted by nonlawyers Nevada Court Services, in that under NRS 40.253 it listed the wrong forum for the tenant to file a Tenant's Answer, and under
the Aiken decision of the Nevada Supreme Court and NRCP 60(b)(4), any lockout order stemming therefrom is void for lack of
jurisdiction.

NRS 171.136 When arrest may be made.


1. If the offense charged is a felony or gross misdemeanor, the arrest may be made on any day, and at any time of day or night.
2. If it is a misdemeanor, the arrest cannot be made between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m., except:
(a) Upon the direction of a magistrate, endorsed upon the warrant;
(b) When the offense is committed in the presence of the arresting officer;
(c) When the person is found and the arrest is made in a public place or a place that is open to the public and:...
(2) The misdemeanor is discovered because there was probable cause for the arresting officer to stop, detain or arrest the person for
another alleged violation or offense;
(d) When the offense is committed in the presence of a private person and the person makes an arrest immediately after the offense
is committed;...
(g) When the person is already in custody as a result of another lawful arrest; or
Krebs did not immediately arrest me under NRS 171.136(2)(d), nor was the DTP arrest for an offense alleged to have occurred in the
officer's presence.
the attached videos are of the incident on June 5th, 2012, not from July 3rd, 2012, but they support my contentions and the
relevancy of subpoening the police incident reports and other documentation should this case not be dismissed, nolle prosequi, de
minimis, etc....
I will forward to you my emails to the RPD et all from June 26th, and July 2nd, 2012. I realize their tone was not a smart one to take
or appropriate and am only sending them in hopes of having this matter dismissed. I do not have any interest in pursuing anything
like Wheeler v Cross 344 Fed Apps 420 (2008)
.
Sincerely,

Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
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NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
To zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
From:NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent:Fri 6/08/12 4:39 PM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
****DO NOT RESPOND TO THIS E-MAIL****
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NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
To zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
From:NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent:Fri 6/08/12 4:45 PM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
****DO NOT RESPOND TO THIS E-MAIL****
****THIS IS AN UN-MONITORED MAIL BOX****
Your online report has been successfully received and the
tracking number is T12004554.
You will be notified via email of any problems with your
report. Once your report is approved, it will be issued
a case number and you will receive a PDF copy as an attachment
in your email within approximately ten business days.
Thank you for using our online reporting system and please
contact us with any suggestions you have for improving our
system.

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6/11/12

NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
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From:NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent:Mon 6/11/12 4:10 PM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
1 attachment
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Your report has been approved report and the permanent number of the case is
120103420.
the delicate information in his report has been replaced for *** to support isolation in this email.
Thank you for using our online reporting system and please contact us with any suggestions you have for improving our system.
Online Officer
Reno Police Department

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Your Online Police Report 120103420 Has Been Approved


6/11/12

NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
To zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
From:NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent:Mon 6/11/12 4:11 PM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
1 attachment
report-120103420-1.pdf (70.9 KB)
****DO NOT RESPOND TO THIS E-MAIL****
****THIS IS AN UN-MONITORED MAIL BOX****

Your report has been approved supplemental report and the permanent number of the case is
120103420.
the delicate information in his report has been replaced for *** to support isolation in this email.
Thank you for using our online reporting system and please contact us with any suggestions you have for improving our system.
Online Officer
Reno Police Department
Reno Police
Department

update on NNAHMS, request for continuance of 2/25/13 Hearing in 067980


From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 2/21/13 4:08 PM
To: rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com (rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com); rbl@robertbrucelindsay.com (rbl@robertbrucelindsay.com);
zyoung@da.washoecounty.us (zyoung@da.washoecounty.us)

Dear Mr. Lindsay and DDA Young,


I am writing to request from DDA Young a stipulation to a continuance of the 2/25/3 Show Cause Hearing in 063341, which I
understand may have been combined with 067980, so I am copying Mr. Lindsay.
I got this yesterday from NNAHMS. I completed the last part of the intake yesterday, and have a request for whatever social worker evaluation report my intake on
2/11/13 will yield. They indicate it should be ready in a day or two, so.
I passed a drug test with DAS yesterday and checked in on time.
Will you inquire with DDA Young if he will stip to a continuance of the 2/25/13 hearing?
Thanks,
Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402 ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Zach has 2 files to share with you on SkyDrive. To view them, click the links below.
2 19 13 more NNAHMS materials for DAS 063341 2025 065630 067980.pdf
2 11 13 Nnahms intake mental health eval proof for now 12-067980 063341 cr12-2025.pdf
Download all

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RE: update on NNAHMS, request for continuance of 2/25/13 Hearing in 067980


From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Sat 2/23/13 10:10 PM
To: Robert Lindsay (rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com)

Hi Diana,
I am not sure I ever had your phone number beyond the one for your office listed at www.nvbar.org.
When you wrote, below, "Zach I got a call from Zach and your hearing has been continued.

Please call me"

Does that mean my hearing in 11-063341 on the DAS Probation Violation (arrest of 2/2/13 alleging that I failed to check in on 1/3/13/ and 1/23/13, $500 cash bail posted)
Show Cause to show why my probation on a 180 suspended sentence should not be revoked has been continued AS WELL?
That's the hearing I really wanted continued because, as specifically mentioned by Judge Pearson at a 2/3/13 Show Cause hearing on the morning of 2/3/13 (I was bailed out at
1 am and found out about the hearing when I called the RJC to inquired about the start time of my continued trial in a different case in 12-065630...that DAS hearing in 063341
was incorrectly noticed on my Jail Release papers for 2/5/13 or something...At that 2/3/13 Hearing I got an Order for Competency Evaluation from Pearson, then went and
provided that to Judge Clifton at the resumption of the 065630 trial immediately thereafter, which, under NRS 178.405, required Clifton to suspend the trial in 065630. Of
course, he did not. He has demonstrated a willingness to fail to apply the law as written in certain instances, invariably to the benefit of the State. Somehow, Judge Clifton then
allowed DDA a recess to go to the counter and request and Emergency Hearing before Judge Pearson to have that Order for Competency Evaluation entered an hour before in
063341 vacated. DDA Young was successful in getting a hearing and having that Order vacated. Judge Pearson was evasive during that hearing when questioned as to
whether he had extra-judicial discussions with Clifton (whom had just exited the Bench in Courtroom D long enough for Judge Pearson to hold the Emergency Hearing to
Vacate his just entered Order for Competency Evaluation, which he claimed to have been reviewing, unprompted, following his entry of that Order, in his chambers,
unprompted...).
I seem to recall having your cell number at one point (I called once when you were at the Dentist office, so...but I can't find it).
I am attaching a pdf of what is held out to the public as Bruce's contact information on the www.nvbar.org website. It includes an email address that seems to not be valid
(though I have not received any "bounceback" error messages when sending emails to it...).
If you wish to update the information held out there, you can at this link:
http://nvbar.org/node/84
Some attorneys choose not to even list an email address there, or even a fax number. However, where an attorney does list an email address there, arguably,
there is some duty to check it or for it to work and such an attorney is arguably placed on notice of various things email to it, whether copied via USPS mail or
otherwise in hard copy or not. Just saying.
Thanks,

Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402 ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com

Zach has a file to share with you on SkyDrive. To view it, click the link below.
State Bar Of Nevada nvbar Robert Bruce Lindsay, Esq. contact information held out to the public.pdf

Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2013 16:37:16 -0800


From: rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com
Subject: Re: update on NNAHMS, request for continuance of 2/25/13 Hearing in 067980
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Zach I got a call from Zach and your hearing has been continued. Please call me

From: Zach Coughlin <zachcoughlin@hotmail.com>


To: "rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com" <rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com>; "rbl@robertbrucelindsay.com" <rbl@robertbrucelindsay.com>;
"zyoung@da.washoecounty.us" <zyoung@da.washoecounty.us>
Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2013 4:08 PM
Subject: update on NNAHMS, request for continuance of 2/25/13 Hearing in 067980

Dear Mr. Lindsay and DDA Young,


I am writing to request from DDA Young a stipulation to a continuance of the 2/25/3 Show Cause Hearing in 063341, which I
understand may have been combined with 067980, so I am copying Mr. Lindsay.
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I got this yesterday from NNAHMS. I completed the last part of the intake yesterday, and have a request for whatever social worker evaluation report my intake on
2/11/13 will yield. They indicate it should be ready in a day or two, so.
I passed a drug test with DAS yesterday and checked in on time.
Will you inquire with DDA Young if he will stip to a continuance of the 2/25/13 hearing?
Thanks,
Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402 ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Zach has 2 files to share with you on SkyDrive. To view them, click the links below.
2 19 13 more NNAHMS materials for DAS 063341 2025 065630 067980.pdf
2 11 13 Nnahms intake mental health eval proof for now 12-067980 063341 cr12-2025.pdf
Download all

RE: update on NNAHMS, request for continuance of 2/25/13 Hearing in 067980


From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Sun 2/24/13 4:50 PM
To: Robert Lindsay (rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com)

Hi Diana,
Oh WOW. I am so happy to hear that. That is wonderful news. The further out for the resetting the better as far as I am
concerned. Nice job. I will make sure to get the forward progress going.
Thanks and I will give you and Suta a call about dinner tonight to see if that is still on. I got some potatos if that helps.
Sincerely,
Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402 ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com

RE: update on NNAHMS, request for continuance of 2/25/13 Hearing in 067980


From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 2/26/13 12:10 PM
To:

Robert Lindsay (rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com)

Getting a continuance was pretty awesome, thank you. I did the orientation at NNAHMS yesterday with Dr. JIm Diss and signed up for counseling to begin next
week, I believe.
Zach has a file to share with you on SkyDrive. To view it, click the link below.

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2 11 13 very redacted just first two pages of 063341 0204 NNAHMS materials including social worker report.pdf

proposal that might be your office some more money and resolve this whole thing.
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Wed 2/27/13 9:14 PM
To: Robert Lindsay (rbrucelindsaylaw@yahoo.com); zyoung@da.washoecounty.us (zyoung@da.washoecounty.us);
mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us (mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us); dwatts@da.washoecounty.us
(dwatts@da.washoecounty.us); mcovington@da.washoecounty.us (mcovington@da.washoecounty.us);
plippar@da.washoecounty.us (plippar@da.washoecounty.us); plipparelli@da.washoecounty.us
(plipparelli@da.washoecounty.us); jhelzer@da.washoecounty.us (jhelzer@da.washoecounty.us)
49 attachments
2 14 11 0204 063341 In Re Beckett Petition for Reinstatement pursuant to SCR 111(10) 57763 - Copy.pdf (763.2 KB) , 2
25 12 0204 Order to Show Cause Order 2012-01 RJC Sferrazza Pearson - Copy.pdf (1216.6 KB) , 2 27 13 0204 063341
Motion to Dismiss Probation Violation - Copy.pdf (303.7 KB) , 3 27 12 0204 03628 02733 bates stampes SBN 11 7 12
Flanagan Order Denying 2nd Mtn Show Cuase - Copy.pdf (1244.2 KB) , 4 4 11 0204 03341 In Re Becker Order Granting
Petition for Reinstatement 57763 - Copy.pdf (664.0 KB) , 6 13 12 0204 063341 065630 email from WCPD Dogan States
Offer detailing plea deal 067980 was latter added to it - Copy.pdf (123.2 KB) , 6 27 12 0204 063341 065630 email from
WCPD regarding plea deal day before 12-067980 arrest - Copy.pdf (122.2 KB) , 8 24 12 0204 063341 065630 067980
email from WCPD Leslie Couglin Settlement regarding settlement plea deal - Copy.pdf (132.6 KB) , 8 24 12 0204 063341
065630 067980 email from WCPD Leslie FW Couglin regarding settlement plea deal - Copy.pdf (196.2 KB) , 0204
063341 Gagnon Right to Counsel in probation violation cases 063341 - Copy.pdf (208.6 KB) , 0204 063341 In Re Beckett
cases - Copy.pdf (75.0 KB) , 0204 distinguishing civil and criminal contempt - Copy.pdf (1625.0 KB) , 0204 iowa bench
book on civil and criminal contempt of court - Copy.pdf (450.1 KB) , 0204 NC Guide on Right to Counsel indigent 22176
60838 063341 - Copy.pdf (453.1 KB) , 0204 Wiki on 0204 22176 60838 063341 Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution - Copy.pdf (390.4 KB) , atty discipline duress mitigation - Copy.pdf (7.5 KB) , pat king kitchen sink pleading Copy.pdf (47.4 KB) , pauperis ifp indigent appeal transcript - Copy.pdf (166.3 KB) , right to counsel civil contempt
hearing cases - Copy.pdf (226.4 KB) , 2 27 13 0204 063341 Motion to Dismiss Probation Violation.pdf (303.7 KB) , 2 25
12 0204 Order to Show Cause Order 2012-01 RJC Sferrazza Pearson.pdf (1216.6 KB) , 2 14 11 0204 063341 In Re
Beckett Petition for Reinstatement pursuant to SCR 111(10) 57763.pdf (763.2 KB) , 4 4 11 0204 03341 In Re Becker
Order Granting Petition for Reinstatement 57763.pdf (664.0 KB) , 0204 NC Guide on Right to Counsel indigent 22176
60838 063341.pdf (453.1 KB) , right to counsel civil contempt hearing cases.pdf (226.4 KB) , 0204 distinguishing civil
and criminal contempt.pdf (1625.0 KB) , 0204 iowa bench book on civil and criminal contempt of court.pdf (450.1 KB) ,
0204 063341 In Re Beckett cases.pdf (75.0 KB) , 0204 063341 Gagnon Right to Counsel in probation violation cases
063341.pdf (208.6 KB) , 0204 Wiki on 0204 22176 60838 063341 Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.pdf
(390.4 KB) , 8 24 12 0204 063341 065630 067980 email from WCPD Leslie Couglin Settlement regarding settlement plea
deal.pdf (132.6 KB) , 8 24 12 0204 063341 065630 067980 email from WCPD Leslie FW Couglin regarding settlement
plea deal.pdf (196.2 KB) , 6 13 12 0204 063341 065630 email from WCPD Dogan States Offer detailing plea deal 067980
was latter added to it.pdf (123.2 KB) , 6 27 12 0204 063341 065630 email from WCPD regarding plea deal day before
12-067980 arrest.pdf (122.2 KB) , atty discipline duress mitigation.pdf (7.5 KB) , pat king kitchen sink pleading.pdf (47.4
KB) , 12 18 12 0204 599 and 607 atty immunity from service of process.pdf (24.6 KB) , 3 15 12 0204 374 Affidavit of
Landlord for Non-Payment of Rent Filed.pdf (69.9 KB) , 4 10 12 to 4 30 12 Couglhin v Nichols 075658.pdf (115.8 KB) ,
12 22 11 0204 03628 1708 Notice of Posting Supersedeas Bond as set by Statute with Sferrazza Note Order atop it.pdf
(205.6 KB) , 2 1 12 Notice of Appeal 12 21 11 Order Resolving Contest Ppty Lient in 1708 0204.pdf (590.6 KB) , 12 12
11 0204 1708 wcll stamped Emergency Ex Parte Motion Hearing Sooner than 12 20 11.pdf (1501.2 KB) , 11 23 11 Motion
to Set Bond and Stay on Appeal 0204 1708 law of case as to 11 7 11 Order Sferrazza which void anyway given excees
NRS 40.385 jurisdiction see Venentian v Two Roads.pdf (19.9 KB) , 12 15 11 0204 1708 Emergency Ex Parte Amended
Case Appeal Statement 44 pages not counting 5 attached Exhibits.pdf (2.4 MB) , 12 15 11 0204 1708 Stamped with no fax
header fax cover shieet 12 14 11 fax to Clifton Sferrazza and Baker re Merliss v Coughlin Hearing Set for December 20th,
2011.pdf (22.9 KB) , 11 1 11 0204 1708 03051 stamped and digitized Emergency Appeal and Motion to Stay Eviction.pdf
(1362.7 KB) , 10 15 11 0204 036281708 email to Baker some real legal quagmires for you.pdf (431.8 KB) , 12 27 11
0204 0362 1708 email to RJC Schroeder Stancil Tuttle Sferrazza Baker JCRCP 84 needs attachment.pdf (251.2 KB) , 5 14
12 and 7 31 12 0204 RX history email to @nvbar.org with attachment to email to @nvbar.org from Zach Coughlin rx
history since February 2008.pdf (1324.4 KB)

Dear Mr. Lindsay and WCDA's Office,


I respectfully submit this in the hopes that a global deal can be entered into, as without that, I will certainly be disbarred
irrevocably, and Judge Clifton and Judge Pearson, I am pretty sure, will be sentencing me to substantial amounts of jail time, in
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addition to what may issue incident to the 3/6/13 arraignment on allegations of violating the SBN TPO/EPO and the 12-01
Administrative Order by Judge Sferrazza. It would mean so much to me and be so very appreciated. I lived here my whole life,
its would be pretty sad to see things continue where they are going (ie, me disbarred permanently, doing lots of time, etc...). I
realize I am not special and I haven't handled things very well in many instances, but, I am doing my best, and have been. I don't
get help from my family, in fact, my Dad often seems to be trying to sabotage my life in some misguided attempt to twelve step
me/hijack my mental health care...
I complete my intake with Northern Nevada Adult Mental Health this Monday, and am starting counseling and am set to meet
with a Dr. Kim on 3/13/13 to see about arranging for my medications to always be available to me if I cannot afford them (and
therefore, hopefully avoid the free fall my life had been in since that occurred and was followed by a string of arrests and
evictions starting in August 2011 (please see my email to Bar Counsel detailing that and attaching proof thereof with my
complete prescription history since about 2008, showing I went off Adderall and Wellbutrin in early August 2011...Please see
my 5/14/12 email to SBN Bar Counsel detailing the fall out of my not being able to afford my medications starting in August
2011, the string of arrests and eviction occurring immediately thereafter, etc.
Judge Weller, Judge McGee, and Judge Van Walraven are all mentors to me and I believe would be willing to indicate that I am
probably not competent to stand trial at this point, and that I am not such a bad person in the grand scheme...I have been attending
Coe Swobe's Thursday Night 7pm Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers meeting, and Coe would confrim that at 322-2154. I truly
do want to resolve all these criminal matters and don't want to pursue any civil claims. I just want to get back to normal life and
am sorry to have upset so many people. I did my best under some extremely trying circumstances that one likely could not fully
understand without living through them.
Please note, I have not filed the attached 2/27/13 Motion for Continuance or whatever, its just a proposed thing to provide some
suggestions for how all the various criminal/civil/administrative things might be resolved, if I am very, very lucky and fortunate.
Maybe the State can pay Mr. Lindsay in exchange for appearing for me in these various criminal matters and brokering this global
resolution. The Gagnon case set out below provides support for such right to counsel under these circumstances. Today, I
checked in with DAS. Upon checking in the RJC Bailfifs served me a new Order to Show Cause for the Administrative Order
12-01 entered on 12/20/12 by Judge Sferrazza. the hearing to be held on 3/5/13 at 2 pm. See both the 2/25/13 Show Cause
Order and the underlying 12/20/12 Administrative Order 12-01 attached. I believe I am still an attorney, even where suspended
(under Florida Bar v. Ross) and, as such, am immune from service of such process (in addition to the service of process
attempted by RJC Bailiffs during other DAS Check ins for the WCPD and SBN Protection Orders against me in 607 and 599.
attorney's exemption from service of process, see Am. Jur. 2d, Process 35. While DDA Watts made a nice argument in
objecting to my subpoenas on 2JDC personnel in my formal bar hearing, based upon my being suspending, I believe Florida Bar
v. Ross, the fact that I was given permission to issue my own subpoenas therein (ie, even if NRCP 45(a)(3) applies, I was
"authorized to appear" in that "court") would provide a counter to any extension of that argument that would suggest that my
being suspended by the State Bar of Nevada (but not the USPTO, therefore, I am still a patent attorney, I think...) would vitiate
any "attorney immune from service of process of the TPO/EPO applications or Orders while doing his DAS probation check-ins
in the RJC filing office"argument...Try to ease up on me a little here, I am doing the best I can everyone. I took in about $13,800
in fees while practicing law between July 2011 and my suspension in June 2012, and lost way, more money than that (especially
counting the sanctions awards that remain unpaid, etc.)...One cost saving measure to the county would be to work out a deal very
soon (like before the 3/5/13 Show Cause Hearing in the RJC, that would avoid the preparation of about 15 hours of trial
transcript at public expense incident to the 1/9/13 Order by Judge Elliott in the appeal of the conviction in 11-063341 (CR122025). I'll sign away any civil law claims I have against any County entities, personnel, etc., especially if my SBN woes, RJC
criminal law woes, and hopefully a thing or two else, can be bargained away (if that is legal...I think it is, but the WCDA's Office
would need to approve of it, I believe...).
II. AMENABILITY TO SERVICE OF PROCESS
B. Persons Immune to Service of Process
2. Persons Attending Court or Governmental Hearings
c. Attorneys
Topic Summary Correlation Table References
35. Generally
West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Federal Civil Procedure k415, 416
West's Key Number Digest, Process k117, 118
Attorneys at law at times enjoy certain privileges and exemptions not generally enjoyed by
lay persons, when they are considered necessary for the due administration of justice and the
protection of a client's rights.[FN1] At common law, an attorney was exempt from the service
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of civil process while attending court.[FN2]


Currently, whether an attorney at law is exempt from the service of process in a civil action
while attending court may turn upon the attorney's residence within the state or county of
suit. Immunity from the service of civil process has been extended to a nonresident attorney
while going to, remaining at, or returning from the place where the client's business is transacted,
upon the ground that the administration of justice demands such an exemption,[FN3]
even though resident attorneys have no such immunity.[FN4]
Some jurisdictions take the view that an attorney is privileged from the service of process
while attending court in a professional capacity in a county other than the county of his or her
residence,[FN5] while others hold that the attorney is not immune from service.[FN6]
[FN1] Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law 196.
[FN2] Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76, 55 S. Ct. 21, 79 L. Ed. 208 (1934); Lamb v.
Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 52 S. Ct. 317, 76 L. Ed. 720 (1932).
[FN3] Durst v. Tautges, Wilder & McDonald, 44 F.2d 507, 71 A.L.R. 1394 (C.C.A.
7th Cir. 1930).
[FN4] Williams v. Hatcher, 95 S.C. 49, 78 S.E. 615 (1913).
[FN5] Ada Dairy Products Co. v. Superior Court, Seminole County, 258 P.2d 939
(Okla. 1953) (holding that a duly licensed and practicing attorney of one county, while
present in another county to represent the client, may not be served with summons of a
suit against a corporation of which he is the president, in the second county).
[FN6] Parker v. Reddick, 196 Tenn. 472, 268 S.W.2d 357, 45 A.L.R.2d 1096 (1954).
Here's an idea...the 3/6/13 arraingment for the felony and gross EPO/TPO violations, what about a Motion to Set Aside both the
WCPD and SBN, or just the SBN EPO itself based upon Coughlin's immunity from service of process while attending court,
especially where his attending was at least tangentially related to the basis or subject matter of the TPO/EPO. If the service was
no good, the violation charge fails...

Please consider:
" 25. The role of retained counsel; in generalSettlement or disposition without hearing; form of release
Settlement is the ideal goal in every case. Seldom can any good come from having a hearing. Even though
the accused attorney claims complete innocence, the committee members may wonder why the matter was
not disposed of earlier. They are quite aware of the fact that such matters do not get to the hearing stage
without the recommendation of the investigating bar attorney, who must have found evidence of
wrongdoing to justify filing formal charges. Thus, the defense is faced with a suspicion of some act of
misconduct. Logically, therefore, the goal of avoiding a hearing is the most desirable one, and the approach
taken should be one that is least likely to lead
to a hearing. It makes little sense to set one's goal for a hearing when the use of diplomacy can avoid it.
Settlement is possible only up to a point prior to the hearing, however. Once the hearing commences, it is
usually too late for the accused attorney to settle with the complainant. The most satisfactory and
beneficial settlements are those reached within two weeks of the filing of the complaint. The potential for
various settlement possibilities are plentiful, but, unfortunately, they are usually predicated on a
commodity in short supply for most attorneys: money. Often it will be necessary for the client to contact
family members and give promissory notes for loans in order to bargain with cash that may be easily
replaced, rather than his license, which cannot. It should be noted that while it is unethical conduct to "buy
off" complaining witnesses, nearly all states provide that if the district attorney either approves or
encourages a civil settlement, then disciplinary proceedings may be avoided. Retained counsel must make
certain he violates none of the canons of ethics himself. The key to avoiding trouble is to be open and
candid with all concerned. Retained counsel should immediately make clear to the accused attorney that he
is to take no action whatever following representation, and a careful inquiry should be made to determine
what action he has taken to date. Invariably, steps will have to be taken to straighten out the harm that he
may already have done. The single most important ingredient for success is the attitude of the accused
attorney. If the grievance committee receives the impression that he is merely interested in a "dodge" to
avoid the consequences of his acts, then great difficulty can be expected. If on the other hand the accused is
genuinely contrite, both in his words and his actions, few committees are likely to take severe action, even
in serious cases. On the other hand, some attorneys may attempt some sort of cover-up. They may lie to the
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committee or may otherwise do great disservice to their own cause when they are not represented. It
should always be kept in mind that a contrite attitude by the accused attorney is a difficult one for a
grievance committee to resist, particularly when it is coupled with a clear and definite plan of corrective
action. Contrition, however, must always be coupled with cooperation, and cooperation must always be
coupled with corrective action. Should one of these elements be missing, a good result cannot be expected.
Once defense counsel takes the client firmly in hand, directs a corrective-action program, and, most
importantly, establishes and maintains a good relationship with bar counsel, he may expect good results,
even in serious cases." from "Defending Lawyers in Disciplinary Proceedings"m 31 AMJUR TRIALS 633.
Coughlin would stip to anything that would essentially put the EPOs back in place thereafter, he doesn't want to bother anybody
or any drama, etc. Coughlin realizes it would be a mistake to try to "expose" Bar Counsel King, and anyways, Coughlin
generally likes Mr. King, that whole formal hearing just got a bit contentious, but Mr. King need not be worried about any
damage to his reputation or allegations of his being a "fraud". There may be some issue with the manner in which the WCSO
carries out 24 hour lockout ORders incident to evictions. Coughlin doesn't intend to pursue having DDA Watts-Vial answer
his SCR 110 subpoenas, especially if all this SBN/criminal/civil stuff can be resolved, hopefully with Coughlin still having a
law license at some point, but if necessary, a disbarment by consent contingent upon all the criminal stuff (an, if permissible
things like the $42K attorney fee civil award in 03628 being addressed) may be a path to pursue. Doesn't sound like the most
heart warming resolution, but if everybody is that mad at Coughlin and truly cannot see any basis for mitigation or why he
contested this or that or how the manner in which the eviction in 1708 was carried out may have been a bit harsh, well...
As to the manner in which the WCSO carries out 24 hours eviction orders to mean "within 24 hours" as meaning that the Sheriff
can race over to a house right after the hearing, versus, must wait at least 24 hours...Coughlin would enter a confidentiality
agreement or some agreement whereby he will be quite about that/relinquish any claims he may have, forego any qui tam action
(just kidding, really), etc., etc.
How about this, I apply tomorrow for appointed counsel for the 3/5/13 Show Cause Hearing, and to officially have Bruce
appointed for the 3/11/13 DAS Probation Violation Hearing, in addition to in the appeal in CR12-2025 (the 1/9/13 Order
granting me IFP by Judge Elliott might help with that) and in the appeal I filed from the 2/13/13 hearing wherein Bruce
appeared, for the Contempt Hearing, "free of charge" as you indicated (under Feick, I believe Bruce should have been paid). I
filed a Notice of Appeal of that 5 day contempt conviction (not sure if it was civil or criminal, if its criminal, I have to report it
to the SBN and USPTO, thus I appealed it, but the RJC probably just viewed that as me being more a pain in the ass and not
getting the picture...I don't want to fight it unless its a criminal contempt conviction....). I think filing the Notice of Appeal in
12-065630 may have resulted in the 2/25/13 Show Cause Order, that, or Judge Pearson was upset that the 2/25/13 DAS
Probation Violation Hearing didn't go on as scheduled on 2/25/13.... See the language in the 2/25/13 Show Cause Order that
suggests that, if I apply for counsel by 4pm on 2/28/13, that some will be appointed (ie, money for your office, a good thing in
my opinion).
More money hopefully upon your office being appointed in the appeal in cr12-2025 and the new appeal I filed within the 10 days
pursuant to NRS 189.010 from the 5 day incarceration order for Contempt ( I guess) from 2/13/13 (the hearing Bruce appeared
at, to my surprise).

Right to Counsel
here is no absolute due process right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings. (Gagnon, supra, 411 U.S. at 790.) On the other
hand, there are "cases in which fundamental fairness - the touchstone of due process - will require that the State provide at its
expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees." (Ibid.) Although there are no rigid guidelines, the United States Supreme
Court has suggested that counsel should be provided anytime the defendant makes a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not
committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public
record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate,
and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present.(Ibid.) In California, however, the Supreme Court has
proclaimed a right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings as a judicially declared rule of procedure. (Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d
at 461-462.)
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The totality of the circumstances, including the DAS materials Coughlin was provided, extreme health problems (including a reaction
preventing Couglin from appearing at a 1/3/13 EPO hearing in 12-599 and 12-607, even to contest service, process, or juridiction,
includign to assert an attorney's (even a suspended attorney appearing pro se) immunity from service of process at the courthouse,
including under courthouse sanctuary doctrine, situational stress incident to Coughlin's formal disciplinary hearing regarding the
irrevocable revocation of his law license, misleading sworn statements by both SBN Bar Counsel Pat King and WCPD Jim Leslie, and
verbal statements and writings to Coughlin by DAS staff, including Officer Celeste Brown, support this colorable claim by Coughlin
that he has not violated the terms of his probation , much less in a manner sufficient to support a summary arrest. Coughlin has received
indications from DAS staff including Officer Brown that, in exigent circumstances calling or writing, especially ahead of time, may
provide a basis for not finding a probation violatin, and Coughlin submits that both alleged probation violation (incident to DAS
Officer Ramos's PC sheet of 2/1/13, which indicate such violation occured on 1/3/13 and 1/24/13...which just happend to be days
where Coughlin had deadlines in 62337 and where Couglin now faces felony and gross charges upon allegations of TPO and EPO
violations occuring on those dates) augers towards either dismissing the charge of an alleged probation violation or affording Coughlin
representation at publice expense, especially where, apparently B. Lindsay, Esq. Showed up to the 12-067980 contempt hearing on
2/13/13 as a freebie, upbeknownst to Coughlin and counter to at least the implicit representation made to him by the Court and
Lindsay upon being led into court in restraints that morning, absent any consultations with Lindsay beforehand whatsoever..

I think Mr. Lindsay and his paralegal Diana are doing a good job and we are making progress towards ultimately (hopefully,
fingers crossed) getting the original plea deal that I voluntarily accepted on 8/27/12 put back on the record and accepted by the
RJC, even disposing of the appeal of the convictions in 11-063341 (now on appeal in CR12-2025):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BnQWmL4_chY That is the audio of the 8/27/12 hearing in 11-063341 where Couglin voluntarily accepted the plea, though it was
rejected. Next time, Coughlin promises, he will hit his mark more cleanly and get his lines right.

The other stupid youtube stuff is coming down. The plea deal was as follows:
From:

Leslie, Jim

Sent: Friday, August 24, 2012 11:17 AM


To: 'Zach Coughlin'
Subject: Coughlin: Settlement of RCR11-063341, RCR12-065630 and RCR12-067980
Mr. Coughlin:
As I had noted earlier, I had relayed the offer you had sent for a settlement. You had sent it to Zach Young directly, as well as
me and other recipients. I then forwarded your email offer to Mr. Young and asked him to reply.
Mr. Young took the position that any prior State offers had been rejected by you or had expired by their terms or by virtue of
lapse of reasonable time. Nevertheless, he has replied indicating willingness to settle as follows:
The entry of plea pursuant to this settlement must occur in Reno Justice Court no later than Monday August 27, 2012.
The plea would be to two misdemeanor disturbing the peace charges, one such charge in RCR11-063341 (the iPhone case) and
once such charge in RCR12-065630 (the 911 case);
Sentence would be 90 days jail on each charge, suspended and concurrent to each other, with the following conditions: (1)
obey all laws (except that the parties agree that traffic violations do not constitute violation of this condition), (2) mental
health counseling as recommended by your psychiatrist or mental health treatment provider, with regular reports every 60
days for a period of one year, (3) take medications and engage in counseling as recommended by said psychiatrist or mental
health treatment provider.
In exchange for this plea settlement, the State will dismiss RCR12-067980 (resisting case).
Please note that Mr. Young was emphatic that this plea settlement must be entered by the August 27, 2012, expiration date or
it is rescinded. The August 29 trial in RCR11-063341 will not be vacated until the settlement plea is entered on monday.
Time is of the essense, since any settlement must be entered at RJC by monday, so please reply via email with your acceptance
and I will set up a hearing for monday.
Thank you,
James B. Leslie, Esq.
Chief Deputy Public Defender
Washoe County Public Defender's Office
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I would absolutely voluntarily agree to that plea deal right now, especially if it could dispose of the appearl in CR12-2025 in a
manner that would allow for a SCR 111(10) application like that in the setting aside of the conviction of former Pahrump DA
Beckett in In Re Beckett.

The only reason I went into court is because I am self representing on 063341. Bruce Lindsay is not my attorney of record on
that case, nor have I ever consented to his becoming my attorney of record therein. I believe
I am asking in writing if Bruce Lindsay, Esq. was appointed as my counsel of record in 2012-065630 for the 2/13/13 Contempt
Hearing, at which I received 5 days in jail for being late, wherein Judge Clifton alleged I had already had the benefit of a warning,
yet I maintain that Robbin Baker told me the start time of the trial in that matter on 12/11/11 had been moved from 9 am to 1:30
pm. Judge Clifton maintained that he did not change the start time, then insisted Robbin Baker did not tell me that, then refused
to indicate just how he could possibly know what Robbin Baker had told me. Subsequently it was learned that Robbin Baker
was not even at work that day, and that no one had called her that day to inquire as to whether I was correct in my assertion as to
her having communicated the start time of the trial as having changed. I believe it is situations like that that resulted in the
current Administrative Order 12-01 (which may not even still be binding considering it was from 2012 and by former Chief
Judge Sferrazza) wherein I seemingly am prevented from communicating with any court personnel besides the Bailiff's, based
upon some unnoticed finding that I had caused distruptions in the filing office, an accusation to which I was never provided an
opportunity to be heard on.
Previously, Judge Sferrazza refused to allow me to appear on my own behalf, despite my having been a licensed attorney in
Nevada at the time in 11-063341, and despite my having filed a Notice of Appearance therein, and an Authorization to represent.
Then Judge Sferrazza, at trial on 8/27/12 and 8/29/12 refused to allow me to self represent still. Then he refused to accept the
plea agreement that would have disposed of all three matters to which I am a defendant in the RJC (11-063341, which is now on
appeal in CR12-2025, with the Appeal Brief, per the attached Briefing Schedule, on March 9th, 2013, and where Judge Elliott
entered an Order granting my IFP on 1/9/13 providing for the preparation of the transcript at public expense; 11-065630, which
stemmed form a 1/14/12 "misuse of emergency communications" gross misdemeanor arrest, that had the trial start on 12/11/12,
where the WCPD was releived on 11/27/12 (the day pre-trial motions were due, I maintain I was forced to proceed pro se due to
Biray Dogan's complete lack of representation, including failing to appear where required at the 2/14/12 arraignment on a gross
misdemeanor (indigent defendnans entitled to representation on gross misdo and felonies "at all stages"...); and the matter
wherein Bruce is counsel of record, 12-067980, where Bruce has stipulated to several continuances...and now today apparently
DDA Young tried to pull something where he failed to stip to the continuance in 11-063341, refuses to take my calls or respond
to any written communications. Further WCDA Legal Assistant Tina Galli informed me today that I am not to call their office
on 11-063341 and that "Diana from Bruce Lindsay's Office is handling it". That is not true at this point, as far as I understand,
but I think Mr. Lindsay and Diana could be very instrumental in resolving these various matters, saving the County a great deal
of money and resources expended prosecuting me, etc. and help me to save myself from myself. I am self representing, I never
consented to Bruce Lindsay, Esq. appearing as attorney of record in 11-063341. Further, I never expressly consented to Lindsay
appearing in 11-065630 at the 2/13/13 Contempt Hearing, wherein I was brought in upon being summarily taken into custody
the day before, and without consulting with Lindsay at all or ever consenting to his appearing on my behalf, Lindsay was seated
at the defendants desk.
From: Charles M. McGee(judgemcgee@msn.com)This sender is in your safe list.
Sent: Fri 1/18/13 1:39 PM
To: zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Dear Zach,
I can, I think, but only with your assistance and approval, help you.
And the only avenue that I think is left to you Zack (my godson is Zach--sorry for the misspell) is a SCR 117 Disability Petition.
You, in my opinion, after considerable though on the matter, need to realize that you need some help.
You shoot you own self in the foot every time.
But if I am wasting my time, let me know.

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My heart is in the right place.


Chuck"

I would prefer that all three matters be resolved (and hopefully the appeal of 11-063341 in CR12-2025 before Judge Elliott can
be included in such a global resolution) in accordance with the terms I agreed to on the record on 8/27/13 in 11-063341 (a
hearing which arguably was combined with the other two matters).
B. Due Process Rights 1. Background The loss of liberty entailed in the revocation of probation is a serious deprivation
requiring that the defendant be accorded certain due process rights. The minimum due process requirements for a probation
revocation proceeding are: (1) written notice of the claimed violation of probation; (2) disclosure of the evidence against the
probationer; (3) an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation); (5) a neutral and detached hearing body; and (6) a written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied on
and the reasons for revoking probation. (Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778, 786.) In Gagnon, supra, 411 U.S. at pp. 781782, the United States Supreme Court applied its parole revocation due process jurisprudence to probation revocation. Parole14- revocation due process rights were established in Morrissey v. Brewster (1972) 408 U.S. 471. Before Gagnon was decided,
however, The California Supreme Court, in People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 457-458, had applied the Morrissey parole
revocation requirements to probation. In Vickers, supra, at 458, the court said: [T]he precise nature of the proceedings for such
[probation] revocation need not be identical [to parole revocation proceedings] if they assure equivalent due process
safeguards. Subsequent California cases concerning the sufficient amount of due process required before probation may be
revoked have relied on Vickers. The few that have indirectly addressed the question of whether Gagnon requires greater due
process than Vickers have disagreed. (Compare People v. Mosley (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1167, 1173- 1174 [noting that any
uncertainty remaining in the wake of Vickers appears to have been quelled by...Gagnon... which explicitly requires written notice
of any claimed violation as part of the minimal due process requirements in probation revocation cases] with People v. Buford
(1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 975, 981 [which continues to cite Vickers and Morrissey as allowing for flexible due process standards
without any due process sine qua nons]). 2. Written notice Concerning written notice, People v. Mosley, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d
at p. 1174, held that where the defendant was given written notice of certain grounds for violation, it was improper to base a
revocation on other grounds not included in the notice, even though the other grounds were shown at the hearing. (See also In re
Moss (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 913, concerning the importance of written notice.) However, in People v.-15- Felix (1986) 178
Cal.App.3d 1168, 1171-1172 [First Dist., Div. 3], the court held that the trial court's offer to grant a continuance where the
defendant clFelix (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1168, 1171-1172 [First Dist., Div. 3], the court held that the trial court's offer to
grant a continuance where the defendant claimed he had not received notice of certain grounds for revocation was sufficient to
meet constitutional concerns. Felix did not address Gagnon, and its ruling may not meet the due process standards of that case.
(See People v. Mosley, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1173-1174). 3. Motion for revocation There is scant case law on the
question of when a motion to revoke has been made too long after the defendants violation of probation to satisfy due process
concerns. People v. Villines (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1298, 1303-1304, cites two federal appellate decisions concerning the
timeliness of motions to revoke probation: United States v. Tyler (5th Cir. 1979) 605 F.2d 851 [due process concerns not
satisfied when the alleged violation of probation occurred more than one year before the motion to revoke and a probation
officer had previously made a decision not to make a motion] and United States v. Hamilton (9th Cir. 1983) 708 F.2d 1412
[unreasonable delay when probation was revoked three years after the violation and the defendant attempted to bring the default
to the courts attention]. 4. Waiver Probationers due process rights may be expressly waived, and may be deemed to have been
waived if the defendant, with knowledge of the rights, fails to assert them in a timely manner. (In re La Croix (1974) 12 Cal.3d
146, 153; People v. Dale (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 191, 195.) 5. Summary Revocation A summary revocation of probation, upon
probable cause that a violation of probation has occurred, is accepted practice. Summary revocation tolls the clock on the term
of probation, and is simply a device by which the defendant may be brought before the court, and jurisdiction retained, before
formal revocation proceedings begin. (People v. Pipitone (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1112, 1117; People v. Barkins (1978) 81
Cal.App.3d 30, 32-33; Pen. Code 1203.2, sub. a.) If, however, it is determined at a subsequent revocation hearing that the
defendant did not violate the terms of probation, the defendant gets back the time that passed between the summary revocation
and the determination that no violation, in fact, occurred. (People v. Tapia (2000) 91 Cal.App.4th 738, 743.) Though Gagnon,
supra, 411 U.S. at 781-782, would seem to require both a preliminary hearing and a final revocation hearing before probation
may be revoked, People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 895, held that a unitary hearing will usually suffice in probation
revocation cases to serve the purposes of the separate preliminary and formal revocation hearings outlined in Morrissey. 6.
Right to Counsel 6. Right to Counsel-17- There is no absolute due process right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings.
(Gagnon, supra, 411 U.S. at 790.) On the other hand, there are "cases in which fundamental fairness - the touchstone of due
process - will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees." (Ibid.) Although there
are no rigid guidelines, the United States Supreme Court has suggested that counsel should be provided anytime the defendant
makes a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at
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liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which
justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to
develop or present.(Ibid.) In California, however, the Supreme Court has proclaimed a right to counsel in probation revocation
proceedings as a judicially declared rule of procedure. (Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at 461-462.) 7. Standard of Proof/Review The
standard of proof applicable to probation revocation proceedings is proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v.
Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 441.) In order to overturn a trial court decision that the defendant violated the terms of
probation, an appellate court would determine, looking at the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether the
record discloses substantial evidencethat is,-18- evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid valuesuch that a
reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendant violated the terms of probation. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557,
578.) C. Evidentiary Issues 1. Hearsay Documentary evidence, whose source is not live testimony, may be admitted when it is
accompanied by reasonable indicia of reliability. (People v. Maki (1985) 39 Cal.3d 707,716 [defendants signature on a car
rental invoice seized from defendants home]; People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144, 1156-1157.) However, a different rule
applies to testimonial hearsay. Any attempt by the prosecution to introduce a preliminary hearing transcript in lieu of live witness
testimony requires a showing of good cause before a defendant's right of confrontation at a probation revocation hearing can be
dispensed with.... (People v. Maki, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 714-716.) The California Supreme Court has held that it is improper to
revoke probation based upon hearsay statements of the sole percipient witness to the claimed violation where there has been no
showing of the witness's legal unavailability and no specific finding of good cause to deny the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses. (People v. Winson (1981) 29 Cal.3d 711, 719; People v. Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1159.) In People v.
Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp.1158-1159, the court stated: If the declarant is available and the same -19- information can be
presented to the trier of fact in the form of live testimony, with full cross-examination and the opportunity to view the demeanor
of the declarant, there is little justification for relying on the weaker version. When two versions of the same evidence are
available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay, applicable as well to Confrontation Clause analysis, favor the better
evidence. In People v. OConnell, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at 1066-1067, the court attributed no error to the trial courts
decision to allow into evidence an Adult Drug Program Termination Report prepared by...the program manager... to show
that the defendant had failed to satisfactorily participate in drug counseling sessions as required by the terms of probation. The
court analogized this report to the documentary evidence Maki prong of the Arreola hearsay analysis, determining that the
report was prepared contemporaneously to, and specifically for, the hearing where appellant's lack of compliance with the
deferred entry of judgment program was at issue, and such reports were routinely received without undertaking the added
burden of calling the author to authenticate it because the reports were prepared in response to a referral from the court.
(People v. OConnell, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at pp.1066-1067.) -20- 2. Exclusionary Rule Generally, the exclusionary rule
does not apply to probation revocation proceedings. (People v. Harrison (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 803, 808.) However, evidence
that has been previously suppressed at a preliminary hearing because of an illegal search or seizure may not be introduced at a
probation revocation hearing if the criminal charges were dropped and a new complaint or indictment was never filed. (People v.
Zimmerman (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 673, 676 [statutory interpretation of Pen. Code 1538].) Illegally seized evidence will be
excluded, moreover, if the police conduct was so egregious as to shock the conscience. (People v. Washington (1987) 192
Cal.App.3d 1120, 1128.) 3. Probationers testimony The testimony of a probationer at a probation revocation hearing, and its
fruits, cannot be used in a later criminal prosecution. (People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at 891-892.) However, if the
probationer takes the stand at a later criminal trial, the earlier revocation hearing testimony can be used to impeach the
probationers truthfulness. (Id. at p. 892.) -21- 4. Collateral Estoppel The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not generally apply
to issues raised in both probation revocation hearings and criminal trials. Thus, facts and issues may be relitigated regardless of
which hearing was held first and what determination was made. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 347-349.)
Likewise, refiling of a motion to revoke probation, following dismissal of the first revocation proceeding, is permissible.
(People v. Villines, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at 1305.) It is within the reasonable discretion of the trial court to decide whether to
hold a revocation hearing before or after trial for a new offense. (People v. Jasper (1983) 33 Cal.3d 931, 935.)
MORE ON THE IDEA OF THE TPO/EPO'S BEING SET ASIDE BASED UPON VIOLATIONS OF COURTHOUSE
SANCTUARY DOCTRINE OR AN ATTORNEY'S IMMUNITY FROM SERVICE OF PROCESS AT THE COURT, ETC.:

http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ny-district-court/1372465.html
"THE LAW
(COURTHOUSE SANCTUARY)
Despite antagonistic dicta to the contrary; most modern era precedent dealing with the issue of Courthouse Sanctuary from
service of process have held that New York State residents receive no such immunity protections. Baumgartner v.
Baumgartner, 273 A.D. 411, 77 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1st Dept.1948); Department of Housing Preservation, City of New York v.
Koenigsberg, 133 Misc.2d 893, 509 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y. Civ.Ct.1986); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Bobo, N.Y.L.J., 1 Misc.3d 901(A),
2003 WL 22928513 (Dec. 17, 2003, J. Miller, Nassau Co. Dist. Ct.) These cases hold that the Courthouse Sanctuary is only
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available to foreign state residents who come into New York's Courts to contest jurisdiction. This doctrine has been slightly
expanded to include New York residents who enter the jurisdiction of a New York Court of limited territorial jurisdiction to
contest jurisdiction. See Palazzo v. Conforti, 50 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. Civ.Ct.1944); Singer v. Reising, 154 Misc. 239, 276 N.Y.S. 714
(Queens County 1935).
The Baumgartner Appellate Division panel also acknowledges a limited Courthouse Sanctuary rule for New York residents
if such service would constitute a disturbance directly tending to interrupt the proceedings of the Court or to impair the
respect due its authority. This rule by itself would not be applicable to the instant case as service of process was effected in
the Courtroom but outside the Court's presence and in between calendar calls.
STATE RESIDENCY IMMUNITY DISTINCTION?
The English Common Law made no New York State residency distinction. The doctrine of immunity from arrest of a litigant
attending a trial of an action to which he is a party found early recognition and dates back to the book of 13 Henry IV, J.B.
Sampson v. Graves, 208 A.D. 522, 203 N.Y.S. 729 (1st Dept.1924). This is for the obvious reason that England had no sovereign
states. The privilege is not a creature of statute, but was created and deemed necessary for the due administration of
justice. See Matthews v. Tufts, 87 N.Y. 568 (1882); citing to Van Lien v. Johnson (N.Y. Ct. Appeals, unreported 1871).
The logical question now arises, exactly when did New York's Appellate Court's recognize a residency distinction for application
of the Courthouse Sanctuary? The answer is that the Court of Appeals never established such a rule. In contra point of
fact, the Court of Appeals has opined that:
It is the policy of the law to protect suitors and witnesses from arrests upon civil process while coming to and attending the
court and while returning home. Upon principle as well as upon authority their immunity from the service of process for the
commencement of civil actions against them is absolute eundo, morando et redeundo. Person v. Grier, 66 N.Y. 124 (1876).
Emphasis Added.
In this unanimous opinion, the Court of Appeals expressly addressed the New York State resident immunity distinction and
established in its dicta that whether any distinction should or does in fact exist, is at least doubtful. This immunity is one of
the necessities of the Administration of Justice, and Court's would often be embarrassed if suitors or witnesses, while
attending Court, could be molested with process. It is noted that Person involved a foreign state resident. In establishing
the sanctuary doctrine, the Court stated that this rule is especially applicable in all its foreign suitors . By direct
implication, the Court of Appeals is also applying the protective rule to New York residents.
The basis of the Courthouse Sanctuary rule is that parties should be allowed to contest jurisdiction without submitting to
it. Allowing Re-service makes a mockery of the traverse hearing and essentially allows the plaintiff to use a defective
default judgment as a weapon to compel the defendant to submit to the service of process. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Bobo;
cite supra. The location of an individual's residence does little to legitimize such a mockery. Absent the compulsion of clear
controlling precedent; this Court will not condone such a situation..."
II. AMENABILITY TO SERVICE OF PROCESS
B. Persons Immune to Service of Process
2. Persons Attending Court or Governmental Hearings
a. In General
Topic Summary Correlation Table References
21. Generally
West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Federal Civil Procedure k415, 416
West's Key Number Digest, Process k117 to 120
Litigants, their attorneys, and witnesses are immune from service of process while attending
court.[FN1] The basis for this rule, sometimes known as the "Courthouse Sanctuary" rule,
is that parties should be allowed to contest jurisdiction without submitting to it.[FN2] Process
immunity is not for the convenience of the person seeking it but is for the convenience of the
court, and should be made available only to further the administration of justice.[FN3] The
test is whether the privilege, if allowed, would so obstruct judicial administration in the cause
for the protection of which it is invoked as to justify withholding it; this depends on the nature
of the proceeding in which the service is made and its relation to the principal suit.[FN4] Because
the privilege is designed for the court's convenience, it is not automatic, and the party
must affirmatively show that it is in the court's own interest in the furtherance of the administration
of justice to quash the summons.[FN5]
Once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, the burden shifts to the defendant
seeking immunity from the service of process to produce evidence establishing immunity
by showing that he or she was attending a judicial proceeding.[FN6]
Caution:
In at least one state, the immunity rule is no longer the law, whether the person seeking immunity
is a nonresident witness or a nonresident party.[FN7]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
AMJUR PROCESS 21 Page 1
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