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CHINA INFLUENCE DISADVANTAGE
China Influence Disadvantage Neg
1NC – China Disadvantage .............................................................................................................................. 2
China- Mexico Ties Up ..................................................................................................................................... 4 Chinese Influence Up ...................................................................................................................................... 5
Mexico- US Trade ............................................................................................................................................ 6 Yes Zero Sum ................................................................................................................................................... 7
Latin America Key to China Econ..................................................................................................................... 9 Latin America -Taiwan ................................................................................................................................... 10 Taiwan War - Extinction ................................................................................................................................ 12
Answers To : Uniqueness
US- Mexico Engagement Now ....................................................................................................................... 14 US Influence Latin America Up ...................................................................................................................... 15 No China Mexico Relations ........................................................................................................................... 16
Answers To: Link & Internal Link
Not Zero Sum – Mexico ................................................................................................................................. 17 Not Zero Sum – Latin America ...................................................................................................................... 18
Latin America Not Key to China .................................................................................................................... 19 China Influence Fails...................................................................................................................................... 20 No US-China War........................................................................................................................................... 21 No Taiwan Impact ......................................................................................................................................... 22
1NC – CHINA DISADVANTAGE
CHINA DISADVANTAGE 1NC – CHINA DISADVANTAGE
1NC – China Disadvantage
A. Uniqueness – China and Mexico are increasing trade and cooperation now –which strengthens Chinese influence in Latin America. XinHua 6/5 (Edited/Translated by Yang Yi “China, Mexico upgrade relationship to comprehensive strategic
partnership” http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/05/c_132431199_2.htm Pena Nieto, for his part, said the upgrade of the Mexico-China ties indicates that bilateral cooperation has entered a new stage. The Mexican side is ready to work with China to constantly improve cooperation at higher levels and through more effective mechanisms so as to achieve common development, he said. The two heads of state agreed to push forward the China-Mexico comprehensive strategic partnership by working jointly
in the following four aspects. Firstly, the two sides will view their relations from a strategic and long-term perspective and improve political mutual trust. The two countries will accommodate each other's concerns, and show mutual understanding and support on issues concerning each other's core interests. China and Mexico will maintain exchanges between high-level leaders, political parties and legislatures, give full play to the existing consultation and dialogue mechanisms, and improve coordination on each other's development strategies. Secondly, the two sides will improve practical cooperation in accordance with their development strategies, and agree to increase mutual investment in key areas such as energy, mining, infrastructure and high technology. In create favorable conditions for Chinese investors.
order to promote trade balance, China supports the increase of imports from Mexico, while Mexico welcomes Chinese enterprises to invest here and promises to
B. Link - increased economic engagement with Mexico reverses the growth of Chinese influence in Latin America. Shaiken et al ’13 Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UC-Berkeley. And Enrique Peters – Center for Latin
American Studies at the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn – Centro de Estudios China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 88-9]
The dominant strategies of each of the parties and how these strategies evolve over time: Mexico’s
regional and global position is being shaped by an increasing accent on diplomatic and trade diversification. The decline in US influence and the expected reforms in the Mexican energy sector may open more room for Mexico to adjust to a growth strategy less dependent on the United States. China’s rising role as a regional and global power and the new economic scenario marked by higher wages and growing concentration in industrial commodities and products are likely to affect the pace of change according to which China’s “going out” strategy will develop in the near future. If Mexico and China reorient their strategies, it is likely that there will be an adjustment in the triangle’s dynamic, which may result in a closer relationship between these two countries.
1NC – CHINA DISADVANTAGE
CHINA DISADVANTAGE 1NC – CHINA DISADVANTAGE
C. Internal Link - Chinese influence in Latin America is key to the global economy and Chinese regime stability. Ellis 11 [R. Evan, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National
Defense University.Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, 1st quarter 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_8591_Ellis.pdf]
, the PRC will need to rely increasingly on a combination of goodwill and fear to deter action against its personnel, as well as its influence with governments of the region, to resolve such problems when they occur. The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country’s sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, China’s attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used “against” Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.
As such incidents increase
D. Impact - Chinese growth prevents global economic collapse and war over Taiwan. Lewis 8. [Dan, Research Director – Economic Research Council, “The Nightmare of a Chinese Economic
Collapse,” World Finance, 5/13, http://www.worldfinance.com/news/home/finalbell/article117.html]
In 2001, Gordon Chang authored a global bestseller "The Coming Collapse of China." To suggest that the world’s largest nation of 1.3 billion people is on the brink of collapse is understandably for many, a deeply unnerving theme. And many seasoned “China Hands” rejected Chang’s thesis outright. In a very real sense, they were of course right. China’s
expansion has continued over the last six years without a hitch. After notching up a staggering 10.7 percent growth last year, it is now the 4th largest economy in the world with a nominal GDP of
$2.68trn. Yet there are two Chinas that concern us here; the 800 million who live in the cities, coastal and southern regions and the 500 million who live in the countryside and are mainly engaged in agriculture. The latter – which we in the West hear very little about – are still very poor and much less happy. Their poverty and misery do not necessarily spell an impending cataclysm – after all, that is how they have always have been. But it does illustrate the inequity of Chinese monetary policy. For many years, the Chinese yen has been held at an artificially low value to boost manufacturing exports. This has clearly worked for one side of the economy, but not for the purchasing power of consumers and the rural poor, some of who are getting even poorer. The central reason for this has been the inability of Chinese monetary policy to adequately support both Chinas.
Meanwhile, rural unrest in China is on the rise – fuelled not only by an accelerating income gap with the coastal cities, but by an oft-reported appropriation of their land for little or no compensation by the state. According to Professor David B. Smith, one of the City’s most accurate and respected economists in recent years, potentially far more
serious though is the impact that Chinese monetary policy could have on many Western nations such as the UK. Quite simply, China’s undervalued currency has enabled Western governments to maintain artificially strong currencies, reduce inflation and keep interest rates lower than they might otherwise be. We should therefore be very worried about how vulnerable Western economic growth is to an upward revaluation of the Chinese yuan. Should that revaluation happen to appease China’s rural poor, at a stroke, the dollar, ste rling and the euro would quickly depreciate, rates in those currencies would have to rise substantially and the yield on government bonds would follow suit. This would add greatly to the debt servicing cost of budget deficits in the USA, the UK and much of euro land. A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods would quickly entail a decline in China’s economic growth rate. That is alarming. It
has been calculated that to keep China’s society stable – ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesn’t end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions – so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they don’t become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war. In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan – whom America is pledged to defend.
1NC – CHINA DISADVANTAGE
CHINA DISADVANTAGE UNIQUENESS - CHINA- MEXICO TIES UP
China- Mexico Ties Up Chinese economic engagement in Mexico is increasing now. Economist 2013 *The Economist Jun 6th 2013 “Why has China snubbed Cuba and Venezuela?”
However, as our story on
Mr Xi’s visit
to Latin America points out, he may have had other reasons for picking
the destinations that he did. Firstly,
he may be trying to respond to Mr Obama’s “pivot” to Asia by showing that China is developing its own sphere of influence in America’s backyard. China’s business relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexico’s National Autonomous University, Latin America
and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The
visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the
region’s commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports.¶ But as
wages in China have increased and high energy prices have raised the cost of shipping goods from China to America, Beijing may be looking for bases such as Mexico and Costa Rica where it can relocate Chinese factories and benefit from free-trade agreements with the United States. This idea thrills the Mexican government, but does it pose an
immediate threat to Venezuela and Cuba? Probably not: China will continue to need their staunch ideological support over issues like Taiwan, for one thing. But it does suggest that China’s economic interest in the region is broadening, especially along the Pacific coast. If that proves to be the case, Cuba and Venezuela, deprived of the charismatic Chávez to court Beijing on their behalf, will have to work hard to stay relevant.
China’s economic influence in Mexico is expanding Shaiken et al ’13 [Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UC-Berkeley. And Enrique Peters – Center for Latin
American Studies at the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn – Centro de Estudios China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8]
This paper highlights the reality that China has indeed integrated
itself into North America in a process beginning in 2001 with China’s
adherence to the World Trade Organization. Before 2001, both Mexico and the U.S. were increasing and deepening trade relations and regional
specializations within the parameters of NAFTA. Since 2001, however, this process has reversed as a result of China’s mas sive trade volume with both the U.S. and Mexico. ¶ The analysis presented herein shows that China’s
rapidly developing trade relationship with both Mexico and the U.S. has had significant effects on each country’s respective trade dynamics. For instance, today China is the second largest trading partner for both Mexico and the United States, falling behind only the total intra-NAFTA trade volume. As we have seen from our examination of the top twenty products imported by Mexico from the U.S. and China, the structure of trade in the region is shifting significantly: for Mexico, its export share in the U.S. market has fallen sharply, contrary to the trade growth of Asia, and particularly of China. As discussed previously, from 2000-2011 both the U.S. and Mexico endured substantial losses in their respective export markets in the NAFTA region, particularly in regards to the manufacturing sector and in products such as telecommunications
equipment, electric power machinery, passenger motor vehicles, and clothing accessories and garments, among many others. ¶ NAFTA, since its origins, has passed through two distinct phases. During the first phase (1994-2000), the region was deeply integrated as a result of trade, investment, and rules of origin in specific industrial sectors such as autoparts-automobiles (AA) and yarn-textile-garments (YTG). In this first phase, NAFTA evolved in accordance with some of the predictions and estimations that we discuss in the literature survey. The region as a whole grew in terms of GDP, trade, investment, employment, and wages, among other variables, while intra-industry trade increased substantially. While some of the “gaps” between the U.S. and Mexico were slowly closing, however, this was only true for a small portion of Mexico’s highly polarized socioeconomic and territorial structure. In other words, even in Mexican sectors highly integrated with NAFTA, the integration process did not allow for the promotion of backward and forward linkages in Mexico. In the second phase (2000-…), NAFTA has shown a deterioration of this process of integration in terms of investment and intraindustrial trade, among other variables. During this time period, both Mexico
and the United States have been on the losing end of competitions with third-party countries, a topic only discussed somewhat in debates on NAFTA (see the survey in part two of this paper).
Neg CHINA- MEXICO TIES UP
CHINA DISADVANTAGE UNIQUENESS - CHINESE INFLUENCE UP
Chinese Influence Up
Chinese influence in Latin America is outpacing the US Menedez 5-10
*Fernando. “The East is rising, in Latin America” 5/10/13 http://www.thecommentator.com/article/3488/the_east_is_rising_in_latin_america] Trade with China has also increased dramatically over the last decade. For example, China now accounts for 19 percent of Brazil’s total trade as compared with 2.8 percent in 2001. Similarly, China accounts for nearly 20 percent of Chile’s total trade in contrast to 5.6 percent a decade ago. China has also concluded free-trade agreements with both Chile and Peru opening up those markets to Chinese manufactured goods.¶ By 2014, China will overtake the European Union as Latin America’s second largest trading partner after the United States. While it still has some way to go in potentially overtaking the United States as the leading trade partner, it is, nevertheless, probable.¶ Most recently, Brazil and China signed an agreement to pay for $30 billion in trade per year using local currencies and thus dropping the dollar. There is also general speculation concerning a new renminbibased currency, which, if it does not replace the dollar or the euro, may well become a significant alternative foreign currency backed by commodities and natural resources. Some even speak of a renminbi trading bloc.¶ All of these moves demonstrate the power of China’s purse, which the US is increasingly unable to match. The speed and extent of China’s growth in Latin America also raises concerns about its geopolitical and military policy objectives in the Americas. Many Chinese firms, especially in telecommunications, have longstanding ties to the People’s
Liberation Army, and that should raise red flags.
China’s pursuing increased influence in Latin America Goodman 5-29
*Joshua. Latin America Desk for Bloomberg BusinessWeek. “Biden Circles Xi as U.S. Duels China for Latin America Ties” 5/29/13 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-29/biden-circles-xi-as-u-s-duels-china-forlatin-america-influence.html]
For Xi, his week-long tour of Trinidad, Costa Rica and Mexico precedes a visit to California for his first face-to-face talks with Obama since taking office.¶ The trip to Latin America and the Caribbean, coming so early in Xi’s
presidency, reflects the rising confidence of the Chinese leadership as it pursues its strategic interests
with little concern for U.S. reaction, said Evan Ellis, a professor at the National Defense University in Washington. China in recent years has ousted the U.S. to become the top trade partner for Brazil and Chile .¶ “In the past Chinese presidents were very deferential to the U.S., always making reference to Washington’s backyard,” said Ellis, the author of dozens of papers and a book about China’s penetration of Latin America. “ You don’t hear any of that from Xi’s team, though you don’t find any threatening rhetoric either.”
Neg CHINESE INFLUENCE UP
CHINA DISADVANTAGE LINKS - MEXICO- US TRADE
Mexico- US Trade
Mexico is trying to create distance with the US in favor of China, plan reverses this Ellis 2013 (R. Evan [associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies];
China's New Backyard; Jun 6; www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america?page=0,1; kdf) Ironically, it's the Latin American country closest to the United States where Xi might be able to make up the most ground. Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto's engagement with the Chinese president, both at the April summit in Boao, China, and this week in Mexico City, allow him to differentiate himself from his pro-U.S. predecessor, Felipe Calderón. Similarly, Mexico's role in forming the Pacific Alliance, a new subregional organization built around a group of four pro-market, pro-trade countries (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) allows Mexico to reassert a leadership role in the Americas, relatively independent of the United States.
Economic integration with Mexico removes Chinese influence Mares and Canovas 10
[David R. Mares & Gustavo Vega Cánovas, the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies (San Diego), the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center (Washington DC), El Colegio de la Frontera Norte (Tijuana), and El Colegio de México (Mexico City).The U.S.-Mexico Relationship: Towards a New Era?, 2010, http://usmex.ucsd.edu/assets/024/11635.pdf]
This chapter begins by briefly characterizing the most recent period of US-Mexico relations, the NAFTA era since 1994. We trace the origins, purposes, and the impact of NAFTA in the two economies and societies. A second section lays out the parameters of a new era in the bilateral relationship, paying particular attention to the challenges to both countries raised by the processes of globalization and democratization. Globalization’s impact on the relationship is best captured in the rise of China and consequent displacement of Mexico in trade relations with the US. Democratization complicates policy responses but improves the likelihood that policy will have some consistency over time. The inadequate manner in which the two countries have responded up to now to these challenges is highlighted. A third section discusses the essence of any appropriate response to these challenges: economic integration. The failure of integration at a regional level is discussed, but we note that Mexico’s long border with the US means that the options open to Brazil, Argentina and Chile in diversifying thei r economic relations simply are not viable for Mexico. A fourth section evaluates the current relationship and offers suggestions to improve the two countries’ abilities to respond effectively to today’s challenges. Whether Mexico or the US like it or not, they are destined to walk together if they want to be successful in this globalized economy. The conclusion speculates on whether the countries will move towards a more collaborative or distant relationship, thus helping to set the context for the indepth discussions in subsequent chapters
Neg MEXICO- US TRADE
CHINA DISADVANTAGE LINKS - YES ZERO SUM
Yes Zero Sum
China is expanding trade ties with Latin America---the plan’s re-engagement pushes them out of Latin America. Dowd 12 (Alan, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, “Crisis in the America's,”
But there’s more at work here than China’s thirst for oil. Like a global chess match, China is probing Latin America and
sending a message that just as Washington has trade and military ties in China’s neighborhood, China is developing trade and military ties in America’s neighborhood.¶ This is a direct challenge to U.S. primacy in the
region—a challenge that must be answered.¶ First, Washington needs to relearn an obvious truth—that China’s rulers do not share America’s values—and needs to shape and conduct its China policy in that context.¶ Beijing has no respect for human rights. Recall that in China, an estimated 3-5 million people are rotting away in laogai slave-labor camps, many of them “guilty” of political dissent or religious activity; democracy activists are rounded up and imprisoned; freedom of speech and religion and assembly do not exist; and internal security forces are given shoot-to-kill orders in dealing with unarmed citizens. Indeed, Beijing viewed the Arab Spring uprisings not as an impetus for political reform, but as reason “to launch its harshest crackdown on dissent in a t least a decade,” according to Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.¶ In short, the ends always justify the means in Beijing. And that makes all the difference when it comes to foreign and defense policy. As Reagan counseled during the Cold War, “There is no true international security without respect for human rights.”¶ Second, the U.S. must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and instead must reengage in its own neighborhood economically, politically and militarily.¶ That means no more allowing trade deals—and the partners counting on them—to languish. Plans for a hemispheric free trade zone have faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in limbo for years, before President Obama finally signed them into law in 2011.¶ Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy. The Wall Street Journal reports that due to political wrangling in Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by an interim for nearly a year, while six Western Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty.¶ Reengagement means reversing plans to slash defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China has “a deep respect for U.S. military power.” We cannot overstate how important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the midst of mass ive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last. ¶ Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be what’s happening in China’s backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps it’s time to do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countries—from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chile— border the Pacific. Given Beijing’s actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.¶ Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine.¶ Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas, this “Monroe Doctrine 2.0” would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes China’s efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but
discourages any claims of control—implied or explicit—by China over territories, properties or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorably upon
the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere. ¶ In short, what it was true in
the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There
is room for only one great power in the Western
Neg YES ZERO SUM
CHINA DISADVANTAGE LINKS - YES ZERO SUM
American Economic Engagement is perceived as Zero-sum – shuts out China Watson 07[Cynthia A. Watson, Professor of Strategy at National War College, Washington, D.C. ENTER THE
DRAGON? China’s Presence in Latin America, 2007, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf] Beijing probably might not have increased its role in Latin America had the Middle East not been a major distraction for Washington over the past ﬁve and a half years. Washington has wanted Beijing to modernize its economy. This
was bound to create more economic, diplomatic, and trade prowess for China as it has reached beyond the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution, particularly in the newly globalized world. In many ways, Beijing’s increased involvement in Latin America reﬂects the unanticipated consequence of getting what the West hoped for from China. But, the inability of Washington to consider anything beyond the concerns about terrorism spreading around the world, and trying to salvage a peace of some sort without nuclear weapons in the Middle East, is having consequences for U.S. interests in other parts of the world. For cultural and geographic reasons, the ties between the United States and Latin America ought to be
stronger than those between China and the Latins. Expectations of the strength of Latin America–U.S. ties have probably always been unrealistic and frankly ahistorical; the two parts of the world actually have a number of fundamental differences. But the distance between Latin America’s experiences and those of China are even vaster, ranging from religion to ethnic homogeneity to historical roles in the world. Washington must make a more concerted effort to act as a genuine partner with the region, rather than relegating it to the position of secondary or tertiary thought that assumes absolute U.S. leadership. The United States and China claim that each is serious about adopting the economic philosophy that undergirds capitalism: economic growth is a net beneﬁt for all, not a zero sum game. If true, China, Latin America, and the United States beneﬁ t from the greater Chinese engagement in this region because it creates competition. Pure economic theory, however, always runs up against political philosophies, leading to trade conﬂ icts, protectionism, and all-too-often a zero sum view based on the international relations theory of realpolitik: what’s good for my adversary must be bad for me. The risks of arousing realpolitik in the United States, particularly as the nation faces increased frustration with the reality of the Middle East, is signiﬁ cant, probably more than the PRC bargained for when it began engaging more with Latin America over the past
decade. It appears unlikely that Beijing will seriously accelerate its involvement in the region because of the number of Congressional hearings, public conferences and assessments, and other warnings alerting the United States to China having discovered Latin America. To accelerate its involvement would risk the relatively strong relations with Washington at a time when other trade problems and overall concerns about China’s growing power are already rising in the United States. At the same time, Washington’s ability to focus equally on all areas of the world is not possible. With U.S. interests directed elsewhere, it seems highly likely that Beijing will be able to maintain the level of involvement in the region it already has, without Washington raising too great a ruckus. Indeed, Beijing’s best outcome from its current balance of involvement in the area is probably going to be the long-term development of trust and ties over several decades with the leaders of this region, rather than immediately creating crucial, highly public ties between itself and Latin American leaders. As so often appears true in the international system, probably the old tale of the tortoise and hare applies here, where China’s biggest gain will be
accomplished over a long time of getting to know the region, rather than showing up repeatedly in the ‘rock star’ role which is too soon and too rash for a long-term, stable set of ties. Washington seems likely to worry about the rock star phenomenon, rather than attempting to manage the emergence of another state becoming a long-term partner with its
Latin American neighbors.
Neg YES ZERO SUM
CHINA DISADVANTAGE IMPACTS - LATIN AMERICA KEY TO CHINA ECON
Latin America Key to China Econ
Latin America key to China’s economy- trade and resources Jiang 2007 [Shixue Jiang, Deputy Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS) of the Chinese Academy of Social SciencesThree
Factors in the Recent Development of Sino-Latin American Relations, ENTER THE DRAGON? China’s Presence in Latin America, 2007, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf]
Chinese achievements in the realm of reform and opening to the outside world have been impressive. But there are
problems. First of all, China is facing increasing friction with the developed countries, which have frequently used anti-dumping practices and other means to restrict Chinese exports. From Therefore, it
time to time, the United States uses economic leverage to exert political pressure on China. is imperative for China to reduce economic dependence upon the United States and other developed countries. To realize this goal, China needs to diversify its trade partners. In this regard, Latin America, a continent with a population of more than 500 million people and an economic size of more than US$2 trillion , is certainly a big market for Chinese products. Second, while China is a nation with a great amount of natural resources, because of its huge population, China is also lacking resources in terms of per capita
distribution. Consider forest area and timber, for example. According to recent statistics, China’s forest area is 1.2 millio n square kilometers, and timber resources are about 10 billion cubic meters. These two absolute numbers are huge compared to many other countries in the world. But in per capita terms, China ’s forest area is merely 0.10 hectares, and timber resources are less than 10 cubic meters, as compared with the world average of 1.07 hectares and 83 cubic meters, respectively. According to a report published in 2006, China’s
per capita reserves of coal, oil and gas are only 70 percent, 11 percent, and 4 percent of the world average.1 On the needs to locate supplies from abroad. Latin America is the perfect place from which China can import many kinds of needed resources . Additionally, the importance of Latin America goes beyond the economic area. Politically speaking, Latin America could be a partner for China and other developing countries in their efforts to oppose hegemony, establish a just world order, and a harmonious world. Both Latin America and China share many common or similar positions towards some of the major international issues . Also noteworthy is the fact that in the United Nations, each country enjoys one vote, and China has the potential to win support from Latin American countries on many issues.
one hand, the nation should make strenuous efforts to upgrade the efﬁ ciency of using its resources; on the other, it
Continued Chinese engagement in Latin America is key to Chinese stability. Farnsworth ’12 (Eric Farnsworth is vice-president of the Council of the Americas in Washington DC and from 1995 to 1998 was
senior adviser to the White House special envoy for the Americas. “Memo to Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America,” Americas Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter, 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth)
What is China doing in the Americas? It’s a good question—and an increasingly important one for policymakers in Washington. According to one
U.S. analyst, it’s about “goodwill, good business and strategic position.”1 Perhaps. But the jury is still out, mostly because China’s interest in the Western Hemisphere is barely a decade old. For many years, beyond attempts to wean Latin American and Caribbean nations away from support for Taiwan and efforts to build Third World solidarity, China’s footprint in the Americas was light. That has now chan ged. Since
then-President Jiang Zemin’s 13-day trip to Latin America in April 2001 and the subsequent visits of President Hu Jintao in 2004 and 2011, Chinese engagement with the region has exploded. Today, China is the top trade partner of Brazil and Chile, and the second trade partner of Argentina and Peru. By late 2010, Chinese enterprises had
invested almost $44 billion in the region, according to China’s National Development and Reform Commission, almost a quarter of which was invested in 2010 alone. Top investment targets included Brazil, but also Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Innovative financing by Chinese entities was often behind the deals—and in some cases, such as Ecuador and Venezuela, investments took the form of loans secured by guaranteed future deliveries of oil. That is a marked change from 2003, the year before Hu’s first visit, when China invested just $1 billion in all of Latin America. By
now the outlines of the story are well known. As part of the dash for economic growth that the Chinese Communist Party believes will help to maintain its legitimacy—an average annual rate of 9.8 percent from 1979 to 2009, including an 8.7 percent growth rate in 2009 when much of the rest of the world faced economic collapse —Beijing is on a global quest to lock in the natural resources that fuel its growth. From Southeast Asia to Africa to Latin America and beyond, China is scouring the globe to invest in primary commodities. By the end of 2011, more than $3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves provided an impressive war chest from which to purchase the global assets that China’s leaders believe they need to support economic growth—and thus political stability—for the medium to longer term. As China faces its own near-term leadership transition, efforts to purchase domestic political stability with foreign trade and investment are likely to intensify. At the same time, Latin American nations that have been the primary trade and investment partners with China have also gained handsomely, at least in the short
term, in the sectors that produce primary goods. Longer term questions abound regarding the balance and terms of trade, the nature of the investments that China is making, and the values that are being promoted or undermined by such investments.2 Additionally, nations that are not supplying significant amounts of commodities to China, including Mexico and Central America, view China more as an aggressive competitor than as an economic partner. The costs and benefits of trade with China are unequally distributed across the Americas.
Neg LATIN AMERICA KEY TO CHINA ECON
CHINA DISADVANTAGE IMPACTS - LATIN AMERICA -TAIWAN
Latin America -Taiwan
Chinese influence in Latin America is key to prevent Taiwan independence Li 07 *He Li, Professor of Political Science at Merrimack College, Boston ENTER THE DRAGON? China’s
Presence in Latin America, 2007, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf] Latin America has been a major battleground of the “foreign policy war” between China and Taiwan over international legitimacy, recognition, and status. China’s quest to recover what it calls “the province of Taiwan’’ is one of the top issues on its foreign policy agenda. Its strategy against Taiwan has been both bilateral and global. Bilaterally, China has used a mix of economic diplomacy and military and political moves to keep Taiwan from claiming independence. Globally, China’s strategy has focused on developing an international united front designed to marginalize Taiwan. Fearing Taiwan’s push for international recognition will lead to its declaration of independence, Beijing is determined to contain Taiwan in every corner of the world, especially in Central America and the Caribbean, the stronghold of Taiwan.Taiwan has 23 million people and well protected territory. Yet, of the United Nations’ 193 member states, only 23 recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state. Of the 23 countries that recognize Taiwan, 12 are in Latin America and the Caribbean. Taiwan has been devoting enormous efforts to retain diplomatic recognition. If these states were to switch recognition from Taipei to Beijing, the damage to Taiwan’s political conﬁdence and its claims of legitimacy as a state would be seriously undermined. According to then-prime minister of Taiwan Yu Shyi-kun in 2002, Taiwan’s allies in Latin America and the Caribbean “have helped us a lot and therefore we consider this an area of maximum diplomatic importance.”2 Under such circumstances, the strategic competition between China and Taiwan has been intensiﬁed in a region far away from Asia.
Failure to stop diplomatic recognition of Taiwan causes military intervention and nuclear war. Lee ‘ 13 (Dennis, Harvard International Review, “A Narrowing Strait” Global Security Notebook, January 28,
Since the 1970s, the cross-straits relationship has swung drastically in China’s favor. Not only has the Chinese economy boomed since the opening of its markets, but the United States has started to abandon Taiwan militarily as well. Now inferior in both economic and military strength, Taiwan can
only hope for continued de-facto independence. At present, the hopes for remaining separate are dwindling. With China gaining prominence in Asia and the global stage, Taiwan may not have a choice in the matter. Cultural
differences present the greatest challenge to the Chinese assimilation of Taiwan. The distinctiveness of Taiwanese culture has already become quite evident since the Kuomintang escaped to the island decades ago. During his presidency, Chen Shui-bian argued frequently that the Taiwanese culture had evolved to be ethnically different and that, in consequence, Taiwan deserves independence. While this argument is unlikely to hold in China at the present, as time passes, it will inevitably become reality. However, the current Chinese strategy almost completely ignores this barrier. China is preparing Taiwanese society for assimilation. Economically, the Chinese are promoting an increase in Taiwanese investment and trade. By offering a profitable economic future, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is luring Taiwanese businessmen and entrepreneurs to the mainland. This has led to integration of some Taiwanese into Chinese society. Not only does this change the Chinese perception of Taiwan, but it also
the Chinese hope to eventually reach a point where unification is smooth for both sides. Economic leverage on politics is also powerful. The strength of Chinese influence and intervention in
affects the Taiwanese perception of China. Opening the two societies to each other makes reunification easier and
Taiwanese politics increases substantially from this economic integration. While it is possible for the reverse to happen, where Taiwanese influence is exerted on the Chinese political apparatus,
the fact that China has a
fairly closed, one-party government makes this rather unlikely. On the contrary, the
Taiwanese government is much more prone to lobbying, and, as a result, can be subject to more leverage from mainland China. This completely lopsided trade relationship
can, and likely will, be used to China’s favor. Yet despite the potential political and economic connections, the social diff erences between China and Taiwan may simply be too drastic to reconcile. Taiwan’s democratic way of government is somethin g that the Taiwanese people hold on to rather dearly. It is high unlikely, if not impossible, for the Taiwanese to give that up, even in the event of an all-out military conflict. The Chinese solution to this problem may be one that is not a new concept in the country and would call for a “one state, two systems” approach. Currently in the PRC, both Hong Kong and Macau are Special Administrative Regions with local rule, differing judicial systems, and influential local governments. Inner Mongolia goes further as an autonomous region of China granted a greater degree of self-rule. This “two systems” doctrine has fallen out of favor in Taiwan recently due to opposition of its current implementation in China, but also represents a potential path to unification. All
this begs the question of what would occur if Taiwan were to refuse China’s call for unification. Many Taiwanese believe that their rejection of reunification, by a possible declaration of independence, would trigger Chinese military aggression across the Taiwan Strait. The military hostility between both countries is not new. Throughout the conflict, Taiwan has relied on its own
military, as well as that of the United States, as a deterrent to Chinese aggression. On the other hand, China has used its military might to ward off any declarations of independence on the part of Taiwan. This impasse has changed as of late since the current pact between the United States and Taiwan does not commit the United States to defend Taiwan. One would assume that in
the event of military aggression, the United States would hesitate to entering a military conflict with a fellow nuclear power. Recent technological investments in the Chinese military only heighten the stakes of the conflict and make Taiwanese-Mainland reunification a certainty in China,
with the only uncertainty being the question of whether military conflict will prove necessary to the realization of this goal. If China continues to push for unification, unification will most likely occur. Taiwanese resistance is weak without foreign assistance and Taiwan is overpowered economically and
Neg LATIN AMERICA -TAIWAN
CHINA DISADVANTAGE IMPACTS - LATIN AMERICA -TAIWAN
militarily. Foreign intervention is fickle and varies with each US administration, public support, and other international factors, thus making both US intervention and Taiwanese independence highly unlikely.
Neg LATIN AMERICA -TAIWAN
CHINA DISADVANTAGE IMPACTS - TAIWAN WAR - EXTINCTION
Taiwan War - Extinction
Taiwan war would escalate causing extinction Hunkovic ‘9 *Lee. Prof Military Studies @ American Military University. “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict –
Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan, and the United States of America” www.lampmethod.com, 2009] A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions
will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.
Taiwan war is the most probable scenario for global nuclear war. Lowther, ’13 (William, Staff reporter in Washington, Citing a CSIS Report, “Taiwan could spark nuclear war:
report,” Taipei Times, Mar 16, 2013, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211, A_Yu)
TICKING TIMEBOMB: The CSIS report says that neither China nor the US can fully control developments that could ignite a Taiwan crisis and lead to nuclear conflict Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US, a new academic report concludes. “Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and China,” says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a policy to
prevent Taiwan’s independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s defense. “Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements,” the report says. In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at
the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia.” The report also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis. “This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation,” Betts wrote in a separate study of his own. The CSIS study says: “For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which
nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.” Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China
seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but they do “provide kindling” for potential conflic t between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US. The danger posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says. “Although Beijing and Washi ngton have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion,” the report says. For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understand s what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party. To make things worse, “neither side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict,” it says. Although conflict “mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise
Neg TAIWAN WAR - EXTINCTION
CHINA DISADVANTAGE IMPACTS - TAIWAN WAR - EXTINCTION
or unlucky.” The report says: “With both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.”
Neg TAIWAN WAR - EXTINCTION
CHINA DISADVANTAGE ANSWERS TO : UNIQUENESS - US- MEXICO ENGAGEMENT NOW
ANSWERS TO : UNIQUENESS
US- Mexico Engagement Now
Economic engagement between the US and Mexico Now
(Robert – contributing writer for Global Voices Online, New York-based political analyst, “U.S. and Latin America – Economic Cooperation Without Militarization?” www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/05/20/us-andlatin-america-economic-cooperation-without-militarization)¶ President Obama’s meeting with Mexico’s President Enrique Peña Nieto centered on the historic economic relationship between the two countries, and furthered their conversation on economic and commercial initiatives as well as immigration issues. Additionally, Peña Nieto highlighted Mexico’s economic growth and the necessity for bolstering student exchange. Both leaders agreed to create an economic team led by Vice President Joe Biden and Mexican Secretary of the Treasury Luis Videgaray. They resolved to create projects to improve infrastructure and security along the 3,000 kilometer-long border, one of the world’s largest.
Economic engagement is inevitable - Mexico and the US are too interdependent, they have no choice but to get along
Peter Hakim is president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based policy organization tank on Western Hemisphere affairs. “Which Mexico for Obama?” 5/1/13 http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/05/01/which-mexico-for-obama/ Crime and violence are likely to remain unrelenting challenges for Peña Nieto. They could even take central stage again. In fact, public security may not improve anytime soon — despite the new government’s multiple initiatives.¶ Peña Nieto’s predecessor, Felipe Calderón, learned how arduous a task it is to reform Mexico’s police and its justice
system, and restore public confidence in them. Now, Peña Nieto is making clear his deep dissatisfaction with — and his intention to overhaul — Calderón U.S.-supported approach to security and drug issues. The expected changes will almost surely irritate many in Washington and may even become a new source of friction in the bilateral relationship.¶ But neither the United States nor Mexico is perfect. The two nations cannot look at each other only as sources of opportunity and gain; cooperation is needed to address risks and problems. Neither country has much of an option, however, because their economies and populations are so deeply integrated. There is no turning the clock back.¶ Mexico and the United State have to solve their problems together and find ways to generate and exploit new opportunities jointly. If they can do it, the payoff will be enormous.
Aff US- MEXICO ENGAGEMENT NOW
CHINA DISADVANTAGE ANSWERS TO : UNIQUENESS - US INFLUENCE LATIN AMERICA UP
US Influence Latin America Up
US influence in Latin America is still unchallenged – culture, proximity, and economic relations.
Ben-Ami, 6/5 (Shlomo Ben-Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister and internal security minister, is Vice President of the Toledo
International Center for Peace. “Is the US Losing Latin America?” Jun. 5, 2013, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/thenew-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami#dvmjOomDWM2ExTYG.99)Yet it would be a mistake to regard Latin America’s broadening international relations as marki ng the end of US preeminence. Unlike in the bygone era of superpowers and captive nations, American influence can no longer be defined by the ability to install and depose leaders from the US embassy. To believe otherwise is to ignore how international politics has changed over the last quarter-century. A continent once afflicted by military takeovers has slowly but surely implanted stable democracies. Responsible economic management, poverty-reduction programs, structural reforms, and greater openness to foreign investment have all helped to generate years of low-inflation growth. As a result, the region was able to withstand the ravages of the global financial crisis. The US not only
encouraged these changes, but has benefited hugely from them. More than 40% of US exports now go to Mexico and Central and South America, the US’s fastest-growing export destination. Mexico is America’s secondlargest foreign market (valued at $215 billion in 2012). US exports to Central America have risen by 94% over the past six years; imports from the region have risen by 87%. And the US continues to be the largest foreign investor on the continent. American interests are evidently well served by having democratic, stable, and increasingly prosperous neighbors. This
new reality also demands a different type of diplomacy – one that recognizes the diverse interests of the continent. For example, an emerging power such as Brazil wants more respect on the world stage. Obama blundered when he dismissed a 2010 deal on Iran’s nuclear program mediated by Brazil and Turkey (despite having earlier endorsed the talks). Other countries might benefit from US efforts to promote democracy and socioeconomic ties, as Obama’s recent trips to Mexico and Costa Rica show. Trade relations provide another all-important lever. President Sebastian Piñera of Chile visited the White House earlier this week to discuss, among other things, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an ambitious trade agreement that might encompass New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Mexico, Canada, and Japan. President Ollanta Humala of Peru is expected in the White House next week, while Vice President Joe Biden is scheduled to visit Latin America soon after. Language and culture matter, too.
Given the extraordinary growth of Latinos’ influence in the US, it is almost inconceivable that America could lose its unique status in the region to China or Russia, let alone Iran. Gone are the days when military muscle and
the politics of subversion could secure US influence – in Latin America or anywhere else. A world power today is one that can combine economic vigor and a popular culture with global outreach on the basis of shared interests. The US is better
positioned than any other power in this respect, particularly when it comes to applying these advantages in its immediate vicinity.
US still retains predominance in Latin America
Menéndez 5/28/13 (Fernando, economist and principal of Cordoba Group International LLC, a strategic
consulting firm providing economic and political analysis to clients, “The Counterbalance in America’s Backyard”, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-counterbalance-in-americas-backyard-2/, CMR) Despite its preoccupation with the Middle East and its recent economic troubles, the U.S. remains a predominant actor in the region, and only the presence of a country capable of projecting superior economic and political power could significantly shift the balance of forces away from the current hegemon. Moreover, unlike the former Soviet Union – once described as a third world country with nuclear weapons – China has
the economic resources to create an alternative locus of financing, trade and development.
Aff US INFLUENCE LATIN AMERICA UP
CHINA DISADVANTAGE ANSWERS TO : UNIQUENESS - NO CHINA MEXICO RELATIONS
No China Mexico Relations
Chinese-Mexican relations are just grandstanding – there’s no actual partnership.
Chris Devonshire-Ellis , 6/7/13 principal and founding partner of Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm provides investment legal and cross border tax advice to mid-cap MNCs from the United States and Europe into China and Asia “China & Mexico Talk of Strategic Partnership Deal, But Much Remains to be Done” China Briefing http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2013/06/07/china-mexico-talk-of-strategic-partnership-dealbut-much-remains-to-be-done.html#sthash.3CaRooza.dpuf These sorts of meetings, in my opinion, are an excuse for political grandstanding and media exposure. As a result, they mean very little. While the prospect of Mexican-Chinese JVs to target the U.S. market may seem appealing to both, in actual fact, the Chinese side have little incentive to do so. Mexico has no double taxation agreement (DTA) with China, meaning that Chinese investors are subject to Mexican rates of corporate income
tax (CIT) and related taxes with no treaty to offset these. Mexico has a higher rate of CIT at 28 percent than China at 25 percent. Although that doesn’t sound like a huge difference – it is more than enough to eat into any available profit gains in such competitive markets. Mexico also levies immediate worldwide income tax claims on all residents – something that is not likely to sit well with Chinese investors. The two countries do have an “Agreement between the Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of the Peoples Repubic of China on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,” however this dates back to 2008 and the current statements do little, if anything, to expand beyond the framework within. That was penned five years ago at the time of Beijing hosting the Olympics. So this could simply be another example of an agreement written
by Mexico to feed their hungry media and to show off their politicians alongside countries that are firmly in the international spotlight, because it contains little of actual substance. So what does the rhetoric actually mean? From the U.S. perspective, probably not a lot. Without any supporting tax agreements, the Mexico-China talk remains just that – talk. Chinese companies have access to U.S. markets anyway and the Mexican
tax code is unattractive to them compared with lower rates back in China.
No Chinese influence in Mexico – multiple obstacles
The Economist 6/8/13 (“From pivot to twirl”, http://www.economist.com/news/china/21579062-chineseleader-tries-smooth-move-americas-backyard-pivot-twirl, CMR) There are big hurdles to overcome, though. The first is that the two countries do not see eye to eye on the size of the trade imbalance. Many Chinese exports to Mexico come indirectly, via America, so China does not count them, says Sergio Ley, a former Mexican ambassador in Beijing.¶ A second problem is a Mexican private sector that believes trade is unfairly stacked in China’s favour, and so keeps its eyes fixed on the American market . Third, Mexico is hitched to an American-led free-trade juggernaut, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, that has until now been anathema to China. For all the tequila that Mexico persuades China to buy, it will take more than fancy footwork by Mr Xi and Mr Peña to turn relations from rivalry to revelry.
Aff NO CHINA MEXICO RELATIONS
CHINA DISADVANTAGE ANSWERS TO: LINK & INTERNAL LINK - NOT ZERO SUM – MEXICO
ANSWERS TO: LINK & INTERNAL LINK
Not Zero Sum – Mexico
China will not challenge US influence in Mexico or Latin America.
Ariel C. Armony 2013; Director of the University of Miami’s Center for Latin American Studies, designated as a Title VI National Resource Center by the U.S. Department of Education, is also the Weeks Professor in Latin American Studies and Professor of International Studies “Conclusions and Debates on the US-Mexico-China Relationship” In "China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations" 5-1-2013 Edited by: Enrique Dussel Peters, Adrian H. Hearn, Harley Shaiken (2013). University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies Publications. http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/clas_publications/3 A careful reading of the chapters in the volume provides clues as to the features of the TR among the United States, Mexico, and China. The following list summarizes some of the most relevant features: The stability of each of the bilateral ties in the triangle: the fundamental relations in the triangle are US-Mexico and US-China. These ties play a vital role for the countries involved—in particular for Mexico’s relationship with the United States. One way in which China can affect the stability of US-Mexico ties is by posing a “hegemonic challenge” to the United States, that is, by “seeking peer status or attempting to become the new hegemon” (Paz 2012:19). China’s consistent strategy of restraint in Latin
America and the US-China institutionalized dialogue on Latin America, among other factors, suggest that China will not rise to challenge the hegemony of the United States in Latin America any time soon. 2
There’s no trade off or competition between China and the US in Latin America.
Chunsi Wu 2013 Chunsi Wu is the executive director of the Institute of International Strategy Studies and research fellow at the Center for American Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS). “U.S.-Mexico-China Relations in the Context of Regional Cooperation: A Chinese Perspective” In "China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations" 5-1-2013 Edited by: Enrique Dussel Peters, Adrian H. Hearn, Harley Shaiken (2013). University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies Publications. http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/clas_publications/3 Secondly, although the U.S. pays close attention to China’s engagement with Latin American countries, it
knows that China does not really have the capability to challenge the position of the United States on the American continent. It is true that Chinese-Latin American relations have developed rapidly over the past ten
years, especially in regards to three aspects: Firstly, China has established connections with the entire American continent, not only developing economic relations with the major powers in the region, but also strengthening its cooperation with many mediumsized countries as well as regional organizations. Some countries in the region, however, do not maintain diplomatic relations with Mainland China, and do with Taiwan. Secondly, China has begun to pursue universal cooperation with Latin American nations, with more and more dimensions emerging in its various relationships including tourism, cultural exchange, security issues, climate change, etc. Thirdly, topics of interest between China and Latin American countries have gone beyond the bilateral and regional levels, with these nations exchanging views on the world order and global affairs. Thus, China believes that its relationship with Latin America has “strategic importance.”2 Certain Chinese scholars have pointed out that the Chinese-Latin American relationship has exhibited unprecedented growth in the new century (Zheng and Sun 2009). China’s increasing
reinforcement of its relationship with Latin American countries, however, does not imply any intention to enter into geopolitical competition with the United States. Economic development is the primary goal of China’s
cooperation with Latin American countries. Indeed, China wants to expand its exchange with Latin American countries to include other areas such as education, culture, politics, security, etc., given China’s belief that one-dimensional relationships are both unhealthy and unsustainable. Chinese-Latin American economic cooperation needs to be both complemented
and supported by diplomacy in other areas. Therefore, from the Chinese perspective, developing comprehensive relationships with Latin American countries has little to do with strategic or military competition.
Aff NOT ZERO SUM – MEXICO
CHINA DISADVANTAGE ANSWERS TO: LINK & INTERNAL LINK - NOT ZERO SUM – LATIN AMERICA
Not Zero Sum – Latin America
Engagement is not zero-sum – the US & China have different interests.
Cerna ’11 (Michael, graduate student in International Policy Management at Kennesaw State University,
Kennesaw, April 15, 2011. “China's Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region.” http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implicationsfor-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/) While China’s commodity-based trade structure is currently lucrative, it does not encourage diversification of Latin America’s exports into more value-added goods, manufactured products, and modern services. Economic relations are dependent on often unstable commodity market demands. U.S. investment in the region is far more diversified and spans a range of value-added activities, including manufacturing, finance, telecom, retail and other
services. Going back to a comparison with the United States, while China accounts for 6.7% of the region’s total exports, the United States continues to be the largest buyer, with a 40% share. Latin America’s exports to the U.S. are more diversif ied and remain fairly balanced so it is better suited to survive a possible commodity cut-off in Latin America. Roughly 24% of the region’s exports are raw materials, another 12% consists of resource-based goods and 60% is manufactured products. Karen Poniachik of Latin Trade also sees enormous risks for the region: “The steep overvaluation of the region’s currencies—due in part to the flood of investment flows and export proceeds—is eroding the competitiveness of its higher-value added goods and services. This could in turn fuel its already high level of overdependence on commodities.” Future Implications With both the U.S. and China
making gains in the region in different sectors, there is seemingly room for each side to grow; which implies that, in fact, trade with Latin America is not a zero-sum game. China presents an alternative to the United States, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. The U.S. is much more diversified than China at the moment and therefore does not need to enter into direct competition. However, as China responds to calls
from Brazil and diversifies its investments, there is increasing worry that China is going to outmatch U.S. trade in the region. These fears may be economically based, but there are potentially harmful political consequences – primarily, providing Latin America with a quasi-world power as an alternative to the U.S. Since the Monroe Doctrine, Latin America has been considered a secure sphere of influence for the U.S. The fact that China presents a less democratic alternative to U.S. influence presents a major problem.
Latin American investment isn’t zero sum.
Cerna 11. [Michael, staff @ CRC, "China's growing presence in Latin America: Implications for US and Chinese presence in the
region" China Research Center -- Vol 10 No 1 -- www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-us-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/]
With both the U.S. and China making gains in the region in different sectors, there is seemingly room for each side to grow; which implies that, in fact, trade with Latin America is not a zero-sum game. China presents an alternative to the United States, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. The U.S. is much more diversified than China at the moment and therefore does not need to enter into direct competition . However, as
China responds to calls from Brazil and diversifies its investments, there is increasing worry that China is going to outmatch U.S. trade in the region. These fears may be economically based, but there are potentially harmful political consequences – primarily, providing Latin America with a quasi-world power as an alternative to the U.S. Since the Monroe Doctrine, Latin America has been considered a secure sphere of influence for the U.S. The fact that China presents a less democratic alternative to U.S. influence presents a major problem.
Aff NOT ZERO SUM – LATIN AMERICA
CHINA DISADVANTAGE NO IMPACT - LATIN AMERICA NOT KEY TO CHINA
Latin America Not Key to China
Domestic commerce key to Chinese economy – not exports
Weihua,writer for ChinaDaily citing IMF official, 3/14/13
(Chen,, “Domestic Demand Holds Key to Chinese Growth”, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/201303/14/content_16307121.htm) (JN) A top International Monetary Fund official warned on Tuesday of the need for China to followthrough on plans to shift its economy from an investment-driven model to one that relies on domestic consumption. Zhu Min, one of the IMF's three deputy managing directors, said the key to this transition is economic reform and the quality, rather than the rate, of growth. Chinese GDP grew 7.8 percent in 2012, higher than the government's adjusted
forecast of 7.5percent. Although it was China's slowest rate of economic expansion since 1999, theperformance was among the strongest in the world. This year, GDP is expected to grow 8 to8.25 percent. Zhu pointed out that China's economy has been moving from a long-established focus on exports to investment. However, the 48 percent of Chinese GDP that investment accounted forlast year was far too high, he told a seminar at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze Schoolof Advanced International Studies in Washington. Overcapacity is a major challenge in China, where utilization of manufacturing resources hasdropped to 60 percent, a level Zhu described as risky. "Over-investment is a big concern and the quality of growth is a big concern," he said. Zhu, who assumed his current post in July 2011, blamed over-investment for constraining thewages of Chinese workers. Household income remains a very small share of the country'seconomy, he said. To maintain growth at or near current levels, China needs to keep moving toward consumption as its key economic driver, the IMF official said. This goal is stressed in the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-15), as well as the Government WorkReport delivered last week by Premier Wen Jiabao at the National People's Congress. The transition has sparked heated debate in China, and Zhu said on Tuesday that how peopletalk about it is important.
China’s economy not dependent on Latin America.
Dominguez 6. *Jorge, Professor @ Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, "China's Relations With Latin
America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes" Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper -- June -www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/china.pdf] Yet, if the gains are shared, the hopes for ¶ further gains are asymmetrical and the relative leverage to shape the future distribution ¶ of gains is uneven as well. China has disproportionate leverage over Latin America in ¶ trade negotiations
because the latter depend ¶ much more on the former . Moreover, Latin ¶ America will
most likely remain a minor ¶ player in the prospects for China’s economic growth while China has already become ¶ a major factor for Latin America’s economic growth. The year 2004 was the best ¶ for Latin America’s
gross domestic product ¶ growth since the East Asian financial crisis ¶ of 1997. A major reason for Latin America’s ¶ growth in 2004 was China’s demand for ¶ commodities, which lifted prices and output ¶ to set most Latin America’s economies back ¶ on a growth path.18 The asymmetry in both ¶ hopes and leverage is an issue for the future.
Aff LATIN AMERICA NOT KEY TO CHINA
CHINA DISADVANTAGE NO IMPACT - CHINA INFLUENCE FAILS
China Influence Fails
Chinese soft power decline inevitable – internal flaws and resentment.
Kurlantzick ‘7, visiting scholar in the Carnegie Endowment’s China Program (Joshua, Charm Offensive: How
China's Soft Power is Transforming the World. p. 232-233) China also may not be able to build its soft power indefinitely. As we have seen, greater familiarity with China will expose many countries to the People's Republic's flaws. China's promises of aid and investment could take years to materialize, yet Beijing has created heightened expectations about its potential as a donor and investor in many countries. China's exportation of labor, environmental, and governance problems alienates average people in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. China's support for autocratic rulers in countries like Zimbabwe and Sudan angers civil society leaders and opposition politicians. If Beijing seems to be dropping its preference for noninterference and "win-win" relations, it will spark fears in countries like Vietnam already suspicious of China. It also could reinforce the idea that despite Beijing's rhetoric of cooperation, when it comes to core interests, China, like any great power, will think of itself first. The Mekong River offers an
obvious example. Though China promises to cooperate peacefully with other countries, in the development of the river, China has proven both uncooperative and meddling. It has meddled by refusing to join the multilateral group monitoring the river and by 8 injecting itself into other nations' domestic politics to get politicians to support China's damming of the river. China could
further alienate other nations if it seems to be using multilateral institutions as a cover, without jettisoning Beijing's own more aggressive, even military aims. Despite signing a deal with the Philippines and Vietnam for joint exploration of the disputed South China Sea, Beijing has not retracted its claim to large swaths of the water. Any Chinese decision that appears arrogant or targeted toward Chinese domination of the region will cause a backlash. Even as officials in Vietnam signed the join exploration deal, they privately warned that they still could not trust their Chinese counterparts enough to share the most important data to Beijing. China’s trade relations, too, ultimately could limit its soft power. If China builds the kind of trade surpluses with the developing world that it enjoys with the United States, it could stoke local resentment. Eventually, Beijing could wind up looking little different to people in Asia or Africa or Latin America than the old colonial powers, who mined and dug up their
colonies, doing little to improve the capacity of locals on the ground. Whole regions could become trapped in a cycle of mercantilism, in which they sell natural resources to China and buy higher-value manufactured Chinese goods.
Aff CHINA INFLUENCE FAILS
CHINA DISADVANTAGE NO IMPACT - NO US-CHINA WAR
No US-China War
No US/China war—It’s in neither country’s best interest
Ackerman 2011 (Robert Ackerman, May 10, 2011, “War Between China, U.S. Not Likely,”
http://www.afcea.org/signal/signalscape/index.php/2011/05/10/11510/) The United States and China are not likely to go to war with each other because neither country wants it and it would run counter to both nations’ best interests. That was the conclusion of a plenary panel session hosted by former Good Morning America host David Hartman at the 2011 Joint Warfighting Conference in Virginia Beach. Adm. Timothy J. Keating, USN (Ret.), former head of the U.S. Pacific Command, noted that China actually wants the United States to remain active in the Asia-Pacific region as a hedge against any other country’s adventurism. And, most of the
other countries in that region want the United States to remain active as a hedge against China. Among areas of concern for China is North Korea. Wallace “Chip” Gregson, former assistant secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, said that above all China fears instability, and a North Korean collapse or war could send millions of refugees streaming into Manchuria, which has economic problems of its own.
Chinese leadership wouldn’t risk war
Ross 2009 (Robert S. Ross is Professor of Political Science at Boston College and Associate of the John King
Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University, September 2009 “Myth The Great Debate” http://nationalinterest.org/greatdebate/dragons/myth-3819)
Professor Friedberg's concluding suggestion that China's illiberal political system exacerbates the China threat fails to grasp that Beijing's authoritarian system is its greatest vulnerability. The Chinese leadership dares not risk war; it is acutely aware of its vulnerability to the will of its people and the necessity to minimize strategic adventurism and the risk of military defeat, lest it be the cause of its own demise. A balanced rather than an ideological assessment of the Sino-American dynamic offers the United States the confidence to compete with China and secure U.S. interests, and simultaneously promote U.S.-China cooperation.
Aff NO US-CHINA WAR
CHINA DISADVANTAGE NO IMPACT - NO TAIWAN IMPACT
No Taiwan Impact
No war over Taiwan– economies too intertwined
Bhakal ‘12 (Maitreya- Freelance Writer at ABSAS Solutions Pvt. Ltd. “Five reasons why China will not invade
Taiwan, and an analysis of Cross-strait Relation.” http://indiaschinablog.blogspot.com/2011/08/analysingcross-strait-relations-and-5.html) China has always placed economics at the forefront of most other matters. Despite the often-tumultuous state
of Sino-Indian relations (and an unresolved border dispute), trade has touched $63 billion. China is India’s second largest trading partner. In the Senkaku island dispute with Japan, Deng Xiaoping, as soon as he came into power in 1978, proposed that China and Japan jointly explore the oil and gas deposits near the disputed islands without touching on the issue of sovereignty. China has also sought joint exploration in the resource-rich Spratlys, a solution which is the right step forward and is in fact more urgent than sovereignty, which the Philippines and Vietnam and have so far been reluctant to do. China doesn’t mind waiting and
biding its time until sovereignty issues get resolved. As Deng Xiaoping famously remarked regarding the Senkaku dispute, “It does not matter if this question is shelved for some time, say, 10 years . Our generation
is not wise enough to find common language on this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will certainly find a solution acceptable to all”. Unlike his predecessor Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao has used a softer approach towards Taiwan,
promoting stronger economic and cultural ties, high-level official visits and direct flights in order to reduce tensions. This pragmatic approach is on display even in the Taiwan dispute. China is Taiwan’s largest trading partner, and Taiwan is China’s seventh largest. Two-thirds of all Taiwanese companies have made investments in China in recent years. In 2010, China (including Hong Kong) accounted for over 29.0% of Taiwan’s total trade
and 41.8% of Taiwan’s exports. The ECFA was heavily tilted in Taiwan’s favor. It cut tariffs on 539 Taiwanese exports to China and 267 Chinese products entering Taiwan. Under the agreement, approximately 16.1 % of exports to China and 10.5 % of imports to China will be tariff free by 2013. Taiwanese firms have invested $200 billion in the mainland, and trade between the two sides has exceeded $150 billion. Taiwanese trade with China. Source: Reuters Both China and Taiwan have a lot to lose by
fighting with each other. Another factor to consider is the incalculable loss that an invasion will have on the Chinese economy, not to mention scaring away potential investors.
No military invasion to regain Taiwan – China will use other methods
Fischer 11/27 -- clean energy entrepreneur and is the founder and CEO of Lumicity Ltd (Tristan, 2012, " Why
China could invade Taiwan – and get away with it," http://www.historyfuturenow.com/wp/why-china-couldinvade-taiwan-and-get-away-with-it/) The People’s Republic of China has been very patient with Taiwan. It knows that time is on its side. However, it could also force the issue within the next few years and force Taiwan to rejoin mainland China under the authority of the PRC. It could show Taiwan a stick and a carrot. The stick is that mainland China will invade to reestablish control over Taiwan. Both the Taiwanese government and the mainland Chinese government say that they are not separate nations, but one, with different governments. The US would not enter into a “civil war” with the two Chinas . In addition, bearing in mind that the US has a huge trade deficit with both China and Taiwan and that the Taiwan Straits are effectively already off limits to the US Navy, it is hard to see the US defending Taiwan, even if it could afford to do so, which it cannot, or were able to do so, which it could not . As a carrot, the mainland Chinese market has become increasingly attractive to Taiwanese businesses. The PRC could offer increased incentives, such as low cost loans from the PRC, to Taiwanese companies, and better market access making the business classes increasingly open to reunification with mainland China.
Aff NO TAIWAN IMPACT
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