States Counterplan & Answers

STATES COUNTERPLAN & AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS
Negative
States CP 1NC .................................................................................................................................................. 2 CP Solves - Infrastructure ................................................................................................................................ 3 CP Solves - Coordination ................................................................................................................................. 4 Answers To: Can’t Solve relations ................................................................................................................... 5

Affirmative Answers
No solvency: States Don’t Control Ports ......................................................................................................... 6 No Solvency – Economy .................................................................................................................................. 7 No Solvency –Coordination Key ...................................................................................................................... 8 No Solvency – US-Mexico Relations ................................................................................................................ 9

1

States Counterplan & Answers States CP 1NC

NEGATIVE
States CP 1NC
CP Text; The 50 states and territories of the United States should fund substantial infrastructure improvements at Points of Entry along the United States – Mexico border. The CP solves the case - States can improve ports of entry
Wilson & Lee 2013
Erik Lee, Associate Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS) at Arizona State University, Christopher E. Wilson, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars “THE STATE OF TRADE, COMPETITIVENESS AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING INTHE U.S.MEXICO BORDER REGION” The State of The Border report: A Comprehensive Analysis of the U.S.-Mexico Border Border Research Partnership May 2013 http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/mexico_state_of_border.pdf Given the fact that POE improvements offer significant and tangible monetary benefits to border communities and trade-dependent industries, state, local and private entities are often willing to contribute funding to border infrastructure projects. Under the current budgetary constraints, it makes sense for federal agencies to take full advantage of these alternative funding sources. Along the Texas-Mexico border, the majority of POEs are owned by the city or county in which they are located. This model for infrastructure investment could be expanded along other parts of the U.S.-Mexico border, but changes to current federal legislation appear to be necessary to allow CBP to “accept reimbursement from sources other than Congress.”17 As demonstrated above, additional staffing is and will be increasingly necessary as trade increases. With the active support of border stakeholders across the region, a proposal along these lines designed in collaboration with federal agencies could likely garner legislative support and could open significant opportunities for investment despite tough budgetary times.

2
Negative -States CP 1NC

States Counterplan & Answers CP Solves - Infrastructure

CP Solves - Infrastructure
Actions by the Border States solve. Shapleigh, Texas Senator, 8 *10/08, Eliot, “Texas Borderlands 2009 The State of Border Transportation
and Security,” http://shapleigh.org/system/reporting_document/file/238/81st_Transportation_Chapter.pdf, date accessed: 07/12/13, LV]
Key U.S.-Mexico border ports-of-entry are located on international trade corridors¶ linking Mexico, the United States, and Canada. The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient ¶ Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) emphasizes continued federal ¶ interest in identifying and promoting key international highway trade corridors in the United ¶ States. U.S.-Mexico border states

should continue to expand efforts at border corridor planning ¶ coordination. Border corridor plans should recognize the role of border ports-of-entry on selected ¶ international corridors and ensure that their contributions to transportation effectiveness and ¶ efficiency is explicitly recognized. In the future, trade corridors
may qualify for a variety of ¶ federal transportation funding, and the border region needs to be clearly recognized as part of the ¶ U.S. corridor program. By clearly stating the case for new trade corridor investment along the ¶ Border, we will establish the foundation to support future requests for federal funding for the ¶ Border Region.¶ In addition, a corridor analysis of trade flow can

produce substantial benefits for both ¶ planners and users. Corridor planning considers the overall efficiency of a transportation¶ corridor by analyzing how efficiencies along the corridor benefit the corridor overall. Evidence ¶ supports the separation of trade flows and transportation flows because the two can differ so ¶ extensively. Enhancing our understanding of how corridors work will lead to a better use of ¶ resources, while a regional analysis of transportation flows will make a stronger case for federal ¶ support. Finally, the bi-national nature of U.S.-Mexico will allow us to synchronize investment ¶ plans with the Mexican Ministry of Transport.

State action solves – greater state initiative leads to national level policy realignment Gerber et al. 2010 James Gerber, PhD California Davis San Diego State University Director of the Center for Latin American
Studies (CLAS) and a Professor of Economics;Francisco Lara-Valencia , PhD Umich, Arizona State University Associate Professor, Director, Research Network for Transborder Development and Governance; Carlos de la Parra, El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, PhD Umich, professor Urban and Environmental Studies at El Colegio de la Frontera Norte. “Re-Imagining the U.S.-Mexico Border: Policies toward a More Competitive and Sustainable Transborder Region” Global Economy Journal Volume 10, Issue 4 2010

The trajectory toward crossborder integration and the increasing political maturity of the ten border states are the underpinnings of the term “transborder,” as we use it here and as it being use by the Border Governors Conference. The Border Governors Conference launched in 2009 a set of Strategic Guidelines, or Plan Indicativo, in an attempt to define policies for the U.S.-Mexico border region as a whole as well as to have a greater voice in the future of overall U.S.- Mexico relations. We argue that this claim to an increased voice in national policies for border states will tend towards a greater partnership between national and regional interests, rather than promoting a tug-of-war between border states and national capitals. Regional-national partnership is essential, both for the social and economic development of the border region, and for the strengthening of U.S.-Mexico ties.

3
Negative -CP Solves - Infrastructure

States Counterplan & Answers CP Solves - Coordination

CP Solves - Coordination
State action on the border is good – induces national coordination and action Gerber, Lara-Valencia & de la Parra 2010 Gerber et al 10 James Gerber, PhD California Davis San Diego State University Director of the Center for Latin American Studies
(CLAS) and a Professor of Economics;Francisco Lara-Valencia , PhD Umich, Arizona State University Associate Professor, Director, Research Network for Transborder Development and Governance; Carlos de la Parra, El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, PhD Umich, professor Urban and Environmental Studies at El Colegio de la Frontera Norte. “Re-Imagining the U.S.-Mexico Border: Policies toward a More Competitive and Sustainable Transborder Region” Global Economy Journal Volume 10, Issue 4 2010

In the context of these challenges, together with deepening cross-border¶ demographic, social, and economic ties, the need for a common vision is¶ increased rather than diminished. The relevance of this vision for the region—¶ and its articulation as a bi-national policy framework—cannot be overstated. As¶ shown by Papademetriou and Meyers (2001), border communities are more likely¶ to influence national policies when they speak about their needs and opportunities¶ with a common voice. In addition, at the local level, a shared image of the future¶ of the border region is necessary for the articulation of clear and actionable goals¶ and for the creation of guidelines that encourage the engagement of public,¶ private and social actors in policy making and collective action.

4
Negative -CP Solves - Coordination

States Counterplan & Answers Answers To: Can’t Solve relations

Answers To: Can’t Solve relations
States do have foreign policy roles, the times have changed. McMillan 2008 Samuel Lucas, Professor, University of South Carolina “Subnational Foreign Policy Actors:
How and Why Governors Participate in U.S. Foreign Policy” Foreign Policy Analysis (2008) 4, 227–253
To fully understand how governors became involved in foreign policy, one must understand how the governorship has been transformed. A comparison of 1950s gubernatorial roles with those that ‘‘emerged during the 1960s’’ and later developed reveals three themes: (i) differences in the political environment in which governors function, (ii) appearance and growth of governors as a principal in federal-state relations, and (iii) the emergence of the governorship as a management position (Beyle and Muchmore 1983:17–18). Since the 1970s, another theme is governors’ international roles, related to economic

development and an expansion of governors’ head of state duties. The changing role of governors is illustrated in how governors are received by foreign dignitaries and increasingly meeting with heads of national governments. Some officials say governors are not usually allowed to meet national ministers and heads of government
because countries know that governors are not representatives of U.S. policy and do not want to offend Washington (Personal Interviews with MO Overseas Official and U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service Overseas Official 2006).1 Yet, Colorado Gov. Bill Owens’ meetings with high-level U.K. officials included trade policy discussions (Sanko 2003) and many governors have met with presidents of Mexico. For example , governors from 10 of the 14 states examined in this study met with a president of Mexico

between 1995 and 2004 . Table 1 presents the countries whose officials met with the governors considered in this study. Governors have adapted their institutional structures to reflect these changes and work with international issues.2 California Gov. Gray Davis created a secretary of foreign affairs in his office, an official who organized the first trip by a
Mexican president to Sacramento and Davis’ overseas meetings with ‘‘British, Israe li and Greek ministers, and Irish, Scottish and Palestinian leaders’’ (Lindlaw 1999). During his first year in office, Davis hosted leaders from China, Japan, and Singapore an d his secretary of foreign affairs visited Mexico over 40 times in 4 years (Lindlaw 1999; Powell 2003). California reported hosting 637 foreign dignitaries from 67 countries in 2001 (Conlan, Dudley, and Clark 2004). Teaford (2002:5) says U.S. states have ‘‘emerged as dynamic molders of domestic policy and vital providers of government services’’ since 1950 such that they now work on issues such as environmental, energy, and immigration policy. In their roles as principal economic ambassador, governors are seen abroad as ‘‘high-prestige, high-impact heads of state.’’ Thus, a National Governors Association (2002:16, 23)

report explains that governors must ‘‘take the lead in ensuring the competitiveness of their states’ businesses in the global marketplace.’’ Although the aims of states’ overseas offices usually remain consistent, all overseas
officials interviewed agree that goals may change due to market fluctuations or gubernatorial priorities (Personal Interviews w ith U.S. States’ Overseas Officials 2006). Gov. Tom Ridge reorganized Pennsylvania’s economic development department and ordered offices to focus 75% of resources on trade promotion, while also recruiting investment and promoting tourism. When Gov. Ed Rendell took office, he reversed priorities, telling offices to focus on investment (Lieberman 1999; Telephone Interview with PA Overseas Official 2006).

5
Negative -Answers To: Can’t Solve relations

States Counterplan & Answers No solvency: States Don’t Control Ports

AFFIRMATIVE
No solvency: States Don’t Control Ports
The states don’t control the ports of entry. Combs 2001 Window on State Government - Susan Combs, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts 2001 State
Functions at the Texas-Mexico Border and Cross-Border Transportation http://www.window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/border/sfatb2.html
II. Responsibilities of Governmental Agencies and Private Entities at the Texas-Mexico Border Crossings

Several U.S. and Mexican federal, state, and local governmental and non-governmental agencies have direct and indirect roles in the Texas-Mexico border crossing process. These agencies regulate the process, enforce laws and regulations, or facilitate the safe movement of cargo and people into the United States. The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) provides and maintains the port of entry facilities used by the federal inspection agencies and state and local agencies. GSA owns all the border stations—except for the Starr-Camargo International Bridge—and is responsible for their design and operation. The federal and state agencies operating in the border station pay rent to GSA based on the amount of space they require.[18] U.S. Federal Agencies The U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Services are the primary federal agencies controlling the northbound, from Mexico into the U.S., border crossing process. They conduct primary and secondary inspections of drivers, passengers, vehicles, and cargo. Inspectors from both agencies have been authorized to perform primary inspections for both customs and immigration purposes. Primary inspections are always conducted at the border
crossing. A primary inspection includes quick reviews of personal identification and citizenship, cargo documentation, and vehicle inspection. Secondary inspections are conducted at border crossing lots. Secondary inspections include more detailed reviews of cargo documentation, cargo, and drivers.

6
Affirmative -No solvency: States Don’t Control Ports

States Counterplan & Answers No Solvency – Economy

No Solvency – Economy
Only federal binational cooperation solves – state action will only make the border less economically efficient. Wilson & Lee 2013 Erik Lee, Associate Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS) at Arizona State
University, Christopher E. Wilson, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars “INTRODUCTION” The State of The Border report: A Comprehensive Analysis of the U.S.-Mexico Border Border Research Partnership May 2013 http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/mexico_state_of_border.pdf For those charged with negotiating the matrix of political and pragmatic challenges that make up the gauntlet of border policy, there are precious few axioms. Even the landmark North American Free Trade Agreement cannot quite frame the entirety of the U.S.-Mexico relationship. Through a historical process of trial and error, the two nations have arrived at, yet not fully implemented, two key concepts that can guide interaction at their shared border: coordination and collaboration. At the border,

the United States and Mexico must manage complex transnational problems and remarkable shared opportunities. Watersheds and wildlife pay little attention to national boundaries, and transnational criminal groups actively seek to exploit regulatory and jurisdictional divides. But with a half-trillion dollars in bilateral trade powering the national economies throughout both countries, border management has implications that extend far beyond the border region itself . In such an environment, cooperative binational solutions are often the only solutions. Unfortunately, an institutional void exists that makes managing such complex interaction across the U.S.Mexico border particularly challenging. While the U.S. State Department and Mexico’s Foreign Ministry formally manage federal government-to-government interaction, a large number of federal agencies, state and local governments also have a significant say in how the border is run. Chief among these is the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
formed in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001 to better organize U.S. efforts to defend itself from terrorist attacks. The importance of DHS in border interaction cannot be overstated, and its creation represented both a securitization of the border, which made the border thicker for both illicit and legitimate traffic, but also an effort to better coordinate border management. Interagency coordination can also be difficult. Adding to this is the large number of state agencies as well as local governments that must conduct international work with their counterparts in the U.S. or Mexico. While there are formal and de facto agencies that manage our border interactions, no binational organization exists to coordinate efforts across areas such as those examined in this volume: quality of life, trade, security and environment. In a curious way, the border tends to divide east and west as often as north and south. Officials, businesses and civil society in El Paso, for instance, are generally more accustomed to reaching across the border to speak with counterparts in Ciudad Juárez to manage a shared challenge than they are to do so with those in San Diego. While the existence of these north-to-south corridors of activity are natural and beneficial, the relative

lack of trans-corridor communication and collaboration can be problematic and work against formulating helpful policies for the entire region. Healthy competition among corridors to attract businesses and federal attention is a sign of a functioning market and democracy, but to the extent that border communities face common
issues, they could also benefit by sharing best practices and speaking to their federal governments with a unified voice.

7
Affirmative -No Solvency – Economy

States Counterplan & Answers No Solvency –Coordination Key

No Solvency –Coordination Key
Federal action is necessary – coordinated planning is necessary to ensure that there isn’t a mismatch of investment. Wilson & Lee 2013 Erik Lee, Associate Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS) at Arizona State
University, Christopher E. Wilson, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars “THE STATE OF TRADE, COMPETITIVENESS AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING INTHE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER REGION” The State of The Border report: A Comprehensive Analysis of the U.S.-Mexico Border Border Research Partnership May 2013 http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/mexico_state_of_border.pdf

A key component of how the U.S.-Mexico border functions to facilitate trade has to do with transportation planning. In the absence of strong and coordinated planning, infrastructure investments on one side of the border or in one region can simply feed traffic into a bottleneck in another area. This process is largely managed by
the Joint Working Committee on Transportation Planning (JWC), a binational enti ty chaired by the two countries’ transportation agencies but including representatives from many federal agencies and state departments of transportation. As border

communities felt themselves increasingly affected by decisions made in Washington and Mexico City, their insistence on being included in these discussions led to the regional border master plan process, in which state DOTs lead stakeholder discussions on border infrastructure priorities. While this process makes sense from a U.S. perspective (in the absence of a national transportation plan, state DOTs essentially manage and spend federal transportation dollars), this process is somewhat of a mismatch for Mexico’s more centralized political system. The system seems to work
better in certain cross-border communities than others, as is seen with California and Baja California’s award-winning master plan.

The Counterplan can’t solve US-Mexico cooperation – that’s critical on the border. Mares & Canovas 2010
David R. Mares, University of California, San Diego Gustavo Vega Cánovas, El Colegio de México “The U.S.Mexico Relationship: Towards a New Era?” Mexico and the United States: Confronting the Twenty-First Century http://usmex.ucsd.edu/assets/024/11646.pdf US and Mexico are in this struggle against crime together. The public in both countries demand that the border be better secured in both directions against the drugs, money, weapons and individuals feeding this crime. Despite the frustrations many on the US side feel as they read sensationalist press accounts, there is no way of ‘fixing’ the border that can provide security for the US without also providing it for Mexico. The expectation by some that the US can ‘seal the border’ against illicit entry of goods and individuals is simply impossible. Even making significant progress toward it would impose economic and social costs on Mexico that would create an even more desperate situation south of the border, thereby producing even greater threats to US national security. The two countries can either address these demands for security in a more
In other words, the

effective manner (and that means doing many things differently) or divert significant human and capital resources from meeting the economic challenges of globalization into an ineffective search for security from crime. Although the levels of violence have declined in 2009 their continuation at historically high levels indicates that the level of trans-national cooperation between the Mexican and the United States governments is not optimal in this area. Given the
magnitude of the violence issue, professionalizing the police and reforming the judicial system are necessary but insufficient responses. Ultimately the penal system should not simply take criminals off the streets, but deter crime. The US model of dealing with crime after the
fact is too expensive (manpower, court time, jail cells and parole infrastructure) and the

severely negative underlying social and economic conditions in Mexico can generate a neverending supply of criminals to overwhelm whatever judicial and police reforms the country adopts.

8
Affirmative -No Solvency –Coordination Key

States Counterplan & Answers No Solvency – US-Mexico Relations

No Solvency – US-Mexico Relations
Only a strong federal action solves the aff – the states can’t coordinate with Mexico and the perms solves any reason why state involvement is good. Wilson & Lee 2013 Erik Lee, Associate Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS) at Arizona State
University, Christopher E. Wilson, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars “THE STATE OF TRADE, COMPETITIVENESS AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING INTHE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER REGION” The State of The Border report: A Comprehensive Analysis of the U.S.-Mexico Border Border Research Partnership May 2013 http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/mexico_state_of_border.pdf

There is no simple answer to the complex challenge of coordinating border planning and management, but a few key ingredients for success can be identified. First, border stakeholders need to be at the table—border experts in Washington and Mexico City are no substitute for those living the implications of policy on a daily basis. Nonetheless, a strong federal role is important. Border communities often work together, but they also compete to attract federal resources and trade flows. The federal agencies are well placed to analyze and balance competing needs, especially in dialogue with border communities. Finally, and hopefully obviously, cross-border collaboration is vital. To strengthen regional competitiveness and security, we need regional coordination.

The states are prohibited from foreign relations by the Constitution. MOORE 1965 JOHN NORTON Assistant Dean and Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida. DUKE
LAW JOURNAL FEDERALISM AND FOREIGN RELATIONS Vol. 1965: 248]
D URING recent years, the United States and most of the other nations of the world have become increasingly concerned with the course of international affairs.' The demands of this era have increased the need for centralized effectuation of foreign policy and for a more realistic redefinition of foreign relations designed to consider the often sophisticated and pervasive effect of domestic policy on the international scene. As is abundantly evident in The Federalist Papers, one of the

principal purposes of the union upon which our nation is based was to achieve centralized control over the foreign relations of the individual states.2 The Constitution of the United States reflects this purpose by providing various
techniques for achieving the centralization of foreign relations.3 Thus, in commenting on the foreign relations power left to the states under the Constitution, the Supreme Court was able to declare in the famous cases of United States v. Belmont4 and United States v. Pink:5 In respect of all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes the State of New York does not exist.6 We repeat that there are limitations on the sovereignty of the States. No State can rewrite our foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies. Power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government

exclusively.

9
Affirmative -No Solvency – US-Mexico Relations

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful