Autocracy and democracy in post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine
Kim Andersen January 8, 2012
1 Introduction 2 Theoretical introduction 2.1 2.2 2.3 Democracy and autocracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Consolidation of democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Checks and balances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 9 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 23 23 25
3 Introducing the explanans 3.1 3.2 3.3 Natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Party system and party of power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 Methodological approach 4.1 4.2 Most similar systems design and process tracing . . . . . . . . . . Operationalisation and causal links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.3 4.2.4 4.3 Natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Party system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Party of power (PoP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Author of the constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Theoretical model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5 Comparison of Russia and Ukraine 6 Case study 6.1 6.2 Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7 Considering an alternative explanation 8 Discussion and conclusion 8.1 8.2 Diﬀusion versus the rest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
27 28 29 30 32 33 34 35 36
A Appendix I: Duma elections in 1993 and 1995 B Appendix II: Duma elections in 1999 and 2003 C Appendix III: Duma elections in 2007 D Appendix IV: Rada elections in 1994 and 1998 E Appendix V: Rada elections in 2002 and 2007
Both Russia and Ukraine became independent of the Soviet Union in 1991, and as “young” countries, their democratic history have been turbulent. Executive and legaslative arm-wrestling over power-sharing has been the norm rather than the exception. Despite these scuﬄes, Ukraine managed to embark on a consolidation course, whereas Russia slided into autocracy as depicted in ﬁgure 1. Thus, the research question sounds, Why did Russia slide into autocracy, whereas Ukraine remained somewhat stable in the same period. Figure 1: Democratic development in Russia and Ukraine according to Freedom House
Notes: Scores are an addition of political rights and civil liberties, and as such, most only be seen as a rough estimate. Source: Freedom-House (2011)
The understanding of the research question entails three pivotal components of democracy. First of all, a clear deﬁnition of democracy is needed. Secondly, yet equally important, the utilisation of Linz and Stepan as well as Schedler’s theoretical conceptualisation of consolidation is needed. Thirdly, to consolidate 3
democracy, a functional political system is needed, and this depends on the checks and balances especially between the presidency and parliament. Hence, this paper deals with the question of democratic consolidation and encroachment through a battery of structural and actor explanans derived from these theoretical understandings. Thus, it is the structure-actor dichotomy that acts as the central structure of the paper. The demise and collapse of democracy has often been related to a presence of natural resources such as oil and minerals (Ross, 2001: 356f). Yet these modernisation theorists, who forward these theoretical understandings, have only developed a conceptual understanding of the eﬀects of natural resources on the state apparatus and its relationship with its population. They have not delved upon how natural resources enters the system. Often it has been assumed that states autocratise and then use the resources to bolster the regime. This paper attempts to develop an understanding of how natural resources enter the political system. The argument is developed in section 3.1. For now it must suﬃce to say that the interplay between natural resources, party system, constitution, and party of power determine the eﬀectiveness of the checks and balances. This is answered by utilising a “Most Similar Systems Design” bolstered by “Process tracing”. Finally, the scope conditions of this paper needs to be stated. First of all, the focus is new democracies. Functioning democracies such as Norway, have access to natural resources, yet because of the consolidated nature of these democracies, they do not get impeded. Thus, the countries of interest are those that can be considered newly constituted democracies embarking on a consolidation course. Finally, these countries must have realised their natural resources and privatised these former state assets. Hence, this paper is limited to post-communist countries and in particular the former Soviet Union. The next section deals with the theoretical introduction, whereas the third section elaborates on the explanans. The fourth and the ﬁfth section depict the theoretical model and the methodological approach, whereas section six and seven compares and elaborates on the comparison through process tracing. The eighth section delves brieﬂy upon the question of diﬀusion as an alternative explanation. The last section discuss and concludes.
This section sets out to develop an understanding of democracy and autocracy. Hereafter it continues with the question of consolidation and ﬁnally addresses
who deﬁne three types of autocracy by stressing three types of leadership. According to Schumpeter.
.checks and balances as are needed for the functioning of democracy. and the other involving autocracy deﬁned as a polity without elections and a guiding ideology. yet have signiﬁcant democratic as well as autocratic traits. The second deﬁnition is that of autocracy. section 2. 2010: 271). The Ogden-Richards triangle shows the relationship between the intension of the deﬁnition and the number of cases or extensions. The right deﬁnition of democracy depends on the cases.
proposition is supported by the lack of rule of law. using a deﬁnition with many intensions such as liberal democracy. One deﬁning democracy as involving competitive elections and a balanced polity. forthcomming). Deﬁnitions are as numerous as there are regimes claiming the name of democracy. Thus. this paper involves two distinct deﬁnitions. Thus. The government is leaded by a small group. he leaves the electorate with the task of electing the deliberating leadership (Moller and Skaaning. two deﬁnitions suitable of these cases are needed. the number of cases is reduced to western democracies.
2. The leadership-type that is relevant in this paper is the one where there are no hereditary succession nor usage of titles as well as no military involvment. which is exercising power within illdeﬁned formal limits but with predictable norms. There is no guiding ideology.1
Democracy and autocracy
Democracy is a contested concept. This position is echoed by Moller and Skaaning. democracy is an arena where deliberation takes place. (2010: 87). who argue that minimalist democracy includes competitive elections (Moller and Skaaning. It is important to stress the competitive element of elections. and hence the system is arbitrary1 . The polity is biased in favour of the leadership.). The ﬁrst deﬁnition that needs to be elucidated is that of democracy understood as minimalist democracy. This type of autocracy is deﬁned as civilian (ibid. The understanding of the leadership is further developed by Cheibub et al. This paper deals with cases that are far from being liberal democracies. to capture these countries. To sum up. It is also important to note that there are no checks and balances. who subscribes to a minimalist deﬁnition. Linz and Stepan (1996: 38f) deﬁne autocracy as a political system with limited pluralism. because an imbalanced polity would be able to make encroachments on the meaningfulness of competitive elections (cf. yet he denounces this as a possibility.3). Such elections stress the importance of a balanced polity. Hence. and thus mobilisation is not prevalent.
Their behavioural dimension entails that no actor.] democracy has become ’the only game in town’. The regime has not been able to create the mass legitimacy. uncertainty. attitudinal. a consolidated democracy is the ”[. Thus. it is important to dwell on the negative side of the consolidation process. political etc. The conﬁdence in the regime. That is. and thus failed to shape pro-democratic attitudes in the population. 1998: 94ﬀ). Put bluntly.. and reversibility.” (Schedler. and constitutional changes. Schedler argues that if a regime is facing a breakdown. is absent (Schedler. it is not only the elimination of disloyal players that lacks. young consolidating democracies faces.] political situation in which [. 1998: 97). as Linz and Stepan (1996: 5) write.
2. however.). Such gradual weakening is exempliﬁed by attacks on institutions of democracy such as elections or attempts to subvert the rule of law. is a regime that has not been able to eliminate disloyal players. The gradual democratic erosion is a problem. Schedler (1998: 96) argues that a regime facing such threats. many new democratic regimes faces. erosion requires ”[. can spend resources on developing alternatives to the democratic regime or attempt to secede..2
Consolidation of democracy
Linz and Stepan (1996: 6) argue that consolidation of democracy requires behavioural. The attitudinal dimension focuses primarily on the ordinary people. vulnerability.” Because the focus of this paper is the attempt to consolidate democracy.. which develops an understanding of the direction of regime. 1998: 6
. whether social. procedures.The next section deals with consolidation. The ﬁrst is the democratic breakdown. whereas the second is the democratic erosion..] the intermittent or gradual weakening of democracy by those elected to lead it. the necessary behavioural changes among the (potential) ruling elites have not been thorough enough. the attempts to weaken democracy. seen as essential to even minimalist democracies in order to maintain meaningful democratic elections. Democratic breakdown necessitates instability.. It might also be the creation of hegemonic parties in order to strangle electoral competition as well as the abuse of state resources by the incumbents in order to maintain power (Schedler. who have to accept democracy institutionally and procedurally as the most appropriate way to govern the state.. which is needed for it to avoid breakdown. It is followed by one about checks and balances. Schedler (1998: 93) argues that there are principally two dangers. and institutions (ibid. the constitutional dimension requires that actors within the state solve issues through laws. Using Linz and Stepan’s arguments. Finally.
and the acceptance of the law as the ultimate arbiter of solutions to problems. the question of Diamond and Morlino’s (2005: xxi) horizontal accountability. the two chambers of Congress can impeach. To sum up.97ﬀ). 1990: 52f). democratic consolidation is changes in elite behaviour. They are also able to deny the president legislation as well as taxes (Kousser and Ranney.2. but to fully grasp their relationship. However. as they too have popular backing.
2. democratic erosion is very much a question of behaviour. convict. Diamond and Morlino argue that horizontal accountability is related to the ability of one institution to keep a check on another institution. The perhaps most prominent example is the American system. Breakdown and erosion entail a negative development of Linz and Stepan’s three dimensions. The president. must be scrutinised. To sum up. and at best vertical. Each branch has certain rights that can keep other branches in check. This is what Linz deﬁnes as the problem of dual legitimacy. Thus. Mainwaring and Shugart (1997: 469) are not as pessimistic as Linz. 1990: 60). the state of the checks and balances is important if democracy 7
. because of the possibility of solving these issues through a careful institutional design. implying that the president is not accountable to any institutions and only to the people (Hague and Harrop. the parliament are not necessary ready to give in. 2007: 277). this paper has considered democracy and consolidation. If the presidency is only subject to the people. the concept of gradual weakening. 2008: 721). accountability rarely works horizontal. as depicted in section 2. might make the president more prone to get head-to-head with the parliament rather than settling the disputes (Linz. which has an elaborate seperation of powers between the Congress and the presidency among other. Following Schedler’s ”gradual weakening”-logic as depicted above. the concept of checks and balances must be probed.). Whereas the erosion of rule of law is an attack on the constitutional solution of problems as indicated by Linz and Stepan. and remove a president as an example. The popular mandate given to the president through the direct election. is able to veto Congress legislation (ibid. popular attitudes. Solutions to democracyrelated issues depends on the personality and style of the president (Linz. In illiberal systems. on the other hand.3
Checks and balances
Until now. it is in a favourable position to weaken other institutions such as the parliament. Schedler brought forth. These concerns follow Linz’ critique of the presidency.
party system. the solution lies in the institutional design. shallow and actor-based are used for the same type of explanan. whereas a party of power as an actor explanation. Table 1: Overview of explanans Name Natural resources Party system Constitution Party of power Structure X X X X Actor
Before delving on the explanans. the institutional design needs to balance the presidency and the parliament as well as create the necessary mechanisms that can provide solutions. Such complementary explanans diverge from situations where the deep course brings about the proximate explanan
the paper deep and structural are used intertwined for the same type of
explanan like proximate. presidential biased polities have greater maneuverability when it comes to encroaching the parliamentarian powers. and constitution as structural explanations. and thus. yet he stresses that their role is to complement the deep explanan. and thus have more maneuverability in manipulating the democratic institutions. According to Kitschelt (2003: 74).3. This lends credence to two hypotheses: H1: Imbalanced polities turn autocratic because the presidency is capable of encroaching parliamentarian power. deep or structural explanations trump its proximate or actor-based counterparts. as is evidenced in section 3.
. As Mainwaring and Shugart correctly points out. The explanan overview is depicted in table 1. the constitution must be seen as a shallow explanan dominated by actors because of Preuss’ arguments regarding the role of constitutions in newly established regimes. the main structure of this paper is the structure-actor2 dichotomy. It is tempting to deﬁne natural resources.has to have a chance to consolidate. Kitschelt’s understanding of structure and actor based explanans needs elucidation. He does not deny the usefulness of the actor explanan. and its eﬀect on checks and balances. Hence. However. HA: A balanced polity can consolidate.
Introducing the explanans
As brieﬂy mentioned in the Introduction.
The latter scenario is not relevant in this paper. in both cases. Thus. to dampen demands for democracy by reducing group activities or making pro-state groups that dominate the polity. as the deep explananw work through other explanans as depicted in ﬁgure 2 on page 17. Whereas taxes involve the population (Moller and Skaaning.1
Ross (2001: 356f) argues that the role of natural resources vis-` a-vis democracy is that of the impeder. before Ross’ two eﬀects set in. natural resources alienate the population from the political process. Secondly.
3. must be elucidated. the existence of a party of power. forthcomming). Firstly. While natural resources have been considered a very deep and structural explanan. to sum up. thus leaving the political system biased and unbalanced and not in a position to consolidate qua the behaviour of the elite. when the beneﬁciary can and does use the natural resources to his own gain. 2001: 336).
3. The repression eﬀect is the creation of a large state apparatus to repress demands for democracy often violently (Ross.and the outcome. The party system is a structural explanan because it rests
Party system and party of power
This section is built around the party system and the party of power. This is what Ross (2001: 335) deﬁnes as the rentier eﬀect. he does not delve upon how the natural resources enter the polity in newly established and ﬂedging democracies. but where the outcome is not connected to the proximate explanan. Hence. The negative eﬀect sets in. in this paper it is dependent on the measurement of party system and party of power. and these entry points are dependent on other explanans and most importantly. the beneﬁciary needs to gain access to the owner or (re)take the ownership. Thus. as well as one relating the two. natural resources have two points of entry. the beneﬁciary or the incumbent gains an unfair advantage over other parties. whereas Ross ﬁnds support for two diﬀerent eﬀects that emanates from natural resources (the rentier and represion eﬀect). That is. However. depending on the ownership. to nationalise the natural resources the beneﬁciary needs control over the parliament in order to justify the action. assuming that the natural resources are owned by private people. Two qualiﬁcations are needed in order to fully grasp how natural resources enter. the question of how the incumbent gets access to these resources.
volatility is dominated by substantial and structural factors. few and less fragmented counterparts (ibid. Hence. Thus. The stability of cleavags are thus essential to the stability of the party system. a very stable party system is one dominated by few. it is expected that the voter moves when the economy moves. The subtantial factors are related to the type of cleavage. but also on the absolute number. the most volatile parties are those dependent on economic cleavages. and its periphery. 2005: 3). To sumarise. According to Aardal (1994: 220). Fluctuations in the economy are likely to be translated into changes in voter preferences. The second argument is related to that of a party of power. whereas the structural are related to the diﬀerent parties and their relationship. old. They ﬁnd that parties dependent on ethnolinguistic. Whereas it is easier to change one’s economic position. the question of the strength of the stability or the level of volatility is of greatest importance. religious. The volatility of parties are. many.. Pedersen (1979: 3) quotes Ascher and Tarrow. Examples of more stable cleavages. personalistic in the sense that they are built around a small number of actors and thus void of any ideology.] net change within the electoral party system resulting from individual vote transfers. the urban-rural conﬂict. This echoes the traits
delves into the demands of what constitutes a real cleavage. 2002: 181) and hence the parliament. fragmentation as well as their age. and not very fragmented parties ﬂuctuating around such cleavages as class or ethnicity. According to Madrid (2005: 2). not only dependent on the type of parties. however. it is
assumed that those cleavages structuring the Russian and Ukrainian party system fulﬁll these demands. according to Almond et al. and fragmented parties are more volatile than their old. cleavages originate in diﬀerent conﬂicts such as the dichotomy between the centre of a country. Thus.. which is. The essential question is to investigate what leads to these movements of votes.
. These cleavages structure the outlook of parties (Whiteﬁeld. In this paper. young. The explanation why this is so might be straight forward and follows the concept of deep and proximate explanans. If choice of party is dependent on economy rather than ethnolinguistics. and territorial. (2008: 82).).”. to change one’s ethnolinguistic position is impossible. Madrid also argues that polarised party systems are less volatile. or the classic worker-capitalist conﬂict3 .on the cleavages created in society. who deﬁne volatility as the ”[. can be found in Lipset and Rokkan’s analysis of the party system dominating western Europe. as well as class-based cleavages are less subject to volatility (Madrid.
. 2008: 738f). They are not inclined to change party.. Yet. voting follows party-lines (Rose. it is possible to say that a party of power with damaging capabilities is one that ﬂuctuates around leading actors. Hence. However. Catch-all parties fares poorly in heavily structured party systems. 2007: 245).1. section 6. Depending on whether the party of power are cohesive and disciplined as in the British case or the opposite as in the American case. it might pose a serious challenge for the functioning of the parliament. a parliament is often in opposition to the presidency. it is not enough that it is built around an actor and is cohesive. Thus. to become damaging. to sum up. party discipline and cohesion are very high among members of the British House of Commons. with strong discipline and is cohesive. Hence.of the vote-seeking party often known as a catch-all party.. where there are deep rooted cleavages.] is signiﬁcantly stronger than all the others.“ (Hague and Harrop. and thus maximise control with the government.] party that outdistances all others [. As is depicted in section 2. The United Kingdom might prove to be a very diﬀerent case. Depending on the internal dynamics of the party. in the British House of Commons. it must also be dominating. Sartori argues that a ”[. the president cannot expect the party to shoulder all policies. Before embarking on an elucidation of the structure of such parties and their damaging eﬀect. it is only possible if the party system is volatile and thus susceptible to catch-all parties. This is because both parties in the United States are not very cohesive and at times have a weak discipline (Kousser and Ranney. because of the alignments of the electorate. Rose writes that parliaments are able to hold the government accountable for abuses of power. 2008: 171). the damaging eﬀect on the parliament as a check and balancing institution can be either small or large.. They argue that such parties are typical in new democracies such as Russia (cf. it is important to relate such parties to that of the party system. and especially in order for it to act as a check on the presidency. in 90 percent of all cases. According to Strom (1990: 566) it is a party that seeks to maximise electoral support. The American political system is an example of a system with a presidential party that acts as a check on even its own president. Hence. However. a successful version of this type of party is not expected in countries.3. and ﬁnally dominates to such an extent that it is possible for the party to prevent the parliament from acting as a balancing institution..
occasions.] made by the peculiar circumstances.] creates the political and institutional preconditions for the emergence of totally new social and political actors. and social habitudes of the people.). Hence. The proximate component of the constitutional explanan is vested in Burke’s argument that constitutions are ”[.3
A constitution is a very unique explanan in the sense that it fuses the deep and proximate or actor-based explanans. Thus. tempers. If the constitution
O’Donnell does not say it explicitly. As an example. 1992-93: 642). which disclose themselves only in a long space of time. which in one way or the other inspires the founding fathers of the new polity (ibid. Preuss’ (1992-93: 641) argues that the constitution ”[. dispostions.
.. civil liberties. it assumed that the type of rule of law he
deals with.. it is actors that deﬁne the constitution.3. Hence. 1992-93: 653).” (my emphasis) (Preuss. One prominent constraint mentioned by Preuss is that of the former regime. who stresses that ”No type of delegated power can in any way alter the conditions of its delegation. This is based on his emphasis of what rule of law ensures. Easter (1997: 187) argues that depending on the structure of the former elites. It is deep in the sense that it deﬁnes the political framework of any country. accountability. diﬀerent types of regimes occur. and moral.. 1992-93: 639). Constitutional superiority is echoed by Sieyes. It ensures political rights. Two issues are worth mentioning in relation with section 2. this section must elucidate both the structural components of the constitution as well as the actor-based components.. while it is plausible to argue that there are structural factors that shape these moods and habitudes. the constitution deﬁnes the country’s political set up. O’Donnell’s emphasis on the importance of the rule of law for liberal democracies echo these positions. which entails authors and interests. civil. newly created countries can to a certain extent shape their constitution as they see ﬁt.2. and a limitation on the prerogatives of the state (O’Donnell.. One pivotal goal of such a constitutionally deﬁned setup. is that of constitutional rule of law. 2004: 32)4 .. 1992-93: 640). is to place the elected representation over all other branches of government (Preuss. He argues that it is the essential pillar upon which any high-quality democracy rests. thus making it the highest source of authority in any society only subject to the constitution itself. and as mentioned above.” (Preuss. It is proximate precisely because it is the written foundation of a country. Feher argues that ”[.] a constitution based on will can only endure as long as those persons whose wills backed the document.” (my emphasis).” (Preuss.
cannot garner mass support.
4. and that the far majority of these are held constant. Landman (2006: 29) argues that MSSD seeks to compare cases that are alike on most explanans. it might not last. the methodological approach is deterministic. As is evidenced below. which in this paper is assumed to be the presidency and the parliament. If neither can agree on it. conﬂict arises. or what is known as a most similar systems design (MSSD) followed by process tracing that probes the ﬁndings of the MSSD. Tsebelis (2002: 27) argues that the unanimity core is dependent on the preferences of the actors in question. 2006: 30). section 2. To maximise the diﬀerence in the outcome. democracy needs a constitution accepted by the key institutions of the regime.2). a process tracing method as described by Bennett (2005: 206) is utilised. Or put inversely. 13
. in order to consolidate. in order for a democratic regime to maximise legitimacy. and thus the question of outliers become important. Is it the parliament or is it the presidency. it needs to deliver a constitution that can be broadly accepted especially by all institutional actors. it is very diﬃcult to know whether the neighbouring case ﬁts the same relationship. To address this caveat. It is an attempt to identify intervening causal processes. To sum up. Hence. this is not the case of this study. This lends crendence to the importance of the author that wrote the constitution. the case is selected on the explanandum (Landman. Assuming that the presidency submits a draft that lies outside the indiﬀerence lines of the parliament. a constitutional battle might either weaken or even force a democracy to break down (cf. any constitution favouring the presidency might damage the democratic development. yet varies on key explanans as well as the outcome. deterministic assumes that explanan X leads to outcome Y. will they attempt to overthrow the document. As mentioned above. SSDs demand that all relevant explanans are speciﬁed. Any constitutional document built on will. It is in such a situation. and thus might not survive its creator. the constitution entails a deﬁnition of the checks and balances as well as battles between those with interests in the setup. As opposed to probabilistic methodology that deems relationships probable.does not receive the support described by Linz and Stepan.1
Most similar systems design and process tracing
The methodological approach is deterministic. Hence. This addressed through the scope conditions depicted in section 1. Thus.
legacy. It is either present or absent. which is basically a detailed narrative couched in theoretical terms.2. Alternatively. Bennett identiﬁes several diﬀerent forms of process traincing. if the incumbent has a party of power strong enough to nationalise privatised state corporations.1. The model is deﬁned in section 4.2
Operationalisation and causal links
In the sections below. Regarding the series of constants depicted in table 2 on page 22 this paper subscribes to Møller and Skaaning’s (2009: 307) understanding of the economic level. table 2).This makes it an ideal companion for MSSDs especially like the one of this paper. As depicted in table 1. but because this paper does not have a single explanan. The one used in this paper is an analytical explanation.3 and the
. 2. Therefore further elaboration on these explanans are not conducted. it must also deﬁne the causal relationship. whereas the latter two are understood as actor-based explanans. Natural resources give the incumbent a resource-advantage. The presence of natural resources can be used to control society through the rentier and repression eﬀect as described in section 3. The original purpose of an MSSD is to single out the key explanan and determine the deterministic relationship. it can be argued that natural resources bolster the negative eﬀects of disloyal elites (cf.2 the process tracing takes place. To fully understand these arguments. the natural resources are at his disposal without the need of private consent.3 depicted in ﬁgure 2. The causal chain argues that natural resources are either granted the incumbent through private sponsors or through parties of power with a negative eﬀect on the checks and balances. the process tracing must attempt not only to single out the most important explanan. 4. Thus. Hence. two qualiﬁcations are needed.
4.1 Natural resources
Natural resources are a binary and structural explanan. it is along the lines of the theory explained in section 2 and the operationalisation depicted in section 4. follows Ross’ (2001: 356f) ﬁndings regarding the negative eﬀect on democracy from both oil and minerals. the two ﬁrst are understood as structures. The idea that natural resources are granted the incumbent through private sponsors is based on the assumption that former state corporations have been privatised. each explanan is operationsalised. and the causal links are spelled out. and transition (cf. The understanding of what constitutes a natural resource as well as the eﬀect of such.
Thus. 4. the question of voting behaviour needs to be addressed. party support from election to election is measured. which lends credence to their deﬁnition as actor-based explanans. to measure a party of power. cleavages have a negative eﬀect on parties of power as a result of their catch-all nature as well as a postive eﬀect on checks and balances. yet equally important. Strong cleavages make it more diﬃcult for the author to neglect large parts of the population. a high degree of volatility. Instead of looking at percentage of votes each party gains. it is considered a structural explanan. This is built on the assumption that parties of power without any signiﬁcant inﬂuence. This method follow Ascher and Tarrow’s deﬁnition albeit in a simpliﬁed manner.2). they are not dependent on a speciﬁc cleavage (cf. make a party system volatile and thus not very structured. 4. the number of seats are evaluated. and thus it might be dangerous to neglect certain groups. Hence. and as such.2. This is so because the parliament is strongly organised. The causal chain related to the party of power indicates that the presence of such parties have a negative eﬀect on checks and balances and hence the 15
. This follows the lines of section 2.3 Party of power (PoP)
A party of power is unique in the sense that they are personalistic and built around a small number of actors. Albeit the method is crude compared to the approach deﬁned by Pedersen. The cleavage is the structuring part of a party system. This is built on the assumption that all are able and allowed to create representation.. To identify cleavages. The same positive eﬀect can be found in relation with the writing of the constitution. voter choices are cross referenced with the party’s supporter base and ﬂuctuations in support over time.2).behavioural dimension) or parties of power rather than being a negative eﬀect in itself. and entails an actor decision. it still gives a rough idea about whether a system is volatile. The causal chain indicates that on the one hand. section 3. to measure the presence of strong cleavages or alternatively. the party must as a minimum be the most signiﬁcant party in the parliament. cannot tilt the checks and balances. the party of power needs to have clear connections to the presidency.2. and void cleavages.1 and the importance of meaningful elections.2 Party system
The party system is based on the concept of cleavages (cf. To estimate volatility. Secondly. Autocracies might try to prevent certain groups in participating in any form of electoral process. Thus. section 3.
section 3. The question of the party system enters independent of natural resouces.2 each explanan plays a signﬁcant role through various chains in aﬀecting the checks and balances. assuming that a parliament is already settled. Strong parties of power are also in a better position to re-write the constitution and thus tamper with the institutions of democracy as well as claim power over state assets.4 Author of the constitution
Feher’s argument regarding the survival of will-based constitutions is pitvotal for the operationalisation of this explanan (cf.
. Will-based constitutions are assumed to lie outside Tsebelis unanimity core. The causal chain indicates that the strength of the cleavages (or volatility) and party of power work through the framework of the constitution. The strength of the party of power is dependent on the degree of volatility and its ability to gain the majority of the votes. As depicted in ﬁgure 2 on page 17 the negative eﬀect of natural resources enters the polity either through private sponsors or parties of power. This measurement is based on the assumption that a constitution deﬁned by the presidency is pro-presidential and thus imbalancing. Hence.3).
4.2.parliament because of its ability to prevent the parliament from functioning. One such feature might be the balancing between the parliament and the presidency. It is a problem if issues with the presidency must be attenuated (cf. It aﬀects the strength of the party of power as well as the checks and balances. whether the author (thus actor-based explanan) has taken other than narrow interests into consideration. the party of power slant the checks and balances in favour of the president. there is an extra-constitutional parliamentarian framework. It is in scenarios of this kind that the party of power has a negative eﬀect on the parliament and thus the checks and balance.
argument is built around Mainwaring and Shugart’s understanding that carefully
designed systems can attenuate problems with presidentialism. the parliament and the presidency are both aﬀected and aﬀect the constitution. and thus making the constitution a question of will. In both scenarios. 4.3
As indicated in section 4. which aﬀects the development of the constitution through its cleavages. 2. Thus. Thus.3)5 . the central aim of this explanan is to measure the conﬂict surrounding the constitution. However. the essential question to ask is.
section 7). Putin changed the privatisation trend.. it is important to understand who has authored the document and the author’s position. referred to as a ”[. but during the transition-phase.] group of seven or so bankers who applied their vast wealth and inﬂuence to ensure the re-election of Boris El’tsin as President in 1996. 2007: 8). and during his brief struggle with then-prime minister Jevgenij Primakov. it is highly dependent on the power arrangement. en masse (Remington. One eﬀect of this is elaborated in connection with parties of power. This created a very strong group of oligarchs. the negative eﬀects of 17
. they supported him ardently. yet for now it must suﬃce to say that it strengthen it.Despite the traditional understanding of constitutions as a relatively deep and structural variable. Ambrosio (2009: 51) notes that the Russian elite created a series of state controlled NGOs to insulate Russia from external interference (cf. Figure 2: Theoretical model
Comparison of Russia and Ukraine
Russia has an abundance of natural resources. Yet because it is the ultimate deﬁner of checks and balances. During most of Yeltsin’s time as president. and started a re-nationalisation of key industries. 2008: 394). they helped removed the popular prime minister (Duncan.. that mined for natural resources.“ (Duncan. This make it subject to the cleavage / volatility situation as well as parties of power. in new countries. 2007: 2). Thus. Russia privatised state-owned enterprises.
natural resources are found in connection with elections and the rentier eﬀect. the Ukraine gas transit system transport around 120 billion cubic metres or 80 percent of Russia’s gas to Europe (Gnedina and Emerson. only seven of those parties contested in the 1995 election (cf. This voter allignment is echoed in the 2003 election. 2009: 2).2). Naftohaz is constantly on the bringe of bankruptcy and is indepted to the Russian energy-giant Gazprom (ibid. However. that beneﬁtted from the economic downturn. Of the 1999 parties. it is possible to argue that despite the presence of an indeed strong economic cleavage. mismanagement has prevented the Ukrainian state access to ”easy” money. CPRF wins 103 seats in the same period. 2007). is to observe the total number of parties. appendix C). The majority of the people are ethnic Ukrainian. In 1993 12 parties contested. The growth in the supporters of United Russia is assumed to be explained by the growth in GDP7 (Rose. which is negative until 1998. Ukraine is very diﬀerent from Russia in the sense that Ukraine is dominated by two large ethnic groups. 2007). The economic cleavage can be seen as a direct consequence of the privatisation or chock-theory in Russia.). only four parties contested in 2003 (cf. In 1995 it is reduced to meagre nine seats. United Russia. 2008: 391). whereas Unity or Yeltsin’s party had greatest success among the wealthier (Rose. volatility is high (cf. Because of the transition many people slided into powerty. 2008: 395f). In 1999 the CPRF6 gained most votes among the poorest. The system is administrated by a state energy company. From the 1995 election. These trends echo Madrid’s depiction of economic cleavages as susceptible to volatility. The 2007 election follows this trend (cf. Another way to observe volatility in this period. Naftohaz. despite the possibility of rents. gained most votes among the richer (Remington. They are decimated to 52 seats in 2003.
. and unemployment rates soared. section 3. whereas the new party. Of those 12 parties. From
1999 it grows with an average of two to three percent (Remington. Natural resources is not playing as important a role in Ukraine as in Russia. only four parties contested during the 1999 election. are also subject to volatility. appendix B).
6 The 7 This
Communist Party of the Russian Federation is supported by the development in the GDP. it is dependent on Russia. In 1993 Russia’s Choice wins 70 seats. Russia holds a Duma election in 1993 and again in 1995. Thus. and as noted in section 7. The CPRF. where Unity’s successor. battered its way unto the political stage with 222 seats. United Russia. The diﬀerence between rich and poor as measured by the Gini-index doubled (Remington. Thus. appendix A). but because of economic mismanagement. 2008: 396).
Yeltsin’s supporters sat up a presidential counterpart with the aim of creating a presidential constitution (Remington. Gueorguiev and Schaechter. 2002. 2001: 170). and the ethnic Ukrainians backed Rukh. Yeltsin decided to take the matter outside the existing constitutional framework. 2006: 111). In the ﬁrst two elections they gained seats. 1998. As is evidenced in appendix E the Russians continued to vote for pro-Russian parties.1 for
is likely that the 1994 election follows these lines as well. While anti-Yeltsin deputies took part in a constitutional assembly. Thus. appendix D and E). 2006: 108f). Of the other parties three survive from 1994 to 1998. but at the same time gave the Duma and the Upper Chamber the possibility of override vetoes by a two-thirds vote in each chamber (Remington. where presidential powers were limited. section 6. Of all the Ukrainian parties.whereas the largest minority is ethnic Russian. Anti-Yeltsin forces sought to create a two-tiered form of government. there seems to be a degree of volatility in the Ukrainian party system. 54. 2001: 160f). which is evidenced in the relative smaller changes in voting behaviour among those voting for the parties that manage to run for more than one election. Yeltsin’s supporters. 2001: 168). These regional patterns are echoed in the 1998 election8 . It is smaller than in Russia. on the other hand. where Russians in general backed the Communists. despite the strong cleavage. Thus. wanted to maximise presidential power and minimise the Duma’s ability to block Yeltsin (Remington. To disconﬁrm the claim that Russians’ favour the left-wing because of economy. the run up to the approval was not void of trouble. and thus leaving the question with the people. The same goes for 2007 (cf. it is worth noting that the Russians’ did not switch to a nonethnic based party during the strengthening of the Ukrainian GDP in the 2000s (Duenwald. it is plausible to argue that Yeltsin alienated other parts of the political arena as well as used will to get his draft approved (cf. While the Duma refused to approve the Yeltsin-draft. 2001: 169). This is also echoed in the 2002 parliamentarian election as well as the presidential elections (D’Anieri. only two countinues. The post-Soviet Yeltsin authored constitution was approved by referendum in 1993.8 percent voted in favour of his draft (Remington.
. and 2007 parliamentarian elections. the Communist party is the most stable with the longest election record. Two distinct positions emerged. whereas from 1999 to 2002. The latter being an essential part of the independence movement (D’Anieri. This draft gave the president lawmaking prerogatives. However. volatility is observed. whereas they lost seats in both the 2002 and 2007 election. 2005: 4). The Communist participated in the 1994. Despite this very strong cleavage.
Kuchma went outside the existing framework. Feher’s argument regarding will-based constitutions seem to have merit in the Ukrainian case. the Rada was legally binded to change it (D’Anieri. Oleksandr Moroz argued. 2006: 84). The ﬁrst Ukrainian constitutional document was approved in 1995 called the ”law on power”. contrary to the Russian case. in both cases. a real signiﬁcant party of power is only United Russia. 2006: 91). appendix A). As depicted in section 3. the Ukrainian Rada was never in agreement with Kuchma and put up a ﬁerce ﬁght. and pushed the constitution through the Rada (D’Anieri. which was approved in 2005. when Kuchma attempted to amend the constitution. Unity contests the 1999 election and wins 73 seats. This was resisted by the Rada (D’Anieri. This reform transferred power from the president to the prime minister (D’Anieri. 2006: 71. where he had more power. it does not receive the same status as United Russia. 2006: 95). Thus. and as Rada speaker. Hence. appendix B and C). alienating parts of the political society. as speciﬁed in section 3. which is 40 less than the Communists. the Ukrainian constitution is approved by ﬁst. as the Rada repealled the reforms of the constitution in 2004. which dominates the Duma with 222 seats in 2003 and 315 in 2007 (cf. United Russia has clear connections to the Russian presidency in the sense
.an elaboration of the eﬀects). the constitution was perceived as the lesser of two evils. whereas a real constitution was put in eﬀect in 1996. 2006: 90). as in Russia. Russia’s Choice disappears practically in 1995 (cf. yet it did not consist of any actual text to be replaced in the constitution.2. 2006: 92). Once again Kucha threatened the Rada with his ﬁst. which made the Rada approve the amendments (D’Anieri. There was great support for the referendum. He used the unpopularity of the Rada and the threat of referendum to make the Rada approve his package. In relation with the constitution of 1996. Another constitutional battle emerged in 2000. While Gill (2006: 70) mentions Yegor Gaidar’s Russia’s Choice as a semi-oﬃcial party. A real power of party did not manifest itself in Russia until Unity. but the high court decided that if Kuchma proposed a referendum supported by the people that demanded change of the constitution. and succeeded by United Russia (Gill. 73). the parliament would otherwise not grant him. Kuchma used the same tactics as above. However. which would give him powers. Thus.2 only strong parties of power are interesting. which was aﬄiated with Putin. The 1995 ”Law on Power” is a package suggested by then-president Kuchma. Secondly. As in Russia much of the debate revolved around whether Ukraine should take a presidential or semi-presidential path.
((Haspel. 2003: 47). which endorses Janukovich. For a United Ukraine. Remington and Smith. Section 3. disappeared in the following election. the party disappeared (cf. though he did not declare himself a member. There is little doubt that Russia and Ukraine are alike in many ways. Table 2 summarises. that in turn affects the possibility of creating parties of power. albeit Ukraine’s Rada has put up signiﬁcant resistence every time. in Russia. 2008: 82). This is not to the same extent the case in Ukraine. the party of power. United Russia has dominated Russian politics since 2003. In Ukraine there is no clear equivalent to United Russia.
a United Ukraine is an electoral alliance consisting of among other Janukovich’s Party
of Regions (Kuzio. The party wins 101 seats. Thus. it is fair to assume that in time. Ukraine has a presidential constitution.. Thus. it is plausible to argue that the checks and balances in Russia are weakened because of the weak party system. and the constitution. identify For a United Ukraine9 as a party of power. As depicted above.
.2 argues that the problem is only severe if the party is cohesive. D’Anieri (2006: 93f) does. however. but in 2007. which is dominated by an ethnic cleavage. the Russian party system is much more volatile than the Ukrainian.that United Russia is formed by Putin during his ﬁrst tenure (Almond et al. The hypotheses are answered in the sections related to the case study 6. Like Russia. because the next election to the Rada is set to be hold in 2012. It is unclear whether Party of Regions. volatility. While they do not evaluate the latest elections. whereas the research question is answerd in section 8. because Kutchma links himself with the party. and becomes the second largest party in the Rada in 2002. appendix D and E). is to be the next party of power. 1998: 434) party cohesion is higher than expected in the ﬁrst elections to the Duma. yet also diﬀerent. Kuchma attempted to rewrite the constitution to his liking. especially United Russia might in fact be a serious problem for Russian democracy. whereas the only Ukrainian party of power. the Russian party leaders have become better at maintaining cohesion. According to Haspel et al. Thus.
Table 2: Comparison of Russia and Ukraine Explanans Transition Stalemate Stalemate Transit tax Cleavage Both Plenty Volatile President None Natural resources Party system Constitutional autor PoP United Russia Imbalanced Balanced Balancing
Constants Legacy Russian Russian
To fully understand this claim. decided to turn against his former ally. The run up to the 1993 constitution evidenced the diﬀerences between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet.6
In section 5 table 2 argues that the Russian political system is imbalanced in favour of the presidency. This lends credence to the notion that the main cleavage of the Russian Duma is economic. Thus. Yeltsin resisted. the president must dissolve the Duma. Khasbulatov. however. This struggle is brieﬂy sketched out in section 5. If the Duma rejects the prime minister three times. The Russian Constitution demands that any prime minister must be approved by the Duma. the deputies would have to give up their seats just one year before the election in 1999. However. Yeltsin. the pro-presidential constitution pushed through a prime minister not very popular among the deputies of the Duma. The crisis. 1998).
6. and as argued in section 5 the CPRF gained votes as the Russian GDP dwindled. and thus parties depending on this cleavage. of reasons unknown. as it became. which created a deadlock between the Supreme Soviet and the president. however. 2001: 73). The newly elected Duma. The Duma rejected Kiryenko twice. The process tracing follows a historical narrative structured around ﬁgure 2. yet the third time. the Russian political system is biased in favour of the presidency as of 1993. with a result favouring Yeltsin’s position. Hence.The leader of the Supreme Soviet. Had the Duma refused to approve Kiriyenko. his goal was to deprive the president of any control over the presidency in an attempt to make him a cerimonial ﬁgurehead (Nichols. it did not get a democratically elected parliament and new constitution before 1993. The dominance did not last. was a power-struggle between elites seeking to gain control over each other (Nichols. and to categorise the Russian and Ukrainian regimes. was in 1994 dominated by Yegor Gairdar’s Russia’s Choice. are susceptible to ﬂuctuations in
. 2001: 65). a process tracing of each case is conducted. This is best evidenced in the battle between Yeltsin and the Duma regarding the nomination and approval of prime minister Kiriyenko. the successor of the Supreme Soviet. and call for elections to the Duma. 2001: 63). the Duma approved (Babayeva and Dokuchayev. as the Russian parliament was called before 1993.1
Russia gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. In 1995 the CPRF becomes the next dominating party. where deputies passed laws counteracting Yeltsin’s decrees (Nichols. whereas the Ukrainian is relatively more balanced.
2007: 8). denied Yeltsin’s opponents air time in their media (Remington. 1997). because of the reinforced cleavages. Putin gets a parliamentarian tool by which he can change the way Russia is governed as well as nationalise key industries and thus use the natural resources to his advantage. then-president Yeltsin did not have the same political resources at his disposal as his successor. 2004). Despite the argument brought forth in section 4. it clearly manifests itself. section 2.the economy.2). natural resources entered the political system through private sponsorship (Duncan. When the economic cleavage weakend. is best depicted by Yeltsin’s attempt to bury the founder of the USSR.2. however. His attempt failed because at the time the CPRF dominated the Duma and ardently refused any such action (AP. 2005) To sum up. Putin. which in turn gives the presidency even more control over the political arena.
. Yeltsin proposed to ask the Russians whether Lenin should be buried or not. Another example is the ﬁnalising takeover of Gazprom in 2005 (Denisov and Grivach. tilted the checks and balances in favour of the Russian presidency. whereas after 2004. Hence. a presidential constitution together with a volatile party system leaving space for a party of power controlling the Duma. the space for a party of power grew together with its negative eﬀect on the checks and balances. During the ﬁrst post-Soviet presidency. The 1996 election proves to be an example of how private sponsorship works albeit by proxy. with the creation of a succesful and lasting party of power. Before 2004 they were elected. Putin had constructed an eﬀective parliamentarian control through his party of power. Hence. The media or the proxy. 2008: 389). owned by the oligarchs. it is only in relation with the presidential elections. Vladimir Lenin in 1997. A prime example of the diﬀerence in power over the political arena between Yeltsin and his successor. United Russia. which he used to among other gain control of the Russian governors. As depicted above. This role evaporates as the GDP increases.1 regarding the resource beneﬁt. and thus makes it the new dominating party of the Duma. the president appoints the governors (Baker. Russian democracy never consolidated because the elite never accepted the democratic game (cf. However. Putin. the Duma was strongest. had no opposition against nationalising key industries. The election of 2003 gives Putin’s United Russia overwhelming support. at the time of the greatest deprivation of the Russian people. Putin. This gives the CPRF a central role during the 1990s as seen in connection with the hestitated approval of Kiryenko. while Yeltsin was not able to bury Lenin because he lacked parliamentarian support.
Janukovich followed Yushenko as president in 2010. Ethnic Ukrainian nationalists. whereas ethnic Ukrainians live in the western and northern part of Ukraine. any further elaborations on the topic is not conducted. it is possible to argue in favour of a classiﬁcation of Russia as a civilian autocracy from the time of the creation of United Russia. because of Janukovich’s succefull attempt to boost presidential powers once again (BBC. section 2. Contrary to the Russian case. who put a high value on avoiding secession.
6. In relation with hypothesis H1. 2007: 23). structured around ethnic cleavages (cf. and as described in section 4. the ﬁrst Ukrainian parliamentarian election took place before the approval of their constitution. and thus the Orange Revolution is seen more as an interlude between Kuchma and Janukovich than a deﬁning event. Yushenko was president from 2005 to 2010 with both Timoshenko and Janukovich as prime ministers. Thus. the question of cleavages and volatility is elevated to a premier position as an essential determining factor of the future outlook of Ukrainian politics.2. Precisely because of the placement of Ukrainian ethnicities. the Orange Revolution deserves a short note. Thus. appendix D and Anieri (2006: 108) for expected future indications of alignments based on section 3. which gave them a strong basis for secession.).They instead attempted and succeeded in manipulating the political game to their advantage thus creating a system. the possibility of especially ethnic Russian secession was a possibility. In 1994. Thus. Hence. that in turn gave the presidency to a pro-Russian president and a signiﬁcant amount of seats to ethnic-Russian parties. were aware of this. 25
. The ethnic Russians primarily live in the eastern and southern part of Ukraine. Hence. supported Kuchma in his amendments of the constitution as well as in the dismissal of Yushenko as prime minister in the 2000s (D’Anieri.2 took another ethnic group into consideration.2 and Madrid’s conception of the weight of ethnicity as a structuring cleavage. the Ukranians elected a new Rada.3). 2010). they made the necessary compromises (D’Anieri.2
Before embarking on the process tracing. the Communist. where the popular change of the incumbent is unlikely. because of its ability to dismantle the Duma as a check on the presidency (cf. the ethnic-Russian party. these cleavages became pivotal in the design of the pre-constitutional Ukrainian institutions. it seems evident that it is conﬁrmed. Thus. 2006: 118) As evidenced in section 5 there is a battle between Kuchma and the Rada. It brought Yushenko to power when Janukovich’s election fraud was revealed.
Another indirect eﬀect of the constitution. Kuchma still needed to create informal institutions in order to for his regime to function as he wanted (Way.). won 175 seats in the Rada (cf. Hence.During Kuchma’s tenure. 1996.). and the lack of a party of power. 2006: 92). Kuchma’s arm-wrestling with the Rada could have been avoided. it lessened Kuchma’s need to weaken the Rada (D’Anieri. However. however. strong cleavages manifested in a parliament prior to the approval of a constitution. are considered a source of income similar to that of natural resources. situates the diﬀerent positions vis-` a-vis the negotiation regarding the constitution. is the deputies’ repeal of reforms (D’Anieri. 2006: 88f). appendix E). 2005: 133). Ukraine does not have access to natural resources comparable to that of Russia’s. yet it is not large enough to play a similar role as natural resources. the negative eﬀect from such sources of income are more or less absent in Ukraine. Kuchma could not attack the g opposition for critism. had he had a successful party of power. Kuchma could not shape the constitution as he saw ﬁt. As depicted above regarding the constitution. This gave them a platform by which. As demonstrated in section 5.2. albeit succesful. In the following election in 2007 one of the members of the alliance. Thus. This is evidenced in the three. Yet because of strong cleavages. Janukovich. and it is likely that any future Ukrainian party of power will face other signiﬁcant blocs. appendix E). This is also evidenced in the immunity. deputies enjoyed. it faced a signiﬁcant opposition in the Timoshenko bloc in 2007 (cf. which might indicate a new party of power in Ukraine. This is best evidenced in the pro-presidential and primarily ethnic Rusian supported alliance dubbed For a United Ukraine. and 2000. Rents from Russian gas on its way to the European market. they could criticise Kuchma (ibid. echoing Feher’s argument. Yet. the Party of Regions headed by former pro-Russian presidential candidate. It clearly shows that a parliament structured around
. the constitution is changed in 1995. To sum up. assuming that Party of Regions is the next party of power. never manage to be elected more than once. a real party of power never manifested. and needed institutions such as processes designed to harass the opposition and falsify election results (ibid. Because of the strong cleavages. during its time. attempts. While the Duma is void of any signiﬁcant opposition to United Russia. section 4. whereas the Russian constitution served Yeltsin well. though limited to its ethnic supporter base because of the cleavages structuring the Rada (cf. Thus.3). The alliance did. Kuchma’s attempts to change it as well as the informal institutions indicate that his did not. eventhough these attempts were succesful.
stable cleavages are in a much better position to resist encroachments. Especially the American Treasure invested a lot of political time on reforms. cleavages seem to be the explanan that most clearly determines Ukraine’s fate. the leverage was not as much a concern as foreign NGOs. they deemed necessary for Russia (Desai. Thus. Hence. the foundation for those battles. Thus. The latter concept is expanded by Tolstrup (undated: 7f) as economic and technocratic or political among other. Thus. and thus forcing the president outside the formal framework. The parliament on the other hand. Thus. 2005: 101). Western leverage over Russia is best evidenced through the opening of the Russian market during Yeltsin’s tenure (Desai. described above. They feared that foreign NGOs might attempt to incite a colour revolution just like the one neighbouring Ukraine experienced (Ambrosio. lies in the compromise made and hence the cleavages. only Yushenko seemed to respect the rules of democracy. 2005: 100). seemed to be very interested in following the constitution. and linkage as the integration with a certain region (Levitsky and Way. Kuchma was not willing to accept the rules of democracy. Russia has an interest in Ukraine because of the Russians and the Black
. and at numerous occassions. among the Ukrainian presidents. Ukraine is subject to a pressure from the West as well as Russia. In this section. Russian elites used the fear of a potential coup to crack down on independent NGOs such as those dealing with human rights and democracy (Ambrosio. the question is brieﬂy assessed through an evaluation of leverage or power to aﬀect other contries. It might also be worth noting that this situation enhanced the power of the Russian minority and their parties. 2009: 46). which lends albeit limited credence to the alternative hypothesis HA. Another eﬀect of these cleavages is that of the room for a party of power. democracy fares better in Ukraine because of the relatively more balanced institutions. The situation in Ukraine is diﬀerent. To postulate that the Ukrainian democracy is consolidated is premature. 2005: 21f). During Putin’s tenure. 2009: 51).
Considering an alternative explanation
The theoretical model does not take external factors into consideration. which at times favoured a stronger presidency. The leverage dwindled as Russia’s GDP grew. he ”overthrew” the constitution through will. Cleavages reduced the room that would otherwise have limited the ability of the parliament to act as a check on the presidency. Whereas Russia is subject to a pressure from the West.
yet failed. However. whereas the latter seems very susceptible to Russian inﬂuence.1 based on Ross’ arguments that natural resources impede democracy. whereas the technocratic linkage is depicted in the relationship between United Russia and Party of Regions. Firstly. Despite being a brief interlude between the primary arguments of this paper and the discussion. yet as evidenced. The ﬁrst position to discuss is Russias abundance of natural resources and its constitution.
Discussion and conclusion
As depicted above in section 5 and 6. Mainwaring and Shugart rightfully argue that much depends on the institutional design. Russia failed to consolidate its democracy because of its imbalanced political system favouring the presidency. it gives at least a couple of points worth noting. and the support of Janukovich. The pro-Russian Kuchma’s sucessor. 2009: 145). United Russia and Janukovich’s Party of Regions established formal ties in order to help the party in the upcomming 2006 Rada elections. Ukraine. Thus. Ukraine is dependent on Russian energy (ibid. yet
. got extensive support from Russia for his election campaign. the discussion focuses on the Russian failure to remain on a democracy consolidating path using Ukraine as a mirror. The economic linkage between Russia and Ukraine is best evidenced through the Ukrainian natural resource dependecy. Then-prime minister Timoshenko criticised the agreement as an illegal attempt to inﬂuence Ukrainian politics. The Orange Revolution is perhaps the best example of a time where Russia needed to inﬂuence Ukrainian politics. Instead Russia attempted to undermine Yushenko’s eﬀorts to democratise by denouncing his attempts as well as adopting confrontational policies toward Kiev (Ambrosio.2. which they do not want to loose (Ambrosio. The former has shook of western leverage through growth in GDP albeit paranoia has made the Russian elite harass foreign NGOs. Thus. Janukovich. and ath the same time. it depends on the decision to utilise them to repress. despite this support the pro-western Yushenko won.Sea Fleet. natural resources must be transferred to the political system through political actors. on the other hand managed to remain relatively balanced because of its party system and the lack of a party of power.It is claimed in section 3. there is a strong Russian interest in Ukraine as well as space to exert inﬂuence. as shown in section 4. 2009: 135). Thus. leverage and linkage is taken serious in both Russia and Ukraine.). albeit this inﬂuence is not succesful at times.1.
diﬀusion is tested vis-` a-vis the rest. The best argument in favour of cleavages is that some cleavages seem to be a better foundation for a party system than others. is the practice in Russia (cf. The party system is considered a prime explanan in section 6. and Ukraine’s cleavages do not necessary beneﬁt its regime. as Pedersen (1979: 9) shows.as shown in the Ukrainian case. The strength and 29
. are not very cohesive. it seems evident that a Russian party of power damages the horizontal accountability of the Duma. Parties of power are considered to have a negative eﬀect on both the Russian and Ukrainian parliament. is primarily based on the Middle East and Latin America. section 6. section 2. On the other hand. which might lend crendence to the damaging eﬀects of such parties. Russia is plagued by a volatile party system. there might be cases where fairly large and dominating parties.2). As brought forth by Haspel et al. several consolidated western democracies go through periods of relatively high volatility vis-` a-vis the general norm. Neither the Russian nor Ukrainian party system seem to embody such cleavages. volatility does not necessary damage the regime. with the creation of For a United Ukraine. the Ukrainian case exempliﬁes a situation where the party system is perhaps too polarised thus making it very diﬃcult for the presidency to have a fruitful relationship with the parliament. However. The key argument within the framework of the scope conditions in favour of the resource curse. The Russian case evidences this as well. Thus. As D’Anieri puts it.2 as intrinsic to the preservation of Ukrainian democracy as a structuring factor as well as preventing parties of power. Russian parties are more cohesive than expected. Another criticism of natural resources as depicted by Ross and used in this paper. It depends on its cohesiveness. However. presidents can go outside the constitutional framework (cf. In the ﬁnal part of this discussion. even in functional democracies.
8. Thus. as depicted in section 2. This is depicted in both section 5 and section 6. the volatility Russia experiences are not necessary a democracy delimiting phenomenon. Kuchma does not need to weaken the Rada anymore (cf. There are not many young democracies with communist origin in these regions (cf.1
Diﬀusion versus the rest
Until know the core explanations of this paper has been discussed. At the same time.1. Thus. Thus. a party of power is not necessary a problem.3.2 and Linz and Stepan). section 1 and the scope conditions). Thus it might be diﬃcult to assess the impeding character of natural resources on newly created democracies. section 5).
However. albeit it might have something to do with the renewed wealth from the natural resources as depicted above. The straight forward answer is that Russia scored negatively on all the explanans and in particular on the party system and party of power (cf. The lack of successful leverage vis-` a-vis the Russians in Ukraine might be explained by a weak Russia. the question of resources bolster the diﬀusion explanation.
8. It might have been very diﬃcult considering the domination of CPRF and later the proSoviet United Russia.thus wealth certainly reduces any leverage any country might face. table 2. dominated by ethnic 30
. the party system showed stronger signs of volatility because of the economic cleavage than the Ukrainian. Because of its pro-Russian stance it might alienate the ethnic Ukrainian population.2
The research question proped the puzzle of why Russia slided into autocracy whereas Ukraine did remain somewhat stable in the same period. This made it diﬃcult to remain on a consoldiation path because of the imbalances created by these very scores. the acquisition and renationalisation of Russian natural resources gave it a chance to insulate itself from state-to-state pressure. It is not known whether the West attempted to inﬂuence the Russian Duma. A party of power (or even a dominating party such as the CPRF) might pose a serious problem for anyone attempting to utilise leverage in a parliamentarian setting. In Russia. However. Thus. And precisely these natural resources as well as the energy dependency might have made United Russia capable of making a deal with the potential party of power. The resource wealth also helped Russia to build new organisations as well as ousting other organisations in order to protect the current Russian regime. if diﬀusion has any merit in this case. it has the potential of causing more harm than good to the Russian case.2). Hence. The ethnic-Russian parties could probably have received some support for secession. section 6. Party of Regions. United Russia is clearly a party of power that is not susceptible to utilised leverage. the ethnic Russians and their parties did not move forward with secession (cf. Thus. The Ukrainian party system depicts a situation where Russian attempts to utilise leverage has been futile not only during the Orange Revolution. thus aligning them among proUkraine candidates. it is important to remember that Party of Regions is not a party that encapsulates the entire population. had they wanted it. as history has evidenced. but also during the ﬁrst ten years of Ukrainian independence. but it is clear that the West succesfully exerted leverage over the Russian president.
easy rents are not as accessible as if the state nationalised it. While external factors are excluded in the theoretical model as depicted in ﬁgure 2. were able to maintain a more stable system securing consolidation. yet they are not determining the outcome of neither Russia nor Ukraine. It seems evident that certain conditions qua the results of this paper must be fulﬁlled if succesful diﬀusion has to take place.1 the idea that natural resources impede democracy was somewhat conﬁrmed. In Russia. The Russian determined to continue to exert inﬂuence in Ukraine paid oﬀ as Janukovich later got elected. As evidenced in section 6.1 show that there are signs of diﬀusion. The Ukrainian case reveals that Ukraine scored better on the explanans. their eﬀect was minor.
. yet depending on the commitment from the state exerting diﬀusion. Especially the latter three explanans owe their postive score to the strong cleavages. It had no natural resources. the model is not seriously impeded by the introduction of diﬀussion. strong cleavags. and thus. the real transformative eﬀect of diﬀusion depends on the endurance of the state. and no party of power. this eﬀect might be of minor importance. if the West was involved in the Orange Revolution. Thus. The ﬁrst condition is the ownership of the natural resources. This is best depicted in the short term eﬀect of the Orange Revolution and the return of the old modus operandi. whereas Russian linkage is very clear in connection with Janukovich’s failed attempt to become Kuchma’s sucessor. Hence. Section 7 and 8. The second condition is related to that of the strength of allies such as strong parties in the state in question. The process tracing revealed that with the creation of United Russia. Such allies might enhance the chance of succesful diﬀusion. yet its importance is dwarfed by that of party system and party of power. the oppositional character of the Russian Duma disappeared. a constitution not overly presidential. Diﬀusion plays a role. The theoretical model addresses democratic development in the long run. Hence short term attempt leaves long term eﬀects with the explanans.cleavages. This is why the Orange Revolution is unimportant. leverage is most clear during Yeltsin’s tenure. and thus the elite cannot use them as depicted in section 7. If they are privatised.
Appendix I: Duma elections in 1993 and 1995
1993 1995 Seats 70 54 48 23 33 23 19 15 4 2 1 1 Party (17/7)† Communist Party Liberal Democratic Party Our home is Russia Yabloko Agrarian Party of Russia Power to the People Russia’s Choice Congress Russian Communities Ivan Rybkin Bloc Women of Russia Forward Russia! Pamﬁlova–Gurov–Lysenko Bloc Union of Labour Communists of the USSR Workers’ Self-Government Stanislav Govorukhin Bloc Russian Unity and Concord Seats† 157 51 55 45 20 9 9 5 3 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 77
Party (12) Russia’s Choice Liberal Democratic Party Communist Party Women of Russia Agrarian Party of Russia Yabloko Russian Unity and Concord Democratic Party of Russia Movement for Democratic Reforms Dignity and Charity Civic Union Future of Russia
Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election. †) Total number of parties / Participated in the prior election. Source: Rose (2011)
. ‡) Involves both SMD and PR seats.
Source: Rose (2011)
. †) Total number of parties / Participated in the prior election.B
Appendix II: Duma elections in 1999 and 2003
1999 2003 Seats 113 73 68 29 17 20 7 2 2 1 1 1 114 Party (12/4)† United Russia Communist Party Motherland Liberal Democratic Party People’s Party Yabloko Agrarian Party of Russia PVR-RPZh: Rebirth–Party of Life Union of Right Forces New Course: Automobile Russia Development of Enterprise Great Russia-Eurasian Union Independents Seats‡ 222 52 37 36 17 4 2 3 3 1 1 1 68
Party (12/4) Commmunists Party Unity Fatherland–All Russia Union of Right Forces Liberal Democratic Party Yabloko Our Home Is Russia Movement in Support of the Army Russian People’s Union Party of Pensioners Russian Socialist Party Spiritual Heritage Independents
Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election. ‡) Involves both SMD and PR seats.
‡) Involves both SMD and PR seats. Source: Rose (2011)
Appendix III: Duma elections in 2007
2007 Party (4/2)† United Russia Communist Party Liberal Democrats Fair Russia Independents Seats‡ 315 57 40 38 -
Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election. †) Total number of parties / Participated in the prior election.
†) Total number of parties / Participated in the prior election. Source: ±) Bojcun (1995: 239) ∓) Birch and Wilson (1999: 1040)
. ‡) Involves both SMD and PR seats.D
Appendix IV: Rada elections in 1994 and 1998
1994± 1998∓ Seats 86 25 18 15 14 11 7 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 Party (19/3)† Communists Rukh Socialist / Village Popular democrats Hromada Greens Social Democrats (United) Progressive Socialists Agrarians National Front Reforms and Order Party of Regional Revival Forward Ukraine! Christian Democratic Party NEP Social liberal union Working Ukraine Razom Menshe sliv Seats‡ 122 46 34 29 23 19 17 16 8 5 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 116
Party (17) Communists Rukh Peasant Party Interregional bloc for reforms Socialist party Republican Party Congress of Ukrainian nationalists Communist party of Crimea Party of Democratic Renewal Labour Party Democratic Party Ukranian National Assembly Social Democratic Party Civic Congress Conservative Republican Party Christian Democratic Party Soyuz
Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election.
‡) Involves both SMD and PR seats. *) Re-run of parliamentarian election of 2006. †) Total number of parties / Participated in the prior election. Source: ±)Herron and Johnson (2003: 19) ∓) Copsey (2008: 300)
.People’s Self-defense Communist Party Lytvyn bloc Seats‡ 175 156 72 27 20
Party (10/2) Our Ukraine For a United Ukraine Communist party Soc. dem. party of Ukraine (United) Socialist Party of Ukraine Timoshenko bloc Democratic Party of Ukraine Unity Party of National Economic Revival Ukrainian Marine Party Independents
Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election.E
Appendix V: Rada elections in 2002 and 2007
2002± 2007∓* Seats 110 101 66 24 22 22 4 3 1 1 93 Party (5/2)† Party of Regions Timoshenko bloc Our Ukraine .
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