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25, 1977, Fiscal Abundio Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons on the ground of squatting as penalized by PD No.772, section 1, which provides that “any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advant age of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five hundred pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.” It was alleged that the accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as successor to the pasture applicant Celestino de la Serna. Informations of the five accused were raffled to Judge Vicente Echaves, Jr. Judge Echaves motu proprio dismissed the five informations on the following grounds: 1) That it was alleged that the accused entered the land through “stealth and strategy”, whereas under the decree the entry should be effected “with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner”,an d; 2) That under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land. As a result of such order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in lieu of “stealth and strategy” the expression “wit h threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said ranchowner. The lower court denied the motion for reconsideration of the fiscal. The fiscal appealed to the Court under R.A.No.5440 but the appeal was considered devoid of merit. ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies to agricultural lands. RULING: No. The decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squatting complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas. The preamble of the decree is quoted below: “WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of National Defense, Public Work and Communications, Social Welfare and the Director of Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City and District Engineers, "to remove an illegal constructions including buildings on and along esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without permits on public and private property." squatting is still a major problem in urban communities all over the country; WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong to the affluent class; WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive against this illegal and nefarious practice.” It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal constructions on public and private property. It is complemented by Letter of Instruction No. 19-A which provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest of public health, safety and peace and order. The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain. Thus, the Supreme Court AFFIRMED the trial court’s order of dismissal.
. RULING: Yes.. they shall have no binding force and effect.TAÑADA VS.. these must be published in the Official Gazette. There would be no basis for the application of the latin maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat in the absence of such notice and publication. contends that the petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition. The clear object of the provision in Article 2 of the Civil Code that even the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. 1985) FACTS: The petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees. letters of instructions." The Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application. publication in the Official Gazette is required. letters of implementations and administrative orders. The implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. .. executive orders. Solicitor General moved to dismiss the case. not even a constructive one. Thus. TUVERA 136 SCRA 27 (April 24. Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution as well as the principle that in order for laws to be valid and enforceable. The Solicitor General in behalf of the respondents. The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette . proclamations. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever." The word “shall” imposes an imperative duty which must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. a right recognized in Section 6. the general public should be given adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens by having these published in the Official Gazette. invoking that the people has the right to be informed on matters of public concern. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration . This is the requirement of due process. general orders. ISSUE: Whether or not before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable. and unless so published. . that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
the title of such decree. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or. The Solicitor General. It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. . that publication means complete publication. which cannot in any event be omitted. the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree. to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. be published in full in the Official Gazette. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval. The Court pronounced that under Article 2 of the Civil Code. TUVERA 146 SCRA 446 (December 29. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners. and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. when necessary. deep secrets. Therefore. the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual. or on any other date.TAÑADA VS. that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.It was held that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature. need not be published. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. or as soon thereafter as possible. Provides that “Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette. that is. and. the supposed date of effectivity. or on another date specified by the legislature. on the merits. claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed. unless it is otherwise provided. ISSUE: Whether or not the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative. the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette and not elsewhere. including those of local application and private laws. It is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval. and t to the public as a whole. all statutes. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application. administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. 1986) FACTS: The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not.” The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself. did not have to be made in the Official Gazette. shall be published as a condition for their effectivity. directly conferred by the Constitution. that publication. but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. To be valid. it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence. regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public. Publication is indispensable in every case. for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. 2. Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law be effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication). to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication. and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. or some of the people only. which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding. as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature. RULING: NO. This is not even substantial compliance. without its previous publication. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. at present. ART.
4136. As a result of such complaint. the Land Transportation and 'Traffic Code. to avoid multiplicity of actions. appellants are in error in contending that "a later enactment of the law relating to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the original law. 2. ISSUES: 1)Whether or not the Municipal ordinance No. By this express repeal. for overtaking a truck. 3. in proper cases. after reading it. 3. The validity of Ordinance No. RULING: 1)YES. the exception just cited obtains in this case. plaintiff-appellee. "injunction has frequently been sustained in order to prevent a multiplicity of prosecutions under it. criminal prosecution may not be blocked by court prohibition or injunction.PRIMICIAS vs. the "mother statute" so to speak. holding that the ordinance was null and void and that it had been repealed by Republic Act No. considering that our law on municipal corporations is in principle patterned after that of the United States. . The Municipality of Urdaneta (appellants) fail to note that Act No. There is no showing that the marking of the streets and areas falling under Section 1. definiteness and certainty are all the more important so that an average man should be able with due care. Hence. A criminal complaint was filed against Primicias in the Municipal Court of Urdaneta against Primicias for violation of Ordinance No. whenever there is a conflict between an ordinance and a statute. the Ordinance becomes invalid. it did not distinguish between passenger cars and motor vehicles and motor trucks and buses. must therefore be determined vis-a-vis Republic Act No. 3. when a member of Urdaneta's Municipal Police asked him to stop and told him that he had violated Municipal Ordinance No. 17 Exceptions however are However. the ordinance at bar is thus placed within the ambit of Republic Act No. for the orderly administration of justice." allowed in the following instances: 1. Ordinance)." for it is a "fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. Republic Act No. Moreover. Series of 1964. par. MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA. its clearness. Pangasinan. 3992. Thus. 2) Whether or not a writ of injunction can restrain the proceedings in Criminal Case No. Primicias. The Court also agrees with the court a quo that when the Municipal Council of Urdaneta used the phrase "vehicular traffic" (Section 1. 4136. PANGASINAN G." Pursuant to Section 63. Series of 1964. 3. No. 18 5. is null and void. that is "it must not contravene . The policeman then asked for plaintiff's license and issued a temporary operator's permit to him. 3992 has been superseded by Republic Act No. otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. As also found correctly by the lower court. to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner. 4136. and more particularly. L-26702 October 18. The writ was issued and Judge Soriano was enjoined from further proceeding in the criminal case. because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was held invalid. and the general rule that a later law prevails over an earlier law. Ordinance No. which was in force at the time the criminal case was brought against Primicias for the violation of the said ordinance." The appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. among others. 3140. which became effective on June 20. was done with the approval of the Land Transportation Commissioner. 4. An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is. was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta. Nowhere in the Ordinance is "vehicular traffic" defined. The Court of First Instance rendered the decision. it would not be amiss for the Court to adopt in this instance the ruling that to enjoin the enforcement of a void ordinance." Following this general rule. contrary to the explicit requirement laid down by Section 38. The general rule is that "ordinarily. to understand and ascertain whether he will incur a penalty for particular acts or courses of conduct. to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights. 2)YES. and not Act No. 3. 4136. Republic Act No. 4136. Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance. 1979 FACTS: Juan Augusta B. (a). . the local statute or ordinance at bar being invalid. herein. on this very ground alone. the statute.3. the ordinance must give way. the lower court did not err in issuing the writ of injunction against defendants. the Municipal Council of Urdaneta did not make any classification of its thoroughfares. about three months after the questioned ordinance was approved by Urdaneta's Municipal Council. Series of 1964. the plaintiff Primicias initiated an action for the annulment of said ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction for the purpose of restraining defendants Municipality of Urdaneta. . 1964. Series of 1964. 4136. Series of 1964.R.
In either case. 7522 for the following reasons: (a) that the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with. 231). as amended). The Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila. the Revised City Charter (R. seeking the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. the respondent Judge issued an order.BAGATSING vs. Blackstone defines general law as a universal rule affecting the entire community and special law as one relating to particular persons or things of a class. 7522. or posted in the local legislative hall or premises and in two other conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government. and (d) that the ordinance would violate Presidential Decree No. city. The respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors. Inc. RAMIREZ G. approved the ordinance on June 15. Respondent Judge rendered its decision. copies of all provincial. or the Local Tax Code (P. as envisioned by Republic Act 6039. fees or other charges" either in a newspaper or publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government or by posting the ordinance in the local legislative hall or premises and in two other conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government. And the rule commonly said is that a prior special law is not ordinarily repealed by a subsequent general law. one as a general law of the land. this petition for review on certiorari. which only demands publication after approval? RULING: Section 17 of the Revised Charter provides: Each proposed ordinance shall be published in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city. 1972 prescribing the collection of fees and charges on livestock and animal products. * * * Each approved ordinance * * * shall be published in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city. Ramon D. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. (b) that the Market Committee was not given any participation in the enactment of the ordinance. While the Revised Charter of the City of Manila requires publication before the enactment of the ordinance and after the approval thereof in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city. 7 of September 30. whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local governments. The petitioner City Mayor.D. and (b) private respondent failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before instituting an action in court.R. hence. certified true copies of all provincial. fees or other charges shall be published for three consecutive days in a newspaper or publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government. (c) that Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has been violated. stressing that: (a) only a post-publication is required by the Local Tax. 1976) FACTS: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. municipal and barrio ordinances shall be furnished the treasurers of the respective component and mother units of a local government for dissemination. No. No. fees or other charges" in particular. which requires publication of the ordinance before its enactment and after its approval. commenced Civil Case 96787 before the Court of First Instance of Manila. and shall take effect and be in force on and after the twentieth day following its publication. the Local Tax Code only prescribes for publication after the approval of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes.A. city. ISSUE: What law shall govern the publication of a tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila. L-41631 (December 17. if no date is fixed in the ordinance. municipal and barrio ordinances levying or imposing taxes. Resolving the accompanying prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. 1974. to exhaust the administrative remedies outlined in the Local Tax Code. the other as the law of a particular case. Bagatsing. The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general. 409. denying the plea for failure of the respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors. and shall not be discussed or enacted by the Board until after the third day following such publication. Section 43 of the Local Tax Code directs: Within ten days after their approval. . Inc. Respondent Judge denied the motion. within ten days after its approval. declaring the nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 of the City of Manila on the primary ground of non-compliance with the requirement of publication under the Revised City Charter. Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general whereas. Code. Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes. "AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE OPERATION OF PUBLIC MARKETS AND PRESCRIBING FEES FOR THE RENTALS OF STALLS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
a charter must yield to the constitution and general laws of the state.In regard. but. There is no rule which prohibits the repeal even by implication of a special or specific act by a general or broad one. Exhaustion of administrative remedies before resort to judicial bodies is not an absolute rule. is hereby held to have been validly enacted. Ordinance No. Otherwise stated. As always." because the imposition of rentals. The dispute is sharply focused on the applicability of the Revised City Charter or the Local Tax Code on the point at issue. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is strongly asserted by petitioners as having been violated by private respondent in bringing a direct suit in court. the rule does not apply. Potestas delegata non delegare potest. fees or other charges" in particular. the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant. Much less could it be said that Republic Act 6039 intended to delegate to the Market Committee the adoption of regulatory measures for the operation and administration of the city markets. speedy and adequate remedy. it must be read into the charter notwithstanding any particular charter provision. that dominant force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes. . A subsequent general law similarly applicable to all cities prevails over any conflicting charter provision. This is especially true where the law containing the particular provision was enacted later than the one containing the general provision. for the reason that a charter must not be inconsistent with the general laws and public policy of the state. Special provision governs. 1975. The decision of the court below is hereby reversed and set aside. dated June 15. 7522 of the City of Manila. Therefore. and where a statute is controlling. The principle may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain. It is maintained by private respondent that the subject ordinance is not a "tax ordinance. Where the question litigated upon is purely a legal one. and not on the legality of the imposition of the tax. the Local Tax Code controls. to ordinances in general. therefore. it is to have read into it that general law which governs the municipal corporation and which the corporation cannot set aside but to which it must yield. The state remains supreme in all matters not purely local. It admits of exceptions. A chartered city is not an independent sovereignty. it in effect adopts as part of its charter general law of such character. When a city adopts a charter. a general provision must give way to a particular provision. A charter provision may be impliedly modified or superseded by a later statute. so that the procedure for publication under the Local Tax Code finds no application. tolls and other fees is not strictly a taxing power but a revenue-raising function. permit fees.
with costs against the City of Manila. the City of Manila appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals. said Article 2189 is decisive thereon. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road. the Municipal Board.CITY OF MANILA vs. or any other city officer. bridges. Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides: Provinces. The Section 4 of Republic Act No. to enforce the provisions of this chapter. and took a few steps. 29 January 1968. The Court of First Instance of Manila sustained the theory of the defendants and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned. Manila and that whenever a report is received from whatever source of the loss of a catch basin cover. regardless of the object thereof. cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of. waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. received a report of the uncovered condition of a catch basin at the corner of P. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila). with the Court of First Instance of Manila. to prove that the Storm Drain Section. ISSUE: Whether or not the present case is governed by Section 4 of R." in particular. . Hence. or from negligence of said Mayor. RULING: No. Office of the City Engineer of Manila.750. No.00 during his incapacity to work.00. the matter is immediately attended to. or any other law or ordinance. a businessman and a professor at the University of the East. Teotico was prevented from engaging in his customary occupation for twenty days and lost a daily income of about P50. city health officer. Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh. Municipal Board.(the respondent herein) who was a practicing public accountant. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence. city engineer. he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6.A.R. stealing of iron catch basin covers was rampant. any person by reason of defective conditions of road. the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. Teotico filed. Whereas. L-23052. Burgos Avenue. No. oral and documentary. public buildings. His head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. a complaint for damages against the City of Manila. and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review. which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative. TEOTICO and CA G. is one of fact. or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions. within a "loading and unloading" zone. and other public works under their control or supervision. its mayor. in connection with the maintenance of said road. GENARO N. The determination of whether or not P. FACTS: Genaro N. either by immediately replacing the missing cover or covering the catch basin with steel matting that because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing. city treasurer and chief of police. streets. in general. The said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney. The decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed. Teotico. Mr. was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos and Old Luneta Streets. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) provides that: The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor. the left upper arm. or injuries suffered by. Burgos Avenue. Manila. whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets. The defense presented evidence.
we must not by any excessive take away from the Commission on Elections the initiative belongs to it. Due regard to the independent character of the Commission. as well as in the appointment of election inspectors. 657." ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Elections. but limited by the provision of the Act that the majority party shall have the right to propose only one inspector.JUAN SUMULONG vs. Act No. 657 has a necessary and proper connection with the reorganization of the Commission on Elections. In the matter of the administration of the laws relative to the conduct of elections. has acted within the limits of the discretion given by section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. Petitioner contends that this requirement of section 5 is a subject not expressed in the title of the Act. as a general proposition. 1941 FACTS: Acting under the authority of section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. It seems evident. in so far requires that a political party must have polled at least ten per centum of the total number of votes cast in the preceding election in order to have the right to propose the appointment of one inspector and his substitute. It should be a sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title express the general subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject. in giving so-called rebel candidates and free-zone factions of the Nationalista Party the right to propose election inspectors for the fifty-three legislative districts. be used sparingly but firmly in appropriate cases. in the light of the relevant provisions of the Constitution.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G. which is the subject expressed in the Title of the Act. now seeks to nullify that resolution on the ground that section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. L-48609 October 10. of which petitioner is the President. No. 657 is unconstitutional. It should be given a practical rather than technical construction. claiming the exclusive right to propose the appointment of such inspectors. and that its conclusion in that section contravenes the provision of the Constitution that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. Pagkakaisa Ng Bayan.R. RULING: The constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should be reasonably construed so as not to interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary legislation. The order of the Commission on Elections is affirmed with costs against the petitioner. requires that the power of this court to review the acts of that body should. . 657 to the Commission on Elections in the choice of election inspectors where none of the minority parties is entitled to propose the appointment of such inspectors is not absolute. One of those parties. the COMELEC adopted a resolution providing for the appointment of election inspectors to be proposed by the political parties and persons named therein. as ordained in the Constitution.
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