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Kim Andersen January 8, 2012
1 Introduction 2 Theoretical introduction 2.1 2.2 2.3 Democracy and autocracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Consolidation of democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Checks and balances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 9 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 23 23 25
3 Introducing the explanans 3.1 3.2 3.3 Natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Party system and party of power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 Methodological approach 4.1 4.2 Most similar systems design and process tracing . . . . . . . . . . Operationalisation and causal links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.3 4.2.4 4.3 Natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Party system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Party of power (PoP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Author of the constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Theoretical model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5 Comparison of Russia and Ukraine 6 Case study 6.1 6.2 Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7 Considering an alternative explanation 8 Discussion and conclusion 8.1 8.2 Diﬀusion versus the rest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
27 28 29 30 32 33 34 35 36
A Appendix I: Duma elections in 1993 and 1995 B Appendix II: Duma elections in 1999 and 2003 C Appendix III: Duma elections in 2007 D Appendix IV: Rada elections in 1994 and 1998 E Appendix V: Rada elections in 2002 and 2007
Both Russia and Ukraine became independent of the Soviet Union in 1991, and as “young” countries, their democratic history have been turbulent. Executive and legaslative arm-wrestling over power-sharing has been the norm rather than the exception. Despite these scuﬄes, Ukraine managed to embark on a consolidation course, whereas Russia slided into autocracy as depicted in ﬁgure 1. Thus, the research question sounds, Why did Russia slide into autocracy, whereas Ukraine remained somewhat stable in the same period. Figure 1: Democratic development in Russia and Ukraine according to Freedom House
Notes: Scores are an addition of political rights and civil liberties, and as such, most only be seen as a rough estimate. Source: Freedom-House (2011)
The understanding of the research question entails three pivotal components of democracy. First of all, a clear deﬁnition of democracy is needed. Secondly, yet equally important, the utilisation of Linz and Stepan as well as Schedler’s theoretical conceptualisation of consolidation is needed. Thirdly, to consolidate 3
democracy, a functional political system is needed, and this depends on the checks and balances especially between the presidency and parliament. Hence, this paper deals with the question of democratic consolidation and encroachment through a battery of structural and actor explanans derived from these theoretical understandings. Thus, it is the structure-actor dichotomy that acts as the central structure of the paper. The demise and collapse of democracy has often been related to a presence of natural resources such as oil and minerals (Ross, 2001: 356f). Yet these modernisation theorists, who forward these theoretical understandings, have only developed a conceptual understanding of the eﬀects of natural resources on the state apparatus and its relationship with its population. They have not delved upon how natural resources enters the system. Often it has been assumed that states autocratise and then use the resources to bolster the regime. This paper attempts to develop an understanding of how natural resources enter the political system. The argument is developed in section 3.1. For now it must suﬃce to say that the interplay between natural resources, party system, constitution, and party of power determine the eﬀectiveness of the checks and balances. This is answered by utilising a “Most Similar Systems Design” bolstered by “Process tracing”. Finally, the scope conditions of this paper needs to be stated. First of all, the focus is new democracies. Functioning democracies such as Norway, have access to natural resources, yet because of the consolidated nature of these democracies, they do not get impeded. Thus, the countries of interest are those that can be considered newly constituted democracies embarking on a consolidation course. Finally, these countries must have realised their natural resources and privatised these former state assets. Hence, this paper is limited to post-communist countries and in particular the former Soviet Union. The next section deals with the theoretical introduction, whereas the third section elaborates on the explanans. The fourth and the ﬁfth section depict the theoretical model and the methodological approach, whereas section six and seven compares and elaborates on the comparison through process tracing. The eighth section delves brieﬂy upon the question of diﬀusion as an alternative explanation. The last section discuss and concludes.
This section sets out to develop an understanding of democracy and autocracy. Hereafter it continues with the question of consolidation and ﬁnally addresses
Such elections stress the importance of a balanced polity.). One deﬁning democracy as involving competitive elections and a balanced polity. 5 . and hence the system is arbitrary1 . The ﬁrst deﬁnition that needs to be elucidated is that of democracy understood as minimalist democracy. who deﬁne three types of autocracy by stressing three types of leadership. he leaves the electorate with the task of electing the deliberating leadership (Moller and Skaaning. Hence. Thus. who subscribes to a minimalist deﬁnition. forthcomming). section 2. to capture these countries. which is exercising power within illdeﬁned formal limits but with predictable norms. Linz and Stepan (1996: 38f) deﬁne autocracy as a political system with limited pluralism. because an imbalanced polity would be able to make encroachments on the meaningfulness of competitive elections (cf. The polity is biased in favour of the leadership. It is important to stress the competitive element of elections. yet he denounces this as a possibility. who argue that minimalist democracy includes competitive elections (Moller and Skaaning. The second deﬁnition is that of autocracy. 2010: 271). the number of cases is reduced to western democracies. The leadership-type that is relevant in this paper is the one where there are no hereditary succession nor usage of titles as well as no military involvment. using a deﬁnition with many intensions such as liberal democracy. Thus. This paper deals with cases that are far from being liberal democracies. There is no guiding ideology. The understanding of the leadership is further developed by Cheibub et al. democracy is an arena where deliberation takes place. Deﬁnitions are as numerous as there are regimes claiming the name of democracy. The right deﬁnition of democracy depends on the cases.1 Democracy and autocracy Democracy is a contested concept. The Ogden-Richards triangle shows the relationship between the intension of the deﬁnition and the number of cases or extensions. and thus mobilisation is not prevalent. 2. According to Schumpeter. This type of autocracy is deﬁned as civilian (ibid. 1 This proposition is supported by the lack of rule of law. This position is echoed by Moller and Skaaning. yet have signiﬁcant democratic as well as autocratic traits. this paper involves two distinct deﬁnitions. It is also important to note that there are no checks and balances. and the other involving autocracy deﬁned as a polity without elections and a guiding ideology.checks and balances as are needed for the functioning of democracy. (2010: 87). To sum up. two deﬁnitions suitable of these cases are needed. The government is leaded by a small group.3).
and reversibility.] political situation in which [. the constitutional dimension requires that actors within the state solve issues through laws. The conﬁdence in the regime.2 Consolidation of democracy Linz and Stepan (1996: 6) argue that consolidation of democracy requires behavioural. 1998: 6 . It might also be the creation of hegemonic parties in order to strangle electoral competition as well as the abuse of state resources by the incumbents in order to maintain power (Schedler. which is needed for it to avoid breakdown. many new democratic regimes faces.] the intermittent or gradual weakening of democracy by those elected to lead it. which develops an understanding of the direction of regime. can spend resources on developing alternatives to the democratic regime or attempt to secede. Democratic breakdown necessitates instability. 1998: 94ﬀ). political etc. The ﬁrst is the democratic breakdown.. Schedler (1998: 96) argues that a regime facing such threats.. 2.).” (Schedler. Their behavioural dimension entails that no actor. however. Schedler (1998: 93) argues that there are principally two dangers. young consolidating democracies faces. Thus.. and thus failed to shape pro-democratic attitudes in the population. The attitudinal dimension focuses primarily on the ordinary people. and constitutional changes. who have to accept democracy institutionally and procedurally as the most appropriate way to govern the state. is a regime that has not been able to eliminate disloyal players. is absent (Schedler. That is. Such gradual weakening is exempliﬁed by attacks on institutions of democracy such as elections or attempts to subvert the rule of law.” Because the focus of this paper is the attempt to consolidate democracy. erosion requires ”[. attitudinal. whether social.. whereas the second is the democratic erosion. Put bluntly. a consolidated democracy is the ”[.The next section deals with consolidation. the necessary behavioural changes among the (potential) ruling elites have not been thorough enough. procedures.. seen as essential to even minimalist democracies in order to maintain meaningful democratic elections.] democracy has become ’the only game in town’. it is not only the elimination of disloyal players that lacks. It is followed by one about checks and balances. the attempts to weaken democracy. The gradual democratic erosion is a problem. Finally. 1998: 97). it is important to dwell on the negative side of the consolidation process. and institutions (ibid. as Linz and Stepan (1996: 5) write. vulnerability. Using Linz and Stepan’s arguments. Schedler argues that if a regime is facing a breakdown. The regime has not been able to create the mass legitimacy. uncertainty..
convict. because of the possibility of solving these issues through a careful institutional design. Each branch has certain rights that can keep other branches in check. 2. 2008: 721). The perhaps most prominent example is the American system. 1990: 52f). as they too have popular backing. They are also able to deny the president legislation as well as taxes (Kousser and Ranney.3 Checks and balances Until now. might make the president more prone to get head-to-head with the parliament rather than settling the disputes (Linz. Mainwaring and Shugart (1997: 469) are not as pessimistic as Linz. 1990: 60). To sum up. it is in a favourable position to weaken other institutions such as the parliament. democratic consolidation is changes in elite behaviour. and the acceptance of the law as the ultimate arbiter of solutions to problems. The popular mandate given to the president through the direct election.). and remove a president as an example. the parliament are not necessary ready to give in. this paper has considered democracy and consolidation. Breakdown and erosion entail a negative development of Linz and Stepan’s three dimensions. the two chambers of Congress can impeach. Solutions to democracyrelated issues depends on the personality and style of the president (Linz.2. Diamond and Morlino argue that horizontal accountability is related to the ability of one institution to keep a check on another institution. This is what Linz deﬁnes as the problem of dual legitimacy. accountability rarely works horizontal. which has an elaborate seperation of powers between the Congress and the presidency among other. 2007: 277). Whereas the erosion of rule of law is an attack on the constitutional solution of problems as indicated by Linz and Stepan. If the presidency is only subject to the people. However. and at best vertical. The president. must be scrutinised. In illiberal systems. Following Schedler’s ”gradual weakening”-logic as depicted above. Schedler brought forth. but to fully grasp their relationship. the question of Diamond and Morlino’s (2005: xxi) horizontal accountability. the concept of checks and balances must be probed. These concerns follow Linz’ critique of the presidency. the state of the checks and balances is important if democracy 7 . on the other hand. as depicted in section 2. is able to veto Congress legislation (ibid. Thus. popular attitudes.97ﬀ). democratic erosion is very much a question of behaviour. To sum up. the concept of gradual weakening. implying that the president is not accountable to any institutions and only to the people (Hague and Harrop.
However. Kitschelt’s understanding of structure and actor based explanans needs elucidation. 8 .3. This lends credence to two hypotheses: H1: Imbalanced polities turn autocratic because the presidency is capable of encroaching parliamentarian power.has to have a chance to consolidate. the constitution must be seen as a shallow explanan dominated by actors because of Preuss’ arguments regarding the role of constitutions in newly established regimes. 3 Introducing the explanans As brieﬂy mentioned in the Introduction. As Mainwaring and Shugart correctly points out. Hence. the institutional design needs to balance the presidency and the parliament as well as create the necessary mechanisms that can provide solutions. deep or structural explanations trump its proximate or actor-based counterparts. and its eﬀect on checks and balances. party system. The explanan overview is depicted in table 1. as is evidenced in section 3. He does not deny the usefulness of the actor explanan. According to Kitschelt (2003: 74). presidential biased polities have greater maneuverability when it comes to encroaching the parliamentarian powers. Table 1: Overview of explanans Name Natural resources Party system Constitution Party of power Structure X X X X Actor Before delving on the explanans. Such complementary explanans diverge from situations where the deep course brings about the proximate explanan 2 Throughout the paper deep and structural are used intertwined for the same type of explanan like proximate. and thus have more maneuverability in manipulating the democratic institutions. the solution lies in the institutional design. and thus. and constitution as structural explanations. shallow and actor-based are used for the same type of explanan. yet he stresses that their role is to complement the deep explanan. It is tempting to deﬁne natural resources. HA: A balanced polity can consolidate. whereas a party of power as an actor explanation. the main structure of this paper is the structure-actor2 dichotomy.
as the deep explananw work through other explanans as depicted in ﬁgure 2 on page 17. 3. The party system is a structural explanan because it rests 9 . the beneﬁciary needs to gain access to the owner or (re)take the ownership. to dampen demands for democracy by reducing group activities or making pro-state groups that dominate the polity. to sum up. and these entry points are dependent on other explanans and most importantly. when the beneﬁciary can and does use the natural resources to his own gain. assuming that the natural resources are owned by private people. The repression eﬀect is the creation of a large state apparatus to repress demands for democracy often violently (Ross. natural resources have two points of entry. forthcomming). depending on the ownership. The latter scenario is not relevant in this paper. natural resources alienate the population from the political process. in this paper it is dependent on the measurement of party system and party of power. Hence. Secondly. That is. While natural resources have been considered a very deep and structural explanan. thus leaving the political system biased and unbalanced and not in a position to consolidate qua the behaviour of the elite. the question of how the incumbent gets access to these resources.2 Party system and party of power This section is built around the party system and the party of power. This is what Ross (2001: 335) deﬁnes as the rentier eﬀect. Thus. Thus. whereas Ross ﬁnds support for two diﬀerent eﬀects that emanates from natural resources (the rentier and represion eﬀect). to nationalise the natural resources the beneﬁciary needs control over the parliament in order to justify the action. 3. The negative eﬀect sets in. Whereas taxes involve the population (Moller and Skaaning. in both cases.and the outcome. Two qualiﬁcations are needed in order to fully grasp how natural resources enter. Firstly. but where the outcome is not connected to the proximate explanan. as well as one relating the two. he does not delve upon how the natural resources enter the polity in newly established and ﬂedging democracies. the existence of a party of power. before Ross’ two eﬀects set in.1 Natural resources Ross (2001: 356f) argues that the role of natural resources vis-` a-vis democracy is that of the impeder. 2001: 336). However. must be elucidated. the beneﬁciary or the incumbent gains an unfair advantage over other parties.
The stability of cleavags are thus essential to the stability of the party system. fragmentation as well as their age. but also on the absolute number. In this paper. They ﬁnd that parties dependent on ethnolinguistic. the urban-rural conﬂict. to change one’s ethnolinguistic position is impossible. and not very fragmented parties ﬂuctuating around such cleavages as class or ethnicity. the question of the strength of the stability or the level of volatility is of greatest importance. Fluctuations in the economy are likely to be translated into changes in voter preferences. The essential question is to investigate what leads to these movements of votes. or the classic worker-capitalist conﬂict3 . The explanation why this is so might be straight forward and follows the concept of deep and proximate explanans. volatility is dominated by substantial and structural factors. can be found in Lipset and Rokkan’s analysis of the party system dominating western Europe. 10 . however. Whereas it is easier to change one’s economic position.. as well as class-based cleavages are less subject to volatility (Madrid. old. 2005: 3). and fragmented parties are more volatile than their old. it is assumed that those cleavages structuring the Russian and Ukrainian party system fulﬁll these demands. The second argument is related to that of a party of power. which is. the most volatile parties are those dependent on economic cleavages. These cleavages structure the outlook of parties (Whiteﬁeld. it is expected that the voter moves when the economy moves. whereas the structural are related to the diﬀerent parties and their relationship. According to Aardal (1994: 220). According to Madrid (2005: 2). If choice of party is dependent on economy rather than ethnolinguistics. who deﬁne volatility as the ”[. This echoes the traits 3 Aardal delves into the demands of what constitutes a real cleavage. (2008: 82). personalistic in the sense that they are built around a small number of actors and thus void of any ideology. Madrid also argues that polarised party systems are less volatile.). Thus. Examples of more stable cleavages. 2002: 181) and hence the parliament.. according to Almond et al. religious.”. many. few and less fragmented counterparts (ibid. and its periphery. not only dependent on the type of parties. and territorial. a very stable party system is one dominated by few.] net change within the electoral party system resulting from individual vote transfers. young. The subtantial factors are related to the type of cleavage. The volatility of parties are. cleavages originate in diﬀerent conﬂicts such as the dichotomy between the centre of a country. Thus. Hence.on the cleavages created in society. To sumarise. Pedersen (1979: 3) quotes Ascher and Tarrow.
section 6. The American political system is an example of a system with a presidential party that acts as a check on even its own president. voting follows party-lines (Rose. 2008: 171). Rose writes that parliaments are able to hold the government accountable for abuses of power. Catch-all parties fares poorly in heavily structured party systems. This is because both parties in the United States are not very cohesive and at times have a weak discipline (Kousser and Ranney. in the British House of Commons. because of the alignments of the electorate. in 90 percent of all cases.. 2008: 738f). Hence. it might pose a serious challenge for the functioning of the parliament. According to Strom (1990: 566) it is a party that seeks to maximise electoral support.“ (Hague and Harrop. Depending on whether the party of power are cohesive and disciplined as in the British case or the opposite as in the American case.3. it is possible to say that a party of power with damaging capabilities is one that ﬂuctuates around leading actors. The United Kingdom might prove to be a very diﬀerent case. Thus. and ﬁnally dominates to such an extent that it is possible for the party to prevent the parliament from acting as a balancing institution.. where there are deep rooted cleavages. party discipline and cohesion are very high among members of the British House of Commons. the president cannot expect the party to shoulder all policies. the damaging eﬀect on the parliament as a check and balancing institution can be either small or large.1. it is not enough that it is built around an actor and is cohesive. However. Hence. it is only possible if the party system is volatile and thus susceptible to catch-all parties. a parliament is often in opposition to the presidency. it is important to relate such parties to that of the party system. with strong discipline and is cohesive. They are not inclined to change party. 2007: 245)..of the vote-seeking party often known as a catch-all party. As is depicted in section 2. to become damaging. it must also be dominating. to sum up. They argue that such parties are typical in new democracies such as Russia (cf. and especially in order for it to act as a check on the presidency. However.. a successful version of this type of party is not expected in countries.] party that outdistances all others [. and thus maximise control with the government. Before embarking on an elucidation of the structure of such parties and their damaging eﬀect.] is signiﬁcantly stronger than all the others. Sartori argues that a ”[. Yet. Depending on the internal dynamics of the party. 11 . Hence.
Two issues are worth mentioning in relation with section 2. and social habitudes of the people. One pivotal goal of such a constitutionally deﬁned setup.3 Constitution A constitution is a very unique explanan in the sense that it fuses the deep and proximate or actor-based explanans.. dispostions.” (my emphasis) (Preuss. Hence. He argues that it is the essential pillar upon which any high-quality democracy rests. civil liberties. and moral. the constitution deﬁnes the country’s political set up. is that of constitutional rule of law. 1992-93: 639).). thus making it the highest source of authority in any society only subject to the constitution itself. this section must elucidate both the structural components of the constitution as well as the actor-based components. tempers. accountability.] creates the political and institutional preconditions for the emergence of totally new social and political actors. 12 . which disclose themselves only in a long space of time. If the constitution 4 Although O’Donnell does not say it explicitly. It is proximate precisely because it is the written foundation of a country.” (Preuss. As an example. O’Donnell’s emphasis on the importance of the rule of law for liberal democracies echo these positions. 2004: 32)4 . and as mentioned above.] a constitution based on will can only endure as long as those persons whose wills backed the document. diﬀerent types of regimes occur.2. civil.. it is actors that deﬁne the constitution. Thus.. 1992-93: 642).] made by the peculiar circumstances. it assumed that the type of rule of law he deals with.. Feher argues that ”[. Preuss’ (1992-93: 641) argues that the constitution ”[. Constitutional superiority is echoed by Sieyes.” (Preuss. It ensures political rights. is to place the elected representation over all other branches of government (Preuss. occasions. Hence. while it is plausible to argue that there are structural factors that shape these moods and habitudes. which entails authors and interests. One prominent constraint mentioned by Preuss is that of the former regime. who stresses that ”No type of delegated power can in any way alter the conditions of its delegation. which in one way or the other inspires the founding fathers of the new polity (ibid.. and a limitation on the prerogatives of the state (O’Donnell. 1992-93: 653). The proximate component of the constitutional explanan is vested in Burke’s argument that constitutions are ”[.3. Easter (1997: 187) argues that depending on the structure of the former elites. 1992-93: 640). newly created countries can to a certain extent shape their constitution as they see ﬁt.. It is deep in the sense that it deﬁnes the political framework of any country. This is based on his emphasis of what rule of law ensures.” (my emphasis).
it might not last. It is an attempt to identify intervening causal processes. which in this paper is assumed to be the presidency and the parliament. Assuming that the presidency submits a draft that lies outside the indiﬀerence lines of the parliament. 13 . Hence. It is in such a situation. Is it the parliament or is it the presidency. This lends crendence to the importance of the author that wrote the constitution.does not receive the support described by Linz and Stepan. conﬂict arises. and thus the question of outliers become important. a constitutional battle might either weaken or even force a democracy to break down (cf. democracy needs a constitution accepted by the key institutions of the regime. and that the far majority of these are held constant. This addressed through the scope conditions depicted in section 1. deterministic assumes that explanan X leads to outcome Y. the case is selected on the explanandum (Landman. Landman (2006: 29) argues that MSSD seeks to compare cases that are alike on most explanans. To address this caveat. If neither can agree on it. section 2. Any constitutional document built on will. the constitution entails a deﬁnition of the checks and balances as well as battles between those with interests in the setup. the methodological approach is deterministic. To sum up. any constitution favouring the presidency might damage the democratic development. SSDs demand that all relevant explanans are speciﬁed. will they attempt to overthrow the document. in order for a democratic regime to maximise legitimacy. yet varies on key explanans as well as the outcome. or what is known as a most similar systems design (MSSD) followed by process tracing that probes the ﬁndings of the MSSD. cannot garner mass support. this is not the case of this study. 2006: 30). Thus. it is very diﬃcult to know whether the neighbouring case ﬁts the same relationship. As opposed to probabilistic methodology that deems relationships probable. To maximise the diﬀerence in the outcome.2). 4 4. and thus might not survive its creator. As mentioned above. Hence. a process tracing method as described by Bennett (2005: 206) is utilised.1 Methodological approach Most similar systems design and process tracing The methodological approach is deterministic. in order to consolidate. As is evidenced below. Or put inversely. it needs to deliver a constitution that can be broadly accepted especially by all institutional actors. Tsebelis (2002: 27) argues that the unanimity core is dependent on the preferences of the actors in question.
2 Operationalisation and causal links In the sections below. two qualiﬁcations are needed. Therefore further elaboration on these explanans are not conducted. The presence of natural resources can be used to control society through the rentier and repression eﬀect as described in section 3.1. Thus. It is either present or absent. The understanding of what constitutes a natural resource as well as the eﬀect of such. it is along the lines of the theory explained in section 2 and the operationalisation depicted in section 4. To fully understand these arguments. the natural resources are at his disposal without the need of private consent. The causal chain argues that natural resources are either granted the incumbent through private sponsors or through parties of power with a negative eﬀect on the checks and balances.2. it must also deﬁne the causal relationship. the process tracing must attempt not only to single out the most important explanan. which is basically a detailed narrative couched in theoretical terms. the two ﬁrst are understood as structures. Bennett identiﬁes several diﬀerent forms of process traincing. follows Ross’ (2001: 356f) ﬁndings regarding the negative eﬀect on democracy from both oil and minerals. legacy. it can be argued that natural resources bolster the negative eﬀects of disloyal elites (cf.This makes it an ideal companion for MSSDs especially like the one of this paper. The model is deﬁned in section 4. but because this paper does not have a single explanan. 4. if the incumbent has a party of power strong enough to nationalise privatised state corporations. table 2).3 and the 14 . Regarding the series of constants depicted in table 2 on page 22 this paper subscribes to Møller and Skaaning’s (2009: 307) understanding of the economic level. each explanan is operationsalised. and transition (cf. The one used in this paper is an analytical explanation. whereas the latter two are understood as actor-based explanans. 2. The idea that natural resources are granted the incumbent through private sponsors is based on the assumption that former state corporations have been privatised.2 the process tracing takes place.3 depicted in ﬁgure 2. and the causal links are spelled out.1 Natural resources Natural resources are a binary and structural explanan. The original purpose of an MSSD is to single out the key explanan and determine the deterministic relationship. Alternatively. 4. As depicted in table 1. Natural resources give the incumbent a resource-advantage. Hence.
Instead of looking at percentage of votes each party gains. cannot tilt the checks and balances. and thus it might be dangerous to neglect certain groups. Strong cleavages make it more diﬃcult for the author to neglect large parts of the population. section 3.. which lends credence to their deﬁnition as actor-based explanans. The causal chain indicates that on the one hand.2).1 and the importance of meaningful elections. 4. This is built on the assumption that all are able and allowed to create representation.behavioural dimension) or parties of power rather than being a negative eﬀect in itself. This is so because the parliament is strongly organised. The same positive eﬀect can be found in relation with the writing of the constitution. the number of seats are evaluated. The causal chain related to the party of power indicates that the presence of such parties have a negative eﬀect on checks and balances and hence the 15 . Hence. make a party system volatile and thus not very structured. Autocracies might try to prevent certain groups in participating in any form of electoral process. voter choices are cross referenced with the party’s supporter base and ﬂuctuations in support over time. 4. cleavages have a negative eﬀect on parties of power as a result of their catch-all nature as well as a postive eﬀect on checks and balances.3 Party of power (PoP) A party of power is unique in the sense that they are personalistic and built around a small number of actors. to measure a party of power. party support from election to election is measured. and as such. This is built on the assumption that parties of power without any signiﬁcant inﬂuence.2). the party of power needs to have clear connections to the presidency. and void cleavages. To estimate volatility.2. and entails an actor decision. Thus. they are not dependent on a speciﬁc cleavage (cf. it still gives a rough idea about whether a system is volatile. This follows the lines of section 2. The cleavage is the structuring part of a party system. To identify cleavages. Secondly. the party must as a minimum be the most signiﬁcant party in the parliament. Albeit the method is crude compared to the approach deﬁned by Pedersen. yet equally important. the question of voting behaviour needs to be addressed. This method follow Ascher and Tarrow’s deﬁnition albeit in a simpliﬁed manner. to measure the presence of strong cleavages or alternatively. Thus. it is considered a structural explanan.2 Party system The party system is based on the concept of cleavages (cf. a high degree of volatility. section 3.2.
Strong parties of power are also in a better position to re-write the constitution and thus tamper with the institutions of democracy as well as claim power over state assets. section 3. 2. Hence. It is in scenarios of this kind that the party of power has a negative eﬀect on the parliament and thus the checks and balance.4 Author of the constitution Feher’s argument regarding the survival of will-based constitutions is pitvotal for the operationalisation of this explanan (cf. which aﬀects the development of the constitution through its cleavages. whether the author (thus actor-based explanan) has taken other than narrow interests into consideration. This measurement is based on the assumption that a constitution deﬁned by the presidency is pro-presidential and thus imbalancing. The question of the party system enters independent of natural resouces. the party of power slant the checks and balances in favour of the president. the essential question to ask is.2. It is a problem if issues with the presidency must be attenuated (cf. One such feature might be the balancing between the parliament and the presidency.3). 5 This argument is built around Mainwaring and Shugart’s understanding that carefully designed systems can attenuate problems with presidentialism. Will-based constitutions are assumed to lie outside Tsebelis unanimity core. In both scenarios. However. the parliament and the presidency are both aﬀected and aﬀect the constitution. assuming that a parliament is already settled.2 each explanan plays a signﬁcant role through various chains in aﬀecting the checks and balances. Thus.3 Theoretical model As indicated in section 4. The causal chain indicates that the strength of the cleavages (or volatility) and party of power work through the framework of the constitution. 4.parliament because of its ability to prevent the parliament from functioning. The strength of the party of power is dependent on the degree of volatility and its ability to gain the majority of the votes. 4. As depicted in ﬁgure 2 on page 17 the negative eﬀect of natural resources enters the polity either through private sponsors or parties of power. Thus. and thus making the constitution a question of will.3)5 . there is an extra-constitutional parliamentarian framework. It aﬀects the strength of the party of power as well as the checks and balances. 16 . the central aim of this explanan is to measure the conﬂict surrounding the constitution.
it is highly dependent on the power arrangement..Despite the traditional understanding of constitutions as a relatively deep and structural variable. Figure 2: Theoretical model 5 Comparison of Russia and Ukraine Russia has an abundance of natural resources.. the negative eﬀects of 17 . Russia privatised state-owned enterprises. This created a very strong group of oligarchs. that mined for natural resources. section 7). 2007: 2). but during the transition-phase. One eﬀect of this is elaborated in connection with parties of power. Thus. in new countries. 2008: 394). they helped removed the popular prime minister (Duncan.] group of seven or so bankers who applied their vast wealth and inﬂuence to ensure the re-election of Boris El’tsin as President in 1996. they supported him ardently. This make it subject to the cleavage / volatility situation as well as parties of power. During most of Yeltsin’s time as president.“ (Duncan. and during his brief struggle with then-prime minister Jevgenij Primakov. and started a re-nationalisation of key industries. Ambrosio (2009: 51) notes that the Russian elite created a series of state controlled NGOs to insulate Russia from external interference (cf. yet for now it must suﬃce to say that it strengthen it. Yet because it is the ultimate deﬁner of checks and balances. en masse (Remington. referred to as a ”[. 2007: 8). Putin changed the privatisation trend. it is important to understand who has authored the document and the author’s position.
Another way to observe volatility in this period. Of the 1999 parties. that beneﬁtted from the economic downturn. In 1999 the CPRF6 gained most votes among the poorest. The growth in the supporters of United Russia is assumed to be explained by the growth in GDP7 (Rose. The diﬀerence between rich and poor as measured by the Gini-index doubled (Remington. only four parties contested in 2003 (cf. it is possible to argue that despite the presence of an indeed strong economic cleavage. This voter allignment is echoed in the 2003 election. but because of economic mismanagement. In 1995 it is reduced to meagre nine seats. Natural resources is not playing as important a role in Ukraine as in Russia. it is dependent on Russia. In 1993 Russia’s Choice wins 70 seats.2). only four parties contested during the 1999 election.). Thus. 2008: 395f). which is negative until 1998. despite the possibility of rents. In 1993 12 parties contested. gained most votes among the richer (Remington. They are decimated to 52 seats in 2003. 2007). The 2007 election follows this trend (cf. 18 . Naftohaz is constantly on the bringe of bankruptcy and is indepted to the Russian energy-giant Gazprom (ibid. However. 2008: 396). the Ukraine gas transit system transport around 120 billion cubic metres or 80 percent of Russia’s gas to Europe (Gnedina and Emerson. The economic cleavage can be seen as a direct consequence of the privatisation or chock-theory in Russia. appendix C). is to observe the total number of parties. From the 1995 election. are also subject to volatility. 2009: 2). United Russia. CPRF wins 103 seats in the same period. The CPRF. appendix A). 6 The 7 This Communist Party of the Russian Federation is supported by the development in the GDP. battered its way unto the political stage with 222 seats. section 3. 2008: 391). Russia holds a Duma election in 1993 and again in 1995. Thus. and as noted in section 7. appendix B). 2007). where Unity’s successor. Of those 12 parties. Ukraine is very diﬀerent from Russia in the sense that Ukraine is dominated by two large ethnic groups. whereas the new party. These trends echo Madrid’s depiction of economic cleavages as susceptible to volatility.natural resources are found in connection with elections and the rentier eﬀect. Because of the transition many people slided into powerty. mismanagement has prevented the Ukrainian state access to ”easy” money. The majority of the people are ethnic Ukrainian. United Russia. and unemployment rates soared. volatility is high (cf. From 1999 it grows with an average of two to three percent (Remington. only seven of those parties contested in the 1995 election (cf. The system is administrated by a state energy company. Naftohaz. whereas Unity or Yeltsin’s party had greatest success among the wealthier (Rose.
As is evidenced in appendix E the Russians continued to vote for pro-Russian parties. Of the other parties three survive from 1994 to 1998. which is evidenced in the relative smaller changes in voting behaviour among those voting for the parties that manage to run for more than one election. 19 . it is worth noting that the Russians’ did not switch to a nonethnic based party during the strengthening of the Ukrainian GDP in the 2000s (Duenwald. While the Duma refused to approve the Yeltsin-draft. Of all the Ukrainian parties. but at the same time gave the Duma and the Upper Chamber the possibility of override vetoes by a two-thirds vote in each chamber (Remington. section 6. whereas they lost seats in both the 2002 and 2007 election. whereas from 1999 to 2002. Anti-Yeltsin forces sought to create a two-tiered form of government. 1998. Two distinct positions emerged. 2001: 170). However. only two countinues. Gueorguiev and Schaechter. Despite this very strong cleavage. and thus leaving the question with the people.whereas the largest minority is ethnic Russian. where Russians in general backed the Communists. This is also echoed in the 2002 parliamentarian election as well as the presidential elections (D’Anieri.1 for 8 It is likely that the 1994 election follows these lines as well. The post-Soviet Yeltsin authored constitution was approved by referendum in 1993. Yeltsin’s supporters sat up a presidential counterpart with the aim of creating a presidential constitution (Remington. It is smaller than in Russia. In the ﬁrst two elections they gained seats. Yeltsin’s supporters. the run up to the approval was not void of trouble. The latter being an essential part of the independence movement (D’Anieri. The same goes for 2007 (cf. 2006: 111). Thus. it is plausible to argue that Yeltsin alienated other parts of the political arena as well as used will to get his draft approved (cf. 54. 2006: 108f). 2001: 160f). appendix D and E). the Communist party is the most stable with the longest election record. 2001: 169). despite the strong cleavage. To disconﬁrm the claim that Russians’ favour the left-wing because of economy. The Communist participated in the 1994. on the other hand. wanted to maximise presidential power and minimise the Duma’s ability to block Yeltsin (Remington. Thus. 2001: 168). 2005: 4). and 2007 parliamentarian elections. Yeltsin decided to take the matter outside the existing constitutional framework. there seems to be a degree of volatility in the Ukrainian party system. 2002. While anti-Yeltsin deputies took part in a constitutional assembly. volatility is observed. and the ethnic Ukrainians backed Rukh.8 percent voted in favour of his draft (Remington. These regional patterns are echoed in the 1998 election8 . This draft gave the president lawmaking prerogatives. where presidential powers were limited.
This was resisted by the Rada (D’Anieri. appendix B and C). but the high court decided that if Kuchma proposed a referendum supported by the people that demanded change of the constitution. 2006: 84). There was great support for the referendum. He used the unpopularity of the Rada and the threat of referendum to make the Rada approve his package. Hence. However.an elaboration of the eﬀects). As in Russia much of the debate revolved around whether Ukraine should take a presidential or semi-presidential path. While Gill (2006: 70) mentions Yegor Gaidar’s Russia’s Choice as a semi-oﬃcial party.2 only strong parties of power are interesting. where he had more power. which was aﬄiated with Putin. 2006: 90). as speciﬁed in section 3. which made the Rada approve the amendments (D’Anieri. as in Russia. Oleksandr Moroz argued. 2006: 95). and as Rada speaker. Kuchma went outside the existing framework. A real power of party did not manifest itself in Russia until Unity. Thus. the Rada was legally binded to change it (D’Anieri. a real signiﬁcant party of power is only United Russia. The ﬁrst Ukrainian constitutional document was approved in 1995 called the ”law on power”. the Ukrainian constitution is approved by ﬁst. which would give him powers. 2006: 91). United Russia has clear connections to the Russian presidency in the sense 20 . contrary to the Russian case. Unity contests the 1999 election and wins 73 seats. whereas a real constitution was put in eﬀect in 1996. it does not receive the same status as United Russia. Russia’s Choice disappears practically in 1995 (cf. and succeeded by United Russia (Gill. yet it did not consist of any actual text to be replaced in the constitution. This reform transferred power from the president to the prime minister (D’Anieri. which is 40 less than the Communists. 73). Kuchma used the same tactics as above. as the Rada repealled the reforms of the constitution in 2004. the Ukrainian Rada was never in agreement with Kuchma and put up a ﬁerce ﬁght. Thus. 2006: 92). alienating parts of the political society. Feher’s argument regarding will-based constitutions seem to have merit in the Ukrainian case.2. Secondly. and pushed the constitution through the Rada (D’Anieri. when Kuchma attempted to amend the constitution. which dominates the Duma with 222 seats in 2003 and 315 in 2007 (cf. The 1995 ”Law on Power” is a package suggested by then-president Kuchma. 2006: 71. appendix A). Another constitutional battle emerged in 2000. Once again Kucha threatened the Rada with his ﬁst. In relation with the constitution of 1996. the constitution was perceived as the lesser of two evils. the parliament would otherwise not grant him. As depicted in section 3. which was approved in 2005. in both cases.
the Russian party leaders have become better at maintaining cohesion. The party wins 101 seats. though he did not declare himself a member. however.2 argues that the problem is only severe if the party is cohesive. Table 2 summarises. which endorses Janukovich. because Kutchma links himself with the party. United Russia has dominated Russian politics since 2003. volatility. it is fair to assume that in time. While they do not evaluate the latest elections. D’Anieri (2006: 93f) does. Remington and Smith. in Russia. 2008: 82). that in turn affects the possibility of creating parties of power. the party disappeared (cf. ((Haspel. Like Russia. Ukraine has a presidential constitution. albeit Ukraine’s Rada has put up signiﬁcant resistence every time. Thus. appendix D and E). For a United Ukraine. is to be the next party of power. In Ukraine there is no clear equivalent to United Russia. Kuchma attempted to rewrite the constitution to his liking. 21 . whereas the research question is answerd in section 8.. 1998: 434) party cohesion is higher than expected in the ﬁrst elections to the Duma. the party of power. identify For a United Ukraine9 as a party of power. 2003: 47). There is little doubt that Russia and Ukraine are alike in many ways. The hypotheses are answered in the sections related to the case study 6. and becomes the second largest party in the Rada in 2002. yet also diﬀerent.that United Russia is formed by Putin during his ﬁrst tenure (Almond et al. Thus. which is dominated by an ethnic cleavage. As depicted above. because the next election to the Rada is set to be hold in 2012. It is unclear whether Party of Regions. According to Haspel et al. Section 3. it is plausible to argue that the checks and balances in Russia are weakened because of the weak party system. disappeared in the following election. This is not to the same extent the case in Ukraine. 9 For a United Ukraine is an electoral alliance consisting of among other Janukovich’s Party of Regions (Kuzio. especially United Russia might in fact be a serious problem for Russian democracy. but in 2007. the Russian party system is much more volatile than the Ukrainian. and the constitution. whereas the only Ukrainian party of power. Thus.
Table 2: Comparison of Russia and Ukraine Explanans Transition Stalemate Stalemate Transit tax Cleavage Both Plenty Volatile President None Natural resources Party system Constitutional autor PoP United Russia Imbalanced Balanced Balancing Constants Legacy Russian Russian Economic level Russia Above Ukraine Above 22 .
was in 1994 dominated by Yegor Gairdar’s Russia’s Choice. 6. and to categorise the Russian and Ukrainian regimes. The Russian Constitution demands that any prime minister must be approved by the Duma. the president must dissolve the Duma. his goal was to deprive the president of any control over the presidency in an attempt to make him a cerimonial ﬁgurehead (Nichols. The dominance did not last.The leader of the Supreme Soviet. are susceptible to ﬂuctuations in 23 . as the Russian parliament was called before 1993. with a result favouring Yeltsin’s position. a process tracing of each case is conducted. This is best evidenced in the battle between Yeltsin and the Duma regarding the nomination and approval of prime minister Kiriyenko. and thus parties depending on this cleavage.1 Russia Russia gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The run up to the 1993 constitution evidenced the diﬀerences between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet. The crisis. the Russian political system is biased in favour of the presidency as of 1993. 2001: 65). Khasbulatov. the pro-presidential constitution pushed through a prime minister not very popular among the deputies of the Duma. whereas the Ukrainian is relatively more balanced. Thus. The Duma rejected Kiryenko twice. as it became. To fully understand this claim. Had the Duma refused to approve Kiriyenko. the successor of the Supreme Soviet. The process tracing follows a historical narrative structured around ﬁgure 2. and as argued in section 5 the CPRF gained votes as the Russian GDP dwindled. yet the third time. If the Duma rejects the prime minister three times. however. 1998). The newly elected Duma. Yeltsin. Hence. where deputies passed laws counteracting Yeltsin’s decrees (Nichols. However. was a power-struggle between elites seeking to gain control over each other (Nichols. 2001: 73). This struggle is brieﬂy sketched out in section 5. the Duma approved (Babayeva and Dokuchayev. 2001: 63). which created a deadlock between the Supreme Soviet and the president. Yeltsin resisted. however. the deputies would have to give up their seats just one year before the election in 1999.6 Case study In section 5 table 2 argues that the Russian political system is imbalanced in favour of the presidency. In 1995 the CPRF becomes the next dominating party. and call for elections to the Duma. of reasons unknown. This lends credence to the notion that the main cleavage of the Russian Duma is economic. it did not get a democratically elected parliament and new constitution before 1993. decided to turn against his former ally.
Putin. The media or the proxy.1 regarding the resource beneﬁt. and thus makes it the new dominating party of the Duma. owned by the oligarchs. A prime example of the diﬀerence in power over the political arena between Yeltsin and his successor. it clearly manifests itself. This gives the CPRF a central role during the 1990s as seen in connection with the hestitated approval of Kiryenko. United Russia. His attempt failed because at the time the CPRF dominated the Duma and ardently refused any such action (AP. During the ﬁrst post-Soviet presidency. 2004). 2007: 8). Despite the argument brought forth in section 4.2). natural resources entered the political system through private sponsorship (Duncan. Russian democracy never consolidated because the elite never accepted the democratic game (cf.the economy. Before 2004 they were elected. The election of 2003 gives Putin’s United Russia overwhelming support. then-president Yeltsin did not have the same political resources at his disposal as his successor. section 2. Putin. Vladimir Lenin in 1997. However. with the creation of a succesful and lasting party of power. Yeltsin proposed to ask the Russians whether Lenin should be buried or not. Putin. whereas after 2004. 24 . is best depicted by Yeltsin’s attempt to bury the founder of the USSR. 2005) To sum up. 1997). As depicted above. Hence. the Duma was strongest. which in turn gives the presidency even more control over the political arena. the president appoints the governors (Baker. which he used to among other gain control of the Russian governors. Putin had constructed an eﬀective parliamentarian control through his party of power. had no opposition against nationalising key industries. it is only in relation with the presidential elections.2. When the economic cleavage weakend. at the time of the greatest deprivation of the Russian people. 2008: 389). The 1996 election proves to be an example of how private sponsorship works albeit by proxy. Putin gets a parliamentarian tool by which he can change the way Russia is governed as well as nationalise key industries and thus use the natural resources to his advantage. the space for a party of power grew together with its negative eﬀect on the checks and balances. because of the reinforced cleavages. while Yeltsin was not able to bury Lenin because he lacked parliamentarian support. Hence. a presidential constitution together with a volatile party system leaving space for a party of power controlling the Duma. tilted the checks and balances in favour of the Russian presidency. denied Yeltsin’s opponents air time in their media (Remington. This role evaporates as the GDP increases. however. Another example is the ﬁnalising takeover of Gazprom in 2005 (Denisov and Grivach.
where the popular change of the incumbent is unlikely. appendix D and Anieri (2006: 108) for expected future indications of alignments based on section 3. It brought Yushenko to power when Janukovich’s election fraud was revealed. the ethnic-Russian party. Hence.2 Ukraine Before embarking on the process tracing. it seems evident that it is conﬁrmed. 2006: 118) As evidenced in section 5 there is a battle between Kuchma and the Rada. 6. and thus the Orange Revolution is seen more as an interlude between Kuchma and Janukovich than a deﬁning event. because of its ability to dismantle the Duma as a check on the presidency (cf. were aware of this. any further elaborations on the topic is not conducted. Contrary to the Russian case. In 1994. structured around ethnic cleavages (cf. supported Kuchma in his amendments of the constitution as well as in the dismissal of Yushenko as prime minister in the 2000s (D’Anieri.). The ethnic Russians primarily live in the eastern and southern part of Ukraine.3). Yushenko was president from 2005 to 2010 with both Timoshenko and Janukovich as prime ministers. section 2. Thus. the ﬁrst Ukrainian parliamentarian election took place before the approval of their constitution. Janukovich followed Yushenko as president in 2010.2. the Communist. which gave them a strong basis for secession. 25 . these cleavages became pivotal in the design of the pre-constitutional Ukrainian institutions. it is possible to argue in favour of a classiﬁcation of Russia as a civilian autocracy from the time of the creation of United Russia. Thus. In relation with hypothesis H1. Thus.2 took another ethnic group into consideration. Hence. the Ukranians elected a new Rada. 2010). who put a high value on avoiding secession. the Orange Revolution deserves a short note. the possibility of especially ethnic Russian secession was a possibility. they made the necessary compromises (D’Anieri. 2007: 23). Ethnic Ukrainian nationalists. whereas ethnic Ukrainians live in the western and northern part of Ukraine. and as described in section 4. Thus. because of Janukovich’s succefull attempt to boost presidential powers once again (BBC. Precisely because of the placement of Ukrainian ethnicities.2 and Madrid’s conception of the weight of ethnicity as a structuring cleavage. the question of cleavages and volatility is elevated to a premier position as an essential determining factor of the future outlook of Ukrainian politics.They instead attempted and succeeded in manipulating the political game to their advantage thus creating a system. that in turn gave the presidency to a pro-Russian president and a signiﬁcant amount of seats to ethnic-Russian parties.
though limited to its ethnic supporter base because of the cleavages structuring the Rada (cf. As demonstrated in section 5. it faced a signiﬁcant opposition in the Timoshenko bloc in 2007 (cf. appendix E). eventhough these attempts were succesful. strong cleavages manifested in a parliament prior to the approval of a constitution. had he had a successful party of power. Rents from Russian gas on its way to the European market. won 175 seats in the Rada (cf.2. Kuchma still needed to create informal institutions in order to for his regime to function as he wanted (Way. it lessened Kuchma’s need to weaken the Rada (D’Anieri. and needed institutions such as processes designed to harass the opposition and falsify election results (ibid. In the following election in 2007 one of the members of the alliance. 2005: 133). and the lack of a party of power. Because of the strong cleavages. Kuchma could not shape the constitution as he saw ﬁt. attempts. 2006: 88f). they could criticise Kuchma (ibid. the Party of Regions headed by former pro-Russian presidential candidate. Yet. echoing Feher’s argument. however. section 4.3). is the deputies’ repeal of reforms (D’Anieri. the constitution is changed in 1995. Thus. assuming that Party of Regions is the next party of power. deputies enjoyed. Kuchma could not attack the g opposition for critism. albeit succesful. yet it is not large enough to play a similar role as natural resources. during its time. Kuchma’s attempts to change it as well as the informal institutions indicate that his did not. 2006: 92). Kuchma’s arm-wrestling with the Rada could have been avoided. To sum up. which might indicate a new party of power in Ukraine. This is evidenced in the three. whereas the Russian constitution served Yeltsin well. Another indirect eﬀect of the constitution.During Kuchma’s tenure. never manage to be elected more than once. This is also evidenced in the immunity. However. Yet because of strong cleavages. 1996. and it is likely that any future Ukrainian party of power will face other signiﬁcant blocs. a real party of power never manifested. This gave them a platform by which. This is best evidenced in the pro-presidential and primarily ethnic Rusian supported alliance dubbed For a United Ukraine. Hence. situates the diﬀerent positions vis-` a-vis the negotiation regarding the constitution. the negative eﬀect from such sources of income are more or less absent in Ukraine. Janukovich. It clearly shows that a parliament structured around 26 . The alliance did. While the Duma is void of any signiﬁcant opposition to United Russia. Ukraine does not have access to natural resources comparable to that of Russia’s. appendix E). As depicted above regarding the constitution. Thus.). are considered a source of income similar to that of natural resources. and 2000.).
among the Ukrainian presidents. lies in the compromise made and hence the cleavages. which at times favoured a stronger presidency. the question is brieﬂy assessed through an evaluation of leverage or power to aﬀect other contries. Western leverage over Russia is best evidenced through the opening of the Russian market during Yeltsin’s tenure (Desai. he ”overthrew” the constitution through will. Hence. The parliament on the other hand. The situation in Ukraine is diﬀerent. To postulate that the Ukrainian democracy is consolidated is premature. only Yushenko seemed to respect the rules of democracy. Thus. In this section. Russia has an interest in Ukraine because of the Russians and the Black 27 . and thus forcing the president outside the formal framework. Russian elites used the fear of a potential coup to crack down on independent NGOs such as those dealing with human rights and democracy (Ambrosio. the leverage was not as much a concern as foreign NGOs. cleavages seem to be the explanan that most clearly determines Ukraine’s fate. The leverage dwindled as Russia’s GDP grew. Thus. they deemed necessary for Russia (Desai. Thus. 2005: 100). Thus. which lends albeit limited credence to the alternative hypothesis HA. 7 Considering an alternative explanation The theoretical model does not take external factors into consideration. Another eﬀect of these cleavages is that of the room for a party of power. It might also be worth noting that this situation enhanced the power of the Russian minority and their parties. 2005: 21f). Especially the American Treasure invested a lot of political time on reforms. Kuchma was not willing to accept the rules of democracy. During Putin’s tenure. 2009: 51). described above. and linkage as the integration with a certain region (Levitsky and Way. and at numerous occassions. seemed to be very interested in following the constitution.stable cleavages are in a much better position to resist encroachments. Cleavages reduced the room that would otherwise have limited the ability of the parliament to act as a check on the presidency. Whereas Russia is subject to a pressure from the West. 2005: 101). the foundation for those battles. democracy fares better in Ukraine because of the relatively more balanced institutions. Ukraine is subject to a pressure from the West as well as Russia. The latter concept is expanded by Tolstrup (undated: 7f) as economic and technocratic or political among other. 2009: 46). They feared that foreign NGOs might attempt to incite a colour revolution just like the one neighbouring Ukraine experienced (Ambrosio.
the discussion focuses on the Russian failure to remain on a democracy consolidating path using Ukraine as a mirror. Ukraine is dependent on Russian energy (ibid. it depends on the decision to utilise them to repress.Sea Fleet. it gives at least a couple of points worth noting. got extensive support from Russia for his election campaign. despite this support the pro-western Yushenko won. Thus. leverage and linkage is taken serious in both Russia and Ukraine. yet as evidenced. The ﬁrst position to discuss is Russias abundance of natural resources and its constitution. Mainwaring and Shugart rightfully argue that much depends on the institutional design.It is claimed in section 3. United Russia and Janukovich’s Party of Regions established formal ties in order to help the party in the upcomming 2006 Rada elections. 8 Discussion and conclusion As depicted above in section 5 and 6.1 based on Ross’ arguments that natural resources impede democracy. The Orange Revolution is perhaps the best example of a time where Russia needed to inﬂuence Ukrainian politics. natural resources must be transferred to the political system through political actors. whereas the technocratic linkage is depicted in the relationship between United Russia and Party of Regions. on the other hand managed to remain relatively balanced because of its party system and the lack of a party of power. whereas the latter seems very susceptible to Russian inﬂuence. yet 28 . Ukraine. Instead Russia attempted to undermine Yushenko’s eﬀorts to democratise by denouncing his attempts as well as adopting confrontational policies toward Kiev (Ambrosio. 2009: 145). albeit this inﬂuence is not succesful at times. and the support of Janukovich. The pro-Russian Kuchma’s sucessor. there is a strong Russian interest in Ukraine as well as space to exert inﬂuence. Thus. Despite being a brief interlude between the primary arguments of this paper and the discussion. Janukovich. and ath the same time.). which they do not want to loose (Ambrosio. However. The former has shook of western leverage through growth in GDP albeit paranoia has made the Russian elite harass foreign NGOs.1. yet failed. Thus. Then-prime minister Timoshenko criticised the agreement as an illegal attempt to inﬂuence Ukrainian politics. as shown in section 4.2. Russia failed to consolidate its democracy because of its imbalanced political system favouring the presidency. Firstly. 2009: 135). The economic linkage between Russia and Ukraine is best evidenced through the Ukrainian natural resource dependecy.
diﬀusion is tested vis-` a-vis the rest. section 6. In the ﬁnal part of this discussion. As D’Anieri puts it.1. Russia is plagued by a volatile party system. Parties of power are considered to have a negative eﬀect on both the Russian and Ukrainian parliament. is primarily based on the Middle East and Latin America. However. Thus.3. the volatility Russia experiences are not necessary a democracy delimiting phenomenon. are not very cohesive. Thus it might be diﬃcult to assess the impeding character of natural resources on newly created democracies. The party system is considered a prime explanan in section 6. However. It depends on its cohesiveness. and Ukraine’s cleavages do not necessary beneﬁt its regime. At the same time. volatility does not necessary damage the regime. Neither the Russian nor Ukrainian party system seem to embody such cleavages. Another criticism of natural resources as depicted by Ross and used in this paper. As brought forth by Haspel et al. Thus. Russian parties are more cohesive than expected.2).2 and Linz and Stepan). the Ukrainian case exempliﬁes a situation where the party system is perhaps too polarised thus making it very diﬃcult for the presidency to have a fruitful relationship with the parliament. several consolidated western democracies go through periods of relatively high volatility vis-` a-vis the general norm. The Russian case evidences this as well. it seems evident that a Russian party of power damages the horizontal accountability of the Duma. as Pedersen (1979: 9) shows. as depicted in section 2. The best argument in favour of cleavages is that some cleavages seem to be a better foundation for a party system than others. section 5). This is depicted in both section 5 and section 6. a party of power is not necessary a problem. Thus. with the creation of For a United Ukraine. section 1 and the scope conditions). The key argument within the framework of the scope conditions in favour of the resource curse. 8.1 Diﬀusion versus the rest Until know the core explanations of this paper has been discussed. presidents can go outside the constitutional framework (cf. is the practice in Russia (cf.2 as intrinsic to the preservation of Ukrainian democracy as a structuring factor as well as preventing parties of power.as shown in the Ukrainian case. which might lend crendence to the damaging eﬀects of such parties. even in functional democracies. there might be cases where fairly large and dominating parties. Kuchma does not need to weaken the Rada anymore (cf. There are not many young democracies with communist origin in these regions (cf. The strength and 29 . section 2. Thus. On the other hand.
dominated by ethnic 30 . 8. it is important to remember that Party of Regions is not a party that encapsulates the entire population. the question of resources bolster the diﬀusion explanation. but it is clear that the West succesfully exerted leverage over the Russian president. The Ukrainian party system depicts a situation where Russian attempts to utilise leverage has been futile not only during the Orange Revolution. table 2. the party system showed stronger signs of volatility because of the economic cleavage than the Ukrainian. Thus. This made it diﬃcult to remain on a consoldiation path because of the imbalances created by these very scores. Party of Regions. if diﬀusion has any merit in this case. However. Because of its pro-Russian stance it might alienate the ethnic Ukrainian population. The ethnic-Russian parties could probably have received some support for secession. but also during the ﬁrst ten years of Ukrainian independence. However. It might have been very diﬃcult considering the domination of CPRF and later the proSoviet United Russia. In Russia. albeit it might have something to do with the renewed wealth from the natural resources as depicted above. the acquisition and renationalisation of Russian natural resources gave it a chance to insulate itself from state-to-state pressure. it has the potential of causing more harm than good to the Russian case. section 6. as history has evidenced.2 Conclusion The research question proped the puzzle of why Russia slided into autocracy whereas Ukraine did remain somewhat stable in the same period. had they wanted it. thus aligning them among proUkraine candidates. the ethnic Russians and their parties did not move forward with secession (cf.2). The straight forward answer is that Russia scored negatively on all the explanans and in particular on the party system and party of power (cf. The lack of successful leverage vis-` a-vis the Russians in Ukraine might be explained by a weak Russia. It is not known whether the West attempted to inﬂuence the Russian Duma. Hence. Thus.thus wealth certainly reduces any leverage any country might face. A party of power (or even a dominating party such as the CPRF) might pose a serious problem for anyone attempting to utilise leverage in a parliamentarian setting. United Russia is clearly a party of power that is not susceptible to utilised leverage. And precisely these natural resources as well as the energy dependency might have made United Russia capable of making a deal with the potential party of power. The resource wealth also helped Russia to build new organisations as well as ousting other organisations in order to protect the current Russian regime.
The second condition is related to that of the strength of allies such as strong parties in the state in question. While external factors are excluded in the theoretical model as depicted in ﬁgure 2. If they are privatised. 31 . strong cleavags. Such allies might enhance the chance of succesful diﬀusion. the oppositional character of the Russian Duma disappeared. The theoretical model addresses democratic development in the long run. yet its importance is dwarfed by that of party system and party of power. yet depending on the commitment from the state exerting diﬀusion. Especially the latter three explanans owe their postive score to the strong cleavages. Section 7 and 8. The Ukrainian case reveals that Ukraine scored better on the explanans.1 show that there are signs of diﬀusion. easy rents are not as accessible as if the state nationalised it. a constitution not overly presidential. their eﬀect was minor. and thus the elite cannot use them as depicted in section 7.1 the idea that natural resources impede democracy was somewhat conﬁrmed. Hence. This is why the Orange Revolution is unimportant. Diﬀusion plays a role. The process tracing revealed that with the creation of United Russia. and no party of power. Hence short term attempt leaves long term eﬀects with the explanans. It seems evident that certain conditions qua the results of this paper must be fulﬁlled if succesful diﬀusion has to take place. The Russian determined to continue to exert inﬂuence in Ukraine paid oﬀ as Janukovich later got elected. It had no natural resources. were able to maintain a more stable system securing consolidation. Thus. the real transformative eﬀect of diﬀusion depends on the endurance of the state. As evidenced in section 6. and thus. the model is not seriously impeded by the introduction of diﬀussion. this eﬀect might be of minor importance. yet they are not determining the outcome of neither Russia nor Ukraine. The ﬁrst condition is the ownership of the natural resources. whereas Russian linkage is very clear in connection with Janukovich’s failed attempt to become Kuchma’s sucessor. In Russia. leverage is most clear during Yeltsin’s tenure.cleavages. if the West was involved in the Orange Revolution. This is best depicted in the short term eﬀect of the Orange Revolution and the return of the old modus operandi.
‡) Involves both SMD and PR seats.A Appendix I: Duma elections in 1993 and 1995 1993 1995 Seats 70 54 48 23 33 23 19 15 4 2 1 1 Party (17/7)† Communist Party Liberal Democratic Party Our home is Russia Yabloko Agrarian Party of Russia Power to the People Russia’s Choice Congress Russian Communities Ivan Rybkin Bloc Women of Russia Forward Russia! Pamﬁlova–Gurov–Lysenko Bloc Union of Labour Communists of the USSR Workers’ Self-Government Stanislav Govorukhin Bloc Russian Unity and Concord Seats† 157 51 55 45 20 9 9 5 3 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 77 Party (12) Russia’s Choice Liberal Democratic Party Communist Party Women of Russia Agrarian Party of Russia Yabloko Russian Unity and Concord Democratic Party of Russia Movement for Democratic Reforms Dignity and Charity Civic Union Future of Russia Independents 146 Independents Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election. Source: Rose (2011) 32 . †) Total number of parties / Participated in the prior election.
‡) Involves both SMD and PR seats. Source: Rose (2011) 33 .B Appendix II: Duma elections in 1999 and 2003 1999 2003 Seats 113 73 68 29 17 20 7 2 2 1 1 1 114 Party (12/4)† United Russia Communist Party Motherland Liberal Democratic Party People’s Party Yabloko Agrarian Party of Russia PVR-RPZh: Rebirth–Party of Life Union of Right Forces New Course: Automobile Russia Development of Enterprise Great Russia-Eurasian Union Independents Seats‡ 222 52 37 36 17 4 2 3 3 1 1 1 68 Party (12/4) Commmunists Party Unity Fatherland–All Russia Union of Right Forces Liberal Democratic Party Yabloko Our Home Is Russia Movement in Support of the Army Russian People’s Union Party of Pensioners Russian Socialist Party Spiritual Heritage Independents Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election. †) Total number of parties / Participated in the prior election.
‡) Involves both SMD and PR seats. †) Total number of parties / Participated in the prior election. Source: Rose (2011) 34 .C Appendix III: Duma elections in 2007 2007 Party (4/2)† United Russia Communist Party Liberal Democrats Fair Russia Independents Seats‡ 315 57 40 38 - Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election.
†) Total number of parties / Participated in the prior election.D Appendix IV: Rada elections in 1994 and 1998 1994± 1998∓ Seats 86 25 18 15 14 11 7 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 Party (19/3)† Communists Rukh Socialist / Village Popular democrats Hromada Greens Social Democrats (United) Progressive Socialists Agrarians National Front Reforms and Order Party of Regional Revival Forward Ukraine! Christian Democratic Party NEP Social liberal union Working Ukraine Razom Menshe sliv Seats‡ 122 46 34 29 23 19 17 16 8 5 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 116 Party (17) Communists Rukh Peasant Party Interregional bloc for reforms Socialist party Republican Party Congress of Ukrainian nationalists Communist party of Crimea Party of Democratic Renewal Labour Party Democratic Party Ukranian National Assembly Social Democratic Party Civic Congress Conservative Republican Party Christian Democratic Party Soyuz Independents 136 Independents Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election. Source: ±) Bojcun (1995: 239) ∓) Birch and Wilson (1999: 1040) 35 . ‡) Involves both SMD and PR seats.
dem.People’s Self-defense Communist Party Lytvyn bloc Seats‡ 175 156 72 27 20 Party (10/2) Our Ukraine For a United Ukraine Communist party Soc. party of Ukraine (United) Socialist Party of Ukraine Timoshenko bloc Democratic Party of Ukraine Unity Party of National Economic Revival Ukrainian Marine Party Independents Note: Parties marked with bold participated in more than one consecutive election.E Appendix V: Rada elections in 2002 and 2007 2002± 2007∓* Seats 110 101 66 24 22 22 4 3 1 1 93 Party (5/2)† Party of Regions Timoshenko bloc Our Ukraine . †) Total number of parties / Participated in the prior election. *) Re-run of parliamentarian election of 2006. ‡) Involves both SMD and PR seats. Source: ±)Herron and Johnson (2003: 19) ∓) Copsey (2008: 300) 36 .
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