RUBEN SERRANO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE, respondents MENDOZA, J.

: This is a Petition seeking review of the resolutions, dated March 30, 1994 and August 26, 1994, of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed petitioner Ruben Serrano's complaint for illegal dismissal and denied his motion for reconsideration. FACTS Petitioner was hired by private respondent Isetann Department Store as a security checker to apprehend shoplifters and prevent pilferage of merchandise. Initially hired on October 4, 1984 on contractual basis, petitioner eventually became a regular employee on April 4, 1985. In 1988, he became head of the Security Checkers Section of private respondent. Sometime in 1991, as a cost-cutting measure, private respondent decided to phase out its entire security section and engage the services of an independent security agency. For this reason, the petitioner was terminated as Security Section Head effective October 11, 1991. The petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter against the private respondent for unfair labor practice/illegal dismissal. Thereafter, the case was heard. On April 30, 1993, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding petitioner to have been illegally dismissed. On the following basis: 1. 2. Private respondent failed to establish that it had retrenched its security section to prevent or minimize losses to its business; Private respondent failed to accord due process to petitioner; Private respondent failed to use reasonable standards in selecting employees whose employment would be terminated; Private respondent had not shown that petitioner and other employees in the security section were so inefficient so as to justify their replacement by a security agency, or that "costsaving devices [such as] secret video cameras (to monitor and prevent shoplifting) and secret code tags on the merchandise" could not have been employed; instead, the day after petitioner's dismissal, private respondent employed a safety and security supervisor with duties and functions similar to those of petitioner.

ISSUES Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioner was legal and valid. Whether or not the right of the petitioner to due process was violated when the employer did not observed the twin notice requirement in terminating him as a Security Section Head. RULING Petitioner Laid Off for Cause. Petitioner's contention has no merit. Art. 283 provides: xxx The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operations of the establishment xxx. The "[management of a company] cannot be denied the faculty of promoting efficiency and attaining economy by a study of what units are essential for its operation. To it belongs the ultimate determination of whether services should be performed by its personnel or contracted to outside agencies . . . [While there] should be mutual consultation, eventually deference is to be paid to what management decides." Consequently, absent proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer. Sanctions for Violations of the Notice Requirement In the case at bar, petitioner was given a notice of termination on October 11, 1991. On the same day, his services were terminated. He was thus denied his right to be given written notice before the termination of his employment, and the question is the appropriate sanction for the violation of petitioner's right. It is now settled that where the dismissal of one employee is in fact for a just and valid cause and is so proven to be but he is not accorded his right to due process, i.e., he was not furnished the twin requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard, the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer must be sanctioned for non-compliance with the requirements of, or for failure to observe, due process. The rule reversed a long standing policy theretofore followed that even though the dismissal is based on a just cause or the termination of employment is for an authorized cause, the dismissal or termination is illegal if effected without notice to the employee. The shift in doctrine took place in 1989 in Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC. The remedy is to order the payment to the employee of full backwages from the time of his dismissal until the court finds that the dismissal was for a just cause. But, otherwise, his dismissal must be upheld and he should not be reinstated. This is because his dismissal is ineffectual. Violation of Notice Requirement Not a Denial of Due Process There are three reasons why, on the other hand, violation by the employer of the notice requirement cannot be considered a denial of due process resulting in the nullity of the employee's dismissal or layoff. The first is that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation on governmental powers. It does not apply to the exercise of private power, such as the termination of employment under the Labor Code. Only the State has authority to take the life, liberty, or property of the individual. The purpose of the Due Process Clause is to ensure that the exercise of this power is consistent with what are considered civilized methods.

3.

4.

Private respondent appealed to the NLRC which, in its resolution of March 30, 1994; reversed the decision of the Labor. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied. The NLRC held that the phase-out of private respondent's security section and the hiring of an independent security agency constituted an exercise by private respondent of [a] legitimate business decision or of a management prerogative. Hence the petitioner raised the case to the Supreme Court contending that the abolition of private respondent's Security Checkers Section and the employment of an independent security agency do not fall under any of the authorized causes for dismissal under Art. 283 of the Labor Code.

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The second reason is that notice and hearing are required under the Due Process Clause before the power of organized society are brought to bear upon the individual. This is obviously not the case of termination of employment under Art. 283. Here the employee is not faced with an aspect of the adversary system. The purpose for requiring a 30-day written notice before an employee is laid off is not to afford him an opportunity to be heard on any charge against him, for there is none. The third reason why the notice requirement under Art. 283 can not be considered a requirement of the Due Process Clause is that the employer cannot really be expected to be entirely an impartial judge of his own cause. . Lack of Notice Only Makes Termination Ineffectual Not all notice requirements are requirements of due process. Some are simply part of a procedure to be followed before a right granted to a party can be exercised. The consequence of the failure either of the employer or the employee to live up to this precept is to make him liable in damages, not to render his act (dismissal or resignation, as the case may be) void. Therefore, with respect to Art. 283 of the Labor Code, the employer's failure to comply with the notice requirement does not constitute a denial of due process but a mere failure to observe a procedure for the termination of employment which makes the termination of employment merely ineffectual. Thus, only if the termination of employment is not for any of the causes provided by law is it illegal and, therefore, the employee should be reinstated and paid backwages The refusal to look beyond the validity of the initial action taken by the employer to terminate employment either for an authorized or just cause can result in an injustice to the employer. For not giving notice and hearing before dismissing an employee, who is otherwise guilty of, say, theft, or even of an attempt against the life of the employer, an employer will be forced to keep in his employ such guilty employee. This is unjust. The Petition is GRANTED in so damages/separation pay is concerned. far as the monetary

unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such farreaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.

HELD: motion for reconsideration denied, motion for new trial granted. Discussion of the Nature of the CIR to emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. Court of Industrial Relations an administrative court - exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees - has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers. In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) Requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. 1. right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. 2. tribunal must consider the evidence presented. 3. have something to support the decision 4. evidence must be "substantial." - such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accepts as adequate to support a conclusion." The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence

ANG TIBAY vs. COURT of INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS Justice Laurel: A motion for reconsideration was filed by the Sol-Gen in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations on the case of National Labor Union Inc. praying that their labor case be remanded to the CIR for a new trial. Petitioner, Ang Tibay has filed an opposition for both the motion for reconsideration of CIR and the motion for a new trial by the National Labor Union. The National Labor Unions case: they alleged that Toribio Teodoro, who dominated the National Workers Brotherhood of Ang Tibay, made a false claim that there was a shortage of leather soles in ANg Tibay that made it necessary for him to lay off workers, however, claim was unsupported by records of the Bureau of Customs & the accounts of native dealers of leather. Such was just a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, inc., from work.

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5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory, such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. 6. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. 8.The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. The court observed that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law. Therefore, in the interest of justice, a new trial should commence giving the movant the opportunity to present new evidence.

1. WON EO 546 and EO 196 are unconstitutional on the ground that the same do not fix a standard for the excercise of the power therein conferred? NO 2. WON the questioned order violates Due process because it was issued without notice to petitioner and without the benefit of a hearing? YES 3. WON the rate reduction is confiscatory in that its implementation would virtually result in a cessation of its opeartions and eventual closure of business? YES Held: 1. NO.

a) Fundamental is the rule that delegationof legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed tha manner of the execise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rarte, its act must be both nonconfiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise , in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just . However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. b) under Sec. 15 EO 546 and Sec. 16 thereof, Respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonamle feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. 2. YES.

PHILCOMSAT vs. ALCUAZ Facts: By virtue of R.A No. 5514, philcomsat was granted a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places the grantee may select, station or stations and or associated equipment and international satellite communications. Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and the ground terminals. The satellite service thus provided by petitioner enable international carriers to serve the public with indispensible communications service Under sec. 5 of RA 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service commission. now respondent NTC Pursuant EO 196 petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction and control and regulation of the respondent NTC Respondent NTC ordered the petitioner to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates September 9, 1987, pending hearing, petitioner filed with the NTC an application to continue operating and maintaining its facilities including a provisional authority to continue to provide the services and the charges it was then charging September 16, 1988 the petitioner was granted a provisional authority and was valid for 6 months, when the provisional authority expired, it was extended for another 6 months. However the NTC directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of 15% on the authorized rates

a)The function involved in the rate fixing power of the NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not quasi legislative; thus hearings are necessary and the abscence thereof results in the violation of due process. b)The Centrak Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribal "In so far sa generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that the notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the excercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where public adminitartive body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whoe rights or property may be affected by the action is entitiled to notice and hearing" c)Even if respondents insist that notice of hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and therefore temporary in nature, it is still mot exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing as well as the requirement o reasonableness. d.) it is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order the be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial wheter the same is made upon a complaint, a summary ivestigation, or upon the comissions own motion. 3. YES

Issues:

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a.) What the petitioner has is a grant or privelege granted by the State and may revoke it at will there is no question in that, however such grant cannot be unilaterally revoked absent a showing that the termination of the opeartion of said utility is required by common good. The rule is that the power of the State to regulate the conduct and business of public utilities is limited by the consideration that it is not the owner of the property of the utility, or clothed with the general power of management incident to ownership, since the private right of ownership to such property remains and is not to be destroyed by the regulatory power. The power to regulate is not the power to destroy useful and harmless enterprises, but is the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interest, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and its patrons. any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringerement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws. b.) A cursory persual of the assailed order reveals that the rate reduction is solely and primarily based on the initial evaluation made on the financial statements of petitioner, contrary to respondent NTC's allegation that it has several other sources. Further more, it did not as much as make an attempt to elaborate on how it arrived at the prescribed rates. It just perfunctorily declared that based on the financial statements, there is merit for a rate reduction without any elucidation on what implifications and conclutions were necessariy inferred by it from said staements. Nor did it deign to explain how the data reflected in the financial statements influenced its decision to impose rate reduction. c.) The challenged order, particularly on the rates proprovide therin, being violative of the due process clause is void and should be nullified. Non v. Dames Nature: this is a petition for certiorari to review the orders of the Reginal Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte. Facts: petitioners were students of private respondents school, Mabini College. In the cse petitioners were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. Petitioners filed a petition in the court a quo seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition and the motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court saying that the students that the students still continued their rally during the resumption of classes even though without any renewal of their permit. It is considered that the students waived their right to readmission signed their enrollment form for the 1 st semester in which the school school has the right to not re-admit students whose conduct discredits the institution. Petioners filed the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. Petitioners claim that they were denied of due process Held: Imposition of sanctions on students requires observance of procedural due process. There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process

2. 3. 4. 5.

They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired. They shall be informed of the evidence against them . They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. Moreover, the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed.

-The school cannot refuse to enroll a student on the simple ground that his contaract expires every end of the semester. Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Par. 137 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which provides that when a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester for collegiate courses. The termination of the contact theory does not even find support in the manual. Par. 137 merely clarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on an installment basis ,i.e. collection and payment of the downpayment upon enrollment and the balance before examinations. Thus, even a student does not complete the semester for which he was enrolled, but has stayed on for more than two weeks, he may be required to pay his tuition fees for the whole semester before he is given his credentials for transfer.

- exclusion of a student for academic deficiency where the real cause of action for doing so is related to possible breach of discipline- staging for mass action and rally-violates tenets of fair play. On the other hand, it does appear that the petitioners were afforded due process, in the manner expressed in Guzaman, before they were refused enrollment. In fact, it would appear from pleading that the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because of failing grades was a mere afterthought. It was denied the what incurred the ire of the school authorities was the student mass actions and which were led and /or participated in by petitioners. Certainy, excluding students because of failing grades when the cause of action taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also constitute a violation tenets of fair play. Petition is granted.

Lumiqued vs. Exevea FACTS: Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.

1.

The students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them.

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ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry? HELD: The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law. . . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a noncriminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side. Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee was cured by Lumiqueds appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration. NOTES: EQUAL PROTECTION Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. Substantive equality is NOT enough, it is also required that the law be enforced and applied equally. Even if the law be fair and impartial on its face, it will still violate equal protection if it is administered with an evil eye and uneven hand, so as to unjustly benefit some and prejudice others. The right to equal protection, basic as it is, sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the three grand departments of the government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivisions thereof, and on many constitutional powers, like the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications. WHO ARE PROTECTED

Equal protection is available to all persons, natural as well as juridical. Artificial persons, however, are entitled to the protection only insofar as their property is concerned.

By constitutional reservation, certain rights are enjoyable only by citizens, such as the rights to vote, hold public office, exploit natural resources, and operate public utilities, although aliens are comprehended in the guaranty. Even ordinary statutes can validly distinguish between citizens and aliens or, for that matter, even between or among citizens only. ATENEO vs. COURT of APPEALS Facts: Carmelita Mateo, a waitress inside the university charged Juan Ramon Guanzon, a boarder and first year student of the university with unbecoming conduct committed on December 12, 1967 at about 5:15 in the evening at the Cervini Hall's cafeteria "Mr. Guanzon, a boarder at Cervini was asking for 'siopao.' I was at the counter and I told him that the 'siopao' had still to be heated and asked him to wait for a while. Then Mr. Guanzon started mumbling bad words directed to me, in the hearing presence of other boarders. I asked him to stop cursing, and he told me that was none of my business. Since he seemed impatient, I was going to give back his money without any contempt. He retorted that he did not like to accept the money. He got madder and started to curse again. Then he threatened to strike me with his fist. I tried to avoid this. But then he actually struck me in my left temple. Before he could strike again, his fellow boarders held him and Dr. Bella and Leyes coaxed him to stop; I got hold of a bottle so I could dodge him. It was then that Fr. Campbell arrived. The incident was hidden from Fr. Campbell by the boarders. I could not tell him myself as I had gone into the kitchen crying because I was hurt." The university conducted an investigation of the slapping incident. Based on the investigation results, Juan Ramon was dismissed from the university. This triggered the filing of a complaint for damages by his parents against the university in the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City. The complaint states that Juan Ramon was expelled from school without giving him a fair trial in violation of his right to due process and that they are prominent and well known residents of Bacolod City, with the unceremonious expulsion of their son causing them actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. In its answer, the university denied the material allegations of the complaint and justified the dismissal of Juan Ramon on the ground that his unbecoming behavior is contrary to good morals, proper decorum, and civility, that such behavior subjected him as a student to the university's disciplinary regulations' action and sanction and that the university has the sole prerogative and authority at any time to drop from the school a student found to be undesirable in order to preserve and maintain its integrity and discipline so indispensable for its existence as an institution of learning. After due trial, the lower court ruled in favor of the Guanzons and ordered the university to pay them P92.00 (actual damages); P50,000.00 (moral damages); P5,000.00 (attorney's fees) and to pay the costs of the suit. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the university, the trial court's decision was initially reversed and set aside. The complaint was dismissed.

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However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the Guanzons, the appellate court reversed its decision and set it aside through a special division of five. In the resolution issued by the appellate court, the lower court's decision was reinstated. The motion for reconsideration had to be referred to a special division of five in view of the failure to reach unanimity on the resolution of the motion, the vote of the regular division having become 2 to 1. The petitioner now asks to review and reverse the resolution of the division of five. Issues: 1. 2. 3. WON Juan Ramon Guanzon was not accorded due process of law WON respondents complaint for recovery of damages was premature because administrative remedies have not yet been exhausted WON private respondents are entitled to damages

When the letter-complaint was read to Juan Ramon, he admitted the altercation with the waitress and his slapping her on the face. Rev. Welsh (Dean of men) did not stop with the admission. He interviewed Eric Tagle, Danny Go, Roberto Beriber, and Jose Reyes, friends of Juan Ramon who were present during the incident. The Board of Discipline was made up of distinguished members of the faculty -Fr. Francisco Perez, Biology Department Chairman; Dr. Amando Capawan, a Chemistry professor; Assistant Dean Piccio of the College; and Dr. Reyes of the same College. There is nothing in the records to cast any doubt on their competence and impartiality insofar as this disciplinary investigation is concerned. Juan Ramon himself appeared before the Board of Discipline. He admitted the slapping incident, then begged to be excused so he could catch the boat for Bacolod City. Juan Ramon, therefore, was given notice of the proceedings; he actually appeared to present his side; the investigating board acted fairly and objectively; and all requisites of administrative due process were met. The claim that there was no due process because the private respondents, the parents of Juan Ramon were not given any notice of the proceedings will also not stand. Juan Ramon, who at the time was 18 years of age, was already a college student, intelligent and mature enough to know his responsibilities. In fact, in the interview with Rev. Welsh, he even asked if he would be expelled because of the incident. He was fully cognizant of the gravity of the offense he committed. When informed about the December 19, 1967 meeting of the Board of Discipline, he was asked to seek advice and assistance from his guardian and or parents. Juan Ramon is assumed to have reported this serious matter to his parents. The fact that he chose to remain silent and did not inform them about his case was not the fault of the petitioner university. Moreover, notwithstanding the non-participation of the private respondents, the university, as stated earlier, undertook a fair and objective investigation of the slapping incident. Due process in administrative proceedings also requires consideration of the evidence presented and the existence of evidence to support the decision (Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 112). Carmelita Mateo was not entirely blameless for what happened to her because she also shouted at Juan Ramon and tried to hit him with a cardboard box top, but this did not justify Juan Ramon's slapping her in the face. The evidence clearly shows that the altercation started with Juan Ramon's utterance of the offensive language "bilat ni bay," an Ilongo phrase which means sex organ of a woman. It was but normal on the part of Mateo to react to the nasty remark. Moreover, Roberto Beriber, a friend of Juan Ramon who was present during the incident told Rev. Welsh during the investigation of the case that Juan Ramon made threatening gestures at Mateo prompting her to pick up a cardboard box top which she threw at Juan Ramon. The incident was in public thus adding to the humiliation of Carmelita Mateo. There was "unbecoming conduct" and pursuant to the Rules of Discipline and Code of Ethics of the university, specifically under the 1967-1969 Catalog containing the rules and academic regulation (Exhibit 19), this offense constituted a ground for dismissal from the college. The action of the petitioner is sanctioned by law. Section 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools recognizes violation of disciplinary regulations as valid ground for refusing re-enrollment of a student (Tangonan v. Pao, 137 SCRA 245). Before Juan Ramon was admitted to enroll, he received (1) the College of Arts and Sciences Handbook containing the general regulations of the school and the 1967-1969 catalog of the College of Arts and Sciences containing the disciplinary rules and academic regulations and (2) a copy of the Rules and Regulations of the CerviniElizo Halls of the petitioner university one of the provisions of which is

Holding: No, he was accorded due process No, complaint was not premature No, there is no basis for recovery of damages Petition granted in favor of Ateneo. CA ruling reversed. Ratio 1. Exceptions to the rule on finality of factual findings of trial courts and administrative agencies The appellate court resolution invoked the rule that findings of facts by administrative officers in matters falling within their competence will not generally be reviewed by the courts, and the principle that findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal. The court does not agree. The statement regarding the finality given to factual findings of trial courts and administrative tribunals is correct as a general principle. However, it is subject to well established exceptions. Factual findings of trial courts are disregarded when - (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded on speculations, surmises, and conjectures; (2) the inferences made are manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) there is a misapprehension of facts; and (5) the court, in arriving at its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of the parties or the evidence presented. A similar rule applies to administrative agencies. By reason of their special knowledge and expertise, we ordinarily accord respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals. However, there are exceptions to this rule and judicial power asserts itself whenever (1) the factual findings are not supported by evidence; (2) where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition, or collusion; (3) where the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; (4) when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest Why he is deemed to have been accorded due process (note: for 9 steps taken by school are enumerated in p. 106-107)

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as follows: under the title "Dining Room" -"The kitchen help and server should always be treated with civility." Miss Mateo was employed as a waitress and precisely because of her service to boarders, not to mention her sex, she deserved more respect and gracious treatment. The petitioner is correct in stating that there was a serious error of law in the appellate court's ruling on due process. 2. The petitioner raises the issue of "exhaustion of administrative remedies" in view of its pending appeal from the decision of the Ministry of Education to the President of the Philippines. It argues that the private respondents' complaint for recovery of damages filed in the lower court was premature. The issue raised in court was whether or not the private respondents can recover damages as a result of the dismissal of their son from the petitioner university. This is a purely legal question and nothing of an administrative nature is to or can be done. The case was brought pursuant to the law on damages provided in the Civil Code. The jurisdiction to try the case belongs to the civil courts. 3. There is no basis for the recovery of damages. Juan Ramon was afforded due process of law. The penalty is based on reasonable rules and regulations applicable to all students guilty of the same offense. He never was out of school. Before the decision could be implemented, Juan Ramon asked for an honorable dismissal which was granted. He then enrolled at the De la Salle University of Bacolod City and later transferred to another Jesuit school. Moreover, his full and complete tuition fees for the second semester were refunded through the representation of Mr. Romeo Guanzon, Juan Ramon's father. There was no bad faith on the part of the university. In fact, the college authorities deferred any undue action until a definitive decision had been rendered. The whole procedure of the disciplinary process was get up to protect the privacy of the student involved. There is absolutely no indication of malice, fraud, and improper or wilful motives or conduct on the part of the Ateneo de Manila University in this case. GOLDBERG vs. KELLY Jack Goldberg, Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York, Appelant V John Kelly et al Facts: The question for decision is whether a State that terminates public assistance payments to a particular recipient without affording him the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to termination denies the recipient procedural due process in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Ammendment

Issue: Held: Ratio:

Procedure No. 68-18: a caseworker sees the recipient and then reports to the unit supervisor to make an official review abt ineligibility and whether or not aid should be stopped. Appellees challenge to this procedure emphasizes the absence of any provisions for the personal appearance of the recipient before the reviewing official, for oral presentation of evidence, and for confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses. However, they are afforded post-termination fair hearing for redress when the can appear personally, offer oral presentation of evidence, and for confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses. If they win, they get what was withheld from them and if not, they can avail of judicial review. District Court found for the complainants and only the Commissioner of Social Services appealed

Whether the due process clause requires that the recipient be afforded an evidentiary hearing before the termination of benefits.

Yes. SC affirmed the decision of the District Court.

Suffice it to say that to cut off a welfare recipient in the face of a brutal need without prior hearing of some sort is unconscionable, unless overwhelming consideration justify it. The need to protect tax revenues is not overwhelming consideration. It does not justify denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards of due process. Due process requires an adequate hearing before termination of welfare benefits Such benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement. The constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argument that public assistance benefits are a privilege and not a right. Due process is influenced by the extent to which one may be condemned to suffer grievous loss and depends upon whether the recipients interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication Consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action. What will serve due process in this case is pre-termination evidentiary hearing

Crucial factor: is that the termination of aid pending resolution may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits (immediately desperate)

Complainants (appellees): NY residents receiving financial aid under the program Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) under NYs Home Relief Program. Their complaint: NYC officials terminated aid without prior notice and hearing thereby denying them due process of law. Prior to the filing of complaints, no prior notice or hearing of any kind was required before termination. The state however adopted procedures for notice and hearing after suits were brought and the plaintiffs challenged the constitutional adequacy of said procedures

Appellants argument: these are outweighed by countervailing governmental interests in conserving fiscal and administrative resources SC: these governmental interests are not overriding in the welfare context Pre-termination hearing need not take the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial trial, just a full administrative review The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner The seven-day notice, the letter, and the personal conference with a caseworker (of above mentioned procedure) are not constitutionally sufficient per se. insufficiency is in not permitting welfare recipients to appear personally before the official who determines eligibility Informal procedures will suffice. In this context, due process does not require a particular order of proof or mode of offering evidence

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Jurisprudence says: where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, evidence used to prove govts case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. This is true not only in crim proceedings but also for admin actions

Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law. Issue: 1) Whether or not Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague 2) Whether or not the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process. 3) Whether or not Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it. Held: In the question whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional. The court held that it is not, As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which the petitioner is alleged to have committed. The court discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms combination and series in the key phrase a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution first if it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid and secondly when, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. In the second issue under Sec. 4 of Rule of Evidence it states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The court answered that Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is to be considered as malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally. It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner. The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.

Dissent of J. Black: Federal judges uses this judicial power for legislative purposes I do not think that the 14th amendment should be given such an unnecessarily broad construction. Court in effect is saying that failure to pay an individual deprives him of his own property. That due process clause forbids any conduct that the majority of the court believes unfair DOES NOT appear anywhere in the due process clause. If they did, they would leave the majority of justices free to hold any conduct unconstitutional that they should conclude on their own to be unfair or shocking to them. If that view of due process is correct, the due process clause could easily swallow up all other parts of the constitution Safety, indicating that their daughter had suffered substantial injuries for which they claim damages amounting to $5000 Petitioner was informed by the director that unless he was covered by a liability insurance policy in effect at the time of the accident, or present a notarized release from liabiltity, plus proof of future financial responsibilities or suffer the suspension of his drivers license. after an administrative hearing, the director rejected the petitoner proffer of evidence on liability. Superir court on the other hand upheld the constitutional contention by the petioner but was later reversed by the Court of appeals. the Georgia CA rejected petitioners contention that the states statutory scheme, in failing before suspending the license to afford him a hearing on the question of his fault or liability. the Clergymans license remained suspended

Issue: WON the Georgia Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibilty Act deny the petitioner due process in violation of the 14th Amendment for the suspension of his license wothout a hearing? YES Held: a) once licenses are issued, as in petitioners case, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involvels state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the license are not to be taken witout that procedural due process required by the Fourth Amendment. b) It is fundamental that except in emergency situations (and this is not one) due process requires that when a state seeks to terminate an interest such as here involved, it must afford "notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.

Estrada vs Sandiganbayan (369 SCRA 342) Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted under an Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness. It dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal

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Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit U.P. vs Ligot Telan (227 SCRA 342) Facts: In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly the University of the People, U.P. administration conceptualized and implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program. After broad consultations with the various university constituencies, U.P. President Jose V. Abueva, the U.P. Board of Regents issued on April 28, 1988 a Resolution establishing the STFAP. A year later, it was granted official recognition when the Congress of the Philippines allocated a portion of the National Budget for the implementation of the program. In the interest of democratizing admission to the State University, all students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits which include reduction in fees, living and book subsidies and student assistantships which give undergraduate students the opportunity to earn P12.00 per hour by working for the University. Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, among others, they state the amount and source of the annual income of the family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from which the University may evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of which they are categorized into brackets. To further insure the integrity of the program, a random sampling scheme of verification of data indicated in a student's application form is undertaken. Among those who applied for STFAP benefits for School Year 1989-90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law. A team composed of Arsenio L. Dona and Jose Carlo Manalo conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal. Ms. Cristeta Packing, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the team submitted a home visit report. Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the report and Nadal's application form. Forthwith, she and Bella M. Villanueva, head of the Office of Scholarships and Student Services, presented the matter to the Diliman Committee on Scholarships and Financial Assistance. In compliance with the said Committee's directive, Bella Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him that the investigation showed that he had failed to declare, not only the fact that he had been maintaining a 1977 Corolla car which was owned by his brother but also the income of his mother who was supporting his brothers Antonio and Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that the Diliman Committee had reclassified him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989, unless he could submit "proofs to the contrary." Nadal was required "to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees" with "interest based on current commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation. commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation. Nadal issued a certification stating, among other things, that his mother migrated to the United States in 1981 but because her residency status had not yet been legalized, she had not been able to find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment." U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) that he committed acts which find him guilty of willfully and deliberately withholding information about the income of his mother, who is living abroad and that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car. As such, the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University and required him to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily make reimbursement, it shall be "effected by the University thru outside legal action.

The SDT decision was thereafter automatically elevated to the Executive Committee of U.P. Diliman for review pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules on Student Conduct and Discipline. Board of regents modified the penalty from Expulsion to One Year- Suspension, effective immediately, plus reimbursement of all benefits received from the STFAP, with legal interest. However the BOR also decided against giving Nadal, a certification of good moral character. Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR decision, in the next BOR meeting Regent Antonio T. Carpio raised the "material importance" of verifying the truth of Nadal's claim that earlier, he was a beneficiary of a scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de Manila University (AdeMU). Learning that the "certification issued by the AdeMU that it had not given Nadal financial aid while he was a student there was made through a telephone call," Regent Carpio declared that there was as yet "no direct evidence in the records to substantiate the charge." According to Carpio, if it should be disclosed that Nadal falsely stated that he received such financial aid, it would be a clear case of gross and material misrepresentation that would even warrant the penalty of expulsion. Hence, he cast a conditional vote that would depend on the verification of Nadal's claim on the matter. U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva countered by stating that "a decision should not be anchored solely on one piece of information which he considered irrelevant, and which would ignore the whole pattern of the respondent's dishonesty and deception from 1989 which had been established in the investigation and the reviews."In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a certification to the effect that Nadal was indeed a recipient of a scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983. That evening, the BOR met again at a special meeting, according to Regent Carpio, in executive session, the BOR found Nadal "guilty." However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order against President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili. Issue: Whether or not the Board of Regent violated Nadal's right to due process when it rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges against him" during the March 29, 1993 meeting. Held: With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent considers the same as "unquestionably void for lack of due process" inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said meeting, that imposition of sanctions on students requires "observance of procedural due process," the phrase obviously referring to the sending of notice of the meeting. However BOR ruled that in any event it is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to respondent. University rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of students whose disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At no time did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation. Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that Nadal was not given due process in the March 29 meeting because the ground upon which he was again convicted was not the same as the original charge. Obviously, he was referring to the basis of the conditional votes on March 28. Whether or not Nadal was telling the truth when he claimed that he received a scholarship grant from the AdeMU. However, Regent Carpio himself testified that the charge considered was "exactly the same charge" of withholding information on the income of Nadal's mother. It should be stressed that the reason why Regent Carpio requested a verification of Nadal's claim that he was a scholar at the AdeMU was that Regent Carpio was not "morally convinced" yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In other words, he sought additional insights into the character of Nadal through the information that would be obtained from the AdeMU. The Court in this regard find such information to be irrelevant and a mere superfluity. In his July, 12, 1991 certification aforementioned, Nadal admitted, although inconsistently, that his mother was a "TNT" who could not find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment" but that

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she was supporting the education of his brothers with the help of another son. The court constitutes this as a sufficient admission that Nadal withheld information on the income, however measly and irregular, of his mother. The court also sighted that respondent aspires to join the ranks of the professionals who would uphold truth at all costs so that justice may prevail. In those who exhibit duplicity in their student days, one spots the shady character who is bound to sow the seeds of chicanery in the practice of his profession. With this the court ruled that it sufficiently shown that respondent has committed an act of dishonesty in withholding vital information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of petitioner University, the latter's inherent power and authority to impose disciplinary sanction may be invoked and rightfully exercised. Therefore deciding that the BOR did not violate Nadals right of due process. The lower court is hereby ordered to DISMISS the petition for mandamus. PEOPLE vs. EUSEBIO NAZARIO FACTS: The case is all about due process of implementing the Municipal ordinances covering tax payments The prosecution would want to show to the court that the accused, as lessee or operator of a fishpond in the municipality of Pagbilao, refused, and still refuses, to pay the municipal taxes for three consecutive years as per ORDINANCE NO. 4, SERIES OF 1955, AS AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 15, SERIES OF 1965, AND AS FURTHER AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 12, SERIES OF 1966, OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PAGBILAO, QUEZON. The accuse by his evidence, tends to show to the court that the taxes sought to be collected have already lapsed and there is no low empowering municipalities to pass ordinances taxing fishpond operators. The defense, by their evidence, tried to show further that, as lessee of a forest land to be converted into a fishpond, he is not covered by said municipal ordinances; and finally that the accused should not be taxed as fishpond operator because there is no fishpond yet being operated by him, considering that the supposed fishpond was under construction during the period covered by the taxes sought to be collected. The defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ultra vires as it is outside of the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact; and that the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ambiguous and uncertain. As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons; especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. TC / CA: In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. It is unmistakable from their very provisions that the appellant falls within its coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term manager." He does not deny the fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries into the fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain them. While it appears that it is the National Government which owns them, the Government never shared in the profits they had generated. It is therefore only logical that he shoulders the burden of tax under the said ordinances.

Whether or not the tax ordinance is a valid adherence to due process? RULING: The court ruled in the affirmative side. RATIO/ DOCTRINE: privilege taxes on the business of fishpond maintenance. They are not charged against sales. but rather on occupation, which is allowed under Republic Act No. 2264. They are what have been classified as fixed annual taxes and this is obvious from the ordinances themselves. Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (2 Bernas 43) FACTS: Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of reflectorized triangular early warning devices. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires. ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, 3) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles, or 4) well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision. RATIO: The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to

ISSUE/S:

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prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers, extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out to all the great public needs. Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is a critical or urgent change with the time? The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . . . As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.

Among these were, unlawful entries, warrantless arrests and seizures, and requiring the producing of documents that may prove incriminating. These were all acts pertaining to gathering evidence. As they did not comply with the 4th amendment, the evidence acquired was deemed inadmissible in court and had to be returned to the defendants. In the present case, the court said that there is no compulsion evident, therefore the only issue was with regards to the 4th amendment. The court noticed that in all the cases mentioned, they all pertained to a physical taking, whether of documents, evidence, or even of the persons convicted (warrantless arrest). In wire-tapping, however, there is no physical taking. What was used was the recording of audio and nothing else. In the courts eyes, this does not qualify as a taking. Moreover, there was no trespassing involved as the taps were done in the streets and not in the houses of the conspirators. Lastly, the court brought up the common-law rule that evidence will be appreciated no matter how it was obtained. Where there is no violation of a constitutional guarantee, the verity of the above statement is absolute. Brandeis Dissent According to Justice Brandeis, wire-tapping is a crime. Applying to the 4th and 5thAmendments the established rule of construction, the defendants' objections to the evidence obtained by wire-tapping must, be sustained. It is, of course, immaterial where the physical connection with the telephone wires leading into the defendants' premises was made. And it is also immaterial that the intrusion was in aid of law enforcement. Independently of the constitutional question, Justice Brandeis opined that the judgment should be reversed. By the laws of Washington, wire-tapping is a crime. To prove its case, the government was obliged to lay bare the crimes committed by its officers on its behalf. A federal court should not permit such a prosecution to continue. Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965) Facts Appellants, the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and its medical director, Buxton, a licensed physician, were convicted as accessories for giving married persons information and medical advice on how to prevent conception and, following examination, prescribing a contraceptive device or material for the wife's use. A Connecticut statute makes it a crime for any person to use any drug or article to prevent conception. The appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each, against the claim that the accessory statute as so applied violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Errors affirmed that judgment. Issue Whether the U.S. Constitution protects the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives. Ruling On appeal, the SC of the US reversed. It was held that: 1. The Appellants have the standing to assert the constitutional rights of the married people.

Olmstead v US 277 U.S. 438 Facts Petitioners here were convicted of a conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act through the unlawful possession, importation and selling of liquor. Petitioner Olmstead is the leading conspirator and general manager of the operations. The operation required over 50 employees, 3 sea vessels, a ranch outside urban Seattle, caches in that city, as well as a fully staffed office. Monthly sales produced at least $175,000.00. Annual income was projected to be over $2M. To be able to gather information on the operation, four federal prohibition officers intercepted messages on the telephones of the conspirators. This gathering of evidence went on for months, yielding a lot of information. Among these were large business transactions, orders and acceptances, as well as difficulties the conspirators suffered, even dealings with the Seattle police. It is important to note that there was no trespass into the property of any of the defendants as the taps came the streets near the houses. Issue Whether wire-tapping amounted to a violation of the 4th amendment. Ruling No, wire-tapping does not amount to a violation of the 4th amendment. 4th amendment - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 5th amendment - No person shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself. In deciding this case, the court went through a number of earlier cases discussing the 4th and 5th amendments. In these cases, struck down as unconstitutional were various acts in the procurement of evidence.

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Accessory should have standing to assert that the offense which he is charged with assisting is not or cannot constitutionally be a crime. The existence of confidential relationship between the physician and his clients, which are married couples, constitutes the appellants standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married people.

2.

The Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contraceptives violates the right of marital privacy, which is within the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, and thus, it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

2. Hallford-had twice been arrested in Texas for violation of abortion statutes; because of the uncertainty of the law it was difficult to tell whether his patient's particular situation fell within or outside the exception recognized by A1196; as a consequence, the statutes were vague and uncertain, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, & that they violated his own and his patients' rights to privacy in the doctorpatient relationship and his own right to practice medicine, rights he claimed were guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments 3. Does-childless couple; Mrs Doe had a "neuro-chemical disorder" & was advised to avoid pregnancy; discontinued use of birth control pills; that if ever she became pregnant, she wishes to have a legal abortion under safe, clinical conditions. ISSUES: 1. whether or not petitioners have standing to bring suit 2. whether or not Texas laws regarding abortions are unconstitutional for invading a constitutionally protected right HELD: 1. Roe-At the trial court stage, it was undisputed that she had standing; logical nexus test in Flast met as her status as a pregnant women was logically connected to the claim that she sought, that is, that the law be struck down as unconsitutional for her to have an abortion. However, appellee notes that the records to not disclose whether she was pregnant at the time of the hearing of the case or when the TC decision was handed down, which is important since usual rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated (US v Musingwear). The delivery of the baby would have rendered the case moot. But the SC relaxed this rule, reasoning that pregnancy provides for classic conclusion of nonmootness, "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Hallford-has two pending cases with the State court, which is significant because "absent harassment and bad faith, a defendant in a pending state criminal case cannot affirmatively challenge in federal court the statutes under which the State is prosecuting him". He tries to distinguish his status as present state defendant from his status as "potential future defendant", but the SC sees no distinction & applies the rule to him, reversing the finding of the trial court on the doctor's standing. Does-has asserted as their only immediate & present injury an alleged "detrimental effect on their marital happiness"Their claim is that, sometime in the future, Mrs. Doe might become pregnant because of possible failure of contraceptive measures, and, at that time in the future, she might want an abortion that might then be illegal under the Texas statutes, which the SC finds as very speculative. The bare allegation of so indirect an injury is insufficient to present an actual case or controversy (Younger v Harris). Does are therefore not appropriate plaintiffs. 2. The SC took a look first at the historical perspective on abortion, reasoning that most of the laws criminalizing abortion are of "relatively recent vintage". Even the Hippocratic Oath, which said that a doctor should not provide drugs to induce an abortion, was found by the court to be at the beginning acceptable to only a small number of people; abortion was for the most part accepted ot tolerated. Common law provided that an abortion before "quickening"(the 1st recognizable movement of the fetus in utero) was not an indictable offense. Whether abortion of a quick fetus was a felony at common law, or even a lesser crime, is still disputed. In English statutory law, England's first criminal abortion statute, Lord Ellenborough's Act, came in 1803. It made

- specific guarantees in the Bill of rights have PENUMBRAS, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. A number of these various guarantees give rise to the right of privacy.

ROE vs. WADE NATURE: Appeal from the US DC of the Northern District of Texas FACTS: Texas State Penal Code Arts 1191-1194 & 1196 make it a crime to procure an abortion, as therein defined, or to attempt one, except procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother." Similar statutes are in existence in a majority of the States. Jane Roe,a single woman who was residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted federal action in Mar 1970 against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face, and an injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing the statutes. Hallford, a licensed physician, sought & was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. John & Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint to that of Roe, also naming the District Attorney as defendant. claiming like constitutional deprivations, & seeking declaratory & injunctive relief. The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court. This court found that Roe & Hallford had standing, but the Does did not for failing to allege facts sufficient to present a controversy. The District Court held that the fundamental right of single women and married persons to choose whether to have children is protected by the Ninth Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face because they were both unconstitutionally vague and constituted an overbroad infringement of the plaintiffs' Ninth Amendment rights. The court then held that abstention was warranted with respect to the requests for an injunction. It therefore dismissed the Does' complaint, declared the abortion statutes void, and dismissed the application for injunctive relief. Roe, Doe & intervenor Hallford appealed to SC regarding denial of injunction, while defendant DA cross-appealed regarding grant of declaratory relief. Petitioners: 1. Jane Roe-unmarried & pregnant; wishes to terminate her pregnancy but is prevented by Texas' laws; unable to transfer to another jurisdiction to secure abortion; contends that the statues invade upon the right of a pregnant woman to chose to terminate her pregnancy, grounded in the concept of personal "liberty" embodied in the 14th Amendment's Due Process Clause; or in personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to be protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras (Griswold, Eisenstat) or among those rights reseved to the people by the 9th Amendment.

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abortion of a quick fetus, 1, a capital crime, but, in 2, it provided lesser penalties for the felony of abortion before quickening, and thus preserved the "quickening" distinction. The case of Rex v. Bourne, apparently answered in the affirmative the question whether an abortion necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman was excepted from the criminal penalties of the 1861 Act. This trend in thinking was carried over to the US to the extent that only as recently as the end of the 1950's, a large majority of the jurisdictions banned abortion, however and whenever performed, unless done to save or preserve the life of the mother.It is thus apparent that, at common law, at the time of the adoption of the US Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently in effect. Phrasing it another way, a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy than she does in most States today. At least with respect to the early stage of pregnancy, and very possibly without such a limitation, the opportunity to make this choice was present in this country well into the 19th century. The SC recognizes that the debate now is between the State's right (some say duty) to protect prenatal life versus the contention that the laws were passed to protect the woman from placing herself in a potentially life threatening situation (as abortion techniques were initially unrefined & presented a threat to the woman's health.) The ponencia moves to a discussion on the right to privacy, conceding that this is not explicitly found in any part of the Consti. But this right of privacy, whether it be founded in the 14th Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, or in the 9th Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her prenancy.The Court concludes that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified, and must be considered against important state interests in regulation. Where certain "fundamental rights" are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a "compelling state interest. While there is a contention that the protection of prenatal life is a "compelling state interest" that warranted the abortion laws, and that the unborn is a "person" under the 14th Amend, the Court held that the use of the word is such that it has application only post-natally. None indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal application. The unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense. Measured against these standards, "Art. 1196 of the Texas Penal Code, in restricting legal abortions to those "procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother," sweeps too broadly. The statute makes no distinction between abortions performed early in pregnancy and those performed later, and it limits to a single reason, "saving" the mother's life, the legal justification for the procedure. The statute, therefore, cannot survive the constitutional attack made upon it here."

ISSUES: 1. WON AO 308 is a law and not a mere administrative order, the enactment of the former being beyond the Presidents power YES 2. WON AO 308 violates the right to privacy YES RATIO: 1. AO 308 establishes a system of identification that is allencompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates the right to privacy. It involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to administer and enforce them will disturb the delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed. Hence, the Court will give stricter scrutiny to the breach of exercise of power belonging to another by one branch of government. Legislative power: the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil govt. Executive power: vested in the President; the power to enforce and administer laws; the power of carrying laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. The President, as Chief Executive, represents the govt as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Thus, he is given ADMINISTRATIVE POWER, which is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. Administrative order: an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of govt. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy (Sec 3, Ch 2, Title I, Book III, Administrative Code of 1987). AO 308 does not merely implement the Administrative Code of 1987; it establishes for the first time a NCIRS, which requires an overhaul of various contending state policies. Also, under AO 308, a citizen cannot transact business with govt agencies without the contemplated ID card; without such, s/he will have a difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Hence, AO 308 clearly deals with a subject that should be covered by law. 2. The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution; hence, it is a burden of govt to show that AO 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. In the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, the ruling in Griswold v. Connecticut that there is a constitutional right to privacy was adopted. The right to privacy is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty The concept of limited govt has always included that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen A system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the State can control. The right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of the Constitution, namely: Sections 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8 and 17 of the Bill of Rights. The zones of privacy are also recognized and protected in several statutes, namely: Articles 26, 32 and 723 of the Civil Code,

OPLE vs. TORRES FACTS: Petition for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Administrative Order(AO) No. 308, entitled Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System (NCIRS) on 2 grounds: 1. It is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate 2. It impermissibly intrudes on our citizenrys protected zone of privacy AO 308 issued by FVR on December 12, 1996 (see p. 144-146 for the complete citation of AO 308)

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Articles 229, 290-292 and 280 of the Revised Penal Code, The AntiWire Tapping Act, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code. The ponencia proceeds to discuss the dangers to the peoples right to privacy: 1. Section 4 of AO 308: provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies through the use of Biometrics technology and computer application designs AO 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage. It does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. The indefiniteness of AO 308 can give the govt the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN. AO 308 does not tell us how the information gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. The ability of a sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on an individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic threats of the computer revolution. The Court ruled that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the National ID and the use of biometrics technology. AO 308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions. The need to clarify the penal aspect of AO 308 is another reason why its enactment should be given to Congress. DISCLAIMER: the Court, per se, is not against the use of computers to accumulate, store, process, retrieve and transmit data to improve the bureaucracy. Also, the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a compelling interest to justify such intrusions. PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO [104 Phil 443; G.R. No. L-12172; 29 Aug 1958] Facts: The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among others that construction of a building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal. Issue:

Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. The State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. The mayor has absolute discretion to issue or deny a permit. The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action. No purpose to be attained by requiring the permit is expressed; no conditions for its grant or refusal are enumerated. It is not merely a case of deficient standards; standards are entirely lacking. The ordinance thus confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, and it is a settled rule that such an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se lawful, is invalid. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard. Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, was beyond the authority of said municipality to enact, and is therefore null and void. Hence, the conviction of herein appellants is reversed, and said accused are acquitted, with costs de oficio.

2.

3.

Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987) FACTS: Ynot transported 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin, challenging the constitutionality of the E.O. 626 A. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this petition for review. ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. 626-A is a valid exercise of police power and a violation of due process. RULING: Supreme Court find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. Judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals (except where there at least 7 yrs. old if male and 11 yrs old if female upon the issuance of the necessary

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permit) the E.O. 626-A will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. We do not see, however, how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, w/ no less difficulty in on province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabao in one province will not prevent their slaughter there; any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says the EO, it could be easily circumscribed by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersede as bond w/c was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The EO defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment; w/c was carried out forthright. The measures struck him at once and pounced upon the petitioner w/o giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him elementary fair play. It is there authorized that the seized prop. shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of carabaos." The phrase may see fit is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden w/ perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. G.R. No. L-59603 April 29, 1987 EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary restraining order, enjoining the trial court from enforcing the order dated February 17, 1981 and from further proceeding with the hearing of the expropriation case. FACTS The President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811 on January 15, 1979, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The proclamation included, among others, four (4) parcels of owned and registered in the name of the San Antponio Development COrporation. EPZA, therefore, offered to purchase the parcels of land in acccordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property. EPZA then filed with Court of First Instance a complaint for expropriation, through which, a writ of possession authorizing the petitioner to take immediate possession of the premises was issued. At the pre-trial conference, parties have agreed that the only issue to be resolved is the just compensation for the properties. Hearing on the merits was then set. Subsequently, the court issued an orders, declaring EPZA as having the lawful right to take the properties sought to be condemned upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the filing of the complaint and appointing commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. The consolidated report of the three commissioners recommended the amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the properties. EPZA filed an Objection to Commissioner's Report on the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation

through commissioners; and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533. The trial court denied the motion, as a result of which, the petitioner filed this present petition enjoining the trial court from enforcing the order and from further proceeding with the hearing of the expropriation case. ISSUE 1) Whether the courts under P.D. 1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose?

HELD The Court ruled on the affirmative declaring the provision of the P.D. 1533 on just compensation unconstitutional and void as the method of ascertaining just compensation under the said decree constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the Court inutile on a matter which, under the Constitution, is reserved to it for final determination. The reason why the Court is empowered to appoint commissioners is to assess the just compensation of these properties under eminent domain proceedings, which is the well-entrenched ruling that 'the owner of property expropriated is entitled to recover from expropriating authority the fair and full value of the lot, as of the time when possession thereof was actually taken by the province, plus consequential damages including attorney's fees from which the consequential benefits, if any should be deducted, with interest at the legal rate, on the aggregate sum due to the owner from and after the date of actual taking." Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding, the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable decree, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. The strict application of the decree during proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. The trial court correctly stated that the valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. A return to the earlier well-established doctrine is more in keeping with the principle that the judiciary should live up to its mission "by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights." The basic unfairness of the decree is readily apparent. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by EPZA as basis for just compensation were made by the city assessor long before martial law, when land was not only much cheaper but when assessed values of properties were stated in figures constituting only a fraction of their true market value. The private respondent was not even the owner of the properties at the time. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of documents which are out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost of present owners would be arbitrary and confiscatory. To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors since they had the opportunity to protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of land owners accept unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not even look at, much less analyze, the statements. It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. In view of the foregoing, P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, was therefore held unconstitutional and void. HELD Petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order issued on February 16, 1982 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE. RATIO/DOCTRINE

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The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shag prevail over the court's findings. SUMULONG VS GUERRERO

The court holds that socialized housing defined in PD 1224 constitutes public use for purposes of expropriation and the provisions on just compensation are declared unconstitutional. The court ruled that the orders of the lower court on the issuance of the writ of possession be annulled for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction. The case was also remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings for the determination of just compensation the petitioners are entitled of.

FACTS OF THE CASE

LUZ FARMS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent. FACTS:

NHA filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land approx. 25 hectares including the lots of Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia VidanesBalaoing w/ an area of 6667 square m and 3333 square m respectively. The market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance w/ PD prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings was adopted by NHA and the land were valued at one peso per square meter. NHA filed for immediate possession of the properties by depositing 158,980 at PNB representing the total market value of the 25 hectares of land. The respondent judge Buenaventura Guerrero issued an order for the issuance of a writ of possession in favour of NHA. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration that they were deprived of the possession of their property w/o due process of law.

Kind of Petition Petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform a. for acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 in promulgating the Guidelines and Procedure Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 from performing an act in violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner.

b.

c.

Backgound of the Case ISSUES: 1. On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage

Whether PD 1224 (it defines the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation) is unconstitutional and violates due process? Whether the Judge acted w/o or in excess of his jurisdiction or w/ grave abuse of discretion in issuing order w/o notice and hearing for the possession of land by NHA? The case at bar also explains the concept of public use, just compensation and due process, all of which the petitioners objections were based.

2.

On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657

3.

On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms).

4. RULING of the Court

Luz Farms a. petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of: i. Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989.

The Court affirms that the taking of NHA of the land to be used for socialized housing covers public use. The term public use has a very broad meaning. It is flexible and an evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. It has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. Housing is a basic need and shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it affects public health, safety, environment and the general welfare in totality. The public character of housing measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but by those who qualify. PD 1224 paragraph d is linked to lowcost housing, slum clearance, relocation and resettlement. All for public purpose. The provisions in PD 1224 about just compensation were declared unconstitutional for being encroachment on prerogatives. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking.. All facts about the property should be considered. The value given by the provincial assessors has a limitation in the valuation of property. Lastly, PD 1224 violates procedural due process because it allows the immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property without giving the owner his day in court.

b.

c.

ii.

iii.

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5.

this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers.

Farm a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals." (Rollo, pp. 82-83). ISSUE/S: constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith RULING: The petition is impressed with merit. The question raised is one of constitutional construction. 1. The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11). The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture." Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. a. b. 5. 6. actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have opportunely raised by the proper party, a been

6.

7.

This Court in its Resolution resolved to deny, among others, Luz Farms' prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction in its Manifestation.

8.

Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant said Motion for Reconsideration regarding the injunctive relief and approval by this Court of an injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This Court also gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.

2. 3.

9.

The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989.

Petitioners argument Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it: (a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity." (b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ." (c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan. (d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. (e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13 ". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determine a lower ceiling. In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the net profit after tax shall be distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year . . ." Argument of the Respondent a. livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. b. He cited that Webster's International Dictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines the following words: "Agriculture the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming. It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . . Livestock domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit.

4.

resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself the court will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation, for all the awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the Court will not hesitate "to make the hammer fall heavily," where the acts of these departments, or of any official, betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution Thus, where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent.

7.

8.

9.

RATIO/DOCTRINE

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1.

The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the language of the document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the ConstitutionThe transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.

2.

The questions were answered and explained in the statement of then Commissioner Tadeo, quoted as follows:

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.

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