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ATP 3-01.60

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ATP 3-01.60 Publication Date Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar Operations DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION . Distribution
ATP 3-01.60 Publication Date Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar Operations DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION . Distribution

Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar Operations

Date Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar Operations DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION . Distribution authorized to U.S.

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION. Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information for official government use. This determination was made on 01 February 2005. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commandant, United States Army Air Defense Artillery School, ATTN: ATSF-DTA, Fort Sill, OK 73503-5000.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE. Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document. Headquarters Department of
any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document. Headquarters Department of

Headquarters Department of the Army

any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document. Headquarters Department of

*ATP 3-01.60

Army, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures No. 3-01.60

Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC

Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar Operations

Contents

Page

 

PREFACE

vii

INTRODUCTION

ix

Chapter 1

INDIRECT FIRE AND THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-1

General

1-1

Enemy IDF: A Tactical Weapon to Achieve Operational Information Effects

1-2

Planning to Defeat the Enemy IDF Threat

1-3

Chapter 2

C-RAM OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

2-1

The Joint and Combined Arms Fight to Defeat Enemy IDF

2-1

Offensive and Defensive Fires Synergy

2-1

Unit Mission

2-2

How to Fight: Enduring Principles

2-2

The C-RAM Functional Areas

2-4

Chapter 3

C-RAM SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION AND ORGANIZATIONAL

CONSTRUCT

3-1

C-RAM Joint Plug-and-Fight Systems

3-1

Core Systems

3-1

Description of Major Components

3-7

C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery Mission and Organization

3-12

Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information for official government use. This determination was made on 01 February 2005. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commandant, United States Army Air Defense Artillery School, ATTN: ATSF-DTA, Fort Sill, OK 73503-5000.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE. the document.

Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of

*This publication supersedes FMI 3-01.60, 16 March 2006.

Publication Date

ATP 3-01.60

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For Official Use Only

Contents

 

C-RAM Joint Intercept Battery Mission and Organization

3-26

Chapter 4

C-RAM UNIT PLANNING, OPERATIONS, AND SUSTAINMENT

4-1

C-RAM Integration with Supported Joint and Army Units

4-1

Command and Control Functional Organization

4-3

LPWS Employment Considerations

4-8

Base Defense Plan

4-8

Network Architecture

4-9

WAVES

Employment Plan

4-11

C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery, Platoon, and Squad Operations

4-12

Degraded Operations

4-14

Chapter 5

EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES

B-1

Emergency operating procedures

B-1

Reconnaissance, Selection, Occupation of Position

B-4

Engagement Operations

B-6

Countering Interference And Jamming

B-8

Deployability

B-9

Communications and Data Link

B-9

Considerations for Potential Future Split-Based Operations

B-13

Appendix A

FIRING CUTOUT ZONE IMPLEMENTATION

A-1

Locating the Mount

A-1

Boresight Preparation

A-1

Collecting Boresight Data

A-2

Firing Cutout Zone Design

A-4

Firing Cutout ZONE Switch Sector Design

A-4

Firing Cutout Zone Implementation

A-6

Switch Locations and Adjustment Procedures

A-7

Appendix B

VME ENC PROCESSOR CCA

B-1

Preliminary Operations

B-1

Set Up WinPASS

B-1

Restarting the VME Processor

B-7

Post Loading Procedures

B-7

Checking and Setting the Date and Time on VME Processor

B-8

Set Up the WinPASS IP Address and TFTP Server

B-9

Appendix C

NORTH FINDING DEVICE

C-1

Position the LPWS Mount

C-1

Connecting the North Finding Device to the LPWS and Powering Up

C-1

Acquiring Data from the North Finding Device

C-1

Appendix D

SUSTAINMENT

D-1

Responsibilities

D-1

Battalion Trains

D-1

Logistics Packages

D-1

Unit Interface with the BRC

D-2

Classes of Supply

D-2

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Maintenance, Recovery, and Repair

D-3

Appendix E

SLEEP DEPRIVATION

E-1

Overview

E-1

Sleeping in the Operational Environment

E-1

Maintaining Performance During Sustained Operations/Continuous Operations

E-3

Specific Sleep Loss Effects

E-5

Common Misconceptions About Sleep and Sleep Loss

E-6

Appendix F

THE INDIRECT FIRE THREAT

F-1

Threat Analysis

F-1

Examples of IDF Threats

F-3

Appendix G C-RAM REPORTS

G-1

Appendix H

SITE SURVEY AND RSOP CHECKLISTS

H-1

General

H-1

RSOP Checklist

H-1

Appendix I SURVEY

I-1

Q48 LCMR Orientation/Survey/Employment

I-1

 

GLOSSARY

Glossary-1

REFERENCES

References-1

INDEX

Index-1

Figures

Figure 2-1. C-RAM functional overview

2-4

Figure 3-1. Local control console (Unit 1)

3-2

Figure 3-2. Electronics enclosure (Unit 2)

3-3

Figure 3-3. Radar weapon assembly (Unit 3)

3-4

Figure 3-4. Local control station (Unit 13)

3-5

Figure 3-5. Remote control station (Unit 14)

3-6

Figure 3-6. SINCGARS radio (generic view)

3-7

Figure 3-7. Example of wireless hardware configuration

3-10

Figure 3-8. Land-based Phalanx weapon system

3-11

Figure 3-9. Control room internal view

3-11

Figure 3-10. C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery organization structure

3-13

Figure 3-11. C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery organization elements

3-13

Figure 3-12. C-RAM Joint Intercept Battery

3-27

Figure 4-1. LCMR site location

4-7

Figure 4-2. Multiple LCMR emplacement

4-8

Figure 4-3. BDOC early warning network

4-10

Figure 4-4. C-RAM data flow

4-11

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Figure 4-5. Example of local warning configuration

4-12

Figure 4-6. Sense and warn architecture

4-13

Figure 4-7. AMDWS (addition to architecture)

4-14

Figure 4-8. Engagement sequence from LPWS during degraded operations

4-15

Figure 4-9. Engagement Sequence from EO Section during degraded operations

4-16

Figure 5-1. LPWS emplaced with mutual support

B-5

Figure 5-2. LPWS emplaced with overlapping fields of fire

B-5

Figure 5-3. LPWS emplaced with mutual support and overlapping fields of fire

B-6

Figure 5-4. RAM target versus friendly track

B-7

Figure 5-5. Alert message display during engagement

B-8

Figure 5-6. Sending NO FIRE to all platoons

B-9

Figure 5-7.

TOCNET notional deployment

B-11

Figure 5-8.

Typical TOCNET node diagram

B-12

Figure A-1. LPWS train ring scale

A-3

Figure A-2. LOS data entry form

A-4

Figure A-3. Typical switch sector design

A-6

Figure A-4. LPWS FCZ switch logic

A-7

Figure A-5. Elevation data unit

A-8

Figure A-6. Train data unit

A-9

Figure A-7. Switch stack, top view

A-10

Figure A-8. FCZ verification form

A-11

Figure A-9. Firing interrupter switch performance data form

A-12

Figure B-1. Example of IP address table display

B-2

Figure B-2. Boot-up screen display

B-6

Figure B-3. PSOS information/modification display

B-7

Figure B-4. Example of date and time display

B-8

Figure B-5. IP Address assignments for Adapter 1

B-9

Figure B-6. IP address assignments for Adapter 2

B-9

Figure C-1. North finding device installation location

C-2

Figure F-1. Rocket launcher

F-4

Figure F-2. Types of rockets

F-5

Figure F-2. Types of rockets (continued)

F-6

Figure G-1. Sample of C-RAM Maintenance Tracker Report

G-1

Figure G-2. Sample of C-RAM IDF Report

G-2

Figure G-3. Sample of Equipment Item/System Report (A)

G-3

Figure G-4. Sample of Equipment Item/System Report (B)

G-4

Figure H-1. De-install and install of C-RAM capabilities

H-5

Figure H-2. De-install roles and responsibilities for C-RAM capabilities

H-6

Figure I-1. Q48 LCMR orientation (without proper survey orientation)

I-1

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Figure I-2. Q48 LCMR orientation (with proper survey orientation)

I-2

Figure I-3.

Survey error

I-2

Figure I-4. LPL error from survey error at 2 km

I-3

Figure I-5. LPL error from survey error at 5 km

I-3

Figure I-6.

Q48 LCMR preferred orientation methods

I-4

Figure I-7. Q48 LCMR orientation summary

I-4

Figure I-8.

Q48 LCMR basic employment considerations

I-5

Tables

Table

1. STANAGs

vii

Table 3-1.

FAAD C 3 I system components

3-7

Table 3-2. Assess the tactical situation and operations

3-17

Table 3-3. RAM threat factors

3-17

Table 3-4.

Environmental effects

3-17

Table 3-5. Threat analysis

3-17

Table 3-6.

Enemy COAs

3-18

Table 3-7. Conduct analysis

3-18

Table

3-8.

Plan ISR

3-18

Table 3-9.

COA support

3-19

Table 3-10. Concept of support

3-19

Table

3-11.

COA comparisons

3-19

Table

3-12.

Running estimate

3-19

Table

3-13.

Annex

3-20

Table 3-14.

Synchronize

3-20

Table 3-15.

EW system operator

3-20

Table 3-16. Initialize AMDWS

3-21

Table 3-17. Map generation

3-22

Table 3-18. Situational display

3-22

Table 3-19. TOC network

3-22

Table 3-20. Dual LAN procedures

3-23

Table 3-21. Power-up

3-23

Table 3-22. Alerts

3-24

Table 3-23. EW data

3-24

Table 3-24. Battlefield display

3-24

Table 3-25. Overlay functions

3-25

Table 3-26. Data distribution

3-25

Table 3-27. CTP Application program

3-25

Table 3-28. Create a plan or order

3-26

Table 4-1. Threat factors

4-5

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Contents

Table B-1. Addresses and boot path

B-2

Table B-2. CPC environment lines on WinPASS

B-3

Table B-2. CPC environment lines on WinPASS (continued)

B-5

Table E-1. Basic sleep scheduling factors

E-2

Table E-2. Basic sleep environment and related factors

E-3

Table E-3. Using caffeine under various conditions of sleep deprivation

E-4

Table F-1. Adversary Activity Matrix

F-2

Table F-2. Rocket Threat

F-4

Table F-3. Mortar Threat

F-7

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Preface

The purpose of this field manual (FM) is to describe the joint and combined arms approach to defeating enemy indirect fire (IDF). It also provides initial guidance on how specialized counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C- RAM) units and capabilities contribute to offensive and defensive counter-IDF fires synergy and to that larger joint and combined arms effort to defeat enemy rockets and mortars. It describes how C-RAM units contribute to enabling counter-IDF shaping, denial, and response operations, and describes how C-RAM units and the C- RAM system of systems (SoS) protect friendly forces by detecting incoming rockets and mortars, providing timely and focused early warning (EW) of attacks, and, in selected locations, intercepting incoming rockets and mortars. This FM focuses on operator actions, at the keyboard or system interface, and must be augmented by a detailed standing operator procedure (SOP) to fully implement the necessary interactions between the commander, the battle captain, and operator.

This FM provides an overview of C-RAM operations based, in part, on lessons learned during the successful corps counter-IDF fight during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) in 20072008. The target audience is C- RAM commanders and staff, leaders, and specialists at all levels and C-RAM trainers at schools, centers of excellence, combat training centers, and mobile training teams. This FM also provides supported maneuver commanders insight into C-RAM and the larger full spectrum counter-IDF operations that specialized C-RAM units support.

This publication implements the standardization agreements (STANAGs) listed in Table 1 in compliance with the multinational force compatibility.

Table 1. STANAGs

Number

Title

Edition

2034

NATO Standard Procedures for Mutual Logistic Assistance

6

2047

Emergency Alarms of Hazard or Attack (NBC and Air Attack Only)

7

 

Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical Attacks,

 

2103

and Predicting and Warning of Associated Hazards and Hazard Areas (Operator’s Manual)ATP-45(C)

9

2112

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance

5

3700

Joint Air and Space Operations DoctrineAJP-3.3

6

3736

Air Interdiction and Close Air SupportAJP-3.3.2

10

3805

Doctrine for Joint Airspace ControlAJP-3.3.5(A)

8

3880

Counter AirAJP-3.3.1(A)

5

4162

Identification Data Combining Process

2

This manual applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/the Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. The proponent of this publication is the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commandant, U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School, ATTN: ATSA-DOT-DTR, Fort Bliss, TX 79916-3802.

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Introduction

The enemy IDF threat is enduring and growing. The C-RAM concept is a joint and combined arms approach to defeating enemy IDF that features offensive and defensive fires synergy and is enabled by, but not defined by, specialized C-RAM units and equipment.

The first chapters of this manual focus on the enduring and growing IDF threat and enduring principles associated with defeating enemy IDF. Chapters 4 and 5, and associated annexes and appendices, address the current rapidly spiraled C-RAM units and equipment, and how we fight them. C-RAM organization and equipment will change over time but the enduring principles will not.

The C-RAM SoS provides the following top-level functional capabilities:

SHAPEReal and non-real-time operations to deny insurgents the opportunity to conduct rockets, artillery, and mortar (RAM) attacks.

SENSETimely, reliable, accurate acquisition of in-flight RAM to support deny, warn, intercept, and respond operations.

WARNTimely, reliable, accurate, localized troop warning for impending RAM attacks.

INTERCEPTRAM munitions in-flight destruction.

PROTECTHardened shelters for high-density troop locations.

RESPONDReal and non-real-time, accurate response operations to defeat RAM insurgent personnel/teams.

COMMAND AND CONTROL (C 2 )Effective battle command structure to support timely and accurate C-RAM operations

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

The following items summarize the doctrinal changes made by this field manual:

Addresses the joint and combined arms approach to defeating enemy IDF with more equal emphasis on all C-RAM functional areas compared with earlier doctrine that was focused almost exclusively on the intercept function.

Replaces “staff estimate” with “running estimate” to reflect FMI 5-0.1.

Replaces the term “fires effects cell (FEC)” and “fires effects coordinator (ECOORD)” with “fires cell (FC)” to reflect FMI 5-0.1.

Replaces the term “fires and effects” with “fires” to reflect FMI 5-0.1.

Adds graphics showing the difference between RAM and friendlies.

Adds text indicating new alert messages with different options for sending “fire permit” to platoons and/or options for sending data to Wireless Audio-Visual Emergency System (WAVES) (with or without correlation).

Adds graphics of new forward area air defense (FAAD) screen shots.

Changes combat service support (CSS)” to “sustainment operations” to reflect FMI 5-0.1.

Adds Sense and Warn Platoon, to split the Operations chapter.

Adds new capability to accept data from FAAD box at external forward operations base (FOB).

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Chapter 1

Indirect Fire and the Operational Environment

This chapter discusses how multinational forces are defeating and planning against the enemy IDF threat in an operational environment. It describes the primary and strategic uses of IDF. Also discussed is how, in general terms, the enemy employs IDF as part of a larger approach in the current operational environment. It addresses the need for commanders to learn who the enemy factions in their area are and learn their weaponscapabilities.

GENERAL

1-1. The battlefield in Iraq is complex and violent. The enemy’s strengths derive from the ability to hide within the populace. This allows the option to select the time and place to engage you with his improvised explosive device (IED) and SAF ambushes. In this way, the enemy avoids your superior firepower and controls your operational environment. Operational environments are a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). You must address the enemy’s strengths with your tactics. Use a coordinated effort of overt and covert activities to manipulate your operational environment to get the enemy to show up at a time and place of your choosing so that you can apprehend or kill him.

1-2. Identify the various sites in your operational area (OA) where the enemy frequently chooses to fight you with IEDs. From this list, select the site that offers your unit the best combination of concealment and firing position for multinational forces (MF).

1-3. Army missions require leaders, Soldiers, and units to be trained as they must fight in that environment. Observations from the field have emphasized the criticality of unit leadership confident in their ability to train realistically and units that can fight effectively over the duration of an operation or deployment.

1-4. The threat from IDFparticularly from rockets and mortarsis enduring and growing. During the Hezbollah-Israeli conflict, the enemy executed approximately 150 rocket attacks per day. Many in the Middle East perceived Hezbollah had won at least a moral victory by being able to wage a sustained and very public rocket operation battle against Israel, despite Israeli dominance in other aspects of the fighting. It was no surprise when Hezbollah tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) migrated to the Iraqi theater of operations. During OIF, enemy rocket and mortar attack levels reached over 1,000 attacks per month during a concerted enemy effort to inflict casualties and erode U.S. and multinational political and popular support. Successful multinational surge operations and focused counter-IDF actions, supported by specialized C-RAM units, helped mitigate the effects of this IDF operational battle and, ultimately, reduced the enemy IDF threat to much lower levels. However, IDF attacks, along with IEDs, suicide bombers, snipers, and other means, remain part of the larger asymmetric arsenal available to our enemies to inflict casualties and battle damage, get media attention, and erode multinational political and popular will. IDFand the larger Hezbollah model of warfarewill likely remain a staple of combat for the near future.

1-5. IDF provides the enemy a low-cost means of attacking U.S. and multinational forces. The IDF threat in Iraq has mostly consisted of rockets and mortars. Therefore, it is important to note that many potential adversaries possess the ability to employ RAM in concert with all or some of the other elements that have replaced manned air forces as the principle aerial threat: tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs), cruise missiles (CMs), and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). While this FM focuses on the IDF threat and C-RAM operations, many of the principles in this FM for attack operations, active defense operations, passive

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defense operations, and C 2 information system associated with C-RAM and defeating enemy IDF can be applied to this larger combination of asymmetric aerial threats that U.S. and MF will likely face in the future.

1-6. Rockets and mortars vary in size and destructive capability. Each type presents its own challenges to applying offensive and defensive C-RAM fires to defeat them. For example, the enemy shooting 60-mm mortars into an FOB off a rooftop or out of the back of a vehicle generally provides minimal destructive power but can be more difficult to detect, target, and respond against. An enemy 240-mm rocket attack can create a spectacular fireball and can cause significant damage but is easier to detect and respond to.

1-7. C-RAM units were created based on urgent operational needs statements from commanders in theater. These commanders, despite significant offensive capabilities, remained vulnerable to the enemy IDF threat. The remainder of this chapter introduces how, in general terms, the enemy employs IDF as part of a larger approach in the current operational environment. Appendix F provides more specific information on enemy rockets, mortars, and their employment, and describes some of the pattern analysis and other tools that C-RAM leaders, fires planners, and maneuver intelligence officers should be familiar with when assessing and planning against the enemy IDF threat.

ENEMY IDF: A TACTICAL WEAPON TO ACHIEVE OPERATIONAL INFORMATION EFFECTS

1-2

C-RAM is deployed in operating areas where the enemy uses primarily asymmetric means to attack

their objectives. Enemy commanders have stated that more than half the battle is a media war; a struggle to create perceptions in key global audiences rather than a contest to gain terrain or political control through kinetic force.

1-9. The enemy conducts lethal attacks but does so in ways, and against target sets, that will have the maximum possible effect in the information arena. These methods include direct fire attacks, suicide bombs, IEDs, and IDF. While the IDF weapons used in current theaters are only occasionally effective in a tactical sense, those used in future conflicts where adversaries have significant support from hostile states may present a lethal IDF threat with far greater accuracy and intensity. Regardless of accuracy, the enemy is adept at getting media attention using rocket and mortar attacks against key U.S. and multinational bases and units.

1-10. In the current active OA, the weapons available to insurgent forces are generally as mediocre as they are plentiful. While IDF remains one of the enemy’s primary means of inducing casualties and achieving battle damage against targets such as helicopters on the ground, effectiveness in the current OA has been lower than enemy leaders expected it to be or believe it really is. The training level of insurgent or militia personnel varies greatly but generally consists of semi-trained personnel who have had some instruction from a military veteran familiar with that particular system. Sometimes these veterans will conduct attacks, which are generally more accurate on average, but typically, they will restrict their activities to recruitment and training of entry-level insurgents or militiamen. In a long-term struggle, enemy commanders do not want to risk their valuable training cadre just to increase success in a given attack, unless a key target is available. Identifying and targeting training cadre is an important element of the counter-IDF fight. In some cases, U.S. forces will face IDF crews that received more focused training in third world countries supporting the extremists. Since these crews are relatively easy to identify based on the accuracy they achieve and the TTP they use, they should be a priority for elimination.

1-11. Despite limitations in the tactical realm, the use of IDF plays some key supporting roles at the operational and even strategic levels in the larger enemy information war, therefore it is likely to endure and grow in the operational environment. For the C-RAM unit or supported commander, the three uses of IDF for operational and strategic purposes most relevant to the conduct of the mission are erosion of popular will, key event exploitation, and symbolic retaliation. At the tactical level, commander assessment of troop and critical asset criticality, vulnerability, recuperability, and threat (CVRT) (likelihood the enemy will target those troops and assets with IDF) remains important to prioritizing active and passive defensive capabilities for protecting Soldiers and equipment from enemy RAM.

1-8.

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Indirect Fire and the Operational Environment

ATTEMPTS TO ERODE WILL

1-12. Steady attacks on U.S., multinational, and host government bases or units create statistics that are weapons in themselves. This accumulation of events assessed as "attacks" feeds reports that create an impression of no progress, despite the fact that the majority of these attacks may have been totally ineffective or even led to friendly force raids and counter-strikes inflicting enemy losses. Based on attack reports, opinion-makers and casual observers in the U.S. and key nations wrongly perceive that the U.S. and its allies are stalled, or that the long-term fight is hopeless. The reverse side of this coin is that merely conducting attacks reinforces enemy morale. Many insurgent forces inductively reason that their attacks are much more effective than they actually are. As a minimum, the enemy assumes that their persistence will wear down the morale of targeted U.S. and multinational commanders and troops, if not inflict actual casualties or operational disruption.

KEY EVENT EXPLOITATION

1-13. The second primary operational or strategic use of IDF relevant to C-RAM is the use of IDF attacks to create strong images during key windows of opportunity. Such an attack might be an attack timed during the visit of a key U.S. or allied official or head of state. While the enemy commander may know there is little chance to hit this individual, the real target is the increased number of media outlets that will be keyed to that location. The attack will almost certainly be broadcast in near-real-time to the world and is calculated to cause the maximum impact for the resources expended. The enemy may also attempt to exploit large crowds where cameras are likely to be used. During OIF, the successful C-RAM intercept of an incoming rocket that was projected to hit a crowd at a morale, welfare, and recreation concert is an example of a C-RAM tactical action that prevented the enemy from achieving a significant operational effect with IDF. The incident also serves as a reminder to commanders about the necessity for operations security (OPSEC) when scheduling events with large crowds, given the known enemy tendency to try to exploit key events with IDF.

SYMBOLIC RETALIATION

1-14. The third primary operational and strategic use of IDF is to retaliate against U.S. forces after particularly damaging U.S., allied, or host nation security force operations. The insurgent or militia commander cannot hit the forces that inflicted the damage, but still must strike back quickly. This is necessary to sustain morale and to possibly deter friendly forces in the area from future operations. A variant of this type of attack is the indirect response to an event. This could be another faction's attack on insurgents or allied groups, which insurgents try to associate with U.S. forces. This can even be a general propaganda attempt to link the U.S. to a negative event that just happened elsewhere in the OA. It is important to be familiar with historical dates that are significant to the enemy and the region, as symbolic retaliation attacks frequently occur on the anniversary of a significant date.

PLANNING TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY IDF THREAT

1-15. C-RAM unit leaders and supported commanders need to learn who the enemy factions in their area are and learn their weaponscapabilities and attack tendencies. It is just as important to learn the motivations of the different factions and how they see the battlefield. Look at your defended areas from the enemy's perspective. C-RAM leaders also need to understand the local population, especially in areas where enemy rocket crews are more likely to get active or passive support. They also need to understand local geography, that, if hit by enemy IDF (intentionally or unintentionally) can be exploited in the larger effort to undermine enemy IDF crews as extremists who are denying the people stability and progress. Once C-RAM leaders understand how their OA fits in the enemy's target set, they must begin the detailed intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). This will create the baseline assessment, with projections of enemy activity in terms of time, weapon system, point of origin (POO), and associated trigger events as well as the larger network of enemy supply and training activities and locations. Even though C-RAM sections may have no assigned intelligence personnel, they can still use the simple tools provided in Army intelligence and doctrinal publications to create and sustain a relevant assessment. This will enable them to

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maximize the potential of the weapon systems under their command as well as advise supported commanders on other C-RAM functional areas in the larger holistic counter-IDF fight. C-RAM leaders need to understand their supported unit OA. They must maintain situational understanding of supported unit actions. This will enable them to anticipate the impact of friendly force operations and how that might alter templated predictions of enemy activity. C-RAM leaders also need to be aware of dates of historical significance in the region that could alter anticipated enemy activity. Appendix F provides more detail on pattern analysis and other tools that C-RAM and supported leaders can apply when assessing and planning offensive and defensive operations to defeat the enemy IDF threat. This will deny them both the tactical and operational advantages they seek, and enable them to target all elements of the enemy IDF network, both physically and in the information arena.

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Chapter 2

C-RAM Operations Doctrine

This chapter describes some of the enduring principles associated with defeating the enemy rockets and mortar threat. It also discusses the C-RAM functional areas. The rapidly spiraled C-RAM organizations and equipment currently used in response to the urgent operational need statement for dedicated C-RAM capability will change over time; however, the principles associated with defeating enemy IDF will likely endure.

THE JOINT AND COMBINED ARMS FIGHT TO DEFEAT ENEMY IDF

2-1. C-RAM is a joint and combined arms and full spectrum approach to defeating enemy IDF that features offensive and defensive fires synergy. It is enabled by, but not defined by, specialized C-RAM units and capabilities.

2-2. The enemy uses IDF to try to inflict casualties and battle damage, reduce multinational political and popular will, and to raise their stature in the community. C-RAM operations reverse this equation by minimizing the casualties caused by enemy IDF. This denies them the mass casualty scenes they seek to exploit in the information arena. It also decreases their stature in the eyes of the average citizen either by their physical destruction or by nonlethal fires that expose their cowardly actions, and the adverse effects such actions have on peace and stability for the people.

OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FIRES SYNERGY

2-3.

alone fails.

2-4. Offense alone will not defeat the enemy IDF threat. During recent conflicts, multinational bases that both possessed and employed the most offensive firepower in theater suffered casualties, major losses of attack as well as lift helicopters, and other valuable equipment. This caused severe mission disruption because commanders lacked the capabilities to provide early warning to troops, had inadequate protective barriers, or lacked the capability to destroy incoming rockets and mortars with C-RAM surface-to-air fires. The enemy was often able to exploit these successes, with operational effect, in the information arena.

2-5. Similarly, in bases that apply a strictly defensive approach, the enemy will fire without any retaliation. The enemy IDF crews and the population that passively or actively support them fear no response and are consequently emboldened. Recruitment of IDF crews becomes easy since the job is less dangerous. It is much easier for the local population to rationalize allowing their neighborhood to be used as an extremist rocket launch site when they know multinational forces will not fire back into their neighborhood. As a result, both the number of attacks and the number of rounds fired in each attack goes up. While defensive C-RAM measures will prevent casualties in many attacks, they cannot prevent them in all attacks. The increase in enemy attacks encouraged by a strictly defensive approach will ultimately overwhelm defenses and achieve at least some tactical effect. More significantly, friendly morale suffers and enemy morale goes up when enemy IDF attacks go unanswered and when there is no serious joint and combined arms effort to deter, deny, or defeat them.

2-6.

The combination of offensive and defensive fires synergy, both lethal and nonlethal, has proven

extremely effective against enemy IDF. The combined arms effort to keep the enemy from employing

Defeating enemy IDF requires offensive and defensive synergy. Offensive or defensive capability

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rockets, mortars, and the fires synergy that targets the enemy at the IDF point of origin while simultaneously cueing early warning and defensive fires to protect Soldiers in the vicinity of the projected IDF point of impact (POI) (or precise employment of nonlethal fires/information operations if the enemy IDF POI is a civilian target) is what C-RAM operations are all about.

UNIT MISSION

2-7. The generic mission of specialized C-RAM units, to be modified as appropriate based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC), is as follows:

C-RAM units, working as part of a joint and combined arms effort, detect incoming rockets and mortars; provide focused early warning; destroy inbound rockets and mortars at prioritized locations; and enable counter-IDF shaping, denial, and response actions in order to protect friendly forces and high-value assets, ensure mission continuity, and help to kill or capture enemy IDF teams and seize their caches.

HOW TO FIGHT: ENDURING PRINCIPLES

2-2

2-8. C-RAM detections help fuel the larger joint and combined arms fight versus enemy IDF. Detections provide the cueing for the immediate offensive and defensive fires used to defeat an enemy IDF attack. They also contribute to the database of historic IDF POO used for pattern analysis and both proactive operations and a more detailed study of past events leading to deliberate operations against the enemy IDF network. C-RAM fusion of organic detections and both supported and networked unit detections enables a more robust situational awareness of enemy IDF patterns than was previously possible.

2-9. Shape operations attempt to prevent enemy IDF attacks from being generated in the first place. C- RAM and supported maneuver operations attempt to shape actions and attitudes associated with IDF employment in areas that can be used as launch points against MF. This is conducted with information operations and other full spectrum operations designed to help people, win their support, and make them less inclined to support enemy IDF activity. In addition, ground patrols attempt to find and seize caches. A high positive ratio of enemy IDF rounds seized in caches compared to enemy rounds fired is an important measure of success in the combined arms C-RAM fight. Aircrews that operate in the FOB OAs should be well briefed on historic enemy IDF POOs and pattern analysis, and should be trained to look for signs of enemy IDF activity during routine flights. Many of the kills achieved against enemy IDF teams during OIF came from alert aircrews looking for and finding enemy IDF activity. Properly cleared denial fires and the conduct of helicopter gunnery and other test fires in historic POOs also help deter and deny enemy IDF activities.

2-10. C-RAM sense and warn operations provide the detection that is key to the joint and combined arms C-RAM fight. Sense and warn operations then provide warning to friendly troops of incoming rockets and mortars so that they can seek cover to avoid being killed or wounded.

prioritized

2-11. C-RAM intercept operations destroy or deflect incoming rockets and locations.

2-12. Protect operations provide Soldiers passive protection against the effects of rockets and mortar blasts. T-walls, Hesko barriers, rocket roofs, and other means help reduce exposure to the risks of enemy RAM.

2-13. C-RAM respond operations (which is a base defense operations center [BDOC] function), directly or indirectly, attack insurgent forces with lethal and nonlethal fires. During OIF, U.S. and MF killed enemy IDF crews and destroyed rockets and rails at the POOs with weapons fired from UASs, attack helicopters, joint air, artillery, ground forces, and other means. When positive identification could not be made at the POOs, U.S. forces tracked vehicles and personnel at the POOs back to their weaponscaches. Multinational forces then planned and conducted appropriate operations to kill or capture the enemy IDF teams and associated supporters. When the enemy fired at U.S. and multinational forces but missed and hit civilians

mortars at

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instead, nonlethal fires such as information operations were used to undermine the enemy for their actions and to reduce their support base.

2-14. Many of the kills achieved versus enemy IDF teams during OIF came from alert aircrews looking for and finding enemy IDF activity. Properly cleared denial fires and conduct of helicopter gunnery and other test fires in historic POO also help deter and deny enemy IDF activities. C-RAM sense and warn operations provide the detections that are key to the joint and combined arms C-RAM fight and provide troops warning of incoming rockets and mortars so they can seek cover to avoid being killed or wounded. Protect operations aim to provide Soldiers passive protection against the effects of rockets and mortar blasts. C- RAM intercept operations destroy incoming rockets and mortars at prioritized locations. C-RAM respond operations shoot back at the enemy with lethal and nonlethal fires.

2-15. C-RAM command and control operations ensure that all C-RAM functions are being leveraged in the fight and seek to maximize synergy between the offensive capabilities of the supported unit and the specialized C-RAM unit supporting the fight.

2-16. These C-RAM functional areas are enduring principles critical to a successful joint and combined arms C-RAM fight. It is important to note that they are interrelated. For example, the response functional area has a significant shaping effect on both the enemy and the population that the enemy depends upon for active or passive support in order to recruit, fund, hide caches, or operate among the people. These functional areas are listed and described in more detail, following the historical vignette below.

Historical Vignette

III Corps successfully applied a full spectrum and a joint and combined arms approach to defeating the enemy and enemy IDF. The enemy used IDF to try to inflict casualties, reduce multinational political and popular will, and to raise their stature in the community. Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) defeated this approach with a full spectrum, combined

arms approach, withstanding the highest enemy IDF attack levels of the war through the

spring and summer and ultimately reducing the enemy to the lowest attack levels in over 4 years by the end of 2007. During the 2 months of November and December 2007 alone, multinational forces seized over 10,000 rounds of enemy IDF. During 2007, multinational forces killed scores of enemy IDF teams with Predator-mounted Hellfire, AH-64, and joint fires. Artillery helped shape and deny support for enemy IDF activity and reduced the number of rounds fired per enemy attack. In selected locations, specialized C-RAM units and equipment contributed to the combined arms approach and to synergy between offensive and defensive counter-IDF fires. C-RAM units successfully warned on well over 800 enemy IDF attacks and intercepted over 72 rockets and mortars in specified locations during the III Corps tour, saving lives and reducing the impact of a concerted enemy IDF- intensive offensive. Information operations helped undermine extremists for the frequent collateral damage their IDF attacks exacted on the Iraqi people. Full spectrum operations helped shape attitudes in favor of multinational force security efforts and against extremists that emplace IEDs and attack multinational forces and Iraqi civilians with IDF. The Joint Fires Cell and MNC-I C-RAM Section played a key role in focusing on the enemy IDF threat and leading and integrating efforts to defeat it. IDF, along with UASs, CMs, and TBMs, will remain the “Poor Man’s Air Force” and something we will continue to see brought into the fight to challenge us. The successful III Corps counter-IDF fight

provides many valuable insights into how to defeat this aspect of the threat that we will no doubt see again in the future during the continuing struggle against radical extremists.

XVIII ABN Corps and subsequent MNC-I and other formations facing IDF threats will

continue the process of learning, improving relevant tactics, techniques, and procedures, and cycling lessons learned from operational deployments to the generating force.

COL Timothy Keppler MNC-I C-RAM LNO

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THE C-RAM FUNCTIONAL AREAS

2-17. The C-RAM functional areas are depicted in Figure 2-1 and are described in the paragraphs that follow.

Figure 2-1 and are described in the paragraphs that follow. Figure 2-1. C-RAM functional overview S

Figure 2-1. C-RAM functional overview

SHAPE

2-18. The C-RAM shape functional area denies or minimizes the enemy’s ability to launch successful IDF attacks that undermine the friendly force mission. C-RAM shape operations include predictive and pattern analysis to assist the counter-IDF aspects of the enemy’s IPB. Good IPB helps orient dedicated and general purpose collection and attack assets in time and space, and provides enhanced situational awareness to non- dedicated aviation and other forces operating in the area based on known enemy IDF trends and tendencies and identified intelligence gaps. It also helps establish appropriate anticipatory battlefield coordination measures. These procedures all combine to facilitate successful supported unit lethal and nonlethal counter- IDF area denial operations. They shape the civilian population and deny the enemy the launch points they seek. It also fuels preemptive attacks to seize enemy rocket and mortar caches and/or attack other aspects of the enemy IDF systemology with the net effect of denying or minimizing enemy IDF success. We face a thinking adaptive enemy; therefore, IPB and the shape process are continuous. Proper command emphasis and focus on the C-RAM shape functional area helps stay one step ahead of, and stay out in front of, thinking adaptive enemies in the counter IDF fight.

SENSE AND WARN

2-19. The C-RAM sense and warn functional areas are focused on detecting, discriminating, and tracking RAM events in flight and providing timely, focused early warning to Soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and civilians.

Sense

2-20. Detections generated in the sense and warn functional areas are critical to joint and combined arms C-RAM success. The sense detections enable multiple functions to occur. In addition to enabling focused

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early warning of friendly personnel, the sense function alerts C-RAM intercept systems to enable surface- to-air engagements that destroy incoming rockets and mortars. Detection information assists in determining POI information, with sufficient accuracy to enable the use of lethal and/or nonlethal response. Accumulated detections also allow proactive shaping and denial efforts. Accumulated POI analysis and identification of accuracy trends are useful in understanding enemy IDF intent, focusing of C-RAM-related OPSEC, and efforts to identify and eliminate enemy human intelligence and forward observers. This also provides indicators of external training and equipping influence in the area.

2-21. The C-RAM sense effort features an integrated sensor system, able to recognize threats, support the alerting of friendly forces to RAM attack (warn), support intercept cueing, and assist commanders and supported units with both lethal and nonlethal response actions and proactive shaping and denial operations.

Warn

2-22. The warn function is focused on providing timely and accurate localized early warning to friendly personnel. This early warning allows time to get in the prone position, seek protective cover, or remain within a hardened structure until the RAM event is complete. This function must maintain a high degree of reliability, to minimize complacency.

2-23. The sensor/warning interface should be automated and make effective use of the following:

Local sensors for short-range attacks.

A network of broad area sensors for long-range attacks and to mitigate the impacts of terrain masking.

A high degree of sensor discrimination to minimize false warnings.

Timely dissemination of warnings using multiple methods (audio, visual, both indoor and outdoor).

The ability to quickly move or augment existing warning coverage based on changes in protected unit stance or other METT-TC factors.

2-24. The rapid warning of a predicted impact area, using input from existing C-RAM and supported and adjacent unit sensors, facilitates the early warning of personnel. Warning is accomplished by transmitting an immediate audio and/or visual warning to a targeted area, limited to the actual zone of danger and not the entire base or area of operations, unless area coverage is directed by the supported commander and troops are educated on this local TTP. This enables threatened personnel to seek any immediately available cover and get in the prone position. The end product of the warn effort is saving Soldierslives and denying the enemy the casualties through IDF. Countless Soldiers have walked away from close encounters with rockets by proper, disciplined reaction to C-RAM warnings.

INTERCEPT

2-25. The C-RAM intercept functional area is focused on the destruction or neutralization of RAM munitions in flight. C-RAM intercepts required acquisition and tracking of incoming rounds that have predicted POI within the designated protected area. C-RAM intercept capability enables supported units in defended areas to continue the mission with greater confidence and less fear of enemy rockets and mortar attacks. Successful C-RAM intercepts prevent lethal effects within protected areas and help to prevent or minimize battle damage. While the C-RAM warn capability is more readily available and significantly improves Soldierssurvivability, it does not stop the rocket or mortar impact and ensuing destruction and shrapnel damage at and around the POI. Any exposed high-value assets such as attack and heavy lift helicopters on the ground cannot react to warning. The C-RAM intercept capability destroys rockets and mortars in the air or deflects them away from targeted areas, saving lives and preventing or minimizing shrapnel effects. Successful C-RAM intercepts boost friendly morale and, at a minimum, deny the enemy the degree of casualties, damage, and the resulting information operations advantages the enemy seeks through an IDF attack. When C-RAM intercepts are visible or otherwise made known to the enemy or local population, there is a psychological advantage for friendly forces that can dampen both the enemy’s

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enthusiasm for IDF attacks and the willingness of civilians to provide active or passive support for enemy RAM attacks. CVRT is key to prioritizing the allocation of limited C-RAM intercept capability and doctrinal active air defense principles, and employment guidelines are applicable to positioning. The recuperability time and cost of replacing defended high-value assets and troop concentrations should be considered when assessing the costs and benefits of C-RAM intercept capabilities and requirements. C- RAM intercepts have saved a large number of lives and prevented significant battle damage. In several instances, C-RAM intercepts prevented the enemy from achieving what likely would have been a damaging media story.

PROTECT

2-26. The C-RAM protect functional area is applicable to all units, regardless of whether or not they are resourced with specialized C-RAM units and capabilities. Many doctrinal passive air defense principles apply. Use of T-wall barriers, Hesko barriers, earthworks, sandbags, SCUD/RAM bunkers, hardened mess hall dividers, and other materials help shield and harden troop billeting and work areas, and protect equipment from shrapnel damage. C-RAM CVRT analysis guides prioritization of barrier emplacement and allocation of limited protection resources for projects such as rocket roofs over high troop concentration areas and dining facilities. The protect function is particularly important for units and places without specialized C-RAM sense and warn or intercept capability. Simple barriers have saved countless lives by containing shrapnel blast and by shielding Soldiers.

RESPOND

2-27. Respond is the execution of lethal and/or nonlethal fires in response to detected enemy IDF attacks. The C-RAM respond function primarily focuses on killing or capturing enemy IDF crews that fired on, are firing on, or are about to fire on friendly forces. The C-RAM respond function can also include nonlethal effects (focused information operations) targeting local populations that are impacted (intentionally or unintentionally) by enemy effect. Since respond and shape efforts often overlap, the respond function impacts friendly, enemy, and local population attitudes. Units that respond aggressively, decisively, and intelligently to enemy IDF enjoy a boost of friendly morale and generally realize a decrease in both number and size of enemy attacks. This is due to a reduced willingness in the local population to support attacks from their area and increased enemy respect for the capabilities of U.S. and multinational firepower and the demonstrated will to use it.

2-28. U.S. and MF kill or capture enemy IDF crews and destroy rockets and rails at the POO by employing weapons fired from UASs, attack helicopters, joint air, artillery, ground forces, and other means. When positive identification can be made at the POO, U.S. forces use target mensuration and other techniques to determine what vehicles and personnel are near the POO at the time of launch and then plan and conduct appropriate operations to kill or capture the enemy IDF teams and associated supporters. Proactive response is conducted based on intelligence that initiates lethal or nonlethal fires prior to IDF action. Reactive response attempts to destroy IDF teams prior to their vacating the POO. When the enemy fires at U.S. and multinational forces but misses and hits civilians instead, or when the enemy intentionally fires at civilian targets, nonlethal fires such as information operations are employed to undermine the enemy’s actions and to reduce the enemy’s support base. When possible, POO sites are examined for intelligence gathering and sensitive site exploitation and captured IDF teams are interrogated for intelligence that can help prevent further attacks. The response functional area, whether employed aggressively and effectively or not, has a significant shaping effect on both the enemy and the population that the enemy depends upon for active or passive support in order to recruit, fund, hide caches, or operate among the people.

2-29. Rules of engagement (ROE) are extremely important to effective C-RAM response. A key element of effective response is the ability to establish positive identification rapidly that meets criteria established in the commander’s ROE. In more restrictive cases, units may require positive visual identification in addition to radar data. Since C-RAM units get the grid for the enemy POO sooner than other sources, collocation of specialized C-RAM units with UAS controllers and fires leaders in the maneuver commander tactical operations centers (TOCs) is a TTP that helps units synchronize intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to the POO for positive identification and clearance of fires more

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quickly. It is important that units clearly understand how the ROE right of self-defense applies to enemy indirect fire. Along with the desire to minimize collateral damage and other considerations, commanders must consider the likelihood that ROE which severely constrain response against enemy rocket and mortar crews typically can cause an increase in both the number and the size of attacks. It may also increase the likelihood of the local population actively or passively supporting enemy IDF activity in their neighborhoods. All C-RAM proactive and reactive response must be executed within the commander’s intent and in accordance with established ROE.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

2-30. The C-RAM command and control functional area ensures all C-RAM functional areas are being leveraged in the fight and seeks to maximize synergy between the offensive capabilities of the supported unit and the specialized C-RAM unit supporting the fight.

2-31. At corps level, a theater C-RAM lead and small staff element, typically working as part of the joint fires cell, integrates the overall C-RAM fight within the corps commander’s intent. It is important that the corps C-RAM section have a mixture of surface-to-air and surface-to-surface fires expertise, as well as division and corps level experience. Depending on the number of C-RAM units and locations in the fight, a C-RAM tactical command post (CP) may need to be established to synchronize multiple specialized C- RAM units with multiple supported division operations. The C-RAM Intercept Battery commander integrates the C-RAM fight with the supported commander at selected high-priority locations allocated as C-RAM intercept capability. The C-RAM sense and warn squad leader integrates with a supported brigade or regimental combat team or the senior tactical commander at the designated FOB, patrol base, or joint security station. The C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery commander and platoon leaders work with multiple C-RAM sense and warn squads and the division(s) commanding supported units. While some units collocate C-RAM units with BDOCs or protection cells, operational experience suggests the best command and control practice is to collocate the C-RAM sense and warn squads in the portion of the TOC where ISR and fires decisions are made. This facilitates positive identification with UASs and results in rapid clearance of fires. The warning function can be triggered as easily from the TOC as from a BDOC or protection cell; however, synchronization with ISR and fires is typically more difficult from a protection cell or BDOC than from the TOC. Commanders organize their command posts as they see fit, and C-RAM unit leaders must be ready to aggressively integrate all C-RAM pillars with supported unit operations from wherever positioned. The key is to promote proactive and aggressive offensive and defensive synergy against the enemy IDF threat. Chapters Four and Five describe current C-RAM Intercept Battery and C- RAM Sense and Warn Battery organizations and operations.

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Chapter 3

C-RAM System of Systems Description and Organizational Construct

This chapter outlines the current states and operational functional solution to the threat facing Soldiers on the battlefield today with the complex threat of indirect fire. Commanders, through their analysis, determine the best employment of available systems and personnel in response to the current threat. This chapter discusses the core systems. It also discusses the C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery mission and organization.

C-RAM JOINT PLUG-AND-FIGHT SYSTEMS

THEORY AND OVERVIEW

3-1. C-RAM and its systems in their current state of spiral development are an operationally functional solution to a complex IDF threat facing combat forces on today's battlefield. Designed as a joint plug-and- fight system, there are both core and non-core systems. Commanders and planners must be familiar with both the capabilities and limitations associated with the integration and networking of additional sensors and responders to the core C-RAM system. Currently, the FAAD, air and missile defense workstation (AMDWS), WAVES, lightweight counter-mortar radar (LCMR), land-based Phalanx weapon system (LPWS), and Redline are organic to C-RAM units. Others, like LCMRs, may be either C-RAM equipment or theater-provided equipment, and which C-RAM personnel will maintain and operate. Systems like the Q36, Q46, Q37, Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) system, and Integrated Base Defense Security System (IBDSS) will not be under operational control of C-RAM units. However, commanders may designate them to support the C-RAM mission through system integration and inter-FOB networking. The concept of the C-RAM SoS is based on the premise that systems under development will integrate successfully with current fielded systems, enhancing their capabilities and moving towards the objective SoS. There is no basic issue or standard equipment that comprises C-RAM. In the current state, manning and equipment are based on a variety of factors. Commanders, through their analysis, determine the best employment of available systems and personnel in response to the current threat.

CORE SYSTEMS

LAND-BASED PHALANX WEAPON SYSTEM

3-2. The LPWS consists of a trailer-mounted MK 15 close-in weapon system (CIWS). The CIWS is a 310-degree, 20-millimeter gun system with separate search-and-track radars, and a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) radar. The gun system is capable of firing 4,500 rounds per minute, with a magazine storage capacity of 1,580 rounds. Two 60-kilowatt generators mounted on the trailer supply power to the entire system. The remote control station (RCS) requires its own power source. A Schreiber Engineering chiller (mounted on the trailer) provides cool water to the electronics (ELX) enclosure. Emplacement time for the complete system is approximately 45 minutes with a six-man crew. The LPWS can be towed by a 10-ton vehicle.

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Description of LPWS Components

3-3.

The MK 15 LPWS consists of the following unit components:

Unit 1, the local control console (LCC).

Unit 2, the ELX.enclosure.

Unit 3, the radar weapon assembly.

Note: Units 2 and 3 together comprise the weapon group.

Unit 13, the local control station (LCS).

Unit 14, the RCS.

3-4.

The LCC (Figure 3-1) is located in the control room. Threat criteria and engagement data can be

entered into the weapons control computer (WCC). If the RCS is inoperable or if the FAAD/LPWS fiber- optic link is broken (degraded operations), the LCC can be used as the primary control panel for the LPWS. The LCC also functions as a maintenance control panel. The operator can perform operability tests, fault isolation, and maintenance operations at the LCC. The LCC contains the local control panel (LCP), mass storage device drawer, and power supply.

3-5. The LCC cabinet houses its chassis assembly, mass storage device drawer, power supply, and air- cooling fans (capable of moving 300 cubic feet per minute to dissipate 2,000 BTUs per hour). The LCC is designed for sit-down operation. A pullout shelf is located at the base of LCC chassis assembly and provides a work surface for the operator. Each of the assemblies is mounted on drawer slides, which may be opened and locked into position for maintenance operations. The control panel/chassis assembly in the LCC is mounted at a 15-degree angle on slides. The chassis assembly houses replaceable circuit card assemblies (CCAs). The CCAs are designed to simplify fault isolation, with one CCA controlling each section of the control panel. For example, one CCA controls the ENGAGEMENT STATUS section, while another CCA controls the MODE CONTROL section.

while another CCA controls the MODE CONTROL section. Figure 3-1. Local control console (Unit 1) 3-2

Figure 3-1. Local control console (Unit 1)

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3-6. The ELX (Figure 3-2) provides environmental protection and packaging for most of the weapon group electronics items. A connector shield, a power junction box assembly, and a transient surge suppressor assembly are mounted on the right side of the enclosure. The enclosure is mounted on six helical shock isolators. The bottom of the enclosure is fitted with two drain fittings that are opened periodically to drain any water that may have accumulated in the bottom of the enclosure. Two hinged doors on the front of the enclosure allow access to the electronic items. Door stay assemblies are located on each top corner of the enclosure. They enable locking the doors in either the 90-degree or 180-degree open position for maintenance operations. The interior of the enclosure contains slide-out drawer assemblies 2A1 through 2A5 and 2A7 through 2A11, which all contain replaceable CCAs. These CCAs are also referred to as replaceable modules. The lower portion of the enclosure houses a power supply and control group 2A6 and 2A12. Small double doors on the lower portion allow access to the power supply and control group (PSCG). Portions of the PSCG are located on the backside of these two doors, with the remainder located in the lower portion of the enclosure. A tie rod on the backside of the enclosure door can be connected to a pivot on the PSCG door. This secures the PSCG door during maintenance operations.

This secures the PSCG door during maintenance operations. Figure 3-2. Electronics enclosure (Unit 2) 3-7. The

Figure 3-2. Electronics enclosure (Unit 2)

3-7. The radar weapon assembly (Figure 3-3) includes the 3A1 radar-servo fire control assembly, 3A2 gun subsystem, 3A3 elevation drive group assembly (mount), 3A4 barbette assembly, 3A5 train platform assembly, 3A32 electro-optical stabilization system (EOSS) pedestal assembly, and 3A33 thermal imager. The barbette assembly supports the entire radar weapon assembly. The train platform assembly is mounted on top of the barbette assembly and is supported by four shock isolators. The train platform assembly supports the bearing mounted elevation drive assembly. The elevation drive group assembly supports the gun subsystem and the radar-servo fire control assembly.

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Chapter 3 Figure 3-3. Radar weapon assembly (Unit 3) 3-8. The LCS (Figure 3-4) is located

Figure 3-3. Radar weapon assembly (Unit 3)

3-8. The LCS (Figure 3-4) is located in the control room. The LCS provides the capability of command and control (from the mode control menu). It also provides friendly protect functions during degraded operations from the FLIR display, and provides operator computer displays and the same mode displays as those of the RCS. The LCS console contains the parameter analysis and storage system (PASS) computer and printer; an engagement controller with video monitor, function keys, electro-optical stabilization steering control, guarded fire button, power supplies, and electronics chassis. The electronics chassis contains the LPWS support processor, which acts as the electro-optical system controller and data interface with the WCC, and the acquisition video tracker that processes infrared image signals in electro-optical search and track (disabled in LPWS).

3-9. The LCS cabinet houses the PASS computer and printer chassis assemblies, engagement controller, Versa Module Europa (VME) bus chassis assembly, and air-cooling fans (capable of moving 240 cubic feet per minute to dissipate 3,276 BTUs per hour). The engagement controller contains a video monitor and keypad. The VME chassis assembly contains the thermal imager video interface devices. Each of the assemblies is mounted on slides that may be opened and locked into position for maintenance operations.

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System of Systems Description and Organizational Construct Figure 3-4. Local control station (Unit 13) 3-10. The

Figure 3-4. Local control station (Unit 13)

3-10. The RCS (Figure 3-5) is located at the engagement operations (EO) section (when the tactical situation permits) and allows an operator to break engagements while in antiair warfare (AAW) mode. The RCS integrates the remote control panel MK 340 into a single console, which duplicates most LPWS operational C 2 functions of the LCP, and exercises control of these functions through the mode control menu. The RCS contains circuitry to accept target designations automatically from other sensor/radar systems. The RCS console also contains an engagement controller with video monitor, function keys, electro-optical stabilization steering control, guarded fire button, and a power supply chassis.

3-11. The RCS cabinet houses the remote control chassis assembly, engagement controller, power chassis assembly, and air-cooling fans (capable of moving 240 cubic feet per minute to dissipate 2,730 BTUs per hour). Through use of the mode control menu, the RCS can mode sequence selected mounts. The engagement controller contains a video monitor and keypad. The power chassis assembly contains power supplies for unit operation. Each of the assemblies is mounted on drawer slides, which may be opened and locked into position for maintenance operations.

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Chapter 3 Figure 3-5. Remote control station (Unit 14) E NGAGEMENT O PERATIONS S ECTION 3-12.

Figure 3-5. Remote control station (Unit 14)

ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS SECTION

3-12. The FAAD command, control, communications, and intelligence (C 3 I) system provides automated EO and protection operations capabilities at the C-RAM EO section. EO section capabilities include real- time EW and target cueing information to C-RAM weapon systems, friendly aircraft identification, and air battle management. Force operations (FO) capabilities include automated mission planning, automated staff planning, and interoperability with other command systems.

3-13. The components of the FAAD C 3 I system include the following:

The EO section that monitors and controls the C-RAM tactical operations for the FOB/BDOC.

The Army airspace command and control (A 2 C 2 ) system that controls the engagement process and provides FOB/BDOC liaison.

The sensor/C 2 system that processes and disseminates track data to firing batteries.

The primary intelligence component, the Sentinel radar that provides airspace deconfliction capability for the Intercept Battery in order to prevent fratricide.

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Table 3-1 lists FAAD C 3 I system components.

Table 3-1. FAAD C 3 I system components

Common Name

Official Nomenclature

Air and Missile Defense Work Station (AMDWS)

Computer, Tactical, AN/GYQ-88

Sensor C 2 Subsystem

Communications Control Set AN/TSQ-183,

AN/TSQ-183A

800 W Uninterruptible Power Supply 5-kw Generator/Trailer

Power Supply PP-8282/U 5-kw, 60-Hz Generator Set, Diesel Engine-Driven, Trailer- Mounted PU-751/M

10-kw Generator/Trailer

10-kw, 60-Hz Generator Set, Diesel Engine- Driven, Trailer-Mounted PU-798/M

Antenna OE-254/GRC

Antenna Group OE-254/GRC

Adaptive Programmable Interface Unit (APIU)

Adaptive Programmable Interface Unit MD-

1217B/U

Fill Device

Electronic Transfer Device, KYK-13/TSEC

Sentinel Radar

Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) Ground- Based Sensor, AN/MPQ-64

High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)

Truck, Utility, S250 Shelter Carrier, 4X4, M1113 or Truck, Utility, 5/4-ton, Cargo/Troop Carrier w/4x4 M998 (HMMWV)

Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System Receiver (PLGR)

Satellite Signals Navigation Set, AN/PSN-11

Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System/90 (SINCGARS/90)

Radio Set, AN/VRC-90

SINCGARS/91

Radio Set, AN/VRC-91

SINCGARS/92

Radio Set, AN/VRC-92

DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR COMPONENTS

3-14. SINCGARS (Figure 3-6) are very high frequency (VHF) frequency modulation (FM) radios with the capability to transmit and receive voice or data communications. The SINCGARS voice radios are used in all FAAD C 3 I subsystems.

voice radios are used in all FAAD C 3 I subsystems. Figure 3-6. SINCGARS radio (generic

Figure 3-6. SINCGARS radio (generic view)

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Chapter 3

AIR DEFENSE MANAGEMENT EQUIPMENT

3-15. Air defense management equipment consists of the FAAD C 2 and the AMDWS. This equipment is described in the following paragraphs.

Forward Area Air Defense

3-16. The FAAD links the various RAM sensors and the Sentinel radar. It provides situational awareness (SA) to the AMDWS and engagement commands to the LPWS. The FAAD C 2 also cues the WAVES EW system (located in the BDOC) automatically when two or more sensors pick up the inbound RAM, providing EW for the area at risk.

Air and Missile Defense Workstation

3-17. As one of the five original Army Battlefield Command Systems (ABCS), the AMDWS allows the C- RAM unit to provide air and missile defense (AMD) force planning and operational support. The C-RAM unit holds one AMDWS linked to the FAAD and the BDOC (when the unit is located at FOB), or the air defense system integrator (ADSI) (when not located at an FOB), where it can obtain external air tracks. The AMDWS sends EW and other vital track data to the other C 2 systems in the network.

ADVANCED FIELD ARTILLERY TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM

3-18. The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) is the digitized link providing automated technical and tactical fire direction solutions, fire asset management tools, and decision support functionality. The system provides Army, Navy, and Marine Corps automated fire support C 2 , pairs targets to weapons to provide optimum use of fire support assets, and automates the planning, coordinating, and controlling of all fire support assets (field artillery, mortars, air support, naval surface fire support, and attack helicopters). The AFATDS has the following capabilities:

Tactical air support.

Technical fire control.

Expanded target coordination and trigger events.

The ability to process 250 fire missions per hour.

Enhanced continuity of operations automation.

Improved attack analysis and target list.

SENSORS

3-19. The sensors assigned to the C-RAM Intercept Battery are the LCMR and the Sentinel radar. Improvement to existing sensor and the addition of new sensors make C-RAM even more accurate and efficient. The following sections describe various sensors currently used by C-RAM.

Q-48 LCMR

3-20. The LCMR is operated as either a counter-fire sensor (Special Operations Command mode) or in C- RAM mode. It also provides 360-degree surveillance and about 7.5-kilometer (km) range. In either mode, the LCMR detects rocket, artillery, and mortar fire, and predicts the suspected POO and the POI. In the C- RAM mode, the LCMR utilizes either the local area network (LAN) or high-speed radios to send this data to the FAAD to be used for track confirmation/correlation, cuing of other sensors, and countermeasures (by relaying data to friendly artillery and air assets). In addition, the Q36/37/46 counter-battery radar found at FOBs with field artillery units may be tied into the sensor network. These radars are described in later pages.

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Q-64 Sentinel radar

3-21. The Sentinel radar detects air-breathing threats and sends this data to FAAD and AMDWS for airspace deconfliction and for EW. It is a Pulse Doppler radar with an instrumented range of 40 km. The Sentinel is accurate, quick-reacting, and acquires targets sufficiently beyond the forward line of own troops. The Sentinel radar provides key target data to battlefield commanders via FAAD. The sensor is an advanced three-dimensional battlefield X-band air defense phased-array radar.

Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment

3-22. RAID provides day and night capability for enhanced target recognition and situational awareness. It also enables timely and appropriate response options (direct air attack, indirect fire, and ground patrol/attack). The system includes a trailer-mounted, 107-foot tower, camera suite, and a ground control station. The RAID system enhances force protection capability with the following:

360-degree, high-resolution surveillance.

Color EO daytime.

Black and white infrared.

Laser range finder.

Pointing azimuth indicator.

Detection and monitoring out to 12 km and vehicle movements out to 20 km.

Wireless Audio Visual Emergency System

3-23. WAVES transmits and sounds the early warning signal. It receives POI data from FAAD and determines the appropriate towers to warn. A combination of outdoor speaker posts, indoor speakers, and lights provide the warning to personnel.

WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

3-24. When conditions or the mission requires wireless communications, the C-RAM unit uses the AN-50e Broadband Wireless System from Redline Communications (5.8 GHz) (See Figure 3-7). For detailed information on how to emplace and configure the AN-50e Broadband Wireless System, consult the operators manual. The preferred medium of communications is fiber-optic, in 25-km clear line-of-sight conditions.

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Chapter 3

Chapter 3 Figure 3-7. Example of wireless hardware configuration S UPPORT E QUIPMENT 3-25. The following

Figure 3-7. Example of wireless hardware configuration

SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

3-25. The following paragraphs describe the vehicular and support equipment. The LPWS (Figure 3-8) configuration consists of the following:

A model 353WDMR 35-ton trailer.

An LPWS gun mount (mounted on trailer).

Two 60-kw generators mounted on the trailer.

A Schreiber Engineering chiller (mounted on trailer).

A control room (mounted on trailer [Figures 3-8 and 3-9]).

An LCC installed in the control room.

A portable FAAD installed in the control room for use during degraded operations.

3-26. The EO section configuration consists of a unit CP, AN/TSQ-182/183/184 with a FAAD C 2 , an AMDWS, and an LPWS RCS. The unit has the general communications equipment associated in all AMD batteries.

3-27. Battery headquarters has the general support equipment associated with all AMD batteries. The sensor section is equipped with a sensor C 2 node AN/TSQ-183A and LCMRs.

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System of Systems Description and Organizational Construct Figure 3-8. Land-based Phalanx weapon system Figure 3-9.

Figure 3-8. Land-based Phalanx weapon system

Construct Figure 3-8. Land-based Phalanx weapon system Figure 3-9. Control room internal view 3-28. Selected joint

Figure 3-9. Control room internal view

3-28. Selected joint systemscore C-RAM integrate with

The Q-36 (Q-46 USMC)/Q-37, Firefinder radars are networked into the C-RAM architecture via the network address translation (NAT) box.

The Q-36 and Q-46 (USMC). The AN/TPQ’s automatic detection, tracking, and locating process is so fast that an enemy weapon’s position can often be pinpointed before its projectile impacts. The primary mission is to locate enemy mortar and short-range artillery firing positions for counter-fire. It is designed to locate short-range, high-angle, low-velocity indirect firing systems. However, it can locate high-velocity artillery and rockets within its capabilities.

The Q-37. The primary mission is to locate long-range, low-angle, high-velocity indirect mortars, artillery, rocket launchers and missiles Also, the radar pinpoints large numbers of enemy weapons and quickly relays precise location information for counter-fire firing systems.

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Chapter 3

However, it can locate short-range, high-angle, low-velocity indirect firing systems within its capabilities. Normally, it is assigned to the Target Acquisition Battery of the Fires Brigade.

Note: As a secondary mission, the Q-36 (Q-46)/Q-37 can provide the C-RAM network with the requisite data for sense, warn, and respond. To provide EW effectively, the C-RAM network requires fast receipt of track data and cannot rely on combat net radio or other traditional transmission means. Use of the NAT box allows sensor data to be received by the C-RAM C 2 systems in a timely matter for EW.

3-29. These sensors are normally assigned or attached to either the brigade combat team or division special troops battalion who exercise operational control; search azimuths, sectors of search, and positioning authority, to include logistics. In some cases, Corp will reserve position authority and will work with C- RAM units in the integration of sensors within the Corp sensor plan. The Corp sensor chief will assist and advise C-RAM units in the development of sensor coverage plans. The radar will process track data to calculate POO/POI and produce a call for fire or an Artillery Target Intelligence message. The radar operators then transmit these messages to their supported fires cells via combat net radios where the missions are processed for execution or are denied.

3-30. The NAT box enables the use of a different programmable Internet Protocol (IP) address for each sensor on a single LAN. The C-RAM unit will tie into all available sensors whenever possible. Some models of the sensors available have fixed IP addresses (for example, Firefinder radar), and do not allow multiple sensors to be accessed by the FAAD C 3 I system independently on a single LAN.

C-RAM SENSE AND WARN BATTERY MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

MISSION AND SCOPE

3-31. The C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery mission is to provide EW of IDF attacks to a supported unit or base that provides data that enables timely, effective response while simultaneously enabling shaping operations against future IDF attacks. Sense and warn teams are typically located in a supported unit TOC or BDOC where they can best support the mission. The C-RAM Sense and Warn unit provides RAM EW and situational understanding (SU) to the supported commander and staff. To accomplish these tasks, the Sense and Warn cell connects to organic and FOB sensors; communications; computers; and ISR assets available at the BDOC.

Surveillance and tracking of incoming RAM

Detect, track, classify, and provide quality track data to command and control system.

Capability to determine POO and POI and danger to protected area.

Pass IDF track information to response elements, if available.

Initiate alarms and warnings in appropriate areas.

STRUCTURE

3-32. The Sense and Warn unit may be organized into the following structure and elements (see Figures 3- 10 and 3-11):

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System of Systems Description and Organizational Construct Figure 3-10. C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery organization

Figure 3-10. C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery organization structure

3-10. C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery organization structure Figure 3-11. C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery organization

Figure 3-11. C-RAM Sense and Warn Battery organization elements

SENSE AND WARN BATTERY COMMANDER

3-33. The battery commander is responsible for all aspects of the sense and warn operations of the battery. This includes planning and training for continuous full spectrum operations. The commander selects the best location to command the battery, considering the factors of METT-TC and the level of unit training.

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This calls for establishing a clear line of communications with the Sense and Warn Platoons and Sections, because they may be located at different locations. The commander’s responsibilities may include the following:

Supervise and standardize the operations of the Sense and Warn Sections and the battery CP.

Reconnoiter and select battery positions (if needed).

Plan for survey control.

Plan specific actions to enhance the survivability of individual sections at various FOBs.

Coordinate and plan for any additional support of the Sense and Warn Sections.

Plan unit movements.

Plan the basic load mix and the resupply actions for the battery.

Plan logistics for the battery supply, mess, and maintenance.

Establish and maintain communications and electronics security.

Keep high headquarters, TOC, and battery personnel informed.

Develop and execute the overall battery defense plan for each of the Sense and Warn Sections and the battery CP.

Supervise safety and conduct risk assessment during battery operations.

Develop the battery SOP for the Sense and Warn Platoons.

SENSE AND WARN FIRST SERGEANT

3-34. The first sergeant is the principal enlisted advisor to the battery commander. Responsibilities may include the following:

Supervise the platoon sergeants and section sergeants.

Assist and advise the battery commander during reconnaissance and selection of the battery position.

Assist the battery commander in the development and execution of the overall section and battery defense plan.

Coordinate administrative and logistical support (less ammunition), to include water and food service, mail, laundry, showers, maintenance, and evacuation of personnel and equipment.

Supervise the health care, welfare, and sanitation of battery personnel.

Plan, coordinate, and execute the evacuation of casualties to the battalion aid station.

SENSE AND WARN EXECUTIVE OFFICER

3-35. The executive officer (XO) commands the Sense and Warn Platoons in the absence of the battery commander. However, he is the primary maintenance officer for the Sense and Warn Battery. The XO’s responsibilities may include the following:

Establish and maintain the sense and warn equipment of the battery.

Supervise the displacement, movement, and occupation of the battery.

Supervise the integration of artillery survey for all sites.

Supervise the maintenance of the battery equipment.

Ensure continuous security of the sense and warn sites and the battery CP.

SENSE AND WARN PLATOON

3-36. The primary role of the Sense and Warn Platoon is to supervise operations of two or more subordinate Sense and Warn Sections. The platoon tracks status of its sections, and provides periodic updates and reports to the battery CP. The platoon monitors section operations to ensure section integration with its supported unit, to include participation with the supported unit intelligence section, integration with current operations, and integration with the unit fire support element. The platoon monitors the

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maintenance status of all assigned equipment and coordinates necessary repair parts and maintainer support. The platoon maintains communications with the battery CP and its sections.

Sense and Warn Platoon Leader

3-37. The platoon leader is the primary supervisor for all the Sense and Warn Sections that are located at various FOBs. Working in line with the XO, the platoon leader is the first officer in the chain of command who oversees the daily maintenance of equipment. The platoon leader’s responsibilities may include the following:

Provide leadership, establish primary C 2 , and supervise the maintenance of all Sense and Warn Sections.

Supervise the integration of Soldiers with the TOC or controlling unit.

Supervise the integration of the C-RAM networks throughout the OA.

Supervise the maintenance of the platoon’s sense and warn equipment.

Ensure continuous security of the sense and warn sites.

Sense and Warn Platoon Sergeant

3-38. The platoon sergeant is the primary advisor to the platoon leader and the direct supervisor for all the Sense and Warn Sections that are located at various FOBs. The platoon sergeant’s responsibilities may include the following:

Provide leadership, establish primary C 2 , and supervise the maintenance of all Sense and Warn Sections.

Integrate the platoon with the TOC or controlling unit.

Integrate any C-RAM networks throughout the OA.

Supervise the maintenance of the platoon’s sense and warn equipment.

Ensure continuous security of the sense and warn sites.

SENSE AND WARN SECTION

3-39. The primary role of the Sense and Warn Section is to provide EW and continuously update the TOC or BDOC cells on sense and warn status at the base, camp, or station and provide IDF input to the S-2 and counter-fire operation section. The section must maintain and operate the FAAD, AMDWS, WAVES, LCMR, and LAN (wireless or fiber), ensuring the operation of the FOB EW links. The following links, voice or digital, must be established when available: RAID, target acquisition sensor suite (TASS), AFATDS, and the UAS common ground station.

3-40. Each section will operate the system and will perform the following:

Interface with the TOC/BDOC or other assigned cells.

Perform operator preventive

maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on the following

component systems:

FAAD.

AMDWS.

LCMR.

WAVES.

LAN (wireless or fiber).

NAT boxes.

Ensure power systems are maintained.

Maintain system logs and reports.

Advise the supported unit.

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Chapter 3

Sense and Warn Section Responsibilities

3-41. The responsibilities of C-RAM personnel are varied. These responsibilities are listed in the following paragraphs.

Sense and Warn C 2 Section Sergeant

3-42. The Sense and Warn C 2 Section sergeant is the direct supervisor for a Sense and Warn Section. His responsibilities may include the following:

Provide leadership, establish primary C 2 , and supervise the maintenance of all Sense and Warn Sections.

Integrate Soldiers with the TOC or controlling unit.

Integrate the C-RAM network.

Directly supervise the maintenance of the section’s sense and warn equipment.

Ensure continuous security of the sense and warn site.

Sense and Warn C 2 Section Leader

3-43. The Sense and Warn C 2 Section leader performs the following:

Provides the commander and subordinate units with RAM information.

Provides information to facilitate SA in order to visualize, describe, and direct the battle as shown in Table 3-2.

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Table 3-2. Assess the tactical situation and operations

Supporting the Local Operations

Verify the commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR) and actions necessary upon identification of CCIR prior to tracking the battle. Configure the EW capability for the current operations per the tactical standing operating procedure (TSOP). Maintain SA and stay abreast of the current tactical situation. Pass information supporting CCIR to the TOC/BDOC battle captain with a recommendation, as required. Disseminate key RAM information within the TOC/BDOC, as required. Brief RAM-related information as part of battle update briefs and shift changes.

Analyze RAM Threat Factors

3-44. The Sense and Warn C 2 Section leader conducts the analysis of RAM threat factors, as described in Table 3-3, before proposing the BDOC area of interest and operational environment.

Table 3-3. RAM threat factors

Operational Environment

Identify the area of interest. Analyze RAM threat factors bearing on the operational environment. Define threat systems bearing on the area of interest.

Analyze Effects of Weather and Terrain

3-45. The Sense and Warn C 2 Section leader analyzes the effects of weather and terrain on RAM operations within the OA as described in Table 3-4.

Table 3-4. Environmental effects

Weather and Terrain Analysis

Analyze air-related military aspects of the terrain using the observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment; obstacles, key terrain, and potential RAM POO. Evaluate the effects of terrain on RAM operations. Analyze the effects of weather on the operational environment. Describe the operational environment effects on threat and friendly capabilities and broad courses of action (COA).

Evaluate the Threat

3-46. The Sense and Warn C 2 Section leader updates the threat doctrinal template; analyzes threat capabilities, strengths, and vulnerabilities; and recommends coverage for high-value assets for the given situation, as Table 3-5 illustrates. Also, see Appendix F.

Table 3-5. Threat analysis

Threat Analysis

Identify threat capabilities. Define the composition of the threat. Analyze the threat. Identify how threat capabilities would impact broad COA.

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Determine Threat Course of Action

3-47. The Sense and Warn C 2 Section leader identifies and evaluates enemy COA, and specifies the most likely threat and most dangerous enemy COA as Table 3-6 shows.

Table 3-6. Enemy COAs

Analysis of Enemy COA

Evaluate the threat COA overlays and provide C-RAM input to the S-2 section. Determine the most likely and most dangerous threat COA. Evaluate pattern analysis products to determine most likely enemy activity, times, and locations. Review the situation template and C-RAM support input to the S-2 section. Support development of critical collection requirements by providing C-RAM input during war gaming.

Conduct Mission Analysis

3-48. The Sense and Warn C 2 Section leader analyzes the mission and determines friendly and enemy capabilities, and identifies critical tasks and capabilities pertaining to C-RAM, as shown in Table 3-7.

Table 3-7. Conduct analysis

Friendly and Enemy Capabilities

Analyze the base order and relevant annexes received from higher in order to derive initial C-RAM concept of operations. Provide initial intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) input for inclusion into the S-2’s overall IPOE estimate. Identify C-RAM specified, implied, and essential tasks. Analyze C-RAM assets available for the upcoming operation. Identify any C-RAM-related constraints and limitations imposed by higher headquarters. Identify C-RAM critical facts and assumptions. Identify accident risk hazards and assess the risk level for each hazard. Recommend C-RAM related information requirements for staff review to become CCIRs, priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), essential elements of friendly information, or friendly force information requirements. Integrate C-RAM into ISR plan in coordination with S-2. Brief the C-RAM portion during mission analysis briefings, if required. Issue a warning order (WARNO) to the unit with the commander’s restated mission.

Plan Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations

3-49. The Sense and Warn C 2 Section leader provides C-RAM input and assists in the staff development of the ISR plan as shown in Table 3-8.

Table 3-8. Plan ISR

ISR Plan Development

Develop initial C-RAM ISR requirements as part of mission analysis. Review the ISR threat related to ISR production and collection requirements. Assist the ISR team’s development of an initial ISR plan. Provide C-RAM scheme of support to ISR plan. Review and update the ISR plan as necessary.

Develop a C-RAM Concept of Support for Each Course of Action

3-50. The Sense and Warn C 2 Section leader assists in the development of COAs, consistent with the commander’s guidance. The Sense and Warn C 2 Section leader incorporates C-RAM capabilities into each COA and briefs them as shown in Table 3-9.

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Table 3-9. COA support

COA Development

Assist the supported unit staff in analyzing relative combat power. Review initial planning overlays created by the S-2/S-3 sections, and portray the initial array of forces for each COA. Develop an initial C-RAM scheme of support for each COA. Provide C-RAM input into the development of the COA statements and sketches. Brief the C-RAM portion during COA briefing to the commander, as required. Record C-RAM aspects of each COA in C-RAM running estimates for future planning.

War Game Concept of Support

3-51. The Sense and Warn C 2 Section leader participates with the supported unit staff in the military decision-making process (MDMP) and incorporates the commander’s guidance. Additionally, the Sense and Warn C 2 Section leader evaluates and reviews each COA from a C-RAM standpoint and develops an initial supporting C-RAM plan for each COA as shown in Table 3-10.

Table 3-10. Concept of support

COA Analysis/War Gaming

Verify the S-3’s list of friendly C-RAM forces. Evaluate C-RAM-related assumptions and evaluate critical events and decision points for appropriate C-RAM input. Review the COA evaluation criteria, once determined by the XO or S-3. Provide C-RAM input while participating in the staff war gaming method. Assist the staff with the development of the synchronization matrix to include key C-RAM events. Refine initial C-RAM scheme of support plan to incorporate analysis of the COA. Record results of COA analysis in the C-RAM running estimate for future planning.

Compare Courses of Action

3-52. The Sense and Warn C 2 Section leader compares each developed COA, consistent with the evaluation criteria, and identifies the preferred COA from a C-RAM standpoint. He then makes recommendations to the commander, as shown in Table 3-11.

Table 3-11. COA comparisons

COA Analysis

Compare COAs using one evaluation criteria category at a time, and by using the decision support matrix. Identify overall C-RAM advantages and disadvantages of COAs with respect to each other, by analyzing the decision support matrix data. In the C-RAM running estimate, record C-RAM specific information from COA analysis and COA comparisons. Identify the COA that has the highest probability of success against the threat, most likely, and most dangerous COA. Recommend the best COA from an overall C-RAM perspective.

Develop the Running Estimate

3-53. The Sense and Warn C 2 Section leader develops the C-RAM running estimate and provides input during the staff planning process. He then posts that information digitally for command, staff, higher, and subordinate access, as shown in Table 3-12.

Table 3-12. Running estimate

Running Estimate Development

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Develop the “Mission” portion of the C-RAM running estimate. Develop the “Situation” and “Considerations” portions of the estimate. Analyze and compare COAs as part of the MDMP with the maneuver staff. Provide recommendation and conclusions as part of the MDMP with the maneuver staff. Finalize the C-RAM plan and issue orders to unit.

Prepare an Annex

3-54. The Sense and Warn C 2 Section leader completes the plan and prepares the C-RAM Sense and Warn annex to the existing operation order (OPORD). The C-RAM annex will clearly state the C-RAM mission and the commander’s intent, and will fully support the force scheme of maneuver as Table 3-13 illustrates.

Table 3-13. Annex

Annex Preparation

Finalize C-RAM Sense and Warn plan based on the commander’s decisions and guidance. Complete the OPORD.

Synchronize Operations

3-55. The Sense and Warn C 2 Section leader synchronizes C-RAM operations to support the scheme of maneuver during all phases of the operation, coordinates with other staff members, and issues orders to ensure synchronization of C-RAM defense as shown in Table 3-14.

Table 3-14. Synchronize

Operation Synchronization

Maintain SA of the decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. Recommend an order, fragmentary order (FRAGO), or request to higher to implement the commander’s decision based on the CCIR. Recommend an order or FRAGO to subordinate units to execute a pre-planned decision, respond to a trigger, or conduct staff-to-staff coordination. Develop recommendations because of unplanned or extraordinary C-RAM battlefield events critical to the current operation and requiring major adjustments to the plan or requests to higher. Confirm receipt and understanding of all orders, FRAGOs, or requests to higher headquarters (or sender).

Sense and Warn C 2 Operator

3-56. The Sense and Warn C 2 operator is the direct operator for the Sense and Warn Section. His responsibilities may include the following:

FAAD C 2 operator primary C 2 .

Maintain all sense and warn equipment.

Integrate with the TOC or controlling unit.

Maintain the C-RAM network.

3-57. The EW system operator establishes, integrates, and maintains all of the C-RAM Sense and Warn Section voice and data communications network architecture. The FAAD C 2 operator has the job of ensuring the C-RAM section remains 100 percent operational at all times. Table 3-15 describes some of these duties and tasks.

Table 3-15. EW system operator

Tasks

Manage the structure and employment of the data for internal C 2 . Provide technical guidance on the joint services/task force communications architecture. Manage unit maintenance and logistics on the AMDWS.

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Manage integration and application of software and hardware upgrades.

Emplace LAN. Manage data connectivity from sensor devices to internal and external sources. Initialize and perform operator troubleshooting procedures on the LAN. Perform the following on a UNIX system:

Operator actions.

System administration functions.

Archive functions.

User accounts maintenance.

Network functions.

Actions in an MSDOS environment.

Perform the following on the AMDWS:

Initialize the software.

Map generation.

Enter boundaries.

Create a sensor coverage overlay.

Select overlays.

Perform FO.

Perform EO.

Perform continuous operations.

Operate, troubleshoot faults, and maintain system.

Conduct PMCS.

Manage nonstandard prototypical computers and “off-the-shelf” equipment using an available logistics system.

Manage data and voice coordination networks.

Load crypto keys into enhanced position location reporting system (EPLRS) and SINCGARS radios.

Perform operator PMCS on digital nonsecure voice terminal (DNVT) and digital subscriber voice terminal (DSVT) equipment.

Perform operator PMCS on EPLRS radio set AN/VSQ-2(V)2.

Operate the EPLRS radio set AN/VSQ-2(V)2.

Operate the PLGR.

Integrate the PLGR into C-RAM systems.

Perform march order and emplacement.

Operate secure voice and data using secure telephones (STU III or STE).

Noncommissioned Officers

3-58. The C-RAM Sense and Warn noncommissioned officer (NCO) responsibilities include supervising all section operators in the performance of their duties, emplacement/march order (to include necessary computers and radios), and performing limited troubleshooting to allow for normal operations. The C-RAM Sense and Warn NCOs supervise emplacement of the FAAD, initialization of communications networks, and connectivity of the AMDWS, WAVE, RAID, TASS, AFATDS, and UAS common ground station.

Initialize Software on the AMDWS

3-59. The C-RAM Sense and Warn NCOs initialize the software on the AMDWS, log into the network, and insert the initialization parameters by performing the steps shown in Table 3-16.

Table 3-16. Initialize AMDWS

AMDWS Software Initialization

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Boot up the AMDWS. Verify role name and external interface configuration. Begin process manager. Configure desktop one on AMDWS with defense planner. Configure desktop two on AMDWS with common message processor. Configure desktop three on AMDWS with common tactical picture (CTP). Configure desktop four on AMDWS with user’s preference, such as Windows NT, Microsoft Office, or SUN Office Tools. Ensure system is configured to interface with the following: WAVE, RAID, TASS, AFATDS, and UAS common ground station.

Perform AMDWS Map Generation

3-60. The C-RAM Sense and Warn NCOs generate an operational map using the defense planner or joint mapping tool kit (JMTK) software application. NCOs conduct planning or current operations on the AMDWS by performing Table 3-17.

Table 3-17. Map generation

Operational Map

Start up the defense planner in the AMDWS. Generate AMDWS maps from the defense planner or generate AMDWS maps. Create a new map tab. Zoom in on the selected map area. Configure map settings. Conduct planning or current operations on the AMDWS.

Establish the AMDWS Situational Display

3-61. The C-RAM Sense and Warn NCOs receive air tracks from live or simulated external sources, then open the correct mission in the defense planner and display the current air picture and situational display by performing the steps shown in Table 3-18.

Table 3-18. Situational display

Displaying the Situation

Start up the defense planner software application. Open an existing exercise, mission, and deployment. Display the current air picture. Relay the track information to other AMDWS in the network. Relay the track information to the other systems on the network, WAVE, RAID, TASS, AFATDS, and UAS common ground station.

Integrate the AMDWS into the TOC or BDOC Network

3-62. The C-RAM Sense and Warn NCOs integrate the AMDWS into the TOC LAN and configure the equipment for operation by performing the steps shown in Table 3-19.

Table 3-19. TOC network

Network the AMDWS

Verify that the ABCS server maneuver control system workstation is operational. Verify that the sustainment operations control system is up and operational. Configure the AMDWS into the LAN. Perform synchronization with global positioning system time. Deactivate the network group definition.

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Verify LAN configuration settings. Reactivate the network group definition settings. Perform node initialization procedures. Perform external data interface configuration procedures with the following systems: WAVE, RAID, TASS, AFATDS, and UAS common ground station. Verify air picture is being sent by FAAD.

Perform Dual LAN Interface Procedures on the AMDWS

3-63. The C-RAM Sense and Warn NCOs configure the AMDWS to operate within a dual LAN interface by performing the steps as shown in Table 3-20.

Table 3-20. Dual LAN procedures

Dual Networking Procedures

Inspect all LAN connections ensuring connectivity.

Configure the AMDWS to run either single or dual LAN.

Set network group definition; activate network group definition.

Power Up the AMDWS

3-64. The C-RAM Sense and Warn NCOs install the AMDWS on the LAN and configure it to operate as a client in the network architecture by performing Table 3-21.

Table 3-21. Power-up

Client Configuration

Conduct initial exterior checks of the high-capacity computer front, rear, and monitor. Boot up the AMDWS central processing unit (CPU). Boot up the high-capacity computer to operate as a client. Log in as user and prepare the system to initialize the AMDWS and CTP-related software.

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Chapter 3

React to RAM Alerts on the Battlefield Situation Display

3-65. The C-RAM Sense and Warn NCO or FAAD operator read and clear RAM track alerts in the order they are received. This provides the TOC/BDOC battle captain and FOB commander with a constant SA of the IDF picture. Perform the steps in Table 3-22.

Table 3-22. Alerts

Displaying Tracks

Select F2 (single track) variable function key (VFK). Select F1 (track clear) VFK. Repeat step 2 for each track alert until all track alerts are cleared. Select F2 (other clear) VFK to clear other alerts, as required. Select USER SYSTEM TOP VFK to return to top level.

Monitor Early Warning Data

3-66. The C-RAM Sense and Warn Section receives EW data on the FAAD. The EW system operator will monitor and interact with EW data as shown in Table 3-23.

Table 3-23. EW data

Early Warning System Operator Actions

Display RAM tracks on the AMDWS. Monitor friendly platforms based on speed, heading, and local airspace management procedures and controls. Transmit changes in C-RAM equipment status to the battle captain. The C-RAM EO section will process, evaluate, and disseminate EW over WAVES and evaluate and correlate RAM tracks. The Sense and Warn NCO will inform the FOB personnel when pending tracks cross an established threshold. The C-RAM Sense and Warn Section will receive and disseminate information to their platoon CP, report and receive C-RAM status updates.

Generate or Modify Control Measures on the Battlefield Situation Display

3-67. The C-RAM FAAD operator generates or modifies selected control measures to reflect changing conditions, or movement to a new site, by performing the steps in Table 3-24.

Table 3-24. Battlefield display

Selecting Control Measures

Press F10 (MESSAGE) VFK. Press F10 (CONTROL MEASURE) VFK. Select desired control measures per commander’s guidance. Enter required parameters at the prompts to generate control measures. Press USER SYSTEM TOP VFK to return to top level.

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Perform AMDWS Overlay Functions Using the Defense Planner

3-68. The C-RAM AMDWS operator displays the correct overlays on the mission map by entering the required information and coordinates, using the defense planner, by performing the steps in Table 3-25.

Table 3-25. Overlay functions

Using the Defense Planner

Start up the defense planner in the AMDWS. Create a new exercise/mission or open an existing exercise/mission. Create a new sensor/weapon/control measure deployment or modify current deployment. Save a deployment (overlay) using approved naming convention. Open an existing deployment (overlay) created in the defense planner. Send a deployment (overlay) created in the defense planner to another AMDWS. Retrieve a deployment (overlay) sent from another AMDWS.

Perform AFATDS Data Distribution

3-69. The C-RAM NCOs distribute data to AFATDS by performing the steps in Table 3-26.

Table 3-26. Data distribution

Plan Manager Tool

Initialize plan manager tool. Send data to plan manager tool. Perform plan package operations in plan manager tool. Close plan manager tool.

Conduct Terrain Evaluation using the Applications Program

3-70. The C-RAM NCOs evaluate the terrain by using CTP mapping tools and digital terrain evaluation data information, per the commander’s guidance, by performing the steps in Table 3-27.

Table 3-27. CTP Application program

Terrain Evaluation

Prepare digital terrain evaluation data link. Perform direct and indirect weapon fire range fan operations. Perform line-of-sight radio profile operations. Perform observation point operations. Display terrain analysis on embedded range fans.

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Chapter 3

Create a Plan or Order

3-71. The C-RAM NCOs write an operation plan (OPLAN), OPORD, FRAGO, WARNO or ANNEX A, and task organization by performing the steps in Table 3-28.

Table 3-28. Create a plan or order

Plan Development

Create a new OPLAN, OPORD, FRAGO, or WARNO. Copy information from the current OPLAN into a new OPLAN, OPORD, FRAGO, or WARNO. Add annexes. Add task organization to OPLAN ANNEX A. Authenticate OPLAN. Save OPLAN. Close OPLAN/OPORD tool.

LCMR OPERATOR/MAINTAINER

3-72. The LCMR operator/maintainer responsibilities include emplacement, connecting all hardware, limited troubleshooting to allow for normal operations, and march-order. During operations, the operator monitors software for malfunctions and takes corrective actions as necessary.

WAVES OPERATOR/MAINTAINER

3-73. The WAVES operator operates the WAVES. The WAVES operator is responsible for installing hardware and software, and for performing operator and preventive maintenance. Once deployed, the WAVES does not require manning. During normal operations, the operator will have to daily boresight the radar and daily check that the radar is level.

C-RAM JOINT INTERCEPT BATTERY MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

MISSION

3-74. The Joint Intercept Battery (JIB), working as part of a joint and combined arms effort, detects incoming rockets and mortars; provides focused early warning; destroys inbound rockets and mortars at prioritized locations, enables counter-IDF shaping, denial, and response actions in order to protect friendly forces and high-value assets, ensures mission continuity, and helps to kill or capture enemy IDF teams and seize their caches.

BATTERY STRUCTURE

3-75. A C-RAM JIB (Figure 3-12) consists of a Battery Headquarters, a Field Maintenance Section, an LPWS System Maintenance Section, an Engagement Operations Cell (EOC) Platoon, a Sense and Warn Section, a Sentinel Section, and three LPWS Interceptor Platoons.

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System of Systems Description and Organizational Construct Figure 3-12. C-RAM Joint Intercept Battery M ANNING C

Figure 3-12. C-RAM Joint Intercept Battery

MANNING CREWS

EOC Platoon

3-76. The EOC has the responsibility for the overall emplacement, operations, and maintenance of the engagement operation workstation (EOWS) and AMDWS systems. Manning consists of four personnel:

one commissioned officer or senior NCO (battle captain), one NCO (battle NCO), one FAAD/AMDWS operator, and one RCS operator. The battle captain and battle NCO are responsible for clearance of airspace and for controlling the fires of the weapon systems.

3-77. The battle captain is responsible for the following:

Coordinates and controls all actions of the various crews on shift.

Monitors C-RAM actions of the engagement crews.

Monitors C-RAM unit operational status and communications among all operational units that have the ability to influence intercept operations directly, or by monitoring communications broadcast between the EOC, BDOC liaison officer (LNO), and operational units.

Acknowledges RAM launch notifications.

Acknowledges airspace "All Clear" from FAAD operator.

Visually identifies track through LPWS FLIR when the situation permits.

Issues the fire control order to the weapons controller (fire permit, hold fire, break engagement).

Receives the engagement summary report from system operators.

Sends the engagement summary report to the BDOC LNO.

3-78. The battle NCO is responsible for the following:

Operates the AMDWS if needed.

Assists the battle captain in duties.

Acknowledges launch alerts.

Broadcasts the RAM launch alert over the air defense net.

Verifies airspace "All Clear" on displays.

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Verifies

that

FAAD/RCS

engagement sequence.

operators

perform

friendly

protect

operations

throughout

the

Verifies that the tracks meet the hostile identification criteria.

Verifies that the current weapon control status allows engagement.

Verifies that the track is following established airspace control measures (ACMs).

Verifies intercept airspace is clear of friendly assets.

Visually identifies track through LPWS FLIR when the situation permits.

Verifies that the battle captain issues appropriate fire control orders.

Sends ammunition count and engagement reports to the battle captain and BDOC LNO.

Performs other duties as assigned.

3-79. The FAAD/AMDWS operator is responsible for the following:

Primary to establish, integrate, and maintain all of the C-RAM voice and data communications network’s architecture.

Emplaces and initializes the EOWS.

Emplaces, sets up, and connects necessary computers and radios, and performs limited troubleshooting to allow for normal operation of the AMDWS.

Acknowledges RAM launch.

Acknowledges that the track is on local sensors.

Declares ―Airspace clear‖ or ―Airspace foul‖ based on ACMs, no fire sectors, and RAM flight profile.

Acknowledges fire control order from the engagement authority (battle captain).

Executes the fire control order.

Monitors the engagement and sends the engagement report to the battle captain.

Monitors airspace, all subsystems, and for sending fire permit to all LPWS when ordered.

Performs power-up procedures, system initialization, database configuration, and integration of all communications equipment and workstations.

Produces, displays, and disseminates aviation templates, overlays, and airspace management.

Oversees the network and automation management, information security and connectivity, the LAN wide area network, mobile subscriber equipment (when available), Joint Tactical Information Distribution System, and the joint data network.

Coordinates and works closely with the signal company (if available) to monitor network performance and database configuration.

Plans system reconfigurations caused by changes in the tactical situation, communications connectivity, and system initialization.

Ensures that C-RAM command, control, and communications remain constantly operational.

Performs other duties as assigned.

3-80. The RCS operators are located in the EOC and are responsible for receiving and providing system and situational updates to ensure timely engagements, and for monitoring weapons systems status. The operators must continually validate all tracks on the system monitors, as well as visually use the FLIR.

Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System Crew

WSS, RCS SO, and EOWS WCO

3-81. The weapons system specialist (WSS) is responsible for the following:

3-28

Emplaces the LPWS.

Reloads the LPWS.

Conducts maintenance on the LPWS.

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Sets the firing cutout switches on the LPWS.

Mans the LCC and releases hold-fire during RAM engagements.

Performs other duties as assigned.

Sense and Warn Team

3-82. The BDOC crewmember is responsible for all integration to the FOB BDOC, establishment and integration of the LAN, wide area network, and an external multi-tactical digital information link network with joint, multinational, allied forces, subordinate and adjacent units, and higher headquarters for planning and conducting operations. The following links are established when available: WAVES, RAID, TASS, hostile artillery locating (HALO) (system), Unattended Transient Acoustic Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) System (UTAMS), AFATDS, and the UAS common ground station. The AMD BDOC crewmember participates in, and provides input to, the BDOC staff’s parallel and collaborative IPOE and ISR efforts, MDMP, common operational picture (COP), targeting process, and rehearsals. The BDOC crewmember synchronizes C-RAM in support of BDOC operations. The BDOC crewmember gives the C-RAM battle update briefs and oversees the production, display, and dissemination of C-RAM templates, overlays, and graphics. The BDOC crew conducts predictive analysis on all C-RAM operations within the OA, makes recommendations, and keeps the FOB, BDOC, and commander informed of significant activities.

Sentinel Section

3-83. The Sentinel section is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the Sentinel radar organic to the JIB. These Sentinel radars provide the EOC with situational awareness of friendly aircraft and provides real time, automated friendly-protect data to the FAAD for generation on dynamic non-engagement sector for the LPWS assigned to the battery. The section ensures that the Sentinel radars are properly emplaced and configured, and monitors system performance to ensure the radars are properly contributing to the accomplishment of the unit mission.

WAVES operator/maintainers

3-84. The WAVES operator/maintainer is responsible for the following:

Performs routine maintenance of the WAVES towers and indoor units, solar panels, and system electronic components.

Conducts the local system and audio checks, and coordinates with the EOC and BDOC for end- to-end function checks.

Performs emplacement and march-order of all WAVES components.

Monitors radio frequency (RF) connectivity between WAVES units, adjusting as necessary for degraded components or local interference.

Assists the section sergeant and battery commander with monitoring changes in the disposition of troops and facilities in the protected area.

Adjusts locations of warning systems or requests additional warning units.

Performs configuration and maintenance of the Integrated Broadcast System (IBS) and alternate IBS.

Raid Operators

3-85. Raid operators are responsible for the following:

Operate and maintain the workstation, camera, and tower.

Obtain named area of interest information from the supported unit S-2 and update the workstation display screen.

Conduct surveillance of IDF named areas of interest, alerting the battle captain upon detection of an IDF crew.

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Obtain the current PIR from the supported unit S-2 and immediately report information of any intelligence value to the S-2 and the battle captain.

Participate in the IDF battle drill by searching the grid for the suspected POO. Where equipped, multiple RAID cameras will refine auto-slew operations by defining a slewing section.

Assist with positive identification of IDF crews and act as an FO for counter-fire/response actions.

The Sense and Warn Section is required to operate the RAID system in the BDOC.

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Chapter 4

C-RAM Unit Planning, Operations, and Sustainment

This chapter describes where and how the C-RAM unit will locate on the battlefield. It discusses the command and control functional organization. This chapter also describes the operational environment awareness as the key enabler of the TOC/BDOC’s ability to command operations in real time. Also discussed are the base defense plan and the network architecture, which is key in providing personnel time for protection from enemy RAM attacks.

C-RAM INTEGRATION WITH SUPPORTED JOINT AND ARMY UNITS

4-1.

Supported Joint and Army commanders are responsible for the following:

TENANT UNIT COMMANDERS

Participate in the preparation of base defense plans

Provide staffing and operating base defense facilities in their areas according to base defense plans.

Conduct individual and unit training to ensure readiness for assigned defense tasks.

Provide their share of facilities, equipment, and personnel for the BDOC and, when appropriate, for the air defense operations center (ADOC).

Advise the base commander on defense matters specific to their units.

Provide for their internal security.

Provide their requirements for common-user communications systems to the base commander’s communications.

SECURITY FORCE COMMANDERS

Act as the first line of defense against hostile acts.

Direct access to the following products:

Intelligence assets.

Language specialists.

Cultural specialists.

Counterintelligence.

Signal intelligence.

Imagery intelligence.

Measurements and signatures intelligence.

Defensive information operations.

Open source intelligence.

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RESPONSE FORCE COMMANDERS

Serve as a mobile force designated to defeat Level II threats.

May be put under the tactical control of commanders of threatened bases.

May be assigned their own OA, where they will coordinate with base defense forces within the OA under a common superior.

Plan and rehearse response force operations within the OA.

TACTICAL COMBAT FORCE COMMANDERS

Serve as a mobile force to defeat Level III threats.

Coordinate with component commanders, area commanders, and Host Nation commanders.

Conduct training exercises and rehearsals to ensure that C 2 procedures are effective.

CONTINUOUS ASSESSMENT

4-2. Continuous assessment is the real or near-real-time machine-to-machine exchange of information between sensors, C 2 systems, and shooters. This machine-to-machine capability enables the operational staff to maintain timely and accurate operational environment SA. Additionally, machine-to-machine connectivity allows for parallel processing of required C 2 functions to expedite the timelines required to interdict or intercept enemy RAM attacks.

HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION

4-3. Horizontal and vertical integration is the seamless linkage of internal TOC/BDOC functional areas and external organizations (at the subordinate, local, or higher levels of command) to conduct parallel processing of time-critical C 2 responsibilities. Well-executed horizontal and vertical integration combine to increase operational effectiveness and efficiency.

4-4.

(RE). Each of these phases is explained in detail in the following paragraphs.

These phases are proactive engagement (PRE), defensive engagement (DE), and reactive engagement

Proactive Engagement C 2 Activities

4-5. PRE is the process whereby intelligence and operational assets such as UASs, radars, acoustic sensing devices, and electro-optical/infrared (both ground and airborne) are used to find, fix, and track potential targets operating around U.S./multinational installations. All operational environment awareness information is selectively available 24/7 on a computer client to the C 2 operational staff, and personnel supporting ground-based DE systems. Once a potential target is identified, intelligence personnel determines and distributes precise target coordinates to the C 2 operational staff. The C 2 operational staff determines the presence of protected and restricted targets, as well as friendly air and ground forces, in or around the immediate target area. To ensure proper identification of the target as hostile, the C 2 operational staff may request additional sensors (such as UASs) be placed in a position to affect continued surveillance of the target. During this process, the C 2 operational staff determines the appropriate weapon (ground or air) to employ for target engagement to minimize collateral damage while achieving the required effect during target engagement. Once the target is identified as hostile, the TOC/base commander is the only person who can order target engagement. Once the engagement order is released and the actual engagement is conducted, the C 2 staff conducts a post strike assessment review to determine if the target was destroyed or if re-attack will be required. At any time during this process the commander may determine to issue a base-wide or selective warning of a possible enemy attack.

Defensive Engagement C 2 Activities

4-6. DE is the single most challenging time-sensitive engagement to which the TOC/base commander must react. The worst-case engagement timeline for this type of target is approximately 11 seconds. During

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this period, the C 2 system must be able to display in real time the actual launch point, anticipated trajectory, and project impact point of enemy rocket, artillery, and/or mortar fire. To expedite the engagement process, the C 2 system must be able to propagate free fire, no fire, and airspace measures to all elements of the C 2 network (including sensors and shooters) to avoid or eliminate fratricide events. Engagement authorization within defined free fire areas is delegated to the appropriate firing unit. If a firing unit must fire into a no fire or controlled airspace zone, authorization to fire must be obtained from the establishing unit headquarters via the TOC/base commander prior to engagement. Once a launch is detected and the projected impact point determined, the C 2 system automatically notifies the entire or selected portions of the installation/base. The C 2 system also provides the capability to notify simultaneously first responders to expedite the flow of emergency personnel to the affected area.

Reactive Engagement C 2 Activities

4-7. Forensic engagement begins within seconds of detecting incoming enemy RAM fire. Once an incoming projectile is detected and a launch point determined, TOC/BDOC personnel request and ensure that appropriate sensors be focused on that point to determine if enemy personnel are still in the immediate vicinity. If enemy personnel are still in the target area, TOC/BDOC personnel determine if there is adequate time to coordinate an immediate attack against that position.

4-8. If enemy personnel have left the immediate launch area but can still be positively identified, then surveillance assets are used to track subject personnel. Once it has been determined that the enemy is at an area or location that can be attacked, intelligence personnel determine and distribute precise target coordinates to the C 2 operational staff. The C 2 operational staff determines the presence of protected and restricted targets as well as friendly air and ground forces in or around the immediate target area. To ensure proper identification of the target as hostile, the C 2 operational staff may request additional sensors, such as UASs, be placed in a position to continue surveillance of the target. During this process, the C 2 operational staff determines the appropriate weapon (ground or air) to employ for target engagement to minimize collateral damage while achieving the required effect during target engagement. Once the target is identified as hostile, the TOC/base commander is the only person who can order target engagement. Once the engagement order is released, and the actual engagement is conducted, the C 2 staff conducts a post strike assessment review to determine if the target was destroyed or if re-attack is required. At any time during this process, the commander may determine to issue a base-wide or selective warning of a possible enemy attack.

COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION

4-9. The command and control element for C-RAM operations will be either the BDOC or the TOC if the site does not have a BDOC. This center should have the ability to directly view the status of and request U.S. and multinational weapons to include indirect and direct fire weapons, rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft and other ISR support in order to defeat enemy IDF. This C 2 node also includes access to and display of sensor information. If tasking of sensors is necessary to support the C-RAM mission, coordination must be accomplished through the TOC or BDOC to the owning units, as required. Additionally, C-RAM personnel must be part of the planning, decision making, and execution processes within the TOC or BDOC. The TOC/BDOC is the C 2 element for C-RAM operations. This includes the ability to directly view the status of and task U.S./multinational weapons to include indirect and direct fire weapons, rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, and special operations forces that may be employed to defend U.S./multinational bases against enemy RAM attacks. This C 2 node also includes access to and display of sensor information to include the authority to task and re-task sensors when required. All sensor, C 2 , and shooter information in the TOC/BDOC is available to all operators on a computer client. Additionally, the TOC/BDOC must be functionally configured, manned, and equipped to enable parallel planning, decision making, and execution of the find, fix, target, track, engage, and assess operations required to defeat the RAM threat.

4-10. The TOC/BDOC is responsible for coordinating other base support actions to include medical evacuation teams, firefighting units, and other first responders in the event of RAM impact within the installation/base perimeter.

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Chapter 4

C-RAM THEATER LIAISON OFFICER

4-11. The C-RAM theater LNO is responsible for establishing a staff organization composed of all affected services and multinational partners with on-going operational activities at the subject installation/base. The C-RAM theater LNO and his staff are responsible for the planning, coordination, and execution of all required operations to effectively carry out C-RAM base defense activities for the commander. The commander requires a C 2 system that supports the find, fix, track, and target, engage, and assess functions of joint C 2 to execute the C-RAM responsibilities. To effectively support sense, warn, and intercept functions at U.S./multinational installations/bases, an integrated C 2 system must be employed which provides timely operational environment awareness; continuous assessment; and horizontal/vertical coordination within, and external to, the TOC/BDOC.

4-12. The synchronization of the many systems and procedures from the seven functional areas enables the FOB decision makers to have SA which improves their ability to make time-sensitive decisions.

4-13. An information network must be developed for all the C-RAM functions to attain maximum effectiveness. It is the method by which operational forces will develop the requisite SA needed to develop and gain battlefield dominance. The information network will provide the C 2 capability required to execute planning and the ability to execute all aspects of the C-RAM mission rapidly. It should support BDOCs and the rapid integration, correlation, and assessment of data from multiple sources. This enables immediate decision, warning, intercept, and attack/counterstrike actions.

C-RAM PLANNING

4-14. Identify Key Assets. Planners must identify and list key assets for consideration as part of the risk analysis. Key assets can be located both inside and outside the perimeter. Critical infrastructure may be located outside the physical confines of the perimeter and not under the commander’s control. Locations in and of themselves are not normally considered key assets. However, a location can be used to identify a key asset. A high concentration of personnel in that location could cause the dining facility to be identified as a key asset.

4-15. At a minimum, the key asset list should include

Personnel (military and civilian).

Mission-essential personnel.

General population.

Property (essential to the mission or high in monetary or symbolic value).

Equipment.

Materiel.

Infrastructure.

Facilities/buildings.

IPOE, INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE, AND THE MDMP

4-16. The C-RAM MDMP can begin with the receipt of a mission from a higher headquarters; or by a headquarter’s anticipation of a new mission based on SA and the commander’s intent. Commanders and staff receive and post the most recent friendly and enemy information, in continuous refinement of the COP.

4-17. Based on the threat analysis and defense plan, the EOC reviews the RAM capability, considering the commander’s intent. When the resultant level of protection is inadequate to satisfy the commander’s intent, the EOC designs various augmentation plans that provide adequate force protection to the FOB. The defense accommodates all projected operations, branches, and sequels. The plans must consider increased logistical support and deployment timelines. At the conclusion of this design process, the EOC war games the various plans and recommends COAs to the commander.

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4-18. The analysis of a mission and the subsequent planning are conducted in parallel. The mission statement of the headquarters is posted on the information network, which is a WARNO designed to ensure understanding of the mission and the commander’s guidance for action. Parallel and collaborative planning continues among the staff on the net, updating and ensuring SA is a continuous process that provides the environment for all other actions within the decision-making process.

4-19. The established architecture allows the C-RAM section to concentrate on a scheme of maneuver that best accomplishes the mission at hand. The BDOC staff conducts integrated staff planning and prepares running estimates in support of the MDMP. It coordinates vertically and horizontally to ensure synchronization of defense; in support of the planning; by analyzing the mission and by defining the battlefield environment. BDOC personnel analyze the command’s OA and operational environment, and identify areas of influence/interest from a C-RAM perspective. They identify both specified and implied essential tasks applicable to the force, review availability of assets for mission planning, and analyze threat factors bearing on the operational environment by providing the information in Table 4-1.

Table 4-1. Threat factors

Tactical Considerations

Locations of RAM launch sites. Range, altitude, and capabilities of threats in the OA. Flight profiles, capabilities, and aspects of the threats outside of the OA that may impact on operations. All critical facts, assumptions, constraints, and limitations associated with or impacting operations. A list of identified assets that may require dedicated protection. Assessment of required detail within the time available for IPOE; determining and submitting initial CCIR, identifying intelligence gaps, and submitting requests for information to the S-2.

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND THE COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE

4-20. Good planning begins with good SA. The shared local COP provides the backbone for SA. The use of shared databases and virtual collaboration to build the COP gives the commander and staff the ability to study the enemy and friendly situations in real time. This sharing of information, to build a COP, streamlines planning and optimizes execution of tactical operations. The COP may look the same at all levels, but its use differs with the level of command and the scope of the operation.

4-21. To build the local COP, the C-RAM section displays the current OA ground and air SA displays, tactical charts, and situation map. It defines the map area to a particular scale, zoom, and center to launch the local COP, and populates the AMDWS with the current C-RAM battlefield graphics. It establishes chart tabs containing active overlays created by various staff sections according to the SOP. It also sets the CP picture and function to automatically populate the AMDWS with the current ―Blue Feed‖ or ―Blue Agent‖ friendly unit status input from the maneuver control system, using Force XXI battle commandbrigade and below (FBCB 2 ). The AMDWS sets the CP picture and overlay situation map function to populate the AMDWS automatically with the current live ―Red Feed‖ from the All Source Analysis System (ASAS). It establishes a CP filter and unit long name to distinguish between live Blue Feed and ―Blue Agent.‖

4-22. Live feeds are displayed per the filtering procedures in the TSOP with mission-specific requirements. Settings for friendly (Blue Feed) data must be set for the current operation. Live Blue Feed displays all platforms with functioning FBCB 2 systems as individual icons. Filter settings declutter platform data to collective unit locations with a default update. The collective unit data must be set for the current situation to optimize performance of the maneuver control system. ASAS and S-2 sections at each echelon correlate enemy (Red) unit data.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AWARENESS

4-23. Operational environment awareness provides an accurate picture of friendly and enemy operations within an area of interest and is the key enabler of the TOC/BDOC’s ability to command operations in real time. It also provides the capability to view and monitor threats and potential targets giving TOC/BDOC C 2

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Chapter 4

personnel the ability to direct and/or redirect strike, intercept, and ISR assets during and prior to execution. Key data and information links (at a minimum) will include local, in-theater, and national level sensors, tactical data links, and messaging to provide relevant information required for timely and accurate execution. Operational environment awareness combines information from air, surface, ground, near space and space assets to provide a four-dimensional view of the operational environment. Sensor and data fusion displayed within the C 2 picture plays an important role in validating targets and eliminating ambiguous information. The information provided under the umbrella of operational environment awareness must be shared throughout the TOC/BDOC and other supporting organizations.

4-24. By developing and distributing a common view of the operational environment, TOC/BDOC C 2 personnel are able to monitor enemy actions and reactions, identify potential threats, determine potential impact on friendly forces/operations, and rapidly inform/warn base personnel of impending/on-going enemy actions.

4-25. During execution, each TOC/BDOC C 2 functional area continuously monitors changes in the operational environment, thus enabling them to assemble the information needed to command and control the fight, and to answer the commander’s question, ―What is the enemy doing and what options/capabilities do we have to counter his actions?‖ Parallel coordination among TOC/BDOC functional areas and between external organizations is essential for timely proactive execution. As unexpected or time-critical events unfold which affect installation/base personnel and/or operations, C 2 personnel assess impacts on their own functional area, level of reporting required, and then develop options for the decision maker. Options must be derived rapidly and communicated horizontally and vertically. Continuous review and assessment of operational environment awareness data often reveals a ―trigger event,‖ which can be used to preempt possible enemy actions.

BATTLEFIELD LOCATION AND EMPLACEMENT

4-26. The C-RAM unit follows standard convoy procedures to and from its location. For detailed guidance on conducting convoy operations, see the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbooks 03-6 and 04-5, and FM 4-01.45.

4-27. Once convoy procedures are completed, C-RAM begins the emplacement and integration process. The C-RAM section integrates with the BDOC to provide the base commander and staff local airspace and RAM information. The C-RAM section should be linked to the BDOC. The airspace control authority establishes and publishes air routes, air tasking orders, special instructions, and flight times for friendly protect and SA. This links all the airspace users for immediate airspace management and synchronization.

4-28. The FAAD will be linked into the WAVES system providing EW to the OA through confirmation or correlation of available RAM sensors. The AMDWS and FAAD systems display the local air picture in the BDOC.

4-29. The employment of the C-RAM unit is based on the commander’s defended asset list, METT-TC, the intercept timeline, threat TTPs, and C-RAM capabilities. Placement of the weapon systems must maximize coverage and limit potential collateral damage of surrounding areas when possible.

4-30. The C-RAM section ensures connectivity to all sensors and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C 4 I) assets available. These include the following systems: WAVES, RAID, TASS, HALO, UTAMS, AFATDS, and UAS common ground station when available.

SENSE AND WARN EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Sensor Employment Plan

4-31. Numerous sensors can collect both actionable information (for immediate response) and gather intelligence for analysis and future use. The family of Firefinder radars (Q36, Q37, and Q46) and the LCMR (Q-48) are the primary indirect fire sensors. These systems can provide reactive targeting data

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(locations) for attack by a variety of responders (counter-fire, maneuver forces [ground or air], Air Force or other attack aircraft, et cetera).

4-32. Acoustic sensors can complement the counter-fire radars. Numerous other sensor platforms or attack platforms, to include UASs, Army helicopters, Air Force or Marine fixed-wing aircraft, and other systems such as Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), provide actionable information. Ground-based sensor systemssuch as RAIDs/Man-Portable Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar System (MSTARS)/wide-area surveillance thermal imager (WSTI)/long-range thermal imaging (LRTI), et ceteraprovide actionable information for use against threat IDF. This includes aerostat-mounted systems.

4-33. The goal of C-RAM is to use every available sensor and attack platforms to assist in the defeat of threat IDF capabilities.

LIGHTWEIGHT COUNTER-MORTAR RADAR EMPLACEMENT

4-34. Ideally, the LCMR should be emplaced on a hill, rooftop, or flat plain. Performance is degraded when placed near obstructions such as buildings, trees, or vehicles. The important thing to remember is if you cannot see through it, neither can the radar (see Figure 4-1).

see through it, neither can the radar (see Figure 4-1). Figure 4-1. LCMR site location 4-35.

Figure 4-1. LCMR site location

4-35. When LCMRs are emplaced, all sectors facing other radars should be turned off to avoid interference. The radars should be emplaced no closer than 1,000 meters apart, and operating frequencies should be separated as much as possible (see Figure 4-2).

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Chapter 4

Chapter 4 Figure 4-2. Multiple LCMR emplacement S ENTINEL E MPLACEMENT 4-36. The Sentinel radar should

Figure 4-2. Multiple LCMR emplacement

SENTINEL EMPLACEMENT

4-36. The Sentinel radar should be emplaced according to guidelines established in FMs 3-01.11 and 3-

01.48.

LPWS EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Gun System Emplacement

4-37. The gun systems should be emplaced inside the perimeter no closer than 500 meters from the perimeter when possible. Gun system emplacement requires relatively flat (±5-percent slope) on hard- packed ground or pad. Each firing system requires a 25-meter area for emplacement because of automatic slewing and the concussion of firing. It also requires a posted ground safety area (keep out area) of 90 meters around each component of the system. During emplacement, the unit will perform gun system mapping to ensure all buildings and no coverage areas are in the ―no fire zone.‖ See Appendix A for firing zone cutout procedures.

4-38. Many emplacement options are available for commanders, based on AMD employment guidelines. The LPWS is a self-defense weapon system that is suitable for protecting assets positioned within the defended asset area of the weapon system. However, because of its limited footprint, the system is not suitable as an area defense weapon system. Therefore, balanced fires, weighted coverage, early engagement, and defense in depth will not be covered in this manual.

4-39. It may become desirable in some situations to emplace the gun system into a prepared survivability position. Should this occur, refer to FM 5-103 and coordinate with the staff engineer to facilitate the accomplishment of this action. If an OPLAN or OPORD calls for the emplacement of C-RAM into a base camp, this will require special coordination.

BASE DEFENSE PLAN

4-40. All artillery sensors detect indirect fires and can be employed to provide complimentary coverage. Coordination should be conducted with the senior artillery officer or his designated representative, who has

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positioning responsibility. The following list of factors should be considered in the emplacement of the sensors:

Radar placement.

Frequency deconfliction.

Indirect fire threat.

Aspect angle of the threat.

Number of sensors available to the FOB.

FOB structure location in relationship to the search angle of the radar.

Amount of traffic (air or vehicle) in relationship to the search angle of the radar.

Vulnerability of the radar site to indirect or direct fire.

Power constraints of the site.

4-41. The emplacement of the WAVES to protect the FOB is another function of the C-RAM section. The operator develops a detailed plan using the following parameters:

Size of the FOB.

Heavy traffic areas (mess facilities, living quarters, work areas, and shopping areas).

Areas designated as logistical arrival areas or departure points.

Dead space areas.

Heavily defended areas of interest.

Fire support assets and their emplacements must also be coordinated as part of the BDOC planning process. They can encompass the following:

Mortars.

Artillery.

Survey teams.

FOs or FIST.

NETWORK ARCHITECTURE

4-42. The EW network is key in providing personnel time to protect themselves from enemy RAM attacks. The EW network must be dependable and timely. Every effort must be taken to avoid false alarms to prevent complacency in the personnel being warned. All warning alarms must be treated as real to ensure the safety of all personnel. Figure 4-3 shows the EW network. The EW network also cues various other C 2 systems to facilitate the appropriate counter action that the command may deem appropriate, such as counter-fire, UAS, or patrols.

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4-9

Chapter 4

Chapter 4 Figure 4-3. BDOC early warning network 4-43. The C 2 infrastructure provides the C-RAM

Figure 4-3. BDOC early warning network

4-43. The C 2 infrastructure provides the C-RAM C 2 node the ability to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information needed to develop a local COP, in support of the commander’s intent and mission. The C 2 infrastructure provides near- real-time access and a near complete local COP to all commanders, through available information sources. The C 2 infrastructure provides the C-RAM C 2 node and all commanders with the capability to visualize and understand their OA. It provides a shared local COP that displays and tracks friendly aircraft and critical targets, enables the synchronization of lethal and nonlethal means, operates with joint and multinational forces, and recognizes and protects its own forces. Figure 4-4 shows an example of C-RAM data flow.

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of Systems C-RAM Unit Planning, Operations, and Sustainment Figure 4-4. C-RAM data flow WAVES EMPLOYMENT PLAN

Figure 4-4. C-RAM data flow

WAVES EMPLOYMENT PLAN

4-44. The WAVES will be deployed based on the site plan. The site plan should depict the site functional view of the system, overlays, and the RF view of the site. After designing the site plan, develop a graphical representation of the WAVES network and organization. It provides a conceptual map with the location of the units, speakers, antennas, and definitions of RF links. For detailed site plan information, see the WAVES installation and operation manual.

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Chapter 4

C-RAM SENSE AND WARN BATTERY, PLATOON, AND SQUAD OPERATIONS

DEPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT CONCEPT

4-45. The emplacement of the sensors used in the sense and warn concept should be considered the first critical step in FOB defense and should, therefore, be emplaced using the following guidelines:

Indirect fire threat to the FOB.

Limitation of the sensors (range and capabilities).

Structural hazards that are within the sensor’s angle of search.

Environmental hazards (heavy vehicle or air traffic) which could limit the ability of the sensor to detect indirect fires.

4-46. The emplacement of the audio and visual warning devices is critical and includes the following considerations:

Heavy traffic areas where large gathering of Soldiers occur (mess facilities; morale, welfare, and recreation facilities; shopping areas; motor pools; sleeping quarters; and all command and control cells).

Landing zones and drop zones.

Guard mount areas, convoy start or finish points, and observation or tower points.

4-47. The ability to warn Soldiers has been greatly enhanced using a fiber-optic link from the sensor to the C 2 node which generates the warn message. Figure 4-5 demonstrates this capability. The warning is automatically generated from the FAAD after more than two sensors verify the launch of an indirect projectile; a correlated message is then sent to the WAVES, which in turn warns a specific area using an audio and visual message.

4-48. WAVES sends out an automated alarm to the local area (see Figure 4-5.) that may be adjusted to allow 10 to 20 seconds warning prior to impact, enabling troops to assume a protective posture (prone position, bunker, or other measures). The public address function of the WAVES may be used to provide additional messages.

of the WAVES may be used to provide additional messages. Figure 4-5. Example of local warning

Figure 4-5. Example of local warning configuration

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4-49. Complimentary coverage is defined as the use of Firefinder radars (Q36/46, Q37, Q48) and LCMR fans to provide a defensive posture, allowing the FOB to acquire incoming RAM. Once the posture has been established, the sensors, FAAD, and WAVES can be used to warn specific areas of the FOB. The warning system is designed to use the state vector message, containing POO/POI data, from the sensors to the FAAD. The warning is generated automatically once two sensors have generated separate state vector messages with similar POO/POI data and have been verified inside the FAAD. Figure 4-6 displays the network or architecture of the current sense and warn system.

4-50. The architecture in Figure 4-6 depicts the systems involved in the sense and warn system. The sensors and WAVES are linked to the FAAD via fiber-optic cable or microwave radio, although the warning is generated automatically, BDOC personnel must ensure that all systems are working properly. The integration of the AMDWS to the above architecture provides the BDOC with the following functions (Figure 4-7):

SA of real time airspace activity (fixed- and rotary-wing assets).

Correlated and displayed POO/POI.

Ability to overlay graphical coordination tools over the airspace.

Ability to display imagery as a background.

Initiate response.

to display imagery as a background.  Initiate response. Figure 4-6. Sense and warn architecture Publication

Figure 4-6. Sense and warn architecture

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4-13

Chapter 4

Chapter 4 Figure 4-7. AMDWS (addition to architecture) DEGRADED OPERATIONS AAW Manual Mode Operation when in

Figure 4-7. AMDWS (addition to architecture)

DEGRADED OPERATIONS

AAW Manual Mode Operation when in Degraded Operations

4-51. If the fiber-optic link from the FAAD to the LCS is broken, the commander has the option to go to degraded operations. In degraded operations, the engagement decision will be made at the EOC, but firing will be manually initiated from the LCS (see Figures 4-8 and 4-9).

4-52. To enable operations from the LCS, a portable FAAD must be connected via J10, and all operational software must be uploaded for the site. Voice communications must be established with the EOC section when a local air picture from external sensors is not available at the local LPWS. This will ensure a continuation of all friendly protect measures.

4-53. To change from air ready to AAW manual operation, select the AAW MANUAL selection at the LCS mode control menu or the LCP, and note that the associated indicator lights white. Within 5 seconds, the AAW MANUAL indicator should change to green and AIR READY should go out. Thereafter, operation is the same as in AAW AUTO mode, except that the operator must manually initiate firing by pressing and holding the FIRE switch when the RECOMMEND FIRE indicator lights yellow.

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Weapon can fire at any air target not positively identified as friendly. Note: Operators at
Weapon
can
fire
at
any
air
target not
positively identified
as friendly.
Note: Operators at LPWS will not have
situational awareness/situational understanding,
because they will lack complete air picture. They
cannot positively identify target as either hostile
or friendly. For this reason, all engagement
decisions will be made at EO Section or BDOC.

Figure 4-8. Engagement sequence from LPWS during degraded operations

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Chapter 4

Chapter 4 Figure 4-9. Engagement Sequence from EO Section during degraded operations 4-16 ATP 3-01.60 For

Figure 4-9. Engagement Sequence from EO Section during degraded operations

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Chapter 5

Emergency Operating Procedures

This chapter discusses emergency operation procedures for SoS and other fault isolation tests, as well as the setup and operation of all component and maintenance for C-RAM equipment. Also covered are engagement operations, countering interference and jamming, degraded operations, and considerations for potential future split-based operations.

EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES

5-1. Emergency operating procedures include battleshort operations, procedures for handling gun jams and stoppages, and procedures for loss of RCS control. Battleshort operations do not correct faults but may mask fault indications. A system STATUS GO may be achieved even though the system is degraded or nonoperational. Results of system operability tests (SOTs) and fault isolation tests (FITs) are not affected by battleshort operations, and failure indications are valid.

5-2. In a combat situation, when continued engagement capability is essential, the BATTLESHORT switch on the LCP may be pressed to override selected system interlocks. When pressed, the BATTLESHORT indicator lights red. When BATTLESHORT is selected, the following system functions and interlocks are bypassed, allowing system operation to continue if any of the functions should fail or any of the following malfunctions should occur:

Note: A battleshort operation is covered in the LPWS technical manual.

Power Quality MonitorInput power (440-volt, 3-phase) out of tolerance.

LCPstandby not achieved.

Power Supply Group ControlELX power on command (from LCP) not present.

Weapon Group ControlAir ready phase 2 not present.

Mount Servos.

Mount readycommand not present (ARS PWR II not present, or ESEA [2A1] or TSEA [2A4] drawer interlock open).

Mount rate gyro activate (ARS PWR II) not present.

Circuit card interlock open.

Power amplifier thermal overload.

Elevation and train drive motor thermal overload.

Radar-Servos.

Search antenna spin rate outside of normal limits.

STSE (2A9) or RSI (2A11) drawer interlock open.

Transmitter.

Klystron bias voltage low (KBVL).

Modulator power supply regulated voltage sum (MPSRVS) abnormal.

Filament bias overtemperature (FBOT).

Modulator power supply airflow low (MPSAFL).

Crowbar (CB).