Book Notes

Plato and Socrates
CHRISTOPHER ROWE

There is evidently an increasing interest among scholars in ancient perspectives on Plato, and on Socrates. On Plato, there are now Julia AnnasÕs 1997 Townsend lectures, given at Cornell,1 and Harold TarrantÕs PlatoÕs First Interpreters;2 on Socrates, Francesca AlesseÕs La Stoa e la tradizione socratica.3 TarrantÕs book has the aim of taking us back to a time when users and interpreters of Plato were less philosophically sophisticated, but still spoke something like the Greek he used, Ô[t]he ultimate object [being] not to understand little known Platonic gures, but to encourage a fresh, almost primitive reading of Plato himselfÕ (vii). This looks like a promise to take us away from the hubbub of modern voices, to a world in which readers were both more innocent than us, and better placed to understand the master; if it is, it is not obviously how things turn out. The ancients, on TarrantÕs own account, had their problems with the texts, their own quarrels with each other, and their own habits of reading – habits which are likely to be as much in need of justi cation as many of our own. But what is certainly true is that an understanding of the ways in which Plato was once read will give us extra reason for reconsidering the ways in which we do it now; and this is what ultimately matters to Tarrant (as he says towards the end, Ôthe main aim of this book . . . has been to discuss issues of meta-interpretationÕ: 198). Tarrant by and large compares modern and ancient approaches, though he also sometimes interposes his own voice. Thus, e.g.: ÔFor [Proclus] all aspects of all parts of a dialogue were relevant to its goal. At times he was too devoted an advocate for PlatoÕs skills, at times too ingenious, but he had the correct overall strategy. The ancients did not eschew the task of saying what they thought was relevant in a dialogue and justifying their position, and neither should we todayÕ (41).4 Julia AnnasÕs strategy has a somewhat different
Julia Annas, Platonic Ethics, Old and New. Pp. viii + 196. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1999. ISBN 0-8014-3518-8 (hbk). No price given. 2 Tarrant, Harold. PlatoÕs First Interpreters. Pp. viii + 263. Duckworth, London, 2000. ISBN 0-7156-2929-8. £40.00 (hbk). 3 Alesse, Francesca. La Stoa e la tradizione socratica. Pp. 387. Bibliopolis, Naples (Elenchos: Collana di testi e studi sul pensiero antico, 30), 2000. ISBN 88-7088-3795. Lire 50,000 (pbk). 4 The implicit strategy of the book seems to be to begin by raising some theoretical
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© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2001

Phronesis XLVI/2

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BOOK NOTES

emphasis, using ancient perspectives – bolstered by additional arguments – directly to undermine modern assumptions:5 contrasting ancient tendencies to unitarianism with modern ÔdevelopmentalismÕ (ch. 1), and especially the idea that there is a fundamental shift of ethical position between the ÔSocraticÕ, i.e. ÔearlyÕ, dialogues and what comes after these (ch. 2: even late on, Plato is a eudaimonist); exploring the ancient PlatonistsÕ emphasis on the concept of Ôbecoming like godÕ, which we moderns have tended to underplay (ch. 3);6 continuing her attack on the treatment of the Republic as a mainly political work (ch. 4) – among other things on the basis of AlcinousÕ view that the Ôsuf ciency of virtueÕ thesis is to be found Ôparticularly in the whole of the RepublicÕ (Annas, 84); questioning the standard modern view of the difference Platonic metaphysics (i.e. form theory) makes to Platonic ethics (ch. 5: ancient Platonists – Alcinous once more plays a prominent role – (a) are unitarians, (b) treat metaphysics separately from ethics, and (c) nd agreement in much of Platonic ethics with the Stoa, who emphatically rejected Platonic

questions, with the Middle Platonists (in particular) as guides (Part I), to trace the history of Plato interpretation down to the Neoplatonists (Part II), and nally to take a closer look at some ancient treatments of particular dialogues and groups of dialogues (Part III) – where the emphasis, as in the book generally, is on studying Ôinterpretation largely as interpretation, not as doctrineÕ (214), and in the context of the corpus as a whole rather than of Ôhigh pro leÕ dialogues (ibid.). (ÔInterpreters acquire visions, visions fuelled by, but other than, the texts that they interpret . . . When the vision is imposed upon the text, instead of teased out of it, then interpretation proper gives way to doctrineÕ: 213.) The usefulness of our categories of ÔearlyÕ and ÔmiddleÕ dialogues (ch. 8, ch. 10) is one particular target; other Ômeta-interpretativeÕ conclusions are less easy to sort out from a somewhat dense presentation of an admittedly highly complex body of material. But there is no doubt that it is a useful book, especially coming – as it does – at a moment when some of our standard assumptions are already looking distinctly less secure than they did. 5 So the argument is not that the ancients must have got things right, just that as a matter of fact they did (as one can see if one gets a proper view of the issues, unhampered by newly-manufactured baggage). 6 Cf. David SedleyÕs ÔThe ideal of godlikenessÕ, one of the new pieces in Gail FineÕs Plato 1 and 2 (see Phronesis 45 (2000), 172 [where Ô1 and 2Õ became ÔI and IIÕ by a slip of the nger]), a piece which – as Annas herself recognizes – makes a similar general point, while developing it in a rather different way; cf. also Ther seAnne Druart, ÔThe Timaeus revisitedÕ, in van Ophuijsen (ed.) (see below); and Katharina Comoth, Vom Grunde der Idee. Konstellationen mit Platon (p. 48. UniversitŠtsverlag C. Winter, Heidelberg, 2000. ISBN 3-8253-0999-1. DM 17,00 (pbk)), the rst piece in which brie y discusses Ô ÒHomoiosisÓ bei Platon und OrigenesÕ (originally published elsewhere). The two other tiny pieces – ÔDie Seele vom ÒGesetz SelbstÓ: Platons Nomoi in kosmologischer BedeutungÕ, given at the Salamanca congress on the Laws (see Lisi, ed., below), and ÔPerÜ t°w ¤n aêtÇi politeÛaw dediñti: Platon, Politeia 608b1Õ – make some unexpected connections with visual symbols.

her overall claim about the value to us of the ancient interpreters looks plausible enough: in some important respects. so far. 6). but still an ex-Academician – gives us repeated reports of the existence of a thorough-going ÔintellectualistÕ position to which Plato would have been exposed (if it belonged to Socrates. since it is actually to be found in Plato – alongside the model that attributes parts uncontrolled by reason only to the not-yet-virtuous. which is not trying to abolish parts of the soul other than the rational. with no break between Socratic intellectualism and Platonic irrationalism (ch. is rather small. At this point my own Ôcon denceÕ in Alcinous as interpreter. they may well have done better than many of us have. as Aristotle says it did). this Ôobviously should not lead us to lose con dence in the ancient Platonists as interpreters – for here the two different approaches alert us to a tension in PlatoÕs own writingsÕ (162). If so. and which actually does make sense of certain texts normally considered earlier than the Republic. and musing on how much help ancient accounts of PlatoÕs position on pleasure give us in trying to make sense of the rather different things he seems to say about it (ch. and insofar as Ôthe ancient PlatonistsÕ (Ôin particular the Middle [ones]Õ (p. that is (Annas implies) understandable.) Here at least ÔdevelopmentÕ seems to me a good bet (and in line with one branch of ancient Platonist interpretation). deserve our Ôcon denceÕ: if we nd disagreement between Alcinous. using Alcinous (again) to construct a unitary picture of Platonic moral psychology. on the one hand. it is not shown that the latter would fail to make sense of those passages on which the Alcinous interpretation relies (whichever these may be). insofar as she proposes that the Ôancient PlatonistsÕ. and it is weakened further by the knowledge that Aristotle – admittedly not a paid-up Platonist. but rather Ôsimply an understated view. (These texts will at least include the ones Annas thinks of as containing.). but simply saying nothing about themÕ: 121. at any rate on this issue. 7: not much. the answer seems to be. as interpreters.BOOK NOTES 211 metaphysics). AnnasÕs approach claims a good deal more than TarrantÕs. and she is surely right that we have paid insuf cient attention to the notion of homoi™sis the™i in Plato. Annas makes a good case. beyond the suggestion that the latter involves Ôan unattractive and dangerous way of looking at myselfÕ (ibid. 1). for saying that Plato was always a eudaimonist. in particular. not ÔSocratic intellectualismÕ. for the absence of any sharp changes on pleasure. The chapter on . and Galen and Plutarch on the other over PlatoÕs moral psychology. Yet (I am inclined to object) no clear grounds are given for preferring AlcinousÕ account of PlatoÕs (real?) position here over GalenÕs and PlutarchÕs. as with Tarrant) got these things right. and an appendix argues strongly that the hedonism of the Protagoras in any case contributes little towards explaining ÔPlatonic theses outside the Protagoras itselfÕ (171)). and for claiming that so-called ÔmiddleÕ-type forms are of little consequence for ethics. on the other hand. If the latter two (ÔunfortunatelyÕ) were attracted by the ÔsuppressedbeastÕ model of the human being (135).

over the nature of happiness).g.212 BOOK NOTES the Republic. and Stoicism: thus AristotleÕs notion of athanatizein gures only brie y. it is centrally a matter of continuing incoherence (pp. and had in many respects thoroughly absorbed it. and as a result he is often unclear or indeterminate on points where later Stoics had been forced by argument to come to a de nite conclusionÕ (3). how much of the apparently political stuff would we really need for the purpose Annas attributes to the author? (No doubt there is an answer to this. in a footnote. Another part of AnnasÕs strategy is to downplay the continuities. and Part 2). which I found the least convincing.8 in an unconscious echo of AnnasÕs argument. 122. in the event. I had formed a rather clearer notion of AnnasÕs view of the dialogue than I had e. of AlcinousÕ. 7 . ISBN 0-19-285412-7. Pp. Part of AlesseÕs general thesis is that if the Stoics wanted to present themselves as being the intellectual descendants of Socrates. it is good to have so clear an overall picture to disagree with. or tries to do so: Platonic and Stoic ethics are closely related (e. between Plato and Aristotle. with nicely chosen (but not particularly well reproduced) illustrations.95 (pbk)): for Taylor. R. in ch.7 is actually one where the Middle Platonists seem to gure rather little. and criticisms of.. 3. even though Aristotle ÔsuggestsÕ the notion. at any rate.) 8 See also Christopher TaylorÕs shortest of introductions to Socrates (C. 64-71. this was not just because of the For one thing. Taylor. if nearly everyone is likely to disagree with some part of TaylorÕs account (especially of PlatoÕs Socrates – though actually this occupies less than a quarter of the volume). .M. One of the effects of AnnasÕs approach is frequently to assimilate Platonic and Stoic ethics. as these currently stand. Socrates: A Very Short Introduction. the StoicsÕ Socratic positions are seen as sharpened by the need to respond to Platonic and Aristotelian ÔdeviazioniÕ from.C. Jonathan BarnesÕs Aristotle from the same series has been given the same treatment. the book is a reprint of the 1998 Past Masters Socrates.99/$8. 23. turns this point to her advantage. £5. if so. this libellus could scarcely be bettered. has not been forced by debate to sharpen the issues that arise. I simply record that AnnasÕs own arguments looked unpersuasive to me. and something like it is supposed to be present at least in the Laws (145-7). Although it does not say so. as opposed to the apparent discontinuities.W. For a statement of the main issues about Socrates.) From AlesseÕs perspective (La Stoa e la tradizione socratica: see above). it leaves large chunks of the dialogue unexplained. has more to do with the rhetoric than the substance of AnnasÕs argument. and between Plato. HareÕs Plato has not (no Plato appears in the list of Very Short titles) – HareÕs well-known conceit of the heavenly twins Pato and Lato was evidently not enough to save it. Oxford University Press. (But this. Aristotle.g. the main continuity is between the Stoics and Socrates. 82-3). Socrates himself (p. by the end. for after all the Middle Platonists were thoroughly familiar with Stoic theory. perhaps. and the Platonist understanding of Plato on pleasure is said ÔinterestinglyÕ to resemble the Stoic idea of pleasure as ÔsuperventionÕ. . and the main difference is that ÔPlato . 2000. or especially. Annas. Oxford.

also has Michael Trapp on ÔPlato in DioÕ (Plato as stylist. 11 PCPS 46 (2000). the Old Stoa and Socratic literature. Oxford. and Frederick E. ÔSocrates provides a privileged interpretative key that helps to situate Dio in a philosophical perspective and to account for his peculiar approach to philosophical traditions – Cynicism especially. x + 308. and CynicismÕ: 241) in Dio Chrysostom: Politics. and very speci c. Dio Chrysostom: Politics. Part 2 (Ôthe defence of SocratesÕ) centres on Stoic criticism of Platonic forms. Diogene di Sinope. Letters. they were perpetually in negotiation with other such literature – including literature critical of Socrates – for the soul of Socrates. argument in it). Ôsuperandola talora con soluzioni di compromesso. poniamo. Stoic and Socratic. Pp.BOOK NOTES 213 in uence of Socratic epigoni like Crates. Simon Swain (ed. and ts into my narrative.A. and for the truth. talora prediligendo un testimone ad un altroÕ. that has no effect on AlesseÕs argument: Ôper quel che riguarda la conoscenza del Socrate storico. As for their knowledge of the ÔliteraryÕ Socrates. Plato. and AristotleÕs criticisms of Socrates. on Dio and philosophy.11 we surprisingly nd Epictetus anticipating Gregory VlastosÕs interpretation of the Socratic ÔelenchusÕ. cos“ non ce nÕ tra gli Stoici e. the Stoics had access to a body of writing now mostly lost. Letters. non cÕ alcuna differenza tra gli Stoici e i moderni. I use this particular article because it particularly struck me. Chrysippus against Plato. Brenk on ÔDio on the simple and self-suf cient lifeÕ. while Part 3 tries to get clear about the StoicsÕ precise relationship to Socratic dialectic and ethics.). but plainly exhibiting a certain ÔdifformitˆÕ. ISBN 0-19-924359X. Socrates. chronological problems. (It is not the business of these Notes to review journal articles. £50 (hbk). Aristotele. LongÕs ÔEpictetus as Socratic mentorÕ.10 In A. Part 1 of the book (Ôla discendenza della Stoa da SocrateÕ) discusses the biographical and doxographical traditions. and – more substantially – in Epictetus.) 9 . Ôma soprattutto per via di una conoscenza diretta e vasta della pi antica letteratura socraticaÕ (14).9 which among other things has some suggestive things to say about some nonPlatonic Socrateses. but also Stoicism – which in ancient culture and doxography were seen as deriving directly from SocratesÕ: so Aldo Brancacci. It took until the imperial era to establish Ôin modo pi de nitivo la natura esemplare ed univoca di SocrateÕ (ibid. A good deal of the StoicsÕ own writing itself belonged self-consciously to the genre of ÔSocratic literatureÕ. and Stoicism). but to all appearances it takes ÔSocratic studiesÕ a step further in a promising direction. which they recognized. 10 Part Four. I have not had time to assess the detailed argument of the book (and there is a lot of detailed. and Philosophy. in the latest Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society. there in the imperial era. and Socrates in Stoic literature. 2000. PolemoneÕ (22). in a piece (ÔDio. Socrates. meet in Dio Chrysostom.). Even if ÔSocratesÕ and ÔSocratismÕ are no more than a matter of a Sokratesdichtung (Gigon). and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.

Socrates maintains (Meno 77c. when brought to light and properly articulated. namely. without the possibility of interference by con icting desires.and consistency-lovers.Õ12 I wonder whether. and second. ÔEpictetus as Socratic mentorÕ. the less extravagant one just gives the agent access to the real good. long-term happiness – and they will recognise their mistake. that the agentÕs conception of what is overall best for him. all that Epictetus is asking for is a method that will be effective in showing people that what they are proposing to do is in con ict with what is really good for them. or is supposed to give him. Why will it not do just to have something like the following? ÔThe basis of the [Socratic] theory is the combination of the conception of goodness as that property which guarantees overall success in life with the substantive thesis that what in fact guarantees that success is knowledge of what is best for the agent. . Hence all that is required for correct conduct is the correct focus. that any set of entirely consistent beliefs. . ÔEpictetus as Socratic mentorÕ. and (2) that they possess true beliefs or preconceptions concerning their own good which. ed. an avenue to the truth in general. we need this in order to explain EpictetusÕ Socratic position.W.13 So far as I can see (at least.214 BOOK NOTES ÔIn EpictetusÕ account of involuntary error. This in turn rests on a single comprehensive theory of human motivation. 22-9. Socratic Studies. in fact. beliefs that have withstood constant testing.F. must be true. This motivation involves desire as well as belief. 12 . 14 Long. which requires to be focused in one direction or another via a conception of the overall good. The cogency of this recommendation rests on the assumption (1) that human beings are natural truth. Burnyeat (Cambridge. 91-2. we have noticed his extraordinarily optimistic rationalism: clearly show someone that his or her present behaviour or set of values is inconsistent with what they really want for themselves – i. Epictetus has anticipated Gregory VlastosÕ interpretation of the Socratic elenchus. Given that focus. which has to be a correct conception of the agentÕs overall goodÕ (C. this might be just to the extent that they are implied by the sort of theory described by Taylor. 8 above). if LongÕs (1) and (2) are involved at all. desire is locked onto the target which is picked out by the conception.or herself (i.14 VlastosÕs version gives Socrates.e. will cause them to abandon their false and inconsistent beliefs . which in context has to be interpreted as the strong thesis that the desire for good is a standing motive. 78b) that everyone desires good things. 1994). Taylor). 1-29.C. that whoever has a false moral belief will always have at the same time true beliefs entailing the negation of that false beliefÕ. esp. 13 Socrates (n. 92.e. and there is no reason to bring in VlastosÕs version of them – the Ôtwofold assumption: rst. overall success in life) is suf cient to motivate action with a view to its own realization. 62-3. given the account Long provides). M. the reference is to Vlastos. what best promotes eudaimonia.

and elegant. by Hugh Benson15 – to outrun the (Platonic) evidence. For sure. Cambridge University Press.16 she takes this view for granted – or rather. despite (what I claim is) the lack of supporting evidence: the view that what Socrates examines. sometimes. given the con ict between (true) ÔdeepÕ wants/beliefs and ÔshallowÕ beliefs discussed at McCabe 58-9 in connection with Gorgias 482a ff. sometimes he is rather examining his own beliefs (as in the Crito – at any rate. whatever we may want to say about Epictetus. substitute. will ipso facto show that one needs a bit more philosophy in oneÕs life. none of these so far abby generalities would do much damage to McCabeÕs overall argument. (The book originated as McCabeÕs 1996 Stanford Lectures. For this simple history. Re ection See esp. his essay on ÔThe dissolution of the problem of the elenchusÕ. just the demand that people say what they really think about the argument?). The. 29. standard view is that Plato comes to move away from Socratic ÔelenchusÕ of individual souls or persons. McCabe proposes a more elaborate. of Ôthe elenchusÕ has surely been shown – e. But even Benson does not (in the article cited in the preceding footnote) question one aspect of VlastosÕs account which has for some reason become standard in treatments of this thing called Ôthe elenchusÕ. Often. Mary Margaret McCabe is in good company when.30/$59. 18 As one would. £37. SocratesÕ interlocutors have not properly thought about something. Cambridge. (On the other hand. especially. and only some special theory about belief would convert what he eventually gets from them into their beliefs. Plato and his Predecessors: The Dramatisation of Reason. . he appears to be examining his own more than he is examining CritoÕs). 45-112. cf.) 15 . or to be confused about it. n. in favour of a greater engagement with impersonal theses. 54-9 generally seems to bring together a rather mixed bag of items. Pp. 52 below.18 However. at the beginning of her new book. I am not sure how much this passage has to do with the demand for ÔsincerityÕ. at all (so that perhaps we should look for a different explanation of the passages about sincerity: might it not be. ISBN 0-521-65306-1.17 The trouble.Õ.) 17 ÔIf the sincerity condition claims that we should take what people believe as the starting point of inquiry .g. or not what the interlocutor believes. and use.95 (hbk). viii + 318. . Tarrant in Robinson and Brisson (ed. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 13 (1995). what Socrates is supposed to do is to Ôexamine himself and othersÕ. The appendix on Ôsincerity textsÕ on pp. McCabe.). is that whatever those texts might appear to imply. or a. 16 Mary Margaret McCabe. in Ôthe elenchusÕ. is peopleÕs beliefs. 2000. But this may always be done indirectly as well as directly – being found not to know about something important. Plato and his Predecessors. what is examined is not typically what the interlocutor believes.BOOK NOTES 215 In fact. what Vlastos says about SocratesÕ own view. as I see it. because she is evidently persuaded by those texts that seem to support VlastosÕs claim that the rules of Ôthe elenchusÕ require that the interlocutor Ôsay what he believesÕ.

a method already problematized by/ through Protagoras in the Theaetetus. that subtle combination of metaphysics and ethics. Parmenides. and that coherence is measured by the degree to which it mirrors the coherence of the external world. suggests that Ôphilosophy. is. Ôfail to turn upÕ. Politicus and Philebus – with opponents (Protagoras. earth-born giants. suf cient for happiness. Ôthe dialogue form not only persists but gains in importance in the late period: especially in my late quartetÕ (10). the inquiring sort. the best kind 19 The immediate reference in the context is to our Ôdeep beliefsÕ (see preceding n. and possibly necessary as wellÕ (230).19 and to the construction of a quasi-Cartesian epistemology (cf. Heraclitus. where ÔpersonhoodÕ is constituted by the coherence of our epistemic state. the readers. Ôis the fact that the drama of the dialogues is ction. 281-3): the possibility of philosophy depends on the possibility of other minds. and so on Ôthe identity. does her general thesis actually require that the cosmos under Cronos in the Politicus myth be going backwards (ch. .). . The Politicus. and needs Plato to help him out. 5). I claimÕ (McCabe continues). These are evidently direct descendants of Vlastosian Ôtrue beliefs entailing the negation of [those] false belief[s]Õ uncovered by Ôthe elenchusÕ (text to n. That is.). 20 ÔCentral to this. For her. or about Ôthe elenchusÕ. 21 Nor. but those connections should not be taken for grantedÕ). . Sophist. It is dialogue that brings out our ownership of beliefs (ÔsincerityÕ again). 30). Ôand progress is towards personhood by means of intellectual orderÕ (269). Plato sets himself up – in three of McCabeÕs four target dialogues: Theaetetus. the difference being that on McCabeÕs account Socrates has rather less than even an implicitly worked-out theory of truth.21 It is also. what makes us have them. I think. because they represent positions that Ôcannot be occupied by reasoning persons living livesÕ (so that Ôtheir theories turn out to threaten their own livesÕ: 90). to nd this whole account richly suggestive (as well as bracingly provocative). separateness of personsÕ (91).20 One does not. and by the time we are through with the Philebus. all of these characters. . they are found to be ctional as well as historical. surely. I think. what makes us get our other ones wrongÕ (59). and of why he goes on writing dialogues. including Socrates himself. and – possibly – Philebus) who. ctional. leads Plato to ask Ôwhat makes [our] true beliefs true. we know why this is supposed to be – namely (to put a complex idea crudely) because the telos is gured as the perfectibility of persons. which (as her subtitle partly suggests) is one of the main things that McCabe originally set out to explain. as she puts it. are imaginaryÕ (there may be Ôsome connections between any particular ctional gure and its historical counterpart. and ÔensuresÕ their connectedness (270: witness the failure of Protagoras et al. . her defence of this view seems to .216 BOOK NOTES Ôon the Socratic methodÕ (37 n. Thus we have an explanation both of why Ôperson-to-person dialecticÕ matters so much to Plato. continuity and . . and the reading of sample dialogues like the ones in question in its turn prompts us. pp. for its part. have to accept all of McCabeÕs story about ÔpersonsÕ and ÔpersonhoodÕ. . to a new re ectiveness. at least in the conditions of the golden age. 14 above). .

rather than about the (temporary) victory of human reason over Ôinnate desireÕ. The range of the contributions is wide: Giovanni Cerri. Lanham. But to that I respond that there is the same degree of likelihood that the ideal state might come into existence as there is that Socrates would come to be in a position to claim to have the knowledge that mattered. Pp. in Who Speaks for Plato? (Gerald A. A cura di Giovanni Casertano. Repubblica X. since Plato wrote the parts of all his characters. that the ideal stateÕs coming into existence would depend on SocratesÕ getting that knowledge. ÔDalla dialettica allÕepos: Platone. though numbers in this category seem to be falling fast – unless nding philosophical explanations of PlatoÕs use of the dialogue is not to count. On the face of it. in ch. and in a way Holger Thesleff. or at least as the rational part of him wants him to be heard. also – more colourfully – Ruby BlondellÕs ÔLetting Plato speak for himself: character and method in the RepublicÕ. Francisco J. 22 See Gerald Press. CriziaÕ. 14. nevertheless. though Press is actually here complimenting McCabeÕs and Christopher GillÕs Form and Argument in Late Plato (1996). Having read the whole. 0-8476-9219-1 (pbk). 13). there is no shortage of treatments of this particular subject: see now also Giovanni CasertanoÕs edited volume La struttura del dialogo platonico. In this volume. for Ôshow[ing] an increased interest in dialogue form among ÒanalyticÓ Plato scholars to whom the volume is limitedÕ. Lire 32. Press. MD. ch. Jos Trindade Santos. 8).22 (Certainly.BOOK NOTES 217 of response to the continuing complaint that ÔanalyticÕ philosophers like McCabe pay too little attention to the dramatic form of the dialogues. ISBN 888096-720-7. 3 n. or nally. No price given). Napoli. the question asked by PressÕs volume (a copy of which he generously gave me) is a non-question. After all. but by and large the volume represents a useful exercise (so maybe after all it was not a non-question). ÔThe philosopher conducting dialecticÕ. 4. 331. 12. from any of his main characters. The question conjures up some straw men. I would still hold that no one has yet shown that Plato wants to dissociate himself signi cantly. and straw Platos. ch. 2000. p. facendo retroagire le conclusioni delle conversazioni posteriori sulle anterioriÕ. and perhaps even then – there are some characters who donÕt speak for Plato. Rowman and Little eld. Pp. 237. Gonzalez (ch. ÔAnalyticÕ is presumably intended here to pick out the sort of scholar who typically neglects form in favour of argument. ISBN 0-8476-9218-3 (hbk). like the one about whether Homer told the truth. 9.000 (pbk). ÔLa struttura dialogica del Menone: una lettura retroattivaÕ (dialogue form allows us to read Ônonsequenzialmente.23) No such complaint need be levelled against Angela Hobbs. clearly – absent some theoretical anti-Platon chez Platon. ch. 11: ÔThe Eleatic Stranger: His MasterÕs Voice?Õ) nds more reasons for claiming that Plato would have meant to distance himself from the Visitor from Elea – one of these reasons being that the ideal state of the Politicus would itself exclude Socrates. Who Speaks for Plato? Studies in Platonic Anonymity. Timeo. 50). 2000 (Collana di testi e studi di los a antica. presumably everything every one of them says ought to be treated in principle as somehow relevant to his overall purpose in writing (hence Erik OstenfeldÕs ÔWho speaks for Plato? Everyone!Õ. or alternatively. 23 La struttura del dialogo platonico. . 14). Theodor Ebert. ÔUna nuova interpretazione del Fedone platonicaÕ (a Pythagorean Socrates addressing his fellow-Pythagoreans: Ôpraticate la dialetticaÕ). Loffredo Editore. Lloyd Gerson is fairly scathing about Ôthe antimouthpiece theoryÕ as a whole. and her Plato and the me of a piece with her reading the age of Zeus as a story about self-determination (ch.

Sera na Rotandaro. of that staple of the Ônew kind of PlatonismÕ identi ed by Press (Who Speaks for Plato? (n. Casertano. and Thrasymachus – and on another presence. Adler and Freud tend to show. not on Socrates. If oneÕs behaviour reveals this cherished image of oneself to be a sham. ÔSimposio e Fedro: variazioni strutturali del discorso dÕamoreÕ. 24 Hobbs. £16. because it is central to PlatoÕs conception of the self. Il ÒgiocoÓ polisemantico del FedroÕ. and that central to this need will be a tendency to form an ideal image of oneself in accordance with oneÕs conception of the ne and noble [kalon]. Ôin the thumos Plato has hit upon psychological traits of real importanceÕ (41). 212). ISBN 0-52141733-3. 533A on p. xiii. ÔStruttura narrative e tempo nel TeetetoÕ. Esempi di rilettura del ÒgiocoÓ loso co di PlatoneÕ (Ô. Giovanna Cappelletti. then anger. .218 BOOK NOTES Hero. many of the issues for which the thumos there becomes the focus have already been raised. Il ÒgiocoÓ analogico di Repubblica VI-VIIÕ (Ôresta lÕipotesi che Platone non abbia voluto scriverne [sc. xv + 335. ÔIl limite della complessitˆ. the kind that takes dramatic form seriously: R. Alcibiades. Lidia Palumbo. Maurizio Migliori. ÔEros tra retorica e loso a. del Bene]Õ. one which in large part he shared with the culture to which he belonged. Pp. Yet. a partire da alcuni dialoghi esemplariÕ. ISBN 0-7156-2993-X.99. 2000. below). 22 above). or means to respect. Cambridge University Press.). in paperback. Modern scholarly literature has tended to play down the thumos – wrongly (Hobbs says). .Õ. xvii + 280. themselves treated in a single chapter. . Marco Esposito. published in 1995 (even reproducing the old ISBN). but on some of his most colourful interlocutors. ÔEsempi di analogia matematica come struttura argomentativa in PlatoneÕ. RutherfordÕs The Art of Plato. 29 below. Sulla struttura dialogica in Platone. Hobbs suggests.24 which in large part centres.e. 2).25 In the Republic Plato seems to move beyond the simple opposition that dominates the Gorgias and the Phaedo. its view of the later dialogues (Ôa difference [i.50 (hbk). especially Callicles. Plato and the Hero: Courage. lessening] of pace and vigourÕ. Pamela Grisei. This is an exact replica of its hardback predecessor.26 ÔI wish to claim that the essence of the human thumos is the need to believe that one counts for something. p. ÔTra polifonia e puzzle. London. 84). Duckworth. contrasts strikingly with McCabeÕs. 26 Further than that: as parallels in Nietzsche. Stefania Nonvel Pieri.) 25 The year 2000 saw the reissue. ÔDal mito al logo al mito: la struttura del FedoneÕ. ÔSocietˆ dialogica e strategie argomentative nella Repubblica (e contro la Repubblica)Õ (partly contra TŸbingen: n. (Hobbs also respects. in the Republic and elsewhere: Achilles. . contrast Vegetti on Rep. Arianna Fermani. 296. 2000. Platonic ÔanonymityÕ: Plato and the Hero. self-disgust and shame are likely to be the result. Pp. ÔVisione e conoscenza. This ideal of oneself also Mario Vegetti. .e. 278). in the shape of the thumos. between the life of reason and the life of desire: now he has Socrates introduce a third element. £37. i.B. Manliness and the Impersonal Good. Angela. also contrast Newell. Roberto Velardi. ÔStrutture narrative e argomentative del CarmideÕ. un sistema che devÕessere nel contempo chiuso e aperto . Cambridge. ÔScrittura e tradizione dei dialoghi di PlatoneÕ (which ends on a note of scepticism about the idea of Platonic anonymity: see preceding n.

The theoretical grounds for the shift are provided (so Hobbs claims in her penultimate chapter) by the proposed uni cation of the Beautiful and the Good. can one detect a sea-change in the air? (Cf. or one that operates just with reason and desire: the Gorgias leaves us with no idea Ôhow reason and the desires are supposed to interrelateÕ (157). . standing his ground. Throughout the book. 23 above. andreia?) Laches.27 which will supply the missing piece in the shape of the thumos and its necessary training. Everything then points towards the Republic. in Casertano (ed. and any offence committed to oneÕs self-image by others will prompt anger and a desire to retaliateÕ (30). The connections of this Hobbsian thumos with Achilles. Gorgias: all in their different ways show the inadequacies of a thumos-less psychology – whether an intellectualist one. not of the immortal soulÕ (Republic X. it will end up promoting a moral kalon which is also the internalization of logosÕ: 230.BOOK NOTES 219 needs to be con rmed by social recognition . .g. of course. the thumos supplies Ôthe apparatus . in particular. (ÔIf the thumos is directed towards the appropriate aesthetic kala. are evident enough.) 27 . Cf. Callicles can be seen for what he really is. Plato recognizes. paralleled by the appropriation of the thumos for the goals of logos. . Once trained. Hobbs is also concerned with issues of gender: how. Plato has shown himself aware of the power of the role-model: witness SocratesÕ calm Achilles. does Plato negotiate the tension between the demand for female auxiliaries/philosopher-queens and an ideal – of courage – stated in terms of ÔmanlinessÕ. Timaeus: 31-3) – and one. and with Homer.). . and a fast-forward to the (perhaps) different worlds of the Politicus and the Laws. like Thrasymachus: Ô[t]he egoistic challenge of the thumoeidic Thrasymachus thus leads Socrates in the same direction as that prompted by the egoistic challenge of the thumoeidic Callicles. replacing the Achilles amok of the Iliad. . what with Harold Tarrant and Julia Annas too voting against ordinary forms of developmentalism. Trindade Santos.) The book ends with a brief look at that educational failure. But in fact from the Apology on. the victory of reason over the desires. It is only tting that the substantive psychology required to combat both characters makes explicit acknowledgement of that element of the psuch from which their challenges largely springÕ (174). also e. and of morality over egoism] possibleÕ (161). The obtaining of this recognition will require self-assertion and perhaps aggression. that he will need to take into account in proposing his own choice of life: how otherwise to appeal to all those energetic young aristocrats? (Male. . needed to make transcendence [i. KahnÕs more general thesis in Plato and the Socratic Dialogue (1996). .e. Alcibiades. made possible by its sensitivity to kala and public opinion. Protagoras. It constitutes a Ôset of motivations and behavioural characteristicsÕ (34) which is Ôpart of the living personality. n. ÔthumoeidicÕ.

after all.50 (hbk)). from the perspective that makes the – unformed – human psyche a battleground between different parts/Ômotivational setsÕ. or Nietzsche. La n du Ph dre de Platon. Cambridge. which ought to nd its way into a number of different debates. Platon.000 (pbk)). 272. Luc. (Ôbased on papers given during Pierre Vidal-NaquetÕs seminars at the ƒcole des Hautes ƒtudes en Sciences Sociales . if this is in the Laches. Given the general nature and origins of Les mots . may say. I suspect that most who might nd it useful would be able. Plato really did always share that perspective. the rather more generous. Firenze. Cambridge University Press.28 In other words. except that the bibliography has been extended (with a French emphasis). les mots et les mythes: Comment et pourquoi Platon nomma le mythe? (ƒditions La D couverte. Lectures de Platon (Biblioth que dÕHistoire de la Philosophie. What is translated is essentially the second edition of Brisson. Studi. Among these pieces is one on the Politicus myth that McCabe criticises. Myth and Philosophy from the Presocratics to Plato. 21 above). or the Protagoras. ISSN 0249-7980. It attempts to avoid the technical language at the beginning of the French edition in order to reach out to those less specialized in the areaÕ (p. I go back to wondering whether it actually helps to see the thumos as part of what makes us human – despite anything Plato. liii + 188. liv). 2000. also a reworked version of a pair of anti-ÔesotericistÕ pieces from 1993. Wilfried KŸhnÕs new monograph also joins the lists against Ôthe schools of TŸbingen and MilanÕ (Wilfried KŸhn. less reductively Aristotelian. 1994). ISBN 2-7116-1455-7. Chicago and London. now that Hobbs has made them. then we should need at least a rather differently constructed argument for the thumos. look obvious (that is. translated. The University of Chicago Press.) 29 Kathryn Morgan. view of ÔSocraticÕ intellectualism that Taylor manages to derive from ÔearlyÕ Plato (see above). 150 F (pbk)). translation diverges from the French second edition. (And a week after putting Plato and the Hero down. Paris. 186). Another. and the translatorÕs introduction is rather complementary to than explicative of BrissonÕs text. ISBN 88-222-4867-8. $27. nouv. Olschki. Critique de la rh torique et de lÕ criture (Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere ÔLa ColombariaÕ. Pp. or Freud. . Pp. Leo S. 2000. book on Plato and myth is Brisson. and Ô[t]he rst part of the . edited. however. and perhaps. Vrin. 1998. this is a(nother) useful book. one that makes connections which. . 2000. viii + 313. rather different (and somewhat hybrid). ISBN 0-521-62180-1.Õ). and with an introduction by Gerard Naddaf (pp. s rie). Librairie Philosophique J. £ 40. All in all. in the way that Hobbs halfsuggests). Other pieces of BrissonÕs on Platonic myths are included in the newly published collection of his pieces on Plato (Luc Brisson. .220 BOOK NOTES Plato and the Hero was in many ways a book waiting to be written. Adler. Plato the Myth-Maker. Pp. . claiming inter alia that the ÔesoteristsÕ have been . Lire 28. and might prefer.29 Morgan begins by de ning her approach as Ôliterary rather than analytic (by analytic I mean a method 28 Compare. Paris. for having the cosmos going in the same direction in the ages of Cronos and Zeus (n. it is not clear whether that particular goal is achievable by these particular means. ISBN 0-26-07518-4. to read the French original. 137.00 (hbk). it is not clear for whom it is intended. . So too Kathryn MorganÕs Myth and Philosophy from the Presocratics to Plato. though the volume contains a mass of material. .

in van Ophuijsen (ed. ISBN 88-343-0613-9.38.A. 31 Of more recent examples. . and that SocratesÕ real target – as the text shows – is the discourses of others (orators.) – From within the Ôschool of MilanÕ. la dialectique oraleÕ (ibid. politicians). there is now Raffaella SantiÕs Platone. or story-telling. Morgan joins a long-standing protest31 against simplistic oppositions between myth (story. Journal of the History of Ideas 10 (1949). (But mustnÕt there be something self-referential even about the picture of a reformed. and the one that makes myth merely something that expresses what reason cannot. Buxton (ed. i. . ÔSi tratta [qui] della prima raccolta di testi concernenti le dottrine non scritte di Platone tramandate dai discepoli .)).] 32 Morgan confesses to nding the second Ômore congenialÕ (4).000 (pbk)). renders him capable of an intuitive leap to a vision of the soul separated from its body and related to the whole. in the same volume) is attracted by the idea that we can nd the Ôunwritten teachingsÕ in the dialogues: see esp. and richer. to which this gives rise: the honey on the cup treatment. which has myth – still. 22 above. Hegel e la dialettica (pp. so I take KŸhn to say. Vita e Pensiero (Collana temi meta sici e problemi del pensiero antico. 80).BOOK NOTES 221 that breaks down a philosophical text into a series of logical arguments)Õ (8). . writing the Preface to Santi. BrandisÕs De perditis Aristotelis libris De ideis et De bono sive Philosophia (1823). 300. 341-4. which includes a reproduction of C. are quite as straightforward as this eloquent.) 30 That elusive ÔanalyticÕ category again: cf. poets. fty years back there is Edelstein. . Studi e testi. Wiles (ÔForms and predication in the later dialoguesÕ. 13-14). Mitchell Miller (ÔDialectical education and PlatoÕs StatesmanÕ. knowledgeable rhetoric that precedes the target passage? One can perhaps be broadly sympathetic to KŸhnÕs strategy without wanting to accept that things. Admitting that this type of criticism has been aired before. 6. according to which Ô[t]he philosopherÕs devotion to dialectic . KŸhn aims especially to replace the end of the Phaedrus within its proper context. and elegant. [I and my co-editor apologise whole-heartedly for allowing the mis-spelling of Thomas JohansenÕs name (as ÔJohanssonÕ) to slip through on p. 344 of the same set of Book Notes. 2000. within the argument second half of the dialogue as a whole.30 which is likely to be a more useful distinction than that between ÔliteraryÕ and ÔphilosophicalÕ – as her book amply demonstrates. argument).). this is treated merely as Ôle re et ou la copieÕ (121) of the dialectical process (ÔlÕ criture sur papyrus nÕint resse Socrate que dans la mesure o elle renvoie ˆ son pr tendu arch type.). The mythological vision is . essentially developing the Ôless radicalÕ interpretation of the idea of philosophical myth-making described [by Rowe] at Buxton 265. see e. n.G. cf. 223 n. polemic suggests. discussed by Mansfeld in Phronesis 45 (2000). and the treatments of philosophical mythmaking.e.32 Instead we are invited to envisage a Ôdynamic interpenetration too ready to take the end of the Phaedrus as a re ection on the authorÕs own productions. alternative to the ÔanalyticalÕ.A. and Plato. R.g. 463-81 (mentioned by Mansfeld. her own treatment of the ÔmiddleÕ dialogues (see following n. é questa la fonte alla quale Hegel attinse le sue conoscenze in materiaÕ (Giovanni Reale. ction) and logos (rational account. From Myth to Reason? (1999). L. as for philosophical writing. somehow – making up for the limitations of reason). (Anne M.): see below) sees the ÔsynopticÕ approach of TŸbingen-Milan as the main.

in the late dialogues (?) it is a matter of Ôcontinu[ing] to acknowledge that language is imperfect and our task ongoingÕ. If I remain unclear about a self-qualifying image of the truth expressed in narrative. The book begins. if there is one at all. Elizabeth Pender. with discussion of the concept of metaphor. and how philosophy might even need to tell stories. Pp. and it will not be surprising if there is fuzziness about just where the fault-line is. which draws on a wide range of other treatments of metaphor and related phenomena.34 takes on part of an even larger subject than Platonic myth: Platonic metaphor. xi + 278. The division between ÔmiddleÕ and ÔlateÕ is one of the cornerstones of MorganÕs treatment – even despite her own argument: ÔWe have seen that philosophical argumentation can be called mythos in this [late] periodÕ (282). properly.00 DM (hbk). there is a lot of negotiation to be done. Republic and Phaedrus) and one on myth in the late dialogues. . Academia Verlag. since Morgan appears to claim that Ôthe use of mythos-vocabularyÕ – in late dialogues like Timaeus – is one sign of a difference from the ÔmiddleÕ period works: while in both cases there is a sense of Ôthe dangers of philosophical overcon denceÕ. and its role in cognition. as employed in the context of the gods and the soul. Philosophers may attack the poets for their ctions. This intuitive understanding cannot stand by itself. 194 has already noticed a similar phenomenon in the (ÔmiddleÕ) Phaedo (not to mention a related one in the – presumably ÔearlyÕ – Apology). apart from its assembling of the material (also summarized in two appendixes). two chapters each are then accorded to the gods and to soul. (Plato certainly does his best to bury it. 34 Elizabeth E. and Morgan is certainly no exception in this. and culminates in a chapter on Ômiddle periodÕ myths (where ÔmiddleÕ is deemed to include the Gorgias as well as Phaedo. then. lies in its selfconsciously theoretical approach. whereas in the middle ones Ôthis awareness was directed at the provisionality and metaphoric quality of our vision of the metaphysicalÕ (281). Images of Persons Unseen: PlatoÕs Metaphors for the Gods and the Soul (International Plato Studies 11). but that ctional world remains an organic element in both the social culture and (along with poetry herself ) the literary context within which they operate. one on Ôsome PresocraticsÕ. Sankt Augustin. But maybe I have misread Morgan here (and the contrast disappears from the Conclusion ten pages later). ISBN 3-89665-006-8.222 BOOK NOTES of myth and philosophyÕ (5). The real usefulness of the book. devotes most of its attention to ÔPlatonic mythÕ33 – we have a complex picture of philosophical myth (or at any rate of Platonic myth) that allows us to see both how philosophy and story-telling might be combined.) By the end of the book – which. Evidently. To point this out is not ( just) pedantry. in any case my main point is about the hold that the ÔmiddleÕ/ÔlateÕ distinction has on us. 33 This part begins with two chapters discussing general issues. 88. Pender. in Images of Persons Unseen. however. 2000. while also perpetually referring to it. after a chapter on Ôtheoretical issuesÕ. and another on Ôthe sophistsÕ. then of PlatoÕs own re ections on ÔimagesÕ and on myths. it arose in the rst place from dialectic and must return to dialectic to ground itselfÕ (242). yet p.

Pp. Translated. 2-87723-493-2 (Peeters France).). xcv + 94.95 (pbk). 38 Ada Neschke-Hentschke. 101). I suppose that this is not an unhealthy state to be in. more suggestive. but (b). to which she necessarily keeps returning. pbk. . No price given. (ed. These constraints – metaphysical. ƒditions de LÕInstitut Sup rieur de Philosophie. Louvain-Paris 2000.38 The effect of this volume is partly the same as that of the three discussed at the start of the present set of Notes.g. 2000. partly different: the same. §VI). PenderÕs systematic approach can sometimes end up understating – even while stating – the slipperiness of her subject. xliv + 348. Hackett. where ÔmetaphorsÕ end and ÔmythsÕ begin (ch. e. 2. style in this respect serves her in good stead. ISBN 90-4290862-2 (Peeters Leuven). And for a history of the reception of the Timaeus(-Critias) – to put modern interpretations in some kind of perspective – one need look no further than Ada NeschkeHentschkeÕs edited volume Le Tim e de Platon/Platos Timaios. and aesthetic – make con icting demands . . The translation rst appeared in the Hackett Plato: Complete Works. 1997.35 Still with myth and metaphor. the cosmology is Ôa theoretical mythos [because Ôat best an approximationÕ] which encompasses philosophical discourse about the physical worldÕ (278). $29. Anyone looking for an introduction to the Timaeus is hardly likely to nd a better one than this. at the same time. like Zeyl (xxxi-xxxii). Pp. re ects both the limitations (it is no more than likely) and the validity (it is no less than likely) of the accountÕ (xxxii-xxxiii). §IV). Contributions ˆ lÕhistoire de sa r ception / Platos Timaios. BeitrŠge zu seiner Rezeptionsgeschichte (Biblioth que Philosophique de Louvain.g. Indianapolis. e. is to warn us against expecting perfect consistency and accuracy.37 ZeylÕs treatment of the main issues affecting the interpretation of the dialogue is.BOOK NOTES 223 some aspects. 49A6-50A4). on a ÔliteraryÕ subject? Plato: Timaeus. 53).g. 3. but in any case PenderÕs aims are different. and after all a metaphorical account may be just as consistent and accurate as a literal one. (Not so on the the distinction between the metaphorical and the literal. insofar as its chief function. by Donald J. in the context. 100. The use of the word ÒlikelyÓ . as a whole. on the ÔreceptacleÕ passage.. . while (c) having a quite nuanced view of the metaphors used to describe him and his activity (ch. in that it presents the More ÔanalyticalÕ. splendidly balanced (so also. 0-87220-447-2 (hbk). Louvain La Neuve / ƒditions Peeters. 37 ZeylÕs position thus resembles MorganÕs: for Morgan.) MorganÕs looser. Donald Zeyl – in the ample introduction to the self-standing edition of his translation of the Timaeus36 – takes a clear stand on the status of TimaeusÕ Ôlikely account/storyÕ: it is simply implausible to take the word eÞkÅw as giving support to a ÔmetaphoricalÕ reading of the account/story. $10. Pender (a) talks standardly about Ôthe creation mythÕ of the Timaeus (e. Le Tim e de Platon. Zeyl. ÔProbably what Plato means is that within the constraints in which the story must be told something like this account is the most plausible one can hope for. with Introduction. 36 35 . epistemological. ISBN 0-87220-446-4 (pbk).95 (hbk). tends to think of Plato as believing literally in a divine creator (116). .

1999. $69. orientating. above. 43 But at this point. ÔThe Timaeus of A.39 The volume is a sequel to Neschke (ed. Epoques moderne et contemporaine (Wolfgang Ršd. ÔPlotinus on eternityÕ. ÔPlatons Timaios und die GegenwartÕ). Fosca Mariani Zini. et Critias)Õ. offers a more circumspect.E. Jean-Fran ois Pradeau. 82. . or foil. then: Antiquit grecque (Mario Vegetti. Ein Beitrag zur Rezeptionsgeschichte der TimaiosÕ). ÔLa Divisio textus du Tim e dans lÕIn Timaeum de Proclus (Sur la physique pythagoricienne du Tim e selon Proclus)Õ). ÔLÕorganisation politique de la cit dans un commentaire anonyme du Tim e de 1363Õ.41 Three of the best bits of Plato and Platonism. Plotinus. Plato and Platonism (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy. cf. Walter Mesch. ÔLÕinqui tude des mondes: Marulle lecteur de Platon et de Lucr ceÕ). Whitehead and A. Alexandre ƒtienne. Karen Gloy. We wonÕt need to read Proclus. and shouldnÕt. 368. Luc Brisson. it is still a moot question where Ômoral motivationÕ comes in.. Jens Halfwassen. to the other. in order to understand Plato. . 17a-27b. ÔDer neue Timaios ÒnachÓ CalcidiusÕ. TaylorÕ.N. ÔLa r ception du Tim e ˆ travers les si cles: un survolÕ). McCabe. Moyen Age et Renaissance (Z non Kaluza. for their own philosophical purposes). in Plato.95. ÔEwigkeit dei Boethius. . ÔDe caelo in terram. use Plato. and more precise. 41 Contents: Introduction (Ada Neschke. view (but then Rist is in primarily polemical mode). or . different. ISBN 0-8132-0910-2 (hbk). Van (ed. 42 Ophuijsen. ÔDer Demiurg: seine Stellung in der Philosophie Platons und seine Deutung im antiken PlatonismusÕ. Is it really his view. Gabor Betegh. ÔPlatonische und neuzeitliche KosmologieÕ. Alexandre ƒtienne. and that – as Neschke suggests in her opening. Washington. we need to read them because we need to understand the history of philosophy (which of course isnÕt to say that moderns themselves wonÕt. Op. or . Il Timeo in Galeno (De placitis. essay – it may yet be possible to establish the original question the ancient text (was) intended to answer. This is Rezeptionsgeschichte of a more familiar kind. Augustine and ourselvesÕ. ch. surely. ÔDer platonische Timaios als Manifest der platonischen DemiurgieÕ. or his SocratesÕ. 39 . ÔLe r™le des math matiques dans le Tim e selon les interpr tations contemporainesÕ.).42 are also on what came of Plato later: John Rist re ects on ÔMoral motivation in Plato.). quod animi)Õ. in that it frequently suggests that these strategies are culturally or otherwise determined. Images de Platon (1997).43 For another small part of that history in relation to the Timaeus. that what we really want is to become ÔmorallyÕ better people? Griswold. also. Giuseppe Bartoli: un lecteur moderne du r cit atlante (Tim e. and especially. 40 See Phronesis 44 (1999). in the same volume. 4 of Han BaltussenÕs Theophrastus against the Presocratics & Plato (discussed by Keimpe Algra in the previous issue).C. Alain Lernold. . and forms a nice complement. Antiquit latine (Enno Rudolph. D. or Aristotle. ÔEntre interpr tation chr tienne et interpr tation n oplatonicienne: Marsile FicinÕ. Johannes M. Dimitri Nikulin. and takes few hostages.224 BOOK NOTES modern reader with alternative interpretative strategies. ÔLe po me politique de Platon.40 and like it the fruit of a colloquium held in Lausanne. The Catholic University of America Press. bibliography. or the Cambridge Platonists. or Ficino. 33). edited by Johannes van Ophuijsen. see also ÔTheophrastusÕ De sensibus and PlatoÕs TimaeusÕ.

$64. 135. a metaphysical principle in PlatoÕs moral psychologyÕ (hesuchia<n> echein is not to be con ated with Ôminding oneÕs own businessÕ). $24. Nicholas Smith. 29 above). ÔAn argument Òtoo strangeÓ: Parmenides 134c4-e8Õ. 46 Also in the volume: Druart (n. 6 above). Ôthe aporia at the end . Wiles. ÔThe clash of methodologies in PlatoÕs StatesmanÕ (on hypothesis and division). Alexander TulinÕs Dike Phonou47 includes a compelling third chapter on Euthyphro 3E75D7. PlatoÕs usual word for the divisions of the soul in the Republic is not ÒpartsÓ but ÒkindsÓ . and the case that Euthyphro is supposed to be bringing against his father: 44 Accepting something like VlastosÕs reconstruction of Ôthe elenchusÕ (see above) along the way. ÔRelations and intermediates in PlatoÕs TimaeusÕ. and paradox in PlatoÕs RepublicÕ (usefully raising the question: to which phase of education might Plato have supposed the Republic to belong? – and offering a highly plausible answer. Stuttgart und Leipzig. Remembrance. Plato never refers [in the Republic] to a tripartite soul. Mitchell Miller. Christopher Shields. . beyond that. BC. Richard Patterson. Daryl McGowan Tress. Pp. 0920980-75-9 (pbk).E. McPherran (ed. Another mainly unconnected collection of essays – though as in van Ophuijsen.). ÔImages. the model is pervasive. Kenneth Dorter. and van Ophuijsen himself treats of ÔThe continuity of PlatoÕs dialecticÕ. and Fred MillerÕs ÔPlato on the parts45 of the soulÕ.95 (pbk)). ÔThe logos of ÒlogosÓ: the third de nition of the TheaetetusÕ (the arguments against this nal de nition Ôought not to dissuade its proponentsÕ (122. Canada.G. McPherran. or touching on.44 The opening pages of his Introduction.95 (hbk). Teubner. But what are kinds of soul? In brief they are primarily lifestyles or potential selvesÕ (266). Ronna Burger. Recognition. 47 Alexander Tulin. Pp. and the purposes of PlatoÕs ParmenidesÕ. Other high points are Charles GriswoldÕs ÔPlatonic liberalism: self-perfection as a foundation of political theoryÕ. . Miller (n. The Right of Prosecution and Attic Homicide Procedure (BeitrŠge zur Altertumskunde. . ÔThe signi cance of some structural features of PlatoÕs CritoÕ (Ôpretheoretical agreementsÕ and Aristotelian endoxa). Allen. . ÔThe problem of sense perception in PlatoÕs PhilebusÕ (mainly on 38C5-39C6). so-called ÔSocraticÕ dialogues. 1999 = Apeiron 32/4. ÔKnowledge and being in the recollection argumentÕ. along with a useful perspective on the interpretation of the dialogue as a whole). ÔThinking and perception in PlatoÕs TheaetetusÕ. fallacies. xi + 157. ÔForms. Asli Gocer. ISBN 0-920980-74-0 (hbk). have some useful things to say about continuities and discontinuities in Platonism.BOOK NOTES 225 Dominic OÕMeara discusses ÔNeoplatonist conceptions of the philosopher-kingÕ. ISSN 0003-6390. . Mi-Kyoung Mitzi Lee. four books on. The list is: Lloyd Gerson. 45 Contrast Rist (with no cross-reference to Miller): ÔFirst. ÔFigure. B. seems somehow hollowÕ (123). and Stanley Rosen. The essays (or six of the eight) were presented at the 4th Annual Arizona Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy: PlatoÕs Epistemology and Metaphysics. ÔHesuchia. 76). ÔMaking new godsÕ (on the Euthyphro). Kurt Pritzl. an index locorum is included – is Mark L. too. why does Plato leave things like this?).46 Next. with reference to McDowell). ÔTwo arguments in PlatoÕs ProtagorasÕ (among other things opposing hedonism to Ô[t]he Socratic viewÕ. form: PlatoÕs ve mathematical studiesÕ. ratio. the editor struggles to make connections. Kelowna. Academic Printing and Publishing. Second. education. Reality: New Essays on PlatoÕs Epistemology and Metaphysics. Dike Phonou. R. 34).

An Introduction. . argues Tulin (chapters 1 and 2. Rubinstein (eds). previously noticed. The Art of Plato [n. If it is not by Plato. Charmides. and probably by a member of the Academy (and not one who was a Ôthinker of the rst rankÕ.. Commentary. edited by Tom Robinson and Luc Brisson.226 BOOK NOTES a Ôlegal impossibilityÕ.H. nor does the passage cited from Rutherford. University of Copenhagen. Socrates – Ôthus . Lexington Books. but what I have read suggests that it is. Lanham. Studies in Ancient Greek History presented to Mogens Herman Hansen on his Sixtieth Birthday. Truth and Relativism in Ancient Greek Philosophy. and by highlighting the conceits that underlie EuthyphroÕs [TulinÕs emphasis] prosecution. Nielsen. Joyal opines. I cannot claim to have read every word of it. The Platonic Theages. T.50 Mark JoyalÕs The Platonic Theages51 is an altogether different kettle of sh: dealing judiciously with. 48 On the Crito: see now Josiah Ober. with the surest of hands. in P. The book largely de es summary (despite the summary offered by the publisher). an admirably meticulous piece of scholarship. No price given. then it becomes interesting as a reading of Plato.g. Museum Tusculanum Press. xx + 343. Charmides. No price given. ÔLiving freely as a slave of the law. Plato and Protagoras. To the volume Plato: Euthydemus. MD. 52 Thomas M. ISBN 3-519-07625-X (hbk). August 20. but in one way or another it covers most aspects of the dialogue and its context. ISBN 3-515-07230-6 (hbk). it is about as full a treatment of the Theages as it could ever have expected to receive. Lysis. . generally BalabanÕs targets (see also Appendix B) are neither well chosen nor well treated. 51 Mark Joyal. Plato casts a stunning light on MeletusÕ prosecution of Socrates through the prism of EuthyphroÕs attack on his own father. 2000.-Demosthenes: the prosecution has to be led by the agnate relatives or master of the victim). . with Meletus v. Pp. 335. 132). Lysis. ISBN 0-7391-00750. 315. $75. Plato: Euthydemus. . L. 49 Oded Balaban. and nally (almost apologetically) dismissing. 2000.00 DKK. Polis & Politics.52 I 1996 [sent to Phronesis only in 2000]. also discussing general principles of interpretation. after PlatoÕs death. and of Socrates – written. which anyone using the Theages (and there are at least one or two who do) will have to take into account. and Critical Edition. e. Plato leads the reader. Selected Papers (International Plato Studies. 50 But – on the rst page of the Introduction – it is. surely untrue to say that ProtagorasÕ Great Speech Ôhas been generally ignored or else dismissedÕ.Õ (99-100). Pp. but is actually a monograph on the Protagoras. the pretensions of the dialogue to authenticity (the passage on the divine sign is counted as decisive: 131). 651. Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart. Robinson. given the parallels. .48 Oded BalabanÕs Plato and Protagoras. 1999. Pp. Proceedings of the V Symposium Platonicum. ISBN 87-7289-628-0. of course. to doubt the equally specious claims of Meletus . Truth and Relativism in Ancient Greek Philosophy49 sounds as if it is about the Theaetetus.00 (hbk). Notes on why Sokrates lives in AthensÕ. 2000. Luc Brisson (eds). Flensted-Jensen. as a whole. on DracoÕs code and on Ps. 25 above] in any way support the statement.

Plato and politics: the little book Empire and the Ends of Politics. 54. edited by G. been felt by many about nding good English translations of what will no doubt continue to be the most widely-read of PlatoÕs dialogues.BOOK NOTES 227 feel too close to be permitted detailed comment. ÔLe Socrate du Lysis est-il un sophiste?Õ. I venture to propose that. it is probably less than a devastating objection to point out that. Wilfried KŸhn. given that there are certain aspects of the dialogue that seem to elude any form of interpretation. ÔZum Status der Ideen in Platons frŸhdialogen Charmides. edited by Susan Collins and Devin Stauffer. 2000. what they make of it sits uneasily with PlatoÕs approaches to politics and political questions elsewhere. [= John] Ferrari. Roslyn Weiss. Among the papers that stick in one readerÕs (and sometimes auditorÕs) mind. 2000 (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought). of more different types. are: Rosamond Kent Sprague. Pp.F. ISBN 3-89665-143-9. Euthydemos. 0-52148443-X (pbk). mainly short. 1999 (Focus Philosophical Library). introduction. 53 PlatoÕs Menexenus and PericlesÕ Funeral Oration: Empire and the Ends of Politics. 402. at any rate. ÔProtreptic and dialectic in PlatoÕs EuthydemusÕ (the rst part on the Stoics and Socrates again). Sankt Augustin. may well provide a solution to the problems that have. this is a particularly suggestive collection. Pullins Company. Matthias Baltes. LysisÕ. Cambridge. The new Cambridge translation of the Republic. 110.54 which has a short but sparkling introduction by John Ferrari. Pp. translated by Tom Grif th. and notes (by) Susan Collins and Devin Stauffer. Cambridge University Press. ÔLÕexamen de lÕamour int ress ( Lysis 216c-220e)Õ. as the editors are in any case well aware. and Glen Lesses.53 juxtaposes PericlesÕ funeral oration with the Menexenus. but a greater simultaneous concentration of re-power. ÔSocratic friendship and Euthydemean goodsÕ. Pp.95 (pbk). pieces on the three target dialogues – too many to list individually. I have found this new version – evidently the product of close collaboration – standing up well. certainly by comparison with most translations since . ÔNaming Socratic interrogation in the CharmidesÕ (a short but effective attack on Vlastos-style notions of Ôthe elenchusÕ: see above. ISBN 0-521-48173-2 (hbk). su f ce it to say that it contains more than thirty separate. passim).R. Translation. 54 Plato: The Republic. £7.55 Aleá 13). some in the context of some of the themes of these Notes. especially because of the brevity imposed on the contributors. Academia Verlag. and comes up with some original questions about the latter. Focus Publishing/R. $6. especially from a political/historical point of view.00 DM (hbk). 55 So far. xlviii + 382. Christopher Gill. than the dialogues in question are likely to have experienced before or are likely to experience again. ÔThe Euthydemus revisitedÕ. ÔWhen winning is everything: Socratic elenchus and Euthydemian eristicÕ (some useful suggestions about when Socrates might argue fallaciously). I think. ISBN 0-941051-70-6. Michel Narcy.96 (pbk). Harold Tarrant.

56 Aleá Havl’Ïek. Pierris. Karel Thein. ÔDie Kritik an Platons Politeia im II. Theodor Ebert. Julius Tomin. ÔMusica e politica nella speculazione platonica: considerazioni intorno allÕethos del modo frigioÕ.). Lisi. JeanFran ois Pradeau. on ÔEpieikeia: Plato and the controversial virtue of the GreeksÕ. PlatoÕs Laws and its Historical Signi cance59 is by Trevor Saunders.58 in Catalan. Quaderni 5.L. Milan Mr‡z. Annali dellÕIstituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli. ISBN 80-86005-74-7. Politikos and Nomoi dialogue groupÕ. xxiv + 402. the book. Several other pieces in the same collection also promise to throw light. No price given. Dimitris Papadis. 1998. ÔDie Kritik Platons an Glaukons Auffassung des besten Staates im V. ÔJoining the beginning to the endÕ. ÔGender-differentiation and Platonic political theoryÕ. see Alessandro Pagliara. Selected Papers of the I. Une introduction ˆ la lecture des Lois de PlatonÕ. Buch von AristotelesÕ PolitikÕ. this set of Proceedings will shortly be followed by those of the Second Symposium. ÔSind Meinung und Wissen nach Platon Vermšgen?Õ. 1998. ÔThe foundation and decay of SocratesÕ best city (Republic VI. Aleá Havl’Ïek. ÔLÕex g te ennuy . Cultura musicale in Grecia e contatti mediterranei. Pp. and Books VIII-IX)Õ. No price given. International Congress on Ancient Thought. ÔDialogautor und Dialog gur: †berlegungen zum Status sokratischer Aussagen in der PoliteiaÕ. Josep Monserrat MolasÕs El pol’tic de Plat—. A. Luc Brisson. ÔThe metaphysics of politics in the Politeia.228 BOOK NOTES Havl’Ïek (ed. The Republic and the Laws of Plato56 contains the main contributions57 to the First Symposium Platonicum Pragense (1997). consists mainly in a kind of running exposition of the Politicus. On music in the Republic. ÔDie Stellung der Nomoi in Platons Staatslehre: ErwŠgungen zur Beziehung zwischen Nomoi und PoliteiaÕ. ISBN 84-8688749-6. ISSN 1128-7217 (pbk). OIKOUMENH. Praha. which marked the foundation of the Czech Plato Society. epieikeia was to be the subject of his next book. 1999 (Collecci— Realitats i Tensions. 2000. Barcelonesa dÕEdicions. Salamanca. on the Phaedo. The longest paper in Francisco Lisi (ed. ISBN 3-89665-115-3. It is pleasing to discover that a general knowledge of Romance languages appears suf cient for following – some – arguments in Catalan: so far as I have read. with some introductory material and short conclusion. 2001. 499b-c. Francisco Lisi. La grˆcia de la mesura. it is for the most part synthetic in aim (reading Plato in the light of a catholic range of secondary literature).). ÔVernunft. Buch der PoliteiaÕ. There are some implicitly linking themes of a general sort (and an index locorum). PlatoÕs Laws and its Historical Signi cance. Robinson. 7). No price given). Natur und Gesetz im zehnten Buch von Platons GestezenÕ. a project sadly terminated by his premature death. Pp.M. Sezione Filologico-Letteraria. Sankt Augustin. Filip Karf’k (eds). 230. on music in Plato.00 (hbk). 351. DM 98. The Republic and the Laws of Plato (Proceedings of the First Symposium Platonicum Pragense). ÔRegent und Gesetz in Platons Dialogen Politeia und NomoiÕ. Academia Verlag. El pol’tic de Plat—. 320. 57 Norbert Blšssner. Dipartimento di Studi del Mondo Classico e del Mediterraneo Antico. 59 Francisco L. at least tangentially. . and sampled. in SYNAULêA (SYNAULêA. 58 Josep Monserrat Molas. but I shall look forward to returning to it in relation to particular sections of the Politicus. Pp. The publisher ShoreyÕs. T. Pp.

Pp. Suhrkamp. 141. has also produced the third edition of SaundersÕs Bibliography on PlatoÕs Laws. Academia Verlag. 63 Walter R. 1998.ex.62 The argument of Walter NewellÕs Ruling Passion63 often seems to converge with that of HobbsÕs Plato and the Hero. that development in Platonic studies. tone. but has a rather different emphasis. unless students of Foucault. 2000. 48.BOOK NOTES 229 of the Lisi volume. revised and completed with an additional bibliography on the Epinomis: International Plato Studies. Wissen (Macht. Le fondement transcendant de lÕordre politique dans les Lois de Platon et chez John LockeÕ).80 DM (pbk)). 12). Rowman and Little eld.ac. Pp. Lanham. Newell. ISBN 0-84769726-6 (hbk). Since many Platonists. Among other things. helps mark the proper emergence of the Laws – so long cherry-picked – as an object of sustained study in its own right. Sankt Augustin. The choice of the Laws as topic for the Symposium. The Erotics of Statecraft in Platonic Political Philosophy.61 itself on the Laws.95 (pbk). but one should be warned that reading this chapter is likely to draw one (as I have been drawn) into reading the others – and this is the weightiest Ôpocket-bookÕ I know. 139). . The twenty papers in the Lisi volume are a mixed in length. vi + 201. the rst issue of Plato includes a report by Alexander Becker and Wolfgang Detel on a conference on Platonic epistemology held in September 2000 in Frankfurt. Wissen. Like Hobbs. are likely to miss this well-camou aged contribution. 61 Organized by the International Plato Society. owes much to SaundersÕs devotion to a work which most still nd hard to love. loi de la cit . 359. 2000. p. and often his conclusions and HobbsÕs echo one another. edited by Christopher Gill (www. Foucault und die klassische Antike. The Society has just launched its own internet journal. Moral. and 60 Trevor J. 0-8476-9727-4 (pbk). it is worth mentioning here. Bibliography on PlatoÕs Laws (third edition.uk/plato). as I understand him. but none the worse for that. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 1362).00 (hbk).60 in time for the Sixth Symposium Platonicum. 24. Saunders† and Luc Brisson. and subject. together with a sense of the status quaestionis on a number of issues. 62 Conoscenti are likely to make rst for the pieces – on the political philosophy of the dialogue – by Chris Bobonich (ÔPlato and the birth of classical political philosophyÕ) and Andr Laks (ÔIn what sense is the city of the Laws a second best one?Õ). the volume as a whole will provide an invaluable collective overview of the Laws. Newell is centrally concerned with understanding PlatoÕs concept of the thumos (he has a picture of rampant Achilles on the cover of the book). MD.g. ISBN 3-89665172-2. that report in turn refers to an important chapter on this same subject in relation to the Symposium in DetelÕs Macht. ISBN 3-518-28962-4. Pp.00 DM (hbk). or those on the reception of the Laws by John Dillon (Neoplatonists) and Ada Neschke (ÔLoi de la nature. Ruling Passion. in August of this year. and for the Salamanca Congress of which the Lisi volume is the fruit. as everybody knows (but why not repeat it here?). $70. with the tireless support of Luc Brisson. Moral. Plato. even if stated in different styles (see e. But for Newell. $24.

The other problem with the book. Symposium and Republic – that is close enough to enable it to be properly tested. Socratic rationalism rather has a tendency (as of course the Socrates of the Republic recognizes) to undermine the effects of such education. on Gonzalez). but of Isocrates.e. Paris. 67 For lists of the names included in volumes I-III. and one actually published by. III: dÕEcc los ˆ Juv nal. Xenophon. But we cannot presuppose that the rare ed politics of this Socratic circle of friends is necessarily in harmony with the actual requirements of statesmanship and civic commitmentÕ (192). FF 560 (hbk). Socrates practices politics by cultivating friendships devoted to philosophy . . ISBN 2-271-057485. CNRS ƒditions. despite all his modern detractors. (This is a fair example of NewellÕs style. or more than. 1054. as I argue. the thumos. especially insofar as the citizensÕ possession of moral virtue depends on their education. ÔThus. i. the CNRS in Paris: two tomes which belong to no particular set of Notes.ve dialogues to serve no purpose other than to demonstrate the impossibility of philosophically guided civic virtue and a love of the noble that might plausibly reconcile statesmanship with the desire for wisdomÕ (194). that it impedes rather than aids a clear understanding of his argument. 22-25 septembre.230 BOOK NOTES for his Plato. I hope I am not to blame for nding. will evidently also make it (into volume 6).fr/DPhA/DPhA_Main. Centrally: does Plato put the same value Newell himself evidently does on Ôcivic virtueÕ. here and elsewhere. as Newell describes it?64 All the same.65) Finally.cnrs. 22 above. TarrantÕs distinction between interpretation and doctrine (n. .vjf. Newell nds a Ôdisjunction between reason and moralityÕ in the Republic. in my estimation. 66 Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques.html 68 Le commentaire: entre tradition et innovation. Philosophy and Ôcivic virtueÕ are in this sense opposed to one another.68 an extraordinarily rich collection of forty contributions on the Cf. 4 above)? Not least about how a Socrates might t into any practicable city (cf. The admirable neutrality of the editorsÕ conception of a ÔphilosopherÕ is shown by the inclusion not only of Glaucon of Athens (Ômoins p n trant [sc. Actes du colloque international de lÕInstitut des Traditions Textuelles. is that as an account of Plato it does not establish a relationship with the texts – in play are mainly Gorgias. but after all reportedly the author of dialogues). the education of their passions (and desires). Yet Ô[i]t is unlikely that Plato would have written thirty. le charact re dans la R publique] quÕAdimanteÕ. (Socratic) reason is the problem as much as. the book raises some important questions. publi sous la direction de Richard Goulet. 1999. and full details of the volumes. Publi s sous 64 65 . n. two massive tomes – both emanating from. The rst is the third volume of the invaluable Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques. Pp.66 these volumes appear to sell so quickly that anyone wanting one had better get on to it at once. go to: http://callimac.67 The other is Le Commentaire entre tradition et innovation. and happen (I am delighted to say) to have found their way to me. Paris et Villejuif. 2000.

avec la collaboration ditoriale de Tiziano Dorandi. 295 F (pbk). nouvelle s rie). ISSN 0249-7980. from classical antiquity to the middle ages.BOOK NOTES 231 origins and development of the commentary. (Hidden in the middle is a piece by Richard Sorabji: ÔIs the true self an individual in the Platonist tradition?Õ We are back once again with homoi™sis the™i. Ezio Ornato. ISBN 2-7116-1445-X. Richard Goulet. Paris (Biblioth que dÕHistoire de la Philosophie. but in this case in the context of the evolution of a problem. Alain Le Boullec. Henri Hugonnard-Roche. . 583. Vrin. Pp. Librairie Philosophique J. 2000.) la direction de Marie-Odile Goulet-Caz .

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