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Legal Separation\Effects of Filing Petition

De la Vina v. Villareal July 31, 1920, Johnson, J. Facts: Geopano, wife, filed a complaint of divorce (Sept. 17, 1917) in RTC Iloilo against her husband de la Vina on the ground of concubinage (which was allegedly occurring since 1913). When she learned of the illicit relationship, she was ejected from the conjugal home. She prayed for a decree of divorce, partition of conjugal property, and alimony pendente. After filing the complaint, she presented a motion for preliminary injunction to restrain her husband from alienating or encumbering the conjugal property. Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Persons Digests v1.0 Page No. 34 Respondent Judge Villareal granted the motion. Husband filed present case of petition for certiorari on the ground that judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action and exceeded his power and authority in issuing preliminary injunction. Issue/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON a married woman may ever acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of a subsisting marriage. Yes. The general rule of law that the domicile of the wife follows that of the husband is not an absolute rule. The husband unlawfully ejected the wife from the conjugal home to have illicit relations with another woman. Continued cohabitation would give the impression of the wifes condonation. A wife may acquire a separate residence where the husband has given cause for divorce. (2) WON in an action for divorce, where conjugal property is concerned, a preliminary injunction may be issued to restrain a spouse from alienating/encumbering conjugal property during the pendency of the action. Yes. Plaintiff contends that husband is granted power to alienate and encumber the conjugal property without the consent of the wife. This only holds true as long as a harmonious relationship exists. When such relation ceases, the husbands powers of administration should be curtailed during the pendency of action to protect the interests of the wife.

Legal Separation\Effects of Filing Petition De La Vina v Villareal Facts: In an action for divorce, the plaintiff wife Narcisa Geopano alleged that since the year 1913 and up to date of the complaint, the defendant husband been sustaining illicit relations with one Ana Calog and having her as his concubine, with public scandal and in disgrace of plaintiff. Upon said allegations she prayed for (a.) a decree of divorce, (b.) the partition of the conjugal property, and (c.) alimony pendente lite in the sum of P400 per month. Subsequent to said complaint, plaintiff filed a motion, alleging that since the filing of her complaint she had personal knowledge that the defendant was trying to alienate or encumber the property which belonged to their conjugal partnership and prayed that a preliminary injunction be issued against the defendant. Petitioner contends that the CFI of Iloilo had no jurisdiction to have cognizance of the said action for divorce because the defendant therein was a resident of Province of Negros Oriental and the plaintiff, as the wife of the defendant, must also be considered a resident of the same province inasmuch as, under the law, the domicile of the husband is also the domicile of the wife; that the plaintiff could not acquire a residence in Iloilo before the marriage between her and the defendant was legally dissolved. Issues: WON the wife may obtain a preliminary writ of injuction during the pendency of the case. Did the judge exceed his jurisdiction? Held: Where the husband has given cause of divorce, the wife may acquire another and separate domicile from that of her husband. Although the law fixes the domicile of the wife as being of her husband, universal jurisprudence recognizes an exception to the rule in the case where the husbands conduct has been such as to furnish lawful ground for a divorce, which justified her in leaving him, and, therefore, necessarily authorizes her to live elsewhere and to acquire a separate domicile. (Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. (U.S., 108)). It is clear therefore, that a married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband, during the existence of the marriage, where the husband has given cause for legal separation. In an action for divorce brought by the wife against husband, in which the partition of the conjugal property is also prayed for, the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband, prohibiting the latter from alienating or encumbering any part of conjugal property during the pendency of the action. It follows from all of the foregoing that the respondent, Hon. Antonio Villareal, as Auxiliary Judge sitting in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo, had jurisdiction to hear and determine the action for divorce instituted in said court by the respondent Narcissa Geopano, and that he did not exceed his power and authority in issuing a preliminary injunction against the defendant, prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action.

Legal Separation\Effects of Filing Petition Reyes v Ines-Luciano Facts: Celia Ilustre-Reyes filed in the JDRC of Quezon City a complaint against her husband, Manuel J.C. Reyes, for legal separation on the ground that the defendant had attempted to kill the plaintiff. The plaintiff asked for support pendente lite for her and her three children. The defendant, the petitioner herein, opposed the application for support pendent elite for the ground that his wife had committed adultery with her physician. Issue: 1. WON the alleged adultery of his wife disqualifies her from alimony pendente lite. 2. WON in determining the amount of support pendent lite, it is enough that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence even by afiidavits only or other documentary evidence. Held: 1. It is true that the adultery of the wife is defense in an action for support. However, the alleged adultery of his wife must be established by competent evidence. The mere allegation that wife has committed adultery will not bar her from the right to receive support pendente lite. In the instant case, at the hearing of the application for support pendente lite before the JDRC, petitioner did not present any evidence to prove the allegation that his wife had committed adultery with any person. 2. In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite it is not necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable to it justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered. Mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for support pendente lite. It is enough that the facts be satisfied by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record. The private respondent has submitted documents showing that the corporations controlled by the petitioner have entered into multi-million contracts in projects of the Ministry of Public Highways. Considering the high cost of living due inflation and the financial ability of the petitioner as shown by the documents of record, We find that the amount of P4, 000.00 a month granted by the respondent Judge as alimony pendente lite to the private respondent is not excessive.

Legal Separation\Grounds\abatement of action, also abandonment Lapuz Sy v Eufemio Facts: Carmen Lapuz Sy and Eufemio Eufemio were married on September 21, 1934 and lived together until 1943 when Eufemio abandoned her. In 1953, she prayed for a legal separation decree from the JDRC of Manila and that Eufemio be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Before the trial could be completed, Carmen died in a vehicular accident. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that Carmens death abated the action. Counsel for the deceased moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. The JDRC dismissed the case. Issue: Whether spouse. the action for legal separation is abated at the death of one

Held: Yes. An action for the legal separation is purely personal. The NCC recognizes this in its Art. 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and its Art. 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself. An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved in this action because these rights are mere effects or incidental to a decree of legal separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. Judgment affirmed.

Legal Separation\Effects of Decree\Other Effects Matute v Macadalo Facts: Armando Medel filed for legal separation against Rosario Matute on the ground of adultery with Armandos brother, Ernesto. The court granted the decree and also awarded their 4 children to Armandos custody. Thereafter, Armando left for the States and left the children with his sister, in whose house Rosario also lived in order to be with her children. After 2 years, Armando came back home and the children joined him. On 1955, Rosario asked permission from Armando to bring the children to manila for her fathers funeral. Armando agreed on the condition that she will return them after 2 weeks. But Rosario did not. Later, Rosario filed a civil case for the custody of the children and support thereof. She claims that the children did not want to go back to their father since they claim he was living with another woman other than their mother. The court denied her custody and ordered her to return the children to Armando. Rosario then instituted against Armando and the judge the present action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. Issues: 1. Whether the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, 2. Whether the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion Held: No. 1. The court had jurisdiction over the case. Whatever mistakes the court had committed would be merely errors of judgment, and is reviewable by appeal. 2. No. Unless the custody has been reviewed or modified, the custody of the children under Armando was stand. The judge was only performing his duty to implement such award. (Note: Physical Custody wife vs. Legal Custody husband. This is a procedural case; solution is not kidnapping the children but filing the proper custody case in court.)

Legal Separation\Effects of Decree\Other Effects\Use of Surname Laperal v Republic Facts: On March 24, 1939, Elisea Laperal married Enrique Santamaria, thereafter using the name Elisea L. Santamaria. In 1958, a decree of legal separation was entered between them by CFI Baguio. Elisea Laperal ceased to live with Enrique Santamaria since then. On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in CFI Baguio a petition praying that she be allowed to resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal. Issue: Is Elisea allowed to use her maiden name? Held: 1. A womans married status is not affected by a decree of legal separation, there being no severance of the vinculum, and under the mandatory provisions of Art. 372 NCC, she shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. There is no dispute that in the institution of these proceedings, the procedure prescribed in Rule 103 RRC on change of name has been observed. But from the petition, the only reason relied upon for change of name is the fact that Elisea Laperal is legally separated from Enrique Santamaria and has in fact, ceased to live with him. It is doubtful whether Rule 103 may prevail over Art. 372 with regard to a married woman legally separated from her husband. However, even applying Rule 103, the fact of legal separation, the only basis for petition, is not sufficient ground to justify the change, for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of said Art. 372. 2. It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated that a petitioner owns extensive business interests, the continued use of Enrique Santamarias surname may cause undue confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of conjugal asset. This finding is however without basis. In the first place, these were not the causes upon which the petition was based; hence, obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced. Secondly, with the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, he conjugal partnership between Elisea Laperal and Enrique Santamaria had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Consequently, there could be no more occasions for an eventual liquidation of conjugal assets. Order set aside; petition dismissed.

Legal Separation\Effects of Decree Baez v Baez Facts: In September 23, Aida and Gabrial Banez were awarded a decree for legal separation because of the latters sexual infidelity. Also included in the decree was the dissolution of their conjugal property, the forfeiture of the respondents one half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children, payment to petitioners counsel to be taken from the petitioners share in the net assets and the surrender of a vehicle and the house to the petitioner. The petitioner filed a motion to modify the decision. The decision was modified, obliging the petitioner to pay as attorneys fees the equivalent of 5% of the total value of respondents ideal share in the net conjugal assets and ordering the administrator to pay her counsel. She sought for moral and exemplary damages as well as litigation expenses and an execution of motion pending appeal. Court denied her motion for damages but gave due course to the execution pending appeal. The respondent was ordered to leave the house and car to petitioner. The petitioner meanwhile has been ordered to post a bond to answer for all the damages the respondent may suffer. The order was appealed by Gabriel, and it was set aside by the CA. Aida filed a MFR but it was denied. In the meantime, Gabriel,s notice of appeal was elevated to the CA. Aida filed a motion to dismiss but the court denied it sine she wasnt able to pay the docket fee. Issues: 1. WON the execution of judgment pending appeal is justified. 2. WON an action for legal is one where multiple appeals is allowed Held: 1. No. There was no superior or urgent circumstance. 2. No. Multiple appeals are only allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with accounting, n actions for partition of property, special civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale for multiple appeals in one case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and is to be held final. In this case, the 2 appeals came from the same issue the legal separation. The effects of legal separation are not separate matters, and they are final when the decree for it has been granted. They are mere incidents of the decree