This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
Kim Andersen January 8, 2012
1 Introduction 2 Theoretical introduction 2.1 2.2 2.3 Democracy and autocracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Consolidation of democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Checks and balances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 9 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 23 23 25
3 Introducing the explanans 3.1 3.2 3.3 Natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Party system and party of power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 Methodological approach 4.1 4.2 Most similar systems design and process tracing . . . . . . . . . . Operationalisation and causal links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.3 4.2.4 4.3 Natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Party system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Party of power (PoP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Author of the constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Theoretical model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5 Comparison of Russia and Ukraine 6 Case study 6.1 6.2 Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7 Considering an alternative explanation 8 Discussion and conclusion 8.1 8.2 Diﬀusion versus the rest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
27 28 29 30 32 33 34 35 36
A Appendix I: Duma elections in 1993 and 1995 B Appendix II: Duma elections in 1999 and 2003 C Appendix III: Duma elections in 2007 D Appendix IV: Rada elections in 1994 and 1998 E Appendix V: Rada elections in 2002 and 2007
Both Russia and Ukraine became independent of the Soviet Union in 1991, and as “young” countries, their democratic history have been turbulent. Executive and legaslative arm-wrestling over power-sharing has been the norm rather than the exception. Despite these scuﬄes, Ukraine managed to embark on a consolidation course, whereas Russia slided into autocracy as depicted in ﬁgure 1. Thus, the research question sounds, Why did Russia slide into autocracy, whereas Ukraine remained somewhat stable in the same period. Figure 1: Democratic development in Russia and Ukraine according to Freedom House
Notes: Scores are an addition of political rights and civil liberties, and as such, most only be seen as a rough estimate. Source: Freedom-House (2011)
The understanding of the research question entails three pivotal components of democracy. First of all, a clear deﬁnition of democracy is needed. Secondly, yet equally important, the utilisation of Linz and Stepan as well as Schedler’s theoretical conceptualisation of consolidation is needed. Thirdly, to consolidate 3
democracy, a functional political system is needed, and this depends on the checks and balances especially between the presidency and parliament. Hence, this paper deals with the question of democratic consolidation and encroachment through a battery of structural and actor explanans derived from these theoretical understandings. Thus, it is the structure-actor dichotomy that acts as the central structure of the paper. The demise and collapse of democracy has often been related to a presence of natural resources such as oil and minerals (Ross, 2001: 356f). Yet these modernisation theorists, who forward these theoretical understandings, have only developed a conceptual understanding of the eﬀects of natural resources on the state apparatus and its relationship with its population. They have not delved upon how natural resources enters the system. Often it has been assumed that states autocratise and then use the resources to bolster the regime. This paper attempts to develop an understanding of how natural resources enter the political system. The argument is developed in section 3.1. For now it must suﬃce to say that the interplay between natural resources, party system, constitution, and party of power determine the eﬀectiveness of the checks and balances. This is answered by utilising a “Most Similar Systems Design” bolstered by “Process tracing”. Finally, the scope conditions of this paper needs to be stated. First of all, the focus is new democracies. Functioning democracies such as Norway, have access to natural resources, yet because of the consolidated nature of these democracies, they do not get impeded. Thus, the countries of interest are those that can be considered newly constituted democracies embarking on a consolidation course. Finally, these countries must have realised their natural resources and privatised these former state assets. Hence, this paper is limited to post-communist countries and in particular the former Soviet Union. The next section deals with the theoretical introduction, whereas the third section elaborates on the explanans. The fourth and the ﬁfth section depict the theoretical model and the methodological approach, whereas section six and seven compares and elaborates on the comparison through process tracing. The eighth section delves brieﬂy upon the question of diﬀusion as an alternative explanation. The last section discuss and concludes.
This section sets out to develop an understanding of democracy and autocracy. Hereafter it continues with the question of consolidation and ﬁnally addresses
It is also important to note that there are no checks and balances. This paper deals with cases that are far from being liberal democracies. Thus. Thus. which is exercising power within illdeﬁned formal limits but with predictable norms. Hence. It is important to stress the competitive element of elections. yet have signiﬁcant democratic as well as autocratic traits. This position is echoed by Moller and Skaaning.1 Democracy and autocracy Democracy is a contested concept. 2. Deﬁnitions are as numerous as there are regimes claiming the name of democracy. The leadership-type that is relevant in this paper is the one where there are no hereditary succession nor usage of titles as well as no military involvment. 2010: 271). because an imbalanced polity would be able to make encroachments on the meaningfulness of competitive elections (cf. who subscribes to a minimalist deﬁnition. 5 . and hence the system is arbitrary1 . The right deﬁnition of democracy depends on the cases. democracy is an arena where deliberation takes place. he leaves the electorate with the task of electing the deliberating leadership (Moller and Skaaning. Linz and Stepan (1996: 38f) deﬁne autocracy as a political system with limited pluralism. to capture these countries. the number of cases is reduced to western democracies. (2010: 87). yet he denounces this as a possibility. According to Schumpeter. There is no guiding ideology. two deﬁnitions suitable of these cases are needed. who argue that minimalist democracy includes competitive elections (Moller and Skaaning. and the other involving autocracy deﬁned as a polity without elections and a guiding ideology.). One deﬁning democracy as involving competitive elections and a balanced polity. Such elections stress the importance of a balanced polity. The ﬁrst deﬁnition that needs to be elucidated is that of democracy understood as minimalist democracy. The second deﬁnition is that of autocracy. this paper involves two distinct deﬁnitions. who deﬁne three types of autocracy by stressing three types of leadership. The polity is biased in favour of the leadership. The understanding of the leadership is further developed by Cheibub et al. section 2. To sum up. 1 This proposition is supported by the lack of rule of law. and thus mobilisation is not prevalent.3). The government is leaded by a small group. using a deﬁnition with many intensions such as liberal democracy. forthcomming). The Ogden-Richards triangle shows the relationship between the intension of the deﬁnition and the number of cases or extensions. This type of autocracy is deﬁned as civilian (ibid.checks and balances as are needed for the functioning of democracy.
Schedler (1998: 93) argues that there are principally two dangers. can spend resources on developing alternatives to the democratic regime or attempt to secede. Schedler (1998: 96) argues that a regime facing such threats.. The attitudinal dimension focuses primarily on the ordinary people. and constitutional changes.” Because the focus of this paper is the attempt to consolidate democracy. uncertainty. 2. Using Linz and Stepan’s arguments. whereas the second is the democratic erosion. The ﬁrst is the democratic breakdown. The regime has not been able to create the mass legitimacy.. and reversibility. Finally. Their behavioural dimension entails that no actor. seen as essential to even minimalist democracies in order to maintain meaningful democratic elections. who have to accept democracy institutionally and procedurally as the most appropriate way to govern the state. Democratic breakdown necessitates instability. vulnerability. it is not only the elimination of disloyal players that lacks. procedures. 1998: 97).] the intermittent or gradual weakening of democracy by those elected to lead it. which is needed for it to avoid breakdown. the attempts to weaken democracy. whether social.] political situation in which [.. 1998: 94ﬀ). which develops an understanding of the direction of regime. young consolidating democracies faces...] democracy has become ’the only game in town’. and institutions (ibid. the necessary behavioural changes among the (potential) ruling elites have not been thorough enough. is absent (Schedler. it is important to dwell on the negative side of the consolidation process. The conﬁdence in the regime. is a regime that has not been able to eliminate disloyal players. as Linz and Stepan (1996: 5) write.). Such gradual weakening is exempliﬁed by attacks on institutions of democracy such as elections or attempts to subvert the rule of law. the constitutional dimension requires that actors within the state solve issues through laws. Schedler argues that if a regime is facing a breakdown. and thus failed to shape pro-democratic attitudes in the population.2 Consolidation of democracy Linz and Stepan (1996: 6) argue that consolidation of democracy requires behavioural. attitudinal. The gradual democratic erosion is a problem. erosion requires ”[.The next section deals with consolidation.. political etc. Put bluntly. a consolidated democracy is the ”[.” (Schedler. It is followed by one about checks and balances. It might also be the creation of hegemonic parties in order to strangle electoral competition as well as the abuse of state resources by the incumbents in order to maintain power (Schedler. That is. many new democratic regimes faces. 1998: 6 . however. Thus.
popular attitudes. The popular mandate given to the president through the direct election. the concept of checks and balances must be probed. Mainwaring and Shugart (1997: 469) are not as pessimistic as Linz. which has an elaborate seperation of powers between the Congress and the presidency among other. 2008: 721). democratic erosion is very much a question of behaviour. because of the possibility of solving these issues through a careful institutional design. They are also able to deny the president legislation as well as taxes (Kousser and Ranney. Schedler brought forth. 1990: 52f). on the other hand. 1990: 60). The president. this paper has considered democracy and consolidation. However. as depicted in section 2. the state of the checks and balances is important if democracy 7 . the two chambers of Congress can impeach. might make the president more prone to get head-to-head with the parliament rather than settling the disputes (Linz. 2.3 Checks and balances Until now. Thus. the concept of gradual weakening. the parliament are not necessary ready to give in. Following Schedler’s ”gradual weakening”-logic as depicted above.97ﬀ). and the acceptance of the law as the ultimate arbiter of solutions to problems. Whereas the erosion of rule of law is an attack on the constitutional solution of problems as indicated by Linz and Stepan. Each branch has certain rights that can keep other branches in check. Breakdown and erosion entail a negative development of Linz and Stepan’s three dimensions. it is in a favourable position to weaken other institutions such as the parliament. To sum up. and at best vertical. To sum up. Solutions to democracyrelated issues depends on the personality and style of the president (Linz. and remove a president as an example. accountability rarely works horizontal. democratic consolidation is changes in elite behaviour. is able to veto Congress legislation (ibid.). must be scrutinised. The perhaps most prominent example is the American system. the question of Diamond and Morlino’s (2005: xxi) horizontal accountability. implying that the president is not accountable to any institutions and only to the people (Hague and Harrop. 2007: 277). If the presidency is only subject to the people. Diamond and Morlino argue that horizontal accountability is related to the ability of one institution to keep a check on another institution. This is what Linz deﬁnes as the problem of dual legitimacy.2. convict. These concerns follow Linz’ critique of the presidency. but to fully grasp their relationship. as they too have popular backing. In illiberal systems.
as is evidenced in section 3. yet he stresses that their role is to complement the deep explanan. and thus have more maneuverability in manipulating the democratic institutions. The explanan overview is depicted in table 1. and its eﬀect on checks and balances. deep or structural explanations trump its proximate or actor-based counterparts. He does not deny the usefulness of the actor explanan. and constitution as structural explanations. and thus. the main structure of this paper is the structure-actor2 dichotomy. 3 Introducing the explanans As brieﬂy mentioned in the Introduction. HA: A balanced polity can consolidate. shallow and actor-based are used for the same type of explanan. whereas a party of power as an actor explanation. party system. According to Kitschelt (2003: 74). 8 . It is tempting to deﬁne natural resources. Kitschelt’s understanding of structure and actor based explanans needs elucidation. the institutional design needs to balance the presidency and the parliament as well as create the necessary mechanisms that can provide solutions.3. Hence. As Mainwaring and Shugart correctly points out. This lends credence to two hypotheses: H1: Imbalanced polities turn autocratic because the presidency is capable of encroaching parliamentarian power. However.has to have a chance to consolidate. the solution lies in the institutional design. the constitution must be seen as a shallow explanan dominated by actors because of Preuss’ arguments regarding the role of constitutions in newly established regimes. Table 1: Overview of explanans Name Natural resources Party system Constitution Party of power Structure X X X X Actor Before delving on the explanans. Such complementary explanans diverge from situations where the deep course brings about the proximate explanan 2 Throughout the paper deep and structural are used intertwined for the same type of explanan like proximate. presidential biased polities have greater maneuverability when it comes to encroaching the parliamentarian powers.
and these entry points are dependent on other explanans and most importantly. This is what Ross (2001: 335) deﬁnes as the rentier eﬀect. to nationalise the natural resources the beneﬁciary needs control over the parliament in order to justify the action. he does not delve upon how the natural resources enter the polity in newly established and ﬂedging democracies. but where the outcome is not connected to the proximate explanan.2 Party system and party of power This section is built around the party system and the party of power. whereas Ross ﬁnds support for two diﬀerent eﬀects that emanates from natural resources (the rentier and represion eﬀect). 3.1 Natural resources Ross (2001: 356f) argues that the role of natural resources vis-` a-vis democracy is that of the impeder. 3. That is. Whereas taxes involve the population (Moller and Skaaning. While natural resources have been considered a very deep and structural explanan. forthcomming). the existence of a party of power. However. Hence.and the outcome. natural resources alienate the population from the political process. Firstly. natural resources have two points of entry. the question of how the incumbent gets access to these resources. Two qualiﬁcations are needed in order to fully grasp how natural resources enter. depending on the ownership. in this paper it is dependent on the measurement of party system and party of power. 2001: 336). as the deep explananw work through other explanans as depicted in ﬁgure 2 on page 17. The negative eﬀect sets in. the beneﬁciary or the incumbent gains an unfair advantage over other parties. to sum up. Thus. to dampen demands for democracy by reducing group activities or making pro-state groups that dominate the polity. The party system is a structural explanan because it rests 9 . in both cases. must be elucidated. when the beneﬁciary can and does use the natural resources to his own gain. The repression eﬀect is the creation of a large state apparatus to repress demands for democracy often violently (Ross. thus leaving the political system biased and unbalanced and not in a position to consolidate qua the behaviour of the elite. Secondly. assuming that the natural resources are owned by private people. The latter scenario is not relevant in this paper. Thus. as well as one relating the two. before Ross’ two eﬀects set in. the beneﬁciary needs to gain access to the owner or (re)take the ownership.
or the classic worker-capitalist conﬂict3 . according to Almond et al. few and less fragmented counterparts (ibid. This echoes the traits 3 Aardal delves into the demands of what constitutes a real cleavage. to change one’s ethnolinguistic position is impossible. religious. volatility is dominated by substantial and structural factors. a very stable party system is one dominated by few. can be found in Lipset and Rokkan’s analysis of the party system dominating western Europe. According to Aardal (1994: 220). The subtantial factors are related to the type of cleavage. These cleavages structure the outlook of parties (Whiteﬁeld.. as well as class-based cleavages are less subject to volatility (Madrid. Hence. fragmentation as well as their age. the most volatile parties are those dependent on economic cleavages. According to Madrid (2005: 2). (2008: 82). and not very fragmented parties ﬂuctuating around such cleavages as class or ethnicity. 2002: 181) and hence the parliament. Thus.). Whereas it is easier to change one’s economic position. however. Madrid also argues that polarised party systems are less volatile. personalistic in the sense that they are built around a small number of actors and thus void of any ideology. old. Pedersen (1979: 3) quotes Ascher and Tarrow. and territorial. The volatility of parties are. it is expected that the voter moves when the economy moves. but also on the absolute number. it is assumed that those cleavages structuring the Russian and Ukrainian party system fulﬁll these demands. In this paper. and its periphery. cleavages originate in diﬀerent conﬂicts such as the dichotomy between the centre of a country. 10 . Thus. whereas the structural are related to the diﬀerent parties and their relationship. and fragmented parties are more volatile than their old. To sumarise.on the cleavages created in society. Examples of more stable cleavages. The explanation why this is so might be straight forward and follows the concept of deep and proximate explanans. 2005: 3).. The stability of cleavags are thus essential to the stability of the party system.”. young. Fluctuations in the economy are likely to be translated into changes in voter preferences. many.] net change within the electoral party system resulting from individual vote transfers. the question of the strength of the stability or the level of volatility is of greatest importance. the urban-rural conﬂict. which is. who deﬁne volatility as the ”[. If choice of party is dependent on economy rather than ethnolinguistics. The essential question is to investigate what leads to these movements of votes. They ﬁnd that parties dependent on ethnolinguistic. not only dependent on the type of parties. The second argument is related to that of a party of power.
with strong discipline and is cohesive.1.of the vote-seeking party often known as a catch-all party. Hence. it is important to relate such parties to that of the party system. it is not enough that it is built around an actor and is cohesive. section 6. However. voting follows party-lines (Rose. The United Kingdom might prove to be a very diﬀerent case. Catch-all parties fares poorly in heavily structured party systems. a successful version of this type of party is not expected in countries. and ﬁnally dominates to such an extent that it is possible for the party to prevent the parliament from acting as a balancing institution... 2007: 245). it is only possible if the party system is volatile and thus susceptible to catch-all parties. in the British House of Commons. Rose writes that parliaments are able to hold the government accountable for abuses of power. Sartori argues that a ”[. to become damaging. This is because both parties in the United States are not very cohesive and at times have a weak discipline (Kousser and Ranney. it is possible to say that a party of power with damaging capabilities is one that ﬂuctuates around leading actors. and thus maximise control with the government. where there are deep rooted cleavages. Depending on the internal dynamics of the party. They are not inclined to change party. Hence. the damaging eﬀect on the parliament as a check and balancing institution can be either small or large. 2008: 171). and especially in order for it to act as a check on the presidency. However.] party that outdistances all others [. the president cannot expect the party to shoulder all policies. 11 . Thus.] is signiﬁcantly stronger than all the others. a parliament is often in opposition to the presidency.. Yet. According to Strom (1990: 566) it is a party that seeks to maximise electoral support. Depending on whether the party of power are cohesive and disciplined as in the British case or the opposite as in the American case. party discipline and cohesion are very high among members of the British House of Commons. Before embarking on an elucidation of the structure of such parties and their damaging eﬀect. because of the alignments of the electorate. to sum up.3.“ (Hague and Harrop. They argue that such parties are typical in new democracies such as Russia (cf. it might pose a serious challenge for the functioning of the parliament.. it must also be dominating. in 90 percent of all cases. The American political system is an example of a system with a presidential party that acts as a check on even its own president. As is depicted in section 2. 2008: 738f). Hence.
is that of constitutional rule of law.” (my emphasis). tempers.3 Constitution A constitution is a very unique explanan in the sense that it fuses the deep and proximate or actor-based explanans. the constitution deﬁnes the country’s political set up. thus making it the highest source of authority in any society only subject to the constitution itself. Preuss’ (1992-93: 641) argues that the constitution ”[. it is actors that deﬁne the constitution. Thus. 1992-93: 642).. Hence. which entails authors and interests. and as mentioned above.. This is based on his emphasis of what rule of law ensures. 12 . which disclose themselves only in a long space of time. and moral. 2004: 32)4 . The proximate component of the constitutional explanan is vested in Burke’s argument that constitutions are ”[. One pivotal goal of such a constitutionally deﬁned setup. is to place the elected representation over all other branches of government (Preuss. One prominent constraint mentioned by Preuss is that of the former regime.. while it is plausible to argue that there are structural factors that shape these moods and habitudes.” (Preuss. accountability.” (Preuss. civil liberties. who stresses that ”No type of delegated power can in any way alter the conditions of its delegation. occasions. He argues that it is the essential pillar upon which any high-quality democracy rests. Hence.. and a limitation on the prerogatives of the state (O’Donnell. it assumed that the type of rule of law he deals with. It ensures political rights..] creates the political and institutional preconditions for the emergence of totally new social and political actors. O’Donnell’s emphasis on the importance of the rule of law for liberal democracies echo these positions. Feher argues that ”[. It is deep in the sense that it deﬁnes the political framework of any country. Two issues are worth mentioning in relation with section 2.” (my emphasis) (Preuss. 1992-93: 639).] made by the peculiar circumstances.] a constitution based on will can only endure as long as those persons whose wills backed the document. As an example. diﬀerent types of regimes occur. Constitutional superiority is echoed by Sieyes. this section must elucidate both the structural components of the constitution as well as the actor-based components. which in one way or the other inspires the founding fathers of the new polity (ibid. 1992-93: 640). and social habitudes of the people.3. civil.). 1992-93: 653).2. Easter (1997: 187) argues that depending on the structure of the former elites. If the constitution 4 Although O’Donnell does not say it explicitly.. dispostions. It is proximate precisely because it is the written foundation of a country. newly created countries can to a certain extent shape their constitution as they see ﬁt.
Thus. any constitution favouring the presidency might damage the democratic development. Landman (2006: 29) argues that MSSD seeks to compare cases that are alike on most explanans. Or put inversely. deterministic assumes that explanan X leads to outcome Y. the case is selected on the explanandum (Landman. and thus the question of outliers become important. It is an attempt to identify intervening causal processes. As is evidenced below. yet varies on key explanans as well as the outcome. it is very diﬃcult to know whether the neighbouring case ﬁts the same relationship. section 2. Assuming that the presidency submits a draft that lies outside the indiﬀerence lines of the parliament. As mentioned above. in order for a democratic regime to maximise legitimacy. it might not last. This lends crendence to the importance of the author that wrote the constitution. SSDs demand that all relevant explanans are speciﬁed. a process tracing method as described by Bennett (2005: 206) is utilised.does not receive the support described by Linz and Stepan. Any constitutional document built on will. Tsebelis (2002: 27) argues that the unanimity core is dependent on the preferences of the actors in question. As opposed to probabilistic methodology that deems relationships probable. cannot garner mass support.1 Methodological approach Most similar systems design and process tracing The methodological approach is deterministic. and that the far majority of these are held constant. democracy needs a constitution accepted by the key institutions of the regime. To sum up. in order to consolidate. this is not the case of this study.2). 2006: 30). or what is known as a most similar systems design (MSSD) followed by process tracing that probes the ﬁndings of the MSSD. which in this paper is assumed to be the presidency and the parliament. To maximise the diﬀerence in the outcome. 13 . Hence. conﬂict arises. a constitutional battle might either weaken or even force a democracy to break down (cf. It is in such a situation. 4 4. the methodological approach is deterministic. If neither can agree on it. the constitution entails a deﬁnition of the checks and balances as well as battles between those with interests in the setup. and thus might not survive its creator. it needs to deliver a constitution that can be broadly accepted especially by all institutional actors. This addressed through the scope conditions depicted in section 1. will they attempt to overthrow the document. Hence. To address this caveat. Is it the parliament or is it the presidency.
4. The one used in this paper is an analytical explanation. the process tracing must attempt not only to single out the most important explanan. the two ﬁrst are understood as structures. The model is deﬁned in section 4. The original purpose of an MSSD is to single out the key explanan and determine the deterministic relationship. but because this paper does not have a single explanan. the natural resources are at his disposal without the need of private consent. if the incumbent has a party of power strong enough to nationalise privatised state corporations. The presence of natural resources can be used to control society through the rentier and repression eﬀect as described in section 3. Bennett identiﬁes several diﬀerent forms of process traincing. Alternatively. As depicted in table 1. follows Ross’ (2001: 356f) ﬁndings regarding the negative eﬀect on democracy from both oil and minerals. The idea that natural resources are granted the incumbent through private sponsors is based on the assumption that former state corporations have been privatised. Thus.3 depicted in ﬁgure 2. The understanding of what constitutes a natural resource as well as the eﬀect of such.2 Operationalisation and causal links In the sections below.2 the process tracing takes place. and transition (cf. it can be argued that natural resources bolster the negative eﬀects of disloyal elites (cf. 2. which is basically a detailed narrative couched in theoretical terms.1. each explanan is operationsalised. It is either present or absent.2. Therefore further elaboration on these explanans are not conducted. and the causal links are spelled out. table 2). it must also deﬁne the causal relationship. two qualiﬁcations are needed. 4. The causal chain argues that natural resources are either granted the incumbent through private sponsors or through parties of power with a negative eﬀect on the checks and balances.1 Natural resources Natural resources are a binary and structural explanan. it is along the lines of the theory explained in section 2 and the operationalisation depicted in section 4.This makes it an ideal companion for MSSDs especially like the one of this paper. Hence. Natural resources give the incumbent a resource-advantage. legacy. whereas the latter two are understood as actor-based explanans. Regarding the series of constants depicted in table 2 on page 22 this paper subscribes to Møller and Skaaning’s (2009: 307) understanding of the economic level. To fully understand these arguments.3 and the 14 .
yet equally important. it is considered a structural explanan.2. Strong cleavages make it more diﬃcult for the author to neglect large parts of the population.2). The causal chain related to the party of power indicates that the presence of such parties have a negative eﬀect on checks and balances and hence the 15 . the number of seats are evaluated. the party of power needs to have clear connections to the presidency. 4. cleavages have a negative eﬀect on parties of power as a result of their catch-all nature as well as a postive eﬀect on checks and balances. The cleavage is the structuring part of a party system. The causal chain indicates that on the one hand. cannot tilt the checks and balances.1 and the importance of meaningful elections. section 3. This method follow Ascher and Tarrow’s deﬁnition albeit in a simpliﬁed manner. This is built on the assumption that all are able and allowed to create representation. The same positive eﬀect can be found in relation with the writing of the constitution.3 Party of power (PoP) A party of power is unique in the sense that they are personalistic and built around a small number of actors. Autocracies might try to prevent certain groups in participating in any form of electoral process. to measure a party of power. to measure the presence of strong cleavages or alternatively. a high degree of volatility. the question of voting behaviour needs to be addressed. make a party system volatile and thus not very structured. party support from election to election is measured.2 Party system The party system is based on the concept of cleavages (cf.behavioural dimension) or parties of power rather than being a negative eﬀect in itself. and void cleavages. 4.2). and as such. Hence. This is so because the parliament is strongly organised. Instead of looking at percentage of votes each party gains. it still gives a rough idea about whether a system is volatile. section 3. Albeit the method is crude compared to the approach deﬁned by Pedersen. Secondly. To estimate volatility. which lends credence to their deﬁnition as actor-based explanans. they are not dependent on a speciﬁc cleavage (cf.. the party must as a minimum be the most signiﬁcant party in the parliament. Thus. Thus. This is built on the assumption that parties of power without any signiﬁcant inﬂuence. This follows the lines of section 2. voter choices are cross referenced with the party’s supporter base and ﬂuctuations in support over time. To identify cleavages. and thus it might be dangerous to neglect certain groups. and entails an actor decision.2.
It aﬀects the strength of the party of power as well as the checks and balances. The question of the party system enters independent of natural resouces. which aﬀects the development of the constitution through its cleavages. whether the author (thus actor-based explanan) has taken other than narrow interests into consideration. In both scenarios. section 3. One such feature might be the balancing between the parliament and the presidency. assuming that a parliament is already settled. 2. 4.parliament because of its ability to prevent the parliament from functioning. the essential question to ask is. Hence.3).4 Author of the constitution Feher’s argument regarding the survival of will-based constitutions is pitvotal for the operationalisation of this explanan (cf. 4. It is in scenarios of this kind that the party of power has a negative eﬀect on the parliament and thus the checks and balance.3)5 . Thus. Thus. the party of power slant the checks and balances in favour of the president. However. the parliament and the presidency are both aﬀected and aﬀect the constitution. This measurement is based on the assumption that a constitution deﬁned by the presidency is pro-presidential and thus imbalancing.2 each explanan plays a signﬁcant role through various chains in aﬀecting the checks and balances. there is an extra-constitutional parliamentarian framework. As depicted in ﬁgure 2 on page 17 the negative eﬀect of natural resources enters the polity either through private sponsors or parties of power.2. 16 . the central aim of this explanan is to measure the conﬂict surrounding the constitution. Will-based constitutions are assumed to lie outside Tsebelis unanimity core. It is a problem if issues with the presidency must be attenuated (cf. The strength of the party of power is dependent on the degree of volatility and its ability to gain the majority of the votes.3 Theoretical model As indicated in section 4. Strong parties of power are also in a better position to re-write the constitution and thus tamper with the institutions of democracy as well as claim power over state assets. 5 This argument is built around Mainwaring and Shugart’s understanding that carefully designed systems can attenuate problems with presidentialism. and thus making the constitution a question of will. The causal chain indicates that the strength of the cleavages (or volatility) and party of power work through the framework of the constitution.
they helped removed the popular prime minister (Duncan. en masse (Remington. it is highly dependent on the power arrangement. and during his brief struggle with then-prime minister Jevgenij Primakov. Yet because it is the ultimate deﬁner of checks and balances. they supported him ardently. that mined for natural resources. Putin changed the privatisation trend. 2008: 394). Figure 2: Theoretical model 5 Comparison of Russia and Ukraine Russia has an abundance of natural resources.“ (Duncan. Russia privatised state-owned enterprises. in new countries. 2007: 2). During most of Yeltsin’s time as president. but during the transition-phase. the negative eﬀects of 17 . 2007: 8)... yet for now it must suﬃce to say that it strengthen it. it is important to understand who has authored the document and the author’s position. Ambrosio (2009: 51) notes that the Russian elite created a series of state controlled NGOs to insulate Russia from external interference (cf.] group of seven or so bankers who applied their vast wealth and inﬂuence to ensure the re-election of Boris El’tsin as President in 1996. One eﬀect of this is elaborated in connection with parties of power. section 7). This make it subject to the cleavage / volatility situation as well as parties of power. This created a very strong group of oligarchs. Thus.Despite the traditional understanding of constitutions as a relatively deep and structural variable. referred to as a ”[. and started a re-nationalisation of key industries.
is to observe the total number of parties. However. The CPRF. where Unity’s successor. They are decimated to 52 seats in 2003. the Ukraine gas transit system transport around 120 billion cubic metres or 80 percent of Russia’s gas to Europe (Gnedina and Emerson. despite the possibility of rents. only four parties contested in 2003 (cf.). Naftohaz is constantly on the bringe of bankruptcy and is indepted to the Russian energy-giant Gazprom (ibid. appendix A). volatility is high (cf. Because of the transition many people slided into powerty.2). 2008: 395f). gained most votes among the richer (Remington. The 2007 election follows this trend (cf. 2007). Thus. 2008: 396). From the 1995 election. Another way to observe volatility in this period. Ukraine is very diﬀerent from Russia in the sense that Ukraine is dominated by two large ethnic groups. 6 The 7 This Communist Party of the Russian Federation is supported by the development in the GDP. Of the 1999 parties. only seven of those parties contested in the 1995 election (cf. battered its way unto the political stage with 222 seats. Of those 12 parties. which is negative until 1998. In 1999 the CPRF6 gained most votes among the poorest. 2009: 2). Natural resources is not playing as important a role in Ukraine as in Russia. In 1993 12 parties contested. These trends echo Madrid’s depiction of economic cleavages as susceptible to volatility. it is dependent on Russia. The diﬀerence between rich and poor as measured by the Gini-index doubled (Remington. The majority of the people are ethnic Ukrainian. whereas Unity or Yeltsin’s party had greatest success among the wealthier (Rose. United Russia. appendix B). Naftohaz. but because of economic mismanagement. 2008: 391). that beneﬁtted from the economic downturn. The system is administrated by a state energy company. Russia holds a Duma election in 1993 and again in 1995. 18 . Thus. The growth in the supporters of United Russia is assumed to be explained by the growth in GDP7 (Rose. From 1999 it grows with an average of two to three percent (Remington. 2007). are also subject to volatility. United Russia. section 3. it is possible to argue that despite the presence of an indeed strong economic cleavage. In 1993 Russia’s Choice wins 70 seats. only four parties contested during the 1999 election. In 1995 it is reduced to meagre nine seats. whereas the new party. mismanagement has prevented the Ukrainian state access to ”easy” money.natural resources are found in connection with elections and the rentier eﬀect. and unemployment rates soared. and as noted in section 7. CPRF wins 103 seats in the same period. The economic cleavage can be seen as a direct consequence of the privatisation or chock-theory in Russia. appendix C). This voter allignment is echoed in the 2003 election.
The post-Soviet Yeltsin authored constitution was approved by referendum in 1993. 2006: 111). 1998. This draft gave the president lawmaking prerogatives. on the other hand. appendix D and E). and the ethnic Ukrainians backed Rukh. As is evidenced in appendix E the Russians continued to vote for pro-Russian parties. The Communist participated in the 1994. but at the same time gave the Duma and the Upper Chamber the possibility of override vetoes by a two-thirds vote in each chamber (Remington. the Communist party is the most stable with the longest election record.1 for 8 It is likely that the 1994 election follows these lines as well. 2001: 169). 2001: 168). the run up to the approval was not void of trouble.whereas the largest minority is ethnic Russian. which is evidenced in the relative smaller changes in voting behaviour among those voting for the parties that manage to run for more than one election. it is plausible to argue that Yeltsin alienated other parts of the political arena as well as used will to get his draft approved (cf. 19 . only two countinues. it is worth noting that the Russians’ did not switch to a nonethnic based party during the strengthening of the Ukrainian GDP in the 2000s (Duenwald. whereas they lost seats in both the 2002 and 2007 election. It is smaller than in Russia. Yeltsin decided to take the matter outside the existing constitutional framework. whereas from 1999 to 2002. To disconﬁrm the claim that Russians’ favour the left-wing because of economy. While anti-Yeltsin deputies took part in a constitutional assembly. volatility is observed. Thus. Gueorguiev and Schaechter. Thus. 2001: 160f). Of the other parties three survive from 1994 to 1998. Of all the Ukrainian parties. and 2007 parliamentarian elections. 2002. In the ﬁrst two elections they gained seats. 2001: 170). The latter being an essential part of the independence movement (D’Anieri. Anti-Yeltsin forces sought to create a two-tiered form of government. However. Despite this very strong cleavage.8 percent voted in favour of his draft (Remington. These regional patterns are echoed in the 1998 election8 . 2005: 4). and thus leaving the question with the people. Yeltsin’s supporters. The same goes for 2007 (cf. there seems to be a degree of volatility in the Ukrainian party system. where presidential powers were limited. wanted to maximise presidential power and minimise the Duma’s ability to block Yeltsin (Remington. section 6. Two distinct positions emerged. 2006: 108f). 54. While the Duma refused to approve the Yeltsin-draft. Yeltsin’s supporters sat up a presidential counterpart with the aim of creating a presidential constitution (Remington. despite the strong cleavage. where Russians in general backed the Communists. This is also echoed in the 2002 parliamentarian election as well as the presidential elections (D’Anieri.
when Kuchma attempted to amend the constitution.2 only strong parties of power are interesting. Thus. Secondly. 2006: 91). and succeeded by United Russia (Gill. Oleksandr Moroz argued. which is 40 less than the Communists. appendix A). A real power of party did not manifest itself in Russia until Unity. 2006: 92). and as Rada speaker. the Rada was legally binded to change it (D’Anieri. it does not receive the same status as United Russia. the constitution was perceived as the lesser of two evils. as the Rada repealled the reforms of the constitution in 2004. yet it did not consist of any actual text to be replaced in the constitution. Hence. which was approved in 2005. Thus. Russia’s Choice disappears practically in 1995 (cf. Kuchma used the same tactics as above. which would give him powers. There was great support for the referendum. alienating parts of the political society. This was resisted by the Rada (D’Anieri. This reform transferred power from the president to the prime minister (D’Anieri. The ﬁrst Ukrainian constitutional document was approved in 1995 called the ”law on power”. where he had more power. the Ukrainian Rada was never in agreement with Kuchma and put up a ﬁerce ﬁght.2. 2006: 90). which dominates the Duma with 222 seats in 2003 and 315 in 2007 (cf. Another constitutional battle emerged in 2000. and pushed the constitution through the Rada (D’Anieri. in both cases. In relation with the constitution of 1996. appendix B and C). which was aﬄiated with Putin. Feher’s argument regarding will-based constitutions seem to have merit in the Ukrainian case. but the high court decided that if Kuchma proposed a referendum supported by the people that demanded change of the constitution. As depicted in section 3. as in Russia. Unity contests the 1999 election and wins 73 seats. 2006: 84). The 1995 ”Law on Power” is a package suggested by then-president Kuchma. However. the Ukrainian constitution is approved by ﬁst. Kuchma went outside the existing framework. 2006: 95). a real signiﬁcant party of power is only United Russia. United Russia has clear connections to the Russian presidency in the sense 20 . whereas a real constitution was put in eﬀect in 1996. which made the Rada approve the amendments (D’Anieri. As in Russia much of the debate revolved around whether Ukraine should take a presidential or semi-presidential path. contrary to the Russian case. 2006: 71. Once again Kucha threatened the Rada with his ﬁst. the parliament would otherwise not grant him.an elaboration of the eﬀects). 73). as speciﬁed in section 3. While Gill (2006: 70) mentions Yegor Gaidar’s Russia’s Choice as a semi-oﬃcial party. He used the unpopularity of the Rada and the threat of referendum to make the Rada approve his package.
because Kutchma links himself with the party. For a United Ukraine. and the constitution.that United Russia is formed by Putin during his ﬁrst tenure (Almond et al. volatility. Thus. D’Anieri (2006: 93f) does. disappeared in the following election. that in turn affects the possibility of creating parties of power. though he did not declare himself a member. the party disappeared (cf. is to be the next party of power. 9 For a United Ukraine is an electoral alliance consisting of among other Janukovich’s Party of Regions (Kuzio. 21 . and becomes the second largest party in the Rada in 2002. ((Haspel. United Russia has dominated Russian politics since 2003. Kuchma attempted to rewrite the constitution to his liking. in Russia. The hypotheses are answered in the sections related to the case study 6. The party wins 101 seats. In Ukraine there is no clear equivalent to United Russia.2 argues that the problem is only severe if the party is cohesive. especially United Russia might in fact be a serious problem for Russian democracy. which is dominated by an ethnic cleavage. Thus. As depicted above. It is unclear whether Party of Regions. the Russian party system is much more volatile than the Ukrainian. Section 3. it is fair to assume that in time. identify For a United Ukraine9 as a party of power. 1998: 434) party cohesion is higher than expected in the ﬁrst elections to the Duma. appendix D and E). whereas the research question is answerd in section 8. which endorses Janukovich. it is plausible to argue that the checks and balances in Russia are weakened because of the weak party system. There is little doubt that Russia and Ukraine are alike in many ways. the party of power. 2003: 47).. the Russian party leaders have become better at maintaining cohesion. but in 2007. whereas the only Ukrainian party of power. however. According to Haspel et al. albeit Ukraine’s Rada has put up signiﬁcant resistence every time. This is not to the same extent the case in Ukraine. While they do not evaluate the latest elections. Like Russia. yet also diﬀerent. Thus. because the next election to the Rada is set to be hold in 2012. Ukraine has a presidential constitution. 2008: 82). Remington and Smith. Table 2 summarises.
Table 2: Comparison of Russia and Ukraine Explanans Transition Stalemate Stalemate Transit tax Cleavage Both Plenty Volatile President None Natural resources Party system Constitutional autor PoP United Russia Imbalanced Balanced Balancing Constants Legacy Russian Russian Economic level Russia Above Ukraine Above 22 .
and as argued in section 5 the CPRF gained votes as the Russian GDP dwindled. However.6 Case study In section 5 table 2 argues that the Russian political system is imbalanced in favour of the presidency. The newly elected Duma. was a power-struggle between elites seeking to gain control over each other (Nichols.The leader of the Supreme Soviet. a process tracing of each case is conducted. Had the Duma refused to approve Kiriyenko. Yeltsin resisted. The crisis. the Duma approved (Babayeva and Dokuchayev. yet the third time. The Russian Constitution demands that any prime minister must be approved by the Duma. the pro-presidential constitution pushed through a prime minister not very popular among the deputies of the Duma. are susceptible to ﬂuctuations in 23 . 1998). 2001: 63). The process tracing follows a historical narrative structured around ﬁgure 2. the successor of the Supreme Soviet. Thus. This struggle is brieﬂy sketched out in section 5. the president must dissolve the Duma. whereas the Ukrainian is relatively more balanced. it did not get a democratically elected parliament and new constitution before 1993. however. 2001: 73). This is best evidenced in the battle between Yeltsin and the Duma regarding the nomination and approval of prime minister Kiriyenko. To fully understand this claim. and to categorise the Russian and Ukrainian regimes. 2001: 65). The Duma rejected Kiryenko twice. where deputies passed laws counteracting Yeltsin’s decrees (Nichols. his goal was to deprive the president of any control over the presidency in an attempt to make him a cerimonial ﬁgurehead (Nichols. however. The run up to the 1993 constitution evidenced the diﬀerences between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet. of reasons unknown. In 1995 the CPRF becomes the next dominating party. Hence. with a result favouring Yeltsin’s position. as it became. The dominance did not last. the Russian political system is biased in favour of the presidency as of 1993. This lends credence to the notion that the main cleavage of the Russian Duma is economic. If the Duma rejects the prime minister three times. Khasbulatov.1 Russia Russia gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. the deputies would have to give up their seats just one year before the election in 1999. which created a deadlock between the Supreme Soviet and the president. Yeltsin. and thus parties depending on this cleavage. and call for elections to the Duma. decided to turn against his former ally. as the Russian parliament was called before 1993. 6. was in 1994 dominated by Yegor Gairdar’s Russia’s Choice.
Vladimir Lenin in 1997. Another example is the ﬁnalising takeover of Gazprom in 2005 (Denisov and Grivach. The media or the proxy. the space for a party of power grew together with its negative eﬀect on the checks and balances. 1997). 2004). Hence. the Duma was strongest. However. and thus makes it the new dominating party of the Duma. denied Yeltsin’s opponents air time in their media (Remington. During the ﬁrst post-Soviet presidency. Before 2004 they were elected. then-president Yeltsin did not have the same political resources at his disposal as his successor.2. whereas after 2004. it is only in relation with the presidential elections. United Russia. As depicted above. 2008: 389). The 1996 election proves to be an example of how private sponsorship works albeit by proxy. Russian democracy never consolidated because the elite never accepted the democratic game (cf. Hence. Putin gets a parliamentarian tool by which he can change the way Russia is governed as well as nationalise key industries and thus use the natural resources to his advantage. The election of 2003 gives Putin’s United Russia overwhelming support. 2005) To sum up. Putin. owned by the oligarchs. is best depicted by Yeltsin’s attempt to bury the founder of the USSR. This role evaporates as the GDP increases.1 regarding the resource beneﬁt. This gives the CPRF a central role during the 1990s as seen in connection with the hestitated approval of Kiryenko. Putin.the economy. natural resources entered the political system through private sponsorship (Duncan. Putin had constructed an eﬀective parliamentarian control through his party of power. because of the reinforced cleavages. which in turn gives the presidency even more control over the political arena. while Yeltsin was not able to bury Lenin because he lacked parliamentarian support.2). section 2. however. 2007: 8). Despite the argument brought forth in section 4. the president appoints the governors (Baker. Putin. which he used to among other gain control of the Russian governors. Yeltsin proposed to ask the Russians whether Lenin should be buried or not. 24 . His attempt failed because at the time the CPRF dominated the Duma and ardently refused any such action (AP. at the time of the greatest deprivation of the Russian people. with the creation of a succesful and lasting party of power. it clearly manifests itself. A prime example of the diﬀerence in power over the political arena between Yeltsin and his successor. When the economic cleavage weakend. tilted the checks and balances in favour of the Russian presidency. a presidential constitution together with a volatile party system leaving space for a party of power controlling the Duma. had no opposition against nationalising key industries.
2 took another ethnic group into consideration. It brought Yushenko to power when Janukovich’s election fraud was revealed. because of its ability to dismantle the Duma as a check on the presidency (cf. because of Janukovich’s succefull attempt to boost presidential powers once again (BBC.3). appendix D and Anieri (2006: 108) for expected future indications of alignments based on section 3. Hence. Janukovich followed Yushenko as president in 2010. Thus. it seems evident that it is conﬁrmed. Yushenko was president from 2005 to 2010 with both Timoshenko and Janukovich as prime ministers. 2010). Hence. the Orange Revolution deserves a short note. who put a high value on avoiding secession.2 and Madrid’s conception of the weight of ethnicity as a structuring cleavage. these cleavages became pivotal in the design of the pre-constitutional Ukrainian institutions. the question of cleavages and volatility is elevated to a premier position as an essential determining factor of the future outlook of Ukrainian politics. and as described in section 4. the ﬁrst Ukrainian parliamentarian election took place before the approval of their constitution. 2006: 118) As evidenced in section 5 there is a battle between Kuchma and the Rada. the Communist. 6.2 Ukraine Before embarking on the process tracing. In relation with hypothesis H1. Thus. were aware of this. Ethnic Ukrainian nationalists. where the popular change of the incumbent is unlikely. the Ukranians elected a new Rada. 2007: 23). section 2. the ethnic-Russian party.They instead attempted and succeeded in manipulating the political game to their advantage thus creating a system. the possibility of especially ethnic Russian secession was a possibility. and thus the Orange Revolution is seen more as an interlude between Kuchma and Janukovich than a deﬁning event. Thus. The ethnic Russians primarily live in the eastern and southern part of Ukraine. whereas ethnic Ukrainians live in the western and northern part of Ukraine.2. that in turn gave the presidency to a pro-Russian president and a signiﬁcant amount of seats to ethnic-Russian parties. Precisely because of the placement of Ukrainian ethnicities. Contrary to the Russian case.). which gave them a strong basis for secession. structured around ethnic cleavages (cf. supported Kuchma in his amendments of the constitution as well as in the dismissal of Yushenko as prime minister in the 2000s (D’Anieri. they made the necessary compromises (D’Anieri. 25 . In 1994. it is possible to argue in favour of a classiﬁcation of Russia as a civilian autocracy from the time of the creation of United Russia. any further elaborations on the topic is not conducted. Thus.
eventhough these attempts were succesful. Because of the strong cleavages. is the deputies’ repeal of reforms (D’Anieri. however. The alliance did. Rents from Russian gas on its way to the European market. 2006: 88f). never manage to be elected more than once. To sum up. assuming that Party of Regions is the next party of power. In the following election in 2007 one of the members of the alliance. echoing Feher’s argument. the Party of Regions headed by former pro-Russian presidential candidate. Another indirect eﬀect of the constitution. 1996. As depicted above regarding the constitution. appendix E). However. While the Duma is void of any signiﬁcant opposition to United Russia. Janukovich. the negative eﬀect from such sources of income are more or less absent in Ukraine. Yet. appendix E). they could criticise Kuchma (ibid.2. Kuchma could not attack the g opposition for critism. This is evidenced in the three. 2005: 133). had he had a successful party of power.3). This is best evidenced in the pro-presidential and primarily ethnic Rusian supported alliance dubbed For a United Ukraine. it faced a signiﬁcant opposition in the Timoshenko bloc in 2007 (cf. Ukraine does not have access to natural resources comparable to that of Russia’s. situates the diﬀerent positions vis-` a-vis the negotiation regarding the constitution. and 2000. As demonstrated in section 5.). during its time. yet it is not large enough to play a similar role as natural resources. and it is likely that any future Ukrainian party of power will face other signiﬁcant blocs. It clearly shows that a parliament structured around 26 . which might indicate a new party of power in Ukraine. won 175 seats in the Rada (cf. Thus. Hence. Kuchma’s attempts to change it as well as the informal institutions indicate that his did not. section 4. Kuchma’s arm-wrestling with the Rada could have been avoided. This gave them a platform by which. and needed institutions such as processes designed to harass the opposition and falsify election results (ibid. strong cleavages manifested in a parliament prior to the approval of a constitution.During Kuchma’s tenure. albeit succesful. a real party of power never manifested. This is also evidenced in the immunity. the constitution is changed in 1995. Kuchma still needed to create informal institutions in order to for his regime to function as he wanted (Way. whereas the Russian constitution served Yeltsin well. attempts. though limited to its ethnic supporter base because of the cleavages structuring the Rada (cf. and the lack of a party of power. deputies enjoyed.). Thus. it lessened Kuchma’s need to weaken the Rada (D’Anieri. Kuchma could not shape the constitution as he saw ﬁt. are considered a source of income similar to that of natural resources. Yet because of strong cleavages. 2006: 92).
The leverage dwindled as Russia’s GDP grew. the leverage was not as much a concern as foreign NGOs. 7 Considering an alternative explanation The theoretical model does not take external factors into consideration. which at times favoured a stronger presidency. 2005: 101). Kuchma was not willing to accept the rules of democracy. Another eﬀect of these cleavages is that of the room for a party of power. Whereas Russia is subject to a pressure from the West. lies in the compromise made and hence the cleavages.stable cleavages are in a much better position to resist encroachments. Thus. It might also be worth noting that this situation enhanced the power of the Russian minority and their parties. Thus. and at numerous occassions. the question is brieﬂy assessed through an evaluation of leverage or power to aﬀect other contries. 2005: 100). which lends albeit limited credence to the alternative hypothesis HA. Cleavages reduced the room that would otherwise have limited the ability of the parliament to act as a check on the presidency. seemed to be very interested in following the constitution. Thus. among the Ukrainian presidents. In this section. and linkage as the integration with a certain region (Levitsky and Way. The situation in Ukraine is diﬀerent. cleavages seem to be the explanan that most clearly determines Ukraine’s fate. Hence. he ”overthrew” the constitution through will. 2009: 46). Especially the American Treasure invested a lot of political time on reforms. they deemed necessary for Russia (Desai. To postulate that the Ukrainian democracy is consolidated is premature. They feared that foreign NGOs might attempt to incite a colour revolution just like the one neighbouring Ukraine experienced (Ambrosio. described above. only Yushenko seemed to respect the rules of democracy. The parliament on the other hand. Thus. Ukraine is subject to a pressure from the West as well as Russia. The latter concept is expanded by Tolstrup (undated: 7f) as economic and technocratic or political among other. 2005: 21f). 2009: 51). During Putin’s tenure. Russian elites used the fear of a potential coup to crack down on independent NGOs such as those dealing with human rights and democracy (Ambrosio. Western leverage over Russia is best evidenced through the opening of the Russian market during Yeltsin’s tenure (Desai. Russia has an interest in Ukraine because of the Russians and the Black 27 . democracy fares better in Ukraine because of the relatively more balanced institutions. and thus forcing the president outside the formal framework. the foundation for those battles.
Russia failed to consolidate its democracy because of its imbalanced political system favouring the presidency. and the support of Janukovich. The ﬁrst position to discuss is Russias abundance of natural resources and its constitution. on the other hand managed to remain relatively balanced because of its party system and the lack of a party of power. The pro-Russian Kuchma’s sucessor. there is a strong Russian interest in Ukraine as well as space to exert inﬂuence. Thus. Thus. 2009: 145). The former has shook of western leverage through growth in GDP albeit paranoia has made the Russian elite harass foreign NGOs. whereas the latter seems very susceptible to Russian inﬂuence. Ukraine is dependent on Russian energy (ibid.1. it depends on the decision to utilise them to repress. Thus. 2009: 135). yet as evidenced. and ath the same time. United Russia and Janukovich’s Party of Regions established formal ties in order to help the party in the upcomming 2006 Rada elections. The economic linkage between Russia and Ukraine is best evidenced through the Ukrainian natural resource dependecy. despite this support the pro-western Yushenko won. Mainwaring and Shugart rightfully argue that much depends on the institutional design. The Orange Revolution is perhaps the best example of a time where Russia needed to inﬂuence Ukrainian politics.It is claimed in section 3. 8 Discussion and conclusion As depicted above in section 5 and 6.1 based on Ross’ arguments that natural resources impede democracy. natural resources must be transferred to the political system through political actors. Janukovich. got extensive support from Russia for his election campaign.). Firstly. it gives at least a couple of points worth noting.2. which they do not want to loose (Ambrosio. However. albeit this inﬂuence is not succesful at times. the discussion focuses on the Russian failure to remain on a democracy consolidating path using Ukraine as a mirror. Instead Russia attempted to undermine Yushenko’s eﬀorts to democratise by denouncing his attempts as well as adopting confrontational policies toward Kiev (Ambrosio.Sea Fleet. whereas the technocratic linkage is depicted in the relationship between United Russia and Party of Regions. leverage and linkage is taken serious in both Russia and Ukraine. as shown in section 4. yet failed. Despite being a brief interlude between the primary arguments of this paper and the discussion. Ukraine. Then-prime minister Timoshenko criticised the agreement as an illegal attempt to inﬂuence Ukrainian politics. yet 28 .
there might be cases where fairly large and dominating parties. diﬀusion is tested vis-` a-vis the rest. the Ukrainian case exempliﬁes a situation where the party system is perhaps too polarised thus making it very diﬃcult for the presidency to have a fruitful relationship with the parliament.3. which might lend crendence to the damaging eﬀects of such parties. volatility does not necessary damage the regime. However. section 1 and the scope conditions).1 Diﬀusion versus the rest Until know the core explanations of this paper has been discussed.2 as intrinsic to the preservation of Ukrainian democracy as a structuring factor as well as preventing parties of power. it seems evident that a Russian party of power damages the horizontal accountability of the Duma. Another criticism of natural resources as depicted by Ross and used in this paper. The party system is considered a prime explanan in section 6. several consolidated western democracies go through periods of relatively high volatility vis-` a-vis the general norm. On the other hand. Thus. This is depicted in both section 5 and section 6. is the practice in Russia (cf. There are not many young democracies with communist origin in these regions (cf. as depicted in section 2.2 and Linz and Stepan).as shown in the Ukrainian case. a party of power is not necessary a problem. even in functional democracies. Kuchma does not need to weaken the Rada anymore (cf. The strength and 29 . Thus. Russia is plagued by a volatile party system. are not very cohesive. As D’Anieri puts it. section 5). the volatility Russia experiences are not necessary a democracy delimiting phenomenon. The key argument within the framework of the scope conditions in favour of the resource curse. section 2. with the creation of For a United Ukraine. Thus. Parties of power are considered to have a negative eﬀect on both the Russian and Ukrainian parliament. It depends on its cohesiveness. 8. is primarily based on the Middle East and Latin America. section 6. At the same time. and Ukraine’s cleavages do not necessary beneﬁt its regime. Thus.1. The Russian case evidences this as well.2). presidents can go outside the constitutional framework (cf. As brought forth by Haspel et al. as Pedersen (1979: 9) shows. The best argument in favour of cleavages is that some cleavages seem to be a better foundation for a party system than others. In the ﬁnal part of this discussion. However. Thus it might be diﬃcult to assess the impeding character of natural resources on newly created democracies. Neither the Russian nor Ukrainian party system seem to embody such cleavages. Russian parties are more cohesive than expected.
And precisely these natural resources as well as the energy dependency might have made United Russia capable of making a deal with the potential party of power.thus wealth certainly reduces any leverage any country might face. Thus. the party system showed stronger signs of volatility because of the economic cleavage than the Ukrainian. 8. if diﬀusion has any merit in this case. but also during the ﬁrst ten years of Ukrainian independence. Thus. Hence. The straight forward answer is that Russia scored negatively on all the explanans and in particular on the party system and party of power (cf. It is not known whether the West attempted to inﬂuence the Russian Duma. the question of resources bolster the diﬀusion explanation. However. The lack of successful leverage vis-` a-vis the Russians in Ukraine might be explained by a weak Russia. This made it diﬃcult to remain on a consoldiation path because of the imbalances created by these very scores. section 6. A party of power (or even a dominating party such as the CPRF) might pose a serious problem for anyone attempting to utilise leverage in a parliamentarian setting. as history has evidenced. It might have been very diﬃcult considering the domination of CPRF and later the proSoviet United Russia. it has the potential of causing more harm than good to the Russian case. The ethnic-Russian parties could probably have received some support for secession. dominated by ethnic 30 . United Russia is clearly a party of power that is not susceptible to utilised leverage. table 2. In Russia. had they wanted it. thus aligning them among proUkraine candidates. Because of its pro-Russian stance it might alienate the ethnic Ukrainian population.2). The Ukrainian party system depicts a situation where Russian attempts to utilise leverage has been futile not only during the Orange Revolution. it is important to remember that Party of Regions is not a party that encapsulates the entire population. but it is clear that the West succesfully exerted leverage over the Russian president. The resource wealth also helped Russia to build new organisations as well as ousting other organisations in order to protect the current Russian regime. the acquisition and renationalisation of Russian natural resources gave it a chance to insulate itself from state-to-state pressure. Party of Regions.2 Conclusion The research question proped the puzzle of why Russia slided into autocracy whereas Ukraine did remain somewhat stable in the same period. However. albeit it might have something to do with the renewed wealth from the natural resources as depicted above. the ethnic Russians and their parties did not move forward with secession (cf.
Especially the latter three explanans owe their postive score to the strong cleavages. Section 7 and 8. and thus the elite cannot use them as depicted in section 7. yet its importance is dwarfed by that of party system and party of power. The Ukrainian case reveals that Ukraine scored better on the explanans. strong cleavags. It seems evident that certain conditions qua the results of this paper must be fulﬁlled if succesful diﬀusion has to take place. a constitution not overly presidential. and thus. easy rents are not as accessible as if the state nationalised it. whereas Russian linkage is very clear in connection with Janukovich’s failed attempt to become Kuchma’s sucessor. The second condition is related to that of the strength of allies such as strong parties in the state in question. Such allies might enhance the chance of succesful diﬀusion. The process tracing revealed that with the creation of United Russia.cleavages. if the West was involved in the Orange Revolution. Hence. Diﬀusion plays a role. the oppositional character of the Russian Duma disappeared. yet depending on the commitment from the state exerting diﬀusion. The theoretical model addresses democratic development in the long run. It had no natural resources. As evidenced in section 6. the model is not seriously impeded by the introduction of diﬀussion. leverage is most clear during Yeltsin’s tenure. The Russian determined to continue to exert inﬂuence in Ukraine paid oﬀ as Janukovich later got elected.1 show that there are signs of diﬀusion. were able to maintain a more stable system securing consolidation. In Russia. While external factors are excluded in the theoretical model as depicted in ﬁgure 2. this eﬀect might be of minor importance. The ﬁrst condition is the ownership of the natural resources. This is why the Orange Revolution is unimportant. This is best depicted in the short term eﬀect of the Orange Revolution and the return of the old modus operandi. Thus. yet they are not determining the outcome of neither Russia nor Ukraine. and no party of power. their eﬀect was minor. 31 . Hence short term attempt leaves long term eﬀects with the explanans. If they are privatised. the real transformative eﬀect of diﬀusion depends on the endurance of the state.1 the idea that natural resources impede democracy was somewhat conﬁrmed.
†) Total number of parties / Participated in the prior election. ‡) Involves both SMD and PR seats. Source: Rose (2011) 32 .A Appendix I: Duma elections in 1993 and 1995 1993 1995 Seats 70 54 48 23 33 23 19 15 4 2 1 1 Party (17/7)† Communist Party Liberal Democratic Party Our home is Russia Yabloko Agrarian Party of Russia Power to the People Russia’s Choice Congress Russian Communities Ivan Rybkin Bloc Women of Russia Forward Russia! Pamﬁlova–Gurov–Lysenko Bloc Union of Labour Communists of the USSR Workers’ Self-Government Stanislav Govorukhin Bloc Russian Unity and Concord Seats† 157 51 55 45 20 9 9 5 3 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 77 Party (12) Russia’s Choice Liberal Democratic Party Communist Party Women of Russia Agrarian Party of Russia Yabloko Russian Unity and Concord Democratic Party of Russia Movement for Democratic Reforms Dignity and Charity Civic Union Future of Russia Independents 146 Independents Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election.
†) Total number of parties / Participated in the prior election. ‡) Involves both SMD and PR seats.B Appendix II: Duma elections in 1999 and 2003 1999 2003 Seats 113 73 68 29 17 20 7 2 2 1 1 1 114 Party (12/4)† United Russia Communist Party Motherland Liberal Democratic Party People’s Party Yabloko Agrarian Party of Russia PVR-RPZh: Rebirth–Party of Life Union of Right Forces New Course: Automobile Russia Development of Enterprise Great Russia-Eurasian Union Independents Seats‡ 222 52 37 36 17 4 2 3 3 1 1 1 68 Party (12/4) Commmunists Party Unity Fatherland–All Russia Union of Right Forces Liberal Democratic Party Yabloko Our Home Is Russia Movement in Support of the Army Russian People’s Union Party of Pensioners Russian Socialist Party Spiritual Heritage Independents Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election. Source: Rose (2011) 33 .
‡) Involves both SMD and PR seats.C Appendix III: Duma elections in 2007 2007 Party (4/2)† United Russia Communist Party Liberal Democrats Fair Russia Independents Seats‡ 315 57 40 38 - Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election. †) Total number of parties / Participated in the prior election. Source: Rose (2011) 34 .
D Appendix IV: Rada elections in 1994 and 1998 1994± 1998∓ Seats 86 25 18 15 14 11 7 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 Party (19/3)† Communists Rukh Socialist / Village Popular democrats Hromada Greens Social Democrats (United) Progressive Socialists Agrarians National Front Reforms and Order Party of Regional Revival Forward Ukraine! Christian Democratic Party NEP Social liberal union Working Ukraine Razom Menshe sliv Seats‡ 122 46 34 29 23 19 17 16 8 5 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 116 Party (17) Communists Rukh Peasant Party Interregional bloc for reforms Socialist party Republican Party Congress of Ukrainian nationalists Communist party of Crimea Party of Democratic Renewal Labour Party Democratic Party Ukranian National Assembly Social Democratic Party Civic Congress Conservative Republican Party Christian Democratic Party Soyuz Independents 136 Independents Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election. ‡) Involves both SMD and PR seats. †) Total number of parties / Participated in the prior election. Source: ±) Bojcun (1995: 239) ∓) Birch and Wilson (1999: 1040) 35 .
*) Re-run of parliamentarian election of 2006. party of Ukraine (United) Socialist Party of Ukraine Timoshenko bloc Democratic Party of Ukraine Unity Party of National Economic Revival Ukrainian Marine Party Independents Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election.People’s Self-defense Communist Party Lytvyn bloc Seats‡ 175 156 72 27 20 Party (10/2) Our Ukraine For a United Ukraine Communist party Soc. †) Total number of parties / Participated in the prior election.E Appendix V: Rada elections in 2002 and 2007 2002± 2007∓* Seats 110 101 66 24 22 22 4 3 1 1 93 Party (5/2)† Party of Regions Timoshenko bloc Our Ukraine . ‡) Involves both SMD and PR seats. dem. Source: ±)Herron and Johnson (2003: 19) ∓) Copsey (2008: 300) 36 .
G Bingham Powell. Babayeva. 1994. and Institutional Design.” Current Digest of the Russian Press.co. E. The (formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press) 50(12):3–4. Thomas. Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power. AP. M. Ashgate. Jr. Ambrosio. 1995. A World View. “The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections of 2007. Politics. 2008. Cheibub. “Yeltsin wants vote on Lenin’s body. “Putin Moves to Centralize Authority. Svetlana and Dmitry Dokuchayev. Jos´ e Antonia. BBC. 2010. “Sergei Kiriyenko is appointed acting no.” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 24(2):297–309.” The Eugene Register-Guard INTERNATIONAL Saturday:13A. 2006. 2 man in the country. Pearson. URL: http://www. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Authoritarian Backlash: Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union. Inc. Peter.bbc. “Democracy and dictatorship revisited. 37 .” Public Choice 143(1):57–101. 2005.References Aardal. Comparative Politics Today. Gabriel A. Sarah and Andrew Wilson. Marko. “Voting Stability. Bojcun. “Hva er en politisk skillelinje?” Tidsskrift for Samfunnsforskning 35(2):218–249.” Washington Post September 14:A01. “Ukraine court boosts powers of President Yanukovych. 2011. 2008. Baker. D’Anieri. Political Gridlock: Ukraine’s 1998 Parliamentary Elections. Copsey. “The Ukrainian parliamentary elections in March[U+2010]April 1994. Plan Would Restrict Elections in Russia. Russell J Dalton and Kaare Strøm.” Europe-Asia Studies 47(2):229–249. Sharpe. 1998. MIT Press. of November. 2010. 2009.uk/news/world-europe-11451447 Bennett. Birch. Jennifer Gandhi and James Raymond Vreeland.” Europe-Asia Studies 51(6):1039– 1068. Almond. Nathaniel. Bent.”. 1997. Paul J. 1999. 2004. Fetched 11th. Andrew and Alexander L George.
” IMF Working Paper. “Ethnic Tensions and State Strategies: Understanding the Survival of the Ukranian State. In Assessing the Quality of Democracy. 2007. “A New Turn to Authoritarian Rule in Russia?” Democratization 13(1):58–77. Herron. “’Oligarchs’. Duenwald. Erik S. Rod and Martin Harrop. 2003.Russian State Buys a Controlling Interest in the Gas Monopoly. Palgrave. 180. Desai. 2005. Comparative Government and Politics. Padma. 1998. “Russian Retrospectives on Reforms from Yeltsin to Putin. The (formerly The Current Digest of the PostSoviet Press) 57(23):5. Smith. Diamond. Hague. and Ukraine. Paul J. Christoph.” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 23(1):4–29. Freedom-House. Easter. 2007. Denisov. 2005. UCL SSEES.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(1):87–106. “The Case for a Gas Transit Consortium in Ukraine: A Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis. An in.” Current Digest of the Russian Press. “Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data.” Economics Working Paper No. 2009. “Too Much of A Good Thing? Credit Booms in Transition Economies: The Cases of Bulgaria. Introduction. Gnedina. 83. ix–xxxi. 1997. . Romania. Johnson. 2005. 2006. Duncan. “Electoral Institutions and Party Cohesion in the Russian Duma. 2007. Nikolay Gueorguiev and Andrea Schaechter. Andrei and Aleksei Grivach. and Paul E. businessa and Russian foreign policy: From El’tsin to Putin.” CEPS Policy Brief No. Moshe. Gill. “Preferences for Presidentialism: Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS. 2011. Thomas F. “It doesn’t matter who votes.D’Anieri. Remington and Steven S. Elena and Michael Emerson. Larry Jay and Leonardo Morlino.” The Journal of Politics 60(2):417–439. 2005.” World Politics 49(2):184–211. The Johns Hopkins University Press pp. “GAZPROM NATIONALIZED. Graeme.” Published on theie website. Peter J S. Haspel. but who counts the votes”: Assessing the fraud in Ukraine’s 2002 parliamentary 38 . Gerald M.
Jorgen and Svend-Erik Skaaning. Thad and Austin Ranney. An introduction. Moller.” International Political Science Review 31(3):261–283. Todd. Grzegorz Ekiert and Stephen E Hanson. 2 ed. “The Three Worlds of Postcommunism: Revisiting Deep and Proximate Explanations. . 2003. Steven and Lucan Way. 2003. The Johns Hopkins University Press.” paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Conference. Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule. Jr. Herbert.” Comparative Politics 38(1):1–20. In Comparative politics today. and Post-Communist Europe. “The 2002 parliamentary elections in Ukraine: Democratization or authoritarianism?” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 19(2):24–54. Ra´ ul. 49–86. Kitschelt. 39 . 2003. A world view. Taras. Linz. Russell J Dalton and Kaare Strøm. “Democracy and Democratization. Chicago Illinois. Gabriel A Almond.” Journal of Democracy 16(3):379–400. Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics. “Beyound the Radial Delusion: Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy and Non-democracy. Levitsky. Routledge. . “Ethnic Cleavages and Electoral Volatility in Latn America. 1996. Linz. 1990. 2005. 2010. What Counts as a Good Cause? In Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. 713–754.. South America. Juan J. Scott and Matthew Shugart.” Democratization 16(2):298 –322. “uan Linz. Landman. ed. and Alfred Stepan. Mainwaring. 1997. April. 2006.” Journal of Democracy 1(1):51–69. 2005. 2008. Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe. Kousser.” Comparative Politics 29(4):449–471. “International Linkage and Democratization.” Aarhus University. 2009. “The Perils of Presidentialism. G Bingham Powell. Presidentialism. Juan J. and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal. Cambridge University Press pp.elections’. Jorgen and Svend-Erik Skaaning. Politics in the United States. Moller. Madrid. Kuzio. Jorgen and Svend-Erik Skaaning. Pear pp. Accounting for Postcommunist Regime Diversity. Moller. ed. forthcomming.
Tolstrup. Jakob. URL: http://www. Michael L..” Russiavotes.php Ross. Russell J Dalton and Kaare Strøm. 2008. Richard. ed. Ulrik K. 1998. ed. 359–405. URL: http://www. Preuss.” Aarhus University.” Journal of Democracy 15(4):32–46. Richard. “Results of Previous Elections to the Russian State Duma. “Constitutional Powermaking for the new Polity: Some deliberations on the relations between constitutent power and the constitution. Remington. “A Behavioral Theory of COmpetitive Political Parties. Thomas F. 2004. “Voting behaviour: 1999. Linkages. “Does Oil hinder Democracy. Guillermo. University of Aberdeen. 127–201. In Comparative Politics Today. Richard. 2011.org/duma/duma elections 93-03. Russian Parliament: Institutional Evolution in a Transitional Regime.org. Gabriel A Almond. Democracy 9(2):91–107.russiavotes. Jr. 1990. Rose. 2008. Pearson pp. Centre for the Study of Public Policy. G Bingham Powell.Nichols. Remington. Rose. O’Donnell. 2001. University of Aberdeen. Politics in Britain. Russian Presidency: Society and Politics in the Second Russian Republic.” European Journal of Political Research 7:1–26. 1979.php Rose. Gabriel A Almond.org. “When can External Actors Inﬂuence Demcoratization? Leverage. 2001. undated. Jr. Andreas.org/duma/duma vote 1999 listparty. Strom. Politics in Russia. In Comparative politics today. 1992-93. Pedersen. 2001. Pearson pp. A World View. 2007. Yale University Press. “The dynamics of European party systems: Changing patterns of electoral volatility. Schedler.” American Journal of Political Science 34(2):565–598. Centre for the Study of Public Policy. Russell J Dalton and Kaa.russiavotes. Thomas M. Mogen N. Palgrave MacMillan. “Why the rules of law matters.” Russiavotes. Thomas F. Kaare. “What is Democratic Consolidation. G Bingham Powell.” Cardozo Law Review 14:639–660.” Journal of 40 .” World Politics 53(3):325– 361. and Gatekeeper Elites.
Lucan A. 41 . George.Tsebelis.” Annual Review of Political Science 5:181–200. Whiteﬁeld. 2005. 2002. “Political cleavages and post-communist politics. 2002. Way. Stephen.” Journal of Democracy 16(2):131–145. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. “Kuchma’s failed authoritarianism. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
We've moved you to where you read on your other device.
Get the full title to continue reading from where you left off, or restart the preview.