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13. FORTUNATO R. PAMIL vs. HONORABLE VICTORINO C. TELERON and REV. FR. MARGARITO R. GONZAGA G.R. No.

L-34854 November 20, 1978 FACTS: Private respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected to the position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol. Therefore, he was duly proclaimed. A suit for quo warranto was then filed by petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, for his disqualification based on this Administrative Code provision: "In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality." The suit did not prosper, respondent Judge sustaining the right of Father Gonzaga to the office of municipal mayor. He ruled that such statutory ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. The matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by petitioner. It is his contention that there was no such implied repeal, that it is still in full force and effect. Thus was the specific question raised. ISSUE WON establishing ecclesiastical tribunals to annul marriages or to declare marriages void ab initio is a usurpation of the sovereign power of 'the State. HELD: There is need of emphasizing that marriage is a social institution — not just a mere contractual relation — whose sanctity is recognized and protected by the State, and is not a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Church. The solidarity of the Filipino family and sanctity of the marital bond are the primary concern of the State, perhaps even more than they are of the Catholic church, as the family unit constitutes the strength of the nation. The Church tribunals in annulling marriages, is usurping the power of the courts established by the State. Even the authority of the priests and ministers to solemnize marriages is granted by State law, without which no priest or minister of any religion or church or sect or denomination can legally solemnize marriages. If the right of the Catholic church to annul marriages or to declare marital unions as void ab initio under its rules were conceded, then there is no reason to deny the same right to the ministers of the Protestant church and other religious sect or denomination. The annulment by the Church does not render the spouses exempt from possible prosecution for bigamy, adultery or concubinage, should they contract a second marriage or have carnal knowledge of, or co-habit with persons other than their legitimate spouses of the first marriage which remains lawful in the yes of the laws validly promulgated by the State. If the Church tribunal believes that the marital union is a nullity from the very beginning under the civil laws, then the Church should advise the parties to go to the civil courts. But the Church should not arrogate unto itself State authority and the jurisdiction of the courts created by the State. To stress, in our country, there is only one sovereign, the Republic of the Philippines, and not the Roman Catholic Church or any other church. Only the sovereign, the Republic of the Philippines, can validly promulgate laws to govern all the inhabitants of the Philippines, whether citizens or aliens, including laws concerning marriages, persons and family relations. And only the courts established by the sovereign, the Republic of the Philippines, can apply, interpret and enforce such laws. The exercise by the Catholic church in promulgating rules

14. RUFILLO D. but the afore-mentioned parties could not be found in their respective residences. with waiver of civil and criminal actions against each other is contrary to law. purports to formulate an agreement between the husband and the wife to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relations with another man. in substance. respondent Notary Public Rufillo D. both dated April 20.. but to his surprise he found that the same was notarized by him as per his file copies in the office. he vehemently refused to sign it and informed the parties that the document was immoral. morals and good customs. 2 The contract. Barangay Captain of Victories. it induces each party to commit bigamy. respondent . without opposition from either one. respondent. 1 Issue: W/N the agreement allowing spouses to remarry. 1976. 1976. Lucia D. why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for having notarized on November 10. Marriage is an inviolable social institution. Facts: Acting upon the letter of Mrs. as well as establishing ecclesiastical tribunals to annul marriages or to declare marriages void ab initio is a usurpation of the sovereign power of 'the State. which affidavit is contrary to law because it sanctions an illicit and immoral purpose. The foregoing contentions of respondent were corroborated substantially by the separate sworn statements of his clerk. Dumangas.governing marriages and defining the grounds for annulment of the same. On April 21. No. admitting that he notarized the afore-mentioned document and that the Agreement is "immoral and against public policy". 1976 IN RE: ATTY. Angela Drilon Baltazar. to show cause within ten (10) days from notice.". 1637 July 6. 3 This is not only immoral but in effect abets the commission of a crime. BUCANA. Lucia D. Doctolero and Angela Drilon Baltazar. that when said document was presented to him for signature after it was signed by the parties. 1975 at Dumangas. but in mitigation he asserted that the document in question was Prepared by his clerk. Iloilo an Agreement executed by the spouses Gonzalo Baltazar and Luisa Sorongon wherein the afore-mentioned spouses agreed therein that "in case anyone of them will remarry both parties offer no objection and waive all civil and criminal actions against them" and that the afore-mentioned Agreement was "entered into for the purpose of agreement to allow each and everyone of them to remarry without objection or reservation . Bucana was required by this Court in its Resolution of March 23. submitted his explanation. dated February 26. that he placed the said document on his table among his files and more than a week later. that he must have inadvertently notarized the same in view of the numerous documents on his table and at that time he was emotionally disturbed as his father (now deceased) was then seriously ill. in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested for it is the foundation of the family and of society without which there could be neither civilization nor progress. 1976. that he dispatched his clerk to get the copy from the parties. morals and good customs? Held: There is no question that the afore-mentioned Agreement is contrary to law. he asked his clerk where the document was for the purpose of destroying it. . Doctolero without his previous knowledge. and what is more. Iloilo. 1976.. A.M.

1976 Facts: Redentor Albano in a verified complaint charged Municipal Judge Patrocinio Gapusan of Ilocos Norte with incompetence and ignorance of the law for having prepared and notarized a document providing for tile personal separation of husband and wife and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. Remedios was ordered to have herself be submitted to an expert to determine if her genitals are indeed too small for . the law considers as void "any contract for personal separation between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement. A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudically dissolving the conjugal partnership. during the marriage. He explained that the spouses had been separated for a long time when they signed the separation agreement and that the wife had begotten children with her paramour.15. respondent Gapusan notarized a document for the personal separation of the spouses Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta of Vintar. Albano vs. It was found that there was no collusion between the parties notwithstanding the non-cooperation of Remedios in the case. Joel Jimene vs. Joel and Remedios are husband and wife. Ruling: To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family. as the case may be. Albano in filing the malpractice charge is in effect asking this Court to take belated disciplinary action against Judge Gapusan as a member of the bar or as a notary.M. for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership". Notaries were severely censured by this Court for notarizing documents which subvert the institutions of marriage and the family 16. 1022-MJ May 7. It was stipulated in that document that if either spouse should commit adultery or concubinage. In 1941 or five years before his appointment to the bench. then the other should refrain from filing an action against the other. Judge Gapusan denied that he drafted the agreement. Joel later filed for annulment on grounds that Remedios is impotent because her genitals were too small for copulation and such was already existing at the time of the marriage. Remedios was summoned to answer the complaint of Joel but she refused to do so. Issue: Whether or not respondent judge committed malpractice as a notary. His belief was that the separation agreement forestalled the occurrence of violent incidents between the spouses. Cañizares Facts: Impotency. He said that there was a stipulation in the agreement that the spouses would live together in case of reconciliation. Ilocos Norte and for the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. No. Gapusan A.

bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. ISSUE: Whether or not Remedios’ impotency has been established. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part. HELD: In the case at bar. yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred. . because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Remedios again refused to do as ordered. The marriage was later annulled.copulation. The trial was heard solely on Joel’s complaint. The lone testimony of Joel that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife. because women of this country are by nature coy. The presumption is in favor of potency. Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of Joel who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether Remedios is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established.

relying on Articles 40. the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. his/her mother. For civil purposes. J. he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else. an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) filed a claim for Paternity Leave. Continental Steel contended that only one with civil personality could die.R. Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent. Petitioner appealed with the CA. a fetus. Facts: Hortillano. but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. without legal personality. it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. who affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s resolution. Proceeding from the same line of thought. specifically. No. Birth determines personality. such should be interpreted in favor of labor. if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. Hence this petition. Hence according to the petitioner. pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). However.Continental Steel v. In case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor. . Even a child inside the womb already has life. Hortillano’s wife had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. The fetus had to rely on another for support. It was maintained by Hortillano. Article 41. by contract and by will. provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. Labor arbiter Montaño argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. Petitioner immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits. Montaño G. Article 42. 182836 October 13. the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. none of which existed in Hortillano’s case. namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child. Hence. through the Labor Union. that the provisions of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. 41 and 42 of the Civil Code which provides: Article 40. the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb. Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits. 2009 Chico-Nazario.

41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. No. who. the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. Time and again. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Yes. in this case. As decided by this Court. 2009 FACTS: Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the FilipinoChinese association in their college. that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. Hortillano’s wife. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother. is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently. such should be interpreted in favor of labor. Te vs. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)] ) Bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to. In the same way. Moreover. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent. Te GR No. the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. Initially. as the latter already had a boyfriend. qualifies as death. Without such qualification. and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery. (Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. The issue of civil personality is not relevant in this case. Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die 2. for sustenance. Even a child inside the womb already has life. which happened in . then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered. lessen the grief of. Whether or not any ambiguity in CBA provisions shall be settled in favor of the employee Held: 1. Whether or not a fetus can be considered as a dependent 3. he was attracted to Rowena’s close friend but. then child shall be understood in its more general sense. the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born. 3.Issues: 1. while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death. such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb. and if possible. 161793. it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die. the young man decided to court Rowena. 2. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40. February 13. If the unborn already has life. The above provisions of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.

Eventually they got married but without a marriage license. and respondent’s. afflicted with dependent personality disorder. The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert. eloped in March. purchasing the boat ticket. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Edward escaped from the house. the evidence must show a link. He is insecure. and her tendency to blame . for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others. After a month. cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together. Edward was prohibited from getting out of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her uncle. Edward’s parents wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and demanded that they have a separate abode. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month. Indeed. They met in January 1996. that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician. weak and gullible. her abuse. exchanged marital vows in May. and has no goals and clear direction in life. and allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live). he. providing their travel money of P80. Verily. has no sense of his identity as a person. It was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward refused bickering that he was young and jobless. medical or the like. HELD: The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. mistreatment and control of others without remorse. Her persistence. As for the respondent. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’ home. After four years in January 2000. Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.January 1996. has no cohesive self to speak of. her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others. if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. respect and fidelity and rendering help and support. observing love.000 and she. They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. she said that it was better for them to live separate lives and they then parted ways. for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave. between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder. ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity. and parted ways in June. however. In June 1996. petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. petitioner. made him relent. and stayed with his parents. As clearly shown in this case.

severe and incurable psychological incapacity. DE LEON. on June 22. Lita. Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in a civil rite officiated by the Municipal Mayor of Zaragosa. and VILMA B. Quezon City. John the Baptist Parish in San Juan. on April 24. ANITA B. Nueva Ecija.R. Bonifacio. respondent is impulsive and domineering. Three months later. Petitioners. 1974 (Deed of Sale) did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. On February 29. Moreover. Subsequently. vs." Subsequently. 1996. 1977. petitioners herein. she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide. Danilo and Vilma filed on May 19. Manila. and husband Felix Rio Tarrosa (Tarrosas). Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. De Leon. the Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale and had TCT No.30 square-meter lot situated in Fairview. and the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a 191. or on May 23. 2006 Decision3 in Civil Case No. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing and seeking to set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 dated August 27. DE LEON. "single. for PhP 19. a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. CV No. declared null and void. 173677 canceled. Both parties being afflicted with grave. Bonifacio and Anita renewed their vows in a church wedding at St. sold the subject lot to her sister. Bonifacio died. Branch 22 in Quezon City. Respondents. LITA DE LEON and FELIX RIO TARROSA. DANILO B. 1965.others. To this union were born Danilo and Vilma. They secured the issuance in their names of TCT No. 2008 and October 20. Q04-51595 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Getting wind of the cancellation of their father’s title and the issuance of TCT No. The Facts On July 20. Bonifacio O. 2008. 173677 was issued on February 24. respectively. 1970. the precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23. PHHC executed. N-173911. as shown in this case. SPS. 88571. then single. 1996 is thus. Thereafter. of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. Accordingly.000. 1968. 2003 a Notice of Adverse Claim before the Register of Deeds . Following the full payment of the cost price for the lot thus purchased. 1972 in the name of Bonifacio. DE LEON. The conveying Deed of Sale dated January 12. The CA affirmed with modification the October 4. N-173911 from the Quezon City Register of Deeds.

in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. The Decision issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal. they presented. d. the following documents: a. De Leon paid [PHHC] the total amount of P1. averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property inasmuch as he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. Aguinaldo who was commissioned to [notarize] documents on said date. The right of ownership over the subject parcel of land was transferred to the late Bonifacio O. On January 12. In support of their case. assisted by their respective counsels. De Leon before the Municipal Mayor of Zaragosa.00 and subscribed before Atty.023. inter alia. Bonifacio O. Both parties stipulate that said marriage is valid and binding under the laws of the Philippines. 173677 for valuable consideration amount of P19. On June 22. A Real Estate Mortgage execution by Bonifacio in favor of spouses Cesar Diankinay and Filomena Almero on July 22. 1977. Quezon City for P841. Bonifacio O. Salvador R. De Leon was issued [TCT] No. b. and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit before the RTC in Quezon City. 1970. The parties stipulate that the Deed of Sale is valid and genuine. Anita. 1970. De Leon on June 22. Quezon City.of Quezon City to protect their rights over the subject property. A Civil Complaint filed by Bonifacio against spouses Cesar Diankinay and Filomena Almero on November 27. .74 x x x. both parties. they were not aware of the supposed marriage between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale. 1979 for nullification of the Real Estate Mortgage. Very much later. However. that fraud attended the execution of the Deed of Sale and that subsequent acts of Bonifacio would show that he was still the owner of the parcel of land. to wit: 1.000. De Leon married plaintiff Anita B. In their complaint. 1974. After full payment. e.023.74 and upon execution of the Final Deed of Sale. Bonifacio O. promulgated on July 30. nullifying the Real Estate Mortgage.30 square meters situated in Fairview. Bonifacio O. 1965 a parcel of land with an area of 191. Danilo. As further alleged.72. The parties have agreed to admit the following facts: a. Nueva Ecija. c. while still single x x x. 173677 on February 24. 1982. b. among other things. On April 24. De Leon disposing the parcel of land under TCT No. De Leon executed a Deed of Sale in favor of defendants-spouses Felix Rio Tarrosa and Lita O. De Leon. c. After several scheduled hearings. upon the full payment of the total [price] of P1.4 The Tarrosas. Anita and her children alleged. 1968. purchased from the [PHHC] through a Conditional Contract to Sell on July 20. 1972. Bonifacio O. submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts with Motion.

premises considered. 1974. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE. SO ORDERED. 1974 was registered on May 8. As they would submit.000. (2) Directing the Register of Deed of Quezon City to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. The late Bonifacio O. España. N-173911 in the name of "Lita O. 173667 in the name of "Bonifacio O. the RTC. De Leon were married in church rites on May 23. (3) Ordering the defendants-spouses to pay plaintiffs the following sums: (a) P25.00 as attorney’s fees plus appearance fee of P2. (d) Costs of this suit.plaintiff Anita De Leon was not a signatory to the Deed of Sale executed on January 12. De Leon. 1996 before the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and [TCT] No. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants in the following manner: (1) Declaring the Deed of Sale dated January 12. That plaintiff Anita B. De Leon". the RTC erred: . f. De Leon died on February 29. De Leon in favor of defendants-spouses Lita De Leon and Felix Rio Tarrosa void ab initio.00 as exemplary damages. on the finding that the lot in question was the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita. (b) P20. Aggrieved. 2006. De Leon and the late Bonifacio O. De Leon and Felix Rio Tarrosa. the Tarrosas appealed to the CA. h. (c) P50. 1974 executed by the late Bonifacio O. The Ruling of the Trial Court On October 4.00 per court appearance.000. rendered judgment in favor of Anita and her children. N-173911 was issued to Lita O. Manila. 1996 at the UST Hospital. 1977 x x x.00 as moral damages. married to Felix Rio Tarrosa" and restore Transfer Certificate of Title No. g. The said "Deed of Sale" executed on January 12.500.000.

The appellate court held further that the cases they cited were inapplicable. As to the deletion of the grant of moral and exemplary damages. Branch 22. Quezon City in Civil Case No. (6) in awarding moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees to the plaintiffsappellees. 2006. De Leon. The Tarrosas moved but was denied reconsideration by the CA in its equally assailed resolution of October 20. attorney’s fees. appearance fee and costs of suit are hereby DELETED. (3) in ruling that defendant-appellants did not adduce any proof that the property was acquired solely by the efforts of Bonifacio O. it also deleted the award of attorney’s fees and costs of suit. in that the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees. 2008. of the Regional Trial Court. Just like the RTC. Q-04-51595 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. De Leon when sold to defendant-appellants. the CA. N-173911 and restored TCT No. De Leon because of the absence of liquidation. and costs of suit which the appellate court ordered deleted. The Ruling of the Appellate Court On August 27. held that no evidence was adduced to justify the award. save for the award of damages. (5) in cancelling TCT No. De Leon. Based on the same reason. Hence. [173677] in the name of Bonifacio O. the CA held that the Tarrosas failed to overthrow the legal presumption that the parcel of land in dispute was conjugal. (2) in not declaring the land as the exclusive property of Bonifacio O.(1) in finding for the plaintiffs-appellees by declaring that the land subject matter of the case is conjugal property. in gist. 2008. (4) in declaring that one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest to Bonifacio O. in view of the foregoing. SO ORDERED. The Issues . the assailed decision dated October 4. The fallo of the CA decision reads: WHEREFORE. the CA rendered a decision affirmatory of that of the RTC. they filed this petition.

provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. IV Whether the court of appeals gravely erred in affirming the decision of the trial court which ruled that one-half (1/2) of the conjugal assets do not vest to Bonifacio O..I Whether the [CA] gravely erred in concluding that the land purchased on installment by Bonifacio O. De Leon because of the absence of liquidation. the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage. Court of Appeals teaches. even though some installments were paid and the title was issued to Bonifacio during the marriage. as Tan v. it is not. the land was Bonifacio’s exclusive property and not conjugal. Espiritu. De Leon. Our Ruling The petition lacks merit. et al. et al. Nicolas. II Whether the [CA] gravely erred in ruling that the Lorenzo. petitioners cite Lorenzo v. vs. We disagree. III Whether the [CA] gravely erred in affirming the decision of the trial court a quo which ruled that petitioners did not adduce any proof that the land was acquired solely by the efforts of Bonifacio O. Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code. even necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. In support of their position. For the presumption to arise. since Bonifacio purchased the lot from PHHC on installment before he married Anita. De Leon before marriage although some installments were paid during the marriage is conjugal and not his exclusive property. Only proof of acquisition . Petitioners assert that. The Subject Property is the Conjugal Property of Bonifacio and Anita The first three issues thus raised can be summed up to the question of whether or not the subject property is conjugal. Espiritu cases do not apply in the case at bar because in the latter the land involved is not a friar land unlike in the former. Nicolas and Alvarez v. and Alvarez vs.

was made more than two (2) years after his marriage to Anita on April 24. 15. and upon his faithful compliance with all the conditions of this contract the CORPORATION agrees to execute in favor of the APPLICANT a final deed of sale of the aforesaid land. if not equivalent. categorical. the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage. to wit: 14. the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor’s obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event. What is material is the time when the property was acquired. in turn. unlike in a contract of sale where title passes upon delivery of the thing sold. In both types of contract. title to the property in question only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22. There must be clear evidence of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it. even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear. and convincing evidence. This full payment. and be transferred in the name of the APPLICANT only upon the execution of the final Deed of Sale provided for in the next succeeding paragraph.during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal. ownership to the property is. It is well settled that a conditional sale is akin. to a contract to sell. Petitioners’ argument that the disputed lot was Bonifacio’s exclusive property. Such presumption is rebuttable only with strong. The conditional contract to sell executed by and between Bonifacio and PHHC on July 20. In fact. The mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. since it was registered solely in his name. is untenable. Upon the full payment by the APPLICANT of the price of the lot above referred to together with all the interest due thereon. presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. taxes and other charges. so that if the suspensive condition does not take place. usually the full payment of the purchase price. will be effected upon payment of the full purchase price. by law. In the case at bar. 1968. Such is the situation obtaining in the instant case. In other words. Titles to the property subject of this contract remains with the CORPORATION and shall pass to. ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered by the PHHCBonifacio Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. as full performance by the CORPORATION of its covenants and undertakings hereunder. the presumption will still apply. 1965 provided that ownership over and title to the property will vest on Bonifacio only upon execution of the final deed of sale which. to stress. 1970. In net effect. x x x Evidently. and the properties will still be considered conjugal. . in a contract to sell ownership is retained by the seller and is not passed to the buyer until full payment of the price. clear. as such. the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed. and the APPLICANT agrees to accept said deed.

the Court held that the pervading legislative intent of Act No.1awph!1 There can be no quibbling that Anita’s conformity to the sale of the disputed lot to petitioners was never obtained or at least not formally expressed in the conveying deed. In this regard. In the interim. So it is that in several cases we ruled that the sale by the husband of property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife is void ab initio. did not adduce any proof that the property in question was acquired solely by the efforts of [Bonifacio]. or like causes. The established jurisprudence on the matter leads this Court to the conclusion that the property involved in this dispute is indeed the conjugal property of the deceased [Bonifacio] De Leon. are accorded great weight by the Court and. be with the wife’s consent. The parties admitted as much in their Joint Stipulation of Facts with Motion earlier reproduced. petitioners could have had work—but did not—towards securing Anita’s marital consent to the sale. as we have explained. 166 of the Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband may alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership. the sale of a conjugal piece of land by the husband. The nullity. absent any showing that the latter is incapacitated. the said cases are not applicable here considering that the disputed property is not friar land. It cannot be over-emphasized that the 1950 Civil Code is very explicit on the consequence of the husband alienating or encumbering any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent.Thus. must. Since Art. except for the most compelling reasons. The property was registered only in 1972 during the existence of the marriage. the question of whether petitioners were able to adduce proof to overthrow the presumption is a factual issue best addressed by the trial court." The Court went on further to say in Alvarez that "under the Friar Lands Act of 1120. In fact. To a specific point. the absence of evidence on the source of funding has called for the application of the presumption under Article 160 in favor of the plaintiffs. Not lost on the Court of course is the fact that petitioners went to the process of registering the deed after Bonifacio’s death in 1996. rebut the presumptive conjugal nature of the lot in question. as administrator. as they really cannot. the equitable and beneficial title to the land passes to the purchaser the moment the first installment is paid and a certificate of sale is issued. factual determinations of the trial courts. as rule. however. under civil interdiction. The cases petitioners cited are without governing applicability to this case simply because they involved a law specifically enacted to govern the disposition of and ownership of friar lands. especially when confirmed by the appellate court. will not be disturbed on appeal. as a rule. In Lorenzo. defendant even admitted that [Bonifacio] brought into his marriage with plaintiff Anita the said land. the Court notes and quotes with approval the following excerpts from the trial court’s disposition: The defendants. proceeds from the fact that sale is in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Art. some 22 years after its execution." Plainly. Petitioners have not. the sale is not valid. albeit in the concept of a possessor only as it was not yet registered in his name. 166 of the Code. it follows that the acts or transactions . As a matter of long and sound practice. 1120 is "to sell the friar lands acquired by the Government to actual settlers and occupants of the same. Else. However.

the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership. the Court agrees with the CA that the sale of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of the partnership is void. the share of Bonifacio after the liquidation of the partnership should be liable to reimburse the amount paid by the Tarrosas. Costs against petitioners. Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Thus. the Deed of Sale executed on January 12. Interest in the Conjugal Partnership Is Merely Inchoate until Liquidation As a final consideration. a mere expectancy. It is a well-settled principle that no person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. 1974 between Bonifacio and the Tarrosas covering the PHHC lot is void. after settlement of conjugal obligations. for. Therefore. or after dissolution of the marriage. as previously stated. the petition is DENIED. Thus. SO ORDERED. and does not ripen into a title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. . the sale is still theoretically void. The CA Decision in CA-G. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. this Court is mindful of the fact that the Tarrosas paid a valuable consideration in the amount of PhP 19. CV No. the right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. when it is finally determined that. even on the supposition that Bonifacio only sold his portion of the conjugal partnership. the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate.executed against this mandatory provision are void except when the law itself authorized their validity. WHEREFORE. as a matter of fairness and equity. Nevertheless.000 for the property in question.R. 88571 is AFFIRMED. Accordingly. there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs. which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate.