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Kim Andersen January 8, 2012
1 Introduction 2 Theoretical introduction 2.1 2.2 2.3 Democracy and autocracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Consolidation of democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Checks and balances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 9 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 23 23 25
3 Introducing the explanans 3.1 3.2 3.3 Natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Party system and party of power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 Methodological approach 4.1 4.2 Most similar systems design and process tracing . . . . . . . . . . Operationalisation and causal links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.3 4.2.4 4.3 Natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Party system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Party of power (PoP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Author of the constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Theoretical model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5 Comparison of Russia and Ukraine 6 Case study 6.1 6.2 Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7 Considering an alternative explanation 8 Discussion and conclusion 8.1 8.2 Diﬀusion versus the rest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
27 28 29 30 32 33 34 35 36
A Appendix I: Duma elections in 1993 and 1995 B Appendix II: Duma elections in 1999 and 2003 C Appendix III: Duma elections in 2007 D Appendix IV: Rada elections in 1994 and 1998 E Appendix V: Rada elections in 2002 and 2007
Both Russia and Ukraine became independent of the Soviet Union in 1991, and as “young” countries, their democratic history have been turbulent. Executive and legaslative arm-wrestling over power-sharing has been the norm rather than the exception. Despite these scuﬄes, Ukraine managed to embark on a consolidation course, whereas Russia slided into autocracy as depicted in ﬁgure 1. Thus, the research question sounds, Why did Russia slide into autocracy, whereas Ukraine remained somewhat stable in the same period. Figure 1: Democratic development in Russia and Ukraine according to Freedom House
Notes: Scores are an addition of political rights and civil liberties, and as such, most only be seen as a rough estimate. Source: Freedom-House (2011)
The understanding of the research question entails three pivotal components of democracy. First of all, a clear deﬁnition of democracy is needed. Secondly, yet equally important, the utilisation of Linz and Stepan as well as Schedler’s theoretical conceptualisation of consolidation is needed. Thirdly, to consolidate 3
democracy, a functional political system is needed, and this depends on the checks and balances especially between the presidency and parliament. Hence, this paper deals with the question of democratic consolidation and encroachment through a battery of structural and actor explanans derived from these theoretical understandings. Thus, it is the structure-actor dichotomy that acts as the central structure of the paper. The demise and collapse of democracy has often been related to a presence of natural resources such as oil and minerals (Ross, 2001: 356f). Yet these modernisation theorists, who forward these theoretical understandings, have only developed a conceptual understanding of the eﬀects of natural resources on the state apparatus and its relationship with its population. They have not delved upon how natural resources enters the system. Often it has been assumed that states autocratise and then use the resources to bolster the regime. This paper attempts to develop an understanding of how natural resources enter the political system. The argument is developed in section 3.1. For now it must suﬃce to say that the interplay between natural resources, party system, constitution, and party of power determine the eﬀectiveness of the checks and balances. This is answered by utilising a “Most Similar Systems Design” bolstered by “Process tracing”. Finally, the scope conditions of this paper needs to be stated. First of all, the focus is new democracies. Functioning democracies such as Norway, have access to natural resources, yet because of the consolidated nature of these democracies, they do not get impeded. Thus, the countries of interest are those that can be considered newly constituted democracies embarking on a consolidation course. Finally, these countries must have realised their natural resources and privatised these former state assets. Hence, this paper is limited to post-communist countries and in particular the former Soviet Union. The next section deals with the theoretical introduction, whereas the third section elaborates on the explanans. The fourth and the ﬁfth section depict the theoretical model and the methodological approach, whereas section six and seven compares and elaborates on the comparison through process tracing. The eighth section delves brieﬂy upon the question of diﬀusion as an alternative explanation. The last section discuss and concludes.
This section sets out to develop an understanding of democracy and autocracy. Hereafter it continues with the question of consolidation and ﬁnally addresses
to capture these countries. Thus. 5 .1 Democracy and autocracy Democracy is a contested concept. The polity is biased in favour of the leadership. two deﬁnitions suitable of these cases are needed. The right deﬁnition of democracy depends on the cases. It is also important to note that there are no checks and balances. yet have signiﬁcant democratic as well as autocratic traits. using a deﬁnition with many intensions such as liberal democracy. section 2. It is important to stress the competitive element of elections. this paper involves two distinct deﬁnitions. (2010: 87).). According to Schumpeter. and the other involving autocracy deﬁned as a polity without elections and a guiding ideology. The understanding of the leadership is further developed by Cheibub et al. 1 This proposition is supported by the lack of rule of law. forthcomming). and hence the system is arbitrary1 . Hence. Thus.checks and balances as are needed for the functioning of democracy. Linz and Stepan (1996: 38f) deﬁne autocracy as a political system with limited pluralism. The Ogden-Richards triangle shows the relationship between the intension of the deﬁnition and the number of cases or extensions. because an imbalanced polity would be able to make encroachments on the meaningfulness of competitive elections (cf. who subscribes to a minimalist deﬁnition. and thus mobilisation is not prevalent. The leadership-type that is relevant in this paper is the one where there are no hereditary succession nor usage of titles as well as no military involvment. The ﬁrst deﬁnition that needs to be elucidated is that of democracy understood as minimalist democracy. Deﬁnitions are as numerous as there are regimes claiming the name of democracy. he leaves the electorate with the task of electing the deliberating leadership (Moller and Skaaning. who argue that minimalist democracy includes competitive elections (Moller and Skaaning. This position is echoed by Moller and Skaaning. democracy is an arena where deliberation takes place. One deﬁning democracy as involving competitive elections and a balanced polity. who deﬁne three types of autocracy by stressing three types of leadership. This paper deals with cases that are far from being liberal democracies. Such elections stress the importance of a balanced polity. 2010: 271). The second deﬁnition is that of autocracy. There is no guiding ideology. This type of autocracy is deﬁned as civilian (ibid. the number of cases is reduced to western democracies. which is exercising power within illdeﬁned formal limits but with predictable norms. 2.3). To sum up. The government is leaded by a small group. yet he denounces this as a possibility.
1998: 6 . Finally. The regime has not been able to create the mass legitimacy. who have to accept democracy institutionally and procedurally as the most appropriate way to govern the state.. the attempts to weaken democracy. it is important to dwell on the negative side of the consolidation process. and reversibility. attitudinal. and constitutional changes. a consolidated democracy is the ”[. as Linz and Stepan (1996: 5) write.). The attitudinal dimension focuses primarily on the ordinary people. is a regime that has not been able to eliminate disloyal players. Schedler (1998: 93) argues that there are principally two dangers.. It might also be the creation of hegemonic parties in order to strangle electoral competition as well as the abuse of state resources by the incumbents in order to maintain power (Schedler. and thus failed to shape pro-democratic attitudes in the population. 2. erosion requires ”[. whereas the second is the democratic erosion. Using Linz and Stepan’s arguments.. procedures. The gradual democratic erosion is a problem. young consolidating democracies faces.. The conﬁdence in the regime. which develops an understanding of the direction of regime. 1998: 97).” Because the focus of this paper is the attempt to consolidate democracy.The next section deals with consolidation. many new democratic regimes faces. whether social.. Thus. 1998: 94ﬀ).] the intermittent or gradual weakening of democracy by those elected to lead it. the constitutional dimension requires that actors within the state solve issues through laws.] political situation in which [. is absent (Schedler. It is followed by one about checks and balances.. however. the necessary behavioural changes among the (potential) ruling elites have not been thorough enough.] democracy has become ’the only game in town’. and institutions (ibid. uncertainty. The ﬁrst is the democratic breakdown. seen as essential to even minimalist democracies in order to maintain meaningful democratic elections. can spend resources on developing alternatives to the democratic regime or attempt to secede. Such gradual weakening is exempliﬁed by attacks on institutions of democracy such as elections or attempts to subvert the rule of law. Schedler (1998: 96) argues that a regime facing such threats. Schedler argues that if a regime is facing a breakdown.” (Schedler. vulnerability. it is not only the elimination of disloyal players that lacks.2 Consolidation of democracy Linz and Stepan (1996: 6) argue that consolidation of democracy requires behavioural. Democratic breakdown necessitates instability. That is. Put bluntly. Their behavioural dimension entails that no actor. political etc. which is needed for it to avoid breakdown.
). the parliament are not necessary ready to give in. Schedler brought forth. 2008: 721). it is in a favourable position to weaken other institutions such as the parliament. on the other hand. and at best vertical. To sum up. must be scrutinised. democratic erosion is very much a question of behaviour. is able to veto Congress legislation (ibid. 1990: 60). 2. Solutions to democracyrelated issues depends on the personality and style of the president (Linz. Thus. the state of the checks and balances is important if democracy 7 . They are also able to deny the president legislation as well as taxes (Kousser and Ranney. 2007: 277). and remove a president as an example. Breakdown and erosion entail a negative development of Linz and Stepan’s three dimensions. the concept of checks and balances must be probed. the concept of gradual weakening. Each branch has certain rights that can keep other branches in check.2. Mainwaring and Shugart (1997: 469) are not as pessimistic as Linz. but to fully grasp their relationship. The president. democratic consolidation is changes in elite behaviour.3 Checks and balances Until now. This is what Linz deﬁnes as the problem of dual legitimacy. In illiberal systems. and the acceptance of the law as the ultimate arbiter of solutions to problems. To sum up. this paper has considered democracy and consolidation. as they too have popular backing. 1990: 52f). accountability rarely works horizontal. the question of Diamond and Morlino’s (2005: xxi) horizontal accountability. popular attitudes.97ﬀ). which has an elaborate seperation of powers between the Congress and the presidency among other. Diamond and Morlino argue that horizontal accountability is related to the ability of one institution to keep a check on another institution. because of the possibility of solving these issues through a careful institutional design. convict. However. These concerns follow Linz’ critique of the presidency. implying that the president is not accountable to any institutions and only to the people (Hague and Harrop. Whereas the erosion of rule of law is an attack on the constitutional solution of problems as indicated by Linz and Stepan. the two chambers of Congress can impeach. Following Schedler’s ”gradual weakening”-logic as depicted above. The perhaps most prominent example is the American system. If the presidency is only subject to the people. as depicted in section 2. might make the president more prone to get head-to-head with the parliament rather than settling the disputes (Linz. The popular mandate given to the president through the direct election.
presidential biased polities have greater maneuverability when it comes to encroaching the parliamentarian powers. and constitution as structural explanations. Table 1: Overview of explanans Name Natural resources Party system Constitution Party of power Structure X X X X Actor Before delving on the explanans. Hence. Such complementary explanans diverge from situations where the deep course brings about the proximate explanan 2 Throughout the paper deep and structural are used intertwined for the same type of explanan like proximate. However. the institutional design needs to balance the presidency and the parliament as well as create the necessary mechanisms that can provide solutions. and thus. the constitution must be seen as a shallow explanan dominated by actors because of Preuss’ arguments regarding the role of constitutions in newly established regimes. the main structure of this paper is the structure-actor2 dichotomy. HA: A balanced polity can consolidate.has to have a chance to consolidate. yet he stresses that their role is to complement the deep explanan. This lends credence to two hypotheses: H1: Imbalanced polities turn autocratic because the presidency is capable of encroaching parliamentarian power. shallow and actor-based are used for the same type of explanan. It is tempting to deﬁne natural resources. As Mainwaring and Shugart correctly points out.3. 8 . the solution lies in the institutional design. The explanan overview is depicted in table 1. party system. and its eﬀect on checks and balances. whereas a party of power as an actor explanation. as is evidenced in section 3. According to Kitschelt (2003: 74). Kitschelt’s understanding of structure and actor based explanans needs elucidation. deep or structural explanations trump its proximate or actor-based counterparts. 3 Introducing the explanans As brieﬂy mentioned in the Introduction. and thus have more maneuverability in manipulating the democratic institutions. He does not deny the usefulness of the actor explanan.
to dampen demands for democracy by reducing group activities or making pro-state groups that dominate the polity. While natural resources have been considered a very deep and structural explanan. to sum up. the beneﬁciary needs to gain access to the owner or (re)take the ownership.1 Natural resources Ross (2001: 356f) argues that the role of natural resources vis-` a-vis democracy is that of the impeder. assuming that the natural resources are owned by private people. This is what Ross (2001: 335) deﬁnes as the rentier eﬀect. Whereas taxes involve the population (Moller and Skaaning.and the outcome. Thus. to nationalise the natural resources the beneﬁciary needs control over the parliament in order to justify the action. The negative eﬀect sets in. The latter scenario is not relevant in this paper. Two qualiﬁcations are needed in order to fully grasp how natural resources enter. in both cases. Hence. forthcomming). and these entry points are dependent on other explanans and most importantly. Firstly. the existence of a party of power. natural resources alienate the population from the political process. the question of how the incumbent gets access to these resources. but where the outcome is not connected to the proximate explanan. However. Secondly. depending on the ownership. The repression eﬀect is the creation of a large state apparatus to repress demands for democracy often violently (Ross. natural resources have two points of entry. 3. before Ross’ two eﬀects set in. 3. the beneﬁciary or the incumbent gains an unfair advantage over other parties. must be elucidated. whereas Ross ﬁnds support for two diﬀerent eﬀects that emanates from natural resources (the rentier and represion eﬀect). thus leaving the political system biased and unbalanced and not in a position to consolidate qua the behaviour of the elite. The party system is a structural explanan because it rests 9 . when the beneﬁciary can and does use the natural resources to his own gain. in this paper it is dependent on the measurement of party system and party of power. That is. Thus. as well as one relating the two. as the deep explananw work through other explanans as depicted in ﬁgure 2 on page 17. he does not delve upon how the natural resources enter the polity in newly established and ﬂedging democracies. 2001: 336).2 Party system and party of power This section is built around the party system and the party of power.
but also on the absolute number. few and less fragmented counterparts (ibid. The volatility of parties are. old. not only dependent on the type of parties. volatility is dominated by substantial and structural factors. Whereas it is easier to change one’s economic position. religious. which is. can be found in Lipset and Rokkan’s analysis of the party system dominating western Europe. Thus. Examples of more stable cleavages.. (2008: 82). young. The essential question is to investigate what leads to these movements of votes. the question of the strength of the stability or the level of volatility is of greatest importance. 10 . cleavages originate in diﬀerent conﬂicts such as the dichotomy between the centre of a country. 2002: 181) and hence the parliament. Madrid also argues that polarised party systems are less volatile. who deﬁne volatility as the ”[. whereas the structural are related to the diﬀerent parties and their relationship. many. and territorial. This echoes the traits 3 Aardal delves into the demands of what constitutes a real cleavage. Hence.on the cleavages created in society. and not very fragmented parties ﬂuctuating around such cleavages as class or ethnicity. as well as class-based cleavages are less subject to volatility (Madrid. These cleavages structure the outlook of parties (Whiteﬁeld. according to Almond et al. To sumarise. The second argument is related to that of a party of power. In this paper. The subtantial factors are related to the type of cleavage. the urban-rural conﬂict. They ﬁnd that parties dependent on ethnolinguistic. and fragmented parties are more volatile than their old. The stability of cleavags are thus essential to the stability of the party system. and its periphery.. it is assumed that those cleavages structuring the Russian and Ukrainian party system fulﬁll these demands. 2005: 3). According to Aardal (1994: 220). the most volatile parties are those dependent on economic cleavages. Fluctuations in the economy are likely to be translated into changes in voter preferences.] net change within the electoral party system resulting from individual vote transfers. a very stable party system is one dominated by few. however. According to Madrid (2005: 2). to change one’s ethnolinguistic position is impossible. it is expected that the voter moves when the economy moves. If choice of party is dependent on economy rather than ethnolinguistics.). The explanation why this is so might be straight forward and follows the concept of deep and proximate explanans. fragmentation as well as their age. or the classic worker-capitalist conﬂict3 .”. Thus. personalistic in the sense that they are built around a small number of actors and thus void of any ideology. Pedersen (1979: 3) quotes Ascher and Tarrow.
it is important to relate such parties to that of the party system. However. This is because both parties in the United States are not very cohesive and at times have a weak discipline (Kousser and Ranney.3. and thus maximise control with the government.. a parliament is often in opposition to the presidency. 11 . where there are deep rooted cleavages.1. The American political system is an example of a system with a presidential party that acts as a check on even its own president. in the British House of Commons.of the vote-seeking party often known as a catch-all party. Hence. As is depicted in section 2. it must also be dominating. it is only possible if the party system is volatile and thus susceptible to catch-all parties. Before embarking on an elucidation of the structure of such parties and their damaging eﬀect. They argue that such parties are typical in new democracies such as Russia (cf..“ (Hague and Harrop. it is possible to say that a party of power with damaging capabilities is one that ﬂuctuates around leading actors. section 6. Hence. because of the alignments of the electorate. However. They are not inclined to change party.] party that outdistances all others [. Rose writes that parliaments are able to hold the government accountable for abuses of power.. party discipline and cohesion are very high among members of the British House of Commons. voting follows party-lines (Rose. Yet. to become damaging. and especially in order for it to act as a check on the presidency. and ﬁnally dominates to such an extent that it is possible for the party to prevent the parliament from acting as a balancing institution. the damaging eﬀect on the parliament as a check and balancing institution can be either small or large. Hence. Depending on the internal dynamics of the party. 2007: 245). a successful version of this type of party is not expected in countries.. 2008: 171).] is signiﬁcantly stronger than all the others. the president cannot expect the party to shoulder all policies. with strong discipline and is cohesive. in 90 percent of all cases. Sartori argues that a ”[. Depending on whether the party of power are cohesive and disciplined as in the British case or the opposite as in the American case. Catch-all parties fares poorly in heavily structured party systems. to sum up. Thus. it is not enough that it is built around an actor and is cohesive. 2008: 738f). it might pose a serious challenge for the functioning of the parliament. According to Strom (1990: 566) it is a party that seeks to maximise electoral support. The United Kingdom might prove to be a very diﬀerent case.
tempers.. who stresses that ”No type of delegated power can in any way alter the conditions of its delegation. The proximate component of the constitutional explanan is vested in Burke’s argument that constitutions are ”[. He argues that it is the essential pillar upon which any high-quality democracy rests. diﬀerent types of regimes occur. civil liberties.. and a limitation on the prerogatives of the state (O’Donnell. It is proximate precisely because it is the written foundation of a country. and social habitudes of the people. this section must elucidate both the structural components of the constitution as well as the actor-based components. while it is plausible to argue that there are structural factors that shape these moods and habitudes.. It is deep in the sense that it deﬁnes the political framework of any country. thus making it the highest source of authority in any society only subject to the constitution itself. which disclose themselves only in a long space of time.] made by the peculiar circumstances.] creates the political and institutional preconditions for the emergence of totally new social and political actors.2. and moral. 1992-93: 653). O’Donnell’s emphasis on the importance of the rule of law for liberal democracies echo these positions.3 Constitution A constitution is a very unique explanan in the sense that it fuses the deep and proximate or actor-based explanans. 1992-93: 640). and as mentioned above. One prominent constraint mentioned by Preuss is that of the former regime.).. which in one way or the other inspires the founding fathers of the new polity (ibid.” (my emphasis) (Preuss. If the constitution 4 Although O’Donnell does not say it explicitly.. Preuss’ (1992-93: 641) argues that the constitution ”[. Hence. Thus. This is based on his emphasis of what rule of law ensures.3.. newly created countries can to a certain extent shape their constitution as they see ﬁt. is to place the elected representation over all other branches of government (Preuss. 2004: 32)4 .” (my emphasis). Constitutional superiority is echoed by Sieyes. 12 . is that of constitutional rule of law. Feher argues that ”[. Easter (1997: 187) argues that depending on the structure of the former elites. Two issues are worth mentioning in relation with section 2. civil. it is actors that deﬁne the constitution. dispostions. 1992-93: 642).] a constitution based on will can only endure as long as those persons whose wills backed the document. the constitution deﬁnes the country’s political set up. It ensures political rights. Hence. it assumed that the type of rule of law he deals with. As an example. One pivotal goal of such a constitutionally deﬁned setup. occasions. which entails authors and interests. 1992-93: 639).” (Preuss. accountability.” (Preuss.
and thus might not survive its creator. As is evidenced below. 4 4. a process tracing method as described by Bennett (2005: 206) is utilised. It is an attempt to identify intervening causal processes. or what is known as a most similar systems design (MSSD) followed by process tracing that probes the ﬁndings of the MSSD. section 2. This addressed through the scope conditions depicted in section 1. As mentioned above. Assuming that the presidency submits a draft that lies outside the indiﬀerence lines of the parliament. it needs to deliver a constitution that can be broadly accepted especially by all institutional actors. Or put inversely. To maximise the diﬀerence in the outcome. the methodological approach is deterministic. it is very diﬃcult to know whether the neighbouring case ﬁts the same relationship. Hence. Thus. democracy needs a constitution accepted by the key institutions of the regime. Tsebelis (2002: 27) argues that the unanimity core is dependent on the preferences of the actors in question. it might not last. the case is selected on the explanandum (Landman. yet varies on key explanans as well as the outcome. 2006: 30). the constitution entails a deﬁnition of the checks and balances as well as battles between those with interests in the setup.2). If neither can agree on it.does not receive the support described by Linz and Stepan. It is in such a situation. and thus the question of outliers become important.1 Methodological approach Most similar systems design and process tracing The methodological approach is deterministic. deterministic assumes that explanan X leads to outcome Y. To sum up. this is not the case of this study. in order to consolidate. will they attempt to overthrow the document. As opposed to probabilistic methodology that deems relationships probable. Hence. conﬂict arises. Landman (2006: 29) argues that MSSD seeks to compare cases that are alike on most explanans. which in this paper is assumed to be the presidency and the parliament. SSDs demand that all relevant explanans are speciﬁed. To address this caveat. any constitution favouring the presidency might damage the democratic development. and that the far majority of these are held constant. Is it the parliament or is it the presidency. This lends crendence to the importance of the author that wrote the constitution. cannot garner mass support. a constitutional battle might either weaken or even force a democracy to break down (cf. 13 . Any constitutional document built on will. in order for a democratic regime to maximise legitimacy.
The original purpose of an MSSD is to single out the key explanan and determine the deterministic relationship. To fully understand these arguments. 2. each explanan is operationsalised. Natural resources give the incumbent a resource-advantage. The idea that natural resources are granted the incumbent through private sponsors is based on the assumption that former state corporations have been privatised. but because this paper does not have a single explanan. Bennett identiﬁes several diﬀerent forms of process traincing.3 and the 14 .1. and transition (cf.1 Natural resources Natural resources are a binary and structural explanan. The one used in this paper is an analytical explanation. The presence of natural resources can be used to control society through the rentier and repression eﬀect as described in section 3. Thus. the process tracing must attempt not only to single out the most important explanan. if the incumbent has a party of power strong enough to nationalise privatised state corporations. 4. The model is deﬁned in section 4. it must also deﬁne the causal relationship. 4. the two ﬁrst are understood as structures. it can be argued that natural resources bolster the negative eﬀects of disloyal elites (cf.2. and the causal links are spelled out. which is basically a detailed narrative couched in theoretical terms. the natural resources are at his disposal without the need of private consent. legacy. Hence.This makes it an ideal companion for MSSDs especially like the one of this paper. table 2). It is either present or absent. Alternatively. The causal chain argues that natural resources are either granted the incumbent through private sponsors or through parties of power with a negative eﬀect on the checks and balances. Therefore further elaboration on these explanans are not conducted. whereas the latter two are understood as actor-based explanans.2 the process tracing takes place.3 depicted in ﬁgure 2. Regarding the series of constants depicted in table 2 on page 22 this paper subscribes to Møller and Skaaning’s (2009: 307) understanding of the economic level. As depicted in table 1. The understanding of what constitutes a natural resource as well as the eﬀect of such. it is along the lines of the theory explained in section 2 and the operationalisation depicted in section 4. follows Ross’ (2001: 356f) ﬁndings regarding the negative eﬀect on democracy from both oil and minerals.2 Operationalisation and causal links In the sections below. two qualiﬁcations are needed.
and as such. The same positive eﬀect can be found in relation with the writing of the constitution. 4.1 and the importance of meaningful elections. the party of power needs to have clear connections to the presidency. Hence. This follows the lines of section 2. to measure a party of power. Thus. To identify cleavages. The causal chain related to the party of power indicates that the presence of such parties have a negative eﬀect on checks and balances and hence the 15 . it is considered a structural explanan. and thus it might be dangerous to neglect certain groups. Strong cleavages make it more diﬃcult for the author to neglect large parts of the population.3 Party of power (PoP) A party of power is unique in the sense that they are personalistic and built around a small number of actors. to measure the presence of strong cleavages or alternatively. Secondly. party support from election to election is measured.2). This is so because the parliament is strongly organised. the party must as a minimum be the most signiﬁcant party in the parliament. which lends credence to their deﬁnition as actor-based explanans. This is built on the assumption that parties of power without any signiﬁcant inﬂuence.2). The cleavage is the structuring part of a party system. To estimate volatility. cannot tilt the checks and balances. section 3. make a party system volatile and thus not very structured. Albeit the method is crude compared to the approach deﬁned by Pedersen. yet equally important. they are not dependent on a speciﬁc cleavage (cf.2 Party system The party system is based on the concept of cleavages (cf.behavioural dimension) or parties of power rather than being a negative eﬀect in itself. Thus. the number of seats are evaluated. section 3.2.2. This method follow Ascher and Tarrow’s deﬁnition albeit in a simpliﬁed manner. and entails an actor decision. The causal chain indicates that on the one hand. the question of voting behaviour needs to be addressed. Instead of looking at percentage of votes each party gains. it still gives a rough idea about whether a system is volatile. voter choices are cross referenced with the party’s supporter base and ﬂuctuations in support over time. 4. This is built on the assumption that all are able and allowed to create representation. a high degree of volatility. Autocracies might try to prevent certain groups in participating in any form of electoral process.. and void cleavages. cleavages have a negative eﬀect on parties of power as a result of their catch-all nature as well as a postive eﬀect on checks and balances.
4 Author of the constitution Feher’s argument regarding the survival of will-based constitutions is pitvotal for the operationalisation of this explanan (cf. the parliament and the presidency are both aﬀected and aﬀect the constitution. 4. This measurement is based on the assumption that a constitution deﬁned by the presidency is pro-presidential and thus imbalancing. there is an extra-constitutional parliamentarian framework. Will-based constitutions are assumed to lie outside Tsebelis unanimity core. Thus. It is in scenarios of this kind that the party of power has a negative eﬀect on the parliament and thus the checks and balance. The strength of the party of power is dependent on the degree of volatility and its ability to gain the majority of the votes. which aﬀects the development of the constitution through its cleavages. the party of power slant the checks and balances in favour of the president. section 3. As depicted in ﬁgure 2 on page 17 the negative eﬀect of natural resources enters the polity either through private sponsors or parties of power.3 Theoretical model As indicated in section 4. 16 . assuming that a parliament is already settled. However. In both scenarios. The causal chain indicates that the strength of the cleavages (or volatility) and party of power work through the framework of the constitution.2 each explanan plays a signﬁcant role through various chains in aﬀecting the checks and balances. Strong parties of power are also in a better position to re-write the constitution and thus tamper with the institutions of democracy as well as claim power over state assets. the central aim of this explanan is to measure the conﬂict surrounding the constitution.3)5 . whether the author (thus actor-based explanan) has taken other than narrow interests into consideration. 5 This argument is built around Mainwaring and Shugart’s understanding that carefully designed systems can attenuate problems with presidentialism. It is a problem if issues with the presidency must be attenuated (cf. and thus making the constitution a question of will. One such feature might be the balancing between the parliament and the presidency. the essential question to ask is. 2. It aﬀects the strength of the party of power as well as the checks and balances. Hence. 4. Thus.parliament because of its ability to prevent the parliament from functioning. The question of the party system enters independent of natural resouces.2.3).
it is important to understand who has authored the document and the author’s position. referred to as a ”[.. in new countries. they helped removed the popular prime minister (Duncan. Yet because it is the ultimate deﬁner of checks and balances. they supported him ardently. and during his brief struggle with then-prime minister Jevgenij Primakov. 2007: 2). Putin changed the privatisation trend. section 7). and started a re-nationalisation of key industries. This created a very strong group of oligarchs. but during the transition-phase.“ (Duncan. Thus. Ambrosio (2009: 51) notes that the Russian elite created a series of state controlled NGOs to insulate Russia from external interference (cf. en masse (Remington.] group of seven or so bankers who applied their vast wealth and inﬂuence to ensure the re-election of Boris El’tsin as President in 1996. One eﬀect of this is elaborated in connection with parties of power. yet for now it must suﬃce to say that it strengthen it.Despite the traditional understanding of constitutions as a relatively deep and structural variable. This make it subject to the cleavage / volatility situation as well as parties of power. During most of Yeltsin’s time as president.. it is highly dependent on the power arrangement. Figure 2: Theoretical model 5 Comparison of Russia and Ukraine Russia has an abundance of natural resources. the negative eﬀects of 17 . 2008: 394). that mined for natural resources. Russia privatised state-owned enterprises. 2007: 8).
The 2007 election follows this trend (cf. Another way to observe volatility in this period. is to observe the total number of parties. where Unity’s successor. and as noted in section 7. only four parties contested during the 1999 election. Natural resources is not playing as important a role in Ukraine as in Russia. mismanagement has prevented the Ukrainian state access to ”easy” money. They are decimated to 52 seats in 2003. despite the possibility of rents. Naftohaz. 2008: 395f). Thus. In 1999 the CPRF6 gained most votes among the poorest. 2007). and unemployment rates soared. appendix B). are also subject to volatility. In 1993 Russia’s Choice wins 70 seats. In 1995 it is reduced to meagre nine seats. whereas the new party. gained most votes among the richer (Remington. The majority of the people are ethnic Ukrainian. 6 The 7 This Communist Party of the Russian Federation is supported by the development in the GDP.2). only seven of those parties contested in the 1995 election (cf. United Russia. The CPRF. The growth in the supporters of United Russia is assumed to be explained by the growth in GDP7 (Rose. The system is administrated by a state energy company. Thus. appendix A). Because of the transition many people slided into powerty. 2007). The economic cleavage can be seen as a direct consequence of the privatisation or chock-theory in Russia. it is possible to argue that despite the presence of an indeed strong economic cleavage. In 1993 12 parties contested. volatility is high (cf. appendix C).). Ukraine is very diﬀerent from Russia in the sense that Ukraine is dominated by two large ethnic groups. Of the 1999 parties. This voter allignment is echoed in the 2003 election. United Russia. only four parties contested in 2003 (cf. The diﬀerence between rich and poor as measured by the Gini-index doubled (Remington. it is dependent on Russia. 2008: 391). Naftohaz is constantly on the bringe of bankruptcy and is indepted to the Russian energy-giant Gazprom (ibid. From 1999 it grows with an average of two to three percent (Remington. Of those 12 parties. 2008: 396). whereas Unity or Yeltsin’s party had greatest success among the wealthier (Rose. Russia holds a Duma election in 1993 and again in 1995. which is negative until 1998. but because of economic mismanagement. the Ukraine gas transit system transport around 120 billion cubic metres or 80 percent of Russia’s gas to Europe (Gnedina and Emerson. section 3.natural resources are found in connection with elections and the rentier eﬀect. battered its way unto the political stage with 222 seats. that beneﬁtted from the economic downturn. CPRF wins 103 seats in the same period. From the 1995 election. However. 2009: 2). These trends echo Madrid’s depiction of economic cleavages as susceptible to volatility. 18 .
However. To disconﬁrm the claim that Russians’ favour the left-wing because of economy. The latter being an essential part of the independence movement (D’Anieri. The same goes for 2007 (cf. Thus. 2002. These regional patterns are echoed in the 1998 election8 . and 2007 parliamentarian elections. Yeltsin’s supporters. 2001: 170). This draft gave the president lawmaking prerogatives. In the ﬁrst two elections they gained seats. 2006: 111). which is evidenced in the relative smaller changes in voting behaviour among those voting for the parties that manage to run for more than one election. Despite this very strong cleavage. 19 . 2005: 4). on the other hand. As is evidenced in appendix E the Russians continued to vote for pro-Russian parties. Yeltsin decided to take the matter outside the existing constitutional framework. there seems to be a degree of volatility in the Ukrainian party system. whereas from 1999 to 2002. 2001: 169).whereas the largest minority is ethnic Russian. The post-Soviet Yeltsin authored constitution was approved by referendum in 1993. and the ethnic Ukrainians backed Rukh. It is smaller than in Russia. it is plausible to argue that Yeltsin alienated other parts of the political arena as well as used will to get his draft approved (cf. only two countinues. Two distinct positions emerged.1 for 8 It is likely that the 1994 election follows these lines as well. Of the other parties three survive from 1994 to 1998. wanted to maximise presidential power and minimise the Duma’s ability to block Yeltsin (Remington. where presidential powers were limited. Of all the Ukrainian parties. While anti-Yeltsin deputies took part in a constitutional assembly. Gueorguiev and Schaechter. despite the strong cleavage. the Communist party is the most stable with the longest election record. whereas they lost seats in both the 2002 and 2007 election. 2001: 160f). section 6. it is worth noting that the Russians’ did not switch to a nonethnic based party during the strengthening of the Ukrainian GDP in the 2000s (Duenwald. 1998. where Russians in general backed the Communists. appendix D and E). 54. Yeltsin’s supporters sat up a presidential counterpart with the aim of creating a presidential constitution (Remington. This is also echoed in the 2002 parliamentarian election as well as the presidential elections (D’Anieri. but at the same time gave the Duma and the Upper Chamber the possibility of override vetoes by a two-thirds vote in each chamber (Remington. The Communist participated in the 1994. volatility is observed. Anti-Yeltsin forces sought to create a two-tiered form of government. 2001: 168). Thus.8 percent voted in favour of his draft (Remington. 2006: 108f). the run up to the approval was not void of trouble. and thus leaving the question with the people. While the Duma refused to approve the Yeltsin-draft.
an elaboration of the eﬀects). This reform transferred power from the president to the prime minister (D’Anieri. The ﬁrst Ukrainian constitutional document was approved in 1995 called the ”law on power”. As depicted in section 3. but the high court decided that if Kuchma proposed a referendum supported by the people that demanded change of the constitution.2 only strong parties of power are interesting. and pushed the constitution through the Rada (D’Anieri. While Gill (2006: 70) mentions Yegor Gaidar’s Russia’s Choice as a semi-oﬃcial party. when Kuchma attempted to amend the constitution. which dominates the Duma with 222 seats in 2003 and 315 in 2007 (cf. appendix A). Another constitutional battle emerged in 2000. Thus. This was resisted by the Rada (D’Anieri. the Ukrainian constitution is approved by ﬁst. He used the unpopularity of the Rada and the threat of referendum to make the Rada approve his package. as speciﬁed in section 3. which was approved in 2005. 2006: 91). as the Rada repealled the reforms of the constitution in 2004. Secondly. 2006: 71. United Russia has clear connections to the Russian presidency in the sense 20 . 2006: 92). yet it did not consist of any actual text to be replaced in the constitution. Once again Kucha threatened the Rada with his ﬁst. However. the Ukrainian Rada was never in agreement with Kuchma and put up a ﬁerce ﬁght. contrary to the Russian case. Kuchma went outside the existing framework. which was aﬄiated with Putin. Feher’s argument regarding will-based constitutions seem to have merit in the Ukrainian case. appendix B and C). which would give him powers. and as Rada speaker. Unity contests the 1999 election and wins 73 seats. Thus. which is 40 less than the Communists. as in Russia. Hence. and succeeded by United Russia (Gill. alienating parts of the political society. the constitution was perceived as the lesser of two evils. The 1995 ”Law on Power” is a package suggested by then-president Kuchma. which made the Rada approve the amendments (D’Anieri. the parliament would otherwise not grant him. it does not receive the same status as United Russia. Oleksandr Moroz argued. 2006: 95). 73). whereas a real constitution was put in eﬀect in 1996. in both cases. As in Russia much of the debate revolved around whether Ukraine should take a presidential or semi-presidential path. A real power of party did not manifest itself in Russia until Unity. 2006: 90). Russia’s Choice disappears practically in 1995 (cf.2. 2006: 84). There was great support for the referendum. In relation with the constitution of 1996. a real signiﬁcant party of power is only United Russia. Kuchma used the same tactics as above. the Rada was legally binded to change it (D’Anieri. where he had more power.
Kuchma attempted to rewrite the constitution to his liking. yet also diﬀerent. 2003: 47). whereas the only Ukrainian party of power.2 argues that the problem is only severe if the party is cohesive. but in 2007. The party wins 101 seats. whereas the research question is answerd in section 8. There is little doubt that Russia and Ukraine are alike in many ways. disappeared in the following election. The hypotheses are answered in the sections related to the case study 6. As depicted above. albeit Ukraine’s Rada has put up signiﬁcant resistence every time. This is not to the same extent the case in Ukraine. 21 . which is dominated by an ethnic cleavage. is to be the next party of power. and becomes the second largest party in the Rada in 2002. it is fair to assume that in time. in Russia. Remington and Smith. identify For a United Ukraine9 as a party of power. especially United Russia might in fact be a serious problem for Russian democracy. United Russia has dominated Russian politics since 2003. For a United Ukraine. 1998: 434) party cohesion is higher than expected in the ﬁrst elections to the Duma. that in turn affects the possibility of creating parties of power. the party disappeared (cf. and the constitution. the party of power. the Russian party system is much more volatile than the Ukrainian. the Russian party leaders have become better at maintaining cohesion. Thus. because Kutchma links himself with the party. According to Haspel et al. though he did not declare himself a member. however. In Ukraine there is no clear equivalent to United Russia. Section 3. appendix D and E). Thus. Thus.that United Russia is formed by Putin during his ﬁrst tenure (Almond et al. D’Anieri (2006: 93f) does. 2008: 82). it is plausible to argue that the checks and balances in Russia are weakened because of the weak party system. volatility. While they do not evaluate the latest elections. ((Haspel. 9 For a United Ukraine is an electoral alliance consisting of among other Janukovich’s Party of Regions (Kuzio.. because the next election to the Rada is set to be hold in 2012. which endorses Janukovich. It is unclear whether Party of Regions. Table 2 summarises. Ukraine has a presidential constitution. Like Russia.
Table 2: Comparison of Russia and Ukraine Explanans Transition Stalemate Stalemate Transit tax Cleavage Both Plenty Volatile President None Natural resources Party system Constitutional autor PoP United Russia Imbalanced Balanced Balancing Constants Legacy Russian Russian Economic level Russia Above Ukraine Above 22 .
2001: 73). Hence. 2001: 63). the Russian political system is biased in favour of the presidency as of 1993.1 Russia Russia gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. and as argued in section 5 the CPRF gained votes as the Russian GDP dwindled. The run up to the 1993 constitution evidenced the diﬀerences between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet. decided to turn against his former ally. the deputies would have to give up their seats just one year before the election in 1999. however. which created a deadlock between the Supreme Soviet and the president. of reasons unknown. The Russian Constitution demands that any prime minister must be approved by the Duma. the pro-presidential constitution pushed through a prime minister not very popular among the deputies of the Duma. Yeltsin resisted. yet the third time. To fully understand this claim. The Duma rejected Kiryenko twice. the Duma approved (Babayeva and Dokuchayev. and call for elections to the Duma. The crisis. as it became. The dominance did not last. and thus parties depending on this cleavage. his goal was to deprive the president of any control over the presidency in an attempt to make him a cerimonial ﬁgurehead (Nichols. However. was in 1994 dominated by Yegor Gairdar’s Russia’s Choice. Khasbulatov.The leader of the Supreme Soviet. 2001: 65). as the Russian parliament was called before 1993. The process tracing follows a historical narrative structured around ﬁgure 2. Yeltsin.6 Case study In section 5 table 2 argues that the Russian political system is imbalanced in favour of the presidency. where deputies passed laws counteracting Yeltsin’s decrees (Nichols. 1998). a process tracing of each case is conducted. however. the president must dissolve the Duma. are susceptible to ﬂuctuations in 23 . This is best evidenced in the battle between Yeltsin and the Duma regarding the nomination and approval of prime minister Kiriyenko. whereas the Ukrainian is relatively more balanced. the successor of the Supreme Soviet. with a result favouring Yeltsin’s position. If the Duma rejects the prime minister three times. This struggle is brieﬂy sketched out in section 5. Had the Duma refused to approve Kiriyenko. The newly elected Duma. In 1995 the CPRF becomes the next dominating party. was a power-struggle between elites seeking to gain control over each other (Nichols. Thus. and to categorise the Russian and Ukrainian regimes. it did not get a democratically elected parliament and new constitution before 1993. 6. This lends credence to the notion that the main cleavage of the Russian Duma is economic.
whereas after 2004. the president appoints the governors (Baker. a presidential constitution together with a volatile party system leaving space for a party of power controlling the Duma. 2008: 389). Putin had constructed an eﬀective parliamentarian control through his party of power. with the creation of a succesful and lasting party of power. 1997). Putin. 2004).the economy. section 2. tilted the checks and balances in favour of the Russian presidency. However. Putin. 2007: 8). As depicted above. it is only in relation with the presidential elections. then-president Yeltsin did not have the same political resources at his disposal as his successor. because of the reinforced cleavages. denied Yeltsin’s opponents air time in their media (Remington.2. 24 . is best depicted by Yeltsin’s attempt to bury the founder of the USSR. it clearly manifests itself. at the time of the greatest deprivation of the Russian people. Putin. Despite the argument brought forth in section 4. the space for a party of power grew together with its negative eﬀect on the checks and balances. natural resources entered the political system through private sponsorship (Duncan. which in turn gives the presidency even more control over the political arena. The 1996 election proves to be an example of how private sponsorship works albeit by proxy. The media or the proxy. Before 2004 they were elected. owned by the oligarchs. Hence. 2005) To sum up. His attempt failed because at the time the CPRF dominated the Duma and ardently refused any such action (AP. Another example is the ﬁnalising takeover of Gazprom in 2005 (Denisov and Grivach. During the ﬁrst post-Soviet presidency. Yeltsin proposed to ask the Russians whether Lenin should be buried or not. had no opposition against nationalising key industries. A prime example of the diﬀerence in power over the political arena between Yeltsin and his successor. Putin gets a parliamentarian tool by which he can change the way Russia is governed as well as nationalise key industries and thus use the natural resources to his advantage. The election of 2003 gives Putin’s United Russia overwhelming support. the Duma was strongest. United Russia.2). and thus makes it the new dominating party of the Duma. This role evaporates as the GDP increases. while Yeltsin was not able to bury Lenin because he lacked parliamentarian support. When the economic cleavage weakend. which he used to among other gain control of the Russian governors. however. Vladimir Lenin in 1997.1 regarding the resource beneﬁt. This gives the CPRF a central role during the 1990s as seen in connection with the hestitated approval of Kiryenko. Russian democracy never consolidated because the elite never accepted the democratic game (cf. Hence.
Thus. which gave them a strong basis for secession. Contrary to the Russian case.3). 2006: 118) As evidenced in section 5 there is a battle between Kuchma and the Rada. appendix D and Anieri (2006: 108) for expected future indications of alignments based on section 3. because of Janukovich’s succefull attempt to boost presidential powers once again (BBC. section 2. and as described in section 4.2 Ukraine Before embarking on the process tracing. Precisely because of the placement of Ukrainian ethnicities. whereas ethnic Ukrainians live in the western and northern part of Ukraine. were aware of this. Janukovich followed Yushenko as president in 2010. Thus. and thus the Orange Revolution is seen more as an interlude between Kuchma and Janukovich than a deﬁning event. they made the necessary compromises (D’Anieri. it is possible to argue in favour of a classiﬁcation of Russia as a civilian autocracy from the time of the creation of United Russia. Ethnic Ukrainian nationalists. the ﬁrst Ukrainian parliamentarian election took place before the approval of their constitution. because of its ability to dismantle the Duma as a check on the presidency (cf.2 and Madrid’s conception of the weight of ethnicity as a structuring cleavage. the Orange Revolution deserves a short note. Hence. any further elaborations on the topic is not conducted. supported Kuchma in his amendments of the constitution as well as in the dismissal of Yushenko as prime minister in the 2000s (D’Anieri. In relation with hypothesis H1. these cleavages became pivotal in the design of the pre-constitutional Ukrainian institutions. Thus. it seems evident that it is conﬁrmed. the ethnic-Russian party. 25 . the question of cleavages and volatility is elevated to a premier position as an essential determining factor of the future outlook of Ukrainian politics. The ethnic Russians primarily live in the eastern and southern part of Ukraine. who put a high value on avoiding secession. Hence. structured around ethnic cleavages (cf. In 1994. the possibility of especially ethnic Russian secession was a possibility.2 took another ethnic group into consideration. Yushenko was president from 2005 to 2010 with both Timoshenko and Janukovich as prime ministers. It brought Yushenko to power when Janukovich’s election fraud was revealed. 2010). the Communist. 2007: 23). that in turn gave the presidency to a pro-Russian president and a signiﬁcant amount of seats to ethnic-Russian parties. the Ukranians elected a new Rada. 6.2.). where the popular change of the incumbent is unlikely.They instead attempted and succeeded in manipulating the political game to their advantage thus creating a system. Thus.
yet it is not large enough to play a similar role as natural resources. albeit succesful. Hence. never manage to be elected more than once.2. The alliance did. 2006: 92). eventhough these attempts were succesful. a real party of power never manifested. and 2000. As depicted above regarding the constitution. they could criticise Kuchma (ibid. had he had a successful party of power. section 4. In the following election in 2007 one of the members of the alliance. This is best evidenced in the pro-presidential and primarily ethnic Rusian supported alliance dubbed For a United Ukraine. 2006: 88f). and the lack of a party of power. however.). As demonstrated in section 5.3). the constitution is changed in 1995. 2005: 133). though limited to its ethnic supporter base because of the cleavages structuring the Rada (cf. are considered a source of income similar to that of natural resources. assuming that Party of Regions is the next party of power.). the Party of Regions headed by former pro-Russian presidential candidate. It clearly shows that a parliament structured around 26 . won 175 seats in the Rada (cf. Kuchma still needed to create informal institutions in order to for his regime to function as he wanted (Way. Because of the strong cleavages. Kuchma’s attempts to change it as well as the informal institutions indicate that his did not. and it is likely that any future Ukrainian party of power will face other signiﬁcant blocs. Thus. Ukraine does not have access to natural resources comparable to that of Russia’s. appendix E). Thus. This gave them a platform by which. whereas the Russian constitution served Yeltsin well. 1996. deputies enjoyed. it lessened Kuchma’s need to weaken the Rada (D’Anieri.During Kuchma’s tenure. it faced a signiﬁcant opposition in the Timoshenko bloc in 2007 (cf. attempts. the negative eﬀect from such sources of income are more or less absent in Ukraine. Kuchma could not shape the constitution as he saw ﬁt. Kuchma could not attack the g opposition for critism. Kuchma’s arm-wrestling with the Rada could have been avoided. echoing Feher’s argument. which might indicate a new party of power in Ukraine. Rents from Russian gas on its way to the European market. and needed institutions such as processes designed to harass the opposition and falsify election results (ibid. Janukovich. is the deputies’ repeal of reforms (D’Anieri. To sum up. However. While the Duma is void of any signiﬁcant opposition to United Russia. situates the diﬀerent positions vis-` a-vis the negotiation regarding the constitution. during its time. This is evidenced in the three. strong cleavages manifested in a parliament prior to the approval of a constitution. Yet. appendix E). Another indirect eﬀect of the constitution. This is also evidenced in the immunity. Yet because of strong cleavages.
The latter concept is expanded by Tolstrup (undated: 7f) as economic and technocratic or political among other. Thus. In this section. Whereas Russia is subject to a pressure from the West. seemed to be very interested in following the constitution. Kuchma was not willing to accept the rules of democracy. The parliament on the other hand. 2009: 46). 2005: 21f). Hence. only Yushenko seemed to respect the rules of democracy. cleavages seem to be the explanan that most clearly determines Ukraine’s fate. It might also be worth noting that this situation enhanced the power of the Russian minority and their parties. Especially the American Treasure invested a lot of political time on reforms. the question is brieﬂy assessed through an evaluation of leverage or power to aﬀect other contries. Thus. which lends albeit limited credence to the alternative hypothesis HA. Another eﬀect of these cleavages is that of the room for a party of power. lies in the compromise made and hence the cleavages. 2005: 101). 7 Considering an alternative explanation The theoretical model does not take external factors into consideration. Russia has an interest in Ukraine because of the Russians and the Black 27 . They feared that foreign NGOs might attempt to incite a colour revolution just like the one neighbouring Ukraine experienced (Ambrosio. the foundation for those battles. The situation in Ukraine is diﬀerent. Western leverage over Russia is best evidenced through the opening of the Russian market during Yeltsin’s tenure (Desai. During Putin’s tenure.stable cleavages are in a much better position to resist encroachments. among the Ukrainian presidents. 2005: 100). he ”overthrew” the constitution through will. democracy fares better in Ukraine because of the relatively more balanced institutions. which at times favoured a stronger presidency. Thus. the leverage was not as much a concern as foreign NGOs. and at numerous occassions. 2009: 51). Russian elites used the fear of a potential coup to crack down on independent NGOs such as those dealing with human rights and democracy (Ambrosio. The leverage dwindled as Russia’s GDP grew. and linkage as the integration with a certain region (Levitsky and Way. they deemed necessary for Russia (Desai. To postulate that the Ukrainian democracy is consolidated is premature. and thus forcing the president outside the formal framework. Thus. Cleavages reduced the room that would otherwise have limited the ability of the parliament to act as a check on the presidency. Ukraine is subject to a pressure from the West as well as Russia. described above.
Thus. it depends on the decision to utilise them to repress. got extensive support from Russia for his election campaign. The ﬁrst position to discuss is Russias abundance of natural resources and its constitution. and the support of Janukovich. However.1. Firstly. yet 28 . whereas the technocratic linkage is depicted in the relationship between United Russia and Party of Regions. on the other hand managed to remain relatively balanced because of its party system and the lack of a party of power. 2009: 145). despite this support the pro-western Yushenko won. Instead Russia attempted to undermine Yushenko’s eﬀorts to democratise by denouncing his attempts as well as adopting confrontational policies toward Kiev (Ambrosio. which they do not want to loose (Ambrosio. Ukraine. yet failed. Janukovich. The pro-Russian Kuchma’s sucessor.1 based on Ross’ arguments that natural resources impede democracy. there is a strong Russian interest in Ukraine as well as space to exert inﬂuence.It is claimed in section 3. 2009: 135). Ukraine is dependent on Russian energy (ibid. as shown in section 4. Despite being a brief interlude between the primary arguments of this paper and the discussion. Russia failed to consolidate its democracy because of its imbalanced political system favouring the presidency. The Orange Revolution is perhaps the best example of a time where Russia needed to inﬂuence Ukrainian politics. Thus. the discussion focuses on the Russian failure to remain on a democracy consolidating path using Ukraine as a mirror.Sea Fleet. and ath the same time. The economic linkage between Russia and Ukraine is best evidenced through the Ukrainian natural resource dependecy. The former has shook of western leverage through growth in GDP albeit paranoia has made the Russian elite harass foreign NGOs. Thus. it gives at least a couple of points worth noting. Then-prime minister Timoshenko criticised the agreement as an illegal attempt to inﬂuence Ukrainian politics. yet as evidenced. 8 Discussion and conclusion As depicted above in section 5 and 6.). United Russia and Janukovich’s Party of Regions established formal ties in order to help the party in the upcomming 2006 Rada elections. whereas the latter seems very susceptible to Russian inﬂuence. albeit this inﬂuence is not succesful at times. leverage and linkage is taken serious in both Russia and Ukraine.2. natural resources must be transferred to the political system through political actors. Mainwaring and Shugart rightfully argue that much depends on the institutional design.
1 Diﬀusion versus the rest Until know the core explanations of this paper has been discussed. At the same time. even in functional democracies.2 as intrinsic to the preservation of Ukrainian democracy as a structuring factor as well as preventing parties of power. Russian parties are more cohesive than expected.2). The key argument within the framework of the scope conditions in favour of the resource curse. is the practice in Russia (cf. In the ﬁnal part of this discussion. volatility does not necessary damage the regime. are not very cohesive. There are not many young democracies with communist origin in these regions (cf. Another criticism of natural resources as depicted by Ross and used in this paper. Thus. As D’Anieri puts it. is primarily based on the Middle East and Latin America. Parties of power are considered to have a negative eﬀect on both the Russian and Ukrainian parliament. section 1 and the scope conditions). and Ukraine’s cleavages do not necessary beneﬁt its regime. as depicted in section 2. Thus it might be diﬃcult to assess the impeding character of natural resources on newly created democracies. section 5). section 6. Thus. However. However. section 2. which might lend crendence to the damaging eﬀects of such parties. The Russian case evidences this as well. it seems evident that a Russian party of power damages the horizontal accountability of the Duma. a party of power is not necessary a problem. diﬀusion is tested vis-` a-vis the rest. The best argument in favour of cleavages is that some cleavages seem to be a better foundation for a party system than others. As brought forth by Haspel et al. several consolidated western democracies go through periods of relatively high volatility vis-` a-vis the general norm. The party system is considered a prime explanan in section 6.1.as shown in the Ukrainian case. Kuchma does not need to weaken the Rada anymore (cf. the volatility Russia experiences are not necessary a democracy delimiting phenomenon. It depends on its cohesiveness. the Ukrainian case exempliﬁes a situation where the party system is perhaps too polarised thus making it very diﬃcult for the presidency to have a fruitful relationship with the parliament.2 and Linz and Stepan). there might be cases where fairly large and dominating parties. This is depicted in both section 5 and section 6. On the other hand. as Pedersen (1979: 9) shows. 8. with the creation of For a United Ukraine. Russia is plagued by a volatile party system. Neither the Russian nor Ukrainian party system seem to embody such cleavages. The strength and 29 .3. Thus. Thus. presidents can go outside the constitutional framework (cf.
Thus. had they wanted it. The Ukrainian party system depicts a situation where Russian attempts to utilise leverage has been futile not only during the Orange Revolution. The ethnic-Russian parties could probably have received some support for secession. Thus. However.2 Conclusion The research question proped the puzzle of why Russia slided into autocracy whereas Ukraine did remain somewhat stable in the same period. It might have been very diﬃcult considering the domination of CPRF and later the proSoviet United Russia. as history has evidenced. dominated by ethnic 30 . but also during the ﬁrst ten years of Ukrainian independence. Party of Regions. 8. if diﬀusion has any merit in this case. And precisely these natural resources as well as the energy dependency might have made United Russia capable of making a deal with the potential party of power. the acquisition and renationalisation of Russian natural resources gave it a chance to insulate itself from state-to-state pressure. thus aligning them among proUkraine candidates. the party system showed stronger signs of volatility because of the economic cleavage than the Ukrainian. Because of its pro-Russian stance it might alienate the ethnic Ukrainian population. table 2. A party of power (or even a dominating party such as the CPRF) might pose a serious problem for anyone attempting to utilise leverage in a parliamentarian setting.2). section 6. albeit it might have something to do with the renewed wealth from the natural resources as depicted above.thus wealth certainly reduces any leverage any country might face. The straight forward answer is that Russia scored negatively on all the explanans and in particular on the party system and party of power (cf. The lack of successful leverage vis-` a-vis the Russians in Ukraine might be explained by a weak Russia. it is important to remember that Party of Regions is not a party that encapsulates the entire population. United Russia is clearly a party of power that is not susceptible to utilised leverage. the question of resources bolster the diﬀusion explanation. This made it diﬃcult to remain on a consoldiation path because of the imbalances created by these very scores. Hence. but it is clear that the West succesfully exerted leverage over the Russian president. the ethnic Russians and their parties did not move forward with secession (cf. it has the potential of causing more harm than good to the Russian case. It is not known whether the West attempted to inﬂuence the Russian Duma. The resource wealth also helped Russia to build new organisations as well as ousting other organisations in order to protect the current Russian regime. In Russia. However.
the oppositional character of the Russian Duma disappeared. Diﬀusion plays a role. and thus. While external factors are excluded in the theoretical model as depicted in ﬁgure 2. and no party of power.1 show that there are signs of diﬀusion. Section 7 and 8. Such allies might enhance the chance of succesful diﬀusion. yet they are not determining the outcome of neither Russia nor Ukraine. easy rents are not as accessible as if the state nationalised it.1 the idea that natural resources impede democracy was somewhat conﬁrmed. The theoretical model addresses democratic development in the long run. It seems evident that certain conditions qua the results of this paper must be fulﬁlled if succesful diﬀusion has to take place. The Ukrainian case reveals that Ukraine scored better on the explanans. The process tracing revealed that with the creation of United Russia. If they are privatised. leverage is most clear during Yeltsin’s tenure. In Russia. a constitution not overly presidential. Thus. This is why the Orange Revolution is unimportant. the model is not seriously impeded by the introduction of diﬀussion. and thus the elite cannot use them as depicted in section 7. The second condition is related to that of the strength of allies such as strong parties in the state in question. 31 . The Russian determined to continue to exert inﬂuence in Ukraine paid oﬀ as Janukovich later got elected. yet its importance is dwarfed by that of party system and party of power. their eﬀect was minor. the real transformative eﬀect of diﬀusion depends on the endurance of the state. strong cleavags. This is best depicted in the short term eﬀect of the Orange Revolution and the return of the old modus operandi.cleavages. Hence. whereas Russian linkage is very clear in connection with Janukovich’s failed attempt to become Kuchma’s sucessor. It had no natural resources. Hence short term attempt leaves long term eﬀects with the explanans. this eﬀect might be of minor importance. yet depending on the commitment from the state exerting diﬀusion. Especially the latter three explanans owe their postive score to the strong cleavages. were able to maintain a more stable system securing consolidation. if the West was involved in the Orange Revolution. As evidenced in section 6. The ﬁrst condition is the ownership of the natural resources.
‡) Involves both SMD and PR seats. Source: Rose (2011) 32 . †) Total number of parties / Participated in the prior election.A Appendix I: Duma elections in 1993 and 1995 1993 1995 Seats 70 54 48 23 33 23 19 15 4 2 1 1 Party (17/7)† Communist Party Liberal Democratic Party Our home is Russia Yabloko Agrarian Party of Russia Power to the People Russia’s Choice Congress Russian Communities Ivan Rybkin Bloc Women of Russia Forward Russia! Pamﬁlova–Gurov–Lysenko Bloc Union of Labour Communists of the USSR Workers’ Self-Government Stanislav Govorukhin Bloc Russian Unity and Concord Seats† 157 51 55 45 20 9 9 5 3 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 77 Party (12) Russia’s Choice Liberal Democratic Party Communist Party Women of Russia Agrarian Party of Russia Yabloko Russian Unity and Concord Democratic Party of Russia Movement for Democratic Reforms Dignity and Charity Civic Union Future of Russia Independents 146 Independents Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election.
B Appendix II: Duma elections in 1999 and 2003 1999 2003 Seats 113 73 68 29 17 20 7 2 2 1 1 1 114 Party (12/4)† United Russia Communist Party Motherland Liberal Democratic Party People’s Party Yabloko Agrarian Party of Russia PVR-RPZh: Rebirth–Party of Life Union of Right Forces New Course: Automobile Russia Development of Enterprise Great Russia-Eurasian Union Independents Seats‡ 222 52 37 36 17 4 2 3 3 1 1 1 68 Party (12/4) Commmunists Party Unity Fatherland–All Russia Union of Right Forces Liberal Democratic Party Yabloko Our Home Is Russia Movement in Support of the Army Russian People’s Union Party of Pensioners Russian Socialist Party Spiritual Heritage Independents Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election. ‡) Involves both SMD and PR seats. Source: Rose (2011) 33 . †) Total number of parties / Participated in the prior election.
C Appendix III: Duma elections in 2007 2007 Party (4/2)† United Russia Communist Party Liberal Democrats Fair Russia Independents Seats‡ 315 57 40 38 - Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election. ‡) Involves both SMD and PR seats. Source: Rose (2011) 34 . †) Total number of parties / Participated in the prior election.
‡) Involves both SMD and PR seats.D Appendix IV: Rada elections in 1994 and 1998 1994± 1998∓ Seats 86 25 18 15 14 11 7 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 Party (19/3)† Communists Rukh Socialist / Village Popular democrats Hromada Greens Social Democrats (United) Progressive Socialists Agrarians National Front Reforms and Order Party of Regional Revival Forward Ukraine! Christian Democratic Party NEP Social liberal union Working Ukraine Razom Menshe sliv Seats‡ 122 46 34 29 23 19 17 16 8 5 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 116 Party (17) Communists Rukh Peasant Party Interregional bloc for reforms Socialist party Republican Party Congress of Ukrainian nationalists Communist party of Crimea Party of Democratic Renewal Labour Party Democratic Party Ukranian National Assembly Social Democratic Party Civic Congress Conservative Republican Party Christian Democratic Party Soyuz Independents 136 Independents Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election. Source: ±) Bojcun (1995: 239) ∓) Birch and Wilson (1999: 1040) 35 . †) Total number of parties / Participated in the prior election.
People’s Self-defense Communist Party Lytvyn bloc Seats‡ 175 156 72 27 20 Party (10/2) Our Ukraine For a United Ukraine Communist party Soc. *) Re-run of parliamentarian election of 2006. party of Ukraine (United) Socialist Party of Ukraine Timoshenko bloc Democratic Party of Ukraine Unity Party of National Economic Revival Ukrainian Marine Party Independents Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election. ‡) Involves both SMD and PR seats. dem. †) Total number of parties / Participated in the prior election.E Appendix V: Rada elections in 2002 and 2007 2002± 2007∓* Seats 110 101 66 24 22 22 4 3 1 1 93 Party (5/2)† Party of Regions Timoshenko bloc Our Ukraine . Source: ±)Herron and Johnson (2003: 19) ∓) Copsey (2008: 300) 36 .
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