U.S.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

The Report on the U.S. Naval War College Workshop on Somali Piracy
Fresh Thinking for an Old Threat
Commander James Kraska, JAGC, USN 28 April 2009

The Naval War College thanks Booz Allen Hamilton, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and the Naval War College Foundation for generous support for the Workshop.

Key Insights
• Piracy has emerged from a complex political, economic and cultural milieu. No single response will solve the problem. • Regional capacity-building and collective maritime action are required to contend with the challenge of piracy so long as pirates enjoy sustained sanctuary in Somalia. Proposals to stop piracy by “fixing” Somalia, however, beg the question—it is doubtful the international community has the capability or will to transform Somalia quickly into a stable and viable state. • Major maritime powers should rapidly expand coastal and littoral security assistance to the regional states, including training and provision of patrol craft and eventually corvettes, in order to shift responsibility for maintaining rule of law at sea to the regional powers. • The civil shipping industry will have to take a greater role in protecting merchant vessels, including provision of armed security in appropriate circumstances.

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n April 7 and 8, the International Law Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the U.S. Naval War College conducted a Counter-piracy Workshop comprised of 50 legal and policy experts from across the globe. The Workshop was designed to take a fresh look at the threat of maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa, assess the tremendous progress in international law and diplomacy that has transpired to address the problem, and to take a measure of the way forward. By collecting many of the world’s top experts to consider the threat of maritime piracy, and by providing a forum to discuss the issue in a frank and open dialogue, the Workshop revisited some conventional thinking and

explored new approaches. The participants brought significant diversity and depth of expertise. Many are involved in day-today decision-making on counter-piracy operations, policy and international law in Europe, Asia and the United States. This point was underscored on the second day of the Workshop, when a number of attendees joined a U.S. Government interagency phone conference to plan a course of action for dealing with the overnight hijacking and ensuing hostage stand-off involving the M/V Maersk Alabama. The Workshop was conducted in the Naval War College’s Decision Support Center, a state-of-the-art briefing center which can anonymously tabulate participants’ responses to issues under consideration, creating a nonattribution record of the proceedings. 1

I. The Threat
The Workshop opened with a prominent irregular maritime warfare expert who provided a threat assessment for the group. The threat assessment concluded that although Somalia is a failed state, it is not a failed society. Central government has collapsed but other forms of authority remain. Some forms of authority are local, restricted to individual towns and villages. Other forms of authority derive from clan or sub-clan positions, and elders are often able to exercise their authority using traditional means. Power also flows from political figures who exercise authority through negotiation or patronage of largely self-interested supporters or allies. Finally, militias and Islamic courts exercise considerable influence in Somali society. Clan organization is a context rather than a determinant of piracy.

On November 21, 2008, the UN released a report by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on piracy off the coast of Somalia based on meetings held in Nairobi, Kenya.1 The Nairobi Report suggests that piracy off the coast of Somalia is driven by the volatile security and political situation inside the country, rampant poverty and other factors. Using the Nairobi Report as a point of departure, the NWC Workshop considered the leading contributors to maritime piracy in East Africa. The causal factors contained in the Nairobi Report were considered as potential drivers of Somali piracy. The Workshop participants independently scored the drivers of Somali piracy according to the level of perceived importance. The data are presented in Figure 1, which displays the results of the exercise. A score of 100 represents a factor of very high importance, whereas a score of 1 signifies a factor of very low importance.

1 Workshop Commissioned by the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN to Somalia, Nairobi, Kenya, Nov. 10–21, 2008, Piracy off the Somali Coast: Final Report: Assessment and Recommendations (prepared by Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah).

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The aggregated scores show that the average of the participants was highest in relation to the volatile security and political situation in Somalia and lowest in regard to environmental hardship. The scores were sorted into quintiles and are reproduced in Figure 1.

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Figure 1: Drivers of SomaliFigure 1: Drivers of Somali Piracy Piracy
In aggregated scores the list of drivers contained in the UN’s Nairobi Report, several NWC illicit The addition to consideringshow that the avercontinues to draw Somalis into the Workshop experts suggested highest in relaage of the participants wasadditional factors that were important in fostering permissive business. The risk-reward calculus is faconditions in which piracy can flourish. First, the availability of pirate sanctuary ashore provides tion to the volatile security and political vorable to piracy and has to be changed. a safe haven from which pirates operate with apparent impunity. Second, the opportunity to situation piracy is presented by the geographic to conduct in Somalia and lowest in regard location of the nation of Somalia and close environmental hardship. The scores were andA number are situated along the proximity of the major piracy hubs of Haradhere Eyl, which of nations have facilitated paysorted into quintiles and are reproduced in Third, the of ransoms legions of destitute, international shipping route from the Suez Canal. ment availability of in order to obtain the young men Figure 1. combines with numerous unpaid or underpaid complicit and nationals and to release of their corrupt officials ships held populate the piracy enterprise. Finally, the low level byrisk associated with Some states, including of Somali pirates. piracy, and the into the illicit business. The risk-reward Inprospect of high rewards, continues to draw SomalisDenmark, have released captured pirates addition to considering the list of drivcalculus is favorable to piracyNairobito be changed. and has Report, ers contained in the UN’s unpunished due to legal and diplomatic several NWC Workshop experts suggested confusion or difficulty with detaining and A number of nations have facilitated payment of ransoms in order to obtain the release of their additionaland ships held by Somali pirates. Some states, including Denmark, have released criminal factors that were important in prosecuting the perpetrators in nationals fostering pirates unpunished due to legal and diplomatic confusion or difficulty with detaining court. The Nairobi study suggests that captured permissive conditions in which piracy can flourish. First, the availability The Nairobi study suggested that these piracy. Aland prosecuting the perpetrators in criminal court. these practices have encouraged ofpracticessanctuary ashore provides a safewider international community has universally pirate have encouraged piracy. Although the though the wider international community condemned piracy activity off the coast of Somali, the Nairobi Report indicates that the same activity haven from which pirates operate with has universally condemned piracy nations have been tolerant of the the opporby the coast of Somalia, the Nairobi Report apparent impunity. Second,existence of piracy offeither sanctioning the crime or facilitating payment of ransoms. In some cases, tunity to conduct piracy is presented bynations appear to have deployed warships to the been indicates that the same nations have area without authority to take robust action to arrest or detain pirates or use force to disrupt the geographic location of the nation of tolerant of piracy by either sanctioning the Somalia and close proximity of the major crime or facilitating payment of ransoms. piracy hubs of Haradhere and Eyl, which In some cases, nations appear to have . are situated along the international shipdeployed warships to the area without auping route from the Suez Canal. Third, the thority to take robust action to arrest or deavailability of legions of destitute, young tain pirates or use force to disrupt attacks. men combines with numerous unpaid or The NWC Workshop experts were asked to underpaid complicit and corrupt officials characterize whether they agreed with the to populate the piracy enterprise. Finally, description of the response by the internathe low level of risk associated with pitional community contained in the Nairobi racy, and the prospect of high rewards, Report. Many of the NWC experts—30 of

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34—either agreed or strongly agreed with system, with no single nation bearing the the Nairobi Report’s characterization that burden. Consequently, organizing a rethe internationalWorkshop experts were asked to characterize whether they agreed withclassic community has either sponse to thwart piracy represents a the attacks. The NWC sanctionedofor tolerated by the international community contained in the Nairobi need toMany collective action problem. The report. shift description the response maritime piracy offthe NWC experts—30 of 34—either agreed or strongly agreed with the equation is obvious, the coast of Somalia, and the responses the outcome of this Nairobi Report’s of provided by the experts are contained in has either sanctioned or tolerated maritime characterization that the international community but the means to do so are more debatable. Figureoff the coast of Somalia, and the responses provided by the experts are contained in This conclusion gives rise to the division piracy 2. of responsibility among regional states, Page | 5 Figure 2. The Nairobi Report also suggested that the 1 2 3 4 5 wider international community has universally Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly condemned piracy activity off the coast of Disagree Agree Somalia, but then has generally been tolerant by either sanctioning or facilitating payment of ransoms or deploying warships to the area without authority to take robust action (arrest and detain, use of force). What is your level of agreement with this 1 3 0 18 12 characterization of the response of the international community? (Number of experts responding under each column.)
Figure 2: Condemning International Piracy Figure 2: Condemning International Piracy

The NWC Workshop received a detailedThe NWC Workshop received a detailed brief on brief on the political, social and economicthe political, social and economic motivations of motivations of Somali pirates. Pirates areSomali pirates. Pirates are exploiting the vacuum exploiting the vacuum created by anarchycreated by anarchy in Somalia. The lack of rule of in Somalia. The lack of rule of law insidelaw inside the nation spills offshore. Somali the nation spills offshore. Somali piratespirates are driven by the goal of pecuniary gain. are driven by the goal of pecuniary gain.Moreover, the crime of maritime piracy has some Moreover, the crime of maritime piracyamount of acceptance in a society whose values have been distorted by conflict and violence. has some amount of acceptance in a soPiracy in the offshore areas of Somalia is ciety whose values have been distorted perpetrated by organized criminal gangs who by conflict and violence. Piracy in the benefit from political protection, so solutions will offshore areas for the wider political context inside the country. The rational risk-reward of Somalia is perpetrated have to account by organized pirate gangs has towho benefitby ensuring piracy is lessthe private sector. The distant states and rewarding while at the calculus of the criminal gangs be changed from time infusing piracy with greater risk. So far NWC expertsaprovided individual assesssame political protection, so solutions will there has been high tolerance for piracy have to costs are for the throughout the international system, with no single nation bearing the ments of the likely impact of Somali piracy because account diffuse wider political context inside the country. The rational risk- thwart piracy represents a classicEurope to Asia burden. Consequently, organizing a response to on international trade from collective reward calculus of the pirate gangs outcome of these equations is obvious, but the means to do over the next five years. Figure 3 provides action problem. The need to shift the has to be changed bydebatable. This conclusion gives rise to thedata on theresponsibility among regional the division of anticipated risk of Somali so are more ensuring piracy is less rewarding while at the same time infusing piracy piracy which nations might serve most states, distant states and the private sector. In considering on the Europe-Asia trade route. with greatercounter piracythere has been a effectively to risk. So far in the Horn of Africa, the NWC experts provided individual high tolerance for piracy because costs on international trade from individually charassessments of the likely impact of Somali piracy In Figure 3, the experts Europe to Asia over the next throughout the provides the on the anticipated risk of Somali piracy on are diffuse five years. Figure 3internationaldataacterized the likely impact of Somali piracy the Europe-Asia trade route. 4 .

The impact of Somali piracy is likely to be severe on 1 2 3 4 5 Europe to Asia maritime trade through the Suez Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Canal, Strait of Bab el Mandeb, and the Gulf of Disagree Agree Aden over the next five years. Page | 6 Number of experts responding in each column. 1 12 1 17 3
Figure 3: Anticipated of Somali Piracy on Europe-to-Asia Figure 3: Anticipated ImpactImpact of Somali Piracy onEurope-to-Asia Trade Trade

In Europe-to-Asia maritime trade through onfigure 3, the experts individually characterized the likely impactmore thanpiracy on Europe2012. In 2008, of Somali 100 vessels were to-Asia maritime trade the Gulf ofSuez Canal andattacked of Aden. Although 13 experts either through the Aden. In the Gulf and more than 40 were hijacked the Suez Canal and strongly disagreed or disagreed, 20 were in agreement or strong agreement. On this question it is considering whether the impact is likely successfully in waters off the Horn of safe to say there 13 experts either strongly severity of When asked,Somali piracy along the was a lack of consensus on the Africa. the impact of “By 2012, how many to be severe, critical trade route connecting Europe and Asia. vessels do you expect to be successfully hidisagreed or disagreed, while 20 were in agreement or strong agreement. On this jacked in the region?,” the estimates among The Workshopsafe to say therethe anticipated impact of Somali piracy on global shipping over also considered was a lack of question it is the experts ranged from a low of 2 or 3 per the next five years, and the results of that question year to a high of 450 attacks per year, with are contained in Figure 4. consensus on the severity of the impact of Somali piracy along the critical trade route most responses in the 50 to 250 range. The impact Europe piracy is 1 2 3 4 5 connectingof Somaliand Asia.likely to be severe on global shipping trade over the next five years. Strongly however, quite strong agreeThere was, Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Disagree Agree The Workshop also considered the anment that in order for Somali piracy to Number of experts responding in each global 2 7 11 ticipated impact of Somali piracy oncolumn. be successfully14 addressed, the rule of0law Figure 4: Anticipated Impact and the has to be Global in Puntland. Puntland shipping over the next five years,of Somali Piracy on restored Shipping Trade results of that question are contained in is the region of Somalia that serves as Regarding the impact of Somali piracy on global shipping over the next five years, the results Figure 4. the primary staging area for most piracy displayed in Figure 4 were even more circumspect emanatingin Figure 3. country. Thirty-three than those from the A greater number of experts—16—either disagreed or strongly disagreed with34 experts agreed or strongly agreed Regarding the impact of Somali piracy on out of the proposition that the likely impact The impact of Somali piracy is likelywillbe severe on Seven participants registered a “neutral” 1 2 3 4 5 of Somali piracy on global shipping to years, be “severe.” restoration of the rule of law in Somaglobal shipping over the next five that Europe to and no expert was inthroughagreement withStrongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Asia maritime trade strong the Suez response. the results displayed in Figure 4 were even lia the statement. for curbing piracy. The was essential Canal, Strait of Bab el Mandeb, and the Gulf of Disagree Agree more over the next five years. in Figure actual numbers in response to the question Aden circumspect than those were not in 3. Similarly, the Workshop experts agreement on the number of piracy attacks A greater number of experts—16—either appear in Figure 5, and indicate that only Page | 6 Number of experts responding in each column. 1 1 17 3 anticipated to occur in the region in 2012. In 2008, more than 100 12 vessels were attacked and disagreed or strongly disagreed with one expert disagreed with the statement more than 40 were hijacked off Africa. Asia Figure 3: Anticipated successfully in waters thatthe Horn ofto curb When asked, “By the propositionvesselstheImpactimpact of Piracy on Europe to piracyTradeoffshore likely of Somali “In order in the 2012, how many that do you expect to be successfully hijacked in the region?,” the estimates Somalithe experts of the anticipated level ofbe piracy on global shipping will piracy ranged it is necessary for 3 per and order to region, from a low of 2 or law year to a among In figure 3, the experts individually characterized the likely impact of Somali piracy on Europe“severe.” Seven participants registered a in the 50 to 250 range. high of maritime trade year, with Suez Canal andbe restored in Puntland and the coastal to-Asia 450 attacks per through themost responses the Gulf of Aden. Although 13 experts either “neutral” response, and no expert was in areas of Somalia.” strongly disagreed or disagreed, 20 were in agreement or strong agreement. On this question it is strong say there was a lack strong agreementthe severity offor Somali piracy to be successfully agreement with the statement.on that in order the impact of Somali piracy along the There safe towas, however, quite of consensus addressed, the rule of law has Europe and Asia. Question 5 poses a broader challenge—if critical trade route connecting to be restored in Puntland. Puntland is the region of Somalia that Similarly, the Workshop experts were not emanating from the restore law and order in serves as the primary staging area for most piracy it is necessary to country. Thirty-three out in 34 experts agreedconsidered the anticipated impact of Somali piracy onin Somalia was over of Workshop on the number of piracy Somalia, rule can that goal be achieved? Theagreement also or strongly agreed that restoration of thehow of law global shipping attacks anticipated to the results of region in inare containedthe Figure 4. appear international essential for years, and occur in actual numbers response the next five curbing piracy. The the that question There isto an question of in Figure 5, in absence and indicate that only one expert disagreed with the statement that, “In order to curb piracy in the offshore region, it is necessary likely to be order on The impact of Somali piracy is for law and severeto be restored in Puntland and the coastal areas 1 2 3 4 5 of Somalia” global shipping trade over the next five years. Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Disagree Agree Number of experts responding in each column. 2 14 7 11 0 . Figure 4: Anticipated ImpactImpact of Somali Piracy on Global Shipping Trade Trade Figure 4: Anticipated of Somali Piracy on Global Shipping
Regarding the impact of Somali piracy on global shipping over the next five years, the results displayed in Figure 4 were even more circumspect than those in Figure 3. A greater number of experts—16—either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition that the likely impact of Somali piracy on global shipping will be “severe.” Seven participants registered a “neutral”

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In order to curb piracy in the offshore region, it is necessary for law and order to be restored in Puntland and the coastal areas of Somalia. Number of experts responding in each column.

Figure 5: Necessity Restoring Law and Order in Somalia Figure 5: Necessity of RestoringofLaw and Order in Somalia

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Disagree Agree 0 1 0 10 23

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Question 5 poses a broader challenge—if it is consensus on how to engineer the stabili-necessary to restore lawMany observers credit Southeast Asia. and order in Somalia, how can that goal be achieved? There is an absence of these efforts with reducing theengineer the international consensus for how to incidence zation and reconstruction of Somalia, with stabilization and reconstruction that they are some analysts so discouraged of Somalia, with somepiracy throughout the Asia-Pacific, of analysts so discouraged that they are doubtful the country can bebe stabilized any soon. The elusive quest have knit a “Somalia stabilized any time and these efforts for crafting the nations doubtful the country can policy,” has persisted since the for crafting a time soon. The elusive quest collapse of the country in 1991. Although neither the United together in a regional counter-piracy comStates nor other nations have successfully implemented a coherent approach for revitalizing the “Somalia policy” has persisted since the munity. Asian counter-piracy cooperation country, the issue of piracy has attracted greater public attention toward the plight of Somalia. collapse of the country in 1991. Although has emerged from three mutually supportOn April 23 2009, thirty nations participated in a UN meeting in Brussels and developed a $250 neither the United States nor other nations ing initiatives. First, under the leadership million plan to rebuild stability in the fractured state. Strengthening regional maritime security in have successfully implemented the top concerns atJapan in 2004,The international signed of the conference. sixteen nations order to reduce piracy was among a coherent approach for revitalizing turn adversity into opportunity and perhaps try to bring some community has a chance to the country, the the “Regional Agreement on Combating issue of piracy and order to the country. Most NWC Workshop experts Robbery” (ReCAAP).2 Piracy and Armed agreed that restoring measure of law has attracted greater public attention toward was essential to curb piracy, and it remains to be first treaty dedicated solely the plight of Somalia. On ReCAAP is the seen whether the donor’s order in Puntland April 23, 2009, make a nations and marked difference. to combating piracy. The treaty established conference will thirty positive participated in a UN meeting in Brussels and developed an organization that operates an advanced a $250 million plan to rebuild stability in information fusion and sharing center in the fractured state. Strengthening regional Singapore. The Information Sharing Centre maritime security in order to reduce piracy (ISC) helps individual nations take action to During the past five years, a large the confergroup of Asian avoidhave come together toto respond more states piracy attacks, and cooperate in order was among the top concerns at to counter piracy in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and throughout Southeast occurs. Secence. The international community has a effectively to piracy when it Asia. Many observers turn these efforts with reducing the ond, beginning throughout the than twentychance to credit adversity into opportunity incidence of piracy in 2005, more Asia-Pacific, and these efforts have knit the nations together in a regional counter-piracy community. Asian and perhaps try to bring some measure of five states that regularly use the Straits of counter-piracy cooperation has emerged from three mutually-supporting initiatives. First, under law and order to the country. Most NWC Malacca and Singapore, including the large the leadership of Japan in 2004, sixteen nations signed the “Regional Agreement on Combating Workshop experts agreed that restoring trading nations of China, Japan, the United Piracy and Armed Robbery” (ReCAAP).2 ReCAAP is the first treaty dedicated solely to order in Puntland was essential to curb States that Korea, an advanced information combating piracy. The treaty established an organization and operates began meeting with the piracy,and sharing centerto be seen whether littoral states of Malaysia, Indonesia and fusion and it remains in Singapore. The Information Sharing Centre (ISC) helps individual the donors’ action to avoid piracy attacks, and to Singapore toeffectively a combined framenations take conference will make a posirespond more develop to piracy when it tive and marked difference.2005, more than twenty-five states that regularly use the Straits the work for improving maritime safety in of occurs. Second, beginning in Straits.3 of China, Japan, the United States Malacca and Singapore, including the large trading nations The meetings were sponsored by the International Maritime Organization, and Korea, began meeting II. Regional with the littoral states of Malaysia, Indonesia, and3Singapore to the UN specialized agency meetings were develop a combined framework for improving maritime safety in the Straits. The for maritime Responses matters and shipping regulation located in London. After several years, the user 2 The sixteen countries were the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, During theRepublic of China, the Republic of India, the Republic of and littoral states signed the “Conations Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the the People’s past five years, a large group of Asian states have come together to cooper- of operative Mechanism,”Philippines, the Republic Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union Myanmar, the Republic of the an agreement that of in order to counter Socialist Republic of Sri ateSingapore, the Democratic piracy in the StraitsLanka, the Kingdom ofstates tothe Socialist Republic of enables user Thailand, help littoral states Viet Nam. of Kuala Lumpur Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security, andcapacity for develop maritime security Environmental 3 Malacca and Singapore and throughout

II. Regional Responses

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The sixteen countries were the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of India, the Republic of Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom of . Thailand, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. 3 Kuala Lumpur Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection, Sept. 18–20, 2006, Kuala Lumpur Statement on Enhancement on Safety, Security and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, IMO Doc. KUL 1/4 (Sept. 20, 2006), available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D15677/kualalumpurstatement.pdf.

Protection, Sept. 18–20, 2006, Kuala Lumpur Statement on Enhancement on Safety, Security and Environmental

littoral states develop maritime security capacity for better management of the straits.4 Third, the three littoral states along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore also began coordinating surface and air patrols throughout the straits in order to improve security in the area. Recently Thailand Page | 8 has joined the efforts. The NWC Workshop experts considered whether these three East Asian initiatives could be transplanted successfully to East Africa. Although the benefits of doing so were potentially significant, the responses represented in Figure 6 indicate that the experts were 4 better management of the of transplanting quite divided on the feasibility straits. Third, the but evenmodelface a startling lack of gover“Asian” they of counter-piracy cooperation sponsored by the International Maritime Organization, the security and bureaucratic capacity. UN specialized agency for maritime the three littoral states along the Straits of and international institutions to the Horn of Africa.nance, experts disagreed or strongly Thirteen matters and shipping regulation began coordi- The region is not economically dynamic, Malacca that Singapore also located in London. After several years, the user nations and disagreed and the Asian initiatives were a suitable model for East Africa. littoral states signed the “Cooperative Mechanism,” an agreement that enables user states to help nating surface and air patrols throughout like East Asia. Consequently, the area littoral states develop maritime security capacity for better management of the straits.4 Third, the the responses toorder to Asia are a model that can straits in piracy in improve security suffers1 from a low tax base, low4 penetration The 2 3 5 three littoral states along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore also began coordinating surface in the area. Recently Thailand has joined of technology and Neutral in integrating be transplantedthroughout the straits in order to improve security in the difficultyAgree Strongly Page | 8 to the Horn of Africa. Strongly Disagree and air patrols area. Recently Thailand the efforts. Disagree Agree has joined theThe NWC Workshop experts citizenry from different backgrounds. efforts. The NWC Workshop experts considered whether these three East Asian considered whether these three East Asian Number ofcould be responding in each column. East Africa. Although the benefits of doing so experts transplanted successfully to 4 9 7 11 1 initiatives initiatives Transplanting the “Asian” Counter-piracy indicate of the discussants Figure 6: could be transplanted success- Similarly, nearly all that the Africa were potentially significant, the responses represented in Figure 6 Model to Eastexperts were fully to East Africa. Although the benefits quite divided on the feasibility of transplanting thedisagreed or strongly disagreed that no “Asian” model of counter-piracy cooperation of doingshow thatpotentially wereHorn ofunanimous, however, inwould be ornotion that no if so were the experts significant, the modifications rejecting the stronglyeven Figure 7 and international institutions to the nearly Africa. Thirteen experts disagreed required responses represented in Figure indicate key differences exist between piracy6off a suitable the “Asian” model in Southeast Asia. disagreed that the Asian initiatives were the coast of Somalia East piracyof fighting piracy could model for and Africa. Somalia has been characterized as a “failed state,” embroiled in crime, ethnic and tribal conflict, endemic corruption and a Asia are a model that can effective governance, predictability The responses to piracy insuffering from a woeful lack of 1 2 3 4 5 and the rule of law. The social Africa.and governance of the country is in Neutral Agree Strongly fabric be transplanted to the Horn of Strongly Disagree disrepair. The neighboring nations of East Africa are comparatively more functional, but still even they face a Disagree Agree startling lack of governance, security and bureaucratic capacity. The region is not economically Number of experts responding in each column. 4 9 7 11 1 dynamic, like East Asia. Transplanting the “Asian” suffers from a Model to base,Africapenetration of Consequently, the area Counter-piracy low tax East low Figure 6: Figure 6: and difficulty in integrating the citizenry from different backgrounds. Africa Transplanting the “Asian” Counter-piracy Model to East technology

Figure 7 show that the experts were nearly unanimous, however, in rejecting the notion that no There are no key differences between countering 1 2 3 4 5 key differences exist between piracy off the coast of Somalia and piracy in Southeast Asia. piracy in the Horn of Africa and countering piracy in Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Somalia has been characterized as a “failed state,” embroiled in crime, ethnic and tribal conflict, Southeast Asia. Disagree Agree endemic corruption and a suffering from a woeful lack of effective governance, predictability Number of of law. The social in each column. 17 13 0 1 1 and the ruleexperts responding fabric and governance of the country is in disrepair. The Figure East Differences between Horn of functional, but still even Asia Figure 7: nations of 7: KeyAfrica are comparatively moreAfrica Southeast Asia neighboring Key Differences between thethe Horn of Africa andand Southeastthey face a startling lack of governance, security and bureaucratic capacity. The region is not economically that the like East Asia. Consequently, the area be transplanted to Africa. penetration of dynamic, experts were quite divided on the suffers from a low tax base, low Clearly, if East feasibility of transplanting the “Asian” Asian different backgrounds. technology and difficulty in integrating the citizenry from approaches and institutions are to model of counter-piracy cooperation and be adopted in East Africa, they will have international institutions to the Horn of AfThere are no key differences between countering to be tailored to meet local conditions.5The 2 3 4 1 rica. Thirteen experts disagreed or strongly piracy in the Horn of Africa and countering piracy results in Figure 8 nearly perfectly repliin Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly disagreed that expert Southeast Asia. the Asian initiatives were a cate those in Figure 7, and only oneAgree Disagree suitable model for East Africa. Number of experts responding in each column. suggested that no modification would 17 13 0 1 1 Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, IMO Doc. KUL 1/4, (Sept. 20, 2006), available at be needed for transplanting the “Asian Figure 7: Key includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D15677/ kualalumpurstatement.pdf. http://www.imo.org/ Differences between the Horn of Africa and Southeast Asia Figure 7 shows that the recognized the contributions of the straits states in the development of Malacca Strait experts were nearly model” to the Horn of Africa. 4 The Singapore meeting also unanimous, however, in rejecting the nosecurity initiatives. tion that no key differences exist between III. Diplomatic piracy off the coast of Somalia and piracy in . Southeast Asia. Somalia is a “failed state,” Responses embroiled in crime, ethnic and tribal conflict, endemic corruption and a suffering Given that it is unlikely that quick progress from a woeful lack of effective governance, can be made in changing the fundamental Protection in the Straitsthe rule ofand Singapore, IMO Doc. KUL 1/4, (Sept. 20, are abetting at predictability and of Malacca law. The social conditions that 2006), available piracy, the http://www.imo.org/ includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D15677/ kualalumpurstatement.pdf.on containing it fabric and governance of the country are in immediate focus must be 4 The Singapore meeting also recognized the contributions of the straits states in the development of Malacca Strait disrepair. The neighboring nations of East and taking cost-effective measures to resecurity initiatives. Africa are comparatively more functional, duce or manage the risk. The international . The Singapore meeting also recognized the contributions of the straits states in the development of Malacca Strait security initiatives.
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piracy could be transplanted to Africa, they disagreed or strongly disagreed that no modifications would be required. Clearly, if East Asian approaches and institutions were to be adopted in East Africa, they would have to be tailored to meet local conditions. The results in Figure 8 nearly perfectly replicate those in Figure 7, and only one expert suggested that no modification would Page | 9 be needed for transplanting the “Asian model” to the Horn of Africa. No modifications of the approaches in Asia would be 1 2 3 4 5 needed for countering piracy in the Horn of Africa. Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Disagree Agree Number of experts responding in each column. 18 13 0 1 0
Figure 8: No Modification of Asian Approaches Needed for Somalia Figure 8: No Modification of Asian Approaches Needed for Somalia

Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (“Contact Group”) and a regional nonbinding counter-piracy agreement, the through January 2009, a greater Given that it is unlikely that quick progress can be made in changing the fundamental conditions Djibouti Code of Conduct. With a view that are abetting piracy, the immediate focus must be on containing it and taking cost-effective number of positive developments toward building on this progress, the measures to reduce or manage the risk. The international community already has achieved occurred in international counterexperts were asked to consider how much significant diplomatic success in countering piracy. responsibility various global actors had piracy law and diplomacy than had for addressing the problem of piracy off Inunfolded in the November 2008 through January 2009, a greater number of positive the 90 days from previous 90 years. the coast of Somalia. Among the choices developments occurred in international counter-piracy law and diplomacy than had unfolded in were regional states, the mentioned UN the previous 90 years. The recent efforts include development of the previouslyshipping induscommunity already has achieved significant try and flag states, under chapter VII of the study—the Nairobi Report—plus two UN Security Council resolutions or the nations with the largest number of registered vessels at diplomatic (authorizingcountering piracy. UN charter success in states to take “all necessary measures”), two bilateral agreements risk from hand and Kenya, on aggregated between the United States and the United Kingdom on the onepiracy attack. The the other, to The recent efforts include development of scores are presented creation of a9, with a facilitate transfer of detained pirates from warships to courts in Mombasa, in Figure UN the previously mentioned the Coast of Somalia score of 1 indicatingregional nonbinding Contact Group on Piracy off UN study—the (“Contact Group) and a a low responsibilcounter-piracy agreement, the UN Security ity and a score of 100 building on this Nairobi Report—plus twoDjibouti Code of Conduct. With a view towardindicating a high progress, the experts were asked to consider how responsibility. Council resolutions under chapter VII of much responsibility various global actors had for addressing the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Among the choices were regional the UN charter (authorizing states to take states, the shipping industry and flag bilateral Interestingly, in Figure 9 the of registered “all necessary measures”), two states, or the nations with the largest number average score vessels at risk between the Unitedaggregated scores are presented in Figure 9, with aplacing from piracy attack. The States among the Workshop experts for score agreements of 1 indicating a lowKingdom, onand a one the indicating a high responsibility. andInterestingly, in figure 9 the average the score of 100Workshop experts for placing the United responsibility score among responsibility with regional states, the responsibility with regional states, shipping industry fairly similar, hand, and Kenya, on the other, tothe shipping industry and flag states wasand flag states was facilitate ranging from an average of 60 to 65. transfer of detained pirates from warships fairly similar, ranging from an average of to courts in Mombasa, creation of a UN 60 to 65. Page | 10

III.the 90 days from November 2008 In Diplomatic Responses

.

Figure 9: Responsibility for Countering Piracy inin theHornof Africa Figure 9: Responsibility for Countering Piracy the Horn of Africa
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The Workshop experts also were asked to score the importance of various international institutions in countering maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa. The experts each assigned a value to the relative importance of the particular international institution for addressing the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Figure 10 illustrates the scores, which are explained

Figure 9: Responsibility for Countering Piracy in the Horn of Africa
The Workshop experts also were asked to score the importance of various international institutions in countering maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa. The experts each assigned a value to the relative importance of the particular international institution for addressing the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Figure 10 illustrates the scores, which are explained on the next page.

Figure 10: Importance of International Organizations Figure 10: Importance of International Organizations

The Workshop experts also were asked to . score the importance of various international institutions in countering maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa. The experts each assigned a value to the relative importance of the particular international institution for addressing the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Figure 10 illustrates the scores.

underway were well integrated with the naval efforts to suppress piracy. Figure 11 indicates that there was not widespread agreement among the experts on whether diplomatic efforts were well integrated with operational naval activities, with two or more participants selecting each of the five possible responses.

In addition to responding to these quesA value of 1 means that the institution tions, the experts were able to provide has no importance, whereas a score of recommendations on other diplomatic 100 means that the institution is of critical initiatives that might offer some promise. importance.meant that10 displays that no importance, whereas a score Djibouti Code ofthe It was noted that the of 100 meant that ConA value of 1 Figure the institution had the institution was of critical importance. Figure 10 duct that the average scores of importance average scores of importance for counter- displays was a nonbinding instrument, and that for counter-piracy of the United Nations Security the Arab and African 78. Second, with an piracy of the United Nations Security Council topped the list at states that negotiated average topped the list at International Maritimethe agreement should make it a bindingPage | 11 Organization. The European Union was Councilscore of 68, was the 78. Second, with scored third. score of 68, was the Internaan average treaty. Furthermore, states from outside tional Maritime Organization. The Eurothe area should be encouraged to provide The Workshop also considered the question of whether the diplomatic efforts underway were in pean Union was scored third. maritime security capacity assistance well integrated with the naval efforts to suppress piracy. form 11 indicates that there was not the Figure of training, communications, widespread agreement among the experts on whether diplomatic efforts were well integrated The Workshop also considered the quessmall boats and security infrastructure to with operational naval activities, with two or more participants selecting each of the five possible tion of whether the diplomatic efforts the nations of the Horn of Africa. Just as responses.
Diplomatic efforts and naval efforts are well integrated. Number of experts responding in each column. 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Disagree Agree 2 8 11 8 4

Figure 11: Integrating Diplomatic and Naval Figure 11: Integrating Diplomatic and Naval Efforts Efforts

In addition to responding to these questions, the experts were able to provide recommendations on other diplomatic initiatives that might offer some promise. It was noted that the Djibouti Code of Conduct was a nonbinding instrument, and that the Arab and African states that negotiated the agreement should make it a binding treaty. Furthermore, states from outside the area should be encouraged to provide maritime security capacity assistance in the form of training,

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Japan provided leadership in construction of a regional counter-piracy center in Singapore, one or more nations should assist the regional states in the construction and operation of a regional maritime security coordination center.

implement a counter-piracy “rewards for justice” program that helps to identify and apprehend the leading offenders.

The UN Security Council should consider should implement a counter-piracy “rewards for justice” program that helps to identify andAfrica additional authorization for naval forces Somalia has the longest coastline in eventually apprehend the leading offenders. operating in the area to seize the accoutreand there are over 2 million square miles ments of piracy, such as high horsepower of water at risk of piracy, complicating outboard motors mounted on the stern naval strategy. The experts were divided of Somali skiffs. One method of enabling on whether the world’s naval forces were Page | 12 this strategy would becoastlineUN Security there are over 2 addressing piracy in the Horn for the in Africa and effective in million square miles of water at Somalia has the longest Council to declare a specifically tailored experts were divided on expert strongly agreed risk of piracy, complicating naval strategy. The of Africa. Not one whether the world’s naval forces were effective in addressing piracy the the of Africa. Not one expert strongly maritime exclusion zone adjacent to the So- in thatHornworld’s naval forces are effectively agreed that the world’s naval the use of large addressing the issue of maritime piracy malia coastline, forbidding forces are effectivelyaddressingthe issue of maritime piracy off off the coast of motors (Figure 12). Somalia’s the coast of Somalia (Figure 12). Somalia throughout outboard

IV. Operational Coordination

IV. Operational Coordination

The world’s naval forces are effectively addressing 1 2 3 4 5 the issue of maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia. Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Disagree Agree Number of experts responding in each column. 3 13 4 10 0
Figure 12: World’s Naval Forces Effectively Addressing Piracy Figure 12: World’s Naval Forces Effectively Addressing Piracy

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exclusive it is unlikely that the deployment of large numbers ofis unlikely thatdistant states into Moreover, economic zone. Fishermen and Moreover, it warships from the deployment the area is sustainable. Many of justification other civil traffic have littlethe nations that have large numbers of warships from distant of sent warships are unaccustomed to operating far from home waters and without logistical support in unfamiliar regions. for high-powered outboard motors, which states into the area is sustainable. Many Furthermore, it is not clear that pirate skiffs, propel the small and fast such a large area can realistically be patrolled,sent warships are of the nations that have even by a large multinational force. It would large merchant enabling them to overtake take more than 60 warships to provideto operatingpresence home unaccustomed an effective far from throughout just a singlethe use vessel transit corridor. Until other more effective approaches are narrow of such high vessels. By banning waters and without logistical support in developed and begin to show progress, however, there is no immediate substitute for operational horsepower engines, the international unfamiliar regions. Furthermore, it is not patrols by major maritime powers. In fact, Figure 13 indicates that a majority of can realistically community can reduce the availability of clear that such a large area Workshop experts—18 of pirate attack.agreed or strongly agreed that out-of-area naval forces should be out of 22—either Such engines the means be patrolled, even by a large multinational doing even more to counter piracy. destrucshould be subject to seizure and force. It would take more than 60 warships tion on sight by the international naval to provide an effective presence throughout The out-of-area naval forces should be doing morejust a single narrow vessel transit corridor. in 2 3 4 5 1 forces operating in the area. countering piracy. Strongly more effective approaches are Until other Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Disagree and begin to show progress, Agree The Contact Group should adopt a means developed Number of experts Somali piracyeach column. however, there 2 no immediate substitute 2 8 16 2 of decoupling the responding in gangs from is Figure 13: Out-of-area Naval Forces Shouldoperational More by major maritime the tribal and social structure of the country for Be Doing patrols through targeted aid and increased support powers. In fact, Figure 13 indicates that a to alternative centers of authority inside the majority of Workshop experts—18 out of country. The donors’ conference is a first 22—either agreed or strongly agreed that step toward realizing this approach. Furout-of-area naval forces should be doing thermore, the international community, poseven more to counter piracy. sibly working through INTERPOL, should

throughout just a single narrow vessel transit corridor. Until other more effective approaches are developed and begin to show progress, however, there is no immediate substitute for operational patrols by major maritime powers. In fact, Figure 13 indicates that a majority of Workshop experts—18 out of 22—either agreed or strongly agreed that out-of-area naval forces should be doing even more to counter piracy. The out-of-area naval forces should be doing more in 1 2 3 4 5 countering piracy. Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Disagree Agree Number of experts responding in each column. 2 2 8 16 2
Figure Naval Forces Should Be Doing More Figure 13: Out-of-area 13: Out-of-area Naval Forces Should Be Doing More

The Workshop experts narrated additional . operational options that might be implemented, and these include the use of: • Deception. “Q-ships”—warships disguised as civil merchant shipping. • Land strike. The use of armed force against safe havens and logistics activities on the shore. Land strikes against identified pirate staging areas would be difficult to conduct and likely ignite anti-western reaction and inflame Muslim passion—making the cure worse than the disease. • Blockade. Monitor the entrance and egress of shipping into and out of Somalia in order to cut pirates off from their bases on land. • Embargo. Prevent the introduction, by land, sea or air, of weapons, communications devices and other equipment destined for use by pirate gangs. • Tailored Exclusion Zone. Use naval forces to prevent the use of certain items or devices, such as high horsepower outboard motors, in designated areas, such as Somalia’s exclusive economic zone. • Unmanned Systems. Greater use of unmanned systems for detection and monitoring of piracy activity may reduce

warship requirements and serve as a force multiplier for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. • Smaller Warships. Employment of smaller warships, such as patrol craft and corvettes, should be embraced over the long term, making the task of combating piracy more efficient. Maritime powers should develop simultaneously regional coastal maritime security capacity, complementing or eventually replacing the foreign presence. • Regional Coordination. In the near term, there is a need to identify a single contact point for vessels facing an immediate threat, such as UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) Dubai. Over the long term, creation of a regional maritime security coordination center to fuse intelligence and share information is essential to shift responsibility toward regional states. This presents an opportunity for regional states dependent on the safety of freedom of navigation in the Horn of Africa—specifically Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states—to provide funding and training for such a center. • Somali Coast Guard. Development of a Somali coastal force is a necessary, but long-term, proposition.

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V. Focus on Somalia
Regional and maritime action is required to contend with the challenge so long as pirates enjoy sustained sanctuary in Somalia. The last time the international community took military action to change the situation in Somalia, it did not go well. • Governance. It is unclear whether a stronger central government or stronger clan system would yield greater stability and governance. The dichotomy implicates all of the promise—and difficulty—experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan. • Somali Development. Providing greater development assistance to Somali clan elders who may have some influence in reducing piracy. • Piracy Financing. Explore the potential for disrupting the piracy financing and ransom system through coordinated banking security.

VI. Industry & Shipping Security
The international civil shipping industry will have to take additional steps to ensure the safety of merchant shipping in the area of greatest risk. Merchant ships should continue to broaden their defensive responses, to include passive measures such as barbed steps to ensure the safety of The international civil shipping industry will have to take additional wire around the lifelines, and consider employment of organic merchant shipping in the area of greatest risk. Merchant ships should continue to broaden their or Page | 15 defensive responses, to include passive measures such as barbed wire security on boardand contract vessel around the lifelines some consider employment of organic or contract vessel security such as some ships,and barges or ships, on board dredgers such as dredgers and barges or those carrying sensitive cargo. those carrying sensitive cargo.

VI. Industry & Shipping Security

Counter-piracy approaches by the private sector appear to align well with the threat assessment we heard this morning. Number of experts responding in each column.

Figure 14: Private SectorFigure 14: Private Sector Approaches Approaches
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1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Disagree Agree 0 3 9 16 4

The depth of discussion and variety and originality of the discourse, conducted In considering the U.S. interagency in a non-attribution environment, were process, the experts had mixed views on productive. The seizure of the Maersk Alawhether the disparate departments and bama, in particular, has elicited numerous agencies were working together successcommentators who suggest meaningless fully to address Somali piracy, with more prescriptions, such as “time to get tough,” experts characterizing the level of success or “we have to change the risk-reward calas neutral or successful. culus” of the pirates. Ultimately, everyone agrees that the best solution is for a restoraFinally, the majority of experts believed tion of law and order to develop within the that the interagency community was workcountry of Somalia, but neither the intering well to counter piracy. national community nor the United States has been able to devise such an outcome. The finding in Figure 16 is particularly The much harder questions lie behind encouraging since the experts also rejected In considering the U.S. interagency process, the experts had mixedand require patiently thinkthose slogans, views on whether the the idea departments were no impediments together successfully to address Somali piracy, that there and agencies were working disparate ing through specific alternative courses of that had experts characterizing the to faciliwith moreto be overcome in order level of success as neutral oron an accurate picture of the Page | 16 action based successful. tate interagency cooperation. In considering the U.S. interagency process, the experts had mixed views on whether the piracy. causes and motivators of Somali Within the US government, the interagency 2 3 5 1 disparate departments and agencies were working together successfully to address Somali piracy, Furthermore, the Workshop4 illustrated community is working together successfully the expertsno single solution will solve the prob- Page | 16 Strongly or views on with more experts U.S. interagency level of success as had mixedsuccessful.whether the In considering the characterizing theprocess, to that neutral Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly counter piracy. Disagree disparate departments and agencies were working togetherSomali piracy. address SomaliAgree lem of successfully to If there is the piracy, desire with more US government, thein each column. to find1progress in adversity, 10 rampant Page | 16 Number ofexperts characterizing the level of success as neutral or successful. 5 8 0 Within the experts responding interagency 2 3 4 5 the community is working together the U.S. Interagency Process Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Figure 15: The Success of successfully to counterthe US government, the interagency piracy. Disagree Agree Within 1 2 3 4 5 community experts responding in eachthat theto Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Number the majority experts believed column. of is working together successfully interagency 1 5 was working 10 to 0 8 Finally, community well counter piracy. Disagree Agree counter piracy. Figure 15: The Success of the U.S. Interagency Process Number of experts responding in each column. 1 5 8 10 0 Figure the Success Within the US government, the15: TheU.S. theof the U.S. Interagency Process working well to 5 2 4 Finally, the majority experts believed that Interagency1Process was 3 Figure 15: The Success ofinteragency interagency community community is working together well to counter Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly counter piracy. piracy. the majority experts believed that the interagency community was working well to Disagree Agree Finally, counterthe US Numberpiracy.government, thein each column. 0 3 5 16 0 Within of experts responding interagency 1 2 3 4 5 community is working together well to counter Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Figure 16: The Interagency Community Works Well piracy. Disagree Agree Within the US government, the interagency 1 2 3 4 5 community is working together well toencouraging since the experts alsoNeutral Agree Strongly Strongly Disagree rejected the idea that Number of in figure 16 is particularly counter 0 3 5 16 0 The findingexperts responding in each column. piracy. 16: The Interagency Community Communityto facilitate interagency Disagree Agree Figure had to Interagency Works Well there were no impediments that 16: The be overcome in order Works Well Figure Number of experts responding in each column. 0 3 5 16 0 cooperation. The finding The Interagency Community Works Well Figure 16:in figure 16 is particularly encouraging since the experts also rejected the idea that Therewereno impediments to UShad to be overcome in order to facilitate interagency4 1 2 3 5 there are no impediments that government efforts to achieve interagency cooperation. encouraging since the experts alsoNeutral Agree Strongly Strongly Disagree rejected the idea that cooperation. The finding in figure 16 is particularly Disagree Agree there were no impediments that had to be overcome in order to facilitate interagency cooperation. impediments to US each column. Number of experts responding in government efforts 3 16 4 1 1 There are no 1 2 3 4 5 Figure to achieve interagency cooperation. 17: Interagency Impediments Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Figure 17: Interagency Impediments Agree There are no impediments to US government efforts Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 to achieve interagency cooperation. column. Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Number of experts responding in each 3 16 4 1 1 13 Disagree Agree Number of experts responding in each column. Number of experts responding in each column. 3 16 4 1 1 Figure 17: Interagency Impediments The depth of discussion and variety and originality of the discussion, conducted in a nonNumber of experts responding in each column. attribution environment, was much more productive than typical analysis of the problem. The

VII. The U.S. Government

VIII. Conclusion

VII. The U.S. Government

VII. The U.S. Government VII. The U.S. Government

VIII. Conclusion

piracy off the coast of Somalia, stretching from the seizure of the very large crude carrier Sirius Star in November 2008 to the capture of the Maersk Alabama in April 2009, has focused world attention on an often ignored corner of the globe. One of the most promising courses of action is to build the rule of law and capacity for governance and the maintenance of security throughout the region. All of the regional states, and Somalia in particular, would benefit from increased security assistance and, just as importantly, development of long-lasting governance, economic and security partnerships with neighbors, friends and allies. Operationally, the threat of piracy has presented the first—and by any measure successful—test of the concept of a spontaneous Global Maritime Partnership (GMP) and a validation of the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.5 The follow-through, moving from coordination among the larger out-of-area naval forces and toward regional efforts and local capacity-building, requires commitment, generous resources and political will in East Africa and throughout the globe.

Participants and Credits
The Workshop was comprised of participants from South and East Asia, Europe and the United States. The participants represented a variety of eclectic professional experiences, including international law attorneys, advisers in the areas of oceans policy, irregular maritime warfare and maritime piracy from several continents, representatives of the international civil shipping industry and maritime piracy and naval experts from academic and policy research institutions. A list of the workshop participants, an agenda for the workshop and selected briefs presented may be found on the Internet website of the International Law Department, Naval War College, at http://www.usnwc.edu/cnws/ild/ild .aspx.

5

James Kraska and Brian Wilson, The Co-operative Strategy and the Pirates of the Gulf of Aden, The RUSI Journal 74–81 (April 2009).

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Special thanks to CDR Sandra Selman, USCG, and Mr. Lawrence Modisett for their valuable roles in conducting the Workshop. The International Law Department is thankful to Dr. Stephen DownesMartin for his generous assistance in analyzing the data, to Charlene Bary-Ingerson for operating the Decision Support Center during the event and to Jayne Van Petten for arranging the travel for the Workshop participants.

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United States Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, Rhode Island 02841 www.usnwc.edu twitter.com/navalwarcollege

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