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Nancy Eisenberg
Arizona State University
Adaptive functioning requires effective regulation of emotion. Emotion regulation includes processes used to change, prevent, or initiate ones own emotional state; to modify the significance of the event for the self; and to modulate the behavioral expression of emotion (Eisenberg, Hofer, & Vaughan, 2007). Effective emotion regulation includes adaptive expression and management of both positive and negative emotions (Eisenberg & Spinrad, 2004), is associated with optimal social functioning (e.g., Bagozzi, Verbeke, & Gavino, 2003; Eisenberg, Spinrad, & Eggum, 2010), and contributes to peoples well-being (e.g., Gross & John, 2003). Conversely, people who are unable to modulate their own strong negative emotions in the face of provocative circumstances and stressors may inappropriately externalize negative feelings (Eisenberg et al., 2001) such as anger and irritation (Olson, Schilling, & Bates, 1999), or may be overwhelmed by fear, anxiety, or depression (Flett, Blankstein, & Obertinsky, 1996).
This article was published Online First June 25, 2012. Gian Vittorio Caprara, Psychology Department, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy; Laura Di Giunta, Interuniversity Centre for Research in the Genesis and Development of Prosocial and Antisocial Motivations, Sapienza University of Rome; Concetta Pastorelli, Psychology Department, Sapienza University of Rome; Nancy Eisenberg, Psychology Department, Arizona State University. This study was partially supported by grants from the Ministero dellIstruzione, dellUniversita ` e della Ricerca to Gian Vittorio Caprara and from the National Institute of Mental Health (R01 MH060838-11) to Nancy Eisenberg. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Gian Vittorio Caprara, Psychology Department, Sapienza University of Rome, Via dei Marsi 78, 00185, Rome, Italy. E-mail: gianvittorio.caprara@ uniroma1.it 105
Most research on emotion regulation has focused on negative emotions and has gradually moved from a focus on global negative emotionality to a focus on specific emotions. Some findings suggest that certain types of strategies may be effective for regulating specific emotions, whereas other strategies may be more effective for other emotions (e.g., Rivers, Brackett, Katulak, & Salovey, 2007). Anger and sadness are the two negative emotions that have received much empirical attention from scholars of emotion regulation, likely because of the adverse consequences of their dysregulation for health and social functioning (Rivers et al., 2007). Anger has fairly consistently been associated with externalizing behavior problems (e.g., Doyle & Dolan, 2006; Eisenberg et al., 2001), whereas sadness tends to be associated with internalizing problems and sometimes externalizing problems (Cassano, PerryParrish, & Zeman, 2007). In contrast, there are fewer studies explicitly examining the regulation of other negative emotions such as shame, guilt, and fear (e.g., Bagozzi et al., 2003). Because various negative emotions appear to have somewhat different effects on adaptation across domains of functioning, it is likely that their management and expression reflect the functioning of different regulatory or motivational systems (e.g., BlanchardFields & Heckman Coats, 2008). Similarly, the capacity to appropriately manage different negative emotions may rest on different abilities and self-efficacy beliefs. Because the dysregulation of negative emotions is frequently associated with undesirable outcomes, it is important to understand the distinctive efficacy beliefs that allow people to cope effectively with specific negative emotions. Individuals are active agents whose capacities for self-regulation allow them considerable control over their experiences and life course (Bandura, 1997). Among the knowledge structures and belief struc-
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tures relevant to humans agency, perhaps none is more influential than self-efficacy beliefs, namely, beliefs individuals hold about their capacity to exert control over the events that affect their lives (Bandura, 1997). Unless people believe they can produce desired results with their actions, they have little incentive to undertake activities or to persevere in the face of difficulties. People often draw on their sense of efficacy when dealing successfully with challenging situations and tend to avoid tasks and goals that they perceive to be beyond their reach (Bandura, 1997). Indeed, findings from diverse lines of research have documented the pervasive relations of self-efficacy beliefs with emotion, cognition, motivation, choice, and action, across domains of functioning such as learning, work, sport, social adjustment, and health (for a review, see Bandura, 1997). People differ widely in how well they manage their emotional experiences in everyday life and the manner and degree to which they regulate their emotions likely depends, in part, on how they appraise their affective experiences. It is likely that appraisals of both the causes of affective states and their expected consequences determine the impact of emotion on individuals psychosocial functioning. A robust tradition of thought leads to the belief that the control people believe they can exert over the causes of their emotions and over the consequences of their reactions strongly influences their regulatory strategies (e.g., Bandura, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). In this regard, self-efficacy beliefs are of pivotal importance because they reflect the control people perceive they are able to exert over an entire emotional experience, including the causes of emotions, ones own reactions, and their expected consequences (Bandura, 1997; Bandura, Caprara, Barbaranelli, Gerbino, & Pastorelli, 2003). In fact, self-efficacy beliefs likely affect the regulation of emotion at both the locus of causality and the locus of their expression and consequences. Self-efficacy beliefs are believed to influence the construal of events from which emotions derive, as well as the framing of likely consequences. Furthermore, self-efficacy beliefs would be expected to influence the anticipation of, and perceived conditions for, alternative strategies to deal effectively with the causes, the expression, and the consequences of emotions. In the present studies, we focused on self-efficacy beliefs in dealing with specific negative emotions, such as anger/irritation, despondency/ sadness, fear, shame/embarrassment, and guilt. Previously, researchers have examined primarily the internal and construct validity of self-efficacy beliefs in managing negative emotions such as anger and despondency (e.g., Bandura et al., 2003). Evidence of both the internal and construct validity of perceived efficacy in managing negative emotions in general have been found across countries such as Italy, Germany, and the United States (Caprara et al., 2008; Gunzenhauser et al., 2011; Lightsey et al., 2012). In addition, for both men and women, perceived efficacy in managing negative emotions has been positively related to life satisfaction (Lightsey et al., 2012) and successful adaptation (Caprara & Steca, 2005), and negatively related to depressive feelings, shyness, and delinquency (Bandura et al., 2003).
require appropriate regulation to avoid jeopardizing ones adjustment and well-being. Each emotion can be viewed as the result of a unique organization of affect, cognition, and behavior under given situational and cultural constraints (Lewis & Cook, 2007). However, different criteria can guide hypotheses related to whether and how different negative emotions can be grouped together and eventually traced to common latent dimensions. First, one could focus on the extent to which nature and experience contribute to each emotion and distinguish between basic or first-order emotions and self-conscious/moral emotions. In accordance with this criterion, anger/irritation, despondency/sadness, and fear could be grouped as basic emotions (Izard, 2007), namely, emotions that have a fixed feeling or motivational component that has been selected through evolution, continue to retain relatively more evolutionarily derived functions than other emotions, and occur with minimal cognitive processes of perceiving and imaging in order to trigger a rapid and sometimes automatic response (Izard, 2011; Tracy & Randles, 2011). In contrast, shame and guilt are generally referred as self-conscious/moral emotions that engage sophisticated cognitive process and that often reflect social and cultural norms (e.g., Tangney, Youman, & Stuewig, 2009). Second, one could focus on the action tendencies associated with emotions and distinguish between emotions eliciting approach and emotions eliciting withdrawal tendencies (Frijda, 1986). Thus, despondency/sadness, fear, shame/embarrassment, and guilt can be grouped together as emotions conducive to withdrawal, whereas anger/irritation can be viewed as mostly leading to attack and approach (Saarni, Campos, Camras, & Witherington, 2006). Third, one could focus on the events that have caused the emotions and distinguish between emotions resulting from the impediments to achieve the goals that one desires and emotions resulting from threats to the individuals integrity and self-regard. Both despondency/sadness and anger/irritation can be viewed as emotional reactions to events such as loss and failure to achieve desirable end points events that interfere with appetitive motives. In contrast, fear, shame, and guilt can be viewed as emotional reactions to events such as threats, punishments, and feelings of self-discontent that interfere with motives to avoid various aversive or uncomfortable situations and experiences. In addition, whereas fear is a basic emotion, both shame/embarrassment and guilt in fact are self-conscious emotions that attest to the influence that sophisticated cognition and culture may exert over emotional experience. Specifically, fear derives from threats to ones own integrity and safety that often are beyond ones own control; guilt and shame/embarrassment derive from violations of obligations, duties, norms, or socially expected patterns of behavior that one should, and often can, avoid. In regard to self-efficacy beliefs, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the structure of efficacy beliefs about the ability to selfregulate emotions should parallel the structure of distinct emotions, at least to a certain extent. Likely different capacities are needed to regulate anger/irritation, despondency/sadness, fear, shame/embarrassment, and guilt, and different self-efficacy beliefs are associated with their effectiveness. Thus, one may hypothesize that the same criteria that distinguish and group emotions are also useful for grouping self-efficacy beliefs.
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Thus, the aforementioned criteria may lead one to group the various emotions in different combinations. Previous findings grouping together self-efficacy beliefs for dealing with anger/ irritation and despondency/sadness (Caprara et al., 2008) led us to focus on motives whose obstruction elicits various emotions. Thus, self-efficacy beliefs in dealing with anger/irritation and despondency/sadness were expected to group together because both concern the management of basic emotions arising from impediment of appetitive motives. Using the same reasoning, one might expect self-efficacy beliefs in regard to dealing with fear, shame/ embarrassment, and guilt to group together because all pertain to the management of emotions that arise from the obstruction of motives to avoid aversive states and are conducive to withdrawal reactions. Yet we could not exclude an alternative hypothesis derived from an additional distinction: It is possible to further distinguish fear from shame and guilt because fear is a basic emotion deriving from threatening events that are often beyond individuals control, whereas guilt and shame are self-conscious emotions. Thus, it was an empirical task to establish whether perceived efficacy in dealing with fear would be traced to the same common factor underlying guilt and shame/embarrassment or to a separate factor.
Study 1
The present study was designed to examine the psychometric properties of the Multidimensional Negative Emotions Self-
Regulatory Efficacy Scale (MNESRES) and, in particular, its five subscales designed to assess self-efficacy beliefs regarding managing anger/irritation, despondency/sadness, fear, shame/ embarrassment, and guilt (SE_AI, SE_DS, SE_F, SE_SE, and SE_G, respectively). Because the management of different emotions requires specific capacities and reflects different experiences, it was hypothesized that self-efficacy beliefs associated with different emotions rest upon different factors. Thus, it was expected that items designed to assess, respectively, SE_AI, SE_DS, SE_F, SE_SE, and SE_G, would load on separate first-order factors. Despite some specificity, self-efficacy beliefs structures were not expected to operate independently of one another; different self-efficacy beliefs likely share some common core. In particular, we hypothesized that measures of SE_AI, SE_DS, SE_F, SE_SE, and SE_G would load on five first-order factors. Then we hypothesized that these first-order factors could be traced to second-order factors. Although previous findings (Caprara et al., 2008) led us to trace SE_AI and SE_DS to the same second-order factor, we could only speculate about the ultimate number and content of secondorder factors once self-efficacy beliefs in dealing with other negative emotions were included. Thus, we examined alternative models in accordance with the above criteria. First, in accordance with above distinction between basic and self-conscious/moral emotions, we tested a model with first-order factors contributing to two second-order factors, one reflecting SE_AI, SE_DS, and SE_F and the second one reflecting SE_SE and SE_G (Criterion 1). Second, in accordance with above distinction between emotional behavioral reactions leading to withdraw and to approach, we tested a model with first-order factors contributing to one second-order factor including SE_DS, SE_F, SE_SE, and SE_G, while leaving SE_AI by itself (Criterion 2). Third, in accordance with above distinction between emotions derived from the obstruction of appetitive motives/goals and emotions derived from the obstruction of the motive to avoid aversive outcomes, we tested a model with first-order factors contributing to two secondorder factors: one including SE_AI and SE_DS and one including SE_F, SE_SE, and SE_G (Criterion 3). Fourth, combining Criteria 1 and 3 led to examining an alternative model in which (a) we traced SE_AI and SE_DS to a second-order factor reflecting what is common to self-efficacy beliefs regarding basic emotions derived from the obstruction of appetitive motives; (b) we traced SE_SE and SE_G to another second-order factor reflecting what is common to self-efficacy beliefs pertaining self-conscious/moral emotions arising from the obstruction of the motivation to avoid certain self-related aversive outcomes; and (c) we left SE_F by itself as a basic emotion stemming from obstruction of the motives to avoid aversive consequences. Ultimately, we hypothesized that first- and second-order factors could be traced to a third-order overarching factor attesting to the common contribution of perceived self-efficacy to the regulation of negative emotions. In addition, we examined whether the factorial structure of the MNESRES was similar in males and females, as previously found for the factorial structure of SE_AI and SE_DS in three countries (Italy, United States, and Bolivia; Caprara et al, 2008). To assess the construct validity of the five scales, we examined the extent to which they related to dispositional irritability, depression, shyness, fearful emotion, and need of reparation, over and above variance accounted for by emotional stability from the
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five-factor model of personality traits (Caprara, Barbaranelli, Borgogni, & Perugini, 1993). In accordance with earlier findings, we expected that all the subscales would be positively interrelated (Bandura, 1997) and positively related to emotional stability (Caprara et al., 2003). Furthermore, we hypothesized that specific self-efficacy beliefs would primarily relate to specific indicators of emotional adjustment such as irritability, depression, fear, shyness, and need for reparation. Thus, we predicted that SE_AI would relate primarily with low irritability, SE_DS with low depression, SE_F with low fear, and SE_SE with low shyness. However, it was unclear whether SE_G would be associated with more or less need to make reparation. Not feeling guilt might reduce the need for reparation, but it is also possible that people who can control guilt feelings are better able to attend to the harm done to others and engage in reparation (Tangney et al., 2009). We also hypothesized that congruent associations would hold when controlling for the relations of both the other subscales and emotional stability with a given index of (mal)adjustment.
Method
Participants. Participants were 178 men (45%) and 225 women (55%) ranging in age from 19 to 22 years (M 20.86, SD .88) from Genzano, a residential community near Rome. Participants were all of Italian extract engaged in a longitudinal study that is still ongoing in that community: Fifty-five percent of them were college students, 30% were employees in various kinds of businesses, and 15% were unemployed. Ninety-eight percent of participants still lived with their parents, as do the majority of young people of that age in Italy. The occupational socioeconomic distribution of the families of origin matched the national profile (Istituto Italiano di Statistica, 2002). In particular, 11% of participants fathers completed elementary school, 35% completed junior high school, 36% completed senior high school, and 18% completed college with a degree. Fifteen percent of participants mothers completed elementary school, 34% completed junior high school, 34% completed senior high school, and 17% completed
college with a degree. Yearly household incomes ranged from 10,000 to 70,000, with an average of 26,000. Procedure. Participants were initially contacted by phone to be invited to grant their commitment to the continuation of the longitudinal research and to establish an appointment. Then a letter was sent by mail to obtain their written consent. Trained researchers went to participants homes to provide information regarding the purpose and the longitudinal nature of research and how to fill out a booklet of questionnaires and to further clarify the general aims and procedures of the research. In particular, to minimize any potential motivational effects of self-assessment, full confidentiality was guaranteed at all stages of research; participants were informed that their responses would be used only with number coded by the research staff; scales were labeled with nondescript titles rather than the actual names; and no information was provided regarding the specific hypotheses. In addition, to encourage frank answers, we explained to the participants the importance of their contribution to the research, informing them that the knowledge they provided would increase the understanding of the determinants of youths well-being and would guide the development of programs designed to help people to manage difficult life situations. Participants were asked to complete the various questionnaires in the next 10 days in accordance with predetermined intervals of time in order to avoid, as much as possible, overloading, habituation, and other response-set biases. The filled booklets were returned on a scheduled day to a research assistant, and participants received a gift certificate for a dinner for two at a local restaurant. The study was approved by Sapienza University of Romes Human Subjects Institutional Review Board. Measures. MNESRES. Participants rated (1 not well at all, 5 very well) their capability to manage anger/irritation (four items), despondency/sadness (four items), shame/embarrassment (three items), fear (three items), and guilt (three items). Items for these measures are presented in Table 1, and alphas are presented in Study 2. Whereas items related to SE_AI and SE_DS were derived from the Regulatory Emotional Self-Efficacy Scale (Caprara et al.,
Guilt
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2008), new items to assess SE_F, with SE_SE and SE_G, were generated in accordance with Banduras (2006) guidelines. In particular, we conducted preliminary work to identify the challenges and impediments to people feeling efficacious to deal with a specific negative emotions in difficult contexts. Specifically, people were asked in pilot questionnaires to describe what makes it difficult for them to deal with despondency/sadness, anger/ irritation, fear, shame/embarrassment, and guilt. The identified challenges or impediments were then built into the MNESRESs items. In pilot testing, participants rated the strength of their beliefs in their ability to deal with the aforementioned negative emotions. To ensure that the final MNESRESs items were built with sufficient gradations of difficulties (i.e., to avoid ceiling effects), those items that lacked sufficient difficulty to distinguish levels of efficacy among respondents were eliminated. Prior to adding the new subscales, a preliminary study (Caprara et al., 2008) supported the partial invariance at both metric and scalar levels across gender and countries (Italy, United States, and Bolivia) of SE_AI and SE_DS (which loaded on a second-order factor) and their discriminant and convergent validity. Irritability. Italian participants rated (1 completely false for me, 7 completely true for me) 10 items tapping their tendency to react impulsively and rudely to the slightest provocation or disagreement (Caprara, 1985; e.g., I often feel like a powder keg ready to explode; .89). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders oriented depression scale. We considered the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders oriented category of depressive problems (including dysthymia and major depression; 15 items; e.g., feel unhappy, sad, or depressed and harm self; .83) from the Adult Self-Report (Achenbach & Rescorla, 2003; 0 not true, 2 very true or often true). Shyness. Italian participants rated (1 never/almost never, 5 always/almost always) their shyness on Cheek and Busss (1981) nine-item Shyness Scale (e.g., I feel tense when Im with people I dont know well; .88). Need for reparation. The seven-item Need for Reparation Scale (1 completely false for me, 7 completely true for me) was designed to measure the proneness to feelings of discomfort and concern, and the desire for atonement due to the negative and harmful outcomes for others as a consequence of ones own conduct (Caprara, Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, Cermak, & Rosza, 2001; e.g., I feel that I have to make up for the wrongs that I have done to others; .67). Fearful affect. Two Positive and Negative Affect Schedule items (scared and afraid; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; 1 never/not at all, 5 always/very much) were averaged in order to have an indicator of fearful affect. In particular, participants were asked to report how they felt in general (not right now or a specific time). Emotional stability. Italian participants rated (1 very false for me, 5 very true for me) their own emotional stability on a 24-item domain scale that is part of the Big Five Questionnaire (Caprara et al., 1993; e.g., I often feel nervous, Im rather touchy; .90). Data analysis. We used maximum likelihood confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) to investigate the structure of the MNESRES. We focused on the fit model indices that were less sensitive to sample size given that obtaining a nonsignificant
chi-square becomes increasingly unlikely with large sample sizes (Kline, 1998). The comparative fit index (CFI), the root-meansquare error of approximation (RMSEA) with its associated confidence interval and p value, the standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR), and the Akaike information criterion (AIC; which is a helpful index when comparing models that are not nested; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) are reported for each model. We accepted CFI values greater than .90 (Kline, 1998), RMSEA values lower than .07 (Brown & Cudeck, 1993), and SRMR values lower than .08 (Kline, 1998). For the RMSEA, a nonsignificant p value means the model we hypothesized is a good approximation of the population. Mplus 5.1 (Muthe n & Muthe n, 2008) was used for CFAs. To test gender invariance of the MNESRES, we adopted a model-fitting process based on the review by Vandenberg and Lance (2000). We tested three models: configural invariance (the same pattern of fixed and free factor loadings was specified across sexes), metric invariance (the same factor loadings for items were specified across sexes), and scalar invariance (the same intercepts of like items regressions on the latent variables were specified across sexes; this basically tests differences in mean values). The most frequent additional tests are typically those of partial invariance at each step; modification indices from each step were used to refine the structure models (Millsap & Kwok, 2004). Each model for a form of invariance (configural, metric, and scalar invariance) was nested in the previous model and involved added constraints that built upon previous constraints. Chi-square difference tests were performed to compare nested models adopting a cutoff of p .01 given that obtaining a significant chi-square becomes increasingly likely with large sample sizes (Kline, 1998). To explore the construct validity of the MNESRES, we examined the relations of the five measures of the MNESRES with various measures of (mal)adjustment. In particular, we conducted (a) correlations, (b) a series of standard multiple regression analyses including all self-efficacy scales as predictors and one measure of (mal)adjustment as the dependent variable (in total, we examined five regression analyses), and (c) a series of hierarchical regression analyses. In the latter, emotional stability was entered first, and the five measures of the MNESRES were entered on the second step. Again, we predicted each indicator of (mal)adjustment separately (in total, we examined five hierarchical regression analyses).
Results
CFA (Italian sample). Preliminary analyses on the data collected with the Italian participants showed that two items of the MNESRES used in the previous version of this scale by Caprara et al. (2008) loaded similarly on more than one factor. Thus, we did not include the items How well can you reduce your upset when you dont get the appreciation you feel you deserve? and How well can you manage negative feelings when reprimanded by your parents or significant others? Both were deemed ambiguous in regard to which negative emotion they indexed. Consequently, we used only 15 items out of 17 items of the MNESRES items for further analyses (see Table 1 for the items of the MNESRES). Alternative models were tested in accordance with criteria reported in the introductory section of Study 1 to distinguish emotions and to address self-efficacy beliefs related with their regula-
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tion. For reasons already discussed, in Model 1, the five types of self-efficacy were considered as separate and correlated constructs on the first level. In Model 2, SE_AI, SE_DS, and SE_F were modeled as expressions of a second-order latent factor reflecting the capability to manage basic negative emotions (Izard, 2007), whereas SE_SE and SE_G were modeled as expressions of a different second-order latent factor reflecting the capability to manage self-conscious/moral emotions. In Model 3, SE_DS, SE_F, SE_SE, and SE_G were grouped as expressions of a second-order latent factor reflecting the perceived capability to manage emotions conducive to withdrawal reactions, whereas SE_AI was left by itself on a factor reflecting the capability to deal with anger/ irritation, a basic emotion conducive to approach (and attack) reactions. In Model 4, SE_AI and SE_DS were grouped as expressions of a second-order latent factor reflecting the perceived capability to manage negative emotions resulting from the obstruction of appetitive motives, whereas SE_F, SE_SE, and SE_G were modeled as expressions of a second-order latent factor reflecting the perceived capability to manage negative emotions resulting from obstruction of the motivation to avoid certain aversive outcomes. Finally, in Model 5, SE_AI and SE_DS were grouped together as in Model 4; SE_SE and SE_G were grouped together on another second-order factor reflecting the perceived capability to deal with self-conscious/moral emotions resulting from obstruction of the motivation to avoid aversive outcomes; and SE_F was left by itself as an indicator of the capability to deal with fear, a basic emotion resulting from obstruction of the motive to avoid aversive consequences to ones being (see Table 2 for the path diagrams of the examined models). The fit indices related to the five models are reported in Table 2. Of the five models, Model 5 provided the best fit to the data by all standards, although Model 1 was nearly as good a fit. The AIC is considered most relevant for comparing nonnested models, with a low AIC indicating a better model. Thus, we decided to consider Model 5, with lowest AIC, as the model that best represented the structure of the MNESRES (see Figure 1 for the path diagram of CFA). Other models were also tested for exploratory purposes. In particular, we examined: (a) a model in which SE_AI was considered by itself; SE_DS and SE_F were grouped as the expression of a second-order latent factor; SE_SE and SE_G were grouped as the expression of another second-order latent factor; (b) a model in which SE_AI was considered by itself; SE_DS, SE_F, and SE_SE were modeled as the expression of a second-order latent factor; SE_G was considered by itself; (c) a model in which SE_AI and SE_DS were grouped as expressions of a second-order latent factor; SE_F, and SE_SE were grouped as the expression of another second-order latent factor; and SE_G was considered by itself. In all the aforementioned models, we included a third-order latent factor of a general capability to manage negative affect (SE_NA) on which all the second-order factors loaded. The models tested for exploratory purposes provided discrete fit indices; however, the program requested unreasonable constraints in order to run. Further details on these alternative models can be obtained by the first author upon request.1 Multigroup factor analyses (gender invariance, Italian sample). The mean change in overall chi-square between the configural invariance model, 2(170, N 179, 224) 329.170, p .001, CFI .935, RMSEA .068 (.057.079), SRMR .067,
and the metric invariance model, 2(187, N 179, 224) 351.159, p .001, CFI .933, RMSEA .066 (.055.077), 2 SRMR .070, was nonsignificant, diff (17) 22.12, p .18, suggesting that full metric invariance held for males and females. Then, we proceeded with the test of scalar invariance; the mean change in overall chi-square between the metric invariance model 2 and the scalar invariance model was significant, diff (10) 40.63, p .001, suggesting partial scalar invariance. We found that the equality constraints needed to be released for the intercepts of Item 3 (SE_AI) and Item 7 (SE_F). After doing so, the mean change in overall chi-square between the metric invariance model and the partial scalar invariance model, 2(195, N 179, 224) 366.548, p .001, CFI .930, RMSEA .066 (.056 .076), SRMR 2 .070, was no longer significant, diff (8) 15.39, p .052, suggesting that at least partial scalar invariance held for males and females. Construct validity of the MNESRES. Intercorrelations of the MNESRES subscales were all significant, mostly with p .01mean r(401) .38 for the total sample, mean r(176) .33 for males, mean r(223) .36 for femalesand ranged from .16 (.16 for males and .12 for females) between SE_AI and SE_G to .58 (.49 for males and .56 for females) across SE_F and SE_SE. Moreover, the zero-order correlations between MNESRES factors and the various (mal)adjustment indicators were in the expected direction (i.e., higher self-efficacy beliefs were related with less maladjustment). In particular, emotional stability was significantly ( p .01), positively related with all the MNESRES factors: mean r(401) .39 for the total sample, r(176) .36 for males, mean r(223) .24 for females. SE_AI was significantly ( p .01) and negatively related with irritability, depression, shyness, and fearful affectmean r(401) .33 for the total sample, mean r(176) .28 for males, mean r(223) .34 for femalesand positively related with need for reparation: r(401) .21, p .01, for the total sample; r(176) .24, p .01, for males; mean r(223) .21, p .01, for females. SE_F and SE_SE were significantly ( p .01) and
1 The adequacy of our sample size to test Model 5 was attested by the common rules of thumb for determining adequate sample size for a particular application of CFA (e.g., ratio of N to the number of variables in a model ( p), N/p 10, in our case 403/15 26.9; the ratio of N to the number of model parameters (q), N/q 5, in our case 403/53 7.60; Mundfrom, Shaw, & Ke, 2005). In addition, in agreement with Muthe n and Muthe ns (2002) strategy to decide on an adequate sample size, we implemented a Monte Carlo simulation with N 400 and with 10,000 iterations, and it emerged that the parameter estimate bias and the standard error estimate bias never exceeded |10%|; the standard error estimate bias for just one parameter (the factor loading of the second-order factor reflecting the perceived capability to deal with self-conscious/moral emotions on the third-order factor SE_NA) slightly exceeded |5%| (it was 5.20); and coverage was higher than 91% in all the examined parameters, except for the coverage correspondent to the aforementioned factor loading, whose coverage was 74%. Overall, if we keep in mind that just one out of 53 parameters was out of range and that neither of previous studies focused on complex CFA models with higher order factors (e.g., Lai & Kelley, 2011; Mundfrom et al., 2005), we can consider the outcome of the Monte Carlo simulation we implemented as a sufficient support of the adequacy of our sample size for this type of validation study.
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Table 2 Fit Indices for Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Multidimensional Negative Emotions Self-Regulatory Efficacy Scale in the Italian and U.S. Samples
Model 1b Sample Italy U.S. 2 190.59 166.60 df a 80 80 CFI .96 .95 AIC 13700.16 16459.87 RMSEA .059 .050 SRMR .043 .048
SE_AI
2b,d
SE_DS
SE_F
SE_NA
SE_SE
SE_G
Italy U.S.
245.42 210.06
84 83
.94 .93
13746.99 16497.33
.069 .060
.063 .055
SE_DS
SE_SE
SE_G
Italy U.S. 194.89 197.86 84 83 .96 .93 13696.46 16485.13 .057 .057 .044 .049
4b,c,d
5b,d
SE_impediment appeve moves SE AI SE_AI SE DS SE_DS
Italy U.S.
192.99 191.53
83 82
.96 .94
13696.56 16480.80
.057 .056
.043 .050
SE_F
Note. Items included in the confirmatory factor analyses were not reported in the graphs because of limited space. CFI comparative fit index; AIC Akaike information criterion; RMSEA root-mean-square error of approximation; SRMR standardized root-mean-square residual; SE_ self-efficacy; _AI anger/irritation; _DS despondency/sadness; _F fear; _SE shame/embarrassment; _G guilt; _NA negative affect. a Each model had a significant chi-square with p .001. This was likely due to the large sample size. b Only in the U.S. sample, modification indices suggested two correlations between error Items 8 and 9 and error Items 1 and 4. c Model based on Italian data needed unjustified constraints in order to run. d Model based on U.S. data needed unjustified constraints in order to run.
negatively related with irritability, depression, shyness, and fearful affectrespectively, mean r(401) .26 and .25 for the total sample, mean r(176) .28 and .18 for males, mean r(223) .19 and .26 for femaleswhereas they were not significantly related with need for reparation. In particular, the correlations of SE_F and SE_SE with need for reparation emerged only for males: r(176) .29, p .01, and r(176) .19, p .05, respectively. Finally, SE_G was significantly ( p .01), negatively related to all the examined indicatorsmean r(401) .15 for the total sam-
ple, mean r(176) .11 for males, mean r(223) .12 for females except for irritability. In summary, the overall pattern of the correlations supported a similar pattern across the sexes. Thus, the following regression analyses were computed with the total sample. The results of the standard multiple regression (see Table 3) demonstrated that the five measures of the MNESRES explained between 12% and 31% of variance in all (mal)adjustment outcomes. When all five self-efficacy subscales were used as simul-
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SE_NA
SE_AI
SE_DS
SE_F
SE_SE
SE_G
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Figure 1. Path diagram of the best factorial solution of the Multidimensional Negative Emotions SelfRegulatory Efficacy Scale in Italy. Error terms are represented by e1 e15. Standardized factor loadings are shown on the straight arrows; asterisks indicate the factor loadings fixed to 1. All paths are significant with p .001. SE_ self-efficacy; _NA negative affect; _AI anger/irritation; _DS despondency/sadness; _F fear; _SE shame/embarrassment; _G guilt.
taneous predictors, only SE_AI was significantly and negatively related with irritability; only SE_DS related significantly and negatively with depression; both SE_DS and SE_SE were negatively related to shyness; SE_F was negatively related to fearful affect; and only SE_AI and SE_G were significantly correlated with need for reparation, albeit in opposite directions (SE_AI was positively associated to need of reparation, whereas SE_G was negatively related to it). Moreover, these same relations were found in the hierarchical multiple regressions when controlling for emotional stability (see Table 3).
differences in their factorial structure across sexes in three countries (Italy, United States, and Bolivia). Thus, we expected a similar outcome in testing gender invariance of the MNESRES in the United States. Given the dearth of relevant cross-cultural research, we could not formulate clear hypotheses regarding differential functioning of the scales scores across Italy and the United States, although we could reasonably expect similarities in the structure (if not the intercepts) across the two samples (Bandura, 2002).
Method
Participants and procedures. The Italian participants were as in Study 1. The U.S. participants were 380 college students (42% male, 58% female) ranging in age from 18 to 23 years (M 19.00, SD 1.17). The U.S. sample was non-Hispanic Caucasian (67%), Hispanic (10%), Asian (9%), and Native American (8%), with other groups accounting for less than 2%. The U.S. participants received credit as part of an introductory psychology course. They did not receive payment for their involvement. Consents and assents were obtained and confidentiality was guaranteed for all participants. The study was approved by the
Study 2
Next we examined the generalizability of the factor structure obtained in Study 1 to another sample in a different country. Specifically, we examined if the model obtained in Study 1 replicated in a sample in the United States and if the structure of self-efficacy beliefs was comparable across the mean and women in the United States, and across the Italian and U.S. samples. As noted above, a previous study using two of five subscales of the MNESRES (SE_AI and SE_DS; Caprara et al., 2008) did not find
Table 3 Results of Multiple Regression of the Five Dimensions of the Multidimensional Negative Emotions Self-Regulatory Efficacy Scale on Relevant Indicators of (Mal)Adjustment
Hierarchical multiple regression (Standardized ) Standard multiple regression (Standardized ) Dimension Depression Irritability Shyness Fearful affect Need for reparation R2 .25 .31 .23 .12 .27 SE_AI .14 .46 .02 .05 .21 SE_DS .40 .15 .26 .12 .001 SE_F .02 .09 .09 .24 .05 SE_SE .04 .06 .25 .03 .05 SE_G .07 .10 .07 .02 .21 R2 .34 .52 .26 .18 .08 Step 1 Emo_St .54 .69 .32 .39 .08 SE_AI .03 .22 .04 .10 .24 SE_DS .28 .02 .21 .03 .02 Step 2 SE_F .08 .01 .02 .12 .04 SE_SE .01 .04 .36 .07 .05 SE_G .07 .09 .07 .01 .21
Note. SE_ self-efficacy; _AI anger/irritation; _DS despondency/sadness; _F fear; _SE shame/embarrassment; _G guilt; Emo_St emotional stability. p .05. p .01.
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Human Subjects Institutional Review Board of both Sapienza University of Rome and Arizona State University. Measures. The MNESRES was administered to both samples (further details on this scale are reported in Study 1). U.S. participants completed an English version of the MNESRES. A procedure of forward- and back-translation was used to ensure the linguistic and conceptual equivalence of this measure across languages (Maxwell, 1996). In particular, the translators were fluent in Italian and English, and in addition to forward- and backtranslating the measure, there were meetings between site coordinators and the translators to ensure that the measure would be valid in both sites by focusing not just on linguistic equivalence but also on the cultural meanings that would be imparted by that measure (Erkut, 2010; Pen a, 2007). Data analysis. In the U.S. sample, we examined the same models that were examined in Study 1 with the Italian sample in order to understand if the model that best represented the structure of self-efficacy in Italy would fit well in the U.S. sample. Then, multigroup CFA (MGCFA) was used to test the hypotheses regarding measurement invariance of the best factorial model for the MNESRES across the sexes in the U.S. sample and across the two countries (i.e., Italy and United States) with Mplus 5.1 (Muthe n & Muthe n, 2008). We used the same analytical approach and model fit indices for the MGCFAs tested in Study 1.
Multigroup factor analyses (country invariance). The mean change in overall chi-square between the configural invariance model, 2(163, N 403, 380) 386.150, p .001, CFI .948, RMSEA .057 (.050 .065), SRMR .048, and the metric invariance model, 2(173, N 403, 380) 400.361, p .001, CFI .947, RMSEA .056 (.049 .063), SRMR .051, was 2 nonsignificant, diff (10) 14.21, p .164, suggesting that full metric invariance held across the two countries. The mean change in overall chi-square between the metric invariance model and the 2 scalar invariance model was significant, diff (11) 73.64, p .001, suggesting partial scalar invariance. We found that the following equality constraints needed to be lifted for the intercepts of Item 3 (SE_AI), Item 5 (SE_DS), Item 7 (SE_F), and Item 12 (SE_SE). After releasing these constraints on intercept scores, the mean change in overall chi-square between the metric invariance model and the partial scalar invariance model, 2(184, N 403, 380) 411.626, p .001, CFI .947, RMSEA .054 (.047 2 .061), SRMR .052, was no longer significant, diff (7) 12.80, p .077, suggesting that at least partial scalar invariance held across the two countries. Alpha coefficients for reliability scores for SE_AI were .81 and .60, for SE_DS were .85 and .63, for SE_F were .83 and .70, for SE_SE were .83 and .74, and for SE_G were .83 and .72, respectively, in the Italian and U.S. samples.
Results
CFA (U.S. sample). The fit indices related to the models tested for the U.S. sample are reported in Table 2. Of the five models tested, although there was empirical support suggesting that Model 5 was a good approximation of the factorial structure of the MNESRES in the U.S. sample as in the Italian one, Model 1 provided a slightly better fit than Model 5. However, because one of our main goals was to understand to which extent there was invariance between Italy and the United States in the models structure, we compared Italy and the United States on Model 5, which was the best model in Italy and the second best (and well-fitting) model in the United States (and also used this model to test moderation by sex). Multigroup factor analyses (gender invariance, U.S. sample). The mean change in overall chi-square between the configural invariance model, 2(167, N 158, 222) 276.278, p .001, CFI .919, RMSEA .059 (.046 .071), SRMR .066, and the metric invariance model, 2(184, N 158, 222) 299.005, p .001, CFI .914, RMSEA .057 (.045.069), 2 SRMR .076, was nonsignificant, diff (20) 22.73, p .30, suggesting that full metric invariance held for males and females. However, the mean change in overall chi-square between the metric invariance model and the scalar invariance model was 2 significant, diff (7) 26.99, p .001, suggesting partial scalar invariance. We found that the following equality constraints needed to be lifted for the intercepts of Item 3 (SE_AI) and Item 8 (SE_F). After releasing these constraints on intercept scores, the mean change in overall chi-square between the metric invariance and the partial scalar invariance models, 2(192, N 158, 222) 312.324, p .001, CFI .910, RMSEA .057 (.046 .069), 2 SRMR .077, was no longer significant, diff (5) 13.32, p .025, supporting partial scalar invariance across women and men.
General Discussion
It has been demonstrated that specific emotions are evoked by different interpretations of events and are associated with different regulation strategies (e.g., Saarni et al., 2006). Based on the importance of differentiating among different negative emotions, and in accordance with the multifaceted nature of self-efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 1997), the construct of emotional self-efficacy was used to address negative emotions and to broaden the range of different emotions assessed. Thus, self-efficacy in regard to managing fear, shame/embarrassment, and guilt were examined in addition to self-efficacy in regard to anger/irritation and despondency/sadness, as in previous studies (Caprara et al., 2008). Accordingly, three new subscales were developed, and the structure of self-efficacy for dealing with five distinct negative emotions was examined in Italy and the United States.
Model Structure
Whereas the five subscales loaded on five correlated factors, SE_AI and SE_DS loaded on a second-order factor of self-efficacy beliefs in dealing with basic emotions resulting from impediment of appetitive motives, and SE_SE and SE_G loaded on a secondorder factor of self-efficacy beliefs in dealing with self-conscious/ moral emotions. Although SE_F did not load on either of these two second-order factors, it could be traced to the same third-order factor overarching the two second-order factors. This pattern was supported especially in Italy; in the United States, this model fit well but not quite as well as the model with five correlated factors (see discussion of this issue below). The third-order factor likely reflects similarity in method of assessment as well as a sense of mastery associated with negative emotional experience in general. In contrast, the second-order factors seem to reflect self-efficacy beliefs associated with, respec-
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tively, (a) the management of distinct emotions stemming from impediment of appetitive goals and (b) the management of selfconscious emotions stemming from obstruction of avoidance goals. In addition, SE_F by itself represents the management of emotions arising from ones inability to avoid events that threaten ones own integrity (fear). The pattern of our findings suggests that the judgments people make about their capacities to deal effectively with various emotions group together mostly based on the nature of goals that get obstructed (i.e., if the emotion stemmed from the obstruction of appetitive goals or of avoidance motives). Nonetheless, one should view the modeling results with caution to avoid any premature conclusions. That said, one should note that both gender and country invariance of the hierarchical model were fully supported at configural and metric levels, whereas country scalar invariance was partially supported (one intercept item in the SE_AI, SE_DS, SE_F, and SE_SE factors was not invariant). Overall, we can state that cross-sex comparisons in both Italy and the United States, as well as cross-country comparisons of factor means, can be considered meaningful because at least one item besides the marker item had invariant intercepts in each factor of the MNESRES (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). Because similarities are far from granting perfect correspondence between two countries, further studies are recommended to clarify the extent to which cultural differences may affect the manner in which people deal with situations that elicit various emotions (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992), and the manner in which self-efficacy beliefs operate in service of emotion regulation in different countries.
stability. This finding is in line with previous results supporting the view that self-efficacy beliefs moderate and shape change in stable traits (Caprara, Vecchione, Barbaranelli, & Alessandri, 2012).
Construct Validity
The construct validity of the MNESRES was supported by the finding that self-efficacy beliefs in dealing with negative emotions were all significantly and positively related with emotional stability. Furthermore, the five dimensions of the MNESRES were significantly and uniquely related with relevant indicators of (mal)adjustment. In accordance with previous findings (Caprara et al., 2008), SE_AI was uniquely and negatively related to irritability, whereas SE_DS was uniquely related to depression. SE_DS and SE_SE were both uniquely and negatively related to shyness. SE_F was uniquely, negatively related to fear. Although we assessed fear with just two items, its unique relation with SE_F attests to the validity of that short scale. SE_AI and SE_G were both related to the need for reparation, although in the opposite direction (high SE_AI was associated with high need of reparation; high SE_G was associated with low need of reparation). Perhaps people who feel capable of getting over anger/irritation for wrongs they have experienced are not only more effective in managing such emotion, but also more inclined to feel the need to repair the harmful consequences deriving to others from ones own wrongs. In contrast, the more people felt capable of containing feelings of guilt after having violated personal moral principles, the less they felt the need to repair their wrong doing. This result may reflect a dark side of self-efficacy beliefs in dealing with distinct negative emotions. However, further studies are in need to explore this hypothesis. The aforementioned significant results held when controlling for emotional stability. Indeed, self-efficacy beliefs in dealing with negative emotions predicted (mal)adjustment beyond emotional
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self-efficacy in regard to negative emotions may typically play a positive role in behavioral self-regulation, excessive confidence in ones own capacities to control and manage such emotions may carry some negative social consequences. People who are excessively confident in dealing with dangerous situations may expose themselves to exaggerated risk. People who are excessively confident in their capacities to manage their negative emotions may also be viewed by others as impolite and arrogant and, consequently, may experience social rejection. Moreover, people who are excessively confident in their capacities to refrain their feelings of remorse for their wrongdoing may ultimately become callous or cynical. Thus, an interesting tact for future work might be to examine social outcomes in a sample including significant proportions of individuals with extremely high and consistent emotional self-efficacy. Finally, the results of the present studies are consistent with the view that, across sexes, and across two countries like Italy and the United States, distinctive emotion self-regulatory efficacy beliefs rest upon different, although related, experiences and capacities. Thus, interventions for assessing and promoting emotional competence should be designed accordingly. In addition, our findings support the validity of MNESRES as a promising tool for practitioners in clinical settings. Therefore, it would be desirable to further corroborate the aforementioned findings across settings and with clinical samples.
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Received August 11, 2011 Revision received March 6, 2012 Accepted May 14, 2012