fo C ,
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" X X ^ I , N o s . 1 -4

O c to b e r , 1941-J u ly , 1942

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.r

Smith College Studies in History

W IL L IA M

DODGE GRAY

HANS KOHN RAY ALLEN B IL L IN G T O N

E d ito r s

BALKAN FEDERATION. A HISTORY OF THE MOVEMENT TOWARD BALKAN UNITY IN MODERN TIMES
BY
L. S. S T A V R T A N O S

N O R T H A M PT O N , M A SS.
P u b lis h e d Q u a r te r ly by th e D e p a rtm en t o f H is t o r y o f S m itli C o lle g e

SMITH COLLHCK S T U D IE S IN H IST O R Y
D O D G li G RA Y J IA N S K O IIN lv A Y A L L K N IM L L 1 N G T O N
EDITORS I'n к Ммii и C ou.m itt S t d d ik h in H is t o r y is pub lished q u arterly, in O ctobcr, Jan u«I V, A l'ill ii ml Ju ly, by the IJcjm rtiuciit o f H isto r y o f S m ith C o lleg e. T h e sub scription liilr r Im nrviMiiy-live cen ts for (tingle n u m b ers, tw o d ollars fo r th e y ea r . S u b scrip tion s anil iri|iU'Hl« for i-KrliaiiKC# ahoukl be a d d ressed to S m i t h C o l l e g e L ib r a r y , N orth am p ­ ton, М им, 1 и л S m i t h Cui.i.KiiK S t u d i e s i n H is t o r y aim s p rim a rily to afford a m ed iu m fo r Mir pub lication nf NUnlies in H isto r y by in v e stig a to r s w ho h a v e som e rela tio n to the Ci>ll«*Kc, riilier a* fa cu lty , alu m n ae, stu d en ts or fr ie n d s. I t a im s a lso to p u b lish from tim e Id lluu*a b rie f n otes ou th e field o f H isto r y w h ich m ay be o f special in te r e st to alu m n ae o f S m ith C ollege an d to oth ers in ter este d in th e h ig h er ed u ca tio n o f w om en . C ontrib utions o f stu d ies or n o te s w h ich p rom ise to fu rth er eith e r o f th e s e a im s w ill be w elcom ed, and shou ld be ad d ressed to P r o fe ss o r R ay A . B illin g to n , N o rth a m p to n , M ass.

WILLIAM

SMITH COLLEGE STUDIES IN HISTORY
N o. 1.
V O L U M E I ( 1 9 1 5 -1 6 ) A n I n t r o d u c t io n o p t h e H is t o r y o f C o n n e c t i c u t a s a M a n u k a c t u i u n g S t a t e ....................................................................... G race P ie r p o n t F u lle r Т и к O p e r a t io n o f t h e F r e k d m ic n ’s B u r e a u i n S o u t h C a r o l i n a .............................................................................................. L a u ra J o se p h in e W e b s te r W o m e n ’s S u f f r a g e i n N e w J e r s k y , 1 7 9 0 - 1 8 0 7 .................................... E . R . T u r n e r T h e C u k r o k k k N e g o t i a t i o n s o f 1 8 2 2 - 2 3 ...................................... A n n ie H e lo ise A b e l

N os. 2-3. N o. 4.

No. N o. No. No.

t. 2. 3. 4.

V O L U M E I I (1 9 1 6 -1 7 ) T h e H o u k n z o ix k r n H o u s e h o l d a n d A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n t h e S i x t e e n t h C e n t u r y .................................................. S id n e y B r a d sh a w C o k k e s p o n d e n c e o f G e o r g e B a n c r o f t a n d Ta re d S p a r k s 1 8 2 3 - 1 8 3 2 ...............................................................................E d ite d b y Joh n S p e n c e r B a s s e tt 'T h e D e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e P o w e r s o f t h e S t a t e E x e c u t i v e i n N e w Y o r k ........................................................... M a rg a re t C. A le x a n d T ra d e o f t h e D e la w a re D is tr ic t B e fo re t h e R e v o l u t i o n ................................................... ..................................................... M a r y A lic e H a n n a V O L U M E I I I ( 1 9 1 7 -1 8 ) J o s e p h H a w l e y ’s C r i t i c i s m o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f M a s s a c h u s e t t s ................................................................................. A la r y C a th erin e Clwne F i n a n c e s o f E d w a r d V I a n d M a r y ......................................... F r e d e r ic k C h a rles D ie t* T h e M in is t r y o f S t e p h e n o f P e r c iie D u r in g t h e M in o rity o f W illia m I I o f S ic ily .................................... Jo h n C. H ild t N o r t h e r n O p i n i o n o f A p p r o a c h i n g S e c e s s i o n .................................... L . T . L o w r e y V O L U M E I V ( 1 9 1 8 -1 9 ) T h e P r o b l e m o f A d m i n i s t r a t i v e A r e a s .............................................. H a r o ld J. L a s k i I n t h e T i m e o f S i r J o h n E l i o t ...................................................................... M , B . F u lle r A S t u d y o f t h e L i f e o f H a d r ia n P r io r t o H i s A c c e s s i o n ........................................................................... ................. W illia m D o d g e C r a y T h e H a y e s - C o n k l i n g C o n t r o v e r s y , 1 8 7 7 - 1 8 7 9 ............................ V e n ila S . S h o r e s V O L U M E V ( 1 9 1 9 -2 0 ) P u b lic O p in io n i n P h i l a d e l p h i a , 1 7 8 9 - 1 8 0 1 ...................... M a r g a r e t W o o d b u r y D e v e l o p m e n t o f H is t o r y a n d G o v e r n m e n t i n S m i t h C o l l e g e , 3 8 7 5 -1 9 2 0 , W i t h a L i s t o f P u b l ic a t i o n s o f t i i e F a c u l t y a n d A l u m n a e .................................................. M a r y B r e e z e F u lle r I n f l u e n c e s T o w a r d R a d ic a l is m i n C o n n e c t i c u t , 3 7 5 4 - 1 7 7 5 .............................................................................................................E d ith A n n a B a ile y V O L U M E V I ( 1 9 2 0 -2 1 ) L e D e r n i e r S i j o u R b e J .-T . R o u s s e a u A P a r is 1 7 7 0 - 1 7 7 8 ..........................................................................................................E lis a b e th A . F o s te r L e t t e r s o f A n n G il l a m S t o r r o w t o J a r e d S p a r k s .................................................................................. .F r a n c e s B r a d sh a w B la n sh a rd T h e W esto v er J o u r n a l o f J o h n A . S e i . d e n ....................................................................................E d ite d b y Jo h n S p e n c e r B a s s e tt V O L U M E V I I ( 1 9 2 1 -2 2 ) M a j o r H o w e l l T a t u m ’ s J o u r n a l W h i l e A c t i n g T o p o g r a p h ic a l E n g i n e e r ( 1 8 1 4 ) t o G e n e r a l J a c k s o n . . . .E d ite d b y John S p e n c e r B a sse tt R e c o lle c tio n s o f Jam es R u s s e ll T r u m b u ll, H is to r ia n o f N o r t h a m p t o n , M a s s a c h u s e t t s ..................... ............. . . . . . A n n a E lisa b e th M ille r

N o. N o. N o. N o. No. No. N o. N o.

1. 2. 3. 4.

1. 2. 3. 4.

N os. 1-2. N o. 3. No. 4.

N os. 1-2. N o. N o. 3. 4.

N os. 1-3. N o. 4.

(C o n tin u e d on in s id e back c o v e r )

V o l.

XXVII, Nos. 1-4

O cto b e r ,

1941-J uly, 1942

Smith College Studies in History

W IL L IA M D O D G E G R A Y HANS KOHN R A Y A L L E N B IL L IN G T O N E d ito r s

BALKAN FEDERATION. A HISTORY OF THE MOVEMENT TOWARD BALKAN UNITY IN MODERN TIMES
BY

L. S . S T A V R I A N O S

N O R T H A M PT O N , M ASS.

*

P u b lish ed Q u arterly by th e D ep artm en t o f H isto r y o f S m ith C o lleg e

V

P r in te d b y
G eo rg e B
anta

P

u b l is h in g

Co m

pany

M E N A SH A , W ISCONSIN

1944

To the P eoples o f the B a lk a n s who I n fig h tin g fa c is m today M a ke possible their fed era tio n tom orrow

w ith t heir conflictin g im p e ria lis t in te re s ts . P e rsia n s. T h e S lav p e a s a n t w as b e in g a ro u se d fro m h is c e n tu ry long slu m b e rs b y re se n tm e n t to w a rd O tto m a n m isg o v e rn m e n t a n d G reek O rth o d o x oppression. T h e se new forces ra d ic ally c h a n g e d th e s itu a tio n in th e N e a r E a s t. T h e reaso n for b eg in n in g w ith C a th e rin e th e G r e a t’s p ro je c ts an d cam p a ig n s in th e se v e n te e n se v e n tie s is t h a t th e m o d e rn p h a se of th e B alk an fe d e ra tio n m o v e m e n t m a y be said to h a v e b e g u n a t a b o u t th a t tim e . B y th e n in e te e n th cen ­ tu r y i t h a d becom e so p ro m in e n t a n d p e rs is te n t t h a t th e p h ra se . T h e p u rp o se of th is w o rk is to fill th is la c u n a — to fu rn ish a co m p reh en siv e a n d b a la n c e d s tu d y of th e m o v e m e n t to w a rd s B a lk an u n ity in m o d ern tim es. " th e E a s te rn Q u e stio n ” b ecam e a cliche w ith jo u rn a lis ts a n d h isto ria n s. T h e conflicts b etw een G reek s. B e h in d -th e scenes th e W e s te rn Pow ers.” i t seem ed a t long la s t t h a t d re a m s m ig h t becom e re a litie s. C o u n tle ss p la n s fo r th e so lu tio n of th is p ro b lem w ere c o n tin u a lly b ro u g h t fo rw ard . W h e n in 1930 re p re s e n ta tiv e s of th e B a lk a n peoples g a th e re d to ­ g e th e r in A th e n s u n d e r a n ew B a lk a n flag to discu ss fe d e ra tio n to th e s tra in s of th e “ B a lk a n H y m n of P e a c e . a n d th e re b y fu rn ish ed a n a tu r a l b e g in n in g p o in t for th is s tu d y . T h e failu re of C a th e rin e to c a rry o u t h e r desig n s en d ed all p o ssib ility of a re o rg a n iz a tio n of th e N e a r E a s t a lo n g B y z a n tin e or Im p e ria l lines. A t a n e a rly sta g e th e p ro b le m of d efin itio n h a d to b e se ttle d . T h e G re e k m e rc h a n t w as bein g s p u rre d to a c tio n b y his ra p id ly grow ing econom ic p o w er a n d b y th e in to x ic a tin g th e o rie s of th e F re n c h R e v o lu tio n . p ro v id e d th e m odern se ttin g fo r th e m o v e m e n t to w a rd s B a lk a n u n ity . S la v s a n d T u rk s a tte s t to th e p ere n n ia l n a tu r e of th is p ro b le m . R o m a n s. . a n d a m o n g s t th e se th e re c o n s is te n tly c ro p p e d u p th e id e a of a N e a r E a s te rn o r of a B a lk a n fe d e ra tio n .PREFACE T h e p ro b lem of th e N e a r E a s t h a s b een of o u ts ta n d in g im p o r­ ta n c e in th e d e v e lo p m e n t of E u ro p e fro m a n tiq u ity to th e p resen t. N ew forces w ere m a k in g th e m se lv es fe lt a n d th e y te n d ed ra th e r to th e d iv isio n of th e B a lk a n s in to n a tio n a l u n its. H o w p ra c tic a l w ere th ese p la n s fo r co o p e ra tio n a n d u n ity w as d e m o n s tra te d b y th e long series of w ars w hich p u n c tu a te d th e h is to ry of th e B a lk a n peninsu la w ith such tra g ic fre q u e n c y . p la y e d one B a lk a n rac e a g a in s t th e o th e r in th e ir scram b le fo r tr a d e a n d d iv id e n d s. T h is p ro sp e c t led to th e a p p e a ra n c e of a con sid erab le n u m b e r of b o o k s d ealin g w ith th e se B a lk a n C on­ ferences of th e n in e te e n th irtie s a n d w ith th e fo rm a tio n of th e B a lk an E n te n te . B u t all of th e se s tu d ie s w ere co n cern ed p rim a rily w ith th e p o st-w a r p erio d a n d p a id little o r no a tte n tio n to e a rlie r d ev e lo p ­ m en ts.

In fact. M o st of th e m . it sh o u ld b e m e n tio n e d t h a t special a tte n tio n h a s been p a id to th o se asp e c ts of th e fe d e ra tio n m o v e m e n t w hich h a v e h ith e rto been overlo o k ed . F in a lly . e x c e p t for th o se p h ases w hich h av e been th o ro u g h ly stu d ie d in re c e n t p u b licatio n s. F r e ­ q u e n tly it p ro v ed n e cessary to su m m a riz e well k now n d ev elo p m en ts in B a lk a n h isto ry . for exam ple. for in sta n c e . or a t le a st th e r a p ­ p ro c h e m e n t. an a tte m p t w as m ad e to co n su lt all th e av ailab le m a te ria l. T h e g re a t m a jo rity of th e p ro je c ts a n d d ip lo m a tic n e g o tia tio n s. h ow ever. W h en d ealing w ith th e fe d eratio n m o v e m e n t per sc . a w o rk co n cern ed w ith “ B a lk a n fe d e ra tio n ’' an d th e "m o v e m e n t to w a rd s B a lk a n u n ity ” sh o u ld confine itself to p la n s a n d ac tio n s d ire c te d to w a rd s th e u n io n . co v erin g as i t does a lm o st tw o ce n tu rie s. I t h a rd ly need be a d d e d t h a t no claim of defin itiv en ess is m ad e for th is s tu d y . I t m a y be w o n d ered. G reeks o r A lb a n ia n s. M a n y w ere ex clu siv ely Slavic a n d d id n o t ta k e in to a c c o u n t R o u m a n ia n s. one reaso n fo r p u b lic a tio n a t th is tim e is th e h ope t h a t th is su r­ v e y w o rk will su g g est a n d lead to m ore d e ta ile d stu d ie s of th e v ario u s p h ases of th e fe d e ra tio n m o v e m e n t. A g ain th e reason is t h a t th e se d o c u m e n ts a lre a d y h a v e been rep ro d u c ed in th e v a rio u s w o rk s on th e se conferences. T h e o th e r reaso n is th e belief t h a t a co m p reh en siv e h is to ry a n d c ritic a l an a ly sis of th e B alk a n fe d e ra tio n m o v e m e n t since th e e ig h te e n th c e n tu ry m ig h t b e of som e p ra c tic a l use to d a y w hen th e p ro b lem of th e p o st-w a r se ttle m e n t is . fu rth e rm o re . sh o u ld n o t be confined to th e s tric tly p a n -B a lk a n m o v em en ts. W ith th e ex cep tio n of th e G reek m a te ria l m e n tio n e d below it is based ex clu siv ely on sources a v a ila b le in th is c o u n try . in o rd e r to b e a t all w e ll-k n it a n d realistic. I t is p ro b a b ly u n n e c e ssa ry to p o in t o u t th e su rv e y c h a ra c te r of a w o rk of th is ty p e . T h u s i t seem ed essen tial t h a t th is stu d y . even th o u g h n o t d ire c tly re la te d to th e fe d e ra tio n m o v em en ts.vi S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d ie s in H is t o r y S tric tly sp eak in g . E x a m p le s of th e la tte r are th e B a lk a n L eague of 1912-1913 a n d th e B a lk a n C o nferences of th e n in e te e n th irtie s. T h e a g ra ria n a n d la b o r fe d e ra tio n m o v e m e n ts. w h y no d o c u m e n ts co n cern in g th e B a lk a n C o nferences h a v e been included in th e collection of d o c u m e n ts in th e ap p en d ices. in o rd e r to p ro v id e c o n n e c tin g links a n d to pro d u ce a ro u n d ed an d cohesive a c c o u n t. w ere confined to th e C h ristia n races a n d d id n o t in clude th e T u rk s . h a v e for th is reaso n been d e a lt w ith in co n sid erab le d e ta il. S till o th e rs e n v isag ed th e inclusion of su ch n o n -B a lk a n peoples as th e H u n g a ria n s. w hile th e fo u r B a lk a n C o nferences h a v e been d escrib ed along m ore g en eral lines b ecause o f th e sev eral e x h a u stiv e stu d ie s a lre a d y p u b ­ lished o n th is su b je c t. of all of th e B a lk a n races. w ere n o t of such a co m p reh en siv e c h a ra c te r. In such in sta n c e s th e b e s t of th e se c o n d a ry sources w ere u tilized .

B. e d ito r of A g ricu ltu ra l E conom y. I am in d e b te d . a n d M r. P ro ­ fessor M . С. X . E v elp id es. I am g ra te fu l to th e m all an d p a rtic u la rly to th o se of th e L ib ra ry of C ongress. J . Including P ro fesso r K . B lack of P rin c e to n U n iv e r­ sity. M . D irec­ tor of th e G en eral A rch iv es of G reece. th e G enuadeion L ib ra ry of A th e n s. D r. D r. S voronos of th e A c ad em y of th e M ed iev al A rch iv es. D ascalak is of th e U n iv e rs ity of A th e n s. C h. A m a n d o s of th e U n iv e rs ity of A th e n s. D im a ra s. L a sc a ris of th e U n iv e rs ity of S alo n ica. to D r. a n d to D r. C h a c o n a s of P la tts b u r g Teachers College. D r. L o u is K e z m a n of N ew Y o rk C ity . F aissler fo r th e ir g en ero u s p erm issio n to re a d th e ir stu d ie s while still in m a n u s c rip t fo rm . in a d d itio n . I g e n u in ely a p p re c ia te th e ir services. A. b ooks a n d speeches. L ig n os of th e A rch iv es of H y d ra . J . I w ish also to ack n o w led g e th e a id of th e follow ing p e rso n s in th e tra n sla tio n of S lav ic m a te ria ls : P ro fesso r H a n s K o h n a n d P ro fesso r M an fred K rid l of S m ith C ollege. S akellarios. P ro fesso r B o d a n Z aw odski of S a ra h Law rence College. I t gives me p leasu re to ta k e th is o p p o r tu n ity to ack n ow ledge th e fi iendly a n d g en ero u s help e x te n d e d to m e b y sev eral G ree k scholars. a n d th e lib ra rie s of C la rk U n iv e rs ity a n d . T h . In a w o rk co n c e rn in g B a lk a n fed eraI ion it is p a rtic u la rly sa tisfy in g to ex p ress g r a titu d e fo r th e h o sp ita lity mid a ssista n c e of M r. New Y o rk P u b lic L ib ra ry . V ic to r S h aren k o ff of th e N ew Y o rk P u b lic I ib ra ry a n d D r. T h e section of th e second c h a p te r d ealin g w ith th e forces a t w o rk in (lie G ree k w orld a t th e b e g in n in g of th e n in e te e n th c e n tu ry is based on m a te ria l w hich I g a th e re d in G reece fo r a fu tu r e w o rk on th e com ­ m ercial b a c k g ro u n d of th e G re e k W a r of In d e p en d en ce. D r. S. D r. D r. L ee of C la rk U n i­ versity u n d e r w hose g u id a n c e th is w o rk w as b eg u n as a d o c to ra l d is­ se rta tio n sev eral y e a rs ago. W id e n e r L ib ra ry . E . C. w h o k in d ly re a d a n d criticized th e m a n u sc rip t. М . T h e d ire c to rs a n d staff m e m b e rs of th e lib ra rie s in w hich I h a v e w orked h a v e been m o st c o u rte o u s. Above all. th e N a tio n a l L ib ra ry of G reece. A dam s of D a rtm o u th College.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n m o v ii pressin g a n d th e n eed fo r som e s o r t of c o o p e ra tio n a m o n g st th e ICast E u ro p e a n peoples is n o t o n ly g e n e ra lly a d m itte d b u t even inmuted u p o n in a v e rita b le flood of a rtic le s. P ro fesso r A. I a m in d e b te d to P ro fe sso r D w ig h t E . L e fc o p a rid es w ho so a b ly a n d courag eo u sly e d ite d L es B a lk a n s d e sp ite n u m e ro u s o b stacles a n d ev en p e tty p e r­ secution . T h a t renearch w as m ad e possible b y a fellow ship g ra n te d b y th e R o y a l S o ciety of C a n a d a . Z a k y th in o s. A. D r. D . S in ce th e n h e h a s g iv en g e n e ro u sly of 11is tim e a n d h a s re a d th e e n tire m a n u s c rip t w hich w as m u c h im ­ proved b y h is m a n y e x c e lle n t su g g estio n s. C am p b ell of th e C ouncil on F o reig n R e la tio n s a n d Dr. C. D r.

S. a n d M r. 1944.v iii S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y S m ith College. NO R TH A M PTO N. for th e tr a n s la tio n of th e a p p e n d ic e s a n d fo r a id in m a n y o th e r w ay s. I a m g ra te fu l also to P ro fesso r G u y S ta n to n F o rd . I w ish to t h a n k m y w ife. e d ito r of Q ueen's Q uarterly . e d ito r of th e J o u rn a l o f Central E u ro p ea n A ffa ir s . L. B e rth a K elso S ta v ria n o s. ed i­ to r o f th e A m e ric a n H isto rica l R eview . . for p erm issio n to use freely th e m a te ria l in m y a rtic le s w hich w ere p u b lish e d in th e ir perio d icals. F in a lly . P ro fesso r S. S. A lex an d er M a c p h a il. M A SSA C H U SET TS. J u ly . H a rriso n T h o m so n .

.. 1 8 2 9 -1 8 4 9 ......... P ro to c o l of th e B u lg a ria n B e n e v o le n t S o c ie ty of B u c h a ­ re st.......... v 1 5 45 66 84 123 152 196 224 259 T h e A w a k e n in g of th e N a tio n a litie s to 1 8 2 9 ......... E.. 1 8 4 9 -1 8 6 0 ........ 1 8 6 6.......................................................... T h e S econd B a lk a n A llian ce S y ste m .. 1 9 1 9 ...... S igned M a y 1 4 /2 6 ......... M a n ife sto of th e S o cialists of T u r k e y a n d th e B a lk an s... 1 8 6 7 .. P assed b y th e C o n g ress of th e L a b o r a n d S o c ia list I n te r ­ n a tio n a l................................. N o v e m b e r 24-25.................. 1 8 7 8 -1 9 0 2 ......... Y e a rs o f P re p a ra tio n ....................... A pril 5 /1 7 . T h e T r e a ty of A llian ce of V oeslau.............................. B....................................... A u g u s t 1 4 /2 6 ............ 1 9 1 4 -1 9 2 9 ...... ix 273 275 277 286 289 292 297 302 ...... I II III IV V VI V II V III IX X In tro d u c tio n ......... 1912........................... H ....................................... 1867.................... R eso lu tio n s o f th e F ir s t B a lk a n Social D e m o c ra tic C o n ­ ference.... C............................ B elg rad e................... 1 9 1 0 ..................... F .................................... L u c e rn e ......... A u g u s t 1 -9 ........................... T h e E n g e lh a rd t V ersion o f th e S e rb o -R o u m a n ia n T r e a ty of J a n u a r y .......... D . A p p endices A. C o n cern in g th e B a lk a n s................. S pecial R e so lu tio n N u m b e r Six................ 1912. 1 8 6 0 -1 8 7 8 . ..................................... T h e D a n u b ia n F e d e ra tio n M o v e m e n t....... 1 8 6 8 ........ D efen siv e a n d O ffensive A llian ce T r e a ty a g a in s t T u rk e y b etw een th e P rin c e of W a lla c h ia a n d M o ld a v ia o n th e One H a n d a n d th e P rin c e of S e rb ia on th e O th e r H a n d .................ч CONTENTS P re fa c e ................................. M ac e d o n ia V ersu s B a lk a n U n ity ......................... R e so lu tio n on th e B a lk a n W a rs p a sse d b y th e S pecial I n ­ te rn a tio n a l S o cialist C o n g ress a t B asel............ ......... 1 9 3 0 -1 9 4 1 ......... B a lk a n F e d e ra tio n a n d Social R e v o lu tio n .. J a n u a r y 7 -9 ...... .................... T h e T h ird B a lk a n A llian ce S y ste m ........... 1 9 0 3 -1 9 1 4 ------........ G... ............... R e tro s p e c t a n d P r o s p e c t. T h e F ir s t B a lk a n A llian ce S y ste m ...........................

.........1 9 4 0 ........... J a n u a r y ..................... B ib lio g ra p h y .......x S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d ie s in H is t o r y I......................... 303 307 309 311 314 333 K .................. P o lish -C z e c h o slo v a k A g reem en t.............................................. Sofia................... N o v e m b e r 11..... P o lish -C z e c h o slo v a k A g re e m e n t..... J a n u a r y 15.......................................... R e so lu tio n s of th e B a lk a n C o m m u n ist C onference................. 1 9 2 0 .............................. J a n u a r y 23......... 1942 ........ ... G re e k -Y u g o sla v P a c t.......... J............................... L...... I n d e x .............. 1942......................

I his accessib ility from A sia o n th e one side a n d E u ro p e on th e o th e r has m a rk e d th e region as a b a ttle g ro u n d of c u ltu re s a n d peoples. 1926). L .THE LIBRARY THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS CH A PTER I IN T R O D U C T IO N T h e re a re few a re a s in th e w o rld w h ere g e o g ra p h y h as influenced h isto ry as p ro fo u n d ly as in th e B a lk a n P e n in s u la . 5 1 9 . A n cel. C v ijic. a s o u th e rn e x ten sio n of th e A lps. L a p en in su le balkan iqu e. T o th e so u th -e a st I he p e n in su la is s e p a ra te d fro m A sia b y th e n a rro w . u n lik e th e Ib erian a n d th e A p en n in e. S im ilarly th e B a lk a n m o u n ta in s. O n th e w e ste rn side of th e p e n in su la a re th e D in aric P in d u s ran g es. 1 . I n d ia . " T h e G eo g ra p h ica l B a sis of lia lk a n U n it y . T h e o n ly ex ten siv e p la in s a re fo rm ed b y th e v a lley s of th e D an u b e a n d th e M a ritz a a n d th e b asin of T h e ssa ly d ra in e d b y th e S a lam b ria . J.h u m aine (P a ris. 1905). G . isla n d -stu d d e d A egean w hich serv es as a h ig h w a y r a th e r th a n a b a rrie r. T h ra c o -U ly ria n s in th e o th e r. H oKarth. In place of th e A lps a n d th e P y re n n e e s th e re is th e w ide D an u b e R iv e r p la in w hile th e M o ra v a a n d V a rd a r tro u g h s p ro v id e easy c h a n n e ls of p e n e tra tio n so u th to th e A eg ean. th e B a lk a n P e n in s u la is s itu a te d a t th e ju n c tio n of tw o c o n tin e n ts. 1939). 9 1 -9 4 . h a s n o n o rth e rn w all to sh e lte r i t from fuirope. 1918). X L V I (spring. T h e re w ere G ree k s in a n ­ tiq u ity in Sicily a n d S o u th I ta ly as well as in th e B a lk an s. “H isto ry an d G eograp h y in th e B a lk a n s. B . T he N ea rer E a s t (L on d on . 5 20. geographic. M a n u el historique de la question d'O rient. T h e q u e stio n arises as to w h y th e L a tin s succeeded in fo rm ing a s ta te a n d a n e m p ire w hile th e n u m e ro u s a n d ab le T h ra c o -Illy ria n s 1 J .T h is g e o g rap h ic co m p lex ity of th e p e n in su la h a s been a pow erful fa c to r on th e side of d is u n ity . ru n n in g e a s t a n d w e s t th ro u g h c e n tra l B u lg a ria . 1 -2 8 . M ears.” N e a r E a s t and. a re an extensio n of th e C a rp a th ia n s .” Queen's Q u arterly. In th e w est a m ere fo rty m iles s e p a ra te A lb a n ia from th e heel of th e Ita lia n boot. D . E . S . T h e la tte r is a tria n g u la r region of co m plex m o u n ­ ta in s w ith its ap ex a t B elg rad e a n d its b ase s tre tc h in g from S alo n ik a to Is ta n b u l. a n d b ey o n d w ere th e b a rb a ria n s — L a tin s in th e o ne case. 1 7 9 2 -1 9 2 5 (P a ris. is th e T u rk is h w ord for m o u n ta in .1 T h e e a ste rn one of th e g ro u p of th re e la n d m asses ju ttin g o u t'f r o m E u ro p e in to th e M e d ite rra n e a n S ea. 1930). T h e te rm “ B a l k a n / ' in fa c t. T h e significance of th is v icin al lo c atio n is in creased by th e n a tu re of th e to p o g ra p h y . T h e B a lk a n P e n in su la . Stavl ianos. X X X V I I (M a y 8. A co m p ariso n of Ita lia n a n d H alkan h is to ry will illu s tra te th e p o in t. T o th e s o u th is th e long ra n g e of hills know n as th e a n ti-B a lk a n s a n d th e n th e M a ritz a v a lle y a n d th e R hodo p e m assif. O f a lm o st e q u a l im p o rta n c e is th e m o u n ta in o u s n a tu re of th e p eninsu la.

T h e com m on h is­ to rical ex periences h a v e p ro d u c e d n u m e ro u s c u ltu ra l sim ila rities a m o n g st th e B a lk a n races.000 sq u a re m iles— t h a t is co n sid erab ly less th a n th e s ta te of T e x a s— th e re a re to be fo u n d six n a tiv e races. W hy also d id th e G reek s fail to p roduce a unified s ta te ? A n im p o r ta n t fa c lo r m u s t h a v e been th e fa r g re a te r geo g rap h ic d iv e rsity of th e B a lk a n s w hich te n d e d to th e fo rm a tio n of in d iv id u a l racial g ro u p s r a th e r th a n a unified s ta te o r em pire. th e n . I (1 9 3 4 ).2 T h e se a n th ro p o g e o g ra p h ic fa c to rs. th e re is no d o u b t a b o u t a co m m on h e rita g e . o r even Silicians a n d G enoese. I t also serves to explain th e h isto ric riv a lrie s of th ese B a lk a n peoples arising from ch erish ed tra d itio n s of fo rm er glory a n d g re atn ess. "Les con flits b alk an iq u es. T h is h isto rical b a c k g ro u n d is sig n ifican t in t h a t it in d ic a te s th a t a v o lu n ta ry B a lk a n fe d e ra tio n is c o n tra ry to p a s t experience. leurs origin es e t leurs co n s£ q u en ces. Ioga. . 4 N . h a s gone so fa r as to su g g e st th a t a com m on B a lk a n ty p e of m an h a s g ra d u a lly evolved— t h a t th e re a re m o re p h y sical sim ila ritie s a m o n g st th e B a lk a n peoples th a n b etw een S erb s a n d C zechs. T h u s in 1934 th e re w as fo u n d ed L a revue Internationale des etudes balkaniques. L e caractere com m un des in stitu tio n s d u su d-est de V E urope (P aris. N ich o las Io rg a . 1 6 8-186. W hile i t is tru e t h a t P h ilip a n d A lex­ a n d e r of M aced o n d id succeed in e sta b lish in g a B a lk a n H ellenic s ta te b y force. I t is o n ly re c e n tly t h a t th is fa c t h a s been recognized. sh o rt-liv e d B u lg a r a n d S erb em p ires w ere s e t u p b y S am u el an d D u sh a n u n til th e T u rk s a rriv e d a n d im p o sed th e ir ru le fo r n e a rly five c e n tu rie s. " B u t e t sign ification d es Etudes b a lk a n iq u e s.” L e m onde slave (F eb ru ary. C o n se q u e n tly in a n a re a of 190.2 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y failed. I t is q u ite ap* N .4 C e rta in ly th e re is som e b asis for th is th e o ry . N ow here in th e p e n in ­ su la can th e re be fo u n d a n a tu r a l c e n te r a ro u n d w hich a g re a t s ta te m ig h t cry stallize. 1 92 9 ). 6. i t ra p id ly d is in te g ra te d a fte r th e ir d e a th s a n d th e div id ed p e n in su la w as th e n o v e rru n b y R o m a n legions. In th e realm of c u ltu re . 3 P . p la in ly re s u lt in c e n tri­ fugal r a th e r th a n c e n trip e ta l a c tio n . w ith th e expressed p u rp o se of stu d y in g th e B a lk a n s as a n in te g ra l u n it w ith a com m on h isto ric al a n d c u ltu ra l h e rita g e . 1926). S k ok . Iorga. h ow ever. T h e y sug g est t h a t u n ity is m ore lik e ly to be forced from w ith o u t th a n to arise from w ith in — w hich is precisely w h a t h a s h a p p e n e d . w ith en clav es of several o th e rs. 3. S everal c e n tu rie s la te r w hen th e p o w er of B y z a n tiu m w eakened.3 T h e R o u m a n ia n h is to ria n .” R evue in tern ation ale des Etudes b a lk a n iq u es. T h e e d ito rs h a v e even coined th e te rm “ la b a lk a n o lo g ie ” to em p h asize th e ir p e n in su la r v ie w p o in t. B u t th e o th e r side of th e p ic tu re sh o u ld n o t be o v erlooked. S erb s a n d R u ssian s. b u t how fa r i t can be a p p lied i t is difficult to e s tim a te .

cit. 4 . “L ’u n it6 b a lk a n iq u e. 1930). 1 lie fiery liq u o r “ r a k i. 1 4 -1 6 . M cC u llo ck .” Revue Internationale des etudes b a lk a n iq u es . I (1934). 1936). In I h e -c o u n try sid e it is difficu lt to d istin g u ish a B u lg a ria n from a S erbian. T u rk ish influence in th e m u sic is a lw a y s d iscern ib le a n d so m etim es g y p sy . L in g u istiq u e balkan iqu e problem es et resu ltats (P aris. 'M I . In fa c t o ne a u th o r ity o n th is s u b jc c t m a in ta in s t h a t 11 1ere ex ists “ a. 131. g iv e ad v ice.. 132. a n d d eliv e r love mes№l|. especially. in c o n tra s t to C a th o lic ism . S an d feld .'11* 011 1 in th e la n g u a g e of th e people. ( *eographic lo c a tio n . “ D e s tra its lin g u istiq u es co m m u n s au x lan gu es b a lk a n iq u e s. 6. i 1. S ee и (no A . a re of G re e k orig in b u t d iffe re n t v ersio n s a re k n o w n to a ll th e Mai lean people. 3 8 -4 0 .” Revue ill's (hides slaves. birds b eing u sed to b rin g a id . 5. B u t w ith th is ex cep tio n th e re a re th e sam e ty p e of s tre e ts. I lie p e a s a n t d an ces. fo r ex a m ­ ple. 1 1 1 -1 1 8 . A lth o u g h th e v a rio u s B alk an Innguages h av e th e m o st d iv erse origins y e t te rrito ria l c o n tig u ity plus c en tu rie s of B y z a n tin e a n d O tto m a n d o m in a tio n h a v e le ft n u m ero u s co m m on c h a ra c te ris tic s in v o c a b u la ry a n d g ra m m a tic a l co n stru c tio n . A n cel. T h e cosI nines are fu n d a m e n ta lly th e sam e d e sp ite local v a ria tio n s. 14. V (1 9 2 5 ). S an d feld . to p o g ra p h ic co m p lex ity a n d co n flicting hislo u c a l tra d itio n s te n d to se p a ra tism . 15. I n religion th e re is. th e sam e g a r­ dens. th e re a re few differences to be fo u n d . Iorga. In m usic and dan cin g . T h e re is also a co m m o n p e rso n ific a tio n of n a tu re . o p en h e a rth s a n d fu rn itu re . a consp icu o u s a b se n ce of clericalism it nil a p ro n o u n c e d a u to n o m y a n d looseness in c h u rc h o rg a n iz atio n s. L e caractere com m un des in stitu tio n s . re m in isc e n t. '’5 I'he sam e is tru e of th e e v e ry -d a y life of th e v a rio u s n a tio n a litie s. D . e t c . w h e th e r th e S la v “ k o lo . 2 S . w ith few e x cep tio n s. in th e 1 K . of th e lin g u istic u n itie s w h ich a re b a se d o n a com m o n origin. 3 8 -5 7 . th a tc h e d roofs. T h e legends of L en o re a n d of H ero a n d L e a n d e r. M an y sim ila ritie s a re also to be fo u n d in p o p u la r legends a n d su p e r­ v isio n s. G eo g rap h ic c o n tig u ity a n d a com m on h isto rical a n d c u ltu ra l b ack g ro u n d h a v e p ro d u c e d . e J. as is th e case w ith th e R o m a n c e lan g u ag es. th e G erm an ic languages.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 3 I> .” th e R o u m a n ia n “ h o ra ” or th e G reek “ c h o ria . mid. G reek or R o u m a n ia n v illag e e x c e p tin g th o se in th e co astal or stric tly M e d ite rra n e a n reg io n s w h ere a n o th e r ty p e p rev ails. 6 Such th e n is th e base u pon w hich a n y fed eral s tr u c tu re m u st rest. M a n y lypcs of foods a n d d rin k s a re co m m o n to all th e B a lk a n co u n trie s. D r u m s in the B a lk a n N ig h t (N e w Y o rk . ii /». in m a n y n-Hpects. houses. a co m m o n a d h e re n c e to O rth o d o x d o ctrin e s. a lm o s t in v a ria b ly is m e n tio n ed b y W este rn e rs w ho tra v e l in a n y of th e B alk an c o u n trie s.” a re p ra c tic a lly id e n tic a l. SeliSCev.” fo r e x am p le. re m a rk a b le lin g u is tic u n ity .

" . L e s etats balkan iqu es (P aris. 1935). S im ila r v iew s are held b y th e G reek a u th o r ity on B alk an geograp h y an d cu ltu ral in stitu tio n s. C. 1 926). . 1930). u n ­ frien d lin ess an d conflict. so m e w riters m in im ize th e e x te n t an d sign ifican ce o f th e se b on d s. for exam p le. “ L es co n tra stes tragiq u es d e l ’esprit b a lk a n iq u e. in tim a te an d p ro fo u n d an d w h ich 'th e superficial p h e n o m e n a of disco rd . On th e o th e r hand. 1933). 1933). III (M arch -A p ril. a c e rta in u n ity .” 7 7 N . D en d ia s L 'o rg an isation du P roch e-O rien t et le m ou vem en t de rapproch em en t balkanique (P a ris. a u n ity w hich is basic. 171. 4 8 2 487.” L es B a lk a n s. m u s t n o t h id e from u s .” L e m onde slave (F eb ru ary. M . 291. III (Jan u ary-F eb ru ary. 3 1 3 -3 2 2 . . . E v e lp id i. “ Los co n flits b a lk a n iq u es. B . R a d itsa . Iorga.4 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d ie s in H ist o r y w o rd s of Io rg a.

* A . m in iste r of foreign affairs to F re d e ric k I I of P ru ssia . 1877). E s s a i p a rtic u lie r de p o litiq u e dan s lequel on propose u n partage de la T urqu ie еигорёепе (P a ris.2 S im ila rly C o u n t de H e rtz b e rg . Cent p ro jets de partage de la T urqu ie (P aris. D ju v a ra .1 T h e lis t of th e a u ­ th o rs of th e e a rlie r p la n s in c lu d e s such illu strio u s n a m es a s C h arles I I of Sicily (1270). L . 4 M . 1940). fo r th e sak e of “ p ro p a g a tin g th e ( h ristia n R eligion. L 'E u ro p e et la revolution fra n q a ise (P aris. an ev e r in c re a sin g n u m b e r of p a rtitio n schem es were p re se n te d . D ria u lt a n d M . th e c o n te m ­ p o ra ry e n th u sia sm fo r all th in g s G reek p la y e d a n im p o r ta n t role in d e te rm in in g E u ro p e ’s view of th e E a s te rn Q u estio n . T h u s C o u n t de V olney. 5 2 2 -5 2 6 . . A R o a d to P eace in Southeastern E u rope (N e w Y o rk . Т . G eshk off. 1925).5 . K. . w hen a b o d y h a s once been s e t in 1 T .1 9 . ra tio n a liz e d as follow s: “ In th e m oral realm as in th e p h y sical. V esn itch . fa v o re d T u rk is h p a r titio n in o rd er t h a t F ra n c e m ig h t a c q u ire so u th e rn G reece. H alkan U n ion . T h e in flu en tial "p h ilo so p h es” a n d th e ir discip les clam o red fo r th e o v e rth ro w of th e b a rb a ro u s infidels a n d th e s e ttin g u p of a G reek E m p ire or a federat ion of G reek s ta te s . L o u is X I V of F ran c e (1685) a n d T s a r P e te r th e G re a t (1710). w ith o u t th e le a s t e x p e c ta tio n s of a n y w orldly profit . T o ta k e its p lace he p ro p o sed th e reg en eratio n of B y z a n tiu m w ith th e ex cep tio n of m o st of E u ro p e a n I u rk ey w hich sh o u ld be d iv id e d a m o n g st th e v ic to rs . T h e n a tu r e of th e se p ro p o sa ls v a rie d w idely.3 T h e relig io u s fa c to r w as also p ro m in e n t in th ese plans. Carra. R . Je a n L o u is C a rra . C y p ru s a n d (he A egean Isles. L h eritier. 1913). 5 . 1 . I. V I I (J a n u a ry . ” u rg ed t h a t a g en eral E u ro p e a n c ru sa d e b e la u n c h e d n g ain st th e infidel T u rk is h e m p ire . 5 -7 3 . Sorel. 2 J . W ith th e decline a n d g ra d u a l d isin te g ra tio n of th e O tto m a n E m p ire from th e se v e n te e n th c e n tu ry o n w a rd . F o r exam ple. G .4 In a d d itio n to n a tio n a l a n d religious a sp ira tio n s. g e n e ro u sly offered sev eral T u rk is h provinces to A u s tria a n d R u ssia so t h a t P ru ssia n e x p an sio n e a stw a rd m ig h t be fa c ilita te d . a F re n c h h isto ria n w ho had jo u rn e y e d in E g y p t a n d S y ria .C H A P T E R II T H E A W A K E N IN G O F T H E N A T I O N A L I T I E S T O 1829 F o r c e n tu rie s p a s t in n u m e ra b le p la n s for th e re o rg a n iz atio n of th e N ear E a s t h a v e c o n tin u a lly b een b ro u g h t fo rw a rd . th e F re n c h J a c o b in w ho s p e n t a n u m b e r of y ears in th e D a n u b ia n P rin c ip a litie s. 1885). M a n y of th e a u th o rs w ere o b v io u sly m o tiv a te d b y n a tio n a l in te re sts. 1914). I. E ra s m u s (1530). T h u s C a rd in a l A lb ero n i. H isto ir e diplom atiqu e de la Grece de 1821 a nos jo u rs (P aris. H3-107. E m p e ro r M a x i­ m ilian I (1518).” A m erica n J o u rn a l of In tern a tio n a l L a w . C re te. C h arles V I I I of F ra n c e (1495). L e ib n itz (1672). “ C ard in al A lb eron i: an Ita lia n P recu rsor o f P acifism a n d In te r ­ n ation al A rb itra tio n .

there was one characteristic which they all possessed in common and th a t was an u tte r disregard and disdain for the native populations. 39fT. X C III (M archJune. M adam e. 1917). H e im plored C atherine the G reat to free “ m y poor G reeks. . it was to R ussia th a t the politically conscious rayahs hopefully looked for deliverance.6 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y m otion. As m ight be expected. e L.7 a factor of prim e im portance 6 C.”6 From this brief survey it is a p p aren t th a t these schemes for the settlem en t of th e E astern Q uestion were as varied as th ey were num erous. T h e Russians were n o t only b ro th er Slavs b u t also of the same O rthodox faith. T he g reat V oltaire was also interested in Greece. . I t is true th a t there were sporadic local uprisings of desperate peasants or reckless outlaw s. A t th a t period. no one ever th o u g h t of taking into consideration th e wishes of the races concerned. And as for the em pire or states which were to be carvcd o u t of the S u lta n ’s dom ains.” 5 Accordingly he held th e disappearance of the O ttom an E m pire inevitable and in its place he urged the restoration of B yzantium . F .” prom ising her th a t should she follow his advice. the people of th e B alkans wrere to take no p a rt in the cam paigns.” L a grande revue . the greater th e m ass th e more difficult it becomes to stop it. co n tact w as m aintained w ith the P atriarch s of C onstantinople and considerable sum s of money and oth er gifts were frequently sent to the P a tria rc h a te and to v a ri­ ous m onasteries th ro u g h o u t the N ear E ast. Considerations sur la guerre aduelle des Turcs (London. I t was only n a tu ra l th a t such should be the case in view of the internal conditions in th e Balkans. If the O ttom an empire was to be overthrow n. M oreover th e R ussian ecclesiastical and govern­ m ental officials carefully fostered the tendency of th e B alkan C hrist­ ians to look to Moscow for guidance and aid. 7 A number of Patriarchs and other high officials were at various periods executed or rem oved from office b y the Turks for suspicious relations w ith th e M uscovites. however. Chasseboeuf com te de V olney. it seems absurd to me th a t one should have such a good o p p o rtu n ity and should miss it.” W hen C atherine failed to p u t his plan into effect V oltaire was deeply disap­ pointed and w rote to her: “Seriously. D uring th e centuries following th e downfall of B yzantium . 1788). “ the X euxis and the Phidias would cover the e arth with your images . “Voltaire et la question d ’O rient. 487. . Up to the end of the eighteenth cen tu ry th e rayahs or B alkan C hristians were so w eak and disorgan­ ized th a t the winning of independence by their own unassisted efforts was never seriously considered. A thens would be one of your cap itals. * I am sure th a t p o sterity will be astonished a t th is. T h u s th e O rthodox C hurch becam e strongly pro-R ussian. Proal. b u t it was generally felt th a t no revolution could be successfully engineered w ith ­ o u t the aid of the g reat powers.

9 T he accession of P eter th e G reat fu rth er increased R ussian pres­ id e in the Balkans. cit. a man of spirit & of knowledge for this country. de Grice et du Levant fa it les annees 1675 et 1676 (Lyon... to place 30.rand T sa r of M uscovy. in th e case of a R usso-T urkish w ar. de Dalm atie. G. alm ost m ystical position in the m inds of the C hristians. and concluded m utual aid pacts with the Princes of the Principalities. 1889). 1678). say th a t th ere was a P ro p h et am ongst them who foretold th a t th e E m pire of th e T u rk would be destroyed by a ('hrysogenos N atio n . where. to gether w ith accom panying gifts. 18.neS 01 "TSWujj'ts ката тот чгрытор |jr i А1катер'шг]Ч В ' VcjicaoTOVPKlKbv TTo\eiJ. to arouse Ihe Serbs and Bulgars against th e Sultan. am ong others sieur M anno M annea. K . T h e g re a t victories of the T sar fired the leaders of the B alkan races with hopes of early liberation. 8 Ibid.” and these. W . ’0 Vjjyas ФераТоз каО) I koxt) rov [Rhigas Pheraios and his Times] (Athens. 15. 356. legendary. were d istrib u ted in g reat num bers to th e churches and m on­ asteries of Greece. M ontenegrin and A rm enian envoys. a J. K ontoyiannes. Serbian. Photios. Voyage d' Italic. p articu larly of the ( nvek race. 1 . Sorel. Zinkeisen. W heler. R ussia also gained g ra titu d e and prestige as an asylum for C hristian refugees. K on. 20-22. . a fuel which m ost of the contem p o rary travellers were quick to notice.8 C onsequently R ussia cam e to occupy a unique. & th a t undoubtedly th e G reeks would be de­ lighted to come under his dom ination. op. P eter also received and encouraged Greek. 1931). L a question d ’Orient au X V I I I е sidcle (Paris. Ch. ’Aitoixvrjixovtbiiara irfpl trjs ’’ ETravacrTacrtois | Memoirs on the Greek Revolution] (A thens. church. th ey were nblo to en ter w ith o u t any discrim ination the arm y. in co n tra st to A ustria.000 men in the l ’.tO yian. 9. K ordatos. Large num bers of them . 17. 1899). m erchant of th e city of A rta. In 1676 th e D u tch traveller Jacob Spon. M . 1903). which can refer only to (lie M uscovites who are alm ost all blondes. and P ete r encour­ aged these hopes as he foresaw th e need of C hristian aid in his pro­ jected wars against the T u rk s.ov ( 1768-1774 ) [The Greeks during the F irst R usso-Turkish W ar under Catherine I I ( 1768-1774 )] (A thens. Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa (G otha. 6 -9 . Also I have heard several Greeks. A. 1857). fled to R ussia. commerce or the professions. 355.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 7 In view of the d o m in an t position and influence of the church am ongst I lie rayahs. 529. for example. th a t is to say blonde. A ccordingly he h ad p o rtra its of himnclf engraved in A m sterdam w ith the title " P e tru s prim us Russograecorum M o n arch a. III. I. for he can easily mobilise great arm ies & cuter th e dom ains of th e G rand Seigneur: b u t th a t which gives him I lie greatest ad v an tag e over th e others is th a t he is the only M onarch of the G reek religion. See also J. Spon and G. B rancovano of W allachia. undertook. & th a t th e y would declare I lieinselves in his favor if th e y saw him enter T u rk ey w ith a powerful nrm y. recorded th a t: Of all the C hristian princes none was feared as g reatly as the ( '. 6-10.

X (1935). th e G reeks regard the T sarin a as their legitim ate sovereign. Polish refugees fleeing before th e Russian 10 K ontoyiannes. Enough of th y w rath. 1 1 Cited by Sorel. О G od.10 T he failure in 1711 of P eter’s expedition across the P ru th did not dam pen the enthusiasm of the B alkan Christians.. 11 Report b y G iam battista de R ossi. 182-210. M arshal M iinnich reported th a t " . 1884). cit. and were placing can­ non and Janissaries in such tow ns as Ochrida. E pirus and M orea. Peter the Great (N ew York. disarm ­ ing the people of A lbania. 10-28. 24. 1768— 314 years. P177 os. Born in Zagora.” and "T h e Origins. See also E . A. C are­ ful preparations were m ade. op. 10. C ited by B . later m oved to Sm yrna and finally to A m sterdam where he lived betw een 1760 and 1776 and accum ulated a fortune. C har­ acter. . rrjs Bcverlas k/итгбрсор rwv Mo<rxo7roXtrwf>. W hen in 1735 the Russian arm ies once more p en etrated into the Balkans. P apachatzes. How m uch longer will last the reign of the crescent. E fforts were made to cultivate good relations w ith T u rk e y ’s trad itio n al enem y.1 2 T ypical of th e contem porary hope and expectation of early liberation by R ussian m ight is th e following touching appeal of John Priggos. he em i­ grated in 1740 to Alexandria. L a question d'Orient. and to furnish th e R ussian troops w ith provisions. M ichalopoulos. For a contem porary folksong expressing a path etically naive hope and belief in Russian aid.” u while a t the same tim e the V enetian consul a t D urazzo wrote hom e th a t the C hristians were wild w ith joy a t the news of Russian victories and th a t the T urks were. . Epirus. Venice.” In 1768 C atherine wras given the o p p o rtu n ity to test the p racticability of her plans. Tw o Russian ships were dispatched to th e M editerranean for a two year cruise to g a th er d a ta on navigation conditions and problem s. . Cited by K ordatos. 1736. involving n o t only th e conquest of Poland b u t also the recreation of a B yzantine E m pire a t the expense of the Sultan. 456-60. Ju ly. so th a t she m ay liberate us from th e heavy and unbearable yoke of th e u n ­ ju st. D angers and A chievem ents of P eter the F irst. Schuyler. our co-religionist. Em peror of allR ussia. M ontenegro. 1757-1798] (A thens.. op. A t the sam e tim e there appeared a num ber of widely d istrib u ted propagandist tra c ts bearing such titles as "T h e Life of P eter the G reat. 20. Peloponnesus and C rete to pre­ pare th e in h ab itan ts for th e coming events. which has ruled the C ity of C onstantinople from 1453 until now. a w ealthy G reek m erchant in A m sterdam : “ M ay God touch th e h e a rt of th e R ussian Em press. " T i цетд. . cit. 1930). 281. 1757-1798 [Rhigas of Velestinos . T he plans of the T sarin a were grandiose." 1 ’H7r€tpwmd xpovекА. . T iran a. P^yas 6 BeXesffTH'Xijs. II. 20-22. 1879).” 1 3 D uring th e reign of C atherine the G reat these hopes of the rayahs seemed a t long la st a b o u t to be fulfilled. A num ber of agents were sen t to Bosnia. Bruckner. P eter der Grosse (Berlin. . therefore. 7. Ph.” [“T he Com m erce of the M oschopolitans with Venice. grasping and faithless T urks. see K ontoyiannes.8 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y field. M oschopolisv and Ja n in a . 13 Priggos was a typical G reek m erchant of this period.

and Bessarabia and was to be ruled by a novereign belonging to th e G reek religion. T o a tta in this Horil the cooperation of A ustria was necessary b u t M aria T heresa op­ posed all p artitio n schemes. while the R ussians had Iicon inform ed by th eir over-optim istic agents th a t a hundred th o u нмnd Greeks were ready for revolt. Joseph I I и ml Katharine. A . 1782 ( 'atherine outlined her plan. A few Russian soldiers were landed in Morca and w ith the aid of local volunteers some fortresses were beliegcd. 1715— 1821 [Peloponnesus during the Second T urk­ ish Rule.1 4 B y th e T re a ty of K u chuk-K ainarji (1774) T u rk ey ceded little territory b u t was forced to recognize R ussia as the protector of M ol­ davia and W allachia and to prom ise to p ro tect th e C hristians of the empire.” Revue de droit international public. R. 1939). see K ontoyianiif’H . should renounce all pretensions to the throne of R ussia II nee the two crowns m ust n o t and should not be allowed to be placed 011 the same h e a d . and th e follow ing recent study by М . and the outbreak of the P ugachev R evolt in 1773. entered th e Aegean sea iind destroyed th e O ttom an fleet a t Tchesm e. . 1896). R. led C atherine to sign the pence with the Turks. leaving th e G reeks to face savПЦ С repression. 5 Iff. 1869). U nfo rtu n ately th e G reeks had expected a powerful Russian 111 my instead of a sm all b an d of five hundred. Obviously. For the repercussions in th e Balkans. T o reassure Joseph. K am arowski. . K ath arina die. von A rneth. An independent sta te nam ed D acia was to be set up as a buffer betw een Russia and A ustria. W ith the d eath of th e Em press in 1781 I ho way was cleared. Porsch. III (1896). see A. op. In a le tte r to Joseph II on Septem ber 10. 64-311. 1 B L. Sakellarios. A pprehensive of his own future id view of th e fate of Poland and th e w idespread R ussian intrigues in !iiu dom ains. it was provided fu rth e r th a t Conm(:intine “ . I wo years later th e R ussian arm ies had reached th e D anube and a Uussian fleet h ad sailed around the A tlantic. L a Question d Orient. T h e B alkan C hristians were filled w ith excitem ent. cit. For the diplom atic aspects. 1715-1821 ] (A thens.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 9 in inics appealed to the S ultan for aid. W allachia. Beziehungen Friedrichs des (!m s sen zur Tiirkei (M arburg. Bruckner. th e Sultan allowed himself to become entangled in the dinputc and after a sharp exchange of notes he declared w ar 011 Russia. Z weite. R ussia should obtain the urea between th e Bug and D neister together w ith one or two islands 111 the archipelago to pro tect her commerce. von Russland (W ien. Surd. 406.. "La question d ’O rient. Finally A ustrian aid was mlccd for the reestablishm ent of “ th e ancient G reek m onarchy” w ith I he understanding th a t C ath erin e’s grandson.” 1 6 14 T h e pressure of Frederick th e Great. B. who was opposed to th e p artitioning of Turkey. . C onstantine. As a result. 269-288. be placed 011 the throne. 'H ПеХХозг^i't/r/os кага rfy b&rkpav TovpKOKparLav. this was b u t a step tow ards C atherine’s ultim ate ци.ч1—a subservient G reek em pire a t C onstantinople. 146-204. th e R ussian land forces luiled com pletely and soon sailed off. I t was to consist of M oldavia.

so a n effo rt w as now m ad e to p ro cu re F re n c h n e u tr a lity in r e tu r n for th e pro v in ce of E g y p t. O rso v a an d B elg rad e. 16 B ruckner. C a th e rin e a c c e p ted th ese c o n d itio n s w ith re se r­ v a tio n s co n cern in g th e V e n e tia n pro v in ces. 406. 4 07. b u t his d e a th in 1787 to g e th e r w ith th e d e a th of F re d e ric k I I th e y e a r b efore a n d th e e x h a u stio n of F ra n c e a fte r th e A m erican W a r of In d e p e n d e n c e cleared th e w ay for A u stro -R u ssia n a c tio n . a p o rtio n of S erb ia. C a th e rin e h a d firm ly e sta b lish e d R u ssia n influence on th e B lack S ea b u t h e r failu re to re s to re th e G reek E m p ire en d ed th e p o ssib ility of a m o re o r less p eacefu l so lu tio n of th e E a s te rn Q u estio n .. so in 1792 she concluded th e T r e a ty of J a s s y b y w hich she a c q u ire d th e te rrito r y b etw een th e riv e rs B u g a n d D n ie ste r. C y p ru s a n d o th e r islan d s. H is b ro th e r an d successor. K am arow sk i. a n d B osnia. Y o u n g ]. i t seem ed fu lly as n a tu r a l a n d o b v io u s a so lu tio n for th e problem as t h a t of m a in ta in in g O tto m a n in te g r ity . B u k o v in a. T h e n o n -G re e k rayahs h a d n o t as y e t been in fe cte d b y th e v iru s of n a tio n a lism a n d th e G reek m e rc h a n ts . 17 S o m e a u th o rities hold th a t a B y z a n tin e so lu tio n w ou ld h a v e b een a sou n d er p o lic y th a n th a t o f p reservin g th e O tto m a n E m p ire e. cit. 3 3 5 -3 4 0 .16 In th e follow ing w a r A u s tria c o n trib u te d little because of in ­ te rn a l re v o lts a n d th e d e a th in F e b ru a ry 1790 of Jo se p h I I . C re te . C o n se q u e n tly w hen C a th e rin e p ro p o sed t h a t th e G reek P h a n a rio te s a n d P a tr ia r c h a te succeed th e T u rk is h P o rte . th e fo rtresses of N icopolis. 45. V idin. G ree k P h a n a rio te a d m in is tra to rs a n d G re e k O rth o d o x clergy w ere d o m in a n t in th e ir re sp e c tiv e fields. H e d e m a n d e d G alicia. G reek sch o lars. h a stily signed th e T r e a ty of S is to v a (1791) on th e b asis of th e status quo ante helium. L eo p o ld I I . H erz e g o v in a a n d th e V e n e tia n p ro v in ces of I s tr ia a n d D a lm a tia . V ergennes. Jo se p h rep lied t h a t he could ag ree to C a th e r­ in e ’s p ro p o sals but. W a lla c h ia to th e A lu ta riv e r.17 A t a n y r a te . K a th a r in a die Z w eite. T h e se . M o re a a n d th e islan d s. m ad e i t c lea r t h a t p a rtitio n w ould be stro n g ly o p p o sed . how ev er. th e F re n c h foreign m in iste r. TsU . th e p ro g ress of th e F re n c h R e v o lu tio n a n d th e im p e n d in g p a rtitio n of P o la n d w as a ttr a c tin g C a th e rin e ’s a tte n tio n . 1783.К) S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y O n N o v e m b e r 13. loc. V enice w as to b e co m ­ p e n sa te d w ith M o re a . N a tio n a lism a n d W ar in the N ea r E a s t (O xford . In h e r re p ly on J a n u a r y 4. H ow ever. 1915). claim ed a s co m p en satio n a n a re a em b ra c in g a s u b ­ s ta n tia l p o rtio n of th e p e n in su la . 46. T h e R u ssian s w ere m o re successful a n d once ag ain re a c h e d th e D a n u b e . [G. w ere u n im p o r ta n t d e ta ils. th e fa ilu re of C a th e rin e ’s p la n d efin ite ly m a rk s th e b eg in n in g of a new ep o ch in th e h is to ry of th e E a s te rn Q uestion.g . In th e lig h t of la te r d e v e lo p m e n ts h e r p ro je c t m a y to d a y a p p e a r fa n ta s tic b u t i t seem s to h a v e h a d a t le a s t a p o ssib ility of success a t th e tim e.

h e ex p lain ed . S y ria a n d M e so p o ta m ia w ere in I lie h a n d s of feu d al lo rd s a n d in A ra b ia th e W a h a b ite s h a d c a s t o u t I lie <H tom an s. 1942). T h u s J o h n P riggos.ire u n d e r th e ty r a n n y of th e T u r k s .1 C iled b y K o rd a to s. u n d e r th e K iu p rilli g ra n d v iz iers a n d u n d e r Uit/. T u n is. as.19 I liiii d e ca y w as n o t c o n tin u o u s a n d u n c h eck ed follow ing th e reign of nileiinan.ofoi'c th e su b je c te d C h ris tia n s h a d p in n e d all th e ir hopes on Unniwi a n d th e o th e r G r e a t P o w ers. a n d M oо w ere for all p ra c tic a l p u rp o se s in d e p e n d e n t. H o w ev er.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 11 I li tvt. of th e su b je c te d B a lk a n races. R h igas sim ila rly tu rn ed d u rin g th e se V i *iiи from R u ssia to F ra n ce an d h er rev o lu tio n a r y p rin cip les. Iu N o a d eq u a te s tu d y h as b een m a d e o f th e variou s fa cto r s resp o n sib le for th e ilt i Him' o f th e E m p ire. S low ly th e oppressed hi vii Its beg an to realize t h a t tie s of religion o r of race c o u n te d for little in I he c o n te m p o ra ry d ip lo m a c y . th e b reak d ow n of th e O ttom an * • Im lu islrative a n d m ilita ry sy s te m s . a n d th e d e v a sta tin g i lli ( In of th e p lagu es. w ho in 1768 h a d i | n r led R u ssia n a id . a n d if th e T u rk is h yoke wiih Iо be c a s t off. Vr/yos. . F or a co n tem p o ra ry fo lk so n g exp ressin g th is i! n p p nin tm ent and d isillu sio n .hil) P a sh a in th e m id -e ig h te e n th c e n tu ry . A lgeria. 20.” 13 I 'lie failu re of C a th e rin e n o t o n ly led to m ore self-reliance a n d indi p ru d e n c e on th e part. 4 2 -4 7 . T h e m o st obvious of (hose w as th e c o n tin u e d d is in te g ra tio n of th e O tto m a n E m p ire . as is so m etim es s ta te d . 21. T h e re w ere p erio d s of m a rk e d re111 v e ry .” T h e Wen tern E u ro p e a n m o n a rc h s. In E u ro p e th e e m p ire h a d lo st H u n g a ry . N a tio n a l in te re s t w as th e g u iding |u liiciple in th e foreign policies of th e pow ers. se e ib id . T ra n s y lv a n ia mid H tikovina to A u s tria a n d th e B lack Sea c o a st as fa r as th e P ru th и in I (he K ilia a r m of th e D a n u b e to R u ssia. B a iley . w ro te e ig h t y e a rs la te r t h a t w h a t w as needed wни "som eo n e of o u r R a c e to a rise a n d to lead o u r c o u n try m e n . “ a lth o u g h th e y are I liiiMlinns. E . b rief d escrip tion of co n d itio n s in th e E m p ire in i In1 n irly n in eteen th ce n tu r y is g iv en in F .. 19.»rasp of M e h e m e t A li. 18. A n ex c e lle n t. fo r exam p le. B u t th e e ig h te e n th c e n tu ry w ith IlM rilmdy d ip lo m acy a n d w a rs a n d h e a rtb re a k in g tre a tie s placed th e t Itiinlian P ow ers in an e n tire ly d iffe re n t lig h t. T h e su rre n d e r of te rrito rie s fa r rem o v ed from th e c a p ita l-w o u ld 1 . S e e M ich alop ou los..th e c h a n g es in trad e rou tes. b y th e b eg in ­ ning of th e n in e te e n th c e n tu ry th e p e rip h e rie s of th e em p ire h a d been bird an d th e c e n le r w as p a lp a b ly m o rib u n d . E g y p t w as in th e In m j. A sia M in o r. each of th e m is on th e look o u t fo r his ow n in te re s ts an d (liny a rc u n c o n cern ed e ith e r fo r C h ris tia n ity o r for th e C h ristia n s who . 1 ‘ijyiit. A S tu d y in A n g lo -T u rk ish R ela tio n s 1 8 2 6 -1 8 5 3 (C am b rid ge. B r itish P o lic y an d the T u rkish A 'i l<inn M ovem ent. su ch as th e d eg en era tio n of th e ru lin g d y n a sty . b u t it also Hiiirked th e a p p e a ra n c e of new h isto ric a l forces w hich w ere co m p letely H v o lu lionizing th e s itu a tio n in th e N e a r E a s t a n d e lim in a tin g th e |inruiil)ility of an im p erial o r B y z a n tin e re s to ra tio n . i t w o u ld h a v e to be acco m p lish ed b y in te rn a l revi tin I ion a n d n o t b y e x te rn a l aid . th e lack of i li'iil illc and tech n o lo g ica l progress in th e N ea r E a st.

uneducated. Islam .12 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y have been less serious if accom panied by a stronger grip on the re­ m ainder b u t this was n o t the case. th e clergy were often men of low character. like Ali in A lbania and Pasvan Oglou in Bulgaria. to a lesser extent. was obliged to auction the bishoprics. Some. greedy and avaricious. to one or another of which every subject had to belong. intrigued against his m inisters and carried on secret negotiations w ith one another and even w ith foreign powers. and th e palace women pulled the strings be­ hind the scenes while pu ppet rulers am used them selves in their harem s. T hus. M oreover. was invested w ith wide powers. all offices from th e highest to the lowest were sold to th e highest bidder. prim arily for adm inistrative reasons. These churches were called "M illets” and were divided as follows.” the Greek nam e for a subject o f B yzantium . the ulem a. as contem porary travellers alm ost invariably rem arked. R om an Catholic. freedom from the “ k h a ra tc h ” and th e rig h t to levy taxes on O rthodox C hristians. A rm enian and Jewish. U nfortunately. T h u s in th e G reek church or “ R oum M illet. T he P atriarch . began their careers as ordinary brigands and were advanced to th e dignity of P ashas by th e helpless P o rte in order to bring them to some so rt of term s. T his collapse of O ttom an strength encouraged th e Powers in their encroachm ents on the em pire and also stim ulated a sp irit of boldness and independence am ong the B alkan C hristians. Both the im potence and th e misrule of the O ttom an governm ent encouraged its subjects to m ake a bid for freedom. judicial power over th e laity. superstitious. T he pashas of E urope disregarded the S u lta n ’s a u th o rity . and the bishops in tu rn had to m ulct the priests who were therefore forced to levy outrageous charges on th eir parishioners. in-20 “ R oum ” is the Turkish corruption of “ R om aios. In addition. This aw akening of the nation­ alities together w ith the vulnerability of th e em pire to foreign aggres­ sion produced a situ atio n extrem ely unfavorable to a Balkan federa­ tion.” 20 were included all O rthodox C hristians regardless of th eir nationality. against the Greeks. including absolute control of the clergy. in order to recover the expenses he incurred in a tta in ­ ing th e throne. as representative of the in terests of the O rthodox C hristians he was invited to sit in the “ d iv an ” w ith th e O tto m an officials and to m ake representations to the governm ent in all affairs concerning his flock. And in C onstantinople. A nother factor which influenced inter-B alkan relations was th e. T he various races of th e O tto m an em pire were divided into church groups. selfish vested interests such as the janissaries. G reek O rthodox. . the Oecum eni­ cal P atriarch . growing hostility of the non-G reek populations against th e E astern' O rthodox church and.

. 317. II.2 4 W ith th e first signs of national consciousness. 52. In 1766 this Serbian Patriarchate was abolished b y decree of llicS iih an . 3 0 . W ith the conversion of K ing Boris in 864. 1807). w rites: B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 1 1 IC . 194. Spon and W heler. T he iihftlition of the Serbian P a tria rc h a te of Ipek in 17 662 2 and of the U nitarian A rchbishopric of O chrida in the following year2 3 placed Imill Serbians and B ulgarians under the direct jurisdiction of the <Ik t Ic P atriarchs. 1771).fait dans les annies 1803 et 1804 . . contenant I histoire de la guerre i Souliotes centre A li-V is ir . 316. 269. T here followed a period of denationalization and lirllcnization. 18-21. the B alkan Slavs ми Iin ally cam e in to conflict w ith the O rthodox C hurch. . .13 I l< i curtd more in extorting m oney th a n in inculcating C hristian prin<Ipk'N. 348. Voyage d 'lta lie . Observations on the Religion.u worse from th e view point of th e B alkan Slav. E d u cated B ulgarians were so im bued w ith Greek ( ill I lire th a t th e y considered them selves G reeks and n ot B ulgarians. iuiiI M aim ers of the Turks (London. [J. I’/Wji/je en G rece. D ue to N (he G reek ch aracter of the O rthodox Church this struggle often in­ volved the Greeks. 10-20. J. IHlfi). especially th e Bulgarians. A sia and A frica (London. in explaining th e u npopularity itl Kodofinikin. D. IfiH^).2 1 I:vO. Government. a purely political m ovem ent using i elision as a camouflage. Clarke. th e G reek-born R ussian representative in Serbia in IH0$. S. M For further details. see infra. C hristianity spread rapidly am ong the 11н1цагн and the Bulgarian Church was declared autocephalous. T he "g reat lili'ii" involved th e restoration of th e B yzantine E m pire and the ( liri'k-controlled O rthodox C hurch was used for th a t purpose. In 1346 the archtilnliop of Ipek was raised to th e rank of Patriarch w ithout th e sanction of th e Patriiiicli of Constantinople. T h us one au th o r. Greek was used exclusively in I In* church and th e schools and th e opening of B ulgarian schools was ttlmngly opposed. Before th e eighteenth century the main «им еет was th e exercise of spiritual dom ination over all O rthodox < hrinlians b u t w ith th e rise of the G reek national feeling it became I lie policy of th e church to hellenize all B alkan regions. 338. Spon of L yon s (London. < Wbcler. L. B y 1018 Bulgaria had Invii conquered by Emperor Basil II but th e autonom y of th e Bulgarian archbisho|ii If of Ochrida w as m aintained until its abolition in 1767. 269. was th e helli'iiizing policy of the church. . avec la chute de Souly en 1804 (Paris.195. 270. A Journey into Greece . I. especially in Bulgaria. in Com pany of D r. B artholdy. Of course the denationalization policy and I hr economic oppression of th e P atriarch heightened the desire for irllgious autonom y. C onsequently B ulgarian nationalism found expression In the struggle for th e exarchate. T his was Iii иi ml to occur under an y circum stances as T urk ish in stitu tio n s i endured impossible th e form ation of an y p a rty except on an eccleslnhlical basis. T he resu lt was a b itte r struggle betw een the P ulnarch ate and the B alkan Slavs. V II. VI. L aw . Travels in Various Countries of Europe. "J I n 1219 K ing Stephen of Serbia sen t his brother Sava to N icaea where th e Greek r<i(iliirch consecrated him th e first Serbian archbishop of Ipek. Porter].

Lascaris.29 2 C G.5 6 b u t the underlying racial antagonism rem ained and increased w ith th e developm ent of national conscious­ ness and interests. The A nglo-Russian Commercial T reaty of 1734 ( Yale H istorical Publications. N ew H aven. 1809-1814 (Belgrade. 29 D ue to various factors. E qually unfavorable to closer inter-B alkan relations were the conflicting economic in terests of the G reat Powers. 295.14 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y D uring the long rule of the Greek prelates in th e Serb provinces. 1936). T his policy can be explained largely by the im p o rtan ce of th e trad e of low-tariff R ussia for E ng­ lan d 28 and to the stiff com m ercial com petition and political rivalry of France in the N ear E a st. Y akchitch. various cases of G reek-Slav cooperation ag ain st th e common oppressor. D . PijYas. M oscow.27 W estern E uro­ pean countries a t th e tu rn of the eighteenth cen tu ry were being rapidly industrialized and were seeking m arkets for th e o u tp u t of their factories. British com m ercial houses were also to be found at Riga. La question d'Orient. of course. L'E urope et la rSsurrection de la Serbie 1804-1834 (Paris. K . “From that cpoch to the present there has existed. 78-81. T h . 1818). greater adapta- . 1810. th e ir servility w ith respect to the T urkish au thorities and their love of m oney had led th e ir flocks to regard th e nam e Greek as alm ost synonom ous to T u rk . Sim ilarly in a Serbian m em oir to Paris dated June 23. In 1769 B ritain n o t only perm itted the R ussian fleet to en ter the M editerranean b u t even notified Paris and M adrid th a t any action against this fleet would be considered an ac t of h o stility to herself. Costopoulo.2 6 T h ere were. 1917). 63. K ordatos. 28 After the 1734 Anglo-R ussian com m ercial treaty. C om peti­ tion arose for th e control of th a t m arket and this factor henceforth influenced to a g reat ex ten t the a ttitu d e of the G reat Powers to the N ear E astern Question. T h is G reek-Slav conflict was destined to play an im p o rta n t role in the B alkan federation m ovem ent.” A. Kazan and A strakhan. 1804-1830] (A thens. the L ev an t was now becom ing a m ark et for W estern factory products. "EXXijvss kcu ката тойs kircXcvcxpcoTimbs toiv ’a y w a s. 296. Petersburg. G eblesco. 17. a national an im osity between the Serbiuns and the G reeks. th a t is to say enemy . In place of being a source of supply for E urope. Reading. an account was given of the Serb-Byzantine rivalry of former tim es and it was added that. 1804-1830 [Greeks and Serbians during their W ars of Liberation. and m oreover Catherine issued a ukase perm itting the British m erchants in Russia to tap the Persian m arket. 178. Thus a power­ ful pro-Russian party existed in London which opposed British intervention in the N ear E ast. La question d ’Orient et son caractbre 6conomique (Paris. Sorel. 1904). Boppe. B rita in ’s sudden shift from a supporter of C ath erin e’s plan to a s to u t cham pion of O ttom an in teg rity is due fundam entally to this fight for m arkets. including favorable trade agreem ents. Documents in td its sur les relations de la Serbie avec Napoleon I . trade betw een the tw o coun­ tries increased to the point where th e British controlled 52% of the total volum e of trade at S t. N arva. particularly during th e early years of th e nineteen th cen tu ry . 28 T hese have been thoroughly studied in M. T his racial rivalry was to be found also in the cities of the Austrian Em pire w here the large Greek and Y ugoslav colonies were perpetually a t loggerheads. desp ite the id en tity of religion. 27 For a general analysis of the econom ic asp ects of the E astern Q uestion. X X X I I . L 'em pire de VOrient. 1938). see C.

see Vi J. C.802 pounds in 1816 and to 1. p a rtly be( mine of its geographic position on th e routes to In d ia and p artly bei nine of the rapidly expanding com m ercial relations. 191-201. D .ily.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 15 lu Ilie early nineteen th cen tu ry . the new A dm in istration nl (Irrccc. A H isto ry of the Levant Com pany (London. O pinions a/ Hit European P ress on the Eastern Question (London. 11)0 417. M asiiiиi.15 to 2.o m arket requirem ents. M oreover F rcnch com m ercial com petition in I lie L evant lessened and finally becam e negligible as a result of the i evolutionary w ars and th e C ontinental blockade. International Economics and the D iplom acy of the N ear E ast. 1928).3 1 During the second q u a rte r of the nineteenth cen tu ry the T urkish I mpire becam e increasingly im p o rta n t in English eyes. W ood. T he value и) I he exports of th e com pany jum ped from th e 88.079. As a result of these ln< lore Anglo-Russian com m erce decreased while th e trad e of the I Mulish L ev an t C om pany increased by leaps and bounds.065 pounds of t'/H.755 Iкhi u<Is in 1714 to 88. 138-187. which was the last year of the com pany’s existence. I Iiiih l he value of th e exports of the English L evant Com pany shrank from 213. P. T h e consequences of this iii-vv policy are well-known— th e postponem ent of th e liberation of Ili<‘ Balkan races and continual friction and even w ar w ith R ussia. Л. a S tu dy . this commercial and IhiIi I i< al situ atio n changed and B ritish policy changed w ith it. to a d o p t resolutely the Iml icy of m aintaining T u rk ish integ rity . its M u n icipal Organisation and Free I'пик. Urquhart.671 pounds in 1825. cit. Ily 1850 T u rk ey was a b e tte r custom er for the U nited K ingdom than 1 1 . M oreover the British feared a possible и1 1cuipt on th e part of the French to recover their recently lost colonies in the Far I iiM. and geographic advantages.065 pounds in 1783.l to 256. ch.591 pounds in 1835. and to 7. however. especially liter the T re a ty of U nkiar-Skelessi of 1833. op. L. I’uryear. its Revenue and N ational Possessions (London.079. H . T h e value of IIMulish exports to T u rk ey increased from th e 1. A rticles and books began to ap p ear describing the I m lcH in a more favorable lig h t and raising for the first tim e the bogey of Russian invasion of In d ia.3 2 Mill у l.30 A gradual i Iniuge in the English a ttitu d e tow ards R ussia and T u rk ey now beiilines evident. France. Ross. I t was this new economic and stra te ­ gic bignificance of th e O tto m an E m pire th a t led B ritain. B ritish Houles to In d ia (N ew York. R ussia or A ustria. 1833). the State and P rospects of English Commerce in the E ast. For further details on the econom ic basis of British N ear Eastern policy.140 pounds in 1845. 1935). 1911).706.671 pounds of IM . In c o n tra st a three per c e n t ad valorem duly on im ports and a small anchorage fee were th e only T urkish InvicH on foreign trad e. French com m erce in the I» •viint during the eighteenth cen tu ry increased rapidly at th e expense of th e British. [fistoire du commerce fran qais dans le Levant au X V I I I е siicle (Paris. VI. over three hunliicd articles were still barred.. R ussia In IKK) prohibited the im p o rtatio n of all foreign m anufactures and ullhoiigh th e 1833 tariff relaxed th e ban som ew hat. 1836).620. ** W ood. M I). H askins. T urkey and its Resources'.

1940). 217. Le Balkan slave et la crise autrichienne (Paris. Turkey. 33 D . Rupp. Loiseau. Columbia. 18701914 (N ew York. 85 C. e ’est le statu quo. Europe. 276. 1898). and when th e rest of Europe was too distracted by other problems to intervene. G. 262-312. See also M . 675. 34 T h e Balkan alliances of 1866-1868 and of 1912-13 were negotiated at periods when Russia supported th e alliances in order to utilize them for her own ends. 275.16 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y B ritain was by no m eans the only power w ith continually increas­ ing economic interests in the N ear E ast. "The Econom ics of British Foreign P olicy. 1825-50. C. 449-484. R ailw ay construction was increasing by leaps and bounds.3 4 M oreover th e billions th a t were invested in T u rkey represented a powerful force for the m aintenance of th e status quo. Earle. especially after the crash of 1873. Cambridge. “Alliances et conflits balkaniques. 1923). As one observer ap tly p u t it. X I . E. F . Feis. H . while A ustrian ind ustrialists and m erchants feared Russian com petition in th e B alkans and T urkey. The D iplom atic H istory of the Bagdad R ailroad ( University of M issou ri S tudies. millions began to be invested in the N ear E a st for th e exploitation of n a tu ra l resources. . and the Bagdad R ailw ay (N ew Y ork. the Great Towers. Economic factors influenced R ussia in her desire to gain control of the principal m outh of the D anube. III (Decem ber. th e building of railw ays and th e m odernization of th e arm ed forces. G erm an industrialists and financiers began to com pete for contracts and concessions in this area and ultim ately gained a dom inant position in the economic life of the O ttom an E m pire. X L IX . sought to gain the favor of the Porte and n atu rally opposed close Balkan cooperation. European Financial Control in the Ottoman E m pire (N ew York. T he eighteen sixties and seventies were decades of rapid industrial developm ent in the H apsburg and Rom anoff Em pires.” Journal of Modern H istory. and big banks and stock com panies were begin­ ning to dom inate the economic organization of these countries. As a result of all this. Bailey. 1929). L a te r in the century. E. let alone federation. H . Le statu quo. T his new industrial capitalism . J. the W orld’s Banker. B. “L ’E m pire otto m an . “T h e injection of th e im perialist spirit into the com plicated situ atio n in the O tto m an Em pire changed th a t area from w hat had been regarded a profitable field for investm ent and speculation into a cockpit of intern atio n al riv a lry . W olf. 1936). 1935). 1834-1853 (Stanford. 1930). 1938). T his increasing economic im portance of the N ear E a st transform ed the area into a vortex of rival E uropean im perial­ isms. Ognanoff.” Voix europienes. which were am ong their m ost im p o rtan t m arkets. M issouri. M. ! As early as 1875 over one billion dollars had been loaned to the T u rk ­ ish governm ent. A Wavering F riendship : R u ssia and A u stria 1876-1878 (H arvard H istorical Studies. Blaisdell. sought in the N ear E a st a wider field for expansion. 676. e’est le courant des affaires et le paiem ent du coupon. 11-17. X I I (Decem ber. 1941).” 3 6 T his effect of the rival imof B ritish Commercial P olicy in the Levant. T h e latter work lists som e of th e recent S oviet studies on this subject.”3 3 T he G reat Powers in their scram ­ ble for concessions.

p articularly. return to the classic lii in I ilinciples of Alfieri. m ore in d ep en d en t and more d e te r­ mined to get rid of their oppressor. W ilson. “ Napol6on et la G rece. E . 11.iHCidakis. I Narrative of the Greek M ission (London. cit. M oschopoulos. S. 12. of Schiller. y e t the uprisings of P aris and the exploits of N apoleon imule the rayahs m ore restless. and usually spread these new ideas tvilli zeal and enthusiasm am ongst th eir oppressed countrym en. Rhigas Velestinlis. Rados. P^yas. . 1797. VEurope cenlrale et les B alkans (Paris. 37. N apolion I" et la Grice (Alliens.1 heard a t all. I/NO. A. 1925). ""J. of Lord S h aftesbu ry. during th e years of F ranco-T urkish liuMlility. 206.” S. 21. IinleiiIs were now beginning to enroll in W estern universities to Hiiliitl out their education. G. K ordatos. 1899). 1 A contem porary P rotestant m issionary ad m itted relu ctan tly th a t. The final force whch was influencing N ear E astern politics a t the Unit of the cen tu ry was th e F rench R evolution w ith its concepts of 111и i ly and nationalism . I I U K. 1934). In the Gazette Nationale de France n| I Vcember 18. 150-164. D riault. steadily increasing in numbers during these years. equality. France or England. M erchants and m ariners. K . 84-98. .39 W hatever the m eans of propagation. 1921). .” L a revue des ttudes napoUoniennes. p articu larly in th e D anubian Prin1 1 1in lilies. Л I l. . I. L a revolution franqaise et les preludes de Vindlpcndiihic hdUnique (Paris. appeared th e following account: и N. G erm any. C. 1839). secretaries an d tu to rs who were beginning to npprm. Cam pbell. Bonaparte et les lie s Ioniennes (Paris.. and new spapers were founded ill iHealed to the spreading of revolutionary principles and to the over­ throw of T urkish ty ra n n y . adventurers. with the aim of underm ining O ttom an a u th o rity . and the concepts of Ши rly. 52. " . French Influence and the R ise of R oum anian N ationalism I liirvard University Thesis. educated in Italy. IU. тЛ т/ст) Icrropla [M odern Greek I'tihlical H istory] (A thens. L ’A lbanie et Napoleon 1797-1814 (Paris.I4). 1937). 1940). Cam pbell. C.38 Finally there were th e sy stem atic propaganda cam paigns d im led from Paris. La revolution franqaise et le sud-est de VEurope (B ucharest. . 1930). L a presse dans la renaissance balkanique (A thens. and fra te rn ity m ay have been barely com prehended. young I hi < ’kn. 1931). X X X (l i tiniary.37 Im p o rta n t also were the French пи к limits. Rodo<i inи( til. 4 1 1 N.. MS. op.40 T he revolutionary ideology m ay n o t Imvr been transferred in ta c t from W est to E ast. Boppe. . there can be no d o u b t about I hr very real influence of revolutionary France upon certain sections m I l he Balkan people. Iorga.in considerable num bers.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 17 l< ilnliHius on the N ear E a st m u st be considered as a fundam ental I и lot in the h istory of the B alkan federative m ovem ent. (veil des peuples. . and alm ost invariab ly retu rn ed to their liniiiclaiid a rd e n t revolutionaries. 53. 8-15. M asonic lodges and oth er secret organizations и г established in the principal cities. were quick to absorb revolutionary docliliii'H while travelling abroad.36 In spite of th e relative isolation of the BalImiiih. of V oltaire. 1914). K ordatos. revolutionary ideas and literatu re seeped in to the peninsula by \iiiloiis channels. L a revolution fra n gaise.

1904). however. Edm onds. . K olokotrones. . Bulgaria w as easily con­ trolled from n earby C onstantinople and c u t off from the influence of W estern E uropean ideas and events. who was associated with Photios. in general. See also Dascalakis. while B ulgaria during this period rem ained quite unaffected.” T . 1. Through this present change it is more difficult to rule the people. 127. “According to m y judge­ m ent. and th ey believed th a t they would be freed. th ey began to tak e m easures for freeing them selves. . Situ ated in th e m idst of E uropean T urkey. can not fail to become fatal to a govern­ m ent as despotic as th a t of th e T urks. therefore. and the people thought that kings were gods upon the earth and that th ey were bound to say that w hatever th ey did was w ell done. P vyas. In th e first few centuries of T urkish rule the lot of th e B ulgarians was n o t unbearable as the T urkish garrisons were few and well-dis~ _41 Photios. Likewise sweeping generalizations can n o t be m ade as regards th e effect of G reat Pow er rivalries. one by one.18 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y I t is very certain and even proven by fact th a t the French principles have already spread to th e capital of th e S ultans and are even nearer to th e walls of the seraglio th a n th e O ttom an m inisters realize: they have been propagated am ong all th e classes of in h ab itan ts and their progress. M. due largely to th e geographic position of the country. the reactions of th e chief B alkan races to these forces. 17. although secret. Kolokotrones. were m uch more susceptible to French R evolutionary theories th a n the peasantry. T he decades of revolution and war in th e W est left th e B ulgarians quite unaffected.ara 1 . Very similar was the account of the G reek guerilla chieftain. 1892). In B ulgaria. O ttom an disintegration or G reek-Slav conflict. in the late eighteenth and early nine­ teenth centuries. th e French R evolution and the doings of N apoleon opened the eyes of th e world. Sim ilarly Greece and R ouniania were considerably influenced by the same theories. ’Airo[u>-qp. th e situ atio n was different from th a t in any other p a rt of th e Balkans.ovevjj. . . 389. K lcph t and W arrior (London. E . B u t when N apoleon m ade no move. 18. T he nations knew nothing before. T he political significance of this situation has been well described by a contem porary Greek re v o lu tio n a ry : T he F rench Revolution in general aw akened th e m inds of all men. L a politique orientate de N apoU on (Paris. were m oulding N ear E astern politics. 128. K olokotrones and E. to generalize ab o ut the effects of any of these forces w ithout consideration for national and class differences. .390. th e period when the other Balkan races were pre­ paring them selves for their revolutionary struggles. I t is danger­ ous. In some regions the one factor was all im p o rtan t and in others it was entirely absent. I t is necessary. In fact the low­ est po in t in Bulgarian h isto ry was reached in the la tte r half of the eighteenth century. All th e C hristians of th e N ear E a st prayed to God th a t France should wage war against th e T urks. T he upper and middle classes. to analyze.4 1 Such were the forces which. . D riault.

A modern au th ority on this i иЬ)|ч:1. 2 4 ) t . 436. the control of C onstantinople began to weaken Mini tlie janissaries sp en t more tim e in terrorizing the countryside llinii in protecting the frontiers. 119. II. . S. 41 A. Hajek. 1925).1 C. One m ight object th a t all the lower clergy and the ни inks are indigenous. Probably th e policy of the 11 lurch was not quite as M achiavellian as m ost B ulgarian w riters make it o u t to be. Com m ercial and private correspondence was iiltm nirricd on in G reek or at least in Bulgarian w ritten in Greek scrip t. H e who did not speak Greek or who did not at least adorn his speech with i nrulc phrases passed for uneducated. M orenvrr. there is b arb arism . T he com plete lilum ph of G reek language and cultu re was prevented.”43 B u t w hatever th e • iiiihos. A fter the sixteenth century. however. 1789. . 1844). th e results were highly unsatisfacto ry to th e Bulgarians. ch. as late as th e eighteen forties reported th a t th roughout I lie Balkans "th e best com mercial houses. 98. 1925). writes th at. T he F rench traveller. T he мини: traveller noted th a t. is th e greatest obstacle to em ancipation. Pioneers in th e n ationalist moven 11* C v L were the guilds in th e cities. 4 4 C. d o rm an t for so long. national feeling. iveil th bfubles.42 As has already been noted. Der K a m p f der Siidslawen um Freiheit und E inheit (Frankfurt. CyIи ini R obert. began slowly to appear a t l ho end of the eighteenth century. Les Slaves de Turquie (Paris. however. Radeff. III. I In* enlightened men of th e co u n try realize fully th a t th e clergy of Bulgaria. more ilungerous th an T urkish m isgovernm ent was the hellenizing policy of (lie O rthodox Church particu larly after th e abolition in 1767 of the U nitarian A rchbishopric of O chrida. 287. by i In. b u t episcopal th u n d erb o lts th rea te n th e U nitarian priests who d are to show th e ir patriotism too clearly. th e b est schools are !. Robert.” Revue des deux шinula. Bulgarien unter der Tiirkenherrschaft (Stuttgart. “T h e ideas ‘G reek’ and 'education1 were soon identified with one iiiiiillicr. 39.” H ajek. it is utmost impossible for a B ulgarian n atio n ality to arise before there is u ini Iional clergy.i Id by the Greeks. Moslem im m igrants lirjjan to trickle in. T he G reek is th e mens agitans molem of all th e O rient: where he is not. V ery sim ilar to th eir medieval |nololypes.1 844).4 4 T his was th e critical period of B ulgarian history. 4 .fact th a t B ulgarian rem ained th e language of the masses. “D u m ouvem ent unitaire de l ’Europe orientale. 40. 1918). h/s i /Л. th e Bulgarian guilds aided the cause by contributions for I hr building of schools and churches. yes. VWndel. as it exists. . . 11. V III (N ovem ber 1 . Some co n tact w ith the w est was m aintained by th e few B ulgarian m erchants trad in g w ith A ustria mill by the num erous R agusan trad ers scattered th ro u g h o u t Bulgaria.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 19 <1 1 »liticcl. L a Maccdoine et la renaissance bulgare (Sofia. Robert. I t should be recognized th a t instruction in anyllilug b u t G reek was difficult in view of the com plete predom inance nl' Greek scholarship and G reek schools.

M ishew. cit.. 47 H ajek. Historical and Religious Re­ lations with R u ssia . 40 Cited by Radeff.4 5 I t was n o t until 1762. Peichinovich. K irchovski and K. Sm yrna and C onstan­ tinople. th a t the B ul­ garian renaissance definitely began w ith the w riting of a history of B ulgaria by th e m onk Paissi. For tw enty years he ta u g h t a t K otel and raised a generation of p atrio ts until in 1797 he was forced to flee to B ucharest whence he carried on his nationalist agitation. . im p o rtan t because for the first tim e th ey were w ritten in th e popular modern Bulgarian. “ O fools. In 1841 a revolt of more general ch aracter took placc with sim ultaneous uprisings in Nish on the Serbian border. O ther schools were rapidly b u ilt in o th er tow ns and D r. The Bulgarians Ancient and M odern. H ajek. op. and Serbian literatu re and histories also stim ulated B ul­ garian nationalism . Paissi’s history was religiously copied and circulated in m an u scrip t form. w ith the aid of the B ulgarian colony in B ucharest. In 1814 and 1816 two religious works were p u b ­ lished b y H . B u t it was alive w ith natio n alist fervor. H ajek. th e Bulgars have been th e m ost glorious. 122-131.. The Bulgarians in the P ast (Lausanne. op. half church-Slavic and half m odern B ulgarian. T his w ork led two B ulgarians of Odessa. P eter Berovich in ­ troduced th e L ancaster-B ell teaching m ethod. 55.. Vasil A prilov and Nicolai Palauzov.. Salonica. 246-251. M inor insurrections broke o u t in 1834 and 1835. O u tstan d in g also was the publication in 1829 by w ealthy Bulgarian m erchants in Odessa of Yuri! V enelin’s fam ous book. Radeff. Its effect was dynam ic in th e lim ited circles in which it was read. to build. in K irk-K ilisse near A drianople and a t Shum la west of V arna.. cit. 54. th e first to have a p atriarch . 225-227. 59. op. S ee also W endel. All these 45 D . however. op. op.. 120— 122. 302-312. op. A num ber of textbooks were w ritten by C hristaki Pavlovich and by 1844 Bulgarian printing presses were to be found in Sam akov. the first to receive C h rist­ ia n ity .47 T his cultural aw akening was supplem ented by a series of sporadic uprisings. 131-140.20 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y Serbian schools and sem inaries which were atten d ed by Bulgarian stu d en ts. a m odern school a t G abravo in 1835. 60.” he cried. Bishop Sofronii of V raca carried on the w ork of Paissi. cit. Like the klephts in Greece the haidouks of B ulgaria kept alive th e spirit of resistance to oppression and were responsible for several revolts between 1830 and 1841. in Their Political. op. 72-75. cit. of all the Slav peoples. . cit. “w hy are you asham ed to call yourselves B ulgarians and w hy do you n o t read and th in k in your language? . cit. 1919). they were the first to have tsars..”46 Since it was not published.. J. op. M ishew. cit. cit. T he w ork had little scientific value and it was w ritten in an artificial idiom. W endel. .

I'Ml).48 In this m anner th e foundation of th e future B ulgarian sta te was Inlil. see С. 4 1 1 For an analysis of the class cleavage in Bulgaria. Z. It should n o t be im agined th a t all B ulgarians were aroused by (In* writings of Paissi. and haidouks had assured the future of U nitarian natio n ality . M Robert. "L'h6ritage de la renaissance bulgare. B u t even this middle class was interested. know n as 'V lm rbadjii” or gentry. . am ong all the Greek-Slavs. I. I (February. 1691) prom ising full autonom y a ttra c te d I Ikиisands of Serbian families. 1943). S. th ey won: less firmly ruled from C ontantinople. cit. The position of th e Serbs was m uch m ore fo rtu n ate th a n th a t of I ho Bulgars. . . 105. th ey were freer from ( Iivlk dom ination. Pages from the Autobiography i'/ к llu lm rian Insurgent (London.” s0 H owever. be regarded as ripe for independence. 42. 320. th u s preliving the b itte r struggle for th e E xarchate. if llii masses of th e people had n o t y et been aroused. As early as the fifteenth century V rbinn refugees had begun to settle in H u n g ary and th e proclam a­ tions of Leopold I (1690. . cit.. L ocated on th e periphery of th e O ttom an E m pire. 543-545.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 21 iw o lts were b ru tally crushed b y th e T u rk s b u t th ey did serve to exi lie popular feeling am ong th e B ulgarians. . A lready th e rom antic R akovski had begun his i-allaut fight for Bulgarian independence and th e in h ab itan ts of 'nimokov and T irnovo had dem anded a B ulgarian bishop. and th ey had more contacts w ith W estern Europe. M oreover. 1913). poets. These promises were n o t k e p t b u t the 1i<i I a t least were g ran ted com plete religious freedom. n o t so m uch in o u trig h t revolt as in reform w ithin the im ­ perial fram ew ork.” Voix mrofu'rms. Kohn. Stoyanoff. 1937). 140-165. generally supported T urkish rule. I> 1 particular im portance was th e aid th e y received from their Serb Inolhers in th e H apsburg lands. it is tru e th a t th e B ulgarian nation can not. 7-16. Sofronii and Venelin. E . certainly th e early hlmtorians. teachers. . had lirrn revived during the first half of th e nineteenth century and was i iipid Iу becom ing one of the m ost im p o rta n t forces in Balkan politics. Black. The Idea of N ationalism (N ew York. l'iliici ion. Bulgarian nationalism . . .49 T hus C yprien R o b ert found in the eighteen for11rii Ih a t “ . T he m ost Iimpressive elem ents in the country consisted of th e tow n m erchants hiul artisans who furnished m ost of the financial backing for the w liools and new spapers and provided m any of the leaders of the n a­ tionalist m ovem ent. 106. th e B ulgarians are the ones whom th e T u rk s fear th e least and for whom th ey have the least rem | k'(‘I . on I lie whole.. See also H . пишу of them tu rn ed to com mercial enterprise so th a t during th e first Ч П ф к . op. 25. op. dorm ant and alm ost ex tin ct a t the end of the eighteenth century. T h e p easant masses were иpathetic while th e w ealthy landow ners and tradespeople. vol. for a long tim e lu come. The Establish­ ment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria (Princeton Studies in H istory. Marinoff.

“Les origines de la liberty serbe.1 0 . II. T he spahis and janissaries were becom ing more and more irresponsible an d oppressive. Theories a b o u t liberty and n atio n ality rig h ts had a negligible influence in Serbia. "EWijves m i 2£p/Soi. Scton-W atson. national. 1911). fees were collected on the death of a fam ily head or the m arriage of a daug hter. W . and betw een 1790 an d 1792 the Serbian m erchants of V ienna issued th e D aily News. A few years later th e Viennese Serbs purchased a press of their own and published the Slavoserb News. was the populai d iscontent arising from th e an archy and oppression of T urkish m is­ govern m cnt. money. 63 M . 1915). H aum ant.5 1 T he m ost im p o rta n t factor in Serbia. “ I t is n o t even the liberty for which the French fought: th e dream of th e rayah is not even the end of oppression b u t only th e end of disorder in oppression. . foreign policy. th e Serbs realized the social and economic advantages of free­ dom and. on practically all produce. See also K ohn. th ey stru ck o u t for com plete independence. however. Ch. K arlovitz becam e th e tru e center of Serb culture and extended its influence to th e Serbs across the frontier. Books. 1927). th ey fought n o t against the S ultan b u t against the local janissaries. Iorga. op. 93. new spapers. IV (July.5 3 Finally. The Southern Slav Question and the H apsburg M onarchy (London. led to a cultural renaissance. 75-78. Pijyas. M urders. 1789. In 1763 th e Serbian com m unity of Venice began th e publication of the Slavoserb Review. 52 E. 9 . In addition to th e one-tenth levy. num erous Serbian books were printed and a considerable literary m ovem ent was developed. As H aum a n t has pointed out. Idea of N ationalism . In H ungary.. spurred on b y T urk ish tactlessness and R ussian intrigue. account should be taken of the significance of th e short6 1 K ordatos. T h e la tte r was printed by the well know n Poulios brothers who also tu rn ed o u t th e Sagacious Hermes.”6 2 Sim ilarly M ilosh Obrenovich was quite co n ten t to owe allegiance to th e Sultan and it was n o t until th e days of G arashanin and Prince M ichael th a t Serbia was prepared to a d o p t an independent. eveil des peuples. 345-551. 69. T hus when th e Serbs in 1804 were finally goaded to arm ed resistance. T hese favorable conditions. 110-112. “ L ’origine des id£es d ’ind£pendanee balkanique. n o t present in the O ttom an lands.” Le monde slave. kidnappings and extor­ tions were frequent and appeals to C onstantinople were useless in view of th e power of th e local officials. particularly. See also W endel. T he difference in th e nature of the Greek and Serbian revolts is clearly m ade in Lascaris.” Revue Mstorique. C X V III (January-April. A gym nasium and theological sem inary were established *n K arlovitz. 17-24. Once freed from their oppres­ sors. arm s and train ed ad m in istrato rs and soldiers poured across the D anube and aided in the establishm ent of the Serbian P rin cip ality . m any Serbian schools were founded. cit. R.22 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y half of th e nineteenth cen tu ry m ost of the tra d e of Southern H ungary was in th eir hands.

Sim ilarly Karageorge appealed to Vladika Petrovich of M ontenegro for aid for th e "common liberation of all Serbs. op. A.” C ited by G. or D alm atia. K isovec.. Zwitter. X X X I (October. T h e nam e “ Illy rian ” is based on the pseudo-scientific conception th a t the Slavs were autochtonous in the B alkans and th a t th e Illyrians of classical a n tiq u ity were their iincestors.6 6 B y the T re a ty of Pressburg (D ecem ber 26. Slovenia. a sentinel at th e forts of Vienna to force her to act correctly. jusqu’a la revolution francaise. 1909). 1805) N apoleon oblained the A driatic territories which A ustria acquired from Venice in 1797 and added them to his p u p p et kingdom of Italy .” La revue slave. cit. wishing to see the ideas of th e R evolution worked o u t w ithin the fram ew ork of th e existing states. 1919). W endel. Petersburg for aid.” Revue des etudes napoleoniennes. Cassi. were of little practical significance. I'iume. Four years Inter (T reaty of Schoenbrunn.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 23 lived Illyrian sta te set up by N apoleon. 54. 105-123. “Les populations juliennes-illyriennes pend­ ant la dom ination napoldonienne. VI (Septem ber-O ctober. “ Illyrisme et sentim ente yougoslave. In 1804 Archim andrit Arsenije G agovich produced a plan for the union of "all Y usoHlavs” into a “Slavoserb Czardom ” and w ent to St. C arniola and C roatia and combined them w ith his earlier acquisitions to form th e “ provinces illyriennes. ie Before the tim e of N apoleon occasional proposals were made for Y u goslav u nity. Only in the m inds of a few revolu­ tionaries was the idea of liberty linked w ith th a t of n ationality giving rise to th e idea of a natio n al s ta te . 1930).54 Some traces of Illyrianism as a political factor are known ни far back as th e m edieval ages and the renaissance b u t it was negli­ gible before th e French R evolutionary period. 195. R agusa and p a rts of C orinthia. in our hands.”Б б I t rem ained for N apoleon to unite th e w estern Y ugoslavs in to one state and aw aken in them the desire for un ity and independence.” Ib id . was an advance guard in the heart of Austria.” Le monde slave. . Der P anslaw ism us bis zum Weltkrieg (Berlin. “Apergu historique de l’lllyrie. 1809) he obtained T rieste.. 1806-1814. 97. In 1807 P etrovich sent a dele­ gate to S t. Fischel. In fact the m ost recent evidence proves th a t the Y ugoslav idea was quite foreign to N apoleon and th a t he had two oth er definite aim s in mind. 98. As m ight be expected N apoleon’s reason for creating this Illyrian sta te was strictly self-interest and n ot (he desire to create a Y ugoslav sta te as has som etim es been suggested. Even the French R evo­ lution did n o t arouse a strong n atio n alist m ovem ent in C roatia. 1933). T h ese plans.1' separate from Ita ly and under the direct adm inistration of the central French governm ent. O ctober 14. 67 In th e words of N apoleon: "Illyria. Petersburg with a plan for the creation of a Slavoserb sta te to include all l he Christians of the peninsula.®7 T he other aim was economic. 214. II (April. T h e one was m ilitary— th e desire to obtain direct co n tact be­ tween D alm atia and th e Italian sta te s and thus have a route to the N ear E a st and a m eans of keeping guard over Vienna. 66 F. however. “ T he m ajo rity interested them selves only in Ilie general ideas of the R evolution and n o t in th e national question. B ritish com m erce was to be barred on th e eastern и V. capable of restraining her.

Miller.. con­ federated w ith a g reat and powerful empire. See also V. N apoleon said. W . 1900). . reafforestation was begun and a netw ork of splendid roads was constructed. P.”60 T h e influence of Illy ria was evident even across th e frontier in the A ustrian and O ttom an lands. 253-287. it did possess th a t significance in the provinces. 127-130. 113-130. 1909).и S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y coast of the A driatic and land routes were to be opened for trad e w ith th e L e v a n t.. W e n d e l. K isovec. I will find m yself in the natural situation of guarding the primary interests of my com m erce in th e M editerranean. th e “ Code N apoleon” superseded th e o u t­ worn m edieval codes. S tarchevich’s im p o rta n t gram m ar was p rin ted a t this period and M arm ont him self m et the expense of publishing Stulli’s fam ous dictionary. cit. T he feverish a c tiv ity of M arshal M arm ont in co n trast to the stagnation of V enetian and A ustrian adm inistration could n ot help b u t arouse th e populace from its ap ath y . T he Serbian leader K arageorge sent a le tte r d ated A ugust 16. the saviour of your co u n try . 1810. . 1935). “ La r6volution franfaise et le royaum e de r illy r ie . W e n d e l. 1 8 0 9 -t8 1 3 ( P a r is .68 A lthough N apoleon h ad no idea of furthering Y ugoslav unity. commercial and agricul­ tu ral schools sprang up in every direction. Colonel M angin a n ­ nounced to the people: “You are now a p a rt of a large nation. Skok. .69 Even more im p o rta n t th a n this economic reconstruction was the cu ltu ral renaissance which paralleled it. VI (N ovem ber-D ecem ber.# . y e t his Illyrian sta te did arouse th e la te n t nationalism of some of its citizens. T he national language was encouraged by th e French. prim ary. . th e old guild system was reform ed.” Westminster Review. N ew spapers were established in the C roat language. peasan t landholding was introduced. 4 3 2 434. th e in­ 68 W ith Illyria. P ivec-Stele. CLIV (N ovem ber.. A dm inistration and justice were reorganized. loc. 12. not a m ountain w hose nam e I do not know. provisional vice-consul of France a t B ucharest. T h e Serbians assure his Im perial and R oyal M ajesty th a t th eir com patriots. “Les sou ­ venirs napoldoniens en Y ou goslavie. you have become Illy­ rians and you m ust m ake yourselves w orthy of th e protection of N apoleon. 1809 to Ledouix. “ N apoleon in the N ear E a st. Dard. the Adriatic and the L evan t.” L a revue slave. powerful protection of th e G reat Napoleon.” Le monde slave (June. L a vie Cconomique des provinces illyriennes. 3. 69 M arm ont himself wrote: "There is not a city. 1 9 3 0 ) .” Cited by E. In a proclam ation of M arch 10. cit. .# .” Cited by M . “ . 1933). 524-527. I t was used in the schools and in some official proclam ations. 60 Cited by Zwitter. X L V II (JanuaryMarch. 364. . asking for the . "Le m ouvem ent illyrien et les F rancais. secondary.” Revue d'histoire diplom atique. T h u s although the nam e “ Illy ria” had no national m eaning to N apoleon. . A national th ea tre was organized a t K arlovac and the poets V odnik (Slovene) and Lopashich (C roat) extolled N a­ poleon in their w ritings. not a village which I have not visited. . cit.

I t was still only an idea. I t should be noted th a t th is decline of the sta tu s of the peasantry was n o t connected w ith the political m isfortunes of the country. G radu­ ally. lies in the fact th a t for the first tim e it united Serbs. op. 13. 1943). E . Black. I t could n o t be called a m ovem ent. before th e le tte r could reach th e French foreign m in­ ister. therefore.. L ittle by little these boyars encroached on th e liberties of the villagers. and those who live in th e kingdom of H ungary. Ib id .. n o t excepting th e B ulgarians who derive. 269.6 1 K arageorge was too late as th e Schoenbrunn T re a ty was signed on O ctober 14.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 25 h a b ita n ts of Bosnia and of th e duchy of H erzegovina. 268. B y 1813 this Slavic nationalism had turned against th e French and w as an im portant factor in th e overthrow of th e French regim e in th e Illyrian provinces. B u t it did provide a beginning— a trad itio n for th e powerful Illyrian m ovem ent of the eighteen thirties and forties. On the contrary. b u t ra th e r in obtaining land. 113. 12. from th e sam e branch. 62 On October 17 instructions were sent to Ledouix to th e effect th at he should do nothing to endanger th e peaceful relations betw een France and T u rk ey hut. 7. will follow their example a t th e first m ove which is m ad e.62 H ow ever. cit. Documents in&dits. 63 P robably W endel. that he should keep in touch with th e insurgents and encourage them “with financial aid if n ecessary. w ith the creation of cen tral au th o rities dispensing justice and favors. A good sum m ary of these negotiations is available in G.6 3 I t undoubtedly did n o t profoundly stir the masses. even though K arageorge u n ­ doubtedly had no au th o rity to speak for oth er th a n the Serbs. "Fouch6 in Illyria. these headm en began to look to the princes ra th e r th a n to the people for advancem ent.” Journal of Central European Affairs. . C roats and Slovenes and stim ulated am ong them th e idea of Illyrian or Y ugoslav u n ity and independence. it does indicate how im p o rta n t th e Illyrian sta te seemed in the eyes of th e Y ugoslavs. T he villagers were free joint-holders of the village lands and burdened w ith no oth er duties th a n th a t of giving th e village head­ m an a ten th of the produce and three days service in the year. T he significance of Illyria. 6. exaggerate the influence of Illyria. loc. A t the tim e of th e creation of th e principali­ ties in th e th irte e n th and fo u rteen th centuries there was no such problem . each dow nw ard step in the p easan ts’ social sta tu s cor­ 61 Boppe. so to speak. 202-209.” Som e financial aid was given betw een 1810 and 1814 to a Serb representa­ tiv e in Paris. T h e g reat m ajo rity of th e people were p easants and they were interested prim arily n o t in n ational u n ity and independence. Y akchitch.. cit. 139. See С. In the D anubian provinces th e situ atio n was quite different in th a t the one fu ndam ental and all-pervading issue was the land prob­ lem. T he various functions known as “boyerii” created b y th e new central governm ent were a m onopoly of these men who th u s cam e to be know n as th e “ b o y ar” class. 386-396. L 'E urope et la resurrection de la Serbie. II (January. and K isovec.

R a th e r it was a purely dom estic affair. 85. T he first prince to tu rn the m ass of th e peasants into villeins was M ichael th e B rave a t the end of the sixteenth century. I. by the restriction of their rights to land. II. and n o t as an arm ed p ro test to obtain national rig h ts. T he m ost im p o rtan t of these was. “T he revolt of the R oum anian people can n o t be b e tte r defined th an as a war of those who have nothing against those whom th ey believe to be rich. a group of boyars p rotested th a t. aim ed against the exploitation of the G reco-R oum anian ruling class. T here 64 D . W estern E uropean developm ents.. . the only R oum anian prince who brought all the R oum anian lands under his sceptre. T he T reaties of K uchu k -K ain arji (1772) and Jassy (1792) were followed by a se­ vere increase in th e p easan ts’ labor dues and. T h e la tte r realized th is quite clearly. In con­ tra s t to th e peasants.26 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y responded rath er to some m om ent of recovery in the co u n try ’s poli­ tical statu s. as the provinces gradually escaped from T urkish rule the landed class was left to rule w ith no m iddle class to check its power. On th e other hand the first to decree the form al abolition of serfdom in th e m iddle of the eighteenth century was the ill-reputed P han ario te Prince C onstantine M avracordatos.” 6 6 A lthough th e peasant problem was all im p o rtan t in R oum ania in th e early nineteenth centu ry . M itrany. 24. W hen th e provinces gained political autonom y by th e convention of A ckerm ann (1826) and the T re a ty of A drianople (1829) th ere was an im m ediate increase in labor dues and o th er servitudes an d a fu rth er restriction of the peasan ts’ land rig h ts. 1930). . as in the case of Greece. Instead T u d o r V ladim irescu seized the o p p o rtu n ity to in sti­ gate a m ass revolt. The L and and the P easan t in Roum ania (N ew H aven . chs. the R oum anian upper class was in co n tact w ith.” he explained to th e T urkish com­ m ander a t Vidin. tveil des peuples. who have robbed and pillaged us until there is left to us only our souls.6 4 T h u s when Y psilanti unfurled the flag of revolt on R oum anian soil in 1821 the populace did n o t flock to his side to overthrow T u rk ­ ish rule. and sim ilarly in a public proclam ation he denounced “ the reigning princes and the G reek and R oum anian boyars . y e t a tte n tio n m ust be paid to th e small group of intellectuals and boyars. the French R evolution. “ Our uprising is directed only against the boyars who have devoured our rig h ts. However.”6 6 In oth er words this first revolt of th e R oum anian people was not stim u lated by n atio n alist considerations or directed against foreign oppression. for it was they who were to have control of the n atio n ’s destinies during m ost of th e century. for th e first tim e. In a petitio n to the R ussian consul a t B ucharest. 65 Cited by 1789. who were interested only in th e internal ag rar­ ian problem . and influenced by. 6 5 Cited by ibid. .

” and “ H isto ry of th e Belgian R epublic. T h e above account is based on this source. In other words. some openly seditious w ritings dealing w ith th e ty ra n n y of princes. in tim e. T hese reform s were im p o rta n t in the 57 T h e b est analysis of th e influence of France on the principalities is to be found in Campbell. These m erchants. as elsewhere. Im p o rta n t also. the French Revolution is n o t w ith o u t a ttractio n . T he various G reek new spapers in V ienna were also effective in propagating revolutionary news and views. B u dapest and the T ran sy lv an ian cities of H erm an n sta d t and K ro n stad t. In Vienna. b u t also of the L atin m ovem ent. and th e use of R oum anian as the language of in struction. especially if youth continues the studies which it is beginning to tak e up. was th e m erchant class which consisted m ainly of G reeks plus a few R oum anians and M ace­ donian Slavs. the adoption of th e L atin alphabet. T h ey like to be told ab out it and cannot help showing a certain approval and a t least adm iring its prodigious accom plishm ents.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 27 were various channels through which the revolutionary theories per­ m eated into th e Principalities. th ere is no d o ubt w hatever th a t th e French principles will eventually have here. . being the lingua franca of th e commercial world. th e ir agreeable and beneficient influence. In the late eighteenth and early n ineteenth centuries. The most im p o rtan t w ork of these cham pions of L atinism was linguistic— the purging of th e R oum anian language of non-L atin w ords and forms. operating from such centers as Vienna. began to popularize the theory th a t the m odern in­ h a b ita n ts of the Principalities were direct descendants of th e noble Rom ans. were two R oum anian m erchants who owned a printing press and published and d istrib u ted books on such subjects as “ Political H istory of the French R evo lution.” In addition to these p ropagandist works. th ey claim ed th a t th e R oum anians were a chosen people whose mission it was to serve as an o u tp o st of L atin culture in th e surrounding sea of Slavic and T eutonic barbarism . in m anuscript form . th e French vice-counsul a t Jassy. there were passed from hand to hand. M ore effective th a n the official repre­ sentatives from P aris were th e French m erchants. n o t only of the French doctrines. m ade definite efforts to spread rev olutionary p ropa­ ganda. a group of R oum anian scholars who had studied in Ita ly and had been inspired by the Roman rem ains. and other subversive subjects.” “ On th e Sovereignty of th e people. the secrets of freem asonry. R oum anian N ationalism . was widely read. 6 -21. secretaries and instructors who were p resent in considerable num bers and who wielded m uch influence.able to re p o rt: F o r the sm all portion of th e boyars who know how to reason. for Greek. for exam ple. w as. T h u s P a rra n t.6 7 T he R oum anian u pper classes were under th e influence.

T h e n o c cu rre d th e ill-fa te d Orloff re v o lt in P elo p o n n esu s in 1769. T h e b asic p ro b le m s w ere social a n d econom ic. . a re m a rk a b le re n a issa n c e o c c u rre d in th e G reek w o rld . 2 2 -2 7 . B u t th is c h u rc h w as o b s c u ra n tis t a n d concern ed itse lf o n ly w ith s tric tly religious m a tte rs . D u rin g th e e a rlie r c e n tu rie s th e p o sitio n of th e G reek s w as b y no m e a n s o u ts ta n d in g . " In R o u m a n ia . A t t h a t tim e th e c h u rc h w as th e c e n tre of th e ir n a tio n a l life a n d it m a in ta in e d a press a n d schools a t C o n sta n tin o p le . b u t th e m e rc h a n ts a n d b o y a rs a n d in te lle c tu a ls. H o w ev er.69 O f all th e B a lk a n peo p les th e G reek s w ere th e m o st a d v a n c e d in p ra c tic a lly e v e ry re sp e c t. w ere concern ed w ith n a tio n a l u n ity a n d freed o m from o u tsid e in te rfere n ce. a n d n o t in fre q u e n tly a n ta g o n istic to . a n d in th e e ig h te e n th a n d e a rly n in e te e n th c e n tu rie s th e y w ere th e m o st in flu e n tia l of th e su b je c t races of th e O tto m a n E m p ire . ч 69 A s C a m p b ell h as p u t it. th e P a tria rc h a te . how ever. 30. as in Ita ly . T h e m o st im p o r ta n t single fa c to r in th e G reek a w a k e n in g w as th e g r e a t re v iv a l of com m erce.28 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y d e v e lo p m e n t of R o u m a n ia n n a tio n a lism because a u n iform lite ra ry la n g u a g e w as th e re b y e sta b lish e d u p o n w hich could be b a se d a n a ­ tio n a l c u ltu re . T h e p e a s a n t m asses w ere in te re s te d o n ly in b re a d a n d la n d w hile th e ru lin g m i­ n o rity stro v e to b u ild u p a sense of n a tio n a l consciousness a n d to rid th e c o u n try of A u s tria n a n d R u ssia n a n d T u rk ish influence a n d ru le . a n d th is re n a issa n c e w as in d e p e n d e n t of. T h e T u rk is h -V e n e tia n stru g g le s from th e m id d le of th e se v e n te e n th c e n tu ry to th e b eg in n in g of th e e ig h te e n th once m ore ch eck ed eco­ n o m ic pro g ress. tra d e p ra c tic a lly ceased to e x ist in th e B a lk a n P e n in su la .” I b id . th e C ru sa d e rs a n d th e B y z a n tin e E m p e ro rs. th e final ex p ulsion of th e V e n e tia n s from G reece in 1715 to g e th e r w ith th e T u rk is h policy of laissez-faire in econom ic m a tte rs .68 S u ch w as th e s itu a tio n in th e P rin c ip a litie s a t th e b eg in n in g of th e n in e te e n th c e n tu ry . esp ecially in th e M o rea. T h e c h u rch w ritin g s of th e six te e n th a n d se v e n te e n th c e n tu rie s a re u n ifo rm ly u n im p ressiv e a n d u n in flu en ced b y c u r r e n t forces.. T h e successful w ars of M o h am m e d I I a n d Selim I I I a t th e en d of th e six te e n th c e n tu ry re sto re d o rd e r so m e w h a t a n d led to a c e rta in re v iv a l of com m erce a n d in d u s try . W ith th e long series of w ars in th e N e a r E a s t a risin g from th e th re e -c o rn e re d stru g g le of th e T u rk s . In th e e ig h te e n th c e n tu ry . th e e v o lu tio n o f n a tio n a lism ca n b e d escrib ed as a lo n g an d su ccessfu l ca m p a ig n on th e p art o f th e in te lle c tu a ls to w in o v er to their n a tio n a l id ea ls o th e r s e c tio n s of th e p o p u la tio n . T h e A lb a n ia n trib e sm e n a t once seized th e o p p o rtu n ity to ra id larg e sectio n s of n o rth e rn G reece as 68 I b id .. in fluenced b y W e s t­ ern d o c trin e s a n d b y th e ir n a tiv e L a tin ism . led to a p erio d of co m ­ p a ra tiv e p ro s p e rity a n d p rogress.

71 so t h a t b y 1821 n u m e ro u s a n d p ro sp e ro u s G reek colonies d o tte d th e m a p of E u ro p e . m any G reek m e rc h a n ts en g ag ed in th e tra d e b e tw e en R u ssia a n d C hina. w h ere th e y re m a in e d fo r te n y e a rs. 1937). K . op. T h e o ld est of th e se c o m m u n itie s. In R u ssia th e G reeks carried on m u ch of th e p ro fita b le B lack S ea tra d e . M o re o v e r e m ig ra tio n from G reece w a s g re a tly hlim u late d b y th e s la u g h te r a n d d e s tru c tio n re su ltin g from th e M orean re v o lt. 378— 423. h a d ju s t A t fen u n d e r w ay . 3 3 7 -3 7 7 . a n d in R u s s ia w h e re th e G reek s were a ttr a c te d b y th e p u rp o se fu l h o s p ita lity of C a th e rin e th e G re a t иnd b y th e o p p o rtu n itie s fo r p ro fit follow ing th e o p en in g of th e B lack i a tra d e ro u te s. op. K a p la n e s in M oscow a n d o th e rs.70 A fte r th is d isa stro u s re ­ v o lt econom ic p ro g ress in G reece w as b o th ra p id a n d w id e sp rea d .. R u ssia n d ip lo m a c y . and m a n u fa c tu rin g . Лбу os eh ttjv kdvLnijv koprqv ккфыуцO rh r ij 25 M a p rio v 1937 [Lecture delivered on the N a tio n a l H o lid a y M arch 2 5 . cit. d a tin g from (lie T u rk is h in v a sio n s of th e fifte e n th c e n tu ry . 1 9 3 -2 0 6 . T h e ex isten ce of th e se colonies a b ro a d w as of th e u tm o s t signifi­ cance. Hi c a t com m ercial h o u ses w ere e sta b lish e d b y V a rv a k e s in A s tra k h a n . In th e H u n g a ria n cities also th e G reek s w ere p ro m i­ nent. S a k ella rio s.. c a rrie d on a flo u rish ­ ing com m erce w ith th e w e ste rn p ro v in ces of E u ro p e a n T u rk e y . o p . t h a t of V enice. (A th en s. cit. a n d in a d d itio n . imd w as d u e p rim a rily to th re e fa c to rs : th e G re e k co m m ercial colon­ ies a b ro a d . social a n d c u ltu ra l re p e r­ cussions. T h e la rg e s t a n d w e a lth ie s t G reek colonies w ere to b e fo u n d in th e lliip sb u rg E m p ire w h ere T u rk is h s u b je c ts w ere g ra n te d tra d in g lig h ts b y th e T r e a ty of K a rlo v itz . w h ere su c h m en as B aron S in as a n d th e Z o sim ad es b ro th e rs a c c u m u la te d tre m e n d o u s fo rtu n es a n d p la y e d a p ro m in e n t ro le in th e eco n o m y of th e H a p slutrg E m p ire . A m a n to s. 71 K o n to y ia n n es. a n d b y 1821 i t n u m b e re d fifteen h u n d re d souls. sh ip p in g . I he o u ts ta n d in g G reek co lo n y w as in V ien n a. p illag in g a n d d e stro y in g . R a lli B ro th e rs. w hile in E n g la n d . T h e s itu a tio n w as v e ry niuiilar in th e D a n u b ia n P rin c ip a litie s a n d th e G reek s w ere able to Kain co n tro l of a larg e p e rc e n ta g e of th e tr a d e a n d to re ta in th e ir position u n til well in to th e n in e te e n th c e n tu ry ..B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 29 well as th e M o re a . 9 -1 4 . th e fa m o u s firm . A t IVifeste th e G reek c o m m u n ity w as en g ag ed in co m m erce. A p a r t from th e p ro fo u n d p o litical. i t sh o u ld be n o te d a t th is p o in t t h a t th e se m e rc h a n t p rin ces iiHually e sta b lish e d com m ercial re la tio n s w ith th e ir h o m e la n d a n d 70 K o n to y ia n n e s. c it. in defiance of ev en th e S u lta n . B y 1821 one cou ld ev en find a p ro sp e ro u s G re e k co lony in C a lc u tta . H alanos in N iz h n i-N o v g o ro d . a n d th e F re n c h R e v o lu tio n . 1 9 3 7 ]. esp ecially b ecau se of th e la c k of econom ic e n te rp rise on th e p a rt of th e c o u rt a n d th e la n d m a g n a te s. .

Travels in the Ionian Isles. either from necessity. 149. Iorga. R oum ains et Grecs au corns des siecles (Bucha­ rest. 1800). has taken a general direction tow ards commerce. M ertzios. e. by their condition on th e continent of Greece. 148. B y the treaties of K u chuk-K ainardji (1774). F. Decem ber 22. T h u s by far the g reater p a rt of th e exterior trad e of T u rk ey . directly and indi­ rectly. T h e English traveller.” ] Ша ‘Пцера. where th eir activ ity can have more scope. w rote in this connection th a t: T h e active spirit of th e Greeks. . A View of the Commerce of Greece. K . which have residents a t home."[ “T h e Greek C om m unity of T rieste. 15-19. 73 T h ese patents were issued by consuls to O ttom an subjects who. 1872). . H olland. 37— 40. R ussia was able to e x tract from T u rk ey various concessions which. T h e opening of th e Black Sea and the S traits to R ussian and A ustrian commerce revived the a n ­ cient tra d e routes betw een the M editerranean and the Black Sea and provided a valuable new m ark et for G reek products." [“T he Epirote Archives of V enice. deprived in great m easure of political or national objects. is carried on by Greek houses. B ut. 1815). who associated m ostly w ith m erchants while travelling in Greece in 1812. 1888). and branches in various cities of E urope. P. theoretically. Beaujour. M . S. 1921). N . D r. Lampros. A lban ia. or from th e convenience to both parties in a commercial point of view. Pecz. Нр&тг] TrevTi)KovratTr)pls rrjs Iv ’OSqcracp 'EXXijyof^Tropmrji SxoXfjr 1817— 1867 [ The First F ifty Years of the Greek Commercial School at Odessa. stim ulated G reek commerce. . "ТА Ь Be^eria ’Нтгесрытийр ’Apxeiov. m utually aiding each other. Jassy (1792). however. In addition the Greek subjects of th e S ultan were given the privilege of flying the R ussian flag on th eir ships. during the Years 1812 and 1813 (London. A ctually. th u s safeguarding them selves against the a rb itra ry exactions and restrictions of the T urkish officials. extending th eir concerns much m ore variously th a n could be done in T u rkey alone. X I (1936). 'II h> Tepyecmj 'ЕХХцм/о) кои>6гг)$. th ey em igrate in considerable num bers to th e adjacent countries. Finally the new ly acquired R ussian privilege of consular representation in the O ttom an E m pire aided the Greeks because m any of them were appointed consuls and still more of them obtained p ate n ts which rem oved them from T urkish jurisdiction and enabled them to trad e free of all taxation excepting the three percent paid by all “ F ran k s. and the supplem entary conventions of 1779 and 1789. from 1787 to 1797 (London. A .7 2 An even more im p o rtan t factor in Greek economic a c tiv ity during this period was the encouragem ent and protection afforded by R us­ sia. 1817-1867] (O dessa. N o com prehensive study has been made of these Greek com m unities abroad but m aterial concerning them is to be found in numerous scattered works. C onstantinidos. . Die Griechischen Kaufleute in W ien (Vienna. Thessaly. 1912). 2eX£5es tKfij s laTopias той kv Оvyyapia Hat Abarpla. H olland.” 7 3 72 H. Some b ranches of th e m igrating families. M acedonia etc. 430-432. 1— 352. MaKfЗогчкой 'EXX?). these valuable patents were so eagerly sought after that they were sold by the consuls of all countries like an y other m erchandise.4cr/jotj [Pages from the H istory of the M acedonian Greeks in H ungary and A u stria] (Athens. in th e exchange of com m odities. A. 1906 p a ssim .g.30 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y th u s stim ulated its economic life..” ] ’Нтшрытгкй XpoviKa. are alw ays left in T u r­ key. fettered in this respect also. were to serve as interpreters. Formed after an A nnual Average. from the possession of pro p erty in the country.

Leake.7 4 T he final an d m ost spectacular factor in th is G reek commercial renaissance was th e French R evolution. Complete M ercantile Guide to the Con­ tinent of Europe (London. H . 24. m ost of them flying the R ussian flag.878 cannon and m anned by 37. T h ese figures are probably to o low as the author does not include the ships of such centers as M issolonghi and the Ionian Isles. 76 On June 12. to drive the F ran k m erchants from th e fairs of Greece. running blockades.. were sw ept off the seas by the English navy. 77 W .” Ib id . L. and the Turkish governm ent . 23.580 tons. and the archipelago. 76 F . 293. oil. . . utilized the situation to its econom ic advantage. Contem porary travellers invariably re­ marked on th e a ctiv ity of Greek shipping. V I. kept a close w atch. Juilliany. T h e Greeks. as French consul. carried on great com m crcial activity. 1836). as their agents. which h ith e rto had first place in th e carrying trad e of th e L evant. . M . 1826-1827). obtained a virtual monopoly of the Black Sea trad e. European Commerce. W . “W e would be happy. G reek m ariners were pres­ ent. P ouqueville. slipping into harbors on d ark nights w ith th eir eagerly aw aited cargoes which th ey sold for fabulous profits. 74 C. W herever profits were to be m ade. reluctantly declared: “ Epoch of glory and m isfortune for France. took on new life. 1818). 1842). who. W ith th e ou tb reak of the Anglo-French wars the F rench m erchantm en. h u n ­ dreds of G reek ships. and as one contem porary observed. A n H istorical Outline of the Greek Revolution (London. and G reek m erchants and m arines everyw here were pro tected and aided in th eir activities by R ussian consuls and p a te n ts . M onseigneur. E ssa i sur le com­ merce de M arseille (Paris. 651-657. I. if we could. and a t length to share very largely in th e exchange of th e corn. . silk and other products of Greece for th e m anufactured goods and colonial produce of the European n atio n s. С. 118.7 5 In addition to the im petus it gave to th e developm ent of the m erchant m arine. Voyage de la Grece (Paris.76 T he num ber of French trad in g e sta b ­ lishm ents th ro u g h o u t the L ev an t was drastically reduced.” 77 F inally th e French Revolution affected the econom ic developm ent of Greece by increasing the dem and and. T he G reeks a t once seized th e golden oppor­ tu n ity . By 1813 the G reek m erchant m arine had increased to the phenom enal figure of 615 ships totalling 153. equipped w ith 5. the French Revolution also enabled th e G reek m erch ants to drive the French from the d o m in an t position which they had h ith e rto held in the commerce of the G reek lands.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 31 As a result of these various privileges an im p o rta n t new m ark et was opened for G reek products w hich consequently rose in value. Pouqueville. the revolution made our com m erce fall into th e hands of the Greeks. as you ask. to o b tain a great p a rt of the internal m aritim e commerce of T urkey. but this com m erce does not existГ C ited by J. th is enabled the G reeks “ . . inhabited until now by a tim id race. V I. fighting off pirates.526 seam en. RiJrdansz. 1807 the Chamber of Commerce of M arseille informed the M inister of th e Interior that. 294-297. D uring th e revolutionary w ars the French m erchants th ro u g h o u t th e L ev an t were left stran d ed as the routes to M arseilles were c u t. or. send Your Excellency each m onth the bulletin of th e sta te of French com m erce in the Levant.

79 T h e conflict betw een the “new ” and “old ” learning is described in detail in F. A detailed stu d y of educational conditions in Greece before 1821 is available in Т . 1930). M erchants. S tudents now began to go to foreign universities to com plete their studies. th e persistent propaganda activities of th e Poulios brothers in V ienna and th e volum inous writings. T he G reek m erchants. although only in the face of b itte r opposition from th e church which frequently denounced the “ a th eistic” and “im m oral” n atu re of the new theories. both w ithin Greece and in the com m unities abroad. 214-216. 80 “ M ost of the Greeks. silk. which would be w anting in their own country. and th e stu d en ts who studied abroad retu rn ed w ith a first h and knowledge of th e new body of thought. All this m eant n o t only m ore education b u t a new type of education.78 Such were the causes of th e revolution which was taking place in G reek economic life during these years.. tend further to create habits of this kind. 1803)." Travels in the Ionian Isles. Holland wrote as follows of this city: “The literature of this place is in tim ately connected w ith. E vangelides. 'II iraiSela kirl TovpKOKparlas [Education under Turkish Rule]. I t was no longer prim arily religious.80 41 78 Sakellarios. D uring this period Jannina was probably the m ost im portant cultural centre in the Greek world. 151. T h e colorful career of R higas. One a u th o rity has estim ated th a t the general price level of M orean products in 1794 com pared to th a t of 1815 was in the proportion of 1:3. See also A. T h e close relationship be­ tween the econom ic a ctiv ity and the cultural progress of G reece was frequently noticed by contem porary travellers. Their connections in G erm any and Italy. of K orais a tte s t to the in ­ fluence exerted by these new concepts. and th e num erous French agents. 34. grain. M ichalopoulos. 1936).1 vtotWyviicfi &va. Memoire sur I’etat actuel de la Grice (Paris. th e price of w heat. L eibnitz and others were tran slated into Greek. E ducational in sti­ tu tio n s m ultiplied by leaps and bounds. T he results of these economic changes were far-reaching and varied. 58. stim ulated th e progress of education in Greece proper by bestow ing lavish gifts of books. and other G reek products. op.32 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y therefore. In stead it was profoundly influenced by the cu rren t E n lightenm ent in western Europe. and at the sam e tim e furnish those m aterials for literary progress.2. T h u s education and learning in th e G reek world gradually broke w ith th e traditional clericalism and scholastic p ed an try . am ong others. Та Tt&vveva ка.yivvii<ns (1648— 1820) [Jannina and the neo-Greek Renaissance {1648-1820)} (Athens. In th e first place th e intellec­ tu al atm osphere was com pletely changed.79 In this w ay th e Greeks were prepared intellectually for the French R evolution and were m uch influenced by it. that . E. 2 vol. (A thens. T h e wealth acquired by m any of the inhabitants gives them th e m eans of adopting such pursuits them selves. are so im bued with the new principles. and Dr. or encouraging them in others.. students. equipm ent and m oney. D escartes. Coray. For the first tim e the w orks of Locke. especially those of Vienna. and frequent residence in these countries. cit. m ariners. and depending upon its com mercial character. all enthusiastically propagated the revolutionary principles th ro u g h o u t Greece. cotton.

Philike H etairia. T he Phanariotes were unreliable and divided. La presse dans la renaissance balkanique. including the P a tria rc h . T h e very w ealthy flip p in g m agnates of H ydra. "Of late years th e Greeks.. H olland sensed this process of change which was tak in g place. in th a t independent consciousness of power which is necessary as a step to (heir fu tu re lib eratio n . A decade before th e o u tb reak of th e revolution Dr. Kolokotronis. 160-170. S. 1797. have been m aking progress in population. D riault. M oreover it was th e w ealth of the m erchants and ship-owners which m ade it econom ically possible for th e G reeks to strike for independence and to finance th e revolution w ith practically no outHide aid during th e first three years. 37ff. T he higher clergy. Chaconas. NeotXXijvnn) ttoXitiki) lotopla. p a rtly because th ey were n a tu ­ rally re lu c ta n t to risk th e ir special privileges and p artly because they disagreed fundam entally w ith th e basic prem ises upon which the revolutionaries acted. NeoeXX^^ iroXmm) icrropla. for exam ple. 170ff. 530. K olokotrones and E. Sim ilarly it was the large.” 8 1 when th ey com pare their present sta te to liberty and eq u ality. I. as it would seem. A dam antios K o ra is. so th ey refused to move unless th ey received assurances th a t Russian aid would be fo rth ­ coming. T h u s it was th e m iddle class which was th e m oving sp irit in (he revolutionary m ovem ent an d which founded th e secret. L a politique orientate de N apoleon. and th e works t herein cited. T he position of th e o th er groups was equivocal. considering them in th eir whole ex ten t as a people. I. 128. M. M oschopoulos. as else­ where. Decem ber 18. 1942) 81 H olland. E dm onds. G. In short. in commerce. th e new middle class in Greece. and skilfully-m anned m erch an t m arine w hich gave th e Greeks com m and of the sea and m ade it impossible for the T u rk s to tra n s­ port th eir arm ies across th e Aegean.. th ey becom e ecstatic and even ready to pass from ecstasy into a state of frenzy. 1892). 3 8 9 .K ordatos. wellarm ed. A S tu d y in Greek N ationalism (N ew Y ork. op. T h e m ost com prehensive stu d y of the class situation in Greece in 1821 is in K ordatos. and com prised th e g reater p a rt of its m em bership. 127. were at first opposed to the revolution b e­ . and literatu re. See also T . cit.” Gazette nationale de France.3 9 0 . Klepht and W arrior (London. Some rem ained loyal to (lie P o rte while those who su pported the revolution had in m ind n ot a Greek nation sta te b u t a revived B yzantine E m pire in which they would have even more power th a n th ey already enjoyed in th e O tto ­ man E m pire. was th e class which was th e m ost receptive to th e new principles and which assum ed th e leadership of th e revolutionary m ovem ent. E ven in the m iddle class there was som e dissension. were ulrongly opposed to the revolution. th e Greece of the early nineteenth centu ry was entirely different from th a t of th e early eighteenth century.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 33 As m ight be expected. T h e prim ates were also h e sita n t to com m it themselves because of th eir v ested interests. and above all.. revolu­ tionary society. in education.

1899).. 84 In th e ancient period this tow n was known as Pherae. M ichalopoulos and K ordatos. T h u s nationalism was to be the keynote of B alkan politics during th e next century.8 5 Born in 1757 in V elestino. T his was due to the cu rren t igno­ rance concerning all things Y ugoslav and to the contem porary en th u ­ siasm for classical Greece. T he G reek m erchant was being spurred to action by th e assurance of his new found strength and by th e intoxicating theories of the French R evolution. 534-543.8 2 T here was one o utstanding exception. Ch. th ey are quite u n im p o rtan t. See also Kohn. the early nineteenth century like oth er periods w itnessed num erous proposals. nam ely. I.. T he au thors of these various schemes were m erely individuals who were sufficiently interested in the E astern Q uestion to set their ideas down in w riting and thus preserve them for p o sterity. op.. T he Slav peasant was being aroused from his centuries long slum ber by O ttom an m isgovernm cnt and Greek O rtho­ dox oppression. 110-118. and K am arowski. 1937). so R higas is known both . U nprom ising as th e situ ation was. both official and unofficial. 83 T h e best biographies of R higas are b y Dascalakis. A lm ost invariably th ey revealed little u n derstanding of th e realities of international relations and less of th e conditions and wishes of the races concerned. the G reek revolutionary R higas P heraios. 378-384. however. loc. T h e m ost common characteristics of the p riv ate projects were th e desire to create a large Greek sta te or con­ federation and the tendency to overlook the B alkan Slavs com pletely. and such an idealistic pro­ posal as a B alkan federation was destined to wage a hopeless b a ttle against th e overw helm ing n ationalist and im perialist m ovem ents. op.8 4 he early revealed a keen intelligence and was cause th ey feared the loss of their fortunes and because of the failure of previous revolts. cit. Behind the scenes th e rival . Photios ’Л-RoiivrjiiovеЬцата irtp i rrjs 'EW ijviKrjs ’EiravacrThtrecos [ M em oirs on the Greek Revolution] (Athens. New forces were now appearing which worked against a collective solution and tended ra th e r to the division of the B alkans along national lines.34 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is to r y In sum m ary w h at conclusions can be draw n from this stu d y of the dynam ics of N ear E astern politics in the early nineteenth cen­ tu ry ? In th e first place the failure of C atherine’s plan arid the defeat of Y psilanti ended all possibility of a B yzantine answ er to the E astern Q uestion. cit. for the p artitio n of the O ttom an^Em pire and the reorgani­ zation of the N ear E ast. either including them in th e Greek sta te or dividing them between the A ustrians and the Russians. cit. 411. who is w orthy of note. B u t so far as significance or practical results were con­ cerned. D ascalakis.im­ perialist interests tolerated the existence of the m oribund T urkish E m pire and played this B alkan sta te against th a t in a m ad scram ble for trad e and dividends. 82 Som e of these private plans w hich appeared in the first quarter of the nineteenth century are to be found in D juvara. A bibliography of the works of Rhigas is available in A. Les oeuvres de Rhigas Velestinlis (Paris.

1 1 1 1 Cited b y Rizo-N eroulo. tin Pheraios and Velestinlis. 73-125.” 8 6 In addition to a common w ar of independence. though livers and m ountains divide i t . and th e first article proclaim ed the nature of the governm ent: “T he H ellenic Republic is one. I t is one and indivisible. Fauriel. IV. as well as of the Greeks. 1925).” A French translation of R higas’ con stituion is given in Dascalakis. he called on all T urk ish subjects. 61-71. C hristian or M oslem. Inspired by these new doctrines. As one contem porary observed. “ In a very short tim e. 186. Old and young. ch. F or a sh o rt period it was practically the national anthem of the B ulgarians and R oum anians. N . Rhigas not only learned French.” W as Rhigas a tru e B alkan revolutionary or m erely a panI lellenist who sought to utilize revolutionary slogans for narrow . T urkish. 23— 29. b u t little l>y little Thourios has influenced th eir souls. to rise sim ultaneously in revolt “from Bosnia to A rabia. though it em ­ braces different races and religions. I t began w ith a revolutionary pream ble. Corns de litterature grecque moderne (G eneva. See D ascalakis. Rhigas urged the creation of a unified B alkan sta te and w ent so far as to m ake plans for its mode of governm ent. as w ell as the G reeks. sing it a t b an q u ets and m eetings of all kinds. Petrovich.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 35 Iulcen into th e service of A lexander Y psilanti. and in D ascalakis. nationalist theories. Oeuvres. 1828). organized new ones. w hite or negro. Thourios was widely accepted by th e people as an expression of th eir defiance of th e T u rk s and of their nnpirations for national freedom . 1934). H istoire des itats balknniques ju squ 'd 1924 (Paris. К Ingas’ song has spread th ro u g h o u t th e entire country. II. he joined th e secret lodges. In this stirring w ar hym n. . the A lbanians and th e R oum anians.” 87 T his first article a t once raises a question of in terp retatio n . Rhigas envisaged a new B alkan sta te which would include the various races of the peninsula. Rhigas. fire also Dascalakis. A rabic. b u t he also absorbed th e c u rre n t revolutionary. sim ply as a pleasan t song. 11. “T he French R epublic is one mid indivisible. H 7 T he first article of the French con stitution was. being based largely on the D eclaration of the R ights of M an imd on th e French C onstitution of Ju n e 24. D uring the course of his travels th ro u g h o u t central and southeastern Europe. Oeuvres. 1793. even women. Rhigas. H I 1 A French translation of Thourios is given in G. Iorga. Because of th e presence of A lbanian and K outso-V lach ■tcments in Velestino. and y et this sta te was to be known as the “ Hellenic Republic. Italian and G er­ man.” 8 6 W ritten in th e popular idiom . 48. 1925). w rote and d istrib u ted various revolutionary tracts and in 1790 composed his fam ous Thourios. Chants populaires de la (Iritce moderne (Paris. S. T he resulting docum ent was by no m eans original. claim Uln^as as their own. 15-29. A t first it was sung for pleasure. L ’union et la conference bal­ kanique (Paris. then G rand In terp re ter of the Im perial D ivan and la te r Prince of W allachia.

while the P hanariotes and the upper G reek clergy b itterly fought the radical revolutionary m ovem ents89 which menaced th eir vested interests.M ich alopoulos. Napoleon failed to lead his v eterans against the Sultan.. see Dascalakis. su ivi de quelques reflexions sur I'elat actuel de la Grice (M arseille. c i t 78. K oum as. T hree thousand copies of the above constitution were printed in V ienna in O ctober 1797. 129.. In other w ords com plete racial I e q u ality was provided for w ith the exception of the language pro­ visions. T h e abolition of class distinctions and of o ther feudal characteristics. See D ascalakis. T u rk s. b u t who I also recognized and sought to utilize as a unifying bond. C onsequently w h at chance there was of a successful B alkan revolt quickly disappeared. In fact. 257. 600. schoolm asters and adm inistrators. E ssai sur les Fanariotes. R higas was arrested b y the A ustrian police. 1832).” T he next three articles provided th a t all races should have th e liberty to vote and to participate in the sta te adm inistratio n . “ T he nation is represented by the m ass of the people w hich is the basis for national representation. op. J and executed.90 T he 88 For varying interpretations on this point. and of all oth er races. and n o t only by the | rich or by the p rim ates” (article 22). and K ordatos. On the other hand. К . cit. was perfectly true. article 7 sta ted th a t: “ T he sovereign people is composed of all the in h a b itan ts of this state. op. b u t while preparing to ship them to Greece. reflects th e contem porary suprem acy of th e G reek priests. Rhigas.-P. 256. w ithout distinction of religions or language: of Hellenes. G reek dom i­ nance in language and culture.90.88 In th is “ H ellenic R epublic” th e G reek language alone was to be used for all adm inistrative purposes (article 53). 'Iff-ropta r&v 'av ripuTrlvuv irpbfaaiv ’aird twv &рхают&гшр xp °vwv rCsv гщерш /ms [H istory of the A cts of M an from the Earliest Years to Our Days] (Vienna. 90 There is disagreem ent as to w hether a revolt at this period would have had any' chance of success. Rhigas. Armeians. R higas’ constitution is of particular in terest because it reflects clearly cu rren t conditions in the peninsula. 98-104. Rhigas was n ot a chauvinist b u t an a rd e n t revolutionary who strove fanatically to overthrow T urkish ty ra n n y and to unite th e B alkan people. 128. B ut the fact th a t th e new sta te was to be of a H elleno-B alkan character. 1824). . R oum anians. w ith Greek language and culture upperm ost. and Rhigas him self explained on this point th a t G reek was the m ost widely understood and easiest of the B alkan languages. 89 M .36 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y n atio n alist ends? A t first sight the la tte r seems to be th e case. M. 82-86. And th a t. M ichalopoulos. 130-163. Zallony. th e safeguarding of th e rights of th e individual and of th e race— all these reveal the influence of revolutionary France. 601. of course. and it was th e ancient G reeks who were held up as models for the citizens of th e fu tu re state. A lbanians. In addition to this blow. handed over to the T urks. X I I. 536. T here was even provision for class as well as racial equality. PijTas. 93-98.

and by a wise policy and . m any more schemes appeared during th e first q u a rte r of I lie nineteenth cen tu ry as b y -products of th e decades of w arfare and diplom atic bargaining am ongst th e G reat Powers. In addition to th e projects of Rhigas and of o ther priv ate in­ dividuals. C zartoryski and his Correspondence w ith Alexander I (1. 1803. in which case E uropean T u rk ey would be partitio n ed . W allachia. 52-55.i von C roatia. . Prince A dam C zartoryski. In stead . ( 'zartoryski foresaw the necessity of appeasing th e o th er powers. .011(1011. I t has been shown already how a com bination of econom ic and political factors caused G reat Itritain to shift from a pro-R ussian policy to one based on O ttom an integrity. B y M ay. Before doing so C zartoryski drew up plans for th e rearrangem ent of Europe in (he event of N apoleon’s defeat. It was to R ussia’s in terest th a t T urk ish in teg rity should be respected but. .( pkillful selection of posts to be occupied by our troops. the subject of n ationalities should be g ran ted full autonom y. I. and I wo years later R ussia and A ustria joined P i t t ’s coalition. R ussia would then take over M oldavia. upon which Russia would be able to secure to herself a decisive and lawful influence b y m eans of th e title of E m peror or ProIefftor of th e Slavs of th e E a st w hich would be accorded to his Im ­ perial M ajesty.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 37 uprisings of th e future were to be uniform ly of a national ra th e r th a n peninsular character. governed locally. p a rt of Bosnia. If this proved im practical. 1888). Corfu. France and England were again a t w ar. by id en tity of religion and origin. . A ustria m ight be p. T h u s the next “ Memoirs of Prince Adam. th en a R ussian-dom inated federation of Hulkan states should be created. N apoleon’s expedition to E g y p t in 1798 radically changed lliu situ atio n and forced b o th B ritain and R ussia to h asten to the defense of T urkey. the m ass of th e T u rk ish territo ries in E urope should be divided into sep arate states. C onstantinople and flit! S tra its. and above all. C attaro . and bound to each o th er by a li deration. by the T re a ty of Pressburg. T he T re a ty of Amiens (1802) which concluded Napoleon’s eastern ad venture k e p t the peace for little more th a n a year.9 1 A usterlitz ended all possibility of a peace settlem en t on such terms. lnlria and D alm atia to th e new kingdom of Ita ly . Belgrade and Ragusa. while B ritain and France could be offered some islands in the A rchi­ pelago or establishm ents in Asia or Africa. N apoleon gained m astery of (lie A driatic and a foothold in the B alkans by annexing V enetia. Am ong th e first of these official plans for a B alkan federation was th a t of the Russian foreign m inister. A ccording to th is m em orandum . In any case th is influence would be established by (he p a rt the Russians will have tak en in the liberation of these terli lories.

76. Before the close of 1806 France and T u rk ey were n o t m erely on friendly term s b u t were allied in w ar against the R ussians in the Principalities and th e English fleet in the 82 S.93 A v ery sim ilar proposal was brou g h t forw ard a t the same time by C ount D ’H auterive. the O ttom an E m ­ pire w as to be divided into two parts. 04 D riault and Lh6ritier. to be ruled from C onstantinople by a C hristian prince under French pro­ tection. however. 83 P. W allachia. however. he urged th a t they be given a definite autonom ous s ta tu s w ith N apoleon again acting as the g u a ra n to r. D riault and Lh6ritier. I. he argued. In the second plan Codrika proposed th a t Bulgaria.9 2 A few m onths later N apoleon was presented w ith tw o other plans for T urk ish p artitio n by M . composed of E uropean T urkey. special adviser on eastern af­ fairs in th e M inistry of Foreign Affairs and form erly secretary o t the T urk ish em bassy in Paris. he sent General Sebastiani to C onstantinople as am ­ bassador extrao rd in ary w ith instructions to recover for France her form er prep o n d eran t influence and to assure th e P orte th a t the i'Vench governm ent sincerely sought to preserve the O ttom an E m ­ pire and to check R ussian expansion.9 4 Napoleon. Codrika. an in ­ tim a te of T alleyrand and an expert on the N ear E a st where he had served in various diplom atic capacities. His proposal was th a t M oldavia. 1891). The European Powers and the Near Eastern Question. 39. In stead of independent p rin­ cipalities. . 39. Shupp. H istoire diplom atique.38 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y series of proposals for the reorganization of th e B alkans came from French ra th e r th a n R ussian sources. T alleyrand pointed o u t th a t the real enem ies of France were E ngland and Russia. F . I. In Ju n e 1806. and of p ro tecto r over each of th e principalities. Serbia. P ashas such as P asvan Oglou in Bulgaria and Ali in A lbania should be left in control of th eir pashaliks under th e g u arantee of France. In his well-known memoir (Octo­ ber 17. Alexander I el NapoUon. A lbania. the G reek Islands and C ontinental Greece should be m ade independent. A ustria would be appeased and R ussian expansion to the south-w est would be blocked and would be deflected tow ards Asia w here it would clash w ith English in terests to the advantage of F rance. B essarabia and a p a rt of B ulgaria be given to A ustria. T atistcheff. f. and th a t France should therefore m ake a close alliance w ith A ustria a t the expense of T urkey. 91. 1931). According to the first. H istoire diplomatique. E g y p t was to be annexed to France and to become the em porium for all the commerce of E urope and Asia. 1806-1807 (N ew York. 1801-1812 (Paris. and th e other. In general Napoleon was to have the role of m ediator in the reorganization of T urkey. In this way. the one ruled from Bagdad by the S ultan. b u t R um elia was to remain under T urkish protection. had decided on a policy of O ttom an integrity. 1805) to N apoleon. 3.

a b o u t th e p artitio n of T urkey. Since his m ain concern a t the tim e was to tackle E ngland. cit. H ardenberg’s proposals were th u s rejected and Napoleon and A lexander agreed th a t France should have the Bocche di C attaro and th a t R ussia should ev acuate th e D anubian Principalities as soon as an arm istice w ith the P o rte was concluded. Bosnia and Serbia. . B ulgaria. Vandal. perhaps even a few Austrians. D enkwiirdigkeiten des Staatskanzlers Fiirsten von Hardenberg (Leipzig. A m onth after we have come to an agreem ent. T he plan was th a t R ussia and Prussia should join in an al­ liance w ith N apoleon. and E ngland would be su b jected . A ustria to ac­ quire D alm atia.” 9 6 In accordance w ith these term s a R usso-T urkish arm istice was concluded in A ugust 1807. If the P orte refused to come to an agreem ent w ithin three m onths then France would aid R ussia in liberating “from th e yoke and vexations of th e T u rk s all the provinces of the O ttom an E m pire in Europe. R ussian. B essarabia.000 men. An arm y of 50.96 S E For the Hardenberg plan. A fter his victory a t Friedland (June 1807) N apoleon decided upon a volte face. F rance was to have Greece and th e ad jacen t islands. 06 Cited b y A. H ardenburg. 244. French. see Shupp. except th e tow n of C onstantinople and the province of R um elia. see Leopold von Ranke. th e arm y could be on th e Bosphorus. and th e th ree should th en proceed to reorganize Europe for th eir m utual benefit..B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 39 Straits. In fact he was h ardly back in S ain t P etersburg from T ilsit before he was talking to th e French am bassador. an agreem ent w ith th e T sa r which would leave E ngland isolated. op. b u t it soon beam e evid en t th a t A lexander had no intention of relinquishing his hold on th e P rincipalities. III. I. Your m ajesty is on the D anube. B ut this alliance was to prove of sh o rt d u ration. I am in a good position in D alm atia. 537-558. could n o t arrive a t the E uphrates w ith o u t m aking E ngland trem ble and p u ttin g her on her knees before th e continent. C onstantinople and the S tra its. NapoUon et Alexandre Ier (Paris. 1906). N apoleon him self toyed fitfully w ith the idea. For the effect of T ilsit on the N ear East. he was anxious to avoid entanglem ents or com plications in eastern Europe. R ussia was to obtain M oldavia. going by C onstantinople into Asia. W allachia. 460-462. 242. who should in tu rn cede his own kingdom to Prussia. 1808 sent to the tsa r his celebrated le tte r w ith a plan for the destruc­ tion of both th e O ttom an and B ritish Em pires a t one stroke. T h e stroke would resound to the Indies. a recon stitu ted Poland m ight go to th e king of Saxony. and on F ebruary 2. 1877). H ard ly had the Franco-R ussian negotiations a t T ilsit begun when the Prussian m inister. proposed to A lexander th e p a rti­ tion of European T u rk ey as a m eans of facilitating th e restoration of Prussia. T he plan was ingenious and daring b u t N apoleon would have none of it.

In contrast. b u t he insisted th a t Russia again w ould be th e m ain beneficiary. 1808. 00 D riault and Lh6ritier.. b u t A lexander ju stly observed th a t C onstan­ tinople was im p o rta n t to R ussia only so far as it would give access to the M ed iterran ean . Instead of p a rtitio n . cit. Serbia and the islands). W estern B ul­ garia and Northern Serbia would go to A ustria. Turkey would be left with Northern Roum elia. Vandal. 407. A ustria m ight be appeased w ith Serbia. was impressed by this objection and ad m itted it as irrefu tab le. T he th ird a ltern a ­ tive was. C aulaincourt in S an t P etersburg soon dis­ covered th a t A lexander w as set on C onstantinople and the S traits and would n o t be budged. as a soldier.. Albania. C ertainly a blow a t England via th e N ear E ast and In d ia appealed strongly to him . recom m ended.. Greece and even E g y p t and S yria. this schem e left . I. foreign m inister Cham pagny presented to N apoleon in February 22. b u t R ussia m ust have th e D anubian P rin o palities. and should therefore be avoided a t all costs. C onstantinople and th e S traits. 40-42. I. France would keep Bosnia. B ulgaria. a long memorandum in which he urged the partition of the O ttom an Em pire. b u t there were m any com pli­ cating factors. Greece and Southern Roum elia to the Dardanelles.07 E qually serious was th e problem of the d istrib u tio n of th e spoils. was convinced th a t th e destruction of the O ttom an E m pire would benefit R ussia ra th e r th an France. H ith erto France had supported Turkish integrity because partition would have benefited only Russia and Austria. but now th at French possessions bordered on those of the Sultan. in which case she would soon disintegrate and be ab ­ sorbed by Russia. Sebastiani em phasized the technical difficulties— m ountainous terrain and th e long. therefore. and the prevailing anarchy and insubordination in th e Em pire. I. M oldavia. N apoleon. T u rk ey could be ignored and left to her destiny. He expressed the opinion th at before long the Turks would be driven out of Europe be­ cause of the proxim ity of Russia. thin. France could have Bosnia. he proposed the follow ing partition plan which would ensure to France an adequate share of th e spoils: Russia would receive Bessarabia. Or T u rk ey could be partitioned. H istoire diplomatique. 0s A fascinating account of these negotiations is given in ibid. R um elia and Salonica. 273-307. European T u rk e y should be reorganized into three M oslem states (Albania. W al­ lachia to the Aluta River and Eastern Bulgaria. A lbania. In a m em oir on the general situation in the N ear E ast he outlined three possible policies.99 ” Ib id . B ulgaria-R um elia and Bosnia) and three C hristian states (Greece. exposed lines of com m uni­ cation. the rest of W allachia. op. In general d ’H auterive. 404.40 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y How serious N apoleon was in proposing such a bold undertaking it is difficult to say. the unrest of the Balkan Christians and especially of th e G retks. I. like T alleyrand. which would ensure their com m unications with Asia. 406. A s Cham pagny pointed ou t. th e Sea of M armora and the Bosphorus. C oulaincourt sug­ gested th a t if R ussia took C onstantinople then France m ight take over th e D ardenelles.98 T hese p artitio n difficulties were em phasized by the C ount d ’H autcrive. all under the sovereignty of the S ultan and th e g u arantee of France.

A t this point. and m aster of the M editerranean.T h u s no drastic revisions were m ade ex­ cept for the recognition of the R ussian annexation of M oldavia and W allachia. By th e spring of 1812 A lexander foresaw the inev itab ility of eventual conflict w ith N apoleon and he therefore prepared a plan by which th e South Slavs could be liberated and N apoleon outm anoeuvered w ith one stroke. N apoleon reverted once more to the policy of m aintaining O tto m an integrity. 1815. W hile th e conflict dragged on during th e next three years.” L ’Acropole. however.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 41 C onfronted by these difficulties and warnings.100 In th e stirring events of th e nex t three years th e E astern Question had no place and th e settlem en t a t V ienna affected only slightly the O ttom an E m pire. A ustria recovered her A driatic possessions. while the Congress was in session. as m ight be expected. th e R ussian arm ies m ight even be able to push w estw ard and contact th e T yroleans an d th e Swiss. Kranco-Russian relations becam e steadily worse. A t the ICrfurt Conference of O ctober 1808. In stead th e T re a ty of B ucha­ rest was signed w ith the T u rk s in M ay and the R ussian troops were Kent northw ard to face th e French in Poland. ш G. I (January-D ecem ber. under the p ro tecto rate of G reat B ritain.” Revue des ttudes slaves. V II (1927). the A ustrian and R ussian governm ents cam e to an agree­ m ent by which A ustria w as to give th e least possible aid to Napoleon m the im pending France-R ussian war. A m onth later Napoleon crossed th e N iem an a t th e head of his G rand A rm y. refused to accept this (im putation and w ar betw een R ussia and T u rk ey w as resum ed in 1809. A peace tre a ty and an alliance w as to be con­ cluded w ith the T u rk s and th e R ussian arm ies on the D anube were then to strike across the peninsula to th e A driatic and a tta c k the i'Yench and A ustrian forces in the rear. Efforts were m ade to obtain Hie cooperation of th e English fleet in the A driatic and a propaganda cam paign was launched am ongst the B alkan Slavs. 45-49. “ Un projet de partage de la I nrquie entre la France et la R ussie en 1808. Vernadsky. G. . A ccordingly th e projected drive across the A driatic was dropped. In th is fashion A lexander Imped to liberate th e A ustrian Slavs by force and the T urkish Slavs liy tre a ty and th en to unite all these South Slavs into a R ussiandom inated federation. Vauthier. 106-110. Russia retained Bessarabia. while th e Ionian Isles were form ed in to the “ United S tates of th e Ionian Islands.” In F ebru ary .. To ex-m arshal B ernadotte in Sweden he w rote th a t after reaching Bosnia. a circular on behalf of th e B alkan C hristians was issued b y Russia I1 ’ranсe in control of the whole of Southern Europe and of the entrance to the Black ii*a. T he S ultan. he had little trouble in winning Alexander to his v ie w p o in t. 1026). “Alexandre Icr et le problem e slave pendant la premiSre m oitie 'It* son rSgne. T h e tsa r pushed this scheme enthusiastically.

T he occasion was the R usso-Turkish w ar of 1828 which developed o u t of differences arising from th e G reek R evo­ lution. M artens.1 0 1 T he powers. S3. "EWvjves ical Ztpfiot. T his was due largely to the efforts of Capodistrias.” Revue de droit international et de legislation сотрагёе. were suspicious of R ussian aim s in the Balkans.103 In place of the lim ited federation of his original scheme C apodistrias now proposed to divide European T u rk ey into five sta te s: the D anubian Princi­ palities.” 102 A num ber of years later when the O ttom an E m pire seemed on th e verge of collapse C apodistrias once more proposed th e creation of a Balkan federation. I t was to this com m ittee th a t th e second federation plan of C apodistrias was presented. W allachia and Serbia. His plan was to denounce th e tre a ty of B ucharest and to create a confeder­ ation consisting of th e principalities of M oldavia. Lascaris. “ E tude historique sur la politique russe dans la question d ’O rient. and restore com ­ merce and p rosperity to the peninsula. the new sta te s were to be ruled by G erm an princes who would recognize the S u ltan s’ sovereignty and who would be under the protection of Aus­ tria. and Greece w ith the rem aining islands.” Sbornik russkago istorideskago obSdestva. prevented an y action from being taken. 48-52. III (1868). C onstantinople w ith its environs was to be a 101 F . however. IX (1877). 1822. These new states were to be ruled by princes from the various E uropean royal families and were to be united in a federation. and this to gether w ith N apoleon’s escape from Elba. . to decide on peace term s. thus benefiting the rest of E urope. 54. France. 209-212. “A perfu de m a carri&re publique depuis 1798 jusqu’3. would p u t an end to the fears of a R ussian dom inated Bal­ kans. 102 J. and its purpose was to a ttr a c t the a tte n tio n of C hristian E urope to th e plight of th e subject races of T u rk e y . and th a t I do n o t w ish. however. 103 At the tim e Capodistrias was not in th e Russian d iplom atic service. Such a settlem ent. deliver the C hristians from T urkish misrule. M acedonia (in­ cluding T hrace and th e ad jacen t islands). E ngland and Russia. Epirus-A lbania. In the next year C apodistrias was m ade R ussian foreign m inister and a t once he urged an aggressive policy in th e Balkans. T h e fate of th is statesm anlike scheme was quickly settled. Serbia (including Bosnia and B ulgaria). the G reek-born R ussian diplom at. C apodistrias argued. F . W ithin a year th e R ussian arm ies had reached the gates of C onstantinople and the fate of T u rk ey seemed to lay in th e hands of th e victors. having been elected President of Greece in 1827. "All this is very well th o u g h t out. when th e T sar com m ented.42 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y am ongst her allies. Capodistrias. b u t to do an y th in g it is necessary to fire cannon. In order to avoid opposition from th e G reat Powers. T he T sa r appointed a com m ittee presided over by C ount K ochubey and consisting of the highest functionaries of the realm.

Objections to this pro ject were raised by P riv y Counselor D ash­ kov* on th e ground th a t such a shake-up would inevitably lead to a Kuropean w ar and th a t th e free city of C onstantinople would be too weak and would necessitate R ussian garrisons on b oth banks of the Hosphorus. Kerner. T his decision is of significance. “is for France w h at th e B osphorus is for Russia. and A ustria w ith Serbia. A ustrian Silesia and half of H anover. Bosnia and Albania. th e obvious strateg y was to p artitio n T u rkey.” b u t it did a ttra c t wide ullention and m an y of its features were included in a p artitio n pro­ posal brought forw ard a t this tim e by th e French foreign m inister I'olignac. 1829). Including the tex t of the Protocol of 16 Septem ber 1829. A fter careful consideration of the various factors in­ volved the com m ittee unanim ously concluded th a t the fall of T urkey was co n trary to R ussian interests and th a t an honorable peace should lie concluded w ith th e Sultan. and Belgium. significantly. expressed the opin­ ion th a t no French m inistry could m aintain itself w ith o u t a tta in in g the R hine frontier and th a t France could no m ore be restricted to her existing borders th an Greece to th e M orea. and th a t in retu rn P russia should be indemnified with Saxony. Accordingly lit' proposed th a t France should obtain the R hine provinces. n ot only because it disposed of C apodistrias’ plan. V (1937).104 W hile th e T s a r’s com m ittee. In IH27 C h ateaubriand.” Cambridge H istorii i l Journal. 105 De la situation politique de VEurope et des in tertts de la France (Paris. 280-290. "R ussia’s N ew P olicy in the Near E ast after the Peace of Adrinmplc. B avaria w ith the archbishopric of ilzburg. th e N etherlands with the other half of H an o v er. L uxem ­ bourg. E ver since th e Congress of Vienna the favorite thesis of th e liberal and B o n a p a rtist opposition hud been th a t France m ust a tta in her n a tu ra l frontier. interesting though ra th e r fan tastic plans for T urkish imrtition were being concocted in France. form erly soldier of th e em pire. J. then am bassador to Rom e. M ettern ich described th is scheme as “ the inconceivable product of a pen tru ly guided by m adness.” T o a tta in th e su p p o rt of R ussia and th e desired territorial i hanges.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 43 free city and the seat of a congress to which each m em ber of the fed­ eration would send representatives. th e Rhine. w as form ulating th e bases of R ussian foreign policy. b u t also because it к presents a reversal of the trad itio n al foreign policy as followed by IV'ter the G reat and C atherine.” he iiiUled. Finally Russia should tak e over the key city of C onstanllnople. . England w ith C rete. published a volum e105 in which he described A ustria and E ngland as ' ‘our eternal and irrenm cilable enem ies” and R ussia as a n atu ral ally. Tw o years later General Richemont. 104 R. “ T he R h in e.

Russia was to obtain M oldavia. Bosnia and D alm atia. Crete. Finally. From the Bourbon Restoration to the Peace of K u tiah ( U niversity of California i 'Publications in H istory. w ith th e ou tstan d in g excep­ tion of the R higas plan. ш I li e июне. Even though th e tre a ty had not been concluded a t this tim e it is ap p a re n t in view of the decisions of the K ochubey com m it­ tee. 1941). w hether for p artitio n or for th e creation of a federation. 76-79. Only Greece was independent Init even her resources were so lim ited th a t when C apodistrias ad ­ vanced his plan for a federation of the B alkan states. Polignac (1829). he expected the Russians and n o t th e Balkan people to drive the T u rk s into Asia." Revue d ’histoire diplom atique. France and the Levant. Accordingly Polignac presented to th e royal council a m em oir pro­ viding for an en ten te w ith Russia on the basis of th e division of the O tto m an Em pire and th e reorganization of th e rest of E urope. the Aegean Islands. '1 ' B ritain was to be bou g h t off w ith th e D utch colonies and A ustria with | Serbia. all the schemes of th e early nineteenth cen­ tu ry . C onstantinople was to be transform ed into th e capital of a new Greek Em pire consisting of Greece. and the coast of Asia M inor from the Black Sea to C yprus. and a fourth of Asia M inor. and France in retu rn was to expand to the Rhine. Berkeley. In whorl.4 4 9 -4 5 1 .44 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y D uring the sum m er of 1829 the Russian arm ies were crushing all T urk ish opposition and w ith th e capture of A drianople th e Eastern Q uestion was once m ore th e all-im portant issue. r c c a il t l i s c t is s i o u of this project is in V. it is significant th a t. W allachia. T he B alkan people were still far too w eak to a tte m p t any large scale reorganization of the N ear E ast. were proposed and were to be p u t into effect by the G reat Powers them ­ selves. J. Driault ami Lli6riliert 'Histoire diplomatique. . X I V (1900). I t was feared and suspected in P aris th a t M etternich had proposed to T sa r Nicholas a plan for T urkish p artitio n from which France was to be excluded. th a t the Polignac scheme could n ot have been considered seri­ ously by the R ussians. See also A Pingaud. X X V I I. Before fu rth er steps could be taken th e T re a ty of A drianople was signed and th e m a tte r was accordingly dropped. this was a period of transition in which B alkan nationalism had trium phed over B yzantinism b u t had not as y et become suffi­ ciently powerful to u n dertake independent action. 402-409. 1 . “Le pro|(‘|. Puryear.106 In conclusion. Saxony and Holland were to be sacrificed to Prussia for the sake of the la tte r’s support. A fter some discussion the royal council approved Polignac’s plan and it was tra n sm itted to am bassador M o rte m a rt in S ain t P etersburg.

T he unpreparedness of th e B alkan states for united action tow ards и common end was illu strated during th e eastern crisis of 1839-1841. the m ost natural and th e least com prom ising is the follow ing. sm all. was one of prep aration ra th e r Ilian of achievem ent. and added. and for all to free Ilirniselves from the foreign yoke in case attem p ts should be m ade to destroy the inli'Ki’ity of the O ttom an E m pire. A ll m ust m ake com m on cause to resist all invasion of their terriInry. M ost im pressive w as th e powerful Nugoslav m ovem ent which flourished in C ro atia and Serbia and which was to play such an im p o rta n t role in th e revolutions of 1848. and to profit by the conflagration of Europe. L a Roumanie. T h e Turkish 45 . T h e com ing of th e nine­ teenth centu ry w ith its nationalism and im perialist rivalries rendered nil such schemes im practical. the Bul1'imans.” but feared th a t it would disintegrate nevertheless. Greece was hlowly repairing th e dam age w rought b y centuries of T u rkish neglect mid eight years of w arfare. th e Serbians. conditions were very unfavorable for closer interllulkan ties. it w ill be necessary to take a line. are thinking of w ays of pulling their chestnuts niit of the fire. orographie. 404. 1829-1849 The end of th e eighteenth cen tu ry w itnessed th e failure of Cath* crine’s plan to restore th e B yzantine Em pire. a t a ball. UUtrature. T his period. therefore. 405. II. and expressed his desire to “m aintain the Turkish Em |>lrr. . for others to reform th ose which th ey already have. A. and intensely nationalistic. T his situ atio n continued to 1849. 1833. in Balkan affairs and th e possibility of a B alkan federation was (lincussed by various o u tstan d in g scholars and publicists. statistique des Rom ans (Paris. .” J. U ntil th a t y e a r the B alkan states showed little in terest in one an o th er while Ilie G reat Powers twice intervened to save th e S u ltan from M ehem et Ali. V aillant. I'lie possibility of a general E uropean w ar over th e disposition of the 'Sultan’s Em pire aroused hopes in th e B alkans th a t some benefits might be gained as a result of the new situ a tio n . the Tsar m et Count de F icquelm ont. ой histoire. W hen the Su ltan ’s empire seem ed about to nllupse under the blows of Ibrahim. T h e B ulgarians during these years were begin­ ning to show th e first signs of national self-consciousness. langue. Obviously. . In th e D anubian provinces a vigorous nniionalist m ovem ent was preparing the ground for unification and liberation from R ussian control. "When the event liiippens. It is worth nuking here an interesting proposal m ade by Tsar N icholas on February 18. the Ausliltin ambassador. while th e decrepit O ttom an E m pire was b u ttressed b y th e rivalries nl the G reat Powers.1 A ccordingly a few 1 As one contem porary observer w rote: “T h e R oum anians. for IIn1 reestablishment o f the G reek Em pire.C H A PT E R III Y E A R S O F P R E P A R A T IO N . in order for som e to m ake laws for Ilii'inselves. In place of a new B yzantium there developed th e B alkan states. and of all lines to take the one I find the nnplcst. 1844). foreseeing a general conflict. weak. finally there was evident in W estern Europe a growing popular interiM l.

R u ssia n a id w as e x p e c te d a n d som e R u ssia n a g e n ts w ere in v o lv ed b u t th e re v o lts p ro v e d u n ifo rm ly w e ak a n d fu tile . illp re p a re d a n d lac k e d m ass su p p o rt. th e p o p u la tio n s o f th e p rovin ces o f th e old G reek E m p ire even on th e A sia tic sid e of th e B osp h oru s are m o stly C h ristian . w hile th e l a tte r ex p e c te d s u p p o rt fro m th e a n ti-R u ssia n F re n c h consul a t B u c h a re st. D e ta ils a re lack in g . 1936). h o w ev er. In W a lla c h ia th e re w as o rg an ized a “ S o cie ty for th e lib e r­ a tio n of S lavic p eoples on th e rig h t a n d le ft b a n k s of th e D a n u b e .46 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d ie s in H is t o r y a tte m p ts w ere m a d e to ta k e a d v a n ta g e of th e o p p o rtu n ity . a n d t h a t th e fo rm e r received e n c o u ra g e m e n t from th e R u ssia n vice-consul a t G a la tz . R o u m a n ia n N a ­ tio n a lism . w h y sh ou ld w e n o t try and reestablish a G reek E m pire? T h er e are th e b eg in n in g s of a G reek sta te . for u n ite d a c tio n . S im ila r o u tb re a k s o c c u rre d sp o ra d ic a lly in 1842 a n d 1843. w as u n d u ly a la rm is t. cit. S erb ia. T em p erley. I se e for m y p art n o th in g b etter to d o . a n d a few R o u m a n ia n s. a n d th e re is no d o u b t an u n io n existing a m o n g th ese th re e p ro v in c e s [W allach ia. T h e y seem ed to h a v e been p a r t of a v a g u e H e ta iris t schem e. 1840. C ited b y C am p b ell. re p o rte d : " T h e re a re a t th is m o m e n t em issaries a t B u c h a re st fro m B u lg a ria a n d S e rv ia . th e w ell-know n B ritish e x p e rt on th e N e a r E a s t. B ulgaria] w hich m ay b e h ig h ly d a n g e ro u s to th e p eace of th e se c o u n trie s .. The C rim ea (L o n d o n . 67. . In th e sp rin g of 1840.” w ith th e aim of sta g in g s im u lta n e o u s re v o lts in B u lg a ria a n d W a lla ­ chia. in 1839. T h e c o n ­ clusion t h a t can be d ra w n fro m th e se u p risin g s is t h a t a m o n g st th e re v o lu tio n a ry le a d e rs th e re ex iste d a feeling of s o lid a rity as a g a in st T u rk ish a n d R u ssia n d o m in a tio n . b u t i t a p p e a rs t h a t th e c o n sp ira to rs w ere m o stly B u lg a ria n s p lu s a few R o u m a n ia n n a tio n a lists. 68. In B u lg a ria th e re w as little E m p ire su cceed ed to th e G reek E m p ire b y m ea n s o f co n q u est. W h en th e T u rk ish E m p ire d estro y s itse lf b y its ow n in ca p a city . A few m o n th s e a rlier. e v e n ts of 1848-1849. b u t n o th in g cam e of th e se p lan s.” 2 C olquhoun. E n g la n d a n d the N ea r E a s t . a n d to e sta b lish a D a n u b ia n fe d e ratio n . see C a m p b ell. T h e B a lk a n people w ere u n p re p a re d . T h e c o n sp ira to rs w ere d isu n ite d .3 D u rin g th e y e a rs b etw een th e p re m a tu re re v o lts of th e e a rly fo r­ tie s a n d th e great. M a y 17. as y e t. to e n d T u rk is h ru le in th e B a lk a n s. o p . su p p o rte d by G reek s. b u t t h a t th e ir effo rts w ere doom ed to fa ilu re b ecause of la c k of o rg a n iz a tio n a n d of p o p u la r su p p o rt.” H . im p o rta n t d e v e lo p m e n ts oc­ c u rre d in som e of th e B a lk a n c o u n trie s. 2 C olq u h oun to P alm erston . a g ro u p of b o y a r a n d m id d le class c o n sp ira to rs p lo tte d a re v o lu tio n in M o ld a v ia to g e t rid of P rin c e S tu rd z a a n d of th e R u ssia n p ro te c to r­ a te . 70. B u lg a ria n s. 3 F o r th e d eta ils of th e se u p risin gs. C o lq u h o u n . I do n ot know K in g O th o. a n d th e n e t re s u lt w as a s tr e e t b raw l in B ra ila w h ich w as h a n d le d b y P rin c e G h ic a ’s police a n d m ilitia forces. 6 8 -7 4 . T h u s th e re v o lu tio n a ry forces w ere n o t o n ly d iso rg an ized b u t also c o n tra d ic to ry . its roots do n ot go deep. I do n o t k n ow if h e is able to su p p ort su ch a d estin y .

R ad eff.7 4 H a jek . “ C f. Thus th e eig h teen fo rties in G reece w ere m a rk e d sim p ly b y a rid p a r ty Hquabbles b etw een th e fu sta n e lla -w e arin g .6 th e R o u m a n ia n u p p e r classes in th e e a rly n in e te e n th c e n tu ry w ere m u ch in flu en ced b y th e h'rench R e v o lu tio n a n d b y th e ir n a tiv e L a tin is t m o v e m e n t. I t was th ese s tu d e n ts w ho w ere to ta k e su ch a le a d in g p a r t in th e 1848 revolutio n a n d la te r in the. n a tio n a lis tic follow ers of Jo h n K o le tte s. b u t m o st of th e m w ere a t Paris. 7 3 7 -7 6 3 . . 7 8 -9 3 . th e union of l he p rin c ip a litie s. 1 1 5 -1 5 5 . M u n ic h a n d G en ev a. 'laropia rijs 'EXXdSos | H istory o f Greece] (A th en s. G . su p ra . A s h a s b een n o te d a lre a d y . 2 2 5 -2 2 8 . V I I . 4 aropla rrjs oiKovowLKijs f a v s rijs *EXXaSos [H is to r y of the Econom ic L ife o f Greece] (A th e n s. b la c k -c o a te d disciples of A lexander M a v ro k o rd a to s .4 E v e n ts in G reece w ere H i m ila d y in sig n ifican t. M ickiew icz a n d Q u in e t p re a c h e d th e d o c trin e s of liberalism a n d n a tio n a l se lf-d e te rm in a tio n . K arolid os. a n d th e m o re c o n se rv a tiv e . L a M acedoin e et la renaissance bidgare. A s a re s u lt of th is stim u lu s a "S o cie ty of R o u m a n ia n S tu d e n ts ” w as fo u n d e d a n d a lib ra ry a n d club room e sta b lish e d in P a ris. p u rify in g th e lan g u ag e a n d e n c o u r­ aging lite ra tu re a n d o th e r a rts . re c o n s tru c tio n a n d ex p an Hion to in c o rp o ra te th e m illio n s of G reek s still u n d e r T u rk is h rule. e s ta b lis h m e n t of th e R o u m a n ia n s ta te . A H is to r y of Greece fro m its Conquest b y the R om an s to the P resen t T im e (O xford. a n d a m o re d e m o c ra tic form of a d m in is tra tio n . B erlin . 1 0 7 -2 1 4 .5 0 . se e C a m p b ell. R o u m a n ia n N a tio n a lism . 2 2 0 -2 2 4 . S c a tte re d re v o lts b ro k e o u t u n d e r th e le ad e rsh ip of ('•corgi R a k o v sk i. I. 1 934). L a te r in 1833 th e re w as fo u n d ed th e P h ilh a rm o n ic S o ciety fo r th e p u rp o se of stim u la tin g th e d e v e lo p m e n t of a n a tio n a l c u ltu re . 1877). T h e re th e y w ere m u c h influ en ced b y th e College de F ra n c e where M ich elet. th e a b o litio n of th e R u ssia n p ro te c to ra te . B u lgarien u n ter der T iirkenherrschaft. R a p ta rch es. 2 5 -2 8 . Som e of th e se s tu d e n ts w ere to be fo u n d a t L unev ille. Im p o r ta n t w ork was d o n e in e sta b lish in g schools. 5 P .B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 47 w o rth y of n o te . M o re o v e r th e y o u n g e r m em b e rs of th e society w ere e q u a lly in te re s te d in p o litics a n d d e m a n d e d . K . am o n g o th e r th in g s. b u t th e y w ere easily a n d b r u ta lly c ru sh e d b y A l­ b an ia n irre g u la rs. F ro m th is c e n tre p ro p a g a n d is t lite ra ­ ture w as sh ip p e d to th e P rin c ip a litie s a n d a rtic le s w ere p u b lish ed in W estern E u ro p e a n p erio d icals c h a m p io n in g th e R o u m a n ia n cause. 6 3 -2 1 6 .5 M o re im p o r ta n t w ere th e d e v e lo p m e n ts in th e P rin c ip a litie s w here (he n a tio n a lis t m o v e m e n t w as g a in in g s tre n g th a m o n g st th e b o y a rs and th e bourgeoisie. 4 1 . 7 F or d eta ils. 1925). M ention should also be m ad e of th e role p la y e d b y th e R o u m a n ia n Htudents e d u c a te d a b ro a d . T h e m asses of th e p e a s a n ts w ere still a p a th e tic a n d i(: w as n o t u n til well a fte r th e C rim e a n W a r t h a t th e B u lg a ria n re v o ­ lu tio n a ry m o v e m e n t g o t wT ell u n d e r w a y . In d e p e n d e n c e h a d fin ally been a tta in e d b u t I wo fu n d a m e n ta l p ro b lem s still re m a in e d . P . F in la y .

W hile these South Slav m anifestations did not in­ clude th e non-Slav G reeks and R oum anians and did n ot envisage a general B alkan federation. wrote a series of articles in which he pointed o ut th a t in creating Illyria N apoleon "h a d tru ly touched the national fibre of the neighboring peoples of the A driatic. 1908).8 Such intolerance gave a powerful stim ulus to the Illyrian cause in C roatia. and o ther Y ugoslav leaders sought united Balkan action as a m eans tow ards South Slav unity and a t tim es seem to have envisaged some so rt of a Balkan-w ide stru ctu re. a French diplom atist and sociolo­ g ist who travelled through the B alkans in the eighteen forties. N apoleon had planned to d isru p t the O ttom an 8 R . in theory. T herefore such Y ugoslav forces as Illyrianism and pan-Serbism although n o t truly pan-B alkan. and the H ungarians. T he Illyrian renaissance of the eighteen forties had its roots in the Illyrian provinces of Napoleon.48 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y T he m ost significant developm ents before 1848 took placc am ongst th e C roats and Serbs of the H apsburg and O ttom an Em ­ pires. even of education. T he Y ugoslav and th e wider B alkan federation m ovem ent were both by their very na­ tu re revolutionary. T h e downfall of th e O ttom an and A ustrian em­ pires was essential for the fulfillm ent of both ideals. L atin was superseded by M agyar as the language of the H ungarian D iet and in 1843 M agyar becam e the ex­ clusive language of th e legislature. A fter the Congress of Vienna. while in Serbia a program was outlined by G arashanin for th e creation of a S outh Slav state. In fact H ippolyte D csprez. y e t th ey are of the utm o st im portance in the h istory of th e B alkan federation m ovem ent. Seton-W atson. Racial Problem s in H ungary (London. the governm ent. T h e Illyrian sta te built by N apoleon had n o t y e t been for­ gotten. W . In addition it was m ade an obligatory subject in the schools of C roatia and it was declared th a t L atin speeches delivered by C roat delegates to the jo in t D iet should be regarded as not having been m ade. B y 1840. T hus the im m edi­ ate aims of the two m ovem ents were identical.” T hey believed th a t having freed them from th e A ustrian yoke. m ust nevertheless be considered in a history of th e Bal­ k an federation m ovem ent. 42. In C roatia there occurred a literary revival which soon found political expression in the resurgence of the Illyrian m ovem ent. Rakovski. after the convocation of the D iet in 1825. Prince M ichael. despite protests from the C roatian Diet'. G arashanin. Francis 1 and M etternich devoted their energies to th e suppression of all liberalism . and. In C roatia L atin was to rem ain the language of the courts and of in tern al adm inistration b u t M agyar w as to be the sole language of intercourse w ith the H ungarian authorities. followed a policy of M agyarization. .

D esprez. lie published in 1832 his Dissertation to the Delegates. In the sam e year C ount Jan k o D rashkovich published his fam ous d issertation which Kiiined wide a tten tio n . Returning to Vienna he devoted himself to linguistic reform s and to the collection and publication of popular Serbian poetry and stories. . H orvat. jo u rn alist and linguistic reform er. 1026. formerly vice-ban of Croatia. lb 1 introduced phonetic reform s in to the old Cyrillic alphabet. I left this city full of confidence in IIw future of Illyrism . and in a sense the founder. 426-438. needless to say. 1847). 91. w ho in 1787 published his fam ous D ictionary of the Slav Language. T he publication created it furore. 89.”10 T he answer. Skok. “La grande Illyrie et le m ouvem ent Illyrien ... l'-M6). was deprived of his of­ fice. publlnhed his fam ous Serbian dictionary.” Le monde slave ( |u11г . Born in 1787. 90. ag itato r. A C ro at noblem an who had w arm ly supported Nnpoleon’s Illyria and then carried on C roat propag anda from Paris. D esprez added: “Nowhere did the vita lity of the lllyrinn idea reveal itself as clearly as at Agram. op.” 9 This C roatian national feeling first expressed itself in the field of literature.” Ib id . “A re We to Become Magyars? S ix Letters from /V. In it he urged Ilie C roat delegates to th e jo in t p arliam ent to w ork for the reestablish­ ment of the autonom ous C ro at adm inistration which had been supImissed a t th e end of the eighteenth century.1 2 The leader.1 1 The o u tstan d in g Y ugoslav literary figure. 92. was a spirited negative. n o t because of its contents. 10 T h e author w as A n tony V akonovich. “ Even to d ay it is still like a lirippy dream which th eir poets w rite about.v/. lie w ent to school a t K arlovitz and during th e first Serbian uprising иgainst the T u rk s he acted as in terp reter to the illiterate Karageorge. T he H ungarian au th o rities ordered its confiscation and the pntriotic C roatian censor. B u t its object had already been achieved. b u t because it was w ritten in ( Yoatian. H orvat. К V11 (March 15. 1 1 J. Born 1 1 II. and one cannot persuade Пичи th a t th e Illy ria of the fu tu re never existed in N apoleon’s m ind. “Le m ouvem ent Illyrien e t les F ran fais. P oliticka P ovijesi Hrvatske [Political H istory of Croatia ] (Zagreb. for m any years secretary of the иtill h Slav A cadem y in Agram. 1 1 H is work was continued by G eorge Danichich. was Vuk Stefanovich K aradjich. of the Illyrian m ovem ent w. I t i rented a sensation as it expressed those vague sentim ents already <iirrcnt in C roatia.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 49 Kmpirc and unify all the Yugoslavs. however. 1017.'is L ju d ev it G aj. In 1832 an anonym ous p am phlet was published a t K arluliidt under th e title. P. a Serb from Southern H ungary. F a th e r H erm an n . 1935). cit.” Revue des deux mondes. W ithin a few m onths it had reached a third edi­ tion. selected the H erzegovinian d ia­ lect as the p u rest form of the S erbo-C roat language and raised it to the position of a literary language.

. T urkey. was replaced by a M agyar. A us dem Siidslawischcn Risorgimento (G otha. In any case he urged the creation of a secret agency in C roatia to p ro tect the pro-R ussian elem ents and to influ­ ence literatu re in favor of pan-Slavism . and in the la tte r city fell under the influence of the Slovak poet. G raz and Pest. H is reforms were adopted w ithout any serious opposition and th u s effected Serbo-C roat literary u n ity . because of the pro tests of the T urkish am bassador in Vienna th a t th e Illyrian m ove­ m ent inflam ed the C hristians in T urkey. In Septem ber 1838. for example. the Croatian Gazette (Novine Ilrvatske ) and the literary supplem ent Day Star (D anica ) in which ho carried on a vigorous p ropaganda in favor of an eventual union of all Y ugoslavs.50 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y in 1809 in K rapina. rdformatcur de la lite r a tu r e croate. C roatia. 374-383. the use of the term Illyrian w as forbidden. In the sam e year. 1935). he studied law in Vienna. 1809-1872. cit. or by breaking aw ay and siding w ith th e Poles against R ussia. 31-72. A. R acial Problems in Hvn~ gary.” Le monde slave (June.. 14 An attem pt had been m ade in 1818 by Gjuro Shporer to found an Illyrian journal w ith Latin characters b ut failed due to lack of funds. asked for Russian help in th e organization of arm ed forces in Bosnia. who w as a Slovak and a C roat sym pathizer. 328-338. In it he sta te d th a t all th e Y ugoslavs n atu rally yearned for union w ith Russia and th a t the M agyars sought to overcome this tendency by am alga­ m ating the Slavs in a H ungarian state strong enough to dom inate A ustria. Gaj sent two o ther letters in . 128-133. 51-57. which could create a general insurrection in the event of an A ustro-R ussian war. In the earlier years Gaj tended to look to Russia for support of the Illyrian cause. T he ag itatio n continued full b last until Ja n u ary 1834 w hen M ojzes.” He had no great literary ta le n t b u t he was full of ideas and enthusiasm and his journalistic w ork and orthographic reform s were of first rate im­ portance in the Illyrian m ovem ent. W endel. A lbania and Serbia. Gaj adopted th e “s h to ” dialect used by K aradjich and introduced rules of o rthography based on those observed by the Czechs. H orvat. op. H erzegovina. Gaj was. therefore. W enzelides. Seton-W atson. he m et C ount Ben­ kendorf. He. therefore. 93-110. with orders to impose stric t censorship.u 13 H . In 1838 th e nam es of his journals were significantly changed to Illyrian Gazette {Novine Ilirske) and Illyrian D ay Star (Danica Ilyrska). 1921). John Kollar. 1935). V II (N ovcm bcr-D ecem ber. forced to m oderate his agitation and to change the title of his paper to National Journal ( Narodne Novine ). th e official censor in Zagreb. Ferdo Si£i6.1 3 E qually im p o rta n t were his journals. M acsik. “L udcvit Gaj. “U ne ten ta­ tive pre-illyrienne: le journal de Sporer. an in tim ate of the T sar and head of the R ussian secret ser­ vice and through him sent a m em orandum to N icholas I.” Les Balkans. th e apostle of “literary reciprocity among all Slav n atio n s.

loc. B u t th e Illyrian m ove­ ment continued its grow th and reached its climax in the hectic days nl' 1848. 39. H is influence. in reply to M etternicli. 1 0 W endel. de­ fin e d som ew hat in these years because of the founding of a C roat paper in Belgrade free from M agyar censorship. X L (July. denied the slightest in terest in th e C roat natio n alist p a rty . op. In the m eantim e a pan-Serb m ovem ent was being fostered in Bel­ grade. W hen A lexander K arageorgevich was elected to the throne in I Ml2 he was forced to m ake various concessions to appease the foreign pnwers and to obtain th eir support. M osely. 704-706. In fact a t the i ml of 1844 G arashanin h ad worked o u t his fam ous Nachertanye or Program. 707. a bold plan for th e unification of the South Slavs under 'n'l laan leadership. realizing th e incom patibility betw een C roatnationalism and T sarist autocracy. takes them m ore seriously. Gaj advocated rebellion in T u rk ey and Austria whereas N icholas was a cham pion of absolutism and legiti­ macy and favored a peaceful solution of th e 1839 crisis. M osely Iиilnt и out that G aj’s pleas for secrecy contained in his m emoir and th e care w ith which II w i i h secreted in the Russian archives indicate sincerity.” B u t the g re a t obstacles to Y ugoslav u n ity were R ussia and 1 1 1 P.” Am erican Historical Review.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 51 1840 describing his w ork of national aw akening and requesting finan­ cial aid. F ischel.1 6 T he sincerity of G a j’s devotion to Russia has been questioned in view of the fact th a t he alw ays proclaim ed his fidelity to A ustria and In 1839 received a ring from Franz F erdinand of which he was very proud. dism issed his m inisters. In the same year he w en t to R ussia him self and obtained ubout 25. T sa r N icholas. D er P anslavism us bis zum W elt<i trp. . G a j’s efforts were doom ed to failure due to his ignorance of Russian foreign policy.. however. 706. 115. D er K a m p f der Siidslawen. Der K a m p f der Siidslawen. and of th e rise of a nationalist p a rty under Ivan K ukuljevich. 208.1 7 T hus by 1842 Gaj.. tu rn ed to A ustria and strove to prove his loyalty and to gain concessions. cit. “A P an-Slavist M em orandum of L iudevit Gaj in 1838. see infra. 1935). in th e light of new docum ents. E . In fact it is ■uiHpected th a t Nesselrode. 207. selected Ilya G arashanin as his I Ilief adviser. and adopted a m ore independent policy.000 rubles from the R ussian Im perial A cadem y and from various Slavophil organizations. 207. 1 1 1 For the influence of Prince Czartoryski on Garashanin and the Y ugoslav m oveiin f t in general. w arned M etternich iiKainst the revolutionary tendencies of th e Illyrian m ovem ent and it In Icnown th a t in D ecem ber 1842. W endel. The Crimea. Tem perley.458. M osely. cit. 4 57. rt fisch el. T hu s W endel discounts G a j’s sym pathies for R ussia b u t Mosely.18 A ccording to G arashanin it was essential for the urnirity and progress of Serbia th a t she should “ unite kindred peoples In her.1 6 At any rate. however. he felt more secure. Two years later. as early as Ju n e 1840.

.” ] Slovanskj/ Р г ё /iled. open her frontiers in order to develop and render m ore easy. 1918). She should.10 Such was th e situ atio n in the B alk a n s w hen in F eb ru ary 1848 19 V. . JovanoviC . T he consolidation of m onarchical dignity w hich will prepare the unification of S erbia w ith all th e other sub­ jected peoples m ust be considered a fu n d am en ta l law of the state. all indicated “the political stab ility and the great future of th e new Serb s ta te . In pointing o u t th e necessity of a C h ristian B alkan sta te to replace E uropean T urkey. m oreover. Ivanovitch. 1909). and the la tte r because it would a ttr a c t the lo y alty and su p p o rt of the Hapsburg Slavs." ["The Yugoslav S tate and the National Program of Ilya G arashanin. he argued as follows: T h is sta te could not be an y other than S erb ia. 155-158. even in th e Middle Ages. T he evidence available indicates th e la tte r to be true.52 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y A ustria.” Fortnightly Review . 3. ‘‘T he Future of t h e B alk an s. Serbia would do no more than revive th e ancient E m p ire of her ancestors. Europe could see nothing m ore in our action th a n th e resurrection of the old Serb S tate. 1044-1046. L X X X X I (June. T aking into account th e religious differences betw een th e Serbs and the Yugoslavs. In order to detach from A ustria the C atholic Yugoslav peoples and to rem ove th em from her influence. Y. 2. for. Serbia should n o t raise on her frontiers a Chinese wall between herself and her co-nationals. 217. it will be necessary to give the greatest a tte n tio n to th e accom plish­ m ent of th is task. . Garashanin had no doubts. S. In this case. T he form er w as opposed to the creation of a united Yugoslav sta te because it would block the route to C onstantinople. L e nouvelle Serbie (Paris. R. and the warlike sp irit and nationalism of her in h a b ita n ts. her n atu ral riches.” This confidence in th e fitness of Serbia raises th e question of whether G arashanin was interested prim arily in Y ugoslav u n ity or in panSerbism . X IV (1932). founded on historic rights a n d th e law of nations. she would have been the successor of th e B yzantine E m pire if th e T u rk s had n o t destroyed it. 1923). As for th e ability of Serbia to unify th e Y ugoslavs. M . H er geographic situation. and in order to bring back to Serbia as m a n y of them as possible.. 134-143. T h u s the fundam ental aim of G ara sh a n in a p p aren tly was the resto ratio n of D u sh an ’s Em pire. 1858 1868 [The Second Reign of M ilosh and M ich ael. Vrzalovd. D ru g a vlada M ilo la i M ihaila. D c v a s . “Jihoslovansky stdtnf a ndrodnf program Iliji Garaganina. 216. His references to a Y ugoslav state were alw ays in term s of an enlarged S e rb ia . T h e fundam ental principle th a t m u st n o t be dep arted from is th a t of national unity. 1858-1868) (Belgrade. . on th e co n trary. G. Serbia should proclaim and realize the principle of absolute liberty of conscience. com m unication w ith th e subjected peoples. In view of this situ atio n G arashanin held th a t th e Serbian policy should be based on th e following principles: 1.

Jnssy. tw o days la te r th e Prince accepted the relorin dem ands. and because all R oum anian . mem ories of the bloody and futile revolts of 1841 were still fresh and the country rem ained quiet mid unaffected by external developm ents. In B ulgaria. Several peti­ tions for reform were addressed to Prince Bibescu b u t th ey were all i ejected a t the insistence of Russia.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 53 Louis Philippe w as overthrow n. T h u s was symbolImmI the union of th e oppressed peoples of Europe ag ainst in te rn a ­ tional reaction. it was s ta te d th a t. university professors lectured on th e u n ity of th e G reek race. and dem onstrations were staged in favor of an expedition into I uropean T urkey. assem bly and I Ik*press. peasants were extrem ely discontented and th e revolutionary Indents were arriving in a stead y stream from Paris. . for exam ple. D ecrees were passed iibolishing ranks and establishing freedom of speech. all lands inhabited by Koumanians should be called R oum ania and form one state. On Ju n e 21 im pressive street dem onstrations were held. . In addition to dem ocracy and republicanism . the new govi i iiinent em phasised national u n ity . T h e R oum anian stu d en ts th en hurried hom e full of plans for the liberation of th eir countrym en and the establishm ent of the millennium. In W allachia. some being very slightly affected and others deeply involved in th e continentwide struggles. Accord­ ingly they were unable to win m ass su p p o rt and Prince S tu rd za was нЫе to crush them p rom ptly and brutally. B rigandage increased on the frontiers. “ . In April a revolt broke out in th e M oldavian capital. th e second French R epublic estab ­ lished and revolutionary governm ents set up in Ita ly and C entral Kurope. In Greece there existed die will to action b u t n o t th e m eans. Repercussions were soon felt in th e Balkan states. B u t th e failure of the C entral E uropean revoluIions and especially th e re tu rn of the English fleet to Piraeus cooled Ibe ardor of th e n ationalists and order was reestablished. T his revolution was essentially bourgeois. In the Principalities th e revolutionaries were able to seize power for a few brief m onths. on Ju n e 15th he abdicated and a provisional govern­ ment was established. W hen the F eb ru ary uprising occurred in Paris a num ber of Roumanian stu d en ts took an active p a rt in the stre e t fighting and Ilien hoisted the R oum anian flag a t th e H otel de Ville w here it flew together w ith th e French. because ill are the hom eland of the R oum anians. Polish an d Italian flags. In the first issue of the news­ paper K onstitutionalul. T he ground had been prepared by the various literary societies for cultural and p ropagandist w ork and by the underground “ F ra tie ” [Fraternity] which carried on revolutionary activities. however. b u t in their proclam ations th e rebels did n o t p ay sufficient iittention to the grievances of the bourgeoisie and peasants. llu.

it is they who have. supported the Austrian arm y and have cooperated in supplying provision. B oth sides buttressed th eir argum ents w ith the phrases of th e new liberalism . For a period th e T u rk s were willing to cooperate b u t finally yielded to R ussian pressure because of the lack of a definite promise 20 July 8. Cited by Cam pbell. T he la tte r province. Croats and W allaehians.54 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y p atrio ts inhabiting them form the R oum anian nation. 1942). L ittle is known of these negotiations ex-v cept th a t no agreem ent for cooperation was possible because of the R oum anian-H ungarian feud over T ransylvania. 1867). 22. “T he Transylvanian Question in 1849. a fight over language and schools and churches. had voted th e union of T ransylvania w ith H ungary and ignored all claim s of th e R oum anians to political and religious equality w ith the oth er nationalities. the Saxons. R oum anian N ation alism . 81 J. I could n ot have su cceed ed . described the situation as follows: “There is a profound hatred between the Austrians and the H ungarians and the latter are equally detested by the other races in Hungarian territory. Liiders. T h e R oum anians w anted freedom for them selves as a nationality. of course. b u t it was above all a nationality struggle.tianu was sent to B udapest to negotiate w ith K ossuth. Campbell. since the beginning of the in­ surrection. T he W allaehians especially have the statu s of pariahs and are the most m iserable people in T ransylvania.” E . T he situation there has been well sum m arized by Cam pbell as follows: T h e form er. 210. 21.” Journal of Central European A ffairs III (April. n o t rights as individual citizens in a unified H ungary. and th ey were willing to ally even w ith th e reactionary H absburgs against the M agyars. U nder these circum stances efforts were m ade to obtain support from abroad. . 22 T he Russian general. the union of the W allaehians with Hungary would have given a different turn to th e insurrection. and the la tte r in turn sent a consul to B ucharest. and under­ n eath it all a strong class feeling between landow ner and peasant. Poujade. A R oum anian representative. W ithou t the provisions whicli I have found in the principalities and w ithout Y anco. Serbs. T he aim was to forestall a possible R ussian in vasion and to secure T urkish assent and recognition of th e new gov­ ernm ent. Chritiens et Turcs (Paris.2 1 T his alliance. while the R oum anians in Transylvania were engaged in a deadly civil w ar w ith the Saxons and M agyars. [the H ungarians] who controlled th e provincial Diet. did finally m aterialize. which dem ands th a t it be one and indivisible. and was recognized a t the tim e as an im p o rta n t factor in the triu m p h of the R ussian and A ustrian forces over th e H u n g arian . 305. C. however. 1848.” 20 T here was m uch ta lk ab o u t an inde­ p endent and united D acia which would include Bucovina.2 2 T he revolutionary W allachian governm ent also sought support in C onstantinople. T ransyl­ v an ia and M oldavia. Since the beginning. the leader of the W allaehians in T ransylvania.! to the Russians. was occupied by R ussian troops in Ju n e 1848. D u m itru BrS. T h u s the revolutionary governm ent of W allachia rem ained isolated.

26 !l3 A t the end of the seventeenth century the Patriarch of Ipek em igrated with thousands of Serbs to Hungary and retained his title as Patriarch. consisting of Serbia. 3* Croatia. . left Belgrade to spread propaganda niuong the A ustrian Serbs. . 397.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 55 of aid from B ritain and France. Bulgaria. All declared them selves in favor of the union of the T riune Kingdom24 and of cooperation betw een th e Serbs and C roats. D alm atia and Southern H ungary. “La collaboration des Croates ct des Serbes en 1848-1849. ibid. 398.. 1935). since A ustria is in agony. 25 StranjakoviC. I lie fundam ental problem in th e provinces was agrarian. a Y ugoslav K ingdom under the k'mner of Prince A lexander K arageorgevich. 396. T h u s the Hunurian Serbs possessed a Patriarch w hile Serbia proper had only a M etropolitan. Ban visited such im p o rtan t ilignitaries as the Serbian P atriarch R ajachich a t K arlovitz. with th e backing of G arashanin. b u t the i evolutionary leaders w ith th eir m iddle class outlook failed to grasp Ilie significance of this fact. .” He also leported th a t am ong th e m em bers were A ustrian C roats and Serbs including Paul C harlovich. On th e night of M arch 24 a proclam ation was issued which clearly expressed the growing m ovem ent for Yugortlav unity. H erzegovina. T he A ustrian consul in llelgrade. llosnia. As soon as Hie revolutions broke o u t in C entral Europe. Bosnia. to liberate them selves com pletely from th e O ttom an E m pire and lo create. of which the centre is the Serbian Council. A commission was set to w ork on the problem b u t after interm inable debates it was dissolved a t the innistcnce of the boyars. on a to u r through M ontene­ gro. A lbania. sent an arm y in to W allachia and w ith very little op­ position p u t an end to th e Provisional governm ent. M ayerhofer. in order Iо organize the South Slavs for action. the Archbishop of Belgrade. Jellachich. a R agusan m an of letters. According to M ayerhofer it called on th e Serbs. 26 Cited.2 3 the newly-appointed Ban of C roatia. Like the Roum anians. D uring th e m onth of M arch.2 6 M eanwhile in Belgrade a com m ittee had been formed to effect the union of th e T urkish and A ustrian Slavs. M athias Ban and Ifrosh Borishev.” hd monde slave (June. Slovenia and D alm atia. . D alm atia and C roatia. C roatia. T h e grievances of the peasants rem ained unM. th e Yugoslavs also a tte m p ted to take a d ­ vantage of th e revolutionary upheavals to forge a united nation and ended by siding w ith the H apsburgs against the M agyars. Syrm ia. S tevan K erkalovich. G arashanin sent M atfnas B an. “a club of pan-Slav and dem o­ cratic tendencies.itisfied and the revolution was th u s foredoomed to failure. Very little can be said regarding any concrete or lasting achieve­ m ents resulting from the brief revolutionary interlude in W allachia. m em bers of this club. Accordingly the S ultan bowed to the will of the T sar. and P eter II of M onte­ negro. reported to M etternich in F eb ru ary and March th a t there existed in Belgrade. Slavonia.

.. T h e C ro a t d e le g a te s a t P re ssb u rg in siste d th a t m an y of th e m o st serious in n o v a tio n s re q u ire d ra tific a tio n b y th e C ro atian D ie t b u t th e ir p ro te s ts w ere ig n o red b y th e M a g y a r m a jo rity . b u t. С. S im i­ la rly in th e H u n g a ria n d e c la ra tio n of in d e p en d e n ce of A pril 14 th e Y u g o sla v a sp ira tio n s w ere ag ain o v erlo o k ed. S eto n -W a tso n . 7 8 -9 0 . P eoples. E . tr e a te d C ro a tia as an in te g ra l p a r t of H u n g a ry . The R evolution ary M ove­ m en t of 1 8 4 8 -4 9 (L on d on . S ch lesin ger. I. su pra. 194.” 29 H e th e n pro ceed ed to sum m on th e assem b ly of C ro a tia . "W e w a n t e q u a lity a n d e q u ity . 30 Cf. 1 8 4 8 -1 8 4 9 (L on d on . if pressed too h a rd b y th e M a g y a rs.30 a pow erful n a tio n a l m ove27 M . T h is in d e p e n d e n t a ttitu d e b ro u g h t re b u k e s u p o n Je lla c h ic h from F e rd in a n d a n d th e H u n g a ria n m in is try b u t th e C ro a tia n C ouncil a p p e a le d to th e E m ­ p ero r to s tre n g th e n th e h a n d of th e B an an d th re a te n e d th a t. . . g o aded by M a g y a r in to le ra n c e . 21. w h ich o u g h t to be m ore im p o r ta n t to th e m th a n life its e lf. w ere p ro g ressin g from p la n s to a ctio n s. 1887). H o rv a t. M au rice. T h e new elec­ to ra l law . In th e e a rly d a y s of M a rc h . . th e y w ould ta k e m e asu re s to defend th em selv es. 193. h a v e th e ir h o n o r a n d h o n e sty . In fa c t. op. 33. Im m e d ia te ly a fte r his a p p o in tm e n t Jella ch ic h a n ­ n o u n ced t h a t " th e R e v o lu tio n h a s ch an ged o u r re la tio n s to o u r old ally H u n g a ry . T h e S erb s of A u s tria -H u n g a ry w ere also o rg an izin g them selv es a g a in s t th e M a g y a rs. . 29 C ited b y H o r v a t. The W a r in H u n g a ry. for ex am p le.” Je llac h ich s ta te d in his p ro c la m a tio n .27 A t th is c ritic a l m o m e n t fo rtu n e p ro v id ed th e C ro a ts w ith a n a ­ tio n a l lead er. 1850). 288. op. " fo r all p eoples a n d n a tio n a litie s liv in g u n d e r th e H u n g a ria n C row n. n o t e n title d to a n y special tr e a tm e n t. 22. cit. G aj h a d led a C ro a t d e p u ta ­ tio n to V ien n a to p le a d fo r se p a ra tio n from H u n g a ry a n d for th e for­ m a tio n of a S o u th e rn S la v s ta te u n d e r th e d ire c t so v e re ig n ty of th e E m p e ro r. a n d D a lm a tia to m e e t a t A g ram in J u n e . T h e Illy ria n m o v e m e n t h a d n o t influenced th e S erb s. 28 T h is p o in t h as n o t b een se ttled y e t . like in d iv id u a l p ersons. The Southern S lav Q u estion . I t seem s to h a v e been in d irc c tly on th e ad v ice of G a j28 th a t th e E m p e ro r on M a rc h 23 a p p o in te d B a ro n Jo se p h Jella ch ic h as B an of C ro a tia .. th e v e ry n a m e of C ro a ­ tia w as o m itte d . th e existence of th e C ro a ts and th e o th e r n o n -M a g y a r peoples w as c o m p letely ignored. cit. . S lav o n ia. ” T h e aim of th e C ro a tia n lea d ers a t th is tim e w as a reo rg an ized E m p ire in w hich each n a tio n a lity sh o u ld possess com ­ p lete a u to n o m y . as h a s a lre a d y been n o te d . 155 ff. W hen in M a rc h 1848 th e H u n g a ria n p a rlia m e n t e n th u sia stic a lly passed laws e sta b lish in g a c o n s titu tio n a l reg im e. T h is p ro v e d to be one of th e decisive e v e n ts of th e rev o lu ­ tio n fo r it rallied th e S o u th S lav s to th e M o n a rc h y a n d c u t off th e M a g y a rs from th e sea a n d h ence from all d ire c t in te rc o u rse w ith lib eral E u ro p e.56 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d ie s in H is t o r y In th e m e a n tim e th e S erb s a n d C ro a ts in H u n g a ry .

” re ­ to rte d one of th e d e p u ta tio n .B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 57 m erit h a d d ev elo p ed a ro u n d K a rlo v itz . " T h e n . K. in c lu d in g m a n y C zechs. 1 1we m u s t look for re co g n itio n elsew here th a n a t P re s s b u rg . b u t th e P a tr ia r c h w as old. . R u ssian s.'ijachich w as acclaim ed as th e S erb ian P a tria rc h a n d C olonel Slniplikac as vo iv o d e. N ext d a y th e c e n tra l c o m m itte e b eg an its sittin g s in th e presence of IIn P a tria rc h . A central co m m itte e w as elected to d evise a schem e of u n io n a n d d eput и l ions w ere a p p o in te d to p re se n t a loyal a d d re ss to th e E m p e ro r a n d Iо a tte n d b o th th e C ro a tia n D ie t a n d th e S lav C ongress in P rag u e. p ro m isin g full a u to n o m y to th e S erbs of th e Kmpire.” “ In th a t case. K o ssuth an sw ered t h a t th e M a g y a rs w ould d o th e ir b e s t to resp ec t S erb ian rig h ts b u t m a in ta in e d t h a t o n ly th e M a g y a r lan g u a g e could bind th e d iffe re n t n a tio n a litie s to g e th e r. d en ied th e v e r a c ity of th is a cco u n t.” th e S erbs answ ered. w ere so lem n ly re a d a lo u d before th e assem b led crow d.” “ T h e S e rb s. A cco rd in g ly a n a tio n a l S e rb ia n c o m m itte e w as org an ized . in 1690-91. T h u s on th e first new s of th e M a rc h re v o lu tio n m H u n g a ry th e to w n councils of N e u sa tz . th e se a t of th e h isto ric th o u g h d o rm a n t P a tria rc h a te . W hen th is a ssem b ly m e t a t K a rlo v itz on M a y 13. O n A pril 8 th e S erb s w ere a d m itte d to th e floor of (he H ouse w h ere th e y d e c la re d th em selv es in s y m p a th y w ith th e H u n g a ria n aim s b u t in siste d o n reco g n itio n of th e ir n a tio n a l rig h ts. J a szi. o r m ilita ry chief of th e n a tio n . “ w ere n e v e r a fra id of t h a t . ( ro ats. G eorge S tra tim iro v ic h w as elected p re sid e n t mid R a ja c h ic h w as p e rsu a d e d to co nvoke a n a tio n a l S erb assem bly. O rd e rs from P e s t fo rb id d in g th e a ssem b ly h a d a rriv e d 1 . 1848 it d eveloped Into a g re a t d e m o n s tra tio n of Y u g o slav u n ity . 310. Toront& l and T e m es. “ th e sw ord m u s t d e c id e . P a n c so v a . I n s te a d of a few h u n ­ dred d eleg ates. B u lg a ria n s a n d R o u m a n ia n s. a t th e tim e o f h is e x ile. K a rlo v itz a n d S endin in tro d u c e d S erb ian a s th e lan g u ag e of th e ir official business. issued by Leopold I. O . ” 31 T h e stage was th u s se t for th e sav ag e race w a rfa re w hich follow ed. 41 T h e form er S erb ian V o iv o d y w a s a t th a t tim e d iv id ed a m o n g th e S o u th H u n цн1 iau co u n tries o f B a cs-B o d rog.1 K o ssu th later. A m e etin g in N e u sa tz d rew u p th e w ishes of th e S erb ian people u n d e r Hcvcnteen h e a d s a n d a d e p u ta tio n w as s e n t to P re ssb u rg to la y th em before th e D ie t. b u t II con tinu ed to live in th e m em o ry o f later gen eration s. T h e orig in al c h a rte rs . Poles. T h e assem b ly th e n p assed a series of re so lu tio n s d ec larin g th e Serbian n a tio n “ p o litically free a n d a u to n o m o u s u n d e r th e H o u se of A ustria a n d th e C row n of H u n g a r y ” an d d e m a n d in g th e re sto ra tio n of the S erb ian V o iv o d y 32 a n d its u n io n w ith th e T riu n e K in g d o m . o v er fifteen th o u s a n d “ a s s is ta n ts ” crow ded in to th e lillle to w n of K a rlo v itz . th e Iюгу tw e n ty -six y e a r old. 1929). T h e S erb s first d ecid ed to a p p e a l th ro u g h th e ir P a tria rc h R a ja c h Idi to th e E m p e ro r.” replied K o ssu th . The D isso lu tio n of IIIH a p sb u rg M o n a rch y (C h icago. c o n se rv a tiv e a n d hesiIant.

” said Gaj in the D iet. M any C roats were appointed to the various sub-com ­ m ittees and K ukuljevich.. 160. 34 Cited by Seton-W atson. 35. cit. far from yielding. B ut should the M agyars assum e the role of oppressors against us and our kinsm en in H ungary.” 3 6 T he D iet appointed a com m ittee to consider its relations to H u n ­ gary and by article eleven declared all actions of th e H ungarian m in­ istry to be null and void insofar as they were a t variance w ith the rights of C roatia or th e jurisdiction of the Ban. “Les origines dc I’unitd you goslave. B atth y an y in retu rn obtained from the fugitive E m peror in Innsbruck a decree depriving Jellachich of his dignities until an inquiry could be in stitu ted . however. then. all of which were m arked by close Serbo-C roat cooperation. stated in a speech..58 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y only after it had disbanded b u t now a sum m ons w as received from the Commissioner of N eusatz ordering the P atriarch to renounce his illegal position. “W e are only one n a tio n . T he C ro at D iet. II (April. ”3 3 Sim ilar fraternization of th e two races occurred when th e C ro at­ ian D iet m et in June. 38.”3 4 T h e Serbian dep u tatio n headed by P atriarch R ajachich was w arm ly welcomed by the C roats and th e P atriarch actually attended High M ass in the cathedral where the Catholic bishop Ozegovich sang the Т е D eum in Old Slavonic. 34. 159. th e C roat nationalist p a rty leader. The Southern Slav Question. On June 6 Gaj and Jellachich both supported proposals for uniting th e Serbs and C roats under one rule and R ajachich heartily responded to these proposals. 540. See also Horvat. op. then let them know th a t we are determ ined to follow the saying of our g allant Ban John E rdody — regnum regno non praescribit leges— and th a t we shall prove to them w ith weapons in our hands. Away. “ T here are no longer either Serbs or C ro ats. Y ." N um erous m eetings were held. b u t after th e M arch R evolution we broke and an ­ nihilated i t . “ B yzantium and Rome succeeded in separating the Serbs and th e C roats.. w ith the M agyar regime of compulsion—we did n ot recognize it even before M arch 15. “T he fraternal union of 800 years promises us a friendly solution of th e prevailing dispute.” L e monde slave. T he sum m ons was relegated to the flames and on M ay 18 Stratim irovich was elected president of the central com m ittee which took the nam e of “ provisional adm in istratio n . Jellachich welcomed the delegates w ith an im ­ passioned harangue. . 35 C ited by M aurice. cit. invested Jellachich on June 29 w ith virtu ally dictatorial powers and stipulated th a t in any nego33 Cited by G. b u t the fraternal tie which unites them is so strong th a t henceforth nothing in th e world will be able to sever i t . 1918). D evas. op. th a t the tim e is long p ast when one nation can rule over another.

ft is extrem ely doubtful w hether the Y ugoslavs in 1848 could have nlliiincd their aim s under any circum stances. cit. Concerned b y th e growing tension betw een the M agyars and the Serbo-C roats. although consciously striving for a Y ugoslav sta te . Vienna was using the force of SerboCroat nationalism to check th e M agyars. realized Mint his only possibility of safety was to place th e m ovem ent under I lie au th o rity of th e E m peror. th e E m peror sent A rchduke John to m ediate between I hem. the Serb Voivody.” rallied around hi in all the C roats and Serbs of th e M onarchy... The m otto. op. 57. M oreover. T he reply of the C ro at D iet was significant. so homogeneous th a t nothing can divide it. th ey p arted . ibid. ‘A n en ten te is not possible unless our b ro th er Serbs of H u n g ary consent to it and benefit by it. 52. B u t now they were lighting for th e preservation of the A ustrian Em pire ra th e r th an for I Ik: creation of a Y ugoslav sta te . was no longer the cham pion of C roatian liberty— he wiih a soldier of the E m peror. B u t young S tratim irovich. On Septem ber 1 the M arch Law s which had secured a re­ sponsible m inistry to H u n g ary were declared null and void and in the tune m onth Jellachich. lacked the il length for effective action. By this tim e.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 59 tiulions the M agyars m u st recognize the T riune K ingdom and its ully. conscious th a t w ar was no longer avoidable.” 3 6 A rchduke Jo hn succeeded in bringing Jellachich and B a tth y a n y together b u t since n either one would m ake concessions. had gained g reat successes in th e B an at and was planning to throw off th e au th o rity of b oth V ienna and Pest. reactionary R ussia in this period was unfavorably disposed tow ards revolutionary m ovem ents M Cited. "W h a t God brings and a h ero ’s fa te . 37 Schlesinger. Accordingly. I t was decided to tre a t the IVlngyars as rebels and to regain th e concessions g ranted earlier in IIk: year. as a free people independent of H ungary. however. R a d e tz k y ’s reconquest of M ilan had re­ ft! «red confidence to th e im perial court. consciously or unconsciously. Jellachich. . in conjunc­ tion with G eneral K nichanin who had crossed from Serbia w ith vol'iiiteers.37 Sim ilarly am ong the Serbs the conservative P atriarch R ajachich who had entered w ith such hesitation into the insurrection. A lexander and G arashhiiii . limited the a u th o rity of S tratim irovich to m ilitary affairs and finally replaced him w ith an A ustrian officcr. For we belong w ith them as m em bers of a single nation. T h u s the Serbs also were u ti­ lized for the defense of the Em pire. on his id urn from the C roat D iet. crossed th e D rave a t th e head of forty thousand men. w ith th e aid of Jellachich. th e P atriarch . now restored to im perial favor and invested with high com m and. I.

W hatever possibility m ay have existed for the realization of the Y ugo­ slav program was th u s throw n away. “ M ysterious fate. was pure loss. 214. A ustria and Russia. 53. illustrious B an. Jellachich and R ajachich b ro u g h t the powerful force of Serbo-C roat nationalism fully on the side of the emperor. T he national unification m ovem ents had been tem porarily 38 Tem perley. Accordingly they were opposed to any united B alkan action which m ight jeopardize T urkish rule. A t any rate. 215. “ b u t I am convinced th a t Y ugoslavism for the m om ent. . 457. since our brothers do n o t u nderstand th e word lib e rty .” 40 In conclusion it is ap p a re n t th a t in this period before 1848 a fed­ eration m ovem ent was virtu ally non-existent in the Balkans. N ot all. 311. P eter II of M ontenegro clearly realized this. cit. D uring th e revolution of 1848 the R oum anian and the Yugoslav m ovem ents for national u n ity were diverted and utilized for the defence of the H apsburg Em pire. T h e popular en­ thusiasm for Y ugoslav u n ity led to an insurrection in Bosnia also. were d ete r­ m ined to m aintain the in teg rity of the O ttom an Em pire. L e Balkan slave et la crise autrichienne. 30 Jaszi. especially B ritain. See Tem perley. referring to the necessity of taking into consideration the E uropean diplom atic situ atio n . however. 1848 he appealed to Jellachich to a d o p t an independent Y ugoslav policy. All is useless. w hether or not there was any other feasible course open to them . were uniform ly weak and unstable. The G reat Powers.38 As for the Serbs and C roats under the H apsburgs.” he w rote to Count Pozza of R agusa. is only an em p ty word. 10 Cited by Loiseau. and were interested only in gaining their independence and extending their frontiers.. T h a t which is n ot conquered with heroic justice is w orth nothing.” Jellachich sent an evasive answer. especially when in Ju ly 1849 the M agyars offered to b u ry the h a tch e t by passing an ex­ trem ely liberal n a tio n a lity law. as was evi­ denced in 1832 and 1839. th ey m ight have been able under different leadership to strike for independence. but the situation there was com plicated by the fact that the M oslem nobles were opposed to both Y ugoslav u n ity and to peasant reform. has placed you a t th e head of the South Slavs. and as a rew ard th ey p u t D alm atia under a yoke of fire. The Crim ea . their dynasty.39 Besides. You have ju st saved the throne of the H apsburgs. On D ecem ber 20. The Crimea. B u t there was m uch bad blood be­ tw een th e races and even in the face of im pending disaster the new law was passed w ith difficulty. Such niceties were incom prehensible to the M ontenegrin w arrior-bishop: “ I had hopes for an in s ta n t. in fact everything. op. . The B alkan states. on the other hand. I am ready to come to your aid with m y M ontenegrins. . . Occupy D alm atia a t once and let us unite. Russia would no more have p erm itted a disruption of th e Em pire by the Y ugoslavs th a n by the M agyars.60 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y in th e O ttom an E m pire as well as in the A ustrian.

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checkm ated b u t th e desire for u n ity rem ained. M oreover the lesson (Voin the events of 1848-9 was obvious and tak en to h eart. If the Turkish and A ustrian em pires were to be overthrow n, it was apparent now th a t the subject peoples should practice cooperation ra th e r than m utual exterm ination. A ccordingly in the decade after 1849 repeated efforts were m ade to unite the peoples of south-eastern E urope against Iheir oppressors and to set up a D anubian federation of free nation hi a les. Finally it should be noted th a t in the decade before 1848 certain ( Irdes in W estern E urope were beginning to show in terest in the Bal­ kans and in the possibility of a B alkan federation. T he Greek W ar of Independence had aroused public opinion th ro u g h o u t E urope4 1but nMention had been concentrated on th e Greeks, while th e plight of Ihe other B alkan races continued to be ignored. D uring the eighteen I liirtics and forties, however, a num ber of books and articles were published dealing w ith th e Yugoslavs and R oum anians and urging federation as the solution of th eir difficulties. T he large num ber of Roumanian stu d en ts in Paris was responsible for m any of the publi­ cations. One of these stu d en ts, A nagnosti, w rote in 1837 for the Revue il?s deux mondes an anonym ous article introducing the Principalities lo the W est. A fter com plaining th a t, “ T he small kingdom s of C entral Africa are perhaps b ette r know n th a n these two im p o rta n t principalillcn,” he w arned th a t if E urope continued to ignore the Principalities, Russia would certainly absorb them and gradually the whole of Turkey. H e urged, therefore, th a t the W estern E uropean govern­ ments declare the Principalities independent. Returned to its independence, declared a neutral country, and placed under th e safeguard of th e E uropean Powers, W allachia, which iodny serves as a stepping stone for R ussia to a tta c k th e P orte, will nerve henceforth as an insuperable barrier against th e encroachm ents id I lie T sa r.4 2 A nother stu d en t, Ion G hica, w rote a series of articles for Le N a ­ tional betw een 1836 and 1840. H e presented th e thesis th a t there was и need for a b e tte r u n derstanding of the R oum anian problem by the British and French governm ents because th e P rincipalities were a potential barrier to R ussia and th e solution of the E astern Question lould be based on th is fact. In his article of Ju ly 23, 1838 G hica re­ ferred to . . th e eight million R oum anians who m ust be constituted
4 1 A considerable literature has appeared on this subject both in Greece and in WcHtcrn Europe. A convenient though brief sum m ary is available in the tw o articles nl V. Penn: “Philhellenism in Europe, 1821-28,” Slavonic Review, X V I (April, 1938), MH 653; and “Philhellenism in England," Slavonic Review, X V I (January, 1936), 10,1 371, X IV (April, 1936), 647-660. * '1 M . A . . . . de Bucharest, "La V alachie et la M old avie,” Revue des deux mondes, 1.4 (January 1 5 ,1 8 3 7 ), 161,162.

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into a single, powerful and independent state, to hold the balance betw een R ussia and T u rk e y .” 4 3 In 1835 G hica expressed sim ilar views in an anonym ous pam phlet, Coup d'oeil sur I’itat actuel de la Valachie et de la conduite de la R ussie relativement a cette province . In addition to these articles there appeared during this period a num ber of inform ­ ative books on the Principalities w ritten by various French diplo­ m ats, sav an ts and publicists w ith a first hand knowledge of the exist­ ing conditions.4 4 T h e b ru tal suppression of the B ulgarian revolt of 1841 served to a ttr a c t more a tte n tio n to th e oppressed Balkan races. T he French m inister of foreign affairs, G uizot, sent Jerom e A dolphe Blanqui, an econom ist, to E uropean T u rk ey to investigate conditions. A fter ex­ tensive travels in Bulgaria, B lanqui n ot only w rote an official report b u t also published a b itte r a tta c k against the T urkish adm inistration. He described it as “an outrage to the dignity of hum an nature. . . . A single word would suffice to p u t an end to this scandal: W hen will Europe say this w ord?”4 5 T o correct this situation B lanqui recom ­ m ended the creation of a B alkan federation consisting of W allachia, M oldavia, Serbia, Greece and B ulgaria. T his scheme m ay have been suggested to him by the Polish emigres as it is known th a t Prince A dam C zartoryski provided B lanqui w ith an in terp reter and w ith “ des conseils.”4 6 A t any ra te nothing came of B lanqui’s investigation. The French governm ent was n ot seriously interested in the Bulgar­ ians and took no fu rth er action in the m a tte r.47 French intellectuals, however, were more alive to the situation. On June 22, 1840, a t the suggestion of V ictor Cousin, a chair of Slavic literatu re and language was established a t the College de France and A dam Mickiewicz, the Polish national poet, was selected to fill it. A lthough prim arily in te r­ ested in the Poles and Czechs, Mickiewicz did em phasize the im por­ tance of the Yugoslavs. “T he E astern Q uestion,” he wrote, “is pri­ m arily Slavic , and it can only be solved by a great revoluton, by a reorganization of th e O rient which will affect th e politics of Europe profoundly.”48
43 Cited by Campbell, Roum anian N ationalism , 116. u C. Petrusier, L a Valachie., la M oldavie, et de Гinfluence politique des Grecs du F anal [sic.] (Paris, 1822); F . Colson, D e Vflat present des principautes (Paris, 1839); E. A. Thouvenel, L a Hongrie et la Valachie (Paris, 1840); Vaillant, La Rom anic, in 1844. 46 J. A. Blanqui, Voyage en Bulgarie pendant I'annle 1844. (Paris, 1845), 181. 40 Ibid., 52; H andelsm an, Czartoryski , Nicholas Ier et la question du Proche Orient, 52. 47 In 1842 and 1846 Alexander Exarch, who had served as B lanqui’s interpreter, appealed to G uizot for aid, requesting particularly the publication of Bulgarian books in the French Royal Press which possessed S lav characters. G uizot promised action but did nothing. La Bulgarie, A ugust 15, 16, 1933. r 48 Cited by M . RadajkoviO, "L’opinion frangaise et le m ouvem ent illyrien de 1840 & 1848,” Le monde slave (June, 1935), 330.

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T h e increasing in terest in France in B alkan affairs was evidenced also in the long series of articles on this subject which appeared in the Revue des deux mondes during th e eighteen forties. Between 1842 and 1846 no fewer th a n th irteen articles by Cyprien R o bert alone were published.49 R obert-w as a keen and shrewd observer who travelled widely th roughout the B alkans and who left in his w ritings an excel­ lent picture of th e contem porary conditions. In the Held of politics he urged the creation of a federation of independent B alkan state s to nerve as a barrier to R ussian expansion.50 H e particularly em phasized Ihe necessity for a Serbo-B ulgarian union. We u n derstand now th e im portance of th e Bulgaro-Serb u n io n ; it 1и (hey who m ust defend the B alkans against Russia. B u t th ey have miother task of no less im portance: after th ey have protected ConHlnntinople against th e Russians, th ey m ust m ake it as powerful as it was form erly, while preparing a g reat confederation of peoples, Asiatics as well as E uropeans, whose political center has alw ays been I lie Bosphorus.6 1 T he keenest in te re st in th e N ear E astern question, however, was dinplayed b y th e num erous revolutionary groups of th e period. T his w h s only n atu ral since all of them sought to change the m ap of IC lirope according to th eir p articu lar doctrines and consequently were mImost invariably concerned a b o u t th e subject peoples of A ustria and I'liikey. T ypical was Prince C zartoryski, th e form er R ussian m inister who had proposed a plan for B alkan federation in 1804.62 Tw o years Ilifer C zartoryski resigned from office because of disagreem ent w ith (lie T sar over the Polish question. In 1830-1831 C zartoryski served < [(resident of th e revolutionary Polish governm ent and then he fled lo Paris whence he carried on his diplom atic activities against Russia, Prussia and A ustria. C zartoryski was m uch interested in the fate of (lie O tto m an Em pire which he viewed as a barrier against further Uwisian and A ustrian expansion.5 3 Sim ilarly he was in terested in Serbia as th e kernel of a future lli'eat Yugoslav state. In fact in Ja n u a ry 1843 he drew up a memoir entitled, “Advice on the policy to be followed b y S erbia,” in which he warned th a t Serbia m u st expand to include th e whole Y ugoslav rade;
im

,() T h e first seven of these articles were republished in a tw o volu m e book; Les SItwcs de Turquie (Paris, 1844). " . . . French interests are evid en tly much less opposed than R ussian interests m l lio real developm ent of the different G reco-Slav nationalities or to their formation lulu n group of confederated states . . . all conjointly answerable to one another and [ilnlmi il to defend one another.” Ib id ., 11,336. M Ibid., II, 413. R obert also envisaged an IIlyrian-M agyar union which would it i vi; ns “a counterw eight to th e eastern union of the Bulgarians and Serbs.” Ibid., II.-M8. 62 Cf. supra, 37. 1 ,1 1 It. Batow ski, "Un pr6curseur polonais de l’union balkanique— le prince Adam <' iirloryski,” Revue Internationale des etudes balkaniques, II (1936), 149-154.

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otherw ise she would be unable to survive the dangers facing the O tto­ m an Em pire. He urged, therefore, th a t Serbia should strengthen her ties w ith the A ustrian and T urkish Slavs, lean tow ards the W estern Powers and especially France, come to an understanding w ith the Poles and H ungarians, and a t all tim es beware of A ustria and Russia, T his m em oir is p articu larly significant because of its influence on G arashanin and his fam ous program of 1844.61 In addition Lo his activ ities on behalf of Serbia, C zartoryski sought to aid the Bulgar­ ians w henever possible and to prom ote H ungarian-R oum anian unity ag ain st A ustria and R ussia.6 6 In conclusion there is little d o u b t that C zarto ry sk i’s efforts to stren g then and unify the B alkan nations were inspired by the hope th a t th e Polish cause would thereby be aided and A ustria and R ussia checked. N evertheless, his wide diplom atic experience and connections and his num erous agents in the various E uropean capitals m ade him a very real force in B alkan politics for decades.66 E qually interested and active in B alkan affairs was the famous Italian revolutionary, Giuseppe M azzini. T he basis of M azzini’s philosophy was the sacred rig h t of nationality. T hus he was strongly in favor of the overthrow of the A ustrian and O ttom an Em pires. In 1833, for example, he w rote an article in La Giovine Italia in which he advocated th a t H u n g ary should form and head a free confedera­ tion w ith B ulgaria, Serbia and Bosnia. “ To w h at other political centre would it be possible to reunite more advantageously the peo­ ples of the eastern coast of the A driatic. An Illyrian kingdom will never be more th a n a n am e.”67 M azzini’s views during this period were n o t very sound. Like m ost observers of th e tim e he knew little ab o u t the Yugoslavs and th e R oum anians and of their difficulties w ith the M agyars. T he fact th a t all these races were subject to Aus­ tria n rule blinded him to the differences am ongst them . A fter the 1848 revolutions, however, M azzini’s views becam e m uch clearer and he sought earnestly to reconcile these nations and to unite them into a D anubian federation.68 Very interesting, although of little practical significance a t the tim e, were the views of M ichael B akunin, th e R ussian anarchist leader, and K arl M arx, the founder of “ scientific” socialism. Bakunin a tte n d e d the g reat Slav Congicss held in Prague in June 1848. On
и M . Handelsm an, Czartoryski, Nicholas le r et la question du Proche Orient (Paris, 1934), 32-34; Batowski, loc. cit., 154, 155. 66 H andelsm an, op. cit., 40-67; Batowski, loc. cit., 155, 156. 5S Cf. supra, 51, 52, 57 H . Bergmann, "M azzini et les S la v es,” Le monde slave, II (M ay, 1918), 665, 066, T h is was to be part of a general reorganization of Europe in which an enlarged G erm any, a restored Poland and the Hungarian Confederation were to form th e first line of defense against Russia, and France, Italy and Spain the second. 58 Cf. infra, 81, 82.

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(lie basis of his observations a t this gathering and th e course of the revolutions in C entral E urope, he w rote in th e au tu m n of 1848 his “ Appeal to the Slavs.” H is m ain points were th a t th e bourgeoisie was a reactionary force; th a t the hope of a revolution lay in the working class; and th a t th e essential condition of revolution was the break-up of the A ustrian Em pire and the establishm ent in C entral and E astern Europe of a federation of free Slav republics.59 Bakunin was one of th e few radicals of this period who cham ­ pioned th e Slavs. Because of the p a rt th ey played in the 1848 revolu­ tions the Slavs were generally regarded as a co unter-revolutionary force which had enabled the H apsburgs to crush th e H ungarian nationalist revolution. T h u s B akunin's “Appeal to th e S lavs” was virulently a ttack ed by M arx and Engels. T h ey b itterly referred to (he Slavs as “ the racial dregs of a thousand y ears’ confused develop­ m ent,” and pointed o u t th a t, . . although pretending to fight for liberty, th ey were inevitably found on th e side of despotism and re­ liction.” M oreover th ey w ent so far as to declare th a t the Slavs lacked (he necessary conditions for an independent existence. “ E xcept the I’oles, the R ussians, and, a t best, the Slavs of T u rk ey , no Slav people has any fu tu re sim ply because all th e oth er Slavs lack the prim ary historical, geographical, and economic prerequisites of independence und ability to exist.” 60 I t w as probably th eir ignorance of th e Slav races th a t led M arx and Engels to tak e this sta n d .8 1 W hatever the cause, it is interesting to consider th eir opinions during this period in view of th e fact th a t by th e end of the cen tu ry it was the socialists everywhere who were to be th e m ost a rd en t and consistent cham pions uf the Balkan races and of a B alkan federation.
r,e E. H . Carr, M ich a elB a ku in (London, 1937), 156-176 f,° Cited, ibid., 176. See also H . M , M acD onald, “Karl M arx, Friedrich Engels, mid the South Slavic Problem in 1848-9,” University of Toronto Quarterly, V III (July, 1939), 452-460. 61 For conflicting view s on this question, see M acD onald, loc. cit., 459, and H . Wendel, “M arxism and th e Southern S lav Q uestion,” Slavonic Review, II (Decem ber, t‘ J 23), 289-307.

C H A P T E R IV T H E D A N U B IA N F E D E R A T IO N M O V E M E N T , 1849-1860 Conditions in the Balkan Peninsula during th e eighteen thirties and eighteen forties had not been conducive to cooperation or united action am ongst the various races. T he B alkan states were still too w eak and too absorbed b y internal problem s to th in k and a c t in term s of th e peninsula as a whole, while the G reat Powers repeatedly dem onstrated their determ ination to prevent any radical change of the status quo. T h u s th e crisis of 1839-1841 created hardly a stir in th e Balkans. T he revolutions of 1848-1849 did arouse th e subject nationalities b u t the lack of common policy and of concerted action led to th e reestablishm ent of H apsburg rule and th e trium ph of re­ action everywhere. T he lesson, however, was n ot lost. T he decade after 1849 is notew orthy chiefly for the alm ost continual efforts made to settle th e rivalries am ongst the oppressed nationalities and to create a federation of free D anubian states.1 E ven before the surrender of the last H ungarian forces a t Vilagos, a num ber of proposals had been bro u g h t forward for u n ity and com­ mon action am ongst the D anubian peoples. P articularly after the intervention of R ussia on behalf of the H apsburgs it was realized th a t cooperation am ongst the M agyars, R oum anians and Yugoslavs was essential if disaster was to be avoided. In London th e H ungarian rep­ resentative, Francis Pulszky carried on a cam paign in favor of the creation of a D anubian federation. Realizing the traditional British sy m p ath y for A ustria as a barrier against R ussian expansion, he pictured the proposed federation as the equivalent of a G reat Power which could take the place of A ustria. In spite of all his efforts, how­ ever, Pulszky was unable to persuade Palm erston to lend any aid to the H ungarians or even to p ro test against R ussian in tervention.2
1 D uring this decade also there were published a number of books proposing vari­ ous typ es of N ear Eastern federations. M any of them were thinly disguised schemes for the establishm ent of Greek hegem ony, e.g. A. C. Dandolo, Quelgues mots sur la question d ’Orient (Corfu, 1853); J. G. Pitzipios-Bey, L ’Orient, les reformes de I'empire byzantin (Paris, 1858); D . R attos, Constantinople, ville libre, solution de la question d'Orienl (Paris, 1860); G. M ano, L 'O rient rendu d lui-mem e (London, 1861). Others hoped to solve the Italian and E astern questions at one stroke and thus proposed that Austria give up her Italian possessions, expand in the Balkans for com pensation and that the remaining Balkan lands be federated on one form or another, e.g. P. de T chihatchef, Italic et Turquie (Paris, 1859); J. Berger de X ivray, Lien des questions d ’Orient et d 'lta lie (Paris, 1860). N one of these plans were of any practical importance. 2 Palm erston detested Schwarzenberg but refused to abandon his neutral position. H is reasoning was that an independent Hungary could not alone fill A ustria’s place, and that if an attem pt were m ade to establish both an independent H ungary and

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In Paris, where exiles of all nationalities could be found, a m eeting was held on M ay 18, 1849 of representatives of the su bject races of Ilie H apsburg Em pire. An agreem ent was reached providing for the deposition of th e H apsburgs and for th e creation of a federalized H ungary in which th e crown would serve as the only link am ongst I lie national units. “ N ationalities well defined by th e lim its of the te rri­ tory they occupy and by th eir trad itio n s of a separate existence” were to.be given com plete autonom y. I t was fu rth e r agreed th a t th e H u n ­ garian D iet should pass an a c t em bodying the above principles and I lint the non-M agyar races of H u n g ary should thereupon aid in the M t niggle against th e A ustro-R ussian coalition.3 In addition to th e above agreem ent there were established in Paris a num ber of short-lived new spapers which cham pioned the liberation of the subject n ationalities and which, for a period a t least, urged closer cooperation am ongst them . O utstan d in g was the journal, La Pologne, journal des slaves confederes ,4 edited by Cyprien R obert Ilie French publicist and a u th o rity on the E a st E uropean races. As Ilie title indicates, R ob ert was in terested prim arily in th e Slavs and, iti fact, the tone of his paper a t th e ou tset was anti-M ag yar. W ith the iiKTeement of M ay 1849 R o b ert readily changed his policy and urged <i(operation between the H ungarians and the Slavs. He even founded и new journal, L'O rient europeen, “devoted to the cause of the em an­ cipation, progress and confederation of all the Slavic and non-Slavic peoples of eastern E u ro p e.”5 T he second num ber urged federation for Hungary in the precise w ords of th e M ay agreem ent. Paper plans in Paris, however, had little effect on the actual i oiirse of events in the B alkans where K ossuth and A vram Iancu were carrying on a w ar of m utual exterm ination. K ossuth recognized Ilie necessity of cooperation w ith the Serbs and the R oum anians and lie did a tte m p t to come to an agreem ent w ith them . In th e spring of 1849 he carried on negotiations w ith Nicholas B&lcescu, one of the Roumanian liberal leaders, and he sent C ount Jules A ndrassy to sur­ vey the situation a t C onstantinople and Belgrade. T h e ensuing dis­ cussions proved futile. K ossuth was quite willing to g ra n t extensive
I'nlimd, war would result. Thus when he discussed the Tsar’s intervention with the UiiHsian minister; Brunnow, Palm erston m erely said, “ M ake an end to it very quick­ ly." D . A . Janossy, Great B rita in and K ossuth (Budapest, 1937), 23, 24. 3 Campbell, Roum anian N ation alism , 266-269; Cam pbell, loc. cit., 26, 27. ‘ It was issued at first m onthly, then sem i-m onthly, then w eekly, beginning in 1line, 1840, and ending in February, 1850. 1 1 It consisted largely of abridgm ents of articles which appeared in L a Pologne. A Momewhat similar journal w as L a tribune des peuples, edited by Adam M ickiewicz < in I lasting from March 15 to June 13, 1849. It w as concerned largely w ith the Italian, Polish and H ungarian national m ovem ents and paid little attention to the Balkans. A detailed account of all these periodicals is available in Cam pbell, op. cit,, 261-270; I 'umpbell, loc. cit., 24-27.

w ithout regard to language or religion. a Piedm ontese agent nam ed Carosini. . agreed to a com ­ promise. in law. use of th eir own language in districts and communes where they formed a m ajority. 278. Serbia. 279. every one of us.68 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y concessions to the other nationalities in such m a tters as language. One of the la st acts of the revolutionary H ungarian parlia­ m ent was to ratify a decree g ranting to the non-M agyar races a recog­ nized statu s. freedom of religious organization and oth er less im p o rtan t privileges. b u t he resolutely refused to transform H u ngary into a federation of nationalities on the ground th a t it would mean the destruction of the sta te. religion and adm inistratio n . H ow ever. cit. and to secure the backing of th e Porte. T he Serbs in H ungary were to have every rig h t com patible w ith H u n g a ry ’s existence as a u n ita ry sta te . no. loc. m ust be equal in right. th a t is to say w ith the citizen in h ab itan ts of its own body. op. 9-1 2 .” C ited by Cam pbell. . w ithin itself.. Such a concession in M arch 1848 m ight have rallied the whole of H ungary against th e H apsburgs. 6 K ossuth added. G arash an in ’s real aim th ro u g h o u t this period was to found a Serbian em pire which would include all the Yugoslavs under T urkish and A ustrian rule.” A ffaires danubiennes. surrounded by th e Russians and nearing the end of his resources. but th e Voivodina was to rem ain H ungarian. T h a t would be an a b su rd ity . 27-32. The inevitable end cam e on A ugust 13 when Gorgei surrendered w ith all his forces to th e Russians. .. “ H ungary m ight federate with W allachia. and in liberty. L engyel. cit. K ossuth was particu larly anxious to begin negotiations w ith the Serbs as he hoped to open hostilities in Serbia with H ungarian and R oum an­ ian legions cooperating w ith th e Serbian and T urkish armies. 8 (Summer. etc.. cit. A fter the collapse of his governm ent K ossuth fled to T urkey w here he seriously took up the D anubian federation project in an effort to obtain allies and to continue the struggle. T . was presented w ith a scheme for the creation of a D anubian federation. “ . H is plan was to come to an agreem ent w ith the Yugoslavs and th e R oum anians. See also Janossy. op. In Ja n u a ry 1850 he m et in Belgrade. Cam pbell. 51-56.” 0 T h u s the suicidal w ar of the H ungarians against th e R oum anians and th e Y ugoslavs continued until finally K ossuth. Slavonia and certain o ther small areas were to be ceded to Serbia. B u t the tim e for such action had long since passed. hoping in this m anner to involve B ritain and th u s unite all possible forces against A ustria and Russia. 1940). who was willing to serve as a m ediator. now it was useless. C roatia. G arashanin. T hus the Serbian foreign m inister. “La question des nationalitds et les exil£s hongrois. if we w ant liberty. but to divide a cou n try according to the languages spoken in it and to accord to each part a distinct political nationality on a distinct territory m eans to destroy that cou n try. it cannot en ter into a federation.

T here th ey m et Frederick H enningsen. 1850 G hica proposed a federation which was to be p a tte rn e d after the A m erican model and which involved th e federalization of H un g ary on the basis of the Paris agreem ent of M ay 1849. explained to him th eir views regarding a possible federation. m ight be recovered. 453. d em onstrated th a t th e situ atio n was n ot diplo­ m atically appro p riate and G arashanin term in ated the negotiations. op. 452. T .* In the m eantim e o th er H ungarian and R oum anian refugees in Ihe W est E uropean capitals were carrying on negotiations w ith much more success. and p articu larly the non-Slav M agyars and R ou­ manians. a t least." H ungarian Quarterly. On F egruary 1. Serbia. "The Hungarian E xiles and the Danulilnu Confederation.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 69 This. 15— 16. T hey were n o t renewed u ntil th e o u tbreak of the Italian wars in . an English 7 Cam pbell. op. Sim ilarly when in 1850 two R oum anian leaders.. as m ight be expected was in th e negative. . 216. Balcescu. T he adopIion of this plan would have m ean t the reduction of H ungary to a purely M agyar sta te ... m ean t th e cession by H u n g ary of all the areas peopled by Serbs and C roats. Kossuth again opposed th e organization of com ponent states on a national basis and insisted th a t the in teg rity of H u n g ary was a sine 4 1 1 a non.7 K ossuth also sought to come to an agreem ent w ith the R oum an­ ians. one of th e R oum anian leaders who had fled to C onstantinople following the overthrow of the revolutionnry W allachian governm ent. 318-320. 1850 he crossed to London accom panied by two of them . 1939). L engyel. G hica’s chief point was the necessity for I lie D anube races. R oum ania and H un g ary were lo be com ponent p a rts of th e federation and th e Poles were to aid in the war of liberation b u t afterw ards they were to be free to go their own way as th ey were sufficiently strong to exist independently and wore not a D anubian nation.” loc. had several m eet­ ings w ith H ungarian represen tativ es and on Ja n u a ry 4. “T he Hungarian E x iles. which had gotten wind of w hat was going on. som ething which K ossuth refused even to dis­ cuss. G arashanin realized th a t this was uniitlainable and he therefore was willing to cooperate w ith K ossuth so lliat some of the Slav provinces. cit. Several m onths elapsed before K ossuth replied to this proposal mid his answer. "I л question des nationalit£s." loc. the Golescu brothers. 453.. particu larly because B ritain was m uch more likely to intervene In a situation involving th e strategic Principalities. T . N egotiations were iiccordingly begun w ith Ion G hica. 217. In P aris th e R oum anian. V (Autum n. cit. Lengyel. the p rotests of the A ustrian governm ent. A ndrassy and Count badislas Teleki. Lengyel. " Cam pbell.1859. H ow­ ever. cit. to stan d united against Panslavism . cit. of course.

B ucovina and Bessarabia. Jaszi. T he W allaehians know very well w hat th ey und erstan d by it: they mean th a t we should de­ tach T ransy lv an ia and the counties of K rasso. . Serbia. . 1850. . never accept. Croatia. In other words the scheme was very sim ilar to the 1867 Ausgleich except th a t it^was triune ra th e r than dual. C ited by O. W allachia. K ossuth was adam ant. shall I spill my n a tio n ’s blood. . B aranya. not .9 9 K ossuth to T eleki. T h an k you! T his I could never. On August 22 he replied: "I wish to see H ungary federated w ith Serbia. a w estern to th e G erm ans . .” . preserving th e rig h t to coalesce w ith W allachia and M aldavia. 87. . th a t is. Never. we should kill th e M agyars.” then details could be left to a con stituent assem bly. the three nationalities would play host to it in tu rn and debates would be held in G erm an or'F rench." Foreign A ffairs.” and would include H ungary. K o ssu th ’s re­ joinder was significant for it clearly revealed the obstacle which to the end nullified all federation efforts. In vain T eleki argued that if there was a mere recognition of the principle of ‘‘the collective n ational existence for which they have been lon gin g. a northern strip to th e Russians. X I I (October. L ittle success was achieved in either direction. "K ossuth and the Treaty of Trianon. their n atu ral rela­ tives. In order to furnish a basis for fu rther negotia­ tions. three fourths of Bihar. B ilcescu drew up a constitution in Ja n u a ry 1850 for a federal sta te including M agyars.70 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y officer who had spent some tim e in the Balkans and who had dis­ cussed the federation question w ith K ossuth. I t was agreed th a t a publicity cam paign should be launched to popularize the federation idea and th a t efforts should be m ade to gain the su p p o rt of Palm er­ ston. . T he federal govern­ m ent would have only three m inisters: war. for such a result. A central assem bly of one hundred and fifty deputies (fifty from each natio n ality ) would m eet annually. . S zath m ar and M arm aros from H ungary and m ake of them a R ou­ m ania which would kindly prom ise to confederate. and half of Zala to th e Serbs. Poland and other countries. C ount Teleki should be kind enough to w rite to me clearly w hat he u n derstands by “ in tern al federation. therefore. . W hile in London B&lcescu was able to cooperate closely with Teleki and General George K lapka whom he found m uch more m od­ erate th a n K ossuth. June IS. D ecentralization was the keynote of the plan. Palm erston con­ sidered the idea interesting b u t he pointed o u t th a t it involved war and. . in th e south th e counties of T o ro n tal. but . M oldo-W allachia. Even A ustria does not do m ore than this. 1933). Obviously this plan was co n trary to K o ssuth’s views b u t Teleki a tte m p te d to persuade K ossuth to m odify his stand. . . foreign affairs. T he new federation would be known as "T h e U nited S tates of the D anube. because the n a tu ra l consequence of this action would be th a t in th e no rth we should give fifteen counties to th e Slovaks. R oum anians and Y ugoslavs according to the desire of the m ajo rity in each district. 86. he refused to consider it. M oldavia. Bacs. w ith us. and com­ merce and com m unications.

July 1. Providence . Poland (A lbert D arasz). in the nam e of th e C entral C om m ittee. . recognition. cit. . as brothers. . .” C ited b y Jaszi. equality. therefore.. . and inquired ab out his “ideas on llvided into federated provinces. K ossuth's position was basically the sam e as m 1849. T h e R oum anians and th e Slavs also have their his­ torical rights. In | nly 1850 M azzini organized the C entral E uropean D em ocratic Com m ittee w ith m em bers representing France (Ledru Rollin). Cited by Cam pbell. . |we cannot] com m it suicide out of courtesy t o th em . . each n atio n ality will organize itself in accordance w ith its own needs and ap titu d es. he can count on the ten millions of R oum anians. .10 After these p ro tracted negotiations and repeated failures the Danubian federation m ovem ent entered a new phase. however. i it. D ue largely to Ihe schemes and efforts of M azzini. 93. If the Serbs and Roum anians . . . I th in k th a t historical rig h t is an im proper right Io invoke. H e w ro te : Serious stu d y and th e knowledge of th e profound antagonism of I lie various races of H un g ary have convinced me of th e im possibility of a H ungarian sta te as th e political and historical u n ity th a t M.ermany (Arnold Ruge). and he a ttem p ted . . 1850. H ungary. and solidarity of nationalities. to reconcile th eir differences and to enlist their support. are n ot satisIiimI . for exam ple. th en . . . O ur political principle is sim ple: respect. . 328. th e transform ation will consist in a dem arcation of races according to well-established m ajorities. rights which a n te d a te th a t of th e M agyars. .B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 71 A deadlock had been reached.. Such are th e general ideas of the R ou­ manians on the subject. . cit. K ossuth w an ts to assure th e exist­ ence and th e developm ent of the M agyar nation and to collaborate in the liberation of th e subjugated nations. op. 10 B&Iescu to Zam oyski. . . w hich is the more just? . 15. . to take p a rt in •lie alliance of peoples against kings. b u t only if Ihey are considered as allies. cannot en ter the league as a M agyar sta te w ith­ out undergoing an internal transform ation . and probably on the Slavs also. as well as Italy. as p artners. and Balcescu m ade it perfectly clear th a t no agreem ent was possible on such term s. . . C. . See also L engyel. to extend it to include the E a st E uropean races. the Slavs among the H ungarians and vice versa. . . .. . . .” loc. In N ovem ber 1850. it tended more and more to be• ome a p a rt of th e general E uropean revolutionary m ovem ent. “La question des n a tio n a lity . If M . lie was anxious. loc. and between them there will be a fed­ eral tie as in Sw itzerland. 327. the H ungarians living am ong th e R oum anians. has tak en care to facilitate th e solution of I he natio n ality question by grouping each one a p a rt from th e others II iid m arking each land w ith th e indelible ch aracter of th e people in­ habiting it. he appealed lо Kossuth. K ossuth sees it. T here you have two historical rights confronting one an o th er. are b u t individual cases or iicattered colonies which will rapidly become denationalized.

As usual he insisted on the integ­ rity of H u ngary b u t he proposed to satisfy the dem ands of th e nonM agyar races by the organization of state-w ide national groups. curiously enough. He was unconcerned ab o u t M azzinian conceptions of a revolutionary new E urope based on the principles of natio n ality and the dem ocratic fra te rn ity of the people. th a t M azzini was pro-R ussian and should be ignored. 1851. M azzini. In F ebruary 1851 B&lcescu drew up a m em orandum defining the R oum anian claims. These organizations were to have control of the churches. began nego­ tiations w ith M azzini. F inally K ossuth a t this tim e was in close touch w ith D avid U rq u h a rt1 2 who insisted. W h at was im p o rtan t was an agree­ m en t in principle.72 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y the possibility and general bases of a pact. who replied w ith his fam ous Expose des principes de la future politiqttc de la Hongrie. XLIV.1 3 U nder th e auspices of the C om m ittee. K ossuth changed his policy. therefore. 1 2 T h e pro-Turkish. T he federation was to include all O ttom an territo ry in­ h ab ited by Y ugoslavs and R oum anians. 229-232. one of K o ssu th ’s chief te n e ts was cooperation w ith th e S ultan against A ustria and Russia. anti-R ussian British M . Cam pbell. As for details. C ircum stances had made both men revolutionaries. 318. T h e scheme was an ad ap tatio n of the Ottoman m illet system and resem bled the solution suggested decades later by 1 1 G . and the P o rte ’s un­ reliability becam e evident.P . M azzini was above all a republican while K ossuth was a n atio n alist interested only in the liberation of his country. however.” 1 1 A t first K ossuth rejected this gesture. . and would extend. and former secretary to th e British em bassy in C onstantinople. Once again there was dem anded a federation of Yugoslavs. and finally accepted the invitation of the C entral C om m ittee to join its b oard. op. preferred to leave them to the fu tu re federal diet. 60-68. In fact such theories m ight favor unduly the Y ugoslavs and the R oum anians.. 13 Janossy.. op. As the m onths passed. cit. cit. d ated April 25. the South Slavs and the M oldo-W allachians. M oreover. eacli under the leadership of a voivoda or hospodar. Balcescu like Teleki. th eir respective frontiers to be determ ined by plebiscites. Teleki su bm itted this m em orandum to Kossuth. b u t in all other respects the two were poles a p a rt. a fraternization am ongst the M agyars. R oum a­ nians and M agyars. editi ed in ed iti (edizione nazionale) (Im ola. S critti. from th e Black Sea to th e A driatic and have a population of twentytwo millions. 1933). negotiations were renewed betw een the H u ngarians and the Roum anians. and other cultural and social institutions. while for th e dogm atic M azzini the O ttom an E m pire was b u t another oppressive autocracy scheduled for partition. schools. In view of these circum stances it is n o t surprising th a t M azzini’s plea w ent unheeded.

op. Unvolutionary propaganda was despatched to all th e D anubian and IIn Ilean countries. and in case of victory. L engyel. M azzini was convinced th a t his projected revolution in Ita ly would be followed by a t least ten others I Inoughout Europe. 336-342. K ossuth fully realized th is and therefore was very anxious In «чипе to an agreem ent w ith th e R oum anians. I. 1853. I I IV. T h e confusion and disorganization of the revolutionary 'Movement was fu rth e r revealed b y th e a ttitu d e of th e Czech emigres.” T he • i owning disillusionm ent cam e w ith th e failure of M azzini’s revolt in Milan in February. In fact Inwards the end of 1851 it was w idely believed in em igre circles th a t in (lie spring of the following year th e peoples of E urope would once nf'.1 4 These repeated failures did n o t discourage the exiles. 342-357. . H enceforth the revolutionary organizaliniiH rapidly disintegrated and th eir activities p ractically ceased. I heir plan was to proclaim a provisional governm ent of the “ U nited Ии les of A u stria” as soon as th e revolution began. inIindented by th e wild enthusiasm w ith which he was received in I upland and the U nited S tates. K ossuth. expected aid from these countries i ill her th an from H u n g ary ’s neighbors. w ith no signs of revolution. even to th e extent nl i r | rearing from the stand w hich for so long he h ad stubbornly held. In' Transylvanians should decide by a free plebiscite w hether or not MCampbell. op.nationalities which to d ay m ake up the A ustrian E m pire. I Iiiih iu the au tu m n of 1853 he m et B ratianu in London and agreed llull if an o p p o rtu n ity for revolution should present itself.. A t th e tim e. D uring his In I lire to u r of E ngland K ossuth found tim e to discuss the situation with M azzini and it was agreed th a t th e Italian and H ungarian revoIillions should be synchronized. th e em igres were presented w ith an imi'xpected o p p o rtu n ity which th ey eagerly seized. cit. and lost in terest in federation *i hemes. this plan was quite unm 'ccptable to th e R oum anians and it was accordingly dropped. however. cit. The spring of 1852 passed.. 15 Cam pbell. cit.. however.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 73 I In: Viennese socialists. M azzini urged all the national groups nf liis C entral C om m ittee to prepare their people for the uprising. m ostly from Paris.. The new diplo­ matic situation was p articu larly favorable for the R oum anians beинке of the concern of the W estern Powers for th e fate of th e Prin111 hi 1 1 ties.oiiis N apoleon’s coup d'etat of N ovem ber 1851 had blasted the Impes of those who had looked for French leadership.nin arise against th eir rulers after th e fashion of 1848. each nutloiiality should fight under its own flag.” loc.1 5 W ith th e developm ent of th e N ear E astern crisis which finally • iilmiuated in the C rim ean W ar. and then to tu rn ip ilust th e M agyars whom th ey denounced as “ th e enemies of all I In. “La question des nation alites.

" T . 1919). Schiem ann. W ." each to be “governed b y a man of its own choice. de M artens. . 426. to the detrim ent of Russian interests. In his fam ous conversations w ith Lord Seym our. The Crim ea. F . W hat was more significant. For de­ tails. 455. In the light of these aspirations and negotiations of the H ungarian and Roumanian emigr6s. 1931). 275-279. he added. it is worth noting Tsar N ich olas’ view s on N ear Eastern reorganization at this tim e. he drew up a memorandum in N ovem ber. IV. th e British ambassador. w ith Constantinople becom ing a free port. 456.” T h is project w as strongly opposed by Nesselrode anil finally abandoned. T he M agyars were compelled once more to bide their time while th e R oum anians p rom ptly dropped the confederation plans and adopted another policy more likely to serve their interests. Im p o rta n t as these H ungarian concessions w'ere. w ith th e result th a t b y 1859 th e Principalities were n ot only rid of foreign troops. X I I . 1853. for m yself and m y successors. The Union of M oldavia and W allachia (Cambridge. cit. They tu rn ed to N apoleon as th e cham pion of the oppressed nationalities. following the exam ple of K ossuth in London. . . the Serbs. K lapka. that Russia was opposed to the use of force by the W estern Powers to en force Turkish rule on Christian peoples. On the union of the principalities. b u t. cit. however. b u t united under the rule of Prince A lexander Cuza. A few monllm later. Serbia and the Principalities independent (the latter tw o under Rus­ sian protection). the Bulgars. in the case of the Slavic provinces freeing them selves from Turkish power. The M aking of Roum ania (Oxford. Geschichte Russlands unter K a iser N ikolaus I (Berlin. op. 343-346. and there fore proposed a declaration in favor of the “reestablishm ent of the real independent'! of th e M oldo-W allachians.. In N ovem ber 1853 th e y agreed th a t a R oum anian-Serbian-H ungarian confederation should be form ed. . . All these negotiations and agreem ents were based on th e assum ption th a t A ustria would become involved in w ar and the subject nationalities would thereby be given an o p p o rtu n ity to rise. E ast. W hen N icholas realized the impossl b ility of an agreement with England. when war seemed inevitable. T hus there was no basis for action. rem ained neutral and the w ar was fought in the C rim ea ra th e r th an in th e Principalities. . in January and February. and the Turkish coasts of the Adriatic and the Archipelago to A ustria. th e y b rought no concrete results. see Tem perley. A ustria. 461.74 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y th ey would rem ain under H ungarian rule. see T . G. and W . and in his discussions w ith Field-M arshal Paskievich. elected b y them selves and from am ong their own nation als. 358-360. agreed to the independance of both C roatia and T ransyl­ vania. to guarantee to Austria that Russia w ill never tolerate any attem pt on th e part of these provinces to aggrandize them selves at the expense of Austria. 1927). E gyp t and Cyprus or Rhodes to England.. Crete to France or Eng­ land. Bulgaria. Riker. Petersburg. “ . Nicholas wrote to the Prussian king on March 27. 1853. Lengyel. A t the sam e tim e Teleki and K lapka were in C onstantinople carrying on negotiations w ith Serbian and R oum anian representatives.1 " T h e last serious efforts in th e direction of a D anubian federation 10 Cam pbell. 1898). 427. I undertake. in which he anticipated a British plan to assume the leadership of the emancipation m ovem ent of the Ottom an Christians. the Tsar envisaged th e partitioning of Turkey. in which each nation should be left free to m anage its dom estic affairs b u t w ith common d ep artm en ts for W ar and Foreign Affairs. (the Greeks of T h essaly and Epirus had til ready revolted). 1854. after the G reek exam ple. the Bosnians and the Greeks. Recueil des traites et conventions conclus p ar la Russ it avec les puissances Stra?igeres (St. “T he H ungarian E x iles.” loc.

I ^w\on. Souvenirs et icrits de mon exil. I" IsOKsuth. 141-165. “In the F ifties: Hungarian Em igrants In. I t was finally decided Ihut' K ossuth should retu rn to E ngland and hold m ass m eetings w ith a view to ensuring English n eu tra lity and th a t an H ungarian arm y iihonld be organized in Ita ly to serve w ith th e allies.” //». 246. to count on freedom of m ovem ent and even help from that direction. K ossuth argued th a t English public opinion could be uoused so as to p rev en t such an even tu ality . . K ossuth n atu rally suspected th a t the allies were interested in using the H ungarians only as tools against A ustria mid therefore dem anded th a t an allied force be sent to H ungary and Ilint Napoleon should issue a proclam ation in favor of H ungarian independence.. Once th e w ar was concluded. arm s and transports b u t not troops. of which tw enty ihoimand were to be placed a t th e disposal of the H ungarian insur• и I h. it was to our interest to arm Tran•• Iv i i nwi. T he M agyars were to be perm itted to hiblish depots for arm s along th e T ran sy lv an ian frontier and Cuza л im lo ask N apoleon for th irty thousand rifles.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 75 were m ade during the course of the w ar in Ita ly in 1859. On Ja n u a ry 17. W hen K ossuth lanirtted th a t allied troops p a rtic ip a te in the revolution N apoleon reIillt*cl th a t such a move would drive th e English governm ent to the mile of A ustria. T . th ey began ne­ gotiations w ith the H ungarian emigres w ith a view to fom enting a revolution w ithin the H apsburg E m pire. and as for us. K ossuth crossed to France in May and was granted an interview by the E m peror.1 7 D uring his conversations w ith th e H u ngarian representatives I ivour repeatedly suggested th a t th ey come to agreem ent w ith the Uonmanians and the Y ugoslavs for common action against A u stria. L engyel. 1859 Geni*ral K lapka reported to K ossuth in London th a t he h ad discussed I lie situatio n w ith Prince N apoleon.19 T hus w ith the ilil of Victor Place./„ M 5. V I (A utum n. 458-470. . A lthough C avour refused to lend active aid on the ground of tran sp o rtatio n difficulties.' H ungarian Quarterly. the French consul a t Jassy. 1 15. 1 1 1 Kossuth w as w ell aware of the situation. “Our interests coincided: it was to (in r Couza’s interest to see Austria so occupied with Hungary that she could not ill ili'io in the affairs of W allachia. 124. K ossuth. cit. op. T h ey all had urged th a t the H ungarians should rise as soon tin hostilities began and th e y prom ised to provide m oney. and if it should decide in favor of a separate adm in' 4 . pcriode de la guerre d ’lta lie (Paris IИ Н Н ). T h e la tte r was willing to cooperate w ith the H ungarians liinuisc of the hostile a ttitu d e of th e E uropean C oncert. to R oum anian u n ity and aspiratio n s. and espelnlly of A ustria. a secret convention m concluded on M arch 22. 79-82. 115-122. an assem bly was to be called in 11 iiину1 vania.18 Ai rordingly G eneral K lap k a was sent to B ucharest to negotiate w ith I'l Inee Cuza. 1940). C avour and K ing V ictor E m ­ manuel. Once C avour n nd Napoleon had agreed on a w ar against A ustria.

” loc. I t is in our in terest th a t H ungary should be independent. b u t S erbia’s liberated people . . cit. crossed to London w here he secretly m et K ossuth and discussed w ith him all aspects of the question. Finally he expressed the opinion th a t the T urkish Em pire was bound to collapse sooner or later.” 20 Rifles were actually sent to R oum ania b u t the plans for a cam paign in T ran sy lv an ia were n o t y et com pleted when the sudden arm istice of V illafranca nullified all these arrangem ents. cit. then on his w ay to th e Italian front. 118-121. continued Michael.!. this was n o t to be opposed. “Politica extern^ a lui Cuza Vod£L §i desvoltarea ideii de unitate national. Napoleon. “th a t in case the T urkish E m pire should dissolve. For th a t reason he ap­ proved of th e K lapka-C uza agreem ent which looked forw ard to the creation of a D anubian federation. R ussia m ight p rev en t such inter v ention b u t in th a t case T urkish control of Serbia would sim ply bo replaced by R ussian. however. . Above all. following this advice. in which case A ustria would seize E uropean T u rk ey unless H ungary were independent. th a t th e independence of H ungary was to the interest of Serbia. b u t a more solid ra m p a rt would be a defensive alliance of 5 0The text of this convention is given in Kossuth. 1 .”2 1 K ossuth agreed w ith M ichael’s views. II (1932). and this can only be attain ed by th e independence ol H ungary. to have the A ustrian power rem oved from our vicinity. H e added. . “T his alone can lead us to our goal which is the confederation of th e three D anubian states: H ungary. V illafranca sim ilarly blasted th e agreem ent concluded between K ossuth and Prince M ichael of Serbia.. op. In the p a st the O ttom an Em pire has been preserved as a barrier against R ussian and Austrian expansion..76 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y istratio n .. b u t this is impossible while A ustria is in possession of H ungary. and M oldo-W allachia. lay in th e fact th a t small nations could safeguard th eir existence only by allying them selves for m u tual protection. 251-256. Serbia wished to free herself from T urkish sovereignty. See also G. . N oticing the encouragem ent extended to the H u ngarians by Napoleon. the guiding principle was to be fra te rn ity . 236-238. "La question des nationality.” he concluded. Briltianu. M ichael therefore concluded th a t it was to Serbia's in terest “ . Lengyel. he ex­ plained to K ossuth. its heir should be n ot R us­ sian or A ustrian am bition.” A nother reason for M agyar-Serbian cooperation. op. Serbia. . M ichael. 22. M ichael hurried to Paris in M ay in th e hope of obtaining French support. ." Revista Istoricd R e m in d . . . 1 1Kossuth. “ I t is our jo in t in terest. b u t the slightest sign of a revolt would be fol­ lowed by A ustrian in tervention. and suggested th a t M ichael should therefore visit K ossuth in London and m ake some arrangem ent for common action. cit. refused to mix th e E astern Question w ith th e Italian for fear of English opposition.

C uza’s leMponse was cool. under Austrian pressure. th a t I he aged prince M ilosh had n o t been inform ed of his son’s London MKvecment an d no one dared now to inform him. B u t when General Klapka arrived in B ucharest in N ovem ber to secure perm ission to i nrry on his revolutionary activities on R oum anian soil. th e H ungarian emigres were again ac­ tive. n ot u n natunilly.:|On December 18th Cuza. encouraged b y the A u stro -Italian tension created by C avour's i|( te r m in a tio n to com plete th e unification of Ita ly . Cuza also refused to permit the Magyars to iin y on their preparations on Roumanian soil.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 77 independent H u n g ary . 1861 Cuza withdrew l liIn bun but the British and Russian governments at once protested strongly against l tin ncnvities of the Hungarian emigr6s and Cuza was compelled to retreat. In (September 1860. cit.. . K ossuth and his followers felt. so now the unexpected i nnclusion of peace d isrupted th e an ti-A ustrian bloc while it was still in process of form ation.. H e found. op. however. In accordance w ith these plans Ludvigh was sen t to Belgrade where he was received w arm ly by all classes. Finally it was agreed th a t when the expected French arm y began i ts advance from the A driatic coast to H ungary.. On January 9. n Ibid.” On this basis it was agreed th a t Ludvigp. informed Klapka that his ■ | hI'ttriice in Roumania was undesirable. Serbia and th e D anubian Princi­ palities. “ I do n o t believe th a t th e E uropean state-system will ever function sm oothly in the E a st w ith o u t th is confederation and w ith ­ o ut th e reestablishm ent of P o lan d . T hus nothing had been accom plished when the news of th e arm istice in I inly ended all hope of any m oves against A u stria. w ith the ending of the w ar and the loss of French support. for exam ple. he would a t once com ­ pel b oth L udvigh and th e Sardinian agent to leave Serbia. should be sent to B elgrade to begin negotiations for a M agyar-C roat understan d in g which was considered essential. SimiIm ly the R oum anians and th e Serbians realistically took th e a ttitu d e III it.2 3 T he reaction of th e Serbians was very m uch the типе. th e Serbian governm ent should aid w henever possible to overcom e tra n sp o rta tio n and oth er difficulties.2 2 In conclusion it is a p p a re n t th a t ju s t as A ustrian n e u tra lity had prevented action during th e Crim ean W ar. 268. C roatia. they were no longer bound by th eir agreem ent w ith the M agyars. Riker. “La question des nationalit£sloc . 24-27. T h e Serbians in H u ngary were to cooperate w ith the M agyars and in retu rn th ey were prom ised a vague autonom y b u t n o t independence. In fact it w as feared th a t if Milosh got wind of w h a t w as going on. an H ungarian envoy. T he fact of th e m a tte r was th a t M ichael an d C uza realized the 256-271. cit. th a t th e y had been unscrupulously exploited b y N apoleon and IIrnnco-H ungarian relations th u s becam e perceptibly cooler. and th a t th e C roatians should be free to sever all ties with H ungary if th e y should so decide. . See t 111 нусI.

” loc. T ransylvania. chastened by repeated fail­ ures and the hardships of exile. convoked for the purpose. w hether th ey preferred independence or continued union w ith H ungary. A t th e same tim e the Ita lia n and Prussian consuls in Belgrade be­ gan negotiations w ith O reshkovich. th a t his real aim was not to p artitio n Austria b u t merely to expel her from G erm any.. and accordingly negotiations were begun w ith the M ag­ y ars and the Serbs. T h e H ungarian General T iirr was sum m oned to Berlin where he laid his plans before Bism arck who approved them. commerce. . On th e eve of the w ar Ita ly and Prussia agreed th a t an effort should be m ade to stim ulate revolts on the Aus­ trian rear.78 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y fu tility of the new situ atio n created by V illafranca and refused to jeopardize their relations w ith A ustria. “La question des nationality. “The Hungarian Exiles. th a t Bism arck was n ot interested in the subject races of A ustria. 457. Ita ly entered the w ar on th e basis of a specific understanding. a high Serbian officer who had form erly been in th e A ustrian service. and the South Slav provinces which were to be joined to Serbia. A scheme was worked out by which the A ustrian frontici regim ents were to be engaged by the Serbs and the H ungarians. also arrived to take p a rt in the discussions.. C roatia. In Ju n e General T iirr and B ism arck’s em issary. 30-32. Statesm anlike as this plan was. Some of th e exiles attacked the proposal because of fear for H u n g a ry ’s in teg rity while others argued th a t w hat H ungary needed was aid from th e W estern powers and n ot from the inferior Slavs and R oum anians. drew up a federation plan which fulfilled the dem ands of th e R oum anians and th e Yugoslavs. 458. A ccordingly definite guar­ antees were asked from B ism arck b u t none were forthcom ing. T he H ungarian exiles. Lengyel. 458.2 5 In 1866 there was a last feeble flurry of excitem ent as a result of the A ustro-Prussian W ar. von Pfuel. " b u t where were any kind of guarantees foi 2 4Lengyel. Roum ania. b u t in all other respects the individual states were to be independent. cit. 459.” loc. The people of T ran sylvania were to decide in an assembly. however. Foreign policy. In 1862 K ossuth. cit. and each sta te w as to be free to w rite its own con­ stitu tio n . Executive power was to be exercized by a federal council responsible to a com­ mon parliam ent. scattered in th e various capitals of Europe. 1 1 was suspected.. The federation was to consist of H ungary. it served m erely to reveal th e ex ten t to which the H ungarian revolutionary m ovem ent had disintegrated.2 4 For all practical purposes th e D anubian federation m ovem ent was now a t an end. 2 5Ibid. custom s and finance were to be under federal control. A h G arashanin pointed out. continued for a few more years their intrigues against the H apsburgs. defence.

B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 79 ns?” T hu s no agreem ent had been reached when the Peace of Prague rnded th e hostilities. Iorga. T h e subject peoples til I lie B alkans n atu rally a ttra c te d th e atten tio n of these revolution­ is t.29 C anini th en retu rn ed to Greece where an insurrection 1 . Belgrad-Berlin. In IHf>2. Slav and Roumanian languages. Now th a t th e M agyars were given equal s ta tu s w ith the A ustrians in the H apsburg Em pire. “has a man had such favorable conditions for making II I"J 7). Iorga. . I’eiiain Italian revolutionaries continued their ag itatio n for Balkan unity and freedom. 'Typical of them was Canini. Wendel. for th e tim e being. boastful manner Canini claimed the authorship of Kossuth’s plan.27 He It hi ix I the R oum anian governm ent openly hostile. X X X V (1912-1913). 54-69. 1936). Finally it should be noted th a t. “» "Utirely. so m uch so th a t lie was arrested and alm ost delivered to th e A u strians. he m ade a to u r of th e B alkan countries in an effort In win su p p o rt for K o ssu th ’s federation proposal of th a t year. recommended the unification of the Catholic and Orthodox churches and i mi’d assassins almost yearly. I lull). as a political force during this period autom atically becam e extinct. vainly hi living to em ancipate th e oppressed of all nations and to create a ilew E urope based on the brotherhood of m an. A. to w h at had been left of the D anubian federation m ovem ent. Unlike the H ungarian and R oum anian leaders who were nationalists above all. N. I lie H ungarians had been practically alone in th eir efforts to arouse ind unite the subject races ag ain st A ustria. a V enetian who fled to Greece after I he 1848 revolutions and who spen t the next fifteen years travelling iiliiiut the B alkans preaching cooperation of the subject races and “ a Miiumon synchronized rev o lu tio n ” against A ustria and T urkey. M em oriile Sectiu n ii Istorice. Since 1859 when R oum anian aspirations had been a t least p artially satisfied by the union of th e Principalities. T his finally p u t nil end. B ism arck und Serbian im Jahre 1866 (Berlin. X V II (1930). th e Italians placed first their revo­ lutionary republican principles.f In his usual . 1866-1871 Uiinlrli. • mini was an able though mercurial character who during his stay in the Balkans I* 11 h im I the Greek. Marco Antonio [Canini].1 I'or details see J.28 Am ongst Ilie Yugoslavs C anini had no g reater success. Vingt ans d ’exil (Paris. for example. H. T he populace accepted lilu proposals b u t he found Prince M ichael tim id and unwilling to ii I boldly. von Reiswitz. “Un prevestitor al confederajiei balcanice: Marc’ Antonio Canini.” I MnWc Academ iei Romdne. Berlin-Belgrad. D espite the unification of m ost of II uly through the diplom acy of C avour. '’Un ap6tre Italien de l’entente Carpatho-Balcanique: Marc’ Antonio i mini. 107— "" N.” he deplored.2 6 In th e next year Francis Joseph came to term s w ith his H ungarian mibjects b y th e Ausgleich setting up a dual em pire. in spite of these developm ents. (lie D anubian federation m ovem ent. 28-51. 105. urged the building of a canal at i «кInIIi.” A cadtm ie Roum aine. th ey rem ained exiles. bulletin de la section historique.

b u t confederations. it is because I also have m y lucky s ta r . 259.’’ Canini. C anini m ade a final gesture of defiance. op. .. . I who. Greece should therefore n ot look to B ritain for aid and should certainly n o t abandon the millions of countrym en under T urk ish rule for th e sake of 300.’’3 1 In 1863 Canini finally returned to Ita ly where five years later he published his m em oirs in which he urged Italian aid for the liberation of th e B alkan C hristians and pleaded once m ore for cooperation am ongst the subject peoples.000 Ionians. H e published an article w ith the title. 258. In reply Canini published a pam phlet entitled Greece.. Serbs and Albanians subjugated to th e T u rk s. nego­ tiations were being carried on w ith B ritain for the cession of the Ionian Isles. cit.. in which he argued th a t E ngland was in terested only in m aintaining the status quo in the N ear E ast and in preserving the O tto m an E m pire as a barrier against R ussian ex­ pansion. 3 0Cited in Canini. On the day of the election of George.80 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y had ju s t broken o u t and K ing O tto overthrow n. Greeks.80 C an in i’s efforts w ent unheeded. however. in th e middle of public rejoicing dared to tell the people such harsh tru th s. A t the tim e. one should be able to destroy T u rk ey in a few m onths. T he m oral and m aterial aid of civilized E urope would probably be forthcom ing to th e Slavo-Hellenes. if I was not killed th a t day. op. . Serbia and Ita ly in the Eastern Question. “ If I was not thrashed soundly. that audacity which makes great men. T h e holy alliance of th e Slavo-H ellenes ought to proclaim the principle of non-intervention. striving to transform the revolution in to an irred en tist w ar against T urkey. accom panied by the retu rn of the Ionian Islands. 3 1Ibid. A single sta te in eastern E urope he con­ sidered im possible because of the m edley of races. a day of cele­ b ratio n th ro u g h o u t Greece. no g reat united sta te in these countries of the eadt. "T h e m ountain [the revolu­ tion] has been delivered of a m ouse. . cit. Canini a t once plunged into the political fray.” As Canini ruefully observed. th e ir common efforts should be crowned with success. B ritish diplom acy was successful in helping to bring a b o u t an agreem ent by which th e D anish Prince George should come to Greece. W ith th e aid of th e united and syn­ chronized m ovem ent of th e Bulgars. his name immortal in history as had hospodar Michael Obrenovich in 1862. .” A nd these confederations would serve as qin obstacle to Russia. 226. “Therefore. so th a t C an in i’s activities were resented in official circles and he was branded by a d ep u ty in the assem bly as a charla­ tan . . Ita ly would cer­ tain ly lend a hand . He lacked audacity. Instead Greece should ally herself w ith Serbia.

'. Canini. M ontenegro.. the prince of the Mirdites.3 4 I Miring th e C rim ean W ar he denounced the W estern Powers for i lunnpioning T u rk ey and criticized C avour for his policy of aiding I he allies ra th e r th a n atta c k in g A ustria. . . . perhaps under the guiding im pulse of the Hellenic I iice. urged the destru ctio n of the A ustrian and T urkish n ipi res and envisaged the form ation of a Y ugoslav s ta te consisting ol Croatia. . Accordingly. In this docum ent G aribaldi w arned th e Balkan peoples th a t th eir struggles in th e p a st had been stultified by lack of cooperation. 1886). n ationalities and urged th a t Ita ly should take the lend in the struggle for th eir freedom.”32 G aribaldi also was interested in th e E astern Q uestion. 64. Questions of frontier lines and political organization. create a D anubian confederation nml a B yzantine confederation. Bosnia and llnllaria. ■ 4Cf. was ready to support GariIhi Idl had he led an expedition against the Turks. T he barrier is created .” 35 U ndaunted by th e term s of the T re a ty of Paris. 1857 his four Slavic Letters In Ilie Italia del Popolo. Lettere al giornale “L 'A driatico” sulla цш tione Balcanica (Venice. In his last le tte r he expressed confidence in th e final libera­ tion of the subject. I'/ -I 176. supra.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 81 "Sooner or later E urope will set up a barrier against Russia. C arinthfa. 1919). D alm atia. 65. . link these two confederations under (he nam e of the U nited S ta te s of the E ast. . Vingt ans d'exil. R eestablish P o lan d . L a Grecia e VItalia nel Risorgimento Italiano (Florence. See Marco Antonio Canini. were of secondary im portance com pared to the g reat ob­ jective. MCited by Canini. In his nu'inoirs Canini states th a t in 1862 he received from G aribaldi a proclam ation which he tran slated in to the various B alkan languages mid d istrib u ted . M azzini called for aid to the subject IIn 1kan races in order to raise “ against the M uscovite em pire a living Iin crier of young associated n a tio n s” and eventually form ing “ a great II hi federation . 190. op. against I hi» tide which is alw ays advancing and which th reaten s to engulf everything. On these term s your triu m p h in th e com ing struggle is nimured. In these he gave an outline of Slavic history iikI literatu re.” 3 3 Mazzini also continued to w ork for a federation of th e east E uro­ pean races despite the failure of his earlier efforts to reconcile them . M azzini published betw een Ju n e 13 and Ju n e 19. Canini 'I'luU'H that in 1862 Bib Doda. “Join liimds. lie urged. . and was willing to acknowledge him н и I' mneror if the expedition proved successful. Vingt ans d ’exil. cit. Proclaim your fra te rn ity an d your alliance before the whole world. united action was essential. Kerofilas. for if all th e nationalities of Ibid. 15 Cited by Kerofilas. Serbia. 207. Garibaldi was extremely popular amongst Balkan revolutionists. In place of bolstering the (loomed O tto m an E m pire.. . The text of the proclamation is also ulvcn in C. In later years Canini continued to urge periodically this Ii il«Tution program. 185. 62. 174-177. liberation.

w as the f a c t t h a t n o t one of th e n a tio n a l g ro u p s in v o lv ed w as serio u sly ijtitcr в в H. E p iru s. H e foresaw th e e x p an sio n of G reece to in clu d e A lbani. he w ro te a n a rtic le in R om a P opolo in w hich he u rg ed th e sam e c o n fe d eratio n p lan w hich he had a d v a n c e d in 1866 b u t in w hich he d e m a n d ed sp e ed y a c tio n for feni t h a t th e Y u g o slav s m ig h t tu r n to R u ssia a n d m ak e C o n sta n tin o p le a S la v c a p ita l. cit.” F ortn ightly R eview . 1866 M azzin i pre s e n te d a so m e w h a t sim ila r p la n in a n a rtic le to th e Dovere entitled “ M issione ita lia n a : v ita in te rn a z io n a le . 57-61.il c o u n try . 1918). G reece also w as to o ccu p y C o n sta n tin o p le a n d preside th e re o v er a c o n fe d e ra tio n of n a tio n a litie s fo rm erly u n d e r th e O tto m a n E m p ire . 682. th e n th e em p ire w ould ra p id ly c ru m b le . M a ced o n ia to A d rian o p le. th e c o a st of A sia M in o r from S inope to K ilin d ria . h o w ev er. th e re w ould be “ . Bergmann.8 0 T h e a b d ic a tio n of K in g O tto in 1862 g av e M azzin i th e oppor t u n ity to w rite on th e s itu a tio n in G reece a n d th e fu tu re of th. A n d th e h ilt of th e sw ord d e stin e d to slay them is g ra sp e d b y S lav ic h a n d s . “Mazzini et les slaves. Kerofilas. “ The T u rk is h a n d A u s tria n E m p ire s .82 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d ie s in H ist o r y A u s tria w ould c o o p e ra te . O n J u n e 26. th e re aso n s fo r its failu re a re ap p a r e n t. T h e fu n d a m e n ta l cause for failu re. c e rta in ly not to th e e x te n t of b ein g w illing to fig h t for th e sak e of fo rm in g a federa­ tio n w ith c e n tu rie s-o ld enem ies. II (May.” in w hich h e a d v o c a te d the o v e rth ro w of th e A u s tria n a n d O tto m a n E m p ires a n d th e s e ttin g up of a D a n u b ia n a n d a S lav o -H ellen ic fed era tio n . Bergmann. “Mazzini on the Eastern'Question. .” 37 F ro m th is a c c o u n t of th e D a n u b ia n fe d e ra tio n m o v e m e n t of th* e ig h te e n fifties a n d eig h teen six ties. cit. 670-674. I n 1871. T h is w as d u e p a r tly to th e fa c t thal th e p e a s a n tr y w as n o t su fficien tly p o litic a lly conscious. Czech a n d Y u g o sla v fe d e ra tio n s." L e m onde slave. th e y e a r b efore his d e a th .. Stansfeld. th e Io n ia n a n d A egean islan d s a n d C re te .” B u t M azzin i. 559-579. T h e in te rn a tio n a l life of I ta ly sh o u ld try to h a s te n t h a t d e a th . Rhoden a n d C y p ru s. In th e first p lace it failed to o b ta in a n y co n sid erab le supporl from th e m asses of th e people. In t h a t case in s te a d of th e th re e frie n d ly P olish. loc. . C o n stan tin o p le sh o u ld be a free a n d a m p h y c tio n ic c ity a n d th e co n fed eratio n s should be allied to Ita ly . op.. 100 m illion SlavM d e p e n d e n t on a single ty ra n n ic a l w ill. CXXIV (April 1.i.” h e w ro te p ro p h e tic a lly . 1877). 37 J. b u t th e fe d e ra tio n w as to be loose enough to avoid tro u b le b etw een G reek s a n d S lavs. . w ith his suprem e fa ith in th e force of n a tio n a lism w as co n fid en t of th e fu tu re . “ are irre v o c a b ly co n d em n ed to die. A n o th e r d ifficu lty w as t h a t th e lean in g s p irits of th e m o v e m e n t w ere m o stly exiles w ho w ere th u s com p elled to c a rry on th e ir re v o lu tio n a ry a c tiv itie s as b e s t th e y could by long d ista n c e .

th e n e g o tia tio n s w ere ilm p p ed a n d th e H u n g a ria n s w ere ig n o red a n d le ft to sh ift for th e m Hl'l V 0 9 . each of th e se g ro u p s w as in te re s te d in th e fe d e ra tio n m ovem ent. . th e D a n u b ia n (n itra tio n m o v e m e n t a u to m a tic a lly b ecam e e x tin c t.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 83 ruled in a fe d e ra tio n . I t w as n o t iiii I i I sev eral y e a rs of exile h a d m a d e i t clear t h a t n o o u tsid e a id w as lorl hcom ing. In c o rrig ib le i I'v o ju tio n ists like M azzin i c o n tin u e d to a g ita te fo r th e o v e rth ro w i•! I lie O tto m a n a n d H a p s b u rg E m p ire s a n d fo r th e e s ta b lis h m e n t of •Ii tno cratic fe d e ra tio n s. how ev er. Ill sh o rt. a t le a s t p a rtia lly . R a th e r th e c e n te r of in te r e s t now s h ifte d to B elg rad e Iiito P rin ce M ich ael w as su ccessfu lly n e g o tia tin g w ith his neighliinri for th e fo rm a tio n of a p u re ly B a lk a n allian ce s y ste m d ire c te d inln iarily a g a in s t T u rk e y r a th e r th a n A u s tria . A n a n a ly sis of th e p ro p o sa ls m a d e a n d th e ta c llcn followed can lead to n o o th e r conclusion. n o t fo r its ow n sak e. S im ila rly th e S e rb s a n d th e R oumu uiaiis w ere w illing to discu ss co o p e ra tio n a n d fe d e ra tio n w ith th e I Im igarian s in 1853 a n d 1859 w h en th e in te rn a tio n a l s itu a tio n seem ed lnvorable. So lo n g a s th e ir a rm ie s wrru v ic to rio u s in 1849 th e M a g y a rs refu sed to c o n sid e r th e concesIihih n ecessary to w in th e c o o p e ra tio n of th e o th e r races. O nce th ese w ere fulfilled. T h e m o m e n t i t ch a n g e d . t h a t K o ssu th w as re a d y to m o d ify h is s ta n d fo r th e sa k e ’n |'t om m o n a c tio n a g a in s t A u s tria . b u t th e ir a c tiv itie s w ere of little p ra c tic a l ■ niifican ce. b y lliq union of th e P rin c ip a litie s a n d b y th e A usg leich. b u t o n ly in so fa r as i t m ig h t sa tisfy its unljonal a sp ira tio n s.

b u t the humiliation of their country during th e C rim ean W ar m ade them feel keenly tin need for a united peninsula ready to act in com m on. 1942). 1923). 8To enforce Greek neutrality. 84 . W.CHAPTER V T H E F IR S T B A L K A N A L L IA N C E SY ST E M . P. book III. Miller.” Journal of Central European Affait II (October. th e power and the patriotism necessary (n win the su p p o rt of the Yugoslavs. StavrianoH. British and French forces occupied Piraeus front 1854 to 1857. “The First Balkan Alliance System. W.'n 1 did possess th e character. Prince M ichael shared these aspirations. 1894). Canini. th e country was thoroughly aroused by th e events in Italy .1 p a rt of the Serbian n atio n a lity gave him great prestige in the ey< of the neighboring S lavs. 219-225. J u s t as the Italian s were being united into otn nation. Mich. the honesty of his c h ara c tt1 and his well known p atriotism had earned him universal esteem ami confidence and his position as a practically independent prince of . M ichael devoted himself to the ta sk of uniting th e B alkan states in p reparation for a w ar of liberation. Vingt ans d ’exil. Ignatieva (1864-1874). independent Soul b Slav state. la mission de Benjamin Kdllay й Belgrade. B u t since Serbia wan too w eak to a c t alone. T h ey had tak en practically no p a rt in the Danu bian federation m ovem ent of the previous decade. Ignatiev. W hen he ascended the throne for tin second tim e in Septem ber 1860. 1860-18781 T h e Balkan alliance system which was established in th e eighteen sixties centred largely aro u n d the figure of Prince M ichael of Serbia A lthough probably n o t as g reat a m an as his p artiarchal sire.) Other description of Michael are to be found in A n s dent Leben K on ig K a rls von Rumiinien (Stuttgail. the well-informed and shrew d R ussian m inister a t C onstantinople. R. 2"Zapiski Grafa H. 1860-1876. th e nobility of his feelings. so th e Yugoslavs dream ed of being liberated from Austrian and O tto m an rule and being united into one great.” 2 M ichael had ruled Serbia for three yem until forced to flee in 1842. 114. The Ottoman E m pire and its Successors 1801-1922 (Cain bridge. T he cooperation of Greece was essential for the success of Mi chael’s plans and the G reeks during the eighteen sixties were ready foi such cooperation. “Les relations de TAutriche-Hongrie et de b Serbie entre 1868 et 1874. 267-290. 226. Seton-Watson. described M ichael i follows: " If M ichael O brenovich did not have quite the intelligent! and th e energy necessary for the great work of reconstruction of tin eastern Slavs. H is am bition wait to m ake Serbia th e Piedm ont of the Balkans. 188.” Le monde j&lil (February. (Hereafter referred to as Izvestiya.3 M oreover tin Ita lia n w ar had aroused the people and stim ulated th e governmcnl 1Some of the material in this chapter has been published in L. 1926). I. 212. S.” Izvestiya M inistervstva Inostran n y k k D e l (1914).

Paleologue. Serbia. T his was m ost fo rtu n ate as G arashanin was им) only the m ost distinguished Serbian statesm an and a stau n ch |nl\nfMle of B alkan cooperation. w ith his nil ih of Balkan independence. . however. was held on A pril 19. 1859. . Petronievich. th e French m inister of foreign affairs. 1 1 1 | 1 1 itoinber.0 wrote. howi \ e i. 391. G orchakov fanned th e flames. b u t also Prince M ichael’s tru sted -I i . I hi M ay 20. w ith a view to th e em ancipation of the B alkans. From St.” L e monde slave. to C onstantinople to open negotiations w ith i In Serbian ag en t. like M ichael. “ Prepare yourself for fu rth er events. 1860 he issued a circular to all the governm ents denouncnif (lie P o rte ’s unfulfilled prom ises of reform and dem anding a rei onnultration of the problem . K allergis. “La premiere alliance entre la Grece et la Serbie. the Greeks envisaged them selves sweeping in sim ilar fashion I limngh Epirus. who sta rte d conversations in Belin the sum m er of 1860. W ith th e victories of the R ed S hirts in Sicily.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 85 In action. Renieris |ilnliied th a t it was the view of O tto th a t the E astern Question • Imnltl be settled by the B alkan sta te s them selves by m eans of either и * n Ien le of th e four B alkan natio n s or a close alliance between i п-м и and Serbia which M ontenegro and the P rincipalities would I> i limit and Lh6ritier. On Ju n e 24. D. one of the outstanding I и i Its of th e period. G arashanin and i In !i4 hian agent. i\ T he first conversation betw een Renieris. T here now followed the V illafranca arm istice. P etersburg the Greek m inister lniil/. was Informed th a t action in th e N ear E a st was im possible because of Ill'lliali hostility. M ontenegro and possibly the D anubian ISiiuipalities. C alabria and “ Niiples. " 1 I Lascaris.6 I liniivenel did n o t disapprove of the plan so th e first step was taken *i" и Greek officer. b u t th e exploits of G aribaldi revived th eir hopes. 1926). ■i iirccc did not then have a consul at Belgrade and was afraid of appointing one ill n nf iirousing the suspicious of the Porte. Shortly afterw ards. T he i i rt'lcs were disappointed. th e y will break M ill when th e Ita lia n affairs are over.iin N apoleon’s N ear E astern policy. M acedonia and C rete. O tto sent M arc Renieris. 1861. II. 456-458. G arashanin showed и 11 In ( onstantinople on a mission concerning the em igration of Moslr inn from Serbia. Especially g et on good term s V 'IIt Paris a t all cost!”4 Accordingly K allergis in P aris m ade very confidential overtures in I'liouvenel.ih Milosh a t this tim e w as seriously ill and M ichael n a tu ra lly was и иwilling to com m it himself to such an im p o rta n t u n dertaking under • in Ii circum stances. M ilosh died and M ichael. H istoire diplomatique.5 Soon a fte r R enieris’ arrival. becam e prince of Serbia. suggesting an i iilt'iile of Greece. K allergis was sen t to Paris to asi i l l . Accordingly In l lie spring of 1861. No encouragem ent was received.

consult each o ther before making any moves and tak e steps to prevent prem ature local explosions which m ight compromise the final success of the two allies. As for the Bulgarians.7 Now G arashanin and Renieris agreed first on the necessity for secrecy. E pirus. N ext th ey decided th a t th e alliance should be restricted al.86 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y be invited to join a t th e app ro p riate m om ent. especially for fear of A ustrian intervention in case of a leakage. however. being the only Balkan sta te which had diplom atic representatives in Europe. 8Ibid. and im m une from the ‘R ussian fever. .394. conscious of the future to which his co untry should aspire. Finally both Greece and Serbia were to push th eir m ilitary p reparations. so th ey decided th a t even if the Bulgarians were not form ally invited to su p p o rt the insurrection they would be draw n in by the exam ple of their coreligionists. both the Greeks and th e Serbs had little sy m pathy for them . accepting the principle of an en ten te w ith Greece and authorizing a continuation of the conversations. Bosnia. of broad views. T h ey also agreed to despatch emissaries am ong the C hristians in E uropean T u rk e y in order to prepare them for an up­ rising as well as to exam ine th e co u n try from a strateg ic viewpoint and estim ate w hat forces T u rk ey m aintained in th e various provinces. who had ju s t replaced Petronievich..” G arashanin th en d eparted from C onstantinople leaving Ristich. the o u tset to Greece and Serbia as C uza’s governm ent was too weak to be of much value and M ontenegrin aid could be obtained when­ ever necessary. T hrace and th e islands of the archipelago while Serbia would obtain no rth ern Albania. . loc. Ristich received a despatch from C hristich which was equiv alent to an ad journm ent sine die of the 1 Lascaris.. On N ovem ber 3. cit. th e Serbian foreign m inister. T hus no definite or detailed arrangem ent was m ade regarding the division of territo ry al­ though it was generally agreed th a t in case of victory Greece would in principle have T hessaly. . H erzegovina and M ontenegro if the la tte r did n o t oppose union. They believed th a t an agreem ent w ith the Bulgarians would be difficult to arrange as no prom inent B ulgarian was to be found “ .” ’ On the other hand they realized th a t it would hardly be possible to divide Bulgaria be­ tween Greece and Serbia. Greece. 393. M acedonia. On Ju n e 11 G arashanin notified Belgrade of the proposal and received instructions from Philip C hristich. A special effort was to be m ade to gain the support of those A lbanians who were discontented w ith th e T urkish regime. was to sound-very cautiously the views of the G reat Powers to these principles and to secure the support of those favorably disposed. 394-397. to carry on the negotiations with Renieris.

state-armed forces existed in иi bia when Michael came to the throne. 1 0Lascaris. th a t every effort would be m ade to fulfill I lie provisions of the convention as if it actu ally had been signed. 22. D. 394-399.1 1 Very n atu rally I lie leaders of th e B ulgarian ^evolutionary m ovem ent looked to Serbia for aid in th eir struggle against the T urks. cit.he B avarian dynasty. He first became prominent и мthe leader of the BrSila revolt of 1842 which was crushed by Albanian troops and Killcovski fled to Marseilles. C hristich perceived tw o obstacles to its mV. 1 1M. . T he B ulgarian people as a whole were beginning during this decade to become politically conscious. 1 1Rakovski was born in Kotel in 1818 and was sent to school in Constantinople lull left at an early age to join the revolutionary movement. 1930). I lie G reek governm ent was now becoming more and more preoccu> Itied w ith internal difficulties which eventually led to the overthrow lo l. Bulgarien unter der Tiirkenherrschaft. D uring these years the relations between th e Serbian and B ulgarian people were very cordial.. largely because of the large and prosperous B ulgarian com ­ m unity in th a t city. 1 7 39. No regular. Then he returned to Constantinople. Bulgarian stu d en ts atte n d e d Serbian schools and Bulgarian Imoles and periodicals were published in B elgrade. Constitutional Government in Bulgaria. Druga Vlada M ilola i M ichaila. Radeff. 220-224. however. T hus it was th a t George R akovski.9 He added. C onsequently it contented itself w ith the (insurances of Serbia regarding th e agreem ent in principles and on November 20.ning: intern al conditions in Serbia and the necessity of obtaining nrm s. organizing insurgent bands and seeking the uipport of foreign governm ents. I’ /1 -173. B ucharest was a center of such iH’livity. Oeuvre du rapprochement et de I'union des Serbes et des Half. 8-10. T here was no hope of getting rid of T urkish rule w ith o u t outside aid and the Bulgarian revolutionists consequently sp en t m uch tim e in the various Balkan i'iipitals collecting arm s. Jovanovic. B ulgarian exiles were given refuge and m ilitary training iti Serbia. 21.ares dan sle p a sst (Paris. Black. Hajek. I t was not until six years later I lint the alliance projected a t this tim e was realized. A fter acknow ledging the advantages of the proposed alliance.1 9 T he Serbian governm ent was n o t alone during this period in its efforts to unite the B alkan people. /25-228. L a Macedoine. Stragnakovitch. liul independent action was out of th e question. A nother cen ter was Belgrade.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 87 iti^ning of the projected alliance. loc.1 2 the acknowledged leader of eThese obstacles were not fictitious. E qually enthusiastic were the llnlgarian revolutionary leaders. 1861 the G reek m inister a t C onstantinople was a u th o r­ ized to acknowledge receipt of th e despatch and to inform Ristich I lint although no convention had been signed Greece would con­ sider herself already allied to Serbia. later fought with I lie Russians in the Crimean War and continued his agitation in the various Balkan i ountries in behalf of Bulgarian freedom.

peace was patched up between the T u rk s and the Serhii to th e advantage of the la tte r. cit. M ikoff. cit. Canini. On June 15. tu rn ed to M ichael as soon as the latl» i had become th e ruler of Serbia. 15 T osh ev.” T he journal. 1929). 646-658. I t is a p p aren t tli. Serbia. On M arch 20. X I I (January.Viitorul. 1).1 4 Rakovski. X I I (April. however. lasted for only ten w eekly issuon as th e B ulgarian colony of B ucharest was shocked by its advanced social theories of political equality and land to the peasan ts.. “ M ichael of Serbia and the Turkish O ccupation. 229. Canini was aware of this situation but kept silent. Montenegro and th e B ulgarians. Radeff. he worked for an u nderstanding between Greece..88 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y the B ulgarian revolutionists. 133-154. 1864 he founded a journal. H ajek. R akovski began preparations for ihe uprising and organized a B ulgarian Legion in Belgrade.000 Bulgarian volunteers would be available in case of united ас tion against T u rk ey . From A thens R akovski went to C etinje and Belgrade b u t since he received little encouragement he continued to B ucharest. In the midul of these activities an incident occurred which upset the plans. 71. Its m otto was. op. P our le droit et la p a ix dans les B alkans (G eneva. I. which appeared in both R oum anian and Bui garian. 409-429.1 3 Ig n o ran t of this. In spite of his assurance th a t a t leasl 20." Slavonic Review. 72-74. . for as has been noted. “ Bui garians and R oum anians everyw here! the key of the N ear E ast is in our h a n d s. R ig h t of N ationali tie s. In 1863 he w ent to A thens and saw varionti political and m ilitary leaders. however. 227. Rakovski im m ediately called for a general revolt b u t the Powers in tervened.1 5 13 A t the tim e. he com plained th a t Greek cooperation wan unlikely because of the opposition of England and the traditional Hellenic d istru st and fear of the Slavs. Bddouchtnost. 72. 11. 1919). 1934). Vinyj ans d'exil. T. 14 A. 1934). X I I (July 1933). Toshev. In a num ber of telegram s which he sent to Prince M ichael from A thens. and Rakovski was left w ith nothing to show for his efforts. cit.'K Serbian diplom acy was n o t exactly straightforw ard. Riker. W ith the aid ol C aptain P eter Pejovich. T here he turned to the idea of Bulgarian R oum anian cooperation. op. “ Friendship and Alliance. it does n ot appear th a t he received m uch en couragem ent. 237-239. Y V . a t ab o u t th e sam e tim e G arashanin in C onstantinople wart insisting th a t th e B ulgarians be excluded from a Serbo G reek alliant < because they possessed no outstanding leader and were under Russian influence.” and its purpose was sum m ed up in R akovski's phrase.. an agent of Prince Nicholas of Montenegro. persisted in his efforts and sought like Mi chael to build up a B alkan alliance against the T urks. I. 1862 Belgrade was bom barded by its T urkish garrison. Balkanskite voini \T1ie Balkan W ars ] (Sofia. An agreem ent w as reached by which the B ulgarians were to create a crisis by staging a revolt and Michael was to follow w ith a declaration of w ar on T urkey. op.

The purpose of these com m ittees.t. which turned to th e T u rk s for cooperii I loti. The'G reeks only think of finding a European princelet ч In» would deign to com m and them . T his “ coalitiune sa c ra ” or "holy union. op. have to rely on th eir own strength. It wiih accepted by Napoleon. local and central. where there is at least a glimmer of hope. 1866 he was forced to abdicate. therefore. ..” Canini. w hen on M ay 10. 581-583. R akovski told Canini: “There is '"'llnng to be done here. 19 Cf.” as it was com m only known. . provided th a t th e B ucharest Bulgarian com m ittee should cHlablish sim ilar central com m ittees in B ulgaria and Serbia and th a t I hey in tu rn should found local com m ittees in th eir respective states.exarchate which by this d ate had developed into a b itte r G reco-Bulgar feud. During the 1863 Polish R evolution N apoleon III secretly suggested to M <'I |m u c h various territorial changes. 284. . the Italian am bassador in Paris. .. as if the keys to the Balkans were not in our hands. op. H islutit' de I'Autriche depuis la mort de M arie-Tkercse (Paris. K . U ndoubtedly this plan was to и certain ex ten t a resu lt of the struggle for a Bulgarian. However. France does not i п т cm herself with us. he spent th e rest of his (lays organizing his fellow counliym en for the w ork of national liberation. Л T urkish occupation of the provinces was feared so in M arch 1866 a (jjioup of B ulgarians and R oum anians drew up the "A ct of Union between the B ulgarians and the R oum an ian s” for th eir m utual prolection. . L. recognize us. R oum anians and oilier nationalities had only th eir own interests a t h eart and th a t the Hnlgarians would.17 R akovski. cit. S. it hlinuld be noted.1 9 |Л So weak did Roum ania appear th at plans were m ade to hand the country over Im Austria. H istoire du second em pire (Paris. . I must Чи'чн m yself there. . D juvara. . but rejected by Austria and England. cit. Asseline. the Secret Hnlgarian C entral C om m ittee. was to prepare (lie people for a com m on revolt against th e T u rk s and to create inde­ pendent or autonom ous sta te s in R oum ania. all of which should eventually unite in a confederacy. including the liberation of V enetia in return Iui Ihe acquisition of th e Principalities. 1877). On the eve of th e Austro-Prussian War this iIhii was again brought forward. a petition to S ultan A bdul Aziz proposing a dual TurcoItnlgarian sta te in which th e S u ltan would be crowned as T sa r of the llnlgars as well as S ultan of the T urks. infra. .B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 89 D uring all this period C u za’s position in R oum ania was extrem ely iihnky1 ®and finally on F eb ru ary 11.18 There now appeared in B ucharest a new organization. Serbia. 107. 1899). H ow ever th e Bulgarians are honest and brave! . Kpirus. 1866 ( irol was elected to the R oum anian throne th e need for Bulgarian иId was over and the Union w as ordered dissolved. M ontenegro. IV. 106. 4 1 1 17 This account uf the “ holy union” is based on a m anuscript kindly made availill ib 1о the author by Mr. . Sugareff of the Agricultural and M echanical College ui IYxhs. Europe ■ Ii ii n nol. this tim e by Nigra. Italy has abandoned^ us. A lbania and B ulgaria. H erzegovina. . had not supported this "holy u nion” as he had by I Ill's tim e come to the conclusion th a t the Serbs. Inspired by the A u stro-H ungarian Ausgleich . Accordingly. . Pierre de la i ш ит. V. it sent early in IK67. 1 1 As far back as 1863 when he was in A thens.. (IM .

Engelhardt. a 4Ibid.20 In the m eantim e th e situ atio n both in the B alkans and in western E urope.115. 82. And w hen th e Cretan revolt broke out in 1866 a group of Bulgarians under the leadership of Dr. Chom akovs sent a m em oir to the G rand Vizier assuring him of th eir fidelity in case of trouble w ith Greece. op. 113. convoked a general assem bly a t Sphakia.90 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y T h u s sim ilar schemes for T urco-B ulgarian cooperation h ad been ad vanced in num erous articles betw een 1866 and 1869. 209. B u t if th e plan were n o t adopted. 21 Crete had been returned to T urkey b y the London P rotocol of February 20. 1906). particularly in th e new spapers Narodnost and M akedonija. th e T sa r was anxious to m arry Princess Olga to K ing George of Greece and he therefore supported Greece on the C retan question and favored a Greco-Serb alliance in case of war 20 T osh ev. cit. had become unusually favorable for united B alkan action. cit. Radeff. a fte r th e defeat a t Sadowa.. and still another to occupy Constant! nople [Russia]. would elim inate to a g reat ex ten t the possibility of such foreign intervention. 242 244.114. E. T he plan advanced in th e 1867 m em oir provided for th e ap p ointm ent by th e S ultan of и C hristian governor for B ulgaria who would head the adm inistration and local arm ies and follow the advice of a representative assembly. F inally it pointed o u t frankly th a t the Ottoman Em pire was menaced by various states— one planned to restore the B yzantine E m pire [Greece]. I t also called for a national m ilitia headed by a Bulgarian commander.2 1 Im m ediately G reco-Turkish relations becam e strained and Greece eagerly sought an alliance w ith Serbia. op. book III. solution (Paris. th e recognition of B ulgarian as the official language in B ulgaria and the establishm ent of a “ B ulgarian O rthodox C h urch” independent ol any o th er church. however. 81. op.2 4 As for Russia. H istoire diplom atique. III. cit.2 3 Moreover A ustria-H ungary. cit. T his plan. 135. but the island was frequently convulsed by revolts. 404. In the sum m er of 1866 the C retans had broken into open revolt. D etails of the 1866 revoll are given in D riault and Lh6ritier. received little encouragem ent from eith er the Bulgars or the T u rk s so thlil the sponsoring com m ittee petered o ut by the end of 1868. 180-320.. . 2 3Izvestiya (1914). I. L a question macedonienne. 1830.. would be unlikely to intervene or to occupy Bosnia-H erzegovina in case of trouble in the B alkans. ctat actucl.. H ajek. 22 Lascaris. book III. th e B ulgarians would be compelled to look elsewhere for relief.2 2 Sim ilarly Michael considered the m om ent opportune as the Porte was engaged with th e C retan revolutionaries and Greece would be easier to come to term s w ith in view of her difficulties w ith T u rk ey . 399. declared th eir independence of the O ttom an E m pire and proclaim ed their union w ith the Hellenic kingdom . loc. 134. an o ther to extend its te rrito ry a t the ex­ pense of the S ultan [Serbia]. (1914). 230-233. T he creation of the T urco-B ulgarian state. it was ar­ gued. 114.

cit. T his alliance system was lnihcd. *' l|i. " hvi'stiya (1914). It will be seen later th a t the Russians also encouragcd a SerbItnlj i г agreem ent. . T h e Austrian governни ui objected to this policy and m ade it clear th at any increase of Serbian strength ml iiulcpeudence would be opposed. 385-402. See also M .” Ibid. 193. book III. . th e people restrained them selves w ith all th e m ore difficulty now Ib a t th e prestige of th e P o rte and of th e S ultan had been greatly i miiipromised by recent events. a lui Cuza VodS.Francuske i A u strije na If ilktnin и vreme Napoleona I I I [French and A u stria P olicy in the Balkans in the I i mi/ of Napoleon I I I ] (Belgrade. II (1932). 133. X X I I . "Politica externS. who was undou b ted ly th e best inform ed am bassa­ dor in C onstantinople.X X I I I (Septem ber• l ili< i . exasperated by th e a rb itra ry acts of a u th o rity and disillimiimed as to th e prom ised reform s. upon th e two strongest states. reported to A thens th a t a Serbo-R oum anian alliance had I ii Higned on M ay 26. V. book IV.” I i dlvn (1914). acted with the arriere pensee of preparing the huh I for a cam paign on th e R hine . . I !• IViinni and M.. 168-170. A serious uprising could have iMViiiTcd in 1866 . despite th e p ro tests of B ritain mil A ustria. finally. “ Le trait6 d ’alliance entre la • V i i ' И. 99. . hook III. 1925). to assure In i m i II of Ragland’s cooperation. op. I.Britain could be led to give any degree of support. §i desvoltarea ideii de unitate и i|ImimIH. 1867 a conference of the Great Powers l i illnnirtK the Cretan question. I ill. on the other hand. stirred up by secret sociH ii‘. 1866. R istitch were charged w ith elaborating at C on stan tin op le. In accordance with th e principle of nation ality N apoleon favored Balkan liberal и Imm Turkish rule and freedom from Russian and Austrian dom ination.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 91 with Turkey. and the I i IIt ui of the Christians in T urkey. 104. as m ight have been expected. op. R uined by taxes and having nothing mure to lose. .4. Popovid. Lh6ritier.” Rcvista Istoricd Romitnd. . and he despatched a copy of the tre a ty 1 1 1 lit bis m emoirs Ign atiev states that: “ I sought to favor the en ten te which M. ' lilunis. 100. T o counter Austrian influence in the Balkans 11 1 I11 n icli governm ent proposed on January 1.” Revue des etudes napoleoniennes. the relations of Greece with her neighbors.. . D riault and Lh6ritier. described the situ atio n as follows: I'lie events in C rete and th e im potence of th e T u rk ish govern­ m ent in suppressing th e insurrection had a general rebound in all |iiulB of th e O ttom an E m pire. th e G reek consul a t B ucharest. in th e shipm ent of arm s from R ussia to Serbia.iiiilicv com m ented on French policy as follows: " . T he first of these agreem ents was betw een Serbia iM iil Roum ania. . Riker. Ignatiev. 136-141. 134. .-Serbia i|n« viewed as the nucleus of a future Y u goslav state and the P orte was urged by the I n in Ii governm ent to consider seriously Serbian aspirations. See also Riker. H istoire diplom atique.29 Four \ I’lii'H later. I Ins Balkan peoples them selves were psychologically read y for revolt by 1866. R elations betw een th e two countries had been close linv 1862 w hen Cuza h ad cooperated.28 As a result of this favorable situ atio n several B alkan alliances w n r signed during th e nex t few years. .25 France also was favorably inclined tow ards the B alkan ни I ions28 until th e R hine question compelled N apoleon to draw close Id A ustria in prep aratio n for fu tu re trouble w ith P russia. 1866. if th e G erm an w ar had continued an o th er few iiKinlhs. III. 1924). understanding that the issue of the Eastern Question н lln< only one on which G reat. on A ugust 18. Politika. in II i\vni|i closer to the H apsburg Em pire. 85. N apoleonic France. Brfttianu. cit. 'h i liia and Greece. she w ished.27 Finally. I I'd'l). la Serbie. 393.

1866. “ Le m ouvem ent panbalkanique et les d ifflren ts aspects des rela­ tions inter-balkaniques dans le pass6. In case of victory. In case of defeat. however. F inally the prince of Serbia was en tru sted w ith th e ta sk of com m uni­ cating the tre a ty to th e prince of M ontenegro and of inviting the la tte r to particip ate in the execution of the convention. op. therefore. S. Serbia was to extend her frontiers a t the expense of T u rkey. the other was to aid with a force of not less th a t 5000 fully equipped men. Valanesco. He added th a t M ichael hesitated to ra tify th e tre a ty because of th e dangers in­ volved b u t he expressed th e opinion th a t it would be ratified w ith a few modifications. th a t the date given. T he signature. which th e tre a ty bore. H . who was R oum anian foreign m inister in M ay 1866. A t any ra te th e tre a ty was never p u t into practicc and a com pletely new alliance was signed by R oum ania and Serbia in Ja n u a ry .. T h e correct d ate of th e tre a ty .. 141. cit. Batowski. Accord­ ing to th is version the tre a ty provided th a t a t a d ate to be m utually agreed upon. K n ez M ichailo i zajednicka radnja balkanskih naroda [Prince Michael and the Movement for the Unification of the Balkan Peoples] (Belgrade.to be invoked. T om itch.3 2 M ichael also renewed his co ntacts w ith the B ulgarian revolution80 T h e text of this treaty is given in appendix A. I t appears. cit. th e tw o co n tracting parties were to inform th e Porte of th eir decision to discontinue p aym ent of th e ’. was th a t of Nicolae R osetti B&l&nescu. T ru e enough Ghionis later inform ed A thens th a t the tre a ty had been ratified after a slight change in th e clause on m ilitary aid. is incorrect. 1865. In th e event of M ichael’s death . 1866 betw een Serbia and M ontenegro. was to receive financial indem nity. T osh ev. D elyannis. lim ited by the D anube. Br&tianu also suggests that this m ight have been merely a prelim inary draft rather than a regular treaty. I. Piro6anac. 1868. II (1938). a tre a ty was signed on Septem ber 23.3 1 In conform ity w ith th e provisions of the Serbian-R oum anian con vention.” Revue internationale des etudes balkaniques. b u t P e tru M avrogheni. 1863 to O ctober 29. is probably 1865 ra th e r th a n 1866. th a t th e tre a ty had been signed by the plenipotentiaries. loc. Prince Nicholas was to be his successor. N. 74.30 T he Serbs denied th e existence of any such tre a ty b u t Ignatiev in C onstantinople assured his G reek fellow m inister. T h e te x t of this tre a ty has n o t been published and it is known only th a t it was concluded w ith the aid of R ussian diplo­ m acy and th a t it provided for the abdication of Prince N icholas and for th e creation of a united Serbian-M ontenegrin sta te under the Serbian dynasty.r trib u te. 3 6 -38. who was m inister of foreign af­ fairs from A ugust 29. M ay 26. while Rou­ m ania. 31 Br&tianu. the protection of R ussia w as.92 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y which he had been able to obtain from a R oum anian official. 1895). 341. I t was n ot B&lilnescu. Z. 33 V. L a form ation de Vital yougoslave . If this should result in a T urkish a tta c k on either p arty .

и Cited by T osh ev. 234.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 93 w ies and cam e to an agreem ent w ith them in th e spring of 1867. cit. I. If/S . . R ussia was more inclined to back M ichael th a n th e unorganized Bulgarians. see ibid. The situ atio n has been well described by M ichaelov. 14 M ost of its members were influential. Radeff. 452.. " * Cited b y S. national church and national em ­ blems. On I'Vbruary 2 . w ealthy. T h e relations betw een the two races were specified in detail and provisions were m ade for com m on defence. because R ussia m ade us u n d erstan d. D uring th a t year I lie idea for th e liberation of our country revived in us and a t the initiative of th e Russian diplom atic agent.” Pages from Bulgarian L ife (1927). 1927). op. Baron OfTenberg. T h is publication is the year bunk published by the Bulgarian Student A ssociation of N ew York.. Druga vlada Л 1Itoin i M ihaila.3 5 T his group form ulated on J a n u a ry 26. W ith the assassination of M ichael. which had pan-Slav tendencies and was in­ terested in getting R ussian aid ra th e r th a n in cooperating w ith the Roum anians or th e Serbians. several persons from all large Bulgarian (owns were invited to consider th e w ay in which it will [sic] be posiiible to draw nearer to th e Serbian governm ent and prepare our fu­ ture liberation. (he B enevolent Society. and of die Serbian. a prom inent member of th e Society. 233. “T he Serbo-Bulgarian Agreem ent of 1867 for a Y ougoslav < iiiilrdoration. a fte r which it would be signed. 1867 G arashanin replied th a t th e program was entirely nalisfactory and he urged th a t it be popularized am ongst th e Buli irian volunteers. ad m in istrativ e system . op.” 3 6 Il u n i i c ( I’lirlw. i nrrency. In 1867 I was fo rtu n ate to be a m em ber of th e old com m ittee34 in Bucharest. M agazinovitch. For the text of the Bulgarian program. N icholas laid claim to the Serbian and continued to do so after the accession of M ilan. presided by th e la te C hristo Georgieff. “ Please read this let ter. 32.. 76. so it cam e to be known as the “old com m ittee” In contrast to the young men with radical social ideas who followed R akovski. 27. 1867 a program providing lor the creation of a Serbo-B ulgarian sta te to be headed by Prince Michael and his successors. cit. I'll us the B enevolent Society found it necessary to tu rn to Belgrade. T he plan was handed to the Serbian representative in B u­ charest who relayed it to Belgrade. “ to th e gentlem en who signed the program and Ii'll them th a t Prince M ichael approves w h a t th ey have done and . 33 H ajek. See Jovanovi£. however. 76. иcourages them and wishes them success for th eir holy cause which will be accom plished w ith the aid of G od.” he concluded.3 3 In this period. as all E urope would be aroused against h er if it were given d ire c tly . T here it was w arm ly received. and generally conservative M ii’mhers of the Bulgarian com m unity. th a t her aid would be possible only through Serbia. A group of B ulgarians in B uch arest had organized a new com m ittee.

39 T o s h e v . M a c e d o n ia a n d T h ra c e w ere d e fin itely recog­ n ized as B u lg a ria n . T h e significance of th is a c c e p ta n c e is a p p a re n t. L a nouvelle S erbie. M ish ew . 1 0 -1 3 . leav in g th e d e ta ils to n e g o tia tio n s for a c o m p le te u n d e r­ sta n d in g . 1867. The B u lg a ria n s in the P ast. op. and e q u a lly sig n ifican t.. 2 2 -2 4 . w ho also found th e p la n ac­ c e p ta b le . H a jek . B elg rad e M a y 22. w as an x io u s to conclude a fo rm al tr e a ty w ith th e S e rb ia n g o v e rn m e n t a n d . 38 C ited b y T o s h e v . R ad eff.. cit. 3 8 6 -3 9 1 . P e tro v ich .. 804. L V II (Jun e 15. 81. i t specifically s ta te d t h a t th e B u lg a ria n p o rtio n o f th e s ta te w as to c o n sist of Bui g a ria . . 1910). F in a lly th e follow ing official c o m m u n ic atio n w as issu ed :38 T o th e B o a rd of th e B u lg a ria n B e n e v o le n t S o c iety : I h a v e receiv ed y o u r p ro to co l (m in u te s of th e m e e tin g ) of April 5 /1 7 . s e n t to m e th ro u g h th e S erb ian re p re s e n ta tiv e in B u ch a­ re s t in re g a rd to som e b e n e v o le n t o b jects. 1. 1867. in full a g re e m e n t w ith th e b asis of th e p ro p o sed p o in ts w e will ta k e steps for a c tio n . op. T h is w as p ra c tic a lly id e n tic a l to th a t of J a n u a r y ex ccp t t h a t th e new s ta te w as to be know n a s Y ugoslavia ra th e r th a n S e rb ia -B u lg a ria . L 'u n io n e t l a conference balkanique. a cc o rd in g ly . S liv en sk y . I. R . cit. c it. T h e re fo re. fa r m ore im p o rta n t. G A R A S H A N IN . p re se n te d it to G a ra sh an in . T h e la t t e r ex p ressed his full a p p ro v a l. P in o n . op. cit. 86. a sorl of n a tio n a l c o n v e n tio n w as called a t B u c h a re st. 1867. L a B u lg a rie d e p u is le tra itc de B e rlin et la p a ix d a n s les B alkans (P a ris. 1927). cit. F o r th e first tim e a p la n for a united Y u g o sla v s ta te h a d been ag reed u p o n a n d officially a c c e p te d .. 29. S tr a g n a k o v ich . a n d a f te r som e d e la y an a u d i­ ence w as o b ta in e d w ith P rin c e M ich ael. 194. 234. 193. 241. T h ra c e a n d M ace d o n ia . H a v in g e x am in ed th e con­ te n ts of th e se m in u te s. a d o p te d a new p ro g ra m . B etw een se v e n ty and e ig h ty d eleg ates from all p a r ts of B u lg a ria assem bled a n d on A pril 17. D e sp ite its c a u tio u s w o rd in g th is n o te does re p re se n t S e rb ia ’s a c c e p ta n c e in p rin cip le of th e B u lg a ria n c o n d itio n s. I find t h a t n o th in g s ta n d s in th e w a y of these b e n e v o le n t o b je c ts b e in g fu rth e re d b y S e rb ia also. I. 87. S h o p o v a n d K olo n i.94 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y T h e B u lg aria n c o m m itte e .37 T h is d o c u m e n t w as ta k e n to B elg rad e w here tw o re p re se n ta tiv e s of th e c o m m itte e . M o re o v e r th e p ro g ra m w as concluded b y th e n o m in a tio n of a c o m m itte e of seven w ith in s tru c tio n s to con­ clu d e a n a g re e m e n t on th e follow ing c o n d itio n s: T h e agreem ent sh o u ld be in force th e d a y it w as signed a n d th e S erb ian g overnm ent sh o u ld co n sid er itse lf b o u n d b y th e a g re e m e n t to re n d e r all th e m a­ te ria l a n d m o ral a ssista n c e n ecessary fo r th e a tta in m e n t of th e com ­ m on e n d . " U n e con f6d£ration b a lk a n iq u e .” R evue des dev:.39 37 T h e te x t o f th is A pril program is g iv e n in ap p en d ix B . h ow ever. 242. a n d . R ad eff. J . B rief a c c o u n ts of th e se S erb o-B u lgarian n egotiation s are g iv e n in D ev a s. op. 803.. op.. m on des. 233. 2 0 3 -2 0 6 . loc. cit.

if I could be of som e a ssista n c e to th e cau se of th is h a n d fu l of heroes.” 41 H o w ev er no e n te n te re su lte d from th e se n e g o tia tio n s. .th e m ission is re v e a le d in th e in s tru c tio n s of T ric o u p is to A n to n o poulos: T h e re [B u ch arest] y o u w ill ta k e p a r t in s e c re t c o n v e rsa tio n s w ith I lie P rin ce . j in c id e n t of th e C e n tra l C o m m itte e in A th e n s in fa v o r of th e C re ta n s : I w ould th e re fo re b e m o re th a n h a p p y .. loc. 4 20. th e G ra n d C ro ss of th e O rd e r of th e S av io r. M ean w h ile A n to n o p o u lo s h a d a rriv e d a t B u c h a re st on F e b ru a ry 6 mid on th e n e x t d a y p re se n te d P rin c e C aro l w ith th e le tte r a n d th e d eco ratio n from K in g G eorge. T h e reaso n s a re rev ealed In the follow ing e x c e rp ts of a le tte r (N o v e m b e r 3. 1867. . A n a g re e m e n t sh o u ld be re a c h e d a m o n g th e fo u r C h ristia n fitatcs re g a rd in g th e a c tio n to b e ta k e n a n d th e n e c essa ry p re p a ra ­ tions. to L eo n M elas. In J a n u a r y 1867 foreign m in is te r T ric o u p is s e n t M ich ael A n to n o p o u lo s tp B u ­ c h a re s t on th e p re te x t of g iv in g to P rin c e C aro l. Before co n sid erin g th is tr e a ty it sh o u ld be n o te d t h a t G reece like S erbia. N e g o tia tio n s w ere b eg u n first w ith R o u m a n ia . 1866) from P . in th e ir elected task. on b e h a lf of K in g G eorge. to th e 40 C ited b y L a scaris. his co u n sello rs a n d o th e r p o litic a l m en w hom y o u th in k it useful to in fo rm of th e d esire of th e G reek g o v e rn m e n t to tig h te n I be b o n d s of frien d sh ip w h ich u n ite G reece a n d R o u m a n ia . P re s id e n t.40 S ev eral d a y s a f te r th e d e p a r tu r e of A n to n o p o u lo s. .B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 95 M o re im p o r ta n t th a n a n y of th e se a g re e m e n ts w h ich M ich ael h a d th u s fa r co n clu d ed w as h is allia n c e w ith G reece on A u g u st 26. c it. . In re tu r n th e P rin c e ex pressed in te re st. \ . th e R o u m a n ia n it g e n t to F ra n c e . 41 C ited in ib id . A fte r se v e ra l c o n v e rsa tio n s B a la c e a n u a n d Tricoupis ag reed o n th re e p rin c ip le s w hich w ere to se rv e as a basis for an e n te n te : 1. 3. T h e E a s te rn Q u estio n sh o u ld be solv ed b y th e com m o n a c tio n of the C h ris tia n s of th e O rie n t w ith o u t foreign a i d . T h e re a l p u rp o se o f. B a la c e a n u . i n th e w elfare a n d in th e p ro g ress of th e H ellen ic n a tio n a s well пн in th e e v e n ts w hich are o c c u rrin g in th e isla n d of C r e te . T h e s itu a tio n in th e N e a r E a s t sh o u ld be b a se d on th e p rin cip le of n a tio n a litie s. M av loyheni. h a d b een a tte m p tin g to com e to a n u n d e rs ta n d in g w ith h e r neighbors. b y th e ir co lla b o ra tio n .. s to p p e d a t A th e n s w ith a n a u to g ra p h e d Idlaer from P rin c e C aro l to K in g G eorge a n d w ith s e c re t in s tru c tio n s from th e P rin c e to discu ss th e so lu tio n of th e E a s te rn Q u estio n w ith the G ree k g o v e rn m e n t. a n d of o u r co n viction t h a t th e p eoples of th e E a s t m u s t live in fra te rn a l u n d e r­ sta n d in g in o rd e r to su cceed. R o u m a n ia n m in is te r fo r foreign affairs. 2. . M r. 421.

real peace and harm ony of her citizens. . . reported th a t. 1867. th e violent passions which are always th e im m ediate result of every revolution and of so­ cial changes when th e y reach th e people. 1923). On Septem ber 30. H istoire diplomatique. 1866-1880 (Paris. thus leaving the viceroy no basis for fu rth er intervention. On F eb ru ary 23. III. have paralyzed th eir ex­ terio r action. 43 N . 104. On th e o th er hand th e internal situ atio n in R oum ania was definitely unsatisfactory. th e com plete disorganiza­ tion in which th e form er regime has left them . How ever. L a politique exterieure de la Grice avant et apres le congres de Berlin (Paris. for th e tim e being. and concentrated it on domestic questions which are th e order of th e d ay . T he negotiations had begun in M ay 1866 when M ichael A ntonopoulos approached R istich in C onstantinople to determ ine the basis on which the Serbian governm ent would re4 2 Cited in ibid. 24. . P rohaska. As in the case of E gypt. no evidence of additional G reco-E gyptian cooperation is available. . T . . the viceroy m ade representations to th e S ultan regarding T urkish policy in C rete and urged m oderation.96 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y cause of the people of C rete.4 2 P robably there were oth er factors involved in addition to internal difficulties. Iorga. 1924). 227. 16 Driault and Lh6ritier. “ In short Serbia possesses w h at R oum ania u n fo rtu n ately lacks to w ork miracles in progress: well regulated finances. 1867 the G reek consul general in E g y p t was given secret instructions to begin negotiations for an alliance w ith th e vice­ roy. U ndoubtedly th e R oum anian gbvernm ent considered it unwise to ally itself w ith Greece a t a tim e when the C retan revolt threaten ed to p recipitate a G reco-Turkish war. 227.. 4 4 Izvestiya (1914). H istoire diplomatique. the Greek governm ent did sign a tre a ty of alliance w ith Serbia. 228.4 8 Sim ilarly in April 1867 the G reek governm ent notified Prince Nicho­ las of its desire to begin secret negotiations for an en ten te b u t no fu rth e r d a ta is available on this subject.” 4 3 T he negotiations w ith R oum ania were b u t one of m any th a t the G reek governm ent was conducting a t this tim e. III. book III.4 1 5 On A ugust 26. Serbia and even w ith E gypt. 33. . . how ever. D riault and Lhfiritier. As a result of pressure from th e consul general and Ignatiev. Lascaris. However. C ertainly domestic considerations were n o t allowed to stand in the w ay of an alliance w ith Serbia. th e S ultan re­ plied th a t he would henceforth do w ithout E g yptian troops. it ap pears th a t in all p robability no definite agreem ent was reached. 4 6 S. 1867 the Roum anian vice-agent in Belgrade. Extrem ely irritated . In view of the situ a­ tion in C rete and th e encouragem ent of Ig n atiev 4 4 a tte m p ts were m ade to form alliances w ith M ontenegro. general respect for th e law. Correspondance diplom atique roumaine sous le roi Charles I . 423. the tre a ty which was the keystone of the whole alliance system .

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sum e the conversations in te rru p te d in 1861. On Ju n e 12, 1866 A n­ tonopoulos reported th a t th e principal conditions of the Serbians were first, th a t a new governm ent be form ed in Greece under Coum oundouros, who was regarded as well disposed to Serbia, and sec­ ondly, th a t m ilitary p reparations be speeded up in Greece as th ey had been badly neglected in recent years. T h e Serbians also m ade other conditions regarding p ropagandist activities, m ilitary stra te g y and diplom atic p reparations and in Septem ber 1866 C ap tain L jubom ir Ivanovich, Serb m ilitary a tta c h e a t C onstantinople, was sent to Greece to estim ate th e m ilitary stren g th of the country. H is decision was th a t th e m ilitary forces of Greece were insufficient for serious action and n o t in a s ta te to undertak e a w ar in the near future. T hus since the Serbians considered th e G reek governm ent in office u n satis­ factory and G reek m ilitary stren g th feeble, th e negotiations lapsed. In th e second half of 1866 the two countries confined them selves to exchanging friendly notes w henever the occasion arose.47 On D ecem ber 30 a new G reek governm ent came into power w ith ( 'oum oundouros as P resident of th e Council and T ricoupis m inister of foreign affairs. B oth of these statesm en favored closer B alkan co­ operation so th a t instructions were sent to D elyannis in C o n stan tin ­ ople pointing o u t the necessity of a Serbo-G reek alliance which should lead to an en te n te betw een th e four B alkan powers. A willingness was also expressed to increase m ilitary expenditures and to prepare the Christians in T u rk ey for revolt while both allies were to oppose any power th a t should a tte m p t to acquire te rrito ry in E uropean T u rk ey .48 D elyannis thereupon began negotiations w ith R istich on Ja n u a ry 28, 1867 b u t im m ediately difficulties arose regarding th e division of territory. In 1861 it had been agreed in principle th a t Greece should obtain T hessaly, E pirus, M acedonia, T hrace and th e islands, w hile Serbia should have n orthern A lbania, Bosnia, H erzegovina and M on­ tenegro. In 1866 R istich and A ntonopoulous had accepted this a r­ rangem ent as a base for fu tu re negotiations b u t now R istich claimed in addition the area know n as “ Old Serbia” which he defined as the ' territory between th e D rin and th e Iskir. In o ther words, th e Serbs were now claim ing for th e first tim e northern M acedonia. Greece was not prepared to accept this p artitio n and suggested th a t no definite division be m ade in advance, b u t th e Serbs insisted on th e p artitio n of Macedonia. O ther proposals were considered b u t none proved satisIno Lory and by the end of M arch the negotiations had lapsed. T he conversations were soon resum ed, however, because of the arm am ent increases in Greece and th e encouragem ent of Russia. By
47 Lascaris, loc . cit,, 400, 401. 48 Ibid., 405.

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in

H ist o r y

M ay 1867 Tricoupis was able to notify D elyannis of the form ation of four new battalions, th e purchase of w ar m unitions, th e d ep artu re of naval officers for th e purchase of w arships and the im pending realiza­ tion of a loan for fu rth er arm ing. An alliance w ith Greece was thus becom ing more and more valuable, In addition both th e T sa r and G eneral Ig natiev pressed for a Serbo-G reek alliance. W hen S. Metaxas, the new G reek m inister to St. Petersburg, presented his cre­ dentials in the beginning of M arch 1867, the T sar asked him for news of th e progress of th e negotiations and continued to ask him on every occasion. Sim ilarly w hen K ing George w ent to Russia for his m arriage w ith G rand Duchess Olga th e T sa r again em phasized the advantages of an alliance.49 T h u s from th e end of M ay th e m eetings of R istich and D elyannis becam e more frequent and finally the Serbian governm ent suggested th a t Greece send an agent to B elgrade in th e hope th a t direct conver­ sations w ith the Prince and his councillors would more easily lead to an en ten te. Tricoupis replied th a t the sending of even a secret agent would arouse the suspicions of T u rk ey and suggested th a t a m eeting be arranged in some tow n outside. T he little A ustrian tow n of Mehadia near the frontier of W allachia was selected and T ricoupis chose for this mission his personal friend, d ep u ty Zanos. On arriving a t V ienna Zanos was agreeably surprised to learn th a t Prince Michael, accom panied by R istich, h ad ju s t arrived a t his e sta te “ Iv a n k a ” near Pressburg. T he Prince invited Zanos to spend several days a t his ch ateau b u t it was decided th a t such a visit m ight easily prove com­ prom ising. In stead it was arranged to hold a m eeting a t the w atering place, Voeslau, an h o u r’s distance from V ienna.60 Before the negotiations were transferred to Voeslau, two m eetings were held in Vienna, th e one betw een the Prince and Zanos, the other between the Serbian m inisters and Zanos. A t th e first m eeting, held on A ugust IS, Zanos em phasized the necessity for an alliance and declared tliat secondary m atters, m eaning the territorial problem , should not be allowed to stan d in the way. T he Prince agreed w ith Zanos on the desirability of an alliance, and several tim es expressed his regret m a t an en ten te had not been arranged sooner, b u t he hinted th a t a prelim inary territorial agreem ent was essential. T he Prince left th e same evening for “ Iv a n k a ” and on A ugust 18 Zanos m et
Izvestiya (1914), book III, 104; Lascaris, loc. cit., 408; D riault and Lh6ritier, H istoire diplom atique, III, 226, 227. 60 Zanos pretended th at his •purpose was to take th e hydrotherapic cure of the famous Dr. Friedmann on the advice of th e laryngologist Scoda whom he actually consulted in order to com pletely conceal th e real purpose of th e trip. E ven the Greek m inister to Vienna, Y psilantis, was not at th e tim e informed of w hat was on foot. T o further ensure secrecy Zanos signed his reports “ R ossignol.”

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G arashanin, R istich and P etronievich5 1 a t the O esterreichischen Hof. T he first question discussed was m ilitary prep arations and the date of war, which was set, w ith little difficulty, for M arch 1868. T he im ­ p o rta n t territorial question was next considered. Zanos argued th a t it was useless to discuss or to define territorial claims a t this early stage and th a t it would be preferable to w ait until th e o u tb reak or the term ination of the w ar when it would be know n w h at te rrito ry would be available for division. M ichael, however, insisted th a t a t least the m inim um territorial claim s be included in th e tre a ty and Zanos finally agreed to this condition. T h ere next arose the question of w hether the minimum lim its should be defined on th e basis of te rrito ry or popula­ tion. Zanos favored th e la tte r b u t since M ichael favored te rrito rial division, Zanos again gave w ay an d asked w h at the m inim um Serbian claims were. As before, these included Old Serbia. Zanos accordingly offered B osnia-H erzegovina for Serbia and T hessaly, E p iru s and Crete for Greece b u t if Serbia insisted on Old Serbia, then Greece would insist on M acedonia, m eaning the area betw een Thessaly, I'll race, the Aegean and th e B alkan m ountains. A fter a long discusftion the m eeting was ended and G arashanin left for “ Iv a n k a .”5 2 Voeslau was now m ade the centre of negotiations and on A ugust 'I \ there arrived M ichael’s aide-de-cam p, Ivanov, w ith instructions to uccept the arran g em en t allocating B osnia-H erzegovina to Serbia and I licssaly and E pirus to Greece. W ith this im p o rta n t question settled и seventeen article tre a ty of alliance was drafted w ith little difficulty.5 3 II was agreed th a t by M arch 1868 Serbia should have an arm y of a t least 60,000 m en plus reserves and th a t Greece should have an arm y nf 30,000 and as large a n av y as possible (article 1). M arch 1868 was iid I. to be a com pulsory d a te for war, b o th parties having the right to postpone th e d ate if eith er found it necessary6 4 (article 2). Should the I’nrkish governm ent a tta c k e ith er p a rty , the o th er was bound to come lo (he assistance of th e a tta c k e d sta te w ith all its resources as if a t wnr with th e O ttom an governm ent6 5 (article 3). A rticle 4 set forth the minimum territorial claim s already agreed upon.5 8 Due to the insistence of Zanos the alliance was to rem ain in force
M I'etronievich had just arrived from his post at St. Petersburg. MLascaris, loc. cit., 410-413. MT h e texts of the alliance and of the supplem entary agreem ents are given in ii|i|ii'iulix C. M Later in a protocol signed in A thens on January 10, 1868 it was agreed th at, 1 , , , the term fixed in article 2 of th e treaty for March 1st shall be prorogued to Sep|i ml>cr 1 , 1868.” Cited by Lascaris, loc. cit., 414. M The Serbs had proposed that the party not attacked should be obliged 1 1 . . . to ii|>|Kii t the attacked party by all possible m eans, but w ithout entering formally into fni Zanos considered this insufficient and changed th e article to read “ . . . acting и If il were at war with the O ttom an G overnm ent.” Ib id ., 415. M Lascaris com m ents th at th e population of Bosnia-H erzegovina was a good deal

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even after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, T hessaly and Epirus, until all th e aims of the en ten te should be realized (article 5). W h at these were was revealed in article 7s7 which provided th a t in case of acquisitions greater th an those envisaged in article 4, a special tre a ty would be concluded to fix the frontiers of the allies and (< > guarantee by a perpetual alliance the results of their common efforln T h e second p arag rap h of article 7 provided th a t in th e case of the provinces not m entioned in article 4, I t is understood th a t one will n ot lose sight of the respect due to tin* will of the people who, after taking up arm s in th e struggle, m ight ex. press th e solemn wish either to annex them selves to the contracting parties or to form theselves into separate b u t confederated states, In the la tte r case, the C o n stitution which governs the confederation should be discussed and regulated by common agreem ent of Greece and Serbia and the countries which will take p a rt in th e confedeni tio n .68 I t is interesting to note this reference to a confederation of independ­ e n t B alkan states in a tre a ty designed to liberate people still undei T urk ish rule. T he com m ent of Zanos is suggestive. Knowledge of th e fu tu re certainly goes beyond the power of m an, and th e form under which th e liberated provinces will establish themselven is still unknow n. B ut if ever the idea of a confederation were to tri um ph and th e different races of E uropean T urkey were to be united on such a basis, w hy not consecrate in the first tre a ty concluded betw een the principal C hristian states of the east, the idea th a t the institutions of the fu tu re confederation should be regulated by com mon consent of these two states and of those who take p a rt in the Council of th e independent peoples?5 9 T he principle of the B alkans for the peoples of th e B alkans wati also affirmed. “T he contracting parties are obliged to oppose w ith nil their power and by all their combined means, any dism em berm ent ol E uropean T u rk ey by which any p a rt of its territory would fall undei the power of a foreign sovereign. T hey will work together and sep.i
greater than that of T h essaly and Epirus and that in case of a successful war Serbin would have gained her independence, another advantage to which Greece would have contributed. T his is true but on the other hand there was a greater likelihood |>l Serbia finding it necessary to go to the aid of Greece, than of Greece to the aid nl Serbia. Moreover Serbia was a more powerful m ilitary power than Greece. As regard Crete, Zanos m ade the reservation in a separate act that in case Crete were annexed l< > G reece, Serbia could not claim another Turkish province as com pensation. Ibid ,, 4 3 1 ,4 3 2 . 57 A rticle 6 provided that when war started neither ally could conclude a sepai nli peace or arm istice. Cited by Lascaris, loc. cit., 416, 417. Tricoupis had called for such a provision in his instructions to Zanos: “ In the case of a more com plete success, the countries nol included in the minimum provisions, will be disposed of in conform ity with the prc dom inant principles of the cen tu ry.” C ited, ibid., 416. 69 Cited, ibid., 417.

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rately, each by the m eans a t his disposal, to m ake it known to other powers th a t the C hristian E a st belongs to th e m .” 60 (article 8). Provision was also m ade for th e propagandizing and arm ing of the C hristians in E uropean T urkey, particularly the A lbanians whose aid G arashanin considered essential as they were situ ated between the Greek and Serbian sections of E uropean T urk ey (articles 9, 10). As for the oth er B alkan nationalities it was provided th a t Serbia should secure M ontenegrin adherence to th e alliance and th a t both parties nho.uld seek the adherence of R oum ania (article 11). I t has previously been noted th a t a Serbo-M ontenegrin alliance was signed on SepIem ber 23, 1866, th a t a Serbo-R oum anian alliance was signed on M ay 26, 1865 or 1866, and th a t Greece early in 1867 had unsuccessfully nought an en ten te w ith R oum ania. B u t there is no evidence to indi­ cate th a t either R oum ania or M ontenegro later joined this GrecoSerb alliancc, although a Serbo-R oum anian alliance was signed on January 1868. Provision was also m ade for a m ilitary convention " . . . intended Iо regulate specifically all m a tte rs relevant to th e operations of the I wo allied arm ies and to the policies which they m ust follow in con­ form ity w ith the com mon in te re st.”6 1 Finally it was specified th a t the treaty rem ain secret in order to facilitate th e a tta in m e n t of th e aims (article 15); th a t K ing George and Prince M ichael ratify the tre a ty in person62 (article 16); and th a t ratifications be exchanged w ithin six weeks63 (article 17). On A ugust 26, 1867 this tre a ty of alliance was signed a t the Hotel Bellevue. Zanos w rote, “ M ay it be the precursor of the liberation of Ilie C hristian peoples still enslaved.” 6 4 W ith th e re tu rn of Zanos to A thens the tre a ty was sent to King ( icorge for ratification. On Septem ber 14, 1867 he signed it a t F ra n k ­ fort on M ain w ith two reservations. T he first one reaffirmed the right of either p a rty to postpone the d ate set in article 2 and the second lnnmd both powers to refrain from provoking T u rk ey to aggression. In Jan u a ry 1868 ratifications were exchanged and on F eb ru ary 16, IK68 the m ilitary convention provided for in the tre a ty was signed. Before estim ating the significance of this G reco-Serbian treaty , it In necessary to consider th e last of this series of inter-B alkan treaties, Ihr Serbo-R oum anian alliance of Ja n u a ry 1868. T h e text uf this allinnee has not been revealed b u t E n g elh ard t has published a version
1 1 1 1 Cited, ibid., 417. 0 1 Cited, ibid., 424. In view of the urgency of this convention, it was agreed verIHilly that the delegate sent to A thens for the exchange of ratifications would at the mu* time also sign the m ilitary convention. и This was included at th e insistence of Prince M ichael. и This last provision w as not observed. 64 Cited by Lascaris, loc. cit., 425.

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which, although apocryphal, is probably fairly close to the original According to this version th e signatories agreed to cooperate ami w henever possible to follow a common policy in th eir relations willi th e G reat Powers an d T urkey. T hey also were to w ork for the emnn cipation of the C hristians under T urkish rule, and in case of w ar they were to furnish 60,000 men each and to conduct a common military cam paign. T h e m ost im p o rta n t provision was th a t on territorial claims. According to article 8, which was to be k ep t secret, in case ol v ictory R oum ania was to obtain the islands of th e D anube delta and th e region betw een th e R u stchuk-V arna line and the Black Sea, while Serbia was to acquire Old Serbia, Bosnia, H erzegovina ami B ulgaria except for th e region assigned to R oum ania.65, As m ight be expected, this last provision has stirred up m uch con troversy. According to th e m emoirs of King Carol of R oum ania the accord w ith Serbia was of a purely platonic character. Serbian histor ians have repeated this assertion while B ulgarian historians have ex­ pressed th e opinion th a t the tre a ty was more th an m erely one of friendship and th a t it did provide for the partitioning of Bulgarin.'1 " I t is obvious th a t no definite conclusion can be reached on the basis ol th e available d a ta . W orth noting, however, is the following report ol the R oum anian agent in Belgrade in 1876: “ I learned indirectly that R istich, through his rep resentative, spoke to the P resident of om Council of a tre a ty of friendship concluded betw een R oum ania and Serbia a t the tim e of Prince M ichael. T he answ er of the President ol th e Council m ade R istich furious, and he wished to publish the afore said tre a ty in the foreign papers.67 If the publication of a tre a ty which had never been enforced represented such a serious step, it would ap p ear th a t it was concerned w ith more th an mere m atters of friend ship. Finally there arises the question of the significance of this fins I B alkan alliance system . In the first place the historical im portance ol these treaties is evident. T he Balkan states had a t last come of a^c and for th e first tim e had joined in a series of bilateral treaties to free them selves, w ith o u t direct foreign aid, from T urkish rule. In addition the Serbo-B ulgarian agreem ent provided for a union of th e Serbs ami B ulgars in a Y ugoslav kingdom while the Greco-Serbian alliance en visaged a fu tu re B alkan confederation. H owever, this aspect of tin alliances can easily be overem phasized. W ith the exception of a few visionary B ulgarian revolutionaries, a B alkan federation was nl>(
6 B T h e text of this version of the treaty is given in appendix D . S ee also A u s dan Leben K on ig K arls von Rum anien (Stuttgart, 1914), I, 241. 66 For exam ple, com pare T oshev, op. cit., I, 83, 84, with Jovanovi6, Druga vlatht M iloS ai M ihaila, 210. 67 Iorga, Correspondance diplom atique, 152,153.

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seriously considered. T h e n atu re of the negotiations indicate clearly (h a t each side was m ore interested in ensuring its fu tu re expansion I ban in furthering the federation cause. E ven a t this early d ate conflicting territo rial am bitions began to appear. Both th e Greeks and the B ulgarians were laying claim to M acedonia and T hrace while th e Serbians were dem anding Old Ser­ bia and ap p aren tly planning an hegem ony over all th e Yugoslavs. I t if* true th a t the Serbo-B ulgarian agreem ent of April 1867 did provide for absolute eq u ality betw een th e two races b u t this is of little im por­ tance as M ichael was dealing w ith only one faction of the Bulgarian emigres and in his relations w ith Rakovski he had d em onstrated th a t he did not take such engagem ents very seriously. Sim ilarly M ichael in his negotiations w ith K ossuth,68 and G arashanin in his conversaI ions w ith R enieris,69 displayed a tendency to d istru st and ignore the Bulgarians and to regard Serbia as the n atu ral leader of the South Slavs and as destined to u nite them in to a Serb-dom inated Yugoslav nlate. I t is significant also th a t th e E n gelhardt version of the SerboKoum anian tre a ty of Ja n u a ry 1868 assigned B ulgaria to Serbia and I hat th e au th en tic tex t of th e tre a ty has never been published. T hus Ignatiev, who k ep t a close w atch on all developm ents, realized w hat I he situ atio n reallly was. Discussing th e Serbo-G reek alliance he com ­ mented w ith prophetic insight: Hut we m ust not have any illusions ab o u t th e sincerity and stability of the entente. I t is inevitable th a t once the struggle w ith the T urks In ended, race rivalries will reap p ear and nothing stable will be built in the B alkan Peninsula u n til m any years have elapsed. Sufficient mi to th e day is th e evil th ereo f.70 A p art from these political factors, it is extrem ely doubtful w hether dir Balkan allies had th e necessary m ilitary stren gth to a tta in their objectives. In R oum ania, w hen Carol ascended the th rone in 1866, he loimd only 15,000 rifles, p ractically no am m unition and the soldiers very poorly trained. In fact the R oum anian arm y was spoken of w ith decision in C onstantinople. In B ulgaria there were no train ed arm ed fbrces w ith the exception of th e sm all B ulgarian legion in Serbia. The M ontenegrins boasted an arm y b u t it was v ery small and dependent to a g reat ex ten t upon Serbia for arm s and m unitions. T he Greek •orres also were weak. T h e Serbian m ilitary attach e, C ap tain L juboruli Ivanovich, who inspected them in Septem ber 1866, found only 11,000 soldiers and 18,000 rifles, and reported th a t Greece was not inidy for war. T h e Serbs were th e best prepared, th an k s to the efforts •il Michael. On his accession he found th a t th e only arm ed forces were
1 1 1 1 ICossuth, Souvenirs et ecrits de mon exil, 251-256. flU Lascaris, loc. cit., 394-397. 70 Izvestiya (1914), book III, 108.

T hey reported th a t the supply service was non-existent. R. 171-173.000 rifles were acquired and an arm s factory was established. the A ustro-H ungarian representative in Belgrade. although it produced only 4. 4 0 0. 1926). T he necessity for m ilitary p reparations and the negotiations leading to the w ith­ draw al of th e T urkish troops from the Serbian fortresses in April 1867 forced the Serbians to rem ain q uiet until a t least th a t date. . Sim ilarly the short duration of the A ustro-P russian w ar and the adoption of the Ausgleich restored 71 J ova no vie.. 7J Izvestiya (1914). 211. In 1867. aside from th e contrivances of E uropean diplo­ m acy. he set ab o u t energetically to purchase arm s abroad.” 7 2 T he Balkan nations. Similarly the G reeks dared n o t tak e action before reaching an understanding w ith Serbia or while negotiations were going on in C onstantinople regarding C rete for fear of injuring th eir cause. In fact on O ctober 16. as provided for in th eir pacts. however.7 3 T h u s th e o p p o rtu n ity rapidly passed aw ay. After 1866 an o th er 55. T he logical m ovem ent to strike was in 1866 when the w ar w ith Prussia had tied A u stria’s hands and the insurrection in Crete. Lascaris. P etersburg that. book III. has now an incontestable character of a c tu a lity . T his was a difficult task as n either T u rk e y nor A ustria perm itted their im porta­ tion. (1914). 222. “ th e crum bling of th e O tto m an edifice as a result of th e uprising of th e C hristian races. ‘‘Les relations de 1’Autriche-H ongrie et de la Serbie entre 1868 et 1874. cit. T hus it seems clear th a t if the allies had waged w ar ag ain st T urkey. Druga vlada M ilola i M ihaila.104 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y th e garrison troops which were equipped w ith 7. Realizing th e need for a strong arm y if his political am bitions were to be ful­ filled. H e was able also to purchase eight field and five m ountain batteries. Sim ilarly B enjam in Kallay. la mission de Benjam in K dllay &Belgrade. 103. th a t capable officers were lacking and th a t the Serbs had few contacts w ith th e in h a b ita n ts of the neighboring T urkish provinces. 73 Ibid. 100. the health service in its infancy and the num ber of officers en tirely inadequate. 221.7 1 D ue to a com bination of factors. th a t the Serbian arm y was weak. however.401. loc. th eir chances of victory would have been very slig h t. were n o t ready for im m ediate action. 1868. largely because of the lack of officers. 1866.000 rifles. Seton-W atson. Ign atiev reported to St. a t th e in v itatio n of M ichael. reported on May 8. W . however.” Le tnonde slave (February. 210. the R ussian governm ent sent three officers to survey the situation. T he eventual pacifica tion of C rete left T u rk e y triu m p h a n t and Greece exhausted from her indirect aid to the C retan rebels. In 1863. book III. In spite of these increases in equipm ent the Serbian arm y was still not a strong fighting force. the alliances remained inoperative.h ad aroused th e B alkan C hristians and weakened the Porte. he obtained 31.000 rifles from Russia.000 rifles yearly.

76.” 7 * Even the iclations between Serbia and M ontenegro becam e strained. 192. loc. 211. which this second m in e rendered irreparable. ™ Izvestiya (1914).. loc.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 105 A ustria-H u n g ary ’s freedom of action and increased h er stre n g th . reported to Beust IIm(.” reported Ign atiev .. ™ Its m embers were C olonel B laznavatz. L a nouvelle Serbie. 76 D evas. 211-216. X . cit. " . “Serbia in the Early Mi'vt'iities. tor. this would be legally im possible and th e Porte ■Mainly would refuse to sanction th e choice of a prince of non-Serbian origin. who sought a rapprochem ent w ith Serbia in order to strengthen the foreign position of A u stria-H u n g ary in p reparation for a w ar of re­ venge w ith P ru ssia. T he effect of the m urder on inter-B alk an relations was equally disastrous. book III.” Slavonic Review. M ichael appeared to be retracing his step s. Correspondance diplom atique. u tte rly incapable of tak in g M ichael’s place. The Ottoman E m pire iiud its Successors j 334. . book IV. By the spring of 1868. 385. T h e reply was th at “ . soon developed in to an unprin­ cipled neurasthenic. Seton-W atson. . cit.7 4 In fact during th e au tu m n of 1867 Prince M ichael appeared to be ab an ­ doning his plans for u nited B alkan action and to be drifting into the orbit of Vienna. . R ussia Imd supported Prince N icholas as th e successor to M ichael80 b u t ben Ibid. 1868 he was m urdered by three assassins. R istich and G avrilovich. . . 1925).ll) In June 1868 th e first Russian dragom an at C onstantinople asked Fuad Pasha v lint would be th e attitu d e of th e P orte in case Prince N icholas was elected by the Muipslitina. T his was due to th e policy of B eust and A ndrassy. < it.” I I ii ( i n . (1914).” Seton-W atson. “The populations. Seton-W atson.76 T h u s w hen A ndrassy in A ugust 1867 visited Michael a t his estate in Slovakia th e Serbian prince was so impressed b y -the renewed stren g th and friendliness of A u stria-H ungary th a t he dismissed his m inister G arashanin who stood for friendship w ith Russia and a nationalistic foreign policy. the feud betw een the rival dynasties. Other theoi ies regarding the murder are given in M iller. Serbia h ad lost an able leader a t th e height of his constructive activities and in his place stood his young cousin Milan. have lost cour­ s e before the a p a th y and indifference of th e reg en ts. “which were on th e qui vive tiwaiting the signal which was to come from Belgrade.77 T his ev en t proved to be a tu rn in g po in t in Y ugoslav history and id Balkan diplom acy. v K dllay.. See also S.‘instate G arashanin and he had already appointed a commission to ascertain S erbia’s m ilitary preparedness when on Ju n e 10. 107. 216. I do not doubt for an instant th at Karageorge was not only an accom plice Inil even the instigator of the assassination of Prince M ichael. I'lic conservative foreign policy of the regency78 which governed d u r­ ing M ilan’s m inority alienated th e Slavs of th e O tto m an Em pire. Since 1860 the relations betw een Serbia and A ustria had been cool because of Michael’s foreign policy and his close relations with M agyar circles.76 H e was ab o u t to t (. who despite undoubted gifts. Moreover. was to em b itter internal politics for the next thirty-five years and leave Serbia w eak and discredited. IV (D ecem ber. how­ ever. Jovanovic. . the Austro-H ungarian diplom atic agen t in Belgrade.

106 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y cause of the opposition of the P orte which feared a union of Serbia and M ontenegro. R ig h tly or wrongly the Greeks felt th a t Serbia had taken ad v an tag e of the C retan revolt to free herself from the T urkish garri­ sons b u t had failed to give any support to Greece in retu rn . and th a t if a p rem ature crisis should arise. One A thenian new spaper. The G reek m inistry declared th a t Greece was exhausted by her recenl: efforts. 82 Izvestiya (1914). S. or a t least its application was indefinitely postponed. In 1869. w ith our resources alone. we have stood up against all th e O ttom an forces. N icholas journeyed to R ussia where he was w arm ly wel­ comed and on his re tu rn to C etinje he m ade no a tte m p t to conceal his am bition to found and head a Y ugoslav kingdom . th e S k upshtina elected M ilan instead. I X (1939). unable to find expression in politics. For three years we have lavished our blood and our gold on the b a ttle ­ fields of C rete. com m ented th a t. however. “L ’institution de l ’exarcat bulgare. 147. Engelhardt. Son influence sur les rela­ tions inter-balkaniques. although the alliance still existed in principle. F or three years. th a t the m ost pressing task was the suppression of brigand­ age. only to have forced upon us a disgraceful declaration which Russia was th e first to advise us to sign. in fact it had been abrogated. VI (1892). 42. for exam ple. Stavrianos.” Les Balkans. . even though in principle she still held to the Serbian alli­ ance. tu rned to the field of religion. As Ig natiev observed. 83 L. book V I. T he origins of th e exarchate m ovem ent go back to the eighteen tw enties w hen occasional dem ands were m ade for the reform of th e financial abuses and th e ap p o in tm en t of Bulgarian bishops to Bulgarian dioceses. while aw aiting the aid of R ussia and th e intervention of th e Serbians and of th e M ontenegrins.82 F inally the m ovem ent for a B ulgarian national church which had steadily been gaining m om entum during th e p ast decade had by 1870 given rise to a b itte r G reco-B ulgarian feud. “ La confederation balkanique. the B ulgarians were dem and ing a separate national church and contem ptuously refused th e com8 1 C ited by E . E qually u n fo rtu n ate w as the growing coolness betw een Greece and Serbia. T he Serbian governm ent replied along much the same lines. T h u s th ere de­ veloped an open riv alry betw een the Obrenovich d y n a sty an d the M ontenegrin prince. she could not be counted on.8 3 T he fundam ental causes for the B ulgarian agitation were the corruption and hellenizing policy of the O rthodox C hurch and the growing B ulgarian nationalism w hich. By 1860.8 1 T h u s in F eb ru ary 1871 an exchange of ideas betw een A thens and B elgrade revealed to w h at an ex ten t the ties had been loosened. however. 56-69. stressing especially its desire to avoid com plications and to aw ait a more favorable occasion." Revue d'hisloire diplo­ matique.

We w on’t be absorbed by th e Slavs. we w on’t let our iliildren be bulgarized.” Izvestiya (1914). 1884). . M ( ’iled by В. “ Ign atiev at Constantinople. 158. 1933). 323. 1 1 1 1 Cited by G. the Bosphorus Beacon. I.85 T h e organ of these anti-Slavs. Trubetzkoi.” Slavonic fii v b h . ” and w arned th e Greeks " . . T his m ean t th e indefinite expansion of the exarchate and th e p erpetuation of the Greco-Bul)'iirian conflict. X X I (1907). n o t to let them trlvcs be cau g h t in snares disguised b y a p p a re n t religious affinities. . Ig n atiev com m ented th a t: II (lie Franco-P russian conflict had sta rte d im m ediately a fte r Sa­ tin wn.” 87 Phus by 1870 the various B alkan alliances h ad become m eaninglt m u and B alkan u n ity had been com pletely sh attered . 1864-1874. speculating solely on th e rivalry w hich the ' hr Htruggle had sow n betw een th e Greeks and th e Bulgarians. 1870 tHe Po rte issued th e firm an establish­ ing an autonom ous Bulgarian church. H .” I I m id 'h isto ire diplom atique.th e G reeks and th e Serbs would pmbably not have hesitated to m arch against th e T u rk s and to acIgnatiev stated th a t th e Turks. . vote of tw o-thirds of the in h ab itan ts. B y this tim e th e exn rebate question had developed in to a clear-cut racial struggle.84 An anti-S lav society w as organized in A thens in 1869 II и the purpose of blocking th e expansion of the Slav race in th e BalIt/ms. T h e exarchate w as det lured heretical and th e E xarch and his bishops were excom m unicated while in th e streets of C onstantinople G reek crowds shouted. during th e C retan in su rre c tio n . II I.” I lie p aper also advised comm on action w ith th e M oslem elem ent . X I (April. . Sumner. La politique russe en Orient. le schism e bulgare. D uring the III nuco-Prussian w ar th e B alkan nations once more had an opporI uni I. . “ . 191. of exploiting th e G reek elem ent in favor of th e purely llfiv in terests . . . 190. In SepItMiiber 1872 th e separation was com pleted. calculated th at it ■ mill be worth while for the P orte to recognize th e Bulgarians and detach them from I in licy.у to strike w ith o u t fear of interv en tio n b u t united action was o ut ui Ilie question.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 107 prom ise proposals of P atriarch s Joachim II and Sofronios.” 8 6 T h u s G reek was p itte d ag ain st Slav. " I > K. 236. T he all im p o rta n t provision of th e act was article ten which statedI hat new dioceses could be added to th e B ulgarian exarchate upon lilt. accused Knssia " . and b y so doing. break th e u n ity of th e Christian nationalities of T urkey and • Hi'im I■ >a t least one of them from R u ssia. 571. H istoire diplom atique . Engelhardt. T he politi­ cal n atu re of the whole problem w as revealed w hen in F e b ru a ry 1867 P atriarch G regory VI agreed to th e creation of an autonom ous Bul­ garian church w ith definite boundaries and th e B ulgarians rejected Ilie plan because of th e territo rial lim itations. . V ari­ ous com prom ise schem es were rejected by th e radicals of each side until finally on M arch 11. “ Long IIv** the schism. D riault and I li^i il icr. L a Turquie et le Tanzim at (Paris. . . which would be less dangerous for th e expansion of th e Greek M|iirit th an is Slavism . book VI.

It was m erely the product of a group of anti-Russian Turkish officials and foreign representatives in C onstantinople and it failed to reccivi th e slightest support from th e Balkan states th em selves. 1872 th e Roum anian agent in C onstantinople telegraplml to Bucharest th e follow ing sum m ary of K halil's proposal: “ It m eans that all I In tributary states should com e under T u rk ey’s aegis by a m ilitary and political in corporation of the German ty p e .example. . book III. adopted during this period an anti-S lav and anti-R ussian foreign policy and sought. leaned In w ards England ra th e r th a n Russia and in M ay 1872.108 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y complish this g athering tog ether of the C hristian shields which they so often dream ed of and discussed. III. while in Athene th e cabinet and th e king both expressed their desire for an under stan d in g w ith T urk ey . who had at tem p ted to cooperate as m uch as possible w ith Ignatiev. he considered friendly relations w ith Turkey to form the basis of his foreign policy.” Iorga. Correspondaiitf diplom atique. In 1870 tin* situation was d rastically changed and one did not need to be :i pro p h et to see th a t th e com plications of this period would n o t exer cise th e sam e fascination on th e m inds of the E astern peoples. ® ° D riault and Lh£rUier. 164. had by 1870 com pletely disintegrated T h u s the only change effected in the N ear E ast during th e Franco Prussian w ar was th e abrogation of the Black Sea clauses of the tre a ty of Paris. for . book IV.B n T h e m ovem ent for B alkan cooperation and liberation. Izvestiya (1915). B oth the S ultan and the grand vizier welcomed these advances and em phasized the necessity foi 88 Izvestiya (1914). 92. therefore. T h e w hole affair w m of little practical significance. T h e king. 95-99.” D esp ite the support of Britain and Austria. . T his was p articu larly true after th e end of 1871 w hen Prem ier Coum oundouros. T h e conservative regency in Serbia was n o t inclined to a d o p t an aggressive foreign policy while the G reek government p ro m p tly declared its n e u tra lity and joined the en tente of neutral powers. . T he sam e a p a th y and unconcern m arked inter-B alkan relation» durin g th e years 1870 to 18 75. th e G reek m inister in C onstantinople. especially. which in 1866 seemed so prom ising. . U ndoubtedly th e very existence of th e O ttom an E m pire would have been in question. On N ovem ber 15. m ade definite overtures to the Porte K alergis.165.89 Greece. in tin light of his experiences. for exam ple. probably willi th e encouragem ent of B ritain. assured th e Porle of th e friendly a ttitu d e of th e G reek governm ent. m ade the unprece dented gesture of presenting th e S ultan w ith the O rder of the Savini of Greece and he inform ed the T urkish m inister th a t in the past In m ay n o t have opposed n atio n alist m anifestations b u t now. an u n derstanding w ith T urkey. 359. was replaced by Zaimes and la te r by B ulgaris. thl plan was em phatically rejected by both Roum ania and Serbia. 350. Khfjlil Pasha. H istoire diplom atique.90 T he la tte r. 89 T h e only plan proposed during th is period for closer inter-B alkan ties waa a fantastic schem e concocted by th e anti-R ussian foreign m inister of T urkey.

MJ." Journal of Modern H istory. Serbia was oscillating betw een th e A ustrian and R ussian cam ps.. T rivanovitch. . w ith th e approval of his gov­ ernm ent. 1871 K allay w rote from B elgrade th a t Serbia hud become th e blind in stru m e n t of R ussian policy and would have I d be reckoned as such in th e fu tu re .375. doubted the sincerity of the offer and hence gave no K'ply. loc. loc. T h e Belgrade new spapers # 1 Sumner. Jovanovid. III. loc. chiefly because of th e lack of tru s t on each side and th e influence of Ignatiev who was then a t the height of his power in C on stan ti­ nople. 4 1 8 . 203. 1931). T he re­ len ts. Russia and A ustria during the Rule of M ilan Obreno■lld i.. w ith th e su p p o rt of b oth A ustria and Russia.9 4 W ith the form ation of th e Dreikaiserbund in the sum m er of 1873.9 1 W hile Greece was pursuing h er anti-Slav foreign policy. however. cit. 387. M oreover. ““ T hese concerned the junction of a railway which Serbia was building and the Minvndcr to Serbia of M ali Zvornik. however.. 562. even dismissed the grand vizier who had been favorably inclined tow ards th e Serbian dem ands. loc.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 109 dose G reco-T urkish relations. cit. 171. III (Septem ber. 202. journeyed In C onstantinople in an effort to settle his differences w ith th e P o rte . asking in retu rn th a t Serbia rem ain benevolently neutral in case A ustria-H ungary was involved in war. cit. III. culm inating in M ilan ’s visit to th e T sar a t L ivadia in the au tu m n of IH71. cit. Triititovich. 563. 140-152. V. TriViiitnvich. Seton-W atson.4 1 9 . loc. S p o lja sn ji odnosaji S rbije [The Foreign Relations of Serbia] (Belgrade IMH7). 203. E m b ittered by this iceeption M ilan left C onstantinople for B ucharest where he found the governm ent a t odds w ith th e P orte over th e rig h t to conclude ommercial treaties w ith neighboring countries. Russia had opposed the succession of Milan and the adoption of the liberal co n stitu tio n of 1869 while A ustria had su pported th e co n stitu ­ tion and persuaded the P o rte to recognize M ilan as th e hereditary uiler of S erbia. how­ ever. loc.. 94 Seton-W atson. in the case nf a T urkish a tta c k on Serbia. D riault and Lh6ritier. N a tu rally th e situ a ­ tion was discussed by th e two princcs and for a period a Serbo-Rouuiiiiiian u n derstanding seem ed possible.. H istoire diplom atique. even proposed th e p artitio n of B osnia-H erzegovina w ith Iw o-thirds of th e area going to Serbia and the rem ainder to the D ual M onarchy.92 L ate in 1870 K allay. N othing cam e of these moves. U ntil the iiutum n of 1870 th e regency in Serbia was d istin ctly pro-A ustrian. R isti6. A u stria-H u n g ary was to recognize Serbian independence and to rem ain benevolently n eutral.9 5 ' ho Sultan. 425-427. cit. 416-418.93 H enceforth A ustro-Serbian relations w ent from bad to worse.. On O ctober 6. cit. a village on the Serbian-Turkish frontier which W iin awarded to Serbia in 1833 b ut which th e Turks had refused to relinquish. ( ireat Pow er rivalries in the B alkans were tem porarily sm oothed over mcl M ilan. refused him an audience and. “Serbia. in order to em ­ phasize his displeasure.

Correspondance dipln m atique. 1 1 3 Cited by Engelhardt. during this period. . On July 1875 th e p easan try a t N evesinje in H erzegovina revolted. bill he added. R istich. Shortly after his arrival M ilan proposed at a banquet several toanl< to Prince Carol and his queen. N either M ilan tun Carol was really anxious for an entente or desirous of leading a geneilil an ti-T u rk ish m ovem ent a fte r th e fashion of M ichael. however. of which (In consequence is: solidarity am ongst us. intei vention on the side of th e rebels was dem anded by the m ass of the people. T h e looseness of inter-B alkan ties. M ilan cam e to tin 96 T h e Vidov Dan referred to M ilan’s reception in Bucharest as “ . which Prince M ichael had already traced . who a t th e tim e was in V ienna arranging for his m arriage. See also ibid. particu larly by th e Liberals who obtained a m ajo rity in lli« A ugust elections. 314.. M ilan could not have pursued an aggressive foreign policy during this period in view of the weakness of his authority and the anarchical internal situation in Serbia. because of the absence of Turktoli troops. Correspondance diplom atique. ss E ven had he so wished. .110 S m i t h C h i . W e believe we are correct in statin g that tliii is the task which our prince particularly has in view . M ilan. . 335.99 Consequently nothing came of these m anifestations.. th a t it was m:i essary to unite w ith th e oth er peoples who were exposed to the den potism of th e T u rk s and to whom even the rights of m an were i« fused. 9 7Ibid. b u t M ilan insisted on a policy Ы n eu tra lity and R istich thereupon resigned.i tion because of the new liberal laws regarding the press and coin m unal organization. In Serbia. in prolonl ag ain st excessive tax atio n and. “ 1 am pleased w ith the welcome which I received in Ron m ania and 1 can say th a t I reaffirmed even more the cordiality extol ing betw een these two friendly countries. was assured by A ndrassy th a t tin Dreikaiserbimd would localize the conflict. th a t it [the S kupshtina] was hap p y to hear of the friendly exchange ol views which had taken place betw een th e two states. T he only result.” Iorga. . however. . 317.” 97 T h e S kupshtina wnn en th u siastic over the prospect of an understanding w ith Roumaniii and failed by only three votes in passing a resolution statin g ". 333. H e had occasion to visit our good friend and neighbor on th e lower Daniil). 315. 316. proved futile. the Liberal leader. cit. See Iorga. Ibid. a moral trium ph.” 98 All this activ ity . was an increase in socialist agit. . G reatly disturbed by this. . the rising spread rapidly. A coalition government was form ed in O ctober 1875 under K aljevich who passed a series nl reform m easures in an a tte m p t to divert the S k u p sh tin a ’s attention from w ar. form ed a government and th e new assem bly im m ediately voted a resolution in favor < il lending aid to th e insurrectionists. was furtlici dem onstrated by th e course of the 1875-1878 B alkan crisis. loc. 44... however. It appears that our m inister of foreign affairs has inaugurated a policy with th e peoph of th e Eastern states. lkoi c S t u d i e s i n H i s t o r y strongly urged Hi t c h а Мер9 1 ’ and when M ilan returned to Belgrade In declared th a t hin journey (o C onstantinople had been fruitless.

D . op. a t th e in v itatio n of Nicholas. Correspondance diplom atique. op. H .2 In F eb ru ary M ilan.1 1 . Bib D oda. 395. T he first step was i iKm by M ilan when in O ctober 1875 he sent an em issary to C etinje in wound Prince Nicholas. howvrr. 380. 117-127. w ith th e aid of th e Powers. 1 1 1 1 Iorga. 1 1 1 1 11arris.. 380. I ‘iinnequently K aljevich was forced to resign. 82. socialists and liberals all clam ored for w ar while M ilan was not positive of R ussia’s tli’iiirc for peace in view of her advice to hasten m ilitary preparations. A Wavering Friendship. The Great Powers and the B alkans. so th a t despite their antagonism they i veulually had to act in concert against T urkey. D 1880 (N ew York. 402-406. R u ssia and the Balkans. Pan-Serbian or1'im itations such as th e O m ladina. 131-134. proposal for a secret tre a ty of alliance and a w ar convention Minimitting the two principals to readiness for w ar by the end of Maich. came of th is co n tact. M oreover. I'Mi)). N othing.103 I'lie Serbian governm ent also m ade an effort to obtain A lbanian ml I'he northern tribes of A lbania seemed ready for action and their b i n d e r . 1937). T he G reat Powers and p articu larly A ustria protested vigor­ ously against this move and forced M ilan to recall his agent. и lull' M ilan feared th e M ontenegrin prince because of his popularity uni! Russian su p p o rt. By the nil of M ay. 1875-1878 (N ew York. 396.101 H ow ever. Sumner. T his proved impossible except w ith M ontenegro u n i even in th a t case it was the force of events ra th e r th a n the desire Iне united action th a t bro u g h t the two sta te s together. cit. sent an agent with a.. Rupp. neither could afford to rem ain m u I ral while the oth er acted. w ar was declared. received subsidies from Belgrade. 118.100 D uring the m onths preceding the declaration of w ar th e Serbian lliivrrnm ent m ade num erous a tte m p ts to revive its connections w ith ol lire B alkan states. . however. 384. 119. to buy M onteiii Hi'iu n eu trality b u t events had gone too far and by th e end of June wai had broken o u t.. В. pan-Slav agents. cit. I t was agreed th a t n either side should do niylliing more th a n aid th e insurrectionists during the com ing winn i .ne Rupp. Ibid. T he friction watt due to the fact th a t N icholas was determ ined th a t the Obreno\ Ii Ii dyn asty should n o t assum e th e leadership of th e Yugoslavs. Harris.104 . cit. 113. in Ju n e 1876. Stojanovi6. a com m on d eterm ination for w ar b rought the Imaces together and a new convention was agreed upon. op. it was difficult to (iirHcrvc peace under th e existing s ta te of affairs. A ttem p ts ui’ll* made by th e Porte. 1 1 1 4 M. . Ristich was restored to power and a few weeks later. 339..B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 111 Hiiielitsioii th a t if there were no w ar there would be revolution and I lint w ar was th e lesser of th e two evils.

G arashanin urged his governm ent to help finance the com m ittee and accordingly 20. G arashanin re­ p orted th a t no aid could be expected because of the opposition ol K ing George and th e h o stility of public opinion which regarded Serbia as a tool of R ussian pan-Slavism and therefore to be feared as much as T u rk ey . H istoire diplom atique. By F eb ru ary of 1876 Serbian m ilitary preparations were m aterially ad­ vanced and M ilan m ade still an o th er effort to gain Greek support. III. 31. 82.1 0 5 T h e G reek governm ent was equally em phatic in its insistence on n eu trality . And since 105 A u s dem Leben K on ig K a rls von Rum dnien. 108 Lascaris. 105 D riault and Lh6ritier. 22. th ey had no interest. I i ’h aim was to force th e hand of the G reek governm ent by launching . 81.1 1 1 " In spite of these efforts the Greek governm ent rem ained firm in iln determ ination to m aintain its n eu trality .107 In th e next m onth M ilutin G arashanin was sent to Athenn as a p riv ate individual to determ ine w hether or n o t the Greek gov ern m en t considered itself bound to the 1867 alliance. T he Serbian envoy then w ent to Salonica where he con­ tacted a local “ W ar C om m ittee" which had been form ed by opposi tion leaders and headed by form er Prem ier Leonidas Bulgaris. T he declared policy of the governm ent was to refrain from intervention unless R ussia partici pated or events indicated the form ation of a greater Serbia. op.. T he first advances were m ade пн early as Ju ly 1875 when the Serbian m inister of foreign affairs stated in a conversation w ith th e G reek agent in Belgrade th a t should the insurrection in H erzegovina be long-lived.. 32. therefore. La politique exterieure de la Grece.1 0 6 In O ctober M ilan sent an aide-de-cam p to A thens in an effort (< > open negotiations b u t th e G reek governm ent did n o t respond. In April of 187(> Prince M ilan’s uncle w ent to B ucharest to procure R oum anian aid b u t Carol w arned of th e dangers of w ar and declared his intention to rem ain n eu tral. . th a t a secret agent be sent to A thens to conclude an understanding betw een the two countries. 15. b u t the G reek agent offered no encourage­ m en t and the m a tte r was dropped for the tim e being. I l l . b u t Coum oundouros in a telegram on F ebruary 23 categorically re­ fused to open negotiations because of the m ilitary unpreparedness ol G reece.i press cam paign and by organizing an insurrection in the G reek prov inces of T urkey. 385. 382. 21.112 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y As fo : th e R oum anians and the Greeks. III.*! directly involved in th e H erzegovinian uprising and they then' fore refused to budge from th eir neutral position. Bosnia and eventually M ontenegro and Serbia would be involved. T h e Greeks had not forgotten their own isolation during the C retan insurrection and were little inclined Iо rush to the aid of th e Slavs whom they now regarded as the greatesl th re a t to the fu tu re of H ellenism .000 dinars were sent from Belgrade. cit. 107 Ib id . Stojanovid. H e suggested.

1876. was opI'M M t'd to G reek expansion and was w orking instead for a “ G reat lliil^m 'a. L a politique extirieure de la Grece. inquiring w hy I •truce.109 W hen w ar was dei hired M ilan m ade a direct appeal for G reek su p p o rt in his proclam aIIon to the people. was proven non-existent by 1876. T he approach of th e R ussians to C onstanllimplc led to the form ation of a new governm ent and the adoption of i win. III. the lerbhm governm ent. article of the treaty . I t is i veil claimed th a t num bers of G reeks joined th e T urkish irregulars in Hulnnria and th a t the G reek M etropolitan N eophitos did n ot hesitate In five his assent to the sentences passed on th e B ulgarian insurgents •i Ihe T urkish ex trao rd in ary trib u n al a t P hilippopolis.policy. can be expected Iи'lore long to follow our exam ple. although allied to Serbia.recce under the presidency of th e v eteran hero K anaris w ith I I к он pis as foreign m inister an d w ith the purpose of preserving in nli ility in th e hope of obtain in g B ritish su p p o rt of G reek aspiraI ii hi m a t the proper tim e. Inh Russia. A coalition governm ent was formed In ( . W . H istoire diplom atique.” Revue d ’histoire diplom atique. VI inu))AS.” 110 Since there was no response in <neecc. although unham pered by such a com m itm ent. In his reply C oum oundouros sta te d th a t because of its pi'ifiomd n atu re. 111 Ib id .B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 113 I hr Powers advised n e u tra lity and R ussia offered no encouragem ent lor action. B oth R oum ania and Greece i | i i mod it co n trary to th eir in terests to join Serbia and M ontenegro ti|iimiHt T u rk ey in a m a tte r which did not directly concern them . T h e diploiiinllr weakness of Greece was obvious— her friends in W estern Euipe were com m itted to a policy of preserving T urkish integrity. according to the first. on Ju ly 28.” 1 1 3 t )ri. D israeli. 1 1 1 1 ( Уled by Lascaris. Gladstone and the Eastern Question (London. 1"И).. 391. Seton-W atson. foreign m inister R istich. rem ained indifferent to the outliienlc of war. there was no reason for in terv en tio n .1 1 2 B u t with I In defeat of Serbia and the in terv en tio n of Russia. "* K. d espatched a note In ( onm oundouros. Insurrections were sta rte d in C rete and th e frontier l?invmces b u t th e Powers in tervened and Greece found it necessary In w ithdraw her troops in order to a v e rt a naval blockade. M oreover. 31. th e alliance had lapsed w ith the d eath of one of the i пн Im eting sovereigns. these I lorious descendants of T hem istocles and B otsaris.1 1 1 Thus the B alkan front. tiliiiiild have consulted th e G reek governm ent before declaring w ar on I in key. . th en p resid en t of th e council. On these grounds th e Serbian claim to aid was rejected. " iiKelhardt. “La confederation balkanique. laboriously b uilt during the years 1866lltfiH. proud of th eir love for liberty.iult and Lhdritier. "T h e Greeks. even if it had been in force. 37. both Greece and Hunmania changed their policies. «180-482.

Burks. A. 1930). Some were for a policy of stric t n eu tra lity . 1942).114 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y As for R oum ania her n e u tra lity becam e untenable once Russia entered the w ar. A divergence of opinion existed am ong R oum anian political leaders regarding this m a tte r.’ Slavonic Review. 1915). how ever. by which the R oum anian govern­ m ent allowed the R ussian arm y free passage through its territory and assured it th e tre a tm e n t of a friendly arm y. R osetti. for th e T u rk s and thus the question was who I would be th eir a ttitu d e to Russia.1 1 4 T he peace settlem ent a t Berlin proved th a t these apprehensions were justified. “ Rom ania and the Balkan C risis'of 1 875-78. see R. H eretofore the Balkan peoples felt th a t if they could u n ite and defeat th e T urks. V. 310-320. “ R oum ania’s Share in the W ar of 1877. however. “Souvenirs d ’avant el d'apres la guerre de 1877-1878. X X V I II (July 15. B u t the peace tre a ty destroyed even this possibility. R.” Revue des deux mondes. T h e co u n try was technically p a rt of the O ttom an E m pire and had been declared to be such by th e new T u rk ish con­ stitu tio n of D ecem ber 1876. th e R oum anians would never fight. T hey were quite aw are th a t Russia.” Journal of Central European A ffairs. N elid ov. T he T re a ty of Berlin. E uropean T u rkey would be theirs. Obviously. T h e T re a ty of San Stefano a t least created a B ulgarian sta te on a fairly sound na­ tional basis according to contem porary evidence. in view of th e fact th a t the right of tra n sit through R oum a­ nian te rrito ry was essential for the Russians. in case of victory. W ith o u t going here into the volcanic question of Bal­ kan and particu larly M acedonian ethnology. W ith th e extension of A ustro-H ungarian adm inistration into Bosnia114 For further details. as m ight be ex­ pected. the Serbians by the advance of A u stria-H ungary in to Bosnia-H erzegovina. 1867 two conventions were concluded. 119-134. the R oum anians by the R ussian acquisition of Bessarabia and the Greeks by their failure to obtain territorial com pensation. it m ay be said th a t this tre a ty is o u tstan d in g for the fact th a t it m anaged to leave every one of th e B alkan n ationalities thoroughly dissatisfied. 241-277. some favored an alliance w ith Russia b u t no p articipation in the w ar. T h u s the Bulgarians were em bittered and dissatisfied by the p artition of their country to allay A ustrian and English fears. 1942). while others urged both an alliance and m ilitary action. with th e exception of Greece. 548-551. was based wholly on considerations of balance of power. II (O ctober. T he situation would n o t have been so u n fo rtu n ate if there had been a possibility of the resurgence of B alkan cooperation as a reaction to the common discontent over the results of G reat Pow er diplom acy. would dem and the retrocession of B essarabia. T he Roum anians. had no illusions regarding the future. II (July. T hus on April 16. and granted inde­ pendence and additional te rrito ry to the other B alkan states. however. V III M arch. . T h e last policy was adopted.

B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 115 Herzegovina. sem inaries and p rin tin g presses. T he feeling for Y ugoslav u n ity was strong and resolutions were passed in favor of cooperation betw een the Serbians. B ul­ garians and Slovenes. Serbian energies were deflected from Bosnia-H erzegovina to M ace­ donia. 1866. Now w ith Serbian expansion blocked to th e n o rth there developed a suicidal lliree cornered conflict w hich for th e next q u a rte r cen tu ry rendered united B alkan action o u t of th e question. B akunin. and by 1874 four Socialist deputies were elected to the S kupshtina. D obrolyubov. T h e Socialists were now an appreciable facto r in Serbian political life and th eir agi­ . believers. T his journal was soon suppressed by the Hovernment and M arkovich was com pelled to seek refuge abroad for ii short period. Its m em bers. a strong m ovem ent continued to exist 111 radical circles in favor of B alkan federation and especially of Y ugo­ slav u nity. 1867. A lthough the first B alkan alliance system d isintegrated soon after I he assassination of M ichael. C roatians. As a result of this dissension the radical wing of the O m ladina uplit off in 1870. and sus­ pected them of republican sym pathies. I t included in its ranks atheists. A lthough two o th er congresses were held. T h e establishm ent of th e exarchate had led to th e G reco-B ulgarian feud over M acedonia. T he resu lt was disastrous. lliree thousand persons a tten d ed . th e first Serbian new spaper with definite Socialist tendencies. representing all th e S outh Slav races. T his was due p a rtly to the opposition of Prince M ichael’s governm ent. literary and educational organization w ith natio n alist aspirations. liberals and m onar­ chists. Chernyshevski and oth er revolutionaries. T h e leader of this faction was Svetozar M arkovich who.” B u t it could agree on no definite program . founded th e R adnik [Worker]. a Serbian sem i-secret. and a t th e second m eeting held in Belgrade on A ugust 6. which feared th e ad ­ vanced social theories held by some of these radical youth. radical republicans. I t received su p p o rt not only from the Serbians of the P rin cipality b u t also from the prosperous Serbian com m unities of the Voivodina. W orse still. T h e first m eeting of the society was held on A ugust 15-18. I t vaguely sought a fte r freedom . im m ediately after leaving th e O m lad­ ina. were under th e influence of H erzen. T his was ev id en t in th e O m ladina. the organization had d isintegrated by 1871. th e Serbs and M ontenegrins were faced w ith a new and more form idable opponent. centered especially a t K a r­ lovitz. Pisarev. These played an im p o rta n t role in th e O m ladina because of their com paratively well developed m iddle class and th eir num erous schools. its w atchw ord being "T h ro u g h knowledge to freedom . b u t o th er Socialist papers were founded. under th e rule of M ilan. m any of whom had studied in Russia. A more fundam ental factor ui the failure of th e O m ladina was its lack of u nity.

384-396. the form ation ultim ately of a B alkan republican federation. com plete revision of th e political anti judicial system s. S. II (1880). 1941). “signifies the socialist negation of nationality! T h e practical im portance of socialiam for th e internal and externa] political developm ent of the Serbian people is the follow­ ing: in tern al social transform ation on the basis of the people’s sov­ ereignty and com m unal adm in istration. In dom estic affairs the Socialists de­ m anded far-reaching political and social reform. D .” 1 1 6 W hen in 1874 a conservative B ulgarian new spaper in C onstantinople complained th a t th e Serbiami were carrying on propaganda in B ulgarian areas. 327-334. Oeuvre de rapprochement. and federation of the B alkan P eninsula. 1875. “ N otre heritage rdvolutionnaire. 146 (D ecem ber. 137-165.” a t first w ith the B ulgarians and u ltim ately w ith all tin* B alkan peoples.ш T h e program of M arkovich and his followers was quite difTerenl from th a t of th e O m ladina. A u s deni Siidslawischen Risorgim ento. 128-131. 116 Cited by G. 1888). X L V II (July. 1931). M arkovich defined his aim s as “liberation and fed eratio n . 1882 1885). revolution in T u rkey. “Svetosar Markowitcli ct lc socialism c scrbc.” Slavonic Review. M arkovich developed the thesis th a t national u n ity and freedom could be a tta in e d only by a general revolution and the estab­ lishm ent of a Balkan federal republic. . “ D ieso cia le Bewegung in S erbien. as did all th e revolutionaries of the period.” he continued. “T h is. H . cancellation of agricultural debts. Jovanovid. IV. TomaSi6. In 116 A detailed analysis of the Om ladina from the Socialist view p oin t is given in Theodorow itsch. 8-10.116 S m it ii C o l l e g k S t u d i e s in H is t o r y ta tio n co ntributed to M ilan ’s decision to declare w ar on T urkey in 187б.” Am erican Journal of Sociology. R u ssia and the Balkans. 392. and the lim itation of p rivate land-holding by grant­ ing to the com m une all land in excess of w hat the individual owner could himself cultivate. Sumner. W endel. In a book published in 1874 entitled Srbija na Isloku [Serbia in the East]. M alon.” L a revue socialiste (D ecem ber. M arkovich replied Chat it was im m aterial w hether or n ot this was th e case because. In an-article in Rad [Work] on D ecem ber 1. B u t the Socialists hoped to a tta in this end by the united efforts of the Balkan peoples ra th e r than by depending upon their governm ents in whicli they had no faith. Malon.” L a federation bill kanique. “Sociology in Y u goslavia. 1527-1563. 11. Bakaloff. See also B. B. Stragnakovitch. “Our com m on aim is th e liberation of the Serbian and B ulgarian people and we do not wish to quibble over w hether a ‘S erbian’ or a 'Bulgar* ia n ’ M orava will form th e frontier betw een Serbia and Bulgaria. including the aboli­ tion of the s ta te police. self-gov­ ern m en t for the com m unes.” Jahrbuchfiir Sozial-W issenschafl I (2) (1880). 1925). T h ey envisaged. IV (Dr cember. "Serbia in the Early S even ties. further. H istoire du socialism s du pu is les tem ps les plus reculcs ju sq u ’d nos jo u rs (Paris. no. 582— 595. In foreign affairs they sought liberation from T urkish rule. T h e latter study contains a sum m ary of Marko v ich ’s interpretation of Serbia’s historical developm ent. 57-60.

A lbania. and the Italians rould claim the whole B alkan Peninsula because of th e R om an E m ­ pire. “T h e Influence of W estern Political T hought in Bulgaria. He pointed o u t th a t exaggerated national aspirations based on p ast glory had no validity. II (July. Erdel and T ransylvania. In Eui nnr there are em pires being form ed which would like to am use them mives by imposing laws upon microscopic states. 148.118 in 1867. Serbia would acquire D alm atia. like all other ■| i U liiih and peoples. w ith a com m on parliami’M l b u t w ith sep arate executive and ad m in istrative branches. X L V III (April. *< г iiliin S.ike th e South Slavs [he w arned] the G reeks and R oum anians niiiiil. K aravelov from the o u tse t opposed Inreign intervention or reliance upon foreign aid .” International Review. . th a t only a 11'deration would enable the B alkan races to live peacefully together. Greece (with T hessaly and I'pirus) and the free city of C onstantinople.” Iun riatW H istorical Review. W ith the dft&h of the pioneer revolutionary. W ith th e expected collnpne of A ustria-H ungary. 1850-1885. More specifically. 87. th e liberated people will them selves decide w hether Hiicli a frontier is even n ecessary. H e concluded."117 In B ulgaria the revolutionary leaders were sim ilarly beginning to lliink in term s of social revolution and Balkan federation. BarI и "The Early H istory of the Balkan L eague. T here he published the newspapers Svoboda [Liberty ] betw een 1869 and 1873. were to be in specially cloge alliance. Mineff. I (1915). he proposed a confederation consisting of Serbia {with Bosnia. Serbia and Rouiniiiiia. 19. Otherwise th e G reeks could claim M acedonia because of th e ir conliol over th a t region during th e B yzantine period. August 3 1 . because th ey expect help.” D em ain. 147. R oum ania. W ithin this 11 nifedcration.” N ezavisim ost. B ulgaria (with T hrace and M acedonia). recognize th a t th eir sep arate existence is too doubtful. 1 1 1 1 "The chief cause of th e thraldom which we have suffered up to th e present. therefore. and Nezavisitiwst [Independence ] in 1873-74. I . 259. Cited b y L. R ak o v sk i. 1917). the three D an u b ian states. supra.1871..119 Instead he urged I lie Balkan sta te s to cooperate closely in order to get rid of foreign dom ination and to m aintain th eir independence. lli ч hi (he fact that th e Christian nations of the Balkan Peninsula.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 117 Ilie final analysis. and so on ad absurdum. “La rgpublique balkanique. 88. B ulgaria. T h e east m ust form "» Ibid. 1943)^511. 1 I1 Ulrick. 118 Cf. W e beg perm ission to say ill ii | Ihose peoples and races are m ost unhappy who rely only on foreign help and exin 1 1 I li' ir salvation at foreign h ands. are deceived. while R oum ania would obtain I lie rem ainder of the B an at. C roatia n nd the southern section of the B an at. K aravelov spen t nine years as a stu d e n t in Moscow where he came under the influence of R ussian radical tho u g h t. H erzegovina and M ontenegro). his w ork was <ontinued by L yuben K aravelov. support and salvation In ии the European cabinets and especially from Russia. Born in K o p riv sh titsa in 1837. He retu rn ed to Bel­ grade in 1867 and in the nex t year settled in B ucharest which became I lie center of his revolutionary activities.

Suchineniya [Works] (Sofia.” C ited by Black.. all are to be equally subject to a common law given by th e m ajo rity of votes of all n atio n alities. K hristo Botev. loc. Each natio n ality m ust be free in all its relations and all the n ationalities m ust represent a u n ity whose power is based on the m ost ju st principles. 261. op. .. Botev. F ra te rn ity and com­ plete E q u ality of all n a tio n s /’1 2 1 Som ew hat different were the views of the fam ous revolutionary poet. Like K aravelov. On his re tu rn he ta u g h t school for a sh o rt period. 1927). loc. As he put it. 512. 11 million South Slavs. as he shrew dly observed." loc.1 2 2 B u t unlike his predecessors B otev was more of a socialist th an a liberal republican. w hether as regards th eir faith or their social standing. S eealso Black. 148. the Byzan­ tine em pires give no guarantees either to the Greeks or to th e South Slavs. cit.. "W estern Political T hought in Bulgaria. 122 B otev insisted on absolute eq u ality for all the federation m em bers. 511. 44. Jew s will all obtain the same rights. . If th e governm ent of every nation had been th e expression of their [the peoples’] real will. cit. 121 Cited by Barbar. His first aim was the overthrow of th e existing “despotic sta te system ” in B ulgaria and the establishm ent of a “dem ocratic republic. He agreed w ith M arko­ vich on the necessity of revolutionary m ass action by the people ra th e r th a n dependence upon inter-governm ental negotiations. th en agreem ents could be concluded with th e o th er Balkan people on th e basis of “ U nity. 39-43. . Vasil Levski.120 A no th er cham pion of B alkan federation was the ard en t republi­ can. Serbia. Like his predecessors B otev distru sted T sarist designs and urged the creation of a Balkan federation in which political and legislative power w ould be vested in a body to which each of the m em ber states would send an equal num ber of represen tativ es. cit. 208. .” “ Bulgars. B ut it seems th a t the governm ents of these states have been occupied w ith nothing b u t the im itation of th e shrewd device of M cttern ich : divide et im pera !1 2 3 120 Cited b y Mineff. th e states of D ushan. but a Bulgarian is not a Serb. K aravelov continued his efforts for federation until com pelled by ill-health to retire in 1874. Black.. "The Prussian is a German and the P iedm ontese an Italian. nor is a Serb a R ussian. .118 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y a w hole . Greece and R oum ania would long ago have over-stepped th eir boundaries as a m a tte r of course. T urks. 6 million R oum anians and 2 million Greeks are th e moral force which is called the D anubian fed­ eration. loc. th eir needs and their aims. Constitutional Government in B ulgaria. 123 K h. 260. See also Barbar. cit. T h e Kingdom s of Sim eon. or in any o th er respect.” Once this internal revo­ lution had been com pleted.. For. cit. B otev studied in R ussia where he im bibed th e ideas of the Polish emigres and studied th e w ritings of the nihilists. aided K aravelov in his journalistic activities in B ucharest and found­ ed his own revolutionary journal in Br&ila. . and helped th e Bulgars to throw off the hated yoke of T u rk ey .

T h e indus­ trial backw ardness of th e peninsula m ade it impossible to build up powerful socialist parties. O rthodox ideas.1 2 4 In o th er words. Its origins can be traced to the Slavophil m ovem ent which stressed the intrinsic value of R ussian as against W estern E uropean culture. B otev was calling for collaboration w ith M arkovich mid his followers. and therefore we look upon this Balkan Piedm ont w ith special d istru st. On M ay 1. cam e under th e influence of th e R ussian revolutionaries and became im placable opponents of T sa rist autocracy. T he Society counted the T sarin a and th e T sarevich am ong its su pporters and it was placed tinder the control of th e A siatic D ep artm en t of th e Foreign Office. Prior to the Crim ean W ar th e Slavophils. grouped ab o u t Ilie journals Rad [Work] and Baduchnost [Future]. T here was little o p p o rtu n ity a t this tim e. T h u s on D ecem ber 21. I t was n o t until Ihe period of th e B alkan and W orld W ars th a t th e Socialists were able Iо win m uch su p p o rt for th eir an ti-w ar and pro-federation policies. for the social­ ist groups of th e various B alkan countries to p u t their theories into practice or to seriously influence inter-B alkan relations. b u t th is did n o t prove very successful as a large proportion of the stu d en ts. was now evident. T he only hopes for a confedcrative union w ith Serbia lies in those Serbians who. 152. ш Ibid. are persecuted by Ilie Belgrade rulers. and w ith its trad itio n s and tendencies it has n Iready proven th a t it will be no more useful for us th an it is for its own people. such as K aravelov. however. G erm any and the o th er w estern E uropean countries. as was done during this period in France. . B otev and Stam bnlov. T he political value of pan-Slavism . 1875 he welcomed w ith enthusiasm th e results of th e Serbian elections in which th e Socialists made notable gains. Branches were established in several R ussian cities. In practice this society concentrated its a tte n tio n on th e Bulgars. there was established in Moscow th e Slavonic B enevolent vSociety for the purpose of aiding th e South Slavs. T h e aim was to in d o ctrinate them w ith pan-Slav. generally speaking. In 1858. We are aw are of this. M uch more widely known and feared th a n the Serbian and Bul­ garian revolutionaries was the pan-Slav m ovem ent. took no p a rt in politics and showed little in terest in the non-R ussian Slavs. and pam phlets. and betw een 1856 and 1876 some five hundred B ulgarian stu d en ts were granted scholarHhips for stu d y in Russia. however. however.1875 he w rote: T h e present Serbian governm ent is the sam e as all th e other governm ents of E urope.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 119 In fact B otev a ttack ed specifically th e pan-H ellenism of th e Greek governm ent and th e tendency of Serbia to assum e th e role of the Piedm ont of the Balkans..

Fadeiev.. 400ff. and a great Slave T sar for th e affairs of all collectively. and national d evelopm ent. 114-124. not only because it controlled m any of the Yugoslavs b u t because it com ­ m anded the entrance to th e B alkans. op. Le pcmslavisme et I’int&rtt franqais (Paris. b u t the occasion was utilized to im press the delegates w ith the m ight and benevolence of M other R ussia. E xcept under the la tte r condition. 368 ff. 1873). Indicative of this transform ation was the publication of the well-known w orks of G en­ eral R otislav Fadeiev and N icholas D anilevski. he adm itted. T he E astern Ques­ tion. IX (July 1. were to a tta in dom inance in the N ear E a st under th e aegis of Russia and C onstantinople was to serve as the free city of the Slav federation. E ven more influential was D anilevski’s book.1 2 5 H enceforth the pan-Slavs became less concerned w ith the preser­ vation and propagation of Slavic culture and turned th eir atten tio n instead to purely political objectives— especially th e destruction of the A ustro-H ungarian and O tto m an Em pires. according to Fadeiev. L. were n ot Slavs but he was certain of th eir support. L X X I (Septem ber 1. M ijatovics.” T he G reeks and th e R oum anians. K laczko. T he im m ediate ta sk of Slavdom. 83. liberty. J. In 1867 a Slavonic E thnographic Congress was held in Moscow w ith representatives from all the Slavic groups excepting the recalcitran t Poles. 132-181. Linguistic and religious differences proved v ery noticeable and aw kw ard. was essentially ‘‘a Slavonian q u estio n . 1871). See also F ischel. a closer trib al union w ith Russia. Once th a t was accom ­ plished there could be p u t in to effect the pan-Slav program which was defined as follows: T h e Slavonian race should endeavour to a tta in tw o objects. viz. “ Le congrSs de M oscou et le propagande p an slaviste.120 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y periodicals. under her m ilitary and international predom inance. “ Panslavism : its Rise and D eclin e. therefore.” Fortnightly Review. L.. was th e defeat of A ustria-H ungary.” 1 2 0 B u t th e g reat obstacle to Slav aspirations in the N ear E a st was G erm anism and p articu larly the D ual M onarchy. therefore. 1867). 187 Ibid. Each tribe requires a Sovereign of its own for its dom estic affairs.— an independent political and social life in th eir own country. Opinion on the Eastern Question (London. Leger.. 126 R. th e independence of the Slaves of th e B alkans and of th e D anube be­ comes an im possibility. for they realized th a t R ussia alone was read y to shed blood for them . 94-112. R ussia and Europe . and they were interested n o t in “archaeological fancies” b u t in “actualities. E. Der P anslaw ism us bis sum W eltkrieg. which first appeared in a periodical in 1869 and two years later was 126 Fischel. financial g ran ts and scholarships were d istributed through ­ o u t the Y ugoslav lands. . 1917). each separately. and all together.1 2 7 T he Y ugoslavs. cit. T h is book was first published in 1870.” Revue des deux mondes.

I t quickly becam e th e bible of the pan-Slav m ovem ent. See also W endel. 30-32. R u ssia and the Balkans. “ .B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n . with th e aid of Russia. b u t Russian dom ination th e y rejected. . 326. 129 Cited by A .”130 128 N . 85.121 published in book form.” In co n trast. C ited b y Iorga. n o t of th e Russian Foreign Office.” Slavonic Review. Russian help th e y were willing to accept. w hether th ey will or not.”1 2 8 A nother widely know n pan-S lavist was C ount N icholas Pavlovich Ignatiev. . cit. . A ustria-H ungary. Sumner. In 1871. for example. He believed firmly in th e principle of Slav u n ity which was to tak e th e form of common action against th e arch-enem y. 1889). L a R ussie et VEurope (St. however. B u t to exert th eir full influence it was necesHiiry for th e Slavs. A ccording to D anilevski th e G erm ano-R om anic culture of Europe was decadent and destined to give w ay to th e fresh and vigorous Slavic culture. to free them selves and to com bine in a federation. Onou. 1871. 325. Petersburg. Der K a m p f der Siidslawen.. iso M ay 5. th a t Russian in terests will not suffer from the an­ nexation of Bosnia and H erzegovina b y A u stria . . postpone all th oughts of solving I lie E astern Question.” I t should be noted. Correspondance diplom atique. G orchakov was of the opinion th a t. Ignatiev regarded himself in th e service. In fact. 391. 395ff. Igna­ tiev considered it preferable to . 369. th e T urkish Slavs can be m ade h ap p y a t th e h ands of th e G ov­ ernm ent of Vienna. “ T he A ustrian and T urkish Slavs m ust be our allies. th e w eapons of our policy against th e G erm ans. happily or unhappily. of liberating Bosnia and H erzegovina from T urkish dom ination.” 1 2 9 In spite of th e w ritings of th e pan-Slav propagandists and the efforts of Ig n atiev and o th er R ussian diplom ats. ra th e r th a n surrender these provinces to A ustroI Iungarian rule and sacrifice th e fu tu re of th e Serbian n a tio n . D anilevski. Ig n a ty ev . Danilevski was convinced th a t th e only solution for th e E astern Question was a Slav federation in which . 390. See also Fischel. T his was especially tru e of th e Balkans. th a t IgnaI iev’s views were by no m eans those of th e m ajo rity in th e Russian diplom atic service. we will rise up in a body against th e Russia which w ants to extend its hegem ony over us. am bassador a t C onstantinople between 1864 and 1877. a Bulgarian p am phlet was published in Moscow urging th e creation of a Yugoslav federation under the hegem ony of R ussia as the m ost powerful Slav state. op. all th e non-Slavic nations m ust enter [Greeks and R oum anians] whose historic destinies. However. “T he M em oirs of Count N . X (Decem ber. 1931). th e Yugoslavs never accepted th e pan-Slav doctrines. ju st as against th e enem y of our fu tu re . b u t of Russian im perialism and pan-Slavism . are linked by inde­ nt ructible bonds to th e Slavic w orld. See also M ijato- . T he com m ent of th e Vidov D an of Belgrade to this proposal was as follows: “ E very Serb and Bulgarian loves and respects bis Russian b ro th er as a Slav.

Constitutional Government in Bulgaria. one or two men who spoke openly of th e creation of a Slavic state. and their local in terests. T h e inhabitants of the Principality have no sym ­ p ath y or care for any race w hatever outside. 131 A. X V III (D ecem ber 1. b u t determ ined not to su b stitu te Russian dom ination for it. I confess. Similar view s were held in Bulgaria.”ш vies. their internal organization. a Slavic em pire. “ N o t R ussian. I have alw ays found them very discon­ tented w ith th e O ttom an regime.” Cited by Black. outside R ussia like A ustria . 1879. th e British consul in Sofia reported: "Panslav agitators.” th ey replied with indignation. being fully and sufficiently occupied with their own affairs. th e French expert on Slavic affairs. 530. . 153. . “ You mean a R ussian em pire?” I asked. la politique russe et le panslavism e. On June 20. "Les reformes de la Turquie. cit. did an y such exist here. Bulgarian p a trio ts on the D anube or on th e A driatic. reported in 1876 th a t: I have visited th e T urk ish E m pire several tim es. M ontenegrin. Leroy-Beaulieu. 1876). “b u t really Slavic. I have had occa­ sion to see Slavic. would be as in­ effective as in Belgium or H olland. I have m et. .” Revue des deux mondes.. Serbian. . loc. 111.122 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y Sim ilarly Leroy-Beaulieu.

1891). 9 L ittle inform ation is available on this point. “ We are even disposed. However. 178. in the beginning of 1882. LVI (Septem ber.3 On F e b ru a ry 11.1 A year later Serbia m ade a feeble a tte m p t Iо come to an u n derstanding w ith Greece. 123 . In reply th e G reek governm ent ex­ pressed willingness to s ta r t negotiations w ith th e Prince b u t on the condition th a t th ey be confined to a bilateral agreem ent. He was warm ly welcomed by th e press and th e public an d he was received .” Fortnightly Review. D . 130. 178. B ulgaria. T his was parI icularly tru e of Prince N icholas of M ontenegro who.” added Tricoupis. A fter th e Berlin peace settlem en t th e furious Hlruggle for th e possession of M acedonia and th e increasing influence nf the G reat Powers in B alkan politics produced a situation extrem ely unfavorable to united B alkan action. N either I lie king of Greece nor his cab in et were willing to su p p o rt this plan no it was soon dropped. IV. IV.2 A bout this tim e Prince A lexander of Bulgaria in th e m idst of his ulruggles w ith his R ussian advisers. T h e Greek governm ent was anxious to end th e schism and offered to bring presture to bear on th e P atriarch to raise th e Bulgarian Exarch to the mine position as th a t of th e M etropolitan of A thens. M ontenegro and Greece w ith K ing George a t th e head of th e coalition. advanced his favorite schem e for an an ti-T u rk ish offensive iind defensive alliance betw een R oum ania. M ilan expressed th e desire Iо confer th e G rand Cross of th e new order of the W hite Eagle upon King George and negotiations were begun for an accord regarding M acedonia b u t no agreem ent w as reached. Bourchier.ih if he were th e head of an in dependent s ta te by th e governm ent.C H A P T E R VI M A C E D O N IA V E R SU S B A L K A N U N IT Y . 365. Progress was m ade on problem s of secondary im portance b u t a stale­ mate was quickly reached over th e exarchate question. A lexander consented to th is lim itation and arrived in A thens on M ay 3. m ade an a tte m p t to build an niiti-R ussian Balkan bloc. IV.. C. H istoire diplomatique. H istoire diplom atique. 179-183. J. E . 179. Hein K a m p f m it den Zarcn und Bism arck (Vienna. D riault and Lhfiritier. some a tte m p ts were made in th e years following th e T re a ty of Berlin b y some of th e Bal­ kan states to come to agreem ents w ith th eir neighbors. 1920). a Ibid. Alexander von Battenberg. “ to favor th e extension of his jurisdiction 1 D riault and Lh6ritier. 1883 th e G reek agent a t Sofia reported th a t A lexander wished to visit A thens and th a t he had ii general Balkan en ten te in m ind. 1878-1902 T he B alkan alliances and alignm ents which had been concluded 'during th e years 1866 to 1868 had d isintegrated by 1870 and proven non-existent by 1876. Corti. “A Balkan Confederation.

even an alliance. 185.124 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y over E astern Roum elia. Ib id . 181.. “ W h at Greece desires. IV. B u t we would not. H istoire diplom atique. it is ra th e r an entente. 6 Cited.”6 T o a tta in an alliance w ith T u rk ey it was necessary to su p p o rt the status guo in the N ear E a st and Tricoupis was prepared to do this tem p o rarily . who was in th e bad graces of th e Porte. IV. recognize th e suprem acy of th e P atriarch and rem ove his seat to the Bulgarian Principality. . B ism arck was interested in th e N ear E ast only insofar as it 4 Cited in D riault and Lh& itier. IV. W e want only peace and th e m aintenance of the present state of affairs. if th at had been possible. w ith T urkey. T he sincerity of the Porte. 182.” C ited in ibid. T he Greek governm ent was willing to recall its counsul in Crete.7 T h u s these feeble a tte m p ts on th e p a rt of the B alkan nations to reach an agreem ent am ongst them selves proved futile."4 In sh o rt the Greeks dem anded th a t th e Exarch renounce th e right to indefinite expansion. 6 H e w rote.” he argued. and th e T urkish governm ent in retu rn agreed n o t to ap p o in t a Moslem as governor of Crete. P robably th e anti-G reek policy of N elidov in C onstantinople was an im p o rta n t factor in determ ining th e policy of th e Porte. but today it is not th ey [the Turks] whom we should fear.. A t any rate. T h e Balkan states now turned to th eir other a ltern ativ e— agreem ents w ith th e G reat Powers. which are dangerous adversaries of H ellenism . In N ovem ber 1881 and February 1882 T urkey had sought an understanding w ith Greece. ibid. A ustria-H ungary and Russia. “W e w ant only th e status quo. In O ctober 1883 th e Turkish rep resen tativ e in A thens even spoke of a visit by K ing George to Con­ stan tin o p le and th e conclusion of an alliance. consent to any fu rth er extension. I would not say th a t w e did not have som e am bitions as regards C onstantinpole. 164. IV. 7 Ib id . 182. T he question of who was to obtain M ace­ donia had broken up these negotiations as it was to d isru p t num erous others in later years. no definite understanding was concluded.. France was busy in N orth A frica. is open to question. T heir conflict­ ing interests in M acedonia and the centrifugal force exerted by the Powers were too great. IV. directed ag ainst the propaganda of th e Slavs.186. however.6 Accordingly he m ade definite proposals to T u rk ey for an alliance and some progress was m ade. No accord was possible on this basis and w ithin forty-eight hours A lexander had left A thens. “is n o t union w ith th e sm all C hristian states of the Balkan peninsula. how ever. T here were only two powers to which the Balkan governm ents could tu rn . T ricoupis now gave up try in g to come to an agreem ent w ith his B alkan neighbors. although th e relations between Greece and T u rk ey were placed on a friendly basis. No form al invitation was issued to K ing George and no definite com m itm ents were m ade on any im p o rta n t m atter..

“La diplom atie de Bism arck et la crise bulgare de IHB6-87. 19. 1935).opsius. 210. von Sosnosky. I 13— 1914). W . In re tu rn it was agreed th a t th e addition of E astern Roum elia Co B ulgaria should n o t be opposed when produced by force of circumtilances. 972.” Revue d'histoire diplom atique. 10 A. 1 1 T . L.” toUrnal of Modern H istory.Ungarns seit 1866 (Stuttgart. 1930). 1935).9 St. T he ngreem ent was regarded p rim arily as a tru ce while th e tw o empires watched each o th er suspiciously and sought to strengthen their positions in th e Balkans. (Cambridge. 1910-1913). 1 1 For further details and references see W . for example. 1 1 P. Langer. F .B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 125 affected relations am ong th e G reat Pow ers. 578-588. N. ed. A ustria.1 1 In the field of economics this policy found expression in the ex­ tensive railw ay projects of Baron H irsch and in th e A ustro-Serbian commercial agreem ent of M ay 6. R ussia recognized th e A ustro-H un­ garian position in th e B alkans as created by the T re a ty of Berlin. Seton-W atson. Pribram. I t was th e Balkan crisis of 1875-T878 which broke up th e D reikaiserbund and which led B ism ark in O ctober 1879 to ally him self to A ustria. Archibald Ciiroy Coolidge. V III (M arch. 1920). Gladstone's Foreign P o licy (N ew Y ork. D ie B alkanpolitik Osterreich. A. 186-208. R. 3 6-49. Finally all th ree p arties engaged to tak e account of their respective in terests in th e B alkan Peninsula and prom ised th a t any new modification of th e territo rial status quo of T u rkey in Europe would be preceded^ by a' com m on agreem ent between th e m . M ass. 101-106. IL (January-M arch. The Secret Treaties of A ustria-H ungary.. T heir aim was ra th e r political and economic influence. 132— 140. 1940).1 2 A lthough of m uch value to 8 D ie Grosse P o litik der Europ'dischen Kabinette. E . I. F o rtu n a te ly for th e B alkan sta te s neither one of th e Powers was interested in territo rial expansion. K naplund. In Ju n e 1881 th e alliance of th e three Krfstern Em perors was revived. III. “T h e G ladstone G overnm ent and the Cyprus C onvention 1880-1885. “Russian Com m itm ents in the Bosnian Q uestion and iiii ICarly Project of A n n exation .8 while B ritain was con­ cerned more with Asia M inor and E g y p t th an w ith th e Balkan Peninsula. In stead th ere was followed a policy of pacific p enetration. G raf Ju liu s Andr&ssy (Stuttgart. V. And A ustria-H u n g ary was to be allowed to annex Bosnia-H erzegovina whenever she chose and to continue to occupy the S an jak of Novil>azar. Albrecht M endelssohn B artholdy. 1881. 1871-1914. 1922— I')z7). Petersburg and Vienna. European A lliances and .10 W hile (Ins arrangem ent regulated th e relations betw een A ustria-H ungary ii nd R ussia in th e B alkans it did n o t elim inate th eir rivalry. W ertheim er. M cdlicott. II.” Slavonic Review. and Friedrich Thim m e (Berlin. Sm edovsky. however. B ut nothing was done because of M agyar opposition to an y fu rth e r acquisition of Slavic territo ry . W . no. had full rig h t by th e 1881 iigreem ent to annex B osnia-H erzegovina and could have easily done no in view of th e active su p p o rt of R ussia and G erm any. 1879-1914 . were both vitally interested in th e B alkans. X I I (June. edited b y Johannes l.

496-527. 13 Pribram. this tre a ty m ade th e co u ntry dependent upon the D ual Mon archy for its im ports and exports. “T h e Novibaztif R ailw ay P roject.1 6 Since T ricoupis. By its term s A ustria prom ised to recognize th e Prince of Serbia as King and to p erm it the kingdom to extend its frontiers southw ard. op.126 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y Serbia. D riault and Lh6ritier. A.1 3 T he significance of th is rem arkable tre a ty is obvious. b u t Bism arck insisted on the inclusion of A ustria-H ungary. X (D ecem ber.5 0 -5 5 . M ay. 161 . In addition to this v irtu a l p ro tecto rate over Serbia. 14 Ib id . K ing George sought an alliance in 1883 w ith V ienna. IV. I. A ustria had obtained full control over Serbian foreign policy and had blocked Serbian expansion north w ard and diverted it expressly to­ w ards M acedonia. Roumania and A ustria-H u n g ary signed an alliance to which G erm any acceded on th e sam e day. 1938). 1930). while denying an y A ustrian deAlignm ents. th e Greek m inister in V ienna. 78-83. Only four years were to elapse before th e disastrous effect of this alliance upon Balkan politics was dem onstrated. C onsequently an a tte m p t was m ade to come to an understanding w ith G erm any. 1 . Progress was slow because K alnoky. 1881.. In politics th e situation was the sam e. J. 325-327. A ustria-H ungary during these years enjoyed the friendship of the Greek governm ent. 1883. the R oum anians did not relish too close relations w ith either one of them . A fter the failure of th e negotiations w ith Bulgaria and T urkey. H erzegovina and th e S anjak of N ovibazar) and to en ter into no treaties w ith o th er foreign countries w ithout A u stria’s perm ission. he resigned from office and on Ju n e 26.” Journal of Modern H isto ry . had long denounced th e M onarchy as an enem y of G reek aspirations. K ing M ilan turned to Vienna and concluded th e secret alliance of Ju n e 28. T he loss of Bessarabia had cooled th eir relations w ith Russia b u t on th e other hand th e large n um ber of R oum anians in T ran sy lv an ia and the economic friction w ith th e D ual M onarchy prevented them from tu rn in g whole­ h earted ly to Vienna. 1883 Y psilantis. A ustria-H ungary was to come to th e assistance of R oum ania if the la tte r were a ttack ed w ith o u t provocation and R oum ania was to com<. A ustriaH u n g ary concluded an alliance w ith R oum ania tw o years later. while Serbia prom ised to p rev en t intrigues on her territo ry against A ustria (including Bosnia. Situ­ ated betw een th e two rival em pires. 1871-1890 (N ew Y ork. H istoire diplom atique. afraid of B ulgaria’s growing stren g th and not certain of his position in Serbia. however. T h u s on O ctober 30. cit. D eserted by R ussia in 1878. opened negotiations with C ount Kalnoky. to th e aid of A ustria-H ungary if the la tte r were a tta ck e d by R ussia. 15 As early as the sum m er of 1880 the M onarchy had indicated a desire to reacli an understanding w ith Greece.1 4 In addition to these two treaties.. By this tre a ty th e tw o contracting parties could n o t en ter into alliances or engagem ents directed against one another.

also. My this m eans the union was effected de facto while nom inally the Irm ly of Berlin was respected. “russ [ische] Konigin. On a rep o rt from Vienna regarding Grecce he m ade th e note. N . 1939). In th e m eantim e th e R ussians had staked everything on the Bulgarians. In eastern R oum elia th ey had left eighty thousand iilles for th e in h a b ita n ts and strove for th e union of th e province with Bulgaria as early as possible. franzos [ische] S ym pathien u [nd] bestechliche Ind iscretio n . was cool tow ard their advances. Being a violation of th e T re a ty of Berlin this move II cmLed an European diplom atic crisis. In fact the G reek statesm an D elyannis. H istoire diplom atique. refused to give any definite prom ise for th e future and ap p aren tly did n o t w holly tru s t th e G reeks. D uring the first tw o years of his rule A lexander was obliged to dismiss seven m inistries and three iNHemblies and still had n o t been able to restore order. . IV . M ed licott. “T h e Powers and the U nification of the tw o Bulgarias. L1V {January. m i “ Ibid. LIV (April. 264. 1939). 1 VV.1 9 Although settled successfully from th e view point of E uropean diplom acy th e union of B ulgaria and E astern Roum elia had fari niching repercussions on the relations betw een th e Balkan States.1 6 Bismarck. 1 1 1 < iled in Driault and Lh6ritier. 17 D ie Grosse P olilik. 263II II. in an instruction to th e legation a t C onstantinople d ated Ju n e 13.” 17 T h u s no agreem ent was concluded between Greece and th e C entral Powers b u t their relations were cordial. 1885.” / iijti$h H istorical Review. W hen in A pril 1879 th e assem bly elected A lexander of B attenberg as hereditary Prince difficulties soon arose betw een (hi1 Russians and th eir proteges.”18 Such was th e n atu re of A ustrian diplom acy in the Balkans. 200. 67-82. expressed the following view point: “ W e consider this governm ent 1 1he A ustrian] as our m ost sincere and n a tu ra l ally in all questions which m ight arise in th e O tto m an E m p ire. had left Russian officers and civil serv an ts in control of th e a d ­ m inistration. In B ulgaria th e Russian governorf/cneral. T he position ol the Prince was precarious because of his failure to obtain B ritish iiiid G erm an su p p o rt for his anti-R ussian policy. Prince Dondukoy* had g ranted a fairly liberal constitution I I. A fter long negotiations a comIHomise was reached w hereby th e Prince of B ulgaria was appointed I'Dvcrnor of E astern R oum elia b y th e S ultan for a period of five years. 188-191. III.. T h e situation enIrii'd a new phase when in Septem ber 1885 E astern Roum elia rose in rebellion against its T u rk ish governor and proclaim ed its union with Bulgaria. IV.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 127 nigns on Salonica. W ith the Serbian and R oum anian alliances. th e friendship of Greece and the control of B osnia-H erzegovina and th e S an jak of N ovibazar the I >ual M onarchy h ad secured a strong foothold there.

C. T he A ustrian governm ent. The real danger was from Greece and particularly from Serbia. Two d ays later G arashanin again expressed his desire for jo in t action by Greece and Serbia should th e status quo n o t be restored and on the 26th he added th a t Serbia was determ ined to resort to arm s if her dem ands were not m et. 202-205. 1885 th e Serbian prem ier and foreign m inister. His reasoning was th a t by such a step he would prevent B ulgarian expan­ sion and dem o n strate th a t w ith o u t Serbia's approval the Balkan balance of power could n o t be disturbed. On O ctober 2 the S kupshtina m et a t Nish where M ilan in his speech from th e throne stressed th e im portance of B alkan balance of pow er and m ade it clear th a t he favored war b u t w ith o u t m entioning the ad v ersary. however. 8 3 . Nazos. T he D elyannis govern­ m ent. persuaded M ilan th a t territo rial com pensation could be secured in th e region of Vidin and th a t war would be unnecessary. and inquired a b o u t the position of Greece.1 28 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y W hen A lexander triu m p h a n tly entered Philippopolis his first conccrn was th e th re a t of T urkish invasion. 21 Ib id . He suggested th a t th e m om ent was favorable for a Serbo-G reek entente. Lascaris. however. however. As early as Septem ber 22.2 1 T h e G reek governm ent was cool tow ards these advances.89.. opposed im m ediate action as hazardous and instead hastened m ilitary preparations. X I (July. M ilutin G arashanin. 1932). had de­ cided against m ilitary action and was contented w ith any solution th a t would retain T urkish suzerainty over E astern Roum elia. I t did n o t know w hether th e Serbians were preparing to a tta c k B ulgaria or T u rk ey and it was not until O ctober 2 th a t Nazos was instructed to determ ine w hat the Serbian requirem ents were for an entente.ih assum ed in both A thens and Belgrade th a t th e revolution in Ron melia would spread to M acedonia and th u s involve th eir interests. H istoire diplom atique.20 In Serbia. th e governm ent could n o t resist the overw helm ing popular dem and for an advance into Old Serbia and im m ediately mobilized its forces and sought united action w ith Greece. Greek public opinion was therefore entirely in favor of sending the arm y to E pirus and th e n av y to C rete and confronting E urope with a fa it accompli as th e B ulgarians had done. “Greece and Serbia D uring the War of 1885. IV. D riault and Lh6ritier. A bdul H am id. visited th e G reek charge d ’affaires in Belgrade. A t first he had considered th e possibility of a w ar w ith T u rk ey b u t he feared a repetition of the disastrous 1876 days and tu rn ed instead against Bulgaria. 9 0 .” Slavonic Review. As a resu lt th e Serbian governm ent now considered collaboration 20 M . By this tim e M ilan had changed his m ind. I t w . on th e other hand.9 1 . hoping to gain territorial concessions b y a show of force. .

T h e Greek governm ent was aw are of th e Serbo-R oum anian con­ versations and realized th a t Serbia would not move against T urkey. “Souvenirs diplom atiques. and when Greece refused to h a lt her w ar p rep aratio n s a blockade was enforced from M ay 8 to Ju n e 7. however. T he reply from Sofia was th a t Greece should first forestall a Serbian a tta c k on B ulgaria for such a m ove would lead to G reat Power intervention in th e Balkans. On N ovem ber 13 the Serbian governm ent. M ilan now decided th a t w ar w ith Bulgaria was inevitable. Driault and Lh6ritier. m ilitary p reparations were rushed and и final a tte m p t was m ade to come to an understanding w ith Serbia. declared w ar on B ulgaria. In the m eantim e I lie B ulgarian victories had increased th e excitem ent in Greece. b u t A u stria-H ungary failed to secure for Serbia some com pensation for th e enlargem ent of Bul­ garia. Accordingly on N ovem ber 5 th e G reek governm ent a tte m p te d a rapprochem ent w ith Sofia w ith a view to realizing. “ Greece and Serbia. “G reece and Serbia. cit. G eneral C atargi. T he T re a ty of B ucharest on M arch 3.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 129 w ith Greece superfluous.2 2 U nfo rtu n ately for M ilan his expectatio n s were n ot fulfilled a t the C onstantinople Conference. N o t only was the B ulgarian fa it accompli accepted for all practical purposes. D juvara. cit. He therefore sent his uncle. M For details see D riault and Lh6ritier. T he A thens cabinet now h u rriedly atte m p te d to bring pressure to bear upon Belgrade b u t it was already too late.2 6 I'lie Powers. G arashanin replied th a t th e Serbian govern­ m ent favored a cautious policy u n til th e Conference a t C on stan ti­ nople h ad reached a decision one w ay or the o th er. 92. were determ ined th a t w ar should n o t break out: anew.2 4 C o n trary to all expectations th e Serbs were decisively defeated. At the three day b a ttle of Slivnitza th e B ulgarians repulsed th e in­ vaders and sta rte d on th eir m arch to Belgrade u ntil stopped by the A ustrian u ltim atu m of N ovem ber 28. A "p a trio tic ” loan was raised. H istoire diplom atique. In answ er to th e G reek inquiries regarding t he basis of an enten te.2 6 Prince A lexander did n o t long enjoy his triu m p h. A group of disM Lascaris.” loc.. IV.” Revue des sciences politigiies. 24. I . 211-246. if possible.” loc. a general Balkan entente. IV. .. 95-98. L III ( Jmuiary-March. 1886 restored the status quo ante helium. 93. ail T . G. H istoire diplom atique. 1930). to B ucharest to secure Roum anian m ilitary assistance23 and he refused to p articip ate in a jo in t declaration w ith Greece to th e European Powers because he was trying to secure th e n eu tra lity of T u rk ey during th e com ing w ar and was therefore anxious to m ain tain a correct a ttitu d e . 86 D elyannis overestim ated the m ilitary power of Serbia and believed that she would soon be able to reorganize her arm y and obtain a satisfactory settlem ent. convinced th a t no com pensation could be obtained through the pacific efforts of A ustria. 207-209.linearis.

T he R oum anian cabinet. After com plaining against G reat Power intervention in Balkan affairs Stam bulov sought to con vin ce D juvara “ . . 103. T he Sobranje unanim ously elected Prince W aldem ar of D enm ark b u t th e opposi­ tion of th e T sa r led the Princc to decline the offer. 23. the R ussian governm ent firmly opposed th e plan and on Ju n e 22.130 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y contented officers w ith R ussian backing forced his abdication 011 A ugust 21. and. Paleologue. According to D juvara. L a rive de B yzance (Paris. T h e hope for Y ugoslav or B alkan unity in th e near future had been sh attered . the Bosphorus and the A siatic shores. loc. n atu rally . 33. V ery am bitious and u tte rly un­ scrupulous. 31. 1 01 . expressed th e fear th a t Bulgaria m ight becom e th e dom inant p a rtn e r of such a union. Stam bulov replied laughingly: "I will sec to it that he is packed out of Bulgaria w ithin fifteen d ays. . 1932). 102. R. Other exam ples of Ferdinand’s B yzantine am bitions are given in Djuvara. 100. . 1887 it w arned B ucharest th a t th e candidacy of Carol for the Bulgarian th ro n e would be considered a violation of the T re a ty of Berlin and th a t should Carol be elected B ulgarian prince. One proposal brought forward was th e personal union of B ulgaria and R oum ania. although Stam bulov. K ratchounov. H.” W hen D juvara asked w hat would be done with Ferdinand. however. Storm Centres of the Near E ast (London.a panoramic painting of C onstantinople.” D juvara. of the sam e typ e which existed between A ustria and H u n gary. th at Roum ania and Bulgaria would be stronger if a personal union were realized. Ferdinand de Bulgarie. cit. Such a w arning. 1933). For th e first tim e th e conflicting interests of th e B alkan states had led to open w arfare. La politique exlirieure de la Bulgarie. cit. R. Russia would sever relations w ith R oum ania and th e la tte r would have to face th e con­ sequences. 1933). Stam bulov in the spring of 1890 revived this plan. all of which were overshadowed by a m ajcstic m ounted figure. was sufficient to p u t an end to all hopes for a B ulgaro-R oum anian union. For the next six m onths th e Bulgarian crown w ent a-begging. Tsar Ferdinand. B ulgaria was now a definitely established sta te w ith little inclination to look to Serbia for aid and leadership as in the eighteen sixties.. enabled him to retu rn on A ugust 29.28 T hus th e mega27 K . Its effects on B alkan politics proved to be far-reaching. 1880-1920 (Sofia. G raves. w aiting for ten m inutes in a room in which was hung. M oreover. T h u s ended th e B ulgarian crisis of 1885 to 1887. T h e Bul­ garian regency seriously considered this possibility and suggested it to th e B ucharest governm ent. he consciously strove for th e restoration of the medieval B ulgarian em pire w ith C onstantinople as its capital. loc. 1887 Prince F erdinand of Coburg was elected Prince of Bulgaria. M adol. in his opinion this union could be realized because the tw o peoples prac­ tised the sam e O rthodox religion and because at one tim e there had existed a Roum anian-Bulgarian K ingdom . y et the unshaken hostility of th e T sar led th e Prince on Septem ber 7 to announce his abdication. pointing o u t the advantages of union. 24. 28 Ferdinand once kept the French m inister.27 F inally on Ju ly 7. 1886. T he problem now was to find another ruler. then Speaker of the Sobranje. M oreover th e ch aracter of the new Bulgarian ruler was of the u tm o st im portance..

henceforth.” Fortnightly R eview. 1906). N . T h e rem ainder of the population. N icolaides. w ith th e exception of such d istin ct m inorities as Vlachs and Jew s. Ancel. No accurate statistics were available so th a t each race juggled th e figures to suit its own ends. . 1920). th e chief cause for B alkan discord. 1918). Greeks. etude d'histoire diplom atique ct de droit public (Lyons. liowever.3 1 Finally th e Bulgarians argued th a t physiologi­ cally th e M acedonians were closer to them th a n to th e Serbs and th a t the M acedonian language was in reality a Bulgarian dialect. during this period a t least.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 131 Jomania of Prince Ferdinand togeth er w ith th e clashing N ear E astern policies of th e G reat Powers and th e increased d istru st betw een the Balkan sta te s com bined to m ake B alkan cooperation d istin ctly im ­ probab le during these years. S. In stead . L a Macedoine (Berlin. La question macedonienne. 30 C. 1918). 432. th ey lacked national consciousness. are G.29 Some general conclusions. L X X X II (Septem ber 2. Brailsford. Ivanoff. Stroum zi. M onastir and Kossovo. G eorgevich. M acedonia (London. however. La question m acldoine (Paris. H. 3 1 J. M ijatovich. W eigand. 1932). 1907).30 T he Serbs pointed to the charac­ teristics of th eir g ram m ar and to th e ir “ slav a” festival as proofs of their Serbian origin. “T he Balkan Problem s. fairly im partial studies. 33 J. then. R. a Greek. T his te rrito ry was th e m elting-pot of the B alkans. 1906). L a Macedoine et la renaissance bulgare (Sofia. Ethnographic von Makedonien (Leipzig. J. so th a t all th ree of th eir neighbors claimed them as th eir own. T o a t­ tem pt to assign exact percentages or figures to these various races is impossible. T o th e G reeks th e y were bulgarophone Greek since th e y were O rthodox C hristians and under the jurisdiction of the P atriarch of C onstantinople. M acedonia m ay be defined as th a t area around and behind Salonica consisting roughly of the three T urkish vilayets of Salonica. Population statistics. Macedonia (London. Radeff. could be called M acedonian. a Serbian. th e re ­ fore were largely useless. the o u tstan d in g feature of Balkan politics in this period was th e increasing rivalry over M ace­ donia. th a t m any p erm u tatio n s were possible when a B ul­ garian Serbophone P atriarch ist could be reckoned either as a Bul­ garian. L a Macedoine (Paris. stood o u t clearly 28 Exam ples of directly conflicting sta tistics are given in C. can safely be draw n from th e mass of conflicting evidence.3 3 One fact of dom in an t im portance. 1924). Cviji6. T. B u t the im po rtan t point was th a t. Rem arks on the Ethnography of the M acedonian Slavs (London. 1930).3 2 I t is apparen t. T hese M acedonians had a ch aracter and dialect of th eir own such as would ju stify their being considered one of th e m any d istin c t Y ugoslav types. In th e first place. N . In fact th e M acedonian question can safely be said to consti­ tute. a region w here several races lived more or less interm ingled. Serbs and B ulgarians were to be found in the border d istricts of th eir respective frontiers. 33 Am ong the best. 1899). or all three.

cit. T his was due to a num ber of factors.” this word m eant not Bulgar but Slav. "Les origines de la lu tte pour la M acedoine. T his did n o t m ean th a t all th e people were Bulgarians. A ccordingly prep arations were m ade for an in34 One writer m akes the point th at although the M acedonians called them selves " Sugars. Strupp. 55-57. III. D uring th e early years th e B ulgarians had to cope only w ith tin? opposition of th e G reek P a tria rc h a te in M acedonia b u t gradually the Serbs began to tak e m easures against th e Bulgarian propaganda.. E . (October. By 1895 th e B ulgarians had opened some six to seven hundred schools in M acedonia w ith tw enty-five to th irty thousand pupils while the v a st m ajo rity of contem porary observors and reputable authorities were agreed th a t th e mass of th e M acedonians considered themselves B ulgarians. J. had been bill garized in th eir sym pathies. 108-114.132 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y and th a t was th a t by th e m iddle of th e nineties the bulk of the M ace­ donians.3 5 M acedonia was well on its way to becoming Bulgarian. th e B ulgarians were now in a position to utilize th e exarchate to bulgarize the M acedonians ju st as th e Greeks had used the P a triarch ate to hellenize them . Ristich m ade an effort to open Serbian schools in Old Serbia and M acedonia to counteract th e effects of the exarchate. H aum ant. 1919). 1931). L a situation ju ridigu e des Macedoniens en Yougoslavie (Paris. 36 Q uotations from numerous authorities arc given in K . As early as 1869 d uring th e exarchate struggle Ristich had taken steps to safeguard Serbian interests in M acedonia b u t a t th e insistence of Ig n atiev he had w ithdraw n his claims. A t any rate. be­ cause of th e opposition of th e Russians and because the Serbs them ­ selves were interested more in Bosnia th an in M acedonia. 30 H aum ant.3 6 A fter the Congress of Berlin th e situation was com pletely changed. Serbian and Bul­ garian in terests thus clashed and led to th e fratricidal w ar of 1885. 62-66. W hen the Bulgarian exar­ ch ate was established and was proven to be an organ for purely Bulgarian ra th e r th a n general Slav interests.” Le monde slave. w hatever th eir racial origin m ay have been. T hus he claim s that m any Serbs in M acedonia were taken for Bulgarians. Somr considered them selves Serbs3 4 and probably m ost were indifferent b u t all disliked th e G reek clergy and th e incom prehensible Greek service. W ith their defeat a t Slivnitza th e Serbs realized th a t unless drastic m easures were tak en M acedonia would soon follow th e course of E astern Roum elia. Ivanoff. Petersburg and was bound by A rticle V II of th e 1881 alliance w ith A ustria to confine h er expansionist am bitions to M acedonia. Since th e firm an of 1870 provided th a t any district could join the exarchate if tw o-thirds of th e population so voted. loc. however. L ittle was accom plished. Les Bulgares devant le congres de la p a ix (Berne. 1855-1872. 1926). Serbia now looked to Vienna ra th e r th an to St. a large p a rt of M acedonia abandoned th e P a tria rc h ate and joined th e Bulgarian church. 47-144. . w hatever th e cause.

T his did n o t satisfy Pashich.” Fortnightly Review . printed books and issued proclam ations until the work was taken over first b y th e m in istry of education and in 1889 h y the m inister for foreign affairs.id established over a h undred schools in th e Kossovo vilayet w ith . W hile in exile during M ilan ’s reign.38 Once M ilan was gone and a Radical governm ent und er Nicholas Pashich came mto power th e Russophil tendencies of th e people soon found ex-. a com plete Balkan federation. In the following y e a r Pashich again w ent to Russia. “T h e Secret T reaty betw een Servia and A ustria-H ungary. 39 T he program of the N ational Radical P arty was drawn up in 1881 by Pashich and his friends. an im m ediate en ten te with th e Bulgars and M ontenegrins. 1895. S. I. 38 Before his abdication M ilan extended th e alliance with Austria to January 13. Sforza. local M'lf-government and a less costly adm inistration. particularly since Tricoupis in Greece was a t this tim e favor­ able to such a scheme. In 1886 the Socicty of Saint Sava was founded w ith th e purpose of aw akening national consciousness in all Serb lands and p articu larly in M acedonia. A fter th e disaster a t Slivnitza an ti-A ustrian feeling in Serbia increased until in M arch 1889 M ilan found it necessary to abdicate in favor of his th irteen year old son A lexander. Pashich was warm ly received in Bulgaria and had close relations with various political leaders. Internally it called for freedom of the assem bly and the press. th e Bulgarian 37 S. it seemed for a while th a t th e new Radical governm ent in Serbia w ith its pan-Slav sym pathies m ight come to an understanding with Sofia. Balkanskite voini. It is even said that he sought Bulgarian aid to oust M ilan and to establish a unified Serbo-Bulgarian state. 1909). I t Irained teachers.i( least five thousand pupils. In addition in 1892 th e Serbian governm ent concluded a new tariff treaty with Ilie H apsburg m onarchy which was based su b stan tially on the 1881 treaty. this tim e w ith King A lexander. P etersburg where he was received and decorated by the T sar.39 Ac­ cordingly in A ugust 1889 P ash ich -w en t to Sofia and proposed an nlliance on th e basis of a delim itation of claims in M acedonia and a joint a tta c k on T urkey. By th e middle nineties the Serbs li. and as a more distant goal. Serbia had become a factor in the M ace­ donian situ a tio n . X C I (M ay. Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovida [Reign of Alexander Obrenovich] (Belgrade. an ti-H apsburg dem onB l r a t i o n s becam e frequent and in 1890 Pashich w ent to St. T h e press stressed Slav solidarity. 28.37 A lthough this policy b rought th e Serbs into conflict w ith th e B ul­ garians. Prol itch. 838-849.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 133 (iMisive propaganda cam paign in M acedonia. Jovanovic. w hile externally it dem anded a Ml ronger arm y. Pachitch et I'union des Yougoslavs. Clearly th e Serbians had left the A ustrian o rb it and the Russians (lierefore promised to support Serbian claims in M acedonia.4 5 -4 7 . .3 7 . T he Radical program called for Yugoslav u n ity so he desired an u n derstanding w ith B ulgaria. Stam bulov. T his was a splendid o p p o rtu n ity for a SerboBulgarian alliance th a t could serve as th e nucleus for a Balkan League. 1929). U nfortunately. T oshev. 3 6 . prcssion. 88ff.

T h u s th e possibility of a Serbo-Bul­ garian u nderstanding was elim inated. particularly as regards the opening of schools. I. op. H istoire diplom atique. Since this line would have left the whole of th e Aegean seacoast to Greece. usually well inform ed ab o u t G reek affairs. N o t only did Stam bulov reject th e Serbian proposal b u t he even betrayed it to the P orte. D . 290. Accordingly S tam b u lo v ’s answ er to Pashich was th a t there was no necessity for th e delim itation of claim s in M acedonia. J.. 1891). K ratchounov. allowed the negotiations to lapse.40 H aving failed to conclude an alliance w ith Sofia. Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovica. however. 25-27. cit. excessive support for th e advance­ m ent of Serb propaganda in M acedonia. states th a t Stam bulov was willing to consider th e idea b u t th a t the claims of Tricoupis proved excessive. His policy was based upon friendship w ith T u rk e y so th a t he could count upon the P o rte ’s acquiescence in th e w ork of peaceful penetration into M acedonia. Stam bulov flatly rejected th e proposal and reported it to C onstantinople.” Fortnightly Review.134 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y statesm an who until 1894 guided th e destinies of his country. and th a t th e line of division between th e two regions should be th e forty-first parallel. 612. for B ulgaria was th e m ost dangerous opponent in M acedonia. which apparently was less anxious for an agreem ent th an the Serbian. 86 -88. th e G reek cab in et was determ ined th a t Bulgaria should be included. One contem porary writer. N egotiations were sta rte d in June 1890 w ith the G reek envoy in Belgrade and were continued in C onstantinople by th e G reek and Serbian m inisters. T h u s the Greek governm ent. th e Serbians now turned to A thens. Bourchier. th a t a B alkan alliance against T u rk ey was undesirable. T he G reek statesm an proposed th a t M acedonia should be divided betw een th e two countries. In fact th e relations between the two countries becam e more and more strained as S tam bulov’s enemies m ade Belgrade th eir base of operations against his regime. T hus in Ju n e 1891 T ricoupis paid a visit to Belgrade and Sofia in th e hope of constructing a Balkan league ag ainst T u rk ey and reaching an agreem ent on the p artitio n of M acedonia. LV (April. receiving additional 40 Jovanovic. T h e Serbians. would have nothing to do w ith any an ti-T u rkish com bination. If this program could be continued w ith o u t interruption for a few years longer then th e whole region would be ripe for annexa­ tion w ith o u t th e necessity for dividing it w ith the other Balkan states. in th e eyes of th e Greeks. 41 Driault and Lh£ritier. IV. “ In R hodope w ith Prince F erdinand. receiving as a rew ard th e rig h t to appoint several Bulgarian bishops to M acedonian dioceses. first into spheres of influence and then into actual possessions as soon as circum stances p erm itted . th a t th e people of th a t region should be allowed to decide their own fate and finally.4 1 If any Balkan alliance was to be concluded. de­ m anded. .

X X I I (October. In stead it dem anded m uch more generous frontiers. form er m inister of religion. . N evrokop and S tru m itsa.” H is m ission. however. 203. 411. Y oung. . T his provided for comm on action by th e two governm ents against th e exarchate and against Bulgarian propaganda in M ace­ donia. 410. N icolaides. 45 C ited in D riault and Lh6ritier. 9 3-98.4 3 N othing cam e of this Serbian plan. In fact the Serbian governm ent sen t to A thens Vladan Georgevich. N ationalism and W ar in the Near E ast. “T h e undertaking b y one or all of the Balkan states of an offensive war against Turkey would appear to me to be im possible and puerile.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 135 ecclesiastical privileges in M acedonia as a rew ard.” T he G reeks also were to use th eir influence w ith th e P a tria rc h a te to aid in th e establishm ent of Serbian schools and th e introduction of th e Slavic language in th e church service. M elnik. T he Greek governm ent was afraid th a t an agreem ent w ith Serbia would drive Bulgaria and T u rkey to a still closer en ten te and therefore rejected th e Serbian proposal as inacceptable. he claim ed. how ­ ever. claim ing M onastir. IV. Belgrade. In addition G reek and Serbian diplom acy should propagate everyw here. 1897). A p p aren tly th e G reek governm ent." . Tricoupis later denied th a t he had sought to form an anti-Turkish alliance. There the m a tte r of a G reco-B ulgarian u n derstanding rested until a few m onths before the o u tb reak of th e G reco-T urkish w ar of 1897. H istoire diplom atique. “T he W reck of G reece.” Scribner's M agazine. aimed on ly at th e establishm ent of more friendly rela­ tions. T h u s the Serbs were ready to leave to the G reeks the te rrito ry which th e la tte r h ad asked of the B ulgarians. A t any ra te th e A thens cab in et was cool to the Serbian ad ­ vances and even inform ed th e A ustrian representative of th e negotia­ tions th a t were being conducted. P rilep. and in retu rn th e Serbs were ready to p ay a pension to th e P atriarch . was anxious for an agreem ent and th e te x t of a proposed accord was subm itted to A thens. in an effort to hasten th e conclusion of an alliance.4 2 T h e proposals of T ricoupis were ta k e n more seriously in Belgrade than in Sofia. placed little value on an understan d in g w ith Serbia w ithout the p articip atio n of Bulgaria. In ad dition it appears th a t th e govern­ m ent was apprehensive of th e results of Serbian propaganda in M ace­ donia. . 292. the idea th a t there exist in M acedonia only Serbs and G reeks. K rushevo. Probably th e purpose of these dem ands was to dis42 H enry N orm an.” T he Serbian sphere of action was to consist of th e vilayets of Kossovo and M o n astir and th e northern p a rt of the vilay et of Salonica. . and Serbian bishops were to be appointed to the dioceses of Prizren and U skub. 204. L a Macedoine. " . . 291. Finally th e adm in istratio n of th e H ilendar m on­ astery in M ount A thos was to be changed as soon as possible from Bulgarian to Serbian. inasm uch as this propag an d a has taken hold and has spread into districts which do n o t belong to th e B ulgarians. On the other hand the federative union of the Balkan peoples is a utopia to which a serious statesm an cannot spend a m om ent of his a tten ­ tion.

In 1893 after th e failure of the negotiations w ith Greece. Accordingly A lexander w ent to Con­ stantinople in Ju n e 1894. 44 Jovanovic. T h e S ultan even suggested th a t K ing A lexander visit him in C onstantinople. 1928). and in the hope th a t it could be checked by im itatin g S tam bulov’s tactics. Vlada A leksandra Obrenovida. N egotiation of com m ercial. Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovida. I. received a w arm welcome and left in high hopes. In Ja n u a ry 1894 S tam bulov w ent to the ex ten t of sending to th e S ultan. 21-23. A ustria-H ungary had been estranged. N othing. Jovanovic. I. Only one course was left. th e pro-R ussian Radical p a rty was driven from power and the governm ent w avered w eakly betw een St. P etersburg and Vienna. 94. Georgevich. internal conditions were again unsettled. The regency was abolished in 1893. and also bring pressure on th e P a tria rc h a te to ap p o in t Serbian bishops to dioceses w ith Serbian populations. T he Porte showed some apprecia­ tion for th e Serbian advances and granted permission for the estab­ lishm ent of Serb schools in th e vilayet of Kossovo. th e y were even willing to conclude a m ilitary alliance if th e P orte would tolerate Serb schools in th e M onastir and Salonica vilayets.136 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y courage th e Serbians in th eir desire for an en ten te w ith Greece. If so. In Ja n u a ry 1893 th e negotiations were dropped. M oreover. 4 6 V. a m em oir containing th e following proposals: 1. through th e m edium of th e T urkish com m issioner in Sofia. 95. 2. A fter rejecting th e Serbian and Greek offers for an entente in 1889 and 1891 Stam bulov in A ugust of 1892 visited th e Sultan in C onstantinople and discussed th e possibility of a definite entente betw een the two countries. T h e T urcophil policy of the Belgrade governm ent had proven as futile as th e other policies it had tried. 1894-1897 J (Belgrade. Greece and B ulgaria h ad refused to agree on spheres of influence in M acedonia and th e R ussians so far had given little more th an promises. 1894-1897 [Servia and Turkey. T he explanation for this T urcophil policy is to be found in th e w idespread alarm a t the increasing Bulgarian influence in M acedonia. cam e of th e visit.4 5 In th e m eantim e Bulgarian foreign policy underw ent a com plete reversal. however. the liberal constitution was abrogated in 1894. 276-280. th ey achieved th eir purpose. Srbija i Turska. Both in her dom estic affairs and foreign policy Serbia was vacillating and w eak. this policy was seriously adopted. custom s and postal conventions betw een th e two states.4 4 Serbia was now in a difficult position. T his op­ p o rtu n ity was eagerly grasped by th e Serbians. Conclusion of a defensive T urco-B ulgarian alliance against all enemies of the tw o states. an understanding with T u rk ey . In fact. .

27. Prince F erdi­ nand sen t condolences to N icholas II and th e reply indicated th a t the anti-B ulgarian policy would be dropped. 6. T he unction cerem ony was very im pressive w ith the T sar. In Ju ly 1895 a d e p u ta ­ tion headed b y th e M etropolitan of T irnovo was sent to St. O rganization of an arm y composed of T u rks and B ulgarians and com m anded by officers of th e two races. Istoriya na nova B algariya. Stanev. 1878-1928] (Sofia. who was the godfather of th e Prince. 1878-1928 [H istory of Modern Bulgaria. 4. being represented by M ajor General C ount G olenichev-K otuzov. His p a tie n t and unexciting policy in M acedonia. P eters­ burg to place a gold crown on th e tom b of A lexander II I . T he group was w arm ly received by th e T sar who shook hands w ith each m em ber and stated th a t he would p ro tect th e B ulgarian people. announced th a t henceforth the rig h t of the B ulgarian exarchate to found and control schools would be w ithdraw n. An am nesty was granted to all th e persecuted leaders of th e pro-R ussian faction and th e governm ent set o ut to effect a reconciliation w ith Russia.. W ith the d eath of T sar A lexander I I I th e w ay was cleared.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 137 3. A t th e suggestion of Stoilov. In case of w ar in Europe the com m ander of th e arm y would be the prince of B ulgaria and if the w ar were fought in Asia th e com m ander would be th e T urkish Sultan. R ecognition of both th e T urkish and B ulgarian languages as official. op. his dictatorial rule a t hom e and his hostility tow ard Russia cost him much popularity. 1929). A nother im ­ p o rta n t step in the rapprochem ent was th e baptism on F eb ru ary 14. 94. Finally th e T sar took the in itiativ e in procuring 4 6 N . . S trict application of th e firm an concerning the exarchate and the Bulgarian schools. K ratchounov. cit.4 6 A pparently th e S ultan did n o t seriously consider this fantastic plan for w h at am ounted to a dual T urco-B ulgarian adm inistration of European T urkey. particu larly am ong th e politicians. 26. O rganization of ail th e provinces of E uropean T u rk ey into an autonom ous sta te which should be adm inistered by an heir to the T urkish throne aided by a mixed T urco-B ulgarian m inistry. B ut S tam b u lo v ’s grip on Bulgaria was becoming more and more shaky. W hen in M ay 1894 F erdinand felt strong enough to assert his au th o rity . A t an y ra te in M arch 1894 th e T urkish govern­ m ent. probably acting under Russian pressure. 5. 1896 of Prince Boris after th e rites of th e O rthodox C hurch. he dismissed S tam bulov and appointed a Russophil cab­ inet headed by Stoilov. T h is news created a trem endous uproar in Bulgaria u ntil S tam bulov induced th e Po rte to rescind its order and to g ra n t the B ulgarians tw o more bishoprics in M acedonia.

the well-known Tim es correspondent in the Balkans m ade the follow ing note in his diary. H e entirely agrees with m e as to the m ischief the young desperadoes and exalt& are doing to the M acedonian m ovem en t.” C ited in Lady Grogan. “Coup d ’oeil sur la question d'Orient au d£but du X X е si6cle (1900-1914 ).48 The com m ittee. 1905). Cahuet. revolutionary com m ittee usually re­ ferred to as the In tern al M acedonian R evolutionary Organization. M oreover there was the rival C entral C om m ittee. cli. The L ife of J. 73-75.50 Very n a tu ra lly this situation alarm ed the Serbians and the Greeks. op. Lascaris. 115-124. Rappaport. 48 Brailsford. “ Lunch tlte -й-Шг w ith the Prince [Ferdinand]. S. I l l — V 49 In October 1900 Bourchier. Prince F erdinand did n o t favor such revolutionary tactics since he believed th a t the same results could be obtained b y diplom atic m eans. “The M acedonian Organisation Y esterday and T o d a y . Even before his downfall a n um ber of B ulgarian M acedonians who were dissatisfied w ith S tam b u lo v ’s cautious T urcophil policy gathered at: Resna and organized a secret. 27-29. 124. fi0 For further details see Brailsford. th a t if the province were annexed by any one B alkan nation the others would be antagonized and consequently it was hoped th a t M acedonia would eventually form th e central sta te in a Yugoslav federation. . Bourchier (London. W hen Stam bulov was dis­ missed in M ay 1894 th e g reatest obstacle to this work was removed and activities were redoubled. S tan d off.. Bulgarian Conspiracy (London. which received aid 47 A . V II (January-July.138 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y for Ferdinand th e recognition of th e P orte and the other Powers.49 B ut the M acedonian revolution­ aries had th e w hole-hearted su p p o rt of th e m ass of B ulgarians both in B ulgaria and M acedonia and th e ag itation continued unabated despite th e views of the governm ent. 5 -6 . 528. 473-482. th e form ation of a Balkan alliance under th e aegis of Russia. Swire. M en were trained and arm ed. 1940).” Berliner Monatshefte. M acedonia. In fact B alkan cooperation was as much hindered as aided b y th e rem oval of S tam bulov from office. spread th ro u g h o u t M acedonia w ithin a few years. V III (1930). T he reconciliation betw een R ussia and B ulgaria was com plete. A. J. 1930). D. “ M akedonien und die K om itadschis. favored the union of M acedonia and B ulgaria. 1935). m unitions were gathered and careful plans were m ade for a m ass uprising. K . 1926). All the m em bers of the In te rn a l O rganization were Bulgarian and some of them . K ratchounov. Heroes and A ssassin s (N ew Y ork. T he aim s of th e organization were not very precise b u t th e im m ediate goal was autonom y for M acedonia. despite th e avowed aim s of the body. I t was felt. S. M acedonia. La question d ’Orient dans Vhistoirc contemporaine (Paris.. 1935). however. 69-71. T . A. Recollections of a Bulgarian D iplom at’s W ife (London. exceptionally well led by such men as D am ian Gruev and Gotze Delchev. llOff. Todoroff. cit.” Foreign A ffairs. 731-747.” Les B alkans. cit.47 T his reversal of Bulgarian foreign policy did n ot m ake possible. led by B ulgarian officers. op. 108.. Strupp. Christowc. 123. 1928). as m ight have been expected. VI (April.

. V. w hose m ain strength was in Bulgaria rather Ilian M acedonia. Brailsford.52 In N ovem ber 1894 there was founded in A thens a secret organization known as the E thnike H etairia or N ational Society. 182-187. 172. Les affaires de Crete (Paris. T he Roum anians claim ed th is race of shepherds and trad e rs as th eir kinsmen and as early as 1864 b u ilt th e first Vlach school a t T irnovo near M onastir. T h e S ultan then a ttem p te d (o conclude an alliance w ith R oum ania.000 francs per year b u t by th e end of the century th ey had reached 500. L a guerre greco-turque au poin t de vue du droit international (Paris. Colonel Y ankov and Professor M ichailovitk i.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 139 from Sofia and worked openly for th e annexation of M acedonia to Bulgaria. and by th e A ustrians who were glad to d iv ert R oum anian a tte n tio n from th e C arpathians. 62 D riault and Lh6ritier. G ooch and H .. by th e French C atholic missions in th e hope th a t a L atin race m ight be m ore am enable to proselytism . P. was to co u n teract th e Bulgarian organization in M acedonia and to c a r r y on G reek p ropaganda in th a t province. T his b o d y . 7. f. an O rthodox priest who founded a R oum anian gym nasium a t M onastir. 61 T h e leaders of this organization. 1898-1914. Roum anian. cit. had for its general aim th e gradual liberation of all (1 reeks u nder T urkish dom ination. 3 -8 . op. Bdrard. ch. T he situ atio n was favorable for such a step as R oum ania a t this tim e was a t odds w ith th e o th er Halkan sta te s over th e K utzo-V lachs of M acedonia and Epirus. which enjoyed the su p p o rt of th ree quarters of the officers of I he G reek arm y and of m any influential and w ealthy Greeks a t hom e Mi ld abro ad . op. I ts im m ediate object. G. 1898). Serbian and Bulgarian a ctiv ities in M acedonia is to be found in Hritish Documents on the Origins of the W ar. A t first they am ounted to only 14. и W . no one in B ucharest was naive enough to suppose Ih at the M acedonian Vlachs could ever be united w ith R oum ania. The D iplom acy of Im perialism (N ew York. L. Politis. Needless to say. H istoire diplom atique. 482. V.5 3 As m ight be expected from this situ atio n there was little prospect for united action on th e p a rt of th e B alkan states when w ar broke o u t in April 1897 betw een Greece and T u rk ey over th e C retan question.. Tem perIcy. eds. however. cit. I. ! (198). T he Vlachs found an able leader in A postolos M argarites. I le was encouraged by th e Po rte as a counterw eight to Bulgar and Greek. X I .6 1 T h u s th e o th er n ationalities took steps to m eet this Bul­ garian m enace and th e struggle over M acedonia becam e yearly more intense. 100-123. were General T zonchev.000 and by 1912 a million francs. A fter 1879 special subsidies for th e aid of Vlach Hchools in T u rk ey were included in th e R oum anian budget.). Swire. 1926ff. (London.5 4 The T u rk s first m ade an effort to secure a m ilitary convention w ith Serbia b u t received no encouragem ent. IV. In 1892 Greco-Serb negotiations were sta rte d in A thens for common action against Bulgarian propag an d a b u t no agreem ent was reached. A good sum m ary of ( Ircck. 74-77. M N . 171. 1935). Langer.

T his policy n a tu ra lly aroused m uch resentm ent. “Tewfik Pacha said to the German am bassador th at the question of our church is a question of m oney for th e Patriar­ ch a te.. 67 D juvara was received on N ovem ber 27. 1898 D juvara reported. G. ‘Is it wise. at the very m om ent when I have been able to extinguish one fire. Serbia. was unwilling to accept this condition. p articu larly am ong th e Greeks. 68 On February 26. for exam ple. chiefly because of th e opposition of th e P a triarc h ate which stood to lose revenues. therefore. T he Greeks. 66 On February 9. On A ugust 31 a defensive alliance was again proposed b u t S turdza. 20. In Ja n u a ry .6 6 th e hostility of R ussia to th e schem e6 7 and th e fear of recognizing still an o th e r n atio n ality in strife to rn M acedonia.” Ibid. T h u s nothing cam e of these negotiations and Turkey was forced to fight Greece w ith o ut th e aid of any B alkan sta te . Djuvara. and 66 T . 1898 Djuvara reported. T he Porte. In M acedonia th e interests of R oum ania are linked with those of T u rk ey so th a t th e M acedonian R oum anians m ight not be subm erged. 48. B ulgarian and Serbian elem ents. to light another one?' ” Ibid. A little later th e S ultan suggested th a t a secret m ilitary convention be concluded betw een th e two countries. T he Bulgarians and th e Serbs were aroused early in 1897 by th e possibility th a t Greece m ight secure C rete while they gained nothing. D juvara. on th e o th er hand.”5 6 T urco-R oum anian relations were therefore close on th e eve of th e G reco-Turkish w ar and on M arch 20. for th e V lad in had h ith erto been counted as Greeks in population estim ates. 1930). “Abdul H am id was very humble before even the shadow of the M uscovite colossus. received th e following instructions on Ju n e 24. 1897 th e S ultan asked D ju v a ra w h at th e a ttitu d e of R oum ania would be in case of a wai w ith Greece. 47.. T h u s th e V lad in w ith th e aid of R oum ania pressed th e P orte for th e sam e privileges as enjoyed by th e Greeks and Bulgars. a Bulgarian agent was sent to A thens w ith th e proposal th a t Greece. however. M es m issions diplom atiques (Paris.1 ’" I t does n o t appear th a t th e R oum anians were them selves very anx­ ious to sign an alliance in retu rn for an extension of Vlach rights in M acedonia. i result th e R oum anians d uring these years tended to look towards C onstantinople ra th e r th a n to th e o th e r B alkan capitals. . th e Roumanian foreign m inister. by the Greek.” Ib id . were no more successful th a n the T u rk s in th eir search for an ally.. 48.1 40 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y T h ey were regarded ra th e r as a sort of speculative investm ent to hr used for bargaining purposes some tim e in th e future. “ Baron T esta told me that th e Sultan had pronounced exactly these words. A h . m ade it clear th a t the recognition by th e Porte of a R oum anian M etropolitan in M acedonia was a prerequisite for any entente. 1897 b y the Sultan who discussed in a low voice the Vlach question for fear of being heard by the Russian charge d'affaires in an adjoining room. 18% w hen he arrived in C onstantinople as R oum anian envoy extraor d in a ry : “ We have g reat in terest in th e m aintenance of th e O tto­ m an Em pire.

C onstantinople th eir dem and for reform s in M acedonia according lo th e provisions of A rticle X X I I I of th e T re a ty of Berlin.69 D espite th e im m inence of w ar th e G reek govern­ m ent rejected th is offer. Greece was to obtain all th e islands of the archipelago. 367. T h e obvious ad v an tag e of such a m ove was th a t it would dem onstrate I lie common aim s of th e three B alkan sta te s and would place them on record in dem anding certain reform s.60 60 N orm an. Vlada A leksandra Obrenoviia. especially am ong the youth. A ccordingly it was decided th a t in place of taking sides in th e G reco-Turkish w ar. in favor of a genuine an d m ore binding Serbo-B ulgarian ra p ­ prochem ent.il. and m ilitarily. 411.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 141 Bulgaria should together lay before th e am bassadors of th e Powers . cit. In addition to th is official understan d in g there existed during this period a very considerable p opular sentim ent. T hen Bulgaria would ta k e th e vilayet of M onastir together w ith th e whole te rrito ry betw een E a st­ ern Roum elia and th e Aegean Sea as far east as the d istric t of Adriniople. T he D elyannis cabinet. and neither p a rty should p u t obstacles in th e w ay of th e o ther b u t should provide m utual aid in all national. 60 J o van ovit. neither p a rty was to u n d ertake any unilateral political or m ilitary action th a t m ight d istu rb th e status quo. . refused to have an y th in g to do w ith this proposal on th e ground I h a t th e T urkish prom ises of reform were useless. T his th e Kulgarians were loath to do b u t it is said th a t th ey did agree to leave ( )ld Serbia as far south as U skub to Serbia and T hessaly as far north .2 1 .is th e M onastir vilay et to Greece. M ount Alhos was to be m ade n eu tral an d Salonica was to go to th e power which. an agreem ent should be concluded w ith Bulgaria. in case of a w ar w ith T u rk ey . In stead th e Greeks suggested a definition of spheres of influence in M acedonia. In the m eantim e public opinion in Serbia was in favor of action but th e governm ent was in no position to m ake war. In the last d ays of F eb ru ary K ing A lexander paid a visit to Sofia and cam e to a three-point gentlem en’s understanding on M arch 1 w ith th e Bulgarian governm ent. 2 0 .. I. how­ ever. An effort was m ade a little late r to reopen negotiations b u t w ar had broken o u t by then and th e Bulgarians were unwilling to be em broiled. ecclesiastical and educational questions.412. Oeuvre du rapprochement. D iplom atically. loc. Stragnakovitch. E very question affecting Bulgarian and Serbian interests in the O ttom an Em pire was to be settled b y agreem ent. m ade th e m ost m ilitary efforts and sacrifices. Serbia had far from adequate m unition supplies. 366. M ontenegro w as to be invited to adhere to this agreem ent. both A ustria-H u n g ary and R ussia were opposed to th e reopening of th e E astern Question.

. however. Accordingly th e Serbian foreign m inister. M ilichevich. finally proved fruitless. Serres and M onastir. the Greeks had been decisively defeated and th e T urkish govern men I was therefore uninterested in these overtures. M elnik. I t suspected th e existence of an an ti-T u rk ish and anti-S erbian understanding betw een Bulgaria and Greece. T he R ussian governm ent did its u tm o st to bring th e tw o states together. V ladan Georgevich. 1909). In th e following y ear th ere was m uch ta lk of a Serbo-Bulgarian rapprochem ent.6 1 T h e significance of th is diplom atic ac tiv ity is th a t th e Greeks found them selves in a war w ith T u rk ey w ith o u t th e su p p o rt of any of their B alkan neighbors. In Ja n u a ry 18. journeyed to C onstantinople in O ctober 1897 and proposed to th e S ultan a defensive and offensive alliance. 310-338. L ater in the year R ussian m ilitary officers visited both Belgrade and Sofia. its candidate Firm ilien should be appointed to th e Uskub bishopric. which th e o th er Balkan states should be free to join. See also the follow ing works b y the same author: D ie Serbische Frage (Stuttgart. Srbija i Turska. S trum itza. in th e hope th a t a general B alkan alliance would th ereb y be eventually form ed. In th e spring of 1899. T his disappointed A lexander deeply. especially because of th e particu larly w arm recep01 G eorgevich. T his th e Greek governm ent was unwilling to consider and by the end of th e year the negotiations had been dropped. however. Beitrage zur Geschichte Serbiens 1897-1900 (Leipzig. T h e Serbian governm ent considered these conditions ex­ cessive and required th a t. By this tim e. however. was sent to A thens w here hr received a plan in which th e G reek governm ent dem anded th e w ith­ draw al of Serbian consulates from southern M acedonia. particularly from Salonica.142 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y T he Serbian governm ent. D as Ende der Obrenovitcli. and French and A ustrian papers talked of an im m inent m ilitary convention betw een Serbia and Bulgaria. Kin^ A lexander’s secretary. and claimed th e region as far n o rth as N evrokop. 1901 Prince Ferdinand visited A lexander in Belgrade and th e two rulers ostentatiously despatched a common telegram of New Y ear’s greetings and good will to th e T sar. F or m onths A lexander had planned to visit St. aside from any entente. because of her strained relations w ith T u rk ey . was n o t ready to depend solely on this agreem ent w ith B ulgaria. 1905). All this activ ity . 74. Prilip. 75. P etersburg w ith his bride b u t th’e arrangem ents were repeatedly postponed an d finally cancelled. K rushevo and Strougo. T he sam e looseness in inter-B alkan ties characterized th e years im m ediately following th e G reco-Turkish W ar when several futile a tte m p ts were m ade by th e B alkan state s to conclude bilateral agree­ m ents am ongst them selves. Serbia turned to Greece and sug­ gested an agreem ent regarding th eir interests in M acedonia. 142-146.

T he new spapers m ade references to a definite alliance and to a u nited fro n t against th e Slavs. I. vol. received m uch publicity.6 3 In 1900. how­ ever.6 2 In th e m eantim e V ienna had been concerned ab o u t R ussian diplo­ m atic a c tiv ity in th e Balkans an d had sought to form a Greco-Roum anian en ten te which could counter-balance a possible pro-R ussian com bination. who visited Belgrade. th e V ienna governm ent secured from Carol th e prom ise th a t i liould Bulgaria order a general m obilization directed against T urkey. Ih i I: the initial enthusiasm soon passed aw ay. 78. IV. See Documents diplom atigues lm n (a is. Ilisto ire diplo­ matique. “ Coup d ’oeil sur la question d ’Orient au dflbut XX" si&cle. som e m oves had also been m ade in the iliicc. As early as A ugust 1898 K ing Carol had expressed a ill'. T h e affair. ■ M i d by N ovem ber 20. D riault and Lh6ritier. 38. 04 Lascaris. 469. however.tion of a Serbian-M ontenegrin understanding.” loc.64 On D ecem ber 19 of the sam e year a commercial I reaty was signed by R oum ania and Greece w hich accorded to each ■ > 1 1юг m ost-favored-nation tre a tm e n t.. while R oum anian Indents were given a w arm welcome in A thens in S eptem ber 1901. D espite th is advice th e G reek king was relucla n t to ta k e an y steps and th e m a tte r was drop p ed . A ctually th e A bbazia interview was m erely a m anifestation of i. 547.ood will which did n o t influence G reco-R oum anian relations for l u n g . 7. 496. T h ey agreed on th e necessity for a common fro n t against Bulgaria and Carol m inimized th e im portance of th e R oum anian propaganda in M acedonia. nos. 424. Petersburg. T h u s in spite of l lie efforts of th e R ussian foreign m inister. K ing Carol expressed once more th e desire to see th e G reek K ing and a t th e suggestion of th e Austrian governm ent a m eeting was arranged a t A bbazia. 2nd series. C ount Lamsdorff. II. 100. 482.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 143 l ion which F erdinand received in St. I. 233. cit. 527. a new pro-A ustrian governm ent had been established. no. F or five ilays th e tw o kings discussed various questions w ith o u t th e presence ■ > 1 m inisters. Driault and Lh6ritier. 319. vol. A t th e insistence of Russia. T he climax was reached in 1905 when th e R ou­ manian m inistry obtained from th e P o rte th e recognition of th e I V ‘ Documents diplom atigues fran qais. Carol continued to m ake friendly speeches. vol. 494.1 m eeting be arranged. 460. nos. T his agreem ent was also . 313. IV. H istoire diplom atique . b u t no agreem ent was signed. . 481. 481. llien R oum ania would a tta c k Bulgaria. and Carol in tu rn pro tested th a t Greece was not bringing pressure to b ear on th e P a tria rc h a te in favor of R oum anian interests им had been agreed. 543. A lexander now m oved closer to A ustria-H ungary.limed indirectly again st R ussia in case th a t Pow er w ent to th e aid "I the B ulgarians. 1902. 483. K ing George com plained "I the R oum anian dem and th a t th e P orte recognize th e Vlach com ­ munities. 2nd series.sire to m eet K ing George and th e A thens cabinet urged th a t such .

first b ro ac h ed th e s u b je c t of th e u n io n of all th e B u lg a ria n p eople b u t G en eral K u ro p a tk in . S e e D ria u lt an d L h eritier. H e p ro m ised . C h a u v in is ts in A th e n s d en o u n ced th e R o u m a ­ n ia n s. IV . 4 7 1 -4 8 2 .66 W ith R u ssia b e h in d B u lg a ria . E . C . A s early a s N o v e m b e r 1898 a n d ag ain in th e s p rin g of 1899 T u rk e y h a d su g ­ g ested a n a g re e m e n t to G reece. G reece n ow tu rn e d to T u rk e y .66 In th e m e a n tim e th e R u ssia n s h a d been fu lly a w are of th e A u stro R o u m a n ia n a g re e m e n t of 1900 a n d of th e G re c o -R o u m a n ia n n e g o tia ­ tio n s. 66 T h e q u estio n of w h eth er a tim e lim it c la u se w a s in clu d ed still rem ain s obscure. t h a t th e G re c o -T u rk ish ra p p ro c h e m e n t sh o u ld ta k e a m o re c o n c re te fo rm a n d b y th e en d of 1902 th e P o rte w as ta lk in g of a d e fin ite allian ce. N u m e ro u s o th e r frie n d ly m oves w ere m a d e b y the O tto m a n g o v e rn m e n t b u t n o effo rt w as m ad e fo r th e a c tu a l con­ clusion of a n a g re e m e n t a n d th e G re e k g o v e rn m e n t realized th a t th e P o rte w as m erely c a rry in g o u t a d ip lo m a tic m a n o eu v re. th e B u lg a ria n P re sid e n t of th e C ouncil. . m ad e it cle a r t h a t h e d id n o t w a n t to d istu rb th e p ea c e of E u ro p e. I t w as th e n ag ree d t h a t th e alliance sh o u ld be co n cern ed o n ly w ith R o u m a n o -B u lg a ria n re la tio n s a n d on M a y 31. H elm reicli an d С .144 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d ie s in H is t o r y V lachs a s a s e p a ra te n a tio n a lity w ith th e rig h t of w o rsh ip p in g in th e ir ow n lan g u ag e. 1937). T h e re w ere also several clauses d e a lin g w ith te c h n ic a l m ilita ry m a tte rs b u t th e se also wenco n cern ed o n ly w ith R o u m a n ia a n d n o t w ith T u rk e y o r A u stria H u n g a ry . P e te rsb u rg . 1902 a se c re t c o n v e n tio n w as signed a t S t. D r. th e G re ek re p re s e n ta tiv e in C on­ s ta n tin o p le . P e te rs b u rg th e y w ere in fo rm ed of th e A u s tro -R o u m a n ia n ag reem ent a n d w ere p e rsu a d e d to c re a te a c o u n te r-w e ig h t a g a in st it. H isto ire diplom atiqu e. 4 8 4 -4 8 6 . th e R u ssia n m in is te r of w ar. in w hich case R u ssia ag reed to a id B u lg aria. ho w ev er. S e e E . B la ck . I t w as s tr ic tly d efensive. b u t th e A th e n s g o v e rn m e n t insisted t h a t o u ts ta n d in g q u e stio n s sh o u ld first be se ttle d . a n ti-G re e k rio ts to o k p lace in R o u m a n ia a n d d ip lo m a tic re la ­ tio n s b etw een th e tw o c o u n trie s w ere a c tu a lly b ro k en off fo r several y e a rs . In the 66 R e la tio n s had b een in terru p ted o n ce b efore b etw een 1892 an d 1896 becau se th e R o u m a n ia n co u rts d eclared illegal th e leg a cies of th e G reek Z appa b roth ers who h ad fo u n d ed t h e Z ap p eion in A th en s. I X (D ecem b er. In A pril 1901 the S u lta n in fo rm ed M a v ro c o rd a to s.” J o u rn a l of M odern H isto r y . “ T h e R u sso -B u lg a ria n M ilita r y C o n v e n tio n o f 1 9 0 2 . A u s tria -H u n g a ry b e h in d R o u m a n ia a n d no p o ssib ility of a n a g re e m e n t w ith h e r B alk an n eig h b o rs because o f th e M a c e d o n ia n q u e stio n . a n tic ip a tin g o n ly a n a tta c k b y R o u m an ia. D u rin g t h e 1 9 1 2 -1 3 crisis th e B u lgarian g o v ern m en t a p p ealed for aid on t h e b asis of th is co n v e n tio n b u t S a za n o v to o k th e sta n d th a t it had lap sed . D an ev . W h en a d e le g a tio n of B u lg a ria n s in J u n e 1902 v isite d St. t h a t a t th e e a rlie st o p ­ p o r tu n ity R u ssia w ould s e ttle th e B u lg a rian p ro b lem a lo n g th e lines of th e T r e a ty of S an S tefan o .

W ith th e G re a t Pow ers u n ite d in th e ir desire to p re se rv e p eace a n d to m a in ta in th e in te g rity of th e O tto m a n E m p ire th e re w as little in c e n tiv e .” 68 T h e D u a l M o n a rc h y now c o n c e n tra te d its a tte n tio n on in te rn a l p ro b lem s w hile R u ssia. A co u n cil of m in isters d ecid ed a g a in st th e nroposals lay a six to four v o te . A n in te re stin g ex am p le of th e p a n -H e lle n is t a sp ira tio n s of th e se y e a rs г. 1929). recom m en d ed th e o ccu p a tio n b y R u ssia of C o n sta n tin o ­ ple and th e A sia tic c o a st of th e B la ck S ea . ’ice D ocum ents d ip lo m a tig u es fra n q a is. •* O n t h e occa sio n o f t h e A rm en ian m assacres of 1896. w as th e s itu a tio n in th e N e a r E a s t a t th e tu r n of l he c e n tu ry .” T h e a g re e m e n t p ro v id e d t h a t th e status quo should be m a in ta in e d as long as p o ssib le a n d t h a t w hen it could no longer be u p h e ld th e tw o p a rtie s sh o u ld c o o p e ra te to p re v e n t a n y o ilie r p o w er from a c q u irin g te r r ito r y in th e B a lk an s. “ R u ssia . B ecause of th e M a c e d o n ia n q u e stio n a n d th e influence of G re a t P o w er d ip lo m a c y . . th e R u ssia n am li. H encevfo rth th e B a lk a n s ta te s d id n o t ta lk w ith such le v ity of d iv id in g th is or th a t p o rtio n of th e em p ire b e tw e e n th e m . cit. T h e p erio d fro m 1878 to th e en d of th e c e n tu ry w itn essed th e usual q u o ta of sch em es fo r th e p a r titio n of th e O tto m a n E m p ire an d for th e c re a tio n of a B a lk a n fe d e ra tio n of o n e ty p e o r a n o th e r. . H isto ire d ip lo m a tiq u e . rem ain ed str o n g ly a n ti-R u ssia n an d g en era lly a n ti-S la v . 1 . th e P h y sse n z id e s p la n of 1879. IV . 507. 62. On M ay 8. L an ger. T h e u ltim a te collapse of T u rk e y 07 D ria u lt an d L h eritier.ary ’s sp ecial in te re s ts in B o sn ia -H e rz e g o v in a a n d in A lb a n ia w ere i ccognized w ith re se rv a tio n s b y R u ssia. N e lid o v . 1897 R u ssia a n d A u s tria re a c h e d th e G o lu ch o w sk i-M u rav iev a g re e m e n t fo r th e p rofessed p u rp o se of “ . for th e fo rm a tio n of a B a lk a n e n te n te . A u s tria -H u n r. I. w hile th e q u estio n of C o n ­ sta n tin o p le a n d th e S tr a its w as d ec la re d to be of a n “ e m in e n tly E u ro p ean c h a r a c te r . v o l. 2nd series. M o reo v er th e d e fe a t of G reece in 1897 rev ealed t h a t th e re w as still p le n ty of fig h t le ft in I he “ sick m a n ” a n d t h a t he co u ld w ell ta k e care of him self. 564. even if it were possible.. 4 8 7 -4 9 2 . th e n . X L I V (Jan u ary.69 a b a n d o n e d te m p o ra rily h e r d e ­ signs on C o n sta n tin o p le a n d tu rn e d to th e F a r E a s t.” 67 S u ch .” E n g lish H isto rica l R eview . 1 8 4 -1 9 5 . e lim in a tin g th e d a n g e r uf a riv a lry d isa stro u s to th e p ea c e of E u ro p e on th e see th in g soil of I lie B a lk a n P e n in su la . n os. P u b lic o p in io n in i iicece. T h e S erb o -B u lg arian W a r of 1885 a n d th e G re c o -T u rk ish w a r of 1897 rev ealed th e e x te n t of th e lack of cohesion b etw een th e B a lk a n s ta te s . th e B a lk a n n a tio n s a fte r 1878 h a d been un ab le to ag ree on a n y co m m o n policy. F in a lly th e in te rn a tio n a l il n a tio n d u rin g th e se y e a rs w as d is tin c tly u n fa v o ra b le fo r a n y B alkan allian ce o r a lig n m e n t d esig n ed to u p s e t th e status quo. t h e S tr a its Q u estion an d th e Kuropean P o w ers. op. L . . a f te r th e N e lid o v p la n had been re je c te d as im p ra c tic a b le .issador to C o n sta n tin o p le. 08 P ribram . W . d u rin g th is p eriod . 61.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 145 w ords of th e G reek en v o y in C o n sta n tin o p le . “ T h e y seek to tie o u r h a n d s .

T he first was to consist of Greece. 816.7 3 An im p o rtan t and notab ly thoughtful contribution to the federa­ tion literatu re of this period was th e w ork of V ladim ir K arich. T he la tte r group was to be placed under th e protection of the G reat Powers while th e form er was to be organized along the lines of th e G erm an Confederation w ith the king of Greece taking the role of the Prussian king. th e well-known G reek literary figure. was not available for this study. and th e E astern Question would cease to preoccupy an d distu rb E urope. In 1889 he published in P aris under th e pseudonym of Dr. see A. I ts pan-H ellenic n a tu re and its im practicability are both a p p a re n t. Syria. he was of th e opinion th a t T u rk ey would and should keep C onstantinople and T hrace because of th e inter­ national com plications th a t otherw ise would arise. .146 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y was tak en for gran ted . IV (M ay-June. 213. L ittle com m ent need be m ade ab o u t this scheme.7 1 R ath er th a n aw ait th e down­ fall of th e O ttom an Em pire. M ilan P irochanats. 4 3 . and th a t a federative alliance of th e eastern peoples for th e defense of th eir common inter­ ests. is th e first and last word of th e policy which th ey could and m ust follow in th e present as well as in th e fu tu re. . Bikelas. Stefan B ratim ich. 72 D .” 7 2 E qually in favor of a Balkan federation was th e Serbian states­ m an. and th e lands of the K urds and D ruses. 1933). Physsenzides.” Les B alkans. 1897). Andreades. 71 For a sum m ary of his career.4 4 . . T h e above men­ tioned brochure b y Pirochanats. 214. A lbania and two other states centering around C onstantinople and Sm yrna. and tu rn in g th eir efforts only tow ard progress and civilization. 1885). L'arbitrage international et Vctablissement d'un em pire grec (Brussels. W e are convinced th a t we should have no m ore illusions of hope as regards R ussia and A u stria-H ungary . ‘‘Un pr£curseur de l’union balkanique: D em etrius Bikelas 1835-1908. pro­ fessor of history and later Serbian consul a t U skub. 73 Cited b y Pinon.70 M ore m oderate and feasible was th e plan of D em etrius Bikelas. and its place was to be taken by two federative groups. cit. form erly President of th e Council under K ing M ilan and cham pion of th e policies of Prince M ichael and Garashanin. en titled L a P eninsule des B alkans.. “ T hen there could be in th e B alkan peninsula a real confederation of independent and satisfied states. Le rSle et les aspiration s de la Grice dans la question d ’Orient (Paris. K arich argued th a t it was essential for th e B alkan states to band together because of th eir weakness an d th e proven cupidity of R ussia and A ustria70 N . a brochure in which he urged a federation of the Balkan sta te s in order to p u t an end to R ussian and A ustro-H ungarian interference in th e affairs of th e peninsula. while th e other was to be composed of A rm enia.” loc. “ U ne configuration balkanique. united by th eir interests.

Finally he m ade a plea for m utual concessions on th e p a rt of th e Balkan races. pre­ pared in 1899 a m em orandum on th e diplom atic and m ilitary situ a ­ tion of th e O ttom an Em pire.reeks have neither sufficient pow er nor the least rig h t to h a lt the 74 V. H e also urged Bulgarian and Serbian w riters to create a com mon lite ratu re and to work for a unification of th eir two languages. In the first place the (•reek E m pire could be reco n stitu ted . K am arow ski believed. passim . . for th e T u rk s and C hristians to overcom e th eir tra d i­ tional conflicts. 84-88. 1927). H e pointed o u t th a t when the E m pire collapsed there were four possible su b stitu tes to ta k e its place. A nother recom m endation was “ to form a Balkan alliance under the presidency of th e T urkish ICmpire. T his he considered a prelude to an u ltim ate Y ugoslav union. K arich pointed o u t th e cultural sim ilarities and th e common historical background and economic interests of th e B alkan states.7 6 N o t all of the plans of th is period were of B alkan origin. He accused the Turkish officials of blind religious prejudice in rejecting S tam b u lo v ’s alliance offer and he argued th a t th e proposed league would be the equivalent of a G reat Pow er and would therefore be able to prevent the interference of foreign sta te s in Balkan affairs. for th e Serbians an d Bulgarians to forget th e 1885 war. M oreover such a league should include T u rk ey and not be directed against th a t co u n try since it also was th reaten ed by th e ('. S rbija i B alkan ski Savez [Serbia and the Balkan League] (Belgrade. A fter raising th e question of th e feasibility of such a league. and th is plan. and later M arshal Izzet Pasha. K am arow ski of the U niversity of Moscow.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 147 H ungary. 1893). I t is interesting to note th a t one of his proposals was the gran tin g of au to n o m y to M acedonia in order to satisfy th e reform dem ands of th e G reat Powers and to curb th e ex­ pansionist aspirations of th e B alkan states.” including a defensive and offensive m ilitary p act and a common assem bly based on th e F ra n k fu rt D iet. Very interesting and statesm anlike were the theories of Professor L. was feasible in th e d ay s of C atherine b u t “ . . and expressed the 1 1ope th a t R oum ania and T u rk ey would la te r join. Colonel. and for th e Greeks to abandon th eir B yzantine “ G reat Id e a . H is prem ise regarding the inevitable downfall of th e O ttom an E m pire was sim ilar to th a t of the pan-Slavs b u t his conclusions and proposals were far different from theirs. Kari£a. As a practical first step he proposed a custom s union of Greece. he concluded. to d a y the ( '. .” 7 4 N ote should also be m ade of a T urkish scheme for closer interlialkan cooperation. 76 Denkwiirdigkeiten des M arschalls Izzet Pascha. Bul­ garia and Serbia as the m ost likely com bination.reat Powers. E in kritischer B eitrag zur K riegssrliuldfrage (Leipzig. I t was essential.

His specific recom m endations were th a t E uropean T urkey be divided into independent sta te s on th e basis of natio n ality and th a t Europe should follow a policy of non-intervention once these states were erected. 1877). The L ife and Letters of E dw ard A .77 M uch less clear were th e views of th e English historian. In stead the city should be a purely B alkan center and the S tra its should be neutralized and all fortifications destroyed. 108. 117-122.148 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y progress of th e political life which has sprung up in their neighbor­ hood am ongst the S lavs. . 338-340.” 76 Secondly th e O ttom an E m pire could be absorbed by one of the G reat Powers b u t this he rightly dismissed as im practical. 119-122. I.” Contemporary Review . It is no sm all feat from his point of view to have turned an European Queen. 409-419. the daughter of Cedric and W illiam . Edward Freem an. into an A siatic Em ­ press of his own m aking. Stevens. Sancerne. T h e notorious “ Bulgarian horrors” perp etrated by the T urkish irregulars in 1876 aroused his interest in th e oppressed Balkan races. R. K am arowski. w ith th e German sections joining G erm any and the Slav areas uniting w ith the Balkan Yugoslavs to form a new em pire w ith C onstantinople as its center. . Freem an gleefully wrote: "The victory of the elections is pre-em inently a moral v ictory. It is a victory of sound European and English feeling over the em p ty brag and tawdry tinsel of A siatic im perialism . of an empire. . if federation is to be h ad . 1897). 1895). . K am arow ski specifically rejected D anilevski’s proposal th a t C onstan­ tinople be m ade the capital of Slavdom and be occupied tem porarily b y Russia.” Fortnightly Review. Lord Beaconsfield has never turned European.” “T h e E lection and the E astern Q uestion. . 13. L a question d ’Orient populaire (Paris. he foresaw the break-up also of the A ustro-H ungarian Em pire. 85-87. 1939). T h e last altern ativ e was th e setting up of independent states and th is plan K am arow ski was prepared to support. if federation is no t to be h a d . . B ritain and the Bulgarian Horrors of 1871 ) (Chicago.” Revue de droit international public. 107. . Freeman (London. B ut of w h at is she to be the head? I need hardly speak m y own m ind—of a federation.. he remains as purely A siatic as if he had never left Ur of the Chaldees. T h ird ly the E m pire could be partitioned.78 As for th e future. and K am a­ rowski showed how this possibility had been proposed by num erous w riters b u t he rejected it as incom patible w ith th e peace of the Balkans and E urope as a whole. 78 W . “La question d ’O rient. 12. 966. . 1880). T hen these newly formed nations should band together w ith C onstantinople as th e capital of a Balkan federation. she m ust be th e head of som ething . X X X V I I (June. “ T he New Rom e m ust ever be th e New Rom e. A som ewhat sim ilar federation proposal is to be found in C. Harris. 7 7Ib id . . 148-152. 965. 79 “ G eographical Aspects of the Eastern Q uestion. III (1896).” 79 T o head this federation of south-eastern Europe Freem an proposed the K ing of H ungary 78 L. . 408. W hen Disraeli was defeated in the ensuing elec­ tions. 232. In num erous articles and speeches he mercilessly lashed D israeli’s foreign policy and supported G ladstone’s proposal to drive the T u rk s o u t of E u ro p e. a triumph of right over wrong. C X X I (January 1. D .

A lthough C rispi’s proposal in 1889 was designed prim arily to <heck R ussian expansion. th e ad visability of prom oting a federal m ilitary com pact be­ tween Servia. thus blocking R ussia’s ' iciest path for invasion of the Balkans. A few 1 1 1 1 “T h e H ouse of H absburg in South-E astern Europe. 382-384. .” 83 Finally. Crispi had faith in th e force of nationalism . head of a S outh­ e aste rn C onfederation. K alnoky received C rispi’s plan cooly. We see th a t th e rising nations of S o u th -E astern E urope are surrounded by three enemies.. so th a t in case of war. however. arguing th a t R ussia had no intention of going to w ar and th a t th e proposed plan could n o t be carried o u t except when events th reatened im ­ mediate developm ents. . A t th e tim e of th e uprising in Bosnia-H erzegovina he praised th e valor of the rebels and accepted th eir struggles as proof of th e ir rig h t to freedom . . an d th a t of these I liree th e A ustrian is th e m ost d a n g e ro u s . no t a nation b u t th e selfish in terests of a family. " Ib id . “As regards th e Balkan lederation. we a t least assum ed th a t he would cease to he D uke of A ustria. th e House of H absburg. T h e outlook is d a rk .80 T he views of Francesco Crispi on th e E astern Q uestion are sig­ nificant as representative of th e a ttitu d e of Italian liberals tow ards l he B alkan peoples d uring these years.8 1 On April 20 he t e l e g r a p h e d th e Italian em bassy in V ienna to urge on C ount K alnoky " . 1889). their lorces m ay from the first be directed by one head and follow one line of actio n .” 82 Sim ilar com m unications were also sen t to th e Italian ministers in Belgrade and Sofia. representing. however. By 1899.. Crispi became alarm ed by th e strained relations betw een R ussia and Roumania and the possibility of R ussian aggression. resentful of the Russian annexation of tli'Muirabia in 1878. never can be eith er ju s t or generous. C C L X X (June. his views had changed: Now w hen we dream ed of a K ing of H ungary. . 11. was erecting fortifications along the Seret. and th e y were asked to rep o rt whether such a m ilitary federation would be favorably received by Serbia and Bulgaria. nevertheless th e Italian statesm an was I'enuinely interested in the futu re of th e B alkan peoples. never can be jnst or generous to Slaves or R oum ans. We see th e stern realities of th e history of our own w onderful age. 1914). In 1889. for example. Crispi replied th a t. II. A nd a K ing of H un g ary above all. as long as th e M agyar is the ruling race of his kingdom . T urkish. B u t we have left off dream ing ab o u t the m atter. nothing was done. Like M azini.” Fortnightly Review. R oum ania and Bulgaria.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 1 49 who would no longer have a n y connection w ith A ustria.385. I am of th e opinion th a t it should be prepared in tim es of peace and n o t when events become im m in en t. . 851. R ussian and A u strian. 1 1 1 The tension arose because K ing Carol. The M em oirs of Francesco C rispi { London.

272.1879.” it held. 1877 and 1886 congresses. th a t is to say by forming th e sta te s of the B alkan Peninsula into a Confederacy. have th e conviction th a t the Balkan Peninsula can be reorganized on th e basis of n atio n ality . I profoundly believe that: those peoples [of th e Balkans] are pervaded w ith th e b reath of liberty which could revive. See also Djuvara. 22-24.248. “ can be resolved only by peaceful means. 809.8 4 In a public le tte r of April 1897 he even w ent so far as to w rite th a t: T h e natio n al Italian p a rty would like to see a Balkan confedera­ tion form ed w ith C onstantinople as th e capital. 19. “U ne confederation balkanique. Crispi. Ban. 1885). 1879). 501. “ T he E astern Q uestion. b u t tw o years late r the association “ resum ed its labors m ore resolutely th a n ever. it did n o t last very long nor exert much influence. in th e projected federation.8 5 In ad dition to these individual proposals. One of these was a G reek association founded in 1884. and place them on th a t great road which has been trodden for several centuries by th e o th er nations of E u­ rop e. Cent projets. 88 Cited b y Pinon. III. 86 Cited b y Loiseau. . H ere the T u rk s could find th eir place if they wished to behave like brothers ra th e r than m asters. L a Quistione Orientate (R om e. 273. 87 T h e on ly references to this association are in Crispi’s m emoirs and in M. V ery little is know n of this body. this being th e only arran g em en t possible which will n o t offend one of the Pow ers. A t the last of these th e resolution adopted read as follows: T he clearest and m ost efficient w ay of avoiding unwholesome covetousness would be a federative organization sanctioned by a neu­ tra lity g u aranteed by Europe. as well as th e strictly Balkan states.” loc.87 M uch m ore im p o rta n t was th e “ In tern atio n al League for Peace and L ib e rty . 86 Cited in The M em oirs of Francesco C rispi.” In all probability. he sta ted before the Ita lian Cham ber of D eputies: I. cit. Le B alkan slave. civilize. See also his Memoirs. there began to appear during th is period organizations for th e specific purpose of furthering th e federation cause. Such is th e ideal. such should be the goal of th e efforts of the B alkan peoples and of all th e cabinets which are anxious for ju stice.88 U nder th e auspices of this league there was form ed in 1894 the 8 4 F. 272. on F eb ru ary 3. 51.. gentlem en.” which passed resolutions in favor of a B alkan federa­ tion a t its 1869. In 1885 it proved neces­ sary to suspend activities tem porarily because of the racial hatred generated by the w ar of th a t year. Solution de la question d ’Orient. and it sought to include T urkey. 1876.” 86 T he association also published a paper entitled Eastern Confederation. p ar VEurope ou par la Porte (Belgrade. 111. however.150 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y years later.

th e em inent Portuguese socialist. L.9 T h e follow ing resolution was passed a t the 1894 Congress of the Peace League. 1 . Serbians. A rgyriades pointed o u t th a t l here were two m ain obstacles to a N ear E astern federation. 1895). Bulgarians. Serbia. sooner or later. A rm enians an d o th er nationalities. 90 P. B osnia-H erzegovina. T h e m ain speech of the m eeting was delivered by the G reek socialist. T h race w ith C onstantinople as a free rity and th e center of th e co n fed eratio n . who was elected president of th e League. 5. b u t th a t was of a tem porary nature and would. B ulgaria. B u t th e general interests of th e confederated states will be regulated by their delegates m eeting a t C onstantinople. 6. M ontenegro. 6. A rgyriades. Asia M inor coastal regions.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 151 "L eague for B alkan C onfederation. T his confederation he explained. by all the m easures destined to assure th e m aintenance of a federative p act. however. '/. finally. o th er bodies for th e solution of th e E astern Question were !o be organized. was to consist of the following countries: 1.” 89 T h e organizational m eeting was presided over by M agalhaes Lim a. 4. D uring th e first decade of th e tw entieth century. T h e first was th e existing O ttom an E m pire. T he League is im p o rtan t. Argyriades and P. as representative of th e a ttitu d e of pacifists and radicals tow ards the Kastern Question. 10. and th a t would be solved by the gran tin g of ruitonom y to M acedonia as a p a rt of th e general confederation of th e Near E ast. as the M acedonian question becam e more dangerous to th e peace of Europe. to p rev ent or settle conllicts am ong them and. A rm enia. Lagarde. "The Congress expresses its satisfaction a t the organization in Paris of the League for llalkan C onfederation. M acedonia and A lbania. See also P. 8. L a confederation hulkanique.” B u lletin officiel du V I m o centres international de la p a ix tenu d Anvers ( M p iq u e) du 29 aoilt au 1 septembre 1894 (Antwerp. . to place all the strength of l he confederation a t the disposal of any s ta te whose independence or integrity is a ttack ed from w ith o u t. [Argyriades] "Le ffidfiralisme et la question d ’O rient. T he o ther was th e M acedonian question. above all.” Revue socialiste. 1896). Solution de la question d'Orient. 1895). each one will be adm inistered internally according to its own will. Roum anians. T h e n a tu re of th is confederation he described as follows: Each one of these states will have com plete autonom y. 167. 9. disappear. w ith prom inent public figures in th eir ranks and with a correspondingly g reater influence on th eir tim es. X X I I (A ugust. having for its aim th e unification of the people of the E ast into one u n it. and am ong th e delegates were Greeks. Greece and th e isle of C rete. R oum ania. P. Compte-rendu de la conference tenue au Grand Orient de France sur cette question (tir i de la Revue socialiste) et la M acedoine . 2. relation sur ce p a ys (tirie de V A l­ manack de la question sociale de 1896) (Paris.00 A pparen tly th is League for B alkan confederation did n o t exert much influence as no reference to it is available o ther th a n th a t describing its organization.

C H A P T E R V II T H E S E C O N D B A LK A N A L L IA N C E S Y ST E M . regular a n d irregular. M ore th an ever before th e Balkan states were deadlocked in a furious cam paign of p ro paganda and terrorism for th e possession of M acedonia. Realizing th a t th eir fu tu re claims would therefore depend on th e vigor and effectiveness of their propa­ ganda. G erm any refused to participate in the police work for fear of offending the Porte and im perilling the Bagdad R ailway plans.2 1 T h e spheres were assigned as follows: K ossovo to Austria-H ungary. more th a n a h u n d red villages were to ta lly de­ stroyed b y fire an d tens of th ousands of in h a b itan ts were rendered homeless an d d e stitu te . T roops. 2 An excellent analysis of this subject is available in Colonel Lam ouche. th e activities of the B ulgarian. Quinze . th e tw o pow ers m ost im ­ m ediately interested. E uropean sy m p a th y had been alienated by th e destructiveness of th e Bulgarian revolutionaries an d th e S u ltan seized this o p p o rtu ­ n ity to strike. T he w ave of terrorism and violence which culm inated in th e general M acedonian insurrection of Ju ly 1903 m ade m atters worse. drew up th e m odest M iirzsteg Program of re­ form for the three M acedonian vilayets of Salonica. T h u s th e M iirzsteg Program was a com plete failure because it did n o t reach to the roots of th e m atter. Serbian and G reek bands be­ cam e m ore feverish th an ever. Salonica to Russia. M onastir to Italy. Such a sta te of affairs could n o t continue indefinitely. it did n o t solve the claim s of the rival asp iran ts to th e succes­ sion of M acedonia. Seres to France. M onastir and Kossovo. 1903-1914 A t th e beginning of th e tw en tieth century th e m ovem ent for B alkan cooperation and u n ity had been b rought to a standstill by th e 1897 G oluchow ski-M uraviev agreem ent and by the struggle for M acedonia. Since th e Powers supported th is reform scheme th e S ultan felt obliged to accept it b u t its sole resu lt was to increase th e disorder. In ad d itio n th e co u n try was to be divided into d istricts and assigned to five of th e Powers w ith A u stria a n d R ussia responsible for th e general supervision of the program . A u stria-H u n g ary a n d Russia. were let loose upon the hapless p e a sa n try . Dram a to Great Britain. th a t is. A clause in th e program provided th a t when th e w ork of pacification w as com pleted a new delim itation of ad m in istrativ e districts should be m ade in favor of a more regular grouping of the various nationali­ ties represented in M acedonia. T h ey recom m ended th a t th e gendarm erie be reorganized and p u t under th e com m and of a foreign general and a staff of foreign officers.1 A R ussian an d an A ustrian civil agent were to accom pany th e T urkish inspector-general on his to u rs and rep o rt on conditions.

Lam ouche was the French delegate for th e reorganization of the gendarm erie. 1912-1913 (H arvard H istorical Series. T he results of th is b ru ta l crime were far-reach­ ing. ch. was also eager to stren g then his position by an alliance. 7-66. Serbia now found herself in a peculiar position. X L II.4 T he first was a general tre a ty of friendship dealing w ith cultural and economic m atters. X X V . H esapschiev. th e com m on circulation of coinage. 465. European D i­ plomacy in the N ear Eastern Question 1906— 1909 (Illin ois Studies in the Social Sciences vol.. on F eb ru ary 1. 6 Cited b y H elm reich.. however. aim ing a t an eventual custom s union (Zollverein). The D iplom acy of the B alkan W ars. was definitely anti-A u strian . op. O brenovich d y n asty was now elim­ inated and P e te r K arageorgevich cam e to pow er w ith th e su pport of th e powerful. Helm reich. 1904 of two treaties. Rizov. R adical p a rty . no. appendix II. T h e R adical p a rty favored an agreem ent w ith B ulgaria. Queen D raga and the queen’s m ale relatives. 1940). for it would strengthen th eir govern­ m ent and enhance th e economic welfare of th e ir country. pro-R ussian. th e draw ing up of conventions for th e extradition of crim inals. th e introduction of th e cyrillic alp h ab et in tele­ graphic com m unications betw een th e tw o countries. T he pro-A ustrian. th e abolition of passp o rt requirem ents. a t th e sam e tim e a tte m p tin g to con­ du ct sim ilar custom s policies w ith respect to oth er states. 4. 3 T h e follow ing account of the diplom acy leading to the form ation of the Balkan League is based prim arily on the standard work b y E. U n iversity of Illinois Press. T he m ost im p o rta n t article was th e first. 1904. and the encouragem ent of tra d e by th e reduction of freight and passenger rates. instead of being d ictated from Vienna. was dispatched to B elgrade to aid th e a tta c h e in carrying on th e negotiations. 1928). II. H enceforth Serbian foreign policy. cit. She had tu rn ed h er back upon A ustria b u t she could n o t look to R ussia for su p p o rt since th a t co u n try was engaged a t w ar in th e F a r E ast with Ja p a n . T he suggestion was favorably received by th e B ulgarian governm ent and M. C. 4 An English translation of the texts is avaialble in H elm reich. T h e result was th e signing on April 12. A detailed account of the policies of the G reat Powers regarding M acedonia is given in W . . One a lte rn a tiv e was Sofia. w ith an uncertain crown upon his head and still unrecognized by various E uropean powers. op. Urbana. I t provided for th e settin g of common postal and telegraph rates. b y which th e signa­ tories agreed. D . then Bulgarian m inister a t Cetinje. D avid. Cam bridge.3 T he first of these was th e m urder in Ju n e 1903 of K ing A lexander. cit. no. while K ing Peter. 1938). T h u s in a conversation w ith the Bulgarian atta ch e in Belgrade.” 6 I t was th e a tte m p t to p u t tins d'histoire balkanique ( 1904-1918 ) (Paris. decadent.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 153 Beginning w ith 1903. P eter discussed the question of an agreem ent. a series of events took place which ultim ately led to th e B alkan alliances of 1912. “ T o perm it th e free im p o rtatio n of their respective products (of dom estic origin).

’th e dispute be subm itted to the T sa r for arb itratio n .0 T he first article of this tre a ty approved of th e M iirzsteg program and pledged the su p p o rt of both sta tes for its a ttain m e n t. 153-158. 7 T h e previous article provided for a special m ilitary convention which was to be drawn up to take care of the even tu alities m entioned in articles 2 and 3. op. and inviol­ ability of th e reigning d y n asties. Bulgaria had pledged herself to oppose A ustrian annexation of a region then occupied by A ustrian forces.. U nited action was also called for in case of an un­ friendly action in M acedonia or Old Serbia (article 3). I t m ight be noted th a t th is principle of R ussian arbitration was included also in th e 1912 Serbo-Bulgarian alliance b u t th a t the H ague C o u rt was n o t then m entioned.154 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y this article into practice th a t led to th e A ustro-Serbian tariff war. Balkanskite voini. T he next article provided for reciprocal m ilitary aid against an atta c k . then th e dispute was to be referred to th e In tern atio n al C ourt of A rb itratio n a t the H ague. . which provided for a political alliance between th e tw o countries. and if th e la tte r refused. T h e second tre a ty . 7.” U ndoubtedly this clause must have been very welcome to K ing P ete r whose position in Serbia was none too secure. On A pril 13. was n o t know n u ntil published in 1929 by Toshev. 1904 th ere was signed a final protocol or covering docum ent for th e tw o treaties which more m inutely defined the various clauses of th e treaties in order to avoid m isinterpretation.7 T he next tw o articles called for th e discussion of all questions arising from th e tre a ty and provided th a t. “on th e present territorial u n ity and inde­ pendence of their respective states. In o th er words. No tim e lim it was set for th e tre a ty b u t it was to be revised after five years should this prove necessary. or on the security. in case no agreem ent was reached.i in th e cyrillic alphabet. 8 H elm reich. 1 . T h e final article provided th a t th e treaties be k ep t in the personal archives of P eter and F erdinand and th a t th e foreign offices be given copies of only th e economic tre a ty . I t was further agreed th a t should the occasion arise th e A lbanian problem should be handled in such a m anner as to pave th e w ay for an alliance be­ tw een Serbia and M ontenegro (article 5). .8 N egotiations were now sta rte d for the conclusion of th e customs 0 T osh ev. In th e last article it was provided th a t th e p a c t should be k ep t secret and th a t it should be com m unicated to a th ird sta te only a fter previous agreem ent be­ tween th e allies. I t was first agreed th a t th e proposed custom s union should not affect existing com mercial treaties w ith o th er countries and th a t efforts should be m ade to establish telegraphic relations w ith Russi. regard­ less whence it came. . . T he m ost im p o rtan t explanatory note specifi­ cally sta te d th a t th e S anjak of N ovi-B azar was considered a pari of th e Kossovo vilayet. cit. 6.

7-10. T he Serbian governm ent accepted th e first de­ mand and sought to change th e second so as to call for only such changes as th e A ustro-Serbian T re a ty required. w ithout consulting Belgrade. however.md th e fam ous “ pig w a r” began. lay th e tariff agreem ent before th e Sobranje where it was passed by acclam ation. Serbia would drop the . T he first diffi­ culty arose when on Ja n u a ry 2. A ustro-Serbian negotiations were recom m enced. T he Serbian m erchants rallied to I ho su pport of the governm ent and Pashich in th e S kupshtina m ade his well-known speech in which he term ed th e A ustrian dem ands as incom patible w ith th e dignity of Serbia and sta te d th a t th e Serbian governm ent desired the friendship. Serbia had already begun negotiations w ith A u stria-H ungary b u t this revelation of th e tariff agreem ent so alarm ed th e M onarchy (h at on Ja n u a ry 11 A ehrenthal dem anded of Serbia th a t th e pro­ vision for an u ltim ate custom s union be dropped. T his.iiul th a t should a Serbo-A ustrian tre a ty be concluded. .B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 155 union foreseen in th e first tre a ty . Belgrade refused to yield fu rth er. “T he Ball-. was n o t to be th e case. i ni Zollverein from th e Serbo-B ulgarian tre a ty and a num ber of ■lianges would be m ade on p oints which conflicted w ith th e m ost l. France. n o t only of A ustria.ins to th e Balkan peoples” be realized. V ienna rejected this offer. for only in this m anner could th e ideal. 1917.9 » Ibid. T he negotiations again collapsed when Austria dem anded preferential tre a tm e n t for her industries in Serbian governm ental contracts p articu larly in th e case of artillery orders.. 1906 th e B ulgarian governm ent. Ita ly and Belgium . after which it was to be replaced by a comm on tariff ra te for b o th countries. Sweden. Sw itzerland. S erbia’s answ er was ta n ta m o u n t to a refusal so th a t V ienna refused to continue negol iations unless Serbia m ade a declaration to th e effect th a t she would not ra tify the Bulgarian agreem ent while negotiating w ith A ustria . on the understanding th a t if a tre a ty were concluded. Serbia would undertake all th e m odifications of th e Serbo-B ulgarian tre a ty de­ manded by A ustria. The A ustrian frontier was closed to th e im port of Serbian livestock . b u t also of l he Balkan states. A comm ercial tre a ty based on I he m ost favored nation principle was concluded w ith B ulgaria in 1>ecember 1906 and oth er agreem ents were negotiated in 1907 w ith Koumania. and an im passe was reached. Serbia now tu rn ed to oth er nations.ivored nation principle. R ussia. I t was hoped th a t by M arch 1. however. 1906 th e tw o countries would have concluded th eir separate agreem ents w ith A u stria-H u n g ary so th a t th e tre a ty could be p u t into operation. By Ju ly 1905 a tariff agreem ent was reached which was to go into effect th e following M arch and rem ain in force until M arch 1.

of course. b u t w ith the assassination of P etkov and th e appointm ent of Stanchov to the foreign m inistry in M arch 1907. however. m atters took a tu rn for th e worse. As long as th e P etk o v m inistry rem ained in power in Sofia the relations be­ tw een B ulgaria and Serbia retained. W hitehead. it is clear th a t th ey can never be cordial and stable un­ til the com petition betw een th e tw o nationalities for an eventual ac­ quisition of th e Slav countries still u n der T urkish rule comes to an end. D ie Auswdrtige P olilik Serbiens 1903-1914 (Berlin. the B ritish representative in Belgrade reported th e situation as follows: T o sum up th e whole situation as regards th e relations betw een Servia and B ulgaria. the Bulgarian press vigor­ ously denounced Serbian policy in M acedonia and a num ber of inci­ d en ts occurred which aroused m uch ill-feeling in both countries. Pashitch was in favour of cooperating w ith Bulgaria for comm on aim s. T he wily Sultan A bdul H am id im m ediately pro­ tested th a t th e C om m ittee had m erely anticipated th e wish dearest. Boghitschew itsch. 1928-31). M. 120-135. 118. 1908 proclaim ed th e T urkish co n stitution of 1876 and prepared for a march on C onstantinople. it ceased to be regarded as binding. th e C om m ittee on Ju ly 23. S tanchov m ade v isits to V ienna and Berlin. I. accom ­ panied b y a corresponding Serbo-B ulgarian rapprochem ent. By 1908 Serbia had broken aw ay from A ustrian economic and political tutelage and stru ck oul on an independent nationalist policy of her own. A ustro-B ulgarian relations becam e close. w itnessed a series of events which com ­ pletely changed th e N ear E astern situ ation. T he first of these was th e “ Y oung T u rk ” revolution of th e M acedonian “ C om m ittee of U nion and Progress. b u t inter-B alkan re­ lations rem ained as u n satisfactory as before. b u t his in ten tio n s were fru stra te d b y the uncom prom ising claim of th e B ulgarians to th e whole of th e te rrito ry aw arded to them by the T re a ty of San S tefano. however. V. a t least outw ardly. was th e M acedonian question. 10 B ritish Documents. H aving gained the su p p o rt of th e arm y in M acedonia. 1908 J. The fu ndam ental difficulty.1 56 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y T his A ustro-Serbian estrangem ent was not. the B ulgarians wishing i t to be considered a purely Bulgarian m a tte r to th e exclusion of the Serbians. B. th eir friendly character. and of deferring th e discussion of th e rights of th e two n ations to th e expected inheritance until it should actually fall due. .” T his C om m ittee consisted m ainly of young men who had acquired a veneer of w estern ideas and who had come to the conclusion th a t th e O ttom an E m pire could survive only if it could be technically and politically m odernized. and as th e relations betw een th e two countries rapidly cooled. On April 2. T he year 1908. See also M .1 0 T h u s th e Serbo-Bulgarian T re a ty of A pril 1904 was practically still-born.

long live th e S u lta n . and abolished th e arm y of 40. hoping thereby 1 1 Л sym pathetic. sum m oned a parliam ent. M .” T he first results of th e revolution were th u s m ost promising. 35-43. 230. 1930). 56-82. An excellent map of the rival railway projects In available in B ritish Documents. E n v er Bey. Le reveil de la Turquie (Alexandria [1909]). I t seemed th a t a t long last th e E astern Question was to lie elim inated b y th e sim ple process of T u rk ey becoming occidental in governm ent. g u aranteed personal liberty and equality of rights to all subjects irrespective of race.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 157 Iо his h e a rt and pro m p tly proclaim ed th e co n stitution in C on stan ti­ nople. A In i<-f sum m ary of the Y ou n g T u rk m ovem ent w ith excellent bibliographical references i I d be found in D avid. th e R ussian foreign m inister since O ctober 1906. In Ju ly 1907 he had concluded an agreem ent w ith the hipanese ending th e M anchurian difficulties and in A ugust of th e line year he had signed th e e n te n te w ith B ritain. 14-22.” A nd for a tim e it seemed th a t such was th e case. exclaimed th a t “ a rb itra ry g o vernm ent” had "d isappeared . th u s connecting th e existing T urkish line and giving Austria d irect access to Salonica. . D iam antopoulo. creed or origin. III.1 2 His first move was th e announcem ent on Ja n u a ry 27. th e leader of th e Y oung T urks. social life and technical equipm ent. At Seres th e president of th e B ulgarian C om m ittee em braced th e ('■reek archbishop. however. V. m ore interested in th e S tra its th a n in th e S anjak or BosniaI lerzegovina. first-hand account of the revolution and its repercussions is ru rn in H . In 1906 the tim id and cautious ( 'ount Goluchowski was replaced in th e A ustrian foreign office by l he energetic and am bitious A ehrenthal who aim ed to strengthen l lie D ual M onarchy by p u ttin g an end to the Serbian menace which he believed th reaten ed to d isru p t th e H apsburg E m pire.1 3 Isvolski.. 11 For a keen analysis of A ehrenthal’s Serbian policy see J. T h e R ussian foreign office in ter­ preted th is step as signifying th e term in atio n of th e 1897 Goluchowki-M uraviev agreem ent and declared th a t a D anube-A driatic railw ay would be b u ilt through Serbia for th e benefit of R ussia and S erbia. cit.. A series of rude shocks followed one upon the other.1 1 These rosy prospects were n o t. lin im e n ts o f a P olitical D ia ry (London. cit. however. T his sudden revolution produced trem endous enthusiasm . both in E urope and in th e O ttom an E m pire itself. Baernreither. of long d u ration. no. was. op. ch. a t D ram a th e revolutionary officers im prisoned . 60-64. 1908 th a t A ustria would build a railw ay from U vatz through th e S an jak of N ovi-B azar to M itrovitza. in A thens a crowd gathered before the T urkish em bassy shouting “ Long live th e O ttom an arm y. 1 3 D etails in D avid. op.000 spies.1 T u r k for insulting a C h ristian. T he first of these was th e A ustrian annexation of Bosnia-H erzegovina and th e Bul­ garian declaration of independence.

A ).. T here was. see В. 15 B oghitschew itsch.158 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d ie s in H ist o r y th a t E ngland would no t oppose a change in th e S traits regime. In Serbia. Schm itt.-U . no. A nd one of the m eans by which the Serbians and R ussians hoped to a tta in this end was the form ation of a B alkan League which would serve as a b arrier to fu rth er A ustrian aggression an d which could strike w ith the force of a G reat Pow er when the o p p o rtu n ity ap p eared. cit. op. L a crise bosniaque 1908-1909 et les puissances europeennes (Paris. 1930). T he Slav press in R ussia preached th e inevitability of w ar betw een Slavdom and T eu to n d o m while th e governm ent undertook a sweeping reorganization and increase of the arm y and navy. p reparations for w ar were m ade as soon as the a n ­ nexation was proclaim ed and it was only th e assurances of Isvolski th a t Russia would sup p o rt th e fu tu re realization of a “ G reater S erb ia” th a t induced th e Serbian governm ent to accept th e A ustrian fa it accompli. D iplomatische Aktenstucke des Osterreichisch.” A ehrenthal agreed and a t th e B uchlau interview of S eptem ber 15. 1937). D avid . I. 125.. 2 vols. 1908 Isvolski consented to th e A ustrian annexation of th e provinces while A eh­ ren th al in retu rn prom ised to look w ith favor upon R ussia’s interests in the S tra its and to evacuate th e Sanjak. The A nnexation of Bosnia 1908-1909 (Cambridge U niversity Press. N in tchitch . ch. D ie auswdrtige P o litik Serbiens. H av ­ ing secured th e consent of th e cabinet to evolve a plan for th e pacific occupation of th e Bosphorus w ith o u t a declaration of w ar against T u rk ey he next sought the cooperation of A ustria and in the sum m er of 1908 offered to A ehrenthal to m ake th e annexation of BosniaH erzegovina th e object of a “ friendly conversation. a m isunderstanding regarding the precise d a te of annexation and to Isvolski’s astonishm ent A ehrenthal pro­ claim ed th e union on O ctober 7.1 5 Balkan u n ity a fter 1908 was stim ulated n o t only by th e reaction from the Bosnian crisis b u t also by the severe Turkification policy of the Y oung T urk s. however. N either Isvol­ ski nor th e Serbian governm ent ever accepted the annexation of B osnia-H erzegovina as a final settlem ent. Osterreich-Ungarns A ussenpolitik von der Bosnischen K rise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914. M. T ogether w ith w estern constitutionalism the T urkish reform ers had adopted w estern nationalism in its m ost un­ com prom ising form. VI. 3928. 1937). (H ereafter referred to as O . tw o days a fter Bulgarian inde­ pendence had been declared. I t was regarded ra th e r as a Serbian A lsace-Lorraine— as a tem p o rary arrangem ent to be over­ throw n a t th e earliest possible m om ent. . B u t form al acceptance was meaningless.1 4 T he m ost obvious result was th e h atred engendered in R ussia and Serbia against the C entral Powers. IV. T he details of th e violent diplom atic a fterm ath of these events need n o t be related here b u t their effect on th e B alkan situ atio n is of first ra te im portance. E . V.JJngarischen M in isteriu m s des Aussern (Vienna. C onsequently a rigid policy of T urkification 1 1 For details.

th e Balkan sta te s a fte r 1908 entered. . The L ife of J . the form er tak in g th e w estern portion and the la tte r th e eastern. 1909. T he resu lt was a w ave of revolts. a fte r th e Balkan league had been formed. th e head of th e P ro ­ gressive P a rty .une to a sep arate agreem ent w ith A ustria regarding Bosnia-HerzeKovina.” On O ctober 4. . Thus th e negotiations were dropped and T u rk ey on April 15. In 1909 th e London Tim es correspondent. 85.1 6 As a resu lt of this reaction from th e Bosnian Crisis and Young Turk nationalism . T he Serbs.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 159 and cen tralization was adopted. .. . th e Young T u rk s by th eir m istaken policies were antagonizing (lieir C hristian subjects and forcing them to com bine for self p ro ­ tection. D . cit. w hich th e Y oung T u rk s are n o t approaching in th e rig h t way. he w rote in th e Tim es th a t it was " . upon a series of negotiations which cul­ m inated in th e alliance of 1912. th e most im p o rta n t providing th a t n eith er p a rty should accept an y p ro­ posed solution of th e question of Bosnia-H erzegovina w ithout th e previous agreem ent of th e other. . 1912. op. T u rk ey accepted these changes b u t countered w ith an am endm ent to th e effect th a t in case of a victorious war ag ain st Bulgaria the conquered te rrito ry should be divided be­ tween Serbia an d T urkey. th e insensate efforts of the Y oung T u rk s to stifle national sen tim en t am ong th e various races of th e E m pire . 134. Bourchier. w hich provided for m utual aid in case of w ar. w ith active Russian encouragem ent. In A lbania the centralization tactics fanned th e flames of nationalism and produced a w ar of liberation. Jam es Bourchier. By th e end of O ctober th e d ra ft of a secret S erbo-T urk convention had been prepared.” th a t m ade possible the alliances. both in th e A siatic and in th e E uropean sections of th e Em pire. . 17 For details. op. i . will prove an insuperable obstacle to th e realization of their program m e. to C onstantinople to come to an u nderstanding w ith the Porte. R a th e r th a n unifying and regenerating th e em ­ pire. see Helmreich. was already prophesying th a t “ . . 13-19. th e question of nationalities in T urkey. . were m ore interested in th e im m edi­ ate problem confronting them and proposed three am endm ents. D avid. T he revolutionary bands in M acedonia once m ore took to th e hills and again plunged th e region into its fam iliar anarchy.17 10 Grogan. however. As soon as th e annexation had been announced in Vienna the Serbian governm ent sen t S tojan N ovakovich. cit.. T h e Serbian governm ent was unable to agree to this am endm ent since an article hostile to B ulgaria would render Ihe convention useless as th e basis for a w ider coalition of the Balkan states as contem plated a t th e o u tset an d because E urope would never consent to T urkish rule being reim posed on C hristian territo ry . 84.

no..19 In th e m eantim e the Serbians had been negotiating w ith th e Bul­ garians for an agreem ent. “ Isvolsky’s speech seems to me very satisfactory . St. ao Helm reich. 86-89.. . Petersburg and C onstan­ tinople. w ith the su p p o rt of th e E n te n te tu rn ed to Bulgaria. cit. . Before m uch progress could be m ade. 37. b u t a series of visits and conversations in the au tu m n and w in ter of 1909 aroused much in terest and specu­ lation. op. C onsequently nothing cam e of the conversations.160 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y W ith th e failure of th e negotiations w ith T urkey. th e Bulgar­ ians had agreed to th e settlem en t of their indem nity dispute with th e P o rte a t Russian expense an d were considering R ussian alliance proposals. Helm reich. cit. T he Serbians were interested prim arily in an anti-A ustrian agreem ent and were willing to p artitio n M acedonia on term s favorable to th e Bulgarians. cit. Im m ediately th e exponents 18 B ritish Documents. Isvolski produced a d ra ft tre a ty b u t it was so favorable to R ussia th a t th e B ulgarian governm ent rejected it. 493.. A ctually these visits counted for little. 25-32. 21. T h e la tte r. 1908 Isvolski m ade a speech in th e D um a in which he openly favored the creation of a Balkan league. op. 38. I am glad he em phasized th e need for com m unity of feeling between th e Balkan S tates and th e com bination of all three of them with T u rk ey for defence of com m on interests. On Decem ber 25. sought to form a B alkan League including T urkey. Serbia. As usual th e M acedonian question broke up th e negotiations. visited Sofia w here he was w arm ly received. op. . th e as­ sum ption by Russia of th e B ulgarian indem nity im proved RussoB ulgarian relations and represented a step in th e direction of a Balkan league.2 1 T he situ atio n changed com pletely when w ar broke o u t in Sep­ tem ber 1911 between T u rk ey and Ita ly . w henever I c a n . 20. T his plan was n o t taken very seriously by anyone excepting C harikov himself. V. Sir E dw ard Grey wired to Nicolson three days later. and th e R oum anian w ar m inister was w arm ly received by the G rand Vizier in C onstantinople. however. In M arch 1909 M ilovanovich.. K ing P eter also journeyed to th e Russian and T urkish capi­ tals.20 T he scene now shifted to C onstantinople where C harikov. Ferd in an d visited Belgrade. However. 21 Ibid. wished to avoid an anti-A ustrian policy and were unwilling to give up a n y portion of M acedonia. D avid . the Serbian foreign m inister. .” 18 Biilow and A ehrenthal now becam e suspicious and th e la tte r sta rte d negotiations w ith th e Bul­ garians. A ssurances of friendship were exchanged and some tra d e agree­ m ents concluded b u t nothing im p o rtan t was accom plished. 19 K ratchounov. I am quite in favour of this and will encourage it. op. 21-25. cit. however.. the new R ussian am bassador to T u rk ey .

X L III (Septem ber. th e pan-S lav R ussian m inisters in Belgrade and Sofia. N eklyudov. Russland und die Entstehung des Balkanbundes 1912. Langer. th e T u rk ­ ish foreign m inister. realizing th a t E urope was n o t behind Charikov. N eratov. 81-95. 1-10. 1933). excited by this possibility. R um ors now were circulated th a t Ita ly was planning a naval cam paign in the Aegean and the S tra its and C harikov. and if successful. T he R ussian diplom ats were fu rth e r aided by th e fact th a t Sazonov. th e R ussian foreign m inister. w ith R ussian encourage­ m ent. to suggest a discussion of more im por­ ta n t questions such as the S traits. E in Beilrag zur Vorgeschichte des W eltkrieges (Berlin. was weak and easily influenced. sought an u nderstanding w ith Serbia in order to com bat T urkish persecution of B ulgarians in M acedonia. foreseeing th e possi­ ble abolition of capitu latio n s.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 161 of R ussia’s th ree d istin ct B alkan policies set to w ork to p u t their theories into practice. was ill and th a t his assistant. “ Russia. The Balkan League (London. T h is tim e it was presented offi­ cially an d changed so th a t th e alteratio n s in th e S tra its regulations should n o t be subject to th e agreem ent of the Powers b u t m erely be a m a tte r betw een R ussia and T u rk ey . and em phasizing th e advan tag es of a T urco-B alkan League. V. However. C harikov was instructed to request a revision of th e 1900 R usso-Turkish railw ay agreem ent.” P olitical Science Quarterly. C harikov th o u g h t th a t T u rk ey would now certainly join a B alkan League. resu b m itted th e d ra ft. Gueshoff. 1908-1912. delayed replying im m ediately an d finally on O ctober 17 flatly re­ fused to consider th e d raft. T h u s Isvolski’s and C h arik o v ’s plans failed b u t th e B alkan League schem e cham pioned by H artv ig and N eklyudov proved successful. R elations w ith Russia quickly became cordial and foreign m inister Geshov. 1928).2 2 In M arch 1911 a new pro-R ussian governm ent had been formed in B ulgaria under Geshov and D anev. Before receiving N e ra to v ’s au th o rizatio n C harikov subm itted to th e P orte on O ctober 14 an unofficial d ra ft em bodying changes favorable to T u rk ey in a revised railw ay accord. 13 I. a t his own request.23 Rizov. Assim Bey. Bickel. E. again on Isvolski’s advice. suggesting alteratio ns in th e S traits regulations. th e Bul­ garian m inister to Rome who had p articip ated in th e negotiation of the 1904 Serbo-B ulgar tre a ty . was in structed to secure French approval for a change in v th e S tra its regulations and. 343-356. w orked for th e creation of a B alkan League exclusive of T urkey. L. Isvolski still sought to open th e S tra its w ith the consent of th e G reat Pow ers. w as sen t to Belgrade and negotiations и О. . the Straits Q uestion and the Origins of the Balkan League. T h u s Isvolski. C harikov saw th e o p p o rtu n ity and urged N erato v to link th e S tra its question w ith th a t of a T urcoB alkan League. and N icholas H artv ig and A. 1915). W .

T hese three agreed and K ing F erdinand gave his consent th a t: 1. T h e approval of Russia should be a conditio sine qua non for the conclusion of th e tre a ty . M ilovanovich. T he tre a ty should provide for th e participation of M ontenegro. cit. T he 1904 tre a ty should serve as a basis of th e new tre a ty .”26 T his did not m eet w ith full approval either. if possible. . 28.2 4 On his retu rn to Sofia Geshov found the cabinet and th e public excited b y th e concentration of T urkish troops in A drianople.. since no m ention was m ade of Mace2 4Ibid. op.. presented a d ra ft of th e proposed al­ liance b u t th e Bulgarians objected to it because. a contested zone to be reserved 'for th e arb itratio n of th e R us­ sian E m peror. . 2. an uncontested Serbian zone. 13-27. th e Serbian m inister to Sofia. w ith Greece. 4. and article four n o t only said nothing of M acedonian auto n o m y b u t actu ally proposed th a t the two vilayets of Salonica and M on astir should be reserved for th e a rb itra tio n of th e Russian E m p ero r. “ .. . and dis­ cussed th e th o rn y problem of the division of spoils. proposing th is tim e th ree zones in M acedonia. however. Geshov ap p arently raised no objections and bo th prem iers departed satisfied w ith the progress m ade. 23. the Bulgarian m inister to Paris. M ilovanovich suggested th a t Serbia should receive all th e land n o rth of th e Shar m ountains while Bulgaria was to have A drianople and th e bulk of M acedonia. and an uncontested Bulgarian zone.2 6 On N ovem ber 3.. T h e tre a ty should be defensive against all states and th e casus foederis should arise if A u stria-H ungary or T u rk ey should try to occupy a n y area in the B alkans or if th e interests of B ulgaria and Serbia dem anded th a t th e T urkish question be settled. b u t it m ade th e Bulgarians realize th e necessity for an alliance w ith Serbia and. th a t for th e present it would be b e tte r no t to draw a definite boundary line b u t to reserve th is p artitio n to th e a rb itra tio n of th e T sar. Spalaikovich. . . op. H e was of th e opinion. cit. 5. Gueshoff. T he general outlines of an agreem ent were first drafted and then Rizov left for Vienna where he m et Geshov and Stanchov. 20 G ueshoff. 3. 25 Bickel. W ith th e aid of th e G reat Powers th e crisis was successfully passed.” T he Serbians therefore modified th eir d raft. G eshov now m et th e Serbian prem ier. op. 1911. If unable to obtain autonom y for M acedonia th en th e area should be divided. 109-111.162 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y were begun ju s t as the Italo -T u rk ish w ar was beginning. “ . th e Serbians were reserving for them selves the rig h t to declare w ar w ith o u t (Bul­ garian) consent. cit.

51.27 By the end of D ecem ber all points except th e question of bounda­ ries had been settled and on th is m a tte r M ilovanovich and Geshov each refused to m ake concessions and each begged R ussia to bring pressure to bear on th e other. cit. 357. 112-114. By J a n u a ry 30 th e b o u ndary near S truga on Lake O chrida was th e last disputed point. th a t is. even though only one of th e signatories considered I he a tte m p t injurious to its interests (article 2). cit. F or a tim e a cabinet crisis in Serbia th reaten ed to d isru p t the negotiations b u t finally Serbia yielded and on M arcb 7 th e prelim inary protocol was signed and six days la te r on th e anniversary of the d eath of th e T sar L iberator th e tre a ty w ith its secret annex received valid ity .. K ing P eter and M ilovanovich now paid a visit to Paris where S tanchov inform ed them th a t th e present d ra ft could never be accepted by B ulgaria.. N eklyudov and especially Rom anovski. cit. Old Serbia and th e S an jak of N ovi-Bazar. cit. b u t if such an organization of th is te rrito ry appeared to the tw o parties to he impossible it was to be divided into three zones: B ulgaria was to 27 Langer. th e R ussian m ilitary a tta c h e in Sofia. if possible. to be formed into th e autonom ous province long desired by Bulgaria. op. was to go to Serbia. H elm reich. op. and th e L ake of O chrida” were.28 By this tre a ty th e tw o sta te s agreed to aid each o th er in case either were attack ed (article 1) an d to tak e jo in t action against any G reat Pow er which tried to occupy an y Balkan te rrito ry under T u rk ­ ish suzeraignty. T his was obviously aim ed a t A ustria. H artv ig . T hus there was a lull in th e negotiations. T he o th er articles were concerned w ith th e mode of ratification of the tre a ty and provided for th e conclusion of a m ilitary convention. loc. T h e territorial claims were defined as follows: th e te rrito ry north and w est of the Shar M ountains. 24-26. th e Archipelago. 50. . In th e secret annex to th e tre a ty it was agreed th a t all territo ry won by th e allies was to be adm inistered a t first by a condom inium bu t was to be liquidated according to the arrangem ents of th e tre a ty within three m onths after th e conclusion of peace. w orked hard to bring ab o u t an agreem ent.. th e in term ediate regions of M ace­ donia “ lying betw een th e S h ar M ountains and th e R hodope M oun­ tains. I t was also provided th a t the two parties should not conclude peace except jo in tly (article 3) and th a t a th ird p a rty could be ad m itted into th e alliance a fter a prelim inary understanding between th e original signatories (article 7). Gueshoff.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 163 (Ionian autonom y and th e B ulgarian governm ent alw ays had the M acedonian R evolutionary com m ittees to consider.. 28 T ext in Gueshoff. op. th e te rrito ry east of th e Rhodope M ountains and the S tru m a R iver to B ulgaria.

.29 In order to give the tre a ty additional solem nity it w as signed not only by th e m inisters b u t b y th e sovereigns of the two states. im proved th e education system and in general rejuvenated th e country. while th e unassigned portion was to be sub­ je c t to th e a rb itra tio n of th e T sa r. “ Venizelos cam e to see me a t 11 P. . cit. 30 T exts in Gueshoff. . 74ff. D iplom atic relations w ith R oum ania were resumed in 1911 and Bulgarian stu d en ts received a w arm welcome in A thens. op. particu larly in view of th e recent loss of B osnia-H erzegovina. Greece sought to o btain C rete in retu rn for lending sup p o rt to T urkey.” 3 2 39 T ext in ibid..M . In reaction to this sta te of affairs a M ilitary League was formed which gained control of th e governm ent and b rought Eleutherios Venizelos from Crete. . and when Bulgarian independence was de­ clared in 1908. T his offer was rejected and th e Greeks realized th a t th e Y oung T u rk s would n o t yield C rete w ithout th e use of force. D . cit. however. H istoire diplom atique. . being a C retan. was in no condition to wage war. and the co u n try was to rn by political dissension.M . 117-127. In foreign affairs Venizelos. th e m ilitary forces were in adequate. 56. 136. T he w ay was now paved for fu rth e r inter-B alkan agreem ents. Serbia was to get an additional strip in northern M acedonia. T he governm ent was w eak. An excellent map is available in H elm reich. 57. 114-117. T he Serbo-Bulgarian alliance of M arch 1912 was th e result of a long series of negotiations d atin g from 1904 b u t th e G reco-Bulgarian alliance of M ay 1912 had no such background. In tern ally Venizelos reorganized and strengthened the arm y and navy. reform ed adm inistration. As early as F eb ru ary 26.3 1 Greece. Bourchier.30 T hus a Serbo-B ulgarian accord had a t last been concluded.. In fact relations be­ tween A thens and Sofia had been strained for years because of the M acedonian question.op. 1910 Bourchier recorded in his diary.. and stayed till 1 A . 32 Cited b y Grogan. did not base his policy entirely on th e M acedonian question b u t sought closer relations w ith his Balkan neighbors. IV. A separate m ilitary convention was concluded a t V arna on M ay 29 and a fu rth e r agreem ent betw een th e general staffs was signed in Ju n e and A ugust. T he basis for a Balkan League had been laid.164 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y have th e region around O ch rid a. The L ife of J.. Its im portance is ap p aren t. 31 Driault and Lh6ritier.. A t the end of April th e T sar notified his acceptance of th e difficult function assigned to him under its provisions. unfolded all his views— even Bulgarian Alliance . T h e tw o B alkan states w ith th e greatest m ilitary pow er and w ith th e m ost conflicting interests had settled th eir differences and agreed on a plan of action. T his proved to be an extrem ely significant step.

74. Geshov was afraid.3 3 On O ctober 16. Grogan.” according to Geshov. b u t even those privileges which had been gran ted to th e C hristian provinces of E uropean T urkey by various in tern atio n al acts. however. particu larly A rticle 23 of the 33 H . 1912 P anas presented a d ra ft tre a ty of alliance. who had form erly acted as B ourchier's assistan t in M ontenegro. I. cit. op. K ing George and Venizelos agreed to this request and D. 1924). the G reek m inister in Sofia. cit. 35 Grogan. were handed by Bourchier Iо a M r. Through T hirty Years 1892-1922 (N ew York. T hen on F eb ru ary 6 Geshov en trusted Bour­ chier w ith a verbal com m unication to Venizelos in which he expressed satisfaction w ith th e G reek proposals and invited additional dis­ cussions. “ In this prelim inary p roject. T his provided for an entente with a view to com mon action for th e defence of th e privileges of th e T urkish C hristians and an eventual defensive alliance against a T urkish a tta c k on eith er p arty . W ith o u t divulging th e contents of th e sealed pack­ age. “ n o t only was nothing said ab o u t autonom y for M acedonia and T hrace. No im m ediate reply was forthcom ing as King Ferdinand was afraid of being. 75. 136.3 6 N egotiations were im m ediately begun and on April 27. T h u s P anas was stalled off w ith th e prom ise th a t B ulgaria was willing to come to th e assistance of Greece on conditions which should be specified in a defensive tre a ty . Panas. was en trusted w ith the negotiations. and who was in structed to deliver them to W ickham vSteed in Vienna. 137. Helm reich. 38. B utler.. op.. T he Russian foreign office was also cool to th e idea of G reco-B ulgarian alliance and N eklyudov em pha­ sized upon th e Sofia cabinet th e necessity of first concluding an alliance w ith Serbia. 361.draw n into w ar over th e C retan ques­ tion b u t in Septem ber Bourchier persuaded Geshov and F erdinand to e n tru st him w ith a verbal request th a t th e problem be p u t on a diplom atic basis. Steed persuaded th e Bulgarian m inister in V ienna to send a special courier to Sofia and a t th e end of April 1911 Geshov received the G reek proposal. . 1911 Panas inform ed G eshov th a t th e G reek gov­ ern m en t was read y to prom ise aid to B ulgaria in case of an a tta c k by T urkey .B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 165 N um erous such talk s were held b y Venizelos and Bourchier during the w in ter of 1910 and th e spring of 1911 u ntil an alliance plan was evolved w ith th e consent of th e king.. cit. op. if B ulgaria in tu rn would reciprocate if Greece were attack ed by T urk ey . 360. W ickham Steed.3 4 N othing fu rth er was done u n til th e Serbo-Bulgarian tre a ty had been alm ost concluded. 34 Gueshoff. cit. op. to gether w ith long letters to Geshov and K ing F erdinand. th a t once th e alliance was signed Greece would ad o p t a reckless policy in C rete and drag Bul­ garia into a w ar w ith T urkey. T h is proposal..

37 Geshov. cit. Geshov states th a t this omission was due to lack of tim e b u t actually when the Greeks had sought to obtain a territo rial delim itation in M acedonia. IV. Sig­ nificantly enough it differed from the Serbo-B ulgarian accord in th a t it had no provisions regarding th e division of te rrito ry . 2779. . 80. . 40. 1875-1891). th e Bulgarians had refused to prom ise m ore th a n Crete and the Aegean Islands. op. T ext in E. five days a fter general m obilization had been ordered in each country. cit. In addition to th e purely m ilitary clauses it was provided th a t if one p a rty were attack ed by a third state other than T urkey. . 40 D riault and Lheritier.166 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y T re a ty of Berlin were passed over in silence. op.40 36 Gueshoff. op. H ertslet. In article six th e restriction w ith regard to C rete was m odi­ fied: “ If a fter Bulgaria and Greece have mobilized or commenced a jo in t war. stu ck to his dem and until Panas yielded and on M ay 30. The M a p of Europe by T reaty (London. 1912 th e tre a ty was signed.. and. Gueshoff. in consequence of th a t action is attack ed by T urkey. V. then th e oth er p a rty would be bound to friendly n eu trality (article 4). T he Greeks a t first also refused to agree to a clause recognizing the rig h t of Bulgaria to go to w ar for th e rights of th e T urkish C hristians based on treaties on the ground th a t the B ulgarians were thereb y providing for M acedonian a u ­ tonom y by falling back on article 23 of th e T re a ty of Berlin.38 T he m ilitary convention foreseen b y th e tre a ty was not concluded until O ctober 5. In addition the tw o states should a c t jointly in th eir relations w ith T urkey and the G reat Powers and should m ake jo in t representations to th e Porte for th e protection and defence of th e G reek and Bulgarian popula­ tions in T urkey. however. 127-130. In an annex the alliance was declared inoperative in th e case of a w ar arising betw een Greece and T urkey over th e a d ­ mission in th e G reek parliam en t of C retan deputies ag ainst the wishes of T u rk ey . I t provided first th a t if eith er of th e signatories were atta ck e d by T u rk ey th e o th e r would come to its aid (article 1). . b u t th is was rejected by Panas.” 3 6 Geshov therefore objected and suggested a form ula providing for M acedonian au to n ­ omy. the la tte r country should find itself obliged to settle the C retan question in accordance w ith th e wishes of th e in h a b itan ts of C rete. B ulgaria und ertak es to assist Greece. 38 T ext in Gueshoff. In this m an n er a G reco-Bulgarian tre a ty was finally signed. cit. 130-133..” 39 By this clause th e w ay was prepared for p recip itatin g w ar b y the adm ission of C retan depu­ ties to the G reek p arliam en t a fte r M ontenegro had sta rte d hostilities. H istoire diplom atique. 3 3T e x t. 37 T his article provided that laws sim ilar to the Organic Law of 1868 for Crete be introduced into th e other parts of T urkey in Europe for which no special organiza­ tion had been provided b y the treaty. 38... ibid.

on th e one side. .” Berliner Monatshefte. On O ctober 16.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 167 T he last of these B alkan agreem ents were th e alliances of M onte­ negro w ith Serbia and B ulgaria. T he re­ sults of these exchanges are n o t know n. 43 C. who had a long ta lk w ith F erdinand and conveyed a reply to Nicholas via the M ontenegrin envoy in T rieste. b rought th e tw o countries together and both protested against th e A ustrian action. T he Bosnian Annexation crisis. T w enty Years of Balkan Tangle (London. 44 E . C onversations were begun in V ienna. cit.42 T his Serbo-M ontenegrin friendship rapidly evaporated. Durham . p articu larly since Nicholas had hoped to succeed (lie Obrenovich line. was probably n o t com m itted to w riting. 223. betw een Nicholas and his prim e m inister. I t has already been noted th a t th e relations betw een th e O brenovich d y n a sty and Prince Nicholas of M ontenegro were never very cordial because of th e rivalry for the leadership of th e Yugoslavs. In Ju n e of the next year Nicholas sent a le tte r to K ing F erdinand through th e D utch correspondent. Baron de K ruyff. V ukovich concluded an agreem ent which provided for close cooperation betw een th e two countries and for a fu rth e r tre a ty and m ilitary convention to be draw n up a t a later d a te . 260. 80-83. however. Nicholas th en tu rn ed to A ustria and offered an offensive and defensive alliance b u t was rejected. Rappaport. and 41 A. 1920). 42 H elm reich. however. T he accession of P eter K arageorgevich in 1903 did n o t decrease th e rivalry betw een th e Serbian and M onte­ negrin dynasties. A rriving finally a t Bel­ grade in an anti-A ustrian mood. according to one account. G regorevich. N icolaides. VII (October. 1914). 944. 1929). "M ontenegros E in tritt in den W eltkrieg. 222. Griechenlands A n teil an den Balkankriegen 1912-13 (Vienna. 1908 General Y anko Vukovich left C etinje for Belgrade b u t was arrested by th e A ustrian police on th e w ay a t Agram . however. SerboM ontenegrin relations were still so cool th a t Nicholas was not asked to take p a rt in th e alliance being negotiated betw een Bulgaria and Serbia. K ing Ferdinand a tten d ed in person the festivities con­ nected w ith th e la tte r ev en t and. op.4 4 D uring th e Italo-T urkish w ar M ontenegro offered to aid Ita ly and proposed united Balkan action b u t Ita ly refused for fear of in­ volving th e whole Balkans. however. the M ontenegrin and Bulgarian kings agreed th a t M ontenegro should obtain th e w estern third of th e S an jak of N ovi-B azar if T urkey ceded it of her own free will or under duress.4 1 R elations becam e p articu larly strained in October 1907 when a plot for the m urder of Nicholas was uncovered which had connections w ith some circles in Belgrade.43 T he agreem ent.. when evidence of a Serbian plot against Nicholas was uncovered in the spring of 1910 and when in O ctober 1910 Nicholas assum ed th e royal title.

b u t a t th a t time circum stances had prevented them from taking action. b u t th e following oral agreem ent was reached: 1. also cam e to some agreem ent w ith Greece b u t it appears to have been of a defensive and oral n a tu re . cit. 41. On this oc­ casion circum stances were more favorable. According to Helm reich a copy of this tre a ty is to be found in th e Serbian ar­ chives b u t it has never been com pletely published. IX (M arch. 2. f. 3. 32 .. 84-88. In the first place th e Balkan states were now m uch more powerful th a n in th e eighteen sixties and th e O ttom an E m pire was relatively weaker. M ontenegro agreed to involve as g reat a num ber of T urkish troops as possible.. op. op. 88.. 47 Ibid. some portions of it were declared disputable and a rb itra tio n was left to one of th e other Balkan rulers. 42. No w ritten agreem ent was signed. while Greece and Serbia had no arm ed forces w orthy of th e nam e. the Balkan states had succeeded in banding together. Postponem ent of the beginning of th e w ar was to be perm itted if Bulgarian prep aratio n s were no t com pleted in time. the very existence of R oum ania was th re a t­ ened by internal dissension. Once before. As regards th e S anjak.” Fortnightly Review. cit. . M ontenegro was to retain all te rrito ry conquered by her forces.168 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is to r y K ing F erdinand and Geshov on th e other. M ontenegro n o t later th a n th e 28th of Septem ber and Bul­ garia n o t later th an one m onth a fter th e M ontenegrin a c tio n . 89. T his verbal agreem ent was therefore of an offensive character designed to s ta r t hostilities by prelim inary action on th e p a rt of M ontenegro. H istory of its F orm ation. 1913).46 I t was app aren tly sim ilar to the B ulgaro-M ontenegrin T re a ty and was directed against A ustria and T urkey. 4.000 francs during every m onth of th e w ar. 37. Gueshoff. 1912 the last of this series of Balkan alliances was concluded in Sw itzerland betw een Serbia and M ontenegro. I t m ight be noted fu rth er th a t M ontenegro. op. to be followed by th e o th er Balkan powers. T he m ost im p o rtan t prob­ lems were financial aid to M ontenegro and te rrito rial com pensation. b u t also political and m ilitary conditions w ithin T u rk ey were chaotic. In M arch 1911 the 46 М . in th e eighteen sixties. H elm reich.. Bulgaria agreed to pay M ontenegro 70.47 W ith these M ontenegrin agreem ents th e second B alkan alliance system had been com pleted. in all probability. A t th e tim e of the first B alkan league th e Bulgarian sta te had no t y et been form ed. 46 Helm reich.. “T he Balkan League. f. 430-440. B oth sides pledged them selves to begin w ar w ith all their forces. 5. By 1912 the Balkan countries had not only b u ilt up efficient m ilitary establishm ents.4 6 On O ctober 6. cit.

T o add to th e difficulties th e in tern al political situation was unstable. T h u s even Ignatiev. 99. A new m inistry was es­ tablished in C onstantinople b u t nothing was accom plished because of th e unrelenting opposition of th e C om m ittee to all governm ental policies. as was the case in 1866.49 By 1912 th e diplom atic situation was com pletely altered. On th e n ext d ay Russia and A ustria issued th e agreed w arning to th e B alkan sta te s to th e effect 48 Ib id .4 8 A second ad v an tag e which the B alkan sta te s enjoyed during this period was th eir favorable position w ith respect to th e G reat Powers of Europe.. I t now was necessary for every G reat Pow er to consult its allies and even th e members of th e opposing cam p before m aking a n y move. a n ­ tagonized b y th e a rb itra ry measures em ployed during th e election and em boldened by clandestine M ontenegrin aid. 100. who had striven so earnestly to unite th e Balkan states. and they lost no t ime in seizing th e o p p o rtu n ity to tu rn ag ain st T u rk ey. T he A lbanians. A few m onths la te r T u rk ey found herself a t w ar w ith Ita ly over Tripoli. for a m utiny broke ou t am ong th e troops sent to restore order. B u t th is m ajority proved valueless. took it for g ranted th a t no move could be m ade unless A u stria ’s a tte n tio n was absorbed elsewhere.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 169 Albanians. . to change in the B alkan status quo was sufficient to check an y concerted an ti-T u rk ish action. . th ere were ab o u t lifty thousand new and untrained recru its in the arm y. re ­ volted against th e rigid centralization policies of th e Young T urks. 92. T his tim e th e uprising was n o t crushed. book IV. form erly th e chief props of T urk ish rule in Europe. T hus the situation was ideal for action by th e B alkan allies. 9 0 -1 0 2 . such as A ustria. In April 1912 elections were held and by d in t of coercion and bribery th e C om m ittee of Union an d Progress obtained 215 o u t of 222 seats. book III. B u t th e division of Europe into tw o hostile cam ps m eant th a t a n y in tervention in Balkan affairs was bound to have continent-w ide repercussions. it was O ctober 7 before a policy could be worked o u t Ihat m et th e approval of all th e Powers. of keeping the Balkan states in check. M oreover th e stren g th an d m orale of th e arm y was seriously underm ined by these political squabbles. revolted once again in M ay. 49 Izvestiya (1914). m ilitarily speaking.i nd were induced to lay down th eir arm s only by prom ises of reform . In th e eighteen sixties th e opposition of a G reat Power. with th e resu lt th a t when m obilization took place. A ustria-H u n g ary was still opposed to th e partitioning of E uropean T u rk ey and was still capable. In an effort to get rid of unreliable elem ents th e governm ent conducted a wholesale purge. T h u s al­ though Berchtold on A ugust 13 was th e first to propose th a t an a t­ tem pt be m ade to secure reform s from T u rk e y and to restrain th e lialkan states.

On th e sam e day M ontenegro declared w ar on T u rk ey and was speedily joined by her allies. . ch. book III. op.6 1 Since w ar did n o t follow. th e S an jak of N ovi-B azar and the n orthern p a rt of A lbania. Serbia and Greece joined M ontenegro in th e w ar against T urkey.170 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y th a t if w ar broke out. T he G reeks drove northw ard. T h e dele­ gates of th e belligerent powers m et a t London to draw up a peace tre a ty w ith th e assistance of representatives of th e six G reat Powers. 108. cit. he did n o t believe th a t B ulgaria would come to th e aid of Serbia in case of an a tta c k b y A ustria. when th e Serbo-Bulgarian tre a ty was ab o u t to be ratified. V I -I X . In fact. Enver Bey executed a coup d'etat a t C onstantinople which again p u t the 60 A detailed account of the steps to war is given in Helm reich.. half a cen tu ry later. race rivalries will reappear and nothing stable will be built in th e Balkan Peninsula until m any y ears have elapsed. his sta te m e n t was proven prophetic. despite th e provisions of th e tre a ty . 61 Izvestiya (1914). T hus once th e w ar had sta rte d and th e T u rk s had been defeated. estranged from A u stria-H ungary since th e Bosnian Crisis. 1913. Pashich frankly told his colleagues th a t he had no faith in F erdinand and th a t. desired a bloc th a t would su p p o rt her in th e N ear E a st ag ainst th e D ual M onarchy. besieged Jan n in a and occupied Salonica. I t is inevitable th a t once th e struggle w ith th e T urks is ended. T he Serbs sw ept over th e whole upper valley of th e V ardar. no modifications of th e territorial status quo would be to lerated. I t was too late. B u t sufficient un to th e d ay is th e evil thereof. M u tu al tru s t or an y conception of some sort of a Balkan federation never entered into th e picture. T he Bulgarians invested A drianople and ham m ered th e m ain T urkish arm y back through T hrace to w ithin a few miles of C onstantinople. while the M ontenegrins surrounded the fortress of Scutari. W hen Bulgaria. T h e history of th is tragic debacle is well known and th e details need n o t be repeated.60 A t the tim e of th e form ation of th e first Balkan League Ignatiev had com m ented as follows: B u t we m ust n o t have any illusions ab o u t th e sincerity and stability of th e e n ten te. The B alkan states had been able to unite in 1912 only because of th e short­ sighted policies of th e Y oung T u rk s and because Russia. th ey surprised all b u t a few well-informed experts by the rap id ity an d com pleteness of their vic­ tories. Now. th e accuracy of his analysis was n o t tested. Confronted by these disasters th e hard-pressed P o rte applied to th e Powers for m ediation and an arm istice was concluded on D ecem ber 3. there was nothing left to hold th e League together and it dissolved into w arring factions. Some progress had been m ade when on Ja n u a ry 23. N or had th e allies definitely settled th eir d ivergent claims in M acedonia.

X . . T he question was a rb itra te d by a conference of th e G reat Powers and a very small b o u n d ary rectification was finally granted. reinforced by Serbian contingents.X V . Sim ilarly th e tre aty betw een Greece and Bulgaria had said nothing of M acedonia and both states were now laying claim to th e Salonica area. op. A p a rt of th e te rrito ry which in th e original Serbo-Bulgarian tre aty had been assigned to Serbia was now reserved for th e new Albania. cit. I t was agreed th a t no sep arate tre a ty would be concluded 61 Helm reich. T he problem was how to divide the spoils. Under pressure of repeated reports of skirm ishes w ith B ulgarian forces in M acedonia. Finally on May 30. 1913 th e T re a ty of London was signed b y which the island of C rete and everything west of th e E nos-M edia line were ceded to Ihe allies and th e questions of A lbania and of th e Aegean Isles were left in th e hands of th e Pow ers. M oreover Roum ania. dem anded a p a rt of th e D obrudja which had rem ained in th e han d s of B ulgaria a fter the ( 'ongress of Berlin. The Belgrade an d Sofia governm ents were rem inded of th e stipulation in the Serbo-B ulgarian tre a ty providing for Russian a rb itratio n in ease of failure to a tta in agreem ent by d irect negotiation. therefore.. In c o n tra st A ustria strove to d isru p t th e B alkan League by bringing together Bulgaria and R oum ania. T h e Serbs accordingly dem anded a larger share of M ace­ donia and this th e Bulgarians indignantly refused. th e tw o countries on Ju n e 1st signed a tre a ty of alliance. R ussia was anxious to preserve th e u n ity of the League and was concerned. w ith th e T u rk s retaining nothing b u t C onstantinople and its im m ediate environs. th e peace con­ ference broke up. A new arm istice was signed. T h u s on F ebru ary . ch. R oum anian statesm en blam ed A ustria for th e failure to ob­ tain greater com pensation and they continued th eir h ostility to Bul­ garia. T he Greeks successfully storm ed Jan n in a on M arch 6 while th e M ontenegrins b y April 22 had starved S cutari into subm ission.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 171 bellicose Young T u rk s into power. dissension now developed am ongst the allies. T hree d ays later th e B ulgarian arm y. renewed its a tta c k upon A drianople and en­ tered th e city on M arch 26. A ctually th e relations betw een the allies d eteriorated rapidly w ith th e result th a t Serbia and Greece drew closer together.6 2 W ith th e T u rk s practically ousted from E urope. as recom pense for her n eu trality . T he situatio n was fu rth er com plicated by th e conflicting policies of th e Powers. T his proved unsuccessful as th e B ulgarian governm ent believed th a t its differences w ith Serbia and Greece could he settled peacefully and therefore refused fu rth er concessions to Roum ania. b y th e inter-allied differences.

Serbia and Greece to come to St. afte r your declaration I com ­ . would join Serbia.” was so incensed by this sharp action th a t he washed his hands of Bulgaria. now rashly despatched the fateful telegram term inating th e negotiations. R oum ania refused to com m it herself in advance b u t th e M ontenegrin foreign m inister announced on Ju n e 27 th a t in case of w ar betw een Bulgaria and Serbia. T h e situation reached such a sta te th a t on Ju n e 8 the T sa r sen t a personal telegram to th e B ulgarian and Serbian statesm en advising them to ask for th e a rb itra tio n foreseen by th e alliance tre a ty . Petersburg where all pending questions could be settled. M ontenegro. in accordance with alliance obligations entered upon th e previous year. T he Bulgarian prim e m inister. Should B ulgaria refuse and w ar thereupon ensue. the w ay was paved for T urkish intervention a t a later date. M oreover G reek troops were being transferred as rapidly as possible to M ace­ donia w here frequent clashes were occurring w ith B ulgarian forces which were being shifted from th e C h atalja lines. Accordingly a re­ quest was m ade th a t R ussia should m ake th e aw ard w ithin seven days. were now dem anding th e whole of M acedonia. T he Bulgarian governm ent was now pressed by its general staff which. who was suffering from a “severe gastric a tta c k com plicated by kidney tro u b les. T he stage was now set for the fratricidal war. N ot only were S erbia’s claim s in M acedonia rejected b u t some Bulgarian statesm en. Because of a m isunderstanding Sazonov did n o t ta k e cogni­ zance of th is request.172 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y w ith B ulgaria regarding th e p artitio n of th e newly-won territories. B oth replies were evasive b u t th e Russian foreign m inister. although no definite agree­ m en t was reached. N ot only did th e Serbs and th e Greeks negotiate an alliance between them selves b u t they also set o u t in realistic fashion to win th e support of th e other B alkan states. “ Now. w ith considerable popular support. Bulgarian relations w ith Serbia were even worse th a n those w ith Greece. Sazonov. invited th e m inister presidents of Bulgaria. th e tw o sta te s were to aid each o th e r w ith all their forces. E ven T u rk ey was approached and. dem anded eith er action or dem obilization w ithin ten days. because of the growing restlessness of th e arm y. Sazonov. Venizelos did begin short-lived negotiations w ith th e B ulgarian m inister a t A thens. and th a t a com mon Greco-Serb frontier would be draw n in th e area w est of th e V ard ar River. D anev. th e two Powers engaged to ask for the m ediation or a rb itra tio n of th e T riple E n te n te or of other E uropean Powers. If there should be disagreem ent w ith Sofia over th e delim itation of th e frontiers. b u t he was restricted by the signed agreem ent w ith Serbia.

including both A drianople an d K irk-K ilisse. however. In o th er words. A few weeks later (Septem ber 29) Bulgaria and T u rk ey signed a I reaty by which T u rk ey regained th e g reater p a rt of T hrace. E nver Bey reentered A drian o p le. T h e general staff assured th e Kovernment th a t th e arm y was read y for action. ch. Finally on A ugust 11 th e am b as­ sadors of th e G reat Powers com pleted th eir arrangem ents for an independent A lbania. B oth Serbs and G reeks won easy victories. ibid.6 4 T he effect of th e T re a ty of B ucharest on inter-B alkan relations is not difficult to surm ise. and th e g reater p a rt of th e coast of M acedonia. although Serbia evacuated th e territories she had occupied only after an u ltim atu m from A ustria. T he a tta c k . including th e city of M onastir. injured. ib id .. “ D etails. w ith the knowledge and a p p a re n t approval of D anev. and answ ered th e Bulgarian "d em o n stratio n ” w ith a declaration of war. ordered G eneral Savov to a tta c k th e Serbian and G reek lines in M ace­ donia. seems to have been intended as a m eans of strengthening B ulgaria’s position in th e settlem en t which was to come through th e m ediation of Russia. Serbia was g ran ted n o rth and central M acedonia. . ( -reece received Salonica. Public opinion in B ulgaria was strongly for war. and despoiled of w h at she believed be** C ited. X V I -X I X . R oum ania was allowed to keep a generous slice of th e D o b ru d ja. 361. Sazonov refused to m ake any m ove and th u s Bulgaria was left to her fate. On Ju n e 28 K ing Ferdinand. which took place on th e night of Ju n e 29-30.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 173 m unicate ours to you! Do n o t expect an y th in g from us. T h e M acedonian groups even threatened D anev and K ing F erdinand w ith assassination if th ey accepted a rb itratio n a t St. P etersburg. and Bulgaria retained only a sm all portion of M acedonia as th e rew ard for her efforts during th e first war.. and th e R oum anians occupied th e D obrudja. K avalla. T he Serbians and th e Greeks. A ttack ed from all sides. B u t events had now gone too far. On Ju ly 10 R oum ania also declared w ar on Bulgaria and tw o days later T u rk ey followed suit. th e advance was considered a political d em onstration ra th e r th a n a m ilitary m easure. B ulgaria was in­ capable of p u ttin g up serious resistance. V iscount G rey sum m arized the results as follows: II left B ulgaria sore. seized th e o p p o rtu n ity . and forget the existence of an y of our engagem ents from 1902 until to d a y .” 5 3 D anev was greatly upset b y th is com m unication and a ttem p te d Iо mollify Sazonov. On Ju ly 31 an arm istice was concluded and on A ugust 10 peace was signed by th e C hristian state s a t B ucharest. M ontenegro extended her frontiers lightly u ntil th ey touched Serbia.

B ulgaria and T u rk ey . while Greece. sought to organize a counter-league. and if possible. Thus inter-B alkan relations during this period were the p ro duct of the h atred s and rivalries engendered by the B alkan W ars. to T urkish rule in E urope. A fter th e T re a ty of B ucharest th e situ atio n was com pletely altered.6 6 Such was th e storm y history of the second Balkan League. was also sore and despoiled. Tw enty Five Years. and T urkey. 1931). while Greece and R oum ania were sym p ath etic to Serbia or to th e W estern Pow ers. 66 A detailed analysis of this period is to be found in M . had strained RussoBulgarian relations and culm inated in the establishm ent of th e Austrophil R adoslavov governm ent. . T he new cabinet prom ptly proposed “ Grey. A ustria. and in H. nothing constructive had been accom ­ plished. T he Balkan League was sm ashed. there were tw o Powers. and R oum ania were equally determ ined to m aintain th e status quo. A D iplom atic H istory 19131923 (Norm an. 1925). Russian diplom acy during the B alkan W ars. to bring ab o u t a reconciliation between Bulgaria and Serbia. 1802-1916 (N ew York. Greece. T his disunity was heightened by th e G reat Powers and especially by A ustria and Russia. T h u s when th e g reat w ar cam e a year later. Viscount of Fallodon. of course.174 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y longed to her. In o th er words R ussia was seeking to recreate a Balkan League u nder her auspices and th u s to elim inate A ustrian influence in th e Balkans. I t had enabled th e B alkan states to p u t an end. finally. A ustrian policy was on the whole success­ ful. b u t aside from th a t. In stead th e second B alkan W ar had so em bittered relations betw een th e form er allies th a t conditions in th e peninsula were more chaotic and m ore explosive in 1913 and 1914 th an in th e preceding years. Serbia and Greece. Faissler. I 254. hungering for a revanche and ready to tak e w hichever side would give them a prospect of o b tain­ ing it. Bulgaria refused to accept th e peace settlem en t as final. w ith Bulgaria as its pivot. European D i­ plom acy in the Balkans. Serbia. T u rk ey. b u t also isolate Serbia and paralyze her irredentist agitation. and especially R ussia’s consent to the R oum anian intervention.6 6 In the case of Bulgaria. 60-77. and including Roum ania. For a few m onths in 1912 the B alkan sta tes had been able to present a united fro n t and to ad o p t and pursue a policy of th eir own in spite of th e opposition of th e G reat Powers. U n iversity of Oklahoma Press. and of th e con­ flicting diplom atic policies of the G reat Powers. Howard. N . 1914 (U n iversity of Chicago MS. R ussia strove to prom ote th e closest relations betw een R oum ania. For Serbia was a t w ar w ith A ustria. 1913-Jun e 28. A ny future Balkan peace was impossible so long as th e tre a ty of B ucharest rem ained. T his n atu rally was th e side of A ustria and G erm any. T his would n o t only blast R ussia’s am bitions. A ugust 10. 1936). on th e o th er hand. who pulled the Balkan states this w ay and th a t in th eir scram ble for allies. The P artition of Turkey.

X (1). the R oum anian governm ent refused to consider closer relations w ith B ulgaria or w ith Turkey. B ritish Docu­ ments. 344. 424. I. 339. nos. 1914 Sazonov was able to rep o rt to the T sa r th a t in case of war R oum ania was n o t bound to a c t w ith A ustria b u t would instead “ take th e side which will be strongest and which will be in a position to promise her th e g reatest g ains. R um ors were cu rren t of a secret alliance between Roum ania.68 as well as of bilateral alliances beI ween Greece and R oum ania. <ireece. while T u rk e y was coming more and more under G erm an economic and m ilitary influence. 160-167. 334. B u t th is project failed because of th e dispute over th e Aegean Isles which had been occupied by G reek forces during the first Balkan W ar and which were still claim ed by Turkey.3 4 4 .6 7 In th e o th e r B alkan countries R ussian diplom acy was more suc­ cessful. B. . 1 . 5 1B ritish Documents. T he traditional A ustro-R oum anian alliance had been w eakened by Ausl ria’s su p p o rt of B ulgaria during the B alkan W ars and by th e peren­ nial T ran sy lv an ian problem . 2nd rev.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 175 an alliance w ith the D ual M onarchy. In stead R oum ania drifted tow ard the E n ten te Powers. In th e spring and sum m er of 1914 the Roum anian and Russian royal families exchanged visits and on June 24. cit. cit.0 B oghitschew itsch. In fact th e tw o countries were on the verge of w ar over this 1 . 423.69 and S erbia and R oum ania.. op. N evertheless. 33 9 . '• » Ibid. Serbia and M ontenegro.). op..60 A lthough none of these ap p ear to have been actu ally concluded. Bulgaria rem ained estranged from h er form er allies and was drifting closer to th e T riple Alliance. 175 -495. X (1). 339. 1257. X (1). no. 61ff. T his w as agreed to in principle by V ienna b u t no t actu ally concluded because of B erchtold’s in ­ sistence on a B ulgaro-R oum anian rapprochem ent.7 Faissler. during the w inter of 1913-1914. the reports do reflect th e cordial relations betw een these sta te s and their d istru st and fear of B ulgaria. ed . 335. nor a T urco-B ulgarian alliance had been consum m ated by July 1914.. IX (2). Howard. although neither an A ustro-B ulgarian.. nos. I. The Origins of the World W ar (N ew York. cit. 1934. The T u rk s proved willing to conclude a p a c t b u t m inor difficulties delayed its signing. the R adoslavov governm ent w ith th e encourage­ m ent of A ustria carried on negotiations w ith T u rk ey for an alliance. D ie auswartige P olitik Serbiens. In spite of the urgings of V ienna. 01 S. th e Russian program of a new Balkan League had failed. 1240. 147-157. F urtherm ore. F u rth e r evidence of this pro-A ustrian policy was K ing F erd in a n d ’s au tu m n v isit to Vienna and his acceptance of a G erm an loan on less favorable term s Iban were offered by Parisian bankers. nos. Faissler.” 6 1 In Greece b o th G erm any and Austria were pushing for a G reco-T urkish alliance. op. F ay. and K ing C on­ stantine ap p aren tly favored such an e n ten te as p a rt of a B alkan bloc und er G erm an tutelage.

6 3 In conclusion it is a p p a re n t th a t the T re a ty of B ucharest had settled nothing. Finally th e lies betw een Serbia and the E n te n te Powers were being fu rth er strength ened during these m onths. and dis­ cussions were going on for th e sale of Russian w ar m aterials to Serbia. 65. 1914.. Greek Foreign P olicy 1914-1917 (U n iversity of Chicago MS. th e conflict between th e tw o countries. 66. a federation in th e N ear E ast. G. op. op. 1913 and Ju n e 28. 6 1 See Argyriades and Lagarde. how­ ever. W ith the assassination of Francis F erdinand these negotiations were dropped for fear of unduly antagonizing A ustria. A French loan of two hundred and fiflv million francs was gran ted to Serbia on Ja n u a ry 12. Tints when th e W orld W ar broke o u t there was neither a united Balkan fro n t nor a com m on Balkan policy. Conversely these developm ents in Serbian foreign policy had the effect of increasing the apprehension of A ustria and th u s sharpenini. T h e ou tstan d in g characteristic of th e non-official Balkan federa tion m ovem ent and plans during th e period preceding th e World W ar was th e increasingly wide popular su pport which th ey received. 1914 proved to be b u t a b reath ing spell in which th e B alkan states jockeyed for position in p rep aration for future developm ents. 63 Faissler. A fter th e T re a ty of Hn charest her relations w ith Bulgaria rem ained em bittered. while those w ith Greece and R oum ania were cordial except for m inor disputes over the tre a tm e n t of m inorities.” H e urged th at a Balkan . V II. S erbia’s position was th e clearest of all. K ing Nicholas had sought a p artial union w ith Serbia. R ather. a number of books and pam phlets were published proposing various federation plans.** T h e m ost effective w ork accom plished during these years.6 5 In Feb62 S. postal and telegraph sys tem s. W ith M ontenegro negotiations were being carried on for closer cooperation between th e tw o countries. 1937). Howard. A list of such persons draw n up before 1914 would have looked m uch like a contem porary Who’s Who in Europe. M any of th e leading scholars and intellectuals of E urope actively sought to establish peace and order and. custom s.. each sta te stood ready to throw in its lot w ith w hichever side seemed m ost likely to satisfy th e natio n al am bitions. 3 66 It should be noted.176 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y issue when news arrived of th e assassination a t Sarajevo and 1Inislands question was overshadowed by the general E uropean crisis. 4 -8 . Solution de la question d'Orient. cit. cit. T he period betw een A ugust 10. th at. Chaconas. In an a tte m p t to bolster his regime which was th reatened by financial difficulties and by th e u n p o p u larity of his sons. if possible. however. By June 1914 the Serbian govern m ent had agreed to a comm on general staff and diplom atic corps and to th e unification of th e finance. O utstanding was the work of a R oum anian writer who signed him self “ L atin . as in other periods. was th a t of organized groups ra th e r th a n individuals. ch.

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i nary 1907 a m eeting was held of th e B ulgarians, Greeks, Serbians iiul R oum anians resident in G eneva. R esolutions were passed deiniiincing the T urkish governm ent for its failure to p u t into effect lIn* reform s prom ised by th e T re a ty of Berlin, an d condem ning th e ■lu u v in ists who k ep t th e B alkan peoples separated. T heir recom ­ m endation was autonom y for M acedonia, A rm enia, A lbania, Bosnia ind Herzegovina and the form ation of a B alkan C onfederation which I hey believed was “ . . . alone capable of safeguarding th e common inl(‘rests and establishing h arm ony and eq u ality am ong th e different i ices an d religions.” 66 More influential th an th e above little group of em igrants was the "organosis,” a com m ittee organized in C o nstantinople a t th e bei inning of 1908 by John D ragoum is, then secretary to th e G reek I' г ■ »I ion, and A thanase Souliotis, a lieu ten an t in th e G reek arm y. I 11is com m ittee was modeled a fte r a sim ilar organization which had lieeu founded in 1906 in Salonica to com bat th e Bulgars. T h e Conu n lin o p le com m ittee grew steadily, m ost of its m em bers being '■reek deputies of th e O tto m an cham ber, G reek journalists, meri li.nits, professionals, and officials connected w ith th e P atriarch ate. 11ii(il the proclam ation of th e O ttom an constitu tio n on Ju ly 14, 1908 I lie "organosis” sought to dim inish th e in ternal dissension am ong the • necks of C onstantinople and to check Bulgarian propaganda in I In ace. As the G reco-Bulgarian duel in M acedonia becam e m ore inlense the leaders of th e “organosis” realized th a t only by cooperation mgst the peoples of the B alkans and Asia M inor could peace and Iи i isperity be restored. T h u s w hen th e O ttom an co n stitution was pro■I iinied w ith th e ideal of eq u ality for all races, it received th e support "I I lie com m ittee. D espite th e frau d u len t n atu re of th e first elections I lie “organosis” backed th e Y oung T u rk s during th e reactionary ■"iinter-revolution of April 1909 and then issued a m anifesto urging llie lin e application of th e co n stitution. W hen, however, th e Young l urks sta rte d on th eir T urkification policy th e “ organosis” turned ni'.niiist them . My this tim e th e com m ittee wielded considerable power. I t had "4 .mized the “ G reek Political League of C onstan tinople” and it was publishing tw o weeklies, th e Political Review and th e Tribune of the
I' 'I' i.ition be formed under the guardianship of Italy. N o Balkan power, he argued, lake such a role, while th e other Great Powers were too directly interested in IIn Nr;ir E ast to be acceptable. Italy, on th e other hand, was connected with both nIIIhiicc system s, was situated close to th e Balkan peninsula, and her king, VictorI т. cl, was better acquainted w ith the N ear E ast than m ost m onarchs. Une Unil i'll (ration orientate comme solution de la question d'Orient (Paris, 1905), ch. X I I. Ли imcJit be surmised, this and other individual plans exerted no appreciable inlllh in i'. “ C ited in Journal de Geneve, February 16,1907.

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Nationalities. T he la tte r, published in French, exerted much influence over th e o th er B alkan n ationalities as well as the Greeks. T hus I lie com m ittee now becam e the center of th e C hristian opposition in I lie O ttom an cham ber. I t planned bills and questions, organized ргемм cam paigns and drew up petitions. Identical memoirs were presen lei I to the T urkish governm ent by th e P a triarch ate and E xarchate in favor of th e rights of nationalities and th ey were supported by t h e various C hristian national organizations and by th e press. T h e leaders of th e “organosis” even visited Sofia and A thens in an effort to bring jo in t G reco-Bulgarian pressure to bear on th e P orte in favoi of th e nationalities. T he organization was interested, however, j»ri m arily in furthering cooperation am ong th e C hristian subjects within th e O ttom an E m pire and was no t concerned w ith th e w ider problem of in ter-B alkan relations. T h u s w ith th e o u tbreak of th e Balkan Warn and th e liquidation of th e T urkish possessions in E urope, th e "or ganosis” was heard of no m ore.67 A b e tte r known and more influential organization was the Balkan C om m ittee in London. A lthough th is body was not concerned direct ly w ith the problem of a Balkan federation it was interested in bettering th e lot of th e Balkan people and in im proving the relations ami strengthening th e ties betw een th e B alkan states. T his com m ittee was form ed in 1903 when M r. Noel B uxton conceived th e idea < > 1 form ing a p erm an en t association of public men, w riters, statesm en, historians and travelers, who would form ulate views ab o u t Balkan affairs, create an inform ed public opinion and a ttra c t the support of influential people. T he com m ittee was loosely organized, рон sessed no funds or h eadquarters, and m et in th e House of Commons a i irregular intervals. W ith th e acceptance of the presidency of the bo<l\ by Lord Bryce in Ju ly 1903, it quickly secured the su pport of influ ential people. T h e A rchbishop of C an terbury, several bishops, t h e chief leaders of the nonconform ist churches, the heads of some of t h e Oxford and C am bridge Colleges, m em bers of both Houses of Parlia m ent, m inisters, consuls, travelers, and scholars, all took p a rt in tile opening cam paign.68 T he C o m m ittee’s first problem was th e adm inistration of M ace­ donia. T he general revolt and th e Salonica bom bings of 1903 had a ttra c te d th e a tte n tio n of th e world b u t th e resulting Miirzsteg P rogram m erely p erm itted R ussia and A ustria to act as th e m anda tories of E urope and increased th e conflict of the rival nationalitien
67 “ L ’en ten te balkanique et l’Organosis de C onstantinople 1908-12,” L es Balkans , no. 6 (M arch, 1931), 1-6. 08 For a list of names, see T . P. C onw ell-Evans, Foreign P olicy from a Back Bemli 1904-1918 (Oxford U niversity Press, 1932), 4.

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lircause of th e provision for a fu tu re delim itation of adm inistrative districts. T h e position tak en by the B alkan C om m ittee on th e M acedimian question was presented in a jo in t sta te m e n t issued by Lord Itryce and M r. B uxton in 1904. Knglish public opinion [they pointed out] never approved the of a m an d ate to A ustria-H u n g ary and R ussia to settle th e It.ilium question. . . . T h e tw o Em pires have now had th e field to themselves since F eb ru ary 1903, a whole year. . . . W h at has been the result? . . . T he answ er is nothing. [The solution, th ey maini lined,-lay in] th e ap p o in tm en t of a C hristian G overnor, not himself i Turkish subject, for M acedonia. . . . T h is G overnor should when ii|>pointed be independent of T urkish control, and responsible, not in I In; two E m pires alone, b u t to the six G reat Pow ers.6 9
policy

T his agitatio n of th e Balkan C om m ittee strengthened th e hands и! the Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdow ne, a t a m om ent when Ausi m i I lungary and R ussia were re lu c ta n t to press for the reform s eml и" l i e d in th e M iirzsteg Program . Accordingly he urged the creation of i i ommission which “would be given ad m in istrativ e and executive Iи> wcr and would in th e first instance be instructed to fram e w ith o u t ill Iny schemes for the effective control of th e adm inistration of finance uni ju stice.” 70 In th e m idst of this a tte m p t the governm ent changed uni the m a tte r was dropped. L ansdow ne’s successor, Sir E dw ard 1* i eу , was generally indifferent to th e M acedonian question for fear ih.il any action m ight offend M oham m edan feeling in E g y p t.7 1 By n к л m s of widespread ag itatio n th e C om m ittee was able to induce 1.icy lo seek a revision of th e M iirzsteg Program b u t nothing was mplished because of the a p a th y of th e Pow ers.7 2
1 1 “ ( 'ited, ibid., 9. " I'm liam entary Debates, Fourth Series, C L X X X IV (February 12, 1908), 166. 1 1 Mr. Robert G raves, then British Consul General at Salonica, w rites th at at th e Мни "il had even been suggested to me th at I m ight draw less atten tion to such un|ili i .nil happenings as were recorded in m y m onth ly bulletins reporting band activiI I . , |"ititical murders, and cruelties inflicted m ainly on the innocent in the ruthless '• гм ion of alleged revolt. I could not bring m yself to act on this suggestion, and I ■ in Mined to report undoubted facts as th ey were brought to m y atten tion , although I I in « i hat my despatches would suffer considerable m utilation before their publica........ Blue Books, if th ey were not entirely suppressed, since it was not opportune llinl public opinion should be excited by such tales of horror when England was not Iи■iMii'd lo take a strong line in M acedonia, as she had taken in Crete a few years ■ и (in " ( Iraves, Storm Centres of the Near E ast, 228. " i iniwcll-Evans, op. cit., 10-13; N oel Buxton, “ D iplom atic D ream s and the I nl i i h nf M acedonia,” Nineteenth Century, L X III (M ay, 1908), 729; P arliam en tary I h huh Fourth Series, C L X X X IV (February 25, 1908), 1698. W hile the C om m ittee mini In in bring pressure to bear on the British governm ent, it urged the Balkan states i IIn mime tim e to try to work out som e com m on progam regarding M acedonia, ii it iiinnifesto dated March 18, 1907, th e C om m ittee stated that: “ . . . the chief llli Ini le that has been encountered in th e endeavour both to concentrate British "I In opinion and to overcom e th e unwillingness of the Great Powers to effect a nl 111Inn has been the failure of the Balkan and Danubian S tates . . . to adjust their I 1 ,1 i' i" one another and to agree upon a com m on solution. . . . Should it be possi-

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W ith th e accession to power of th e Young T u rk s and th eir promise of reform from w ithin, th e n a tu re of th e problem was changed. Men of experience such as M r. B uxton and M r. Bourchier were skeptical of th e Y oung T u rk prom ises b u t when M r. W. A. M oore, an em issary of th e C om m ittee, gave a favorable rep o rt of th e friendly a ttitu d e of the non-T urkish com m unities, it was decided to give qualified sup­ p o rt to th e new regime. Accordingly th e C om m ittee first sought to p rev en t new disturbances following th e revolution and sent telegram s to th e In te rn a l M acedonian R evolutionary O rganization and to the Y oung T u rk leader, E n v er Bey, urging peace and reconstruction.7 3 T o fu rth e r this policy of cooperation, M r. B uxton and other rep resen tativ e m em bers of th e B alkan C om m ittee accepted an invi­ ta tio n from th e C om m ittee of Union and Progress to v isit C on stan ti­ nople. T h ey were w arm ly received by th e Young T u rk s who wel­ comed th eir views as indicating th e existence in E ngland of an honest and w idespread sy m p ath y for T urkish liberalism . E urope a t this time, however, w as in th e m idst of th e Bosnian annexation crisis. The Young T u rk s declared a b o y co tt of A ustrian goods; Serbian opinion clamored for w ar; and th e B uxton p a rty , to its surprise, found its activities suspected by th e C entral Powers. Baron Von M arschall reported from C onstantinople th a t M r. Buxton, “who let him self be feted here like a T urkish national hero,” was encouraging T urkish resistance to A u stria,7 4 while A ehrenthal even asserted th a t Buxton “disposed of considerable funds and th a t he employed a large num ber of agents in th e nefarious w ork of p ropagating aspirations am ong the ign o ran t Serbian p o p u latio n .” 7 6 G rey, however, defended B uxton’s activities and inform ed his am bassador to Vienna th a t, “ I have now discovered th a t he [Buxton] told th e Servians not to expect an y sup­ p o rt from th e Balkan C om m ittee for B ritish N aval assistance in case of w ar betw een Servia and A ustria, and seems to have endeavored to exercise a m oderating influence.” 7 6 On his retu rn to E ngland M r. B uxton gave Sir E dw ard Grey a
ble, as th e result of a frank and friendly discussion betw een the S tates concerned, for an agreem ent to be reached, and should the Powers then be informed of th e solution which would m eet the wishes of the S tates m ost closely bound by ties of blood and language to the various sections of the M acedonian population, the C om m ittee is convinced th at such an im portant pronouncem ent could not be entirely disregarded, and th a t a very great im petus would be given towards the long-deferred solution of the m ost vexatiou s question in European p olitics,” H ellenic H erald, I (M arch, 1907), 75, 76. See also ibid., II (February, 1908), 54, 55. 13 Grogan, L ife of J . D . Bourchier, 133; C onw ell-Evans, op. cit., 16, 17. 74 Baron von M arschall to German Foreign Office, Decem ber 5, 1908. D ie Grossc P olitik, X X V I , no. 9329. 75 C artwright to Grey, D ecem ber 23, 1908. B ritish Documents, V, no. 489. See also O .-U .A ., I, no. 768. 76 G rey to Cartwright, January 26, 1909. B ritish Documents, V, no. 533, See also ibid., V, nos. 480, 505.

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sum m ary of th e situation in T u rk ey as he saw it. T here was a possi­ bility, he pointed out, of a retu rn to th e old ways, so th a t he deemed it “ essential th a t th e eyes of th e Y oung T u rk s should be k e p t upon llngland. T h ey are inclined now, to use a slang phrase, to play up to England, and even if we do no m ore we m ay keep them in this sta te of mind, which form s th e necessary influence in th eir reform ing a m ­ bition, w ith o u t risky or expensive sacrifices.” 77 T h e Foreign Office, however, despite an official visit to London of the Y oung T u rk leaders, T a la a t an d D javid, was too h esitating and half h earted in its tactics ;ind B ritish prestige, which had been p aram o u n t a t the beginning of life revolution, gradually declined. D espite this fact the C om m ittee continued its qualified supp o rt of th e T urkish G overnm ent, although not w itho u t grave misgivings. A lm ost from th e beginning th e Young T urks began to divide into Liberals, who favored full representation of all th e races of th e Em pire, and th e N ationalists, who were m uch stronger and who dem anded the rule of T u rk ey by a strictly T urkish party . W ith th e triu m p h of th e N atio n alist faction th e C om m ittee w ithdrew its su p p o rt and reverted to its form er role of critic of Turkish a d m in istratio n .78 As a final effort the Balkan C om m ittee recommended and obtained the ap p o in tm en t, by th e T urkish govern­ m ent, of a commission to assist th e ad m in istrato rs in M acedonia to establish a b e tte r order. U n fo rtu n ately th e o u tb reak of the ItaloT urkish and Balkan W ars p u t an end to these feeble efforts a t reform . W hen the Balkan League was form ed th e C om m ittee supported il whole heartedly. Assured by th e su p p o rt of public opinion and by (he state m e n t of the B ritish prim e m inister th a t “ th e Powers would not oppose the territo rial changes resulting from the victory of the Allies,” th e C om m ittee then devoted itself to a cam paign in London in favor of a peace settlem en t in accordance w ith th e wishes of the liberated nationalities. T he com ing of th e second B alkan W ar p u t an end to these efforts, and th e C om m ittee th en sought to revise the terms of th e T re a ty of B ucharest which it branded as u n ju st and harm ful. “ As for the T re a ty of B u ch arest,” w rote Bourchier to Bux­ ton on Ju ly 28, 1914, “ it is th e fo n s et origo malorum, and so long as it stands there will never be peace in th e B alkans.” 79 By this tim e, however, th e g reat d ays of th e C om m ittee had been passed. T h e first five years of its existence were th e m ost effective.
77 C ited b y C onw ell-Evans, op. cit., 21. 78 For exam ple, a t its annual m eeting, held on Ju ly 17, 1910, the C om m ittee e x ­ pressed its regret at “ . . . w hat appears to be th e undue influence of certain advoi ul cs of racial dom inance in Turkey . . . and th e delay in the establishm ent of equal justice for all races and creeds. . . . ” H ellenic H erald, IV (July, 1910), 120. A year later, how ever, the C om m ittee passed a resolution protesting in the strongest term s и linst the policies of the Y oung Turk governm ent. H ellenic H erald, V (M ay-June, 1911), 50. 7# Cited by Grogan, op. cit., 158. See also C onw ell-Evans, op. cit., 32.

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in

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ist o r y

T h e su p p o rt th a t th e C om m ittee a ttra c te d was so widely represen­ ta tiv e of B ritish national life th a t no governm ent could dismiss its ag itatio n as th e artificial p ro d u ct of a p ropagandist society. The rep u tatio n of th e C om m ittee spread to th e continent where, especially in C entral and E astern E urope, it acquired a legendary fame which lasted to the o u tb reak of the war. However, in th e years ju s t preced­ ing Sarajevo, th e B alkan problem s becam e so inextricably inter­ tw ined w ith E uropean diplom acy and th e conflict of alliances had become so clear and sharp th a t th e effect of public opinion became less an d less. M oreover British diplom ats were generally hostile to th e Balkan C om m ittee and regarded its activities as am ateurish and annoying. W hen th e C om m ittee representatives visited T u rk ey in 1908, th e B ritish m inister in V ienna described Noel Buxton to his G erm an colleague as “ un im becile” who was n o t to be taken seri­ ously,80 while T yrell, G rey’s p riv a te secretary, assured M ensdorff, the A ustrian am bassador to London, th a t B uxton was an honorable and able m an, b u t a visionary, “ an intelligent a ss.” 8 1 I t is n o t surprising, therefore, th a t during the Balkan and W orld W ars th e B alkan Com ­ m itte e ’s stan d for a peace settlem en t based on n atio n ality rights was disregarded.8 2 M uch more effective and significant th a n th e w ork of these vari­ ous organizations was the agitation carried on by the international socialist m ovem ent and especially by the B alkan socialist p arties.8 3 I t has already been noted th a t a few pioneer Balkan socialists had preached the u n ity of the Balkan peoples as early as th e eighteen seventies.84 A t th a t tim e, however, th e in dustrial backw ardness of th e peninsula was such th a t it was impossible to build up a powerful socialist m ovem ent which could influence appreciably th e course of events. By th e first decade of th e tw en tieth century the situation had changed. T he B alkan socialist parties still could n o t be com pared to th e w orking class organizations in W estern E urope, b u t considerable advance had been m ade. A brief survey of this progress will furnish a background for th e anti-w ar and pro-federation cam paigns of the B alkan socialists during the T rip o litan and Balkan W ars. T he m ovem ent was strongest in Bulgaria. A fter the d eath of Botev in 1876 a considerable period elapsed before a definite socialist o r­
80 Von T schirschky to Von Biilow, D ecem ber 21, 1908. D ie Grosse P olitik, X X V I, no. 9164. 81 Mensdorff to Vienna, Decem ber 11,1908. O .-U .A ., I, no. 725. 82 A com plete history of the Balkan C om m ittee is given in L. S. Stavrianos, “The Balkan C om m ittee,” Queen's Quarterly, X L V III (1941), 258-267. 83 A general survey of the pre-1914 Balkan socialist m ovem ent in relation to Balkan federation is given in Khr. K abakchiyev, K u m Balkanskata Federatziya [Towards Balkan Federation] (Sofia, 1914). K abakchiyev w as one of the leaders of the “ narrow” Bulgarian Socialist P arty. 84 Cf. supra, 115-119.

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ganization was established. In 1891 th e B ulgarian Social D em ocratic P arty was founded b u t w ithin a y ear it had disintegrated because of dissension over th e question of political a c tiv ity b y th e p roletariat. I n Ju ly 1894, as a reaction to th e repressive policies of th e S tam bulov governm ent, th e p a rty was reunited an d in th e 1894 and 1902 elec­ tions it won tw o and eight seats respectively in th e Sobranje. T he growth of th e P a rty was seriously ham pered, however, by th a t peren­ nial question which has plagued w orking class parties th ro u g h o u t th e world, nam ely, collaboration or non-collaboration w ith th e p ro­ gressive bourgeois parties. T he final resu lt was a split in 1903 into the orthodox, radical, “n arro w ” Socialist P a rty led by D im itiir Hlagoev, and th e m oderate “ b ro ad ” Socialist P a rty led by Y anko Sakiizov. In spite of this cleavage th e Socialists gained nine o u t of th irty seats in th e Septem ber 1911 m unicipal elections in Sofia (seven “broads” and tw o “n arrow s” ) b u t when th e Balkan W ars broke o u t Sakttzov was th e sole Socialist rep resen tativ e in th e S obranje.8 5 In Serbia, a fte r th e very considerable success a tta in e d by M arko­ vich and his followers during the eighteen seventies, th e m ovem ent declined som ew hat because of governm ental persecution and because of the lack of a large, class-conscious p ro le ta ria t which led to a te n d ­ ency in th e direction of radical dem ocracy ra th e r th an socialism. T he coup d'etat of Ju n e 3, 1903 an d the new co n stitu tio n which guaranteed freedom of th e press an d civil rights stim u lated th e labor m ovem ent greatly. W ithin a m onth the Serbian Social D em ocratic P a rty was o r­ ganized as a regular political p a rty and in the elections of Septem ber of the same y ear a Socialist candidate was elected to the S kupshtina. As in Bulgaria, dissension arose over the question of collaboration w ith the bourgeois parties b u t a split was avoided as the “collaboration­ ists” left the Socialist ranks and joined the Y oung R adical P arty . A fter this th e progress of the Socialist P a rty was steady. In th e legislative elections of A pril 1912 it was very active. M any p am phlets and over 400,000 leaflets on cu rren t issues were d istrib u ted and two Socialist candidates were elected. T h e Serbian Socialist P a rty also aided the ■socialist groups in th e Y ugoslav provinces under T urkish and A us­ trian rule. A dvice, funds, propaganda m aterial and experienced or­
85 A socialist account of th e pre-1912 Bulgarian working class m ovem ent is given in T . T chitch ovsk y, The Socialist Movement in B ulgaria (London, 1931), 9-21; and a com m unist account in Khr. K abakchiyev, “ Bolgarskaya K om m unisticheskaya I’artiya," K om m unisticheskiye P a rtii, 41-71. N um erous articles in the various socialist periodicals are also available, especially on the “broad”- “narrow” issue. J. Sakazoff, ‘Die Spaltung in der Bulgarischen Socialdem okratischen P artei,” D ie Neue Zeit, XX I (1) (1903-1904), 472-475; A. Zankov, “ Der Socialism us in Bulgarien,” Socialistische Monatshefte, (2) (A ugust, 1904), 624-631; S. M anoff, “Ce qui se passe en Buli;arie,” Le revue socialiste, X L V (M arch, 1907), 254-263; Dim ker, “La crise socialiste m Bulgarie,” Le mouvement socialiste, X I I I (M ay 15, 1904), 65-76.

X X X (July-A ugust. . X X V II (2) (August 6. Popowitsch. K ropotkin an d others. and who had a weird conglom eration of ideas based on M arx. M oreover th ey found few to listen to th eir argum ents a t a tim e w hen th e g reat naional concern wasover th e fact th a t more Greeks rem ained under T urkish rule th an un­ d er G reek. Through intrigues. X I (Septem ber 1. th at “ . H erzegovina. then a commercial and m anufacturing center. D .11. . and the greatest of these com es from those w ho should be our com rades.8 6 In Greece the w orking class m ovem ent began in th e eighteen seventies on the island of S yra. Laptschew itsch and Z." Le mouvement social­ iste. Am ong the m ost im portant articles on this subject are M . A la te r leader w ith a firm er grasp of M arx­ ism was N . secretary of th e Socialist International Bureau. G iannios who.S . III (1912).” Mouvement socialiste. Vatis. Blanqui. who had little real c o n tact w ith th e masses. A short survey of th e Yugoslav socialist m ovem ent in the H apsburg Em pire is given in M. P atras. 67-69. 'laropla tov 'EXXtjv l k o v ’EpyartKov K i v i i f i a r o s [H istory of the Greek Working Class Movement] (Athens. K om m unisticheskiye P a rtii. D . M any of its leaders were vain an d am bitious intellectuals who quarreled w ith one a n ­ other.” Bulletin ptriodique du bureau socialiste Internationale. for exam ple. 1911 to C am ille Huysm ans. 1922). D . op. organized the League of th e W orking Classes of Greece in 1908.88 8 1 1 A socialist account of th e pre-1912 Serbian working class m ovem ent is given in D . There is a number of obstacles to overcom e. the G reek Socialist P a rty . b u t a t least a n um ber of working-class political organiza­ tions and trad e unions existed an d exerted some influence in lim ited circles.) T h e standard history on this subject is b y the M arxist writer. 69. One of th e early leaders was th e law yer Platon D rakoules. . called for the “ U nion of the Balkan S tates into a Dem ocratic Balkan F ed eration . “ Der Sozialism us in Serbien. Istoriya Sotzializm a и S rb yi [H istory of Socialism in Serbia] (B el­ grade. “Le socialism e on G rice. especially with the neighboring Balkan countries. K ordatos.” G. personal jealousy. 'I<rrop£a той 'EXXijvucoD ’Eруапкой Kij'ijMaTos. 1911). 21ff. persecuted in C onstantinople by th e Young T urk s.50. (H ereafter cited as B . P opovitch . T op alovitz.1903). By 1912 no Socialist h ad been elected to th e C ham ber of D eputies. our Socialist P arty is still im perfectly organized. bad faith and general ineptitude our work is still in an em bryonic state al­ though our efforts since 1885 in the direction of the awakening of labouring classes and their organization have been unceasing. an d subsequently spread to A thens. Article II of the constitution of the Socialist Centre of A thens. and a year later. and th e Voiv o d in a . K . T utzow itsch. no. cit. X I X (2) (1900-1901). 8 (1912). 87 A ll of these bodies stood for reform a t hom e and peace and cooperation in foreign affairs. 648-654. Bosnia.I.” D ie Neue Z eit. “ D ie Entwicklung der sozialdem okratischen B ew egung in Serbien. Volos and o th er large cities.87 On th e whole th e w orking class m ovem ent in Greece was m uch w eaker th a n th a t in B ulgaria an d Serbia. “Grecheskaya K om m uni­ sticheskaya P artiya” [“Greek Com m unist P arty” ]. 276-302.184 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y ganizers were sent to M acedonia. “Le m ouvem ent socialiste parmi les Serbes et les Croates de H ongrie. Piraeus. fled to A thens in 1911 an d founded the Socialist C enter of A th en s. E. 88 D rakoules him self adm itted in a letter of Ju ly 7. K ordates. who founded a socialist paper in 1885. 1909). Ch.. 101-104. S ee also P. 169-171. 516-522. Dracoules.” A rch ivfiir die Geschichte des S ozialis­ m us und der Arbeiter-bewegung. and in Lapchevich. Proudhon. 1 931 -1 932.” D ie Neue Z eit. Bakunin. Lapchevich. “ D ie sozialistische Lage in Serbien.

II (1881). 1906). 319-327. and th e class electoral system m ade it extrem ely difficult to m ake political headw ay. especially.89 In T u rk ey there was very little w orking class a ctiv ity until the Young T u rk revolution of 1908. especially because num erous governm ental employees. revue annuelle du socialisme international (Paris. X X V (1) (D ecem ber 1. .. et al. I (July. C. w ith th e o u tstan d in g exception of D r.” Jahrbuch fu r Sozialwissenschaft. U nder th e Jewish 88 For the protest of the International Socialist Bureau. “ Le socialism e en R oum anie. R akovsky. and V IIе Congres socialiste international tenu a Stuttgart du 16 au 24 aoUt 1907. 432. and in E uropean T u rk e y th e Jew ish an d B ulgarian. “ Le m ouvem ent socialiste en Roum anie. 1897). W . Jaray. circum vented the law by joining instead th e Socialist P a rty . established a new weekly journal and toured the co u n try in an organizational cam paign. P. 2 (1910). T h e general aw akening accom pany­ ing this event led to th e organization of several unions and socialist groups. b u t th e o u tb reak of the P easant R evolt in 1907 led to such savage persecution th a t the P a rty was v irtu ally an­ nihilated and th e In tern atio n al Socialist B ureau was moved to pass a resolution against the “ invidious a rb itra ry actio n ” and “ crim inal violence” of th e R oum anian governm ent. Rakovski and th e well-known econom ist and literary critic C. Compte rendu analytique public par le secretariat du bureau socialist international (Brussels. Alm anack de la ques­ tion sociale et du centenaire de la rbpublique pour 1892. prohibited by law from joining labor unions. Axelrod. In A siatic T u rk ey th e m ost active group was the A rm enian. M unca [Work]. M arculescu. IV (1886).I . Gh. m uch progress was m ade. Argyriades. In F eb ruary 1910 a So­ cialist P a rty was once m ore organized and th e Rom ania Muncitoare [Laboring R oum ania] was issued th rice weekly. 421-437. E. X (July. X X I (M ay. led to th e v irtu al disappearance of th e p a rty w ithin a few years.S . M alon. C.) 162-164. together w ith th e wholesale desertion of th e leaders who joined th e Liberals. " D ie sociale Bewegung in R um anien. I (A ugust-Septem ber. Considerable progress had been m ade by 1912. The Socialism of Today (N ew Y ork. 493-496. “ Le socialism e en R oum anie.” D ie Neue Z eit. Am ong th e m ost signifi­ cant articles are: P. G. was founded in B ucharest. W alling.” L ’hum anite nouvelle. 181-183. In tern al dissension. “ D ie Arbeiterbewegung in R um anien. 38. N .D . A fter 1878 a feeble social revolutionary m ovem ent with an arch ist tendencies was noticeable in R oum ania b u t it was confined to intellectuals. B. 1897). 1889). A num ber of scattered "circles” were form ed. and in 1909 im p o rtan t railw ay strikes occurred in w hich all races p articip ated . 1908). 353-365. 433.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 185 T h e Socialist m ovem ent in R oum ania was as restricted as th a t in Greece. Its leadership.” L a revue socialiste. was incom petent and untru stw o rth y . C. see B . Mill6. 1916). D obrogeanu-G herea. In Salonica.. “ Le socialism e en Roum anie. 76-81. 313-317.” L a revue socialiste. In 1892 a Socialist P a rty was organized and th e weekly. es­ pecially over th e sta tu s of th e num erous Jewish m em bers. R akovski and a few others. T h e periodical literature on the history of the Roum anian working class m ovem ent a t various periods is especially rich. no. 192-206. In 1905 D r. 1907). had no c o n tact w ith th e masses and exerted little influence. L.” Le mouve­ ment socialiste.

1910. N evertheless it published journals.” Com munist International. 1 1 2 T h e Greek socialists sent no representative but th ey did telegraph their greet­ ings to th e conference. 69. . no.I . 1907). A. no. 1 (1910). G reeks. B enaroya. and T urks refused to affiliate and th e “ F ed eratio n ” rem ained alm ost exclusively Jew ish. 43.S . th e m ovem ent persisted and th e m onths preceding the B alkan W ars were m arked b y increasing cooperation betw een the races in several strikes and dem o nstrations. (Brussels. Before considering th e stan d taken by th e B alkan Socialist parties w ith regard to inter-B alkan affairs.I . . T hus on F eb ru ary 7. th e first of its kind.I . no. T urkey. 83-96. 1 (1910). T h is im p o rtan t conference. In spite of increasing persecution by th e alarm ed Turkish governm ent.d . during th e In tern atio n al Socialist Congress a t S tu ttg a rt (A ugust 18-24. 8 1Propositions et projets de resolutions avec rapports-explicatifs present is au congres socialiste international du Stuttgart ( 18-24 aoilt 1907) . 395. 31-33.. II.. Slovenia and R u th e n ia. no.мтцм. no. In Ja n u a ry 1911 a M acedonian Socialist Congress was held at Salonica and representatives of all th e races were sent from th e v ari­ ous cities.186 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y leader. On the persecution b y the Y oung Turk governm ent.S . R oum ania. 'Ia r o p la той 'E X X jji/iko D 'Еруатшой ’ К. 68. Accordingly it was decided th a t th e Serbian Socialist P a rty should convene a general B alkan Socialist Conference a t Bel­ grade. see Federation balkanique. see B . M ace­ donia. M ontenegro. Bosnia. For the m ovem ent in M acedonia.90 Such was the s ta te of socialism in th e B alkan countries a t th e be­ ginning of th e tw en tieth century. 69. and th e Slavic areas of A ustria-H ungary— th a t is C roatia.тт. th e “ Socialist F ederation” was established in th e hope th a t it would u ltim ately include th e various races of a t least E uropean T urkey. and in general pro­ vided leadership for the m ilitan t working-class m ovem ent of M ace­ donia. n .. H erzegovina. 17 (N ovem ber. 8 (1912). no. was held on Ja n u ­ ary 7-9. 146 (D ecem ber. K ordatos. it should be noted th a t th e in tern ational Socialist m ovem ent as a whole was also concerned w ith th e Balkan question because of its im portance in general E uropean diplom acy.S . 11. 8 (1912). ob­ tained affiliation w ith th e Second In tern atio n al. 1931).).9 2 T he result of the three d a y s’ discussion was th e unanim ous adoption of a series of resolutions 00 For th e m ovem ent in Constantinople and A siatic Turkey.9 1 T hree years later. 65-143. see P . . conducted strikes. 10. K itaigorodsky. 2 (1910). a m eeting of th e Balkan delegates was arranged. B . no. In view of the increasing tension in th e N ear E a st it was agreed th a t common action on th e p a rt of the Balkan Socialists was necessary in order to com bat th e w ar danger. Bulgaria. 13. “T he Labour M ovem ent in T u rk ey. R epresentatives were sent by th e Socialist p arties and groups of Serbia. B . A ctually th e Bulgarians. 1904 th e In tern atio n al Socialist B ureau passed a resolution protesting against th e massacres in M acedonia and urging th a t this region be gran ted com plete autonom y and th a t its various national groups be given full o p p o rtu n ity for d evelopm ent. 1925).

1911).9 3 Som ew hat sim ilar was th e “ Resolution on th e S ituation in T u r­ key” adopted by th e In tern atio n al Socialist Congress a t Copenhagen on A ugust 30. Finally th e secretaries of all th e p arties were in stru cted to keep in close touch w ith each o th e r an d a second conference w as scheduled to be held in Sofia in 1911. S (1910). which is n o t divided b y th e antagonism dividing th e governing v classes. and in B . 1911 the T ripo litan W ar began. A fter denouncing th e im perialist policies of the G reat Powers in T u rk ey an d th e violation of th e rights of union and of strike b y th e T urk ish governm ent. it was sta te d th a t only the socialist program of radical dem ocratic reform s w ithin th e B alkan states (including T u rkey) an d a peaceful e n ten te of th e B alkan peoples.I .S . guardianship. . could effectively check foreign aggression an d establish peace and pro sp erity . 1910. . .B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 187 against th e pred ato ry . “ Our com rades of Ita ly are agreed w ith o u r O ttom an com rades to p ro test under th e nam e of th e com m on interests of th e p ro le tariat.” T h e m anifesto also urged th e T urkish governm ent to ta k e to h e a rt th e lesson of cu rren t events and to satisfy th e aspirations of its national groups and of the w orking classes. it was argued. 237-240. 177. . will co n trib u te efficaciously to th e reconciliation of th e Balkan 93 T ext of th e resolutions adopted given in Appendix E. energetic and consistent cham pion of th e idea of th e solidarity of th e nations of S o u th -E astern E urope. of strengthening th e force of resist­ ance of th e people against th e policy of conquest of E uropean cap­ italism . 94 Sligh tly varyin g tex ts of th is resolution are to be found in H u itiem e congres socialiste international tenu d Copenhague du 28 aoM au 3 septembre 1910. conquest and reaction. by the struggle of th e proletarian class. . no. acting as representative of th e w orking class. has u ndertaken th e im p o rta n t mission of co n stitu tin g itself the m ost conscious. T h e In tern atio n al Socialist B ureau was a t the tim e in session a t Zurich and it im m ediately issued a m anifesto calling on th e workingm en of all countries to oppose th e war. it was stated . Only one w ay o u t rem ained. and. im perialist G reat Powers and against th e reac­ tionary B alkan m onarchies w hich were accused of upholding the I’owers in “ th eir policy of interference. th e B alkan peoples rem ained isolated from each o th e r by artificial frontiers a t a tim e when “ th e triu m p h al m arch of cap italism ” called for economic and political cooperation am ongst th e nationalities. Compte rendu analytique publie p a r le secretariat du bureau socialiste international (Copen­ hagen. T his.. . .94 T h e events of th e n ext few years fully proved th a t these resolu­ tions were taken seriously b y th e ir fram ers. On Septem ber 26. against an undertak in g as crim inal as it is m ad. Social-dem ocracy.” Because of these forces.

b u t it was forbidden by th e a u th o ri­ ties. and instead strong anti-w ar articles were published in th e p a rty p ap er. 113. th e E xecutive C om m ittee of th e Socialist P a rty was in­ stru cted “ to convey fratern al greetings to th e Socialists of Ita ly and T u rk e y . 88 Ib id . 8 (1912)... Further efforts were m ade to solve this problem but th e Balkan W ars broke ou t before a com prom ise could be reached. T h ey are related economically. “ . 8 (1912). T h ey should be related politically.S . . . 88 Ibid.99 86 T ext of th e m anifesto in B .. T h e nations of S o u th -E astern E urope possess all th e cultural condi­ tions for autonom ous developm ent.1 88 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y n ations while w aiting for th eir closer union in a federative organism.4 7 -4 9 .. no. Even th e p a rty of BosniaH erzegovina planned a m eeting.96 I t was decided th a t the B alkan Socialist parties should hold an ti-w ar m ass m eetings th ro u g h o u t th e peninsula on O ctober 23. Socialism will therefore uphold w ith all its influence.9 6 In addition to this m anifesto. 2 (1910). 66. In Salonica a crowd of eight thousand heard local and foreign o rators speak in T urkish. no. th e O ttom an prole­ ta ria t is united in agreem ent w ith th e universal p ro le tariat to fight against w ar in general . and the proposed conference had to be postponed. no. 1911. adhering to th e International Socialist Bureau.. . C roatia. 76. 11 (1913). W hen a second conference had been proposed. and th a t. 45. One of th e resolutions passed a t th is m eeting proclaim ed th a t. D elegates were sent by th e p arties of Serbia. 46. Since this m eant the inclusion of the “ broads. th e idea of th e solidarity of th e B alkan nations and will develop the force of resistance of these nations against the intrigues and aggressions of E uropean capitalism . only a B alkan federa­ tion will enable th e nations of th e B alkans to ensure th eir to ta l de­ velopm ent of culture and political independence. A t th e insistence of the Bulgarian “narrow” socialists. One of th e purposes of th is m eeting was to organize common action against th e w ar. for th e form ation of a B alkan federative republic (including T u rk ey ) and for th e dem ocratization of the Balkan states. . T his prelim inary conference now considered the problem and decided that all socialist parties and groups in th e Balkans. “ .” 97 In A thens the m eeting was addressed by D rakoules and. Spanish and French. th e “narrows” had refused to participate be­ cause the “broads” were to be adm itted. a prelim inary Balkan Socialist Conference m et a t Belgrade on O ctober 18. no. 77. th e “broad” Bulgarian socialists had been excluded from the first conference at Belgrade.” 98 In Bulgaria and Serbia m eetings were held not only in the capitals b u t also in m ost of th e tow ns. . 8 (1912). Bulgarian. . no. 87 Ib id . 112. no. T hese plans were fulfilled to th e letter.I . Bosnia and T urkey. See Ibid. 8 (1912). 80 T he other purpose was to sm ooth the w ay for the calling of a second regular conference. T h e purpose of these m eetings would be to bring pressure to bear upon th e various governm ents and to gain popular su p p o rt for the Socialist program — th a t is.” the "narrows” refused once more to take part. in addition to th e usual resolutions. . 2 4 . should be invited to the second regular con ­ ference. R oum ania.

Several weeks before the actu al o u tb reak of the w ar th ey had fore­ seen th e danger and begun an an ti-w ar cam paign. II. contains interesting information on conditions in the city during the course of the Balkan Wars. 1912.S . 73. and A rchiv filr die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung. 3.i press cam paign again st th e im m inent w ar. 'IcrTopla той ' E \ \ t ) v i k o v 'V . 1 0 2K ordatos. pre­ vent th e oppression of T urkish and A lbanian m inorities and strive for th e fra te rn ity of all the B alkan races. 8 (1912).. T he one exception was in Greece. 100 For tex t.p y а л l k o u KcW/uaros'. B . T he first Balkan W ar began on O ctober 18. 72. T his was more strikingly shown in the next tw o years during th e course of th e Balkan W ars. 1 0 3B . no. As soon as hostilities began. and specific instructions were issued to the Socialist parties of th e various E uropean countries regarding a n ti­ w ar action. including th e A lbanians and T u rk s. T h u s no delegates were sent to th e 1910 and 1911 Balkan Socialist Conferences and sim ilarly iluring th e B alkan W ars th e G reek Socialists rem ained q u ie t. T he Congress was held on N ovem ber 24 and 25. 1912.I . . 391. In th a t co u n try th e Socialists were relatively uninfluential because of in tern al dissensions and because of th e g reat popularity of Venizelos who had won th e su p p o rt of the w orking class by passing various social reform bills. 63-66. 392.” 100 In order to strengthen and unify (lie struggle against th e w ar th e B ureau decided to call an ex trao r­ dinary In tern atio n al Congress a t Basel. in progressive dem ocratization and in close union of all th e B alkan states. 62— 64. however.101 T he B alkan Socialists. T h is report issued by the Socialist Federation of Salonica on A ugust 3. no. oppose th e renewal of old rivalries betw een th e allies.. On O ctober 29 th e In tern atio n al Socialist B ureau issued a resolution ex­ pressing horror a t th e massacres th a t were tak in g place and declaring th a t th e solution of th e Balkan problem lay n o t in w ar b u t. while the Balkan parties were instructed to com bat the w ar. .103 In R oum ania th e Socialist P a rty early in Septem ber began . had no need for such guidance. and on Septem ber 30 thousands of copies of an anti-w ar leaflet were d istributed and mass m eetings were organized in various cities. 9 (1912).102 In Salonica th e powerful Socialist Federation was quickly rendered in­ effective by th e economic dislocation an d unem ploym ent caused by t he w ar.I . .B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 18 9 All th is a c tiv ity on th e p a rt of th e B alkan socialists did n o t a p p re ­ ciably influence th e course of events b u t it does d em onstrate th eir readiness to a c t on behalf of peace an d of B alkan federation. 101 T ext in appendix F. . see ibid. T he parties of A u striaJH u n g ary and Russia were espec­ ially w arned to guard again st th e intervention of their governm ents in B alkan affairs. 11 (1913). . VI (1916).. an d by th e severe persecution of th e G reek arm y of occupalion. “ . no. 1913. including T urkey. .S .

which passed resolutions ag ain st th e th reaten in g w ar an d in favor of Balkan federa­ tion. W h at we w an t. 77. such th o u g h ts would n o t en ter y our h e a d .000 Roum anians in decided by th e v o tes of 45.1 90 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y a m anifesto was issued describing R ou m ania’s relations w ith th e belligerents and calling on th e w orkers to oppose intervention. 10 (1913). no t tu rn against each other to-m orrow as is already sta te d of you in th e press and diplom atic circles?105 D uring the course of his speech Sakiizov was continually interrputed and even th reaten ed by th e o th e r deputies. He denounced th e governm ent for leading th e country tow ards a war which could solve no problem s. no. W e m ust conqun liberty as well as universal suffrage a t home. 22— 25. In Bulgaria th e “ narrow ” faction held a congress a t R uschuk on A ugust 28. leaflets d istributed and th e p a rly press utilized to th e full. One m ore means for opposition rem ained. delivered a defiant an ti-w ar speech before the Sobranje. Sakiizov.. of labor. 106 Ibid .”10* M ost spectacular and effective were th e cam paigns conducted b y th e B ulgarian an d Serbian parties. th e sole Socialist [“ b ro a d ” ) dep u ty . Will you who are allied to d ay . .000. including T u rkey. 7-11. . for a w ork of peace. . On Septem ber 20 th e C entral C om m ittee of th e sam e group issued an an ti-w ar m anifesto and tw o days later p ro test m eetings were held th ro u g h o u t the country. have returned to a state of slavery. D em onstrations were organized. such as “ Sham e on you! If you had a drop of C hristian blood. A fter m obilization was ordered th e ranks of th e p a rty were decim ated.” “ H e ought to w ear an osmen head dress. and added: We do n o t w an t a Balkan C onfederation in stitu ted in view of the war. 2nd supplem ent (1912). 11 (1913). of production and exchange. a w ork of liberty and of prog­ ress. no. no. for the fate of 7. On O ctober 8. w h at we are preparing is a Confederation uniting in fact all th e B alkan nations. a T schalm a. 49. 9 (1912). was th e speech delivered in th e S kup sh tin a on O ctober 7.” B .” On leaving th e Sobranje Sakiizov was atta c k e d by a group of stu d en ts arm ed w ith revolvers and clubs and he escaped only w ith difficulty. when w ar was expected m om entarily and th e excitem ent was a t its height.000 electors. 9. “ To th e present w ar betw een th e Balkan nations and th e T u rk s we oppose our id e a l: A federal republic among all the states and all the nations in ­ cluding Turkey and R oum ania. to continue th e publication of th e p a rty paper b u t it was a t once suspended by th e governm ent. M any ta u n ts were hurled a t him . no. 78. ..I . T h e Serbian Socialists carried on a sim ilar anti-w ar cam paign. An a tte m p t was made how ­ ever. O utstanding in view of later developm ents. 1912.S . we have here in th e interior of Roum ania more than 6 million peasants who. 1912 by 101 T h e m anifesto continued as follows: ‘‘Brothers. exploited b y landowners and the tyranny of th e adm inistration.

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Lapchevich, one of th e tw o Socialist deputies. T his speech is w orth considering in d etail, n o t only because of its rem arkably prophetic character, b u t also because it contains a clear an d specific exposition of th e n a tu re an d principles of th e contem porary Balkan socialist m ovem ent. Lapchevich first em phasized th a t th e Socialists of all th e Balkan countries had been consistent cham pions of B alkan unity. The recently created B alkan League, he added, did no t represent a I rue union of th e B alkan nations b u t ra th e r a tem p o rary com bination formed under R ussian auspices w ith aggressive designs. T h e outcom e, Ilierefore, would be w ar, b u t such a w ar he denounced as wholly un ­ justified in view of th e fact “ . . . th a t th e m ost dangerous enem y is (lie im perialism of th e g reat pow ers.” T h ere still rem ained, he a d ­ m itted, th e problem of th e decadent a n d oppressive O ttom an Em pire. Yet th e fund am en tal basis of th is problem was no t th e inherent incapacity of th e T urkish people b u t ra th e r th eir a n tiq u a ted feudal regime tog eth er w ith th e im perialist exploitation of th eir E m pire by (he E uropean powers. T he population of T u rk ey bears on its shoulders a living and a dead m an: capitalism [i.e. E uropean] which crushes it w ith th e burden of its claims, and feudalism which gives it no possibility of developing i i s productive forces. . . . W ar in th e B alkans can n o t p u t an end to (his situation. If w ar did break o u t, he continued, an d th e T u rk s were driven from (he B alkans, then new w ars would in ev itab ly ensue because of bound.iry disputes which would arise as a resu lt of th e interm ixture of races. "T he Serbians will try to free th eir com p atrio ts from Bulgarian dom ination, and vice-versa, and th u s new conflicts will arise. . . .” I'his in tu rn , he w arned, would lead to “ . . . the in tervention of the I'i'c a t cap italist sta te s . . . and such intervention m ight signify a genci л1 conflagration of E urope . . . .” In conclusion he urged th e Sociali I program as th e only feasible solution: 111st cad of w ar betw een th e B alkan nations which would paralyse our forces and would open th e w ay to cap italist conquerors, we ask: T he developm ent a t hom e of all n ationalities and of all th e counI I ies in th e B alkans; T he building up of th e economic an d cu ltu ral forces; T he union of th e B alkan nations in a fratern al com m unity in th e form of federated and dem ocratic republics for th e w elfare of all th e nationalities in th e B alkans an d for th e resistance of th e oppressive I lowers of E uropean capitalism .106 Steps were also tak en to convene a second B alkan Socialist Con(cicnce w ith th e purpose of strengthening and coordinating the

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anti-w ar m ovem ent, b u t th is proved to be impossible because of the differences am ongst th e B ulgarian socialists and because of th e lack of tim e. T he various parties did succeed, however, in issuing, a few d ays before th e o u tb reak of th e war, th e jo in t “ M anifesto of the Socialists of T u rk ey and th e B alkans.” T h e Young T u rk governm ent was denounced for denying liberty, equality and justice, and for perp etu atin g th e vices of th e old regime. T he Balkan Allies were also a ttack ed for p lo ttin g w ar w ith th e alleged purpose of overthrow ing T urkish rule and a tta in in g national unity. How, it w as asked, could national u n ity be a tta in e d in M acedonia w ith its Bulgars, Serbs, Greeks and A lbanians, o r in th e A drianople vilayet w ith its Turks, Bulgars and Greeks? T h e u n ity argum ent was th u s rejected as “ m erely a p retex t for th e B alkan governm ents” whose tru e aim was “ economic and territo rial expansion." T o th e outrageous ideal of . . . disposing of th e lives of . . . people by w ar, of haggling for th eir rights and th eir territories, we reply by th e declaration of th e im perative necessity, already proclaim ed a t the inter-B alkan and Socialist Conference of Belgrade in 1909,107 closely to unite all th e people of th e B alkans and the N ear E ast in the most dem ocratic form, w ith o u t distinction of race or of religion. W ithout such a Federation of th e people of E astern E urope, national unity is n either possible nor durab le for th em .108 On M ay 30, 1913 th e T re a ty of London ended th e first Balkan W ar. A m onth later, on Ju n e 29, th e second Balkan W ar had broken o u t over th e question of th e division of th e spoils. T his w ar was op­ posed, no less th a n th e first, by th e Balkan Socialists. In Roumania a series of mass m eetings were held in Ju n e and early Ju ly in an effort to prev en t intervention, and on Ju ly 13, the d ay of mobilization, a m anifesto was issued denouncing th e preparations for war. T he pre­ vailing arg u m en t of “ th e peril of a greater B ulgaria” was rejected ан m ere camouflage for a w ar of conquest. Instead of w ar, th e mani festo called for peace and for th e building up of a tru ly free and demo­ cratic R oum ania.109 In Serbia a very active cam paign was conducted against th e out break of a second war. M eetings and dem onstrations were organized, thousands of leaflets were d istrib u ted , and in the S kupshtina the tw o Socialists continually reiterated a three-point program : peace, unconditional dem obilization, and B alkan federation. W ith o u t m uch consideration for th e Agenda, w hether it was a question of m inting, or of railw ay workers, or of new com m unications
107 The date of this conference was D ecem ber 25-27, 1909/January 7-9, 1910. 108 T ext in appendix G. T h e precise d ate of this m anifesto is not available. TinInternational Socialist Bureau published it on October 12 with th e statem ent that il had just been received. 108 B .S .I ., no. 11 (1913), 77-79.

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by rail, th e budget, credits etc., our deputies alw ays addressed the house and com m enced and term in ated th eir subjects by th e three de­ m ands above m entioned.110 Nor did th e Serbian successes in th e second B alkan W ar affect the stand of th e p a rty . If peace is signed a t B ucharest, in our opinion this peace will be only nom inal. If class relations are no t created, i.e., if th e F ederation of the B alkan R epublics is n o t realised, we shall see fu rth er struggles, for all th e dynasties and all th e bu reau cratic cap italist and m ilitarist cliques desire hegem ony. . . .U 1 Although this agitatio n did n o t succeed in p reventing war, it did lead Iо increasing p opular su p p o rt for th e socialist position. On M ay D ay 1913 th e Socialist P a rty received messages of congratulation bearing thousands of signatures from all th e divisions of th e arm y. In M ay 1914 th e P a rty congress was held in Belgrade and th e Bulgarian Socialist, Sakiizov, who was present, was given a g reat ovation. The usual resolutions were passed in favor of internal reform and Balkan federation. A fter th e Congress was ended an im posing dem onstration look place in th e streets of B elgrade in favor of union betw een Bul­ garia and Serbia. In the sam e y ear elections were held and th e Social­ ist P a rty , despite its republicanism an d extrem e anti-w ar stan d , re­ ceived tw en ty p er cent m ore votes th a n in th e 1912 elections— th a t is, an increase from 25,000 to 30,000.1 1 2 In Bulgaria, also, th e renew al of w ar had been actively opposed. On M ay D ay 1913 th e “ n arrow s” issued a proclam ation attack in g the Balkan League as . . . a p a c t concluded, to th e d etrim en t of th e people, betw een the i ulers and th e bourgeoisie of th e four states. . . . W e were told th a t the w ar would realise th e form ula: “T he B alkans for th e B alkan nalions,” b u t instead th e prospects are for inter-allied w ar. . . . T he consequences of the B alkan w ar clearly show us th a t th e enfranchise­ ment, th e independence, and th e u n ity of nations as well as their economic developm ent could n o t and cannot be realised by a war. . . Social progress, national independence and u n ity can only be i <. ilised by a federation of B alkan natio n s.1 1 3 W ith th e o u tb reak of th e second Balkan W ar and th e disastrous defeat of B ulgaria, public opinion tu rn ed sharply to th e su pport of the Socialist program . W hen th e B alkan W ars began th e Socialists had only one seat in th e Sobranje, b u t in th e elections of Decem ber I'М3 they gained 37 seats (21 “ b ro a d ” and 16 “ narrow ” ). W hereas in l lie 1911 elections th ey received ab o u t 25,000 votes, in 1913 th e figure
1 1 1 1 Ibid., no. 11 (1913), 69, 70. 111 Ib id ., no. 11 (1913), 71. 1 1 1 Ibid., no. 11 (1913), 71-76. m W alling, The Socialists and the W ar, 106, 107; B .S .I ., no. 11 (1913), 69-71.

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jum ped to 107,000. M oreover th e Socialist program had n o t been altered in th e slightest, so th a t th e 107,000 voters had, in effect, cast th eir ballots in favor of a republican Bulgaria and a B alkan federa­ tion. M oreover oth er opposition p arties were ready to su p p o rt a bill for th e abolition of th e m onarchy unless their dem ands for radical reform s were m et. T he position of th e crown was precarious, so much so th a t Sazonov asked Pashich w h ether in th e event of th e abdication of F erdinand, Serbia would be willing to intervene to uphold the m onarchical principle. Fearing th e spread of republicanism in Serbia, Pashich replied in th e affirm ative. Ferdinand, however, m et th e d an ­ ger by refusing to call th e Sobranje and by ordering new elections for M arch 8, 1914. In th e face of extrem e governm ental pressure the Socialist v ote fell from 107,000 to 85,000 th a t is a decline of about 20% . No fu rth er electoral contests were held u n til th e post-w ar period when F erdinand, a fte r th e second g reat national defeat, was finally forced to ab d icate.1 1 4 T h is survey reveals th a t d uring th e course of th e B alkan W ars, despite w ar h ysteria an d governm ental persecution, th e B alkan So­ cialist Parties, excepting th a t of Greece, stuck resolutely to their principles. Again and again th ey reiterated th a t w ar provided no solution for th e B alkan problem — th a t instead it would lead to fu rth er w ars betw een th e B alkan state s and probably to th e in te r­ vention of th e G reat Powers and to a general E uropean conflagra­ tion. A lasting settlem en t could be obtained, th ey insisted, only by th e establishm ent of dem ocratic, republican B alkan regimes and by th eir unification into a B alkan federation. T here now arises th e p rob­ lem of ascertaining th e effectiveness of th e Socialist propaganda. T his is extrem ely difficult to do because of th e alm ost com plete lack of d a ta . T here is little doubt, however, th a t th e Socialists had very little influence a t th e o utset. T h e B alkan people n a tu rally looked forw ard to th e liberation of th eir brothers under T urkish rule and th ey hailed th e B alkan League as a m eans of a ttain in g this end. T hus th ere could have been very little response to th e Socialist thesis th a t a w ar by th e Balkan allies ag ain st T u rk ey would bring disaster ra th e r th a n freedom. An indication of this is th e reaction to Sakiizov’s speech in th e Sobranje on O ctober 8, 1912. B ut by th e m iddle of 1913 th e situ atio n had changed. T he Socialists had now been proven correct—a t least in one respect. W ar had n o t brought peace and liberty, b u t ra th e r more w ar and m utual d istru st and h ate. T h e re­ 1 1 4B ritish Documents, X (1), nos. 331, 349; Khr. K abakchiyev, “ Bolgarskaya K om m unisticheskaya P artiya.” Kom m unisticheskiye P a rtii, 73-75; W alling, The Socialists and the W ar, 108-110; C. G. Logio, Bulgaria, Problems and P olitics (London, 1919), 98-105.

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suit was a considerable increase in Socialist influence in Serbia and a spectacular increase in B ulgaria. U ndoubtedly th e two costly wars led m any of the voters to select th e Socialist tick et because of their war-weariness ra th e r th a n a n y enthusiasm for a B alkan federation. N evertheless by 1914 when th e B alkan states were hopelessly divided and feverishly preparing for still more war, th e Socialist p arties had become th e m ost powerful and consistent force in th e B alkan federa­ tion m ovem ent.

C H A P T E R V III B A LK A N F E D E R A T IO N A N D SO CIA L R E V O L U T IO N , 1914-19291 In th e B alkan Peninsula th e W orld W ar was essentially a con­ tin u atio n of the Balkan W ars. T h e second Balkan W ar and the T re a ty of B ucharest had ended th e short-lived u n ity of th e Balkan states. T h u s during th e course of the W orld W ar th ey were unable to pursue a n y common policy and instead, one a fte r an other, they intervened in the w ar on w hichever side seemed th e strongest and prom ised th e most. Serbia, of course, was involved from th e outset. On A ugust 7 M ontenegro joined Serbia. In th e m eantim e T urkey w as passing under G erm an control. On A ugust 2 G erm any and T u rk ey had signed a secret tre a ty to become effective in th e event of R ussian in tervention in th e w ar— a condition w hich already existed when th e tre a ty was signed. T urkey was not ready to enter th e conflict, however, and for several weeks the T urkish authorities am used them selves by carrying on negotiations w ith th e Allies who were ignorant of th e tru e sta te of affairs. T his situation was ended when on O ctober 29 a T urco-G erm an squadron com m anded by the G erm an A dm iral W ilhelm Souchon bom barded several R ussian Black Sea ports. On N ovem ber 3 Russia declared w ar on T u rk ey an d two days la te r B ritain an d France did likewise. Bulgaria was th e next B alkan sta te to intervene in th e war. F or over a year F erdinand re­ ceived bids from both sides and carefully w atched the course of mili­ ta ry events. Finally on Septem ber 6, 1915 he concluded an alliance w ith th e C entral Powers an d on O ctober 14 declared w ar against Serbia. T he failure of th e Gallipoli cam paign, th e defeat of th e R us­ sians in Galicia and Poland, and th e desire for revenge ag ainst Serbia all co n trib u ted to his decision to throw in his lot w ith th e Central Powers. In th e case of Roum ania, her K ing was in favor of joining A ustriaH u n g ary and G erm any, b u t th e cabinet preferred n eu tra lity and public sentim ent was generally pro-Ally. D uring th e first tw o years of th e w ar th e R oum anians h esitated to take sides, b u t th e Allied successes in 1916 on th e French, Italian , Russian, and N ear E astern fronts convinced th e R oum anian governm ent th a t th e tim e had come to en ter on th e winning side. By the secret tre a ty of A ugust 17, 1916,
1 Som e of the m aterial in this chapter has been published in L. S. Stavrianos, “T he Balkan Federation M ovem ent: A N eglected Aspect," Am erican H istorical Review, X L V II1 (October, 1942), 30-51.

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R oum ania agreed to join th e Allies and in retu rn was promised T ransylvania, Bukovina, an d the B an at of T em esvar. T en days later R oum ania was involved in th e war. Greece now rem ained th e only n eu tral in th e B alkans. K ing Con­ stantine, related to W illiam II an d fearful of a B ulgarian a tta ck , favored n e u tra lity , if n o t actu al alliance w ith G erm any. B u t Veni­ zelos, prim e m inister since 1910, believed th a t Greece could a t last com plete her unification b y joining th e Allies. T he resu lt was a b itte r V enizelist-royalist feud which was destined to plague G reek political life for tw o decades. T h e deadlock was ended forcefully by th e Allies in 1917. T h ey blockaded th e G reek ports, recognized th e Veni­ zelos governm ent a t Salonica an d compelled C onstantine to abdicate, on Ju n e 12, 1917, in favor of his second son, A lexander. Venizelos was then called to head a new governm ent, and on Ju ly 2 Greece officially becam e one of th e Allied Powers.2 T hus th e Balkan states becam e involved in th e W orld W ar and once more fought one an o th e r for th e fulfillm ent of th eir respective national am bitions. T he G reeks d re a m t of a new G reat Hellas which would include th e coast of Asia M inor and possibly C onstantinople; the Serbs and R oum anians sought to liberate th eir b rothers under H apsburg rule; and th e B ulgarians were determ ined to sm ash the B ucharest settlem en t and to gain th e whole of M acedonia. T he results of th is w ar were no m ore satisfactory or p erm anent th a n those of th e B alkan W ars. T he A u stro-H ungarian m inorities were freed and th e G reco-Turkish exchange of populations ended a centurieslong dispute b u t Bulgaria rem ained m ore discontented th a n ever. T he harsh term s of th e T re a ty of N euilly left Bulgaria a revisionist state and m ade impossible a n y p erm an en t rapp ro ch em ent between the B alkan governm ents d uring th e post-w ar period. T h u s it was not the governm ents b u t ra th e r th e agrarian parties of th e peasants and the socialist an d com m unist p arties of the w orkers th a t were by far the strongest forces for B alkan u n ity in the years im m ediately follow­ ing th e peace settlem en t. F u rth erm o re, these p arties enjoyed the su pport of a large percentage of the B alkan people and for brief periods were in power. D uring th e w ar years, 1914-1918, th e socialist m ovem ent was disrupted in the B alkans as in th e rest of E urope. A nti-w ar resolu­ tions had been passed a t th e various pre-w ar congresses of th e Second In tern atio n al, b u t when w ar did come, th e socialists split into three main groups, causing th e d isruption of th e In tern atio n al. T he “ rig h t”
3 T h e involvem ent of the Balkan states in the World W ar is described in В. E. Schm itt, The Coming of the W ar, 1914 (N ew York, 1930), I, 418-459, and th e works cited therein.

Van Der Slice. A.3 In th e Balkans th e Socialist P arties were divided by this faction­ alism and in addition they were fiercely persecuted by th eir govern­ m ents. . T he “ le ft” socialists. and in some cases. T h e B alkan p ro letariat sound the alarm for the w orking class and popular masses of the B alkan coun­ tries to ta k e upon them selves the defence of the independence of the B alkan Peninsula. and a fte r m uch discussion. th e m ost im ­ p o rta n t aim s in the p resent im peralist w ar.. International Socialism and the W orld W ar (Cambridge. T h e conquest and th e p artitio n of the B alkan Peninsula and T u rk ey are. T he Zim m erw ald and K ienthal Conferences of 1915 an d 1916 represented a tte m p ts on the p a rt of th e “ cen tre” and “ le ft” socialists to revive th e international socialist m ovem ent. in convening a second Balkan Socialist Conference a t B ucharest in Ju ly 1915. under a regime of persecution and oppression. and this regime provides overw helm ing proof th a t their aim had never been th e liberation of the peoples and the in teg rity of the B alkan countries. The “ce n tre ” socialists denounced th e w ar and refused to su p p o rt it actively. B ulgarian. however. 1941). together w ith the struggle for world trad e. . I t is th eir d u ty and to their in terest to fight for the realization of the B alkan republican federation. accused th e “ rig h t” and “ce n tre ” of betraying the w orkers and dem anded th a t th e w ar should be im m ediately transform ed into a class war. . supported th eir respective governm ents in th eir w ar efforts. T he ruling classes and the B alkan dynasties rule. . . who were num erically th e w eakest a t th e outset.198 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y socialists. T h e situ a ­ tion rem ained chaotic u ntil th e Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 pre­ cipitated th e issue and led to a definite division betw een th e adherents of th e Socialist Second In tern atio n al and those of th e Com m unist T hird In te rn a tio n a l. R oum anian and Serbian parties were present. Fainsod. N ever before has th e peril of the policy of conquest of the G reat Powers appeared so im m inent and so clear. who were in th e m ajo rity a t th e beginning of th e war. 1914-1919 (Philadelphia. 1935). th e subjugated peo­ ples of M acedonia. T he B alkan W ars as well as the W orld W ar prove th a t only an independent union of 3 M . and Peace. D iplom acy. M ass. International L abor. R epresentatives of th e G reek. b u t ra th e r the conquest of new territories. D o b ru d ja and T hrace. obliged to flee before foreign arm ies of occupation. . b u t no p erm anent organization was established because th e “c e n tre ” wished to reestablish th e old In tern atio n al while th e “le ft” under Lenin insisted upon th e creation of a new Third In tern atio n al dedicated to class w ar and world revolution. b u t they preserved th eir p a rty connections w ith th e “ rig h t” and refused to em bark on class w ar. T hey did succeed. . an ti-w ar resolutions were passed and a m anifesto was issued attack in g th e G reat Powers and th e existing B alkan regimes and calling for a B alkan republican federation.

77. Logio. th e leader of th e “ narrow s. 169. Only th e eleven m em bers of th e “ narro w ” group voted for these m otions. for B lagoev attacked Parvus as violen tly as he did P lekhanov. K abakchiyev. b u t like th eir com rades in th e rest of Europe. La federa­ tion balkanique. Blagoev.4 T his strong anti-w ar position by no m eans reflected th e sen ti­ m ents of all th e B alkan socialists. One provided th a t th e B ulgarian Gov­ ernm ent should come to an understan d in g w ith th e governm ents of th e n eu tral countries w ith th e view to com mon action for th e term ina­ tion of th e war. In th e next y ear th e “ narrow s” endorsed th e an ti-w ar m anifesto of th e B ucharest conference. Bulgaria's Problems and P olitics. T hey re­ jected th e anti-w ar m anifesto of th e B ucharest Conference and sev­ eral of them accepted im p o rta n t official positions.” H e did n o t h esitate to a tta c k such o u tstan d in g Socialists as th e Germ an P arv u s an d th e R ussian P lekhanov.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n the B alkan peoples. 235. 78— 85. 'IcrropJo той 'EWijpikou 'Еруапкой Kirfparos. T he o th e r required th a t th e Sobranje should call upon th e p arliam ents of th e o th er B alkan countries to arrange for a com m on defense against foreign invasion and to tak e steps tow ards a B alkan federation. op. . In Bulgaria th e “ b ro a d ” socialists were generally n ationalistic an d backed the governm ent.6 In co n trast. and a few days before B ulgaria’s intervention in th e w ar th ey issued a proclam ation w arning th e people of th e g o v ern m en t’s intrigues and dem anding the preservation of n eu trality . As early as A ugust 1914 he w as w riting in his journal. 1927. cit. w hen th ey urged Bulgarian in­ tervention in th e w ar. 236. will be able to assure th eir lib erty and their in te g rity . 1916. freed from th e tutelag e of any G reat Power w h a t­ soever. 37. F ainsod..6 On N ovem ber 24. Im m ediately a fte r th e declaration of war the p arliam en tary group of th e “ n arro w ” Socialist P a rty published a m anifesto denouncing th e “ tre a c h e ry ” of th e “ B ulgarian bour­ geoisie and m onarchy” an d calling for “ uncom prom ising class w ar” and a “ Balkan federative republic” as th e only m eans of escaping th e horrors of war. March 1. “ Bolgarskaya K om m unisticheskaya P artiya. 154— 157. Novo Vreme [New Tim es ] th a t a general E uropean revolution would follow th e w ar and th a t such a revolution was “ th e only salvation for m an k in d . 1917-1918.” took a stan d very sim ilar to th a t of Lenin. 170. 1914 th e “ narro w ” deputies introduced two m otions before th e Sobranje. “Across th e frontiers we stretch fratern al hands 4 K ordatos. c T h e charge that B lagoev was unduly influenced by Parvus and becam e imbued with ‘‘extrem e R ussophobia” is unjustified. T h ey were all agreed th a t the u ltim ate solution lay in reform and federation as proposed in th e m anifesto.” K om m unisticheskiye P a rtii. 5 A m erican Labor Year Book. II. In fact th e Prem ier himself sta te d th a t th e su p p o rt of th e “b ro ad s” was of th e u tm o st im portance for his governm ent. th ey disa­ greed sharply on th e w ar issue.

9 In other words. these “ rig h t” socialists. D rakoules was so strongly interventionist th a t in Ju ly 1915 he was expelled from his party. . he claim ed for Greece th e Aegean Islands. when w ar credits were being voted in the S obranje. 77.200 S m ith C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y to the w orkers of Greece. VI (February 15. for example. in favoring federation b u t a t the sam e tim e backing the w ar aim s of their respective governm ents. a division on th e basis of the principle of n atio n alities. 16-30. cit. 8 P. Drakoules.” A sia tic Review. found them selves in the 7 C ited in K abakchiyev. 1915). 1915). A ugust 11. Schopov. In fact one of them . Yannios. . and even C onstantinople. . “T h e Balkan S tates and th e Federal Principle. against the annihilation and enslavem ent of Serbia. R oum ania and T u rk e y . Blagoev stated in the nam e of his p a rty : We remain uncom prom ising opponents of a w ar which was forced on the Bulgarian people . E pirus. In consequence of th e above we v ote against the w ar credit of five hundred million levas. . . T o these nationalist aspirations he added a proposal for a Balkan federation of “ th e dem ocratic type. Sm yrna. M ost of them supported Venizelos in his p ro -E n ten te policy and took a posi­ tion very sim ilar to th a t of th e “rig h t” socialists in th e Allied coun­ tries. 1915.” Finally on D ecem ber IS. 113-133. . im m ediately published in th e sam e journal a reply in which he stated th a t th e Bulgarian socialists were equally in favor of a federation. In an article in th e A siatic Review. “G reece. Serbia. M acedonia. b u t only a fte r “ a ju st division of land conquered in th e war.7 In Greece th e situation was essentially th e sam e although much more confused because of th e tendency to em phasize personalities ra th e r th a n issues. we dem and the im m ediate cessation of bloodshed and the conclusion of peace. Social D em ocracy. In spite of various unification efforts innum erable factions continued to exist consisting of followers of D rakoules. T he P arty has believed th a t the unification of the B ulgarian nation was possible only through a B alkan federative republic consisting of all the Balkan countries as autonom ous m em bers. based upon th e solidarity of the productive masses of all th e B alkan coun­ trie s. .” 8 Such a position was bound to lead to conflict w ith th e Bul­ garian “ b ro ad ” socialists who were supporting th e w ar aim s of their governm ent. . M ost extrem e in this respect was D rakoules who favored in ter­ vention in the w ar ag ain st th e C entral Powers and th e creation of a g reater Greece. the Balkans and the Federal Principle. Theodoropoulos and o th er labor leaders. 78. Schopov. energetically protests against annexation of foreign lands and . V II (July. See N ew Y ork Call. op. B enaroya. acknow l­ edging the right of all n ations to self-determ ination and self-govern­ m ent. A. E . 9 A. .” H e then quoted statistics designed to prove th a t M acedonia was predom inantly B ulgarian and should therefore be turned over to B ulgaria. 1915.. .” A siatic Review.

D . 401. L a question d'Orient (Paris. A. Am erican Labor Year Book. th e repre­ sentativ es of th e F ederation insisted on the following points: the evacuation of the occupied territories and th e restoration of the status quo ante bellum. custom s union of th e B alkan sta te s. “T he M acedonian Q uestion. 193. T hese arrests. Sideris. b u t in both countries th e socialist agitatio n was c u t sh o rt by foreign invasion and occupation. and in A ugust 1915 it sent a com ­ m unication to the convention of th e Bulgarian “ narrow s” in which it censured all th e G reat Powers alike for th eir im perialist plans in the Balkans. Rakovski. A t th e inter-A llied Labor and Socialist Conference held in London in F eb ru ary 1918.” 1 0 In R oum ania and Serbia th e Socialist P arties denounced th e war as im perialist and dem anded a federation of free Balkan peoples. 1918). 208. “ I t is by this m eans.1 1 T he Serbian Socialists were n o t as divided as those of Greece and Bulgaria. 1 1Am erican Labor Year Book. to g eth er w ith the occupation of R oum ania by foreign arm ies. 1916. 1916. In co n tra st th e m ore leftist L abor F ederation of Salonica adopted a strong anti-w ar stan d an d denounced the n atio n alist am bitions of all th e B alkan governm ents. see “Transylvania and M acedonia. 207. an d dem anding a federated Balkan republic as th e only way out of th e dilem m a. 254-256. W hen th e R oum anian govern­ m ent intervened in th e w ar in A ugust 1916. and th e collective gu aran tee by th e B alkan states of th e rig h t of the m inor­ ities to develop freely.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 201 sam e m utually an tagonistic position as th e “rig h t” socialists of the W estern E uropean countries. W alling. Sideris. 211. 400.” New Europe. and only by this means th a t we will be able to m arch forw ard tow ards th a t dem ocratic fed­ eration of the Balkans which th e w orkers and the B alkan peoples so ard en tly desire and which is so essential for peace. effectively silenced th e Socialist P a rty until the Arm istice. and P. 210. th e o u tstan d in g Socialist leader. D im itratos. . VI (April 11. it a t once arrested Dr. A few m onths after the o u tb reak of th e w ar ( lie E xecutive C om m ittee of th e R oum anian P a rty issued a m anifesto w arning ag ain st R ussian pro p ag an d a designed to involve th e country in war. 1918). See also A. VI (M arch 7. Once Greece entered the w ar the L abour Federation opposed exaggerated national claim s and strove to prev en t a peace settlem en t based on m ilitary conquest.” New Europe. 396-401. and hundreds of his followers. Resolutions to the sam e effect were passed a t the p a rty convention in N ovem ber 1915 and a t h undreds of mass meetings organized in all th e cities. 1918). R akovski regarding M acedonia and Balkan federation. I t was represented a t th e B alkan So­ cialist Conference of B ucharest. T h eir position was to th e left of the centrists b u t not as 10 T h e text of their memorandum to the conference is available in pam phlet form in A. The S ocialists and the War. For a war statem ent by Dr. Couriel. D .

386. all com bined to produce th is g reat revolutionary upsurge. Griinberg. th e tw o socialist deputies. In th e sitting of th e S kupshtina of A ugust 1. th e two Socialist deputies issued a sta te m e n t in th e S kupshtina in which th ey urged th e form ation of a Balkan federative republic as “ . an d in having tolerated th e activities of th e national secret society. th e establishm ent of a Soviet regime in H ungary.” T he occupation of th e co u n try b y enem y troops did n o t lead the Serbian Socialists to change th eir views. 1915. T his position they held consistently th ro u g h o u t th e w ar period. 1919-1920. b u t w ithin Serbia Socialist ac tiv ity becam e impossible and was n o t renewed until th e disintegra­ tion of th e H apsburg E m pire in th e au tu m n of 1918. . for liberation from th e im perialist G reat Powers. K atzlerovich and L ap­ chevich.1917). 281-284. A t th e o u tset the Labor and A grarian P arties appeared to be of equal stren g th b u t w ithin a few years th e la tte r had gained th e upper hand. 1916). 136-139.1 3 T he la tte r were also handicapped by 12 C. “Y ugoslavskaya K om m unisticheskaya P artiya.1 2 W ith th e cessation of hostilities a t th e end of 1918 the Socialist m ovem ent quickly revived and w ithin a few m onths experienced a trem endous grow th. . both refused to su p p o rt th e governm ent. on A ugust 10. T h u s th e y m ain­ tained th a t th e governm ent did n o t m erit socialist support. A few m onths later. 1914. T he m ost obvious was the num erical superiority of th e p easan ts over th e city p ro letariat. 210-213. A nother reason is to be found in th e fact th a t th e Balkan governm ents persecuted with p articu lar severity th e labor m ovem ent. V (D ecem ber 13. E qually spectacular was the increase in the stren g th of th e A grarian P arties representing th e peasan t masses. B. as th e C om m unist P arties a ttra c te d consider­ able su p p o rt am ongst th e poor peasantry. T his was due to a n um ber of reasons. For th e a ttitu d e of the Y uguslav socialists in th e H apsburg Em pire. th e sole means for th e cessation of slaughter. 13 T h e nature of th e W h ite Terror in th e Balkans has been eloquently described b y H enri Barbusse who m ade a tour of th e Balkans in 1925 and sum m arized his find­ ings in Les Bourreaux (Paris. 1926). th e trium ph of th e Bol­ sheviks in Russia. Am erican Labor Year Book. . see “A Southern Slav Socialist M ani­ festo . th ey argued th a t Serbia was p a rtly responsible in having allowed herself to be a paw n in the h ands of R ussia and France. although this factor can be over-em phasized.” Kom m unisticheskiye P a rtii. and especially th e revolu­ tio n ary C om m unist P arties. and th e destruction an d suffering resulting from th e war. W hile agreeing th a t th e A ustrian u ltim atu m was an outrage. T he disintegration of th e H apsburg Em pire. D ie Internationale und der Weltkrieg (Leipzig. Narodna Odbrana.202 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y far left as Lenin and his followers. Boshkovich.” N ew Europe. In the next y ear th e Serbian Socialist P a rty p articipated in the B ucharest Socialist Conference and supported its pro-federation and anti-w ar resolutions. Delegates were sent to the Zim m erw ald and K ienthal Conferences. and for the cu ltural and political progress of all th e B alkans.

no. . . “T h e Com m unist M ovem ent in R oum ania. 303. . 1918 and a t its congress of J a n u a ry 1920 it voted to affiliate w ith the T hird In tern atio n al. Stefan R adich. 176.1 6 T he resu lt was a split in th e w orking class m ovem ent th ro u g h o u t th e world.” Communist International. although the Party had left th e Socialist In te rn a tio n a l in 1915. 16 Fainsod. K olarov. 86-98. R akovski. T hus. th e rig h t wing elem ents left in (he Socialist P a rty m aintained th eir tie w ith th e Second In te r­ natio n al. indicates th at the Com m unist Party failed to estim ate at its true worth th e n ational factor in th e struggle of the toiling m asses. 78— 85. no. A new com m unist m anifesto was draw n up which denounced th e Second In tern atio n al as b a n k ru p t and called for world revolution based on W orkers’. w here th e pan-Serb policies of th e cen tralist Belgrade governm ent were so h ated.” Accordingly th ey have studied and discussed at great length the problem of nationalities in th e Balkans. 1921-1922. In opposition. 4 (July-A ugust. 201-211.” Communist Inter­ national. representatives were present from R oum ania. to rep u d iate all p articip atio n in a bourgeois m in istry .1 4 Finally th e labor m ovem ent in general was seriously w eakened by th e b itte r feud between th e C om m unist an d Socialist P arties in all th e B alkan coun­ tries.ible to win th e allegiance of th e g reat m ajo rity of th e C roatians by dem anding auto n o m y as well as social reform . Soldiers’ and P easan ts’ Soviets. Am erican Labor Year Book. 2551-2554.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 203 t heir tendency to em phasize class w ar to th e ex ten t of alm ost ignoring I lie all-im p o rtan t n atio n ality problem . 13 (A ugust. 'I&ropia той 'E X X i^ u k w ’Еруатшой Kwr/paros. 278. 177. T here existed ap p aren tly a difference of opinion betw een th e p a rty sections and th e executive com m ittee over th is issue. W hen th e first Congress of th e T hird Intern atio n al convened in M arch 1919. 178-185. 1920). 1924).1 7 In Y ugoslavia th e Socialist P a rty called for a congress a t Belgrade on April 20-25. it was n o t until t he congress of M ay 1921 th a t a resolution was passed for unqualified adherence to th e T h ird In te rn a tio n a l.e. 4 (July-A ugust. “T h e N ational Q uestion in the B alkans. 1924). T h u s in a c o u n try such as Yugoslavia.” Communist International.. See V. no. Am erican Labor Year Book. op. K ordatos. 1 0 V atis. cit. 277. 17 Ch.” R epre­ sentatives were sen t from all th e provinces of th e newly organized 1 4 T h e Com m unist leaders realised this flaw in their tactics and ad m itted that their failure “ . 1921-1922. th e A grarian leader. 1919. of all p arties willing “ to profess anti-m ilitarism i. B ulgaria an d Y ugoslavia. “ R esolution on th e Q uestion of N ation alities. T his schism in th e labor ran k s was p recipitated by th e form ation of the T h ird In tern atio n al. II.” K om m unisticheskiye Partii.. was .1 6 In R oum ania th ere was m uch friction w ithin th e Socialist P arty over th e question of joining th e new In tern atio n al. 302. and these were grouped together as th e B alkan R evolutionary Socialist Federation and granted th ree votes o u t of a to ta l of fifty-five. “ Grecheskaya K om m unisticheskaya P artiya. In Greece th e Socialist L abor P a rty was form ed on N ovem ber 3.

generally speaking. 17 (N ovem ber. 213. th e more conservative Social­ ists rem ained w ithin th e Second In te rn atio n al. I t m eant. . “ . see infra. . 207.” Com munist In ter­ national. th e adoption of fu ndam entally different program s. passed a resolution. “ .19 Finally in B ulgaria th e “ b ro ad ” Socialists. 21 T ex t of this resolution given in appendix H. T heir im m ediate aim was th e overthrow of th e existing m onarchical re­ gimes. . no. these countries m ay live in concord and lib erty and devote th eir stren g th in th e fu tu re to Socialism . 83-96.204 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y sta te and a resolution was passed unanim ously in favor of affiliation w ith th e T h ird In tern atio n al. who had cooperated w ith th e governm ent during th e course of th e war. Sim ilarly the 1927 M ay D ay m anifesto of the Second International included a dem and for “T h e Balkans to the Balkan Peoples! For the Balkan Federation of Free Balkan Peoples!” International Inform ation. K itaigorodsky.” 2 1 18 For references and details. the Second In tern atio n al a t its Lucerne Congress in A ugust 1-9. As in th e case of R oum ania and Greece. this program . 1925). 317. now retain ed th eir affiliation w ith th e Second In tern atio n al while th e “ n arro w ” Socialists a t th eir Ju n e 1919 Congress voted un an i­ mously in favor of joining the C om m unist In te rn a tio n al. 19 P. 20 (April 12. I t has already been noted th a t before and during th e first W orld W ar all the Balkan Socialist P arties had consistently dem anded a federation of dem o­ cratic B alkan republics as th e only feasible solution of th e E astern Question. 1921-1922. no. in addition. 1919.” I t recom m ended in addition th e holding of plebiscites u nder n eu tral control in order to determ ine th e frontiers of the federated states. "The Labour M ovem ent in T u rk ey. 318. A m erican Labor Year Book.1927). A t th e second congress held in Ju n e 1920 th e P a rty adopted th e nam e C om m unist P a rty of Y ugoslavia. In th e post-w ar period the Socialist P arties affiliated w ith the Second In tern atio n al retained. see infra. . 20 For references and details. although th ey never w orked o u t their policies and tactics in th e sam e detailed fashion as did th e C om m unist Parties. IV. th e establishm ent of dem ocratic republics and th eir unification into a B alkan federation. . in favor of a rapproche­ m ent am ong th e Balkan peoples an d their union in a federation of independent S ta te s. F or exam ple. T h ey also professed to be working for th e establishm ent of socialism b u t th a t p a rt of th eir program was usually phrased in vague term s and obviously concerned th e more d ista n t future. 142.18 A sim ilar split took place in T u rk ey where ap p aren tly tw o distinct C om m unist P arties were organized in 1920. 208. one in C onstantinople and th e o th er in A nkara. T he Socialist P a rty under H ylm i Bey a d ­ hered to th e Second In tern atio n al an d based its program on W ilson’s F ourteen P oints.20 T his rift in th e B alkan labor m ovem ent did n o t involve sim ply adherence to rival in tern atio n al organizations. Finally it expressed th e hope th a t.

no. there existed " . nothing b u t th e proletarian revolution and the dictato rsh ip of th e p ro letariat w ith its organization of th e W orkers’.” I t m ight be noted fu rth er th a t th e tw o differed also in organization. . the historical possibility of a bourgeois-dem ocratic revolution against imperialism and m onarchism . August 7.” T h e Com m unist explanation for the adoption of a new revolutionary program runs as follow s: before the Balkan W ars. and " E ven ts in the Balkans and Prospects of a W orkers’ and P easan ts’ R evolu tion. in International Press Correspondence. 205-222.2 2 A com parison of these tw o program s reveals th e fundam ental difference betw een th e Socialist an d C om m unist positions. T he Socialist Parties in th e B alkan countries h ad few contacts w ith each o th er and m et on only a few occasions w hen some special problem presented itself. th e Socialist L abor P a rty of Greece and th e Socialist P a rty of R oum ania. was entirely different. The Balkan Com m unist Federation held conferences fairly regularly. For details regarding these conferences see K om ­ m unisticheskiye P a rtii. In co n trast. T his conference was viewed as one of th e regular m eetings of th e Balkan Socialist F edera­ tion b u t the la tte r was now renam ed th e B alkan C om m unist F edera­ tion and was affiliated to th e T h ird In tern atio n al. T he views and program of th is Balkan C om m unist F ederation were revealed in the following reso lu tio n : . b u t th e one speaks vaguely of “rapprochem ent am ong th e B alkan peoples and th eir union in a federation of independent S ta te s ” while the o th er specifies a “ B alkan Socialist Soviet R epublic” established by m eans of “ proletarian revo­ lution an d th e d ictato rsh ip of th e p ro le ta ria t.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 2 05 T h e program of th e B alkan C om m unist Parties. th e C om m unist P arties were closely associated in th e B alkan C om m unist Federation which m et com paratively fre­ qu ently and form ulated policies an d tactics to be followed thro u g h o u t 22 T h e tex t of the resolutions passed at th is conference is given in appendix I. In Ja n u a ry 1920 a conference was held in Sofia which was atten d ed b y th e C om m unist P a rty of Bulgaria. 8-27. former head of the Com m unist International. B oth parties call for a B alkan federation. when the Balkan people were struggling for national liberation. 10 (April. and the authoritative articles b y G. B y 192S. a total of seven had been called. will liberate the B alkan nations from all oppression and will afford them a possibility of self-determ ination uniting them all into one B alkan Socialist S oviet R epublic. P easan ts’ and R ed A rm y deputi'es. Thus a bourgeois-dem ocratic revolution was no longer feasible. . 1925). See K om m unisticheskiye P a rtii. 69-86. in conjunction with the poor peasantry” could now end the dom ina­ tion of the ruling classes and dynasties. . on th e other hand. and in the B ol’ shay a Sovetskaya E n tziklopediya [Grand Soviet E n ­ cyclopedia] | under th e heading “ Balkan Com m unist F ederation. the Socialist L abor P a rty of Y ugoslavia. 1924. D im itrov.” Communist International.” B u t this possibility was elim inated w hen th e Balkan inonarchs and bourgeoisie follow ed an aggressive expansionist policy during the Balkan and W orld W ars and thereby becam e th e pawns of European im perialism. O nly a “revolution of the proletariat. . and liberate and unify the Balkan peoples into a federated Socialist S oviet R epublic. and the establishm ent of a dem ocratic federated republic in the Balkans. 215. .

in view of these differences and in view of the fact th a t bo th sought to gain th e su p p o rt of the sam e general class. so now th e revolutionary m ove­ m ent was m uch stronger an d b e tte r organized in B ulgaria and Y ugoslavia th an in Greece or R oum ania. 570-572. C om m unist and Socialist P arties undoubtedly had th e su p p o rt of th e g reat m ajo rity of the population and seriously th reaten ed th e existence of th e Belgrade regime. V III (Septem ber. 1925. On the other side the Federation balkanique regularly attacked socialist policies in the Balkans. In fact in B ulgaria the A grarians were in pow er from O ctober 1919 to Ju n e 1923 while in Y ugoslavia during these years th e A grarian. 1925. F o r a while it seemed th a t. 1925. th e radical A grarian and labor p arties m ight a t long la st have an o p p o rtu n ity to apply th eir program s for social reform and for federa­ tion. In Bulgaria th e A grarian P a rty had from its inception fought again st th e expansionist policies of K ing F erdinand before it finally rose to power in 1919. A ugust 14. Accordingly th e P a rty strongly opposed th e B alkan W ars and num erous articles were published in its organ. when th ey were m oved to M oscow “owing to th e prevalence of m artial law in the B alkans. D im itrov in the B ol’shaya Sovetskaya E ntziklopediya. 334 (January 1.” International P ress Correspondence. see International Inform ation. econom y and retren chm ent in adm inistration. "Bulgaria” Labour M onthly. 24 A typ ical socialist denunciation of Com m unism is to be found in the article b y Z.” Labour M onthly.2 4 Such was the general background of th e g reat revolutionary up­ heaval which convulsed th e B alkan Peninsula in th e im m ediate p ost­ w ar years. 1925). “Ten Y ears’ Com munism in the Balkans.” L ivin g Age. T his was actu ally done to a slight ex ten t until counter-revolu­ tions from th e right sm ashed th e radical parties and drove them underground. 26. For exam ple. . Zemledelsko Znam e [Agrarian Banner ]. II. and A ugust 1. and th e cessation of th e im perialistic foreign policy followed by Ferdinand. Its platform called for cu rtailm en t of th e growing powers of th e Crown. criticizing F erd in an d ’s regime. VI (M ay. see the issues of Ju ly 1. no. in th e South Slav lands a t least. 310. 1928). T h e headquarters of this federation were in Sofia until 1924. June 25. As in the pre-w ar period.23 As m ight be expected. 28-32. 311. 1924. 1924). th e tw o p arties rem ained b itte r rivals throughout th e post-w ar period. T opalovi6. One of th e four A grarian deputies 23 A list of the various conferences of th e Com m unist F ederation is given in the article b y G. N evertheless th eir efforts are of g reat significance in the h istory of the B alkan federation m ovem ent and require detailed exam ination.206 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y th e peninsula. “T h e Balkans. th e dis­ banding of the regular arm y in favor of a m ilitia. For tw o conferences of the Balkan Socialist P arties. I t was in 1900 th a t the A grarian Union or P a rty w as founded by D im itiir D ragiev as a p ro test ag ainst th e oppressive rule and excessive tax atio n of th e Liberal R adoslavov gov­ ernm ent. held in March 1924 and June 1925 to discuss the situation in Bulgaria and the relations of th e B ul­ garian Socialist P arty with the T san k ov governm ent.

the position of K ing F erdinand had becom e untenable and on O ctober 3 he abdicated in favor of his son Boris. 5 9 . p a rtic u ­ larly th e former. The Autobiography of a Rebel. K . o u t of a to ta l of 236 seats. 1918 th e Bulgarian lines had been broken. who had replaced th e pro-G erm an R adoslavov in June. N evertheless his speech. Prem ier M alinov. Zem ledelskiya SUyuz [The A grarian Union] Sofia. Espe<ially prom inent in th is an ti-w ar cam paign was A leksandiir S tam ­ boliiski who had joined th e p a rty in 1902 and by th is d a te was one of its prom inent leaders. 26 A. By S eptem ber 15. In th e 1919 elections. 5. T odorov. In th e m eantim e th e C om m unist and Socialist P arties.1 2 5 . . was issued calling on the people to com bat th e d rift to w ar an d to dem and continued Bulgarian n eu trality . 1915 a m ani­ festo signed by Stam boliiski an d Y anko Sakiizov. no. D . 93. A lthough S tam ­ boliiski was defeated by com bined loyalist an d G erm an forces. 4. who thereupon entered th e cabinet in Ja n u a ry 1919 and becam e Prim e M inister in O ctober. Strashim irov. b luntly w arned th e K ing th a t intervention in th e w ar would cost him his throne. which was published an d d istrib u ted th ro u g h o u t th e country. 92. W hen th e W orld W ar broke o u t th e A grarinns strenuously opposed in tervention. T he new ruler was acceptable to Stam boliiski.1 3 1 . On A ugust 30. T he trial of stren g th cam e in D ecem ber of th e sam e year when a strike of railw ay em ployees paralyzed tra n sp o rtatio n and th reaten ed to lead to revolution. 1943). Four days earlier Stam boliiski had been released and sent to th e front in th e hope th a t he could calm th e m utinous troops. Soldier and Statesman (Chicago.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 207 (lien holding seats in th e Sobranje supported th e governm ent’s war policy and was thereupon p ro m p tly expelled from th e P a rty . had been gaining rapidly in stren gth.1 3 2 .25 A few weeks later th e A grarian p arliam en tary group elected Stam boliiski to represent it in th e group of p a rty chiefs who were to seek an audience w ith F erdinand.2 6 W ithin three years Stam boliski was vindicated. Dvete m i Sreshti s T zar Ferdinand [M y Two M eetings with T zar Ferdinand] (Sofia. th e C om m unists won 47 and the Socialists 39. w ith characteristic courage and im petuousity. on behalf of the Agrarian and “ b ro a d ” Socialist P arties. Balkan Firebrand. W ith th e aid of Allied troops 85 Galeriya TJbili Durzhavni M uzhe [Gallery of A ssassinated Statesm en] (Pleven. F o r his rashness Stam boliiski was arrested. tried by courtm artial and condem ned to penal servitude for life. 1914). Instead he proclaim ed a republic an d advanced on Sofia. I t was a t this m eeting th a t Stam boliiski. 927). asked for an arm istice which he was compelled to sign unconditionally on S eptem ber 29. T h eir request was granted and th e audience was set for Septem ber 4. As head of th e governm ent he signed the T re a ty of N euilly in th e sam e year. established him as th e o u tstan d in g opponent of th e d y n a sty . 58-65. 1915). Stam boliiski.

” Slavonic Review. 1927). Problems and P oli­ tics. . “A Peasant Statesm an. P a st and Present. Kennedy. 439-448.321. D em ocrats 7. 15. 1920.089 o u t of 100. 177-186.27 T h e significance of th is situ ation lies in th e fact th a t tw o parties favoring B alkan federation now had th e su pport of a large m ajority of th e Bulgarian people. is given b y V ictor N . Socialists 7.097. K iranov. Alexander S tam b u lisk y. See Logio. . In th e M arch 1920 elections th e A grarians and C om m unists won 68 per cen t of th e seats (161 o u t of 236).30 Even m ore im p o rtan t a t th is tim e was the pro-federation stan d of the 27 K abakchiyev. and with th e aid of considerable force an d sundry shady practices he was able to curb both th e radical an d reactionary forces and to rem ain in power u n til 1923. Bulgarskolo Zemledelsko Dvizhenie [The Bulgarian Agrarian Movement] (Sofia. soviet Bulgaria. 7. Sim ilarly the Socialist P arty a t its conference held in Sofia on Septem ber 1-2. 1920) 274-276. L.711. An excellent short stu d y of Stam boliiski. A.156. Agrarians 52. 2 8N ew York Tim es. 5 (Septem ber. 11. II (D ecem ber. 593-608. D em ocrats 34. with bibliographical references. G entizon.195. 1923). C om m unists 29. “ Bulgaria’s Future. T h e figures given ou t b y the M inister of Interior are. 1920). b u t th e A grarians were able to gain 113 seats a t the expense of th e Socialists who retained only 9 seats. V (O ctober 1. People's P arty 4.339. D espite G overnm ent terrorism 48 Com m unists were retu rn ed to th e Sobranje. An Interview with Prem ier S tam bolisky. 1919). ch. 3 0 Communist International. Balkan u n ity was n o t a pleasant sentim ent to be voiced on sta te occasions. M ay 2. dem anded Balkan rapprochem ent. N ovem ber 28. ibid.29 F u rth erm o re it should be noted th a t for th e A grarians and Com­ m unists. “Stam boulisky et le peuple bulgare. “Alexander S tam b olisk y. “ Bolgarskaya K om m unisticheskaya P artiya. Liberals 3.” Fortnightly Review. Sharenkoff in th e Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences.811).208 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y Stam boliiski broke th e strik e a fte r m uch violence. no. G henadievists 3. and then proceeded to a rre st th e C om m unist leaders and to call for a new election in M arch 1920 w ith th e aim of overw helm ing th e C om m unists and gain­ ing a clear m ajority. Balkan Firebrand. . 118 (N ovem ber. CCCVI (July 24. Radicals 6. I t was an integral p a rt of their program and th ey had consistently advocated it for decades and continued to do so now. 54-57. T h e figures for th e various parties were: Agrar­ ians 113. 1918. Bulgaria. T odorov. T san k ov party 1.” Contemporary Review. 1923). 407-411. “Alexander S tam b olisk y.” L ivin g Age. T h e C om m unist P a rty a t its Ju n e 1919 Congress drew up a program which called for th e estab lish m en t of a socialist.” K om m u n isti­ cheskiye P a rtii. Progressives 7. 12. Bulgaria.” Revue de France. Socialists 2. Logio. D . Bourchier. 89-95. 1919). 1920. N ationalists 15. Liberals 3. P. no. 1923). 2 9N ew York Tim es.. 784-789.992. J. 4 (August 1. W ith th is victory Stam boliiski becam e com plete m aster. 8. P . 67-70.28 and in th e m unicipal elections of O ctober 1920 these tw o p arties polled over 80 per cent of th e to ta l votes cast (82. C om m unists 48. 114 (August. a friendly alliance w ith th e neighboring peoples in order to create a B alkan Socialist F ederated S oviet republic which will be a p a rt of th e E uropean and W orld Socialist F ederated Soviet R epublic which will realise a union betw een all th e nations and a lasting peace. and for the conclusion of .

fearful of the Com m unist danger. “ I have no d o u b t. April 10.” he added.. 183. H e also proposed. C zechoslovak and Roum anian governm ents. and these capitals. b u t. pledged support to his "Green Interna­ tional” schem e. in the factories. W arsaw and B ucharest. "that our 'Green Internationale’ w ill u ltim ately free Russia from the Soviets. 112-125. 1942).e. a great Congress of th e A gricultural League was held on February 15. will be victorious over th e A u strian s. and th e seventh article of these Principles reads as follows: "T h e A grarian Union favors durab le and peaceful relations between Bulgaria and h er neighbors. “ T raitor! You are a Serb!” “ No. 184. as th e p easan t leader of a peasant p arty . I t seeks to stren gthen these good relations by uniting Bulgaria w ith the o th er B alkan states on a fed­ erative b asis. A t least. th e B ulgarian delegates had 3 1 E arly in 1921 Stam boliiski visited Prague. 26. and also the Red International of the B olsheviks who were attem pting to destroy all governm ent and individual in itiative. W hile in prison S tam boliiski form ulated th e P rin ­ ciples of the Bulgarian Agrarian N ational Union [i. and Stam boliiski elaborated on the "Green International. On his return to Sofia. .” replied Stam boliiski. S tam ­ boliiski sta te d on a num ber of occasions th a t he had alw ays worked for closer inter-B alkan relations. who know nothing about farming. this was to be an international union of th e peasants of Central and Southeastern Europe. AleksandUr Stam boliiski.” 3 3 W hen he was a t the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919. and m ake both realize th a t the farmer is ju st as necessary to the life of a country as the workers on the roads. to offset th e W h ite International of the reactionaries w ho wished to restore th e monarchs and landlords. I am n eith er a Serb nor a B ulgarian. 33 P etk ov.” New York Tim es. it is destined to free farmers elsew here from th e unjust restrictions placed upon them b y the m anufacturers and capitalists.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 209 A grarian governm ent in power. or em ployed in transportation.. Oeuvre du rapprochement. “ I am conscious th a t it is m y im perative d u ty to raise m y voice in favor of rapprochem ent am ong the Balkan sta te s. great. .”34 According to some sources.” W ith memories of recent w ars still fresh. less frequently and as a m ore d ista n t goal. 3 4Ib id . 66-69. lichnost i idei.3 1 T hro u g h o u t his career Stam boliiski took ad v an tag e of every op­ p o rtu n ity to fu rth er inter-B alkan unity. he added. A t th e tim e of the A ustrian a tta c k on Serbia in 1914 he sta te d in the Sobranje: “ I hope th a t our brothers. A survey of the agrarian m ovem ent throughout Central and Eastern Europe is given in M. “ I am a Y ugoslav. a federation of all the Halkan countries.” 3 2 In th e next year he was jailed for his opposition to F erd in a n d ’s plans to intervene in th e w ar and to a tta c k Serbia. the m ajority shouted. HodSa. . 1921. In addition. Stam boliiski hoped to unite all the E uropean agrarian parties into a “ Green In te rn a tio n a l” w hich could cope w ith both com m unism on th e left an d reaction on th e rig h t. th a t he had been persecuted for his efforts. . Federation in Central E urope: Reflections and Reminiscences (London. th e Serbs. 32 Stragnakovich. of th e A grarian Party]. In innum erable speeches Stam boliiski repeatedly urged rapprochem ent w ith Serbia and th e unification of all the South Slavs into one.” W ith th e support of the Polish. federated state.

T he d a y a fte r he signed the T re a ty of Neuilly. be erected into a little sta te w ithin the union. . loc. G. .210 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y actu ally been authorized to propose th e establishm ent of a Yugoslav federation in which M acedonia would be included as an independent s ta te . and D edeagatch—and let th is new sta te serve as a pledge for the fu tu re B alkan C onfedera­ tion . it will elim inate all th e p retexts of rivalries and strife be­ tw een th e B alkan sta te s and will facilitate the establishing of the fu tu re confederation. then another Balkan war was in evitab le. .” N ation. T h e author states th at since a Y u goslav federation was favored in practically all circles he suggested at a m eeting of Agrarian leaders in Sofia th at th e Bulgarian delegation in Paris be instructed to m ake such a proposal. A ccordingly in April 1920 th e Italian m inister to Sofia. For unanim ously I was assured th at if Thrace and th e A egean coast were taken aw ay from Bulgaria.” N ation. C IX (N ovem b er 29. A lso the T hrace question would be solved. Serbian. C avalla. S tam boliiski flatly rejected both this proposal and a sim ilar one a sh o rt while later by Baron A lio tti’s 35 H . in a private interview w ith S tam boliiski. T h u s th e w hole endless M acedonian question w ould be finally settled . he proposed th e creation of an independent M acedonian state. X V (1922). “ D rifting Toward a Jugoslav Federation. cit. T h e offer included a dem and that M acedonia. 4 6 3 464.937.” 37 In th e Sobranje on a nu m ber of occasions he sta te d th a t Bulgaria was ready to join a Y ugoslav federation. 1919). 123. C ro atia and Slovenia. a plebiscite be held “em bracing all th e populations delivered from th e T urkish yoke since 1912. “ Union in the B alkans. 1919 th a t." Current H istory. T heodorov. 699-702. B alkan Firebrand. nor Bulgarian. and for th e form ation of a g reat Yugoslav S ta te . “T o m y astonishm ent I was told th at Stam boliiski already had instructions in Paris to m ake such a proposal. 936. urged priv ately in a le tte r of Septem ber 2. Alsberg. big and sm all.” See also C. C IX (O ctober 4. and there were no federation. proposed an Italo-B ulgarian alliance directed against Y ugoslavia. R oum ania and th e Kingdom of the Serbs. W hile passing through L ju b ljan a a few years later he told the ed ito r of th e Slovenski Glas th a t: “ The g reat m ajo rity of th e Bulgarian people are for union w ith Serbia.3 6 A lthough th e B ulgarian offers a t th e Peace Conference were re­ jected. C roats and Slovenes proposing th a t th e p a st be forgotten and th a t all B alkan governm ents collaborate for th e common security and eco­ nomic welfare of th e B alkans.” If th a t were n o t feasible. T. see Todorov. 937. in place of th e m utilation of B ulgaria. For th e role of Stam boliiski at N eu illy. which is neither Greek.3 6 I t is known th a t th e chief of th e Bulgarian delegation.. All this n atu rally aroused apprehension in Ita ly w here th e prospect of a powerful. u nited Y ugoslav sta te was viewed w ith distaste. he sent letters to the prem iers of Greece. freely use the p orts of the new s ta te th u s co n stitu ted — Salonica. L e t all the nations. 1919). Stam boliiski persisted in his efforts for cooperation and unity. 30 “P eace in the Balkans: A Bulgarian S olu tion . Baron A liotti. Stephanove. 37 Stephanove.

39 Swire. VI (April. T h e debacle of 1918 seemed to p u t an end to th e O rganization because th e g reat m ajority of the M acedonians and B ulgarians by this tim e had been alienated. a t th at tim e Bul­ garian m inister to Belgrade. In an effort to check this activ ity . 145-156. T h e first step had been tak en in th e direction of th e long-desired rapprochem ent with Y ugoslavia. Todorov. “T h e M acedonian O rganization Y esterday and T o d a y .38 In addition to refusing th e Ita lia n proposal. See also T od orov’s article in the N ew York Times. T he n reat obstacle was th e In te rn a l M acedonian R evolutionary O rgan­ ization. T h u s in 1920 I he O rganization recomm enced its raids against Y ugoslavia. C ount A ldrovandi.” Foreign A ffairs. In addition it received m oney and oth er aid from Ita ly who was anxious to keep Bulgaria and Y ugoslavia ap art.anization an o p p o rtu n ity to pose as th e cham pion of natio n al rights and justice.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 211 successor. H enceforth the B ulgarian governm ent took m ilitary m easures to control th e bands and th e nu m b er of raids declined considerably. llalkan Firebrand. T his body. and th e S ta m ­ boliiski governm ent was strongly hostile. Balkan Firebrand. th e Bulgarian governm ent on M ay 19. arrangem ents were m ade for th e conclusion of a secret B ulgarian-Y ugoslav m ilitary alliance b u t this never m a­ terialized because of th e assassination of Stam boliiski and th e over­ throw of his governm ent in Ju n e 1923. Bulgarian Conspiracy. A ugust 12. Iо be composed of Bulgars an d Serbs who should a c t in common against the com itadji bands. A lthough nothing was done a t th e tim e. In fact. 1922 proposed to Belgrade th e establishm ent of a jo in t frontier guard. b u t th e sam e answ er was re­ ceived. 137. 1928). . Hulgar-Yugoslav relations im proved correspondingly. in effect. D uring th e W orld W ar it fought with th e Bulgarian arm y an d was given th e adm inistration of Serbian M acedonia. 184-186. gave th e Orс. T he harsh term s of th e T re a ty of Neuilly. T h e offer was repeated once more during the Genoa Conference in 1922. an in stru ­ m ent of th e B ulgarian governm ent. A fter th e first B alkan W ar it ceased to be a tru ly M acedonian organization and becam e. had now degenerated into a band of unprincipled adventurers. 478-482.m easures to effect a rappro ch em en t w ith Y ugoslavia. however. in his article. and in his autobiography. I his suggestion did lead to discussions which culm inated in th e T reaty of Nish (April 1923) providing for b e tte r supervision of th e frontier. Stam boliiski took concrete. a t which ta sk it distinguished itself by its irresponsible violence an d terrorism . which a t th e tu rn of th e cen tury reflected the aspirations of th e M acedonian people and fought w ith th eir com plete support again st T urkish misrule. 138. 191-196.39 N o t only were th e B ulgarian people and governm ent in favor of 38 An account of these n egotiations is given b y K osta T odorov. 1928.

The T reaty of Trianon and its Consequences.. H ungary and her Successors. M acartney. In accordance w ith the program of th e Balkan C om m unist F edera­ tion. M y N ative L and (N ew York. “Croatia in European P olitics. T h e la tte r factor was especially im p ortant. T h ey felt th a t the protection of th e Serbian arm y was needed im m ediately and they disregarded th e p ro tests of a m inority who wished to ensure the adoption of the federal principle before uniting w ith Serbia. R evolts broke o u t against th e Serbian ad m in istration in a num ber of provinces and it was n o t until tw o years had elapsed th a t th e Provisional G overn­ m ent agreed to hold elections on N ovem ber 28. proclaimed th e union.” |Journal of Central European A ffairs. H ungary. Stephanove. 362ff. 1943). 147-157. B u t rule by B elgrade proved unpopular. The B alkan P iv o t : Yugoslavia (N ew York. A. As soon as th e A ustro-H ungarian E m pire crashed in th e autum n of 1918. a t th e form al request of tw en ty four delegates from Zagreb. mass unrest and political instability were practically as g reat as in Bulgaria. . b u t very m uch th e sam e sentim ent prevailed a t this tim e in Y ugoslavia. On No­ vem ber 23 th e M ajo rity proclaim ed th e union of th e territories under its control w ith the K ingdom s of Serbia and M ontenegro. and G. T om itch . cit. for it led to a politi­ cal feud which lasted for tw o decades.212 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y close relations w ith th eir neighbors and especially w ith th e Y ugo­ slavs.. M ost of the representatives were con­ servative men. C. Radin. there m et in Zagreb a revolutionary assem bly know n as the N atio n al M ajo rity and composed of p a rty leaders from th e various Y ugoslav areas of the Em pire. 1919-1937 (Oxford U niversity Press.40 One of the strongest of th e federalist groups opposed to th e cen­ tralizatio n policies of N icholas Pashich was th e C om m unist P arty. 63-70. Adam ic. 33 -3 9 . T he powerful A grarian and C om m unist P arties in Yugo­ slavia had precisely th e sam e views on foreign policy as th eir counter­ p a rts in Bulgaria. 304-329. T his decision took effect on D ecem ber 1 when Prince A lexander. D . B avaria and Ita ly . th e Y ugoslav C om m unists took th e stan d th a t th e economic problem s as well as th e oppression of national m inorities could be 40 C. 1929). L. and invited th e Prince R egent of Serbia to assum e th e regency of th e new state. 1937). loc. TomaSic. 1942). Beard. and th e un p o p u larity of th e centralization policies of the Belgrade govern­ m ent. In spite of th e fact th a t Y ugoslavia had emerged triu m p h a n t from th e W orld W ar. II (April. A . Royal In stitu te of International Affairs. L a form ation d I’etat yougoslave. 1920 for a constituent assem bly. th e influence of th e social upheavals in Russia. T he chief reasons were the terrible destruction and suffering resulting from th e war. 930934. T h ey were alarm ed by the advancing Italian troops on th e D alm atian coast and by th e revolutionary tem per of th e peas­ a n ts who were sacking the castles of landlords.

” K om m unisticheskiye P a rtii. T h e Serbian и nd Bosnian Socialists were alm ost unanim ously for affiliation with the Third Inter­ national and were opposed to cooperation w ith the Belgrade governm ent. 95-101. T h e CroaIinn and Slovenian socialists were m ostly in favor of working with th e M inistry until Ilie em ergency was passed. T h e Socialists retained their pre-war program in favor of a Balkan federation. 28-32. 16. th e governm ent passed a d rastic law “for the defence of th e s ta te ” which severely curtailed civil liberties. however. 1928). 113 (O ctober 12. and thereby to exterior security and to econom ic and cultural progress. 1924). 1928. no. 1921 l hey polled 200.000 votes and gained 58 seats o u t of a to ta l of 419. 559-566. T h e Y ugoslav Socialist P arty rem ains true to the old watchward of th e Socialist International: 'The Balkans to the Balkan people! A free Federation of the free and equal peoples of the Balkan Peninsula!’ ” T h ey further dem anded an agreem ent betw een Bulgaria •md Y ugoslavia regarding the M acedonian question.” L ivin g Age 334 (January 1. 4 (July-A ugust. 137-140.” N ation. W endel. and a tendency to place too much em phasis on class struggle and not enough on m inority rights.” Labour M onthly. 1921). 1919).4 1 A few days after th e con­ ference: had been held th e entire. Nish and Zagreb th ey had a m ajo rity of th e seats. X X X V I I (2) (A ugust 29. “Y ugoslavskaya K om m unisticheskaya I’artiya.” D ie Neue Z eit. H . See K olarov. “Situation in Y ugo-Slavia. T h u s th e C om m unists were driven underground and were unable to run an y candidates in th e succeeding elections held in M arch 1923. Soon afterw ards. . “T h e W hite Terror in Jugo-Slavia. In view of their great strength during these years it seem s strange that I lie Com m unists offered little opposition to this persecution. V. at their convention at Belgrade on April 15. 1925).” D ie Neue Z eit.join th e T h ird In te rn a tio n a l. P . I (Septem ­ ber. . “Y ugoslavskaya Kom m unisticheskaya P artiya. no. as th ey them selves freely ad m itted . B ut th e Com m unr. “Sozialism us und K om m unism us in Jugoslaw ien. annuled th e m andates of the C om m unist deputies and outlaw ed the ( 'om m unist P a rty . newly-elected C entral C om m ittee md tw o hundred oth er m em bers were im prisoned.” Communist International. See Z. B oshkovich. International Inform ation. 403. l or exam ple. 142ff. increased in strength at the expense of th e Com m unists. 8 (Febru­ ary. T h e reasons seem to be internal dissension regarding policies and tactics. “T en Years Communism in the B alk an s. 507-511. In I he elections to th e C o n stitu en t A ssem bly on N ovem ber 28. X X X V I II (2) (Septem ber 17.” T h e m ajority •nnongst them remained affiliated w ith th e Second International w hile a m inority joined the new Com m unist P arty of Y ugoslavia. Jugowitsch. 78-85. understanding and the Balkan Federation.4 2 11 R epresentatives from all the provinces attended this conference.” Kom m unisticheskiye P a rtii. . were com paratively weak. 41 Boshkovich. “T h e N ational Q uestion in the Balkans.” Communist International. 270-275. 1928. and hence were known as “ M inisterialists. M ay 20. Topalovit.” N ew York Times. b u t by class w ar and revolution which would lead to the establishm ent of a soviet sta te and of a com ­ m unist Balkan federation. no. 1928. and concluded as follow s: “ N oth ­ ing but a consistently dem ocratic policy in th e home and foreign p olicy of th e Balkan S lates can lead us toward reconciliation. See B oshkovich. 16. “ Repression in the Jugoslav S ta te.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 213 nolved n o t sim ply by federalization. 1921). th ey denounced Ihe Balkan governm ents for “striving and fighting against one an oth er” and for "blind subm ission to th e lead of the great im perialist powers. T his program was ado p ted when th e more radical Socialists held a conference in Belgrade in A pril 1919 and voted to. .ts were now a t th e height of th eir power. 404. T h u s the national parties. “Sozialistische E ntw icklung in Siidsluwien. T h e Socialists during th is post-war period. like that of Radich. April 28. In th e C roatian m unicipal elections th ey gained th e largest n um ber of votes and in such cities •is Belgrade. 1920).

I t de m anded distrib u tio n of land. Croatia. R. and even of all the races betw een the B altic and Aegean Seas. H ungary. I t was equally opposed Iо d irect rule from Belgrade. D ie Ideologie der Kroatischen Bauernbewegung (Zagreb. X X I X (October. T h e author is indebted to Dr. An interesting account of the early years of Radich i i given in “Autobiography of Stephen R ad ich . 1919 th e C roatian P easant P a rty adopted a program providing for an independent C roatia (with Slovenia) which would have no m ore th a n an irreducible m inim um of “ com m on affairs” 43 In 1902 Radich proposed a plan b y which a Danubian federation w as to be sub stituted for the dual system of th e H apsburg m onarchy. R adich insisted on a g u arantee of the federal principle before union w ith Belgrade.” Current H istory. On the next day a m eeting was held of three thousand C roatian P easan t Parly delegates who unanim ously rejected th e decision of th e N ational M ajo rity for im m ediate union w ith Serbia. T h e federation was to con sist of Bohem ia. Constitution of the N eutral P easant Republic of Croatia (Pitta burgh. In stead it dem anded th e creation of a fed erated Y ugoslav sta te which would include as autonom ous units not only Serbia. A fter this federation had been realized the A grarian leaders envisaged a federation of all th e Balkan peoples. 452. T his program was prac­ tically identical to th a t of S tam bolilski’s A grarian P a rty . T h e S lavs of the federation were to enjoy full cultural and spiritual relations with Russia. b u t the real strength of his p a rty was unknown a I the tim e and he had little influence on the deliberations. M ontenegro and th e o th er newly ac quired provinces.214 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y An even more serious obstacle for th e Belgrade centralists was the C roatian A grarian P a rty founded by Stefan Radich in 1905.."1 W ith th e collapse of th e E m pire in 1918 a new program w as adopt e<I to m eet th e needs of th e changed situation. 48-5 9 . I t was opposed to th e m aintenance of a large arm y and to m ilitarism in general. ed. Dr. G alicia. C roatia. T h e capital of the federation was to be Vienna.4 4 Stefan Radich was one of th e p a rty leaders who p a rticip ated in the m eeting of the N ational M ajority a t Zagreb on N ovem ber 2*1. 1923). B osnia and Herzc govina were to receive full autonom y and to d ecide by v ote w hether or not th ey should unite with Croatia. K ezm an. F ischel. 82-102. 1918. . T here now began th e lonj: struggle betw een th e C roatian A grarians and th e Belgrade authorities. and German A ustria. 44 L. Before the W orld W ar R adich was n o t concerned w ith Y ugoslav or Balkan unity. Herceg. and d ep u ty to the Skupshtina from 1920 to 1928. Louis K ezm an for an explanation of the view s of the leaders of the Agrarian P arty regarding Balkan federation. Kezman was secretary general of th e Agrarian P arty from 1919 to 1927. Slovenia.453. and Radich expressed th e hope that the Czech language would be used b y the three Slav states so th at it m ight com pete w ith the German and Мац yar languages. 1923). b u t also Bulgaria. Der Pans lawism us bis zum Weltkrieg. 1928). and in establishing a triune system which would give C ro atia a position of autonom y akin to thal enjoyed by A ustria an d H un g ary under the H apsburg m onarchy. On M arch 1. I le was interested m ainly in economic and social reform s which would lighten the burden of the peasants.

1 1 1 I he description of th e m eeting is based on an account kindly furnished b y Dr. all this. and th e speakers ini Imlcd Radich. October 1. 1920. T he " p ly of th e Belgrade au th o rities was sim ply to im prison Radich 11ni il th e je v e of the co n stitu en t elections of N ovem ber 28. T he keynote of th e m eeting is Ihe need for federation. D espite open terrorism th e A grarian I'art у continued to increase in stren g th and in th e elections of M arch l'>. and Ferhad beg Ali D raga. In Bulgaria i hr Stam boliiski governm ent was actively seeking a rapprochem ent uni. a federation w ith Y ugoslavia. b u t th eir refusal to p a rtic ip a te in the w ork of th e assem bly i 11. A t th e sam e tim e Radich organized a m onster lи liiion to th e Peace Conference for a “ n eu tral C roatian P easan ts’ KVpiiblic" w ith a C roatian C o n stitu en t Assem bly of its own. 60-68. as did also I In1 Yugoslav C om m unist P a rty . cit.. 103-106. A u s dem K am pfe um den selbstandigen Staat K roatien (Vienna. In C roatia the d o m inant A grarian I' n iy held precisely the sam e views as th e Bulgarian governm ent.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 215 « ill) an y o th er state. I t ■ in not have an y trace of R oum anian or H ungarian feudalism any с than it can be a copy of R ussian bolshevism . I Ik.4 6 This m arks th e high poin t of th e post-w ar mass m ovem ent for a Viiroslav federation and general Balkan cooperation.45 In O ctober 1924 the A grarian P a rty held a g reat mass m eeting I I Verpolie in E astern C roatia n ear D jakovo.iaphy of Stephen R adich. loc. the Slovenes. Inod unequivocally for a Balkan C om m unist F ederation. th e Presi■ I. “AutoIilii|. A t th e o u tset and Hiobably for a long tim e it will n o t include R oum ania or Greece I" i . th e p a rty of th e non-Slavic (chiefly A lbanian) In inch of th e Y ugoslav Moslem m inority. 40-53. ми l urally. IUM . D ie Ideologie der Kroatischen Bauernbewegung. th e C om m unist. I'Ml). if possible. the SerbIiiii I )em ocrat George Popovich. R adich expressed his views as follows: I'he B alkan federation can be only peasan t and republican.1 v peoples.i:i now th e acknowledged leader of th e g reat m ajority of th e Croiii. Dr. W ith th e o th er B alkan Mliilrs it was anxious to establish close relations in th e hope th a t a t a с d ista n t futu re a general B alkan federation m ight be established. th e C roats. 1928). Herceg.M its representation in th e S kup sh tin a jum ped to seventy. I illy of th e eighty C roatian seats were won by P easant P a rty candi•hilcs. and finally to A lbania.inse it is really and form ally lim ited to the four principal Yugo< ■ 1. uni to M acedonia and M ontenegro.most powerful opposition p a rty in Bulgaria. the Serbs and the Bulgarians. I • / l i m n . Radich w. Nil |ili.” Current H istory. nl of th e D jem iet. . L upu of th e R oum anian P easan t P arty . X X I X (October. 934-936. T h e text of the Radich speech is in L a federation balkanique.move.in people. w ith th eir com plete consent. I his was tru e also of th e M ontenegrin F ederalist P a rty which was Л Pavelich.1hied Pashich to secure th e adoption of a co n stitution of an exiii inely centralized character.

Balkan federation. “ is in sym pathy 47 Cited b y Stephanove. and should never rest u ntil it has been realized. An editorial of the L ju b ljan a Novi Chas. described th e situation in th e following prophetic w ords: T h e m ost salient question facing our S tate is th a t of our relations w ith Bulgaria. Bulgai ians. K oroshetz.216 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y suprem e in M ontenegro and m aintained close relations w ith the R adich P a rty . Noel Buxton. left for solution to the Belgrade race alone. T h e union with Jugoslavia seems to be th e one thing th a t all political factions are agreed upon. cit. T h a t policy. 48 Alsberg. organ of Dr. An A m erican journalist who in th e autum n of 1919 interview ed Bulgarian and Y ugoslav leaders of various par ties. . in a less insistent degree.47 T h e accounts left by contem porary observers uniform ly em pha­ size th e popular and w idespread dem and for Y ugoslav and. loc. and he especially invites th e kindred branch of th e Southern Slavs—-“ our Bulgarian b ro th e rs. he added. All Jugoslav people independent of the Belgrade politicians are thoroughly convinced th a t th e security of our fu tu re existence as a S ta te dem ands union w ith B ulgaria.” T he B ulgarian A grarian P a rty . K oroshetz favored a Y ugoslav federation. to a lesser ex ten t. T h e p a rty led by R adich— republican. On th a t account th e entire Slovene and Croatian people should inscribe th is dem and in its program . which sooner or la te r will lead us to isola­ tion and catastrophe. will never bring ab o u t our consolidation w ith th e brave B ulgarian people. R adich has proclaim ed his desire to unite all the peasants of th e B alkans in one state... all the more as the B ulgarian N atio n to d ay is fully prepared and qualified for it. com m ented as follows a fter a conversation w ith th e editor of th e Sofia C om m unist daily: H is m ost significant sta te m e n t referred to th e insistence by his p a rty th a t a B alkan federation be form ed to avoid fu tu re w ars. 463. Sim ilarly th e d o m in an t Slovenian People’s P a rty led b y D r. C roatians and Slovenes will be the strongest S ta te in Southern E urope. C roatian and federalist— is rapidly growing in influence. loc. espoused by th e supporters of g reat Serbian dream s. cit. W e know th a t th is question. 937.48 Sim ilarly th e English Balkan expert. is the real obstacle to the creation of a strong an d united Jugoslavia. In Serbia. W ith o u t B ulgaria we shall pursue only a g reat C hauvinistic policy.464. and one of th e strong citadels for the w orld’s peace. reported in the a u tu m n of 1921 th a t. The sta te m e n t proved significant and startlin g because it was repeated by p ractically all the leaders of the other parties. T h e fu tu re Jugoslavia of Serbs. I t will prove a g reat g u aran tee for th e cultural development of Southern Jugoslavdom . because th e B ulgarians belong to the national u n ity of th e S outhern Slav S tates. I heard the same th in g .

K abakchiyev. 1923. nos.49 Finally in 1922 Professor S tephanove of Sofia U niversity sum m arized I lie situation w ith th e sentence.ipprochem ent w ith Y ugoslavia. 65-117. 1923). arm y officers— all com bined in a successful coup against the governm ent on Ju n e 9. . alienated by A grarian oppression during the previous th ree years an d believing them selves strong enough to profit later from this turm oil. 937.” Kom iinmisticheskiye P a rtii. ch. if it comes into power. .B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 217 with the P easan t P a rty in C roatia. th e M acedonian O rganization. 70-109.6 1 In th e m eantim e a sp lit had occurred in th e ranks of th e M ace­ donian O rganization.1 A detailed account of th ese gruesom e even ts is given in Swire. In B ulgaria S tam bolilski’s i . “T h e Balkans T o d a y . th e bourgeoisie. Ш 335 . B ut so ferocious did l lie bourgeois reaction become th a t A grarians and C om m unists co­ operated in S eptem ber 1923 in a w idespread revolt which was barely > nu lled a fte r days of bloody fighting. T odorov. cit. and ■M|iecially their failure to support the Agrarians. certain of l he M acedonian leaders had come to th e conclusion th a t th e Organi. Bulgarian Con\ piracy. an d to seek an alliance w ith th e Com m unists *" N oel Buxton. 1921). An anti-C om m unist account of these even ts is given by Ilie present Agrarian leader. led to th e form ation of a strong coalition against him. K olarov "The Nm-ial Basis of th e T sa n k o ff G overnm ent. however. T he M acedonian O rganization had taken p a rt in the i oup against S tam boliiski because of th e Ia tte r’s willingness to recog­ nize the status quo in M acedonia. his d rastic reform s on behalf of the peasants. S ee Com munist International.” Communist International. which. “ R aditch-S tam bolisky versus Paslulch-D avidovitch .. 96-109. T h e Com m unists. T he te rro r dragged on reaching itн bloody climax w ith th e Sofia C athedral bom bing of April 14. "Bolgarskaya K om m unisticheskaya P artiya.i (ion was being exploited for purely B ulgarian interests and th a t h i entirely new policy was necessary. 28 (N ovem ber. no. 1925 •md the subsequent m ass executions. 27 (Septem I i . I‘ 5). loc. O ctober. A ccordingly it was decided Iо strive henceforth for M acedonian autonom y ra th e r th a n for an ­ nexation to B ulgaria. V.l ilie Com m unist International. in Balkan Firebrand. T he Crown.”50 These issues were destined to be settled by assassination and nppression— b y th e assassination of Radich and Stam boliiski and by I he suppression of th e federalist p arties. 1 . 26. K .. were severely criticized by th e leaders i. and some of its m em bers joined forces w ith the ( om m unists w ith th e expressed purpose of w orking for a Balkan < onfederation. no. u nited Jugoslavia versus G reater Serbia— those are th e issues in th e B alkan Slavdom of to d a y . Five d ays later Stam boliiski was assasinated. and his ruthless persecution of all opposition. rem ained neutral. 157-180. w hether from i lie right or left. 60 Stephanove. intelli­ gentsia. will bring Jugo-Slavia an d B ulgaria into close relationship. 90 (A ugust. 14 (August. 1923). W ithin a year. T h e tactics of th e Bulgarian Com m unists during this period. 13-30.” Nineteenth Century. . 26.

[B ut. In a spirited editorial th e program of this publication wan defined as follows: T h e principal task of our publication as its title has already shown. A. I t called for the liberation and unification ol partitio n ed M acedonia. was the publication on Ju ly 15 of the first issue of La federation balkanique. . C haulev. which will hasten to unite undv. T his sta te m e n t was essentially the sam e as the previous one except th a t it n a tu ra lly was concerned more specifically w ith t h e M acedonian question. W e wish th a t they m ay cease to be the common prey of European im perialism and Balkan chauvinism . . A leksandrov. T he liberty and peace of th e Balkans. Protogerov and P. In the spring of 1924 negotiation:! were carried on in V ienna w ith representatives of th e T hird Intel national. th eir flag. will only be a tta in e d by m ovem ents for national liberation which will break. W e w an t liberty and peace for our countries and our peoples! W e know also th a t this lib erty and this peace are n o t graciously gran ted b u t m ust be conquered by a desperate struggle! A nd we are beginning this struggle! T h is first issue of La federation balkanique also contained a declai ation of policy signed on behalf of the C entral C om m ittee of the M acedonian O rganization by T . In addition it urged a Balkan federation. a fortnightly periodical published in V ienna in all th e Balkan languages as well as in G erm an and French. a t any rate. it added. which finally will be eager to unite its forces into a single B alkan front directed against Chauvinism and conquering im perialism from what ever q u a rte r it m ay come. . through th e B alkan fedei a tion. the w orking masses of their nation into a united national fro n t. T h e outcom e. W e wish to m ake it understood to all the citizens of th e B alkan stated th a t only the union of our countries and our peoples in a federation will perm it them to liberate them selves once and for all from political and economic servitude. I t favored th e dem ocratization of the Balkan states on the ground th a t th e n atu re of th eir governm ents would determ ine the fate of M acedonia. is to propagate the idea of the liberation and the rig h t of sell d eterm in atio n of the B alkan people as well as th a t of federalization .218 S m ith C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y who likewise stood for autonom y. the bonds which a tta c h them to the E uropean and B alkan governm ents. . . as soon as possible. which already in their foreign and dom estic policies have sufficiently deni o n strated th a t they are again st the liberty and self-determ ination of the peoples. . th a t th ey m ay cease to be th e arena where the la tte r settle their disastrous internal quarrels. . which will have aided and draw n upon their power for the so cial struggles of these sam e masses in neighboring countries. these aims could not be g a in e c I by cooperation w ith the E uropean or B alkan governm ents] . Who look p a rt in these negotiations and w h at agreemenl:. . were concluded is (lie subject of b itte r dispute to the present day.

p ara­ lyze the an n exationist asp iratio n s of th e B alkan state s and the im perialist tendencies of the E uropean states as well as guarantee a just solution for all th e national differences. In fact C haulev specifically 1 . C om m unist policies were adopted insofar as a i.is a forgery p erp etrated by th e Com m unists in an a tte m p t to ex­ ploit the prestige of th e M acedonian O rganization. for the selfdeterm ination of th eir peoples and of foreign peoples. immedin Iel у accused each o th er of responsibility for th e crimes. which alone can g u aran tee the political existence of an independ­ ent M acedonia and the independence of the rest of th e B alkan peo­ ples: satisfy th e economic an d cu ltu ral in terests of the B alkan states united on the principle of free access to th e three B alkan seas. against the existing peace treaties.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 219 .” 6 2 T h e publication of these docum ents n atu rally created a sensation md led to a series of extrem ely confusing charges. A t th e sam e tim e a w ave of m urders were com ­ mit led. T h e seminllicial Sofia journal. 1924 A leksandrov u. and the C om m unists an d th e Federalists on th e other. as th e supporters of i lie new policy were called to distinguish them from th e pro-B ulgarian M acedonians know n as Suprem ists. regimes an d to establish a B alkan federation. F irst A leksandrov and Protogerov denied th a t the C entral C om m ittee had issued th e above sta te m en t and branded 11 . T he responsibility for this mass butchery has not been ascertained to the p resent day. B u t no m ention " is m ade of soviet socialist republics. counter-charges iml assassinations.! In tern atio n al.1ted in an interview a t th is tim e th a t th e m ovem ent was n o t com­ munistic— th a t it stood for “p easan t proprietorship and dem ocracy in the bourgeois sense. favoring th e cultural developm ent of all th e eth n ic m inorities. T hen on A ugust 31. th e victim s being m ostly Federalists.ulical mass m ovem ent was to be organized to overthrow th e existiii). As m ight be <ypected th e Bulgarian governm ent and th e Suprem ists on th e one Iы nd. . T his was in­ dignantly denied by C haulev an d o thers who claimed to have been Ipresent when th e C entral C om m ittee discussed th e problem and II i ced on th e new policy. The significance of th is docum ent lies in th e fact th a t it represents alliance betw een th e M acedonian O rganization and th e Com m u­ n e .is assassinated and im m ediately th e re a fter the assassins were i lieinselves m urdered. sta te d th a t th e C om m unists atli uipted to gain control of th e M acedonian O rganization in order to hi " New York Tim es. it can depend only upon th e progressive and extrem e revolution­ ary m ovem ents of E urope struggling against the im perialist policy "I their governm ents. . 1924. Finally it was sta te d th a t th e com m ittee realized th a t . August 15. L a Bulgarie.

Bulgarian Conspiracy. In order to emphasize and publicize the federation idea. B alkan Firebrand.l. Finally it co n stan tly reiterated th a t th e only solution for th e sorry mess which it described to its readers lay in radical mass m ovem ents which would overthrow th e prevailing re gimes. on th e one hand. K ing A lexander’s dictatorship in Y ugoslavia. W h at do you th in k . 169-202.220 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y throw " th e entire peninsula into th e chaos of revolution. Do you believe in the possibility of realizing a B alkan Federa­ tion through the present governm ents? 5.” and that A leksandrov was m urdered because of his refusal to cooperate with them . W h a t is.5 3 On w hichever side th e guilt m ay rest. I t strove to . of a F ederation of th e Balkan 53 A bibliography on this subject is given in Swire. UnTights of ethnic m inorities are sufficiently respected and guar an teed? 3. op. is strongly anti-Stam bolilski and on the w hole pro-M ihailovist. establish “ tru ly dem o cratic” governm ents. is anti-Com m uni:. T odorov. Logio. 25. and Christowe. an d organized or stim ulated various international organizations to furnish relief and to bring pressure to bear on I Ingovernm ents concerned. cit. F or th a t reason Aleksan­ d ro v and his followers were m assacred and then th e assassins in tin и were killed to m ake sure th a t th ey would n o t reveal who had given th e orders. 332-336. th e editors drew up a questionnaire w hich read as follows: 1. C. 181-192. th e reactionary regimes in the o th er B alkan countries an d th e general oppression of national m inorities.il tra c t th e a tte n tio n of W estern E urope to the sta te of affairs existing in th e B alkans. and to the rivalries which set the B alkan states against each o th er on tino th er hand? 4. Heroes and A ssassin s. I t denounced th e Ita lia n dom ination of AI b ania an d Ita lia n intrigue th ro u g h o u t th e peninsula. th e m eans w hich will p u t an end l o th e oppression of ethnic m inorities. Do you consider the p resent solution of th e M acedonian ques tion as conform ing to the principles of justice and liberty. . it carried on a cam paign along th e lines in d icated in its first issue. Bulgaria. th e Suprem ist M acedonian leader. ан well as to th e in terests of peace? 2.. in general. and G. Do you believe th a t. u nder th e present B alkan reaction. ch . 10. P a st anil Present (M anchester. th e fact rem ains th a t Tm federation balkanique had been launched and for eight storm y yeai: betw een 1924 and 1931. T h e m ost detailed and m ost convincing pro-Stam bolilski and pro-federali I accounts are given in Swire. were alarm ed by the new federation m ovem ent and doubted th e sincerity of A leksandrov’s public repudiation of it. I t ceaselessly opposed th e W hite T erro r in B ulgaria. in your opinion. 9. 1936). T he com m unists and F ederalists replied th a t th e Bulgarian governm ent and M ihailov. and th u s make possible th e creation of a B alkan federation.

w riters and academ ic people such as A lbert E instein. In general th e C om m u­ nists and left-wing Socialists stressed th e need for prelim inary revo­ lution and fundam ental social changes. T here was a wide difference of opinion. how• ver.1926. JeanUichard Bloch. I d w ard B ernstein. A uguste I'orel. Stefan R adich and I'.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 221 peoples and w h at are. As for th e peninsula n elf. use of th e b allo t an d cooperation w ith th e League "I N ations. Joseph Redlich. L ittle can be deduced from the d a ta available on this i|m\4tionnaire. the conditions under which it could be realized?6 4 Between 1926 and 1930 th is questionnaire was sen t to a large num ber of p rom inent individuals an d th eir replies were published in the phper. La federation balkanique continued to be published until April I‘>31. A.carrying on of revolutionary activities w ithin th e peninsula. while th e m oderate Socialists i in I th e liberals depended m ore on peaceful m eans such as educa­ tional cam paigns. certain M ace­ donian leaders such as V lahov and C haulev form ed a rival organizaI iihi. in y o u r opinion. . George L ansbury. I t can be said. H enri Barbusse. T h is body adhered to th e principles of the I 'i elaration published on Ju ly 15. and scieni isl s. I t is difficult to estim ate th e e x te n t of its influence during the ' ven years of its existence because no circulation figures are avail11ile. W hen th e In tern al M acedonian R evolutionary O rganization 1. b u t it does indicate th e existence of a widespread In ling am ongst E uropean liberals and radicals in favor of a Balkan federation. th a t it did serve to bring to th e a tten iк> n of certain circles in w estern E urope th e existence of pressing m inority and social problem s in th e B alkans and th e possibility of their solution by m eans of B alkan federation. A rth u r P onsonby and G. 1924 and cooperated closely w ith I lie Com m unists in th e publication of L a federation balkanique and in tin. February 1.11 led to ally itself as a body w ith th e C om m unists. A ulard and C harles Baudouin. as to how federation was to be attain ed . All of them con­ dem ned th e existing sta te of affairs in th e B alkans and practically ill of them favored th e creation of a federation and considered it possible of realization. Willi the expiration of th e journal. T hom as M ann. the Im ro U nited. Over one hundred and fifty persons responded. however. labor leaders such as Jam es M axton. D um oulin.in N oli. M. am ong l hem being statesm en such as Francesco N itti. th e effect of th e jo u rn al and of th e m ovem ent it represented i ' ins to have been one of radicalizing th e M acedonian revolutionii и s. these M acedonian leaders conIuiiied to oppose actively th e existing Balkan regimes and to strive " La federation balkanique.

A m o n g th e la tte r w as R ad ic h him self w ho died from th e effects of his w o u n d on A u g u st 8. A c c o rd in g ly th e A g ra ria n s to o k th eir se a ts in 1924 a n d b y M a rc h of t h a t y e a r P ash ich w as com pelled to resign. w as of b rief d u ra tio n . a g o v e rn m e n t s u p p o rte r fired u p o n leaders a n d m e m b e rs of th e C ro a tia n P e a s a n t P a r ty . T h e reco n ciliatio n . a lth o u g h still in p riso n him self. R a d ic h was u n a b le to w o rk w ith his colleagues a n d b y A pril 1926 th e coalition w as en d ed . how ev er. im p riso n ed R adich on ch a rg e s of high tre a so n a n d co n sp ira c y .222 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y for th e c re a tio n of a n a u to n o m o u s M a c e d o n ia w ith in a g en e ra l B alkan S o cialist F e d e ra tio n . 1928. D u rin g th e n e x t tw o y e a rs p olitical tu rm o il ag ain pre­ vailed a n d reach ed a crisis w hen on J u n e 20. d u rin g a b itte i d e b a te in th e S k u p s h tin a . H e a p p a re n tly h o p e d b y th is su d d en rev ersal of policy to g ain concessions b y p a rlia m e n ta ry a c tio n . A so-called “ consti tu ti o n ” w as issued th re e y e a rs la te r. he a n n o u n c e d t h a t th e C ro a tia n P e a s a n t P a r ty was re a d y to recognize th e m o n a rc h y . In th e m e a n tim e in Y u g o sla v ia th e fe d e ra list p a rtie s h a d been su p p re sse d a n d a ro y a l d ic ta to rs h ip e sta b lish e d . b u t a c tu a lly th e d ic ta to rsh ip . D e sp ite th e se m easu res th e C ro a tia n P e a s a n t P a rty elected p ra c tic a lly th e sam e n u m b e r of d e p u tie s a s before. killing tw o a n d w ound ing sev eral o th e rs. A lth o u g h th e C ro a tia n P a r ty had gain ed s e v e n ty s e a ts in th e 1923 electio n s. R a d ic h w as now re­ leased from p riso n . R a d ic h refu sed th e p ro p o sa l. a n d in ste a d . th u s e n d in g th e pos sib ility of a Y u g o slav fe d e ra tio n . R a d ich fo u n d it necessary to seek refu g e a b ro a d d u rin g th e n e x t y e a r. 1929 a b ro g a te d th e C o n stitu tio n of 1921. a n d even th e C onsti tu tio n of 1921. F inally K in g A le x a n d e r in 1925 d issolved th e S k u p sh tin a . T h e Com m u n is ts now offered to form a u n ite d fro n t w ith R a d ic h alo n g tinsam e lines a s th e ir a llian ce w ith th e M a ced o n ian O rg an iza tio n in B u lg a ria . a n d in N o v e m b e r 1925 h e e n te re d th e c a b in e t as m inis te r of e d u c a tio n . F a ce d w ith th is situ a tio n K in g A lex an d er on J a n u a r y 5. a n d d u rin g th e succeeding electo ral cam p a ig n used s tro n g -a rm ta c tic s in a n a tte m p t to crush th e o p p o sitio n . m em b ers of h is p a r ty w ere given p o rtfo lio s in the g o v e rn m e n t. D u rin g th e follow ing m o n th s g o v e rn m e n t in Y u g o slav ia prac­ tic a lly cam e to a s ta n d s till a s m in is try follow ed m in istry . b u t R a d ich now cam e to the co nclusion t h a t th e o n ly re s u lt of his p a r t y ’s a b s te n tio n w as to p e r­ p e tu a te P a sh ic h in pow er. T h e C ro a tia n d e p u ties th e re u p o n w ith d re w from th e S k u p s h tin a a n d se t u p a riv a l b o d y a I Z ag reb w h ere th e y p assed re so lu tio n s refu sing to recognize law s e n ­ a c te d b y th e “ R u m p ” S k u p s h tin a a t B elgrade. T h e C ro a tia n d ep u tie s ag ain refu sed to s it in th e S k u p s h tin a . d issolved all p o litical p a rtie s a n d estab lish e d a p erso n a l dic­ ta to r s h ip in an effort to re sto re n a tio n a l u n ity . th e d y n a s ty .

F o r th e C o m m u n ists a n d S o cialists a n d A g ra ria n s. ram a n d p h ilo so p h y . T h is w as in e v ita b ly so for th e C o m m u n ists an d S ocialists w ho w ere tra d itio n a lly a n ti-w a r.66 In conclusion. “ S ee M a ca rtn ey . H u n g a ry a n d her Successors. T h u s I lie p o ssib ility of fe d e ra tio n fro m below w as e lim in a ted . tr u s ts a n d th e o th e r sym bols of age-lo n g e x p lo ita tio n . 3 6 8 -3 7 5 . b u re a u c rac ie s. T h e d esire fo r a fe d e ra tio n w as. m o re th a n a n y o th e r fa c to r. In fa c t. In p ra c tic a lly e v e ry o th e r re sp e c t th e se g ro u p s w ere m u tu a lly .h i ( ag o n istic.iss. for it w as esse n tia l for th e re a liz a tio n of th e ir aim s. S im ila rly th e A g rarian s w ere e q u a lly a n ti-w a r a n d in te rn a tio n a lly m in d ed a n d envisaged som e s o rt of an in te rn a tio n a l p e a s a n t o rg a n iz a tio n w hich would rid th e m of d y n a stie s. “ C o n stitu tio n a l C h an ges in Y u g o sla v ia . T h is d id n o t m ean. w ho th o u g h t in te rm s of in te rn a tio n a l classes r a th e r th a n n a tio n a l s ta te s . th e o n ly tie b e tw ee n lliem . conii ib uted to th e d e fe a t of th e la b o r a n d a g ra ria n m ass m o v e m e n ts a n d Iо (he triu m p h of th e forces of re a c tio n in th e B a lk a n P e n in su la . fo r th e se g ro u p s fe d e ra tio n was all im p o rta n t. T h u s . how ever. T h e p e a s a n ts w ith th e ir h ig h ly develo p ed sense of p ro p e rty rig h ts m is tru s te d a n d feared th e u rb a n w o rk ers a n d th e i.is d a n g e ro u s a n d irresp o n sib le e x tre m ists w hile th e C o m m u n ists corned th e S ocialists as co m p ro m isers a n d b e tra y e rs of th e w o rk in g • l. th e significance of th e se d e v e lo p m e n ts in th e im ­ m e d iate p o st-w a r y e a rs is t h a t fo r th e first tim e th e B a lk an fe d e ra tio n m o v em en t h a d secu red a m ass basis. a n d w ho foresaw . T h e S o cialists d e n o u n c e d th e C o m m u n ists . . a n d th e w ork s th erein i ilrd .” P o litic a l Science Q uarterly. h ow ever. L V (D ecem b er.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 223 rem ain ed in force to a g re a te r o r less d egree. ho w ev er. B a lk an fed eratio n w as v e ry m u ch in th e a ir in th e n in e te en th irtie s b u t th e idv o cates w ere th e n p rim a rily lib eral in te lle c tu a ls w ho h o p ed to iilla in th e ir e n d s b y p e rsu a sio n a n d e d u c a tio n r a th e r th a n b y ra d ic a l oeial ch an g e. u n til th e ev e of th e G er­ m an in v asio n tw elv e y e a rs la te r . a n d D .in u ltim a te w orld so cialist o r c o m m u n ist fe d e ra tio n . 5 8 2 -5 9 3 . th e e n d of all fe d e ra tio n a tte m p ts . 1940). T h e w o rk ers in tu r n w ere w eakened b y la c k of u n ity . H ith e rto B alk a n c o o p era tio n i nd fe d e ra tio n h a d been th e d re a m of iso lated id e alists a n d of p o w er­ less re v o lu tio n ists.idical m o v e m e n ts asso c ia te d w ith th e m . I t w as th is d issension w h ich . T om aSic. o r th e slo g an of d ip lo m a ts a n d s ta te s m e n w ho . fed e ra tio n c o n s titu te d a fu n d a m e n ta l a n d in te g ra l p a r t of th e ir p ro г.ilm ost in v a ria b ly w ere in te re s te d p rim a rily in n a tio n a l a g g ra n d ise ­ m en t.

1934). 29-32. would lead to political rapprochem ent and would be econom ically advantageoiiH for both th e B alkans and th e rest of E urope. D iourdievitch. W ith th e suppression of these elem ents th e ch aracter of th e federation m ovem ent changed. there appeared in Sofia the first num ber of a daily jo u rn al entitled B alkanski Zgovor [B alkan Entente ]. M alinov and I.2 1 Stragnakovitch. 224 . th e C om m unists and th e Socialists. B ulgaria was involved in the w ar and th e continued publication of th e jo urnal becam e im possible. In th e previous decade th ey m ade a few a tte m p ts to win p opular su p p o rt b u t w ith very little success. to es tablish closer relations. was to prom ote a rapprochem ent am on^ the B alkan states. and th e political leaders A. 2 TchSd. an d th ey hoped to a tta in this end b y th e form ation of a B alkan federation. Un contribution yougoslavr 4 l ’histoire du m ouvem en t.1 Som ew hat sim ilar was the new spaper cam paign begun in 1926 by C. On Ju ly 28. 1915. Georgevich in favor of a B alkan custom s union. Individuals an d organizations w ith liberal tendencies now assumed th e leadership.” L es B alkans. The aim of its editor. and ev en tu ally to unite w ithin a federal fram ew ork. N either th e govern­ m ents nor th e general public showed a n y appreciable interest in thin schem e. it was claimed. T h eir prim ary concern was not social reform bn I ra th e r the m aintenance of peace. M ishev. 1930-1941 D uring th e decade following th e peace settlem ent th e m ost im­ p o rta n t and consistent cham pions of B alkan federation were the A grarians. V (M arch-April. Unlike their radical prede­ cessors th e y did n o t organize m ass revolutionary parties for the overthrow of existing governm ents. however. and various articles in su pport of this end were contributed b y such figures as th e English jo u rn alist Jam es Bour chier. In spite of the refusal of m ost journals to publish his articles. In stead th ey sought by various p ro paganda m ethods to win th e su p p o rt of public opinion and thereby to induce th e B alkan governm ents to settle their differences. Oeuvre du rapprochement. 218-224. Georgevich organized in 1928 th e “ In ter-B alk an Association for Peace and P ro sp erity . T hese liberal advocates of federation did n o t suddenly come to life in th e nineteen thirties. “ Vers l’union balkanique.” In Ju n e 1929 th is group sent to the principal journals and statesm en of th e B alkan an d W estern E uropean countries a sta tem en t urging the creation of a B alkan custom s union w hich.C H A P T E R IX T H E T H IR D BA LK A N A L L IA N C E S Y ST E M . Geshov. W ithin a few m onths. for exam ple. D. G eneral Savov. E.

Leipsig and o th e r centres. In th e case of th e B uxtons. 1919). P etk ov.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 225 In th e m eantim e. ' I). In Ja n u a ry 1930 l hose various groups. Noel B uxton. 220. an excellent stu d y was published which de­ scribed Serbo-B ulgarian relations in th e p ast.4 In th is respect there should be noted th e w ork of th e Balkan C om m ittee which in the pre-w ar period had wielded its influence on behalf of reform in M acedonia. and then. I’. m u st be th e com m on •Iream of all th eir peoples. I w a n t you to m ake y our friends in (1 recce and B ulgaria realize th e b rillian t b u t fleeting o p p o rtu n ity which now presents itself. M unich. Prague. as a resu lt of th e influence of R adich and Stam boliiski. P . L a federation balkanique (Sofia.6 I hc question m ay well be raised w hether th e British governm ent was not more interested in obtaining th e aid of th e B alkan sta tes th a n in in-curing th eir federation. were sent on a semi-official mission to B ulgaria w ith th e following in structions from W inston < hurchill: T he creation of a B alkan C onfederation com prising B ulgaria. under th e auspices of th is League. M ichev and B. in order to coordinate th eir activities. Serbia. Leese. M ontenegro and Greece. L. th ey published a book entitled The W ar and the Haitians in which th ey foresaw th e fulfillm ent of th e territorial as­ pirations of th e B alkan states a t th e expense of th e H apsburg and O ttom an Em pires. Toulouse. 6 Cf. Berlin. for exam ple. a fter th eir i г I urn from B ulgaria. Buxton and C. a num ber of societies for th e fu rtherance of Y ugoslav unity were organized in Belgrade. C harles Roden Buxton. 72. R oum ania. G eneva.” In th e sam e year.3 Liberals in th e w estern E uropean countries were also interested in Balkan federation.6 W ith th e o utbreak of th e W orld W ar.md for th e Union of all th e S outh S lavs. supra. 37-45. supra. . these instructions coincided perfectly w ith views which th ey had held and с -pressed for decades. an d called for th e form ation of a united Y ugoslav state. . Balkan Problems and European Peace (London. 1931). Jam es B ourchier and other loaders of th e C om m ittee sought to bring Bulgaria over to th e side ■ ■ I the E n ten te Powers. 178-182. of th is League. In th e spring of 1915. 1 1 N. and to assure them th a t E ng land’s m ight and perseverance will n o t be w ithheld from an y righteous effort to secure th e stren g th and union of th e B alkan peoples. denounced Ita lia n ini rigues am ongst th e M acedonians. . * Cf. strong enough to play ■h i effective p a rt in th e destinies of E urope. however. УI. . 221.iris. In fact in th e a u tu m n of 1914 Noel B uxton . com bined lo form th e “ League for th e R approchem ent of th e Serbs and Bulgars . as was a p p a re n t in th e replies to th e question­ naire of L a federation balkinique . Vienna. if any.md his brother. N o m aterial is available concerning th e later activities.

226 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y T here will be nothing to p revent harm onious co-operation. R. 409415. M oreover the relations betw een the B alkan states were 7 N . 112. 151 (April. 131 (June. 1915).” Queen's Quarterly. and C. . 155 (April. 640-653. A t th e end of the w ar th e main preoccupation of th e Balkan C om m ittee was to prevent th e m u tilation of Bulgaria. I t is no t likely for some tim e th a t this harm ony will take the form of a federation. th a t Ita lia n pen etratio n in A lbania be checked. 121. T h e case for the p erm an en t representation of th e B alkan Federation upon th e Coun­ cil of th e League of N ations would be irrefu tab le.. Buxton. having the m axim um of liberty to each individual member. op. I t is highly probable th a t such an alliance would lead in a very few years to some form of com m ercial union. 1941). and th a t Greece re­ ceive C yprus and th e D odekanese Islands. See also J. “ Bulgaria.9 T h e failure of these various liberal organizations to m ake any progress during the nineteen tw enties is due to several reasons. Bourchier. In the first place each of the Balkan governm ents was too concerned with pressing internal problem s. For th e first tim e in history we are p erm itted to con­ tem p late a sta te of affairs in which th e g au n t spectre of B alkan hatred and of B alkan w ar will be finally laid to re st. cit. I t will be a defensive alliance.7 D ue to various political and m ilitary factors the B ulgarian gov­ ern m en t cast in its lot w ith th e C entral Powers. . . 258-267. 9 Stavrianos.” Nineteenth Century and After. 1939). w hich would prom ote the m aterial prosperity of all th e S tates. 1927). 733-740. See also the follow ing articles by the chairm an of the Balkan Com­ m ittee. th ey were unsuccessful in securing th e adoption of an y of th eir recom m endations.8 A fter th e signing of th e T re a ty of N euilly the C om m ittee devoted it­ self to th e ta sk of securing some revision of th e frontiers in th e hope th a t th is would lead to a rapprochem ent am ong th e Balkan states. 1939. “T h e Balkan C om m ittee.” Contemporary Review. 404-409. and as a resu lt the Balkan S tates will present a united front tow ards any em pire which m ight endeavor to bring pressure upon them from w ithout. A lthough th e Com m ittee m em bers m ade frequent rep resentations to th e B ritish governm ent and published num erous articles. to pay m uch a tte n tio n to plans for closer interB alkan ties. social unrest. a section of M acedonia and a suitable freehold p o rt on th e A egean. Specifically it advocated th a t Bulgaria be given Southern D obrudja. X L V III (Autum n. If this conception took shape. 8 Buxton and Leese. . The W ar and the B alkans (London.” Contemporary Review. 1937). D.” Contemporary Review. L X X X V I (October. “T h e Scram ble for the B alkans. in which case. a Balkan Federation becomes possible. In stead it urged a peace settlem en t based on th e self-determ ination of peoples. a new G reat Power would come into being and ‘the Balkans for the B alkan peoples’ would be achieved a t last. “Towards Balkan U n ity . 1919). such as unem ploym ent. and m inority claims. Sir Edward B oyle: “Serbia and the M acedonians.

” Foreign I (fairs. A fter signing treaties of alli­ ance w ith Czechoslovakia (Jan u ary 15. T his preponderance of the satiated powers did no t lead to political stab ility in southeastern Europe because of th e in terv en tio n of th e G reat Powers. 1927). I ranсe concluded treaties of friendship w ith R oum ania (June 10. 478-482. Ita ly strove to safeguard her exposed geographical position l>y gaining p aram o u n t influence in A lbania. These rival alliance system s n atu rally aroused suspicions and m utual d istru st am ongst b o th th e Balkan sta te s and th e G reat Powers. however. 1928). VI (April. C onsequently the succession states combined to form th e L ittle E n te n te as a precaution ag ainst Bul­ garian a. The offer was rejected b u t Ita ly continued to sabotage efforts to effect a rapprochem ent betw een B ulgaria and her neighbors by aiding the M acedonian bands in th eir raids into Greece and Y ugoslavia. the Italian govern­ ment hurriedly proposed an anti-Y ugoslav alliance to Stam boliiski with the aim of elim inating th e possibility of such a federation. . B ritain rem ained more in the background b u t dislike of French dom ination of the co n tin en t led her to m aintain cordial relations w ith Ita ly during l licse years. B ulgaria and A lbania— while the Italians 10 Todoroff. T he Yugoslavs accused Ita ly of seeking to encircle them w ith h e r satelites— H ungary. These conflicting interests of th e G reat Powers inevitably had l heir effect upon in ter-B alkan relations. In 1920. France sought allies in the B alkans to b u ttress her m ilitary hegem ony in Europe. I ta ly ’s greatest gain.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 2 27 far too unsettled.10 Ita ly also strengthened her position in th e eastern M editerranean by sign­ ing a series of friendship treaties w ith Greece and R oum ania in 1926. T his left Ita ly no choice b u t to upport th e revisionist sta te s if she were to retain a foothold in the Italkans. T hereby F rance becam e the p atro n and defender of the •tutus quo in so utheastern E urope. securing control of the ‘> t raits of O tran to and preventing th e establishm ent of a strong power in th e B alkans and especially on th e D alm atian coast. 1925). for exam ple. 1926) an d w ith Yugoslavia (initialled M arch 1926 and signed N ovem ­ b e r 11. In this way F ran co -Italian rivalry sharpened and made much more dangerous th e differences betw een th e B alkan states. I lungary in 1927 and T u rk ey in 1928. 1924 and O ctober 16.nd especially H ungarian revisionism . when there existed w idespread public opinion in lavor of the creation of a Y ugoslav federation. was m ade in A lbania w here a v irtu a l p ro tecto rate was established by i h e Treaty of T iran a in 1926 and th e tre a ty of alliance in th e following \car. “T he M acedonian Organization Y esterday and T o d a y . T he T re a ty of N euilly had left Bulgaria a revisionist power and she was unwilling to conclude agreem ents involving recog­ nition of th e territo rial status quo.

] . P . and arb itratio n .228 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d ie s in H is t o r y accused th e French an d Y ugoslavs of the sam e m otives in concluding th eir agreem ent. however. 1931). T he re-establishm ent of friendly relations betw een Greece and Yugoslavia was followed alm ost im m ediately by a decided re­ laxation in th e tension betw een Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. and a more detailed account in A. some­ tim es alm ost to th e poin t of war. and ten days la ter the two countries concluded a tre a ty of friendship. 1930 a convention was signed a t A ngora in which a final settlem en t was reached on all o u tstanding problem s. In M arch 1929. 143ff. [Hereafter referred to as Survey of International A ffairs. Survey of International Affairs. 1 1 A brief analysis of Balkan diplom acy during th is period is given in E . MacCallum. A mixed Bulgaro-Y ugoslav Commission began negotiations a t P iro t in F ebru­ ary 1929 and by F eb ru ary 1930 it succeeded in achieving a settlem ent of th e vexed question of properties which were divided by th e frontier and in concluding an agreem ent for th e m aintenance of order and security along th e border. conciliation. reparation pay­ m ents and the liquidation of th e property of th e exchanged minorities. R elations betw een th e tw o countries had been strained. T oyn b ee. F or alm ost a decade th e difficulty of establishing a sm oothly working system for th e tra n sit of Y ugoslav goods through Salonica was the chief obstacle in th e w ay of a com plete understanding betw een Yugo­ slavia and Greece. including property settlem en t following th e exchange of m inorities and th e sta tu s and tre a tm e n t of M oslems in W estern T hrace and of G reeks in Con­ stantinople. A t th e sam e tim e Greece and T urkey were settling th eir differ­ ences. a pro­ tocol for naval lim itation. B ulgaria and Greece had still to come to term s regarding a Bulgarian o u tle t to th e Aegean. J. A bout 1929 inter-B alkan relations im proved considerably wit h th e conclusion of a series of agreem ents settling long-standing dis­ putes." Foreign P olicy Reports. by various issues. and a tre a ty of commerce and navigation.1 1 D espite this series of agreem ents the situation was as y et by no m eans com pletely settled. 5-17. 1931). “ Recent Balkan Alignm ents. 1930 (Oxford. n eu trality . T h u s in Ju n e 10. T he first was th e G reek-Y ugoslav p act concerning Salonica. Greece and T urkey. a convention was signed which m et these difficulties. VII (M arch 18. T he Yugoslavs were dissatisfied w ith th e m anage­ m ent of th e G reek section of th e Belgrade-Salonica Railroad and claim ed th a t freight charges were too high and th a t th e p o rt facilities a t Salonica were inadequate. conciliation and judicial settlem ent. Four m onths later the rapprochem ent was com pleted by th e conclusion of a tre a ty of friendship. In 1930 negotiations were recommenced and were aided by th e encouragem ent of M ussolini who had hopes of a trip a rtite tre a ty of friendship and a rb itra tio n am ong Ita ly .

1 3 In addition to th is catastro p h ic drop in prices there was a very considerable decline in th e q u a n tity of exports. On the effects of the depression. Economic Intelligence Service. Czechoslovakia and B ritain together increased by some 15% betw een 1925 29 and 1930-34. The Balkan countries being predom inantly ag ricu ltu ral. T his im provem ent of relations was one of th e factors which induced certain individuals to call a Balkan Conference in th e hope of furthering Balkan unity. while th a t of so utheastern Europe declined considerably. 103. T h ey must lie sought and applied by m eans of a general agreem ent between all consum ing and p r o d u c in i: countries. 13 League of N ations. 1940). olive oil— 32.8% . 1943). 1 . I'M I). 104. M oreover Y u g o slavia still regarded A lbania suspiciously and F ranco-Italian rivalry and intrigue in th e peninsula was by no m eans ended.1 5 were p artic u ­ larly hard h it by th e d isproportionate drop in agricultural prices during th e depression. the value of th e principal export com m odities dropped as follows be tween 1929 and 1930: c u rra n ts— 17. w here m ost of them were grown. Roum anian M inister of A griculture.1 6Accordingly eight east E uropean ag rarian states— including B ulgaria. G erm any. 117ff. (Inform ation D epartm ent Papers.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n Bulgaria and R oum ania were also a t odds over th e treatm ent of Bu! garians in the D obrudja and various p ro p erty issues. In Greece. R oyal In stitute of International A ffairs. w heat and maize. In R oum ania 40 to 45% of th e to ta l national income w a s derived from th e cu ltivation of cereals and during the sam e period they dropped in value by 50% .261. . A nother factor was th e world-wide economic depression. 3. wrote in 1931: “Solutions no longer depend on individual G overnm ents. T h e b est work on post-w ar econom ic developm ents in Central Kiiropr and the Balkans is A. Oxford. G enova. The Agricultural Crisis (G eneva. The Danube B asin and the German Economic Sphere (New York. 50. Europe's Trade. 54% in Greece. 16 T h u s Professor Jon Raducanu. 78% in Roum ania and 79% in Y ugoslavia. M editerranean products experienced a sim ilar decline in price.5% . no. N evertheless I life B alkan situ atio n w as m ore settled a t th e end of 1929 th an a I any o th er tim e in th e post-w ar period. olives— 13. In th a t sam e y ear th e tw o most i m p o r t a n t cereals produced in Y ugoslavia.1 4 This situ atio n forced th e statesm en of all these countries to the con­ clusion th a t purely natio n al m easures were no longer adequate and th a t concerted in tern atio n al action was necessary. I ' M I ) I. In B ulgaria betw een 1930 and 1931 c e r e a l s fell an average of 47% in price while tobacco fell 16% and eggs 25%. decreased in pi ii e by 18% and 53% respectively. leal tobacco— 12. Economic Committee. Basch.9% .” The Agricultural C risis. A S tu dy of the Trade of European Countries w ith Each Other and with the Rest of the World (League of N ations.6% . 2ft. Yugoslavia and 12 According to th e latest figures 81% of the total occupied population of Bulgaria is engaged in agriculture. 1 4 South-Eastern Europe. dried figs— 12. see ch. A B rief Survey.3% . T his was due partly to lack of purchasing power an d p a rtly to economic nationalism . l o r example. w heat production in France.

For details. A t th e opening of the plenary assem bly of th e first B alkan Con­ ference on O ctober 5. T he proposal was enthusiastically received and on M ay 12. . th e In tern atio n al L abor Office. see supra. N evertheless th e mere holding of these conferences pointed th e w ay to sim ilar action in the political field. a form er Prim e M inister of Greece. Its function was to 16 A brief survey of these agrarian conferences is given in G eshkoff. 4. th e V ice-President of th e G rand N ational A ssem bly a t Angora. S. 150. 151. to request several international organiza­ tions to sponsor th e calling of a B alkan conference. T he delegates included such personages as th e President of th e R oum anian C ham ber of D eputies. T h e Commission on O rganization was successful in securing the adoption of its proposed sta tu te . an illustrious assem blage was on hand. form erly prem ier of Greece. T he aim of this agrarian bloc was to form a custom s union which could bargain on equal term s w ith th e indus­ trialized states of W estern E urope. cit. th e w ork of th e conference was en trusted to six commissions w hich had been appointed to stu d y th e various problem s of federa­ tion.. By th e end of Ju n e all of th e Balkan states had signified th eir approval of the conference and m ade ap p ro p riate arrangem ents for th e sending of delegates. Among th e observers were th e diplom atic corps a t A thens and representatives of the League of N ations Secre­ ta ria t. T he G reek governm ent offered the hall of th e G reek C ham ­ ber of D eputies for th e use of th e meeting. 144-147. Vers I’union balkanique (Paris. ch. Balkan Union. to be known as th e Balkan Conference. th e In terp arliam en tary Union and various o th er in te rn a ­ tional organizations. see Basch. P. 1930 the Intern atio n al B ureau of Peace a t G eneva sent to th e six B alkan foreign m inisters a circular in v itation to a tte n d a B alkan Conference in A thens in O ctober. 1934). and th e profound social repercussions of th e economic crash served as a spur to actio n . the In tern atio n a l Peace B ureau. A fter the prelim inary series of welcoming a d ­ dresses. 17 A. Papanastassiou. P ap a n ­ astassios suggested th a t a semi-official conference be called to consider th e possibilities of a federation of th e Balkan states.230 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d ie s in H is t o r y R oum ania— held tw o conferences in A ugust and O ctober 1930 in W arsaw and B ucharest.17 A fter a num ber of fruitless proposals he gained th e su pport of th e U niversal Peace C ongress. 18 For the earlier activities of this organization in behalf of Balkan federation. and nu m er­ ous senators and deputies.1 6 These favorable circum stances led A lexander Papanastassios. A perm anent organization was estab ­ lished. A few more conferences were held b u t the bloc soon becam e a m ere appendage of th e League of N ations Commission of E n q u iry for E uropean Union. op.18 A t th e 1929 m eeting of th e Congress in A thens. 11.

and tak e a n y other action deemed necessary. this organization has nevertheless an official character. Balkan Union. T he organs of th e Conference were to be th e G eneral Assembly. representatives of peace organizations. R. Padelford. composed of politicians. N . finally. consisted of th e m em bers of p a st and present delegations. N ovem ber 5 -11. Istanbul. S. universities. Kerner and H. T h e S ecretariat was assigned th e custom ary d u ties and was financially supported by annual p ro -rata contributions. secretaries. 1931. fix the agenda. consisting of the chiefs and two m em bers of each delegation. rather than to present a de­ tailed factual account. P ap an astassio s: T hough based on the national groups. Several excellent. T heir d u ty was to win th e sup p o rt of all peace and politi­ cal groups and of the general public. 1940). cit. b u t also because the delegations of each cou n try to th e Conferences are chosen after consultation w ith the governm ent. Each cou n try was to be represented by th irty voting m em bers plus ex­ perts. I. 1933. and to su b m it an annual rep o rt of th eir activities. Council. A Road to Peace in South­ eastern Europe (N ew York. October 22-29. N . October 20-26. IV. Peace in the B alkans. J. Petrovich. III. and observers. A thens. to help select delegates for fu tu re conferences. L 'union et la conference balkanique (Paris. H oward. to w ork for th e application of the Conference resolutions in th eir co u n try . Salonica. 1934). II. G eshkoff. 1935). 46. 47. outstanding being Т . T he best description of th e ch aracter of this B alkan Conference is th a t by M. 1932. op. and though its decisions do n o t obligate th e govern­ m ents. and these governm ents are represented a t each C on­ ference b y th eir diplom atic officials (who follow th e deliberations in the capacity of observers) in the co u n try in which th e Conference m eets. 1936). 1930. not only because th e governm ents of the six countries su p p o rt the ac tiv i­ ties of th e national groups. S ecretariat and N ational G roups. 20 T h e locations and dates of the four conferences were: I. annual confer­ ences were held betw een th e years 1930 and 1933. was to serve as th e executive body of th e Conference. Vers Vunion balkanique.19 In accordance w ith th e provisions of th is sta tu te .B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 231 prom ote Balkan cooperation in economic. Its task s were to m eet betw een sessions. approve th e budget.. T h e follow ing account of these conferences is intended to sum m arize and interpret the proceedings and results. The Movement towards International Organization in the B alkans (N ew York. Bucharest. The Balkan Con­ ferences and the Balkan Entente 1930-1935 (Berkeley. and Papanastassiou. in th e hope of m aking a B alkan union u lti­ m ately practicable. J. T he Council. T he Conference was to m eet annually in each of I lie B alkan countries in tu rn an d th e president of th e conference was to be th e le a d e r of the delegation in whose co u n try the conference m et in a n y given year. O ctober 5-13. intellectual and political intercourse. .20 T he results of these conferences were very sim ilar to those of the League of N ations 19 Papanastassiou. T he N a­ tional G roups. social. and professional organizations. full-length studies of the conferences are available.

a p p o in tin g w om en police officers and p ro v id in g for m o re carefu l in sp e c tio n a t fro n tiers. p o in tin g o u t th a t th e ir s u p p o rt w as a p re re q u isite fo r success. T h is o rg a n iz a tio n w as to be re la te d to a n d p e rfo rm th e sam e fu n c tio n s as 31 S ee G eshk off. c re a tio n of lib ra rie s a n d p ro fe sso rsh ip s to em p h asize B a lk a n ism . p ro v id in g fo r e q u a l rig h ts a n d privileges. tra n s la tio n of B a lk a n folklore in to th e v a rio u s B a lk a n la n g u a g es. T h e C om m ission on In te lle c tu a l C o o p e ra tio n p o in te d o u t to th e fir. op. a lth o u g h th e la tte r n e v e r a c tu a lly fu n c ­ tio n e d .. T h is led to th e fo rm a tio n of th e P e rm a n e n t C om m ission of B a lk a n J u r is ts a n d of th e B a lk a n H isto ric a l I n s titu te . a b o litio n of ch ild la b o r a n d p r o s titu tio n . 2 4 7 -2 5 1 . 1 6 6 -1 8 0 . A t th e 1932 B u c h a re s t C onferen ce th e re w as a d o p te d a d r a f t c o n v e n tio n on th e s ta tu s of aliens. e q u al tr e a tm e n t of foreign w o rk ers. 193 3 ). c it. an d P etro v ich . A t th e la s t con­ feren ce a d r a f t s ta tu te of a B a lk a n L a b o r Office w as a d o p te d . Som e progress h a d b een m a d e alo n g th e se lines b y th e tim e of th e second conference. c it. O th e r p la n s w hich w ere considered a t la te r co n ferences w ere th e u n ificatio n of B a lk an law a n d th e e s ta b ­ lish m e n t of a com m o n in s titu te of h isto ric a l research . op. 2 0 9 -2 1 6 . A B a lk a n A sso ciatio n h a d b een form ed a n d n a tio n a l p ress associa­ tio n s c re a te d . T h e final a rtic le of th e co n v e n tio n s tip u la te d t h a t it should b e p a r t of a genera! B a lk a n p a c t. a n d t h e works th e re cited .22 T h e co n feren ce f u r th e r called on th e g o v e rn m e n ts to e lim in a te th e traffic in w om en a n d ch ild re n b y a d o p tin g th e L eag u e of N a tio n ’s C h ild ren C h a rte r. 3 6 3 -3 7 0 ..232 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d ie s in H is t o r y a t G en ev a. B u carest 2 2 -2 9 octobre 1932 (B u ch a rest. R e so lu tio n s w ere a d o p te d in fa v o r of th e im p ro v e m e n t a n d c o lla b o ra tio n of s a n ita r y services. a n d u rg ed a t th e first co n feren ce t h a t serio u s a tte n tio n be g iv en to th e precario u s p lig h t of th e a g ric u ltu ra l a n d in d u s tria l w o rkers.. m odifi­ c a tio n of te a c h in g so as to serv e th e cau se of p eac e. op.21 T h e C om m ission on Social a n d H e a lth P ro b lem s m a d e a th o ro u g h s tu d y of social leg islatio n in th e v a rio u s c o u n trie s. 2 7 7 -2 8 3 . a th le tic a n d sch o lastic c o m p e titio n s.. op. . a n d ra tific a tio n of th e c o n v e n tio n s a n d re c o m m en d atio n s a d o p te d b y th e I n te r n a tio n a l L a b o r Office a t G en ev a. an d tra n sla ted an d rep rin ted in G eshk off. a n d th e celeb ra ­ tio n of a B a lk a n W eek in each c o u n try a t a fixed d a te . c it. calling fo r ex changes of stn d e n ts a n d p ro fesso rs. an d K ern er an d H ow ard . T h e co m m issio n s co n cern ed w ith n o n -p o litica l p roblem s w ere a b le to m a k e slow b u t a p p re c ia b le p ro g ress a t each conference.si co n feren ce t h a t th e p re v a ilin g in te lle c tu a l iso latio n fo stered m isun d e rs ta n d in g a n d p re ju d ic e . 22 T e x t in I I I • Conference balkan iqu e. cit. [H ereafter referred to as I I I C B ]. T o re m e d y th e s itu a tio n a n elab o rate p ro g ra m w as s u b m itte d a n d a d o p te d . u n iv e rs ity s tu d e n ts a n d professors h a d exchanged v isits a n d som e effo rts h a d b een m a d e to org an ize e d u c a tio n а1опц B a lk a n r a th e r th a n n a tio n a l lines.

n os. 1 3 9 -1 4 0 . a n d each w as s u b o rd in a tin g econom ic w elfare to m ilita ry policies. 1 8 6 .B alkan F e d e r a t io n 233 I lie I n te rn a tio n a l L a b o r Office. . o p.th r o a t co m p e titio n fo r foreign m a rk e ts . A t su cceed in g conferen ces th e C om m ission d e v o te d itself la rg e ly to th e c o n sid e ra tio n of w a y s a n d m ean s of se cu rin g th e a p p lic a tio n of p ro p o sals w h ich h a d b een p re v io u sly a d o p te d b u t w hich re m a in e d u n fu lfilled . a n d th e e sta b lis h m e n t of a B alkan T o u r is ts ’ F e d e ra tio n to s tu d y a n d en co u ra g e to u r is t traffic. 34 I C B . a n d Y u g o sla v g o v e rn m e n ts a n d w as th u s a t le a st p a rtia lly a p p lie d . I t s findings w ere v e ry sim ila r to th o se of th e E a s t E u ro p e a n a g ric u ltu ra l conferences. I t w as g e n e ra lly ag reed t h a t a la rg e p e r­ cen tag e of B a lk a n p ro d u c e co u ld b e co n su m ed w ith in th e p en in su la . M o re specifically. p re p a re c o n v e n tio n s. T h e re s u lt w as c u t. 272 -276. op. T r a n sla te d an d rep rin ted in G esh k off. a n d s tu d y all q u e stio n s concern in g lab o r. th e c o n stru c tio n of tw o m ain tr u n k lines (rail a n d ro a d ) fro m th e B lack S ea to th e A d ria tic . w h ich in tu r n w ere s te a d ily conII ac tin g b ecau se of th e g e n e ra l econom ic crisis. T h e C om m ission a c c o rd in g ly u rg e d “ econom ic co lla b o ra ­ tio n ” as th e p re lu d e to u ltim a te econom ic u n io n . a n d tra n sla ted an d rep rin ted in G esh k off. 1931). 288.24 T h e con feren ce fu r th e r a p p ro v e d a d r a f t c o n v e n tio n fo r a B a lk an I’o sta l U nion w hich w ould p e rm it re d u c tio n of p o sta l r a te s b etw een B alkan c o u n trie s a n d w o u ld e x te n d .reek. 289. 23 T e x t in I V C B . sp eed u p . R a ilro a d s w ere few a n d th e ir usefulness w as d ecreased b y th e ex isten ce of som e n a rro w g a u g e lines. cit.. A t its p le n a ry session of O c to b e r 10 th e first con feren ce a d o p te d reso lu tio n s callin g fo r th e c o n tru c tio n of d ire c t rail. ro a d .1 8 7 . N o t a single b rid g e sp a n n e d th e D a n u b e in th e w hole B a lk a n a re a w hile A lb a n ia w as inaccessib le b y ra il o r b y h ig h w a y from a n y B alk an • I a te . M o re o v er each of th e Iialk an c o u n trie s w as th r e a te n e d w ith a c re d it crisis d u e to o v e r-b o r­ row ing. D ire c t te le g ra p h ic c o n n ec tio n s existed b etw een m o st of th e le a d in g cities b u t te le p h o n ic co m m u n icai ion w as still re la tiv e ly u n d e v e lo p e d . a n d reg u la riz e p o sta l Horvice in th e p e n in su la . a n d teleg ra p h ic lines b etw een all th e c a p ita ls . T h is c o n v e n tio n w as la te r a c c e p te d b y th e ('.. n a m e ly . cit. n T e x t of B a lk a n P o sta l U n io n in L es B a lk a n s. 5 2 8 -5 3 1 . collect a n d p u b lish la b o r inIu rin a tio n . 1 3 -1 4 (O cto b er-N o v em b er. II .m d from th e D a n u b e to th e A e g e a n . o p.23 T h e C om m ission o n C o m m u n ic a tio n s fo u n d t h a t a g r e a t d eal of im p ro v e m e n t w as n ec e ssa ry in th e tr a n s p o r ta tio n a n d c o m m u n ic a tio n facilities in th e B a lk a n c o u n trie s. a ir. cit. an d in K ern er ■ md H ow ard . T u rk is h . a n d y e t in te r-B a lk a n co m m erce a m o u n te d to o n ly n in e p e r c e n t of the to ta l foreign com m erce of th e s ta te s . 2 9 2 -3 0 1 .26 T h e C om m ission on E co n o m ic A ffairs s tu d ie d in d e ta il th e eco­ nom ic p o sitio n of e v e ry B a lk a n c o u n try a n d of th e p e n in su la as a whole..

co-ordinate policies. and of a C entral Balkan Commercial In stitu te . T he second conference adopted a resolution estab­ lishing th e Balkan C ham ber of Commerce and In d u stry . T he significance of this Convention is ap p aren t.. and to m ake special a rran g em en ts for products no t included in the preferential system . T his or­ ganization was p atte rn e d a fte r th e Intern atio n al C ham ber of Com­ m erce an d was intended to im prove economic relations. 147-162. exchange and tran s­ fer. unification of tariff nom enclature. T h e text of the C onvention on Regional Econom ic . and investigation of th e possibility of a m onetary union. designed to encourage commerce. an In ter-B alk an G rain Exchange.” Its expressed aim was to develop inter-B alkan trad e and to secure ef­ fective protection for Balkan goods in foreign m arkets. and a m aritim e section was added to it in 1933. H aving exam ined th e general economic situation a t th e first con­ ference. a C entral Cereal Office to coordinate production. A com m on com m ercial policy was to be adopted in order to stim ulate th e exportation of Balkan products to foreign m arkets. and sales. the Commission then devoted itself to th e developm ent of specific projects. Eco­ nom ic cooperation was to be fu rthered also by the rem oval of ob­ stacles to th e tra n sit of goods. a C entral Tobacco Office. Unlike th e C ham ber of Commerce and In d u stry set up in C onstantinople. op. collaboration betw een banks. composed of represen tatives of th e national offices. the adoption of a common policy of protection for Balkan products (es­ pecially tobacco). Other resolutions called for the creation of a Balkan C ham ber of A griculture modeled a fte r th e C ham ber of Commerce and In d u stry . and a Cen­ tra l Union of C ooperative Societies. T hese projects were fu rth er discussed a t B ucharest in 1932 and finally a t th e Salonica Conference in 1933 there was adopted the im p o rta n t “ D ra ft C onvention on Regional Economic E n te n te . advise m ethods of elim inating duplication and conflict. distribution.2 6 2e A convenient sum m ary of the work of the Com mission on Econom ic Affairs is given in Geshkoff. this P erm an ent Commission was to be a statecontrolled organ. cit. for it was designed to furnish an economic basis for political union. and before concluding a comm ercial tre a ty w ith an extra-B alkan sta te th e signa­ tories were to exchange views. I t was of­ ficially opened a t Istan b u l during th e celebration of Balkan W eek in M ay 1932. and propose new commercial agreem ents.234 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d ie s in H is t o r y th e first B alkan conference on O ctober 10 adopted resolutions ad­ v ocating the organization in each Balkan sta te of an office for the stu d y of com m ercial questions. A Com pensation C ham ber was to be established to facilitate tran sactions in credits. M ore im p o rtan t was the P erm anent Commerce Commission. T o attain these ends th e contracting parties were to g ra n t m utual m ost-favoredn ation tre a tm e n t in th eir tariff arrangem ents.

com m unications. cit. T h u s a week before th e first conference was Iо open. and m utual assistance for an y B alkan sta te attack ed by any o th e r Balkan state. pacific solution of differences by a B alkan Conciliation Commission or the World C ourt. Since the fundam ental questions a t issue had already been ruled out. IV. it was argued. P apanastassios conceded th a t the ques­ tion of m inorities m ight be discussed “ in principle. th e Bulgarian delegation announced its decision n o t to a tte n d on th e grounds th a t th e problem of m inorities was n o t on the agenda. 217-221. 156-161. op. 365. th a t th e Council appoin t a com m ittee to u n d ertak e th e stu d y of a Balkan p a ct involv­ ing outlaw ry of war. 221-224. op. cit. cit. 1933). however. 28 I C B . and in Kerner and H oward. nos.. and a gen­ eral discussion on m inorities took place in th e Political Commission. and th a t this com m ittee rep o rt a t th e next conference. in securing th e adoption of a resolution recom m ending th a t the Balkan foreign m inisters meet an nually to discuss o u tstan d in g questions. th e situation was quite different. P apanastassiou. No progress was m ade. T he conference broke this im ­ passe by referring th e proposed pact. T he Commission did succeed. am icable settlem en t of all disputes. and translated and reprinted in G eshkoff. a very considerable num ber of constructive and valuable projects were pre­ sented and adopted. op. cit. however. 364. M eetings and negotiations for Balkan unity were predestined to failure. A rb itratio n and Judicial S et­ tlem ent and provided for an agreem ent of non-aggression.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 235 From this survey it is a p p a re n t th a t in th e technical and com paralively non-political fields of intellectual cooperation. for the Bulgarian delegation. T he Commission on O rganization explained th a t no questions of detail were to be discussed b u t only th e broadest of general principles. unless preceded by a ju s t settlem en t of the m inorities question. op. w ith all th e am endm ents and E ntente was published in Les Balkans. . 27 A sum m ary of the accom plishm ents of the four conferences is given in Kerner and Howard. 1088-1091. 14-15 (N ovem ber-D ecem ber. and a su b stan tial proportion of them were p u t into operation.27 As regards political questions.. and m utual assistance.28 A p ac t was accordingly d rafted by Professor Spiropoulos of th e Uni­ v ersity of Salonica and considered by th e Political Commission a t the 1931 conference. while M . T he proposed p a c t was modelled after th e L ittle E n te n te ’s G eneral A ct of C onciliation. social and health problem s. From th e o u tset the Commission on Political Relations was faced w ith th e ta sk of reconciling sharply conflicting interests and view points. 62. 284-287.. supported by th e A lbanian. however.. and economic relations.” T h e Bulgarians were persuaded in this m anner to a tte n d th e conference. (he deb ate on th is question was lim ited and inconclusive. suggested ad jo u rn ­ m ent of th e discussion u n til the problem of the non-fulfillm ent of m inorities treaties had been solved.

cit. II.. an a tte m p t should be m ade to dispose of th e contentious m inorities question by direct. 134. These proposals. a revised d ra ft of a p a c t of non-aggression. 30 T ex t of the Bucharest D raft Balkan P act in I I I CB. which had been introduced by th e G reek national group in th e hope of satisfying th e B ulgarian dem ands. op. provided th a t a p erm an en t M inorities Bureau should be established.. op. peaceful settlem en t and m utual assistance. W ith th e rejection of this proposal the Bulgarian delegates left the conference. T h e o th er B alkan countries. In addition. op. cit. this draft included proposals for dealing w ith th e m inorities problem .4 4 1 . 290-299 and Kerner and Howard. . op. 347-356. She 23 Les Balkans. and in addition th a t a M inorities Commission representing th e six B alkan countries should m eet once a year to exam ine com plaints from minorities. T h e Bulgarian delegation in reply issued a declaration accepting th e p ac t on th e condition th a t I n ­ eq uality of Bulgaria be recognized and the m inorities provisions be loyally enforced.. nos. cit. T he fourth conference a t Salonica contented itself with expressing th e hope th a t th e governm ents would a d o p t th e draft B alkan P a c t and arrange for annual m eetings betw een th eir foreign m inisters to sm ooth o u t difficulties. B ulgaria still rem ained an unsatisfied power. w ith certain reservations. Papanastassion. however. 181-202. ai J V C B .236 S m itii C o l l e g e S t u d ie s in H is t o r y proposals resulting from the Political Com m ission’s discussions. cit.30 T his p act repre­ sents th e m ost im p o rtan t achievem ent of th e conferences in th e po­ litical field.4 7 7 . 13-14 (O ctober-N ovem ber. bilateral negotiations betw een th e national groups. 102. and translated and reprinted in Geshkoff.4 7 8 . 200-208.. refused to a c t on this h in t and no fu rth e r bilateral discussions on minorities took place. negotiations and resolutions. In th eir absence th e delegates of th e o th er five countries approved. A good analysis of the work of the Com m ission on Political R elations is given in Geshkoff.29 T h e Bulgarians and A lbanians prom ptly acted upon this proposal by concluding an agreem ent providing for reciprocal recognition of th e juridical existence of m inorities for whom educational facilities were to be provided. to a special commit tee which was to su b m it a rep o rt three m onths before th e next conference. 4 4 0 . T he conference fu rth er recom m ended th a t pend­ ing tliis elaboration of the p act. A ny question on which th e m em bers of th e Commission failed to agree would be referred to th e League of N ations. 1931). C onsequently th e B ulgarian delegation to th e th ird con­ ference a t B ucharest refused to discuss th e d ra ft of a B alkan Pact and proposed ad jo u rn m en t of th e deb ate until th e next conference in order to arrange bilateral negotiations on th e m inority question.3 1 T his survey reveals th a t despite all th e m eetings.

An isolated Bulgaria w as obviously no th re a t. was m ade th e occasion for a renewal of I he assurance of I ta ly ’s friendship for Bulgaria. and a fte r B ulgaria’s refusal to adhere to th e 1934 B alkan P act. T he failure of successive B ulgarian govern­ ments to curb th e activ ities of th e M acedonian R evolutionary <> i ganization clearly b ro u g h t B ulgaria w ithin th e scope of this dcfiiii I ion. an d G erm any which was ini­ tialled on Ju n e 7. For these reasons th e B ulgarian governm ent was u ncertain of its diplom atic position and was therefore ready to ta k e steps to im prove its relations w ith Yugoslavia. M oreover th e F o u r Pow er P act between France.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 237 si ill refused to accept th e term s of th e T re a ty of N euilly as final and she persistently rejected a n y p act which involved recognition of the status quo. 1933 aroused anxiety in B ulgaria because this ap p aren t rapprochem ent betw een F rance and Ita ly rem oved one motive for I ta ly ’s sup p o rt of Bulgaria.m niversary of Bulgarian independence. b u t so long as she refused to en ter a non-aggression pact. Italy still m anifested a special in terest in Bulgaria. One reason was th a t in Ju n e 1931 a G overnm ent of National Union had been form ed in Sofia which included several members of th e A grarian P a rty th a t had been trad itio n ally in favor < > f close relations w ith Y ugoslavia. M oreover the rise of H itler to power an d his bellicose statem en ts regarding the Versailles settlem en t and th e need for G erm an expansion stim ulated t he revisionist m ovem ent th ro u g h o u t E urope an d aroused th e ap p re­ hension of B ulgaria’s neighbors. Ita ly . were of d irect concern to Bulgaria. the Italian press declared th a t B ulgaria could count on continued Italian supp ort. T h e tw enty-fifth . Y ugoslavia and Rouinania. In addition th e series of nonaggression p acts which had been concluded on R ussian initiative during th e sum m er and which included T u rk ey . Yugoslavia was th e m ost successful in im proving her relations with Bulgaria. l essor which th ey contained covered th e case of a sta te th a t gave support to arm ed bands which invaded th e te rrito ry of an o th e r state. which was celebrated a t the beginning of O ctober 1933. T his a ttitu d e was a cause for w orry for B ulgaria’s neigh­ bors. Accordingly they sought to counter I he increased danger by settlin g as far as possible th eir differences with Bulgaria and by strengthening th e ties am ongst them selves. so long she would conlinue to offer a foothold to an y G reat Pow er desirous of intervening in th e B alkans. G reat B ritain. By 1933 th is was no longer an hypo th etical danger. ' ir which refused th e req u est of th e invaded s ta te th a t it should take ill the m easures in its pow er to deprive such arm ed bands of as­ sistance or protection. In Ju n e 1933 a protocol was signed by llie two countries providing for m ore effective m easures against the . T he definition of th e agr.

Between Septem ber and D ecem ber of 1933 th e Bulgarian and Yugo­ slav royal families exchanged several visits and were m ost enthusi­ astically welcomed by the populace of the two capitals. T his was achieved when th e two countries signed a p a c t of non-aggression on Ju ly 3. visited Sofia. . In M ay 1933 th ey suggested th a t th e Bulgarian governm ent should become a p a rty to an agreem ent guaranteeing the inviolability of th eir frontiers which the G reek and T urkish governm ents intended to conclude betw een them selves. Therefore th ey atte m p te d first to im prove their own relations w ith Bulgaria. T his refusal did no t cause Greece and T u rk ey to abandon th eir project for tightening th e bonds between them selves. 1933. 13. were apprehensive of a Yugoslav bloc which would be in a position to dom inate th e Balkans. T hese signs of growing friendliness between Bulgaria and Yugo­ slavia were no t alto g eth er welcomed by th e o th er B alkan countries. y et this move did encourage the popular m ovem ent in favor of a rapprochem ent w ith Yugoslavia. and although none of its prom i­ nent leaders were apprehended.” In th e m eantim e R oum ania was concerned by th e increasing de­ m and for revision and by th e B ulgaro-Y ugoslav rapprochem ent and G reco-Turkish alliance which left her isolated. Greece and T u rk ey . T h e signifi­ cance of these visits was increased by the fact th a t th ey represented a renewal of personal relations betw een the tw o m onarchs after a lapse of nineteen years. T his Bulgaria refused to do. . th e R oum anian foreign m inister Nicholas Titulescu. H er first step was to come to term s w ith the Soviet Union. for exam ple.238 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y M acedonian hands. in order to secure a common line of action in conform ity w ith th eir policy of friendship. T he conversations were cordial b u t th e Bulgarian governm ent m ade it clear th a t it was unwilling to bind itself by any . and undertook to consult each o th er on all intern atio n al questions which were of in terest to them “ . She was willing to im prove her relations w ith her neighbors b u t not to the ex ten t of surrendering her claims to a m odification of th e territorial status quo. Accordingly th e rulers and m inisters of all the Balkan countries exchanged visits in th e fall of 1933 and on O ctober 12. On Sep­ tem ber 14 th ey signed a tre a ty by which they m utually guaranteed th e inviolability of th eir com m on frontiers. understanding and collaboration in p rotection of th eir respective and common in te re sts. On Ju n e 25 of the sam e year the Bulgarian a u ­ thorities carried on a bouse to house search in Sofia in an a tte m p t to crush the M acedonian O rganization. Roum ania n ext sought to p ro tect her southern frontier by prom oting a general B alkan p a c t which would su p p lan t the existing bilateral agreem ents from which she was excluded.

An aggressor was defined in accordance w ith A rticle II of th e London C onventions of July 3-5. T h e signatories bound them selves to guarantee m u­ tually th e security of th e existing Balkan frontiers and “ . T h ereafter. defined in more precise term s the nature of these engagem ents. . T he p a c t was declared n o t to be di­ rected against an y Power.” T he p a c t was defined as a “ defensive in stru ­ m ent” and accordingly if an y signatory sta te com m itted an a ct of aggression again st an y o th er country. T hey recognized th a t existing treaties rem ained binding upon them . th e relations of th a t sta te w ith I lie o th er signatories would cease to be governed by th e term s of the pact.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 239 pact which would render im possible an y fu tu re modification of the Treaty of Neuilly. and it was to be open to any other Balkan countries whose adherence would be “ . . T he m aintenance of th e existing territo rial situation in the Balkans was declared binding upon the signatories. th e object of lavorable exam ination by th e contracting p a rtie s. a four-pow er Balkan I’ac t was initialed a t Belgrade on F eb ru ary 4 and signed a t A thens live days later. T he agreem ent was to come into force on th e d a te of its signature. to con­ sult w ith each o th er on th e m easures to be taken in th e face of eventualities capable of affecting th eir interests as defined by the present agreem en t. th e term s of which were n o t m ade public for some weeks a fter signature. Its object was to g u arantee Balkan front iers against aggression by a B alkan state. . and in the absence of agreem ent to th e con trary . .” An additional protocol. it would a u to ­ m atically continue in force for seven more years. Accordingly a fter negol iations carried on in G eneva and Belgrade.” T h ey also undertook no t to em bark upon any political action in relation to a n y o th er B alkan sta te w ithout the consent of th e o th er signatories. A t the end of O ctober 1931 th e foreign m inisters of th e four states . 1933. and declared th a t the p a c t was “ n o t in contradiction w ith previous obligations. and if n o t so denounced. it would rem ain in force for another five years. A p a c t which would include all the Balkan sta tes was obviously o u t of th e question. T he signatories agreed to begin negotiations w ithin six m onths for conventions in conform ity w ith the objects of the pact. T h e p act could lie denounced a fte r tw o years. b u t it would also come into operation against a B alkan sta te which joined an o th e r Power in com m itting an a c t of aggression upon a signatory. B ulgaria’s neighbors therefore decided to come lo an agreem ent am ongst them selves in the hope th a t B ulgaria would cither change her mind d uring th e course of their negotiations or would be induced to join them a t a later date. failing denunciation.

and even proposed unofficially to cede Tsaribrod and Bosiljgrad in the event of an alliance. T he Balkan E n te n te had replaced th e Balkan Conference. In addition th e establishm ent of a Balkan B ank was agreed upon in principle and a commission was appointed to go into th e question of th e unification of legislation. and the works there cited. 508ff. T his was em phasized by P apanastassios. and for th e estab lishm ent of an Econom ic Council which was to exam ine th e possibilities of closer economic collaboration and to rep o rt w ithin six m onths. T h e B alkan E n ten te. con­ ciliation. he pointed out. who apparently was on close personal term s with K ing Alexander. cit. therefore. Padelford.240 S m ith C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y m et a t A ngora where they drew up and ad opted th e S ta tu te s of the Balkan E n ten te. th e P resident of the Council of th e Balkan Conference. T h e o th er principles included in th e D ra ft Balkan P act could th en be reserved for la ter negotiations. Kerner and Howard. According to K osta Todorov. had been organized for th e purpose of m aintaining th e status quo and thereb y was auto m atically directed against revisionist Balkan states. to w hich A lbania and B ulgaria would readily adhere. T h e proposed pact. the latter m uch preferred a B u l­ garian alliance to the Balkan P act. judicial settlem en t and protection of m inorities. 90ff. T hus. 250-257. consisting of th e foreign m inisters of th e four m em ber stales. 203-222. arb itra tio n . m utual assistance. T he organization th u s established obviously would carry on m uch the sam e ty p e of w ork as th e B alkan Conferences had in th e past. despite th e opposi­ tion of P apanastassios and others. T odorov. .. was con­ cerned only w ith th e m aintenance of th e existing Balkan frontiers while th e B ucharest D ra ft Balkan P a c t of th e B alkan Conference contained th e principles of non-aggression. a t th e tim e when th e B alkan P act was being negotiated. lim ited though it m ight be.3 2 T h e two.. th e differences be­ tw een them were fundam ental. op. op. T hey provided for regular m eetings of th e P erm anent Council of the E n ten te. cit. th e Bulgarian Peasant leader.. In fact. cit. however. 116-138.. op. Balkan Firebrand. th e fifth Balkan Conference which was to have been held a t Istan b u l was adjourned sine die. T h e B alkan Conference had striven to bring all the Balkan states together on some program . Otherw ise th e h asty conclusion of a p a c t designed only to guarantee th e B alkan frontiers would serve to m ake Balkan understanding more 32 T h e d etails of the diplom acy culm inating in th e formation of the Balkan E ntente are given in Geshkoff.. th a t th ere be concluded a m ultilateral p act of non-aggression and pacific settlem ent of disputes. Survey of International A ffairs. He urged. on th e o th er hand. were n o t sim ilar. W hy this offer was rejected is not m ade clear. in th e hope th a t it would gradually be expanded as o u tstan d in g issues were settled. 1934. with th e im p o rta n t difference th a t th e P erm anent Council would be able to m ake decisions and ta k e action where th e Balkan Conferences had only been able to m ake recom m endations.

Such action on T u rk e y ’s p a rt would co n travene th e T urco-R ussian tre a ty of n eu trality of 1925. lor all in ten ts and purposes. P apanastassiou. . sim ply an antirevisionist bloc. Even in th is respect it was lim ited. 526-528.3 3 T he plea was ignored. by th e term s of th e p act. 534. and further to aggravate her position b y re­ nouncing. Bulgaria has been unable to see her w ay to signing a pact which would crystallize for all tim e the actual status-quo in the Balkans w hich has been established m ainly at her expense. th e E n te n te could o p erate effectively.34 33 A.’’ X X X ° congres universel de la p a ix tenu d Locarno du I” au 6 septembre 1934. W hile th e p a c t was being negoi iated th e Soviet A m bassador in A ngora drew a tte n tio n to th e possi­ bility th a t in th e event of hostilities betw een th e Soviet Union and R oum ania. 1942). 448. the hope deeply im bedded in the nation's heart for a revision of the T reaty. When th e term s of th e p a c t were m ade public. W. socially and intellectually.S. In these circum stances th e G reek governm ent asked for and received assurances from th e o th e r th ree governm ents th a t under no condition would th e application of th e p a c t involve Greece in hostililies w ith a G reat Power. see Survey of International A ffairs. Cor­ dell H ull: In sp ite of th e pressure w hich has been brought to bear on her.” Les lialkans. 1934). 1934). like the L ittle E n te n te in C entral Europe. 533. 68-74. 1934. a tta c k e d th e governm ent on the ground th a t il should have tak en sim ilar precautions to ensure th a t Greece would not become involved in w ar w ith Ita ly as a result of th e obligations which she h ad u ndertaken in regard to th e protection of Y ugoslavia’s frontiers. in which case T u rk ey . th e opposition in ( 'ireece led by Venizelos. P apanastassiou. So long as B ulgaria rem ained isolated and th e G reat Rowers refrained from m ilitary o r diplom atic intervention in the Balkans. would be obliged to su pport R oum ania against Bulgaria an d therefore against Russia. T o sta te these condiI ions is to reveal th e fu tility of th e P a c t.overnm ent issued a w ritten declaration to th e effect th a t it would expect no aid from T u rk ey in th e event of a conflict w ith th e U . economically. Cited b y H . Docu­ ments officiels. Bulgaria could see no reason to accord volu n tary endorsem ent to p enalties im posed upon her b y a dictated peace treaty. 34 Regarding the reservations. “ Les conferences balkaniques et le pacte balkanique. V (January-February. politically. th e E n te n te was. w ithout even a hint of com pensation. though by peaceful m eans. 1-7. Bulgaria m ight be draw n in on th e R ussian side. N .” Journal of Central ICuropean A ffairs. W hereas th e B alkan Conference looked tow ard a fundam ental and com prehensive union of all th e B alkan peoples. T h e significance of these reservations lies in the fact th a t th ey narrow ed th e p a c t to a purely anti-B ulgarian instrum ent. and th e resulting B alkan E n ten te became. A. 145 (M ay. M iller. “L e pacte d ’en ten te balkanique. T h e Bulgarian a ttitu d e to the P act w as set forth in a n ote to Secretary of S tate. H oward.S. In order to avoid this difficulty th e R oum anian r.R. “ Bulgaria and th e Balkan E n ten te.” Contem porary Review.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 241 difficult. 447. “T h e Balkan P a ct. I (Janaury. purely political.

1939). 135. 149. A nother im p o rtan t factor was th e growing economic dependence of southeastern E urope upon G erm any. Balkan Firebrand.242 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y H ardly had the E n te n te been formed when it began to show signs of cracking under the pressure of a resurgent G erm any. first clandestinely and later in open defiance of the treaties. A P olitical and Economic Survey (London. R oum ania. For. regardless how m uch the Balkan sta tes m ight resent the m ethods of D r. Between 1933 and 1936 th e percentage of T urkish exports going to G erm any rose from 19 to 51. Schacht or fear com plete N azi control. th e G erm an arm ies could operate w ith little restraint behind th e p rotecting Siegfried Line. T u rk e y ’s dependence was even greater. M oreover th e exports of these countries to G erm any were considerably greater th an th eir im ports. this class was gradually excluded from governm ent by the ruling classes which had 35 For details. op. . 175. T he existence of a large peasan t class w ith a m iserable stan d ard of living has been . 3 -9 . 1936). A fter a brief spell of political power during th e first decade a fte r th e W orld W ar. ch. while th e percentage of th eir exports going to G erm any increased d uring th e sam e period from 16 to 27. an d even in securing B ritish agreem ent to the expansion of the Versailles fleet into a navy. especially since bo th B ritain and F rance were relatively u n interested in B alkan products. H itle r’s suc­ cess in carrying o u t rearm am ent. was the first shock. The b est and m ost detailed account is in Basch. Schacht in the Balkans: T h e Econom ic Background. T odorov. w ith inevitable diplom atic repercus­ sions. In th e case of H ungary. however. w ith th e exception of Roum anian oil. M ore startlin g was the re-occupation and refortification of th e R hine­ land. H eretofore the m em bers of th e Balkan and L ittle E n ten tes had calculated th a t if th e Reichsw ehr stru ck to th e southeast. B u t in th e m eantim e G erm an economic hegem ony had been estab­ lished in so utheastern E urope. I t was no t till 1938-39 th a t th e western Powers realized th e politi­ cal danger im plicit in N azi economic dom ination and then th ey made frantic efforts to provide the B alkan countries w ith alte rn ate m arkets. and South-Eastern Europe. its right flank would be exposed to a French co u n ter-attack across Bavaria. th ey could not afford to antagonize th eir principal custom er.i sta n d a rd feature of Balkan society.3 6 T he danger from G erm any was increased by th e social and polit i cal conditions prevailing in the B alkans a t this tim e.. 271. th e percentage of their im ports coming from G erm any rose from 19J in 1933 to 35 in 1937. Y ugoslavia." Bulletin of International N ew s. 193-203. X I I I (July 4. R oyal In stitu te of International Affairs. T h u s the B alkan countries found them selves hopelessly dependent on th e Ger­ m an m arket. 10-13. 165. B ulgaria and Greece. 122. see “ Dr. Now. cit. 183. so th a t they found them selves tied by a double bond to G erm anyas th e principal m ark et for th eir products and as a deb to r who was unwilling or unable to liquidate his d eb t except by exports.

1939) 148-159. “ Can Germ any W in the Balkans?” H arper's M. C L X X V III (January. 506. M osely. “ T h e Social Пт g r o u n d in Balkan P olitics. Some were secretly mibsidized from Berlin.uy.-ine.” P olitica. especially since th e opposition elem ents were alm ost invariably pro-B ritish. In addition th e Reich did n o t hesitate Iо extend its influence by m eans of cultural missions. economic and political factors al­ ii red fundam entally th e balance of forces in southeastern E urope and I hereby underm ined th e foundations of both th e Balkan and L ittle I nlentes. D rucker. T hese m ovem ents were largely indigenous—• I logical pro d u ct of th e existing economic and social conditions— and in I he case of R oum ania. Such auilioritarian regimes did n o t autom ically ad o p t a pro-Axis foreign policy b u t they n atu rally felt a certain sense of kinship w ith th e g reat I'.1 1 they did create a favorable atm osphere for the consideration of . P. .ir to th a t of th e N ational Socialists and generally favoring closer relations w ith th e Reich. Seton-W atson. F .37 11 was th e la tte r course which was adopted. the five S o u th -E ast E uropean anti-revisionist states. even w ithin th eir narrow regional lim its. . were now faced w ith the question w hether i pair of en ten tes which had originally been m ade m ainly w ith an eye I" H ungary and B ulgaria should be b u ilt into a larger stru ctu re of I INances covering Europe as a whole and involving th e risk of a col­ li ion not only w ith H u n g ary and B ulgaria b u t also w ith Ita ly and <•! i m any. X X V I II (D e11 n i l 1938). T he new situ atio n has been described ap tly as follows: . th e Iron G uard enjoyed considerable sup­ p o r t am ongst the peasan try . num erous к liolarships for Balkan stu d e n ts for stu d y in G erm any. pro-French and violently antiAxis. now th a t th e tw o I'» .erm an victo ry in Europe.iscist powers of E urope. T h e im portance of these internal develop­ ments cannot be stated in absolute term s. 1936.il vortices of post-w ar political disturbances round H u n g a ry and id B ulgaria were being cau g h t up into a m aelstrom of E uropean dim ensions. . D ictatorial governm ents were established which ruthlessly suppressed a n y radi( . or w hether the original arrangem ents would cease to be operative. 249-272. p articularly when it P. E. IV (June. direct or indirect. b u t it can be assum ed safely III. 139-154. and all gained in prestige and pow er a fte r each <.il m anifestations am ongst th e p easan try or th e workers. N evertheless these parties were ceri .B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 243 l iken alarm a t th e radical p easan t and labor program s. in their i elii (ions w ith one another. and th e encouragem ent of dissentient elem ents such as l lie C roats in Yugoslavia.” Yale R eview . M oreover n ativ e fascist parties arose w ith program s basically simII.1 pro-Axis shift in th e foreign policies of these states. 1939). “ Hitler and Southeastern Europe. “ Survey of International A ffairs.i inly under N azi influence. H . th e organizalion and unscrupulous use of G erm an m inorities in R oum ania and Vugoslavia.3 6 T his com bination of m ilitary.

30 N ew York Tim es. M ay 7. th e G reek point of view won ou t and it was agreed th a t the liability for m utual de­ fence should be lim ited to purely Balkan exigencies and th a t in ail o th er cases th e obligations of th e E n te n te m em bers should be re­ stricted to th e aid required u nder th e League C ovenant. who was engrossed in negotiations for th e sum m oning of the M ontreux S traits Conference and had no desire to become involved in A driatic quarrels. coupled w ith a 38 N . . N ew York Times. 1936 in Bel grade was overshadow ed by th e trium ph of M ussolini in E thiopia and th e failure of th e League of N ations to check th e flagrant Italian aggression. M. S. "Post-W ar P olitics in G reece. 1936). As each crisis arose. G eneral M etaxas was p articu larly in sistent on this point because th e problem of obligations under th e p act had become a partisan m a tte r in Greece. a contingency which a I th e tim e did n o t seem a t all im probable. a cordial inv itatio n was extended to join th e E n tente. X II (Septem ber. . T he effect of such a move. Despite strong opposition from Y ugoslavia and R oum ania. 7. T he issue had been reopened in th e spring of 1936 by charges from th e Opposi­ tion th a t the foreign m inister.244 S m ith C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y becam c apparent (bat the W estern Powers were unwilling or unable to oppose effectively G erm an and Italian aggression.1 9 3 6 . 8.38 Greece was strongly supported by T urkey. as events were to prove. K altchas. M ay 6. and th ey hastened to m ake certain th a t their obligations would not in­ volve them also in a w ar w ith a G reat Power. 1936. had signed a secret m inute in G eneva in 1934 nullifying th e state m e n t of reservation m ade a t th e tim e by the G reek C ham ber. th e E n te n te m em bers a tte m p te d to consolidate th eir internal position. and in an a tte m p t to conciliate Bulgaria. 159. according to th e charges. are only concerned w ith th e Balkan frontiers. clearly and unequivocally defined. Accordingly th e G reek ob­ jectiv e a t the Conference was to elim inate all danger of involvemenl in w ar w ith Ita ly by excluding th e A lbanian frontiers from th e guar antees of th e P a c t. one a fter an o th er of th e Balkan states hastened to loosen their ties with the threaten ed country. T he lesson was n o t lost on th e E n ten te m em bers.” 39 A t th e sam e tim e th a t th ey were lim iting th eir external obliga tions. ensured th eir own u ltim ate destruction. In order to allay G reek apprehensions it was specifically added th a t “ . M aximos. would have been to com m it Greece to action in case of an Italian a tta c k on Yugoslavia. the obligations of Greece.” Foreign P olicy Associativa Reports. T h e Balkan E n te n te Conference held on M ay 4-6. and thereby. . T he difficulties over T u rk e y ’s request to fortify th e Straits were adju sted w ith ease.

.is now become more diplom atic th a n m ilitary . his dismissal foreshadow ed a fu ndam ental shift in Roun u n ian foreign policy. and to ad o p t a conciliatory a ttitu d e tow ard <. em phasized th a t R oum anian policy would iml l)e altered. for the i enervations now m ade abandon h er to Ita lia n aggression. D uring th e au tu m n nl I ‘>36 a num ber of visits were exchanged betw een R oum anian and I'lili-sh political and m ilitary leaders.” 4 2 A sim ilar loosening of ties was evident in th e case of th e L ittle K ntente a t th is tim e. it is little m ore th a n an alliance against B ulgaria. th e powerful ally of th e French and the • /eclis. R oum ania a t th is tim e was torn betw een two possible courses of action. T h e dism issal of T itulescu an d th e ap p o in tm en t "I Victor A ntonescu to his position was a clear indication th a t Roum.d m anner.” 4 1 E qually revealing is General M elaxas’ sta te m e n t to th e G reek correspondents. ” betw een th e tw o countries. th a t “ the E n ten te 11. M ay 7. nil a rd e n t Francophile.ie( stan d s. As the I> ..erm any and Italy .B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 2 45 promise to consider an y dem ands for revision which were m ade in a Irr. th e rapprochem ent betw een R oum ania Mi ni Poland n atu rally raised d o u b ts regarding R oum ania’s position m I lie L ittle E n te n te and her com m itm ents to Czechoslovakia. it is true. 12 Ibid.i h eady done b y lim iting th e P act. T he ilicrnative course was to draw closer to Poland. « Ibid. T he m ovem ent for a rapprochem ent betw een B ulgaria and Y ugoslavia i ■con stan tly growing in th is co u n try . A rgum ents for th is policy included th e fear of I'lissian intentions on B essarabia. of becom ing a corridor for R ussian arm ies bringing su pport In Czechoslovakia.. In view of th e Polish-G erm an nonM i i i ession p a c t of Ja n u a ry 1934. how ever.inia had selected th e la tte r course.. . T his is evident in th e following news despatch from Belgrade a fte r th e conclusion of th e Conference: " Vugoslavia’s in terest in th e p a c t in th e fu tu re will be sm all. a su p p o rter of th e League and of th e two l iilentes. T he first indication was th e dow nfall of the \ eieran R oum anian foreign m inister. T he first. A ntonescu. d ic ta te d by th e needs of the l. and agreem ents were signed for i' 1 11иical and cu ltural cooperation and for “close m ilitary collabora. both foreign and •Ii miestic.ilile E n te n te and th e G erm an th re a ts to Czechoslovakia. could n o t repair th e dam age . M ay 8... T his was the policy advocated and begun by Titulescu.1936. involved h i alliance w ith Russia. Nicholas T itulescu. and th e well-known hostility betw een Poland and Czechoslovakia. CeiIbid. and the danger. M ay 10. 1936.1936.4 1 1 T hese steps. Long known r. th e leading proIii iiicnt of isolationism . b u t m ore significant th a n his assurances w as the "i n ked strengthening of P olish-R oum anian ties.

Czechoslovakia. th e E n te n te had decided th a t Czecho­ slovakia's tre a ty w ith th e U .” Fortnightly Review. M elville. T h e other states of the E n te n te were left to draw their own conclusions. I (June. U nable to reconcile th e different attitu d e s tow ard the G reat Powers.44 T he final step in th e disintegration of th e L ittle E n ten te was reached a t th e Belgrade conference in April 1937. 1987. 725-730. in critical danger from G erm any. T h e proposal was too late to be acceptable. and y e t th e decisions of th e Belgrade Conference elim inated a n y likeli­ hood of aid for Yugoslavia in case of an Italian a ttack . X I X (Septem ber. “ Russia and R um ania.S. 4 6N ew York Tim es.” L ’Europe nouvelle. 736-749. 1937 he signed th e p a c t witli B ulgaria which provided sim ply th a t “ .” Nineteenth Century. March 27. Brossolettc. 1936). M ilan Stoyadinovich. 1936). and th a t th e la tte r countries should be free to assum e an y a ttitu d e th ey saw fit tow ard G erm any and Ita ly . and cam e to term s with B ulgaria and Ita ly . especially after th e E thiopian affair. had k ept them inform ed of th e negotiations a n d they 43 Pertinax.4 5 M ore th an an y o th er B alkan country Y ugoslavia feared Ita ly ’s am bitions in the Balkans. R. 1937). see F. in their opinion. A. .R. th e com m unique a n ­ nounced th a t g reater elasticity had been agreed upon in relation t< > ex tra-D an u b ian affairs. 1937). should involve no obligation upon R oum ania or Y ugoslavia. proposed th e enlarging of the m ilitary clauses of th e p a c t into a guarantee of full m ilitary assistance in case of aggression from a n y q u a rte r instead of from H ungary and B ulgaria. and P. . X I X (April.” N othing a t all was said either ab o u t renunciation of territo rial de­ m ands or ab o u t Bulgarian e n try into the B alkan E n ten te. A fter m entioning new tra d e agreem ents. was confirmed a t th e B ratislava Conference of th e E n te n te Council. Ogg. by th e signing of tw o treaties w ith Bulgaria and Ita ly which left th e B alkan E ntente as innocuous and ineffective as th e L ittle E n ten te. Events. Survey of International A ffairs. On Ja n u a ry 24. abandoned th e trad itio n al pro-French policy w hich had been followed by K ing Alexander. . 455. 918. first evident in Augusl. 917. F. “G erm any and the Balkans. L 'E urope nouvelle. 344. 1936.” 4 3 T he slackening of the L ittle E n ten te ties.246 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y tain ly by the end of 1936 Roumanians position had shifted consider­ ably from I lie d ays when T itulescu had so actively espoused the principle of tlie "indivisibility of peace. Accordingly th e Y ugoslav prem ier. in th e face of strong p opular opposition. CVL (June. there shall be inviolable peace and perpetual friendship betw een Bulgaria and Y ugoslavia.S. Freund. Roumania w ould no t be budged from her new course and th e Y ugoslav leaders had already ensured them selves. Yugo­ slavia. “ Nicholas T itu lesco. C X X (D ecem ­ ber. 44 C. 522-526. however. For conflicting view s of the relation of France to the Czech proposal. 1936).

1936. while the dem ocratic elem ents in terp reted th e tre a ty as a desertion of th e libII al forces in Europe and as a short-sighted sacrifice of fu tu re security l"i the sake of im m ediate. Czechoslovakia and th e m em bers of th e Balkan K ntentejhad been inform ed as to th e general conditions b u t under llalian pressure th e tre a ty had been rushed through before its final text could be com m unicated to Y ugoslavia’s allies in accordance w ith I In: procedure laid down in th e S ta tu te s of th e L ittle and Balkan I\iiLentes. m ade a reciprocal pledge to prevent a n ti-Ita lia n activities w ithin its borders. to rem ain neutral in case of unprovoked a tta c k b y a th ird power. extending to Y ugoslavia th e tariff prefer1'iices h ith erto reserved for A ustria and H ungary under th e Rome protocols. M arkovitch. 1937). March 29. In a superficial sense th e term s were highly advantageous for Vugoslavia. L.” L 'E sprit tnhrnational.47 T h e a ttitu d e of the Kulcntes was sim ilarly disapproving. 4 7 9 IH5. and prom ised to respect the existing b o n d e rs of A lbania. see D .48 the tru e feelings of th e B alkan states were expressed a t the 1 1 1 G reece feared that Y ugoslavia m ight support Bulgaria’s claim s for an Aegean ■ nil let and Roum ania and Turkey were sim ilarly apprehensive about renewed claim s. 291-315. tem p o rary gains. Ita ly m ade su b stan tial commercial concessions. “ L ’orientation n ouvelle de la Y u goslavie. and to consult "ii m atters affecting th eir com m on intersts. A lthough th e initial statem en ts I"i (lie press welcomed the P a c t as an assurance of peace in th e Adri11 io. 1937. 513-516. “German Influence in the B alkans. Jackson. H. Purvey of International A ffairs. agreed to increase im ports of Italian goods. Greece in Peace and W ar (London. New York T im es. 16. I t also promised in am eliorate th e lot of th e Croat-Slovene m inority in Italian Istria .1937.‘W i 505. it was officially announced that и had been agreed that th e P act w as com patible with both the letter and spirit of the llalkan E ntente. In rei urn Yugoslavia recognized th e E thiopian em pire. II (A ugust.md to refrain from encouraging th e C ro at terro rist Oustachis. 1937). 1942).” Fortnightly Review. “ Les mmvelles perspectives dans les B alk an s.46 M uch more distu rb in g was th e Italo-Y ugoslav agreem ent of M arch 25. and doubling th e Y ugoslav export quota. II (July. 1937. C X L V II (M arch. 152. A t th e m eeting of the llalkan Council held in A thens on February 14. 1937. ° T h e treaty with Ita ly together with th e proposed Concordat with th e Vatican «m used such a political storm in Y ugoslavia that the Stoyadinovich cabinet was alil overthrown. 1937. although no t w ith o u t some misс. January 1. 1937). N ew York T im es. . H oward. 351-353. 1 . Survey of International A ffairs. For suggestions as to th e inspiration • I I lie P act. 1937. 4 8 New York Tim es. R. Y ugoslav public opinion was strongly opposed to it.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 247 eventually gave th eir approval. b u t th e reception of th e tre a ty outside of Italy . February 15. I' !. Caclam anos. M ilitary circles still regarded Ita ly as th e arch enem y. was far Icom favorable. N . B oth countries agreed n o t to a tta c k each other. ivings.” L ’E sp rit international.

60 D uring the next tw o years th e A ustro-G erm an Anschluss and the p artitio n and occupation of Czechoslovakia sm ashed th e one entente and seriously underm ined the other. 133-135. X I I (1938). “T h e I talo-Y u goslav T r ea ty . Econom ically.1937. being largely surrounded by th e Axis Powers and th eir satellites.” Current H istory. “Jugoslavia’s Choice. T his was welcomed in some q u arters as a means of rem oving centers of tension..icge S t u d i e s in H is t o r y Belgrade Conference of (lie L ittle E n te n te in April 1937. March 29. 1937). H itler’s “peaceful” m ethod of conquest by propaganda.49 In th e end th e Italo-Y ugoslav trea ty w as approved by both E ntentes. 110. F or Greece and T urkey th e p a c t was less d istu rb ­ ing. M oreover. . 1937). April 3. 1941). th is tre a ty . and the result of th e tre a ty was to incline her even more tow ards G erm any. The specific fears and grievances of the individual states were apparent.i . together with th e o th er developm ents in th e Balkans since 1936. 3 -1 0 . In th e clearer light of retrospect. R oum ania was fearful of an Italian-IIungarian-Y ugoslav alignm ent th a t m ight be achieved a t her expense. X L V I (June. X X (October. b u t w ith a general feeling th a t it m arked the end of an y hope for a coordinated foreign policy on the p a rt of the Balkan states. G. “ Italy. 417-419. T he Axis Powers now repre­ sented an im m ediate th reat to th e B alkan states. G erm any now bordered on the Balkan Peninsula. In the face of the rising storm th e allies were already cutting the ties between them and seeking refuge in a policy of sauve qui peut . Y ugoslavia and the D anube B asin .” L 'E sp rit inter­ national. Lubenoff. M ore alarm ing was the new strategic situation. represented the beginning of the break-up of th e Balkan and L ittle E ntentes.248 S m it h C o i . 50 N . T he significance of this tre a ty lies in the fact th a t it was sym pto­ m atic of a general European trend aw ay from collective treaties to­ w ard bilateral pacts.” Bulletin of International News. Czechoslovakia was discouraged by th e obvious rebuff to France and th e desertion from th e status-quo front. X I II (April 17. and Yugoslavia was p a rtic u ­ larly endangered.1937. M irkovich. Greece welcomed the prom ise of peace in th e A driatic while T u rk ey hoped th a t it m ight increase the chances of Italian adherence to the M ontreux convention. internal disruption and u ltim atum was especially th re a t­ ening for R oum ania and Yugoslavia w ith th eir large G erm an and 49 Ib id ." Foreign A ffairs. Stoyadinovicli was sharply criticized for concluding th e p a c t w ithout previous consultation and more generally for startin g a system of bilateral accords which were contrary to th e spirit of th e tw o E ntentes. how­ ever. “ La situation international dans les B alkans. so utheastern Europe was more th an ever dependent upon greater G erm any w ith her recently acquired A ustrian and Czechoslovak in­ dustries.

1938. J. H u n ­ g ary ’s ap p e tite was w hetted b y th e seizure of th e C arpatho-U kraine in Septem ber.6 1 N or could outside aid be counted on any longer as I lie M unich agreem ent was tak en to m ean. 12. however. K napton. 1938 th e P resident of th e E n te n te Council signed a T re a ty of F riend­ ship an d Non-Aggression w ith th e Bulgarian foreign m inister a t Salonica. 1938. 222-228. 69-73. X V III (N ovem ber-D ecem ber. X V (Septem ber. 762. Sim ilarly the L ittle E ntente sought to placate H ungary. Greece and T urkey should lapse. H ungary violated the pact by occupying the Carpatho-Ukraine on the occasion of the German a ttack on Czechoslovakia. X V (August. Jackh. 1938).6 3 Significantly enough. 1-19. E liot. T he resounding victories of th e Axis from 1936 to 1938 had raised th e hopes of th e small revisionist states. T he prospects were an y th in g 61 G. A ugust 2. S. 6 3Bulletin of International N ew s. Bulletin of International News. th e agreem ent said nothing ab o u t respect for th e territorial status quo or ab o u t Bulgarian m em bership in th e E n ten te . Bulgaria and H ungary. 64 For th e reception of the pact at the tim e. and B ulgaria was inspired to seek sim ilar gains in M acedonia and D obrudja. Codresco. Italy. “ La VII>6me reunion du conseil perm anent de l’en ten te balkanique & B ucarest.6 4 T h e news of th e M unich agreem ent b rought increased efforts to stem th e tide of revisionism. Stoyanoff. X I II (M ay.6 2 T h e E n te n te m em bers a t th is tim e were n o t only faced w ith the overwhelm ing m ight of the ever-expanding and ap p aren tly insatiable Axis partn ers. III (M arch. “T h e D u el for Central Europe: Som e A spects of French D i­ plom acy. an agreem ent was signed recognizing Hungary's dem and for eq u ality of arm am ents and providing for pacific settlem en t of disputes.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n oilier m inorities. E. 408. 1938-1939.” Journal of Central European A ffairs. T h e Balkan E n te n te delegates m et to ­ gether in an unprecedented ten day conference in N ovem ber to con­ sider the situ atio n created by th e collapse of th e L ittle E n te n te and to discuss the possibilities of new defense. II (April. 1938).1938. b u t also w ith a m arked revival of Bulgarian and H un­ garian claim s for revision. by which th e allies recognized B ulgaria’s rig h t to rearm and ngreed th a t th e clauses of th e C onvention of L ausanne providing for I lie dem ilitarization of the frontiers betw een Bulgaria. N ew York Tim es. A t the Bled Conference in August 1938. 1939). 763-783. On Ju ly 31. “T h e German D rive in th e B alkans. G. (lie E n te n te atte m p te d to come to term s w ith Bulgaria. W ith this terrifying prospect in mind. 1938). 1939).” Foreign P o licy Reportsi X IV (D ecem ber 15. “T he M ilitary C onsequences of M unich. th a t B ritain and F rance had renounced their inl crests in central and east E uropean affairs. N ew York Tim es. “ Les int£r6ts perm anents de la Bulgarie. see F .” A ffaires danubiennes. 1939). August 1. 1942). In retu rn B ulgaria agreed n o t to a tte m p t to change her existing frontiers by force and to su b m it all disputes w ith her neighbors to a rb itra tio n or judicial settlem en t. both by G erm any and by I he Balkan states.” t'E s p r it international. 62 E . .” International A ffairs. 407. F . In th e next m onth. T h e sta te s of th e Balkan E n te n te were llius faced w ith th e possibility of a com bined a tta c k by G erm any.

e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y b u t promising. C L IX (April. I t is conceivable. C ertainly this could n o t be accom plished by th e B alkan E n ten te. th a t a genuine B alkan agreem ent of th e ty p e envisaged by th e Balkan Conference. 41. The first im p o rtan t decision to be reached was th e announcem ent.1 " T hree m onths later th e Council m et again in B ucharest and the discussion was resum ed. K ing Carol. m ight have succeeded in keeping the peninsula o u t of th e m aelstrom ..1939. for the E n ten te merely expressed once more th eir hope th a t Bulgaria would join th eir ranks. N ovem ber 29.67 T h e Balkan E n ten te. W ith a final declaration of solidarity. th e conference d isbanded. By this terse statem en t. w hich then proceeded to consider more im m ediate questions. as well as lay R oum ania open to sim ilar demand:. however. B oyle.1938. M. for example.1. is that the all im p o rtan t issue was no longer Bulgaria b u t ra th e r the struggle betw een th e G reat Powers w hich was rapidly involving th e whole continent. Kiossievanoff. from R ussia and H ungary. and y et a t the sam e tim e th ey announced once more their opposi­ tion to all territo rial revision. February 2 2 . including all th e B alkan sta te s and based on th e principle of the B alkans for th e B alkan peoples.251) S m ith C o m . made early in the conference. 67 N ew York Tim es. T h e tru th of th e m a tter. T he Bulgarian question was also left unsolved. February 21. As an initial move to appease th e Axis. b u t nothing was confirmed. “ Bulgaria. T here were wild rum ours of territorial concessions to induce Bulgaria to join th e E ntente. 1939).1939. therefore.6 6 M oreover Hungarian th re a ts against the rum p of Czechoslovakia were m ingled w ith oini nous rem arks about T ransy lv ania.68 T he failure of the Balkan E n te n te to m ake any headw ay w ith the Bulgarian problem in spite of th eir realization th a t som ething must be done is understandable. 414. was n o t to be expanded. T he m eeting failed to accomplish an y th in g concrete. b u t w ith o u t renewing the P a c t which autom atically expired th e next year. Thus 66 N ew York Times.” Contemporary Review. tie ju re recognition of G eneral Franco was approved by th e Council. although im probable. constituted as it was in 1939. 1939. Greece and T u rk ey let it be known th a t th ey would n o t involve them selves in th e C entral E uropean problem s which did n o t concern them nor would th ey undertake a n y obligation to assist R oum ania or Yugoslavia ag ain st H ungarian aggression. for (ho M unich successes had increased revisionist agitatio n in Bulgaria to th e p o in t where it threatened th e overthrow of th e pro E n ten te prem ier. contended that th e cession of D ob ru d ja to B ulgaria would only encourage her to m ake fu rth er claims. . 68 E. th a t H ungarian claims could n o t be consid ered because th ey did n o t affect all m em bers of th e E n ten te. T hey ad m itted that some fu rth er ad ju stm en ts would have to be m ade beyond arm s equal ity. 68 Ibid.

she was 11need to play th e only role left to her. 1940). nos. and he hoped th a t b y shrew d bargaining.. Ita ly's Aggression nuninst Greece (Athens. D iplom atic Documents. in case nl an a c t of aggression leading to w ar in th e M editerranean area. First G erm any followed up th e occupation of Czechoslovakia on М.69 Six days la te r F rance countered w ith an agreem ent to double h er purchases of R oum anian oil and th e next m onth the Uritish g ran ted a large loan. nl An enlightening picture of th e invasion of Albania and th e repercussions in the llnlkans is given in Greek White Book 1940..6 2 On M ay 12 a Jo in t D eclaration was issued m London and A ngora th a t. and th ereby gained a lumping-off place for fu rth e r expansion. T h e latter ■liiiiged violation of th e con su ltative clause of the Balkan P act. 1939). 01 As the first definite com m itm ent m ade b y an y m ember of th e Balkan E ntente. T h e position of Y ugoslavia was even more dangerous.lied a d ictato rsh ip th e y ear before.i i man arm s and m achinery. A sim ilar economic tussle occurred in Vugoslavia an d T u rk ey . 1 1Ibid. K ing Carol. 41. X IV (M ay. passim .ipital. T hese tem p o rary agree­ m ents were replaced b y a fifteen year m utual-aid p a c t signed by Itritain. he could use lii:i valuable oil wells as a m eans to w ard off a G erm an sanctioned a I lack b y B ulgaria or H ungary. T h e o th e r B alkan countries assum ed v arying atti1in les depending on p a rtic u la r conditions. 31-33. Excluded from th e B ritish guarantees and cu t off Imm outside aid by an alm ost com plete ring of enemies. sought a position of n eu trality be Iween G erm any and G reat B ritain. F rance and T u rk ey on O ctober 19. Bulletin of International N ew s. 589.0Great B ritain . 1939). X V I (April 6.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n mi 251 t he last few m onths before th e o u tb reak of th e w ar the decisive l и lo r was th e b a ttle for influence in th e B alkans waged by G erm any "ii (lie one hand and B ritain and France on th e other. and the East.6 3 W ith th e o u tb reak of th e w ar T u rk ey was th e only co u ntry bound in the Allied cause. 2-30. who had establi . nos.6 1 B ritain and F rance retaliilcd on A pril 13 w ith unilateral guarantees of th e independence of Koum ania and G reece. pending the conclusion of a definite and pi i m anent agreem ent. LII (January-Ju n et 1939). occupied th e c o u n try in a few days. nam ely stric t n eu trality and M l D etails in Bulletin of International N ew s. th e B ritish and T urkish governm ents. Ни Turkish treaty was denounced both by th e A xis and by Y ugoslavia.1ГсЬл15 by forcing R oum ania on M arch 23 to sign a commercial .и cord w hereby R oum anian grain and oil were to be exchanged for • . and declared that I in key’s action had destroyed th e neutrality and therefore th e very existence of the I nlente. an d R oum anian oil and m ineral re0 u rces and tra n sp o rta tio n system s were to be developed by G erm an ■. 308-311. 1 . A sim ilar FrancoI'urkish declaration was issued on Ju n e 24.6 ® N ex t Ita ly on April 7 suddenly attac k ed Albania. nos. Ibid. would aid each o th er to th e u tm o st of th eir power. Accordingly he did n o t hesitate lo desert Poland when th a t co u n try seemed destined to be th e next Nazi victim . 45. R oyal M inistry for Foreign Affairs.

68 In addition to th is Italian effort. nos. 1939. no.2 52 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y cooperation w ith Ita ly in th e creation of a n eutral bloc. O ctober 7. Great B ritain and the East. 1939). D uring O ctober and NovemWhite Book.0 4 Such was the sad position of th e Balkan E n te n te in Septem ber. there were several o th er plans cu rre n t for th e creation of a n eu tral boc. LI (N ovem ber. . O ctober 24. their intention of rem aining strictly neutral. January 11. 66 T h e Greek Perm anent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs reported the follow­ ing conversation with th e Italian m inister in A thens on O ctober 10. P robably it would be m ore accurate to state th a t during th a t period none of th e belligerents was ready to extend th e fro n t to include th e B alkans. T he Italian governm ent. 6 7B ulletin of International News. 1939. O ctober 12. 50. if the Balkan sta tes also m aintained a similar attitu de. January 27. 1939. 1156. and R oum ania. A nother difficulty was th a t no m eans had been found to overcom e th e Y ugoslav objections to th e passage of Italian troops through her te rrito ry to p ro te ct R oum ania. T his was particu larly tru e of Italy who announced her non-belligerency a t th e ou tb reak of th e w ar and who was anxious to p rev en t hostilities from occurring in th e M edi­ terran ean . 1083.” Current H istory. . after the signing of th e NaziSoviet tre a ty . . From th e entire con­ versation it was evident th at th e Italians feared Russian intervention as a potential m enace to their own regim e and in view of the danger of Slav expansion.67 T he Italian plan for a peace bloc appears to have collapsed in D ecem ber. 0 4Greek .1940. the Italian m inister said to m e in strictest confidence that the Italian governm ent had decided to m ake public at an early date . Y ugoslavia. . S ee also V. so th at Italy could not see with an indifferent ey e th e interference of B olshevik Russia in European affairs. we should avoid the disasters of war.6 6 and suggested. 131. w ith th e possible inclusion of B ulgaria. 1939: “ . F or alm ost a year a fter th e beginning of th e w ar th e E n tente was able to continue to function and to prevent th e extension of hos­ tilities to the Peninsula. 1939. 16. D ean . was afraid of R ussian penetration in th e B alkans. and H ungarian dem ands on R oum ania could no longer be held in check. T o conclude th e E n te n te picture. an d H ungarian-R oum anian-Y ugoslavian frontiers. W ith th e o u tb reak of th e R usso-Finnish W ar. H e said th at th e hard struggle which Italy had undertaken again st Com munism in Spain was still fresh. therefore. S ign or G razzi gave m e to understand th at the Italian governm ent had been led to th e ab ove decision in consequence of R ussia’s latest intervention and of her expansion in Eastern Europe. 1939. O ctober 21. 1940. 322. 1940. N ovem ber 25. T h u s he added. H ungary. th e policy of Greece was a cautious m ixture of friendliness tow ards G reat B ritain and th e preservation of good relations w ith Ita ly . January 11. “ Stalin in Europe. 55. Turkish-B ulgarian. M uch Italian blood had been shed then. New York Tim es.6 6 W ith th is favorable diplom atic situation th e Balkan countries were able to conclude a series of agreem ents by which troops were w ithdraw n from th e G reek-Italian. 53. th e Soviet danger seemed less m enacing. 6 6Great B ritain and the East. 19. 97.” Greek W hite Book. an agreem ent for m utual defense am ong Italy. 1939. M. 6 8N ew York Tim es.

however. .69 I t was also rum ored am ong British circles th a t in N o­ vem ber. and secu rity . added th a t. and Roum ania.” I t is believed th a t Sarafoglu fu rth er informed his colleagues th a t Bulgaria had agreed not to press her claims on S outhern D obrudja while th e w ar lasted.. W orking som etim es with b u t for th e m ost p a rt coun ter to th e Italians. p u t it as follows: Since the o u tb reak of th e p resent conflict th e governm ents of the E n ten te have openly expressed a desire to rem ain neutral. T he balance of forces in the Balkans was now clearly revealed. B ulgaria. a m eeting of th e Balkan E n te n te was held a t Belgrade on F ebru­ ary 2-4. “ . .. regarding th e future.” On th e surface.70 S hortly after th e failure of these last efforts to create a neutral bloc. 1939. and th a t the adoption by the E n te n te of any independent policy was ou t of th e question. A p­ preciation was also expressed a t th e conference for Ita ly ’s policy of non-belligerency.1 9 3 9 . and strenuous efforts Were m ade to find a basis of agreem ent between th e two la tte r countries. February 3. T he stubbornness of K ing Carol. th e situ atio n seemed highly satisfactory for th e E n te n te Powers. th e T u rk s wished ap ­ p aren tly to include Greece. . together w ith G erm an opposition. “ Bulgaria . order. 70 Ib id . wrecked this plan before th e end of th e year. b u t th e plan was pro m p tly rejected by th e oth er m em bers as far too dangerous. . 1940. unique condition th a t th e developm ent of events should not affect th eir in teg rity or independence. K ing Carol proposed th e transform ation of th e Balkan E n ten te into a defensive m ilitary alliance to resist all aggression. I t was recognized. S hukru Sarafoglu. th a t the pres­ ervation of Balkan n e u tra lity th u s far was due to a happy and acci­ dental com bination of circum stances. b u t on the sole. a t least. . N ovem ber 4. who had th e argum ent of an A nglo-French g u aran tee of R ou m an ia’s territo rial integrity. T he points agreed upon show th a t th e aim of th e allies was to insure peace as far as possible and a t th e sam e tim e to preserve I he territo rial s t a t u s q u o u ntil a general settlem en t of E uropean ques­ tions could be considered. T h ey had no illusions.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 253 her. CincarM arkovich. T h e Yugoslav representative. October 2 9. Accord­ ingly it was tacitly agreed th a t it was up to the various m em bers to look individually to th e G reat Powers to keep them o u t of th e Euro69 Ibid .1939. which stan d s like a beacon before our own aspirations for peace. T urkish diplom acy was active in a tte m p tin g to draw a group together under th e auspices of th e Allies. who had seen th e Bulgarian foreign m inister ju st before th e conference. will w ork w ith us on parallel lines for m aintenance of peace. if n o t publicly ad m itted. 1940.

7 1 T h is was soon d em onstrated when th e fall of France. 207. 115. Interpretations of th e work of th e conference are given in R. "La conference de Belgrade. 172. T h e success of th e Soviet Union incited Bulgaria and H ungary to press th eir claims. 1940). 1940. and th e annexationist policy of th e Soviet Union plunged th e Balkan countries. while R oum ania drifted tow ards G erm any in th e hope of o btaining a N azi guarantee which m ight curb H un­ garian and R ussian aspirations. “ Conference of the Balkan E n ten te. she was left unsupported by her allies. F ebruary 10. p u t an end to th e Balkan E n ten te. for all practical purposes. Pertinax.” N ation. February 3. u nder the pressure of th e centrifugal forces of th e w arring Powers. one by one. T he la tte r claimed a large slice of T ransylvania an d rejected the R oum anian counter-proposal for an exchange of populations. LV (February IS. 4. one of 71 A sum m ary of the proceedings of the conference is given in N ew York Times.000 M agyars and 1. .000 R oum anians. T h u s th e m em ber n ations adopted varying policies in their search for shelter from war. T he B ulgarian dem and for Southern D obrudja was ap p aren tly supported b y th e Soviet G overnm ent. T he term s of th e Balkan P a c t precluded assistance from th e o th er B alkan states. T h e Balkan E n te n te now experienced a fate sim ilar to th a t of th e L ittle E n ten te. th e entry of Ita ly into th e war. T he deadlock was broken by th e aw ard given by the Axis Powers a t V ienna on A ugust 30 by which R oum ania was com­ pelled to surrender to H ungary an area of ab o u t sixteen thousand sq uare miles w ith th e population of 967. In th e m eantim e little headw ay had been m ade w ith H ungary. D uring conversations held in Ju ly a t Salzburg betw een R oum anian and G erm an representatives. “La conference de l'entente balkanique.154. b u t also. So now w ith Roum ania. it had already ceased to be an effective and independent bloc. 1940). CL (February 10. 147. 1940). and in Bulletin of International News. A ppeal to G erm any b rought no response and th e provinces were ac­ cordingly surrendered. X X I I I (Febru­ ary 3. and on A ugust 30 an agreem ent was reached by w hich this area up to th e former 1912 border was ceded. 763-766. Y ugoslavia sought closer cooperation w ith H ungary and Bulgaria u nder Ita ly ’s leadership. 206. into th e E uropean con­ flict. Greece and T urkey tightened still more th e bonds betw een them and leaned tow ards B ritain and France. T h u s although th e E n ten te a t this conference had been extended for an other seven years. Pinon. W hen Czechoslovakia was pressed by G erm any." Revue des deux mondes.” L'E urope nouvelle.254 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y pean war. On Ju n e 26 the R oum anian governm ent was faced w ith a Soviet ultim a­ tu m for the cession of B essarabia and N orthern Bukovina. in practice. 1940. T h is p artitio n in g of R oum ania n o t only reduced th a t country alm ost to its pre-w ar size. 116.

LV (A ugust 1.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 2 55 I he questions raised had been th e dissolution of the B alkan E n ten te in order “ to elim inate B ritish influence” in the Balkans and to isolate 1'urkey. for the llalkan Peninsula was now one of th e th eatres of war. 1145-1148. Transylvanus. “T h e D ism em berm ent of R u m ania. . No sooner had the G erm an troops occupied R oum ania th a n Ita ly a tta ck e d Greece. 1919-1937 (Oxford.1940). M acartney.7 2 A t th e sam e tim e th e B alkan E n te n te ceased to exist. E. on her own in itiativ e. 237-244. E . Seton-W atson.” T h e u ltim atu m was rejected and th e long G reco-Italian war began.” Bulle­ tin of International N ews.ifter th eir initial advance. W ith regard to the W estern Powers an a ttitu d e of reserve m ust be m aintained. T reaty Revision and the H ungarian Frontiers (London. X I X (October. -S57— 562. This e n try of R oum ania into th e “ political sphere” of th e Axis Powers proved to be b u t the prelude to actu al absorption. T h e R oum anian au th o rities explained th a t th e s ta te of th eir arm y was such th a t a thorough overhauling by a foreign m ilitary pow er was essential. H itherto the G erm an arm ies had rem ained on th e left b an k of th e D anube n P.” Journal of Central European A ffairs. X V II (Septem ber 7. and th a t G erm any had undertaken th e task. In th e m eantim e T u rk ey had adopted a policy of non-bel­ ligerence while Y ugoslavia and Bulgaria rem ained n eutral. 1941). no. 1940. 1940). 41ff. A t the tim e th is proposal was supported by m ost of th e R ou­ m anian press.. 1937). 1934). G erm an troops began to arrive in stren g th on O ctober 14 by air.73 C o n trary to general expectations th e Italian s were checked . 251-255. see Greek White Book. has entered the political sphere of G erm any and Italy .” Great B ritain and the E ast. w ith th e lim its of objective inform ation. by th e D anube. W ith this avow al th e independence of R ou­ m ania m ay be said to have en d ed . 1940). 77ff. and this guarantee was accepted b y th e R oum anian governm ent. 85. 73 For the long series of provocations and negotiations culm inating in the ultim a' um. T he re­ m aining m em bers were interested only in self-preservation. C onsequently it is n o t perm issible to a tta c k I he Axis Powers in an y way. P.” Foreign A ffairs. “Transylvania P artitioned. “ Is Bessarabia N ext?” Foreign A ffairs. 1940). and g radually were pushed back into Albania. C. 18-27. I (April. R. X V III (April. M osely. W hen th e V ienna aw ard was issued it was accom panied by an exchange of notes betw een Ita ly and G erm any agreeing to Kiiarantee th e in teg rity of R oum anian territo ry . A. W . Hungary and her Successors. “ End of the Balkan E n ten te. M osely. A gainst whom this guarantee was directed was m ade clear when on Septem ber 6 General Antonescu defined R oum anian policy as follows: R oum ania. On O ctober 28 G eneral Metaxjas was handed an u ltim atu m by the Italian m inister dem anding th e rig h t to occupy for th e du ratio n of I he w ar an unspecified “ nu m b er of strategic points in G reek te rri­ to ry . and by railw ay through H ungary. “Ordeal in T ransylvan ia.

” American Review on the Soviet Union. T his was refused by th e Cvetkovich governm ent. 191-197. T urkey and the U .R . were out­ weighed by th e necessity of reaching Greece to p revent unchallenged Allied control in th e E astern M editerranean. C vetkovich left for V ienna where on M arch 25 he signed an agreem ent.” New Europe. the Y ugoslav public. 1940. 1941). In them the G erm an G overnm ent prom ­ ised to respect th e territo rial in teg rity of Y ugoslavia and n o t to require th e passage of G erm an troops. “ Bulgaria. D uring the first week of F eb ru ary 1941 th e first troops began to arrive. III (February. In reply G erm any dem anded a n u m b er of concessions. “T u rk ey’s Foreign P olicy and H itler’s W ar. ch. and dem ands were m ade upon th e Bulgarian governm ent to perm it th e e n try of th e G erm an forces into th e country. 1941).” Bulletin of International N ew s. So profound and general was th e reaction th a t it was a veritable revolution. a tte m p te d to counter this m ove by proposing th e form ation of a G reek-T urkish-Y ugoslav bloc. the Bulgarian governm ent agreed to th e G erm an dem ands. D espite repeated B ritish w arn­ ings and a Soviet offer of a p act of m utual m ilitary assistance. T he new coalition governm ent under G eneral D ushan Simovich announced th a t it was ready to do every74 ‘‘W hy Bulgaria W ent Over?” N ew Statesm an and N ation. 1941).S . 3-32. X X I (M arch 8. addressed to C vetkovich and signed by von R ibbentrop. . and in a few weeks th e occupation was com pleted.. 1943). Padev. D espite these assurances. These considerations. alw ays strongly anti-G erm an. U nder these circum stances th e Regency and governm ent were overthrow n by a m ilitary coup on M arch 27 and P eter was proclaim ed King. in response to a German u ltim atu m . N . I (August. 221-224. including th e dem obilization of th e Yugoslav a rm y and the rig h t of tra n sit through Y ugoslavia of G erm an m uni­ tion.S .7 4 T he w ay was now cleared for th e advance to the Aegean. Howard. which offered instead to sign a p a c t of non­ aggression and m utual friendship. First pressure was b rought to b ear on Y ugoslavia to adhere to th e TriPow er P a c t of Septem ber 27. 1941). b u t his efforts failed because of Y ugoslav and T urkish reluctance. An inter­ esting account of the S oviet offer of a p act of m utual assistance and of the reaction w ithin Bulgaria is given in M . hospital and troop train s. “T he German T hreat to Bulgaria. th e published te x t of which provided sim ply for Y ugoslav particip atio n in th e Tri-Pow er Pact. 232. X V III (February 22. Tw o “ letters of guar­ a n te e ” were added to th e protocol. T he B ritish foreign min­ ister.256 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y ap p aren tly because of th e u n certain ty of M oscow’s reactions to a fu rth e r advance in southeastern E urope and of th e danger of bringing T u rk ey into th e conflict if her control of th e S traits were menaced. after th e Italia n disasters in A lbania. Finally. T hus G erm an troops were massed on th e R oum anian side of th e D anube. Escape from the Balkans (N ew York. reacted violently a g ain st th e pact. H. A nthony Eden. 231.

b u t overw helm ing superiority in tan k s. 3 -2 7 . . D uring th e nineteen thirties an oth er a tte m p t was m ade to bring the Balkan sta te s together. 132— 146. sought to obtain economic security by drastic in tern al social reform . and of Balkan Conferences to discuss th e ou tstan d in g issues and to m ake definite proposals to th e governm ents. was insufficient. b u t th a t it was also determ ined to take a firm stan d if th e c o u n try ’s independence and territo rial in­ tegrity w. On A pril 17. sabotage in th e rear b y C ro at terro rists and M acedonian bands. planes and artillery enabled the N azis to force th eir w ay to A ttica. F . On April 23 G erm an m otor­ cycle troops entered A th en s. T h e results were by no m eans negligible. 1941). The Untamed Balkans (N ew York. T h e Conferences gained w idespread publicity and considerable popular sup p o rt. desperate and disillusioned after seven years of alm ost continuous w arfare.75 Such was th e history of th e B alkan federation m ovem ent between the tw o W orld W ars. economic an d cultural cooperation betw een the 76 M irkovich. th a t it would respect all outstanding “ public and open” engagem ents. revolutionary. it was hoped th a t th e sam e end could be a tta in e d by m eans of educational cam paigns to influence public opinion. and th e rap id ity of th e N azi a tta c k spelled the doom of Yugoslavia. “Jugoslavia’s C hoice. Y ugoslav resistance w as surprisingly weak. th e G erm an high com m and announced th e end of all organized Yugoslav resistance. mass m ovem ent. W . F or a tim e it seemed th a t the strong C om m unist P arties or the even more powerful A grarian P arties of Radich and Stam boliiski m ight succeed in carrying through this revolutionary program in a t least a p a rt of th e Peninsula.as threatened. and some progress was m ade in furthering social. L. P easants and w orkers. T h u s on th e m orning of April 6 the Nazi divisions invaded bo th Y ugoslavia and Greece. In place of force and m ass action. tw elve d ays a fte r th e beginning of th e cam paign. of course. X X (October. In th e case of the la tte r co u n try th e reason given for th e a tta c k w as th e presence of B ritish troops on G reek te rrito ry . T h e collapse of th e southern Y ugoslav arm y exposed the left flank of th e A nglo-G reek forces in M acedonia and forced them to retreat. In ad eq u a te p rep a raI ions. T his. 1941). B u t severe and unrelenting persecution coupled w ith th e assassination of th e p easan t and proletarian leaders checked th is radical m ovem ent and led to the establishm ent of au th o ritarian regimes of various types.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 2 57 I liing possible to m aintain peace. I t began in 1918 as a great. K ovacs.” Foreign A ffairs. Olym pus and a t T herm opylae. as G erm any sought prim arily the dem obilization of th e Y ugoslav arm y and tra n ­ sit rights for G erm an troops. and to p u t a final end to the th re a t of w ar by uniting as closely as possible th e peoples of the Balkans. S tands were m ade a t M t.

p articu larly in th a t it was concerned prim arily with th e m aintenance of th e territo rial status quo and. B u t the Balkan P act of 1934 fell far short of the Conference recom m endations. however. is th a t no fu ndam ental distinction can be m ade betw een B alkan and E uro­ pean politics. th a t th e Balkan peoples are peculiarly incapable of living peacefully side by side. and during th e next several years it expe­ rienced the sam e fate as th e o th e r E uropean blocs of th a t n ature. . was directed again st Bulgaria. F ranco-Italian diplom atic rivalry affected inter-B alkan relations in the im m ediate post-w ar period as H apsburg-R om anoff riv alry had in th e pre-w ar. T he inescapable conclusion. T hus to inquire w hy th e th ird Balkan alliance system disintegrated is to ask w hy th e League of N ations proved ineffectual and w hy th e second W orld W ar broke out. in effect. Similarly Anglo-French appeasem ent policies in th e nineteen thirties virtually determ ined th e fate of th e B alkan E n ten te as is evidenced by the fact th a t th e decisive problem which th e E n ten te had to m eet in the last few years of its existence was n o t Bulgarian b u t ra th e r ItaloGerman revisionism . I t can n o t be concluded from this. therefore. T h u s th e B alkan E n ten te was essentially an anti-revisionist bloc.258 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y states. Balkan politics trad itio n ally have been in tim ately d ependant upon and affected b y general E uropean politics.

T h is is especially tru e of th e B alkan federation m ovem ent Ih i . b u t these were J ih gotten as soon as their n atio n alist aspirations were. Il.ilkan bloc b u t th e m otive in such cases was purely one of m eeting In .mse it is very m uch alive to d a y and because federation in general md Balkan federation in p articu lar are considered w orth striv in g lor and highly desirable. A dispassionate appraisal of th e subject.il ion necessarily reflected a w idespread contem porary enthusiasm l'ii federation.in E m pire and th e creation of a num ber of federated states in I In.is it suited th e interests of th eir p articu lar country. D uring the • M'lilren forties and fifties. does n o t lead to such an optim istic conclusion. and th e rest.my num ber of projects for D anubian federation. C onsequently there arises th e danger of as'miing th a t th e various proposals of th e p ast for more B alkan coopi i. however. C ath erin e’s granI Iii же plans a t th e end of th e eighteenth cen tu ry were designed to set и i' . F o r exam ple. it becomes increasingly difficult to retain a proper periu d iv e .ils were m ade by th e G reat Powers for the partitioning of th e Oti"in. Occasionally a G reat Pow er statesm an did strive to create i Il. b u t again th e prim ary aim was not I hr solution of th e B alkan problem . of T alleyrand. In th e early nin eteen th cen tu ry num erous proIиri. co u n try ’s diplom atic needs a t th e given m om ent. As th e mass of d a ta ac<иm ulates. W hen th e Balkan sta te s gained th eir autonom y or th eir indelence. for th e m om ent 259 . M ost of th e cu rren t studies of th e prospects for Balkan Ь di l ation begin w ith a few references to Prince M ichael and to the Il. b u t only for so Iihii. while d ’H auIII i ve’s schem e in 1808 aim ed a t French hegem ony in th e N ear E a st 11 i lie expense of Russia. R oum anian and H ungarian leaders drew nli .i R ussian-dom inated G reek E m pire in th e B alkans.rther. .place of E uropean T u rk ey . of H ardenburg.i Ilean League of 1912 as proof of th e long and honorable history of I lie federation m ovem ent.ilkan statesm en occasionally showed some in terest in cooperating » iIII (heir neighbors and even talked of federation. T his was true "I Russia’s sponsorship of th e B alkan alliance system s of th e eighteen i lies and of 1912.CH A PTER X R ETR O SPEC T AND PRO SPECT J One of th e pitfalls which besets the p a th of th e historian who has iiudicd a given m ovem ent a t length is th e n a tu ra l and u nderstandiblc tendency to exaggerate its im portance. Sim ilar m otives are a p p a re n t in th e proIк iiuls of Polignac. th eir a ttitu d e to federation was fu ndam entally th e same. The general effect of G reat Pow er diplom acy for over a century li i i been to keep the B alkan sta te s a p a rt ra th e r th a n to draw them inr.

th a t in th e period prior to 1914. like the n in eteenth century revolutionaries. N one was convinced th a t federation in itself m ight be in accord w ith th e long range interests of th e Balkan states. collec­ tively or individually. I t m ay be concluded. satisfied by (he unification of M oldavia and W allachia and by th e Ausglcich of 1867. and essential for th e fulfillm ent of th eir social aspira­ tions. middle class intellectual elem ents. and Rhigas. can easily be overem phasized. th e E n te n te fell to pieces as soon as th e Axis Powers intervened actively in B alkan affairs. Pashich and Venizelos and K ing F erdinand banded together to form the B alkan League. however. a real federation m ovem ent w ith considerable mass following developed under th e leadership of tw o groups. therefore. b u t each w as interested above all else in acquiring as large a portion of E uropean T u rk ey as possible. R ather federation was for them a slogan to be adopted when it served as a m eans to some o th er end— usually national independence or expan­ sion— and to be discarded when it no longer fulfilled th a t purpose. D uring these years. but only after his earlier intolerant nationalism had led to disaster. Condi­ tions in th e Balkans were such in th e pre-1914 period th a t these revolutionaries exerted no lasting influence as is illustrated by the ineffectiveness.260 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y a t least. of th eir proposals and careers. I T he few exceptions to th is generalization are to be found in th e cases of those Balkan and foreign revolutionaries who were devoted pri­ m arily to their revolutionary principles. and th e liberal. Sim ilarly in 1912. M azzini. O utstanding am ongst these were G aribaldi. the radical agrarian. albeit each group had a different ty p e of fedJ It is true that K ossuth later urged federation. C ertainly they were n o t convinced of this to th e p o in t of adopting it as th e basis of their foreign policy. In evitably. then. F or th e former.1 T h e prim ary aim of Prince M ichael and of G arashanin was n o t federation b u t th e establishm ent of Serbian hegem ony in the Balkans. T he B alkan P act developed into a purely anti-B ulgarian instrum ent. th ey were au to ­ m atically broken and th e second Balkan W ar was th e result. and their alliance system of th e eighteen sixties was m erely a m eans to th a t end. socialist and com m unist parties. M arkovich. . none of th e B alkan or G reat Pow er statesm en was interested in fed­ eration per se. W hen th eir alli­ ances proved an obstacle in th e w ay of th a t goal. T h eir significance. I t was specifically agreed th a t th e signatories were to aid each o th er only in th e case of Balkan contingencies. Botev. Accordingly th ey consistently advocated and actively worked for B alkan federation. from th e im m ediate point of view. fed­ eration was an integral and fu ndam ental p a rt of their program s and philosophies. T he policies of th e Balkan rulers and statesm en in th e post-w ar years rem ained fundam entally th e same. K aravelov. however.

By April. H itle r’s “ New O rder’’ was the lot of I lie B alkan peoples.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 261 i i. M oreover. ! H. 4 T ex t in appendix J. are de­ term ined on the conclusion of this w ar to enter.. W ith th e suppression of these radical p arties during i lu. T heir hope was to arouse public opinion suf­ ficiently to induce th e B alkan governm ents to settle th eir differences. T he collapse of th e League of N ations and of th e general l . and the D ignity of M an. th e Principles of D em ocracy.i (ion in mind. bo th G overnm ents express the hope th a t in th is cooperation.3 On N ovem ber 11. they will also be joined by oth er countries in th a t p a rt of th e E u ro ­ pean C ontin en t. . Iо establish closer relations. " I . It has been necessary. 1-12. individuals and organizations w ith liberal ten d ­ encies assum ed th e leadership of th e federation m ovem ent. ra th e r th a n a peaceful. V. 1942). The United N ation s on the W ay (Chicago. in which th e signatories expressed I lieir conviction th a t th e “ G erm an ty ra n n y ” will be finally overllirown. I n this latest phase it is necessary to distinguish betw een tw o d istin ct ■ ispects of th e m ovem ent. 1940. the tw o G overnm ents consider it im perative to declare sol­ em nly even now th a t Poland an d Czechoslovakia. 1942).” Foreign P olicy Reports. based on th e respect for th e Freedom of N ations. Federation was I lie expressed goal of th e conferences which th ey organized and fed<ration th ey preached in th eir educational cam paigns in th e various Balkan countries. v o lu n tary federation.uarantee of its stability. federation was som ething essential— a prerequisite for the m aintenance of peace am ongst th e B alkan peoples. into closer political and economic association. therefore. th e one consisting of num erous agreem ents •md plans form ulated ab ro ad . Axis dom ination of th e B alkan peninsula has not p u t an end to I lie federation m ovem ent b u t ra th e r has precip itated a new phase. 1 4 ff.nineteen tw enties.roup also. X V III (M ay 15. a Polish-Czechoslovak agreem ent was m ade public. it should be noted I h a t a num ber of official agreem ents for post-w ar collaboration have been concluded am ongst th e governm ents-in-exile representing v ari­ ous E uropean countries. 1941. .uropean system of collective security au to m atically p u t an end lo these hopes. D ean.ignificant federation tren d s in th e popular resistance m ovem ents within th e peninsula. M .2 m ostly in B ritain and th e U nited States. to deal with the current Balkan federation m ovem ent as an integral and inseparable part of the general E ast European situation. as independent and :. Considering first th e plans proposed abroad. an d th e oth er being th e still em bryonic b u t p o tentially highly :. Bonnet. .overeign S tates. an d eventually to u n ite w ithin a federal Iramework. For this i.4 2 T h ese proposals alm ost invariably concern the w hole of E astern Europe rather Ilian the Balkan Peninsula alone. closing once and for all th e period of p a st recrim inations and disputes and taking into consideration the com m unity of th eir fu ndam ental interests.uropean A greem ents for Post-W ar R econstruction. which would becom e th e basis of a new order in C entral E urope and a r. and added th a t: .

Sava N. 2. it began the publication of th e m onthly leaflet. 1942. th e four delegations established on Ja n u a ry 7.”6 The speeches delivered a t th e signing of th is declaration were stronger an d m ore definite. Research on Industrial P ost-W ar E conom y of th e System AH.2 62 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y A step in th e direction of this proposed “ closer political and eco­ nom ic association” was taken when th e Greek. b y Professor Stephen de Ropp. K osanovich. th e C entral and E astern E uropean Planning Board. The declaration was vaguely w orded. 7. . O th er peoples of E astern E urope. enjoying a stable peace w ith freedom and pro sp erity . Greece. "Common Aspirations of the N ations of Eastern Europe. T his is based on th e prin­ ciple of “ T he B alkans for th e B alkan Peoples. Each group is headed by its own steer­ ing com m ittee. Prepared b y the Polish N ational S tudy Group. Poland. O ur states of E astern E urope and th e B alkans. In th e D eclaration of Czechoslovakia.6 In accordance w ith these aim s. In M ay. T he purpose of th e B oard is to carry on research w ork concerning all problem s of reconstruction in th e C entral and E ast E uropean region. signed a t the Conference of the Intern atio n al L abor O rganiza­ tion. N ew Y ork City. T h is is organized in four national groups. Plan of Research for Post War Reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe. of frank and friendly collaboration th a t we conceive th e p a rt to be played by our countries in th e reconstruction of a new E urope. T h e Board also has published a num ber of Documents and Reports consisting of the m inutes of th e Board m eetings and of reports on research. no. w hich presents d a ta on th e internal developm ents of the above m entioned four countries. 6. Polish and Czechoslovak delegates issued on N ovem ber 4. 1941). having sim ilar social tructures. Yugoslav. N . In th e words of th e Y ugoslav delegate.7 T he m ost detailed and im posing official undertaking is th e Greek Y ugoslav A greem ent of Ja n u a ry 15.” N ew Europe. 1942. 7 T he titles of the first three issues of the Documents and Reports are: no. 1. . will be called to join th a t com m unity. K osanovich. as soon as th ey free th e m ­ selves from th eir Fascist rulers. and enemies. II (D ecem ber.” and provides for the creation of a post-w ar B alkan Union. and th e whole B oard by a general steering com m ittee. Greek. 1942. 3. and Y ugo­ slavia. we tried to give expression to these desires for the first tim e. no. an Econom ic and Financial Organ 6 T ext in N ew Europe. “ I t is in this spirit . and Yugoslav. as soon as they regain th eir freedom . * S. Polish. I t affirmed th eir “ profound devotion to th e dem ocratic principle” and th eir concern for th e social and eco­ nomic sta n d a rd s of th e masses of th e p easant population. Czechoslovak. will u ndoubtedly tend to merge into a com m unity of h a r­ mony. . 1941 a jo in t declara­ tion a t th e conference of th e In tern atio n al L abor O rganization. 1942. 10. m entalities. M ay 28. Min utes of the Inaugurative M eeting of Joint Econom ic C om m ittees of the Central anil Eastern European Planning Board. Survey of Central and Eastern Europe. 1941). T h e m achinery of th e Union is to consist of a Political Organ. T h e headquarters of the Planning Board are at 2< > E ast 62 Street. II (D ecem ber. 11.

and m ilitary policies. freedom "I the spoken and w ritten word. th e presidents of the Councils of M inisters of th e m em ber-states will m eet when necessary to discuss questions of general in terest to th e Union.md to coordinate efforts for effecting a “rapprochem ent of public opinion” am ong m em ber-states. and th ey envisage w ith satisfaction th e future adhesion to th is agreem ent of o th er B alkan sta te s ruled by govern­ ments freely and legally c o n stitu te d . 1940. and to im ­ prove inter-B alkan com m unications of all types. th e independence of I lie courts of law. equality of all citizens before th e law. free admission of all citi✓ niis to th e perform ance of all s ta te functions. 1942. to prepare projects for agreem ents of conciliation and a rb itra tio n between them . In addition.reement presents th e general foundations for the organization of i IJalkan Union . and an agreem ent was M if iied on Ja n u a ry 24.” 8 In the m eantim e the governm ents of Poland and Czechoslovakia had been conducting negotiations w ith a view to supplem enting their initial declaration of N ovem ber 11. . b u t th eir task s are sim ilar.d sta te by th eir respective co nstitutions. . T hese rights are. A rticle tw elve of the Czechoslovak­ i a Iish A greem ent is w orth noting as it enum erates th e various liredom s and rights to be guaranteed to the citizens of each confed' i n Ii. T he purpose of th e Econom ic and fin an cial Organ is to coordinate custom s tariffs and foreign tra d e policies w ith a view to the conclusion of a custom s union. . T h e ch aracter and organization of th e organs of th e p ro­ posed Polish-Czechoslovak confederation are no t so specifically delined.” T his is one of the M l l ongest and m ost im p o rtan t features of th e agreem ent as it estab” I ext in appendix L. “ freed o n i of conscience. personal freedom . .if. T he M ilitary Organ is I о prepare a common plan for th e defence of th e “ E uropean froni icrs” of th e m em ber-states and to coordinate in general their m ilitary e stablishm ents.1 com mon economic plan and a B alkan m onetary union. nam ely th e coordination of political. F inally th e “ high co n tractin g parties declare th a t this . freedom of organization and associal i o n . T he duties of th e Political Organ •ire to coordinate th e foreign policies of the m em ber-states. economic. freedom of learning. B oth agreem ents envisage niily a confederation. to elaborate .B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 263 and a P erm an en t M ilitary Organ. and th e governm ents of l lie Union will facilitate regular m eetings betw een parliam en tary delegations of th e various states.1 P erm an en t Bureau. T his agreem ent is basically sim ilar to th a t signed by llie G reek and Y ugoslav governm ents. th a t is a p erm an en t and close association bei ween tw o sovereign and independent sta te s ra th e r th an a federal nliile w ith a comm on executive power and com m on assem blies and ministries. and th e control of governm ent by th e representallve national bodies by m eans of free elections. all of which are to be assisted by . regarding th e principles of the projected confederation.

T here are sim ilar differences as to w h at states should I»' included in th e proposed unions. is in itself n o t very significant. a surprisingly large n um ber of proposals for a B alkan and general E a st E uropean federa­ tion have been m ade by various individuals and political leaders of th e countries concerned. 82. they expressed their satisfaction w ith th e conclusion of th e Greek-Yugo­ slav p a c t by th e adoption of th e following resolution: T h e governm ents of Poland and Czechoslovakia . finally. and even dem anding. others a confederative organization while a th ird group is satisfied w ith vari ous form s of economic cooperation such as common tariffs and cur­ rencies. . more than a t a n y oth er tim e. . articles and speeches. Even th e Axis propagandists speak vaguely of a post-w ar contin ental federation which will be free of w h at th ey term th e disturbing influence of th e B ritish E m pire and of Anglo-Saxon dom ination. T his is quite under­ standable. Some of th e au th o rs favor a federative union. A t th e tim e th a t the Polish and Czechoslovak governm ents signed th eir agreem ent. convinced th a t th e confederation of sta te s in C entral E urope will be called upon to collaborate w ith the B alkan union envisaged by the governm ents of Greece and Y ugoslavia. Some have in m ind a g reat bloc 9 T ext in appendix K . 1942. 1942). w arm ly cong ratu late the governm ents of Greece and Y ugoslavia on their initiation of a B alkan union by their agreement concluded on Ja n u a ry 15. R epresentatives of every n atio n ality and of every shade of political opinion have contributed to this veritable flood of books. From all sides federalism is held forth as the m eans for the fulfillm ent of these aspirations. 10 N ew Europe. expecting. th a t th e signatories of these tw o agree­ m ents foresee close cooperation in th e post-w ar period betw een the B alkan and C entral E uropean confederations. inspired by the sam e sentim ent of fra te rn ity which anim ates th e relations betw een Poland and Czecho­ slovakia. . T h e volume of this m ass of plans and suggestions. E ven a cursory survey of th e proposals m ade reveals th a t th ey have little in common a p a rt from th e idea ol closer collaboration am ongst the sm aller nations of C entral and East ­ ern Europe.1 0 In addition to the^e official engagem ents. T he w ar-ravaged peoples of Europe are today.9 I t should be noted. In fact it appears th a t th e prin­ ciple of federalism enjoys a t present th a t vogue possessed a t one time by th e p arliam en tary constitutionalism of England and a t another by th e revolutionary republicanism of France. confident th a t only cooperation of these tw o regional organizations can assure the security and develop the p rosperity of th e v a st region stretching betw een th e B altic and Aegean Seas. II (February. a peace settle­ m ent which will hold ou t some prom ise of enduring peace and social security.264 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s i n H i s t o r y lislics an indispensable requirem ent of u n ity in th o u g h t and outlook w ithin the proposed collective organization. however.

” From address to Coun■il mi Foreign R elations in Chicago. A sim ilar view was expressed in a Ju ly 1943 issue of the 'invicl (rade union magazine. R.1 6 Still an o th e r point of conflict am ongst the advocates of federation i ■I he volcanic question of th e in ternal regimes of th e post-w ar states. Journal of Central European A ffairs. in the Soviet view . Such n conception of the new organization of the smaller European nations w ould mean I i . "We m ust not .1 1 A nother fundam ental difference is a p p a re n t in th e m a tte r of reI. as is ap p aren t when one co n trasts th e Soviet-C zechoslovak tre a ty of friendship. II must be recognized that several projects for federation that have em anated recently I t he W est reeked pungently of the long bankrupt an ti-S oviet p olicy. 1943 th at: “ Since this declaration [Polishi /iv. not m uch progress has been m ade. m utual assistance and post-w ar collaboration (Decembrr 12. August 24. Czechoslovakia considers it essential . or a B altic. u President BeneS is in favor of post-war regional federations but insists that.1 943.1 4 T his issue concerns.iy 31 and June 14. several difficulties have iiiiiirn. II urban.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 2 65 including all the small nations betw een th e Aegean and th e Baltic while others favor tw o or th ree sm aller units. try to create a confederative bloc of sm all nations in Central I in ope as a barrier between post-war G erm any and Russia and hostile to both. с. 1943. M ay 3 .” It does not 1'illow. if n o t allied to. that the Soviet G overnm ent is opposed to an E ast European federafor all tim e and under all circum stances. T ex t in Inform ation Bullelin. N ew World md sim ilar publications. M ololuv explained a t the M oscow conference that. Dr. no t only a C entral E uropean b u t also a B alkan federation. .1943.1941. 1943) w ith the severance of Soviet-Polish diplom atic relations. M ay 22. A Classified B ibliography (N ew York. and I m ust confess. . a N orthern and a S outh­ ern. M.hoslovak declaration of N ovem b er 11. of course. D . . A ufricht. 1 1 T h e Slovak Agrarian leader. W ar. Peace. in W ashington. adm itted as early as April 12. then federation m ight be discussed in a realistic fash ion . Its view s presum ably were expressed in an article in h vrstia (N ovem ber 18. u The C zechoslovak representative in th e U nited States. the emigr6 governII и 11 (м were too unstable and out of touch with their peoples to undertake far reaching I' deration com m itm ents. and Ki t /instruction. According to this Izvestia article. 1 1 An idea of th e number and variety of plans proposed m ay be gained b y examinIiii: recent issues of N ew Europe. 1943). A few of the au th o rs obviously are 11 1inking in “ Cordon S a n ita ire ” term s1 2 while o thers insist th a t any I< ‘deration. 1943) w hich included the follow ing passage: “T h e Soviet Union— and this m ust be especially em phasized— firmly rejects an y attem p ts to I much a policy of a sanitary cordon regardless of the form in which it m ay be m asked. however. This bulletin is issued three tim es w eekly by th e em bassy of the I I ' 1 S. 1943. that u ' should reach a com m on agreem ent with the Soviet U n ion . I he strong pro-R ussian forces in B ulgaria and Y ugoslavia would never accept an an ti-S oviet B alkan federation. . M ilan H odza. D ecem ber 7. if it is to have a n y chance of success. Colonel Vladimir S. has advocated a Central Eurol>r. . a D anubian an d a B alkan.H ions w ith the Soviet Union. m ust be closely as­ sociated w ith. C. . N ovem ber 19. paring for a new European war. W ar and the Working Class. 1 1 T h e Soviet G overnm ent w ith its “ Cordon Sanitaire” phobia is extrem ely sus|ilcious of federation proposals. . 1943.” Nut) York Tim es. . 22. 1940] was m ade. the Soviet U nion. 24-26.1 3 I t is no secret th a t ili is issue has seriously affected Polish-Czechoslovak relations. but th at after authority and stab ility definitely had been ■ illilish cd . News Flashes from Czechoslovakia.” N ew s Flashes from i rcchoslovakia.m federation as “a barrier betw een N azi ideologists and R ussian B olsheviki.” N ew York I inn's. I li is problem of relations w ith th e Soviet Union is largely responsible for the fact th a t the Polish-Czechoslovak agreem ent for post-w ar i onfederation is now v irtu ally n on-existent. See also the works listed in H.

” 1 6 T here is no agreem ent. X X (January. in New s Flashes from Czecho­ slovakia. with the aim of correcting or approving th em . By all odds th e o u tstan d in g feature of th e Balkan situation today is th e rem arkable stren g th and te n acity of th e underground m ove­ m ents which have been able to w rest control of large areas in Greece and Y ugoslavia from th e Axis forces. C zechoslovak M inister of S tate. however. Otherw ise th ey are rem iniscent strongly of th e long list of sim ilar projects which were bro u g h t forth during th e course of th e nin eteen th cen tu ry and which. T o say th a t the underground forces are fighting exclu­ sively for national independence and th a t their activities are purely m ilitary is to ignore th e m eaning and significance of th e national independence m ovem ents in th e B alkans and thro u g h o u t Europe. . should be based on th e sam e political and social principles. however. W hereas m any em ­ phasize th e need for far reaching political and socio-economic reforms. as to w h at these principles should be. II (June. I t appears. “ Danubian R econ­ stru ction .” Foreign A ffairs. o thers evidently prefer a retu rn as far as possible to the pre-1939 status quo while a few would go still fu rth er back and reconstruct E urope along the lines of th e super-national H apsburg E m pire. 243-252. and the text of the E astern European Peasant Programm e in th e Central European Observer. 1944. m ust n o t be looked upon as m erely organizations of resistance against th e enem y. “ th e in ternal regimes of th e states . T hese m ovem ents are also inevitably schools and laboratories of new political th o u g h t regarding th e future. In short. 205. as has been noted. D ecem ber 28. T h e y are of in terest as reflecting th e currents of th o u g h t in certain B ritish. 17 Compare for exam ple the follow ing works: O tto of Austria. A m erican an d em igre circles. th a t the futu re of the federation m ovem ent will be d eter­ m ined more b y th e forces an d m ovem ents now developing in the B alkans ra th e r th a n by books a n d articles w ritten abroad.1 9 4 2 ). K ybal. therefore. .266 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y Some of th e w riters insist v ery properly th a t if the federation is to be stable. 246. .1943. January 17. 1942).1 7 In conclusion.” N ew Europe. V.1 8 As for th e h o st of unofficial plans. Hubert Ripka. “T h e Case against H apsburg R estoration. exercised no appreciable influence on B alkan affairs. T he Polish-Czechoslovak agreem ent alread y is wrecked over th e Soviet issue while th e G reek-Y ugoslav agreem ent obviously rem ains suspended in m id-air so long as the retu rn to power of both of these em igre governm ents is un certain . 18 T h e N ational C om m ittee for the Liberation of Y ugoslavia has repudiated the Y ugoslav governm ent-in-exile and has proclaim ed officially th at it will reconsider "all international agreem ents that have been concluded and obligations undertaken b y the governm ent-in-exile on behalf of Y ugoslavia. th ey are n o t only 10 Dr. it is difficult to see how th ey m ight influence seriously the course of future events in th e Balkans.” Inter-Continent News. These m ovem ents. 1942). the practical significance of these num erous un ­ official proposals an d of the official agreem ents of the governm ents-inexile easily can be exaggerated. 204. X X I X (July 3 1 .

dem ocratic dom estic in stitu tio n s and a Yugoslav— and if possible a B alkan federation. 2) In order to carry o u t th e principles of sovereignty for the nroples of Y ugoslavia.ii lier upsurge. As has been noted. including the infinitely greater socio-econom ic dislocation и nulling from this war. D ecem ber IS. however. Bosnia and H ercegovina. X X (January. C roatia.1 1 ion— even federation— am ongst th e Balkan nations.. T his historical com parison is of the nl most significance.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 26 7 u... in o rder th a t Y ugoslavia be a real home I"i all its peoples and in order th a t it should no longer become an ай на for a n y reactio n ary clique in Y ugoslavia. during the people’s liberation war.irlies rose to prom inence in th e years following 1918. >o. these urbanizations are concerned a t p resent prim arily w ith th e struggle . As m ight be expected under th e circum stances. the greatly enhanced power. . In this revolutionary sense th e situ atio n a t p resent resembles. indicates th a t th eir thinking on th e post-w ar problem is along th e lines of th eir predecessors of the tw enties. E. T o d ay th e N alional C om m ittee for the L iberation of Y ugoslavia.g a in st th e G erm an occupation forces. 1943.” Foreign Illnits. th a t ■ . Beneg. prestige and attraction of the fin\ irt Union. in quality though n o t in degree19 th e situ atio n w hich developed a t the end of th e first W orld W ar.ilionalist w ith respect to th e invad er b u t also revolutionary w ith lespect to th e past. radical labor and agrarian 11. 1942).. M ontenegro. and th eir main objectives were drastic social reform a t hom e and close collabo1 . “T his war will conclude w ith even more profound revolutionary disturbit" than in 1918. the federative prin111 ile will ensure full eq u ality for the peoples of Serbia.20 ■ “ The revolutionary p otential in th e Balkans is much greater now than in 1918 be■ h i i of various factors. * “ Inter-Continent N ews. “T h e O rganization of Post-w ar E urope.. the organs for th e people’s power have been established in th e different regions of Y ugoslavia in th e form of people’s liberation i om m ittees an d regional anti-fascist Veces for th e people’s lib era­ tion. and the discrediting of th e traditionally privileged and generally antiiliimocratic elem ents due either to their unpopular pre-war policies or their present *nll. th e N ational Liberation F ro n t of Greece an d the F ath erlan d F ro n t of Bulgaria must be considered as essentially a contin u atio n or a revival of th a t i . Movenia. M acedonia. 3) In accordance w ith th is th e federative organization for Nnjjoslavia will be based on th e fullest dem ocratic rights. T h u s P resident BeneS is of the opinion th a t in Eastern I . and th e I h i m ust be noted th a t already now. T he scan ty m aterial which i available. T he N ational C om m ittee for th e L iberation of Y ugoslavia al" idy has ado p ted officially th e following resolutions: 1) T h e peoples of Y ugoslavia never have and do n o t recog­ nize the division of Y ugoslavia in to p a rts by the fascist im perialists in id have proved in the com m on arm ed struggle th eir firm will to и main united in Y ugoslavia.iboration w ith the Axis. 232.

” New York Tim es. See also New York Tim es. B u t that is n o t all. depending on the will of the Bulgarian people. W hether we like it or not. . th e foundations of a genuine Balkan union have been laid. 447. T h ey regard th e political an d economical u n ity of the B alkans as indivisible and th eir goal is the foundation of a B alkan union. 1943. . 2 2P adev . . Albania and Greece. . 87. . "Bulgarian and Rum anian Partisan units have joined the People':! Arm y of Liberation under General Josip Broz (T ito) and are fighting beside a formidable Y ugoslav guerrilla force. . .1 on which som e observers believe the future of that part of the world m ust rest after the w ar. 200.” Will it lead a t long last to some sort of B alkan unity or will we witness once more the tragic events of the post-1918 period ? Precise predictions are n atu rally impossible b u t this stu d y of almost: tw o centuries of th e federation m ovem ent does. . cit. T h is has been achieved by th e forces of th e Left. .2 1 One ob­ server who rem ained in the B alkans for some tim e after th e German invasion and who was in close touch w ith underground forces came to the conclusion th a t. It m ight begin with G reece and Y ugoslavia. . . P adev. T h e idea of a still wider Balkan federation or confederation or union intrigues a great m any B alkanites. Bulgaria (if not already in a new South-Slavic com bination) and probably R um ania. M ore significant for the fu tu re is th e fact th a t their attitu d e tow ard all B alkan problem s is th e rig h t one. is to oust the N azi invader. M. . . T h ey know that for a long tim e m any Bulgarians have considered them selves Y ugoslavs. . In p a rts of the B alkans I saw these forces a t work. . . op. . H ow m any autonom ous or sem i-autonom ous units there will be in the Y u goslav federation is left to the future. . 249-251. . although no precise data is available as to th e n a tu re and extent of th eir relations. of course. . A nother informed observer has sum m arized th e situation as follow s: " . T h ey talk of bringing Bulgaria into the South-Slavic federation. . F u rtherm ore it is not w ith o u t significance th a t the N ational C om m ittee in Yugoslavia. .2 2 T he final question which arises is. T h eir p rim ary aim . in the opinion of the au th o r. . then take in Albania. Janaury 8. T h e Y ugoslav Partisans are in close contact with L eftist guerrillas in Bulgaria. w hat are th e prospects for this "general tre n d . is now operating as a pail of M arshal T ito ’s N ational L iberation Arm y. . 88. . 1943). From the sam e c ity cam e an earlier report that. . the thinking within the Liberation Front of Y ugoslavia touches the fringes of the postwar q uestion. . indicating not only the spread of active resistance against th e G erm ans in the satellite Balkan lands but also a possible growth of ties within south-eastern ‘peasant Europe. . this is the general tre n d of political events in th e B alkans. M y Native L and. . 1944. signifi­ cantly nam ed the K hristo B otev brigade. Decem ber IS. and th a t a B ulgarian d etachm ent. Escape from the Balkans (N ew York. December 1. 446.. . I t does p o in t to a t least two 21 A recent report from Cairo referred to “a pretty well substantiated rapproclie m ent betw een the EA M [initials of the Greek words for N ational Liberation From | w ith th e ‘Fatherland F ront’ of Bulgaria as well as w ith M arshall T ito's Yugoslav Partisans . 1943. strange as it m ay seem.” Adam ic. . .268 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y In addition to this form al decision of th e Y ugoslav Com m ittee it is well known th a t both in Y ugoslavia and Bulgaria there is wide­ spread feeling in favor of the inclusion of Bulgaria in a post-war federal Yugoslav sta te . First of all they are thinking of a Y ugoslav fedeni tion. T h is is a m atter of considerable political im portance. the N ational L iberation F ro n t in Greece and th e F ath erlan d Front in Bulgaria are in co n tact w ith each other. during these years of N azi ty ra n n y by the B alkan peoples them selves.” N ew York Times. 201. provide some clues to th e future.

in defiance of th e long-established rule th a t th e B alkans ■'liould belong to the B alkan nations. Public "l>inion. sen t to them by various m inistries. Czechoslovakia in her long agony enjoyed the full иvinpathy of our people b u t n o t the su p p o rt and help she needed Irom our G overnm ent. A t the end. b u t II i tainly it can be predicted th a t failure to set up such governm ents will m ake federation impossible. was th u s com pletely suppressed. A lexander’s policy of collaboration w ith his B alkan neighbors m d w ith B ritain. who had to bear the whole burden of tax atio n . to seize Albania. . for example. it was reduced to a m ere rum p. . T here is no d oubt. . not to suffer the sam e fate as those of th e past. France. in fact. T he Press was n o t m erely controlled. W h at a t the end of 1940 was th e political clim ate of Y ugoslavia? T h e co u n try was then governed by a Regency of three mem bers. T his internal situ atio n was th u s the first g reat cause of subsequent developm ents. I lie B udget of a country. th e political and social situ atio n in I ngoslavia under the Regency was a classic exam ple of the conditions in which a proud and in dependent people were driven by th eir own ( Government along the p a th tow ards revolution. if n o t by any . T he feelings of the people received little consideration in the m a t­ in's of foreign policy. and w ith o u t any real say in th e sta te of affairs.] O ur relations w ith I''ranсe cooled off first. I t can n o t be argued th a t such governm ents auto m atically will m ake possible a federation. T h e Lower II I >use of th e Y ugoslav P arliam en t— th e S kupsntina— did n o t function for th e simple reason th a t it did n o t exist. the Senate. bound hand and foot to I lie Regency.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 26 9 b. th a t Y ugoslavia's d rift tow ards th e Axis during th e late thirties would never have occurred had Y ugoslav foreign policy been d eter­ mined by th e wishes of the people ra th e r th an by the am bitions and li ars of a tin y clique in Belgrade. or by the prin ted w ord. was draw n up by the G overnm ent alone. . and afterw ards more and more openly— to abandon this p a th of Y ugoslav foreign policy. 1 1hat is. w ith o u t even a p ro test on our p a rt. T he first of these principles is dem ocracy. an d the U nited States. were allowed no say nor super­ vision of any kind. G enuinely dem ocratic I'overnm ents capable of winning th e confidence and su p p o rt of their icHpective peoples are a prerequisite. which had no o p p o rtu n ity to express itself. . T he people. T his in tim ate connection betw een dom estic affairs and foreign policy is m ade perfectly clear in the fol­ lowing in dictm ent of th e pre-w ar regim e by K ing Peter. In short.isic principles which m ust be respected if fu tu re federation efforts . . As for the U pper House. T he newspapers were com pelled to publish as their own. A fterw ards the L ittle E n ten te w as w eakened and destroyed. o n l y one of whom exercised full influence in S tate affairs. either a t the i lections. Italy was allowed. whose population num bered 16 million. T he Regency m ade a fatal m istake w hen it began— a t first very i . I t was w holly subservient 10 the official directions which covered th e last detail of its work.uitiously and w ith a very suspect secrecy.их. b o th leading •и tid es and com m entaries.

T his foreign policy was th e second g reat cause of Y ugoslav dis­ conten t. T hus. . T aking dom estic and foreign policy together. and w ith these G reat Powers continually on th e verge of w ar over the ex ten t of th eir respective spheres of influence. th e immorlal sp irit of the Kosovo field spoke again.3 270 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H ist o r y form al step. . X I X (January 23. post-wai 23 Speech to the D efence Union Luncheon in London on D ecem ber 17. E ith e r posl w ar Europe will be organized on th e basis of some system of collective security. as it alw ays spoke when om natio n h ad to pass through a g reat spiritual crisis. 1942). or else E urope will be carved up into spheres of influence. it m ean t th a t Y ugoslavia was to step into the cam p of the enem ies of hum an freedom and to renounce her national independence. the B alkan P a c t itself was abandoned.” Central European Observer. as it has been said. T hese tw o principles obviously are not cure-alls. T h u s indecisive­ ness first and fear afterw ards. In the light of th e tragic histories of th e L ittle and Balkan E n ten tes.3 1 . 1941. a I least on a European-w ide scale. In th e end Y ugoslavia to her own sorrow alm ost ranked amon^ those S tates th a t. they resolved to p u t a stop to encroachm ent on their patience. 3 0 . . T hey leave a host of pressing questions unansw ered— frontier lines. caused the then rulers of Yugoslavia to tu rn th eir backs on th eir co u n try ’s traditional friends and to seal so-called friendship w ith m anifest aggressors who are w aiting simply and solely for th e first o p p o rtu n ity to invade. In internal policy. On M arch 25. them selves fed th e crocodile who was swallowing them one b y one. it is difficult to envisage th e con­ tinued existence of an y federal system in E astern E urope. or in any o th e r p a rt of Europe. unless th is condition is fulfilled. I'M I T ext in “ Y ugoslavia’s P ast and F utu re. its fear and its m iscalculation. th is miserable foreign policy which shortsightedness and fear led the Regency to pursue had as its consequence even more disgraceful concessions to the Axis Powers. 1941 th e representatives of the Y ugoslav G overn­ m en t and th e R egency signed in V ienna a docum ent th a t was sup­ posed to bring Y ugoslavia into the T rip a rtite Pact. T hey re­ fused to accept the decision of th e Regency which bro u g h t Yugo­ slavia into the Axis orbit. . th a t m ean t the stabilization of an evil state of affairs inside the country itself. no greater gulf could exist betw een a people and its rulers th a n the un h ap p y Regency had m anaged to create by its folly. Once th e people realised th a t their very soul was a t stake. A t daw n on M arch 27. w ith clusters of small nations seeking th e protection of one of the G reat Powers. T h e people flung o u t the G overnm ent which was try in g to sell the n a tio n ’s soul in the m a rk e t place.2 3 T h e second essential principle is effective collective security. I w an t to stress th e people when I speak ab o u t this historical ev en t. In foreign policy. It in a rhetorical question to ask w h ether a n y B alkan or E a st European federation could survive in a E urope of the la tte r variety.

w hereas if they are adopted and ap ­ plied.. it will n o t prove possible even to begin to consider th e various o th er problem s in a м . th a t these principles are basic h i this sense: if th e y are n o t adop ted and applied. Sava K osanovich. 424-439. . From th e federation view point these are th e tw o all im p o rta n t factors in th e situ ation today. social and economic in stitu tio n s once the enem y has been i■ . th a n a few years ago.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 271 <Germany. Cairo an d T eheran Conferences Iin ve opened.md so forth. two events of first Importance have occurred. 1944 I' I )r. I t is believed. economic relations betw een E astern and W estern Europe. Ivan Subasich (spokesm an of K ing Peter) of a governm ent >1 1it h unites the dem ocratic Y ugoslav elem ents outside the country with M arshal T ito ’s L iberation M ovem ent in Y ugoslavia. 232. B oth collective security and dem ocratic in stitu tio n s are m ore feasible now. I he oth er notew orthy event is the issuance of strong and defi­ nite pro-federation statem en ts by representatives of b o th the T ito иud Subasich governm ents.24 Sim ilarly the Moscow. T he first is the form ation on Ju ly 7. VI (N ovem ber. 1943). Social W elfare. M r. M inister of InIci ior. and in the Round T ab le on “T h e B attle ■ и i In lialk ans. H ealth and Public W orks in th e Subasich I " I Ii is political awareness of the Balkan peoples is em phasized in BeneS. n o t only will consideration of the o th er problem s becom e feasi­ ble. “OrH111/и Iion of Postwar Europe. then th e prospect for the 1 11 1 ii re is by no m eans w ith o u t hope. In the case of Yugoslavia it has led I n l h e r to a national u n ity and a national renaissance which is quite unparalleled in the q u arter-cen tu ry history of th a t country. P O S T S C R IP T Since the w riting of the above conclusion. | idled. cit. If the above speculations are sound. in th e words of Prim e M inister C hurchill. “a wide field o| Iriendly cooperation” in b o th th e w ar and post-w ar periods imongst th e nations of th e world. P ara­ doxical though it m ay seem in the m idst of a second W orld W ar. the ■vents of th e next few years m ay reveal th a t a Balkan federation is • loser to realization now th a n a t a n y oth er period in th e m odern era." loc. < ertainly th e peoples of th e B alkans to d ay are politically conscious ilid aroused to an unprecedented degree and have m ade clear in their manifestos an d program s th eir determ ination to set up dem ocratic political. however.” Free W orld. . b u t th e problem s them selves will become less dangerous and complex. T he signifii шее of this accom plishm ent is th a t it dem onstrates a fact which is 11 e«|iiently overlooked or o u trig h tly denied— nam ely th a t the up' m pe of popular m ass m ovem ents in the Balkans need n o t necessarily Ii id to chaos and to civil w ar.ilistic and practical fashion.

T he significance of these statem ents needs no em phasizing. T hese statem en ts m ay well prove to he the blueprints of the new Balkans. They reveal a desire and an a ttitu d e tow ards Balkan federation which in rem iniscent of the revolutionary post— 1918 period. Second. Foreign M inister of the National C om m ittee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia has expressed himself as follows: O ur first aim is free federal Y ugoslavia. we will invite A lbania to en ter w ith full and equal rights. Greece m ust either be included in th e federation or we m u st have a perm anent alliance w ith her. foresees a post-w ar South Slav federation stretching “ from T rieste to V arn a” in which the com ponent units would enjoy cu ltu ral autonom y and wide powers of self governm ent. following th e Turkish-G reek population exchange more th a n tw o decades ago. 1944. W e m ust have a B alkan federation.27 2 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y governm ent. B u t th a t’s n o t enough to insure peace in th e B alkans. and it is now pari of Greece. n atu ra lly . Dr. 11. the center of a larger u n it— perhaps a B alkan confederation. T h e first B alkan e n ten te had only one aim — to hold Bulgaria down.2 6 I believe th a t post-w ar federated Y ugoslavia will become. Form erly th a t portion of M acedonia probably had a m ajority of Slavs in its population. In addition he has sta te d . G reek Macedonia n a tu ra lly belongs to Greece a n d is p a rt of Greece. I believe th e best solution for this problem is to give Macedonia full au to n o m y w ithin th e federal state. in the B alkans. is up to th e Greeks. T he g reat bone of contention betw een Y ugoslavia and Bulgaria was th e sta tu s ol M acedonia. T hai. H ow ever. T hen we will be stro n g enough to repel a n y atta c k s from w hatever q u arter. I am firmly convinced th a t th e B alkans will th u s become a pillar of harm onious developm ent in Europe. I t was an unsound basis for a peaceful bloc. Sim ilarly. T h a t would end th e Yugoslav-B ulgarian dispute. only to Slav M acedonia. I ’m sure th a t Y ugoslavia and Greece can easily agree on th eir frontiers. A nd finally they definitely recognize Greek M acedonia as Greek. a n d th e first step would be a union of Y ugoslavia and Bulgaria. I refer. th u s c u ttin g the ground from under the feet of certain G reek circles afflicted w ith Slavophobia. n atu rally . it was colonize!I w ith G reek m oney by G reeks from Asia M inor. As far as Greece is concerned. T h ey propose a u to n o m y for M acedonia— the only feasible solution for the problem which has poisoned inter-B alkan relations for over half a century. . 26 N ew York Tim es. April. Josip Sm odlaka.

have 11:reed on the following: I. th e other и ill come to her aid w ith a supporting arm y com prising n o t less th an live thousand men com pletely equipped and arm ed. N either of th e H igh C o ntracting P arties m ay conclude an П mistice or suspension of arm s. T he p resent tre a ty of alliance is to rem ain in effect for ten \ <. 273 . 91.A P P E N D IX A D E F E N S IV E A N D O F F E N S IV E A L L IA N C E T R E A T Y A G A IN S T T U R K E Y B E T W E E N T H E P R IN C E OF W A L L A C H IA A N D M O L D A V IA ON T H E O N E H A N D AND T H E P R IN C E O F S E R B IA ON T H E O T H E R H A N D . iIn’ two arm ies will fight together. II. Sieur G arashanin. and have nam ed as th eir plenipotentiaries for this purpose: H is Highness the Prince of W allachia and M oldavia. Le trait6 de Voeslau du 26 aovtt 1867. and. If th e course of operations an d m ilitary success dem and th a t the war be conducted beyond th e frontiers of W allachia and Serbia. In case of defeat. 403. Imm T urkish suzerainty. if possible. Lascaris. V. S IG N E D M A Y 14/26. III. having exchanged their plenipotentiary letters which were found in good and due form . if T u rk ey ati и l<s by force of arm s one of th e High C ontracting Parties. nor sign a peace w ith o u t th e com1 Translated and reprinted from S. m inister of foreign affairs. an d will have a rig h t only to th e booty which falls into its mwii hands. irrevocably to conclude a defensive and offensive alliance и . will invoke the arm ed protection of Russia. th e H igh C o ntracting P arties a fte r previous ■ г i cem ent. T his arm y will be placed under the com m and of ilie suprem e chief of the m ilitary forces of th e co u ntry w hich is ati iclced. IV. Sieur 1 1 Valenesco.md and His H ighness the Prince of Serbia on the o th e r hand. either on th e offensive or on the defensive.irs w ith th e irrevocable aim of liberating th eir states. To succeed in th is th e High C o ntracting P arties will m ake it known to the P orte on a d a te set by com m on consent. and His Highness th e Prince "I Serbia. to be m aintained 11 its own expense. See supra. desirous of liberating th eir S tates from T urkish suzerainty and of и> niiring full and com plete independence. Senator.iinst T u rk ey . T . R egulations for the strateg ic positions of the arm y . have decided by common i unsent. 92 for the question of the correct d ate of this •H illy. 402. W ho. 1926). III (Sepli inlicr. th a t they ii lnse to pay th e trib u te required by suzerainty.i i i i. 18661 His Highness th e Prince of W allachia and M oldavia on th e one Ii.et la Serbie. ‘‘La premiere alliance entre la i .” Le monde slave.

. V II. will obtain an indem nity of m oney which will be determ ined by a special commission.274 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y plcte consent of the o th er p a rty . M oldavia-W allachia. since she is n a tu ra lly lim ited by th e D anube. T he Prince of Serbia assum es th e obligation of com m unicat­ ing the p resent tre a ty to th e Prince of M ontenegro and of inviting him to tak e an active p a rt in th e execution of th e present agreem ent. In case Serbia succeeds in extending h er boundaries at T u rk e y ’s expense.

A P P E N D IX В PR O T O C O L O F T H E B U L G A R IA N B E N E V O L E N T S O C IE T Y O F B U C H A R E S T . T h e sta te religion shall be th e O rthodox. in th e tw o dialects. 7. 6. A P R IL 5/17. T he sam e shall hold for th e fu tu re coinage. T osh ev. which. and its geographic position. which. T hrace and M acedonia). 28. T h race and M acedonia. are assem bled to deliberate upon and to discover m eans for the liberation of our dear fatherland. E ach co u n try shall retain its own dialect for official use and hence th e officials will be required to belong to th a t natio n ality am ongst which they serve. 5. has been n ear to us for centuries. . T he Y ugoslav K ingdom shall consist of Serbia and Bulgaria (Ilie B ulgarian lands to include B ulgaria. Serbian and B ulgarian. Religious m atters shall be governed by an independent Synod 1 T ranslated and reprinted from A. Slivensky. in order th a t we also m ight join the ranks of th e free nations and m anifest to th e world th a t we exist. 8. L a Bulgarie depuis le traite de B erlin et la p a ix •Inns les Balkans (Paris. our interests. we. 3. will aid us to atlain our liberation. All th e decrees of the Yugoslav K ingdom shall be published sim ultaneously.194. w ith th e rig h t of succession. Radeff. T he K ingdom shall have one national flag composed of th e in­ signia of th e tw o races. 275 . and to speak th e dialect of th a t country. and for such a nation we can prefer no other th an the Serbian. therefore. 1927).” P ages from Bulgarian I ile (1927). 2. And as a basis for such fratern al rapprochem ent we propose. and hence only w ith th eir close brotherhood we can and we will become an independent nation. 27. th e following tw elve points. for our m u tu al benefit. 4. b u t all confessions will be free. 18671 W hereas the present circum stances call upon all oppressed nations in T u rk ey to tak e m easures necessary for th eir liberation. w ithout exc eptions. in its n atio n ality . 1. I. In order to a tta in th is desirable end it is necessary to select a neighboring nation. its faith. and in I. under the nam e of Y ugoslav Kingdom . T he head of the new governm ent shall be th e present Prince of Serbia. 193. T h e Serbian laws in force to d ay are accepted by us and shall Ik: translated also into th e B ulgarian dialect. Im perfect translations are given in S. “T h e Serbollnlgarian A greem ent of 1867 for a Y ougoslav C onfederation. the Bulgarians living in Bulgaria. in accordance w ith existing conditions.ire identical. A fratern al union should be effected betw een th e Serbs and l he Bulgars. B alkanskite V olni [The B alkan Wars] (Sofia. M ichael Obrenovich. 1919). 77-79.

therefore. 12. in th eir agreem ent for the futu re Y ugoslav K ingdom . will find it possi­ ble to provide for the a tta in m e n t of th is p atrio tic aim. Dr. . T he agreem ent to have force on th e day on which it is signed by th e Serbian governm ent and by th e com m ittee. K hristo Georgiev. of th e fifth day of th e m onth of April. D one in B ucharest in th e y ear from th e b irth of C hrist one th o u ­ sand eight hundred sixty-seven. 10. who. II. M ay A lm ighty God be P ro tecto r an d G uide in this sacred decision of ours. D r. in order to bring into execution the common desire. according to circum ­ stances and necessity. M ichael Koloni. we find it judicious to choose a com m ittee of seven persons. S tefan Ivanov. m ust have in view the following two conditions: I. G. who. T h e head of the sta te shall select th e m em bers of the m inisterial cabinet from the tw o races. P rotich. M M . T he Serbian G overnm ent m u st obligate itself in the said agreem ent to render all m aterial and m oral assistance for the a tta in ­ m ent of th e com m on end as the com m ittee. T h e national representation shall be m ade up in proportion to th e population of th e sta te and in accordance w ith th e form exist­ ing in Serbia to d a y for this purpose. However. W e choose. T his Synod shall consist of a M etropolitan P rim ate and th e bishops of the dioceses according to the dialect of th e population. T he head of th e clergy and th e Synod shall alw ays reside in the capital. residing a t p resent in B ucharest. T hese nom inations m u st be confirmed in every case by the governing au th o rity .276 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y composed of b o th races. D. T he capital of th e Y ugoslav K ingdom shall be selected by the n ational representatives. D. as m em bers of this com m ittee. G. A tanasovich. w ith o u t a n y m aterial responsibility w hatsoever on the p a rt of an y of th e undersigned. Nicolopoulo and D r. thinks fit. 9. 11. Ghicolesco. because of th eir position.

and for this purpose have nam ed as th eir plenipotentiaries: His M ajesty the K ing of Greece. Greece. Le traite de V oeslau du 26 aodt 1867. Com m ander of th e Or­ der of Saint-S tanislas of R ussia.” Le monde slave.A P P E N D IX С T H E T R E A T Y O F A L L IA N C E O F VOESLAU. P etronievitch. 18671 In th e nam e of th e M ost H oly an d Indivisible T rin ity . Since the abnorm al condition in which the O tto m an E m pire finds itself m akes possible arm ed action by the T urkish forces against Greece and Ser­ bia. Lascaris. M ilan A. “ La premiere alliance entre la ( li-6ce et la Serbie. 277 . and His H ighness th e Prince of Serbia. C onsequently Serbia pledges herself lo have by next M arch (1868) an arm y of sixty-thousand men on war footing in addition to the reserves. declaration of w ar again st T u rk ey will n o t be m ade ex­ cept a fte r deliberation and m u tu al agreem ent. . In consequence. . T . I lowever. Zanos. M em ber of th e < ham ber of D eputies. Pierre A. C hevalier of th e Gold Cross of th e O rder of l lie Saviour.md obligations for them . they have resolved to conclude a tre a ty of alliance. th a t th e p resent position of th e C hristian peoples of th e E a st is intolerable. III (Septem ­ ber. His Hellenic M ajesty and His Serbian H ighness felt it necessary lo consult to g eth er in view of th is ev en tu ality . 1926). have agreed on the following articles. an d th a t these peoples should be­ come th eir own m asters and decide on th eir own d estiny by th eir united action independently of all foreign in tervention. A U G U ST 14/26. Article 2. . T he High C o ntracting P arties engage to pursue the realization of the aim of th eir alliance b y all m eans in their power. etc. for her p a rt. His M ajesty the K ing of th e Hellenes and H is Highness th e Prince of Serbia. w ith th e exception of th e case provided for in article 3 of I his tre aty . T he H igh C ontractin g P arties engage to fu rth er their m ilitary p rep aratio n s in a m anner which will assure the success of I he aim which th ey propose. considering th a t the sta te of affairs in th e E ast creates rights . have recog­ nized th e necessity of an agreem ent as to th e m eans of bringing ab o u t . Article 1. U nder Secretary of S ta te to the M inistry of Justice.hi en ten te betw een these peoples and th e necessity of a decision as to I he m easures to be taken to realize th e ir legitim ate desires. 428-437. W ho. a fte r exchanging th eir p len ip o ten tiary letters which were found in good and due form. . pledges 1 Translated and reprinted from S.

who. is under obligation to su pport th e attack ed country by all o th er m eans possible. Article 3. m ay express th e solemn wish . th e tw o Parties are bound to en ter the conflict even if th e T urkish G overnm ent a t­ tacks only one P arty . Article 4. and the tw o S tates. except by special m utual agree­ m ent. it will be perm issible for each of th e High Parties to decide on suspension of arm s. by th e sam e tim e. Article 5. However. th e tw o C ontracting Parties are bound to conclude neither a peace nor an arm istice until the goal of th eir alliance has been a tta in e d . w ith o u t form ally entering into war w ith T u rk ey . the P a rty which is no t attack ed . in order to gu aran tee th e w ork of their common effort by a p erpetual alliance. it is agreed. A fter th e beginning of hostilities. Once the w ar has begun. th e liberation and annex­ ation of th e states of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Article 6 . N evertheless. it will be perm issible for each of the H igh C ontracting P arties to p u t an end to th e w ar and to lay down arm s th e m om ent it can assure its ally of the following results: F o r H is M ajesty th e K ing of th e Hellenes. the High C ontracting P arties will consult together for the p articu lar purpose of concluding betw een them selves a special tre a ty as m uch for the designation of the frontiers of th eir respective S tates as for the continuation of theii relations. th e alliance betw een Greece and Serbia will nevertheless re m ain unalterab le and indissoluble. th a t is. from this d ate. before M arch 1868. will again tak e up arm s after m utual delibei ation.278 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d ie s in H is t o r y herself to have. as soon as circum stances perm it. a fter tak in g up arm s in the struggle. In case th e w ar realizes its aim s com pletely or to a g reater degree th an th a t described in article 4. However. the High C ontracting P arties engage to strive w ith all th eir force for th e com plete liber­ ation of all th e C hristian peoples of E uropean T u rk ey and of the is­ lands of th e Archipelago. th e liberation and annexation of th e states of E pirus an d Thessaly. th a t we will no t lose sight of th e respect due to th e wishes of th e people. F or H is Highness th e Prince of Serbia. If the ev en tu ality contained in the preceding article occurs. b u t a fter th e tim e agreed upon. Article 7. In case th e territo ry of one of th e tw o C ontracting S tates should be a tta c k e d by th e O ttom an G overnm ent before the tim e agreed upon in th e aforesaid article. in order to pursue th e com plete realization of the aim of their alliance. an arm y of th irty -th o u san d men and to equip as considerable a fleet as possible. acting as if it were a t w ar w ith the O tto­ m an G overnm ent. if insurm ountable obstacles pre­ v en t th e com plete accom plishm ent of th e aim of th e alliance.

any dism em bermciit of E uropean T u rk ey by which an y p a rt w hatever of its terrilury would come under the power of an y foreign sovereign. T he ratifications will be exchanged a t A thens in the ■otiree of six weeks. . th e constitution which governs th e confederation an d th e countries which will take p art in th e confederation will be discussed an d regulated by common agreem ent betw een Greece and Serbia. T he High C ontractin g P arties prom ise to a c t in behalf ■ il the C hristian peoples of E uropean T u rk ey for each of whom. T he tw o P arties b o th engage to enlist th e A lbanians. T he present tre a ty will rem ain secret. Article 8. one "I the C o n tractin g P arties will be especially responsible for th e purl '■ise of persuading them to join th is alliance and of preparing them for I lie struggle.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 279 i 11her for annexation to th e C ontractin g P arties or for th e creation ■ if d istin ct. relative to th e object of th e present Treaty. C onsequently. In th e la tte r case. T h e High C ontracting P arties will w ork together and ■parately. T he tw o C ontractin g S tates will consult w ith one m other in order to arrange a m ilitary tre a ty as soon as possible which "ill he draw n up to decide all m a tte rs relative to th e operations of I lie two allied arm ies and to th e lines which th ey should take in ac■i и «lance w ith th e common interest. Article 9. T he tw o P arties will also a c t sim ultaneously to bring Uoum ania into th eir alliance. unknow n to th e other. Article 10.in during the course of th e war. each by the m eans a t th eir disposal. Article 15. Article 11. Article 13. for th e success of th e aim of H u h alliance. Article 12. In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the pi eHent tre a ty and have affixed th eir seals thereto. Article 14. Serbia will u n d ertak e p articu larly to persuade M ontenegro to join th e alliance. T he present tre a ty will go into effect and become valid I the d ay it is ratified by His M ajesty the K ing of th e Hellenes пн I I lis H ighness th e Prince of Serbia. T he High C ontractin g P arties prom ise each other inutual aid and assistance during th e negotiation of the peace as well . to m ake known to (lie friendly Powers the principle th a t th e C hristian E a st belongs to I hem. th ey pledge them selves to oppose w ith all th eir power and by m eans contrived betw een them selves. arm s an d m unitions of war. ■ai h by th e m eans a t th eir com m and. Article 17. T h ey are also bound to procure a t th e tim e specified. ■ ich according to his m eans. Article 16. confederated states. N either of th e tw o C o n tractin g P arties m ay m ake illiances w ith a foreign power.

T his being agreed. . Petronievitch P.) sepa r a t e act In order to an ticip ate a n y difficulty which m ight arise in the future. A. th e enorm ous sacrifices of which she is giving heroic exam ples. have placed this island in a position which gives her exceptional an d incontestable rig h ts. A. Zanos (L. th e fourteenth of A ugust.) (L.S. th e plenipotentiaries of th e tw o S tates have agreed on th e follow ing: If because of unforseen events of absolute necessity. T h e Serbian plenipotentiary who recognized th a t the sta te m e n t advanced by th e plenipotentiary of Greece w as n o t only fu ndam entally ju st. eighteen hundred and sixty-seven. tak in g as their criterion th e iden­ tity of origin which links these provinces or districts w ith Greece or Serbia. th e p len ip o ten tiary of Greece declared th a t th e arrangem ents m ade above should n o t be applied to the island of C rete. In case of such an ev en tu ality .S. near Vienna. raised no objection to th is statem en t. it is agreed th a t Greece and Serbia will reserve th e rig h t to seek an equivalent am ong the neighboring provinces which are under the direct dom ination of the O ttom an Porte. resulting from th e stipulations of article 4 of th e secret tre a ty of to d ay . betw een Greece and Serbia. and th e countless catastro p h es which she has undergone for such a long tim e. M. T he bloody struggle which th is island has m aintained for more th an a year.280 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d ie s in H is t o r y Concluded a t Voeslau. it should become impossible for th e C o ntracting P arties to annex th e provinces m entioned in th e said article 4 as th e m inim um of territorial acquisi­ tion. b u t also agreeable to the feelings of his Sovereign an d to the sym pathies which th e island of C rete has inspired in th e whole Serb nation. therefore th e Hellenic pleni­ p o te n tia ry proposed th a t the island of C rete should n o t be considered in any w ay as an equivalent and should rem ain outside all stipula­ tions and arrangem ents concerning the choice of territorial acquisi­ tion which m ight be transferred to one or the o th er of th e two C ontracting Parties. H is M ajesty th e King of the Hellenes an d His Highness the Prince of Serbia will come to an agree­ m ent to fix th e lim its of these provinces or d istricts which are to be annexed to th eir respective states. Signed : M. Zanos added th a t he would give this statem en t th e sam e force as if it had been included in th e tre a ty .

D raw n up in tw o copies an d signed a fte r reading. th a t the tim e lim it lised in article 2 of th e T re a ty for th e first of M arch of this year. J A N U A R Y (O . and the . In faith whereof. n ear Vienna. A fter th is arran g em en t was settled and accepted by the under­ lined in th e nam e of th eir respective governm ents. (lie exchange of ratifications was m ade. th e tw o respective governm ents having iiKiccd to conclude a m ilitary tre a ty in execution of th e aforesaid treaty. have nam ed tw o delegates ad hoc.mding betw een th eir respective governm ents. Francois Zach.S . th e Serbian G overnm ents. 1868. Concluded a t A thens. Signed: P. 1868 PR O TO CO L S IG N E D A T A T H E N S . th ey have signed th e p resent protocol in two <o|)ies and have affixed th eir seals thereto.) T he undersigned. eighteen h u n ­ dred and sixty-eight. A ntonopoulos (L. 1867. ( (included an d signed a t Voeslau th e fourteen th of A ugust. th e fourteen th d ay of A ugust. M ichael G. Zanos M. 1868. Voeslau.S.) 16.S.i.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 281 T he p resent separate a c t shall be ratified. L ieutenant-C olonel of th e A rtillery. M.S . luive m et for this purpose today. duly lulhorized b y th eir respective governm ents to carry o u t the exchange "I ratifications of th e T re a ty of Alliance betw een Greece and Serbia.) (L. th e te n th of Ja n u a ry . Would be extended to the first of Septem ber. following an under. and these ratifications will be exchanged a t th e sam e tim e as those of th e tre a ty of this day. S igned: M ichael G.) IJy v irtu e of article 14 of th e T re a ty of Alliance concluded th e lourteenth of A ugust. I t was first settled and agreed betw een them . and Francois Zach. A ntonopoulos. a t A thens. betw een th e P rincipality of Serbia and the K ingdom of Greece. 1868 M IL IT A R Y T R E A T Y S I G N E D A T A T H E N S . th e te n th of Ja n u a ry . the instrum ents (> 1 ratification having been produced and found in good and due form. A.) 10.S. P etronievitch (L. F E B R U A R Y ( O . eighteen Iи indred and sixty-seven. A. L ieutenant-C olonel of the Art illcry in th e service of H is M ajesty th e Prince of Serbia. 1867. Chief of th e F irst <'lass Section of th e M inistry of Foreign Affairs of His M ajesty the King of th e Hellenes.

4.2 82 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y Hellcnic G overnm ent. T h e in fan try as well as th e reserves will be arm ed w ith fluted rifles in a ratio of one hundred and tw en ty shots per m an and a supply of provisions for four m onths which will be ready a t th e be­ ginning of the cam paign. Chief Lieutenant-C olonel of the C alvalry of (he Staff-Office. Nicolas M anos. 2. 1868. tw o fluted pieces of ordnance per one thousand men. a t th e end of the month of A ugust. Tim e of Opening the Campaign T h e precise tim e of th e opening of th e cam paign will be decided a fter m u tu al agreem ent on th is subject by the tw o respective Gov­ ernm ents. Greece. 3. who have agreed upon the follow­ ing: 1. including reserves. an arm y of th irty thousand men. for her p a rt will have. each of which will be provided w ith two hundred and fifty shots. . M eans In accordance w ith article 2 of th e aforesaid tre a ty and w ith the protocol of Ja n u a ry 10. an arm y of sixty thousand men on w ar footing. M. by the same tim e. M ission of Officers T h e G overnm ents of Greece and Serbia will nam e officers who will be sen t to Belgrade and to A thens and whose mission will be to m ake sure th a t th e w ar prep aratio n s agreed upon are being carried o u t and to serve. T he proportions betw een these different services will be for th e artillery. Greece an d Serbia will secretly organize guerrilla corps for th e purpose of invasion. th e cavalry will m ake up one-tw entieth and th e engineers oneth irtie th of th e arm y. w ith a reserve force of tw en ty thousand men. as interm ediaries for th e com m uni­ cations which the said G overnm ents will have to have before and d uring th e war. in accordance w ith th e stipulations already agreed upon in th e T re a ty of Alliance and th e Protocol. each one of which will be provided w ith two hundred and fifty shots. T his arm y will be provided w ith th e necessary provisions and arm am ents. a t the sam e tim e. Serbia will have. composed equally of th e different services an d th e artillery of which will have th e sam e proportion of tw o fluted pieces of ordnance per one th o u ­ sand men. artillery engineers and officers of health and a d ­ m inistration. 1868. Revolutionary Bands T he organization of revolutionary bands will be included in war p reparations. of ab o u t five thousand men each. cavalry. T his arm y will include in fan try .

w ith th e exception m ade form erly of all which ( niicerns th e m aritim e w ar w hich Greece will wage alone as underHlood.1eked b y T u rk ey before th e declaration of w ar or before th e tim e iised for opening th e cam paign. operating w ith three divisions: T he division of th e N o rth . besides th e measures which it m ust tak e in accordance w ith the aforem entioned ii licle. 7. Strategic Considerations with respect to the Intermediate Countries T he isolated situ atio n of each of th e tw o Allied Armies a t th e Iie}’inning of th e w ar. General Theatre of the War Following the stipulation of article 4 of th e aforesaid tre a ty . will hasten th eir II и m ation as vigorously as possible and th eir e n try into the cam paign.md inciting them to a general arm ed insurrection. Strategic Operations I t is agreed th a t w ith regard to strateg ic operations of the H el­ lenic arm y in E pirus or in T hessaly as well as those of th e Serbian ii my in Bosnia and H erzegovina.ivc th e ta sk of furnishing th e necessary m eans to the C hristians . it has been realized: a) T h a t th e T u rk s will un d o u b ted ly establish th eir base of operalioiis against Greece an d Serbia in these countries. all I uropean T u rk ey will c o n stitu te the general th e a tre of th e w ar u liich will consequently be com m on ground for the united action of i lie two Allied Armies. th e P a rty n o t attack ed .n lies shall a c t according to w hatev er plan of cam paign seems ui Iable and proper to a tta in th e proposed end. Sudden and Urgent Departure of the Bands In th e case provided for in article 3 of th e aforesaid tre a ty . will im m ediately send th e revolutionary bands or guerrilla • urps already form ed. including Kossovo-Polic . 9. Beginning of the W ar by the Bands T h e w ar will be begun by th e revolutionary bands which will li. or if th e y are n o t y et form ed.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 283 5. T hese detachm ents u ill serve afterw ards to carry on m anoeuvers against th e T urkish forces. th a t I lie te rrito ry of one of the tw o C o n tractin g P arties should be at1. and p erhaps d uring all of th e first cam paign. each of th e C ontracting I’. 8. 6. since they can no t be fixed in adinee nor decided by th e presen t tre a ty . Living necessitated a prelim inary exam ination of th e strategic imIни lance of th e in term ediate countries which are form ed by th e basins "I I lie V ardar an d th e D rin.

urge the aforesaid peoples to tak e up arm s and to create th u s a strong diversion which should doubtless have very im p o rtan t consequences for th e success of th e war. Velessa and O chrida. th a t of th e M iddle. Revolt of the Bulgarians Since both sides realize th e ad vantages of a revolt of th e Bul­ garians of th e B alkans. b) T h a t to Serbia falls th e ta sk of cu ttin g th e com m unications which lead to Velessa. b u t th e aforesaid suspensions of arm s will never have the ch aracter an d the v alid ity of an arm istice which. according to article 6 of th e T re a ty . an d th a t of th e South form ed b y th e plain w hich includes th e m outh of th e V ard ar and of the V istriza. b y its geographical position. we have agreed th a t Serbia will. is called upon to close th e routes which lead from the A driatic to th e V ardar an d to th e separate D rins (the Black and th e W hite) and especially to M onastir. . c) T h a t it is A lbania which. b) T h a t th e principle strateg ic points are Salonica. 11. 10. c) T h a t we m ust consequently a tta c h th e g reatest im portance to th e routes leading to M onastir an d p articu larly to those w hich lead to Salonica. the principal center of which is M onastir. Velessa (bridge across th e V ardar). formed by th e plain of the T ch ern a (trib u ta ry of th e V ardar) betw een Peristeri and Babouni. Skopia (bridge across th e V ardar).284 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d ie s in H is t o r y an d th e O vtche-Polic. M onastir. Importance of Albania T he g re a t im portance of th e cooperation of A lbania having been thoroughly recognized. m ay n o t tak e place until a special m utual agreement is reached. 12. it has been agreed th a t the tw o G overnm ents of Greece and Serbia shall w atch by all practical m eans possible for th e execution of article 10 of th e T re aty . And we have reached th e following conclusions: a) T h a t it should fall to Greece to concern herself w ith th e so u th ­ ern division and above all to in tercep t th e com m unications around Salonica which lead in th e direction of M onastir. Prizrene and P rich tin a. by all possi­ ble m eans. K oum anovo. Suspension o f A rm s T he C om m anders in Chief of th e Armies will have th e power to conclude suspensions of arm s w hich will be only local and of shorl d u ratio n .

Exchange of Ratifications T he ratifications will be exchanged w ithin a period of three m onths a t th e latest from th e p resent signing. Concluded a t A thens. the tw o delegates ad hoc have signed th e present M ilitary T re a ty and have affixed th eir seals thereto. Ratification of the Treaty T h e presen t T re a ty will go into effect an d become valid th e day 11 i s ratified by th e tw o M inisters of W ar of Greece and Serbia.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 28 5 13. 16. S ig n ed : L. Zach L ieutenant-C olonel of A rtillery . Secrecy of the Treaty T he presen t M ilitary T re a ty will rem ain secret. 1868. Telegraph lines T he Hellenic G overnm ent engages to connect its telegraph lines with those of Italy . F eb ru ary 16. > 14. M enos Chief L ieutenant-C olonel of C avalry of th e Staff Office F r. 15. I n faith whereof.

T he tw o P arties forbid them selves p articularly to entci into a n y political agreem ent w ith one or several Powers which will be of such a n atu re as to affect th e agreem ent stipulated in tinp resent T reaty . A rticle 5. if need be. as far as possible. Engelhardt. A rticle 3. If there is reason. T here will alw ays be friendship and sincere u n ity be­ tw een the Prince of R oum ania an d the Prince of Serbia and between th eir h ered itary successors and th eir respective subjects. VI (1892). A rticle 6. will be the object of a prelim inary agreem ent between th e tw o Parties. be il by th eir m oral influence. or by arm s. 286 . th ey will com bine their m ilitary operations aftci a plan draw n up jointly." Revue d'histoire diplom atique. an active 1 T ranslated and reprinted from E. of new rig h ts and privileges judged inseparable from th e autonom y of the principalities. “ La confederation balkanique. so th a t th e benefits of the said overtures or negotia­ tions can be assured. w henever they have a com mon interest to pursue or to defend. 36^39. T hose m atters especially considered by th e two P arties as an in tegral p a rt of th eir auto n o m y and logically incontestable are the rig h t of jurisdiction over foreign residents. for both of them . A rticle 2. T he tw o C o ntracting P arties form ally pledge themselves to consult to g eth er and to com bine forces if necessary. T h ey m ust each have a t th eir com m and.A P P E N D IX D T H E E N G E L H A R D T V E R S IO N OF T H E SER B O R O U M A N IA N T R E A T Y O F JA N U A R Y 18681 A rticle 1. and th a t of accrediting the consular agents directly w ith the aforesaid Powers. In all political and commercial negotiations in which the tw o S tates will be called upon to particip ate com petitively th e y will m ake know n th eir views to one an o th er and as far as the object of th e negotiations will allow. the power to conclude com m ercial treaties w ith the neighboring Powers and others. w hether it be against: one or several of the G reat Powers. A rticle 4. C onsequently all overtures or negotiations having as th eir aim th e recognition or consecration of one or both sides. in order to em ancipate the C hristian peoples of the O ttom an Em pire. or against T urkey. th ey will provide their agents w ith iden­ tical instructions. (secret) T he tw o C ontracting P arties engage to acl to g eth er especially when circum stances dem and cooperation.

T o give one an o th er ostensible testim ony of th e in- . to this effect. with I lie Hellenic Kingdom . will be annexed and reunited with Serbia in p erp etu ity . H erzegovina and Bulgaria. Since the essential aim of th e p resent T re a ty is to esi.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 287 Inice of 60. Article 10. is realized. will rem ain secret. care will be tak en to announce th e existi nee of this tre a ty by the usual m eans of publicity. will be annexed and reunited w ith Roumnnia in p erp etu ity . A later tre a ty will determ ine.isc. th e tw o C ontracting P arties will m ake th e following arrange­ ments betw een them selves: T he islands form ing th e d elta of th e D anube and th e eastern rer i<> n of B ulgaria bounded by R uschuk an d V arna.000 men. an in tim ate solidarity betw een th e different C hristian peoples of E uropean T u rk ey in view of a solution ■ ■ I (he E astern Question beneficial to them . T he provinces or d istricts which th e fortunes of w ar m ay place in (lie possession of the Allied S tates. an d th a t of Serbia w ith th e P rincipality of M ontenegro.iblish. A rticle 9. will be adm inistered proviKinally by councils in which th e C ontracting P arties will be equally represented. and I he Black Sea on th e other. th e C ontracting P arties will striv e to o btain th e consent of Greece and M ontenegro to those • l. p atern al and liberal gov­ ernm ent. to w hom V ill fall th e suprem e direction of th eir m ovem ents. However. Old Serbia. and 8 above.insure them of the benefits of a C hristian. foreseen in the prec id in g article. in th e usual proportions w hich compose an arm y of cam paign. on one side. if these tw o arm ies nliould o perate separately or u n d er a single head and. T h e p resent stipulations. Article 11. in th e la tte r i . which will be m ade up of the three corps of l loops. from the present tim e. (secret) If th e ev en tu ality of w ar. (secret) If Providence blesses th eir efforts and gives i hem th e free disposition of territo ries rem oved from O ttom an dom i­ nation. Bosnia. T he R oum anian governm ent will negotiate.iuses of th is T re a ty which m ight be applicable to them . if necessary. A rticle 8. A rticle 7. th e Princes of R oum ania and Serbia will uddress a jo in t proclam ation to th e C hristian peoples announcing th a t l hey have taken up arm s to help them gain th e franchise and to . since th e sole fact of a real agreem ent betw een th e two i (mu tries will be of a n a tu re to raise th e m oral a u th o rity of their I'uvernm ents and the confidence of th e autonom ous populations or I hose who are still subject. 7. except th e region "I (his province a ttach ed to R oum ania. especially those included in ■ и I ides 6.

288 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y tim a te rapprochem ent which has taken place betw een them and to satisfy. . in p a rt. the aim indicated in paragraph 2 of the preceding article. the sta tu s of public m inisters and will accord them the honors. d ignity and prerogatives due th is rank. th e C ontractin g P arties will form ally give to th eir accredited agents a t Belgrade and B ucharest.

which nerve as p retex ts for E uropean diplom acy and its m onarchic reacliunary agents. T he fewer th e countries n o t u n d er foreign rule. in opposii ion to th is policy. in stru m en t of the political expansion < 'I European capitalism . and w hich are m ost nl Tenuously opposed to th eir interests and to th eir needs. hurl itself on those agricultural *011 ntries. th e economic forces of th e B alkan coun­ tries are exhausted. b y th e super-profits gained on undertakings of unlim ited concessions. JA N U A R Y 7-9. From these i ontradictions arise all those crises. guardianship. 289 . and finally by comm ercial treaties and taxes on tran sp o rt. th ere has been created. i onquest an d reaction. th a t th e m ovem ents an d th e struggles of th e n a ­ tions of S outh -E astern E urope an d of th e Balkans. in o rder th ere to place its surplus gained from the ex|iloitation of th e w orkers in its own country. B E L G R A D E . T his territo rial and national subdivision is n o t in accordance w ith the transform ation which th e triu m p h al m arch of capitalism has created in th e co njuncture of economic life. th e m ore will i . p ertu rb atio n s and events. T he first B alkan social-dem ocratic conference declares. By th e interest to be Imid on S ta te loans. to uphold th e ir policy of interference. terriI< trial an d national situations. w ho possess all llie conditions of culture for autonom ous developm ent. All th e progressive force < > l the people m u st strive to enfranchise itself from P articularism and 1 Reprinted from Bulletin ptriodiqu e du bureau socialiste internationale. 19101 I Under th e enforced g u ardianship an d by th e p reponderating in­ fluence of E uropean diplom acy. 64-66. In acting thus.ipitalism w ith o u t an y consideration. w hich hinder th e m odern economic developm ent and th e cu ltu re of th e people.A P P E N D IX E R E S O L U T IO N S O F T H E F IR S T B A LK A N SO C IA L D E M O C R A T IC C O N F E R E N C E . are th e ex­ pression of inevitable aspiratio n to economic an d political enfranrhisem ent. w hich are industrially undeveloped and incapable of political resistance. th eir developm ent and th eir progress are kept down an d th eir very existence is threatened. in th e historic p ast of ' nuith-E astern Europe an d especially in th e B alkan peninsula. 2 (1910). E uropean capitalism has draw n th e B alkans and the countries of S outh -E astern E urope into th e sphere of its ruthless ex­ ploitation. no.

to d o a w a y w ith th e n u m e ro u s fro n tie rs. III T h e first so cial-d em o cratic con feren ce in th e B a lk a n s p o in ts o u t esp ecially t h a t th is in e v ita b le tra n s fo rm a tio n c a n n o t be realized in th e sen se of th e in te re s ts of th e p eo p le b y th e m ilita ris t policy of th e B a lk a n m o n arch ies a n d b y re a c tio n a ry bourgeois ru le. se p a ra te c o u n trie s w hose econom ic a n d p o litica l d e sti­ nies a re u n ite d . b ecau se th ese s tir u p a n ta g o n ism b etw een n a tio n s .290 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d ie s in H is t o r y from Iso la tio n w hich o n ly satisfies p a tria rc h a l life a n d th e lim itatio n of such to th e clan a n d to th e v illag e. w hich a re th e first c o n d itio n s n eed ed to w re st th e lives of th e se people from th e h a n d s of th e ir re a c tio n a ry . p o litic al a n d n a tio n a l co n d itio n s e x istin g in S o u th -E a s te rn E u ro p e . and on th e o th e r. c re a te a new n a tio n a l a n ta g o n ism w h ich p re v e n ts th e so lu tio n of th e B a lk a n q u estio n b y th e a m a lg a m a ­ tio n of th e n a tio n s. all a s p ira tio n s te n d in g to m a te ria liz e th e co m p lete d em o ­ c ra tic a u to n o m y of th e p eople a n d th e in d ep e n d en c e of th e n a tio n s. th e y m u st asp ire . th e B a lk a n co n ­ feren ce is of th e o p in io n t h a t th e se a s p ira tio n s c a n n o t be realized e x c e p t b y th e co alitio n of econom ic forces. S o cia l-D e m o c rac y m u s t fo rm u la te th e se desires first b ecau se th is so lu tio n of th e q u e stio n co rresp o n d s b e st w ith th e in te re s ts of social a n d u n ite d d e v e lo p m e n t. foreign a n d n a tiv e ru lers. b y th e su p p ressio n of a r ti­ ficially c re a te d fro n tie rs. a im s a t th e re a liz a tio n of th is a s p ira tio n . th e y m u s t fin ally a im a t sh a k in g off th e yo k e of d ire c t o r in d ire c t foreign ru le . th e c a p ita lis ts. w hile th e w o rk in g class. w hom it influences. in o rd er th u s to o p en th e p a th to u n io n d e m a n d e d b y m o d e rn econom ic and p o litic a l a u to n o m y . n a tio n a lity a n d c u ltu re . a n d also b e ca u se th e a c tiv ity of so cial-d em o cracy is p e rm a n e n tly d e te rm in e d b y th e d e ­ v e lo p m e n t of th e p eople. a n d th a n k s to th e econom ic. on th e one han d s e p a ra te p eople of id e n tic a l la n g u ag e. m oreover. w hich. a n d b e cau se th e stre n g th of th e class stru g g le d ev elo p s m o st co m p le te ly in in d e p e n d e n t n a tio n s. F o r th is reason th e C on feren ce of S o cial-d em o cracy th in k s it a d v isa b le to c o m b a t all a n ta g o n is m e x istin g b etw een th e p eo p le of S o u th -E a s te rn E u ro p e . II W hile reco g n izin g th e n e c e ssity a n d th e ju stific a tio n of th e a s ­ p ira tio n s of th e p eople of S o u th -E a s te rn E u ro p e . b rin g a b o u t a n u n d e rs ta n d in g b e tw e e n th e m a n d su p p o rt. H o w ev er. b y class stru g g le. su p p o rte d b y th e m on­ a rc h y . w ith all th e ir m ig h t. sow h a tre d a n d d is tr u s t. w hich ta k e s aw ay from th e people th e r ig h t to d isp o se of th e ir ow n fa te . a n d . b y th e co m p le te re c ip ro c ity a n d c o m m u n ity of ex isten ce a n d p ro te c tio n fro m a com m o n d an g e r.

neve’r c a n o r w ill g ive u p th e ir p riv ileg ed p o sitio n .troy th e econom ic a n d p o litic a l force of th e people. u n ifo rm ly a n d in a g re e m e n t in c a rry in g o u t iIn. w h e th e r th e y be u n ite d n a tio n a lly o r com posed of d iffe re n t mil ions. now t h a t it h a s b een re p u lse d in th e F a r E a s t a n d lives in g re a te r ■iu n ity w ith th e p eople of its ow n c o u n try . has le rta k e n th e im p o r ta n t m ission of c o n s titu tin g itself th e m o st con( ions. th ro u g h th e in te r­ im d ia r y of th e s e c re ta ry of th e so c ia l-d e m o c ratic p a r ty in B elgrade. w hich th ro w s itself w ith more vig o r in to its p ro fit e a rn in g a n d sa n g u in a ry policy in th e BalI. of s tre n g th e n in g th e force of re sista n c e of th e people ir iin st th e p olicy of c o n q u e st of E u ro p e a n c a p ita lism . a n d . w h e th e r th e y be m o n a rc h ist. a s w ell as a n o u tlin e of th e o rg a n iz a tio n ■I I he re la tio n s of so c ia l-d e m o c ratic p a rtie s in th e B a lk a n s a n d S o u th I '. F o r th e n e x t co nference. w hich is ■ ml d iv id e d b y th e a n ta g o n ism d iv id in g th e g o v ern in g classes. for th e g o v e rn in g classes. a c tin g a s r e p re s e n ta tiv e of th e w o rk in g class. w hich will be held hi 1911 a t Sofia a d e ta ile d p ro g ra m m e of o u r p o litic al a n d n a tio n a l i l. a n d th u s to m a k e it possible in a c t sim u lta n e o u sly . b y th e stru g g le of th e i ii i 'Ic ta ria n class.iste rn E u ro p e .1 rem ain in close to u c h w ith each o th e r.ainst th e influence of R u ssia n C zarism . 1. e n e rg e tic a n d c o n s is te n t c h a m p io n of th e id ea of th e so lid a rity ■ ■ I l lie n a tio n s of S o u th -E a s te rn E u ro p e . I t raises itself i specially a g a in s t th e im p e ria list te n d e n c y of A u s tria -H u n g a ry a n d H'. IV It is th e d u ty of th e se c re ta rie s of th e so c ia l-d em o cratic p a rtie s nl (he B a lk a n s a n d of S o u th -E a s te rn E u ro p e .titns m u st b e d ra w n u p . . o r re ­ p u b lican . N o r can th e policy of a p p e a l to th e c a p ita lis t s ta te s of E u ro p e b e o f use to th e people. . Social> I■niocracy.B alkan F e d e r a t io n 291 ■ I. .ms.p re se n t reso lu tio n s.

A Docum entary State ment of the P osition of the Socialists of all Countries. and in Archiv f u r die Geschichtc des Sozialism us und der Arbeiterbewegung. The fear of th e ruling classes th a t a revolution of th e workers would follow th e declaration of a E uropean w ar has proved a n essential guarantee of peace. would become the m ost frightful danger to civilization and th e workers.” T h e B alkan crisis which is already responsible for so m any calami ties. it would be their first duly to intervene in order to bring it to a speedy term ination and to employ all th eir power to utilize th e economic and political crisis created by th e w ar in order to rouse th e masses of th e people and thereby to hasten th e downfall of capitalistic class dom ination. F or this reason the Congress rejoices th a t all Socialist P arties and labor unions of all countries are unanim ous in th eir desire to make w ar upon war. because ol th e disproportion betw een th e im m ensity of th e catastrophe and the triv a lity of the in terests invoked in justification of it. E. By sim ultaneously rising in revolt against imperialism. th e working classes and their p arliam en tary representatives in the countries concerned shall be bound to do all they can.щт A P P E N D IX F R E S O L U T IO N ON T H E BA LK A N W A RS PA SSED BY T H E S P E C IA L IN T E R N A T IO N A L SO C IA L IST C O N G R E SS A T BA SEL. W alling. 10 (1913). Also published in B ulletin piriodiqu e du bureau socialiste international . VI (1916). and every section of the in tern ational m ovem ent offering resistance to its governm ent. N O V E M B E R 24-25. with Special Reference to then Peace P olicy {N ew York. 19121 A t its Congresses in S tu ttg a rt (1907) and Copenhagen (1910). 99-104. the In tern atio n al Bureau laid down th e following principles for th e war against w ar: “ In th e case of w ar being im m inent. 393-397. “ Should w ar nevertheless b reak out. T hus a splendid co-opera­ tion of the w orkers has been b rought about which has already con­ trib u te d m uch to m aintain th e threatened peace of th e world. the w orkers of all countries are bringing public opinion to bear against all w arlike desire. if allowed to spread. I t would likewise be one of th e mosl scandalous events which has ever taken place in history. to p rev en t the w ar breaking ou t. assisted by the Intern atio n al B ureau. The Socialists and the W ar. 29 2 . Each 1 Reprinted from W . 1915). no. 9-12. using for this purpose th e m eans which ap p ear to them the m ost efficacious but which m ust n a tu ra lly vary according to th e acuteness of th e class w ar and of th e general political conditions. T he Congress therefore asks all Socialist P arties to continue th eir efforts w ith all m eans th a t appear to them efficacious.

national. Albanians.ivors. an d have dem anded the establishm ent of a dem ocratic federation of th e B alkan states.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 29 3 Socialist organization will be asked to do its own p a rt in furthering <om m on action. b u t и cognizes th e danger th a t. The Congress above all calls on th e B alkan Socialists to oppose everyi liing likely to lead to a renew al of the old anim osities betw een Servi­ ans. including T urks. The B alkan Socialists T he Socialist P arties in th e B alkan peninsula have a difficult task. have contributed to th e grow th of intolerable economic. C roatia. and th ereby to embroil th e peoples of A u stria-H u n g ary and o th e r n ations of Europe in conflict in the interests of th e ruling d y n asty . T he Socialists of b o th A u stria-H ungary and of I n ly will have to give special a tte n tio n to th e A lbanian question. Slavonia. and Greeks. an d R oum anians as again st a n y n ational jingoism th a t may have been let loose. T he Socialists in th e Balkans should also strongly oppose a n y depriving of rights of these peoples m d proclaim th e fra te rn ity of all Balkan peoples.. A u stria and Italy T he Socialists of A ustria-H ungary. b y system atically postponing all reform s in 1'iirkey.iinst those Balkan peoples whom th ey are a t th e present m om ent Inditing— the T u rk s and A lbanians. A lbania .m sform th a t co u n try in to an A ustrian province. The Powers of Europe. believing th a t th e Socialists of th e B alkans will leave no nlone untu rn ed after th e w ar to p rev en t these states being robbed of wliat they have gained a t such heavy cost b y th e dynasties. and political conditions. and Herzegovina m ust continue w ith all th eir stren g th th eir successful e Hurts to p rev en t an y a tta c k of th e A ustrian m onarchy upon Servia. and capitalists of th e B alkans.1 rists. w hich necessarily led to un rest and 11 ) war. Bulgarians. th e milii . as well as to all violence .isl any a tte m p t to ta k e b y force from Servia th e fruits of w ar or to li. The Congress ad m its th e rig h t of th e A lbanians to autonom y.ipsburg d y n asty . R oum anians. ever th irstin g for expansion. Bosnia. u n d er the guise of autonom y.i|-. T he Social Dem ocrai к Parties of A ustria-H u n g ary will also have to struggle in th e future 111 secure dem ocratic a u to n o m y for all the southern Slav nations w ith­ in (lie frontiers of A ustria-H u n g ary and a t present governed by the ll. T he B alkan Socialists w ith g reat courage have fought against I lie use of these conditions as an excuse for w ar in th e interests of the dynasties and th e middle-class capitalists. T hey m ust continue to resist in th e futu re as th ey have done in the Ii. T he Congress urges them to persevere in th eir adm irable endi-.

294 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d ie s in H is t o r y m ight become th e victim of A ustro-H ungarian and Italian am bitions. Germany. which. in th e n ear fu tu re th reaten the peace betw een A ustria-H ungary and Ita ly . T he Congress expects th a t th e tow n and co u n try w orkers of Russia. and G reat B ritain— to dem and from th eir governm ents a t th e present m om ent an under­ tak in g to refuse all su p p o rt to eith er A ustria-H ungary or Russia and to abstain from all intervention in the B alkan trouble. and in every respect to observe an unconditional n eu trality . T he Congress recognizes these strikes as a g u aran tee again st the crim inal intrigues of Czarism . w hether upon A rm enia or C onstantinople. France. would be . after having shed th e blood of th e R ussian people and afte r having so often betray ed an d delivered th e B alkan n ations to their enemies. As C zarism is the hope of all reac­ tio n ary forces in Europe. will oppose all bellicose C zarist undertakings. R ussia T he Congress heartily co n gratulates th e R ussian workers who organized p ro test strikes. Therefore. concerning which A ustria and Servia are in dispute. and resist every C zarist a tta c k . If Czarism is once more pretending to play th e p art of liberator of th e Balkan nations. will te a r asunder this fabric of lies. France. T his m ight n o t only co n stitu te a danger for A lbania herself. and to bring ab o u t its downfall is one of th e first duties of th e international m ovem ent. Poland. as proving th a t the R ussian and Polish w orkers are beginning to recover from th e blows received during the C zar’s counter-revolution. so it is also th e m ost inexorable enem y of dem ocracy and of th e peoples under its rule. now recovering th eir stren g th . is now w avering betw een dread of th e consequences th a t a w ar would mean for itself an d the fear of a renewed national uprising which it has itself created. b u t might. A w ar betw een the three leading civilized nations over the question of an o u tle t to the sea. by con­ cen tratin g all th eir energy tow ards a renewal of their revolutionary fight for freedom against Czarism . and Great B ritain T he m ost im p o rtan t ta sk of th e in ternational m ovem ent falls to the lot of th e w orkers of G erm any. and F inland. A lbania can only become really independent as an autonom ous u n it in a dem ocratic federation of the Balkan states. the Congress calls upon th e A ustro-H ungarian and Italian Socialists to com bat a n y action of th eir respective governm ents which aim s at draw ing A lbania w ithin the sphere of th eir influence and to persevere in th eir efforts to consolidate the peaceful relations betw een A ustriaH u n g ary and Italy . it is in order to reconquer by means of this p re te x t R ussian predom inance in th e Balkans.

inil it would finally secure the peace of th e world.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 2 95 с rim inal folly. T he Congress is of opinion th a t the g reatest danger to E uropean peace is the artificiallyloHtered anim osity betw een G reat B ritain and G erm any. now profiting by these differences. I t \\ . however. To this end.mis the ruling classes in all countries to p u t an end to th e economic misery produced by th e capitalistic system and no t to increase it by w и like action. I t therefore u rlcomes th e w orkers of both countries in th eir efforts to im prove the nil nation.Com m une. T he w orkers of G erm any an d France do not recognize th a t an y secret treaties m ake it necessary for them to interfere in llu. B alkan conflict. 11 would be th e d u ty of B ritish. would be to re­ move th e g reatest danger to in tern atio n al peace. French. i lie downfall of th e Osman dom inion in Asia M inor becam e inevitable. j Remedies If. I t calls upon the workers of all countries to p it against the m ight of capitalism and Imperialism th e solidarity of th e in tern atio n al labor m ovem ent. since I lie result would lead stra ig h t to a E uropean war. as a consequence of th e m ilitary d efeat of T urkey. I t believes th a t the best m eans of rem oving friction would In an un derstanding betw een G erm any and G reat B ritain concerning i lie arre st in th e increase of th eir respective navies and th e abolition of i lie right of cap tu re of p riv ate p ro p erty a t sea. II. an d G erm an Socialists to oppose w ith all their m ight a policy of conquest in Asia M inor. T he Congress invites i lie Socialists of G reat B ritain and G erm any to continue th eir agitalion for such an understanding. I t insists on its dem and for peace. The Congress notes w ith satisfaction th a t Socialists of all nations in agreed as to these m ain lines of foreign policy. and led to g reat strikes. the efforts of th e intern atio n al m ovem ent m ust be directed. II would render impossible an a tta c k on Servia by A ustria-H ungary. I t would w eaken i In powerful position of Czardom . w ar will iml be w ith o u t disaster for them selves. and th a t the com petition in arnitiinents in E ngland and on the C ontinent has increased class conIII. I t would be m adness if the governm ents 11иI not com prehend th a t th e m ere notion of a E uropean w ar will call l"i ili resentm ent and fierce p ro te st from th e w orkers who consider it i ' i une to shoot each o th er down in th e interest. T h ey m ust rem em ber th a t iIn I'ranco-G erm an W ar resulted in th e revolutionary m ovem ent of Ни. in the present fram e of m ind of the workers. and for th e profit of . th a t th e R usso-Japanese W ar p u t into m otion the и volutionary m ovem ent in Russia. T o overcom e all o u tstan d in g differences betw een G erm any on the "iic side and France and G reat B ritain on th e other. G overnm ents m ust in il forget th a t. above ill.

If govern m en ts in te rru p t th e possibility of norm al developm ent of the peoples and thereby provoke them to ta k e desperate steps. .296 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y capitalism . or for the sake of dynastic am bition and of secret diplo­ m atic treaties. they will have to tak e the whole responsibility.

m ilitarism . rising from I lie m ounds of corpses an d sm oking ruins. The political an d public lib erty of th e people will be destroyed by militarism and m onarchic au tocracy. We raise our voices i ill more loudly against w ar an d we ask th e labor and p easan t masses I< igether w ith every sincere dem ocracy. whom th e w ar touches more directly. th e socialists of th e B alkan countries as well as of the Near E ast. th e B alkan sta te s will bid goodbye to th eir independence. A ustria a t Salonica. T h e International Socialist llurcau published it on O ctoper 12 with th e statem ent th at it had just been received. be an accom plished fact. Translated and reprinted from B ulletin periodigue du bureau socialiste international . M oreover. in all p rob­ ability. which. G erm any occupying th e rest of A natolia inil Ita ly in South A lbania— such will probably be th e m ap of the Fast a fte r th e eventual dow nfall of th e O ttom an Em pire. E ngland in A rabia. 5 -7 . to unite w ith us in opposing I lie policy of sanguinary violence. it will. B ut we. Therefore.A P P E N D IX G M A N IF E S T O O F T H E SO C IA L IS T S O F T U R K E Y A N D T H E BA L K A N S. W hen these lines appear. 19121 T o th e w orking people of th e B alkans and Asia M inor. w ith our conception of in tern ational solidarity. the lion’s share. for bo th th e conquered an d th e conquerors will see. 385-390. T ext also available in Archiv fu r die Geschichte Sozialism us und ih r Arbeiterbewegung. T he p ro letariat of th e B alkans has nothing to gain in this advenI ure.— T o th e I . th e w ar will have for th e Balkan provinces o th er connequences resulting from th eir political and geographical situation. on th e d ay when th e y fall into th e clutches of th e powers. . bureaucracy. piece by piece. we will n o t allow "iirselves to be sw ept on b y th e chau v in ist wave. th a t is th e eco­ nomically richer p a rts an d th e m ost im p o rtan t strategic points. R ussia on th e Bosporus and in E astern Anatolia. no.a hour In tern atio n al! T o public opinion! W ar is a t our doors. w hich carries such disastrous conse­ quences in its wake. political reaction and financial speculation w ith th eir usual a fterm ath "I heavy taxes an d increase in th e price of food. strengthened by its vic­ tory over th e T urk s. 9 (1912). VI (1916). of exploitation and profound misery. In th e event of th eir being victorious in th e struggle and of th e <M(om an E m pire being divided up. m ay become th e prey of the g re a t cap italist powers who for centuries have been snatching th e territories of th e E ast. will dem and new credits for its arm ies as well 1 T h e precise date of this m anifesto is not available.

will they realize th eir national unity? Bourgeoisie and nationalism are powerless to set up a tru e lasting n ational unity. th e Greeks. caste. th e B ulgarians of the v ilay et of A drianople. b u t it does n o t abolish them . w ithout racial. T hey will become still more b itte r. I t is n o t the socialist parties which will oppose the realization of th e political unity of the elem ents of each nation. T he tru e m otive of th eir policy is nothing b u t th e desire for eco­ nom ic an d territo rial expansion which characterizes all capitalist countries. really. who would. th e nationalists of th e B alkan States invoke th e necessity of realizing th eir national unity. Should T u rk ey be the victor. B u t will th is u n ity be realized by a division of the population and the territories of T u rk ey am ong the small Balkan S tates? Will th e T u rk s who have fallen under th e dom ination of th e Bid garians. nothing b u t a p re tex t for the B alkan governm ents. And after these hard trials. race or religious privileges. Political dem ocracy alone. we would have a recrudescence of religious fanaticism and M oham m edan chauvinism — th e trium ph of political reaction— th e loss of th e few im provem ents obtained a t the price of so m any sacrifices in the in ternal governm ent of the country. have th e ir national unity? Will th e Serbs of N ovi-B azar or of Old Serbia. I t will. can create real national unity. who will pose as the saviours of th e conquered B alkan powers. m oreover. in order to extend th eir interested pro tecto rate to th e ruined nations. th e Alban ians of M acedonia. T he nationalist arg u m en t is. b y a division be eventually placed u nder th e yoke of A ustria or of Italy . N ational unity founded on th e subjugation of th e national ele­ m ents of o th er races carries w ithin it a basic fau lt which threatens it unceasingly. the Greeks. the national struggles betw een th e n ations will not be finished. of obtaining political autonom y for th eir n ationals under T urkish dom ination. dem anded by th e L abour Interna tional. T u rk e y ’s neighbors seek for them selves th e sam e advan- . T he rig h t of nationalities to autonom ous life is the direct conse­ quence of political and social eq u ality and of the abolition of all class. In order to ju stify th e w ar. th e Bulgarians. N ationalism only alters the nam es of the m asters and th e degrees of oppression. religious or class discrim ination.298 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d ie s in H is t o r y as new privileges for its sovereigns. th e T urks. Serbs or Greeks. w ith tru e eq u ality for every elem ent. T h a t which is created by the w ar m ay be destroyed by a n o th e r war. bring a b o u t th e trium ph of th e im perialism of A ustria an d Russia. who m ay become th e prey of Russia. each one aspiring to hegemony. th e A rm enians and th e K urds of E astern A natolia.

T h e successive "Voung T u r k ” governm ents n o t only continued th e errors of th e past:. ignorance. A gainst the w ar. mi .B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 299 t. in order to apply a system of de­ nationalization and of oppression. em igration and brigandage. I t has tu rn ed a deaf ear to all dem ands for relonn for M oham m edan an d o th er w orking men and peasants. The hope th a t th e new regim e would p u t an end to the p a st by inaugurating a new policy. I t has upported only its feudal subjects and nom adic tribes who were imied again st th e defenceless agriculturalists. th e responsibility of th e T urkish governm ents. w ithout whose help they would n o t have been able to m aintain their dom ination. th ey m ade use of the a u th o rity and prestige of a seeming parliiinentarism g ran ted to T u rk ey .itic centralism . But we acknow ledge th a t th e people— and the people only— have the right to dispose of th eir fate. We reproach the T urkish regim e for th e com plete absence of real liberty and equality for th eir nationalities— an absolute lack of sei 11rit у and of g u arantee for life of th e rights and privileges of citizen­ ship— the non-existence of ju stice an d of a well-organized and im ­ partial adm in istratio n . we oppose th e action of th e conscious and organized masses. j B ut if we em phasize the grave responsibility of th e B alkan S tates the prospective war. when th ey hindered the internal reorganization of T u rk ey . By their proverbial in ertia th e T urkish governm ents have done nothing b u t provoke and p e rp e tu a te misery. in a word anarch y which serves to d ay as a p re te x t for inter\ ciition and for war. in a n y w ay. sm othering th e rights of the nationalities and the i Ia ims of th e labor masses. I t has upheld a system of extrem ely heavy . massacres w ith o u t num ber in A natolia and in Roumclia. together w ith an excessive bureauM. W e denounce them also to the civilized world. which we rep u d iate with all our forces. for I lie investm ent of th eir cap ital and for th e em ploym ent of th eir super­ fluous personnel for whom th ere is no longer room in th e offices of I lie city. as well as in th e p ast.md onerous im posts. if we accuse European diplom acy u liich has never desired serious reform s in T urkey. has been unfulfilled. The men of the new regim e. who are concealing them selves behind the miiall sta te s: th ey w an t m ark ets for th e disposal of th eir goods. in certain respects even surpassed the old which had elevated th e system atic assassination of political advei saries to th e height of a governm ent system . to the people of th e em pire and p articu larly to the M oham m edan masses.iges as the g reat powers. of d uplicity. we (in not wish to minimize. as a m eans of solving political and social problem s.

I t is no t b y trying to revive projects half a cen tu ry old. th a t th e T urkish governm ent will be able to solve th e problem of nationalities. we reply by th e declaration of the im perative necessity. already proclaim ed a t th e Inter-B alkan and Socialist Conference of Belgrade in 1909.300 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y T o th e outrageous ideal of the nationalists of disposing of the lives of their peoples by w ar. render possible tin dem ocratic federation of th e Balkans. w ith equality of languages Only an ad m in istratio n in which th e various ethnic elem ents ol th e em pire are represented. we consider th a t only radical reform s in its internal rcla tions can establish peace and norm al conditions of life. на tional u n ity is neither possible nor enduring for them . of u niting all th e people of the Balkans and of I lie N ear E ast in the m ost dem ocratic form of governm ent. cantons and com m unes. more especially.— and by establishing local governm ent (self-government) in districts. and finally. th a t is to say those few thousand individuals atta ch e d to th eir privileges. an d of th e parties. T hese reform s will annoy T urkish bureaucracy. by g ranting com plete autonomy to th e n ations for th eir educational institutions. T here will lie no rapid economic and social progress for th eir developm ent will be continually th reaten ed by th e perpetual retu rn of internal reaction and foreign dom ination. rem ove foreign intervention and th e danger of war. political and social developm ent. h urrying to every frontier and into every province to com bat tin' disasters b u ilt up in th is co u n try by T urkish incapacity and oligarch у T he solution of the g reat problem s which trouble th e people ol th e O ttom an E m pire will g u aran tee th e national security of the M oham m edans and will enable them peacefully to tu rn th e ir atten tion to th eir economic. W ith o u t such a federation of the people of E astern Europe. B ut they will benefit to th e highest degree th e T urkish people. social legislation w ith g u arantees of th e rig h t of organization and assem bly. churchm. I t is by gran tin g tru e equality. can gi\ < ' to th e M oham m edan labor and peasant masses the m inim um of sal isfaction which will a tta c h them to th e new regime. w hom th e pn n e n t regime reduces to th e exclusive role of soldier and policeman. Only agrarian reform . w ith proportional representation of th e ethnic elem ents.. . will furnish th e necessary guarantee ol im p artiality . a reform of th e im posts. Such is the program for th e realization of which we m ake our appeal for help not only to th e B alkan p ro le ta ria t b u t also to in ternational Socialism. W ith regard to the O ttom an Em pire. and of haggling for th eir rights and tlieii territories.— schools. inherited from shortsighted bureaucracy. w ithout racial or religious discrim ination. etc.

b u t also a civil w ar. . I'or weeks and m onths we have led a cam paign ag ainst war. for th e B alkan w ar In ings w ith it an im m inent danger for general peace. By rousing all i In. have the < Ii ( p consciousness of th e double role we have to play in regard to the liiolctariat of the world an d to ourselves. Mis ingrained and nourished b y a false education. we will n o t fail to fulfill our d u ty of international nolidarity. for liberty. for pence. th ey will n o t fail to ta k e th e o p p o rtu n ity offered them of ih owning th e masses in blood or b y enacting restrictive legislation in oiih-r to stifle our m ovem ent of em ancipation. against mili­ eu ism. we are sim ply th e out-posts. in a word. Down w ith th e war! Long live th e in tern atio n al solidarity of the people! T he Socialists of T u rk ey and of th e Balkans. again st cap italist exploitation.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 301 We. for l In. it m ay not only provoke a conflict betw een nations. by giving preponderance in politics to im perialist elem ents. B ut 11 is particu larly a t th e presen t m om ent th a t we p ro te st th e m ost loudly. Holding back the belligerent cu rren t let loose by th e govern­ m ents an d by th e chauvinistic press. i the cap italist governm ents of several countries have been driven 11 s' I he successful victories of th e p ro le ta ria t into th eir last strong­ holds. In fact. for equality.em ancipation of th e classes and of th e nationalities. civilization and hum an progress. And.ivour the struggle betw een nationalities and the dom ination of the ■ tiling classes. destined to l. greedy for conquest. struggling against th e sentim. th e socialists of th e B alkans and of th e N ear E ast.capitalist ap p etites of th e G reat Powers. We express our firm determ ination to uphold w ith all our nl n-ngth the fight of th e w orld’s p ro letariat against war.

A summary of this resolution was also published in the New York Tim es. 1919). 302 . 1 The International at Lucerne. C O N C E R N IN G T H E BA LK A N S. peace in the B alkans will only be re-established by th e exercise of the free disposition of th e peoples and th a t no peace which is n o t based on these principles can be lasting or salu tary for th e life of th e Balkan peoples. 1919. A U G U ST 1-9. The Resolutions. 19191 T h e Conference is in favour of a rapprochem ent am ong the B alkan peoples and th eir union in a federation of independent states.A P P E N D IX H S P E C IA L R E S O L U T IO N N U M B E R SIX . T h e frontiers of th e federated S tates will be determ ined by th e riglil of th e Balkan nationalities and peoples to dispose of th eir own fate. to-day more th a n ever. 12. August 11. T h e Conference is of th e opinion th a t. th e Conference appeals to all Social­ ists of th e Balkans. T his rig h t will be expressed in a plebiscite under neutral control. PA SSE D BY T H E C O N G R E SS OF T H E LA B O R A N D S O C IA L IS T IN T E R N A T IO N A L . The Provisional Constitution (London. 1919. L U C E R N E . th a t th e peoples of these countries m ay live in concord and liberty and devote th eir strength in th e fu tu re to So­ cialism. A ccepting these principles.

th e Balkan states are unable 111 restore by th eir own m eans th e economic life w ithin th eir territorial boundaries. th e national u n ity prom ised by the и 11 ing bourgeoisie.A P P E N D IX I R E S O L U T IO N S O F T H E B A L K A N C O M M U N IS T C O N F E R E N C E . SO FIA . finan>ially and politically depen d en t upon E n te n te im perialism and having Income a species of E n te n te colonies.md will open a free w ay o u t into th e large space by u niting th e small nations into an economic union. th e y will have i о export th eir raw m aterials into these em pires and im port m anul. saving them from th e narrow ness of sta te frontiers. N othing b u t the Social R evolution will secure to th e sm all nalions a free existence and an independent developm ent.11 a sta te of political enslavem ent and starv atio n and extrem e w ant . to tally b a n k ru p t and Iml ideally subject to the g reat im perialistic E n ten te powers. I t will rid i In in of th e enorm ous sta te d eb ts. T o tally ruined. 1920). far from having solved I heir natio n al problem s and rem oved th e cause of th eir m utual h a ­ treds. T h e problem s of th e C om m unist and Socialist P arties in th e Balkans T he world war. T he nations applying for help from th e g reat im perialistic powers will be deprived of free economic developm ent. The liberation of th e B alkan n ations from th e political.2460. 11-12 (June.” 303 . th e y have arrived a t th e loss of th eir independence. . it will set free th e productive forces ol all countries. financial m d economic rule of th e im perialistic E n ten te. .ietured goods. has left them econom ically exhausted. far from having resulted in a n ational union of llie B alkan nations and in th eir liberation. burdened w ith enorm ous d eb ts and taxes. T h e reason I< > i lliis confusion is th a t the conference was assem bled as a continuation of the preWiu Balkan socialist conferences and then it affiliated itself with th e Com m unist Inicrnational and adopted the nam e “ Balkan C om m unist F ed eration . th eir natio n al free1 Reprinted from the Com munist International . as a result of th e w ars. and are m oreover unable to im prove the terrible condilions of th e working and th e propertyless masses. MSS. under ■onditions which contain new sources of h atred and new wars.iniong th e w orking masses. T h is conference is referred to as both socialist and com m unist. JA N U A R Y 19201 1. no. I t is Incom ing evident to all th e B alkan peoples th a t instead of having и liieved. Ju ly. T he enorm ous w ar ilrbts oppressing the Balkan nations suck ou t th eir lifeblood for the benefit of the E uropean bankers and ham per th eir economic develop­ ment.

th e Socialml L abour P a rty (C om m unists) of Y ugoslavia. T h e Conference m akes it a d u ty of the B alkan C om m unist and Socialist parties to educate th e proletarian and propertyless masses in a revolutionary Socialist (M arxist) spirit. I t calls upon them to prepare and to arm them selves willi force. m ost of which have already entered th e prim ary stages of th is revolution. depend on how th ey fulfil this g reat mission. has created a new revolutionary epoch.304 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d ie s in H is t o r y dom and union. th e objective develop m ent of the conditions of life having allotted them a g reat hisloi i< mission. Soldiers’ and Red A rm y deputies. and more especially in E urope. caused by the five years of th e world'n w ar an d th e irreconcilable class opposition roused by this w ar in m odern capitalistic society. T he Conference of th e B alkan C om m unist Federation declares in consequence th a t nothing b u t th e proletarian revolution and 1 In* d ictato rsh ip of th e p ro letariat w ith its organization of th e counciln of W orkers’. composed < > l th e Bulgarian C om m unist P a rty (“ N arrow Socialists” ). w ith th e partiei p ation of th e representatives of all th e nam ed parties.i S oviet Republic. discussed in iln session of Ja n u a ry 15. th e creation of conditions necessary for th e develop m ent of th eir productive forces. w ith revolutionary sp irit and discipline. urging w ith an irresistible force th e p ro letariat of all capitalist coun­ tries to seize th e political power. peace and welfare for th e ruined an d enslaved B alkan nations who have shed so mucli blood. in order to m ake them conscious of th eir historic problem s and the g reat aim of th e pro letarian liberating m ovem ent. T heir full liberation from all oppression. Inevitable proletarian Socialistic Revolutions are therefore to be an ticipated in the advanced European countries. th e Socialist Labout P a rty of Greece an d the R um anian Socialist P a rty . unitin g them all into one B alkan SociaIi:. in Sofia the question of th e affiliation < > l th e B alkan Socialist Federation to th e T h ird C om m unist Interna tional and arrived a t th e following conclusions: 1. and to form powerful revolutionary organi zations. all this can be achieved only if (hey becom e united and form one B alkan Socialist Soviet Republic. T h e Conference therefore calls upon th e p ro le taria t and the pool of th e Balkan tow ns and villages. will liberate t In* B alkan nations from all oppression and will afford them a possibiln \ of self-determ ination. 1920. T h e intern atio n al revolutionary situation in th e whole world. an d to unite them into m ass organiza tions to struggle for th e v icto ry of th e g reat in ternational Com m unist Revolution. T h e Conference of the B alkan Socialist F ederation. . urging them to unite under the red b an n er of C om m unism .

th e B alkan C om m unist and Soci11 nl P arties consider th a t one of th eir chief problem s is to coordinate i In ir actions. In view of such conditions. T h ey are unable to u n ite and form a federation of th e Balkan nl a l e s under th e rule of th eir n atio n al bourgeoisie because of th e stubliornness an d m egalom ania of th e bourgeoisie. uni to paralyze thereb y th e counter-revolutionary forces moved 11 iilist it from th e B alkans or through th e Balkans. T here is also in addition th e lack of space. mi well as th e grow th of th e C om m unist m ovem ent. T he B alkan liiiiugeois p arties are incapable of coping w ith th e present situation 11 и I of satisfying th e enorm ous needs and desires of th e working iMimses. to set up the du latorship of th e p ro le ta ria t and th e propertyless masses based on . will force th e B alkan Com ­ munist an d Socialist parties to seize the political power. and because of the nl ml acles sure to be set up in th is case in each of the states by the dynasties. 11 lie w ant and fatal exhaustion of th e w orking classes. and on a cap italist base w ith o u t th e help of th e E uropean ■ ipilal. th e B alkan states are facing financial I> . In such a revolutionary epoch. the com plication of unn o l v e d national problem s and th e reactionary. T his all lends to very hard conditions. to give all possible su p p o rt to th e R ussian Socialist Soviet I' i public in th e com ing pro letarian Socialist R evolution in E urope. creating such a situ atio n in th e B alkan states. starv atio n . au tocracy and m ilitarism . T h e position of th e B alkan natio n s created by th e w ar and ii nulling in th e deepest changes in economic life. is m arked on the hand by a colossal concentration of capital. and th e fact of I lie proletarian R evolutions in E urope. a colossal monopolizai и h i of th e m eans of production and of exchange.i iil<ru p tcy as a result of th e w ar. it would ham per i In. and E uropean capital will moreover itself founder in th e n ear fu tu re under th e blows of the ing Social R evolutions in E urope. D isunited. B u t even were th is help to be gran ted them .B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 305 I. w ith no possible issue for th e Balkan nations. a rb itra ry form s of i'iivernm ent em ployed by th e bourgeoisie in the B alkans. an d using th eir influence on th e popular masses of the M11leans. and an irreconcil11ilr class opposition. hostile to each oilier and subject to th e im perialistic E n te n te powers th e Balkan i Н е к are unable to restore th e ir economic life w ithin th eir territorial I» hindaries. and being given such an in te r­ na lional revolutionary situ atio n . t. All these conditions.economic developm ent of th e Balkans. of th e unbearable burden of enor­ m o u s sta te d eb ts and heavy financial obligations im posed on them 11s' I lie g reat im perialistic E n te n te powers. and on th e o th e r by economic ruin. considering th eir disunion and th e present cap italist relas.

consisting of th e Coin m unist and Socialist parties of Bulgaria. P e a sa n ts’ and Soldiers’ Councils. P easan ts’ and Soldiers’ Councils. p u ttin g into p ractice the principles and m ethods of revolutionary relentless class struggle and th e proletarian dictator ship in th e form of W orkers’. T he B alkan Socialist Federation. ami c) to secure and accelerate in such a way the victory of th e universal C om m unist R evolution. P easan ts’ and Soldiers’ Councils. based on Socialist principles. 4. P ea san ts’ and Soldiers’ Council:. 2. ami in proportion to the m utual help which th e proletarians of all conn tries will afford each o th er in th eir revolutionary action and in propor tion as th ey unite th eir revolutionary hom e struggles w ith the uni versal in tern atio n al revolutionary liberating struggle.306 S m it h C o i . and are co n trary to th e revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. 5.” . as th e union of th e Balkan C om m unist and Socialist parties was called up till now. has set as its aim : a) to liberate the labour movement from th e im pure ingredients of opportunism and social patriotism which caused th e b a n k ru p tcy of the Second In tern atio n al in 1914. Servia. subjecting thcii own separate cause to th e interests of the victory of th e Interna tional P roletarian Revolution.l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y W orkers’. as well as for the proletarian d ictato rsh ip expressed in W orkers’. 6 . founded in Moscow in M arch 1919. In consideration of all th is th e Conference decides: 1. in order to coordinal г th eir acts and th eir struggle w ith the activ ity of those proletarian p arties which are fighting for th e Proletarian R evolution as theii im m ediate aim . and to found the Balkan Socialist Soviet Republic. in pro portion to the courage and the full com prehension of its necessii\ th a t will be shown in th e carrying o u t of the dictatorship of the pro le ta ria t based on the W orkers’. the B alkan C om m unist and Socialist parties consider it necessary to establish close connections w ith each other. T he T h ird C om m unist In ternational. and acknow ledge th e necessity of relentless class wai fare for th e victo ry of th e Revolution. b) to unite the forces of all genuinely revolutionary parties of the world p ro letariat. Greece and Rumania joins the T h ird C om m unist Intern atio n al and forms its Balkan sec­ tion. T he B alkan C om m unist Federation. In view of the accom plishm ent of these im p o rtan t tasks. accepting th e principles and m ethods of th e revolutionary class struggle and th e proletarian dictatorship based on th e W orkers'. T he victory of th e P roletarian Socialist R evolution and the transform ation of m odern capitalistic society into a Communism. P easan ts’ and Soldiers’ Councils. will be hena fte r called th e “ B alkan C om m unist F ed eratio n . will be accom plished w ith great ci p ro m p titu d e and less victim s on th e p a rt of th e p ro letariat.

iiize th e principle of freedom and justice. The tw o G overnm ents consider it im perative to declare solemnly ■\ i'ii now th a t Poland and Czechoslovakia. T he tw o G overnm ents are resolved already now to co­ operate closely for the defence of th eir com mon in terest and for the preparation of the fu tu re association of the tw o countries. 1941). 97. as constitu tin g th e foundation of all our common civilization. and tak in g into connlrration the com m unity of th eir fundam ental interests.itfc by proclaim ing them selves th e builders of a New E uropean '> i (ler. b o th G overnm ents express the h o p e th a t in this cooperation. to enter as independent and imvercign S tates into a closer political and economic association. II The tw o G overnm ents also stigm atize in th e gravest term s the ■\ nical farce which th e leaders of N azi G erm any are endeavouring to ' l. N O V E M B E R И . closing once and for all •In period of p ast recrim inations and disputes. M oreover. 98. th e principles of dem ocracy and th e d ignity of m an.irantee of its stability. 19401 ' I lie Polish G overnm ent an d th e Provisional Czechoslovak Gov■i и m ent have decided to issue th e following sta te m en t: I I m bued w ith an inflexible faith th a t th e heroic struggle now being » iK < d by G reat B ritain. 307 . T he hypocrisy of these assertions is m ost clearly revealed in the lil. are d ete r­ mined.11 ions. based on respect for th e freedom of 11. ag ainst G erm an i \ i . they will also be joined by o th er countries in th a t p a rt of th e E uropean linent. I (April. on th e conclusion of this war. th e expulsions of th e n ativ e populations from im1 Journal of Central European A ffairs.ht of G erm an endeavours aim ing a t the com plete destruction of i nil l wo an cien t nations. which would become the basis of a new order in C entral Europe and a г n.mny will end in the final defeat of the forces of evil and destruci inn.world m ust be based on th e cooperation of all elem ents which c. and A nim ated b y th e profound conviction th a t th e fu tu re order of I In. to g eth er w ith her Allies. which have contrib u ted so g reatly to hum an i ivilization. T he violence and cruelty to which our two nations are Iicing subjected.A P P E N D IX J PO L ISH -C Z E C H O SL O V A K A G R E E M E N T .

T hey offci a striking exam ple of th e sp irit and m ethods of th e G erm anic New Order. . mass executions an d deportations to concentration camps. T h e tw o G overnm ents address this burning appeal to all free peoples im m une from th e G erm an terror. th e exterm ination of th e intellectual class an d of all m anifestations of cu ltural life. th e plundering of public an d p riv ate p ro p erty . th e banishing of hundreds of thousands of men and women to th e interior of G erm any as forced labour.308 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y mense areas of its secular hom elands. th a t in the m easure of their stren g th th ey should help th e nations allied in the struggle for the freedom of all nations to achieve th e speediest possible deliverance of th e world from its present m onstrous nightm are. the spoliation of th e treasures of science and a r t and th e persecution of all religious beliefs— are unparalleled in all hum an history.

w hereby both G overn­ ments decided th a t a fter th e w ar Poland and Czechoslovakia shall . A u­ tonom ous banks of issue of th e S tates form ing th e Confederation will be m aintained. B oth governm ents reached agreem ent w ith regard to a num ber of principles of th e projected Confederation w hich were de111 n■ < 1 in th e following declaration ad o p ted during th e c u rre n t week.A P P E N D IX К PO L ISH -C Z E C H O SL O V A K A G R E E M E N T . i cem ent. 1940. . a Confederation of S tates in th a t area of Europe w ith which the ii. and th eir conviction th a t the security and l>iosperity of the area of E urope situ ated betw een the B altic and Лгцсап Seas depend prim arily on th e collaboration of two confederai ii ii is.. 91. 1 Journal of Central European A ffairs. I The C onfederation will coordinate th e policy of foreign tra d e and custom s tariffs of th e S tates form ing th e Confederation w ith a view to th e conclusion of a custom s union. II (April.. while in th e event of war a unified suprem e com m and will be appointed.i I'cment of Ja n u a ry 15. I t will be th eir ta sk to assure th a t th e p a rity established betw een th e various national currencies shall be per­ m anently m aintained. defense. i i . posts and telegraphs. the foundation of one of w hich had been laid b y th e Polishi rchoslovak agreem ent an d of th e o th er by the G reek-Y ugoslav .il intersts of th e tw o countries are bound. I li< G overnm ents of Poland an d Czechoslovakia have agreed on the billowing points w ith regard to th e fu tu re C onfederation of Poland md C zechoslovakia: I T he tw o G overnm ents desire th a t th e Polish-C zechoslovak Con­ federation should em brace o th e r S tates of the E uropean area with which the v ital interests of Poland and Czechoslovakia are linked up. social questions..sing th eir satisfaction w ith th e conclusion of the G reek-Y ugoslav hi. 309 . 1942).. 'i T he C onfederation will have an agreed m onetary policy. ’ T he purpose of th e Confederation is to assure com m on policy with regard to foreign affairs. 19421 In execution of th e declaration of th e G overnm ents of Poland md Czechoslovakia of N ovem ber 11. I T he Confederation will have a common general staff. tra n sp o rt. whose task it will be to prepare th e m eans of defense. th e G overnm ents of I’oLmd and Czechoslovakia conducted u n in terru p ted negotiations on i lie subject of th e m ethod of bringing th e above declaration to fruii ion« A t th e sam e tim e bo th G overnm ents adopted a resolution exIHcs. economic and financial m atters. JA N U A R Y 23. 92.

14. T he question of the m utual recognition by th e S tates form ing the Confederation of school and professional diplom as or docum entн and sentences of court. road. T he S tates in possession of sea and inland harbors will take into consideration the economic interests of the C onfederation as a whole. Q uestions of n atio n ality will rem ain w ithin th e com petence of the individual S tates form ing th e C onfederation. freedom of learning. T he S tates included in th e Confederation will jointly defray Uncosts of its m aintenance. 12. and th e control of governm ent by rep resentative national bodies elected by m eans of free elections.310 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d ie s in H is t o r y 6 . . Unestablishm ent of comm on organs of th e C onfederation will h<necessary. as well as the question of m utual legal aid in p articu lar in the execution of court sentences will be regu lated. equality of all citizens before Un­ law. M oreover. w ater and air tra n sp o rt as also of th e telecom m unication services will be carried o u t according to a common plan. T h e passenger traffic betw een th e various S tates included in th e Confederation will ta k e place w ith o u t an y restrictions. S tates form ing the C onfederation. T he constitution of th e individual S tates included in th e Con federation will g u arantee to the citizens of these S tates th e fol­ lowing rig h ts: Freedom of conscience. 13. personal freedom. in p artic u lar without passports and visas. th e independence of the courts of law. freedom of the spoken and w ritten word. the S tates forming the C onfederation will m u tually su pport the interests of the sea and inland harbors of the S tates forming the C onfederation. T he question of free domicile and of right In exercise a n y gainful occupation of the citizens of the individual S tates form ing th e C onfederation. T he Confederation will coordinate the financial policies of the 7. 10. especially w ith regard to taxation. 9. 8. An identical tariff foi postal and telecom m unication services will be binding on all the ter­ ritories of the Confederation. over th e whole te rrito ry of th e Confederation will be regulated. T he Confederation will assure cooperation am ong its members in educational and cu ltural m atters. 11. T he developm ent and adm inistration of railw ay. free adm ission of all citizens to the perform ance of all state functions. C oordination will also be applied in th e realm of social policy of th e various S tates of the Confederation. freedom of organization and association. B oth G overnm ents have agreed th a t in order to ensure Un­ common policy w ith regard to the above m entioned spheres.

wherein I he G overnm ents will be represented by th eir Chiefs or by their Кcpresentatives will co n stitu te a t the side of th e N ational General Staffs a Com m on G eneral Staff of th e N ational Armies. President of the Council of M inisters and M inister of th e lulerior. T his Organ. have decided to con­ clude the present A greem ent concerning the C onstitution of a Balkan 11 nion and to th a t effect have nam ed th eir plenipotentiaries: His M ajesty.A P P E N D IX L G R E E K -Y U G O SL A V PA C T . 311 . K ing of Y ugoslavia. 19421 I faving observed p a st experience. has nam ed His Excellency. these M inisters have agreed to th e following dispositions: C hapter I ORGANS OF THE UNION A rticle I. and consideri111 * t h a t in order to assum e th e independence and peace of th e Balkan 1. th e fundam ental principle of th eir policy m ust be the principle ■ ■ I “ T he Balkans for th e B alkan peoples. 1942). His M ajesty. which have d em o n strated th a t a lack of close under­ lain! ing betw een th e B alkan peoples has caused them to be ex­ ploited b y th e powers of aggression in th eir aim tow ard political and m ilitary pen etratio n and dom ination of th e peninsula. T his Organ 1 Journal of Central European A ffairs. Envoy I \ trao rd in ary and M inister P lenipotentiary and P erm anent U nder­ secretary of S tate for Foreign A ffairs. K ing of the I Icllenes. II (April. A fter receiving th e com m unications of th eir plenary powers. C harlam os Simopoulos. President of th e Council of M inisters and M inister of I'oreign Affairs. Em anuel Tsouderos.” His M ajesty. and more p articu larly recent i \ Iн-riences. has nam ed His Excellency. A political Organ co n stitu ted by th e M inisters for Foreign Affairs.1 les. and His Excellency. and His Excellency M om tchilo N anchitch. T he O rgans of th e Union which will m eet a t regular intervals are: I. which were found to be draw n up in good and due form. and An Econom ic and Financial Organ co n stitu ted by tw o members of each G overnm ent who will be com petent in economic and financial m atters. A rticle II. M inister of l oreign Affairs. T he P erm an en t M ilitary Organ. th e K ing of Yugoslavia. 88-90. an d His M ajesty. JA N U A R Y IS. Professor Slobodan Yovanovilch. K ing of th e Hellenes.

B. and of th e defense of th eir interests. b. C hapter II b u s in e s s o f t h e o r g a n s o f t h e u n io n A rticle VI. A commission charged w ith th e elaboration of agreem ents of intellectual cooperation betw een m em bers of the Union and w ith th e supervision of th eir application. (1). B. A commission charged w ith the coordination of th e efforts of th e O rgans of th e press in view of the reciprocal rapprochem ent of public opinion in S tates which are m em bers of th e Union. allowing these delegations to proceed to exchanges of views and to expressions of th eir wishes in the form of questions of com m on interest which would be subm itted to them by com petent organs. (2) T he task of th e Economic and Financial Organ will be: A. A rticle III. T o prepare projects for agreem ents of conciliation and arbitration betw een th e m em bers of th e Union. T o coordinate the foreign policy of th e m em bers w ith a view to enabling th e Union to a c t in a uniform m anner on an international plane and to proceed w ith prelim inary consultation a t all times when th e v ital exterior in terests of th e m em bers of th e Union should be m enaced. in order to discuss questions of a general order of in terest to th e Union. Economic and Financial C. A P erm an en t B ureau will comprise three sections: A. Political B. M ilitary A rticle IV. C. T o coordinate th e policies of exterior commerce and custom s tariffs w ith a view to th e conclusion of a custom s union. one for the A rm y and A viation and the o th e r for the N avy. A rticle V II. T o co n stitu te by m eans of special organs all m eans which will p erm it th e am elioration of com m unications betw een m em bers of . A rticle V. T he P residents of the Councils of M inisters of the S tates com posing th e Union will m eet w henever circum stances re­ quire. An elaborate com m on economic plan for m em bers of th e Union. T he political Organ will u n d ertak e the co n stitution of th e following O rganizations: a. C ollaboration betw een Parliam ents: T he governm ents of the Union will facilitate regular meetings between parliam entary delegations of th e S tates of th e Union.312 S m it h C o l l e g e S t u d i e s in H is t o r y will com prise tw o bureaus. the task of the political organ will be: A.

T he mission of the . (4) T he p erm an en t bureau will form a secretariat of I lie different organs of the Union and its task will be: A T o prepare m aterial for the labors of th e Organs of th e Union. Done in London in duplicate. financial and m ilitary coopera­ tion of th e m em bers of th e Union. 'I'o stu d y all questions th e solution of which m ay render more efficacious the political. T he p resent A greem ent will be ratified.dkan Union. Г. as soon as th is is possible. economic. A rticle X I.m ned forces of th e Union will be to defend th e E uropean frontiers ul I lie S tates of the Union. as well as to u rist developm ent w ithin th e Union. Article V III. .ilion. (3) T he ta sk of th e M ilitary Organ will be to coor­ d inate activities concerning collaboration betw een th e natio n al arm ed Idices of th e m em bers of th e Union. T h ey consider them selves bound b y th e foregoing dispositions from the d a te of exchange of the in stru m ents of ratifi• . on th e 15th day of Ja n u a ry . adoption of a common plan of defense an d a common ty p e of arm am en t. and th e ra ti­ fications will be exchanged. navigation by sea.. etc. T he high co n tractin g p arties declare th a t this agree­ ment presents the general foundations for th e organization of a H. roads. one thousand nine hundred and forty-tw o. I> . the rep resentative plenipotentiaries have hereto placed their signatures and th eir seals.B a l k a n F e d e r a t io n 31 3 (lie Union (railw ays. posts and telegraph). In witness whereof. Article IX . and th ey envisage w ith satisfaction the futu re adhesion to this ■ ureem ent of oth er B alkan sta te s ruled by governm ents freely and legally co nstituted. th e original in French. C hapter III A rticle X . < T o supervise th e application of th e decisions of the Organs of the Union. air and river. 'I'o prepare a d ra ft of an A greem ent in stitu tin g a B alkan m onetary union.

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