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Knowledge as Power: Science, Military Dominance, and U.S. Security Author(s): Robert L.

Paarlberg Reviewed work(s): Source: International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Summer, 2004), pp. 122-151 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137549 . Accessed: 26/04/2012 22:17
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Knowledge

as

Power

L.Paarlberg Robert

Science, Military Dominance, and U.S. Security

Can the UnitedStates
maintainits global lead in science, the new key to its recentlyunparalleledmilitary dominance? U.S. scientific prowess has become the deep foundation of U.S. militaryhegemony.U.S. weapons systems currentlydominate the conventional battlefield because they incorporate powerful technologies available only from scientificallydominant U.S. weapons laboratories.Yetunder conditions of globalization,scientificand technical(S&T)knowledge is now spreading more quickly and more widely, suggesting that hegemony in this area might be difficult for any one country to maintain.Is the scientific hegemony that lies beneath U.S. weapons dominance strong and durable, or only weak and temporary? Militaryprimacytoday comes from weapons quality,not quantity.EachU.S. military service has dominating weapons not found in the arsenals of other states. The U.S. Air Forcewill soon have five differentkinds of stealth aircraft in its arsenal,while no other state has even one. U.S. airbornetargeting capabilities, built around global positioning system (GPS) satellites, joint surveillance and target radars, and unmanned aerial vehicles are dominating and unique.1 On land, the U.S. Army has 9,000 M1 Abrams tanks, each with a fire-controlsystem so accurate it can find and destroy a distant enemy tank usually with a single shot. At sea, the U.S. Navy now deploys Seawolf nuclear submarines, the fastest, quietest, and most heavily armed undersea vessels ever built, plus nine supercarrier battle groups, each carryingscores of aircraft capable of delivering repeated precision strikes hundreds of miles inland. No other navy has even one supercarriergroup.2
at the Weatherhead L. Paarlberg is Professor andAssociate Robert at Wellesley Science College, of Political on international concentrates Center at Harvard Muchof his research forInternational Affairs University. agricultural policy.
The author wishes to thank Richard Cooper, Daniel Johnson, Devesh Kapur, Henry Nau, Don Paarlberg Jr., Robert Ross, Michael Teitelbaum, and two perceptive reviewers for helpful advice during his preparation of this article. 1. The United States controls 90 percent of all the world's military satellites. Eight days before Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, Maj. Gen. Franklin J. Blaisdell, U.S. Air Force director of space operations and integration, stated, "We are so dominant in space that I pity a country that would come up against us." Quoted in Andy Oppenheimer, "Arms Race in Space," ForeignPolicy, No. 138 (September/October 2003), pp. 81-82, at p. 81. 2. For a comprehensive examination of U.S. weapons dominance, particularly in the air, in space, International Vol. 29, No. 1 (Summer2004),pp. 122-151 Security,

@ 2004 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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Such weapons are costly to build, and the large relativesize of the U.S. economy (22 percent of world gross domestic product [GDP])plus the even larger U.S. share of global militaryspending (43 percentof the world total in 2002, at marketexchange rates) have been key to the development and deployment of these forces. Yet economic dominance and spending dominance would not suffice without knowledge dominance. It is a strong and rapidly growing S&T capacity that has allowed the United States to move far ahead of would-be competitors by deploying new weapons systems with unmatched scienceintensive capabilities. It was in the middle of the twentieth century that the global arms race more fundamentallybecame a science race. Prior to World WarII, military research and development (R&D)spending absorbedon average less than 1 percent of total majorpower militaryexpenditures.By the 1980s,the R&Dshare of major It was precisely durpower militaryspending had increasedto 11-13 percent.3 this as of science became a more ing period, importantpart militarymight, that the United States emerged as the clear global leader in science. During World WarII, the military might of the United States had come more from its industrial capacity (Americacould build more) than from its scientificcapacity (Europe, especially Germany and the United Kingdom, could still invent more). As that war came to an end, however, a fortuitous migrationof Europeanscientists to the United States plus wartime research investments such as the ManhattanProjectgave the United States the scientificas well as the industrial lead. During the Cold War,the U.S. lead grew stronger.Scientistsfrom the Soviet Union briefly challenged the United Statesin space, but then decisively lost the race to the moon. The United States responded to the Soviets' successful launching in 1957 of the world's first earth-orbitingsatellite, SputnikI, with much largerinvestments in its own science education and weapons R&Dprograms. By the later stages of the Cold War,U.S. weapons had attained a decisive quality advantage over Soviet weapons. This first became fully apparent to U.S. intelligencein 1976,when a Soviet pilot flew his mach-3MiG-25Foxbat jet interceptorto Japanin search of asylum. Upon inspection the Foxbat was found to be virtually devoid of any next-generationtechnologies;it was little
and at sea, see BarryR. Posen, "Commandof the Commons:The MilitaryFoundationof U.S. HeVol. 28, No. 1 (Summer2003),pp. 5-46. gemony,"International Security, 3. These data from the Stockholm InternationalPeace Research Institute (SIPRI)and Mary Vol. International Acland-Hoodare cited in VallyKoubi,"Military Organization, TechnologyRaces," 53, No. 3 (Summer1999),pp. 537-565, at p. 537.

military R&D expenditures doubled. Scales Jr.S.when stealth aircraft." President Ronald Reagan's 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative to develop and deploy a space-based shield against Soviet intercontinental missiles promised far more than U. laboratories could deliver at the time.S. Stephen D.the U. 2002). 179. qualitative edge was even more prominent. decision. Williamson Murray and Robert H. 1981).S.the U.International Security29:1 124 more than a "rocketwith a window.: Harvard University Press.S. battle deaths were suffered during the assault itself. battle deaths. Lita. Air Forcenow could destroy virtually any target on the surface of the earth. Etter. and without a thirty-eight-daybombing campaign (as in the first Gulf War). Delores M. forces in Vietnam.5 The U.S. 4.S. and (Washington.." Following the defeat of U.S. and suggested that the United Statesmight be betteroff investing in quantityratherthan quality. 7. 167-181.S. the United States conducted (this time with no battle deaths) an air campaign so dominating that the Serb air force did not even attempt to fly. leaving Soviet weapons scientists even further behind and contributing in some measure to the final demoralizationof the Soviet leadership. p. plus far less damage to Iraqi buildings. In the 1999 Kosovo conflict. "Defense Science and Technology.The Iraq War:A Military History (Cambridge. 6.U.lasers.S. National Defense (New York: Random House.C. yet it left a demoralizing impression on leaders in Moscow. and electronics for precision strikes gave U. In the second PersianGulf Warlaunched against Iraqin March2003.During President Ronald Reagan's administration.Froma safe altitude.4 But the U.to move away from a large conscriptarmy and toward a smaller and better-trainedall-volunteer force became a reason to increase ratherthan decrease science investmentsin weapons quality. forces a decisive edge. there were fewer unintended civilian casualties(one civilian died for every thirty-fivemunitions dropped). D. if that target had fixed and known geographic coordinates. and roads." in Albert H.6 Iraqiforces using Soviet equipment were easily brokenand expelled from Kuwait at a total cost of 148 U.Only 105 U.S. Teich. 5. forces were able to go all the way to Baghdad using only half the number of troops deployed in 1991 and only one-seventh as many (but far more precise) air-launchedmunitions.' U.as well as in the dark. U.. James Fallows.S. the United States was using GPS satellite-guided bombs capableof strikingwith devastatingprecisionin any weather. 2003). pp. infrarednight vision. . bridges. weapons quality advantage was in full view for the first time during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. post-Vietnam. Koubi. Mass. AAAS Science and TechnologyPolicy Yearbook Association for the Advancement of Science. Nelson. "Military Technology Races. some popular critics questioned the military advantage of hightechnology ("gold plated") weapons systems.S. eds. By the time of the Afghanistanwar in 2001.: American Stephen J.

Joint Forces Command cites several other performance deficits as well.and informationtechnology (IT)-to weapons design and use. Also necessary for this dominance are the nation's vast economic resources.000 sorties a day were able.new sensor systems. A classified assessment of the war by the U.S. precision. chemistry. One part of this strategy should be to contain the fur8. and its unmatched international military basing structure. to destroy the tanks and infantry vehicles of the Republican PervasiveGPScapabilities. 2003. October 3. "Pentagon Criticizes High Rate of Allied Deaths by Allied Fire.Then I judge the durability of the U. It should be the policy of the United States to devise a homeland security strategy that does not impair the nation's access to foreign science talent. conventional military dominance. A14. military dominance on the convenIt thus becomes importantto judge the magnitude and dutional battlefield.S. 9. Thom Shanker.S. I first measure the U. public schools in grades K-12. 10. near real-time"sensor Guard.as Power1125 Knowledge strike aircraftflying up to 1. speed. conventional military preponderance depends on more than just its lead in science and technology. forces to leverage the four key dimensions of the modern battlespaceknowledge. several quick-response "decapitation" strikes against regime leaders failed to produce results. In the sections that follow. 172.. even through a blinding sandstorm. It is the internationaldominance of the United States in these fields of science and technology that has made possible U. "Command of the Commons. lead in S&Trelativeto the capabilitiesof potentialrival states by using a variety of science output and resource input indicators. see Posen. U. p. to be sure. global lead in science and technology. scientific hegemony. By every indicator.2001."1 rability of U." New YorkTimes.assuming the United States can remain a large net importer of scientific talent and knowledge from abroad.S. The first is the greaterspeed with which scientificknowledge can diffuse (perhaps away from the United States)in the modern age of globalization. the currentlead of the United States is formidable.S. Upon examination. On the deficit side.S. Preserving this vital net inflow of scientific assets has been made more difficult.and lethality-and to prevail quickly at minimal cost. its skilled military personnel.The second is the poor science preparation still provided by so many U. 21.S. For a more complete review of the magnitude and limits of U. .9 The key to this revolution in militaryaffairs(RMA)has been the application of modern science and engineering-particularly in fields such as physics.8 to shooter" intelligence. Ibid.S.S. p. and computer-networkedcommunications allowed U.these two factorsneed not present a significantthreatto the U. lead by examining two possible weaknesses within its foundation. including weak battlefield damage assessment capabilities and "fratricide" losses to friendly forces. by the homeland security imperatives arising from the terroristattacksof September11." p. however.S.

South Korea. scientists.S. scientists working in the United States led other nations by a large margin in both numbers of papers published and numbers of citations. Victories that bring resentment will breed resistance. Leadin Scienceand Technology? The U. Vol. The United States is uniquely capable of innovating new "smart"technologies to protectsoft homeland targetsagainst unconventionalthreats. Table 1 reveals that scientists working in the United States have been publishing roughly four times as many papers as scientists in Japan. while worldwide scientific paper output increased 3. 275. numbersof registeredpatents. "TheScientificWealthof Nations. and the humanities. 793. scientists have received roughly five times as many citations as papers from the second-rankingU. the second-ranking country.The currentFortress Americaapproachrisks undercuttingthe nation'slead in scienceby keeping too many talented foreigners out.000 indexed journals published worldwide from all scientific fields. and papers published by U.Anotherpart of this strategy should be a more effective mobilization of the nation's massive S&T capacity when responding to the asymmetric threats that do arise. social sciences. Over the period 1981-94.7 percent per year.From 1992 to 2002. scientific lead also can be measured in numbers of patented inven11. lead in science and technology can be measured in terms of either final scientificoutput or R&Dinput. . or numbers of prizes won.International Security29:1 126 ther growth of terroristthreats by avoiding conventional military campaigns that create determined new political adversaries abroad. The Institutefor ScientificInformation(ISI)has maintainedsince 1981 a database of scientific citations from roughly 9.S.Scientificpaper growth rates above 10 percent per year were registeredby China. excluding mathematics. 7 (February1997). U. Singapore.7 percentper year." Science." The U.S.K. By all such measures.and Taiwan. This wide U. p.most easily expressed in the form of asymmetricthreatsagainst soft targets.S.the United States holds a commanding global lead. Scientificand technicaloutput is most often measuredby counting numbers of scientificpapers published. RobertM. No. yet these were higher growth rates from a much smaller base.S.S. numbers of papers cited in other published papers.including homeland targets. output increasedonly 2. May. How LargeIs the U. lead in scientific papers and citations has been diminishing over time.

157 ISIEssential Science Indicators.in-cites. Published Papers by Scientists.http://www.14 Prize winnings are another output indicator of relative science strength.S.S.050 665.006 193. Va.628.2002 (Arlington. who was otherwise confidentin his 1990book Boundto Lead of the continued strengthof the United States.323 570. reinforcingworries about a supposedly diminished U. viewed this patent trend as a "cause for concern. Japan.: National Science Foundation.006 Citations 30. In 1970 American inventors had accounted for 66 percent of U.albeit a lagging indicator because science prizes are usually awarded years or even decades following the moment of scientificachievement.A count of win12. competitivenessvis-a-vis Japanand other rising economies in Asia.Patentingby U.228 5.Canada. but by 1989that share had fallen to just 52 percent. Nye Jr. Counts of patent citations can help get around this problem.523.126 288. 14.548 198. inventors 1999 the U. National Science Foundation.gov/sbe/srs/seind02/c6/c6s4.S. patents. 1990). either because intellectual property laws are weak or because industrial trade secrets enjoy blanket protection.S.049 4.763 255.S. By U. share of new patents was back up to 54 percent."12 Nye need not have been concerned.Italy. share of patents awarded in the United States began to decline.Russia. inventors revived in 1990 and began growing more rapidly than patenting by foreign inventors once again.618. and numerous other countries.259.765. A more difficult problem is differing national approaches to intellectual property.13 have also continued to lead in patenting within foreign countries. registering more patents than local competitorsin Brazil.Bound to Lead:The Changing Nature of AmericanPower (New York:Basic Books. 2002).html. Top Ten Countries.667 459. Joseph S. In many countries inventions are not patented at all.France.EvenJosephNye. January 1992-June 2002 Rank by Papers/ Citations 1/1 2/4 3/3 4/2 5/5 6/6 7/7 8/17 9/10 10/20 Country United States Japan Germany England France Canada Italy Russia Australia China Papers 2. Patent counts have numerous limitations as a measure of science strength because the significance of different inventions varies widely. During the mid-1980s. and here as well the United States dominates.htm#c6s411.777.nsf.S.154 672.Germany.com/countries/2002allfields.308 619.935 2.753 3.831 5.. SOURCE: tions.963 346.245.591.105 3. p.186. 212.442 1. and Citations to Papers. 13. . http://www.as Power 127 Knowledge Table 1. the large U.844 494. Science and EngineeringIndicators.

while the Japanese share fell back down to its 1980 level of just 20 percent. 1990). share of global high-technology production remained at a strong 33 percent.000. but more careful thinkers argued that the U. No. "The Myth of Asia's Miracle. The ISI has used its citation database to generate a list of the world's 1. Two-thirds of these scientists (815) worked at institutions in the United States. chemistry.S. known as "high-technology manufactures.16 Popular concerns were laid to rest when the U.17 In addition to papers.nobel. India 2." working at 429 different institutions in twenty-seven different countries around the world. the People's Republic of China has none. "The Geography of Scientific Citation.S. share of global high-technology production subsequently revived to reach an unprecedented 36 percent by 1998. In the decades around World War II.S. 6 (November/December 1994). it is also possible to count numbers of highly productive scientists. See also Paul Krugman. and American scientists began to establish a commanding lead. pp. Vol. The next four countries in rank order are the United Kingdom (with 100 of these top scientists). See Henry R. pp. 18.International Security29:1 128 ners of all internationally recognized science prizes worth more than $200. and Japan with 34. and medicine. with American scientists entering the winning ranks in large numbers only in the 1930s. Canada with 42. proportionately fewer German and French scientists won.1s These ISI database results also indicate that highly cited scientists tend to 15. prizes.html. physiology." Throughout the 1980s the U. Science and Engineering Indicators. 17. http://www. lead in S&T is the country's share of world production of technology-intensive manufactured goods. Russia has 2. five were living and working in the United States." Environment and Planning A. 761-765. 62-78.15 A more derivative indicator of the U. patents. and Taiwan 1. Scientists from the United Kingdom consistently won approximately 10 percent of all awards in the twentieth century. Complete Nobel Prize records are available from the Nobel e-Museum. This is a lead that has continued into the twenty-first century. It then declined to 30 percent from 1988 to 1995.2002. Michael Batty. 16. 73. winning roughly half of all prizes given.S. Germany with 62. National Science Foundation. reveals that German scientists won most of the awards early in the twentieth century. lead was still strong. Nau." Foreign Affairs. 35 (2003). Vol. citations. . while Japan's share grew from 20 percent in 1980 to 26 percent in 1991. including Nobel Prizes and the Fields Medal in mathematics.se/index.222 most "highly cited scientists. and high-technology production. Of the seven 2003 Nobel Prize laureates in physics. Concerns spread that Japan might be emerging as a technological challenger at least in commercial manufacturing. TheMyth of America'sDecline: Leadingthe WorldEconomyinto the 1990s (New York: Oxford University Press.

the population's entrepreneurialdrive to start new venA total of forty-six locations tures. hubs were Albuquerque. and Donna Fossum.23 These R&D in19. eight were in the United States. Calif. 2001 (New York: Oxford University Press. MR-1639. in constant dollar terms.close contactswith nonprofitfoundations. the presence of established companies and multinationalcorporationsto provide expertise and economic stability.0-OSTP (Santa Monica. San Francisco. industry. New York City.0-OSTP (Santa Monica. with three hubs total.S. and the media to find the geographic locations that mattermost for innovation in the new digital age. The total U. Of the seventeen hubs that had the highest aggregate scores. Steven W.19 A recentglobal inventory of such innovationhubs in the area of informationtechnology found that a preponderantnumber were indeed located within the United States. New Foundationsfor Growth:The U.21 The closest competitor was the United Kingdom. Innovation System Todayand Tomorrow. September 2002).and private-sectorlaboratories.S. all of the institutions that house ISI'shighly cited scientists lie within a two-mile radius of the MassachusettsInstituteof Technology.22 U. Popper and Caroline S.: Science and Technology Policy Institute. RAND. January 2002)." and thirteen of these forty-six hubs were in the United States. Austin. The closest security rival of the United States with multiple hubs on this list was China. and only two in the top seventeen. and the availability of venture capital. These investments have a recent history of steady expansion. These eight U. or even in the top thirty. R&D portfolio (private as well as public investments) exceeds $250 billion a year. R&D grew from $100 billion in 1976 to $265 billion in 2000. Kei Koizumi. . Boston. FederalInvestment in R&D. Wagner.S. Wired magazine consulted local sources in government.and access to venture capital. 23. In the area of Boston. Calif.20 around the world were identified in this manner as "technology hubs. 45. lead in science and technology is to consider inputs of R&D investment. 15." 21. RAND. total U.S. and Silicon Valley.In 2000. 20.several competing first-classuniversities. for example. p.S. p. Human Development Report. but none of China's hubs were in the top seventeen. United Nations Development Programme. Such geographicclustersof scientists can grow into highly productive "innovation hubs" if they feature the right mix of both public. R&D INVESTMENT Perhaps the best way to measure the U. 22.: Science and Technology Policy Institute. 2001). Eachlocation was rated on a scale of one to four in four areas:ability of areauniversities and researchfacilities to train skilled workers or develop new technologies. RaleighDurham-Chapel Hill. Batty. Seattle. with four hubs total.as Power1129 Knowledge work in tight geographicclusters.S. "The Geography of Scientific Citation. Elisa Eiseman.MR-1338.

caused some defense advocates to worry. EU Commissioner Chris Pattenwarned his fellow Europeansof what he called a "brutallysimple statistic":the United States with just 4 percent of the world's population accounted for 50 percent of the world's R&D spending. Charles I. http://papers.it is also worrying for Europe's future capacity to rival the United States in highly capable military technologies. 2003.25 States invests 40 percent more in R&D than the original fifteen European Union (EU)states combined. Calif.this continuedprivatization of U.not just largereconomic size. Eric Bloch. and Fossum.cfm?abstract_id?72188. U." Issues in Science and Technology. 4 (Summer 2003). To judge the military value of these R&D investments more carefully." Times Higher Education Supplement (London).24 yet they are also at the foundation of U. military supremacy.69 percent in the United States.S. economic growth and commercialcompetitiveness internationally.S. Claire Sanders.it is necessary first to separatethe less vital private component from the more vital public component. Research Strength.comparedwith 2. Eiseman.26EU officials have repeatedly described these figures as worrying for the future economic performanceof Europe compared with the United States. In 2002. lead over the EU in R&Dspending had widened for the seventh year in a row." Stanford University Economics Working Paper No. 25. FederalInvestment in R&D.27 During an interludein the 1990s.ssrn. No. "European R&D Draining to U.total public-sectorfederalR&Dbudget authority(defense plus nondefense) had earlierincreasedfrom $60 billion in 1976 to nearly $90 billion during the Reaganadministration.S.This concern was only temporary.by 158 percent. 27. 20-22. "Securing U.com/sol3/papers. R&D.S. investments in R&D far outstrip those of other wealthy states.S.which reflectedin part a real dollar shrinkageof public federal R&D. effort.S. July 8.. 26.International Security29:1 1130 vestments are routinely credited with boosting U. Total gross domestic expenditures on R&D in the United States exceed those of The United Japan. 97-015 (Stanford. In June 2003.from 50 percentin the mid-1980sto more than 66 percent of the total in 2003.Vol.: Stanford University.the second-largestR&D-investingcountry.S. Economic Growth in a World of Ideas. 1998). Koizumi. The private share of the total U. Jones.S.S.but then fell back to just $80 billion in the mid-1990s. pp. TotalR&Dinvestments in the EU in 2000 equaled 1. This is a reflectionof a greaterU.The federal R&Dinvestment decline was reversed for nondefense programs in the late 1990s in 24. R&D portfolio has increased significantly. In constant dollar terms (fiscalyear 2002 dollars).S. 19. June 27.9 percent of GDP. the European Commission reportedthat the U. "Sources of U. .

the domestic science community responded to this neglect with a successful Congress-basedlobbying effort. 19. 13. No. "Scientists have become much more politically savvy.S. media initiatives."28 When total federalR&Dspending went into a decline in the mid-1990s. As Allan Bromley. at p. the president's FY 1999 budget request contained significant new increases for nondefense federal R&D.the AmericanAssociation for the Advancement of Science circulated in Congress a budget analysis that projected a further 25-30 percent constant-dollardecrease in federal science and technology support between FY 1995 and FY2000. "Science's Growing Political Strength.In June 1996. For defense programs. The post-Cold Wardecline in federal military R&Dspending took longer to reverse. military R&D fell 16 percent between 28. 4 (Summer 2003).the decline was decisively reversed after the September11 attacks.and Technologywith a new National Science and TechnologyCouncil that he chairedbut failed to use. prompting five Republican senators led by Phil Grammof Texasto submit legislation in January1997 calling for a doubling of the nondefense federal science and technology budget over the next decade. the scientific community used national economic competitiveness as its justificationfor advocating more nondefense federal R&D money. Thus by FY 2003. federal nondefense R&Dbudget authoritywas increased 24 percent in nominal terms. Federal R&D investments in nondefense programs recovered partly due to the political strength of a new domestic science lobby.Engineering." Issues in Science and Technology. scientific community.former assistant to the president for science and technology.S.this domestic science lobby pushed successfully to revive at least the nondefense component of that spending. . Ibid. roughly 20 percent in real dollars above the earlier Reagan-erapeak.as Power 131 Knowledge response to lobbying efforts from the U. total federal R&D outlays were back up to $112 billion. between FY 1996and FY2000.and CapitolHill events.explains. developing effective advocacy groups that drive federal policies and budgets through grassroots lobbying. Bill Clintonfailed to meet even once with the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology. In the post-Cold Warpolitical environmentof the 1990s. The Clinton administrationhad initially been neglectful of federal R&Dinvestments.He also undercut the executive branch access of scientists by replacing the Federal Coordinating Council for Science. In addition. Allan Bromley and Michael S. D. pp. U.29Beginning in 1995. Lubbell. 29.Vol. 13-15. In constant dollar terms. As a result of these lobbying efforts. In his first term.

testing.pdf. was spending roughly as much on just the weapons development component of its military budget as any other single state was spending on its entire military budget. By 1998. Lieberman asked. In 1999. by 2003. The Department of Defense R&D budget accounts for roughly 94 percent of total national defense R&D budget authority.S. military R&D spending had recovered enough in constant dollar terms to surpass even the 1991 late Cold War-era level. above the rate of inflation. Department of Defense R&D spending was down to just 43 percent of total federal R&D spending. U. "FY 2001 Department of Defense Share of Federal R&D Funding Falls to Lowest Level in 22 Years. military R&D investments increased as well. Jeff Bingaman. By 2002. This recovery of U. June 2002.32 Support for military R&D spending was only restored following the arrival of a new Republican administration in Washington in January 2001. 13-17. defense R&D investments are in the development. testing. Senate led by Senators Joseph Lieberman. according to calculations prepared by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. well below the FY 1986 peak level of 63 percent." Data Brief NSF 01-319 (Arlington. when total Department of Defense outlays for research.org/enews/fyi/. and evaluation of specific weapons systems. "Techno-Warfare:Military R&D. to provide the more fundamental science and technology knowledge needed to meet future military requirements.33 The United States. and then most decisively following the September 11 terror attacks.S.se/milex/aprod/nationaldata/equip_exp_mil_r&d. Lieberman. 2001). Current information on U.: Division of Science Resources Studies. SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Project. http://projects . and evaluation reached $56 billion. 31. writing in Joint Force Quarterly...30 While federal nondefense R&D began increasing after 1996. and another decrease slated for the next fiscal year .S. Va. where will our technical superiority come from?"31 Such alarms failed at first to trigger any noticeable presidential or congressional response. Joseph I. at p. 32." Joint Forces Quarterly. Total defense spending increased dramatically. federal defense R&D outlays continued into 2003. and as a subcategory.sipri. 14. Current priorities for S&T spending include further investments in IT so as to ad30. defense S&T advocates in the U. "With a 30 percent decline in military research. R&D funding for the Department of Energy's atomic energy defense activities accounts for the remaining share.aip.International Security29:1 132 1991 and 1996.S. but the Department of Defense also engages in more basic S&T research. . defense R&D spending policy is available at the American Institute of Physics Bulletin of Science Policy News. as shown in Table 2. 33. 22 (Summer 1999). February 26. development. pp. and Rick Santorum were sounding the alarm and calling for annual 2 percent increases in military R&D. and by FY 2001.S. National Science Foundation. Most U.No. spending for military R&D remained essentially flat. http://www.

2000. FederalInvestment in R&D.as Power1133 Knowledge Table 2.7 3. Table 2 reveals that Europe was falling further behind the United States in military R&D investment even prior to September 11.7 3.4 percent of 34. Koizumi." OECD Observer.S.7 2001 44.1 3. followed by the Russian Federation (30 percent). Eiseman. Among all the wealthy nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) between 1990 and 1998.4 3.5 3.8 2000 42.4 1. 35.4 9. this important subcategory of defense R&D spending increased as well. "R&D Defence Spending Falls. and new weapons and capabilities based on nanotechnology.7 10.0 3.1 1996 41.6 - - SOURCE: SIPRIMilitaryExpenditure and Arms Production Project.3 9.S.se/milex/aprod/nationaldata/equipexpmil_r&d. but these countries have much smaller R&D budgets overall. The United States still puts 0. This S&T budget in the Department of Defense supports roughly 35 percent of all federal research in computer sciences and 40 percent of all federal engineering research.5 1.7 4. but the ratio in the United States declined briefly and then recovered to 55 percent.2 1.3 1.7 10. and by 2000 had increased to more than four to one. reaching $10 billion in FY 2002.9 1995 42. and Fossum.1 1.7 4. June 2003. .9 1997 42. investments in defense R&D were recovering from their initial post-Cold War slump.0 14. 69.35 The closest competitor to the United States in terms of allocating R&D budget shares to the military has been the United Kingdom (35 percent).6 3.5 1998 42. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.6 3. vance the RMA. to total EU spending on military R&D was slightly more than three to one when the Cold War ended in 1991. the defense share of budgetary R&D appropriations declined from 37 percent to 30 percent.5 1. Following the September 11 attacks.$ billions.1 1.6 4.S.4 6. http://projects . at constant 2000 prices) 1991 United States United Kingdom France Germany Total European Union 49.5 9. The ratio of U. Expenditure on Military R&Din the United States and Western Europe.7 3.2 - 2002 50. biological sensors.April 28. missile defense. other governments allowed such investments to continue sliding. 19912002 (U.5 3.34 THE POSITION OF POTENTIAL RIVALS As U.9 3.pdf. p. back up in real dollar terms to the early 1990s' level.8 1999 42.5 2.sipri. and robotics.6 11.

more than twice the proportion allotted by the United Kingdomor France. "From Crisis to Transition: The State of Russian Science Based on Focus Groups with Nuclear Physicists (U)." UCRL-JC-146574 (Livermore.gov/ future2002/ponarsversion3_12-10-01.The Soviet Union at one point was devoting as much as 2-3 percent of its gross national product to militaryR&D.The list of deficits is long. and Russia's once-privilegeddefense scientistswere suddenly obliged to acceptlow salaries and to work in deterioratingresearchfacilities with outdated equipment. p. Eiseman."37 tal R&D expenditures in Russia are now smaller than those in Canada. were "close to Science in Russia will recover only slowly from this collapse.but its satellite capaMR-1292-AF (Santa Monica.a largershare than most industrial countries now invest in total R&D.llnl.and its aviation industry is based mostly on antiquated Soviet technology. Comparisons are made converting foreign currencies to U. Koizumi. The Military Potential of China's CommercialTechnology. U.yet their science capacitiesremainfarbehind those of the United China'smost advanced faStates. Department of Energy.38 The Chinese economy has now enjoyed twenty-six consecutive years of strong growth based in part on the acquisition of new technologies. p.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Tostarvation.36When the Soviet system collapsed. Nuclear physicists protested with hunger strikes or took menial jobs in other fields. China's nuclear power industry is rudimentary.S. The militaryR&Deffortsof today's RussianFederationare only a fractionof the determined (yet still inadequate)efforts made by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. FederalInvestment in R&D. 63. In space China's launch capabilityis impressive for a developing country. Calif. .03 percent of its GDP to defense R&D. 2001). and only about 4 percent the level of total R&D spending in the United States. 36.International Security29:1 134 its GDP into military R&D. Gerber. China has only limited supercomputercapabilities and its PCs are composed primarily of imported parts. in his words. Quoted in Theodore P.S.: RAND. and Fossum.Japanis a heavy R&Dspender. In microelectronics cilities have been six to eight years behind the state of the art and continue to be criticallydependent on imports. state spending on military R&Dwas sharply reduced. Today China's leaders clearly aspire to close the military technology gap with the United States. 117. In 1996the directorof the second largest nuclearresearchcenter in Russia took his own life because he could no longer endure a situationin which his employees had not been paid for five months and. 38. 2001). Calif. Roger Cliff.but it allocatesonly a trivial 0. http://cgsr.html. dollars with OECD purchasing power parity exchange rates. 37. In telecommunications China depends on foreign firms for advanced transmission technologies.

and inadequate protections for intellectual property. x-xi.for example.First.Despite China'ssize. The Military Potential of China's CommercialTechnology. total numbersof scientists and engineers currentlybeing trained in China are substantiallyfewer than in the United States. Indigenous innovation remains difficult in China because of various institutionalconstraintsincluding continued state controls over information flows. The United States awards roughly eight times as many doctoraldegrees in the naturalsciences and in engineeringas China. .S.Finally.Despite several decades of strong economic growth. Ibid. the military systems that the United States and China field in 2020 will largely reflect the technologies available to those countries in 2010 or earlier. 62. weak factor markets.Roger Cliff concluded in 2001 that China's resourcesfor technologicalprogresswere roughly comparableto those 39. four decades after this had been done by the Soviet Union and the United States. by the difficultiesJapan'sdefense industries have experienced in developing F-2 indigenous fighter aircraft.but it still remainslimited by advanced countrystandards. Cliff. Much of China's scientificprogress results not from indigenous R&Dbut from technology transfersassociated with foreign investments by private firms. p.39 According to a 2001 assessment.40 China's stock of scientificcapital is growing rapidly.pp. because development cycles for weapons are long.the process of integrating them into a smoothly functional whole is challenging. This has been demonstrated.. In 2003 China used a modified version of the Russian Soyuz technology to put its first manned satellite into orbit. Thus. Furthermore. R&D total (in purchasingpower dollars) and only 50 percentof the Japanesetotal.. China'saverage level of commercialtechnology will still lag behind advanced world practice. military systems are often designed around technologies that are a decade or more old by the time the weapons become operational (In the United States... China's total R&Dspending remains less than 25 percent of the U.Even though militarysystems build on technologies that are fundamentally civilian. in military technolChina is destined to remain significantlybehind well into the future: ogy China's overall military technology in 2020 will still be significantlyinferiorto that of the United States. even if all the component technologies of a weapon system are available.as Power1135 Knowledge bilities remain limited.Second.the process of translating civilian technological capabilities to military technology is nontrivial.for several reasons. 13 to 15 years typically elapse between the initiationof a majorweapon development programand the initial operational capability of the first production units). 40. they still involve technologies that are specifically military and thus must be independently developed.

and space. xv. a comparable level of military R&D spending today 41." China Brief. when China launched the so-called National High-Technology Research and Development Program (the 863 Program."42The urgency of this new effort was reinforced when China witnessed the dominance of U. Jiang Zemin. At that point. implying that by 2020 China's civilian economy might be able to attain the average technological level of South Korea or Taiwan today. nanoweapons. told his colleagues that China must ready itself for what he called a century of sustained "intellectual warfare.. "Military Sales to China: Going to Pieces. lasers. Calif. 2003). 44. 2003.: Stanford University Press. officially announced that the nation would reduce the size of its current forces so as to redeploy its limited resources to "quicken the pace of constructing our military's information technology. began to talk of switching to a quality-based RMA. directed energy. For China.International Security29:1 1136 of South Korea or Taiwan in the 1970s. which will hardly be standing still. Qian Xuesen. Quoted in Joseph Kahn. "China Plans to Cut 200. the Nuclear to the InformationAge (Stanford. September 2. High technology was then elevated to even higher priority after 1986. as Deng Xiaoping put technology and the military third and fourth-after his list of the "four agriculture and industry-on modernizations" that China should pursue in the 1980s. unmanned combat planes. Feigenbaum. Jamestown Foundation. A9. high-technology weapons in the 1991 Gulf War. The Soviet Union failed to catch up in a qualitative arms race with the United States in the 1970s and 1980s even though it devoted 2 to 3 percent of its entire gross national product to military R&D. Ibid.Vol. China's post-Maoist leaders appreciated the contribution of science to military preparedness."44 Such efforts notwithstanding. Fisher Jr. p. China will not be able to switch quickly from a high-quantity force to a high-quality force. Richard D. p. Chinese military theoreticians began to endorse an even wider range of military high technologies. given its continued four to one advantage over China in new R&D investments.S.000 Troops over 2 Years. No. and more. 2. including information warfare. The People's Liberation Army (PLA).41 This will not be enough to catch the United States." New YorkTimes.. 43.China's and Strategic Techno-Warriors: NationalSecurity Competition from .43 In September 2003 China's military chief. Evan A. In 1987 the father of China's strategic missile program. 42. 2002). which traditionally had counted on quantity to trump quality. so-named because it was initiated in March 1986) to speed the development of military and dual-use technologies in areas such as IT. space weapons. biotechnology. 23 (November 21.

S. the 1990 level). Times articlein May 2004 asserted that the lead abroad?A front page New York United States had "alreadystarted to lose its worldwide dominance in critical areas of science and innovation.45 than trying to match the United States B-2 bomber for B-2 bomber. The Military Potential of China's CommercialTechnology. "U. maintain production lines for PLA military orders and have their own R&D institutes that develop military products from weapons to satellites.S.as Power 137 Knowledge Rather would requirean unlikely doubling of total military budget outlays. lead in S&Tmust be considered. Cliff. Estimating China's total spending on military R&D is difficult. The first is the more rapid pace at which scientific innovations now spread across borders in the age of globalization. Instead China should consider a number of radically asymmetric actions (called "nonmilitary war" actions or "nonwar military" actions) including cyberattacks. 55. and the use of weapons (including chemical and biological weapons) not recently permitted under the international laws or rules of war. "China: War without Rules. 63. p.-China Commission Public Hearing on China's Budget Issues. because much of the official defense budget excludes R&D outlays. Sharpe. environmental disruption. pp.. 2001.: M. or operated now by corporation groups.S. Shambaugh.S. 2004. superiorityin science-basedweapons." Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. and a drop in the U. The nominally private defense industries run by civilian ministries under the State Council. N.S. This article cited a dip in numbers of papers published by U. Will poor science education at home undercut the U. 46."Some of this loss may be real.htm. .e.S.Y. computer networks or laser attacks on U. 1999). "Written Testimony for U. Leadin Scienceand Technology? Two hypothetical threats to the currentU. James R. See Ming Zhang. A PLA Art Press publication in 1999 entitled Warfarebeyond the Rules argued that China should not fall into the trap of trying to match or defeat U. May 3. Is Losing Its Dominance in the Sciences. Vol. but much is imagined. http://www.." New YorkTimes.S.46 How SecureIs the U.China will more likely focus in the short run on possible "niche" or "asymmetric"responses to the overwhelming U. share of its own industrial patents. Xiaonong Cheng.uscc . even for Chinese officials. Al. Virus attacks on U. China'sMilitary Faces the Future (Armonk. drug smuggling. public schools in teaching science and matheuing underperformance matics in grades K-12.gov/textonly/transcriptstx/tesxia. back down to 52 percent (i.S. Most investment in military R&D in China comes not from the defense budget but from the civilian investment budget.S.S. terrorism.S." December 7.p. Lilley and David L. physicists.E. eds.47 45. 47. No. Will this more rapid diffusion of scientific knowledge give a catch-up advantage to laggards and make it difficultfor the United States to hold its currentlead? The second is the continof U. William Broad. 6 (November/December 1999).S. satellites might be an example. 16-18. forces on the RMA battlefield.

: MIT Press. Vol. No. "Cross-over. Among countries that are scientificallycapable. more knowledge is now available from abroad through globalization.as tabulated by the National Science Foundation. and on the scientific and technological literacy of the receiving One empirical study found that societies with a science production society. will leading scientific states find it more difficult to maintain their advantage?The wider availabilityof low-cost telecommunicationshas indeed led to a "demise of distance"as regardsinformationflows. 32.and such divides cannot easily be bridged through new investments in hardware alone.50Uptake and effective use at the receiving end depends heavily on levels of social or institutional development. 865-885. the internationalsharing of knowledge does have large effects.International Security29:1 138 THE MORE RAPID DIFFUSION OF TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE In the age of globalization. James Gleick. 2003). September 2002). Nalyn Siripong. and far more sharing among such capable countries is clearly taking place. and the InternetWorldwide Poverty. 52.but the quantityneeded to catch up is even greater. the Digital Divide(Cambridge. 2001).48 One empirical study of science and technology informationflows within the United States between 1975 and 1999 discovered the average geographic distance between scientific collaboratorsand the average distance between inventors and those citing their inventions had increased by roughly two-thirds. The study expected this threshold to rise with the steadily increasing knowledge For societies at the bottom of requirementsof today's catching-up process. the internationally coauthoredshare of all published scientificand technicalarticles." Working Paper 2002-06 (Wellesley. "The Demise of Distance? The Declining Role of Physical Distance in Knowledge Transmission. 50.51 rate of fewer than 150 scientific papers per 1 million inhabitantsper year are markedly less able to absorb flows of scientific or technical knowledge. 49. Scientists in the United States participatedheavily in these internationalcol48. 51. DigitalDivide:CivicEngagement." Research Policy. Between 1981 and 1995. WhatJustHappened: Frontier A Chronicle (New York:Panfromthe Information theon. Daniel Johnson. (New York: Cambridge University Press.and too little of what is currentlyavailable is taken up or put to effective use. Mass.49 Yet "digital divides" between advantaged and disadvantaged societies can impede this spread of scientific and technical information. Pippa Norris. Americo Tristao Bernardes and Eduardo da Motta e Albuquerque.52 the science capabilitiesladder.: Department of Economics. Thresholds. and SocialInclusion: Technology Rethinking .increased from 17 percent to 29 percent. Information Mass. and Amy Brown. 5 (May 2003). and Interactions between Science and Technology: Lessons for Less-Developed Countries. 2002). Mark Warschauer. pp. Wellesley College. with scientific knowledge diffusing more rapidly across borders.

publishing more internationallycoauthoredarticlesthan scientists in any other country. the United Kingdom. National Science Foundation.ratherthan the other way around. 54. but this is only because the total numberof articlespublished by U. International Cooperationin Researchand Development (Santa Monica. Wagner. Only India. are in fact looking to stay.and a preponderanceof this equipment is located in the United States. and Russia are less internationalized. and Economic Sciences. more than one-fifthof all the membersof the American Physical Society live abroad.S. rather than across internationalborders). many of these talented foreign scientists never go home.as Power1139 Knowledge laborations. One 1998 study found that 47 per53.International to the United Mobilityof Scientistsand Engineers States-Brain Drain or Brain Circulation?NSF 98-316 (Arlington.'s currentlyengaged in R&D in the United States were born This brain drain works strongly to the relativescientificadvantageof abroad. and Scott Hassell.: Science and Technology Policy Institute. Behavioral. for several reasons. 2001). Hypothetically.Forexample. 1998).Second.55 the United States. scientists is so large.China. by this measure. a great deal of American science remains autonomous despite increased internationallinkages. and 60 percent of institutionalsubscriptions to the journalof this society are purchasedby foreign universities and laboratories. Nearly 30 percent of all Ph.D. or any of the continentalEuropeancountries. Also.lower than in Canada. RAND. U.S. 55.S.This means that most of the foreign collaboratorsof Americanscientists are coming to the United States. Japan.54 The bulk of all collaborationsin American science still remain contained within the country (the greatest demise of distance has been among collaboratorswithin the United States. Caroline S. National Science Foundation. Calif. Yet this increased internationalizationof science need not imply a net leakage of scientific knowledge out of the United States.the United States might risk a net loss of scientificadvantage if foreign scientists or students were to come on temporaryvisas.The internationally coauthoredshareof U. Many of those who come. laboratoriesand universities. . published articlesis relativelylow by international standards. a leading reason for the growth of international collaborationin science has been an increased number of "big science" projectsthat requirethe sharing of expensive large-scaleequipment. Allison Yezril. First. not national.S. Va.and then returnhome.: Directorate for Social.53 The leading scientific societies now tend to be global. however. scientists do publish more internationally coauthored articles than scientists in other countries. work briefly in U.and it means that the essential nodes of innovation remain geographically located within the United States. than the United States. revised November 10. Ibid.

Science knowledge also moves internationally when multinational business firms transfer technology through commercial sales or foreign direct investments. and enforcers do not require proof that technical data changed hands. Skolnikoff. The New Face of War:How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century (New York: Free Press.'s had stayed on. is empowered under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act to control through the issuance of licenses the export of specifically identified military items and technologies. Eugene B. Growing GlobalMigration and Its Implicationsfor the United States.D. Is Losing Its Dominance in the Sciences.thirds of these students will never go home." Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). March 2001). combined with a strong net brain drain away from rival or potentially powerful neutral states.59 There is of course no way to 56. yet this is hardly an uncontrolled process.C. 23.S.D.'s were still working in the United States when this 1998 study was done. and roughly half of the Canadians went home. companies had been providing sensitive information to China. D.000 students from developing countries. "Re- . Communications satellite technologies were recently removed from Department of Commerce control and placed under more restrictive State Department ITAR control. Broad. p." 57.International Security29:1 1140 cent of foreign students on temporary student visas who earned doctorates in the United States in 1990 and 1991 stayed on and were still working in the United States in 1995. and the students most likely to stay were those from nonallied countries. 195.S. p. National Intelligence Council. and thousands of China's brightest young scientists have taken advantage. Numbers of science and engineering doctoral graduates from China and India who say they intend to stay began to decline after 1996.56 U. NIE 2001-02D (Washington. Bruce Berkowitz. law has made it easier for Chinese students to remain in the United States following the Tiananmen Square crisis of 1989. communist countries. More than 500. when it was learned that U. The U. according to the National Science Foundation.D. but 79 percent of Indian Ph. Nearly 90 percent of science Ph. "U. 58.58Commercial products and technologies with a potential military dual-use are similarly controlled under the 2001 Export Administration Act.57 The comforting picture that emerges for the United States is one of "brain circulation" among allied states.S. Ibid.S. 2003).'s from South Korea went home. 59.: National Intelligence Council. including "technical data. and former communist countries are currently studying outside of their home countries-many in the United States-and the National Intelligence Council estimates that roughly two. administered by the Department of Commerce. simply talking to a foreign engineer can trigger a violation charge. and 88 percent of Chinese Ph. the Department of State controls all items on a specific munitions list. in the Bureau of Political Military Affairs. State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.

as Power1141 Knowledge keep knowledge of sensitive new technologieslocked up forever. LawrenceLivermore.In 1998America'sLos Alamos. 61. Roger Cliff explains: "No matter how advanced the technological level of China's civilian industries or how sophisticated the civilian equipment and components available for import. fusion weapon detonation in 1952was followed by a Soviet detonation just ten months later.and the first U. Currently. and these have to be developed indigenously.S. and 60.S." paper presented at the "International Conference on Science. The first U. it took only three years for Germany to build its own Dreadnought Nassau-class copy. but copying and imitationthrough espionage will not be enough to bring laggard states all the way up to a full RMA capability. . military R&D discoveries will diffuse internationally?Security precautions notwithstanding. 65-73. Irving A. the security loss is often containedbecause the weaponization of these technologies still requires a strong local R&D capability. employees of these labs traveled frequentlyto scientific conferencesand laboratoriesabroad. rivals will be able to copy and match leadsearch Universities and National Security: Can Traditional Values Survive?" in Teich. A scientifically lagging Soviet Union was able (together with the United States) to borrow and build on Germanrocketryinnovations after World WarII. advancements in military R&D will almost surely spread internationallythrough such linkages.S.398 foreign visitors.one that most lagging technology importers-such as China-still do not have.Yetwhen potentially hostile foreign states do occasionally gain access to finished dual-use technologies.the risk that U. The Military Potential of China's CommercialTechnology. and the initial U. pp.S. Nelson." Cliff. fission weapon detonation in 1945 was followed by a Soviet detonation only four years later.Roughly 70-75 percent of the research needed to make progress in weapons-related work is still unclassified. Harvard University. weapons laboratories have to some extent become globally networked. Copying was at one time a viable option for those trying to catch up with technology leaders. Kennedy School of Government.S. and Technology Lita. September 23-24.and the U. 2002.AAAS Science PolicyYearbook. knowledge of U.p.S.60 In the modern age of more collaborativescience.824visitors from sensitive countries. even U.61 Is there a danger in such collaborations that U. Technology and Innovation: Emerging International Policy Issues. When Britain developed its new super battleship HMS in 1906. lead in atomic weapons that emerged from that same war proved fleeting as well.S.and Sandia Laboratoriesreceived 6. including 1.S. Globalization. 9. all Chinese weapon systems ultimately have to incorporate purely military technologies.and it is often best developed in part throughinternationalcollaboration." John F. Lerch. "Terrorism. and Fear: Science in the 21st Century.

Through espionage China may have been able to gain informationon the W-88 warhead used on U.formally or informally aligned with the United States. allies.S. 64. Fisher. 2001. and among the twenty-nine states in the world in 2000 with more than twenty internet hosts per 1. National ScienceFoundation.62The only four states above this threshold level of IT density outside the OECD were Hong Kong. government halted this sale in 2000.given the notorious weakness of the PLA in areas such as command. and command systems. communications. Development 2002.Science Indicators. all formal U. is a unique human and institutionalasset that less capable foreign rivals can neither copy nor steal. Report. and the United Kingdom." .Moreover. the Chinese military system will not be able to advance to an RMA capability. IT-basedmilitaryinnovations are not rivals.S.000 people (the United States had nine times that number). and Engineering 63. The superb U. United Nations DevelopmentProgramme. programcodes.whether by purchase or theft.p. satellites. all-volunteer military force. highly trained.64 such imported or stolen technology. the very few states that might be able to copy and match U.The RMAdepends on entire systems of both hardware and software-sensors. Human 62. not just weapons platforms.4."Military Sales to China.and intelligence. and China was nearly successful in purchasingfrom Israel the Phalcon system (which contained modern phased-arraytechnology) Yet even with access to before the U.S.About 70 percentof these foreign origin patents were grantedto inventors from just four countries-France. Israel. and continuously practiced personnel can operate these networked RMA weapons systems.Japan. Potential rivals such as China cannot hope to develop an RMA capability through simple transfer. The two most rapidly growing foreign patent applicant countries are Taiwan and South Korea. control.63 Dominant military innovations will also be more difficult for rival states to copy because they are no longer stand-alonepieces of hardware. only teams of technically skilled. In the IT sector. 60.S. Germany. built specifically to provide such operating personnel. Taiwan and South Koreasurpassed Canada in 1998 to become the fifth and sixth most-active sources of foreign inventors patenting in the United States. Tridentmissiles. TableA2.Singapore.S. First.Or consider those states that have demonstrated some scientific prowess by patenting inventions in the United States. two more allied states.International Security29:1 1142 ing-edge military technology innovations is greatly reduced.and the United Arab Emirates.one indicatorof absorptioncapacityis density of internet use.all but four were democracieswithin the OECD.

a new National Commission on Mathematicsand Science Teachingfor the 21st Century. and mathematics (the so-called STEMfields). and 12 performingat or above the "proficient" achievement level in math and science. relative to peers in other countries.S. we might well have viewed it as an act of war.as Power1143 Knowledge WEAK K-12 SCIENCE TRAINING? Another hypothetical threat to U. students at the 12th-gradelevel. and only one scored lower in physics. D. students in grades 4. with fewer than one-thirdof all U. National Commission on Excellence on Education. We have even squandered the gains in student achievement made in the wake of the Sputnik challenge. technology.S. was "disappointingly unchanged. engineering.and most did so in science as well."66 met. "Math Education at Risk. political leaders struggled to respond to this 1983warning. pp. 79-81. scientific dominance is the continuing underperformanceof the primary and secondary (K-12) education system in the United States.the president and the state governorsadopted the following national goal. We have. Moreover. p. Nation at Risk (Washington." Issues in Science and Technology. Cited in Lynn Arthur Steen. in effect. Results from the latest National Assessment of EducationalProgressin 2000were equally dismal.S. "By the year 2000. been committing an act of unthinking.S. but many primary and secondary public schools in the United States have long underperformed in science. Government Printing Office.All states established new content standardsin mathematics. 5. at p. the United Statescame in nineteenth.chairedby former SenatorJohn Glenn. No.C. 8. 66. America's universities are world leaders in science. In 1983the National Commissionon Excellencein Education found the United States lagging behind most other industrialized nations and concluded that the nation's security was consequently at risk:"If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educationalperformancethat exists today. In September2000."65 U. we have allowed this to happen to ourselves. 19.we have dismantled essential support systems which helped make those gains possible. United States students will be the first in Yet this goal was not the world in mathematics and science achievement. none scored significantlylower than the United States in advanced math. 4 (Summer 2003). reviewed the ThirdInternational Mathematicsand ScienceStudy and discovered that the performanceof U. 80. . Vol.S.: U. unilateraleducational disarmament. and with more than one-third below 65. Finallyin 1990. April 1983).Among twenty nations assessed specifically in advanced math and physics." Out of twenty-one countriescomparedin this study. As it stands.

the nation gains access at no charge to a human capital resource that costs the government of India roughly $15. and then by persuading the best of these foreign students to stay.pdf.D. Human Development Report. Moore.'s are now awarded to foreign students. In the physical sciences and engineering specifically. "Establishing Federal Priorities in Science and Technology. not a threat to that hegemony. the foreign-born share of science and engineering doctorates in the U. pp.D. and economics were born outside of the United States. "The Foreign Student Dilemma. 35 percent to 45 percent of them from India. 273-283.7"As long as the United States can continue to attract this trained for67.000 per student to train. the United States remains the preeminent land of immigrants." See also Duncan T.International Security29:1 144 even the "basic level. Nelson.S.69 Between 1990 and 2000. According to an estimate by the American Immigration Lawyers' Association. No. AAAS Science and TechnologyPolicy Yearbook.000 of these well-trained Indian professionals. In 1999 all four of the U.gov/inits/Math/glenn/report.68 In addition to universities. the training cost savings for the United States equaled $2 billion per year. science has found a way to overcome this domestic educational handicap by importing trained science talent from abroad. Lerch. Cited in Saritha .S. BeforeIt's TooLate:A Reportto the Nation from the National Commissionon Mathematicsand Science Teachingfor the 21st Century. thus facilitating movement into the country for roughly 100. 4 (Summer 2003).'s now go to foreign students. universities make up for K-12 educational deficits in science and math by attracting well-trained STEM students from abroad. Nobel Prize winners in physics.S. and Fear: Science in the 21st Century.ed. U. workforce increased from 24 percent to 28 percent.S. 70. In this sense. globalization can be counted as a support for U.000-$20." in Teich. physiology/medicine. 2001." Issues in Science and Technology. When it comes to science.S. John A.000 H-1B employees in the United States today. 68. Ph. International Mobility of Scientists and Engineers to the United States-Brain Drain or Brain Circulation? 71. 19. http://www. By implication. when Congress in 1998 eased the annual quota on H-1B visas. science hegemony. National Science Foundation.70 When the United States allows graduates from India's elite institutes of technology to enter with temporary visas. chemistry. 35 percent of U. Ph. high-technology U. and Lita. pp. Globalization. 22-23. United Nations Development Programme. 69. roughly 50 percent of U. U. "Terrorism.S.S.Vol. Irving A. In all the natural sciences and engineering.S. there are some 900. manufacturing firms have also come to rely heavily on foreign-born graduates for a substantial portion of their growing workforce. Armstrong."67 Since 1975 the United States has fallen from third place to seventeenth place in the proportion of its 18-24 year olds earning science and engineering degrees. Roughly one-third of the foreign scientists now working in the United States arrived already fully trained.

including homeland targets. those who resent and resist U. power may be driven to employ increasingly asymmetric attack responses against ever-softer targets. Science-based dominance has made the use of conventional force much easier for U. which brings a danger of more frequent and more careless use of force in circumstances where the conventional military results may be positive. The attacks are a vivid reminder that science-based dominance on the conventional battlefield does not protect against unconventional attacks on soft nonbattlefield targets. Seyom Brown.72 If a conventional military "victory" creates new and determined political enemies. 72. More frequent and more aggressive U. the weakness of its own K-12 science preparation system will not have to undermine U. officials to contemplate.S. military actions might also speed the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities among states hoping to deter U. citizens and commercial assets abroad. .S. In 2002 the National Science Foundation initiated a series of new grants designed specifically to counter asymmetric terror threats by supporting breakthroughs in areas such as cybersecurity and the detection and decontamination of biological or chemical warfare agents. D. either to deployed U. Department of Homeland Security is investing more than $1 billion a year in R&D. conventional weapons supremacy grows. New RisksPost-September 11: Asymmetric Attack? The September 2001 terrorist attacks and their aftermath highlight several new risks in this regard. forces (as in Iraq). or U.S. it thus becomes essential to make sound judg- Rai.S.S. As U. one unintended consequence can be an increase in asymmetric threats. The Illusion of Control:Force and Foreign Policy in the 21st Century (Washington. W1. Policy judgment and restraint are the second key to containing asymmetric threats. dirty bombs.S. conventional might. as is noted below.C.S. science hegemony overall. weaponized anthrax spores.: Brookings.S. using fuel-laden hijacked airliners. or even to the homeland. Work Visas Puts Companies in India in a Bind. Such efforts can and should be expanded." New YorkTimes. p.S. or worse. To contain the growth of asymmetric threats. 2003). First. "Cap on U.as Power1145 Knowledge eign talent. but there are ways to contain it. this threat can be addressed through science itself. The new U. but the political results negative. There is no way to completely eliminate this asymmetric challenge.October 1.S. 2003.

or middle-technology targets in low-technology societies (commercial aircraftoperatingin Africaand U. naval ships at anchorin Arabianports). High-technology targets in high-technology societies are apparently not that inviting. not just scientificknowledge. by the actual target choices made by low-technology targets in low-technology societies (embassies or hotels in Africa). visa applications in all categoriesfell from 10 million down to 6.5 million. This calls for more political science.S. That said.C. 2004. March 24. D.S. even to relatively sophisticated middle-technology terroristgroups such as al-Qa'ida. 241. Accessto ForeignScientists New RisksPost-September 11: Reduced More science will be good for security. Murray and Scales. .International Security29:1 146 ments about the most likely political reactions of conventionally defeated or threatened adversaries. the threat of asymmetric responses would not be any less if the United States were to decide to invest less in science. "Violent groups will soon recognize the rewards from attacking non-redundant. http://www.Williamson Murray and RobertScales argue that the United Statesneeds to make largerinvestments in politicaland culturalknowledge. not just more rocket science.74 themselves: terrorists the belied. high-value nodes in our increasingly complex technological and economic networks.more science usually means more security. The number of temporaryworker visas issued specifically for jobs in science and technol73. According to Homer-Dixon.S. conventionalmilitarydominancewill cess. The War in Iraq." See "Synchronous Failure: The Real Danger of the 21st Century. p.S. science. so far. 74. Thomas Homer-Dixon has argued that scientifically sophisticated systems and societies somehow This argumentis present softer and more inviting targetsto terroristgroups. Washington.73 be resented and resisted becomes essential to minimizing a proliferation of asymmetric threats.. These attacks will be intended to precipitate cascades of failures or the collapse of whole technological and social systems. if it is to wage conventionalwars with sucKnowing when an exerciseof U. visa policies post-September 11 is reducing the vital flow of foreign scientists into the United States. successful U.S.but an overzealous pursuit of homeland security now risks a weakening of U. George Washington University. Between FY 2001 and FY 2003. or at most middle-technology targets in high-technology societies (commercial and government buildings in the United States or commuter trains in Spain).html.edu/~newsctr/ newscenter/ 1212/homerdixon." remarks by Thomas Homer-Dixon to the Elliot School of International Affairs.gwu. An excessive tightening of U.Even in the face of asymmetricthreats.

Hijackers' Visa Approval Letters Received. Florida.Congress in 1996 passed an Illegal Immigration and ImmigrantResponsibilityAct designed to police such visa abusers. U. using an expanded list of twenty different sensitive disciplines and an equally long list of sensitive countries.77 Following this embarrassment. James Glanz.S.a belated notificationwas delivered to a flight school in Venice.grantingvisa renewal requestsfor two of the hijackerswho died in the INS was moved into the new Departattacks." http://www.76 had been in in the 2001. as the Immigrationand NaturalizationService (INS) had gone too far in allowing suspect foreign nationalsto abuse their visa status.as Power1147 Knowledge ogy in the United States dropped more sharply. p.falling by 55 percent in 2002 The weaker post-September 11 U.S.78 Having previously erredon the side of being too lax. See Mark Potter and Rich Phillips.S. but not all. and even South Africa. following the 1998 nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan and also with the sensational allegations in 1999 (which later proved mostly wrong) that a Taiwanese-born scientist acting out of disloyalty had perpetrated a security breach at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Instead the hijackersremained famously unnoticed by the INS even months after the attack. The Palestinian immigrantwho drove a truckof explosives into the WorldTradeCenter's underground parking garage in 1993 had come to the United States legally on a student visa in 1989.com/2002/US/03/12/inv.html. visa authoritiesare now erring on the side of being too strict.but then overstayed and was two years "out of status" by the time of the attack." New YorkTimes.75 of this decline.school. Pakistan.S.visas/. "Study Warns of Lack of Scientists as Visa Applications Drop. visa and immigrationpolicies was appropriateafter September 11. . http://www . A24.com/features/2001 /0205. embassies by providing only a passport. 2003. 78. 11.washingtonmonthly. Some tightening of U. Citizenship and Immigration Services in 2003. a university letter of endorse- 75. November 20. An urge to tighten this relaxed approach had arisen even prior to September 11. Nicholas Confessore. "Six Months after Sept.confessore. foreign nationals acto science at American universities could cepted study expect to receive visas at U. Tightenedvisa proceduresare making entry into the United States by foreign scientists significantlymore difficult. Russia. In the aftermath of this Los Alamos panic. including China. but the university-basedNational Associationof ForeignStudent Advisors If a stronger student visa monitoring prevented effective implementation. system place September 11 hijackerswould have found it more difficult to elude detection.cnn." Washington Monthly. May 2002.S. 77. Traditionally. the State Department began working more aggressively to screen immigrant visa applications from scientists in particular. economy can be blamed for some alone. ment of Homeland Security and renamed U. 76.Exactlysix months afterthe attack. "Borderline Insanity.flight.

000fewer visas to visiting scholars.82 three of the top students (from an applicant pool of 224) accepted by the BiostatisticsDepartmentat Johns Hopkins University in 2003 could not start because of visa problems.S. Joseph Joffe.nationalacademies.outstanding foreign scientists had alreadybeen prevented from entering the country. Passport Rules Could Hit Allies.soIn 2003 a new rule required most visa applicants to undergo in-person interviews with U. Following the September11 attacks. p. John A.researchers." statement from Bruce Alberts.Vol. pp. consular officershave become subjectto criminalpenalties if they grant a visa to someone who subsequentlycommits a terroristact in the United States. Some individuals caught in this squeeze were prominent foreign scholars invited to speak at scientific meetings or teach at American universities. causing still more delays.S. and a survey of physics departmentchairsrevealed that at the beginning of the 2002 academic year. 80. 2003. president. National Academy of Engineering. Wulf. and Harvey Fineberg. 2.81 Valuable science students are being kept out of the United States by these new procedures." Issues in Science and Technology.and important international conferences were already being canceled or disrupted because of visa delays. National Institute of Medicine. several hundred outstanding young 79.about 20 percentof internationalstudents admitted into graduatephysics All programshad been unable to start specificallybecause of visa problems. 2003. William. p. president.S." Scientist. December 13.so as a consequencelargernumbersof visa requests are either denied or delayed. Foreign scientists were among the first to be squeezed out by such new policies. See "Current Visa Restrictions Interfere with U.org/news. president. and recordsshowing they could afford to live in the United States.U. Armstrong. "Locking Out the Brainpower?" WashingtonPost. Texas.79 In 2002 comparedwith the year before. "U.S. when the World Space Congress was held in Houston.83 In one case.June 20.International Security29:1 148 ment. teachthe United Statesgave 8. Science and Engineering Contributions to Important National Needs. and speakers. 82. in 2002. more than 100 overseas delegates-including an eminent Russian astrophysicist-could not get visas in time and missed the meeting. No. Marjorie Valbrun.According to a spring 2003 reportby the American Institute of Physics. 2003. November 23. In December2002 the three presidents of the U.and Medicine issued a statementwarning that ongoing researchcollaborationshad alreadybeen hampered. 4 (Summer 2003). 22-23. http://www4. consular officials overseas. 81. 83.Engineering. As an example. numbers of internationalstudents entering graduate physics programs dropped by roughly 15 percent after September 11. National Academies of Sciences. A. National Academy of Sciences. March 24.nsf/isbn/s12132002?OpenDocument. 2002. 19. ers.S. . B7. "The Foreign Student Dilemma. Dana Wilkie. "Foreign Scientists Steer Away from States." Wall Street Journal.

At 90 percent of American colleges and universities in 2004. 1." New YorkTimes."Foreign Scientists Are Being Stranded by War on Terror. 87." . 2004. due to longer processing delays post-September 11. with applications from Chinese and Indian students dropping by 76 percent and 58 percent respectively. January 20. "International Relations 101. p.87 Tighter surveillance and security procedures have also begun to discourage talented foreign scientists from coming to the United States. the National Security Entry and Exit Registration System began to require special procedures such as fingerprinting. p. New federal procedures imposed in May 2002 require universities to monitor the activities of their international students more closely. a government facility in Illinois that employs 500 scientists from eighteen different countries. those scientists who make routine visits home to see family experience visa troubles that can block their timely return to work.500 staff members with advanced degrees are foreign nationals.S. experienced a 90 percent visa denial rate in the United States post-September 11. These denials are now discouraging new applicants. 86. 85. and in some cases delays extended up to a full year. For international students from countries that the U. the State Department had a backlog of 25." New YorkTimes. photos. 2004. France.84 Many visa applicants also experience a kind of virtual denial. the number of names on the State Department's antiterrorist lookout list doubled. 2003. the average wait to receive a visa increased to sixty-seven days. "Decline Seen in Science Applications from Overseas. and trips to check in at district 84. Diana Jean Schemo. government considers to be sponsors of terrorism."WallStreetJournal. "Foreign Scientists are Being Stranded by War on Terror.000 visa applications that had not been processed.as Power1149 Knowledge Pakistani students who had been carefully selected by their government as potential future university leaders. where nearly half of the 5. In the months following the attacks. Meanwhile in Australia. and who had been accepted for graduate training in the United States. Thus by the fall of 2002. March 31. A16. Bernard Wysocki Jr. February 26. Robert M. A23. At the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory.. Gates. employees are being informally warned about the perils of visiting home. Wysocki. and consulates were required to run more visa applicant names through Washington's cumbersome interagency clearance system. applications from international students had fallen.86Publicly funded science research in the United States has already been disrupted by these new security measures. and the United Kingdom enrollments are rising rapidly. p. At the National Institutes of Health."8 For science and technology students.

S. Yet science-basedmilitary primacy on the battlefield is clearly not a guarantee of security. conventional military hegemony. globalization has strengthened it. Quoted in Eugene Russo. The war against internationalterror should be fought with science.S. and if the United States then responds by indiscriminately denying foreignersaccess to the homeland.International Security29:1 1150 In May 2003 the Homeland Security Departmentannounced as well offices.David Heyman.S. Security Bad for Science?" Scientist. military primacy in the long run. April 26."89 Conclusion: SmartWeapons. the more incentive they will have to move toward these unconventionalresponses. "U. science.physics. Wilkie. rather than at the expense of science. Rather than threatening U. It is also demonstrablybad for the competitive health of U. 2004.Conventionalvictories that make new enemies may encouragea dangerousshift toward asymmetry.This new "Fortress America"approach to homeland security puts important social and cultural values at risk.S. director of the Homeland SecurityProgramat the Centerfor Strategicand International Studies.Determined adversariescan innovate increasinglyasymmetrictactics against an endless list of soft targets.but the long-termhealth of U. U. Smart societies can develop not only smart new weapons for conventional use abroad.S. The homeland security strategy of the United States should include much larger science investments in disciplines such as chemistry." 89. warned in April 2004 that "to win the war on terror.we [the United States] may lose our scientific preeminence. borders (using photos and fingerprints)for an estimated 23 million foreign nationals entering the country every year.S. primacy in science could itself be critically weakened. where promising new counterterrorapplications are sure to be found. nanotechnology. and Policies. "Foreign Scientists Steer Away from States.S. and hence for U.againstAsymmetric Threats Military primacy today rests on scientific primacy. . 1."8 a requirement for "biometric"screening at U. primacy in science.and the more domination and resentment they feel under U.and information technology. science is being impaired.and the scientific primacy of the United States rests on a remarkablydurable foundation. p. but also smart new capabilities for threat detection and soft target pro88. many of them science students or researchers.S. The homeland may be slightly more secure in the short run because of these new procedures. biotechnology.

Rita R. Colwell. Silicon polymer nanowires 2.to protect against terroristbombs."91 Science can indeed bring big security gains in asymmetricas well as in conventional military affairs. dangerous chemicals.2406782. remarks to Council of Scientific Society Presidents. Federalinvestments are already moving the United States down this smart science-based response path. When conventional military victories are made easy by smart weapons. the Departmentof Energy will receive $232 million for research on the detection of nuclear weapons production. Penrose Albright. an extra measure of caution is needed to avoid the careless creation of dangerous new asymmetricadversaries.S. Funnels Billions to Science to Defend against Terrorism.story?coll= la-headlines-nation." Los Angeles Times. 91.. New information technologies using powerhouse terascale computing capabilities may soon be able to help in tracking and anticipating the behavior of terror networks. director. For example. and other public hazards. National Science Foundation. roughly $7 billion was proposed to develop high-technology defenses against terrorattacks. Forexample. One line of defense already in place in thirty cities is a LawrenceLivermoreNational Laboratory-designedsystem for monitoringthe air for biological attack.Yet protection of national security requires that all military advantages be used with judgment and care. November 19.C.and the Departmentof Homeland Security has proposed development of a fully networked national sensor system to monitor the air continuously for pathogens. "U. .as Power 151 Knowledge tection at home. D.90 New systems capableof detecting dangerousamounts of radiation are increasinglyaffordableand unobtrusive.5 billion specificallyfor researchand development.com/news/nationworld/ nation/la-nahomeland 7mar07.including $3. http://www. In the Bush administration'sFY 2005 budget. 2004. and might someday be developed and deployed into "smart"cargo containers. March 7. Quoted in Ralph Vartabedian. defends this approachby arguing that "science is the big advantage the West has over these people who would throw us back to the Stone Age. Washington.latimes. Security requiressmart policies as well as smart weapons. nanofabrication may hold the key to a timely detection system for some terror bombing threats.0. 2001.000 times thinner than a human hair can cheaply detect traces of TNT and piric acid in both water and air. 90. assistant secretaryfor science and technology at the Departmentof Homeland Security.