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Relieving The Aboveground Land Use Pressure: A Game Theory Analysis On Underground Space Knowledge Sharing LI, Rita

Yi Man

Relieving The Aboveground Land Use Pressure: A Game Theory Analysis On Underground Space Knowledge Sharing
LI, Rita Yi Man, Department of Economics and Finance Hong Kong Shue Yan University Hong Kong SAR, China Email: /
First Author

Modern underground space planning knowledge sharing no longer depends on face-to-face meetings, lectures or phone calls only. The conventional read-only Web 1.0 designed by HTML helps us know about the World wide underground space planning. Nevertheless, during the era of Web 1.0, online users can only read but cannot add anything new or express their ideas. The current change to Web 2.0 has been regarded as an evolution of World Wide Web from a static to a dynamic concept. Rapid and dynamic cross border knowledge sharing among planners become possible with the help of Web 2.0. The use of Web 2.0 as a knowledge sharing method, however, is still not very common nowadays among urban planners. In this paper, it reviews Web 2.0 tools available for underground space planners, their motivations on knowledge sharing via Game Theory.

Keywords: Game Theory, Underground Space Planning, Knowledge Sharing, Web 2.0 1. Introduction
The quest for more space in cities is a world-wide phenomenon. It is self evident that as cities develop due to populations growth and concentrations of business activities [1]. For example, the highest share of underground transportation in Tokyo (55%) helps relieve the pressure of the above ground transportation system. Similar facilities can also be found in cities like Hong Kong and Paris (Figure 3). Besides, underground space provides extra space for utilities, e.g. the significant share of utilities infrastructure in Stockholm (41%) have been constructed due to severe climate and the needs for heating facilities [2]. Extra underground space also opens up opportunities for businessmen to open shopping malls in densely populated cities such as Singapore (Figure 1) and Taipei (Figure 2). It also gives room to storage of materials [3]. Although underground space use needs heavy construction costs, the running costs are low. Furthermore, it provides resilience during earthquakes which are important to cities locate in earthquake prone area. There is no doubt that underground space use, the benefits and shortcomings has been very well studied descriptively. There are even suggestions on introducing zoning for underground space [4]. Nevertheless, little is known about the knowledge sharing motivations and resistance via Web 2.0 [5]. This paper sheds light on the above issues with Game theory as the backbone of research.

International Journal of Engineering and Industries(IJEI) Volume4. Number1. March 2012 doi: 10.4156/IJEI.vol4.issue1.1

Relieving The Aboveground Land Use Pressure: A Game Theory Analysis On Underground Space Knowledge Sharing LI, Rita Yi Man

Figure 1 An underground shopping mall near MRT: Vivo City in Singapore

Figure 2 Departmental store in Taipei.

Figure 3 Chateau dEau Metro Station in Paris.

Relieving The Aboveground Land Use Pressure: A Game Theory Analysis On Underground Space Knowledge Sharing LI, Rita Yi Man

2. Game Theory
Game theory is the study of how strategic interactions among rational players produce outcomes with respect to the preference of those players. It deals with decision-making processes which involve two or more parties, also known as players with partial or complete conflict of interest. Each of the players in a game faces a choice between the two strategies. At least one agent can maximize his utility through anticipating (either consciously or implicitly in his behavior) the responses to his actions by one or more of the players. In academia, game theories are used extensively in modeling and complex behaviors analysis in wide range of fields such as social interactions, economics, theoretical biology, security, politics and defense [6].

3. Knowledge sharing via Web 2.0

Knowledge is a broad and abstract concept that has brought much attention and epistemological debate in western philosophy since the Greek era [7-9]. It can be viewed as a mixture of information, contextual experience, expert, framed values, shared belief and insight which provide a framework for accessing and integrating new skill, information and knowledge which is stored in form of common practices inside an organization. It is regarded as a valuable commodity for an organization in the context of knowledge economy which can be produced internally, i.e. create inside the organization and externally, i.e. i.e. buy from outside. Knowledge management literature defines knowledge from different perspectives [10]. Knowledge sharing assumes that there are at least two parties: the knowledge owner and the knowledge receiver [11]. As knowledge between these two parties is asymmetric and incomplete, parties seeking knowledge may not be able to identify qualified knowledge providers and fail to be motivated to engage in knowledge sharing [12]. Human and IT and are the two major middleman in knowledge sharing. The IT-centric strategy emphasis the use of IT tools to facilitate and reuse of knowledge [13]. The term Web 2.0 has been widely used since OReilly named it in 2004. It is suggested that the Web 2.0 tools have to demonstrate at least some of the following characteristics [14]: 1) Online users can become one of many writers in websites; 2) Data sources grow when there are more and more people use them; 3) Software used beyond the level of one single device; 4) Cost-effective scalability services are adopted instead of packaged software [14]. In Web 2.0, trust builds between website owners and other internet users creates new knowledge, authority decentralization from website owner to online participants provides freedom to share and re-use web content. Although there are more and more people who know how to use computers at present, number of knowledge owners who use Web 2.0 for underground space knowledge sharing is still limited. Some people also concerned the level of validity on information provided by Web. Face-to-face or non-sustainable paper work knowledge sharing methods are far more common than e-methods, not to mention Web 2.0. It is undeniable that human beings resist change and this is especially true in times of uncertainty. [14].

4. Research method and results

By using the keyword search underground space planning, there are 136 results in total (as of date on 12 July 2011), 213 (as of date on 14 July 2011) and 623 (as of date on 14 July 2011) by using the keywords underground space safety and underground space construction. Yet, majority of these do not actually cover relevant materials on underground space planning. Some of them just mention the word underground space without elaboration. Others are completely irrelevant, such as cartoons with scene based on underground space. There are 7 valid results in total 2 for underground space planning, 3 for underground space safety and 2 for underground space construction.

Relieving The Aboveground Land Use Pressure: A Game Theory Analysis On Underground Space Knowledge Sharing LI, Rita Yi Man

Social Network Communities Blog Bookmark Journal Articles Chatroom Instant messager Create User Group

Be2camp X


2 Collab


Email X Forum X Files upload Free X Profile of Users X Tag Table 1 Examples of Web 2.0 tools [15]. Keywords


Number of search Valid outcomes outcome Underground space planning 136 2 Underground space safety 213 3 Underground space construction 623 2 Table 2 Underground space planning knowledge sharing in Youtube (Authors research results)

Relieving The Aboveground Land Use Pressure: A Game Theory Analysis On Underground Space Knowledge Sharing LI, Rita Yi Man

Keyword Undergrou nd space planning

Location Korea

Title, Content The Revolution of Underground Spaces [Arirang Today] With a limited amount of land, Korea is expanding her facilities underground, the latest revolution in land use planning. This clip provides case studies on Koreas university underground land use, shopping malls and others. Preview of No Escape: Dangers of Confined Spaces It records the history of how and why confined space construction accident occurred near Denver on October 2, 2007. 5 people were killed and 3 others injured when a fire erupted 1,000 feet underground in Colorado. Confined spaces: deadly spaces Designed for municipal workers, it illustrates the basic rules for working in confined spaces. Oxygen deficiency and other potential hazards are covered. Furthermore, the health effects and physical characteristics of toxic gases which are examined. Confined Spaces: Safe Yesterday, Deadly Today It identifies the safety and health hazard in confined space. City of Edmonton: Leader in tunneling construction The clips shows the advantages to proceed underground space construction, the construction team's expertise and response to emergency situation, such as a road collapse due to sewer or water mains failure ,or flooding. Underground Pelasgian cities in Cappadocia 01 This clip provides information about the underground facilities of the Underground Pelasgian cities in Cappadocia, its history and construction method.

Website http://www.youtu BeaX0IRjyd8

Undergrou nd space planning


http://www.youtu q6YdMDZCaiE

Undergrou nd space safety

Vancouv er Canada watch?v=HA6yh0 TB5ag&list=PLC4 44380298FD23C8 &index=11

Undergrou nd space safety Undergrou nd space safety

Kimberly , BC, Canada No informati on

http://www.youtu rUM7tnYcOjQ& feature=relmfu http://www.youtu GOII0YNTVIs

Undergrou nd space constructio n

Cappadoc ia, Turkey

Undergrou Moscow, Moscow Metro : Kropotkinskaya Russia The clips show cut and cover technique used in nd space Kropotkinskayas construction of a massive open trench. constructio n Table 3 underground space plannin

http://www.youtu K1X9l9JhPhk&f eature=autoplay &list=PL567F45 4A60118B20&in dex=75&playnex t=2 http://www.youtu 9XqjT_Gmz7M

Relieving The Aboveground Land Use Pressure: A Game Theory Analysis On Underground Space Knowledge Sharing LI, Rita Yi Man

5. Underground space planning knowledge via Web 2.0: a review based on Game theories
We often encounter situations where our interests are in conflict with the interests of the others. Social dilemmas are situations in which and collective and personal interests are at odds [16]. Since 1970s, considerable effort has been devoted to apply game-theoretic techniques in industrial economics. Many of these are of direct relevance to competitive strategy. These include issues such as the importance of first-mover, reputation formation and exploitation. Despite its popularity, there is also critic about game theories. Rational models of competitive interaction posit players engage in complex reasoning environment. Yet, our decision-makers are far less analytic and perform far less comprehensive analyses thla these models posit [17]. Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken were chosen to illustrate the motives of underground space planning knowledge sharing. These games were chosen because they are well-known symmetric 22 games [18]. The payoff under game theories can be visualized as I, II, III, IV in Table 4. For example, if player 1 chooses to share his knowledge but player 2 chooses to withhold knowledge, the playoffs will be I for player 1, III for Player 2 as shown in the shaded boxes of Table 4. Player 2 Share knowledge Keep the knowledge Player Share knowledge I,I II,III 1 Keep the knowledge II,II I,IV Table 4Payoff matrix of knowledge sharing game between knowledge holder and receiver [9]

5.1 Prisoners dilemma of underground space planning knowledge sharing

The idea of Prisoners dilemma originated from 2 prisoners in a prison who were questioned in 2 separate rooms [9]. The dilemma is usually used to explain collective action. Sometimes, it has been used in public good problem or others to check participants strategic structure [19]. As typical payoffs of the 2 players display III>I>IV>II, corporate is the dominant strategy. In case of underground knowledge sharing decision, knowledge holder under this situation prefer to share knowledge as this is the only way to maximize benefit [9]. Peoples greed is sufficient to motivate a competitive choice [20]. One can understand the Prisonners dilemma from every day life experience in ordinary life we engage in many transactions with other people in which there is potential profit for both parties from some kind of cheating. Normally, we do not see much of this cheating. I have no doubt that the merchant will put in the package the merchandise which I buy, or which I ordered, even though if he put in something else cheaper is it quite dubious that I would be able to win a lawsuit. On my part, if I decide I did not like the product and returned it with the remark that it was defective, having first damaged it so that it is indeed defective, I could get a gain. Neither I nor the merchant worries particularly about this kind of behavior, although the merchant worries more than I do for reasons that will become plainIf we worried about it, we would both take precautions, with the result that socially we would be worse off by the cost of these precautions. We have here what appears to be a prisoners dilemma matrix, but the two parties are having cooperativelyWhat Adam Smith called the discipline of continuous dealings take care of the matter [21].

Player B Share knowledge Player Share knowledge 5,5 A Withhold knowledge 7,1 Table 5 Prisoners dilemma knowledge sharing game [9]

Withhold knowledge 1,7 2,2

In N-persons game which simulates the real environment of knowledge sharing, payoff for each player depends on the acts among the pool of players. Suppose that there are N people, the knowledge

Relieving The Aboveground Land Use Pressure: A Game Theory Analysis On Underground Space Knowledge Sharing LI, Rita Yi Man

sharers and shirkers receives payoff p(n) and s(n) respectively. According to Li and Poon [9], a knowledge holder chooses to share knowledge if and only if p(n+1)>s(n). In case of prisoners dilemma where s(n) > p(n+1), number of people use Web 2.0 as tools of underground space planning knowledge sharing does not affect participants knowledge sharing behaviors, the new comer only chooses to shirk.

Figure 4 N-persons prisoners dilemma game [9].

5.2 Chicken game of underground space planning knowledge sharing

Although the Prisoners Dilemma models an important class of conflicts, it is not the only type. Another important game is Chicken which is named after the reckless teenage behavior of driving cars head on towards each other at high velocity. Each of the drivers has two options: to swerve or not. The driver who swerves is chicken. If both swerve, both of them are chicken; if neither swerves, a catastrophic collision takes place [22]. This game represents a situation where individual and collective rationality at variance level [23]. It is characterized by the payoff III> I, II> IV, maximization tactics can be realized when players choose different strategy. Compared with Prisoners Dilemma, Chicken game is less controversial because a cooperative choice can be rational whether the player sees his choice was chosen for the two players or as the player himself [24]. In N-persons games of chicken, the best strategy depends on the number of underground space knowledge sharing participants in Web 2.0. When there are fewer online participants, the new comer will be more willing to share their knowledge all the way through until the number of participants reach the intersection point of line I, II and III, IV [9]. Share knowledge 6,6 9,4 Player B Withhold knowledge 4,9 3,3

Player A

Share knowledge Withhold knowledge

Relieving The Aboveground Land Use Pressure: A Game Theory Analysis On Underground Space Knowledge Sharing LI, Rita Yi Man

Figure 5 N-persons Chickens game [9].

4.3 T-period repeated game of underground space knowledge sharing

A fundamental idea of the theory of repeated games is that the cooperative outcomes of militiaperson games are consistent with the usual 'selfish' assumption in economic theory [25]. Consider a two-person knowledge sharing and receiving scenarios in which the sharers can choose actions in each period and collect payoffs as a function of that periods actions. This can be viewed as an infinitely repeated game [26]. The repeated games theories suggest that players decisions making in the long term. Suppose is the games discount factor and simultaneous games with N underground space knowledge holders. R1, R2, R3,RT are the return of actions and each period with n1, n2, n3,,nT number of underground space knowledge holders who use one specific Web 2.0 tools for sharing the knowledge. Such that the total return for knowledge sharing will be: (1- )

T 1

T-1(RT) [27]

6. Conclusion
Although there more and more online users in modern society, underground space planners seldom use this tools to share their knowledge via these tools. The Prisoners dilemma and game of chicken show that different web 2.0 owners have to use different tactics to attract people to use these tools.

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