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POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER 2007

LEAVE NO MAN BEHIND - SANDOVAL


This reviewer is originally based on the BAR REVIEW LECTURE OUTLINE Political Law and Public International Law of Atty. EDWIN REY SANDOVAL with his permission. * Updated and Enhanced by Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr Political Law defined POLITICAL LAW

That branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the government organs of the state and defines the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory. (Sinco, Philippine Political Law 1, 11th ed., 1962) Political law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory. (Macariola v Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77) THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

STATE DEFINED.

A State is a politically organized sovereign community, independent of outside control, bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, and acting through government functioning under a regime of law. CIR v. Campos Rueda, 42 SCRA 23 (1971) A state is a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a fixed territory and possessed of an independent government organized for political ends to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience. (Prof. Samilo Barlongay quoting Garner, Introduction to Political Law, 41.)

THE ELEMENTS OF A STATE ARE: territory, people, sovereignty, government. People refers simply to the inhabitants of the State. Territory is the fixed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited by the people of the State. Government is the agency or instrumentality through which the will of the State is formulated, expressed and realized. Sovereignty is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which that State is governed. PEOPLE

As a requisite for Statehood: The people comprising the state must be adequate enough for self sufficiency and defence. Furthermore they must be of both sexes in order that they may perpetuate themselves

THE NATIONAL TERRITORY Art. I, 1987 Constitution The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago,

regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.

In short, the Philippine territory consists of: (1) the Philippine archipelago, and (2) all territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.

THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO

Basis of Art. 1 of the 1987 Constitution [PIL, I. Cruz] 1All the waters within the limits set forth in the: a) Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898 (Cession of the Philippine Islands by Spain to the U.S.), b) between Spain and U.S., The Treaty of Spain and U.S. at Washington, November 1, 1900 (Cagayan, Sulu & Sibuto), c) Treaty between U.S. and Great Britain, January 2, 1930 (Turtle and Mangsee Islands); 2All the waters around, between and connecting the various islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of their width or dimension, have always been considered as necessary appurtenances of the land territory, forming part of the inland or internal waters of the Philippines; 3All the waters beyond the outermost islands of the archipelago but within the limits of the boundaries set forth in the aforementioned treaties comprise the territorial sea of the Philippines. 4The baselines from which the territorial sea of the Philippines is determined consist of straight lines joining the appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago (straight baseline method); The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine archipelago is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE: Outermost points of the archipelago shall be connected by straight baselines and all islands and waters therein are regarded as one integrated unit

The archipelagic doctrine has a two-fold purpose:(1) economic reasons;(2) security.

national

The archipelagic doctrine is the principle that it is an integrated unit; everything within it comprises the archipelago. The Constitutional provisions embodying this doctrine are: 1. "archipelago, with all the island and waters embraced therein" 2. "the waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of the breadth and dimensions, form part of internal water"

Method of determining the baselines 1. RA 3046 (17 June 1961) Determine appropriate points of the outermost Islands of the archipelago, then connect them by means of a straight line until all islands are surrounded or enclosed by the imaginary straight lines. "The baselines from which the territorial sea of the Philippines is determined consist of straight lines joining appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago." (fifth whereas clause.) 2. RA 5446 (8 September 1968).-- Sec. 2 of the Act provides that the definition of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. Uses of the baseline: a. Determine what is internal water (all waters inside the baseline, whether or not more than 12 miles from the shore). b. Determine the 200 mile EEZ. c. Archipelagic Doctrine

GOVERNMENT

Government is that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them. Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society. (US v. Dorr, 2 Phil 332, 339). The government performs two kinds of functions, to wit, the constituent and the ministrant. Constituent functions constitute the very bonds of society and are therefore compulsory. Ministrant functions are those undertaken to advance the general interests of society, such as public works, public charity, and regulation of trade and industry.

Doctrine of Parens Patriae One of the important tasks of the government is to act for the State as parens patriae, or guardian of the rights of the people. This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties. De Jure and De Facto Governments A de jure government has rightful title but no power or control, either because this has been withdrawn from it or because it has not yet actually entered into the exercise thereof. A de facto government, on the other hand, is a government of fact, that is, it actually exercises power or control but without legal title. The three kinds of de facto government are as follows: (1) The government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter. (2) That established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state. (3) That which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated as a govt of paramount force, like the Second Republic of the Philippines established by the Japanese belligerent. The characteristics of this third kind of de facto government are: (a) Its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful govt. (b) During its existence, it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful govt. SOVEREIGNTY The supreme power of the State to govern persons and things within its territory. "Sovereignty is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which the State is governed. There are two kinds of sovereignty, to wit, legal and political. Legal sovereignty is the authority which has the power to issue final commands whereas political sovereignty is the power behind the legal sovereign, or the sum total of the influences that operate upon it. Sovereignty may also be internal or external. Internal sovereignty refers to the power of the State to control its domestic affairs. External sovereignty, which is the power of the State to direct its relations with other States, is also known as independence. xxx" (Cruz.)

'Theory of Auto-Limitation' is the property of the State-force due to which a State has exclusive legal competence of self-limitation and self-restriction (Jellinek)

DOMINIUM and IMPERIUM Imperium refers to the State's authority to govern. It covers such activities as passing laws governing a territory, maintaining peace and order over it, and defending it against foreign invasion. When the State act in this capacity jure imperii, it generally enjoys sovereign immunity. Dominium refers to the capacity of the State to own property. It covers such rights as title to land, exploitation and use of it, and disposition or sale of the same. The Regalian doctrine whereby all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and anyone claiming title has the burden to show ownership, comes within this concept. In this capacity jure gestium, the State descends to the status of ordinary persons and thus becomes liable as such." Distinguish sovereignty from dominion. Sovereignty is the right to exercise the functions of a State to the exclusion of any other State. It is often referred to as the power of imperium, which is defined as the government authority possessed by the State . On the other hand, dominion, or dominium, is the capacity of the State to own or acquire property such as lands and natural resources. (Separate Opinion, Kapunan, J., in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000, En Banc, See Footnote 86)

Is sovereignty really absolute? While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties . . . A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken." (Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18) Kinds of Sovereignty Political Refers to the Refers to the power Authority that has behind legal sovereignty, i.e., the power to issue the Final commands, different sectors That is the Congress that mold public Opinion Legal Internal External

Refers to the powerRefers to the power of the state to of the state to control its domesticdirect its relations affairs with other states a.k.a. Independence

(Separate Opinion, Kapunan, J., in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000, 347 SCRA 128, 268-270, En Banc [Per Curiam] (Concept of Jura Regalia vs. Concept of Native title) Generally, under the concept of jura regalia, private title to land must be traced to some grant, express or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the American Colonial government, and thereafter, the Philippine Republic. The belief that the Spanish Crown is the origin of all land titles in the Philippines has persisted because title to land must emanate from some source for it cannot issue forth from nowhere

In its broad sense, the term "jura regalia" refers to royal grants, or those rights which the King has by virtue of his prerogatives. In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has over anything in which a subject has a right of property or propriedad. These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by the king as the sovereign. The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally held by the King, and while the use of lands was granted out to others who were permitted to hold them under certain conditions, the King theoretically retained the title. By fiction of law, the King was regarded as the original proprietor of all lands, and the true and only source of title, and from him all lands were held. The theory of jura regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest. The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial. In the landmark case of Carino v. Insular Government (41 Phil. 935, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. Ed. 594 [1909]), the United States Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the pre-war Philippine Supreme Court, made the following pronouncement: x x x Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. x x x The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia. Carino was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1909, at a time when decisions of the U.S. Court were binding as precedent in our jurisdiction (Section 10, Philippine Bill of 1902). We applied the Carino doctrine in the 1946 case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]), where we stated that [a]ll lands that were not acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain, but [a]n exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. . Dominium was the basis for the early Spanish decrees embracing the theory of jura regalia. The declaration in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that all lands of the public domain are owned by the State is likewise founded on dominium. If dominium, not imperium, is the basis of the theory of jura regalia, then the lands which Spain acquired in the 16th century were limited to non-private lands, because it could only acquire lands which were not yet privately-owned or occupied by the Filipinos. Hence, Spain acquired title only over lands which were unoccupied and unclaimed, i.e., public lands. TERRITORIAL, PERSONAL, and EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is the manifestation of sovereignty. The jurisdiction of the state is understood as both its authority and the sphere of the exercise of that authority. (Sinco 26.)

a. Territorial jurisdiction is the authority of the State to have all persons and things within its territorial limits to be completely subject to its control and protection. b. Personal jurisdiction is the authority of the state over its nationals, their persons, property, and acts, whether within or outside its territory. The Civil Code provision that prohibitory and mandatory laws follow citizens wherever they go is an example. c. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is the authority of the State over persons, things or acts, outside its territorial limits by reason of their effects to its territory. Art. 2 of the RPC is a classic example of this. DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT BASIS:

i. Constitutional: Art. XVI, Sec. 3. The State may not be sued without its consent. ii. Jurisprudence Positivist theory: There can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the laws on which the right depends. (Holmes in Kawananakoa v Polyblank) Sociological theory: If the State is amenable to suits, all its time would be spent defending itself from suits and this would prevent it from performing its other functions. (Republic v Villasor, 54 SCRA 83)

The doctrine is also available to foreign States insofar as they are sought to be sued in the courts of the local State. The added basis in this case is the principle of the sovereign equality of States, under which one State cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. To do so would "unduly vex the peace of nations." (Cruz.) Basis of the Doctrine of State Immunity ETHICAL PRACTICAL As to a foreign As to a local state state "There can be no "Par in parem non The state will be legal right against habet imperium" busy defending Doctrine of itself from the authority that sovereign lawsuits makes the law on equality of all states which the right depends"

DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION - the local country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of their own laws DOCTRINE OF PACTA SUNT SERVANDA international agreements must be performed in good faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties . . . A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken." The Holy See v. Rosario, 238 SCRA 524, Dec. 1, 1994, En Banc [Quiason] In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See. The issue of petitioner's non-suability can be determined by the trial court without going to trial in the light of the pleadings, particularly the admission of private respondent. Besides, the privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. As the department tasked with the conduct of the Philippines' foreign relations (Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title I, Sec. 3), the Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country (Rollo, pp. 156-157). The determination of the executive arm of government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts (International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]). Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the country's foreign relations (World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1972]). As in International Catholic Migration Commission and in World Health Organization, we abide by the certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. WHEN A SUIT IS AGAINST THE STATE AND WHEN IT IS NOT.

A suit is against the State, regardless of who is named as the defendant, if it produces adverse consequences to the public treasury in terms of disbursement of public funds and loss of government property. When a suit is against the State, it cannot prosper unless the State has given its consent. In the following cases, however, the suit is not really against the State. 1. When the purpose of the suit is to compel an officer charged with the duty of making payments pursuant to an appropriation made by law in favor of the plaintiff to make such payment. For in this case, the suit is not really against the State, the State having acknowledged its liability to the plaintiff through the enactment of an appropriation law. Rather, the suit is intended to compel performance of a ministerial duty. (Begoso v PVA, 32 SCRA 466 and Del Mar v PVA, 51 SCRA 340 both involving the War Widow Benefits Law due the veterans.) 2. When from the allegations in the complaint, it is clear that the respondent is a public officer sued in a private capacity. 3. When the action is not in personam with the government as the named defendant, but an action in rem that does not name the government in particular. Republic v. Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124, March 19, 1993, En Banc [Campos] [When is suit deemed suit against the State? Liabilities of public officers who exceeded their authority] Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are: 1) When the Republic is sued by name; 2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency; 3) When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government. 4) When the suit is against a foreign state or embassy As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority. Until recently in 1991 (Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282 [1991]), this doctrine still found application, this Court saying that immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except when it has given its consent, it cannot be invoked by both the military officers to release them from any liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the government. The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the State in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants. This Court has made it quite clear that even a high position in the government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another. The inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths that followed the incident. Instead, the liability should fall on the named defendants in the lower court. In line with the ruling of this Court in Shauf v. Court of Appeals (191 SCRA 713 [1990]), herein public officials, having been found to have acted beyond the scope of their authority, may be held liable for damages. DA v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, Nov. 11, 1993 [Vitug] [Can government properties be levied to satisfy judgment against the State? Waiver under Act No. 3083] Waiver of State Immunity: The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principle of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contracts relate to the exercise of its sovereign functions.

EXPRESSL Through a Special law Art. 2180 NCC "The state is liable for quasi-delicts when it acts through a special agent"

Through a General law Act 3083 in relation with CA 327 as amended by PD 1445 ACT 3083 deals with money claims arising from contracts with the gov't. whether jure imperii or jure gestionis

IMPLIEDLY By entering into a contract Restrictive Doc. of State Immunity This doctrine provides that only contracts entered into by the government in its proprietary capacity amounts to a waiver of its immunity from suit

By filing a pleading The pleading filed must assert an affirmative relief because in doing so, it opens itself to a possible counterclaim

Art. 2189 NCC "LGUs shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by any person by reason of defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, & other public works under their control & supervision."

When the state litigates, it is not required to put up

Procedure to collect: File your claim with COA COA must act upon it Within 60 days from filing If COA refuses pay, elevate case to SC (certiorari)

By doing so, it is deemed to have descended to the level of a private individual But if it entered into a contract in its governmental capacity it is not deemed to have impliedly waived its immunity from suit

a bond, or be asked to pay legal fees because it is assumed that it is always solvent.

Where the waiver is through a special law, file the suit with the courts.

Lansang v. CA, G.R. No. 102667, Feb. 23, 2000, 2nd Div. [Quisumbing] [Suits against public officers] The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the State where the satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the State itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. 12When public officials can be sued personally To REQUIRE him to do a duty required by law To RESTRAIN him from doing an act alleged to be unconstitutional or illegal

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To RECOVER from him taxes unlawfully assessed or collected AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION Art. XVII, 1987 Constitution SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or (2) A constitutional convention. SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. (*RA No. 6735 is now a valid law for peoples initiative) SECTION 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention. SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision. Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition. Modes of Proposing Amendments or Revision Proposal Thru Con. Con. By a 2/3 vote of all members of Congress Thru Peoples initiative By petition of at least By

Ratification Thru Congress By a vote of Majority of All its members a

12% of the total no. votes case in of registered voters of Which at least 3% of Each legislative dist. Must be represented No amendment shall be authorized oftener than Plebiscite

Here it will not Act as a legislanot 60 tive

By a majority vote of all its members

The plebiscite shall be held earlier than

Body but a

if calling is submittedonce every 5 years

beginning Feb. 3 99 days nor later Than 90 days After the approval Of such amendment/revision, or after the certification by the COMELEC of the Sufficiency of the Petition as the Case may be Lambino vs. Comelec, GR No. 174153, October 25, 2006 HELD: Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second

Constituent Body to the people

mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a peoples initiative. Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to [A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution. In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to Amendments to this Constitution. X x x There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between amendment and revision of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a peoples initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments. Imbong v. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28, (1970) HELD: Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution (now Art. XVII), has full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting separately. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call a constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal power granted, such as the power to fix the qualifications, number, apportionment, and compensation of the delegates as well as appropriation of funds to meet the expenses for the election of delegates and for the operation of the Constitutional Convention itself, as well as all other implementing details indispensable to a fruitful convention. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details, which are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as long as such statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the Constitution, they are valid. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such implementing details after calling a constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority is expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res. No. 2 as amended by Res. No. 4. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be vetoed by the President is no argument against conceding such power in Congress as a legislative body nor present any difficulty; for it is not irremediable as Congress can override the Presidential veto or Congress can reconvene as a Constituent Assembly and adopt a resolution prescribing the required implementing details. Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1967) DOCTRINES: (1) Proposal of amendments is not a political but a justiciable question subject to judicial review. This doctrine is reaffirmed in Sanidad v. COMELEC. (2) The choice as to whether to propose amendments or to call a constitutional convention for that purpose or to do both was a question of wisdom and not of authority and hence was a political question not subject to review by the courts. (3) The constituent power, or the power to amend or revise the Constitution, is different from the law-making power of Congress Tanada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil 1101 DOCTRINE: The courts can inquire into whether or not the prescribed procedure for amendment has been observed.

AMENDMENT- Isolated or Piecemeal change REVISION- Revamp or Rewriting of the entire instrument

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Lambino vs. Comelec, GR No. 174153, October 25, 2006 HELD: Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. X x x Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended. In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan includes change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances. Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Groups initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Groups proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present BicameralPresidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Groups proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional Commission, writes: An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied) X x x

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Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision. The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. These three examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision sought by the present petition is located. However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word republican with monarchic or theocratic in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checksand-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution. Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow peoples initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions. DOCTRINE OF PROPER SUBMISSION > The entire constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. Submission for ratification of piecemeal amendments disallowed Lambino vs. Comelec, GR No. 174153, October 25, 2006 HELD: The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. CITIZENSHIP * Citizenship is membership in a political community with all its concomitant rights and responsibilities. Whether natural-born or naturalized, this status confers upon the individual certain prerogatives which may be denied the alien, although both of them come under the term person as protected by the due process and equal protection clauses. Thus, the citizen enjoys certain exclusive rights, such as the rights to vote, to run for public office, to exploit natural resources, to operate public utilities, to administer educational institutions, and to manage the mass media. Art. IV, 1987 Constitution SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

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(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; (3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. SECTION 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. SECTION 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. SECTION 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it. SECTION 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. THREE METHODS OF ACQUIRING CITIZENSHIP: (1) Jus Sanguinis Citizenship is conferred by virtue of blood relationship. (2) Jus Soli Citizenship is conferred by virtue of the place of birth. (3) Naturalization the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the privilege of a native born citizen.

Valles v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc [Purisima] [Jus sanguinis principle; renunciation of Philippine citizenship; Application of Res Judicata in citizenship issues] Jus sanguinis principle The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth. * The principle of Jus Sanguinis does not apply to adopted children, it applies only to children of natural filiations. Renunciation of Philippine citizenship The mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express . As held by this Court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of ones citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado v. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well. Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a ground for losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioners claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water. Application of Res Judicata in citizenship issues Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e., the principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship . However, in the case of Burca v. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:

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1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and 3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court. Tecson v. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277 (2004) HELD: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses: "No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs] (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married. X x x

Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo(20 SCRA 562), citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon(82 Phil. 771)] and Serra vs. Republic (91 Phil. 914). On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states "We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases. First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the

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stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather. Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here. Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis. Finally, Paa vs. Chan(21 SCRA 753) This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino. The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo. xxx xxx xxx

"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother. The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs. Cayat (68 Phil. 12). I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose. x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated. The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail. Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him. The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.

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In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, Oct. 1, 1999, En Banc [Kapunan] [Failure to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority] Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. xxx The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. xxx Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Bengzon, III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, En Banc [Kapunan] [Natural-born Philippine citizenship; Effect of Repatriation; Naturalization and Repatriation] There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof. As defined in the x x x Constitution, natural-born citizens are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530 xxx To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any government announced policies (Section 1, R.A. 530). Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may x x x reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act No. 63 enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. xxx Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63 (An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired [1936]).

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Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces (Section 4, C.A. No. 63); (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II (Section 1, Republic Act No. 965 [1953]); (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 2630 [1960]); (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 8171 [1995]); and (5) political and economic necessity (Ibid). As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last residedxxx Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a naturalborn Filipino. Angat v. Republic, G.R. No. 132244, Sept. 14, 1999 [Vitug] [Repatriation under R.A. 8171] R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on October 23, 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. An application for repatriation could be filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization chaired by the Solicitor General with the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency as the other members. Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630, May 26, 1999, En Banc [Mendoza] [Dual citizenship and dual allegiance] Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volitionxxx Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) (Local Government Code) must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, x x x, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. Instances when a Philippine citizen may possess dual citizenship: 1Those born of parents whose country adopts the jus sanguinis principle in fereign countries which follows the jus soli principle. 2Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and an alien father, if by the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country. 3Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country, the former are considered citizens, unless, by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT PREAMBLE

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We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society and establish a government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. A preamble has two functions: (1) identify the authors of the Constitution, and (2) state the general principles upon which the Constitution is founded. (Sets the tone for the succeeding provisions) * Does not confer rights nor impose duties * Not a source of power or right for any department of government * It only sets down the origin, scope, and purpose of the constitution, as such, it is useful as an aid in ascertaining the meaning of ambiguous provisions in the body of the constitution SOVEREIGNTY OF ITS PEOPLE AND REPUBLICANISM Art. II, Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. Under this principle, the Philippines is a democratic state that is, a government for, of, and by the people. But it is not a pure democracy. Thus, while it is true that the people are the possessors of sovereign power, it is equally the case that they cannot exercise the powers of government directly, but only through the medium of their duly elected representatives. Their participation in government consists of : 1) Suffrage - electing the officials to whom they delegate the right of government. 2) Plebiscite a) Ratifying the Constitution b) Approving any amendment thereto c) With respect to local matters, approving any changes in boundaries, mergers, divisions, and even abolition of local offices d) Creating metropolitan authorities, and e) Creating autonomous regions 3) Initiative and referendum - enacting or proposing laws, local or national, in a referendum. 4) Recall (Under the Local Government Code.) Features of Republicanism: 1. It is a government of laws and not of men; 2. There is periodic holding of elections; 3. There is observance of principle of separation of powers and of checks and balances; 4. There is observance of the role that the legislature cannot pass or enact irrepealable laws. ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW Art. II, Sec. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopt the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. "Adopts the generally accepted principles of international law" means the Philippines uses the incorporation theory (Doctrine of Incorporation). Without need of statute, these principles of international law become part of the Philippine body of laws from the municipal point of view. CIVILIAN SUPREMACY CLAUSE Sec. 3, Art. II, 1987 Constitution SECTION 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

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The supremacy of civilian rule over the military is ensured by, (i) the installation of the President, the highest civilian authority, as the commander-in-chief of the military, (ii) the requirement that members of the AFP swear to uphold and defend the Constitution, which is the fundamental law of the civil government, (iii) the professionalization of the service and the strengthening of the patriotism and nationalism, and respect for human rights, of the military, (iv) insulation of the AFP from partisan politics, (v) prohibition against the appointment to a civil position, (vi) compulsory retirement of officers (no over- staying of officers), so as to avoid propagation of power), (vii) a 3-year limitation on the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff, which although extendible in case of emergency by the President, depends on Congressional declaration of emergency, (viii) requirement of professional recruitment, so as to avoid any regional clique from forming within the AFP, as well as (ix) the establishment of a police force that is not only civilian character but also under the local executives. IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, Aug. 15, 2000, En Banc [Kapunan] The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. x x x The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines' authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. X x x It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippine experience reveals that it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the implementation and execution of certain traditionally civil functions. x x x [S]ome of the multifarious activities wherein military aid has been rendered, exemplifying the activities that bring both the civilian and the military together in a relationship of cooperation, are: 1. Elections; 2. Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross; 3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters; 4. Amateur sports promotion and development; 5. Development of the culture and the arts; 6. Conservation of natural resources; 7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program; 8. Enforcement of customs laws; 9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities; 10. Conduct of licensure examinations; 11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high school students; 12. Anti-drug enforcement activities; 13. Sanitary inspections; 14. Conduct of census work; 15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board; 16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices; 17. Peace and order policy formulation in local government units. ACADEMIC FREEDOM UP Board of Regents v. CA, G.R. No. 134625, Aug. 31, 1999, 2nd Div. [Mendoza] Academic freedom of institutions of higher learning is a freedom granted to institutions of higher learning which is thus given a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students. If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates. Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the graduation of a student, for it is precisely the graduation of such a student that is in question. Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc., 227 SCRA 595, Nov. 8, 1993 [Vitug]

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The essential freedoms subsumed in the term academic freedom encompassing not only the freedom to determine x x x on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught (and) how it shall be taught, but likewise who may be admitted to study. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT R.A. No. 8371 AN ACT TO RECOGNIZE, PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES/INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, CREATING A NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, ESTABLISHING IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Isagani Cruz v. Sec. of DENR, G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000, En Banc, [Puno and Kapunan, Separate Opinions] The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native titlexxx Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to selfgovernance and empowerment (Sections 13 to 20), social justice and human rights (Sections 21 to 28), the right to preserve and protect their culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual rights, and the right to develop their own sciences and technologies (Sections 29 to 37)xxx Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group ownership. The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only. (Separate Opinion, Puno, J., in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, et al., G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000, En Banc) Concept of "native title" Native title refers to ICCs/IPs preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be recognized and respected (Section 11, IPRA). Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineatedxxx The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial. In the landmark case of Carino v. Insular Government (41 Phil. 935, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. Ed. 594 [1909]), the United States Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the pre-war Philippine Supreme Court, made the following pronouncement: x x x Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish

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conquest, and never to have been public land. x x x (Carino v. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 941) The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regaliaxxx Carino was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1909, at a time when decisions of the U.S. Court were binding as precedent in our jurisdiction (Section 10, Philippine Bill of 1902). We applied the Carino doctrine in the 1946 case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]), where we stated that "[a]ll lands that were not acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain, but [a]n exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. (Separate Opinion, Kapunan, J., in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000, En Banc) THE FILIPINO FIRST POLICY Sec. 10, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution SECTION 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 [1997][Bellosillo] When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinosxxx Where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic lawxxx From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified Filipinos must be preferred OWNERSHIP/ACQUISITION OF LANDS BY ALIENS Sec. 7, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution SECTION 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Sec. 8, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution

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SECTION 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law. THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY Sec. 16, Art. II, 1987 Constitution SECTION 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 [1993] [Davide] [the Concept of InterGenerational Responsibility] While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation, the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the wellfounded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. THE PREFERENTIAL RIGHT OF MARGINAL AND SUBSISTENCE FISHERMEN Sec. 7, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution SECTION 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of local marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

The preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their exploration, development and utilization x x x shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. Moreover, their mandated protection, development and conservation x x x imply certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone. What must be borne in mind is the State policy enshrined in the Constitution regarding the duty of the State to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature (Section 16, Article II). (Tano v. Socrates, G.R. No. 110249, Aug. 21, 1997)

THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO RECOVER PROPERTIES UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS OR EMPLOYEES

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Sec. 15, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution SECTION 15. The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials and employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.

Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, et. al. v. Desierto, G.R. No. 130140, Oct. 25, 1999, En Banc [Davide] Section 15, Article XI, 1987 Constitution provides that The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees as transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel. From the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, however, it was clear that this provision applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases. Thus, the prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated in Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution may be barred by prescription. STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT SEPARATION OF POWERS Cruz: Purpose.-The doctrine of separation of powers is intended to prevent a concentration of authority in one person or group of persons that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of our republican institutions. More specifically, according to J. Laurel, the doctrine is intended to secure action, to forestall overaction, to prevent depotism and to obtain efficiency. xxx Blending of Powers.-- There are instances under the Constitution when powers are not confined exclusively within one department but are in fact assigned to or shared by several departments. As a result of this blending of powers, there is some difficulty now in classifying some of them as definitely legislative, executive or judicial. As J. Homes put it vividly when he remarked that "the great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to another." The powers of government may not at all times be contained with mathematical precision in water-tight compartments because of their ambiguous nature, e.g., the power of appointment, which can rightfully be exercised by each department over its own administrative personnel. xxx ISSUE: May the Government, through the PCGG, validly bind itself to cause the dismissal of all cases against the Marcos heirs pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts in a Compromise Agreement entered into between the former and the latter? Held: This is a direct encroachment on judicial power, particularly in regard to criminal jurisdiction. Well-settled is the doctrine that once a case has been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction, the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion and control of the judge. In a criminal case, the manner in which the prosecution is handled, including the matter of whom to present as witnesses, may lie within the sound discretion of the government prosecutor; but the court decides, based on the evidence proffered, in what manner it will dispose of the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution, even by the justice secretary, to withdraw the information or to dismiss the complaint. The prosecutions motion to withdraw or to dismiss is not the least binding upon the court. On the contrary, decisional rules require the trial court to make its own evaluation of the merits of the case, because granting such motion is equivalent to effecting a disposition of the case itself. Thus, the PCGG, as the government prosecutor of ill-gotten wealth cases, cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases against the Marcoses pending in the courts, for said dismissal is not within its sole power and discretion. (Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744, Dec. 9, 1998 [Panganiban]) DELEGATION OF POWERS Potestas delegatas non delegari potest What has been delegated cannot be further delegated.

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Sec. 23, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution SECTION 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war. (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

Delegation of Emergency Powers to the President Article VI, Sec. 23, Constitution (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

Conditions for a valid delegation of Emergency Powers to the President: 1) There must be a law 2) There must be a war or other national emergency * other national emergency may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence, or epidemic, typhoon, flood or other similar catastrophe or nationwide proportions or effect 3) The delegation must be for a limited period only 4) The delegation must be subject to Congressional limitations & restrictions 5) The power must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress Tests of a valid delegation of power : Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority x x x. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected . (Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106, March 19, 1997) THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT LEGISLATIVE POWER Authority to make laws and to alter and repeal them Advantages of BICAMERALISM 1. Allows for a body with a national perspective to check the parochial tendency of representatives elected by district; 2. Allows a more careful study of legislation; 3. Makes the legislature less susceptible to control by the executive; and 4. Serves as a training ground for national leaders Advantages of UNICAMERALISM 1. Simplicity of organization resulting in economy and efficiency; 2. Facility in pinpointing responsibility for legislation; and 3. Avoidance of duplication Kinds of Legislative power 1. ORIGINAL possessed by the sovereign people 2. DERIVATIVE that which has been delegated by the sovereign people to legislative bodies (Congress) and is subordinate to the original power of the people also 1. CONSTITUENT power to amend and revise the constitution 2. ORDINARY power to pass ordinary laws The people, through the amendatory process, exercise constituent power, and, through initiative and referendum, ordinary legislative power

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Kinds of limits on legislative power 1. SUBSTANTIVE LIMITS curtail the contents of the law Ex. No law may be passed which impairs freedom of speech 2. PROCEDURAL LIMITS curtail the manner of passing laws Ex. A bill must generally be approved by the President before it becomes a law The power of congress to legislate is PLENARY, that is it may legislate on any subject matter. Congress may not pass irrepealable laws, the power of present and future legislatures must remain plenary Legislative power may be delegated either by a specific constitutional provision or by the immemorial practice of it being delegated to local governments

COMPOSITION, QUALIFICATIONS, AND TERM OF OFFICE A. SENATE COMPOSITION - 24 Senators elected at large by qualified voters QUALIFICATIONS Citizenship: Age on the day of election: Education: Registered voter: Residence: election) TERM OF OFFICE - Six (6) years Natural-born citizen 35 Able to read and write In the Philippines 2 years (immediately preceding the

No Senator shall serve for more than 2 consecutive terms, and for this purpose, no voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall be considered for the purpose of interrupting the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. (Art. VI, Sec. 4)

B. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMPOSITION Not more than 250 Members (*unless otherwise fixed by law) elected from: a) Legislative districts (80% of the seats shall be allotted to district representatives.) b) Party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. [Sec. 5(2)] The districts are to be determined according to the following rules: [200 districts or 80%] 1. The districts are to be apportioned among the provinces, cities, and Metro Manila. [Sec. 5(1)] 2. The apportionment must be based on the number of inhabitants, using a uniform and progressive ratio. Within 3 years following the return of every census, Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts, based on the standards herein provided (to make it representative and more responsive to the people). [Sec. 5 (4)] 3. Each legislative district must comprise as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory (to avoid gerrymandering, or putting together of areas where a candidate is strong, even if these are not contiguous). [Sec. 5 (3)] 4. Each city with a population of at least 250,000 must have at least one representative. [Sec. 5(3)] 5. Each province, regardless of population must have at least one representative. [Sec. 5(3)] QUALIFICATIONS Citizenship: Age on the day of election: Education: Registered voter: Residence: TERM OF OFFICE - 3 years Natural-born citizen 25 Able to read and write In the district, if district representative 1 year in the district (immediately preceding the election)

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No Member of the House shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. No voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall be considered an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected for the purpose of circumventing this 3-term limitation. (Art. VI, Sec. 7)

Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995) HELD: Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic (95 Phil. 890), we laid this distinction quite clearly: "There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; 'domicile' denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile." X x x In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives (199 SCRA 692), this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. Domino v. COMELEC, 310 SCRA 546 (1999) HELD: It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. "Domicile" is a question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time. X x x A persons "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. X x x As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention. THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM The Party-List Law (R.A. No. 7941) AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Ang Bagong Bayani OFW labor Party v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, En Banc [Panganiban]

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HELD: The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the States benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. The party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. INVIOLABLE PARAMETERS IN PARTY LIST SYSTEM (Republic Act No. 7941) 1) The twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.

2)

The two percent threshold - only those garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives.

3)

The three seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.

4)

Proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes." Method of Allocating PL Seats a) Rank all the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. b) The ration for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. c) All the parties with at least 2% of the total votes cast for PLS are guaranteed one seat each. (Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats) Formula: Allocation of Additional Seats: Divide the votes received by a party who is entitled to a Qualifying Seat (QS) by the total number of votes cast in favor of the party who received the highest number of votes cast under the party-list, then multiply it to the number of seat to which the latter is entitled. Formula for determining Additional Seats of 1st party (with highest votes) Number of votes of First Party = Total votes for the Party List System Proportion of votes of FP relative to votes of PLS

Rules: a) If proportion is greater than 6% - entitled to 2 AS b) If proportion is between 4% to 6% - entitled to 1 AS c) If proportion is less than 4% - NOT entitled to AS Formula for determining AS of other qualified parties Number of votes of party entitled to QS x # of AS of 1st party Total votes cast of 1st Party * Do away with fractional representation Formula for determining No. of Party List Representatives Number of District Representatives = No. of PLR 4 REGISTRATION: Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or

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a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election. DISQUALIFICATIONS: The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: (1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes; (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; (3) It is a foreign party or organization; (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes; (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. NOMINATION OF PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES: Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes. A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned. QUALIFICATIONS OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEES: No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless: (1) He is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines (2) A registered voter (3) A resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election (4) Able to read and write (5) A bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election (6) At least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election GUIDELINES FOR SCREENING PARTY-LIST PARTICIPANTS: (Ang Bagong Bayani OFW labor Party v. COMELEC) 1) The political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interest, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors. 2) While even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized

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and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives. In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented.

3)

In view of the objections directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x Furthermore, the Constitution provides that religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. (Sec. 2 [5], Article IX [C]) The prohibition was explained by a member of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: [T]he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party. 4) A party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows: 1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes; 2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; 3) It is a foreign party or organization; 4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes; 5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; 6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; 7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or 8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it had registered. Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become members of the House of Representatives. A party or organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.

5)

The party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a partylist candidate is not only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organization to be elected to the House of Representatives. 6) The party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. x x x 7) Not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties. Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented. 8) While lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. x x x DOES THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRE ALL SUCH ALLOCATED SEATS TO BE FILLED UP ALL THE TIME AND UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES? The Constitution simply states that [t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution

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explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote proportional representation in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives. X x x Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown x x x that Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress. (Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 136781, Oct. 6, 2000, En Banc [Panganiban]) SPECIAL ELECTIONS TO FILL UP VACANCY The law that governs and lays down the details concerning the special congressional elections is Rep. Act No. 6645 (December 28, 1987). Under the law, no special election will be called if the vacancy occurs (i) less than 18 months before the next regular election in the case of the Senate, or (ii) less than 1 year before the next regular election in the case of the House; in these cases, we will just have to wait for the next regular election, for practical reasons. When the vacancy occurs during the period when special elections are allowed to be conducted (18 or 12 months or more before the next regular election), the particular House of Congress must pass either a resolution by the House concerned, if Congress is in session, or a certification by the Senate President or the Speaker of the House, if Congress is not in session, (a) declaring the existence of the vacancy and (b) calling for a special election to be held within 45 to 90 days from the date of calling of the special election (that is, from the date of the resolution or certification). But the Senator or Member of the House thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the term. (Art. VI, Sec. 9) Funds certified by the COMELEC as necessary to defray the expenses for holding regular and special elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, shall be provided in the regular or special appropriations and, once approved, shall be released automatically upon certification by the Chairman of the COMELEC. (Art. IX-C, Sec. 11) SALARIES While it is Congress, through a salary law, that determines the salary to be received by its members, the Constitution mandates that no increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the two houses approving such increase. Purpose of the provision -- The reason for the this rule, the Court said, is to place a "legal bar to the legislators yielding to the natural temptation to increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for higher compensation is lacking, but with the length of time that has to elapse before an increase becomes effective, there is a deterrent factor to any such measure unless the need for it is clearly felt." (Philconsa v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300) Illustration: If a salary law is passed in 1988 increasing the salary of members of Congress, the same law can only take effect for the term that begins at noon of 30 June 1992; but if a salary is passed in 1988 decreasing the salary of members of Congress, the law can take effect right away, since the Constitution prohibits only the increase. If another salary law is passed in 1993 to increase the salary, the same can take effect not in the term beginning at noon of 30 June 1995; the top twelve senators elected on the 2nd Monday of May, 1992 would still be holding office then. It can only take effect in 1998. Effectively, therefore, such law can take effect only after the expiration of the longest term of a Senator, which is six years, even if the term of the Representative who voted for the law is only 3 years. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES Sec. 11, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution

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SECTION 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. FREEDOM FROM ARREST Elements of the privilege: 1) Congress must be in session, whether regular (sec. 15) or special (supra). It does not matter where the member of Congress may be found (attending the session, socializing in a private party, or sleeping at home); so long as Congress is in session, freedom from arrest holds; 2) The crime for which the member is to be arrested is punishable by 6 years of imprisonment or less. "Punishable" refers to the maximum possible penalty which a penal statute attaches to the offense. It follows too that if the crime is punishable by 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor or more, the member can be arrested, even if he is in session in the halls of Congress. People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Feb. 3, 2000, En Banc [Ynares-Santiago] HELD: The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives x x x arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. SPEECH AND DEBATE CLAUSE This privilege protects the member concerned from any libel suit that may be filed against him for a speech made "in" the halls of Congress or in any of its committees. Speech is not confined to traditional speech but even to the casting of votes, the making of reports, a debate or discussion, even communicative actions, and any other form of expression. The speech, however, must be made "in" Congress in the discharge of legislative duty.

Jimenez v. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876 (1966) HELD: Scope of Parliamentary Freedom of Speech and Debate.-- "Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question."

The provision protects the Member of Congress only from being held liable outside of Congress ("in any other place"); it does not protect him from liability "inside" Congress, i.e., from possible disciplinary measures that his peers may impose upon him. For as mentioned above, his speech may constitute disorderly behavior as in Osmena v. Pendatun (109 Phil 863), and this may be penalized with censure, suspension for 60 days, or expulsion, the latter two upon concurrence of 2/3 of the membership. It is important to note that this privilege is not absolute. The rule provides that the legislator may not be questioned "in any other place," which means that he may be called to account for his remarks by his own colleagues in Congress itself, and when warranted, punished for disorderly behavior. Thus, in the case of Osmena v. Pendatun, the President himself who had been vilified by the petitioner could not file any civil or criminal action against him because of this immunity. Nonetheless, the majority of the

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members of the House of Representatives in which the questioned speech was delivered were not precluded from demonstrating their loyalty to the chief executive by declaring Osmena guilty of disorderly behavior and suspending him in the exercise of their disciplinary power [now Art. VI, Sec. 16(3)]. Illustration: If Congressman X makes an oral abuse against Congressman Y in the halls of Congress, he cannot be arrested nor prosecuted for slander because of the speech clause. But he can be punished by his peers for disorderly behavior. But if Congressman X, in the course of heated debate, assaults Congressman Y and inflicts physical injuries, he can be criminally prosecuted (for direct assault with grave or less grave physical injuries) because although a verbal assault is immune, a physical assault is not immune. But although he can be prosecuted, he cannot be arrested while Congress is in session, because while he is not immune from prosecution, he is immune from arrest, assuming the penalty does not exceed prision correctional. The court must thus wait for the recess of Congress before it can order his arrest. Q. Does the privilege extend to agents of congressmen or senators? A. YES, provided that the agency consists precisely in assisting the legislator in the performance of legislative action (Bernas citing Gravel v. US, 90 LW 5053) DISQUALIFICATIONS INCOMPATIBLE OFFICES: Art. VI, Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. xxx

An INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE is a post which a member cannot accept unless he waives or forfeits his seat in Congress. A sensu contrario, if he waives or forfeits his seat, he may accept the other post, since the incompatibility arises only because of his simultaneous membership in both. NOTE: No forfeiture shall take place if the member of congress holds the other government office in an ex officio capacity e.g. membership in the board of regents of U.P. of the chairman, committee on education, in the Senate

FORBIDDEN OFFICES: Art. VI, Sec. 13. xxx Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.

A FORBIDDEN OFFICE is one to which a member cannot be appointed even if he is willing to give up his seat in Congress. The effect of his resignation from the Congress is the loss of his seat therein but his disqualification for the forbidden office nevertheless remains. The prohibition lies in the "fiduciary" nature of the relationship involved. Such a member cannot resign in anticipation of the passage of the law creating such office or increasing its emolument as a way of circumventing the prohibition. However, the prohibition is not forever (as in the Jones Law); it is for the term for which he was elected.

OTHER PROHIBITIONS: (i) Personally appearing as counsel before any court of justice, the Electoral Tribunal, quasijudicial bodies, and other administrative bodies. (ii) Being interested financially in any (a) contract with, or (b) franchise or special privilege granted by, the Government, its subdivision, agency or instrumentality, a governmentowned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary. The prohibition is for the duration of his term of office. (iii) Intervening in any matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit. (iv) Intervening in any matter where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

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What the Constitution prohibits in the case of members of Congress who are also members of the bar is their personal appearance before any of these bodies. This is not a prohibition against, the practice of law in any court. Thus, a member may still sign and file his pleadings, give legal advice, continue as partner, and have a partner or associate appear for him in court.

INTERNAL GOVERNMENT OF CONGRESS ELECTION OF OFFICERS

First order of business - election by each house of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, and such other officers that the rules of each house may provide. A majority vote of all the respective members is required to elect these two officers. Upon the election of the President and the Speaker, the Constitution deems the Houses "organized." (Art. VI, sec. 19)

Santiago v. Guingona, 298 SCRA 756 (1998) HELD: While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court. In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power "to determine the rules of its proceedings." Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to govern its internal affairs. Pertinent to the instant case are Rules I and II thereof, which provide: "Rule I ELECTIVE OFFICERS "SEC. 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a President, a President Pro Tempore, a Secretary, and a Sergeant-at-Arms. "These officers shall take their oath of office before entering into the discharge of their duties. RULE II ELECTION OF OFFICERS "SEC. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority vote of all its Members. Should there be more than one candidate for the same office, a nominal vote shall be taken; otherwise, the elections shall be by viva voce or by resolution." Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene. Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they "are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them." Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.

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In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold the very duty that justifies the Court's being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. X x x QUORUM

The quorum required to conduct business is a majority (1/2 + 1) of all the members. But to pass a law, only the votes of the majority of those present in the session, there being a quorum, are required. This is known as the "shifting majority".

To illustrate: 13 members of the Senate are sufficient to constitute a quorum. If only 13 members are present, a vote by 7 in favor of a bill is sufficient to pass it. But as the number of those present increases, the number of votes needed to pass a bill would correspondingly increase, i.e., shift. When a quorum cannot be had, a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and compel the attendance of the absent (recalcitrant) members by the means of arrest or such other measures and penalties as the House may provide in its rules. In Avelino v. Cuenco (83 Phil 17), the ruling then was: The quorum was computed on the number of Senators over whom the Senate has jurisdiction at the time of session.

RULES OF PROCEEDINGS Each House or its committees may determine the rules of its proceedings. These rules include the procedure to be followed in "inquiries in aid of legislation." The House may set aside the rules it adopted as it sees fit, because these rules are only of a temporary nature. The rules of the Commission on Appointments concerning its internal business could be reviewed by the Courts, that is, it is a justiciable matter, when a certain construction of such rules would defeat the right of the individual to a public office. Pacete v. Sec. of the Commission on Appointments, 40 SCRA 58 (1971)

Q. May the SC intervene in the implementation of the rules of either house of Congress? A. On matters affecting only internal operation of the legislature, the legislatures formulation and implementation of its rules is beyond the reach of the courts. When, However, the legislative rule affects private rights, the courts cannot altogether be excluded (Bernas citing US v. Smith, 286 US 6) DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS Each house may punish it members for "disorderly behaviour." What constitutes "disorderly behaviour" is solely within the discretion of the house concerned. Although a member of either house cannot be held accountable in any other place for any speech he make in the Congress or in any committee thereof, he can be found guilty of disorderly behaviour by his own peers, so ruled the Court in Osmena v. Pendatun. 109 Phil. 863 (1960). The penalty may consist of (i) censure; or upon a 2/3 vote of all the members of the house, (ii) suspension, not exceeding 60 days, or (iii) expulsion.

JOURNAL AND CONGRESSIONAL RECORDS

The journal is only a resume of minutes of what transpired during a legislative session. The record is the word-for-word transcript of the proceedings taken during the session.

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Probative Value of the Journal

The journal is conclusive on the courts as to its contents, so the SC ruled in US v. Pons, 34 Phil. 729 (1916). Pons, in this case was prosecuted under a criminal statute. He contended, however, that the statute was passed past the midnight after February 28, 1914, the last day of session of the legislative body, but that the members stopped the clock at mid-night, to pass the law. The SC rejected this claim, ruling that the probative value of the journal could not be questioned, otherwise proof of legislative action would be uncertain and would now have to depend on the imperfect memory of men.

Matters Required to be Entered in the Journal The Constitution requires that the following matters be contained in the journal: (a) The yeas and nays on third and final reading of a bill [Art. VI, Sec. 26(2)]; (b) Veto message of the President (i.e., his objection to a bill when he vetoes it) [Art. VI, Sec. 27(1)]; (c) The yeas and nays on the repassing of a bill vetoed by the President (Art. VI, Sec. 27(1)]; (d) The yeas and nays on any question at the request of 1/5 of the members present [Art. VI, Sec. 16(4)] In addition, the journal contains the summary of the proceedings. A record, on the other hand, contains the verbatim transcript of all proceedings of the house or its committees. The Constitution is silent as to what the record must contain. However, in Art. XI, Sec. 3(3), the Constitution speaks of the vote of each member of the House either affirming a favorable or overriding its contrary resolution of the impeachment complaint to be "recorded."

Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268, Aug. 14, 1997 [Mendoza] HELD: The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effects. Thus, in United States v. Pons (34 Phil. 729, 735 [1916]], quoting ex rel. Herron v. Smith, 44 Ohio 348 [1886]), this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as public memorials of the most permanent character, thus: They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals. Journal Entry Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory

As to matters required by the Constitution to be placed in the journal, the journal is conclusive. But aside from these 4 matters, any other matter does not enjoy such conclusiveness. The Enrolled Bill Doctrine: Once a bill has been approved by both houses, the bill is engrossed or enrolled, and this "Enrolled Copy of the Bill" bears the certification of the Presiding Officer of the house (either Senate President or Speaker of the House) that this bill as enrolled is the version passed by each house. The purpose of the certification is to prevent attempts at smuggling in "riders". The enrolled copy is then sent to the President for his action.

SESSIONS REGULAR SESSIONS Art. VI, Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine, until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays. xxx Sec. 16(5) Neither house during the session of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other house, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting.

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Place as here used refers not to the building but to the political unit where the two Houses may be sitting.

SPECIAL SESSIONS Special sessions are held in the following instances: a) When the President calls for a special session at any time (Art. VI, Sec. 15) b) To call a special election due to a vacancy in the offices of President and VicePresident (Art. VII, Sec. 10) in which Congress shall convene at 10 a.m. of the third day after the vacancy, without need of a call. c) To decide on the disability of the President because the Cabinet (majority) has "disputed" his assertion that he is able to dispose his duties and powers. (This takes place not when the Cabinet first sends a written declaration about the inability of the President, but after the President has disputed this initial declaration.) (Art. VII, Sec. 11.) > Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within 48 hours, without need of call. d) To revoke or extend the Presidential Proclamation of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus (Art. VII, Sec. 18). > Congress, if not in session, shall, within 24 hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene, without need of a call. In the last three cases, Congress convenes without need of a call. These are exceptions to the general rule in the 1st case that when Congress is not in session, it can only meet in special session call by the President.

JOINT SESSION When both houses meet jointly, they generally vote separately. The reason is obvious: there are only 24 senators, while there are at least 250 representatives. It would be bad policy to give one vote to a Senator, who was elected "at large", and the same weight of vote to a representative, who is either elected only by one legislative district or a partylist. JOINT SESSION AND SEPARATE VOTING TAKE PLACE IN THE FOLLOWING INSTANCES: (a) Voting Separately a) When Congress, while acting as the canvasser of votes for the President and VicePresident, has to break the tie between two or more candidates for either position having an equal and the highest number of votes (Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 5). b) When it decides (by 2/3 vote) on the question of the President's inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office (Art. VII, Sec. 11, par. 4). c) Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the VP, when it confirms the nomination of a VP by the President from among the members of Congress; such person shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the members of both Houses, voting separately (Art. VII, Sec. 9). d) When it declares (by 2/3 vote) the existence of a state of war [Art. VI, Sec, 23(1)]. e) When it proposes to amend the Constitution (3/4 vote of the members) [Art. XVII, Sec. 1(1)]. (b) Voting Jointly

There is one exceptional instance when the two houses meet and vote jointly: When, there has been a proclamation of Martial law or a suspension of the writ by the President, and Congress has to decide whether to revoke or to extend such proclamation or suspension (majority vote of all members, voting jointly) (Art. VII, Sec. 18).

THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective

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Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. Pimentel v. HRET, 393 SCRA 227 (2002) HELD: The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber's respective electoral tribunal. Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioners' direct recourse to this Court is premature. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation. However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise, the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit. Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. Request of Justices Melencio Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano to be relieved as members of the HRET (Res. March 19,1991) In said request, the three justices asked to be relieved from membership in the HRET. According to them, political factors which have nothing to do with the merits of the case, were blocking the accomplishment of their constitutionally mandated task. They therefore suggested that there should be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation with their respective political parties, to insure their independence and objectivity as they sit in Tribunal deliberations. The SC resolved to direct them to return to their duties in the Tribunal. According to the court, in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of Congress, all members of these bodies should be guided only be purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases before them and that in the contemplation of the Constitution, the members-legislators, thereof, upon assumption of their duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respective political parties but as impartial judges. To further bolster the independence of the Tribunals, the term of office of every member thereof should be considered co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.

As judges, the members of the House Electoral Tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. (Bondoc v. Pineda [G.R. No. 97710. September 26, 1991.]

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STATUS In Angara v. Electoral Commission, the SC held that the then Electoral Commission was an independent body, although attached to Congress, In Suares v. Chief Accountant, the Commission on Audit, (then under the 1935 Constitution) as adjunct of Congress, was ruled to be an independent body, although attached to Congress, and so the salary of its staffers need not be the same as those of the Senate.

INDEPENDENCE OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS: Although the Electoral Tribunals are predominantly legislative in membership and the provision creating them is found in Article VI on the Legislative Department, it is not correct to say that they are mere adjuncts of the Congress of the Philippines. In fact, in the discharge of their constitutional duties, they are independent of the legislature, and also of the other departments for that matter.

ORGANIZATION (Art. VI, Sec. 19) The Electoral Tribunal shall be constituted within 30 days after the 2 houses shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. FUNCTIONS (id., Sec. 17) The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the (i) election, (ii) returns, and (iii) qualifications of their respective members.

Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members. The electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House only when the latter become members of either the Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives subject to Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution. While the proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec. 6 of RA. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner's contention that "after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral exercise from the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the question of qualification" finds no basis in law, because even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of candidates.(Aquino v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400, Sept. 18, 1995, En Banc [Kapunan]) As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. (Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300) While the COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by Farias is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives (HRET). Under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. Thus, the COMELEC's decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in deference to the HRET's own jurisdiction and functions. (Guerrero v. COMELEC, 336 SCRA 458)

Libanan v. HRET, 283 SCRA 520, Dec. 22, 1997 [Vitug] (No appeal from Decisions of the Electoral Tribunal)

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The Constitution mandates that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall each, respectively, be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members. The Court has stressed that x x x so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. The power granted to the Electoral Tribunal x x x excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same. The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in exceptional cases. In Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780), the Court has explained that while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference, the Court may do so, however, but only in the exercise of this Courts so-called extraordinary jurisdiction x x x upon a determination that the Tribunals decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero (Morrero v. Bocar [66 Phil. 429]), upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. The Court does not x x x venture into the perilous area of correcting perceived errors of independent branches of the Government; it comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution itself calls for remedial action.

THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS Secs. 18 and 19, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution SECTION 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. SECTION 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.

The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a majority representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can by sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power. No party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule. To allow it to elect more than its proportional share of members is to confer upon such a party a greater share in the membership in the Commission on Appointments and more power to impose its will on the minority, who by the same token, suffers a diminution of its rightful membership in the Commission. No party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule. Section 18 also assures representation in the CA of any political party who succeeds in electing members to the Senate, provided that the number of senators so elected enables it to put a representative in the CA. Therefore, in the Senate, a political party must at least have 2 duly elected senators for every seat in the CA. (Guingona v. Gonzales [G.R. No. 106971. October 20, 1992.])

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FUNCTION (Art. VII, Sec. 16) The Commission shall confirm or approve nominations made by the President of certain public officers named by the Constitution or by law: 1. Heads of the executive departments 2. Ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls 3. Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain 4. Other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution a. Chairman and members of 3 Constitutional Commissions b. Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council c. Members of the Regional Consultative council

SESSIONS AND PROCEDURE (Secs. 18 & 19) The Commission on Appointments shall meet to discharge its powers and functions only while the Congress is in session. The meeting may be called by (a) the Chairman, or (b) a majority of all its members. The Chairman of the Commission does not vote, except to break a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission rules by a majority vote of all its members. INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION (LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS) Sec. 21, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. The power of Congress to conduct investigations exists for the primary purpose of enabling it to discharge its legislative functions wisely and effectively-- to guide and aid Congress in the enactment of laws, their amendments and as well as their repeal. Each house or any of its committees may conduct "inquiries in aid of legislation" according to its duly published rules of procedures.

Legislative investigations are carried out in order to ascertain (a) what new legislation is needed (b) the existing law to be repealed and (c) whether a new legislation is effectively accomplishing its purpose with a view of amending it. But in addition to obtaining facts that may be useful in enacting laws, the power of inquiry may be utilized by Congress for the scrutiny of executive action as well as the formation of public opinion. Congressional investigations have the salutary effect of keeping the public informed of what is happening in their government since congressional investigations are given wide publicity by media.

To enforce this right, the SC upheld the power of Congress to hold in contempt a person required to appear before Congress or its committee and answer questions relevant to a matter of legislative interest in the Arnault cases.

Senate of the Phil. v. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006 The power of inquiry HELD: The power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation. X x x

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Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or Houses duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons affected, even if they belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances, none appearing to obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be established, resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction. Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of executive privilege. X x x Executive privilege Schwartz defines executive privilege as the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. Similarly, Rozell defines it as the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public. Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. It has encompassed claims of varying kinds. Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase executive privilege, it may be more accurate to speak of executive privileges since presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either judicial or legislative investigations. One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informers privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. X x x That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez. Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the privilege: The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution x x x ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO [G.R. No. L-3820. July 18, 1950.] - Legislative Contempt HELD: No person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.

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Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to the subject of the inquiry, subject of the course to his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. The materiality of a question that it may be propounded to a witness is determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. AUTHORITY OF EITHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO COMMIT A WITNESS FOR CONTEMPT BEYOND PERIOD OF LEGISLATIVE SESSION. There is no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. While the existence of the House of Representatives is limited to four years, that of the Senate is not so limited. The Senate is a continuing body which does not ceases to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted. NORECO v. Sang. Panlunsod of Dumaguete, 155 SCRA 421 (1987) HELD: A line should be drawn between the powers of Congress as the repository of the legislative power under the Constitution, and those that may be exercised by the legislative bodies of local government unit, e.g. the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete which, as mere creatures of law, possess delegated legislative power. X x x The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis, and local legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to possess it for the same reasons that the national legislature does. The power attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se but to the character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government. The same thing cannot be said of local legislative bodies which are creations of law. However, the rights of the persons (a) appearing in, or (b) affected by such inquiries shall be respected. Notable among these rights is the right against "self- incrimination". Usually, immunity is granted to those who are compelled to appear.

Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 (1991) HELD: The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self. The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone. As held in Jean L. Aznault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member. Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in its judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made. The critical element is the existence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that overbalances any private rights affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly." QUESTION HOUR

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Art. VI, Sec. 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session. Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006 HELD: A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. X x x Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment . It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary. Executive Privilege While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive privilege may be invoked against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in the possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress. Thus, the case holds: There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal-deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of

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decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant case. Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions claims of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of privilege authorized by the Order to determine whether it is valid. While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case basis, examining the ground invoked therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied claim of privilege, a defect that renders it invalid per se. By its very nature, and as demonstrated by the letter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted above, the implied claim authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g., whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.). While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by the privilege under the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being referred to by the executive. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in the phrase confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested. A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted. X x x Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected. X x x Due respect for a coequal branch of government, moreover, demands no less than a claim of privilege clearly stating the grounds therefor. Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. A useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege against self-incrimination. X x x The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress. In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. X x x x x x x x x X x x Executive privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain informations must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is By order of the President, which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less reason to

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uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score. It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance. X x x Right to Information E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of executive officials in the hearings conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for information pursuant to their right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioners are not amiss in claiming, however, that what is involved in the present controversy is not merely the legislative power of inquiry, but the right of the people to information. There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen. Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information. To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte: It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit. The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of inquiry. Conclusion Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. For [w]hat republican theory did accomplishwas to reverse the old presumption in favor of secrecy, based on the divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity, based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty.

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Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have given up something of much greater value our right as a people to take part in government. Question Hour (Art. VI, Sec. 22) and Legislative Investigation (id., Sec. 21) a. As to persons who may appear: 22: Only a department head 21: Any person b. As to who conducts the investigation 22: Entire body 21: Committees c. As to subject-matter 22: Matters related to the department only 21: Any matter for the purpose of legislation. ACT AS BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS Art. VII, Sec. 4. xxx The returns of every election for President and Vice- President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each provinces or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of election (w/c is the 2nd Tuesday of June), open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass (i.e., tally the certificates of canvass) the votes. The persons having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes (tie), one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the members of Congress, voting separately. The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates. POWER OF IMPEACHMENT

The following are subject to impeachment; (Art. XI, Sec. 2.) a. President b. Vice-President c. Justices of the Supreme Court d. Members of the Constitutional Commissions e. Ombudsman Grounds for impeachment (Art. XI, Sec. 2.) a) Culpable violation of the Constitution b) Treason (RPC) c) Bribery (RA 3019) d) Graft and corruption (RA 3019) e) Other high crimes f) Betrayal of public trust Limitation: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. [Art. XI, Sec. 3(5)] Forum: The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. [Art. XI, Sec. 3(1)]

PROCEDURE FOR IMPEACHMENT (Art. XI, Sec. 3.)

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A) Initiation stage 1) If initiated by less than 1/3 [Secs. 3(2)-(4)] (a) A verified complaint for impeachment is filed with the House of Representative by: (i) a member of the House of Representatives, or (ii) any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member of the House. (b) The complaint must be included in the Order of Business within 10 session days upon receipt thereof. (the purpose is to prohibit any delay) (c) Not later than 3 session days after, including the complaint in the Order of Business, it must be referred (by the Speaker) to the proper committee (usually, the Committee on Justice and Order). (d) The Committee has 60 session days from receipt of the referral to conduct hearings (to see if there is probable cause), to vote by an absolute majority, and to submit report and its resolution to the House. (e) The resolution shall be calendared for consideration and general discussion by the House within 10 session days from receipt thereof. (f) After the discussion, a vote is taken, with the vote of each member recorded. A vote of at least 1/3 of all the members of the House is needed to "affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or to override its contrary resolution."

If the Committee made a favorable recommendation (i.e., it recommended that the complaint be sent over to the Senate), 1/3 of all the members are needed to approve such recommendation. If the Committee made a contrary recommendation (i.e., it recommended the dismissal of the complaint), 1/3 of all the members are needed to disapprove or override this report. In other words, so long as 1/3 of the case would be sent to the Senate , regardless of the number who vote House), that it should not be sent to lower house votes to proceed with the trial, then the regardless of the committee recommendation, and (which, could even be as high as 66% of the entire the Senate for trial.

The reason is that the initiation stage does not determine the guilt or innocence of the officer being impeached. It merely determines whether there is a prima facie case against the officer that merits a full blown trial in the Senate.

2) If initiated by 1/3 [Art. XI, Sec. 3(4)] If the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. This means that the entire process is cut short. There is no need for a Committee report and discussion anymore, since the end result is that 1/3 of the members of the House have decided to send the case for trial.

B) Trial Stage a) The Articles of Impeachment of the Committee is forwarded to the Senate, which has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment, for trial. b) When sitting for the purpose of trying an impeachment case, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. c) As a general rule, the President of the Senate presides over an impeachment trial. But when it is the President of the Philippines who is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be the presiding officer, but he shall not vote.

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d) To carry out a conviction, the vote of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate (16 Senators) is required. If less than 2/3 vote that the officer is guilty, the effect is acquittal. e) The judgment of the Senate (like the judgment of the House on whether to initiate) is a political question that cannot be reviewed by the court (Romulo v Yniguez). (Unlike a law that can be reviewed by the courts because of the existence of constitutional standards, this judgment cannot be reviewed, for the Constitution itself has granted the discretion to this co-equal branch to appreciate the case as presented.) CONSEQUENCES OF IMPEACHMENT [Art. XI, Sec. 3 (7)] Art. XI, Sec. 3 (7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law. In case of acquittal The President continues in office, because pending the impeachment trial, he remains in office. Acquittal does not only mean the dismissal of the impeachment case, but also a bar from any criminal action on the same offense that may be filed later on.

In case of conviction

Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than (i) removal from office and (ii) disqualification to hold any office under RP. But a person convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law (RPC, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and other penal laws). The courts cannot review the judgment on the impeachment case, and ultimately the removal from office and the disqualification, because these are political questions. But it can review the judgment in the criminal case. Must impeachment precede filing of criminal case? In Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 324, the SC said that the broad power of the Constitution vests the respondent court with jurisdiction over public officers and employees, including those in GOCCs. There are exceptions, however, like the constitutional officers, particularly those declared to be removable by impeachment. In their case, the Constitution proscribes removal from office by any other method; otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an offense that carries the penalty of removal from office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution trial, and punishment, in accordance with law. The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the Republic of the Philippines. The party thus convicted may be proceeded against, tried and thereafter punished in accordance with law. The clear implication is, the party convicted in the impeachment proceeding shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law; and that if the same does not result in conviction and the official is not thereby removed, the filing of a criminal action in accordance with law may not prosper. Constitutional officers are not entitled to immunity from liability for possible criminal acts. But there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. They must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment (Art. XI, Secs. 2 and 3). Should they be impeached, they may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against them in appropriate proceedings. Therefore a fiscal or prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against constitutional officers. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings.

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THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS BILLS THAT SHALL ORIGINATE EXCLUSIVELY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Art. VI, Sec. 24. All appropriations, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

The above-mentioned bills are supposed to be initiated by the House or Representatives because it is more numerous in membership and therefore also more representative of the people. Moreover, its members are presumed to be more familiar with the needs of the country in regard to the enactment of the legislation involved. (Cruz ) An appropriation bill is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of funds from the public treasury. A revenue bill is one that levies taxes and raises funds for the government, while a tariff bill specifies the rates or duties to be imposed on imported articles. A bill increasing the public debt is illustrated by one floating bonds for public subscription redeemable after a certain period. A bill of local application is one involving purely local or municipal matters, like a charter of a city. Private bills are illustrated by a bill granting honorary citizenship to a distinguished foreigner.

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 632 (1994) HELD: Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to " propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

THE ONE-SUBJECT, ONE-TITLE RULE Sec. 26[1], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. De Guzman v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129118, July 19, 2000, En Banc [Purisima] The objectives of Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof", are: 1. To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation;

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2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and 3. To fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire. Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is sufficiently complied with where, as in this case, the title is comprehensive enough to embrace the general objective it seeks to achieve, and if all the parts of the statute are related and germane to the subject matter embodied in the title or so long as the same are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. (PJA v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703) Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject." (Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106) In any case, a title must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act." The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object." The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given a practical rather than technical construction. Tio v. VRB, 151 SCRA 208 (1987)

Lambino vs. Comelec, GR No. 174153, October 25, 2006 HELD: Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone (448 So.2d 984, 994 (1984),), the Supreme Court of Florida declared: Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes logrolling, which, if our judicial responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed amendment amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the amendments proponents simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of the proposal makes it impossible to state what it will affect and effect and violates the requirement that proposed amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis supplied) Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine (698 P.2d 1173, 1184 ), the Supreme Court of Alaska warned against inadvertence, stealth and fraud in logrolling:

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Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the single-subject rule was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an initiatives passage, and there is a greater opportunity for inadvertence, stealth and fraud in the enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate independently of any structured or supervised process. They often emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters typically use simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers and eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative before the election. More importantly, there is no process for amending or splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly distinguish the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied) HOW A BILL BECOMES A LAW Three Readings on separate days: No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings... [Art. VI, Sec. 26(2).] On "first reading," the title of the bill, without the provisions, is read before the body. The presiding officer then refers the bill to the proper committee e.g., "To the Committee on Local Governments". (Congress generally works through its committees, not as one body.) After consideration of the bill or resolution, the Committee returns the same to the body together with its amendments, objections or recommendations. Where the report is favorable, the bill is placed on the proper calendar. If the report is unfavorable, the matter shall be laid on the table, unless the body on the whole decides otherwise. On "second reading", the bill or resolution is read in full before the floor, with such amendments as the committee may have proposed. Then, it is subjected to debate, discussion and amendments. When this is through, a motion to close the general debate is made, then a vote is taken by the membership on whether to pass the bill or not on the basis of the amendments or discussions. The bill as amended and approved is the "printed in final form" and its copies are, as a general rule, distributed to the members at least 3 days before its passage. [Sec. 26(2)] [The purpose of the 3-day requirement is to enable the members to check if the bill reflects the text and amendments approved on second reading, and to see if riders have been introduced.] As an exception, however, the Constitution allows the 3-day and printed copy requirement to be dispensed with when the President certifies to the necessity of the immediate enactment of the bill to meet a public calamity or emergency. [Sec. 26(2).] In this case, therefore, the three readings may be made in less than 3 days without the bill being printed. On the "third and final reading", the bill is called by its name or title, then a vote is taken right away, with the "yeas" and "nays" entered in the Journal. No more amendment is allowed. [Sec. 26(2).] As a general rule, the three readings must be conducted on separate days, [Sec. 26(2).] The exception is found in Art. VII, Sec. 10: When Congress convenes to call a special election to elect the President and Vice-President, "the bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under par. 2, Sec. 26, Art. VI", meaning, the three readings can be done on the same day. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 632 (1994) HELD: The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, 26(2) qualified the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved. In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the "except" clause

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as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by presidential certification, the time saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring immediate enactment. It may well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing copies of the bill three days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the face of an emergency requiring the calling of a special election for President and Vice-President. Under the Constitution such a law is required to be made within seven days of the convening of Congress in emergency session. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. THE BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE A bill can be passed jointly (when it is a joint session, supra), or separately. In the latter case, it can be passed simultaneously (when a bill is taken up by both houses separately but at the same time, or sequentially (when a bill originates form one house and goes to the other house). There is no problem if the bill is passed jointly. But if it is passed separately, the bill approved by one house goes to the other house, which can amend such bill. Once the other house approves the bill, this is called the other house's version of the bill. A Bicameral Conference Committee is then organized, composed of equal number of members from the Senate and the House, to make recommendations to the respective chambers on how to reconcile the two versions of the bill. The respective members are usually granted blanket authority to negotiate and reconcile the bills. At the end of the process, the committee comes up with a "Conference Committee Report", which is then submitted to the respective chambers for approval. Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance, 235 SCRA 632 (1994) HELD: As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emergency out of a Conference Committee, it has been explained: Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to make any material change in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult provision to enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a proposal originating in either house by striking out everything following the enacting clause and substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are now altogether different, permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a new bill . . . The result is a third version, which is considered an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only requirement for which being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills. Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. 17 If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis. X x X

Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee's Report in these cases must have undergone three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to negotiation since each house may seek modifications of the compromise bill. The nature of the bill, therefore, requires that it be acted upon by each house on a "take it or leave it" basis, with the only alternative that if it is not approved by both houses, another conference committee must be appointed. But then again the result would still be a compromise measure that may not be wholly satisfying to both houses.

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Art. VI, 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. For if the purpose of requiring three readings is to give members of Congress time to study bills, it cannot be gainsaid that H. No. 11197 was passed in the House after three reading; that in the Senate it was considered on first reading and then referred to a committee of that body; that although the Senate committee did not report out the House bill, it submitted a version (S. No. 1630) which it had prepared by "taking into consideration" the House bill; that for its part the Conference Committee consolidated the two bills and prepared a compromise version; that the Conference Committee Report was thereafter approved by the House and the Senate, presumably after appropriate study by their members. We cannot say that, as a matter of fact, the members of Congress were not fully informed of the provisions of the bill. The allegation that the Conference Committee usurped the legislative power of Congress is, in our view, without warrant in fact and in law. PJA v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, Nov. 11, 1993, En Banc [Cruz] HELD: A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference committee. THE ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE Engrossment or Enrollment of the Bill Once the bill is approved by both houses, the bill is engrossed or enrolled. The Enrolled copy of the Bill bears the certification by the presiding officers (Senate President and Speaker of the House) that this enrolled copy is the version passed by each house. Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268, Aug. 14, 1997 [Mendoza] HELD: Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. Bill No. 7189 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. x x x To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance) that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case (Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 [1974]) we went behind an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate. But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained, because a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. x x x This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President contained provisions which had been surreptitiously inserted in the conference committee x x x. (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance) It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution that upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed. (Philippine Judges Assn v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 710 [1993]) In other cases, this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well-established. It is cited with approval by text writers here and abroad. The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations: X x x. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and

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executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. (Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 36 L. Ed. 294, 303 [1891]) THE APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENTIAL VETO The bill as approved by Congress and certified by its presiding officers is then presented to the President. Generally, there are 3 ways for the bill to become a law: 1) When it is approved by the President; 2) When the vote of the President is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the members of both houses; 3) Upon failure of the President to veto the bill and to return it with his objections, to the House where it originated, within 30 days after the date of receipt. [Sec. 27(1).] But there are 2 cases when a bill becomes a law without the signature of the President: 1) When the veto of the President is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the members of both houses; and 2) When the bill is one calling a special election for President and Vice-President under Art. VII, Sec. 10. Here the bill becomes law upon 3rd and final reading. The Acting President is not required to sign, for he may have an interest in the question.

Veto Power of the President

Message Veto versus Pocket Veto.-- There is only one way for the President to veto a bill: By disapproving it, and returning it to the house where the bill originated, together with his "veto message" (explaining his objections to the bill, which message shall be entered in the Journal within 30 days after receipt [Sec. 27(1)] No "pocket veto" in the Philippines.-Philippines. What is a pocket veto? Compare with Art. I, Sec. 7 of US Constitution: Art. I, Sec. 7. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return in which case it shall not be a law. (The United States Constitution.) In this regard, there is no "pocket veto" in the

A pocket veto, as in the US requires two concurring elements, (1) failure to act on the bill and (2) the reason he does not return the bill to Congress is that Congress is not in session. Thus, if the US Congress is in session, failure by the President to act will not result in the veto of the bill. In the Philippines, there is no such provision. Inaction by the President for 30 days never produced a veto. If Congress is not in session, the President must still act in order to veto the bill. Only he needs to communicate the veto to Congress without need of returning the vetoed bill with his veto message. Sec. 27, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House

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shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. (2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

Veto Message: When the President vetoes a measure, he should return the measure to the House of origin, indicating his objections thereto in what is commonly known as a "veto message" so that the same can be studied by the members for possible overriding of his veto. Is partial veto allowed under the Constitution? The general rule is that the President must approve entirely or disapprove in toto. The exception applies to appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, any particular item or items of which may be disapproved without affecting the item or items to which he does not object.

Gonzales v. Macaraig [G.R. No. 87636. November 19, 1990.] HELD: Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item-veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As specified, the President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words, the power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to some " particular appropriation" therein. The challenged "provisions" fall short of this requirement. Firstly, the vetoed "provisions" do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. Consequently, Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) although labelled as "provisions," are actually inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the President's veto power. An item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the bill. It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice declared "that an 'item' of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill." Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133, April 15, 1992, En Banc [Gutierrez] HELD: The veto power of the President is not absolute. The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. However when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration needs the money to run the machinery of govt. and it can not veto the entire bill even if it may contain objectionable features. This is the reason for the item veto power. The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. The terms "item" and "provision" are different. An item refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the bill. It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. An item obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of money, and not some general provision of law. In this case, the President did not veto an item. She vetoed the methods or systems placed by Congress to insure that permanent and continuing obligations to certain officials will be paid when they fall due. In this case, the vetoed portions are not items but are provisions. The augmentation of specific appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement payments, by transferring savings from other items of appropriations is a provision and not an item. It gives the SC Chief Justice the power to transfer funds from one item to another. There is no specific appropriation of money involved.

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Neither may the veto power be exercised as a means of repealing existing laws. This is arrogating unto the Presidency legislative powers which are beyond its authority. CIR v. CTA, 185 SCRA 329 (1990) HELD: An "item" in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section imposing a particular kind of tax, but rather to the subject of the tax and the tax rate. In the portion of a revenue bill which actually imposes a tax, a section identifies the tax and enumerates the persons liable therefor with the corresponding tax rate. To construe the word "item" as referring to the whole section would tie the President's hand in choosing either to approve the whole section at the expense of also approving a provision therein which he deems unacceptable or veto the entire section at the expense of foregoing the collection of the kind of tax altogether. The evil which was sought to be prevented in giving the President the power to disapprove items in a revenue bill would be perpetrated rendering that power inutile ( See Commonwealth ex rel. Elkin v. Barnett, 199 Pa. 161, 55 LRA 882 [1901]). PHILCONSA v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994) HELD: As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates," it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in the category of "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no place in an appropriations bill. These are matters of general legislation more appropriately dealt with in separate enactments. Former Justice Irene Cortes, as Amicus Curiae, commented that Congress cannot by law establish conditions for and regulate the exercise of powers of the President given by the Constitution for that would be an unconstitutional intrusion into executive prerogative. The doctrine of "inappropriate provision" was well elucidated in Henry v. Edwards, supra., thus: "Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp constitutional powers conferred on the legislature, neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of the constitutional powers conferred on him as chief executive officer of the state by including in a general appropriation bill matters more properly enacted in separate legislation. The Governor's constitutional power to veto bills of general legislation . . . cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such measures in a general appropriation bill, thereby forcing the Governor to choose between approving unacceptable substantive legislation or vetoing `items' of expenditures essential to the operation of government. The legislature cannot by location of a bill give it immunity from executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governor's veto power over substantive legislation by artfully drafting general law measures so that they appear to be true conditions or limitations on an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be permitted to impair the constitutional responsibilities and functions of a co-equal responsibilities and functions of a co-equal branch of government in contravention of the separation of powers doctrine . . . We are no more willing to allow the legislature to use its appropriation power to infringe on the Governor's constitutional right to veto matters of substantive legislation than we are to allow the Governor to encroach on the constitutional powers of the legislature. In order to avoid this result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated as 'items' for purposes of the Governor's item veto power over general appropriation bills. xxx xxx xxx ". . . Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner as to encumber the general appropriation bill with veto-proof 'logrolling measures,' special interest provisions which could not succeed if separately enacted, or 'riders,' substantive pieces of legislation incorporated in a bill to insure passage without veto. . . ." Overriding the Veto

Upon consideration of the objections raised by the President in his veto message, the House from which the bill originated shall reconsider the bill. If after such reconsideration, 2/3 of all the members of such house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent together with the objections of the President, to the other house by which it shall likewise be reconsidered. If approved by 2/3 of all the members of that house, it shall

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become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each house shall be determined by "yeas" or "nays", and the names of the members voting for or against shall be entered in the Journal. [Art. VI, sec. 27(1)] Judicial review of a Presidential veto PHILCONSA v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994) HELD: We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill. Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on the President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the Legislature arises (Notes: Congressional Standing To Challenge Executive Action, 122 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1366 [1974]). To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]). An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress (Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 [1976]). In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts. Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus Curiae, noted; "This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or individual Senators as such having substantial interest in the question at issue. It could likewise be said that there was requisite injury to their rights as Senators. It would then be futile to raise any locus standi issue. Any intrusion into the domain appertaining to the Senate is to be resisted. Similarly, if the situation were reversed, and it is the Executive Branch that could allege a transgression, its officials could likewise file the corresponding action. What cannot be denied is that a Senator has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office" (Memorandum, p. 14). It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy, however, is available only when the presidential veto is based on policy or political considerations but not when the veto is claimed to be ultra vires. In the latter case, it becomes the duty of the Court to draw the dividing line where the exercise of executive power ends and the bounds of legislative jurisdiction begin. LEGISLATIVE VETOES The Congress cannot deem a draft submitted by an executive agency passed as law by it mere inaction within a certain period. It must go through the 3 readings and the submission of the bill to the President, as required by the Constitution. In Miller v Mardo, 2 SCRA 298 (1961), the SC struck down as unconstitutional Sec. 6 of RA 997, which provided that the reorganization plan drafted by the Department of Labor and submitted to President for approval shall be deemed as approved by Congress after its adjournment, unless in the meantime, Congress by resolution disapproved the plan. It struck down as well the Reorganization Plan drafted pursuant to this law. In so holding, the Court ruled that the approval of a bill cannot be made by Congress by mere silence, adjournment or concurrent resolution. The Constitution requires the two houses to hold separate session for deliberation, and to submit the determination of one to the separate determination of the other, unless a joint session is provided for. This method of passing a law amounts to an abdication by Congress of its legislative prerogatives to the Executive. EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. xxx (Civil Code)

When a bill becomes a law through any of the 3 means mentioned above, the law does not become effective at once. According to the ruling upon reconsideration in Tanada

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v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985), in addition to the date fixed either by the effectivity clause of the statute, or, in its absence, by Art. 2 of the Civil (15 days after its publication), there must first be a publication of the law either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation [EO 200]. Otherwise, there is a violation of due process. This requirement for publication applies to any kind of law, even laws which are not of general application, private laws (e.g. law granting citizenship to X), laws of local application, and rules and regulations of substantive character.

INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls, independent of the legislative assembly. It is the right of a group of citizens to introduce a matter for legislation either to the legislature or directly to the voters. Referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of the electors become a law. It is a method of submitting an important legislative measure to a direct vote of the whole people, the submission of a law passed by the legislature for their approval or rejection. APPROPRIATIONS LAW General Principle

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. [Art. VI, Sec. 29(1)]. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments (Sec. 24). (The reason is that the House is the more popular chamber of Congress.)

General Appropriation

The President shall submit to Congress, within 30 days from the opening of its regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of (a) expenditures, and (b) sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures. (Art. VII, Sec. 22). The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law. [Art. VI, Sec. 25(1), 2nd sentence]. The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. But may decrease said budget No provision or enactment shall be embrace in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. [Art. VI, Sec. 25(2)] The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies. If, by the end of the fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted, and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress. [Art. VI, Sec. 25(7)]

Special Appropriation

A special appropriations bill shall (a) specify the purpose for which it is intended, and (b) supported by funds, actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein. [Art. VI, Sec. 25(4)] A special appropriations bill may be proposed to supply a lack or meet a new need, like a special election. In the case of a special law to elect the President and Vice-President,

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however, the requirements of the sections are specifically exempted by the Constitution in Art. VII, Sec. 10. Transfer of funds already appropriated No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations. However, the President, President of the Senate, Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commission may, by law, be authorized to "augment" any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices, from "savings" in other items of their respective appropriations. [Art. VI, Sec. 25(5)] Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes, to be supported by appropriate vouchers, and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law. [Art. VI, Sec. 25(6)] In Demetria v Alba, supra, it was held that Sec. 44 of the Budget Act of 1977 (BP 1177) granting the President the blanket authority to transfer funds from one department to another, with or without savings, is unconstitutional.

Prohibited appropriation to enforce the Separation of Church and State No public money or property shall be appropriated (applied, paid, or employed), directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any religion (sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or any system of religion) or of any priest (preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or religious dignitary). EXCEPTION: When such priest, et. al., is assigned to (a) the AFP; (b) any penal institution; (c) any government orphanage; or (d) any leprosarium. [Art. VI, Sec. 29(2)] Appropriations laws (the spending powers of Congress (id., Sec. 25)) are tied up with Tax laws (the power to raise revenues (id., Sec. 28)). They are two indispensable sides of a coin. They are tied up by the principle that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (id., Sec. 29(1)).

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Qualifications of President (Art. VII, Sec. 2.) 1) Natural-born citizen of the Philippines 2) Registered voter 3) Able to read and write 4) 40 years of age on the day of election 5) Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the election Regular Election and Term

The President and Vice-President (who shall be elected with and in the same manner as the President) shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of 6 years, which shall begin on the noon of June 30 next following the day of election. The regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the 2nd Monday of May. (Art. VII, Sec. 4 pars. 1 & 3).

Re-election

The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. Furthermore, no person who has "succeeded" as President and has served as such for more than 4 years, shall be qualified for any election to the same office (the Presidency) at any time. (Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 1) The person who succeeds as President and not just in an acting capacity, could either be (i) the Vice-President, or (ii) one who was elected President in a special election. In both cases, if he has served for more than 4 years, he is ineligible for re-election as President.

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If he served for 4 years or less, he can run for re- election, since (a) the term "succeeded" encompasses election and (b) the general rule prohibiting the President to run for re-election refers to the President elected during the regular election. The Vice-President on the other hand, shall not serve for more than 2 successive terms. And for this purpose, a voluntary (but not involuntary) renunciation of office for any length of time, shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full terms for which he was elected. (Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 2).

Electoral Tribunal for the Election of the President and Vice- President

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for that purpose. (Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 7.)

PROHIBITIONS (Art. VII, Sec. 13.) Prohibition against the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants (a) They shall not hold any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided by this Constitution (b) They shall not practice any other profession. (c) They shall not participate in any business. (d) They shall not be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted. Exceptions positions: a. President (1) The President can assume a Cabinet post, (because the departments are mere extensions of his personality, according to the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, so no objection can be validly raised based on Art. VII, Sec. 13.) (2) The President is the Chairman of NEDA. (Art. XII, Sec. 9) b. Vice-President Art. VII, Sec. 3. xxx The Vice-President may be appointed as member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation. c. Cabinet (1) The Secretary of Justice shall be an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. (Art. VIII, Sec. 8[1]) (2) Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, appointive officials shall not hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government- owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. (Art. IX, B, 7, par. 2) to rule prohibiting executive officials from holding additional

Art. VII, Sec. 13 talks of "unless otherwise provided by the Constitution." In the case of Cabinet members, this refers to Art. IX, B, 7, par. 2. Thus, the Constitution allows a Cabinet member to hold another office provided either (1) such is necessitated by the primary functions of his position (e.g. Secretary of Trade and Industry as Chairman of NDC, Secretary of Agrarian Reform as Chairman of the Land Bank), or (2) is allowed by law.

Civil Liberties Union (CLU) v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991) HELD: By ostensibly restricting the no. of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or asst. secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the govt. and GOOCs, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Art. VIII, Sec. 13 prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. If maximum benefits are to be derived from a dept. head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other govt. offices or employment.

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The stricter prohibition applied to the President and his official family under Sec. 13, Art. VII as compared to the prohibition applicable to appointive officials in general under Art. IX, B, Sec. 7, par. 2 are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat them as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions. Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the govt during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Consti. itself. xxx However, the prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Art. VII, Sec. 13 must not be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said official's office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and function on said officials. The term ex-officio means 'from office; by virtue of office. It refers to an authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position. Ex-officio likewise denotes an act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office. An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. To illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail Transit Authority. "The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION Temporary or permanent vacancy in the Presidency before the term 1. If the President-elect cannot assume his post at the beginning of his term because i) he has not qualified as yet ( e.g. he had an operation and so he could not take his oath of office on June 30), ii) or a President has not been "chosen" and qualified as yet (e.g. there is a tie and Congress has not yet broken the tie), then the Vice-President shall act as President until the President-elect shall have qualified, or shall have been "chosen: and qualified, as the case may be. (Art. VII, Sec. 7, pars. 2 & 3). 2. If the President-elect i) dies, or ii) becomes permanently disabled "at the beginning of the term of the President" (i.e., before the term), then the Vice-President elect shall become the President. (Id., par. 4) 3. If both President and Vice-President (i) have not been "chosen" or (ii) have not qualified, or (iii) die, or (iv) become permanently disabled, then the President of the Senate, or in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House, shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been "chosen" and qualified. (Id., par. 5) In case both the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House are unable to act as President, then Congress shall by law, provide for the "manner of selecting" the one who will act as President until a President of Vice-President shall have (been either "chosen" or "elected" pursuant to the special election referred to in Art. VII, sec. 10, and qualified.

Permanent Vacancy in the Presidency during the term (Art. VII, Sec. 8.) 1. In case of the President's (i) death (ii) permanent disability, (iii) removal from office (the only way is by impeachment), or (iv) resignation, the Vice-President shall become President for the unexpired portion of the term. (par. 1) 2. In case of both the President's and Vice-President's death, permanent disability, removal from office (by impeachment), or resignation, then the Senate President or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House, shall act as President until the President or VicePresident shall have been "elected" (pursuant to the special election in Art. VII, Sec. 10) and qualified. (par. 1.)

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When the Acting President (i.e., the Senate President, or Speaker of the House) dies, becomes permanently disabled, or resigns (but is not removed, because there is no need to impeach him, his stay being temporary), then the Congress shall by law, provide "who" shall be Acting President until the President or Vice-President shall have been "elected" (pursuant to the special election in Art. VII, Sec. 10) and qualified. This Acting President shall be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications. (par. 2)

Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, En Banc [Puno] HELD: Resignation x x x is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President. In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears ; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead on the same service of our country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. Temporary Vacancy in the Presidency during the term (Art. VI, Sec. 11, supra) A vacancy in the Presidency arising from his disability can occur in any of the following ways: 1. A written declaration by the President 2. Written declaration by the Cabinet 3. Finding by Congress by 2/3 vote that the President is disabled. In all these cases, the Vice-President temporarily acts as the President. Voluntary declaration of inability by President a. When the President transmits to the Senate President and the Speaker his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President. b. The Vice-President shall so act until the President transmits to the Senate President and the Speaker a written declaration that he is no longer unable to discharge his office. Contested inability of the President a. When majority of all the members of the Cabinet transmit to the Senate President and Speaker their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge his office, then the Vice-President shall immediately assume the Presidency in an acting capacity. b. The President can contest this by sending his own written declaration to the Senate President and Speaker, that no inability exists. Upon such transmittal, the President shall automatically assume his office. c. Should the majority of the Cabinet insist on their original stand by transmitting a second written declaration of the President's inability within 5 days from resumption of office of the President, then Congress shall step in. d. Upon receipt of this second declaration by the Cabinet, Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within 48 hours, without need of call, in accordance with its rules. (If it is already in session, it must meet right away, as glimpsed from the fact that they only

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have 10 days to decide, whereas if it is not in session, it must convene in 2 days and decide before the 12th day.) e. Congress shall determine the President's inability within 10 days after receipt of the second written declaration by the Cabinet if it is in session, or within 12 days after it is required to assemble by its respective presiding officer if it is not in session. f. If the President, by a 2/3 vote of both houses voting separately, determined to be "unable" to discharge his office, then the Vice-President shall act as President. If less than 2/3 find him unable, then the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office. Serious Illness of the President Art. VII, Sec. 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state of his health. The members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be denied access to the President during such illness. CALL A SPECIAL ELECTION IN CASE OF VACANCY IN THE OFFICES OF PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT (Art. VII, Sec. 10.) When a vacancy occurs in the offices of the President and Vice-President, more than 18 months before the date of the next regular presidential election, the Congress shall convene at 10 AM of the 3rd day after the vacancy, in accordance with its rules, without need of call. The convening of Congress cannot be suspended. Within 7 days after it convenes, it shall enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and Vice- President, to be held between 45 to 60 days from the day of such call. The holding of the special election cannot be postponed. Not later than 30 days after the election, Congress shall again act as Board of Canvassers (see infra), since Art. VII, Sec. 4 par. a talks of every election for President and Vice-President.

Thus, the timetable is: Day 0 - vacancy occurs Day 3 - Congress convenes without need of call Day 10 - Congress passes the special election law, if it has not passed before this date Day 55 to 70 - election is held Day 85 to 100 - as the case may be - canvassing by Congress, if it has not done so earlier. Under the Constitution then a vacancy is filled by the 100th day from the vacancy at the latest. The law so passed is exempted from the following: 1Certification under Art. VI, sec. 26, par. 2. Thus, the three readings can be done all on the same day. 2Approval by the President (for obvious reasons). The bill automatically becomes a law, then, upon its approval on 3rd and final reading. 3Certification by the National Treasurer of the availability of funds, or revenue raising measure under Art. VI, Sec. 25(4). Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations.

IMMUNITY FROM SUIT OF THE PRESIDENT

The SC has affirmed time and again the doctrine of the President's immunity from suit. In a resolution in Carillo v. Marcos, (April 1981) and in the later case of In re Bermudez (October 1986), the Court said that it is "elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure." Three(3) reasons for such immunity: 1. The singular importance of the Presidency and his high visibility. 2. The distraction that suits would bring to such an important official laden with enormous responsibility. 3. The consequence that the President might hesitate at the moment of greatest peril to the nation if he knows that he would be held liable later on.

Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, En Banc [Puno]

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HELD: The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser. Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006 HELD: Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment. Soliven v. Makasiar; Beltran v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988) HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case where the President is a complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against the accused. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. The President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by another person. Q: Does the President's immunity from suit extend even beyond his term? A: Yes. So long as the act was done during his term. Q: Does the President's immunity from suit extend to his alter egos? A: No. Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, Mar. 2, 2001, En Banc [Puno] Can former President Estrada still be prosecuted criminally considering that he was not convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him? HELD: We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio. Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution.

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To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him x x x. This is in accord with our ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT EXECUTIVE POWER Art. VII, Sec. 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. Id., Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. The executive function is essentially the duty to implement the laws within the standards imposed by the legislature. Under the Constitution, this power is exercised by the President. Thus, when the Cabinet and other branches of the Executive Department implement the law, they are acting under the control of the President. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom confidence" and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing, "are subject to the direction of the President". Villena v. Sec. of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1939)

Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, 178 SCRA 760 FACTS: This is a petition for mandamus asking the Court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and his immediate family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. The issue is whether or not, in the exercise of executive power, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. HELD: The Constitution provides that the executive power shall be vested in the President (Art. VII, Sec. 1). However, it does not define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e. the power of control over all executive depts., bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander in chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to congress and the power to address Congress. (VII, Sec. 14-23) The inevitable question is whether by enumerating certain powers of the President, did the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? According to the SC, that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific power enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. In this case, the President has the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. She has the obligation to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. She has to balance the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.

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Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration : It cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. THE CONTROL POWER OF THE PRESIDENT Sec. 17, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution SECTION 17. The President shall control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. Faithful Execution clause or Take Care Clause (Sec 17, Art. VII)

The President shall ensure that laws are faithfully executed. It is not for him to determine the validity of a law since this is a question exclusively addressed to the judiciary. Thus, until and unless a law is declared unconstitutional, the President has the duty to execute it regardless of his doubts on its validity. A contrary opinion would allow him to negate the will of the legislature and to encroach upon the prerogative of the judiciary. (Nachura, pp 224-225) "Control" is the power to substitute one's own judgment in that of a subordinate. The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency: All executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Under the qualified political agency doctrine, the different executive departments are mere adjuncts of the President. The secretaries are the alter ego of the President, men of his bosom confidence whom he designated to assist him in his otherwise physically impossible multifarious functions, the extension of the President in the particular field in which they act. Their acts are presumptively acts of the "President, until countermanded or reprobated by him". The President can substitute his will over those of the secretaries, and they cannot complain. Furthermore, they hold their office subject to the discretion of the President, who can replace them anytime once he loses his confidence in them.

Joson v. Torres, 290 SCRA 279, May 20, 1998 [Puno] HELD: Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. As head of the Executive Department, the President, however, may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally. The members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in certain matters because the President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time. Each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority. THE PRESIDENTS POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Sec. 4, Art. X, 1987 Constitution SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

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"General supervision" means the mere overseeing of a subordinate to make sure that they do their duties under the law. But this does not include the power to overrule their acts, if these acts are within their discretion. Art. X, Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

The grant of mere supervisory power over local governments and autonomous regions is in line with the policy of the State to promote the autonomy of local governments and autonomous regions. There can be no real local autonomy while the National Government controls the local governments.

Ganzon v. CA, 200 SCRA 271 (1991) The petitioners question the power of the President, acting through the Secretary of Local Government, to suspend and/or remove local officials. HELD: It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitution, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right -- or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. The omission of "as may be provided by law" (Sec. 4, Art. X) signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from Congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline. Petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. This is a mistaken impression because legally "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. "Control" has been defined as the power of an officer to alter, modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. "Supervision" on the other hand means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. Bito-Onon v. Fernandez, 350 SCRA 732, Jan. 31, 2001, 3rd Div. [Gonzaga-Reyes] HELD: The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law." This is distinguished from the power of control or "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter." On many occasions in the past, this court has had the opportunity to distinguish the power of supervision from the power of control. In Taule vs. Santos, we held that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether a local government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. He cannot interfere with local governments provided that the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body. Officers in control lay down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officers merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done to conform to the prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act.

Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135, Aug. 4, 1994, En Banc [Cruz] HELD: The difference between control and supervision was further delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but

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only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. Joson v. Torres, 290 SCRA 279, May 20, 1998 [Puno] HELD: The power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. The President's power of general supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law. Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires. THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT

Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. (Cruz) Appointment is the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. It is distinguished from designation in that the latter simply means the imposition of additional duties, usually by law, on a person already in the public service. It is also different from the commission in that the latter is the written evidence of the appointment. (Nachura) The power of appointment is, according to the SC in Concepcion v. Paredes, the most eminently executive power, because it is through his appointees that the President can execute laws. The power of appointment by the President under the 1987 Constitution has been significantly curbed. It can be classified as follows:

i.) Permanent or temporary. Permanent appointments are those extended to persons


possessing the requisite eligibility and are thus protected by the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. Temporary appointments are given to persons without such eligibility, revocable at will and without the necessity of just cause or a valid investigation; made on the understanding that the appointing power has not yet decided on a permanent appointee and that the temporary appointee may be replaced at any time a permanent choice is made. ia.) A temporary appointment and a designation are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Such confirmation, if given erroneously, will not make the incumbent a permanent appointee [Valencia v. Peralta, 8 SCRA 692] ib.) In Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154, it was held that where a person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, a designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.

ii.) Regular or ad interim. A regular appointment is one made by the President while
Congress is in session, takes effect only after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and once approved, continues until the end of the term of the appointee. An ad interim appointment is one made by the President while Congress is not in session, takes effect immediately, but ceases to be valid if disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or upon the next adjournment of Congress. In the latter case, the ad interim appointment is deemed by-passed through inaction and deemed disapproved by the Commission on Appointments. The ad interim appointment is intended to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official duties. iia.) An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment [Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 140 SCRA 22]. Steps in the appointing process: 1) Nomination by the President; 2) Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; 3) Issuance of the commission; 4) Acceptance by the appointee.

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In Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil 740, the Supreme Court declared that an appointment is deemed complete only upon its acceptance. Pending such acceptance, which is optional to the appointee, the appointment may still be validly withdrawn. Appointment to a public office cannot be forced upon any citizen except for the purposes of defense of the State under Sec. 4, Art. II, as an exception to the rule of voluntary servitude.

Discretion of Appointing Authority.

Appointment is essentially a discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the minimum qualification requirements prescribed by law for the position. See Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327; Lapinid v. Civil Service Commission, 197 SCRA 106; Pobre v. Mendieta, 224 SCRA 738.

PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (a) Heads of the executive departments (Art. VII, Sec. 16.) (b) Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls (Id.) (c) Officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with the rank of colonel or naval captain (because these are officers of a sizeable command enough to stage a coup) (Id.) (d) Other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in the Constitution: (i) Chairman and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions (ii) Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council (composed of the IBP representative, professor of law, retired SC justice, and representative of the private sector. Note the ex-officio members: Chief Justice, Secretary of Justice, and representative of Congress) (iii) Sectoral representatives (Now an obsolete provision) (iv) Regional Consultative Commission Upon recommendation of the Judicial and Bar Council (a) Members of the Supreme Court and all other courts (b) Ombudsman and his 5 deputies (for Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao, general and military) Appointment of Vice-President as Member of the Cabinet Appointments solely by the President 1. Those vested by the Constitution on the President alone (e.g. appointment of VicePresident to the Cabinet) [Art. VII, Sec. 3(2)] 2. Those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. 3. Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. 4. Those other officers lower in rank whose appointment is vested by law in the President (alone). Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution SECTION 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or involuntary, but such appointments shall be effective only until after disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549 HELD: Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to be appointed by the President: 1) The heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval

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captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2) All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; 3) Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; 4) Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. It is well-settled that only presidential appointees belonging to the first group require the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254, April 22, 1992, En Banc [Padilla] HELD: From the cases of Sarmiento III vs. Mison (156 SCRA 549); Mary Concepcion Bautista v. Salonga (172 SCRA 160), and Teresita Quintos Deles, et al. v. The Commission on Constitutional Commission, et al (177 SCRA 259), these doctrines are deducible: 1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election). 2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. Manalo v. Sistoza, 312 SCRA 239, Aug. 11, 1999, En Banc [Purisima] HELD: Unconstitutional are Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 (DILG ACT) which empower the Commission on Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments are not required by the Constitution to be confirmedxxx The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP x x x do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Bermudez v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 131429, Aug. 4, 1999, 3rd Div. [Vitug]) HELD: This question would x x x pivot on the proper understanding of the provision of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (Book IV, Title III, Chapter II, Section 9) to the effect that All provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary. Petitioners contend that an appointment of a provincial prosecutor mandatorily requires a prior recommendation of the Secretary of Justice endorsing the intended appointment x x x. When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It should be here pertinent to state that the President is the head of government whose authority includes the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. CONTROL means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. Expressed in another way, the President has the power to assume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau and office . It can accordingly be inferred therefrom that the President can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations. It is the considered view of the Court x x x that the phrase upon recommendation of the Secretary, found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the Revised Administrative Code, should be interpreted x x x to be a mere advise, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature. The

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President, being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority. LIMITATIONS ON THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT

Sec. 13, 2nd par, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

Sec. 15, Art. VII. 1987 Constitution SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

In Re: Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta , 298 SCRA 408, Nov. 9, 1998, En Banc [Narvasa] HELD: Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within two months preceding the Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared election offenses in the Omnibus Election Code; while the second consists of the so-called midnight appointments. The SC in clarified this when it held: Section 15, Article VII has a broader scope than the Aytona ruling. It may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only midnight appointments those made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their number and the time of their making but also appointments presumed made for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the Presidential election. De Rama v. CA, 353 SCRA 94, Feb. 28, 2001, En Banc [Ynares-Santiago] (Sec. 15, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution applies only to Presidential appointments; There is no law that prohibits a Local Chief Executive from making appointments before his/her term ends) HELD: The records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of recalling the appointments of the fourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC, the only reason he cited to justify his action was that these were midnight appointments that are forbidden under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution. However, the CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. Petitioner certainly did not raise the issue of fraud on the part of the outgoing mayor who made the appointments. Neither did he allege that the said appointments were tainted by irregularities or anomalies that breached laws and regulations governing appointments. His solitary reason for recalling these appointments was that they were, to his personal belief, midnight appointments which the outgoing mayor had no authority to make. The CSC correctly ruled, however, that the constitutional prohibition on so-called "midnight appointments," specifically those made within two (2) months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President.

Exception: Temporary appointments, to executive positions, when continued vacancies therein will (1) prejudice public service (e.g. Postmaster) or (2) endanger public safety (e.g. Chief of Staff).

REGULAR AND RECESS (AD-INTERIM) APPOINTMENTS Art. VII, Sec. 16. xxx The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointment shall be

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effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

Appointments requiring confirmation are of two kinds, (i) regular, if the CA, that is, Congress, is in session, or (ii) during the recess of Congress (because the Commission shall meet only while Congress is in session [Art. VI, Sec. 19]). Regular appointments require confirmation before the appointee can take his post. The President nominates, Congress receives the nomination and forwards this to the CA for confirmation, then the Office of the President issues a Commission, at which point the appointee can assume his office. Recess appointments, on the other hand, need no confirmation to be effective, albeit temporarily. The appointment is effective until it is disapproved by the Commission on Appointments, or until the next adjournment of Congress (unless meantime, it is confirmed by the Commission) (Art. VII, Sec. 16, par. 2) Q. Discuss the nature of an ad-interim appointment. Is it temporary and, therefore, can be withdrawn or revoked by the President at her pleasure?

A. In the case of Matibag v. Benipayo (380 SCRA 49) the SC stated that an AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. Q. How is an ad interim appointment terminated? HELD: An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment. These two causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all ad interim appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles over the heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however, can complain because it is the Constitution itself that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad interim appointees. (Matibag v. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49, April 2, 2002, En Banc [Carpio]) Q. How is an ad interim appointment distinguished from an appointment or designation in an acting or temporary capacity? HELD: While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. (Matibag v. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49, April 2, 2002, En Banc [Carpio]) Limitations on the appointing power of the Acting President Art. VII, Sec. 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective unless revoked by the elected President within ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office. THE MILITARY POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT Sec. 18, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting

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jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or the legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with the invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. As Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, the President has the following powers: a. He may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. b. He may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or c. He may proclaim martial law over the entire Philippines or any part thereof. Subject to: Art. VIII, Sec. 1 par. 2. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Govt.

CALL OUT THE AFP TO PREVENT LAWLESS VIOLENCE (CALLING OUT POWERS) This is merely a police measure meant to quell disorder. As such, the Constitution does not regulate its exercise radically

David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006 ISSUE: W/N PP No. 1017 is a declaration of martial law or the exercise of the President of her calling out powers? HELD: Section 18, Article VII grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, the Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Are these conditions present in the instant cases? As stated earlier, considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Offices vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country. Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the Presidents calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser

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power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is not so. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her calling-out power. The declaration of Martial Law is a warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called upon by the executive to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law. In his Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, an authority in constitutional law, said that of the three powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare Martial Law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties. It is a strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly. It cannot be used to stifle or persecute critics of the government. It is placed in the keeping of the President for the purpose of enabling him to secure the people from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their individual freedoms. In fact, Section 18, Art. VII, provides: A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its command is ultra vires. Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence. The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1) the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Q. Distinguish the Presidents power to call out the armed forces as their Commanderin-Chief in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, from his power to proclaim martial and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Explain why the former is not subject to judicial review while the latter two are.

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HELD: There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, provides in part: The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling out power is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII x x x. Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamations (of martial law) or suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President's action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio unios est exclusio alterius. X x x That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e., that the power to call is fully discretionary to the President, is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission x x x. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court. Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers. If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof. On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. The determination of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for disaster as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining order every time it is exercised. Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion

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or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the President's exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, Aug. 15, 2000, En Banc [Kapunan]) SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

A "writ of habeas corpus" is an order from the court commanding a detaining officer to inform the court (i) if he has the person in custody, and (ii) what his basis in detaining that person. The "privilege of the writ" is that portion of the writ requiring the detaining officer to show cause why he should not be tested. Note that it is the privilege that is suspended, not the writ itself. Requisites: 1. There must be an invasion or rebellion, and 2. The public safety requires the suspension.

Effects of the suspension of the privilege 1. The suspension of the privilege of the writ applies only to persons "judicially charged" for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 5). Such persons suspected of the above crimes can be arrested and detained without a warrant of arrest.

"Judicially charged" as used in the Constitution is imprecise. For if one were already judicially charged, his detention would be legal and so he could no longer petition for habeas corpus. Habeas corpus precisely contemplates a situation in which a person is being detained without being charged in court. Thus, the provision should read "one who is suspected of complicity in" the two crimes above. As a general rule, no person could be arrested without a warrant of arrest (validly issued upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, ( cf. Art. III, Sec. 2), unless (i) the arrest was made in connection with a crime committed in the presence of the detaining officer, or (ii) the privilege of the writ was suspended. If the public officer arrests him without a warrant, the officer becomes liable for "arbitrary detention" under Art. 124 of the RPC, and a petition for habeas corpus can be filed to seek his release. The suspension of the privilege does not make the arrest without warrant legal. But the military is, in effect, enabled to make the arrest, anyway since, with the suspension of the privilege, there is no remedy available against such unlawful arrest (arbitrary detention). The arrest without warrant is justified by the emergency situation and the difficulty in applying for a warrant considering the time and the number of persons to be arrested. But the crime for which he is arrested must be one related to rebellion or the invasion. As to other crimes, the suspension of the privilege does not apply.

2. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within 3 days, or otherwise he shall be released. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 6). In other words, the public officer can detain a person without warrant of arrest, but he can only do so for 72 hours. Before the lapse of 72 hours, an information must have been filed in the proper court charging him of the offense for which he was arrested. Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, if the detainee wants a preliminary investigation to be first conducted by the fiscal, he must sign a waiver of the effects of Art. 125. (delay in the delivery of detained persons) The effect of the suspension of the privilege, therefore, is only to extend the periods during which he can be detained without a warrant. Under Art. 125, as amended by EO 272, the public officer can only detain him for 12, 18 or 36 hours depending on the gravity of the offense of which he is charged; within this time, he must be judicially charged, otherwise, he must be released. When the privilege is suspended, the period is extended to 72 hours.

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What happens if he is not judicially charged nor released after 72 hours? The public officer becomes liable under Art. 125 for "delay in the delivery of detained persons." As to the detainee, it is submitted that he or someone else in his behalf can file a petition for habeas corpus. For even if the suspension has a lifetime of 60 days in general, as to that person, the suspension only has an effectivity of 72 hours, so that after this time, the suspension is lifted as to him.

3. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. (Art. III, Sec. 13) PROCLAIM MARTIAL LAW Requisites: 1. There must be an invasion or rebellion, and 2. Public safety requires the proclamation of martial law all over the Philippines or any part thereof. Effects of the proclamation of martial law The President can: 1. Legislate 2. Order the arrest of people who obstruct the war effort.

But the following cannot be done (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 4) 1. Suspend the operation of the Constitution. 2. Supplant the functioning of the civil courts and the legislative assemblies. principle is that martial law is proclaimed only because the courts and other civil institutions like Congress have been shut down. It should not happen that martial law is declared in order to shut down the civil institutions. 3. Confer jurisdiction upon military courts and agencies over civilians, where civil courts are unable to function. court" doctrine which holds that civilians cannot be tried by military courts if the civil courts are open and functioning. But if the civil courts are not functioning, then civilians can be tried by the military courts. Martial laws usually contemplates a case where the courts are already closed and the civil institutions have already crumbled, that is a "theater of war." If the courts are still open, the President can just suspend the privilege and achieve the same effect. 4. Automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The

This is the "open

The Role of Congress a. When the President proclaims martial law or suspends the privilege of the writ, such proclamation or suspension shall be effective for a period of 60 days, unless sooner revoked by the Congress. b. Upon such proclamation or suspension, Congress shall convene at once. If it is not in session, it shall convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call within 24 hours following the proclamation or suspension. c. Within 48 hours from the proclamation or the suspension, the President shall submit a report, in person or in writing, to the Congress (meeting in joint session of the action he has taken). d. The Congress shall then vote jointly, by an absolute majority. It has two options: (i) To revoke such proclamation or suspension.

When it so revokes, the President cannot set aside (or veto) the revocation as
he normally would do in the case of bills. If Congress does not do anything, the measure will expire anyway in 60 days. So the revocation must be made before the lapse of 60 days from the date the measure was taken. (ii) To extend it beyond the 60-day period of its validity.

Congress

can only so extend the proclamation or suspension upon the initiative of the President. The period need not be 60 days; it could be more, as Congress would determine, based on the persistence of the emergency. If Congress fails to act before the measure expires, it can no longer extend it until the President again redeclares the measure, for how do one extend something that has already lapsed?

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Note that Congress cannot "validate" the proclamation or suspension, because it is already valid. It is thus restricted to the 2 measures above. If Congress extends the measure, but before the period of extension lapses, the requirements for the proclamation or suspension no longer exist, Congress can lift the extension, since the power to confer implies the power to take back. If Congress does not review or lift the order, this can be reviewed by the Supreme Court pursuant to the next section. The Role of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filled by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of (a) the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ, or (b) the extension thereof. It must promulgate its decision thereon within 30 days from its filing. (Art. VII, Sec. 18 par. 3) This is because judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2) The jurisdiction of the SC may be invoked in a proper case. A petition for habeas corpus is one such case. When a person is arrested without a warrant for complicity in the rebellion or invasion, he or someone else in his behalf has the standing to question the validity of the proclamation or suspension. But before the SC can decide on the legality of his detention, it must first pass upon the validity of the proclamation or suspension. The test to be used by the Supreme Court in so reviewing the act of the President in proclaiming or suspending, or the act of Congress in extending, is the test of arbitrariness which seeks to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the measure. The question is not whether the President or Congress acted correctly, but whether he acted arbitrarily in that the action had no basis in fact. Deciding on whether the act was arbitrary amounts to a determination of whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is now made part of judicial power by Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2. This curbs radically the application of the political question doctrine. This test was taken from the case of Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 446 (1971). The issue there raised was whether in suspending the privilege of the writ in 1971, Marcos had a basis for doing so. The SC, in considering the fact that the President based his decision on (a) the Senate report on the condition in Central Luzon and (b) a closed door briefing by the military showing the extent of subversion, concluded that the President did not act arbitrarily. One may disagree with his appreciation of the facts, but one cannot say that it is without basis. In this case of Lansang vs. Garcia, the SC held unanimously that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of the factual basis in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof. This holding of the SC is now found in Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 3. There are 4 ways, then, for the proclamation or suspension to be lifted: 1) Lifting by the President himself 2) Revocation by Congress 3) Nullification by the Supreme Court 4) Operation of law after 60 days Military Trial of Civilians Void Even Under Martial Law, If Civil Courts Are Open. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 5.). In the case of Olaguer vs Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 , the Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2 decision was reversed. According to the SC, civilians who are placed on trial for civil offenses under general law are entitled to trial by judicial process. Since we are not enemy-occupied territory nor are we under a military govt. and even on the premise that martial law continues in force, the military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts that have remained open and have been regularly functioning. The assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the President's power as Commander in Chief or on any theory of martial law. As long as civil courts remain open and are regularly functioning, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by civil courts. To hold otherwise is a violation of the right to due process.

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DECLARATION OF WAR AND DELEGATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS The Congress, by a vote of 2/3 of both houses in joint session assembled but voting separately shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war. [Art. VI, Sec. 23(1)] In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may authorize the President, for a limited period and subject such restrictions as the law may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment of Congress, unless sooner withdrawn by its resolution. [Art. VI, Sec. 23(2).] This grant of emergency power to the President is different from the Commander-inChief clause. When the President acts under the Commander-in-Chief clause, he acts under a constitutional grant of military power, which may include the law-making power. But when the President acts under the emergency power, he acts under a Congressional delegation of law-making power. The scope of the grant is such "powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy." This power is (1) for a limited period, and (2) subject to such restrictions as Congress may provide. The power ceases (a) upon being withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, or, if Congress fails to adopt such resolution, (b) upon the next (voluntary) adjournment of Congress. For the fact that Congress is able to meet in session uninterruptedly and adjourn of its own will proves that the emergency no longer exists is to justify the delegation.

David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006 HELD: The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states: x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a state of national emergency. The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees x x x but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads: Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP 1017? The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. X x x x x x x x x Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President Arroyos inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislatures emergency powers. This is an area that needs delineation. A distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare a state of national emergency and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise. Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads: SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

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(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to other national emergency. If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a state of national emergency pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a state of national emergency. The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed together and considered in the light of each other. Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency powers. Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus: (1) There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. X x x Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term emergency under Section 17, Article XII refers to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences. This is a limited view of emergency. Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety, and perception. Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a) economic, b) natural disaster, and c) national security. Emergency, as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect. X x x This is evident in the Records of the Constitutional Commission, thus: MR. GASCON. Yes. What is the Committees definition of national emergency which appears in Section 13, page 5? It reads:

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When the common good so requires, the State may temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest. MR. VILLEGAS. What I mean is threat from external aggression, for example, calamities or natural disasters. MR. GASCON. There is a question by Commissioner de los Reyes. about strikes and riots? What

MR. VILLEGAS. Strikes, no; those would not be covered by the term national emergency. MR. BENGZON. Unless they are of such proportions such that they would paralyze government service. x x x x x x MR. TINGSON. May I ask the committee if national emergency refers to military national emergency or could this be economic emergency? MR. VILLEGAS. dislocations. Yes, it could refer to both military or economic

MR. TINGSON. Thank you very much. It may be argued that when there is national emergency, Congress may not be able to convene and, therefore, unable to delegate to the President the power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. In Araneta v. Dinglasan, this Court emphasized that legislative power, through which extraordinary measures are exercised, remains in Congress even in times of crisis. After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another department, unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial, given the ability to act, are called upon to perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively. Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress. Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privatelyowned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

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Although the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the AFP should not exceed 3 years, the President may extend such tour of duty in times of war or other national emergency declared by Congress. [Art. XVI, Sec. 5(7).]

EXECUTIVE CLEMENCIES Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution SECTION 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

Reprieve is a temporary relief from or postponement of execution of criminal penalty or sentence or a stay of execution. It does not more than stay the execution of a sentence extended to a prisoner to afford him an opportunity to procure some amelioration of the sentence imposed. (Black) It is the withholding of a sentence for an interval of time, a postponement of execution, a temporary suspension of execution. (People vs. Vera) Commutation is a reduction of sentence. (Black) It is a remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed. (People vs. Vera) Pardon is a permanent cancellation of sentence. (Black) It is an act of grace proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for the crime he has committed. It is a remission of guilt, a forgiveness of the offense. (People v Vera)

Kinds of Pardon.-- Pardon may be classified into absolute or conditional and plenary or partial. An absolute pardon is one extended without any strings attached, so to speak, whereas a conditional pardon is one under which the convict is required to comply with certain requirements. A plenary pardon extinguishes all the penalties imposed upon the offender, including accessory disabilities, whereas partial pardon does not. Where the pardon is conditional, the offender has the right to reject the same since he may feel that the condition imposed is more onerous than the penalty sought to be remitted. But in the case of an absolute pardon, the pardonee has no option at all and must accept it whether he likes it or not. In this sense, an absolute pardon is similar to commutation, which is also not subject to acceptance by the offender. Amnesty is a sovereign act of oblivion for past acts, granted by government generally to a class of persons who have been guilty usually of political offenses (treason, sedition, rebellion), and who are subject to trial but have not yet been convicted, and often conditioned upon their return to obedience and duty within a prescribed time. (Black; Brown v Walker, 161 US 602). Probation is a disposition under which a defendant after conviction and sentence is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation officer. [Sec. 3 (a), PD 968.] Parole is the suspension of the sentence of a convict granted by a Parole Board after serving the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence penalty, without granting a pardon, prescribing the terms upon which the sentence shall be suspended.

Pardon distinguished from probation

Probation and Pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually distinct and different from each other, both in origin and nature. In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. The probationer, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody-- subject to the control of the probation officer and of the court, he may be rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when

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rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937)

Notes: In both cases, there must be a final judgment of conviction, and the convict must be exempted from service of sentence. But pardon is granted by the Chief Executive for any crime, while probation is granted by the court after investigation by a probation officer only for cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed 6 years and 1 day (prision mayor), where the crime is not against the security of the State, where there was no previous conviction for an offense punished by arresto mayor, and where there was no previous availment of probation. In absolute pardon, the sentence and its effects, including the accessory penalties, are abolished upon the grant of pardon. In probation, the restoration of the probationer to his civil rights takes places only after his final discharge after the period of his probation. (Secs. 14 & 16)

Pardon distinguished from Parole

Pardon may be granted by the Chief Executive under the Constitution and formerly the Administrative Code, at any time after final judgment of conviction, even before service; while parole is granted by the Board of Pardons and Parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law only after the convict has served the minimum term of his sentence. In pardon, the convict becomes a free man; in parole, he is not really free because although he his released from the custody of the law, he must submit to periodic examination by the Board of Parole.

Pardon distinguished from Amnesty 1. Pardon is usually granted for common crimes; amnesty, for political crimes. 2. Pardon is granted to individuals; amnesty, to a group, class, or community generally. 3. Pardon can only be granted after conviction; amnesty may be granted even before trial. 4. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment; amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, that is, it overlooks and obliterates the offense with which the convict is charged that the person released stands precisely as though he had committed no offense. (Barrioquinto v Fernandez) 5. Pardon is a private act of the President which must be pleaded and proved by the person because the courts do not take judicial notice of it; amnesty is a public act of which the courts take judicial notice. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1991 ed.) 6. Pardon does not require the concurrence of the Congress; amnesty requires such concurrence. (id.) Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96, Jan. 19, 1999, En Banc [Puno] HELD: Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. This provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after the finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity (See Article 79 of the Revised Penal Code). The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effect is the same the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the Presidents power to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Monsanto v. Factoran, [170 SCRA 190] HELD: While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt and not forgetfulness. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the

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crime and the conviction thereof. Pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores to him all his civil rights. Unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages. But, stated otherwise, if the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged. When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt. Garcia v. Chairman, COA HELD: Our Constitution reposes in the President the power and the exclusive prerogative to extend executive clemency under the following circumstances: "Except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. "He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress." In the case at bar, petitioner was found administratively liable for dishonesty and consequently dismissed from the service. However, he was later acquitted by the trial court of the charge of qualified theft based on the very same acts for which he was dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioner's innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service Commission. The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service. This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency. In Re: Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, 251 SCRA 709, Dec. 29, 1995 [Hermosisima] HELD: A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one (Alvarez v. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil. 50). By the pardonees consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon. Under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order the arrest and reincarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence. It is now a wellentrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered. THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT Sec. 21, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Sec. 25, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution SECTION 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America

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concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

The power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. (Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000) By reason of the President's unique position as head of state, he is the logical choice as the nation's spokesman in foreign relations. The Senate, on the other hand, is granted the right to share in the treaty-making power of the President by concurring with him with the right to amend.

Treaty distinguished from executive agreements

Executive agreements entered into by the President need no concurrence. The reason is that although executive agreements are a kind of international agreements, when the Constitution intends to include executive agreements, it says so specifically, as in Art. VIII, Sec. 5, par. 2, when it speaks of the power of the SC to review final judgments of lower courts in cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, is in question. In holding that treaties are formal documents which require ratification with approval of the Senate, while executive agreements become binding through executive action without need of a vote by the Senate, the SC in Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351 (1961), said that the difference between a treaty and an executive agreement is that a treaty is an international agreement involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character, while an executive agreement is an international agreement embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and traditions, and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature. Nature of Executive Agreements : There are 2 classes : (1) agreements made purely as executive acts affecting external relations and independent of or without legislative authorization, which may be termed as presidential agreements, and (2) agreements entered into in pursuance of acts of Congress, or Congressional-Executive Agreements. (USAFFE Veterans Assn. v. Treasurer, 105 Phil 1030)

Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000, En Banc [Buena] HELD: The Phil. Govt. has complied with the Constitution in that the VFA was concurred in by the Phil. Senate, thus complying with Sec. 21, Art. VII. The Republic of the Philippines cannot require the US to submit the agreement to the US Senate for concurrence, for that would be giving a strict construction to the phrase, recognized as a treaty. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA as merely an executive agreement because under international law, an executive agreement is just as binding as a treaty. Lim and Ersando v. Honorable Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002, En Banc [De Leon] HELD: In Ichong v. Hernandez (101 Phil. 1155, 1191 [1957]), we ruled that provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State. In Gonzales v. Hechanova (9 SCRA 230, 242 [1963]), x x x as regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress. The foregoing premises leave no doubt that US forces are prohibited from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory.

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Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 [1997], En Banc [Panganiban] HELD: One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties . . . A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken." POWER OF IMPOUNDMENT PHILCONSA v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506, Aug. 9, 1994 [Quiason] HELD: Impoundment refers to the refusal of the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type. Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal sources of the authority of the President: 1) The authority to impound given to him either expressly or impliedly by Congress. 2) The executive power drawn from the Presidents role as Commander-in-Chief. 3) The Faithful Execution Clause. The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the President desist from implementing the law if doing so would prejudice public interest. An example given is when through efficient and prudent management of a project, substantial savings are made. In such a case, it is sheer folly to expect the President to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law. CONTRACTING AND GUARANTEEING FOREIGN LOANS Art. VII, Sec. 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government, or government-owned or controlled corporations, which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters provided by law. Art. XII, Sec. 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of the monetary authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be made available to the public. POWER WITH REGARD TO THE UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law... The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within 30 days from its execution. (Art. XII, Sec. 2, pars. 4 & 5).

THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT To maintain the independence of the Judiciary, the following safeguards have been embodied in the Constitution: (Cruz) (1) The SC is a constitutional body. It cannot be abolished nor may its membership or the manner of its meetings be changed by mere legislation. [Art. VIII, Sec. 4 (1)] (2) The members of the judiciary are not subject to confirmation by the CA. (3) The members of the SC may not be removed except by impeachment. (Art. IX, Sec. 2.) (4) The SC may not be deprived of its minimum original and appellate jurisdiction as prescribed in Art. X, Sec. 5 of the Constitution. (Art. VIII, Sec. 2.)

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(5) The appellate jurisdiction of the SC may not be increased by law without its advice and concurrence. (Art. VI, Sec. 30.) (6) The SC now has administrative supervision over all lower courts and their personnel. (Art. VIII, Sec. 6.) (7) The SC has exclusive power to discipline judges of lower courts. (Art. VIII, Sec. 11.) (8) The members of the SC and all lower courts have security of tenure, which cannot be undermined by a law reorganizing the judiciary. (Id.) (9) They shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. (Art. VIII, Sec. 12.) (10) The salaries of judges may not be reduced during their continuance in office. (Art. VIII, Sec. 10.) (11) The judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. (Art. VIII, Sec. 3.) (12) The SC alone may initiate rules of court. [Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (5).] (13) Only the SC may order the temporary detail of judges. [Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (3)] (14) The SC can appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary. [Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (6)] CREATION: The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 1.) The Supreme Court is a constitutional body. As such it cannot be abolished by the Congress for the power to destroy only resides in the one who has the power to create. The lower courts (Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts), on the other hand, are established by law, and so could be abolished by law, provided the security of tenure is not undermined.

COMPOSITION: The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices. [Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1)] MODE OF SITTING: It may sit en banc, or in its discretion, in divisions of 3, 5 or 7 members (or 5, 3 or 2 divisions). [Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1)] At present, the SC sits either en banc or in 3 divisions with 5 members each. QUALIFICATIONS (1) Natural-born citizen [Art. VIII, Sec. 7(1)] (2) At least 40 years of age (id.) (3) At least 15 years of experience as a judge of lower court, or practice of law in the Philippines (4) Of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence [Art. VIII, Sec. 7(3)] SALARY NOT EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX: In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (July 1987), the Court ruled that under the 1987 Constitution, the salaries of members of the Judiciary are not exempt from taxes. It anchored its decision on the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, that is, on the legislative history of the present Art. VIII, Sec. 10.

SECURITY OF TENURE AND REMOVAL Art. VIII, Sec. 11. The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. Art. XI, Sec. 2. The xxx Members of the Supreme Court xxx may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. In Re: Raul Gonzales, A.M. Nos. 88-4-5433. April 15, 1988 HELD: A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of

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such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehaviour that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings. The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be vulnerable to all manner of charges which might be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court. FISCAL AUTONOMY Art. VIII, Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133 (1992) HELD: As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions. FISCAL AUTONOMY means freedom from outside control. The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. FUNCTIONS OF THE COURTS ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, G.R No. 133486, Jan. 28, 2000, En Banc [Panganiban] HELD: While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the peoples fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections. In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano (134 SCRA 438, 463, Feb. 18, 1985), the Court had occasion to reiterate that it also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom. JUDICIAL POWER Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

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Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice 1) to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and 2) to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. As early as Angara v. Electoral Tribunal, the SC held that when it performs his checking function of the co-equal branches, it is merely performing a duty imposed upon it by the Constitution; that it acts as the mechanism that implements the "supremacy of the Constitution." The extent to which it exercises this function, however, has been limited by the political question doctrine. When the court allocated constitutional boundaries, it neither asserts supremacy, nor annuls the acts of the legislature. It simply carries out the solemn and sacred obligations imposed upon it by the constitution to determine conflicting claims and to establish for the parties the rights which the constitution grants to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. [Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936)] The inherent powers of a Court to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice includes the right to reverse itself, especially when in its honest opinion it has committed an error or mistake in judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to a party litigant. (Tocao v. CA, GR No. 127405, September 2o, 2001)

Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135, Aug. 4, 1994, En Banc [Cruz] (Do lower courts have jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a law?) HELD: The lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation (Sec. 19[1]), even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article VIII, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE I.B.P. v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000) HELD: As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review. It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are political questions. The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed . Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution. As Tanada v. Angara puts it, POLITICAL QUESTIONS refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political question. In the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr, [p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political

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decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment pronouncements by various departments on the one question.

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The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that [T]he Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution) Under this definition, the Court cannot agree x x x that the issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable - the problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom . Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court . When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Under this definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated. But while this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President, it may look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion. A showing that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable controversy. Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, En Banc [Puno] HELD: In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II is clearxxx EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably Section 1 of Article II, and Section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Section 11 of Article VII. EDSA 1 vs. EDSA 2 EDSA 1 EDSA 2 a) Involves the exercise of a) An exercise of people the power people power of revolution of freedom of speech & Which overthrows the freedom of assembly to petition the government Whole government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the president b) Is extra-constitutional b) Is intra-constitutional and and the the legitimacy of the new resignation of the sitting government that president that it caused resulted and from it cannot be the succession of the VP subject as of judicial review president are subject to judicial review c) Political question c) Involves legal questions REQUISITES FOR THE PROPER EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW The time-tested standards for the exercise of judicial review are: (1) The existence of an appropriate case;

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(2)

An interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) The plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) The necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: 1) The existence of an actual and appropriate case; 2) A personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; 3) The exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and 4) The constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

Actual Case or Controversy An ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY means an existing case or controversy which is both ripe for resolution and susceptible of judicial determination, and that which is not conjectural or anticipatory, or that which seeks to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems. A petition raising a constitutional question does not present an actual controversy, unless it alleges a legal right or power. Moreover, it must show that a conflict of rights exists, for inherent in the term controversy is the presence of opposing views or contentions. Otherwise, the Court will be forced to resolve issues which remain unfocused because they lack such concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed from a clash of adversary arguments exploring every aspect of a multi-faceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests. The controversy must also be justiciable; that is, it must be susceptible of judicial determination. X x x [IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000)] An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest; a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief. (David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006) A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY has been defined as, a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law. Courts have no judicial power to review cases involving political questions and as a rule, will desist from taking cognizance of speculative or hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and in cases that has become moot. Subject to certain well-defined exceptions courts will not touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its validity. [Cutaran v. DENR, 350 SCRA 697 (2001)]

Isagani Cruz v. Sec. of DENR, G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000, En Banc, [Puno and Kapunan, Separate Opinions] HELD: In the case at bar, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights. A law has been enacted, and the Implementing Rules and Regulations approved. Money has been appropriated and the government agencies concerned have been directed to implement the statute. It cannot be successfully maintained that we should await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial resolution. It is precisely the contention of the petitioners that the law, on its face, constitutes an unconstitutional abdication of State ownership over lands of the public domain and other natural resources. Moreover, when the State machinery is set into motion to implement an alleged unconstitutional statute, this Court possesses sufficient authority to resolve and prevent imminent injury and violation of the constitutional process. Advisory Opinion GENERAL RULE: A request for advisory opinion cannot come in the category of an actual case or controversy since the issue raised does not involve any conflict in law that has assumed the proportions of a full-blown dispute. The court in this case is being asked only to counsel and not to decide. EXCEPTION: When the purpose is to solicit from the court a declaratory judgment involving the interpretation of the rights and duties of a person under the provisions of a deed, will,

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contract, or other written instrument, or a statute or ordinance, the case is deemed an actual controversy over which the courts may validly assume jurisdiction. Moot and Academic Cases An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead. (Gonzales v. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733)

David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006 HELD: A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. X x x The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the publics interest, involving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, G.R No. 133486, Jan. 28, 2000, En Banc [Panganiban] HELD: While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the peoples fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections. In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees." Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom. Proper Party IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, Aug. 15, 2000, En Banc [Kapunan] "Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." [IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000)]

David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006 HELD: Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in

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interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer. Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: In matter of mere public right, however, the people are the real parties. It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied. With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied. However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public. This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. X x x Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 (1993) HELD: This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. X x x x Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. Liberal Attitude of the Supreme Court on Locus Standi I.B.P. v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000) HELD: X x x, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006 HELD: However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan, where the transcendental importance of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec, this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the far-reaching implications of the petition notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases

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where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings. Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed to sue under the principle of transcendental importance. Pertinent are the following cases: (1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, where the Court ruled that the enforcement of the constitutional right to information and the equitable diffusion of natural resources are matters of transcendental importance which clothe the petitioner with locus standi; (2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, wherein the Court held that given the transcendental importance of the issues involved, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of direct injury to the parties seeking judicial review of the Visiting Forces Agreement; (3) Lim v. Executive Secretary, while the Court noted that the petitioners may not file suit in their capacity as taxpayers absent a showing that Balikatan 02-01 involves the exercise of Congress taxing or spending powers, it reiterated its ruling in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely and standing requirements may be relaxed. By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1) The cases involve constitutional issues; (2) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Courts attitude toward legal standing. In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, the Court ruled that the status of Kilosbayan as a peoples organization does not give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the on-line lottery contract, more so where it does not raise any issue of constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot sue as a taxpayer absent any allegation that public funds are being misused. Nor can it sue as a concerned citizen as it does not allege any specific injury it has suffered. In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec, the Court reiterated the direct injury test with respect to concerned citizens cases involving constitutional issues. It held that there must be a showing that the citizen personally suffered some actual or threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official act. In Lacson v. Perez, the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is not a real party-in-interest as it had not demonstrated any injury to itself or to its leaders, members or supporters. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, the Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members of Congress have standing to sue, as they claim that the Presidents declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation of the emergency powers of Congress, thus impairing their legislative powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and Social Justice Society, the Court declared them to be devoid of standing, equating them with the LDP in Lacson. Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions. The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged direct injury resulting from illegal arrest

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and unlawful search committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not question their legal standing. In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights. In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez, Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan , Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, and Tanada v. Tuvera, that when the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws. In G.R. No. 171483, KMUs assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of their members. We take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, the Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi. In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence. She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has pending electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her case. But considering once more the transcendental importance of the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing rules. It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the liberality doctrine on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the transcendental importance doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the PP 1017 cases. This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi. Taxpayers Suit The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. v. San Juan, 260 SCRA 250, Aug. 1, 1996, To constitute a taxpayer's suit, two requisites must be met, namely, that public funds are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed, and that the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged ultra vires act. Undeniably, as a taxpayer, petitioner would somehow be adversely affected by an illegal use of public money. When, however, no such unlawful spending has been shown, as in the case at bar, petitioner, even as a taxpayer, cannot question the transaction validly executed by and between the Province and Ortigas for the simple reason that it is not privy to said contract.

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Gonzales v. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733, Aug. 14, 2000, En Banc [Gonzaga-Reyes] A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, a taxpayers action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power Earliest Opportunity: GR: If not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal. Exceptions:

1. 2.

In criminal cases can be raised at any time in the discretion of the court. In civil cases can be raised at any stage if it is necessary to the determination of the case itself. 3. In every case, except where there is estoppel can be raised at any stage if it involves the jurisdiction of the court. Necessity of Deciding Constitutional Question Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 (1990) HELD: The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions are properly raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the determination of the case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground such as the application of a statute or general law (Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, [1909], Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 [1941]). Lalican v. Vergara, 276 SCRA 518 (1997) HELD: Thus, even if all the requisites for judicial review of a constitutional matter are present in a case, this Court will not pass upon a constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case or if the case can be disposed of on some other grounds, such as the application of the statute or general law.

Effects of Declaration of Unconstitutionality

1. Orthodox View An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights, it


imposes no duties, it affords no protection, it creates no office. It is inoperative as if it has not been passed. (Norton vs. Shelby)

2. Modern View The court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not
annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute has no existence. Partial Unconstitutionality Requisites for declaration of partial unconstitutionality of a statute: 1. The legislature is willing to retain the valid portions even if the rest of the statute is declared illegal. 2. The valid portions can stand independently as a separate statute. CONGRESSIONAL POWER OVER JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT Art. VIII, Sec. 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. xxx But while the jurisdiction of courts is a matter of legislative apportionment, the Constitution sets certain limitations on this prerogative:

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1. It cannot decrease the constitutionally set jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. (It may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.) 2. It cannot increase the constitutionally set appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Art. VI, Sec. 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence. 3. It can increase the original jurisdiction of the SC (pursuant to its general power). 4. It can make the jurisdiction of the SC concurrent with lower courts (pursuant to its general power). Thus, under the Rules of Court, the original jurisdiction of the SC is concurrent with the RTC and in the case of the special civil actions, with the CA. 5. It cannot pass a law reorganizing the judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its members. (Art. VI, Sec. 2, par. 2) The Supreme Court's Jurisdiction A) Original jurisdiction [Art. VIII, Sec. 5(1)] (1) Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. (2) Petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus. (3) Sufficiency of factual basis of proclamation of martial law and suspension of privilege of writ of Habeas Corpus Note that the SC does not have jurisdiction over declaratory relief cases, which must be filed with the RTC (In Re Bermudez said so too, and yet gave due course to the petition.) The first case (ambassadors, etc.) is made concurrent with RTCs by law (Judiciary Act of 1948). The second case (special civil actions) is concurrent with the CA and the RTC, with respect to inferior bodies.

B) Appellate Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court shall have the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on (i) ordinary appeal, or (ii) petition for review on certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgment and orders of lower courts in the following cases: (1) Cases questioning the constitutionality or validity of any (a) treaty, (b) international and executive agreement, (c) law or statute, (d) presidential decree, (e) proclamation, (f) order, (g) instruction, (h) ordinance, or (i) regulation. (2) Cases questioning the legality of an (a) tax, (b) impost, (c) assessment, or (d) toll, or (e) any penalty imposed in relation thereto. (3) Cases in which the jurisdiction of lower courts is in issue. (4) Criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. (5) Cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. (6) Orders of the Constitutional Commissions.

Appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in two ways: 1. Ordinary appeal This is obligatory on the courts, so the appellant possesses this "as a matter of right". Under this mode, the SC can pass on both questions of fact and law. Ordinary appeal to the SC is allowed by law in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher, including those involving other offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused on the same occasion (to ensure uniformity of decision). (Sec. 17, Judiciary Act of 1948). The other case is the automatic review by the SC of criminal cases where the death penalty is imposed. This is unlike the ordinary appeal taken where the penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher, for in this case, the review is automatic. The reason why it is not automatic in the first case ( reclusion perpetua) is that on appeal, the appellate court may increase the penalty imposed by the trial court (to death) so that the convict must first waive his right against double jeopardy, precisely by voluntarily making the

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appeal, before the SC can reopen the case on appeal. But the case is different when death is imposed because the worst that could happen on automatic appeal is that the judgment is affirmed. Naturalization and denaturalization cases under the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Sec. 17) used to be directly appealable to the SC. But this is deemed to have been amended by the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (BP 129) which, in Sec. 5(3), makes all cases decided by the RTC, appealable to the CA, except those made directly appealable to the SC by (i) the Constitution, (ii) BP 129 and (iii) Sec. 17 [3(i)] and Sec. 17 [4(4)]of the Judiciary Act of 1948. Naturalization and denaturalization cases do not fall under any of the exceptions.

2. Petition for review on certiorari This is discretionary on the SC. It has the authority not to give due course to the petition, if the petition shows no merit on its face. Thus, mode provided for in Rule 45, is limited to pure questions of law. All other cases can be appealed to the SC using this mode. The Constitution now provides that "no petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor." (Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2) The four other cases falling under the appellate jurisdiction of the SC (viz, constitutionality, tax, jurisdiction and pure questions of law), are appealable to the SC by petition for review on certiorari. However, in cases involving constitutionality, tax, or jurisdiction, when the resolution of the main issue depends on a controverted question of fact, the case must be appealed to the CA on both, questions of fact and law, and the decision of the CA is then raised to the SC by petition for review on certiorari on pure questions of law. (Sec. 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948)

Certiorari

The certiorari referred to in 5(1) (when the SC exercises original jurisdiction) is the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, where the question raised is a "jurisdictional question," that is, (a) lack of jurisdiction, (b) excess of jurisdiction, or (c) grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The certiorari referred to in 5(2) (when the SC exercises appellate jurisdiction) is certiorari as an ordinary mode of appeal, where the issue raised is "error of judgment" or error of law.

SESSIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT Cases to be Heard by the SC En Banc Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. CA, 334 SCRA 465, June 28, 2000, En Banc [Purisima] HELD: Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated February 7, 1989, as amended by the Resolution of November 18, 1993: 1) Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question; 2) Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty; 3) Cases raising novel questions of law; 4) Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; 5) Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and Commission on Audit; 6) Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both; 7) Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may be modified or reversed; 8) Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof merit the attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the court en banc; and

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9) All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention. DECISION-MAKING DELIBERATIONS Art. VIII, Sec. 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts.

The reason for the requirement that the decision must be reached "in consulta" (i.e., after deliberations by the group) is to emphasize that the SC is one body, albeit collegiate, so that the decision of the case is by the court itself and not the ponente. The writer of the opinion is merely the spokesman of the body.

Consing v. CA, 177 SCRA 14 (1989) ISSUE: W/N absence of certification by the Court of Appeals renders that decision invalid. HELD: NO. The certification requirement imposed by the 1987 constitution was meant to ensure the implementation of the constitutional requirement that decisions of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts, such as the CA, Sandiganbayan and CTA, are reached after consultation with the members of the court sitting en banc or in a division before the case is assigned to a member thereof for decision writing. The absence would not necessarily mean that the case submitted for decision had not been reached in consultation before being assigned to one member for the writing of the opinion of the court since the regular performance of official duty is presumed. The lack of certification serves as an evidence of failure to observe the certification requirement but it would not have the effect of invalidating the decision. Prudential Bank v. Castro, 158 SCRA 646 (1988) HELD: The certification requirement refers to decisions in judicial, not administrative cases. From the very beginning, resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases have not been accompanied by any formal certification. In fact, such a certification would be a superfluity in administrative cases, which by their very nature, have to be deliberated upon considering the collegiate composition of this Court. VOTING Votes required to "render a decision or resolution" A) En banc

Concurrence of a majority of the members who (i) actually took part in the deliberations (i.e., the consultation) on the issues in the case, and (ii) voted thereon. [Art. VIII, Sec. 4(2) and Sec. 11.] a. The lowest possible votes needed to render a decision is 5, since quorum of 15 is 8, and majority of 8 is 5. This number may increase as the number of justices present increase; b. One who abstained is deemed to have voted for the purpose of computing the majority vote needed. For an abstention is really a form of casting a vote with its own repercussions on the outcome of the case. c. One who was present but kept silent during the deliberations and did not vote is still included in the counting for the purpose of determining the majority. For it may happen that he has already made up his mind on how to decide and influence the outcome of the case. d. But one who expressly inhibited or is disqualified from taking part (for instance because of conflict of interest) is not included. e. There must be a quorum before a valid decision can be made. Without a quorum, there can be no valid business to begin with. f. In case, the necessary majority cannot be mustered, then there is no decision rendered. (See effect of failure to reach a majority below.)

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B) In divisions

Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved (a) with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and (b) in no case without the concurrence of at least 3 of such members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc. No doctrine or principle of law laid by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. [Art. VIII, Sec. 4(3)] a. In a division of 7 members, the majority if all are present is 4. If only 6 are present, 4. If only 5 or 4, 3. If only 3, no quorum. b. In a division of 5 members, 3 votes are needed regardless of whether 5, 4, or 3 are present. c. In division of 3 members, 3 votes are needed. d. In any of these cases, when the votes cannot be mustered, the case must be raised to the court en banc.

Effect of failure to muster the necessary majority: If the necessary majority cannot be had, the case is again reheard. If upon rehearing, no majority is still had, the following are the effects: a. If a case is on appeal, the judgment appealed from is deemed affirmed except: (i) Criminal cases where the judgment is that of conviction: the conviction is reversed, and the accused is acquitted. (ii) Cases where the lower court declared a law, etc. unconstitutional: the judgment is reversed, and the validity of the law is deemed sustained, pursuant to the presumption of constitutionality under Sec. 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. (If the lower court declared the law as not unconstitutional, this judgment is deemed affirmed pursuant to the general rule above.) * (Thus, if 12 are present, 5 voted the law unconstitutional, 4 voted for its validity, and 3 abstained, there is no decision and so the law remains valid.) b. If the case is an original petition, then the case is deemed dismissed.

Writing of the decision Sec. 14, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

In the case of the SC and lower collegiate court, this rule is addressed to the one to whom the writing of the opinion was assigned after consultation, that is, the ponente. In the case by other courts, this rule is addressed to the judge.

Dissenters and Abstainers

In the case of a decision on the merits, if a member (a) took no part, or (b) dissented, or (c) abstained from a decision or resolution, he must state his reason therefor. (Art. VIII, Sec. 13.)

Minute Resolution

In justifying the so-called minute resolution, the SC said in Borromeo v. CA, 186 SCRA 1: "The SC disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord w/ the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petitions were filed merely to forsetall the early execution of judgment and for noncompliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing a petition always gives the legal basis.

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The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate decisions and/ or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case."

And neither does the rule apply to administrative cases decided by the SC itself, as it held in Prudential Bank v. Castro, 158 SCRA 646, thus: "No constitutional provision is disregarded in the SC's Minute Resolution denying a motion for reconsideration 'for lack of merit, the issues raised therein having been previously duly considered and passed upon. In an administrative case, the constitutional mandate that 'no *** motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be *** denied without stating the legal basis therefor is inapplicable. And even if it were, said resolution stated the legal basis for the denial, and, therefore, adhered faithfully to the constitutional requirement. 'Lack of merit,' as a ground for denial is legal basis.

Memorandum Decisions:

The distinctive features of a memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered by an appellate court, second, it incorporates by reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the decision, order, or ruling under review. Most likely, the purpose is to affirm the decision, although it is not impossible that the approval of the findings of facts by the lower court may lead to a different conclusion of law by the higher court. At any rate, the reason for allowing the incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. The idea is to avoid having to repeat in the body of the latter decision the findings or conclusions of the lower court since they are being approved or adopted anyway. (Francisco v. Permskul, 173 SCRA 324) The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.

Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. CA, 293 SCRA 26, July 23, 1998 [Martinez] HELD: The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals Yao v. CA, 344 SCRA 202, Oct. 24, 2000, 1st Div. [Davide] HELD: The memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it become an additive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for the validity of this kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it. Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set forth as to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike down the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience. Period for Decision-Making Sec. 15, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution SECTION 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by

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the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. (2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pending, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself. (3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period. (4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay. Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, A.M. No. 00-8-05-SC, Nov. 28, 2001, En Banc [Pardo] HELD: The law creating the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 is clear on this issue. It provides: Sec. 6. Maximum period for termination of cases As far as practicable, the trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan once commenced shall be continuous until terminated and the judgment shall be rendered within three [3] months from the date the case was submitted for decision. On September 18, 1984, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its own rules, thus: Sec. 3. Maximum Period to Decide Cases The judgment or final order of a division of the Sandiganbayan shall be rendered within three [3] months from the date the case was submitted for decision. Given the clarity of the rule that does not distinguish, we hold that the three [3] month period, not the twelve [12] month period, to decide cases applies to the Sandiganbayan. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan presently sitting in five [5] divisions, functions as a trial court. The term trial is used in its broad sense, meaning, it allows introduction of evidence by the parties in the cases before it. The Sandiganbayan, in original cases within its jurisdiction, conducts trials, has the discretion to weigh the evidence of the parties, admit the evidence it regards as credible and reject that which they consider perjurious or fabricated. THE RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT Sec. 5[5], Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

Limitations to this power: Such rules shall (i) provide simplified and inexpensive procedure, for the speedy disposition of cases, (ii) be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and (iii) not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the SC. [Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5)]

NO QUASI-JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE WORK OF JUDGES

Generally: No non-judicial work for judges; No quasi- judicial and administrative work for judges.

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As a general rule, members of the judiciary shall only have judicial functions, in line with the separation of powers principle of the Constitution.

Exceptions: Constitutionally appointed non-judicial functions of the Supreme Court a. Act as Presidential Electoral Tribunal b. Chief Justice as presiding officer in impeachment trial of the President. [Art. XI, Sec. 3(6)] c. Chief Justice as Chairman of the Judicial and Bar Council. ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS (1) Supervision of lower courts [Art. VIII, Sec. 6.] (2) Temporarily assign judges to other stations in the public interest. [Art. VIII, Sec. 5.(3)] (3) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid miscarriage of justice [Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (4)] (4) Discipline of lower court judges. [Art. VIII, Sec. 11.] (5) Appointment of officials and employees of entire judiciary. [ Art. VIII, Sec. 5(6)] Power of the SC to Discipline Judges and Order their Dismissal People v. Gacott, 246 SCRA 52 (1995) HELD: The very text of the present Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that "the Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts," is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. it was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity, as will hereafter be explained. The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can "order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein." Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon decided by the full Court itself. Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc, on February 9, 1993 a Court En Banc resolution was adopted, entitled "Bar Matter No. 209. In the Matter of the Amendment and/or Clarification of various Supreme Courts Rules and Resolutions," and providing inter alia: For said purpose, the following are considered en banc cases: xxx xxx xxx 6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both. xxx xxx xxx This resolution was amended on March 16, 1993 and November 23, 1993, but the aforequoted provision was maintained. Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc. This would subvert the constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court of the lower courts, and the very purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in divisions of three, five or seven members. Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against members of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be decided in division. Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464 [1993]

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HELD: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act. However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. In fine, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. Dolalas v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, 265 SCRA 818 [1996] HELD: The complaint against petitioner-judge before the Office of the Ombudsman is basically administrative in nature. In essence, petitioner-judge is being charged with having violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. It must be borne in mind that the resolution of the administrative charge of unduly delaying the disposition of the said criminal case involves the determination of whether, in resolving the alarms and scandals case, petitioner-judge acted in accordance with the guidelines provided in the Rules of Court and in the Administrative Circulars in pursuance of the ideals embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct. Such is clearly an administrative matter. Unquestionably, this Court is mandated under section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to assume administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. De Vera v. Pelayo, 335 SCRA 281, July 6, 2000, 1st Div. [Pardo] HELD: Before a civil or criminal action against a judge for a violation of Arts. 204 and 205 (knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order) can be entertained, there must first be a final and authoritative judicial declaration that the decision or order in question is indeed unjust. The pronouncement may result from either: (a) An action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the judgment; or (b) An administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for promulgating an unjust judgment or order. Likewise, the determination of whether a judge has maliciously delayed the disposition of the case is also an exclusive judicial function (In Re: Borromeo, supra, at 461). REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY Art. VIII, Sec. 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary. LOWER COURTS Composition: The composition of lower courts shall be provided by law. The laws are the Judiciary Act of 1948 and BP 129. Qualifications Lower Collegiate Court (Court of Appeals) (1) No person shall be appointed member of any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen. [Art. VIII, Sec. 7(1)] and a member of Philippine Bar. (2) The Congress shall prescribe qualifications of judges of lower courts. [Art. VIII, Sec. 7(2)] (3) A member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. [Art. VIII, Sec. 7(3)] Lower Courts

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(1) The Congress shall prescribe qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine bar. [Art. VIII, Sec. 7(2)] (2) He must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. [Art. VIII, Sec. 7(3)] QUALIFICATIONS OF RTC JUDGES 1 Natural-born citizen of the Philippines; . 2 At least 35 years of age; . 3 For at least 10 years has been engaged in the practice of law in the Phil. or has . held public office in the Phil. requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite. QUALIFICATIONS OF MTC JUDGES 1 Natural-born citizen of the Philippines; . 2 At least 30 years of age; . 3 For at least 5 years has been engaged in the practice of law in the Phil. or has . held public office in the Phil. requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite. THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL SECTION 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. (2) The regular Members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year. (3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings. (4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council. (5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it. SECTION 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS A. COMMON PROVISIONS

SECTION 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. SECTION 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any business which in any way be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any

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contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries. SECTION 3. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. SECTION 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance with law. SECTION 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. Their approved annual

SECTION 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules, however, shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. SECTION 8. Each Commission shall perform such other functions as may be provided by law.

Safeguards insuring the independence of the Commissions: a. They are constitutionally created; may not be abolished by statute. b. Each is expressly described as independent. c. Each is conferred certain powers and functions which cannot be reduced by statute. d. The Chairmen and members cannot be removed except by impeachment. e. The Chairmen and members are given fairly long tem of office of seven years. f. The Chairmen and members may not be reappointed or appointed in an acting capacity [Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358]. g. The salaries of the chairmen and members are relatively high and may not be decreased during continuance in office. h. The Commission enjoy fiscal autonomy. i. Each Commission may promulgate its own procedural rules; provided they do not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights [though subject to disapproval by the Supreme Court]. j. The Chairmen and members are subject to certain disqualifications calculated to strengthen their integrity. k. The Commission may appoint their own officials and employees in accordance with Civil Service Law.

Gaminde v. COA, 347 SCRA 655 (2000) HELD: In Republic vs. Imperial (96 Phil. 770), we said that "the operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first three (3) Commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term." Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms. Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or qualification, the interval between the start of the term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter. In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between "term" and "tenure." "The term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time during the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term

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during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent." In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions of a staggered 7-5-3 year terms, we considered the plain language of Article IX (B), Section 1 (2), Article IX (C). Section 1 (2) and Article IX (D), Section 1 (2) of the 1987 Constitution that uniformly prescribed seven-year term of office for Members of the Constitutional Commissions, without reappointment. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. There is no need to expressly state the beginning of the term of office as this is understood to coincide B. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

SECTION 1. (1) The Civil Service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. (2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. SECTION 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. (2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except as to positions which are policydetermining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination. (3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. (4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. (5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.

(6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection as may be provided by law. SECTION 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs. SECTION 4. All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution. SECTION 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions. SECTION 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the Government of any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of its subsidiaries. SECTION 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,

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agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. SECTION 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government. Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.

The civil service now covers only government owned or controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress of by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation .[Trade Unions of the Phil. and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. NHA, 173 SCRA 33 (1989)] The test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. [Camporedondo v. NLRC, 312 SCRA 47 (1999)] The civil service does not include Government owned or controlled corporations (GOCC) which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law. [National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 125 (1988)]

* More cases and doctrines under ADMINISTRATIVE LAW C. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be Members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to a vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions : (1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. (2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable. (3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters. (4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. (5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.

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Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law. (6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. (7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates. (8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision. (9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall. SECTION 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. SECTION 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. SECTION 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission. SECTION 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article. SECTION 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution. SECTION 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law. SECTION 9. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of the election and shall end thirty days after. SECTION 10. Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. SECTION 11. Funds certified by the Commission as necessary to defray the expenses for holding regular and special elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, shall be provided in the regular or special appropriations and, once approved, shall be released automatically upon certification by the Chairman of the Commission. Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 (1991) FACTS: Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The Commission on Appointments confirmed the appointment despite Cayetano's objection,

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based on Monsod's alleged lack of the required qualification of 10 year law practice. Cayetano filed this certiorari and prohibition. ISSUE: w/n monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10 years? HELD: YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other works where the work done involves the determination of the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs. Agrava.) The records of the 1986 constitutional commission show that the interpretation of the term practice of law was liberal as to consider lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as engaged in the practice of law provided that they use their legal knowledge or talent in their respective work. The court also cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star, that lawyers nowadays have their own specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands of their specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet them. These days, for example, most corporation lawyers are involved in management policy formulation. Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group from 1963-1970, then worked for an investment bank till 1986, became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and also became a member of the Davide Commission in 1990, can be considered to have been engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyerentrepreneur, etc. Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358 (1990) FACTS: Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac was appointed by Pres. Aquino as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the Dec. 1989 coup d'tat attempt. ISSUE: WON the appointment is unconstitutional HELD: NO. Art. IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as "independent". Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by the SC as provided by the Constitution in Art. IX-A, Section 7. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. Matibag v. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49 (2002) FACTS: Benipayo, Tuason and Borra were appointed Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, of the Commission on Elections, by the President when Congress was not in session. Did their appointment violate the Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C of the Constitution that substantially provides that No member of the Commission (on Elections) shall be appointed in an acting or temporary capacity? HELD: In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes v. Yorac and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party v. Bautista. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately. While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC shall be independent, this provision should be harmonized with the Presidents power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the Presidents power to make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory

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construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution. The Presidents power to extend ad interim appointments may indeed briefly put the appointee at the mercy of both the appointing and confirming powers. This situation, however, in only for a short period from the time of issuance of the ad interim appointment until the Commission on Appointments gives or withholds its consent. The Constitution itself sanctions this situation, as a trade-off against the evil of disruptions in vital government services. This is also part of the check-and-balance under the separation of powers, as a trade-off against the evil of granting the President absolute and sole power to appoint. The Constitution has wisely subjected the Presidents appointing power to the checking power of the legislature. This situation, however, does not compromise the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional body. The vacancies in the COMELEC are precisely staggered to insure that the majority of its members hold confirmed appointments, and no one President will appoint all the COMELEC members. x x x The special constitutional safeguards that insure the independence of the COMELEC remain in place (See Sections, 3, 4, 5 and 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution). In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting appointments prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. * More cases and doctrines under ELECTION LAWS D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. At no time shall all Members of the Commission belong to the same profession. (2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one Commissioner for five years, and the other Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. SECTION 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such nongovernmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto. (2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties. SECTION 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.

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SECTION 4. The Commission shall submit to the President and the Congress, within the time fixed by law, an annual report covering the financial condition and operation of the Government, its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and non-governmental entities subject to its audit, and recommend measures necessary to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. It shall submit such other reports as may be required by law. Q: What is the general function of the Commission on Audit? A: It is the function of the Commission on Audit to examine the accuracy of the records kept by accountable officers and to determine whether expenditures have been made in conformity with law. It is therefore through the Commission on Audit that the people can verify whether their money has been properly spent. Q: Classify the functions of the Commission on Audit? A: They may be classified thus: (1) to examine and audit all forms of government revenues; (2) to examine and audit all forms of government expenditures; (3) to settle government accounts; (4) to promulgate accounting and auditing rules including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures; and (5) to decide administrative cases involving expenditures of public funds.

The COA is clothed under Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution with the "exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules, and regulations including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties." The authority granted under this constitutional provision, being broad and comprehensive enough, enables COA to adopt as its own, simply by reiteration or by reference, without the necessity of repromulgation, already existing rules and regulations. It may also expand the coverage thereof to agencies to instrumentalities under its audit jurisdiction. [PAL v. COA, 245 SCRA 39 (1995)]

Mamaril v. Domingo, 227 SCRA 206 (1993) HELD: The responsibility for state audit is vested by the Constitution on the Commission on Audit. Under the Constitution, the COA "shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts, pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, . . . However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto." (Italics supplied; Art. IX-D, Sec. 2, par. 1). Section 2(2) of the above article states that the COA is given the " exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the technique and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, . . ." (Italics supplied). As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions of the Constitution, state audit is not limited to the auditing of the accountable officers and the settlement of accounts, but includes accounting functions and the adoption in the audited agencies of internal controls to see to it, among other matters, that the correct fees and penalties due the government are collected. The verification of the correctness of the evaluation and computation of the fees and penalties collectible under the Land Transportation Law (R.A. No. 4136) are parts of the functions of the COA, which examines and audits revenue accounts (The Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, P.D. No. 1445, sec. 60). When any person is indebted to any government agency, the COA may direct the proper officer to withhold the payment of any money due such person or his estate to be applied in satisfaction of the indebtedness (P. D. No. 1445, sec. 37). Likewise, under the Manual on Certificate of Settlement and Balances, a government auditor is empowered to order the withholding of the payment of any money due a person determined to be liable for disallowances, suspensions, and, other deficiencies in the accounts audited (Sec. 39).

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Sambeli v. Province of Isabela, 210 SCRA 80 (1992) HELD: In the exercise of the regulatory power vested upon it by the Constitution, the Commission on Audit adheres to the policy the government funds and property should be fully protected and conserved and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented. On the proposition that improper or wasteful spending of public funds or immoral use of government property, for being highly irregular or unnecessary, or scandalously excessive or extravagant, offends the sovereign people's will, it behooves the Commission on Audit to put a stop thereto. (Tantuico, State Audit Code Philippines, p. 235) In the cases of Danville Maritime, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, 175 SCRA 701 (1989) and D.M. Consunji Inc. v. Commission on Audit, 199 SCRA 549 (1991), We defined the role of the COA in this wise: ". . . No less than the Constitution has ordained that the COA shall have exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or use of government funds and properties." (Art. IX D, Sec. 2(2) 1987 Constitution of the Philippines) (emphasis supplied) Indeed, not only is the Commission on Audit (COA) vested with the power and authority, but is also charged with the duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to . . . the expenditure or uses of funds ... owned by, or pertaining to, the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities (Article IX (D-1) Section 2(1), 1987 Constitution) . That authority extends to the accounts of all persons respecting funds or properties received or held by them in any accountable capacity. (Section 26, P.D. No. 1445). In the exercise of its jurisdiction, it determines whether or not the fiscal responsibility that rests directly with the head of the government agency has been properly and effectively discharged (Section 25 (1) ibid), and whether or not there has been loss or wastage of government resources. It is also empowered to review and evaluate contracts. (Section 18 (4), ibid.). And, after an audit has been made, its auditors issue a certificate of settlement to each officer whose account has been audited and settled in whole or in part, stating the balances found due thereon and certified, and the charges or differences arising from the settlement by reason of disallowances, charges or suspensions. (Sec. 82, ibid.) (Dingcong v. Guingona 162 SCRA 782) DBP v. COA, 373 SCRA 356 (2002) ISSUE: Is the constitutional power of the COA to examine and audit government banks and agencies exclusive? Does it preclude a concurrent audit by a private external auditor? HELD: Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of its framers, point to only one indubitable conclusion the COA does not have the exclusive power to examine and audit government agencies. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware of the need to allow independent private audit of certain government agencies in addition to the COA audit, as when there is a private investment in a government-controlled corporation, or when a government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the government borrows money from abroad. In these instances the government enters the marketplace and competes with the rest of the world in attracting investments or loans. To succeed, the government must abide with the reasonable business practices of the marketplace. Otherwise no investor or creditor will do business with the government, frustrating government efforts to attract investments or secure loans that may be critical to stimulate moribund industries or resuscitate a badly shattered national economy as in the case at bar. By design the Constitution is flexible enough to meet these exigencies. Any attempt to nullify this flexibility in the instances mentioned, or in similar instances, will be ultra vires, in the absence of a statute limiting or removing such flexibility. ISSUE: Between the COAs findings and conclusions and that of private auditors, which should prevail? HELD: Moreover, as the constitutionally-mandated auditor of all government agencies, the COAs findings and conclusions necessarily prevail over those of private auditors, at least insofar as government agencies and officials are concerned. The superiority or preponderance of the COA audit over private audit can be gleaned from the records of the

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Constitutional Commission x x x. The findings and conclusions of the private auditor may guide private investors or creditors who require such private audit. Government agencies and officials, however, remain bound by the findings and conclusions of the COA, whether the matter falls under the first or second paragraph of Section 2, unless of course such findings and conclusions are modified or reversed by the courts. ISSUE: May the power of the COA to examine and audit government agencies be validly taken away from it? HELD: The power of the COA to examine and audit government agencies, while nonexclusive, cannot be taken away from the COA. Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that: Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatsoever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the COA of its power to examine and audit the same government agencies. Q: What is meant by the power of the Commission to settle accounts? A: It means the power to settle liquidated accounts, that is, those accounts which may be adjusted simply by an arithmetical process. It does not include the power to fix the amount of an unfixed or undetermined debt. Compaia General de Tabacos v. French and Unson, 39 Phil. 34, 42 (1919).

SANDIGANBAYAN Balmadrid v. Sandiganbayan, 195 SCRA 497 (1991) HELD: The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law. In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees. (Section 4, PD 1606). Private persons may be charged together with public officers to avoid repeated and unnecessary presentation of witnesses and exhibits against conspirators in different venues, especially if the issues involved are the same. It follows therefore that if a private person may be tried jointly with public officers, he may also be convicted jointly with them, as in the case of the present petitioners. Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 324 (1984) HELD: It is clear from the above-quoted constitutional provision that respondent court has jurisdictional competence not only over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices committed by public officers and employees but also over other crimes committed by them in relation to their office, though not involving graft and corrupt practices, as may be determined by law. The intention of the framers of the New Constitution is patent from the explicit language thereof as well as from Section 1 of the same Article XIII titled "Accountability of Public Officers," which provides:. "SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people." There is no merit in petitioner's contention that Section 4(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, is violative of the provision of Section 5 of Article XIII of the New Constitution because the former enlarges what the latter limited. Said constitutional provision delegates to the lawmaking body the determination of "such other offenses" committed by public officers over which the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction. Accordingly, the President of the Philippines, exercising his lawmaking authority and prerogative vested in him by the Constitution, issued Presidential Decree No. 1486 which mandates in Section 4(c) thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over "other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporation, in relation to their office." (Emphasis supplied) When the lawmaking authority

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chose to include all public office-related offenses over which respondent court shall have jurisdiction, the courts will not review questions of legislative policy. It is enough that the act is within the constitutional power of the lawmaking body or authority and, if it is, the courts are bound to follow and apply. Lacson v. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298 (1999) HELD: A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office. Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing provision on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A. 8249] in relation to their office." The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4 . The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, 235 SCRA 103 (1994) HELD: It is now settled that sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information charging violation of that law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is filed. The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court. It is indeed true that in some of our decisions the expression "the maximum period of ninety (90) days" is used. But that is only for the purpose of emphasizing that the preventive suspension therein involved, which were for more than ninety (90) days, were excessive and unreasonable. It is to be noted that the ninety-day period of preventive suspension is not found in sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 but was adopted from sec. 42 of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807), 7 which is not sec. 52 of the Administrative Code of 1987. This latter provision states: Sec. 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligency or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. The duration of preventive suspension is thus coeval with the period prescribed for deciding administrative disciplinary cases. If the case is decided before ninety days, then the suspension will last less than ninety days, but if the case is not decided within ninety days, then the preventive suspension must be up to ninety days only. Similarly, as applied to

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criminal prosecutions under Republic Act No. 3019, preventive suspension will last for less than ninety days only if the case is decided within that period: otherwise, it will continue for ninety days. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN COMPOSITION Art. XI, Sec. 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed. QUALIFICATIONS Art. XI, Sec. 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have for ten years or more been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Section 2 of Article IX-A of this Constitution. APPOINTMENT AND TERM Art. XI, Sec. 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur. Id., Sec. 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from office. RANK AND SALARY Id., Sec. 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary, which shall not be decreased during their term of office. DISQUALIFICATIONS Art. IX, Sec. 8. xxx During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Section 2 of Article IX-A of this Constitution. Art. IX, A, Sec. 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. Art. XI, Sec. 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business purpose may be granted, directly or indirectly by any government owned or controlled bank or financial institution to the President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in which they have controlling interest, during their tenure. JURISDICTION

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Id., Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS Art. XI, Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate on its own or on complaint any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient (2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter; to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties. (3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. (4) Direct the officer concerned in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action. (5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents. (6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence. (7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency. (8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.

The functions of the Ombudsman may be divided into four: Prosecutory; (3) Disciplinary; and (4) Assistory.

(1)

Investigatory; (2)

Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545 (1990) HELD: As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty "to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials" (Sec. 12) and to "investigate . . . any act or omission of any public official . . . when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." (Sec. 13 [1].) The Ombudsman is also empowered to "direct the officer concerned," in this case the Special Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action against a public official . . . and to recommend his prosecution" (Sec. 13 [3]). The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we. The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances

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committed by public officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office to investigate all criminal complaints against public officers regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office" (Sec. 16, R.A. 6770). Lastimoza v. Vasquez, 243 SCRA 497 (1995) HELD: The Office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty. It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute. Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645 (1993) HELD: The crucial issue to resolve is whether the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees. In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend petitioners, respondents (Urgent Motion to Lift Status Quo, etc, dated January 11, 1993, pp. 10-11), invoke Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which provides: "Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided." X x x x x x x x x

When the Constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the suspension" of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to "suspension," as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word "suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension" should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated (Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371 [1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]). Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges. Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees. In order to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he may need to suspend the respondent.

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The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes, among them, the danger of tampering or destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent; the intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be given the discretion to decide when the persons facing administrative charges should be preventively suspended. In Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960], this Court, holding that a preventive suspension is not a penalty, said: "Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty." OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 160 SCRA 843 (1988) HELD: Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is given to the Ombudsman, the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost effective February 2, 1987. From that time, he has been divested of such authority. Under the present Constitution, the Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzalez) is a mere subordinate of the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter's authority or orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate the prosecution of cases but can only conduct the same if instructed to do so by the Ombudsman. Even his original power to issue subpoena, which he still claims under Section 10(d) of PD 1630, is now deemed transferred to the Ombudsman, who may, however, retain it in the Special Prosecutor in connection with the cases he is ordered to investigate. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS Composition and Qualifications Art. XIII, Sec. 17. (1) There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission on Human Rights. (2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law. (3) Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential Committee on Human Rights shall continue to exercise its present functions and powers. (4) The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and regularly released. Powers and Functions Art. XIII, Sec. 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions: (1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights; (2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court; (3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection; (4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities; (5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;

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(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families; (7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights; (8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conduced by it or under its authority; (9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions; (10) Appoint its officers and employer in accordance with law; and (11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law. Id., Sec. 19. The Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendations. Carino v. Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483 (1991) HELD: The threshold question is whether of not the CHR has the power under the Constitution to adjudicate; whether or not, like a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights. The Court declares the CHR to have no such power xxx The most that may be conceded to the CHR in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. xxx To be considered a judicial function, the faculty or receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the CHR does not have. EPZA v. CHR, 208 SCRA 125 (1992) ISSUE: Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of.? HELD: No. The constitutional provision directing the CHR directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the CHR to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is only conferred by the Constitution or by law." xxx Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has not jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending (w/in his district), or by a Justice of the CA, or of the SC. It may also be granted by a judge of a RTC in any action pending in an inferior court w/in his district. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DEFINITION: The study of the maintenance of the proper balance between authority as represented by the three inherent powers of the State and liberty as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

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Manila Prince v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 (1997) HELD: A Constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. What is the Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy? Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the Constitution, that law or contract, whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes, is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract . (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 [1997] [Bellosillo]) I. CLASSIFICATION Written vs. Unwritten 1. Written one whose precepts are embodied in one document or set of documents. 2. Unwritten consists of rules which have not been integrated into a single, concrete form but are scattered in various sources, such as statutes of fundamental character, judicial decisions, commentaries of publicists, customs and traditions, and certain common law principles. Conventional vs. Cumulative 1. Conventional an enacted constitution, formally struck off at a definite time and place following a conscious or deliberate effort taken by a constituent body or ruler. 2. Cumulative result of political evolution, not inaugurated at any specific time but changing by accretion rather than by any systematic method. Rigid vs. Flexible Rigid one that can be amended only by a formal and usually difficult process. Flexible one that can be changed by ordinary legislation. The Constitution of the Philippines is written, conventional and rigid 1. ESSENTIAL QUALITIES OF THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION Broad Not only because it provides for the organization of the entire government and covers all persons and things within the territory of the State but more so because it is supposed to embody the past, to reflect the present and to anticipate the future. The constitution must be comprehensive enough to provide for every contingency. Brief It must be brief and confine itself to basic principles to be implemented with legislative details more adjustable to change and easier to amend. Definite Ambiguity in its provisions will result in confusion and divisiveness among the people, and perhaps even physical conflict. Exception: Found only in those cases where the rules are deliberately worded in a vague manner, like the due process clause, to make them more malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of new conditions and circumstances. ESSENTIAL PARTS OF THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION Constitution of Liberty Series of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the citizens and imposing limitations on the powers of government as a means of securing the enjoyment of these rights. ARTICLES II, III, IV, V, and, XII. Constitution of Government Series of provisions outlining the organization of the government, enumerating its powers, laying down certain rules relative to its administration and defining the electorate. ARTICLES VI to XI Constitution of Sovereignty

II.

III.

1. 2.

2. 3.

1.

2.

3.

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Consists of provisions pointing out the mode or procedure in accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought about. ARTICLES XVII INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE TAXATION POLICE POWER Power of the State to Power of the State to demand enforced enact such laws in contributions for public relation to persons purposes. and property as may promote public health, safety, morals, and the general welfare of the public. Only the government Only the government or its political and its political subdivisions. subdivisions. Enforced contribution is demanded for the support of the government. Operates upon a community, a class of individuals or their property. Money contributed in the concept of taxes becomes part of public funds. Use of property is regulated for the purpose of promoting the general welfare. Operates upon a community, a class of individuals or their property. No transfer of ownership of the property seized, at most there is restraint on the injurious use of the property. Restraint on the exercise of a right. Persons affected receives no direct benefit but only as such as may arise from the maintenance of the healthy economic standard of society. Amount imposed should not be more that that sufficient to cover the cost of the license and the necessary expenses of regulation. Relatively free from Constitutional limitations and is superior to the nonimpairment provisions. EMINENT DOMAIN Power of the State to take private property for public use upon paying to the owner a just compensation to be ascertained according to law. May be granted to public service or public utility companies. Property is taken for public use. Operates on an individual as the owner of a particular property. There is transfer of ownership or a lesser right (e.g. lease), of the property.

DEFINITION

Authority exercising the power Purpose

Persons affected Effect

Benefits received

Amount of imposition

Presumed that the taxpayer receives the equivalent of what he contributed in the form of protection from the government, and the enjoyment of living in a civilized society. Generally no limit as to the amount of tax to be imposed.

Person affected receives just compensation for the property taken from him.

No amount imposed, since it is property which is taken.

Relationship to the Constitution

Subject to certain Constitutional limitations

Subject to certain Constitutional limitations (e.g. inferior to the nonimpairment of contracts clause).

POLICE POWER MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 328 SCRA 836, March 27, 2000, 1st Div. [Puno] HELD: Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative

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boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. The exercise of the police power lies in the discretion of the legislative department. No mandamus is available to coerce the exercise of the police power. The only remedy against legislative inaction is a resort to the bar of public opinion, the refusal of the electorate to return to the legislature members who, in their view, have been remiss in the discharge of their duties.

Binay v. Domingo, 201 SCRA 508 (1991) HELD: The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et alienum non laedas" and "Salus populi est suprema lex." Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719). On it depends the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property, and it has been said to be the very foundation on which our social system rests. ( 16 C.J.S., p. 896) However, it is not confined within narrow circumstances of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs. LAC, supra). PASEI v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988) HELD: The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. "Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits." It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens." "The police power of the State . . . is a power coextensive with self-protection, and it is not inaptly termed the 'law of overwhelming necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number. Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power. Police power may sometimes use the taxing power as an implement for the attainment of a legitimate police objective.

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Tio v. VRB, 151 SCRA 208 (1987) HELD: "The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry over another. "It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation'." Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The power of eminent domain could also be used as an implement of the police power.

Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA, 321 SCRA 106 (1999) Q. What powers of the State are involved in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)? Discuss. HELD: The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the States police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of Rights provides that [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The CARL was not intended to take away property without due process of law. The exercise of the power of eminent domain requires that due process be observed in the taking of private property. Republic v. MERALCO, 391 SCRA 700 (2002) Q. Discuss why rates to be charged by public utilities like MERALCO are subject to State regulation. HELD: The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police power of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulations of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as the use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public regulation. In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the public against arbitrary and excessive rates while maintaining the efficiency and quality of services rendered. However, the power to regulate rates does not give the State the right to prescribe rates which are so low as to deprive the public utility of a reasonable return on investment. Thus, the rates prescribed by the State must be one that yields a fair return on the public utility upon the value of the property performing the service and one that is reasonable to the public for the service rendered. The fixing of just and reasonable rates involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests. Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. CA, 329 SCRA 314 (2000) Q. Discuss the nature of the authority of local government units to issue or grant licenses or permits. HELD: The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.

Binay v. Domingo, 201 SCRA 508 (1991) HELD: Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations (Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise

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from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. (62 C.J.S., p. 277). The so-called inferred police powers of such corporations are as much delegated powers as are those conferred in express terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the municipal corporation and the additional fact that the corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such powers. (Crawfordsville vs. Braden, 28 N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental agencies, must have such measures of the power as are necessary to enable them to perform their governmental functions. The power is a continuing one, founded on public necessity. ( 62 C.J.S., p. 273) Thus, not only does the State effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the police power but the municipality does also. (U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102). Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." (Sections 91, 149, 177 and 208, BP 337). And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein." The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. Philtread Workers Union [PTWU] v. Confesor, 269 SCRA 393, March 12, 1997 HELD: Article 263(g) of the Labor Code (vesting upon the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what industries are indispensable to the national interest and thereafter, assume jurisdiction over disputes in said industries) does not interfere with the workers right to strike but merely regulates it, when in the exercise of such right, national interests will be affected. The rights granted by the Constitution are not absolute. They are still subject to control and limitation to ensure that they are not exercised arbitrarily. The interests of both the employers and the employees are intended to be protected and not one of them is given undue preference. The Labor Code vests upon the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what industries are indispensable to national interest. Thus, upon the determination of the Secretary of Labor that such industry is indispensable to the national interest, it will assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute of said industry. The assumption of jurisdiction is in the nature of police power measure. This is done for the promotion of the common good considering that a prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the national economy. REQUISITES LAWFUL SUBJECT: The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police power LAWFUL MEANS: The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals The first requisite simply means that the subject of the measure is within the scope of the police power, that is, that the activity or property sought to be regulated affects the public welfare. As long as the object is the public welfare and the subject of regulation

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may be properly related thereto, there is compliance with the first test requiring the primacy of the welfare of the many over the interests of the few. Even if the purpose be within the scope of the police power, the law will still be annulled if the subject is sought to be regulated in violation of the second requirement. In Constitutional Law, the end does not justify the means. The lawful objective, in other words, must be pursued through a lawful method; that is, both the end and the means must be legitimate. Lacking such concurrence, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.

Churchill & Tait v. Rafferty, 32 Phil 580 (1915) HELD: There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts. The courts cannot substitute their own views for what is proper in the premises for those of the Legislature. If a law relates to the public health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community, it is within the scope of the police power of the State. Within such bounds the wisdom, expediency, or necessity of the law does not concern the courts. "It [the police power] has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditions affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring about 'the greatest good of the greatest number.' Courts have consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social conditions demand correction." From whatever direction the social, economic, or general welfare of the people is menaced, there is legal justification for the exercise of the police power; and the use of private property may be regulated or restricted to whatever extent may be necessary to preserve inviolate these declared essentials to the well being of the public. It has long been recognized that uses of private property which are offensive to the senses of smell of hearing may be so regulated or segregated as to disturb as little as possible the pursuits of other persons. It is not the adoption of a new principle but simply the extension of a well established principle to hold that the police power may also regulate and restrict uses of private property when devoted to advertising which is offensive to the sight. The indiscriminate use of outdoor advertising tends to mar not only natural outdoor landscapes but whatever of civic beauty has been attained by the expenditure of public moneys for parks, boulevards, and buildings. The widespread agitation in many European countries, as well as in the United States, against the so-called billboards the most common form of this kind of advertising shows that they are a source of annoyance and irritation to the public and interfere with the proper enjoyment of outdoor life by the general public. This justifies their suppression or regulation to the extent that they interfere with the right of the public. Taxicab Operators of MM v. BOT, 117 SCRA 597 (1982) HELD: Petitioners farther take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive because of roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at the time of registration. As public respondents contend, however, it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and evens graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of common knowledge.

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Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exist so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed. As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. (Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 48 [1970]. It may also regulate property rights. (Samson vs. Mayor of Bacolod City, 60 SCRA 267 [1974]. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". (The Constitution of the Philippines, Second Edition, p. 548.) Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 324 (1986) HELD: The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for nonpayment of a debt ex contractu. But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only facts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power. DECS v. San Diego, 180 SCRA 533 (1989) FACTS: The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again. The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. HELD: The proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction. A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however appropriate this career may be for others.

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The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements." The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. Where even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found wanting. Sangalang v. IAC, 176 SCRA 719 (1989) ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor of Makati could have validly opened Jupiter and Orbit Streets to vehicular traffic? HELD: There is no merit in BAVA's claims that the demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter Streets amounts to deprivation of property without due process of law or expropriation without just compensation. There is no taking of property involved here. The act of the Mayor now challenged is, rather, in the concept of police power. Unlike the power of eminent domain, police power is exercised without provision for just compensation. However, it may not be done arbitrarily or unreasonably. But the burden of showing that it is unjustified lies on the aggrieved party. Our considered opinion is that BAVA has failed to show that the opening up of Orbit Street was unjustified, or that the Mayor acted unreasonably. The fact that it has led to the loss of privacy of BAVA residents is no argument against the Municipality's effort to ease vehicular traffic in Makati. Certainly, the duty of a local executive is to take care of the needs of the greater number, in many cases, at the expense of the minority. Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, 236 SCRA 197 (1994) Q. May solicitation for religious purposes be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power? HELD: Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order that the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience. It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guarantees of the free exercise of religion that everything which may be so called can be tolerated. It has been said that a law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with the free exercise of religion merely because it also incidentally has a detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more religion. Thus, the general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise. Villacorta v. Bernardo, 143 SCRA 480 (1986) HELD: Regulation is a fact of life in any well-ordered community. As society becomes more and more complex, the police power becomes correspondingly ubiquitous. This has to be so for the individual must subordinate his interests to the common good, on the time-honored justification of Salus populi est suprema lex. In this prolix age, practically everything a person does and owns affects the public interest directly or at least vicariously, unavoidably drawing him within the embrace of the police power. Increasingly, he is hemmed in by all manner of statutory, administrative and municipal requirements and restrictions that he may find officious and even oppressive. It is necessary to stress that unless the creeping interference of the government in essentially private matters is moderated, it is likely to destroy that prized and peculiar virtue of the free society: individualism.

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Every member of society, while paying proper deference to the general welfare, must not be deprived of the right to be left alone or, in the idiom of the day, "to do his thing." As long as he does not prejudice others, his freedom as an individual must not be unduly curtailed. We therefore urge that proper care attend the exercise of the police power lest it deteriorate into an unreasonable intrusion into the purely private affairs of the individual. The so-called "general welfare" is too amorphous and convenient an excuse for official arbitrariness. Let it always be remembered that in the truly democratic state, protecting the rights of the individual is as important as, if not more so than, protecting the rights of the public. This advice is especially addressed to the local governments which exercise the police power only by virtue of a valid delegation from the national legislature under the general welfare clause. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006 May a Law be declared unconstitutional because of the illegal acts done in pursuant of its implementation? FACTS: Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate direct injury. In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas alleged that, on February 24, 2006, they were arrested without warrants on their way to EDSA to celebrate the 20 th Anniversary of People Power I. The arresting officers cited PP 1017 as basis of the arrest. In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. claimed that on February 25, 2006, the CIDG operatives raided and ransacked without warrant their office. Three policemen were assigned to guard their office as a possible source of destabilization. Again, the basis was PP 1017. And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that their members were turned away and dispersed when they went to EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue, to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power I. A perusal of the direct injuries allegedly suffered by the said petitioners shows that they resulted from the implementation, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, of PP 1017. ISSUE: Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In general, does the illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional? HELD: Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the Presidents calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens constitutional rights. Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion. This is logical. Just imagine the absurdity of situations when laws maybe declared unconstitutional just because the officers implementing them have acted arbitrarily. If this were so, judging from the blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed upon by the Court, majority of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code would have been declared unconstitutional a long time ago. Del Mar v. PAGCOR, 346 SCRA 485 (2000) Q. How should laws that grant the right to exercise a part of the police power of the State be construed? Held: Lest the idea gets lost in the shoals of our subconsciousness, let us not forget that PAGCOR is engaged in business affected with public interest. The phrase affected with public interest means that an industry is subject to control for the public good; it has been

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considered as the equivalent of subject to the exercise of the police power. Perforce, a legislative franchise to operate jai-alai is imbued with public interest and involves an exercise of police power. The familiar rule is that laws which grant the right to exercise a part of the police power of the state are to be construed strictly and any doubt must be resolved against the grant. The legislature is regarded as the guardian of society, and therefore is not presumed to disable itself or abandon the discharge of its duty. Thus, courts do not assume that the legislature intended to part away with its power to regulate public morals. The presumption is influenced by constitutional considerations. Constitutions are widely understood to withhold from legislatures any authority to bargain away their police power for the power to protect the public interest is beyond abnegation. It is stressed that the case at bar does not involve a franchise to operate a public utility (such as water, transportation, communication or electricity) the operation of which undoubtedly redounds to the benefit of the general public. What is claimed is an alleged legislative grant of a gambling franchise a franchise to operate jai-alai. A statute which legalizes a gambling activity or business should be strictly construed and every reasonable doubt must be resolved to limit the powers and rights claimed under its authority.

POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN Who May Exercise? Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, 328 SCRA 137, March 14, 2000 The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the Constitution and the laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of ah individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubt[ful] interpretation. Exercise of Eminent Domain by LGUs Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corp., 292 SCRA 678, July 20, 1998 [Panganiban] The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control and restraints imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other legislations." In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

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Requisites for Proper Exercise 1Taking of private property 2Public use/purpose 3Payment of just compensation 4Valid offer to buy and refusal of offer TAKING in the Constitutional Sense > May include trespass without actual eviction of the owner, material impairment of the value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses fro which the property was intended. Requisites for a valid taking: 1. Exproprietor must enter a private property 2. Entry must be for more than a momentary period 3. Entry must be under warrant or color of authority 4. Property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected 5. Utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment Taking under Eminent Domain distinguished from Taking under the Police Power PPI v. COMELEC, [G.R. No. 119694. May 22, 1995.] To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2722, amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposesxxx The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory "donation," measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed. The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent Comelecxxx Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed. . . . Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. TELEBAP, Inc. v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337, April 21, 1998 [Mendoza] In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. Consequently, a license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves. As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide airtime to the Comelec.

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Meaning of Public Use Traditional Concept: The number of actual beneficiaries determines public purpose. the benefits redound in favor of individuals, then the purpose is not public. If

Concept of vicarious benefit: Abandons the traditional concept. The purpose is public as long as the society in general is indirectly benefited, i.e. conversion of a slum area into a model housing community. There is a vicarious advantage to the society. Filstream International Incorporated v. CA, 284 SCRA 716, Jan. 23, 1998 [Francisco] The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to acquire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the city. That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not diminish its public character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them. Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a flexible concept, influenced by changing conditions. Public use now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land reform and housing. Estate of Salud Jimenez v. PEZA, 349 SCRA 240, Jan. 16, 2001, (Public Use Requirement; Payment of Just Compensation) In the exercise of eminent domain, only as much land can be taken as is necessary for the legitimate purpose of the condemnation. The term "necessary", in this connection, does not mean absolutely indispensable but requires only a reasonable necessity of the taking for the stated purpose, growth and future needs of the enterprise. The respondent cannot attain a self-sustaining and viable ECOZONE if inevitable needs in the expansion in the surrounding areas are hampered by the mere refusal of the private landowners to part with their properties. The purpose of creating an ECOZONE and other facilities is better served if respondent directly owns the areas subject of the expansion program. The Legislature may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well-settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the existence of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere or to substitute their own views for those of the representatives of the people. In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in their character. The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. 46 Payment of just compensation should follow as a matter of right immediately after the order of expropriation is issued. Any delay in payment must be counted from said order. However, the delay to constitute a violation of due process must be unreasonable and inexcusable; it must be deliberately done by a party in order to defeat the ends of justice. Payment of Just Compensation Just compensation is described as a full and fair equivalent of the property taken from the private owner by the exproprietor. This is intended to indemnify the owner fully for the losss he has sustained as a result of the expropriation. Just compensation = actual or basic value of the property + consequential damages - consequential benefits (which should not exceed the consequential damages)

The basic or market value of the property is the price that may be agreed upon by parties willing but not compelled to enter into a contract of sale.

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Acquisition of Easement of Right-of-Way The exercise of the power of eminent domain does not always result in the taking or appropriation of title to the expropriated property; it may only result in the imposition of a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss or title or possession. In this case, while it is true that the plaintiff is only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested y the imposition by the plaintiff upon the defendants that below said transmission lines, no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed. (NPC v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1) How expropriation may be initiated? Two Stages in Expropriation of Land Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 137569, June 23, 2000, The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose declared in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint"xxx. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissionersxxx It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. Moreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation that title over the property passes to the government. Therefore, until the action for expropriation has been completed and terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated remains with the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his property, subject to the power of the State ultimately to acquire it through expropriation. Is prior unsuccessful negotiation a condition precedent for the exercise of eminent domain? SMI Development Corporation v. Republic, 323 SCRA 862, Jan. 28, 2000 Current effective law on delegated authority to exercise the power of eminent domain is found in Section 12, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides: SEC. 12. Power of Eminent Domain The President shall determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the National Government, and direct the Solicitor General, whenever he deems the action advisable, to institute expropriation proceedings in the proper court. The foregoing provision does not require prior unsuccessful negotiation as a condition precedent for the exercise of eminent domain. In Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of Appeals, the President chose to prescribe this condition as an additional requirement instead. In the instant case, however, no such voluntary restriction was imposed. When Ownership transferred to Expropriator Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 137569, June 23, 2000 The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. When may the Expropriator enter the Property? Upon receipt of the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by DAR of the compensation in cash or in Land Bank Bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land xxx (Land Bank v. CA & DAR v. CA) When used as Implement of Police Power

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Power of Eminent Domain is utilized as an implement of Police Power to promote the welfare of the people. It is the Constitution itself which mandated the pursuit of Agrarian Reform Program to address once and for all the plight of the landless and the poor which for centuries has been the source of discontent and unrest. (ASLP v. Sec. DAR) POWER OF TAXATION Does the power to tax include the power to destroy?

The power to tax includes the power to destroy if it is used as an implement of the police power (regulatory) of the State. However, it does not include the power to destroy if it is used solely for the purpose of raising revenue. (ROXAS vs. CTA) NOTES: > If the purpose of taxation is regulatory in character, taxation is used to implement the police power of the state. > If the power of taxation is used to destroy things, businesses, or enterprises and the purpose is to raise revenue, the court will come in because there will be violation of the inherent and constitutional limitations and it will be declared invalid. Taxes distinguished from Licenses

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. CA, 329 SCRA 314, March 31, 2000, En Banc [Purisima] The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass almost all matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of the community. Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. The power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal protection of the law. Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do business and the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular profession. The first is usually granted by the local authorities and the second is issued by the Board or Commission tasked to regulate the particular profession. A business permit authorizes the person, natural or otherwise, to engage in business or some form of commercial activity. A professional license, on the other hand, is the grant of authority to a natural person to engage in the practice or exercise of his or her profession.

The Life-Blood Doctrine Taxes are the life-blood of the Government and their prompt and certain availability are an imperious need. (CIR v. Pineda, 21 SCRA 105) The existence of the government is a necessity; the main source of the government is taxes. These are the life-blood of the government. The government will not be able to survive and continue to perform its functions without taxes. (CIR v. Algue, Inc., 158 SCRA 8)

Can taxes be subject to off-setting or compensation?

Philex Mining Corporation v. CIR, 294 SCRA 687, Aug. 28, 1998 [Romero] Taxes cannot be subject to compensation for the simple reason that the government and the taxpayer are not creditors and debtors of each other. There is a material distinction between a tax and debt. Debts are due to the Government in its corporate capacity, while taxes are due to the Government in its sovereign capacity. It must be noted that a distinguishing feature of a tax is that it is compulsory rather than a matter of bargain. Hence, a tax does not depend upon the consent of the taxpayer. If any taxpayer can defer the payment

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of taxes by raising the defense that it still has a pending claim for refund or credit, this would adversely affect the government revenue system. A taxpayer cannot refuse to pay his taxes when they fall due simply because he has a claim against the government or that the collection of a tax is contingent on the result of the lawsuit it filed against the government. Tax Exemptions Sec. 28[3], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution SECTION 28. (3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. Sec. 4[3], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution SECTION 4. (3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law. Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions subject to the limitations provided by law including restrictions on dividends and provisions for reinvestment.

CIR v. CA, 298 SCRA 83, Oct. 14, 1998 [Panganiban] Laws allowing tax exemption are construed strictissimi juris. Hence, for the YMCA to be granted the exemption it claims under the abovecited provision, it must prove with substantial evidence that (1) it falls under the classification nonstock, non-profit educational institution; and (2) the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes. However, the Court notes that not a scintilla of evidence was submitted by private respondent to prove that it met the said requisites.

Who may grant tax exemptions?

Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744, Dec. 9, 1998 [Panganiban] The power to tax and to grant exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. Section 28(4), Article VI of the Constitution, specifically provides: No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases.

Tax Treaties; International Juridical Double Taxation

CIR v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., 309 SCRA 87, June 25, 1999, 3rd Div. [Gonzaga-Reyes] The RP-US Tax Treaty is just one of a number of bilateral treaties which the Philippines has entered into for the avoidance of double taxation. The purpose of these international agreements is to reconcile the national fiscal legislations of the contracting parties in order to help the taxpayer avoid simultaneous taxation in two different jurisdictions. More precisely, the tax conventions are drafted with a view towards the elimination of international juridical double taxation. International juridical double taxation is defined as the imposition of comparable taxes in two or more states on the same taxpayer in respect of the same subject matter and for identical periods. The apparent rationale for doing away with double taxation is to encourage the free flow of goods and services and the movement of capital, technology and persons between countries, conditions deemed vital in creating robust and

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dynamic economies. Foreign investments will only thrive in a fairly predictable and reasonable international investment climate and the protection against double taxation is crucial in creating such a climate. THE BILL OF RIGHTS THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS Sec. 1, Art. III, 1987 Constitution SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31, Dec. 12, 1997 [Romero] When one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process "refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced," while substantive due process "requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just."

Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, Jan. 18, 2000, En Banc [Puno, Dissenting Opinion] Proceeding from this premise of relativism of rights, I venture the view that even assuming arguendo respondent's weak claim, still, the degree of denial of private respondent's rights to due process and to information is too slight to warrant the interposition of judicial power. As admitted in the ponencia itself, an extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is, thus, futile to determine what it is. What is certain is that it is not a criminal proceeding where there is an accused who can claim the entire array of rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Let it be stressed that in an extradition proceeding, there is no accused and the guilt or innocence of the extraditee will not be passed upon by our executive officials nor by the extradition judge. Hence, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee. Indeed, an extradition proceeding is summary in nature which is untrue of criminal proceedings. 18 Even the rules of evidence are different in an extradition proceeding. Admission of evidence is less stringent, again because the guilt of the extraditee is not under litigation. It is not only the quality but even the quantum of evidence in extradition proceeding is different. In a criminal case, an accused can only be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In an extradition proceeding, an extraditee can be ordered extradited "upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case." If more need be said, the nature of an extradition decision is different from a judicial decision whose finality cannot be changed by executive fiat.

Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, Oct. 17, 2000, En Banc [Puno] Procedural due process requires a determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to whether procedural protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss." We have explained why an extraditee has no right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request for his extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition for extradition. The extraditee's right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage of the extradition process to accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information of the basis of the request for his extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of the government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign relations.

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Needless to state, this balance of interests is not a static but a moving balance which can be adjusted as the extradition process moves from the administrative stage to the judicial stage and to the execution stage depending on factors that will come into play. In sum, we rule that the temporary hold on private respondent's privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to the United States. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.

People v. Dela Piedra, 350 SCRA 163, Jan. 24, 2001, 1st Div. [Kapunan] [Void for Vagueness Doctrine] Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. A criminal statute that "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," or is so indefinite that "it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions," is void for vagueness. The constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning. We reiterated these principles in People vs. Nazario: As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and become an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

Lumiqued v. Exevea, 282 SCRA 125, Nov. 18, 1997 [Romero] The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.

Fabella v. CA, 282 SCRA 256, Nov. 28, 1998 [Panganiban] In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) The right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) A real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.

Central Bank of the Philippines v. CA, 220 SCRA 536, march 30, 1993, En Banc [Bellosillo] (When prior notice and hearing may be dispensed with)

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We held that a previous hearing is nowhere required in Sec. 29 nor does the constitutional requirement of due process demand that the correctness of the Monetary Board's resolution to stop operation and proceed to liquidation of first adjudged before making the resolution effective. One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing; bank runs would be the order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process, fortunes may be wiped out and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking community." Admittedly, the mere filing of a case for receivership by the Central Bank cab trigger a bank run and drain its assets in days or even hours leading to insolvency even if the bank be actually solvent. The procedure prescribed in Sec. 29 is truly designed to protect the interest of all concerned, i.e., the depositors, creditors and stockholders, the bank itself, and the general public, and the summary closure pales in comparison to the protection afforded public interest. At any rate, the bank is given full opportunity to prove arbitrariness and bad faith in placing the bank under receivership, in which event, the resolution may properly nullified and the receivership lifted as the trial court may determine.

TAN vs. BARRIOS, [G.R. Nos. 85481-82. October 18, 1990.]

In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of the Constitutional rights of the accused should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial, is no longer possible, the accused should be released since the judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due processxxx The public respondents gravely abused their discretion and acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction in misconstruing the third paragraph of the dispositive portion of this Court's decision in Cruz vs. Enrile as their authority to refile in the civil court the criminal actions against petitioners who had been tried and acquitted by Military Commission No. 1 during the period of martial law. It is an unreasonable application of Cruz vs. Enrile, for the decision therein will be searched in vain for such authority to reprosecute every civilian who had ever faced a court martial, much less those who had been acquitted by such bodies more than a decade ago like the petitioners Tan, et al. hereinxxx The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against the petitioners and their co-accused before Military Commission No. 1. The principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular case of the petitioners, the proceedings were fair, that there were no serious violations of their constitutional right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of the military commission that heard and decided the charges against them during the period of martial law, had been affirmed by this Court (Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546) years before the Olaguer case arose and came before us. Because of these established operative facts, the refiling of the information against the petitioners would place them in double jeopardy, in hard fact if not in constitutional logic. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE Sec. 1, Art. III, 1987 Constitution SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. TELEBAP, Inc. v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337, April 21, 1998 [Mendoza] There are important differences in the characteristics of the two media which justify their differential treatment for free speech purposes. Because of the

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physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the government must, of necessity, allocate broadcast frequencies to those wishing to use them. There is no similar justification for government allocation and regulation of the print media. From another point of view, the SC has also held that because of the unique and pervasive influence of the broadcast media, [n]ecessarily x x x the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.

ISAE v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000, 1st Div. [Kapunan] Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and penalizes the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regards to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. X x x The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "Equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School (International School, Inc.), its "international character" notwithstanding.

People v. Dela Piedra, 350 SCRA 163, Jan. 24, 2001, 1st Div. [Kapunan] A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Where the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may appear on the face of the action taken with respect to a particular class or person, or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design over another not to be inferred from the action itself. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of "clear and intentional discrimination."

People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Feb. 3, 2000, En Banc [Ynares-Santiago] We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

THE RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES Sec. 2, Art. III, 1987 Constitution SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

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Sec. 3, 2nd par., Art. III, 1987 Constitution SECTION 3. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Requisites of Valid Search Warrant and Warrant of Arrest

Government of the USA v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002, En Banc [Panganiban] [Vitug, Dissenting Opinion] (Is Prior Notice and Hearing Required before Judge Issues Warrant of Arrest in Extradition proceeding?) 1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word immediate to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered immediate. The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of impairing a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression a prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accusedxxx It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records adequate for him to make an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to best serve the ends of justice. He could have determined whether such facts and circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact, he actually concluded from these supporting documents that probable cause did exist. We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to answer after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word hearing is notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary (See Sec. 9, PD 1069) in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedingsxxx Verily x x x sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape of the accused from the requested state. 2. On the Basis of the Constitution Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest xxx

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To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination under oath or affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest. In Ho v. People (280 SCRA 365, October 9, 1997) and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of conducting a hearing just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we required was that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. In Webb v. De Leon (247 SCRA 652, 680, per Puno, J.), the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest x x x. At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine complainants and their witnesses (Ibid; citing Allado v. Diokno, 233 SCRA 192, May 5, 1994). In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage if he so desires in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions. That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one not the opposite would be justified in view of respondents demonstrated predisposition to flee. Determination of Probable Cause is a Judicial Function Abdula v. Guiani, 326 SCRA 1, Feb. 18, 2000, 3rd Div. [Gonzaga-Reyes] The determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives. Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutors report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused for an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutors bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining personally and independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable the His Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutors recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the

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Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer. Particular Description of Place to be Searched or Persons or Things to be Seized

People v. Estrada, 296 SCRA 383 [Martinez] The applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. In the present case, it must be noted that the application for a search warrant was accompanied by a sketch of the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. The sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of private respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a squarexxx With this sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe the residential house of private respondent with sufficient particularity so as to segregate it from the other buildings or structures inside the same compound. But the search warrant merely indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of private respondent sought to be searched has characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of the constitutional requirement.

People v. CA, 291 SCRA 400, June 26, 1998 [Narvasa] It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the warrant is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant.

Instances of Valid Warrantless Searches 1234567Search incidental to a lawful arrest Consented search Stop & frisk Plain view Search on a moving vehicle Customs search Check points

Search Incidental to a Lawful Arrest

People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432, June 17, 1999, En Banc [Davide] While a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected to discover dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime and which search may extend to the area within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the search. The process cannot be reversed. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed.

Consented Search

People v. Leila Johnson, G.R. No. 138881, Dec. 18, 2000, 2nd Div. [Mendoza] Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to

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recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nations airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. (Her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person in flagrante delicto.) Plain View Search

People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, Jan. 22, 1999, En Banc [Puno] The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized.

People v. Abe Valdez, G.R. No. 129296, Sept. 25, 2000, En Banc[Quisumbing] For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present: a) A prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; b) The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and c) The evidence must be immediately apparent; and d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

Stop-and-Frisk Search

Manalili v. CA, 280 SCRA 400, Oct. 9, 1997 [Panganiban] In the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s): Where a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and make reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself or others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.

Malacat v. CA, 283 SCRA 159, Dec. 12, 1997 [Davide] Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a stop-and-frisk, it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop-and-frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the

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police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a stop-andfrisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and selfpreservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. Searches at Checkpoints

People v. Usana, 323 SCRA 754, Jan. 28, 2000, 1st Div. [Davide] This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists right to free passage without interruption, but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicles occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.

Instances of Valid Warrantless Arrests Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court: a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence. (Inflagrante delicto) b) When an offense had just been committed and there is probable cause to believe, based on his personal knowledge or of other circumstances, that the person to be arrested committed the offense. (Hot pursuit) c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. (Escapee) In Flagrante Delicto Arrest

People v. Molina, 352 SCRA 174, Feb. 19, 2001, En Banc [Ynares-Santiago] Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

Arrest in Hot Pursuit When an offense had just been committed and there is probable cause to believe, based on his personal knowledge or of other circumstances, that the person to be arrested committed the offense. Under this paragraph, 2 stringent requirements must be complied with, namely: 1An offense had just been committed, and 2There is probable cause, based on his personal knowledge of the person making the arrest or of other circumstances, that the person to be arrested committed the offense. [Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law] Can the place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, be amplified or modified by the officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduce in support of their application for the warrant?

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Held: Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the warrant is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. (People v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 400, June 26, 1998 [Narvasa]) THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE Sec. 3, Art. III, 1987 Constitution SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Zulueta v. CA (253 SCRA 699)

The right may be invoked against the wife who went to the clinic of her husband and there took documents consisting of private communications between her husband and paramour. R.A. No. 4200 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4200 AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described: It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition. SECTION 2. Any person who wilfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or who violates the provisions of the following section or of any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than six months or more than six years and with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if the offender be a public official at the time of the commission of the offense, and, if the offender is an alien he shall be subject to deportation proceedings.

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SECTION 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against national security: Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence. The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the person or persons whose communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph line or the telephone number involved and its location; (2) the identity of the peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words; (3) the offense or offenses committed or sought to be prevented; and (4) the period of the authorization. The authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the order which shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by the court upon being satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest. All recordings made under court authorization shall, within forty-eight hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the order, be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the peace officer granted such authority stating the number of recordings made, the dates and times covered by each recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records included in the deposit, and certifying that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part thereof have been made, or if made, that all such duplicates or copies are included in the envelope or package deposited with the court. The envelope or package so deposited shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or their contents revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall not be granted except upon motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or persons whose conversation or communications have been recorded. The court referred to in this section shall be understood to mean the Court of First Instance within whose territorial jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for are to be executed. SECTION 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation. SECTION 5. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or accordingly amended. SECTION 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA, 235 SCRA 111, Aug. 4, 1994 [Padilla] Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

Navarro v. CA, [G.R. No. 121087. August 26, 1999.]

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Indeed, Jalbuenas testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmativexxx Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY Is there a Constitutional Right to Privacy?

Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998 [Puno] The essence of privacy is the right to be let alone. The SC clarified that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights. Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, i.e., Secs. 1, 2, 6, 8, and 17.

Marquez v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135882, June 27, 2001, En Banc [Pardo] Section 2 of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, as amended, declares bank deposits to be absolutely confidential except: 1) In an examination made in the course of a special or general examination of a bank that is specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity, 2) In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the bank, 3) Upon written permission of the depositor, 4) In cases of impeachment, 5) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or 6) In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that [e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons and punishes as actionable torts several acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an officer, revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION Sec. IV, Art. III, 1987 Constitution SECTION 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, G.R No. 133486, Jan. 28, 2000, En Banc [Panganiban] The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot, therefore, be justified. It does not leave open any alternative channel of communication to gather the type of information obtained through exit polling. On the other hand, there are other

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valid and reasonable ways and means to achieve the Comelec end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought about by exit surveys. It is concluded that the interest of the state in reducing disruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the media and the electorate. Quite the contrary, instead of disrupting elections, exit polls properly conducted and publicized can be vital tools for the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections; and for the elimination of election-fixing, fraud and other electoral ills. Content-Based and Content-Neutral Restrictions on Free Speech

Osmena v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA 447, March 31, 1998 [Mendoza] Content-based restrictions are imposed because of the content of the speech and are, therefore, subject to the clear-and-present danger test. For example, a rule such as that involved in Sanidad v. Comelec (181 SCRA 529 [1990]), prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from campaigning either for or against an issue in a plebiscite must have compelling reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict scrutiny. These restrictions are censorial and therefore they bear a heavy presumption of constitutional invalidity. In addition, they will be tested for possible overbreadth and vagueness. Content-neutral restrictions, on the other hand, like Sec. 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, which prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time to political candidates during the campaign period, are not concerned with the content of the speech. These regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to support them. A deferential standard of review will suffice to test their validity. The clear-and-present danger rule is inappropriate as a test for determining the constitutional validity of laws, like Sec. 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, which are not concerned with the content of political ads but only with their incidents. To apply the clear-and-present danger test to such regulatory measures would be like using a sledgehammer to drive a nail when a regular hammer is all that is needed.

SWS, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, En Banc [Mendoza] Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the press. To be sure, Section 5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press by prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days immediately preceding a national election and seven (7) days before a local election. Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. O Brien Test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of Section 5.4 (United States v. O Brien): A government regulation is sufficiently justified (1) if it is within the constitutional power of the government; (2) if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms (of speech, expression and press) is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question.

Live Media Coverage of Court Proceedings Supreme Court En Banc Resolution Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquinos Libel Case, dated Oct. 22, 1991

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The propriety of granting or denying permission to the media to broadcast, record, or photograph court proceedings involves weighing the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, the right of the public to information and the right to public trial, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the due process rights of the defendant and the inherent and constitutional power of the courts to control their proceedings in order to permit the fair and impartial administration of justice. Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.

Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against Former President Joseph E. Estrada, A.M. No. 01-403-SC, June 29, 2001, En Banc [Vitug] The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.

The Doctrine of Fair Comment

Borjal v. CA, 301 SCRA 1, Jan. 14, 1999, 2nd Div. [Bellosillo] Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.

Vasquez v. CA, 314 SCRA 460, Sept. 15, 1999, En Banc [Mendoza] Even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. This is the gist of the ruling in the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan, which this Court has cited with approval in several of its own decisions. 26 This is the rule of "actual malice." In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Such a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as members of a self-governing community. Without free speech and assembly,

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discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled. As Justice Brandeis has said, "public discussion is a political duty" and the "greatest menace to freedom is an inert people." Right to Peaceably Assemble

Jacinto v. CA, 281 SCRA 657, Nov. 14, 1997, En Banc [Panganiban] The exercise of the rights of free speech and of peaceful assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances "is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society," regulation was limited to the mayor's reasonable discretion in issuing a permit to determine or specify only the streets or public places to be used for the purpose and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder.

In Re: Petition to Annul En Banc Resolution A.M. 98-7-02-SC Ricardo C. Valmonte and Union of Lawyers and Advocates for Transparency in Government [ULAT], G.R. No. 134621, Sept. 29, 1998 B.P. Blg. 880 did not establish streets and sidewalks, among other places, as public fora. A close look at the law will reveal that it in fact prescribes reasonable time, place, and manner regulations. Thus, it requires a written permit for the holding of public assemblies in public places subject, even, to the right of the mayor to modify the place and time of the public assembly, to impose a rerouting of the parade or street march, to limit the volume of loud speakers or sound system and to prescribe other appropriate restrictions on the conduct of the public assembly. To insulate the judiciary from mob pressure, friendly or otherwise, and isolate it from public hysteria, this Court merely moved away the situs of mass actions within a 200-meter radius from every courthouse. In fine, B.P. Blg. 880 imposes general restrictions to the time, place and manner of conducting concerted actions. On the other hand, the resolution of this Court regulating demonstrations adds specific restrictions as they involve judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice. There is thus no discrepancy between the two sets of regulatory measures. Simply put, B.P. Blg. 880 and the assailed resolution complement each other.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION Sec. 8, Art. III, 1987 Constitution SECTION 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Jacinto v. CA, 281 SCRA 657, Nov. 14, 1997, En Banc [Panganiban]

Does the right of civil servants to organize include their right to strike? Clarify. Held: Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively recognized in Association of Court of Appeals Employees (ACAE) v. Ferrer-Calleja (203 SCRA 596, November 15, 1991). But, as in the exercise of the rights of free expression and of assembly, there are standards for allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the purposes of the association, the overriding considerations of national security and the preservation of democratic institutions (People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382, December 27, 1972, per Castro, J., where the Court, while upholding the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act which outlawed the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive" organizations, clarified, "Whatever interest in freedom of speech and freedom of association is infringed by the prohibition against knowing membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to be clearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding considerations of national security and the preservation of democratic institutions in this country." It cautioned, though, that "the need for prudence and circumspection [cannot be overemphasized] in [the law's] enforcement, operating as it does in the sensitive area of freedom of expression and belief.")

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As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the proviso "in accordance with law." This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. Executive Order No. 180 (Issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino on June 1, 1987) which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which "enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service" (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987, dated April 21, 1987) by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed. It is also settled in jurisprudence that, in general, workers in the public sector do not enjoy the right to strike. Alliance of Concerned Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment (124 SCRA 1, August 3, 1983, also per Gutierrez, Jr., J.) rationalized the proscription thus: "The general rule in the past and up to the present is that the 'terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law.' X x x. Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by the workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements." (Ibid., p. 13) After delving into the intent of the framers of the Constitution, the Court affirmed the above rule in Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) v. Court of Appeals (175 SCRA 686, July 28, 1989) and explained: "Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government Employees to Self-Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, '[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes [thereto].'' (Ibid., p. 698) Petitioners public school teachers walked out of their classes and engaged in mass actions during certain dates in September 1990 protesting the alleged unlawful withholding of their salaries and other economic benefits. They also raised national issues, such as the removal of US bases and the repudiation of foreign debts, in their mass actions. They refused to return to work despite orders to do so and subsequently were found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service for having absented themselves without proper authority, from their schools during regular school days, and penalized. They denied that they engaged in strike but claimed that they merely exercised a constitutionally guaranteed right the right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances - and, therefore, should not have been penalized. Should their contention be upheld?

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Held: Petitioners, who are public schoolteachers and thus government employees, do not seek to establish that they have a right to strike. Rather, they tenaciously insist that their absences during certain dates in September 1990 were a valid exercise of their constitutional right to engage in peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances. They claim that their gathering was not a strike, therefore, their participation therein did not constitute any offense. MPSTA v. Laguio (Supra, per Narvasa, J., now CJ.) and ACT v. Carino (Ibid.), in which this Court declared that "these 'mass actions' were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers' duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons," should not principally resolve the present case, as the underlying facts are allegedly not identical. Strike, as defined by law, means any temporary stoppage of work done by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute . A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment; or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees. With these premises, we now evaluate the circumstances of the instant petition. It cannot be denied that the mass action or assembly staged by the petitioners resulted in the non-holding of classes in several public schools during the corresponding period. Petitioners do not dispute that the grievances for which they sought redress concerned the alleged failure of public authorities essentially, their "employers" - to fully and justly implement certain laws and measures intended to benefit them materially x x x. And probably to clothe their action with permissible character (In justifying their mass actions, petitioners liken their activity to the pro-bases rally led by former President Corazon C. Aquino on September 10, 1991, participated in, as well, by public school teachers who consequently absented themselves from their classes. No administrative charges were allegedly instituted against any of the participants.), they also raised national issues such as the removal of the U.S. bases and the repudiation of foreign debt. In Balingasan v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 124678, July 31, 1997, per Regalado, J.), however, this Court said that the fact that the conventional term "strike" was not used by the participants to describe their common course of action was insignificant, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, was deemed controlling. Moreover, the petitioners here x x x were not penalized for the exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Rather, the Civil Service Commission found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having absented themselves without proper authority, from their schools during regular school days, in order to participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the nonholding of classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for which they were responsible. Had petitioners availed themselves of their free time - recess, after classes, weekends or holidays - to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no one - not the DECS, the CSC or even this Court - could have held them liable for the valid exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary stoppage of classes resulting from their activity necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government workers. Their act by their nature was enjoined by the Civil Service law, rules and regulations, for which they must, therefore, be made answerable. FREEDOM OF RELIGION Sec. V, Art. III, 1987 Constitution SECTION 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Sec. 6, Art. II, 1987 Constitution

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SECTION 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable. Sec. 29[2], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution SECTION 29. (2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. Sec. 3[3], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution SECTION 3. (3) At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without additional cost to the Government.

The Two Aspects of Freedom of Religion The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on ones belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare (J. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed., pp. 176-177).

Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256, March 1, 1993, En Banc [Grino-Aquino] While the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion, this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent.

INC v. CA, 259 SCRA 529, July 26, 1996 [Puno] The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. The Iglesia Ni Cristo's postulate that its religious freedom is per se beyond review by the MTRCB should be rejected. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious programs brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the State is duty-bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our society today. "For sure, we shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still."

Did the MTRCB act correctly when it rated X the Iglesia Ni Cristo's pre-taped TV program simply because it was found to be "attacking" another religion?

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Held: The MTRCB may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by the Iglesia Ni Cristo but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogma and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Vis--vis religious differences, the State enjoys no banquet of options. Neutrality alone is its fixed and immovable stance. In fine, the MTRCB cannot squelch the speech of the INC simply because it attacks another religion. In a State where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas, that can fan the embers of truth.

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, 236 SCRA 197, Sept. 1, 1994 [Regalado] Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not solicitation for "charitable or public welfare purpose" but for a religious purpose, and a religious purpose is not necessarily a charitable or public welfare purpose. Such solicitation calls upon the virtue of faith, not of charity, save as those solicited for money or aid may not belong to the same religion as the solicitor. Such solicitation does not engage the philanthropic as much as the religious fervor of the person who is solicited for contribution.

To require a government permit before solicitation for religious purpose may be allowed is to lay a prior restraint on the free exercise of religion. Such restraint, if allowed, may well justify requiring a permit before a church can make Sunday collections or enforce tithing.

Austria v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124382, Aug. 16, 1999, 1st Div. [Kapunan]

An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed not worthy of membership. Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. To be concrete, examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religious significancex x x Where what is involved is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church, i.e., the minister was not excommunicated or expelled from the membership of the congregation but was terminated from employment, it is a purely secular affair. Consequently, the suit may not be dismissed invoking the doctrine of separation of church and the state. THE LIBERTY OF ABODE AND THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL Sec. 6, Art. III, 1987 Constitution SECTION 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN

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Sec. 7, Art. III, 1987 Constitution SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744, Dec. 9, 1998 [Panganiban]

Some of the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information on matters of public concern: 1) National security matters and intelligence information. 2) Trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code [R.A. No. 8293, approved on June 6, 1997] and other related laws) and banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act [R.A. No. 1405, as amended]); 3) Criminal matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals, which courts may not inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution; 4) Other confidential information. The Ethical Standards Act (R.A. No. 6713, enacted on February 20, 1989) further prohibits public officials and employees from using or divulging confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public. (Sec. 7[c], ibid.) 5) Other acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court. As to the meanings of the terms public interest and public concern, the Court, in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, elucidated: In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. Public concern like public interest is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE Sec. 10, Art. III, 1987 Constitution SECTION 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. Is the constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations absolute? Held: Nor is there merit in the claim that the resolution and memorandum circular violate the contract clause of the Bill of Rights. The executive order creating the POEA was enacted to further implement the social justice provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which have been greatly enhanced and expanded in the 1987 Constitution by placing them under a separate Article (Article XIII). The Article on Social Justice was aptly described as the "heart of the new Charter" by the President of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, retired Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma. Social justice is identified with the broad scope of the police power of the state and requires the extensive use of such power. X x x. The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness. It is restricted to contracts with respect to property or some object of value and which confer rights that may be asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals,

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comfort, or general welfare of the community, even though contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and control them. Verily, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. And under the Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police power of the State because they are not ordinary contracts but are impressed with public interest. Article 1700 thereof expressly provides: Art. 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects. The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid implementations of E.O. No. 797 (Creating the POEA), which was enacted under the police power of the State, they cannot be struck down on the ground that they violate the contract clause. To hold otherwise is to alter long-established constitutional doctrine and to subordinate the police power to the contract clause. (The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. POEA, 243 SCRA 666, April 21, 1995 [Davide, Jr.]) Petitioners pray that the present action should be barred, because private respondents have voluntarily executed quitclaims and releases and received their separation pay. Petitioners claim that the present suit is a "grave derogation of the fundamental principle that obligations arising from a valid contract have the force of law between the parties and must be complied with in good faith." The Court disagrees. Jurisprudence holds that the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of contract is subject to the police power of the state and to reasonable legislative regulations promoting health, morals, safety and welfare. Not all quitclaims are per se invalid or against public policy, except (1) where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or (2) where the terms of settlement are unconscionable on their face. In these cases, the law will step in to annul the questionable transactions . Such quitclaim and release agreements are regarded as ineffective to bar the workers from claiming the full measure of their legal rights. In the case at bar, the private respondents agreed to the quitclaim and release in consideration of their separation pay. Since they were dismissed allegedly for business losses, they are entitled to separation pay under Article 283 of the Labor Code. And since there was thus no extra consideration for the private respondents to give up their employment, such undertakings cannot be allowed to bar the action for illegal dismissal. (Bogo-Medellin Sugarcane Planters Association, Inc. v. NLRC, 296 SCRA 108, 124, [Panganiban]) THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED Sec. 12, Art. III, 1987 Constitution SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

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(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455, Feb. 1, 1999, En Banc [Per Curiam] Procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation in accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438 (An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining, and Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof):

1) The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. Every other warnings, information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person; 2) He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him; 3) He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice; 4) He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting on his behalf; 5) That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel of after a valid waiver has been made; 6) The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means - telephone, radio, letter or messenger - with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished; 7) He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same; 8) In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in writing and in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak; 9) That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must cease if it has already begun; 10) The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements; 11) He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be admissible in evidence.

People v. Obrero, 332 SCRA 190, May 17, 2000, 2nd Div. [Mendoza] There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision: (1) those which are the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of Section 12, and (2) those which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same Section 12. Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing the declarants consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such confession will be sustained.

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Moreover, the confession contains details that only the perpetrator of the crime could have given. X x x. It has been held that voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its being replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which cannot be said of a mind on which violence and torture have been applied. When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such that they could not have been concocted by one who did not take part in the acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in the extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists showing that the statement was voluntarily executed, the confession is admissible against the declarant. There is greater reason for finding a confession to be voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails with the essential facts contained in such confession. But what renders the confession of accused-appellant inadmissible is the fact that accused-appellant was not given the Miranda warnings effectively. Under the Constitution, an uncounseled statement, such as it is called in the United States from which Article III, Section 12(1) was derived, is presumed to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel. Now, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that the suspect in custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings: (1) he must be informed of his right to remain silent; (2) he must be warned that anything he says can and will be used against him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent himx x x There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accusedappellant without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him. This kind of giving of warnings, in several decisions of this Court, has been found to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect. Especially in this case, care should have been scrupulously observed by the police investigator that accused-appellant was specifically asked these questions considering that he only finished the fourth grade of the elementary school. X x x Moreover, Article III, Section 12(1) requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial interrogations be competent and independent. Here, accused-appellant was assisted by Atty. De los Reyes, who, though presumably competent, cannot be considered an independent counsel as contemplated by the law for the reason that he was station commander of the WPD at the time he assisted accused-appellant. This is error. As observed in People v. Bandula (232 SCRA 566 [1994]), the independent counsel required by Article III, Section 12(1) cannot be special counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal attorney, or counsel of the police whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. In this case, Atty. De los Reyes, as PC Captain and Station Commander of the WPD, was part of the police force who could not be expected to have effectively and scrupulously assisted accused-appellant in the investigation. To allow such a happenstance would render illusory the protection given to the suspect during custodial investigation.

People v. Endino, 353 SCRA 307, Feb. 20, 2001, 2nd Div. [Bellosillo] [Admissibility of Video-Taped Confessions Given to Media Men] The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. It is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extra-judicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system.

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We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused with the knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession was given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere. A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

People v. Andan, 269 SCRA 95, March 3, 1997 While it is true that a municipal mayor has operational supervision and control over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution, however, appellants confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question the appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the State as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truthxxx Appellants confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him. The Supreme Court further ruled that appellants verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution and, therefore, admissible in evidence.

People v. Lugod, 352 SCRA 498, Feb. 21, 2001, En Banc [Gonzaga-Reyes] Records reveal that accused-appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel, and that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice, he would be provided with one. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that he intended to waive these rights. Besides, even if he did waive these rights, in order to be valid, the waiver must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, the accused-appellant's act of confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel cannot be used against him for having transgressed accused-appellant's rights under the Bill of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime committed may be. In the same vein, the accused-appellant's act in pointing out the location of the body of Nairube was also elicited in violation of the accused-appellant's right to remain silent. The same was an integral part of the- uncounselled confession and is considered a fruit of the poisonous tree.

Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, En Banc [Puno] In People v. Teehankee, Jr. (249 SCRA 54 [1995]), later reiterated in the case of Larranaga v. Court of Appeals, et al. (287 SCRA 581 at pp. 596-597 [1998]) , we laid down the doctrine that:

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We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-togavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. x x x. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden. What are the two principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases? Held: There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases. The British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat. The American approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc. THE RIGHT TO BAIL Sec. 13, Art. III, 1987 Constitution SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Government of the USA v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002, En Banc [Panganiban] [Vitug, Dissenting Opinion][Is Right to Bail Available in Extradition Proceeding?]

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Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional provision on bail x x x, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, Jr. [later CJ]) It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not an issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. (Sec. 18, Article VII, Constitution) Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

Lavides v. CA (GR 129670, Feb. 1, 2000) In the first place, as the trial court itself acknowledged, in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is required. On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.

THE RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED DURING TRIAL Sec. 14[2], Art. III, 1987 Constitution SECTION 14. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence The Question of Prejudicial Publicity

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Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, En Banc [Puno] Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-togavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity.

The Right to Public Trial Request for Live Radio/TV Coverage of Trial of Estrada (Vitug) An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings. THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION Sec. 17, Art. III, 1987 Constitution SECTION 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Sec. 12, 3rd par., Art. III, 1987 Constitution SECTION 12. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

Immunity Statutes

Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (231 SCRA 783) They are the transactional immunity and the use-and-derivative-use immunity. Transactional immunity is broader in the scope of its protection. By its grant, a witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction. In contrast, by the grant of use-andderivative-use immunity, a witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.

THE PROHIBITION AGAINST CRUEL, DEGRADING AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT Sec. 19, Art. III, 1987 Constitution SECTION 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

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(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. THE RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY Sec. 21, Art. III, 1987 Constitution SECTION 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. Two kinds of Double Jeopardy

People v. Quejada (259 SCRA 191) The first sentence of Clause 20, Section 1, Article III of the Constitution ordains that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The second sentence of said clause provides that if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense whereas, the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offense charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment or the same offense. So long as jeopardy has been attached under one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.

Almario v. CA, 355 SCRA 1, March 22, 2001, 2nd Div. [Quisumbing][Will Elevation on Appeal of Civil Aspect of Decision Constitute Double Jeopardy?] Clearly, jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to speedy trial was made upon motion by counsel for petitioner before the trial court. It was made at the instance of the accused before the trial court, and with his express consent. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial. Double jeopardy may attach when the proceedings have been prolonged unreasonably, in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial. Here we must inquire whether there was unreasonable delay in the conduct of the trial so that violation of the right to speedy trial of the accused, herein petitioner, resulted. For it must be recalled that in the application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.

THE RIGHT AGAINST EX-POST FACTO LAW AND BILL OF ATTAINDER

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Sec. 22, Art. III, 1987 Constitution SECTION 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES Government of the Republic of the Philippines The Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of the government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government. Agency Refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein. Department Refers to an executive department created by law. This shall include any instrumentality given having or assigned the rank of department, regardless of name or designation. Bureau Refers to any principal subdivision or unit of any department. This shall include any principal subdivision or unit of any instrumentality given or assigned the rank or a bureau, regardless of actual name or designation, as in the case of department-wide regional offices. Office Refers to any major functional unit of a department or bureau including regional offices, within the framework of governmental organization. It may also refer to any position held or occupied by individual persons, whose functions are defined by law or regulation. Instrumentality A government instrumentality refers to any agency of the national government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. The term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations. Regulatory Agency A regulatory agency refers to any agency expressly vested with jurisdiction to regulate, administer or adjudicate matters affecting substantial rights and interest of private persons, the principal powers of which are exercised by a collective body, such as a commission, board or council. Chartered Institution A chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes state universities and colleges and the monetary authority of the State. Government-owned or Controlled Corporation Blaquera v. Alcala, 295 SCRA 366, Sept. 11, 1998, En Banc [Purisima] Government-owned or controlled corporations may perform governmental or proprietary functions or both, depending on the purpose for which they have been created. If the purpose is to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit, the function is proprietary. If it is in the interest of health, safety and for the advancement of public good and welfare, affecting the public in general, the function is governmental. Powers classified as proprietary are those intended for private advantage and benefit.

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ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONSHIPS Supervision and Control Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs, and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing the relationship of particular agencies, the word control shall encompass supervision and control as defined in this paragraph. Administrative Supervision Administrative supervision which shall govern the administrative relationship between a department or its equivalent and regulatory agencies or other agencies as may be provided by law, shall be limited to the authority of the department or its equivalent to generally oversee the operations of such agencies and to insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently, and economically but without interference with day-to-day activities. Attachment "Attachment" is the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and the attached agency or coordination. General Supervision GENERAL SUPERVISION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE; CONCEPT. Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the exercise of general supervision "to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." The general supervision is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Local Government. In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The fundamental law permits the Chief Executive to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body. (Taule vs. Santos, G.R. No. 90336. August 12, 1991)

Bermudez v. Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, G.R. No. 131429, Aug. 4, 1999, 3rd Div. [Vitug] When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It should be here pertinent to state that the President is the head of government whose authority includes the power of control over all "executive departments, bureaus and offices." Control means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. Expressed in another way, the President has the power to assume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau and office. It can accordingly be inferred therefrom that the President can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations.

Beja, Sr. v. CA, 207 SCRA 689, Mar. 31, 1992 [Romero] An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the

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"lateral relationship" between the Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for "policy and program coordination." With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency from Departmental control and supervision is further reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a Department's administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference with respect to appointments and other personnel actions "in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions" under the Administrative Code of 1987. QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

KMU Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386, Dec. 23, 1994 [Kapunan]

The Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. Section 5 (c) of the said executive order authorizes LTFRB "to determine, prescribe, approve and periodically review and adjust, reasonable fares, rates and other related charges, relative to the operation of public land transportation services provided by motorized vehicles." Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. As subjects for governmental regulation multiply, so does the difficulty of administering the laws. Hence, specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Given the task of determining sensitive and delicate matters as route-fixing and rate-making for the transport sector, the responsible regulatory body is entrusted with the power of subordinate legislation. With this authority, an administrative body and in this case, the LTFRB, may implement broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Legislature may neither have time or competence to provide. However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service.

Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998 [Puno]

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.

Rabor v. CSC, 244 SCRA 614, May 31, 1995, En Banc [Feliciano]

"It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate authority and promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes." All that may be reasonably demanded is a showing that the delegated legislation consisting of administrative regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by the governing or enabling statute. Requisites of a Valid Administrative Regulation

Philippine Bank of Communications v. CIR, G.R. No. 112024, Jan. 28, 1999 [Quisumbing]

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Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered administrative rulings (in the sense of more specific and less general interpretations of tax laws) which are issued from time to time by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is widely accepted that the interpretation placed upon a statute by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found to be erroneous. Thus, courts will not countenance administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement. Special Requisites of a Penal Regulation 1- The law itself must make the violation of the administrative regulation punishable 2- The law itself must impose the corresponding sanction therefor 3- The regulation must be published QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES Investigation distinguished from Adjudication

Carino v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 [Narvasa]

The Commission on Human Rights to have no adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasijudicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking.

Simon, Jr. v. CHR, 229 SCRA 117, Jan. 5, 1994, En Banc [Vitug] CHR has no adjudicatory powers (reiterated Cario v. CHR case)

Rules of Procedure of Quasi-Judicial Agencies Doctrine of Implication: Where an administrative body is expressly granted the power of adjudication, it is deemed also vested with the implied power to prescribe the rules to be observed in the conduct of its proceedings. To be valid, the rules must not violate the fundamental rights to encroach upon constitutional prerogatives, like the rule making power of the Supreme Court. The right to notice and hearing is essential to due process and its non-observance will as a rule invalidate the administrative proceedings. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain ones side or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

Subpoena power. The power to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum is not an inherent in administrative bodies. It is settled that these bodies may summon witnesses and require the production of evidence ONLY WHEN: 1- Duly allowed by law 2- Always in connection with the matter they are authorized to investigate

Contempt power. Like the subpoena power, the power to punish for contempt is essentially judicial and cannot be claimed as an inherent right by the administrative body. To be validly exercised: 1- It must be expressly conferred upon the body, and 2- It must be used ONLY in connection with its quasi-judicial as distinguished from its purely administrative or routinary functions. (C. Cruz, Philippine Administrative Law,

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ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils ., 283 SCRA 31, Dec. 12, 1997 [Romero] As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.

Fabella v. CA, 282 SCRA 256, Nov. 28, 1998 [Panganiban] In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers' administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers' organization and a supervisor of the division. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers' organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.

Singson v. NLRC, 274 SCRA 358 [1997] Requisites of procedural due process in administrative proceedings, to wit: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have something to support itself; (4) the evidence must be substantial; (5) the decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; (7) the Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. It is self-evident from the ruling case law that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is the subject of review. Thus, we have ruled that "the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review."

Central Bank of the Philippines v. CA, 220 SCRA 536, March 30, 1993, En Banc [Bellosillo] Sec. 29 does not contemplate prior notice and hearing before a bank may be directed to stop operations and placed under receivership.

CONTEMPT POWER OF QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES

Simon, Jr. v. CHR, 229 SCRA 117, Jan. 5, 1994, En Banc [Vitug]

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On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply this doctrine to cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in character. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view. In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Villaflor v. CA, 280 SCRA 287 Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is lodged with an administrative body of special competence. The Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Paat v. CA, 266 SCRA 167 [1997] Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of courts jurisdiction is fatal to ones cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. This doctrine is disregarded: 1) when there is a violation of due process; 2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; 3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;

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4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; 5) when there is irreparable injury; 6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; 7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; 8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; 9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceeding; 10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and 11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

Carale v. Abarintos, 269 SCRA 132 [1997] Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is not jurisdictional. It only renders the action premature, i.e., claimed cause of action is not ripe for judicial determination and for that reason a party has no cause of action to ventilate in court.

Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, 344 SCRA 358, Oct. 25, 2000, En Banc [Pardo] This Court has held consistently that "before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action." THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC OFFICE 1It must be created by law or by authority of law 2It must possess a delegation of a portion of the sovereign powers of the government, to be exercised for the benefit of the people. 3The powers conferred and the duties to be discharged must be defined by the legislature or through legislative authority 4The duties must be performed independently and without control of a superior power other than the law, unless the law itself provides otherwise 5It must have some permanence and continuity. CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC OFFICE (1) It is a public trust (2) It is not a hereditary possession (3) It is not property, outside the commerce of men (4) There can be no vested right to a public office APPOINTMENT

Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154 Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in naturexxx Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the designation of the petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason

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is that the decree clearly provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be a member of the Cabinet.

Bermudez v. Torres, 311 SCRA 733, Aug. 4, 1999, 3rd Div. [Vitug] An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective. Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of discretion on the part of the appointing authority.

Sevilla v. CA, 209 SCRA 637 (Appointment distinguished from Designation) Appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the functions of an office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition of additional duties, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment or election. A mere "designation" does not confer upon the designee security of tenure in the position or office which he occupies in an "acting" capacity only. Thus did this Court make such a distinction: Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official. . . . It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature. "Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named. "Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the designation of the petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. . . . Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated."

Nature of Appointment Appointment essentially Discretionary Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568, June 22, 1993, En Banc [Bellosillo] The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to the appointee. In other words, the choice of the appointee is a fundamental component of the appointing power. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Once the power of appointment is conferred on the President, such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently, when the qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual, such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment.

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In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can qualify for the posts in question, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Accordingly, while the conferment of the appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid legislative act, the proviso limiting his choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his prerogative. The Luego Doctrine

Rimonte v. CSC, 244 SCRA 504, May 29, 1995, En Banc [Bellosillo] Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer vested with such power according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. Indeed, this is a prerogative of the appointing authority which he alone can decide. The choice of an appointee from among those who possess the required qualifications is a political and administrative decision calling for considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of the service which can best be made by the head of the office concerned, the person most familiar with the organizational structure and environmental circumstances within which the appointee must function. As long as the appointee is qualified the Civil Service Commission has no choice but to attest to and respect the appointment even if it be proved that there are others with superior credentials. The law limits the Commissions authority only to whether or not the appointees possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothing else. If they do then the appointments are approved because the Commission cannot exceed its power by substituting its will for that of the appointing authority. Neither can we.

The Next-in-Rank Rule

Abila v. CSC, 198 SCRA 102, June 3, 1991, En Banc [Feliciano] The next-in-rank rule is not absolute; it only applies in cases of promotion, a process which denotes a scalar ascent of an officer to another position higher either in rank or salary. And even in promotions, it can be disregarded for sound reasons made known to the next-in-rank, as the concept does not import any mandatory or peremptory requirement that the person next-in-rank must be appointed to the vacancy. The appointing authority, under the Civil Service Law, is allowed to fill vacancies by promotion, transfer of present employees, reinstatement, reemployment, and appointment of outsiders who have appropriate civil service eligibility, not necessarily in that order. There is no legal fiat that a vacancy must be filled only by promotion; the appointing authority is given wide discretion to fill a vacancy from among the several alternatives provided by law. What the Civil Service Law provides is that if a vacancy is filled by promotion, the person holding the position next in rank thereto shall be considered for promotion. In Taduran v. Civil Service Commission (131 SCRA 66 [1984]), the Court construed that phrase to mean that the person next-in-rank would be among the first to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified. In Santiago, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission (178 SCRA 733 [1989]), the Court elaborated the import of the rule in the following manner:

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One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person to the next higher position x x x REVOCATION OF APPOINTMENT

De Rama v. CA, 353 SCRA 94, Feb. 28, 2001, En Banc [Ynares-Santiago] It has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointee's assumption of the position in the civil service, "he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by revocation of the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and hearing". Moreover, it is well-settled that the person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the position. This right is protected not only by statute, but by the Constitution as well, which right cannot be taken away by either revocation of the appointment, or by removal, unless there is valid cause to do so, provided that there is previous notice and hearing.

QUALIFICATIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICE As an ACT: This refers to an act which a public officer must perform for him to formally commence the discharge of his official duties. Ex. Taking an oath or filing a bond As an ENDOWMENT: This refers to the qualities which the a public officer must possess to insure the proper discharge of the duties of his office. Ex. Age, Citizenship, Suffrage, Literacy, Residency, Academic & Moral qualifications DISQUALIFICATIONS Sec. 40, LGC SECTION 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; (c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic; (d) Those with dual citizenship; (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad; (f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and (g) The insane or feeble-minded.

Caasi v. CA, (GR 88831, Nov. 8, 1990) To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office"

DE FACTO OFFICERSHIP

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A DE FACTO OFFICER is one who actually possesses the office under a colorable title. His acts are regarded as valid and binding in so far as third persons and the general public relying on said acts are concerned. Elements: 1- A validly existing public office 2- Actual physical possession of said office 3- Color of title to the office, by a. Reputation or acquiescence b. Under a known and valid appointment or election, but the officer failed to conform to a requirement imposed by law. c. Under a known appointment or election, void because of the ineligibility of the officer, or want of authority of the appointing or electing authority, or because of an irregularity in his appointment or election, such ineligibility, want of authority or irregularity being unknown to the public. d. Under a known appointment or election pursuant to an unconstitutional law, before the law is declared unconstitutional. Entitlement to Salaries General Rule: The de facto officer is not entitled to salaries. The rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into the office in good faith and under color of title. Exception: De facto officer is entitled to salary when there is no de jure officer in the given office during the period when he actually discharged the functions of said office. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION Scope of the Civil Service

Camporedondo v. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, Aug. 6, 1999, 1st Div. [Pardo] The test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The PNRC was not impliedly converted to a private corporation simply because its charter was amended to vest in it the authority to secure loans, be exempted from payment of all duties, taxes, fees and other charges, etc.

KINDS OF APPOINTMENT IN THE CIVIL SERVICE Permanent A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of laws, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof. [Cruz, LPO] Temporary In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility; provided that such temporary appointment shall not exceed 12 months but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available. Accordingly, it has been ruled that temporary appointees may be terminated at any time even without cause. They have no fixed tenure. [Cruz, LPO]

CLASSIFICATION OF POSITIONS IN THE CIVIL SERVICE Career Positions 1) Open career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required;

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2) Closed career positions which are which are scientific or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities. 3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Usec., Asec., Bureau Dir., Reg. Dir., Chief Dept. Service and other officers as may be identified by the Career Executive Services Board, all of whom are appointed by the President; 4) Career officers, other than those in the CES, who are appointed by the President such as the Foreign Service Officers in the DFA; 5) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which sall maintain a separate merit system; 6) Personnel of GOCCs whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; 7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled. Characteristics: 1- Entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations or based on highly technical qualifications; 2- Opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; 3- Security of tenure Non-career Positions 1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff; 2) Department heads and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal or confidential staff; 3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential staff; 4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed 1 year, and performs of accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency; and 5) Emergency and seasonal personnel. Characteristics: 1- Entrance on bases other than those of usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; 2- Tenure, which is limited to a period specified by law or which is co-terminus with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made. HIGHLY TECHNICAL POSITIONS A highly technical position according to the Supreme Court in De los Santos v. Mallare, (87 Phil 289) re quires the appointee thereto to possess technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree. PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL POSITIONS A primarily confidential position is one which denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom from intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. (De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 [1950]) The Proximity Rule CSC v. Salas, 274 SCRA 414, June 19, 1997

Under the proximity rule, the occupant of a particular position could be considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the appointing authority was the latters belief that he can share a close intimate relationship with the occupant which ensures freedom of discussion without fear or embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayal of personal trust or confidential matters of state. Withal, where the position occupied is more remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant.

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APPOINTMENT IN THE CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE

De Leon v. CA, 350 SCRA 1, Jan, 22, 2001, En Banc [Ynares-Santiago]

It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only "to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed." Achacoso did not. At best, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only as temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and "at a moment's notice," conformably to established jurisprudence. The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.

General v. Roco, 350 SCRA 528, Jan. 29, 2001, 1st Div. [Ynares-Santiago]

It must be stressed that the security of tenure of employees in the career executive service (except first and second-level employees in the civil service), pertains only to rank and not to the office or to the position to which they may be appointed. Thus, a career executive service officer may be transferred or reassigned from one position to another without losing his rank which follows him wherever he is transferred or reassigned. In fact, a CESO suffers no diminution of salary even if assigned to a CES position with lower salary grade, as he is compensated according to his CES rank and not on the basis of the position or office he occupies. ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY CASES Jurisdiction in Administrative Disciplinary Cases Fabian v. Ombudsman Desierto Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 xxx In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only. This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that no litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the remedy. Appeals in Administrative Disciplinary Cases

CSC v. Dacoycoy, G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999, En Banc [Pardo] Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant

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George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that "the phrase 'party adversely affected by the decision' refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office" and not included are "cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary" or "when the respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal." In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law "does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges" enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service Commission; Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority and more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission. PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION

Beja, Sr. v. CA, 207 SCRA 689, March 31, 1992 [Romero] Imposed during the pendency of an administrative investigation, preventive suspension is not a penalty in itself. It is merely a measure of precaution so that the employee who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from the scene of his alleged misfeasance while the same is being investigated. Thus preventive suspension is distinct from the administrative penalty of removal from office such as the one mentioned in Sec. 8(d) of P.D. No. 807. While the former may be imposed on a respondent during the investigation of the charges against him, the latter is the penalty which may only be meted upon him at the termination of the investigation or the final disposition of the case.

Gloria v. CA, G.R. No. 131012, April 21, 1999, en Banc [Mendoza] There are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation (Sec. 51, Civil Service Law, EO No. 292) and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated (Section 47, par. 4, Civil Service Law, EO No. 292). Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be reinstated. However, no compensation was due for the period of preventive suspension pending investigation. The Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) providing for compensation in such a case once the respondent was exonerated was revised in 1975 and the provision on the payment of salaries during suspension was deleted. But although it is held that employees who are preventively suspended pending investigation are not entitled to the payment of their salaries even if they are exonerated, they are entitled to compensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal if eventually they are found innocent. Preventive suspension pending investigation x x x is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. On the other hand, preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension.

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Hagad v. Gozodadole (Vitug) [G.R. No. 108072. December 12, 1995.] The determination of whether the Ombudsman under R.A. No. 6770, (Ombudsman Act of 1989), has been divested of his country to conduct administrative investigation over local elective officials by virtue of the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 7160, (Local Government Code of 1991), is the pivotal issue. The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the President. Respondent local officials contend that the 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-day preventive suspension provided by Section 63 of the Local Government Code to even now maintain its application. The two provisions govern differently. In order to justify the preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against the officer or employee should involve dishonestly, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) that charges should warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed against him. The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials, whether elective or appointive, who are under investigation. Upon the other hand, in imposing the shorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension prescribed in the Local Government Code of 1991 on an elective local official (at any time after the issues are joined), it would be enough that (a) there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is strong,(c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.

Garcia v. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207, Sept. 10, 1999, 2nd Div. [Quisumbing] The power of the Office of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend an official subject to its administrative investigation is provided by specific provision of law. Under Section 24 of R.A. 6770 SECTION 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. We have previously interpreted the phrase "under his authority" to mean that the Ombudsman can preventively suspend all officials under investigation by his office, regardless of the branch of government in which they are employed, excepting of course those removable by impeachment, members of Congress and the Judiciary. The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also to the Deputy Ombudsman. This is the clear import of Section 24 of R.A. 6770 abovecited.

PROHIBITIONS AND INHIBITIONS Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution SECTION 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or

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instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568, June 22, 1993, En Banc [Bellosillo] The view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-out difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to other government posts, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning agency; the VicePresident, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The distinction between the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, was not accidental when drawn, and not without reason. It was purposely sought by the drafters of the Constitution as shown in their deliberation, thus "MR. MONSOD. In other words, what the Commissioner is saying, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that the prohibition is more strict with respect to elective officials, because in the case of appointive officials, there may be a law that will allow them to hold other positions. "MR. FOZ. Yes. I suggest we make that difference, because in the case of appointive officials, there will be certain situations where the law should allow them to hold some other positions." The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be extended to elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph.

Sec. 13, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution SECTION 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary [194 SCRA 317] What is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itselfxxx Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so

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far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned. xxx The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private office or employmentxxx Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: "They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitionsxxx Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possible refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or employment in the government during their tenure. Respondents' interpretation that Section 13 of Article VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would obliterate the distinction so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when the high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the President to Assistant Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil servants from the rank immediately below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold any other office or position in the government during their tenure. To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional compensation in exofficio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned official's office. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office." An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. Sec. 13, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution SECTION 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected. Sec. 90, LGC

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SECTION 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. (b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall not: (1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party; (2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office. (3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an official; and (4) Use property and personnel of the government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the government. (c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom. The Law on Nepotism

CSC v. Dacoycoy, G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999, En Banc [Pardo] Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: a) appointing authority; b) recommending authority; c) chief of the bureau or office; and d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. Clearly, there are four situations covered. In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

Debulgado v. CSC (GR NO. 111471, Sept. 26, 1994) A textual examination of Section 59 at once reveals that the prohibition was cast in comprehensive and unqualified terms. Firstly, it explicitly covers "all appointments", without seeking to make any distinction between differing kinds or types of appointments. Secondly, Section 59 covers all appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal governments, as well as any branch or instrumentality thereof and all government owned or controlled corporations. Thirdly, there is a list of exceptions set out in Section 59 itself, but it is a short list: (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity; (b) teachers; (c) physicians; and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The list has not been added to or subtracted from for the past thirty (30) years. The list does not contain words like "and other similar positions." The original appointment of a civil service employee and all subsequent personnel actions undertaken by or in respect of that employee such as promotion, transfer, reinstatement, re-employment, etc., must comply with the Implementing Rules including, of course, the prohibition against nepotism in Rule XVIII. To the extent that all personnel actions occurring after an original appointment, require the issuance of a new appointment to another position (or to the original position in case of reinstatement), we believe that such

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appointment must comply with all applicable rules and prohibitions, including the statutory and regulatory prohibition against nepotism.

Laurel V v. CSC, 203 SCRA 195 "By legal contemplation, the prohibitive mantle on nepotism would include designation, because what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly." We cannot accept petitioner's view. His specious and tenuous distinction between appointment and designation is nothing more than either a ploy ingeniously conceived to circumvent the rigid rule on nepotism or a last-ditch maneuver to cushion the impact of its violation. The rule admits of no distinction between appointment and designation. Designation is also defined as "an appointment or assignment to a particular office"; and "to designate" means "to indicate, select, appoint or set apart for a purpose or duty." LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Immunity from Suit of the President

Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, En Banc [Puno] This is in accord with our ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez (145 SCRA 160 [1986]) that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.

The Doctrine of Condonation

Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 SCRA 768 [1992] The rule is that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.

Garcia v. Mojica, G.R. No. 139043, 314 SCRA 207, Sept. 10, 1999, 2 nd Div. [Quisumbing] In a number of cases, we have repeatedly held that a reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds. The agreement between petitioner (representing Cebu City) and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the contract was signed, during petitioner's prior term. At that moment, petitioner already acceded to the terms of the contract, including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to the city government. Thus, any culpability petitioner may have in signing the contract already became extant on the day the contract was signed. It hardly matters that the deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been made months later. While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F.E. Zuellig, however, this should not prejudice the filing of any case other than administrative against petitioner. Our ruling in this case, may not be taken to mean the total exoneration of petitioner for whatever wrongdoing, if any, might have been committed in signing the subject contract. The ruling now is limited to the question of whether or not he may be held administratively liable therefor, and it is our considered view that he may not.

TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS

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Expiration of Term Term of Office Distinguished from Tenure of Incumbent Gaminde v. COA, G.R. No. 140335, Dec. 13, 2000, En Banc [Pardo]

In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between term and tenure. The term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. Term of Office of Persons holding Primarily Confidential Positions The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures (Corpus vs. Cuaderno, 13 SCRA 591). When that confidence is lost and officer holding the position is separated from the service, such cessation is not removal from office but merely an expiration of his/her term (Cadiente vs. Santos, 142 SCRA 280). An incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure of the appointing power. When the pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not removed or dismissed from office his term merely expires (Ingles vs. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171). It is the fact of loss of confidence, not the reason for it, that is important and controlling. The Hold-Over Doctrine

Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 305 SCRA 397, March 25, 1999, 2nd Div. [Bellosillo] The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law. Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified. The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the law-making body favors the same.

Galarosa v. Valencia, 227 SCRA 728, Nov. 11, 1993, En Banc [Davide] The rule is settled that unless holding over be expressly or impliedly prohibited, the incumbent may continue to hold over until someone else is elected and qualified to assume the office. This rule is demanded by the most obvious requirements of public policy, for without it there must frequently be cases where, from a failure to elect or a refusal or neglect to qualify, the office would be vacant and the public service entirely suspended. Otherwise stated, the purpose is to prevent a hiatus in the government pending the time when the successor may be chosen and inducted into office. Resignation

Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, En Banc [Puno] Resignation x x x is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment (Gonzales v. Hernandez, 2 SCRA 228 [1961]). The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral.

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It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes v. CA, 284 SCRA 276, Jan. 16, 1998 It is the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. It is an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority. To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority. The last one is required by reason of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code.

Abandonment of Office

Canonizado v. Aguirre, 351 SCRA 659, Feb. 15, 2001, En Banc [GonzagaReyes] Abandonment of an office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. In order to constitute abandonment of office, it must be total and under such circumstances as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment. There must be a complete abandonment of duties of such continuance that the law will infer a relinquishment. 6 Abandonment of duties is a voluntary act; it springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice. There are, therefore, two essential elements of abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and second, an overt or "external" act by which the intention is carried into effect. Generally speaking, a person holding a public office may abandon such office by non-user or acquiescence. Non-user refers to a neglect to use a right or privilege or to exercise an office. However, non-performance of the duties of an office does not constitute abandonment where such nonperformance results from temporary disability or from involuntary failure to perform. Abandonment may also result from an acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful removal or discharge, for instance, after a summary removal, an unreasonable delay by an officer illegally removed in taking steps to vindicate his rights may constitute an abandonment of the office. Where, while desiring and intending to hold the office, and with no willful desire or intention to abandon it, the public officer vacates it in deference to the requirements of a statute which is afterwards declared unconstitutional, such a surrender will not be deemed an abandonment and the officer may recover the office.

Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes v. CA, 284 SCRA 276, Jan. 16, 1998 Abandonment of an office has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. Indeed, abandonment of office is a species of resignation; while resignation in general is a formal relinquishment, abandonment is a voluntary relinquishment through nonuser. Clear intention to abandon should be manifested by the officer concerned. Such intention may be express or inferred from his own conduct. Thus, the failure to perform the duties pertaining to the office must be with the officers actual or imputed intention to abandon and relinquish the office. Abandonment of an office is not wholly a matter of intention; it results from a complete abandonment of duties of such continuance that the law will infer a relinquishment. Therefore, there are two essential elements of abandonment; first, an intention to abandon and, second, an overt or external act by which the intention is carried into effect. Removal of an Officer Unconsented Transfer

De Guzman, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129118, July 19, 2000, En Banc [Purisima]

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As held in Sta. Maria v. Lopez (31 SCRA 637, 653 citing Ibanez v. Commission on Elections, L-26558, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 1002, 1012 and Section 12 of the Tax Code). "x x x the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed - not merely assigned - to a particular station. Such a rule does not pr[o]scribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency. x x x" The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the service for causes other than those provided by law and after due process is accorded the employee. What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise of the power to dismiss. But where it is the law-making authority itself which furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law. Abolition of an Office Reorganization Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. Naturally, it may result in the loss of one's position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization to be valid, it must also pass the test of good faith, laid down in Dario v. Mison (176 SCRA 84 [1989]): As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition" which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. R.A. No. 6656 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6656 AN ACT TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION SECTION 1. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to protect the security of tenure of civil service officers and employees in the reorganization of the various agencies of the National Government and of local governments, state colleges and universities expressly authorized by law, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, without sacrificing the need to promote morale, efficiency in the civil service pursuant to Article IX, B, Section 3 of the Constitution. SECTION 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:

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(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) Where an office is abolished and other performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same function as the original offices; (e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof. SECTION 3. In the separation of personnel pursuant to reorganization, the following order of removal shall be followed: (a) Casual employees with less than five (5) years of government service; (b) Casual employees with five (5) years or more of government service; (c) Employees holding temporary appointments; and (d) Employees holding permanent appointments: Provided, That those in the same category as enumerated above, who are least qualified in terms of performance and merit shall be laid first, length of service notwithstanding. SECTION 4. Officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given preference for appointment to the new positions in the approved staffing pattern comparable to their former position or in case there are not enough comparable positions, to positions next lower in rank. No new employees shall be taken in until all permanent officers and employees have been appointed, including temporary and casual employees who possess the necessary qualification requirements, among which is the appropriate civil service eligibility, for permanent appointment to positions in the approved staffing pattern, in case there are still positions to be filled, unless such positions are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature. SECTION 5. Officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given preference for appointment in other agencies if they meet the qualification requirements of the positions therein. SECTION 6. In order that the best qualified and most deserving persons shall be appointed in any reorganization, there shall be created a Placement Committee in each appointments shall be given preference for appointment in the judicious selection and placement of personnel. The Committee shall consist of two (2) members appointed by the head of the department or agency, a representative of the appointing authority, and two (2) members duly elected by the employees holding positions in the first and second levels of the career service: Provided, That if there is a registered employee association with a majority of the employees as members, that employee association shall also have a representative in the Committee: Provided, further That immediately upon approval of the staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned, such staffing pattern shall be made known to all officers and employees of the agency who shall be invited to apply for any of the positions authorized therein. Said application shall be considered by the Committee in the placement and selection of personnel. SECTION 7. A list of the personnel appointed to the authorized positions in the approved staffing pattern shall be made known to all the officers and employees of the department or agency. Any of such officers and employees aggrieved by the appointments made may file an appeal with the appointing authority who shall make a decision within thirty (30) days from the filling thereof. SECTION 8. An officer or employee who is still not satisfied with the decision of the appointing authority may further appeal within ten (10) days from the receipt thereof to the Civil Services Commission which shall render a decision thereon within thirty (30) days and whose decision shall be final and executory. SECTION 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have been separated in violation of the provisions of this Act,

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shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as the case may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay for the period of separation. Unless also separated for cause, all officers and employees, who have been separated pursuant to reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be paid the appropriate separation pay and retirement and other benefits under existing laws within ninety (90) days from the date of the effectivity of their separation or from the date of the receipt of the resolution of their appeals as the case may be: Provided, That application for clearance has been filed and no action thereon has been made by the corresponding department or agency. Those who are not entitled to said benefits shall be paid a separation gratuity in the amount equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service. Such separation pay and retirement benefits shall have priority of payment out of the savings of the department or agency concerned. SECTION 10. All heads of department, commissions, bureaus, agencies or offices who after the effectivity of this Act willfully violate any provision thereof, including failure to abide by the rules promulgated by the Civil Service Commission or to implement a Civil Service Commission reinstatement order, shall upon conviction be punished by a fine not, exceeding ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) or by imprisonment of not less than three(3) nor more than five (5) years or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the Court, and suffer permanent disqualification to hold public office. SECTION 11. The executive branch of the government shall implement reorganization schemes within a specified period of time authorized by law. In the case of the 1987 reorganization of the executive branch, all departments and agencies which are authorized by executive orders promulgated by the President to reorganize shall have ninety (90) days from the approval of this Act within which to implement their respective reorganization plans in accordance with the provisions of this Act. SECTION 12. The Civil Service Commission shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the provisions of this Act. SECTION 13. All laws, rules and regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. The rights and benefits under this Act shall be retroactive as of June 30, 1987. SECTION 14. If any part, section or provisions of this Act shall be held invalid or unconstitutional, no other part, section or provision thereof shall be affected thereby. SECTION 15. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of its publication ion at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Canonizado v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133132, Jan. 25, 2000, En Banc [GonzagaReyes] The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function. It is acknowledged that Congress may abolish any office it creates without impairing the officer's right to continue in the position held and that such power may be exercised for various reasons, such as the lack of funds or in the interest of economy. However, in order for the abolition to be valid, it must be made in good faith, not for political or personal reasons, or in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees. An abolition of office connotes an intention to do away with such office wholly and permanently, as the word "abolished" denotes. Where one office is abolished and replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity. Thus, in U.P. Board of Regents v. Rasul (200 SCRA 685 [1991]) we said: It is true that a valid and bona fide abolition of an office denies to the incumbent the right to security of tenure (De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 [1982]). However, in this case, the renaming and restructuring of the PGH and its component units cannot give rise to a valid and bona fide abolition of the position of PGH Director. This is because where the abolished office and the offices created in its place have similar functions, the abolition lacks good faith (Jose L. Guerrero v. Hon. Antonio V. Arizabal, G.R. No. 81928, June 4, 1990, 186 SCRA 108 [1990]). We hereby apply the principle enunciated in Cezar Z. Dario v. Hon.

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Salvador M. Mison (176 SCRA 84 [1989]) that abolition which merely changes the nomenclature of positions is invalid and does not result in the removal of the incumbent.

Larin v. Executive Secretary, 280 SCRA 713, Oct. 16, 1997 While the Presidents power to reorganize can not be denied, this does not mean however that the reorganization itself is properly made in accordance with law. Well-settled is the rule that reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith.

Impeachment

Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, En Banc [Puno] We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio." Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against himxxx Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.

Recall Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office. The people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations. Such power has been held to be indispensable for the proper administration of public affairs. Not undeservedly, it is frequently described as a fundamental right of the people in a representative democracy. (Garcia v. COMELEC, 227 SCRA 108, Oct. 5, 1993, En Banc [Puno]) By Whom Exercised By the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs [Sec. 69, RA 7160]. Initiation of Recall Process [Sec. 70, RA 7160] By a preparatory recall assembly or by the registered voters of the LGU. Preparatory Recall Assembly. Composition a) Provincial level: All mayors, vice-mayors and sanggunian members of the municipalities and component cities. b) City level: All punong-barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the city. c) Legislative District level: Where sangguniang panlalawigan members are elected by district, all elective municipal officials in the district, and in cases where sangguniang panglunsod members are elected by district, all elective barangay officials in the district. d) Municipal level: All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the municipality.

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A majority of all the PRA members may convene in session in a public place and initiate a recall proceeding against any elective official in the LGU concerned. Garcia v. Comelec: Notice to all members of the PRA is imperative; thus where the resolution was adopted without giving notice to all the members of the PRA, the same is fatally flawed. Initiation of recall by registered voters Recall of a provincial, city, municipal or barangay official may also be validly initiated upon petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in the LGU concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected. Angubong v. COMELEC: The SC underscored the need for a petition signed by at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in the constituency in order to validly initiate a recall election. Thus a where the petition is signed only by the petitioner and does not even bear the names of the citizens who have allegedly lost confidence in the public official, then the petition should be dismissed. Effectivity of Recall The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall. Should the official sought to be recalled receive the highest number of votes, confidence is thereby affirmed, and he shall continue in office [Sec. 72, RA 7160] Limitations on Recall [Sec. 74, RA 7160] b) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence. c) No recall shall take place within one year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one year immediately preceeding a regular local election. Angubong v. COMELEC: Regular local election referred to in Sec. 74, LGC, means that the approaching local election must be one where the position of the official to be recalled is actually contested and to be filled by the electorate.

ELECTION LAWS QUALIFICATIONS OF VOTERS Sec. 1, Art. V, 1987 Constitution SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage. REGISTRATION OF VOTERS

Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, 355 SCRA 318, Mar. 26, 2001, En Banc [Buena]

The right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voters Registration Act of 1996.

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Stated differently, the act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. Thus, contrary to petitioners argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even preelection activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. ABSENTEE VOTING Sec. 2, Art. V, 1987 Constitution SECTION 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot. THE MEANING AND PURPOSE OF RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT IN ELECTION LAW

Marcita Mamba Perez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133944, Oct. 28, 1999, En Banc [Mendoza] The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego v. Vera is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualifyx x x The fact that a person is registered as a voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another district. Thus, in Faypon v. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), this Court held that the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence.

Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 574, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc [Panganiban] The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding elective public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for. Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the area in which they seek to be elected, the Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from [seeking] an elective office to serve that community. Such provision is aimed at excluding outsiders from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. Establishing residence in a community

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merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community. This purpose is best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. PRINCIPLE OF BALLOT SECRECY Sec. 2, Art. V, 1987 Constitution SECTION 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, G.R No. 133486, Jan. 28, 2000, En Banc [Panganiban] The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their official ballots to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified. Also proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or disclosing those of disabled or illiterate voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the association of voters with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in accordance with the instructions of a third party. This result cannot, however, be achieved merely through the voters verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of whom they have voted for.

THE HOLDING OF SYNCHRONIZED ELECTIONS

Osmena v. COMELEC (July 30, 1991) Republic Act 7056 provides for two (2) separate elections in 1992 as follows: "Sec. 2. Start of Synchronization To start the process of synchronization of election in accordance with the policy hereinbefore declared there shall be held; "(a) An election for President and Vice-President of the Philippines, twenty four (24) Senators and all elective Members of the Houses Representatives on the second Monday of May, 1992, and "(b) An election of all provincial, city and municipal elective officials on the second Monday of November, 1992. The purpose of Republic Act 7056 is as stated in Section 1 thereof under the heading "Statement of Policy" ". . . to start, as much as practicable, the synchronization of the elections so that the process can be completed in the 1995 elections with the result that beginning 1995 there shall be only one (1) simultaneous regular elections for national and local elective officials every three (3) years. With the clear mandate of the 1987 Constitution to hold synchronized (simultaneous) national and local elections in the second Monday of May, 1992, the inevitable conclusion would be that Republic Act 7056 is clearly violative of the Constitution because it provides for the holding of a desynchronized election. Stated differently, Republic Act 7056 particularly Sections 1 and 2 thereof contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution.

POLITICAL PARTIES Sec. 2[5], Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution SECTION 2. (5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to

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uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration. Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law. Sec. 60, OEC SECTION 60. Political party. "Political party" or "party", when used in this Act, means an organized group of persons pursuing the same ideology, political ideas or platforms of government and includes its branches and divisions. To acquire juridical personality, qualify it for subsequent accreditation, and to entitle it to the rights and privileges herein granted to political parties, a political party shall first be duly registered with the Commission. Any registered political party that, singly or in coalition with others, fails to obtain at least ten percent of the votes cast in the constituency in which it nominated and supported a candidate or candidates in the election next following its registration shall, after notice and hearing, be deemed to have forfeited such status as a registered political party in such constituency. (Sec. 22, 1971 EC, with amendments) THE LONE CANDIDATE LAW R.A. No. 8295, June 6, 1997 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8295 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE PROCLAMATION OF A LONE CANDIDATE FOR ANY ELECTIVE OFFICE IN A SPECIAL ELECTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide the people with adequate and constant governance and representation in public affairs. Towards this end, the State shall ensure that, as much as practicable, each and every elective position in the executive and legislative branches of government is occupied at all times at the least of cost to government. SECTION 2. Proclamation of a Lone Candidate. Upon the expiration of the deadline for the filing of the certificates of candidacy in a special election called to fill a vacancy in an elective position other than for President and Vice President, when there is only one (1) qualified candidate for such position, the lone candidate shall be proclaimed elected to the position by proper proclaiming body of the Commission on Elections without holding the special election upon certification by the Commission on Elections that he is the only candidate for the office and is thereby deemed elected. SECTION 3. Assumption of Office. In the absence of any lawful ground to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy in order to prevent such proclamation, as provided for under Sections 69 and 78 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 also known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, the candidate referred to in the preceding paragraph shall assume office not earlier than the scheduled election day. Certificates of candidacy filed in violation hereof shall not be given due course. For this purpose, the Commission shall decide petitions for disqualifications not later than election day; otherwise, such petitions shall be deemed dismissed. SECTION 4. Disqualification. In addition to the disqualifications mentioned in Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 40 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, whenever the evidence of guilt is strong, the following persons are disqualified to run in a special election called to fill the vacancy in an elective office, to wit: a) Any elective official who has resigned from his office by accepting an appointive office or for whatever reason

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which he previously occupied but has caused to become vacant due to his resignation; and b) Any person who, directly or indirectly, coerces, bribes, threatens, harasses, intimidates or actually causes, inflicts or produces any violence, injury, punishment, torture, damage, loss or disadvantage to any person or persons aspiring to become a candidate or that of the immediate member of his family, his honor or property that is meant to eliminate all other potential candidate.

SECTION 5. Prohibited Acts, Election Offenses and Penalties. Any act of coercion, bribery, threat, harassment, intimidation, terrorism, or actually causing, inflicting or producing violence, injury, punishment, torture, damage, loss or disadvantage to discourage any other person or persons from filing a certificate of candidacy in order to eliminate all other potential candidate from running in a special election shall constitute as an election offense. Violations of this provision shall be prosecuted and penalized in accordance with the provision of Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code. SECTION 6. Applicability. The pertinent provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, and other election laws which are not in conflict with the provision herein provided, shall remain in full force and effect and are hereby adopted as parts hereof. SECTION 7. Implementing Authority. The Commission on Elections shall, within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of this Act, promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the purpose of this Act. SECTION 8. Separability Clause. If for any reason or reasons, any section, provision of this Act, or any part thereof, or the application of such section, provision or portion is declared or held unconstitutional or invalid, other parts or the remainder thereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect. SECTION 9. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive orders, in whole or in part, particularly pertinent provisions of Republic Act Nos. 7160 and 7166, including the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, are hereby amended, repealed or modified accordingly. SECTION 10. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY Sec. 73, OEC SECTION 73. Certificate of candidacy. No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein. A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath. No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who was filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.

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The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred. (Sec. 19, 1978 EC) Sec. 76, OEC SECTION 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. The Commission, provincial election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of election inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy. (Sec. 25, 1978 EC) EFFECT OF FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY Sec. 66, OEC SECTION 66. Candidates holding appointive office or positions. Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

PNOC-EDC v. NLRC [May 31, 1993]

Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, even those organized under the general laws on incorporation and therefore not having an original or legislative charter, and even if they do not fall under the Civil Service Law but under the Labor Code. In other words, Section 66 constitutes just cause for termination of employment in addition to those set forth in the Labor Code, as amended. Sec. 26, COMELEC Resolution No. 3636 SECTION 26. Effect of Filing Certificate of Candidacy by Elective Officials. Any elective official, whether national or local who has filed a certificate of candidacy for the same or any other office shall not be considered resigned from his office. HSATIC WITHDRAWAL OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY Sec. 73, OEC SECTION 73. Certificate of candidacy. No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein. A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath. No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who was filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices. The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred. (Sec. 19, 1978 EC) SUBSTITUTION OF CANDIDATES Sec. 77, OEC

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SECTION 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission. (Sec. 28, 1978 EC)

Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999, En Banc [Melo]

All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code.

Recabo, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134293, June 21, 1999, En Banc [Gonzaga-Reyes] It will be recalled that the mother of herein petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy on March 25, 1998 and later withdrew the same on March 31, 1998. In the meantime, private respondent Reyes, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy on March 27, 1998. Thereafter, herein petitioner Recabo, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy on April 2, 1998, in substitution of his mother who had withdrawn earlier. Assuming all three candidates were fielded-in by the same political party at the time petitioner Recabo, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy there was no more void to fill in as respondent Reyes, Jr. had already filed his certificate of candidacy as official candidate of LAKAS NUCD-UMDP. Verily, there was no more vacancy to be substituted for. Disunity and discord amongst members of a political party should not be allowed to create a mockery of our electoral process, which envisions one candidate from a political party of each position." Sec. 12, R.A. No. 9006 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9006 AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR ELECTION PRACTICES SECTION 12. Substitution of Candidates. In case of valid substitutions after the official ballots have been printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates shall be considered as stray votes but shall not invalidate the whole ballot. For this purpose, the official ballots shall provide spaces where the voters may write the name of the substitute candidates if they are voting for the latter: Provided, however, That if the substitute candidate is of the same family name, this provision shall not apply. DISQUALIFICATION CASES BEFORE THE ELECTIONS Sec. 68, OEC SECTION 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)

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committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971 EC) Sec. 69, OEC SECTION 69. Nuisance candidates. The Commission may, motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate. (Sec. 26, 1978 EC)

Bautista v. COMELEC, 298 SCRA 480, Nov. 13, 1998, En Banc [Melo] In the present case, it has been established that respondent's known appellation or nickname is not "Efren" as stated in his Certificate of Candidacy, but "Boboy" or "Boboy Tarugo". Two "EFRENS" and two "BAUTISTAS" will necessarily confuse the voters and render worthless a vote for an 'Efren' or 'Bautista' during the appreciation of ballots, thus preventing the determination of the choice and true will of the electorate. Respondent's lack of financial means to support a campaign as an independent candidate is manifested by his inability to file his Income Tax Returns for calendar years 1995 and 1996. This only amplifies the fact that he has no bona fide intention to run for the position of municipal mayor of Navotas, a municipality with 104,601 registered voters. Respondent has not demonstrated any accomplishment/achievement in his twenty-six (26) years of existence as a person that would surely attract the electorate to choose him as their representative in government. Elective public officials are respected leaders in the community. Respondent has not shown any. This Commission as the vanguard of the people in the determination of the chosen representative of the electorate in government will not be an instrument to subvert that choice. The circumstances in the case at bar warrant that respondent be declared a nuisance candidate.

Sec. 78, OEC SECTION 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

Salcedo II v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135886, Aug. 16, 1999, En Banc [Gonzaga-Reyes] Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by section 78 of the Code refer to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy are grave to prevent the candidate from running or,

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if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous mistake. Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to ones qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to ones identity, is not within the scope of the provision.

Loong v. COMELEC [Dec. 1992]

If a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code. Section 1 Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure similarly provides that any voter contesting the election of any regional, provincial or city official on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with the Electoral Contest Adjudication Department. The petition may be filed within ten (10) days from the date the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2). It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to be stated in a certificate of candidacy, under Section 74 of the Code, may be made only after the lapse of the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, through no fault of the person who discovers such misrepresentations and who would want the disqualification of the candidate committing the misrepresentation. It would seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a gap between the time of the discovery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made after the 25-day period under Sec. 78 of the Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation of the results of the election is made. During this so-called "gap" the would-be petitioner (who would seek the disqualification of the candidate) is left with nothing to do except to wait for the proclamation of the results, so that he could avail of a remedy against the misrepresenting candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo warranto against him. EFFECT OF DISQUALIFICATION CASES Sec. 6, R.A. No. 6646 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646 AN ACT INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL REFORMS IN THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Trinidad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135716, Sept. 23, 1999, En Banc [YnaresSantiago] With the complaint for disqualification of private respondent rendered moot and academic by the expiration of petitioner's term of office therein contested, COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in proceeding to disqualify petitioner from his reelected term of office in its second questioned Resolution on the ground that "it comes as a matter of course after his disqualification in SPA

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No. 95-213 promulgated after the 1998 election." While it is true that the first questioned Resolution was issued eight (8) days before the term of petitioner as Mayor expired, said Resolution had not yet attained finality and could not effectively be held to have removed petitioner from his office. Indeed, removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term. We see no error in the COMELEC's rejection of private respondent's move to be declared as Mayor on account of petitioner's disqualification. To begin with, the issue had been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of petitioner's challenged term of office. Second, even in law and jurisprudence, private respondent cannot claim any right to the office. As held by the COMELEC, the succession to the office of the mayor shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Code which, in turn, provides that the vice mayor concerned shall become the mayor. In the latest ruling (Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995) on the question, this Court said: To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances."

Sunga v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA 76, March 25, 1998 [Bellosillo] Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word "shall" signifies that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced. 11 The implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre v. Duavit in effect disallows RA No. 6646 imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of its authority. Interpretative rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative agencies must always be in perfect harmony with statutes and should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general provisions into effect. By such interpretative or administrative rulings, of course, the scope of the law itself cannot be limited. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.

PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES Sec. 241, OEC SECTION 241. Definition. A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns. Sec. 243, OEC SECTION 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy: (a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; (b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain

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discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Section 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code; (c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and (d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates. Sec. 15, R.A. No. 7166

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR SYNCHRONIZED NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS AND FOR ELECTORAL REFORMS, AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES SECTION 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President Vice-President, Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives. For purposes of the elections for President, VicePresident, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it. Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers may be initiated in the board or directly with the Commission in accordance with Section 19 hereof. Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of canvassers, or on the municipal certificates of canvass before the provincial board of canvassers or district boards of canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be specifically noticed in the minutes of their respective proceedings.

Sandoval v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133842, Jan. 26, 2000 [Puno]

The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. The law, nonetheless, provides an exception to the exception. The second sentence of Section 15 allows the filing of petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns even in elections for president, vicepresident and members of the House of Representatives for the simple reason that the correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in the election. This rule is consistent with and complements the authority of the COMELEC under the Constitution to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall" and its power to "decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections." The Doctrine of Statistical improbability

Velayo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135613, March 9, 2000, En Banc [Puno]

Standing alone and without more, the bare fact that a candidate for public office received zero votes in one or two precincts can not adequately support a finding that the subject election returns are statistically improbable. A no-vote for a particular candidate in election returns is but one strand in the web of circumstantial evidence that those election returns were prepared under "duress, force and intimidation." In the case of Una Kibad v. Comelec, we warned that the doctrine on statistical improbability must be viewed restrictively, the utmost care being taken lest in penalizing the fraudulent and corrupt practices, which indeed is called for, innocent voters become disenfranchised, a result which hardly commends itself. This specially applies to the case at bar where respondent COMELEC's ruling is premised on questionable affidavits of private respondent's witnesses, and election returns which appear to be regular on, their, face.

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Moreover, the doctrine of statistical improbability involves a question of fact and a more prudential approach prohibits its determination ex parte. PETITION TO DECLARE FAILURE OF ELECTIONS OR ANNUL ELECTION RESULTS Sec. 6, OEC SECTION 6. Failure of election. If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. (Sec. 7, 1978 EC) Sec. 4, R.A. No. 7166 SECTION 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. The postponement, declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members. The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election. In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the succeeding regular election.

Mitmug v. COMELEC, 230 SCRA 54, Feb. 10, 1994, En Banc [Bellosillo]

Before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must concur: first, no voting has taken place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless results in failure to elect; and, second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the election. There can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been defiled and cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be determined, it must be accorded respect. After all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires that a majority of registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a winning candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual number of ballots cast. Thus, even if less than 25% of the electorate in the questioned precincts cast their votes, the same must still be respected.

Banaga, Jr. v. COMELEC, 336 SCRA 701, July 31, 2000, En Banc [Quisumbing] A prayer to declare failure of elections and a prayer to annul the election results x x x are actually of the same nature. Whether an action is for declaration of failure of elections or for annulment of election results, based on allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence or analogous, the Omnibus Election Code denominates them similarly. ELECTION PROTESTS AND QUO WARRANTO PROCEEDINGS

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Jurisdiction in Election Protests and Quo Warranto Proceedings Who has Period to file Position jurisdiciton Remedy Election Protest President & VP - within 30 days after proc. Quo Warranto - within 10 days after proc. EP & QW - SET: w/in 15 days after proc. - HRET: w/in 10 days after proc. Member of Congress (Senator/ Congressman) ~ CERTIORARI Rule 65 RC

Supreme Court

~ NO APPEAL

as Presidential SC is sole judge Electoral Tribunal ~ MOTION FOR RECON

SET/HRET

~ NO APPEAL SET/HRET: Sole judge of EP

EP & QW - within 10 days after proc.

Regional Provincial City/Comp. City Officials

COMELEC

~ NO APPEAL

~ CERTIORARI Rule 65 RC

Municipal officials

RTC

~ APPEAL TO COMELEC ~ NO APPEAL from COMELEC decision ~ CERTIORARI Rule 65 RC

Barangay officials

MTC

~ APPEAL TO COMELEC ~ NO APPEAL from COMELEC decision ~ CERTIORARI Rule 65 RC

These periods are MANDATORY, but they may be extended if the grounds relied upon by the petition is: 1- Lack of citizenship of the proclaimed candidate, or 2- Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines

Dumayas, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April 20, 2001, En Banc [Quisumbing] A petition for quo warranto under the Omnibus Election Code raises in issue the disloyalty or ineligibility of the winning candidate. It is a proceeding to unseat the respondent from office but not necessarily to install the petitioner in his place. An election protest is a contest between the defeated and winning candidates on the ground of frauds or irregularities in the casting and counting of the ballots, or

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in the preparation of the returns. It raises the question of who actually obtained the plurality of the legal votes and therefore is entitled to hold the office. ELECTION PROTEST vs. QUO WARRANTO ELECTION PROTEST QUO WARRANTO ~ ISSUE: who really won ~ ISSUE: Whether or not the in the elections proclaimed candidate is ~ Grounds: qualified or disqualified Fraud, Intimidation, Threats Coercion, Vote-buying, Ballot-snatching, etc. ~ Who can file: ~ Who can file: Only a candidate running Any registered voter may for the same office may file a quo warranto file an election protest COUNTER-PROTESTS

Kho v. COMELEC, 279 SCRA 463, Sept. 25, 1997, En Banc [torres] It should be stressed that under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the protestee may incorporate in his answer a counter-protest. It has been said that a counter-protest is tantamount to a counterclaim in a civil action and may be presented as a part of the answer within the time he is required to answer the protest, unless a motion for extension is granted, in which case it must be filed before the expiration of the extended time. Apparently, the counter-protest of Espinosa was incorporated in his answer. And as what was revealed, this answer with counter-protest was filed only on June 15, 1995, which was obviously late for four (4) days. It appears that Espinosa did not file a motion for extension of time within which to file his answer with counter-protest. In the absence thereof, there is no basis then for the COMELEC First Division to admit the belatedly filed answer with counter-protest. It is worthy to note that as early as in the case of Arrieta vs. Rodriguez, this Court had firmly settled the rule that the counter-protest must be filed within the period provided by law, otherwise, the forum loses its jurisdiction to entertain the belatedly filed counter-protest. In the case at bar, there is no question that the answer with counter-protest of Espinosa was filed outside the reglementary period provided for by law. As such, the COMELEC First Division has no jurisdictional authority to entertain the belated answer with counter-protest much less pass upon and decide the issues raised therein.

EFFECT OF DEATH OF PARTY IN AN ELECTION PROTEST

De Castro v. COMELEC, 267 SCRA 806, Feb. 7, 1997 An election protest involves both the private interests of the rival candidates and the public interest in the final determination of the real choice of the electorate, and for this reason, an election contest necessarily survives the death of the protestant or the protestee. It is true that a public office is personal to the public officer and is not a property transmissible to his heirs upon death, thus, upon the death of the incumbent, no heir of his may be allowed to continue holding his office in his place. But while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that after the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. An election contest, after all, involves not merely conflicting private aspirations but is imbued with paramount public interests. The death of the protestant neither constitutes a ground for the dismissal of the contest nor ousts the trial court of its jurisdiction to decide the election contest.

WHEN ELECTION PROTEST IS DEEMED ABANDONED

Miriam Defensor-Santiago v. Fidel Valdez Ramos [P.E.T. Case 0001, 2-1396] Protestant seeks to be declared as the truly elected President up to 30 June 1998. In the 8 May 1995 elections, however, she was elected Senator for a term

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ending on 30 June 2001. As Senator, she has become a member of the legislative department of government impressed with the duty, among others, to fiscalize the executive. She cannot, in my view, opt to fiscalize the executive until she herself becomes the executive, at which point, she will abandon the fiscalizing duty entrusted to her by the people. She must choose only one of the two (2) positions involved; she cannot have both within overlapping periods of time. And she, in fact, made the choice becoming and qualifying as a Senator of the Republic from 30 June 1995 to 30 June 2001. It appears clear that the people (electorate) expect her to perform dutifully, creditably and successfully in the position of her last and most recent choice. She should, in my considered view, be deemed to have abandoned or waived her claim to the Presidency of the Republic, at least until 30 June 1998, when she can run for the said office without relinquishing or forfeiting her seat as Senator (See Sec. 67, Art. IX, BP 881). [PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting] DISMISS the instant election protest, since it has been rendered moot and academic by its abandonment or withdrawal by the Protestant as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions thereof. [Majority decision, dispositive portion] APPRECIATION OF BALLOTS The Equity-of-the-Incumbent Rule If two or more candidates are running or the same office, and they bear the same first name, surname or both and a voter in his ballot wrote only either of the two, the vote shall be appreciated in favor of the incumbent. The Idem Sonans Rule Same sound Rule. If the name of the candidate is misspelled by the voter, for as long as when it is pronounced it sounds like the name of the candidate, it shall be counted in his favor, unless it can be considered as a marking-- if it is a marking, the entire ballot is invalid. The Description Personae Rule The use of nicknames and appellation of affection and friendship, if accompanied by the first name or surname of the candidate, does not annul such vote, except when they are used as a means to identify the voter, in which case the whole ballot is invalid. JURISDICTION OVER ELECTION OFFENSES Election offenses 1- Vote-buying and vote-selling 2- Wagering upon the result of the election 3- Threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device and other forms of coercion 4- Appointment of new employee, creation of new positions, promotion, granting salary increases 5- Transfer or detail of government official/EE without COMELEC approval COMELEC : Exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute RTC : Exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal acitons or proceedings for violation of election laws MTC : offenses relating to failure to register or vote PRESCRIPTION PERIOD FOR ELECTION OFFENSES : 5 years from date of commission THE LAW OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS THE POLITICAL AND TERRITORIAL SUBDIVISIONS OF THE STATE Sec. 1, Art. X, 1987 Constitution

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SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

Autonomous Regions (Sec. 15, Art. X, 1987 Constitution) SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

Administrative Regions

Abbas v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287, Nov. 10, 1989, en Banc [Cortes] Administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. They are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governmentsx x x There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.

Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253 [1995] Thus the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the power "to merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices. The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division or merger of local governments, which all have political consequences on the right of people residing in those political units to vote and to be voted for. It cannot be overemphasized that administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political representation.

Special Metropolitan Political Subdivisions (Sec. 11, Art. X, 1987 Constitution) SECTION 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will hereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.

MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 328 SCRA 836, March 27, 2000, 1st Div. [Puno] When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a special development and administrative region and the MMDA a special development authority whose functions were without prejudice to the

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autonomy of the affected local government units. The character of the MMDA was clearly defined in the legislative debates enacting its charterxxx Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. This was explicitly stated in the last Committee deliberations prior to the bills presentation to Congressxxx It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a special metropolitan political subdivision as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a special metropolitan political subdivision requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. R.A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President, whereas in local government units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA. Clearly then, the MMC under P.D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R.A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal x x x. THE CONCEPT OF LOCAL AUTONOMY Sec. 25, Art. II, 1987 Constitution SECTION 25. The State shall ensure governments. Sec. 2, Art. X, 1987 Constitution SECTION 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. the autonomy of local

Limbona v. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786, Feb. 28, 1989, En Banc [Sarmiento] Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government and in the process to make local governments more responsive and accountable, and ensure their fullest development as selfreliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress. At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises general supervision over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in favor of local government units declared autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its own future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to self-immolation, since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.

Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA, 181 SCRA 495, Jan. 29, 1990, En Banc [Cortes]

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The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions.

Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52, May 14, 1991, En Banc [Paras] The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 436436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio." "Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. (emphasis supplied) As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539). What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.

Alvarez v. Guingona, Jr., 252 SCRA 695, Jan. 31, 1996, En Banc [Hermosisima] The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means decentralization. It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an imperium in imperio. Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio, the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own pace and discretion but also with their own resources and assets.

DUAL NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Every local government unit created or organized [under the Local Government Code] is a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it shall exercise powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory. [Sec. 15, R.A. 7160] Accordingly, it has dual functions, namely: 1) Public or governmental : It acts as an agent of the state for the government of the territory and the inhabitants 2) Private or proprietary : It acts as an agent of the community in the administration of local affairs. As such, it acts as a separate entity for its own purposes, and not as a subdivision of the State [Lidasan v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496] PROPERTIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

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Dacanay v. Asistio, Jr., 208 SCRA 404, En Banc [Grino-Aquino] As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect.xxx The Executive Order issued by Acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of Heroes del '96 Street as a vending area for stallholders who were granted licenses by the city government contravenes the general law that reserves city streets and roads for public use. Mayor Robles' Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians.

CREATION, DIVISION, MERGER AND ABOLITION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 239 SCRA 11, Dec. 6, 1994, en Banc [Vitug] Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and later the Municipality, of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly filed, so also, if not indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country, certain municipalities that comprised the municipal circuits organized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978, issued by this Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this administrative order, the Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon. Cdpr At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelledxxx Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is preferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, 21 and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.

Alvarez v. Guingona, Jr., 252 SCRA 695, Jan. 31, 1996, En Banc [Hermosisima]

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Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," mainly because the Act allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional prescription, originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant controversy.

Padilla, Jr. c. COMELEC, 214 SCRA 735, Oct. 19, 1992, En Banc [Romero] The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution from its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution has not affected our ruling in Tan v. COMELEC. It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phrase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.

Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106, Dec. 8, 1994, En Banc [Bidin] Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.

Boundaries of Local Governments

Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211, Mar. 7, 1995, En Banc [Puno]

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.

City of Pasig v. COMELEC, 314 SCRA 179, Sept. 10, 1999, En Banc [YnaresSantiago] (Boundary Dispute) Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only

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be an exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of such barangaysxxx Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in abeyance the conduct of the same, pending final determination of whether or not the entire area of the proposed barangays are truly within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Pasigxxx Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has already been rendered moot and academic. The issues raised by the Municipality of Cainta in its petition before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Napico are still pending determination before the Antipolo Regional Trial Court.xxx Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. In the same vein, the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and set aside. POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Police Power

MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 328 SCRA 836, March 27, 2000, 1st Div. [Puno] It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is x x x a development authority. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself x x x. Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDAxxx The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the Sangguniang Bayan. This was composed of the members of the component city and municipal councils, barangay captains chosen by the MMC and sectoral representatives appointed by the President. The Sangguniang Bayan had the power to recommend to the MMC the adoption of ordinances, resolutions or measures. It was the MMC itself, however, that possessed legislative powers. All ordinances, resolutions and measures recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were subject to the MMCs approval. Moreover, the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money, and the power to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions were vested exclusively in the MMCxxx Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a central government, i.e., the MMC which fully possessed legislative and police powers. Whatever legislative powers the component cities and municipalities had were all subject to review and approval by the MMCxxx

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. CA, 329 SCRA 314, March 31, 2000, En Banc [Purisima] The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass almost all matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals,

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comfort and convenience of the community. Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. It is provided for by law. However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal protection of the law. In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City Mayor to petitioner was burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the Court of Appeals that respondent City Mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing such special conditions in its permit as the same have no basis in the law or ordinance. Public respondents and private respondent SOPI, on the other hand, are one in saying that the imposition of said special conditions on petitioner's business permit is well within the authority of the City Mayor as a valid exercise of police power. The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the state within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc. 234 SCRA 255, July 20, 1994

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code, which empowers the local government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinance are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

LLDA v. CA, 251 SCRA 42, Dec. 7, 1995 [Hermosisima]

The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the

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heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power of Local Government Units." On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and management. It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. Section 149 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it. Power of Eminent Domain

Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corp., 292 SCRA 678, July 20, 1998 [Panganiban] The principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agents to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can reach every form of property which the State might need for public use. All separate interests of individuals in property are held of the government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity; and they have the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest requires it. Thus, the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement. While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case. For example, a final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue; it cannot, however, bar the State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as prescribed by law, and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property. May a local government unit validly authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body? Held: The Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for that purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the Municipal Council will not suffice. The case of Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals which held that a mere resolution may suffice to support the exercise of eminent domain by a local government unit is not in point because the applicable law at that time was B.P. 337, the previous Local Government Code, which had provided that a mere resolution would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast, R.A. 7160, the present Local Government Code, explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose. What are the requisites before a Local Government Unit can validly exercise the power of eminent domain? 1) An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property; 2) The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless;

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3) There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws; 4) A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. ORDINANCE a) This is a law b) Permanent in nature c) 3rd reading is required in its enactment RESOLUTION a) Mere expression of the sentiment or opinion b) Temporary in nature c) No 3rd reading is required

Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, 328 SCRA 137, march 14, 2000, 3rd Div. [Gonzaga-Reyes] Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular uses to promote public welfare. It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common need and advance the general welfarexxx In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong seeks to exercise the power of eminent domain over petitioners' property by means of a resolution, in contravention of the first requisite. The law in this case is clear and free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent domainxxx Power of Taxation

Philippine Petroleum Corp. v. Municipality of Pililla, Rizal, 198 SCRA 82, June 3, 1991 [Paras] The trial court did not err in holding that "since the power to tax includes the power to exempt thereof which is essentially a legislative prerogative, it follows that a municipal mayor who is an executive officer may not unilaterally withdraw such an expression of a policy thru the enactment of a tax." The waiver partakes of the nature of an exemption. It is an ancient rule that exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority (Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Acting Commissioner of Customs, 18 SCRA 488 [1966]). Tax exemptions are looked upon with disfavor (Western Minolco Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 124 SCRA 121 [1983]). Thus, in the absence of a clear and express exemption from the payment of said fees, the waiver cannot be recognized. As already stated, it is the law-making body, and not an executive like the mayor, who can make an exemption.

Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52, May 14, 1991, En Banc [Paras]

The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643) . Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax" (b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power. (c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government. Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer

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vested in the City of Manila. (d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers.

Province of Bulacan v. CA, 299 SCRA 442, Nov. 7, 1998 [Romero]

The tax imposed by the Province of Bulacan is an excise tax, being a tax upon the performance, carrying on, or exercise of an activity. The Local Government Code provides: Section 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following: xxx xxx xxx (h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products; xxx xxx xxx A province may not, therefore, levy excise taxes on articles already taxed by the National Internal Revenue Code. Unfortunately for petitioners, the National Internal Revenue Code provides: Section 151. Mineral Products. (A) Rates of Tax. There shall be levied, assessed and collected on minerals, mineral products and quarry resources, excise tax as follows: xxx xxx xxx (2) On all nonmetallic minerals and quarry resources, a tax of two percent (2%) based on the actual market value of the gross output thereof at the time of removal, in case of those locally extracted or produced; or the values used by the Bureau of Customs in determining tariff and customs duties, net of excise tax and value-added tax, in the case of importation. xxx (B) xxx xxx xxx [Definition of Terms]. For purposes of this Section, the term xxx xxx

(4) Quarry resources shall mean any common stone or other common mineral substances as the Director of the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences may declare to be quarry resources such as, but not restricted to, marl, marble, granite, volcanic cinders, basalt, tuff and rock phosphate; Provided, That they contain no metal or metals or other valuable minerals in economically workable quantities. It is clearly apparent from the above provision that the National Internal Revenue Code levies a tax on all quarry resources, regardless of origin, whether extracted from public or private land. Thus, a province may not ordinarily impose taxes on stones, sand, gravel, earth and other quarry resources, as the same are already taxed under the National Internal Revenue Code. The province can, however, impose a tax on stones, sand, gravel, earth and other quarry resources extracted from public land because it is expressly empowered to do so under the Local Government Code. As to stones, sand, gravel, earth and other quarry resources extracted from private land, however, it may not do so, because of the limitation provided by Section 133 of the Code in relation to Section 151 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Devolved Powers to Local governments Sec. 17, LGC SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code.

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Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein. (b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) For Barangay: (i) Agricultural support services which include planting materials distribution system and operation of farm produce collection and buying stations; (ii) Health and social welfare services which include maintenance of barangay health center and day-care center; (iii) Services and facilities related to general hygiene and sanitation, beautification, and solid waste collection; (iv) Maintenance of katarungang pambarangay; (v) Maintenance of barangay roads and bridges and water supply systems; (vi) Infrastructure facilities such as multi-purpose hall, multipurpose pavement, plaza, sports center, and other similar facilities; (vii) Information and reading center; and (viii) Satellite or public market, where viable; (2) For a Municipality: (i) Extension and on-site research services and facilities related to agriculture and fishery activities which include dispersal of livestock and poultry, fingerlings, and other seedling materials for aquaculture; palay, corn, and vegetable seed farms; medicinal plant gardens; fruit tree, coconut, and other kinds of seedling nurseries; demonstration farms; quality control of copra and improvement and development of local distribution channels, preferably through cooperatives; interbarangay irrigation system; water and soil resource utilization and conservation projects; and enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves; (ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR, implementation of community-based forestry projects which include integrated social forestry programs and similar projects; management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest development projects; (iii) Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this Code, health services which include the implementation of programs and projects on primary health care, maternal and child care, and communicable and non-communicable disease control services, access to secondary and tertiary health services; purchase of medicines, medical supplies, and equipment needed to carry out the services herein enumerated; (iv) Social welfare services which include programs and projects on child and youth welfare, family and community welfare, women's welfare, welfare of the elderly and disabled persons; community-based rehabilitation programs for vagrants, beggars, street children, scavengers, juvenile delinquents, and victims of drug abuse; livelihood and other pro-poor projects; nutrition services; and family planning services; (v) Information services which include investments and job placement information systems, tax and marketing information systems, and maintenance of a public library; (vi) Solid waste disposal system or environmental management system and services or facilities related to general hygiene and sanitation; (vii) Municipal buildings, cultural centers, public parks including freedom parks, playgrounds, and other sports facilities and equipment, and other similar facilities;

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(viii) Infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of the residents of the municipality and which are funded out of municipal funds including but not limited to, municipal roads and bridges; school buildings and other facilities for public elementary and secondary schools; clinics, health centers and other health facilities necessary to carry out health services; communal irrigation, small water impounding projects and other similar projects; fish ports; artesian wells, spring development, rainwater collectors and water supply systems; seawalls, dikes, drainage and sewerage, and flood control; traffic signals and road signs; and similar facilities; (ix) Public markets, slaughterhouses and other municipal enterprises; (x) Public cemetery; (xi) Tourism facilities and other tourist attractions, including the acquisition of equipment, regulation and supervision of business concessions, and security services for such facilities; and (xii) Sites for police and fire stations and substations and municipal jail; (3) For a Province: (i) Agricultural extension and on-site research services and facilities which include the prevention and control of plant and animal pests and diseases; dairy farms, livestock markets, animal breeding stations, and artificial insemination centers; and assistance in the organization of farmers and fishermen's cooperatives, and other collective organizations, as well as the transfer of appropriate technology; (ii) Industrial research and development services, as well as the transfer of appropriate technology; (iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR, enforcement of forestry laws limited to communitybased forestry projects, pollution control law, smallscale mining law, and other laws on the protection of the environment; and mini-hydroelectric projects for local purposes; (iv) Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this Code, health services which include hospitals and other tertiary health services; (v) Social welfare services which include programs and projects on rebel returnees and evacuees; relief operations; and population development services; (vi) Provincial buildings, provincial jails, freedom parks and other public assembly areas and similar facilities; (vii) Infrastructure facilities intended to service the needs of the residence of the province and which are funded out of provincial funds including, but not limited to, provincial roads and bridges; inter-municipal waterworks, drainage and sewerage, flood control, and irrigation systems; reclamation projects; and similar facilities; (viii) Programs and projects for low-cost housing and other mass dwellings, except those funded by the Social Security System (SSS), Government Service Insurance System p. 172 (GSIS), and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF): Provided, That national funds for these programs and projects shall be equitably allocated among the regions in proportion to the ratio of the homeless to the population; (ix) Investment support services, including access to credit financing; (x) Upgrading and modernization of tax information and collection services through the use of computer hardware and software and other means; (xi) Inter-municipal telecommunications services, subject to national policy guidelines; and

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(xii) Tourism development and promotion programs; (4) For a City: All the services and facilities of the municipality and province, and in addition thereto, the following: (i) Adequate communication and transportation facilities; (c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the national government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs, and services. (d) The designs, plans, specifications, testing of materials, and the procurement of equipment and materials at P170 from both foreign and local sources necessary for the provision of the foregoing services and facilities shall be undertaken by the local government unit concerned, based on national policies, standards and guidelines. (e) National agencies or offices concerned shall devolve to local government units the responsibility for the provision of basic services and facilities enumerated in this Section within six (6) months after the effectivity of this Code. As used in this Code, the term "devolution" refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. (f) The national government or the next higher level of local government unit may provide or augment the basic services and facilities assigned to a lower level of local government unit when such services or facilities are not made available or, if made available, are inadequate to meet the requirements of its inhabitants. (g) The basic services and facilities hereinabove enumerated shall be funded from the share of local government units in the proceeds of national taxes and other local revenues and funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and governmentowned or controlled corporations which are tasked by law to establish and maintain such services or facilities. Any fund or resource available for the use of local government units shall be first allocated for the provision of basic services or facilities enumerated in subsection (b) hereof before applying the same for other purposes, unless otherwise provided in this Code. (h) Regional offices of national agencies or offices whose functions are devolved to local government units as provided herein shall be phased out within one (1) year from the approval of this Code. Said national agencies and offices may establish such field units as may be necessary for monitoring purposes and providing technical assistance to local government units. The properties, equipment, and other assets of these regional offices shall be distributed to the local government units in the region in accordance with the rules and regulations issued by the oversight committee created under this Code. (i) The devolution contemplated in this Code shall include the transfer to local government units of the records, equipment, and other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions, and responsibilities. Personnel of said national agencies or offices shall be absorbed by the local government units to which they belong or in whose areas

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they are assigned to the extent that it is administratively viable as determined by the said oversight committee: Provided, That the rights accorded to such personnel pursuant to civil service law, rules and regulations shall not be impaired: Provided, further, That regional directors who are career executive service officers and other officers of similar rank in the said regional offices who cannot be absorbed by the local government unit shall be retained by the national government, without any diminution of rank, salary or tenure. (j) To ensure the active participation of the private sector in local governance, local government units may, by ordinance, sell, lease, encumber, or otherwise dispose of public economic enterprises owned by them in their proprietary capacity. Costs may also be charged for the delivery of basic services or facilities enumerated in this Section.

LTO v. City of Butuan, G.R. No. 131512, Jan. 20, 2000, 3rd Div. [Vitug] LGUs indubitably now have the power to regulate the operation of tricyclesfor-hire and to grant franchises for the operation thereof. "To regulate" means to fix, establish, or control; to adjust by rule, method, or established mode; to direct by rule or restriction; or to subject to governing principles or laws. A franchise is defined to be a special privilege to do certain things conferred by government on an individual or corporation, and which does not belong to citizens generally of common right. On the other hand, "to register" means to record formally and exactly, to enroll, or to enter precisely in a list or the like, and a "driver's license" is the certificate or license issued by the government which authorizes a person to operate a motor vehicle. The devolution of the functions of the DOTC, performed by the LTFRB, to the LGUs, as so aptly observed by the Solicitor General, is aimed at curbing the alarming increase of accidents in national highways involving tricycles. It has been the perception that local governments are in good position to achieve the end desired by the law-making body because of their proximity to the situation that can enable them to address that serious concern better than the national governmentxxx The power over tricycles granted under Section 458(a)(3)(VI) of the Local Government Code to LGUs is the power to regulate their operation and to grant franchises for the operation thereof. The exclusionary clause contained in the tax provisions of Section 133(1) of the Local Government Code must not be held to have had the effect of withdrawing the express power of LTO to cause the registration of all motor vehicles and the issuance of licenses for the driving thereof. These functions of the LTO are essentially regulatory in nature, exercised pursuant to the police power of the State, whose basic objectives are to achieve road safety by insuring the road worthiness of these motor vehicles and the competence of drivers prescribed by R. A. 4136. Not insignificant is the rule that a statute must not be construed in isolation but must be taken in harmony with the extant body of laws.

Have the powers of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) to register, tricycles in particular, as well as to issue licenses for the driving thereof, been devolved likewise to local government units? Held: Only the powers of the Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board (LTFRB) to regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire and to grant franchises for the operation thereof have been devolved to local governments under the Local Government Code. Clearly unaffected by the Local Government Code are the powers of the LTO under R.A. No. 4136 requiring the registration of all kinds of motor vehicles used or operated on or upon any public highway in the country. This can be gleaned from the explicit language of the statute itself, as well as the corresponding guidelines issued by the DOTC. In fact, even the power of LGUs to regulate the operation of tricycles and to grant franchises for the operation thereof is still subject to the guidelines prescribed by the DOTC. Power to Enter into Contracts

Osmena v. COA, 238 SCRA 463, Nov. 29, 1994, En Banc [Narvasa] The participation by the City in negotiations for an amicable settlement of a pending litigation and its eventual execution of a compromise relative thereto,

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are indubitably within its authority and capacity as a public corporation; and a compromise of a civil suit in which it is involved as a party, is a perfectly legitimate transaction, not only recognized but even encouraged by law. A compromise is a bilateral act or transaction that it expressly acknowledged as a juridical agreement by the Civil Code and is therein dealt with in some detail. "A compromise," declares Article 2208 of said Code, "is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced." The definition is reflective of the general concept of a compromise in other jurisdictions, as "an agreement between two or more persons, who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their difficulties by mutual consent in the same manner which they agree on, and which everyone of them prefers in the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of losing." That the City of Cebu complied with the relevant formalities contemplated by law can hardly be doubted. The compromise agreement was submitted to its legislative council, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which approved it conformably with its established rules and procedure, particularly the stipulation for the payment of P30,000.00 to the de la Cerna family. Neither may it be disputed that since, as a municipal corporation, Cebu City has the power to sue and be sued, it has the authority to settle or compromise suits, as well as the obligation to pay just and valid claims against it.

Osmena v. COA, 230 SCRA 585, Mar. 2, 1994 [Nocon] The Commission on Audit has the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to revenue and receipts of and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities. The Auditing Code of the Philippines (P.D. 1445) further provides that no contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor and the proper accounting official of the agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into the obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose and the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current fiscal year is available for expenditure on account thereof. (Emphasis added) Any contract entered into contrary to the foregoing requirements shall be VOID. Clearly then, the contract entered into by the former Mayor Duterte was void from the very beginning since the agreed cost for the project (P8,368,920.00) was way beyond the appropriated amount (P5,419,180.00) as certified by the City Treasurer. Hence, the contract was properly declared void and unforceable in COA's 2nd Indorsement, dated September 4, 1986.

City of Quezon v. Lexber Incorporated, 354 SCRA 493, March 15, 2001, 1st Div. [Ynares-Santiago] We must differentiate the provisions of the old Local Government code of 1983 (BP 337) which was then in force, from that of the LGC of 1991 (RA 7160), which now requires that the mayors representation of the city in its business transactions must be upon authority of the sangguniang panlungsod orpursuant to law or ordinance (Sec. 455 [vi]). This restriction, therefor cannot be imposed on the city mayor then since the two contacts were entered into before RA 7160 was even enacted. Under BP 337, while the city mayor has no power to appropriate funds to support the contracts, neither does said law prohibit him fro entering into contracts unless and until funds are appropriated therefore. In fact, it is his bounden duty to so represent the city in all its business transactions. On the other hand, the city council must provide fro the depositing, leaving or throwing of garbage and to appropriate funds for such expenses. It cannot refuse to provide and appropriate public funds for such services which are very vital to the maintenance of cleanliness of the city and the good health of its inhabitants.

REPRESENTATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN LAWSUITS

Ramos v. CA, 269 SCRA 34, Mar. 3, 1997

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The recent case of Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. Court of Appeals, set in clear-cut terms the answer to the question of who may legally represent a municipality in a suit for or against it. Only the provincial fiscal, provincial attorney, and municipal attorney should represent a municipality in its lawsuits. Only in exceptional instances may a private attorney be hired by a municipality to represent it in lawsuits. These exceptions are enumerated in the case of Alinsug vs. RTC, Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental. Private lawyers may not represent municipalities on their own. Neither may they do so even in collaboration with authorized government lawyers. This is anchored on the principle that only accountable public officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and that public funds should not be expended to hire private lawyers xxx Although a municipality may not hire a private lawyer to represent it in litigations, in the interest of substantial justice, however, we hold that a municipality may adopt the work already performed in good faith by such private lawyer, which work is beneficial to it (1) provided that no injustice is thereby heaped on the adverse party and (2) provided further that no compensation in any guise is paid therefor by said municipality to the private lawyer. Unless so expressly adopted, the private lawyer's work cannot bind the municipality.

Province of Bulacan v. CA, 299 SCRA 442, Nov. 7, 1998 [Romero]

xxx While it is true that the Provincial Governor can enter into contract and obligate the province only upon authority of the sangguniang panlalawigan, the same is inapplicable to the case at bar. The agreement and modus vivendi may have been signed by petitioner Roberto Pagdanganan, as Governor of the Province of Bulacan, without authorization from the sangguniang panlalawigan, but it was also signed by Manuel Siayngco, the Provincial Legal Officer, in his capacity as such, and as counsel of petitioners. It is a well-settled rule that all proceedings in court to enforce a remedy, to bring a claim, demand, cause of action or subject matter of a suit to hearing, trial, determination, judgment and execution are within the exclusive control of the attorney. With respect to such matters of ordinary judicial procedure, the attorney needs no special authority to bind his client. Such questions as what action or pleading to file, where and when to file it, what are its formal requirements, what should be the theory of the case, what defenses to raise, how may the claim or defense be proved, when to rest the case, as well as those affecting the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy, materiality or immateriality of certain evidence and the burden of proof are within the authority of the attorney to decide. Whatever decision an attorney makes on any of these procedural questions, even if it adversely affects a client's case, will generally bind a client. The agreement and modus vivendi signed by petitioners' counsel is binding upon petitioners, even if the Sanggunian had not authorized the same, limitation of issues being a procedural question falling within the exclusive authority of the attorney to decide. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, 336 SCRA 201, July 19, 2000, En Banc [Panganiban] Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the national government. Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the government, primarily responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic

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policies, plans and programs for the entire country. However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally. There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one. KAPUNAN: The interaction between the national government and the local government units is mandatory at the planning level. Local development plans must thus hew to "national policies and standards" as these are integrated into the regional development plans for submission to the National Economic Development Authority." Local budget plans and goals must also be harmonized, as far as practicable, with "national development goals and strategies in order to optimize the utilization of resources and to avoid duplication in the use of fiscal and physical resources."

Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135, Aug. 4, 1994, En Banc [Cruz] Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions is accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.

Joson v. Torres, 290 SCRA 279, May 20, 1998 [Puno] Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is lodged in two authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority. This is explicit from A.O. No. 23. Pursuant to these provisions, the Disciplining Authority is the President of the Philippines, whether acting by himself or through the Executive Secretary. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the exclusive Investigating Authority. In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the Disciplining Authority may designate a Special Investigating Committee.

Moday v. CA, 268 SCRA 586, Feb. 20, 1997

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The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 4389 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. BLG. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although pertaining to a similar provision of law but different factual milieu then obtaining, the Court's pronouncements in Velazco vs. Blas, where we cited significant early jurisprudence, are applicable to the case at bar. "The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is 'beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same.' Absolutely no other ground is recognized by the law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in its consideration of a municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The provincial (board's) disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative functions of the municipal council or president. Such has been the consistent course of executive authority." Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly Anuncio has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property.

Bito-Onon v. Fernandez, 350 SCRA 732, Jan. 31, 2001, 3rd Div. [GonzagaReyes] In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an association, federation, league or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government officials. The Local Government Code defines the liga ng mga barangay as an organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto. The liga shall have chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels. The municipal and city chapters of the liga shall be composed of the barangay representatives of the municipal and city barangays respectively. The duly elected presidents of the component municipal and city chapters shall constitute the provincial chapter or the metropolitan political subdivision chapter. The duly elected presidents of highly urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the Metropolitan Manila chapter and metropolitan political subdivision chapters shall constitute the National Liga ng mga Barangay.

ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES

Malonzo v. Zamora, 311 SCRA 224, July 27, 1999, En Banc [Romero]

On its first regular session, may the Sanggunian transact business other than the matter of adopting or updating its existing rules or procedure? Held: We cannot infer the mandate of the (Local Government) Code that no other business may be transacted on the first regular session except to take up the matter of adopting or updating rules. All that the law requires is that on the first regular session x x x the sanggunian concerned shall adopt or update its existing rules or procedures. There is nothing in the language thereof that restricts the matters to be taken up during the first regular session merely to the adoption or updating of the house rules. If it were the intent of Congress to limit the business of the local council to such matters, then it would have done so in clear and unequivocal terms. But as it is, there is no such intent. Moreover, adopting or updating of house rules would necessarily entail work beyond the day of the first regular session. Does this mean that prior thereto, the local council's hands were tied and could not act on any other matter? That would certainly be absurd for it would result in a hiatus and a paralysis in the local legislature's work which could not have been intended by the law.

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Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135, Aug. 4, 1994, En Banc [Cruz]

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision. That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of control rather Have the powers of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) to register, tricycles in particular, as well as to issue licenses for the driving thereof, been devolved likewise to local government units? Held: Only the powers of the Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board (LTFRB) to regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire and to grant franchises for the operation thereof have been devolved to local governments under the Local Government Code. Clearly unaffected by the Local Government Code are the powers of the LTO under R.A. No. 4136 requiring the registration of all kinds of motor vehicles used or operated on or upon any public highway in the country. This can be gleaned from the explicit language of the statute itself, as well as the corresponding guidelines issued by the DOTC. In fact, even the power of LGUs to regulate the operation of tricycles and to grant franchises for the operation thereof is still subject to the guidelines prescribed by the DOTC. than mere supervision. That power was never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to wit, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness of the tax measure. VETO POWER OF LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVES DISQUALIFICATIONS UNDER SECTION 40 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE Dela Torre v. COMELEC

Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, the rationale of which was set forth in "Zari v. Flores," to wit: "It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited...xxx Petitioner contends that his probation had the effect of suspending the applicability of Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code, suffice it to say that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioner's conviction of fencing which we have heretofore declared as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40 (a), subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant

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of probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation. Clearly then, petitioner's theory has no merit.

Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, 307 SCRA 630, May 26, 1999 [Mendoza] Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control."

Marquez, Jr. v. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 538, April 18, 1995

Section 40 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 enumerates those who are disqualified from running for any elective local position, among whom is a: (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad. The term "fugitive from justice" refers not only to those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but also to those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug finds the definition given to it by the Oversight Committee, i.e., "a person who has been convicted by final judgment," as appearing in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, as inordinate and an undue circumscription of the law. Justice Davide agrees and further submits that it also unreasonably expands the scope of the disqualification in the 1991 Local Government Code because it disqualifies all those who have been convicted by final judgment, regardless of the extent of the penalty imposed and of whether they have served or are serving their sentences or have evaded service of sentence by jumping bail or leaving for another country. The definition thus disregards the true and accepted meaning of the word fugitive. This new definition is unwarranted for nothing in the legislative debates has been shown to sustain it and the clear language of the law leaves no room for a reexamination of the meaning of the term.

Rodriguez v. COMELEC, 259 SCRA 296, July 24, 1996

To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for the disqualification or ineligibility of a person seeking to run for any elective local position under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, should be understood according to the definition given in the MARQUEZ Decision, to wit: "A 'fugitive from justice' includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution." Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post. LIMITATION ON TERM OF OFFICE OF LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIALS

Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133495, Sept. 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157, En Banc [Mendoza] To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective

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position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. This point can be made clearer by considering the following cases or situations: Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of the incumbent. Six months before the next election, he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the next election? Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and subsequently resigned from office before the full term expired, he has not actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the term limit. Under Art. X, 8, voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one "for which he was elected." Since A is only completing the service of the term for which the deceased and not he was elected, A cannot be considered to have completed one term. His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term. Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next election? Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively. In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the application of the disqualification provisions have not concurred, namely, that the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times and that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local official is considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has not been elected three times. In the second case, the local official has been elected three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three consecutive terms. LibLex Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a total failure of the two conditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. X, 8. Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he qualified to run again in the next election? Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor.

Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602, July 28, 1999, En Banc [GonzagaReyes] The two requisites for the application of the three term rule was absent. First, Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, he did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by the SC that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections. Second, Lonzanida cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. His opponents' contention that Lonzanida should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,

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"Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected." The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Lonzanida vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. In sum, Lonzanida was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit.

Socrates v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154512, Nov. 12, 2002, En Banc [Carpio]

This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code x x x. These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of servicexxx Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election midway in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term. Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. The debates in the Constitutional Commission evidently show that the prohibited election referred to by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection after the third term, not any other subsequent election.

Mendoza v. COMELEC G.R. No. 149736, December 17, 2002

VITUG, J., joined by YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., voted to dismiss the petition. He contended that as revealed by the records of the Constitutional Commission, the Constitution envisions a continuous and an uninterrupted service for three full terms before the proscription applies. Therefore, not being a full term, a recall term should not be counted or used as a basis for the disqualification whether served prior (as in this case) or subsequent (as in the Socrates case) to the nineyear, full three-term limitxxx In order that the three-consecutive term limit can apply, two conditions must concur, i.e., (1) that the elective local official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government position, and (2) that he has served three consecutive full terms, albeit a voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be deemed to be an interruption in the

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continuity of the service for the full term for which he is elected. The constitutional provision does not appear to be all that imprecise for and in its application. Section 8, Article X, of the Constitution is explicit that the term of office of elective local officials x x x shall be three years which phrase is forthwith followed by its mandate that no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms, and that [v]oluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he [is] elected. The law evidently contemplates a continuous full three-year term before the proscription can apply. MENDOZA, J., in whose opinion QUISUMBING, J., joined, voted to dismiss the petition on the ground that, in accordance with the ruling in Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 [1998]; Arcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133639, Oct. 6, 1998 (res.); Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 [1999]; and Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, Feb. 4, 2002, a term during which succession to a local elective office takes place or a recall election is held should not be counted in determining whether an elective local official has served more than three consecutive terms. He argued that the Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election on that day was actually only his third term for the same position. PROHIBITION UNDER SECTION 90 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE

Javellana v. DILG, [G.R. No. 102549. August 10, 1992.] The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it. Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members "may practice their pro