G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916 ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee. TRENT, J.

: This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. From a judgment sustaining the defendant's demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action, followed by an order dismissing the case after the plaintiff declined to amend, the latter appealed. It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant. The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are as follows: That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities established by General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the consent of the parties. (Garcia vs. Montague, 12 Phil. Rep., 480, citing article 1261 of Civil Code.) Upon the termination of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil. Rep., 137.) To this extent a marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations .Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make .The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law determines from time to time, and none other. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or government upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. With these principles to guide us, we will inquire into the status of the law touching and governing the question under consideration. Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34). Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in the Peninsula, were extended to the Philippine Islands by royal decree on April 13, 1883 (Ebreo vs. Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law read:

ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually assist each other. ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second paragraph deals with the management of the wife's property.) ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him when he charges his domicile or residence. Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for just cause relieve her from this duty when the husband removes his residence to a foreign country. And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows: ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole extent specified in the preceding article. 1. The consorts. xxx xxx xxx ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by paying the pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having the right to the same. Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease. The failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one of them. The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home. May the husband, on account of his conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the pension? Is the rule established by article 149 of the Civil Code absolute? The supreme court of Spain in its decision of December 5, 1903, held:. That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions dated May 11, 1897, November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which article 149 grants the person, obliged to furnish subsistence, between paying the pension fixed or receiving and keeping in his own house the party who is entitled to the same, is not so absolute as to prevent cases being considered wherein, either because this right would be opposed to the exercise of a preferential right or because of the existence of some justifiable cause morally opposed to the removal of the party enjoying the maintenance, the right of selection must be understood as being thereby restricted. Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise to this appeal was whether there was any reason to prevent the exercise of the option granted by article 149 of the Civil Code to the person obliged to furnish subsistence, to receive and maintain in his own house the one who is entitled to receive it; and inasmuch as nothing has been alleged or discussed with regard to the parental authority of Pedro Alcantara Calvo, which he ha not exercised, and it having been set forth that the natural father simply claims his child for the purpose of thus better attending to her maintenance, no action having been taken by him toward providing the support until, owing to such negligence, the mother was obliged to demand it; it is seen that these circumstances, together with the fact of the marriage of Pedro Alcantara, and that it would be difficult for the mother to maintain relations with her daughter, all constitute an impediment of such a nature as to prevent the exercise of the option in the present case, without prejudice to such decision as may be deemed proper with regard to


the other questions previously cited in respect to which no opinion should be expressed at this time. The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus vs. Alvir (9 Phil. Rep., 576), wherein the court held that the rule laid down in article 149 of the Civil Code "is not absolute." but it is insisted that there existed a preexisting or preferential right in each of these cases which was opposed to the removal of the one entitled to support. It is true that in the first the person claiming the option was the natural father of the child and had married a woman other than the child's mother, and in the second the right to support had already been established by a final judgment in a criminal case. Notwithstanding these facts the two cases clearly established the proposition that the option given by article 149 of the Civil Code may not be exercised in any and all cases. Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision of the supreme court of Spain, dated November 3, 1905. In this case Don Berno Comas, as a result of certain business reverses and in order no to prejudice his wife, conferred upon her powers to administer and dispose of her property. When she left him he gave her all the muniments of title, mortgage credits, notes, P10,000 in accounts receivable, and the key to the safe in which he kept a large amount of jewels, thus depriving himself of all his possessions and being reduced in consequence to want. Subsequently he instituted this civil action against his wife, who was then living in opulence, for support and the revocation of the powers heretofore granted in reference to the administration and disposal of her property. In her answer the wife claimed that the plaintiff (her husband) was not legally in a situation to claim support and that the powers voluntarily conferred and accepted by her were bilateral and could not be canceled by the plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff the defendant wife appealed to the Audencia Territorialwherein, after due trial, judgment was rendered in her favor dismissing the action upon the merits. The plaintiff appealed to the supreme court and that high tribunal, in affirming the judgment of the Audencia Territorial, said: Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing that the spouses are mutually obliged to provide each other with support, cannot but be subordinate to the other provisions of said Code which regulates the family organization and the duties of spouses not legally separated, among which duties are those of their living together and mutually helping each other, as provided in article 56 of the aforementioned code; and taking this for granted, the obligation of the spouse who has property to furnish support to the one who has no property and is in need of it for subsistence, is to be understood as limited to the case where, in accordance with law, their separation has been decreed, either temporarily or finally and this case, with respect to the husband, cannot occur until a judgment of divorce is rendered, since, until then, if he is culpable, he is not deprived of the management of his wife's property and of the product of the other property belonging to the conjugal partnership; and Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each other of their own free will, thus establishing, contrary to the legal provision contained in said article 56 of the Civil Code, a legal status entirely incompatible with the nature and effects of marriage in disregard of the duties inherent therein and disturbing the unity of the family, in opposition to what the law, in conformity with good morals, has established; and. Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Doña Adela Galindo are not legally separated, it is their duty to live together and afford each other help and support; and for this reason, it cannot be held that the former has need of support from his wife so that he may live apart from her without the conjugal abode where it is

his place to be, nor of her conferring power upon him to dispose even of the fruits of her property in order therewith to pay the matrimonial expenses and, consequently, those of his own support without need of going to his wife; wherefore the judgment appealed from, denying the petition of D. Ramon Benso for support, has not violated the articles of the Civil Code and the doctrine invoked in the assignments of error 1 and 5 of the appeal. From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears quite clearly that the spouses separated voluntarily in accordance with an agreement previously made. At least there are strong indications to this effect, for the court says, "should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each other of their own free will." If this be the true basis upon which the supreme court of Spain rested its decision, then the doctrine therein enunciated would not be controlling in cases where one of the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the other or where the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and the wife seeks to force him to furnish support. That this is true appears from the decision of the same high tribunal, dated October 16, 1903. In this case the wife brought an action for support against her husband who had willfully and voluntarily abandoned the conjugal abode without any cause whatever. The supreme court, reversing the judgment absolving the defendant upon the ground that no action for divorce, etc., had been instituted, said: In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don Teodoro Exposito who left the conjugal abode, although he claims, without however proving his contention, that the person responsible for this situation was his wife, as she turned him out of the house. From this state of affairs it results that it is the wife who is party abandoned, the husband not having prosecuted any action to keep her in his company and he therefore finds himself, as long as he consents to the situation, under the ineluctable obligation to support his wife in fulfillment of the natural duty sanctioned in article 56 of the Code in relation with paragraph 1 of article 143. In not so holding, the trial court, on the mistaken ground that for the fulfillment of this duty the situation or relation of the spouses should be regulated in the manner it indicates, has made the errors of law assigned in the first three grounds alleged, because the nature of the duty of affording mutual support is compatible and enforcible in all situations, so long as the needy spouse does not create any illicit situation of the court above described.lawphil.net If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of November 3, 1905, and if the court did hold, as contended by counsel for the defendant in the case under consideration, that neither spouse can be compelled to support the other outside of the conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a final judgment granting the injured one a divorce or separation from the other, still such doctrine or holding would not necessarily control in this jurisdiction for the reason that the substantive law is not in every particular the same here as it is in Spain. As we have already stated, articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in force in the Peninsula are not in force in the Philippine Islands. The law governing the duties and obligations of husband and wife in this country are articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 .In Spain the complaining spouse has, under article 105 of the Civil Code, various causes for divorce, such as adultery on the part of the wife in every case and on the part of the husband when public scandal or disgrace of the wife results therefrom; personal violence actually inflicted or grave insults: violence exercised by the husband toward the wife in order to force her to change her religion; the proposal of the husband to prostitute his wife; the attempts of the husband or wife to corrupt their sons or to prostitute their daughters; the connivance in their corruption or prostitution; and the condemnation of a spouse to perpetual chains or hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the only


This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband. Alfonso Lacson (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner spouse) and Carmen San Jose-Lacson (hereinafter referred to as the respondent spouse) were married on February 14. petitioner-appellee. That the one is not dependent upon the other is apparent from the very nature of the marital obligations of the spouses. for this year's summer months. Bacolod City. 1903. 34. L-24259 August 30. Petitioners have mutually agreed upon the dissolution of their conjugal partnership subject to judicial approval as required by Article 191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines — the particular terms and conditions of their mutual agreement being as follows: (a) There will be separation of property — petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson hereby waiving any and all claims for a share in property that may be held by petitioner Alfonso Lacson since they have acquired no property of any consequence. all alive. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife. 1968 CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON. they respectfully pray that notice of this petition be given to creditors and third parties pursuant to Article 191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and thereafter that the Court enter its judicial approval of the foregoing agreement for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and for separation of property.R. administer and enjoy such separate estate as they may acquire without the consent of the other and all earnings from any profession. nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term. (e) Each petitioner shall have reciprocal rights of visitation of the children in the custody of the other at their respective residences and.ground for a divorce is adultery. She filed on March 12. heretofore filed in this case.: These three cases (G. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature.R. No. L-23767 August 30. no change or modification of the rule has been announced. during the summer months. power to grant a separate maintenance must also be lacking. (b) Hereafter. 1963 a complaint docketed as civil case E-00030 in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila (hereinafter referred to as the JDRC) for custody of all their children as well as support for them and herself.00 for the support of the children in her custody. The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for judgment. 1953. each of them shall own. Petitioners have separated last January 9. and separation of property. A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty. as in the instant case. It is. L-23482. CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON. defendant-appellee. ----------------------------G. 1968 ALFONSO LACSON. vs. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. except that the Court shall immediately approve the terms set out in paragraph 4 above and embody the same in a judgment immediately binding on the parties hereto to the end that 3 . embodying their amicable settlement. 4. petitioner. and. as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. did not return. 1963 they filed a joint petition dated April 21. plaintiff-appellant. and commenced to reside in Manila. the two children in the custody of each petitioner shall be given to the other except that.Rep. read as follows: 3. And since the decision was promulgated by this court in that case in December. petitioner-appellant. thru the assistance of their respective attorneys. but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. No. (c) The custody of the two elder children named Enrique and Maria Teresa shall be awarded to petitioner Alfonso Lacson and the custody of the younger children named Gerrard and Ramon shall be awarded to petitioner Carmen San JoseLacson. docketed as special proceeding 6978 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (hereinafter referred to as the CFI). the spouses. it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one. and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered. J. 45. if a court lacks power to decree a divorce. respondents. (d) Petitioner Alfonso Lacson shall pay petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson a monthly allowance of P300.R. ALFONSO LACSON. On January 9. On April 27. possess. 1963 — on which date. Petitioners have no creditors. The important and pertinent portions of the petition. 5.R. G. To them were born four children. 1963 when petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson left their conjugal home at the Santa Clara Subdivision. 1963 the respondent spouse left the conjugal home in Santa Clara Subdivision. all four children shall be delivered to and remain with petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson until June 15. The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that the power to grant support in a separate action is dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. as it necessitates a determination of the question whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for living separate from her husband. the well settled and accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction. No. CARMEN SAN JOSELACSON and THE COURT OF APPEALS. therefore. 3 Phil . CASTRO. 1968 ALFONSO LACSON. However. consequently. she shall return the two elder children Enrique and Maria Teresa to petitioner Alfonso Lacson — this judgment of course being subject to enforcement by execution writ and contempt. succeeded in reaching an amicable settlement respecting custody of the children. The antecedent facts are not disputed. L-23767 and L-24259) involving the same parties pose a common fundamental issue the resolution of which will necessarily and inescapably resolve all the other issues. dispose of. ----------------------------G. Although the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States and the judgment rendered by this court was there reversed. vs. (Benedicto vs.) This positive and absolute doctrine was announced by this court in the case just cited after an exhaustive examination of the entire subject. Bacolod City. an obligation. and decided to reside in Manila. the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. L-23482 August 30. it does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole. Thus their joinder in this decision. the reversal did not affect in any way or weaken the doctrine in reference to adultery being the only ground for a divorce. De la Rama. business or industry as may be derived by each petitioner shall belong to that petitioner exclusively. WHEREFORE. But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce or separation. vs. support.. 1963. rest.

The CFI (Judge Jose R. 1963. 32384-R) its decision granting the petition for certiorari and declaring null and void both (a) the compromise judgment dated April 27. so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. after hearing. the aforecited three appeals converge on one focal issue: whether the compromise agreement entered into by the parties and the judgment of the CFI grounded on the said agreement. The law allows separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. 1964.. 1963 for execution of the compromise judgment rendered in special proceeding 6978. on June 1. the Court of Appeals issued ex parte a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the order dated June 22." . 1äwphï1. Enrique and Teresa. testimonial or documentary. and ordered that upon "failure on the part of Carmen San Jose-Lacson to deliver the said children [i. On February 11.R. No. On October 14. From the decision dated May 11.e. on the grounds of res judicata and lis pendens. rendering judgment (hereinafter referred to as the compromise judgment) approving and incorporating in toto their compromise agreement. but his motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated July 31. 1965 the Court of Appeals also certified the said appeal to the Supreme Court (G.R. After the denial of her motion for reconsideration. 1963. 1963 in so far as it relates to the custody and right of visitation over the two children. the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. 32384R). In compliance with paragraph 4 (e) of their mutual agreement (par. the said custody in her favor be confirmed pendente lite. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife. No. It does not appeal that they have creditors who will be prejudiced by the said arrangements. and Rule 64 section 7 of the (old) Rules of Court. emphasis supplied). Querubin. granted the petitioner spouse's motion for execution. issued an order which sustained the petitioner spouse's plea of bar by prior judgment and lis pendens. 32608-R) wherein she raised. (2) The Court of Appeals erred in resolving in the certiorari case the issue of the legality of the compromise judgment which is involved in two appeals. 1963 the petitioner spouse opposed the said motion and moved to dismiss the complaint based. among others. and thereafter prayed the CFI to reconsider its judgment pertaining to the custody and visitation of her minor children and to relieve her from the said agreement. thus in effect depriving her of the right to appeal. 191. We hold that the compromise agreement and the judgment of the CFI grounded on the said agreement are valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership. Fernandez. filed a motion for execution of the compromise judgment and a charge for contempt..R. she averred that the CFI (thru Judge Querubin) committed grave abuse of discretion and acted in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate execution of the compromise judgment in its order of June 22. 1963. minor children who are all below the age of 7.. The petitioner spouse moved to reconsider. L-23767). The petitioner spouse filed an urgent motion dated July 5. the respondent spouse interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G. In her petition for certiorari dated June 27. par. Joint Petition as the only means by which she could have immediate custody of the . and that since all the children are now in her custody. 4." . On May 7. (2) the setting aside. 1963 in special proceeding 6978 of the CFI. among others. After hearing. presiding). wherein she also alleged. subject to judicial approval. L-24259). In the case at bar. presiding) issued an order on April 27. that she entered into the joint petition as the only means by which she could have immediate custody of her minor children. the Court of Appeals on May 11. now the subject of an appeal by certiorari to this Court (G. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership. 1963 for execution of said judgment. as abovestated. The respondent spouse likewise filed a motion dated May 15. 4 . (3) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the compromise agreement upon which the judgment is based violates article 363 of the Civil Code. since "no hearing on the facts was ever held in the court below — no evidence. No. 1963 rendered in special proceeding 6978 of the CFI. 1963. agreement pertaining to the custody and visitation of her minor children .. No. and dismissed the case. 1963. the writ of execution issued pursuant to the order of the respondent Judge Querubin dated June 22. 1964 promulgated in said certiorari case (CA-G. No. the petitioner spouse interposed an appeal to this Court. (Art. the spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their separation of property and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership.ñët As heretofore adverted.. 32798-R) wherein she likewise questioned the validity or legality of her agreement with the petitioner spouse respecting custody of their children. and (3) the awarding of the custody of Enrique and Maria Teresa to her. she may be held for contempt pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 sections 9 and 10...R. She prayed for (1) the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents therein and any person acting under them from enforcing. The respondent spouse also instituted certiorari proceedings before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership. 1963. are conformable to law. to return the two older children Enrique and Maria Teresa in accordance with her agreement with Alfonso Lacson] to the special sheriff on or before June 29. 1964 the Court of Appeals certified the said appeal to the Supreme Court (G. 1963 the respondent spouse filed in the JDRC a motion wherein she alleged that she "entered into and signed the . The petitioner spouse likewise filed his answer. appellant did not specifically ask to be allowed to present evidence on her behalf. Finding the foregoing joint petition to be "conformable to law. 1963 for reconsideration of the compromise judgment dated April 27." On May 24. the issue of validity or legality of the compromise agreement in connection only with the custody of their minor children. emphasis supplied) The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage. 1963 for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction ex parte which urgent motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated July 9.R. in its order dated June 22. 1964 and the resolution dated July 31. (Art. 1963. and assigned the following errors: (1) The Court of Appeals erred in annulling thru certiorari the lower court's order of execution of the compromise judgment. instead of the issue of grave abuse of discretion in ordering its execution." the CFI (Judge Jose F. as well as of the conjugal partnership. As prayed for. Thus the new Civil Code provides: In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements. of the compromise judgment dated April 27. presented — only a question of law pends resolution in the appeal.". The JDRC on May 28. 1963.R. among other things. 190." and thereafter prayed that she "be considered relieved of the .. 1963 and execution order dated June 22. 1963. L-23482). 1964.. The petitioner spouse opposed the said motion and.. and (b) the order dated June 22. by contempt proceedings and other means." From the aforesaid compromise judgment dated April 27. the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons. their mother. the petitioner spouse delivered all the four children to the respondent spouse and remitted money for their support. No. since "no evidence of any kind was introduced before the trial court and . 1963 and the order dated June 22. 3[e] of the compromise judgment).. No. denied the respondent spouse's motion for reconsideration. 1963. the respondent spouse interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.any non-compliance or violation of its terms by one party shall entitle the other to enforcement by execution writ and contempt even though the proceedings as to creditors have not been terminated.

35. except for a very few reasons known to the law. However. whereas the joint petition of the parties docketed as special proceeding 6978 in the CFI was filed on April 27. the penalty of imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. in so far as it awarded custody of the two older children who were 6 and 5 years old. The order dated April 27. (Arroyo v.the wife's residence being in Manila. If the parties have agreed to file a joint petition. but did not do so . The petitioner spouse — who could have raised the issue of lis pendens in abatement of the case filed in the CFI. The Civil Code specifically commands in the second sentence of its article 363 that "No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age. If she has erred. Neither does the said award of custody fall within the exception because the record is bereft of any compelling reason to support the lower court's order depriving the wife of her minor children's company.. they become good husbands and good wives from the necessity of remaining husbands and wives. 1963. the issue regarding the award of the custody of Enrique and Maria Teresa to the petitioner spouse has become moot and academic. inasmuch as a lengthy separation has supervened between them. Nonetheless. Reprint. they must be confronted with facts before they can properly adjudicate. for necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes . 58-59). For though in particular cases the repugnance of the law to dissolve the obligations of matrimonial cohabitation may operate with great severity upon individuals. . and render mutual help and support (art. Besides. 109. The complaint docketed as civil case E-00030 in the JDRC was filed by the respondent spouse on March 12. to cite the decision of the CFI and to ask for the dismissal of the action filed by the respondent spouse in the JDRC. the respondent spouse. Evans. 12). It might be argued — and correctly — that since five years have elapsed since the filing of these cases in 1963. They provide only that there is a pending action. When people understand that they must live together. as [I]t is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with. [T]hat the Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior pending action. 1äwphï1.. (2) Shall receive at least elementary education. Therefore. There is. courts cannot proceed on mere insinuations. rudeness of language. Gerrard — 9. Maria Teresa — 10. at the slightest ruffling of domestic tranquility — brought about by "mere austerity of temper. 1963. 1963. It prohibits in no uncertain: terms the separation of a mother and her child below seven years. The lower court's order is eloquently silent on what these compelling reasons are. And the JDRC acted correctly and justifiably in dismissing the case for custody and support of the children based on those grounds. Vasquez de Arroyo. Id. it was because they wanted to avoid the exposure of the bitter truths which serve as succulent morsel for scandal mongers and idle gossipers and to save their children from embarrassment and inferiority complex which may inevitably stain their lives. True. that . unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure." (Report of the Code Commission.... this Court does not thereby accord recognition to nor legalize the de facto separation of the spouses.had the right. coupled with the observations made by the Code Commission in respect to the said legal provision. the ages of the four children should now be as follows: Enrique — 11. the other. and the husband's in the conjugal home in Bacolod City. 5 . virtue in making it as difficult as possible for married couples — impelled by no better cause than their whims and caprices — to abandon each other's company. 42 Phil.It is likewise undisputed that the couple have been separated in fact for at least five years . when the respondent spouse signed the joint petition on the same matter of custody and support of the children and filed the same with the CFI of Negros Occidental. '. the CFI stated in its order dated June 22. on the grounds of res judicata and lis pendens. the propriety of severing their financial and proprietary interests is manifest. the husband and the wife are obliged to live together. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouse to live under the same roof. The use of the word shall2 in article 363 of the Civil Code. We now come to the question of the custody and support of the children. However. Moreover... it was null and void because clearly violative of article 363 of the Civil Code. respectively. 1 Hag. in effect sought to separate them from their mother. therefore. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. and render conjugal rights to. and Ramon — 5. 1963 of the CFI.ñët Article 356 of the new Civil Code provides: Every child: (1) Is entitled to parental care. pp. not a pending prior action. 1 We agree with the Court of Appeals. they purposely suppressed the "compelling reasons for such measure" from appearing in the public records. this Court is loath to uphold the couple's agreement regarding the custody of the children. however. yet it must be carefully remembered that the general happiness of the married life is secured by its indissolubility.. . therefore. a want of civil attention and accommodation. which again in the language of Arroyo v. Con. 54. . In this jurisdiction.. unless such separation is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a court.. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for "compelling reasons" for the good of the child: those cases must indeed be rare. Therefore. Needless to state. . It is not disputed that it was the JDRC which first acquired jurisdiction over the matter of custody and support of the children. they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off. p. 466. denying the respondent spouse's motion for reconsideration of its order dated April 27. 467. Vasquez de Arroyo.. if the mother's heart is not to be unduly hurt. observe mutual respect and fidelity. underscores its mandatory character. this Court cannot constrain the spouses to live together. in so approving the regime of separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. of the custody of the two older children (both then below the age of 7). and the experience of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married couple shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. 161 Eng.) (Arroyo vs. To that extent therefore. 1963."." We would like to douse the momentary seething emotions of couples who. her moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand the situation. considering:. to the father." The rationale of this new provision was explained by the Code Commission thus: The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. as in cases of adultery. 60). But the foregoing statement is at best a mere hint that there were compelling reasons. The passage of time has removed the prop which supports the respondent spouse's position. even occasional sallies of passion" without more — would be minded to separate from each other. If the parties agreed to submit the matter of custody of the minor children to the Court for incorporation in the final judgment. that the CFI erred in depriving the mother. new Civil Code). Vasquez de Arroyo. For it is no defense against the dismissal of the action that the case before the CFI was filed later than the action before the JDRC." (Evans vs. petulance of manners. This is for the sake and for the welfare of the minor children. she in effect abandoned her action in the JDRC. supra — is a "state which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned..

In seeking a reexamination of the decision. We believe. It is also argued that. No pronouncement as to costs. the proposition altogether does away with the social aspects of marriage in favor of its being a matter of private contract and personal adventure. stating. Russell Leo Moran. likewise. 28 January 1961 (which was a suit filed by a client against his lawyer for failure to perfect an appeal on time). ESCAÑO.R. the reason being that Vicenta's claim that dispensation was granted was not indubitable. We. The said appellee claims that state recognition should be accorded the Church's disavowal of her marriage with Tenchavez. The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce. has filed. It was plain in the decision that the damages attached to 6 . without stating that papal dispensation was actually granted. move for its reconsideration. custody and control of each such child as will be for its best interestpermitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age . that the CFI may increase this amount of P150 according to the needs of each child. which was hers at the time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner "contrary to morals. in plainer terms.R. Vicenta's belated appeal to Canon law.R. Rule 99 of the Rules of Court which. does not. L-23767) are affirmed. to present evidence regarding this matter. by the award of moral damages. Code. ACCORDINGLY. and services. Tenchavez and defendant-appellee Vicenta F. Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "On 10 September 1954. L-19671 July 26. her denial of consortium and desertion of her husband are not included in the enumeration of cases where moral damages may lie. becomes imperative. Particularly when account is taken of the circumstances that she obtained the Nevada divorce in 1950 and only sought ecclesiastical release from her marriage to Tenchavez in 1954. in fact. G. not being sufficiently established. and a faulty one at that. promulgated on 29 November 1965. Neither the case of Ventanilla vs. L-13851. habitual drunkenness. plaintiff-appellant Pastor B. 6. Escaño. did not make good his promise to submit the document evidencing the papal dispensation. No. good customs or public policy" (Civ. it contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of affections in that contributory negligence involves an omission to perform an act while alienation of affection involves the performance of a positive act. at least one of the children — Enrique. plaintiff and appellant. When husband and wife are divorced or living separately and apart from each other. This is the clear mandate of sec. in turn.R. 1964 and the resolution dated July 31.L. His welfare should not be subject to the parents' say-so or mutual agreement alone. is in point. we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other errors assigned in the three appeals. of his parents. and blessed by three children. G. 1963 and June 24. after she had sought and failed to obtain annulment in the civil courts. there is no evidence to support it. With the view that we take of this case. Although the spouses have agreed upon the monthly support of P150 to be given by the petitioner spouse for each child. during the trial in the lower court. a memorandum in intervention. and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding. upon leave previously granted. and her counsel. now invoked by the said defendant-appellee. She concludes that. One last point regarding the matter of support for the children — assuming that the custody of any or more of the children will be finally awarded to the mother. The argument is untenable. the court. and after she had flaunted its principles by obtaining absolute divorce. incapacity. no such document appears on record. an additional effect of legal separation has been added to Article 106. it deserves the laws recognition and protection over the other. The award of moral damages against Vicenta Escaño is assailed on the ground that her refusal to perform her wifely duties. and the orders dated May 28. A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that no such evidence was introduced in the CFI. and. shall award the care. our main decision limited itself to the statement. TENCHAVEZ. 27 July 1960 (wherein the precise ruling was that moral damages may not be recovered for a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding). be denied. To be sure. sound convincing. instead of fitting the concept of marriage as a social institution. L-23482). 32384-R (subject matter of G. in addition. goods. the eldest — is now eleven years of age and should be given the choice of the parent he wishes to live with. The need. since the second marriage is the better one. take judicial notice of the devaluation of the peso in 1962 and the steady skyrocketing of prices of all commodities. that the Tenchavez-Escano marriage was no more than a ceremony.. RESOLUTION REYES. recognized by both civil and ecclesiastical authorities. L-14333. it cannot be considered. all factors and circumstances in the case having been duly considered in the main decision.: Not satisfied with the decision of this Court. 1964 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. for grounds not countenanced by our law. Galang. Art. Centeno.(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian. and the question as to the care. the parents are already separated in fact. J.. second.000 for damages and attorney's fees were awarded to Tenchavez in the decision) should.. third. because this was not raised in the court below. the courts must step in to determine in whose custody the child can better be assured the right granted to him by law. VICENTA F. 1966 PASTOR B.. This latter court relied merely on the mutual agreement of the spouses-parents. J. still this Court must speak out its mind on the insufficiency of this amount. P-2)". 21) for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral damages. unless the parent so chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity.B. It is clear that the abovequoted legal provision grants to every child rights which are not and should not be dependent solely on the wishes.. Besides. upon hearing testimony as may be pertinent. as in this case. ET AL. this was not a sufficient basis to determine the fitness of each parent to be the custodian of the children. custody. while the Moran-Escaño marriage fits the concept of a marriage as a social institution because publicly contracted. therefore. not to mention the fact that all the children are already of school age. On this point.. (4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical. defendants and appellees. and can not. This is a dangerous proposition: it legalizes a continuing polygamy by permitting a spouse to just drop at pleasure her consort for another in as many jurisdictions as would grant divorce on the excuse that the new marriage is better than the previous one. urges a comparison between the two marriages. Where. Appellee obviously mistakes our grant of damages as an effect of legal separation. (Emphasis supplied). Movant Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escaño are undeserving of an award for damages because they are guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take up proper and timely measures to dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving her husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying another man (Moran). or poverty. defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño. moral and intellectual development. states. The prayer of appellant Tenchavez in his motion for reconsideration to increase the damages against Vicenta (P25. much less the whims and caprices. whom said defendant married in the United States. This theory cannot be considered: first. therefore. nor the case of Malonzo vs. the decision dated May 11. The Church's disavowal of the marriage. inter alia: . 1963 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (subject matter of G. L-24259 is hereby remanded to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for further proceedings. vs. in the above-entitled case. respectively.R. in accordance with this decision.

Lucero vs.. (Hilton vs. Contrary to intervenor Moran's contention. as. as if the two branches of the law contradicted one another. and her proof on it was inadequate.. The res is the personal status of the plaintiff domiciled in the Philippines. Not affecting the jurisdiction over the subject matter. enforcible by process of contempt. For analogous reasons. Thus. She never stopped her wrongdoings to her husband. unless contrary to the policy of its own law. 60) (Emphasis supplied) But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect accorded to individual liberty in civil cases. (Cas cit. 1954". 6. The argument should be addressed in the legislature. . 42 Phil. 178. the arguments advanced against the award of attorney's fees must be rejected as devoid of merit. L-20043. Finally. A judgment affecting the status of persons. without resolving the question of lack of jurisdiction over her person".When. the action against the non-resident defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff. for instance. And where the wealth of the deserting spouse renders this remedy illusory. 1950 . that foreign decrees cannot be enforced or recognized if they contravene public policy (Nussbaum. and because she filed a counterclaim against plaintiff (Rec. and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. in the present case. because. pp... error for the intervenor to ask that "private international law — rather than Philippine civil law — should decide the instant case". Her denial of cohabitation. section 7).. Guyot 159 U. App. SEC. 113.J. Cas. 852). and. 157. Russel Leo Moran. but it referred to physically coercive means. and the recognition to be accorded to the divorce decree thus obtained is quite another. the Department of Foreign Affairs informed plaintiff Tenchavez that "According to information. 40 L. — In the recognition and enforcement of foreign laws the Courts are slow to overrule the positive law of the forum. the public policy of this forum is clearly adverse to such recognition. we prefer to 7 . a consort who unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support (Art.. (15 C. In a consolidated paper (intervenor's rejoinder and appellee Vicenta Escaño's supplemental motion for reconsideration).. refusal to render consortium and desertion of her husband started right after their wedding but such wrongs have continued ever since. overruled her challenge to its jurisdiction.. . in private international law. 254) The award of damages. Since prescription is an affirmative defense. 45 Phil. . The principle is well-established. the other". (11 Am. the burden lay on the defendant to clearly prove it. Although in a letter. 326. even though she had stated in the counterclaim that she was not waiving her special defense of lack of jurisdiction. Ed. 54. in fact. 300-301). as. 563. Vicenta should be deemed to have withdrawn the objection to the lower court's jurisdiction over her person. was merely incidental to the petition for legal separation. Principles of Private International Law. because it was not filed within four years since the Tenchavez-Escaño marriage in 1948. the second. the issue is raised that "the Supreme Court cannot reverse the decision of the lower court dismissing the complaint nor sentence Vicenta Escaño to pay damages. either on appeal or by special remedy which could have been availed of by the appellee when the lower court. and Ramirez-Cuaderno vs. Philippine courts may validly try and decide the case.. was unnecessary because the matter was not properly brought to us for resolution. on September 13. the Court declaring that — We are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order. they have jurisdiction over the res. 1963 Ed. 110) (Emphasis supplied) It is. she (appellee) secured a decree of divorce on October 21. and in that event their jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. I Ves St. The Arroyo case did rule that "it is not within the province of courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with. It is thoroughly established as a broad general rule that foreign law or rights based therein will not be given effect or enforced if opposed to the settled public policy of the forum. and married an American citizen. the court properly ignored the point (Rev. may be entered to compel prostitution of the purely personal right of consortism.S. 7. 232). save as the court. 205-206). 110 U. and they will never give effect to a foreign law where to do so would prejudice the state's own rights or the rights of its citizens or where the enforcement of the foreign law would contravene the positive policy of the law of the forum whether or not that policy is reflected in statutory enactments. Gallemore. since nothing in the main decision was designed or intended to prejudge or rule on the criminal aspect of the case. As the case presently stands. and the two should not be confused. there is no cogent reason why the court may not award damage as it may in cases of breach of other obligations to do intuitu personae even if in private relations physical coercion be barred under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and factum". 2 Swan St. the decision did not impair appellee's constitutional liberty of abode and freedom of locomotion. — No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors and properly argued in the brief. as it was incumbent upon her to do (Relativo vs. p. Cheely vs. While much could be said as to the circumstances surrounding the divorce of the appellee. then. so that the period of limitation has never been completed. 81 Phil. Garvan. It is to be noted that in this civil case only a preponderance of evidence is required. On the argument about the action on tort having prescribed. LR 8 App. Roach vs. note.1äwphï1. Vicenta Escaño did exercise these rights. . 853) SEC.. may notice plain errors not specified. The action for legal separation was filed on 31 May 1956. we see no point in discussing the question of appellee Escaño's criminal intent. such as a decree confirming or dissolving a marriage. 701 [28:298]. and which was disallowed by the court below. 76 Phil. citing Mabanag vs.. At any rate. therefore. Cottington's Case. A resolution by the Supreme Court of the issue of jurisdiction over the person of appellee Vicenta Escaño. under date of 10 December 1954. The right of a citizen to transfer to a foreign country and seek divorce in a diverse forum is one thing.ñët It is urged that the actions for legal separation and for quasi-delict have prescribed: the first. to support her argument that moral damages did not attach to her failure to render consortium because the sanction therefor is spontaneous mutual affection. Cuaderno. 95.S. Jur. 43. the basis thereof is erroneous: the marriage was not the cause of appellee's wrongful conduct. Civil Code of the Phil. Questions that may be decided.. an action for separation or for annulment of marriage. at its option. Farnie. For all these reasons. and even abused them by stating in her application for a passport that she was "single". 167.S. De Guzman. The argument on both points is untenable. on 1 June 1957. Castro. Intervenor reiterates that recognition of Vicenta's divorce in Nevada is a more enlightened view. as was extensively discussed in the decision. (1 Moran 411. Rule 51. and render conjugal rights to. because it was not filed within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause. is recognized as valid in every country. and not any legal mandate or court order. Neither was the alleged error of the lower court put in issue in her brief as appellee. however. 28 November 1964. or any of its constituent elements. Limitations.). there is no satisfactory and convincing evidence as to the time when plaintiff Tenchavez. Appellee-movant commits a similar mistake by citing Arroyo vs. Clayton. and also clerical errors. p. received the said letter. Arroyo.her wrongful acts under the codal article (Article 2176) expressly cited. Harvey vs. if any. nor was she duty-bound to act immediately upon hearsay information. . the better to facilitate her flight from the wrongs she had committed against her husband.

the doctrine cited by defendant’s counsel that ‘no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. declaring the marriage contract between private respondent Edgardo M. While it is true that if a marriage is null and void. 11. 1996. which declared null and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. xxx For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage. 1979. SO ORDERED. 1979. however.R. Although decided by the High Court in 1992. there is in fact no subsisting marriage. and 3. These documents were submitted as evidence during trial and. the appellate court also said: Terre v. 1982. vs. Ty is declared null and void ab initio. BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION. 1977. As shown in the records of the case. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. IN REQUIRING FOR THE VALIDITY OF PETITIONER’S MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT. private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig. Ty. this instant petition asserting that the Court of Appeals erred: I.2 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Branch 160. herein petitioner. Ty null and void ab initio. are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. they also had a church wedding in Makati. in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. Branch 160. . The appellate court rejected petitioner’s claim that People v. 2349. The church wedding on August 27. The present case differs 8 . For the reasons above cited. 1991. Reyes. A JUDICIAL DECREE NOT REQUIRED BY LAW. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the amount of P15. 12 and 12-A. 1980. a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. He alleged that they had no marriage license when they got married. J. 2. In sustaining the trial court. REYES. No. 209 as amended by E. The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly? To resolve this question. according to petitioner. IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS. we are unwilling to rule that the matter of whether a marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse to determine for himself – for this would be the consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed to a second marriage even before a competent court issues a judicial decree of nullity of his first marriage. 1982. TY. should any be instituted. as in the instant case. he was still married to Anna Maria.6 At the outset. the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner to private respondent null andvoid for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the marriage between private respondent and Villanueva. on August 4. On July 24. 5 In refusing to consider petitioner’s appeal favorably. IV IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE DEFENDANTAPPELLANT. to say the least. She submitted their Marriage License No. Attorney Terre. 5739990 issued at Rosario. Petitioner. and EDGARDO M. 1977.1 The Pasig RTC sustained private respondent’s civil suit and declared his marriage to herein petitioner null andvoid ab initio in its decision dated November 4. are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29. that a second marriage may proceed even without a judicial decree. 1991. decided before the enactment of the Family Code (E. Cavite on April 3. as Exh.O No.000. without difficulty. Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria. 1977. particularly the first and the second which we shall discuss jointly.R. 1979. 1996. in defending her marriage to private respondent.’ It does not say. The fact that the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4. III IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CIVIL EFFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME MARRIAGE LICENSE. Case No. respondents.000. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. 1977. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner. But the appellate court said these cases. He did not question this document when it was submitted in evidence. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. On April 4. respectively.A. Said the appellate court: We can accept. The results would be disquieting. However. II IN THE RESOLUTION. – G. xxx WHEREFORE. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4. all motions for reconsideration are hereby denied. . Then they had a church wedding on August 27. 1991. while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4. 127406 November 27. upon the foregoing ratiocination. which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. Reyes and defendantappellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. It also ordered private respondent to pay P15. Both parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. 1979. no longer control. no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity. was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4. petitioner. the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision. and could not have been the intendment of even the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code on marriage. and his church marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27. THE COURT OF APPEALS. 1977. Mendoza3 and People v. private respondent wed Ofelia P. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent] Eduardo M. . On January 3. 227).abstain from so doing in order not to influence in any way the criminal case. 2000 OFELIA P. 1980. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M.: This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24. COURT OF APPEALS. G. of the Court of Appeals in C.00 as monthly support for their children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes. Hence. praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. pointed out that his claim that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. Adm. we shall go over applicable laws and pertinent cases to shed light on the assigned errors.O. Aragon4 are applicable in this case. ab initio. the facts situate it within the regime of the nowrepealed provisions of the Civil Code.00 to his children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from November 4. we must note that private respondent’s first and second marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979. No. For these cases held that where a marriage is void from its performance. It also appears indisputable that private respondent and petitioner had a church wedding ceremony on April 4. in Manila. CV 37897. on April 4. before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. 1980. 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedent for this case. the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. We modify the appealed Decision in this wise: 1. Metro Manila. DECISION QUISUMBING. A binding decree is now needed and must be read into the provisions of law previously obtaining.

we find that petitioner now has raised this matter properly. before Wiegel. or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. Mendoza. 11.19 however. 40. This ruling was affirmed in Tolentino v. we upheld the right of the second wife to share in the estate they acquired. we conclude that private respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid. In Apiag v.17 the Court held that there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. (Family Code. Our rulings in Gomez. The second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case. We held that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegeland the effectivity of the Family Code. Terre should have known that the prevailing case law is that "for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage. categorically stated that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Similarly. and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code. Art." The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. she married another man. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. As held in Jison v.23 However. Terre (1992)21 the Court. (Art. that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent. In Wiegel. the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage. there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage.8 both involving a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code. we are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate court’s finding that despite private respondent’s "deceit and perfidy" in contracting marriage with petitioner. 147. having been contracted during the existence of the first marriage. He claimed that his first marriage in 1977 was void since his first wife was already married in 1968. Originally. 52. The Court.25the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. We held that Atty. The Court acquitted accused on the ground that the second marriage is void. Additionally. We exonerated a clerk of court of the charge of immorality on the ground that his marriage to Filomena Abella in October of 1948 was void. 54. in the present case. there can be no bigamy.22 the Court held: Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. saying that it is not for the spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage is void or not. Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid marriage. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance. Mendoza and Aragon. Pertinent to the present controversy. a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel. Mendoza and Aragon. to share in their acquired estate and in proceeds of the retirement insurance of the husband. or if the absentee. 50. In Yap v. And since the death of the husband supervened before such declaration. accused contracted a third marriage during the subsistence of the second marriage. 40. on grounds of justice and equity. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases. Earlier 9 .16 Yet again in Wiegel v. In Gomez v. 48. Thus. Aragon. however.12 and Consuegra v. Court of Appeals. 86.15 the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as precedents. applying Gomez. the Court found the second marriage void without need of judicial declaration. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent. A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. therefore. accordingly. for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. though he has been absent for less than seven years. is generally considered as dead and before any person believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage. we recognized the right of the second wife who entered into the marriage in good faith. there are no two subsisting valid marriages. there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time. unless: (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved. The Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. 83. still there was a need for judicial declaration of such nullity (of the second marriage). Cantero. appears to be conflicting. Accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. the Civil Code contains no express provision to that effect. In Domingo v. Paras. expressly relying on Consuegra. coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner married private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil ceremony. Jurisprudence on the matter. Both cases involved the same factual milieu. In 1978. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. At any rate. Moreover. Sempio-Diy (1986). 14 But in Odayat v. the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. or (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive. Since the second marriage is void. There is no need for a judicial declaration that said second marriage is void. Court of Appeals (1993). Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that: Art. Consuegra and Wiegel. the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Mendoza and Aragon rulings. Consuegra. At that time. the prevailing rule was found in Odayat. In this case. (Emphasis supplied).11 this Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case. Amante (1977). The Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting. we disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. we applied Odayat. 13. Lipana. See also arts. Hence. thus reverting to the Odayat. In the present case. 148). Tan. in People v. 99. Court of Appeals. 39 of the Family Code). Bobis7 and Mercado v. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. since she was already previously married to one Eliseo Portales in February of the same year.9 under which a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly required. 42. 20 Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage – Art. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. and the first one terminated by the death of his wife. In Terre v. the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979. he could benefit from her silence on the issue. (1997)24 the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage. Lilia married Maxion in 1972. 44.significantly from the recent cases of Bobis v. concluded that:18 There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other. After the death of his first wife.13 however. Wiegel. Thus. Consuegra.10 and People v.

but for another reason." On the matter of petitioner’s counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees. for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto. it did not award moral damages because the latter did not adduce evidence to support her claim. Several people. he was a staff correspondent in the Far East of the magazines The American Weekly of New York and The Sphere of London. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY. The appellate court might have its reasons for brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant below which undoubtedly could have tendered a valid issue. the sum of P250. for we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. Lilius et al. driving his own car.: This case involves two appeals. 1979 and used in both the civil and the church rites.000. coming from Calauan.000 personally belongs to the plaintiff Sonja Maria Lilius. L-39587 March 24. He was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the road at said points and had no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing at Dayap. our laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly support to their two children. The locomotive struck the plaintiff's car right in the center. 1996 and its Resolution dated November 7. Prior thereto. In our view. he did not see the crossing but he heard two short whistles. ET AL. Province of Laguna..26 Like the lower courts. As petitioner contends. besmirched reputation. there was nothing to indicate its existence and inasmuch as there were many houses. left Manila in their Studebaker car — driven by the said plaintiff Aleko E. with the costs of the suit. the sum of P50. the appellants Aleko E. for the purposes above stated. anxiety. the total amount of P30. if not common sense. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. with the cooperation of his wife and coplaintiff. were walking on the opposite side. To do so. SO ORDERED. one by the defendant the Manila Railroad Company. are reversed partially. which will be discussed later. as a legal and social institution. under the facts therein alleged.28 WHEREFORE. The defendant the Manila Railroad Company. 1934 ALEKO E. assign two alleged errors as committed by the same court a quo in its judgment in question.1âwphi1 Although the appellate court admitted that they found private respondent acted "duplicitously and craftily" in marrying petitioner. with costs. it must be understood that of the amount adjudicated to the said plaintiffs in this judgment. who seemed to have alighted from the said truck. we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. of letting the wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls "his own deceit and perfidy. Furthermore. Province of Laguna. Lilius has. some without question and the others by a preponderance of evidence. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M. the appellant the Manila Railroad Company assigns nine alleged errors committed by the trial court in its said judgment. but which was not timely interposed by her before the trial court. Obviously. After dragging the said car a distance of about ten meters.865. and the award of the amount of P15. Lilius. Where the road was clear and unobstructed. social humiliation and alienation from her parents. it was impossible to see an approaching train. via Dayap. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24. the sum of P5. Costs against private respondent. by way of indemnity for material and moral damages suffered by them through the fault and negligence of the said defendant entity's employees. author and photographer. who translated his articles and books into English. G. petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage.petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondent’s allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. In the same breath. Lilius et al. we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded in the present case. He slowed down to about 12 miles an hour and sounded his horn for the people to get out of the way. praying. answering the complaint. he saw a huge black mass fling itself upon him. 1996. plaintiffs-appellants. 1931. in turn. and his 4-year old daughter Brita Marianne Lilius.27 There are other remedies. that the Manila Railroad Company be ordered to pay to said plaintiffs. VILLA-REAL. And although the suit brought by the plaintiffs has the nature of a joint action. LILIUS.000. He had others in preparation when the accident occurred. He utilized the linguistic ability of his wife Sonja Maria Lilius. Lilius et al. she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish. The force of the impact was so great that the plaintiff's wife and daughter were thrown from the car and were picked up from the ground unconscious and seriously hurt. and Swedish. to the plaintiff Brita Marianne Lilius. which turned out to be locomotive No. the appellate court erred when it refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality. from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila. The following facts have been proven at the trial. Lilius. Moreover. denies each and every allegation thereof and. As a ground of their appeal. including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. At about 7 o'clock on the morning of May 10.. At about seven or eight meters from the crossing. so that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P.. and prays that it be absolved from the complaint. he had made the trip as far as Calauan. his wife Sonja Maria Lilius. With his attention thus occupied. to Dr. She adds that the interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of marriage. militates against such incongruity. the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the left side of the road. outweighs such technicality. Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes. alleges that the plaintiff Aleko E. and the other by the plaintiffs Aleko E. negligently and recklessly drove his car. 713 of the defendant company's train coming eastward from Bay to Dayap station. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING. According to him. in and outside the Philippines. judgment is rendered ordering the defendant company to pay to the plaintiffs. to wit: The plaintiff Aleko E. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial.000 plus legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint. Indeed we find there was a marriage license. his writings netted him a monthly income of P1. German. That this license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage. Marfori of the Calauan Hospital.e. Should we grant her prayer. which will be discussed in the course of this decision. Immediately afterwards. Before reaching the crossing in question. It was the first time that he made said trip although he had already been to many places. though it was the same license issued on April 3. the sum of P10. and the balance to the plaintiff Aleko E. if not inequity.500. for many years. the dispositive part of which reads as follows: Wherefore. she acted as his secretary. the locomotive threw it upon a siding. by way of special defense.R. the plaintiff drove at the rate of from 19 to 25 miles an hour. defendant-appellant. would make the application of the law absurd. been a well-known and reputed journalist. vs. i. No. Lilius — for the municipality of Pagsanjan. Some of his works have been translated into various languages. In spite of the efforts of 10 . on a sight-seeing trip. At the time of the collision in question. J. but never from Calauan to Pagsanjan. In support of its appeal. shrubs and trees along the road. the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage. the petition is GRANTED. the plaintiff.. She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate court from giving her defense due consideration and weight. Logic. But we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity. This case originated from a complaint filed by Aleko E.

daughter of Aleko E. excessive. Lilius is — in the language of the court. taking into consideration the circumstances in which the said expenses have been incurred. The flagman or switchman arrived after the collision. The plaintiff Aleko E. nor anybody indicating its existence.635 which the court awards to the plaintiffs by way of indemnity for damages. The trial court sentenced the defendants to indemnify him in the sum of P10. Waterous. Due to a timely and successful surgical operation. the said plaintiff was highly nervous and very easily irritated. She underwent two surgical operations on the left leg for the purpose of joining the fractured bones but said operations notwithstanding. which the law requires in order to avoid damage. the tibia and fibula of the right leg. In the case of Gutierrez vs. to serve as a warning to passers-by of its existence in order that they might take the necessary precautions before crossing the railroad. nor anything. otherwise. the flagman and switchman would have always been at his post at the crossing upon the arrival of a train.000. The said flagman and switchman had many times absented himself from his post at the crossing upon the arrival of a train. the different items thereof representing doctor's fees.ne+ As to the indemnity of P5. coming from the station with a red flag in one hand and a green one in the other. The next question to be decided refers to the sums of money fixed by the court a quo as indemnities for damages which the defendant company should pay to the plaintiffs-appellants. it is not enough that the latter has been guilty of negligence. by slackening his speed and continuously ringing the bell and blowing the whistle before arriving at the crossing. it was because. however. and because of the fractures of both legs. however. the deformity is permanent in character and as a result the plaintiff will have some difficulty in walking. 1ªvvphi1. which fractured required medical attendance for a considerable period of time. Paul's Hospital in the City of Manila where they were treated by Dr. this court is of the opinion that the defendant the Manila Railroad Company alone is liable for the accident by reason of its own negligence and that of its employees. for failure to send the said flagman and switchman to his post on time. employing the care and diligence that a good father of a family should apply to his own person. The plaintiff Sonja Maria Lilius suffered from fractures of the pelvic bone. which she has on her forehead caused by the lacerated wound received by her from the accident. However. to the members of his family and to his property. on previous occasions as well as on the night in question. The lacerations received by the child have left deep scars which will permanently disfigure her face. for not having taken the necessary precautions to avoid an accident. With respect to the plaintiff-appellant Aleko E. contributed to the accident. a contusion above the left eye and a lacerated wound on the right leg. for not having had on that occasion any semaphore at the crossing at Dayap. disfigures her face and that the fracture of her left leg has caused a permanent deformity which renders it very difficult for her to walk". he did not see the crossing in question. wife of the plaintiff Aleko E. the sum of P5. and. driving his car at a speed which prudence demanded according to the circumstances and conditions of the road. his attention having been occupied in attempting to go ahead. nor had he suffered any facial deformity. Lilius suffered from a fractured nose.000. although now completely cured. On the afternoon of the same day. neither is the sum of P10. Gutierrez (56 Phil. on the part of its employees — the flagman and switchman. Her condition was serious and. and for several months he had great difficulty in concentrating his attention on any matter and could not write articles nor short stories for the newspapers and magazines to which he was a contributor. one on the forehead and the other on the left side of the face. she was hovering between life and death. The lacerated wound. which saw her at the trial — "young and beautiful and the big scar. Lilius. she will be forced to walk with some difficulty and continuous extreme care in order to keep her balance. the right leg of the plaintiff Narciso Gutierrez was fractured as a result of a collision between the autobus in which he was riding and the defendant's car. As to the sum of P10. is reasonable. but everybody should look after them. although this court believes his claim of a net income of P1. Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant entity employed the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting its aforesaid employees. and the engineer. It appears that the herein plaintiff-appellant Aleko E. Waterous. in order to warn them of his approach and request them to get out of the way. have duly been proven at the trial and the sum in question is not excessive. and received a large lacerated wound on the forehead. slackening his speed in the face of an obstacle and blowing his horn upon seeing persons on the road. loss of personal effects and torn clothing. was two short blows from the whistle of the locomotive immediately preceding the collision and when the accident had already become inevitable. As a result of the accident. for not having remained at his post at the crossing in question to warn passers-by of the approaching train. has left a disfiguring scar.000. inasmuch as nobody is a guarantor of his neighbor's personal safety and property. The child Brita Marianne Lilius received two lacerated wounds. If he failed to stop. she survived her wounds. for several days. which he received of the impending danger. adjudicated to her by the said trial court by way of indemnity for patrimonial and moral damages.. The train left Bay station a little late and therefore traveled at great speed. nor was there anybody to warn the public of approaching trains. but it is also necessary that the said victim has not. there had been no notice nor sign of the existence of the crossing. look and listen before going over the crossing. as he knew nothing about it beforehand. and upon the persons who appeared to have alighted from the said truck. as he did when he came upon the truck parked on the left hand side of the road seven or eight meters from the place where the accident occurred. which she received on her forehead. and after taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case. On the day of the trial the fracture had not yet completely healed but it might cause him permanent lameness. the plaintiff's entered St. through his own negligence. thus losing for some time his only means of livelihood. The diligence of a good father of a family. and taking into further consideration her social standing. nor did he have the social standing that the herein plaintiff-appellant Sonja Maria Lilius enjoys. below the knee. adjudicated to him by the trial court as indemnity for damages. the stationmaster. both of which were wound on their respective sticks. In view of the foregoing considerations. this court is of the opinion that the accident was due to negligence on the part of the defendant-appellant company. In the opinion of Dr. in spite of the fact that he was driving at 12 miles per hour after having been free from obstacles. 177). neither is 11 . in order to avoid any damage. it did not employ such diligence in supervising their work and the discharge of their duties because. he was unable to stop the locomotive until after it had gone about seventy meters from the crossing. above and below the knees.000 which this court reduced to P5. Lilius and Sonja Maria Lilius. in order that a victim of an accident may recover indemnity for damages from the person liable therefor. hospital and nursing services. for not having employed the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of the said employees in the discharge of their duties.engineer Andres Basilio. it would have had a semaphore or sign at the crossing and. in view of the absence of said flagman and switchman. is not confined to the careful and prudent selection of subordinates or employees but includes inspection of their work and supervision of the discharge of their duties. the leg in question still continues deformed.000 in favor of the child Brita Marianne Lilius. in spite of the fact that the said plaintiff therein was neither young nor good-looking. in addition to fractures of both legs. Taking into consideration the fact that the plaintiff Sonja Maria Lilius. The first and only warning. Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary evidence which the parties presented at the trial in support of their respective contentions. Lilius took all precautions which his skill and the presence of his wife and child suggested to him in order that his pleasure trip might be enjoyable and have a happy ending.500 a month to be somewhat exaggerated. Prior to the accident. in addition to multiple contusions and scratches on various parts of the body.

vs. Espita. German and Swedish. Narag. is not excessive. Dominador M. it is necessary for him to prove the existence of such assistance and his wife's willingness to continue rendering it had she not been prevented from so doing by her illness. which the law imposes upon her. Rule 1. the plaintiff Aleko E. No. from the date of the appealed judgment until this judgment becomes final. including the care and education of the children and attention to the husband upon whom primarily devolves the duty of supporting the family of which he is the head. It therefore came as a terrible embar[r]assment to me. inasmuch as a wife's domestic assistance and conjugal companionship are purely personal and voluntary acts which neither of the spouses may be compelled to render (Arroyo vs. The spouses must be faithful to. enrolled in subjects handled by Atty. it is necessary for the party claiming indemnity for the loss of such services to prove that the person obliged to render them had done so before he was injured and that he would be willing to continue rendering them had he not been prevented from so doing.000 claimed by the plaintiff Aleko E. Ms. profession and within a short time. in utterly scandalous circumstances. Campos Rueda (35 Phil. Mrs. Gina Espita. assist. NARAG. and entrusting the care of their home to a housekeeper. the Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law. Wherefore. his family. with the sole modification that interest of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the appealed judgment until this judgment becomes final will be added to the indemnities granted. Narag. When the wife's mission was circumscribed to the home. this court. continuous extreme care being necessary in order to keep her balance in addition to the fact that all of this unfavorably and to a great extent affect her matrimonial future. professional and political. commercial and industrial.. The plaintiffs-appellants are entitled to interest of 6 percent per annum on the amount of the indemnities adjudicated to them. Furthermore. 190. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence. "her services. it was not difficult to assume. Narag in the early seventies as a full-time college instructor in the College of Arts and Sciences and as a professor in the Graduate School. are demanding greater civil rights and are aspiring to become man's equal in all the activities of life. industry. . and (4) that in order that a husband may recover damages for deprivation of his wife's assistance during her illness from an accident. one of the husband's rights is to count on his wife's assistance. nowadays when women. apart from the services of his wife Sonja Maria Lilius as translator and secretary. 42 Phil. by virtue of the marriage alone. that is. Espita. ATTY. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of P2. and support each other.the same excessive. On November 13. Exerting his influence as her teacher. the first question to be decided is that raised by the plaintiff Aleko E. Atty. contained in articles 44-48 thereof. 17 years old and a first year college student. engaged in their businesses. This question has impliedly been decided in the negative when the defendant-appellant entity's petition for the reduction of said indemnity was denied.C. marriage has ceased to create the presumption that a woman complies with the duties to her husband and children. However. interpreting the provisions of the Civil Marriage Law of 1870. that she performed all the said tasks and her physical incapacity always redounded to the husband's prejudice inasmuch as it deprived him of her assistance. Vazquez de Arroyo. 255. and he who seeks to collect indemnity for damages resulting from deprivation of her domestic services must prove such services. when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity. it is hereby affirmed in toto. is not excessive. Narag courted Ms. 12 . with unspeakable grief and pain when my husband abandoned us. declaring it to be reasonable. complainant. gradually lessening her resistance until the student acceded to his wishes.000 for a permanent deformity on the face and on the left leg. With respect to the plaintiffs' appeal.. In the case of Goitia vs. in their desire to be more useful to society and to the nation. said as follows: The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and obligations of the spouses. rendered by her prior to the accident. A.500. 2 The complainant narrated: The St. This assistance comprises the management of the home and the performance of household duties. not finding any error in the judgment appealed from.000 which the trial court adjudicated to him by way of indemnity for damages consisting in the loss of his income as journalist and author as a result of his illness. is guilty of negligence and is civilly liable for damages suffered by a motorist and his family who cross its line without negligence on their part. The husband must live with and protect his wife. DOMINADOR M. society and conjugal companionship". (3) that an indemnity of P5. Lilius relative to the insufficiency of the sum of P5.01 of the Code of Ethics for Lawyers. to public or private institutions which take charge of young children while their mothers are at work. as a result of personal injuries which she had received from the accident now under consideration. in accordance with the provisions of section 510 of Act No. in politics. PER CURIAM: Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the bar.500 for the loss of what is called Anglo-Saxon common law "consortium" of his wife. 54). Lilius has not presented any evidence showing the existence of domestic services and their nature. translating them into English. In view of the foregoing considerations this court is of the opinion and so holds: (1) That a railroad company which has not installed a semaphore at a crossing an does not see to it that its flagman and switchman faithfully complies with his duty of remaining at the crossing when a train arrives. in order that it may serve as a basis in estimating their value. under the law and the doctrine of this court. taking into consideration the fact that the lacerations received by her have left deep scars that permanently disfigure her face and that the fractures of both her legs permanently render it difficult for her to walk freely. Louis College of Tuguegarao engaged the services of Atty. with the costs of both instances against the appellant. So ordered. . but which they managed to from me. . in addition to the fact that such services formed part of the work whereby he realized a net monthly income of P1. 256). The plaintiff Aleko E. 3405 June 29. NARAG. there is no sufficient evidence of the true value of said services nor to the effect that he needed them during her illness and had to employ a translator to act in her stead. (2) that an indemnity of P10. the value of which has not been proven. if not to a nursemaid.000 for a permanent deformity on the face and legs of a four-year old girl belonging to a well-to-do family. suffered by a young and beautiful society woman. Dominador M. 1989. In the case under consideration. which services consisted in going over his writings. in force in these Islands with reference to the mutual rights and obligations of the spouses. whom she accused of having violated Canons 1 and 6. Thus. Narag filed an administrative complaint 1 for disbarment against her husband. 1998 JULIETA B. to live with Ms. Lilius as damages for the loss of his wife's services in his business as journalist and author. In 1984. They then maintained an illicit relationship known in various circles in the community. and their children. 252. respondent. and as a prominent member of the legal profession and then member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tuguegarao. Therefore. Atty. many of them spending their time outside the home. As to the amount of P10. Julieta B. and acting as his secretary. except when he removes to a foreign country.

Complainant has been systematically and unceasingly destroying the very foundations of their marriage and their family. Jose. she fires off letters or complaints against her husband in every conceivable forum. Their marriage has become a nightmare." In addition. . as is her nature. Your Respondent. She explained that she had earlier dropped the case against him because of his continuous threats against her. vitriolic and unbending. her sense of right[e]ousness and morals completely corrupted by a member of the Bar. Your Respondent has a loving upbringing. in public and at home. she became more fierce and predatory. he described his wife as a person emotionally disturbed. 1991. 19 In the hearing before IBP Commissioner Plaridel C. physically. by the Complainant. Narag. faced with an absolutely uncomprehending and uncompromising mind whose only obsession now is to destroy. the IBP Board of Governors 9dismissed the complaint of Mrs. report and recommendation. humility. she stated. he alleged that she had voluntarily executed her Affidavit of Desistance 16 and Motion to Dismiss. when she wrote the Letter of November 11. but gave him the best legacy in life: a purposeful and meaningful education. 5. your Respondent suffered in silence and bore the pain of his misfortune with dignity and with almost infinite patience. all without basis. Complainant comes from what she claims to be very rich parents who value material possession more than education and the higher and nobler aspirations in life. Narag has abandoned us. Your Respondent loves his family very dearly. RTC. On the other hand. Their marriage has become a torture chamber in which Your Respondent has been incessantly BEATEN. this Court 11 received another letter 12 from the complainant. was that her husband had remained a faithful and responsible family man. No. . Her value system is the very opposite. his family. He gave his family sustenance. . companionship. and purely on impulse. filed in compliance with this Court's Resolution issued on July 6. viz: What is pitiable here is the fact that Complainant is an incurably jealous and possessive woman. who was his former student in the tertiary level[. respondent alleged the following: 20 2. Espita at the Department of Trade and Industry Central Office at Makati. Metro Manila. The darkness continues to shroud the marital and familial landscape. 566. He preserved the good name and dignity of his wife.It appears that Atty. BRUTALIZED. In fact. Tuguegarao. 1991. 1991. Narag used his power and influence as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan to cause the employment of Ms. honor or obey your spouse. 1991. But this is not to be." The truth. and most of all. destroy. just to satisfy the consuming demands of her "loving" jealousy. in sickness and in health . Fernan received from complainant another letter seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint. Thus. he remained calm and never inflicted violence on them. 10 The case took an unexpected turn when. 1990. a few hours afterwards. with her seven children 13 as co-signatories. 5 Supporting her letter were an Affidavit of Desistance 6 and a Motion to Dismiss. Proc. Denying that he had threatened. Branch III. 3. she repents and feels sorry for her acts against the Respondent. Commissioner Racela. xxx xxx xxx Your Respondent subscribes to the sanctity of marriage as a social institution. a liberation from enslavement. 18 On August 24. a comfortable home. Your Respondent has to undergo a catharsis. in a Resolution dated December 18. mentally. forgiveness. . Then. and understanding. and emotionally. and every time the streak of jealousy rears its head. 4.] 3 This Court. Even in the most trying times. the light at the tunnel for Your Respondent does not seem in sight. to testify under oath "that she prepared the Motion to Dismiss and Affidavit of Desistance on her own free will and affirmed the contents thereof. and has done all he could in thirty-eight (38) years of marriage to protect and preserve his family. Ms. again appealing for the disbarment of her husband. 17 even appearing before the investigating officer. 14 In his Comment on the complainant's letter of November 11. if only to preserve their family and their marriage. at this point in time. Your Respondent never 13 . The Complainant never mellowed and never became gentl[e]. for this gesture. Dominador M. TORTURED. and (3) she was suffering from "emotional confusion arising from extreme jealousy. for better or for worse. 1989. 15 respondent prayed that the decision of the Board of Governors be affirmed. 4 On June 26. loving. and concern for the poor. referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. she was then in the grips of one of her bouts of jealousy. Your Respondent comes from very poor parents who have left him not even a square meter of land. this Court issued another Resolution referring the Comment of respondent to the IBP. This is in compliance with the marital vow to love. he professed his love for his wife and his children and denied abandoning his family to live with his paramour. Cagayan. Paraphrasing Dorfman in "Death and the Maiden". the office of then Chief Justice Marcelo B. 1992. education. on November 25. Complainant is a violent husband-beater. It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty. Narag for failure to prosecute. She further asserted that he had neither entered into an amorous relationship with one Gina Espita nor abandoned his family. can the torturer and the tortured co-exist and live together? Hence. and HUMILIATED. He was always gentle and compassionate to his wife and children. Hence. However. and destroy. Complainant was reared and raised in an entirely different environment. 8 In a Decision dared October 8. His children are all now full-fledged professionals. love. Even in this case. (2) all the love letters between the respondent and Gina Espita were forgeries. 7 attached as Annexes A and B. mature. to live with a 22-year-old woman. Out of gratitude perhaps. nurtured in the gentle ways of love. Espita agreed to live with Atty. . Complainant abhors the poor. with perpetual regret and with great sorrow. consumed by insane and unbearable jealousy. harassed or intimidated his wife. and gainfully employed. a good and respected name. For thirty-eight years. She alleged therein that (1) she fabricated the allegations in her complaint to humiliate and spite her husband. But your Respondent never revealed these destructive qualities to other people. when her jealousy cools off. BATTERED. . Spl. ABUSED. filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage. . 1992. which she filed before the IBP commission on bar discipline. .

. bad and immoral her husband is. Narag refused all these efforts of respondent Narag. I. 12439. He never had or is having any illicit relationship with her anywhere. . Civil Case No. evil and immoral.S No.R.) with S[upreme] C[ourt]. 3. Jr. is not true.). emotionally. He never lived with her as husband and wife anywhere at any time. . . Narag. or any other capacity because her husband is evil. . . It is he who has been mercilessly scandalized and crucified by the Complainant. (. and absolutely without force or intimidation. .). be it in Centro Tumauini or any of its barangays. Adm. . namely: a) Whether there was indeed a commission of alleged abandonment of respondent's own family and [whether he was] living with his paramour. .7 Complaint for Disbarment (. disgraced. . . abuse[d]. He tried several times to reconcile with Mrs. Tumauini. to the effect that the affidavit of Dominador B. et. . 3. Respondent is also suffering from hypertension. 1-92-0083. . His very physical.1 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty . shamed. and all other sectors of the community to tell them how evil. . . . That respondent is totally innocent of the charges: He never courted Gina Espita in the Saint Louis College of Tuguegarao.23 On July 18. for no reason at all. Narag tried to return to the conjugal home many times with the help of mutual friends to save the marriage and the family from collapse. G.8 Complaint for Disbarment. and humiliated respondent Atty. . and immoral.S. mentally. Withdrawn (.4 Complaint for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices and concubinage.] Mrs.. or in any other place. et. Respondent never abandoned his family[. Narag and Tuguegarao MTC Judge Dominador Garcia during the trial of Criminal Case No. at any time. . the investigating officer submitted his report. It is only now that he is constrained to reveal all these things to defend himself. 3. . She tells them not to hire him as professor. again (. In fact.". as an incurably jealous wife and possessive woman suffering everytime with streaks of jealousy.2 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty. No. . professional organizations. battered. that her husband is worthless. IV. Narag. He never begot a child or children with her. Case No. and hardly able to earn his own keep. reputation and dignity? Because of Complainant's virulent disinformation campaign against her husband. al. DILG. 3. .3 Complaint for Concubinage. bad. . xxx xxx xxx III.). xxx xxx xxx VI. Narag from the practice of law. physically. . . On the other hand. (. Your Respondent is not a scandalous man. Isabela. Pending. Finally. were never denied by him on the witness stand much less presented and offered proof to support otherwise. DISMISSED by IBP Board of Governors (. 1996. . as shown by the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of Respondent Atty. and humiliated. the due execution and contents of which.al. Narag. . 107383. . 3. religious societies. 89-114. DISMISSED. 3.. Pending. Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Cagayan. Complainant Julieta Narag's claim in her counter-manifestation dated March 28.. although he objected to their admissibility for being allegedly forgeries. he offered to return home and to reconcile with Mrs. Gina Espita. Narag. Tuguegarao. Narag is an unbearably jealous. That all the alleged love letters and envelopes (. Is this love? Since when did love become an instrument to destroy a man's dearest possession in life — his good name. . psychological. . 1997. No. and economic conditions render him unfit and unable to do the things attributed to him by the complainant. scandalized. Complainant tells everyone. goodfor-nothing.9 Complaint for Concubinage. Re-instituted (. . Atty. Dominador. . . Narag and her two sons forcibly drove respondent Narag out of the conjugal home. weakened and debilitated by progressively degenerative gout and arthritis. xxx xxx xxx II. 4061. and psychologically. dated February 27. brutalized. respondent did not present himself on the witness stand to testify and be cross-examined on his sworn comment. 3. Narag are false and fabricated. Narag. Your Respondent has been irreparably and irreversibly disgraced. virulent and merciless wife since the beginning of the marriage. . Dominador M. Adm. 1996.6 Complaint for Concubinage. picture (. .). . DISMISSED. 92-109. . 24 recommending the indefinite suspension of Atty. . Complainant filed Motion for Reconsideration. . DENIED. February 20. . except a jealous rage. Jr. . scandalous.).. vindictive. abandoned. Mrs. People vs. . Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Cagayan. medical. among many other similar certificates touching on the same ailments. . everywhere. 22 In his desperate effort to exculpate himself.). . . 3. much less did he present his alleged 14 . Except for the testimonies of respondent's witnesses whose testimonies tend to depict the complaining wife. executed his affidavit freely. Third MCTC. . Case No. . P-5-90. Complainant Julieta B.5 Complaint for Civil Support. He never caused the employment of said woman in the DTI. Narag is now an old man — a senior citizen of 63 years — sickly. The material portions of said report read as follows: Culled from the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by the contending parties. as Counsel. in one of the hearings of the disbarment case. employing every unethical and immoral means to attain his ends. Please see the attached medical certificates. . .) are inadmissible in evidence as enunciated by the Supreme Court in "Cecilia Zulueta vs. respondent submits that all the other allegations of Mrs. . . Court of Appeals. who incessantly beat. V.revealed anything derogatory to his wife. I. Narag. voluntarily. b) Whether the denial under oath that his illegitimate children with Gina Espita (Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador) as appearing on paragraph 1(g) of respondent's Comment vis-avis his handwritten love letters. 21 To prove the alleged propensity of his wife to file false charges. two (2) issues are relevant for the disposition of the case.).). But Mrs. . OMBUDSMAN Case No. he averred: I.). again (. After that. 1996 was obtained through force and intimidation. violent. She goes to colleges and universities. 3405. 1996. Respondent Atty. respondent presented as evidence the following list of the complaints she had filed against him and Gina Espita: 3. tortured. (. before the Tuguegarao MTC on May 3. RTC.

. sir. the IBP adopted and approved the investigating commissioner's recommendation for the indefinite suspension of the respondent. flagrant. respondent's denial that he is the father of the two is a ground for disciplinary sanction (Morcayda v. that she and her husband prodded the complainant to accept the respondent back. or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. brother of the alleged paramour Gina Espita. 37Bienvenido Eugenio. Narag had maltreated his wife. he [was] residing in the house of Reynaldo Angubong. with whom she had two children: Q Mr. denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration. sir. Reyes. 27 Subsequently the complaint sought the disbarment of her husband in a Manifestation/Comment she filed on October 20. Narag the love letters respondent had sent to his sister. 40 Dominador Narag. namely: Aurelle Dominic N. aside from herself. convincing and satisfactory evidence. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant. Hence. 125 SCRA 467). sir.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. good moral character is not only a condition precedent 28 to the practice of law. (Witness pointed to the respondent. but grossly immoral. do you know the respondent in this case? A I know him very well. Isabela. you claim that Atty. Absent any evidence showing that these 15 . Q Could you please tell us why do you know him? A Because he was always going to the house of my son-inlaw by the name of Charlie Espita. Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador. 42 Charlie Espita. do you know the residence of Atty. xxx xxx xxx Q Mr. More specifically. categorically state under oath that this is the residence of Atty. he may be suspended or disbarred." and that Atty. we find the respondent subject to disciplinary action as a member of the legal profession. corroborated complainant's charge against respondent in these categorical statements he gave to the investigating officer: Q Mr. si[r]. when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct. nor should he. 44 In addition. and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case by clear. sir. testified that she learned from the Narag children — Randy. He said I am the live-in partner. CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Narag. 34 Presented by complainant as witnesses. whether in public or private life. That is. Narag and Gina Espita are allegedly living as husband and wife. 30 Furthermore. 45 Witness Bienvenido Eugenio strengthened the testimony of Charlie Espita in this wise: Q Mr. Narag? A Because you are staying together in that house and you have left your family. Q How do you know that Atty." Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in order to live with Gina Espita. "as officers of the court. xxx xxx xxx Q And under oath this is where Atty. Daarol 33 that. Worse. Jervis B. the complainant was able to establish that respondent abandoned his family and lived with another woman. 32 We explained in Barrientos vs. is it not? A Yes. 46 Witness Nieves Reyes. Witness. can you point [to] him? A Yes. 1997. Naz. behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.paramour. Q And this is located where? A Centro Tamauini. Narag is living with your sister? Did you see them in the house? A Yes. is it not? A Yes. sir. it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree 31 or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. Gina Espita. 47 On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses. Your Honor. 35 were: Charlie Espita. Charlie Espita admitted (1) that it was he who handed to Mrs. sir. Narag is here. You claim that? A Yes. in its Resolution dated November 30. Jr. Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador. Charlie Espita repeated his account that his sister Gina was living with the respondent. Narag is now living with your sister as husband and wife. Gina Espita. do you know Atty. Atty. Espita and Kyle Dominador N. Q If Atty. Narag tried to dissuade him from appearing at the disbarment proceedings. Dominador Narag) Q Why do you know Atty. Narag? ATTY. immoral or deceitful conduct. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: Rule 1. dishonest. xxx xxx xxx During cross-examination conducted by the respondent himself. The IBP granted this stiffer penalty and.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful. 25 In its Resolution 26 issued on August 23. Viewed from all the evidence presented. 38 Alice Carag. and (2) that Atty.Rule 7. xxx xxx xxx Q You said also that Atty. Q How do you know that they are the children of Atty. CONTINUATION OF THE DIRECT A Because he is the live-in partner of my sister and that they are now living together as husband and wife and that they already have two children. 36 Magdalena Bautista. 39 Dr. After a careful scrutiny of the records of the proceedings and the evidence presented by the parties. lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Eugenio. Narag? A Yes. Narag? A Yes. Thus. Narag? A At that time. Witness. that the Narag couple again separated when the respondent "went back to his woman. a neighbor and friend of the estranged couple. sir. NARAG: Already answered. 41 and Nieves F. 1997. Q And you specifically. and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Bong and Rowena — that their father left his family. Espita. a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. to disprove the adulterous relationship between him and their having begotten their illegitimate children. such conduct must not only be immoral. 29 Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful. we find that the conduct of respondent warrants the imposition of the penalty of disbarment. he is the live-in partner of my sister. 1997. but a continuingqualification for all members of the bar. Dominador M. sir. Narag and your sister have two children. Q Why do you say that? A Because at present you are living together as husband and wife and you have already two children and I know that is really an immoral act which you cannot just allow me to follow since my moral values don't allow me that my sister is living with a married man like you. Espita.

that I and my wife ha[ve] parted ways. It would appear. Jervis B. then. his acts prove otherwise. At the same time. you did not give me love. This is one reason that affected us. 52 As a husband. Respondent may have provided well for his family — they enjoyed a comfortable life and his children finished their education. 48Besides. But these accomplishments are not sufficient to show his moral fitness to continue being a member of the noble profession of law. Witness. Mr. he gave me life. I suppose I cannot forgive a person although am a God-fearing person. but if the sin or fault is with the emotional part of myself. he merely denied that he wrote them. could you please tell this Honorable Commission the effect on you? A This has a very strong effect on me and this includes my brothers and sisters. Q How about the effect on your brothers and sisters? Please tell us what are those. whom he bore two children by the name of Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador. our community. how can you say that? Yes. that he was hardly in a position to be a good husband or a good father. showed his resentment towards his father's moral frailties in his testimony: Q My question is this. It hurts to say that I and my wife parted ways. your father gave you life. respondent has the duty not only to himself but also to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. who grew up mostly under the care of their mother. and to render help and support. educate and instruct their children according to right precepts and good example. which contains the fact that your father is maintaining a paramour. And it also affected my children so much. which I could prove and I stand firm to this.witnesses had an ill motive to testify falsely against the respondent. with whom he had two children. Narag. sir. sir. narrated before the investigating officer the trauma he went through: Q In connection with that affidavit. Mere denial does not suffice. is that what you are saying. xxx xxx xxx COMR. companionship and understanding. instead. we affirm that the two sets of evidence were written by one and the same person. In these letters. also submitted as evidence the cards that she herself had received from him. that he is morally fit to have his name in the Roll of Attorneys. which my mother-in-law hated him so much for this. am I correct? A Long before. 54 Another son. In addition. He may have also established himself as a successful lawyer and a seasoned politician. to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court. xxx xxx xxx Q Why did your wife leave you? A The truth is because of the things that had happened in our family. 49 This he failed to do. respect and fidelity. their testimonies are deemed worthy of belief. hardened criminal on earth. A With the reputation that he had removed from us. At this point in time. respondent clearly manifested his love for Gina and her two children. A Sort of. his flesh is your flesh. when his moral character is assailed. he abandoned his family to live with her paramour. complainant. CONTINUATION. would you send him to jail and have him disbarred? That is the question. Rather. sir. as well as moral and spiritual guidance. Guided by the rule that handwriting may be proved through a comparison of one set of writings with those admitted or treated by the respondent as genuine. he presented ninety-eight (98) pieces of documentary evidence 50 and ten (10) witnesses. especially because my wife belongs to a wellknown family in our community. he must meet the charges squarely and present evidence. his blood runs in your veins. but merely relied on information from either respondent himself or other people. that the testimonies of the witnesses of respondent did not establish the fact that he maintained that moral integrity required by the profession that would render him fit to continue practicing law. sir. his bones are your bones and you now disown him because he is the worst man on earth. And then my wife knew for a fact that my father has an illicit relationship with Gina Espita. Q Dr.. sir. JOSE: I think it sounds like this. he is a partner who has solemnly sworn to love and respect his wife and remain faithful to her until death. he depicts his wife as a "violent husband-beater. Your Honor. while others were presented to impeach the good character of his wife. I suppose he has to be given a lesson. 55 Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage.g. Neither did their testimonies destroy the fact. sir. Jr. sir. To prove his allegation. I might just forgive him if he will have to experience all the pains that we have also suffered for quite sometime. Cordova 56: "The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue 16 . especially my married life. Assuming for the sake of argument that your father is the worst. is there a fault that is so serious that it is incapable of forgiveness? A That depends upon the sin or fault. the complainant presented as evidence the love letters that respondent had sent to Gina. which really affected us. His children. So. he is also obliged to live with his wife." and as an "insanely and pathologically jealous woman. such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is imperiled. A husband is not merely a man who has contracted marriage. is there any sin so grievous that it cannot be forgiven. 51 We note. While the burden of proof is upon the complainant. Your Honor. but I h[av]e to give the person a lesson in order for him or her to at least realize his mistakes. Q You are now telling that as far [as] you are concerned because your father has sinned. why not? But for sure. destroy and destroy" him as shown by her filing of a series of allegedly unfounded charges against him (and Gina Espita)." whose only obsession was to "destroy. this has also affected the health of my elder sister because she knows so well that my mother suffered so much and she kept on thinking about my mother. Dominador Narag. who bore him two children. vitriolic and unbending. Further. whom he acknowledged as his own. Respondent adamantly denies abandoning his family to live with Gina Espita. 53 Respondent himself admitted that his work required him to be often away from home. you have no more father. must have scarcely felt the warmth of their father's love. as proven by the complainant.. Q In your wife's family? A In our family. We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Narag. We remind respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties — e. But the evidence shows that he was away not only because of his work. to observe mutual love. A Well. Q And what do you mean by that? A What meant by that is my father had an illicit relationship and that my father went to the extent of scolding my wife and calling my wife a "puta" in provincial government. respondent did not present any evidence to prove that the love letters were not really written by him. I did not feel much from my father even when I was still a kid because my father is not always staying with us at home. sir. Thus. that he had abandoned his family and lived with Gina Espita. however. Q Will you please tell us specifically why you and your wife parted ways? A Because my wife wa[s] ashamed of what happened to my family and that she could not face the people. to support. and to give them love. Some of them testified on matters which they had no actual knowledge of. Respondent's son.

and he appears to be a recurrent. after which the date the defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff by way of maintenance. and which at the same time was reasonably valued at more than P125. by his own wrongful acts. illegal.000 for services rendered in the trial court and the same amount for services rendered in this court. caused her to withdraw from the domestic hearth and to establish a separate abode for herself and two younger children. As held in Maligsa vs.: This action was instituted on May 27. on or before the 10th day of each month. 1928. As was said by Justice Moreland in Goitia vs. In her complaint the plaintiff asks for an allowance of P750 per month. for its solution. In addition to this the defendant appears to be now earning a substantial salary in commercial activities. The proof in support of this charge does not in our opinion establish a case for separate maintenance. the defendant was guilty of repeated acts of infidelity with four different women. we were able to record the fact that neither of the spouses had at any time been guilty of conjugal infidelity. Let copies of this Decision be in the personal record of Respondent Narag. however. for the purpose of obtaining separate maintenance and custody of the two younger minor children. and from that date the defendant will be required to pay P500 per month for maintenance as already suggested. about one month before the present action was begun. Rafael Villanueva. the sum of P500. and the Office of the Bar Confidant. 57 the respondent was disbarred from the practice of law. with costs against appellee. No. he is shown to have had illicit relations with still another. Toledo. This final separation occurred on April 20. Vazquez de Arroyo (42 Phil. and furnished to all courts of the land. So ordered. G. In the case before us repeated acts of conjugal infidelity on the part of the husband are proved. when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. Guillermo and Sergio Villanueva. In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate maintenance from her husband it is not necessary that the husband should bring a concubine into the marital domicile. until the promulgation of this decision. even given just cause to the other to suspect illicit relations with any person. In the end. without relation to the graver charge of conjugal infidelity. if not an incurable offender against the sanctity of the marriage tie. and her right to their custody will not be disturbed. 1905. 1928 CIPRIANA GARCIA. so far as the proof showed." WHEREFORE. at the time of the trial of this case in the lower court. as well as a proper allowance for professional legal services rendered by the plaintiff's attorneys in this action. probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. 17 .as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community. L-28904 December 29. coupled with a lack of consideration and even brutality towards the plaintiff. a husband cannot. and she long continued in marital relations with him with a view to keeping the family intact as well as with hope of retrieving him from his erring course. No. Perverse and illicit relations with women outside of the marital establishment are enough. 54). The law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose incurable propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable. L-29959 December 3. In that case. defendantsOSTRAND. who were.R. Cabanting." In Toledo vs. and that neither had. 58 the respondent was disbarred after the complainant proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. was married to the defendant. on July 16. While this litigation was pending in the lower court the defendant was required to pay the amount of P500 per month for maintenance of the plaintiff. The grounds on which separate maintenance is sought infidelity and cruelty.. upon cruelty alone. in conformity with the doctrine stated in Arroyo vs. beginning April 1. 252. plaintiff-appellant. Dominador M. in Obusan vs. an incident which is incorporated in the case by means of the amended complaint. In the present case. whether in his professional or private capacity. plaintiff-appellant. vs. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed. the case could doubtless be affirmed. Guillermo. by clear and convincing evidence. and unbearable conduct. 1927. It appears that the two younger children are now living with the plaintiff. which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage. 1929 AURELIA DADIVAS DE VILLANUEVA. 1928. But these payments ceased when the appealed decision was promulgated on or about the end of March. 1927. STREET. and where a husband by wrongful. in honesty. namely. 1927. under an interlocutory order of June 15. Likewise. 1928. and the law is not so unreasonable as to require as acquiescence on the part of the injured party which is beyond the capacity of nature. RAFAEL VILLANUEVA.: This is an appeal but the plaintiff from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija dismissing the complaint. with costs against the plaintiff. The proof with respect to the charge of cruelty shows that the defendant has not infrequently treated the plaintiff roughly and that he has at times directed abusive words to her and challenged her to carry her troubles into court. relieve himself from the duty to support his wife imposed by law. drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him. To them have been born three children. at the time of the trial. the complainant was able to establish. ISABELO SANTIAGO and ALEJO SANTIAGO. as well as costs. defendant-appellee. the sum of P720 for expenses of procuring transcript. that respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. The judgment is therefore reversed. he cannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relations and repudiate his duties thereunder. The plaintiff will also be awarded the sum of P720 in satisfaction of the amount paid out for the transcript necessary to this appeal. This give the wife an undeniable right to relief. Campos Rueda (35 Phil. the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. G. Upon hearing the cause the trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint and abrogated a prior order of the court for maintenance pendente lite. in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila by Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva against her husband. in the City of Manila.000. This Court declared that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar. The plaintiff. where the pair have since resided. the incorrigible nature of the defendant in his relations with other women. Deeply rooted instincts of human nature sanction the separation in such case. 262). With respect to the first of these charges the proof shows that during the period of about ten years prior to the institution of the action. Narag is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. however. and the sum of P500 per month. Antonio. the plaintiff appears to have exhibited forbearance.000. J. which shows him to be wanting in moral character. During their marital life the spouses have acquired real estate which. vs. was assessed at more than P85. and it is ordered that the plaintiff have and recover of the defendant the sum of P2. Rafael Villanueva. The plaintiff in this case is therefore entitled to judgment at the rate of P500 per month beginning April 1. and if the case depended. 59 "a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct. where the charges of cruelty were found to be unproved or insufficient. Obusan. and Sergio.000 for attorney's fees. Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva. until judgment shall be promulgated in this case. aged respectively 18. SO ORDERED.R. The plaintiff is also entitled to an allowance for attorney's fees which we fix at P1. this being in addition to the use which she makes for living quarters of a modest property belonging to the conjugal estate. conduct for instance. 10 and 9 years. but we are of the opinion that the sum of P500 per month will suffice. Thought at all times protesting against these irregularities in her husband's conduct. J. and even after the action was begun.

As to the plaintiff's maintenance allowance it is the evident that the sum of P500 monthly is much too large and that an allowance of P50 per month is all that ought be granted at present. but through force and intimidation she was prevented by her parents from 18 .: The facts of this case as appearing on record and in the stipulation submitted by the parties and approved by the lower court. and his fraudulent acts conveying to said Alejo Santiago property belonging to the conjugal partnership. Taking into consideration the facts stated. 1925. the lands specially described in the complaint are the most important ones. it is shown by documentary evidence that the land was acquitted by Isabelo Santiago previously to his marriage to the plaintiff. that taking into consideration the actual financial conditions of the conjugal partnership. the plaintiff is not free from blame. Defendant husband filed his answer contending that when they were still residing in Manila. but she was virtually driven out of their home by her husband and threatened with violence if she should return. and it is ordered that the defendant. with the understanding that she would follow him later. which apparently she failed to do. with others. that defendant went back to Zamboanga City to fetch her. (5) The court erred in not granting the other remedies prayed for in the complaint. because of illicit relations between Alejo Santiago and Prisca Aurelio. defendant Isabelo Santiago has shown himself unfit to administer the property of the conjugal partnership. that with a view to favoring materially the said Alejo Santiago and fostering his whims and caprices. The appellant makes the following assignments of error: (1) The court erred in declaring her separation from the defendant Isabelo Santiago unjustified. which. according to the plaintiff's testimony. defendant-appellant.In her complaint the plaintiff alleges that she was married to the defendant Isabelo Santiago on April 8. on the contrary. L-11086 March 29. No costs will be allowed. it is not the fault of one that two quarrel. FELIX. No. respecting the illicit relations of his son and Prisca Aurelio. under her care. (4) The court erred in not granting the plaintiff the right to administer the conjugal property. and is attempting to convey.1awphi1. 1953. and plaintiff could not live in their conjugal dwelling. the court should restrain defendant Isabelo Santiago from conveying of attempting to convey any property of the conjugal partnership. that through insidious machinations. and in all probability. The second and fourth assignments of error are entirely without merit. In October of the same year. instead of seeing to the vindication of the honor of plaintiff's daughter by requiring his son to marry her. and that from that date they lived together as husband and wife. plaintiff's parents caused her to be alienated from him resulting in her refusal to return to Manila and live with her husband again. Prisca. Ordinarily. thus seemingly countenancing the illicit relations between them. defendants Isabelo Santiago has continually refused to provide for her support. The fifth assignment of error relates principally to the plaintiff's prayer for an allowance of attorney's fees.00 from the date of the filing of the complaint. aside from the quarrels. P200.net The first and third assignments of error deserved some consideration. 1958 PILAR ATILANO. by reason of incessant marital bickerings and quarrels brought about by incompatibility of temperament and above all. without employment nor had she any property of her own. that. 1952. their married life was characterized by harmony and understanding. CHUA CHING BENG. prayed that as defendant was under legal obligation to support her. she had very unpleasant experiences in other respects. which separation became necessary in order to avoid personal violence. (2) The court erred in dissolving the preliminary injunction and refusing to set aside the transfer of title made by Isabelo Santiago in favor of Alejo Santiago. defendant Isabelo Santiago has been conveying. after which marriage. and it seems that he was prevailed upon by the wife's parents to return to Manila leaving her behind. plaintiff and Isabelo Santiago have been several discussions and quarrels. to said Alejo Santiago property belonging to their conjugal partnership. It clearly appears that the spouses led a rather stormy life subsequent to the dishonor of the plaintiff's daughter. countenance by the other defendant Isabelo Santiago. he be ordered to give her a monthly allowance. that said Alejo Santiago seduced Prisca Aurelio. to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff's rights. plaintiff-appellee. and the latter gave birth to a child. pay to the plaintiff the sum of P50 per month for her maintenance and that such payments be made within the first ten days of each month. he was prevailed upon by the latter to allow his wife to stay with them a while with the understanding that she would follow him later to Manila. by defendant's inability to provide for themselves a home separate from the latter's parents. and her assertion that her husband's son was the cause of her daughter's pregnancy is probably not unfounded. which culminated in their separation of February 3.500 cavanes of palay at P4 per cavan. that said property produces annually around the neighborhood of 4. and with the products and fruits of the property of the conjugal partnership. the couple sailed for Manila and established their residence with the parents of the husband. G. and that the other defendant Isabelo Santiago. until continued family dissentions compelled her to leave the conjugal dwelling on February 3. we do not think that the court below erred in refusing to grant such allowance. Pilar Atilano filed with the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga a complaint for support against her husband. and still. has refused to have anything to do with the matter. are as follows: Chua Ching Beng and Pilar Atilano were joined in lawful wedlock in Zamboanga City in May of 1951. vs. (3) The court erred in not granting the plaintiff the right to administer the conjugal property. It requires no stretch of the imagination to conclude that to keep the two young people under the same roof with the opportunity to continue their illicit relations would create a very embarrassing situation for the girl's mother. and that by said immoral conduct and acts. that notwithstanding plaintiff's repeated demands. The defendants' answer to the complaint was a general denial. or through the industry of the two. among the property that defendant has conveyed or is attempting to convey Alejo Santiago. Under these circumstances. Under the circumstances of the case. 1925. It also appears that. that defendant Alejo Santiago is a son of Isabelo Santiago by his first wife. went so far as to order her to leave his house and threatened to illtreat her if she returned. and that husband. and Prisca Aurelio is a daughter of plaintiff by her first husband. at the husband's initiative. that when they visited plaintiffs parents in Zamboanga in October 1952. that by reason of the attitude of defendant Isabelo Santiago. The separation therefore seems necessary. they went to Zamboanga City to pay the parents of the wife a visit. and the court should therefore order that its administration be placed in the hands of plaintiff. plaintiff is entitled to a monthly pension P500 pendente lite. had been acquired by plaintiff and defendant Isabelo Santiago during their married life with money belonging to the conjugal partnership. that defendant Isabelo has publicly maintained illicit relations with a woman by the name of Geronima Yap.R. 1910. The judgment appealed from is therefore modified. to compel the plaintiff to cohabit with her husband can only lead to further quarrels and would probably be unfortunate for both parties. alleging that they had been estranged and living separately since October. Isabelo Santiago. J. So ordered. we do not think that the plaintiffs' separation from the husband in unjustified. that she was staying with her parents in Zamboanga City. On September 30. Her young daughter was. She therefore. Neither can we find any sufficient reason for depriving the husband of his right to administer such conjugal property as may exist. and that in the meanwhile. The plaintiff has failed to prove that the property conveyed to Alejo Santiago is community property.

in giving the husband authority to fix the conjugal residence (Art. which was. then the defendant-appellant shall be considered relieved from the obligation of giving any support to his wife. however.R. appears that he may find it hard to make adequate provisions for their family. defendant-appellee. it provides for only one occasion when the second alternative could not be availed of i. that plaintiff wife. the court rendered judgment granting the wife a monthly allowance of P75 after finding that the wife's refusal to return to Manila was caused by her aversion to stay with the parents of her husband after she had experienced some previous in-law troubles. especially if he is not fully capable of meeting his obligation as such head of a family without the aid of his elders. when there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. The only question presented for. and upon receipt of the decision.. which is a clear illustration of this perennial domestic problem. The aforeqouted provision of the law is clear enough to require any further elucidation. It is so ordered. she recounted her plight to them and as the usual reaction of parents in matters of this nature. In the meantime. But even granting arguendo that it might be "illegal" for him to persist on living with his parents over the objection of his wife. L-13114 November 25. but this Tribunal certified the case to Us for adjudication pursuant to the provisions of Section 17-6 of Republic Act No. Without pronouncement as to costs. the decision appealed from is hereby modified by giving the defendant husband Chua Ching Beng the option of supporting his wife at their conjugal dwelling apart from the home of the parents of the husband. Should plaintiff wife refuse to abide by the terms of this decision. allegedly suffered by reason of such misrepresentation. separate from his parents. has adopted a more conciliatory attitude by acknowledging his obligation to support her and even going to the extent of expressing his willingness to abide by her wish to have a conjugal dwelling apart from his parents. We are aware are that although the husband and the wife are. nor is it against any recognized norm of morality. to order said defendant to pay Elenita Silva the sum of P250. is the moral or legal obstacle that the lawmakers contemplated in the drafting of said provision.000. this argument becomes moot in view of defendant's manifestation that he is willing to establish a residence.. that he be declared under. the lower court found that the root-cause of all their differences could be traced to disagreements common among relatives by affinity. plaintiffs-appellees. REYES. our consideration by this appeal is whether a wife is entitled to received support from his husband where she refused to live with him on account of some misunderstanding she had with the husband's immediate relatives. Indeed disagreement among in-laws is a problem as old as the world itself.e. stated in her complaint. 109). Certainly. apart. that as the husband. Wherefore. of the court a quo. 111). although it. without disclosing to her that he was married. against Esther Peralta.: Direct appeal on both questions of fact and law from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao. nominal and exemplary damages. for he is allegedly receiving a salary of only 170 a month as salesman in a commercial firm.L. As it was denied. yet and in such event We would see no plausible reason why she should be allowed any support from the husband. 19 . which was duly opposed by the defendant. Most likely. ET AL. 42 Phil. seeking to enjoin the latter from representing herself as Mrs. had the unfortunate experience of finding herself in some sort of domestic controversy. We do not think that misunderstanding with in-laws. Defendant's answer contains both specific denials and counterclaims for actual damages and fees due to harassment and moral damages caused by Silva's marital relation with defendant. at his option. G. plaintiff would refuse to receive support under that set-up. adduced to support her allegation of incompatibility of temperament and marital quarrels. He insists. but despite this discouraging facet of married life there would always be in-laws as long there are marriages and the same vicious cycle would be repeated. In the case at bar. with the prayer that in the event. No evidence was. they picked up and championed the cause of their daughter which resulted in the estrangement of the young couple. ESTHER PERALTA. assisted by her husband Saturnino R. and on May 3. therefore. and this is borne out by the findings. and that the wife is entitled to be supported. who may be considered third parties to the marriage. the dispositive portion of which reads. obliged to live together. While physical illtreatment may be ground to compel a husband to provide a separate maintenance for his wife ( Arroyo vs. our laws contain no provision compelling the wife to live with her husband where even without legal justification she establishes her residence apart from that provided for by the former. y a favor de la demanda. he is given the option to fulfill the said duty either by paying the allowance as fixed by the Court or receiving and maintaining the person entitled thereto in his house. if plaintiff so desires. the amount involved being more than P200. el jusgado dicta decision en esta causa contra de los demandantes. it was prayed that the complaint be dismissed. and he would even be willing to establish a conjugal dwelling in Manila separate from that of his parents if that was the plaintiff's desire. no compulsion to remit the allowance to her at Zamboanga City. We find that while the wife remains adamant on her stand to effect a separation in fact between her and her husband. Thus. his wife and the rest of the family (Art. Civil Code. observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and assistance ( Art.000. It is clear to Us. Defendant further averred that while he was not evading his obligation to support his. 110). plaintiff filed a petition for alimony pendente lite premised on the same facts as. and his subsequent refusal to acknowledge their offspring.00 byway of the attorney's fees. vs. Esther Peralta Silva.B. This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Davao on December 27. based on stipulation of facts agreed upon by the parties. defendant had the right to fix the residence of his family. J.00. J. then 19 yeas of age. Vasquez de Arroyo. fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed.. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in this case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. plus P10. or by receiving and maintaining in his house the person who has a right to receive support. 1954. he preferred to fulfill said duty by receiving and maintaining her in Manila. Silva. defendant filed a petition electing to fulfill his. It appearing that defendant husband availed of the option granted him by Article 299 of the Civil Code and there being no legal or moral hindrance to the exercise of the second alternative as elected by him. After trial the lower court rendered judgment. with her husband's immediate relatives in the opposite camp. which made her feel that living with them would already be intolerable and unbearable. from that of his parents. defendant brought the matter to the Court of Appeals. obligation as thus fixed by the trial court by receiving and maintaining plaintiff at his residence at Pasay City. Instead. does not prohibit him from establishing the same at the patriarchal home. the latter. 1960 ELENITA LEDESMA SILVA..000. 1954 by Elenita Ledesma Silva. that her demand that they establish their home in Zamboanga could not be met by the husband because of the latter's job in Manila and due also to the husband's fear that his wife would always be under the influence and pressure of the latter's parents. to wit: EN SU VIRTUD. No. Defendant does not dispute that our civil Code imposes on the husband the responsibility of maintaining and supporting. and that her parents also exerted undue pressure and influence upon his wife to file the complaint. when they visited her parents.going with him. In giving the obligor the option to fulfill his duty.00 as moral. however. and that he elects to perform his obligation by the second means allowed him by law. that under the. which provides: ART. the answer to the question presented by this appeal is certainly obvious. It is true that plaintiff wife charged that they were estranged because of marital troubles and incessant bickering. 54 ) said allegation was not proved during the trial. The law. The person obliged to give support may. 296. 299.

and the marriage solemnized? A. — Yes sir. and Mrs. Having been made to believe that he was single. and he has been carrying that name eversince. although there is convincing proof that the defendant and Saturnino Silva. — And it was also on that day (January 14. In her written statement to the President of the Davao Local Council. in her testimony in court. — Who was the justice of the peace who performed the marriage? A. Juan Quijano. We started living together as man and wife in December. and the two were married on January 14. But the witness' asseverations regarding the marriage. the evidence on record fully supports the foregoing findings of fact the lower court. but with the advice that she should not return to Maco for the time being. 2-3. Florence. 411 t. (pp. Girl Scouts of the Philippines. and accompanied by Esther. No documents of marriage were prepared nor executed. Silva? A. if true. presented as witness for the defendant. for which reason. 1948.00 por los conceptos indicados. taken by themselves and considered with other circumstances appearing on the record. Tagum. Davao. only testified to the following: xxx xxx xxx Q. 1945 by one Father Cote on the occasion of a house blessing. From the "marriage". a younger sister of the defendant. Silva? A. (p. — It was Father Cote who asked us the questions and after that he said I pronounce you as husband and wife. — Do we understand from you now that it was the first time that you began to live together as husband and wife with Mr. Upon his return to the Philippines. contracted marriage with plaintiff Elenita Ledesma Silva. allegedly because there were no available printed forms for the purpose. and another suit against her was instituted in Cotabato.000. and later to the United States. I have nothing to be ashamed of for this because I was convinced of the sincerity of his request and of the fact that we were going to get married soon after liberation. named Saturnino Silva. 22-C). Silva sustained serious wounds in the battle of Ising. Silva started to frequent the house of the Doctoleros. that even without the signing of marriage contract by the parties.. The findings of the fact of the lower court may be briefly summarized as follows: At the outbreak of the war in 1941. was accused of having collaborated with the enemy. and because I myself wished that our marriage take place after liberation — which was then nearing — marriage was delayed. xxx xxx xxx Q. reveal too much uncertainty and incoherence as to be convincing. for all intents and purposes they were legally married. having in mind the provisions of the new civil code. y d) Las costas del juicio.000. Noteworthy also is the fact that while in her foregoing declarations she asserted that they started living together as man and wife since December. appellee Esther Peralta demanded support for their child. (Exh. then an American citizen and an officer of the United States Army and married to one Prescilla Isabel of Australia. . he complied with my request and in due times my relatives gave their consent to our marriage. and for this she was arrested. on May 9. On May 8. Silva is lawfully wedded to the defendant Esther Peralta? A. b) Condena a los demandantes. Florence and her sister. For some reason or another.) Again. he was the commanding officer of the 130th Regiment. the lovers lived together as husband and wife.. 1945. But he pleaded to me that he needs me and that I join him and live with him in his quarters. in my humble way of thinking. After thinking the matter over. but if the parties have acted and believed that they are husband and wife. with general headquarters at Magugpo. sir. No evidence was offered. however. this witness-defendant never revealed any marriage contracted by herself and Silva. had been ordered to sent to the Philippines during the enemy occupation to help unite the guerillas in their fight for freedom. Saturnino Silva. Esther Peralta testified as follows: Court. under the overall command of Colonel Claro Laureta of the 107th Division. he proposed marriage to me. however. Sometime during the year 1944. named after him. As a result of our living together.00 por honorarios de abogado. With all sincerity. actually lived together as common-law husband and wife.n. Juan Quijano. I bore a child. .n. she declared. On cross-examination. instituted a suit for support in the Court of First Instance of Manila. she resided with her sister. — Except for the fact of final formal marriage contract. In June of 1942. Quijano. appellee herein. 1944. c) Condena a los demandantes a pagar la suma de P5. I told him to talk to my sisters and to the oldest relative of mine living in Magugpo. ASI SE ORDENA. the defendant Esther Peralta abandoned her studies as a student nurse at the Zamboanga General Hospital. In 1944. he divorced Precilla Isabel and later. Q. that is even better than signing marriage contract which the parties cannot agree. in Maco. when asked to explain on her use of the surnames Silvas. mancumonada y solidariamente a pagar a la demanda la suma de P30. a child. Pedro Pia. he was transferred to Leyte. she accepted his marriage proposal.) (Emphasis supplied). t. brought to Anibongan and later to the general headquarters at Magugpo for investigation that Silva first met Esther Florence was exonorated of the charges made against her and was ordered released. was born. and. en autos por falta de meritos. Tagum. 20 . Thereupon.s. — And you affirm to this Court that plaintiff Saturnino R. Except for the statement that a marriage actually took place between Saturnino Silva and Esther Peralta. — Yes. 1945) when you said you were married to Mr. she declared — Sometime later. Davao.s. Jr. his refusal. The justice of the peace was also there (p. In fact. — Would you. say that a man and women are legally married without the marriage contract having been signed by both contracting parties to the marriage. because that was the time when we were legally married. Magugpo. to prove any such alleged marriage.n. 411. He was baptized and registered as Saturnino Silva. Camilo Doctolero at Tipas. for a time. Heeding such advice. But this is not all. .a) Ordena el sobreseimiento de la demanda. Atty. Mrs. In the course of the pre-trial conference. t. and soon professed love for Esther. It is difficult to imagine how appellee could have easily forgotten or be confused as to who performed the alleged marriage when such fact. went to live with the spouses Mr. the present action was filed against Esther. to my humble way of thinking. heralded an important and memorable event in her life.) (Emphasis supplied). 1944. Hence. I agreed. Mr. Jr. Mabini Davao. — I would say. xxx xxx xxx Q. (To the defendant) Do you have any evidence to show that you are married? DEFENDANT: That was during guerilla days and it was the justice of the peace of free Davao who solemnized our marriage. she attested as follows: Q. other than the testimonies of the defendant herself and her counsel. As was natural.s.

can be easily understood and needs no special demonstration beyond her testimony to that effect. 26-27). No great effort is needed to discern that Esther Peralta would never have agreed to live maritally with appellant Silva nor beget a child by him had not Silva concealed that he was already married. The records also disclose that in a complaint for support in Civil Case No. and was being sued for its support. 1945. In the affidavit (Exhibit "H-2")attached to the aforementioned complaint she affirmed under oath that she was "single".000. El jusgado estima en P15. she applied for an indefinite leave of absence to attend to a personal matter in Manila. with a view to forcing appellee into abandoning the interests of her child.00. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage as done. because. but I was present when Silva asked the hands of Esther Peralta in marriage from her older sister. As this injury was inflicted upon the appellee from 1945 onwards. Although Article 2216 of the Civil Code expressly provided that "no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order the moral. Silva having formerly introduced appellee to other persons as Mrs.. 22). The plaintiff's distress upon learning from her lawyer that her husband had a child by the defendant. Regarding the counterclaim for damages. it is not proper for Esther to continue representing herself as the wife of Saturnino. Wherefore. and when she refused. Exhibit A-1). an Australian national. 47-49)that her claims of humiliation and distress are not satisfactorily proved. Saturnino Silva was still married to one Priscilla Isabel. he should stand liable for any and all damages arising therefrom. 245-246. especially because. mas la adicional de P5.. being a woman of sufficient schooling. The lower court's award of moral damages is. All the foregoing circumstances. as already noted. asked about the reason why Esther Peralta left her position.000. 2217). assailed as unjustified and not allowable under the law and jurisprudence governing before the effectivity of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.s. and we have found no ground to disturb such findings. App. and that appellee was earning P150. 1902. pp. She told me there was a case. 2) of 1889 (Arts. Esther's loss of employment is ultimately a result of Silva's deception and she should indemnified therefor. the lower court awarded damages to the defendant appellee. but actual fraud (dolo) practiced upon the appellee. the alleged consort. likewise. Granting arguendo the correctness of the proposition that. and an addition exercised improper pressure upon the appellee to make her withdraw the suit. under the old law. impliedly. seeking support of their minor child. Restauro). lead to the conclusion that no marriage had really taken place.00 attorney's fees. confers no right to claim damages. at the time of the alleged marriage on January 14. according to her own letter Exhibit "S". This is particularly the case here.. must have known the significance of the terms thus employed. no marriage was ever solemnized? xxx xxx xxx A. that to this effect.00 as moral damages and P5.00. "H" and "H-1").n. 1107. appellant's brother and one Mrs. This is a liability that flows even from Articles 1902 and 1107 (par. This award is contested by appellants on the ground that defendant appellee's resignation from the Girl Scouts Davao Council was voluntary.000. Silva. warning her of untoward consequences otherwise. nominal. los daños que la demandada ha sufridi porhaber perdido el puesto en la Davao Council. that Silva's act in hiding from appellee that he could not legally marry her. which include the expense of maintaining the offspring and the expenses of litigation to protect the child's right's and the loss of the mother's own earnings. he allegedly have an Australian wife. and taking all the circumstances of record. we cannot give value on the presumption of the marriage under section 69 (bb) of the Rules of Court. (t.00 por honorarios de abogado. 2176 and 2202 of the New Code).000. still the evidence of record satisfies us that after the filing in May of 1954 of the first action by Esther Peralta against appellant Saturnino Silva. was not mere negligence. and in the case appellee Peralta would not have been compelled to relinguish her employment to attend to the litigation filed to obtain for the child the support that Silva refused. Appellee Esther Peralta. awarded her P15.. y por los sufrimientos moralque aquella ha sufrido. Misa. testified: She resigned. and has had to be supported exclusively by his mother since then up to the present. Consequently.000. filed against her the present action in Davao and another one in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. 1945. the Court below has carefully analyzed the evidence in its decision and found (Rec.s. 2). In the face of the evidence." (t. Silva and defendant Esther Peralta. and the latter's actual marriage to plaintiff Ledesma. 223226. no moral damages were allowable as a consequence of sexual relations outside of wedlock. stating in its decision.. it also excludes others from doing likewise. In case of fraud (dolo) the debtor shall be liable for all losses and damages which clearly arise from the failure to fulfill the obligation. since it appears that appellee had acted in good faith. went to see Esther Peralta to press her to drop the case. and that a vigorous denial of the supposed marriage was made by Saturnino Silva. or exemplary damages may be adjudicated". la suma de P15. Art. Art.00 pecuniary damages awarded by the Court below are excessive or inequitable. 22816 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. In view of the non-existence of appellee's marriage with Saturnino Silva. Saturnino Silva. and unchaining a series of investigations that brought to light her condition as an unwedded mother. because the appellant Silva has refused to pay or even contribute to such support. pp.Q. we are not inclined to disturb 21 . Witness Felicidad Santos. That such deliberate maneuvers caused the mother mental anguish and even physical suffering (she actually became ill as a result). Girl Scouts executive of Iloilo.n.000.. — I did not say that there was marriage solemnized. and the assessment thereof "is left to the discretion of the court. pp. to whom "she must have been wedded in contemplation" (sic. Article 370 of the Civil Code of the Philippines authorizes a married woman to use the surname of her husband. after the new Civil Code had become operative. charging her with conversion of Silva's properties in addition to bringing to the attention of the higher authorities of the Girl Scouts organization (wherein Esther Peralta was then employed) appellee's claim to be the wife of Col. in the absence of proof that the suit was reckless or malicious. filed by appellee "as his common-law-wife" (Exhs. in constitutes a justification for the award of moral damages (Art. which were still unserved on him until the case at bar was tried. we can not say that P15. The court below. said appellant managed to avoid the services of summons. coupled with the admitted fact that no marriage documents of any kind of prior to. there should be a clear showing of the facts giving rise to such damages (Art 2217). As to plaintiff Elenita Silva's claim for moral damages. claimed by appellee in the first counterclaim of her amended answer (Record on Appeal. during or after the marriage were ever prepared or executed by anybody. In fact that was the time when she told me that there was a case which (she) filed in Manila and to attend that case it will interfere too much of her activities as an Executive of the Davao Girl Scout. appellants. there is apparent here an obvious pattern of harassment. It is well to note in this connection. and sent her letters thus addressed (Exh. Exh. which turned out to be the civil case that she had filed against Silva for the support for her child by him.00 a month until she had to leave Davao to attend to her son's case. considering the trial judge's ample opportunity to observe the witnesses at the stand. — Do I understand from you that between plaintiff Saturnino R. Considering that the child was born on October 30. implying authority to used the disputed appellation prior to his subsequent marriage to Elenita Ledesma. through counsel.

Every body must feel a wish to sever those who wish to 22 . after the conviction of the guilty spouse in a criminal prosecution for that crime. and appellant Saturnino R. 597. 1 McCord's Chan. plus P5. which are the basis of the cross-action. but she averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of her husband. she can. 151). Arroyo and Dolores C.00 by way of pecuniary and moral damages. granting her alimony at the rate of P400 per month. Har. the suffering party must bear in some degree the consequences of an injudicious connection. and of humanity which confined its views merely to the happiness of the present parties. and he may be required to pay the expenses. is discretionary in the trial court. The humanity of the court has been loudly and repeatedly invoked.: Mariano B. Car. Humanity is the second virtue of courts. and we prefer to record the fact that so far as the proof in this record shows neither of the spouses has at any time been guilty of conjugal infidelity. with a few short intervals of separation.) Nevertheless. If it were a question of humanity simply. it will be found convenient to dispose first of the defendant's cross-complaint. STREET. where it is impossible for her to continue safely to cohabit with her husband. Ostrand and Ruiz. 1920. Upon hearing the cause the lower court gave judgment in favor of the defendant. The judgment must therefore be recorded that the abandonment by her of the marital home was without sufficient justification in fact. defendant-appellee. the judgement appealed from is modified and defendant appellee Esther Peralta is enjoined from representing herself. plaintiff-appellant. Rhame. speaking through the eminent jurist. After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to induce her to resume marital relations. rudeness of language. Silva. 294). reached the conclusion that the husband was more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him. To begin with. and directing that the plaintiff should pay to the defendant's attorney the sum of P1. . and are of the opinion that the conclusion stated is wholly untenable.. the Supreme Court of Michigan. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO. No costs. However. and to his cause are chiefly traceable without a doubt the many miseries that have attended their married life. compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance (Goitia vs. a divorce cannot be obtained except on the single ground of adultery and this. to consist of (1) a decree of separation. directly or indirectly to be the wife of appellant Saturnino R.R.000 for his services to defendant in the trial of the case. In view of the decision which we are to pronounce nothing will be said in this opinion which will make the resumption of married relations more difficult to them or serve as a reminder to either of the mistakes of the past. for this step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses — a state which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned. but undoubtedly the first is justice. in this jurisdiction.. made use of the following eloquent words. 1921 MARIANO B. Dec. Accordingly it had been determined that where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart from her husband. [S. when the wife went away from their common home with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband. The tales of cruelty on the part of the husband towards the wife. 35 Phil. this action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. . The plaintiff thereupon removed the case with the usual formalities by appeal to this court. Schindel (12 Md. Silva is in turn ordered to pay Esther Peralta the amount of P30. and if this cannot be done. The enforcement of this obligation by the wife against the husband is not conditioned upon the procurance of a divorce by her. but still they are not that cruelty against which the law can relieve. are in our opinion no more than highly colored versions of personal wrangles in which the spouses have allowed themselves from time to time to become involved and would have little significance apart from the morbid condition exhibited by the wife. 144. Car. including attorney's fees. J. (Mercado vs. G. That imperative necessity is the only ground on which such a proceeding can be maintained also appears from the decision in Schindel vs. Accordingly she in turn prayed for affirmative relief. (2) a liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Boydvs. admitting the fact of marriage. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of wedlock by marriage in the year 1910. as here. No. In the State of South Carolina. Campos Rueda. The evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree. We have carefully examined and weighed every line of the proof. ARROYO. — which are perhaps even more applicable in a proceeding for separate maintenance in a jurisdiction where. 16 Am. . even occasional sallies of passion. the obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty universally recognized in civil society and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143 of the Civil code. but the question occurs. they have lived together as man and wife in the city of Iloilo until July 4. The trial judge.) Upon one occasion Sir William Scott. Mere austerity of temper. Judge Thomas M. vs. either actual or menaced. and we do not see that the appellants were substantially prejudiced by the admission. both must suffer in silence. held that an action for the support of the wife separate from the husband will only be sustained when the reasons for it are imperative (47 Mich. necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation. 197. . What is cruelty? .].. The liability therefor should be exclusively shouldered by the husband Saturnino Silva. Boyd. too.00 as attorney's fees. not innocent surely in any state of life. L-17014 August 11. Under such misconduct of either of the parties. In Davidson vs Davidson. From this consideration it follows that provision should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband. DOLORES C.000. but the same court has more than once rejected the petition of the wife for separate maintenance where it appeared that the husband's alleged cruelty or ill-treatment was provoked by the wife's own improper conduct. and since that date.]. In view of the forgoing. In examining the legal questions involved. petulance of manners. authorizing her to live apart from her husband. Said he: That the duty of cohabitation is released by the cruelty of one of the parties is admitted.. a want of civil attention and accommodation. we agree with appellants that it was error for the court to sentence both appellants to the solidary payment of the damages. it would be a question easily decided upon first impressions. upon consideration of the evidence before him. The defendant answered. nor even upon the existence of a cause for divorce. or has given just cause to the other to suspect illicit relations with any person. (3) and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. and that she had left her husband's home without his consent.. the interests of both parties as well as of society at large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife. [S. pronouncing the judgment of the English Ecclesiastical Court in a case where cruelty on the part of the husband was relied upon to secure a divorce for the wife. 252). must subdue by decent resistance or by prudent conciliation. As to the admission of the amended complaint. if they do not threaten bodily harm. (Rhame vs. 179. Cooley. the Supreme court fully recognizes the right of the wife to have provision for separate maintenance. do not amount to legal cruelty: they are high moral offenses in the marriage-state undoubtedly. Eq.the award. for it may exist on the one side as well as on the other. where judicial divorces have never been procurable on any ground. What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be admitted where they are not accompanied with bodily injury.000. . 37 Phil.

and that real humanity. Therefore. 466. Reprint. 35. the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment. in his own representation and as Guardian Ad litem of his son BENIGNO PEREZ Y TUASON. to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband. (Evans vs. the happiness of some individuals must be sacrificed to the greater and more general good. and it is supposed in the petitory part of the complaint that he is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with him as a wife according to the precepts of law and morality. in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill. Darby. and in the alternative. pp. (21 Cyc.: Appeal from an order. an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. D. Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice. enforcible by process of contempt. and consequently with any degree of happiness. G. decided in 1883. 36 La. . . yet it must be carefully remembered that the general happiness of the married life is secured by its indissolubility. and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband. and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. who cannot live together with any degree of harmony. but if it were. Sir James Hannen. the defendant. so far as we can discover. Weldon (9 P. 1 Hag. the plaintiff's wife and Benigno's mother. and. L-14874 September 30. 467.live separate from each other. equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England. The law has said that married persons shall not be legally separated upon the mere disinclination of one or both to cohabit together. who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. To vindicate the policy of the law is no necessary part of the office of a judge. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof. No. in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order. Arroyo. without doubt. for necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes. may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. acting through his guardian ad litem. as in many others. both moral and legal. prays that his mother. reversing the judgment appealed from. (113 Jur. only one court. 52). but could not be enforced by imprisonment. Evans. Ann. and in Weldon vs. Upon examination of the authorities we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with. The complaint states three causes of action. it is obvious that the crosscomplaint is not well founded and none of the relief sought therein can be granted. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. the defendant would be liable to attachment for contempt. 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. vs.L. it would not be difficult to show that the law in this respect has acted with its usual wisdom and humanity with that true wisdom. has ever attempted to make a peremptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other. The decision referred to (Gahn vs.) but it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property. dated October 27. In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States. . J. 1148. the other. The same considerations that require the dismissal of the crosscomplaint conclusively prove that the plaintiff. 161 Eng. initiated this civil case against Angela Tuason de Perez. and the experience of these countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable.R. REYES. The plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint.. and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony. to return to the common home and cohabit with him. Con. much less the first feelings of an individual.) In the light of the considerations stated.) In a decision of January 2. For though in particular cases the repugnance of the law to dissolve the obligations of matrimonial cohabitation may operate with great severity upon individual. ANGELA TUASON DE PEREZ. enforcible by process of contempt in case of disobedience. So ordered. it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause.B. plaintiff-appellant. J. Benigno Perez y Tuason. formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife. rents. ... The action is one by which the plaintiff seeks the restitution of conjugal rights. though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaled. and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. the supreme court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile. but my situation does not allow me to indulge the feelings. 1909. which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint. expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland. When people understand that they must live together.. dismissing its Civil Case No. 1. In this case. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile. 34626 for lack of jurisdiction. of the Court of First Instance of Manila. 1958. Accordingly. could be obtained by the injured spouse. and if the facts were found to warrant it that court would make a mandatory decree. . 1060 ANTONIO PEREZ. entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return. they become good husbands and good wives form the necessity of remaining husbands and wives. the question is raised for the first time in this jurisdiction whether it is competent for the court to make such an order. and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to the marriage. it is averred that the defendant is squandering all of her estate on a young man by the name of Jose Antonio Campos Boloix. and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt. in case she should refuse to obey it. in unqualified terms. where a decree of adherence. The only question which here arises is as to the character and extent of the relief which may be properly conceded to him by judicial decree.. Mariano B. It was decided many years ago. though he is. requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal rights.. they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know cannot shake off. be declared a prodigal and placed under appointed to administer her properties. Of course if such a decree were entered. all income. except for a very few reasons known to the law. Thus in England. so far as the present writer is aware. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders. Civ. the plaintiff. upon her failure to do so. as administrator of the ganancial property. because of which Benigno Perez y Tuason. Under the first causes of action. and render conjugal rights to. has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and that she is under an obligation. defendant and appellee. President in the Probate. Plaintiff Antonio Perez. 11. in his own representation and as guardian ad litem of his adoptive son. that regards the general interests of mankind. without special pronouncement as to costs of either instance. and that during the pendency 23 . We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. .

is vested under Republic Act No. The same thing can be said of the third cause of action wherein Antonio Perez seeks to recover damages and attorney's fees because his wife's act (avowing openly her intention to marry and have a child by Campos Boloix or if not. The court may counsel the offended party to comply with his or her duties. a compromise agreement was arrived at and submitted for approval of the court on May 2. On May 31. In his second cause of action. upon the other (spouse)" under Article 116 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. as third case of action. On January 2. the lower court asked the parties to submit further memoranda on the sole issue of jurisdiction. 1958. . The trial court erred in holding that the Doctrine of Estoppel of Jurisdiction is not applicable in this country and erred further in failing to apply said doctrine to the present proceedings. Assuming 24 . Hence. as follows: The trial court erred in holding that the Court of First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction over the causes of action alleged by Antonio Perez in the complaint." Finally. . two hundred twenty-five. the trial court. 1401. by order of September 30. and it is nowhere alleged that any such net fruits exist. . seeks to recover from her the total sum of P185. as a case where one spouse "bring danger . and also lies within the jurisdiction of the Domestic Relations Court. just to put plaintiff in a ridiculous and embarrassing position. asserts that by virtue of the said alleged acts of prodigality committed by the defendant wife. the husband Antonio Perez. in addition to the aforementioned acts.nèt It is easy to see that the first cause of action set forth in the complaint. future) acts of disposition (no annulment of her past transactions is demanded) must be necessarily based on the wife's being subject to guardianship. e. The trial court erred in holding that the Court of First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction over the causes of action alleged by Benigno Perez y Tuason in the complaint. two hundred fifty. 1958. the second cause of action is inextricably woven into and cannot stand independently of the demand for guardianship of the wife. 38-A) expressly gives that court exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings under the provisions of Article 116 of the Civil Code. After this was done. the court below was correct in viewing this cause of action as primarily predicated on the grant of guardianship due to alleged prodigality of the wife. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or brings danger. that it should have that defendant was in estoppel to question the jurisdiction of the trial court is. On April 16. on its face. 1401 with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. and that the preliminary injunction be dissolve. Republic Act no. The third alleged error charged against the Court below. R. therefore.)1awphîl. defendant filed an opposition to the approval of the compromise agreement. ordered the dismissal of the case on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. after a preliminary hearing. wounded feelings. Register of Deeds. sine the allegation thereof is therein reiterated. dishonor or material injury upon the other. Appellants assign three alleged errors in the order appealed from. and the remedy of injunction sought against further (i. on the ground that (a) the same is contrary to law and (b) it was not freely or validly entered into by her representative. Without resolving this particular question. among other things. so that like the first cause of action." No error was. that: SEC. as well as other persons.of this suit. 60 Phil. the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a preliminary injunction as prayed for in complaint. according to her. since Article 116 lies in the chapter concerning personal relations between husband and wife." The case involves acts of a spouse that "brings . xxx xxx xxx (d) — proceedings brought under the provisions of Articles one hundred sixteen. the court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases after the effectivity of this Act: (b) — Cases involving custody. the defendants had repeatedly advised him.00 by way of damages and attorney's fees.000. On March 19. since the conjugal partnership is only entitled to the net fruits of such property. but to personal (i. The action falls squarely under the provisions of subsection (b). for and his own behalf. or material injury" upon the other. Said motion was denied by the court a quo in its order of April 2. 1958. wherein the minor Benigno Perez y Tuason. creating the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court of the City of Manila and defining its jurisdiction. extreme humiliation. that she intends to marry Jose Campos Boloix and to have a child by him not withstanding her present marriage to the plaintiff. since the latter are mere accessory to the property itself. 1958. committed in the appealed order in holding that this cause of action lay outside the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. 1958. therefore. and. More fundamental still. and take such measures as may be proper. . While this last motion was being considered by the Court. and that. 167). 1401. the second also lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Domestic Relations. the wife's statutory power to alienate her paraphernal (Phil Civil Code. guardianship. guardianship. physical or moral) injury to one of the spouses.) While Article 116 of the Civil Code (referred to in subsection [d] above) states:. the conjugal partnership of gain is being dissipated to the prejudice of both spouses. Nevertheless. WHEREFORE. above-quoted. Section 38-A.. by anyone else) placed the plaintiff "in an embarrassing and contemptible position" (sic) and causing him "grave anxiety. dishonor ." The Court of First Instance held that this cause of action is also one of those provided by Article 116 of the Civil Code. as a "case involving . 38–A—Provision of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding. 1958. ask his mother be placed under guardianship because of her alleged prodigality. the plaintiff husband avers that. Sec. 1958.A. the injured party may apply to the court for relief. and prays that a suitable person or institution be appointed to administer her properties. wherein Antonio Perez alleges that the prodigal acts of his wife result in the conjugal partnership of gains being dissipated to the prejudice of both spouses. through his representative. adoption. a writ of injunction be issued to prevent the continued waste and disposition of her properties. Plaintiff. wherein plaintiff was heard ex parte. the defendant filed a second motion to dismiss the case. The law (subsection (d). (Emphasis supplied. which. More controversial is the issue involved in the second cause of action of the complaint. provides. . Article 140) necessarily implies power to alienate its future fruits. he prays for a writ of injunction to restrain her from "dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains. before the Court could act. without merit. she was willing to have one by any other person. If the wife were not in any way incapacitated. is exclusively cognizable by the Domestic Relations Court. paternity and acknowledgment. this time on the ground that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction over the present proceedings. injunction being a mere incident thereof. the defendant appeared through counsel and prayed for the dismissal of the case on the ground of res judicata. after deducting administration expenses (People's Bank vs. (Emphasis supplied. if she could not have such a child. two and three hundred thirty-one of the Civil Code. therefore. e. plaintiffs Perez (father and son) appealed. Antonio Perez. We find the appeal to be untenable. . and prays for a writ of injunction to restrain her from "dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains. We are inclined to think that "material injury" as used in Article 116 does not refer to patrimonial (economic) injury or damage. relief should be sought in the Court of Domestic Relations. wherefore. the mere fact that the alienation of her paraphernal would deprive the conjugal partnership of the future fruits thereof would not give rise to a cause of action for injunction.

25 . Costs against appellants. and could dismiss the case (as it did) if it found that it had no power to act therein. such estoppel could not operate against the Court. at any time. The order appealed from is hereby affirmed. the Court.for the sake of argument that defendant appellee was placed in such estoppel by merely executing the compromise and submitting it to the Court's approval. could motu proprio inquire and determine whether it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. Regardless of the parties.

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