UFPPC (www.ufppc.org) Digging Deeper I: October 11, 2004, 7:00 p.m.

Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War: The United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina (Lanham, MD, Boulder, CO, New York & Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
Abbreviations and Acronyms. 2 pages. Preface. “This book explores the underlying factors that have engendered a U.S. strategy of indirect intervention in Third World Countries through alliances with drugtrafficking proxies. This strategy was originally developed in the late 1940s to contain communist China; it has since been used to secure control over foreign petroleum resources. The result has been a staggering increase in the global drug traffic and the mafias assorted with it” (xi). Resistance to acknowledgment contributes to the problem (xii). “Parapolitics . . . tends to metastasize into deep politics . . . This is the heart of the analysis” (xii-xiii; also 29). Oil. Attempt “to dominate a global system for the production and distribution of oil” began in 1945-1946; containment of USSR morphed into drive to control oil (xiii). “Free world defense” also a factor, but “above all” domination of “an increasingly unified global oil system” (xiv). CIA coups: Iran (1953), Indonesia (1965), Ghana (1966); secret agreements to maintain petrodollars’ strength resulted in Third World impoverishment (xiv). What to do. End repressive drug policies; reduce oil consumption and move toward multilateral and equitable oil system; renounce drive “to become hegemon”; expose secret agreements (xv). The alternative is more “triumphal unilateralism in the United States and terroristic Islamism” (xvi). Call for a more peace-oriented “soft politics” (xvi-xvii). Acknowledgments. “Above all I am grateful to my best friend, Daniel Ellsberg” (xvii). Author’s note [pre-9/11 preface]. Viciousness of the corrupt system (xviii). Importance of informing Americans about Plan Colombia (xviii-xix). Introduction: The Deep Politics of U.S. Interventions. ‘Parapolitics’ is conscious deceit and collusion; more generally, ‘deep politics’ is practices repressed rather than acknowledged (1). The “CIA-Air AmericaKuomintang complex” in late 1940s was “the prototype of the U.S. use of drug proxies” (2). Covert operations and unofficial proprietaries tend to become factors in deep politics (3-4). The case of Stinger missiles (4-6). Obscure connections between covert operations, political influence, drug airlines, and mob-controlled banks; e.g. Farhad Azima (6-7). Oil lobbies & AIPAC, “both almost beyond mention in polite public discourse” (7-9). Public resistance to recognition accompanies “deceptions and intrigues outside the sites of policy discussions” (910). Bureaucratic “subrationality, or rationality of the part” produces pressure in unavowable directions (10-12). “Archival bias” has led to neglect of “deeper forces that articulate themselves obliquely” (1213). Vietnam histories as an example (1316). Notes (16-23; of interest, n.47 on establishment of AIPAC [20-21]). I. AFGHANISTAN, HEROIN, AND OIL (2002) Ch. 1: Drugs and Oil in U.S. Asian Wars: From Indochina to Afghanistan. Since the Renaissance, empires have sought resources and usually used drugs to finance expansion (27). U.S. dependence on drug proxies can be traced to 1949-1950 decision to support residual Kuomintang in Burma (28). It has been a regular feature of postWWII U.S. “deep politics” (28-29). Central Asian energy supplies geopolitically central for U.S. (29-31). Though al-Qaeda uses drug trade, this was muted in 2001 Afghanistan invasion because of alliance with drugdealing Northern Alliance (32-33). Notes (3337; of interest, n.17 on Brzezinski’s “There isn’t a global Islam” [35]). Ch. 2: Indochina, Colombia, and Afghanistan. Oil in the three areas (39-40). U.S. military involvement’s ebbs and flows correlate with drug trafficking (40-41). Secret Saudi deals to keep petrodollars in U.S. economy in 1970s (41). A factor in Third World impoverishment (42). Wars in the light of the drug trade (43). Sings the U.S. will not challenge drug politics of its proxies in

Afghanistan, 2001-2002 (43-46). Opium traffickers “may have helped induce” the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan in 1979 (4650). Speculation that phony Laotian crisis of Jul.-Aug. 1959 due to SE Asian drug traffickers (50-52). Notes (52-58). Ch. 3: The Origins of the Drug Proxy Strategy: The KMT, Burma, and Organized Crime. Complex intrigues and mutual manipulations of CIA and Kuomintang & organized crime (59-61). Paul Helliwell as link (61-62). Chinese tongs and Triads as “the true sociological underpinnings of the KMT and the China lobby” (62-63). Deep collusion of oil and drugs can be expected in Central Asia (64-66). Notes (66-68). II: COLOMBIA, COCAINE, AND OIL (2001) Ch. 4: The United States, Oil, and Colombia. Escalating U.S. involvement in Colombia (71-73). Right-wing paramilitary AUC sanctioned but “Plan Colombia” remains focused on military approach to FARC, Marxist rebel movement; interest in the Caño Limon oilfield is behind U.S. involvement (7273). Fighting drugs is a cover; actually, U.S. involvement increases drug trade (74-76). U.S. training in counterinsurgency dates from 1962 (76-77). CIA bomb school in Los Fresnos, TX (77). Autodefensas outlawed in 1989, but U.S. & Colombian militaries collude to continue them, with the aim of driving FARC out of oil regions in north and central Colombia (78). U.S. pressures has turned FARC into narco-guerrillas (78-79). Notes (80-83). Ch. 5: The CIA and Drug Traffickers in Colombia. Suggestions and signs of ongoing CIA-drug-trafficking paramilitary connections at least since creation of Muerte a Sequestradores (85-87). NSDD 221, defining drug trafficking as a national security matter, the “executive equivalent of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1964” (87). True purpose of U.S. campaigns on drugs has been “to alter market share” (88-89). Drugs & CIA airlines (89-91). Notes (91-95). Ch. 6: The Need to Disengage from Colombia. U.S. aid packages mask military reality with a human rights veneer (97-98). Paramilitaries the chief stumbling block (98). Similarities with Vietnam derive from “demands from major U.S. oil corporations

for increased security [that] have led the U.S. government still further into a de facto alliance with local right-wing forces involved in drug trafficking” (99). Oil company pressures since mid-1990s (100). News management, advisory role, air transport (101). High likelihood of an “escalating disaster” (102). The real enemy: “right-wing former CIA assets and their successors” (103). Notes (103-05). III: INDOCHINA, OPIUM, AND OIL (1972) ([5 updated chapters] from The War Conspiracy, 1972) Ch. 7: Overview: Public Private, and Covert Political Power. [2003 note:] A recurring pattern: “official reluctance . . . overcome by those with influential crime connections below, backed by influential financial interests above, with an intelligence officer serving as go-between” (110). No deescalation in SE Asia 1950-1970 (110-11). Intelligence agencies used provocation, connivance, and deceit to prepare escalation; incidents attributed to breakdown of intelligence and then used to justify increasing the intelligence establishment (111). A “general syndrome” (112). E.g. Thomas G. Corcoran’s law firm (113-14). “Diverse intelligence operations . . . and diverse overseas economic interests . . . are revealed to be part of one continuous story” (114). Unclear who is using whom (114). In general “the same financial interests” involved (115). Gabriel Kolko, in The Roots of American Foreign Policy (1969), argues conspiracy unnecessary because business defines a consensus (115). But he overestimates the degree of consensus; “our constitutional processes . . . are not yet meaningless” (116). Legal restrictions (11617). Notes (117-18). Ch. 8: CAT/Air America, 1950-1970. [2003 note:] In SE Asia, a “root illusion was to think that the brilliant success of the Marshall Plan in restoring the economies of Europe could be replicated in Vietnam and Laos to ‘build’ nations that had not previously existed” (119-20). Nixon’s career aided financially by organized crime, the China lobby, oilmen, and possibly the CIA ― all with a common stake in the Far East, where until 1967 Nixon was always a spokesman for expansion (121-22). Air

America (123-24). Its establishment, with White House connivance (125-26). Claire Chennault hoped to overthrow Chinese Communists (126-27). CIA backed Phoumi Nosavan in Laos (128-29). Joseph Alsop drums up fraudulent Chinese invasion, Aug. 1959 (130). Pressure on Eisenhower to send troops to Laos (131-32). CIA backs cop (13233). A crisis, with Soviet intervention, was generated (133-34). Pressures on Eisenhower in election year (cf. 1964 Tonkin Gulf crisis; 1968 Pueblo crisis) (135-37). Notes (138-46; of interest, n. 4: “The idea of ‘nation building’ is an example of shallow thinking concealed by a shallow metaphor. Nations are normally not ‘built,’ they grow” [138]). Ch. 9: Laos, 1959-1970. [2003 note:] All top generals in Laos in politics were involved in drug trafficking; important, since in Laos are roots of U.S. involvement in Vietnam (147-48). Detailed refutation of Nixon’s March 6, 1970 statement justifying escalation in Laos (148-62). Notes (162-68); of interest, Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin [1991]). Ch. 10: Cambodia and Oil, 1970. 2003 note (167). Sihanouk forced to accommodate U.S. for economic reasons (168-69). Possibility of oil discoveries off Cambodia’s shores (169-70). U.S. covert

operations involved in Cambodia, both in coup and strategy of provocation (170-75). Struggles within the U.S. bureaucracy; Nixon misled (176-78). Nixon’s “interlocks” with the American Security Council, intelligence personnel, and Pacific-oriented oil companies (178-79). Notes (179-84). Ch. 11: Opium, the China Lobby, and the CIA. [2003 note:] Historians have still to assimilate the need to uncover the active role of the CIA & CAT/Air America in organizing drug trade, and the connections of these to U.S. politics (185-86). Influence of financial interests on U.S. policy, now a CIA monopoly (186-87). Corporate experience used to set up “proprietaries” (187). CAT/Air America the largest in Asia by far (187-89). Pan Am’s involvement (190). China Lobby (190-91). Supplied Gen. Li Mi in Burma & N. Thailand, 1949-1961 (191). U.S. pretended to believe opium in U.S. was coming from communist China (191-92). Utility of opium trade to U.S. in contacts with Triads (192-93). Drug money may have funded China Lobby (193-94). Kuomintang connections (194-95). CIA involvement; degree of U.S. leadership’s knowledge doubtful (196-97). Organized crime links (197-99). Notes (199-207). A Deep Politics Bibliography. 60 entries.

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