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French edition: Revue Internationale des Sciences Sociales (ISSN 0304-3037), Unesco, Paris (France).

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Topics of forthcoming issues: Socio-economic information: systems uses and needs At the frontiers of sociology Technology and cultural values

Editor: Peter Lengyel Assistant editor: Ali Kazancigil Correspondents Bangkok: Yogesh Atai Belgrade: BalSa Spadijer Buenos Aires: Norberto Rodrguez Bustamante Cairo: Abdel M o n e i m El-Sawi Canberra: Geoffrey Caldwell Cologne: Alphons Silbermann Delhi: Andr Bteille London: Cyril S. Smith Mexico City: Pablo Gonzalez Casanova Moscow: Marien Gapotchka Nairobi: Chen Chimutengmende Nigeria: Akinsola A k i w o w o Ottawa: Paul L a m y Singapore: S. H . Alatas Tokyo: Hiroshi Ohta United States: Gene Lyons

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Authors are responsible for the choice and the presentation of the facts contained in signed articles and for the opinions expressed therein, which are not necessarily those of Unesco and do not commit the Organization. Permission for reproduction of articles appearing in this Journal can be obtained from the Editor. Correspondence arising from this Journal should be addressed to: T h e Editor, International Social Science Journal, Unesco, 7 place de Fontenoy, 75700 Paris.

international social science journal

Published quarterly by Unesco Vol. XXXII, N o . 4, 1980

O n the state
Editorial 585 Nicos Poulantzas "j" Research note on the state and society 600 Origins and formation Maurice Godelier S. N. Eisenstadt Romila Thapar Processes of the formation, diversity and bases of the state 609 Comparative analysis of state formation in historical contexts 624 State formation in early India 655 Central patterns Pierre Birnbaum Aristide R. Zolberg States, ideologies and collective action in Western Europe 671 Strategic interactions and the formation of modern states: France and England 687 Peripheral developments Guillermo O'Donnell Comparative historical formations of the state apparatus and socio-economic change in the Third World 717 The state in the dominated social formations of Africa: some theoretical issues 730 The world system Immanuel Wallerstein Silviu Brucan The states in the institutional vortex of the capitalist world economy 743 The state and the world system 752

Issa G. Shivji

ISSN 0020-8701

Continuing debate Leon Z.Zevin T h e n e w international economic order and reorientation of the economic development policy of the developing countries 771 Socio-economic data bases: situations and assessments Fernando Gonzlez Vigil National primary socio-economic data structures VII: Peru 781 The social science sphere Andr Beteille O n the concept of tribe 825 ISSC Stein R o k k a n Prize in Comparative Research 829 Professional and documentary services Theodore Wyckoff Standardized list of national political units in the twentieth century 833 Approaching international conferences 847 Books received 850 Recent Unesco publications 853

the state


i A s Fernand Braudel writes in Civilisation matrielle, conomie et capitalisme, XVe-XVIIIe sicle, 'Nowadays, the state is rated very highly'. T h e contemporary state, unlike the state structures of the past,fills'the entire social space'.1 T h e fascination, mingled with fear, that is exerted by the state the ' m o n strous progeny of power and law' as Paul Valry called i t i s not new; throughout the ages it has produced a number of metaphors alluding to monsters and other infernal deities of mythology such as Leviathan or Moloch. T h e Mexican writer Octavio Paz has given us the latest, and certainly not the least evocative, of these metaphors: 'the philanthropic ogre', a term that admirably expresses the contradictory feelings aroused by the state, which is seen as a dominating force with totalitarian ambitions, but also as a guardian of the citizens and a regulator of society. The state, then, is omnipresent: in industrial societies, in Africa, Asia and Latin America, both internally and on an international level. T h e result is that it is constantly being discussed by what Rgis Debray has called 'the n e w mediocracy', 2 thus undergoing the 'entropy of the media'. 3 O n e attitude which is very m u c h in vogue is anti-etatism, a combination of liberalism and libertarianism, which sees the state as absolute evil. Another is the Manichaean, ethnocentric sublimation of L'tat civilis1 which praises one type of state unreservedly and holds u p all others to obloquy, as so m a n y instances of despotism.5 O f course w e can all hold any given political system to be either good or less good or detestable, but holding such views is quite different from making a calm, serious attempt to explain the phenomenon of the state. The articles in this issue deal with some of the questions that arise in connection with the state, drawing upon the lessons to be learned from sociology, anthropology, political science and history. This is not the first time this Journal has dealt with the question of the state. Almost ten years ago w e published an issue on 'Regional Variations in Nationbuilding' (Vol. XXIII, N o . 3, 1971), in which several articles dealt with the formation and development of the state in various parts of the world.

Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XXXII, N o . 4, 1980



These articles were actually the outcome of a comparative research project on the formation of the state and nation-building carried out by Unesco and the International Social Science Council. A n inter-regional conference (Crisy-la-Salle, France, 1970), three regional symposiain Europe, Asia and Latin Americaand a round-table meeting of a more technical nature were held, the latter on data for comparative historical studies on nation-building. A s a result of these meetings a two-volume work Building States and Nations (1973) was published under the editorship of S. N . Eisenstadt and Stein R o k k a n . Stein R o k k a n died prematurely in 1979. (The International Social Science Council has just instituted an ISSC-Stein R o k k a n Prize in comparative research.) But the fact that S. N . Eisenstadt is one of the authors contributing to this issue links the two projects, which are separated by a decade during which the discussions centring on the state have been carried a stage further and enriched by n e w theoretical and empirical material. However, if today w e reread the abovementioned issue of the ISS J and the two volumes of the work edited by Eisenstadt and R o k k a n , w e see that most of the questions and hypotheses on the state formulated in them are akin to the problems of our day discussed in several of the following articles, not to mention the wealth of material on the methodology of comparative research and the constant care taken to juxtapose theory and empirical data and to treat history as an integral part of sociological analyses. A m o n g the major services rendered by these meetings and the volumes published as a result were that they analysed the specific nature of the formation and development of the state in various regions and the connections between this process and the culture of each of these regions, m a d e some attempt to assess the implications of all this for the Third World, and raised the question of 'Alternatives to the Nationstate' (Vol. I, p. 25). Another issue of the ISS J bearing on the state is Vol. X X X , N o . 1, 1978, entitled 'The Politics of Territoriality', in which Silviu Brucan, w h o also contributes to this number, considered the question 'The nation-state: will it keep order or wither away?' (p. 9-30), showing that it would not be easy to get rid of this old acquaintance. Three other articles in the same issue dealt with the territorial aspects of the state, and Vol. X X X I , N o . 4, 1979, 'In Search of Rational Organization', contained articles on state bureaucracy and the public sector in several countries.

In addition to dealing with a subject the concerns of social science communities throughout the world, this issue is also intended to be a tribute to the m e m o r y of Nicos Poulantzas, w h o died in October 1979. W h e n w e decided to deal with the subject of the state, Nicos Poulantzas was thefirstspecialist w e consulted, and in June 1978 he was good enough to write a 'Research Note on the State and Society'. This text was obviously not intended for publication, and its author,



.Who was deeply interested in the progress of our project, was preparing an article on the state and democracy today for this issue. W e have decided to publish the Note for it reflects fairly closely Nicos Poulantzas' thinking on the state, albeit in a simplified way. . In the moving Testimony by his friends which appeared in the French newspaper Le Monde5 shortly after his death, tribute w a s paid not only to the sociologist, the intellectualand the considerable volume of work he left behind himand the champion of democratic socialism, but also to a 'lively, generous and warm-hearted' friend, w h o was 'always ready to question his o w n opinions whenever he felt that the changing situation warranted it'. In the foreword to his last book, L'tat, le pouvoir et le socialisme (1978), in which he elaborated and reformulated some of his theoretical views, Nicos Poulantzas wrote: T assume responsibility for what I write, and I speak for myself.'

The state is a complex phenomenon. W e shall eschew definitions, which are always either too vague or too narrow and rarely of any use; rather, w e shall ask some questions, taken at r a n d o m from a m o n g the m a n y that could be asked, which illustrate.this complexity. Is the state nothing more than an institution with its bureaucracy and its officials, an institution responsible for quite specific functions, such as policing, defence, justice and so on, or is it a juridically.defined concept, closely related to that of sovereignty, or the equivalent of law and order, orseen from a sociological standpointthe arena where different social forces face one another? Is it of the same substance as society and the various social, political and economic processes, or. is it a separate entity, derived from society but above it? Is the state.necessarily territorial? H o w does it differ from political power? H o w does it differ from the government or from the political system? C a n the word 'state' be used of all forms of political domination, from the chiefdom of primitive societies to. the contemporary state, and including the ancient Greek polis, the European feudal system, historical empires and absolute monarchies? In philosophical, historical and sociological literature the state has been understood in one or other of the ways implied in these questions. The article on the state in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968) contains references to forty-five others, including authority, government, international politics, nation, nationalism, power, social, structure, sovereignty, legitimacy, democracy, constitutions and constitutionalization, the political process, monarchy, c o m m u n i s m , Marxism, anarchy, religion, Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Bodin, Rousseau, Burke and Hegel. In A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, by J. Gould and W . L . Kolb (1964), the article on the state refers to four components that differentiate it from other political entitiespeople, territory, government and independencewhile admitting that it is difficult to confine oneself to description and not tackle questions such as



' W h y does the state exist?', ' W h y should w e obey the state?' or ' O n what grounds is the state justified?'. Since Plato and Aristotle, questions such as these, on the origin and the nature of the state, power and political authority, have been asked by political thinkers of all the great civilizations, whether Judaeo-Christian, Islamic, Chinese or Indian. Machiavelli was the first to use the word 'state' (from the Latin status, the past participle of stare, to stand) as w e understand it today. The phenomenon of the state was studied and analysed by the philosophers of the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and thefirsthalf of the nineteenth century, and then by social scientists from M a r x onwards. In their excellent work, La sociologie de l'tat(l979), B . Badie and P . Birnbaum give a remarkable critical analysis of the sociological theories of the state, from M a r x to present-day sociology, through Durkheim, W e b e r and the functionalists (p. 13-119). Political scientists have often focused their attention on the state, as well as political sociologists and social anthropologists. Their studies were for a long time predominantly juridical in nature, both in Europe and in the United States, and political science was considered to be the equivalent of Staatswissenschaft.'' After the Second World W a r , American political science was dominated by behaviouralism and empirical studies. The state was thought to be too huge an entity to be studied satisfactorily. Political processes and the political behaviour of individuals and groups were analysed by the adherents of structural functionalism and systems analysis. N o mention of the state will be found in the series of works on comparative politics which were published in the 1960s in the United States, under the auspices of the Committee o n Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council, and which had a marked influence on several generations of political science students and scholars. (These included: G . A l m o n d and J. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas; L . Pye (ed.), Communications and Political Development; J. La Palombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development; R . W a r d and D . Rustow (eds.), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey; L . Pye and S. Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development; and L . Binder et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development.) In these works political regimes were analysed in terms of development or of modernization, so that not only the state but also the domination-dependence relationships which constitute the history of these societies were left aside. Latin American specialists countered this approach with their theory of dependencia, and since the 1970s scholars in Latin America, and also in Africa and Asia, have placed the state and problems relating thereto in the forefront of their considerations. The concept of the state has always been central to the study of international relations. In the theory of international relations, however, the state is often regarded as something that is 'given', or a basic entity, whose behaviour and place in the international system are analysed without regard to its nature or its specificity, even w h e n the analysis bears on domestic factors affecting foreign policy.



Historians and Marxists working in the various branches of the social sciences have never lost sight of the importance of the state, whereas for political scientists and sociologists of other schools of thought it has actually been a rediscovery. This is especially true in the United States where, after the remarkable work done by the neo-Marxists and the rebirth of political economy, 8 the establishment, having neglected the question of the state for two decades, is n o w once again studying the subject. For example, Daedalus, the journal of the American A c a d e m y of Arts and Sciences, has published a number (Autumn 1979) bearing the title 'The State'. International professional associations in various social science disciplines are also taking an increasing interest in the study of the state. The programme of the Twelfth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, to be held in Rio de Janeiro in 1982, gives considerable space to this question. IV O f the different ways of approaching the question of the state, the articles in this issue, broadly speaking, adopt two, the genetic and the functional. A n d indeed the formation of the state as a universal as well as a specific form of domination, and its functions and behaviour in all societal spheres and on an international level, must be borne in mind if one is to understand and explain the nature and role of the phenomenon and the forms it takes. Maurice Godelier, Romila Thapar and S. N . Eisenstadt deal with the endogenous processes which are at the origin of the state and with the question of h o w the state came into being. In Godelier's opinion, at the basis of the state there is the differentiation founded on dialectical relations between violence and consent. His hypotheses shed light on the phenomenon of generalized obedience and on the binding force of all social lifethe fact that groups with opposing interests nevertheless share certain conceptions of social and cosmic order. Eisenstadt also deals with this problem, but he starts from different premises. In his opinion, what he calls 'cultural codes'the ways of perceiving and evaluating the social situation and the cosmic order shared by the members of a societyare facts whose role in the process of the institutionalization of societies he analyses. Godelier, o n the other hand, is concerned with demonstrating the mechanisms of these conceptions; he believes it is essential to see clearly the mechanisms by which majority consent is.obtained spontaneously and m u c h more effectively than by force, however brutal. H e maintains that this consent is obtained and domination is legitimized because it appears to be a service rendered by the dominating group to those it dominates. Godelier's analyses, illustrated by examples from several archaic societies and historical empires such as the Inca Empire, also help us to understand the modern state. This is true of the role he assigns to ideology, and more particularly to religion, which he considers to be not simply a reflection, or a system of representation, that legitimates, a posteriori, the relations of dominance



that arise independently of them but, on the contrary, as one of the conditions for the formation of these relations, part of the inner framework of the relations of production and exploitation. Despite certain formal differences, his opinions on the matter are akin not only to those of Eisenstadt but also to those of Pierre Birnbaum both of w h o m see culture and the state as being closely correlated. The question w e must ask is: T o what must w e attribute the appearance, within tribal units, of an internal differentiation between social functions and the formation of n e w hierarchies that are founded not on family relationships but on divisions of a n e w kindorders, castes, classeswhich marked the change from a stateless society to a state society? This differentiation is due to the new material relations of m e n with nature and with one another that are formed as agriculture and exchanges develop and necessitate a division of labour. T h e social divisions between family groups found in primitive communities are transformed into relations of exploitation by a threefold mechanism: the dominant minority misappropriates the product of the community's labour for its o w n benefit (Godelier calls this process the transformation of 'surplus-labour', used for the reproduction of the entire community {travail-en-plus), into surplus labour {sur-travail) for the exclusive benefit of the dominant minority); this minority represents the c o m munity with regard to an exterior situation and therefore regulates the circulation of goods and services; lastly, it controls the use of c o m m o n resources (the land), so that not only does the majority become ideologically and socially dependent on the minority, but also comes to depend on it materially. Godelier emphasizes the diversity of these transformations, which have produced different hierarchiesorders, castes, classesand maintains that there are 'as m a n y types of state as there are types of social hierarchy and modes of production supporting them' and that 'the emergence of one form of state does not follow automatically from the existence of a hierarchy of orders and classes'. Romila Thapar starts her very detailed historical examination of the formation of the state in India by arguing against the application of the concepts of oriental despotism and the Asiatic m o d e of production ( A M P ) . She basically criticizes the incompatibility of the A M P with the dialectic approach, and the lack of empirical evidence in its support. Thapar maintains that in the appearance of a state system in India, in the Ganges Valley, in the middle of thefirstmillennium B . C . , the transition from family-based relations to a stratified society on the one hand, and conquest on the other, in no w a y played an exclusive part. T h e process varied, passing from centralized, unitary states to segmentary ones, through various decentralized systems in which the peasants owned their land and trade was a widespread occupation, both these variables being incompatible with the A M P . She also points to the links between castes and economic interests, links which were m u c h more complex than m a n y observers imagine. She further stresses the importance in ancient India of a peasant economy and trade between urban centres.



Thapar therefore emphasizes the diversity of ways in which the formation of the pre-modern Indian state took place. It is interesting to note that the concept of the Asiatic m o d e of production has long been a source of impassioned controversy in countries such as India or Turkey, where attempts have been m a d e to apply it. R . Thapar underlines that it was the British colonizers and historians w h o spread the notion of oriental despotism. N o t without reason, she sees in this attitude the trace of certain prejudices, invalidated by empirical evidence. A n epistemological aspect might come into play here. Most intellectuals in the developing countries to which attempts have been apply the concept of A M P have rejected the concept because it implied that their societies were stagnant, or 'cold' to use Claude Lvi-Strauss's taxonomy, and were outside the current of the history, progress and general development of humanity, at the centre of which were the 'hot' societies. They perceive both A M P and oriental despotism as notions that devalue. A s Maurice Godelier says, for M a r x the A M P in most cases leads to immobilism because its types of state and types of oppression seriously hamper the emergence of private property. It differs from the ancient m o d e of production and also from the Germanic, one variant of which, under the influence of R o m e , resulted in Europe in the feudal m o d e of production, which in turn led to the capitalist m o d e of production and, o n the political level, to the absolutist and then to the modern state. S. N . Eisenstadt suggests using an analytic functionalist approach to study the state, and for reasons of comparison is interested in the factors which govern the processes of the institutionalization of societies. H e identifies t w o of these factors, namely cultural traditions and the political and ecological contexts of societies, and more particularly their places in the international system, notably from the angle of models of hegemony and dependence. Cultural traditions consists of cultural 'codes', symbols of collective identity and ways of legitimizing social and political order. Eisenstadt notes that the institutionalized forms of these cultural orientations live on in a durable way through the historical phases societies pass through. Returning to the hypotheses he advanced in The Political Systems of Empires (1963), he distinguishes several types of state (examining more particularly the imperial, imperial-feudal, patrimonial and city-state systems), in terms of the characteristics of the lite, cultural orientations and the processes of change. In the development of these types of state, which he illustrates by examining various societies where they have existed (India, Islam, China, Western Europe), he is concerned to show the various patterns of centre and periphery, of social stratification, of the litesautonomous to a greater or lesser extentand of the m o d e s of change and conflict, the last being closely connected with the process of the institutionalization of cultural orientations and with the political and ecological contexts. W e should note here two aspects of this very elaborate concept. First, it broadens the functionalist approach to the state by integrating conflicts and change into it and, above all, by trying to take into account the impact of the



international systemconsidered in terms of hegemony, the imperial centre and dependenceon institutional forms, the lites and the processes of change in societies, particularly in peripheral societies. Second, though Eisenstadt follows the traditions of functionalist sociology in attributing to lites a strategic role in the formation of the state, he goes further by stressing the functions of secondary lites alongside the principal lites, and this conception of the state is not simply that of a 'machine r o o m ' 1 0 with levers manipulated by the lites. Pierre Birnbaum and Aristide Zolberg are concerned with the emergence of the m o d e r n state in western Europe. T h e methodological approach of both authors consists in integrating history with political sociology. Another c o m m o n position is their emphasis on the specificity and originality, with regard to all types of state that have existed in the pastcity-state, tribal federation, empire, absolute monarchy, etc.'in the political formula', as Pierre Birnbaum writes, which, at the end of the Middle Ages, took hold in certain European societies whose centres came up against resistance from obdurate feudal strongholds on the periphery... Tied to a particular history, in a specific socio-cultural and religious context. ....the result of a tremendous differentiation of social structures . . . the state thus emerged as an institutionalized politico-administrative machine served by officials w h o identified themselves with their functions, and cut off from civil society over which it tried to exercise total guardianship, supervising that society through its administrative authorities and private law, dominating it through its police, stimulating it through intervention in the economy and, ultimately, mastering it by winning over the people and bringing them to accept its o w n values. This perfect model, this ideal type, corresponds to the most fully developed existing example, the French state, whereas in Prussia, as in Italy and Spain, the institutionalization of the state remained incomplete.11 O n the other hand, the state has failed to develop fully in s o m e societies, as in England which did not have to face such crises of feudality,12 or the United States which never had a feudal society. T h e model for such a society is found in the United K i n g d o m which, according to Birnbaum, has a centre rather than a state since the centralization of the political system has not been accompanied by an elaborate differentiation of the politico-administrative structures, and civil society has governed itself. Pierre Birnbaum accordingly draws a clear distinction between the state and either the 'political centre' or civil society, and also between the m o d e r n European state and other historical forms of state.13 H e approaches the state from the angle of its social, cultural and political environment, defines the outlines of the modern state and, above all, shows that, in its present form and functions, it does not constitute for ever a n d everywhere, the single m o d e for governing societies. T h e m o d e r n state is therefore not a universal institution and the form it has taken in Europe is conditional u p o n the specific culture and history of that region^



Furthermore, by making use of the sociology of knowledge and political sociology, Pierre Birnbaum here clearly demonstrates the correlations between the ideologies adopted by the labour movement in Western Europe (Marxism, anarchism, trade-unionism) and the types of state in which they develop. These considerations corroborate his comprehensive approach to the state, and broaden our knowledge of the connection between the state, classes, ideologies and economic and political processes. Birnbaum takes the state as an independent variable, whereas the economic element, whether industrialization or capitalism, is the intervening variable. This approach enables him to explain h o w countries with comparable economic structures and degrees of development m a y have radically different states and ideologies. Birnbaum emphasizes the political rather than the economic variable and maintains that the emergence of particular state forms in Europe and rather remote links with the development of the market economy. A s regards the situation in the Third World, he has elsewhere observed that there state-building occurs 'through imitation, a more or less compulsory import of exogenous patterns. . . '" Aristide Zolberg attaches m u c h importance to the politico-strategic dimension. H e puts the emphasis on what he calls the 'interface', a zone where the internal and external facets of a state meet. In Zolberg's opinion, w h e n analysing the formation of states, neither the politico-strategic factor nor the capitalist world economy should be considered as overdeterminative, but as two entities which meet at the interface and interact in an a priori indeterminate manner which must be examined separately in each case. Faithful to his aim of enabling 'political macro-sociology to push back as far as possible the point from which it starts to penetrate the area of history pure and simple', Zolberg examines in great detail the medieval origins of the state, the formation of the inter-state system in modern Europe and the role that interactions between France and England played in the formation of the modern state in both these countries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. H e shows that the wars and the international situation of that period had contrasting effects in the two countries. Whereas in France they contributed to the formation of an absolute monarchy, which accentuated internal tensions and stood in the w a y of economic development, in Great Britain the same variable, after helping to eliminate the possibility of an absolutist solution, strengthened parliamentarism. In thefirstcase, the state increased its hold o n civil society; in the second, civil society circumscribed state power. Guillermo O'Donnell and Issa Shivji deal with the state in dependent social formations. T h efirstadopts a comparative outlook, which he illustrates by contrasting the circumstances of state formation in Latin America with circumstances of the same kind in Asia and in Africa. O'DonnelFs study has the merit of taking into account a large number of factors, such as the characteristics of the colonial powers, the countries subject to colonization and the world system, which changed considerably in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thus the formation



of the modern state in Latin America took place, in opposition to pre-capitalist colonizing powers, in the context of capitalist competition, whereas in Asian and most African countries it was a question of a struggle against highly developed capitalist powers in the context of monopolistic capitalism and multinational firms. O n the other hand, these countries had the advantage of the presence of the socialist countries in the international system and, in m a n y cases, of their political, economic and military aid. T h e striking aspect of G . O'Donnell's study is that, contrary to the approach which consists of examining the state from the starting-point of society, he begins with the state and moves towards society. H e maintains that in the periphery, unlike centrally based states, it is the state apparatus that has given shape to society and has determined the social and political context by building the nation and controlling economic transactions. H e explains his ideas by bringing into play Doth societal and international variables. Issa Shivji's subject is Africa, and more particularly the United Republic of Tanzania. H e starts by observing that no one in Africa has been able to prove convincingly that Marxist theory was not suited to the African situation, and that it has been even less possible to put forward any other theory of state. H e therefore adopts the view which sees the state as an instrument of the dominant classes, but he refrains from considering it as a bureaucratic and military machine which can pass unchanged out of the hands of the bourgeoisie into the control of the proletariat. A s the state is a class category, it must be annihilated by a revolution, which will then replace it by another state structure. H e disagrees with those w h o deny the class character of the African state and defend the theory of the 'non-capitalist state', which would be a transition state, no. longer bourgeois but not yet socialist. Shivji reviews the various theories which attempt to account for the specific nature of the African state. In his opinion, all these approaches deviate from M a r x i s m and do not help towards an understanding of the state in that region. H e dwells more particularly on the old theory of the unity of international financial capital, upheld notably by Kautsky, which n o w has supporters in Africa. This unity, s it is suggested, would constitute the basis of a dominant world class. This international oligarchy would be the dominant class in African states on both the economic and political levels. Local political workers would only be 'service agents' and the neo-colonial state would have the same basic nature as the colonial state; in other words, it would continue to be the state of the central bourgeoisies. Issa Shivji's refusal to accept this view is significant, and reflects an attitude fairly widely held by Third World intellectuals. The right of oppressed nations to create politically independent states is n o w an accepted fact which cannot be challenged. Even if economic domination continues, power is n o longer directly in the hands of the bourgeois class in the mother country, but is held by local dominant classes within the neo-colonial state. These local classes, whose factions enter into alliances with various imperialist powers, are autonomous to a greater or lesser extent



depending on the case in question, and international and domestic contradictions result in the existence, within these dominated social formations, of a crisis of hegemony, with incessant political crises ensuing. Furthermore, imperialist domination goes hand in hand, within the state, with pre-capitalist social relations, and these factors all have a bearing on the character of the state. In the Third World, the state is n o w perceived as an instrument of political liberation, the prelude to economic freedom; it is also.the expression of the dignity of formerly colonial peoples. It enables them to play a part on the stage of history and to protect themselves collectively against imperialism and transnational firms. The central argument of Immanuel Wallerstein's article, which is also found in his books, The Modern World System (Vol. I, 1974; Vol. II, 1980) and The Capitalist World-Economy (1979), is that 'the states, the classes, the ethnic/ national/state groups, the households form an institutional vortex which is both the product and the moral life of capitalist world economy. Far from being primordial and pre-existing essences, they are dependent and coterminous existences'. O n e can see the difference between this approach and the political sociology of Birnbaum and Zolberg. This is, in fact, a complete reversal of perspective, notably in its assertion that the behaviour of states constitutes the intervening variable16 whereas, for Birnbaum, the state is the independent variable. T h e Iranian revolution is a good example which might almost be taken as a test case for all these different analysis of the state. Here w e have a society that has rejected a state model, diffused from the centre (Birnbaum) and dependent upon certain politico-strategic factors (Zolberg), in which factions of the dominant class wielded power and whose economy w a s dominated by imperialism (Shivji), so that the state in question m a y be claimed to have been a product of the capitalist world economy (Wallerstein). Endogenous processes can currently be seen at work in this society, based on Islamic cultural codes, symbols of collective identity and modes of legitimation (Eisenstadt), challenging typically Western ideas such as modernity, progress and secularism and aiming at the destruction of former state structures (Shivji) and at allowing forms of state based on Iranian culture and history to emerge. But what factors, it m a y be asked, will play the decisive role in the process started by the Iranian challenge to the state? Political and ideological processes, processes linking cultural trends, institutionalization and social change, factors at the interface of the domestic and external spheres of society, or again processes of the dominant 'historical system', that is, the capitalist world-economy? W h i c h of the two, the political or the economic, will constitute the independent variable, relegating the other to the position of the intervening variable? Wallerstein justifies his theoretical choices by a philosophical standpointmaterialismand by a heuristic consideration: W h i c h is the criterion best able to account for the largest possible proportion of social action? His reply is the integrated processes of production, and these he uses to define a 'historic system',



a term he prefers to 'society:' or to 'social formation'., The capitalist world econo m y constitutes such a system, emerging in Europe in the sixteenth century. For four centuries it spread until it has embraced the whole world, and engendered all m o d e r n institutions, including the state. For Wallerstein, states are institutions that satisfy the needs of the class forces that operate and that have c o m e into being at the level of the world economy. Objectively, they are classes of the world economy and, subjectively, classes of a state. Paradoxically, both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat express their class consciousness at a levelthat of the statewhich does not reflect their real economic objectives. This anomaly leads these classes to define themselves in terms of groups, the principal one of which is the nation, others being religion, race, language, culture, and so on. Such communities of interest m a s k the anomaly of classes organized o n a national or state basis. The fact that sections of the world bourgeoisie or the world proletariat define themselves in turn in terms of national, religious, ethnic or class groups is due to the difficulties of overcoming the crucial antithesis between the objective classes of the world economy and the subjective classes of the state. The concept of the capitalist world economy offers remarkable prospects for a comprehensive, integrated approach to the world system, and the role of the state therein. Silviu Brucan also is interested in the study of the world system. But his is a m o r e classical approach, m o r e in the tradition of the theory of international relations where the state is not a product of the world system but an actor that influences the world system and is in turn affected by it. Referring to the nation-state (he remains faithful to this idea, rather neglected nowadays, as he believes it to be conceptually more useful for international studies, whereas the notion of the society-state would be more useful for studying national political systems), he starts by reassessing the classical theories of the state, including Marx's. These classical theories were all formulated with regard to a model of a self-sufficient state, functioning in a closed circuit, the comprehensive social system being the national society. Today, however, states are largely determined by the international environment, and their behaviour is more influenced by external factors than by class conflicts and processes. This is all the more true as w e are living in a period of transition from an international to a world system. In this connection, Brucan, while approving Wallerstein and his capitalist world economy, does not dismiss an author such as George Modelski w h o places the political factor at the centre of the formation of the world system (like Aristide Zolberg, w h o mentions Modelski in his bibliography). The state must be studied in relation to h u m a n aggregatesclasses and ethnic groupsas well as to the dynamics set up by the behaviour of these aggregates. Brucan deals with two themes: classes, ideology and foreign policy on the one hand, and the level of autonomy the state possesses with regard to its economic



base on the other. H e puts forwardfiveideas: (a) class interests operate vertically within a nation but not horizontally between nations; (b) in international politics the nation has a role distinct from class; (c) strategically, foreign policy is based o n class, but governments have considerable autonomy in their first, immediate reactions; (d) the state is indeed the political instrument of the dominant class, but the ways of making it function can change; and (e) the nation-state operates at the point where the domestic sources of foreign policy encounter international factors. Brucan thinks of the world system as an integrated structure functioning o n principles of identifiable behaviour and including units (states) whose activities are increasingly organized according to the internal requirements of the world system. H e sees the scientific and technological revolution as the origin of this n e w integrated comprehensive system, rather than capitalism or the political factor. H e illustrates his point by examining the military, economic and political spheres and believes the globalizing impact of the scientific and technical revolution to be so great that, in his opinion, it will bring about the erosion of ideological standpoints. A s regards the capitalist world, he notes 'the end of the liberal era', 'the politicization of the economy', and, above all, the attempts by large capitalist countries 'to plan the overall development of the industrialized world'. Lassalle's 'night-watchman state', which limits its activities to ensuring the safety of the bourgeoisie and business world, is replaced by the interventionist state. H e emphasizes the complexity of the relations existing between the state a n d transnational firms, and the role of the 'trilateral.commission' in ironing out the contradictions amongst the imperialist powers and co-ordinating their strategies with respect to the Third World. In the Third World, which is suffering from the adverse effects of dominant capitalism and the international division of labour, the state is in a dependent position and its behaviour is conditioned by the social forces in power. It is at one a n d the same time, and contradictorily, an instrument of development and of imperialist penetration. Silviu Brucan examines at length the 'Second World', i.e. the socialist states. H e observes that, by force of circumstances, these states function within a world system with rules dictated by capitalism; the views he expresses here are very similar to those of Wallerstein.18 The character and role of the state in socialist societies have been conditioned by the need for rapid industrialization, and its principal function has been to accumulate capital. In thisfield,as in education and culture, the socialist state is to be credited with very great achievements. For M a r x , however, industrialization was the stuff of capitalism, a socialist society should be post-capitalist and post-industrial, and the revolution shouldfirstoccur in the highly developed capitalist countries. Lenin and his successors never had the opportunity to examine whether the type of state created to industrialize a developing country could also be the instrument of another, post-capitalist revolution of a totally different nature. In Brucan's opinion, it is n o w evident that this type of statefindsit difficult to respond to n e w social and economic tasks.



V T h e state is a genuinely unavoidable problem of our times. J . - W . Lapierre has s h o w n the drawbacks of living without a state." Societies that are part of the world system are not concerned with this question. In them the state in its various forms is an historical reality. It is, on the other hand, essential to understand and explain the state better, and if it is true, as M a r x claims, that humanity only ever sets itself those problems it is capable of solving,18 it should be possible to transform and domesticate it to serve m a n . The most difficult problem, and one which was at the heart of Nicos Poulantzas's concerns,19 is probably that of democratizing the state from below, by participation and self-management, while preserving representative democracy, the guarantor of liberties (although this can certainly take forms other than that of traditional parliamentary government). This is true for industrialized and Third World societies, although in the latter the question is complicated,firstby the problems of domination-dependence, which put these societies and their states out of joint, and second, in m a n y cases, by the need to seek different forms of state and democracy in harmony with their history and culture. In the meantime, the state model of the centre is spreading everywhere, and w e have n o assurance that the differences in the types of. state found in various countries are differences in anything essential. The state is progressing and extending its hold everywhere. In O E C D countries (1976figures),state expenditure accounts for between 30 and 50 per cent of the national income. In the United States, this expenditure came to 41 per cent of the national income in 1977, 35 per cent of which went on non-military expenditure. The 'welfare state', which Milton Friedman calls the 'paternal state',20 operates as a'super-capitalist', a.'super-policeman' and a 'super-insurance company', the last aspect having become one of the mainstays of the legitimacy of the modern state. But simultaneously with its disquieting gigantism, with its 19<W-style features (after all, only four years separate us from Orwell's ominous date), the state is showing signs of impotence, being, as Daniel Bell said, too large for small problems and too small for large onesalthough in this connection it is hard to k n o w where smallness stops and largeness begins. However, the modern state is genuinely in a state of 'crisis', largely as a result of its striving to be universal, to dictate to all spheres of society: political, economic, social, cultural, etc. Whatever its form, the centralizing state, founded on the principle of the monopoly of loyalty, finds it difficult to cope with regional or ethnic demands, or to allow minority groups to opt for exit or raise their voice in protest,21 to say nothing of its weakness with regard to multinationals and euro- and petro-dollars. In any event, the state does not appear to be o n the point of withering away and if its survival is ever threatened it will be due to its gigantism and excessive complexity, transforming it into an 'entropy state'.22 . [Translated from French]




1 5

6 7

Fernand Braudel, Civilisation materielle, conomie et capitalisme, XV'-XVIII' sicle. Vol. 3: Le temps du monde, Paris, A r m a n d Colin, 1979, p. 39. R6gis Debray, Le pouvoir intellectuel en France, 10 p . 7 , Paris, Ramsay, 1979. Franois Chtelct, 'L'origine et la fonction de l'tat', Le monde diplomatique, p . 12, Feb- 11 ruary 1978. The title of a book by Charles Debbasch, Paris, 12 Fayard, 1977. O n states founded on law, and despotic states, see Blandine Barret-Kriegel, L'tat et les esclaves, Paris, Calmann-Lvy, 1979. O n thefictionof Asiatic despotism, the monster that only the East is claimed to have begotten, according to the imagination of the classical West, see Alain Grosrichard, Structure du srail, Paris, Seuil, 1978. 13 10 October 1979. See Harry Eckstein, ' O n the "Science" of the State', Daedalus, Vol. 108, N o . 4 , A u t u m n 1979, p. 1-20, and the article 'State' in the Inter- 14 national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,15 1968, Vol. 15, p . 143-57. See Elizabeth C r u m p Hanson, 'International political economy as a newfieldof instruction 18 in the United States', International Social Science Journal, Vol. X X X , N o . 3, 1978, p. 666-77. J. P . Nettl, ' T h e State as a Conceptual Variable*, World Politics, Vol. X X , 1968, p . 559-92, 17 probably thinking of the English-speaking countries, noted that, at the time he was 18 writing his article, the concept of the state was not very fashionable in the social sciences; and Professor Macpherson, ' D o W e Need a Theory of the State?', European Journal of 19 Sociology, Vol. XVIII, 1977, p . 223-44, was 20 of the opinion that only Marxism and social 2 1 democracy needed one, reflecting a restrictive opinion fairly widely held in the English22 speaking social science establishment. Both these quotations are taken from Philip Resnick's paper 'In Search of a Theory of the Modern State' presented at the Eleventh

World Congress of the International Political Science Association, M o s c o w , U S S R , 1 2 18 August 1978 (typescript, 22 p.) which provides an excellent survey of the American and European literature on the state. Bertrand de Jouvenel, Du pouvoir, p . 19, Geneva, Constant Bourquin, 1945. Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, Sociologie de l'tat, p . 191-216, Paris, Grasset, 1979. The part played by the specific characteristics o f the European feudal system in the subsequent processes of institutionalization of European political systems is also stressed in two basic books: Barrington M o o r e , Jr, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Boston, Beacon Press, 1958; and Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, London, N e w Left Books, 1974. See Georges Lavau, ' A propos de trois livres sur l'Etat', Revue franaise de science politique, Vol. 30, N o . 2 , April 1980, p . 396-412. B . Badie and P . Birnbaum, o p . cit., p . 178. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist WorldEconomy, p . 293, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century, p . 351, N e w York, Academic Press, 1974. Jean-William Lapicrre, Vivre sans tat? Essai sur le pouvoir politique et l'innovation sociale, 375 p . , Paris, Seuil, 1977. Karl M a r x , Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, London, L a w rence & Wishart, 1971. ' L a gauche et l'tat', Le Monde, 11 March 1977. Newsweek, 22 January 1979. See Albert O . Hirschman, 'Exit, Voice, and the State', World Politics, V o l . X X X I , N o . 1, October 1978, p . 90-107, Hazel Henderson, 'The Entropy State', in G . Boyle, D . Elliott and R . R o y (cds.), The Politics of Technology, London, L o n g m a n and Open University Press, 1977.

Research note on the state and society

Nicos Poulantzasf
T h e object of this paper is to point out the essential problems and outline the themes which, in m y opinion, should guide research on the state and society in the world today. It seems evident that the two objects of study, 'state' and 'society', can o n n o account be equated or dealt with at the same level without running the risk of considerably enlarging the scope of the research. It is, of course, impossible to speak of the contemporary state without referring to the society underlying it, nor can society be divorced from the state which governs it. The fact remains, however, that according to whether w e choose the state or society as the focal point of our research, our approach to the other term will necessarily be different. If w e consider the problem from the standpoint of society, the state will indeed c o m e into it, but not so m u c h for its o w n sake as in terms of its effects on, and its presence in society. I propose here to focus research on the state, for three main reasons: First, because of the m u c h broader role of the state and the development of state structures in the world today, a phenomenon that is not altogether n e w but which differs qualitatively from what it has been in the past. Second, the comparative lag in research on the state as opposed to studies on society that characterized the three main trends in social science thinking up until about 1965-70: T h e dominant Anglo-Saxon tradition in the social sciencesa melting-pot of trends from functionalism to systemisma marked feature of which has been a neglect of the peculiar role and specific character of the 'state' which has been absorbed into a very broad concept of the 'political system' and into one dividing up power into a multitude of 'power pluralisms' and micro-powers. In official Marxism, there has also been a marked neglect of the.inherent role and

Nicos Poulantzas (1936-79) was a Greek sociologist whose main professional activity was carried out in France. His principal books have been very influential, widely cited and translated into several languages, amongst those available in English being Political Power and Social Classes; Fascism and Dictatorship (in French, 1970), Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (in French, 1974), and State, Power and Socialism (in French, 1978).

Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XXXII, N o . 4, 1980

Research note on the state and society


specific nature of the state. For a long time the state was regarded as no m o r e than the so-called 'superstructura!' envelope surrounding the 'basis' to which it was entirely subordinated and was, therefore, n o more than a tool to be manipulated at will by the ruling class. Social sciences in Western Europe, particularly in France, the Federal Republic of G e r m a n y and Italy. Although in these countries the state has always been a primary object of research (one of the reasons for this n o doubt being the role of the European states in the democratic-bourgeois revolutions), they have nearly always been confined to a 'juridical' conception of the state, hence European juridico-political science, the predominant feature of which was the study of constitutional law and juridico-political philosophy. Third, the choice of the state as the central object of research is prompted b y the fact that it is becomingand this is no coincidenceone of the main themes in the present trend in ideologico-theoretical thinking in what is held to be important in the social sciences today. Taking the state as the main focus for research alters the lines along which the latter is to be conducted, and analyses of social phenomena and of society in the broad sense (economic, social and ideological structures, the class struggle, social movements, etc.), indispensable though they are, will be approached in terms of their relevance to change within the state and in state structures. Obvious, typical examples are multinational corporations or the current world economic crisis, but seen in terms of their impact on, and relation to the nation-state, and to state policies with regard both to that crisis and to the crisis of the state. In short, it is a matter of deciding u p o n an approach and adhering to it for both practical purposes (research constraints) and scientific reasons, for if all things are inexorably bound u p (state-society), the only w a y of arriving at a scientific result is to circumscribe the subject under study, albeit allowing oneself the greatest possible leeway. Research should concentrate o nfiveor six broad fields, each comprising several main themes. I shall restrict myself initially to outlining them before embarking on questions of method (interdisciplinarity, schools of thought, order in which they m a y be dealt with, etc.), it being understood that at thefirststage of research thesefieldsand themes should be seen in their overall perspective a n d only subsequently dealt with in detail through case-studies. Thefirstof these broad subject headings concerns general problems pertaining to the theory of the state, its purpose being to clear the theoretical terrain. There is in fact a series of common theoretical issues with which all disciplines and schools of thought are faced in analysing the state, even if they differ as to the solutions they propose. These questions of theory arise in the current crisis in, and explosion of traditional thinking o n the state in the social sciences: (a) the crisis in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of social science which can be seen quite clearly in the United


Nicos Poulantzas

States with the trend a m o n g the members of the academic establishment away from this traditional w a y of thought; (b) the crisis in Marxism, most obvious in the revival of Marxist thinking on the state; (c) the crisis in the juridico-constitutionalist conception of the state in Western Europe and the revival of sociologico-political analyses of the state; (d) the emergence of n e w schools of thought in the analysis of power: the Foucault school, the anti-psychiatry school, the psycho-analytical school going beyond classic Freudo-Marxism, the anti-institutional school, n e w research into the 'totalitarian phenomenon', etc. W h a t are these n e w themes and the questions they raise? The state, the political, powers. Is power reduced to the state? Is power reduced to the political? Is the political reduced to the state? Is the state composed of government machinery under formal state control, or does it go beyond that and include institutions which in terms of their form are 'private' (such as the family)? These issues are fundamental in present-day societies and are relevant in defining and designating the subject and scope of the state. The connection between the economico-social sphere and the political-state sphere: questions as to the specific nature of state structures. Is there an order of determination between the state and the m o d e of production, and if so, what is it? According to what theoretical frame can current state intervention into the economy be comprehended? The state and forms of organization of hegemony. Is there a correlation, and if so what is it, between the state and class domination? Is the state merely a tool-object of the ruling classes, is it an independent entity overlying class, or is it more a field of manoeuvre within which power relations between classes are condensed? W h a t are the relations between the 'ruling classes' type of organization and the institutional framework of the state? Is the position of the state vis--vis the general public that of an isolated, impregnable fortress, or d o the struggles of the people permeate the state? The state and politico-social consensus. Does the state dominate through sheer repression? If not, is it enough to simply combine repression with ideological apparatus, thereby enabling the state to 'deceive' the people? Should one also speak of a power technology (Foucault) which would consist of physical procedures going far beyond the repression + ideology combination? Does state domination correspond to the people's wish to be dominated, to a 'master wish' (psycho-analytical concept)? H o w exactly does it c o m e about that the people sometimes say no to oppression? State machinery and class relations. If indeed there is a correlation between state and class relations, can that correlation alone, even if approached in a complex and subtle w a y , be accepted as an exhaustive explanation for state machinery? Does state machinery have a specific physical make-up (disciplinary and authoritarian structures, bureaucratization, etc.) which cannot be broken d o w n into class relations of one kind or another?

Research note on the state and society


These questions are important for they are encountered constantly in any concrete analysis, and in some respects are the key to all further research. It remains to be seen whether these theoretical problems should be dealt with separately and as a preliminary or in the course of investigation into the other fields. The secondfieldconsists of a breakdown of some of. the areas of research into broad theoretical headings. There are three that I can see: (a) the state of developed capitalism; (b) the state in independent capitalist countries; and (c) the state in socialist countries. I should like to m a k e a preliminary c o m m e n t based o n a theoretical premise of m y o w n ; it is increasingly clear, for all or nearly all current research, that what were thought to be decisive differences between capitalist and socialist states are narrowing, in the sense that there are certain structural similarities, or at least related elements in the problems they are confronted with and also in their w a y of dealing with themin the field of welfare, technological problems, aspects of bureaucratization, etc. The reasons for this are widely discussed today. Whatever the case m a y be, without falling in with the theories of R . A r o n or even A . Touraine as to the affinitive nature of post-industrial societies, it does appear that the supposed radical difference between these two types of state (capitalist societies and those practising true socialism) does not stand up to a close examination, which leads us to the conclusion that investigation into areas of c o m m o n ground in these states is not to be discarded, indeed quite the reverse. F r o m a scientific point of view, however, the distinction must be m a d e between these different types of state if w e are to avoid confusion. Even if their basic structures are in some respects related, they nevertheless have their o w n specific features. Phenomena such as bureaucratization, technological constraints, the movement of lites, etc., appear in a different light in the two types of state, both as regards their present-day form and as they emerged and have been reproduced historically. There is a particular problem with regard to the distinction to be m a d e within the capitalist states, between the central and the peripheral, dependent states. Indeed, the degree to which capital and labour processes are n o w internationalized, widening the gulf between the imperialist centre and the so-called Third World, makes any overall theory o n the capitalist state of today an inadequate basis for the study of these states. A theory o n the n e w type of state that has developed in the countries of dependent capitalism is called for, all the more urgently in that, whereas a great deal of research has been done into the economies of dependent countries (trade inequalities, technological dependency, neocolonialism, etc.), n o 'general theory' o n the political system peculiar to these countries has so far been evolved. The only general studies w e have are those establishing the relationship between political institutions and the dependent countries' efforts towards 'modernization', and adhere to the ideology of


Nicos Poulantzas

'under-development', viewing the situation in the Third World countries not as one of structural exploitation and oppression by the dominant countries, but merely as a matter of 'making up the leeway' between these and the 'developed' countries. But all the current theories on dependency are radically opposed to this approach, of which a typical protagonist in the economicfieldis W . Rostow. A particular effort should therefore be m a d e in research to work out general analytical principles in dealing with the type of state prevalent in the dependent countries, reaching beyond concrete case-studies on one or other of them. Which leads m e to a further problem which arises again in the fourth field below. W h a t form d o the structural links between today's three main types of state (central capitalist, dependent capitalist and socialist states) take? This question goes far beyond the simple issue of international relations between these states. It is clear, for example, that if the actual institutions prevalent in each of these types of state are what they are today, it is partly (and the question is just h o w m u c h ) because of the very existence of the other types of state. It is probably a complex structural link going beyond the mere 'external' influence of each state on the others. T o continue on the subject of concretizing and narrowing d o w n research, which should however otherwise be kept at a fairly general level, another distinction should be m a d e . It concerns present-day 'capitalist' countries and is the distinction to be m a d e between exceptional state forms (Fascist states and military dictatorships) and those which are more or less typically representative of hegemony, roughly corresponding, in so far as the countries of the centre are concerned, to the 'parliamentary democracy' model. This distinction is, of course, clearer in the countries belonging to the centre than those of the periphery, where there is a tendency for exceptional forms of government to become the rule, and this brings us back to the previous point, i.e. an analysis of the actual form of state in dependent countries. But there, too, there is a clear distinction to be m a d e , for there is a marked difference between Mexico and Chile or between India and Argentina. Whatever the case m a y be, I wish to emphasize this point in order to stress the need to pin-point onefieldof research in particular, and that is Fascist states or military dictatorships. In thefirstplace because it is a phenomenon that is as topical n o w as it has been in the past. Secondly, and above all because the principles guiding research into these types of state cannot be the same as those applied to the 'other' state forms. They are phenomena with a character entirely of their o w n , with their o w n structures. The problem cannot be eluded by vague considerations as to the spread of 'totalitarianism' throughout the world. The phenomenon of totalitarianism is none the less real and must be dealt with in its proper context. But this does not m e a n one should entertain the illusion that Fascist states and

Research note on the state and society


military dictatorships are inherently and entirely different from others states, for they are structurally alike in m a n y respects, and this explains w h y they m a y be analysed as part of one and the same research project. A s m y study of the contemporary state proceeds, I shall set aside a chapter on the international aspect, along the lines set forth in the secondfieldabove. Although this issue crops u p again in the subsequent fields, it deserves special attention, notably on the following topics: The first concerns the state, nation, nation-state and the present phase of imperialism. Does the current internationalization of capital and labour processes call in question the existence of the nation-state? Does the present phase in imperialism bring about such profound changes in the nation as to challenge the constitutive link between state and nation? Are w e moving towards the decline of the nation-state, to be superseded by institutional inter-state, para-state or supra-state forms of government? If so, to what extent does the nation-state still carry any weight, and what is its role? If not, assuming that the nation-state is still the core, and the kingpin of domination, as I personally hold it to be, what changes is it nevertheless undergoing as a result of the current phase of imperialism? For the fact that the nation-state still actively persists (and does not merely survive) and is reproduced does not m e a n that it is i m m u n e to change brought about by internationalization. The second topic concerns the nation. A problem that is unavoidable and must be tackled, the blind spot in the social sciences today, the importance of which is becoming increasingly clear. W h a t are the effects of internationalization on the nation? Is the nation really on the path to decadence or is it m o r e a case of a rupture of the 'national unity' imposed by various states and a resurgence of a variety of national entities hitherto kept d o w n by the dominant nation-states? W h e n c e the question of the revival of national minority struggles the world over and their effects on the state. Third, the state and multinational corporations, a problem which m a y be dealt with here (for it comes up again) from a particular standpoint: is it a question here of the declining power of the nation-state giving w a y not to supra-state forms of government, but directly to fractions of capital in the shape of multinational companies? If not, what bearing do multinational corporations actually have on the present changes in nation-states? W h a t connection is there between multinational capital and domestic capital in each country? Thefifthfieldconcerns the present institutional changes in the state. I would suggest the following as the main line of research: Are the capitalist countries today undergoing such profound changes as to m a k e it possible to speak of a n e w state form different qualitatively from any they have had in the past? I personally think this is so, and would describe this form of


Nicos Poulaiitzas

government as 'authoritarian statism'. The following points m a y be m a d e in this connection, and are central to current research in this field. T o what extent do the growing economic functions of the state, which are plainly to be seen in the vastly increased state intervention in all spheres of social life, bring about significant changes in the state? Is the economic planning machinery of the state, leading to pronounced state control over social life, an inevitable consequence of the development of capitalism? Does this machinery succeed in overcoming economico-social contradictions or are w e witnessing the downfall of the welfare state founded o n Keynesian illusions on organized planned capitalism which is supposed to have succeeded in mastering these contradictions? A marked shift in the organizing role of the state away from political parties towards state bureaucracy and administration, and the overall decline of the representative role of political parties. This is a subject which today goes m u c h further than the relatively old phenomenon of dwindling parliamentary prerogatives and a more powerful executive. W h a t are the consequences for political institutions as a whole, of this n e w phenomenon of centralism and bureaucratization? A n d consequently h o w do the political parties n o w fit in structurally with the political system? T h e n e w hegemonic organization of the bloc in power and its effects on the diverse machinery of state. Significance of the massive shift in hegemony towards powerful monopolistic capital and the restructuring of the repressive m a chinery of state: example of the army within the framework of the military-industrial complex. The crisis of the ideological hegemony of the ruling classes and consequent shift in the role of consensus-building away from ideological apparatus such as schools or univertities towards the media. T h e n e w forms of social control: replacement of the clear-cut social pattern previously based mainly on places of confinement (prisons, homes, etc.) by a whole n e wflexiblefar-reaching set of expedients cutting across the whole social system (a more dispersed police force, psychologico-psychiatric sectorization, networks for social work and unemployment benefits, etc.). O n e important result of this is a decisive process of 'de-institutionalization' of the ideologico-repressive machinery, and a process of 'de-confinement' in so far as the special machinery (homes, prisons, various places of collective confinement) intended to 'isolate' those w h o are thought to be 'abnormal, deviant or dangerous' is opening up and extending its influence to the whole of the social body, thus implying that the whole of society is potentially 'abnormal' and 'dangerous', guilt n o w being shifted away from the actual deed committed towards the intention inherent in people's mental make-up, and repression n o w encompassing both punishment and prevention. T h e

Research note on the state and society


disruption of the existing legal system and juridical ideology, as represented by the 'state of law' in order to m a k e allowance for these institutional changes. The n e w forms of social control and aids to sustain a n e w technology of power: computerization, electronics and political freedoms. The mechanization and breaking d o w n of the state machinery (army, police, administration, justice, ideological devices) into formal, overt networks, on the one hand, and tightly sealed nuclei controlled closely by the highest executive authorities, on the other, and the constant transfer of real power from the former to the latter, entailing the spread of the principle of secrecy. The deployment of a whole system of unofficial state networks operating concurrently with the official ones (para-state machinery) with n o possible check by the representatives of the people. The n e w forms of protest and social struggles (urban, ecological, feminist, student movements, struggles to improve the quality of life) and the n e w policies to control them. N e w methods of organizing social 'consensus' against these 'dissident' movements. Neo-liberalism and n e w state 'reform' practices, co-existing alongside authoritarian statism and akin to it in content. Special attention should be given here to issues pertaining to the present economic crisis, the political crisis and the state crisis. This means setting out from the theoretical premise that the present world economic crisis is not simply dudto the overall economic situation at the present time but is an actual structural and macrohistorical issue. W h e n c e the following questions: The modern state faced with the economic crisis. Crisis of state policies in the face of crisis; it n o w appears that the classic palliatives used by the state to deal with the crisis are themselves directly conducive to economic crisis. Hence what is k n o w n as 'crisis of the crisis-management'. Effects of this situation on the machinery of government, social control, organization of the consensus. Is this economic crisis as well as the crisis in the w a y in which the state handles this crisis leading to a crisis of the state at the present time? For it is n o w k n o w n that economic crises o n their o w n , of whatever kind they m a y be, do not necessarily bring about a crisis of the state. If so, does this crisis occur in all capitalist states and with equal sharpness? W h a t role does it play in the reorganization of state machinery? W h a t is the exact nature of the crisis? Is it a crisis leading to the disruption and weakening of the state, or one giving rise to a further crisis foreshadowing the strengthening and m o d ernization of the state? D o the weakening and replacement of the present state constitute two alternatives, or are they rather a dual, contradictory tendency characteristic of the state today?


Nicos Poulantzas

Finally, I feel that a special sixthfieldshould be set aside for questions pertaining to the state and democracy today: (a) towards a decline in representative democracy and civil liberties; (b) the n e w claims for self-management or direct democracy in the world today, and h o w they relate to representative democracy. [Translated from French]

Origins and formation

Processes of the formation, diversity and bases of the state

Maurice Godelier Process of the formation of the state

Traditionally, a distinction is drawn between two processes which govern the formation of the state, one exogenous to society, the other endogenous. T h e term 'exogenous' is used when one society conquers another and the conquered people are subjected to permanent domination by their conquerors; the term 'endogenous' when one part of a society gradually establishes its predominance over the other members. This article will be devoted mainly to an abstract analysis of the conditions which render possible the development, within a society, of one dominating and several dominated groups. I have adopted, for this purpose, a method which might be regarded as formal and applicable to any kind of division of society into two groups, one dominating and the other dominated. W h a t I have in fact done is to pose in abstract terms the general question of what constitutes the power to dominate. A n y power to dominate, I consider, always has two components which are indissolubly linked and which give both strength and efficacy: violence and consent. It is m y view that, of these two components of power, the stronger is not the violence of the faction which establishes its domination, but the consent of those w h o are dominated. If this is the case, it will be appropriate, in order to understand the processes of the formation of relations of domination and state power in archaic societies, to operate on the theory that, in order for one part of society to establish and perpetuate its domination over another, i.e. to maintain its position at the centre and summit of society, repression is less important than agreement, physical violence and psychological pressure than ideological conviction, leading to the

Maurice Godelier, an economic anthropologist, is Director of Studies at the Ecole de Hautes tudes en Sciences Sociales and a member of the Laboratoire d'Anthropologie Sociale of the Collge de France, 11 place Marcelin-Berthelot, 75231 Paris Cedex 05. He has written numerous books and articles, including Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology (1977) and an article in this Journal (Vol. XXVI, No. 4,1974) on 'Anthropology and Sociology: Towards a New Form of Co-operation'.

Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XXXII, N o . 4, 19S0


Maurice Codelier

consent and acceptance, if not actually the 'co-operation' of the dominated section of the society. In this abstract form, this hypothesis applies not only to the formation of relations of domination of the order, caste and class type, but equally to relations between the sexes and the domination of w o m e n by m e n . A theoretical point of fundamental importance is therefore to decide h o w certain concepts of the social and cosmic order can be shared by groups having, to some extent, opposing interests. It is this question of the sharing of concepts that constitutes the theoretical problem to be solved. Let m e m a k e myself quite clear, so as to leave no r o o m for idle or insincere objections. Domination is never established without violence, though the latter m a y sometimes be only latent. There is all the difference in the world between passive acceptance and active consent. Moreover, active consent is never 'spontaneous', but the result of cultural background and individual education. Moreover consent, even passive, will never c o m e about o n the part of all the members or all the groups in a society, and never without reservations and contradictions. A s I see it, the violence/consent relationship is not static. In certain circumstancesbut the problem is which onesconsent changes into passive resistance; in others, passive resistance turns into active resistance and sometimes into rebellion against the social order. Then again, rebellion m a y sometimes be transformed into revolution, seeking to change the structure of society. O r again, but more rarely, a revolution m a y succeed. Yet these changes in the relations between violence and consent are the outcome not of chance circumstances, but of a particular accumulation of all the opposing forces that divide society and set one part of it against the others. Divisions and antagonisms affect the whole character of a society, and not merely its symbols and people's images of their fellow m e n . They permeate the whole of the everyday life of society, which is at once their strength and their weakness. In view of this, I shall not approach the subject from the standpoint of formal philosophical theory, so as to avoid sterile juggling with opposites, violence and consent. That is not the crux of the matter: it is that, essentially, violence and consent are not mutually exclusive. In order to endure, any power of dominationand this is true in particular of power born of the brute force of conquest and warmust include and reconcile these two prerequisites. T h e proportions will vary according to circumstances and to the strength of the resistance, but, even w h e n domination is the least contested, there is always the potential threat of recourse to violence the m o m e n t consent is weakened or gives risefirstto refusal, and then to resistance. The purpose of the foregoing is to forestall misunderstanding, whether theoretical or political. I a m attempting a theoretical understanding of the fact that dominated groups can spontaneously 'consent' to being dominated. M y hypothesis is that, for this to be possible, the dominators must appear to be rendering some sort of service. It is only in these conditions that the power of the dominating group can be regarded as 'legitimate', so that it becomes the 'duty'

Processes of the formation, diversity and bases of the state


of the people dominated to serve those w h o are serving them. It is thus essential that dominators and dominated should share the same concepts, for there to be consent based on recognition of the 'need' for society to be divided into several groups, and for one of them to dominate the others. In m y view, the problem of the formation of the state refers back to that of the formation of an aristocracy in archaic societies; and also to the concentration of social power in the hands of certain individuals w h o come to personify the general interest. Let m e give an example. The So are an agricultural people living in Uganda, on the slopes of M o u n t K a d a m and M o u n t Moroto. They live on sorghum, stock-raising and a little hunting, but their situation is precarious. Their agriculture is threatened periodically by drought or disease attacking their crops. Their cattle are constantly being stolen by the various groups of Karimojoing shepherds living on the plains. The forest is shrinking as a result of burn-baiting, and nearly all the g a m e has disappeared. These people number about 5,000, divided into widely dispersed patrilineal clans.. A study was m a d e of them by Charles and Elizabeth Laughlin {Africa, 1972, p . 51). In this society the m e n dominate the w o m e n , and the older members dominate the younger. But there is, among the elders, each of which represents his lineage or clan, a small minority of m e n w h o dominate the rest of the society: those w h o are initiated in kenisan, w h o have the power to communicate with the ancestors (emet) and to obtain from their benevolence everything that makes life happygood harvests, peace, health, and so on. The ancestors themselves communicate with a remote god (beigen). W h e n a m a n dies his soul (buku) becomes one of the ancestors and the elders of all the groups recall the names of their ancestors, but only the kenisan initiates can call them by their names and speak to them face to face. A n y non-initiate w h o dared to do this would be struck at once by madness, begin to devour his o w n excrement, and 'climb the trees like a baboon'behave like an animal, in factand die. This threat hanging over the population puts a hedge of 'potential violence' around the persons and the acts of the kenisan initiates, w h o carry out their rites in a sacred place concealed from the public and close to the 'house of belger, the god. W h a t then are the functions of these elder-initiates, of w h o m there are approximately fifty out of a total of 5,000 people? O n e of their main tasks is to bury important dead, both m e n and w o m e n , and to ensure the transition of the soul of the deceased to the condition of emet, ancestor. They also take action whenever society is threatened, by serious drought, epidemics, enemies from without or internal conflicts. In the last case, they set up a kind of court of justice, which names the culprits after consulting the ancestors. Their skill in witchcraft is such that they are even feared by their enemies, the Karimojong, w h o raid their territory. W h e n their harvest is laid waste by drought, insects, w o r m s or mildew, they carry out ceremonies to 'bring rain' or 'bless the sorghum'. A goat is sacrificed


Maurice Godelier

to the ancestors, part of the meat is placed on the altar and the rest consumed by the kenisan. The sacred site and the rites for bringing rain belong to a few clans only, of which only one has the power of making rain fall for the whole of the tribe, for which only the kenisan perform the rites. W e see thus that this group of a few m e n derive their power from the fact that they have special access to the ancestors and the god, w h o have the capacity to reproduce every form of life, to bring prosperity, justice and peace, and to triumph over enemies and adversity. They thus hold, as it were, a monopoly for influencing the conditions (to us imaginary) governing the reproduction of society. B y exercising their powers and making sacrifices to the ancestors, they serve the c o m m o n interest and are identified, in the eyes of the living and the dead, with the interests of all the members of the societymen, w o m e n , elders, rich and poor. They personify and embody their society. Naturally, 'in exchange' for their services, they enjoy the greatest prestige, authority and also some material advantages. This is an example of domination by a group of elders organized on the basis of a secret society of initiates. It does not constitute an aristocracy in the true sense of the word, but only the extension of the domination of the elders over the younger members of the group, of the m e n over the w o m e n . Let us n o w take a second example, that of the Pawnee Indians of North America w h o lived, before the arrival of the Europeans, in large sedentary villages along the valley of the Mississippi, cultivating maize and engaging in seasonal hunting of the bison. This society had an aristocracy composed of hereditary chieftains and hereditary priests. The chieftain inherited from his maternal ancestors a magic package, to be found today in m a n y m u s e u m s in America, consisting of an antelope skin containing a few teeth and other sacred objects. The Pawnee Indians believed that this package had the power of ensuring the fertility of the land and the annual return of the bisons in the summer. Thus the chieftain's family owned the means for ensuring the intervention of supernatural powers for the general welfare of the community and for their prosperity, both material (good crops, successful hunting) and social. The tradition was that if, as a result of war, the magic package was stolen or destroyed, the whole tribe would disintegrate, split up and cease to exist as a society, in which case each family would have to go off and merge with other tribes. W e have here an example of religious concepts serving to justify the dependence of the c o m m o n people o n a hereditary aristocracy of chieftains and priests. Religion provides the ideal milieu for a domination relationship and, it might be said, a source of violence without violence. Here again, this power of domination appears to stem from the monopolization by a group of society of conditions which w e in our civilization today regard as imaginary, conditions governing the reproduction of life. The point at issue is whether the religious beliefs are only a representational system putting the stamp of legitimacy o n an existing relationship of domination which would

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have been established without those beliefs, or whether, o n the contrary, they constitute one of the conditions responsible for development of this domination relationship and are an integral component of it. Let us n o w take afinalexample, that of the Incas whose civilization unlike the other two described above, was a state society, the state being personified by the Inca, the son of the Sun, a living god. In the garden of the Temple of the Sun, at Cuzco, was an offering to the'gods consisting of numerous models, in gold, of all the plants and animals of the Tawantinsuyu, the Empire of the Four Quarters, includingfirstand foremost ears of Indian corn and statuettes of lamas and shepherds. Every year, the Inca and members of his family, in another garden, themselves sowed, watered and harvested the Indian corn destined for the great festival of the Sun-god. The fact that, to us in the present day the services rendered by the Inca appear to be 'imaginary', whereas the forced labour done in the fields of the Inca or his father, the Sun, and on the construction of roads, temples, towns and granaries seems to us both very real and a form of extortion, oppression and exploitation is an indication of at least two points:first,that this 'imaginary' service, since it was not regarded by the Indians as different from or opposed to reality, was not illusory at all; and, secondly, that the monopoly exercised by the Inca and his family over the 'imaginary' conditions governing the reproduction of life was one of the main foundations from which his right to appropriate part of the land and of the labour of the village communities was derived. If this is true, religion is seen to be not only a reflection of social relations but also a factor which governs the development of these relations and becomes a part of the internal structure of the production and exploitation system. T h e difference between the Pawnee and the Inca aristocracy is that the former continues to be a group of m e n superior in kind because they are closer to the gods to w h o m they have special access, exercising a sort of monopoly, whereas the Inca, o n the contrary, is n o longer a m a n , but a god. Like the Pharaoh in Egypt, he is a god living a m o n g m e n . It will be noted that the material basis of the Pawnee aristocracy was a combination of agriculture and hunting, whereas the material basis of the Inca empire consisted of a combination of intensive agriculture and stock-breeding. Conditions for the production of surplus labour-time in the two cases were very different. In the former, there was an aristocracy, but there was no separate institution, distinct from family groups, to ensure the domination of one group over the others; in the latter, there was a specialized instrument and apparatusthe politico-religious bureaucracyfor the exercise of power, and the state existed as an institution, distinct from the kinship system though based on the structure of that system. Between these two examples there is a qualitative difference due to the emergence of a certain type of state resulting from the attribution of a divine character to the social authorities and a section of the society. I therefore put forward the following hypothesis: that in order to take shape


Maurice Godelier

and reproduce itself on a continuing basis, a relationship of domination and exploitation must take the form of an exchange, and an exchange of services; it is this that enlists the consent, either passive or active, of those on w h o m it is imposed. I m a k e the further hypothesis that one of the main factors responsible for the internal differentiation of social functions and social groups and thus for the formation, over varying periods of time, of new hierarchies based not on kinship but on n e w types of division (orders, castes, classes) is that the services provided by the dominant group should be related to reality and to invisible forces seeming to control the reproduction of the universe. This must have played an essential part since, in the balance between the services 'exchanged', those rendered by the dominant group appeared all the more fundamental for being 'imaginary', while those rendered by the dominated appeared all the more trivial for being more visible, more material, and concerned only with means available to all for influencing the reproduction of society. I believe, however, that for the development of the movement resulting in the formation of the new divisions, orders, castes and classes, it was essential that not all the services rendered by the dominant group should be 'illusory' or even 'invisible'. Returning to the example of the Pharaoh w h o , in Ancient Egypt, was regarded as a living god, son of the Nile, lord of the land and waters, sole source of all life force, both that of his subjects and that of all the creatures of nature, w e can see that this power and this image of a benevolent god, lord of life, was more than just a symbol. Did m e n not require royalty, and the reunification of the two kingdoms of Upper and Lower Egypt, to d a m the flow of the Nile which, every year brought the fertile river deposits, the rich 'black' earth h e m m e d round on every side by the sterile 'red' earth of the desert? A n d as for the Inca, was he not responsible for the construction of the vast embankments thanks to which m a n y mountain slopes, previously barren, could be sown with Indian corn? It is true, of course, that the Inca was, by this means, encouraging the development of a crop which was easy to stock and transport to the town, the palace, for the use of the Inca, the army, the priests and the administration. A n d Indian corn was also used traditionally for sacrifices to the gods and ritual ceremonies. But not all the maize planted went to the Inca and the dominating group, nor was it stored by the Inca for his o w n needs: he used to throw open the state granaries periodically to the poor, and, in the event of catastrophe, he m a d e the stocks available to all those in need of succour. Thus more than religion is needed for religion to dominate men's minds and the life of society. It is only under certain historical conditions that it can provide a basis for the formation of hierarchical relations and give a minority sovereign power over society. W h a t is required, therefore, in collaboration with archaeologists and prehistorians, is a study of the processes which have led, all over the world, to the emergence of new types of status and power hierarchies in social groups previously based on kinship links within the same global social

Processes of the formation, diversity and bases of the state


unit (which w e vaguely call a tribe). Archaeology shows that these processes began with the sedentarization of certain groups of hunter-gatherers having vast natural resources available in their vicinity. But these processes spread and, above all, diversified only with the development of agriculture and stock-breeding. I think that the development of new material relations between m a n and nature and a m o n g m e n created new possibilities for the emergence of differentiated and even opposing group interests. It also created the need for ritual and direct control over nature, which was steadily becoming less wild and more domesticated, without which m a n was unable to reproduce himself, and which in turn, was experiencing growing difficulty in reproducing itself without m a n (animal and plant species found in agriculture and stock-breeding). I think that these n e w material conditions and distinct new interests gave rise to divisions which seemed atfirstto be advantageous for everyone, as differences serving the interests of all and, to that extent, legitimate. It is therefore with the paradoxical statement that the process of the formation of castes and dominating classes and the emergence of the state were, in a way, legitimate, that I propose to conclude this brief view of the problem. Thus labour devoted towards community ends (travail-en-plus), which exists in every classless society, gradually became transformed into surplus labour {sur-travail), a form of exploitation of m a n by m a n . T h e term 'surplus labour' is used to denote all forms of material activity which are designed to reproduce a community as such, as opposed to the individuals and families that m a k e it u p . In m a n y so-called primitive societies, the work designed for the reproduction of the individual and his family is done separately. There are, on the other hand, forms of collective work, performed by all or a majority of the families in a society, and designed to produce the material means for the reproduction of the community as suchcelebration of rites, sacrifices, preparation for war, and so on. Thus the function and nature of the labour normally done by families for the reproduction of the community to which they belong change w h e n this work is designed to reproduce the conditions for the existence of those w h o alone henceforth represent the community and embody its c o m m o n interests. Surplus labour can gradually be transformed into surplus labour-time in the form of exploitation. T o complete this analysis, it might be useful to investigate h o w , in situations of domination born of violence and conquest, mechanisms conducive to pseudoconsent are set up, for purpose of stabilizing this power. The ceremonies for the enthronement of a n e w king by the Mossi of Yatenga provide a striking example. The Mossi are descended from horsemen from G h a n a , to the south, w h o , about the middle of thefifteenthcentury, conquered the Volta basin. They subjugated the native agricultural peoples, w h o are k n o w n today as the 'people of the land' or the 'sons of the land'. The latter have retained all their ritual power over the land and agricultural production. W h e n a Mossi king dies, a new king is chosen from a m o n g the sons of the deceased sovereign. Only Mossi descended from the


Maurice Godelier

former conquerors m a y designate the new king. H e then sets off alone and poorly clad o n the long enthronement journey which brings him back after some fifty days, to the gate of his capital, where he makes his triumphal entry on horseback as king. His journey takes him through the conquered villages, where the 'masters of the land' reside, and where he is invited to take part in rites addressed to the ancestors of the peoples subjugated, and to the powers of the land. A s M . Izard writes: The new chief of the foreigners appears alone, humbly, before the representatives of the oldest occupants of the country, to ask them to accept his authority and accord him the legitimacy that only the land can confer. H e offers or promises them presents. A play is enacted between the king and the 'sons of the land': he is humiliated, kept waiting and mocked, nothing is done to provide him with food or lodging.1 Thus, by including him in their rites, the priests and chiefs of the indigenous clans have the king recognized by their ancestors and by the earth as one of their o w n people, so giving his power a legitimacy that conquest prevented him from possessing fully. This recognition of the king is, of course, at the same time, a recognition by the king of the legitimacy of the power of the indigenous people; and this mutual recognition is scaled by the exchange of royal protection for their labour and a share of the produce of the land. In this w a y the kingship, established by the force of arms, is transformed into a sacred institution. The king alone unites in his person the community of the conquerors and the community of the conquered; he alone personifies the unity of the two communities, albeit opposed to one another. H e thus represents at a higher level the whole of society, and he alone constitutes the state. His person, w h e n he is king, becomes sacred, which accounts for the taboos applying both to him and to all those approaching him. Even power established by conquest must, in order to become stabilized, seek the means of enlisting a degree of consent. In attempting a comprehensive view of the development of social relations that has transformed the social divisions existing between kinship groups in primitive societies, three types of process might be identified. First of all, there is a minority group which gradually comes to represent the whole of the community, reaping the benefit of the surplus labour normally intended to ensure the reproduction of the community, and so having privileged access to the product of social labour. Secondly, this minority, representing the community vis--vis the outside world, becomes capable of controlling the exchange of goods and services between communities, thereby assuming control of valuable goods used for reciprocal gifts or the exchanges through which the relations between communities are reproduced. A n d lastly, this minority can gain mastery of the use of the c o m m o n resources of the land gradually controlling them completely, though community ownership of these resources is not actually abolished. There are thus instituted

Processes of th formation, diversity and bases of the state


processes which m a y , in the long run, result in the community's material conditions of production being expropriated by a minority representing it. This leads to a separation of the producers from their material means of existence, and dependence of a n e w type, material this time and not social or ideological, of the majority of the members of society on the minority dominating it. It is these transformations in various forms that have produced the hierarchies of orders, castes and classes which, in the course of history, have succeeded the earlier forms of social life represented by tribal or inter-tribal communities.

Orders and classes

Orders, castes and classes are forms of social hierarchy often associated with distinct forms of state. Orders, in the ancient world, are associated with the city-state. Castes, in India, combined to form the social and territorial units constituting the kingdoms of India, for the sub-continent was formerly divided into a hundred or so local kingdoms at the summit of whose hierarchy were the Brahmins and the king. A s to ciasses, this appears to be a modern form of social hierarchy and exploitation of m a n by m a n , a product of the disintegration of an order society, the feudal system, and of the development of the m o d e of production of capitalist society. The distinction between orders and classes, in Western thinking, crystallized in the eighteenth century. F r o m the works of the early economists it m a y be noted that both Quesnay and A d a m Smith use the concept of class to describe the social groups composing the economic system of modern society. Quesnay, w h o was physician to the King of France and thus uniquely versed in the vocabulary of ancient feudal society, with its divisions into 'estates'nobility, clergy, third estatechose to base his Tableau conomique de la France (1759) o n classes and the relations between the 'productive class' and the 'unproductive class'. H e shows h o w the annual product of a modern 'agricultural' nation circulates a m o n g three 'classes'the class of farmers and agricultural workers, which is the only productive one, the landowner class and the 'industrial or unproductive class'. A generation later A d a m Smith, in his Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), maintains, on the contrary, that of the three classes into which every 'civilized' society is divided, only the landowning class is indolent and unproductive, whereas those of the farmers and the capitalists serve the general interest of society. Subsequently, Ricardo (1813) and M a r x (1857) continued to analyse modern capitalist society in terms of classes. Thus it seems that the eighteenth century saw the development of new social relations different in type from the orders and social levels bequeathed by the Middle Ages. This concept of classes designates social groups occupying the same place in the production process, regardless of their membership of a social order. Thus


Maurice Gdelier

a bourgeois owning land and a landowning nobleman are both classified as landowners, occupying a similar place in the production process, although occupying different places in the order hierarchy. It would therefore appear that the concept of 'classes' was introduced after the development, in society, of production relations entirely divorced from the old social institutionsfamily, political and religious hierarchies. A t the same time, the concept of classes refers to a historical situation in which the old relations of dependence, personal, individual and collective/have disappeared or are disappearing, and there is increasing legal equality a m o n g the members of society. Outside the industrial production process, where the workers are subordinated to the owners of m o n e y and the means of production, individuals, in theory, enjoy the same rights. In theory, differences of sex, race, religion and opinion, n o longer directly affect the place individuals occupy in the production process and the work process. Comparing this situation with that existing in antiquity, w e note that the fact of being born a citizen of Athens conferred the right to the use of a part of the land of the city, which the citizen could either cultivate himself, or have cultivated by slaves. Citizenship, or membership of a local community in the form of a city, gave privileged access to the land, which was the basis of the economy in ancient times. O n the other hand, a free m a n coming from another neighbouring city had no right to o w n and cultivate a plot of land in Athens. The result of this w a s to confine 'foreigners' to other occupations, such as crafts or trade. Here, as w e see, production relations are not based on the division of labour but are, on the contrary, the basis of it: individuals occupying the same place in the division of labour do not occupy the same place in the production process. It is essential to draw a distinction between the labour process and the production process. If a free m a n exercised the same manual trade as a slave, he occupied the same place in the labour process, but a different place in the production process. For a slave had n o rights over his production which, like his person, belonged, to his master. Whereas, on the contrary, the status of a free m a n , because he was. free, gave him a different position in regard to his labour and the product of his labour. It is clear from this that membership of a city-state, i.e. citizenship, constituted, in the Greek city, the original form of production relations. In a sense 'politics' here constitutes a 'production relation', an infrastructure. A s opposed, to the situation in the capitalist production system, there is here n o division between economic activities and the institutions in which they take place (enterprises, etc.), o n the one hand, and non-economic social, political and religious, activities, on the other. Thus orders are not the same as classes, though they are, like classes, forms of domination and of exploitation of m a n by m a n . M a r x , in The German Ideology (1845-46), draws a very clear distinction between order and class. Making a brief outline of the evolution of feudal society, he describes h o w the bourgeoisie is slowly transformed from an order into a class. Originally a local group, inhabiting;

Processes of the formation, diversity and bases of the state


small towns and cities, with only local interests and influence, the bourgeoisie came gradually to form a social group with national interests and influence. With the development of market production, the n e w role of money, colonial expansion, international trade, etc., the bourgeoisie, originally a specific fraction of the feudal orderthe third estatechanged its character. It was in order to define this change that M a r x introduced the distinction between class 'in itself and class 'for itself. The bourgeoisie, although it had become a national force, none the less continued for a long time to behave like an order subordinated to the nobility, without either challenging the culture and values of the nobility or laying claim to even a share of the political power. According to M a r x the bourgeoisie still continued to behave like an order, although it was already a class 'in itself. It was only later, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that the bourgeoisie, from being a class 'in itself became a class 'for itself, and, conscious of its n e w and separate identity, claimed its share of the exercise of power. However, the works of M a r x do present one difficulty, since, in the Communist Manifesto (1848), he uses the word 'class' to designate the orders of the society of the ancient world or of feudal society. The celebrated phrase at the beginning of the Manifesto is: 'The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.' W h a t M a r x meant to say, in m y view, was that orders, like the classes of modern society, were forms of exploitation of m a n by m a n at a certain stage in the development of productive forces. H e used this term, which he k n e w to be relatively inappropriate and anachronistic, in order to suggest that the time had come for a different view to be taken of'orders', a view different from that of the actors taking part in that period of history. In other words, M a r x means that these 'orders' were social divisions, based on and implying the exploitation of m a n by m a n , and not, as they were officially represented as being, a perfectly harmonious relationship between groups performing complementary functions. It is therefore, a mistake, I consider, to attempt to see in the orders of antiquity classes visible only to modern historians of Marxist leanings. M a r x seeks not so m u c h to discern something else beneath the appearances as to put a different interpretation o n what appeared, to see it from the viewpoint of the modern era which, by separating economic activities from other social relations, m a d e it possible for thefirsttime to discern more clearly the part played by economics in the formation of social relations and the course of history. If asked to explain the development of the social orders in antiquity, I should say that these orders represent relations of domination and exploitation born of the partial disintegration of earlier community-production relations. These relations resulted from forms of labour and ownership that developed gradually, becoming distinct from the earlier community forms, which they contradicted without being able to abolish completely. Reverting to the example


Maurice Godeller

of the landed-property system in a city like Athens, w e see that the paradox, the contradiction of the form of private ownership practised there was that it could only exist and be maintained by being subordinated to the communal ownership of part of the city land by the city and the state. The paradox was that, in order to o w n and cultivate a plot of land marked off from the community land, the citizen was obliged, in a way, to produce and reproduce the community to which he belonged.

The ideas of mode of production and of Asiatic state in M a r x

This context of the development of new forms of labour and ownership, differing from and opposed to the early community forms, provides the basis for an analysis of what M a r x calls the 'Asiatic', the 'ancient' and the 'Germanic' modes of production. These, according to him, were the three oldest forms of property and production, which he sometimes calls the tribal m o d e of production. In this tribal m o d e of production, the land belongs to the community as such. But this c o m m u n a l land is divided into two parts; one of which the community owns directly, the other which it lets to individual families for their temporary use. This arrangement corresponds to an evolution of the forms of production, as a result of which certain groups (families, clans) are able gradually to satisfy their m a i n material needs separately, by their o w n efforts. Collective labour continues to exist, and is performed by various families and clans, but it is designed not so m u c h for their benefit as to produce the means for the reproduction of the c o m munity as a whole (religious sacrifices, warfare activities, and so on). Under these conditions, according to M a r x , several transformations m a y occur. O n e such transformation leads to the development of the Asiatic m o d e of production. T h e content of social relations changes without any radical modification of their forms. The land, owned directly by the community, m a y in certain conditions be expropriated by a higher community. The individual families composing the community as a whole continue, when this occurs, to work the land which n o w belongs to another community. N o w as before, these families and individuals hold and use the land, but do not o w n it. The surplus labour which they normally contributed to the reproduction of their community serves henceforth to reproduce a higher community which exploits them and might be personified by a king or a god. There is thus a change of content but not of form and, paradoxically, this line of evolution goes on reproducing archaic communal forms of property and production which henceforth constitute the basis of state power. According to M a r x , this m o d e of production and these types of state and oppression seriously hampered the emergence of private property and of development bases distinct

Processes of the formation, diversity and bases of the state


from and opposed to the archaic forms of property and production. It is for this reason that M a r x tended to regard the Asiatic line of evolution as a historical development which led, m o r e often than other lines of evolution, to stagnation and 'dead-end' societies. However, he subsequently went back on this view w h e n , writing to Vera Zazulich in 1881, he admitted that the continued existence of these local village communities was a dynamic force serving as a support for these forms of class and state structure. M a r x contrasts this line of evolution with what he termed the ancient m o d e of production and the Germanic m o d e . The ancient m o d e likewise originated in the tribal m o d e of production and community forms of property. But it w a s distinguished by the development, alongside community property, of a privateproperty system subordinated to it; also by the fact that, the community takes the form of a state, and that community property is state property. M a r x does not explain h o w , in the case of the Greeks, a tribal community became a state, and a state having its centre in a city. H e talked about several tribes assembling on a certain territory, but this does not explain the form their association assumed, which was that of a community of citizens. It should be remembered that, in antiquity, private property was regarded as being 'cut off' or 'separated from' the c o m m o n property (privatus in Latin means cut from the ager publicum). It was on the basis of this form of citizens' private property that the social differences between rich and poor, etc., developed, which gave rise to the major political and social conflicts in Greek cities such as Athens. W h e n the private ownership of land was combined with the private use of slaves in production, the impulse towards the unequal accumulation of wealth reached its zenith in the ancient world. But it must be remembered that in Sparta, in the same area, land continued to be the property of the state, even w h e n parts of it were distributed to citizens for their use, to be cultivated by families of helots w h o were also the property of the community, of the state. In Sparta slaves were not privately owned, and neither was the land. The third line of evolution M a r x mentioned was that which led to the formation of the late Germanic community. According to him, at the time of Tacitus, after the intense Romanization of certain Germanic tribes, there existed communities formed by the association of families or clans, each owning their o w n plots of farming land, but sharing c o m m o n land for cattle-grazing, forests for gathering berries, etc. M a r x stressed that this form of community differed from the others, in that in this case, in his view, the private ownership of farming land became the starting-point for community property, which served as an appendage to private property, its complement for the organization of stock breeding a n d other economic activities. The community, instead of being a 'substantial' unit like the ancient tribal community, the Asiatic community or, to a certain degree, the city in antiquity, was an association of owners linked by kinship, working in co-operation.


Maurice Godelier

Marx's theories as regards the idea of the Germanic community evolved in the course of his life. The works of Maurer, Haxthausen, G r i m m and others gradually m a d e him realize that this type of community, composed of private owners, was in fact the delayed result of the disintegration of a far older type of Germanic community in which there was n o private ownership of the land, but only a right to the use of plots of land redistributed periodically among families. T h e very fact of plots of land being allocated for varying periods of time indicates that the land continues to be the property of the community as such. W h a t M a r x learned from the works of Haxthausen and others was that there had existed an ancient Germanic property system very similar to the one still surviving in nineteenth-century Russia, where the mir sometimes still redistributed land a m o n g families. M a r x regarded the mir as the basis of Asiatic forms of state, which had also existed in Russia. In view of this, it is not surprising to find Engels, in 1881, w h e n writing about the M a r k and the early forms of Germanic communities, advancing the hypothesis that, in other circumstances, the Germanic communities might have constituted the basis, in Europe, for Asiatic-type states. But R o m a n ization changed the course of development and produced, between the time of Caesar and that of Tacitus, the new type of Germanic community which was to give rise to the development of the feudal m o d e of production. The feudal m o d e of production, however, according to M a r x and other nineteenth-century writers, had more than one base; it was the product of two opposing lines of evolution nevertheless moving in the same direction:first,the gradual disappearance of the slave system in production, to be replaced by forms of dependence which, though still personal, did not m a k e the individual the property of a master ( R o m a n colonate, etc.); and, second, the gradual enslavement of the 'free' German peasants. If asked to draw a conclusion from this brief summary of Marx's theorieswhich are exceedingly complex and enlightening despite the fact that they betray the limitations of the information available at his timeI would stress that there appear to exist as m a n y types of state as there are types of social hierarchy and modes of production supporting them. The Asiatic form of state is totally different from that of an ancient city-state which, in its turn, has little in c o m m o n with the feudal hierarchy composed of vassals and suzerain. M a n y problems have today to be posed in different terms. It is increasingly clear that the development of a complex caste system in India was the outcome of the evolution of ancient tribal and inter-tribal structures, a form of evolution no more primitive than that which led to the differentiation of orders in the ancient city. In both cases, orders and castes are combined within forms of states, of which they constitute the supports. But despite the work of Louis D u m o n t and m a n y others, the relation between the caste system and the state is still not very clear, and it will probably be necessary, here again, to m a k e a very through analysis of the significance of the king and kingship in India. Finally, and this is fundamentalthe emergence of one form of state

Processes of the formation, diversity and bases of the state


does not follow automatically from the existence of a hierarchy of orders and classes. T o illustrate this, let us take an example from anthropology. There existed in the nineteenth century in the Niger, a group of n o m a d Touareg societies dominating the African farmers. These societies were organized in a hierarchy of groups with, at its summit, a tribal aristocracy which wielded political power and dominated n o m a d tribes which supplied it with cattle, labour and armed forces. Lastly, subordinated to the stock-breeders, were African farmers w h o paid tribute. T h e domination of the aristocracy was exercised without the existence of a state structure. Thus w e have here a society composed of orders/classes without a state. W h e n the territory was colonized by the French, a mutation occurred amongst certain of the Touareg groups, including in particular the Kel Gress, studied by Pierre Bonte. W h a t happened was that one of the aristocratic families attempted to rise above the others, laying claim to part of the tribute which the others levied from their dependants for the defence of their c o m m o n interests against the European colonizers. This meant that the other aristocratic families would have had to renounce some of their power, privileges and material goods. The attempt failed, but the example is a very important one, since it signifies at least two things. T h efirstis that the formation of a coherent state system is not necessary in cases where the dominant group is a warrior aristocracy with a permanent supply of arms and means of destruction. T h e second, that the formation of a state m a y , for a certain period, constitute a regression, a diminution of the powers of the dominating class. Its power is concentrated, as it were, in a part of this class, and it m a y not have been easy to recognize in this case that this partial loss suffered by each section of the aristocracy in fact redounded to the benefit of the aristocracy as a whole. [Translated from French] Note

Michel Izard, 'Le royaume de Yatenga', in: R . Cresswell (ed.), lments d'ethnologie, Paris, A . Colin, Vol. 2, p. 234, 1975 (Collection 11). References

B A L A N D I E R , G . Anthropologie politique. Paris, Presses Vol. XVIII, N o . 3-4, July-December 1978, Universitaires de France, 1969. p. 155-88. CLAESSEN, H . ; S K A L N I K , P . The Early State. The G O D E L I E R , M . Introduction to Sur les socits prHague, Mouton, 1978. capitalistes. Paris, ditions Sociales, 1970, E N G E L S , F . Origins of the Family, Private Property p . 13-142. and the State. K R D E R , L . The Asiatic Mode of Production. V a n F O R T E S , M . ; E V A N S - P R I T C H A R D , E . E . African PoG o r u m , 1975. litical Systems. Oxford University Press, . Formation of the State. Englcwood Cliffs, N . J . , 1940. Prentice-Hall, 1968. F R I E D , M . 77;e Evolution of Political Society. N e w M A R X , K . Epochen konomischer GesellschaftsforYork, R a n d o m House, 1957. mation in Grundisse der Politischen konomie. G O D E L I E R , M . La part ideelle du rel; L'Homme, Dietz Verlag, 1953, p . 375^tl3.

Comparative analysis of state formation in historical contexts

S. N . Eisenstadt Towards a new analytical approach

O u r approach to the analysis of the state in general and the modern state in particular has emerged above all from the re-analysis of the concept of tradition itself arising from the reappraisal of studies of modernization and the idea of convergence of industrial societies. The single most important element of the n e w perspective is the recognition that, in the shaping of the institutional dynamics of societies, two aspects seem ta be of special importance:firstly,their cultural traditions, and secondly, their politico-ecological settings in general and their place in the international system or systems in which they participate, in particular. Tradition, whichfiguredin m a n y works initially as a sort of general residual category to cover major aspects of institutional structures which could not b e explained in terms of the original model of modernization, became defined in a m o r e specific w a y . T h e various aspects of tradition were differentiated and their relations to concrete institutional patterns specified. It was broadly shown that tradition is perhaps best viewed as the processor at least part of the processby which different aspects of reality are culturally and socially constructed and transmitted in society, i.e. as the reservoir of the most central social and cultural experience of a society or civilization. This reservoir is not, however, s o m e sort of general, undifferentiated 'store'; rather it has several components, the relations between which are complex and often paradoxical. There are three major components: thefirstone consists of certain generalized modes or orientations of perception and evaluation of social reality, of

S. N. Eisenstadt is Professor of Sociology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem andformerly Dean of the Eliezer Kaplan School of Economics and the Truman Research Centre of the same university. He has taught in Norway, the United States, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Australia and the Netherlands, and is the author of many books and articles, among them T h e Political Systems of Empires (1969), Tradition, Change and Modernity (1973) and Revolutions and the Transformation of Societies (1978).

Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XXXII, N o . 4, 1980

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the cosmic and of the socio-political order, which, for convenience, w e shall call cultural 'codes'; second, there are the symbols of collective identity; and, third, the major modes of legitimation of the social and political order. O n e of the most important findings of our research w a s that these different aspects of tradition can change at different tempos. It was found, paradoxically enough, that the different cultural orientations tend to be more continuous than the symbols and 'content' of collective identity, even if the latter are often seen as more stable and continuous. Further, this analysis has indicated h o w these codes influence and shape s o m e very basic components of the social structure. W e were able to formulate in a systematic w a y , going beyond the rather vague indications found in the earlier literature on traditions or in sociological analysis, those aspects of the institutional structure that cannot be fully explained in terms of levels of technological development or of structural differentiation and specialization, which are influenced by such codes. The most important a m o n g theseof direct relevance to the analysis of the stateare: (a) the structure of authority; conceptions of justice; (b) the structure of power and of political struggle; (c) principles of social hierarchization; and (d) the definition of membership within different communities all of which greatly influence the major policies adopted in any society, and the perception of social problems within it. A s a result, such conceptions also greatly influence the m o d e s of integrationmoral, legal or communicativeof the societies in which they are prevalent, and the major patterns of their legitimation. Moreover, these conceptionsand their institutional derivativesare 'carried' by special social actors and mechanisms, especially by several types of cultural, educational and political lites and frameworks and m a y cut across different societies. They also exhibit dynamics of their o w n . O u r research has equally indicated that m a n y of these institutional aspects seem to be continuous across different historical settings; they span levels of technological development and are closely related to continuities in certain basic social and cultural orientations and to the construction of traditions, even in modern settings. The research has also indicated that the very institutionalization of cultural orientations systematically generates potential for tensions, conflicts and change. This potential is rooted,first,in the contradictions arising within the systems or sets of codes themselves; second, in their application to broad institutional complexes, and, third, in the clash between various complexes of codes and various types of institutions and interests. Hence, conflicts and protest are inherent in h u m a n societies and influence organizational and symbolic dimensions of social change. This appears in different patterns of rebellion, social conflict and heterodoxies, the constellations of which vary greatly between societies and strongly influence their specific historical experience and dynamics.


S. N. Eisenstadt

In practice, these tendencies occur in different politico-ecological settings, two aspects being specially important. Very strongly stressed in recent research is the importance of international political and economic systems and of the place of different societies within them, particularly relations of hegemony and dependency. There is also the more general recognition of the great variety of different politico-ecological settings of societies, such as small and large societies, dependence on internal and external markets, and the like. In our w o r k o n comparative civilization w e have distinguished between several types of political regimes, each characterized by a certain constellation of structural features closely related to characteristics of lites, cultural orientations and processes of change. T h e major types w e have analysed are the imperial, imperial-feudal, patrimonial and 'exceptional' city-states. Imperial and imperial-feudal societies T h e major characteristic of centre-periphery relations (Shils, 1975, chaps. 1 and 3) in the imperialand to a large extent also in the imperial-feudal societieswere a high level of distinctiveness of their centres; the perception of the centre as a distinct symbolic and organizational unit, and sustained attempts by the centres not only to extract resources from the periphery but also to permeate and reconstruct it according to the centre's premises. T h e political, and to some degree, cultural-religious centres in these societies were conceived as autonomous foci of the charismatic elements of the socio-political* and often also of the cosmiccultural order. These centrespolitical, religious and culturalwere the foci and loci of the various great traditions that developed in these societies, distinct from local traditions not only in content but also in the symbolic and organizational structural characteristics. T h e permeation of the periphery by the centres was discernible in the development of widespread channels of communication which emphasized their symbolic and structural difference, and in the attempts of these centres, even if only to a limited degree, to break, through the ascriptive ties of the groups at the periphery. Closely connected to such centre-periphery relations is strong articulationespecially a m o n g the higher strataof symbols of social hierarchies and stratification, of country-wide strata-consciousness and of tendencies to some political articulation and the expression of such consciousness, as well as a high degree of ideological symbolization and mutual orientations a m o n g the major religious, political: and even ethnic and national communities. Although such communities tended to attain a relatively high degree of autonomy as well as distinct boundaries, yet in most of these civilizations, they also tended to constitute mutual referents of each other (i.e. being a good 'Hellene' was identified with citizenship in the Byzantine state, and vice versa) (Eisenstadt, 1969, 1978). This strong symbolic articulation and the distinctiveness of the major insti-

Comparative analysis of state formation in historical contexts


tutional patterns is, in these imperial and imperial-feudal societies, closely related, to certain cultural orientations. M o s t of these empires developed in close relation to some of the great civilizations or traditions in the history of mankind, such as the special Chinese blend of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism; the Christian tradition in all its variants and the Islamic one; all of them constructed civilizational frameworks distinct, both symbolically and organizationally, from the political, ethnic and national ones. Most shared several basic cultural orientations or codes which set them off from some of the other civilizations which emerged in the same so-called axial age (thefirstmillennium B . C . ) {Daedalus, 1975; Voegelin, 1954). They were characterized by a great autonomy and the dissociation of the cosmic (religious) from the m u n d a n e order; and also, because of their mutual relevance and impingement, by strong emphasis on the need to bridge the transcendental sphere and the m u n dane order. While they shared emphasis o n the tension between the cosmic and mundane worlds with other civilizationssuch as the Hindu and Buddhistunlike these, they exercised some kind of this-worldly activity, above all in the political, military and cultural, but (especially in the European case) also in the economic spheres, as a bridge between the transcendental-cosmic and the m u n d a n e world (in Weber's terminology, as a 'focus of salvation').. Further, there developed a strong emphasis o n the commitment of the different population groups to the cosmic and social orders, and relatively autonomous access of at least some groups to the major attributes of these orders. Such cultural orientations, the structure of centres and of centre-periphery relations, were very closely related to differences between the major lites and institutional entrepreneurs. M o s t of the lites or institutional entrepreneurs (Barth, 1963; Eisenstadt, 1971) in imperial and imperial-feudal societiesand above all the articulators of models of cultural and social order, political lites and (to a lesser degree) representatives of different collectivities and economic litespossessed autono m o u s resource bases and potentially independent access to the centre and to each other. Moreover, there arose a multiplicity of secondary lites. These, b y their impingement on the centres and the periphery shaped various movements of protest, political activities and the struggle within them. Each litewhether 'primary' or 'secondary'could be at the origin of certain movements of protest or of a political struggle with a higher level of organizational and symbolic articulation and of certain potential orientations and linkages a m o n g themselves and to the centre.


S. N. Eisenstadt

Patrimonial societies T h e major patrimonial societies were characterized by a relative absence of the symbolic and structural distinction between centre and periphery; they possessed a higher degree of status segregation but a lower degree of country-wide 'class' consciousness and of symbolic articulation of the major collectivities (Eisenstadt, 19736; Schrieke, 1957); relatively little symbolic and institutional distinction between centre and periphery; a strong tendency to narrow status association; and low autonomy of the major lites. The predominant cultural orientations are either an emphasis o n a low or a high level of distinction and tension between the transcendental and the m u n d a n e orders, the focus of resolution being otherworldly; w e a k commitment to the socio-political and even to the cultural order and a tendency to accept it as given. These societies were also characterized by relatively weak symbolic articulation of different communities and of major lites (whether functional (political and economic) or articulators of cultural models and of the solidarity of different communities) and by the embedding of such lites within ascriptive groups. Exceptional city-stales! and tribal federations T h e societies in which the second pattern of change developedthe Greek (and R o m a n ) , the city-states of antiquity and the near-eastern, above all Israelite and Islamic tribal federations; Eisenstadt, 1971a, chap. 6)were characterized by a somewhat different pattern. The cultural orientations prevalent within them were also those of a perception of some degree of tension between transcendental and mundane orders; s o m e strong this-worldly conception of the appropriate resolution of this tension as well as a relatively high level of commitment to the cultural and social order. The centre-periphery relations were characterized by a growing symbolic and structural (but not so m u c h organizational) differentiation between the centre and the periphery and by their mutual impingement, thus being rather similar to the imperial regimes, as were some of the basic characteristics of their lites. But the structural difference between the centre and periphery was not, in both these types of societies, fully institutionalized. This was shown by the fact that, while their central symbols and the officials w h o dealt with internal and external problems were distinguished from the periphery, yet most citizens could also participate in the centre. Even when m a n y could d o so only to a limited extent, this was not dissimilar from the social distinctions m a d e at the periphery. T h e most important outcomes of a structurally and symbolically distinct centre, and of overlapping membership between the centre and the periphery, were the relatively weak identity (beyond embryonic nuclei) of the ruling class,

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as well as of other lites, as autonomous social formations, organizationallyand not only symbolicallydistinct from the leaders of different social groups and divisions. Variations in patrimonial SocietiesBuddhist and Hindu civilizations Within each of these societal types however there develop far-reaching variations along three dimensions. First of all there existed variations within cultural orientations, in the 'locus' of the resolution of tensions between the transcendental and the m u n d a n e orders (or for salvation), especially in the emphasis placed o n this-worldly and other-worldly orientations; in their interweaving; in the delineation of the institutional loci of resolution and in the extent to which basic ascriptive groups were seen as bearers of certain attributes. Second, there existed important differences of structure in the loci of the activity and internal autonomy of the major lites and institutional entrepreneurs; in the extent to which different lite activities were undertaken through identical roles and in their organizational settings; and in solidarity between different entrepreneurs and between them and the broader strata of the society. Third, there existed far-reaching variations in the politico-ecological settings of these societiesespecially with respect to the existence of relatively compact political regimes (such as empires or patrimonial kingdoms, not tribal federations or feudal regimes); and to size. The most important variants arose within those patrimonial city-state and tribal regimes that were related to religions or traditions connected to the great traditions emphasizing strong other-worldly conceptions of salvation, such as Buddhism (Tambiah, 1976) and Hinduism. These great traditions and their local versions were carried by relatively autonomous, often international lites, such as the Buddhist Sangha (and to a smaller degree the Zoroastrian clergy) the likes of which could not be found a m o n g the little traditions of most other regimes under which patterns of relatively non-coalescent change occurred. These lites created centres that, in the religious sphere, were distinct from their o w n periphery as well as special interlinking networks between these centres and the peripherybetween the great a n d little traditions. But, given the strong other-worldly emphasis of these great traditions, these cultural orientations did not generate corresponding distinctiveness in the political centres and in the relations between these centres and their periphery, nor did they tend to produce far-reaching restructuring of other institutional spheres. True, autonomous cultural-religious groups, especially the Sangha in Buddhist societies, often participated in political life, the basis of which was their organizational dependence o n the rules, and the rulers' quest for legitimation. But such participation occurred mostly within the frameworks of the various patrimonial


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regimes under which these lites often became politically very powerful. The situation in the Hindu civilization of India was rather different. Like Buddhism, which started as a heterodox sect within Hinduism, the latter was an other-worldly great civilization; yet its negation of the mundane world was not as total as that of Buddhism (Biardeau, 1972; D u m o n t , 1970). Hinduism, as most fully articulated in Brahmanic ideology and symbolism, strongly emphasized the tension between the transcendent and the mundane ordertension derived from the perception that the mundane order is polluted in cosmic terms. This pollution can be overcome either through total renunciation or through ascriptiveritualactivities and adherence to the arrangement of social activity in a very complicated hierarchical order reflecting individual standing in the cosmic order and emphasizing the differentiated ritual standing of basic primordial kinship and territorial social units (the jatis). In all these ways it has a m u c h more direct relation to worldly activities than Buddhism (Conn, 1971; D u m o n t , 1970; Heesterman, 1964; Mandelbaum, 1970; Singer and C o h n , 1968; Thapar, 1978, p . 40-63). The cultural-religious centrethe ideological core of which was the Brahmanic ideology and symbolism that developed in Indiaconsisted of a series of networks and organizational-ritual subcentres (pilgrimages, temples, sects, schools) spreading throughout the subcontinent, often cutting across political boundaries (Cohn, 1971; Singer and C o h n , 1968). The religious centre or centres became very closely associated with the broad, ethnic Hindu identity (even more closely associated than the religious symbols and those of political community in Buddhist societies). The vague, general, yet resilient boundaries of Hindu ethnic identity constituted the broadest ascriptive framework within which the Brahmanic ideology was worked out. A t the same time, however, as in different other-worldly religions, the major centre of Hinduism was not political. Although there arose in India small and large states and semi-imperial centres, n o single state emerged with which the cultural tradition was identified (Heesterman, 1971). Accordingly, centre-periphery relations in most Indian principalities and kingdoms did not differ greatly from such relations in other patrimonial regimes, city-states, or tribal federations. These political centres, although organizationally more compact than the ritual centres, were not continuousregimes and kingdoms arose and fellnor did they serve as major foci of Indian cultural identity. This gave Indian civilization its internal strength and explained its capacity to survive under alien rule (Fox, 1971; Heesterman, 1957, 1964, 1971). The relative independence of the cultural traditions, centres, and symbols of identity from the political centre were paralleled by the relative autonomy of the social structure, the complex of castes and villages and the networks of cultural communication (Beteille, 1965; Ishwaran, 1970; Mandelbaum, 1970). It was these groupings and networks that bred the major types of insti-

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tutional entrepreneurs and lites, political and economic entrepreneurs on the one: hand and articulators of models of cultural order and of the solidarity of different ascriptive groups on the other. Their entrepreneurial activities were structured by two fundamental aspects of Indian social life. First of all, they were rooted in,, and defined by, the combination of ascriptive primordial and ritual characteristics;, secondly, such definitions contained very strong emphasis on th proper performance of mundane activities (Neale, 1969; Rudolph, Rudolph and Singh, 1975;. Morrison, 1970). Islamic civilization A rather special pattern of relations a m o n g cultural orientations, centre-periphery relations, and institutional entrepreneurs crystallized in the realm of Islamic civilization (Gibb, 1962; V o n Grunebaum, 1946, 1954; Hodgson, 1974; Holt,. Lambton and Lewis, 1970; Lewis, 1950, 1973; Turner, 1974). The most important cultural orientations were the distinction between the 'cosmic', transcendental realm and the mundane one and the stress o n overcoming the tension inherent in this distinction by total submission to G o d and by this-worldlyabove all, political and militaryactivity; the strong universalise element in the definition of the Islamic community; the, in principle, autonomous access of all members of the community to the attributes of the transcendental order (to salvation) through submission to G o d ; the ideal of the ummah (the politico-religious community of all believers distinct from any ascriptive, primordial collectivity); and the ideal of the ruler as the upholder of the ideal of Islam, of the purity of the ummah, and of the life of the community (Gibb, 1962; V o n Grunebaum, 1954). In the Islamic realm the original vision of the ummah assumed complete convergence between the socio-political and the religious communities. T h e original Islamic state developed out of conquest, motivated by a new universal religion and borne by conquering tribes. In this initial state of conquest the identity between polity and religion was initially very close. Similarly, m a n y of the later caliphs (such as the Abbasides and Fatimides) came to power on the crest of religious movements, legitimized themselves in religious terms, and sought to retain popular support by stressing the religious aspect of their authority and by courting the religious leaders and sentiments of the community. Political problems (e.g. the determination of legitimate succession and the scope of the political community) originally constituted the main theological problems of Islam. But, owing to widespread Muslim conquest, to the tensions between tribal conquerors and conquered peoples, to the emphasis on total submission to G o d , as well as to the strong ideological dissociation between the universal Islamic community and primordial local or ethnic communities, after the initial attempts of the first caliphs and the beginning of the Abbaside Caliphate, the ideal of a c o m m o n


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political and religious community was never realized. Accordingly, there developed in Islamic politics a growing dissociation between the political and the religious lites, and the various local communities and institutional spheres, albeit with a strong latent religio-ideological orientation towards the unification of these spheres (Gibb, 1962, p . 3-33; Turner, 1974). The identity of the religious community was forged and upheld mainly b y the Holy L a w (Sharia) as annunciated, and elaborated by the religious leaders, the ulema, and enforced by the rulers. Between the ulema and the rulers a very peculiar relation was forged in which the ulema became politically passive or subjugated to the rulers even though relatively autonomous in the performance of their legal-religious functions (Schacht, 1970). This combination gave rise to the very high degree of symbolic and organizational autonomy of the political lites; to the relatively great symbolic autonomybut only a minimal organizational oneof the religious lites; and to a growing separation of the two. T h e religious leadership depended heavily on the rulers and did not develop into a broad, independent and cohesive organization. Religious groups and functionaries were not organized as a separate entity; nor did they constitute a tightly organized body except, as in the Ottoman Empire, when organized by the state (Gibb and B o w e n , 1957, chaps. 8-12). The strong ideological dissociation of the universal Islamic community a n d the different primordial communities generated weak solidarity between its carriers and the political or religious articulators of the cultural model of Islam. The combination of religious orientations, the structure of lites, and relations between lites and local ascriptive communities gave rise, in imperial a n d patrimonial Islamic systems alike, to certain unique types of ruling .groupsespecially to the military-religious rulers w h o emerged from tribal and sectarian elements, and to the system of military slavery which created special channels of mobility such as the qui system in general, the M a m e l u k e system and Ottoman devshirme in particular, through which the ruling group could be recruited from alien elements (Ayalon, 1951; Itzkowitz, 1972; Miller, 1941). Similarly, except in the case of so-called missionary orders which established n e w regimes, few structural linkages were forged between the political lites and the articulators of cultural models and economic entrepreneurs (though often there were close family relations a m o n g some of them). Variations in imperial and imperial-feudal societies The Chinese Empire China's Confucian-Taoist-Buddhist-legalist tradition, by contrast to monotheistic religions, was characterized by a somewhat weaker stress on the tension between the transcendental and the m u n d a n e order; a very weak conception of an historicaltranscendental time dimension; a strong this-worldly focus for overcoming this

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tension; relative openness in formulation as well as in its accessibility or flexibility to broader strata (Balazs, 1964; Elwin, 1973; Reischauer and Fairbank, 1963,. chaps. 2-10). This ideology was very closely tied to the political framework of the Chinese Empire. The empire was legitimized by the Confucian symbols, while the Confucian symbols and the ethical orientation found their natural place and framework, their major referent, in the empire. T h e Chinese was probably the most this-worldly of all the great traditions. The thrust of the official Confucian-legalist framework was the cultivation of the socio-political and cultural orders as the major focus of-cosmic harmony. It emphasized this-worldly duties and activities within the existing social frameworksthe family, broader kin groups, and imperial serviceand stressed the connection between the proper performance of these duties and ultimate criteria of individual responsibility. O f course, the tradition also emphasized individual responsibility along with a strongly transcendental orientation, but this responsibility was couched largely in terms of the importance of the political and familial dimensions of h u m a n existence. Chinese tradition also stressed a basic affinity between the symbols of the centre and the status identities of the peripheral groups. Orientation to the centre and to participation in it constituted a n essential component of the collectiveidentity of m a n y local and occupational groups. All these orientations greatly influenced the structure of the Chinese centre and of the major lites and strata in Chinese society. T h e Chinese centre was an. absolutist one in terms both of political and cultural orientations. T h e imperial centre, with its strong Confucian orientation and legitimation, was the sole distributor of macro-societal prestige and honour. Social groups or strata did not develop independent status orientations except on a purely local level; the major (almost the only) wider orientations were bound to the politico-religious centre (Balazs, 1964; Eisenstadt, 19716; Lapidus, 1975; Michael, 1955). O f crucial importance in the linkage between the centre and the periphery in general, and to the process of strata-formation in particular, was the structure of the major groups linking the imperial centre to the broader societythe literati, i.e. all those w h o took the Confucian examinations or studied for them (Balazs, 1964; H o , 1962; Kracke, 1953). This lite was a relatively cohesive congeries of individuals and quasi-groups sharing a cultural background enhanced b y the examination system. and by adherence to Confucian classical teachings a n d rituals. The literati constituted the source of recruitment to the bureaucracy and combined the activities of political lites and of articulators of models of cultural order, enjoying close relations with the articulators of the solidarity of collectivities (the heads of family and of wider kinship groups), and they exercised


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almost a monopoly over access to the centre. T h e organizational framework was nearly identical to that of the state bureaucracy (which recruited 10 to 20 per cent of all the literati), and except for some schools and academies it had no organization of its o w n . This lite, which was relatively widespread, was in principle recruited from all strata, even from the peasantry, though in fact most literati were Tecruited from the gentry. Thus, unlike in Russia, it maintained relatively close solidarity relations with most groups within society. The Russian and Byzantine empires A different constellation of cultural orientations, structure of lites and structure of centres and centre-periphery relations developed in the Russian and Byzantine empires (and in the Abbasside, Fatimide and Ottoman empires). Within the late (post-Mongol) variant of Christian civilization (Muscovite) (Pipes, 1975; Seton-Watson, 1952) the centre succeeded in imposing a relatively high degree of subordination of the cultural order to the political order, and a relatively low degree of autonomous access of the major strata to the principal attributes of the social and political orders. T h e political sphere became the monopoly of the rulers; the economic sphere became less central, and economic activities were left, in so far as they did not impinge directly on the centre, to their o w n devices. The broader strata were granted autonomy in other mundane, primarily economic, activities, without being permitted to imbue them to any large extent with wider meanings in terms of the basic parameters of the cultural-religious spheres. T o this end, the centre vigorously segregated access to the attributes of the cosmic order (salvation) (which was extended to all groups with only comparatively w e a k mediation by the Church) from access to the attributes of the political and social orders which, after the post-Mongol period were almost totally monopolized b y the political centre. Religious heterodoxies became either other-worldly or dissociated from the political sphere. However, sometimes, as in the case of the True Believers, they impinged to a degree o n the economic sphere (Gerschenkorn, 1970). The major mechanism through which the centre attained its goals was forced segregation between the political power lites (which were also the articulators of the cultural order especially in its political dimensions), the economic and educational lites and the articulators of the solidarity of the major ascriptive collectivities (Eisenstadt, 1971e, chap. 6; Raeff, 1966). The Byzantine Empire did not experience a trauma like the Mongolian conquest which in Russia paved the w a y to the weakening of the autonomous orientations and structures of the major active strata. Hence, the Byzantine centre w a s never able to segregate this-worldly and other-worldly orientations of different groups, strata or lites to the same extent as the Russian centre, though such

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attempts were often m a d e ; and the religious supremacy of the Emperor over the Patriarch w a s the official doctrine of the Byzantine Empire and Church (Hussey, 1937; Ostrogorsky, 1956). Cultural-religious orientations did not become as totally subjugated to the political sphere as in Russia, and the Church, oriented as it was towards otherworldly activities, never became politically as fully controlled as the Russian one. Similarly, different strata, such as the aristocracy and the peasantry, had relatively more autonomous access to the centre. Similarly, Byzantine society w a s characterized by great autonomy of secondary lites and of linkages a m o n g them and the broader strata (Charanis, 1940-41; 1951a, b). Western European civilization A still different set of relations developed in the imperial and imperial-feudal structures of medieval and early modern (Western and Central) Europe (Beloff, 1964; Bloch, 1961; Hintze, 1975; Lindsay, 1957). European civilization w a s characterized by a very high number of crosscutting cultural orientations and structural settings. T h e symbolic pluralism, or heterogeneity, of European society w a s evident in the multiplicity of traditionsthe Judaeo-Christian, the Greek, the R o m a n , and the various tribal onesout of which its o w n cultural tradition crystallized. T h e most important a m o n g Europe's cultural orientations were an emphasis o n the autonomy of the cosmic, cultural and social orders and their interrelatedness, which w a s defined in terms of the tension between the transcendental and the mundane order; along with an emphasis on ways of resolving this tension through a combination of thisworldly (political and economic) and other-worldly activities ( O ' D e a , O ' D e a and A d a m s , 1975; Troeltsch, 1931). These symbolic orientations became connected with a very special type of structural-organizational pluralism, which differed greatly from what can be found, for instance, in the compact Byzantine (or Russian) Empire, though it shared m a n y aspects of cultural models with Western Europe. In the Byzantine Empire, this pluralism w a s manifest in a relatively high degree of structural differentiation within a relatively unified socio-political framework in which different social functions were apportioned to different social categories. T h e structural pluralism developed in Europe was characterized, above all, by a combination of steadily increasing levels of structural differentiation, o n the one hand, and constantly changing boundaries of collectivities, units and frameworks, o n the other hand. A m o n g these collectivities and units there was n o clear-cut division of labour. Rather, there was constant rivalry between them over their standing with respect to the attributes of the social and cultural orders; over the performance of the major societal functionswhether economic, political or culturalas well as over the very definition of the boundaries of ascriptive communities.


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T h e combination of these cultural orientations and structural conditions generated several basic institutional characteristics in Europe (Bloch, 1930, 1961; Brunner, 1968; Prawer and Eisenstadt, 1968); the most important being: the multiplicity of centres; a deep permeation of the periphery by the centres and impingement of the periphery on the centres; relatively little overlap of the boundaries and restructuring of class, ethnic, religious and political entities; a comparatively high degree of autonomy of groups and strata and of their access to the centres of society; m u c h overlap between various status units, together with a high level of country-wide status (class) consciousness and political activity; a multiplicity of cultural and functional (economic or professional) lites enjoying relatively great autonomy; m u c h cross-cutting, and a close relationship with the broader, m o r e ascriptive strata; a relatively great autonomy of the legal system with regard to other integrative systemsabove all, the political and religious spheres; and great autonomy of cities as independent centres of social and structural creativity and identity formation (Brunner, 1968, p . 213-41; W e b e r , 1957).

Patterns of change and transformation

W e shall n o w consider the major patterns of change in the historical societies described; proceed then to the analysis of the cultural orientations and institutional patterns that existed within them; and finally analyse the connections between the patterns of change on the one hand and the cultural orientations, institutional patterns and politico-ecological settings on the other. The pattern of coalescent change A closer look at the historical evidence indicates that several major patterns of changeeach with s o m e very important subvariantscan be identified. O n e such pattern, characterized by a relatively high degree of coalescence both in the outcomes of change in major institutional spheres, as well as in its processes, can be identified above all in the Chinese Empire (Balazs, 1964; Elwin, 1973; Reischauer and Fairbank, 1960, chaps. 2-10), in the Byzantine and Russian empires (Pipes, 1975; Ostrogorsky, 1956; Seton-Watson, 1952), in some, but only s o m e , of the Islamic states (Gibb, 1962; Lewis, 1950; Turner, 1974)especially the Abbasside and to a lesser extent the Ottoman empires (Inalcik, 1973; Itzkowitz, 1972; Wittek, 1963), and in medieval and early modern Western and Central Europe (Beloff, 1964; Bloch, 1961; Hintze, 1975; Lindsay, 1957). The outstanding feature of the patterns of change in these societies was thatfirst,modifications and restructuring of the major collectivitiespolitical, religious and nationaland of institutional frameworksthe economic, religious

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and that of social stratificationtended to go rather frequently hand in hand with radical restructuring of the political system itself. Second, there tended also to develop strong connections between changes in the bases of access to power and its symbols and those in the group bases and criteria of structuring social hierarchies and between the various movements of protest and central political struggle, as well as a very high level of organization and ideological articulation of the issues of this struggle. True enough, even within these generally imperial and imperial-feudal societies, the most frequent types of change were dynastic ones, sometimes affecting the boundaries of the polity, and often failing to produce far-reaching modifications in their political structures. But beyond this, although sometimes in close relation, other patterns developed with a far greater degree of coalescence between the restructuring of the political regimes and other institutional domains. Thus, dynastic changes were often connected with the rise, growth and strengthening, or the decline and weakening, of professional, cultural and religious lites and institutions as against more ascriptive groups; with shifts in the strength of the monarch versus the aristocracy and of the aristocracy versus the urban groups and the free peasantry, or with shifts in the strength and independence of the bureaucracy. These changes were also often connected with shifts in the principles of the political articulation of such groups, especially with the broadening and narrowing of their autonomous access to the centre (Eisenstadt, 1969, 1978, chap. 4). A similar picture emerges with respect to the relation between the continuity of the economic frameworks and that of the political boundaries of the empires. Here, more than in other types of traditional societies, changes in the scope and structural principles of the economic systems or of strata formation tended to impinge directly on the political centres; at the same time as far-reaching changes in the political regimes could affect the functioning of economic institutions and the structuring of social hierarchies. Within these political systems there also developed tendencies toward coalescence or linkage between the major types of movements of protest and conflict, i.e. between rebellions and heresies; between these and institutionbuilding (primarily in the economic and cultural spheres by secondary lites); and between each of these and the more central political struggles and processes. S o m e of these connections became more than merely ad hoc coalitions, and gave rise to closer organizational and symbolic 'merging' of these movements, often generating n e w symbolic and institutional patterns. This last tendency was closely related to the high level of symbolic and ideological articulation of the political struggle that tended to occur in these societies. Within this broad pattern there were several important subvariants which can be distinguished,first,according to the degree of coalescence between changes in the major institutional domains of a society, and in the major movements of


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protest and conflict; second, according to the continuity of any given political regime and, in cases of discontinuity, the nature of the 'outcome'above all whether it entailed a breakdown or a transformation (with different degrees of violence) of a regime. The Chinese, Rucian, Byzantine and Islamic empires T h e Chinese and the Russian empires were characterized by the lowest degree of coalescence, with the Chinese evincing a very long and the Russian a m u c h shorter continuity, in both cases the outcome of discontinuity being violent revolutionary transformation. The major types of protest and political conflict that occurred in the Chinese Empirerebellions and the emergence of provincial governors as relatively semiautonomous warlords, as well as conquests by foreign dynastiesdid not usually exhibit a distinctly n e w level of political articulation. Most rebellions provided only secondary interpretations of the prevailing value structure and did not create any radically n e w orientations. The political orientations of the military governors and warlords were likewise set within the existing value and political frameworks. Although they strove for greater independence from;, or seizure of, the central government, they rarely envisaged the establishment of a new type of political system (Dardess, 1973; Eisenstadt, 1969). Similarly, the major heterodoxiesTaoism, Buddhism, and especially the secondary. Confucian schoolsworked within the prevailing social framework, or tended towards withdrawal from it. The only close relations between ideological struggles and changes in the central lite groups and the actual policies of the centre arose in some of the orthodox Confucian controversies a m o n g the central lites. However, these changes were usually limited to the centre, the upper echelons of the bureaucracy and the literati (Dubs, 1939; Liu, 1959). T h e closest relation between changes in political regime and strata formation in the Chinese Empire was the one c o m m o n to all imperial societiesnamely those political changes connected with shifts in the relative strength and standing of free peasants against would-be aristocratic elements. But even this connection manifested itself in China, in contrast, for instance, to the Byzantine Empire, more at the level of rulers' policies than at that of political articulation of these strata. Similarly, the great urban and commercial developments under the Sung, while associated with alterations in the policies of the government, were not correlated with changes in the m o d e of impingement of these groups on the centre. In imperial Russia (Pipes, 1975; Seton-Watson, 1952) the centre w a s able for a relatively long period to maintain a very strict segregation between local rebellions, religious movements and events and conflicts at the centre itself. This centre which, from at least the period of Peter the Great, was strongly modernizing, generated widespread processes of economic and social change,

Comparative analysis of state formation in historical contexts


but tried to control it and minimize the emergence of any autonomous political expression and organization which might arise. The major mechanisms of control were the autonomous access of the various groups to the centre; conversion of economic into political resources; and segregation of the major strata and institutional entrepreneurs. The Byzantine Empire was characterized by a relatively high degree of coalescence of change, of internal restructuring and transformability, especially with respect to shifts in the strength of imperial and aristocratic rulers and the free peasantry. But the very intensity of this struggle was a m o n g the causes of the ultimate demise of this empire (Ostrogorsky, 1956). A m o n g the imperial systems within the Islamic realm, the Abbaside and Fatimide empires (Lewis, 1950) evinced a pattern rather close to the Byzantine, while the Ottoman is closer to its direct predecessor, the Byzantineexcept that its breakdown was connected with a (relatively non-violent) revolutionary transformation. Western and Central Europe Within the Europeanand especially the Western and Central Europeansocieties (Belofiy 1964; Bloch, 1961; Hintze, 1975; Lindsay, 1957) there developed a high degree of coalescence of change and restructuring of political regimes and other institutional domains, as well as coalescence of movements of protest, religious heterodoxies and political struggle and their mutual restructuring. Thus, changes within any institutional domain often impinged on others, and most significantly on the political sphere. These changes gave rise to the continual mutual restructuring of these spheres which did not, however, necessarily coalesce into a unified political or cultural framework. There was also a close connection between movements of rebellion, heterodoxies and political struggle, concomitant tendencies o n the part of various lites and the broader social strata to support centre-formation and the combination of such activities with institution building in the economic, cultural and educational spheres. A s compared with the pure imperial systems, the imperial-feudal Western societies were characterized by m u c h lesser stability of regimes, by constant changes in regime and collectivity and by continual restructuring of centres. A t the same time, they evinced a m u c h greater capacity for institutional innovation cutting across different political and national boundaries and centres, ultimately leading, in appropriate economic and entrenched settings, to the Great Western Revolution.


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Partially coalescent and non-coalescent patterns of change A second pattern of change in historical societies, and which was prevalent above all in some (especially Greek and R o m a n ) city-states of antiquity and in Near Eastern, especially ancient Israelite and Islamic tribal federations was characterized by a high level of coalescence between the processes of change, i.e. between rebellion, religious or intellectual heterodoxies and central political struggle, but connected with a far more short-lived institutionalization of coalescent changes in the major institutional spheres (Ehrenberg, 1960; Eisenstadt, 1971a, chap. 6; Fuks, 1974). A third pattern of change, to be found above all in the ancient Near Eastern (Moscati, 1962) or early South-East Asian (Steinberg, 1971) and in most Islamic (Turner, 1974) societies was characterized by a relatively low level of coalescence both in the institutionalization of change in the major domains, as well as in the processes of change. In most of these societies, even the more dramatic or widespread changes in the principles and boundaries of regimes and of other collectivities and institutions, despite obvious mutual impingement, did not tend, o n the whole, to coalesce; each tended to change in relative isolation or conversely each might evince relative continuity while important alterations take place in the others. Similarly, there developed a relatively loose connection between changes in political regimes, o n the one hand, and the restructuring of principles of access to political power by the economic and social spheres, o n the other. Far-reaching changes in these political regimes were usually combined with personal or dynastic changes, with shifts in the relative hierarchical standing of different families, ethnic groups or regions, in the boundaries of the different polities; in the content of symbols of legitimation which upheld the special virtue of the rulers; or in the policy orientations of the rulers, such as coercive, manipulative or solitary modes. Such changes were also often connected with the emergence of new economic or religious groups, which, however, rarely gave rise to, or were directly connected with, the restructuring of the principles of access to political power. A t most, they were connected with shifts in the policies of the rulers. T h e kingdoms, tribal organizations and city-states were also compatible with the development of relatively extensive economic systems, based on interstate commerce and even agricultural markets, which cut across political boundaries and survived, the demise of regimes. Accordingly, deep modifications in technological or economic activities and in institution-building, or 'modes of production', though often contributing indirectly to the crises of different patrimonial regimes, did not always necessarily coalesce with such changes.

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This pattern was very closely related to a relatively low level of connection or coalescence, or a high level of segregation between different movements of protest and conflict, i.e. between rebellions and heterodoxies, between them and the central political struggle, as well as between these processes and those of institutional innovation, above all in the economic and cultural spheres. C o n c o m i tantly, this pattern was also closely connected with loose ideological articulation of issues of political struggle and activities. Buddhist and Hindu Societies Within this broad pattern several variants can be distinguished, according to the degree of the differentiation or complexity of the various societies and according to whether they were embedded in relatively 'archaic', 'local' frameworks and culture or, o n the contrary, were connected with 'high civilizations', above all other-worldly religions, such as Hinduism and Buddhism (Biardeau, 1972; D u m o n t , 1970a, b; Tanbiah, 1976) or to some degree Zoroastrianism. In the relatively 'simple', less differentiated regimes, such as some of the earlier Near-Eastern or early South-Asian societies, the demise of a political regime could also entail the disappearance of whole 'peoples', as well as of their religion. A t the same time, the connection between changes in certain broader ethnic, linguistic and chiefly economic systems and those in the political field, was in m a n y cases, very weak. In the more complex and differentiated regimes, especially in so far as they were connected with the higher civilizations, there usually developed greater distinctiveness of 'ethnic', national, cultural and above all religious collectivities and institutions, and of economic frameworks, as well as of frameworks of social stratification. These tended to persist or change without direct connection to shifts in political regimes. A t the same time, some connections appeared between changes in the religious and civilizational frameworks and the political and economic institutions even if these connections were m u c h weaker than those to be found in societies in which the more coalescent type of change predominated. Several versions of such (weak) connections can be discerned in the development. In the (Theravada) Buddhist realm (Tambiah, 1976), rebellions tended to have relatively well-articulated millennarian orientations, sometimes connected with political groups. This often gave rise to the construction of n e w symbols and dimensions in the definition of the local political community, adding a higher level of symbolic articulation, a broader orientation which sometimes served as the basis and framework for the crystallization of symbols and national boundaries. Such 'nations' often evinced, m u c h greater continuity than the political regimes as did the religious traditions. But these movements did not generate distinctiveness of the political centres or in the relations between these centres and their peripheries; nor did they redefine


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the criteria of access to political power or profoundly restructure other institutional spheres. In India, within the framework of the Hindu civilization certain more complex movements of change occurred, linked to relations between rebellion and heterodoxy and broader institutional change. M a n y of India's movements of change were related to broad caste categories and groups, and they generated modifications in those institutional spheres in which such caste groups were especially active. Throughout Indian history these characteristics encouraged a strong propensity to piecemeal innovation within different institutional spheres, i.e. the redefinition of political boundaries, changes in technology and in levels of social differentiation and some restructuring of the economic sphere, and transformations in social and economic polities as well as in the religious sphere, as manifest primarily in the appearance of new movements and sects (Dumont, 1970a; Kolff, 1971; Singer and C o h n , 1968; Thapar, 1978). These religious movements often became closely connected with major structural components of change, particularly, with the processes of regional and caste change and caste mobility, with the crystallization of new caste groups, and continual restructuring of caste activities and political boundaries. Yet these processes were only rarely connected with the restructuring of the political systems or the relations between the political and economic spheres. In general, traditional Indian civilization exhibited great heterogeneity in the structuralorganizational aspects of its institutional spheres, together with continuity in its other parameters. Sunni Islam A special pattern of connection between movements of change and modifications in different institutional spheres also arose within most of the Islamic (Sunni) societies (Lewis, 1973, p. 217-60), which, on the whole, were characterized by a relatively low level of coalescence between movements and processes of change, despite the strong ideological emphasis inherent in Islam on the merging of the political and religious realms. Various religious sects and popular movements frequently emerged but the religious check on political authority was weak in stable regimes since there was no machinery for enforcement other than revolt. Hence numerous sects and m o v e ments were aimed at the destruction of the existing regime and the establishment of a new, religiously pure and true one, or they were politically passive. A n d yet, because of the tendency towards coalescence inherent in the ideology of Islam, there developed, at least in the geographical heart of Islam, a dynamic change that went beyond the typical segregative pattern and tended more towards coalescent patterns of change, and which was manifest in attempts to re-establish the Islamic ideal of the pure religious-political communitythe ummah. This tendency w a s strongest during the establishment of new political regimes, like

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imperial systems (the last and most enduring of which was the Ottoman Empire) semi-tribal ones, like those in the Maghreb (Gellner, 1969) or even lately a m o n g the Swat ( A h m e d , 1976) and it tended to subside after the establishment of a n e w regime. Accordingly, w e witness in Islamic historyprincipally in the heartland of Islama constant swing between the upsurge of quasi-totalistic politico-religious movements which aimed at the complete transformation of the political regime through such illegitimate means as assassination and rebellion, and the strong other-worldly attitude and political passivity that helped to maintain the despotic character of existing regimes.

Analytical and comparative conclusions

The preceding analysis indicates that a high level of articulation of political struggle and the coalescence of movements and patterns of change is strongly related to a great, symbolic and institutional distinctiveness of the centre from the periphery, of articulation of strata-consciousness, a multiplicity of autonomous lites in general and secondary lites in particular, and to the prevalence of high tension between the transcendental and the m u n d a n e order, a relatively strong this-worldly conception of the resolution of this tension or a close commitment to the cosmic and social order. The key to the understanding of this correlation lies in the fact that there exists a close relation or parallelism between the degree of symbolic articulation or 'problematization' (akin to Geertz, 1973, p. 171) in the different cultural contexts of certain major problems of h u m a n existence, on the one hand, and a high degree of symbolic and institutional distinctiveness of the major aspects of the institutional order, on the other. Our analysis has pointed to some of the institutional mechanisms and social actors connecting such symbolic problematization and articulation in the symboliccognitive and institutional spheres, by contrast to the pure structuralists such as Lvi-Strauss (1974), w h o have often been accused of simple emanation (Gluckman, 1974; Rossi, 1974). The major lites and institutional entrepreneurs constitute the main linkage, between the cultural orientations and the symbolic articulation of the principal institutional spheres as also between all these and processes of social change. These entrepreneurs are the active carriers of diverse cultural orientations, while coalitions between them ensure the structural and symbolic articulation of the principal institutional spheres, as well as different collective actions, organizations and movements, and of the linkages between them. The most important mechanisms by which such lites shape the major elements of the institutional order arefirst,the availability of'free' resources or


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activities not entirely embedded in ascriptive units, such as families, communities and guilds. These can serve as the bases of n e w institutional centres, hierarchies and collectivities. Secondly, there is the simultaneous development of broad markets which cut across such units; and thirdly, alternative conceptions of the social, political or cultural order which differ from the existing pattern not only in the sense of a reversal of the status quo (Gluckman, 1963, chap. 3) but also of possibly going beyond it. Symbolic articulation and 'problematizatior O u r analysis indicates that the articulation of the problem of h u m a n existence is greater w h e n there is a perception of tensions between the transcendental and the m u n d a n e order, close commitment to such orders; or w h e n they are not accepted as given. In so far as such orientations become institutionalized they tend to generate strong tendencies towards freeing resources, relatively wide markets, alternative conceptions of the social order, as well as the autonomous crystallization of major lites and institutional entrepreneurs. T h e more autonomous institutional entrepreneurs often serve as activators of alternative conceptions of the social order and as organizers of free resources, linking such resources and activities drawn from different spheres, and potentially crystallizing them along n e w directions. Accordingly, they favour the emergence of close symbolic articulation of the major components of the institutional order; autonomous access of lites and collectivities to each other, intimate mutual linkage between them and their c o m m o n convergence o n the centres, as well as the ability of entrepreneurs to organize collective action (rebellions and political struggle in particular), in relatively 'autonomous' formations. In such cases, other things being equal, close connections tend also to grow between the different types of rebellions, heterodoxy, and political struggle, as well as coalescence in the rates of change in different institutional spheres. B y contrast, a w e a k perception of tension between the transcendental and m u n d a n e order tends to minimize the problematization of h u m a n existence, and hence does not favour close symbolic articulation of the major institutional spheres, free resources and autonomous lites not embedded in ascriptive collectivities. Other-worldly orientations But even within those civilizations where a perception of a tension between the transcendental and the m u n d a n e order is prevalent and institutionalized, m a n y differences exist in institutional contours and in processes of change. These are

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also strongly influenced by varied cultural orientations and the concomitant characteristics of major lites. O u r preceding analysis stressed two variables of special importance. O n e is the distinction between, and relative emphasis on, this-worldly and other-worldly resolution of the tension between the transcendental and the m u n d a n e orders (or of salvation). The second, cutting across thefirst,are the relations between the attributes or foci of the resolution of this tension, the attributes of salvation, and the attributes of the major primordial ascriptive collectivities. Thus,firstof all, the level of generalization of resources, the scope ofdiflerent markets, and the symbolization of institutional spheres, as well as the emergence of alternative conceptions of social order, tend to be least developed w h e n the focus of salvation is on other-worldly activities, or o n a combination of otherworldly and this-worldly activities. Similarly, the opportunity of linking the free resources generated either by such conceptions or by the prevailing technological and structural conditions and directing them into n e w institutional channels is greater where a close relation a m o n g the attributes of salvation, and those of the major ascriptive ('ethnic' or 'national') communities exists. A n emphasis on other-worldly resolution of the tension between the transcendental and the m u n d a n e order tends to generate broad markets and distinctive religious centres, but not of other institutional spheres, and only very w e a k connections between such resources as m a y become available through technological forces in other spheres and those that develop in the religious sphere. Here the articulators of the models of cultural order, while autonomous in their religious activities, are, from the institutional viewpoint, embedded in broader ascriptive collectivities (as are the political and economic lites). Hence, they d o not undertake m a n y autonomous activities or orientations or possess the ability to create n e w institutional complexes. The segregation of the internal dynamics of these m u n d a n e spheres from the dynamics of the cultural and religious centres is greater when the foci of the other-worldly resolution of the tension between the cosmic and the m u n d a n e order is dissociated, as in Buddhism, from the major ascriptive, primordial communities. In these cases, other-worldly resolution of such tension m a y combine with the main attributes and symbols of the collectivities, but not with restructuring the major institutional spheres and of centre-periphery relations. W h e n the other-worldly resolution of the tension between the transcendental and the m u n d a n e orders is based, as in Hinduism, o n a closer relation between the other-worldly attributes of salvation and the major attributes of the basic ascriptive groups, certain free resources become available and wide markets are created beyond the purely religious sphere. These resources m a y be directed into various secondary channels, though ultimate control over their conversion is also vested in the religious sphere.


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Such orientations tend to generate, reinforce, and be carried by lites that combine, on one hand, a certain autonomy in their function (political, economic, etc.) and some internal differentiation a m o n g these functions, while, on the other, they are strongly embedded in solidarity groups and there exists predominance of the articulators of the models of the cultural order, w h o are the carriers and models of other-worldly salvation. While here the conception of alternative orders is, as in Buddhism, very limited and on the whole other-worldly, it has become connected to defined activities in institutional spheres. T h e ideal of renunciation, a major aspect of Hinduism (Biardeau, 1972; Thapar, 1978, p . 63-105), while setting u p a n e w focus of commitment, did not lead to upgrading the secondary limitations or to linking them to the ultimate level of socio-cultural reality and identity. This ideal did not generate n e w motivations or orientations that could tie activities in these non-religious spheres to the fundamental parameters of Indian cultural identity. N o n e of India's m o v e ments produced n e w linkages between the m u n d a n e and the religious spheres, or gave rise to fundamental changes in the meaning and structure of different institutional spheres (Thapar, 1978, p . 63-105). Foci of salvation A high tension between the transcendental and the m u n d a n e order, along with s o m e emphasis on this-worldly activities, tends to generate plentiful free resources, wide markets, close articulation of institutional spheres, and a large variety of alternative conceptions of the social and political order. The perception of this tension gives rise to, or at least is associated with or carried by, autonomous lites whether articulators of the models of the cultural order, political lites or articulators of the solidarity of different collectivities. Accordingly, societies in which these orientations are prevalent tend to develop multiple coalitions of such lites, which m a y be able to mobilize free resources as well as to channel them in n e w directions. Given the potentially mutual orientations of such institutional entrepreneurs, the directions of change m a y coalesce. Within this pattern there m a y be several varieties according to the content and constellations of these orientations. These constellations m a y vary according to the interweaving or segregation of this-worldly and other-worldly foci of salvation (a problem inherent in most high civilizations and religions), the institutional spread of the foci of this-worldly resolution of the tension between the transcendental and the m u n d a n e orders, and the relations between the major attributes or foci of the resolution of the tension and the basic attributes of the principal ascriptive collectivities. The weaker the emphasis on the other-worldly realm (as in China) the sharper the focus of salvation on the this-worldly, and the more this-worldly

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salvation is focused o n a single institutional area (as in both China and Islam), the stronger the tendency for potentially autonomous litesespecially articulators of models of cultural and social order and political litesto be brought together within a single social framework or category exhibiting little internal differentiation, as best illustrated by the Chinese literati. Such a structure gives only limited scope for free resources and markets even if the symbolization of the dominant institutional spheres is relatively strong. The flow of resources a m o n g markets is relatively restricted: most of the free resources are directed towards the centre. Concomitantly, in such situations lites will find very w e a k bases for the autono m o u s mobilization of resources and hence the potential for internal transformation tends to be relatively restricted. The stress o n a single institutional focus of this-worldly salvation was c o m m o n to China and Islam (in Islam the focus was politico-military) and resulted in a similar structure of entrepreneurs and to limits to the society's transformative capacities. But in Islam there also existed a very strong other-worldly emphasis (segregated from the this-worldly one) that generated a relatively strong conception of an alternative social and political order and the special sectarian political dynamics characteristic of that civilization. The more institutionally segregated the relations between symbolically tightly interwoven this-worldly and other-worldly foci of salvation (as was the case in Russia), the stronger the trend towards a situation in which the different lites, instead of merging, are increasingly segregated. However, they retain powerful mutual orientations as to the centre. Hence such situations are characterized by wider markets, the free flow of resources, albeit under stricter control, from the centre, and stronger tendencies towards institution-building as well as impingement o n the centre, which can be checked only by coercive measures. A t the same time, the close symbolic interweaving of the foci of salvation creates a potent and potentially articulate conception of alternative social orders. L o w coalescence and segregation between different movements of protest and lites, which yet retain some mutual orientations, tend to assure relative longevity of regimes. W h e n these can no longer be maintained, very violent upheaval occurs, carried by certain (especially secondary) lites recognized in revolutionary movements. B y contrast to all the foregoing cases, in so far as there develop, as in Western Europe, both a tight interweaving of this-worldly and other-worldly foci of salvation and a relative multiplicity of this-worldly arenas serving as the loci of such conceptions, the potentialities of transformability of the social order are highest. These orientations generated a rich variety of conceptions of alternative social orders, and of their attainment, as well as different autonomous lites (articulators of models of social order, functional lites, even articulators of the solidarity of ascriptive collectivities), and coalitions between them. Hence, there


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developed m a n y points of crystallization of free resources and of linkages a m o n g them. T h e comparison between Europe and Islam underlines the importance of the second dimension mentioned above, namely, the degree of association between the attributes of salvation and the attributes of the basic ascriptive collectivities, an association that was very weak in Islam and very strong in Europe. The closer such association, the m o r e channels of resources and the stronger the bases of solidarity between entrepreneurs. Ecology and change Ecological settings above all influence the availability of resources for institutional restructuring and the capacity to institutionalize the potential for change that m a y be contained in any society. Ecological settings also influence the availability of resources in different markets by determining the relative importance of domestic and external markets. T h e comparison between the Byzantine and the Russian empires o n the one hand, and Western European imperial-feudal patterns and the Islamic and Hindu civilizations, o n the other, shows that, under imperial systems there developed relatively unified frameworks of the major compact markets, while in the Western European and the Islamic cases (as well as the Indian one) cross-cutting markets were established. T h e relative predominance of 'internal' marketswhether compact or crosscuttinggenerates, in all these cases, great reservoirs of resources which can be channelled in different directions. Hence they enhance the institution-building and transformative capacity of societiesand in all these societies access to the markets and the flow of resources within them were structured by the major dominant lites. In imperial (and patrimonial) societies such activities were ultimately controlled by the political lites. In the imperial-feudal and different decentralized systems, the structure of the cross-cutting markets and the linkages between them were greatly influenced by the multiplicity of lites which often cut across political boundaries. In all societies the nature of such linkages depended heavily on certain characteristics of lites, as analysed above. Thus, in the realm of Islam, linkages were provided mostly by the ulemas and the various orders. Given their dissociation from the political lite and the official disregard in the Islamic tradition of the major 'local' ascriptive collectivities, these lites did not usually develop very strong solidarity linkages with such collectivities. This lack of solidarity linkages between the ulemas, the political rulers, and broader ascriptive collectivities, minimized their effectiveness in the structuring of broad markets, in mobilizing resources and in directing them into n e w coalescent channels. But given their basic orientations tendencies arose, at least in extreme situations, to coalescence between political and religious change.

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In Europe, solidarity linkages maximized the tendency to the mobilization of resources in m a n y directions and a high degree of coalescence of changes. The Western European and Islamic civilizations, from the point of view of their ecological settings, seem to be close to the H i n d u one. But given that in the Hindu case it w a s only or mainly the ascriptive-ritual networks a n d caste organization that constituted major linkageswith but little this-worldly emphasis on political or economic activitiesthe connection between religious movements and political systems w a s m u c h weaker than either in Islam or in Europe. It chiefly gave rise to patrimonial formations with only modest transformative capacities in the political realm. The institutionalization of potentialities of change does vary not only according to the cultural orientations and solidary relations of lites but also as between societies in which compact, as opposed to cross-cutting markets, predominate. In societies with compact markets, the central controlling mechanism constitutes an easy target for the processes of change, thus often creating an all-or-nothing struggle where the chances of a breakdown of regimes inevitably increases. Cross-cutting markets create greater opportunities of finding various ways of restructuring the different institutional spheres. High dependence on external markets (as can be seen from the analysis of the exceptional city-states and tribal federations) minimizes the opportunity of institutionalizing change, even if it is characterized by a relatively close of coalescence of rebellions, heterodoxies and the central political struggle, and by the development within them of transformative tendencies. T h e intensification of political struggle has, w e have seen, more often led to the demise of these systems and their incorporation in various ways into other societies. The explanation lies in the fact that certain societies attempted to maintain, in their particular international settings, institutional activities more appropriate to 'bigger' societies with wide internal markets (Eisenstadt, 1977). H e n c e these societies tended to specialize in working for different external markets while maintaining a m u c h lower level of domestic specialization. This, as w e have seen, is manifested in the minimal, embryonic development of specialized activities, ruling groups and institutional frameworks. T h e combination of the available resources with the relatively low organizational capacities of the lites explains the difficulties experienced in the institutionalization of potential capacities over the long run. International settings Yet these institutional constellations in general, and the structures of lites and processes of change in particular, are greatly influenced by the international system in which different societies develop. There exists a sort of feedback effect between the place of a society within


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an international system and the structure of its lites. A hegemonic society tends, on the whole, to foster or reinforce more autonomous lites while a state of dependence tends rather to foster or reinforce less autonomous ones, with all the structural and institutional consequences this implies. T w o additional processes or factors are significant. O n e is the 'original' structure of lites as related to the cultural orientations in diffrent societies. In so far as these are relatively non-autonomous, as was the case in Spain, their very hegemony tends to reinforce relatively non-autonomous tendencies, both in the hegemonic centre and in the dependencies. However, as in the case of Japan, such lites d o evince sufficient autonomy for them to attempt to forge a relatively hegemonic position, or at least an independent niche in the international system. Their ability to do this also depends on the structure of the international system. The most important variables in such situations are: the rigidity or flexibility of the organizational and symbolic structure of the hegemonic society and of the dependent societies; the parallelism or similarity between the structures of the imperial centre and its dependencies; permeation of the dependencies by the hegemonic systems, economic, social, political 'imperialist', are identical or organized in a c o m m o n framework; the uniformity of the different links and mechanisms of dependency; the prevalent type of dependency, whether it is direct (direct rule, conquest, etc.) or indirect; the keeness of competition between different hegemonic powers operating within an international orbit and the extent to which secondary powers also develop within each such an orbit. The m o r e prevalent the heterogeneity within an international system a n d the greater the distance and difference between its component units, the greater is the opportunity for transformation and changes from within. Thus the relatively low transformability noted in the Chinese and Byzantine cases seems connected to their setting in international systems characterized by relative rigidity and monolithic tendencies in social and symbolic structures; parallelism or similarity between the structure of the imperial centre and of the peripheries; heavily direct dependency (conquest or geographical contiguity between the imperial centre and its territories); and relatively c o m m o n frameworks of the prevalent international systems, political, cultural and economic. The higher transformability in the other cases seems to be related,first,to the internal structure of the hegemonic power, which w a s more pluralistic or heterogeneous. Within the various economic, political and cultural international systems, which were not organized under one framework, there were certain autonomous and contradictory developments. A n especially important contradiction arose out of the premise of the cultural and political international systems, which often undermined the power structure of a particular imperial system. In most of these cases, too, dependence was multiple and rather indirect. There was further n o close parallel between the social structure of the hegemonic and

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the dependent units. Finally, multiple subcentres of power tended to emerge, representing autochthonous generators of change. M u c h structural and cultural autonomy (as well as the other aspects of flexibility, noted above) facilitated various transformations, i.e. changes in the internal structure and regimes of the imperial centres and their dependencies, shifts of power in the relations between the 'core' of such systems and its dependencies, as well as developments within the hegemonic power, the secondary power and the dependencies. These in turn often favoured new cultural orientations and lites, which tended to transform the restructuring of relations between centre and periphery, between conquerors and conquered.


A H M E D , A . S. 1976. Millenium and Charisma among Norton (ed.), Studies in Roman Economic and Pathans, A Critical Essay in Social AnthroSocial History in Honor of A. C. Johnson, pology. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. p. 336-56. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press. A Y A L O N , D . 1951. L'esclavage du Mameluk. JeruC O H N , B . S. 1971. India: The Social Anthropology salem, Israel Oriental Society. of a Civilization. Englewood Cliffs, N . J . , B A L A Z S , E . 1964. Chinese Civilization and BureaucPrinceton-Hall. racy: Variations on a Theme. N e w Haven, Conn., Yale University Press. Daedalus. 1975. Wisdom, Revelation and Uncertainty. Spring issue. B A R T H , I. 1963. The Role of Entrepreneur in Social Change in Northern Norway. Bergen, Artok. D A H R E N D O R F , R . 1959. Class and Class Conflict in . Industrial Society. Stanford, Calif., Stanford B E L O F F , M . 1964. The Age of Absolutism. London, University Press. Hutchinson. D A R D E S S , J. W . 1973. Conquerors and Confucians; B E N D I X , R . 1960. Max Weber: An Intellectual Aspects of Political Change in Late Yuan Portrait. N e w York, Doubleday. China. N e w York, Columbia University B E N D I X , R . ; R O T H , G . 1971. Scholarship and PartiPress. sanship: Essays an Max Weber. Berkeley, D U B S , H . H . 1939. W a n g M a n g and his Economic University of California Press. Reforms. T'oung Pao, Vol. 35, p. 263-5. BETEILLE, A . 1965. Caste Class and Power: Changing D U M O N T , L . 1970a. Homo Hicrarchius; The Caste Patterns of Stratification in a Tanjore Village. System and its Implications (Mark SainsBerkeley, University of California Press. bury ed.), London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson. B I A R D E A U , M . 1972. Clefs pour la pense hindoue. Paris, ditions Seghers. . 19706. Religion, Politics and History in India: Collected Papers in Indian Sociology. Paris BLOCH, M . 1930. FeudalismEuropean. In: and The Hague, Mouton. E . R . A . Seligman (ed.). Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 6, p. 203-10. N e wE H R E N B E R O , V . 1960. The Greek City-State. Oxford, York, Macmillan. Basil Blackwell. . 1961. Feudal Society. Chicago and London, EISENSTADT, S. N . 1969. The Political Systems of Empires, N e w York, Free Press of Glencoe. University of Chicago Press. (ed.). 1971a. Political Sociology: A Reader. B R U N N E R , O . 1968. Neue Wege der Sozialgeschichte. Gttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. N e w York, Basic Books. . 19716. Social Differentiation and Stratification C H A R A N I S , P. 1940-41. Internal Strife at Byzantium Glenview, Scott Foresman. in the Fourteenth Century. Byzantian, Vol. 15, . 1971c. Societal Goals, Systematic Needs, Social p. 208-30. Interaction and Individual Behavior: Some . 1951a. O n the Social Structure and Economic Tentative Explanation. In: H . Turk and Organization of the Byzantine Empire in the R . R . Simpson (eds.), Institution and Social Thirteenth Century. Byzantinoslavica, Vol. 12, Exchange. The Sociologies of Talcott Parsons p. 94-153. and George C. Homans, p. 36-56. Indianapolis, . 19516. The Aristocracy of Byzantian in the Ind., Bobbs-Merrill. Thirteenth Century. In: P. R . Coleman-


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References (continued) EISENSTADT S. N . 1973a. Tradition, Change and HEESTERMAN, J. C . 1971. Kautalya and the Ancient Indian State. Wiener Zeitschrift fr die Kunde Modernity. N e w York, Wiley. Sd- und Ostasiens, Vol. X V . 19736. Traditional Patrimonialism and Modem Neo-Patrimonialism. (Research Papers in the H E U S S , A . 1973. Das Revolutions Problem in Spiegel der Antiken Geschichte. Historische ZeitSocial Sciences, Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage. schrift, Vol. 216, N o . 1, p. 1-72. (Studies in Comparative Modernization); N o . 90-003.) H I N T Z E , O . 1975. 77;e Historical Essays of Otto Hintze. (Ed. by F . Gelbert.) N e w York, . 1977. Sociological Characteristics and Problems Oxford University Press. of Small States. Journal of International Relations (Jerusalem), Vol. 2, N o . 2, p. 35-60. H o , PING-TI. 1962. 77ie Ladder of Success in Imperial China, Aspects of Social Mobility 1368-1911. . 1978. Revolutions and the Transformation of N e w York, Columbia University Press. Societies. N e w York, The Free Press. H O D G S O N , M . G . S. 1974. The Venture of Islam E I S E N S T A D T , S. N . ; C U R E L A R U , M . 1976. The Form Conscience and History in a World Civilizof SociologyParadigms and Crises. N e w ation. Vol. I, The Classical Age of Islam. York, Wiley. Chicago, 111., University of Chicago Press. . 1977. Macro-SociologyTheory Analysis and Comparative Studies. Current Sociology, H O L T , P. M . ; L A M B T O N , A . K . S.; L E W I S , B . 1970. The Cambridge History of Islam. Cambridge, Vol. 25, N o . 2. Cambridge University Press. E L W I N , M . 1973. The Pattern of the Chinese Past. H U C K E R , C . O . (ed.). 1969. Chinese Government in London, Eyre & Methuen. Ming Times, Seven Studies. N e w York, F O R S T E R R . ; G R E E N J. D . (eds.) 1970. Preconditions Columbia University Press. of Revolution in Early Modern Europe. Baltimore, M d . , Johns Hopkins. H U S S E Y , J. M . 1937. Church and Learning in the Byzantine Empire (867-1185). London, O x Fox, R . G . 1971. Kin, Clan, Raja and Rule, Stateford University Press. Hinterland Relations in Pre-Industrial India. Berkeley, University of California Press. INALCIK, H . 1973. The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age 1300-1600. London, Wcidenfcld & NiF U K S , A . 1974. Pattern and Types of Social Economic colson. Revolution in Greece from the Fourth to the Second Century B . C . Ancient Society, Vol. 5, I S H W A R A N , K . (ed.). 1970. Continuity and Change in p. 51-81. India's Villages. N e w York, Columbia University Press. G E E R T Z , C . 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. N e w I T Z K O W I T Z , N . 1972. Ottoman Empire and Islamic York, Basic Books. Tradition. N e w York, Knopf. G E I X N E R , E . 1969. A Pendulum Swing Theory of Islam. In: R . Robertson (ed.), Sociology of K O L F F , D . H . A . 1971. Sannyasi Trader-Soldiers. Religion, p. 127-41. Harmondsworth, Penguin. 77ie Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol. 8, p. 214-20. G E R S C H E N K O R N , A . 1970. Europe in the Russian Mirror: Four Lectures in Economic History. K R A C K E , E . A . 1953. Civil Service in Early Sung (960-1067). Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. University Press. G I B B , H . A . R . 1962. Studies on the Civilization of Islam. Boston, Mass., Beacon Press. . 1955. Sung Society: Change within Tradition. Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 14, p. 479-89. G I B B , H . A . R . ; B O W E N , H . 1957. Islamic Society and the West, Islamic Society in the Eighteenth . 1957. Religion, Family and Individual in the Century. London, Oxford University Press. Chinese Examination System. In: J. K . Fairbank (ed.), Chinese Thought and Institutions, G L U C K M A N , M . 1963. Order and Rebellion in Tribal p. 251-68. Chicago, HI., University of Chicago Africa. N e w York, Free Press. Press. . 1974. Structuralist Analysis in Contemporary Social Thought. London, Routledge & Kcgan L A O U S T , H . 1965. Les schismes dans l'Islam, introduction une tude de la religion musulmane. Paul. Paris, Payot. H E E S T E R M A N , J. C . 1957. The Ancient Indian Royal L A P I D U S , I. M . 1975a. Hierarchies and Networks: A Consecration, the Rajsuya Described according Comparison of Chinese and Islamic Societies. to the Yajus. Texts and Annoted. The Hague, In: F . W a k c m a n and C . Grant (eds.), Conflict Mouton. and Control in Late Imperial China, p. 26-42. . 1964. Brahmin, Ritual and Rcnouncer. Wiener Berkeley, University of California Press. Zeitschrift fr die Kunde Sd- und Ostasiens, Vol. V I H . . 19756. The Separation of State and Religion in

Comparative analysis of state formation in historical contexts


References (continued) the Development of Early Islamic Society. pedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. V , p. 393International Journal of Middle East Studies, 403. N e w York, Macmillan/Frcc Press. R A E F F , M . 1966. Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia: Vol. 6, p. 363-85. The Eighteenth-century Mobility. N e w York, L E G O F F , J. 1968. Heresies et socits dans l'Europe Harcourt, Brace & World. pr-industrielle. Paris, Mouton. LVI-STRAUSS, C . 1963. Structural Anthropology R E I S C H A U E R , E . O . ; F A I R B A N K , J. K . 1960. East Asia, The Great Tradition, A History of East-Asian (trans, by C . Jacobson and B . G . Schoepf). Civilization, Vol. I. Boston, Houghton Mifflin. N e w York, Basic Books. L E W I S , B . 1950. The Arabs in History. London, R E S I N K , G . I. 1966. Indonesia's History between the Myths. Essays in Legal History and Historical Hutchinson. Theory. The Hague, W . van Hoeve. . 1973. The Significance of Heresy in Islam. Islam in History: Ideas, Men and Events in the R I G G S , F . W . 1966. Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity. Honolulu, East-West Middle East, p. 217-36. London, Alcove Press. Center Press. L I N D S A Y , J. O . (ed.). 1957. New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. VII. Cambridge, Cambridge Rossi, I. (ed.). 1974. The Unconscious in Culture: The Structuralism of Claude Lvi-Strauss in PerUniversity Press. spective. New York, Dutton. L I U , J. T . C . 1959. Reforming Sung China: Wang An-Shih (1021-86) and His New Policies. R U D O L P H , S. M . ; R U D O L P H , L . I.; SINGH, M . 1975. A Bureaucratic Lineage in Princely India: Elite Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. Formation and Conflict in a Patrimonial M A N D E L B A U M , D . G . 1970. Society in India. Vol. I, System. Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 34, Continuity and Change. Vol. II, Change and p. 717-54. Continuity. Berkeley, University of California S A R K I S Y A N Z , E . 1965. Buddhist Backgrounds of the Press. Burmese Revolution. The Hague, M . NijhoiT. M I C H A E L , F. H . 1955. State and Society in Nineteenthcentury China. World Politics, Vol. 7, p. 414- S C H A C H T , J. 1970. L a w and Justice. In: P . M . Holt, A . K . S. Lambtcn and B . Lewis (eds.). 33. The Cambridge History of Islam, Vol. II, . 1965. The Origin of Manchu Rule in China: p. 539-68. Cambridge, Cambridge University Frontier and Bureaucracy as Interacting Forces Press. in the Chinese Empire. N e w York, Octagon. M I L L E R , B . 1941. The Palace School of Mohammed S C H R I E K E , B . J. 1957. Ruler and Realm in Early Java: Selected Writings of B. Schrieke, Indothe Conqueror. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard nesian Sociological Studies. The Hague, University Press. W . van Hoeve. M O M M S E N , W . 1974. Max WeberGesellschaft Politik und Geschichte. Frankfurt-am-Main, S E T O N - W A T S O N , H . 1952. The Decline of Imperial Suhrkamp. Russia 1855-1914. London, Methuen. M O S C A T I , S. 1962. The Face of the Ancient Orient. SHILS, E . 1975. Center and Periphery. Chicago, N e w York, Doubleday. 111., University of Chicago Press. N A K A M U R A , H . 1964. Ways of Thinking of Eastern S I N G E R , M . ; C O H N , B . S. (eds.), 1968. Structure Peoples: India-China-Tibet-Japan. Honolulu, and Change in Indian Society. Chicago, 111., Aldinc. East-West Center Press. N A K A N E , C . 1970. Japanese Society. London, Wei- S O U R D E L , D . 1970. The Abbasid Caliphate. In: D . M . Holt, A . K . S. Lamblen and B . Lewis dcnfcld & Nicolson. (eds.), The Cambridge History of Islam, N E A L E , W . C . 1969. Land is to Rule. In: R . E . FryVol. I, p. 104-40. Cambridge, Cambridge kenberg (ed.), Land Control and Social University Press. Structure in Indian History, p. 3-16. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press. S P U L E R , E . 1970. The Disintegration of the Caliphate O ' D E A , J.; O ' D E A , J.; A D A M S , C . 1975. Religion and in the East. In: P. M . Holt, A . K . S. Lamblen Man: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. N e w and B . Lewis (eds.). The Cambridge History of Islam, Vol. I, p . 143-74. Cambridge, C a m York, Harper & R o w . bridge University Press. O S T R O G O R S K Y , G . 1956. History of the Byzantine State. Oxford, Basil Blackwell. SRINIVAS, M . N . 1966. Social Change in Modern PIPES, R . 1975. Russia under the Old Regime. London, India. Berkeley, University of California Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Press. P R A W E R , J.; E I S E N S T A D T , S. N . 1968. Feudalism. STEINBERG, D . J. (ed.). 1971. In Search of Southeast In: D . L . Sills (ed.), International EncycloAsia. A Modern History. N e w York, Praeger.


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References (continued) T A M B I A H , S. J. 1976. World Conqueror and World V O E G E L I N , E . 1954-56. Order and History, Vols. I I I I . Renouncer. London, Cambridge University Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press. Press. T H A P A R , R . 1978. Ancient Indian Social History. Von G R U N E B A U M , G . E . 1946. Medieval Islam: A Delhi, Orient Longman. Study in Cultural Orientation. Chicago, 111., T I L L Y , C . 1975. National States in Western Europe. University of Chicago Press. (ed.). 1954. Studies in Islamic Cultural History. Princeton, Princeton University Press. T R O E L T S C H , E . 1931. The Social Teaching of the (American Anthropologist Memoir, 76.) Christian Churches. N e w York, Macmillan. W I T T E K , P . 1963. The Rise of the Ottoman Empire. T U R N E R , B . S. 1974. Weber and Islam: A Critical London. Study. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.

State formation in early India

Romila Thapar
Theories on the earliest formation of states in India remain generally rather simplistic. There is none of the richness of concepts, which has entered the discussion of state formation in Africa or Meso-America. This poverty of theory derives, in part, from an abiding obsession with one image of the early Indian state, that of oriental despotism. Projected initially by nineteenth-century British administrators and historians,1 it did not even find its counterpoint, as did m a n y other images from the same source, in the more radical writings of this century. The equally obsessive and generalized Marxist concern with the 'Asiatic m o d e of production', despite contrary empirical evidence, continued to be enthusiastically projected and the labours of Indian Marxists 2 .who tried to show its inapplicability have often been brushed aside. The emphasis o n the nature of the Asian state was given such weight, that the preliminary question of the process of state formation, tended to be neglected. S o m e tentative suggestions grew in the main out to two possible explanations; thefirsthung on the conquest theory, where it was argued that the Aryans conquered the indigenous population in thefirstmillennium B . C . , and this was the initial step in what ultimately resulted in the creation of the state. T h e other argued for internal stratification, that the emergence of castes was an indication of the coming of the state. In the light of more recent research, both these theories are subject to substantial qualification. In thefirstcase, there is considerable doubt n o w as to whether there was an Aryan race which conquered systematically throughout the Indian sub-continent. Instead it is being suggested that 'Aryan' should be seen as a cultural and linguistic concept, its diffusion relating more to migration and technological links, rather than to conquest. In the second case, the equation of caste stratification with class stratification is being questioned. Perhaps the best w a y of re-examining the question would seem to be to analyse afresh the process of

Romila Thapar is Professor of Ancient Indian History at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. Amongst her publications are Asoka and the Decline of theMauryas (1961), History of India (Vol. I, 1966), The Past and Prejudice (1975) and Ancient Indian Social History: S o m e Interpretations (1978).

Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XXXII, N o . 4 , 1980


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state formation in the earliest historical period and ascertain the major changes which took place in the transition from a non-state to a state society. A state is generally associated with political authority which functions within a territorial limit, delegates its powers to functionaries, is financed b y revenue collected from those w h o contribute regularly on an impersonal basis to its maintenance and acts as an instrument for integrating social segments identified, not merely by ritual roles but also by economic functions.3 The state therefore is different from government and is in turn different from society. T h e emergence of such a system, historically attested for thefirsttime in India, occurred in the middle of thefirstmillennium B . C . and had as its geographical focus the central Ganges valley (Fig. 1). Earlier, at the start of thefirstmillennium B . C . there is evidence from Vedic texts and archaeology of a society located in the western Ganges valley which appeared to be o n the edge of state formation but was different from the subsequent society to its east, which clearly shows evidence of the existence of a state. The evidence gathered from the various Vedic texts and other related literature suggests a range of stratified societies. T h e chiefships of the Rig-Vedic times, such as that of the Bharatas, m o v e d gradually towards a monarchical system in the western Ganges valley of which the K u r u and the Pancala were typical. The chiefships of the central Ganges valley, a m o n g which the most famous was that of the Vrijjis, survived for a longer period, and in the view of some historians had evolved into states before they fell prey to the powerful monarchies of the area. The analysis of these early forms is particularly relevant in the Indian context, since the process of state formation was a continuing process in the subcontinent throughout the centuries, with the n e w areas being brought into state systems. It has been said that there was a pathological fear of anarchy in India, defined as the absence of a king or a state; it can be equally well argued that it was not the fear of anarchy but the justification for this continual process of state formation which was being emphasized in the sources. The emergence of the state in any of the larger regions of the Indian subcontinent was not a uniform change affecting the entire region; more often it was initially limited to small nuclei. This tended to m a k e the change all the more dramatic. A study of the earliest forms therefore m a y provide a pattern, which was either repeated or modified or reorganized in later periods, but of which the constituents would remain substantially the same. In the western Ganges valley, the transition from chiefship to kingship, resulted in a condition which might be called arrested development of the state.4 Certain trends inclined towards the emergence of a state, but others remained impediments. Vedic society of the earlier half of thefirstmillennium B.c. can be characterized as a lineage-based society. The unit was the clan, and this formed the essential structure at m a n y levels. There was a consciousness of territory and an identity with territory expressed through the clan n a m e being bestowed o n the

State formation in early India


F I G . 1. The Ganges valley.

territory claimed. Thus, the territories of Gandhra, M a d r a , Kekeya, Kura, Pacala, Matsya, were all named after the clan which claimed sovereignty over them. Such territories were termed the janapada, literally 'the area where the jana tribe placed its foot'. The clan consisted of the families of the chiefs (rjanya) and the rest of the clan (the vis). Land was originally owned in the n a m e of the clan, and w e are told that the chiefs were not allowed to give it away without the consent of the clan.c T o begin with the chief was the protector of the clan. This w a s necessary in a society of pastoral cattle-keepers for w h o m the rights over grazing lands and the increase of the herd was crucial. Herds were often enlarged by stealing neighbours' cattle, and the search for cows {gvisthi) became a synonym for cattle raids. A successful cattle raid was followed by a division of the booty, the distribution taking place at the assembly of the clan. Stratification was reinforced by the major part of the


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spoils going to the chief and the priests. The priests claimed that their incantations and prayers assured victory to the heroes and that they alone could communicate with the gods. Pastoralism was not, however, the main occupation of the clan. The cultivation of wheat and barley and, in some areas, rice, increased in importance with the settling of the clans in the western Ganges valley.8 Agriculture led to a gradual change in the definition of wealth from thousands of head of cattle and horses together with slave-girls, chariots and gold, to the inclusion of land as an item of economic value. Agriculture encouraged a different power base for the chief, with the concept of territory being transformed into rights over land. This is expressed in a change in terminology where the rjanya, still the consecrated chief, becomes part of the wider group of ksatriyas, a term derived from ksatra meaning 'power'. T h e ruling chiefs within this group moved further towards kingship through a series of elaborate sacrificial rituals. These involved assertions of association with divinity. T h e rituals were performed for the chiefs by the brahmans w h o thus become the legitimizers of the n e w status, and incidentally, thereby, also improved their o w n status and claimed the pre-eminent position in the social hierarchy. T h e gradual concentration of power in the hands of the ksatriya rja increased his effective control, but, at the same time, lesser chiefs were not his appointees and held the position in their o w n right. There was a minimal delegation of authority. T h e power of the king was further weakened by the separation of sacred and temporal functions. T h e office of the king drew heavily on religious sanction, as is evident from the association of kingship with fecundity and prosperity. This association is often symbolized by the king being regarded as a 'rain-maker'. It is repeatedly stated that unrighteous kings are responsible for drought. M a n y stories refer to the coming of the rains after twelve years of drought, w h e n the throne is restored to the rightful incumbent. T h e support for the office came from occasional tribute and prestations. T h e words used for such tribute, bali, bhga and sulka, were subsequently to become the regular terms for periodic taxation. This has led to some controversy as to whether they should not be interpreted as taxes in this early period as well.7 But in the context in which they occur they seem to connote tribute rather than tax, since they are not periodic nor of a stipulated amount nor are they collected from designated categories of persons. The providers of prestations and tribute were of course the lesser members of the clan and the texts speak of the ksatra eating the clan in the same w a y as deer eat corn.8 The vis or clan had itself undergone a change with the grihapati, the head of the household gradually emerging as a distinct social entity. Significantly in the subsequent period, the grihapati is often described as the vaisya (derived from vis) and the functions of the vaisya are precisely those performed by the grihapati in the earlier period, namely, cattle rearing, agriculture and trade.9 The grihapatis m a y originally have been the junior members of the ruling lineages or

State formation in early India


the wealthier members of the clan. Their emergence suggests the existence of what might be termed 'a householding economy' in which each patrilineal household was the unit. Cultivated land owned by the grihapati was worked by the family and, if necessary, by hired labourers and slaves as well. M i n i m u m handicrafts required for servicing the household were also produced by such employees, an activity, which, w h e n it increased, became the basis for exchange and trade. The identity of the labourers and slaves is not clearly indicated but they are referred to as sdras and dsas. Both terms have u n k n o w n etymologies. They occur earlier as the names of tribes in north-western India and m a y therefore reflect the subordination of alien groups.10 Dsa was later to become the technical term for slave.

The theory of vama

Society w a s by n o w sufficiently stratified to require a theoretical structure of explanation and this is expressed in the theory of vama, often translated as 'caste'. It has been argued that this was a system of ritual ranking in which the purest, the brahman, was ranked the highest.11 T h e others, in degrees of impurity, took lower positions with the lowest being that of the untouchable, whose emergence belongs to the later post-Vedic period. A n alternative hypothesis maintains that the establishment of the varnas indicates a class stratification which points to the existence of the state, even though the other elements of the state remain elusive at this time.12 W h a t has not been recognized in these theories is that the main criterion in differentiating each varna in the initial stage is precisely that which links it most closely with lineage and relates to different patterns of marriage alliances. Three distinct patterns are discernible. T h efirstis that of the brahmans observing the gotra subdivisions in which exogamy is crucial and marriage within the subdivision is not allowed. A special dispensation had to be given to the brahmans of the south for them to break this rule and marry the mother's brother's daughter. T h e second pattern is that of the ksatriya and the vaisya w h o more often than not marry endogamously within the vamsa or lineage. T h e third pattern of the sudra system is totally different and is based on the notion that the parentage is of 'mixed castes' (sankrnajati). The rank of the sdra is determined by the particular intercaste combination of his parentage.13 T h e reconstruction of the origins of the Sudra castes is in any case an exercise in theory, since the possible permutations are infinite and the sdra lists in the texts do not necessarily agree. F o o d taboos associated with each varna strengthen the notion of ritual ranking,11 as does the fact that the non-brahman Buddhist and Jaina literature reverses the ranking of thefirsttwo castes and the ksatriyas are placed higher than the brahmans. In so far therefore as it was a ritual ranking it only applied to areas dominated by brahmanical values. T h e co-relation with economic status is also not invariable for there are impoverished brahmans and wealthy sudras.


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The unity of society and internal harmony was sought to be established through the varna structure. There were no formal procedures for legal action and the redressing of wrong was linked to social pressures and expiatory rituals. External protection w a s highlighted in the office of the rj or chief. Indirect attempts to sanction his control over physical force, can be seen in the close association of the senni (commander) with his immediate retinue, as well as in the tradition of leadership in battle being a prerequisite for the office of the chief. There were multiple prestations and gifts to support elaborate rituals maintaining the status of both the chief and of sacred authority, but there was no systematic method of collecting an income to finance the institutions of a state. M o s t of the wealth was consumed in any case in prestigious rituals. The vast sacrificial ceremonies, the Yajnas, extending over m a n y months if not years were rituals which combined the function of the potlatch with various degrees of gift-exchange. Gifts established status a m o n g chiefs. The distribution of gifts by the yajamna (the one w h o holds the sacrifice) to the priests established his status as well as that of the priests. The rituals were a source of legitimacy for the chief but they also prevented the investment of wealth into economically more productive channels. T h e diversion of wealth into such channels did take place in the succeeding period, the middle of thefirstmillennium B . C . , and in the adjoining area to the east, the central Ganges valley. The change of geographical location is referred to in the story of Videgha Mathava w h o , w e are told, travelled east, but stopped and waited at the River Gandaka until Agni, the god offire,had purified the land across the river, after which he settled there. Being a low-lying, wetter area, pastoralism met with problems and gave w a y to a predominantly agricultural economy. T h e cultivation of wheat and rice was possible in Kosala (eastern Uttar Pradesh) where one of the early kingdoms arose. Further east, the marshlands of north Bihar were more conducive to rice.15 Rice is essentially a single-crop cultivation, and even with the assistance of irrigation in the form of river channels and tanks, as mentioned in the sources, it was difficult to ensure a regular second crop. T h e need to obtain a larger surplus led to the extension of agriculture and the references tofieldsunder rice run into hundreds of acres in the descriptions of wealthy landowners. 10 T h e larger acreages of cultivated land were either held by clans or by individual owners where clan holdings had ceased. This was regarded as private ownership with full rights of alienation. Irrigation was either the concern of the clan or was maintained by local landowners, a pattern which was to persist in most parts of northern India for m a n y centuries. T h e state rarely provided irrigation facilities. The extension of plough agriculture and the organization of irrigation have often been regarded as sufficient requirements for the emergence of the state. That the emergence of the state was not an automatic or mechanical development from these changes is suggested by the co-existence in the central Ganges valley of two types of political systems, where in the one case the state remained in limbo, in the

State formation in early India


other itflourished.The contrasting picture is presented on the one hand in the gana-sangha systems often represented as republics, oligarchies or chiefdoms, and on the other, in the monarchies which increasingly became the n o r m for the state in early India. The existence of chiefdoms was not restricted to the central Ganges valley. They are referred to in other parts of India well into thefirstmillennium A . D . " Those of the central Ganges valley have however been described more fully in early Buddhist sources. T h e chiefdoms were either those of a single clan such as that of the Skyas, to which the Buddha belonged, or of a confederacy of clans such as the eight which went into the making of the famous Vrijji confederacy. T h e clans were uniformly oksatriya status but there was a sharp demarcation between the ruling clans (rja-kiila) w h o claimed ownership of the land, had the right to sit in the clan assembly and were accorded the highest social status, and the other half, as it were, which consisted of the hired labourers and the slaves w h o worked the land for the ruling clans and w h o were excluded from claiming social and political rights.18 N o mention is m a d e in the chiefdoms of private property in land, or of the grihapatis as landowners. In case of conflict, as over the distribution of water for irrigation on one occasion, the ruling clans as a group entered the fray and fought it out.10 There was, however, a fairly complex system of administration in which all the members of the ruling clans had equal status. Matters of importance were discussed in the assembly hall and voted upon, and problems of administration were given due weight by the assembly. The gana-sangha chiefships seem therefore to conform to the category of stratified societies prior to state formation, as defined by some theorists. In the chiefdoms, the religious ritual was the worship of ancestral tumuli, the brahmanical sacrificial ritual being alien. The status of the brahman therefore even in the caste hierarchy was lower than that of the members of the ksatriya clans w h o were the ruling families and the landowners.20 The varna system is treated as a theoretical notion with little relevance to actual social stratification. Social functioning w a s based on the ati, which has been translated as the m i n i m u m effective lineage and on the jti, a larger group frequently defined by occupation but whose membership was conditional on being born into the group. A dual stratification divided jtis into high and low. T h e absence of an emphasis on ritual ranking led to these areas being categorized as impure and outside the social pale in brahmanical sources.21 That there w a s a powerful religious alternative to brahmanism in the chiefdoms is evident from the loyalty of m a n y of these clans to religious teachers w h o emerged from their midst, such as Gautama Buddha w h o was a Skya, and Mahavlra, associated with Jainism, w h o was of the Vrijji confederacy. Whereas the chiefdoms remained, as it were, on the edge of state formation, the monarchies such as the kingdoms of Kosala and M a g a d h a indicate the emergence of full-fledged states. This transition appears to have followed from a number


Romila Thapar

of other major changes. T h e more evident of these changes were the emergence of a professional, commercial group as well as of a peasant economy. Both developments broke the limitations of the prestation system of the western Ganges valley and led to a more liberated economic expression. Urban centres were often in origin the residences of the ruling clans and, as such, eachjanapada, or territory, identified with a clan, had at least one large centre which was the political capital. This was true of the jcmapadas of north-western India as of those of the central Ganges valley. The K u r u capital of Hastinpura and the Pacala capital of Ahichhatra were equally important as political centres as the Skya capital of Kapilavastu and the Vrijji centre at Vaisli. A significant change in urbanization came about when some of these centres acquired commercial importance both as places of production and with incipient markets. The combination of political and commercial activity was what led them to be called the 'great cities', mahnagara, in Buddhist texts.32 The process can be traced through various stages. O n e of the by-products of kingship and the concentration of political power in the hands of one family was a change in clan relations. The heads of ten households, the grihapatis as private owners of land, and as the main supporters of the economy, had improved their status. With the extension of agriculture in the central Ganges valley, the grihapati became the symbol of wealth and the main tax-payer propping up the kingdom. Wealth was increasingly computed in measures of grain, and later in coined money. 2 3 The wealth released to the grihapati from both the extension of agriculture and the decline of a prestation economy could n o w be invested in trade. Trade developed out of more simple exchanges at the level of the village and of the market, the nigama. Itinerant smiths working on the n e w technology of iron doubtless encouraged itinerant trade. This m a y gradually have stabilized into regular trading circuits. The growth of settlements around the river system in the Ganges valley provided a natural means of communication by river. The locations of the 'great cities' associated with the early trade are at nodal points in relation to the river system, and are generally at the confluence of at least two ecological zones. Literary descriptions of cities exaggerated their size, sometimes up tofiftysquare kilometres, which is not corroborated by archaeology.24 Nevertheless the urban levels at excavations are considerably larger in area than the pre-urban levels and the literary exaggeration symbolizes the sense of a larger size. There is also a recognizable uniformity of some archaeological artefacts which characterize urban levels at sites in m a n y parts of the Ganges valley. Associated with these levels is the discovery of punch-marked coins in particular which have been found in m a n y thousands. These form the archaeological counterpart to references to coined m o n e y gradually becoming the basis of transactions in the cities. N o t only did this extend the reach of trade, but it also brought with it the profession of the banker w h o financed trade. Usury is frowned upon in brahmanical sources. The good brahman is permitted to lend money on interest only in the direst of circumstances,

State formation in early India


and then too is required to perform an expiatory ritual to absolve himself of the accruing sin.25 Buddhist ethics on the other hand recognize usuary as a legitimate activity open to any m e m b e r of society. T h e term used for the banker is sreSthin setthi meaning he w h o has the best, and the banker was a highly respected person in non-brahmanical sources. Frequently, the wealthy grihapati m o v e d into the banking profession and became the respected sresthin.2" T h e existence of the heterodox religious sects, recognizably the Buddhists, Jainas, and a large variety of non-conformist groups such as the Crvkas and the Lokyatas, helped to legitimize the grihapatis' investments in trade, rather than the burning up of wealth in ritual prestations at the sacrificial ceremonies. The brahmanical sacrifices did not die out, since kings still sought legitimization of their status through these rituals, but they became increasingly a formality. W h a t is more important, the consumption of wealth at such gatherings was n o w marginal to the total wealth produced. Brahman specialists in the rituals were rewarded with grants of fertile agricultural land and some of the wealthiest landowners in the n e w kingdoms were such brahmans, despite the injunctions in the legal texts against brahmans making a living from agriculture." The householding economy based on the private ownership of land which emerged from the gradual disintegration of clan ownership not only led to a diversion of wealth into trade and commerce, but also brought about changes in the agrarian economy. Where the heads of households took increasingly to trade, their supervision over agriculture was reduced. Thusfieldstended to be cultivated not by their employees, but were leased to peasant cultivators w h o paid a share of the produce to the owner. These m a y well have been the erstwhile labourers, but their function and status had changed w h e n they became tenants. In m a n y cases the sizes of holdings were too large for the household to work them directly and, consequently, tenants had to be installed. In one case w e are told that after renouncing a major part of his wealth, the head of the household still retained 500 ploughs, 100 acres of land and 40,000 cattle. Impoverished grihapatis, those w h o , because of drought and lack of a harvest were unable to retain any wealth, and were reduced to the status of poor peasants are also mentioned. Peasant tenures were developed further through the settling of waste land by agriculturalists. This was done through the entrepreneurship of the state w h o then claimed ownership over such lands. In thus extending the agricultural economy the state obtained larger revenue.28 Where the state owned the land a system of tenures was established with the cultivators paying a percentage of the share to the state. In such tenurial systems there was a direct relation between the state and the cultivator without the intervention of the landowning intermediary. In caste terminology the sUdra in the agrarian context gradually became the cultivator in the sense of a peasant. T h e siUdra as peasant and artisan and the yaisya as the grihapati become the main bearers of the burden of tax, and taxation comes to be an important element in the theory of the state.


Romila Thapar

Changing theories of the state

In the period during which the state emerged there is a noticeable change in the explanation for the origin of kingship and government. 29 Whereas earlier, qualities of leadership were stressed and prowess in battle prized, later texts speak more frequently of other elements. In these theories the contractual aspect is added deriving from a condition in which society itself was supposed to have undergone a change. The earliest society is described as a Utopian remote past in which there were n o kings, laws or social distinctions. But gradually virtue declined and this m a d e it necessary for laws to be instituted and for authority to be vested in the king as the protector of society both from external threats and internal dissensions. T h e description of the decline of virtue varies in brahmanical and Buddhist sources in accordance with the perspective of each on social change. Another important distinction is that the brahmanical king is the nominee of the gods, but the Buddhist version speaks only of people electing one from a m o n g their midst and investing him with power. In the fourth century B . C . the theory of the state is elaborated upon in the notion of the seven elements, later to be called the seven limbs, which constitute the state.30 These are discussed in the Arthasstra of Kautalya, w h o lists them as the ruler, the ministers and administrators, the territory, the capital, the treasury where the revenue was brought, physical force and allies. These constituents existed in a somewhat nebulous form in the chiefdoms of the central Ganges valley and one m a y therefore describe the Vrijji confederacy as a state-in-the-making. But they are more firmly and clearly recognizable in the monarchies of this area such as that of Kosala and M a g a d h a . The texts which describe them regard the monarchical state as its only legitimate form. T h e legitimization of the monarchical state is also reflected in the conflated and interpolated versions of the two epics of early India. The Mahbhrata which has as its main location the K u r u territory of the western Ganges valley records the anguish of the chiefdoms slowly giving way to the coming of the state. The narrative depicts a society prior to the rise of the state, but the heavily conflated additions which take on the character of didactic interpolations are equally clearly a defence of the monarchical state. The Rmyana has as its base the kingdom of Kosala in the central Ganges valley, and possibly the earliest version of the epic was restricted to this area. But with the extension of its geography in later redactions, the horizon was also extended. The conflict between the state and the non-state is m u c h more clearly crystallized in the Rmyana where R a m a the hero, a prince of the state of Kosala battles against Rvana whose society of Raksasas said to be demons is strongly suggestive of a chiefdom. The Rmyana in particular has a chequered history. It was translated into various Indian languages and with each version some changes were introduced. It is significant that the rendering of the text into regional languages tends to

State formation in early India


coincide with the establishment of strong monarchical kingdoms on an extensive scale in the same areas. The translations therefore, apart from the religious message of propagating the cult of Vishnu, were also a subtle means of eulogizing the monarchical state. A s a continuing process in Indian history, in areas beyond the Ganges valley, the pattern of change from lineage-based societies to state systems is a recurrent pattern. The process is not in every case entirely identical to the one described here, but broadly approximates to it. Where clan lands lay juxtaposed with m o n archies, clan ownership was eroded by the conquest of the area or by the encroachment of the monarchical system through the clearing of waste land and the establishing of agricultural settlements. Ruling clans took o n ksatriya status and with the break-up of clan-held lands the lesser ksatriya families claimed ownership over private holdings.31 T h e ruling clans became the feudatories to the neighbouring monarchies, and if the control of the latter weakened the feudatories gradually acquired independent status. A s local lites they emulated the life-style of the monarchies and included in this was patronage of courtly literature in Sanskrit, the building of temples the granting of land to brahmans learned in the Veda and the encouraging of a n e w phase of Hinduism reflected in the Puranic texts. Those reduced to the condition of peasant tenants were given the rank of sras as also were those w h o worked as artisans and craftsmen. Trade in the early stages remained the occupation of the outsider though gradually the wealthier local families were inducted into this circuit as well. The varna system in such areas soon became the model for social organization with the introduction of caste society. Brahmans were imported since legitimization through the sacrificial rituals was necessary for the n e w order. In return they were given substantial grants of land and other forms of patronage and often became the focal point of cultural assimilation. Legitimization did not merely m e a n the centring of a monarchical state but also the provision o ksatriya genealogies and lineage links for those w h o had succeeded in acquiring political power. 32 The genealogical component of the historical tradition is therefore given priority in the historical chronicles written after the middle of thefirstmillennium A . D . The vaisya even as a caste category tends to be less important in later centuries w h e n occupations connected with trade are often relegated to sdra status. With the acceleration in the formation of small states in the latefirstand second millenniums A . D . , there is a m u s h r o o m growth of sdra jtis, reflecting the assimilation of n e w clans o n an extended scale, as well as the proliferation of occupational groups in newly opened areas.33 The ritual hierarchy of the varna system was maintained with the introduction of religious forms into newly established states and the attempt to absorb the existing religious cults and sects into what might be called the great tradition of Puranic Hinduism. The rituals sought to assimilate the local clan deity, to incorporate its territory as part of the n e w state and to convert its priests either into the


Romila Thapar

"brahman caste or as special functionaries in temples built to the deity. This has been demonstrated for example in the history of the Jagannath cult at Puri which becomes such a focus in a late phase of the growth of the state in Orissa.34 In such situations there was sometimes a convergence of caste and economic statuses. Even where this did not happen the varna system helped convey a sense of orderliness, uniform with other areas despite such economic transformations as the emergence of a peasant economy and commercial groups. The transition from lineage to state was not the only pattern of change, nor was conquest the only avenue of state formation as has been asserted by m a n y commentators on the pre-modern Indian past. Areas with a long history of state systems underwent intensive historical changes through time, the varying forms being integral to the nature and role of the state. T h e latter ranged from centralized unitary states to what have recently been described as segmentary states, not to mention various relatively decentralized systems in which varieties of peasant tenures and commercial interests constituted the variables. T h e relationship between metropolitan areas and peripheral areas was by no means unchanging or "uniform. Nevertheless there is a tendency a m o n g theorists on the pre-modern state to insist that the Indian data supports a single system having prevailed throughout the sub-continent and valid virtually for all time. Briefly summarized, the discussion of the state in pre-modern India assumes a static situation until the colonial period, the only change being from clan systems to the engulfing of society by the despotic state, a change believed to have occurred on an extensive scale in antiquity. With the absence of private property in land, ownership was vested either in the state or in the village community which was in any case subservient to the state. A despotic king extracted revenues from the village communities. These were described as otherwise autonomous and autarchic except that production being entirely agricultural was dependent on irrigation facilities controlled by the state through a hierarchy of officials w h o also collected the revenue. In such a situation the rare town was an administrative centre, there being a total absence of commerce. The only commodities produced were luxury goods for royal or courtly consumption. This image of what was in essence regarded as oriental despotism was elaborated upon in Marx's 'Asiatic M o d e of Production' and remains the most influential theoretical model for discussion of the traditional Indian political economy. Attempts have been m a d e to show that the empirical data do not support such a model or that the model itself contradicts the very theory of a dialectical process, but nevertheless insistence on its applicability continues. Recently, a more refined definition of the Asiatic m o d e of production has been suggested on the basis of data relating to the Inca state in Peru and its environs.35 The pre-Inca situation was one in which land was owned communally by clans, was redistributed periodically between extended families, w h o worked it but did not o w n it, and labour was c o m m u n a l , with the villagers acting in

State formation in early India


co-operation. The Incas conquered these clans and declared that all land was the property of the state, some of it being declared crown land. T h e rest of the land was worked by members of the clan, but by forced labour. T h e clans lost their rights over the land in terms of ownership but continued to have rights of possession and use, and production therefore remained c o m m u n a l , despite a changed m o d e of production. T h e Inca state maintained some of the earlier customs of providing food, drink and seed to the cultivators in an apparent attempt to suggest that the earlier system still prevailed. There was also an administrative organization to control the clans. T h e state, in such a system, was the collective landlord and therefore the superior community. Kinship relations as ties in production were destroyed, as was the earlier social formation. The application of such a model to the early Indian situation remains inappropriate. There is some ambiguity on the question of the ownership f land by the state other than in the clearly defined state lands. But there are frequent references to private ownership and to the alienation of land by its owners. W h e r e th state system already existed, bringing n e w land under cultivation was in m a n y instances, carried out through the agency of the state either by land grants to individuals or by settling the area with agriculturalists. Mention is m a d e in the Arthasstra of Kautalya of settlements odra agriculturalists brought from overpopulated areas or induced to come from neighbouring kingdoms. 36 Elsewhere the same text makes special mention of state lands, and refers to these as being cultivated either by share-croppers or by hired labourers and slaves or even by those undergoing judicial punishment.37 However, these settlements did not eliminate the independent owners of the land. The question as to which type of agrarian structure predominated, privately owned or state-owned land, remains without a statistically proved answer. Possibly the short duration of large-scale states and the availability of n e w lands until recent centuries would suggest that the extension of agriculture through settlements by the state was not utilized to the point of its becoming the predominant system. In any case, the increasing incidence of land grants m a d e by members of the lite to religious and secular beneficiaries from thefirstmillennium A . D . onwards would have militated against the absolute control over land by the state. The continuation of independent clan systems juxtaposed with peasant economies until recent times would also suggest that state entrepreneurship in agriculture was not uniform throughout the various kingdoms. The major form of peasant protest against oppressive taxes until the middle of the second millennium A . D . was not revolt but migration to new lands outside the jurisdiction of the state to which the peasant belonged. Kings are warned not to over-tax the peasants, lest they migrate and thereby impoverish the kingdom. Migration would again point access to fresh lands for settlement. Such protestors were doubtless welcome in neighbouring, kingdoms for their settlement would result in additional revenue. .. . .


Romila Thapar

Theories of state formation relating to pre-modern India tend to either ignore or to underplay the importance of both the peasant economy and the rise of commercially based urban centres as factors in historical change. Lineage or clan systems were weakened by the strengthening of these two 1 features in particular. Ritual status in so far as it was expressed in the varna or caste hierarchy acted as a continuing undercurrent of lineage systems, particularly in societies dominated bybrahmanical values, and where caste and economic status tended at times to converge. Such societies were often those in which the commercial economy was weak or else was controlled by the ritually high castes. The strength of the c o m mercial economy is not recognized by modern commentators at other times perhaps because of the debate on the pre-conditions necessary for capitalism and the emphasis given to what was seen as the marginal role of the commercial economy in India. State formation in early Indian history m a y be seen as a process of change from social formations broadly classified as lineage-based systems to those dominated by a peasant state system. But the nature of the state and the changes which it underwent through time do not conform easily to any of the existing models. N o r is the change from one social formation to another clear-cut, for there is m u c h that survives from the earlier to the latter and m a n y overlaps. Apart from the interpretational preconceptions of m a n y theorists on pre-modern India, it is also these overlaps which have often helped to maintain the interplay between ritual and economic status, leading to the clouding over of the one by the other, and thus effectively hiding both the essential points of historical change and the complexities of Indian society in its early phases. Notes

5 6

L . Krader in The Asiatic Mode of Production Indian Historical Review, July 1975, Vol. II, (Asseh, 1975) traces the sources of the N o . 1, p. 1-14. 8 idea in various European writings from the Satapatha Brahmana, XII.7.1.12. 8 seventeenth century onwards. Gautama DharmasUtra, X.47; pastambha DharSuch as the papers by Irfan Habib and S. Naqvi in mastra, II.11.28.1. 10 Science and Human Progress (Bombay, 1974), H . W . Bailey, 'Iranian Arya and Daha', Transand Romila Thapar, The Past and Prejudice, actions of Jhe Philological Society, 1959, N e w Delhi, 1979. p. 71 if. Sdra is sometimes linked to the H . Claessen and P . Skalnik, The Early State, Ksudraka or Oxydrakoi tribe mentioned in Mouton, 1978; M . Fried, The Evolution of accounts of Alexander's campaign in northern Political Society, N e w York, 1967. India. J. W . McCrindle, The Invasion of A more detailed discussion of state formation in the India, p. 324-5, London, 1896; Plutarch, middle of thefirstmillennium B . C . in northern Lives, IX. India will be available in Romila Thapar,' 11 L . Dumont, Homo Hierarchlcus, London, 1972. 12 From Lineage to State (in press). R . S. Sharma, op. cit. . 13 Satapatha Brahmana, XII.7.1.15. Manu Dharmasstra, X.12 ff. 11 Romila Thapar, 'The Study of Society in Ancient Ibid., IV.205 IT. 15 India', Ancient Indian Social History: Some O . H . K . Spate, India and Pakistan, p. 514 ff, Interpretations, N e w Delhi, 1978. London, 1964. 16 R . S. Sharma, 'Class Formation and its Material N . Wagle, Society at the Time of the Buddha, Basis in the Upper Gangetic Basin', The Bombay, 1966; R . Fick, The Social Organ-

State formation in early India


Notes (continued) ization in North-east India in the Buddha's Time, Calcutta, 1920. V . S. Agrawala, India as Known to Panini, p . 426 ff, Varanasi, 1963. H . N . Jha, The Licchavis, Varanasi, 1970. Kunla Jtaka. N . Wagle, op. cit. Manu Dharmasstra, 11.23; X . 4 5 . Fick, o p . cit., p . 251 ff. Vinaya Pitaka, I, p . 240-1. A . Ghosh, The City in Early Historical India, Simla, 1973. BaudKyana Dharmasutra, This is also attested to by the epigraphical evidence of donations to the Buddhist sangha from the second century B . C . onwards in western India ' and in the Andhra region. BaudKyana Dharmasutra, I.5.10.28. Kautalya Arthasstra, II.l; 11.14; 11.24.
28 30 31

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

32 33 31

35 35 37

27 28

R . S. Sharma, Political Ideas and Institutions in Ancient India, Delhi, 1968. Arthasstra, VI. 1. Surajit Sinha, 'State Formation and Rajput Myth in Tribal Central India', Man in India, January-March 1962, Vol. 42, N o . 1, p . 3 5 80. Romila Thapar, 'Genealogy as a Source of Social History', op. cit., p. 326 ff. R . S. Sharma, Social Changes in Early Medieval India, Delhi, 1969. H . Kulke, 'Royal Temple Policy and Structure of Medieval Hindu Kingdoms', in A . Eschmann et al., The Cult of Jagannath and the Regional Tradition of Orissa, N e w Delhi, 1978. M . Godelier, Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology, p. 186ff,Cambridge, 1977. Arthasstra, II.l. Ibid., 11.24.

Central patterns
States, ideologies and collective action in Western Europe
Pierre Birnbaum
Historical sociology has gradually brought to light the m a n y processes which give rise to specific types of states. Rejecting all determinist or evolutionist explanations, it affirms the originality of the various mechanisms of political modernization. 1 Political systems, then, do not follow one another in ah-inevitable sequence, as w a s maintained both by traditional political philosophy and by the reductionist theories, which derive the nature of politics from the successive stages of economic development, often on the basis of structuro-functionalist models of organicist origin, or of structural changes which, they claim, necessarily affect economic systems throughout history. O n e of the least challengeable gains of contemporary political sociology lies precisely in the recognition of striking originality in the political formula which, at the end of the Middle Ages, took hold in certain European societies whose centres came u p against resistance from obdurate feudal strongholds on the periphery. T h e birth of the stateparticularly necessary in the case of Franceis therefore perceived as the result of a process of differentiation which fostered the formation of an autonomized public area and of structures peculiar to it which attest to a gradual institutionalization. Tied to a particular history in a specific socio-cultural and religious context, the state was above all the result of a tremendous differentiation of social structures. Its advent overturned once and for all the organization of the social system, which henceforth took its structure from the state. T h e state thus emerged as an institutionalized politico-administrative machine, served b y officials w h o identified themselves with their functions, and cut off from civil society, over which it tried to exercise total guardianship, supervising that society through its administrative authorities and private law, dominating it through its police, stimulating it through intervention in the economy, and ultimately mastering it by winning over the people and bringing them to accept its o w n values. Other societies, such as England, were not faced with crises of that kind. F r o m the end of the Middle Ages onwards, save in exceptional times, the centralization which affected all political systems was not matched there by a differentiation of politico-administrative structures. Civil society largely succeeded in Pierre Birnbaum is Professor at the University ofParis-I, 17 rue de la Sorbonne, Paris Cedex 05. A specialist in political sociology, he is the author of Les sommets de l'tat (1977), L a classe dirigeante franaise (1978) and (with B. Badie) Sociologie de l'tat (1979) amongst other works.

Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XXXII, N o . 4, 1980


Pierre Birnbaum

regulating itself, the various social categories more or less managed to m a k e their voices heard at the centre, and Parliament m a d e it possible to install efficient machinery of representation. Thus England did not experience the building of a state on the lines ofthat taking shape in France and, to a lesser extent, for example, in Prussia. A legitimate centralization prevented the emergence of a differentiated politico-administrative machine claiming the right to be separate from civil society, the better to rule it. In the United K i n g d o m to this day, a relatively permeable social aggregate, or Establishment, and not a true state, organizes the workings of a civil society from which it does not differentiate itself.2 Once brought to term, these two diametrically opposed processes of political centralization each gave rise to a transformation of the entire social system which was destined to remain quasi-permanent. F r o m then onwards, social groups developed different strategies, political parties organized themselves in their o w n way, according to the specific goals they pursued in one or other system, the intellectuals themselves instituted strategies and enjoyed an influence closely bound u p with the m o d e of centralization, and the ideologies arising on this side and that diverged totally, for they took root in contrasting realities. Political sociology must therefore take seriously the particularity of m o d e s of political centralization and the m a n y kinds of states it brings forth. F r o m this standpoint the state is seen as an independent variable around which the entire social system in all its aspects reorganizes itself. W e would like first of all to show here h o w the ideologies that arise and m a n a g e to spread are in perfect correlation with the type of state in whose presence they develop; w e shall then go o n to consider their influence on the workers' movement, its structure, its values, the organization it adopts and the strategy it employs both in.relation to the state and in the course of the collective bargaining through which it strives to obtain advantages for all its members. T h e sociology of knowledge establishes various kinds of links between ideologies and social settings. It endeavours to reveal a correlative or causal relationship between knowledge, in the general sense of the term, and the social system. Whether its inspiration is Marxist (from M a r x to Lukacs), Weberian (including the relationism of M a n n h e i m ) or functionalist or ethnomethodological, the sociology of knowledge interprets ideologies, world views or, indeed, values according as they are produced by a social class, a group or, again, an aggregate of interacting individuals. It never takes into account the specificity of politics, though this m a y revolutionize the conditions in which knowledge is produced. M a r x , for example, saw the social classes as the only begetters.of the ideologies which expressed their interests. In his view the representations, thought and intellectual commerce, of m e n appeared here again as a direct emanation from their material behaviour.3 Similarly, according to the model that predominates in the works of M a r x and Engels, the state is the state of the most powerful class, that which is economically dominant and which, by means of the state, becomes the politically dominant

States, ideologies and collective action in Western Europe


class as well.4 M a r x never attempted, instead of linking forms of knowledge to social classes, to link them to the different types of states, although he did occasionally acknowledge their existence w h e n , for example, he contrasted the French or Prussian state with the British or Swiss state.5 B y placing the emphasis, as he occasionally did, on the specificity of states, M a r x could have snapped the connection he ceaselessly forged between ideologies and social classes, and conceived of correlations between ideologies and types of states. Since he did not try, he was led to consider intellectuals solely in terms of their membership of a class and never according to their relationship with states. Hence, according to M a r x , intellectuals could be regarded only as the political and literary representatives of the social classes whose interests they expressed. Having stated the problem in these terms, therefore, M a r x ignored the ties which, in s o m e cases, bound intellectuals to certain particularly institutionalized types of statessuch as France or Prussiawith the result that the theories they developed and the ideologies that sprang u p in such a setting were a function of the state and not of the social class. It m a y then be postulated that other theories and ideologies would c o m e into being in the presence of a minimal state such as Great Britain. Although social relations in these countries were identical in nature, the difference in the type of state called into being contrasting world views and determined the particular roles played by the intellectuals in each case. Within the Marxist tradition, the question of intellectuals and the role of ideologies were given particular attention by Gramsci. In his view 'they correspond to the function of " h e g e m o n y " which the dominant group exercises over the whole of society and to the function of "direct domination" or c o m m a n d which is expressed in the state and the "legal" government'. 6 Going even further than M a r x , Gramsci considered that intellectuals were the agents of the dominant class, and that they enabled it to exercise its hegemony both over society and over the state. Once again, the specific intellectual/state relationship was effaced. Yet in contrasting the states of the East with those of the West, Gramsci emphasized that in the East 'the state is everything', whereas in the West the state w a s the 'moat' of the fortress of civil society which, unlike the 'primitive and gelatinous' society of the East, was seen as a 'sturdy structure'. O n the basis of this distinction, Gramsci could have shed light on the different roles played by intellectuals not only in relation to social classes but also according to the different types of states. Unfortunately he did not take that course. Perry Anderson sums u p Gramsci's thought in the following model: 7 East West State Civil society Coercion Domination Movement Civil society State Consent Hegemony Position


Pierre Birnbaum

H e takes the view that, according to Gramsci, 'the preponderance of civil society over the state in the West m a y be paralleled with the predominance of "hegemony" over "coercion" '." This model has the merit of outlining a comparative and differentiated sociological approach to intellectuals and ideologies. However, it remains inadequate. The fact is that, in his interpretation of Gramsci, Perry Anderson maintains his o w n East-West antithesis, which does not enable him to account for the substantial differences that separate Western societies themselves from one another.9 In the same way, he sees them as having been equally aristocratic societies in the seventeenth century but ignores the p h e n o m e n o n of institutionalization of the state in France and relegates to the background the factors that m a k e the French absolute monarchy, where the state became autonomous and differentiated itself from the nobility, distinct from the English aristocratic system where, in contrast, the state remained minimal and nondifferentiated. M a r x , Gramsci and Perry Anderson aside, therefore, it is essential to recognize the diversity of the modes of political centralization which operated in the West if w e are then to attempt to study the emergence of ideologies according to the type of state they encounter, if it is true that in the West domination is not only exercised through civil society but sometimes, on the contrary, transmitted essentially by the state.10 Here w e would like to employ a sociology of knowledge which depends not on socio-economic settings bt inter alia on socio-political settings, and then to see h o w relationships develop between ideologies and types of states, taking as afirstexample Western Europe at the end of the nineteenth century. In so doing w e aim to challenge both the developmentalist and evolutionist view, which ties the advent of a particular kind of ideology, such as c o m m u n i s m , closely to a particular m o m e n t in industrialization,11 and those models which deny the diversity of historical political processes and claim that identical sets of state ideological apparatus perform, to the profit of the bourgeoisie, similar activities in all Western countries.12

The French model

A s w e have seen, highly institutionalized, differentiated and autonomized statesof which France is the ideal examplecan be distinguished from those that have undergone a process of political centralization leading to a minimal state. O n the basis of this distinction, which makes politics the independent variable, w e must take into consideration those relationships that exist, in each case, between the state and the dominant class; in some cases a fusion m a y be observed and in others a differentiation. But beyond thisfirstpolitical variablestate or non-statewhich raises the question of fusion with the ruling class, w e must also take into account another political variable, independent of thefirstbecause it is of entirely different

States, ideologies and collective action in Western Europe


T A B L E 1. Relationships between state and dominant class in Western Europe France Germany United Kingdom

E+ F1+ M +
Note: E + F+ 1+ M + or E or F or I or M

E+ F+ IM-

E-1 F+ IM +

Differentiated or non-differentiated state (centre). Fusion or absence of fusion of state with ruling class. Industrialization from above or industrialization from below. O p e n political bargain or closed political bargain.

1. In the case of the United Kingdom, as w e shall see, given the fact that there is no truly differentiated state, the problem of its possible fusion with the ruling class does not arise. The political area is occupied by an Establishment. In this case, therefore, the F + represents a social fusion without real differentiation of political roles.

origin: that of the political bargain through which, at different rates, democracy is attained. In order to account for the emergence of ideologies, therefore (and here w e shall deal only with the ideologies which structure the collective action of the working class), it is essential to use both these political variables in order to analyse the results of their m a n y combinations. A m o n g the highly institutionalized states, the G e r m a n state was unable to differentiate itself from the aristocracy. In this case, the result was a fusion of state with dominant class which, as Barrington M o o r e observed, was responsible for

F+ M-1+




Great Britain



Neither Marxism nor anarchism


> Anarchism

Anarcho-syndicalism > Marxism


F I G . 1. Ideologies and socio-political settings in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century.


Pierre Birnbaum

the revolution 'from above' 13 and favourable to change and to rapid industrialization pursued with the active participation of the state.14 In such a context it is easy to understand the rapid development of a Marxist social democracy that expressed the direct antagonism between the working class and a dominant class in close osmosis with the state. The rise of Marxism corresponded to the formation of a sturdy working class born of the rapid industrialization and dominated by an alliance of the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. Lassalle 's version, in contrast, points to the weight carried by the state in the organization of the dominant classes.15 G e r m a n social democracy was organized in the very image of the state it hoped to conquer; it was as centralized' and disciplined as the state itself, and it is understandable that R . Hilferding spoke of 'Bismarckianism'. The state, however highly developed or institutionalized, none the less emerged as the instrument of a dominant class. Thus social domination was clearly visible through political domination. It is thus understandable that the trade-union was subordinate to the party. T h e factor that separated Kautsky from Bernstein, and which ultimately became the essential issue in the great theoretical debate that stirred G e r m a n social democracy at the time, was the question of the state. The revisionists wanted to implement an indirect strategy for gaining power through the economy (which in our model represents an adequate action in the presence of a weak state) and to transform the party into a democratic party, trade-unionist version. For Kautsky and the majority, on the other hand, the working-class party must m a k e 'the state its o w n ' . 1 6 This situation accounts both for the vigorous development of Marxism and for the weak development of anarchism." T h e workers' movement, then, w a s struggling not so m u c h against the state per sein accordance with the anarchists' programmeas against the state of the dominant class. In France, in contrast, the institutionalization of the state was accompanied by marked differentiation from the dominant class. The absolute state, or the bureaucratized state, presented itself as a machine for dominating civil society and not as the instrument of the dominant class. Domination was thus experienced first in its political dimension, which perhaps explains the initial upsurge of anarchist theories and the subsequent spread of anarcho-syndicalism. In the second half of the nineteenth century anarchism spread in France, parallel with the great strengthening of the state.18 The vast influence exerted by Proudhon over the workers' movement up to the beginning of the twentieth century testifies to the weight carried by anarchism. According to Proudhon, the state was far from being a mere tool of the dominant class; it was a differentiated machine that had to be fought as such. In his analysis of Napoleon Ill's coup d'tat, he emphasized the specificity of the resultant state.19 Confronted with the French statewhose originality, incidentally, he failed to perceiveProudhon developed analyses identical with those advanced, from opposite ideological horizons, by both de Tocqueville and M a r x . In Proudhon's view, 'centralization being by nature expansive and intrusive, the purview of the state constantly grows at the expense of

Slates, ideologies and collective action in Western Europe


corporative, c o m m u n a l and social initiative'.20 M a r x , analysing the Second Empire in his turn, took up Proudhon's analyses only to refute them systematically; in his opinion the state hems in, controls, regulates, oversees civil society and holds it in tutelage; he saw it as a 'frightful parasitical body that enveloped the body of French society as though with a membrane, blocking all its pores'.21 Faced with the French state, M a r x abandoned his traditional analysis in terms of social class to acknowledge, like Proudhon, the specificity of the political domination exercised in this context. H e also agreed with de Tocqueville, w h o emphasized that f under the old regime, as in our time, not one city, town, village or tiny hamlet in France, not one hospital, factory, convent or school could dispose independently of its o w n property. Then as n o w the administration thus kept all Frenchmen in its tutelage'.22 The fact that liberal thought, Marxist theory and anarchist analysis, despite their incompatibility, agreed in recognizing the particularity of the French state reveals the profound influence exerted on ideologies by socio-political settings. A s Pierre Ansart rightly observes,23 a structural homology can be perceived between the practice of mutualism a m o n g the workers, whichflourishedin France in Proudhon's day, and its theoretical creation, which also developed, in the image of the workers' friendly societies, by rejecting the state in favour of independent economic action. This being so it must also be recognized that the activity of the movement was perhaps determined primarily by the type of state to which it was opposed. A slower rate of industrialization and the maintenance of an economic structure in which, as a result, small producers and craftsmen acted only as an intervening variable admittedly favoured the acceptance of anarchist theories, but were nevertheless overdetermined by the specificity of the state. W e should also mention, with Yves Lequin, that anarchism was equally successful at the time in infiltrating the large-scale industrial sector.24 In these circumstances it is not surprising that, unlike what occurred in Germany, anarchism long held the upper hand over Marxism. A s Edouard D r o z observes: 'Through his o w n work and that of his followers, Proudhon did most to create the Confdration Gnrale du Travail [General Confederation of Labour]. '25 Similarly Jacques Julliard and Annie Kriegel both draw attention to the strong influence exerted by Proudhon, through Pelloutier, over revolutionary syndicalism.20 The organization of labour exchanges and the acceptance of the idea of the general strike27 illustrate the working class's attempts at self-organization. Pelloutier considered that it was in the workers' interest 'to unite, and to look upon the tradeunion and the co-operative society, not as an employment bureau and a compulsory savings bank, but as schools of revolution, production and self-government'.28 It is striking to find in Pelloutier's writings the British concept of self-government; in both cases it expresses rejection of the state. However, whereas in the United K i n g d o m the limited character of the state was highly unfavourable to the development of anarchism or anarcho-syndicalism, in France the strength of the state was accountable for their rise.


Pierre Birnbaum

In opposition to the development of a socialist party which would set out to conquer the state, and in opposition to Marxism and its Guesdist expression, Pelloutier, developing the labour exchanges, subscribed to the view which speaks of 'mutualism, co-operation, credit and association, and declares that the proletariat possesses in itself the instrument of its emancipation'.29 In these various formsindividualist and terrorist, mutualist, collectivist and syndicalist30anarchism consequently developed on a tremendous scale in France, corresponding to the power enjoyed by the state in that country. F r o m this standpoint, the antithesis between French anarchism and the Marxism which developed in G e r m a n y was attributablein the opinion of both Bakunin and Kropotkinless to a difference between the 'Latin mind' and the ' G e r m a n m i n d ' than to the type of state built u p in each of those two countries and to its greater or lesser differentiation from the dominant class. It is thus understandable that at that time the attitude of the strikers reflected, in Michelle Perrot's view, 'a belief in the primacy and omnipotence of political factors'.31 It is true that at the Marseilles Congress in 1879 Guesdism triumphed over the corporatist and mutualist movement. 3 2 Nevertheless anarcho-syndicalism long maintained its control over the workers' movement, and the Amiens Charter of 1905 still reflected its influence.33 In addition 'Guesdism, which claimed kinship with M a r x , in fact retained at the outset a strong anarchist or Blanquist influence'.34 Whatever their differences in approach, these three movements sought to define themselves in relation to the state byfightingit or by organizing themselves outside it and against it. Guesdism, the French version of Marxism, concentrated on action against the state: 'Let us say and repeat to the proletariat', declared Guesde, 'that unless the working-class party seizes the state there can be no transformation of society and n o emancipation of labour'.35 T h e French socialist movement gradually rejected co-operative organizations, friendly societies and anarchist trends, and the exclusion of anarchism became final in L o n d o n in 1906 with the temporary backing of Jaurs, w h o cannot after all be regarded as a statist.36 However, the French section of the Workers' International (Section Franaise de l'Internationale Ouvrire or S F I O ) which w a s formed in 1905, while rejecting revolutionary syndicalism, long retained traces of Proudhonian influence37 and w a s infinitely less structured than G e r m a n social democracy. The birth of the Communist Party at Tours in 1920 was to accelerate the organization of the French workers' movement on state-like lines. A s Annie Kriegel aptly observes: 'Each party constitutes itself as the negative of the state which, within its territorial sphere, it sets out to destroyon the model of the G e r m a n Social Democratic Party, whose design as the negative of the Prussian state so captured the attention of Lenin. . . . T h e French Communist Party rediscovered what gives the French political system its coherence and unitythe concept of absolutism.'38 There could be no clearer demonstration of the weight carried by the 'state' variable in the organization of the social system, of political

States, ideologies and collective action in Western Europe


parties, and of the ideologies sponsored by different social or political movements. Like anarchism, which found particularly favourable soil in France, Marxism, as it developed later, at a time w h e n industrialization was further advanced, adhered in its turn to state determinism. T h e successor to anarchism, the answer to the formidable French state, the Communist Party, which planned to take over the state and not to destroy it, constituted itself in its image: 'The C o m m u n i s t Party functions like a state because it is modelled on the state.'39

The British model

If w e turn n o w to the British model of a political centralization which took place without any true differentiation of state structures, w efindthat the installation of the machinery of representationwhatever the real difficulties of making it work, especially in relation to the working classmade possible some degree of selfgovernment for civil society as a whole. Although Great Britain w a s ruled by a dominant classan Establishment which absorbed n e w arrivals from the middle classesthe working class did not embrace Marxism as it did in G e r m a n y , which had likewise experienced fusion of the ruling class with the state and fairly rapid industrialization. The British working class did not go to war with the dominant class but negotiated, often violently, with the employers to improve its living conditions and its standing in society as a whole. It almost invariably rejected any recourse to the state and any growth of the state, preferring to strengthen itself, the better to assert its rights. Just as it did not embrace Marxism, the working class did not accept the anarchist or anarcho-syndicalist model which had been such a success in state-structured France. The works of G o d w i n and William Morris notwithstanding, anarchism never became acclimatized in Great Britain for the state itselfremained weak. T h e state was not the main issue to be opposed or utilized. A s G . D . H : Cole observes, anarchism managed to entrench itself firmly only in countries ruled by a strongly dominant state, such as France, Italy or Spain; it had n o raison d'tre in Great Britain.40 Literary anarchism apart, such anarchist groups as arose in Great Britain were most often led by foreignersat the end of the nineteenth century, Kropotkin; at the turn of the century, Jewish workers from Russia, G e r m a n y or Polandall of them from countries where domination was maintained, often brutally, through state institutions or the use of force by a powerful empire. But anarchism remained negligible: ' W h e r e state tyranny is little felt, for lack of experience of centralization and bureaucracy, it is m u c h more difficult for revolt t start spontaneously, or for slogans like "neither G o d nor master" tofindan echo.'41 Lastly, as George W o o d c o c k notes, anarchism remained virtually nonexistent in the Netherlands, the United K i n g d o m and the United States. All these are countries where the state is only slightly differentiated. T h e first type of state


Pierre Birnbaum

m a y be explained by the model of consociational democracy, in which respect'for schisms is accompanied by an accommodation between lites to avoid building u p the state; the other states are social systems in which civil society manages more or less to regulate itself, likewise avoiding differentiation of state structures.42 T h e only form of anarchism which came to light in those societies was a peaceful one influenced by Tolstoy and remained within civil society.43 Anarchism remained an anarchism of civil society which was not directed against the state, and its theorists were more often poets or writers than movement organizers.44 According to David Apter, the n e w anarchism making its appearance in the English-speaking countries is a reaction against the system of roles in civil society and not the expression of a struggle against a state. The young people's counterculture attacks the social identity of the protagonists; violence is directed against oneself and not against political authority.45 In the United States, as in the United K i n g d o m or again in the Netherlands, the type of anarchism whichfindsexpression today m a y thus be seen as evidence of the absence of a truly institutionalized state. Here once again, in a negative sense, politics appears as the independent variable that determines the kind of ideology emerging.48 Thus Great Britain, unlike G e r m a n y or France, never really welcomed either Marxism or anarchism. A s Henry. Pelling observes, British trade-unionism from the nineteenth century onwards was infinitely stronger than that of other European countries; highly self-organized and aware of its strength, 'the British m o v e m e n t was neither very Marxist nor clearly oriented towards party politics'.47 Preferring economic action to political struggle, the leaders of the British workers' movement even refused to take part in the Second International which met in L o n d o n in 1896. T h e 1880s witnessed attempts to organize several Marxist movements, such as the Social Democratic Federation around H y n d , which sought to subordinate trade-union action to political action, and to assign a vital role to the state. These movements, extremely hostile to trade-unionism, remained outside the popular culture of the British workers w h o , for their part, opted most often for a purely economic struggle.48 In the face of economic difficulties and employers' reactions, however, the trade unions themselves, as w e k n o w , gradually entered the political arena in order to defend their o w n rights. It should be remembered that this process led to the formation in 1900 of the Labour Representation Committee, which was broadly dominated by the trade unions; the representatives of the socialist m o v e ment were in the minority. In 1906 this committee became the Labour Party, which w a s to set itself the task of giving expression, o n the political scene, to the workers' demands for improvements in wages and working conditions. Even though this parliamentary socialism triggered reactions of rejection, and gave birth to a revolutionary socialism that was sometimes Marxist in inspiration and to a direct-

Slates, ideologies and collective action in Western Europe


action trade-unionism closely resembling French anarcho-syndicalism, it took lasting hold as the m o d e of representation of the British working class. In contrast to the situation which prevailed in G e r m a n y , where the workers' movement confronted a state undifferentiated from the dominant class, the British working class, save in unusual times, has o n the whole ignored Marxism. It has refused to subordinate the trade union to the party. Integrated into the political system and able to be 'heard' by representatives w h o m it controls, it has scorned French-style anarcho-syndicalism and its struggle against the state, and has never k n o w n separation and rivalry between union and party.49 Through the payment of compulsory dues by unionized workers to the Labour Party, the practice of almost inevitable unionization and the predominant position of the unions in the Party, the working class has subjugated the political apparatus and communicated to it its o w n pragmatist and reformist ethos, the expression of its, full participation in civil society. Hence the Labour Party does not betray the working class (Miliband), but speaks for it.60 Marxism, anti-statism, and an economic pragmatism allergic to ideologysuch are the three ideological responses in close correlation with the type of state which emerges, in the majority of cases, in each of the systems studied. Let us add that, whereas in France 'revolutionary syndicali s m equals trade-unionism plus direct action',51 conversely it m a y be contended that in the United K i n g d o m trade-unionism equals revolutionary-inspired syndicalism, in so far as it seeks to cause civil society to evolve, minus direct action. U p to the First World W a r French syndicalism had its similarities to trade-unionism; but while the British trade unions were subsequently to succeed in taking control of the Labour'Party, in France they were to yield pride of place to the parties for a long time to c o m e . Th logic of the state or centre thus weighs heavily on the union/party relationship and on the ideologies through which it is expressed. W e m a y briefly note that this purely political logic also determines the methods of settling labour disputes. Trade-unions in the United K i n g d o m and the United States always prefer to reach agreement directly with the employers in a contractual setting because, 'in contrast to French Jacobinism, Anglo-Saxon liberalism leads to a curbing of the state's power to intervene, even at the cost of a trade-union monopoly'. 5 2 In France, o n the other hand, collective agreements do not exist, and recourse to the state and the courts is often the result. This Jacobin tradition is reflected in the very conception of the right to form and join tradeunions, which the Waldeck-Rousseau Act raised to the status of a public freedom on the same footing as freedom of opinion; the state was thus to act as an arbitrator, with most disputes being settled in court. In Great Britain, o n the other hand, the situation was practically the reverse. Since the 1870s the law has developed negatively, intervening'only rarely in collective relations in order that the state should not be called u p o n to rule in disputes. A s a result, such disputes came to be treated mainly as matters of equity. Hence the 'voluntarism' characteristic of industrial relations in Great Britain, where free


Pierre Birnbaum

collective bargaining was for a long time the corollary of the absence of legislation.5? A product of the 'weakness' of the state and the self-regulation of British civil society, this voluntarism, as w e k n o w , was gradually worn away, from the 1960s onwards, by the Industrial Relations Act (1971), the incomes policy and the social contract; whereas in France, in contrast, the state was trying during the same period to encourage collective bargaining54a transformation which is perhaps indicative of the diminishing role of a state in France today as it turns towards liberalism. T h e differences between the two models nevertheless remain striking and continue to depend o n the nature and role of the state. A further indication of the extent of these differences is the almost total absence of political strikes in Great Britain up to the 1960s, whereas in countries like France lacking a route of access to the state, the working class uses the strike as an alternative means of exerting collective pressure. T h e strike served in this case as an extra-parliamentary channel for political participation by the working class.56 In contrast, with voluntarism in decline, the British labour m o v e m e n t managed to integrate itself into the machinery of the state in order to limit its action. Rather than find.itself regulated from above, the trade-union hierarchy preferred to legislate for itself. Hence the participation of the unions in the political centre, the rise of corporatism and the often violent reactions it provoked at the base.56 F r o m the difference in the impact of Marxism and anarchism in France and Great Britain respectively at the end of the nineteenth century to the contrasts which persist today in the matter of industrial relations, and, for example, the more or less effective application of corporatism, it is clear that, as time goes on, the 'state' variable continues to have its specific effect.57 In his book The Modern World-System, which has since become a classic, Immanuel Wallerstein analysed the antithesis which he s a w as arising, from the sixteenth century onwards, from essential differences between the states at the core and those of the periphery.58 Fruitful as this distinction might be, it has the drawback of obscuring the specific characteristics of the core states themselves (England, France and the Dutch Republic) which arose, not from the development of the market economy, but from their o w n history. In The Capitalist World-Economy Wallerstein extends his definition of the core to include all capitalist countries. This giant antithetis, already questionable per se inasmuch as it still fails to take any real account of the particular characteristics of each state within the capitalist world, is used by the author to analyse relations between the bourgeoisie and the working class at the core and on the periphery.59 In point of fact, just as the core states retained their o w n characteristics, so did each of them establish distinctive relations with the various social classes. Again, those social classes were admittedly different from the social classes on the periphery but they maintained different kinds of relations a m o n g themselves in each of the core countries. Moreover Wallerstein can only remain silent concerning the impact of

States, ideologies and collective action in Western Europe


different types of states on ideologiesa problem to which he gives scant attention.. The analysis presented here, however, shows h o w far ideologies depend, not on the capitalist state in general, or even on the social classes alone, but on the sociopolitical setting. A s w e have tried to show, the state emerges as the true independent variable, industrialization being only an intervening variable in countries which are all capitalist in structure. The relationship between these variables explains w h y Great Britain and Germany, two countries where industrialization was fairly rapid, produced profoundly different ideologies because their states were radically dissimilar. T h e same relationship accounts for the conflicting ideologies which flourished in France and G e r m a n y respectivelycountries whose state structures were comparable. However, while Marxism spread in Germany, where the state was tied to the dominant class, anarcho-syndicalism developed in France, where domination mainly took a political form. T h e fact remains that, once industrialization was widespread in France, anarcho-syndicalism gave w a y to variants of Marxist-inspired socialism. This potency of the state seems to us an essential factor. In conclusion w e m a y point out that it even influences the manner in which an ideology takes shape. Just as Proudhon, de Tocqueville and M a r x agreed in recognizing the distinctive character of the French state, so today Robert Dahl, Wright, Mills, David Easton and James O ' C o n n o r , despite their conflicting theoretical approaches, accord little importance to the state itself in their analyses of American society. Again, within the contemporary Marxist movement, James O ' C o n n o r in the United States and Ralph Miliband in the United K i n g d o m concentrate mainly on the contradictions of capitalism or the homogeneity of the ruling class, thus ignoring the problems of the state, whereas Nicos Poulantzas and Claus Offe in France and the Federal Republic of Germany, in spite of their differences, agree in recognizing its essential character as a constituted public area. This means that even the theoretical models thrown up within a single school of thought, e.g. Marxism, should not be interpreted solely in terms of their internal logic and that the controversy they arouse is not confined to the cognitive level but perhaps depends more upon the type of state in whose presence they have been constructed. [Translated from French] Notes

See for example J. Peter Nettl, 'The State as a Conceptual Variable', World Politics, July 1968; Samuel Finer, 'State Building, State Boundaries and Border Control', Social Science Information, Vol. 13, N o . 4, 5; Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton, N . J . , Princeton University Press, 1975.

3 4

For a typology that affords a means of distinguishing states from centres, see B . Badie and P . Birnbaum, Sociologie de l'tat, Grasset, 1979. K . M a r x , The German Ideology, London, L a w rence & Wishart, 1964. F . Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, in K . M a r x and


Pierre Birnbaum

Notes {continued) F . Engels, Selected Works in Three Volumes, Vol. Ill, London, Progress, 1969. 5 See Badie and Birnhaum, op. cit., Chapter 1. 6 A . Gramsci, uvres choisies, p. 266-8, Paris, ditions Sociales, 1959. 7 P . Anderson, Sur Gramsci, Paris, F . Maspro, 1978. A d a m Przeworski criticizes P . Anderson's interpretation of Gramsci's work by showing that, in Gramsci's view, states in the West use both force and consensus depending upon the relations between social classes. A t the same time he ignores, as do Gramsci and P . Anderson, the specificity of states in the West and its consequences for the m o d e of government: 'Material Bases of Consent: Economics and Politics in a Hegemonic System', Political Power and Social Theory, 1, p . 58-60, 1980. 8 Anderson, op. cit., p . 43. 9 P . Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, London, N e w Left Books, 1974. 10 Stein Rokkan, for his part, draws his conceptual m a p of Europe according to the various procedures of national construction, and not . according to the different types of states which have taken shape there. For example, he attributed the genesis of communism to the schism produced long ago by reaction to the Reformation. In Protestant countries, the resultant osmosis between political and religious lites favoured consensus, and rendered subsequent upsurges of communism impossible; in Catholic countries, the antagonism between those lites favoured dissension and later the appearance of communism. This explanation is primarily culturalist and ignores differences in state construction, for example between France and England, which appear in the same column in the conceptual m a p of Europe. See S. Lipset and S. Rokkan, ' Cleavage Structure, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: A n Introduction', Party System and Voter Alignments, N e w York, Free Press, 1967, and S. Rokkan, 'Cities, States and Nations', in S. Eisenstadt and S. Rokkan (eds.), Building States and Nations, Vol. 1, Sage, 1973.
11 12 13 11








22 23




See, for example, Seymour Lipset, L'homme et la politique, Chapter 2, Paris, L e Seuil, 1963. Louis Althusser, 'Idologie et appareils idologiques d'tat', La Pense, June 1970. Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Boston, Beacon Press, 1958.



Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Harvard University Press, 1962. See G . Roth, The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany, p. 10-11, Ottawa, Bedminster Press, 1963. According to Lassallc, 'it is the state's function to perfect the development of freed o m , the development of humankind in freedom'. F . Lassalle, Discours et pamphlets, p. 188, Paris, Giard & Brire, 1903. A . Bergounioux and B . Manin, La social-dmocratie ou le compromis, p . 65, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France,. 1979. See also D . A . Chalmer, The Social Democrat Party of Germany, N e w Haven, Conn., 1964. George Woodcock, Anarchism, p. 404-9, London, Pelican, 1963; A . R . Carlson, Anarchism in Germany, Methuen, 1972. O n the differences between the anarchists and Marx over the attitude to be adopted towards the state and the possibilities of transforming it, see Paul- Thomas, Karl Marx and the Anarchists, p . 344 et seq., London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980. P . J. Proudhon, La rvolution sociale dmontre par le coup d'tat du 2 dcembre [1852], Paris, Marcel Rivire. P . J. Proudhon, Capacit politique des classes ouvrires, p . 287, Paris, Marcel Rivire. K . M a r x , 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', in Surveys from Exile, London, Penguin/Allen Lane, 1973. A . de Tocqueville, L'ancien rgime et la rvolution, p. 122, Paris, 1953. Pierre Ansart, Naissance de l'anarchlsme, p . 131 et seq., Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1970. Yves Lequtn, Les ouvriers de la rgion lyonnaise . (1848-1914), Vol. 2, p . 282, Lyon, Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1977. Edouard Droz, P. J. Proudhon, p. 34, Paris, Librairie des Pays Libres, 1909. Annie Kriegel, Le pain et les roses, p. 95-6, Paris, Union Gnrale d'dition, 10/18, 1973. Jacques Julliard also likens Pelloutier to Proudhon, while pointing out the difference between their views on socialism and the idea of war. Fernand Pelloutier et les origines du syndicalisme d'action directe, p . 209-10, Paris, Le Seuil, 1971. See F . Ridley, 'Revolutionary Syndicalism in France: the General Strike as Theory and M y t h ' , International Review of History and Political Science, 1966, Vol. 3, N o . 2 . Quoted in Julliard, op. cit., p. 341.

States, ideologies and collective action in Western Europe


Notes (continued)
29 30

31 32 33 34







42 43 44


Fernand Pcllouticr, Histoire des Bourses du Tra- 4S vail, p . 99, Publications G r a m m a , 1971. Jean Matron analyses all- these currents in Le mouvement anarchiste en France, 2 Vols., 47 Paris, F . Maspro, 1975. 48 Michelle Perrot, Les ouvriers en grve, France 1871. 1890, Vol. 2, p . 703, Paris, Mouton, 1974. Michelle Perrot, 'Le congrs de la scission', Le 49 Monde, 9 December 1979. See Henri Dubief, Le syndicalisme rvolutionnaire, Paris, A . Colin, 1969. Michelle Perrot, 'Les socialistes franais et les problmes du pouvoir (1871-1914)', in Michelle Perrot and Annie Kriegel, Le socialisme franais et le pouvoir, p . 19, Paris, E . D . I . , E0 1966. Quoted in Dubief, op. cit., p . 12. See also Claude Willard, Les guesdistes, Part 2, Chapter 11, Paris, ditions Sociales, 1965. Madeleine Rbrioux shows h o w Jaurs later drew nearer to syndicalism, in Jean Jaurs. La classe ouvrire. Textes prsents par M . Rbrioux, p . 14-15, Paris, Maspro, 1976; see also, by the same author, 'Les tendances hostiles l'tat dans la S . F . I . O . (1905-1914)', Le Mouvement social, October-December 1968, and 'Jean Jaurs et le marxisme', Histoire du marxisme europen, Vol. 1, p . 233, Paris, 10/18, 1977. Madeleine Rbrioux, ' L e socialisme franais de 1871 1914', in J. Droz (ed.), Histoire gnrale du socialisme, Vol. 2 , p . 196, 1974. Annie Kriegel, Communismes ou miroir franais, 61 p. 149, Paris, Gallimard, 1974. Christine Buci-Glucksmann, 'Pour u n eurocom62 munisme de gauche', in Olivier Duhamel and Henri VVever (eds.), Changer le P.C.?, p. 133, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1972. G . D . H . Cole, Socialist Thought, Marxism and Anarchism, 1850-90, Vol. 2 , p . 336-7, London, Macmillan, 1961. Franois Bdarida, 'Sur l'anarchisme en Angleterre', in Mlanges d'Histoire sociale offerts Jean Maltron, p. 23, Paris, ditions Ouvrires, 63 1976. Badie and Birnbaum, op. cit., Part 3. 61 Woodcock, op. cit., p . 18. April Carter, The Political Theory of Anarchism, p. 10-11, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971. David Apter, 'The Old Anarchism and the N e w Some Comments', in D . Apter and J. Joli (eds.), Anarchism Today, p . 8-10, London, Macmillan, 1971.

See David Stafford, 'Anarchists in Britain Today', and Rudolf de Jong, 'Provos and Kabouters', in Apter and Joli, op. cit. Henry Pelling, Histoire du syndicalisme britannique, p . 130, Paris, Le Seuil, 1967. See F . Bcdarida, ' L e socialisme en GrandeBretagne de 1875 1914 , in J. Droz, op. cit., Vol. 2 , p . 356 et seq. O n party/union relations in various leading cases, see Jacques Julliard, 'Les syndicats et la politique', in P . Birnbaum and J. M . Vincent (eds.), Critiques des pratiques politiques, Paris, Galile, 1978. See also.Alessandra Pizzorno, 'Les syndicats et l'action politique', Sociologie du travail, April-June 1971. H . M . Drucker, Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party, Chapter 1, London, Allen & U n w i n , 1979. See also L . Panitch, Introduction to Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy, London, Cambridge University Press, 1976. T . Nairn is one of the few authors to establish a relationship between the nature of the Labour Party and the relative weakness of the British state; 'The Nature of the Labour Party', New Left Review, N o s . 27 and 28, 1964. In 'The decline of the British State', New Left Review, N o . 101, 1977, p . 23, he rapidly extends his study of the relationship between the 'backward' state and the working class, placing emphasis also on the separation between the intellectuals and the working class. Jacques Julliard, 'Thorie syndicaliste rvolutionnaire et pratique grviste', in Le Mouvement social, October-December 1968, p . 60. Grard A d a m and Jean-Daniel Reynaud, Conflits du travail et changement social, p . 59-61, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1978. See also the comparative article by Colin Crouch, 'The Changing Role of the State in Industrial Relations in Western Europe', in C . Crouch and A . Pizzorno (eds.), The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968, Vol. 2 , Chapter 8, 1978. A . Flanders and M . A . Clegg, The System of Industrial Relations In Great Britain, Blackwell, 1954. G . Lyon-Caen, 'Critique de la ngociation collective', Droit social, September-October 1979. W e m a y perhaps adduce as further evidence the rediscovery of the role of the conciliation boards (conseils des prud'hommes) which obviate recourse to the state and testify to its withdrawal from employer/employee relations. See Pierre Can's thesis Sociologie des


Pierre Birnbaum

Notes {continued) to the community structures in resisting the conseils de prud'hommes, Paris, E . P . H . E . , development of social and political move1979. ments, whether Marxist or anarcho-syndicalist Walter Korpi and Michael Shalev, 'Strikes, Inin inspiration. Although such movements dustrial Relations and Class Conflict in took an increasingly organized shape towards Capitalist Societies', British Journal of Socithe end of the nineteenth century, it should ology, June 1979, p . 181. nevertheless be said that, in the setting of Colin Crouch, Class Conflict and the Industrial these community relations and of'clientelism', Relations Crisis, London, Heinemann, 1977. the main feature w a s individual or smallVery briefly, for lack of space, let us observe in group anarchism. See for example Richard conclusion that in Italy the state has not Hostetter, The Italian Socialist Movement, succeeded in institutionalizing itself and difChapter 13, Princeton, 1958; G . Woodcock, ferentiating itself completely according to the op. cit., Chapter 11; Sidney Tarrow, Peasant French model. It continues to be infiltrated Communism in Southern //a/y,Chapters 3 and 4, by civil society. In place of the state/civil N e w Haven, Yale University Press, 1967. society relationship, therefore, w e find a power structure composed of several lites c s Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, and not, as in the United K i n g d o m , a domiN e w York, Academic Press, 1974. nant class. This situation, accompanied by a 6 9 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist Worldbelated industrialization accomplished in reEconomy, p . 292-3, Cambridge University ality neither on the initiative of the state nor Press and Presses de la M . S . H . , 1979. on that of a dominant class, long lent strength


16 57

Strategic interactions and the formation of modern states: France and England

Aristide R . Zolberg* Introduction

Whether it is based more on a Weberian or more on a Marxist approach or o n a more or less happy blend of several macro-sociological traditions, any essay in theoretical analysis of the origins of the state as the profound form of political organization in modern Europe, the dynamics of its subsequent development, its diversification and its dissemination is sooner or later confronted with an epistemolgica! dilemma arising from the very nature of its object. The c o m m o n method employed in such exercises is the comparativity methodthat applied to universes whose units are mutually exclusive and which are independent of one another. The comparative analysis of th state is thus based on the image of a world m a d e up of societies, h u m a n entities regarded as largely self-sufficient and so linked u p by a mainly endogenous drive. However, anyone w h o takes that course is very soon m a d e to realize that such a construction differs widely from historical fact, the path of history is strewn with cases that combine to show that in every age societies are permeable to outside deterministic influences attributable not only to the repercussions of global processes set in train by interactions between the m a n y societies making up the universe in question but also to the individual volition of one or other of those societies.1 Although it is true that this problem crops u p in practically every branch

Aristide Zolberg, Belgian by birth, is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago and Associate Professor, Elie Halvy Chair, Institut d'tudes Politiques, Paris (1979/80). His earlier interests centred on Africa, and he published One-party Government in the Ivory Coast (1964 and 1969). Later, he turned to the analysis of Western political change, ethnic conflicts, international migrations and the State, contributing to Crisis of Political Development in Europe and North America (ed. R . Drew, 1979), Ethnic Conflict in the Western World (ed. M . Esman, 1978) and Human Migration (ed. W. McNeill and A. Adams, 1979). * T h e author wishes to thank M r G u y Hermet, Director of the Centre d'tudes et de R e cherches Internationales of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, for his hospitality, and the staff of C E R I for having this article typed. Afirstversion of it was presented during the meetings organized by C E R I , the cole des Hautes tudes en Sciences Sociales and the Maison des Sciences de l ' H o m m e in Paris, on 27-8 M a y 1980. Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XXXII, N o . 4, 1980


Aristide R. Zolberg

of the social sciences, it prescribes special theoretical difficulties in relation to the subject under consideration, for in the European region, at the time w h e n the state began to loom on the horizon, the universe of h u m a n societies considered from the political standpoint consisted of a very limited number of relatively powerful protagonists whose interactions set off collective processes o n a very large scale, and whose individual actions could determine the very existence of other units making u p the whole. This is particularly true of what w e shall call here politico-strategic action; that is to say, the set of pressures which are exerted directly or indirectly by political protagonists of a given aggregate in order to influence the organization and individual behaviour of other protagonists in the aggregate or even the structure of the aggregate as a whole, and of which resort to armed force is merely the most obvious expression. If w e consider that it is not simply a matter of the consequences, for a given state, of the actions undertaken by other protagonists in relation to it but also of the internal consequences of its o w n external enterprises, it would seem that any comparative macrosociology of the state which ignores this factor is d o o m e d to leave out of the explanatory schema a set of residual variables whose right sometimes exceeds even that of the variance explained, whereas the very act of taking this factor into consideration will divert the analysis from the general towards the particular. Should the renaissance taking place in thisfieldbe seen as a return from historical macro-sociology to political history, which has been criticized by m a n y historians o n the ground that it is factual? H . G . Koenigsberger, for example, seems to suggest as m u c h in a recent analysis of the variation between European regimes at the beginning of the modern age, taking the theories of Otto Hintze and Norbert Elias as his starting-point.2 In the last analysis, except for the illusory claims of a certain theoretical formalism, Koenigsberger seems to regard historical macro-sociology and historian's history as complementary approaches starting from two poles of a continuum rather than as mutually exclusive enterprises. If w e accept the rules of the g a m e , the task incumbent o n political macro-sociology is precisely to push back as far as possible the point at which it enters the zone of history pure and simple. M o r e particularly, in relation to the subject w e are discussing, what matters is to determine whether the international politico-strategic aspect will necessarily fall outside macro-sociology, as Koenigsberger assumes, or whether it can be retrieved for our quiver. Although history certainly has the advantage in this field, that is not in the least because theoretical reflection has failed but because it has rarely been undertaken. The reason for this might be that the appearance of the state as a two-faced political structure, as J. P . Nettl put it, one face looking inwards and the other outwards, brought about a parting of the intellectual ways that led to the split which today is found alike in history, political sociology and the sub-disciplines which favour one or the other.3 Thus while recent decades have witnessed, on the one hand, an abundance of theories concerning international

Strategic interactions and the formation of modern states: France and England


relations and, on the other, a proliferation of comparative analyses dealing with the regime or the state, very little effort has been directed towards the interface. W e find ourselves confronted, on the one hand, with the globalism of historians such as Fernand Braudel, William McNeill or again Geoffrey Barraclough, w h o has the merit of being comprehensive but w h o is too eclectic to fit easily into the simplified presentation necessary to any theoretical exercise, and, o n the other hand, with sociology's theoretical globalism tending towards reductionism, either vaguely idealistic as in the case of Talcott Parsons or else strictly materialistic as in that of Immanuel Wallerstein, whose enterprise is d o o m e d to fail precisely because it regards the politico-strategic dimension in the international sphere as an epiphenomenon. 4 T h e schemata based directly o n the process of politicostrategic interactionin other words, the theories propounded by specialists in international relationssuffer in their turn from a fatal flaw: that of concerning themselves solely with this process, without considering the exchanges between it and the other processes that contribute to the overall structure or even, in most cases, the interface between states and the system of the states.6 Far from claiming to resolve these difficulties, w e wish merely to point out that a global-type aggregate cannot be conceived exclusively as a 'world economy' or an 'international political system', but might be thought of as the result of exchanges between three distinct analytical structures: the. economic, the politico-strategic and, w e must add, the cultural, each of them in evidence both at the societal and the intersocietal level.

The medieval origins of the state and the system of the states
T h e appearance of the state in the medieval West, considered in its morphological aspect as a type of organization distinct from both the empire and the city, is inseparable from the more or less simultaneous emergence of several aggregates of that type in the region. T h e fact that this morphological unit should have materialized in large numbers m a y be attributed not only to iterationthat is to say, to the fact that the cultural, social and economic factors which contributed to the process of political transformation w e are considering crystallized more or less simultaneously in several parts of the regionbut also to a relational dynamism peculiar to the politicalfielditself. The dynamism in question sprang from the pluralism of the structures of authority which w a s the characteristic distinguishing Europe at the end of the invasions from other Euro-Asiatic civilizations, and which was itself a factor in what Perry Anderson has termed the 'detotalization of sovereignty'.0 W e shall try to show,first,h o w the interactions set in train by this pluralism, regarded here as the initial situation gradually reduced it but did not eliminate it in favour of a single centre of political domination


Aristide R . Zolberg

and, secondly, h o w the crystallization of these multiple centres produced effects which helped to give them a c o m m o n morphological character. The premature division of part of the region into a set of mechanisms for domination at a fairly high level of territorial aggregation helped to turn each of them into a state. The chief factors which contributed to the pluralism of the structures of authority are well k n o w n . Resulting from the superimposition in one and on the same space, and of the protracted interactions, of structures inherited from the R o m a n Empire, Christianity and Germanic tribalism in a material and d e m o graphic environment that varies from region to region, those factors included, at the structural level, the differentiation of the respective spheres of spiritual and temporal authority; and at the territorial level, the fragmentation of feudal power that conflicted with its theoretical concentration at the level of kingdoms, although traces ofthat concentration remained. Lastly, Europe also contained an archipelago of. urban islets grouped around trade routes and tending to develop a relatively autonomous power. T h e transformation w e are considering should therefore be understood as two simultaneous processes: the emergence of territorial sovereignties starting from all-purpose aggregates, and the aggregation of domination starting from widely scattered territorial power. The differentiation of spiritual and temporal authority took shape at a fairly early ; stage with the emergence of the structures of the Empire and the Papacy, including not only separate legal institutions but also machinery enabling the emperor and the pope to extract from society as a whole the necessary resources for autonomous action. B y means of such structures, the two areas of authority were transformed into two poles of power whose interactions constituted a field of tension that showed itself in various forms including even armed conflict. According to Otto Hintze, the fissures opened by such clashes provided other protagonists with somewhere to squeeze in, and a m o n g them those w h o formed the nuclei of future states.7 J. Strayer, taking u p the same subject, lays particular stress on the unforeseen consequences of the Church's victory over the Empire towards the end of the eleventh century, when important economic and social changes took place. The Gregorian concept of the spiritual primacy of the Church unintentionally helped to crystallize the conception of temporal authority. Europe maintained its religious unity, but henceforth the Church had to deal with each kingdom or principality separately. In this way, according to Strayer, the foundations of a multistatal system were laid.8 The same process can be explained more generally by the logic of a bipolar conflict. Given the danger represented by a strong and united Empire, the Church's interest lay in encouraging the development of multiple temporal power, for the rivalries engendered by such a system would enable her at any time to obtain the necessary support in bringing this or that unruly prince to heel. Such rivalry did not, however, have only one outcome. Where the confrontation was direct, as in Italy, coalitions formed around each of the antagonists, thus leading to the

Strategic interactions and the formation of modern states: France and England


fragmentation of territorial power. O n the western flank of the Empire, on the other hand, R o m e ' s interest lay in helping to bolster the power of a prince capable of acting as a counterweight to the Empire itself. In fact w e observe that throughout the thirteenth century the Church played ah important role in the rise of the French monarchy, not only by bestowing on it the seal of legitimacy but also by giving it material aid, albeit indirectly, in allowing it to call upon the clergy for a financial contribution. W h a t had been a custom was m a d e official practice at the end of the conflict between France and the Papacy that lasted from 1296 to 1311. 9 B y lending her support to kings, the Church was merely strengthening from the top a process of accumulation of power which had started from the bottom since the feudal breakup. Norbert Elias has suggested that the process, which under the social and economic conditions arising in Western Europe towards the eleventh century led to the emergence of a limited number of powerful protagonists, might be compared to the model of a market in which the ply of competition leads to the concentration of economic power in the hands of a few large units.10 Having territory as its main object, the process of accumulation developed on the basis of the 'rational' behaviour of the competitors present at the start: they did not set out to gain control over a particular domain but merely wished to control the lands adjacent to those they already possessed, so as to strengthen their security. A somewhat random selection thus operated a m o n g them and, in the resultant n e w pattern, interactions of the same kind a m o n g the survivors spread the struggle for hegemony to wider and wider regions. Competition itself played a part through two complementary mechanisms: the deployment of armed might and the organization of tax collection. It thus led to differentiation of the apparatus of domination through the institutionalization of hew organizations. W e should add that, over and above the advantages of territorial accumulation pure and simple, there was a qualitative transformation which might perhaps be compared to the economists concepts of 'value added'. These units thus reached a critical mass at which they began gaining advantages over residual units. A s Elias suggests, competition thereafter operated in a market that was n o longer free: the only course left to the residual units was to attach themselves to one or other of the critical masses. This process seems to have crystallized, towards the beginning of the thirteenth century, in a set of very varied patterns in each of the great European regions: a development which Elias does not attempt to explain, merely observing that the formation of hegemonies was highly probable but that the location of their centre and the line of their boundaries could not be predicted. W e should remember that at this period, according to Yves Renouard, th 'lasting lineaments of modern Western Europe' were shaped by a series of decisive battles between 1212 and 126.11 While the Anglo-French frontier was being hammered out t Bouvines, the Christians were gaining control over the Iberian peninsula and the struggles


Aristide R . Zolberg

between the kings of France and Aragon in the region of Toulouse were starting a frontier between France and Iberia. Thereafter none of the big states waged any major war for nearly a century. It was a period of relative stabilization at the international level and hence of coexistence between a number of relatively isolated politico-strategic areas during which the kingdoms entrenched themselves by absorbing their earlier conquests. In Iberia various aggregates were thus built u p o n the basis of the three columns of the Christian advance; in France the royal domain, having been increased by the recapture of the north-west, had become a critical mass that enabled the kings to launch a policy of annexation. Nevertheless, not only did Burgundy, Brittany, Guienne and Flanders remain outside the scope of the central power, but the extension of the territory led to the formation of what Strayer calls a 'mosaic', that is to say an entity, which remained similar to an empire, and whose management problems, exceeding the capacity of the centre, set off a n e w trend towards decentralization; this was the period of the appanages. In contrast the English king's defeat o n the Continent, together with Scottish resistance, reduced him to a political power which in territorial terms was m u c h m o r e modest, and in which his defeat forced him to b o w to the barons. In the next century this double limitation facilitated the formation of a m u c h more highly integrated whole than that of the French victor. T h e early development of the state in England, which m a d e it easier for its kings to mobilize the resources needed for action abroad, m a d e up for the advantages conferred o n France by its size and wealth. A more detailed analysis would probably convey more clearly the distinctive nature of this North Atlantic area, where the process of monopolizing domination became organized at a fairly early stage around a bipolar axis. In this area, as Elias points out, by the end of the thirteenth century 'of the five great warrior houses with some competitive power left, two played a special role: the Capetians and their successors as Kings of France, and the Plantagenet Kings of England'. 12 T h e next two centuries were to be dominated by the duel between the two dynasties, with the monopoly of domination in the lands of the former Frankish K i n g d o m of the West as the prize. The internal political development of each of the antagonists was inextricably bound u p with the progress of this duel, which had begun its see-saw in the decades that followed the N o r m a n Conquest. In the long term, their interactions contributed to the breakup of the global political system and went to strengthen political integration within a smaller territory. The first stage in the transformation of the French and English kingdoms into states also m a d e an essential contribution to the formation of a system of European states; thus the two processes determined each other. However, J. Strayer's interpretation of the genesis of state institutions in these two countries seems atfirstglance to contest the hypothesis of the important role played in that genesis by their interactions. W e lays great stress on the fact that thefirstcentral administrative institutions set u p in the two countries,

Strategic interactions and. the formation of modern states: France and England


towards 1100, owed their existence to internal considerations; the high courts of justice and the treasuries, he notes, were permanently established long before the departments of foreign affairs and defence m a d e their appearance.13 H e advances a.hypothesis that is the reverse of ours: namely that state institutions went o n developing throughout the thirteenth century, w h e n there were few wars, whereas that development was checked in the next century, w h e n war became almost continuous, because then the antagonists often relied u p o n improvisation rather than administrative innovation. M o r e generally he considers that in the Anglo-French area, the period 1300-1450 marks a hiatus between t w o fruitful periods of political development. . Strayer's objections lose m u c h of their substance if w e consider that the appearance of specialized administrations holds a privileged place in his conception of the state, at the expense of a broaderbut also, it is true, m o r e abstractconception of a set of processes constituting a system of 'monopolistic' domination within a given territory. It is quite evident, for example, that the treasuries were multi-purpose institutions which from the very beginning mobilized the resources needed for royal action both at h o m e and abroad. Strayer points out that in England, towards the end of the twelfth century, the emergencies caused by foreign wars were such that the vassals' contributions were insufficient to cover the king's needs and had to be transformed into a general tax. Furthermore, he seems to consider that the Anglo-French duel constituted an indispensable stage in the formation of the state in a broader sense, which comes close to our view of it. According to his thesis, the successes gained by. the princes in the thirteenth century m a d e the wars of the fourteenth century 'necessary, and possible', for they served as the transition to the stage of sovereign states. But around 1300 it was not at all clear w h o was independent and w h o was not. W h a t about Wales, Brittany or Flanders? It was impossible to draw definitive frontiers in a Europe which had k n o w n only interlocking spheres of influence and fluctuating boundaries. The wars, especially those for the conquest of peripheral regions by the state centres, thus helped to define the areas controlled by the t w o most advanced European states. Here Strayer agrees with the interpretation w e put forward, on Elias's authority; earlier. W h a t Strayer has to say about institutions between 1300 and 1450 in n o way conflicts with our hypothesis. A s already noted, he lays the emphasis on administrative improvisation. The establishment of war charts, for example, did not give rise to permanent administrative departments, because he maintains the conduct of military operations and of diplomacy w a s the business of the king and his council, w h o regarded such matters as too important to be left to professional administrators. The fact remains that such improvisations paved the w a y for an ever-increasing mobilization.of resources o n behalf of the political centre and that, furthermore, the 'reserved area' status assigned to external action suggests that, in the king's mind, the entire system, was merely the instrument of such action.


Aristide R. Zolberg

W h e n w e turn our attention more specifically to the methods of mobilizing resources on either side, w e obtain a better insight into the internal processes which were set in motion by the Anglo-French duel, and which might be analysed in the terms employed by S. Finer in discussing the role of military organization in building the state: he speaks of interlocking 'cycles': that is to say, of a series of exchanges prompted by mobilization requirements between the various social structures and leading to a transformation of the whole. 14 A s M . H o w a r d shows, 15 because the vassalic obligation had proved obsolete long before, a wider obligation on the Italian model had been adopted (Statue of Westminster, 1285; arrire-ban (call-up of vassals and rear vassals) under Philip the Fair). Towards the beginning of the fourteenth century, it became clear that it was dangerous to arm the mass of subjects, whose military performance was in any case unsatisfactory, and also that the progress of the royal monopoly was creating under-employment in the traditional military class. The military labour market was thus favourable to the central power, provided only that it had the means to pay the warriors. Hence, during the. Hundred Years W a r the English armies in France served essentially under contract, as did the French armies from the second half of the fourteenth century onwards. T h e additional expense incurred by this system could only be covered by the revenue derived from trade, in the form either of dues payable directly to the king, or of loans granted by the merchants, or of contributions from representative.bodies in the towns or other productive classes. Thus the parliaments, the estates and representative assemblies of the non-military and c o m m o n sections of the population began to play an important part in the private capacity to m a k e war. This brings us to Hintze's hypothesis concerning the role played by conflicts resulting from the multiplicity of European sovereignties in the origins of,the Stndestaat (that is to say, not only the state, but also the estates), which helped to give its original shape to the m o d e of domination that was becoming general. A s Hintze has it, in order to prosecute their wars, the princes atfirstcalled upon those elements of the population whose possessions and local authority equipped them to m a k e financial and military contributions. These elements were thus constituted in estates. A s the needs of the sovereigns (who were also anxious to become.independent of the notables) increased, the estates strove to have their privileges strengthened in exchange for their contributions. Hintze declares that, for the price, the alternative to such concessions was often the outright loss of a region.16 T h e French and English representative institutions (estates) developed m o r e particularly during the long wars fought between the two countries in the fourteenth andfifteenthcenturies when, according to B . Gune, the royal governments continuously poured 'more than half their resources' into war and everything connected with it.17 . Hintze considers that this observation helps to rough out a more general model concerning the positive contribution of external conflicts to the development

Strategic interactions and the formation of modern states:. France and England


of representative institutions in Europe. But what, then, does he m a k e of the absolutism that developed, as w e shall see, out of the international conflicts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and which, he admits, forms a striking exception to his generalization? His answer is very disappointing: he merely explains to us that absolutism was only a transitional stage, based on the.fact that in m a n y places the estates had become an obstacle to the development of larger states, and that that stage was followed 'as soon as this development required by political necessity had been completed' by a rebirth of the representative principle. W e prefer to restate the problem as follows: Is it possible, on the one hand, to think of a given international pattern as a 'variable' possessing a particular value for each of the protagonists and, on the other hand, to specify the conditions under which this or that form adopted by that variable was able to contribute to the development of a certain constitutionalism, and the conditions which tended rather to atrophy it? Without going further into the elaboration of this schema, w e would point out that it brings us back to what w e have termed the 'interface'. Even when the exigencies of a given strategic pattern led the central power to look within the country for a more efficient means of mobilizing the resources he needed, the effects produced were by n o means exclusively determined by the external stimulus. It seems for example, that at the period w e are considering, a set of economic and social conditions dictated to the English state a strategy for mobilizing resources based, primarily on trade, whereas France, while developing the salt tax, lived mainly on direct taxes, and that this difference contributed to the differentiation of their representative institutions. T h e internal pattern did not dictate either solution, but m a d e one more likely than the other at a critical time; however, once the choice was made, its repercussions led to the institutionalization of certain mechanisms which thereafter reduced the range of future options. Furthermore such internal transformations also changed the initial international pattern. Thus, in the case of France, the Hundred Years, W a r helped to free the monarchy from the limitations of the previousfiscaland military system18 through the abandonment of the seigniorial call to arms and the creation of a paid army, in which the artillery was the deciding factor. The royal talliage {taille royale) of 1439, to which the aristocracy consented for the purpose of raising such an army on conditions that the aristocracy itself should be exempt from payment, and which was transformed into a levy on the military {taille des gens d'armes) during the next decade, was thefirsttruly national tax. A s w e k n o w , the time came when the title to nobility was based on hereditary exemption from this tax. However, the coercive machinery at the disposal of the state centre was still limited; as Perry Anderson points out, Charles VIFs orderly companies did not total more than 12,000 menhardly a sufficient force to control a population of 15 million. Consequently the nobility, as swordbearers, kept a large measure of autonomy at the local level of power. Thus, the n e w monarchy, which for thefirsttime succeeded in gathering round it all the


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ducal provinces, did not yet constitute a centralized or integrated state. Contrary to what took place in England, where the monarchy's military requirements strengthened the role of Parliament, the consolidation of the States-General as a permanent national institution was blocked by the regional assemblies and, since the nobility was exempt from taxation, it had n o interest in urging that they should be convened. This institutional blank contributed to the French monarchy's setbacks in the sixteenth century, but subsequently m a d e it easier for absolutism to take hold. Since the situation was very often one of war, there can be n o disregarding the technological factor and everything connected with it, including the military organization proper. It is no exaggeration to say that the advent of artillery set off, on the basis of the 'economy-technology' cycle, a transformation whose repercussions still further accentuated the trend towards state monopoly and towards the formation of an international pattern, which w a s to become a constituent factor in the transition to the modern era. The introduction of gunpowder in a civilization which had already mastered the art of casting bells produced the cannon, which very quickly transformed the technique of fighting. H o w a r d does not hesitate to assert that the English were driven out of France, not by the mounted knights or by Joan of Arc, but by the gunners w h o were so early brought into the French armies; whereas the English, emboldened by the legendary success of their archers, resisted the innovation longer. N o t only did the archers stand u p poorly to the impact of even the rudest artillery, but, more important, the n e w weapon completely transformed siege technique, making the maintenance of strong points in a foreign land a very precarious undertaking.19 In this way the n e w technology helped to complete the division of the North Atlantic region into two sovereign political entities separated by the sea. M o r e generally, by giving the monarchies the decisive advantage, this new' technology contributed to the process of institutionalizing the monopoly of political domination at a given territorial level: a process which at the same time marked a big step towards the formation of a system of states. For it was not simply a matter of a few cannon, but of organizing artillery trains whose effective use entailed very heavy investment, beyond the capacity of all save those entities that enjoyed the advantage of economies of scale: in other words, those which had attained critical mass. In France, for example, the cost of the royal artillery increased tenfold between 1375 and 1410, and by the end of thefifteenthcentury it fielded 149 pieces of ordnance served by hundreds of m e n and thousands of horses.

Formation of the interstate system of modern Europe

Strategic interaction between states was an irreducible factor in the processes which wrought profound transformations in the European region from 1450 to 1750 and in its relations with the outside world. Having already had occasion

Strategic interactions and the formation of modern states: France and England


to demonstrate the force of this argument in relation to Immanuel Wallerstein's economistic reductionism concerning the origins of the 'Western world-system', w e shall confine ourselves here,first,to underlining the contribution of this factor to the formation of a true 'system' of states in Europe; second, to suggesting h o w that system contributed to the general strengthening of the state as a structured political aggregate differentiated from 'civil society'; and lastly, considering the pattern formed by this system as a 'variable' in the sense defined earlier, to exploring h o w this variable might fit into the explanation of the differentiations that arose between European regimes. It should be pointed out that the imagery based on the notion of the interface which w e shall use in discussing this subject implies n o taking of sides in the controversies between the main schools of historical or sociological thought. A s it happens, this imagery does not seem far removed from that used by Perry Anderson in relation to the link between the internal and external processes which combined to lead Europe towards the formation which he calls 'absolutism', although w e prefer to this term the less downright one of 'Renaissance states' suggested by H . R . Trevor-Roper.20 In this connection, Anderson, taking his cue from Althusser's couplet o n which he bases his general approach, says that, although the relations of production within each state certainly 'determined' that type of regime, for the state itself was formed by external forces which can be thought of as a system of states. Although Anderson attributes very great importance to this process, showing for example h o w Castilian absolutism 'overdetermined' the more general emergence of this formation through the dominant role played by Spain o n the European scene, his discussion of the international factor remains rudimentary, and is suddenly interrupted by a favourable reference to the suggestions of B . F . Porshnev,21 the Soviet historian. In a historical analysis of political relations between Western and Eastern Europe at the time of the Thirty Years W a r , Porshnev refers to what he calls the scientific potential of the notion of a 'system' of states which, he says, has been used 'for quite s o m e time by historians', a m o n g w h o m he mentions Lenin in particular. It is quite plain that the system is based on politico-strategic interaction. Concluding his historical analysis, Porshnev advances the following schema: 22 1. While 'all states without exception showed a tendency to external expansion as long as their internal social structure remained based on exploitation' as a rule 'this tendency was paralysed by similar tendencies in other states. . . . 2. In each period, one or other main centre of aggression arose against this background. This is precisely what transformed the s u m of the states into a system...' because 'such and such forces always united to deal with aggression and a second centre of the system was formed. The adjacent states and those which cast themselves in the role of "tertius gaudens" occupied the middle ground; such and such a counterweight was formed to stand u p to them and so o n ' .


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3. There are thus 'objective and general laws for any system of states whatsoever: that is to say, laws independent of individual wishes'. 4. Changes of pattern within a given system, or even passage from one system to another, are ultimately attributable to the 'no less objective and implacable laws of economic development' and to 'class contradictions' whose repercussions m a y modify the role of a state in the system and hence, the system itself. It will thus be noted that, while Porshnev shares the views of Western historians and theorists as to the international dynamic itself (we are thinking here, in particular, of Ludwig Dehio, on w h o m w e shall largely rely for the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and of Morton Kaplan), he has the merit of trying to forge a formal link between that dynamic and other social processes.23 If w e avoid giving too m u c h attention to differences of terminology, and if w e add afifthpoint concerning the retroaction of the system of states towards the 'class contradictions' within some of them, as Theda Skocpol has done in her comparative analysis of the great revolutions, this schema well reflects the thought behind the analysis which follows.21 Let us briefly review the transformation that led to the emergence, towards the middle of the seventeenth century, of a particular type of interstate system: that which has been described as the 'balance of power'. The processes of m o n o p olization has resulted in the appearance in the western part of the continent, during the second half of the fifteenth century, of two territorial aggregates inordinately larger than all the others: on the one hand France which, after recovering the English possessions in the south-west, had destroyed the Burgundian state and absorbed its possessions, except the L o w Countries, and whose population was some 15 million; and on the other hand the Spanish aggregate which, in spite of France's efforts, had been formed in 1469 on the basis of the personal union of the crowns of Castile and Aragon (the latter being itself a complex amalgam) and whose subjects totalled 7 million. Having contrived to strengthen their state apparatus in the Spanish aggregate this applied mainly to Castile) the two great powers lost no time in coming to grips in Italy, the former favourite battleground of Empire and Papacy, whose economic wealth and strategic weakness m a d e it an attractive prize (the strategic weakness was due to the stabilization of regional conflicts towards the mid-fifteenth century into a balance between half a dozen small-scale political units). After two decades of warfare (1494-1516) during which the Empire, strengthened by the acquisition of the Burgundian L o w Countries, and England also entered the part, the two leading protagonists were more or less in balance. Partition of the Italian peninsula into two seemed the most likely outcome. H o w ever, the election of the King of Spain as emperor in 1519 changed the situation completely: the emergence of such a superpower held out visions of reconstitutioning a universal empire embracing all Western Christendom. At this critical m o m e n t , incidentally, the unexpected success of the overseas expeditions launched

Strategic interactions and the formationof modern states: France and England


by the C r o w n of Castile gave the Habsburgs a tremendous advantage: not only did the extraordinary financial benefits gained by plundering the Amerindians play a role in the election of Charles I of Spain as emperor, but the opportunities created by these ventures attracted into his c a m p Genoese and G e r m a n entrepreneurs: in other words international capitalism, for which the Habsburg dominion, with the strategic capacity to m a k e a success of its projects, formed the best conceivable field for investment. T h e activities of the Habsburgs in Europe and the West Indies sustained one another: having obtained, through their primacy and the support of a subjugated pope the virtual monopoly of colonization in the N e w World, they then m a d e use of the advantages this gave them to pursue their European ambitions, at the same time their European successes strengthened their position overseas delaying by a full century the penetration of the periphery by other European states. Even Portugal and her possessions were annexed after a time, to the gigantic aggregate that was taking shape. This close connection between what was happening on the European scene and overseas likewise explains the reversal of the empire-building process in the next century, when the repercussions of the failure to achieve hegemony in Europe triggered the disintegration of the Spanish monopoly overseas, thereby helping to give the periphery a structure that reflected Europe's o w n evolution towards a multistatal system. W e shall see later h o w , in its turn, organization of the periphery on these lines contributed to this trend. If the universal Empire failed of achievement in Europe in the sixteenth century, the courses are not to be found in the domain of socio-economic determinism. The failure of the project must be attributed primarily to French resistance. Moreover, that resistance itself can in no sense be explained by France's position in the 'world economy' in process of formation, because at the critical m o m e n t France happened to be at a disadvantage in relation to it. The causes, then, must be sought in strategic capacity per se: that is to say, the armed might which France could mobilize on the basis of the political organization forged by the monarchy in the previous century. While the defeat at Pavia clearly shows that that armed might was insufficient, the policy subsequently pursued by France bears out our hypothesis concerning the relative autonomy of the strategic factor. Threatened by the Habsburgs on three fronts and more or less, bereft of European allies, France appealed for support to the historic enemy of Christian Europe. Towards 1525 Francis I initiated negotiations with Suleyman the Magnificent, and his envoys encouraged the Turkish advance leading u p to the siege of Vienna four years later.25 This broadening of the theatre of conflict wrought a profound change in the situation, since it was n o w the Empire that was threatened at its two extremities, and France could take advantage of the position she held in relation to its centre. N o r should w e forget that France did not hesitate to support the G e r m a n princes against the Emperor, in the same w a y as the Empire had done during the previous century in the struggle which pitted certain princes against the French monarchy.


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The result of these interactions, of which w e have retraced only the line of force here, was the restoration of a degree of balance about the mid-sixteenth century. But, as historiansamong them F . Braudelagree, the two antagonists had worn each other out with their conflicts.2' Here the notion of 'retroaction' which w e added to Porshnev's schema proves its usefulness: the repercussions of the processes set in train by interstate conflicts led on either side to crises on the plane of what the Marxists call 'class contradictions', a term which covers roughly what w e m e a n by 'internal interstructural exchanges'. Thus France was rent by religious conflicts while the Spanish branch of the Habsburgs had to deal with the revolt of the L o w Countries, which was both symptom and cause of the obstacles impeding the extension of Iberian absolutism beyond its original cradle, Castile. Out between thefissuresin the impasse once again there emerged on to the European chessboard two pieces that were to m a k e a decisive contribution to the evolution of the international pattern. England, driven back to the British Isles and protected from undue outside interference during thefirsthalf of the sixteenth century by the struggle between the two great powers, differed from other states in that henceforth it had the choice between war and peace. T h e variable which for England reflected the strategic pattern was such that her protection could be guaranteed by a fleet; but it proved that the development of such an instrument could also give her a power in the interstate system out of all proportion to what she could mobilize from a small population and strictly limited wealth. W e shall return later to the significance, of this variable in the political development ofthat country. O n the plane of the international system, sea warfare was reducing to a few days, or even.a few hours, crises which on land might spread over several decades.27 Thus the defeat of Spain by England in 1588 marked a decisive turningpoint in the evolution of the system by making the most likely issue to the European conflictthat is to say, the maintenance of a multistatal systema virtual certainty.28 In the immediate result, this situation proved especially favourable to the emergence of the second piece on to the chessboard: this time a completely n e w one, the. United Provinces. A s the recent work of G . Parker shows, the evolution of the L o w Countries' revolt towards independence for part of the region can only be explained by the strategic constraints imposed on Spain throughout her eighty years of effort to put d o w n the revolt, beginning with the naval defeat of 1588, or even perhaps with the Turkish pressure brought to bear in the Mediterranean during previous decades.29 Here the chain of cause and effect ran both ways: the revolt helped towards the English victory, which in turn ensured support for the rebels; these events reduced Spain's freedom of action, which facilitated the settlement of the religious wars in France and soon enabled that country to stage its come-back on the international scenea development that favoured England and the Dutch rebels; and so on. Thus at the end of the sixteenth century Spain found herself faced with

Strategic interactions and the formation of modern states: France and England

7 0 1

three European adversaries in addition to the Ottoman Empire, and was led to treat successively with each of them. This was the signal for the free-for-all overseas. The Iberian aggregate managed to defend the greater part of its N e w World empire, but England, the United Provinces and, after a time, France were able to gain a foothold in the West Indies (including Brazil) and in the north of Florida. The Dutch also infiltrated into Asia at Portugal's expense.30 A large part of the outside world was thus transformed into a periphery exploited by Europe. However, the European merchants and colonists could m a k e headway only where they enjoyed the military and naval support of their governments, not only against the indigenous inhabitants or non-European entrepreneurs already established in such and such an area, but also against their European competitors. Hence the formation of the new 'world economy' cannot be attributed solely to the inexorable drive of capitalism; the striking force which the state organization of the Europeans enabled them to mobilize contributed to the success of their merchants, and hence to the rise of capitalism itself. Conversely M . H o w a r d suggests to us h o w the division of the periphery into areas controlled by each of the antagonists strengthened the trend towards the development of a state system in Europe itself. H e maintained that, at a period when war, evolving pari passu with the more general transformations overtaking European societies, was increasing by the pressure of the mercenaries ('no money, n o Swiss'), the means which the combatants could mobilize at h o m e remained strictly limited. The bankers w h o had kept the princes going during the previous decades had been reduced to bankruptcy by the insolvency of their clients, w h o had not yet established tax systems with which to tap the wealth of their subjects regularly; the latter, moreover, had not yet accumulated wealth on the scale necessary to finance what were n o w long-drawn-out and indecisive campaigns. Thus the capacity to sustain warfare, and hence to.maintain political power in Europe, became, in the course of the seventeenth century, more and more dependent on access to the wealth extracted from the world outside Europe or created by the trade which, in the last analysis was derived from that wealth.31 Evocative though this hypothesis m a y be, it calls for some qualification, for it is obvious that the situation was not the same at all times and in all cases. A m o n g the protagonists w h o played a leading political and military role during thefirstpart of the seventeenth century, neither France nor Sweden, for instance, had the benefit of such support. This m a y even help to explain why, in these two cases, international constraints led the state to bring stronger pressure to bear on society at h o m e , thus starting the 'cycles' which had the effect of institutionalizing absolutism in the full sense of the term. The fact is that in Europe at this time there were virtually only two protagonists for w h o m the world outside Europe already represented a major source of wealth; these were the Spanish branch of the Habsburgs (which also ruled Portugal u p to 1640) and the United Provinces. However, although there can be n o doubt that thisfinancialresource increased


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in a general way. the military might of each of them, and hence their position in the interstate system, it had a very different impact on the internal pattern of each and thus contributed to the formation of distinctive political structures. O n the Spanish side, the wealth extracted from the world outside Europe primarily served the Castilian monarchy, giving it a degree of autonomy in relation to Aragon and the southern L o w Countries in carrying out its projects, and thus helped to bolster u p an absolutism which in appearance w a s very powerful but in reality increasingly devoid of substance, and which, failing to promote any profound changes in society, soon ceased to develop.32 In the United Provinces, on the other hand that wealth chiefly served the merchantsor 'civil society' if that term is preferredenabling them to prevent the constraints born of the centuries-old struggle for national' independence (after Spain, France became the principal source of danger) from precipitating the cycles of transformation leading to the constitution of an absolutist-type state. Organizing itself into an oligarchic confederation, this mercantile society turned war into a specialized activity which it entrusted to 'subcontractors' led by the House of Orange-Nassau, applying to it innovations of the same kind as those that brought about the country's spectacular economic growth in the seventeenth century: that is to say, chiefly a capitalintensive method of investment.33 In fact, it w a s then and there that the 'military revolution' took place, which w a s to continue throughout the seventeenth century in Sweden, France and the Electorate of Brandenburg. H o w a r d points out in this connection that the armies of the United Provinces formed the great exception to the deplorable state of the mercenary armies of the period: they were exceptionally efficient, for the very simple reason that they were regularly supplied and paid. The merchants' earnings enabled their military agents not only to pick the most skilful mercenaries but to m a k e sure of their services by paying them on a yearly basis. This professional system facilitated tactical innovations such as formations of musketeers with a far more effective fire-power, and the practice of entrenchment, an activity which was beneath the dignity of all other mercenaries but which vastly increased defensive capacity. M o r e generally, the economic successes of the mercantile society enabled it to cover at the same time, without having to increase the pressure of taxation or of recruitment, the huge investments needed in building an unequalled line of fortifications and afleet,which also came to be manned by professionals. Needless to say, thisfleetdid m u c h to secure the position which the United Provinces had carved out for themselves on the periphery. Although the Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years W a r , sanctioned the crystallization of 'European balance' and the legal recognition of the sovereignty of constituted states, that balance w a s maintained by the interplay of mechanisms of conflict arising mainly out of the bipolar tension between Bourbons and Habsburgs. Thus, the second part of the seventeenth century (with which w e shall conclude this outline of the interstate system in

Strategic interactions and the formation of modern states: France and England


order to return to the internal: changes that accompanied its formation) w a s marked by the challenge to this balance represented by France's drive for a predominant position in relation to the Spanish branch of the Habsburgs; that is to say, not only Spain but also the Spanish L o w Countries. A t the same time, the various motives which had prompted European expansion overseas during the previous two centuries were being reduced to a search for the necessary means to strengthen the power of the states confronting one another in Europe. While the Dutch, after breaking forcibly into one or other trade networks, developed an economic system which enabled them to profit from any subsequent share-out of the spoils, the English and the French were striving to build up mutually exclusive trade systems which could only be maintained by force. T h e result was an escalation of the conflict to virtually world-wide proportions, after which naval warfare became increasingly the decisive factor. In an initial phase, French designs led the maritime and Protestant Powersthe Anglo-Scottish combination and the United Provincesto set aside the differences born of their commercial rivalry and band together to prevent the elimination of their centuries-old enemy, whose already diminished power threatened them less than the power of the empire that was building. However, in a second phase, France was able to take advantage of this very rivalry to obtain British support in an enterprise whose aim was purely and simply to eliminate the United Provinces. These last, however, emboldened by their defensive organization, not only managed to resist invasion but were shortly able to take advantage in their turn, of the internal tensions which racked Great Britain to reverse the situation and come to the aid of those in that country w h o opposed the political evolution directed at turning it into a satellite of France and transforming it into a Catholic monarchy of the absolutist type. T h e association of Great Britain and the United Provinces under the leadership of William of Orange w h o , 'prevented from ruling as a monarch in Holland, became a European statesman', formed the main pole of an alliance of all the states threatened by French hegemony, including the Papacy. The naval defeat of France at L a Hogue (1692) ensured the survival of the n e w regime in Great Britain and confirmed the multistatal orientation of the system, as the destruction of the Spanish A r m a d a had done a century earlier. But France, far from renouncing her ambitions, soon regained the initiative, thus reviving a conflict which quickly assumed global proportions. In its wake Great Britian raised itself to the status of a world power, while elsewhere Russia took over from the Ottoman Empire and Sweden on the eastern and northern flanks of the European interstate system. Great Britain's predominance enabled her to call the tune by imposing a policy of balance on the continental powers. N o t wishing to replace French hegemony by that of the Austrian Empire she had n o interest in eliminating France and negotiated a separate peace with her in 1713; a year later the Empire was obliged to fall in with the n e w pattern.


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A s H o w a r d further points out, while the greater capacity of the maritime powers to provide themselves, by exploiting the periphery with the financial resources needed to sustain an immense strategic effort was the deciding factor during the period 1689-1713, it was also at that time that an alternative method of obtaining such resources was developed on a hitherto unprecedented scale: namely the growing capacity of European governments to control, or at any rate tap, the community's wealth and to use it in setting up machinerya bureaucracy, tax systems, armed forcesthat enabled them to extend their control over the community still further. Even before 1700 the master plan had been laid d o w n : that of a state machine capable of managing a full-time force and of maintaining it in time of peace as in time of war: a force composed of a coherent hierarchy of m e n imbued with a distinct subculture.34 All the European states without exception were transformed by this; but let us consider h o w significant variations were able to take shape in the c o m m o n melting-pot of these two centuries of interactions.

Interface dynamics in France and England

W e have already alluded to the contributions of the international variable to the decline of the French monarchy in the second part of the sixteenth century and to the subsequent preservation of France's territorial integrity. Although the wars of religion ended with the reaffirmation of a royal state of which Paris became the true centre, there was nothing yet to suggest that during the next century France would become the very model of an absolutist state. It should be remembered, for example, that the Edict of Nantes sanctioned the existence of a veritable archipelago of autonomy within the statea situation so u n c o m m o n that in 1625 H u g o Grotius dedicated his De Jure to Louis XIII in tribute to the most tolerant of monarchsand that the peripheral regions, such as Brittany, still retained their o w n institutions. France's weakness m a d e a pacific policy necessary and the maintenance of peace m a d e administrative economies easier; Sully contrived to double the royal revenues without overweighting the state apparatus. However, the demonstration that concerted action by the two Habsburg states would enable them to dominate the whole of Europe soon compelled France to intervene. F r o m the very start of his military and diplomatic intervention in the Thirty Years W a r , Richelieu did his utmost to build up a rationalized administrative machine for royal intervention throughout the country, and he put an end to the consociational society by wiping out the Huguenot strongholds. Since France, despite the cardinal's efforts, had not yet succeeded in establishing herself on the overseas periphery, his foreign policy necessitated a sudden huge increase in the fiscal burden, which quadrupled in one decade from 1630 onwards. 35 France's intervention, at first mediatized by subsidies to Sweden (which, incidentally, with the addition of those Sweden obtained from Russia, were of consider-

Strategic interactions and the formation of modern states: France and England


able help to Gustavus Adolphus in building up a strong state), and by the employment of G e r m a n mercenaries, ended with large French armies in the field.38 The need to improvise such an army, rendered urgent by the death of Gustavus Adolphus, prompted the innovation that was decisive for the future development of the French political system: the creation of a civil bureaucracy to administer the army, a remarkable feat considering that at the time n o formal bureaucracy existed to administer anything.37 Military emergencies facilitated the imposition of the system of administrators in regions that were invaded or threatened; the royal troops were regularly deployed in the interior of the country to back up the demands of the central power; and the expansion of the administrative apparatus contributed, more generally, to the emergence of a'new social formation, the nobility of the robe, which by c o m m o n consent is generally credited with a crucial role in building up the French absolutist system. A s in the middle of the previous' century, the repercussions of a long period of murderous and costly international conflicts heightened internal tensions and thus helped to precipitate a general crisis in European societies, which in France took the form of the Fronde. After this hiatus, evolution gathered speed with the accession of Louis X I V for w h o m , according to Perry Anderson, absolutism w a s not an end in itself but an instrument of military expansion. France, having as yet managed few moves on the overseas chessboard, logically turned her attention to the conquest of a European centre that appeared vulnerable in the small size of its territory and population and the limited degree of organization of the state. After ten years of internal preparations, including the departmental reorganization of ministries including those of the Navy, W a r and Foreign Affairs, and refinement of the system of administrators which m a d e it possible to double the net revenue of the monarchy, came the invasion of Holland and what followed. During the reign of Louis X I V the strength of the royal army increased tenfold from 30,000 or 50,000 on his accession to 300,000 by 1713. Anderson, referring here to the works of Goubert and Mousnier, says that the growth of such a military machine meant both the final disarmament of the provincial nobility and the capacity to put d o w n popular revolts quickly and effectively.38 French culture was itself transformed: the 'curialization of the warriors', to which Elias attached great importance as a mechanism of royal absolutism, was matched by what might be termed the 'bellicization of society', which showed itself not only through the transformation of standards revealed by Michel Foucault but also through the invention of a n e w kind of town planningthat of fortified towns. 39 However, it is in the more h u m d r u m field of public finance that the profound consequences of the systematic constraints imposed by the international variable were most apparent. T h e escalation of international conflicts at the end of the century resulted in a parallel increase in the expenditure of the French state, which between 1689 and 1714 totalled nearly 5 million livres (300 million sterling): that is to say, very little less than the combined expenditure of the three


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principal members of the opposing coalition.40 N o t counting the service of the public debt already incurred as a result of the war, by the end of the reign the war was swallowing u p between two-thirds and three-quarters of the public expenditure. Since nearly half the realm was exempt from taxationa result of the institutionalization of earlier choices concerning the nobility and clergy, which could not be disavowed without endangering the regimethe talliage weighed very heavily on the mass of the populationwho were also liable for generalized military servicewhile covering only 30 per cent of expenditure. Despite the tendency to institutionalize specialized central bureaucracies, the constraints of the political system prevented the state from applying that technique in the crucial matter of revenue, in this respect falling short of the state centralism achieved in the United K i n g d o m . Since the device of tax farming responded poorly to the increased fiscal pressure, the total revenue obtained by. the French state through indirect taxes probably diminished during the war; in view of the limitations on what it could extract from society by this means, the state resorted to borrowing; but, as its credit inexorably shrank, borrowing grew more and more expensive. Furthermore, having been ousted from the foreign m o n e y markets controlled by its enemies, it lent itself increasingly to venal transactions. W h e n the war ended, the total debt came to more than the state could expect to collect from ordinary revenue sources in thirty years, and the debt charges alone ate u p nearly the entire annual revenue. The problems created by this deadlock were never really solved; by the time the war was over, the most unwieldy state apparatus in the world was turning over only in order to stay in place. . It would also be possible to retrace step by step the influence of the constraints imposed by the role France was coming to play in the international pattern with regard to the final solution of the Protestant problem before, during and after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) and in the evolution of the links between the state centre and the territorial peripheries, of which the case of Brittany affords a good illustration. A t the beginning of Louis X I V ' s reign this province still enjoyed a broad autonomy, arranged by its estates and trading freely with foreign countries, with England as its principal partner. O n Colbert's initiative, Brest was created out of nothing as the great naval port of the Atlantic fleet. Since the province thus acquired outstanding strategic importance, the king could n o longer afford not to keep it well in hand. Brittany rebelled during the war with Holland (1675) as the result of the introduction of n e wfiscalobligations (it was a question of stamped paper) without consultation with the estates. The m o v e ment developed into a more general uprising against the seigniorial regime and impressment, and was brutally crushed. This w a s the prelude to the ending of regional autonomy. After a difficult start, the royal administrators, established at Rennes, in 1689, succeeded in imposing, without consulting the estates, the two n e w taxes created for the purposes of the war: the poll-tax and the tithe. In becoming for administrative purposes a province like the others, Brittany also began its

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economic decline. W h e n Paris closed the kingdom to English cloth through prohibitive customs duties, England quickly turned away from her Breton suppliers, and .the war at sea itself dealt the trade based on. regional industry a blow from which it was never to recover. Once more, of the two kinds of France possible, the state gave priority to the continental one because of the pressures of the international system.41 Though w e do not propose here to consider war as the sole and unique source of causality, w e nevertheless subscribe to Roland de Mousnier's view,12 whichfitsin with the one w e ourselves have outlined o n the basis of the notion of 'cycles', as suggested by Finer. W a r m a d e necessary a level of taxation that went far beyond what the king's subjects considered lawful. Thisfiscalpressure helped to provoke revolts, thereby forcing, the royal government to use its armed forces inside the country, but at the same time causing it to encourage economic development to increase the country's taxable wealth. Although war was not permanent from 1625 to 1789, the governments in power during periods of conflict nevertheless acquired habits which persisted w h e n peace returned. They thus assumed a despotic and tyrannical aspect which led to criticism of the monarchy and of society. In conclusion, let us not forget that the ultimate crisis of the ancien rgime clearly began as a result of the repercussions of a war whose cost was beyond the capacity of the system. The sequence.of processes contributing to the very different development of the English political system must be attributed not to England's insularity, considered as a geographical fact, but to the manner in which that insularity, at a given period was woven into a particular interstate pattern and thus became part of a variable with respect to the country's internal composition. It is noteworthy that historians such as L . Stone, C . Hill and P . Anderson, w h o in other respects hold very diverse views, all agree more or less about the initial cause of the country's originality. Although England, at the beginning of the modern age, was subjected to a centralizing pressure just as powerful as that which prevailed a m o n g the continental states, that pressure did not lead to the establishment of a standing royal army. This omission in the monarchical apparatus subsequently imposed very strict limits o n action by the monarchy, regardless of what the political aims of any particular sovereign were to be. A n d England's position in relation to the international pattern is clearly what m a d e the persistence of that omission possible. W e must look beyond the early establishment of a parliamentary system to the international situation as a whole in Europe at the time of the Rnaissance. During the first half of the sixteenth century, whereas Spain and France were engaged in a struggle the m o m e n t u m of which drove them inexorably to turn themselves into war machines, England was not directly threatened and did not need either an army or even a navy to,defend itself. However, because the Tudors shared ambitions similar to those of the other European monarchies, they intervened on the Continent in 1512-14, 1522-25 and again in 1543-46. Nevertheless


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as they were only able to mobilize a very small force compared to that of the continentals, the campaigns of the Tudors cost them a good deal of money without bringing them any substantial successes. L . Stone explains very clearly the structural nature of the limits to their action. Firstly, given the population factor, the only way in which the English G r o w n could develop a striking force was by engaging the services of foreign mercenaries, mostly Italians and Germans. Secondly, the C r o w n was highly dependent on the taxes allowed to it, since it had not been able to develop any direct resources of its o w n , like gold and silver in the case of the Spanish C r o w n , salt in the case of the French monarchy, or copper in that of the Swedish. 43 Hence, only by selling the greater part of the Church lands which it had recently seized was the English monarchy able to undertake the campaigns of 1543-46. But this decision represented a decisive turning-point for the monarchy, because of its unforeseen results. First, the C r o w n n o w retained, in the form of revenue independent of parliamentary vote, only what was necessary for its peace-time requirements, and secondly, the sale of 'national property' further precipitated the emergence of a n e w social class, the 'gentry', w h o henceforth would influence English society against any transformation of an absolutist type, making it less and less likely that the monarchy would at some future date, ignore Parliament and go its o w n way. Thus the monarchy had landed itself in an impasse. It could maintain itself on a small revenue so long as it did not raise an army, but if it did so it would be obliged to apply to Parliament, and Parliament would take advantage of the situation to oppose any attempt by the monarchy to establish absolute power. This did not apply when it came to building u p afleet.During the second half of the sixteenth century, this was found to be necessary not only for the country's defence but also to serve the ambition, shared by the monarchy and the English ruling classes alike, to carve a place for themselves in the overseas periphery then in the process of formation. B y its very nature, a strategic instrument of this kind could not be used internally. Given these facts, one can understand h o w the European crisis of the seventeenth century took the form, in England, of the collapse of the Stuart monarchy followed by a revolution. During thefirstdecades of the century, in foreign affairs, the Stuarts did not stray to any great extent from the tradition established by their predecessors. The danger from Spain had been reduced by the peace of 1604; France was emerging from her civil wars weakened and cautious; the United Provinces formed a friendly Protestant power; Scotland, also Protestant, had been joined to the English Crown; and from 1618 onwards, the spectacular rise.of Sweden under Gustavus Adolphus ensured the maintenance on the Continent of a certain balance between Catholics and Protestants, so that in their conflicts the belligerents turned away from the British Isles. This pattern favoured a policy of retrenchment under the protection of afleetwhichalso served the interests of the merchant adventurers and the investors w h o backed them up,

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including the C r o w n itselfand there was still no pretext whatever for the formation of a royal army. Without any such army, the state had n o reason to build up the bureaucratic machinery for supplying the m a n p o w e r and finance that an army needed, as w e saw in the case of France. Thus, w h e n the Stuart monarchy tried to enter the stream of European politics, attempting to be as independent as possible from Parliament and to form England and Scotland into a unified whole, it turned out that it lacked the two keys to absolutist power; namely a standing army which it could use against its subjects, and a local bureaucracy paid by the central government and upon which it (the monarchy) could depend.44 It is significant that the crisis arose as a result of a Scottish rebellion that occurred w h e n the King and his Archbishop attempted to impose the English form of religious organization on the Scottish clergy, appearing at the same time to threaten the nobility whose rise to power had been based on the acquisition of ecclesiastical property. W e shall say nothing here about the period of the civil war which led to the rise of Cromwell's absolutism, particularly from the military standpoint. His coercive powers were based on a level of taxation five times higher than under the monarchy, but the system collapsed following the Protector's death, after L o n d o n had refused to pay its taxes. Thus, a situation similar to the one which had contributed to the collapse of the monarchy in 1638-42 n o w brought about the opposite result, i.e. its restoration. Shortly after the Restoration, the tension between the absolutist aims which the Stuarts still harboured and the aims of those sectors of society in favour of development towards a parliamentary form of government, manifested itself simultaneously in both internal and external policy, since the choices that were being m a d e in each of these spheres were complementary. At the risk of oversimplifying, it is fair to say that in view of the monarchy's lack of means at the start, it could only succeed in strengthening its power by calling upon outside support. A n d this, for lack of any alternative, meant calling on France. This involved the pursuit by the monarchy of a foreign policy contrary to the economic interests of those w h o wanted parliamentary government, and of a religious policy that went against what had, for over a century, c o m e to be one of the pillars of national identity. The balance of internal forces is not enough to explain the result of this conflict, for in spite of all the opposition to its plans inside the country, the monarchy, strongly supported by the greatest European power of the time, only narrowly missed being successful. Those w h o were opposed to this political trend were able to halt it by exploiting the opportunities presented by the international situation. Thus, the crystallization of a decisive differentiation in the morphology of the European stateabsolute monarchy, parliamentary monarchycan be explained by the coming together of internal and external processes at the interface of the most crucial case. Let us recall very briefly the sequence of events.45 Whereas from 1668,


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England formed part of a triple alliance with Holland and Sweden against France in 1670 the English king signed a secret agreement with France in which he undertook to declare himself a Catholic as soon as circumstances permitted, and in return he obtained the necessary funds to free him from parliamentary restrictions. In spite of the state's bankruptcy, Charles II started a war with the United Provinces in 1673 in alliance with France. T w o days before the declaration of war he issued an indulgence to the Catholics (as well as to the Protestant minorities), while Parliament reaffirmed the supremacy of the Anglican Church. A s Parliament had been prorogued and remained suspended throughout nearly the whole of the period 1674-79, Charles II became more dependent than ever on his foreign patron. However, those w h o were opposed to the king's action placed every possible obstacle in his way. In an effort to turn foreign policy from its too exclusively French leanings, his o w n Minister, Sir T h o m a s Osborne, started negotiations for the marriage between M a r y , the king's elder daughter, and Prince William the ultra-Protestant head of the House of Orange and Stadtholder of the United Provinces. A t the same time, a movement was launched to replace, in the order of succession to the throne, James, the Catholic, by his elder brother the D u k e of M o n m o u t h , the king's illegitimate but Protestant son. Charles II, after proroguing Parliament yet again in 1679, excluded M o n m o u t h from the succession and, in 1685, in extremis, declared himself a Catholic. James II, having m a d e thefirststep towards a reconciliation with Parliament on his accession, took advantage of threats of invasion (the D u k e of Argyll in Scotland and M o n m o u t h in England) to obtain parliamentary approval at last for the creation of a royal army whose numbers quickly rose to 30,000 m e n . The n e w king had the advantage for the army's maintenance, of a considerable increase in customs duties as a result of the very protectionist policy o n which all parties concerned were agreed, and he was therefore less dependent than this predecessor on French subsidies, which by this time accounted for only an eighth of the government's annual revenue. Matters were n o w very rapidly coming to a head. Bent on building up an organization on which he could rely, James, contrary to the law, put Catholic officers into the army, a large part of which was concentrated near London, and tried in vain to obtain the repeal of the laws in question. W h e n Parliament, scandalized by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, attempted to wrest the army from the king's hands through a return to the militia, it was finally dissolved. The king n o w went straight for his aim. Having succeeded in obtaining from judges in his pay a suspension of the laws barring Catholics from public office, he proceeded to appoint Catholics, one after the other as Governor of Ireland, as Admiral of the Fleet, and even in such sacrosanct strongholds of Anglicanism as the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. In 1688, in spite of the whittling d o w n of French subsidies, James II felt sufficiently sure of his success to proclaim the complete emancipation of the religious minority to which he belonged, having the Anglican bishops w h o opposed this measure imprisoned in the Tower

Strategic interactions and the formation of modern states: France and England


of London. At the same time, the birth of his son meant that his sister (a Protestant) was no longer in the direct line of succession to the throne and ensured continuity for his plans. Although the courts helped to strengthen the opposition by proclaiming the bishops innocent, what turned the tide was the decision taken by the Earl, of Danby, backed by the Bishop of London, to invite William of Orange to c o m e over to England. Despite feelers for compromise put out by both sides, William finally landed at the head of 11,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. While the nobility and gentry rallied slowly to the side of this imposing force, the king's supporters deserted him en masse. Receiving no help from. Louis X I V , then engaged, in a campaign in the Palatinate, and unable even to prevent William from sailing, James II was forced to disband his army that had not received its pay and to seek refuge himself in France. A group of peers, alarmed by the danger of a popular uprising in London, thereupon asked William to enter London with his army to keep order. A s Koenigsberger points out, it was not just a coincidence that a Prince of Orange, the representative of a regime which stood out particularly from the current of absolutism was the one w h o thus contributed to laying the foundations of a parliamentary monarchy in Great Britain. Without going into details about the, internal and external, processes which combined to provide the n e w regime with institutions, let us remind ourselves that although the need for an army was acknowledged n o w that the regime could only survive by actively opposing French hegemony, thefirstthing that Parliament did on being s u m m o n e d in February 1689 was to impose the Act of Mutiny on the king. This allowed him to maintain an army for one year only, at the end of which his authority over the troops had to be renewed. That, in turn, could be done by seeking the approval of Parliament. This was followed by the Act of 1701 stipulating that no sovereign might engage in war for the defence of a foreign territory, or even leave the country without the consent of Parliament. This act marked thefirstconstitutional step towards parliamentary control over foreign policy.10 With the danger of a French invasion removed by the victory of the reorganized Britishfleetoff L a Hogue in M a y 1692, Parliament proceeded to consolidate its ascendancy by a very strict limitation of the Crown's revenues, at the same time encouraging state centralization by abandoning the system of farming out taxes and replacing it by the Treasury. It gave extra impetus to the strategic policy already established by cutting army expenditure below the level desired by the king, while increasing the navy's budget above what he desired. Thus, between 1688 and 1713, the number of naval units increased by 40 per cent and naval tonnage by 60 per cent. Disagreements between France and Great Britain became accentuated during the struggle which opposed them for nearly a quarter of a century. H o w was it that Great Britain in spite of all the drawbacks from which it suffered, and whose ordinary revenue at the end of the Stuart period was not one-fifth that of France,


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managed not only to carry on during the struggle but even, eventually, to triumph over nation far richer than itself? Let us note,first,that in Great Britain state expenditure prior to the Revolution amounted to some 2 million pounds sterling a year. This rose to 72 million for the period from 1689 to 1702, and to no less than 99 million during the following decade. The war, as in France, swallowed up most of this. But to deal with this huge burden, Great Britain organized itself differently from France. In thefirstplace, with the establishment of the new regime, Parliament was able, in 1692, to bring in a property tax, from which the big landowners were in no w a y exempt. This tax, which alone brought in 2 million pounds a year, was more fairly distributed and so weighed relatively less heavily on those at the bottom of the scale than did the talliage. In addition there were customs duties which, increasing fourfold between 1690 and 1704, accounted by the end of the war for nearly half the national revenue. While, as in France, the bulk of the revenue in Great Britain came from indirect taxes, the establishment of the Treasury ensured that a larger share went to the central government. Under this n e w system, the state was able to triple its ordinary revenue between 1689 and 1714. A fairer and more efficient taxation system inspired public confidence and helped to give the state a reliable image. The credit system, which got slowly under w a y in and around the year 1690, when government borrowing still accounted for only one-tenth of the expenditure, was subsequently regularized through the setting up of the B a n k of England which, after the state's near-bankruptcy in 1696, provided for its short-termfinancing.This, institution, which later on replaced the Exchequer in the management of long-term loans, was merely one of m a n y innovations leading to the development of the London market as a centre for transactions in government bonds. Thus the interest rate, which stood at 10-14 percent in the 1690s, had dropped ten years later to between 5 and 6 per cent. It is likely that the greater efficiency in mobilizing resources through the taxation and credit systems was matched by a greater military efficiency also. The results of the conflict' were thus not at all the same in the two cases. A s Finer points out, the W h i g nobility and their B a n k of England associates, founders of the n e w regime, supported the war on land and sea by which they maintained themselves. So did the merchants, for it brought them good business; and the army could not be used by the monarchy to abolish the constitution, as the officers were mostly the younger sons of the W h i g families that supported the Revolution. Meanwhile the Tories, jealously protecting the local power on which their status in the country was based, preferred to keep to the traditional form of war at sea; supporting and controlling the militia as they did, they were opposed to any attempt to create a military monopoly or a centralized bureaucracy. It will be observed, however, that in Great Britain, as in France, the international conflict brought about profound changes in the realtionship between the centre and the peripheral regions. This was precisely the period at which the United Kingdom was formed, through the abolition of the Scottish Parliament, the setting up of a

Strategic interactions and the formation of modern states: France and England


highly centralized and repressive administration in Ireland, and by the exclusion of the Catholic minority from full citizenship. The contrasts between the two countries remain striking. In the case of France, the variable resulting from the international situation had helped to create an absolute monarchy which tended to play a role in this system that sharpened all internal tensions was an obstacle to the development of the economy. In Great Britain, however (with the exception of Ireland, which nevertheless accounted for nearly half the population of the United K i n g d o m as a whole), this variable, after first rendering the absolutist solution less probable and thenfinallycontributing to its elimination, offered the country the chance to choose a foreign policy which facilitated the rallying of the ruling classes to the n e w regime, and even the integration of the middle classes. A s it grew stronger, so the British state became increasingly parliamentary. Because the interactions between France and England formed one of the principal poles around which the interstate system was being reshaped, both countries were forced to commit themselves fully to the role this system imposed on them, and the differences in their internal organization could only become more and more marked during the second 'Hundred Years W a r ' that had already started.

O u r purpose has been to show the need to include the international strategic factor as an explanatory variable in any comparative macro-sociology of the formation of the Western state and of its development and differentiation. W e have also been concerned to demonstrate the possibility of subjecting this factor itself to a sociological type of treatment, which would enable it to be included in a more elaborate theoretical pattern. T h o u g h w e have concentrated on Great Britain and France for the purposes of example, what w e have said could of course be extended to other cases, as w e have suggested by referring to Spain, the United Provinces, Sweden and Prussia. W e should add that a demonstration of this kind could equally well be m a d e with regard to later periods, including our o w n . The theory that emerges from this exploratory essay might be summarized as follows: during the period in question, the internal transformations that took place in each state in the process of formation helped to bring about the emergence of an interstate system of which these states were the component parts. This system developed its o w n particular dynamism whose repercussions m a y be regarded as specific variables having retroactive effects u p o n each unit of the whole. This cycle of exchanges occurred also in the reverse sense, with internal mutations leading to changes in the international pattern thus modifying the variable formed by the international pattern in relation to its components units. If one were to continue in this way, one could conceive of a complete series of political structures


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and processes, itself part of a more comprehensive cultural and social system of which it would form an irreducible structural component. Even if it is unlikely that w e shall c o m e to conceive this complete series in any very clear way, it is useful to take it, on an ontological level, as the starting-point for our studies, so that they are more firmly grounded in historical fact. A s regards the contributions m a d e by the international political and strategic factor to the development of states and regimes, is it a matter of 'overdetermination' in relation to a more basic factor acting both inside a country and at a global level (as claimed by those w h o consider the political structures of the modern world to be merely epiphenomena with respect to the formation of the capitalist system, extending on a 'world-economy' scale) or else as Hintze puts it, is it a matter of 'co-determination'? Let us say, rather, that w e are confronted with two sets of restrictions which come together at the interface and whose relations are themselves indeterminate. Although it is true that w e have learned to visualize h o w the constraints brought about by relations of production and everything connected therewith, as well as those that can be attributed to already established internal political structures, combine to determine the subsequent development of a given political system, it is equally true that the constraints that w e have identified intervene decisively at crucial moments of that development. A s these constraints are of a systematic nature, it would be a mistake to relegate their manifestations to the purely factual, in other words to put them arbitrarily at the lowest level of a hierarchy of determinisms. Everything points to the fact, however, that the relative importance of each of these series of constraints varies from one period to another and one situation to another. H o w , w h y , and with what results? This is precisely what has to be determined. It follows from this that w e shall stand a m u c h better chance of achieving our legitimate theoretical ambitions if w e begin from the outset to work out our theories in relation to relatively accurate parameters, in other words, by limiting both in time and in space the particular world to which they are supposed to apply. In this way, history and sociology will be able to join together in the pursuit of a c o m m o n task. [Translated from French] Notes
These remarks apply equally to sociology and political science. The chief works which spring to mind are: Barrington M o o r e , Jr, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston, Beacon Press, 1966); the introduction by Charles Tilly to the collective work he edited, The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975); the contributions m a d e to that work by Stein Rokkan and Samuel Finer, to which w e shall return later; R a y m o n d Grew (ed.), Crisis of Political Development in Europe and North America (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979); Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978); Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, Sociologie de Vtat (Paris, Grasset, 1979). It will be noted, however, that others besides ourselves have already raised the problem w e are discussing. A m o n g them w e m a y mention: Perry Anderson, Lineages of

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Notes (continued)

8 . the Absolutist State, L o n d o n , N e w Left Books, 1974); Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolution ( N e w York, Cambridge 9 . University Press, 1979); and above all I m m a nuel Wallcrstcin, The Modern World-System (New York, Academic Press, 1974). Indeed, a detailed criticism of this last work ('Origins 1 0 of the Modern World-System: a Missing Link', to be published in World Politics, 1981) 1 1 started us on the analysis of which this paper represents the second stage. H . G . Koenigsberger, 'Monarchies and Parliaments in Early Modern Europe: Dominium Regale or Dominium Politicum et Regale', Theory 1 2 13 and Society, Vol. V , March 1978, p . 214. See J. P . Nettl, 'The State as a Conceptual Vari- 1 4 able', World Politics, July 1968, p . 559-92. F r o m this analysis w e arrived at the notion of the 'inter-face'. Our reading of Fernand Braudel is based on the American edition of The Mediterranean 10 and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, N e w Y o r k , Harper & R o w , 1976; as regards historians, see also William McNeil, The Rise of the West: a History of the Human Community, N e w York, T h e ls N e w American Library, 1963; and Geoffrey 17 Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary History (Baltimore, Penguin, 1967). A s to the sociologists, see Talcott Parsons, Societies: Comparative and Evolutionary Per-1 8 spectives (Englewood Cliffs, N . J . , Prentice-1 9 20 Hall, 1967) and the above-mentioned work by Wallers tcin. This is the flaw in the otherwise highly evocative model proposed by George Modelski: ' T h e Long Cycle of Global Politics and the NationState', Comparative Studies in Society and 2 1 History,Vol.20, N o . 2 , April 1978, p. 214-35. Further on, however, w e shall refer to B . F . Porshnev's schema, which tries to m a k e 22 good this omission.

Anderson, op. cit., p . 21, 405, 409, 412, 423-4. This conception, based on the works of Marx and Weber, w h o m Anderson regards in this connection as complementing rather than contradicting each other, comes close to that of McNeill (see above), w h o emphasizes the 'heterogeneity' of the medieval West. Otto Hintze, 'The Formation of the States and the Constitutional Development: a Study in History and Polities', in Felix Gilbert (ed.), 77ie Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, p . 167, N e w York, Oxford University Press, 1975.


Joseph R . Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State, Princeton, N . J ; , Princeton University Press, 1970. Here w e rely on the American edition of Robert Fawtier, 77e Capetian Kings of France, p . 8 8 95, N e w Y o r k , St Martin's Press, 1960. Norbert Elias, La dynamique de l'Occident, p . 4 4 64, Paris, Calmann-Lvy, 1975. Yves Renouard, '1212-1216: c o m m e n t les traits durables de l'Europe occidentale moderne se sont dfinis au dbut du x n e sicle', Annales de l'Universit de Paris, Vol. X X V I I I , January-March 1958, p . 5-21. Elias, o p . cit., p . 63. Strayer, o p . cit., p . 2 6 - 7 . Samuel E . Finer, 'State and Nation-Building in Europe: T h e Role of the Military', in Tilly,' op. cit., p . 84-163. This approach resembles that outlined by Elias concerning the 'sociogencsis of the fiscal monopoly', o p . cit., p. 153-83. Unless otherwise stated, our discussion of military development throughout this essay is based on the source book by Michael H o w a r d ; War in European History, Oxford,, Oxford University Press, 1976. Hintze, in Gilbert, op. cit., p . 312, 340, 345 et seq. Bernard Gune, L'Occident aux XIV et XVe sicles : les tats, p . 205, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1971. Anderson, op. cit., p . 86. H o w a r d , op. cit., p . 13. See H . R . Trevor-Roper, ' T h e General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century', The European Witch-Craze of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, p. 46-89, N e w York, Harper & R o w , 1969. Anderson, o p . cit., p . 32-9, and particularly note 37, p . 37. A s regards the attribution of 'over determination' to Spain, see p . 60 of the same work. B . F . Porshnev, 'Les rapports politiques de l'Europe occidentale et de l'Europe orientale l'poque de la Guerre de Trente A n s ' , Comit International des Sciences Historiques, p. 138, 161, 162, note 1, Uppsala, A l m quist & Wikscll, 1960. Ludwig Dehio, 77ie Precarious Balance, N e w York, A . A . Knopf, 1962. Unless otherwise stated, our discussion of the formation of the interstate system at the beginning of the modern era will be based on this unjustly neglected ' classic (published in 1948 under the title Gleich-gewicht oder Hegemonie). F r o m the theoretical standpoint, see especially Morton


Aristide R. Zolberg

Notes {continued) Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, p. 21-36, N e w York, John Wiley, 1957. . Theda Skocpal, States and Social Revolutions, p. 22-4, and her discussion of individual cases. G . R . Elton, Reformation Europe, 1517-1559, p . 119, N e w York, Harper Torchbooks, 1963. Dchio, after Ranke, sees in this the first sign of a counterweight being brought to bear by a maritime power on the periphery of Europe (op. cit., p . 38). It will be noted that this analysis agrees entirely with Porshnev's schema. W a s Lenin a disciple of Ranke? Braudcl, op. cit., Vol. II, p . 945. Dehio, op. cit., p . 55. Garrett Mattingly, The Armada, p . 401, Boston, Houghton, Mifflin, 1959. Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659, London, C a m bridge University Press, 1972; and, by the same author, The Dutch Revolt, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1979. In the opinion of J. H . Parry, for example, the activities of England and France in the N e w World resembled 'tactical countermoves on the chessboard' {The Establishment of the European Hegemony, 1415-1715. N e w York, Harper Torchbooks, 1966). See also K . G . Davies, The North Atlantic World in the Seventeenth Century, p . 25-31, 35-45, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1974; and for the United Provinces, C . R . Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800, London, Hutchinson, 1965. H o w a r d , op. cit., p . 51. Here w e rely in the main on P . Anderson's interpretation, op. cit., p . 71-84. The connection between the political organization and the economic rise of the United Provinces is underlined by Douglas C . North and Robert Paul T h o m a s in The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History, p . 132-45, Cambridge, University Press, 1973. These authors, however, minimize the contribution m a d e by exploitation of the periphery to the development of Dutch capitalism. H o w a r d , op. cit., p. 49, 54. Anderson, op. cit., p . 98. W e cannot, unfortunately, linger over the case of Sweden which'showed, as that of the Duchy of Brandenburg (Prussia) was to do still more spectacularly a little later on, that the international pattern could also take the form of a variable allowing a state to be built up almost exclusively on the basis of military organization. These examples illustrate a process of state-building through'value added' where certain social factors were present in a particular context. For the role of French and Russian subsidies in Gustavus Adolphus's enterprise, see Porshnev, op. cit., p. 150-1. Howard, op. cit., p. 64. Anderson, op. cit., p . 62. This 'curialization' has been the subject of a detailed study: Norbert Elias, La socit de cour, Paris, Calmann-Lvy, 1974. With regard to the term 'bellicization', see Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir, Paris, Gallimard, 1976. Our reference to the planning of fortified towns is the result of a visit in 1980 to the Muse des Plans-Reliefs in the attics of the Htel des Invalides, Paris. All the facts quoted in the paragraph which follows have been taken from the wellstocked paper by P . G . M . Dickson and John Sperling, ' W a r Finance, 1689-1714', The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. V I : The Rise of Great Britain and Russia, 16881725, p. 284-315, London, Cambridge University Press, 1970. Here w e are alluding, of course, to the very interest in interpretation given by Edward W . Fox in History in Geographic Perspective, The Other France, N e w York, W . W . Norton, 1971. Roland Mousnier, Les institutions de la France sous la monarchie absolue. Vol. II: Les organes de l'tat et la Socit, p . 7 et seq., Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1980. See also his general conclusion. Lawrence Stone, 'The English Revolution', in Robert Frster and Jack P . Greene (eds.), Preconditions of Revolution in Early Modern Europe, p. 68, Baltimore, M d . , Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970. Ibid, p . 103-8. Christopher Hill, The Century of Revolution, 1603-1714, p . 13-14, N e w York, W . W . Norton, 1961, m a y also be consulted. Here w e are following Christopher Hill, op. cit., p . 193-311. The following paragraph is based on David Ogg, 'The Emergence of Great Britain as a World Power', The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. V I : The Rise of Great Britain and Russia, 1688-1725, London, Cambridge University Press, 1970.



37 38 39

20 27 28 29





31 32 33



45 48

31 35 36

Peripheral developments
Comparative historical formations of the state apparatus and socio-economic change in the Third World
Guillermo O'Donnell
Our purpose is to pin-point a serious gap in knowledge rather than to present a substantive argument. W e already k n o w quite a lot about the economic history of the Third World. Also, through the pioneering efforts of Immanuel Wallerstein and his associates, some fruitful conceptualizations have been proposed about global relationships between the centre, semiperiphery and peripheries of the world capitalist system. However, very little has been done in terms of comparative studies of the state apparatus in Third World countries; furthermore, to m y knowledge, very few country-studies have devoted specific attention to this subject.1 Such neglect is surprising. Whatever the specific social form adopted, the later the incorporation to the world market and the attempts to define and achieve economic growth, the more crucial and expansive has tended to be the role of the state apparatus in the countries of the Third World. If, for some time, historians could deceive themselves by writing the history of England basically as the history of its civil society, it is clear that in the periphery both the patterns of economic growth and of class formationnot to- say anything of political alliancesare inextricably linked, before and after decolonization, to the role played by the state apparatus. In most cases it m a y not be exaggerated to assert that, instead of the state being, as classical theoriesi.e. those originating in the centresupposed, some sort of reflection of civil society, it was, to a large extent on the contrary, the state apparatus that shaped the basic features of our societies. Frequently, an industrial bourgeoisie and its counterpartan industrial working classhave resulted from public policies. These, if oriented b y an economically liberal mould, have specifically aimed at such an outcome or, if oriented towards some form of socialism or state capitalism, the entrepreneurial activities undertaken by the state apparatus have spilled over into the creation of

Guillermo O'Donnell is an Argentinian political scientist, currently a member of the Instituto Universitario de Pesquisas, at the Conjunto Universitario Candido Mendes, Rua de Matriz, 82, Botafogo, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. He was formerly director of th Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad, in Buenos Aires. He has done research and published on the state, bureaucracy and public policies in Latin America.

Int. Soc. Set. J Vol. XXXII, N o . 4, 1980


Guillermo O'Donnell

a satellite bourgeoisie that began accumulating capital in the backward or forward linkages' of such state economic activities. O n e way or the other, the creation of an industrial bourgeoisie and a working class w a s important not only in itself but also because it profoundly transformed the relative positions of all other classes and strata. Contrary to the classic capitalist patterns of economic development, an emerging dominant class did not shape the political power embodied by the state. O n the contrary, in most cases the domestically, dominant class has been the child of the state apparatus. Naturally, in both patterns a complex dialectic is initiated between the dominant class and the relative autonomy of the state apparatus, but such dialectic is only formally similar in the.centre and in the Third World. Suffice it to mention, a m o n g m a n y other things, that the historical pattern of the capitalist centre gave ample r o o m to political ideologies that emphasized individualistic components, while in the Third World, whatever the ideological orientation prevailing in each case, strong collectivistic, c o m m u n a l and state components are frequent. Ideology is that part of global social reality that codifies it, attributing to it meanings that are rooted in the historical experiences of most people. T h e collective and state view of where the axis of society is located and from which directionfor better or for worsethe main dynamic impulses have and will originate, m a y sound unfortunate to the liberal tradition of the capitalist centre. But it is a basic feature of the topology of social reality that the various versions of populism and socialism are shared by wide segments of the population the Third World to w h o m , with recurrent success, such movements appeal. This is because the state in the Third World is not the idealized (i.e. mythological but not ineffective) synthesis of the existing civil society. O n the contrary, it is usually a profoundly unrepresentative entity (the m o r e so the closer it is to its colonial origins) whose historical mission is to be the agent that produces a synthesis of what, in most cases, is a profoundly heterogeneous civil societywith itself and with the state. Quite frequently, the state apparatus (however w e a k and s fragmented it m a y seem to an ethnocentric observer) appears asand actually isthe only centripetal force. T o say the least, in m a n y cases in the Third World, however riddled by the contradiction of being at the same time a crucial point for the internal diffusion of neocolonialist and imperialist domination, the state apparatus has played, in various crucial historical tasks, a far m o r e important role than in the capitalist centre or, for that matter, than in the socialisms of the Northern Hemisphere. It has meant the creation of nationhood (understood as the subjective recognition by most of the population of belonging to a ' w e ' that coincides with the political boundaries of a state, which thus becomes a national state) and the unification of its territory as a space for the circulation of goods and services, whether its form be capitalist or not. There are countries where these tasks . have not yet been completed, but the trend is clear: a state tends to homogenize its political space in terms, at least, of nationhood and economic transactions. T h e

Comparative historical formations of the state in the Third World


difference between the Third World and the rest is that, in the accomplishment of such tasks, and the profound, at times harsh, reshaping of civil society that goes with them, the state apparatus has taken a particularly active role, in a highly condensed historical time.

The Latin American case

After these generalities, one m a y n o w be somewhat more specific. If the state apparatus is such a crucial agent in the patterns of change of most countries, w e m a y expect that efforts will be m a d e to our abysmal lack of knowledge about such subject-matter.2 A s for m a n y other themes in the social sciences, useful knowledge means comparative knowledge without which the student has no guidance to what is unusual or surprising, different or recurrent, and thus cannot deepen research and thought towards theoretical-explanatory concepts of the observed patterns of change and relationships. But what and h o w should w e begin comparing at this primitive level of our knowledge? The answer is difficult to carry into practice but rather easy to enunciate : utilizing the little w e k n o w to derive reasonably informed guesses about certain crucial problems that seem to account for marked differences in the historical patterns of formation of the state apparatus, and its relationship with socio-economic change, a m o n g sets of Third World countries. In other words, there is no need to blunder about blindly or yet adopt an ultra-empirical standpoint. Let m e illustrate the point. With few exceptions, the c o m m o n experience of the Third World is a colonial past. But beyond this generic similarity the case of Latin America is quite different from that of, to simplify, Africa and most of Asia. In Latin America the colonizing country was distinctly pre-capitalist (actually, Portugal and Spain were a semi-periphery that fostered, via their colonialism, the beginnings of capitalist industrialization in England and the Netherlands), while the colonization of most of Asia and Africa was a crucial stage in the unfolding of capitalist imperialism. This meant, a m o n g m a n y other things, that the bureaucratic colonial machinery in Latin America was very different, in its structure, functioning and the social penetration of its impacts, from that elsewhere. Furthermore, in Spanish America (though, not in Brazil, where the imperial bureaucracy continued to function without major interruption after political independence) this meant that in the early nineteenth century there was a major reshaping of the public bureaucracy; in quite a few cases it approached sheer dissolution, only to reappear with a very different face some decades later. However weak and penetrated by neo-colonial interests, in Latin America this entailed a rather long process of state formation, as well as m a n y intermediate sectors formed, and nourished, by their overlap with the state apparatus. Even though both the patterns of Brazilian continuity with the colonial administration and the Spanish-American m o d e of


Guillermo O'Doimell

rather sharp discontinuity can be observed in contemporary Asia and Africa, the redirection and reshaping of the state apparatus in these continents for (more or less authentic) national goals is far more recent. This is not only a chronological matter. S o m e Latin American countries (most clearly, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) had basically completed the tasks of nation-building and economic unification by the turn of the nineteenth century, while practically all the others had achieved this by the 1930s. By contrast, this is a rather recent stage, or has not even yet fully occurred, in most of the lately decolonized countries of the rest of the Third World. This has not only resulted in a different pattern with respect to the control and expansion of the state apparatus, but also means, that such processes have occurred at a very different historical stage of the world system. In thefirstplace, the superiority in armaments that a minimally endowed state apparatus (or a group or region closely linked to a foreign power) can have over the population at large, is far larger n o w than what was at the disposal of the emerging Latin American states of the early nineteenth century; in m a n y cases it took decades for them to acquire decisive coercive control over their territory. M o r e importantly, if decolonization did not m e a n economic independence but, in most cases, some form of neo-colonialism, the concrete forms it took in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been different. Following political independence, Latin American countries became the informal economic colonies either of the United K i n g d o m or the United States. Both were at the stage of rapid expansion of competitive capitalism. Instead, the large majority of African and Asian countries which were decolonized after the Second World W a r not only remained embedded in economic relationships determined by highly monopolized forms of international capitalism, but also by the existence of a socialist c a m p that, if it could not compete with the capitalist c a m p in directly economic terms, did provide alternative forms of social (and state) organization and, in some cases, political and military support for experimenting with such forms. Both in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the natural resources of the periphery are crucial to the northern centres, but in the nineteenth century the paramount interest of the central capitalist countries was their extraction. Today this interest is combined with what has m a d e the transnational corporations truly transnational:first,the need to expand the markets for their products to the Third Worldthus shaping cultural habits and income distribution in ways that would fit such a purposeand, second, the strategy of transnationalizing production, in such lines where this makes an important contribution to overall profits, mostly by taking advantage of the cheap work-force available in the Third World. Naturally, the Latin American countries have not escaped, but there has been interaction with a national state apparatus and, to some extent, national classes which have had a rather long time to unfold and establish themselves. The picture is not uniform throughout Latin America, but at least in the

Comparative historical formations of the state in the Third World


larger countries such a bourgeoisie certainly was not the comprador bourgeoisie which, according to most analyses, was prevalent in m a n y African a n d Asian countries by the time of decolonization. This meant that the existence of a domestic industrial and commercial class, with its o w n base of capital accumulation in the domestic market, had already fostered an important expansion of the state apparatus, both in the entrepreneurial role of undertaking economic activities that were not feasible or convenient for such bourgeoisies (but were indispensable for its accumulation), and as the overseer of such classes and their worker complements (including an active role of mediation in their relationships). That in most cases the ethos of populism arose in Latin America before and not after the invasion of the domestic markets by the highly monopolized capital of the transnational corporations is but one indication of this multifaceted problem of timing. R o u g h as they are, w e begin to envisage a template of categories (dichotomies which could be broken-down into more refined classifications) to cover problems and periods apparently crucial to the understanding of differences in the historical patterns of state formation in the Third World according to: (a) whether the colonizing power was capitalist or not; (b) continuity or discontinuity with the colonial administration; (c) the stage of world capitalism at the m o m e n t of decolonization and, in terms of the world relationship of forces, the availability of socialist options and supports; and (d) the presence of a properly constituted national state and a local bourgeoisie (i.e. a class with an important base of capital accumulation in its o w n domestic market) and the transnationalization of production by the major corporations. Obviously, these temporally bounded categories are not the only ones w e need for our purposes. Fortunately, w e can cross such categories with others, even though things start to lose linear simplicity, as they should. Another factor c o m m o n to all Third World countries is the savagery with which the colonizers and their local allies treated the native populations. But there, again, concrete situations varied. At one extreme w e have cases, such as Argentina and Australia, with huge areas of land which the expansion of the world market m a d e valuable for the export of foodstuffs. Those lands were sparsely populated by nomadic aborigines w h o were rapidly massacred, leaving very few traces of their cultures. At the other extreme w e have situations, epitomized in Latin America by Mexico and the Andean countries, as well as by quite a few Asian countries, where colonization was brutally superimposed on complex and sophisticated local cultures, based on populations with a long experience of sedentary, agrarian life. These usually m a d e available a large population for economic exploitation. T h e rather empty lands, when they became incorporated into the world market, had to procure an immigrant work-force which, towards the turn of the nineteenth century, had to be attracted by wage incentives, which meant that capitalist relationships spread quite early and determined the basic characteristics of the state, which


Guillermo O'Donnell

acted essentially as the agent to attract migrants and guarantee capitalist social relationships. B y contrast, the penetration of export-oriented capitalism in the second type of situation, tended to reproduce, albeit economically and politically subordinated to such forms,' previous arrangements for the exploitation of the work-force. Furthermore, not only for ecological or technological reasons, but also as a consequence of the availability of abundant and cheap labour (which was only marginally remunerated in cash), the implantation of international capital in the latter cases was usually accompanied by labour-intensive technologies. In such circumstances, society and the state became m u c h more hybrid mixtures of capitalist and various pre-capitalist social relationships. Furthermore, the need to control a large and highly exploited work-force generated (as I surmise comparative data would show) an hypertrophy of the coercive forces vis--vis the state's economic and consensus-building efforts. O n e would expect that such different roles of the state apparatus in societies that varied so m u c h along this dimension, generated significant differences in the rates and modes of expansion of the very state apparatus; and that these, in turn, would give us a m u c h complementary, and perhaps partially corrective, information of what economic and social historians have taught us about the origins of nations. If these two types of situation are reasonably clear-cut, the more c o m m o n one in Africa and a good part of Asia, along with some significant cases in Latin America, entailed the imposition of colonial rule and, later, an emerging state striving to become national (which m a y or m a y not coincide with the boundaries of colonial administration) over a highly heterogeneous population, i.e. neither the 'empty land' nor the reasonably homogenous traditional empire cases. In this third type of situation, ethnicity, regional language, religion, culture, and other attributes, experienced as enormously important by the constituent groups, tend to become paramount. The picture becomes more complicated when waves of more recent migrants, also highly differentiated from the already resident population, are forced to assume a politically subordinated role but assume important roles as members of the comprador bourgeoisie and/or internal trade. T h e situation becomes still m o r e complicated w h e n , as was often the case, the plantations and enclaves by which international capital manifests its early presence encompass, aside from the port and the capital, only a fraction of the territory, thus pushing even further, by 'modernizing' the population in that part of the territory, the degree and the potential explosiveness of existing heterogeneity. In these cases, the state apparatus, on one hand, usually has to accomplish the 'normal' task resulting from its semicolonial status (i.e. dealing with those fractions of international capital implanted o n its o w n territory), and, on the other hand, has to find some way to impose its rule over such a society. Ideally, but with great difficulty, the state apparatus m a y succeed in establishing itself as the supreme arbiter of conflicts springing from such fractionalization. M o s t frequently, the state apparatus is captured by some

Comparative historical formations of the state in the Third World


group, or coalition of groups, which becomes a serious hindrance to the fostering nationhood, in so far as. the state appears, to the subjected groups, as the very negation of its claims to universality and devotion to the general interest. Only where colonization proceeded in practically empty lands do the classic theories of the state as the political mirror of civil society have some plausibility. In the second type of situation the state, more specifically, the state apparatus, is one of the basic mechanisms for the continued political and economic exclusion of the subordinated, basically indigenous population. Thus, it m a y be said that such an apparatus traces the boundaries that split u p societies which have a long w a y to go before eliminating features of their colonial heritage. In this sense, such a state can hardly be said to change civil society; at most, it represents the crystallization of a social and economic domination (partially cushioned by middle sectors basically nourished from that very apparatus) which is sharply contrasted from most of the population. In the third situation, the picture is even more complex since, far from 'representing' in some way or another the existing society, the state apparatus has to create a minimally homogeneous society and a nation. A t least in the short and m e d i u m term, it frequently stops short of this, becoming the political crystallization of the supremacy of certain groups. I surmise that the anatomy of such apparatuses, and their history, would tell us m u c h , not only about the different degrees of homogeneity of societies, but also about the ways in which different issues have been dealt with in different situations.

Linkage to the international market

Another facet c o m m o n to practically all Third World countries is that they became linked to the international marketat different historical m o m e n t s and at different stages of world capitalism, as already mentionedthrough a single or a few products that, for some reason became interesting to the centre. A s staple theorists3 have shown, each product, at a given stage of internationally available technology, entails specific requirements and consequences in terms of the organization of production (or extraction). M o r e recently, Albert Hirschman 4 has proposed a promising extension of his conceptualization of backward and forward linkages, tracing them through their implications in terms of class formation and, of great interest for our analysis, of formation and patterns of expansion of the state apparatus. T o put simply an empirically complicated matter, some primary products can be handled by establishing a tenuous relationship with the local society: perhaps only means of transportation to the port, the port itself and some police force for the control of labour. Others, o n the contrary, like the example Hirschman uses (coffee in Brazil) require a rather dense set of relationships, not only with classes and groups in civil society (placed both at the input and the


Guillermo O'Donnell

output end of production) but also in terms of requiring, in the interest of the stability of the economic relationships established around the product, a rather sophisticated and complex role for the state apparatus. Quite a lot is k n o w n about the economics and the technologypast and presentof m a n y of the products that linked Third World countries to the world market. This leads m e to believe that, using Hirschman's approach, quite powerful hypotheses could be derived about the reciprocal impacts of such products with the formation and expansion of the state apparatus. . O n the other hand, what has been said, indicates that it would be a reductionist mistake to limit the inquiry to this dimension. Significant differences should be expected in the impacts of the same product if its production took place in, say, a country, which w h e n the process began already had a reasonably established national state and needed to attract labour by wage incentives as against a country which was under colonial rule and where labour was mostly under preor non-capitalist relations. This suggests that the variations would be a function of interactions a m o n g the characteristics of the products and the other dimensions w e have explored above. T h e linkage approach is closely related, but not identical with another, which knowledge of Latin American cases suggests, and which m a y have generated similarly important effects in other regions of the Third World. This refers to the point in the cycle of the product where barriers to entry were so high that the local bourgeoisie or oligarchical groups were unable to control it (which supposes a particular role and resource availability of the state apparatus, since such limits were different depending on support, indifference or, quite frequently, hostility from a state apparatus profoundly penetrated by international capital). A s Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto6 have shown, an important feature was whether the main export product was directly exploited by a local class, which gave birth to a local bourgeoisie with its o w n base of capital accumulation in the domestic market and rapidly displaced the more comprador elements of its o w n class. This pattern w a s different from that, such as some plantations and most mining, where the natural resource was directly exploited by international capital, thus leaving very little economic space for the emergence of a local bourgeoisie. Naturally, this had m u c h to doand the reason it is close to the linkage approachwith the characteristics of the product: in particular, with the complexity of the technology for its production or extraction and the intensity of capital requirements. Compare, for example, the minimal requirements, in terms of capital, technology and labour, required for cattle-raising in a favourable climate, with the important technological and capital investments, as well as the numerous workers and the complexity of their organization, entailed by certain mining activities. That, w h e n such requirements became rather stringent, the local bourgeois or proto-bourgeois groups had to cede to international capital, and that the nineteenth-century post-independence state seldom acted to lower these barriers to

Comparative historical formations of the state in the Third World


entry to its bourgeoisie, or tried to undertake such activities itself, is a testimony to the neo-colonial situation under which quite a few countries still remain. This m a y be seen even in the highly favourable case of cereals and cattle-raising in Argentina, where for a long time (even though local classes controlled the land and thus appropriated enormous economic benefits) international capital monopolized the meat-packing factories, international trade, internal and external transportation, insurance and the like. But, most important in our context, rather low barriers of entry to direct production for local groups did have the important consequence of fostering the early emergence of local classes, particularly a bourgeoisie, that were fundamentally absent where the direct production or extraction of the main export products was controlled by international capital. In the latter cases, the main counterpart of the state apparatus had to be international capital since, aside from guaranteeing 'law and order' and dealing with the recurrent frustrations of middle sectors depending on the state apparatus, or of petty commerce, the embodiments of capital were the main forces in such societies. Furthermore, the marginalization of aspirant bourgeois groups and the restricted monetization of the economy which this situation typically entailed meant that international capital was the main counterpart of the state apparatus since its royalties were by far the most important reliable resource for the state. Thus, there tended to emerge a state apparatus predominantly coercive towards the population, the 'tranquillity' of which w a s one of its main contributions to a continuing relationship with international capital. In addition, and for the same reason, such apparatus was under heavy pressure to provide employment to middle sectors which had few alternative opportunities, which was in contradiction to the slim, and unstable, resource base provided by dependency on royalties. Thus, it is not surprising that real attempts at national economic policymaking and institution-building, such as a central bank or a minimally effective taxation system, occurred m u c h later than in countries towards the opposite pole. In these, the local classes controlling the main natural resources were hardly S c h u m peterian entrepreneurs, but some of their economic surplus spilled over into urban investments and activities, thus fostering a more complex w e b of social classes, including middle sectors that did not depend so heavily on the state apparatus for their survival, as well as the rudiments of a working class. Obviously, in terms of patterns of growth of its apparatus, and in its policies, the state expressed this complexity, which should not be confused with the cases of great social heterogeneity mentioned above.. Furthermore (in so far as such situations meant that the main economic ties with international capital did not turn around royalties), the relationships of the state apparatus (as well as of the local bourgeoisie) with such capital were more complex and mediated. Finally, what remained as the economic surplus locally appropriated by the domestic classes, and its spill-over into society at large, yielded a reasonably broad domestic tax basis. This in turn meant that, quite soon, countries of this kind could establish a state apparatus more closely


Guillermo OWonnell

linked to the local social classes, and that, furthermore, the very shape of such a n apparatus, as well as of the policies it adopted, were significantly more complex than where international capital, by directly controlling the production or extraction of the main export products frustrated such developments. Another case would be where the barriers to entry at the point of production are extremely high for local groups but where an economic activity has m a n y backward and/or forward linkages in the local society, even though fully controlled by international capital. The example that, albeit with some reservations, comes to mind is oil. It is attractive because it shows that the height of the barriers to entry is not given once and for all, but m a y depend, beyond sheer economic considerations, on subtle combinations of internal political factors and international circumstances. W h a t it m a y not be possible for local bourgeois groups to do m a y be possible for the state apparatus itself, by means of nationalizing the directly productive activities and, quite likely, also the stages that put the product at the disposal of the international market (refining and local transportation). It is n o accident that such moves were infrequent until quite recently, in so far as typically very weak (and politically penetrated) state apparatuses and a high degree of monopolization of the required technology and equipment m a d e decision almost unthinkable. But, more recently, with stronger state apparatuses (to a certain extent related to the increasing relative importance of oil in the world market) and m o r e easily available technology and equipment, such decisions have been taken. T h e nationalization of the main source of capital accumulation should have meantthough on this point, as on m a n y others already touched upon, w e k n o w surprisingly littlean enormous change not only in the shape of the state apparatus but also in its social role and impacts. The appropriation of such a crucial source of economic surplus had to occur in the direction of some form of socialism or state capitalism, in so far as it placed in the hands of the state apparatus resources which dwarfed most other economic activities. Furthermore, it has transformed the state apparatus into a congeries of agencies that, whatever the more or less socialist or capitalist m o d e of social organization adopted, allocate a significant proportion of economic and social investment and expenditure, via public policy decisions, and not the market. Naturally, the active role assumed by the state apparatus in the promotion of socio-economic change (including the formation, at times practically ex nihilo, of classes nourished by the transfer of its surpluses) is translated into a distinctive pattern of institutions. Despite specificities arising from the sheer volume of oil resources, these cases m a y be seen as an extreme example of a phenomenon that has been becoming increasingly c o m m o n in the Third World. In the face of a weak local bourgeoisie, and aiming at nationalistic goals by w a y of varieties of socialism or populism, the state apparatus not only assumes the exploitation of the main sources of capital accumulation, but also more or less willingly becomes the creator and economic tutor of n e w bourgeois fractions, whether by the transformation of previous

Comparative historical formations of the state in the Third World


social classes or, as' happened early in Mexico, long before oil became crucial there, by favouring segments originating in that very apparatus. This tutorship role pertains most intimately to domestic patterns of economic change and class formation which highlights our main argument: that, if the study of the historic formation of the state apparatus is important in itself, it is also an indispensable component for describing and explaining what for too long have been considered as purely economic, and possibly sociological dimensions. Even before the great b o o m in oil prices, the technological complexities of its exploitation, the physical infrastructure requirements for its export and the numbers of quite highly specialized skills it demanded, meant that m a n y backward linkages operated with vast ramifications throughout the local economy. Further, the political linkages (with their impacts o n the state apparatus) were stronger, in so far as the resource base depended heavily on royalties (discouraging anything but a rudimentary tax-system) and the destiny of most social classes was closely linked to the allocation patterns of the state income. This, together with continued and uncertain bargaining with the oil companies, placed a high premium o n the control of the state apparatus, particularly those institutions that dealt directly with international capital and with the internal allocation of the resulting resources, as well as the coercive forces which, on one hand, had to guarantee 'law and order' and, on the other, were supposed to prevent competing local groups from displacing those which had gained the upper hand. M u c h so-called 'instability' (and the spasmodic expansions and contractions of the state apparatus) in such countries m a y be understood as a pattern of political conflict springing from this kind of situation. T o complicate things further, it was to the advantage of international capital to encourage alternative candidates for governmental positions w h e n those w h o held them became 'unreasonable' in their demands. Furthermore, it.did not take m u c h time for the armed forces to reach the conclusion that, if it was they w h o had to provide the main guarantees for the continuation of such situations, it was only natural that they should also occupy the highest positions of power in the state apparatus. But they discovered that this only reproduced within the armed forces the emergence of challengers for the highest governmental positions, which could only be resolvedin most cases temporarily, but in any case generating an entirely n e w pattern of political conflictby state exploitation of the product. W e have to add another dimension also c o m m o n to all Third World countries due to their economic dependence: the particularly severe impact of certain world crises, especially the one of the early 1930s. Such crises tended to have a different impact according to whether a country had achieved political independence or continued under colonial rule. If the latter, most frequently, whatever might be the local interests, also during wartime they tended to be simply ignored by the colonial administration for the sake of the direct economic and/or strategic interest of the imperial power, Such drastic accentuation of the 'normal'


Guillermo O'Domiell

subordination of the colony to the centre must have left profound marks, not only on the economy but also on the administrative apparatus which mostly was the initial structure for thefirstpost-colonial governments. Where political independence was achieved before such crises, highly varied responses occurred. In some cases the economy and the state apparatus practically collapsed; in others the latter survived passively, without major institutional and policy innovations, waiting for better times. In countries which had important bases of capital accumulation in the hands of a local bourgeoisie and, hence, a more complex and diversified state apparatus, the world crisis of the 1930s was met with policies to expand the domestic market and the state apparatus, thus fostering a rapid process of importsubstituting industrialization. A s a result, the crises were milder and shorter than in most other cases. Similarly, when severe import restrictions were imposed by the Second World W a r , the crucial alleviation of resulting bottlenecks was achieved by the degree to which there existed not only a local industrial bourgeoisie but also a state apparatus to adopt entrepreneurial and promotional policies. After the Second World W a r , the new trends of international capitalism, and its confrontations with socialist countries which only then adopted active policies towards certain parts of the Third World, should be taken into account; particularly, the fantastic growth of transnational corporations from the 1950s. Without displacing the old extractive, export-oriented pattern, these corporations were, and remain, interested in the domestic markets of the Third World for the sale (and in quite a few cases, also the manufacture) of their products. S o m e Third World countries turned to a certain form of socialism which, under the conditions in which such a turn was taken, entailed an enormous expansion in the role and weight of the state apparatus. In the majority of countries which, s o m e h o w remained linked to the world capitalist systemparticularly those, which were more 'attractive' because of market size and a 'favourable' political climatethe transnational corporations had an active interest in the range of domestic social and economic policies and the long-range stability of 'friendly' governments. This was rational for corporations which, unlike the export-oriented companies under the colonial and neo-colonial pattern, n o w saw the domestic markets of the Third World as an important source for their capital accumulation on a world scale. S o m e countries, for want of market size or the 'proper' political climate, were left practically untouched by this pattern, but m a n y have had to learn h o w to deal with these crucial changes, superimposed on the lingering but no longer decisive export orientation. Such learning has ranged from simple acquiescence to whatever the multinational corporations (and the national states backing them) deemed convenient, to spectacular expropriations, not only of the old incarnations of international capital but also of these newer ones. The majority of cases can be located between these extremes, each showing a complicated pattern of negotiations, concessions and threats aimed at attaining some convergence of the domestic

Comparative historical formations of the state in the Third World


impacts of the transnational corporations with the stated goals of national social and economic development. Often, such attempts have resulted in an extraordinary growth both of the local branches of corporations and of the state apparatusthe latter in keeping with the attempts to exercise controls, of tackling in a morefinely,tuned fashion economic problems and of establishing various modes of direct association with the corporations. Again, as during the world crisis, these externally determined events had profound consequences. M a n y of them have been carefully explored, with the blatant exception of the changes they induced in the shape and role of the state apparatus and their impacts on national society. Lately, w e have been facing a newer trend which has putfinancialcapital in the dynamic vanguard of world capitalism. It m a y be too early to say m u c h about this, except that the interest payments on such capital lent out has been running up against the increasing difficulties that the Third World (with the exception of the oil-producing countries and a few others) is facing in its balance-of-payments. This suggests that there are rather close limits to financial expansion at a world scale. Where serious difficulties have been experienced (generally combined with severe political crises), countries have tried to face them through policies that attempt (in quite orthodox neo-liberal fashion, whatever the proclaimed ideological allegiances) to reverse developmental schemes based on extensive industrialization, and growth of the state apparatus, especially those branches more closely connected with entrepreneurial/promotional and social-welfare roles. This, of course, contradicts any linear view of the growing weight of the state apparatus, although it can hardly be said that such a trimming is having a weaker social and economic impact than the previous pattern.


A s far as I know the exceptions are the studies conducted by Oscar Oszlak in Argentina ( C E D E S ) , Fernando Unicochea and Jos Murillo de Carvalho in Brazil (IUPERJ) and the project on the historical formation of the stateapparatus in Central American countries undertaken by the Consejo Superior de Universidades Centro Americanas ( C S U C A ) . This is an appeal to economists, not only to historians, anthropologists and political seientists. W h a t the former write about Third World economies often sounds as if the concrete shape and role of each state apparatus does not deserve to be taken into consideration or, at most, as if it were a nuisance for the 'proper', functioning of the economy. This ceteris paribus could not be

more misleading, even for narrowly defined economic analysis. Cf. among others, Melville Watkins, ' A Staple Theory of Economic Growth', Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, N o . 29, M a y 1963. For the first presentation of Hirschman's ideas about economic linkages, see Strategy of Economic Development, N e w Haven, C o n n . , Yale University Press, 1958. T h e recent extension of this author's linkage-approach is in A Generalized Linkage Approach to Development, with Special Reference to Staples, Princeton, N . J . , Institute for Advanced Study, 1978. Fernando H . Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependencia y desarrollo en Amrica Latina (1st ed.), Mexico City, Siglo X X T , 1969.

The state in the dominated social formations of Africa: some theoretical issues
Issa G . Shivji The nature of the state
According to Marxist theory, the state is an instrumentan organof one class against another. It was born together with antagonistic classes in society. T h e state is an organ which expresses dominant class power in its most concentrated form. Although M a r x and Engels used the term 'instrument' in describing the state, it is clear from their various writings that they did not have an 'instrumentalist' or mechanistic view of it. They saw the state as an organ, rather than simply a weapon of the oppressing class: it is its political power. A n d political power, as the Communist Manifesto put it, 'is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another'.1 Thus, it is a fundamental principle of Marxist theory that the state is a class category and that state or political power always has a class character. For Lenin, therefore, the basic problem of every revolution w a s that of state power. A n d M a r x ' s most important theoretical generalization, after the experience of the Paris C o m m u n e , was that the working class could not simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield it for its o w n purposes;2 that the bureaucratic-military machine, i.e. the state, could not simply be transferred from one hand to another but that it had to be smashed and 'this is the preliminary condition for every real , people's revolution on the Continent'.3 It is this very principle which lies at the base of the controversy on the nature of states in independent African countries. But before w e deal with the different views on this, let us quickly recall two important recent events, both of which once again brought to the fore the theoretical question of the class character of the state. O n e of the most significant points of difference between the Chinese. C o m munist Party ( C P C ) and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ( C P S U ) , m

Issq G. Shivji is Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania (P.O. Box 953). He has published The Silent Class Struggle (1974) and Class Struggles in Tanzania (1976), as well as editing Tourism and Socialist Development (1975) and is completing a history of the Tanzanian labour movement.

Int: Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XXXII, N o . 4, 1980

The state in the dominated social formations of Africa


their ideological split of the early 1960s, was the problem of characterization of the state in the Soviet Union. T h e 1961 P r o g r a m m e of th C P S U , ' adopted b y the Twenty-second Party Congress, proclaimed: ! Having brought about the complete and'final victory of socialismthefirstphase of communismand th transition of society to the'full-scle construction f communism; the dictatorship of the proletariat has fulfilled its historic mission and has ceased to be indispensable in the U S S R from the point of view of the tasks of internal development. The state, which arose as a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, has, in the new, contemporary stage, become a state of the entire people, an organ expressing the interests and will of the people as a whole. 4 A n d further: The Party holds that the dictatorship of the working class will cease to be necessary before the state withers away. The state as an organization of the entire people will survive until the complete victory of communism. 5 This was a declaration of a state without class character since it was a 'state of the entire people' and not a dictatorship of a particular class. The C P C , in its polemic, vigorously argued that the thesis of the 'state of the entire people' was fundamentally against the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism. It said: In the view of Marxist-Leninists, there is ho such thing as a nn-class or supra-class state. So long as the state remains a state, it must bear a class character; so long asthe state exists, it cannot be a state of the 'whole people'. As soon as society becomes classless, there will no longer be a state.6 While between the C P C and C P S U this was:essentially an ideological question, for the Indonesian C o m m u n i s t Party (PKI) the definition of the class character of the state had immediate practical implications. In attempting to. define the character of the Indonesian state during Sukarno's time, the leadership of the P K I put forward, what has subsequently c o m e to be called, the 'theory of two aspects in state power'. , This thesis argued that state power w a s charaterized by t w o aspects: the anti-people aspect consisting of compradore, bureaucrat-capitalist and landlord classes o n the one hand, and the pro-people aspect composed mainly of the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat.' D . N . Aidit, the then leader of the P K I , succinctly summarized the 'two-aspect theory' thus: The economic structure (basis) of the present Indonesian society is still colonial and semi-feudal. However, at the same time there is the struggle of the people against this economic system, the struggle for a national and democratic economy. . . . The realities of the basis are also reflected in the superstructure, including in the state power, and especially in the cabinet. In the state power are reflected both the forces


Issa.G. Sfiivjl

that are against the colonial and feudal economic system, and the forces that defend imperialism, the vestiges of feudalism, bureaucrat-capitalism and the compradores. . . . The state power of the Republic of Indonesia, viewed as a contradiction, is a contradiction between two mutually opposing aspects. Thefirstaspect is the aspect which represents the interests of the people (manifested by the progressive stand and policies of President Sukarno that are supported by the P K I and other groups of the people). The second aspect is the aspect that represents the enemies of the people (manifested by the stand and policies of the Right-wing forces or the diehards). The people aspect has become the main aspect and takes the leading role in the state power of the Republic of Indonesia.8 T h e 'two-aspect-in-state-power' theory had very little to d o with the teachings of M a r x and Lenin on the question of the class character of state power. However, it justified and rationalized the participation of the then leadership of the P K I in the state. It lent support to their reliance o n and loyalty to the ideology of Sukarno, w h o w a s supposed to represent the 'pro-people' aspect in the state. However, w h e n the class battle c a m e to a head, the state showed its true character. In the coup of September-October 1965, Sukarno's regime was practically overthrown and the party w a s banned. In the self-criticism9 that followed, the P K I leadership that escaped annihilation bitterly criticized the two-aspect theory as an 'opportunist or revisionist deviation' because it denied the MarxistLeninist teaching that 'the state is an organ of the rule of a definite class which cannot be reconciled with its antipode (the class opposite to it)'.10 'It is unthinkable that the Republic of Indonesia can be jointly ruled by the people and the enemies of the people.'11 If w e have cited the Sino-Soviet debate and the P K I ' s theory at some length, it is because both of these have found echoes in the current debates in East Africa o n the class character of the state. T h e counterpart in Africa of the Soviet theory of the 'state of the entire people' is the theory of the 'non-capitalist state'. This tries to c o m e to grips with those regimes which have adopted some form or other of socialism as their ideology. T h e states in these countries are defined as socialist-oriented: their class character is neither bourgeois nor proletarian. In other words, state power here has no definite class character but is said to be leaning towards socialism.12 'This type of state is a transitional type: not bourgeois (also not tendentially, though capitalist elements exist), not yet socialist.' T h e adherents of this theory see a special role for states, that of social transformation. 'These are countries where state power is used as an instrument of a social transformation, starting from predominantly pre-feudal and pre-capitalist, sometimes feudal or semi-feudal relations and aiming at socialist formation, without passing through a capitalist formation'.13 In one swoop, this thesis dismisses two fundamental propositions of the Marxist theory of the state: that state power is a concentrated expression of the rule of the oppressor class and that the transition from class to classless society (i.e. socialism) will inevitably pass

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through the dictatorship of the proletariat which is nothing but 'the proletariat organized as the ruling class'.14 Lenin considered this second proposition so fundamental to Marxist theory, that, he said, it constituted 'the most profound distinction between the Marxist and the ordinary petty (as well as big) bourgeois'.15 There is a second school of 'independent' scholars which has also attempted to theorize on the nature of the state in Africa, particularly in those countries where the regimes have proclaimed some form of socialism. T h e two leading proponents are Roger Murray 1 8 and John Saul.17 Their main focus has been G h a n a under N k r u m a h and the United Republic of Tanzania under Nyerere, respectively. Succinctly, the main thesis of these writers m a y be summarized as follows. Their point of departure is that the social formations under discussion are essentially characterized by 'unformed' classes. This is especially true of that classthe petty bourgeoisie or Murray's 'political class'which accedes to state power after independence. This, too, is an unformed class and therefore the class character of the post-colonial state is not only 'undetermined' but even opens up the possibility of sections of this class using state power to institute socialism. 'The essence of the matter is that the post-colonial state (the 'political kingdom') has simultaneously to be perceived as the actual instrument of a continuing anti-imperialist and socialist revolution'.18 Thus, these authors see a section of the petty-bourgeoisie w h o are already in state power as 'committing, suicide' and pursuing the 'historical alternative' of socialism. Whether they will d o so or not is a 'political X ' (to use Saul's phrase), i.e. an u n k n o w n in the equation. It can be readily seen that this thesis comes very close to the two-aspect theory of Aidit. All along the line it is an outright denial of the fundamental propositions of M a r x ' s theory. B y introducing the concept of 'political class' and such notions as 'plasticity' of a class, it clearly departs from the Marxist understanding of a class as essentially defined in relation to its role in the social process of production. B y positing the possibility of a petty-bourgeoisie opting for a socialist alternative, it completely negates the thesis of the hegemony of the proletariat. By propounding that the class character of the state is 'undetermined' and speculating on the possibility of state power carrying out socialist strategies, it denies the class character of the state and the need to smash the state machinery for revolutionary transformation. Since these authors claim to be applying the Marxist theory of the state to the concrete reality in Africa, it is important to emphasize these departures from the fundamental propositions of that theory: unless, of course, these authors argue that such propositions have been invalidated in Africa and develop an alternative theory of the state. Since they have done neither, their theses can only be evaluated in relation to Marxist theory as a whole. Finally, there is another school of 'Marxist' theoreticians for w h o m the question of concretely determining the class character of state power does not arise at all.19 W e shall deal with their theses in greater detail in the next section. Suffice it to mention here that, for these scholars, state power in all the neo-colonies is in


Issa G.Shivji.

the hands of a global .financial oligarchy, and local classes have n o share in it. M e m b e r s of local classes m a y m a n the state apparatus, but they have d o with state power. They are only 'servicing agents' of thefinancialoligarchy. A few of these servicing agents m a y be reactionary and faithful agents of imperialism but a large n u m b e r of them are 'innocent' and o n the side of the people. T h e task of the revolution is to -isolate these few elements and support the m a n y against imperialism. T h u s the problem of both state power and revolution is solved by these'Marxists'by their overall analysis of global imperialism.

State and ruling class

T h e problem of which class or classes hold state power in the social formations dominated by imperialism has the centre of intense discussions in East Africa. A s will be readily seen, this question is closely tied up with the change from colonial to neo-colonial state. . With differences, of emphasis and formulations, it appears that most writers are agreed that, under colonialism, the ruling class was the metropolitan bourgeoisie. In other words the colonial state was part of the imperialist state. T h e question then arises: what change, if any, did independence bring? According to D . W . Nabudere and his associates, w h o have been most concerned with the issue, independence involved virtually n o change in the class character of state power. T h e y argue that the ruling class in all the neo-colonial states, as well as the imperialist states, is the financial oligarchy. With the rise of imperialism this financial oligarchy concentrated all capital in its hands at the global level; thus they control and dominate the economies of all the neo-colonies. Since thefinancialoligarchy is the economically dominant class, it also rules politically and is therefore the ruling class: the owners of capital are also the owners of the state. Let us quote Nabudere at s o m e length to get the flavour of his argument. W have already shown that when capitalism enters its monopoly phase it does so with the rise of afinancialoligarchy which dispossesses other bourgeoisies and thus turns them into a petty-bourgeoisie. Colonialism, which arises with this phase, implies exports offinancecapital. This capital produces a petty-bourgeoisie in the colonies. It could not reproduce a national bourgeoisie when, in the imperialist country itself, such a bourgeoisie is negated and destroyed, giving rise to afinancialoligarchy. In colonies which arose before this phase any national bourgeoisie which might have sprouted was routed byfinancecapital and was increasingly turned into a petty-bourgeoisie. This petty-bourgeoisie is stratified according to its role in the process of production and distribution. This to us must be the starting point in analysing classes in a particular country.20 Nabudere's starting-point is actually also his conclusion for he argues in the same article that 'in its old age a monopolist stratum within it dispossesses the others

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and.increasingly turns it into a petty-bourgeoisie, and turns s o m e of the pettybourgeoisie into m e m b e r s of the proletariat while creating and reproducing a petty-bourgeoisie, proletariat and a commodity-producing peasantry o n a world scale'.21 In this thesis w e have a picture of global class formation which m a k e s it almost unnecessary to.attempt a class analysis of a concrete social formation. Since, with the rise of imperialism, thefinancialoligarchy has 'dispossessed', 'routed', 'negated' and 'destroyed' all bourgeoisies, the only classes w e can expect to find in the dominated formations are the petty-bourgeoisie, the proletariat a n d the commodity-producing peasantry. A n d as with economics so with politics for,.as Nabudere puts it rhetorically: ' C a n there be any doubt that the economically dominant, class in the neo-colony is the financial oligarchy of the imperialist countries and that politics must reflect the base?'22 Y . T a n d o n closely follows the footsteps of Nabudere. In his essay, significantly entitled ' W h o s e capital and whose state?', T a n d o n argues in the same vein except that, unlike Nabudere, he admits the existence of a local bourgeoisie. But he asserts that this local bourgeoisie has no capital of its o w n . All capital is o w n e d by the imperialist bourgeoisie while the' local classes only 'employ that capital'.23 They are therefore nothing but the 'servicing agents' (Tandon's phrase) of imperialist capital. Whereas, for Nabudere, the only change at independence was that the personnel of the state apparatus was n o w recruited from the local petty-bourgeoisie, for T a n d o n independence meant a change in the government, not the state. , Let us ignore the various inconsistencies and contradictions in these formulations and concentrate o n the central theses. Those acquainted with the Marxist debates of the early part of this century would at once recognize the similarity between these theses and those advanced at different times by Kautsky and Kievsky. Both these theoreticians were answered b y Lenin. Since Nabudere and his associates forcefully claim to derive their theses faithfully from Lenin, it is appropriate to recall very briefly Lenin's position in these early debates. Kautsky speculated o n the possibility of all national finance capitals uniting to form an internationally united finance capital which would jointly exploit the world.21 Nabudere's thesis of a world financial oligarchy comes very close to Kautsky's internationally united finance capital. Kautsky used his theory to justify presenting imperialism as peaceful. Lenin derided this view as opportunist, for it evades and obscures the very profound and fundamental contradictions of imperialism: the contradictions between monopoly and free competition which exists side by side with it, between th gigantic 'operations' (and gigantic profits) offinancecapital and 'honest' trade in the free market, the contradiction between cartels and trusts, on the one hand, and non-cartelizd industry, on the other, etc.25 Lenin, argued that the various alliances between imperialist countries were simply temporary truces in periods between wars, and that monopoly capitalism did not


Issa G . Shivji

do away with competition but rather intensified it a m o n g the rivalfinancecapitals. It is this which is the source of imperialist wars. Thus Lenin could have never conceived of finance capital so united internationally that it could provide the basis of a world ruling class. Kievsky, on the other hand, argued against the demand for national selfdetermination to be included in the party programme of the Bolsheviks on the grounds that in the 'era of finance capital' national self-determination was 'unachievable'. N o t only that, but such a d e m a n d would be reactionary because the national state fetters the development of productive forces.26 Lenin refuted this argument as a caricature of Marxism and an example of 'imperialist economism' The d e m a n d for national self-determination, Lenin argued, was essentially a d e m a n d for political independence, for a right of the oppressed nation to establish a separate state. This did not m e a n that political independence would necessarily m e a n economic independence, for finance capital was capable of subordinating the economies of most sovereign, politically independent, countries. Nevertheless, the creation of separate, sovereign and politically independent states was possible and achievable. The right of the colonies and oppressed nations to secede and create independent states was a fundamental democratic right and should be supported by the proletariat. In this polemic, Lenin's position on the question of the meaning of political independence is clear and m a y be summarized as follows: Political independence or national self-determination means the establishment of a separate national state. That under imperialism the establishment of such separate national state is possible and achievable. That political independence does not m e a n that finance capital is unable to continue dominating independent countries.27 The question is: what could Lenin have meant by a 'separate national state' if not a state where power is in the hands of a local class or classes? Or, could he, like Nabudere, have meant simply a state whose personnel is drawn from local classes? T o ask these questions is really to answer them. It is n o w clear that Nabudere's thesis has nothing in c o m m o n with Lenin's theory on this important question of state and ruling class. N o r do writers like Saul provide us with an alternative, coherent theory in opposition to the theory of M a r x and Lenin. Finally, w e must briefly discuss the thesis of another scholar, w h o has also written mainly on the United Republic of Tanzania. Freyhold has tried to escape Nabudere's conclusions derived from a formalistic application of 'economically dominant/politically ruling class' by creating a n e w term, 'governing class': One distinction which ought to be made is that between the ruling class and the governing class (Poulantzas). It is a normal feature of capitalism that the economically ruling class

The state in the dominated social formations of Africa


does not govern the state directly but leaves this to hierarchies of state functionaries and politicians w h o are conditioned and compelled in a number of ways to act according to the general interests of the ruling class. Unless the governing class actually determines the process of economic reproduction in the country it cannot be called a ruling class however large its formal powers may be.28 T h e governing class for Freyhold is m a d e u p of the top personnel ('i.e. the ministers, principal secretaries and directors of the administrative apparatus, the general managers of the larger parastatals, the heads of the appointed party bureaucracy at the different levels, the heads of the repressive opparatus'29) of the state apparatus. They are the functionaries or top employees of the state, but certainly not the holders of state power. W h o then constitute the ruling class? 'The ruling class which determines the core functions of the state and the actual dynamics of the economy is the metropolitan bourgeoisie represented in Tanzania mainly b y the World B a n k , aid agencies of Nordic and other European countries and a variety of transnational corporations'.30 For Freyhold, as for Nabudere, there appears to be a single world ruling class which she calls 'metropolitan bourgeoisie' (Nabudere's 'financial oligarchy'). Whereas Kautsky logically extended the tendency towards economic concentration into the fact of a single world monopoly ('internationally united finance capital'), Nabudere and Freyhold have created on this basis a law of political concentration, la Kievsky, to create a 'fact' of a concentrated, single ruling class ! All the arguments Lenin advanced against Kautsky and Kievsky, therefore, apply with even greater force to these writers. T o uphold their thesis of a single ruling class at a global level, which exercises state power in all the imperialist and neo-colonial countries, Nabudere and Freyhold would have to show,firstand foremost, that there exists such a single class at a world level. Since classes are 'large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in the historically determined system of social production' (Lenin),01 they would at least have to show the existence of a single system of social production at a world level. Certainly, neither Nabudere, m u c h less Freyhold, would argue that there exists a single system of social production (a single social formation) at the global level. T h e concept of 'governing class', too, presents m a n y problems. First, it is not clear w h o constitutes the top personnel in the state apparatus as a class. They would constitute a class if it were shown that they occupy a definite place in the system of social production, etc., which is not Freyhold's argument. Rather, she concentrates on the fact that they are top functionaries of the state. Being employed by the state, however, does not m a k e a social group into a class: if it did, then all the functionaries, from minister to messenger in the state apparatus, would be part of Freyhold's governing class. Lastly, there is an irreconcilable contradiction between Freyhold's theoretical conception of the governing class and her description and analysis of the 'governing class' in the United Republic of Tanzania. In theory the governing class



is supposed tohave only formal powers, while in practice the Tanzanian 'governing class',' according to Freyhold, has exerted power and performed all those functions (through the state) that one would attribute to a ruling class. ~ According to Freyhold, the 'governing class' in the United Republic of Tanzania since independence has consolidated the state, established its supremacy and mobilized 'supportive' classes, in the process reconstructing the state in its o w n interests and in line with the interests of foreign investors. They have expanded the economic apparatuses of the state by nationalization and other measures, thus creating a public sector. There were two main reasons, Freyhold says, for the governing class to opt for state-capitalism. The option for a collective appropriation was dictated to the ruling class by its weakness vis--vis other social classes and the lack of resources for the state apparatus. Allowing its o w n members and African petit bourgeois outside the public sector to scramble individually for places in a newly opened up sector for African capitalism would have eroded the unity and discipline within the governing class and would have left it without the strength and the resources necessary to stabilise its position. While consolidating its economic base through the economic apparatuses of the state, 'the governing class also transformed the old independence m o v e m e n t into a special ideological apparatus of the state capable of submerging any independent organization of peasants and workers and capable of providing an additional clientele for the governing class'. A n dfinallythe expansion of the repressive apparatus has gone on apace by the expansion of the army, the national service and the militia. W h a t is m o r e , the 'governing class' has also developed its o w n ideology to justify this expansion, its extended power and to build u p the support of intermediate classes. Seen over a longer period the socialism of the nizers [another terminological invention of Freyhold's, which means the same thing as her 'governing class'] was in practice a set of strategies which expanded their power vis--vis the submerged classes, gave them the means to build up an intermediate class which supports them and put them into a position that made them a viable partner to the metropolitan bourgeoisie. It is thus that the 'governing class' has built u p the 'post-colonial state' which 'enjoys more power and stability than it ever had before', O f course, there are dangers to this stability which arise from the various 'contradictions internal to the Tanzanian type of state-capitalism which express themselves in the difficulty for the state to accumulate the capital which the governing class needs both in order to cooperate with the metropolitan bourgeoisie and in order to maintain and expand its supporting class'.32 . This interesting analysis of the Tanzanian state probably comes quite close to reality but hardly justifies Freyhold's theoretical proposition that her 'governing

The state in the dominated social formations of Africa


class' has only 'formal powers' and that it is different from a ruling class. W e would suggest that Freehold's o w n analysis shows that there is n o conceptual difference between her 'governing class' and the concept of ruling class. In her concrete analysis she is describing the same phenomenon by a different term, which 'terminological' distinction is in any case hardly justified except to allow for opportunistic interpretations.

Here, w e will attempt to gather together the main threads of the foregoing critique in the form of some broad theoretical propositions. It must be emphasized that the concrete class character of any particular state is to be defined by a concrete analysis of the particular social formation under discussion. While general theoretical propositions are a guide, they cannot be a substitute for a concrete analysis. However, the issues raised above are of a sufficient general character to allow for theoretical treatment. A s w e have seen, the main issues revolve around the nature and class character of the neo-colonial state. But this cannot be dealt with separately from the questions of the colonial state and political independence. Although the term 'colonial state' has gained wide currency, it is clear that it does not constitute a separate category. With the colonization of a particular country, the imperialist power involved extends certain apparatuses of the imperialist state to its colony. T h e term 'colonial state' is a kind of short-hand to describe these local apparatuses of the imperialist state. The state power rests in the hands of the ruling class of the imperialist country. This does not, of course, preclude certain autonomy in decision-making on the part of those w h o run the local apparatuses. The point, however, is that the ruling class is that of the colonizing country, which makes the so-called 'colonial state' nothing but part of the imperialist state. M a n y observers have noted the exaggerated prominence of the bureaucratic and military, as opposed to political (parliamentary institutions, etc.) apparatuses in the 'colonial state'. This, w e suggest, is one manifestation of the thoroughly anti-democratic nature of imperialism, for, as Lenin said, 'imperialism is . . . the 'negation' of democracy in general, of all democracy'. 33 A n d this characteristic is to be seen not only in the 'colonial state' but also in the neo-colonial ones, where imperialism is allied with the most reactionary local ruling classes. Political independence is an important step in the general struggle for national, liberation. It is one of the democratic demands of the oppressed nation. It means the creation of a separate national state, but does not automatically bring the end of the economic domination of finance capital. It does m e a n , however, that state power is n o longer directly controlled by the ruling class of the former colonizing power. . . .


Issa G. Shivji

In a neo-colonial state, state power rests in the hands of a local class or classes which constitute the ruling class. This class or classes have their o w n class interests arising from the place they occupy in social production, which in the longer run coincide with the interests of imperialism as a whole. In a neo-colonial situation, the inter-imperialist rivalries c o m e to have a full weight because the various factions and classes in the local state power forge alliances with different imperialist powers in line with their o w n interests. Both the internal class contradictions and the inter-imperialist rivalries are reflected in the constant political turbulence and reorganization of the ruling blocs in these countries. Thus, power in the neo-colonial state is imbued with the crisis of hegem o n y , popularly interpreted as political instability. The various neo-colonial ruling classes exhibit different degrees of independence from particular imperialist powers, in line with the conjuncture of class alliances and struggle at particular times. Those w h o argue that political independence does not bring any change in the class character of state power are hard put to analyse the politics of neocolonialism. They have to explain the local politics as a direct, crude reflection of inter-imperialist rivalries despite havingfirstposited a monolithic, global financial oligarchy. O n the other hand, their interpretation of local political struggle and alignments is reduced to isolated conspiracies and intrigues since they deny the role of local classes in state power. The force of the Marxist theory lies in its being able to explain concrete political movements, and thus become a guide to action. There must be something fundamentally wrong with the 'Marxist' theory of those w h o can repeat all the truisms but resort to subjectivist explanations of concrete political changes. In understanding the states in the neo-colonies m u c h work yet remains to be done at the level of concrete analysis. Without this it is not possible to theorize, especially on the state forms in these countries. Secondly, concrete analysis will have to c o m e to grips with h o w economic domination by imperialism manifests itself at the political level, at the level of state. Imperialist domination is one side of the coin. The other important characteristic of the dominated social formations is that, in m a n y of them, pre-capitalist social relations still prevail. H o w do these impinge on the state, both at the level of struggles for power and in 'influencing' the character of the state apparatus? This is another set of questions which need to be concretely analysed. Notes

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,'Manifesto of the Communist Party', in Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, p . 127, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1969 (3 vols.). Karl Marx, 'The Civil W a r in France', in Marx and

3 4

Engels, On the Paris Commune, p. 68, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1971, 357 p . Karl Marx, 'Letter to Ludwig Kugelmann, April 12, 1871', in ibid, p . 284. 'The Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The

The state in the dominated social formations of Africa


Notes (.continued) N e w Communist Manifesto', in D . N . Jacobs 18 (ed.), The New Communist Manifesto and 19 Related Documents, 3rd ed., p. 30, N e w York, Evanston/London, Harper & R o w , 1965, 256 p . (Harper Torchbooks). 0 Ibid., p . 31. 6 'The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, June 14, 1963', in The Communist Party of China, The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement, p . 36, 20 21 London, Red Star Press, 1976. 7 R . Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Su- 2 2 karno, Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965, 23 p. 132-40, Ithaca and London, Cornell Uni- 24 versity Press, 1974. 8 Quoted in ibid., p. 134, taken from 'Build the P K I along the Marxist-Leninist Line to lead the People's Democratic Revolution in Indonesia 25 (self-criticism of the Political Bureau of the C C P K I , September 1966)', Five Important Documents of the Political Bureau of the CC PKI, p. 50, London, Banner Books and Crafts Ltd., n.d., 280 p . 9 The self-criticism is to be found in the booklet cited above. According to Mortimer, op. cit., p. 397-9, this self-criticism was put out by the Peking-based group of the P K I leadership, w h o disavowed Aidit's theories. 10 Ibid., p. 132. This quotation is from Lenin's, 'The State and Revolution', Collected Works, Vol. 25. 11 Ibid. 12 See, for instance, G . Brehme: 'State and L a w in Post-colonial Independent States', in Othman, 26 Haroub (ed.), The State in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Institute of Development Studies, University of D a r es Salaam, July 1977 27 (mimeographed). 28 13 Ibid., p. 6. 11 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 'Manifesto of the Communist Party', o p . cit., p. 126. 15 V . I. Lenin, 'The State and Revolution', Collected 29 Works, Vol. 25, p. 417, Moscow, Progress 30 31 Publishers, 1964. 16 R . Murray, 'Second Thoughts on Ghana', New Left Review (London), N o . 42, March/ April 1967. 17 John Saul's main relevant articles are 'The State in Post-colonial SocietiesTanzania', The Socialist Register (London), 1974, and 'The Unsteady State: Uganda, Obote and General A m i n ' , Review of African Political Economy (London), N o . 5, January-April 1976. R . Murray; quoted in Saul, op. cit., p . 352. The main writers in this school are D . W . N a b u dere and Y . Tandon. T h e following two articles summarize their position well: D . W . Nabudere, 'Imperialism, State, Class and Race' (A critique of Shivji's Class Struggles in Tanzania), Utafiti (Dar es Salaam, University of Dar es Salaam), Vol. II, N o . 1, 1977; Y . Tandon, ' W h o s e Capital and W h o s e State?', University of D a r es Salaam, March 1977 (mimeographed). Nabudere, op. cit., p. 67-8. Ibid., p. 65. Ibid., p . 72. Tandon, op. cit., p. 21. The whole argument and Lenin's rebuttal are in V . I. Lenin, 'Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism', Collected Works, Vol. 22, p. 285-98. Ibid., p . 293. In his Preface to N . Bukharin's p a m phlet, 'Imperialism and the world economy', Lenin said: 'Abstract theoretical reasoning m a y lead to the conclusion at which Kautsky has arrivedin a somewhat different fashion but also by abandoning Marxismnamely, that the time is not too far off when these magnates of capital will unite on a world scale in a single world trust, substituting an internationally unitedfinancecapital for the competition and struggle between sums of finance capital nationally isolated. This conclusion is, h o w ever, just as abstract, simplified and incorrect as the similar conclusion drawn by our Struvists and Economists of the nineties.' V . I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 22, p . 105. Kievsky's arguments and Lenin's rebuttal are in V . I. Lenin, ' A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism', Collected Works, Vol. 23, p . 28-75. Ibid., p . 50-62. Michaela von Freyhold, 'The Post-colonial State', Review of African Political Economy, N o . 8, January-April 1977, p. 76. Ibid., p. 85. Ibid., p . 86. Lenin defined classes thus: 'Classes are large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation (in most cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their role in the social organization of labour, and, consequently, by the dimensions of the share of social wealth of which they dispose and the m o d e of acquiring it. Classes are groups of


Issa G. Shivji

Notes {continued) people one of which can appropriate the labour of another owing to the different places ' they occupy in a-definite system of social economy.' (A Great Beginning', Collected Works,\o\.29,v'.A2\.) All the quotations are from Freyhold's article 'The Post-colonial State'. For a view different from both Nabudere and Freyhold, see Said Salum, 'The Tanzanian State: A Critique', Monthly Review (New York), Vol. 28, January 1977, p . 51-7. ' A Caricature of Marxism . . .', op^ cit., p . 43.

The world system

T h e states in the institutional vortex of the capitalist world-economy

Immanuel Wallerstein
W o r d s can be the enemy of understanding and analysis. W e seek to capture a moving reality in our terminology. W e thereby tend to forget that the reality changes as w e encapsulate it, and by virtue of that fact. A n d w e are even more likely to forget that others freeze reality in different ways, using however the very same words to do it. A n d still w e cannot speak without words; indeed w e cannot think without words. Where then do w e find the via media, the working compromise, the operational expression of a dialectical methodology? It seems to m e it is most likely to be found by conceiving of provisional long-term, large-scale wholes within which concepts have meanings. These wholes must have some claim to relative spacetime autonomy and integrity. They must be long enough and large enough to enable us to escape the Scylla of conceptual nominalism, but short enough and small enough to enable us to escape the Charybdis of ahistorical, universalizing abstraction. I would call such wholes 'historical systems'a n a m e which captures their two essential qualities. It is a whole which is integrated, that is, composed of interrelated parts, therefore in some sense systematic and with comprehensible patterns. It is a system which has a history, that is, it has a genesis, an historical development, a close (a destruction, a disintegration, a transformation, an Aufhebung). I contrast this concept of 'historical system' with that of the more usual term of 'society' (or of 'social formation', which I believe is used more or less synonymously). O f course, one m a y use the term 'society' in the same sense I a m using 'historical system', and then the issue is simply the choice of formal symbol. But in fact the stardard use of 'society' is one which is applied indiscriminately to refer to modern states (and quasi-states), to ancient empires, to supposedly autonomous 'tribes', and to all manner of other political (or cultural-aspiring-to-be-political) structures. A n d this lumping together presumes what is to be demonstratedthat
Immanuel Wallerstein is Distinguished Professor of Sociology, and Director of the FernandBraudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems and Civilizations, at the State University of New York, Binghamton, NY 13901, United States. His publications include T h e M o d e r n WorldSystem (Vol. 1,1974; Vol. II, 1980) andThe Capitalist World-Economy (1979).

Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. X X X n , N o . 4, 1980


Immanuel Wallerstein

the political dimension is the one that unifies and delineates social action. If boundaries drawn in every conceivable wayintegrated production processes, exchange patterns, political jurisdiction, culturalcoherence, ecologywere in fact always (or even usually) synonymous (or even highly overlapping), there would be little problem. But, as a matter of empirical fact, taking the last 10,000 years of h u m a n history, this is not at all the case. W e must therefore choose a m o n g alternate criteria of defining our arenas of social action, our units of analysis. O n e can debate this in terms of philosophical a priori statements, and if so m y o w n bias is a materialist one. But one can also approach this heuristically: which criterion will account for the largest percentage of social action, in the sense that changing its parameters will most immediately and most profoundly affect the operation of other parts of the whole? I believe one can argue the case for integrated production processes as constituting this heuristic criterion, and I shall use it to draw the boundaries which circumscribe a concrete 'historical system', by which I m e a n an empirical set of such production processes integrated according to some particular set of rules, the h u m a n agents of which interact in some 'organic' way, such that changes in the functions of any group or changes in the boundaries of the historical system must follow certain rules if the entity's survival is not to be threatened. This is what w e m e a n by such other terms as a social economy, or a specific social division of labour. T o suggest that a historical system is organic is not to suggest that it is a frictionless machine. Quite the contrary: historical systems are beset by contradictions, and contain within them the seeds of processes that eventually destroy the system. But this, too, is very consonant with the 'organic' metaphor. This is a long preface to a coherent analysis of the role of states in the modern world. I think m u c h of our collective discussion has been a prisoner of the word 'state', which w e have used transhistorically to m e a n any political structure which had s o m e authority network (a leading person or group or groups, with intermediate cadres enforcing the will of this leading entity). N o t only do w e assume that what w e are designating as 'states' in the twentieth century are in the same universe of discourse as what w e designate as 'states' in, say, the tenth century, but even m o r e fantastically, w e frequently attempt to draw lines of historical continuity between two such 'states'of the same n a m e , or found in the same general location in terms of longitude and latitudesaid to be continuous because scholars can argue affinities of the languages that are spoken, or the cosmologies that are professed, or the genes that are pooled. T h e capitalist world-economy constitutes one such historical system. It came into existence, in m y view, in Europe in the sixteenth century. T h e capitalist worldeconomy is a system based on the drive to accumulate capital, the political conditioning of price levels (of capital, commodities and labour), and the steady polarization of classes and regions (core/periphery) over time. This system has developed and expanded to englobe the whole earth in the subsequent centuries.

The states in the institutional vortex of the capitalist world-economy


It has today reached a point where, as a result of its contradictory developments, . the system is a long crisis.1 The development of the capitalist world-economy has involved the creation of all the major institutions of the modern world: classes, ethnic/national groups, householdsand the 'states'. All of these structures postdate, not antedate capitalism; all are consequence, not cause. Furthermore, these various institutions, in fact, create each other. Classes, ethnic/national groups, and households are defined by the state, through the state, in relation to the state, and in turn create the state, shape the state, and transform the state. It is a structured maelstrom of constant movement, whose parameters are measurable through the repetitive regularities, while the detailed constellations are always unique. W h a t does it m e a n to say that a state comes into existence? Within a capitalist world-economy, the state is an institution whose existence is defined by its relation to other 'states'. Its boundaries are more or less clearly defined. Its degree of juridical sovereignty ranges from total to nil. Its real power to control the flows of capital, commodities, and labour across its frontiers is greater or less. T h e real ability of the central authorities to enforce decisions on groups operating within state frontiers is greater or less. The ability of the state authorities to impose their will in zones outside state frontiers is greater or less. Various groups located inside, outside, and across any given state's frontiers are constantly seeking to increase, maintain, or decrease the 'power' of the state, in all the ways referred to above. These groups are seeking to change these power constellations because of some sense that such changes will improve the particular group's ability to profit, directly or indirectly, from the operations of the world market. The state is the most convenient institutional intermediary in the establishment of market constraints (quasi-monopolies, in the broadest sense of the term) in favour of particular groups. The historical development of the capitalist world-economy is that, beginning with relatively amorphous entities, more and more 'states' operating within the interstate system have been created. Their boundaries and the definitions of their formal rights have been defined with increasing clarity (culminating in the contemporary United Nations structure of international law). T h e modalities and limits of group pressures in state structures have also been increasingly defined (in the sense both of the legal limits placed on such pressures, and of the rational organization by groups to transcend these limits). N o n e the less, despite what might be called the 'honing' of this institutional network, it is probably safe to say that the relative power continuum of stronger and weaker states has remained relatively unchanged over 400-odd years. That is not to say that the same 'states' have remained 'strong' and 'weak'. Rather, there has been at all m o m e n t s a power hierarchy of such states, but also at no m o m e n t has there been any one state whose hegemony was totally unchallenged (although relative hegemony has occurred for limited periods).


Immanuel Wallerstein.

Various objections have, been m a d e to such, a view of the modern state, its genesis and its m o d e of functioning. There are four criticisms which seem to be the most frequent and worthy of discussion. , First, it is argued that this, view is too instrumental a view of the state, that it makes the states into, a mere conscious instrument of acting groups with no life and integrity of their o w n , with n o base, of social support in and for themselves. It seems to m e this counter-argument is based o n a confusion about social institutions in general. Once created, all social institutions, including the states, have lives of their o w n ' in the sense that m a n y different groups will use them, support them, exploit them for various (and even contradictory) motives. Furthermore, institutions large and structured enough to have permanent staffs thereby generate a group of personsthe bureaucracies of these institutionswho have a direct socio-economic stake, in the persistence andflourishingof the institution as such, quite independent of the ideological premises on which the institution was created and the interests of the major social forces that sustain it. N o n e the less, the issue is not w h o has some say in the ongoing decisions of a state-machinery but w h o has decisive or critical say, and what are the. key issues that are fought about in terms of state policy. W e believe that these key issues are: (a) the rules governing the social relations of production, which critically affect the allocation of surplus-value; and (b) the rules governing the flow within and across frontiers of the factors ,of productioncapital, commodities and labourwhich critically affect the price structures- of markets. If one changes, the allocation of surplus-value and the price structures of markets, one is changing the relative competitivity of particular producers, and therefore their profit-levels. . It is the states that m a k e these rules, and it is primarily the states that intervene in the process of other (weaker) states, w h e n the latter attempt to m a k e the rules as they prefer them. The second.objection to this mode,of analysis is that it ignores the reality of traditional continuities, as ensconsed in the operative consciousnesses of groups. Such consciousnesses d o indeed exist and are very powerful, but are the consciousnesses themselves continuous? I think not, and believe the merest glance at the empirical reality will confirm that. The history of nationalisms, which are one of the salient forms of such consciousnesses, shows that everywhere that nationalist movements emerge, they create consciousness, they revive (even partially invent) languages, they coin names and emphasize customary practices that c o m e to distinguish their group from other groups; They do this in the n a m e of what is claimed to have always been there, but frequently (if not usually) they must stretch the interpretation of the historical evidence in ways that disinterested observers would consider partisan. This is true not only of the so-called 'new' nations of the twentieth century2 but of the 'old' nations as well.3 It is also clear that the successive, ideological statements about a given n a m e w h a t it encompasses, what constitutes its 'tradition'are discontinuous

The states in the institutional vortex of the capitalist world-economy


and diffrent. Each successive version can be explained in terms of the politics of its time, but the fact that these versions vary so widely, is itself a piece of evidence against taking the assertion of continuity as more than a claim of an interested group. It surely is shifting sand on which to base an analysis of the political functioning of states. The third argument against this form of analysis is that it is said to ignore the underlying centrality of the class struggle, which is implicitly asserted to exist within some fixed entity called a society or a social formation, and which in turn accounts for the structure of the state. If, however, classes is the term w e use for groups deriving from positions in relation to the m o d e of production, then it is to the realities of the set of integrated production processes that w e must look to determine w h o constitute our classes. T h e boundaries of these integrated production processes are in fact, of course, far wider than the individual states, and even sub-sets of production processes do not correlate very often with state boundaries. There is consequently no a priori reason to assume that classes are in some objective sense circumscribed by state boundaries. N o w , it m a y fairly be argued that class consciousnesses have tended historically to be national in form. This is so, for good reasons w e shall discuss below. But the fact that this is so is n o evidence that the analytic perception is correct. O n the contrary, this fact of the national form of consciousness for trans-state classes becomes itself a major explicandum of the modern world. Finally, it is said that this m o d e of analysis ignores the fact that the wealthiest states are not the strongest states, but tend indeed to be relatively w e a k . But this is to misperceive what constitutes the strength of state machineries. It is once again to take ideology for analytic reality. S o m e state machineries preach the line of a strong state. They seek to limit opposition; they seek to impose decisions o n internal groups; they are bellicose vis--vis external groups. But what is important is the success of the assertion of power, not its loudness. Oppositions only need to be suppressed where they seriously exist. States that encompass relatively m o r e homogeneous strata (because of the unevenness of allocation of class forces in the world-economy) m a y achieve via consensus what others strive (and perhaps fail) to achieve via the iron hand. Entrepreneurs w h o are economically strong in the market do not need state assistance to create monopoly privileges, though they m a y need state aid to oppose the creation by others, in other states, of monopoly privileges which would hurt these market-strong entrepreneurs. The states are thus, w e are arguing, created institutions reflecting the needs of class forces operating in the world-economy. They are not however created in a void, but within the framework of an interstate system. This interstate system is, in fact, the framework within which the states are defined. It is the fact that the states of the capitalist world-economy exist within the framework of an interstate


Immanuel Wallerstein

system that is the differentia specified of the modern state, distinguishing it from other bureaucratic polities. This interstate system constitutes a set of constraints which limit the abilities of individual state machineries, even the strongest a m o n g them, to m a k e decisions. T h e ideology of this system is sovereign equality, but the states are in fact neither sovereign nor equal. In particular, the states impose on each othernot only the strong on the weak, but the strong on the stronglimitations o n their modes of political (and therefore military), behaviour, and even more strikingly limitations on their abilities to affect the law of value underlying capitalism. W e are so used to observing all the things states do that constitute a defiance of other states that w e do not stop to recognize h o w few these things are, rather than h o w m a n y . W e are so used to thinking of the interstate system as verging on anarchy that w e fail to appreciate h o w rule-ridden it is. O f course, the 'rules' are broken all the time, but w e should look at the consequencesthe mechanisms that c o m e into play to force changes in the policies of the offending states. Again, w e should look less at the obvious arena of political behaviour, and more at the less observed arena of economic behaviour. The story of states with communist parties in power in the twentieth-century interstate system is striking evidence of the efScacities of such pressures. The production processes of the capitalist world-economy are built on a central relationship or antinomy : that of capital and labour. T h e ongoing operations of the system have the effect of increasingly circumscribing individuals (or rather households), forcing them to participate in the w o r k process in one capacity or the other, as contributors of surplus-value or as receivers. The states have played a central role in the polarization of the population into those living off appropriated surplus, the bourgeoisie, and those whose surplusvalue is appropriated from them, the proletariat. For one thing, the states created the legal mechanisms which not merely permitted or even facilitated the appropriation of surplus-value, but protected the results of the appropriation by enacting property rights. They created institutions which ensured the socialization of children into the appropriate roles. A s the classes c a m e into objective existence, in relation to each other, they sought to alter (or to maintain) the unequal bargaining power between them. T o do this, they had to create appropriate institutions to affect state decisions, which largely turned out to be over-time institutions created within the boundaries of the state, adding thereby to the world-wide definiteness of state structures. This has led to deep ambivalences in their self-perception and consequently contradictory political behaviour. Both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are classes formed in a world-economy, and w h e n w e speak of objective class position, it is necessarily classes of this world-economy to which w e refer. A s , however, the bourgeoisiefirstbegan to become class-conscious and only later the proletariat, both classes found disadvantages as well as advantages to defining themselves as world classes.

The states in the institutional vortex of the capitalist world-economy


T h e bourgeoisie, in pursuit of its class interest, the maximization of profit in order to accumulate capital, sought to engage in its economic activities as it saw fit without constraints on geographic location or political considerations. Thus, for example, in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries, it w a s frequent for Dutch, English or French entrepreneurs to 'trade with the enemy' in wartime, even in armaments. A n d it was frequent for entrepreneurs to change place of domicile and citizenship in pursuit of optimizing gain. T h e bourgeoisie then (as n o w ) reflected this self-perception in tendencies towards a 'world' cultural stylein consumption, in language, etc. However, it was also true then, and n o w , that, however m u c h the bourgeoisie chafed under limitations placed by particular state authorities for particular reasons at one or another m o m e n t , the bourgeoisies also needed to utilize state machineries to strengthen their position in the market vis--vis c o m petitors and to protect them vis--vis the working classes. A n d this meant that the m a n y fractions of the world bourgeoisie had an interest in defining themselves as 'national' bourgeoisies. T h e same pattern held for the proletariat. O n the one hand, as it became class-conscious, it recognized that a prime organizational objective has to be the unity of proletarians in their struggle. It is no accident that the Communist Manifesto proclaimed: 'Workers of the world, unite!'' It was clear that precisely the fact that the bourgeoisie operated in the arena of a world-economy, and could (and would) transfer sites of production whenever it was to its advantage, meant that proletarian unity, if it were to be truly efficacious, could only be at the world level. A n d yet w e k n o w that world proletarian unity has never really been efficacious (most dramatically in the failure of the Second International to maintain an antinationalist stance during the First World W a r ) . This is so for a very simple reason. T h e mechanisms most readily available to improve the relative conditions of segments of the working classes are the state machineries, and the political organization of the proletariat has almost always taken the form of state-based organizations. Furthermore, this tendency has been reinforced, not weakened, by whatever successes these organizations have had in attaining partial or total state power. W e arrive thus at a curious anomaly: both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat express their consciousness at a level which does not reflect their objective economic role. Their interests are a function of the operations of a world-economy, and they seek to enhance their interests by affecting individual state machineries, which in fact have only limited power (albeit real power, none the less) to affect the operations of this world-economy. It is this anomaly that constantly presses bourgeoisies and proletariats to define their interests in status-group terms. T h e most efficacious status-group in the modern world is the nation, since the nation lays claim to the moral right to control a particular state structure. T o the extent that a nation is not a state, w e find the potential for a nationalist movement to arise andflourish.O f course, there


Immanuel Wllerstein

is n o essence that is a nation and that occasionally breeds a nationalist movement. Quite the contrary. It is a nationalist m o v e m e n t that creates an entity called a nation, or seeks to create it. Under the multiple circumstances in which nationalism is not available to serve class interests, status-group solidarities m a y crystallize around substitute poles: religion, race, language, or other particular cultural patterns. Status-group solidarities remove the anomaly of national class organization or consciousness from the forefront of visibility and hence relax the strains inherent in contradictory structures. But, of course, they m a y also obfuscate the class struggle. T o the extent that particular ethnic consciousnesses therefore lead to consequences which key groups find intolerable, w e see re-emergence of overt class organizations, or if this creates too m u c h strain, of redefined status-group solidarities (drawing the boundaries differently). That particular segments of the world bourgeoisie or world proletariat mightflitfrom, say, pan-Turkic to pan-Islamic to national to class-based movements over a period of decades reflects not the inconsistency of the struggle but the difficulties of navigating a course that can bridge the antinomy: objective classes of the world-economy/subjective classes of a state structure. Finally the atoms of the classes (and of the status-groups), the incomepooling households, are shaped and constantly reshaped not only by the objective economic pressures of the ongoing dynamic of the world-economy but they also are regularly and deliberately manipulated by the states that seek to determine (to alter) their boundaries in terms of the needs of the labour-market, as well as to determine the flows and forms of income that m a y in fact be pooled. T h e households in turn m a y assert their o w n solidarities and priorities and resist the pressures, less effectively by passive means, m o r e effectively, w h e n possible, by creating the class and status-group solidarities w e have just mentioned. All these institutions togetherthe states, the classes, the ethnic/national/ status-groups, the householdsform an institutional vortex which is both the product and the moral life of the capitalist world-economy. Far from being primordial and pre-existing essences, they are dependent and coterminous existences. Far from being segregated and separable, they are indissociably intertwined in complex and contradictory ways. Far from one determining the other, they are in a sense avatars of each other.

Notes r have developed these theses at length in The Modern World-System, N e w York, Academic Press (Vol. I, 1974; Vol. II, 1980); and The Capitalist World-Economy, Cambridge, C a m bridge University Press, 1979. In 1956, Thomas Hodgkin wrote in a 'Letter' to Saburi Biobaku {Od, N o . 4, 1957, p. 42): 'I was struck by your statement that the use of the term 'Yoruba' to refer to the whole range of peoples w h o would nowadays describe themselves as Yoruba (as contrasted with the Oyo peoples simply) was due largely to the influcnce of the Anglican Mission at Abeokuta, and its work in evolving a standard'Yoruba'

The states in the institutional vortex of the capitalist world-economy


Notes (continued) , language, based on O y o speech. This seems to m e an extremely interesting example of the way in which Western influences have helped to stimulate a new kind of national sentiment. Everyone recognizes that the notion of 'being a Nigerian' is a new kind of conception. But it would seem that the notion of 'being a Yoruba' is not very m u c h older. I take it from what you say that there is no evidence that those w h o owed allegiance to the kingdom of Oyoor to the earlier State system based upon Ife?used any c o m m o n name to describe themselves, although it is possible that) they m a y have done so?' George Bernard Shaw has the Nobleman in Saint Joan exclaim: ' A Frenchman! Where did you pick up that expression? A r e these Burgundians and Bretons and Picards and Gascons beginning to call themselves Frenchm e n , just as our fellows are beginning to call themselves Englishmen? They actually talk of France and England as their countries. Theirs, if you please! What is to become of m e and you if that way of thinking comes into fashion?'

The state and the world system

Silviu Brucan
T h e state is, and remains, a central concept in social sciences and there are authors belonging to various schools of thought w h o maintain that the study of the state is what political science is all about. A n d yet so little attention has been given to the state in recent decades that one is left with the impression of a dormant Leviathan unaffected by what is going on in the world. T o use a current (much abused) categorization, while in the West the concept of state has been drowned in the broad and rather volatile 'political system', in the East the proponents of 'real socialism' have avoided, for obvious reasons, dealing with the 'real state'. Cutting across that artificial categorization, there are Western Marxists w h o feel so strongly about the electoralfiatthat they have c o m e to believe that the state, which has so faithfully served the bourgeoisie, could equally serve the cause of a revolution against it. In other words, w e are faced everywhere with the all too familiar tendency of adjusting theory to the conveniences of politics. Therefore, it becomes necessary to restate Marx's basic theory on the state, see to what extent it still applies, and review it in the light of n e w developments in both the social sciences and social reality. W e will thus find that the state has undergone significant changes both in role and in functions; I submit that even s o m e of the basic assumptions upon which the Marxist theory on the state was formulated require a thorough re-examination, starting with its origins. It is m y contention that the types of state existing in the world today are to a large extent shaped by the international environment. Actually, the most recent changes in the activities and behaviour of states have been determined externally, i.e. from the world system, rather than from inner class conflicts and processes. T h e classic theories on the state were elaborated at the time when European states functioned as self-contained social systems whose decisions originated Silvia Brucan is Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Bucharest, Romania. A former Ambassador of his country to Washington and representative to the United Nations, he has published two books inEnglish: The Dissolution of Power (1971) andThe Dialectic of World Politics (1978), both contributions to a Marxist theory of international relations. He is now working on the design of a type of institution required to establish a new world order.

Int. Soc. Scl. J., Vol. X X X n , N o . 4, 1980

The state and the world system


chiefly from within. T h e global social system w a s the national society. Jean Bodin, T h o m a s Hobbes and Niccolo Machiavelli, the founders of modern political science, viewed the state as the supreme power within its territory; major decisions were motivated as raison d'tat. M a r x also operated with national society and it w a s in this context that he described the contradiction between productive forces and relations of production, between economic base and political superstructure, and the class struggle whereby the proletariat must itself constitute the nation to acquire political supremacy. 1 Although he was thefirstto discover the mechanism of the worldwide expansion of capitalism, his writings nevertheless reflect a historical age in which the European powers were predominant in world affairs; the structure and functions of the state were primarily dictated by domestic forces and necessities. This is apparent in the exclusive focus of M a r x and Engels o n the 'internal' development of society to explain the origin and evolution of the state. M a r x ' s model for his theory of the capitalist system was Great Britain; suffice it to note that the United K i n g d o m ' s budget for 1977 (as well as Italy's) w a s set in its essential ceilings by the International Monetary F u n d to illustrate h o w external forces n o w impinge u p o n state decisions. In fact, I propose to demonstrate that w e are n o w in a transition period in the history of international relationsfrom the international system that arose with the expansion of capitalism and the formation of nation-states in Europe to the emerging world system. Whereas in the former the inputs from the nationstates are predominant and decisive in shaping the system and determining its behaviour, in the latter it is the reverse effect of the world system that will prevail over its subsystems, adjusting all of them to its motion. It is in this contemporary perspective that I intend to re-examine M a r x ' s theory of the state.

The genesis of the state

W h e n , w h y , and h o w the state appeared as a political institution remain to this day controversial questions. Vested theoretical and ideological interests are here deeply involved. For knowledge about the conditions of its appearance is essential in setting the kind of theoretical framework that is going to be used in the analysis of the character and functions of the state. Such knowledge is equally important to speculate w h e n and h o w the state m a y disappear or be abolished. A fairly scientific inquiry into historical, or rather pre-historical, circumstances has been m a d e possible by the enormous research work in political anthropology accomplished in the first half of this century. A t the time w h e n such research was in an initial stage, and Lewis M o r g a n was probing into the social organization of the Iroquois tribe and other American aborigines, Friedrich Engels based his famous conclusions o n the origins of the state o n M o r g a n ' s findings. His classic thesis was that the split of primitive society into classes wanted


Silviii Brucan

an institution whichset the seal of general social recognition on each new. method of acquiring property and thus amassing wealth at continually increasing speed;! an institution which perpetuated, not only this growing cleavage of society into classes, but also the right of the possessing class to exploit the non possessing, and the rule of the former over the latter. A n d this institution came. The state was invented.2 However, the sources of anthropological information available to Engels were scarce and limited in scope. It w a s only in the 1920s and 1930s that research extended to primitive societies in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Polynesia, and political anthropology came of age.a This is not to say that all the answers have been found since that vast research was undertaken without a conceptual framew o r k and major theoretical directions.4 This m a y well explain w h y the main tendency has been to study each group from the viewpoint of its uniqueness rather than to ascertain what are the basic forms of activity whichdespite very diverse conditionshad to develop out of necessity everywhere as prerequisites for the existence of h u m a n society.0 It is in this direction that w e will focus our inquiry. T o begin with, a genetic view of political organization must reckon with the fact that primeval anarchy could not suddenly blossom forth into a full-fledged state, claiming absolute dominance within its territorial limits and exercising the numerous functions already mentioned. Whilst it is an accepted assumption that, initially, m e n lived for long in small bands or villages, around 5000 B.c. such isolated units began to cluster: into larger groups: tribes, then tribal federations and, in some regions, highly centralized kingdoms or empires. Although this line of development w a s affected in various areas and continents by specific geographic or ecological conditions, it remained nevertheless fundamental. Technological limitations, namely the inability to produce beyond subsistence level, was conducive to autonomy, whereas the development of agriculture and the first division of labour resulted in a surplus of goods and an accumulation of wealth that eventually led to the formation of an upper class; this internal transformation in turn stimulated intertribal economic exchange, warfare over land, and slaves, conquest and annexation of defeated tribes and villages by the victor. Both processes, the internal transformation and the aggregation of tribes into larger units, required a strong centralized political institution, that is a state t establish class domination and control the n e w community, to levy taxes, and to build u p military forces.6 Engels emphasized only the class origin of the state, focusing exclusively o n the internal transformation. However, one of the fundamental facts of tribal society lies in the two conflicting tendencies involving ethnic rather than class aggregation: the centrifugal effect of autonomy and territorial dispersion, and the centripetal urge for unity and consolidation to meet external competition. A n d it is politics only that settles the problem for merely political power, i.e. the state, can overcome autonomous trends and territorial dispersion, thus forging

The state and the world system


the n e w , wider community. T o the degree that a social group lost its autonomy and was assimilated into a larger unit, the exercise of force became the inevitable companion of politics requiring the state to set u p some sort of military organization. A s I have documented elsewhere,7 anthropologicalfindingsled m e : t o the conclusion that the sphere of politics began where that of kinship left off. In other words, from the m o m e n t kinship relations ceased to be the social regulating factor in primitive society, politics emerged as the organizing and integrating force. With the split of primitive society into classes and the aggregation of tribes into larger units, politics acquired a n e w dimension: the state was created as an instrument of class domination and the organizer and forger of the n e w community. I briefly mention these features of primitive society merely to point out that the origin of the state must be related to both basic types of h u m a n aggregation, ethnicity and classes, and to the dynamics generated in their behaviour by class inequality and external competition. It is m y contention that such theoretical clarification is essential if one is to deal adequately with the modern nation-state.

T h e nation-state
In international studies, the state is too abstract and lifeless a concept unless one fills it u p with the national component. Experience shows it is not enough to mention the form of the state, that it is authoritarian or democratic, capitalist or socialist; to understand its external behaviour one must add that it is French or American, Russian or Chinese, Chilean or Vietnamese. Only then m a y one proceed with the analysis. Therefore, the nation-state is a concept m o r e adequate to present world conditions; it couples the state with its national component and vice versa. I can hardly think of a concept more meaningful and fruitful in explaining patterns of behaviour, orientations and options, policies and strategies in the world arena. Consequently, Ifindthe relationship between nation and state a m u c h m o r e useful conceptual linkage in international studies than that between state and society which seems more appropriate to the study of domestic politics; A n d yet there are m a n y authors w h o question the relevance of the nationstate today. They argue that the technological revolution has rendered the nationstate obsolete, that nation-states are becoming 'penetrated' and 'permeated' by systematic foreign intrusion, and that the enormous growth of multinational corporations marks the 'end of the state'. Those w h o oppose such views maintain that the nation-state is still the prime mover on the international scene and that nationalism is stronger than ever. It is not because w e prefer.the middle.ground, but rather because w e feel


Silviu Brucan '

that both phenomena must be reckoned with as facts of international life that w e believe only a dialectical approach m a y provide the clue. Hence, I propose to operate at two levels of analysisthe national and the world leveland then see h o w the two interact with each other, and which one is gaining ground. The most relevant question with regard to the nation-state is the role of the ruling class in shaping foreign policy, and the part played by the state in the whole exercise. Here, I should recall a controversy in the United States in the early 1960s: one author, proceeding from the thesis that foreign policy is shaped by domestic class interests and noting that the Cold W a r had brought fabulous profits to the corporate lite, was concluding that the United States would continue to plunge along the same perilous course, that the ruling class was so obsessed with its o w n short-term interests as to be incapable of a rational analysis and cool appraisal of the dead-end towards which it was heading. A different opinion was presented by an editorial stressing a new element, namely the appearance of a section of the American ruling class (headed by President Kennedy) that was becoming aware of the dangers inherent in that course of action; while the ruling class does not want to change its foreign policy, such a division of opinion within ruling circles makes a modification possible in the very self-interest of capitalism.8 Involved in that controversy are basic theoretical issues regarding (a) the relationship between class interests and foreign policy, and (b) the degree of autono m y which the administration or the state enjoys vis--vis the economic base.

Ideology and foreign policy

In recent years, compounding the above issues, quite a few international developments have come into conflict with the theoretical claim that international politics are activated by ideological motivations and, consequently, that foreign policy is exclusively or primarily dictated by class interests. Let us start with the two nuclear treaties jointly drafted by the United States and the U S S R which were rejected by capitalist France and communist China on the ground that these treaties were designed to secure Soviet-American nuclear hegemony. In the IndoPakistan war of 1971, as well as in the war in Angola, the United States and China found themselves on one side of the fence, while the U S S R stood firmly on the other. M o r e recently, authoritative Soviet statements warn against an AmericanChinese alliance. Apparently, such bizarre coalitions could hardly be explained in class-ideological terms. Thus, both the inner and outer dynamics of class and national interests reveal that traditional theories have lost their explanatory power. I suggest the following theses to form an analytical model that could deal with such phenomena and be logically integrated within a coherent conceptual framework.

The state and the world system


Class interests and aims work vertically within the national system but not horizontally in relations with other nations. While the class struggle remains the motor of society's development, and the classes in conflict tend to expand into the international environment in search for support (e.g. the factions in the Angolan war), they do not extend straight into that environment because they there enter a n e w sphere of politics where contradictions of a different kind are at work. Hence, support m a y c o m e from odd sources (e.g. Israel's massive aid to right-wing Christians in Lebanon). Nations play a role distinct from that of classes in international politics. Although nations are m a d e u p of classes and other social groups with clashing interests, once they are organized as states and largely integrated (as a result of c o m m o n language, territory, economy, culture, religion, etc., forged under historical and strategic circumstances which m a r k their place on the world m a p ) , nations acquire a drive of their o w n in international politics. That drive cannot be identified with any of the component classes; once more the behaviour of the whole differs from that of its parts, particularly since the whole is exposed outwardly to different conditions. For in the international system nations are big or small, mighty or weak, rich or poor, developed or underdeveloped; and these discrepancies generate a type of conflict (and co-operation) different in kind from inter-class conflict within society triggered by contradictions in the m o d e of production and in the social structure. It is on the basis of that distinct role of the nation that one can speak of national interest superseding class conflict, particularly when vital national assets (e.g. territorial integrity) are in danger. While a state's orientation in foreign policy has a definite class background cast by national strategic aims, in reactions to specific events or crises governments enjoy a wide autonomy. T o begin with, foreign policy cannot be, and never is, a simple projection of domestic class interests into the international environment; what is more, although in a capitalist country the corporate lite is the dominant force in establishing the direction of foreign policy, this does not m e a n that corporate executives m a k e or carry out policy themselves; nor are statesmen by any means simply docile agents of big business. In each country, there are traditional ways and means whereby the ruling class influences foreign policy. I have documented 9 h o w leading social forces affect the formation of American foreign policy, focusing on the years 1957-58, so crucial in terms of American orientation. T h e Sputnik, signalling the Soviet development of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles had rendered the whole atomic strategy of the United States obsolete. Almost immediately, three major groups were constituted, each m a d e u p of corporate executives, generals, press-trust magnates, and establishment scientists. Their endresults were the Rockefeller Report, the Gaither Report, and the Council of Foreign Relations with Henry Kissinger as rapporteur. Thesebodies guided the articulation of a n e w military


Silviti Brucaii

doctrine and m a d e short- and long-term recommendations that were faithfully followed by both Democratic and Republican administrations throughout the 1960s. A s to the w a y class interests are cast by national strategic aims, one could mention the policies of President de Gaulle, w h o opposed American hegemony to promote the national interests of France, and pulled French troops out of N A T O , yet stayed in the Atlantic Alliance for class reasons; he realized that France alone could not maintain capitalist dominance. Here I must recall that M a r x and Engels warned against a mechanical view of the correlation between the economic base and politics, while both spoke of the autonomy of the state not only from the base, but also, by w a y of exception, from the warring classes.10 Moreover, the leeway in foreign policy is m u c h larger (e.g. the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939) than that in domestic matters, where the class struggle and the ideology that goes with it is a restraining factor. Where is that autonomy located and h o w does it work? History abounds with cases where governments and political leaders representing the same class advocated quite different policies. A famous case in point is the harsh political conflict between Churchill and Chamberlain over British policy towards Nazi G e r m a n y , though both belonged to the same aristocracy and the Conservative party. Likewise, in the socialist countries, virulent polemics and sometimes violent conflicts broke out between groups or leaders of the governing party starting with Stalin, Trotsky and Bukharin through to the recent denunciation of the ' G a n g of Four' in China. T o put things in their proper perspective, w e must point out that the Marxist thesis that politics is primarily a question of class relations provides only a general framework. It does not, of course, exclude the possibility of political conflicts arising between factions or. individuals within this framework. But whereas political conflicts between classes ultimately involves the fundamental issue, as Lenin put it, of which class holds power, quarrels between various factions or leaders revolve around the question of w h o will exercise power on behalf of the class: Churchill or Chamberlain, Stalin or Bukharin, the liberal wing or the right wing, the hawks or the doves? Therefore, in the system of five variables [natural-material basis (size of territory and population, geography and productive forces); societal structure and forces; contingency factors; state system, and leadership], I have formulated for the study of foreign policy formation, the variable state system corresponds to the fundamental issue involving the class in power, whilst leadership covers class representation. The state system is the political instrument of class domination; leadership provides for different conceptions about ways to use and direct state power to serve the dominant class. Therefore, it is in the latter variable rather than in the state system that autonomy in decision-making is located.-

The state and the world system


B y state system I mean,all the institutionsgovernment, administration and its machinery, including the military and the coercive apparatusin which the power of the state is vested. The government is only a temporary element of the state system, whereas the machinery is a permanent one. A s w e will see later this distinction is important. A s for leadership, the problem is h o w m u c h of an independent variable is a president, a prime minister? H o w m u c h leverage does he have in foreign-policy decisions? I suggest that he is not entirely independent; his initiatives and behaviour occur within a certain sphere of autonomy provided by the given political system. W h a t is more, in a class society, the leader is both the product of, and an actor in, the historical process, which means that he is the representative of his class as well as the maker of decisions designed to serve the purposes of that class. H e equally belongs to his nation and thus views the world through a national telescope. Even with such powerful personalities as Mussolini or Hitler, Stalin or M a o Tse-tung, Roosevelt or D e Gaulle, one could hardly find actions and behaviour that went against their state's interests, as perceived by them and their followers. However idiosyncratic, leaders as.a rule behave and act within the sphere of autonomy prescribed by their respective system. If they attempt to exceed it, a sort of safety valve is triggered against such violations. It works erratically and not always successfully. The various putsches against Hitler, within his o w n entourage, point to the existence of such a safety valve even in a Fascist state. Watergate is a striking illustration of the w a y such a device works in the American system against attempts by the chief executive to extend his power beyond constitutional bounds. A t the other political pole, Khrushchev w a s relieved of power w h e n the Politburo decided that his initiatives had become erratic. A final point: h o w does the state machinery react to independent decisions m a d e by strong leaders? Going back to the controversy over American policy, one is bound to recall two cases: w h e n President T r u m a n decided to alter American policy with respect to the Soviet Union, moving to the right, he enjoyed the full co-operation of the state machinery; however, when President Kennedy decided to abandon the perilous Cold W a r confrontation with the Soviet Union, he encountered the resistence of 'strong bureaucratic interests in the Department of State, C I A , and Pentagon' which opposed, such a shift in policy in the same way as the French generals in Algeria opposed the change m a d e by General de Gaulle.11 O n e finds similar patterns within the British state apparatus when initiatives on Rhodesia or Northern Ireland were taken. Briefly, the state machinery, being programmed to follow the established strategy and foreign policy of the ruling class, reacts as a strong conservative force whenever political initiatives are perceived as deviating from that line.


Silvia Brucan

T o s u m u p , the state cannot be described exclusively in class terms; its domestic function to secure class domination combines with its external function, which is to promote the interests of the ruling class while performing as the armour (politico-military) and administrator (economic) of the nation facing external competition raging in the world arena. T o obtain the popular support required by its external function, the state must secure the co-operation of those significant social and political forces lying beyond the ruling class. The nation-state operates at the intersection of the domestic sources of policy and the stimuli and constraints coming from the international environment. Policy decisions, therefore, m a y never be exclusively attributed either to domestic or to external factors. A s a rule, such decisions derive from a combination of both, the weight and intensity of each varying according to circumstances and cases. Hence, the student of foreign policy is advised to focus,first,on domestic sources as being primary, to study the dialectical process whereby economic, social and political variables interact in a mutual interplay constantly influenced by the external environment, and to examine h o w all these variables meet and clash within the state system, ultimately culminating in foreign-policy decisions and actions. Having dealt primarily with the domestic sources of foreign policy, let us n o w proceed from the other end: the world system.

The world system and its impact upon the nation-state

Ours is an epoch in which international relations are in transition, from the international to the world system. This is a system encompassing the whole planet and functioning with sufficient regularities to impose certain recognizable patterns of behaviour on all its subsystems, particularly nation-states. In fact, international relations are becoming so systemic that the system acquires a drive of its o w n . For thefirsttime in history w e can speak meaningfully of 'world polities', 'world markets', 'world crises' and 'world problems'; only n o w do w e realize that the two world wars were prematurely called such since, not until recently, have warfare capabilities reached a really worldwide scope. W e must point out here that there are various approaches to the world system and the timing of its emergence. Immanuel Wallerstein, in a monumental work, divides the historical process into four major epochs, starting with the fifteenth century w h e n the origins and early conditions of the world system, then exclusively European, appeared.12 While I agree with Wallerstein's focus on the role of capitalism in the formation of the world economy, I must point out that m a n y parts of the world remained for centuries outside the capitalist whirlpool,

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maintaining their isolation, their tribal societies or their feudal or tributary modes, because the instruments of communication, transport and information capable of unifying the planet were developed only lately. George Modelski takes a different view, emphasizing the political factor in the formation of the world system.13 While stressing the role of world powers in creating the global system, he designates Portugal as thefirstsuch world power in the 1500s. However, at that time, Portugal k n e w neither what nor where the planet was, a circumstance hardly consonant with worldwide domination. I suggest that the watershed in the creation of a global system encompassing the whole planet is related to the scientific and technological revolution. It is this revolution that m a d e communication universal, transport supersonic, information instantaneous and modern weaponry planetary, that has m a d e it possible for a global sphere of multilevel interdependencies to emerge and function with a unifying and integrating force. Therefore, I place the emergence of the world system, as distinct from the international state-system, in the middle of the twentieth century, w h e n major breakthroughs in science began to be applied on a scale wide enough to affect international politics. The important theoretical point is that the world system represents the conceptualization best suited to handle the n e w world problems that have arisen in recent decades. W h a t w e need in this respect is a conceptual link between the world system and the origin and nature of these problems. Certainly, development, ecological balance, nuclear proliferation and nuclear war or scarce resources, or energy cannot be adequately dealt with in the context of the 1500s, or for that matter of the 1800s, for the very simple reason that they were not world problems then. A n d they did not exist as such because there was no world system to encompass their global scope. In dealing with the world system I proceed from the assumption that, far from being a chaotic amalgamation of elements interrelated by accidental linkages, this system is based on certain structures comprising unitsnation-stateswhose activities are increasingly adjusted to the inner motion of the world system, functioning according to identifiable principles of behaviour. The military sphere A typical illustration is the effect of the world system upon the military policy of the major powers. Since nuclear missile weapons are planetary in both destructive and delivery capability, nuclear policy acquires a global scope that transcends alliances and overrides all other considerations, including ideological ones. Globalism has led the United States and the U S S R stubbornly to preserve the monopoly of basic decisions on war and a nuclear strategic bipolarity. China's advocacy of a strong Western Europe originates in the same nuclear logic and in the global power game it regulates. The same logic of the power game makes China


Silvlu Brucan

accept Japan's reliance on the American nuclear umbrella which, by the way, meets with American interest in keeping Japan non-nuclear. The global power game, continuously fed by the arms race, and vice versa, makes for a war system. This m a y well explain w h y the nuclear race goes on and on, although present arsenals are sufficient to destroy the world m a n y times over. T h e overall effect of the world system upon nation-states is apparent in the active participation in the arms race of all nuclear powers, irrespective of their domestic regime, and in the tendency it generates in other ambitious nations to go nuclear. Briefly, the world system causes nation-states to m a k e adaptive decisions to its dynamic motion that the latter would not m a k e only in response to domestic wants. The economic sphere It is in economic relations and activities that the world system best reveals its powerful impact upon nation-states. T o understand the nature ofthat impact one must recall that capitalism has been instrumental in overcoming the isolation of continents and countries, establishing the world market, the international monetary system, and in setting u p the rules of international trade and monetary exchange. A s the Communist Manifesto put it, succinctly, the bourgeoisie creates a world after its o w n image. 14 World trade has been converted from an exclusive club of major exporting nations into a real world activity with more than 100 countries participating ever more substantially. The rate of growth of world exports is rising faster than the growth-rate of either production or average G N P . This means that national economies are increasingly dependent on foreign sources of raw materials and modern technology as well as outlets for their products. The energy crisis makes it abundantly clear that economic dependence is n o longer the prerogative of developing nations. Indeed, interdependence is the law of the world. The globalization process powered by modern technology is a basic feature of present international relations. It is a factor so strong that it overrides even ideological positions: joint ventures between socialist states and multinational corporations are cropping u p every day. The current economic and financial disorder is really global; it affects everybody, all nations. In fact, the globalization of the world economy has come so rapidly that neither economics nor the political institutions, national and international, are prepared or equipped to deal with it. Japan is probably the best model of close co-operation between the government and the corporations; In early 1978, Prime Minister Fukuda stated that his administration would lead the country to a 7 per cent growth rate, and consequently Japan would enjoy economic stability. A s I was visiting Japan at the time, I argued in an article that even if Japan attained a higher rate it could still not reach

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stability so long asfinancialdisruptions and stagflation continued to plague the world market.16 Indeed, Japan's economic situation is a far cry from stability. Interdependence is not merely a catchy notion of modern rhetoric; it is a hard reality of world politics. Yet, so far, the strategy of the industrial nations has focused on a concerted effort within the O E C D , the club of the twenty-four rich, to overcome the crisis. The O E C D Scenario for 1980, which is half prediction and half guideline accepted by all members, called in 1976 for a 5 ^ per cent average Tate of growth annually, assuming that thus inflation will go d o w n in 1980 to 4 - 7 per cent, while unemployment would be cut to 4-5 \ per cent.10 Available data (in 1979) show clearly that the original targets were never attained; not even the lower growth targets set for 1978 were attained and 1979 marked a n e w downturn, with both inflation and unemployment going from bad to worse. The logical conclusion is that the developed nations cannot overcome the crises by closed-circuit planning. The real novelty, however, is that the O E C D Scenario is thefirstattempt to plan the economic development of the industrialized world as a whole. Only a decade ago, this would have been considered heretical and unrealistic in the West. The liberal ideology of the law of the market and 'free enterprise' was still strong. T h e O E C D Scenario, the summit meetings of the seven rich, as well as O P E C , mark a n e w stage in the evolution of the world capitalist system: the end of the liberal era when the law of the market regulated international economic relations. Instead, w e are witnessing a general politicization of world economics. Governments and states are taking over economic issues handled heretofore either by the private sector or through business-governmental negotiations, largely on the basis of economic criteria. N o w , political considerations prevail. W h e n the seven rich refuse to embark on a massivefinancialventure to assist the poor nations to industrialize, the motivation is chiefly political. Although economists argue that such investment could in turn trigger a vigorous expansion of O E C D nations, the latter are afraid that a strong Third World would challenge their dominance in the world structure of power. B y the same token, w h e n O P E C decides to raise further the price of oil while firmly maintaining output levels, its primary motivation is also political. It could m a k e m u c h more money out of increased output, but chooses to preserve its new-found power over the next decades by influencing consumption patterns in the oil-hungry North. W e have c o m e a long way from Lassalle's 'night-watchman state' chiefly concerned with the security of business activities, whilst production, commerce, and finance were taken care of by the natural workings of economic laws. T h e great depression of the 1930s climaxed the intervention of the state in securing the functioning of the national economy which could n o longer be left to its o w n devices. N o w , when the international economic andfinancialsystem has broken d o w n , the state is called on to play a growing economic role not only domestically but also internationally.


Silviu Brucan

W h a t about the state and the multinational corporations? The main theoretical point here is that the symbiosis between the state and the monopolies should not be construed as a complete fusion; rather the two constitute a dialectical model the two parts of which are united and opposite, convergent and divergent. T h e question yet to be examined is: which of the two is growing more powerful in this n e w stage of capitalism? Available data show that, o n the one hand, the state supports the multinationals in m a n y ways, encouraging their expansion, while, on the other, the multinationals act in m a n y instances against the policies of the state. However, the multinationals cannot ignore the realities of the power g a m e in an environment in which the competition over markets and raw materials is very often reinforced by the struggle over strategic positions, spheres of influence and military bases. It is not fortuitous, therefore, that so m a n y American companies have invested massively in the United States' client states, where they have found the ideal 'open door'. W h a t is more, so long as the instruments of coercion and violence are under nation-states' control, it is o n these that multinationals must rely whenever the security of their operations is in jeopardy. Hence, multinationals are bound to cluster around the main centres of power in the capitalist worldthe United States, Western Europe and Japanreflecting to varying degrees the strategic conflicts a m o n g these. T o s u m up, the relationship between the state and the multinationals is neither linear nor simple; it is complex and contradictory, involving both conflict and co-operation, the weight of each being determined by the forces at work in world politics. Concerning the dilemma of inter-imperialist contradictions or co-ordinated imperialist strategy (Trilateralism), w e are again faced with contradictory trends rather than with one single directional thrust. Recognizing the existence, in the world capitalist system, of a contradictory process of co-operation and rivalry, one author feels that this is reflected in a division of labour in contemporary Western societies between capitalists and state managers (figures at the top of the state apparatus), a division that gives rise to differences in interests and ideology. It occurs within a structural framework that operates so that the pursuit of self-interest by state managers (concerned with preserving and expanding their o w n power) tends to serve the long-term interests of capital. Thus, n o matter h o w strong President Carter's group commitment to the Trilateral Commission (United States, Japan, Western Europe), once they were in power, their interests as state managers dictated another direction: protecting American interests against Japan and Western Europe. Actually, neither state managers nor big business are acting on the basis of the needs of capitalism as a system.17 Whilst inter-imperialist contradictions generate a sort of economic war, trilateralism is a convenient device to co-ordinate strategies against the Third World, as already noted. Finally, let m e point out briefly that all the n e w developments described earlier

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are bound to affect the conditions for social revolution in the West and, consequently require corresponding changes in both the theory of revolution and the strategy to ensure its success. Social revolutions have always constituted focal points of international conflicts, particularly in areas of strategic importance. Surely, Western Europe is an extreme case in this respect, for a leftist coalition coming into power in France or Italy would be thefirstcrack in the very centre of the capitalist system. Hence, considerable forces would oppose such a change; in a regional system dominated by N A T O and the E E C both committed to the preservation of capitalism, the new power in Italy or France would come up against formidable odds. Consequently, whilst internal factors remain decisive in the outbreak of revolution, the further consolidation and success of the n e w socialist power will largely depend on external factors. It logically follows that, in Western Europe, the forces of social change must advance on a broad front not only internally but also externally. For the task here is to change both the socio-economic fabric of society and the structure of the regional system. Turning n o w to the Third World, one must start from the premise that it is here, through the so-called North-South system that the powerful thrust of capitalism is being felt at its worst. The North-South system is the end result of a century-old international division of labour between the central mtropoles of the North and their peripheries in the southern continents (Africa, Asia and Latin America) to the effect that the former have become highly industrialized and rich, whereas the latter have largely remained underdeveloped and poor. Despite political independence acquired by the former colonies or dependent states, the mechanics of that historical relationship, based on uneven terms of trade, rapacious investments, loans, etc., is such that it works systematically in favour of the industrial nations, widening the gap that separates them from the developing nations. Under such conditions, the specific role of the state largely depends o n the social forces in power. In m a n y developing nations the state seems the best instruments for modernizing the economy and for the. development battle on the international arena. Conversely, in other cases the state is a sort of beachhead of the former mtropoles helping the smooth functioning of the North-South system. T h e logic of the development battle drives the masses in these countries to combine the struggle against imperialism with that against the agents or clients of the latter, w h o are in control of the state. Briefly, the state in the Third World is caught in the middle of two conflicting pressures: one coming from the world capitalist system with its conditioning effect, the other generated by the resurgent thrust of national self-assertion. The Second (socialist) World is going its o w n w a y , though not as insulated from worldwide economic disruptions as one used to think. In fact, the socialist nations are compelled to function within a world system in which capitalism still sets the rules of the game in international economic relations and on the world


Silviu Brucan

market. Lenin was aware that the triumph of revolution in a backward country like Russia could not change the international system, and, as he put it, only its triumph 'at least in several advanced countries' could allow socialism to exercise a decisive influence u p o n world politics as a whole. 18 However, the advanced countries have survived the great revolutionary sweeps in the aftermath of the two world wars. A n d it is central capitalism (still holding a commanding position in the world economically and technologically) that continues to transmit its o w n functioning principles and patterns of behaviour to the economic relations a m o n g nations. Although the world socialist system n o w extends to over one-third of the globe, produces almost 40 per cent of world industrial output, and is a growing political and military factor, the role it plays in the world economy is still marginal: around 11 per cent of world trade and even less in world investments.10 Therefore, the socialist nationshowever different internallymust adjust to the motion of the world system. T o define the character and role of the state in these societies, one must consider that, because the revolution started in less developed countries, industrialization became the vital and paramount task. Unless these societies catch u p with central capitalism economically, socialism cannot assert itself as a social formation superior to capitalism. The crux of the matter in industrialization is what M a r x called capital accumulation. Thus, from the very beginning to this day, the state's primary function in the Soviet development strategy has been capital accumulation. A n d since that strategy of rapid industrialization requires central planning, all-out mobilization of material and h u m a n potential, a regular allocation of a high percentage of national income for development (implicitly a lower share for consumption), and an attack on the educational front, the Soviet state took shape as a political instrument capable of enforcing such a strategy in a hostile international environment. Surely, these internal requirements combined with those deriving from the foreign policy of a great power with worldwide strategic interests; thus the Soviet state was invented. In terms of historical stages, M a r x viewed socialism as a post-capitalist, implicitly post-industrial, society, for industrialization actually belongs to the capitalist era. It was the bourgeoisie w h o elaborated the theory of industrialization, the ways and means to implement it. W h e n Lenin modified Marx's anticipation that the revolution would start in advanced industrial countries, he pointed out that the Soviet state would have to carry outfirstthe tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and only afterwards pass to the socialist one. But he never dealt with the fundamental question, whether the same type of state could possibly perform its role in two revolutions so different in character, nature and values from each other. Predominant in his projection was the class-theoretical determination of the state, while neglecting its economic underpinning, that is, the effect u p o n the form of the state of the

The state and the world system


process of capital accumulation. True, Lenin was aware that during thefirststage one would have to preserve 'not only the bourgeois right but even the bourgeois statewithout the bourgeoisie'.20 Only such a form of state could naturally handle capital accumulation, extract it from the. peasantry and working-class, use the economic surplus to enlarge production, while keeping consumption low. Indeed, the Soviet state has successfully carried out that very development strategy, recording spectacular achievements in industrialism, in education and science, in defence buildup. Using the same model, Eastern European countries m a d e tremendous progress in industrialization. But what about the next stage at which, according to official documents, a 'full-fledged socialist society' must be built? Apparently, the state that was structured and streamlined to enforce rapid industrialization cannot adequately respond to the n e w economic and social tasks. This is clearly reflected in a steady decline in the rate of growth, the failure to improve the quality of production, and lagging agriculture. In the Soviet Union the slow-down started earlier (8.45 per cent industrial growth in 1966-70, 7.42 per cent in 1971-75) dropping during the currentfive-yearplan to 5.7 per cent in 1977 and 4.8 per cent in 1978. T h e same tendency is n o w apparent in Eastern European nations. The slow-down is occurring at a time w h e n these nations have embarked on a large-scale implantation of modern industrial technology, a process that was marked in all industrial nations by a considerable increase in economic growth." A thorough analysis of the causes will reveal that the very political system (based o n the Communist Party and the state) that enabled the Soviet U n i o n to become a major industrial power and Eastern European nations to industrialize so rapidly, is n o w the single greatest barrier to the further development into the n e w stage of socialist transformation. T h e state appears too rigid, over-centralized, incapable of using scientific methods of management, unable to cope with an industrial society, a complex and diversified economy, an educated working class, and a huge army of competent engineers and administrators. Obviously, a socialist society requires a different form of state. Everywhere, in all three worlds, economic relations and activities foreshadow a time of change. The political sphere T h e sphere of power and politics has its o w n dynamics also within the world system; political relations a m o n g nations do not necessarily reflect either economic or military affairs. There are world powers still at the pre-industrial stage (e.g. China), and major centres of power (e.g. Japan) without significant military strength. W h a t are the specific dynamics of power politics? T h e starting-point here is the lack of a centre of power o n the international


Silviu Brucan

arena, akin to the state in society. Hence, the tendency of great powers tofillthis vacuum. While, after the Second World W a r the model was bipolar with the two superpowers, the United States and the U S S R , leading worldwide camps organized along ideological lines, with the emergence of China as a world power the model became triangular. M o r e recently, Western Europe and Japan have been added; the pentagonal model is currently used to explain the global power game. The impact of the world system is apparent in global competition, with all great powers playing by the rules of the game, irrespective of their domestic regimes. T o illustrate: in a game with three players, an important rule is that none of the three should be caught having equally hostile relations with the other two. Such a situation m a y bring the two closer together. Hence, Peking rejects the very notion of American-Soviet dtente; M o s c o w warns against a Sino-American rapprochement and Washington gets jittery whenever a Sino-Soviet understanding is in sight. N o ideological considerations are involved; the game looks like a cool mathematical model. The really new element is that, in world politics, there are n o w significant forces at work outside the geometric model. A n e w type of powerI call it systemic powerhas emerged ever since the oil-exporting countries organized O P E C and began to take concerted decisions.21 In other words, from the Third World strong challengers are coming to the fore, wielding n e w political weapons to change the rules of the power game. T h e environment is favourable: with more than 150 political units scattered over the world this is the most decentralized international system in modern history. In fact w e are witnessing a crucial conflict: the old thrust toward centralization is n o w clashing with the drive to decentralize power in the world system. Briefly, the impact of the world system upon the nation-states is being felt in all major areas of foreign policymilitary, economic and politicaland as far as w e can tell the impact is going to increase in the future.

A view of the future

While the nation-state is still the prime mover on the international scene, and nationalism is permeating world politics, the organizing and integrating force of the world system is gaining ground. A s I read these contradictory trends, w e are approaching a n e w era in the history of h u m a n communitiesa long process of profound transformation with a transition period that m a y take a century or so: from the present international system to the world system. Indeed, the international systemwith the nation-state as its basic structural unit, capitalism as its main organizing principle in economics, and with the great powers acting as co-ordinate managers of world ordercan n o longer work on the basis of these premises and is, therefore, under severe strain. Since the nation-

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state is the structural element, and thus the most enduring one, it is the capitalist world system and the role of the great powers that must undergo change in the next decades. Thus, it is not accidental that the call for a n e w international economic order has been heard at this particular time and has acquired such worldwide appeal. It is part of the underlying transformation of the international system. W h a t distinguishes the international system from the emerging world system is that, whereas in the former the inputs from the nation-states were predominant and decisive in shaping the system and determining its behaviour, in the latter it is the reverse effect of the world system that will prevail over its subsystems, adjusting them all to its o w n motion. This means that eventually the nation-states will n o longer have the power to m a k e independent decisions that m a y temporarily hold back the motion of the system. In fact, international relations and transnational activities will become so systemic that the world will function in a self-regulating manner.


3 4

'Manifesto of the Communist Party', in Lewis 8 See Monthly Review, N e w York, SeptemberS. Feuer (ed.), Marx and Engels, N e w York, November 1960. 9 Doubleday/Anchor, 1959. See Brucan, op. cit., p. 214-7. 10 Friedrich Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Works, Property and the State, p . 97, N e w York, p. 588, London, 1968. 11 International Publishers, 1933. Walter Lippman, 'The Reappraisal', The New Georges Balandier, Anthropologie politique, Paris, York Herald Tribune, 1962. 12 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, Presses Universitaires de France, 1967. Vol. I, N e w York, Academic Press, 1974. David Easton, 'Political Anthropology', Biennial Review of Anthropology, Stanford University 13 George Modelski, 'The Long Cycle of Global Press, 1959. Politics and the Nation-State', Paper preSee Claude Lvi-Strauss, 'The Social and Psychosented to the Tenth World Congress of logical Aspects of Chieftainship in a Primitive Political Science, Edinburgh, August 1976. Tribe', in Ronald Cohen and John Mid- 14 'Manifesto of the Communist Party', op. cit. 10 dleton (eds.), Comparative Political Systems, See 'West Alone Cannot Overcome Crisis', Daily p. 64, Garden City, N . Y . , The Natural Yomiuri, 27 January 1978, Tokyo. 16 History Press, 1967. The Times (London), 28 July 1976. See M . Fortes and E . E . Evans Pritchard, African 17 Fred Block, 'Co-operation and Conflict in the Political Systems, London, Oxford UniverCapitalist World Economy', Marxist Persity Press, 1970; Marshall D . Sahlins, 'The spectives (New York), Spring 1979, p . 82-7. 18 Segmentary Lineage: A n Organization of V . I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, p . 148, Predatory Expansion', 1961; and Robert M o s c o w , Foreign Languages Publishing Lowie, 'Some Aspects of Political OrganizHouse, 1966. 19 ations among American Aborigines', and Sec Mezdunarodniyie Zhisn, M o s c o w , March Lorna Marshall, ' K u n g Bushman' all in 1975. Cohen and Middleton (eds.), op. cit.; M a x 20 Lenin, Statul si Revolutia, p . 107, Bucharest, Gluckman, Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal E d . P . C . R ' . , 1946. 21 Societies, N e w York, Mentor Books, 1965. See Silviu Brucan, 'The Systemic Power', Journal Sec Silviu Brucan, The Dissolution of Power, of Peace Research, Oslo, N o . 1, 1975. p. 97-105, N e w York, Alfred Knopf, 1971.

Continuing debate
The new international economic order and reorientation of the economic development policy of the developing countries
Leon Z . Zevin
M o r e than five years have elapsed since the United Nations General Assembly, at its sixth special session, adopted the Declaration on the Establishment of a N e w International Economic Order and the Programme of Action to put it into effect. The new international economic order is a multi-level phenomenon which influences not only the sphere of world trade, the international division of labour and co-operation between states in industry, credit, finance, science and technology, but also the national economy of individual countries. The campaign for the n e w international economic order stimulates the search for new, rational avenues of economic development and ways of organizing international co-operation in the underdeveloped regions where half the world's population live. The economic growth strategy which aimed at substituting domestic producr tion for imports, and the strategy of all-out expansion of export industrieseven at the cost of turning them into an enclave within the national economywhich replaced it in approximately the mid-1960s, are gradually yielding ground to m o r e balanced conceptions of the economic development and international co-operation of the developing countries. Understandably that process is still incomplete, and opinions are far from being united on all issues. Indeed, could there be a single strategy for the economic development of more than 120 developing states, which differ in their social and economic systems, levels of development, size of territory and population, incidence of mineral and other natural resources, and degree of participation in world trade and in the international division of labour? This seems to be the explanation for the current 'concept explosion'the

Leon Zalmanovich Zevin is Director of the Relations with Developing Countries Sector, Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, Academy of Sciences of the USSR. He is the author of many publications on problems relating to economic co-operation between socialist and developing countries and to the international division of labour and methods of assessing its effectiveness. He also works on questions connected with new concepts in the economic development of the less developed countries, and with their influence on international economic co-operation.

Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XXXII, N o . 4, 1980


Leon Z. Zevi'n

emergence of a host of n e w concepts: national and collective self-reliance; rural development; meeting basic needs; endogenous development; strengthening links between industry and agriculture; development of small industries and organization of their interaction with large-scale modern enterprises; even territorial distribution of industry through priority for the construction of new plants outside large towns; and so on. T h e characteristic feature of these concepts is that they are the fruits of the collective efforts of the developing countries; some of them have originated in international organizationsthe Group of 77, the non-aligned movement, or the regional economic commissions of the United Nations. T h e collective formulation of concepts is an indication that the developing countries understand the need to re-orient their economic development strategy in changing world economic conditions, and to strengthen their political and economic co-operation with one another so as to weaken the detrimental influence of external factors and increase the pace of social and economic progress. In most of the n e w concepts it is recognized that domestic efforts must play the leading role in economic development, while an expansion of international co-operation and fulfilment of the requirements of the new international economic order are viewed as an important condition for creating a favourable external situationall of which should promote the developing countries' progress and give it a supplementary but very vigorous impetus. At the same time, their collective origins go far to explain the inconsistency of these concepts, the compromise nature of several postulates, a certain touch of utopianism, the belief that a group of very heterogeneous countries can form a lasting economic union, and so on. Leaving aside any detailed analysis of these concepts, let us try to trace the possible consequences of their extensive application for the scientific and technological progress of the developing countries, for a change in their situation in the world economy, for associating the broad masses of the population with the process of economic construction and for their active participation in public affairs. Models of domestic development and international co-operation cannot be reliable unless they take sufficient account of the prevailing trends, and in particular of the scientific and technological revolution, an integral social process that exercises a growing influencealbeit one that varies in intensity and natureon all groups of countries. Under unregulated market-economy conditions, the scientific and technological revolution worsens the unevenness of development, increases the dependence of the 'periphery' on the industrial 'centres', strengthens the expansion of transnational corporations in the developing countries and leads to 'technological neocolonialism'. But the application of the achievements ofthat revolution can m a k e

The new international economic order and reorientation of the economic development policy


a tremendous contribution towards overcoming the backwardness of the developing countries and can speed up the formation of modern productive capacity and the solution of social problems there. Another important consideration is that the developing countries are elaborating these n e w concepts at a time w h e n the international community is faced with long-term, global problems whose solution entails vast outlays of material and manpower resources and requires, by reason of their scale and complexity, the co-operation of all groups of countries. Thus the application of the rich potential of scientific and technological progresswith, of course, due regard for specific local economic and social conditionsmust be more fully reflected in the national strategies and concepts of the developing countries. Clearly it is also in their interest to take an active part in the solution of global problems o n a basis of genuine equality, mutual advantage and consideration of their specific requirements. The purpose of the n e w concepts is to effect some degree of change in the prevailing trends of economic development, to re-orient it in order to wage a more active struggle against hunger and poverty, to eliminate the most flagrant social injustices, to secure a more even distribution and redistribution of incomes, and to put an end to inequality between developed and developing states. All these problems call insistently and urgently for solution. The fact is that the fully and partly unemployed in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America n o w number 300 million, or approximately one-third of the entire work force. U p to 800 million people live in absolute poverty, and by the year 2000, even according to optimistic forecasts, their number will not fall below 600 million unless the prevailing pattern of income distribution can be radically altered and economic growth speeded up. Moreover the inequalities are growing worse within the developing world itself: in the period 1961-70 the greatest difference between regions of developing countries in average annual growth rates of per capita G N P was a factor of 2.7, whereas in the period 1971-77 it was a factor of almost 10. The gap is widening, too, between the industrial capitalist powers and the developing countries as regards levels of economic development: the ratio of per capita G N P between those groups of countries has n o w reached 13:1, as compared with 10:1 immediately after the war. The external indebtedness of the developing countries has grown to $350,000 million, while the deficit in the trade balance of the oil-importing countries of that group has been estimated at $35,000 million in 1978. T o ward off hunger and a further decline in the standard of living, they are obliged to import some 40 million tonnes of grain per a n n u m . The Indian economist N . Joshi has calculated that for their exports to the capitalist states the developing countries receive only one dollar out offivepaid by the consumers in those states; the remainder piles u p with middle-men of every


Leon Z. Zevin

kind, andfirstand foremost with the transnational corporations, for 'services' rendered in transport, processing and distribution. O n e feature of the n e w concepts is that they d o not yet encompass the entire complex of problems of social and economic development; each takes o n a task in a given specific area. For instance, the strategy of national and collective self-reliance aims to harness the potential of individual developing countries and their joint efforts in order to reduce their one-sided dependence o n external factors, and to strengthen their hand in negotiations with the developed countries. In this contextas was stated by the Ministers of the Group of 77 of Arusha'the strategy of collective self-reliance should be viewed as an integral part of a global economic system', and 'economic co-operation a m o n g developing countries is a key element in a collective self-reliant strategy'. In other words, these countries are attempting to create their o w n basis for economic development by giving priority to the formation of a system of horizontal links and by gradually enhancing the complementarity of their economic structures. Unesco's concept of endogenous development focuses attention on internal sources of economic growth and social change, which it considers paramount, and also on the need to avoid an 'elitist' type of development. T o that end, it proceeds o n the premise that the developing countries should not blindly copy Western models of social-economic development. The strategy of meeting basic needs is designed to increase employment and to supply every family with sufficient food, housing and clothing and the most important public services. T h e strategy of rural development calls for greater attention to agriculture, rural handicrafts, the establishment of a production infrastructure and so on. It is not hard to see that all these n e w concepts are a forced reaction to the most acute individual problems which arise in the course of the national rebirth of liberated countries. Their varying degree of acuteness from country to country and at different stages of development does m u c h to explain the preference accorded to this or that concept. However, it is important that the choice of a sequential, 'step-by-step' treatment of today's problems should not result in a fragmentation of economic policy, a breach of continuity or a loss of perspective. Obviously, as more work is done o n the n e w concepts and as they are tested in practice, questions as yet unclear will be answered, and then a more comprehensive appraisal can be m a d e of their merits and weaknesses. Meanwhile the young nation-states are stubbornly and persistently seeking out alternative paths of development and attempting to apply the n e w concepts o n a national or collective basis. This is already reflected both in their domestic development and in their position in the system of world economic relations. In the discussion of lines for reorientation, a special place belongs to problems

The new international economic order and reorientation of the economic development policy


relating to the scientific and technological basis of the n e w strategy and conceptsthe combination of domestic and borrowed technology, the choice of capitalintensive or labour-intensive techniques, the size of enterprises, priorities for industry or agriculture, and so on. The n e w concepts often fail to provide a clear answer as regards the nature of the scientific and technological basis for development. T h e priority they accord to small enterprises, agriculture and rural industries, labour-intensive technologies and the production of simple articles or production to meet urgent needs, solves some urgent problems but in thefinalanalysis threatens to perpetuate the technological backwardness of the developing countries and condemn them to technological stagnation. Such a course, if long pursued, m a y lead to 'legitimization' of the existence of two groups of states, which differ sharply in economic levels, in ability to harness the achievements of scientific and technological progress, and in the methods, intensive or extensive, of economic development they employ. This can scarcely be avoided unless a consistent course of industrialization is pursued, with, of course, due heed to the specific circumstances of each country or group of countries and to the social and economic problems to be solved at a given stage. The point at issue, then, is not whether industrialization is needed, but what kind of industrialization, in what stages, and h o w best to take account of the development peculiarities of the country concerned. Only industrialization can weld the national economy into a single modern whole, eliminate archaic structures which impede social progress, and tap the creative capacities of the broad masses of the working population. T h e achievement of these purposes presupposes that a country, having adopted a particular development strategy in the light of its o w n circumstances, will put it into practice, consistently raising the technological infrastructure and building a modern system of education and personnel training. The experience of the developed countries shows that only industry can absorb a large quantity of manpower, including m a n p o w e r released from agriculture. T h e n e w concepts have not yet proved that they can guarantee full employment over the long term and promote the formation of a unified national economy, or that small and medium-sized enterprises will be able to produce goods in the necessary volume and in sufficient variety to meet the requirements of the population. In the Arusha Declaration, the ministers of the developing countries in the G r o u p of 77 were most forthright in expressing their doubts in this score: While the satisfaction of basic human needs of the people and the eradication of mass poverty must have a high priority in economic and social development, the idea is unacceptable and erroneous that these goals can be achieved without the all-round and comprehensive economic development of the developing countries and the establishment of the N e w International Economic Order.


Leon Z, Zevin

Hence the criteria for assessing the efficacity of the n e w concepts should be the following: Their ability to change unfavourable trends in development and to satisfy the most pressing needs of the populationand primarily of its poorest stratahaving regard to the need for a steady rise in the level of living. T h e possibility of ensuring continuity with all rational elements of the development strategies and concepts n o w in use. Orientation in the long term towards the application of modern technology after a stage-by-stage approach to it through purposeful harnessing of the achievements of scientific and technological progress together with the utilization of local and intermediate technology and equipment. T h e strengthening of economic independence through organization of the reproductive process primarily on a national basis, or on the collective basis of an association of developing countries, with simultaneous stimulation of participation in world economic relations. Active and conscious participation by the broad masses in measures to reorient economic development policy. These criteria can be satisfied only by comprehensive strategy of national development, and this fact has w o n growing recognition in recent years. It is no longer thought nowadays that merely securing relatively high rates of economic growth will automatically suffice to eliminate inequality in incomes or to put an end to hunger and poverty, the alienation of town from country and the other social evils of underdevelopment. The comprehensive approach sees progressive change, and especially agrarian and educational reform, as the prerequisite for successful economic growth. It also includes a rational population policy, the m a x i m u m possible increase in employment and the selection of production structures, equipment and technology directed towards meeting the basic needs of the majority of the population, its poorest strata. A t the same time, efforts are m a d e to combine the concept of domestic economic development and that of the organization of external economic relations within a unified national strategy. The realization that economic development is a complex and comprehensive social phenomenon has revealed one of the weaknesses of the programme for the n e w international economic order: the emphasis o n restructuring relations in the sphere of distribution relegates, as it were, to the background the restructuring of relations in the sphere of production. Yet it is obvious that the purposes of the n e w international economic order cannot be achieved merely through measures of redistribution, through a more even distribution of world income. The decisive condition for a full achievement of the purposes of the n e w international economic order is all-out growth of productive capacities, to be achieved through an optimum combination of domestic resources and the potential

The new international economic order and reorientation of the economic development policy


of international co-operation. T o bring this about, the developing countries will have a struggle with the transnational corporations, which use their productive, technological andfinancialmight primarily to obtain the m a x i m u m profits; their capital investments are constantly exceeded by the outflow of profits. In the context of the n e w international economic order, therefore, great importance attaches to measures for the transfer of scientific and technological k n o w - h o w , which promote the achievement of genuine economic independence and the choice of an avenue of development in conformity with the people's will. A m o n g such measures, the following in particular should be mentioned: Assistance in determining the purposes of a scientific and technological policy which reflects the needs of an underdeveloped economy, and the methods whereby the state is to apply it. A more marked orientation of scientific and technological research in the developed states, and of international co-operation in thatfield,towards meeting the needs of the developing countries. A policy of bilateral co-operation in science and technology in response to the need to step up scientific research in the developing countries, and to lay a national, and also a collective, infrastructure for science and technology. Application of the recommendations of the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development m a y contribute both to a faster transfer of scientific and technological k n o w - h o w to the developing countries and to a more active utilization of science and technology by those countries for purposes of social and economic progress, raising the living standards of the population, overcoming backwardness and establishing modern social structures. The comprehensive approach to development adopted by m a n y developing countries faces them with a number of problems for whose solution they count on the help of the international organizations of the United Nations system. Thus Unesco might make its contribution by expanding research into the global aspects of the new international economic order and |into methods of increasing the achievements of scientific and technological progress according to level of economic development, structure of the economy, social system and cultural and national traditions, and also by drawing up recommendations for bringing systems of education and personnel training into conformity with long-term strategy of social and economic development. The nature of a scientific and technological potential conducive to independent economic development and priority lines o n which to create such a potential in the developing countries, the optimum combination of domestic and borrowed technology, equipment, research and development, and the elimination of material inequalities and social injustices: here is another set of questions to which there is as yet n o answer. Unesco could also speak with authority about ways in which the enormous scientific and technological potential n o w used for purposes of armament might be


.Leon Z. Zevin

reoriented towards the goals of peaceful development of all countries, towards solving global problems, and towards organizing extensive research into the pressing and long-term social and economic problems of the developing countries, above all the least developed a m o n g them. Over the past decade some of the problems mentioned have fallen within Unesco's purview: it has taken the initiative on a number of occasions, and made a number of recommendations. But the increasing complexity of the international situation in the early 1980s, the formulation of strategy in the new United Nations Development Decade and the reorientation of development in a number of liberated countries have all necessitated a reappraisal of some established views and attitudes. Co-operation o n the basis of a comprehensive approach to the problems of development is offered by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, which thus promote the establishment of a modern economy geared to the specific circumstances of each country; to theconstruction of sectoral and territorial production complexes, whether industrial or agro-industrial; to the creation of a national scientific and technological infrastructure and of effective systems of education and personnel training; and to active participation by the least developed countries in international scientific and technological exchange. A s shown by experience of co-operation with India, for example, these purposes are well served by comprehensive long-term intergovernmental agreements and programmes of economic, commercial, scientific and technological co-operation extending over ten tofifteenyears. These m a k e it possible to co-ordinate international co-operation with the social and economic development plans of the partner countries; to facilitate contacts between their planning and managerial bodies; to collaborate in fundamental and applied research and development work, and on projects in third countries; and to stimulate international specialization and co-operation in production, science and technology. A long-term strategy of economic development through the establishment of sectoral and territorial production complexesand eventually of a national economic complex on a modern basismay e m b o d y m a n y postulates of the developing countries' n e w concepts. Such a strategy is directed towards solving the key problems of an underdeveloped economy; it m a y combine medium- and long-term targets, the interests of economic growth and social progress, domestic and external resources. Its implementation helps to fortify national sovereignty by providing it with a reliable material base, and to intensify co-operation between the developing countries and their active participation in world economic relations on a footing of equality. A n d these are, after all, goals whichfigureprominently in the programme of the new international economic order. [Translated from Russian]

Socio-economic data bases: situations and assessments

National primary socio-economic data structures. VII: Peru*

Fernando Gonzlez Vigil** in collaboration with Ana Maria Tenenbaum and Julio Velarde
Socio-economic statistics T h e basic feature of the statistical data examined here is their socio-economic character. Deciding what to consider in these spheres is a difficult exercise in itself for, in the broad sense, there are few phenomena that d o not have social or economic features. W e therefore examine the statistics that contribute to economic policy-making, provide information for the agencies concerned with social welfare, and help the public at large to gain a more realistic picture of the social and economic environment. O u t of the wide range of existing socio-economic data, w e confine ourselves to analysing those currently being produced and published, and m a k e only incidental reference to data relating to the past. Another aspect of the statistical data w e have singled out is their regularity. However, w e include a number of specific surveys and studies which, though of varying periodicity, provide the basis for the compilation of continuous statistics. Another characteristic of the socio-economic statistics which w e analyse is their comprehensiveness. T h e term general statistics is taken to cover all economic agents at the national level participating in a particular activity. O n the basis of that definition, the analysis does not include data emanating from the operations of private entities unless their importance in terms of the activity as a whole is such that they warrant being regarded as 'general'. W e likewise exclude data from both public and private bodies that are of relevance only to their o w n administration and operations, such as the financial statements of firms. Data o n individual cities, departamentos and regions are also excluded from the study, although statistics providing nation-wide coverage are, in fact, analysed in terms of their breakd o w n by regions, departamentos, districts, etc. Lastly, mention should be m a d e of the primary nature of the socio-economic data which w e analyse. T h e information involved is that obtained by direct methods, i.e. data which are m a d e available to users in the form in which they have been compiled by producers, without having been subject to any processing other than that strictly necessary for tabulation purposes. H e n c e the inventory does not contain data in the form o f ratios, percentages, indexes, and so on. O n c e the available primary data are k n o w n , w e can already form a clear picture of the indicators that can be derived from them, regardless of whether or not these are developed b y the same sources that produce or circulate the primary data. Classification of socio-economic statistics The data to be analysed are classified under threemain headings: (A) demographic, social and labour statistics; (B) aggregate economic statistics; and () economic statistics by kind of activity. Thefirstgroup (A) covers afieldof activities similar to the range covered by the United

* The previous surveys in this series concerned. Australia (Vol. X X I X , N o . 4 , 1977), Tunisia (Vol. X X X , N o . 1,1978), Norway (Vol. X X X , N o . 3, 1978), the Ivory Coast (Vol. X X X I , . N o . 1, 1979), Greece (Vol. XXXII, N o . 2 , 1980) and Sri Lanka (Vol. XXXII, N o . 3,. 1980). ** Member of the research staff of the Centro de Estudios y Promocin del Desarrollo(DESO), Apartado Postal 11545, Lima 11, Peru; and Professor of Economics at the Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos.

Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XXXII, N o . 4, 1980


"Nations in its statistics, i.e. demographic statistics (A. 1), social statistics (A.2) and labour and social-security statistics (A.3). T h e demographic statistics are broken d o w n in their turn into population censusfigures(A. 1.1), population statistics (A.1.2), vital statistics (A.1.3)comprising data -on births, deaths, marriages and divorcesand migration statistics, both domestic and international (A. 1.4). Social statistics are subdivided into housing ( A . 2 . 1 ) , education, science and technology ( A . 2 . 2 ) , culture, recreation and mass communication ( A . 2 . 3 ) , health ( A . 2 . 4 ) , security and public order ( A . 2 . 5 ) and social services ^ A . 2 . 6 ) . Thirdly, labour and social-security statistics are broken d o w n into employment statistics (A.3.1), comprising data on employment and the economically active population, wages and salaries, trade-unions and labour disputes, employment services, and industrial accidents, injuries and disablement, and social security statistics -(A.3.2). T h e second group (B), aggregate economic statistics, includes the systems used for national accounts (B.l), government statistics (B.2) and the external sector (B.3). This group also includes statistics on price aggregates (B.4.1) and on the size and composition of household budgets {B.4.2). T h e data examined in this group are general in character and relate to activities within the economic sphere, rather than to any particular sector of activity. T h e third group of statistics analysed c o m prises aggregate economic statistics by kind of activity (). These relate to specific sectors of the economy and are subdivided in accordance with -the main breakdown of activities under the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIQ of the United Nations, the statistics analysed being agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing (C.l); mining and quarrying (C.2); manufacturing (C.3); electricity, gas and water (C.4); construction (C.5); wholesale and Tetail trade and restaurants and hotels (C.6); transport and communication (C.7); finance and insurance (C.8); statistics on tourism (C.9.1) and community, social and personal services (C.9.2). General features of the statistics In the statistical inventories to which w e shall be referring, mention is m a d e of the statistical series compiled by the agencies of the National Statistical System. Although the results obtained will be analysed in our references to these agencies, it should be pointed out that they reflect the general features of the socio-economic statistics analysed by us here, since the institutions responsible for producing the socio-economic statistics which w e describe are basically public agencies. T h e other institutions represent the users and, in m a n y instances, they reproduce the primary data or publish analyses in which those data are used for specific purposes. In the context on which this study focuses, the production of statistical data is primarily geared to the economic aspect, while data on the social environment tends to take second place. Resources in general are meagre, but are even more so in the case of production of social statistics. The variables currently produced on a periodic basis can be said to have m a d e some progress in recent years. Although there is still room for improvement as regards their quality, coverage, periodicity, rapidity of processing and publication and their geographical breakdown, it is possible to assert the statistics produced provide a considerably more accurate picture of the socioeconomic situation obtaining in the country than they have done in the past, an achievement that represents the m a x i m u m that can be expected having regard to the limited resources available and the difficulties hampering the production of statistical data, aspects to which w e shall refer further below. O n e of the essential factors in the quality of statistics is their reliability. However, reliability does not only depend on those engaged in statistical work. It also depends, a m o n g other things, on the quality of the data forming the raw material of the statistical product, which are obtained from a variety of sources; on the purposes for which the data used; on the techniques employed; and on the training both of the people supplying the data and those handling them until they are m a d e available to users. There is still a considerable volume of data available in the different public sectors and organizations that are not taken into consideration or processed. Most of the information processed is designed for specific administrative use rather than for statistical purposes, and it is difficult to

National primary socio-economic data structures. VII: Peru


use such data for m o r e wide-ranging analyses. In recent years, attempts have been m a d e to m a k e better statistical use of the information compiled through administrative channels by means of coordination within the framework of the National Statistical System, the links established between the different production agencies and users, and the use of single-theme questionnaires. In addition to the defects inherent in the statistical process, those supplying the data m a y consider that it is to their advantage to introduce distortions. In m a n y instances, it is essential for the confidential nature of individual replies to be protected, and fears that information will be divulged m a y result in the information supplied being distorted at the very source. W a y s and means exist of testing the consistency of data, and have been put into practice in m a n y cases. In our analysis of the resources available for production and publication of socio-economic statistics, w e shall refer to their features and limitations; these too have a significant effect o n quality. Considerable progress has been m a d e over the years in producing aggregate socio-economic data at the national level. Since 1977, the sectors have been instructed to break d o w n their statistics o n a regional basis, in a bid to analyse the progress m a d e towards the goals of regionalization and decentralization. H o w e v e r , in spite of the efforts m a d e in this area, it has not yet been possible to ensure satisfactory production of statistics having the requisite geographical coverage. T h e problem is compounded by the fact that there is n o single system in force for subdividing the country into regions and that, since the series providing regional coverage produced by the various sectors relate to the different regional breakdown patterns developed by them, it is difficult to piece the information together. It will also be necessary to increase the production of data covering departmentos, provinces, districts and other local subdivisions, after first investigating users' requirements. A s regards periodicity, statistics produced o n an annual basis are most prevalent; it is rare to find statistical data compiled at intervals of less than one year. Since m o r e frequent data are needed for certain purposes, it m a y be surmised that there is a shortage in the supply of statistics compiled o n a six-monthly, quarterly, monthly, fortnightly and weekly basis. T h e purpose for

which each series is to be used has to be k n o w n before a n appropriate periodicity can be determined, and this is a matter for decision by the production unit in co-ordination with both users and data sources; a great deal still remains to be done in this area, as it does in connection with the rate at which the data are processed and published. This aspect, unfortunately, is governed by resources available. Specific features of the statistics For classification purposes, w e have included the population census a m o n g population statistics but the latter extend well beyond the strictly d e m o graphic domain. The censuses provide data on the country's population structure and on the social, occupational and economic characteristics of the population. There have been seven population censuses to date: the results of the first three, which were taken in 1836, 1850 a n d 1862, were not published, but those of the subsequent censuses, in 1876, 1940, 1961 and 1972 were issued. T h e eighth population census is expected to be taken in 1981. Opinions differ as to the quality of the data collected at the last census, but the view is widely held that considerable progress was m a d e in regard to the technical aspects and the coverage, and the margin of reliability of the data is quite broad. T h e census data and the information collected from public registry offices are used to compile periodic statistics o n population features and vital statistics. Public registry offices present a problem as far as coverage is concerned, especially in rural areas, and omissions have to be estimated in order to produce m o r e reliablefigures.T h e different projections concerning the country's population have been completely invalidated by the census results, since they misrepresented the true population trend and its space distribution and age breakdown. Considerable efforts have been m a d e in recent years to overcome this problem, partly through the National Population Survey which was carried out between 1975 and 1976, the results of which will help to produce better estimates concerning the country's population. Social statistics are at a less advanced stage, as regards coverage and reliability and the rate at which they are produced and circulated. This is partly accounted for by the qualitative


nature of s o m e of the services provided and by the population characteristics, which m a k e it difficult to process the statistics. Moreover, the quality of the data is affected by the fact that, in most instances, information is obtained from sample surveys and that coverage of s o m e of the variables considered is confined to services performed through the public sector, with resources provided by the latter. In cases where the private sector provides information on its activities, there are delays in communicating the data and it is difficult to consolidate them in the form of reliable aggregates since the indicators used are not always the same. Reliable statistics on housing can be said to be still confined to census results. T h e third housing census is expected to be taken in 1981, but it m a y be noted that data o n housing have also been obtained from the population censuses. A large proportion of the existing data is obtained from projections based o n the census figures. Apart from these data, there were in the past very few sectoral statisticsimportance has only recently begun to be attached to this informationor multi-sectoral data. T h e latter, which other sectors are instrumental in compiling or producing but which, by their nature, are relevant to housing, have tended to m a k e up for the lack of information in this category. M a n y of the data items can only be obtained by indirect methods or sample surveys, and even the actual agencies producing the statistics have little or n o access to an appreciable number of data sources. This is true of data o n building and urban development enterprises, accommodation for rental, self-help housing, housing prices, and so' on. The offices of various ministries and the administrative records complete the range of data sources on housing. T h e social statistics provide the widest coverage and the highest standards of reliability are those pertaining to the education sector. T h e data available include indicators on educational levels and statistics on education centres, different types of applicants, students, school-leavers and diploma-holders, sectoral resources and educational incentives. However, the continuity of the statistics produced in the sector has been interrupted as a result of the educational reform instituted by the revolutionary government. Forms of education for which data are available from 1973 onwards comprise basic education, vocational training, regular, special and initial training. F r o m 1960 onwards, data are available for secondary schools, secondary-level vocational schools and teacher-training establishments and, up to 1970, for craft training arts education and upper secondary, non-university, pre-school and primary education. After being nation-wide up to 1970, coverage has been by educational zones and regions from 1973 onwards. Statistics o n science and technology could be said to occupy the last place, partly o n account of the fact that impetus has only recently been given to activities in that field. Statistics on culture, recreation and mass communication are fairly comprehensive as far as the variables taken into account are concerned. Various bodies are responsible for data compilation and circulation, there being no single agency in charge of centralizing them. Coverage is confined to statistics from public sources and data circulation is restricted. Statistics for the health sector are recorded and processed o n a monthly basis, and the data are received directly from the establishments concerned. A s far as the organization of the sector is concerned, data are available in respect of its operational resources. Rounding off the social statistics are data on security and public order and on social services. Statistical coverage and reliability in respect of thefirstcategory arc satisfactory, but their circulation is restricted and, in some instances, the information is strictly confidential. T h e second ' category comprises various kinds of variables connected with social matters. Responsibility for these is shared by a number of agencies whose task it is not so m u c h to compile statistics as to provide services, and this accounts for the unreliability of this category of socio-economic data. Labour statistics can be initially broken d o w n into two categories: statistics on employment, the economically active population and wages, and sectoral data properly speaking. Data in the first category arc obtained from surveys conducted a m o n g households and firms, and from administrative records, payrolls, organizations and departments in other sectors and projections based on the population censuses. Although ways exist of checking the reliability of the statistics, there is ample scope for introducing deliberate distortions, especially in regard to the employment situation and income levels. Standards of reliability

National primary socio-economic data structures. VII: Peru


for sectoral data are m u c h higher, since they are obtained from various government departments, and this ensures that up-to-date information is supplied. Data are available on trade-union organizations, labour disputes, strikes, collective wage agreements, employment services, industrial accidents, injuries and disablement. Variables constituting social security statistics are also compiled and have national coverage. These complete the range of data regarded as constituting demographic, social and labour statistics. Most progress in the production of statistical data has undoubtedly been m a d e in the economic sector. This is partly accounted for by the pressure exerted by users, but it is basically due to the different representations m a d e by the government. T h e impetus given to statistical activity in thisfieldgoes back a number of decades although, in most instances, the historical series compiled lack continuity, since the criteria and methods used by the different agencies producing the data have tended to vary. It is also here that the greatest discrepancies can be observed in the data emanating from the different sources, and this is a problem that has been tackled in recent years. The national accounts are drawn up on the model provided by the United Nations System of National Accounts, Series F , N o . 2 A , Rev. 3 . Although this system has been introduced only recently, notable progress has been m a d e ; a great deal still remains to be done, however. The adoption of the latest revision of the United Nations System of National Accounts makes it easier to compare the country's situation with that of other countries and fulfils one of the essential requirements for harmonizing the national accounts of all the countries in the A n d e a n G r o u p . A s far as input-output tables are concerned the desired frequency of compilation has not yet been attained and m a n y other aspects still have to be improved. Statistics o n monetary matters, banking and finance in general are perhaps a m o n g the oldest established in the country. Data are available in some detail, and display consistency and a high degree of reliability. Although government statistics and those for the external sector have both been compiled for a number of decades, they d o not reflect a wholly continuous pattern and it is perhaps this information which differs most from one source to the other. S o m e of the variables are

particularly liable to distortions, while others have been considered as being confidential until very recently. O n the whole, the progress m a d e in developing these aggregate economic statistics has been fairly satisfactory. T h e consumer and wholesale price indices are rapidly computed for the country's main cities on the basis of the weighted averages of the price variations for the individual items making u p the 'shopping-basket' devised for the purpose. T h e price indexes for the main macro-magnitudes complete the range of price statistics. Series are also compiled for the breakdown of household budgets for different geographical areas and social categories o n the basis of sample surveys a n d inquiries. Only one household survey of national scope dealing with consumption has been c o n ducted throughout the country, the data collected have proved to be fairly comprehensive. T h e National System of F o o d Statistics is currently performing a most important role in regard to expenditure on food consumption. T h e third group of statistics, designated as 'economic statistics by kind of activity' have also attained a high standard, considering the limited operational capability available for compiling them. A variety of data sources are used, the m o s t noteworthy being censuses, surveys and a d m i n istrative records. T h e sectoral data breakdown is good and it has proved possible to compile large numbers of series in respect of specific products. Although coverage is predominantly national, a considerable number of series are produced for the departmentos and even the provinces. These statistics are compiled mainly o n an annual basis but m a n y series are produced at more frequent intervals. T h e different sectors usuallyfirstproduce estimates, and in s o m e cases it is only after s o m e considerable time that these are adjusted and the finalfiguresare worked out.

The national statistical system Brief historical account of the Peruvian statistical system T h e development of the National Statistical System in Peru has been erratic. N o single statistical structure as such has remained in place for a n y extensive period, since changes have constantly


been introduced concerning legal, administrative and operational aspects. It should be pointed out that the importance attached to socio-economic information and the support given to the production of such data have varied over the years in accordance with the objectives of the various governments. At the time of the Inca Empire statistics played a fundamental role in socio-economic terms. It is possible to affirm that a statistical system indeed existed and that it produced information mainly about the population and the economy. T h e statistical system of the time was based on the use of quipus and the public officials specializing in this w o r k were called quipucamayocs. T h e quipu (knot) consisted of a thick horizontal length of cord from which hung other strands with a series of knots tied in them. B y means of the colour, thickness and length of the cords and the various types of knot, events, stories and items of news were recorded as well as various quantifiable phenomena. T h e Inca statistical system had a practical purpose and consequently received the support of the population. Records were kept of births and deaths, of available m a n p o w e r for warfare and for the defence of the population, and also of products of the land, livestock and metals. A s a result, reliable vital and migrational statistics were kept and it can be affirmed that thefirstpopulation census was conducted at that time. During the colonial period (1535-1821), statistical production served strictly tax collection or parish purposes. It was sought to establish which people were taxable, the m a n p o w e r available for work in the mines or timber-yards, and the number of Indians w h o had been converted to Christianity. Because of this, the recording of statistics met with widespread resistance and the highly developed statistical traditions of the Inca period c a m e to an end. There were n o technical criteria to guide the compilation of statistics and considerable omissions resulted. Coverage was only partial, confined basically to the indigenous population, and, as might be expected, because of the objectives pursued, such data were of little reliability. Throughout the republican period there have been considerable changes, as regards both purposes and uses assigne'd to statistical information and the importance attached to it. During

the period immediately after independence, the importance of statistical activities was explicitly recognized in legislation, but no provisions were m a d e for any organizational structure which could carry out statistical production. T h efirstpopulation censuses of the republican period (1836, 1850, 1862) suffered from technical deficiencies,, and were conducted mainly in connection with tax-revenue control; they also served electoral purposes and to determine military m a n p o w e r resources. In 1853 a Statistics Section was created for thefirsttime in the Ministry of Government, but it was only in 1873, at the time of the reorganization of that ministry, that the Directorate of Statistics was set up. This directorate was divided into three sections: population statistics, territorial, statistics and state statistics. O n e of its most important roles was to conduct the 1876 census,, thefirsttechnical census to be held in Peru, which sought to determine the country's h u m a n and economic potential. Its purpose was to obtain not only qualitative population data, but also data o n land-ownership and industrial property. The war with Chile in which Peru w a s involved between 1879 and 1883, and the invasion and defeat which it suffered, left the country in a calamitous state. The functioning of the state w a s completely disorganized and the support which statistical information had been receiving vanished. In thefinancialperiods from 1880 to 1914 budgetary appropriations or the Directorate of Statistics were not even taken into consideration: this must have led to a drop in statistical work in the country, and, in fact, there is n o record of any national statistical activity during that period. In 1915 a budgetary appropriation was re-assigned to the Directorate of Statistics and it thus became operational once again, but this time as part of the Ministry of Public W o r k s . O n e of the important functions which it performed was the establishment of the basis for a cost-of-living index for Lima and its publication at regular intervals. In 1923 the Directorate ofStatistics was transferred to the Ministry of Finance and Trade. A n electoral roll was drawn up in 1931, a preliminary step towards the National Census of Population and Employment conducted in 1940. The National Statistical Service was created by L a w N o . 7567 promulgated in 1932; the Directorate of Statistics became the National D i -

National primary socio-economic data structures. VII: Peru


rectorate and the Central Office of National Statistics was created. The 1940 Census was carried out seventyfour years after the previous general census and, this time, data on the socio-economic characteristics of the population were sought. This census was a milestone in the history of statistics in Peru, and m a n y people speak of a 'pre-1940 period' and a 'post-1940 period' when referring to the Peruvian statistical system. Under a decree passed in 1944, the National Directorate of Statistics was reorganized and the guidelines for the operation of the National Statistical Service were laid d o w n . T h e main production of statistical series continued to be the responsibility of the National Directorate of Statistics, which issued series o n , inter alia, births, marriages and deaths, employment, culture, transport, a number of economic andfinancialactivities and cost-of-living and wholesale-price indexes. In 1958 the National Directorate of Statistics became the National Directorate of Statistics and Censuses. In 1959 the Organic L a w on Censuses was promulgated (Law N o . 13248) providing for population and housing censuses to be conducted every ten years and economic censuses every five years. In 1961 a threefold national census was carried out, covering aspects of population, housing and agriculture. F r o m the 1950s o n , more widespread awareness and acceptance was noted in respect of ideas about planning. There was a lack of appropriate statistics, and planning organizations were consequently compelled to produce basic statistics themselves. Since one of the essential aims of statistics is to serve as a basis for planning, a close relationship was to develop thereafter between planning and statistics organizations. The year 1962 saw the creation of the National Institute of Planning and the National Directorate of Statistics and Censuses came under its authority until 1966, when it rejoined the Ministry of Government. During the 1960s, the importance attached by the government to the production of statistical information stemmed largely from the need to supply information in connection with the obtaining of international loans. T h e Alliance for Progress and the growing volume of bilateral and multilateral aid were largely responsible for the increasing importance accorded by the government to the production of statistical data. In the

late 1960s there was increasingly clear realization of the importance of socio-economic data in connection with planning needs. Furthermore, the growing involvement of the public sector brought with it a greater demand for socio-economic information, the government being the main user of such data. A constant concern of authorities of the Revolutionary Government of the A r m e d Forces, which took power in 1968, w a s the setting up of an appropriate structure to ensure the efficient functioning of statistical and census services. It was stated in Government Plan ('Plan Inca') that statistical organizations should be combined to form a single national system in order to bring about an improvement in statistical services. This idea was given practical expression, m a n y years after it was first propounded, in Decree-Law N o . 21372, promulgated on 30 December 1975, which established the National Statistical System ( S E N ) . T h e most important tasks carried out by the system's central agency during the 1970s, prior to the creation of the S E N , include the following: the National Population and Housing Survey of N e w T o w n s (Marginal Districts) of 1970; the seventh Population Census and Second Housing Survey, carried out on 4 June 1972; the second Agricultural Survey, conducted between 4 and 24 September 1972; and the second series of National Economic Surveys which included inquiries into the trade, building, electricity, m a n u facturing, mining and hydrocarbons,fishingand services sectors. These surveys were carried out by trained personnel and use was m a d e of modern data-processing and publishing technology; this meant that the users were provided with reliable information with the m i n i m u m of delay. It should also be pointed out that in 1974 the National Demographic Survey was begun, with the aim of determining Peruvian population dynamics by obtaining indicators on births, deaths, marriages and migration. O n e of the more important functions of the National Office of Statistics and Censuses was periodically to compile and publish wholesale price and cost-of-living indexes. This work was subsequently carried out by the National Institute of Statistics and then by the National Office of Statistics ( O N E ) , organizations whose scope of activities has been considerably enlarged during recent years.


quently has a vital role to play in Peru, by working towards an improvement in the quality of statistics available. All units performing statistical functions in Peru need to be linked with one another through a central organization; only when this has been fully achieved will it be possible to speak of a true national statistical system. In this respect it should be mentioned that two committees, a C o ordination Committee and a Consultative C o m mittee, have been set u p . T h e Sectoral C o ordination Committee was created in order to ensure that the Central Office and the various public administration sectors played an active part in the formulation of national statistical policy and statistical plans. The purpose of the Consultative Statistical Committee was to facilitate participation by sectors other than the public sectors in national statistical activities. Similarly, one of the national system's objectives is to foster the interest of the general public in statistical activities so as to secure their active participation and collaboration on a long-term basis, a fundamental prerequisite for the success of the system. T o date, only two National Statistical Plans have been drawn up, covering the periods 1977/78 and 1979/80. These plans were afirstattempt at bringing together information contained in preliminary sectoral and regional plans, and they represented a step forward in terms of statistical programming by providing a means of ordering the activities of the various organizations producing statistical information. The aim of these plans has been to channel the needs of the various users, to m a k e the best possible use of available resources and to ensure implementation of the activities of all the units in the system. T h e plans assign responsibility for each of the tasks to be undertaken during the period, and specify order of priority, geographical coverage and periodicity. It is intended to carry out quarterly, annual and biannual assessments of the plans, such assessments serving as a basis for corrective measures to ensure their effective implementation. National Statistical Plans are drawn up in relation to the National Economic and Social D e velopment Plans. M o r e specifically, the National Development Plan for 1979/80 seeks to launch a programme of economic recovery and encourage economic decentralization by strengthening regional development organizations. Following these

Creation and growth of the National Statistical System Since its creation the National Statistical System ( S E N ) has been fulfilling a vital role. The National Office of Statistics ( O N E ) , the governing body of the system, and the Sectoral Offices of Statistics (OSE), responsible for individual sectors, are the agencies chiefly responsible for production and publication of basic socio-economic statistical information. Other public and private institutions round off the list of organizations responsible for the data with which w e are concerned. T h e National Statistical System ( S E N ) was created by Decree-Law N o . 21372 in D e c e m ber 1975, the application of which is regulated by Supreme Decree N o . 0 0 5 - 7 7 - P M and the National Institute of Statistics (INE) was established as its central agency. It operated under this title until 1978 when responsibility for the governing body of the S E N was transferred to the Director of the National Institute of Planning under Decree-Law N o . 22411. Technical and normative functions are centralized in the National Office of Statistics ( O N E ) , operational activities being the responsibility of the respective sectoral offices. O n e exception to this concerns statistical information activities, responsibility for which lies with the central agency of the system. At the present time, the National Office of Statistics has twelve statistical offices in Arequipa, Cajamarca, Cuzco, Chachapoyas, Chiclayo, Chimboto, H u a n cayo, Iquitos, Piura, P u n o , Tacna and Trujillo. T h e creation of the S E N represents a significant advance in regard to the production of socio-economic data. Prior to its establishment, the compiling of data was handled independently by each administrative sector according to its resources and needs. There was n o co-ordination whatsoever, the approaches and methodologies adopted differed considerably, and in spite of the efTorts m a d e there were considerable gaps, duplication of work, and inconsistenciesdefects which have all been tackled since the creation of this integrated system. There can be n o doubt that efficient national administration calls for the use of statistics that are co-ordinated, reliable and available w h e n needed, data that will provide a clearer picture of the national situation, facilitate the integral planning of development and serve as a basis for decision-making. T h e S E N conse-

National primary socio-economic data structures. VII: Peru


general guidelines, the National Statistical Plan for this biennium seeks to expand the production of socio-economic indicators, widen their coverage and improve the production of regional statistics so as to reflect the process of decentralization. T h e introduction of 'single-theme' questionnaires is another major advance brought about by the S E N . B y using this system it is hoped to improve and expedite the collection of information, rationalize procedures, avoid unnecessary duplication in data research, standardize criteria and classifications and establish the data base for the National Data B a n k . It is proposed to obtain the necessary information from primary suppliers on the basis of a 'single-shot' questionnaire and the collection will be carried out using standardized, co-ordinated procedures so as to meet the requirements of the various users. T h e introduction of the questionnaires was begun in 1976, covering, at the outset, the food, industry, mining andfisheriessectors. The central agency of the system is to be the body responsible for conducting national censuses, with the operational support of the respective sectoral offices as required. It will also be responsible for co-ordinating, standardizing and supervising the work of the public bodies. These provisions concern both regular surveys and the special surveys that are conducted from time to time. Surveys are prepared in co-operation with the various sectors, users and those responsible for conducting them. U n d e r the provisions of the Cartagena Agreement, Peru has undertaken to provide statistical information for the joint use of the members of the A n d e a n G r o u p . T h e government has not yet provided the statistical system with the necessary resources to fulfil this obligation, but it has nevertheless been possible to meet the most urgent requirements by means of additional efforts by the various S E N units. Operational capacity and output of the National Statistical System T h efindingsof the survey of the national statistical organization carried out in 1972 have provided detailed information concerning the services of the National Statistical System and their operational capacity as at December 1976. These data, the result of the Second National Statistical Inventory,

were published at the end of 1978. Unfortunately, budgetary limitations and lack of personnel have prevented statistical surveys from being carried out periodically. Information covering the most recent years is of a m o r e globalized kind a n d in certain cases it is incomplete; it has been provided by the sectoral offices to the central office of the S E N , which was strengthened in July a n d December 1978. W e shall set out the most salient features of the information supplied by the various S E N units, so as to give as up-to-date a picture as possible of the system's operational capacity and output, describing the major changes that have occurred in recent months. Statistical officesOSE During recent years n o constant growth rate can be seen in the operational capacity of the National Statistical System. O n e indicator of development is the number of statistical offices existing in the system. B y statistical office w e m e a n any a d m i n istrative office, irrespective of hierarchical level, under the authority of an agency in the public sector which carries out all or s o m e of the functions of data collection, processing and analysis as part of the work of producing statistical information. T h e 1972 survey of the national statistical organization showed the existence of forty-eight statistical offices, while the Second National Statistical Inventory revealed that the n u m b e r of offices had increased to ninety-six. This growth is explained, on the one hand, by the expansion of the public sector, as reflected in the substantial increase in the n u m b e r of its institutions, a n d , o n the other, by the growing importance attached to the production and systematization of statistical information. However, b y the end of 1978 the n u m b e r of statistical offices had reached only 105; this slower growth-rate observed in recent years is due to the shortage of bothfinancialand h u m a n resources, a situation which is blocking the establishment of n e w agencies, responsible for statistical production. Since the passing of Decree-Law N o . 21372, which provides for the establishment of the Sectoral Offices of Statistics ( O S E ) in the various ministries, progress has been recorded in this respect. In December 1976 these offices existed only in the economy and finance, education, transport and communications sectors; in the other sectors certain bureaux carried out the functions


T A B L E 1. N u m b e r of statistical offices of the S E N by size1 and administrative'sector Under Administrative sector Agriculture and food Trade E c o n o m y and finance Education Energy and mining Industry and tourism Integration Interior Fisheries Office of the President Foreign relations Health Labour Transport and communications Housing and building


5 2 2 9 3 9 1 8 3 3 1 6 2 10 3 69

Between 5 and 9

Between Between 50 and 10 and 19 20 and 49 above

4 4 12 5 9 10 1 8 6 7 1 6 5 14 4 96

1 2 1 2 2 2 3 15

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8

_ 1 1 2

1 1 2


1. Defined according to the number of Executive Staff and Senior Technicians in the Office. Source: Second National Statistical Inventory, I N E , September 1978.

of the O S E . N o w , however, only the foreign re- Human, financial and material resources lations sector lacks a Sectoral Office of Statistics. N o critical examination of the progress of the sysThese offices have been set up in the remaining tem and its achievements as regards the quality sectors fairly recently and are in the process of and scope of the current output of socio-economic being fully established, as in the housing and information can be m a d e at present in purely building and the integration sectors, to n a m e but abstract terms. Consideration must be given to the two examples. In some sectors, the O S E are dinumber and the qualifications of the personnel rectly responsible to the Directorate in the sector, with which the National Statistical System is whereas in others they c o m e under the Sectoral equipped, and thefinancialand material resources Planning Offices. W h e n the O S E are placed under available to it. the authority of other offices there is a danger that For the purposes of this survey, the h u m a n less importance is attached to statistical work, resources of the National Statistical System c o m because it is assigned lower priority. prise the staff employed in the statistical offices. T h e size of the statistical offices can also be Furthermore, w h e n discussing the shortage of reconsidered as an indicator in regard to the oper- sources, reference will necessarily be m a d e to the ational capacity of the system. For the purposes qualification of staff. of the surveys carried out, size is defined o n the At the end of 1976 staff employed by the basis of the number of executive staff and senior Statistical Offices of the system numbered 1,893, technicians. In terms of this criterion, it can be but the distribution of personnel between the varistated that small-scale offices are in the majority, ous sectors was far from uniform. T h e Office of since in most there are fewer than five executive the President of the Republic where 33 per cent of and senior technical staff (sec Table 1). the personnel is concentrated, is a significant

National primary socio-economic data structures. VII: Peru


example, although it should be pointed out that thisfigurecovers all staff employed in this office. Next in order of size is the agricultural and food sector due, m o r e especially to the considerable number of personnel in the latter area. In July 1978 thefigurefor personnel stood at 1,290, a drop of 32 per cent. However, discounting the President's Office and the foreignrelations and employment sectors, which did not supply any information for 1978, it will be seen that staff employed by the S E N did not show a decrease of this order as at July 1978. The abovementioned sectors accounted for 38 per cent of staff, but this represents an inflatedfigure,since it includes personnel engaged in non-statistical activities. T h e apparent decrease seen at that date is also explained by the fact that, in the Second National Statistical Inventory, S E N personnel included staff in the various statistical offices, whereas the data concerning staffobtained for 1978 refer only to the Sectoral Offices of Statistics in a number of the administrative sectors. T h e National Office of Statistics accounted for 43 per cent of the staff employed by the system in July 1978; of these 549 staff members, 507 were working in the central office and 42 in the regional offices. Staff in S E N offices are by no means n e w recruits; m a n y were transferred from other administrative sectors when the national office was set up. T h e agriculture and food sector is next in importance, accounting for 28 per cent of the total number of staff employed in the system. T h e National Statistical System has at no time since its establishment been sufficiently staffed. This shortfall has become more acute in recent years as a result of the austerity measures adopted by the government. Financial incentives which induce workers in the public sector to leave their employment have had a considerable impact within the S E N . Staff resignations account for the reduction in personnel working in the S E N as from October 1978. Repercussions have been greater a m o n g qualified staff and this has had a marked effect on the efficiency of statistical work. In December 1978 a figure of 981 staff members was recorded for the whole system, 24 per cent lower than that of July of the same year. Decreases have been m o r e marked in the economy and finance, energy and mining and industry and tourism sectors. A s for staff at the National Office of Statistics, although central-office personnel de-

creased by 23 per cent, employees in the regionr offices increased by 105 per cent. There are insufficient numbers of professional and support staff, and both categories, have decreased in absolute terms over recent years. In December 1976 professional staff represented 30 per cent of S E N m a n p o w e r , whereas in December 1978 it represented 42 per cent of the total staff numbers. At the end of that year therewas a majority of professional staff only in the sectors of economy and finance, education, industry and tourism and integration, and at the National Office of Statistics. Personnel training levels and categories are two further important factors in the system to which attention should be drawn. T h e results of the Second National Statistical Inventory show that 77 per cent of personnel c o m e within the technical category, including managerial staff, senior technical employees represent only 19 per cent of the m a n p o w e r employed b y the system,, and it would be desirable to see a substantial increase in proportion. T h e shortage of this staff category has had a considerable limiting effect o n statistical output. T h e problem is less acute in the education, industry and tourism, and employment sectors. Most staff members are of secondary education level; a good number have received specialized training. Post-graduate and university-level staff represent, respectively, 4 and 34 per cent of all personnel. T h e agriculture and food sector accounts for the highest concentration of staff with post-graduate training, 33 per cent of its employees having reached this level. A considerable proportion of the system's total m a n p o w e r resources consists of auxiliary technical staff at the secondary education level accounting for 3 7 per cent of the total. T h e majority of staff at the managerial level have received specialized, training at university, while staff with non-specialized higher education predominate a m o n g the senior technicians. Thesefigureslead us to conclude that there is a marked shortfall in regard to qualified staff (see Table 2). Similarly, there are very considerable requirements in regard to the specialized training of technical staff in the system. Needs are greatest in the areas of compilation and processing of primary statistics and of statistical analysis, specialized work in which 34 and 28 per cent respectively


T A B L E 2. S E N personnel by category and level of education (in percentages)1
Level of education/ category Postgraduate University specialized University non-specialized Secondary specialized Secondary non-specialized Other types

Executive 2.43 4.23 1.69 2.48 0.48

Senior technician 1.22 7.29 10.62

Technical auxiliary


General service

Total 3.65 15.64 18.75 35.45 23.09 3.43 100.00



3.43 5.55 23.93 12.78 0.48 46.17

0.69 0.85 7.03 6.92 1.06 16.53

0.05 2.01 2.91 1.90 6.87

1. D r a w n up on the basis of the results of the Second National Statistical Inventory.

of the staff require training. This aspect has not been overlooked, and in recent years training has been provided to members of the S E N by means of various courses and seminars. Unfortunately, the majority of those w h o have received such training n o longer work in the system and the acute shortfall from the qualitative point of view largely persists. Technical co-operation arrangements could be used here in order to provide training courses in statistical work, while maxim u m use should be m a d e of fellowships for statistical activities offered by various countries and international organizations; the organization of training courses and seminars for S E N personnel should be pursued. Visits m a d e to the various Sectoral Offices of Statistics have only served to corroborate the facts referred to above. Particular mention should be m a d e of the considerable shortage of professional staff with statistical training, the heavy impact of resignations as a result of the austerity measures adopted by the government and the general undermanning of the system. This shortfall is partly remedied by the work of university students w h o are mainly employed on a part-time, non-salaried basisalthough this brings with it problems of discontinuityand also through the use, where necessary, of contractual arrangements for a n u m b e r offieldactivities and surveys; these are carried out by the permanent staff only in certain sectors. T h e National Statistical System has been created and brought into operation without an adequate budget, and conditions have worsened

with the aggravation of the economic crisis affecting the country. The National Institute of Statistics began its activities on the basis of the budget that had been allocated to the former National Office of Statistics and Censuses, despite the fact that its responsibilities and functions had considerably expanded. The other statistical offices in the various sectors also assumed new functions and responsibilities which were not matched by the budgetary resources needed to discharge them. Apart from the meagreness of the funds assigned to them, certain offices had no individual budget of their o w n and their activities were dependent on the decisions of officials w h o did not always give priority to statistical activities. T h e importance of allocating greater financial resources to the statistical offices must be stressed, for both the production and dissemination of statistics are affected by the lack of adequate funds. Material facilities are also insufficient in m a n y cases and this factor hampers achievement of the goals of the National Statistical System. Table 3 shows the position of the Statistical Offices of the S E N as regards equipment at the end of 1976. The use of computers, with or without teleprocessing, indicates considerable development as far as statistical data-processing is concerned; it m a y be noted that at that date 30 per cent of the S E N units were already using computers. 20 per cent of the offices were using conventional (unit record) equipment; 24 and 19 per cent respectively were using punch-card machines and verifiers and 13 per cent other data-input systems.

National primary socio-economic data structures. VII: Peru


T A B L E 3. N u m b e r of statistical offices of the S E N using data-processing equipment, by type and; administrative sector Conventional equipment (UR)1

Other data-input systems

Administrative sector Agriculture and food Trade E c o n o m y and finance Education Energy and mining Industry and tourism Integration Interior Fisheries Office of the President Foreign relations Health Labour Transport and communications Housing and building

4 4 12 5 9 10 1 8 6 7 1 6 5
14 4 ~96

1 1 1 1 4

2 1 2 2 1 3 3 1 1 3 4 2 25

1 4 2 2 1 1 2 3 2 1 19

2 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 1 3 4 2 23

2 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 4 1 18

2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 12


1. Tabulators, classification and reproduction machines, collators, calculators and interpreters unit record ( U R ) . Source: Second National Statistical Inventory, I N E , September 1978.

At the present time only certain Sectoral Offices of Statistics are using automatic dataprocessing systems for at least part of their operations; very few have their o w n equipment, h o w ever, and other parts of the work have to be carried out manually. Offices that do possess such equipment usually provide assistance to other offices in the sector and such support accounts a good deal of their resources. Automatic data-processing is efficient and rapid, facilitating the more elaborate processing of a great volume of primary information in a m i n i m u m of time. U s e of such equipment, whether purchased or rented, should be extended within the system, subject to preliminary studies of the offices requesting these facilities,

covering such aspects as the volume of information being processed, the degree of processing required and the speed with which the information needs to be m a d e available to users, T h e austerity measures are also affecting office equipment, which, in addition to being insufficient, is far from being sophisticated. Furtherm o r e , the lack of printing equipment is delaying publication and circulation of statistical information, and in extreme cases it becomes impossible to issue what is produced because the office lacks either its o w n equipment or the necessary financial resources. S o as to bring supply into line with d e m a n d , and reduce the discrepancy between the quantity of statistical data produced and that

No information declared

Computer with teleprocessing

without teleprocessing

Punch-card machine



2 3 8 2 8 7 1 8 2 3 ,4 2 8 2 60


which is published, the Statistical Offices of the system should be equipped with the necessary material resources, particularly the Sectoral O f fices in the various ministries. Outputstatistical series Having analysed the operational capacity of the National Statistical System w e shall n o w turn to the output of the Statistical Offices, supplementing this information by reference to the classification of socio-economic statistics. W e shall thus see the various difficulties that have to be coped with, and this will give us the necessary yardsticks for measuring the achievements of the system. T h e n u m b e r of statistical series provides an indicator in regard to the output of the Statistical Offices. B y statistical series w e m e a n the ordered set, generally time-ordered, of numerical values of a variable associated with an economic, social or other p h e n o m e n o n . However, variations exist in the extent to which series are globalized and in the sphere of competence of the statistical offices in the various administrative sectors, and this m a k e s the task of comparing time-series difficult (see Table 4). T h e series recorded in the survey of the

national statistical organization carried out in 1972 refer to production, sales, stocks and employment. These were supplemented by series drawn from specialized publications, covering m o r e especially finance and banking, foreign trade, employment, education and health. T h e industry and tourism sector is responsible for the preparation of m o r e than 84 per cent of the total n u m b e r of series, followed, in order of importance, by the agriculture and food andfisheriessectors and the Office of the President of the Republic. A s regards the latter office, it should be noted that statistical series produced by various public institutions such as the National Office of Statistics and Censuses are included in the figures. In December 1978, 19,842 series were recorded, a lower figure than that for 1972. This drop can be explained, however, by the greater degree of aggregation of the statistical series. In the majority of sectors a significant increase can be observed in the number of statistical series, an indication of the country's growing interest in obtaining an increasing volume of statistical information. T h e industry and tourism sector again heads the list here, although the number of series produced by it has dropped since 1972. This lower

T A B L E 4 . Statistical series by administrative sector Administrative sector Agriculture and food Trade E c o n o m y and finance Education Energy and mining Industry and tourism Interior Fisheries Office of the President Foreign relations Health Labour Transport and communications Housing and building TOTAL 19721 ' 1534


19762 2 188


Vo1'2 42.63

91 3 541

0.36 0.01 2.11 84.16

716 703 957

12 469 3.61 3.54 4.82 62.84 0.35 1.84 4.32 0.22 0.78 2.13 2.55 0.09 686.81 23.333 76.89 42.11


4.13 3.01

58 25 593



70 366 857 44 154 422 506 18 19 842

65.34 11.30




Sources: 1. Survey of the National Statistical Organization. 2. Second National Statistical Inventory.

National primary socio-economic data structures. VII: Peru


T A B L E 5. T h e National Statistical System ( S E N ) : number of statistical offices, staff employed and number of statistical series produced, by administrative sector N o . of offices % 4 4 12 5 9 10 1 8 6 7 1 6 5 14 4

Administrative sector Agriculture and food Trade E c o n o m y and finance Education Energy and mining Industry and tourism Integration Interior Fisheries Office of the President Foreign relations Health Labour Transport and communications Housing and building

Staff 376 80 113 44 54 135 2 35 99 617 18 48 91 136 45 1898

% 19.86 4.22 5.97 2.32 2.85 7.13 0.11 1.85 5.23 32.59 0.95 2.54 4 7.18 2.38

N o . of series
2188 372 712 703 957 12 469
70 366 857 44 154 422 506 18 19 842

11.03 1.87 3.61 3.54 4.82 62.84 0.35 1.84 4.32 0.22 0.78 2.13 2.55 0.09

4.17 4.17 12.50 5.20 9.38 10.42 1.04 8.33 6.25 7.29 1.04 6.25 5.20 14.58 4.171

Source: Second National Statistical Inventory, I N E , September 1978.

production is explained o n the one hand by the exclusion of information o n trade, but chiefly by the greater degree of aggregation of the series. The lack of statistical data in the integration sector is due to its recent creation. It m a y be noted that there is n o relation between the number of offices, the personnel employed and the number of series produced in each administrative sector (see Table 5). The results of the Second National Statistical Inventory corroborate the above observations concerning the characteristics of the socioeconomic statistical data currently being produced. A s regards geographical coverage, it will be seen that 86 per cent of the series is national in scope. Coverage is mainly regional in the education sector whilst in the energy and mining sector/most series cover the departamentos. T h e periodicity of the series is mainly annual (82 per cent of the total). Production o n a monthly basis is mainly to be found in the trade sector and the Office of the President of the Republic (see Tables 6 and 7).

T A B L E 6. Statistical series prepared by the statistical offices of the S E N according to geographical coverage No. of Geographical coverage National Regional Departmental Provincial District Urban Rural Other

statistical series
17 026

85.81 2.41 3.93 0.40 0.06 3.68 0.04 3.677

478 779 80 12 730 8 729


Source: Second National Statistical Inventory, INE, September 1978.


N o . of statistical scries 16 304

T A B L E 7. Statistical series prepared by the statistical offices of the S E N by periodicity

Periodicity Annual Six-monthly Quarterly Monthly Fortnightly Weekly Other Non-periodical

82.17 0.51 1.65 12.58 0.31 0.52 1.11 1.15

101 327
2 496

61 104 221 228

istical data, a n d also shows the categories of data with which they deal. W e have divided the institutions into three groups. In group A w e have,firstof all, the central agency of the National Statistical System, the National Office of Statistics ( O N E ) which is attached to the National Institute of Planning. In addition to its task of preparing and conducting censuses a n d surveys, in co-ordination with the appropriate sectors, it is responsible for the production of statistics covering population, national accounts a n d prices. It also takes part in the production of statistics in conjunction with other institutions in its capacity as the central agency of the S E N , a n d publishes socio-economic statistics of various kinds. T h e second group (B) consists of the various offices in the ministries, which are mainly concerned with the production and/or publication of socio-economic statistics. M a n y of these act as Sectoral Offices of Statistics ( O S E ) as part of the structure of the S E N , w h o s e development w e have described above. These institutions, in conjunction with the National Office account for most of the primary socio-economic data-production, so that national progress in the field of socio-economic information m a y be assessed o n the basis of the activities of these two groups of institutions. Because of budgetary limitations and lack o f resources, the processed data cannot, unfortunately, b e disseminated as widely as they should.

Source: Second National Statistical Inventory , INE, September 1978. Factors limiting statistical output L a c k of resources, h u m a n , financial and material, constitutes the principal factor limiting the production of statistical data. Reports state that in 77 per cent of the offices w o r k is hampered b y insufficient staffing; in 67 per cent there is a lack of trained staff; in 61 per cent of the offices there are inadequate financial resources and in 57 per cent appropriate equipment is lacking. P o o r coordination with information sources and with users is another limiting factor. A t present the shortage of resources is the largest problem, a n d this shortage has b e c o m e m o r e severe in recent years as a result of Peru's difficult economic situation. It should be stated that the various persons consulted at the National Office of Statistics a n d in the different Sectoral Offices affirmed that this w a s the major factor, and urged that a large n u m b e r of trained personnel should be appointed so that objectives might be achieved. Co-ordination has, in fact, been significantly improved with the setting u p of the various agencies of the S E N . T h e administrative procedures involved in obtaining funds and the carrying out of other priority activities are also limiting factors as far as statistical output is concerned.

Lastly, w e have listed in group C the other institutions, both public a n d private, which are connected with the production and/or dissemination of socio-economic statistical data. T h e list is not, of course, exhaustive, institutions having been selected according to their importance. M o r e over w e have confined the list to those institutions that have their headquarters in L i m a . There are few institutions which produce primary data, as most of them limit their activities to reproducing primary data a n d processing secondary data o n their basis. Their activities go beyond purely statistical operations and the data in m a n y cases are used as r a w material for analysis and research; in other cases, the dissemination of data m a y b e Main institutionsproducing and\orpublishing closely linked to the institution's activities or the socio-economic statistical data data m a y be used to give a general indication of their development or serve evaluation purposes. A p p e n d i x 1 contains a list of the m a i n institutions These institutions include banks, research centres, producing and/or publishing socio-economic stat-

National primary socio-economic data structures. VII: Peru


public enterprises and associations and institutions of various kinds. The institutions disseminating d e m o graphic, social and labour statistics include public bodies, the Central Reserve B a n k of Peru and study and research centres, s o m e of them recently established. Demographic statistics are the responsibility of the National Ornee of Statistics, although specific units in the various ministries and public bodies collaborate with it in the production of certain series. With regard to social statistics, the recent establishment of the Sectoral Office of Statistics in the Ministry of Housing and Building has led to the processing and dissemination of data on housing through the Central Office of the S E N and the banks connected with activities in this sector: other public bodies also carry out statistical activities in this area. T h e Ministry of Education, the National Council of the University of Peru and the National Research Council are the key agencies in the production of educational, scientific and technological statistics. Their activities are complemented by those of other public agencies and research institutions, although none of these places its main emphasis on the production or dissemination of statistical data. Statistical activities relating to culture, recreation and mass communication are basically the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, the National Institute of Culture and the National Institute of Recreation, Physical Education and Sport. The Ministries of Health and the Interior, the Social Security Department and other public bodies are responsible for statistical activities connected with the health sector. Statistics o n security and public order came under the Ministry of the Interior, the Civil Guard, the Judiciary and the Peruvian Investigatory Police (PIP). T h e Ministry of Health, the National Institute for the Welfare of Minors and the Family, and other public-welfare institutions, produce statistics relating to the social services. Statistics concerning employment and labour questions are the responsibility of the Ministry of Labour, but, in contrast to the other sectors, statistical activities in this sector are carried out by various offices within the ministry. O n e of the tasks of the Technical Office for M a n power Studies which is attached to the Directorate-

General of Employment and which functions as a research centre, is the production of statistics o n employment, the working population and salaries. The Sectoral Statistics Unit, which is part of the Planning Office, deals with statistics relating to trade-union organizations and labour disputes, as well as industrial accidents, injuries and disablement. It should be noted that data produced by this office are disseminated through private bodies alone. O n the other hand, it is the Employment Division which produces statistics relating to employment services. Other public departments, workers' organizations, and academic and research centres which carry out economic analyses, are also responsible for disseminating and analysing statistics concerning labour matters. Statistics on social security are produced mainly by the Ministry of Labour and by the Peruvian Social Security Offices. T h e production, description and analysis of aggregate economic statistics are carried out by government bodies, such as the Central Reserve B a n k of Peru, and the National Institute of Planning; by various associations and confederations; by the banks and by a number of other research institutes and centres. M o s t of the latter have been established very recently and carry out both short- and long-term analyses. T h e National Office of Statistics, in conjunction with the various departments in the ministries, draws u p the country's national accounts, while the input-output tables are prepared by the National Institute of Planning. T h e Central B a n k is responsible for the preparation of monetary andfinancialstatistics, although this is done in close collaboration with other bodies dealing with such matters, including the National Association of Financial Enterprises, the Stock Exchange, the National Commission for the Supervision of Business Enterprises and Securities, the Financial Development Corporation and the Superintendency of Banking and Insurance. T h e Ministry of Economics and Finance and the Central Reserve B a n k are the main sources of governmental statistics relating to income and expenditure, and of statistics for the external sector; these are supplied to the central office of the S E N , which disseminates these data together with statistics from lhe other sectors. T h e National Institute of Public Administration also plays an important role concerning public-sector


statistics to the time when the information is m a d e available to the users and is used by themis a lengthy affair. W e shall say something of the gaps between one phase and another and of the main reasons for the length of the period between the occurrence of events or phenomena and the time when the data concerning them reach the users. W e have already seen that in the last few decades, particularly since the establishment of the National Statistical System, considerable progress has been m a d e in the generation of socioeconomic statistical data, but the fact that they have been treated as confidential often unjustifiably, has considerably restricted their use. Data have been produced which, had they been published, might have led to better understanding of the country's situation, but it was not in the interests of government authorities that social and economic phenomena should be brought to the public notice. T h e result was that in some cases bodies that obtained 'confidential' information from the institutions which had collected the data published the information without paying m u c h attention to accuracy, which often produced a distorted picture of the situation. In other cases isolated data were published, and were explained or interpreted according to the viewpoint, not always the most correct, of the institutions that published them or of the public in general. If adequate official information w a s lacking, rumours proliferated, and in some situations created a climate of mistrust and confusion which had a very bad effect on affairs in the country. Until recently the official bodies disseminated the statistical data which they considered most relevant. But, although there has been a change of policy since then, data arc not yet disseminated as widely as is desirable, lack of resources being one of the factors which greatly restrict the extent to which basic statistics are disseminated. A n d as access to other bodies that publish, interpret and analyse these primary data becomes easier, reliable information is being disseminated through a wider range of media, although, as w e shall see below, access to these sources is also in m a n y cases restricted. There is still a considerable discrepancy between the generation and the dissemination of statistical data, with respect both to quantity and to the time that elapses between one phase and

employment statistics and other governmental data. With regard to foreign trade, the Office of the Secretary of State for Trade provides the basic data while information concerning balance of payments is supplied by various private and public bodies. T h e National Office of Statistics takes an active part in the production of statistics on prices and household budgets. Statistics on prices are also provided by the offices of the Ministries of Agriculture and F o o d , Industry, Trade, Tourism and Integration, and other public bodies. Prices are normally published by various bodies and business firms but apart from the fact that it would be virtually impossible to give this list in full, it is also unnecessary, since our concern here is global price statistics and indices of the main macro-economic variables. The Ministry of F o o d and Agriculture, within the context of the National System of F o o d Statistics, takes an active part in producing statistics concerning household budgets. T h e production of economic statistics by kind of activity is the responsibility of the offices of the respective ministries; they supply sectoral data obtained from primary sources to the National Office of Statistics, public bodies and other users. These statislics are reproduced and analysed, however, by a vast number of public and private bodies, including banks, research centres and institutes, associations and confederations and public enterprises. T h e appendix contains a list of the most important for each category of data.

Storage, dissemination and use of socio-economic statistics The discrepancy between the generation and dissemination of statistical data N o t all the data collected are processed, nor are all the processed data disseminated, or even accessible. Moreover, not all those w h o receive the,data use them, or if they d o they do so partially. It is therefore necessary to distinguish the different phases through which statistical data m o v e , from the time they are collected to the time they are actually used. It should also be taken into account that the processing of the datafrom the time when data are supplied to the bodies which produce

National primary socio-economic data structures. VII: Peru


another. The lack of adequatefinancialand m a terial resources is an obstacle not only to the production of data but also to their dissemination. In some cases this prolongs the period of time between the collection of data and their availability to the user. In other cases users w h o wish to have access to information have to apply directly to the offices producing it, since it is not published for a long time, if ever; or, at best, it is published in very limited editions, so as to restrict dissemination. These problems have been aggravated by the austerity measures which the various bodies of the National Statistical System have been, obliged to adopt. Main publications containing socio-economic statistical data Brief historical summary of major publications Although this study deals mainly with socioeconomic statistical data produced and published at present, w e must say something of the publications, covering a wide field and containing a wealth of data, which have played an important part during this century, particularly the publications issued at regular intervals by the governing body of the National Statistical System and the National Accounts. F r o m 1931 to 1934 the National Directorate of Statistics published the Extracto Estadstico del Per (Peruvian Statistical S u m m a r y ) ; after that, the National Directorate of Statistics and Censuses published the Anuario Estadstico del Per (Peruvian Statistical Yearbook), the n a m e of which was changed to Boletn de Estadstica Peruana but later changed back to Anuario Estadstico. T h e last issue covered the year 1971 and marked the end of the dissemination of socio-economic data. Despite certain technical deficiencies, it gave a national overview of d e m o graphic, social, economic and employment indicators which, taken together, reflected the development of Peru. Information concerning the National A c counts has been prepared since 1942. Its preparation was the responsibility of the Central B a n k Reserve of Peru, an institution which published the main macro-economic aggregates under the title Renta Nacional del Per (National Revenue of Peru). This not only gave figures, but also

analysed them. A s the result of a technical study which m a d e it possible to improve the calculation of the aggregates, the Central Reserve B a n k of Peru adopted a n e w methodology to which the data were adjusted, from 1950 onwards, and the statistical tables were published under the title Cuentas Nacionales del Per (Peruvian National Accounts). In 1976 the preparation of the National Accounts became one of the main tasks of the National Institute of Statistics, and the governing body of the system is still responsible for their preparation and publication. T h e series are set out in accordance with the latest revision of the United Nations System of National Accounts (Series F , N o . 2 , Rev. 3) and of the International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities (Series M , N o . 4 , Rev. 2). T h e adoption of this method has m a d e it possible to widen considerably the categories of data processed, not only for the last year but also for the preceding years; in s o m e cases figures are given for as far back as 1950. Data for the period 1970-78 include, in addition to overall supply-and-demand c o m p o nents, output and input for each class of economic activity, public revenue and expenditure and the four national consolidated accounts, and series for each class of economic activity and type of expenditure are included from 1950 onwards. A s pointed out in the annexes, the data are set out both in nominal terms and in real terms, from which, together with the accompanying analysis, one can m a k e an overall assessment of the economic development of our country in recent years. . Description of the publications The classification adopted for the publications listed in A n n e x II is that used by the responsible institutions: the National Office of Statistics ( O N E ) (A), the ministries (B), and other institutions, both public and private ( Q . With a few exceptions, w e shall deal only with the main periodical publications containing socio-economic information formulated consistently as regards data and series. A s well as indicating the institution responsible for their publication, w e give information about their periodicity and the main categories of data included. The O N E is responsible for the publication of the results of national censuses and national


accounts. It also publishes statistics concerning demography and prices. Mention should be m a d e of the publication of the Informe Trimestral (Quarterly Report), which deals with the national economic situation, as well as of other special nonperiodical studies. O N E publications are issued in limited numbers and arc rapidly becoming unavailable, but their small circulation and the delay in their publication are mainly due to the lack of resources. A s a result of these problems, the size of the edition varies from one number to the next, according to the resources available each time. T h e administrative sectors themselves publish the statistics which they produce. A n d the O S E or their equivalent have the prerogative of rendering official the statistical data to be p u b lished. Appendix 2 lists the publications of the ministries, indicating in each case the specific office responsible and the size of the edition, which is quite small. These publications are sent to the various government departments and to certain specialized libraries and documentation centres. Only in very rare cases are a few copies set aside for sale or for exchange with other publications; this, together with the fact that not all the processed data are publishedor not till a considerable time has elapsedmakes it necessary in m a n y cases to g o to the original source of information in order to obtain it promptly. These publications include the yearbooks of the different sectors and other annual publications. In most cases they containfinalfigures,which means that the publications are only available to users after a considerable time. In some sectors there are, in addition to the annual publications, other publications m o r e frequently issued, which generally contain provisional figures. T o the time that elapses before data are prepared for publication must be added the time during which the material is set aside o n account of the lack of financial and material resources which w e have already mentioned. In extreme cases the publications are interrupted, as in the case of several publications listed in the appendices to this article which are not being published at present even though the material is available, for example, publications in the agriculture and food, health and tourism sectors. In other cases not all the data processed can be published, owing to lack of resources, so that users have to apply to

the offices producing the data if they wish to have access to them. Moreover, s o m e sectoral offices of statistics publish n o material; others produce only special or non-periodical publications, or else publications that do not contain socio-economic statistics. This occurs in the following sectors: economics and finance, co-ordination, foreign affairs, housing and construction. T h e third group of publications listed in Appendix 2 is m o r e heterogeneous as regards both the nature of the publications and their periodicity and dissemination. T h e size of the editions varies from one publication to another, although in general it m a y be said that publications prepared by public bodies are printed in m u c h smaller editions than those prepared by private bodies. T h e former are distributed free of charge or sold at a low price, whereas the latter m a y be divided into two groups: those intended for academic use, for research and as a community service, which are sold at a relatively low price, and those intended for small selected markets, for which the cost of subscription is m u c h higher. In these publications, unlike those in the two previous groups, and with a few rare exceptions, analysis and comments are given, as well as the actual statistics. Nevertheless, generally speaking there are few publications in which projections of statistical data are provided, or else these are more reproductions of the projections prepared by the government authorities. T h e main periodical publications are listed according to the categories of data which predominate in each of them. W e note that the various agencies of the National Statistical System are principally responsible for publishing demographic and social statistics. Private bodies deal mainly with labour and economic statistics, areas in which more works are published, both by the S E N and by other public and private institutions, including banks, educational and research centres and trade-union associations. Use of socio-economic statistics T h e government is undoubtedly the main user of basic socio-economic statistics, since they are of prime importance in the process of decisionmaking in government management. T h e National Institute of Planning and the different sectoral

National primary socio-economic data structures. VII: Peru


planning offices are also important users of socioeconomic data, which play a key role in development planning. Other departments in the various sectors use statistical information, as well as the sectoral planning offices. In cases where information is not published, staff in the ministries or in other public bodies of the sector have free access to it, provided it is not confidential, if they apply to the places where the data are produced and stored. If the data are disseminated, the publications containing them are immediately distributed free of charge to these members of the staff. Similarly, the governmental authorities of the other sectors have wide access to data. It should be pointed out, however, that not all w h o receive statistical information actually use it, and some m a k e only partial use of it. The information is disseminated in various ways: in publications, both periodical and nonperiodical, or in the form of separate sheets, pamphlets, documents or books, which m a y give either figures alone or figures accompanied by analysis and comments. Statistics m a y also be widely disseminated by the communication media, although only in the case of the principal macroeconomic variables and social indicators which reveal the country's development. If the information is not published, the data m a y be found in special reports intended for limited circulation, in computerized lists, or in the data banks or documentation centres which serve some sectors. The public sector usually has access to data stored in all these ways, including non-processed primary data, if special permission is obtained from the competent authorities. The universities and other educational and research centres are both generators of information and important users of socio-economic statistical data. University staff and research workers generally have considerable difficulty in obtaining statistical data, from either public or private sources, as a basis for the bibliographical material which they use for their courses and for carrying out studies and research. T h e possibility of obtaining information is usually a key factor in the success of their work; hence these users are generally obliged to apply to the sources that produce the data in order to obtain the information they require. S o m e of the information is obtained through established official channels, and the rest

is obtained unofficially through contacts of various kinds. If the exchange of publications were put o n a systematic basis, access to a larger number of publications, both public and private, would be possible; however, m u c h remains to be done with regard to the exchange of publications. In s o m e cases the results of the studies and research carried out in these centres are published and put on sale, although they do not always provide all the statistical information which was used as raw material. This information, as well as unpublished information, is stored in the educational or research centres, to which access is in most cases rectricted. Students constitute another group of users of socio-economic statistical data, particularly students preparing monographs or theses. These works can be consulted in the libraries of research centres, and in some cases the best arc published. S o m e students work on previously published information, while others use data which m a y not have been published before; in rare cases they have access to non-processed data. Special permission to consult such data, whether produced by public or private bodies, is required, and is quite difficult to obtain. In return for access to information, students usually carry out practical w o r k , either without payment or for a nominal fee. This is also useful to the data-producing bodies, which, thanks to these users, can to some extent m a k e good their lack of resources. It should be added that students or graduates m a y work on data which they themselves collect, for instance by carrying out field-work and surveys. Banks, financing bodies, trade-unions and professional associations also use statistical data. A n d in recent years members of the general public have taken a considerable interest in what is going on in Peru and want information about it. Their interest is increasing daily, as can be seen from the appearance of publications m a n y of which contain analyses of the country's situation, and for which there is an increasing demand. This change of attitude is particularly marked in business circles; businessmen today are interested in obtaining reliable statistical data, for which they are prepared to pay substantial sums of m o n e y . S o m e publications are specially designed for a highrevenue market, and the general public therefore does not have access to the statistics they contain.


It is not sufficient to k n o w what information is required; its supply and use must also be promoted. For this purpose w e need a bridge between the bodies generating statistical data and the users; documentation centres, information centres and specialized libraries, for instance, provide such a bridge. S o m e libraries and documentation centres are attached to the institutions generating statistical data. Thus the O N E has a library which in time will receive the data generated throughout the whole system, although it is not yet in operation. There is no central data bank, but various bodies have their o w n data banks. M a n y ministries have n o libraries or technical archives as yet, not to speak of data banks, although some progress has been m a d e in this direction. Only a few of these data-storage centres are open to the general public. In others only the staff working in the institution or those working in the public sector have access to the data, unless special permission is obtained. Lastly, it should be pointed out that in some cases certain conditions must be met, in addition to the payment of subscription fees, before one can have access to the data and use the services provided. [Translated from Spanish]

International bodies which have headquarters in Peru or abroad also use statistical data. S o m e merely compile information obtained from different countries, and publish it in international yearbooks and bulletins. Governments, foreign banks and international bodies also require statistical data as a basis for decisions as to the granting of loans, making investments or carrying out other business in our country. Foreign academics or research workers also use statistical data concerning Peru for studies which are published in specialized articles, books, theses or dissertations. Finally, it should be mentioned that one of the duties of the diplomatic corps in Peru is to obtain information about the principal social and economic variables, and to report the main facts to their government authorities, together with summaries of reliable statistical data. It m a y be noted that there is co-ordination with public bodies within the sector and outside it, both as sources of information and as users of the data produced. Such co-ordination meets the need to k n o w what statistical data are required, and it is the general practice. Ever since the S E N was established, every effort has been m a d e to see where the production of statistics is failing to meet demands, and a table containing up-to-date figures could be expected to reveal m u c h larger figures. T h e other type of co-ordination is basically a matter of guidance and training.

Appendix 1. Alphabetical list of the main institutions producing and/or publishing socio-economic statistical data No. Institution Central Agency of the National Statistical System Oficina Nacional de Estadstica, Instituto Nacional de Planificacin Address Type of data

A v . 28 de Julio 1056, Lima 1

Demographic statistics (A.l) Housing ( A . 2 . 1 ) National accounts: income and outlay (B. 1.1) Government statistics (B.2) External sector (B.3) Prices (B.4.1) Household budgets (B.4.2) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C)

National primary socio-economic data structures. VII: Peru


Ministries Ministerio de Agricultura y Alimentacin (Agriculture and Food), Oficina Sectorial de Estadstica

Jr. Cahuida 805, Lima 11

Ministerio de Economa y Fininzas (Economy and Finance), Oficina de Informacin y Estadstica Ministerio de Educacin (Education), Oficina Sectorial de Estadstica

A v . Abancay s/n, Lima 1

Parque Universitario s/n, Lima 1

Ministerio de Energa y Minas (Energy and Mining), Direccin de Estadstica Ministerio de Industria, Comercio, Turismo e Integracin (Industry, Trade, Tourism and Integration), Secretara de Estado de Comercio (Trade Division), Oficina Sectorial de Estadstica Ministerio de Industria, Comercio, Turismo e Integracin (Industry, Trade, Tourism and Integration), Secretara de Estado de Industria (Industry Division), Oficina Sectorial de Estadstica Ministerio de Industria, Comercio, Turismo e Integracin (Industry, Trade, Tourism and Integration), Secretara de Estado de Integracin (Integration Division), Oficina Sectorial de Estadstica

Jr. Zepita 423, Lima 1

Centro Cvico, Nivel 1, Lima 1

Calle 1 s/n Piso 13, Urb. Crpac, Lima 27

Population statistics (A. 1.2) National accounts: income and outlay (B. 1.1) Prices . 4 . 1 ) Household budgets (B.4.2) Agriculture and hunting (C. 1.1) Forestry and logging (C. 1.2) Water (C.4.3) National accounts (B.l) Government statistics (B.2) External sector statistics (B.3) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Population statistics (A. 1.2) Education ( A . 2 . 2 . 1 ) Cultural statistics ( A . 2 . 3 . 1 ) Recreation statistics (A.2.3.2) National accounts: income and outlay (B.l. 1) National accounts: income and - outlay (B: 1.1) Mining and quarrying (C.2) Electricity (C.4.1) Gas (C.4.2) Mass communication (A.2.3.3) National accounts: income and outlay (B.l. 1) External trade (B.3.1) Prices (B.4.1) Wholesale and retail trade and restaurants and hotels (C.6) National accounts: income and outlay (B.l. 1) Prices (B.4.1) Employment and economically active population (A.3.1.1) Manufacturing industry (C.3) National accounts: income and outlay (B.l. 1) External trade (B.3.1) Public information of all types

Calle 1 s/n Piso 13, Urb. Crpac, Lima 27


Appendix 1 (continued) Ministerio de Industria, Comercio, Turismo e Integracin (Industry, Trade, Tourism and Integration), Secretara de Estado de Turismo (Tourism Division), Oficina Sectorial de Estadstica Calle 1 s/nPiso 11, Urb. Crpac, Lima 27 International migration (A.1.4.2) National accounts: income and outlay (B. 1.1) Prices (B.4.1) Balance of payments (B. 3.2) Restaurants and hotels (C.6.2) Tourism (C.9.1) Vital statistics (A. 1.3) Migration statistics (A. 1.4) Health services (A.2.4.3) Security and public order (A.2.5) National accounts: income and outlay (B. 1.1) National accounts: income and outlay (B. 1.1) Fishing (C. 1.3) Vital statistics (A. 1.3) National accounts: income and outlay (B. 1.1) Balance of payments (B.3.2) Population statistics (A. 1.2) Deaths (A. 1.3.2) Health (A.2.4) Social services and welfare institutions (A.2.6.3) Industrial injuries and disablement (A. 3.1.5) National accounts: income and outlay (B. 1.1) Wholesale and retail trade (C.6.1) Community, social and personal services (C.9.2) Population statistics (A. 1.2) Domestic migration (A. 1.4.1) Employment and economically active population (A. 3.1.1) Wages and salaries (A. 3.1.2) Social security (A.3.2) Public sector employment (B.2.2) National accounts: income and outlay (B. 1.1) Employment services (A. 3.1.4)


Ministerio del Interior ( H o m e Office), Oficina Sectorial de Planificacin, Direccin de Estadstica

Av. Crpac s/n, Lima 27

1 1 12

Ministerio de Pesquera (Fisheries), Oficina Sectorial de Estadstica Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Foreign Relations) Ministerio de Salud (Health), Oficina Sectorial de Estadstica e Informtica

Av. Javier Prado Este 2465, Urb. San Luis, Lima 24 Jr. Azngaro 387, Lima 1

1 3

A v . Brasil 2309, Lima 11



Ministerio de Trabajo (Labour), Direccin General de Cooperativas de Servicio, Unidad de Investigacin y Estadstica Ministerio de Trabajo (Labour), Direccin General de Empleo, Oficina Tcnica de Estudios de M a n o de Obra ( O T E M O )

Centro Cvico, Lima 1

A v . Salaverry Cuada 8, Piso 1, Lima 11


Ministerio de Trabajo (Labour), Direccin de Colocaciones

Pablo Bermdez 386, Lima 11

National primary socio-economic data structures. VII: Peru



Ministerio de Trabajo (Labour) Oficina Sectorial de Planificacin, Unidad de Estadsticas Sectoriales

A v . Salaverry Cuadra 8, Piso 4, Lima 11



Ministerio de Transportes y Comunicaciones (Transport and Communications), Oficina Sectorial de Estadstica Ministerio de Vivienda y Construccin (Housing and Building), Oficina Sectorial de Estadstica Other institutions Andean Air Mail and Peruvian Times S . A .

A v . 28 de Julio 1004, Piso 4, Lima 1

Jr. Domingo Cueto 120, Piso 7, Lima 11

Trade-unions and labour disputes ( A . 3 . 1 . 3 ) Industrial accidents, injuries and disablements ( A . 3 . 1 . 5 ) National accounts: income and outlay (B. 1.1) Information processing for all sectors National accounts: income and outlay (B. 1.1) Transport and communications (C.7) Housing ( A . 2 . 1 ) National accounts: income and outlay (B. 1.1) Water (C.4.3) Construction (C.S) Employment statistics ( A . 3 . 1 ) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Demographic, social and labour statistics (A) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Labour and social-security statistics (A.3) Electricity ( C . 4 . 1 ) Exports ( B . 3 . 1 . 3 ) . Manufacturing industry (C.3) Employment statistics ( A . 3 . 1 ) Monetary and financial statistics (B. 1.3) Finance (C.8.1) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Demographic, social and labour statistics (A). Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C)


Jr. Carabaya 928, Of. 304, Lima 1


Apoyo S . A .

A v . L a Paz 1580, Lima 18

22 23 24 25 26

Asesoramiento y Anlisis Laborales S . A . Asociacin Electrotcnica Peruana Asociacin de Exportadores Asociacin de Relaciones Industriales (ARI) Asociacin Nacional de Empresas Financieras Banco Agrario del Per

Pablo Bermdez 285, Lima 11 A v . Repblica de Chile 284, Lima 1 A v . Las Flores 436, Lima 27 Jr. Azngaro 430, Lima 1 Natalio Snchez 125, Lima 1 Jr. Carabaya 593, Piso 7, Lima 1



Banco Central de Reserva del Per(BCRP)

Jr. Miro Quesada 441, Lima 1


Jr. Carabaya 421, Lima 1 A v . Nicols dePirola 1065, Lima 1 Jr. L a m p a 535, Lima 1 Jr. Lima 499, Lima 1 Housing statistics (A.2.1) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Economic statistics by kind of activity ( Q Economic statistics by kind of activity ( Q Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Cultural statistics (A.2.3.1) Monetary and financial statistics (B. 1.3) Agricultural statistics (C.l.1.1.2)

Appendix 1 (continued) 29 Banco Central Hipotecario del Per


Banco Comercial del Per


Banco Continental


Banco de Crdito


Banco de Ia Industria de Ia Construccin Banco de Ia Nacin

Jr. Junn 319, Lima 1


A v . Abancay s/n, Lima 1

35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

Banco de la Vivienda del Per Banco de Lima Banco de Londres y Amrica del Sud Banco Industrial del Per Banco Industrial Banco Minero Banco Peruano de los Constructores Banco Popular Banco Weise Biblioteca Nacional Bolsa de Valores de Lima Cmara Algodonera del Per

Jr. Caman 616, Lima 1 Jr. Carabaya 698, Lima 1 Jr. Carabaya 442, Lima 1 Plaza Gastaeda 681, Lima 1 Plaza La Merced 600, Lima 1 A v . Inca Garcilazo 1472, Lima 1 Jr. L a m p a 560, Lima 1 Jr. Huallaga 380, Lima 1 Jr. Cuzco 245, Lima 1 A v . Abancay 4 ta. Cuadra, Lima 1 A v . Miro Quesada 265, Lima 1 A . Miro Quesada 327, Lima 1

National primary socio-economic data structures. VII: Peru



Cmara de Comercio de Lima

Ortiz de Zavallos 398, Lima 11 Las Begonias 441, Lima 27 Beln 1066, Lima 1 Av. Paseo de la Repblica 571, Lima 1 Av. Guzmn Blanco 240, Lima 1


49 50 51

Cmara de Fabricantes de Autopartes Cmara Nacional de Turismo Cmara Peruana de la Construccin ( C A P E C O ) Central de Cooperativas Agrarias de Produccin Azucarera del Per Ltd. N o . 69 (CECOAAP) Central de Trabajadores de la Revolucin Peruana Centro de Asosora Laboral (CEDAL)

Aggregate economic statistics (B) Wholesale and retail trade (C.6.1) Manufacturing industry (C.3) Tourism (C.9.1) Construction (C.5) Industry (C.3) Agricultural statistics (C.l.1.1.2) Manufacturing industry (C.3) Wholesale and retail trade (C.6.1) Employment statistics (A.3.1) Employment (A.3.1) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Employment statistics (A.3.1) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Demographic, social and labour statistics (A) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Employment statistics (A. 3.1) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity ( Q Demographic, social and labour statistics (A) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Demographic, social and labour statistics (A) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Employment statistics (A. 3.1) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C)


H . Velarde 240, Lima 1 Av. Guzmn Blanco 462, Of. 402, Lima 1


Centro de Documentacin y Estudios Sociales (CEDES)

Av. Arales 969, Lima 1


Centro de Estudios de Derecho y Sociedad (CEDYS) Centro de Estudios de Economa y Planificacin (CEDEP)

Pachactec 1155, Lima 11


Av. Benavides 712, Dpto. 204, Lima 18


Centro de Estudios de Poblacin Av. Los Conquistadores, y Desarrollo Lima 27 Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Participacin Av. 6 de Agosto 425, Lima 11 La Paz 434, Of. 90, Lima 18


59 Centro de Investigacin Econmica para la Accin (CIEPA)


Appendix 1 (continued) 60 Centro Nacional de Capacitacin Investigacin para la Reforma Agraria Av. Javier Prado 1358, Lima 27 Jr. Zepita 423, Lima 1 A v . El Rosario 195, Lima 27 Juan Polar 195, Lima 27 Science and technology (A.2.2.2) Agriculture: production and services (C. 1.1.1) Science and technology (A.2.2.2) Industry (C.3) Monetary and financial statistics (B. 1.3) Employment statistics (A.3.1) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Employment statistics (A.3.1) Employment statistics (A.3.1} Agriculture and hunting (C.l.l) Forestry and logging (C.1.2) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Wholesale and retail trade (C.6.1) Employment statistics (A.3.1) Prices (B.4.1) Construction (C.5) Science and technology (A.2.2.2) Education, science and technology (A.2.2) Government statistics: income and outlay (B.2.1) Monetary and financial statistics External sector statistics (B.3) Finance (C.8.1) Balance of payments (B.3.2) Air transport (C.7.1.2) Tourism (C.9.1)

61 62 63 Centro Nacional de Productividad Comisin Nacional Supervisore de Empresas y Valores

Comunicacin S . A .

64 65 66 67

Confederacin de Trabajadores del Per (CTP) Confederacin General de Trabajadores del Per (CGTP) Confederacin Nacional Agraria Confederacin Nacional de Comerciantes ( C O N A C O ) Confederacin Nacional de Trabajadores ( C N T ) Consejo de Reajustes de Precios de la Construccin Consejo Nacional de Investigacin Consejo Nacional de la Universidad Peruana ( C O N U P ) Contralora General de la Repblica Corporacin Financiera del Desarrollo ( C O F I D E ) Corporacin Peruana de Aeropuertos y Aviacin Comercial ( C O R P A C )

Aycucho 173, Lima 1 Plaza 2 de Mayo s/n, Lima 1 A v . Miro Quesada 327, Lima 1 Av. Abancay 210, Lima 1

68 69 70 71 72 73

Av. 28 de Julio 565, Lima 1 Domingo Cueto 120, Lima 14 Av. del Parque Norte 1172-1174, Lima 27 Calle Aldabas 3. Cuadra, C h a m a , Lima A . Wiese 315, Lima 1 Av. Garcilazo de la Vega 1456, Lima 1 Aeropuerto Internacional Jorge, Chvez Av. Elmer Faucett, Callao, 2.


National primary socio-economic data structures. VII: Peru



D E S C O (Centro de Estudios y Promocin del Desarrollo)

A v . Salaverry 1945, Lima 11


E C O (Grupo de Investigaciones Econmicas)

A v . Aviacin 3020, Of. 301, San Borja, Lima

77 78 79

Electricidad de Lima (ELECTRO-LIMA) Electricidad del Per

Empresa de Administracin de Inmuebles del Per (EMADI-PERU) Empresa de Saneamiento de Lima (ESAL) Empresa Minera del Centro

Conde de Superunda 261, Lima 1 Paseo de la Repblica 144, Electricity (C.4.1) Lima 1 Jr. Huancavelica 466, Housing ( A . 2 . 1 . 2 ) Lima 1 A v . Venezuela 812, Lima Jr. Carabaya 891, Lima 1 Paseo de la Repblica 3587, Lima 27 Bernardo Monteagudo 222, Lima 17 Terminal Martimo del Callao, Piso 3, Callao 1 Bernardo Monteagudo 210, Lima 17

Social statistics (A.2) Employment statistics ( A . 3.1) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Employment statistics ( A . 3 . 1 ) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Electricity (C.4.1)

80 81 82

Empresa Minera del Hierro (HIERRO-PERU) Empresa Minera del Per (MINERO-PERU) Empresa Nacional de Puertos (ENAPU-PERU) Empresa Nacional de Comercializacin de Insumos (ENCI)


84 85


Empresa Nacional de Ferrocarriles del Per

Jr. Ancash 207, Lima 1

Housing ( A . 2 . 1 . 2 ) Water (C.4.3) Housing ( A . 2 . 1 . 2 ) Water (C.4.3) Mining and quarrying ( C . 2 ) Manufacturing industry (C.3) Mining and quarrying ( C . 2 ) Manufacturing industry (C.3) External trade (B.3.1) Water transport ( C . 7 . 1 . 3 ) External trade (B.3.1) Agricultural statistics (C.l.1.1.2) Wholesale and retail trade (C.6.1) Railway transport (C. 7 . 1 . 1 . 2 )

87 Empresa Nacional de Radiodifusin del Per A . Tamayo 154, Lima 27 Culture, recreation and mass communication ( A . 2 . 3 ) Communications (C.7.2)

88 Empresa Nacional de Telecommunicaciones (ENTREL-PERU) Empresa Nacional de Turismo (ENTUR-PERU) Empresa Pesquera del Per de Produccin de Harina y Aceita de Pescado ( P E S C A - P E R U ) Las Begonias 475, Piso 5, Lima 27 Jr. Junn 455, Lima 1 A v . Javier Prado Esta 2465, Lima 30

89 90

Restaurants and hotels ( C . 6 . 2 ) Tourism (C.9.1) Fishing (C. 1.3) Manufacturing industry ( C . 3 )

Appendix 1 (continued) 91 92 93 94 Empresa Pblica de Comercializacin de Harina y Aceita de Pescado ( E P C H A P ) Empresa Publica de Servicios Pesqueros (EPSEP) Empresa Siderrgica del Per (SIDER-PERU) Escuela de Administracin de Negocios para Graduados (ESAN) . Fondo Nacional de Salud y Bienestar Social Guardia Civil del Per Industrias del Per A v . 28 de Julio 715, Lima 1 A v . Javier Prado Este 2465, Lima 20 A v . Tacna 543, Lima 1 A v . La Molina, Lima Exports (B.3.1.3) Fishing (C. 1.3) Manufacturing industry (C.3) Fishing ( C l . 3 ) Manufacturing industry (C.3) Construction (C.5) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Health (A.2.4) Social services (A.2.6) Social security statistics (A. 3.2) Security and public order (A.2.5) Manufacturing industry (C.3) Science and technology (A.2.2.2) Mining and quarrying (C.2) Manufacturing industry (C.3) Demographic, social and labour statistics (A) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Science and technology (A.2.2.2) Mining and quarrying (C.2) Science and technology (A.2.2.2) Agriculture: production and services (C. 1.1.1) Science and technology (A.2.2.2) Electricity (C.4.1) Population statistics (A. 1.2) Science and technology (A.2.2.2) Health (A.2.4) Social services (A.2.6) Science and technology (A.2.2.2) Manufacturing industry (C.3) Population statistics (A. 1.2) Health (A.2.4) Social services (A.2.6) 95 96 97 98 A v . Salaverry Cdra. 8, Lima 1 A v . E . Canaval s/n, Lima Calle 7, N o . 229, Lima 12 Malecn Balta 758, Lima 18

Instituto Cientfico y Tecnolgico Minero (INCITEMI) Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (IEP)


Horacio 694, Lima 11

100 101

Instituto de Geologa y Minera Instituto de Investigaciones Agro Industriales Instituto de Investigaciones Energticas y Servicios de Energa Elctrica (INIE) Instituto de Investigacin Nutricional

Pablo Bermdez 211, Lima 11 A v . L a Universidad 595, Lima 12 Jr. Francisco Masas 370, Lima 14 A . Salazar 409, Lima 27

102 103

104 105

Instituto de Investigacin Tecnolgica, Industrial y Normas Tcnicas (ITINTEC) Instituto de Nutricin

Morelli 2." Cuadra, Lima 27 Tizn y Bueno 276, Lima 11

National primary socio-economic data structures. VII: Peru


106 107 108 109

Instituto de Salud Pblica Instituto de Urbanismo y Planificacin del Per Instituto del M a r del Per

A v . Salaverry 8. Cuadra L i m a 11 Los Olmos 117, L i m a 11 Esq. Gamarra y Gral del Valle, Callao 5 A v . Petit Thouars 3899, Lima 27

Health ( A . 2 . 4 ) Housing statistics ( A . 2 . 1 . 2 ) Construction (C.5) Fishing ( C l . 3 ) Demographic, social and labour statistics (A) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Employment in the public sector (B.2.2) Other government statistics (B.2.3) Social services ( A . 2 . 6 )

Instituto Internacional de Investigacin y Accin para el Desarrollo ( I N D A )


Instituto Nacional de Administracin Pblica (INAP)

A v . G u z m n Blanco 298, Lima 1


112 113 114

Instituto Nacional de Asistencia y Promocin del Menor y de la Familia ( I N A P R O M E F ) Instituto Nacional de Becas y Crdito Educativo ( I N A B E C ) Instituto Nacional de Cultura Instituto Nacional de Investigacin y Capacitacin de Telecomunicaciones (INICTEL) Instituto Nacional de Investigacin y Desarrollo de la Educacin (INIDE) Instituto Nacional de Planificacin (INP)

A v . San Martn 685, Lima 21 A v . Salaverry 3285, L i m a 27 Jr. Ancash 390, Lima 1 A v . Juan Pezet 1907, Lima 27 V a n de Velde 160, L i m a 27


Educational incentives (A. Cultural statistics ( A . 2 . 3 . 1 ) Recreation statistics ( A . 2 . 3 . 2 ) Science and technology (A.2.2.2) Communications (C.7.2) Education, science and technology ( A . 2 . 2 ) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Input-output tables (B.1.2) Economic statistics by kind of activity () Education ( A . 2 . 2 . 1 ) Recreation statistics ( A . 2 . 3 . 2 ) Education ( A . 2 . 2 . 1 ) Culture, recreation and mass communication ( A . 2 . 2 ) Demographic, social and labour statistics (A) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Monetary and financial statistics (B. 1.3) Finance ( C . 8 . 1 )


A v . Repblica de Chile 262, L i m a 11



Instituto Nacional de Recreacin, Educacin Fsica y Deportes ( I N R E D ) Instituto Nacional de Teleducacin Instituto Peruano de Administracin de Empresas (IPAE)

Estadio Nacional, Puerta 29, Lima 1 Ministerio de Educacin, Parque Universitario, Lima 1 A v . Jos Pardo 610, Lima 18



Instituto Peruano de Derecho, Tcnica Bancaria

Jr. A . Wiese 515, Lima 1


Appendix 1 (continued) 121 Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena (JUNAC) Minero Per Comercial (MINPECO) Oficina Central de Informacin (OCI) Oficina del Primer Ministro Oficina Nacional de A p o y o Alimentario Organismo Regulador de Tarifas de Transporte ( O R E T T ) Petrleos del Per (PETRO-PERU) Poder Judicial, Oficina de Estadsticas Polica de Investigacin del Per Proyaccin S . R . L . Seguro Social del Per Servicio de Parques ( S E R P A R ) Servicio Nacional de Adiestramiento en Trabajo Industrial (SENATI) Sistema Nacional de Propiedad Social ( S I N A D E P S ) Sociedad de Beneficiencia Pblica de Lima Sociedad de Industrias Sociedad Nacional de Minera y Petrleos Sociedad Nacional de Pesquera Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros TELECENTRO Paseo de la Repblica 3895, Lima 27 Scipin Liona 350, Lima 18 Jr. de la Unin 264, Lima 1 Palacio da Gobierno, Calle Pascadera, Lima 1 Natalio Snchez 220, Lima 11 Garcilazo de la Vega 1168, Lima 1 A v . Paseo de la Repblica 3361, Lima 27 A v . Paseo de la Repblica s/n, Lima 1 A v . Espaa 4." Cuadra, Lima 1 Av. Garcilazo de la Vega 911, Of. 501, Lima 1 A v . Grau 351, Lima 1 Av. Arenales 371, Lima 1 K m . 15.2 Autopista a Ancn, Lima 1 Coronel Incln 831, Lima 18 Carabaya 641, Lima 1 Los Laureles 365, Lima 27 A v . Nicolas de Pierola 917, Lima 1 A v . Garcilazo de la Vega 911, Lima 1 Jr. Huancavelica 240, Lima 1 Jr. de la Unin 234, Lima 1 Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) External sector statistics (B. 3) Mining and quarrying (C.2) Manufacturing industry (C.3) Mass communication statistics (A.2.3.3) Aggregate socio-economic statistics (A, B , C ) Population statistics (A. 1.2) Household budgets (B.4.2) Agricultural production and services (C. 1.1.1) Prices (B.4.1) Land transport (C. 7.1.1) Mining and quarrying (C.2) Manufacturing industry (C.3) Gas (C.4.2) Security and public order (A.2.5) Security and public order (A.2.5) Community, social and personal services (C.9.2) Health (A.2.4) Social-security statistics (A. 3.2) Housing statistics ( A . 2 . 1 . 2 ) Recreation statistics (A.2.3.2) Education, science and technology (A.2.2) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Health (A.2.4) Social services (A.2.6) Manufacturing industry (C.3) Mining and quarrying (C.2) Fishing (C. 1.3) Monetary and financial statistics (B. 1.3) Finance and insurance (C.8) Culture, recreation and mass communication (A.2.3) 122 123 124 125

126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140

National primary socio-economic data structures. VII: Peru



Universidad Catlica del Per, Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, Econmicas, Polticas y Antropolgicas ( C I S E P A ) Universidad del Pacfico, Centro de Investigacin (CIUP)

A v . Bolvar s/n, Lima 21


A v . Salaverry 2020, Lima 11


Vernal Consultores S . A .

A v . M a n c o Cpac 639, Lima 13

Employment statistics ( A . 3 . 1 ) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Employment statistics (A. 3 . 1 ) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C) Employment statistics ( A . 3 . 1 ) Aggregate economic statistics (B) Economic statistics by kind of activity (C)

Appendix 2 . Alphabetical list of publications containing socio-economic statistical data Produced by the National Office of Statistics (ONE) Title of publication Boletn de Anlisis Demogrfico Censo Nacional de Poblacin Censo Nacional de Vivienda Cuentas Nacionales del Per ndice Global de Precios al Por Mayor ndices de Precios al Consumidor ndices de Precios al Por Mayor: Construccin y Mano ndices de Precios al Por Mayor: Productos Agrcolas ndices de Precios al Por Mayor: Productos Pecuarios Informe Estadstico Periodicity Type of data

de Obra

Annually Irregular Irregular Annually Quarterly Monthly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly

A.1.1 A.2.1.1 A,B, C B.4.1 B.4.1 B.4.1 B.4.1 B.4.1 A.1.3, B , C

Produced by the ministries N o . of copies

Title of publication


Periodicity Annually Annually Annually Annually

Type of data

Ministerio de Energa Anuarios de Estadstica y Minas (5) Elctrica Ministerio de Energa Anuario de la Minera y Minas (5) del Per Ministerio de Energa Anuario del Petrleo y Minas (5) del Per Anuario Estadstico Ministerio de Agricultura y Agropecuario Alimentacin (2)

300 C . 4 . 1 300 300 300 C.2, C.3 C.2, C.3, C.4.2 C.1.1,C.1.2, C.4.3



Appendix 2 (continued)
Anuario Estadstico de Ministerio de Industria, Comercio Exterior Comercio, Turismo e Integracin ( M I C T Q , Secretara de Estado de Comercio (6) Anuario Estadstico de Ministerio de Trabajo, Cooperativas Direccin General de Cooperativas de Servicio (14) Anuario Estadstico de MICTISecretara de Turismo Estado de Turismo (9) Anuario Estadstico del Ministerio del Sector Interior Interior (10) Anuario Estadstico del Ministerio de Trabajo, Sector Trabajo Direccin General del Empleo (15) Anuario Estadstico Ministerio de Pesquero Pesquera (11) Balanza Comercial por MICTISecretara de Zonas Econmicas Estado de Comercio (6) (fascculos por zonas econmicas) Boletn Estadstico de MICTISecretara de Comercio Exterior Estado de Comercio (6) Boletn Estadstico de MICTISecretara de Turismo Estado de Turismo (9) Boletn Estadstico Ministerio de Salud (13) Mensual Boletn Mensual de MICTISecretara de Bienes de Consumo Final Estado de Comercio (6) Boletn Mensual de MICTISecretara de Exportaciones Estado de Comercio (6) Autorizadas Comercio Interior por MICTISecretara de rama de Actividad Estado de Comercio (6) Econmica Compendio Estadstico Ministerio de Transporte y del Sector Transporte y Comunicaciones Comunicaciones (18) Directorio Estadstico MICTISecretara de de Establecimientos de Estado de Turismo (9) Hospedaje Encuesta mensual al MICTISecretara de Comercio Minorista: Estado de Comercio (6) Avance Estadstico Estadstica de Comercio MICTISecretara de Exterior Estado de Comercio (6) Estadstica de la MICTISecretara de Comunidad Industrial Estado de Industria (7)




300 200 600 100 300 350 250


Annually Annually Annually

A . 1 . 4 . 2 . B . 4 . 1 , B.3.2 A . 2 . 3 , A . 1 . 4 , A.2.4.3, A.2.5 A . 1 . 2 , A.1.4.1 , A . 3 . 1 . A . 3 . 1 . 2 , A.3.1 .4, A . 3 . B.2.2 C.1.3 B.3.1

Annually Quarterly

Quarterly Quarterly Monthly Monthly Monthly

300 200 800 200 250 150 300 600 100 500 250

B.3.1 C.6.2, C.9.1 A . 1 . 2 , A.1.3.2,, A . 2 . 4 , A.2.6.3, C.6.1, C.9.2 C.6.1 B.3.1.3




C.6.2, C.9.1




Annually Annually

B.3.1.3 C.9.2

National primary socio-economic data structures. VII: Peru

Ministerio de Transportes y Comunicaciones (18) Estadstica de Recursos Ministerio de Humanos del Sector Transportes y Transporte Comunicaciones (18) Estadsticas Ministerio de Departamentales Educacin (4) Estadstica Industrial: MICTISecretara de por Departamentos Estado de Industria (7) Estadstica Industrial: MICTISecretara de por Grupos CIIU Estado de Industrias (7) Estadsticas por Zonas Ministerio de de Educacin Educacin (4) Estimacin del Parque Ministerio de Transportes y Automotor Comunicaciones (18) Folleto de Divulgacin Ministerio de Transportes y Estadstica Comunicaciones (18) Indicadores del Sector MICTISecretara de Manufacturero Estado de Industria (7) ndices de Precios de MICTISecretara de Importacin Estado de Comercio (6) Informativo Estadstico MICTISecretara de Estado de Industria (7) Industrial Informefinalde los Ministerio de Resultados de Trfico Transportes y Comunicaciones (18) Postal Movimiento de Viajeros MICTISecretara de en los Establecimientos Estado de Turismo (9) de Hospedaje Parte Anual de Cetceos Ministerio de Pesquera (11) Parte Anual de la Ministerio de Industria de Enlatado de Pesquera (11) Pescado y Mariscos Parte de Venta de Ministerio de Harina de Pescado Pesquera (11) Parte Mensual de Ministerio de Actividades del Sector Pesquera (11) Pesquero Parte Semestral de Ministerio de Alimentos Balanceados Pesquera (11) Parte Semestral de Ministerio de Harina y Aceite de Pesquera (11) Pescado Precios Obtenidos de las MICTISecretara de Exportaciones de Estado de Comercio (6) Productos

Estadstica de Peaje


300 300 300 300

/ 500

B.4.1, C.7.


A . 3 . 1 . 1,C.

Annually Annually Annually Annually Annually

A.2.2. 1

C.3 C.3
A.2.2. 1 C.7.1

300 300


C.7 C.3
B.3.1. 2 , B .

Quarterly Six-Monthly Six-Monthly Annually

250 200 250 100 600

60 60 60 60 60 60



C.6.2, C . 9 .

Annually Annually

C.1.3 C.1.3, C.3

Monthly Monthly

B.3, C.1.3, C.1.3, C.3

Six-Monthly Six-Monthly

C.1.3, C.3 C.1.3, C.3



B.3.1. 3



Appendix 2 (continued)
Principales Productos MICTISecretara de Industriales. Estado de Industria (7) 1. Industria de Alimentos Principales Productos MICTISecretara de Industriales. Estado de Industria (7) 2. Industria de Bebidas y Tabaco Principales Productos MICTISecretara de Industriales Estado de Industria (7) 3. Industria de Artculos metlicos, maquinaria no elctrica y aparatos elctricos y transporte Principales Productos MICTISecretara de Industriales Estado de Industria (7) 4. Industria de Minerales no Metlicos, Industrias Metlicas bsicas Principales Productos MICTISecretara de Industriales Estado de Industria (7) 5. Industria del Cuero, Madera, Papel e Imprenta Principales Productos MICTISecretara de Industriales Estado de Industria (7) 6. Industria Qumica y Derivados del Petrleo Principales Productos MICTISecretara de Industriales Estado de Industria (7) 7. Industria Textil, Calzado y Diversos Sntesis Econmica del MICTISecretara de Grupo Andino Estado de Integracin (8) Sistema Nacional de Ministerio de Estadstica Alimentaria. Agricultura y SINEASubsistema 1 : Alimentacin (2) Unidades Agropecuarias. Boletn Estadstico Mensual SINEASubsistema 1: Ministerio de Agricultura y Boletn Estadstica Trimestral Alimentacin (2) SINEASubsistema I: Ministerio de Boletn Analtico Mensual Agricultura y Alimentacin (2)

250 250

C.3 C.3



















B, C C.l.l







National primary socio-economic data structures. VII: Peru


SINEASubsistema 2: Ministerio de Costos de Produccin, Agricultura y Mustreos de Alimentacin (2) Rendimiento e Informacin para Anlisis y Estudios. Boletn Estadstico Mensual SINEASubsistema 2: Ministerio de Boletn Estadstico Agricultura y Trimestral Alimentacin (2) SINEASubsistema 2: Ministerio de Agricultura y Boletn Analtico Alimentacin (2) Mensual SINEASubsistema 3: Ministerio de Agricultura y Granjas Avcolas, Alimentacin (2) Granjas de Porcinos, Centros de Engorde, Establos Lecheros, Plantas de Incubacin, Distribuidores de Alimentos Salanceados, Hojas Informativas Mensuales SINEASubsistema 3: Ministerio de Boletn Analtico Agricultura y Mensual Alimentacin (2) SINEASubsistema 4: Ministerio de Fbricas de Alimentos Agricultura y Alimentacin (2) Balanceados, Informa Quincenal SINEASubsistema 4: Ministerio de Plantas Procesadoras de Agricultura y Leche Pasteurizada. Alimentacin (2) Informe Mensual SINEASubsistema 4: Ministerio de Plantas Procesadoras de Agricultura y Leche Enlatada. Alimentacin (2) Informe Mensual SINEASubsistema 5: Ministerio de Canales. Boletn Agricultura y Semanal Alimentacin (2) SINEASubsistema 5: Ministerio de Agricultura y Mercados (Lima Alimentacin (2) Metropolitana). Boletn Diario SINEASubsistema 5: Ministerio de Mercados (Lima Agricultura y Metropolitana). Alimentacin (2)






C l . 1.1.2



C l . 1.1.2



Cl.1.1.2, C.6.1






C ., C . 3



Cl.1.1.2, C.3



Cl.1.1.2, C 3






Cl.1.1.2, C.6.1



Cl.1.1.2, C.6.1


Appendix 2 (continued) Resumen Semanal SINEASubsistema 5: Mercados (Nivel Nacional). Boletn Diario SINEASubsistema 6: Plantas Procesadoras de Aceites y Grasas. Informe Quincenal SINEASubsistema 6: Plantas Procesadoras de Avenas. Informe Quincenal SINEASubsistema 6: Plantas Industriales de Fideos. Informe Quincenal SINEASubsistema 7: Consumo (Lima Metropolitana). Informe Diario Situacin de la Actividad Industrial. Avance de Resultados Situacin Ocupacional del Per Ministerio de Agricultura y Alimentacin (2) Ministerio de Agricultura y . Alimentacin (2) Ministerio de Agricultura y Alimentacin (2) Ministerio de Agricultura y Alimentacin (2) Ministerio de Agricultura y Alimentacin (2) Daily 30-50 C.l.1.1.2, C.6.1



C.l.1.1.2, C.6.1



C.l.1.1.2, C . 3



C.l.1.1.2, C . 3



B.4.2, C.l.1.1.2, C.6.1

MICTISecretara de Monthly Estado de Industrias (7) Ministerio de Trabajo. Direccin General de Empleo (15) Annually




A . 1 . 2 , A.l.4.1, A.3.1.1 A.3.1.2, A.3.1.4, A.3.2, B.2.2

Other publications Title of publication Actualidad Econmica del Per Anlisis EconmicoFinanciero de las Operaciones Mensuales Anlisis Laboral Institution Periodicity Type of data A.3.1.B, C B , B . 1 . 3 , C , C.l.l, C . 1 . 2

Centro de Asesora Laboral Monthly ( C E D A L ) (53) Banco Agrario del Per (27) Monthly

Asesoramiento y Anlisis Laborales S.A. (22) Andean Air Mail and Andean Report Peruvian Times S.A. (20) Anuario del Cooperativismo Proyeccin S . R . L . (130) Peruano Anuario Estadstico de Central de Cooperativas Comercializacin. Informe Agrarias de Produccin anual de operaciones de Azucarera del Per produccin de la industria ( C E C O A A P ) (51) azucarera peruana

Monthly Monthly Annually Annually

A.3 A.3.1.B, C C.9.2 C.l.1.1.2, C . 3 , C . 6 . 1

National primary socio-economic data structures. VU: Peru


Anuario Estadstico de la Polica de Investigacin del Annually Policia de Investigaciones Per (PIP) (129) del Per Anuario Estadstico PolicialGuardia Civil del Per (69) Annually Anuarium de la Cmara Peruana de la Annually Construccin Construccin ( C A P E C O ) (50) Boletn Banco Central de Reserva Monthly del Per ( B C R P ) (28) Boletn Cmara de Fabricantes de Monthly Autopartes (48) Boletn Centro de Documentacin y Bimonthly Estudios Sociales ( C E D E S ) (54) Boletn Empresa Minera del Per Monthly (MINERO-PERU) (83) Boletn Empresa Nacional de Quarterly Puertos (ENAPU-PERU) (84) Boletn Instituto del Mar del Per Monthly (IMARPE) (108) Boletn Sociedad Nacional de Fortnightly Pesquera (138) Boletn Algodonero Empresa Nacional de Bimonthly Comercializacin de Insumos (ENCI) (85) Boletn Burstil Bolsa de Valores de Monthly Lima (45) Boletn de Estadsticas ENCI (85) Annually Boletn de Noticias Minero Per Comercial Weekly (122) Boletn Diario Bolsa de Valores de Daily Lima (45) Boletn EconmicoCorporacin Financiera del Financiero Desarrollo (COFIDE) (73) Daily Boletn Estadstico Banco de la Vivienda. Departamento de Estudios Monthly Econmicos (35) Boletn Estadstico Consejo Nacional de la Monthly Universidad Peruana (CONUP) (71) Boletn Estadstico Corporacin Peruana de Quarterly Aeropuertos y Aviacin Civil (CORPAC) (74) Boletn Estadstico Empresa de Administracin Quarterly de Inmuebles del Per (EMADI-PERU) (79) Boletn Estadstico Seguro Social del Per (131) Annually Boletn Estadstico Banca Superintendencia de Banca Quarterly y Seguros y Seguros (139)

A.2.5 A . 2.5 B.4.1.C5 B.1.3, B.3, B.4.1 C.3 A.3.1.B, C C.2 A.3.1, C.7.1.3 Cl. 3 Cl. 3 B.3.1.3, B . 3 . 4 , C I . 1 . 1 . 2 B.1.3, C.8.1 B.3.1, C I . 1 . 1 . 2 , C.6.1 B.3.1.3, C . 2 B.1.3, C.8.1 B.1.3,B.3.4 A.2.1.2, B , B.1.3 A . 2.2 B.3.2, C l . l .2, C.9.1 A.2.1.2 A.2.3,A.3.2 B.1.3, C.8


Appendix 2 (continued)
Boletn Estadstico del Mercado de Valores Comisin Nacional Supervisora de Empresas y Valores (CONASEV) (62) Boletn Mensual Cmara de Comercio de Lima (47) Boletn Mensual C O F I D E (73) Boletn Mensual E M A D I - P E R U (79) Boletn Mensual Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros (139) Boletn Peruano de Vernal Consultores S.A. Importaciones (143) Boletn Semanal Cmara de Comercio de Lima (47) Boletn Semanal Sociedad de Industrias (136) CI Diario B C R P (28) Carta Econmica del Per Vernal Consultores S . A . (143) Catlogo Peruano de la C A P E C O (50) Construccin CENTROMIN Empresa Minera del Centro ( C E N T R O M I N ) (81) Compendio Estadstico Empresa Pesquera del Per Pesquero (PESCA-PERU) (90) Conferencia Anual de Instituto Peruano de Ejecutivos (CADE) Administracin de Empresas (119) Cuenta General de la Contralora General de la Repblica Repblica (72) Datos Estadsticos Electricidad de Lima ( E L E C T R O - L I M A ) (77) Datos Estadsticos sobre Superintendencia de Banca Operaciones de las y Seguros (139) Compaas de Seguros Economa Universidad Catlica del Per (141) Electrotcnica Asociacin Electrotcnica Peruana (23) El Exportador Peruano Asociacin de Exportadores ( A D E X ) (24) Estadstica Semanal Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros (139) Estadstica Trimestral Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros (139) Esto es CENTROMIN CENTROMIN (81) Estudios Econmicos Banco de Crdito (32) Estudios Econmicos: Banco de la Vivienda (35) Boletn Estadstico Monthly B.1.3 Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Weekly Weekly Daily Monthly Bimonthly Bimonthly Annually Annually B.B.4.1, C.6 B.1.3, C.8.1 A.2.1.2 B.1.3 B.3.1.2 B,B.4.1,C6 C.3 B.1.3.B.3 A.3.1.B, C B.4.1.C.5 C.2 C.1.3, C.3 A , B, C

Annually Annually Quarterly

B.3.1 C.4.1 C.8.2

Six-monthly Quarterly Weekly Weekly Quarterly Six-monthly Quarterly Monthly

A.3.1.C C.4.1 B.3.1.3, C.3 B.1.3 B.1.3 C.2, C.3 A.3.1.B.C A.2.1, A.3.1

National primary socio-economic data structures. VII: Peru


Estudios Econmicos: Situacin de a Industria Manufacturera Finanzas Internacionales Gerencia

Banco Industrial del Per (38)


A . 3.1, B , C , C . 3

C O F I D E (73) Weekly Instituto Peruano de Monthly Administracin de Empresas (IPAE)(119) Grupo Andino: Carta Junta de Acuerdo de Monthly Informativa Oficial Cartagena ( J U N A C ) (121) ndice Econmico Mensual Banco Continental (31) Monthly ndice de Precios de la Consejo de Reajuste de Monthly Construccin Precios dela Construccin (69) Industria Peruana Sociedad de Industrias (136) Monthly Informativo C A P E C O (50) Fortnightly Informativo Politico Centro de Estudios y Monthly Promocin del Desarrollo ( D E S C O ) (75) Informativo Quincenal Sociedad Nacional de Fortnightly Minera y Petrleo (137) Informe de la Economa Centro de Investigacin Annually Peruana Econmica para la Accin (CIEPA) (59) Informe Semestral de C E C O A A P (51) Six-monthly Operaciones Informe Trimestral de la C I E P A (59) Quarterly Economia Peruana La Economa Peruana, Universidad del Pacfico Annually Anlisis de Coyuntura (142) Econmica Memoria Banco Agrario (27) Annually Memoria B C R P (28) Annually Memoria Banco Central Hipotecario Annually del Per (29) Memoria Banco Comercial del Annually Per (30) Memoria Banco Continental (31) Annually Memoria Banco de Crdito (32) Annually Memoria Banco de la Industria de la Annually Construccin (33) Memoria Banco de la Nacin (34) Annually Memoria Banco de la Vivienda del Annually Per (35) Memoria Banco de Lima (36) Annually Banco Industrial del Per Annually Memoria

B.1.3, B . 3 B, C

B, C

B,C B.4.1, C.5 C.3 C.5 A.3.1.B, C C.2


C .,C.3
A.3.1.B, C A.3.1.B, C B, B.1.3, C, C.l.l, C.1.2 A,B,C A.2.1.2,B,B.1.3,C B.B.1.3.C B,B.1.3,C B.B.1.3.C
B, B.1.3, C , C . 5 B.B.1.3.C A.2.1.2, B , B.1.3, C B,B.1.3,C B, B.1.3, C , C . 3 B,B.1.3,C B.B.1.3, C, C . 2 B.B.1.3, C, C.5

Memoria Memoria Memoria

Banco Internacional (39) Annually Banco Minero del Per (40) Annually Banco Peruana de los Annually Constructores ( B A N P E C ) (41)

Appendix 2 (continued) Memoria Memoria Memoria Memoria Memoria Memoria Banco Popular (42) Banco Wiese (43) C O N U P (71) E N A P U - P E R U (84) . E N C I (85) Empresa Nacional de Telecommunicaciones del Per (ENTEL-PERU) (88) Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros (139) Minero Per (83) Bolsa de Valores (45) Annually Annually Annually Annually Annually Annually B,B.1.3,C B, B.1.3.C A.2.2 B.3.1, C.7.I.: B.3.1, d . i . . C.7.2


Annually Monthly Monthly Weekly Monthly Annually Annually Monthly Annually Annually Monthly Monthly Quarterly Weekly Six-monthly Monthly Six-monthly

B,B.1.3,, C B.3, C . 2 , C.3 B.1.3,C.8.1

Minero Per Comercial Movimiento de Valores Registrados Nota Semanal B C R P (28) Per Econmico Apoyo S.A. (21) Apoyo S.A. (21) Per en Cifras Banco Continental (31) Per en Cifras A D E X (24) Per Exporta Banco Popular (42) Per in Brief Plan Nacional de DesarrolloInstituto Nacional de Planificacin (116) Comunicacin S . A . (63) Realidad Sociedad Nacional de Reporte Econmico Minera y Petrleo (137) B C R P (28) Resea Econmica D E S C O (75) Resumen Semanal Banco de Londres y Review Amrica del Sud (37) Asociacin de Relaciones Revista Industriales (ARI) (25) Instituto Peruano de Revista Peruana de Derecho Derecho y Tcnica Bancrio Bancaria (120) Banco Continental (31) La Situacin Econmica del Per La Situacin Econmica Banco de Crdito (32) Nacional Instituto de Urbanismo y Urbanismo y Planificacin Planificacin del Per (107)

B, C
A , B, C

' A, B, C
A, B , C B.3.1.3, C.3 A , B, C A,B, C A.3.1,B,C

C.2 B,C
A.3.1.B, C B, C A . 3.1 B.1.3, C.8.1

Quarterly Bimonthly Bimonthly

B, C B, C A.2.1.2, C.5

The social science sphere

O n the concept of tribe

Andr Beteille*
T h e Constitution of India gives recognition to a category of people designated as the Scheduled Tribes, and makes special provisions for their political representation and their economic and social welfare. T h e Scheduled Tribes and the Scheduled Castes constitute the two principal components of the backward classes towards which the Government of India has adopted a policy of protective discrimination. This policy has various implications, and questions are raised from time to time about the exact basis of the social identity of the communities whose members are its beneficiaries. These matters come up before the courts, and some lawyers at least seem to assume that there must be a clear answer to the question as to what constitutes a tribe within the k n o w ledge of the sociologist or the social anthropologist. Anthropologists have since the time of Lewis Henry Morgan argued about the definition of tribe, but very little account has been taken of the tribal communities of India in these general debates over definition. This is unfortunate, not only because of the legal and constitutional significance of the problem, but also because of the size and variety of the tribal population of India. This population comprises about 6.5 per cent of the total, and stood at nearly 40 million at the 1971 census. There are said to be over 400 tribes in India, and they cover the widest range of variation in terms of race, religion and language, as well as economic and political organization. It is sometimes said that in putting the policy of protective discrimination into action officials of the Government of India are interested not in tribes as such but in only those communities that have been identified and listed as the Scheduled Tribes. But this is to evade the issue, for it can hardly be maintained that the list itself is a random collection of communities put together with no regard for any rational criteria of classification. A s a matter of fact, the criteria used have been several and varied; they have not always been related to each other; and they have been left implicit more often than m a d e explicit. T h e list of Scheduled Tribes n o w in use has been constructed by the efforts of various people, beginning more than a hundred years ago. T h e British Indian civil servants of the nineteenth century often combined the duties of administration with the pleasures of ethnography. Their labours produced a large corpus of reports, m a n uals and gazetteers devoted to the enumeration and description of the peoples of India. T h e decennial census provided these ethnographeradministrators with opportunities for constructing a kind of ethnographic m a p of India, which they hoped to use in the administration of the country. They proceeded by trial and error, rather than according to any clearly formulated system of classification. T h e earlier accounts of the peoples of India show a preoccupation with the identification and description of the various tribes and castes in the population, without any clear criterion of distinction between the two kinds of units. W h a t are n o w acknowledged as castes are freely described as tribes, and vice versa. Even today it is not always easy to tell whether a particular group should be described as a caste or a tribe. Yet it might seem that if only w e followed the anthropologist's definition of 'tribe' nothing would b e easier than to distinguish between the two. In practice the distinction between 'tribe' and 'caste' continues to bedevil the student of Indian society,

* ISSJ correspondent in Delhi.

Int. Soc.Sci. J., Vol. XXXII, N o . 4, 1980


and so w e must ask whether this does not reveal a deficiency in the conception itself of tribe. Anthropological convention has treated the tribe as a 'completely organized society',1 i.e. a self-perpetuating system having within its boundaries all the resources necessary for the continued maintenance of a particular m o d e of collective existence. T h e tribe is in this sense a whole society a n d a whole culture, unlike the moiety, the phratry, the clan, the lineage or the family. Each tribe has its o w n territory, which means that it is politically autonomous, whether or not it is politically organized. It also has its o w n language or dialect which is the mark of its distinctive culture. It has been tacitly assumed that, as in the case of the nation-states of Europe, c o m m o n territory and c o m m o n language go hand in hand. Until recently social anthropologists have been inclined to take the boundaries of the tribe for granted, focusing their attention on its internal structure. It is as if a tribe could be understood on its o w n terms without taking into account other tribes or other societies of a different kind. T h e work of Evans-Pritchard a m o n g the Nuer showed that a tribe is a tribe only in opposition to other tribes.2 T h e experience of India (and other Asian societies) would seem to indicate that a tribe might usefully be viewed as a tribe only in opposition to a social order of another kind. Nineteenth-century scholars viewed tribal societies in the light of evolutionary theory. This was true not only of anthropologists like Lewis Henry M o r g a n but also of historians like Fustel de Coulanges. M o r g a n sought to demonstrate the stages of social evolution by the comparison of contemporary primitive societies. Fustel reconstructed the transformation of Greek and R o m a n society from a primitive to an advanced type. In all of this the tribe represented a type of social organization as well as a stage in social evolution. The evolutionary perspective has been revived in the writings of Marshall Sahlins and in Godelier's critique of Sahlins.3 Godelier goes back to the writings of Morgan to argue that w e can understand the tribe as a type of social organization only if w e view it as a stage in social evolution. N o w , w e m a y follow M o r g a n and show h o w savagery is replaced by barbarism which in turn is replaced by civilization; or w e m a y use a more differentiated sequence of stages, identifying the tribal type of organization with a particular

stage in the sequence. But the real problem, it seems to m e , lies not in identifying the evolutionary stage to which the tribal type of organization corresponds, but in coming to terms with the coexistence of the tribal and other types of organization within the same social and historical context. A n d it is precisely here that the evolutionists of both the past and the present fail to give satisfaction, in so far as evolutionary theory cannot be a substitute for historical understanding. The trouble with nineteenth-century evolutionists was that they too readily believed that the development of a more complex or a more advanced type of society led automatically to the effacement of the tribal type. It is a truism that tribe has preceded state and civilization on the broad scale of social evolution. That is not the problem. T h e problem is that tribes have for centuries and millennia continued to exist on the lap of state and civilization, and to be marked by their impress. T h e evolutionist is preoccupied with the succession of types; our problem is h o w to deal with the coexistence of types in the multistructural formations that are a characteristic feature of so m a n y Asian societies. Godelier has drawn attention to the two schemes of classification presented by Sahlins in his discussion of tribes. In thefirstscheme, presented in 1961, there are four types of organization corresponding to four stages of evolution: the band, the tribe, the chiefdom and the state. In a longer essay, published seven years later, the scheme is somewhat simplified, and, instead of four, w e have three types, namely, the band, the tribe and the state. Godelier finds fault with Sahlins for collapsing the two middle terms of his first scheme (tribe and chiefdom) into one, and so making his later conception of tribe somewhat more elastic than his earlier. In hisfirstessay Sahlins had considered a segmentary structure to be the defining feature of the tribe as a type of society. The significance of segmentary political systems was brought to light by British social anthropologists w h o had worked in Africa. The initial effect of the publication o African Political Systems was to highlight the differences between centralized and segmentary societies, characterized by Fortes and EvansPritchard as societies of Group A and Group B . However it soon became apparent that the distinction between the tribe as segmentary system

On the concept of tribe


and the tribe as chiefdom is relative rather than absolute. In the interval between thefirstand the second essays by Sahlins, Gluckman had published his authoritative work in which he had argued that 'the difference between tribes organized under chiefs and those which lack chiefs is not as great as it appears to be'. 4 Even such a redoubtable ethnographer as Malinowski had, it would seem, mistaken for a chiefdom a system that was basically segmentary in character.6 In the hundred years since Morgan anthropologists have learnt to distinguish analytically between the band, the segmentary system and the chiefdom. But they have continued, by and large, to apply the same term 'tribe' to all the three. It is to some extent a matter of convenience whether w e emphasize the continuities between the three modes of tribal organization or their discontinuities. For those w h o are interested in examining as a historical process the interactions between tribe and state (or between tribe and civilization) there are obvious advantages in starting with the continuities between the various modes of tribal organization. The several hundred units that comprise the Scheduled Tribes of India cover all the modes of tribal organization from the band to the chiefdom. This was so as far back as the early nineteenth century when the tribal areas began to be systematically opened up by the colonial administration. Indeed, u p to that period one might with some justice speak of 'tribal states' in addition to tribal bands, segmentary tribes and tribal chiefdoms. Historically, whether a given tribe was to be reckoned as a tribal chiefdom or qualified as a tribal state depended very m u c h o n the fluctuating fortunes of the larger polity of which it was a part or to which it was related, and not simply on its o w n evolutionary potential. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the mix of the different modes of tribal organization a m o n g those w h o comprise the Scheduled Tribes of today was different from the present mix. Bands of hunters and gatherers such as still exist a m o n g the A n d a m a n Islanders, or, o n the mainland, a m o n g the Birhors, were more c o m m o n then than n o w . The segmentary m o d e of tribal organization was also more c o m m o n in Orissa, M a d h y a Pradesh, Bihar and in the frontier areas. But there were chiefdoms as well, in addition to the tribal states referred to above.

T h e concept of tribe thus faces a double problem in the context of Indian society.There is first of all the problem of discriminating a m o n g related and overlapping modes of tribal organization. There is the equally vexatious problem of drawing clear lines of demarcation between tribal and non-tribal society. In a sense thefirstproblem is only an aspect of the second. In North America, Australia, Melanesia, Polynesia and, to a large extent, even in Africa south of the Sahara, the relationship between tribe and civilization (or between tribe and state) has been of a very different order from this relationship in India and in Asian countries generally. It is for this reason that a concept of tribe based o n the experience of Australia or North Americathe richest fields of classical anthropologycan do little justice to the realities of the Indian situation. In India evolutionary schemes which outline the succession of different types of social organization must yield to the actual historical analysis of coexisting social formations varying widely in scale and complexity. In North America, in Melanesia and in Australia the encounter between tribe and civilization was sharp and sudden; and it has a dramatic, not to say traumatic, character. T h e conditions of the encounter were such as to bring- out the contrast and the cleavage between tribe and civilization, rather than the overlap and the continuity between them. Australia provides the best example: here tribe and civilization represented the two extremes on the scales of technology, social organization and ideology. Race, language and culture divided the tribal from the non-tribal population so sharply that there never could be, as in India, any doubt about their respective identities. In India the encounters between tribe and civilization have taken place under historical conditions of a radically different sort. T h e coexistence of tribe and civilization, and their mutual interaction go back to the beginnings of recorded history and earlier. Tribes have existed at the margins of Hindu civilization from time i m m e m orial, and these margins have always been vague, uncertain andfluctuating.6Hindu civilization acknowledged the distinction between tribe and caste in the distinction between two kinds of communities, jana and/aft', the one confined to the isolation of hills and forests, the other settled in villages and towns with a more elaborate division


of labour. T h e transformation of tribes into castes has been documented by a large number of anthropologists and historians; undoubtedly, the opposite process also took place, though it cannot be as easily documented. T h e tribe as a m o d e of organization has always differed from the caste-based m o d e of organization. But considered as individual units, tribes are not always easy to distinguish from castes, particularly at the margins where the two m o d e s of organization meet. T h e native terminology itself reflects this ambiguity. For instance, in the Bengali language the term for caste is jati and the term for tribe is upajati; but upajati might also denote subcaste. T h e distinctive condition of the tribe in India has been its isolation, mainly in the interior hills and forests, but also in the frontier regions. B y a n d large the tribal communities are those which were either left behind in these ecological niches or pushed back into them in course of the expansion of state and civilization. Their material culture and their social organization have largely been related to the ecological niches in which they have lived their isolated lives.

T h e isolation of the tribal communities is and always has been a matter of degree. S o m e tribes have been m o r e isolated than others, but at least in the interior areas, where the bulk of the tribal population is to be found, none has been completely free from the impress of the wider civilization. Their isolation, whether self-imposed or imposed by others, blocked the growth of their material culture, but it also enabled them to retain their distinctive modes of speech. Today the most important single indicator of the distinction between tribe and caste is language. T h e castes speak one or another of the major literary languages; each tribe has its o w n distinctive dialect which might differ fundamentally from the prevalent regional language. But even this test of identity does not always work. There are m a n y tribes in western India, including the Bhils, one of the most populous in the country, w h o d o not have any language of their o w n , having at an u n k n o w n date adopted the language of the region. It is n o accident that from time immemorial the Bhils have also been associated, both materially and s y m bolically, with s o m e of the most important states in the history of western India.

1 2

This is Morgan's phrase, repeated in a recent text by Godelier referred in note 3, below. E . E . Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer, Clarendon Press, 1940; see also M . Fortes and E . E . EvansPritchard (eds.), African Political Systems, Oxford University Press, 1940. Marshall D . Sahlins, 'The Segmentary Lineage: an Organization of Predatory Expansion', American Anthropologist, Vol. 63, 1961, p . 322-45; Marshall D . Sahlins, Tribesmen, Prentice Hall, 1968; Maurice Godelier, Per-

4 B 6

spectlves In Marxist Anthropology, Cambridge University Press, 1977. M a x Gluckman, Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society, p . 85, Basil Blackwell, 1965. J. P . Singh Uberoi, The Politics of the Kula Ring, Manchester University Press, 1962. There is a vast literature on the subject, but the best single account is in N . K . Bose, The Structure of Hindu Society, Orient Longman, , 1975.

ISSC Stein Rokkan Prize in Comparative Research

The International Social Science Council, in conjunction with the Conjunto Universitario Candido Mendes (Rio de Janeiro), is setting up a biannual prize named after Stein Rokkan in homage to the memory of this great scholar, to be awarded every two years, starting in 1981, and amounting to 2,000. The prize is to reward a seminal contribution in comparative social science research written in English, French or German, by a scholar under 40 years of age on 31 December 1981. It can be a manuscript or a printed book or collected works, published since 1979. Four copies of manuscripts typed doublespace or of printed works should be delivered together with a formal application for the prize to the International Social Science Council before 31 March 1981. Manuscripts and publications received will not be returned.

W o r k s submitted will be evaluated by the International Social Science Council with the assistance of an appropriate referee or referees, under the supervision of the European Consortium for Political Research ( E C P R ) and its Chairman. The award shall be made by the ISSC General Assembly meeting in November 1981 on the recommendation of the ISSC Executive Committee. Its decision shall befinaland not subject to appeal or revision. The amount of the prize m a y be shared by two or more applicants, should it be found difficult to adjudicate between works submitted. For further information, please contact: The Secretary-General International Social Science Council Unesco, 1 rue Miollis, 75015 Paris, France.

Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XXXII, N o . 4, 1980


Professional and documentary services


Standardized list of national political units in the twentieth century

The Russett-Singer-Small list of 1968 updated Theodore Wyckoff*
It has n o w been over ten years since the American Political Science Review published a tool long needed by researchers in thefieldof cross-national studies: a standardized list of national political units in the twentieth century. This standardized list, assembled by political scientists Bruce Russett, and J. David Singer and Historian Melvin Small, brought a welcome measure of order into the previously often confusing business of providing a definitive list of the states in the international political system. 1 It is the need for an updated standardized listand particularly a list with enhanced c o m puter usabilitywhich has engaged the attention of the present writer. Working with the original authors of the 1968 list, the writer has amended the original standardized list, updating it to September 1980. N e w states and other internationally significant non-state units have been added, and the computer readability and researcher usability have been enhanced by the addition of n e w variables. Altogether the revised list numbers 281 units, 168 of them independent entities.2 Basically the n e w list has been developed observing the same decision rules as the original 1968 list. That list continues to be valid for all research for the period prior to its publication date, mid-1968. T h e criteria of size and sovereignty continue the same. Entities whose population never exceeded 10,000 are excluded unless they can be shown to b e or to have been diplomatically significant,,e.g. by general diplomatic recognition by other powers. Only four states fall in this category: Vatican City and three South Pacific states, N a u r u , Vanuatu and Tuvalu. Political units not generally recognized to be independent and sovereign at any given time are classified as 'dependent' in three categories (colony, mandate or militarily occupied) or as 'part of a larger entity'. C o m p o n e n t parts of sovereign political units are not included in the list unless twentiethcentury history has shown them to have had significant political significance in their o w n right. Effective dates are stated for each of these categories. Another criterion is that the list should have universality, that is, it should cover all the globe's major geographic regions. With this in mind, one notable omission from the 1968 list has been added: the continent of Antarctica. Lastly, three n e w variables have been added: an alphameric or spelled-out region code, a dependency status code, and an eight-letter spelling of the n a m e of each country, abbreviated where necessary. Following the above decision rules, the revised list incorporates several types of changes. Thirty-one countries newly independent since 1968 have been added to the list or have their states changed from dependent to independent. Nine additions of other types of entity have been m a d e to the list o n the grounds that these are justified by recent diplomatic history. T h e United Nations, really a suprastate rather than a nation-state, has been included o n the grounds that it possesses a measure of sovereignty in its o w nright:certain specified territory, certain persons with primary loyalty to it, certain military units thatfightunder its flag, and certain governmental decision-making machinery. T h e European C o m m u n i t y has also been included following s o m e of the same reasoning, but other regional political organizations have * Associate Professor of Political Science, Northern Arizona University, B o x 6023, Flagstaff, Arizona 86011.

Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XXXII, N o . 4, 1980


not, on the grounds that they, are more diplomatic clearing-houses than political entities in their o w n right. Added to the list as 'parts of larger entities' are Biafra, which unsuccessfully sought independence from Nigeria from 1968 to 1970, Northern Ireland and Palestinian Lebanon, as well as three south African semi-autonomous dependencies: Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda. Omitted are ethnically identified regions for which separatist movements exist, but where separatist political action and violence have not reached the point of assuming international political significance. Typical of such regions are Quebec, Scotland, and the Basque and Kurdish homelands; these are not included here. Altogether the new list shows 166 independent states, two supra-states and 113 non-state political entitiescolonies, m a n dates, and parts of larger entities. A total of 151 of the independent states are members of the United Nations; the fifteen non-member states are Switzerland, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Nauru, Tonga, Kiribati, Tuvalu, St Vincent, Andorra, Liechtenstein, M o n a c o , San M a rino, Vatican' City and Vanuatu. (The official United Nations roster shows 153 members on 1 January 1980, but this includes the non-sovereign Soviet. Socialist Republics of Byelorussia and Ukraine, which became members by special agreement in 1945.) The list divides the world into twelve regions differentiated geographically, culturally and politically. The Western Hemisphere is divided into three groups differentiated culturally rather than geographically: Anglo-America, Latin America and Afro-America. Europe is divided into Western and Southern Europe as one region and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as another. Africa is divided into West and Central Africa as one region, and East and Southern Africa as another. North Africa and the Middle East are considered as a single separate region. Asia is divided into a South Asian region, a South-East Asia and an East Asia, "and to those is added an Oceania-Australia. T o these twelve regions is added a thirteenth category, 'World'. The two entries under this category are United Nations (code number 001), and a 'World Total' (code number 999). The thirteen regions and categories and the code names given them are thus:

Anglo America, including Greenland Latin America Afro-America Western and Southern Europe Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union Middle East and North Africa West and Central Africa East and Southern Africa South Asia South-East Asia East Asia Oceania, Australia, N e w Zealand and Antarctica World


The remainder of the machine-readable part of each country's entry consists of a case number, a three-character dependency status code, and an eight-letter version of the country n a m e . The case number is a three-digit code assigned to each country from the set 000-999, corresponding to the country code used in Russett, Singer and Small's 1968 list of country codes. The country code is the c o m m o n denominator which makes the old and n e w lists mutually machinereadable. The dependency status code consists of an T , ' D ' or ' O ' corresponding to Independent, Dependent or Other. ('Other' usually refers to states which have ceased to exist, like AustriaHungary, or which have become parts of larger entities, like Serbia and Montenegro.) Printed with the code letter T are two digits corresponding to the year of independence for independent states. T w o blank spaces shown with ' D ' and ' O ' are equivalent to ' O O ' , a double zero or 'missing data' code, indicating that any year entry would be misleading. The code '99' means that the country in question was independent prior to 1900. Periods of temporary change of status (wartime or postwar military occupation) are ignored. Blank spaces also show that the entity was not independent on 1 September 1980. The eight letter version of the country n a m e is read by the computer as two four-letter F O R T R A N variables, since F O R T R A N words are limited to four letters. Reading three sample entries from the first page of the list, it is apparent that both machines and humans can read them rather easily.

Standardized list of national political units in the twentieth century


031 AFA173 B A H A M A S is read as: Case number 031 Region: Afro America Independent since 1973 Name: Bahamas 006 L A M D P U E R T O R I is read as: Case number 006 Region: Latin America Dependent Name: Puerto Rico

042 LAMI199 D O M R E P U B is read as: Case number 042 Region: Latin America Independent since before 1900 Name: Dominican Republic The l i s t of cases follows.


Bruce M . Russett, J. David Singer and Melvin Small, 'National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List', American Political Science Review, Vol. L X I I , N o . 3, September 1968, p . 932-51. Sources for the revised list are: Russett, Singer and Small, op. cit.; U . S . Department of State, B u . reau of Intelligence and Research, Status of the World's Nations January 1978, Department of State Pub. 8735, Washington, U S G P O , 1978; supplemented by 'Geographic Bureaus of the Department of State', Leaflet # 2 5 1 1 , 1-77, S T A T E ( R G E ) , updated for period to 31 December 1979, by telephone inquiry to State Department Bureau of Public AfTairs, Peter Knecht; United Nations Press release, ' M e m b e r States of the United Nations',

N e w Y o r k , United Nations, Department of Public Information, Press Section (18 September 1979) confirmed for period to 31 D e c e m b e r 1979, b y telephone inquiry; Elmer Plischke, Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options, Washington, D . C . , American Enterprise Institute, 1977, Appendix A 'Community of Nations'; U . S . Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services, World Data Handbook, Washington, D . C . , U S G P O , 1972 ( D O S Publication 8665, General Foreign Policy Series 264, released August 1972); New York Times and Christian Science Monitor for entries not elsewhere listed, e.g. Palestinian L e b a n o n a n d South African autonomous regions.

List of national political units in the twentieth century. U p d a t e d to 1 J a n u a r y 1 9 8 0 Part of larger entity from to

Code Region code no.

Unit n a m e (8 letters)

Unit name (extended) United Nations United States of America Alaska Hawaii Virgin Islands Puerto Rico Greenland Faeroe Islands Canada

Independent from to 1945

Dependent from to


001 002 003 004 005 006 010 011 020






1959 1960


col col col col col col col

1959 1960


NEWFOUND BERMUDA BAHAMAS CUBA HAITI DOMREPUB WINDIES JAMAICA TRINIDAD BARBADOS DOMINICA GRENADA STLUCIA STVINCEN ANTIGUA MONTSERR STKITTS GUADELOU MARTINIQ NETHANTI MEXICO BELIZE GUATEMAL HONDURAS ELSALVAD NICARAGU COSTARIC PANAMA CANALZON COLOMBIA VENEZUEL GUYANA SURINAM FRGUIANA ECUADOR PERU BRAZIL BOLIVIA PARAGUAY CHILE Newfoundland 1920 1933 Bermuda Bahamas Cuba Haiti Dominican Republic (West Indies Federation) Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago' Barbados Commonwealth of Dominica Grenada St Lucia St Vincent and the Grenadines Antigua Montserrat St Kitts-NevisAnguilla Guadeloupe Martinique Netherlands Antilles Mexico Belize (British Honduras) Guatemala Honduras El Salvador Nicaragua Costa Rica Panama Panama Canal Zone Colombia Venezuela Guyana (British Guiana) Surinam (Dutch Guiana) French Guiana Ecuador Peru Brazil Bolivia Paraguay Chile 1973 1902

Appendix 1 (continued) 021 030 031 040 041 042 050 051 052 053 054 055 056 057 058 059 060 065 066 068 070 080 090 091 092 093 094 095 096 100 101 110 115 120 130 135 140 145 150 155 AAMD AAMD AFAI73 LAMI02 AFAI99 LAMI99 AFAO AFAI62 AFAI62 AFAI66 AFAI78 AFAI74 AFAI79 AFAI79 AFAD AFAD AFAD AFAD AFAD AFAD LAMI99 AFAD LAMI99 LAMI99 LAMI99 LAMI99 LAMI99 LAMI03 LAMO LAMI99 LAMI99 AFAI66 AFAI75 AFAD LAMI99 LAMI99 LAMI99 LAMI99 LAMI99 LAMI99 1920 1933 1949 1973 1902

col col col col col col col col col col col col col col col col col col col col


1958 1962 1962 1962 1966 1978 1974 1979 1979

1962 1962 1962 1978 1974 1979 1979

1958 1958 1958 1958

1962 1962 1962 1962

1958 1962 1958 1962 1958 1962 1958 1962 1958 1962 1958 1962


1903 1979 col


1903 1903

1966 1975

1966 1975

col col col

Standardized list of national political units in the twentieth century


160 165 200 201 202 203 205 206 209 210 211 212



Argentina Uruguay United K i n g d o m Isle of M a n Guernsey and dependencies Jersey Irish Republic (Eire) Northern Ireland European Community Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg

' . col col col 1922

1927 1979 1940 1945 1940 1945 1914 1918 1940 1944 1942 1944 1942 1944

1940 1945 1940 1945 1914 1918 1940 1944 1942 1944 1942 1944

occ occ occ occ occ occ

220 221 223 225 230 231 232 235 255 256



France Monaco Liechtenstein Switzerland (Helvetia) Spain Gibraltar Andorra Portugal Federal Republic of Germany Saar


1945 1949

1945 1949 1920 1935 1945 1947 1947 1957 1945 1949

occ man occ col occ 1920 1935 1945 1957 1945




G e r m a n Democratic Republic Poland Danzig (Austria-Hungary) Austria Hungary Czechoslovakia Slovakia Italy 1918 1918 1938 1955 1918 1918 1939 1945 1949 1919 1939 1945

290 291 300 305 310 315 317 325



1939 1945 1920 1939 1939 1945 1938 1955 occ man occ occ

1919 1920

1945 1918 1918 1918 1939 1945

1939 1945 1939 1945

occ occ


Appendix 1 (continued) 326 328 331 338 339 345 346 347 348 350 351 352 355 360 365 366 367 368 369 370 375 380 385 390 395 400 401 402 403 404 410 411 412 413 420 WSEO WSEI99 WSEI99 WSEI64 EESI12 EESI99 EESO EESO EESO WSEI99 WSEO WSEI60 EESI08 EESI99 EESI99 EESO EESO EESO EESO EESO WSEI19 WSEI99 WSEI05 WSEI99 WSEI44 WSED WSED WCAI75 WCAI75 WCAI74 WSED WCAI68 WCAO WCAO WCAI65 TRIESTE VATICAN SMARINO MALTA ALBANIA YUGOSLAV BOSNIA HERZEGOV MONTENEG GREECE CRETE CYPRUS BULGARIA RUMANIA USSR ESTONIA LATVIA LITHUANI UKRAINE BYELORUS FINLAND SWEDEN NORWAY DENMARK ICELAND AZORES MADEIRA CAPEVERD SAOTOME GUINEBIS CANARYIS EQUAGUIN RIOMUNI FERNANDO GAMBIA Trieste Vatican City San Marino Malta Albania Yugoslavia/Serbia Bosnia Herzegovina Montenegro Greece Crete Cyprus Bulgaria Rumania (Romania) USSR/Russia Estonia Latvia Lithuania Ukraine Byelorussia Finland Sweden Norway Denmark Iceland (Western Isles) Madeira Isles Cape Verde Islands So T o m and Prncipe (Portuguese Guinea) Guinea-Bissau Canary Islands Equatorial Guinea (Spanish Guinea) Rio Muni Fernando P o The Gambia 1964 1912 1914 1921 1939 1944 1941 1944 1943 1947 1947 1954 1964 1914 1921 1939 1944 1941 1944 1908 1908 1919 1941 1944 1960 1908 _ 1918 1940 occ man col occ occ occ occ occ 1908 1908 1919 1913 1947 1954


1941 1944 occ 1912 1960 1908 occ col col

1918 1940 1918 1940 1918 1940 1941 1943 occ 1941 1943 occ 1918 1920 1919 1940 1945 1940 1945 1944 1975 1975 1974 1968 1960 1960 1965 occ occ col col col col col col col col col col col 1960 1960 1905

1918 1940 1918 1940 1918 1920

1919 1905 1940 1945 1940 1945 1944 1975 1975 1974 1968


Standardized list of national political units in the.twentieth century


430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 450 451 452 460 461 462 470 471



(French West Africa) (Mali Federation) Mali (Sudanese Republic) Senegal Benin (Dahomey) Mauritania Niger Ivory Coast Guinea (French Guinea) Upper Volta Liberia Sierra Leone Ghana (Gold Coast) (German Togoland) Togo (French Togoland) British Togoland (to Ghana) Kamerun (German Cameroon) Cameroon (French Cameroons) British Cameroons (split between Cameroon and Nigeria) Nigeria Biafra (French Equatorial Africa) Gabon Central African Republic'(Central African Empire) Chad Congo (Brazzaville) (French Congo) Congo (Kinshasa) (Belgian Congo) Zaire Uganda Kenya Tanzania/ Tanganyika/ German East Africa Zanzibar

6/60 8/60 1960 1960 1960 1960 1960 1960 1958

1958 1959 1960 1960 1916 1922 1960 1960 1960 1960 1960 1958 1960 1961 1957 1916 1922 1960

col col col col col col col col col col col col col occ man man col occ occ man occ man

1959 1960 1959 1960

1960 1961 1957


1960 1922 1958 1916 1919 1922 1960 1916 1919 1922 1960 1922 1956





1919 1922 1922 1961

1919 1961

475 476 480 481 482



1960 1968 1970


col 1968 1970

1960 1960

1958 1960 1960

col col col 1960 1960

483 484 490



1960 1960 1960

1960 1960 1960

col col col

1960 1960

500 501 510



1962 1963 1961




1963 1964

1962 1963 1916 1916 1922 1922 1961 1963

col col col occ man col


8 4 0

Appendix 1 (continued) 515 516 517 520 ESAO ESAI62 ESAI62 ESAI60 RUANURUN BURUNDI RWANDA SOMALIA (Ruanda-Urundi) Burundi Rwanda Somalia/Italian Somaliland British Somaliland French Somaliland Djibouti Ethiopia (Abyssinia) 1922 1962 1962 1962 1960 1941 1941 1950 1950 1960 1960 1977 cl occ man col col man 1922 1962 1962 521 522 530 ESAO ESAI77 ESAI99 BRSOMALI DJIBOUTI ETHIOPIA 1960 1977 1936 1936 1941 1941 531 540 541 550 ESAO ESAI75 ESAI75 ESAO ERITREA ANGOLA MOZAMBIQ FEDRHONY Eritrea Angola Mozambique (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland) Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) Rhodesia (Southern Rhodesia) Zimbabwe Malawi (Nyassaland) South Africa Cape Colony Natal Transvaal 1975 1975 1941 1941 1945 1975 1975 1953 1964 col occ col col col occ

551 552



1964 ___ 1965

1964 1965

col col

1953 1964 1953 1964

553 560 561 562 563



1964 _ 1920



1903 1920 col 1903 1903 1910 col 1910 1910 1910 col col 1910 1910

564 565



570 571 572 574 575 576 580 581



Orange Free State/ Orange River Col. (South West Africa) Namibia (German West Africa) Lesotho (Basutoland) Botswana (Bechuanaland) Swaziland Transkei Bophuthatswana Venda Madagascar (Malagasy) Comoro Islands

1900 1900 1910 1915 1915 1922 1922 1966 col col occ man col col col col col col col 1910

1966 1966 _ 1968 1966

1960 1975

1968 1976 1977 1979 1960

1976 1977 1979

1947 1975 col


Standardized list of national political units in the twentieth century


585 590 591 600



Reunion Mauritiu Seychelles Morocco

1968 1976 1911 1956


col col col col man occ man 1956 col 1956 1923

1911 1956 601 MNAO TANGIER Tangier 1923 1940 1940 1945 1945 1956 1912 1956




Spanish Morocco


605 606



Ifni Spanish North African Presidios (incl. Alhucemas, Ceuta, Chafarinas, Melilla, and Penon de Velez) Western Sahara (Spanish Sahara) Algeria 1962 Tunisia 1956 Libya/Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Fezzan

1934 1969

col 1969 col


609 615 616 620



1975 1962 1956

col col col


1912 1912 1942 1942 1946 1946 1951 1951 1956 ~ 1917 1917 1920 1920 1932 occ man 1956 col occ man col

625 630 640 645



Sudan (AngloEgyptian) Iran (Persia) Turkey/Ottoman Empire Iraq (Mesopotamia)

650 651



(United Arab Republic) (United Arab Republic/Egypt) Egypt

1932 1958 1961 1922 1958 1961 _ 1958 1961 1922 col


Appendix 1 (continued) 652 MNAI44 SYRIA

Syria (United Arab Republic/Syria) 1944 1958 1961 1943

1918 1923 occ 1923 1944 man


1958 1961 1918



Lebanon Palestinian Lebanon, Southern Lebanon (PLO controlled areas) Jordan (Transjordan)

1918 1923 occ 1923 1943 man 661 MNAO SLEBANON





1918. 1923 occ 1923 1946 man 1946





Israel (Palestine) 1918 1923 occ 1923 1948 man 1948 Saudi Arabia/Nejd 1902 Hejaz Sultanate 1919 1926 Asir 1914 1926 1926 1930 col 1914




1902 occ
1919 1926

671 672



673 674 678 680





Al Hasa 1913 occ Jabal Shammar 1921 Yemen 1918 People's Republic of 1967 1967 col Southern Y e m e n (Federation of South Arabia/Aden Colony) Aden Protectorate 1915 col

1930 1913 1921 1918


690 692 694 696 698 700



Kuwait Bahrain Qatar United Arab Emirates (Trucial O m a n States) Muscat and O m a n Afghanistan 1961 1971 1971 1971

1961 col 1971 col 1971 col 1971 col




Standardized list of national political units in the twentieth century


710 711 712 713 720 721 730 731 732 735 740 741



People's Republic of China Manchukuo Mongolian People's Republic Republic of China (Taiwan, Formosa) Hong K o n g Macao Korea (Chosen) Democratic People's Republic of Korea Republic of Korea Far Eastern Republic (to U S S R ) Japan Ryukyu Islands


1932 1945 1945 1921 1921 . 1949 1905 1905 1945 1945 1948 1948 1948 192G 1920 1922 1922 1945 1945 1952 1952 1945 1945 1951 occ 1951 1972 col 1972 750 751 752 SASI47 SASO SASO INDIA FRINDIA PORTINDI India 1947 French India (incl. Pondicherry) Portuguese India (incl. G o a , Diu and D a m a n ) Bhutan Sikkim Pakistan Bangladesh Burma 1971 1947 1972 1937 1942 1942 1945 1945 1948 1948 780 781 790 800 SASI48 SASI65 SASI99 SEAI99 SRILANKA MALDIVES NEPAL THAILAND Sri Lanka (Ceylon) 1948 Maldive Islands Nepal Thailand (Siam) 1965 : 1965 col 1948 col col occ col 1954 1961 col 1954 col occ 1962 760 761 770 771 775 SASI71 SASD SASI47 SASI72 SASI48 BHUTAN SIKKIM PAKISTAN BANGLADE BURMA 1971 col col 194T 1977 1932 1961 1962 1947 col occ col occ col col 1949


Appendix 1 (continued) 810 SEAO INDOCHIN Indochina Cambodia (Kampuchea) K h m e r Republic Laos 1949 1941 1945 1949 1954 1953 1949 1954 1954 col 1954 1949 1954 col 1949 1949 col occ col 1949

811 812 815












(Indochina) Socialist Republic of Vietnam (formerly North Vietnam) Socialist Republic of Vietnam Republic of Vietnam Malaysia/Federation of Malaya Malayan Union Federated Malay States

1954 1975 1954 1975 1946 1957 1957 1942 1942 1945 1945 1946 1942 1942 1945 1945 1946 1942 1942 1943 1945 1963 1941 1941 1945 1945 1963 1942 1942 1945 1945 1946 col occ col col

1975 1975

1946 822 SEAO UNFEDMAL Unfedcrated Malay States (inch Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, Trengannu) Sabah (North Borneo) col occ col 1946 col occ col 1963 824 SEAO SARAWAK Sarawak col occ col 1963 col occ col 1946 1946 1940 1963 1965 col 1963 1965







Straits Settlement (incl. Penang and Malacca) Singapore




835 840





1941 1941 1945 1945 1942 1942 1945 1945 1946 1946

col occ col col occ col

Standardized list of national political units in the twentieth century








Indonesia (Netherlands East Indies) West Irian (Netherlands N e w Guinea) Timor Australia




860 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 910 911 912



1942 1942 1945 1945 1962 1962 1976 1901 1920 1920 1975 ' 1901 1901 1901 1901 1901 1901

col occ col man col col col


N e w South Wales Western Australia South Australia Victoria Queensland Tasmania Papua and N e w Guinea Papua N e w Guinea (German N e w Guinea) N e w Zealand Cook Islands N e w Caledonia (New Hebrides) Pacific Republic of Vanuatu Solomon Islands Gilbert and Ellice Islands (Gilbert Is.) Kiribati (Ellice Is.) Tuvalu Fiji Islands Tonga Islands (Friendly Islands) French Polynesia (Oceania) Nauru

1901 col 1901 col 1901 col 1901 col 1901 col 1901 1946 1975 1946 1914 1914 1921 1921 1920 1920 925 930 935 OAUD OAUD OAUD COOKIS NEWCALED VANUATU 1980 1980 1978 1978 1979 col col col col col man col col occ man col 1946





940 945 946 947 950 955 960 970



1979 1979 1970 1970

1970 1970

col col col





Appendix 1 (continued) 980 OAUD MICRONES U . S . Pacific Trust Territories (inch Caroline, Marshall and Mariana Is.) Federated States of Micronesia Guam 1914 1914 1920 1920 1944 1944 1947 1947 1941 1941 1944 1944 1914 1914 1920 1920 1962 1962

col occ man occ man col occ c o l c o l occ man

c o l

985 990



Western Samoa

991 995 999



American Samoa Antarctica World Total

Approaching international conferences1

Columbus, Ohio International Union of Local Authorities: Congress IULA, 45, Wassenaarseweg, The Hague (Netherlands) Centre Thomas More: Round Table (Theme: Limits and Mutation) Centre Thomas More, B.P. 150, 69210 L'Arbesle (France)

17-18 January L'Arbesle (France) 26-28 March Washington, D . C .

Population Association of America: Meeting PAA, Box 14182, Benjamin Franklin Station, Washington, D . C . 20044 (United States) Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics; U . S . Environmental Protection Agency: ConferenceEnvironmetrics '81 Environmetrics '81, SIAMS, 33 S. 17th St., Philadelphia, PA 19103 (United States) Institute of Environmental Sciences: Second International Conference on Tourism and Environment IES, Ms Peterson, Exec. Dir., 940 E Northwest Hwy, Mt Prospect, Illinois 60056 (United States) International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences: Intercongress E. Sunderland, Seer. Gen., c\o Dept of Anthropology, University of Durham ( United Kingdom) Centre Thomas More: Round Table on Cultural Identity, Religion and Nation Centre Thomas More, B.P. 105, 69210 VArbesle (France) Institute of Management Sciences; Opinion Research Society of America: Joint Meeting M . Lister, Strategic Policy Sec, East Build., 1201 Wilson Ave, Downsview, Ontario M3MIJ8 (Canada) International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations: Tenth Annual Meeting Prof. Neil B . Weissman, Dept of History, Dickinson College, Carlisle, PA 17013 (United States)

6-8 April Washington, D . C . 10-15 April Lausanne

23-26 April


25-26 April

L'Arbesle (France)

4-6 M a y


28-31 M a y Bloomington (United States)

1. N o further details concerning these meetings can be obtained through this Journal.

Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. X X X n , N o . 4, 1980


History of Economics Society: 1981 Meeting Warren J. Samuels, Dept of Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824 ( United States) 9-12 June Honolulu Association of Asian Studies, Commission of Hawaii, Philippine Studies Committee: Symposium (Theme: Filipinos in Hawaii and the United States and Philippine Studies) Symposium Committee, Filipino 75th Anniversary Commemoration Commission, 1151 Punchbowl Street, Room 233, Honolulu, Hawaii 96813 (United States) 10-13 June River Falls C H E I R O N International Society for the History of Behavioral and (United States) Social Sciences: Thirteenth Annual Meeting Dr D . A . Charpentier, Dept of Psychology, University of Wisconsin, River Falls, WI54022 ( United States) 15-21 June International Union of Architects: Fortecnth World Congress and Warsaw Fifteenth General Assembly (Theme: Architecture-Man-Environment) Comit d'Organisation du 14' Congrs UIA, Assoc, des Architectes polonais, SARP-Foksal 2, B.P. 6, Warsaw 00950 (Poland) 21-26 June Interamerican Society of Psychology: Eighteenth Interamerican Congress Santo Domingo Gerardo Marin, Spanish-speaking Mental Health Res. Centre, University (Dominican Republic) of California, Los Angeles, Calif. 90024 ( United States) 22-26 June Social Science & Medicine: Seventh Inernational Conference (Themes: Noordwijkerhout Ideologies, Social Policy, Health Structure and Social Sciences, etc.) (Netherlands) Dr P. J. M . McEwan, Glengarden, Balleter, Aberdeenshire AB3 5UB (United Kingdom) July Downsview International Society for the Study of Behavioral Development: Sixth Biennial Conference ISSBD, Dr H . McGurk, Dept. of Psychology, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey ( United Kingdom) World Federation for Mental Health: World Congress Ms Edita G. Martillano, National Exec. Dir., Phil. Mental Health Assoc, 18 East Avenue, Quezon City (Philippines) International Federation of Operational Research Societies: Ninth International Conference Mrs H . Welling, IFORS, co D T H , IMSOR, Bygning 349, 2800 Lyngby (Denmark) International Political Science Association: Round Table on Social Mobility and Political Attitudes IPSA Secretariat, cjo University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario KIN 6N5 (Canada) International Sociological Association: International Congress on the Emerging W o m a n p o w e r Prof. Samir K. Ghosh, Internat. Organizing Committee, 114 SriAurobindo Road, Konnagar, WB 71235, near Calcutta (India) Pacific Science Association: Fourth Inter-Congress Ms B . Bishop, Gen. Seer., PSA, P.O. Box 17801, Honolulu, Hawaii 96817 (United States) Society for the Study of Social Problems: Thirty-first Annual Meeting Dr H . Auerbach, 208 Rockwell Hall, Univ. College at Buffalo, 1300 ElmwoodAve, Buffalo, N.Y. 14222 ( United States ) Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs: Thirty-first Pugwash Conference Pugwash Conf. on Science and World Affairs, 9 Great Russell Mansions, 60 Great Russell Street, London WC1B 3BE (UnitedKingdom)

1-3 June

East Lansing

July 20-24 July

Manila Hamburg





August 25-28 August 26-31 August

Singapore Toronto Banff (Canada)

Approaching international conferences


13-17 September


13-18 September Jerusalem

21-25 September


26-30 September


Alcohol and Drug Problems Association of North America: Thirtysecond Annual Meeting Alcohol and Drug Problems Assoc, of North America, H . Hewlett, 1101 Fifteenth StNW, Suite 204,Washington, D . C . 20009 (United States) International Congress on Drug and Alcohol (Theme: Drug UserIndividual & Systematic Issues) Stanley Einstein, Organizing Committee, Internat. Congress on Drugs and Alcohol, P.O. Box 394, Tel Aviv (Israel) International Political Science Association: Round Table on the Political Dimensions of the N e w International Order IPSA Secretariat, co University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario KIN 6N5 (Canada) International Federation for Housing and Planning: International Congress IFHP, 43, Wassenaarseweg, The Hague (Netherlands) International Union for the Scientific Study of Population: General Conference IUSSP, S rue Forgeur, 4000 Lige (Belgium) International Relations Research Association: Annual Meeting IRRA, 7226 Social Science Buildg., University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI53706 (United States)

9-16, December


28-30 December Washington, D . C .

29 April1 May San Diego Population Association of America: Meeting (California) PAA, P.O. Box 14182, Benjamin Franklin Station, Washington, D C 20044 (United States) Oslo International Federation for Housing and Planning: Thirty-sixth World Congress IFHP, 43 Wassenaarseweg, The Hague (Netherlands) International Political Science Association: Twelfth World Congress IPSA Secretariat, c/o University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario KIN 6N5 (Canada) Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs: Thirty-second Pugwash Conference Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, 9 Great Russell Mansions, 60 Great Russell Street, London WC1B 3BE (United Kingdom) International Sociological Association: World Congress Marcel Rafie, ISA Secretariat, P.O. Box 719 'A', Montreal, P.Q. H3C2V2 (Canada)

7-11 June

August August

Rio de Janeiro Warsaw

23-28 August Mexico City

Books received

B R E N , Rainer. Gegenwarts-bezogene Orientwissenschaft in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Gttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht [1980]. L I N I G E R - G O U M A Z , Max. Guinea Ecuatorial: Bibliogra204 p . , index. (Schriftenreihe der Stiftung fa general, III & IV. Berne, Commission Volkswagenwerk.) Nationale Suisse pour l'Unesco, 1978, 1980. C H E R N S , Albert (ed.). Quality of Working Life and the 2 vols. 317 p . Kibbutz Experience: Proceedings of an International Conference in Israel, June 1978. Norwood, Pa., Norwood Editions, 1980. Philosophy, psychology 287 p . ,figs.(Kibbutz, Communal Society, and Alternative Social Policy Series, 2.) B A D C O C K , C . R . The Psychoanalysis of Culture. $17.50. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980.264 p . , tables, F R A N C E . Mission l'Informatique du Ministre de bibliogr., index. 15. l'industrie. Six pays face l'informatisation ; U S S R . A C A D E M Y O F S C I E N C E S . Ethics: Communist Canada, tats-Unis, Grande-Bretagne, HonMorality. M o s c o w , U S S R Academy of Scigrie, RFA, Sude, par l'Association interences, 1980. 196 p . (Problems of the Contemnationale de donnes pour le dveloppement. porary World, 83.) Paris, L a Documentation Franaise, 1979. 391 p . , tables. (Informatisation et socit, 5; 'conomie et politique' series.) Religion RAO, C. H . ; HANUMANTHA; JOSHI, P. C. (eds.). Reflections on Economie Development and M C S W E E N E Y , Bill. Roman Catholicism: The Search Social Change. New Delhi/Bombay/Calcutta, for Relevance. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980. Allied Publishers Private Ltd, 1980. 428 p . , 272 p . , index. 9.95. bibliogr., index. Rs. 100. M I L E T , Jean. Dieu ou le Christ ? Paris, ditions de U N I T E D STATES O F A M E R I C A . N A T I O N A L COMMISSION Trvise, 1980. 334 p . (Polmique.) O N Y O U T H . 77ie Transition of Youth to Adulthood: A Bridge too Long, ed. by Frank Brown. Boulder, Col., Wcstview Press, 1980. 228 p . , figs., index. Hardcover, $25.50; paperback, Social sciences $11. Z A H N , Erich. Systemforschung in der Bundesrepublik World Congress for Rural Sociology, 5, Mexico City, 7-12 August 1980: The Struggle of Rural ,'' Deutschland. Gttingen, Vandenhoeck & R u Mexico, by Gustavo Esteva et al. Mexico ' precht [1980]. 139j)., tables, bibliogr. City, Mexican Organizing Committee, 1980. 214 p . , tables, bibliogr. General Sociology B L A S I , Joseph Raphael. The Communal Future: The Kibbutz and the Utopian Dilemma. Norwood, Pa., Norwood Editions, 1980. 279 p . , tables, F A L K , bibliogr. (Kibbutz, C o m m u n a l Society, and Alternative Social Policy Series, 1.) $17.50. Political science Richard A . ; K I M , Samuel S . (eds.). The War System: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Boulder, Col., Westview Press, 1980. 659 p . ,

Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XXXII, N o . 4, 1980

Books received


tables, bibliogr. $35. (Westview Special cin y Presupuesto, Diciembre 1979. 340 p., Studies in Peace, Conflict and Conflict tables. Resolutions.) P A L E O L O G U E , Eustache. Les nouvelles relations conoF E R G E , Zsuzsa. A Society in the Making: Hungarian miques internationales. Paris, Presses Univer, Social and Societal Policy, 1945-75. White sitaires de France, 1980. 278 p . , bibliogr., Plains, M . E . Sharpen Inc., 1979. 333 p . , index (I.E.D.E.S.Collection Tiers Monde.) tables, index. $22.50. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME. Rural M E R R I T , Anna; M E R R I T , Richard L . (eds.). Public Women's Participation in Development. N e w Opinion in Semisovereign Germany. Urbana/ York, U N D P , 1980. 226 p . , illus., tables, Chicago/London, University of Illinois Press, bibliogr. (Evaluation Study, 3.) 1980. 273 p . , index. (The H I C O G Surveys, U N I T E D N A T I O N S A S I A N A N D PACIFIC D E V E L O P M E N T 1949-55.) ADMINISTRATION C E N T R E , E X P E R T G R O U P P O L S B Y , Nelson W . Community Power and Political M E E T I N G , N E W D E L H I , 17-21 S E P T E M B E R 1979: Theory: A Further Look at Problems of Administrative Reforms for Decentralized DeEvidence and Inference, 2nd enl. ed. N e w velopment, ed. by A . P . Saxena. Kuala Haven/London, Yale University Press, 1980. Lumpur, A P D A C , 1980. 302 p . 245 p . , index.
P R I C E , Robert M . ; R O S B E R G , Carl L . (eds.). The

Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Social welfare Domination. Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, 1980. 376 p . , bibliogr., D E R T H I C K , ' Martha. Policymaking for Social Security. index. $8.95. (Research series, 43.) Washington, D . C , The Brookings InstitutionSINKIN, Richard N . The Mexican Reform, 1855-76: 1980. 446 p . , index. Hardcover, 15; paperA Study in Liberal Nation-building. Austin, back, 5.75. Institute of Latin American Studies, 1979. G U I L L E M A R D , Anne-Marie. La vieillesse de l'tat. 263 p . , tables, bibliogr., index. Hardcover, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1980. $18.95; paperback, $7.50. 238 p . , tables. (Politiques.) U S S R . A C A D E M Y O F S C I E N C E S . Present-day Develop- M A S S O N , Alain. Mainmise sur l'enfance : gense de ment of Africa. M o s c o w , U S S R Academy of la normatique. Paris, Payot, 1980. 216 p . Sciences, 1980. 221 p . (African Studies by (Traces.) Soviet Scholars, 1.) ORGANISATION MONDIALE DE LA SANT. BUREAU RV E N E Z U E L A . UNIVERSIDAD C E N T R A L . F A C U L T A D D E G I O N A L D E L ' E U R O P E . Les soins de sant priCIENCIAS JURDICAS Y POLTICAS. INSTITUTO maires en Europe, par Leo A . Kaprio. DE ESTUDIOS POLTICOS. Politeia, 1978. Copenhague, Bureau rgional de l'Europe, Caracas, Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1980. 44 p . , bibliogr. 5 S.wiss Francs. (Rap1978. 529 p., tables. ports et tudes E U R O , 14) " W N G B O R G , Manne. Disarmament and Development: A Guide to Literature Relevant to the United Nations Study. Stockholm, Frsvarets ForApplied sciences skingsanstalt [1980]. 65 p .
C H E S T O N , Stephen T . ; W I N T E R , David L . (eds.). Hu-


H A R R I S O N , Paul. The Third World Tomorrow: A Report from the Battlefront in the War against Poverty. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1980. 378 p . , bibliogr., index. 2.50. Social and cultural anthropology, M T Y S , Antal. History of Modern Non-marxian Economics. Budapest, Acadmiai Kiad, 1980. ethnology 591 p . ,figs.,index. $50. C A R M A C K , Robert M . Etnohistoria y teora antropoM E I E R , Gerald M . International Economics: The lgica. Guatemala, Ministerio de Educacin, Theory of Policy. N e w York/Oxford, Oxford 1979. 87 p . , illus., bibliogr. (Cuadernos de University Press, 1980. 381 p . , figs., tables, Seminario de Integracin Social Guatemalindex. 6.95. teca, 26.) M E X I C O . S E C R E T A R A D E L T R A B A J O Y PREVISIN S O CIAL. La ocupacin informal en aeras urbanas, . Historia social de los Quiches. Guatemala, 1976. Mexico City, Secretara de ProgramaMinisterio de Educacin,' 1979. 455 p . ,

man Factors of Outer Space Production. Boulder.Col., Westview Press, 1980.206 p . , figs., illus., tables, bibliogr. $18.50. ( A A A Selected Symposium, 50.)


Studies of Health Systems and Medical Care, 3.) 15; 831.25. N E E D H A M , Rodney. El futuro de la antropologia social: F R A N C E . C E N T R E N A T I O N A L D E L A R E C H E R C H E SCIENDesintegracin o metamorfosis? Guatemala, TIFIQUE. M A I S O N DES SCIENCES D E L ' H O M M E . Ministerio de Educacin, 1979. 27 p . (CuaUNIVERSIT R E N D E S C A R T E S . Technique et dernos del Seminario de Integracin Social culture. Paris, Maison des Sciences de Guatemalteca, 25.) l'Homme, April 1978. 249 p., illus., tables. (Bulletin de l'quipe de recherche 191, 3.) . . . . Techniques et culture. Paris, Physical planning Maison des Sciences de l ' H o m m e , N o vember 1979. 130 p . , illus., maps, bibliogr. GUIBOURDENCHE, P.; KUKAWKA, P.; MARIE, C , et al. (Bulletin de l'quipe de recherche 191, 4.) Agonie ou relance de l'amnagement du terriK L E I N M A N N , Arthur. Patients and Healers in the toire : propos de la confrence de Vichy. Context of Culture. Berkeley/Los Angeles/ Grenoble, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, London, University of California Press, 1980. 1979. 213 p . (Cahiers de l'Amnagement du 427 p . , figs., bibliogr., index. (Comparative Territoire, V . )

bibliogr. (Seminario de Integracin Social Guatemalteca, 38.)

Recent Unesco publications*

(including publications assisted by Unesco)

Aspects of Iraqi Cultural Policy, by Abdel-Gawad Educational Planning and Social Change. Paris, D a o u d El-Basri. Paris, Unesco, 1980. 38 p . , Unesco/International Institute for Educational illus. 10 F . (Studies and Documents o n Planning, 1980. 211 p . 40 F . Cultural Policies.) International Bibliography of the Social Sciences: Economicsl Bibliographie internationale des The Child's Right to Education, ed. by Gaston M i a sciences sociales : Science conomique, V o l . 27', laret. Paris, Unesco, 1979. 258 p . , figs., 1978. L o n d o n / N e w Y o r k , Tavistock Publitables. 28 F . cations, 1978. 526 p . 32; 280 F . Communication Policies in Kenya, by Peter M w a u r a . Paris, Unesco, 1980. 94 p . , tables. 20 F . International Bibliography of the Social Sciences: So(Communication Policies Studies.) ciology/Bibliographic internationale des sciences sociales : Sociologie, V o l . 2 8 , 1978. Communication Policies in Nigeria, by Frank O k w u London/Chicago, Tavistock Publications/ Ugbajah. Paris, Unesco, 1980. 67 p . , tables. Beresford Book Service, 1980, 463 p . 30; 12 F . (Communication Policies Studies.) 270 F . Communication Policies in Zaire : A Study, by Botombele Ekanga Bokonga. Paris, Unesco, Many Voices, One World: Towards a New More Just 1980. 59 p . , tables. 14 F . (Communication and More Efficient World of Information and Policies Studies.) Communication Order, by Sean MacBride et al. London, K o g a n P a g e / N e w Y o r k , Cultural Policy in Australia, by Jean Bettersby. Paris, Unipub/Paris, Unesco, 1980. 312 p . , figs., Unesco, 1980. 86 p . ,figs.,illus., tables. 16 F . tables, index. 50 F . (Report by the Inter(Studies and Documents in Cultural Policies.) national Commission for the Study of C o m Cultural Policy in Yugoslavia, by Stevan Majstorovic. munication Problems.) Paris, Unesco, 1980. 81 p . , illus., tables. 16 F . (Studies and Documents in Cultural Policies.) Mass Media: The Image, Role and Social Conditions Demographic Aspects of Educational Planning, by T a of Women. Paris, Unesco, 1979. 78 p . (ReN g o c C h u . Paris, Unesco/International Inports and Papers o n M a s s Communication, stitute for Educational Planning, 1980. 84 p . , 84.) 12 F . tables. 15 F . (Fundamentals of Educational The Multilateral Exchange of Educational AudioPlanning, 9.) visual Materials: Existing Mechanisms and Suggestions for the Future. Paris, Unesco, The Economics of New Educational Media, vol. 2: 1980. 117 p . , tables. 30 F . (Educational Cost and Effectiveness. Paris, Unesco, 1980. Methods and Techniques, 2.) 316 p . 48 F . (Educational Methods and Techniques, 1.) Education, Work and Employment; Vol. 1: Education, Training and Access to the Labour Market, How to obtain these publications: (a) Priced Unesco by Jacques Hallak et al. Paris, Unesco/ publications can be obtained from the Office International Institute for Educational Planof the Unesco Press, Commercial Services ning, 1980. 320 p . , tables. 45 F . ( P U B / C ) , 7 place de Fontenoy, 75700 Paris, or from national booksellers (see list at the Education, Work and Employment, vol. 2: Segmented end of this issue); (b) unpriced Unesco p u b Labour Markets, by Martin Carnoy. Worklications can be obtained free from Unesco, place Democracy and Educational Planning, Documents Division ( C O L / D ) ; (c) publiby Henry M . Levin. Education and Selfcations not put out directly or in co-publiemployment, by Kenneth King. Paris, Unesco/ cation by Unesco can be obtained through International Institute for Educational Plannormal retail channels. ning, 1980. 283 p . , tables. 45 F .

Int. Sot. Sei. J., Vol. X X X I I , N o , 4, 1980


Population-Environment Relations in Tropical Islands: Particular Reference to the Role of CommuniThe Case of Eastern Fiji. Paris, Unesco, 1980. cation. Final Report. Bangkok, Office of the 230 p . 60 F . ( M A B Technical Notes, 13.) Regional Adviser for Social Sciences, Unesco Rgional Office for Education in Asia and The Problems of Rural Education, by V . L . Griffiths. Oceania, 1980. 121 p . Paris, Unesco/International Institute for Educational Planning, 1980. 38 p . 15 F . (Fun- Two Studies on Unemployment among Educated Young damentals of Educational Planning, 7.) People, by Simone Morio and Yarrise Zoctizoum. Paris, Unesco, 1980. 133 p. tables. Social Sciences: In Response to Policy NeedsFour 15 F . Case Studies from Asia, ed. by K . J. Ratnam. Bangkok, Office of the Regional Adviser for Women in the Media. Paris, Unesco, 1980.119 p. 18 F . Social Sciences, Unesco Regional Office for World Directory of Social Science Institutions 1979, Education in Asia and Oceania, 1980. 175 p . 2nd ed. rev.I Repertoire mondial des institutions de sciences sociales, 2' d. rev. et augm. Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism. Paris, Repertorio mundial de instituciones de ciencias Unesco, 1980. 499 p . 90 F . sociales, 2a. ed. rev. y aum. Paris, Unesco, Studies on Women in Southeast Asia: A Status Report, 1979. 485 p . (II World Social Science Inforby Lccla D u b e . Bangkok, Office of the mation Services/Services mondiaux d'inforRegional Adviser for Social Sciences, Unesco mation en sciences sociales/Servicios mundiaRegional Office for Education in Asia and les de informacin sobre ciencias sociales.) Oceania, 1980. 77 p . , bibliogr. 60 F . Trends in Ethnic Group Relations in Asia and Oceania. Paris, Unesco, 1979. 292 p . , tables, bibliogr. Young People and Cultural Institutions: Eight Young 38 F . (Race and Society, 3.) People Give their Views on the Cultural Institutions in their CountriesA Unesco Unesco Meeting of Experts and Participating ReSurvey. Paris, Unesco, 1980. 87 p. 20 F . searchers, Kuala Lumpur, 14-28 September 1979: Dynamics of Nation-building, with

Unesco publications: national distributors

G E R M A N D E M O C R A T I C R E P U B L I C : Buchhaus. Leipzig, Postfach 140, 701 Leipzig or international bookshops in the German Democratic Republic. G E R M A N Y (FED. REP.): S. Karger G m b H , Karger Youcef, A L G E R . Buchhandlung, Angerhofstr. 9, Postfach 2, D-8034G E R M E R I N Q / M N C H E N , 'The Courier' (German editionA R G E N T I N A : E D I L Y R , S . R . L . Tucuman 1685,1050, only): Colmantstrasse 22, 5300 B O N N . B U E N O S AIRES. G H A N A : Presbyterian Bookshop Depot Ltd., P . O . Box. A U S T R A L I A : Publications: Educational Supplies Pty. 195, A C C R A ; Ghana Book Suppliers Ltd., P . O . Box. Ltd., P . O . Box 33, B R O O K V A L E 2100, N . S . W . Period7869, A C C R A ; The University Bookshop of Ghana,. icals: Dominie Pty. Subscriptions Dept., P . O . Box A C C R A ; The University Bookshop, C A P E C O A S T ; T h e 33, B R O O K V A L E 2100, N . S . W . Sub-agent: United University Bookshop, P . O . Box 1, L E G O N . Nations Association of Australia (Victorian Division), G R E E C E : International Bookshops (Eleftheroudakis, 2nd Floor, Campbell House, 100 Flinders Street, M E L Kauffman, etc.). B O U R N E 3000. G U A T E M A L A : Comisin Guatemalteca de CoopeA U S T R I A : D r . Franz Hain, Verlags- und K o m m i s racin con la Unesco, 3.a Avenida 13.30, zona 1, sionsbuchhandlung, Industriehof Stadlau, D r . Ottoapartado postal 244, G U A T E M A L A . Neurath-Gasse 5, 1220 W I E N . HAITI: Librairie ' A la Caravelle', 26, rue Roux, B . P . B A N G L A D E S H : Bangladesh Books International Ltd., 111, PORT-AU-PRINCE. Ittefaq Building, 1, R . K . Mission Road, Hatkhola, H O N D U R A S : Librera Navarro, 2.a Avenida N . " 201,. D A C C A 3. COMAYAGUELA, Tegucigalpa. B E L G I U M : Jean D e Lannoy, 202, avenue du Roi, H O N G K O N G : Federal Publications ( H K ) Ltd., 1060 BRUXELLES. C C P 000-0070823-13. 5 A Evergreen Industrial Mansion, 12 YIP F A T Street, BENIN: Librairie nationale, B . P . 294, P O R T O Novo. W o n g Chuk Hang Road, A B E R D E E N ; Swindon BOLIVIA: Los Amigos del Libro: Casilla postal 4415, Book C o . , 13-15 Lock Road, K O W L O O N . L A P A Z ; Avenida delas Heronas 3712, Casilla postal H U N G A R Y : Akadmiai Knyvesbolt, Vci u. 2 2 , 450, COCHABAMBA. B U D A P E S T V , A . K . V . Konyvtrosk Boltja, NpkoztrB R A Z I L : Fundao Getlio Vargas, Servio de Publisasg utja 16, B U D A P E S T V I . oes, caixa postal 9.052-ZC-02, Praia de Botafogo I C E L A N D : Snaebjm Jonsson & C o . , H . F . , Haf188, R I O D E JANEIRO (GB). narstraeti 9, R E Y K J A V I K . B U L G A R I A : H e m u s , Kantora Literatura bd. Rousky 6, I N D I A : Orient Longman Ltd.: Kamani Marg, Ballard SOFIJA. Estate, B O M B A Y 400 038; 17 Chittaranjan Ave., C A L B U R M A : Trade Corporation no. (9), 550-552 Merchant C U T T A 13; 36A Anna Salai, Mount Road, M A D R A S 2 . Street, R A N G O O N . B-3/7 Asaf Ali Road, N E W D E L H I 1; 80/1 Mahatma C A N A D A : Renouf Publishing Company Ltd., 2182 Gandhi Road, B A N G A L O R E - 5 6 0 0 0 1 ; 3-5-820 HyderSt. Catherine Street West, M O N T R E A L , Que. H 3 H 1 M 7 . guda, H Y D E R A B A D - 5 0 0 0 0 1 . Sub-depots: Oxford Book C H I L E : Bibliocentro Ltda., Constitucin n. 7, caand Stationery C o . , 17 Park Street, C A L C U T T A 700016; silla 13731, S A N T I A G O (21). Scindia House, N E W D E L H I 11001; Publications Section, C H I N A : China National Publications Import CorpoMinistry of Education and Social Welfare, 551 C - W i n g , ration, West Europe Department, P . O . Box 88, P E K I N O . Shastri Bhavan, N E W D E L H I 110001. C O L O M B I A : Editorial Losada, calle 18A, n. 7-37, I N D O N E S I A : Bhratara Publishers and Booksellers, 29 Jl. apartado areo 5829, B O O O T A ; Edificio L a Ceiba, ofiOtoIskandardinataIII,jAKARTA.Gramedia,Bookshop, cina 804, calle 52, n. 47-28, M E D E L L N . Jl. Gadjah M a d a 109, J A K A R T A . Indira P . T . , 37 Jl. C O N G O : Librairie populaire, B P . 577, B R A Z Z A V I L L E ; D r . S a m Ratulangie, 37, J A K A R T A P U S A T . Commission Nationale Congolaise pour l'Unesco, B.P. I R A N : Iranian National Commission for Unesco, 493 B R A Z Z A V I L L E Avenue Iranchahr Chomali N o . 300, B . P . 1533, T E H C O S T A R I C A : Librera Trejos, S . A . , apartado 1313, R A N . Kharazmie Publishing and Distribution C o m p a n y , S A N Josa. 28 Vessal Shirazi Street, Enghlab Avenue, P . O . C U B A : Ediciones Cubanos.O'Reilly N o . 407, L A H A B A N A . Box 314/1486, T E H R A N . C Y P R U S : ' M A M ' , Archbishop Makarios 3rd Avenue, I R A Q : McKenzie's Bookshop, Al-Rashid Street, P . O . B . 1722, N I C O S I A . BAGHDAD. 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Past topics1
F r o m 1949 to the end of 1958, this Journal appeared under the n a m e of International Social Science Bulletin, not all issues of which were devoted to a main topic. Microfilms and microcards are available from University Microfilms Inc., 300 N . Zeeb R o a d , A n n Arbor, M I 48106 (United States of America). Reprint series are available from Kraus Reprint Corporation, 16 East 46th Street, N e w Y o r k , N Y 10017 (United States of America). Vol. XI, 1959 N o . 1. Social aspects of mental health* N o . 2. Teaching of the social sciences in the U . S . S . R . * N o . 3. The study and practice of planning* N o . 4 . N o m a d s and nomadism in the arid zone* Vol. XII, 1960 N o . 1. Citizen participation in political life* N o . 2. The social sciences and peaceful co-operation* N o . 3. Technical change and political decision* N o . 4 . Sociological aspects of leisure* Vol. XIII, 1961 N o . 1. Post-war democratization in Japan* N o . 2. Recent research on racial relations N o . 3. The Yugoslav c o m m u n e N o . 4 . The parliamentary profession Vol. XIV, 1962 N o . 1. Images of w o m e n in society* N o . 2. Communication and information N o . 3. Changes in the family* N o . 4. Economics of education* Vol. XV, 1963 N o . 1. Opinion surveys in developing countries N o . 2. Compromise and conflict resolution N o . 3. Old age N o . 4 . Sociology of development in Latin America
1. T h e asterisk denotes issues out of print.

Vol. XVI, 1964 N o . 1. Data in comparative research* N o . 2. Leadership and economic growth N o . 3. Social aspects of African resource development N o . 4 . Problems of surveying the social sciences and humanities Vol. XVII, 1965 N o . 1. M a x Weber today/Biological aspects of race* N o . 2. Population studies N o . 3. Peace research* N o . 4 . History and social science Vol. XVIII, 1966 N o . 1. H u m a n rights in perspective* N o . 2. Modern methods in criminology* N o . 3. Science and technology as development factors* N o . 4. Social science in physical planning* Vol. XIX, 1967 No. No. No. No. 1. 2. 3. 4. Linguistics and communication* The social science press Social functions of education* Sociology of literary creativity*

Vol. XX, 1968 N o . 1. Theory, training and practice in management* N o . 2. Multi-disciplinary problem-focused research* N o . 3. Motivational patterns for modernization N o . 4. The arts in society*

Vol. XXI, 1969 N o . 1. Innovation in public administration* N o . 2. Approaches to rural problems* N o . 3. Social science in the Third World* N o . 4 . Futurology* Vol. XXII, 1970 N o . 1. Sociology of science* N o . 2. Towards a policy for social research N o . 3. Trends in legal learning N o . 4. Controlling the human environment Vol. XXIII, 1971 N o . 1. Understanding aggression N o . 2. Computers and documentation in the social sciences N o . 3. Regional variations in nation-building N o . 4. Dimensions of the racial situation Vol. XXIV, No. No. No. No. 1972



N o . 1. Socio-economic indicators: theories and applications N o . 2 The uses of geography N o . 3. Quantified analyses of social phenomena N o . 4 . Professionalism in flux Vol. XXVIII, 1976

N o . 1. Science in policy and policy for science* N o . 2. The infernal cycle of armament N o . 3. Economics of information and information for economists N o . 4 . Towards a new international economic and social order Vol. XXIX, 1977

N o . 1. Approaches to the study of international organizations N o . 2. Social dimensions of religion N o . 3. The health of nations N o . 4. Facets of interdisciplinarity Vol. XXX, 1978 N o . 1. The politics of territoriality N o . 2. Exploring global interdependence N o . 3. H u m a n habitats: from tradition to modernism N o . 4. Violence Vol. XXXI, 1979

1. Development studies 2. Youth: a social force? 3. The protection of privacy 4 . Ethics and institutionalization in social science

Vol. XXV, 1973 N o . 1/2. Autobiographical portraits N o . 3. The social assessment of technology N o . 4 . Psychology and psychiatry at the cross-roads Vol. XXVI, 1974

N o . 1. Pedagogics of social science: some experiences N o . 2. Rural-urban articulations N o . 3. Patterns of child socialization N o . 4. In search of rational organization Vol. XXXII, 1980

N o . 1. Challenged paradigms in international relations N o . 2. Contributions to population policy N o . 3. Communicating and diffusing social science N o . 4 . The sciences of life and of society

N o . 1. The anatomy of tourism N o . 2. Dilemmas of communication: technology versus communities? N o . 3. W o r k

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