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Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view

Introduction to Kant's
Michel Foucault
Translated by Arianna Bove Translator's Note The following text is my translation of Michel Foucault‟s Complementary Dissertation on Kant‟s Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view, presented as his doctoral research in 1961. The original version in French can be found here. Foucault translated Kant‟s text into French for Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin (Paris: 1964), but this Introduction was never published. It is now held at the Foucault Archive in Paris at the at the Institut de mémoires de l‟édition contemporaine (IMEC {D60/D61}). A much shorter version of this text, which merely presents the intellectual context in which Kant elaborated his views on anthropology, appeared as the Introduction to Foucault's published translation in the Vrin edition of Kant's Anthropology. In my view, the importance of the text that follows has been largely underestimated. It is not only important as a scholarly appreciation of Kant‟s oeuvre as a whole, but also because it outlines an explicit relation between what would later become Foucault's own main concerns and the history of philosophy as innovated by Kant. The notion of technology, the role of language in an anthropological study of subjectivity, and the warnings against the dangers of a metaphysical treatment of epistemology are here taken up by Foucault through an exegesis and critical interpretation of Kant‟s text. Of great interest is Foucault's view on the problematic relation between inner perception - Gemut- (as an empirical mode of knowledge) and being in the world, especially where this relation results into a philosophy of consciousness. Kant had asked: how can psychology help our pragmatic knowledge of man as a world citizen? Foucault takes up this question to level his criticism against structuralist anthropology and the status of the human sciences in relation to finitude, as will be further developed in The Order of Things, but through Kant, he also engages with the fallacy of epistemology as metaphysics. Following Kant‟s concern as expressed in the Critique of Pure Reason, Foucault questions whether psychology has come to supplant metaphysics in man-centred reasoning. Foucault also takes on a further suggestion from the Anthropology concerning how any empirical knowledge of man is tied up with language. The conclusion he draws from Kant‟s text is that man is a world citizen in so far as he speaks. For Foucault and Kant, anthropology is therefore concerned neither with the human animal nor with self-consciousness, but with Menschenwesen, the questioning of man‟s limits in knowledge and concrete existence. [read more...]

This translation is incomplete and based on my manuscript which at times resulted unclear. Only the first few pages of the original text are missing, where Foucault historically contextualises Kant's text. They will be uploaded eventually, but I have given priority to what was missing from the published introduction, and what was of more philosophical relevance. The paragraph headings are mine, as are the translations of German terms. The original French version of the Introduction can be found here (thanks to Marcio Miotto who made it available and Colin Gordon who checked the text). I am currently working on improving the translation and would welcome any comments or suggestions (simply write to ari at In 2006 this text came to the attention of various publishers and some of them will unfairly be capitalising on the work you see here. Hence, the licence. If you are interested in the story, read on.

Introduction to Kant's Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view

This text took shape over a period of twenty five years, and the only stage available to us, transformed in line with Kant‟s thought as it brings out new formulations, is the last one. […] Would the archaeology of the text, if it were possible, allow us to see the birth of „homo criticus‟, whose structure would essentially differ from the man who preceded him? The Critique, with its own propaedeutic character in philosophy, will play a constitutive role in the birth and becoming of concrete forms of human existence. Comparing what can be apprehended through the texts of the Anthropology with those of the Critique, one can hopefully see how Kant‟s later works are engaged with the series of pre -critical researches, with the whole enterprise of the Critique itself and also with the group of works which, in the same period, attempted to define a knowledge specific to man. Paradoxically this triple engagement makes the Anthropology contemporary to what precedes the Critique, to what carries it out and also to what would soon eliminate it. For this reason, in the analysis of the work it is impossible to separate the genetic perspective from the structural method: in its own space, in its final presence and in the equilibrium of its elements we are dealing here with a text that is contemporaneous to all of the movement that encloses it. The structure of the relations of the Anthropology to the Critique alone will allow us, if correctly defined, to decipher the genesis that moves towards this last equilibrium- or last but one - if it is true that the Opus Postumum already walks the first steps on the finally rejoined soil of transcendental philosophy. In 1797, Kant was working on The Conflict of the Faculties. One can see similarities in the analysis of temperament between the Observations on Beauty and the Sublime, dated 1764, and the Anthropology, dated 1798. The perspective in the two works is without doubt entirely different. In the Observations it is organised around moral sentiments – their classification being seen then as a given, a matter of fact - whilst the description in the Anthropology is ordered by a sort of deduction of

the temperaments, starting with the tension and the release [détente] of activity and of feeling. However the content is amazingly similar when it comes to expressions and choice of words. Beilegung [insertion/settlement] Beck regards Beilegung – the imputation of a representation – as the determination of the subject to an object which differs from it and for which it becomes the element of knowledge [connaissance]. Kant remarks that representation is not reserved to an object, rather a relation to something other is devolved to representation and through the latter this relation becomes communicable to others. He also points out that the apprehension of the multiple and its subsumption under the unity of consciousness is one and the same thing as the representation of what is only made possible through this combination. Only from the perspective of this combination can we communicate with one another: in other words, the relation to the object renders representation valid for each and therefore communicable; this does not prevent the fact that we have to operate the combination ourselves. The main themes of the Critique –the relation to the object, the synthesis of the multiple, the universal validity of representation- are here strongly grouped around the problem of communication. There the subject is not found as determined by the manner in which it is affected, but rather as determined within the constitution of the representation „wir können aber nur das verstehen und anderen mitteilen, was wir selbst machen können‟ [we can only understand and communicate with others, what we ourselves can do]. Inner sense.(1) The apperception on the one hand is defined, in a sense closer to the Critique, by the consciousness of the understanding alone. It is not related to any given object or to any intuitive content: it concerns nothing but an act of the determining subject and to this extent it is to be accounted for neither by psychology nor by anthropology, but by Logic. Hence there emerges the great danger evoked by Fichte of the division of the subject into two forms of subjectivity that can only communicate with one another within the disequilibria of the subject-object relation. This is, as Kant recognises, the „great difficulty‟: but one must be careful that the spirit is not a „dopplettes Ich‟, but a „dopplettes Bewusstsein dieses Ich‟ [a double consciousness of these I]. This debate allows one to define the space within which anthropology in general is possible: that would not be the region within which the observation of the self arrives to a subject in itself, nor to the pure „I‟ of synthesis, but to a „me‟ that is object and present solely in its single phenomenal truth. But this me/object, given to sense in the form of Time, is not foreign to the determining subject since it ultimately is nothing but the subject as it is affected by itself, as an analysis of the concrete forms of observation of the self. Put together, the unpublished and the published texts constitute, at two different levels, the unity of one course that simultaneously responds to Beck, conjures up the Fichtean danger and denotes an exteriority, an empty space, as the possible place for Anthropology. [creux]

The discussions regarding the metaphysics of right. [Kant and Schutz] Since the 16th century juridical thought has primarily been concerned with the definition of the relation of the individual to the general form of the State, or of the individual to things within the abstract form of property. In the second half of the 18th century, the relationship of belonging amongst individuals themselves in the concrete and particular form of the couple, the family group, the household and the home come under question: how can civil society, which the bourgeoisie presupposes as its own foundation and justification, particularise itself in these restricted unities, which do not follow the feudal model, yet need not dissolve themselves at the moment of its permanent disappearance? C. G. Schutz was concerned when seeing that in Kant‟s „Metaphysics of right‟ these relationships were too faithfully modelled on the major forms of right [droit] over things. Kant doesn‟t give them a place in the section entitled: „Von dem auf dingliche Art persönlichen Recht‟, which is divided into three domains, following the three essential forms of acquisition - Erwirbt [to have gained]: namely man acquires woman, couple acquires children, family acquires domestics. Schutz refuses to believe that in the matrimonial relation „the woman becomes a man‟s thing‟. The form of satisfaction that, in the order of marriage, a man can get out of a woman does not reduce a woman to a state also primitively simple; the reification of another has no truth outside of cannibalism: marriage and rights that are given do not turn people into „res fungibiles‟. In brief, the problem that Schutz poses is brought back to the constitution of this concrete islet of bourgeois society for which neither the right of the peoples nor the right of things can account for: a spontaneous synthesis that is not exhaustible by contract theory, nor by the analysis of appropriation, fringes on the law where domination is neither sovereignty nor property. In his protestation Schutz confuses the moral with the juridical point of view, the human being with the subject of the law: a distinction that is re-established, in its rigour, in Kant‟s response. But Schutz‟s objection goes to the very heart of the anthropological preoccupation; that is a certain point of convergence and of divergence of the law and morality. The Anthropology is pragmatic in the sense that it does not envisage man as belonging to the moral city of spirits (that would be named practical), nor to the civil society of the subjects of law (that would be named juridical); he is considered as a „citizen of the world‟, which means as a member of the concrete universal within which the subject of law, determined by judicial rules and subjected to them, and is at the same time a human being who in his freedom carries his universal moral law. To be a citizen of the world is to belong to a certain region that is as concrete as an ensemble of precise judicial rules that are as universal as the moral law. To say that an anthropology is pragmatic and to say that it envisages man as a citizen of the world amounts to saying the same thing. Within these conditions it will be the task of the Anthropology to show how a legal relation that is of the order of possession, that is to say a jus rerum, can preserve the moral nucleus of the person taken as subject of freedom without compromising it at the same time. …paradox…

of dissimulations. Without doubt. Moreover. -or what he can and should do of himself as „freihandelndes Wesen‟ [free handling of being]: an exchange of freedom with itself and the manipulation of the compromises of exchange can never be exhausted within the clarity of recognition pure and simple. her sovereignty over man. there is a whole host of things that Kant makes allusions to within the preface of the Anthropology. for gallantry is nothing but an entangling of pretentiousness: the man‟s pretension to reduce the freedom of the woman in the marriage that he hopes for. then there emerges the right to monogamy. an ensemble never offered in its totality. gallantry. But the Anthropology of 1798 turns this decision into a constant method: in a resolute desire to follow a path where man is never expected to find himself absolutely within a truth of nature. in spite of marriage. The original meaning of the Anthropology is to be Erforschung [tr. of fishy intentions. its concrete latitude. not to study memory. Dietetics. World Citizen. 1. a network where they. Hence. where it is a question of pretension of cunnings. [here we will examine man not as a natural being] as the Kollegenwurfe of 1770-80 had already stated. a whole network is created where neither right nor morality are ever given in their pure state. Here his declared objective is to determine what makes man. offer to human action its space of playing. This is neither the level of foundational freedom nor the level of the rules of right. Thus. the first revendication of this freedom is to escape from jealousy. intertwined. but the way one makes use of it. as the point of equilibrium between the jus rerum that makes the woman her husband‟s thing and of his morality that recognises in each person a subject of freedom. See the third part of the Conflict of the Faculties: the research done by Hufeland helps Kant solve one of the difficulties that had not ceased to weigh on the Anthropology: how to articulate an analysis of what Homo Natura is on the basis of a definition of man as subject of liberty. Not .: examination/enquiry]: an exploration. never in peace with itself because given within a movement where freedom and nature are entangled within Gebrauch. a point of equilibrium does not mean a point of arrival nor an equitable sharing. the woman‟s pretension to exercise. By treating man as a „freihandelndes Wesen‟ the Anthropology brings out a whole area of „free -exchange‟ where man lets his freedoms circulate as if from one hand to another: man socialises with others for a deaf and uninterrupted commerce that provides him with a residence on the whole surface of the world. of compromises and waiting. It is the appearance of a certain pragmatic freedom. 2.The right to be jealous up to the point of murdering is a recognition of the moral freedom of the woman. Anthropological thought will not claim to provide the definition of a human Wesen in naturalistic terms: Wir untersuchen hier den Menschen nicht nach dem was er natürlicher Weise IST‟. and to feel that one is more than a thing in provoking a jealousy that will remain impotent before the irrepressible exercise of this freedom. of which our word of usage covers some of the senses. of undisclosed efforts to influence.

but a practice at once immediate and imperative of a fully given culture. 4. This opposition is irreducibly organised and within its lessons of the Anthropology. together: an analysis of the way in which man acquires the world (its usage. in certain ways like a parent with his hilheim Meister. 3. Book of the daily exercise. The game then becomes a „künstlicher Spiel‟ and the appearance in which the game receives its moral justification. also. but he plays this game. that means.: art=artifice). the Anthropology repeats . that the world is a school. This defines the „pragmatic‟ character of the Anthropology: „Pragmitisch‟. the very nucleus of anthropological reflection and the indication of its singularity. „ist die Erkenntnis von der sich ein allgemeiner Gebrauch in der Gesellschaft machen lässt‟ [is the discovery from the self of a general usage society]. Then the pragmatic was not understood as the useful given to the universal. In 1798. constitutes a school that leads itself to the knowledge of and the practice of the world. it appears modified twice. A relation that Practical Reason had assured a priori in the imperative and that the anthropological reflection had guaranteed in the concrete movement of the daily exercise: in the Spielen [playing]. the anthropological reflection will have for meaning the placing of man in this constitutive element.: game=toy) and the ambiguity of the Kunst (tr. like in the illusions of the describe what man is. it will determine what man „can and should‟ do with himself. a school teaching. form a fundamental tension: the progress of culture. it becomes a certain mode of relation between the Können and the Sollen [can and must/ought]. This motion of the Spielen is singularly important: man is the game of nature. that are. It is not the case that. at the origin. The Anthropology is then deployed according to this dimension of the human exercise that feeds on the ambiguity of the Spiel (tr. of taking back unto himself the devises of intention (2). whilst it is in his duty [appartient d‟être] to be master of the game. it means that he himself has played to be a victim of the game. It is placed within the text of a freedom that one posits at once as singular and universal. and he plays with himself: and if he comes to be played. after all. But what Goethe‟s text and all the Bildungsromane say for the course of history. Therefore [anthropological reflection] will be. it reveals. The Anthropology will not be then a history of the culture. This theme has been without a doubt. The world is its own school. Such was the programme defined by the Kollegenwurfe. the Kollegentwurfe said. or an analysis of its forms in succession. On the other hand. It teaches man to recognise in his own culture the school of the world. but what he can make of himself. not of theory and of „school‟. how he can constitute himself in it and enter the game: Kittspielen. through which he is formed and that he puts into play to dominate the game: das Sollverstehen. In the 1798 text. The Anthropology will not try to know „how one can use man‟ but „what one can expect from him‟. and synthesis of the prescriptions and rules that the world imposes upon man. its knowledge [connaissance]). This means that the usage is taken out of the level of technical actuality and placed within a double system: of obligation affirmed towards oneself and of respectful distance towards the others. in which the history of the world is summed up.

without them being ever posed into a question. what then is the relationship of anthropological knowledge to the critical reflection? In what does the investigation of Gemüt and of its faculties differ from a psychology. the link to the three Critiques. that are suggestive of the line of slope that is appropriate to it. will the 1798 text be able to say what was not said in the Kollegenwurfe? Something of the knowledge of the world is then wrapped with this knowledge of man that is Anthropology. where the ability and the duty belong to the unity of a game that measures one against the other. but within the synthesis of the present. whose irreducible and fundamental faculties determine the organisation of the three Critiques. a long tradition has made it . at least until the last page. as the Kollegenwurfe testify. of freedom and utility and of school and world. not in the cosmo-political dimension of the Welt. the reciprocities and the limits and exchanges of citizenship. on one side. and is thus opposed to rational physics as the object of the inner senses is to the object of external senses. In that. the Gemüt. the Anthropology deploys itself in the accepted division of nature and man. One knows the distinction established by the Architectonic between Rational Psychology and Empirical Psychology. If it is true that the Gemüt is the question of the Anthropology or the primary element of its exploration. at the same level as the Anthropology. is developed. The preface to the text of 1798 assigns itself as its object man as resident in the world. even though they do not provide a complete reply. At the beginning. The Anthropology. imperious. through the cosmos. Its equilibrium is at the moment found in their admitted limits. hence to metaphysics. is neither homo natura nor the subject of freedom. And this lacuna is even more perceptible in the edited/published text than in the fragments of the Nachlass. one has grounds to pose a certain number of questions: How a study of Gemüt allows knowledge of man as citizen of the world. even less so at the anthropological level. always restarting from the daily usage. and where the world becomes school within the prescriptions of a culture. It explores a region where freedom and utility are already tied within the reciprocity of usage. the texts of the Anthropology and of the Critique of Pure Reason seem to answer directly. But if the discourse of the Anthropology has remained foreign to the work and the word of the Critique. The first belongs to pure philosophy. Time there reigns. the laws and the duties. If it is true that the Anthropology analyses. according to an encyclopaedic organisation. be it rational or empirical? To this last question. in the Anthropology. the Weltbü infinitum within the present form. hardly ever seems to take as privileged theme the examining of man as inhabitant of the world: of man establishing. We touch upon the essential: Man. With respect to Empirical Psychology. but in that interior of the Gemüt. The greater part of the analyses. Here are some elements. and approximately all those of the first part. he is given within the already operating syntheses of his relation with the world. moreover. the Anthropology remains within the same perspective where Kant has placed it in order to make emerge.

Therefore. An empirical knowledge cannot. and furthermore. in any case. psychology postulates an equivalence of inner sense and apperception. b) From the point of view of the content. and that they leave open the possibility of a „sort of psychology of inner sense‟ the contents of which are dependent on the conditions of all possible experience. rational psychology can and should subsist as a discipline. whilst the inner sense designates an empirical mode of knowledge. the confusion between the soul. In what does this difference consist? a) From a formal point of view. -hence without content. in different light. and despite the fact that it seems to be excluding all forms of possible . in the exploration of the Gemüt. which does not intend to nor claim to be knowledge of the Seële [soul]. and thus psychology has confiscated a discouraged metaphysics within which it had already taken an improper place. allowing escaping both materialism and spiritualism. and given that it is necessary to prepare psychology for its stay in an empirical science of man within an Anthropology that will balance the empirical science of nature. all seems clear in this abstract organisation.necessary for it to be placed within metaphysics. the recent failures of metaphysics have been able to make one believe that the solution of the insolvable problems is concealed in the psychological phenomena that pertain to an empirical study of the soul. These texts of the Anthropology are situated in the direct obedience to the Transcendental Dialectic. and solely defined by the „I think‟ (cogito). Empirical Psychology will then have to be detached from metaphysics. And if such displacement cannot be made within the immediate. What they denounce is precisely the „inevitable illusion‟ that the paralogisms account for: we make use of simple representation of the I. without knowing their fundamental difference. to which it is foreign. or does the soul retire on the contrary in the non-empirical solidity of the substance? All these questions show. and the ensemble of phenomena that appear to the inner sense. given that apperception is one of the forms of pure knowledge. has no place for any psychology. the I think. It is given explicitly as a refusal of psychology. psychology cannot avoid being trapped in the interrogation of change and identity: does the soul remain itself within the incessant modification of time? Do the conditions of experience that it makes of itself. and marking an avoidance of this speculation „zum fruchtbaren praktischen Gebrauch‟ [faisant sign de nous détourner de cette spéculation]. metaphysical notion of a simple and immaterial substance. and the necessarily temporal progress of phenomena need to be considered themselves as affectations of the soul that exhausts itself in the phenomenal dispersion. the Anthropology. that we make appear to ourselves in the ensemble of the phenomena tied to their subjective condition of time. whatever that would be. Consequently. in order to define this particular object that is the soul. it is necessary to point out that the paralogisms are neither concerned with rational psychology. On the other hand. provide the principles or clarify the fundaments of a knowledge derived from pure reason and consequently entirely a priori. However. as we can read it. that is devoid of any content. nor with empirical. that is the pure form.

Without saying it. the presence of Geist in the Anthropology is no less decisive. But what we can take hold of.psychology. the great tripartite structure in which the Introduction to the Critique of judgement seems to provide the definitive formulation. What does this mean? In what can “a necessary concept of reason. whether it is or not in the order of psychology? It is not Seële. a principle: but is it determining or regulative? Neither one nor the other. no element. and one that maintains in its triviality this example of daily language. To be discrete. Like all living beings. We are dealing with a Prinzip [principle]. it has an oriented course. at once this transcendental discipline and this empirical knowledge? Or on the contrary has it rendered/made them forever impracticable at the outset? Is it the Gemüt itself that needs to be interrogated now. Therefore. for a sliding of perspectives. But inversely. its duration does not scatter within an indifferent dispersion. finally. “Durch Ideen” [through ideas]. of the Gemüt. This definition is truly brief and does not seem to promise much: „Geist ist das belebende Prinzip im Neuschen‟. if one has to take seriously this „invigoration‟ (vivification) that he partakes in. at the outer margins or in the proximity of the Anthropology itself: there is no indication of a close exteriority. cannot be but what. the Anthropology does not put out of the way what had already been denounced in the Critique of Pure Reason. attention or knowledge (connaissance) in general nor with one of the forces (Krafte) mentioned in the Introduction to the Critique of Judgement. Not even. towards a virtual totality. it is and it is not Geist. but on the other hand.: the principle] is given to experience or within its virtual totality. Does this lead to the conclusion that the Anthropology. in the course in which it [tr. is the reason why this invigoration takes place. no chapter of the Anthropology is given as a discipline planned by the Dialectic or as this empirical psychology perceived on top of the Methodology. one empirical psychology and one discipline gone back towards the practical usage – what are its relations to the Anthropology? … Firstly. Neither with a Vermogen [faculty] such as memory. to which no object of correspondence is given in sensibility” (Cassirer) give life to . In the Gemüt. no section. a banal sentence. the movement through which the Geist gives to the spirit the figure of life. the text says. has become itself. can appear within experience. In so far as it leaves two options open. nothing in the text of the Anthropology makes one suppose that an empirical psychology or a rational psychology as a discipline can be founded elsewhere. something in it that projects it. with a simple representation such as the „pure I‟ of the first Critique.does one have something that relates it to life and that pertains to the presence of the Geist? And here a new dimension opens up: Gemüt is not merely organised and equipped with powers and faculties that share in its domain. without stopping it. Nothing is clearly indicated to us as to what this principle itself is. it is towards rational psychology that it takes its distance.

of an imperious spiritual sovereignty. that are made and remade like as many particles that live and die in the spirit. 3) In other words. and not as an invigorating one. these multiple structures of a totality in becoming. and the idea. but it indicates in advance how to research such nature. 1) It doesn‟t have to reveal the nature of things in an ostensive movement. But if this had been the case. with his duties and rights. can live within the element of the possible. In this way the Gemüt is not simply “that which is”. they make the spirit enter the mobility of the infinite. within this temporal dispersion that is originary to it. to promise. the Geist would be defined to enter the game as a regulative principle. or even the life of the Absolute itself. And is this not precisely the field that the Anthropology ascribes to its investigation? To which it suffices to add that what Gemüt has to make of itself is “the biggest possible empirical usage of reason”. since ideas receive from experience itself their own domain of application. The Gemüt would owe its life to this distant. but “that which it makes of itself”. but opens the possibility of objects. to give birth within the passivity of the Gemüt. Then one cannot say that it is the idea of Geist to ensure the regulation of the empirical diversity of Gemüt. and the world with him. through (durch) the Idea. proceeds towards a totalisation that is actualised through and by the Geist. in the sociability/sociable to the infinite refused to it. 2) In indicating finally that the access to the end of the universe lies beyond the horizon of knowledge (connaissance). The important paragraph of the Critique entitled: “Of the ultimate end of the pure use of reason” allows one to apperceive the organising role of ideas within the concrete life of the spirit (3). but towards the theme of a Geist that little by little invests man. The fact is that the Idea liberated of its transcendental usage and of the illusions that it cannot help originating. without respite to its duration. Hence the “durch Ideen” that we inhabit has a different meaning. to this inaccessible. . a use that will only be the greatest possible. On the other hand. Such is the function of the Geist: not to organise the inner sense Gemüt in order to make it a living being. an impossible achievement. or the analogous of organic life. One could believe that Gemüt. to the swarming movement of ideas. in this cosmopolitan city. all the curve of the Anthropology is not oriented towards the theme of man as inhabitant and resident of the world. but to vivify it. Then the empirical reason never dozes off on the given. give themselves continuously to „the movement in order to go further‟ without however losing themselves in the insurmountable horizon of this dispersion.the spirit? Here one must avoid a counter-sense (paradox). has its meaning within the plenitude of experience: it [the idea] anticipates a scheme that is not constitutive. it engages empirical reason within the task of an infinite labour. but efficacious presence. which is that of empirical determination.

is such that there can be no truthful anthropology that is not pragmatic. doesn‟t the Geist deal with this enigmatic „nature of our reason‟ and then with the question of the Dialectics and of the Methodology of Pure Reason? This is the disconcerting notion that seems to suddenly refer the Critique. but for all that. towards a domain of facts where man will be doomed to a very original passivity [longe]. of dialectics de-dialecticised. C. An Anthropology is only possible in so far as the Gemüt is not fixed to the passivity of its phenomenal (phenomenic) determinations. It will always only be able to return to a drowsy spirit. in the Critique.' (4) The presence of the Geist. the uprooting (arrache) of its determinations and gives it a future that it does not owe to anything but itself. If this analogy is founded. but rather it (the Gemüt) is animated by the labour of ideas at the level of the field of experience. [they also are] „the supreme tribunal of all rights and of all pretensions‟. but also impossible: „all theoretical reasoning on this subject is in vain. will be given all of a sudden to the transcendental. within the Gemüt. turned towards the domain of experience and being one with the very game of phenomena. It is the Geist that opens to the Gemüt the freedom of the possible. Within these conditions. But does this „nature of reason‟ here play the same role as the nature of human understanding in Hume: of primary explication and final reduction? For the moment let us just point out an analogy of structure between this „nature‟ that pushes reason to leave „an empirical usage‟ in favour of „ a pure usage‟. B. but that deploys itself always within an initial innocence. „illusions of originary prestige‟. gives rise to the transcendental mirage is that which in the Anthropology makes pursue the empirical and concrete path of the inner sense (Gemüt). But indicated on grounds of symmetry in the structures. without however containing in itself (is it not pure and simple nature?). Consequences: A. One and the other are always ready to lose themselves. and with it. in their very movement. D. and the concrete life of the spirit such as it is described in the Anthropology: this too is animated by a spontaneous movement that exposes it ceaselessly to the danger of being played within its own game. This will be a „psychology‟ minus life. The possibility of a non-pragmatic anthropology is recognised in theory and within a general system of the knowledge of man. of this dimension of the liberty and of the totality that transcends the Gemüt. the Anthropology has rendered impossible an empirical psychology and a knowledge of the spirit completely developed at the level of nature. non–transcendental. once reached its apex. it is challenged as content of knowledge: the study of memory as a simple natural fact is not only useless. one could ask whether the Geist. towards an empirical region. which is . basically. And Kant finds no reason to write of any other [system]. dead and without its „belebendes Prinzip‟. The Geist then will be the principle. One understands that. each fact is then taken within the open system of Können and of Sollen. and the conditions of experience will be related finally to the primary inertia of a Nature. to escape from themselves.The movement that. Witness the preface to the text of 1798. inert.

or the objectifying it allows. but only form of the synthesis.without being either the real agent or the simple coming to consciousness of this passage. the principle of its movement within the field of the empirical. The Geist is the root of the possibility of knowledge. entails that the infinite is never there. And. is not an element secretly indispensable to the structure of Kantian thought: something that will be the nucleus of pure reason. The texts of the period between 1770 and 1780 link the expression of the „I‟ to the possibility of being an object for itself. for instance. that the infinite animates therefore the movement towards truth and the inexhaustible succession of its forms. this invisible and „visible réserve‟ within the inaccessible distance of which knowing and takes place and acquires positivity. it is the inextricable presence and absence of the figures of knowledge: it is this withdrawal. the Anthropology has no “contact” with a reflection on the conditions of experience. but always in an essential withdrawal. it is the empirical and manifest form within which the synthetic activity of the „I‟ appears as a figure already synthesized. As a collection of empirical observations. the un-rootable origin of its transcendental illusions. at the beginning. as structure inextricably primary and secondary: it is not given to man to enter the game. And therefore. the necessity of the Critique and the possibility of the Anthropology. A certain crossing analogy lets one half-see in the Anthropology like a (photo) negative of the Critique. The Critique will take that decision: The „I‟ can never be object. and in its empirical version. where the faces of truth arise tirelessly. This incidence of the spoken „I‟ marks the passage of feeling to thought -from Fuhlen [feeling] to Denken [thinking]. designating. the anthropological analysis has hesitated for a long time. But it is not clearly decided whether the root of this possibility is the „I‟ itself. dans une sorte d‟a priori d‟existence). in a sort of a priori of existence (elle n‟est pas donneé d‟entrée de jeu á l‟homme.designated at the margins of the anthropological reflection. This original fact hangs over its structure unique and sovereign. the infallible judge of its return to its legitimate patria. it inserts itself in the multiplicity of a temporal sensibility. this essential difference is not of the kind/order of a non-relation. Take subjectivity. It appears and it suddenly fixes itself in a figure that will remain unchanging in the field experience. a) The relations of the synthesis and of the given are presented in the Anthropology alongside the universal image of what they are within the Critique. for knowledge itself. the undertaking of the establishment of a structural comparison of one with the other. as the irreducible . it offers itself as already there. [The nature of] its being is of a not being there. Or in the text of 1798. in its transcendental version. in itself. the „I‟ is not considered in its fundamental synthetic function. the locus of truth. On this point. but when [the I] appears. The Geist will be this original fact that. without for all that finding again a simple object status. What relations authorize within these two forms of reflection this radical element that seems their common being? To be honest the difference of level between the Critique and the Anthropology is such that it discourages.

the domain that it privileges is not that of where the faculties and powers positively manifest what they have. that are finally the reinforcements and the weakening in the sensible effects that anticipate. the meaning of the already-there. in retrospect. within space. for example. but which. However. in the Anthropology. The a priori in the order of knowledge. intended to denounce and dismantle the transcendental usage of reason but with a constant reference to the domain of positivity of each Vermogen [faculty]. but appears within the density of a becoming where its sudden emergence takes infallibly. what is an a priori of knowledge from the point of view of the Critique is not immediately transposed in the anthropological reflection as an a priori of existence. In the anthropological research each faculty follows a line/track that is also the path of all possible deviations. In other words. in its fundamental project of propaedeutics. is not offered as such in concrete existence. Self-consciousness. reveals itself as already there. b) The Anthropology follows the division of the faculties –Vermogenthat the Critique admits too. on the other hand. in the reflection on concrete existence. Thus the relation between the given and the a priori takes on. For an Anthropology. for the Anthropology. what is given is lightened. the given is not in fact ever offered according to an inert multiplicity indicative in an absolute fashion of an originary passivity and calling on its diverse forms the synthetic activity of conscience. The dispersion of the given is always already reduced in the anthropology. becomes. it appears rather as the always re-emerging temptation of a polymorphous . as spontaneously on the voluntary synthesis of attention. the kind of insular syntheses. an inverted structure with respect to that which has been employed in the Critique. having received the provisional or solid figures of the synthesis. passivity that is absolutely originary is never there [does not exist]. to move away from their centre and justification. According to the anthropological of a thought that cannot operate but this figure of already constituted experience: it is within this „I‟ that the subject will come to recognize its own passage and the synthesis of its identity. that are the schema of exploration that trace. an originary that is not chronologically primary. by soft lights that give the depth of the already operated. by an unexpected depth: already grouped and organised. it is the domain where they manifest their weakness – or at least the dangers/perils where they risk of losing themselves. is the movement for which. they want to alienate themselves in the illegitimacy. secretly dominated by a whole series of syntheses carried out apart from the visible workings of conscience: it is the unconscious synthesis of the elements of perception and of obscure representations that even the light of understanding always to dissociate. more than their nature or plain forms of their activity. On the contrary. What is for knowledge the merely given. as soon as it appears in the succession of figures of the synthesis. The structure is inverted by the original dispersion of the given. What is indicated. Thus what the Critique welcomes as the infinitely thin surface of a multiple that has nothing in common with it apart from being originally given is lightened. is not defined as a form of experience and condition of limited but founded knowledge. that are in sensitivity the reorganisations that allow for the relation of one sense to another. in the order of concrete existence. Without doubts the Critique.

it must be] the discovery of what has already been. consciousness will renounce the language of this first person –as decisive as to what has been (aussi décisive cependant qu‟il ait été) – to decline itself in the fiction of a We. the other a Characterisation. for the Characteristic. but what has something at once fascinating and precarious within the fragment of appearance. the rules of their exercise in the individual. the Anthropology is cased according to the same model: at the beginning. however late. But this is no doubt a false opening: an adjustment to the norms of the Critique that would not correspond to the vocation of the text. The long analysis of deficiencies and diseases of the spirit follows a brief paragraph on reason. presents two parts as general plan to the Anthropology: one Elementarlehre and one Methoderlehre. a distancing in relation to the Critique? No. the immediate coordination that permits that research in the . internal to humanity: Methoderlehre. the different faculties in the organisation form the totality of the Gemüt: Elementarlehre. The study of sensibility. and that substitute the traditional distinction. does not explore what can be held as well-founded in the phenomenon. “on how to know the interior of man [starting] from his exterior”. Possible experience defines equally well. in its limited circle. then. without doubt. to the extent that. In the anthropological region. Apparently. and also comes to transmit what she steals. but one is a Didactic. there is no synthesis that is not threatened: the domain of experience is almost emptied of content by dangers that are not of the order of arbitrary supersession. obscurely. that which governs its exercise in the domain of possible experience. For the Didactic. and the increasing importance given to the considerations on mental pathology in the notes and projects . [an investigation of what is conditioning in foundational activity] it represents the investigation of the unconditioned within the conditioned. The text of 1798 offers likewise two sections. The terms of the Didactic and the Characteristic that appear in the last stage of reflection. whilst reworking the great critical opposition of Schein [appearance] and Erscheinung [phenomenon]. the thematic of the Anthropology: to know. is all the more surprising since the content and the ordering seem not to have been modified at all. within a family. which occurred without date in the last years. are curiously accompanied by subtitles of which one can hardly see the relation they have with the title. and prior to all explications. All the Kollegentwurfe and the text published by Starke. in a paradoxical return. the field of truth and the field of the loss of truth. but of the collapsing on itself. since the latter veils what it makes shimmer (dangle). c) One detail finally has its importance. in consciousness. This change.up to the developed text of 1798 – attests to the fact that these reflections on negativity have been in the line of force of the anthropological research. the distinction between one doctrine of elements and one doctrine of method goes hand-in-hand with the critical research: on the one hand. to the prestige of a „me good-soul‟ (moi bien-aime) that fascinates it. [In relation] to the Critique. that which constitutes the faculty of understanding. [Rather. Is this change a reorganisation of the whole. [the subtitle] is “on the art of knowing the interior as well as the exterior of man”. and on the other.egoism: the possibility of saying „I‟ gives rise. inside a people or a race.

as we have seen. but also extends beyond itself. made possible and betrayed in its Phenomenon. With regards to the Characteristic. From Vermogen [faculty as ability/wealth/potential] to Erscheinung [Phenomenon]. and of the ethical connection. This is what gives each paragraph of the first part this obscurely tertiary rhythm: Power at the root of its possibility. in their manifestations. imagination in the poetry tied to the sign. The art of knowing the interior as well as the exterior of man. that has imposed itself for a long time. Or again: the power to desire with one‟s emotions. the couple. So simultaneously close and distant are the regions where the a-priori of knowledge is defined and where the a-priori of existence is . follows an articulation that repeats it as a negation: the theory of the elements becomes prescription with regard to all the possible phenomena (what has been properly speaking the end of the Methodenlehre). It is precisely where this articulation of Können [be able to] and Sollen [ought to] resides. allowing to go back from the sign to power. the plac e of the supreme good. as in the language in the first person). and inversely the theory of method becomes regressive analysis towards the primitive nucleus of powers (that was the meaning of the Elementarlehre): a mirroring reproduction. [it also extends] on knowledge of man in the exterior forms the manifest it. race. power is imperially recalled to this radical truth that binds it to itself in the mode of obligation. and spontaneously. „das Innere des Menschen aus dem Ausseren zu erkennen‟ [to recognise the inner of man from its outside]. without passing the limit of extrapolation. and is denounced in its perversion by the Phenomenon. is then. or more. in full right. imagination in the fantastic shipwreck of dreaming. of the adventure of perdition.dimension of Gemüt does not only open on the interior knowledge of the self. What the Critique distinguishes as the possible within the order of conditions (Vermogen [faculty]) and the real within the order of the constituted (Erscheinung [phenomenon]) is given by the Anthropology in one inextricable (insecable) continuity: the secret of Power is revealed in the luminosity of the Phenomenon.(5) For instance. in the virtuality of Vermogen and at the root of the possible. at the same time. So much the term Elementarlehre has been imposed by the symmetry of the Critique. that the analysis of Gemüt can only be conscious of itself in the space of a research of “powers”. To the model of the Critique. but a Didactic: it does not discover without teaching. it announces at the same time the exterior: that man does not dispose of his possibilities without being engaged. Power imperatively tied to itself. egoism. self-consciousness. the species. this exploration knows that in dealing with the interior. Power found and lost. Disengaged in its veritable signification. the imagination as power of original „invention‟. the relation is at once of the order of manifestation. that what is essential to anthropological thought [is found]. it reveals that the groups of phenomena –the bodies. not a theory of elements.are not given once and for all and […] on themselves. but rather they come back from the apparently static truth of phenomena to the radical possibilities that give them meaning and movement. where it finds at once its truth and the truth of its perversion (since the use becomes abuse. effective consciousness of representations. the false truth of passions.

like same and other. in so far as the latter concerns itself with pure knowledge. two domains balance each other out: that of a Physics and that of an anthropology that will have to accommodate (welcome) the more restrained edifice of an empirical psychology. the question becomes more insisting of knowing what relation is established between the Critique and the Anthropology. Isn‟t all this negatively further confirmed by the Anthropology itself? Nowhere is the prior Critique invoked: and if the correspondence of the two texts is easily visible. The correspondence that goes immediately for the Physics is not carried out in details. It is buried in the text of the Anthropology where it forms the framework. will not have resorted to a prior Critique. it is never given nor reflected upon as such. The relation between the Critique and the Anthropology: the structure In so far as this far proximity appears more clearly. what must I do? – a question that is practical. On the other hand in the vast field of empirical psychology.(7) From the point of view of pure philosophy (that wraps the Critique within the Propaedeutics). no place is made for the Anthropology. like a structural given. The Anthropology. and one has to envisage it as a fact. These three questions that hang over and. in the form of the original. The contact between one and the other form of reflection is null. There is not then a possible critical influence on the form or content of an Anthropology. The Logic. (6) The architectonics of pure reason. The „rational Physiology‟ that considers Nature as Inbegriff aller Gegenstande der sinne knows nothing but Physics and Rational Psychology. in order to constitute itself and occupy the place that he had granted to the Architectonic. . (8) With regard to the first. We know the three fundamental interrogations accounted for in the transcendental Methodology: What can I know? – a speculative question to which the Critique answers „where reason has to limit itself‟. only appears on the empirical side. what can one hope for? – an interrogation at once theoretical and practical. What is enunciated in the order of conditions appears. But more than Newtonian physics it has no need for a critical reflection in order to identify and verify itself: the Anthropology. to a certain extent. it cannot therefore be regimented or controlled by the Critique. unlike Psychology. [there is] not the rigorous symmetry between pure philosophy and empirical philosophy. not as the manifestation of a prior and intentional ordering. Two texts are of singular importance: a passage regarding psychology in the transcendental Methodologie to which we have already referred.determined. and one very enigmatic indication that appears in the Logic.

but the point where philosophical reflection comes to culminate into an interrogation of the interrogations themselves. that is to say in the Logic and in the Opus postumum. that the Anthropology as we know it does not lend itself at any moment to answer the fourth question. on the path of retour. challenged: it is no longer the last empirical stage of a knowledge organised philosophically. one needs to be careful not to hurry this point. However. the Ethics and the Religion. are we to comprehend that in these three questions. who naturally believes himself questioned in them. but that the question is only posed much later. can be found at the beginning of the Logic. to: Was ist der Mensch? that we would try to understand. in their original gravitation around man. at the moment when it is him who asks them and who is concerned with asking them in relation to himself (to dissipate all philodoxia)? Let us just note. or as that of this same knowledge to the subject -if it is true as a text of the Logic claims that knowledge has „eine zwiefache Beziehung: erstlich. and within a perspective that does not belong to it properly. Doesn‟t this sudden movement that knocks off balance the three interrogations towards the anthropological theme betray a rupture in thought? Philosophieren seems to be able to deploy itself exhaustively at the level of a knowledge of man. surrounded in their power by questioning and reinstalled. the largely empirical status that the first Critique assigns to the Anthropology is. that which the Anthropology wants to say. the moment when in Kantian thought the organisation of Philosopheren totalises itself.command the organisation of critical thought. . man was obscurely the „Gegenstand‟ (sensible concrete object)? That towards whom they would disclose themselves and who stands opposite them. And first. neither in the denunciation of a so-called rupture affecting this transcendental resolution of criticism. It is in the light of the answers provided. the Metaphysics. ready to give the unexpected answer that they solicit in another language? Or rather are we to think on the contrary that these three questions ought to be in their turn interrogated. but affected by a decisive modification. or in the discovery of a hypothetical new dimension along which Kant would approach at last that to which he had originally been the closest. to begin this examination. A fourth question appears: what is man? –which only follows on from the first three in order to take hold of them again in a reference that wraps them all: because they all have to relate themselves to that one. not even as the empirical exploitation of the question in its broadest sense. eine Beziehung auf das Objekt. by a new Copernican revolution. as they should all be accounted for by the Anthropology. in these texts. zweitens eine Beziehung auf das Subjekt‟? [a twofold relationship: to the object and to the subject] In other words. by this very fact. what does their „relation to the fourth question‟ mean for the three? (sich bezeihen auf) Are we to understand this relation as that of knowledge to its object. outside of the Anthropology.

Copula define the figure of the relation between God. Answers or solutions? These texts should not be regarded as either. And at . What might seem to us a rupture or discovery in the text of the Logic. of the originary or of the fundamental? a) Certain texts point to it as the very act of thought. and through the haunting repetition of the themes. it is in so far as he exercises his sovereignty as a thinking subject. But it can be defined exactly in this sense starting from the power where it takes its origin: „Gott und die Welt. the world and man. Starting from man. universum. the definition of the relation between God. However. als Wesen das diese Begriffe vereinigt as beings which unites this concepts‟. und der Mensch als Person. the trilogy Subjekt. the world and man. die Welt. the absolute can be thought. [Man is then] that which is then the copula. und der Geist des Menschen der beide denkt‟ [God and the World. the structure itself of judgement is brought back onto the regime of traditional logic. and man becomes the mediator starting from which „ein absoluter Ganze‟ [an absolute totality] is designated. und Ich selbst der Mensch als moralisches Wesen‟. it is the concrete and active unity in which and for which God and the world find their unity: „Gott. reveals itself then as the fundamental interrogation of philosophical reflection. regains scope both in the rigour of its limits and in its greater extension. Praedikat. as if with God. One must leave to the fragments of the Opus Postumum their tentative character. the world and man. If man gives unity to the world and God. d.thinking the world and thinking God: „Der medius terminus…ist hier das urteilende Subjekt (das denkende Welt -Wesen. come to rejoin.What is man? The Opus Postumum The texts of the Opus Postumum that are dated in the period of 18001801 tenaciously repose. A fragment attests to this: „System der transcendental Philosophie in drei Abschnitten: Gott. take ear to this divergence that makes a body with the originary unity of the effort. and the spirit of man thinks the two of them]. in their coexistence and their fundamental relations. where everything is thus well considered in its sole form. forming the real unity where the personality of God and the objectivity of the world. die Welt.i. the sensible and supra-sensible principle. the linklike the verb „to be‟ of the judgement of the universe. these three notions are not given as the three elements of a planned system that juxtaposes them along a homogeneous surface. The third term is not there as a complement: it plays the central role of „medius terminus‟. Rather. What is the correct meaning of this unification of God and the world in man and for man? What synthesis or what operation confronts it? Can it be situated at the level of the empirical or of the transcendental. der Mensch…) b) This unifying act is then the synthesis itself of thought. they are possible paths and tests for a thought that advances on the ground of a finally attained transcendental philosophy. with regards to the division of transcendental philosophy. c) Finally man appears as the universal synthesis.

It is no longer correlative of a Zeit-bestimmung (9). the world of the Opus postumum is concomitant to the determination of me as objective content of experience in general. ein Teil der Welt. The accomplishment of the closure of this folding seems to entail the exclusion of language.each instant. Therefore. as a whole (Ganz) is beyond (au-delà) all the predications and maybe at the root of all the predicates. Its opposition to the universe allows one to fix its meaning in a transcendental philosophy. more wrap (envelopment) than landmark. as „Weltbewohner‟ [world inhabitant]. It is not given at the opening of the whole. takes place in the field of experience and finds there a concrete system of belonging. man is defined as the inhabitant of the world. the interrogation on man emerges as the question to which the entire problematic of the world and God cannot avoid to be related to. bin mir jenes ver haltnisses beurisst und der bevengenden Krafte zu Empfindungen (Wahrnehmungen). on this side of language. but it is not exactly the same world. But this relation to the question on man does not have the value of an absolute reference. as a figure of this movement for which the me. and „obstinacy‟ (Beharrliches) of a spatial coexistence. every time the geography of these new territories needs to be located. but it makes illegible (achoppe) what the predicate of the world ought to be by way of symmetry. that is in question in the fragment of the Opus Postumum. thus freeing a serenely fundamental thought from the content itself of the question: Was ist Mensch? It cannot be deployed within an originary autonomy: because of the entry to the game. However. And to be honest what is disclosed to it is anticipated and made possible by the transcendental Analytics and the Refutation of Idealism. in becoming object. or rather the world in the same sense. because the world. [the world] is sketched out in the bending of a tout that permits it to be. but the precondition (le presuppose) of a Sinnenbestimmung of me. und ich bin selbt ein veltresen. –Es ist eine Welt ausser mir (praeter me) im Raume und der Zeit. And in place of it being defined by the „perseverance‟. it is not about pointing to a naturalist perspective whereby a science of man entails a knowledge of nature. this world is not without structure and signification. It is no longer easy to talk of this world. Rather than to the determinations in which the human beast is taken and defined at the level of phenomena. it is present in the flexion on the (me) self of Ganz .‟ The world is discovered in the implications of the „I am‟. Then this world thus disclosed is neither the Physis. – Ich der Mensch bin mir selbst ein ausseres Sinnenobjekt. and of its primary form that is predication: a text of the Opus postumum talks about „personality‟ as a predicate of God. And this predicate remains unfilled (en blanc). for the experience of a me. The „exterior things‟ of the Refutation of Idealism have been the conditions of the determination of Time as a form of inner experience. nor the universe of validity of the law. And all reflection on man is brought up again circularly into a reflection on the world. „Der Mensch gehort zwar mit zur Welt‟ [man really belongs to the world]. what this pertains to is the development of selfconsciousness and of the I am: the subject is affected in the movement through which it becomes object of itself: „Ich bin. .

-whereby the world is nothing but.consists in the impossibility of surpassing it and the imperious necessity of accepting its frontiers as limits. It envelops existence because as well as being the concept of its totality.] What do they mean. existence develops its concrete reality: a double meaning enclosed in the very world Inbegriff [epitome]. Or. by containing it. of domain. but absolutely nothing impedes to conceive an other system or other relations to be defined differently. 3) But however lawful this supposition is („es mag…‟). and limit.The world and the universe in the Opus Postumum. simultaneously retains and frees it. three other questions emerge. and what are these three prescriptions in which the interrogation on man is distributed related to? It is easy to . Straight from when the „was ist der Mensch‟ is formulated.‟ [The philosopher must be able to determine: the source of human knowledge. does not remain stable and fixed on the vacuum that it designates and interrogates. The world. de facto. of source. This system is given once. This is to say that the world is not the open space of the necessary. the extension of possible and useful use of human knowledge. and it is not possible for the relations to be other [than what they are]. conforming to Begriff der Inbegriff. the place where we had left him: this is to say. whilst the world is a system of real relations. in its turn. The universe is the unity of the possible. 2) One can only have – by definition – one universe. This is then in the Opus postumum the world where man appears to himself. or rather three imperatives of knowledge are formulated that give to the anthropological question its character of concrete prescription: „Der Philosoph muss also bestimmen Können: Die Quellen des menschlichen wissens Der Umfang des moglischen und naturlichen Gebrauches alles wissens Und endlich die Grenzen der Vernunft. starting from the world. Thus the world. Differently from the universe. the limits of reason. „Der Begriff der Welt ist der Inbegriff des Dasein‟ [the concept of the world is the complex of existence]. on the other hand. one cannot avoid recognising that there cannot be but one world: „Es mag nur Eine Welt sein‟. going back to the Logic. The correlative of the possibility of conceiving of other worlds. Because the possible is only thought starting from a system given by actualité. but a domain where a system of necessity is possible. taken back in its signification as „Inbegriff des Daseins‟ appears according to a triple structure. and the plurality of worlds is only delineated starting from an existing world and from what can be offered to experience: the world is „das Ganza aller moglichen Sinnen Gegenstander‟. The world is the root of existence. the time when the three questions had been referred to the one: what is man? This question. the source that. a domain. could be given in numerous examples („es mag viele Welte sein‟). the world is given within a system of actuality that envelops all real existence.

in the fourth question. On the one hand. This is to say. [What necessarily makes up the existence of things belongs to Transcendental Philosophy]. at the level of transcendental philosophy where finally they are formulated. to the notion of world as whole (tout). They determine the structural belonging of the interrogation on man to the questioning of the world. We are here at the level of the structural foundation of the anthropological-critical repetition. it is sufficient to go through the text of 1798 to see that it overlaps exactly the domain of the critical undertaking. The Anthropology does not say anything more than what the Critique says. nor that they point towards a new interrogation that has surpassed them: but simply that the anthropological question poses – by taking them back . And here we find it in the rigorous undertaking (reprise) of the three questions that dominate the three Critiques. in the Logic. The wealth of the source.the questions that relate to itself. At the more superficial level. The totality of existence thinks as Ganz (entirety) and not as Alles (tout). the determination „the sources of human knowledge‟ give (contenu) meaning to the question: what can I know?. and the reference to them in the end does not entail either that the former disappear in the latter. at the watermark of these three themes.recognise. these three notions. and the sketch of what will be in the Opus postumum the fundamental structure of the „Inbegriff des Daseins‟. “Was notwendig (ursprunglich) das Dasein der Dingen ausmacht gehort zur Transcendental Philosophie”. they have a whole different import. have reached the fundamental level where the Inbegriff of existence is interrogated. Umfang (domain). once specified. The content. they are given as common forms of the interrogation on man and the meaning (signification) of the world. in its fundamental character. Or what necessarily (originally) belongs to the existence of things. domain and limit. the meaning of this fundamental repetition does not have to be asked either to the repeated word or to the language that it repeats: but to that towards which this repetition goes. and Grenzen (Limit). and the determination of the „limits of reason‟ give its meaning to that „what is possible to hope‟. without doubt. the relationship of man and the world. the determination of the „domain of the possible and natural usage of knowledge‟ indicates what could be the reply to the question: „what shall I do?‟. in fact. But. In other words. A paradoxical repetition: source. for their own perseverance and weight. However. towards the disclosure of this ternary structure in which the question in the Opus postumum and that characterises the Inbegriff of Daseins is: source. already present in the web of critical thought. the solidity of the domain and the rigour of the frontier are inseparably linked to what it has as a necessity (this is to say originary). of the fourth question is then not fundamentally different from the meaning that the first three questions had. Quellen (source). and where they appear finally to themselves (pour elles-mêmes). And through this is disclosed. both the reconsideration of the first three questions. -this relation that seemed locked . domain and limit. is this fundamental structure of its Inbegriff that we already know. and to which they give meaning in the last Kantian texts. These concepts are common to the themes they specify.

of sensitivity. domain and limit. but the basis of a transcendental correlation between . der menschliche Geist in mir in einem system das All der Dinge befassend…‟. offers itself in the gripped solidarity of a determinism that sends back to a priori syntheses of a judging subject (eines urteilenden Subjekt). The world. since the world had been unified by man. it means that it has a fundamental correlation. they match the trilogy internal to the first Critique. they provide a triple content to the interrogation on man to which they relate all others. But by resuming each of these tri-partitions. the world is only domain in relation to a founding (fondatrice) activity that opens itself on/to freedom. they resume and strengthen in one word the work of each Critique: pure reason. practical reason and faculty of judgement. offers itself on the space of the manifold that designates the originary passivity of sensibility. They repeat the three fundamental questions which. At the level of a transcendental philosophy they dissipate immediately to let a correlation emerge where the whole of existence defines what belongs to it necessarily and originally. who hadn‟t been but an inhabitant of the world. die Welt ausser mir. and of thought precisely as limit. and consequently „der Mensch gehort zwar mit zur Welt. understanding and reason. And by the same token. and the inaccessible term where one is always approached really but in vain. but this source of knowledge is inexhaustible precisely because this originary passivity is indissociable from the forms of Vereinigung [merging] of spontaneity and of the spirit. as domain of all the possible predicates. according to Kant. The world. If the world is source. as limit of possible experience. but the foundation of a transcendental correlation between passivity and spontaneity. The ambiguity is well expressed in this fragment: „Gottuber mir. Later.within the indefinite repetition of its circularity. aber nicht der seiner Pflicht Angermessene‟ [on the background of a transcendental correlation between necessity and freedom ](10). and substitute to these systematic divisions the organisation of the transcendental correlatives. by their very repetition. the level of the fundamental. Doesn‟t a text of the Opus postumum say: „Der Mensch in der Welt gehort mit zur Kenntnis der Welt [Man in the world belongs with knowledge of the world]? But these paradoxes are at the level of natural knowledge. they put on hold. One sees the scope of the field of reflection that covers these three notions: source. animate all philosophy. Thus one notices that the world is not simply source for a faculty of sensation. Finally. as source of knowledge. in so far as it is proper to the ambiguity itself of this notion to designate the frontier too easy to cross. But it is only limit because there exists a certain „nature‟ of reason whereby the labour is one of anticipation on the totality. The world. excludes all transcendental usage of the Idea. beyond which it is impossible to go back into passivity and spontaneity [on the background of a transcendental correlation between passivity and spontaneity]. In a sense. that the world is not simply the domain for a synthetic understanding.

as its own drive. On the other hand. but the basis of a transcendental correlation between reason and spirit (Vernunft-Geist). it repeats the first three questions. become traditional.necessity and freedom. from the beginning. that of a structure which – in its most radical aspect than that of all possible faculties. On the one hand. and the division. and therefore in the Opus postumum it is linked. that the world is not just limit for the use of Ideas. originary. hence. An episode within an anthropology that does not have any claim to such universality of meaning and a transcendental philosophy that takes the interrogation on man at a much more radical level. The relation of the 1798 text to the Critique is thus paradoxical. than an episode. to an interrogation on God and on the world. we are not at the end of our path. at this stage we are already too far on the path that should have taken us to the exact situation of the Anthropology – to the place of its birth and insertion in critical thought. One sees what the place of the fourth question is within the economy of Kant‟s later work. the question is developed entirely at this level as if it had never pertained to this singular domain that is the Anthropology. which in turn rests on its work but does not root itself in it. Or rather. the Anthropology refers back to.offers itself to the word (parole) and is finally liberated from transcendental philosophy. but necessary correlation. the great articulations of the Critique. in other words. hence the Anthropology does not refer back to the Critique. despite this implicit and constant reference.that develop at the root of the existence of things. in Kantian thought. But we also find: the question „what is man?‟ is given in the Logic as the anthropological interrogation par excellence. but transcendental philosophy . the Critique announces it and makes it pace inside of an empirical philosophy. ursprunglich). to be explicit. As if the Anthropology became impossible (at the level of a fundamental rather than merely programmatic possibility) unless taken from the point of view of a Critique completed and already lead to accomplishment by a transcendental philosophy. Therefore. of the faculties. It is divided of itself towards what it ought to bring together (fonder) that is no longer the Critique. but it repeats them by substituting to a tri-partition that more or less directly follows the distinction of the faculties (Vermogen). This episode has been structurally necessary: its passing character was linked to a passage that reassures it. or to the principal organising elements laid out by it. within this system of correlation the reciprocal transcendence of truth (vérité) and freedom is founded. within the passage from a critical reflection –hence necessarily propaedeutic. The anthropological question is not of independent content. in other words.necessity (notwendig. The meaning and function of the question: what is man? consists in the bringing of the divisions of the Critique to a level of fundamental cohesion. the play of the three notions that account for the relations of man and of the world: no longer empirical and circular relations of immanence at the level of a natural knowledge (connaissance). And here. The reference of the Logic to an anthropology that reduces to itself all philosophical interrogation seems to be nothing more. of inseparable transcendences. the Critique only has foundational value in relation to the the accomplishment of a transcendental philosophy.

of story and of example secretly heading Kantian thought towards a founding reflection. and decisive to the forms of reflection that offer themselves as goals to achieve it. The given is therefore never deceptive. It is the function and the web of its empirical status. in the order of time. This repetition is not a going back to the same. What.itself. On the other hand. If the Anthropology is systematic it is in so far as it borrows its coherence from all of the thought of the Critique. as an already coherent object. The Anthropology itself asserts that it is at once „systematic and popular‟. precarious and always doubtful labour of the succession: the manifold as it offers itself to the senses is not yet (noch nicht) ordered. A judgement that is produced before this ordering activity [putting into order (zuvor)] risks being false. The relation described by the Anthropology has its own dimension within the slow. forms truth according to the measure of this time itself. -each of the three books of the Didactic repeat the three Critiques. for anticipation. the retrospective reassessment of reasoning (Nachgrubeln) and the indefinite folding (repli) of reflection (Uberlegung) intervened. because here the dispersion is no longer that of the given and sensible passivity. Its (dispersion) is not contemporaneous to . as a knowledge. it is the dispersion of synthetic activity in relation to itself – dispersion that offers itself as a „jeu‟. we have been able to determine of its path will allow without doubt to better understand how the Anthropology was able to be at once marginal in relation to the Critique. the wear (usure) of the frequentation (Umgang) [of the world] will be able to research find out what he is. The Principe of this totality is not man himself. and what judgement inserts within time. the time of the Anthropology is guarantor of an insurmountable dispersion. the understanding must come to add itself (hinzukonsmen) and insert an order that it supplies itself (hineinbringen). the becoming of humanity and its path towards inaccessible goals. it only offers the diverse already dominated within the unity of the I think. this relation of succession does not put up with/withstand being extended with impunity. The Anthropology is systematic: which is not to say that it enunciates all that can be known of man. only provides the multiplicity of the given through an activity already constructive at the outset. because he is linked to the world. and the Caracteristique refers back to the texts on history. and only there. resides the organising principle of the Anthropology. not because it judges well. Empiricity and Time 1. the error could equally slip. [There is] one example to determine how exactly this repetition occurs: the text entitled „Apology of sensitivity‟‟ refers to the relation between intuition and understanding. form of the intuition and of the inner sense. The time of the Critique. a coherent whole: no longer Alles. and it is by dwelling on these two words that we can decipher its own proper meaning: in repeating the Critique at a popular level of advice. but that it forms. This empiricity must now be attended to /followed in itself. but Ganze. On the other hand. if. but because it doesn‟t judge at all. There. and only the indefinite labour of enquiry.

the Time of t he Anthropology remains doomed to the domain of the Ver…. it inevitably succeeds/follows itself. and to all the slippings that have been made (Ver Kunstein. friable and compromised incertitude of an exercise that is called Kunst .is what limits it –placing it. dispersed time mercilessly obscures and renders impenetrable the synthetic acts. the deeper the layers are buried in originary passivity. but rather the fact that nothing is ever given without being at the same time offered to the danger of an undertaking that is simultaneously the ground in the construction. exercises its sovereignty in three ways: it is the puissance/power of the negative. but this negation can and must be comprehended also as spontaneity (in relation to the determinations of the diverse) as well as artifice (in relation to the validity of the given). because it maintains the dispersion of the syntheses and the always renewed possibility of seeing them escaping from one another. and through which. the Kunst that. is one of the terms that frequently recur in the Anthropology – and one of those that remains the most inaccessible to translation. The word „Kunst‟. of avoiding appearance (Schein). . and to the freedom. with its derivatives (verkunstein. as well as giving to appearance the plenitude and meaning of the phenomenon: this is to say that the Kunst retains (détient). However. its role is that of building . or also it can be cunning of the cunning and refined form that transmits the value. -more in the form of freedom-. thus giving rise to error (donnant ainsi prise á l‟erreur).above and counter to/against the phenomenon (Erscheinung). for the same fact. thus deploying itself at the level of the Ur…. Time is not that in which. and the dodging in the arbitrary. Kunst is in a sense the negation of originary passivity. and because of which the synthesis is made.itself in the organisation of the manifold. moreover. Verdichten. time becomes transparent to a synthetic activity that was not temporal itself. In the Critique. the patient. it affects it not in the manner of a given that indicates a primary passivity. in the Anthropology. erkunstein. since it was constituent. Given that the time of the Critique had reassured the unity of the originary (from the originally given until the originary synthesis). in an indefinite domain. What affects the synthetic activity -the opening to this freedom. and substitutes to the sovereignty of the Bestimmung [determination]. the seriousness of the phenomenon. in proximity of the sensible (au ras du sensible) already inhabits the whole domain of the given. It is that which gnaws at the synthetic activity itself. the power of reciprocal negation of Schein and Erscheinung. and as simple appearance. gekunstelt). and this Schein can be used intentionally. as Erscheinung: thus in the exchange of signs of morality. the sensible content can be nothing but a mask and it is in the service of the cunnings of a lie. the more there is in the sensible given that is open to this game of freedom: the content of sensible intuition can be utilised artificially as Schein. Equally. Then. but in the way of an intrinsic possibility that raises the hypothesis and the threat of an exhaustive determination: that the possibility of error is linked to the duty. Neither art nor technique are concerned there. Ver ruchen).

that has been fundamental in the Critique. This is to say that the originary is where. and dooms it to a diverse. time and the dispersion it determines. Kunst and the Subject: a relation between truth and freedom. time gives it back its true meaning. but of finding again a temporal web that. communication. a connection between truth and freedom. so the connection of truth and freedom starts to be deciphered in the Anthropology. The originary is not the really primitive. in the instant. where it can never rejoin/meet itself in an a-temporal sovereignty. This is not because the problem of origins is foreign to it: on the contrary. towards an archaism of fact and of right. in time. corresponds in the Anthropology the relation of time to Kunst. to establish. and this insurmountable determination refers back to the existence of an external world in relation to which an inner experience of change had been possible. truth and freedom belong to each other. But what the Critique states as determination. This link will be. To the relation of time and the subject. but makes thus escape from the sphere of determinations the relation to truth. that it is not of disclosing and is the decision of the intentional. without offering itself. consequently and simultaneously. what the Anthropology deals with is always already there. this is to say that time. the privileged theme of transcendental philosophy. to a liberty that is negation to exercise. show in the texture of the „Beziehung auf‟ a reciprocal belonging (appartenance) of truth and freedom. is it not the same thing that is repeated? Time receives and reveals a „relation to…‟ a primary opening that is. it is the language of exchange. the originary. In the Anthropology. from far and high. and the interrogation that animates the relentless question of the Opus Postumum. opens it by the very fact. As the Beziehung auf [relation to] becomes visible in the Critique through the structure of Vorstellung [imagination]. One can have a false/ wrong Anthropology – and we know it too well: it is that which attempts to shift towards a beginning. having already begun. Systematic by virtue of a structure that is that of the Critique. had been the root of this „Beziehung auf‟ [relation to] that characterises the first opening of all knowledge. dangerous freedom that links the work of truth with the possibility of error. and the primary passivity that it indicates. the subject had self-consciousness (conscience de soi) as „determined in time‟. what is primary for the Anthropology is doomed to a time that completely envelops it. and that the Anthropology repeats. Thus the time that eats into and crumbles the unity of the synthetic act. The Anthropology is systematic. „Was ist der Mensch?‟. in the relationship between passivity and spontaneity. Time. is not less rooted [radical]. In the Critique. the Anthropology describes along a temporal dispersion that is never ended and never starts. and never entirely given. Kant‟s Anthropology offers us another lesson: to repeat the a priori of the . From the Critique to the Anthropology. in its turn. through the labour and the dangers of Kunst. It is the truly (vraiment) temporal. the structures of the a priori.

In order to become popular a knowledge must rely on „eine Welt -und Menschentkenntniss‟. it is what implicates itself in order to exist. A text of the Logic offers a definition of the notion of Popularitaät. Which is what the Anthropology wants to say itself: the reader finds himself in such environment of total evidence (Vollstandige Einsicht) that he can indefinitely find new examples. towards the exhaustive and dissipates the danger of particularity. its arguments are no better (nor other) than those of scholastic savoir. popular knowledge. because man and that knowledge are within the obedience of one . epithet. 2. What is meant by this? Neither a certain nature of the content (an empirical analysis can only be popular). in this sentence of the Logic that circumscribes the requirements of popular knowledge. in popular knowledge an exigency of discourse that goes towards the whole. but in the manner of administering the evidence. on the other hand. This circle is not about unravelling. „eine Vollstandige Einsicht‟ [a complete view]. But the popularity is not the primary. but it offers the certitude that the whole is given in the inexhaustible multiplicity of the diverse.Critique in the originary. the page that once was blank. as oeuvre of popular form. It will be a knowledge of man that man himself will be able to immediately comprehend. Its own character lies not so much in the particularity of a style. nor a certain quality of the form (a non popular knowledge can receive a „garment‟ that makes it accessible). in a truly temporal dimension. since it speaks a common language. Despite this systematic deep-rootedness (enracinement). the definition of anthropology is not found? This is to say that the Anthropology.what resides in language: the possibility at once to speak it and to speak about it. relies on itself in so far as it is knowledge of man and the world. is to say that one finds between the author and its public the undivided basis of daily language that continues to speak. To say that a text is popular because the readers can find examples for themselves. earliest and the most naïve form of truth. -in language. without transition and without changes. in the current usage lies the inexhaustible source of these „examples‟.its truth is the same.‟ How come. through which the writing extends towards the reader. without interrogation and in the familiarity of the recognised. As popular knowledge and knowledge of the „popular‟. and to do so in one and the same movement. but they add something to it because in the discourse of scholastic knowledge one can never be sure that the proof is not „einseitig‟[biased/one-sided]. of the interior. but taking as it is given and where it is given. thus authorising. there is. In relation to knowledge. will clarify it. of tastes and of inclinations of men. on the contrary. and indefinitely extend. can rely on itself. . it is not an addition. the Anthropology is a „popular work: where examples can be found by each reader‟.e. recognise. The various proofs offered never give the impression of being particular. The Anthropology. i. a knowledge of concepts. or style of expression: it is perfection … „eine populare Vollkommenbeit des Erkenntnisses‟. It distinguishes itself from technical and scholastic perfection: not that it is not compatible with them. it will speak of him and.

that they will reveal/say what they really want to say. The differences that daily language gives to dumm. one erases them for the sake of a terminology that is supposed to reproduce a logical articulation of the real within the space of nature. It is not at all a matter of providing a silent Logos of nature with a prolific language of men. All the expressions given there are thought with all their weight of seriousness. No doubt . Within the classification of mental illnesses in the 18th century. Why does one regularly say: „ein richtiger Verstand. But they do not derive from a cause foreign to human practice. Differently from the non popular texts. Geck [fop]. The meaning of these idioms is always actual to them. it welcomes language in the totality of a practice that is never put back into question. there is neither mystified language nor erroneous vocabulary. eine geubte Urteilskraft. there is no historical explanation in the Anthropology. tor. narr [fool]. Furthermore. that does not form either the city of spirits. and to give to each. form the support and the substance itself of analysis. It is in following the thread of language and of practice in examining them at a slower pace. Something is thought within the whole that is said. the Anthropology does not try to fix and justify its vocabulary. but rather of totalising this language on the supposition that there is no folding in it that is not accompanied by a particular modality of meaning. or by the references to other linguistic ensembles. for Kant. ei n kunrzweiliger Mensch‟? What does one say when saying: „Geld ist die Losug?‟. terms such as einfaltig. there are all the „moral idioms‟ that exist in the customs and relations between men and in their language they are known expressions: rules of politeness. the empirical guiding thread is different from the patient effort to exhaust the verbal forms of a theme. the Anthropology is a sort of general idiomatic. uses in fashion. In a sense. and unklug [idiot] are challenged as mystifying and vain. tor. Popularity and Language The Anthropology is therefore not rooted in a system of expression and of experience that is a German one. in its precise meaning. In the web of the texts. It is sufficient to interrogate and to give a hearing to it. and narr are all as valid and full of meaning as those established by the naturalists amongst the terms of vesania and insanity established in the species. conventions and habits in meetings. On the contrary. dumm [stupid]. They all have their justification. only relevant to a popular usage founded solely on the obscurity of a dubious tradition. The Anthropology is the elucidation of this language tout fait – explicit or silent – by which man spreads on things and amongst his kind a network of exchanges. of reciprocity. but this universal inhabiting of man within the world. But these are words that. the real extension of its domain. Without a doubt Kant would surpass (essaie-t-il) this domain given by the analysis of foreign practices.inexhaustible language. eine grundliche Vernunft?‟ Isn‟t there something that goes right to the essence? Which serious game is played in the opposition „eine langweilige Unterredung. At the anthropological level. of solid comprehension. they are no longer hidden in a distant past: apart from a note on the meaning and taste for business amongst the Jews. and in comparing them in a sort of empirical plane. nor the total appropriation of nature.

and weissagen. the „vermognen Idem zu schaffen‟. ausdenken. The term of Melancholia.that is not yet absorbed even if buried. for example. But it is not more essential. The secret right of a Latinity . And when in his own language he feels „embarrassed to find an expression that is exactly appropriate‟. has a constant educative value in the comprehension of man as citizen of the entire world. does not go though Latinity. even if its words have been deviated by an excessively long usage. Since Latin starts emerging as language of savant and philosophical universality. one finds firstly. He thinks it is better to use Latin than to hinder. vorhersagen. The Latin reference there is systematic and essential. administrative capital.. the path of thought in the Anthropology. psychological or technical of invention: entdecken. near the sea. erdichten. Wahnsinn – sementia. it replaces the analysis in a scientific tradition: Unsinninngkeit – amenita. he experiences even German language as an embarrassment and limitation. The meticulousness. he recurs to „some dead and savant language‟. and of a general manner. But the real labour. crossroad. when the spiritual power and the taste lead these productions. Wahnwitz – insana. without residue . so complex. dissociable. one has to do with Dichtkunst [literature].watches over the language effectively used (mise en oeuvre). plus the power of their giving f orm according to the laws of productive imagination: it is the vermogen zu bilden. This is a reflection upon and in a system of constituted and enveloping signs. neither by fact nor by right. and almost at the level of quasi-synonymes. through refinements of the Germanic language. the great dynasty. „the march of science‟. in the Critiques. University city and commercial centre. does not concern what constitutes the veritable meaning of the tiefsinnigkeit. And moreover. annotates all the time the corresponding Latin word. but in following the vertical dimension. There is also the verbal domain of Sagen: Wahrsagen. must be asked to a whole dynasty of language (de la langue): on the one hand. in the broad sense. it follows the lines of force of the German system of expression. sometimes it fixes a system of correspondences between the critical level and the anthropological domain. In the Critique of Pure Reason. On the surface. Sometimes. The reference to Latin is maybe more frequent in the Anthropology than in the Critiques. sometimes. nor does it have value beyond indication and landmark. But all this does not prevent the Anthropology from unwinding itself in its entirety within a geographical and linguistic domain from where it is not. on the other hand the subtle opposition. the series Scharfsinnigkeit. Leichtsinnigkeit etc. this meaning. it allows distinguishing an ambiguity of meaning: Leicht and schwer mean light and heavy as well as easy and difficult. and was ausfinding machen er sinnen. entfinden. -that can . and the web of powers of the spirit. it plays with words that designate other forms. and that grants what is said with an intrinsic value of exchange. with the tiefdenken. with which Kant. sufficiently indicates that the universality of his purpose is one and the same as a certain implicit Latinity. difficult to untangle. the usage of modern languages does not contest. of Dichten [writing poetry].it is this that is the most particular in his experience to dominate limits: Konigsberg. the universal meaning of the preferred word (parole). to arrive at the meaning that is proper to them‟. for those who employ them or understand them. Aberwitz –vesania.

as instrument of exchanges. of what there is to exchange. the langue accordingly is not given as system to be interrogated. langue is the field common to philosophy and non-philosophy. that limits itself to imitation. when this art takes form in the justified solemnity of verses. the real ground of anthropological experience is much more linguistic than psychological. in the Anthropology. they are disengaged or seen through the net of words. Also what is identified and defined is the complex network of the Dichtung thanks to a totalisation of the verbal domain related to it. and it is not taken back to its rigorous meaning: danger of the Beredskeit in which the relations of understanding and of sensibility are inversed. free play of language on itself . None of the three great functions of language must be omitted: enunciation of contingent fact (Erzahlen). by the transparency of a common language. but rather as an element that goes by itself. philosophical language recognises the possibility to find its locus of origin and define its field of exploration in a given language. one sees Kant criticise this or that confusion in the manner of expression. whether silent or speaking. danger of the Versmacherei. at the interior in which one is placed within a game. -or rather communicate. on these minuscule forms of society that are the common meal. formulation. the group that has the value of model is neither the family nor the state: it is the Tischgesellschaft [dinner society]. This abandonment of the philosophical reflection in relation to a universality of the Latin form has its importance. and what must be exchanged. nothing must be felt privileged or isolated. do not form in their structure the guiding thread of the analysis. the powers also put into action. From now on. it is about poetry in the strict sense. the importance of the Unterhaltung. but each. must be present in the common sovereignty of the parole. in the practice of a native word. but situates this disclosure in a determined verbal domain. From the point of view of the Anthropology. a relation of all to all.address itself also to the eyes and the ears. The fact that this language is linked to a language does not make it relative nor limits the meaning that it provides. vehicle of dialogues and virtuality of not yet reflected on in itself in the Anthropology: but it is used at every moment. a prestige of this social and moral model of a Gesellschaft where each finds himself at once sovereign and friendly (close to). the Dichtung [literary work] finds itself embroiled in a couple of oppositions where it risks alienating itself and losing itself. danger of the Naturmalerei. It is in language that they confront themselves. deprived of spiritual power. as they have for a long time been tied up with daily usage. The banquet. (11) There is then a Kantian Banquet –an insistence. exchange and rectification of judgement (Raisonieren). Isn‟t this a peculiar image of universality? There must be established. Surely. This relation of philosophical meaning to significations of a langue – which will be so decisive in German thought. but it is not in the name of a really existing distinction that one can denounce those who do not make use of it and do not consider it. But to each of those levels. finally. The value of a discourse that from one to the other and amongst everyone is born and ends. The faculties. as having occurred.

on the other hand. but in the form of totality. in the form of human universality. It is easy to understand how this repetition can have structure. It is there that language assumes. function and value of passage: it is because the Critique. without rupture. it has. in a time already sold. but not in so far as he must belong to such social group or such institution: purely and simply because he speaks. one must obey the laws of an internal structure: those of the supple continuity. it finds. It is a truth more interior and more complex. instead of being simply repeated at the level of . We are no longer surprised by these promises made at the opening of the Anthropology. achieves and finds again its reality. the moment of passage to transcendental philosophy. and whereby the particularities themselves are the legitimate birthplace for universal significations. the man of the Anthropology is Weltburger. As far as the content itself of the discussion is concerned.(Scherzen). becomes cosmo-political prescription. truth takes then shape through the temporal dispersion of syntheses and in the movement of language and of exchange. His residence in the world is originally an inhabiting of language. It is in the exchange of language that. finally the irony of the game. In fact. all at once. In an anthropological perspective. without renunciation nor alienation. We have noted above how the anthropological reflection can constitute. since it is in the movement itself of exchange. Everyone is free. It is by this that the analysis of the Gemüt. there must be these three dominant functions.and that the work seems to give up on delivering. liberties meet each other and are spontaneously universalised. nor the pure impact of the given. in a language already spoken. in limiting itself to an analysis of the Gemüt. inside a temporal flux and a linguistic system never given in their point zero. In speaking in the community of convivium. Round and round. of forming a whole. the articulation of liberties and the possibility. The truth that the Anthropology exposes is then not a truth anterior to language and that it will see to transmit. The Anthropology is then „systematically projected‟ by a reference to the Critique that passes through Time. nor the a priori moments of its constitution. something that is like its originary form: the universal emerging (naissant) in the middle of the experience in the movement of the truly temporal and of the really exchanged. in a movement that is the rhythm proper to this form of meeting: initially the novelty of the event. Similarly whilst at any time the originary could have been defined as the temporal itself. and that exchange accomplishes the universal truth of man. can be self-organised without the intervention of a force or an authority. or to make the discussion deviate are never experienced by others as abuse or constraint. of the manner in which each person‟s freedom to formulate his opinion. one can now say that the originary does not reside in a preliminary and secret signification. Also in the regulated element of language. it doesn‟t find its primitive form. it is there also that man deploys its anthropological truth. he attends to and accomplishes himself the concrete universal. in the form of internal sense. for individuals. by the repetition itself of the Critique. there. then the seriousness of the universal. popular value because its reflection is situated at the interior of a given language that makes it transparent without reforming it. . of studying man as „citizen of the world‟. to insist upon it. but in the more manifest route of the exchange.

the problematic of the Welt and the In-der-Welt will not be able to escape the „threat‟ of empiricity. in order to see there the authentic repetition . elle confondra l‟analyse des conditions et l‟interrogation sur la finitude. the domination of Kantian memories. starting from the outlined confusion. and it would manage to play the role to which it had been destined. The Anthropology repeats the Critique of Pure reason at an empirical level where one finds it already repeated the Critique of Practical reason: the domain of the necessary is all the same the domain of the imperative. elle se déploiera sans différence de la problématique du nécessaire á celle de l‟existence. in a moment of Husserl‟s thought. is repeated in such a manner that the syntheses of truth (i.for an already distant culture . of the forms where the reflections on the originary had confiscated it. During the whole opening on the region of the fundamental it will not be able to. le caractère préalable de la Critique et la forme achevée de la philosophie transcendantale. It has surely been of the initial project of Husserl. it will conflate the analysis of conditions and the interrogation of finitude. What have we blindly renounced to by failing to see that the authentic articulation of Philosophieren was at the level of the present much more restrictive. (on prêtera à l‟Anthropologie á la fois les privilèges de l‟a priori et le sens du fondamental. as one witnesses in the Logische Unversuchungen.the empirical. But because the originary can never be itself the ground of its own liberation. in a thought that maybe has not noticed that it keeps some filiations and fidelity to the „Chinese views of Kuningsberg‟? One probably needs to understand what to „philosophise with the hammer‟ means. the effort to escape the originary conceived as immediate subjectivity has finally referred to the originary conceived within the density of the passive syntheses and of the already there. lead to what will have to be its justification and meaning. -and that consists in keeping the place of a critical reflection elided. could not manage to hide the structural disequilibria. All phenomenological psychologies and other variations on the analysis of existence are the dismal evidence of a world that is ours . starting from there.distant. see at first glance what the „kurgenrot‟ is and understand what we return to in the Eternal Return. the origin and finitude. Even the reference to Descartes. substituting. this „destructuration‟ of the philosophical field has never been as perceivable as in the wake of phenomenology. There. Without doubt. Addition: the Anthropology will move indifferently from the problematic of necessity to that of existence.) Post Kantian confusions. in this thought that thinks the end of philosophy is where the possibility of still philosophising and the .of what has been . The Anthropology is therefore by essence the investigation of a field where practice and theory are mutually traversed and resorted/appealed to entirely.e. the reflection on the a priori. now appear in the element of freedom (in the recognition of the particular as universal subject). to free the regions of the a priori. the constitution of the necessary within the domain of experience). The reduction would only open on a transcendental of illusion. It will be useful one day to envisage all the history of post-Kantian and contemporary philosophy from the point of view of this confusion.

it is nothing but collection and rhapsody of examples. The analogy of place in the two texts is striking. or Schmid: Empirische Psychologie (Iena: 1791). Can one conceive of an anthropology that will take the empirical as its content and its laws. but precisely. by Starke. especially in Germany. the reflexive movement that divides it comes from somewhere else and goes somewhere else. and certain works that immediately place themselves within the Kantian obedience. Without doubt it is only an empirical collection. As guidance. one could compare them by the paragraph. First of all one ought to include without doubt: Tetens: Versuch über die Menschliche Natur (1777). the other reason is the delay of the publication of the Anthropology. In the Anthropology one finds a double system of solidarity: on the one hand with the critical reflection and transcendental philosophy. some year later. without a precise definition of the manner in which this knowledge relies on the empirical domain that it covers. and that one should see the point of origin or the means of their definite . It is very difficult to properly establish the way in which Kant‟s work is inserted in the chronology and the network of influences of these anthropological texts. it is often impossible to trust the dates of publication in order to establish the order of influences and of presences. Still one must add that there had been a classical reordering of psychologies in the 18th century. On the other hand the anteriority of certain texts gives one ground to believe that Kant has really known and used them in his Anthropology. This is for two reasons: one is the very ascendancy of Kantian thought on science and singularly on psychology and medicine of his epoch. This work which Kant had noticed served as a guiding thread for the Anthropology. notes. of course notebooks as those used. Despite the fact that many texts published well before the Anthropology explicitly or implicitly refer to Kantian thought and present a resemblance to it. In all these texts we already find references to Kant. we only have in this complex network three kinds of landmarks: the texts that contain an explicit reference to Kant. neither defining nor compromising the very form of knowledge. in the second half of the 18th century. One must also add the second edition of the Anthropologie by Platner. but that is addressed to essences in a reflection on man to which only intuition provides richness and life? The empirical would only be applied as an example. as for instance Ith: Versuch einer Anthropologie (Berne: 1794). the Anthropologie by Platner (1772). and obviously the Psychologia empirica by Baumgarten (1749). like Kollner: Bestimmung der organischen Krafte nach Grundsatzen der Kritischen Philosophie. Must one consider the bending towards empiricity as essential to all reflection which aims to move from the a priori towards the fundamental? And when a science of man becomes possible it is included with all rights in the trajectory of philosophy towards itself. A problem remains that even the movement of Kantian thought has not at all helped to solve: it is the problem of empiricity in the anthropologic-critical repetition. but on the other hand with the immense series of anthropological researches that developed. or Hufeland: Macrobiotik. Kant‟s Anthropology does not provide a clear answer to this. a delay which has given cause to the distribution of students.injunction to a new austerity reside.

ce qui est par le corps le physique commence á . theatre and novels. for instance. What can these new anthropologies mean in relation to a science of man of the Cartesian type? It seems that the initial project of anthropology was linked at the beginning of the 18th century to a host of precise scientific difficulties: what is often too hastily called the Critique of the Cartesian mechanicism was for the contemporaries a mode of formulating within a theoretical vocabulary the new labour of their knowledge (connaissance). even if it is not possible to situate exactly the chronological order of their reciprocal relations and the prestige of influences yet. In Nachla‟s notes. Schmid dedicated a paragraph to Hilfsmittel of the empirical study of the soul: history books. that which address exteriority (sein Ausseres) and the body: that is medical anthropology. There are modifications or novelties in the last edition of the Anthropology that have their origin in these recently published texts. in the courses published by Starke. biographies. under the pretext of constituting a science: the Anthropology. Thus there‟s a whole network of empirical knowledge that constitute. that Kant has read Empirische Psychologie by Schmid and has used it. is identified in Kant in a distinction between Vorhersagen. history. It is difficult not to think that there one finds the origin of the titles that after 1791 Kant will give to the two parts of the Anthropology. in this period. and of „perceptio principalis et adharens‟. had already been fixed at the 16th century. one can without making too big a mistake find the influence of certain texts on the development itself of Kant‟s work. Wahrsagen and Weissagen. in this order. Leaving aside the archaeology of a term the form of which. tragic and comic poetry. In a general manner. that one would not put under challenge. the world. if not the fate. Or in 1791. But there is more: the Psychologie of Baumgarten has provided schemas that the Anthropology had used and elaborated on: the distinction between „perceptio primaria et secundaria‟. one could say that in this period the researches on the functioning of the human body were the occasion (provided the opportunity) of a capital conceptual de-doubling: in the unity of the Physis. But more importantly: Schmid himself distinguishes three kinds of human sciences: that which addresses man‟s interiority (sein Inneres) and all that appears to the inner sense: this is psychology. It is only in the text of 1798 that one finds a mention of Hilfsmittel. which are. the domain of Anthropology.accomplishment in Wolff. whilst so called Anthropology must study the mutual relations of interior and exterior. But for now one can question the general significance of the field of empirical knowledge that comes into being. novels. for the bodies. biographies. The link between this network and Kant‟s text is evident. the physics (dans l‟unité de la Physis. qu‟il n‟est pas question de mettre en cause. Finally. at the end of the 18th century. what is by the body the physique starts to be detached from what is. one cannot find any mention of empirical sources that help or sustain the anthropological reflection. One can be sure. Similarly the analysis of Wahrsagen and of Weissagen in Baumgarten. observations on character.

in any case the measure of this gap. he regards the modifications of the soul „von der Seite da sie etwas in dem Gehirn als dem innern Organ der Seële sind‟. la physique). “Definitus Physiologia per scientiam corporis animati. Logica} It is in so far as it is an anthropology that Physiology acquires its specificity. Man is then the first theme of knowledge that could appear in the field left free by the decoupling of Physis and Physics [Physis et Physique]. by the „Selbstgefuhl‟. it is in so far it can no longer cover the domain of the human body. pour les corps. and will define also in terms of relations what is not related to her. and that is what I call Anthropology‟. . unless one takes the standpoint of Physis. it will be this limit pulled down. -4. in the analytical Psychology of the Anthropology. The Anthropology will only be addressed to a phenomenon of phenomenon. praesertim humano‟? Surely because the knowledge of man finds itself at the crossing point where the determination of a metaphysical privilege. meet. but that refers to this difficulty of ordering together the savoirs of physics [la Physique]. in the Anthropology. anthropology is the reason for its not being pure and simple Physics. This is by opposition to their philosophical methods. But Telena had clearly seen that the relation cannot be circumscribed. in terms of continuity what is rupture and in terms of positivity what is finitude. that is the soul. to the terms of a bending that always presupposes the horizon of Nature. -3. How to explain such curious notional crossings. -2. on this side of herself. because it will not accept anything of what man knows of himself. strictius a medius per scientiam corporis sani.But why is this gap linked to anthropology rather than to biology in general? Why does Wolff say that Physiology is a science „de corpore animati. if a science of nature seems to shift away from a science of Physics. The physique in man will be of the order of nature.This paradoxical posture of anthropology (that is the reason of what it is part of-party to-) is full of consequences. On the contrary. and he prescribes „physiology‟ as the science of bodies.Due to what is most initial in its project. Kant will group together in the „Physiology‟ all the empirical knowledges of nature. and the mastery of a technique that is medicine. sometimes contradictory. Reductive. of which „Physics‟ only covers one sector. It will be at once limit of the science of Physis and science of this limit. the physiques and the Physis? Wolff maintains the Physica as the most general form of knowledge of nature. {Wolff.decoller de ce qui est. and one tries to explain „als Solche Gehirnsbeschaffen heiten und Veranderungen‟. But on the other hand. alii tractationem physicam de homine in specie Anthropologiam vocant”. on the domain that she limits. In fact. without being of physics. one must take the modifications of the soul „wie sie durch das Selbstgefuhl erkannt werden‟. the Anthropology cannot avoid being at once reductive and normative. The existence of anthropology is at once the cause and effect. Platner says: „One could regard the body and the soul in their reciprocal relations and limitations. according to his. but only what he can know by the movement that goes through the mediation of the Physis.

its possibilities and its limits. It is thus that the Anthropology. It is there that lies the ambiguity of this Menschenkenntniss by which the Anthropology is characterised: it is knowledge of man. The Anthropology will then not only be science of man and horizon of all sciences of man. prescribing in advance to each science that calls man into question its course. Surely. And an anthropologically founded science will be a reduced science. an assignation of the originary. nor self consciousness. measured on man. In founding knowledge (savoir). and a third historical. by a single movement limits and finalises it (ou du moins en constituant la science de ce qui fonde le savoir…). Whatever its empirical contents. and like the others. a second one that will be psychological. 1792] But as a natural being man grounds his knowledge by limiting it. finalised towards itself.The Anthropology thus finds itself enveloping and surrounding all knowledge of man. deposed of its own truth. the Anthropology. and of men united in political associations‟. nor to the empiricisms that always hang over Locke‟s thought. but also science of what grounds and limits for man his will always be the science of an animated body. It conveys a meaning that cannot be superposed to the „traites de l‟homme‟ in the style. where less than constituting the science that founds knowledge (savoir). „De l‟ établissement des connaissances humaines‟. which is to say at once the natural being of man. but it is knowledge of the knowledge of man. it is a savoir in the language of nature. The Anthropology will be knowledge of a health that to man is synonymous to animation. in a movement that interrogates the subject on itself. And each domain of the sciences can take place within the large field of the Anthropology. It functions as explicit or implicit horizon to all that man can know about himself. In fact. the Anthropology then has an epistemological structure that is proper to itself. as the basis. takes the form of a normative knowledge. But these are only moments in its total epistemological structure. on its limits. in a movement that objectifies him at the level of his natural being and in the content of his animal determinations. Ith predicted in this manner an Anthropology that would be physiological. The Anthropology was believed to put in . nor less. -5. even less in the Cartesian obedience. [Lacratelle: „Of the establishment of human knowledges‟. as it is simultaneously foundation and reductive rule. in so far as something of man is implicit in it: „the first object that strikes me in this vast groups of our knowledges is that which is concerned with man considered in his personal relations. but the Menschenvesen. and developing according to a right functioning. a last one moral or teleological. and by inserting it in a little of nature that does not provide him with the possibility unless he retracts its value (mais entant qu‟etre naturel l‟homme ne fonde sa propre connaissance qu‟en la limitant. In some way the science of the normal par excellence: „Die Lehre von der Beschaffenheit von dem Nutzen der Teile des menschlichen korpers in gesunden Zustand‟. they are balanced around something that is not the human animal. qu‟en l‟inserant dans un peu de nature qui ne lui donne de possibilite que s‟il retire sa valeur). the law of its possibilities and the a priori limit of knowledge. but for this given back to the truth of man. and on what he authorises within the savoir that one gains on him.

in their total organisation. it imitates of the exterior and in the gestures of empiricity the movement of a Critique. this lesson says that the empiricity of the Anthropology cannot be founded on itself. The anthropological interrogation has a different meaning. In fact. in the form of positivity. soul and body. and what is given in it seems to be able to function as an a priori.e. only has been definitely expelled/referred back to starting from an ontology of the infinite. i. one would only have to indicate that this lesson is not at all simple. so liberated and grounded that one can think such finitude in itself. For a long time the anthropologies have thought they could welcome the Kantian lesson without difficulties or thinking twice: Schmid. a knowledge of finitude can exist. It is here that the great reordering operated by Kant intervenes. the situation of the Anthropology bears some resemblance to that of Aufangsgrunde der Natur: to put forward the system of articulation between the Critique and the a priori forms of knowledge on the one hand. to the primary and unsurpassable forms that the Critique manifests. at the level of man. subject and object. the internal structure of the Anthropology and the question that secretly animates it take the same form as the interrogation of the Critique. Ith are only the first proofs of a list that could be long and not stop at the 18th century. We need even the resistible naivety of our contemporaries to celebrate in the Anthropology the passage of finally secured associations or we would lose the austerity of rationalism. This is to say that the Anthropology will find itself doubly subdued to the Critique: as knowledge. can never reflect itself at the level of itself. it poses in fact a question that would transfer on the philosophy of our epoch all the shadow of a classical philosophy now deprived of God: can one have empirical knowledge of finitude? Cartesian thought. few of them are surprised of their deafness to the grammatical misunderstanding of Menschenkenntniss. Finitude. the a priori conditions of knowledge. But on this symmetry of surface reigns a deep dissymmetry: in the Anfangsgrunde it is a question of Physics and of a science thus . And empiricism practices this finitude and refers to it without pause. Heifeland. historically developed without the Critique. it only offers itself to knowledge and discourse in a secondary manner. The moment in the wonder of this reconciliation they only reencounter the miracle. Thus understood. Anyway. and from the experience of error. it is about knowing – savoir – if. that it is possible only as a repetition of the Critique. in the general organisation of Kantian thought. and on the other hand the principles of an empirically constituted savoir. one forgets what was essential in the lesson left by Kant: the difficulty of situating the Anthropology in relation to the critical ensemble. the moment one believes to assert critical thought at the level of a positive knowledge. it is. but what it is constrained to refer to is not an ontology of the infinite. In fact. there is an ambition to know the possibilities and the limits of knowledge. as exploration of finitude. to the conditions that the Critique fixes and to the domain of experience that determines it. but as limit of itself as much as frontier of knowledge. but that is will not stop referring to it and that if it figures as the empirical and exterior analogon it is in so far as it is supported by structures of the a priori already named and displaced.question a sector of nature. reencounters this finitude. even though it struggled well early.

the Anthropology points a finger to [montre du doigt] the absence of God and it deploys itself in the gap left by this infinite. but that keeps referring to it and interrogating it. and give back to this resemblance a rational order. as a Critique liberated from prejudices and of the inert dead weight of the a priori. but which cannot assume in it its veritable dimensions since it cannot be reflected upon. The epistemological configuration proper to the Anthropology mimics the Critique. The Principles of Nature go by God and render superfluous the hypothesis of an actual infinite. the empirical nature of man says limit. In other words. This order consists in making the Anthropology gravitate around the Critique. and by that. One has wanted to make (what is nothing but another modality of the same forgetting of the Critique) . This accompanying of the Critique by an anthropological teaching. the continuity is established by the common insistence on limits and the rigour of the finitude that they indicate. whence the Critique has showed the internal contradiction. One would see in what network of counter-senses and illusions the Anthropology and contemporary philosophy have engaged one another. this obstinacy…of linking to the structure itself of the Kantian problem: how to think. once it cannot give access to the region of the fundamental that if it remains in obedience of a Critique. within empirical thought. And this re-established order has been for the Anthropology the authentic form of its liberation. The fact that for twenty-five years Kant has taught Anthropology has to do with things other than the exigencies of his university life. by itself. but we must not be taken in by this prestige. from the Critique to the Anthropology. The marginal character of the Anthropology resides there: it is at once the essential and the inessential. of boundaries.constituted in its plenitude and its truth: in the Anthropology it is about the Physis. within a reflection that does not go through an ontology of infinite and does not find justification in a philosophy of the absolute? A question that is effectively at the outset in the Anthropology. One could say that the critical movement is disengaged (degage) from the anthropological structure: at once because it only takes its value from liberating itself from it. This reciprocal and inverse character and this dissymmetric symmetry of the synthesis and of the limit surely lie at the core of Kantian thought: it is to them that the Critique retains its privileges with respect to all possible knowledge. Where the nature of physical bodies says synthesis. of the negativity at the level of nature. founding it. that layer of knowledge where it is a question of imperfection. of failures: shortly. Now it is time to come back to our starting problem. this monotone counter point through which Kant doubled the effort of transcendental reflection by a constant accumulation of empirical knowledge on man. from going against it. -this constant border in relation to which the centre is always shifted. analyse. the putting into place of its veritable meaning: it can appear then as that in which the passage from the a priori to the fundamental is announced. from critical thought to transcendental philosophy. justify and ground finitude. One wants to value the Anthropology as Critique. from the Critique to Anfangsgrunde the continuity is assured by the forms of synthetic activity and the field of truth that it founds and structures.

the transcendental illusion that concealed pre. -this starting from which the truth is always there and never given. this in-this side of (en-deca) is finitude itself. once in fact it cannot speak but the language of the limit and of negativity: it cannot but have the meaning of transmitting of the critical vigour to the transcendental foundation the presence of finitude. consequently. and all these philosophies where the point of departure and the concrete horizon are defined by a certain anthropological reflection upon man. Here and there an illusion is at play: what is proper to western philosophy since Kant.e. This illusion currently defined as finitude becomes par excellence the withdrawal of truth: that in which it hides and in which always one can find it again. The problem of finitude is shifted from an interrogation on the limit and transgression onto an interrogation on the return to the self. What Kant designated in it. of phenomenon and experience. instead of being defined by the movement that would criticise it in a reflection upon knowledge. but as one of the concrete stigmata of finitude. from a problematic of truth to a problematic of the same and the other. The necessary character of the transcendental appearance has been more and more often interpreted not as a structure of truth.the field of positivity where all human sciences find their foundation. It enters the domain of alienation. The paradox consists in this: in freeing itself from a preliminary Critique of knowledge and from a primary question on the relation to the object. but replicated in the field of experience where it proves/tests itself on the region of the originary where it is founded. and then in admitting an actual infinite in the field of possible knowledge. The illusion. as the inverse. It is by symmetry and by referring to this as guiding thread that one can understand in what this anthropological illusion consists of. In the name of what is. What consists in applying the principle of understanding out of the limits of experience. as „natural‟ has been forgotten as fundamental form in relation to the object and recuperated as „nature‟ of human nature. of what must be according to its essence the Anthropology within the entire philosophical field. the mirror image of the transcendental illusion. This illusion balances. has been referred to an anterior level where it appears at once de-doubled and founded: it becomes truth of truth.Kantian metaphysics. in its anthropological form. philosophy is not liberated from subjectivity as fundamental . by a sort of spontaneous transgression or anthropological illusion resides in a reflexive regression that must account for this transgression. the point of origin of this movement for which man loses truth and incessantly finds himself called back by it. i. In this the anthropological illusion resides. one must challenge all these „philosophical anthropologies‟ that present themselves as natural access to the fundamental. Finitude is only superseded if it is something other than itself and where it rests on a in-this side of where it finds its source. and their possibility. In fact one historically derives from the other. it becomes thus the raison d‟ être and the source of the Critique. from a structural point of view. in a very ambiguous manner. or rather it is by a slipping/sliding of meaning in Kantian Critique of the transcendental illusion that the anthropological illusion could be born.

a meaning where it is a question of return to the originary. but only signals the incapacity we are in to exercise against this anthropological illusion a real Critique. The death of God is a manifest effect in a gesture doubly deadly that. the insidious values of the question: „was ist der Mensch?‟ are responsible for this homogeneous field.i. The fact that they circulate indifferently in all the human sciences and in philosophy does not found a right to think as of a single holder these and those. and all philosophy is given as being able to communicate with the human sciences or the empirical reflections on man without going through a Critique (detour). is not separable from the infinite of which he is at once negation and herald. de-structured and indefinitely reversible where man gives his truth as the soul of truth. Because man. in which this extenuated truth that is the truth of truth sits and silently takes it in. towards the foundations of our savoir. to that by which there is in the world signification. One can then understand why in one single movement characteristic of the reflection of our epoch. to the authentic. of „structure‟. . but this bending is the knot of time where the end is beginning? The trajectory of the question: was ist Mensch in the philosophical field is completed in the answer that challenges it and disarms it: der Ubermensch.e. It is on the contrary locked up/shut up in giving itself thickness. The Nietzschean enterprise could be understood as end point finally given to the proliferation of the interrogation on man. in his finitude. The Anthropology is this secret path that. those which would be the value that they could have and that would be right to give back to them in a rigorous thought. of „genesis‟. And then of this Critique we have received the model since more than half a century. by ending the absolute. all knowledge of man is either presented dialectically at the outset (dialectics of origin) to enter the game or it is rendered dialect in full right. is at the same time assassin of man himself.theses and point of departure of its reflection. it is in the death of man that the death of God is accomplished. hypostasised and closed in the insurmountable structure of „menschliches Wesen‟. an epistemology or a theory of knowledge. and that would show that finitude is not end.only indicate for the instant the confusion of the domain where they take their role of communication. links by an un-reflexive meditation the experience of man and philosophy. to the founding activity. It is impossible to conceive of a Critique of finitude that would be liberatory then in relation to man as well as in relation to the infinite. . The polymorphic notions of „meaning‟.

and which therefore contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of a priori knowledge. the laws. Kant.] Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.‟ (3) On this issue. 164-165: Of the application of the categories to objects of the senses in general. B877 (9) Temporal determination as form of intuition (10) see Kant on the „Third Antinomy‟ in the Critique of Pure Reason. Critique of Pure Reason. 29-30. p. Kant. [Victor Dowdell trans. Kant. but of psychology.Translator's footnotes: (1) see I. or to deceive ourselves by intuitions which are formed in accordance with such fictions (day dreaming). 49 on mental illness: „Mental illness lies in the inclination to accept the play of ideas of the inner sense as empirical knowledge. Anthropology. $88. Anthropology.‟ (6) Here Foucault is likely to be referring to Kant. with sensation. p. 653 B860 (8) Kant writes: „[Empirical psychology] is a stranger who has long been accepted as a member of the household. p.‟ (7) see I. of association. whose synthesis is entirely subject to empirical laws. That which in its connection with the actual is determined in accordance with universal conditions of experience is (that is. the pendant of the empirical doctrine of nature. (trans. is actual. 464 B560 (11) see Anthropology. that is. exists as) necessary. with the conditions of intuition and concepts. p. not of transcendental philosophy. Critique of Pure Reason. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. see Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason. where Kant asserts that: „In so far as imagination is spontaneity. until it is in a position to set up an establishment of its own in a complete anthropology. 185 . p. p. 239-240 B266: „That which agrees with the formal conditions of experience. section $24. that is. although it is only fiction. Preface. p. (2) I. I sometimes also entitle it the productive imagination. The reproductive synthesis falls within the domain. Kant. p. to distinguish it from the reproductive imagination. 2003.‟ Critique of Pure Reason. 1996. and we allow it to stay for some time longer. 630 B826 (4) I. Critique of Pure Reason. by Norman Kemp Smith) Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2 (5) On this. p. 664. p. 1996. 19961996. Kant. mainly. is possible. That which is bound up with the material conditions of experience. B150.