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Vor. 1.
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M A R C H , 1888.
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No.

I.

O F THE

STEAM PRESS

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KETCHESON L REEVES,

LEAVESWORTH, KAN.:

1888.

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JOURNAL

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GERMALV IDEAS O S C A l;i IiR 1..

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sufticient inasses, could the armies thlit were-tcYie1ivt.r 1:iris 1i:ive sprurig from the earth and Iwcri up011 lis hefime wc s i q i ~ ~ c t ettll i v i d existence? Icy road?! \\e litire them a t hniiie, why h a w we :not learned to iuove upon them? .C;KYDI.ITZ himself would have beeit helplesg with cavalry harwee that could i i o t niove on ice. .A fern brigades who had leariierl this accwiiplishpieuk did, however, the othem might have done :is inurli.\ s m u t on the ice ai111 I This is incleetl B diarp drraipiiiiient and the Irince $dls back upon U I Om ~ q n i f i c n t r i t a r y ; . : those cli:irgc=e tliat overthww the time-lionoreti principle, Tlint i i i niiie o r i t l i t t c n cIi:irgw i j f rawlry 9,gainst cavalry one side or the other wheel* about before tlie shnck. Be remihds his friend that,in 7 0 the opposing c:;\-alries alninst in\-nrial)ly peu6trated each dther and fuught haid to harid in the m e l s . Here, however, is the very point that the cavalryman makes in proof of the inferioritybf the cavalry of 70 to that of FREDERICK. (FREDERICK cliargetl i n conipact. order * ! : h e r e could be no peuetratiou, ; shock. He fornitilly tliscouraged aloowattacks, becliu.w they led siiiiply I to the iiielee, and he added I want no melees, the cavalry should charge in a wall. The result of this w i s d i a t tlie side that saw it was going to have the worst of i t could do )in better than to dodge the blor. The iiiability twkeep this cornpact order is attrihuted to b f f i c i l n t training of the h o r w t i n t 1 I I I ~ I I . \ A t Vionville yrt.at ma-sea I I ~ cavalry w r c frittercd away, regiment by regiment, without l ~ l a i i aiid \\ithorit unity. There was no one who commanded the cavalry IL* H whole. They had few cliiu1- w l i o tliirecl t o asunie the rcspcmsih3ity of leading large inasses of cavalry iu order against tlie euemy h i t , fw this, it is the system and not the iiitlividual that is to hlanie. The SEYDLITLE~, ZIETHENSand DRIEWSS did npt pome into the r time, of the worltl generals of cavalry ; they are tlie espres4oii* of mode of instruction of that time.. As to DRIE.UEN.--L)id not FHEDEKICK exclaini, in aurprise at hie w p l o i t a t Leuthen, \\hat! that imbecile DRIESEN? and yet the monarch \vas a good judge of character. .A genius and a n ordinary niaii are therefore bfttkEapabte of obtaining great results, their exploits are the results of the p r i n e i p l ~ of their education. $The principles of F R b : i ) ~ x i c : g are still followed, i l l theery, hut not in practice; iu the niaiiiier of upiiig cavalry, h u t n e t i n the means by which the atom ( the trooper is littetl f;)r aggregation LO thc I I I ~ W B * ~ILRATcavalry uerc. certainly not drilled individually, but hfcHaT did not lead his nieii on FREUEKICYS principles.
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work should not only be brought out but should find iminetlinte translation into French -for it is from the French versiou that I make niy nqteg. The cavalryman, while heartily thanking the Prince for having undertaken the defence of the mounted arm against the attack9 that have latterly been made upou it, thinks that his praise has beeu tnn generously bestowed, and assures hini that this opinion is shared, generally, hy the experienced officers of the arm. You hiive rewesented .us as realizing - the ideal, he savq * whilt. wt feel, even i n readiiig your writings, how little we made of our opportunities and h6w vast is the room for irdprovement. You consider praise, properly beahwed, as more likely to stimul:ite imprpvemenithan wouIp hostile criticism, which more ofteu prnvokes weless discussiou and resistance; but your dominant idea ie. that nur cavalry was employed according to the rules ifi 70 arid 71 ; that, generally, it was well led and behaved handsomely; that i t s services were highly tishctory. / d e , the [Thlan was the terror of all France, but, as thc. French cavalry mas still niore badly handled than our o h , this is saying little How often our cavalry disappointed gur expectations. A SEYDI IT/ - ~ . c ~ u l thave l given a better account of them. Such a geriius cannot, in(Ieecl. he made to order, b u t the sFtem of education should result i i i fimning chief3 capable of properly hitidling m&s, capable of doing great deeds with theni : and it should result in forming these c K f s jioni inen only fairly gifted, if they are but rigorous, m.tive, brave and chivalrous. a Our cavalry is anin7ated by the b e a t spirit, ita officem yield nothing i n zeal and devotibn to those of FREDERICK THE GREAT ; i t s horses are even better; hut what is the use of all this, if the hories.are not trained and. handled in a rational manner. . O u r horses are tough and capable of extraordinary service wheu radonally haudled. For example:1 . \ l b r i p l e marched one d a y from Beauvais to Gisom, took part i u t h e capture of that place and r e t y p e d t o Beauvais in the afternoon, 88 niiles; the next day it moyed to m r n a y and back, 31 miles; tlie fourth day it moved to Breteril, where some squadrons made several charges, and it t h e n returned to Beauvais in the afternoon, 38 miles. .+ B u t how seldom we-dared to demand such efforts. How inaiiy times lie enemy. Why WILB he allowed to fall l d i upou swarms froni our mass of cavalry envclvpe him and c u t the railways in his rear? W h y did we not x o u t thoroughly during the minter? 4 H a d our.leaders tklt capable of covering :30 to ti0 miles ,a day with
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( : E R Y A S I l ) E A 8 S O S C A 1'-4Lh'l-.

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I)? reginleiits, +till keeping some of his forre i n hand, than to low the \vIit~Ie, i n sever:iI liner. across cointry." [ t we~lw that ahnut October 1st each year thc r*luittlro~i.s: receive their . : t t i i 1 u ; i I cotitiitgeut of recruit.. mid young horses. the s i 1 i i x h i i is then t l i vi<lccl t i p i i i t o a ~iuriiherof rhling classes and is i i o t fommecl or drilled :IS :I ~~luatfriiii until late i n the spring. TJie work IJf' these riding c.Ia.<ws is inspected a t fisetl intervals an11the csercises t l J be rc(litire(1 at rsch inspection are strictly Inid dowu. The :iii~tse..of thi? eyeteni of instruction arc saitl t o I w a t the root of the evil. *'The iiirans 11x5 I~cenaIIo\vcd t o crowd the end out of sight: school ridirig :inJ exhihition+ more suited to the circlis riug than t t r the clrill halls h:ive l)cen : i I l ~ ~ v i ~tioI crowd out everything practical, until tlie horses conic t;)rth i u the spring ruined, crammed, n o t trained, and ready to h l t when once miire i i i the fresh air." 3 The remetlies ..uggt+teil are, ..quatlro~i drill during the trititer, route niarcliez, iritlivi~lualworking of Iiorses i n the o p t t air, ( rtsiiig the ritliup halls oiil?. fbr recruits :tnd young horses, except i n bad weather,) conion of' the work instead of iuspectioii at fixed t i n w , and, i n the school of the +iliuidrott and large hotliee, a eonstant C ~ C t o the reqnirenieiita of ;tc.tual war. The squa(1ron is the unit: five squadrons to the regiment, t w o regitiitwtr tt) the I)rip;ttle ant1 three hrigadca to the cavalry divisibii. Tilt. sluaclroii tins three platoons and is fortned in doulile rank. Its personnel is o w captnin, three lieutenants ut1111 3 3 eulisted. I n coniputinF its strength fiir squadron drill in winter, we find the folloaing data :- 3 troopers i on an average ) on duty away frnnt tlw rvgiriient: 4 ~,nltrliefor the otiicers; 9 sick; 5 on guarcl, iit'kitclieit,.c~c.: :3!1 recbruits; 3i ineti remaining for drill; 4 trumpeters : 1.5 nou-ci)rnissioned otficerr, :itid ]:ut but not least, 13.5 horses, of-which number, 26: are ! . O U l l ~ homa, not i n ranks. I t is urged that, though -56 men in rank are uvt enough b r the noriital. >(1itadrou forniatiou of three platoons in double rank, yet they are aniple fiJr two rlouble r m k platoons or for four iii single rank. Eleven files froiit is taken as tlie smallest admissible iu double rank, 1w a siiialler frlJllt than that would give the platoon a greater depth than
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SOH-, c chief traitietl i n siiel! a sch6ol caiitttjt think of Ieacliiig his tlivisioii agaiitsk the erierily in. c o n i p c t order, if he k m w s thnt the tirst change i r i clirec*til)n,w i l l - threaten the order of potato patch, the sligltte.~t his conintnrirl. " '' He p e t e r s r:ither to send his nivii against tlic ciretiiy I)? sl1uadroits,

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The fbllowiug table will give some idea of the way in cvlticli the mount of the squadron is divided into clas3es fiir riding. I t coiitains, however, some suggested ni~idifications as to ctatuificatioti. 1st Cla.w.-Cotisisting of 1.7 young horses (current ye;ir) w i t h tlic I q t
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T R . i I N I S G HOWm.

2nd C l w . - Thirtcett young horses I previoits year 1 w i t h the retti:iinder

.of g d horsemen. 3rd Class.- Thirteen horses I~elo~igitig t i i riiiers of tirst c . 1 ; ~ . 4th Class.-Thirteeti hor+esbelongiiig to riclers of sccoiitl elas+. .ith,tith aut1 7th Cl;~+es.- Recruits i i t i picked IiiirseF t j l ) t i l ciiiitiugeiits
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years back. ( Thirteen horses ench class. 8th C h . - lbckw,iril re<.ruit.. g ~ fI:&t year I ) I I

A (lead loail i n the saddle is foiiu~l to tire the home niqre than a rill& #if three tinier the weight. \-t)ung h o w e feel a lnatl IIlnkr rvhen at the Iinlt tliau whcii i n r~totinn. \Vhcn the how? hreaks froin the trot do riot check I& speed INI J t4 h i n g him d o ~ v i iivitli hit :ind leg. *The sulille horse iuwt he trained to carry back his tistoral relitre of gravity t o the (entre of yravity of the rider.
niettiocl of training a Iwrse to n collectell nrtiort (wit11 his (1u:irters well under h i m 1, is to rounrl the cortlers of tile Iiall, with t h centre of the l t i t i t l quarters thrown well ;iwsy from the wall ! toiv\.:tr<l~ the csircle described T h e g:dlop shoulcl nlways cover more grouii(l tlinll the trot, l)tlier\viX thc trot is sufficient.
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Cdiiiren M Iw-

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horses ( :3 years olii, I aut\ that the recruit is t i c i t ~ I J l l l l t e :t&u ~ ~ ranks t;>rm i l e nine months, while thts horse is counted out fiir :it least :I y w r s l i d i i h:ilf. Ten tliowiiiiil lii)r+w Iwitig reiluired annuslly for retiloutit. \e see. t h t the young horse is carefully tmiiietl by esperiet~cetl h o w n i e n , whi) still ride thcir own trained horses daily t i ) keep their c hands in. m i a t the recruit 3v:irtis to ride u p i tlic I w t horses, so that, while the horse is trainell 1))- the I w t hormueu, he iu turn bcciitiies the traiuer of riders. As in the que.4on of egg ani1 chicken, i t is useless to iuquire 0 1 1 which side,the rPciproc:iI inilc.l\teclt ess I)e,o:tn. \ The cavalry of the aiicients were mcrceultries d n w u from mition+ of honemen, I)ut tlic. unrcli:il)ilit.y of such troops suggested the thought of training up catalry :it hotiiv. This is the origin of cnvalry schools which are properly bnt :i tueaiij to :ill end. The L;ernitui syateiii < i f inspection of 1)rupres nf c l w s at fixed periods, is seriously objected to, as tentliug to foster rehearsals and $hi>\vy performance+ :it the expeuse IJf solid education. The followiug itlen.4 as to the riding echool are of interest: Instruction i n cl:i+eg is a necessity imposed hy the scarcity o f instructors ; but this instruction should conLqin n ~ more ) of the siniultaneous element of tlrill than i+ ahsolutely iieceLwry, and kr much individual teaching aa possil)le. Time and trouble will he saved t)? eserciaing the horses under twitieii ritiem I d o r e the recruits nIouut. +Instruction should begin on the pad with arraugements for attaching stirrups. The.= latter should, however, not he t1rei1 too early. Whet1 stirrups are iswed. it should uot be to the wliole $qu:iiI b u t to each nian as his p r o g r e s requires them.

to he gained or lost ~Itxnge t)f g l i t by riJiiti(ling the cornem more or le.* exactly. * * If your horse 4)ffers an unespectetl resiski~~ce I I I - I ~ ~~ ~ J , I I I I I I S ~I I : L ~ ~ * niatle 21 mistake yesterday. -1s a& insmnce of the unreasoning severity onc-e iu f i ~ s t ~ iat] o ~iltatrtlc~, tor is q;i;)ted as fol1en-s:.
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*. I)ist;iiic*es,i n the h;i11. are lint

~ ( l i~p of 1 the sptrr throughoui tile sclttntl ! Two tilore, A i r i ( t n o w , t w o mure t o plea- tu;! Nuch of the fancy riding of the school? h a . * eotue t1o1vr.n t o U S frotat the .Cliarge i u I X s p e w d Order, which up to 17-10 rrns otre of tlte regul:ir ft)rni*. Eacdi horseman used t o caracole before tk frout of tile etictiiy tiischargin? his bullets, and avoiding the shofi nf hi.. a t l v e m r v tjv nicans ot pitr)uctte* ant1 all kind? of artirtic rilai~oe~~vres, il~e r+ica of. .
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I e age$. . T h e 0111 titlie ho-e was c o a m and sluigish; he eoulcl s k ~ i dfl&, h u t the :i~iimalof t o d a y , with more or less hlootl ill him, requires daily niuch fresh nir and exercise to keep him i n condition. Epizootic can be not only treated but prevented by fresh nir, ancl the less a horse is i n tiis stable the purer will the stable be when he ii there. Periods of t w i or three weeks are taken up, several times R year,to rest niid fatten up the horse after some unusual esertio!,, s11r11: m the tiiniioeuvres, etc., but, if ihe animal were neve-r nllowecl to get fat ancl rluggisli, there \t-oitl~lhe no need of such rests. T h e Iwst oats t h e German cavalry ever had were wJlnt tllcy got in Fratirc,\ v I i t > i t frct-ll froit1 the evils i)f t l i r contract to Irl\vest t)i~ItIcr.
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are highly reconinieiidt.il. ai111i t is sii,gg!r.-ttxll that t l i t . iristructor place hi9 hands on the leg o r wrist to a.wirta himself tli:it i t is iiiotit,nless during exercises of the tlppt>+itci menil~et. t ~ r .-o t h a t t h e "Some recruit.- rcquirt. t i i l i c t o ~levelopt h t . 1 ) r ~ ~ I ttl>rk, buttocks nuiy ti1111the 1~)ttnni of tlic rn~ltlle. If tlir ridcr floes not envelop his liorse properly, lie seek. 11, secure hi- 1 ) o ~ i t i ~l)y ~ i itiinin !brc.e, carries a r i t l luiiig. I , I I thts rciii." his buttocks I):ick, hi> lt~zrf\)rwar~l. '"The reius are usii:tll! givcii t t o o slltm: t h l . horse i5 worriecl and tht. recruit spnilell. Tlie >+sit r l i 1 ~ i i 1 1 1l ) t , t1i~)roitgIily +<.currvl Iwfilrt. the rt.iu3 are lifted from tlic liInrzc.'.- iieck. 'rbi.- iii:iy l i t . ( I I I I I C * w i t h the horse U I I tlic longe or let1 1)y m ~ ~ t t irnoutittvl t~r iii:iii." ' " W e sniiietiiiiea hear i: saisl. . H t a ha. i i o - v a t , h u t :I ~ ) I hantl.' J ~ I Purr sitre :iiic1 fret. e a t , he cnnii4)t ride his h o w nonseuse! \Vitliout :I ~4~rre1.1, iiiitiiii,ge h i s 1 i i ) t y . eproperly iiiiist iiectx.v;arily h a r e ;i n-ell, and he who~docs gowl seat. Ylit. revc.r.-e. l i a ~ w t ~ v e r is, i i l i t true: t l i t l seat is but the first riiling." * l step and t1ot.s not iiii1)ly p ~ ~ ' ";\gain, a triBlJpt'r I I I : ~ riclc* ~ l);~lally, he i.G i i ~ to ~ t be unseated brit he canni)t manage his 1ior.c : wliilt. anbtlier h;is :I correct seat. is d u p p l e : hi.; of eadi other, with precision, an11 tinder control, limbs act inclepc~n~lently leg to k e e p his sndtlle at n n un but lie has n o t the i i v c : e s i r y -trcripth expected nioveiiieut of his iiiount." ' " S e r e r c1o.e tbe le:! m ) r e tlinii :i hand's breadth hehind the girths: never, on the flanks d i are the spur is to be useti for m o t h e r purpose ani1 a t tht. hnhit ot' kicking a t the boot." yhere pressure iiiiglit 1 The whip is ( * ( m i d t I I I nioit useful ausiliary and should be short ) that :I touch c a i i be given a t the cx;ict poiut where it is reant1 rigid, I quired, and withoiit tickliiig the hor3e. " 'hvoid sho.rt reins.'-.\ horse fumbles a 1 i c 1 t d k a a t a leap, the colonel cries, ' h a l t : ' 'drop reius:' 'close lebm! '-ttieii. when :ill this it. (lone he shouts fi)rwanl.' Tlie home slioot~ off' like :in arrow aiitl clears the ditch. Saddle galls i i i fruiit ~ J I Ithe left iiud i n rear on the right betray a short rein." ! " T h e martingale i* of no use, except for flat racing. 1st.-It gires a tiilse c:irringe to the heall, aiid the horse is far more likely to resist its action tlinii to yield to it. 2nd.-If s$ort enough to have ally eKect. it hampers the h o w in his movements, eapecinlly.jli leaping, i i d it' brings hini tlowti if he stumbles. 3rd.- I t deprives the reins of their'heral action. 4th.- It weighta the fo,reheatl with e.xtra harness. requires two hands and i t is therefor unsuited 5th.--It~.rational U ~ C . to cavalry.
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6th.- It requires more time i n 1)ritlling and makea it di.ficult to lead the horse." The author saw niore martingales aniotig the officers of one reginieut of infautry than i u a brig& o f 1400 cavalry. " ;\II easy and tirrn seat i i the wlutioii of iiiany a prd>leni for which .. the inexperieiiced rider seeks a special harness." '* B i b should be easy aud wrefully adjusted to the mouth '' Sose l):iiids or liritllez are recoinmended :w preventing the horse from tully openiiig his jaws, aud e.scaping the action a)f the hit 1)y passing Ilia I toiigiie over it and out of the niouth. . *'-I1iow.c with the hit under the tongue will pull as thougli working u p to the bit. wheli i i i reality, lie is dragging behind it and is not i n haiiil."
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*'.English slang, coiiventiotial ( I r e s and saddlery and a grotesquely esaggqated jockey seat. were received as the essence of English sport." . + ' * . i n intelligent rider, ' w e were told,' considers his horse only as a means of locomotion, to transport him rapidly from point to point-in what nianiier is of tin iniportanre, &c. &c." The air was full of such wise .-awe. ."Saturnlly the'reactiou set in, the anglomsniac was an object ~ ) perseciitioti f : arrest aas a coninton punishment for ,riding the Englieh tri Jt." " Gradually, lionever, it \YS realized that English sporting notions had been misrepresented ; and. au intelligeat interest having been awakened, the anplonianiac withdrew into obscurity before the strong light

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ICK CIiARLFS ; and. it may be inferred t.hat th is no uanger of a re\turn of hostility to sport when we read, that, iu the autu_mn of '86, two generals ,uf cavalry f d o w e d a h u n t on bare hacked horses,"
" If the generals of 185.3 had been still as young rqnd active as they were in 181.i, when they had held nearly the e q p e . , v o k . they woold,

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have directed it, and they would have obtainetl ii warlike cavalry : :I>. also, they \voulCl, hx their perjoiial 1)re.wiic.t.. h a v e 1)rcvcBiited rlie abuses nientione(~.~* ( It ia a well knowii fact that the hstr fibr riiliiir i; I o - t Iwt\vet.n 40 and 50; having arrivcvl at this age I J ~ ! ~ C W S coiitiiie t h e i i i + e I v i ~ to ~ the strict necessitiys of the service. S o w . the strict requirements are i i o t 5utticient to keep up practice i n riding; the fi is lost, the warriair sliirit tlisippears; and, whenrvar breaks out, wheu ria!ing uiust I)e t l ~ i i i v . i t i- :I fiitipiie. it is.the cause of many rutftrings thnt tlestrtjy all 1)lqjisiire i i i wurfiirc.. * * Neither.Frwmtucl; nor ~ A I ~ O I , E O were S accotiipliditvl h l ~ ~ ~ i i it1it.y ~ l i . knew w h a t could he reiluireil of c:iv:tlry : i i i i l they I i n l l othtsr thiiigs 1 1 ) I J C C U ~ them, ~ hut the lwtter ;in otticer rille+ :in11 ilrill> tlit iiiort :igrcc~:ili1e \tit1 the service be to him. *If he knows only the munotony of routine, t h t . irriritl of n -ttilw@iiig service that liw iu view ouly the great ilay of iiispvcti~)ii. Iic c:iiiiiot li:ivt, a pawion for his profiicin, he will becorne skeptical. b l : ~ .nntl w i l l p t b r the charms of an e l e g m t 1)uuiloir to those f ) f hi3 4 t I l e . H u n t i n g and paper chasiug are strongly recniuriieiiclcd iis ilc~vcl~ipiiig the style of riding required for cavalry. Steeple chnsing and racing have greatly iniprovetl the breeil ot horses arid .the methods of traiuiu,z ; but, a s speed euters too Inrpely into races, quch sports should be encouraged anioilg the noii-c~)niiii~ionetl otticem, only wheii they can be supervised by :in officer with a tirrii h:iutl. ai111the course aiid conditions shoulil be sucli M 11) Jevel~)li 1iiiIit:iry riding. The great ilifference between the steeple ch:~.er : i i i d the c-li:irg:tir aris& from the fact that the rider of the former lkid-es full l i l w t y to the daring power of t h e hind qunrters, siipports the! head tiriiily with h i t t i hands, and is careful not to hamperthe pace. The charger ou the contrary shouhl iiever bear hard i ) i i the hit, as he ie riddei; with but a single haud; and he must he ;ihle to ?;tip aiid turn short instantly, his hind quarters being :itways suficieutly gstherc~l under him? He niust be accustomed to keep himself poised and collected w i t h hut slight support of the bit ; for, in heavy column, i n liiir, ariiiil i l w t aud powder smoke he cannot ohoiue his footing, nor can hia ritler, who i+ other.wise occupied, give a,thought to the matter. lThe dharger niust be trained to leap high and far, often unexpectedly, without a rush, and without losing the equilibririni of his mnrcmaie. Last hiit ,not lenst his gait is that of the $lowest horse i n the line. . +gain, b-good steeple chaser niay run nwnyiii cvcry r;icc : 1)riivi~lt~Il he ~ n s \ r e r qtlie iiiilication+ of ilircctiali), 1 1 i ( - ,iaJckt*yrare9 little what

happrii5 after the tinidi. llie jockey iiiay kill hi& horse to .win, the trooper i i i i i n t save hi- niniiiit. .* \\hell n iteclilc cli:ll-c,r retuzt.:: :i ,juiup, they yay, * he dont feel like it to-(lay, he iniiet linve slept ha~lly. The charger milst always obey. *.Ylie 1wsitiI)ii t)f :I gooti khgli.4 jockey - n o t . that of the itnglo- , : 1ii:iiiihc --,lt,c..+ not tlifier, t;ir :is the thighs iue w)iiceriietI, from that of e\ery p i o t l rilcar: I ) u t it i5 inrich niorch (littictilt t o o k r r e , I,ecaiise of tlie rtrniii ,111 the ti:iii(l:, ; i n t i 1)ecaiire thc upper Imly,niiist be carriecl forward t o relicye ttrv IiiiiiI-li:iii~lariil allow i t t o h c t only o n the +peed. e fore. Iianil giving tlir support. * y o i ~ lrider iii:iy carry hi> leg3 fi>rwnrd tiw reliof, as long as.he tloep n < ) t n w ~ theiii. l b u t the thighs ailit I;tittock+ nlways preserve the- corrwt lto.itioii, :iniI, ;u Iie nppr~la~.lic..~ ; i i i ~ i b s t w l t the ~ , legs rt.tiirii to place, ant1 I tIic <elitre n,i gravity ( I t t h e tior>(> is brtlirght I~nck tkrther iiiitler that of the riiler. .. It the iiiilitnry rider ndtil)ts. nttluick gaits, the position of t h e jockey,, I i e i i i w t no t \)e surpriwl . w t i hi? horse I i i w hi< hq1sl,itual c:irriage k ~ i t i seck sii1)iiort i n the haiitl.

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rll take the place of e s c w i v c icIiooI-ritlin;r i i i minter, niarcIrcs on icy roatLG are iug,z:t.>ti.d. Th<\ h:ickiiit.ii t i n i l iiini!.ritIe4 ;ire I I I H stopped by the colJ, an11 the (iivalry s h ~ ~ u llenrri d to take c y e of theniselves iii the \vor>t weather. The German Cavalry are now supplied with ice. nails which are rltiic.li1.v at!juitetl a n i l rciiioved. b u t the n i d i require practice in the use of tlieui. Yhe regulations p h i b i t squadron drill when the thertlegrees Fahrenheit. niumeter falls below *>5 i Swimming horses, fording. recnriiioisarice allti fometl marches are Juggesteil as 1niitter.S irhicb might occupy tlie cavalry while the squadron is reduced by the al)seiice of the recruits aiid instructors, as well as at other tirnes. \Ve tint1 some interesting points in the pussnge of fords by heavy columns 0 1 1 the field of battle. *If the ct)luiiiii crosses in a stmight line, the water is danlmed u p ; tlie line then beconies coucave and tinally breaks in the middle. By making the liue cimvex thi3 ettect can onl:; IE delayed. T h e lieact o f each pltitouii shciuld turn ohliqukly u p stream, as i t enters the water, sntl should re,date 0x1 the head bf the preceding platoon, while the rear should iucliiie tlown s t p r u . d h i s leaves a papage filr the water between platoon?, while preserv&ig the formation of the

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panrage, but the dress of the plattmriii wt)ulil I)e lurder to preserve i n t l i v water than t h e fbrru of the oblique colunins suggested. "The value of reconnoisssllce'is ernph;i4zeil I)! the niimher i)t' itist:inc*t+ in which. in ' 5 0 auil '71, Cavalry niade Ioiig tleti)urs anal lost iioiirs on the hattle-field through failure to reconnoitre fi)rila ;in(I s l a d l i i u p i l l their irnmediate front."
FORCED >I A R('HES.

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Forreti illarches shoiild not be (wried to wtrenied without preview careful traipiug. Loss of Hesh ili)es no linrm, l)u t. \ v l i e i i t h r ltys anat fiset give 0 t, the limit of'uset'ulness ha> Iweti pas-etl." 6' 111 marches on instruction the ct)nstant passage t'rorii cvlrtniri t i t ' :'iscto threes and twos and back ; p i l i , ir ii \va$te ( i f ' t i t i i t s ; i i i , l -treiig..rh. whi(,li could be better eniplo~etliii louy trl>ts. The frout i n t o liiie. I i o w c v c ~ r ,i > legitimate in these circumst:inees, 31 the cotnnqnil c:innot be tilo well 1)rt'pared to take the charging order." Long rapid marches, with Iiawige & aletile.< preceding the a r r i n l ' 011 the charging grciuncl, are nlwt useful cserckes i n view t i t ' the I i > n ~ rauge of nii~tlerutire, ani1 ijf the inimetlst, ali.-tance Iwt\veen t h e reacrve, ana1 the tirst, line. where it will be on1ert.d where the cavalry \vi11 be I,o+te(1, for the chargc when the geueral i n c*i)nitrtuntl sees t h e moltlent fi)r its cnipleyment approaching." " 1 have been present," says this Csvalrf Chief. " a t t i r e great I>nttles amid nia68es of cavalry; every tirile it was, o r would- httrc I ) c . t ~ r i . ne(++ e r y to cover great tlistaiices ar~tlto p z + ile.tilea l)t.t;)re lwiiig i n lltisition to take the charb.ug gallop." ' 6 J l w s of cavalry aho3d 1w exerciseil nvt otily i n ibrcetl nlarcbec up to 30 niilez per tlay hut :ilsn in covering a mile or two rapidly w i t h .' out arriviuq 4)ut of win(\) anti pa+iiig quickI) f i c j i i i coluniti t o 4iriIcr t)f com bat." ' *' Inspectom- too seldoni conceru themselves with niarche~. They tinil i t more' convenient to take up a iwsition 4 1 1 1 an en~iiienc~e anc~ enjoy a f series of varied and lirely tableaux, a succedioii of ral)i(lly +ticweding c\ r es, than to acconipany a cavalry colunin for an hour iit a d i i w trot." 3*.gHe ridieJes the iuanceuvres on kuowii ground against :iii ininpinary I a ( \ r e m r y , whose actions are limited beforehanii." He w)uId have the iuspector look, ' 2 1st.-To d'wipliiie on the march. 2utl.-To regularity of p i t a t the steady collccteil trot. &(I.- T o condition of the horses. 4tIi.-To -rtmiug of ohtacles ( q u i t e a clifercnt m:itte\nii t h e ni:trrh from leaping II the track I. :St,t,.-'To'tlle ~izsxgt! of a defile with 24 qii:liIr~)ii+.

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line.of co~uriiiis: through the ndoptioii of ct.iitr;il I ~ ~ ~ V I . I I ~i t I1 I 1I ) h t I J t ) i l L I I I I I squadron, and through the rejectim of all iuvemioiis ai111t)f nU e v t ~ l u tjons, without tactical object. iniporkincv nttnchetl to iu~lividual i!i.structioii : i 1 1 1 1 4th.-Increased training. 5th.-'The isiie o f a tire nrni of I I I I I ~ rnnge :in11 t h e thorough i i i + t r i i ( , tiou of each trooper i n riiarhrnnnship. j i n ' 7 0 i i i thc i i s e ~ ) t tlicir ' " T h e French werendmittctUy superior t ~ us arms, aucl t h i t is n p ) i n t ii&o I)C iirplectcal. filr witliout I)rniti(*itwcy tlitxrt., the best cavalry is hut t'ootl fir 1)owler.*' ".iroi(I niiyttiing like :I !iieuii i n clrill: 1 t 8 t eveiyti,ing 13e tile t~ritconie of'plnce nml nionieiit." " Fighting on foot is only :in c?rl)c(lic.nt t o he e i i i l ) l ~ ~ y K eI~ W IlI t l 1 ~ *Intaritry baE not yet conic up." " T h e sabre iold Idicc. :ire the ari1i.G ripon whicli C'nvalry niriat rely to realize i t s especial fil'ticti<)n.i.. Its evoliitioiis n i u i t a11 h a v e i l l view 111e a t tack. ''
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TIIE R A L L Y .

TI)kuow how to rally rnpi~lly is oiie ot' the 1 i i ~ w t eA-enti:tl rwiiiire rnents fi)r Cavalry." ! "There niust he a reserve with which to pivc the List deci5ive blow.
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hut this reserve niust finally l w eniployeal. null the s ~ I u a d r o i tirst i ~ engagell must, by that time, have rallied aiicl be theniselves nvailulilt~ i n it3 place." " FREDERIC .niade thia rally a great point. ;in11 he prcscri1)e~l that after every charge i n cornpnct onlcr ' the commarid disperse should be given,' but he adds, 'no$ that it is tht:,iiiteiition tl) 1 1 0 this iii the: presciice of the e n e n i i : yi,u niust, tell the i i i e i i thnt i t is t o exercise ttieiii in rnllying. T h e tlogs'will always tliapeme i i i spite of you after the shock.'"

111,. c;iptaiii, i i i froiit of the centre of tlie stluadron, is always the piiitlcs, ncvordiiig to the.(;erin:iii regulation. brit thia provieiou is considered tiiulty f11r the cliarFe, a s thr slightest illaccuracy i n direction will produce the fire ot' the entwiy will not be ' I)renLs, niigl n.a the gnlis t'orniecl proiiiptly C . ~ I J S C ~ ~ . I t is rirged r l i n b i i i thts rcsgiiiieiiu, and eveii i i i the b r i p d e in line, the f whole line: gtiide right i u rllumlroiis of guidc <lit)iiltl l)c [lie c'eiitre ~ ) the 11wI d t winr, guide left i n those of the right wing. They arc reluctant, Ii~i\vt~ver to , \vc:tkcii t h e 1)riiiciple that niakei the squadroii coniniander, . ; well as tlitv~rt~ticnlly, tlie leader of his men. The-captaiii ~)ractwd!, n .-~ilJU~ re.iiiniu l~ thi. guillc i i i i t i l the mmim;ind *'To the climge." which -Ii~)til~ I)? l the signal for *' g u i ( l e centre *' fi)r the wht)la line. (;uillc riglit, fi)r ~t1u;iclroriiuf the left wiog, means that each squadrou w o u l ~ lrtyulate o n tlie chief t 1 f ' it.* right plntoon. A iic:it exlwdierit is iiicntiontd by. which a colonel obtained cohesion i n the chnrge, w i t h Cav:dry on i\-Iio+e training hevoiiltl place 1 1 0 confiilenc(.. \\'itti t1)ur q u : i c l r o I i . G i i i line, he wheeled the first, "half left," the fimrtli, .*11:ilf riplit," just before t l i r cwiiiiiiand charge, so as to produce. ~ u c hn Ixtckiiic t h t iin,t u t n ) i ) p c * r could wheel off, and so that at the ~iionie~it. aiiticiptetl, whcii hi+coninisnd ~voulilbolt. it should bolt towards $ the ellellly. &
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Iiorses nirist not he alltnved to regard the charge as nii>tliing uiirisuaI.j:~sany cause fi)r excitement; horse and rider must be 11.- i . o d :it the clinyiiig gnllop ne a t the wnlk. T h e more practice we have :it @ick @ita thebiiorc we cnn count npon Cohesion in the charge. Loiig ga~lops must re'tluiretl if the cavalrj is tn fintl i t s true eleirient ou the
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erieniy's flanks." $ TO rcaulnte the # s i t & the Gerinaii reMiatioils recommends drill in siiiplc. raiik, with iiitervnla o f cine home l e n k r b&t\veen files; and, nfterwartls, a siriiilar douliR. raiik forn]atioii, \vi$ one I); two ~ ( J M lengths obliges fhe trooper to ride his horse Iictweeii the m n k ~ 'I'his fi)r~ii:iti~)~i iii~lcpeii~leiitly. aud he can lw Iiel~li i i ~ l i ~ - i ~ l i irespuneihle nIl~ for the result, iiot being ilrngged nlong hy the ma.+. * ' 1'rel)anlti40 this o p w ortier (lrill, the instructor rlioukl .take u p a b 1wsLtit~11, ant1 hnve h k i i i e i i gdltjp around him i n a Y\VaTlll, on a large ci rclr." " I I I . u ( . l i R zhapc they will iiot torniciit their hirtea nlwut dress and i i i i w v : i l < . nnd the iustructor cnii easily clirrect faults hi iiiclividual riding. T h i 5 r s p c i k w c . i- espwinlly I I W ~ ' I it! I ~ I)rokeii grouiitl with plenty of uhstaclrs. ' '

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rerliiiirtit.ii~lictiuu.
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I t is interestins to tind, in this connection, the

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niountetl skirmish line one in which the men are i n hand and capable of manaeuvreing. The Gerniaiis seem to have nothing of the kind. -1httnting gallop is. recoinmended for the charge, but the charging . gallop and t h e cornniand "charge,"just Infore the moment of the shtwk. cannot. be given up ; it' imly kc:tuse of the rnorsl elfect they produce i u one way or another. " In charging infantry or artillery the cliarging p I l o 1 ) ip not indisIieusahle, but it is imperative against cavalry." " Against cavalry. keep the trot a long time, take u p the p l l i ~ l i only when quite near the eneniy tu get the h o w a i n wind, auil commaud ' charge,' a little Iwfore the shock." "'The trooper shoiiltl look straight to the front, without turuiug his i ' head to watch the aligninept." " The h o t to boot ' is t a l d t i only for the charge, a t other times there shiiuld be iyore room i n rauks." " T h e effect of a c-hiirgc shoulil he judged froiri the front, where a11 icka cau be olitained of the shock and cohesion ; in judging from i)ue w i n g these b ) i n t s are inisetl atid direction is the only poiut cvusidered." " FREDERIC inspected his cavalry in the field, not o n the drill ground ; he took his stand where he pleased, and required the cavalry to charge upon him in compact lines without being throwu into (lisorder hy the ground." . '' A chief who can lead his troops against the enemy over all kincls of ground will consider. as perfectly natural, strokes of daring .which, to an. other, would appear to court disaster." . " T h e leader eduaated in such a who01 knows, when he conies tlJ high .command. what can he required of his men. I t is thus that we cau fimn leaders, I l o t , illdeed, such as SEYDLITZ, ZIETIIFN and KI.I.CHEH ; these were geuiuses, which the spjteni did uothing hut complete, but we can forni II like DHIEWES ani1 the rest, and. these rneir also dit1 great deeds."

provision be made for an open order forotatibn similar to our

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THE ORDER OF COJIRAT.

.'The order in which charges are tu be niatle should not be tisetl, Iiut ihi)ultl he dependeut on the .object :1nt1 the circumstances." '' F R E ~ ) E R ~order c'$ for c:liargitig lv&% tirst, a compact liiie. Ii4)ot ~ I

N. R L - I E I I ~ I I T I plaa.ed hir rw'riiits a i l 4 iiu<~crt>iiii meu i i i tlic ir8biil r i i i i k n 1111 t i l . , ~.ruust ~ e l i i i i a l t l i c i n . 11, keep nii e y v o u t l i v i ~ i t i i v 1 i i r w rtiziii s t t i ii t h t y , l i d i i s l t a.linrxc. w ~ i i u r e l s .Isy ~ f u l i i i g tliein u i t h thvir snlrre. He splwsr, h*rc hnd , t i ) o l , r t i i i n t t ~ rtrcwl, 111 I ! i t i i i-r w t i ~ ~ i ~ c.harge beforr he tha,uuht rhr prcBp<,r t i l i n e . ti,ial airri\+.al. lie r ~ r i i i i v l i i i i , l $ 8 1 i t . i b FI!) 1st ):I, thrcateirrl h i m with tlrt. I<w q v f I!is h t w l . lie rvlblic 11 ' . ' 1 1 1 t t 1 nit*.r111s. l t , t l l l s . I / ! - IICII~I nnG nl Iii. -#b\er<,icti, l s i i t t l ~ ~ i f . ~ l i i r til r ~a ~, z .is I I G . iii.i-tt-1 8 5 1 1 ~ i r i i i :: ~ . :I) 1 1 1 1 . i i t f m . d
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HE 310 U NTS.

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011 the part of cavalry officers nisy tw prvsiiiiied w i t h the past niethotls of' inspection employed h v tlie Quarterniadter's !iepartrneiit in the 'purchass of Iiorws. I'ntil*hiIi the pa>t t w o or three y e a r s il h o : d *ifofiicers hiis generally beeii cimsi(lerei1 riecc... sary, and while in the composition of the boards raralry officers h a v t , heen preferred, it h a j frequently happened that ilffii+r+ of tither Hrni- 1)f ' t h e wrvivt. h a y h r ~ n ernpln.vec1 o n this tliity.

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mount. '' 2d. That the absence of depots in iwcr-dde ~IRc'c.- to \\ hich raisere '' could %n)p their anirnals for --ale, and the clelultory manner in which '* Purchase Boards are compelled to travel thro\tgh the cooiitry in search '*ofmateria], is not a ystent best calculntecl to obtain -uch animals 84 arc' '' fit for the service. ":M. That the Huctuating nature nt' price>, tlepeuding upon the "amoUnt of the !early appropriations, is n o t c*alcttlated to encourage the 6 ' misers to seek the Gorernment market. A clealer nhi) IJ offered only '' $125 for a n animal tiir which another Roardlnii*re libemlly eup@ed with " fundr, would hare the year before given SI.31, is naturally disgusted '' and inclined to seek a more equahle mart for hi- wateo. That officers are rarely put upon Yurchtw Hoards with regard " 4th. I' to special fitness therefor,md that the chwgeable character of the yearly ."boards allow few even become e x p e r p In European cavalry the *' ' remount ofticer ' is selected from those specially trained in hippology,
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t-,rrinrttif." I t w i l l I W oIi5erveII that ir?aII tliest. (Iefec-k;r ' s q i t tllc tirst i t corlt~itioll 01' sttiir.* i:. prescippti.wl which i i n Inricer exist.<, :111d tll:it 4 0 tJle tlefer.t< enuilieratyit hy IAieutzllant I~Of3EHP:'OS t t t u ~ , hc t aclflnl t h p l w o er,cirmb\!,< ~ i t t ,if t ~ the ~ t w t r a c t system a i d iuspectiiiti Iiy citizen esp*rt.<. T w o :iIternative reniedies are coneideretl by the Lieirtc2ti:ltlt. The tirst i- one'propnkd by Calit~?%t GEORGE I:. P!>xJ)ot'.tlle (Auarterrn:i.+ter's t1el)artnient. which is that ()Fa"getterti1 1ic)rSe tlepot iin the .* plan a.3 general depots of' the Quartermaster's tlrpartn~e~tt for mpfig '' tliz whole wrvice with dl animal- fiir v:ivdrv3 ;tr$llcry tir tlraught . . . *. purposes. The ilejwt t i l tw directly under th4(~ii;irtr,rtlt:L~ter-(;1.tternl, :tiid to keep o n tianJ : i reserve supply of ariitttal.~." I u coosiderirrp thi$ plsn the Iietiterrnrrt pr~rriclwcth:tt t h c a i)ttic,er.in a l . ronininnd I)f the ilqwt should he of high r m k : i t i d 11 ~ t ~ t d ) ? , ). ) t u 1 1 p e x d / m c e with his cottitnand entire@ ,seliar:ited f h ) r ~ l&+.e with ally other . b garrisor~ : t h t h(a :.hall l w a<r;isteC\by corps relntivc* til th? duties nf h an able corps of rulmdinates specially .selected fnr tlltir iltterest and skill i n everything p+t+ninp tcl the hohe : :inti that a ti:ttklitin of ca\'aI-ry large enough t u fptni.sh one private trcwper for eacoll;t\vo hotzes b attache1 to the depot. % .', permanent I'urchase Hoanl of thre; expert cavalry. , oecer?; with a$ otficer .of the Quar$erinastrr$ departnierlt atwched,, is another impo#wnt pro+aiwr of h k 'depot p h n . The genkral purpose of'the Bepot, as aketchetl I)! Lieutenant ROBERT$os, wot,dil Rppear to he to pror;de B place i n whirh the'horeeu purc?hseC\ after gtbper(inspectiod might receive suitable instructioq and training to fit them f& .+vice when draft+ to re&nents,.and 'where ytticers aqd men 'might a h recdre valuable instruction. There can be no two opinions to the good repults which might be expected to f o l l m from the establishnient of an insti#ution of this character, whatever ma:; be thought 84 to-. the practicabiIit9of tke kcheme. I t is stated ic L k W h a n t RORERTSON'S article that Captairi Posn n h ~ ~ , . Puggested the depot plnn, . " objects to the Purchase Roar?(of tlirer ofictBm hein cumbersome and protIuc.tive%rw lack of unnnimtty of opinioll c . *,
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yhicbioften e & & among them, of delay in t h e transaction of tiusine*s;" from phich it may I* inferred that the plan as clevcloped hy Lieutenan! bears h u t slight reeemhlancc to that 1m;posed br capkin ROBERT-ION POND; snd it is safe ta Iirtylict t h n t n o 1i1a11fiir the f~~taitili~hnlcnt of n
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apportion #;nerd of the Xrlny ainong thc several reginierits according to their needs ant1 the tequirellielits of the e r v i c e . T h e disbursement of tl e several sums ~houlilhe rnaile Iiy the &ginlental Quartermasten un er the direction of the cih)ncls of regiments. who should desiguate the tficers for the l%)anl of 1nol)ecti)rf: which ehould be a permanent I d y 41 each regiment, ~ i ~ i i i of p ~the ~ ~vetwin~ l u y surgeon and a duitable uunil)er of otficew. w bought a t the headquarter.3 The horses should,as far tw practicable. I or principal otatiou of' the regiment, or a s close as possible thereto. ,Upou the eetablishmeiit of this systeni it would soon become knowu that a t every largecuvalry station there w m a constant and unfailing demand for homes of 11 c<rtsin t'ype, for whicli fair prict.9 i n rash \voiilcl be p i t l . T h e demand would certainly result i r i tlie t'ortlicorllillg {if :i supply; and\the Boards of Iriapecciou by keeping befbre thein s high standard, would as certainly iinprow the character of the horses prewiiteil mil c o r r a p m d i n g l y t h e excellence of the regiruerltnl IuountA . T h e opinions and criticisms of his brother office^ wvould stimulate each '-ember of the Inspecting Board to conwieiitiow etfiwt i n the tlirectioi~ \\-c~uld ause ofilmprovernent ; as surely, the rivalry betweell the reyioier~ts ' the commmding officers ti) ererciw close supervision to dee that the

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CERTAISLY by iiext spriug iiew $tee\ guns am1 rartiuges \vi11 bc iasuecl
t p all our field batteries. -1sh t l i cwiitain features which are novel, from their lightness iirc riiitddt* t l i o i i c l i n o t especially, designed fir horse'batteries, it was thought tlw .b+ucinti~iiIwight illterestecl in a . brief descriptio11 of them. I u 1R79 oGr field batteries were still arniecl with 3 inch Y. L. ridand ligbt 12 pounder guns. which, with tlir 11) pouiitler I'arrott guns, coil- ; stituted the armameut for this dewice clurilig the war:, -1ppropriations for tlie Iiiaiiufacturc 01' nrciiiaore riiateriail were sr, limited that little could be done i n ariy tlirecticin ill ti+ way I B ~ ' iruprnve: one iuch )I. I,. riRe was cwiivejtecl into bree&nieiit. But i n loader and the resulb obtaiiietl werr SO sati+tiwnry iliat it \V:W recomguiw b~ niatle for ispiit! : t i i d trial, simply mended that a battery of * u d ~ as 8 temporary substitute for the more iiliproved guii which \vas even then recognized as a necesity. The gun was converted fr@ H niurrle into H tweech-loader by ciittiiig off the breech a i d cltscohel; Ant1 screwing in-8 steel breech-receiver, iii which worked transrersely B sliding breech-block. The folldaing year another guu was converted on the same. plan, but the lyre \vas eqlerged to ::+$G iuches in order tarenove the old lands and admit of re-rifling with 8 1 1 increavd twist. This gun was subeequently r e a n i d out to 31z6 iuches, and was then used in inany experimenw for testing carriages. powders. and projectiles. S i x of the* guns were shortly after issued t o some of the light batteries and were accepted as a great improvement .over the31. L. rifle. Its shell weighed 13 bs., and its powder charge was 3 b s . This guii is nientioned because 011 the resulk obtained with it ivere . +tly haeed the calculations fnr the new steel g u n ; and hecaue Rix ( fi -* of them are iiow in service. m&wted on steel carriages made a t the Waterrliet arsenal. In .September, 1882, the Chief of Ordnance a d d r e e d the Ordnauce
firid
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check from jtriking aud beiug iiijured. \\'heu ready fi)r tiring ,the Iireec.11 hlock is locked i u position by the lieact #if the lever hnndle. which theu rests in a recess in the upper part (if the carrier ring. In the De Bsiige p clieck tlie '1ir:iil ot' the spiilitle i i -hiiped like :I mushroom, anq\iti rear'cbf it, *lippet1 over the 5Iiank ,if tlie spiniIle, is :I ring or pad of plnstic inaterial, which rests i n rear againd the face of t h e breech block. The Idsotic *\th?taiice w e i t i i :I mixture of:sbe3tos, tall^^. nnd graphite, fornieil iritu ;I pait i i i a 4 i e iiiiilrr great prewire. The mu&rooni head received the pressure i ) f the p i ~ d e z rw i ~ s , ;in11 the pad. by its Corn presion effects t h e ibturat iou . I n t h e Frryre si< c.Ii6c-k tlic qiiiiille terniiiia~e.si r i :I hettil having the forti! of R conicnl t'rustiini. ;'The Iic.a(l is eriilrrncecl by :I riny with a c w i i cui interior iurfhrt., : i i i M i h i i t 3 esteriiir surftlce in tight c,)nt:ict with the \vnlls t j f the yiiii, T h e 1):i.v t h v ring rt.-t.- : i s t i i i * t the face ot' t h e breech hlwk. anil rht. riiic i.- 30 niljwtcil :I* tii leave uoliglit *pace hetween . this face :in11 tlic hencl t t f thv spiii4Ile. \Vheii the piiriler p s e s a c t . the head is forcetl back ;uitl wedges oiit tlic ring until it tits accurately on its scat ani1 prevents :in? tw:lpe of pas. l'lii~ugh both of thew checks are w r y di1rtiI)le. i n .wri*iiv e x t r p n i h fog the De, Bange :inil r i n p for t h y .Freyrecclievk would tif I V I I rsb h t a , fiiriiiGhcil w i t t i other zpart. parts. and could t)e. iiciiiiztec~ in : ifisw"i1iiti~tes. The working # i f the hreecli 1,loc.k is very j i i i i p l v . It is opened 1)y one ni:in i n four niotioiis, i i i which he itscs l i a i t l i h:in(ls without ch?ingitlythem. and, t19 the gtin rieeil not be . q ) I J I l p d iior the vent pricked, the loidiiip i.. nccomplishetl very iliiickly. S I I niaiiii:iI ha?: Iwen :itloptetl for the ~ U I I , but two c;iiiii~~iitv:r~ ('ai1 iiianil~ulntcit very & $ d y in every rcspect. aluring firing, except runniiig tiirwirtl into hatter! a f t e r discharge, and even in this respect wt' are hetter of than with the (1111 n i u z ~ l eloader, &P from the use of' the dieck : t t t n c h n l t t t tlic new carriage the recwil ir; I e s thau hefore. The relli:tiiiiiig iletail.4 I I the ~ yuii whic-li :it&c*t the b:iIli*tic properties . :ire the diamher. which is elipsoitlal.iii . h p e :1n(1 10 inches long, a i d the rifling i n which there' :ire 24 lza%li :in? grooves : width of l:mds, .I!? : ividth I J f grr)i,ve,+, .:i : depth tit' rrtmves. .05, :in11 pitch unifi)rin one tiirii . i r i 30 calibre.
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1 he projectiles i i s e d i n testing the p i i were, cast iron +hell and varioiis . band 5 inch wide thxperimental ahraj)nrl. . Both liatl :t ~ i i i g l e copper atmrhed near the hlze to priducc rvt+tioii : the shell ha? a Hotchkise hsae precusuiori fiise aut1 cont:iiiietl i l i i i e h i i g charge of 6 t aiz. l i t ' rniisket powder: the shntliiwl hut1 :I p o i l i t tiiiir mi!l p r c i i s i o t i base he; were innde first i t t ' ( y i i l irobii :iiiaI : i i j ~ i \ v : i r d + .*iec.l: I t r i t I I ~ I I I * ' hHtl lieen . aletiiiitely :i~lttlitedR hen 1 Int'r t l i r proi*;iii:: : I - I I I I I I I ~ - .
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IvBillt r i i l l r

iiw ~ilrai i r t ttic *tiell.

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front qirci rear and riveted together. This gave to tht. axtc \he stmctilrc of a bearq with ita depth iu the directioil of the greatest strain : from that time no a o r e difficulty was'fTind i n thnt particular.-. Colonel BUFFISI;m s also applied to this carriage a very sintple aud effective recoil c41ec.k cNlirake, which reducetl'the recoil when tireat-oit a pl;itfornt front about z.$f6et to about i feet. The. hrake -;ittiiclnd t o e a ~ h + l e ~ c a ~ t i . & tof s twa) ririls, IIIIC o f wliic:li . is connected liy sn e!e to,the ;isle .ihoiil~lerat one elid itnd at the other i:. One e x - ' sereweit ir!t(i a h,zitrsiiig, w h i c h e i i 1 4 * w + i t stout spiral $Iring. treniity of the other rod. pwiiig through thr .spring. terminates i i i a n u t which,Iie& :ig:iitist tlle sp while tlie other estreiiiity tertiiiiiates i n 11 shtmwhirh C a l i he titttvl tire of the wheel. I t weir!+ very Simply ; s t c i p i the recoil w i t h i i t uiitluly stmiiiiiig the. w h t d : ( ~ i i i I)r :ittached o r mmii~eclfroni the wheel at \ril1 : ; I I I $ on the iitareh w r v w :ea niud s c r a p ~ r . -:ire the ?111.v features nhic.li the carr*hgea of this t y p i i i the trail. ~+)itwtirn&

issued ti:the wrvice. 1k-e h:d one at Silitd~ Ho~)k i i i i i l lluriiic the test of the..steel gun it had t'reciueritly t o b e reltaired. tliett I$e!eeented a ne\\: desipii eiiiI)~idyiiigthese Colonel BI-FFISGTOS features dewriba!l aliove t w succeiful, but clitferiu;. esentially from other carriages it: the cotstruction ~ ) tfh e cheeks. These were macle of double *tee1 plat+. riveted topxher w i t h curved flanges above atid .helow. It weighed 1,300 ~ i l J U I l d S anct'kciod perfectly well >l)o rouudi of 3 ; pouiido i n t l i v steel tit.141 gun. It- perfect condition at the cloie of this trial, which \<ns iila~lcas irvere pos$iblC, caused ib adoption. and 'I5 were ordered clinstruc-tetl und ronie arc' IIOIV. I helie ve, i n service. Twenty-five extraguns anal cnrriages were ;tIw lirtfergtl by the Chief o f Ortifor money enough to iiitnce, and i i i hi- eitirii;it* Bir;thii ytuir he '&kg increa&,this number to 1U). . In many resperts thjs carriage $ resenlt)teS other nluderil carriage..: it li:w a trnil chest for: tciol.. which are indispeiwable fiw a I)reeell-loader ; tlic wheels are of w d %th nietallic naves : Ibut the characteristic featurrr are the drable cheek plates, ufiited 11.v t r i i i t + ~ r n ~ the , spr4iiE lrnke.6, atiil the flangrrl a s k before aleicrihed.

THE USE OF ARMS, MOUNTED.

35

:I serviceof more than eighteen year9 in the ITnited S t a t e cavalry, I have !et to *e the first cavalry soldier who could u e his srnis on horsehack. I reter particularly to the revolver, s l i t 1 will pays the sabre by - with a few re:isolis for retiriug, o n accou1)t of physical di~ability, this tiiiie-lioiic,rrd c.a valry weapc~n: For the p i i r p t k of coriipariiig the satire ancl revolver I h k e tlie effertive range of the former to be four and one-half feet, and that I,f the latter ten pards, and will assiiiue that a s a h e - t h r t ~through ~t the hody or a hard

L:KIS(;

\>\ow over the heal1 are of ecitial effivacy t l J a -pistol-shot noutitl. I take i t that four secorials would he required .to succe~sfttlly carve oiie man and

g:rt.within sabre range of' another. I hww titat in t1trr.e atid orte-htqt'secottd~ a11expert pistol shot can fire with accurnty five shots from a revolver at a distaiice of over ten yards with h o w at r u n . There is no rellilon why n cavalryman slioiiIc1 iiot carry two or even. four revolvers, if he knows how to iiJe tlieni ; and if he does not knorv b o w to handle them, I believe him better off' \vitIi(,uf auy. With this number of pistols it would be difficult to bnsgine a c i w where his fire would become eshaustetl before he had an opportunity to reload. T o recapitulate: W e have h r the masiniunt rangc. of the Jabre four :ti111 a half feet; thv revolver i e eqtiall,~ cowl for thirty feet, with psiI.ilitiea f u r I ) L ~ ~ ~ thpt I I I t~ l i -~ ~.**..-. 'I'hc, i-31)Ictity of execution \vith the s:il)rG, four r w o i i ~ l . whit(, ~. t;a.ti ::Ib*' t.t*vt)Iver is le= tllari o ~ i c .~eco~)rt. "Surely the tenaiity with wliic*h we r l i q t t ) N I ' I U ~;aricit.nt I i i i g t I I \\(.It niake "a wity soldier laugh, were not its etfectv so pernicious as tu M)riieti1iies " make a good .soldier weep." Some cavalrymen claim t h a t it' the sahre is clorle awn!- with we art' reduced to the grade ot' mounted intantry; others sap that the tilue for doing gnod work with cavalry is enjed -certainly neither of these elawes can have a conceptiori of .what a terrihle \venpa)il the re\-nlver hecomer when in skilfiil handP. I know o f , I ) n t o ~ t einstai1c.e w l i t ~ r t i~t s I I W hy a

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Inounted organization has ever been perfected, but the results in this are illore than sufficient to establish it supremacy as a cavalry weapon, were we entirely devoid of individual cases iu which a high degree of skill had been attaiiied. The orp:inization to which I refer WBJ :I remnaut of (JUAXTRELL'S command under R leader named BILL,~XDEFSOX \ clnimiug to heloqg to the confedelntc arniy ), wlio iufested the dortheni part of Missouri during the last year (it* the w:!r of t h d Rebellion. These men were armed with three or fuyr revolvers each, and at the time to which 1 refer numbered ahout fifty. . They attacked, upon an open prairie, a command of our iiiouiited troopers whose numbers I have heard variously estimated :it from 200 tub 2%). r \ r o ~ ~ s O s command 's lost but five or six men and only eight I)r teii ot'the Federal troops escaped with their lives; the others \vt=re Inill a l l i t over tlie pmirie k ) r a distauce of four miles arid were killed witti reva)lvc.rs. I have I i t w i informed, and I believe credibly, by men \vho helougerl to A S I ) I X W N 'coril'mautl ~ that mounted pistol practice was their priuc*ipnl occupntion. The depl(ir;ihle dcticiency of our cavalry in the WAS of their a r m mounted is hut too viviilly pictured iu the engagemeuts with mounted Indians during tlie lnst t\renty years. Here I propow to make particular referewe to hiit one battle. At tIi?,close of our late Civil war the reputation o f ( i e n e r d t'i-<,rE:K HCS a cavalry commander was considered by niariy ad r e c ~ m dti, 11lJIiC ( i f those $\aut cnvnlry otticers t r a i w d in this : he coiiin~antled tlie i t h Cavalry for sorhe time. most excelleiit scIi~~i1 previous to l S 6 . >laiiy (of I l k captaiua hiid beeu triiined i n the same school of experience, and he liatl time a d opportunity to give the 7th , ' Cavalry the traiuing and discipline. suggested b y ,his extended service, and,it is certainly fair to suppose that this reginietlt in 1856 waa a fair sample of the United States Cavalry. comSearlp three hundred of these troops under General CUJTER'S. mand were attacked in an open country, where they were expecting an enemy, and according to the best accounts I hare been able to obtain, were annihilated in the short space of half au hour. The Indiana claim ' to have lnst but thirty tire killed and y y they crowded in upon the cavalry so as to make the tightiug almost hand to hand. The cavalry seem fr, ' have beel) n i a r c h i ~ ~ hy g fours t)r twos, and wheo :ittecked 011 crne flnuk i t . is presuiiietl they B)riiied. or attempted to ftmu liur towards &e enemy ; the coiiiitry is 9 1 )level that the Intliaii~woultt not hare oatqked o n b t l i flanks a t once for the reawn that Lheir'fire w($lJ hare Iicetl- dmt m . . fatal to one another as it \vas to tlie cavalry. S o w it \vaiuM seem to go . without Fnying that in two nic)unted orpiiizatione engaged as these .were, . the numl)cri ot' .IUCII oil each rille crrtually Lfin/r @~y nt any one ti? were-ap proximately equal, with perhaps Mine advantage in faror of the Indian%

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T H cis$ ~ O F A KJIS, MO L - S T ~ .

command i n thie engagement I can picture W ' m e n o eberal CUSTEH'B .ashaving all they coul do sit upon their horses, having little control e r them and e n t i p l y incapable of handling their revolveru, which I believe to be the onlp: w e a p e for mounted firing. I believe in the .&rt curbinre for cavalry, but think it should be used on fc)ot only. There is b u t one Way ti) account for this and other diwsters tt) wIiicI1 l o u r crvalrv hss heed kubjected in recent Indian engagements. ani1 that ir;. . I w r poor riding and the,iitter inefficiency in the w e of nur arm3 on horst.back. The mounted Indians have been trainetl all their lives a t this kind lpf work and it ie needles to a y how much the avernce cavalryman pets.. The great difficulty incident to training men to manage their horses and handle their arms when mounted only makes the accomplishment the more va1ual)le when attained. I know the road to succesr in this line is far from being a royal one, and the work and drudgery coiinerted there.with is very great, because it involves what is known as snap shontiob with the revolver. I am thoroughly cirnvinced however that m y t h o u &nd Genetrained to use this weapon mounted would surpasq iii eficienvy ten thousand cavalry such as we now have, and I furthermorc full! believe they would in ,close quarters he far more tban R niatch for tlouble their number of infantry. Opportunities tvould occur in which such cav:dry cimld surprise infantry or get amongst them under cover of night, . . :iiicl'in such an event1 with the power'nf firing with accuracy tive sh& in linir seconds, and the confidence a coilrage which H knowledge of this -kill would give then1 - I believe thGy \vould easily destroy more than their number before they could be checked. The tinre seenis to h a r e passed when m e n become very eminent in inore than one line, hut this very cohdition of thinge brings with it the surety that a n expert in any useful directiou is cehain to find a demand f i r his work; and if we propose to make a reputable score as cavalry i l l the future, I helieve we must bend our energies to training our men to rGle and shoot wheu niounted;.with this feat once accomplished. tllt,re will hr a liyely cieniand for our servires so long as there are horses to ride allai

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SABERS OR R E V O L I'Ii'KS!
. NAPOI.EOS'U victnries at Bautieti iiitd Liguy, supported rAvalrv. did not avert Elba or Saint Helena, as shoulc _petted. O n the other hand, the proper use of a decisive the ,matest victories of every age.
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the sword has not been the most effective of the horse&De weapons i-ition has been maintained by a brilliant litera: turn. Some hationshave even worshipped the nakedsword, and we find the legend of the arnw blanche, the beautihl w h i p weapon. woven into every tunes. = W e will also find that a great deal has the spear and lance, pike and bayonet, & arount of scientific and professional attention i e cannon and the m&iine gun, and uo science ca E h invention than the science of ordnance and gun nerp. T h e revolver d o n e baa 'kceived scant attention ns a weapon ; ther i s hardly an intelligent notice of it to be found in any b o k . encyclopAia or pamphlet, i na n 9 .language; ita use in war is a novelty ; it has been dist r u d by ita f r i e n h and ridiculed by good cavalry soldiers; and i t is today subetanti+ly the same weapon that was patented by SAMUEL COLT -me fifty years ago. ' In the armed contests pf men the conibatants have been principally divided into horse and foot. To make.the proper distinction and to preserve to cavalry ita essential spirit, we will here define the cavalryrnan &B . one who habitbally usea his arms on horseback ;he may at times dismount to fight nn foot, aa did the English Knights at Cressy, or SAERIDAN'~ tmopers at Appomattox, but the spirit, t h e life 7 3 and the nerve of cavalry

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Kea i o ita ability to use ita wppona mounted. An infantryman with a ;home,which h e as simply BEJ d means of locomotion, is IIO more a c a v a l r y * man t+ he wh p e a to the battlefield in a'buggy o r on a railroad car. I n thestruggles of home and foot, we will see that a victorious in%try cllp seldom produce solid reaulte, u n l e s misted by a n excellent cavalry. Thus the great victodea of the English Iong-bowmen gave no permanent advantagea to the victom ; the pikemen, though 80 often victorioue, saved only their libertiee, b u t did not diecpurirge. their enemies ;

janizaries were routed by the cavalry was hmkeu by Roman c a d r y ; the Spaiiish infailtry w t i t down before the French drngoons. But cavalry is slinv to rccnver fr rn the blows received on the day of Sedan ; there, IIPOU the fields o f a c i n g and Cazald the%& cavalry of Imperial France way ruioecl iti an attempt to driv bark the German skirmi3hers. At mme places. in+ed, the lines o skirmishers were broken through' at the first onwt, bSt the tire of th supports in all cases 4lestroyed the force of the tierce chdrge.\ * Let us reflect that cavalry is still arinect with thv weapons of h a & , ism or of chivalry, that the traditions of SEWLITZJ of ZIETHEN,o MURAT are still accepted modefe-for our ambition ; that )io great impror ment has been made since the days when FHEDERICK +HE GBEATgave ordera that any cavalryman shoul'd he shot who wvodld receive a charge a,i a walk. N & d w e wonder, thee, at this defeat by ni+ern i n f d t r y , or that this defeat was 90 disastrous and final, or that tlid use of mounted cavalry against uubroken infantry is unive lly regardbd as a vain and uselem sacrifice? \Vho will say that c8;alr can ever e g d u ita former p i t i o n without iuany vital changes? Cavalry, for weapons,have-either used th tiiissile orlthe hand wenpou. r who ueed the The most terrible horsemen of any age ha\ heen t foretells the day when ' the whole city shall flee fur mimile. JEREMIAH the no'w of horsemen and bowmeu."' T h e i h e n t i o d of the saddle is ae~ribed to the Persian mounted bowmen who thus i n c w the tpuritp of the seat? T h e F y t h i s n soldier overransthe mb*t powerful ancient! . monarchim. Hi favorite weapon waa the bow. which e ueed aa he rode, shooting h i a r r o w s with g m t precision.' RAWLINEION thus d e r i b e s the Panhian cavalry: "It waa carefully trained in the anagement of the h o w a d the' bow, and was qn+ualled in the rapidity d dextarity of ita movemew. The &her delivered his arrows with as mh precieion and force in retreat a~ in advance,.and was almoet more f e when he reti& than q h e n he charged the foe."' Behold hem a picture a model cavalry

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SABERS OH REL'OL P'EHS!

SABERS O K REI-OLVEKS?

41

an . Irenienilier well that thew horsc.ineli ~vtieuilat>attd the Komurl troops of I'~)WPI.;Y ;IWI ot' C'.WAK. Siilcw it has --veil thelegions o f tlie i l t ~ p k e n established that the bow aod iirrow w r t ~a111oi1gthe weapons used by HANNIBAL'S Numidinu cavalry,' i t seeius altogether probable from their character as troops. and the customs o f h e i r deweudants that their . rirvonte we&pon was the niissile. From the arrow to the bullet we skip . two thousand years. :Today the Closwcks, the Khirgiz, the Bedouins, the Alhriaiis, and: the $rth +neric.uu Indialla are expert- rifle shots on revolver. Far cscelliug any previous blow at tlie han4ls of a mounted man, which tint ailnpts it to the modern . battlefield. . ' Before discussing the weapons to he used. it i s desirable, of couree. to conduct the csvalrysso as to arrive iu the (?est p i ~ ~ s i b lcondition e within tb'e eiiecttve reackdt' i& arms. - ' h e two' points will tiler1 arise: timi, cluain with the enemy, second. avoitling or turning aside the miseile of
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the e g m y . . Twenty-five years ago charging cavalry c d d trave--the range of the infantry arm in le++ than fLrty ~ecootls.during which infantry could 6re two shots. , S c / w the zone of tire is iiic*rtwecl to twelve hundred yards and m6/. I n the German cavalry a t inspectioil.< the cavalry &e now erpected to make l'our or five tulles a t the trot aud gallop m d then to execute'thecharge,in full career without getting Iilti\tn or winded.' B u t still tbe cavalry I U ~ Y remain under the tire of tlie i n h t r y for three minutes. during which the lnttSr iutly fire tiftren shots. The adoption of a fire-+7eapoii by cav:dry woiilil pruhably be ti)llowe(l by a slight i u c e of interval. ;If e c h t h ~tornf:lticpus and of successive W'Juld have to be tested. T h e second consideption is how to a w i d ur t u n 1 'tiside the missile -of the enemy. The varioua irregularities of the ground, the constantly .diminishing range where our horsemau rides under the trajectory, the m o r a l effectof the charging mass upon that which is standinistill, the active and aggreesive action ofi the horse irtillery; all t h e e will tend to make '' ffective the aimed fire of the infantry. Butathe missile which has been X n n g in ita flight aod.re8ches the frail body of horse or man can .only be turned aside by defensive armor. Brerretplates are tested by placing them as.targeta, a t asbout eeventyfive yarda, u t which distance they m i s t e d the infantry bullet u p to 1884. I n eerrice they w6uld be effectual at less distances, and when on the body of a moving man the resisting and deflecting power would be still more increased. l'bere is no doubt about their having saaved many livee in the --'

Pmnco-&rmull war. The cuira.., coiilistiiig of frout a11tl back piece, the latter osly capable of resisting the saber stroke. w e i p b from eight to eleven pounds according tu cizt. and is made of steel. . The alleys of aluminiunl &serve some notice here. The properties of the metal have only been known f6r about-thirty years, since discovered by DEVILLE, and u p to this day it has not become iu general use ouiog to the expense of manufacture. This difficulty appear8 t u have heen largely overcome in the electric furnace so that the q r i o u s rad^ of -aluminium alloys are quoted a t from sixteen to forty-tive tents per pound. T h e properties of the metal are non-corrosive action, liglltnes, ductility : it is two and a half times heavier than water aut1 is about p light aa glzps. So far it has been found that when iuore than teu per cedt. of aluminium is used with copper the alloy be-es brittle; this grade haJ the lustre and color of gold. The latest government. tes-ts of-tliid grade of aluminium bronze, hot rolled from a t\4o inch billet, 1:) t i inc$ r w i i c l bar itre -as follows : 11 I:I:JI~Ih'r -8Iii.ire inch. ' r e n d e streiigth piiincla per y u a r e inch. Hardness 21.17.' - ' The avemge properties of 137 specinlens of accepted guir steel, trow hoop, jackets and t u b e s , oil tempered und annealed, u. s.C;ovwianeut teats,are as follows: I Tensile strength 96,150 pounds per square inch. Elastic limit 51,611 pound& per square inch. Hardness. 21.4.' I The immense field of the alloys of aluininiulii hap j d s t been-entered and we may only speculate as to the future and posihilides of thie metal. But I think that enough is known to warrant the of defensive armor can be constructed, superior to in use, which will eKectunlly protect against the ereat mrtiou of the zone of fire.. - 1 'Eleven y e m ago iu the Inst great European war had attained immense p w e r . A Russian general was 1)ullet.a mile in rear of the positions of his a r m y in the . were picked OB'two miles in r e m of tlie P w , uu(! were when sheltered by the brow of'a ridge which ruse them? Balls after coming a, mile entered. the of two feet, and a perpendicular distance of . One-of these bullets would travel a mile am1
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1. HANXIBAL'S a m y in Italy, by lienenrl J)E P E Y ~ E R I'nited . service Magazine,IW. 2 . l a t t e t e r s sur la Csvallerie par le Prince K,RAt-r I~,HESI.I)IIE-~~Y~,RLFI~~~L;Y.p. m.
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.auy number of men who Ehould happen to k i l l ib liirc of in:irch.L h e fire arms of thenext war will be still more deadty, and i t seems strauge that the subject of protection from this fire has not received more attention. The destructive effect of large gun8 forced the sailo- to armor defense until they reached the rery limit of its usefdness. Who knows but what we may build u p to that limit on land? Whatever the future may be in this respect i t seems to me that it is 1 3 more serious question for the cavalryman. than for aiiy other soldier. The itifantry rifle is effective to such a great distance, it takes such a slight wound to place a man o u t of the combat. the vital parts are protected by 80 delicate a w i n g , that the cavalryman should fairty he granted something of a protectictn while c d n g the zone of &e powerleas to reply to the eneniyi bullets. . The cavalry having been conducted to the proximity of tlie enemy with a minimum of Joes .and a cousiderable reserve of energy, the next p i n t a for cqneideration are: tirst, the cavalrymans use of his weapohs i l l delivering his blow, and second, as to his conduct after the shock. I t w i l l be in pusidering the cavalrymans use of his arms that ne must decide between the saber arid the revblver. It has been found that with the horse at speed six shots can be tired with Jelibkrntiou and more or less accuracy while traversing a distance I $ seventy-five yarda. N o argumeut in favor of the saber can ehow that iu effect extends bepond the reach of the sword arni of ita owner. . h e d with the anber against an infantry armed with a hreech-lode; the moet terrible part of the charging trooper is the h o w . The saber is not feared; t h p weapou is liardly effective heyoutl the range of the homes four feet i l IIC ~ thuncleiz p t ; the f o o t - u n i s more a p t to le etruck by the horse thair by the saber; tlie result of a collision with a ruuuinlr horee in more to be dkaded. This cool foot-soldier who uow .stands u p ; e . the ekirmish line to receive the cnarging home can a t a few yards easily drop the rider who comes upon him. swingiug his saber, thirty inches long, but he cannot stop the horse 80 well. The sniall calibety and heavy . c h a m now adopted by infantry will eilable an animal to travel a long dletance and trample several infantrymen to death after lie has receive? more than one mortal wpund. A t the battle of Beaumont. in 1870, ti112 . French &lone1 DECONTENBON with the 5 t h C u i m i e r a charged the skirmbbere of a portion of the 27th Prussian h e regiment. DLCONTENSON fell mortally wousded witbin fifteen k c e a of the skirmish line, oue of his poncommimio ofticerswas killed in attempting to saber the Prussiaii troopers who succeeded iii runuiug over the skirniisll line were thohughly defeated by the supports. The Prusaiaii company gained ita brilliant succee~ withoht sacrifice; some of the fusil&re, ruu o*or thrown down by the horses, had received suclr trifliug ciurtusiona
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that they rriiiained with their battaliou. Ou the other the French regiment of cuirassiers in th8 charge amo otticers ancl upwards of ? horn. LU the celebrated Tour, their lo@ was 1 0 s of horses.
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froni th: sword. That is why so many homes are k i l l q . L e t ue noy substitute the revolver for the saber, and the effect of cgralry is at least tioutdetl by the new element that eutera the question. can uo louger ignore the rider, the reach ot whose terri cretwetl a hundred fold: . . The wlkr is powerless :ig.iiliFt P I I revolver can be tired i n either

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rider * out of the combat. as he fires in With the revolver the rider site squarely ou his ho every directiou. TI)deliver R Iilow with a saber a troo r is a p t to throw his center of gravity to nile piale - to lose his Beat in f t . Every horsenian knows the cliuiger of a broken stirrupstrap, a shy, jump, or a loose girth at a i ~ c l ia nioment. rherc is an e between riding, on a tanhark track and U k i u g a run . A, man m:iv swin;rhis.Lwher hut it is different. when you the carbine iii its lwot, surrout!d his waist with %beltjfull of c a r t r i d p i ~ t i dbuild 11p the saildle iu frriut and rear with articles df equipment: The saber acts for brit a n inslant - a cut, a gone in the wild career of tbe charge. With can be delivered -six hefore and six after livered bv .the saber. H b w long it tskw to hecome a swordsman, especial& with - t h e homes
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The hame of tile sabreur must I& rkilletl i t t nli i l w :iris ih. T h e idea'uf cvcr thtuiniug such u cavalry must al ajs be u 7 wild, ghy dream i n this country. B u t y i u can j u m p on a btoncho, T -. put him at full @peed and ehoot just as well a* if you werc riding a thproughbred. Thousands of such a cavalry could lk put in shape h r etficieut uae in,this country yhile the gentlemen of* the sRber:.are drilling at cuts . in their riding schuols, and JOMINI'S testimouy is that the huce, not the d e r , is the weapon c o t ' the shdck; that the saber i3 the arni of' the idelee. The revolver is at 'once the ! P A T of tb hedlony charge, the struggfe aud the.rout. Tbe'uee of the revolver iz.iiot expehsive. Practice in the manual aiitl in theinlamer ofdeI&ering the hlow is most uecemrv. The mvsteries of' "gettikg the drop" should be learned without using carjridges. ' I % fine nerves of the expert ritleniau are not essental. A gentlenian whose hand shakes with a .peculiar muscular tremor told me that he he-' came a elwe snap +t with the revulver, iiotwithstanding his affliction. The fine eyesight of the sharphooter is uot emntial, for there are good '. ?imp ebota.who could neve! win the sharpshooter's hadge. Sppyo~e we ackuusvletlge the *her to be the best weapm in the clear &Id, without mud, rocks aut1 ravines. Wbat does it avaa against a11 \ enemy up a tree, on the roof of a house, eveu on the other aide of' a fence I or under tbe b a n d - n a p u ? Prince K R A ~ T DE H O H E N I ~ H E - I N ~ E L F I Nin OE his N , " Lett& about Cavalry," eays: "The s t a r dared not advance the mvalry divisions aloue into the heart d' the lil)*tilc country w l i c w they would have been surrounded ou all Y'icles by francatireurn, national guards and newly formed r q o g . ' " That is a good deal from u Pruwian Lieuteuantbediea o f t General. ! h a t but vital defects of armament could bring German o mu h au acknowledgment? cgvalryl t b The1 friends of the saber my, " It is always loaded .' W e auswer. & ia the revolver. If you don't believe it, leoany nivolver be pointed at how i t feels." Mortal courage i s born of coutidence What you man w i l face the smoking muzzle of his euemy'a revolver and not believe i t contaiee a meswnger of deatruction that caunot be parried by any arb of the fencing achool aud riding track? F i r a t e authoritiea on the subject-of the charge aud the melee have stated that there?are021y a certain number of men in any command who are ready an~eagk?f-~o come to blows. A very large proportion is carried along by the elan of the former; they may add to the weight of the cbergipgmaea; they may even be rmh iu pursuit but would never steni the tide of defeat ; they are more anxious tu avoid than to receive blowa -___
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This class of men cannot be relied u . p n to clnw with an e w m y in a death s ruggle on equal chances. Seither can another clasa, still ;lesaaggressive, ',,&IO have no heart Ih the tight and who will run away if they get a chance. I t haa been urged by the saber men that a man ie brave according .to the length of his weapoii. This fact renders ineffective a large number of sabers of moderately brave men, who would usrj a pistol at ten yards, but not a saber at one yard. Then ther& the logic of figures. During ow last kar there were treatecl 24ti,i12 cases of wounds which w u l d be identitied as shpt, Mber , i " : ! were inflicted by the saher, and of or bayonet wounds. Of these T these " a large proportion had their origin in private q u a d l a or broils, or were inflicted by sentinels in the diwhar,ae of their d u t i i " I The pro- . portion of deaths from the.+ wounds $\vis only fire per cent.. which . . . forbids the idea that the saber left its rictims dead.. onithe field. In the war of 1866 there were 48 I saber ant1 bayonet woundsi in all rians, Austrians. Bavarians and Italians. If the propdrt.ion of saber . .< to bayonet wounds was the same as in our war, about 270 &n be placed t o . the ciedit of the yhite weapnn. hi the war of 1850-71 /there were 9 X . Germans wounded hy the saber and bayonet, and by tlic + n e ratio about 4.50 of them would be due to the saber. There were six Germans killed by the saher stroke. Iu that war the Germans had seventy thousand cavalry in the field, and the great cavalry battle a t Mars la Tour w a s fou$t hetweem five t h o k n d horse. I .. ' W e are almost reminded of those battleu of the fifwenth century, about which MACIIIAVELLI MIS.? I f the white weapon ($111 do no better ' -. than this in three wars, it is certain the rerolrer will do np wora& ! V e have next to consider the conduct o f cavalry qfter th8 shock. After the shock the cavalryman with his present armanie finds. that hi* has not injured the line of the eueniy ; he uaiinot stay th hecause he is R creature-of offense only-and is ruined by inaction or in any poaition .where he is placed iu an attitude of defense. So he r i d 4 away again on his jaded horse and the trodden infantry gets u p and b =.away in his hack aa be goes. With revolvers. the story of cavalry riding over an . , infantry force withaut destroying it 'need not again bel told. We will here find an answer to the questiou propounded elsewher4 as to the cause of the futility of the mndern cavalry charge., The ear* is not tu be . -. found iu excessive loplsee, becauw cavalry have often reacbed a n enemy's. he loss& in the , liue that was hristling with artillery and breech-loaders. .. . , t i t is hard W' advance have been go mixed up with those of p t r e a t t brl determine them, but it is pybable that no cavalry f * Balaklava. to.. - - - .-W a n . h a v e chargkd with g m L r lossea than tho? of Prcpt~ma t Gettys-

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burg or of SKORELEFF in the Green Hills. It has been well esjablkl~c~l that the greateat losaee to cavalry have occurred after the-shticks-iiiill t l t i b for the reasons given. Cavalry must be provided with -serves I I W I : I L hand to encounter the suppompof the, enemys first line. Extra revidvcrs . or reloading devices equal to those of General KELTON. are in;liqwusal,l~~. When cavalry encountere c y a l r y it+ role will be more siru~ilet1i:uI when i t acta against infantry and ntanp of the couditions mentioned Iic!t;m. will etill exist. Here supposing the enemy to be advaucing :it $111 t ( l i i : i l rata of speed i t will not he advisablea) tire six shots before crobsinc I I i line;one@shot will he tired at about seventy-five yard,, e oue at ailmiit I 1 i i i . t \ and oqe at about fifteen yards The revolver.ariued ruiik, while still illtact ahd all unanewemd, delivers three staggering hJow up,n the ho-tilta line, then follows u p the last blow with the full weight ot home anal ril1-r. Theree_Sl~ow three shots left, and a trooper who cannot hit :I man 01ii h o w at tail yards distance, within three months after hi3 first niouiitd driU, 9 not fit for-the high a n d honorable calling of a cavalry sddier. Great ignorance exists about the revolver anioug military men cvc.ry, where. A n English cavalry otiicer who has Iqtely written u book 011 modem cavalry discuslee most subjecta intelligeutly but disniiwes t h e rc 7 rolver from considerntip ,on the ground that a trooper will have to p i i l l up his horse iii order to deliver a n accurate blow. FRAZER, also an Erfglishmau, says: I t is IN: &lone1 KEITH hoped that revolvers, which are far more dangerous to friend than tiw i n a c m , will never be supplied to our private dragoons. The same i)fii- j cer mays t h a t if the training of reoruite, which in the English service i s performed by the adjutant and riding-master, is performed instead liy eqaadron otticers, they must expect leru individual proticiency in tlw soldier. This laat remark will perhaps explain the Colonels alarm inver e of the revolver. W e will freely acknowledge how terrible a weathe y pon i t is in careless and ignorant hands. In the campaign of 1876. two o f f i c e r s of my regiment were wounded by their own revolvers; iu the n e s t year another killed. his horae; shortly afterward two meii in a sniall amimaad on a scout shot themselves accidentally. In those days the pevdvrr ,wee carried for no known reason and nien who had worn it fdr gears werv \often mart clunisy in ita use. Within the last four years I have reptptedly . neeo the revolver give! to recruits as won ate they were only jkirly p i ficient in t h e school o f - t h e suldier mounted, aud never a~ accident

occdrred. . T h e text book ou Minor Tnctics, by Colwclel W I L K I N S ~ N ~ S H A W , in uee at the U. S . Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenwiirtli, does not mention t h e rwiilvvr at all. t h w i p i i r i n g the fact that wnie two hiinalred- thhusnud revolvers are i t i iisc ill tile Kuwiau arniy, and that &a weapon i t l i m at Iciirit i i fiiir war rcwrril i t i t l i k country. The author

a y s : -is (the t d p e r s ) arms shbuld not be used from the saddle except for the purpose of -signal. Dismounted cavalry c s ~ l use their fire-arms efectually. The inference of course is that mounted cavalry cannot use their fire-arms effectually. Colonel W I L K I ~ N - S E A W remarks S are , taken from7the Prussian regulations, and they give an merage modern ) mounted caralry. idea of the use of fire-arms y Such ideas are comnion in our service as well .as abruad. I n answer t o such criticisms I &I1 give# few examples of the UPR D f the revolver itiitler various conditions ; to show its cluickna and durenev. in the * on foot ; to show how i t parries the stoutest charge or melee as well a hlow or overhauls an enemy in retreat; a i d again to show its clucceaeful P use by considerable bodies of Inen. The guard of a railroad espress car in Texas, openiud the door of his car was confronted by a burglar who fired in his f w . The guard drew his kvolver and smptied the six shota into the burglars body before the latter could fall or adyance or fire u secoutl shot. I WBJ tbld this by the living actor and hnve reasnu to lwlieve i t to be ttue. 141 fact, i t is no great feat to tire six sbot3 with the Colts single action serTiCe revolver in I less than four seconds. At Old Church, Virginia, in 1881, Captain; now Colonel, W. 3. ROYALL, armed with a revolver, with two troops of the * Fifth Cavalry, advance nncler Captain L A ~ A S E who , waR charged General STL.AKTS and LATANE met in the headlong charge. armed with a maher. ROYALL LATASEwas killed, but KOSALI.wa3 able to charge thropgh the &emy and rejpined his command with six +aber wounds. .?4t Solomons Fork, Kansu Territory, in 1857, Lieute ant, afterwards with his saber, charged t w i e upon asingle General, J. E. B. STUART, wa? seriously wound in the second Indian who had a pistol. STUART attempt, and it took three officers an4 several troopers to /kill that Indian I i finally. . I borrow a few English examplest, I A t E l Teb a n Arab was cutting down one of our fellows, when a farrier shot him dead so clean that the sword just c u t thrbugh the mans t , scalp. that was all. Captain BURN-MURDOCK, of the koyals, with his le@ jammed under a dead camel, at Abu Klea, succeeded in-killing four or five Arabs whoattacked hini while in this critical p i r i o n . A troop sergeant major of the 10th :Husslrra. says: , On chargiog the GQudaneaeat El Teh, I first attempted to c u t themi down with my w o r d , but found I could do little execution with i t ; t h enemy for the

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m*t part Cluding my I)lows, aud even when struck. a p p a r i n g to wffer litde frpm then1 ; I theu drew iny revolver and soon knocked over three
o r four.' " * 'The famouo Colonel BURNARS was killed ill a uselery s b e r fight with .a co~rple of Arab spearmen. He was n bemi k+al cavalryman, and if he had red a pistol he would probably be living toilay. C. 8. A., comThe otecial r e p r t (if General ~ O H SS. WHARPON, mantling two t h o u p d cavalry at the battle of Scone's River, in 1863, Gays: *!The proper'\r$apoon for cavalry hns proved to be the revolver."' A number of :'onfederate generals Ilare giver1 siruilnr opinions. Major 'hiOXA.9 HARRISOS. 'I'exaa h n g e e , i n his report of a rccounoissance 011 the day fi$lowing'shiloh, says: "The front line of the eneiny'a infant? nnd his cavalry in ita rear wtw put to flight : 'p. portion of the latter only a h ; a hand to hand engzigemeut with the Rangers had attested their superior skill in the use nnd management of pistol and horse."' - I n thiR ' . B. c*harge. the.. Confederate Colonel, afterwards Lieutenant-Genewl, R .FORREST was wounded. Generab WM.T. YHERMASS reporb confirm the flight of our men? 1 I h a w purposed mfraietd from quoting H number of books written hy Vmfediymte cava rymen or their friends. 'These H r i t i n g have given most positivk testimony in favor of the rerolrer,but I hare preferred not to use them, fearing that their sornetPhat one-sided character might preP this question. 1 will simply mention vent a free and cordial tliscuesion o two instances o f ' t h e use of the r e h v e r , given in "Scott's Partisan Life' with Mosby.v ? h e first ie a fight a t Xyerstown, Virgiuia, on Noveoiber 18,1864, betaeeSr Z d u a d n n of Federal cavalry under Captain H. BLAZER. SI& Ohio,'snd n detachment of Confederate cavalry, under Major RreRARDS. T% Confederates, ueing revolre&, defeated the Federals with a loss of t r nty-four , twelve wounded. and sixty-two prisonem and 'ho&; a d with a themselves of one killed and one wounded. The statement of the Medical and Surgical History of the W a r is that the Federbl loes was sixty and that the Confederate loss \vas ten, ill killed. wounded and missing. Again there is a fight mentioned,, one hundreci on a side, where the Federal loss wae twenty-six killed and wounded, and'fifty-four prisoners and eighty horses; the Confederate lm, nothing. T h e nearest to a verification in the list of enpgemente in the Medical and Surgical History of the War ia the action at Drainesvilie, !Z !, 1864, betweer &.W?Y'* men and a detachment Virginia, on Fehnuary 2 of the 2d Massachusetts Cavalry, under Captain d. 8. REED. The Federal I& i s here given at ten killed. seven wounded and fiftyseven miming; the Confedrmte Itm, two&jllctl nntl four W O I I I I ~ C ~ .

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Owing to the efforts of several officers and the entl+'hsksm of the inbest1 in the world. fantry our army is now an army of marlremen -the But aa a result of it all, the ambitious trooper finds himself in an anomalous and rnortifyiug position. Gold medals and high onors are prws c r w for rifle firing, but the cavalryNan's weapons are rbiddeu from military matches aut1 competitions. No encouragement \s given to the cavalryman who pexfecte himself in the use of his distinctiqe weapone, but his honors must be obtained with an infantry rifle ;he must !lie on his Mck with an infantry gun-sliug strapped ovtr his krleeAliis hbm? perchance a thousand miles away. This state o f b i n g e is largely dqe to the indifdike the trooperf of eveiy other ference of our ca\-alrgmen themselves. where the infadtry have shown land d e are content to follow im thy the way. If we had not acceptkd theseimethods as right our arm, \\e would long ago have had systems and match of our OWL Unless we ourselyes eatablisb the fact that pe have a part of our own to play aud that we are able to assume it, i t id probable that our ountry will discover t h a t she doee not need the expetwive luxury of a calalry, in numbers equal to ope-Aurth the peace establirjhment. . Such an event has occurred w i t h i d o g of living caval7 offiwm. Of pouree no one The revolver is necessarily irn officer's w e a p n . s but e t@ge would thfnk of using the officer's sword ih a scrimmage ; i ' of authority, almost as svoFbhless for offenp or defense as at field marshal'sI 1t baton, which by the wny is but a memory of 'the war $ub and mace. The officer finds i t to be out o f the quesqon to carry a rbine or rifle, but he needs a far-reaching hkndy weapon with which * O W h k orders or take a hand in any little fracas within a radiu$ of a, hundred yards at least. A case in F h c o c c u r r e d during the A p h outbreak of 1872, in Arizona, when a n officer at fifty yards, killed an tndinn who was in the very act of knifing a wldier. Such a n emergency 4 a y never m u r . in any of our lives, but i t is the duty of every ofEcer to k e p himeelf pre. . pared for the moment when his very beat effdrta will be c a l v for. Tbouesods of men can throw a stone or a base-Ml with a c c u p y who muld , not place a revolver bullet to save their lives-yet tbe uacular action * . and the practice required are about the same. The tru h is that m a t people who carry a revolver are content with a knowled e of ita power, , . without an idea as to the method of commanding that power for their ;. oprn use. A revolver in such bands @ about as a w k w W ' a n d dangerous a plaything 88 a locomotive engine would be in the hands of one ignorantly attempting to '* run '' it Witnesa the Chicago p l i e shooting into a crowd of anarchists at close revolver range, and the numberof innocents . inaproprtidn to the number of anarchieta hit. Witneaelsimilar ~ 8 8 6 8 in . almost every daily paper. How tcn we hear of deepetete-encdunters between individuals who empty their revolrera at each &her at a couple ' of yards distance.

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improvements General KELTONS

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SABERS OK HEVOLIEHS?

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The revolver ia far from perfect.


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show where the peatest changes should be made. The uniformity in size of the stocb furnished with revolvers is a source of much trouble.

vice to US. It seems probable that the of three bullets in the Same place will be immensely greadr thnn that of
a single larger bullet, while the penetration and deadly etffct will not be so great. I 1 At twenty-fire yards our miseile must pomtively etop!nn a d v e m r y ; no man with a mortal wound must be allowed to kill sevetOl1 enemies before he succumbs, as is frequently the case when emnll cabher revqlvem are used. Lhe English on this account distrust even our .%tneriwn revolvers. h large number of their officers use great doul)le-ht(-rrelled pibtols, home-pistols, four-barrelled derrinjpre and the like, with an k x p r w bullet. R , Id 0, The four-barrelled \\ilkenson, we are m u r e d by Major K I ~ I I E N EHOI drop a n ox. I do not know of any measure of stopping INwer that ins been adopted, but a ditferent meapure of efficiency with rifle$ and revolvers is necessary. In old days i t was no great feat to knock over a buffalo with , your Colt* revolver, 80 I wou i t to be satisfactory in that regard. two inches, the round, soft Good results with the Colts ball and smaller charge, call be obtained u p to fifty yar&. These are well-known expedients, adopted by experts who are liable to have use for I their weapons at close quarters. h report by General JOHW C. KELTON, in 1881, gives &me results aii follows: Eight men out of three companksin the divisibn made sixtythree, seventy-fhur and ninety per cent. of bite with the pietc(lat thegallop;. sixshots advancing from one hundred yards, and. reloadin$ six shots in retreat, in one minute and fifteen seconds. T h e best iCdividual score with the pistol mounted. firing six shots approaching at the kallop between one hundred yards and ten yards of the target, then reloading and firing six shota in retreat pt the gallop was seventy-two per Celt., and ofhita ninety-five per cent. These resulte were obtained after ten,days practice. T h e remarkable exploits of cowboys with the revolver are well knowneuch amusements, for instance. as knocking off insulators $om telegraph poles while running by. The shooting of the celebrated Lieutenant TURNER, of the 10th Cavalry, is often1 mentioned in the arllly. This man, ,. L his si<&, would write with a pistol in each hand, and without looking a his init\als in bullet holes at ten v.Such, with the 1)tb;r deeds of dueling days, and the later attainments of CARVER a n d BO~ARDCS, as snap shots, show the wonderful proficiency thal can be reachnfcl-with ouch a weapon IIS the revolver. I

Every man who has a revolver furnished him should hnvc his hand fitted to the stock. Gene@ KELTOX proposes radical chanyes in the shape of tbe qtock, allperhape in t h e right direction if we use t h e Smith and W w . I have always preferred a Colt; the stock whittled and filed so aa toifit t h e h a n d and allow the thumb to be extended oil the left of the hammer. One of the hardest things to learn about the revolver is the manual of cocking the piece in rapid firing. General KELTOX proposes to obviate this by some chaugea in the form of the hammer. Cowboys frequently file off the notch of the tumbler 80 that the full motion of cocking will The principle of rebounding locks, wherely the haninot bi! n-ry. mer woddktich a full cock aRer each dischhrge, would settle thc question, but some people would claim it would make the wenpon too danger.
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Tbe Smith and \YesJon has dekcts in the trigger pull, tenipvring of the small psrts, recoil and coniplicrtecl arrangeniellt. I think expert sliot~ in this country,prefer the Colt for close shooting. The Colt p e r h a p pw~esseaa n excess of power. I t has a penete~tion in white pine of two and a quarter inches a t 300 yards-a penetration of one inch corrFponding to a daugerous wound. Too great power of this kind would ellcourage firiug at long distances and would dipinish stopping power a t short clietancee. Stopping power muJt not be measured by penetration To get the former we must add to the m&ss and decrease the relocity of t h e bullet, but neither must be changed sufficiently to impair tlie ~ c e u r a c y He& we_= a very delkaie adjustmeui is necessary. The multibull cn tridge seems to have.been condenlned l)y the OrilI w M x . Dejmrtment, u the grounds that i t is no better than the single 1x111 ! a distances u p t u t .euty-five yards, aud that i t has not sutticient p o w v r at dmtancea over seventy-tive yards. The experiments gave excellent kargets at seventy-five yards. a single cartridge doing t h e work of three SO far ae accuracy goew, with just the right amount of dispersion. A t rhia dietanca i t gave a penetration of about one inch in white pine. The Chief of Ordnance and the Board of Ordnance Offjcera do not regard these r e ~ l t ae e satisfactory, but whether on account of poor results a t greater dietancea, I cannot determine. Certain it is that seventy-five yards in the +it a t ashickthe revolver should k u s e d by a mountid man. snd all exprirnents should be mnducted with the view of making the cartridge efficient within that range. \Vhile the dispersion of the niultiball cartridge ia hardly to be noticed at twenty-five yard3, this very fact may

Marshal SAXEis credited with =ping that: all others, are the most tenacious of existing follies, change. Reading the story of cavalry, ita realize how true the solid old marshals maxim was. \Vd then how often great military successes have folloged the greateat huovations; we

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#SAB!~'kA9O H H F d * l - O I d l'I.IHS!

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u~'ABERS O R X E V O L VERS?

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remember with what disgust the first use of " villaiuous d t p e t e r " was m i v e d : we smile at the arguments offered only twenty-two years ago again& the breech-loader, and we notice the great similarity between these argumenb and thoee now advanced against the revolver. It will Boon be acknowledged that the cavalry of today is handicapped by ita arm4 as much as were the iron-clad knights at Cresuy by their armor. Here in our country we Cave broken BO often with the hard aud faat rules of war on e e a and land,twe have so few of venerable memorjes to retard our progress, aud we respect 90 little tlie moth-eaten anti rusty beaide the original and new, that the future of the man on horseback is bright& here than elsewhere. Sow, the question is, whether upon the ruineof bld tactics, arms and organizations, a new cavalry will be raised, proud of old traditions, though discarding them, ready and able to be '' i n fortune's cap " the ,very feather.-*

lain I<O\AI.I. met halls1 t a lraiiil: the 4,ue ~ i t h slo~er. tlie other with pistol,aud LAT.4SE If ceived instaut death. I;~BSAI,I. \FIU y e w r e l y wtroudecl by I..\T.\SK'* suber.an,l by the men who rharged close by I.&TAsE'* side. and his squaalrons wrre driven i n t o burdied flight. The dincipline of the reculnr service. however. arwrteQ itaelf. and withic a It!$ huudred yfUd6 tlie Federal cavalry wheeled iuta line in Iwautlful order. again to receive and again to be proken

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.luQing from the pupen, by c'aptain 11.\1.1. and I.ieutenaut S W I F T a)n the rnbstitution ~f the rcvolver lor the aaber. I1 wiuld seem Illat the 'advocala of thin rarlirihl change in the urmament o f the ca).alry arc thoroughly convint.ed. ill thtbir own min&qait Icn.-t.~,r the advisaIdlity. necessity even, of making the proposed change. W h i l e I pxagnlze the leal ulid ability with which the special plea for t h v rcvolver haa k e n made. 5-el I feel compelfed tn t a y that I do i i o t thiuk the nrgllnrerlts n m l iustances 1,). which it hss been suppnrted are such n s to rarry rourivtion 10 t h v mind :in:a,no. r,,n\ersnnt wltb the hlstury of the cai-'elr)-a m . H a d we k l i iurlliallcd with mcsolilur? exdmplealf a cwc i l l ~11,a.h !!%.I1 orsaiili,eql. i l l atriirten a n d d i w i ~ ~ ~I.n\-nlry. i n A ~ rvlgina u p m tIwsat>urnionc.ha'i i.et.l) 8 ~ t + . u :triol t ~ ~ r,,lltc.a ~~ t-: one ita equal in ever? abilwr respect. bill ~ l t ~ p ~ ~ IIIU?I t~~ the li revolvcr ~ ~ $ ftpr it. . I I V ~ . ~ ~tvc. - , ahtauial fc-1 iiiore eontblent*ci n t l w n*rcrtd -itpq,riawit! a $ liw arms IC, e.u~i<l s t ~ i ll l 1 u t ~ ~ 1 ~ t iicti<,ll v.1 Sotonly h w ntl l ~ i ~ t n ! ~this c~t k i~ ii~ gl ~ hcen f ~ i v c aus. hut we venturc. ai-ct-rt i l ~ n t110)t #811v
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civil yunuits o n l y n lew m o n t h s before. but w h o ing that the c i i i p l ~ ~ y ~of n ethe ~ ~ trevolver, iiiskail of tllr saber. w u I l l i t k l y a failure but a ~tim..tmiiboue in e\ery rcspeet. Hac1 the sil*r k e n used we have ever). reusou to tnlirve,cousiderin$ l i r c h a n c t e r of the ~ i u e have h . e n entirely d i d r e n t . The killlug of Captain troops cnyugecl. the ~ , i i t ~ ~ would I. $T \ s v tvrtaiiiily ,lid uait aIect tlie geuerul rcwllt. unless b y itimi%%ing the ardor o f hia tmop. nnql 4'aalvtakiii I : , , , \ I I lw.,luLlv:y uwed .his ewa1~efrrbiii alcath C B I Btlbv n i * , l d l a b t h e rvutimeutal 1 , r t . j i i ~ I i wt s 1 ~ i a . h< , x i * : $ v l n t t h r i t time against tlic I I W $11 ~ l i ~ ~ r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l ~ . ~ ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~ 8 . I , , t i l e n~sitoleriiil it.nt.*nf ~ I ~ . ~ . , + s I ~ I L - ~ *tind s 111. l<atrolt,r KIIIII~LII-i t liru iittwkiiiga tmdy ac,-cnll~.al ;i\hilry.< n i t i : i i t : t11v -tairics t u be triiv. t l i i . ~ ItratvN, Iiiitliiila .liltire iwrliapa. than t l l l i t tltry 1aa,tii1n.rii ( t 1 . c n i ~ II l,.tsI> c , i incii. whose c v 1 1 1 ) rislit t a o t i l e n a l i i v t v f t,aivulry rented lipon t l w i a r t that t l i r > lilill Iigtne. nwl were ilesigiiutrtl I I ~ O I Iniustvr r d h & i.a~i11ry. I t is extremely tlmr the) I u i never wnru u aaber.ur if they I,a<I.poswssed uo k ~ i ~ w l e d of ~ Its e use \,rctltnltlv or le,wcr:antl thnt. 1111 tliinxs ~ ~ ) i i y i ~ i e r e ~niicllt l , . ~IIII\& ~ ~ ~ saved ~ ~ ~ hi0 : ~ cartridgesand ~ s have k.npture*lthe whole I ~ d 1 :y , taking memurea t o prevent their~dlaluuilndugto tight. ha11 he iiitlnint,.l with a clesirv t u '' nrelie n killiuy" t ~ fhis nnte br?llum. Free Soil enemies. not b e e i ~ \' e k n o \ v uf siiiiilar reputations for di~sli and ilestrllciivenks, made by cerlainkther men farther emt, whure , m l y \veapa,nr were pistol., H ho were +112ful to attack o n l y bodies of r a w wrriita. or ~a~ldiersstmggling from their couimancl~. I u t wvre yrudeut enough to keep alwags at a safe distance from 4izripliue<\ t r o o p . if possihe. The lesvons they learned once or twive I,? accidentally runniug fa>ulof rugular cavalry were uever IoqJotteu by (he survivors. The C m r k r aml other semi.civilieed troop^ ruay Le expert ill th4 use of Are-IUuLs on hursehek at exhibition drills in time of peace. but we have no pr' q of the dentruetire effect of their practice in war: while we do know whet a twror tlre?!MwIr8a have always k d .even t o the Ixst uf troops. wheu ariiied with the lauoc. :. late as ] S i * . a b o d y of c'i%asslan cavalry, magniliceut byrsemeu .bd splendid swordsinen. havlng Leeu arrncd wit11 rilles aud revolvem. to be used qn horsel&k when attacked bg

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In all welldlecipllned volunteer reglmcnts. in the last t w o and a half . a m o f our wwr. the ordenagainst attempta t o employ thz revolver in a rharge were alino.it as strict th& given by FR W ER I1 .K RIE G R E A T to hts Cavalry. and they mllrired no aperial efforts for their enforcement. b u t were cheerfully obeyed.hecaude it \vm seen hy e\.eryone that u p , n ohedienw to them depended all their hopes of suwear. That the d a l r a t Old Church instanced IUan example of the r u c r e d u l employment of the revnlver may admit of a very different cbnatrilrtion is rhou-n by the f n l l n w i n ~ extrart d the from"Y~lellan's~.ifeo Stuart'": f " T h e c h a w w w mndr in ~ . o l u m l al b f f ~ m r r a r ~with mber. It wm received by the enemy standing in liur. drawn up in the road alrd 011ritller I ' lN ~ . slde of lt,nnrl with nn alrnmt harrplesi dlnrliar$e a B f their pista,ls. ('upinin 1. ( T t s ~ a n #
It is hardly reasonable to doubt that had our plains ludians been fOPght when! lbey drat f thomughly t w cavalry. labtlng Ixvame hostile. with tlie sharpened s a d r in the hands o peace would have roiiie yean befure It was brouRh1 about by the t a c t l a , ik have puraued. I'erliap we chould have been s p a H the memory of the great dislisier upon the Llttle I%ig IIorn hat1 tieneral ( Y S T E n brought hbwholernmmand.iu fresh cond)tion. Hith sharpened sshrs. to the south end of the Indian camp and charged home. acruss (he level plain, upon the seething m.seuf inen. women. rhlldreu aud $MJeiea. diwla?ing all tip mnfuslon lncldent to the moving of sn large a camp. I~ndoubtedly 111erewtn~lil have bcu.11 *ale up011the bank#
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S'ddERS O R RI,*I'OLVERS?

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Even wlth the improvemente already Nade iu yistols.auch us iutweral I i k : i n ~ s nuti '~ othem that may be made I n the future. the dlflicully of w'nderiu: x d c the actioir ui revolvers on any extended front of a charging W y wlll makr the prc*eiwc oi o>tfiwr. i r i t f w prsitlon e e d them, and whlch are the only ones they should ocruliy i n u charge. utterly ininow d peable. ' . With a want of p r o p e r ~ h ~ ~'charging t h e c s v s l r y niinht nrrive in the midst of thaenemy'srnnks wlth empty revolver% By another ane of GencrnI Esi.rav.u'* d e v i c s t h r pistol anberecharged with s l x arlrldgea in a moment, but that our mumetit. wlieii Loth hso& were engaged. might prove a crlUcal one. and offer the c*uciiiy 1111 iqiportutiity # i f cldiog Ute contest with the raber. I am prepared to admit that a gbch revolver in skilfiil hnnils 1111iytw a n esceedjiiply v d u b l e weapon for the t per under many circumstances. Tlint i t is thc dcadly. kifallil~le instrument o f deatructionThat It is clalmed t u be by@&admirers i m l . ~ ~ d v w i r ; e .'That s uny remnif who cannot hit w i d It an obJect thesizeof a man. nt ten >,irtl.. rlirec msitiths alter he hM taken h h first lesson Infrlding. Is not tit for the high aud Iiouurable w!IiuK& a cavalry soldier." I emphatfcally deny. m. i Y y own experience wlth the revolvei. whlch has beeu rather extensive. I n ~iioiiirte+I and dpmonnted practlce would not support such extra\'agant assertion,.. I hare seeu many good revolver shota'developed~onthe target range --hen all the cona1itiou.i were favuruble: when there wan no such excitement as irould anendacharge : n o Ilyini: projwtilesnnd no opyoslng a v d r y comlng thundecngdown wiih the evident inwntrou of ctaying loux e u w g h tu urnlie Ita mark. Even snap shootlng, under such conditlons. i~ very different irlm kccping up thr , petulrmtyop of the pistol." wheudlrected upon the face of a uoti.rcsistitip tlirgct. In considerlng the queitlon of the ease w k h which skill io hilu~llinp the revolver is ac. .. quit&. fo+unately we are able toget out of the realm of theory ititc~ 1t11. doiiiiiiii of d i d facts. . In the annual target report of the Department o f the JIisouri iur Ik87 u c f i t d the f ~ l l o w i ~ ~ g d d , the heat b a t have heen obtalned in.mounte4 pistol prncfic-~~ aiuring tlir year; firlng done as the gallop : A t 10 yards. 70 per ceut.: a 1 men tiring. "15 '' 17 ''. 46 '* "20 .. *2-, .< ,
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m a y fold. but to my of mdng that the Icnowledge of

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MB. P n y D E S T : I thin! Captain C A K H is mistaken ih yllttiny 1h~pRaualtiea of the BRlRr at two pe; cent. of the Iin the t'runco-licrutan war. According 10 the Iwst information I have. that Anurn nould he a Httle over one h ~ n d r e d t b of oue per cent. My statebent of the Incident at Old l'hurch wan derived from a c o n v ~ m t i o n with Colonel Rovrl~ himbelf, . a few months ago. The fight at Cyerwenlioml i Tmulebruu I can hardly be cited in this discussion of sabers and revolvers. for several WIWons: I t iw&Y a victory of the

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Pruasian lance and nut of the aaher. The .4ustrlari commander '' rrcjived the mounted ch-. aud thus violated all rule and precedent. The Austriaua did no! use r e v o l v e y all. but single-barreled. m ~ l e l o e d i n ' g horse plstob. h s to the remaindeLof this argument, 1 am SBtirlierl to k t i t rest where it le.
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I.IEL.TEks;
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fiIa.I.WT(~S. ,

llie \sociiitif*fIi t i l l Iw greatly ilrterestcd i n rcadlrig ua'le paper i n the J a t ~I:.~.$I..BB w e Iiavt! be!2nillterCste~l and enterUiiirJ in hearing it read here. The query raised by the title." Pistol or saaber." S l l g g e S t d n l o n c ~ .to . ruy mlnd. the line uf discusion which 1 LhriUght the geiitlcluarl would pllrsue: pirat. tlle wurnptloii

T6e meinher.

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- '. Bu Now when,we remember that the best ahooting reymeuted above has Lceii made under thedlnct$on and tdnlng of oRlcers who are tbemselvea expert snap sliob, who have cm'I

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ploged every incentive pousihfe to encourage their meu,evrn to the esteut o f otikring prtzrs provided at thelr own e x p e m we m a y well ask why huvc not better residw beeu obtained i f theart of aCcumte shooting with the revolver in m easily acquired t h a t a rwruit rail learn iu t h m months io hit hls man e + e v time at ten' yards." As ouly me-hulf or three-fourths of the men o f the troop have apparently been engaged In this pravtlcv. nnd !lint iudividually,' not in rank, what are we to &Ink of the remainder w h o are prc.ruiiiabl) muvh iulcriur in ' &ll t othose reported : I belleve In the utility ofsthe revolver u a flghting weoipm when empla~yedin its proper sphere, that Lp, by indlvidtials,,b~aniall parties of q v a l r y wheri'open order tiphting ia made n a a s W by the nature of t h e ' m u n d . and I a m wHllng toad\-ocate its adoptioti.as a charpiug wapon fpr lege hodlea when I t baa been demonstrated that it cull br advantageously a u k t i . toted for the caber. and CaCtIca have been deplaed which wlll admiC o f its being safely an81 m a a l n l l y employed, but enneither of t6em h u heen done yet. so far ru I h o w , I prefer to aMdekr the p n a e n t b y thesaber. which has never yet failed in the hands of thwe who have had d e colua&eand the stlll to me i t properly. and hare placed 'io it the confidence i t hau
d m y a deemed.

that the cavalry should be armed with but oue o f these \\'eiipt~rrS; SeCtlqdl). a11 argumtirit lu; tended fo demomtmte that the e b e r as a cavnlry weapon is obsolete W d V a l u c l n s aud tbnt . ' (he. revolver is par e d a n the rm of the mounted service in. modern warfare. t i e has e n d e a v o d tu atgngthen his posi ou in the discovery apd illuatratim 6f a w e m l n g anfagonism between these two weapons. To obtaid nfreawr pr~~milleoce for rtie reviilver, whlch we a l a ) . have in our service. he di 'e8 and would banish from our h ndr the =her which has been traditionallgmd is t o d r t z mmt popular and esleenicd \ v d * u with tl!e cavalry ' throughnut the civilized w a r l l t I t is with respect t o this featiire of his @Tatinleiit that I muld., -Le a criticism. 111 m y oplnibh thew two arms nre Ilutuml allics Asvavalr>-. weapons. anal while 'I am pleaml to uote the merim o f th&vcilver. which the prnt)c.mau has so well p ~ s . sented.and a 4 which I a an advocate. I would retnio tlle s a l r r nlldp3U~'iate the revolver e % n all our arm%the =her. tke revolver aucf the carbine. Considwith It. Indeed. I woWd r ering t h e duties thut must certaiuly fall to our cavalry in the event 41 a wnr Ryaiu In thln , count&. the greatncse of our tcrritcwy, I l l , physical feutures. and the mper o f our people. 1 believe the& three weapons are necesfisry U, the cavalry. that is ma)' a$in the dual capacity of avalry proper aud innunled rltletneu. Our nrm hae been swcesaful In this dual CcLpaclty heretofore. arid I am quite certain. that there is a very great number o f wvalry om

@en to 8vnd ca~alry opportunltled i> hrs neve! had before when sqbares could be formed tu lmid 1 L According t o meld .Marshal Y .y Yamr. '(In moderh warfare t h e long &ugc and deh c t l v e Breof artillery n-ltat~a&&tered formation. There will k more frequenlopport u n l t h forthoac brilliurt damha of small bodied o f cavalry, n which. by taking sdvantege of the d t l d moment, the cavalry of dLvhicrp so often d h t l n g u i h themdveas..' Hon, In his "PI-&& of Modem TacUa." neema never t o hm'e considere4 for a moment tbe padbllits of cavalry ndng Ere urmr i n monnted action. and yet he writea BB follows: f Cavalry on the 'The ScUon o bnttld-fleld 4 by no means a thing of the past. The

The employment Of the h q c h l o d e r b M by compelllug Infantry to fight in loaae order.

our Rehellion and the three European warn. i t h u not galncvl real I p l w r h u c e ae a cavalry warpon. .Sow. that we have the improved revolver which will kill at 300 yhrds aucl m a y be tired eighLeen ClmcJ i n rbopt two minutes- that I s rtree roulidN lorded an+ fired there are cavd r y omcers. who, without falr trlal, would dlscord it and arm our troogiera with the Mher and carbine; Indeed not a few would take away both the b a k r and revolter making UII slmply . mounted Infantry. Thuse w l t h whom the pis(0l in not in favor. assert that It la more d a w r -

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THE KELTON DEVICES.
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DEVICES BY MEANS OF WHICH EFFECTIVE MOUNTED FIRING WITH THE PISTOL AXD CARBISE C 9 N ltE
OBTkIsEDBYi,THE C-QVALHY IN ATTACK.

BY

m1.a I Y E L I . a

KELTOX
1; S , .\

.\Sl*TAST

.\l%lCT.\ST tiRSF;K.\I..

IWTRUCTION for firing the pistol from the home is well established. It is difficult. however, to analyze the.method practiced hy the best shots. or to describe it xce t in a general way. P P n the unsteady support the I n the first place, pistol shnoting, owing t hand gives the weapon, should always be according to the snapmethod; o look along the pistol, that is, the eye is not taken from the object t nor should any effort be made to align the pistol hetween the eye tmd object. T h e best results are obtained when there is no perceptible pause between quickly proiectilig t h e pigtol and firing ; uo attempt being made tn look along the barrel to see if i t pointa at the object. The pistol bullet directed .rris&nctively, t w is the arrow from the bow, or the stone must from the sling. T h e cayalryman must do this first dismounted, for t h e k ie no other way of delivering the pistol blow when mounted. The Bame is true of carbine firing mounted, when the horse is ih motion at the gallop. By the following method great skill is usually soon attained in pistol firing at an object in front, rear, or on either side- when moving or still; when both the firer and object are moving ; whw?$ring at an object only aeen for Jmoment. t h e eye.taking only its direct@on and speed : or when firing with two pistols at two objecta in divergent-directions and atdiffere n t distances. I t m u s t b e admitted by the-cavalryman that he should be able t o give all such pistol blows, if M i b l e , and the surprise generally is, if h e does not succeed when the following directions and suggeetions are carried out: T h e first penciple to obeerve in rifle or carbine firing, and especially in pbtol firing, is to extend the thumb when holding the handle. It must be ertended,aw nearly aa p i b l e i p the direction of the bore of the

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weapon an& the prolongation of the fore-arm, and nd patip the handle. This exten*brings the thumb along the side of t h . revolver pistolHammer,and tli&nuei eud of the handle should rest ove the little finger. support t o , This method of holding gives the necessary aud till +ible . . . . the -w-)g,- -__ . . -. -I . Experiencehas shown tlia&e extension of the t h u d b along the stock in the prokmgation of tke fore arm enables the weapon,! whether rifle o r -pistol, t n be not only quickly aligned on the object, ut, after a little practice, to k thTown into accurate alignment with it from any pnsitjon I without lookihg a t weapon a t all. To make the best use of the pistol the cavalryman, $hen firing, must, if p&ihie, place his thumh in the priilon6ation of the ibre-arin ; this not a n l y to give quicker and truer direction to the projectile, hut better .contml of the- weapon when it rCC6iIs. The remarkable recoil of the pistol . . follo\vs from its construction, the point of support i n the hand being 80 much below the ling of recoil in the barrel. The ohjettionahle severity . of this recoil is much overcome b.y extending thk thumb over the grip as . proposed. 0 The rca.wn for the thumh extension is n pliysiological one, and found in the fact that thereby is best secured that opposition of the thumb and forefinger which gives t h e hand its wonderful power of rnanipulstion. I n the usual way of holding the pistol, owing to the form df it3 handle, the. b t u s e of the thumb is not and cannot be made : h e y e the use of one of the most important factors in the nice manipulation .of a delicate instrument is hardly called i n t o requisition a t ail. By the ndoption of the. thunibpiece on the lever arni of the pistol safety-stop this extension is. so far as practicable, secured. . The blow with the pistol should be delivered aft& the ..same manner as the c u t over the point with the foil. Tu make this cut succm- -fully, it is +lutely e w n t i a l that the thumb be extended along the grip ; i t is equally essential, in making the pistol hlow, that the thumb be , extended along the handle, in the prolongation of the j forearm, and a8 , nearly as possible, directly in rear of the barrel. Ond should. no more attempt to sight the pistol than the foil in making a Mbw ; but, looking . . a t the ol4ect;give the weapon true d i r e c t i h by the haoh -to do which the thumb must he.exteuded on the grip. hlthoiigh tdis 11- beeu well .4 established, probahly ever since pistols were made, c e b i n l y ever-since they were used in.the duel, it is not generally known, b d it seems not to bavebeen taken into consideration by revolver d o u f a c t u r e r s . To . . . admit it uow and in consqiieoce modify the cavalry1 revolver, will of c o u m , be expensive to maiiufacture.re aud to the gocetoment ; but that . i t is true oncl .will be of inestimable advagtagc when clone is the o@nion . device toithe pistol, which and experience of pistol shota. A stllety~stop

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THE . KEIjTON DE VICES. .

T H E KEL7'0.N DEVICES.
as good tlisniouiited firing is made at 15 yrlrd5, and le carried with dismounted Bring, on alternate days pr weeks.
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preventa the W i b i l i t y of an W e n t , and one which requires the thunib to he extended nearly aa proposed, has been tried and found to work well.' Snap firing, the only kind which ,mounted men can a$pt with ad'vantage, shopld begin en foot,'at black pasten placced on a canvas target five paca distant. In firing, the eyeemust see only,the object, and the pistol must I* projected a t it and fired. with t h e w m e niotiou and rapidity that a missile is thrown from the hand, f r y n the e r n e r a i d position of the arm. The . b.ullet .sh;uld.leave'the.pistcAl just IW t h e thrown missile does the hand, th& object at which the projectile i s thrown being alone'noticed. ' First, nn foot, cpck, project, and snap the uuloaded revolver a t some object not more tlialji 5 paces pff,and note, as the hammer falls, where it points. Do, t h h each day, dt firjt some 12 or 24 tiiiies, before a shot is fired, till the pistol is fimad when snapped to be in h e with the object. *p&t at intervals. Thqn place one round ball-cartridge, 10 grains of powler, i r i t h e re. ' volver, to discharged after t h e fifth snap. ' ' Repeat frequently. always notiug where the pistol points wheu snapped, so as to correct any error in ita grmp or projection which pret . Vents it from taking a line poqtwn. , Then insert two cartridges, two empty chambers iuterveiiiug. Repeat fwquently. . " After P fen. days, three, four, five, and then six cartridges should be ' fired in succesiuu, a t the &me time gradually iucreaing the distance. 111this way good suap h c e droding, effective in war, will soon be made. and with a sniah expenditure of ammunition. As tl;s firer instin~tirelffPR~ the way to throw the bullet ( for he must . not even glance a t h i s pistol) and acquires skill, the tlistaiice f r o m the object shoiilh be ipcressed 2 er Spaces. '.' A t 10 .or 12 paces he ehould, after glancing iatently a t the ohject, . .look away and then f i ~ with ; the. back t o tbe target, standing in the position of "guard," look over the right +oulQer aud tire; oqxsiondlly fire a c m ' the body, the left side. heing toward the target. This first prac. tice up to 15 yards should. be with reloaded' shells, 10 and 12 grains of powder, a n d the round droppkd ball, .4J caliber. * .*As m n good firing is made at 15 yards, instruction after the same ' manner, pt a 4 i n c h buU's-eye, with 16 to 20 grains uf powder and the p r230-grains bullet, should be continued up to fifty yarlla. i i i ~ ~ e a s i nthe i ~ ly m l s tlic diehncee of the firing p i n t s by5 paces at a tinir. , D c y ~ ~ i>O rrgulation cartridge and bull's-eye 'rhould I= use.etl up to 100 yards. Mounted firing with.tbe'pisto1, reduced charges. ahoultl b e , '~ l l tis l sovn
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. The foregoing gives a t l e s t an insight into the-best niethcwl of revolver firing. Its reasoiiablenes !vi11 become apparent m SQOU 89 tried. .It til-t rnther wild shooting mu& be expected; hut i f the practice is beguii with reduced charges, the surprise will prol>ably be at the rapid iiitprriveiuent and ~t the increased int rest and tlie great. and iniiiiediate .kill attained in ,iiou)ited firing; this, after all, is the nliject dreired. -1s soon as the possibilities of the piiptol are fully recuguired, andpthe cavalry generally accept this weapon for close fighting, the liandlc will be w) fitted to the hand and the hammer so adjusted that it caii be used to . much better effect than a t present. Tire drvicecr for Ifi'ngiiig about rflcirnt tt~nrli~ i U thr t carbib nnd pirrtol, )iiot(rtkd, iitoioifrrl, and rmderiltg the rCco1rt.r m/k to ~ ~ ~ n r d in er rad-* , rr~rdreltxldiq it i-alidly, awFir*t.-"rhe automatic check-rein, whereby tho ci~yalry~iian can control his Iiorse for brief periods without the uw of hi- bridle hand. S e m i d - The safetystop, wherel)y the cocked carhine and revo1vt.r can be hnndletl freely in rank>, Iieltl in afiy poeitinn b y the cavalryliian f the thunib in without endangering cornrntlw, whereby the extension o firing becomer obligatory, alii1 ita oppnsition to the tripgerfiiiger issecured. thus enabling the firer to give true direc:ion to the '' Mow without sighting, and better govern the recoil of the pistol. ' Third.-The cartridge-pnck, wher&y the pistol cartridges nre asentbled in clusters, is a very secure and inexpensive manner, so that they can all'he inserted into the chambers of any of the jointetl revolvws a t ' one time. Fo~clrtrth. - The carhine detachable magazine, wherehp five nr ten cartridges are attached to it just in froirt of the guard bncl most conv.euient to the hand for reloading; this while the horse is at the dharge and without the rider IiarinK to look a t what the hand is doing. ' F@. -T h e clarbine-ding, whereby the to the person, muzzle up, in the charge, . and wliereoli the pistol.packs can bb carried in a
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THE CAECK-REIS ATTACHMENT.

The check-rein is especially useful for cavalry h0rses-d enable cavalrymen to use hoth hauds in mounted firing while the h o d are in motion, and for hard-mouthed or restive horses in general. I n &eir applicatbn t r ) the special needs of the c-svaty service there should 6 in eKery q 9 p i spring attachments of a t least three different strengtbs: out of every one hutidred thirtv should be limited tn a pi111 of IO pouucle. sixty to 15 pounds, and ten to 20 pounds.

64

THE RELTON DAVICES.

T H E KELTON DEVICES.
SAFETY -STOP.

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I of When ueed OD c a d r y homes, each <-per, kuowiiig the amount restraint hie ho? should have at a-gallop, limits his stride to that gait by drawing back the rein upon starting, fixing the curb a t the proper point by fastening it over or in aay co*enient way to the ponimel of the eaddie, thus effecting the control needed. It b preferred the buckle which unit+ the ends of this check-rein should be f i x d n e a r the attachment of the left rein, in order to readily adjust it with the left hand. It then only remains for the'trooper with another rein to guide his horae, having both hands free to bandie his carbine while firing and loadthe perfect alignment of a cavalry force may be ing. By this N-PB 'maintained in a charge, where perfect array is absnlutely essential for SUCC~BB. The play of the ripring affords the horse such movement of his head not to hamper him in going over uneven ground, in jumping, or in case he stumbles and falls. With such a cbeck-rein all homes hard to control, or while mounting, when the pressure on the bit is a p t to be relaxed, can be brought into subjection, 80 as to give great freedom to the hands. , The automatiqaheck-rei? is expected not only to sec&rep o d mounted firing in the by controlling horses aud keeping shuadrons aligned, but also to be'of- great seraice in training cavalry horses to keep, at alJ gaits, an evenness of stride and length of step which will enable troo$s to maintain at all times their alignment, so that the service of most guides am be dispensed with, and also a large number of the commands pre= . acribed in tactiw which .are difficult to hear on the drill-ground and imo understand in the noise and excitement of battle. With such possible t a check-rein all holries hard to control in harness or in mounting under the middle, wheu t h e pressure upon the bit is a p t to be relaxed, c brought into subjection 80 as to give great f d o m to the hands a n a : der the office of a groom unnecesary. A horse unhitched, without rider or ariver, with this check rein properly.adjusted, will be under such control as to feel no disposition to run, aud if he doecl will be under such restraint as to limit his speed and ren der it an easy matter to stopahim. The check-rain attschment is prefembly fastened to the curbrein next to the bit, while another curb-rein is held in the hand to guide the

The safety.stop is an at'tachment for pistol, carbine, or! rifle, by which 'the hammer mag be retaiued at full-cock without dan&r of discharge i when pulling on the trigger d o u e ; and it consisb of : I pip or itup wbich '*. is o$erated by the application of the thumb UPOU the grip in opposition the trigger-finger. The danger of unintentiounl or ,prematlrre discharge of a weapou is always considerable, and with mounted men using sod-to-hand conflict there is always dnnger. $0 comrades, in preiiiature discharge of this weapon, eitber on account of unmanageable h o w + , when both hands are neetletl to &utrol them. or from the convulsive iiiovenicilt of a man who has hiniself beeu shot. In . order to ivoiJ thiz diingcr the rnorernent of the h:lrulncr arrested when at full-bent by a device iihicli, in addition to the'uose ofl the sear catch- . fng in the tumbler-w)tcll, rendem the combined operation/ of the fbrefiuI . 1 g& aud thurub,~necej.:iry to dixharge the weapon. As the pistol i$ !ir~liu:irily Iichl with the hand grasping the stock, t h e thunll, will not by i ~ l : i c w lulin)u ita-support : only when the pistol is projected in the nrt ot', tiring will it be exteiitlctl itnil plticetl upon the leyer-airii of,tlic sia,p, m i l l 11.3 it \rill be in opposition t t ) tbt. fi~rctingerk ~ . this position, thcrc will he i u the 3ct of tiring ; i tirnler p p up011 the weapon, which will ste:idy it'anal prevent itj. being pullcd/off to m e side . 4nd control its recoil. . In ,o;der to discharge the cocked pistol, the deliberate kction of a puM on the 'trigger by the foretinger and n pressure by the thunjb on the levera r m of the stop is necessary ; Eeuce, the accidental dischade of the'cocked pistol is almost a n inipwsiibilip. : I

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It is evideiit the stop can he applied t o any gun and &ould be to the carbine, not cmly. to wcure safety to comkdes i n mounteqjfiring in ranks, blh to n+e the thunil). extension imperative, for it i s an;absolutely neeesJarg position for it in s o a p shooting.
'CIIC PISTOL PACK.

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In caae the pommel of -the saddle is eucumbered with the holster, o r overmat, or any part of the accouterments of the cavalryman, placing the check-rein over i t mny be a very uwuitahle adjustment. 111 that case it be fastened to the front I J ~ ' the saddle by a very simple device devised by myself.
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The pistol-pack presents a means for rapidly reloadyng the chambers of revolvers; it consists of cartridges secured together 80 that they C B ~ all bt. instantly inserted and the holding device removed. This pack affords a means by which the chambers of any jointed self-ejecting pistol can h e loaded +multaneously and in t h e e seconds. The need,of,Ruch-n *..pack for certain nod rapid reloading is absolutely necessary in Wiw, an'd ePpecinlly ithere the pijtol is used in hand-to-hand combat, where S U C C ~ S J * Ilepn<lsuiw)ii the rapidity with which it can be relowfed and diechar@d. Thew are t w o forms of packs; both are constructed upon the same principle.
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, THE KELTON DEVICES.

66

THE KEI.TON DEVICES.

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The pack !is durable enough to stand any kind of handling and W s portation, and if the parta are preserved they can be used many

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TEE CARBINE DETACEABLE MAGAZINE.

To.make carbine firing aa welLae infantry skirmish firing most ekective, if ia abwlutely necessary that there should be at least a detac ble magazine QU the carbine and rifle, for the p i t i o n of the soldier i n fi 'ng, either'on horseback or lying down as aakirmisher, makes it necessary for him to have his cartridges nearer the receiver of his rifle than they are when carried in his belt.. Hence a detachable magazine, having fide or ten cartridges, is suggested, to be, by a simple locking device, attached to . the gun in front of the guard and just under the receiver. Thus atta&ed, the cartridges will not be i n the way in manipulating the breech-bbck, and be in the most convenient place for the cavalryman to handle *hen mounted and tiring a t the gallop, or for the infantrym,an to use when in either the ,prone or supine position. It is designed that these cartridga be put up in caaea containingfive or ten at the men&, and PO transported and isaued to and carried on the pemn b f . the soldier. When one case is emptied, it can be instantly removed wid another taken from the belt and attached. I n this way is pro. vided a practical magazine, wh@h for the time being forms part of the ' rifle, and which in action may be thrown away after being emptied, but, o e n a r i l y , would be.replace?$n the belt to be subsequently refilled. The, belt will, i u d l y , carry nine mapzines. .. . . . The advan&,ges.derived from thie method-of supplying cart;l'dges to , themilitaryare: t. more can be,carried on the person than by any other method. t.the carbine a n d rihe.can-be more d i l y and conveniently loaded u the rifle, under the'receiver. than by a n y magazine attached t especiallv in skirmish firinp. p i s mag&> is baianced on the rifle, and is so situated that i t does not nterkre with its poise nnd balance. Its center of gravity being the vertical p.lsne through the axis of thg rifle, it will have no tendency to tarn i t in aiming and firhg-a result which must be inevitable when .- the magazine is attached on the side of the rifle, a position for it which I cannot fail tb prevent good firing. In this magazine the wood cannot swell so as tu fitsten in the cartrid*. nor will they fdl out by gravity or a n y ordinary jar when the un'covered m w i n e is turned with the cartfidgea heads downward ; yet they

into the rifle; hence they do away with the uge of the.present woven belt and the cartridge box. Each magazine is a c a r t r i d e b o r in itself, and for garrison purposes, nt a trifling e x p a w , one or two for each soldier can be mnde most attractive in a p p a r a n c e for dress occasions. h'ow the Ordnance Department i s u e a the cartridges twenty in a box ; . when they reach the soldier they are taken out singly and put. singly in his belt, and thence singly carried to the receivgr of the rifle. With the'magazine they go to the soldier and h b belt ten at 'a time, and from thence u u d w the repeiver of the rifle ten at a t i m g I n aimed firing aa skirmishers the soldier now, in order .to fire seven shots in. twenty-five seconds, is-obliged to karry four in his mouth;two in his band', and,one in the receiver. With this magazine he cau carry ten 1p r k c t i d l y ) in hie recei\.er. Hence it niay be.ex+ted he will fire ten aimed shots with thie magazine where lie iiow fires seven. It will be posihle to issue these maguines on the field of battle,looped on cppper wire or strong cord of such length that, if.the soldier g e e them at a time a!ien he c:innot dirpolh of then1 on his h l t , or in. excess of the runiber he can so (lisp& of, he can attach

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econoiny i n the I&r of from.the time theytwe put inta the m a p i n e e a t an arsenal they (lo not need handling till put

his belt. The loiking device for attachiug the magazines to tce rifle and the *. is strong. effective, simple n;d ecquorpical. There is now great need felt of 6ome such detachable magazindfot'the. il while in action it. ie,all i m p o r k n t . carbine and rifle on the, ~ k i r ~ d s lrauge; to render skirmishers more self-reliant and formidable. and the firingJne . . i s battle more dangerous. . L> The q e r i t s of .the one p r o p d . d e p e n d upon the position it. qccuph' on the.-rifie and carbine, the simple and inexpensive mesne of carrying them m the belt and attaching them to the rifle, and the means employed to retain the cartridges in their receptacles. . It is probably not necessary t o use more thaa two screws to fasten the locking-pla& to the magazine. A meting machine and crimping die wh' hwill a t the &me time punch the Qrewholes, simph and iueqknsive, constructed to make the magaziiie plates as rapidly as nails are made, and when mauufactured by machinery and i n large nurnberewill not-be much more expensive. The. more porous the wood the larger muat the cartridge receptacle8 be t o allow for the contraetiou thereof when exposed to dampness and rain. The magazine for war is preferably made of some light I @ , the material aud lolwr costing not more t h a u 16 to.20 cents. But even at that price, throwing away the w p t y magazines would only I w perrniarible in tbe heat of battle, when everything gives way to the exigencies of war.

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TEE K E L T O S DEI-IC'E:S.
THE CARBISE-F!I.ISG.

T H E K E L T O S D E L'ICES.
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The carbine-sling is macle to contaiu o n the front part eight receptpclea for pistol-packs, 80 that they will he nearest the Iian~l when dhe ' pistol is to bp reloaded; and the bnck of the Fling cnittiiiiis n ilotilde~ or single spring-hook, into which the carbine:when rrverwl an11 the swil,el fastened iuto a special Grew-riug i n the I n w r e i d t i f t h c git:ird-pl:ite, n b y be forcedfnuzzle up. Iii this pnsitiou it will cnalde the c:ivttlr!ntait! t o mount his horse w i t h o h difficulty and &bout h t g e r , cautil,t interfere with the'arm when the pistol is used, will not entaiigle the d e r w i t h his horse should he fall, aud will be in positilln tiir tire s h o u l t l lie tw throkn i or separated from his horse. The play of the carbine-swivel is limited to ii ntoverriritt of i>nIy ti 'e inches, by a s t o p strap fastened on the inside of the sling :ut11:ihottt tsv I I t y o n e inches -from .the buckle. The hm)k should be t i . t e t t q l ~ ~ ta1ti)kit t fifteen inches from the center of qore'nient of the swivc.1. :iid +oiiltl probably be covered with rubber or leather, to prrveiit it_f'ronr itijuritig the barrel. . 1 When tlie mrhine is ;lung on the hnvk tljr s w i v i ~ lA ~ ~ t t tw I ~ ilvt:icli&l l 'from the swivel-ring and fastened i t , a spp~cirdkitty i t , t h p .SIIJC~. PO p1:iced :is I tp_-&ure ita best adjuptment. By this arrangement it i3 not Imipwe(l to (lo away ~ i t l i ; o i ~ $carbine-hoot for carrying this wenpon when ~1(~t:icltc~l frit!tt tht. sling. . I t is only a aubetitute, at times, in lieu-of drt)ppittg the c w l i i i i c b i n t h e c.lt:trp . w i t i p i s t o m o n the nirrrch, or wheu dimorintecl, :in11 i i t 1 h - e of h m g ing it Over the shoulder in mounting, nn em;!-t w k w i t h :tit unniar~:~ge.al~lc . . horse. . . The bend of the h w k should .he sn great that the I):irrc4, :itirr entering, will have some play. This will prevent the carliine t'rwt jtilting out.J In firide; the carbiiie while itiounted, it should he tletached frtm the ' swivel. c While eight or nine rece1;tacles for pistol cartridge.; itlay he plrrced in . h n t of the sling, the auntber to be rarried ciin only lie deteriniued by actual experience. Nine pnckages of cartridge. w r i g h sis poitn~ls 4 s ' ounces, wh,ich may be too ntuch reigltt on the vilest and intcdt~re urtditly with respiration. Possibly four packs, twenty-tiiur c.artritlges, \rcighiug forty-four ounces, may be all that in any ertiergeiicy w i t I,? IIM.II. With only f6ur packs on the sling it may he p o d t l e to succes~fuilytire the car. bine attached to the mivel. i I ' The h t on~ the rear of the carhiiie-dlnp is in connection with the swivel-ring a t the end 6f the gtcclnl-ploh. and is adapted t(1 *ling the rarhine on the back, mozzle up, to conveniently iliepwe 4 it i n ntnuritine. :st timea on the marrh and a t drill, and in the charge with tlie pistol. Ihtli

hail& will u ~ u a l 'be l ~ required to sling the 'carbine ou the back. f i e entrance to the hell! of thehook is slightly snipller t,han the diameter of the carbine barrel.
~IIETAOD O F I.OCKISc; T H E C.\HUISPWrO THE J L I S G , MUZZLE U P
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~ a the w swiveI-ItooIi i u t o ttie riug preGaretI s i r it. Iht1, the carbine nnd reverse it till the niuzrle is betweeu the shoulderblades, i i + i i t < the w i v d att:tc!trueut as a fulcrum, arid hold it iu that p i - . tion; .at tlie Ealite tiiiie pi+ the left hand, palm outward, betweeu the back :Itit1 the slinz r t q r the hawk, i t i i ~ grasping the sling atid ttie barrel force it intt! ttte ~tiv'ik. 1Itc (*:trl>iite is disengiiyetl by the reverse nperatioit.

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\Vltilv i t t i .:lwcial intpcwtance is attacliecl t o the inethoil of sliiigiug tlic ' carbine, i t will. nt~vertticIcs, Iw fi,uuci a ntort (vinitiwtaMe' and couveuieut way of i l i ~ p i ~ s i ~ (it' t gi t :it times, aiid wht.ii so sluiig ~ $ wcure 1 better pistol practice tliati w l t e i i it is suspended liy the swivel.
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This belt contains I i K - k i t i g plates, to which any reqiired number of' magwines, contaliiny five or ten fiirtriilgw, ma>- be iii3tnutly attached, in the same secure manner as they lire 1 . i t h e c-arbiiie, andicau be iustahtly detached fbr use oil the carbine.

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I i t t d t - w t i w i wiffi t k rctltorridic deckrein atid Uw reluad?'!te,fdlo,c.iq order t ita9 tlericrjiw t / w pi& a i i / ~ titi, r r ~ r I ~ r ~ t r - c ~ a im ~q , iu Ig it ~& in mingle t a d , I dog ordrr id . w c ~ p t : ~~l I \ . First. -Severnl drills, yitltout amis, with the *check-qeiii attachment,. '. ! . . ' ti a t all paces. ' &m,d.-;\dv:ince at the \\-ilk, I1:ilting a t 20 yards, a j d i a i m a n 8 fire - 1 the'carbine witti Llank cartridges. \ Thirtl.--X&-ance' a t the gallop, h g t i n g a t each 109 !yards, orh aim 7 1 I aud fire the carbine with hl:ihk cnrtri FouMt.--Advance at the walk. a d gallop, :&th thk carbine slung muzzle u p or c a r r i d i n the boot., tiriu the pistol with ?lank cartiidgee '. ,, I without haltiiig. ' 1 ,?tjfJ~-.\d\'atw.e at the'.walk and gallop,.firi!s-the +bine; with h a l l -' cartridges, at t:irgets, coniiueucing a t 300 yards, h l t i u g Ik, aim 'aud' fire.. and contiuue the a~lvancetill within 100 yards of the &get, noting the , . riumber of hit?:
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8~~.-.~~lva :itnthe ~ ~gallop, e with the qrbine sluudor in the .boot, ' firing the pistol with bl;trtk .cartridges. noting the number that can, be fired by troops%racharge of 100 yards; alsu the n u n i b in a charge of 600 far&.
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No aim -no deliberate iim-can be takeii when firing finapwiee a t the gallop. The projection of the carbine in the true direction of the object and firing; are practically simultaneous motions. Hence no conimand of aim can properly he given. I n firing by vcillry, at the gallop, the only commands are: Fire by battalion (or ,company). Kendy,
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Fidy.-Advance at the gallop, firing the carbine P i l a p w i s e a t targets, commencing at 600 yards therdrom, without halting, the carbine detahhed from the ewivel, using ball-cartridges ; dropping o r clinging carbineat 200yard~distant.andfiring the pistol up to 10 yards of the target, .nOting.thenumber of hits.

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M A R C H I N G CAVALRY.
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BYBRIGADIER CESERAL I T. MEKIUTT.

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ilk this country, estalllishes the fact that the distances laid down by Europeans 88 a forced march for that arm ( twenty-five miles a day ), is II,O more than *ell-marched cavalry call accomplish for six days in every week in a ,campaign. This distance should be makhed in from five to six hours,including halts. A longer time than six hours spent on the road in marching twentyfive milea, is a positive detriment to a ravalry command. Ally shortening of the time to less than five hours, depending on iiicreaeed rate of march ing, would probably result in iiijury to the horses. 4 It is proposed to state in ctetail how this niarch for cavalr; should be made. -. Cavalry in ordinary marches can ?nd s~iouldstart 0x1 the march, for nine of the longer day nionthsof the year,)!. half past sixor seven oclock, and for the winter months, about an Iiour later. This leaves ample time, after a sessonable reveilte, for care of the aniiiids, breakfast for the men and packing of the wagons or pack mules. Every duty of the camp on the niarch should be performed by trumpet &ills,k u n d e d under the direction of the commanding officer. First, Reveille, then Stables, T h e General, Book and Saddlea, Mount and Forward. The hour for the first of dew,followed at once by the second, is designated I Breakfast is taken by the men The General and the call Commandieg Officer, and eounded ports after his breakfastyor the purpose. This is more important than it may at first thought seem. The Commanding Oflicer must regulate these calls by the state of preparation, which some mornings, depending on i h e weather and other matters, will advance more rapidly than on others. No one call should ever be eoundI

EXPERIESCE in m a r c h i n g a v a l r y conirthncls

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ed until the dutiea pertaining to the call which has gone before, are comf the General ! is sounded before breakfist is over. or Boots pleted. I and Saddles before the camp equipage is packed. corifusiim, ill-temper and a badly conducted preparation ensue, which will effect the conimand, worse. perhaps than one would,imagine, for the whole day. A half hours delayin leaving camp is better than a n ill-conductetl rudi, which will get the command out of camp at the preconceived hour, hut leaves horses an$ pen fretted and uncomfortably packed for the ni:irch. I09 much attention cannot be given- to the tone of a c a v a l g c o n i p n d tbr k march. . It is not too much to say that of two commands whkli march with similar o~itfita, that the horses of that command will best endure the f?tigues of the march (all other things being equal) which is in best t o n e and temper during the march. En the preparation and start, aswell a3 in the smallest details of the marcb,the closeit supervision of the Cornmancling Officer must be exercised. As no call sliould.be sounded until the duties of the one which precedes i t are practically completed, no one ehoiil~l,be allo*ed to anticipate the duties pertaining to a call. No horse z l i o u l J be saddled. with the exception perhaps of that of-theOrderly Trumpeter, until the signal sounds, * when all are addled. It mnybe n e e m $ for nien i n the troop to saddle, at the call, horses of men who are at headquarters packing the baggage and mew kits. This should be atten&dcto in the troop, and the details carefullyregulated by the troop officers. A s soon a3 the G e n e r a l sound;, one or more troop officers should r e p i r .ti) tlie troop groiinds and superintend the details of everythinfi till the ni:irch l)c.gins. . &jots and . Baddles .is the Inst call sounded nt gen&il 1 i c : i ~ I ~ ~ i t : i r tu~nrtsi l the nxirch comnwiicei. Here i t may bc remarked that Boots :;tit1 S;idtlles, withip the b u t any preiimtnaiy call; is an alartu; It cover9 the s i i J ~ ~ ~ i tot* h o d s , forming ranks and niouuting, without any other. conimanda from headquarters. On the march, unlesa orders are i n t i m e to the contrary, it covers the sanm amount of preparation, and ia follow .en the as to Forthe ward from headquarters, orders having already been order of the troops in column. It may he remarked that ill large commands the preparation, except in1 the lending hattalion, would stop at leading into ranks and standing tu horse, as care niust always be taken in cavalry, that no officer or trooper a b u l d remain mounted unnecwarily. The column in route should habitually be a column of fours. \Vith large commands the double column of foum.can be used Q&&anugee. Less tbao the column of fours should n e v e r b permitted OD the march of a command greater than a troop, and as a matter of practice, it is believed that even e+ emall a fo& aa a e p ebbuld habitually march in this wlumn. I n commands not larger than a battalion, an increased distauce ou the 4 . between troops, depending upon the avoidance of dust, may

.be perniitted, though the distauce should never be so p a t as tu interfere

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with the ctlnipact march, (LP R unit, of the command. T h e active interest in every incident ot the march must begin with d l the offjcersdJf :I c ~ i l i i i i i uthe moment the Forward is sounded. h i t officer who tlirows himself into the saddle aid listlessly settles into hi. haupclies fur tho-to Iiirii-diill routine of a niurch, is badas an ex:inipIv and useies i n coutrol l k t e r for the comniautl that he ehoitld make the march roHeil ilia I)l;iiiket iu 1111 :tiiibulance. The tnen s h ~ u l d be required to sit u p CUI their horses. and n d l n l l i n the slcLlle. The column of fourz iuid o t i tlitiicult r o d s made to spread out, iakiug should I* k e p t cl~ised, t pisct~s, through brush or over qrossings, aud to diverpiiig trails i i h j ~ bad pass a h i d of. mtlwr tliiiu to rein u p and wait to follow in single file, the troopers w h o have pursued the direct pmcticiible. trnik. + i l l this r y u i r e a close atteutim i i r i t l activity fin tIie parkof the troop office.. iAt the vi111 of tlie firit hhur the column is halted for ifrbm &n to fifbe 1 hshitual, arillthe men and horses of a coniteen minutes. lliis ~ 1 1 1 i n 1 ~ ninnd sIiouI~Ibe tmiiicd to espect it. Duriug this halt the saddleshould t x ntIjusted : i 1 1 t I the i i i e i i ~aIioiiIiI be encoumge:ecland required, if need be, to t i 9 to tile rear, which should riot he allowed a t oqer t i m e a h t h e niarch, iitiless ii triicplwr is eick, in which case it would gederally be better to.send him to ninrch with the train, ynder the care of ttQ surgeon. If the conirnantl starts from camp a t 7 oclock it will 8:15 +fore it marches after the first halt, and h i l l h a w left to n i a d h about twenty-one niiles out of the twenty-five for the clay. Each hour after the first, the halts-should lw not longer than five minutes, or better, at the eecond hnlt, sftip f;)r :I i i i i i i i i t ~ or two, then move forward on foot, sounding the I Forwsrtl, :ind stviipin; out briskiy. After leading for fifteen or twenty niinutes, h d t tor :I i i i i i i t i t e Iir two, then mount and move forward at the trot h r tittwn i i i i i i u t c c . after which resume the walk till the completion (it the how. lliese exercises repeated each hour of the miarch, will give a ueeded variety, lighten the work on both horses and men, prevent saddle sores a n 4 chafing, atid coniplete the. march, IW a short .calculation will show, inside tlie time abnve specified. The trot h n be taken u p to ad\ vantage for ten oc more niinutes, twice or oftener during each of the last three hours of the march, so that the hours march will cover about six miles of the route; n9r will the gallop for from seven ta ten minutee be found to be an injury, in a well-conducted command. , . It is not posible to complete an article on this subject without repeating rules, wliich, iu order to be enforced, must be constantly repeated. I Permit 111) man to leave the ranks mounted. . . Permit no horse to be writered, officers or privates, wve when all nre watered. There is no stream ahere in watering there ia not r w m generally for

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a b&&iun of cavalry to water, if the officers superintend and to be done properly. I n larger streams which are fordable, the , tmope,should be marched nearly to the further bank and formed and left front into line before being permitted to drink, thus leavin mom for the troop in re+ to make a like formation in the middle of t$ * ,h . and ale0 near the. hitherbank, so that in a stream eighteen 9 twenty feet wide, you may h i v e a double column in m m , consbting df homes drinking a t once. fmm eix to eight t r o o p of cavalry, all ps ehould be marched out fro& hundred yards if need be, the prdor noncommissioned officers in adplaces for watering, and to direat .their troop to t h e places by signal. .+ . ICdoea pot require an elaborate dalculation to show how much time i s * how trying it is to h u e mved with a little of a column to halt on a \-i . the command for the leading the way for a columq the bripk of a stream to of hundrede of d r y and dusty-throated horses in tP, rear, when a little . care would perrpit all to diink at the same time. I c b My d v i q to an ofticer commanding a march is to arrest au officer or , c o n h e a trooper who wilfully neglects attention to the smallest. detailb of the march, so necemary to ,the preservation of the en$,urance of the

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. Z men and h o w i 2 . . e The foregoing 4~ been &itten with the understanding that forage for .the h o r n is curried with the command or obtained at thecamps. f f the command ie to eubeiet by grazing, the length of the march, as well as ita d e w , muat be modified. Not unfrequently in marches on eampaign a * d r y command makq an unforseen halt for half an hour or more. In these caaea a m f d commander will select the llalting place aa far aa may be where the pasturage i s beet and form in column on the grasa, requiring the boxsea to be unbitted 80 that they may graze with &Facility. During v q k an enforced halt of this character dear a grain field or stored forage can be umd to give the mhla a much-needed feed. A command, large or 4 , &odd never remain mounted for even a short halt. A last caution k, a cavalry commander accompanied by a train is, never to permit a w n to leave camp or to occupy the mad until the command bae

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distance is not more than I00 miles, the usual halta at the end of each of. the ti& f a r or five hours must be made as in ordinaty marching, and during the entire niarch n hich should be made in 30 houra or leas, there shou!d be not lese than t w o grand halta to feed and refresh both homes and meu. I n these, which should last for, two houra each, the h o w ,should be unsaddled and permitted to roll and feed or lie down as they prefer. These halts should be pack on the completion of the first and second thirds of the march, tlepeiidiug on the advanugea of water and otherwise fit stopping places. If the distihce to be accomplished is more than 150 milea, th forced-, march should commeuce at the rate of uot to exceed fifly rpilea o$ each day, and beyonti 200 miles, the mnrches should be reducedto forty and even thirty miles per day. These m~rchcs. i t is hardly necessary to say, refer to commands of horses and men which are in the best possible condition for marching. This coudition in garrisou is obtained by subjecting a command to the usual garrisou duties aud daily mounted drills, in the rbsence of whjch there should be at least two hours exercise on the road h r the horsesof a command. E,asy caiupaigu marches of from ten-to fourteen milw per day, are good in preparing both homes ,dnd men for. forced. marchen. Without this prepamtion, a command will BO! be able to make the marches, either campaigu or forced, and an attemp1 to accomplish eveu &portion of the distances mentioned must result in the deatrudion of a cavalry command through disabling or killing the Lo=. The following, 89 illustrations of forded marchea, ara extracted from different source3 as being of interest on the subject; it should be remarkedthat the instances are not intended aa even plete list of the many long distance marches, now of ill yur own service; aliiiost every Indian dampaign of t the last half century had one or more forced marches \\ hich illustrate the endurance and pluck of.the Ameri the capacity of the cavalry for i legitimate work * Letters regarding cavalr by Prince KEA

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FOBCED YABCHEB.-

Cavdqiu eltigencies can march for from three to five days at the rate of CO m i l ai n 24 houra A &@e march of not to exceed 100 mileacan be aammpliehed in 24 to 30 hou T h e manner of marching in making h r c d march& plust depend J t h !t o t a l distance t u be made. I f the

During the battle of Columbey-Nouilly, 14th-Aug ron of dragoons of the guard, pursued a body of French Toul, and eummoned the town to s u r r e n d T On the 15 received orders to give u p the brigades of d temporarily, a n d m the Ifith, these horsemen battle of Mars-la-Tour. The writer says: We more rapid march fipm 3 idly of cavalry, fo Marsla-Tour is 32 miles in a n air line. On the 27th, some of the boldeat cav

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the appeadnce of the troopers sild the state of their horses. The piatoons were reduced, however, by six or seven filw. hach Sotnia had left sixteen or twenty horses' en route, which. for the moot part, rejoined (luring the day and proceeded at once to fbnl the \'irtnla. See ' L T n raid .c sur la Vistuls, Rerue Militailire de 1 ' E : t r : i i i p ' 'Duriag the I l u s i a u C'onceiitrtltion iii h+;ir:itin' n brigide of cavalry Otlesa, ~ I I O i i l c s . See " Les marched in two days from R i c h e i i e t f ' ~ Tendences Xctuclles de l a C'acallerk H_usr." Three Sotuim of Oural Cossack-. Inarching over rontli wivered with m o w . made 46, 50 niid 56 miles each i n a single day. See Irivdide RUSW No. 231, 1883. I n the Riwian autunin rnaueuver- of 18q3, det:ichnieut- of c~ivalry made 200 and 300 niiles i n five dnys. I n our own service there are many instance.: of IonF-Aistattce marches. familiar to officers of cavalry experience. Some of the nienihers of this rissociation having been psrticipants i n thehe mardier. Tlit.se it i t not I necessary to enter into in detail. The cavalry of our service owes iniich to that prinde of raralrp officers, General P. ST. GEO. C'imsn Bc4tler being n m w t accomplished tactician he was especially successful i n innking lorig marches rnpidly and with niost perfect preservation of hir liwcez. T h e writer of this hah the good fortune til scronipany Gen. C'OOKE 88 ' a staff officer in the niarch of the coiiiniaitil i i i from Utah in the slimmer of 1861. The comnland, wliicli c*iiti-izte(l ot' infiintry. olivalry and artilIery, marched from Cednr Y:iIIey. Iwycintl s a l t Lake C'ity. to Fort Learenwcirth by forced marchez, aitcl while thr details'of the march are not obtainable, it is recalled that the hone- i)f tlic cw:ilry mid artillery, though. little forage was fed, were in bctter isorking order on the conipletion of the march than they were on its-iuctydoii. made m a n y The same accomplished cavalry ofticrr, GcriernI CO@KE:, marches distinguished for their succe~sas loiig dismncefiiarches. . One recorded in the history of the 2d Dragoons, with a qiiagron 100 strong, from Lawrence. Kanms, to Fort Riley- II distnnce of niitkty-eight milesw a s accomplished in less than. twenty-eight hours.:!; Our Civil IVar furnishes many instances of successful h a i i c e ma cavalry. In fiict, a 'forccd presupposed a l i k mnrrh of the cavalry of the other. STUART'S Chambersburg raid with artillery and cavdky, 1,800 Rtmng, /'. - . was made at the rate of eighty miles in twenty-seven holtw.
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French army, anil their reports establislied the t h c t l h a t its corps were iu

.thb neighborhood of V'ouxiers. One of these officers must have niaile o n that d a y nearly 86 t i i i l e s . " '&Afterthe enpgernenta of Arteuay aut1 Orleans and the capture o f
that place on Octobe; 1 Ith, >h.e 241 anil 4th cavalry divi~ions pursued the enemy 34 miles to the Saulclre nntl toryards Blois and Marchenoir, %herd they were met atid stopped bk fresh. itrdintry." " W e require'pbavaIv to traverse L'Y rniiw per day, for two or three coniwutive days. There have been c:wes where detaclirneuts have had to march greater distances i u a cliiy. I For instance, the 150 ulaiis of Thctr" in@ made 32 or 53 miles oii Jiily 1.5, 18M3.~~ " W e see our officer's patrub iiiukitig as much as 84 m i l a i u a sitigle day.. ,In the allvance on Challiiid, i n lrC70, the atlv:inced Prumiaii cavalry C divisions made 8a milqs iu iwo clay:. " The folloying is given s t h e methot1 of 11 finced march ot' 31 miles ,in the German army for a division of.cavalry : 4 About 2. miles at a w u l ~ half , an hour. A b u t 2.33 miles a t a trot, quarter ,if au hour. A*t. 2. d e s a t a walk, half nu hour. . :-.About 4 5 miles a t a trot, hilt' ail hour. About 2. miles at a walk, half au hour. Ahout 2.35 !ides at a trot, quarter of an li~ntr. About 2. tuilea a t a walk, half an hour.
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. . l i . niiles in three and a half Iiouw, with lialf an hour's time for short halts. Grand halt of two or three IiouM About 2. . miles at a walk. half an hour. About 2.33 miles a t a trot, quarter of an hour. . ,miles a t a walk. half aq,hour. About 2 8. About.2.33. miles at a trot, quarter of au hour. niilb a t a walk, half an hour; A b u t 2. A b u t 2.33 miles at a trot, quarter of an hnuf. miles at a walk,.balf a n hour. Ab& 2.
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16. miles in three a d a qunrter hours, with 30 minufer short halta, thua making 31 or 32 miles in ten410) hours. During this march the cavalry divisions should be passed froiu foriliation oE=march, to that of combat, once each day. H e r e are instancesof " fttrced marches " in the Russian service : "In 1884 two Sotniaa of Don Coesacks made 318 miles in threejdays under the worst conditions aa regards roads and wpther. On the arrival of the detachmentth'ey were inspected by Gen. GOURKO at the w d k , trot and charge. The Commander-in-Chief shoped hirueelf fully satisfied with
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. ' I niarrbcd wilh a r e g i ~ e n o t n large horse$. wilbuut a single feed f s f grain. taentp-two J<,r#rnal Mililq miles a day f o r niuety.nine dtayc " - G m p . .St i;,.,rgr r94'. I . . .-. A . . ~ I $ T S m k c Itvtilrrliuti o/ the r. P . .LVo. X 1 . I .
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One of the moet successful forth marches. of modern times was that made the mHef of the TEORNBURQ command by a battalion of the 5th Cavalry in the autumn of 1879; Several officers, menilwre of this a L w o 1 ciation, were participants in that march. 'The distance hccomplished was 170 measured miles. The time f r o m ' l l A. N. October 2d, to 5:30 A. at. Oatober 5th. TWwaa at the rafe of Gxty miles per day for two ,'and threequarter days. This march is mentioned as heirig peculiarly eucceasful for, in brief. the following reasone: . Pid.-The distance accomplish4 in the time. -No horses' were lost or disabled on the march, and there were nodceably no &re-bnck horns afler its completion. Third.-The command-men and horses-were in good condition for service a t once after the march. ID mviewing the foregoing m e is impre-sed with the siruplicit? of the problem to be solved in order to march successfully, cav:tIry or niixed commands for long dietancq, or for continued niarcli~sof the ordin:iy camhi@. Everything, is compreheuded in the word+, e o j ~ - t a dcure OJ' h often our horses are sacrificed hy the neglect ( J f thir. k. TOO I quots in conclusiomfrom a letter receatly received from General COOSE, who ixp: "Any unusual succe59 I may have bad in cavalry marches, I euqmct mag be attributed to my constant thoughtfulness sod attentionmy g&tiintpeat feltlin- the welfare and comfort o t Imwd atld met&- I fearh that order."

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MARCHING CAVALRY.

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D E S I R E to invite the attention of the Association fbf a few momenta this evening to some remarks upon the uek of the carbine and pieto1 on horseback ; to discus the q u e t i o n t h e t h e r buch use id advisable at all, and if so,to what extent and how far it should 9 k e the place of the msber and lance. The U. S. Cavalry is at present armed with the saber, carbine and pistol-the two latter breech-loading fire arms, the.arnmlfnition contab$ in metallii: cartridge cases. I t is to be taken for granted that we are to use all these a r m in Borne I way or other, and it would seem that definite rules for their use should be laid down by the proper authority. The fact that widely different-opinions hs to the proper use of each arm, and in some cases asjto whether the arms are useful at all prevail, makes the subject a diflicult one.' T h e rapid? i w p e r n e n t - h fire a r m since the introduction of rffled weapons, which is afin goidg'oa;8ee'med at one time likely to lessen greatly the value of the cavalry arm. T h e wars of the last quarter of a century h a r e dissipated that th-y, b u t have led to a great deal of discussion as tb ita proper use. he rtgards thegeat v d u e of ita work a screening and reconnoitering force there ie noques tion. As to its value as a dragoon force, opinion in this T u n t r y Lire e n favorable, but has not yet obtained very general a c c e p m c e in hurop. AB to whether it can hereafter appear in heavy maaeee and by charging i n line or column affect the fate of battles. is still a matter of doubt, be determined only by future,\Fnm. Modern cavalry may be lonselydivided into heavy and light cavalry; the foriiier armed with piatol and saber and, in mme casea,with the h c e ; the latter, with pistol. saber aud a tarhine. Tn moat, of the continental arrnic; the carhilie has been added tn'the equipment of the heavy cavalry, 90 that the two hndie. are practimlly armed alike; the principal difference being in the weight of the men and horses. This is notbbly the caee i n

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I the army of Russia, where within a few years,-all the lancer regimentp, except aLfew it^ the Imperial Guard, have been converted into dragoons. The universal acknowledgment that a fire welipon i.2 neciwwy to the cavalry being recognized, the question ariees w to \vhetlier ita use shqll he confined to the.caihine on foot, or the carbine or pi5tol. i>r l ~ ~ ~ t h ~ -i ~ i lh wa l l be used Mounted. Looking back a t the action of cavalry froin the iiitroduction of,fire a r m to the present time, we fin11 that their u5e on horseback, though often resorted to, has been i n the ~.m(l gcuernlly ciintlenined, ahd that during those periods iu which niouuted tire Iins I)eeii n i o S t taught aud practiced, the cavalry has accomplish& l e h anti lwei1 :It its lowest p i n t in- public estimation. On the other hniid, irn(1r.r the iiiHueiice of ADOLPEWS, FH~DERI TItE C KC ; w . i T , SIX)such reformerv as GCRTAVUS LITZ. >IURAT and others, who steadily f o r l d e such use, it att:iineil t o g h t celebriix. Early in the sixteenth century the petrotiel, the first fire weapon used hy cavalry, WIS nhantloned :ind the anjuebus t , i wlicel lock eubjtituted. The petroilel was in reality a small 1i:irttl chinoin, tirctl I)? a match ; the stock rested against the cuiriws anti the n i i i u . 1 ~\ \~: I < iiipportpd by a crotch which stocwl up from the poiiilncsl (if tlir - : i ~ l ~ l l v . 'l'tia> whet4 lock was R cousiderable ad\*auce an the petrotit~l,I j i i t w i \.tar! ~ -ioii re'placed by the pistol, which is generally used hy the r:tr:Jrr, ;it111 i; k ~ ~ r n v i i to have been used by thp German Reitcre, at that tinic the fiirt~nio.~t csvalry in Europe. as early as the bnttle.of St. Iiuentiri i n 1557. Tlie systerii o f the Reitem .weme.to have consbtetl i i i fiJrming io sllimdrnH9 of from ten to sixteen ranks in depth, and riding up Githiii raticv I J the ~ eiicniy at a walk or trot.. The first rank theu tired'twn stints each, whirled outward from the rghtre r\nd firmed &ti rear c S tlie lakt rank. where they . reloaded their pistols. The second rank took u p the tire :is solin a3 unmahked by the fiqst, and so on* throughnut the column. This p v e considerable weight to their tire, but i t was swn overccinic II? the Freiich I a t rpectl cavalry, which adopted the custpm of charging i n I I ~ I D Ithklii with the saber, and generally succ8eded i n Fouting them. L t e r in !tie century a custoni ar?Gnf drawing!up tlit> r:ivalry i n t \ w lines, with a considerable interval between t h e d -tlie tirst line arnied with $stols'delivei.etl their fire, tvlieeled about piid retired xrouiiil the flanks of the second line, which ttie'n c.harpl h o k e with the lance or \ saber. .* 4. t About the middle of the sixteenth century the cnrhiiie rame into but in quite general use, and very much the same tactics were etiipli~ye~l, all, or nearly all the illstances of which we h a r e :illy recviral, t h t . c*arl,iiier$ seem to have been w i l y defeated by thc regular cnv;dry. >IOT4 k: \ i l l his " R i s eof the Dutch 'Hepublic," gives :I riotahlt. instatic0 (,t' thik kiiid a t the lmttle of Mmkerheyde iu 1554, where the carl)inevre cd' C'ouut.
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LOUIS of Sas*au, after defeating the Spanish carbineen, were charged by the cuimwierr and lancers, while wheeling to reload, and utterly destroged . So in 1.590, at the I)attle of I r r y , the German b i t e & , after delivering, ' their fire were retiring to reload, the Freuch cavalry &ed the moment to ChargeJrovc thein hack in confusion on their secdnd line of- h w w * K OF E 1\IAYENxE, whicq wfw thrown into cava\lry. coinm:lodetl by the ~ such disqrlrdcr thnt they were unable to charge with ady effect, and l h e 1 OF ~ ' A V A R R E . battle was won hy HESKY In thy ..eventeenth century, GKSTAWS ADOI~PACS, t h e great king of Sweden, s p p a r c d ti1)on the scene and introduced manphenefirial reforms; ' i s he found them, were-of the verpjclunirieat clexripThe cnraky tuctns. : tion ; the q u m l n i n s (if great depth, t h e men heavily armed nnd eqnipped, scarcely ahle t o niove out of H walk, and relying hlmost entirely ,tipon . tlieir tire arnw. Tlie Saetlish king reduced the depth.nf the .yuadrnns, at tirat t i l fi)ur i i i i ~ lnfrcrwirila to three ranks. H e diredted that the front rpiik, after tiring cine viilley from their pistols, sholildj draw ~rrber~? rind cqiargt;. iii-te:ul IJt' rvtiriiig to reload? After charging, !hey rallied to the rcttr, : I I ~ tlic . ~ w e i i ~ thin1 l, :uid fourtn lines folloaetl in khc mnie. inaniier. , to have been only a dniprontise on the T h i j lire : i c . t i o l i . s ~ v ~ t i i . +however, kin:'. 1i:it-t w i r h rlit. 1irtavioib dispomition to u s ? fire-arne o ~ l y . f i e constaiitly inc.iilc.uttvl tlic LWV ; T t h e %her in h a d to I{anil. conflict, nnd ta\i;ht his troo\wr< tli:it i t WLQ to a proper use of that kcnpon I ' that they . were 1,) look f ~ i r-IIIY.CS~. I n 11i4.3 tlic g t u t ( ' O N ~ W still further revived the widit nf the cavalry servictx. ant1 cycvi:illy hy his conduct a t the battle of Ijocroy, which was gaiiieil nlnlc)at tsnKirtaly by the action of the cavalry led by C'OXDE in p r son; in a Feries ( b t ' terrific. clinrges. . . cdme near suffering a very' s e r i ~ u sdefeat at to the directly opposite action of Marshal ' his cavalry, and i h o received the cliiirgc. of the ctit>iity'+cavalry with a carbine fire a t $ halt. DE GR.txzros.r wa.s roiltr(1 s i i t l purs!ted in u t t e r disorder, and only hy ' the Itlost vigoroil$ rscrti*inP.of C ~ S Dwas E s ~ ~ c c eobtained. ss 111 the 4,:trly p r t of the' 18th century. 3Iarlhorougb's cavalry, unde: I,nr(l ('irrry, during the battle of Blenheim, were attacked hy the French them with the saber, the cartiintw-s, tiring nii,iinted. CITTH char+ fi)rcc.s beiiig alriiit rqnd and easily defeated them. I+ter in the same Iiattlc N a e h a l TALI..~RX) directed a force of over ten lthousaad k'r6nch cavalry to make an etbrt to retrieve the fortune of the: day, hut BR they again :itteniptril t o -re& Marlhorough'e cavalry hy airnounted carbine fire a t a h:tlt, they i w r e tidtlen ckrw aud R large proportion, including T . i i . t . . \ H D Iiiiiisclf, were forcal to s'drrender.
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CHARLEE THE TWELITII and -Marshal SAXE continued the efforts tiow being made to make the c a v d r y a more mobile and active force, but it wan reserved for FREDERICK TAE GREAT to bring the cavalry arm to , perhape the highest state of efficiency it had ever reached. His timt great change according to DENLBOX was to prohibit ahwlutely the u ~ e ot fire arms mounted, and-to compel his troopers to rely entirely upou the use of the saber in the charge at full speed. T h e world waa Boon finging with the fame of his horsemeu, and out C J f cleclare9, thnt twenty-twogreat battles fought by FREDERICK -NOLAS tifteen were certainly won by his cavalry. I t was not fireaetion mounted that gave the cavalry tltic riilLrterfrrl pJitiuD, for FREDERrCR had positively prohibited it and Major Generill \ v ~ H , o n eo4his beat officere,after SEYDLITZ and % I m f i E s , rays distinctly : Experience has convinced me n more than a hundred occasioils, filr I have never seen a sqbadron d e d upon ita fire, that it ha- uot l ~ c t i overthrown by that wbich came pon it, at speed, without firing. I n the latter wars o f the 18 ntury, we find no advanc-e upori the I n the American Revolution the cavalry f(JrCC of idem of FREDERICK. eitherside was small i number apd ita duties chiefly of a partisan nature. I n the battles of that,conflict, it exexked little influence on the result. The mme may be said of the early battles of the French Itevolution. and it wae not until 8 A P O L E O N was firmly aeated on the throne, tllnt tlltb cavalry, again conforming to the maxims of FREDERICK, SEYDI.ITL and ZIETEIEN,took ita proper ptace. NAPOLEON, DENISON says, hadza very high opiuion of the card r y mrvice, and understood thoroughly all the various phases of its duty N o man kliew better the importance of light cavalry for coreriiig the movementa of an army. and for searching out, and watching the tnarclie-~. and deaigns of tbe enemy. He Boon changed the system of orgctuizatiort in the Frencb army and gathering together the scattered regirireiits of horse, formed them into brigdes, diviaiona, and finally, into corps darmec. The t m p e were taught to depend on the saber and lance, arid e v w the drsgoons and carbineera were ridcipally employed as light cavalry though they occasionally diemounted to fight on font. We have no record of their ever using the carbine on horsebat#, and towards the close of hi* reigir any of the dragoon regimen@ were ccinverted into lancers -the laiicer at this time i n c r e d in poptilariiy and attained great importance ah a charging weapon. From the peace of 1815 no new principle WG introduced isvolving the action of mounted troops, until the introduction I J ~ breech4oading anus. , Dyriiog the great Civil War in the U. S., the cavalry were generally armed with t b breechhading carbine, Colts or Remingtons *zvolver and the eaber.

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These tire nrnis, however, were by no means equal t t J the arms now in use, being supplied with paper or muslin covered cartrid$-, and fired by means of a p e r w s i o n cap. The infantry, with the erceptiou of a few regirltents armed with the war e with Sharp breech-loader or the Spencer magazine gun, t i ~ u g h t ~ u t t t h , the old niuzzle loading rifled niusket. I n the charge the s&er vas genqrally used, and more especially by the cavalry of the Army of the Iotomac. In outpost skirmishes and atfairs of Jmall partjes, the pistol was often used in the charge. The Confederate cavalry were mere -eabecially given to the use of this weapon. Both sides used the carbine on foot to a great extent, being conipellecl to in the first instance by the itatlire of the country, which \vas generally rough. covered with high stake aud rider fences, or stone walls, and often densely wooded. .\nother reastm for the great use thdt was made of the carbine, isaoubtless the fact that the volunteer cavalry, in the early days 07 the war had not yet acquirtd sufficient confidence. in themselves as cavalry to attempt inounted 6ghting. This is illustrated by the fact that pretty nearly all the saber c b r g e a during the first years fighting were made by the regular regiment(. \chich, of couree, cherished a truditiwal foitdnes- for that weapc8K iuntmices, I can mention the affair a t Eairfas Court House, under ];$ut. TOYPKINB, of t h e 2d, or.@ it is now known, 5th Cavalry; the charge of the 1st Cavat Nilliamsburg, and of bhe 2d Cavdry, under alry, under Col. GIUEK. a,t Beverly F o ~ d . ~ I ~iii t ethe r sar this-* Captain, DOH General ~ I E H H I T T distiuction in a great measure ceased to exist. and there *ere no mnre gallant charges t h a u were ntade by the volunteer regimelit, wnd brigades. I allude to i t simply to draw attelltion to the circuitistartee that *our cavalry improved in tlriil a i d gained iiexperience, their GOUW was not in the direction of mounted fire action, but of thc use of tbe saber. Where it was necesgary from the nature of the grkud or for other ressone to fight on foot, they fought on foot and used tHeir carbinerito g m l ]wrpOBe, b u t wheti the condition+ permitted nlounted fighting, the carbine aa a rule remained in its socket, and the men drew saber. It is only neces sary to point to the actioir of the 1st and A d Cavalry fi-visions at WinChester, Cedar Creek, \Vwd-tock and the Fiye Forks ccrtnpaign to prove the truth of this amertiou. I n the great valley of Virginia during the mntpaignxof 1863 a n d in several battle3 of the campaign ii< the Shenaiidoahin b864, there were many occasions where our cavalry hrui a clear remember did they uw the carbine m o u n t 4 m i o n a l l y and the eaber often. I n individual . niishea, encounters of small advanced parties, &., the &bine wan o c a sionally used. Also in advanciug with the heade of coluqbns covered by a
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force of mounted skirmishers, the carbine was often employed ' to hHstcn the retirement of the enemy's skirmishers, or to cover our own retiring fibrces when the conditions were r e v p e d . I remember some vety effective work of this king by the 1st and 34 Cavalry Divisions; in the valley,. near Rearneysville, i n August, 1861. ' The cavalry corps+&nving out on a reconnoisance, had run u p agaiust, not anly the Confederate caralry which was to be expected, but a very large force of Confederate infantry, advancing towards the Potomac under General EARLY in person. I t \vas of course necessary to fall back, a n d long linea of mounted skirmishers (*overed the' retiring columns and by their fire succeeded in keeping the Confederate infantry a t a fairly respectable distance, and enabled us to save'our trains and artillery, though one brigade under CPTER wnc cut otf fmm the rest, and forced across the Potomac, at Shepherdstown. I n this case the mounted fire wag certainly valuable, and perhaps the ouly thing t h k & u l d have succeeded. T h e enemy's forces included RHODES', N'S divisions of infantry, with cavinimensely superior in number, that a u ing to fight on foot, would certainly

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charging fpce would have been extravagant h compared with any nclvantages likely to be obtained. ,Asit was, the enemy was kept at a rea.+ onable distance during the movement, the morale of the fiori*ewas 'not , iiijored in the slightest degree, and the object of the recnnnoikulnce wafully attained. O f course if a n enterprising cavalry command, sufficiently Ntrong in nombera to make a n i m p m i o n , had been present, the dispnsition would not hare answered, but aa i t happened, the main force of the LEE, was otherwise emConfederate cavalry, under General FITZHUGE ployed: a d what tf& waa in the neighborhood, did not think i t aclvisable to precis us. I n similar casea advancing or retiring, a cavalry force might occrwipnally accomplish ita object with more fircility, than in a n y other way. Witli such possible object in view, there is, in my mind, no question as to the propriety of drilling the men in the use of their fire armsrniountetl, hut i t should be fiilly understood that such use was to I x exceptional, and that their main dependence would be the saber when mounted. FREDERICK THE GREAT, although e o bitterly oppoeed to firing in line niounted, that he prdered that a n y officer authorizing it should be immediately cashiered, still d i k t e d that his troopere should be thoroughly inetructed in the u w of their 6re arms on hor@mck. His idea seems to h a r e bee? that any tiring in line, teaded to weaken the soldiers' faith i n the superiority of the charging weapon, and that therefore it was to IK
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discouraged. His.reliance was placed undoubtedly on the lancc or mlwr in connection with the shock, and the shock was not obtainable with the tendency to halt to aim, which the act of firing n crrbine niouuted, induced. i * . A n instance of the determined use of tlq different weapons empbyetl, mice came under my observation towards the elow of thq war of the Rebellion. A squadron of the 17th Peunsylvaoia Caualty, sfas onlercd from 6 \\'inchester to Martinsburg. Va. When about half wayqnd while marching in column of foura, having just pawd the village of unker Hill, tlie cavalr)? squadron was attacked by an apparently equal force of o*I~Y's The latter were d r a u p in line along the edge of liawy woods, a b u t t w o hundr yards from the road, and poured i a lieavy volley froni their carbines as the Union cavalry came u p abreas . Inimediately thq after, th6y drew pistols and charged as fomgers, firing pidly approached. The officer in conimand of the Union cavalry took tlic trot and gained a piece of o p n ground, on which his a d r iced party hail . halted, wheeled into line,,drew d e r and charged. TI e defeat of the Confed-erate cavalry followed almost immediately. Thei nien had scat. tered in the charge, and having emptied their pistdls, retty generally, were helpless agaiust the determined-harge of tbe Fed@nl cavalry w i t h . in the wood*2 their eabers. They retreated in disorder and disappea the whole affair probably not occupying ten ,minutee, a d our 1 0 s being . continetl to a&w tlesh wound$, and one horse k i n d T h at&irwrurr;d & o u t midnight, but as a full moon waa shining and abo t two iurher id' PIIOW on the ground it waa practically as light b y . Had the Coirfetlerates charged with the d e r . I doubt whether the Unibn officer would have had time to form line a t all, but hfosm'? h e n wbre not giveu t6 that sort of fighting, though like the rest of the Confederate cavalry, they would tight desperately enough in their own way. The general resulta of the four years of war in A n i e r i a were ininiecliately favorable to the cavalry force. Its place in public estimation, always high after the organization of the corp in 1863,0waa never higher thau ' - . when. largely by its action under ita gallant leaders, the dar-was brought to a close in the spring of 1865. The new princip!ea de\-t$oped, however. . / uere uot.in the line of mounted Bring, but in the great bse which could IK made of a cavalry force under any and oll circumstances; in otlier words, to the f3ct.that they could be made a s?lf-protectidg, independent, a d gone.by when-they c o u h be coilsidered active force, and that the day h like the artillery, an auxiliary force simply, enwmqusly dmtrmtive it is true when properly handled and guarded, but utterly powerless to protect 4 itaelf when alone. The p r i n c i h l conflicts of the last twenty yearn, the - * ' Franeo-Prussian and Russo-Turkish wars have scarcely rrdded to our information j n this respect, though they have caused attention to be directed
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the infantry divisions, and though the Prussian Vhlans, which a t first aeton*ed the world by the reckleddaring of their advanced rties and -sitering forces. were evenbmlly driven to the shelter g t l i e i r inh t r y also, i t wag not by the'actiyn of the regular troops' of the enern? . 'eo mu.& rn from inability to cl&witv the fmqe tiwns., who attacked . tLem;fmm behind woods,_stone walls, or any availnhle ambush, anit d k ' p - e a d & m n as any strtvig party could be conceutmted spinet. thcm. The German cavdry, who depended almost entirelv on their lance+ or eabems, and +rely useti the carbine. even f'or clisnioriiited fighting, Here unable @c&e with this irregulag force in guerrilla \tarfare, and their use. fulnwwag, cansequently, materially impaired. This fact has not escaped the attention of progressive officers in foreign services, and has led to much ,&useion, their attention. beiig particularly drawn to thamanner .in whioh cavalry was handled on this continent, upder similar circiimatances, but 5 % much greater succep. As this involves, however, the use of cavalry dismounted, i t does not comg within the range of m y subject, but will be treated of by othera. T h a t t h e pistol is a very much more powerful weapon than hef3re the invention of the metallic cartridge and other Inter_ipiprovementa, ceunot he diepufed. The facility withewhich it can be reloaded disposea of the ohjection w h c h existed when the trooper had to fall back to reload. The ii1vention.q of General KELTOI, probably well kuown to most of the otlicew present, still further increases the edcieucy of this arm. Whether they will result in making it the principal charKing weapon of the cavalry, as General KELTONhopes and believer, milst be left to be deterpiined by more thorough experiments than have yet been practicable, and p e r h a p t o the actual experience gained iii future wars. Experiments made at-this post with the S. P. and Wesson pistol by . ('aptain CARRof the 1st Cavalry. led to the belief that by the automatic c h e c h f n , and the cartridge packs of General Km:roN, great rapidity o f fire, combined with considerable accuracy, could be obtained at a rapid gait. The facility with which the weapon can be reloaded while in motion, by the use of these cartridge packs,gives it an advantage as a cbarging weapon which it has hitherto lacked. Expenmeats with, the carbine, mounted, by the sanie officer, showed that it waa impoaeible to obtain a n y accuracy with it while in motion. G d target m u l t a were obtained, however, by galloping to within 600 yarde of the target, halting t o fire a , f l o p , and 80 4p. It cannot'be were obtained without the foot or Iybg down, or .the

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? more than ever before, to the manner in which e a r d r y wa9 handled iii our w.The F p n c h cavalry, m'-a.rule. were held cio*eato or i l l rqar 4 1 1 '

that if it is often doubtful whethek cavalrycan afford t o charge infantry


at ep&d, much leas am they afford to halt and begin firing: from horae-

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back when witbin 600 yards of them. The act of halting to fire in the front of. a charging force of cavalry,ae far as I know, Has had but one result, and it is scarcely worth while to diecum it. The conclusions which I draw from the facta gathe& in my reading, a~id from what little' experience I have had during my cavalry service, firingmay be ndv;able under certain c i p x m stances. to tHe carbine, it should be uaed only a n rare occasions, mounted, as by vedetta for the pumpoee of signalling, or for temporary resistance by small bodies on acouting'duty or advanced t o patpul for the same reasons, and lin& of skirmishers\ when nece&y foroe back a retiring line, or to cover aretreat which w8s being too c l ~ l y pushed, ant1 where a charge with the saber was man)festly unadvihbie.' I t should he used, tiowever, with great discretion, and inever used in line , of battle under any circumstances. Third-That the pistql may be made a valuabje weapou for the charge iu line. as it already ie recognized to be for a charge aa fpmgeps,' or for individual use. but that further tau must be msde in actual con- . %ict before we can concede that i t ie a better Sreapon than the saber for . use in the charge by large bodies.
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B~IEVE it t a b e unheceaurrr ai tliiJ late (late io c l ) w u i i i b m y time in p p v i n g by referen& @ the,exploits of nii)tlcrii h ~ i l a v ,Iioth i i i our country and much more rwently iu Europe, that tire y t i t i i i . ilisiiiounted fire action, is in the f u t y l h - b e Eully sdknowledgecl ;IS nn iiirp)rtnnt characteristic of light cawilry. In t h e words of R clistiii;liliiliecI Knplish

extraordirrar~service9 t h t largc hiclies of I*ith. the Federal and ,, . the Southern cavalry, tlghting Sr tliq t t r r i + t Imrt ecliially re11 on_ fwt as on Iiorwback, rendered to their resltcctivr sides, ha\+ long &CII mat1 great extent in t e n of history; the feelirig no doubt exi.*twl k) 1 Europe. that development i n the ririlitryy a r t coultl hqrtlly be Iqoked for io-,the struggle of armed cibizeus of tlic \Vestern fitpublic. It \ y ~ e ciouhtless conceded- that the men were br:ive and f n l ~of zeal in their c:iuse, Init with everything-ef niilikiry wiriice to Iesrn op the actual battletieltl. Ouce more, the unineritecl uatuc Of tirt)iihted iiifaiitry, which we . . still t i i d applied tlrc Xniericnn war c:iv:?lry i n fiwrigu: t e s t books publielied within three yearz, tlotibtless did niiic4i to turu +vay the cavalry strialent from a critical p t d y of thr achiwemctits l i f a rit~uiitedforce, which, nt this lnte day, is 1)egiiiiriiig tab bc rccdgriizecl w / t h e prototype of the iclral cavalry wldier of the future. , I t is I I ~ W th t the p u b w i s , shtiwu i u . invitiug your atteirtiori to 1 1 ~ .rc:isoiIs w h y tt e iubject of t h e dizrir~h~ntetl serrice of vavnlry aa1v:inced G o slowly iiito .fa\.onibleconsider-

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T h e experiencej of recent $hrope.an Cpiiipqipz 11:ivc irn~tiita1,ly proved * t h a t if cavalry % to & prepared to fultil :ill tliv t:i..Ji+, which, with u t demanding tcio much from it, will cert:iiiily i i i titttirc. c*ntripaigns falt its lot; the cavalry d d i e r must be able at any time to tight on foot and o it fairly well. It is, however, a fact, w we rcatl * t h t i i p to thr tims of t h e Franco-German war the practical iinportaiicc 01 this subject w~msolutchy i g n o r d beth in England. and on the oontiiiriit of Eiiro1w. ah4 that only recently has it begun, ta meet with the full. l*r:trrk recopti. tibu i t deserves, aud it may be useful (for a p u r p y to Iw h o v n p r w eptly) to consider Mme of t.h resspblp why tlie iiiirii~iiw :i~lvatit:tgeti) be decked in making the cavalry x$&er s e l f - s i r p p ~ r t i r ~rrrrlcr ~ ~ ticsrly :\I1 .conditions of i i i d e r u fighting, was not i t o w e ac-yvltccl iir its full c.stc.iit - hy Europenb uiilitary authorities and writers. . First,th&u, we find upon the authority o P Colonel TKF.S(*II that lkitisli and continental cavalry oficers of the old school remitetl w long as they could the notion of turniog the cnvalry soldier into nh:it they termed a -hybrid creatur6, as hing opposed to the traditions and i t l e e of the cav.. alry arm. . .. . The glorious re.mrd of the anne blanch; the feeling that the soldier drilled in the use of the lance atid =be; s o d iu horsemanship, should be taught to regard the saddle as invariably his proper place, and Ceutaurlike, to be inseparable from hie horse; did much to close their eyes to the new field of enterprise opened.for thecavalry corps. .Again, notwithstan g the fact that The hrilliant aud, in some

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That they have i i o t g i v w 11- i;i Ilehil the tiiethc#s, time, couditiotia, etc.. uutler which iii their wonderfully .ucceRSful experimeuta the saher \vas erclianptd for the rifle aiid tlie ride fbr the g k r , with equal skill in each, is :ill the riiore t ~ ) he .cleploretl, -iuce jt appeak that iat 1871 Cieueral \os Scinitwr, one ut the mort Iliglhy uccoinplk#ied cavalry eoldiersof Europe. could write as follows. Speakiug i o his *Instruetione for service, he sags : % e d n e o t conceal from Cavalry of the dis~iwunted ourselves that in the !ast canipaign (1831-71 ) we appear in the field totally unprepared in this respeci. Later, in the same b ,he beam -tiniony to the value of modern methods iii the f o b i - 0 s: I am conyinced, he says. .thatr cavalry would L o t be up to the iequirernente of the day if we were not able, uuder certaiu circumstadces, to fight on foot, nor woulcl i t be worth the sacrificee that it cmta tBeState. Independeut aud successful action of cavalry divisions ie not conceivable, un. lees such cavalry is capable of maintaining a combat with firearms, offen-

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eive and defeneive,by whole regimentrl. F u r t h g , we fiud that i n 1x84 the


English officer already quoted could still write that European cavalry had 80 fu failed to do, what it is claimed the American horsemen acconiplished twenty-th& years ago, namely, to use the words of the writer referred m, act with boldness andakill, both on foot and on horseback. It u1 true that since 1871; much has k e n written ant1 many regulations adopted in Edrope for the dismounted service, but with the exception of the Russian campaigns in Turkey, no opportunity has been granted to test their methods wherqin they differ from those we cherish by tradition, from the fathers of the modern d r a p o n . I n r e g a d to the latter cnnipiga we a* thld byGene+ VALENTINE , B A K E R t h e the Kuwiiiri , trained to fight ou foot and horseback, did not justify the expec d tation formd for them, and Ge,neral BAKER% conclusien is that the Ruesian dragoon is not g o d cavalry, and is R very bad infantry wl. dier. Further, to quote Captain BEI:Lof the Eighth Hussars, he says that both Russians and Turks were aheolutely defi(General BA)CER) cient in, scouting duties; and the rapidity ahd range of the itifantr! weapon. eeemed to fright b o t h . c n d r i e s out of all idea of vigorous nction in the presence of infdntry. Again,we find that the Russian cavalry mantwvers in 1899, in tli6 neighborhood of Warsaw,att&ted i.great deal of attention in the neighboring continentakarn)ies for several reasons. .4mong obhers, it was the first instaaae in Euro+, in which a large cavJry force, engaged in mancmavem, attempted .to u n d e r e k e a raid r\fter the Aiiieri&nii,cishion, against a f a f d i h n t point nf the enemys communications. I may have said enough, to show that we are the p 0 9 8 e s s o r s , vfar, of all that there id to learn from that greatestof military teachers, experience iu . war, in the matt&. o f modern dismoun@ service of cavalry,.and the . kindred .svbject F v a l r y raids, mtde poasible by the self-supporting charw . . r of modern horae. , *:It. -not ,be .questioned- then, that it is highly t o collect thereault..cif esperience bearing on these subjects. important The officerswho led and eerved with thecavalry should tell us just when in any n a m d battle eir. biserhen ,&mounted to fight ; what we& the conditions at the, mom nt; ,what was the nature qf the ground ; bow taken advantage of; at was :the stqength and disposition of the .guardleft with the h o w ! H o w did. bhe line retire b e f w superior inf i t r y ? H o w wgs theiact of =mounting covered? and many other p i n t a of tactical intereab Surely the moat instructive method of study of the important subject, diemou@ed .semi* of cavalry,.would be not to tT@orize, b u t . t o examine . - in> meet critical detail juat-what has b&n done. It really makea no difference whatever that the eiqen&nceshould fit the theory, but every difference that the: training should fit the experience.

Trusttvrthy accounts iu detail of the esperimen

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nient from which such great advantages were rea d, can be compared ech-lnading n w h nod recorded in tactics. As the manual fnr the nnism follows the invention. 80 qhoiild the tactics the results of experience. I will not attempt, however, in a paper prepired,in I the brief tinie at niy disposal i u this case, any such criticad study qf &e p r t i a j record we already possess. I desire rather to confine myself 6 ) au examination of some of the characteristics of mcwlern c a v : i l r y , d b the detail of a few points in our disniounted practice and tactics. which it w h l d be well for an . \ m i a t i o n of American cavalry ofiicers to annsider and decide prnmptly, in view of the fact, that the recognitionof thc value of the lessons taught liere, although tardy, is growiug in strtiigth and spreading. The attention of cavalry sddenta of all armier iq now, very recqtly, invited hy foreign writers, to close study of tactics, equipment, and resblts of dismounted fighting and raids in this cuuiitry. It would seem that this CavulryA-iation of O U M has been formed jret at the right time to ohtain and preserve before it is too late, the informatic~n now alone p n s e s e d by o u r cavalry soldiew north and m i t h . tk authors of nicderii wouting; raiding; and dismounted fighting. T o begin then what manner of mau is this n r ~ l e r udragoon, which war. \\-lien the , the experience in the latter part of the Eranco-(;ef.l~a~~ Frqnctireurs compelled the German cavalry to ma+h under the prokction of infantry, taught a11 Europe t d o o k to as the iodel for the future? In reality the modem dragoon ie in 6 seuse a tu uiited infantryman. The cavalry soldier with all the confiddnce in his h rse and saher. t h e love of enterprise, and longing fo persoual distin ion, w b i d ne am told should aiiiniate the h o d , rides in the s a d e , the ever m d y \ infantry support rides i n the carbine socket. So a wnipariiec: and prG vided, hia characteristic is, Sir H ~ H A V E L O L ys, Kapecrkitlg af our war cavalry, a self reliant all sufficing efficiency. He c h thz a r mattack in hand the enemy at Winchester, and on foot pus hnme and carries the earthworks of the infantry a t Five undertake a crusade into the heart of the enemys with a bouyant feeliiig that uo or SHERIDAX, can stop him:. *, Surely it is apparent ern horsemen have increased poeeibilia ties of c o r p distinction, s h i v ofwnr at sea they ran crlliw over wide areas in ijearch of I Zt was at the clow of the war of the claim mad4 for them, that they ara the only exponents JO far,.iE recent war, of the future cavalry eoldier, and that their methods deserve close study. I n this :I do wt forget that

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DIS.\fOtr-W'Efi SERVICE OF CAVALRJ-:
In the English service until 1883 only erery ot&r
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General VON&H&U)$ tells us "the drill regulations of VKEDEHIC K THE GREAT for h h cavalry required not only that they should be capable of holding p i t i o n e and villages'againrt an enemy, hut that they eliould be able t o maetez such places as churchyards, etc.," and he adds, " 111 thie glorious period, howevet, cavalry lost nothill&of its true spirit; they tlid ,not forget to charge ith t h e a m blaitrlic, although they had niuch more t ~ n b in g fighti on fi)ot 'than now-adays, and hail tietluently to a t t a i tbeir succe88 by fighting in tha.t manner." To this I sulmiit, i n support of m previous s&tebent, that as no niodern rifle existed i n K i x o FREDERICK' time to decinlate _the lines of c-harging 110- at distaiic 9 which to him would h a r e T r u e d iacretlible, t h e niotlal 'for-future t l b mounted service and the p i b i l i t i e s I ~ f o r erav:ilry i n wide aweepiug raids, would not 4. found in a study of thht great general's tactics :iud

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i n each section one man holds the horses of the ether three. is that t h e & o m holders Auother methtnl, proposed by Colonel BOXIE,

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'It may a b :be pQinLed blrt that PETER TIIE C;REAT'orgalliXt.d a.corps of dragoonaan gained a grePt victory at Pultovu by their w e ilkmounted, but t ,ey were mounted infantry in reality; their nrnii consisted bf long rnlr&et$ and sword bayonets and they &wried spades and sliorela

. . f o i field intrenchments. Again, the dragoons of NICHOLAS<~T wbre rbounted infantry,. Eight squadrons of. the regiments of ten quaiirons were tirnied w i t h niuskets and bayonets aud two with lances: . * .
Having thus demonstrated, I hope, thnt it is the.disniiiiiritet1 service ot' cavalry; not ,the' mounted use of infantry: Wl~iclr .we have under c o n ~ i ~ l e r ation, I, invite your attentiqn brieHy.to wnie points of tactics niitl equip.' ment. T h e able 'cavalry commander, VOXSCHMIDT, h& smtetl foy us con'cisely a principle OF our own practice, namely ! l1We niust act with r o m thie first, and as many carbines as pom$Jle should be brought decision f into play from tbe commencement." <This leacia .LIB t o cwneider the question' of the riumber of men dismountiug from a troop, and the best method of holding the horses. . The Germad fashion is 88 fonows: "'At the 'command dismount, all the men of the B e a r rank dismount, H:ith- carbines, and' all those of the' fmnt rank, r h o are-toldoffaa No. 1 for dismounting. . Those of the f r u i t rank, who are told offaa Xo. 2 for dismounting, remain mounted and iake on their right arm the rein of the'frqnt rank S o 1 nn their Aght. lr'ho s o tikep rounfi his riglit turns his horse left about; front rank No. 2 d arm and in his right hand the reine' of the homes of X s 1 and 2 rear . rank, which me fmtened together and h p u g h t to him by 'NO. f ." 'In &e French cavalry No. 2 holds the horse of So. 1 on' his right and

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should btt clisniouuted. i n which cas% he tl;i'nks that dne - man could hold six horses, iiioluding his own. . The Ehglish criticism . bf the ,Anierican method ' in as follows : I " .\gainst this system it is objgcted :i: that mkch time is required f;w l i i i k i r i g ani1 unlinking horses, and moreover, it presents the possible , . tli.sadrantage of one horse, if he breaks away, carryihgwith him one or . two others." r, .I careful consideration of thia sub,jwt leads nie to the c~ollc~iision that the objection as to time is not well taken; B few drills and 1)rnctk.e reelucez the tiins required to forni the troop disniountqrl to H few & ~ o i i i l s ; fiftecii seconds will do i t from the coiiimand dismoiint. I n regarti to the himes brenkiig nway. a more serioiw.ohjection o f t h e sarire character exists to the European method, fiir slic)lild a horse-holder I)ecoine disnble(1 by z i stray hiillet, the horses. hrlil sepnntely, niight din1)et-w i n three tlitf'ereie direcdons, while with us- three of the four would reiiiriin tiell together aud Iw $lore c d y cnught up.* Another advantage w c~onsic~rred abnia{I is t'he better ability to whic~h docs riiit s e ~ n ito I maim~.uvert h e let1 tiorsea. The :iwkwarcl h u ~ ~ c h , * h e to a d head, which the Gerni:ui nic.thoil pl"~tlure+, \ V ( J l i l t l certainly seein to be difficult .to lead ; whre:in w e CRII all 1)mr trstjiiioiiy. t h n t Iiy ( ~ i isyste,ni r the led hi1m.s can be rnmi~t*urertvl all o v e r t h e field, at an increawl mit, if iiecesary. It wouJtl IH? well,-4 think, t o tiuthorize the itlea iif tlisrn;~unting the h o G - . ' Iiolders auggestedby Colonel R ~ W I E when , by so doing better advantage .. can he taken of corer. It ran be done at :in? time after the dismounted nieii h a r e k v e d out I)y merely directing number fout to dismount. - I n mount first. the rush for the h & e s in the remount, niiniher f y r ~ o i i l d i d the confiision I* Ies than if! he stood dismounted t i t h all the bridlea i n his hand, as ~ g g e s t e c l by the E'reiicli' c*olfinel. I an{ also of the opinion illat it wc>u)d he an advantage if ouniber three lLkecl hii.horse to nurnlwr four iiisteatl of taking his bridle over his h o d s head and handirig it ti; number- fbur. In this way a troop of ,led d o m , standing in column of fours, uncler corer,'could he held in bundhw o f four with , . ease by half the nuril!xr o f ho-holders dismorrnted,jevh ?ne holding , ' two hunches, the other'.half' vailable, with the b r b i n e , on top -of ' the bnrik as cii*nnJunted guard. ! . , Another point in o u i kcti&, which we might c hider to-night i$ w'he,tlier the authority to dismount a line of mounted kirmishers*ould . !>r would nnt ?ean advantage. .In that c a s . oF course! every man should hold hi* rJ\Vn hurse, and-adr:inre firing, diemouuted. j Is the@ any lessnn in the great school of experiend which caused 'the

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movement to be lek out of our tactics? The English do it, bui not to the extent of each man holding his owp horse. Recent experiments i n thi direction have been made in the 1st Cavalry, the skirmisher holding his horse at the end of a lariat, and mmo. of our members cau doubtless give us the result. Thnt the aoldier cad hold his horse aud fight dismounted,.we haveseen illustrated in Indian skirmishes; but the dauger to be apprehended iii civilired warfare \vould of course be th charge with the saber of thesoemys skirrnishers, while ours were in the a t of mouiiting o r dismounti& In one reapect our tactic8 for dioniouiitecl service are sadly lacking, and that i3 ju the fighting formation of the men after dismounting. \Ve lmk to thedetails of our former espetietice for instruction in the posi bilities of dismountecl service; whaL it should be expected to do, based upon the story of what it did. Bud since our war the a r t of fighting infantry in dispersed order has become a special and iniportant study. Many acconipliolied otlicem of foreign service have written 0 1 1 the subject, and the general principles have been formulated and universally accepted by three at least of the great European powers. We learn 8lnong other thiugs from Sir LLWLET C;KAH.\>~S dateniciit ef the general principles, the f&owing: Pit&.--The foryatiou for battle mupt be such as twfavor to the u t m o s t the e5wt,of our own fire, and niiuiiiiize the damage done by that of the enemy. * * M . - - F o r the front or fir g line the only forniation, both for . attack and defense, which meets these requirements, is a line of small . w t i o n s extGii4iA in ?ingle rang. Thid.--TNe firing line-has a very differeot mission to that of the old line of skirmaiers. %le latter had only to prepare - t h e way for the cvlumne or lines; the former, ou the conFrary, hes to fight tbe battle out to ita very conclusion. . 1 8 find also, by-reference to the Attack Formations of European Armies. that with regard to the shooting line there is an agreement of opinion in favor of .working by groups. In the German prmy each extended section of a conipany forms a 6- group. It is &der command of a non corwuisioned o t h e r and is mparated by an iutervtrl from the groups on either side. In the AUSti.ian army each shouting line is a chaiu of squads (not more than seven or leas than four files). Each squad. has a leader of its own. T h e e r tended line h u & n exten.t of front to cover, but within that space the squads; regulating their distauce by the squad of direction, are free to act aa cinchstances require. The Germans with their usual prompJness to profit by their own mili-

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the , p r i n c / p l a of infantry combat. *his is what they cornmnnd or the dismounted .1 grouud. die d i s t r i b u ~ o uiu from ternhorary corer, and these/are the principle the directions say : * * The cavalry m1die.r should be able to hvail himself of :the advantage of the ground, surmount the o m c l e s it presents, gain ground by rushes, tiriug ri&t up to the enemy. The Z i i g or platoons, are divided into s o u p s ot frr)@tree to livc tiles, each led by a non-coninii4oned officer. Changes of direction, they ray, a r e best macle by the leader pointing o u t a partioular ohject, fecl- . . ing or iutervals belween groups aud files heing takeii from tliz center. It is evident that we m e d and should a t once prepare amanual of ti&tiiig tactics for our meii dismounted. Ue should remember what. (;cner:il Vox FCHJIIDTtell u s ou this point, uaiiiely, to 4,al\vays hear in mind that only that which h% become amatter of habit a i d second natuw , . oi! the drill.grouucl, shoiild be put into exe&tion beforelthe enemy, as it Fortuhately \vk do 1 1 4 in , my alone can have unp hope of success. o p i ~ i b n iieed , atiy radical chauge in our dienfounted- tadtin, ])ut oiniply ckvelopment of our p r e x n t methods. O u r sets of foiiraigive US, I think. an escellent system of groups, for the shooting line, and; the hadtalion of . four troops the best fighting unit. To illustrate the folldwviug ortline of a method fiw group fighting might be considered. 1l In the formation of tbe troop, all the nc!n-commissioned ofticbrs, Hith g corporals, would the exception of the 1st sergeant and i i i c l u d i ~ ~the be told off. as group leaders, mid 80 far as possiMe two sets ?f fours assigned , to each. . Corporals should be uumbem one ofaeta of foul$ to be available for disniounted purposes. In the. dismount LO fight on foot, as soon as the line is fornied,tha- . tluop coiiiaaud, .Extend*for attack, would m i d the lide forgard into a. line ofgroups in column of threes,with depltiying and gro/lp interrals,and rcgulnting on the g o u p of ctiwction in the Center. Thia woiild IE done liy each group _nioviogout fours right, or left forkard, fours a t the co+mand Extend left, (as it may be right or fiw attack. 111 the forward moyerheiit each p u p conducted Ijy the group leader nukes in double time & p t i a l wheels to place /itself in line of * deploying groups. In the preliminary @van& of the group line t o attack, the f i r i n g heiug in this stage a t long ranges, the group leaders deploy their leading threes a t ,double intervals; the ruFn deploy right and left on number two.
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1nstructlYtrs.for Cavalry.-VrBs

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who ie the guide. The group leader follows with the rear three a t tive or ten pards distauce. The rear three may be led by the group leadem in column of fila, .or deployed. When the fire of the enemy becomes etfective, say a t 900 to 600 yards, the group leader may throw forwvard,by one movement, his rear rank men to fill the intervals. or he may, if cnver is available i n the direction of the advance, send the meu forward by name froni cover to cover. He thus holds the group w+ll in hand and the suhdivisioii of cornman41 of the group line affords the d p t a i n the best means of working the tleployed troop forward oyer the long clistsncea that rnust now-a-days be traversed under hot. fire. Th? independerice of the group leaders should controlled by the lieutenants of platoons, and hy itistriicdon and drill in the followihg principle, namelv: $0 adrarire i n the direction intlic;ated by the troop leader until by the groups right and The trobp in support shoulcl he worketl u p to the front i n t h e snmi manner, retainiug its coluriiri forninticin as long an p o ~ s i l ~ l t ~ . It p a y reinforce thc tiring line. either by sending tlesig~~atetl grniips forward to fill intervals or by a genrriil ~novenieiit fiirwartl of the d q h ~ e i l supporting groiip, fnr tht.. piirpwe of inr& the fire a t criticd momeri ts. If a third troop is employed :is a reserve it shortltl Iw \v.)rketl claw i111 to, the .fighting line a* the fight progre~vs,arid the second line lieconies & o r b e d in the filut: The firing l i i i c . haring at this stage been pi~shed u p b the limit of clore, rapill, intlelwn;lent tire, when the roar. of tlir breech-haper drowns all soiintl of Coice; the rriticnl moment for u s w i l t should be indcated hythe trumpet charFe, kliereiipon the reserves (lep1oykd.mov.e rmard on the run, the fighting line redoubles itr fire niitl when the reserve reaches it. If 11nnl)le to move the drop tc? corer, an!l hold on to the grimnd gained. battalion of four troop; ns :in escellelit fighting unit, I wnuld suggest thnt the tiattalion be foriiied bir disniouiited attactk to the h o t , in line of troopsin c.olumii of foiiru. The battali~m, ninving on a road in column, niny be thrown forward i i i three lines iii any tlirceor defense, by one ciiniiiiand of the major. For instance a t the command * Diunioriiit for attack frolit, the Ie:itlund exfends forwaril in groiiIis, dismoiinta in column of f i i i i ~ for-firing line, to corer front of battalion. The second troop mounted move u p on the line to right of tirst troop, and remaining in columii of fours, c\ismounts+left front into line and nioves out in groups in support. &Thirdtroop briuga the head of column in line to left of lcntliup troop. Iiiw and mnves out a& reservv. with a p h dismounts, right front i i i t t ~ toon in column of fours i i i rc:ir of c i c l i tlauk of support. Fourth t n q ~

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remains niounted i n column of pl t&a echeloned in rear of the moat esposed flank of led horses, or sen [I a platoon to each flank. h e direc tion tbe attack shoZl4 take, or line of defense he formed. if d i q w to l i n e of march, may be indicated itistantly by the majar changing the direction of column halt right or halt left, hefnre commanding Diemount for attack : the fire line troop forming and movihg out on a line. parallel to the front of the leading four which ha8 turned in the new d&rection. For the preliminary advance, the line of led h o h in co!iimn of foura moves forward, following the,disninunted men, to tk limit of cover. The horse holdera then dirriioiiat and half torm a dismeuoted guard i n . deployed groups to thezront. The horses are held clllse u p to cover hy the other half, eadh mau holding two buuches of f m r , the horse of nurnlwr three being linked (n nuniher four. If cover in available thc mounted t r w p reniains echeloned in columu of plarrxms in rear of the e q d flank. When the ground is iinfavorahle for mounted &rk the platoons of the mounted t n o p hre sent to each flank, dismounted, and fornied obliquely to line of led homes. The flankiug platoons should be extende& i n g r m ~ pa s t half intervals; thus the p a d of led horses forms a half circle covering their charge, the T e n dismounted in fire groups uith every advantage of cover. Depth. n o c f r o n t of a t tack or defense, lwitig now the rule, I can w e no reasdn wby the battalion acting singly rhould lwe tirile in forming a front of , t r o o l ~in line before ciismounting to advanre. The present skirmish tactics can,of course. be .used when h l y a thin line in observation is desired. The advantage of a sy-steiti of signals bf sound k t w e e o the troop aiicl group leaders is nppareiit &%me officers of the German army in 71 used metal whistles. and it hasbeen strongly recommended that all be directed to do s o . I n niy opinion the whistles should be mdre for the purpose of conveying information than commands. A realCstic glaiice a t the situation would prove this, I tbink. Fancy a captain workiug forward, under hot lire, a line of fightiag g r o u p . It is iniposeible for hint to iiiove lip nnd down the line, seeing everything. in the old nay. Suppose, now, his flanking group breaks out of the timber to a p i t i o n froni which an o p i i view is obtained, arid is able to signal without 10% of time: we overlay eiieriiy; or enrniy nioviop right or l e h ; or retreating froni this flank, etc. Certainly the ditficult task of the fire line leader would he facilitatal thereby. I am of the opinion that American ingeiiuity ran prepare a simple aud that each proup leader should ccxle of whistle signals for int~~rniatiou. he taught to use it. TO make H spsteni of group line morements:effective, the manual of

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DIS'.IIOL'I\"I ED SERVICE

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fighting tautics suggested should insist upon vigoroud aud frequent tlrillc in the-~chnolof- the group. The @ups 'each peimahently aseigned to a non-commissioned officer, should ly rep-tedly deployed ant1 reformed on the drill ground until leaders and meli are thoroughly familiar with the details of exteusioii from the command dismount. Th'ey should then be throwu finvard fur drill in attack over long distances of diversified ground; being required ' to climb hills, pass through wonds. over fences, etc. This put of the drill should be made realistic, and initriictivc i n the tine a r c of skirmishing. The group leaders should give c;irtifiil instriiv. p use of cover; pointing i n i t t h a t i t tiillst ;iftion..fnr example, in regard t ford free outlook tu the front for the use of the rifle, r i i d niii.-eiitit ~It?l:i.v the advance; otherwise, to seek it, is simple cowarclice. We may be encouraged to believe, by the reniarkalil(~ w c c e w of t 1 i ~ kvget practice, thnt our men could be stimulated antl iiiterestc~li t ] t i i ~ d c r i i niethocls of attack over long distances, by a judicious spteili of rewurcls and competition in physical training. The modern soldier should beas active on fout ns an .\p:~clie Imlinii. Excellence in ru.n,ui.ng, walking, hill clim%iug nii(1 l ~ ~ i t1ist:iiict. ig skirniish .matches, rewa@d and encourageil, would mnii rep:y 11s. Q uick, vi nrws moterielit and .'military alertness, would become cliiuictcristic(it our troop, antl tbt half hearted performance of any tlrill rt.cliiirii1; extra physical exertioj, be a thing of the past. While an the subj t, I would suggest that the Iieiiry hlllJt I I O W irsiictl. IN? erchauged for a I ghter one, and the metal clasi,' on the h w l fiir thc Mills spur. The quqtion of1 equipment is SQ closely connected with the etficiciic.:\. of the cavalry for the long marches uecessary for hadern uscfiilnt-b.s,:hat it may be'considereh in the qudstion of disniounteh service: & . w i t h o u t proper +uipnient, the weak link in the chain.-the horse's I)nck, 'is likely to bc u w l u p antl the trooper dismounted prematurely on thc ro:d to the battle field. 111.this matter we certahily have every reasmi .'to ~ ~ J l l ~ . l t l l . d is due to.at-least t y o causes. Onc i., t h k i n the i n - \ late oiirselves ~ n it Cteneelp hard service of the frontier for the last twenty ye:trs, our (*:traIry officers have riddeir thousands of miles. It is within rthe limit t ( J s l y thousands of miles. It is safe to ~ s ythat , as intelligent rncn of, this Ian11 of inveution t h y would be a p t to d k o v e r all the'defecti 1 1 1 ' the horst,.equipnieiita they,had 80 constantly in use. The other cause ie thj_titct. .. _ that of late years, the Ordnance Office has L e n wise and q u k k tu rcceiw --auggeations OF improvements fur t r i d , emanating'froni the men who & J . . . the riding. Oie. further article of equipment must provided .fur the &ralry nian won, and that'+ an implemeut for cutting wire fenyes. The - e x t e n t

tu which such f e n c e are u - d now, will be aserious hiodrauce to the movement o f ' t r o o p in the near future. \ I n conclusion, I mi t61npted to put in a plea fix the Aparejo, which h a s been such a g o d frieutl to many ot' us in Arizoua and +ewhere. By i t s use a raiding 6rigade riiight strike o u t y r o s country, almost independent of wheels nnd roads, aud yet ne11 supplied with rdtions and'mmunition. ' h e niule> should be led in s n d l trains, not herded. They * could be used a h , fiir the solution of the yrubleni of how to supply the fire line with ammunition. It i.3 an h i e n c a n , or rather Spanish-Anieripi; improvement in mnsp r t a t i o n over rough ciiiiiitry, and may possibly i n mnle future war add to our Iicinurahle record a? Ieatterj i u euterprie and 1irogr&j for the C ~ V P d r y arm.
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_THE FRENCH C A Y M A Y ; ITS ORQA?c'I7hTIOYi, -\RM.\NES'l', REMOUNT -SIC KY I CE, .SC'HOOI~S,, I s 1 'r i UCTIo s , I ~L I,I
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A N D TACTICS.

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a'epite of its bravery and heroic devotiwi, was,bHjng to its injtidirious entp l y n e i i t , defectire organization and lacir,of iiistruction f i r field service, . . . ., alnicist qnrrihihted. Orgattizotinn in IR7t,-hft4r the close rzf the.War the cavalry .was, coiiipletel~ rC~>rgPliiZe<teHd largely iacreascd : 406 pquadmrs weie f o r d 4 -l?cjiig 82 squ&ons in excess o f i t s strength a t the outh&k of' the war. "l'lie I q p r i a t Lftiard'wak broken up 4n.d Pistributed throdghont the cav- . . +y'il(i the b wides, carbineers and knee& were dishantlqd. The pea 68,240 no4*rnp&iQri&I ' '; e& ishnient w1i3 as follows: 3,.76$ o t f i ? ~ ~ , . dficers and men: tetal, 71,609 officeh, 'non-commiqim-d officers aut( t <' nieff And 63,193 horns. . - . Orghnizutw,r in I8S;I.-During the summer of 1887 a law was' paseed, ; nritliorizing the crestion of 13 new .regimen@, whi&twbeli orbgii~zed, . will give the cavalrx a peace establish*mest of a k i i t 74,000 otticere nnd

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&pni&wic . i l k 2870.--\t the o u t b r i k ut' the E'niiico-f icrinai! war the French cavalry.iiumhered 63 regiments. Its entire etreiipth on t h peace foothg was 28,000 men, and 40,OOO ou thl. war~estu1,lishriieiit. I t was divided into cavalry of the h p e i i a l Guard q d cavnlry uf the I h e ,
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,The cavalry iucluding t h e vew fonnatioils*) is l?ivicl&. into 90-regiiiieiitS, 1!+squadrons of volunteer scoute and 8 . r e y o h t cobipanies. The regiments consist of 12 of cuiraeeitrp, 30 of clragoous, 39 ck' lipht'cavglry '<!$khicW21 are chasseurs and 18 hussars), t i of c-hns..rt . . . of Spahis I itative African ) : ' The cuirasiers' and 'dragnons coastitute the fiearp cav&, the chae-..

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Chdry.-One regiment of cuirassiem, 1 reginleiit of'cilrl)itteem. 1 &$ment of chaseeurs, 1 regiment of dragoous, 1 regiilleiit of lancers and 1 regiment of guides. 1 tu Gadry.TTen &giments of cuirsssitxa, 12 re&nent.G of dragoons, < 8 regiments of lancers, 12 regiments of chaeseurs, 8 reginients of husssrs, 04 rggimeiita of chasseurs d'hfrique, 3 regiments of Spahis: The' regiments of t h e Guard badeach 6 squadrons per reginlent. T h e ' regiments of the line, viz: cuirmsiers, dragoons and lancers, 5 .ytiadrotlP, one beiog a depot Guadron. The light cavalry regiments, vir : h u s m s . chasrreurs and spahis, 6 squadroos each, one being a.depot squadron. T h e strength.of the, larger tactical units was m follows: the hrigade, I,ooY, me:i, the division, 2,000 tp 5,000 men. The cavalry divisions, if attached to army corps, had IJUC h t t e r y of horee - artillery ; if acting independently, 2 'htteriea. T h e light cavalry, as also the dragoopsaf the line, were nioatly armeil with Chaseepclt carbiues, having a range of 800 paces only : the I:uirem had,in additioii E o the lauce and saber, pistols; the cuirassiers oiily wbem and pistols. i The horses .of the light cavalry were mostly from Algeria ; tliose of tlie remainder, principally French horses. Within three months after the opening of the W a r tlie cavalry, in
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cording to subdivision o f arm. The divitions iwisi~ting(if I I I W briga(le of cuhmiiers, one of dragoons. and one of &aswur- or htl--ai.r, :ire ( l e ''ignated by the narnea of their commanders. -These squa$roris, though periiianenay rspucldnnre o/ Vdunterr orgad*&, are only called into active service a t a nioj~ilimtion.or during the grand xuantEuvers. Their organization is similar to fluit of au ordinary quadroo, a n d they consist of selected men kcruited froin unattacheil soldiem or reservists who have served a t least one year i i i the u v n l r y . . They are espeoially inteucled for outpost duty. Each volunteer, wheu into ,wtive service. is required to furnish tiis hime, unifiwm and equipOne e q u d r o n is sttrichcd to cndl a m y carp. Thecaptaiils a e n from t h ? active list, and th? lieutctiatit* t'riint t h e active hat or m r v e . The nurirber of troopers in a squatlror~is 120. T h e r&ount companies, are e m p l o y 4 .as follows: Oue i n each of the four mmount districts, one with the schools, aiicl tliree io .\lyeriH. &gunkation 0f.a Sqtudron.-One captain commandant, 1 second captsin, 1 first lieutenant, 1 second lieutenant. 2 rub-lieutenuub, 1 squad'on- ergeant major, 6 rgeants, 10 sekgeants, 1 quartermuter corporal, 12 corporale, 1 farrier rporal, 2 farriers, 4 trumpeters, 122 soldiers. (of whom 32 are of the first class); total strength of-aluadrolt, 6 otticem. 150 ~?n-commiesbnedo$cere and men, and 144 h ~ s . EaJl regiment haa five field officers, 40 ofticers of other grades, and 817 v m k i o r w d o m and men. On the war fwtiiig 3 regiment has 6 0 combatan@, a brigade 1,200, and a division : 1 ; 6 0 0 .
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The c*itirrwsierswonl. mounted, has a length of 46 ini*li#s, it* weight is '1 ltw. 1: *)I-<.. that of ite wabbant 2 Ibs. 3 ow., and of the &lrd ancl . a b h:ird 5 lli+. 2 ~is. 14 dm. : 3 .The drncoon sword, mounted, is 45.87 inches long; it ii iliglrtly curred.. \Vt*igIit of swortl 2 Ibs. 14 ow.;of ~cabloard2 Ibe. 8 ow. 12 drs. ; weiglit aif wdttiard 2 lbs. 3 073. 4 tlrs.: weight of sword ancl xd)I)atd 4 Ilw. 1 2ULQ. The light cavalry sword is more curved than that of tlie/Ileavy cavalry. 11s length, rlioi!nted. is 43.3 inches. , Its weight ie 2 I b d 8 UZ*. 12 dm.; \\eight of wiililoanl 2 lbs. : ou. 4 tlrs.: weight' of sword HndI scatobilr? -I ! I N 12 OL+. The weight of the helmet (steel with black h(k.se.hair mane) is 2 llw. 6 o7-d. The cuiracu i . worn by c u i m i e r s I is of' &el, yud has a Iwwt plate :ubi back piece. Its weight \-ark with the size of the maii, !'rotti 1.5 2 11)s. tu lS.4 Itw .Vdcwi/c 1':tunh.- Every trooper when orclerecl oil reccmiioitcririg ~loiy rtwives :I lllrlrriite petard, which is carried% a special coiitpartnle~~t iti tlic saddle bug?. The petard consists of a tin case cimmiiiiiig S.1 ora. . ot' the explosive. It. is exploded by nieans of a tulnrinate,rap. and fie. :iii(l is used for the rapid destruction of railways, telegrsph; liiiw, bridges. tiiiiitels,.'&c. It is d d i that the explosion of two petnrda u p ' i ~ a steel or inin rail, will I w sutticient to make a r u p h r e from -16 to IB iuchw long. 1 lie esplo+ion of 5 petards upon 2 iion-consecutive railwanties will make

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ARMAMENT.

rupture 2 ynrtls long. \Vith 3 petards an engine ;r tetidbr r l i ~ ~ be y disw i t h 15, n breach 4 feet long cau I w rnn~leih a wall 5 foot thick, :tiid with 8 , stiy field gun niay be disabled. 0 1 1 riiiliing exlicditions, a great aniount of claniage cah Iw done by ' rileails of this explosive, with great rapidity aut1 safety.
REMOUNT SERVICE.

T h e c u i w i e r s are armed with swords and revolvers, aud each regiment

is omvided with sixty carbines. The dragoons, chasseurs nitd IiuSsnR are
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with swords and carbine$, subofimrs, trumpeters, corporals and farriers have a revolver,and no Carbine. Remount troopers are armed with light cavalr!* sabers only. b r T h e carbine i s a'breech-loader ( G m patterii,) bolt type; weighi 7 ' lbe. 11 oz., length 3 ft. 10 in., caliber, 4 3 of a n inch. The lever is bent down horizontally. Thecarbine is sighted u p to 1200 yards, and takes . -* the Barpe amniunition aa the Graa rifle, with which the infantry is armed. Rcadrrer (paUem 1873.)-Thia W of the same caliber as the Gras rifle. T h e we h t of the bullet ia 180.56 grains, of charge 10 grains, of cartridge 259.B grains. L e n a of barrel,*yinches; length of revolver. 9+ in. ch-; r e i g h t of redolver. 2 Ibe. 10 OZ. The revolver can k cocked with the thumb OD the hammer, ur by p d h g the trigger. are df a r e e patterns: cuiraesiers, pattern 18.54, dragoon, patSw+ tern-1864; a n d light cavalry, pattern 1822.

France is divided into four districts for geueral remount. p u r p o e , sild .\lgeria into three districts. Each district is commanded by a colonel or lieutenand colonel uiiatInched, who is under the direct orders of the W a r Mini&r. in all that rchtes to the purchase of horses. There is an inspector &era1 at the head of the remount service, and an assistant i n s p e c m geheml; the former a general of division and the latter a general of brigade. Each district routninr four or tive remount depots; 'the latter are P)mmand& b y , chiefs of squadron, assisted by a number of captains and lieutenante of cavalry, a veterinary siirgeon. an executive officer, and a detachment of remount trmpers. The remount d e p t a are under the jurisdiction of the Generals coni. niand,ingAthe .\rmy Corps districts in which located,as regnrds diecipline :ind police, ?in :ill that relate9 tcl the remount service pmper they nre utiller the c s c i4w crrntrol of the comln:incler~ of t l i t - rciutiiiiit distrkts.

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THE F R E X U C.4 Val 1.R Y.

T H E FHRNCH CAVALH 1 :

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The pun?pse of horses is regulateti by the \\-ar Miilister, i i i accordthe service- l'urance with the political fo cast and the exigencies : c h are made in publi by committees, etch coi~sbtiup of a chief of depot, two other remount officers and a veteriuary surgeoil. These officers receive a daily allowance of 82.00 while purchasing h o r n , besides their remount par. Only geldings and .nihres ( xcept thnse with foal J are eligible for army use. They must be of E'r ch origin, 4 years of' age, free from vi& and sound, have flowiug manes lid tails aucl come up to the standard, which is. 15 ,hands in. tu 15 hands 3 in. for cuirussier homes, 14 hands 3 in. to 1.5 bauds_{ an iu: tbr dragoon horses. sand 14 to 1 q htmd3 for light cavalry horses. The horsea presented to the bnartl are es;iiiiiiitd, : i i i t l :Ire :iccepted if a majority favor it. Each oliicer aubiiiits his \\ ritteu trliiiiion on every -home. presented;together with ita money value, if he favors its accepte president, and the dealer ance. Them written estimates are handed t is then informed of the price, whichis t average of the three prices. A special re@ster is kept of all horses purchased, nn each officer is also required to'record in his note book his opinion of he horses accepted, toThe regisgether with the price he has himself suggested in ach cas-. tere and note booka.are submitted to the inspector eneral of thekeniount service yearly for his examination, to enrbie him f r i judge of the qualification of the offi&rs for this special duty. . . All horses purchased are kept on probation for a period of from niue to thirty daya before final acceptance. The bo-, upon arriving a t the depot,'are branded on the feet and chargers and troop horses. . They are h i d e d into two cb--officers' retained at the depot for a certain length of tinie for acclimation, dieting 'and preliminary training. ' b The prices paid for h o w of the different sub-ariils are, as follows: j . j Fpr oscers' chargers, 8240. i I Fnr troop homes of cuirassigrs, $200. ! For troop h o w of dragoons,;$l80. For troop h o w o f light ca&y, $160. j For riding school homes, $340. (Trained principally or general .'offic*) , dlbunting of of office re are furnished with 'chargem by the State, either gmtuitoualy. on pyrnent, or temporarily. Cadalry lieutenads, s'urgeone attached to cavalry regiments and veterinary surgeonei r e furnished with one horae gratuitously, and captains of cavalry two horeea A general distribution of horses takes place , annually on tha let of .April, when officers are allowed t o choose from all horn in the regiment (except those assigned ' t troopers), ~ and from the young homes arriving from the depots, provided they are at leaet 5 peara old and suitable for squadron horses. Officers w e reaponsible for

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the goid c i r G ot tltcir horws, and if tlic latter Ilreak ~ h i or i are injured through neglect, are required to reimbum4fi&$vertinieiit by paying an amount equal ty the seventh part of the cost pricq increased aa mauy have I ~ legal year* of service kmainiug. ,OHicen times as the horse W I J U are forbidden to leiid or drive their chargem. Captains of' cavalry. promoted to field office-. are ahwed to ret& their horses by paying ais ' horse, inamount equal to the seventh part of the c p t @ye ~ f the creased as many times as the latter has legal years t l service re~i~niiiiiig. Field and general officersare allowed tu purchasw ho&a at cost price.
INSPECTIONS.

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The cavalry reginieqts, remount and veterinary krvices and cavaly school of application are ayangecl or distributed in 14 inspection (list&&, wiih a n Inspector CifSrr& of Cavalry ( geueral of division or brigade ) i n charge of each district:i I
TERRITORIAL C A V A I.RY.

There are 19 regiments of Territorial ('avalry. each coiisietiilg of' 4 squadrons, 2 of dragMns and 2 of light cavalry. The cadres of these regiiuents are perniaiiently formed, but the nieii are allowed to remain a t their homes aud hare no duty whatever iu peare time, except the yearly muster. The orpnimtioii o f a territorial q u a d ; rou is similar to thnt of an ncctive squadroii. The territorial quadrom are iiiobilized at the statioiie of the active reginlent. of the mime N u h division of nrm.
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Heqimrifal Sclds.-Each regimeut of cavalry has 3 whooh; the 1st is on the principle of mutual instruction and is called the scliool of the
tion of tlie school of the 1st degree.

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soldiem, aS teachers. Thpx is held in tlie squad-room: colonel appoints a t leastf3 professors, of the rank f lieutenaut. The anme e'ubject cau be taught by one professor in both lhmls. I n each regiment the colonel appoints a c a p t a n director. who has under his orders a clerk, to take charge of school property and to do ' 'mry. The captain clerical work, slid to look after the sub-otlicers' 1 director a i d +e ollicer professors form a board o exaniiwrs, which is presided over by the lieutenant-colonel of the regirn n t ; the latter k i n g in charge of all the schools. The iuetruction in e school o? the l a t degree comprises reading, writing and the firs; four rules of arithmetic. I t i s obligahy for a!l kldiers i h o are ignorant those suLijwt, A ,

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special syllabus, prepared f o r t h e use of soldiers, iQ : i h e u w l in the repimental schools. One h o u r a t Jeast, daily, is given to the schnnl of this d e , which in winter b increased to two ours. *-.The instruction in the .schml of the 2d degree r o n i p r i ~ s : ;raiiiinnr. . arithmetic, general notions of geography and pmcticsl notions of the minor operations of war. fiirThe school is iutended for corporals reroni~iieiidetlfOr pri)iii~~tion, rieG, sqrgqnts, and one year volunteers. There are two rlase* ZI w e k , each of a n hour and a half in duration. h t the ehl t)f ,die year thore pupils who have atFined siifficieiit knowletlp, are escusGI froni further attendance. iri The instruction-in the school of tIie.'%l tlegrec c o n i p r i ~ ~ s escrcidee : Freuch (dictation and"composition.) arithmetic, history of E'riiuce, geography, elements of plane geometry. map rr:itliirg :ind instruction i n t o pography, ant1 field.fortiPcation. a h d f : tlierc :ire There are three c1ams.a week, each of :in h u r ai111 h i d e s two attendauces for study, of an,hour arid a lialf each. This school is volunhry and is reserved F G r g e a n t s and one year volunteers. No sergeant can be recommended R d proniotioti to the rank of sublieutenant u n l g he has p d succesafiilly through the school of the 3d degree, or gives proof of poB8eesiug the knowledge rcyuiretl I)? thc preacribed pmgraiiime. The colonel fises the hour at whicli tlie school is held and a quarterly report of the progress of t h e sclionl is iiiacle by the -lieutenant colonel. ' The captain director does not interfere with thc srliool of the 1st degree, but the oliicer professors are under his orilers, and he superinteuds the instruction g i v y by them. H e r y o r b to the lieutenaiit l mattere concerning the achool of the 3cl and :AI degree. colonel d Instruction in fencing is obligatory for bot&Lfficers and men, and is under the general SuprPiaiop of a field ofticer o f the regimeut, who hss a 2d captain or lieutenant u j d e r his orders in special charge of the school of fencing. The instruction in fencing is given Iy n spcially trained sergeant with a number of abiitanta. Special Military sdtod of 9. Cy.- The Spevial Military ,School of St. Cyr has for ita object the the' t k i n i n g of cadets for the infantry. m:irinr infantry, ana. cavalry. The c o u w laeta two years. Adniision is hy c o i i i petition. Pupils are admitted between the ages of e'ighteen and twenty. .Sergeante, corporals, and soldiere who have completed two yeam service,, are allowed to compete the age,of twenty-five. The pupils, 750 in number,.are organized in conipanies and form a battalion. Those, who at the end of the 1st year, are intended for the cavalry, are formed in a section b y themeelres. t a f f of the achool consists of: a general of Iwigade, commandant, The s

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%I t . o : i i i i i iii(I:iiit, seveiitecn inf:intry otticerp instructors), arid I uine crrvalry otticers (, instruct~hsJ. Searly all the- p o f e s o w are n~ilitary officers, sevbn only being civilThe studies are uncier the supervision o f H didctor, a supeiior otti.I . inns. cer, who is assisted liy t\ro sub-directors of studies. -411 interior nintters ;if discipline are settled by : I douncil of cliscipline, - tbrmed from the staff of the schdol. .\fter the tinal exnniinatioii, lists are pref)tpd, ackording to merit, nf . 'all t h w aiualifietl fircommissions in the inlairtry aiid cavalry. A c ro coni@te fo&e taiu nusiber of tlio5e highest o n the list are allow t staE school. . ;;-Those aJvignrc1 to the c:ivnlry are sent to the c&alry school at Sau' ,I irnir. *p!accct i n regitn$iite as Grgeantrr t w 1Tupils w\icTiCi~tu p u s m i y corpoials, if they I i n v e ~ ~ r r ethe d time which i s hceurmry fur pronio- . tion to these grades. The tin~c liiwzwcl u t rn-licx)Ic o u ~ , t s a~ service. School qf dpplientiotr a ! Snto~ttrr. T h e School of hpplirstion f e w the + dairy at-Saujiiur, I n s heeii %wituted with the ti)llo+ing ohiects : Fird.-The i n s t i ~ g i : ) of ~ n certaiu ~ i u n i b e rof aavalry a i d iirtillery i lieutenants who :ire *ut*) it each ye&.post graduate etliicadon of thc " edralry cniletr," of SI.' 6-Secwd.-The Cyr, a11 of w~ioiu tire cornpelid to enter it after tilair gi:itlu:ition at St. c y r , and k T k k e i n g as'.rigrred to regiments. 77~ird.- Tl~e?netructinnof siich nnncrin1mi.rsic~n$1 oftirera of-ca&lry as ate in&ndecl for promotion to second lieutena~iciekin that arnx F o k h . - Completion of thc prnctical instriiction i of qewly itppointed m i s t a n t veterinary surgenos. It contains also a d e p r t n i e n t of optical and eledtricnl telegraphy for certain noii.cc,iiinii~ioiie~~ otticeru and privates of citd~try, anh u. SCIIOOI of . blacksmithing for the cducatioii of re$inental blacki$~.~itIie.~ The course for all escept the telegraphers lasts eleven months. T h e conip.ition of tlie who01 is as follows: :ai 1st 1,irutenori~ C I i t.avalrc ...... .,.: .............................
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5 1 l~iei~trnanta oi ravalry ( i i n l ~ ~ i ~ . n t * d

.......................... 71 Spn-Cu1iinii~8imed officers............................. ,'.... ...........%'i Veterinary Siirgvons __.. ............................... t ................. 31 .

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The 1st lieutenane of cavalry and artillery khowii aa "oliiciers'd' instruction '* ) enter the 'schod directly from their regirnenta, aud are chosen (on recommendation of regimental commanders to the general of eacharmy corps ), as officers who are fitted by their aptitude, i n ~ l l i g e n c e and 'industry. for promotion,. in the eveut of their cteditable standing at the school. The conditions are that they shall u o t be over 31 years of

--1

108.

T H E FREXCH PA VAI,fllv.

age, a d must have served at least t w o yeah m 1st lie~~tennntz.A t the end of the course t h e e officers are classed according to their marks: thoee compri#d in the firat half are borne on the roll of p r o m y t h , and are entitled intbe order of their ,merit to the tirot w a i i c i e s of captaincies &urring in their a r m ; the lower half receive no advantage in t h e way of promotion. No. 1 1 of each claw. anti it the c l a s he a large one No. 2 a h , ia recommeuded for an inirnedinte captaincy. TIIP lieutenants of artillery are sent to the acliool principnll~* with tlie view of fitting them for i o s t p ~ c t o cof ~ equitation in their Iiatteries. They are borqe on a separnte list in reckoni~igtheir stmiding, though their ct)umt* is .the eame as that of th.e cavalry otficers. is as follows : The mu& for all the officiera d in~tructioii . Fid.-Theory i n d practice of cavalry riiontinuverr; in France and abroad. , -.-Equitation. Hippology, including anatomy, wience of tireeding ant1 *:practicaLB r g i w r a t i o n s , Tystem of purchasiug reniounts, siii~eiug :III~I study &.h& ,eqaipments u d in France and abroad. These l&w\! -subjects are studied with mucb advantage in the hlackeruith shops anal- aaddle factories of the school, the.largest military ones in the world. Fmrfh.- Military art, including French military orgarii~atioiiemiti the principal m q t a r y lawe Qf France, history of cavalry from antiquity to modern times, tactice ,of th three arms, practical nisrches of davalry, acting independently aud i conjunction with other a r w , a d q t e t l to varioiie aorta of ground. - Ffl.-Topography; study of the principal cornpisses ~ n d other instruments used in France and abroad, ink etching, sketches of country t , versed on horseback, map work in colored c~aydnr. ( Practical and pid.) fortihqtion ; knowledge of ditterent s o r b of field wnrke, -.-Field defence of inhabitkd places and a d v a n w e s to be taken of dittereut sorts - eniployof natural positions, practical elemenfa of nili.tary telegraphs, rnent of exploeives, etc. SetmA-Artillery; knowledge of material of service, etfectz, of lire, yewice of piece, military bridges, armament of foreign powers.. Eighth.-German. %idee the above a p taughtfeucing. gymnastics, and target practice (carbine and revolver.). The etanding of each officer is determined, hy yeekly interrogations mid quarterly examinations, while recitations from the text are always required. .Themaximum in each recitation is 20.. To pass the school with a recommendation for pmmotion, each officer, even though he be in the ikbt balf, must have a n average of 12 in equitation and military instruction,.and 1.0 in g e n e d instruction.

Thini.b

ne

e
.

\-

..This average s e e n ~ *low, hut the sptern of marking is severe, equally H) IW a t We3.t lniiit, and the course is extensive beddes. I n computing the general staudiiig a t the end of the year the marks aqe given under 4 tlifferent heatle, as f;,llowo : Conduct, 10 : practical equitation, including hippology, 33,; military iiistruction, practical part, $3 ; . general instruction, %1. O f these ninrk?; the ones R w conduct are given persnnally by the comitiaiidant of the L i c I i i d , the others by examinilg committees. I t will thus IF W C I I what a prcpondemnce is giveu to the (narks re1;itiiig to ec~iiit:itii~i~ :iiiiI tlir study of the horse. It is, ill fact, tlic exl w t h w d deri~ler;rtiiiii of the x!i~wl to make of the o@cer a horseniaii n n ~ l Ivaal~r of cavrilry, ant1 all the othcr i~i$tructionof the .school is s,ulmtliI I a ted to there o b j w t a . .The It1 lieutellants froni St. Cyr iwnstkute II divit$on entirely wparate IC far as allinstruction ROW. Their couree conifroin $lie 1st liei~teiiar~t.~. aiicl tlieoretial and practical knowledge of the b o k , 1Irise.i ei~uitation. t ririlitary art :ind Iiistorp, pnktical manwuvers of cavalry in the fielrl, ( ~~TIII:II~ target , 1,r:ictic.c.. tolwgr~phy, elements of HrtiUery. tncticq, fencirig : i i i t l gyniumtics.~Ilie ci)iirx fiir the ri,iu-coiniiiisionecl officers is the same ae for the 2d . Iie.~itenaritr,except that it is niore e l e m e n ~ r yin militnry a r t and tactics, . XIMI has the stlclirion of rnilitary geographg. T h e (ailre (if the school is as follows: Pcrtiitcned &@-Oi;e general of brigade or colonel. commandant ; 1 colonc~l or lieiitenaiit colonel. 2d commandant; 8 majora,.l quarter, tiisster, 1 payniaster, 1 assistant quarterlnaster, 1 aas+tmt paymaa r and 7 clerks. Jfi/itclr!/ hwfrircforr.-One chief of squadron. principal insfrucdr, and 3 captain a i d i lieutenant instructors. I Riding .lfia*fet**.--One chief of squadron, principal instructor, and 1 captain anti i lieutenant &iictnrs. . General I,tdrwt!,r.*.-One chief of aqudron, director of studiea and . lirofesuor of hiilitary a r t and topography : 1 captain, assistant inwtructor : 1 lieuteuaiit. professor iif history and niilitwy geography ; 1 captain, profeswr of fbrtificatiiiii, ami science appiiecl th military art ; ~ A p t a i np>, . fesscw of German ; 1 captain professor of-telegraphy; 3 surgeons and 3 L veterinary surgeons. 4 L There are also a large ntimbe; of non-commirrsioned officeru and AIdiera inc:lutled in the permanent effect.ives of the school. for the riding - hall, hospital, saddle factory, gymnasium. etc. The military duty, guard, fatigiie. ctc:. are performed by two quad. . rons. From th&e are tnken t.hc orilerlidnf the offiaerp and non-commie: sioued offirem The nim vininii~siiinc.doflicers on entering the ?tion1 are

f.

1.,

. .. _

1
110

.
c

THE FRE...CH CA V-4 L K 1.


3 t ~ )4 !0
P.

given a distinctive uniform, are entitled to &lute from all enIistecI men except the non-commissioned staff-nd -sergeanb, and are provided with orderlies -one for every two. This last provisioii seems natural when i t ie recollected that they receive their proniotinn immediately on the corn-. pletion of their course at school. The effective of horses a t the 8 c h o o l is a t present as follows: idinghall anjmals ..................................................... Cavalry horses, c l m ........... 110 Cavalry horses, claw ........... 230 Draught h o w &............................................................. . . .

m,recitution, often followed by work i


P. 11.

.wlioola till ti

:. P

... ...

. i !I S
- .4dding to.these 200 horses in proces of triiiiiiiig a t the school, and the government horses which the instructiou ofIicers arid iioii-commie sioned officers briqg with them from their troops and Ixitteries, the total of horaes is 918. All the riding hall animals proper are imported .English thoroughbreds, which are very carefully trained and cdi;c$for at the school. One of these horses is assigned to each officer on his arrival; ;ut1 is ridden by him iu the riding hall exercises. duriiig the morning or afternooir-Rotrrs of each alternate week. During %e remainder of the time thecavulry horses of the fiist arid second cfa&.are employed for these exewises, aud are choseii 1)v-tlic otticerz atrandom. T h e delicate management requiredJ in the traiiiiug of these thoroiighbreds forme a beneficial portion of the otticersinstruction, and receives. the greatest care frnm the riding masters. There is a school of training attached to the general .school, which has for i t s object the breaking aud training of the ditlicult horses seut each year to the school by the differe n t regiments, and the exercising of the officers in this art. The black&thing school ie of tb greatest practic.al advantage. A certain numh r of men are annually sent from the cavalry regiments, and during the year are fully instructed in all the details of theoretical and practical blacksmithing, especially the horse-shoeing. The course of veterinary surgery ueema t a b e most complete. The assistant veterinary surgeons, on entering the school, sign a11 ei;gagenient of service !%r six yeam. T h e dnye duties for all connee d with the ~ l i s o 1 kgiu ilt 6 A. M., and circumstances, a t from 4 io ti I.. BI. end, according e following i the prognunmc for the different Jays: M&fup, lVednesdaya and Friday*.--Si$ A. 31. to 8. A. SI., riding hall e r e r c k ; S h to 10 A. M., recitations; 1%30 r. 11. tu 2 3 0 riding hall and training school for homes; 3 to 4 3 0 P. Y., first, recitation, fencing

atcrdayd.-Six A. 31. to 8 A. >I., recitation upon Id service of cav:dry, includiug readin;. of notes upoii recounoiacrances, arches of advanced a i d rear guards, and a diyxmion of thepractical problem in each service given o u t tLr thc day; 8 to 10, riding hall; 12. 31. t o 6 I.. M., practical service of recuiiiit~isswce,etc.. (: practical solution of the nioriiing . probleni I. . Occasioiially this pphleni is giveu oiit ou Friday, and the whole the sfart is maak of Saturday is given t u this practical work. IH this c ~ s e as early : L S . ) A . 3 1 . . each officer carrying his breakfast in his saddle-&. of mi1it:ir.v 1 lie otticerl; diuriictiou :ire clivided for the pur~yme exercises i n l o two IJerritaiieitt tiiviaious, each uiicler conimand of a tal). . tiiiii. They are often eniployecl as two o p p s i u g l ~ ~ l i of e st r o o p in aimulatiilg the iictuttl operations of Gar, and sonietimes combined when there is Iieed of R large 1)ody. They thus form two companies, by which, siiigly or c o n ~ l ~ i ~it11 ~ e the d , priiiciples of war can I n practically demonztratrd, froiii the iii:irc.h of ai1 army corps to that of a reconnoiteriug
I .

e of the annexed

?;tluad. Tlic ~ c o i i d Ijruteiimts and non-commiss~oned .sfficeT perform, i n ~ those of onlinary garrison routine, like mlditiliii to their W ~ O I J duties. the ofiicirs of our 1;iavciiwurth school. They are both in barracks and are reaiuired to, ktvp ct,rt:iiii ht)urs, ant1 subject to a considerable degree of tiiwipiiiie. Ttie first lieiitenaiits under iustruction are exenipt from all duties, save the drill> a w l rtuclies pertaining exclusively to their course. They nrc qiiartereil i n lo(lgiup iii towti a t their own expense. All. of the otticerd of the ~ l i 0 0 1 are hachelom aiid are required to roes8 together. 1liis arrangement is sujiposetl to foster h o m e camaraderie, reprler

&

,.

..

afterwarda

*
12

Tuesday and TXu~sdap.-G A. 31. to 8 A. BI., ridiug hall; R:30 t o In A. Y., recitation or target practice; 12:30 to 3 JI., mounted drill, including saber e x e r c k , leaping of bars, ditches, walls, on steeple conme;

e & z of humiliation on the part the living cheaper, a d Iirevent any f of the pourer otticrrr, who cannot atford to keep.expeoeii.e establiahplenta. AI1 otticfers preserve after their arrival at the sohool the uniform of tbeir , reapertivt. regiiiirrits anti curpe. For the riding exercises, however, there.. -% is prescrilwtl fiJr 1111 a dark blue culotte, tight-fittingat the knee and 3ery IWJW above, En niatle a~ to.leave the greatest liberty to the l i m b on . h n ~ w l w c ka , cl&-fitting lwmt a i i c l nickle S ~ U R . All of t h e e articles are cmiueutly lieat aiid ~ i r ~ c t i c a l .The culottes save +thee, and with t h y - / rest oc the dress, have 21 very iuilitary air. / The etiquette iii (Ires is very strict. Everyone qppeara iybthta in the nit,riiing and wears them at all exercises. uutil tbe duties of the day are over; they ure never permissible iu the eveuing at ,dinner. S p u d n r e always worn, aud no officer l a v a his quartere iu the afternook after fbur oclock withtiut thc saber;. gloves are. equally obligntory in the It may I w proper to remark that the system ifterirooii prouieuadee. . ot instruction i l l the wiiool eince the war of 1870 has, like that in the < ollier braitclirc ot r h r inilitary bcrvice, undergoue argreat change. Tlw
3 -

I.

I
'

112

THJ FREYCH CA VALK Y. '

TI1E FH ENCH C A L'A L R 1'.

118
~

entire revolution in their tactics since th date has involved a different --. course of study, and the work pursued in the school is of the most earneet and unremitting kind. Neither p r pt nor example i s lacking on the prirt-of the superior officers to main n this. The &mmandant of the school attends, in all sorts of weather, the opening of the riding hall at 6 A. M., and is seen constantly during the day at the various exercises. There are four immense riding halls at the school, three of them being larger than that at West Point, and four large stables. The latter are built of stone and are said to IE the most perfect models of stahlea in existence. Prepurntoy Cardry School a i ? Atrfroi.-Th~.~hool was estahli&d iu 1886, its ohject being the edwation of Imys f& the grade of sergeant of cavalry. T h e cadre of the school is as follows : One chief of squadron, ; -3 lieutenant commandant; 1 captain com!nandant'. 2nd coiiiniai~dant instructors ;, 1 paymaster; 1 administration otticer ; 1 doctor ; 3 sergeant major instructors; 6 sergeant instructow; 13 corporal instriictors; 1 sergeant fencing master; 1 sergeant gymnastic instructor. There are Imides a uumber 4f non-commigsioned officers, trunipeters a i d troopers employed as clerks. worklneb. etc. The personnel of civilians consists of 1 professor and 10 w i q t a n t professors. The refectory. laundry and lidpita1 are under the charge of 8 Sistersof Charity. The number of pupils at the school is 500. T h e age of admission is s they reach the minimuni age for enlist13,and the boys graduate just a ment. They sigu an engagement to serye in the army for a p e r i d of seven yeara The course of instruction lasts tive years. Thc scliool is divided into five clames. The first compriees the boys of 17 yeara of age, the second thoee of 16, the third those of 15, the fourth thcwe of l4.and the fifth thoee d 13. The h y s are organized into three squadrons, each under a lieutenant ihstructor, who commands, instructs, and administers his &p&oci, the duties being similar to those of a captain in a r'eginient. He han under hia orders as mistants 1 sergeant major. 2 sergeants, 4 corporale, and some chiefs of squad, selected from those boys in the equadroii who %re moet distinguished for their military beariug, soldierly couduct and capacity for com~uaod. The course of instruction comprises: Firsr.-Prirnary instryction, reading, writing, arithmetic, elements of *metry, land eurveying, leveling, the elements of physical and natural sciences, history and general gecgrapliy, German, vocal music and landscape drawing from .nature. * / . 8 t m n d - M i l i t . a ~ instruction, which emhracef the sclionl of the trooper, platoon. and squadron, garrison aud field service. elementary

c o u m in fortification, topography, artillery, adniinistration and account ability, the application of t h e physical sciences ' i d w a y s and tele-t graph linea from a military point uf-+ew, a course in hygiene. The prograninie of the course in gyninastirs, fencing, boxing and Indian c l u b i p prescrilml in orders from the W a r Office. :-. All the pupils wear a military uniform, aud thpse of the first 'and second clases, spurs. and are armed as light cavalry. The main object of this school is not m l y to give & e m boys a good primary, general and niilitary education: but also to inculcate in them a high W U M of honor. patriotism aud good fellowship. Each year 100 of the pupils :ire tlistributrd among the different cavalry-regiments,and OF this nuniher more than two-thirds are expected to make good non-comn ~ i ~ i o n ofiicer e ~ i instructors. I t is believed that this preparabry school, now i n i t s infnncy, will give the best reaults, and will f u r n i s h a e cavalry regiments with p o d sergeants. . ISSTRWTIOX.
. .

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* -

'
A

The instruction of the'cadres and troopers of the French cavalry is considererl tlie niost inip~irtsntpart 'of their service, a i d all other dueiee art! nuhordirinte to it. The instruction 'year is divided into four periods, eiicli of which claws with an inspection. F i r s t Pcrbul.-Laat.~ atbout six months, and is who1ty.devot.d to indivitlual instrurti71ii. and comprises : Schwl of the trddper, mounted and disnbountecl, theoretical instruction in the elementa o f garrison and field service, preparatiir? instruction. in fencing. Care of arms, vaulting, gymnastics, iuclucling riinniurr, jumping, lise of parallel- bars, boring, e&. The inspectioii ~ t this ' pericwl is made by the colonel o f t h e regiment. Second Period- Estentlu f h m April 1st to J u n e 1 s . and cornprim: T h e echiml of the trooper mounted ( with arms), xhml of the platoon ~nouuted,platoon and squadron tirill dismounted. end theoretical inatruction in garrison and c a n i p i g n service. This period, ddfiog which the recruit bt.conier a soldier. is c o n h e r e d 80 important thdt ita inspqjon ie , made hy the hrigade comiuauder. Third Yeriod.-Begins on J u n e 1st nod ends on J u l y 15th, add comprises the school of the squadnm mounted and a continuation of the practical l e w n s in field service. As the regimental drill can. only begin, with advantage, after the instruction of.the squadron. haa baen completed. the colocel makes the inrpection of thie period himeelf, requiring each squadron. after going-through the various evolutions, to p e r f o m p practical operatiou in .field service. F0wt.h Period.- Begius about the middle-of J u l y and ends''on the l e t of September, and comprises the school of the regiment, w i d exercises in field service and the different branches of instrucgon left un-

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T H E FRElVCH C A V AI d R Y.

, :E

114.,

THE FRENCH CA VA 1,R Y.

115

finished a t the en4 of the third period, such as the training of the young horeee and the practical exercises of the cadres. The inspection of this period L made by the division commander or the division inspector general. The instrytion of the recruits in horsemanship, only begun in the fimt yehr, is continued during the remaining pears of their service. Owisp; to the great importance attached to riding drills without arms, a~ much time isdevoted to the old soldiers in t h w exercises as to the recruits, the captains regulating the period of individual mounted instruction, an that the old soldiers and recruits are ready to +gin the squadron drill together. Practical instriction in field duty, the object of which i* to trait] the troopers in their duties in war and to cultivate their individuality and intelligecce, is given as often as poesible on varied ground. The drills and field exercises go,h d i n band through u t the year, c:icli receiving an equal amount of atten 'on. Drill Re@uthm.-The drill regulations of the French cavalry were pub1ished.h 1876, revised and completed in 1882, and consist of four p r t a 1st. Basis of instruction, 137 pages. fd. Uismounted iustruction, 65 pages. ( T h e length of the quick step is 29; iiichej and cadence 115 per minute; the double step 31;3 inchesatid cadeuce 170 per minute.) 3d. Mounted instruction, including the regimental evolutionr, 2 t J i pages. 4th; School of the brigade .and division, 160 pages. T h e prac%cal instruction for cavalry field service was published by the War Office in 1881. It is divided into two parts. Part 1 gives the principlee and rules for cavalry field service, and Part 2 explains the method of applying these principles and rules o n the ground. The eubjecta treated of, are: general definitions, orientation, definitions relatin: to the ground, reconnoissances of the ground;indications, written orders and reports, execution of marches, march of an isolated squadron, squadron guard and rear guard, reconnoitering. establishment of cantonments.-bvouacs and c a m p , and the duties pertaining to each, police and picket guards, outposts, subsistence of troops in the field, requisitions, minor operations of war,,di+ributions. provost guard duty, safe guards. q e platoon is formed ih double rank and consists of twelve files, including a non-cqmqrieeioned officer on each 9ank and one in the center of the fmnt rank. T)e platoon leader is the guide and is posted l + paces in frontof t h e c e n t e r p f the platoon. Commands may be given in three ways, either singly or combined, namely, lfy the a-oice, by gesture and by the direction ead gait of the horse, but every well-instructed platoon must be able t . g follow its leader without commtinds. In the direct march i o liae the mrpoial 'in the center of the-platoon follows accuratelj in the irate of the platoou lcader arid preserves a distance of 13 pares tioni him.

'

y T

The trimpew all dress toward the center, keepiug slight intervals t o , e u r e ease in the ranks. 111 ope11order the distance is 6 paces. In the route column the guide i p 15 paces in front of the center of the leading four. This column ir always fimned by breaking to the front from either flank. ' The clisniounted conibat of a platoon is conducted aa follows: A t the comniand " Figlit on' fooi " the tympers halt and disnwunt, with the exception'of So. 2r. 1 1 1 Jisruoutitiug, the guide, front rank. and h'os. 1 and 3 of the rear rank nllJVe RJrwaril; the guide and sa.1 and 3 o$ the front rank two horses' Itbngths, the others one4ome's length. The Sw.2 and 4 of the rehr rauk rmnd f&t. All the troopers then tlisrnount, w i t h the exception of the S o . 3. SurntjerJ OIIC aut1 three hand their relus ti, number two, and nuplbers four link their horses tu those of n u m b e r three. Kumbera one, three aod four tlieu take their cartridge boxes from the right saddle bags, paes them over their ~ h ~ w l ant1 h s N O W rapidly to the front, forming in two ranke. I f a smaller uuiliber of disnptnted troops is required. the numbers t w o aud four dismount, and p w their reios to numbed one and three. who reinnin ruounted. ' The platocm le;ider tlesignatea the support and moves his dismounted ' men to the front at the double, and deploys them as skirmishers with two paces iutervals, add with the guide center. The led h o k are conducted to the rear.by :I ~ i o n - c i ~ ~ ~ r n i ~ ofticer. i o ~ l e c l The skirmishers /are .taught the principle:: of attack a i d def;?nge,tire discipline, to k k e advantage of cover, and cc!niul:intl~ :ire giveu by the voice or by the whistle,'and no trumpet sigiialr: are allo\ved except for the "Assault." A t tBe signal " Rally," . the led horses :we brought up to the platoon, or to a point indicated by the leader, when the iiieii regain their horses rapidly by the shortest route, sling carbines ant1 niouut. I f the support has not been deployed,,it forms in &ar and delivers fire, while the men are kgaihing their horees. -' The route columu may also be dismounted to fight. The quatlron coiisists of 48 files,.! firstdaas troopers in the front r a n k ). 'ThF captaiu is posted 4 squadron length in frort of the center of the squadrhn. The f o u r lieutenants 14 paces in front of the center of their platimns. The 2d capmin 3 paces in rvar of the'center of the squadron. The four senior sergeants are 14 paces in rear of *the center of their respective platoons, arid the remaining sergeants and corpora9 a r e o n the flanka of the platoons and counted in the fburs. When the captain comintmdaiit gives a cohnatid his saber i3 raised vertically, and lowereat ciniilarlj- a t the command of execution. The chiefs of platoon have their kbers drawn ouly =hen the men carry theim. In the dirqct march iii line, the cnptain commandant is guide,'and* the chief of the 'Zd platoon rrgylates his inarcli so that the center of the 4uadipn will iiltvn~s he :it the prescribed distance from the guide and directly in his
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116

THE FRENCH CA V A L K Y .

T H E FRENCH CA V A L H I - .

II i

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trace, the other platoon leaders regulate on the leader of the 2d platoon and the file c l & ~ ,see that the Eorpnral in the center of each platoon marchea accurately in the rear of the platoon leader. I f the squadron leader ieavee his place in line, he indicates the point of direction to the chief of the 2d platoon, w e the direction of the march devolves upoil the latter. from line, to the right or left, or to Column of platoons may be the frnnt. In this formation the captain commandant, when guide, is half a platoon f Ont. in front of the leader of the first platoon. Line ma\. be formed fro n column, to the front, to the flank, or obliquely to the flank. Aa a rule, 11 deployments, in which the platoons have .unequal distanws to pess ove , are exewted a t a rapid gait, and the platoons move to their places by the shorteat.route. The usual drill pace of the %luatlrotl is thc. trot, but it .ferfuently drilled xver.long distances, a t a fait gallop. Tlitr

.. .*

plcee of th cavalry are, as follows : IVllIk. Trul.


Light Caydry, 110 yds,.per minute. Llne, 120 . -we ** I:U)

(idlop.

FCL.1

~;,,i:op.

S L y d a per minute. 371 yds p e r I I I ~ I I I I I 4-1 ~ . p l r per mloutr.

The charge o f the squadron is executed in line iw i n column, in-close or ertendedwder. The enemy is always marked by four trooper? supervieed by a nKni-comrnissioncd officer, arranged sn RS t o reprewnt the four chiefs of platoon of an opposing squadron. T o execute the charge the captain causes sabers to be drawn, and passes to the g d l o p :it or XOt) h f n r e reachiug the point froni \vhic*li h t a wish& * yard6 from the enemy. to make the charge, the squadrou leader conimantl~ Attack, nntl ddee not command Charge until the squadrdn has arrived within 50 i ) r 60 paces f the m?rke& representing the ejierny. A t the commantl Charge,Pnhich is repeated by all the lieuteihnte, the sliiarlron charges eabere dnd increases its gait to the greatest speed cnnsistent with the contrul of the horses. The charge from columu is only made wheii there i$ \ neither time nqr Lpace for deploying, or when it is desired to break the ene_mys line at some point at sliy cost. The charge as for,lgcw may he .executed from liue o r column, and may be combined with a charge iu compact order. I t consists of the dispersion and charge, ant1 the enemy is r e p r e s e n d as before, but the markers have an increased interval. A t the command *As foragers charge, the troopen take the gallop and dispame in a fan-shaped order, upon arriving a t I00 paces from the markew t k charge is sounded. After charging h r n 1.50 to 200 paces, the squadi ron ralliea rapidly upon the squadron leader. I Preliminary to every c h g g e , ground scouts and combat patrols a r i i pud@ out 200 yards rapidly ti) the f r a t and flank3 to reconnoiter the grbund and kbtain quick%felligen?e o f the mowmedts of the enemy. I n the attack t.he role of the icouia is cohsidered most employment is never omitted.
66

I n the dismounted combat of a squa!ron 3 platoous are generally dismounted to fight,one forming the support. The 4th platoon remains mounted and act.* as reserve. The squadron leader comn~andethe dismounted men, and a lieutenant the led horses. Sclrml of tkt. rtyiiwlu,tt.--IThe r e g i m m of maneuver eouaista of 4 q u a d row, ttie q i i n t ~ r o i interval ~ ib 12 pacea. The squadrons are IiuniberflI from right to left ; the 1st and 2 1 constitute the right wing, the 3d and 4th, the left aiiig; each commanded b y a chief of squadrous. The p t a of the officer3 in line are as follows: The colonel, when acting.as guide of the regiment, -f squadron front in advance of the captain of the q u a d ron of direction; the captain instructor behiud him; the 2 eergeant majors, chief trumpeter and colonels trumpeter, in rear of the captain instructor: the lieuteuaut colonel to the left and a little i n rear of the colonel; the chief3 of squadrons, in front of the center of their wings. in line with the captains commandant. The standard is ou the left of the 4th platoon of the 2tl squadron. The line formations of the regiment are aa follows: First.-The line of battle, in which the normal squadron interval is 12 paces. This order is especially e m p l o p d in the charge. and is also used when the regiment is obliged to remain motionleeg and expoeed to artillery fire. The regiment wheels at all gaits, and always on a morable pivot. &cuntl.-The line of platoon colcmns, in which the squadron inter-Val L equal to the front of a squadron in line. The liae of platoon columns p 0 e great mobility. and can be used with a d v p t a g e on varied ground. It admits of a rapid deployment into line of battle, and is re- , garded the best preparatory formation for attack. lhird.-The m a s formation, which is the same as the liD0 o f p l a t d o columns, withthe interval reduced t o twelve pacea. T h e m u occq$eci b t little space, comparatively speaking, and can be maneuvered and deployed with great facility. The column formations are as follows : Fir&-The column gf platoons with squadron distances of eighteen paces. The field officers and the captain commandant, except the first, march on the flank df the column. The colonel, wheui guide, marches one half squadron frout in advance of the captain of the leading squadran. From the column of platoons may be formed the three orders i o line, either parallel. perpendicular or oblique to the column. Seaond.-The double~colurnn,consisting of the twd half regimenta, in column of platoons sidb byside, with a n interval of Ewelve pacea. Third.- Column of route. The charge of the regiment is executed in the eomL general manner aa that of the platoon and squadron. The colonel and the officers and

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T R E FREXCH Cd V.4 I,h'k-.

T H E PREXCH Cd

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noncommissioned otticers and trumpetem whi) :u-conip:iny 1iii11, place themselves in 'the center of the regiment, iu l i i i r w i t h tlir coiupany iiliicera- e,,. ., For.tbe peace manceuvete the general rule i* 1 ) : begin the attuck at the walk, then paw to the trot, which is continued for i l )ut l$tl() pew, then i i i the attack of commence the gallop, which is kept up for ti00 paces. infantrpftp800 paces, then charge for about 80 to 1 paces. J3dutionS of the Btigade.-Tlie brigade of iiimuk*iivcrw i i + b c b t ' two * . regimenta and one battery of horse arFillery. The line formations are: The liiz of battle. t1Ie i i i v of p1:itooii col. .j umns, an+ the line o f . m m . ,'. the colnmn of The column [ormations are: The colunin ot' ~ii:isse+, squadrons at full or half distance, the columii of plattwiis, the double column and the route column. . When the brigade is in line formation the sqiiarirori of direction is usually the 2d %uadron of the 1st regiment. . 'rhe gciieral o f b r i g d e is half squadron front in advance of the colonel of' the l e t re,ginient. Evolutions . o f Me Diviuiun.-The division of nian1viiver consists o f three brigades and three batteries of horse artilbry. The line formations are: The line of battle, the line of platnon columns, the line of msrtses and the line of brigacies i n cotunins of iiia53e9. The column formations are: The column of squadrons, the column of platoons, the double column and the route column. I n line, the direction is taken from the regiment of directinn of the &n+r brigade.

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TACTICY.

T d i b d EnapLuy&nl o f Cuvuly.-In the field service. of the French civalry, ot.her th* ita action 011 the tieltl.of' 1)attle $11 wnjiiuctioii with
the other arms,the dutiea of scouting and g i n i n g iiitelligeiice of' the enemy (seryie d'exploration,) and those of insuring the safety o f t h e army (service de securite,) are separate aut1 ( l i d t i n c t , : I I ~eiit r i i i t v t i t o tiitbrent corps, the former to the indepeudeut. aiid tlir latter* t o the tliviainnal Cavalry. .. T h e role of the independent.divisions covering the a m y , coiisistJ i i i yreening the movements of their own army, w U t eudeavoring to dis- ' cover thoee of the enemy, thua forming the strategical advancetl i or rear, guard of the force they cover. Each .independent division provides for i t j o w n safthtv I U I the niarch, by an advan&-guard. flanking-parties. etc., and at a h u l ~ , by outposts. ' Ita explomtione are tnade by discovery patrols, each co~isisti-ug of i l l 1 intelligent non-commimioned officer and from 2 to 6 trwpers, pushed 2 or * 3 days a b e d of the advanced coutact squadrous, tlieir iiiisioii I)eiug to thoroughly reconnoiter the country.md corer the divbiou OLI the mar+ ;

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'and officers' patrols consijiing of a n oficer a d B or 3 p A e d troop<,pushed still farther ahead, either upon snnie special ndsjion or to gather' . what iufimmitioii they can of the enemy. These scoutiiig parties and officed patrols arc a l l o w 4 great f r e e c h i of action fi)rrec.oiinoitering purpowr, :mi are cluite independent of the niniii body. Each tliviriou geiierallp turriishes 2 contact squadmi* for this duty. two platoons of each squadron performiug the patrol duty, with the reinuiniiig t w o plritooilu in support. Thur with 16 patrda of' 6 nien, each covering a froilt of 2 milee, the division would explore B total front of 32 milee. The main body the remaining 21 or 22 squadrons and the h o r n artillery ) fO11ows i n rear under the immediate orders of the division CORImnndcr. While at a conAderable distance from the euemy, 40 miles or inore, the (livision marches on several road?, 3 if posihle, with the ruiruY-cier 1)rigadC i n the centet and a l i t t l e in the rear of the other brigades, OIIC C(J1itact q u a d r a n being detached from each. I J p n nearing the thueniy, the cliri*itm contracts i t s front, and niarchez orb 1 or 2 roads, employiug a contact squadron for the line and light brig8cies in the firat case, and in the second CLS, one squadron from the leading brigade. Connection with the army is maintained by the brigades of divisional cavalry. The brigades of divisional cavalry are charged with the service of seciiritj-, which, as n rule, is restricted to a comparatively limited zone.. Each brigade is disposed in 3 lines: *First, ecouts; 2d, supporb, consisting of g ups of squadrons 2 or 3 6 miles in rear of the l e t line; 3d, the reserve, nsisting o f the 2d regiment of the brigryle, 2 o r 3 miles in rear of the center of the 2d line and under the immediate orders of the brigade commander. The main purpose of this arrangement, is to secure a curtain or screen, through which nothing must he allowed to pas. This 3 line formation though unsuitable for the service of exploration, is considered to be the bFpt for the service of security. for the echelons being quite near the main m y , can r e d i l y , find shelter withinathe infantry lines, and their role not being at1 offensive one, rapidity of conceutration is not so urgent M iu the case of the iudependent cavalry. When the division forms for combat i t is distributed in ihree lines of echelons, Rith the center in advanee. I f the division consists of two brigades only, one forms the first hue. and the second the second and third lines. As a rule, the brigade bf c u i r a s i e n is posted iu t h e first line, and the brigade of dragoons and light cavalry, iu the secord and third lines respectively. Each line immediately throws out gmuucl scouta m d combat pntrols. The distance between the first and Recond linea is from 200 to 300 paces, and &tween first and third from 300 to 400 paces. 'The horse arlillery is mamed 150 paces in r e 3 of the first line. The tirst line formed in line of masses with deploying inten-als, or iu line

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. THE FRENCH CAVALRY

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of platoon columns, h tbe line of attack. IU comniaiider selects his. poiut of attack and inan&uvecB accordingly, tleployiup Ilia quadroiie a* l a t e aa p i b l e . . He, IW well as the commander of the secoiid line, is allowed great liberty of ?tion. The second line is the line of niaiiiwver and generally march- in line of masses with deployihg illterrais, null ir formed in line of columns aa mon as the first line is deployed i u t o line . of battle, and-remains dwaya a t a fixed dista.nce froiu the first h i e . Its spe+d role is to support the first line, aud maucvuver against the Hank or rear of the enemy's second h e . Its comiirander always retain3 some squadrons in- h h d . The third line, held m n rc'aerve against every eventuality, k e e p at a distance of a b u t 450 pace8 in rear of the first, and i t i under the immediate orders of the division eoniniuider. The fundamental principles of combat of the Preach e-avalry are m follows: Againat cavalry t i always attack first. and a u t i c i p t e the adveraacy-in the qharge; to surprise and take h i m iu flank and rear; to supp o k t every front attack by a simultaneous flank attack. ..Ct@ry, aa a rule,should never charge infantry, unles the latter be dem o r a l i z e d and wavering, in which w, it i u w t endeawir to approach it under cover till within striking distaucc+autI then attack with the greateat impetuoeity, y i n g over the:death sone 88 rapidly as p o s i i 6 . The attack ia made in echelons, one,kollowing~tbe other in rapid successiou, 90 that d e enemy will not have time to reform his broken lines. In the attack against artillery one portion of the cavalry c-hafges w foragere; overlapping both b k s . of the enemy, wtiilst the remainder triea to turn the position and fall upon the a u p ~ ~ o r b .
__-M'orlts used in the foregoingcompilation: Annu+re de l a cavalerle Fnrnoslse. 1Wj. Rerumde Cavalerle. 1&87-'8& Reglement our led Exercfses de la Cavalene. The Armed Strength o f France. The yhoulof A p p l l d O n atSauiniir. 112 I.ieutenanl

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?STITUl'IGI A :D BY-I,
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U.S.CAVALRY A S S O C I A T I O N .
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SEC. 3. Honora? members shall I)(* elcl.tet1 frdm rlleh tlistinguidled L1 military or naval service, not on the active IiNt, and froin eminent menof learning. Their nurnkr shall not exceed twenty: Sorninationn for honorary members shall be made to the Executive Couiicil, ancl after favorable report by the Council, a vote equal to one-half the number of remlar and life menibere, given by proxy o r prcwwce at a n aiinrial niPrting, shall becsst,a inajority

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SEC.4 . Any individual may be elected an associate or life Iiiembrr by a vt)te of the Execwtive Council, confirmed by a majority vote of the regular r e i d e n t members of the A-iation. SIX. .j. The prize essayirt of each year nhall be II lift. iiieiiiMr without I'ayment of fee. l i f r iiwiiilwm under Section an<lprivileges (I!' the . & s o ciation, including a share in its discussions, presentation ot' palwrs. eta'.. I i i i t ahall not be entitled to vote or be eliaililr to office. S s r Y . Membership itates froin the tirst day i ) f tliv calendar year i n which the application is mnale, un1w.i said fipplii.atiibii is ~ n a < lafter e I)tacciiilit*r 1.5th, when the Inembership dates frim tlw tint t h y o i the w x t ~ d e n ~ l i h r year..
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oi t 111. Ssc.!J. S o member sliall be clidlnikst4 vxivpt 0 1 1 rc.~.oliliiiriiilation Executive Councik, approved by a iifujority vott. 'It' tlir nlemlier. o i tlir A ~ s ~ J dation, voting by proxy ar,pre.sence, at any rcyulitr or t.alleil meeting, o i r h i c l inotim of nt least one month shall be given. Meinlwrs t w o years in arread shall be dropped. When dropped fofnon:paymrnt of dues t h e y riiay regain their membemhip by paying two pesrs' arrearage o f diirr, but tlw E x ecutive Council niay ndjuat any special case on iis nierits.

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-4RTICLE V.
COVSRSNEST.
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. \ President. A Secretary, who shal also he Twaeurci. A Vice-PFident and L Corresponding Secretar for racli branch. 8w. 2. The permane it committees shall br :, A n Executive Counci to consist of tlir President of tlir Assuciation. the Secretary and Treanurer,a d t h m members to benppointcd by the President. -4 Committee on Pub1 cation and Correspondence, consisting of two m t w h r s appointed by the Pre ident, and the Secretary aiid Tresaurer.

/j

ARTICLE VI.
DCTIB).

Swrrior 1. The Presi tion or ita branches at p'h' sach duties ea pertain to t YE. 9. In the absenc. shall pieside. SEX. 8. The Secretar .Executive Council and of H e shall keep a juwnal o
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ent shall preside at the meeting o f the Aesocia11 he m a y be present. and yenrrally shall perforni c office. of the President the wnior r e & i l e & l w present and Treasurer ahall be ex-ojicio a r i i h l w of t l i r the Publication and Correspondenre Committee. the proceedings o f the A w i i i t i o n ,
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separate re-

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CON&'lTUTIOPF AND B ILLA WS.


ning only sufficient to defray t lir e3tiiiiatrtl for the enkuing quarter. . o f each Immch may be Iield upon siic.11 h t e s if thkn. I w no paptar to IN* rea01 o r l)ii+iiitls<t t t d (late, the 'Correspiiding St.crvtitry iiiay a l i i i i t Special uieetiiip inny b t h callc~lwlirn i i t v y s -

funcls remaining o n ha
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Sqc.5. Monthly as the branch nmy deci be tranmcted at the a


wry.

BY = LAWS.

e siicli By-Laws,not iiic.onsi?;tc>ntw i t h tliis


nec-eswry for a proprr twnsactioii of busines..
. \ I<TICI.E
Srxmoa 1.
P E r T i o s 1. Cushinp's manual shall, in 61, far a* applicable', govern ttw Ibnrliaiiientary pri)c,t.edings of t h r society. SEC.2. The ri,cul:ir nieetings dial1 be held on the first a n d thiril \lomla?.n

IS.

Y EETl Stih.

An annual meeting cilia11 I)e lield :it the 1it.adquartt.m d tlw A d a t i o n , o n t h e third Xonday of January. SEC.2. T h e regular businesa n i e e t i n p aliaII ti< l i r l t l t-ict. v:ich i i i o i i t l i . Special mdetingaehall be called by the President r ~ n d %iwt;irv i l l e n <h*sir:itBtt,. ARTICLE S .

AI'ERB ASD PROC'EEDISC?i.

advisable by t h e Executivr Council. the iation and i b branches, together s i t l i tlir clixusbe published, anti tlistritwtc*tl fnse of expense to each &gular, 'life, honorary-and associate iiirinbcr. ana1 t o *ut+ . libraries and periodicals 88 may be deterniinetl b y the Coiiiniittt.t. O I I 1'1111li~ation ~d Correspqndenre.

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ARTICLE S I .

:tilt1

A L T W I O I I OF T H E COSSTITUTIOS.

A aliioriiiii fi)r tlic transaction of buaineen, otlier tllan t l i r rcatling tlirt.uahion of p;i1wrs, rhJl consifit of a niajority of the rcpiilar resident iiienilwrs. PEC. ti. T h t w l%y-I.awsiiiay IN- added to or arneniiwl at any meeting by / a two-think vote- oi t h r repil:rr resident ~ n r m t w r ~ . SEC..-I
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than sixty days prior to said

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OFFICERS OF TSZ ASSOCXTIOS.

LIST OF ?JEMBERS.

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I*,ni~*. P.5. BAT-. .\. E

. . . . . . . . . . .~ ' d p t lst~'avaIr) .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Major Pay I>ep't li.\iHD, \ V . . . . . . . . ' - . . . . . l o t1.ieut.t;th ('rivalry I<C.\I'II. \ \ I) . . . . . . . 1st I.ieuc. .Id ('avalry 1!11Y \ S . K 11 . . . .,."d I irut. 211 c'aValW

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Pl.I.I.Em. E.B............1st I.ieut.7thCovalry Y ~ m I i r ~ d W. I . e'. ........ ..l'aytnin 5th Cavalry G A ~ I I A KJ I~ w. . ........ . l a 1 I.ieut.9lb CaValry ( i a 3 1 . 1 - v \ s . .I. I 1 .I. ..... 1 s t I.ieut. :>tb Cavalry
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.Is( Lieu :!th Infantrl\ I R l I r . F. J . . . ....... :.?d hi ut. 2d Cavalr) J<rsm.T.\ V . . . . . . . . ..l st I.ie I. lllth ('nraln

.........i'ap

.I.&cKN,s. .I. , . . l ' u p I . 1st ('a\. v t , Muj. I..'. .\ . I ~ m s w s . Cr . . .. . . .?d Lie1 t. 111th I'aralr? .Intisrros, .I..\. . . . st 1.i I . Rlh c'tivttlry s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . st I.ieo1. $1. I , . - . I k . K I E S . . I . 31. . . . . . . . . 2cl I.l&tt. :nth I'nrnIr?

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KEXSED\-. \V. H.. . . . . .c'aptn[ft luth 1:a;uIry I.AWT0S. 11. \\ . . . . . . . . . ('BPI 111 Ith 1 ll\alr! 1,.4SDI% . I . F. H.. . . . . . . ~ s laiktit. t 1st Cawslr) Ins~os. R . . . . . . . . . .Irt l.leut. i t h IhvnIr!

......

.........................

........2d Lieut. 7th C a v a l q MACWSALD, I;. 11.. ..... ?d Llctit. 1st Caralrv M - I ~ s A L D J. . H.. .....zd I.ieut. 10th ra\mlry MWRE. F... . . . . . . . . . . .l'ap ' i t 'Ilh ('nralry t Y c R R a u . .\. .......... l b t 1 . k I-1st \rliller:

v. .: ....... . I ~ i t c 1:nyt. 2d ('ava]r! ..... ,211 I.ieU. 18th Infantry

A Complete Treatise
Illt~.trai~on~ 3" c ' n p

Forriticatioit, Millidry

IlridKe-, M i n i n g ,

&c.

With
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900
M.

1 . 1 m d . I . DlreLtor of t h e Koyal >lilttars Collcps >unhury.

MURRAY. C. 11.. .........1st 1.i ut. Itlr t'nrnlry YERRI~,\V..BI-IR.(;~~.. Bvt. Yaj. (;en. I..*. .\. MAC'nMR. . \ . I * . . ........3 1 1.ietit. 5th Ca\Calq RCLELL.SS. 11. I). ....>lnjor Ex c'. 8. ('avalr>t W ' I S 7 Y R E . F . . .......2d I.it.ltt. 19th lufantry tW4'ir)v. A . M i ' l l . . ('01.6tIt I n I . . H v t J l i j . cien'l I:..*. A. Yizsm. J . K...........,.IS. 4'01. X t h t'a\-alr)~IOYLAS >.I . . .............Caplain 7th l'avalr) I I i a L m t . F ............ .Ist I.ieot. htll l'evalr: *MARTIS. H .>la I A S K . . ............... MILLS. A. I.. ............ ,241 l.ieu;. 1st Cavalr! StirK.\u..r O . . . ........1st ].tent..kl crralr! M~STGOMERY K.11. . ....l'nptain:,th Crvalr) YUS?I~D. THW.T.. . .(;en'l Ex 1'. 1.t.avalr) No~uernow.C. E.. .....1st Lietit, 10th Cavalr) NORV'UL. F. P. ........ .Cnptaiu 10th l'avalr) t2iorea.C. R.......... .Is( Lieut. 8th I n f a n t v OLUSTEAD. J. A ..........l'aptaln 9th Cavalry PADDOCK, R B......... .2d Lieu(. tilh Cpvalr! PADDCN-K,J. V. S . . 1st l,ietit. rith l'avilr) parrwsc. L.'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2d bieut.c'. E hSD.( ; . E.. ................ .;Capt. Q. 31. 11. t F A t i E . c . .......................... Col. 31. n. 'PARKER. p . W...... ..Late Lieut. 6th Cevalr)' Flomra E............ .....%I I.leut.:kl Cavrlry R.4FPF.RTY. W.1.. ........Captain 61h Cavalr)

I l r i n g a complete S n r r a t i v e 01 t h e C n p l u r e of Cah11, t h e Siegeof Shrrpur. inc Rn ile of Ahmed Khel. the brilliant March t o Candnhar. and the Uefeat of A y o b Khan. w i t h ihe Operruonson t h e Htlmund. and the Setllcn~enlwith Abdur Rahman Khan With Xl.apr. I ) e m y Evo 2 1 . A i d e - M e m o i r e t l , t hc \ I . I : [ try Science-. Fr.imcd Froin t h e Ciuiiriliutions of Offtcer% of the DIIlercni ~ r v i i c * a . n d E d i i c d I+ a Ccvnml:ter of llic Corps of Koyal Lngineerr. With niimeroiir Plates and \S'ondcnts. 1.onduu \Vc.ile. ,SI@ 3 \ol. 8 \ 0 H.df Calf rubbed I, 81o.m. A Military D i c r l o n a r y . c o m p r i + i n c I'crtii.. 5 c i ~ i ~ t i l i .ci t t ~ l <tihrr\vt with t h e S r t r n c r of W.ar Compiled It,. .Wtr,or C t a r m l G Author c \ f .' I'he Gtinncr'. A i d " : ar&ed by $fi:;:%iition w i t h Supplement. Crown 8vo. cloth. IOI 6d. A m m u n s t i o n ; n I ) c \ f r i p r i v c T r e n t i r r on t h e 1)itYrreni l'ittjcctile., C h n w e s , FUKS, R o c k e t % .Bc , a1 pre*cntin "IC f * nLand a n d I c n S e r \ i c c . a n d on other N a * Store%manufactured in the Royal I.atmralnry. B y .w.rjor i'i:,idn IJ?w'mkr .Vdjend;e. f i . 4 , A w r r ~8t.~uperinlendent, Koyal I.nbora orv. Woolrich 101. 6d : b y pow. S I , rd Plate. refmrcd I - in the above mame N'ork, 41 the , bound Ammunition. VOI. 11, uniform w i t h nbovc. o r . ; I ) ! p0.1, 7.. A m m u n i t i o n , Sc>tr. <)it. k i n g a n a h r i d g m e n t J , f Val.. I angl 11.

Afghan War. 1879-80

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@ .

A Narrative o f t h e A s h a n t i War.

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o f Russia.-*Hi.;rory of R u s s i a from t h e E d i e 4 T i m e i to 1882. By R m d a u d Edit+ and Enlarned by Nmflnr f f o r k l l Dcilr, !ncludrng a Hi%tory of t h e T u r k o R u s m a n W a r m 1877-8. (rom t h e hest Authorttms. h y t h e Ldttor 3 VOIS.. 8v0; pp. 1 , 1 2 0 . Low. ass. Hiotoryd the I n d i a n M u t i n y , 1057-58, commencjI> from Ihr c l o s e of t h e s e c o n d 601 I --With Map Uemv 8\o.. a s . W x r Volu e of Sir l o h n Kayc'r Hirtory of the Sepo With Plan<. Uemy 8ro. ~ 0 % . - W i t h 4 Plan.. Demy 8vo. ms. Vol I!I Vol Hbtory of the United States F i r d S e r i e s . From t h e F i r s t S r t t l e m e n t of t h e C o u n t r to the.Adoption of t h e Federal Constitution. Second Series.- From t h e Adopt on o f t h e Federal Constitution to t h e End of t h e 'iixteenth Congress By R l r l m d H i r r l r r f h 6 v o l t . avo. Cloth. with Paper Lahelr. Uncut E d g e r and Gilt Tops. f a i o o ; Sheep. i t s 00: H a l f Calf, $ns s c . I bold only in Setri History d f t h e C i v i l W a r in A m e r i c a - fly t h e t h m t r d c P u r k T t a t ~ h l e d , with t h e a p r w a l of t h e author Volumes I . I I and I11 embracing. wirhoiit abrtdgment, the 61-1six \:oKmes of t h e F r e n c n edition. With maps faithfully e n g r a \ e d from t h e ortginals. and ? , . g o . printed in t h r e e colors. avo. Cloth. extra. per \ 0 1 Hiatory o f t h e Campaign.- H i s t o r y o f t h e C a m p a i g n for t h e C o n q u e s t of C a n a d a I O ,Frbm t h e d e a t h of Montgomery to t h e retreat of t h e Britrh Army under Sir Guy . Car eton By CkarIr, H#rcYjorrr. Illustrated. 8vo. Clol h. extra. S3 m H i s t o r y o f t 3 United States of America. f r o m t h e I J i s c o v e r y of t h e Continent to t h e E..tdhbli+ment o f t h e Conrtitution in 1789 , B &me# Barcroff. T h e Author 5 l a s t reviqioa. Complete in SIX volumes. avo. Price, in Blue Cloth. gilt top. uncut edge. $15 0 0 ; Broro Cloth, gilt top, u n c u t edge, paper titles, $15.00; S h e e p . marble edge, S Z I as. History of Cfvalry. By Colonrl Drluion. 18s. Horse, p a t nd Dragoons.- S k e t c h e s of A r m y Life at tlome and Abroad. By Rij.2 F & & d .Zo&arr W i t h Illustrations by t h e A u t h o r . pp. 116. Square Bvo, Ornamental Cloth, 8 % ~ . How to Rid4 and School a Horse. With a S y s t r n t of Horae G y m n a s t i c r . C r avo. as 6d. Service and E v o l u t i o n s of- As r e v i s e d by 4er M a j e s t y ' s C o m m a n d .
I*

altrl V o 1 u n t e t . r ~ . By Major 3s. 6d. Lee, Gen. Robert E . - L i f e o f G e n e r a l K o l w r t E. Lee. By ],kn EJhJ C O O L . Illustrated with Portraicr on Steel, Maps. a n d WoDd Engravings avo. Cloth. e+. $ 5 . 0 . ; Sheep. $6 04 Ilaif Morocco. $ 7 . ~ . Lee. Gen Robert E.- I ' e r r o n l l R e m i n i s c e n i e e , A n e c i l o t t i nnd Letter. o i Grncral Kobzrt E I-ce. W i N i s m Jams ( f o r m e r l y Chaplain In (;eneta1 Lee's A r m y ) . lllu'trated with S% f t d & d Engmvine-. 8vo Cloth, t 3 . 5 0 ; Sheep. $4 5 0 : Half Morocco, 85 s ; Morocco, $7.Lee, G e n . Robert E . : Four Y e a r s wi{IrYF?neral Lee : . I : e i n g a S h m m a r y o f t h e more Important Event. touching t h e C a r e e r o f G e n e r a l Robert E.Let in t h e W a r between t h e S t a t e s ; together with a n Authoritative Statement ofzhe Strength of ;he Army which h e cobmanded in she Ficld. R W a l t e r H. Ta ler, of his Staff, and late Adjutamt.Gencrd of t h e Army of N o r t h e r n Virgizia. 8vo. Clot{. $a.oo Life of Charles X I 1 or S w e d e n . Ity Voltairr. L . 1 5 .

Lectures on Tactics

F. H Dyhs Garrison Instructor. E D. Fcap

f o r Officers o f t h e

. \ m y . hlilitia.
410

Life o f George Washington


stereotyped plater
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By .fataw 8 a F D..Dl F r n t i i entirely new With a n &graving on steel a n d I illustrations on r o o d Cloth. extra. $r.as.' ALTA ~ E D ~ T I O N tamo. . O n e blurtration. 75 CIS. Lives o f Warriors.- L i v e s of W a r r i o r s or he T h i r l y Y e a r s ' W a r . By Sir Edrwvd Curt. 1 \ O I S . , 1zs. Manual of Elementary F i e l d E n g i n e e r i n g . 1880. I s . 6d. ; by p o s t . IS. Ild. M a n u a l oi F i e l d - A r t i l l e r y Exercises. 1881, Memorandum for the Guidance o f Cavalry employed i n O u p p n s t Duly at Alderrhot. By Sir Hop. C r @ d . 3d. Military Handbooks for R e g i d t a l Oficers. 3y7Coi. C. B. Bmr;rddwy, R. A. : I .- UILITAIIY S K K T C H I N C A N D K E C O N N O l t S A N C E . BY COl. F. f.&&hisor a n d Mejw H. G. M a c G m p r . Fourth Edition. W i t h 15 Plates Small-Crown 8ro. +s, l l . - l n ~ ELEMENTS ni M O D R R N ~'ACTICI P r u c t i c d l applied to EogLah F o r m u i o n s By Lio*r.Col. WiIkirror S k e w Fifth Edition.- With 1 5 J l a t e s a n d Maps. Small crown 8ro. p. I l l . - Ft8t.D ARTILLRIIV. I t s Equipment, Organizalion and Tactics. By Ma+ Sirtom C. h i ( , K A. With 12 Plates. Secood Edition. Small crown avo. 61 I V -Tug ELEMENTS 0 . MILITAW~ D ~ l r I s r r A T t o N kirst . P a r r ; P e r n a n e n t System of Admiaistration D MajmJ. W-Brxlo.. Small crown 8v0, 7s. 6d. V.- HILITARV Its Pnredtrre sed Practice. R y M o & Siasor C./'ran, R. A. Second Edition.. Small crown 8wo. 4s. 6d. VI.- CAVN.RV IN M O D a E U WAR. By cd. p. ChRdVIk h U k . s d l CtoWn 8V0, 6s. VI1 -F~ELD WoaKr. T h e i r T e c h w a l C o n w u c r i o n and Tactical Application By t h e E d i t o q CoL C. B. E r n t * o s d ~ R. , A . Smdl crown 81.0.

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133

M i l i t a r y S u r v e y i n g and Field S k & c t l i n g .

f Great B r i t a i n M i l i t a r y Forces o

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Military Reports a d c l r e s w d t o t he F r e n c h W a r \iiiii.ter. H y CJ/. h ' , i ~ , . i i. S 1 J G / , French Military Attache in Prursia. 1 8 W 1 8 p . 1ranslated.bg L.,rp/,iin H o m e , R E

N o t e s on Cavalry Tactics, O r g a n i r a t i l l n , e t c . -By a C a v a l r y Officer. W i t h Uiagrarn. Vemy avo, t a s . N o t e s o n M i l i t a r y S u r v e y i n g and R c c o n n o i r s a n c e . B y .lfajor J K Poftesorr 7s: bd. : by pO*h 7h pd. O n Seats and S a d d l e s . I h l c . a n d R i t i i n C ; a n d t h e P r e v e n t i e n a n d C u r e of
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On War. By Crtzcrtrl C'lausrzilz. T r a n s l a t e d b y CotniirI f. f.G r d a m . 21s. O p e r a t i o n s of t h e South A r m y i n J n n u a r v 3 n d F e b r u a r y . 1 8 7 1 . By Col. Carw


Vow Wabrfrnrfrbrn

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M i l i t a r y L i f e of the Duke o f W e l l i n g t o n . I%yj a c k s o t i ani1 S,.,ff. 2 $01.. P b s . &c. Dcmy 8to. 11s. Militar); Law, M a n u a l o f - 188;. 2s. bd. M i l i t a r y T o p o g r a p h y , T e x t - B o o k nf - I n c l u d i n g t h e Cour-c.' u t l:i-triictit,il ' R M..Academy. R 51. S t a 6 College, &c. By L X H: h ' i i r C , a r c f t . Profcswr
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T h e appcndoce%contain n u m e r o u s Icirers from a r m y c o m m a n d e n bearing upon

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T h e C a m p a i g n in A u s t r i a in 1866. By L i e u f : - C u f d n d t i t d r . A'. E.

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Studies in Troop

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ljy H. B. .t/i.c-/.ifau. .J..V,

The Olcer's Memorandum Book

7.. 6 d . e.rch; tiy poz.1, 8,. for Peace and U'ar. Iiy C d . A'. Harrrson. Fourth Edition. Rfvised throughout. Oblong p m o . red basil. with pencil. p Od H.SrAuw. l ' h t r t l The DeIense and A t t a c k of Positions and Localities. Ily COL. Edition, Revised ai,. Corrected. C r y t Uvo. 3s. 6d l A'. A. The Principles and Practice of M o d e r n Artillery. Uy L L u t . - C ~ l m rOwcr, With Illustrations 15s. The A r t i l l e r i s t ' s Manual a n d British Soldier's (.'onipendium. l%y Cupf. C Y I ~ ~ I A J , R.A. p. The Principles of War. By Cup/. Lmdy. 5s. h e Art of War. By B a r m decjomini. 9s. The Artillerist's Handbook. o f Reference; Alphal)elically .ti raiigrd i n he fnriii ions and Answers on.Artillcry. Military Law, Interior Ecunomy an<l XIt.ccthncou. A Guide to the Examinations for Promotion, a n d a Handl~ool of Keferena:e for ihc By Cngf. ( ; r a p l+'iI/, A'. A and Cepc / 1.. Dalmr. e Royal and Auxilia Artillcry Second Edition. c7bth, 6s. Column; a N a r r A t i v e o f t h e Advance of the River C'tnlumii of t h e Sile firrr).f:rukrrb&r,, ditwoary Force, and its Keturn down the Rapids By ht@jb?.G~= the H o n f I . L. Colborrr, late Commanding the Piver Column. With hlaps by M'SJOP Irish Rifles. Crown avo. 7s. 6d. The Elements o f Field-Artillery. I k i g n e d for t h e L'-e o f Irifatilry aiicl C a v a l r y Odicen. B H m KsoIIyr Capmin Royal Artiller Author of '.From Sedan I O barbruck," Editor of " rncidentn in the &poy War." 8;c With %&raving*. Crown 8vo. 7. 6.3. The Operations of War E t p l a i n e d a n d I l l u s t r a t e d . Ily .Vt+r- Grrrtral S i r E,/:,vrrd 8-e Hemfey, K.C. a. C. !Fourth Edttion, revised throughotit. 410. w i t h numerous Illu*trations. ps from t h e t i e r m a n Otficial of the W a r Office. Hy Capfair in 5 rols , wit cares of n a p s L6. The War o f 1870-71. By$ Prussian Ofticer. T r a n s l a t e d b y Copt. ( . f l . Fuir/dr.r&Vi*, R. A. 7s. 6d. The Opencionq o f t h e <; mlfi Armies in F r a n c e , from S c , l J n 'to t h e cncl of t h e War. By Major B l m u . T Ld by HajmJoaSr. wth Kcgiment. 9 s The Battle o f Sedan. By Cup!. Fif:-Gcmgr. W i t h P h o t o g r a p h s . 12.. s . ; by post. zs. 2d. The k m p a i g n in Holland in tf99. 2

j s . ; Iiy port. p. ad. C'ornpiled ill I l i c I k p a r l r u e n t of h l i h i a r y Histor) of the Prus\ian Staff. a n d translated b y Co/omrI l ' o r / i . r i c h f and Cajl.H. .W Heziw. With Maps. L t IS T h e Campaign of 1866; a I'nctical I<etrorqct. Tratislatecl b y 'Col. Ouvry, C . B. 7s ; I > ) post. 1 s ad. T h e Seven W e e k s ' War in Germany. Ily (apt. H . .If. H~CWY. -< 6s : by p o s t . 6 ~(d. T h e Principles a n d C o n s t r u c t i o n c d J l i l i l a r y Bridges. a n d the Passage of R i v e r s in llibt.,r> Oper.~ri.,nr H y .\ir IIeward D O U ~ L S With Plate. Lc I.. The Y o r k t o w n Campaign and ihe S u r r e n d e r o f Cornwalli., 1781. By Henry P. Illurtrited. 8.0. Cloth. 0: 00. Johrsfom. The P i q u e t C o m m a n d e r ' s Note-Book-Compiled fur t h e u~ of the Volunteer Force. By Y.gror E W . A l d r r i r j . A d j a t m t Central London Ranger. Piice. td. T n e Pgench C a v a l r y i n i s 7 0 w i t h T a c t i c a l deductions. By /.ieut.-CoL. emir. Tranrla!ed b y C F. Thornpaor. 7th Hu-rs. 6s ; by post. 6' 3d T h e Tactical W a r Game .A T r . t n a l a t i m ( k n c r a l v. Y c r d y du Vernoi,' Beitrag zum Kriepr.piel " U) / X Y a r D o r a r l c h i e Major K . V . With a Pian y.& I . The Nation i n A r m s . l'rnii.lalrd from t h r ( ; c r n i J n of ?.icuf.-CX. H ~ ~ YOU u Rder Goltz b y Phr/ip .4 A s h w o r t h I.ondon; A'lcn. 1887 Pp 3 4 1 Sire Q * ' x 6" I 1 ' ; " . Weight, . under 2 lbs. I 01. Price, 15. T h e Sepoy War in I n d i a . - .A l i i s t o r y of tile Stpoy \Var i n Iiidm. 1bj;-1858. By Sir fohm William K a p U e m ) 8 r o Vol 1, 18s V o l 11. Lt Vol III.Lt T h e Composition of A r m i e s . - I i o w lo u b s e r \ e t l i c C~sui8lw*iItiiiio f Armies, Milatar! Ueconnoi5rance m d Defen\e of Fortified Post. Hy a n I J f l i ~ c r With Plans. 3 i . od ; by post. 3s. Tbe Fighting of To-day. U'ritten lor Y o u n g Officer-. a n d t r a n s l a l i d from t h e German by Captain W i r k h n . R A. I S . )d. ; h y po+t. I \ 7d T h e R e g u l a t i o n Drill of the P r u s i i a n .%rmy. T r a i t s l a t e d by Coionrl & & a i Nmdirafe. 10s. 6d.; by p0.1. 101. 9d T h e S o l d i e r ' s P o c k e t B o o k . l o r Ficlcl Service. Hy C m . Sir Garwet ublsc.+f, C. E. 5s.; by post, 5. (d. The English A r m y ; its Past History. P r e s e n t C o n d i t i o n , a n d F u t u r e Prorpccir. B y MOJO. A. C n B t h i 7s 6d : hy post. 8s T h e W a r in Egyp: and t h e S o u d a n . lly T.Arcker. 1.ontlon: Hlackie & Sons, 1886 4 v o k Pp tr10 Sirc of each vol , rhout IO" I 7%" x t'," Weight. under p Ibs.. 14 oc. Price, i f . I&. T h e Sepoy War. 1857-8. L'nmpilecl f r o m t h e P r i v a t e J o u r n a l s of Gm. S r Ifope Groat. C C B. By Cajfnia Kaollyr. R .4. .

The C a m p a i g n o f 1866 in Germany.

+.

The War between the United States and Mexico,- I{y Gcorgt Wdkenr X d N .
Lllurtra-e& Embracing Eleven Folio Pictorial Dtawings ! in colors t 01 the Principal Conflicts, by Carl Nedrl. With a Uerription o f each Battle folm. H i l f hlorocoo. w m . The Russian A r m y . a n d i t s ( ' a m p a i g n s in T u r k e y in 1 8 7 7 - 7 8 . Hy F. First Lieutciiani in the Corps of Engineers. United State. A m " . and l a t e Attache to . the United Stater Legation a t SI. Pctersburg With .&In* conuining z6 g a tMilttai'y e s of Maps, P h n t , etc., printed rnoatly m colors. avo. Cloth, $ 6 . ~ . The Historical Reference Book.--ComprisinE il Chroiiological T a b l e of Univcr-1 With Hirlory. a Chronological Dictionary of Uni\erral History. and a Riogrrphical DictDnar Geographical Notes. For the use of Students. l e a c h e r s and Readers. By Lori, deitp+m. New edition. Crown avo. 57p pages. Half Leather. $3 00. The Hessians i n t h e Revolution.--The H e s s i a n s ani1 t h e n t h e r German Auxiliarlcs of Great Britain in the Revolutionary War. Bv Edward f . h r l l . Yap'and Plans. Pages x u , 328. nmo. Cloth. 01.~0.

.V.krt-,

'

T h e Persian Warn-Being Chapters X X S V I a n d X S X V l l I Io X1.1 oC*'Crote's


Hmory of Greece." For Use in American Colleges.
tymo.

Half Bound.

)I

9
,

Thomas. Geo. H.- Life and S e r v i c e s of M a j o r - G e n e r a l G e o r e 11. Thoma.. By GI.. R. W . ] d r s o a , U. S A lllurtratcd. Crown 8vo. Extra cloth. R e a T o C a b u l with the Cavalry Brigade A h-arrative o f Per.iona1 E x p e r i e n c e s w i t h the force under General Sir F.J ROberI5. C. C . H With Map and lllustratims from
Sketches by the Author. Second Edit=. Demy avo
os.

TheBnglish Battles and Sieges in the Peninsula. Lly Sir William Napier, K. C. B. g ; Ditto in 6 volumes. Ls The Italipn Campaign of 1859. By Mujor M i l l e r , A'. A. >vi111P1nn.i.

__

T r a i n i n g of Troops lor S e r v i c e i n t h e %Id, from the German 1. 1871. 1 s .

h i . . .R c g u l a t i o n s
Ba~iljarkson.

Tor

- ( Translated'

L C .

(Id ; 1'y p a l .

LIS.

Treatise on Military Surveying.

By.Li&.-Col.

:e.

':

188

LIST OF BOOKS.
eclmrant u n e .armec

LIST OF BOOKS.
De la c a v a l e r i e e c l a i r a n t une a r m e e - E t u d e Des exerc:scs p r a t i q u e s tlu s e r v i c e e n c a m p a ' iic
rur

139
IC
w r v i c c d e 13 c a v a l e r i e
Pmrt,. n 8 , ~ .
10

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tion. Drarimx or Fortification. Field Works. Military Poll. and Attack 2nd Defense of ',rid Works. Ry CaflIpia &ad,. 7s. 6d ; by p a t . 8s. Upton. Emory-Life and L e t t e r s of Emory Upton, C o l o n e l of t h e F o u r t h Rc@men+'of Artillery, and Brevet-Major-General U .S. Army. By Pefrr S M i r h i r Profc..or U . . h Mi.tury Academy With an liitroduction by J a r r r H a r r i r o r iVilsomv 1.i; U S. A With Portraiis. avo. Cloth. L.co V e t k i n a r y D e p a r t m e n t , Her M a j r s t y ' s , A r m y . R e g u l a t i o n s for 1882. IS. 3'1. War;. w i t h t h e T a c t i c s of t h e Three Arms, A b r i d g e d . By Louis Besuncorn. Translated by Lirmf8aaal-CoCoarC la#l8firld, R A. 45. 6d ; by PO%<& 8d W a n of the 18th and 19th C e n t u r i e s . - A n n a l s of t h e W a r s o f t h e 18th ant1 i o t h Centuries By Si+ dum+ Carl. 5s. per \ol. ; by port, 5s jd. Waterlpq Campaign - Journal of t h e W a t e r l o o Campaign. Hy Grnrrnl .l/cr<.rr, 8 . uJ ' Vola L F 15.

Treatire 00 Fortification. Part 1.- Contents : Artillery,' Principles of Furtitira-

I M i r i r f r r r de I a r-erw, etal-major g e n e r a l . . p I U ~ C B U I .

Broch. in-18.

c.

WaterlwLectures. Ry Col. C. C .Chrsney. 10s.6d. Xenophon -l'ranslat<d. The Atuabasis, or K x p e d i i i o n

of C y r u r . and tl;r Memorabilia of Socrater. Literally Translated from tnc Greek o f Senophon. By the ,?K. S. Watrea. df. A. With a GeograRhical Commcnrary. by W R. A i a r z m l h . Esq. tamo. Clotli. ) I co. *. Zulu War, 1879 A EJarrntive of t h e F i e l d Operntioiir. ' 3s. 6d.; hy IBWI. 4..

/.

Abrege d ' h i p p o l o g i e . a I'usage des sour-officiers'de l.armer, aclopte Isour I'enaeign-

de l'kippologie dansl'arrnre. par clcciston miiiirtericlle d u I C J U B " 1863. Par A . I ' , z / I . P ~ . veterinrire principal. proferseii: d'Lippolagie. etc.. etc. 8r edition Parr.. ,884. I \ o I tn-12 3 fr. 9. A i d e - m e m o i r e ( T h e o r i e p r a t i q u e ) d u F e r v i c e e n c a m p a g I i e nu b i v o u a c e t n u x Avantpostes. Paris. 186q I t.01. in 18 avec planches. I fr. 2s. A i d e - M e m o i r e d e I'officier d r c a v n l e r i e e n ca.mpaKne. P a r / u r q w s de Chu6.>:. . . major du 19 chaueurr. Par.s. 1883. I vol. in-18. cartonne en toile 3 fr A r m e e - K a l c n d c r p. 1888 p a r V. Below ( e n feuilles I. Berlin. 2 -. Avar!tpostea de cavaleric legcre S o u v e n i r s ; par F. dr BrGzrR, general de cava!ene. ,6L edition.' Paris. ,880 I vol. in-16 avcc planchis. 4 fr. , Campagnc de Prusse . ( 1806) d'aprrs les a r c h i v e s d e la g u e r r e . Icnn. I'ar P.' Feuad. . bvec a cartes et jdroquis. 111-8. B t y c r r - L m r a a / t . to f r Campai o f Sedan; t h e D o w n f a l l of the S e c o n d E m p i r e 1 Aux.-Sizpi.. 15;o). Par G?%a& Sa. p. avec plans e t ca;tes N e w Tork. Helie 1) 5 Camct. ai&-memoire d'e I'officicr (IC c a v a l e r i e e n . c a m p a g n r , nplBrou\c l ~ le r Miairtr8 & la f l e w , IC IV mars 1886 Paris. 1886. 4 vol cart. toile aoplai-e. a, ec peau d'ane, crayen et caoutchouc .a fr. 50. Cava1erie.- E x p l o r a t i o n \ e t c o m b a t . P a r le nrnJor baron l a h u r c , c h e f tl'eiat-mn,or de la m division de cavalene b e b . Paris. 1884. I 4.in-8. 3 fr. c o , c. Cavalefic.-Service d'expforation et de s u r e t e . Par----**** ( E x t r a i t d u Jwrnol der rrirrrrr niIilaiwr b. Paris, 1804. Rroch. i n 4 I fr. 15. Combat a pied de la cava1erie.- E t u d e s u r le c o m b a t a pied de la c a v a l e r i e . 'I'ulique anciennSZpstique moderne. Par T. Soair. colonel du IIC hu.sard5. Para-. ,877. 4 I $01. i n - t i . 2 fr. Conference sur la c a V ~ l c r i e ~ c l n n le s passe et clans I'avenir. Par .I/. d'And!.ra, licutcnamt.cobncl d'etat usjor. Paris. 1870. *i?ol in-18. a \ e c fi urc. CI planchcs i j c , k Coun abtege d'hippdogie, a I'usage ' d r s ' s o u ~ - o h i c i e r s . . r l e s l)rigaclicr< e t ele\c.. brigadiers des oorps de troupe3 a cheval. redige pdr I C < soin%dc la Commission hippique, approuve parale M1nirfv8 dr &a # r m e . le a avril 1874. Paris, 1886. I vol in-r8 I f r 5 0 . C o w d'hippoloiple. a I'usogc d e M M . les officiers d e I'armee. d e M h f . les oftiricrs des haras. l u veterinrircs. .&,c , rdopte' pour I'enrei nement hippoloaiquc dmr I'armce p.~,, decision ministenelle du i r j u i n 1863. Par M.A b'af'ea, officier d c la Lepton d'honneur ;IC "veteriorire rincipd. professcur d'hippologie e t directeur du hams d e I'Ecole de c.avalersi, CIC' 4* edition. saris, 1885. a forts vot. in-8 a w c planches e t figurer dans le tertc. 14 f r .
enetit

arec planchcr

E m p l o i d e . l a c a v a l e r i e en campagne. P a r le IiruIrnuiif-cdond Thonms ( C o d & . - - ~c n c e f a t l~ e X I mar. tS+, a la Kruniori d e r officicrr'i Paris. 1878 Hroch. in-8. I fr E n campagne - S e r v i c e d e 1.1 c a v a l e r i e e n c a m p a n e , I'ar le gcnrrof boron I'on Lor 'l'raduit d e I'allcmand par c. Gradroa. capitaine h!.vcle at, p rtgtment de hussards Paris. 1883 ( Extrait d u j . v r r m l J t s r r i r a ' r r n i / i f n r n r \ t "41. in-8. a v e c carte en cpuleurr 3 fr. E q u t p a g e s mi1itaires.- Aide-memoire a I'u.cage dks officiers d'infanterie et <le '. CavJimie. Pari.. 1877 I \01. in-18 a \ c c a7 planches, papier blanc et peau d'anc relie toile. a fr. P a r de P/uUcz*i/ir( E x t r a i t d u E t u d u u r l'emploi de la cavalerie en campagne [ m r r , r l d r r sc.iea,.ts m i l i f o i w * ) Pari.. dm. Hroch i n 4 . 75 c . F r l i l d i e n i t - O r i l n u n y . ( K r g u l a t i o n * for Fiela1 Service'). Berlin, 1887. Emsf-S&.p / r i d .Ilrtt/rr r a d b h n Pp. 216 Weight. 7 oz Price. 2s. H o h e n l o h e I n g c l h n g e n , Prinz Kraft \III.ITARISC.HE B K I E v E 111: Ueber V l e t 2 4 4 p 3 e r t f n . 4 -. Feld Artillcrie. P e d c r 8 STUATR~I~L Ha:EFI? HY 11. gr 8'. 27fp ?\ec I goquis e l I plan de ballille. Berlin. 5 9. Idees p r a t i q u e s stir le servicc d e la cavalerie.' I'ar ~cncruI-nrnjor dr A'osrnburg. Prix. 4 fr. I n s t r u c t i o n pour les marches de la c a v a l e r i e o p e r a n t seule. ( i x t r , d u journal , f a r'.itm.rs m t f i f a i r r r ) Pari.. 1684. Rroch in 8. 5 0 C . I n s t r u c t i o n p r a t i q u e d u IO j u i l l e i 1884 s u r le Xervice d e la c a v a l c r i e e n campsgne.. Paris, ,884 I YYI in-a8 cartonne. I f r . I n s t r u c t i o n p r o v i s o i r e s u i I'usage ds r e v o l v e r ( I C g u e r r r systenle L)eIvipne ). Partr, 1871. Broch. in-18 a c planc~e. p c . ' I n s t r u c t i o n d u 16 a o u t 18Tj s u r I'dpiploi e11 c a m p a g n e du hilflrr dana In .cavhlerie. Paris. 1875 Hroch. in-r!l- . , s c. Kleist. G. v. Die Offirier-Patrouille u. d i e *trateyiache h u f y a t ~ ed e r K a v a l l e r i e gr. 8 I V CI 60 p. H d i n 1 20. La cavalerie fra'ncaiss e t la culiqur d u reylenirtit de 1876( E i t r a i t du j o u r m l 41s rrirrrrr n r l i f v i r r r 1. Par Y M V d c m a . Park\. ~88, Hroch. in-8. I fr. J ronfcnncc c Toours J. I'ar Le combat a pied de i a c a v a l e r l e . ( A ~ , P o &I Y d i r a r . Paris. ,881 Hroch. in-8 50 c L < d u c a i i o n d e I'infanterie francaise, a la 'direciion d u ' * S p e c t a l e u r Militaire." 1887. Par / I . dr Fhtn.,. Paris Pp 532. Weight. under I Ib to 01. Price, 8 fr.

et d e c o m b a t , d'apre" e n opuscule d u ycneral-major dol Verrly du Vern i\. mar e n ragor; a v c c l e i iwnnc :tux reglemcnrs beiges. Par F rimmtvhaws. P.mr. 1837. I fr. soc - f

Le r a i d

e t les sapeurs a c h e v a l . Par ( Extrait du f o a r n a l d r s r r i r r r r r urililairrr

P . A. G*'*.
I

'-01

c a p i t a i n e a la legion e t r a n g e r e in-8 a v c c a cartes. D fr. 50

Le service d e s rapports
ant

et t e c o n n o i s s i n c r s de I'officier d e ciwalerie. Par &&Ide h ~ ~ s u r d s d Hanowe e Na. 15 'Iraduic par B wu,s lieuten. Pari,. 1867 I fr. 50 E. Les Chicns m i l i t a i r e s d a n s I'nrmee francaise. l'.w L. /upin. I n .8. B r r p p L r D r a r l f . 3 fr. 50 ,

, N a r d o a r r , Colonel d u tegimcnt

- Manual - few.

d ' e q u i t a t i o n de In cavalerie a l l r m a i i d r , Itreviere partic. Par le hfme. AnPrix. 3 f r . y x M a n u a l d ' e q u i t a t i o n allet.nhn&, t r a d u i t d e I'allemandc. p a r IC Cbmn#undunr C h ' h c ~ . Paris. Methode de d r e s s a g e d u c h c v a l de t r o u p e . Paris. I&. ii1218 c a l l . 40r,

Coum d'equitation.

cavalerie iellement e t cnseigne a I'Ecole de cavalcric. et dans les carps de irotlpcq a the, .I. de M. le Ministre de la guerre. en date d u 9 avril 1853 8. cditior.. Paris, 1833. I rol. in-18 cartonne todle. ; fr. mai idaa p o r t a n t r e g l e m e n t s u r les Exercices de In cav.tlerie, revisnttt ~ ~ p l e t a le n decret t du 17 julliet 18*. Paris, 1686 i vol. in-19 cartonnei. 3 fr. Lc memc a pnndea marges. ; rol. in-8. 6 fr. 0 De l a d i d o n actuellcment donnee aux operations de la 'cava1erie.- E x a m e n Critique de la direction act'uellement donnee aux o ralions de la cavalerie. Extrait du j o u r n a l de# sccI.crr miti-s). Pa, 1881. Broch. i n 3 I fr.

Par le ronfr &Rum, ecuyer e n chef de I'Ecole d e

I'argO& ~ ' I v Q . , c?pitaine commandant au huurrds. Paris, 1887. 75c. ' Observations rclativea S u r I'instruction p ~ q i t d r u I 7 fevrier 1875 c u r Ir s e r v i c e de la c . ~ ~ a k f en i e campasne: par IC r a ) i t a i r r ( ; . I K r l r a l t d u f o r r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ * = ~ I ~ aL.= r ~ n i C i ~ Paris, ,880. Rroch. in-d. 4 0 c P e t i t t r a i t e e l e m c n t a i r e d e i a p o g r a y h i c p r a t i q u e . a I'u,ape des rous+ficiers, caporcrux. c t clever. Par H r m r q r i n . lieutenant d'infantcrie Parir, ,007 m.

NouvGau procede d ' c n l c v e m e n t d e s pieces p a r le c a v n l t l i r .

'

'

R e g l e m c n t d'cxerci.cr de la c a v a l r r i e n n i r i c h t r n t t e . I i i ~ t r ~ c i i od nu c a v a l i e r a cheral 'lradutt de I'allemand par l e CorrrraadaaI <.hahwt, major du 4- Chrusuur.. Prix. s fr. gcc. R c g l e m e n t d u 3 1 m a i 1887 s u r le service des nrmieh a l l e m a n d e s e n c a m p a g n e .

'ire

I,

.
I

-,140
Reglament d u 17
Pari\
11.

. .~.

LIST OF BOOKS.
I* I

.
t i r des t r o u p c a d e c a v a l e r t e .

a o u t 1884 sur I ' i n s t r u c t i o n d u -01. i n 4 avcc hguru. cartonne. I fr.

P3r T. B O I I ~ cC o l,o n e l d u Broch. in-18 avec 2 cartes en uouIcurs. I fr 50. $@ce des avant-poster, I'rr G.-Mu.r. 7konror. chef d ' e s c a d r o n s B U l e d r a p o i i z . Paris. 1873. Broch i m - 8 . abet planche. sfr 50. Sur le8 manceuwes de briga&.-Iiistrurriori p r o v i s o i r e s u r lei inantcuvrrs d e brigade P V K cadres (6avalerie I . Parir. 1881. Broch in-$8 0 5 c' Tactique elementnire, d e la c a v n l r r i e p r u s s i e n n r , e t I r a g n l e n ' . clr la tactique gmerale en usage dams I'armee prussiene. d'aprcs I'our rape allemand du p w w l mn,w P,..4. P6ni Traduic p.r Ha##ick, capiuine a u I= drayon. Paris, ,875 I YOIzn- 3 z fr 50 Troia journees d'exploration p a r . u t i r d i v i s i o n &e c a v a l e r t e c n a v a n t d ' u n e a r i t t t C. s u r la ligne d'operacions de Chdonsa hlctz. Essai d'aprc. la , a r i c .I\CC un croqut, der mnrrhe.. Par Mar. C ' b j I s , c a p i u i n c d'ctat-major. Paris, ,878. Brwh in-#a A V ~ C L ~ r t colorice. e I f r . ,5 Uoe marche-manacuvre de C a v i l e r i e e n A r g u n t r e ISTSJ, 0 l w r a t i o i i . i 1iyk)c;thctiques; par un officier de cavalertc. Paris. t8,y I \ol tn-S a v c c + c.irtc%e n codleur. 6 fr
huurrds.

Service d'esploration et d e surete p o u r la c a v a l e r i e .


Pa".. 1879

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IOURNAL
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thch txvialry otticers of tht- early ye:irs i i f tlie war,

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tlic iicw geiierittigiii I J ~ ottiwrs, as \veil ii? w i t l i those WIIIJ kucw him personally, his iiaiiie is the ayuuiiyrii of cscelleiice i n the inouiitetl serviw. T1io.w wht~h;rd tlie fbrtuiie tu serve w i t h liirii in the war arc not surpri.wtl at the high 1)lnce asigueil h i m iii history niitl by coiiiinon apreenient. His was a u u i q w cliiiructer. . Hc \ v a f u l l of tlash. without ostentation o r parn(le. (luiet i l l liir i i i a i i i i e r , but decisive iii action. A strict disciplinarian, Who 1i;iiI thc reqtcct i l i i i t affection of his cominantl. As a troop aiitl batta1ii)ii coiiiniaiiiler, Geii. (tlieii Cap.) BUFORI) was among the first (it the cavalry otticer5 (if tlie * old army to depart from the cast-irow rule of Jlartiuetisiii, : t i i d to treat the soldier as H thinking, reasoiiing Ijciiig. 1Ie b H J k especial pains, as a troop coninlander, to d i g d f y aud eIevnte the 1 1 0 1 1 ~ 1 m i 1 i i i 4 ~ 1 otficcrs 1 c ~ l of his troop,goiug 80 far iq the i n t e r i x iliauagenieut I J f tiis cor~iniaudas tu couvene a board of n o t i - a x n m i s s ~ e c l Otficers for the w j u d i c a t i w of matters personal to the ineti of his troop. It is uot uecessary to indicate with what pxceIIent erect-a neII-manap;ecI course of this character \vas pursued, uor need it be suggested that it is an exlwriilient which I l l J t every troop coniiiiander couhl :idopt with Bucceea. 111 the prewiit iiuiiiber ut the JOURNAL the Cavalry h i a t i o i i preseiits to its n i e m l ~ x s ag~t~ likonew d of Maj.4;en. B~JFOKD. It is from a His cornmkion photograph taken in the uniform of a as L\ inijor-geuernl of voluuteers wau

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GENERAL .JOHS I:UI.OtiD.

GENEH.IL JOHN BUFORD.

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while he waa sick with his fatal illrie~si n \Vasliiiigtoii. Ko pliotograpli could convey a correct idea of his living presence. He was of medium stature, fair-haired, blue gray eyes, w i t h a tlroopiug, flaxeii moustache, which almost coiicealed his niouth. (;en. BUFORD was Huelit iii conversation, and, though at times taciturn, \V:IS always :qqwtmchal)le a i d pleasant to hia officers and meu. H e was :I superb horsemail niitl neat in his attire, though lie affected a carelessuew ill dress niore I L ~a protest ngwiust the gaudy displrry of wnie of hi3 cavalry coutemiioniriea, w h o iiidulgetl iu tinsel and feathers, for whoiir hi3 rarpect was not great, tli:iii h*caiise neglect- of dress waq uiitural to hinh He. llespiml oateiitatioii a d clisplay of aiiy k i d . was geiitlc,geiii:il a i d iiatural i l l social iiitercoufie, but a very tiger wheii a r o u d . I t is licit the iuteuticin a t this time to enter into the tictails of Geii. BUI.ORI)> Iilb. I t is to I w Iioped t h t 4 worthy Iicn iiiay i l l ilic iieiir fut u r e iliakc this record for tlie b w 4 t offutufc rav:ilry iiieii. i t is especially wiuht?cl iiow to put nu record fact? its to tlir sliiire tliiit Gyii. I~UVOKII liatl iri tlie filial wccess a t Gettyshurg - the p i r t Iic t1.h iu x.lectiug, ailti liulding the field whose nntural aclvautagcu gave our brave troops tlir victory that saved the coiintry from invasiou auil final destructiou. We quote from Bates Battle of Gettysburg: 0 1 1 the iiight of the Wth, Geii. BUVOHD e l w i t sonit! Iiours with Col. h n i \ x C . DE:VIN, (one of his brigade coniniantlers,) and while cornnieiiting oil tlie in formation 1)rought scouts, reiii:irkrtl that the hittie wc~ulcl lw fiiuglit ut that iii I y DEVINS p i i i t and that he WNJ afrai? it woulcl coniiiiericeiii tlic morning before the iirfautry would get up. They will attack i i i the morniug aud they will and we will collie homing-skirmishers three deep, rutid BUFORD, have to tight like devils to hold our owii uutil support arrives. The enemy must know the iniportaiice of this psitioil : i i d will straiii every nvrve to Becure it. T h e judgment of FORD wna just, showing that he was p I of remarkable discwrnment and penetration. Being well m u r e d that the eneiiiy wns a l m t to attack him, BUFORD was early in the mcldle and hatl made tlie riiust i i i i p o h g clisliositioii to meet them of which his little h r c e would aclniit. Hac1 he hat1 at hi3 back the half ruillion of troops, that a farmers wife i u reply to enquiries of a rebel officer had cleclaml were in Gettysburg, he could have scarcely made one more 80. I n additiou to being imposiug, it had the virtue of k i n g erective, and when the rebels came ou boomiiig, skirriiishers three deep, as BUFORD had predicted, they met a stpbborii resistance. As BUFORDS meii for the most part fi)ught tlisiiiounted, the enemy ab fireti took them for infailtry and coiisequeutly moved iartlily ancl with much circumspection, giving time for the t i n t corps, which was now rapidly approaching, t o come up, 80 from the opeuing furtune favored the

Union arms. -1 constantly iucreasiiig skirmish tire was rmntinued for half an hour, when the eiieniy having brought up his artillery opened with :inswered promptly, a i d inaintainrtl much spirit. The guns of RL.FORI) the contest gallantly, preserving the delusion that he was well supported. SRW that the The fury of the fight increased a t every monient, and BI-FORD f the field : hut not nn weight of numbers heariiig on him would p r e s hini o inch was yielded though he hatl every preparation iiiade for retiring to Cenia s a moment of gloom etery hill, wheu he could hold out no louger. I t h and anxiety to that true heart. Would he be left to his fate and Iw? obliged to sacrifice that vantage groiiiid he had striven-so hard to hold? The history of the battle then goes on to recount the story of the nrricorps, a i d continues: ral and tleployment of REYSOLDS who had firstfelt the shock ot b a t t l e , a d d i i r T h e heroic BCFORD, ing the long hours of this terrible day, had held his t r o o p 011the flanks 0 opportunity or necessity reof the infantry, joining in the fierce fight a quired, and who from his witchtower had wiiniied ancl reported every phase of the battle, wns now at tlie critical ninmeilr a pillur of strength. His front was trieil hiid the attempt wns made to push part hini : i h g the low ground, clrainedby Stevens KIIII, when some severe tightin:: (icriirred. nut he maintained his ground intnct, 6 ~ 1 that 1 ai1niiral)le position, wlicre : u again s a ~ c d . the army nt length fought dud won the Iiiittle, w Indeed. says this histiiry, tlic spirit of l 3 1 , P o w ) , like n gootl angel, seemed to Iw constantly lioreriiig over the rntire tielil of that first thy. One of the 1wst reacl of our niilitnry critic3 N I ~ S of hini: Hr not only showed tbe rarest tenacity, Iwt l)y his Icrsonal capacity iiintlc his cavalry acconiplish marvels. alii1 rival infantry i n their steatlfastii**, riot oiily in the battle. itself Imt aftt.r\varda, nlie;i tlcployctl i n the intervale, tlrainetl hy Stevens Run. wcst of Gettysbiirg. But we ilea1 riot quote further. Tki3 i. par1 of tile rrriml of h w n i u i s cavalry division in m e tlays liattlr - tliv timt (lay a t (Settyshurg. It is R record tliat rctlccts iwiljiiig glory O I I I l ~ r v u n ~11 ~ :recortl that every cavalry tJtticer niay Iw prowl nf.

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Iih'EEDIAVC: OF C.4 VALRl' HORSESS.
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nil classes of men, and of all persons whose v ~ w a t i o i iI V I I I I I P C ~ the111 ~ iiiore or less with the constant use of homes, ncitlc sh~ultlh:1vc n higher appreciation of the indiriclunl merit of sric.11 :iiiininlz tli:ui the mounted corps of d i e s . The individual fitness of the bows (if n caralry regiment is a large factor in estimating its etficiciicy. Sitice then its efficiency is meailired by the quality of i t s horses it becomes itliperatire that .it be well mounted. The question of how to ol)tni~ithe tii:iterial to constitute the beat mounts is therefore exceedingly pcrtiiietit. Applying 'this question in its practical hearing I choose for iiiy subject - " How our ' Godernrnent may breed its Cavalry Horses" I & not claim the merit of novelty for the suggestions I niay H+C . NI to the establishment of a "Government Breediqg Fiiriii," fiir it. is known that otheis, (including the I.ieutenant Getiernl of the .1rniy9) 'entertain views of their own on this subject; g!it for the niaiiner of' ImmI. * . ing and. the selection of breeding stock, I niay claim origiunlity. ' Whether it be a necessity at this time for the gorcrnnient to tnkc i n hand the active operation of a breeding estoblishnient for such alpnrpiw may admit of doubt, but I shall attempt to show thnt the necesdty 11cics exist and never heretofore in a greater degree than a t the present time. The difficulties annually met with by the department charged with the PUTof relmounts for our service are by no means nlieting. but wit11 -. .& succeeding year, it is growing inore difficult to obtain suitable horses, e and their fitneas becomes still .more reduced below the required stan~lartl. Breedem have taken a new departure in horse4reeding; they no lcliiger devote their capital and energy to breeding eaddle aninials but are Iwing carr;ed away wi-th the popular craze for heavy foreign draft horses or standad bred trotters. The denland for saddle anima6 is being rcduc1~1; people generally ride lem nod drive more; railrode span the country in

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every dirt.cticin. and it is un longer B necessity to t w c l mouiitc(l. $)rile iew ritlc fiir iileaaiire aiitl for these, n ~ u e but high priced well-gnitr(l I :uiiriial? stiffice. Since i i i iny (ipiiiioii it tieconie~piiticy on the part of the povcriiiiieilfc to lciitl its fnstering c:wc to the ~rcomplishnieiit of such an object I prc; piw to ..how in what iiiatiiier it ni;iy be accomplished. First - How Iiorses Iwst ndapted for the mounted service mny Iw! 1)red. ! 8cntrtl-The superiority of the auimals selected for breeiling stock. :iiitI thc iii:iiiiier iit' their I)reetlina to a tixed standard. T1tird-A plaii o f a breeding farni with cstiniateu of the cost clfsniiie. FotirUi - A cornparisin of the fitness of the aninids hred to n ccrtnin L . ' .-t:uiclnrtl w i t h that of those sripplitd hy purchnse pncler the contract , system . ., Fifth - A tlc~criptioii I l f tlie clitlerent gaits of saddle aniiii:ds and tholx best :ial:iptwl for the c.:iv:ilry service. i stock for this p u r p ) x there sliciriltl he nhFor the f o u i ~ ~ l : i t i t i iIireciling tained by purcliase iri 01)eii iiiiirkt-t n iiuiritwr of nntive I i i i l i i i i i pony tii:ires ..elected for the-ir Htiicr-2 2s (tunis. and as sires (proprtioiied to the -, iiiiniIwr of miire? j tIiiirouylr1)recI stallioiis of sire not less thaii sixteen Iiaiitle, phy&ally awl ~011stit~tici11~I1y aouiitl, with aniple Imne ant1 sub Froiii the i i i i i c i r i ot' these woulil-bf!scliiiretl the femnle proginy 1 statice to constitute .the ( ~ u i i iof s the priiposeecl st8ivdtlr(i%ed cavalry 11 rses; in . which we slinll expect t n tiutl aniiiials that when nintureci will qirn e . ; d l service. I n order to show the a~lviiiitngea to be tlesired for the ~iiiiu~itecl t i ) lw p i n e d b y such a cciiiil~inntiouof h l i ~ it ~ l will lie i i ~ e w i i y to 3) a little into the history ot' the h e e d s of the aiiiiiids .selected. Th:it of the I I n their s e k . is t o ~ well i k i i i i \ v i i to rcquird elnlw)ration. tlii~roiiglil~recl t i o i i of sirei ivc sliall expect uod map feel assured that they will i n i p r t t o their progeny the pied 11wlities rlint hare reiideretl tbeni P I fhnieus the world over. 'l'he crowiiig of' tlieiii on other hreeds of h o w when cxrriecl on. has i n every iiishince resulted in the improvement o f the 1w.r pre-lwteiit bllxxl, for iii speed, resolution and eiidurailce. muscular clew!1 t i p e n t and density of bone, they s u r p w all other breeds and there is scarcely R race of horses but may be ikprored hy a c m with them. ' This fact is alniost universally recognized and. nearly all t,he countrirn of' , the ririlizecl globe hare for years regirded the English t h d t e ~ g h h ~or ~l '' blo~111 Iinme " ;is t h e hasis of all substantial impruvement. Whether in. :iiliiiixturc w i t h the blcwl of the pbegmatic draft h o w or the ninre * qiirite(1 trotter. of Xniericaii prcductinti. the influence of such )lad-%' lire einiiient a i i t l wlf-iwwrtiiig, lcncliiig to a higher degree of perfection iii tlie resiiltniit progeiiy. The t ~ r n i thor~ii~glil~recl " is the synonym of the highest form of physical iwrfec-tioii iti till :iiiiiii:ils; applied td the horse i t refere to animala
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I required for our military service? I c o n t p i that f r c h iio other 1 meed n we hope to obtain meterial of such excellence. Where can me nd, iii this country, animals that liave esliihited qualities which 90 exci surpriw and challenge admiration? As mothers they e x c d in the ca of 1 their otfrpring. Their instinct of self-preservation is woncierfiilly dkvelo p d . This is exhihited amidst the winters storm, when they paw away the snow to reach the noririsliing grass or u p m the arid snnds nf t h e (Iwert, when, with ~ ~ i i e r r . i tlirertion. ~g they take the shortest route to the nearest 1 m 1 to slake their thirst. The sagebrush of the plains or the cottoiiwcwwl of the valley alike contril)~te f i d for the111when noiw else is near. They readily ac1:ipt theniselves (O all conditioiis of life,an(l m e at all tinies reatly for faithful wrrice. Why need I multiply pmof of the gwxl 11unlities of this hardy race ? Having in view that the laws of heredity tench IIA that * like Iwgeh like, we may safely calculate on the certainty of transmiseioii of sucll characteristics to their ofspring, \vhen c i i i i l h l with the .selected ajm, through succeeding generati6ns. I Iiohl it :I fact that the lnclitiii poiiy is. mare nearly contiected with the blootl of the tliorouphhral than. t h t of any other breed of horses iu this country. I t is, then, 1 1 0 violeiit outc-rm we shall attenipt, but rnther a reuiiion of the bl(Md that, tliouph eniniiating from the same well-spring of equine life, has thrnugh diverse cliuniicls .followed ita courses unmixed and unknpaired i n ib quality throiiph inore than two centuries, and it is now prnpc~&!t o unite again thme rtrwnis of 1 divergence anti combine in the progeny of S U C ~selected siren a 1 ~ tlriins the characteristics of both. In so tloing we h 1 1 l t i 1 1 4 1 no iiic~iiii~)atiI)ili~~ to reconcile. I)ut a happy union in the I)lendinp of the peculiar berance of spirit i n the thoroug:hl)red gently toned hy sdtiusture

denoruin&?d I~lwrl horns fronr well estnl)lishe(l purity ot lineage. We are informed thrtt the lighter horses fiw spee(1, intrciillicc(1 i n t i i Englancl prevjous to the reign of JAME.. 1, were S11aninnls, Tiirk3 and Barbs. The Arabians were introd cecl i n the latter part iif the reixii i)f Q ~ ~ E E S ANNE. Similar horses tra i n 2 their lineage froin the sanie snurce were brought to hIesico hy the paniartls. The -1ral)ian horses I)nsses.wtl unt l o u b k i beauty of form a d #race of iiiotion. but were inferior in size to the average thoroughbred, being rarely over fi)ur!een :i11(1 one-half liantls high.- Thqthoroughbred horse is purely a British ~)roductinn. At a very early day the rulers of Great Britain directed thejr attention to the work of improving the breeds o f their horses by croissing tlieni w i t h the Spnniawls. Turks, Barbs and Arabians. From the Spaniards of Mesico desfeuded to the Aiiicrican Indians of tho western plains the foundation stock of their breed of ponies, which have been rendered still more diminutive in size I)y the vicissitudes attendant upon the conditionsnf their noniatlic life, but HS vigorous, hardy am1 enduring and as well adapted to all needs of their savage life and the uges made of them in Indian carfare as their reiiiote ancestry of two centuries ago. This much of the history of the thoroaghljred is given by way of showing the rdhtionship existinr between them and the Indian . Asked why Indian pony mares are to be preponies of the present f e d as dams, I answ r because they ~ J W S the qualities we desire to retain in our proposed standard in n greater degree thaii any other breed of horses; characteristics so marked that uo amount of outbreeding would eradicate. All officctrs of esperience on the western plains have had nculsr proof of the supenori!y of Indian ponies over our animals in Indian warfare, their docility,.activity, tractalhlity and hardy endurance, combined with- +eight-bearing capacity, render them especially adapted for such p u r v s . I niight mention as evidence of their ability to carry weight some instances often witnessed in our immediate vicinity-that of two and eonietimea three $u& Indians mounted on nile pony, or that of one single animal drawing the lodge poles of a large Indian tepee, their ends sttapped over itqback with many pounds of Indian penates, children and dogs on the t vis behind. I once saw a single pony carry)? the entire carcass of a 1 rge elk minus the head. The Osages, noted fot the large size of their mqn. sometimes weighing as high as 250 pounds, are often seen mounted on iminutive ponies. I attribute this ability to carry great weight to their iuscular developnient and density of bone. I know of no other breed of nimals of equal ability i n this line, according to s i z e , except the Mexican urro. also of Spanish origin. This quality renders them well adapted f r warfare purposes, for which they have been wed from their earlieet his ry. Why are they not, then, to-day as valuable for the foundation s k upon which to form a class of h o r n

D r muscular development; with intelligence unimpaired, and size, i v tb

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weight-bearing capacity, iscreased. It is from such union that we i l l obtain suitable dams, wliich, when bred again to thoroughbred sires, 1 ill produce foals wliich, when properly hroken and gaited. will leave nothi g to be desired in our cavalry hor.-es. Animnls representing all the ner mry qualifications, and as nearly approaching the desired standard as i is practicable to obtain by systematic breecjing, and so superior to th acquired by purchase under the contract systeni that it will Iw? real ly apparent to all concerned,aiid cheaper to the goverunielit by at least opeha&. There can be but small doubt that animals so \)red will rrtain the g quditiea of their progenitors. E r c r y iiring thing brings fi@ its yo after ita own kind, in some casea the exact counterpart olr the

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B K E E D I S G OF CA 1-A I& 1. HORSES.

It would require an appropriation by Coiagrc<* of f i i i i t l a to purch the necessary breeding stock, not to esceed 8:30,000.00, wliich would putticient to inaugurate the undertaking. This amount +)IIIII cover lcrpeiises conoected therewith, inoluding coat of atnl)les,sheds an( pay of employes, etc., for the first year. I r woiild require for Iixmtioii sonic nditary reservation i i i th

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In coupling such h i m s, of a widely ilittiirent character. arid with such di#nnt variations of reed, new elementa of tlivergeiice WOIIIII I W intmduced in the offipring. T h e force of hcrctlity is i~sit:iIlycserteil to compel the progeny to adhe to the character which tins. l)ec,)r,lc tixctl iii the species, rather than to ollom the variations sought to I)c w t : i l i l i d ) t ~ a l . but in the selection of bot9 parents. each more nearly rrprCs(*iitiiig tht. type it is desired to origina aid in favor o f the perpetu . * With a niixed and betemgenenus ancestry, rc~prtwiititigv:iri~iiis

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stiti~tit~n:illy s o i i i i c l , with aiiiple lwie and siili*t;iiic-e; mare$ to la snlitl c l J o r d - h y s , hriiwiiz or chesttiutr, :iucl iiia IC* thnii iimrtc I high. h i i i)%cer of the cavalry a m slioulil be tletailrtl ns Ful)l>ri
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The breeds of horses,*he selection o f Iwectliiiz * t w k , tlic I of s t a l l i o i i a mid brood ruarw, the weuiiiiig. rearing rind 1)F:ik

blimil. as well as i i i pectiliaritics of form and distinctive characteristics, what is bred i n thv h i e will Iw transmitLI witti unfailing certainty. L L Beauty ot fi)riii mill f i . : i t i i w . strength of force and intellect, elegance nnR grace of i i i o t i o i i , iiitcgrity

eiiviroii ~ I I I V I I ,:111(1 cut npon the reservatiim; reared on it the yniiitg Htick wvoulil be far inork. healthy atid free froni the ailtnentr rhicli thc use of corn cngcntlers. The reservatioii having Iweii prnperly eiicloscetl, tlic tlivinion of tures elioiilil be arraiiged to accoiiinitwlate fifty I)roml iiia@s each.

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Slollione.- Stables ah

constructed conveniei~tlyuear tc) each of


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not afford a means of deterniin-

ing what the p@rcentage this question, however,

r any given number of mares may le;

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country is of course
ill npply exactly t o home I)recaling i n this iiitely known. hut they accord i n the nlain breedeis with whom I have coiiiIiiunicntecl. Id elapsc before any apnefits accrue to the gnvthe Iwginning to 8ecllre ~ s of 9 the stallions on the Indian mares. in the second year of the establishment,

ernment.

It would

i u tlie standard horse. The thorouglhred stallions liavpip serval IW die nieaiis to accomplilrh tlie object aimed at, should then be sold. A coniplete record of b m l mares, etallioiis atid fords, will1 pedigrew of ench should be kept, (late of service, birth of fo:il, Sex. color, 111atkI to avoid the evils resiiltiiig from ings, etc. This would he very ne-ry iucatuous breeding, aiid to insure the igtelligent s u k q u e i i t iiiating of : sire and dam. Good judgment and careful management in properly iiiating s i r e and danis from now on, an(! in the education of the younk aniiiials reared, would undoubtedly be -followed by succes in the undertaking. If tlic. results were encouraging and it should become decessaj to IBreecl n p d . e r iiuniber o f animals than the vue breeding farm could1 supply, others i!i. different sections of the country could be organized u the eaiue V ~ U ciples.

at four years old, nfter having heen pro1

service. The education ant1 training of

fillies for b m l mares had been obtained.


there would be a n excess of mares. needed

If the n u m h r of

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mber of young anit e than the necessities of the service would

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SUCLa Iweediiig fkrnr

~ t i we w -coniparc t le cost to the goverurueut of the auiriia~s brei oil \v th the prices paid by tlic aiuarterniaster's tieputnient, tlie &Kcrenee wil Iw largely to the credit of' the former, to slip notli iug of their superiority. I t costs the farrusr about 870 to mise ii co~lin~oii

fiw a fiw better and more suitable aitiiunl. The prices untler tlie p r e s w t contcict *ystenl riluge f om 8125 to $165 per head, with cost 1 4t r a u r p r tiltion aildctl. Now let us compare the relative merit and titiless of such stund:ircI-

meut mther seems tu be Imsxl vu estimates for a certaiu iiulllber of h&c to be dupplid ut h ce u price per head. liud when the coutrktu are let the aiiimala ate fimd to fit tlie price. The contractor seuds out his agent and he wlectu such h o w & he cau ~ f t i i ~to t l buy, leaviiig him a haiitlwiltc margin dii his price to the goveriiinent;, he buys everything i u ' t h e shape of a horse that he ,think8 will pus+ muster ; his oliject and his only care is to pick upaniruals that C:III ruii the puntlet of itispeetion, and as n nintter of fact'nranyiuferior oucs gct in. Sow, iu:iuy of these would be fully worth the prices paid for other uses tliau the cavalry service. \Ve receive

I.

156

BREEDIIVC: O F C A V A L R Y HORSES.

BKEEDILVG O F (2.4 V A L R Y HOh!Sh*S

137

men shun them and the captain who wishes his troop to make a creditable appearance on parade or ut battalion inspection, prefers to hare them out of ranks. As a matter of fact but few of the horses purchased by the quartermasters department liave any suitable, well established saddle gait, and there is seemingly but little attention paid, previous to purchase, to this niwt important requisite. The cootractor niay subm?t a n y horse For inspection of proper coltrq, size, :ige, etc., and 2t)pareiitly sound ant1 free from bfeiuish. aucl it will generally be accepted regardless of qualiticatioiis as to saddle gaits; of c o u h the animal iuwt walk, trot and gallop, but on tlie quality ofsuch gaits but slight atteutioii is k t o r v e d . He rriigllt be able to walk hut two and a liulf d e s nu hour, or trot hard enough to b m e n a troopers teeth, or labor in his movemeqts a t the p l l o p like his near relation the Norman Percheron, but it mahers not, down gws tlie good American clollars for this new ncquisitiou and pop goes the U. S Government braud on hie shoulder, that binds him to servitude for the halalice of his uatural life, unless sooner brought before an officer of the Inspector General%Departnient Nearly all our I w t saddle horses have a large admixture of thoroughbred blood, for that givee them style, energy and endurance Kentucky nnd Tennessee have quite a number of noted sadtile stallions, the g e t of which have usually been well adapted to the saddle and it especial attention harl been paid to the business of breeding, and the desceudants of these stallions had been bred with as much care tw has beeu takeu with trotting and running horses, we might ere this have had a well established line of saddle horses. . There are three gaits posses4 by nearly all horses to some e x t e n t ; the walk, the trot arid the gallop, some are fast walkers, but trot and gallop badly, while others walk iaditferently well, but are great trotters, then we have nuother c l y by no menns common, which pess as natural bmite. the wnlk, the pace and the gallop, the pace being the distinctive characteristic. T h e s e fbur gaita may be regarded a$ natural gaitj. As artificial *;ai@, there are four, the fox trot. running walk, rack and single foot. ,The fox tror is simply a modification of the true trot. and while it is not a trud diagonal motion, it departa from it simply in the fact that the forefoot tuuches the ground slightly in wlvauce of the diagopal hind foot. It is the slowest of the artificial gaits, but it- is above all others, an d day gait, and a horse possessing it to perfection.wil1 perh a p make a longer journey from sunrise to sunset, under the saddle, than s t a n y other gait. This in my upinion is the gait par d e n c e for the cavalry, when inore rapid movenicirt than the walk is desired. It is easily acquired b) any well bred intelligent horse under proper %raining: The running walk is simply a modification of the true trot, but the
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head is carried higher than in the fox trot or 6r:liiiary walk, &I\ the Iiiiiil foot takes she ground in a;L\va~ice of the diagoiial fore foot. wliicli b m k u tlie cunculnrion; a closer rein is bvnerally helcl.tlinn in the fi,r b o t ;1ii11 the pace is a faster one, arid inay be carried to a three i i i i s u t e gait. , 111 i t the poise I of the foot, is such as to give the horse niore of H clinihiiig riiotioii in front I n it the souud of the fiiotfulls is not unlikc that ot the ortliiiary walk quickened, and the feet take the growid i n the milie ortlcr. I t j i . I might be described as a variation of the true walk by iitiprtiiig to it : , bouoding or elastic quality, in fact a wiilk o i l a run, if sdcli u coutmclic* tory description is admisiblc. Tbe r x k is a modification of the true pace. i i i which tbe liiiicl foot touches the ground in advance.of the leutliog fore foot. The singlefoot cannot be classed IW either n diagonal or a lntecil w i t , it is exactly intermediate betwceo the trot niid the pace; each fw>t seeins to work independently of associatio;~ with either of the others, niitl the sanie interval of time elapses between each footfall. It is,a fast gait crud can be increased to the rate of a milein three ruiituteu. I These four artificial gaits, in connection with tlie fout iratur~dimes, constitute all the requisite gaits of trained ~;ldillehor&+, only $bur of which may be said to be essential in w e l l - h k e n cavalry IIUM~J -the walk, I fox trot, true trot and gallop. I have followed very closely the desc.ripti;,n and analy$is of-the saddle gaits, given in an article which appeared i n the I h d e r a G&te of Octo; ber, 1887, aa being the best description of the (liferent sntldle gaits I have ever e n , and I have described the gaits a t leiigth to show to what extent the education of a good saddle horse may be carried. Tdo much cunnot be said on the necessity ofaur horses being well gaited, and, though.the artificial ones do not necessarily constitute a part of their training, they are all the better for the possession of somc of theni, aiid agaiu, I emphasize the foz t t d . Long codinued marcherr at the wnlk are tiresome to DI8n and horse. The fox trot relieves and rests horse as wdll as rider; i t requires no increased exertion, while i t increaseJ tbe mpidi(ty of the move ment five or six milea an hour. I f the men were rnoquted nu hbms having this gait they would not eshibit disiiicliuatiou to b p thqaot, for it i s regular snd steady in its rapidity. s wore The ditference between a well-gaited liom nncl a rough one i readily appreciated by cavalryineir tliau aiiy other c l w . It is thelong, fatigue, with l o a of teruper and energy weary days march that e ~ g e n d e m at the end,and by how much is t h k coiidition enhance$ when the trooper haa been niouuted o n a roughly-gaited nninial ; besides, his efticiency is impaired, and, it called for other d u t y , he is not in condition to perform i t with alacrity ahd prompt obedience.

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BREEDING OF CA VA I,H Y

155

IroKSI:~.
duriiig a period of five or teu years. tlic tlitfereiicv i i i liiy~wol' I I I C 1)iectliiig farm would be sutticieiit to repay :ill ap!iro1iri:itiuii~ : i i d olwraiiiig expenses, and leave a large I)alaiice to it2 credit. I t is by coiupariwii that we judge o f tlie value nf :illy iiiiiiiid. ,Y,i\v, if this c l w will (lo niore and better work mid cost lesv to hlie goveriiiiient tliau those purchased, it beconies selt'evideirt that they &re uortli i~:cire nro~iey. Indeed, i t may be safely attiririccl they will cost It% t1i:tiI out- hall', i and our cavalry regiineiity will be iliouiitctl OII supcriofl ; i i i i i i i d s , whose qualitia Irirve beeu geiierated i i i tlie 1 i I ~ ) o c l uiitil they have kcoiue hereditary. Other governments have preceded us i u such eiiteq)rises, aid their breeding studs have pwed bcyoiicl the poitit of esperimental veutiirea to that of assured success. Why slioultl w e tlclay tu fullokv their lead, t u wall iu the matter of breeding our o w i i Iium~s : u iu the t$doptiuri ut' new rude1 arms aud niuuitiuus of riitnlerii tvnrhre : ' Why need we dclay, wlJile the ucccjsity auuually kcoineu NOR apparent ? H o w to begiii it, where i i i i t l to tvliat extent, :ire bubjecta that may well eukpge our niost careful uttcutiuu.
e

I
'1

Then let lis unite in the requmt fur well-pited aiiiiiislr. It is Idicvetl that, while the present system doej prevail, i t is pisible ant1 pmctica1)le ' for the qiiiirterniaster's department to do this. I t may rliglitly iucreaw the caist, h i t it will Hdtl to the comfort and etfectiveuess of our service. uad, I iwlicrc', will lessen desertion. I riiay I>epclnloned tor'referring to niy own cxpcrieiicc iii the s e k tioii itf c.:iv:tli*y horse+, having served 011 ir Imirtl for tlixt piirposv, wlicn eighty per rent. of the homes presented fi)r inspectioli i i i C ~ I C I1n:irket I I hnve 1)eeri priwnt :is i i slwtator \vc*n. rc.jcctcvl for wfticieiit reiistms. at :in i i i q w i ~ t i i i i i nf 1 i r ) r - w ~ 1)urcIi;ise;etl uiitler the rtiiitnic't syrteiii, wlieii I had an oppirtunity tcb witnem tlir nietliocls ot' ex:iniiii:itioli aiitl the t e s t t o whicli ariiriiiild wcrc sul,jectetl to determine their titiless ti)r tlie service. aid I c a i i state that their eraniili:ttion w to the pwws+)ii hf siiitdilv aatltlle gaits yas c u i w r y and incoiiiplete. I holtl that it is iiccrswry that tile :ininiiiI iinclergning inapectiun tw rit~tte~r sutticieiitly t u intettigentIy tleterniinc its fitness in eaeh indivitlual case. Fnmi the governm~iitbrecding farm slioiiltl ctinie animals Iiaviiig all the ytHnl jualities of traiiietl c:rvalry horse<, Imikeri to ritlc: ttricl 1m)ken to saddle gaits; to walk timr miles withii; the h o u r , to t r o t sniouilily. tu canter gmrefully, to g;illop well, and, if necd Iw, to ruii f e r ir inail's life wlieii duly callell ; ot' kiritl, tract:lble tlispsiticm, ewily ~iin~rolletl U I I drill, p d e or untler tire, i i i riiiiks or nil tlie skiriiiisli line. iii the stillile or on herd ; icitelligent, iiiuwular :in11 substantial. coilragcoil*. f'e;irles :ind ciitliiring, if' need IR able to scil&t f;ir :i liriiited tirile on p s s , bi cutlure t l i i r q , winter's culcl or suiiiincr'* hetit-ftw t1ic.w qualities t h y houltl iuherit. For these qualities were they I)retl, i i i i c l such we iii:i? ~ w n : ~ l cxlic.c-t ~ l y tlieni to retain. I n acltlitioii, \vc ni:iy coiiiit on their heiug siire fiiiitecl, quick, active nncl wide awake, without sliiggisliiiess or sLu1Jnimnes. Fmni their breeding \vc shoiilcl expect tliciii tal Iic litlie in ueck, hentls nitlitr small, wide hetweeii tlie eyes ant1 fiill in the fi)relieatl, with erect, piiiitcd ears. intlicutiiig.nitelli;.eiice aiidl :ilertnesl;, : t i i d , t i d y . of sizn ~utticientti) carry nll the weight r e q u i r d . Tlicir etlucation tal mlclle baits sti~~uld IK! emy to iiiipurt. with reaswnal)le care m ( 1 pcitieiicru. Snpplieql with siicli auiimals nutliilig in theni would lw left to be tlcsiretl, and the very highest degree of etticiency of cavalry troi~ps\ v i ~ u l t lI)e the more readily attiliiied. fur they woulcl be tittetl ti) 1)ertiirIil tlic work requirtd of then1 under :tll couditiunr iii the b e d i+iiiirr pos$ibk. Iu eouclusiw, I ,hetieve that the wtlvaiituges whicli iiiuet follow u course u t rystmintic: Imxrliuy will fiilly jiistify t h e eslwriiiiciit. The yearly appropriatious fur,purehsc of rciiii)uiit* nggrepte a large amount, runuing into millioiis iu the courde i ) f H few pears, When the actual c a t of theae animals is contrasted wiiii that of those purchased

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-FRENCH IDEAS ON CAVALRY.


ltil

FllL-T 1 . 1 E L ' T E S A S T IST

c . .&. C A V A l . I : Y .

the di-br of ' i o , tlie Freucli caval;y, yieltlirrg to the iustiuctive. iiiipulse of tile vaiiiliiished, m u l e ~iasteto actopt i u tile wholeeale nianner the regulations of the victor. 'rhey Iwrrowctl f f m i the Cerittaiis tbeir idens, tlicir priuciples, their iiietliotls of remount, and their fighting tactics; and yet, in spite of tiiuch p r o p s , the cavalry is still -according b the opinion of neighboring powers - the weak point of the French army. Cfeneral B O I I E , believing that the French scliwl has no reason to b o w down before t h e German, takes up the gauntlet for his lintion, and inac~bea on his shield this device: '' TFIE Fa~xc*tr CAVALRY, IIANT)LEI) ON FRENCH PRINCIPLEG, isq WITHOUT R I V A L 1s cO3lBAT! " In proof Of _. this.Iirop&ition, the General proceeds: Jirut-To a study of the preaeiit Frcncli tactics, a i d . coiiwilueutly, of the German tactics of which i t i3 a copy. . Seumd-l'o a study *of the cavalry under the First Euipire,' ntitl an expos: of the Freuch tactics of that epoch. !f%ird-To a study of the cavalry in the lrrst war, aucl an ecpo~; of the modifications which modern iuventioirs impose upon the tactics of the arm.

FTER A et

PRI23ENT TACTICS-UTILITY

OF A NORMAL ORDER OF COXRAT.

A normal order replnces the vague, uucertaiii, a i d utlhJmeeii, by p i n ciples, if not invarialile, a t least almost always nppliwblc; it gives greater mobility and more ripid attack by avoiding the waitiiig for onlers; and, lastly, it ~ v e us a f n m exclusively relying upon the genius of the chiefs, who, after all, cannot IK everywhere. T h e infnntry hiw practically realized this nornisl order. but not so the Cavnlry, and for the followiug .eaeons: For the infautry aU ground is practicable. The space, the nature of
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l the ground, will be more or less favorable to the normal dispitioii. b u t in general, the disposition mu be taken. Hedgea, trees, houses, ditches, I which stop tlie other arms-far froin paralyzing the attack of the iiifantry permit i t to make ita way under cover. Is it threatened by cavd r y , the same formation may still apply, since it is only Iie-ry to clcm up the intervals. To resume: The infantry has found a normal fighting formation - duqay tlre ~ h e aim$ , and m y to m i m e , lending ibef erreily to aU tindn 1 i nf ground, a p p l i d e to the difwhich may present U&w in tmr, t n dl the 1 i y p t J m if d w n , t e against infantry, artillery, OT aady. 1 Hrre the cavalry found a similar formation? No. Ita formation raries according as i t is to attack artillery, cavalry, or I infantry; it does not lend itself to every kind of ground, since the obstacles that shield the infantry shatter the linea of cavalry w h m power lies in their union and in their ehock. I A brigade having n front of 600 metere, n divisioii wiU require 1,800 or 2,cKH) meters front, ( a n d this, in every direction, for there is no certainty as to tlic direction in which i t niay hare to act). Sucli open spaces are hard to find, and we catiiint, as in nietliaeval o have oiir quarrel out. tinies, repair to a field of arms t T o these considerations. we inlist add another, anti a weighty one. The enemy niust be left uncertain as t) tlie poilit of attack ; otherwiw, the surprise and the unforeseen arc lost, nod it is exactly thme two qunlities that ninke the arm niarvelous i n its Would the issue of a duel be tlouhtful wheie one of the tluelista \vas well up i n all t h e nrts of fencc, while the otlicr l i d but one thrust, well known, and always the same? T o satisfy these conditions would involve n cotitnu\iction. O n the one hand, a normal order presents many xdvantagea; and on the other, i t allows the enemy to guess the point of attack. Consequently, you will I e iu tlie situation, pnd ready say the chiefs of cavalry must be quick to c d i ; ant1 to their judgment with appropriate orders for every n everything must be left. This is to declare that the handling of the arm requires exceptional qualities which \Jill be rarely found among thoee who command it. This is not the opinion of the author; the problem, notwithstanding ita apparent difficulty, ie easy of mlution, if we adopt b r the cavalry, principles very simple, rules very few in number, very easy of application, admitting of certain and rapid execution, sud in accord with the ioherent qualities of the French character. Doea the present Franco-German tactice conform to these requirements?

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162

FRENCH IDEAS ON C-4 JIII,K I*.

FKI.:,\CH I D E A S O S f . ; C FA1,R K ,

163

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FRENCH TACTICS, COMBAT FOR.HATIOS.

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F o r aldivision of cavalry, the norinul fighting forination 1:riil down. comprisea nine linea of unequal strength. The tirst line delivers the Iilow and is supported by the second, while the third forins tile raervp. The dietance between ;c/telom variej according to circumstances. gTk second and third lines extend beyond the wings of the first line ( o n e to the riglit, the other to the left,.) to protect the flanks, which are considered h e weak pBinta of cavalry. The three Knee detach combat patrols,and the squadrons send out ground atmu@ who move in &ance of the front. T h e artillery which was mnwed 150 paces behind the center of the firet line, moves to the fighting position which has been indicateil to it. As enon ae the general of:division, resolved to give battle. ha4 given his orders. the chiefs of the first and second linea enjoy complete liberty of action. 111 the attack made by the several lines, as .won as the iiibervention trf flank guarde or offensive flanks is necessary, the q u a h i i s of the wings, without waiting for any order, should detach theniselves very rapidly fmm the line. A brigade would aaaume a similar formation. This, then, is a sketch of the normal cornbnt@formation of cavalry againat cavalry. The dominant idea of this disposition is, that by flank attacks alone. can a decisive cliaracter be given to the cavnlry coinhat ; and hence tlie object of manoeuvre is to gain the flanks of the enemy ancl to defend oiir own. The value of this formation depids, then, upon the correctnes of this estimate of the power of the flank attack. Against infantry or artillery, the flank attack is unquestionably ninst eartain. we thus avoid a part of the fire; we envelope the enemy, strike him in rear and force him to face about to reply by his fire; and if, at thia moment the shock occurs, the chances of euccess are great. In a cavalry combat, the conditions are quite different ; we have t o do neither with m o t i o n l a artillery nor with slow moving infantry. The first precept inculcated in a cnvalry leader is to be tnpjirst fn aftruk, and (if he has allowed the adversary to take the initiative) to anticipate hirn onyhac i n the &qe! This principle is 90 inimitable that the regnlationa my,and properly : The chief of m d y will not forget, that, of all the f & he mcry aommit, one alone i r infamu, in &. The hypothesisof a line of cavalry remaining motionless to receive t h e shack being therefore i n a d m i b l e , we can discuss the flank attack with reference only t o lines moving to the encounter.
1 .

The regulatioii m y , For the flank attack we sliould seek to strike the I wiug of the enemy with the center of our line. Suppose a regiment to have succeeded in atriking thua; of the four squaclrnns, the two that pass in frout of the enemy will /have :I p r t of their troopers charging into space, and the other iiieu will /he iuferior. in 1)allistic shock. to their adversaries, for they are taken i q Annk by the chests of the enemys horses and have every chauce of biiig knocked over. Must we then seek to attack exclus.ively nt the Iiack of the nioring line? Lct us see; to fall 011 the rear of the eiieriiy, thc sqiiacliroiis will lirvc to make a change of front, which cannot be tbinc a t too great s p e d ; aiirl to resume full speed until the directioh of the eneiny it will not lw +ible has been obtained. Meanwhile. the latter is increasing his speed; the shock with our niain liiie takes place beforc he is tnken iii rear, and our first line, charging through, finds itself face t o fiice with tiibnds. riieets its q v n flnnk avack ! .! If howc*er. - the regulation dunk attack ha?; no c h m & of succesp. it L W RIIW~S is otherwiw when used to disengage a rqiiilwd linc. I n @is G is almost certain, since we fall on the piir*iiiiig t r t q w m oftlie enemy. (lisp e m l liy the shock nncl with horses faligiiwl lry thc -riprciije cHorts of the charge. taking then1 in flank ancl r w r with o u r f r w l i nninirls. , The flank attack alsn finds its IISC i n tile attack 14IiiHlibs in Iiriwcpss of formation or clinnging position. I CoutrRry to itleas now current, t I i c :iiitIior tlicii Inys $ann t I i i ~ prillciple : A line nf cnr~11r11 , ! J d b m~rclriirg, ( l r p / i i y d ,to the nttrcri:, micat nnf tltitrk oj i b j a n k . Let i t ( h i ita d u t y ; that i* t o say, let it riirli i i p r i i thc cncniy with epeetl and ardor. Its flwiks will hnvc nothing to fear. since tlw mi.lie will occur before they can 1w take11 in the rear. In any event. once started for the attack. i t elioiild I n ? a ~ l i i t e forbidden ~y that eiiy I W M i ) frnm the win@ should detach itselt. of i t s o w p accord. to nrek an athi+ or to make one. It is for the ;dieloiuc in tlie rear to take this role. but everything that is thrown forwmd in the line should arrive witliotit wastage at the target, so that the chief niay certain of the effect lie will prlwlllcc. T h e leatler of n charge should not have to wntch his flanks and nnticc what is g h g , o n a b u t him. His ohjecta should he simple a1111m y to attain. deninnding only euergy-tn throw hinieelf on the enemy without allowing him time to see where he is. The ariii is dificiilt to Iiandle, but Kith siiiiplc niellinils, like thnse of the First Enipire, ninny of its chiefs are capable of managing i t ; while, on

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164
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FREACH IDEAS ON CA I . LK E .

FRENCH IDEAS OK
&LE

CA VALRI-.
LINE

165

the other hand, the present formation of three lines, not u i d e r control, prevents the developmelit of its special qualities. With the three lines 80 widely separated all unity of comniiiud diaappears. We have three separate hrigkdes or three separate regillleiits, each acting under ita chief, while the superior coruniautler is helpless aa to modifying orders previously given or issuing uew ouea t n meet new requirementa , The exigencies of cavnlry combat can he satisfied only by coiireiitra ing the force. in the hands of the geneml, leaving to hi3 lientenants noth\. ing but the rigoroua execution of orders received.

OF THE LINES-FIRST

1 -

GROUND SCOUT8.

In the vicinity of the enemy, says the French tactics. the q u a d rons are preceded, at 200 metere, each by two troopers, who are to signal obetsclea which might stop the advance. A t the moment of nttack the role of these scolits has n special i m p o h n c e in preventing the cavalry from charging on impractical)le ground. T h e cavalry must not riiah blindly over unknown ground, says ME, but+he urew t h e following ohjections t a the metliod of n g adopted : . T h e swarm of m u t e will reveal the presence and even the force of

When the line is moving at rapid gait (trot or. gallop) these ecouta not give the required information. T h e rapid gait, before a charge.

eatined to deliver the firat blows. {he regulation provides for three casesFiteC.-The firat line equals the enemys line. Semnd.-lhe firat line ia superior to the enemys line. s inferior to the enemys line, the latter o c r ~ ~ p y Tlrid-The firat line i ing a ninre extended front. To each of these problems there is a solution indicated 6Llitiiewasted! criea the author, q c h second Imt, tliniiiiishes tile chance of surpnae ! What matter all these situations? T o attack firat and at once-there is the only principle; ancl i t n w l s for its application only boldnesa and energy-qualities eminently French. . A regiment in line charges a btigade in line. Sn much the better; they will give account of douhle their number. The four squadrons nw in fact equal in force to thoae that they strike. and the rcmniiiiiig foiir with ~ q u a i r n n s of the enemy, charging into the air, will find t h e n i w e l ~ winded horeea, at the mercy of the eecond ;cheh. Even now, the wings are safe; they are melted intn tho enemy at the moment of the shock. and cannot be taken in Hank I)y t h m that overlap them. The order from the general of division is simple: Start for the ohjwtive that 1 indicate to you; charge home, straight at it, without thought of your flanks, and crush the obstacle; the rest is iiiy nftbir. T h e execution is even more simple. This is the nld French priiiciple. it has rlways given us succesa in cavalry combat, and nothing hetkr llm yet been found. 0 1 The two counter clirrenta of opinion on this subject may I w s t a h 1 by the following extracts: 5 A.ineiplar sf #te RegulatioM sf 2876.--The cohesion, nec-ry in the preliminaries of the attack, is lesa neceBBIuy in the charge proper. It is important, in fact, that at the command churge! the brav&t t r a p riding the best horn, should not be checked; a n d that the individual vator, n eacli, which ie to finally decide the success of the charge, should leave, t all the advantagea of h&.audacity, tenacity, strength an ekill. Aineiplcs oj the ReguUona oj 188%--Hold to the moet abaolnie coheaion in the charge becauee it i a by the valor, impetuosity and auclacity of t h e whole body, by the example of the officera, by the action of the file cloaera, by the moral backing of the supports, and, shove all, by the maintenance of order and coheaion, that we m u r e to the shnck a11 irresistable power.
THE CHARGE IN .WALL.

ave been tripped by a rabbit hole; there may 1w uadron. Again, when once the gallop is taken

Then, @e swarm of scouts before a line marching

the charge may ritable cause. of disorder,fallen horses and men and wounded breaking u p t h e ranks in rear. And, finally, t h e m u t e must, aet moment of excitement, be expected to find their.placea in

role should -belong either to isdated patrols or to the combat


while they are aeeking contact of the still diatant enemy. They n the necoplllvy time to look u p favorable ground,and can report tbink of accidenta Nothing must hamper the daah. -:Heaven

tboee whoee horees fall!

FKESCH IDEAS O S C.4 VALHI-.


be obtained, a t a maximuni,
at

167

the smile time, there by

TOcousider the two most important oues, viz : I The mnmaruler of, the m r r d line aoiitribritea . h the *rrrc+ of tlg fird
gttaekiny fhe .first litw o j the enemy in $at&.
+

This the author considers inadmissible, as the second lina, k i n g en far i n rear of the tirst, can not make this flank attack in time; the tirst line will have struck the enemy and all will be over hefore the secontl comes up. I
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11, T t t c j p l i n t u reptheif. ? Tlic enemy, disunited by the pursuit, will be charged io flank, says

at

distance, and the hole he left in the

wall will be stopped

r, you leave full play to individual d u b .

his short finish of twenty-five meters, we waut, not niui reining

the repiihtion ; and five separate and more or less complim d evolutions are indicated for carrying nut this singleprovieion. . Tnn much complication and drill, say8 the general : ttw, mnch time Icwt. the mere nomenclature and definitions, impose a &ere lalmr tc) ncqiiirc them. It is a veritable Chinese puzzle. certain tc) head to ininird i m errom. Give UR few evolutions arid let t h e s bc heroically 4 n p l r . qiiictly llllder?;tOm~ by all and without chancc filr hesitation. The rtJe o f the secoiitl line is too complicated.
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THIRD LINE.

themselves killed.
n their little horses, nnd stood u p in their stirrtips to clap their

n l s with the French character and

The third line constitutes the reserves and remains in the hnntl o f tlic general of division. It should, like the other lines, h a w tbe Rtrength of a 1,rignde. for i t must play the rnle of-first line should the enemy nttack in the flank where it is posted. The regulations, however, reduce it to a single reginlent hy tlctarliin~ twu squadrons to support the artillery and two more to follow eliwly the cchter of the first line and fill the g a p . seciirc a mlicl The author thinks the rear ranks should be sufficient hf the-. front. and calls this a return to the three and four-rank for+~ation middle ages. The third line is too far away to be of use in case of ecessity (400 deters behind the second); i t will not be able to strike its w i n g Mow at tlle moment :vlien the line is yielding ; it will arrive only after the linc has yielded and is falling back in confusion.
THE MODERN IDEA.

.
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mounted in E u m p e ; i t is d g o the cavalry that rides worst.


lese, i t remains the mcnrt terrible hecause it charges nt fnll ~ p i l .
THE SECOND LINE.

The formation and the rtJe of the linea demonstrate thn the principles nt present in vogue are absolutely oontrary to those that d elop the pnwerful qualities of cavalry.

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To what, then, can we attribute the rage of this Germdr method ? Is i t the novelty, the fear of falling into the rut of roii(ine, the desire
for progress. the hope of being the pioneem of the tut$ire? This iR, inclced. R fine rtile.

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FRENCH IDEAS ON CAVALKI

FAESCH IDEAS O S C.4 VA LH Y.

169

Buiis this method, in reality,a new one? L e t us make a coniparisiii. Here the author usee the parallel column with startling efiect. 0 1 1 the left we have modern tactics (eo called) ; on the riglit ancient tactics. Paragraph by paragraph we follow the comparison ; aurely. we are comparing two editions of the same tactics. Grouiid scouts ; flanks, ofleiisire and defensive; reeerves; division into three lines ; first liue; secoiitl line ; distance ktwm lines ; jesercises and niameuvres against a supposed enemy, a marked enemy, represented enemy. -- i . The pribciples are ide tical. We have been comparing with the! r i i i l i tary regulatqns of the E peror LEON for the year 880. No inisprint : for the year 86. O u r new regulationd, then, date back ten ceiituried!

tinie necesqry to execute a charge as at Eyluu, where lie;cli:~rgc(lwith eighty-four squadrous. In principle, t h e reserve wm J t a stwk of j quadroue. The Emperor hesitntecr long, beefore forming his reservelcnviilry iiito II corps, anti when, a t last, he (lid 90, niriiy opportuiiities fc r actioii \veri* lust, I ~ c a i i s ethe chiefs did not like to have their units, letaclic~tlfrwn their ortlerr, niid Ixmuise the halidling of the n i m e s required csceptioiially I large fields. I

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FIQHTINI; TACTICS. -

. rlicse were remarkal)ly simple. The priiiciple \vnsd Tlic :itt:ick, always attack, niliiilly :ind u\ full qieetl. T o atkiiri this, thdy fitst grtiitlN-tl :ill the fiirce i n the h~Iici* of the chief; wcontl, nliuitwiiv+il Iiy Iiic*tliimla
aiiiiplc enougli to I W jiillowetl witliout crror or Iirsitntion. j To await the tiiiic of action. tlie regiiiicntr were i + ; i w t l i i i dose ClJ~liliiliS C O I ~ ~ ~ I Iof ~ Sscliinilrow C ~ ~ tleploywl oiic. I w h i i i i l the citlicr. I lie. I):ittlc forniatiiiii fiir 1)rig:ide or ilivisioii wiiiliri-cs/ t w o l i i i w liiie c b f nttiwk niid line of reserve. lIie secontI liue M i i u d the firrt, or ovcd:ipliilig oat. will;. With three bripules, t w o were in first linc, the s1iortc.r r c w i ~ i i l liiie tk-ilihtiiig tlie rnlly of the first line hehincl its wings. ~lepl($ecl rtriiiglit to The role of the fimt line was the charge, IIIIVII~C the front, but not with the entire line a t once. The chief fimt trieil the cneniy with a brigade or a regiment,. and \vatchW\ the reailts lit*fore SUC S ccsively engaging the riecessnry tirces. **Tlifrc~ is tlic !hiveHis orders to his sulmrdinate were very clear: tive; go a t full speetl, without thought of your flanks4 anti overtliniw everything. I f thc first and second athicks failed, tlie chief Ii1;icctl Iiiniaelf ut the I r e d of whnt remained and let1 it t!) the char:, . The second line, with the riilc of support, full ow^ tlie first a t a distance of 700 to 850 IO to 185 meterr, ( t h e iiidIerii tuc*ticcr put 200 t o 300 iiicters between the first ant1 secoiitl lilies, aiid 400 nietew b e tween rrecoud and third). \Vhe.re a number of divisions were acting together, eiwli oiic \vw forme(\ oniwo lines as above; ttie secontl clivisioii was in ienr a)f oiic wing of tlie firjt. the third in rear of the otlrer and farther back, :ud so oii. Save in the rxceptioiial CLWS of the cliarges of clwp c d u l i i l i s at Eylau, ILitislmi aiid \\titerloo, the clirisioiis engaged successivuly alii1 reftwilled in rc:ir of the supporting ;elrelOtt. Sote that the divisions flanked each other, h i t that each unity was separate, with i t 4 two lines closely gr~)upednn(l i n the Iinnrls of. its chief. I Evdrtliotiz.--To hreik from column for d e p l t i y m e n ~ etr., the quadrons broke into column of platoons and formed froid intb linc.

THE FIRST =-PIRE.

Because we were beaten and humiliated in 18i0, i p it really ncccesm-y


t n copy our neighbnrs and adopt principles a s ancient 1 s the tonills of tlw 4 PIIA ROB ? There is in our annuals a n epnch, that eclipses all the p u t -tlie Fmt

,.

Empire. Let un look at hat. then ives an exhaustive review of the actioii of m v - = General BONIZ alry under the first empire-Marengo. Austkditz, Schleitz. Snnlfcld, ,Jenn. HnK, Ejlau, Friedland, Eckmiihl, Essling. Wagrani, Nienien, Sriiolensk, hloskowa, hlontereau, Fleuris, Ligny nnd Waterloa Frnm this mass he deduces the conclusion * that during tlie wliolc of this perid the French cavalry (against all foreign cavalry. without csception.) has known nothing but victory. Employed either i u deep colunins, -, as an irresistable n i w , breaching and overthrowing everything, or in thiii lines, acting by regiment or brigade, we fiiitl hut onc and the smiie result-always succem ! , A n d yet our cavalry, was ivorsc niouiitel and rode worse than that of our eneniies, which was, as at the preseiit day, remarkably skilled in manwuvreing !
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pees:

TAClILX3 OF TEE FIRST EMP1h.-

I>IYTRIHUTION OF TIIE lA\-AI,liY.

Under the Empire& this cavalry c@ to 1w as formerly, iiivarialdy on the wings. It was placed, unitid, where it could best utiliie ib power for- the offensive; There was. theiefore, no fixed ilistrilwtioii. Evcry army corps had some cavalry, but besides this, there is n general rwnw etoek of d y . The cavwlry of the army corps might be increased, diminish& or even entirely witl$rawn, during the battle; and, in the same way, the strength of the cavalry reserve would vary during the

action:
,Apparently MURAThad an enormous mass of quadrons under his orders, but, in reality, this command was but momentary; limitecl to the

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FHEXCH IDEAS O A Y C-4 V-4LH Y

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To move to the right or left the qundroiis broke into C O ~ U N I I of platoons uad either formed line to tlie left or right, or.cliauged directiou
and foriiretl frout intu tiuc. Cliangea of front were c o n s i G d too slow and ttw, wiiipIicatet1, n1ic1 were liniited to a quarter or a half change. Flank Attacke -These were parried very siniply by the wconil echelon, which, by a charge straight tu the front, woiiltl strike the eneniy w!de still uhsteady, from the manoeuvre he hn$ just executccl to piiu his imsi tioq. The flank attack was used uot against a chargiilg line, but to iliwiignge a liue rcpubxd arid pursued by. a disordered enemy, or, s p i n , against a n i a e d Iwwly, or against a bony in process of forinntion. T h e rally 80 neceesary, whether the charge is n succes or :I failure, was considered as of the first importance, aud the official reports o f the CllbpLgV nieats p ~ v e that the squadrons were thoroughly clrilled in rallying Irolllptly. w executed The evolutions were so simple and easy that they coulcl I with horsesaf average traiuing,and with very ordhnry horsemen. In p m f of this, iii 1814 and 1815 Fmnce w w invaded by all the cavalries of Europe, wcll mounted, with many old troopers, and tinding, on French soil ground very favorable to their manoeuvrea. The French cavalry, on the other Irand, (annihilated in 1812) had nothing but conscripts in the ranks, and yet it continually whipped the eueiiiy ! . The secret? Speed,and boldnea in attack were the two factors. The first obtained by anlalnioet childish simplicity of moveiueub; the eecoud, inherent iu the national character. . And thus, by bringing into play their personal qualities aud leaving to the eneiny the refiuementa of evolution ; in spite of the ridiug I d tlie Prueeiane. Buseiana, Austrians and Euglish; iu spite of their marvelous manmuvreing. the French cavalry, bad horses and bad horsemen, knew nothing b u t victory. Its chiefs understood that what is one mens meat is nuother rnaiib p b n , and that, by handling Frenchmen on French priiiciples,a result will be attained that cannot be expected from foreign methods. Have theu circumstances changed ? Let u4 turn to 70.
CAMPAIGN OF 1870. The author considers only the actions before the fall of StyIan and of Metz I n these actions of the cavalry of the Army of the Iihiue, we have to do with regular cavalry formed and trained in time of pence. In the secondperiod, however. the cavalry ranks were filled with r a w levies and utitrained homea; and, in view of the point which we wish t u determine, the study of thie p h would be useleas. .

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FRENCH IDEAS OAV Cii V A L K Y.

FRE.N('H IDEAS O N CA C'ALHY.

173

Gradually losing its heaviness, the artillery has attained a mobility approximating to that of cavalry; add to this the precisiou of ita guns, the terrific 'crmgea of its bursting projectiles. and we have only to bring into I the boldners and independence of which it is susceptible, to attain the aximum of ita power. Thia boldnem depending upon a support, the infantry can no longer 8 1 the conditions, and this mission becornea exclusively that of the cavalry, rapid enough to keep up. I The intimate'union of these two arms opens a linritlw field : Attack lof tciqgrcardul bivouacs a t p m t dietaim; oeeupatioii o f imporlatit pitwiu d t disLuricea Jnnn the infanty; rapid intervention fill ai1 i~itervcll in the iite o f kdtle, or to cruah a point which hoe weakewd, kc., &e. uddenly appearing at an unexpected point, i t will blnst the infantry miu a distance too great for reply; and. l i m b r i n g up, when the enemy ave concentrated their artillery to reply, it will vainuh, to reappear at nie new and distant point. Cavalry support cqu alqie Isriuit this obility. A t Seclan the Geniums sup&ted a galling fire from 200 pieces by a 'ogle regitiient of hussars, scattered along 80 as to appear to cover a long I ne, thus holding back the French and allotving the Prussian infantry .Ir me to come up. This union of the cavalry and artillery will be mutually henekial ; ot only will itgive the artillery ita mobility, but i t will give the cavalry anticlate for the infantry fire that now hampera ita action. T h e r6le of cavalry is, then, enlarged by ita unio with the artillery, and by the uulimited independeqce i t acquires by the roper employiueut of ita power of fighting. on foot. B u t to return to the cavalry combat.

tl

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elements by bending them to French principles ; for ea& people has ita temperanlent. its faults, its qualities : and it is beyond cliupute that the regulations should take accoriiit of this. Other powen have adapted a cunning formation, and +eek succem by means of feints nnd evolution, as we believe, too cornplicaied. ' Let us beware of adopting these evolutions of the drill ground, these mathematical figures, these calculations of seconds, distahcea and directions. Iu Germany they say o u r generals of the first empire were but snbreurs, were tacticians, espertr playing Hith ditticultiea. while those of FHEUEK~C Well, let each return to it3 traditions. W e admit that, td-day E I formerly, the French cavalry has worse horses and worse horseknen than any other; but that matters little, since, in the last war as uuder the Empire, our dragoons hare beaten them by employing, we repeat it, the principles of, the French school dnd uot of the German. I s i d e s , experiment proves that foreign methods do tiot apply to the French character. For five years the French have been aceiduously drilling in the German school. The result, when we experiment, is failure. F o r the front attack we deploy too soon ; for t h e tlank attack w e arrive too late. I n the division each line attacks separately, and, iustead of one body in the hand of its chief,we have an attack of threeisolated brigadea. Down, then, with the Prussian regulations that are stifling our capabilities. For seveuteeu years we have been painfully plodding along in t h e furrow trawl by o u r rival. Enough of this d e c a d e h e ; rise and m u m e direction in the true road of progress. And. when war breaks out once more,let the French valry take the field in full confidence, for the whole history of ita cav v combata i s no*ing but victory. J I ,I 1 :Thus is justified the proud device of thie work. . ?EKE FRENCH CAVALRY, HANDLED ON FRENCH PRINC m, IS LWBI-

CONCLOBION.

V A U J 3 D W COMBAT.

\Vc have considered the p e n t French regulatioiir, aud consequently the German tactics, of wnich they are a copy. W e have examined the tactics of the fitat empire. We have studied the cavalry action of the last mr and the eflect of nludern inventions. Now for the questiou : French pqmciples o r German for the cavalry combat? I We have copied dl the ideas of our conquemra; th t was natural ; but havegone t i n far ; we have copied the German by m for combat of cavalry kgainst cavalry, when, for more than a centur , it has been reguly heaten by the French system. T h e regulationa of Germany may suit the cbaractier of her men and nature of her homes; perhapa Pruseia would mak woree use of her

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CA V.4 LR Y RECK UITMENT.

175

BY J. K. YIZSER. LIEI.TESAST-(',,I~)~EI.. mil ( ' \ \

&I 1t\

fulnem and well being of our cavalry service d e p i d s material of which it is composed, that the imigood clnw of men cannot be ton strongly urged, ' ea the snbject of ita recruitment to serious consideration. It is to suppqae that the men heretofore enlisted in the cavalry have, I d be expected to join the service, for tbe proves the contrary. now under discueaion, will probably be betby considering it in connection with army desertions, for t to the faults in recruiting may properly be ascribed the r of deaertione which continue to occur. I n support of this stated that the records a t the cavalry depot at hat hut of 2,661 recruits received at that depot t two years, no lese Lhan 348 of them deserted d be sufficiently instructed for assignment to regivieats. were retained a t this depot longer than four ell quartered, liberally fed, kindly treated a i d perforni lig,ht d u t y for purpo8es of instruction, yet many o f them before they had been at the depot more than a month or eix
of deaertion were investigated by hoards of oficew, separate wrhten reporta in each case. These reports show three things; that no cause could be cliscovered, that the mail a former deserter and feared recognition, or that he had coruniittctl e crime and was in dread of arrest and punishment. From the fact that these men deserted before they had any satticient o&ortthitp to obtain any adequate knowledge of the eervice, and hefore t4ey could have formed MY decided like or dislike for military life, it is eyident that they had no honeat or fixed purpose in enlisting, hut cnnie iqto the army to m u r e temporary relief and shelter, or trnnsportation to yme new field of adventure.
o made

They were doubtless men of roving, reckless nod diw)iiteiltHl d i s l v sitions, and of that wortlilesj class who fail to find any sueady or regular eiuploynient, and should never have been enlisted. They probably sought a w t 1broker, arid the rendezvous for the @me reason that takes mexi to :i 1 it ia quite probable that by a reasonable and proper etfort on the part of the recriiitiiig officers, t* real characters of these ineii nright have Ixxn cliscovercd, and the govtrnment have been saved the e x p o s e attending I their eulistnient. Under the of War Department ordew, published iri N : ) . survey have, for more than tances leading to desertion in view of ascertaining the h u e c a u w which lead rice; arid the result of $1 this inquiry fully justifier the desertions from t h e u r m y cannot pmper?y be of discipline, mode of life, or'treatment of soldiers in bur i t is to be mainly attributed to want of character. or ihherent viciousn e s in the deserters themselves. The immediate transfer of recruits from rendezvous to their regiments, a d the more frequent payment of troops have both been suggested and as proper remedies for the evil of desertion. None of these reach the source of the evil, for the reason that it resiiw with the recruit, and so long as bad men a n accepted b$ recruiting 0% cers desertions will continue to occur, as is well knnwn to officers of experience or reasonable observation. Besidea the expense, loss of time and inju y t u the by 80 many desertions, the army is brought into culty of securing desirable recruits is s an expensive b m c h Cavalry i very inipnrtant nature nnd to p r f o r i u makes i t that,the best of material should be secured. F o r the prokr ciischnrge of the varied duties of good cavalry, great intelligence, b n perception, quick decision and individuality are most important, and ithe exercise of these faculties gives the chief value to cavalry. Every &ort should be made in recruiting to secure a c h of men combining thd qualities ahve named, with physical strength, vigorous health, strong ance, sanguiue temperament, and 84 far as poesible can give grace aud vigor t o early manhood. I The enlistruent of recruits for the cavalry service sho Id be entrusteJ to officer9of experieiice, and, while just claims f i r m r u ting details in regular turn should he recognized, special Btnesa must havd greater weight in determining which of?iceracan be safely & p e d to duty of such vital importance to the best interem of the service. I

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17k

CAVALRY RECRUITMENT.
good recruits, recruiting officers must be good judges of

C 4 VALR 1 ' BECRUITMENT.


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T o secure

personal antecedents. Men frequently apply for enlistment the physical requisites with attractive personal appeannce, utterly devoid of character, and seek admission into the arniy to escape the penalties of some unpunished or undiscoverel crime. Much labor and painstaking a r e will be required by recruiting parcomposed of the most soldierly of men, as it is h i r They should its secured will, as a rulc, correen constituting the recruiting party.

u p and doing. A portion of the d e t i l the public thproughfarcs beyond the l i n i i t q

*
h u m . nre well 4 s e d ' a n d acquire regular and' industrious habits. It should be borne in mind, in this connection, that the present stren:.th s ouly about X,C)OO men ; thnt the mnks gf o u r cavalry nrni of the service i of our regiments are already well filled with p d niateria1,as the array of ecrvice chevrons iodi+tea; that, as the percentage of p o d m:tterial increaees, the number of recruits required each year will decrease, antl that. at present, not more than 100 recruits p r nionth are rieeclccl. It ie undoubfedly poesible to enlist 100 good nien per nionth, tinil it imanifeatly proper for the best interests of the service and the country that a higher s t a n d a d should be established and greeter c in ins takeii to ~eecure6rst-claes men. Whenever the inen enlisted are taken from the more intelligent and higher grades of society, the service will lwconie 1 more generally known among the better classes, and, as a natural rcwlt, an increased proportion of enlistments will be made from tlic niorc &sirable.claeeee, "be present medical examination of recruits prior tiJ eiilistiiierit i i very rigid, and generally entirely satisfactory as far m physical souiitlness ie concerned, b u t does not always settle the question of nienhl vigor, which ie quite as eesential to the usefulness and future efficiency of the I eoldier. T h e intelligence, moral tone, former occupation, and character of the'recruit as to stability becornea a matter for the investigation of I the recruiting oflicer, who should also be satisfied that the applicant for

euliatment has an earnest desire or decided preference tbr military life above other eiuployments, and has from choice a n h o w t purpose in enlisting. T o .accept n recruit who is not likely to develop into a good aoldier, or oue WIIO is certain to become .discontented and unhappy, and consequently of uo value, is at once a great injustice to the dan and to the government. With nearly 8.OOO,OOO men subject to military serrica, it is entirely p s i l ) l e to secure hundreds of young Americans in perfect physical health, fill1 of spirit, activity a n d euterprise, having a natural fonilnw for homes aiid a lore of adventure, and general personal characteristice which would ensure an incressing fondness for frontier service, and st+p aught to b taken to secure this clam of men. With all the care that can be taken, mistakes will sohetimes occur,. a i d it would be far better if recruits were contiuued in -vice on p r o h tion for the first three or four months. aiid that the government should rer e p e the right of discharge a t the end of the period of probation for sufficient cause, such as evident want of character, viciousoeas, or for hid(leu or concealed physical defects, upon the recommetidation of a cornpe+lit hoard of otticers at the cnvalry depot, to consist of the depot corn-' wander, depot surgeon, aucl three senior oflicem next iu rank to the depot conimander. . S o injustice would result to the inen, antl the government would be in a nieasure protected from fraud. S o nitiu who is not likely to innke a gml ant1 acceptable solcligr, shoultl I* retained in service, and, there is every r e m m why such undesirable nieii should be clisclinrged before k i n g gthe sent to reginients, iiistead of being r e t i n a l to Imorne a burden ' servicc'aiid a ncetlless expense to the government. I DIXG9810N.
t

.\.-There is no minor 8iibjeCt of more Importance tn the mvnlry of Ihc. I'niled *law*. thnn the one whirh id treated of in the paper we h a w been1 n d (('01. \IILSEK'> on Enlistiucnts faw tlic c'avalry ) and a h l c h hm Lcvn discuased by members csf the .\ww*latioii. I wna particularly impreasccl with thc information imparted to the the Aroclatiou by 1.iciit. Tiiui~nir.. IIc lclla us. and he ~ e U l I t ut lint hand. from good moe of hls troop who Ilnvc rcoiRincd in the service. thnt mme o f tnc k t mnterlal wMclr c q l b la driven on1 of L h c nersjm by 1lic wnu1 of proper lreatulent at the rwNi(ing d e ts. l ' l i i q iiiforniati~ru is nniflrmc.tl by the remarks of c'ol.St'MwE and SUpplOme~rcdby what hn.6 Inum mid by 1.ieut. S ! \ ' i n IU t o the robbery of m r u i t a at me recmiting rendezvous. I h t w inlittt-rs nll ~ l c w r v e to h lookeci f o b by tbc proper authoritlm and should Ir chmged. 'l'herc i. I I O qiir+tion but thnt the yearly number of reported descrtiona is greatly awellnl c:ich y w r 11). tlic repcnters or pmfrglional dcscrters. llow to get rid of thls .bus In a v i h l

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('lingrcss l i urecoiled \\ ith Iiorror.afmulatetiorotberaiae.fmm the -Mblepmpaltinn tlinl clt*scrtcrs shoul4 IW tattned wltli sonic mark hy whlch they muld be recognized and t h u prevcnted from re.cnlisting. So them nrc no gruundn for hope that thls plbo will be adopted. &*ME) i f i t werc. i t woirl~l only mitigatcrnd not remove thc aliuse complained of. for tbwe iiiily i~s111~1 In? markcrl who were npprehendsl nncl rotivictecl of desertion. Statlatlcn nhoa tlinl t h w H N . ab111yH .n\nll part of thnse whn i l m r t . and not always the wo-t.

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C'A VALR Y RECRUITMENT.

A method to prevent n n a o r t h y p e n . who have been hefore in the service from enlisting s as f d l ~ ~ sLet . -cry a n d one which should commend Itself to army otiicen generally I man who enlista from this tlme forward be indelibly marked. in sonm plarc s r l c ~ t e db y cxped. with a small star.or other sign. Let this mark be recognized us au h o t i ~ ~ r u lo ~l m e. signifying the honorable entry into the I ' n i t e d . , % t e a army o f the persou who weam it. I.et the badge he given with the consent of the p e q n who enters the servire as any a,tltcr cwncliti8m o f hls enlistment-sneh M the oath to serve and to obey the articlea of wnr uual the ~ t t i ~ e r s over him. If n-ry to popularize thL..olcera on promotion or enlisted mcu n n rc-eulist. f distlnctiun. ldeut should receive the same mark o It is thought that this regulation could he Introdured iutn the recruiting regulations without the Intervention of Congwas: but If thls could not be done thcrc is no altiesti<,ii that M It L. purely voluntary. C:ongrear rould acrrdly objcct to it. As tlwre is no or1icc.r or sohlier that is not proud of a n hunurable vonnection with the arniy. thrrc nre nonc \\ I i o r h o i i l d not he glad of a mark which will ldentlfy them with it, eren nfter they hare lcft it. Can anyone doubt the good effect o f this rule In preventing tlrc eullstmcnt o f an). man who has ever beec iu the service who eould not f u r n i s h ymwf of t i 1 1 liononil,lv aliwhnrgc" It need lu?ercely be added that evldence of the removal of the murk sliould q r r n t c a*n bar to enlistment In this connection it has heen suggested that the star plnccd on m e n anal oiliccrs should indiaite the polnta at which p w a u r e should be applied to prevent blccding I * * deati, i t , P%IC of wound In battle or from aceident Whether thle is feasible. the meuibers o f thr iiirdiad corps who are memhera of the .\esoclntion will he able t o say. If it \I ~ m l d nuswer the dmlde pnrpnne it would be well : b u t I a m lirm in the conviction that the iualrlil,le stur sli<,ultl I w adopted M an honorable mark o f memherahlp of the army. with or without t h L aslditia,nai good which might redult from ita use.

the rctulezvoua i n 1Iw ' cation of their antecedents is impossible. By changing the location cities. a better elsssof men.although fewer in number,coiil<lprobalkiy be wcured. Colonel XIZXFR~X suggeatlou of reeriiitlng partlea visitiug the country, is in the direct line of Improvement and ha8 heen advlaed hy others: and a feu mouths ago the A8ljutaitt General informed me t h a t experiments would he mule. then the charncter ut the men ctmltl he known, and hrough this knowledge of thelr families there might be bcttcr control. I The suggeatlon of a probationary period. or a cocditional enlistment is one that I hnrc long thought would be most leairable during pca1.e. Then the aervice could he clvaml of , undesirable charseten. who neverthelem do not desen-e dishonorable discharge. nor indeed. punishment by eourt martial. 8s well as those who prove ricioiis. Thls \vouId r q i i l r e 81 , change o f law. but it h a matter well deaerving the careful considerntion and earueat actioii .of oltlcers interested In the welfare of the service. One,of thegreat draw.bmka to the emciencyof the rccruiting senice is the m - . s w rondition frequently i m p o e d upon it. A t one t h e enlistment. are conliued to men dfsrharge~l wlth excellent eharactera. at another great exertions are urged to till numeruus varaurita. nntl ~erlu for conaiderahle p e r ~ o d recruiting ~ IS almost or entirely silspeuded ior lark uf fnu+.. i t should be comparatively easy for the central authority to arrauge for a atead? flow of crllist. men& throughout the rear. reference k l n g h@dto the well established mriatioris that the n s cause. In Ume o f peace it In dmoat impomible to Bod young men wlth intelligent martial aqpinr, tione, who are otherwine acceptable. Theae qudltfea must he developed after enlistincut. \ I C cannot expect merelfto engraft the technique of t h e service lipon special qualities a l ~ ~ w l y b u n d . To develop them. it is an old s t o r y to my that the men must be eurefiilly nurtun.al as soldien. both at depot m d In the ranks. But this is not meant to i ~ p l g that then- is n o t one elam h e t e r thau another lrom whleh celecUona should he made.

LIWT.-COL.WoonArLL. Yedienl Department.- I hacc had no service nt thc niwntcd depot and none with cpvdry recruit. 8s such. but the conditiuus of the gcnerul rerruitiiig ~ervlce. with p h i e h I am familiar. are much the same as those for the cavalry. Ilcl*ntinp in s o b n c e what I have .aid elsewhere. I believe that to require testinionink of chnrnrter while the rendezvousareestabllshed as they noware. in rertaiu parrs of lurgccities. will bring rWNiting there to an abrupt end. Very few such rccriiita eulist froni any retil Lnowlctlpc of.or l w e for the?nllltary service. Many enter I t from tht. prewure of *lcstitutlon. f < wa livelihood. for snbaistence a n d when their ImmLvliatc wan& nre supplied. if they have not heen favorably impresued. are very a p t to desert. being cucuurngc*l thcreiii b y a Inx Imblir nentlment in regsrd to that crime and perhaps not reganilng the noleniuity o f the oath. Such men have no fixed residence, certainly none near at hand, and for the tnmt of them II vcrili-

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i t ia the intention of this Snciety to discus all pihits and subjects pertaining to the cavalry service, from the sliot and shoeing of the horse to the crown of the riders head, each m e n i b r having the privilege of selecting his own subject. For the interest of the Society generally, members furnishing papers to be read and conaidered a t home o r published abroad, should write on . those. subjects which have in their service interested theiii most, or upon . which they b y e some special information. From books and papers, if we clioose to apply oiiraelves, we may learn
of the operations of the past, and articles written on tliosc subjects are intereating,becauee they carry with them to the finish true accounb of the accomplihments of those great men in our profession whose examples we wish to followa I n studying those exaniples it becoiiies us also to take heed of the present, in which we are interested, a t least, t o the extent of making proper preparation for the future. In the present we have the daily actinus of nien inmediately surrounding us, and we are called upon to determine what our fellow soldier i s by what he says or does. We are sonietiines led to doubt the loyalty of our moet intimate friends and are distrustful of all. This should not be the caae with soldiers, for in all our undertakings we are 90 entirely dependent upon each other that, to insure sueces~s,we should know and trust. wILKISON.in his Lifeof a Private Snldier,say3 : KOmatter how &rave a veteran eoldier may be, he relies on the nieii on either side of him to e.&d there until they fall. He relies on them to acconipany him in the edvancee and to be by h i aide when slowly falling Inck before a euperior force. It is essential that a soldier heam the voices of his cowradee when he is charging. He must know that his comrades are as etaonch fightere a e he. The paat ie aa a tale that i s told, and its burdeus now rest UPXI the men of OW t h e . A proportionate share of responsibility is thrown upon

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every otiicer and enlisted mau iu the servicd to-clay; but the portion allotted each of us is 90 slight that we are npt to think lictle of it, mcl, entertaining only a vague idea of our individual obligatiws, me scarcely realize their importance until we are aroused by some extraardinary occurrence. It is then that those who are unprepared prove to be failures and better nien come to the front. I It is hard to niake a young officer, who is liring*an easy life, following heaten paths, I ~ I i e v e i n responsibility until it actually comes u p t i him. It is tlitticcilt to i n i p r w upon the j y u n g enlisted man the fact that mnie of the characteristics of a good soldier must come from h e a t h his own blouse and must he coutained in his own actions. Therc are few men whose capabilitiea extend in all directions, nnd those who have had a certain amount of experience in Ufe are a p t to doubt any nians doing all he advises o t h e n to do. I n other words, i t is quite an easy matter toindicate what a wldier ought tb be, but quite another to be one. W e kill, therefore, leave h nbler pen^ the subject of what the soldier should he, and will look a t him a~ h e is, 1~s\vr? find him and see him every day. There can be t i 0 reason why the personnel of tlie u much interest to tlie servim cavalry should not be cliscusd with quite t a s tliscusgions held upon arms, amriiuuition a i d othei material. I approach the subject, however, with the knowledge that many officers think there can be no improve ent m%lc in this respect; ithat their meo are all nien, and not to improved upnii ; hence they are ( l i s p 4 to let well enough alone. On this principle flint,locks abd paper cartridges were good enough. Why change to breech-loatlem .and metnIIic shells? While i t is true that a majority of our enlisted men nre of the nietallic sort and have the proper ring about thein; still some are of the paper kind, good when not d r u n k ; p o d if e v e r y t h g ic? all right, but not to be depended upon in bad weaker. It is in support of the reliable men, me nom have in the service thnt reform is required; that those men who are not worthy to wear the uoi. form, and who lower the standard of the enlisted soldied i n the eyes of the community, should be rooted out and kept out. No b n should be accepted BS a recruit wh%n not bring credentials o r s h o w k m l character by testimony of reliable persons. This rule once adopt+d and kiiown throughout the country, a better claim of men would untlo btedly present themselves for enlistment. Men who now p the rend vous daily and think only of returning provided they can do no better o d d n d hesitate to enter and enlist if they knew good character $be a neeesgary qualification, and felt that association from that cause w o u p Iw! an object. Few good men enter the service, I imagine, without giting the matter some thoughtful consideration ; if, then, the character of Ithe occupation

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raked to a point where, all thought of tlegradatioii is out of the question, i t would doubtless ha- the double effect of in(iuceiiient to g w d aa well aa hindrance to bad men. But with all due care and taking every precaution, we are h i n d to get bad characters occasionally ; men who develop evil teiitlencies after elllist. ment. Such men should be tlischarged at once, instead of being kept i n service aud ordered to be disciplined. I do not beiiere that any aiiioiint of army discipline will correct a morally had man ; nor cln I look iipon the army as a training school for morals, thc discipline of inen for our purposes having altogether a different bearing. W e enforce (liscipline iu order that men shall be brought to render effectual service in time of need. Each soldier, therefore, should be treated as an intliviclnal i n whom the government hss taken a special interest and intends to improve and develop for.its own bene6t. BANC!ROFT says: T h e cibject of all earthly esperience i3 to tlevelop t h s v a l u e of the individual man; and the object of society, of institutions and of government is to protect the rights and to favor the derelopment of each man of the race. If this is true in regard to society Ant1 t h e institutions of men in civil life. why nhould not the election and iniprovement of the individual soldier add strength to the m a s ? The training, government, subsiitence and most effective use of men at arms haa been the study of the greatest soldiers of all ages. Thoee men who guide and rule, the rulers knowing the necessity of having force at hand, make the proper government of that force a niatter of first consideration and necessarily 80, because to be useful to theni at all it must he reliable and effective. T o be reliable is to be subordinate; to maintain this newwary subordination, discipline is resorted to, and to attain that we have to come down from the consideration of battlea and chargea in masa to the less interesting subject of the individual soldier. If there is ever a time in the life of a .soldier when he needs care and kindness aa an individual it is on his first e n k r h g the service. I presume almoet every officer has experienced the feeling of having wasted sympathy on undeserving men. T h i s is one of the experiences of life among men. The unfortuoate part of it is that i t falls so beavily sometimes upon men who really are deserving. It too frequently happens that officem w i l l not take the pains to discriminate in their treatment ot enlisted men, between an intentional or an unintentional mistake. Sufficient allowan& ie not madefor the ignorance of men, nor is sufficient patience exercised in the way of overcoming this ignorance. . Every recruit who joins the army is more or leas unjustly treated, and each hae to receive many hard knocka before he reaches a point where he can look for kindheas.

The character of the mail g m far toward eatahlialiing his Jtatus afid
i h c man w h o cloes not pnseq the iiecessnry firmness to await the time when he alii tlcclnre himself, deserts. This niny aCcoUII8 for the large number of desertions froni our urmy in the tirst year of enlistnient, atid aa the greater numlwr of clesertions take place within that time, the cause may ciisily be tliscoverctl. The men are new to the service and unfnniilinr with restraint. They nre mixed in with all kind of chaactcrs god, had ant1 iiidifferent, ut the rendezrnus, and every discnnifnrt atteiide the journey from the rendezvous to the depot. While at the t l e p t there is still niore crowding and snrnetimes not even a lwd. All t h e trials have to be endnred for three months or more, and a t the eiicl, men who n regiments in enlisted for certnin regiments ill the south are aseigned t t h e n h h and vice versa. -Thus it is that every step on the part of t h e government has been contrary to that which was expected by the recruit aiid t n utter despair of any change for the better the man deserts. There are quarters at our cavalry dcpnt at Jefferson Barrack9 for probably 4(K, nien ; that is to give necessary room and comfort for :ill. They frequently have over 600 there. The men h a r e no placc to go, no amnsenient or recreation, and a large sick report preraile, for it is one of the mast unhealthy places in the United States. Those who becnn{e discontented and honiesick have plenty of time aiid cause to regre! the btep they have taken and to mope over the situation. The place has a & m y appearance; thcre is nothing bright or cheerful abont it, and t h e men rezlenil)le convicts rather than soldiers. I f an experience d .this nature lasting three months, will not take the spirit nut of n young niap who entered the service with expectations of a bright and happy life, a~ lie understowl that of a snldier to be, I do not know what will do so. A depot niay be a necessity but it would be far better for the new men and for the service, and would decrease desertion one-half if recruits could be enlisted for regiments they select and be seht to their stations, their ;future homes, with as little delay as pomible. It is unreasnnable to sappose that ofiicers selected from/ kgimenta and sent to depnts are going to take very much interest in recruits for the general service, and therefore. the sooner a recruit gets nu{ of their hands aiid under the protection of his proper officers the better. ; The company is the true and only home of the mlttieri I n the company the new man ceaeea to be a recruit and learns to be @ mldier in the shortest p i h l e time. There he h a the care and pn)t&ion of hie own officers; the affiliation of comrades wholly in sympathy with his own views; every comfort in garrison that a soldi$ shoultl l$are-his own I d and I d d i n g , his private bos, his iiniforni and eqnipnlents complete. s made Whatever he lias is under the protection of all and what bE lacks i

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up to him by comrades, who are closer than brothern. Here there is I I O 'deception ; the captain is intimately acquaiuted with every iuaii, and each man has hip true value. i known the more aclvautageous i t is to the The better a true man k man and the more quickly cornea his preferment; the .woiier a mwal is discovered the better it is for the honest men. T G finer poiit,ts ctf the moral law are not particdarly observed by soldiets, but the lines are drawn 80 exceedingly close on some otf'euees that the offender has sooii .it> chnnse. between reformation or desertion. It is seldoni that a ninn of any etanding in his company deserts. When an nccurreiice of this kind docs take place his comrades can always give a reason, antl it nil1 be f i ~ u i i ( lto be not " incident to the service." The prescnt management of recruits seem to be in contrntlictioii to t h e requirements of men, making so radical a change in life. friini tht. freedom o f a citizen to the restrnintsof a soldier; I mean the hetter ~ : W P of men, the kind of men we want. -It ie not to he supposed that a sensible man entcring the scrvicc ns a private soldier will have extravagant expectations, but it woultl be better for the man and the service if even ordinary expectations were fiiltilled, and still better if good and fair treatment exceeded expectations. The Adjutant General of the h n i y reports 6,168 acceptetl recruits last year: 3,788 native born, 2,380 foreign; 5,587 white, 681 cnloretl; lR,53.5 applicants for enlistment- 72 per cent. of the whole nu nil^^ were rejected by recruiting officers ou account qf physical arid menhil (lisqualifications, which shows that nntwithstandbg the presirig iiectl for recruite, the officers charged with this i m p r t a q t duty cserrise tlne care to prevent the enlistment into the army of rue1 not fitted ti)r tlic ilutie.. 1 , of a soldier. It appears further in this report that during%he year 2;2N nicn tleserted from the whole army, and of that iiuinber 1;lO.j were men m i g n e d to regiments from depot. D u e care having bkeu esercisecl by officers i n making these enlistments, there musb be some good~cau3e for tlie ilescrtioii year, antl ihnsniuch a 3 the cleserof so large a number within the fi& tion from depots is more than d o u b b that from the whole army, peraistence in that system, unless some radical ch5dges are niatle, m:~? Iw fairly questioned. T h e lengthened detention of recruits ;it .Jefferson .Barracke,an unhealthy post, and 90 near the outskirts ot' a large city, where every temptation is put in the way of young inen, i3 the ruin of many good men, and doubtless, the cause of the desertion of nunil)crn who would have been satisfied and contented in their companies. In the c a d r y service alone 2,151 men were received a t .Jetfernon h c k e depot f r o m January 1st t o Deccniber Blst, 188i. During that

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year I,$:;!) inen were sent to regiments, 137 were discharged a t t l e p t , 297 tlesertecl. and l!) died. Of 455 desertem from all the cavalry during the yeat., 397 mcii dcsertetl froni depot. In support of the statenieiit of the depot being unhealthy, I sulmit a coniparison betwreii the death rate at that station and the!rate at others. The tleath nites for the last year for the whole nrdy was, 8.8 per 1 .OWO. At Daricls I?;lancl, $.!I; Columbus Barracks, 2.7; !Jefferson Barmcks, 2 1 . 5 . I also sillmiit :in article taken from a late uumber oc the A r t y trtrd A\~t.y . h t n r t d . touching the nintter of desertion from depob: ' '' In :i desrriptivc list of Lddeserters,' received this w e e l c fmni tlir head11ii:irtem of the Recrniting Service, 1 7 . S . Army, we find recortletl tlic nanies of 204 desertem. Of this nunilwr 161, or more than two-&inls. were recruits w h o n&cr got further thnn the rendezr0us or depots; riglitceii were from tlie E:iigiri&r Buttailinn. antl the reniniiring twenty-five from reginieiits of the linc. That this large nuinher of pxrnits ~houlcl desert so won after enlistnlent is a peculinr phase, arid ?ne well worLh 1nokiiig intt). I'erhnps oue cause niay he the monoton j aiitl isolation of the recruiti~igtlelwt, wliicli pcrhnps aloes not conie u p to the recruit's itlc.al of :I Pcildiert life, uor give hini the lweit itlea of w9at his inilita;y c:ireer is to he. I'erliaps if recruits on enlivttueiit were drufteil tit once to re~iiiients:inti there I)rokcii in, i n the old-fuhioncd t a y , the r b u l t niight be tlitfereiit." The rceruib liaving pased their trials nnd troubles a t tlepot, we iiow follow tlieni to their reginients. Tliey arc sent from ilepot iii siuall detachments, an O I I arriving a t regiriieiital Iieaclc~uartcrsare %signed iind sent to troop the iiien being nllowecl to select their troops \\'lieu it cau be done withou injury tv the-' men, if they 'service. A s affairs are n o w conductetl, the future for th coinfolc. our behave tlieiiisclves, has in it a lit& of comparative ea=e a siildiers lire never ovcraorkcd, on the other hand idlen is the bane of our army. There is drill if the weather is not too boi OUR, or if the niud is not ton deep, when in other callinp they are wo king for theniselves. tire out aiid about, attendiug to their duties, rniu )r diine, but if any coniriiintliiig otti,cer should uiidertake in these days carry out the ~ FKEUEHICY, he would h pronounced a e d n k at once, and precept I J old w o i i l ~ lbe et~iideninctl i n iiii~nerous uuofficial communicatidns to headquartcrs on his official acts. (.;rc:it iii~prove~iient has h e n made io late years tow B making the rnlistwl tn:in inore comfortable in his quarters. I t is r!ght and proper that i n c w sIioiil(1 h:ive spring niattreses, feather pillows and every comfort can afford. Good fiml,clean well ventiand converiieiice the govcr~irnent

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lated qunrters, clothing to suit the climate, reading rimtiis, I)ntli rmms and
certain facilities for amusement. but when this has all been furnished #le soldiem should be required to make a proper return, aiitl that is a full days work for a days pay. The idleness of our soldiers iu barracks is the cause-of many disagreeable criticisms and it frequeutly reaches a point where the soldiers themselves complain of the monibtony of their lives, and no doubt not a few desert ou that accouut. W e pay SIJ much regard ,to the niatter of having everything out doors just right for coinfort, that we drag along from Noremher to April or )fay in a state of hiliernatioii, waking u p in the spring to find that last years work l i u to be clone over, and that the enforced idleness of m a n p nionths render it :I lal)or, all ot which might have been saved by a continuance of instruction intloors, when it could not be done outside, but the day should 1 w nil rxceptioiially severe one when able-bodied nien cannot stand a certain aniouiit of expwure. There is so much time and 80 niaiiy ways in which nicn can IN? irupmved that there is really no excuse for having so many ignornut nieu in t h e ranks of our army ; some of whom are even nlloweil to go tl;n)ugh a whole enlistment without beiug able to s i p their names to the mueter

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When we come to consider the expense of niaiiitniiiing n troop of cavalry for six mouths, and find that the orgaiiization is less efficient on the first day of May than in the November precetling, it looks serious, and when that is multiplied by 120,the cavalry arm, when not efficieut, niay . well be called a n expeusive luxury. Some troops are i n lwtter condition and are far superior to others, but we have yet to see any troop where every man in the ranks is able to p r f o r n i all the duties of n cavalry wldier, and until all men are 80 instructed there is somethhg left for the officer to do, and I may here add that those men wlioni we deem well instructed in every particular have generally picked up their iiifornintion . or have a natural talent for o k r v a t i o u , and hiive, not bcconie the thorough soldiers they are through instruction. T o indicate what is expected of the iiitliritliial cavnlrvnian of the future, I will preseut the remarks of Col. HOME on the suhject : T h e position of cavalry should be on the Hanks; that is to say, there should he no ma88 of cavalry on the roads folliowing or leading the a i , but the whole couutry should be filled with Iicorsnien working on a br ad front, pushing on at all tinies, if checked simply halting, while those on the right and left, turn whatever stop; the advance. Thus the cavalry of a n army resembles more than anything else the feelen of some insects, ywhed out in front and conveying impres&na to the nniniaf, which guide ita movements. To accomplish this duty tlioroughly and completely, the cavalry soldier must be trained as a n individual, not merely as a unit of

His individual knowledge and ahility must be contiuually improved and strengthened, while at the same time his +wer of acting aa a fraction in large m should be kept steadily in kiew. Thue, as previously said, the cavalry soldier requirea to be all hd has ever been, together with a great deal more he bas hitherto not been.! This theory is deduced from the experience of service h i late wars,and it will be seen that the proper instruction of the indivitlutd aildier is considered an absolute necessity. T o any thoughtful man +I> is now or may become a troop commander, and who niay be called upon a t any time to put this iheory into practice, or may have the responsibility tlirorn upon him of gaining important informstion through the .indivitlutd troopers under his command, this subject niust k of suffirrient iniportanee to cause a desire on his part to be prepared. Therefore II) day should Iw, allowed to slip by without some advance toward t h e e n d d e s i r d . I t niust be admitted that we have a great deal to do to bring the individual soldier u p to tlie standarxwhere he can be. thoroughly rel.id u p i i i p every particular of his duty, and that merely-taking care of the horses during the winter nionths and drilling only in suninicr will not accomplish the work. It is ueedlm to say anything a b o u t the reeponeibility for the situation of to-day. I n the p u t our cavalry proved equal th the occasions; that ia to sap, it was good as it had to contend with ; bht improvement in arms and changes io the management and disposition of )oldiers in battle calls now for a higher standard, aud it is to be seen *ether those in authority will recognize the fnct. There is 110 failure on the part of the government in furnishing evcry requisite for efficiency. W e have wnie splendid men in the ranks-men capable of learning or doing anything. The horses, generally speaking, are good, and the arms kid equipmenu excellent. k i n g well supplied with the bcst inaterid, we certainly ought to be niakiug some risible improvement; but is our cavalry really any better to-day than it was this time last year? W e seem to be drifring aloug, holdiug our OWD, to be sure, but makibg no advance. The tirue will come when a n inspection of cavalry troops will b incomplete when i t does riot reach the inclividuysoldier. T t d i y tlie inspector is satisfied and will give- s g00rl report ou swing trnopb ami battalions move in line or coluiiin at the walk, trot or gallop, the mavements, if tolerably well executed, concealing from his riew the actiona of individuals, who perhaps h a r e not heen in thy saddle since the last iiiqkctioii and who are as igiorant as can be of all their duties. Under t h e 4 circumstances +t a h x t r o o p commanders, the men really responsible, get a credit to which tltey tire not entitled, and depnrtnient, division and army headquarters rewire reports which, as far a . . the efficiency of the individual cavalryman, as required to-day, is concerned, undouhtedly lead to false conclusions.

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THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER. SOIIW rapt:tinr :ire keet when left to exercise their o r r t ~ i jutlgtiieiit in ~voiitrolliiigtheir nieii, while others in the same coiiininud have to be folIab~etI r i p cltwly. Some, if the responsibility is throwii u p o n %ni visit their troops and cluarters frequently and have a thorou& knowledge of . every,thiiig pertainiug to their commands, while others sigb their morning reports i n I)ticl a t the hands of a servant, perhaps, and. sgldonl gee their see then1 when compelled to do SO; giving b an excuse for trtn)l)s or o n l ~ s1ic-h neglect the opinion tbat nien in quartere should not too often dist u r l d by tile Iweseelice of the otticcr; such an opinion is nothing le* than :I illere ~ w m o n ; ~convenietice I to the officer who holds it, and such an otticer not o ~ i l y makes a c.oiiveiiietice of his troop but also cdnipels the govcriinieiit t o expend money in his pay for which it gets a shall return I t i; riot the intei!tioii iii tliia paper to touch upon the dutiea or cliscipline ot\ ofiicers yciierally, Init where any military system admits of such deglect . I L S 1111. becii iiientiouecl, i t mag be seen that some advantage niight accrue to tlie ciiliitccl iiiaii IW ail iiidividual, and to the governmaat as *ell, if it were diHcrent. This Asocitttioii clniiiis to have for ita ohject the advniirenient of the cavalry service generally. llie inatriicticni I,f the younger oliicers now going on is one step in the riglit clirwtiou qiid y i l l r1oubtle.m cause all officers to study:more than they . Iiaw bcen doiiig, :tiid to inform theruselvea in order that they niay not be left ciitirely i n the rear. B u t what are the uses of advadced theories if no pnictical application id r u d e ? Wherein is our service to be advanced . o r benetitecl if niter we rend and study the campaigns of other arniiea in the field, we clime the book and permit the irksome details of our own duties to go OII without improvement? It is fascinating in the extreme to read . the brilliant charges and man(EuvTr89 of large bodies of cavalry in the.f!& h i t awfully stupid and annoying t o come dowu Lo a n inspection of Private So niid Sos underclothing, still i t Is important thnt the prirate have his clotliing and it is essential that the captain know he has it, without regard to what was done at Mars-la-Tour or what was not done at St., Privst. 111 other \VCJrdS if n e expect to make m y real &ancement the otticers, wliose duty it is to look after the imtruction and improvement of the individual soltlkr, iuurt be at their posts constantly for practical work ; otherwise the niagniticent theories set forth for our inetruation will prove .as iisele* n* i i n iille dreaiii and our superiors! although they may find us I our not being well u p i n the history of the past, may meet with disaster $ able to graalo aiitl perform the simple duty required tojmeet a present , be as well inc~nergeiicy. I t is useful. as well as ornamental for us formed as.posihle, hut as suhordinate officers, officers directly in command , . of enliztcvl iiie11, there can be no doubt where our first duty lies, or what I ! is moat important for us to know. Let us then in our m h after knowl-

I have intimated that the cavalry of an army have niade no advance within the pest few years. (I exoept the niatter of rifle tiring.) Nor do we eee or hear of any steps being taken towards improvement beyond the usual sumlper drills, which are the same year after year The old strain is still kept on the cavalryman, and he is expected to do everything a b u t the post in the WAY of guard, fatigue, etc., that an infantryman does. He receives nu more pay, although subjected to considerable expense in the purchase of extra clothing, cleaning stutf, etc. The result of this is that some of our beat men,after serving one enlistment i n the cavalry, re-enlist i n the infantry. It would he a great point p i n e d if we could hold our old men, as a man in the second enlistment is worth much more than a recruit. I do not say that the cavalryman has too much to do; he is really not occupied half the time in winter ; hut his employnest ehoiild be of a d i s r e n t pnture-should he confined to h i 3 arm of the service, and some distinction should be made between the mounted and foot soldier, if for no other r y n than to prevent our losing so many good men, the tnrnsfer of ab experienced cavalryniau to a foot regiment bciug a greater loas to the government than the pittance it would require to retain him 88 an expert. I n the matter of drills, exercises auct instruction in our army, the management is generally left to the discretion (Jf post commanders. W e are loth tu exprem it, but we feel that in some instances a corps prejudice exista which preventa progres. A sniall cavalry command a t the tail end of an infantrygrvrison will bave very little chance for iniprovement other than that which haa to be done, and tlie cavalry officer who seeks to perf@ hig men and asks for time or relief from other duties, for that pur. pose, is silenced if not ridculed. A cavalry officer in command of niixed troop feels a delicacy in showing n preference for his own arm and 80 it happens, that in either case, the cavalry is not allowed the opportunity i t says: T h e tendency is for everyone to ahould have. Colonel HOME think his own branch the most important, that such feelings are very n the lower grades often do niuch gml, but as nien rise iii natural and i the service it is desirable that they should kuow something of the duties of other branches and the difficulties others have tu contend with. Cavalry officers falling into command bf mised forceswill not then expect their infantry to gallop infantry officers will not seek to bind the cavalry , to the pace of their infantry. T h i s calls for B liberality of feeling which, on the part of post commandeb, in our service, is not often exhibited, and when we consider that they are the 05cers who have the full control of the enlisted men, and have almost u n l i m i e authority in a11 matters of drill and discipline, the lack of it is disastrous. There are as many opinions in regard to the proper way of exercising command as there are men tu give commands.

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THIS I N D I V I D l i A I , S O I ~ D I E K .

TiiA. I S D I VIDU-41. SOI,UIEh'.


I

191

edge, in ficltls of inforniation niore Iiriqwly I A m g i n g tu o u r siilwriors, not forget to iiilpart wtue practicnl l e w m tu iut'eriom i n whc~.seIiaritlli, aftes all is eaid r i i t l tlont., lie our suceeW or firilure. 111 p s c e t l i i c l i i i garrison the o t h e r I l m every nclrriiibigc, I1:is t i o h x i e t y n i i a l I I O k a f l tlic daily routine t ~ f his duty g i e s liiriicl irucl Ii:iiitl with hi.< oiiiit;)rts aiicl aniusenleiitli, Init iiiragiue tlie !et.liirg of *capmiu, t v h ; IKoiiglit w i t h his troop, suclderily i n the presence of an enemy, with a desperate tluty to perfiriii, having iiegledted his duty to h i s men, i i o w feels :I w u i t uf contiin. tliem and they i l l him. Under like ciirumstu~icestlie dticer who has been. true to hia sulwrcliuates niiw comriiands their respect a i d 1 s in that sufficient strength to affection ae well ns full olwtlietice, arid 1 enable him to eligigtt tlre enemy with every coiltitlencr ot' succes. 'flw best and strongest of us require eucoiiragemeut occasioually, and wlleii it comes from a superior?t 9ee1us to have double weight The wltlier who never geta a pleasant word or receives the henefit of n kiiid act 1'rc)iii liir captain will uot be likely to do riiore than he is cc;iiipclled to t l o 311dwill escape that if psqible. o all. kiii~In~?ss tu those who are trFiiig to t l o well. firriiStrict justice t ness with tho& w h o try3tu do wrong, shoirltl be the role. Favciritisni iir the army is not coiifineil to -high places. Hundreds of ei!listed men nrc thrown i l l t o coirfiienieiit for the ruost trivial otfeilsee, a i d Inaiiy are retained a t h d luhor under guard for lllonths aw:iitiug trial uucl aftcrwards found inrioceiit of any offense. On the other hal:tl, not a few favorites escape who shoultl he punished,and the presence i i i the rnriks bf many disreputable cllaracters is a standing disgrace to the army at large, as well as a constant annoyance to the respectable nien of &e orgauizations to which they belong. Within a few years any uiau who could pull a throttle vulve \vas supposed to be an engineer, but the loes of many lives and great destruction of property 6 o n taught railroad authoritiea that the best aud must iutelligent men they could eniploy were the cheapeat for the specific duty required. From the experience of the past, as alrencly cited, it is evident that thf cavalry service of the future will require the eniploymeiit of iueu sutticieiitly intelligeut for their speci6c duty. 'fhc prolxisition to have selected meu for the cavalry will, I know, a t first meet with antagonism from other corps; but it should not when it is understood that the duty required is for the safety of all aud fur the benefit of the whole army. Any infautry officer coming in cqrnmaud of mixed forces. and feeling the be l greatly relieved i n riiiud anxiety aud reqwmsil)ility of command, w o i ~ l ~ if fully awureil thut his outposts were well gunrtled-that those posts were held by inteUigeut, relialile meu, wlio would not fail I i i i i i . sntl that he and his fwt-aore iufautry could obtain their welluariietl relit i n caret!. T h i s assumption is submitted furvhe consideration of infautry ( J ~ X ~ ~ who I-S

+ace

may coiiiruantl cavalry, but who may now be disposed !to qucstiou ilie iiuliortmce and uudermte the value of the steps necessaq to iinprove and ndvauce the cavalry. This As~cxiation, although distinctikedy for cavalryI I I C ~& , au iiiclucenlent has thrown its doors wide ope& and invites the cii raiice a i d tifiliation yf every officer of the army and navy. While we & e uo aiiibition tu surpass others, our aini is simply to excel' in our o \ v n line where excellence may be required to perfect the whole. There is uo intention i n I' his paper to underrate the mnk and file bf the army. The heart of cvery true soldier, whether ha is otficer or private, goes out tu his 1)rother in arms, in the nrnks or out of them, p'v vitled only lie lw true, 50 tliut tlie individual soltlicr, wher he can respect hiinself, a d , wlleii lie Iwrforius his duty faithfully, needIhave uo fear of the criticisms of any man.

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C.4 V-4 1,R 1- R A I D S .

19::

f uest .that I slioultl become a nieiiilwr of tlit: I-, S. t:iv:ilry .S. Ckr:ilry, O I I t l i v roll> of Association. from an officer of tlic 1st I which I had been lrorne as n major from Sovemlwr 5 , 1 R t i l . ti) . \ i i g - t ::I, 1886, and lieutenant-colonel from that date to the h t e I # m y prloiitotioii 88 colonel 3d Cavalry, April 4, ISTH. was acc~onilo:inir~tl i)y :I re*iliiesttliiit I should give a p a p r on m y e?tpericnw.iu cav:ilry r:iialing itr the \ r t + t c r ~ ~ .. army. More thau a qii:irter of R century has el:ipwd 4iicc I \v:i* :i 1o:irticiIo:iitt i u the first mid niutle by iiny corisit1eml)le hotly (,of* c:iralry frcolii citlivr the Union or Confederate armies. Its (letails are ~ ~ I I l l J s;is t frc.-ti i r i 111) menlo*, as if of receiit occurreiice. Thd :irtiiy of the >Ii&i1q)i, uiit1c.r wns, after its 1)riIli:iut oprr:ition.c the cumman$ of Nuj. Gen. Joirs POPE, around Kew 3i&riti, and Island So. 10, transferred to the ric.iiiity ( i t Corinth, Miss., early in the spring of 1862. T h e Army of tKe illississippi consisted of three tlirisiotw of.itithitry, oue division of cavalry and - batteries of artillery. The divieiou of cavalry was coruniaiitled bx (jell. (;ot:itos ( ; n . A s c ; i . : K ; its second brigade, consisting of the 2d IOIVU Csrtilry atit1 3 1 1liclii;:iti Cavalry; I had the honor to commancl. leaving IAicot.-Col. E I I W . \ I : I ~ .HATCH, 2d Iowa Cavalry in the imiiiedirte commaiitl of tlic rcgiitietit (if which I was the colonel. The 2d Jlichigaii Cavalry, OF \rIiicli t h i . GRANGER had lKen colonel, a very superior body of 111e11, w:is w i i h i i i i t a11 experienced commander. Captain, now Lieutetraiit-tiencriil, SIII.:I:II>.\S, y a a on duty at Gen. HALLECKS headquarters, as acting ~iii:irt~,rtit:i~t~,r, and i t was with niucli p n u a s i o n and reluctance, that the Cieiierd ;IIIII\VCII him to take the appointment of colonel of the regimeut. T h e brigade covered the left flank of the army of the JIis&i!qoi, a i t i l of the entire.army in front of h r i n t h , its pickets e?tteti(liit: \wII tal t t i v lefl and making almost daily reconnoisancea.

(jcnernl POPE, after the siihject had been cpuggestd by him and disthat a raid should be niatle by n cnmlty command. T o consented, nlthorigh Gen. GKAXOEI: did not favor it. this (;en. HAI.I.E(*K Gcn. IWE conferred with me, atid I told him I would rinlearor to carry wit his views to the I m t of m y nhility. The ortlem acre issoed. and the iirce~snryprelxwationa niatle. The 211 Inwn Cnralry nlnl the 211 Mirhignn Cnvnlry, each Iiurnlw+d from !)(HI to 1,000 men. I t was onlered tli:it only erective horscs shoiilcl he taken. so that fi*)ni the 2tl Iowa : i h t .Ed)(), and froni the 2d Jlichipn about 400. otfiaers nntl men were wlrctetl F i r e ( l a p rations of Ijread, sugar, coffee arid salt were issued ; for the meat ration IVC were to depend iipoii the country. Forage for one night wns :ilso taken. The coninisntl WRJ tint eticiinilm!ecl with p c k mininls, a i n h ~ a n c e r or artillery. Gen. SIIRKIDAS dined with me, and & n u t ( I i i > l i o f tlic 28th o J May, 18G2, the coniniand started 011 its march. I 1i:icl reportetl t o (leu. POPES headquarters, tn tnlie leave of him and :IINI of (;en. Gi:ASc:k:R; the latter I d c mr q o d b y e with the remark. Tlicre goes the finest b r i g d e of cawlry ia the army. HEACKEUARD \rill catch you aitil haug you. The genernl impreasion was, that we were going to reinfqrce Gen. 0. A I . .\IITCIIFJ.I.,:it Huntsville, Ala., or for some service in that direction. Oiir niarch was to the eastward n few mileg, wliere we bivouacked for the night. The liest day we continued the ninrch to and beyond Iuka, ani\ friini thcre we iiinrcheiec\ more i u a westerly coi1rse. makbig a uoon halt nt Peptons 1fiIls. The encniy did not seem to hare anr scouts watching our i ~ i ~ ~ r e m e n and t s , but few able 1u)died men were eutounterecl in our march. .\ couple representing themselves ns journeyink to the residence ofn clergyman. for the purpose o being married, were Informed that the o I)e postpoued for a few days. as the expectant weililing would hare t groom would accompany us. I
c i i w ~ l proposed ,

So unexpected was the advent of the command into the enemys country that a detachment, I think a company of cavaky, rode past the flankers and up to the column before they d i s c o v e d their. mistake, thinking m . e were Confederate cavalry, and, of course, became our pneoners. I n the afternoon our march was continued southerly until dark aud then directly for Booneville, on the Baltimore & Ohio railroad. An hour or t w o before daylight we halted about a mile frqm the depot, not wishing to reach the latter until light enough to see. lOur approach to, nrwl surrounding of, t h e depot waa a perfect surprise. $he main body of the comrnand was held in readineae for an emergen+y, while detachments were sent below and above the v w n to destTy any culver@ bridges or water tanks found. At the depot was f o u g a n enfine and train nf box cars, with platfnrm car, ou which were loafled artillery and

1 4

C'A V A L A Y RAIDS.

CA V A LR Y KAIDS.

195

other supplies. The depot building waa also filled with stores, all of which were fired and destmyed. The woods adjacent to the depot contained a large number of sick and convalescents. These, preparatory to the tiring of the builttilip :ind train, were direated to be removed, and part of N? conini:intl Misted in their removal. After an hour or two'$ delay and the returii of the absent detachments, the conimand commenced ita return niarch to camp, near Farmington, having met with little opposition, and. not being ntlviseed of the evacuation of the works around Corinth by the eiieniy ; otlwrwise tlie return march might have been made by a le= circuitous route, :ind the command might have been employed on the dank of the retrentinp enemy. . The k m m a n d reached ita old camp the night of the fourth day after its - 8 departure, i0 fin? that the enemy had retreated from Corinth, and the next day joined the army in the vicinity of Kienzi, and that afternoon was empbyed, with the addition of a battery of artillery, in making a reconnoiehce toward Blacklands, and within n few hours, being able t i ) report to the commanding general that the enemy \vas yet in force iu our ' front, I n addition to the destructiou of property at Booneville and the alarni created at the headquarters of the Confederate commander, as was afterwards learned, about ten locomotives and two hundred box cars fell into our hands between bridges d e a b y e d south and meet of Corinth. I w+z infornied by Gen. MCPHERBON, then superintendent of the railroad, that .this transportation enabled him to supply the army from Colunibus, Ky., until additional transportation waa sent from the North, the Tennessee river being too low to admit of the passage of the smallest class of hoete. The loee in my command waa comparatively small. Raids of any kind, in m y opinion, are demoralizing to those engaged, and should inflict great damage on the enemy to compensate fix the 4 eKect on the discipline of a command. The 2d Iowa Cavalry was composed of comparatively young m a l and mostly farmere' boys-fine howmen-and, having the reginlent ~ from September 14, 1861, until i t was -put under my Q W supervision , * in the fieh in froit of New' Madrid'in Ma,rch, 1862. it WBJ well disciplined, and in drill, at least, equal to any cavalry regimeut i n the servick. The 2d Michigan Cavalry had also the advantage of being cliraiplined and drilled by a cavalry officer of experi-ence, and. with the assignment of- SEEBIDAN as ite commander, his influence was soon apparend. Such troops are better for raids than the undisciplined or imperfectly inetructed. My experience in this first raid suggested that the organizations for other d d a should have the addition of an ambulance for cadi regiment,

two pack auimalr for each company and regimental heatlqnarters,a four-gun hattery of horse artillery to each division, R section of snwe for a brigade. Also that crowbars, sledge-haniniers aud axes rhould l a taken for the pirpose of loosening rails and switches mid rutting fuel for burning tim and twisting rails. I hope that this subject may be continued by others who have had the expetience of raiding in both the eastern and western armies.

a -

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account of ita vast extent, the Asiatic origiii of it. p c ~ ) p l ( ant1 ~ . t;llc nomadic character of many of ita present inliiil~itiiiit~, liu&a i i> peculiarly adapted to the development n d cstensive ure of caval&-. Although a study of the Russian cavalry is al\wys interesting, t l l c ject, at the present time, has special iiiterest f%r the .\nierican student. O h account of ita extent, poor roads, and the natural :~dapt:~bility of ita inhabitante to the horse, the conditions in Itussin are eimilnr to those exiating in our country at the time of the last war we are not surprised to learn, that the lessons of t h e rebellion fruit in Ruseis; and that the tendencylhere at the present time is to gip-c. great importance to the raid, and to fashion all the cavalry on the niw(e1

infantry. Tlic cavalry target practice is similar to that of infantry. The niovements conform, as iiccirly as circumstances perinit, fighting on f t ~ t to the open order formations of the intiintry. h e aim of the R u s h i s is to makc the c:ivnlry feel i t 4 own ind&ndence and i t s nbility to take care of itself unclc-r any niicl all circumstances. With this view they are taught to throw up teihpoeiry cnrtliworks nntl to clinrge with the bayonet. A s .uys an Eiiglish writer: I t is hopctl that without sacrificing the etiiciency of cn\-hlry i n its priinary employment, tli:rt of righting on horseback, it m:iy lw ~ ~ o s ~ iat l ) ltlie e Yanie time to train it *) thoroughly for tlimmintecl nctiori :LY to place at a-RusPian i . w of liorseni~~n provided with entrenching generals clispnsnl a great n tools and fit to nie:~.ure themselves o i t timt with tlie eneniys infiintry, whilst equal, when moanted, to any eiiquiiiter with his .cavalry. Ihit little value is plticed nu the revolver; on tiwt the trwpers \veapnii is the riH9; on horseback, the saber. r To show that all t h k fighting ontbot :in11 gener;il scrkice IW infailtry I will mention w e fact has not caused a c\etcrioratii)n i n tllc ccct*alr!ptn~t, only, viz : that, in their drills, sections and quatlronj pmaice iu r.liargiirg agginst otic another, passing tlirough oue n!iothers ranks. I f they are lint g&l cavalrynien this inanwuvre nil1 show it ; for the pwd =at, clnick eye, anal thorough command of tlic horse -all recluirites of HI cavalry -are necessary to a cornpietion wit~iouta r c i ~ c i i of t jtliis inovenient., The regular car:ilry is c o i n ~ ) o ~ of: l First, tcw r e ~ i i i i c ~ icif i l the . guarcl, c:ornpriz;iiip: ! I i of Cuiras&w.
2 of Dragoons, 2 of J ~ l l c r man11 , 2 o f illPsalm,

. .

Aud, second, forty-six regiruenb of c1cigooii.S. 1i)riniiig the cavalry . of . the


line. The four regiments of cuirassiers of tlic gci:ircl hare four qunclrons each, nll other regiments have ais ~ ~ u m l n m r . E h h squ$droii, i n peace or war, is conipoeed of: \ i 1 .Sqiratlron Scrg!c~ant-JI:ij<~r, ! 11 SerL-ants, (.4smior, 7 j i i i i i t ) r ) . I \ : ; Trunipetcrs, ( 4 i n Ciiirtwic*rs ). I
.

1
1

After the combat the horse. again comes into victorious, in pursuit; if defeated, to a place of safety.,
the cavalry, and by this reorganizacion all line regimentj were niatle (Ira &ne, and, with the exception of a few guard regiments, all other kintls 6f cavalry were abolished. T o enable them to engage infantry, they were given a similar weappn., the Berdan rifle with a shorter l~arrel. The cav. alry regulations expressly declare that the troopers are to be taught tu pride themselves on their ability to tight 011foot, aid to take tlie place of

S .Iaiic-e-Corlwrals, 120 Irivates, 14:: Horses.

The squadron is diticlccl into f a i r sections of aistecri tiles front each. for a sis squi1ilri)n orga)iiuitioit is : The reginiental estal~lishnient

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198

THE AUSSIAK REGL'LAH CAVALRY.


OFFICERS AND CLASSED OFFICIALS. HORSES.

. Squadron Cornmantlers,

( Captains J ....................... Hrb~tnental Adjutant ............................................ Paymwter and Quartermaster ............................... Artns oUic*ers ................................................. Repiniental Judge Advocate ........................... Subalterns ........................................................... Total officers. .............................................

Re riinental Commander ..................................... Fit'Iel officers ........................................................

0ffirct-s anel Troop ................................................

2
ti

.........................

!I40

Totill .......

....e..$...

....................................

..-". ........... _ _Si


1,025

1
1 1

2:1 -

Senior Surgeon.. ........................ .Junior Surgeon ......... \ ............. Veterinary Surgeon .............................................. Accountant ...... :................................................ Captain .............................................................. Total cl-d OfiCidS. .................................

__

3;

1 1
1 -

I n the g u m l s the regimental conimander is a major-gent line, a colonel: O f the 1.33 eliamouuted privates there a r e : I ; (ilioc.inLwmitli.'a pupils, 3 Trutiipeter pupils, -1s I'ertiiunent Orderlies, I ; 0r(I e rly-roou1 1It.sseng:crs, 24 Officws' Gmorns, 7 Cooks, 2.5 14 Otticers' Bakers, .Servants.

RONCOJMISBIONED OFFICERS AND MEN.

Cnmbatants- Mounted : Squadron Sergeant-Majors.........- ................. I; .Sergeants ................................................ titi Regimental Trumpeter ................................. 1 Trumpeters ................................................. 1s Lance Corporals. ..................................... is 1'rivntc.s ........: ........................................ 720 T o t a l mounted combatants ...... .:........... %;!I
( 8.)

When inohilized, sixty o f . these go to fill up the ranks; t31 cooks and bakers Imunle transport drivers. and the rest remain as 8ar .nts in the officers' ftliiiilies. A cavalry brigade consiets of two regiments. A division, tactical uuit, coitsista of two brigades and two h o r s e b a t b r i m
STRENGTH OF A CAVALRY DIVISION OF THE LJX1
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Combatants - Dismounted: Korigh ritlers ............... Ser)reantn, (inclwling 1 for transport Privates .........................................
I

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!I?O

.
( b.)

Total e-ombatants................................

Volnnteerr ...................... *mental Clerk ............ 0thc.r Clvrks ............... Various Eiuploya, liml Departmentn. ........... Sacrietan ................................................... 1 Armorer and Assistants .............................. 2 Farriers, Regimental and .Squadron. ............ 1 Saddlery De artment ................................. Cutter and fitter ......................................... Tailors ..................................................... Total Non-Combatants ........................ 22 Regimental Transport Drivers ....................... 48 Grand total non-combatants .................. 70 Total N. C. O f f i c e r s and Men, (including\'dunteers )................................... 9~

( c. ) Non-Combatantn:
s

swks ................. ....... Two horse 1)attwies.. .....


.Gl.

4 ..... ........I Tlirrc. drngoon rcbgitilc-ntsIOR' 1 3 2 , ~ : ; : tie Cow1c.k rcyi'nt 2.;' 3 One-half sotnia o f Cos-!

Two Iiripntle stntrti .........,

1)ivisicmalstaff ...............

1: ........

-I -1.....

lf.12H,'\H.

.................
7 ' %;

.....

I...

on

:;!I:< ?,*?o

.....

........

.....

..........

..... ..-. .....


.........; ........
~ i '

1'1'1.1

AS D TI<.\ SSITIRT.

staff ai111 Frtwral tliti'on 31 :<........ ~upp~ clivisioii. y ........... 1 1 1).........I

70'

...

..... 1 48 ..... .._I_ -

.....

The measures recently adopted by virtue of the decree 6f the 23d of August, 1883, have substituted for the i e p o t squadron, which formerly corresponded to a regiment, a depot cadre corresponding to a division and comprising three or four sections ; two cadlee, that is to say six or eight sections, constitute a brigade.

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k l.

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200
,

THE R l v S S I A S K E G ( % A R CAVALXl*.

These cadres are charged, i n peace, with the training of rein4)iitits fiir their cavalry reginleiits; i n war, i n aJclition, with the forinntioil of alrl)tlt quadrons, froni which the losses i n the field are niatle gootl. Ench brigaatle of cadres has a staff of one major-general, one i u l , i i i t : i n t . two clerks, w e nrmnrer. In p a c e the cadre consist3 of ten officers, I W I clnsml offici:ils, 249 conibatmit n n k sntl tile ant1 thirty-five n o n - c o t ~ ~ l ~ti i t a ~ ~ rnnk a i d file; horses, 2!li. III niol~ili7ationciich sectioii receives froni each reginiciit two. s t : i t i ' ~ a p . tains, (one a1re:uly with the cxtlre), two roughridem. the com1i:ikiiit I I I ) I I coniniisioiiccl ofticem ant1 nieii left Idiind hg the regiment, two t-tvrkb, . five dresser-pupiis, one saddler, one armorer and one ciitter. Tliey.are seat at once to the depot with all their papers, rtc. 1 . h h . section then prnceds2 nil the arrival of the reserve nien ani1 tlic lia)r.ws ' olitainecl I y the cooscription, to forni two tlepnt sqiiatlrons r i f t\vrrity tiles ,.to the section, retaining 1% comhataut and forty-five noil-cc)iiiliii~tIlt noiicomrnissionecl officers am1 men to form a tliirtl squatlroii. ,if rraliiirct~.t a t . ' hasten the niakiiig of uiiifornis. etc. Each depot sqiiatlrwi will haw five officers, 180 combatants, ( I I I C I I I. elerea non conilmtnnte. 213 horns.
___I_~... .......
. l , p ~ l d, ,

Strtwgtli o f wrtii):i in 1 3 : i t ' t ' . .................... Ikceivvcl frsitii rvgiiiwnts c ~ iiuiIiilir.:iti*iii i ... Total. ................................................ Tlwre an' rcqiiirwlTo forin tm-n clept)t w1ii:iqIroiis.. .................. To form the t h i n 1 r~lii:dron....................... Total. ............................................... Ketlnirecl, tlierefa)re, front riwrw .oi c w . l i rrginient ..............................................
ARMS.

__.

.Y<3,,.C,,,,,, O d 1 1 * t d .If. .,.

I /'.

II.., v .

<',#,,,.

.\#,,# 0, I,,.

!I !1

........
..
~

!I!

Ill,
I1 ~. . . .

411;

:;I;

slomrl.--Is curved, three feet four inches long, and weighs two pounds eleven o u n m . The scabbard is of wood covered with leather. Thr gurad is niade in one piece. R @ . - TIrg Berdan dragoon rifle-6 carried by all combatants (excrpt sergeant-majors. trumpeters, and &qmrt-serpeants,) in a case siring over butt behind right hip. It is securetl at the same cattridge as the infantry rifle, of barrel, k i n g 4 ft. long. It3 weight

.-

b8

Y'HI.; K USSI-4AT REG ULA K ('A VA I,H Y.


OII

203

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OR J aide.- A forage rope, 1 clothes brush, 1 g r e w lwush, 1 hariiess brush, 1 shirt, 1 pair drawens, 1 pair ankle boots, 1 towel ; a i d iii a pocket, 4 horse sboes, 16 nails, 1 chrry mmh. On neat &.-A hay net, a bag with 1+ rations bisciiits, 1 cholern . belt, 1 p a i r u p s . 1 bandage, bag cotitaining-gif-12 02. of groats, bag ( T h e last three b%v are rolled , with 1$ .oz. ealt. bag with tea and sugar.
'

.
. ;

H o ~ arc s obtaiiietf for the army in time of peace by ;purclnw, aud nio1,iliratioii by recluisitioniuG. I Heniou~ib for tlie line cavalry are purchased by oqcers specially tlct;tiled. The purchas? price varies from 186 to 207 rublescthut is, from 8148 tlJ SIC5 The above L ; U I I I cover ~ a11 expeiises of' purclinre a?d keep of the h o uiitil ~ he arrivcsat the uiiit for w1iicli he is tlestiiietl. N o s p c i a l color is laid down for each regiiiieot, but h o w s are assigned' to quadroue to 15 according to color. The horses must be from 14 harids 2 incl~ea Ii:~iids1 inch iri height, s i t t i a inargiii of one inch for exce~tionally wellsti:ilad niiimals. They miist lw from three to p i s years of age. After purcliase (cvidemtly condition:d) tlie hbrses are iiiiited a t the tlelwt cadre corresp)mling to the regiment, where they nre i r q ~ c t C d . J ~ By board and improper ones rejected. 111 1885, out of !)$ti7 (uriiishecl by the reniouiit officers, 1,031 were rrjectal. The horses reniairi one year at the tiepots, and are there broken to service. All reti~ouiits jihi their corp between September 15th aiid Octciber 1 5 t h : tli:ct is,aI~otit the tiriie of the iirriv:il of the new levies.
HEQCI.'IITIO.WNG FOR 110K.F-q O N JIOBILI/.ATIO

The JIiniste~ of War determines from the liom censu.q

Iiorses a district is to furnish, fixes the price to hc paid Ijcr 111,rse aid :11,1MJiIItS certaiu places where h i i m s are to be hollght. The +videlit desire IJII t ~ i e part of the KusJian government is to get the horn4 wit~ioutfrictiiiii, ill-will or iujuutice. To t h i s end, o m e m parting volbtitnrily witli their homer receive 20 per ceut. adtlitional on the price fixed by law, sild free two Ii~irses,besides, in .the c l u to which the one tgken hc~l011ge. Osners concealing, or failing to produce, their horses are liable tll 81 fiiie

i
e

rriiriiher

of

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' I

aniouiiting to douhle the price of the horse, or, if unable to p y , they linble to imprisonment.
INSPECTION AND CONDEJINATION OF IIORRW.

Homes arc examined annually by a board coi~sistiiigof regiiueiital. b r i p d c and division commanders. T h e period t r f service for n horn is ten years, hence 10 per ceut. are coutleriinetl. All that haw served twelve yeam are first throwii out, theti those that art uuscylr~d,tlicu the oldest until 10 per ceut. have been ejected. The after-hisuvy -of u contlcmned horn is the same as in our service.
STABLE M A S AOEY EST.
T

Htmes iiiust have from fifty-six to seveiity iuches of staiidiiig room in stables. Stalls inlist be a t least rline feet kmr inches loug. with u ga11gway i n two fwt fbur inches widc. Stalde orderlies nw prewicrlt in stthlefi :it :ill time+. 'I'he Itusieiis h a w three stahler n 11:iy. The first is at 5 or 6 A. x.,depending on the season ; the second a t uoon. after drill,

.
i

204

T H E RUSSIAS R E G U L A R (7.4 v;1rAtCi:

205

and the third a t 6 P. Y . The oats :ire divided into threc equal feeds. One or two pounds of bay are given a t each of the first two atahlea, the rest a t evening stables. Horses are shod at least once every six weeks. Iu-@interhorsea are exercised for no hour in blankets. Once R week t h F u g h the winter and spring nionths route march- are niacle, regardless of ithe conditio!i of the roads, by lmlies varying in size froiii a section to ,a regiment. These marches, which are s i s or ten niiles i i i leiigth, are 'qyde at a pace of two-thircle of a mile a t a walk an11one and one-thin1 ni* at a trot;finishing u p with two rnilys a t a trot a i d two-tliirds of u mile at a walk. .
FORAGE KATION.

Forage is imuetl every ten or fifteen days. The peace ration Rir liiic cavalry is ~ L Bfi)IIows: Oats, 9 tbs. .ii oz. ; hay, !) t>s. 1 0%. ; straw, :ibs. 10 oz. Oiie mouth of grazing is giveu :ill cavalry Iior.ws per yc;ir, ; i i i t l this is in lieu of dl rntions. It neceswry hay niay l a siil)stitiitecl f i x oats, at the rate o f -1 Its. 8: oz., hay fur 3 h s .13 oz. wits. [[I tiiiie of war the ration is 1 2 . h 1.5i oz oab and 13 tbs !)A 02. hay.
JIARCIIES.

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The rates f i r ninrching cavalry is: I .At a walk :;A iiiiles per lioiir; .\t o tript i s niiles per lioiir ; At i i trvt and :I walk altern:itir 4:; iiii1c.s 1it-r Iigliir. h day's ;iiarch is from 20 to 26 iniles;'~hetiilia ocbciipictlIwiiig f r o i i i : ; : tu 8 hours. u n d e r favorable conditiow niall Iw!lies of .cavalry are cousid ered capable of marching -16 miles in day.

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ESTREXCIII.

As has b e r i i already stated, the C:IY ry is taught t u throw u p t e n i p r a r y entrenchments. The goreriimeiit lia.5 refully provided it witti gtwi p t l
.
proper tools fiw this purpose, ant1 with he siniplest aiitl ea-iest nieiins of currying them. Iu tlie first place, tweiity light shovels and twenty axes are carried, in each wliiadmn. ou tlie saddles, iii leather c'avs. (These are fitted with loops alia1 iniiy be carried oil the waist-belt.) 0 The following tooh nntl material are earrietl iri a two-horse wagci~~ iu the regimental trnrcsport : '(A.) F o r deatriieticin t i f railways mid telegraphs, per two wliiailrciiis: Variouh tools v r o w h r , wrcnclics, auger, Iiniiiiiit.r,eolol-c~liist*l, k.., in c:ises.) 2 1 pyrosiline cartrit1:c.s wit11 fiiscs, priihcrs, ,kc., i n C;ISC'S. 4 tope Iicvkrtn f t i i cliiilIiiiix tclegricpli po~vs. io.&. spcin yarn ior tisinz rartritiges. i 0 ft. vim1 for tying tt*ltyr:111li wires. .TO ft. wire f4ir c*iit:in:liiig s : i i i i c . Pack .wddIe and aliliiirtc'riciii~.i,s for varryinp'tlie diovc. Total weight 1q21 1Ls. Total fur regiiiicint 426; 11)s.

T00123.

L.I.,

F
T H E RISSLQN REGULAR PAVALKY.
"7

I'KIXI'IPAI.

IWIOIATIONS O F A

SQIJADRON.
L .

Are h e , cduniiis of sections at wheeling distance, a i d ( d i e h ~ fur giiuiiig g r t ~ i d to the front uncl Hunk by a quarter whecl or sectioiis to that Hailk. 'A scl~tailroiican move to the front or a Hank 411 single file,
iii

twos, tlircer or aivw line iu sectitin front. til 1 ymls.


itt

The distance between squ % I f i n s in a rcgitucut The reginlent in line, therefore, IIW u front of'
IIEUIZIESTAL FORHATIOX.

.\ reginieut geucnilly ~varks iu.line of squadron c o l u n m ~ lit tleldoying di-t;iiic~.h i t tlic i n t t m d niay be reduced to *veil yard.. . l'hr c o l u i ~ ~ i i I I s l u u d r ~ ~at u ~ whceliilg di-t:uice, cliiarter fimti:itiasti> :ire : ~ ' ~ ~ I I I I Iof ct~luii~tru i t l i WWII yurtla lwt*.vecri quadroue, pr coluiua of wctioiis ut \\ litwlitig tli-taure.
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GENERAL PRINCII-LES!

I n other words. the regimentd transport has a grand totiil of forty-two carriages, eighty-five horses and fortytwo drivers. T h e length of a cavalry division marching iki onc' coltin~n.w i t l w u t : l i t advance @ad, with ita artillery, exclusive of i t s triiiit, is 7,370 Iiiices. W i t h ita train, same formation, ahnut 9,W2 paces.
TACTICAL SOTES.

The squadron is drawn up in double rank, with one ynrd f r i m Iie;icI

to croup, and is divided into four sections. At all titties the

sectiiiii i-

sixteen files front, the rear rank in centre of section heingjeft 1)lanli if necessary. T h e squadron hap, therefore, a front of sixty-fimr tiles, :it1(1, with the guides on the flanks of sections, occupies a frolit of eighty-six yards. Ita depth, including file closers, is fifteeu yards.
FORMATION OF A HlUADRON I N LINE.

The sections lire counted offby threes. The squadron leader iir line is section-front distance in front of the centre of his squadron. The 1e:itlet-s left sections are one pace in front of the Yecontl tile from respectively of their sections,and those of tlie two centre of the centre of their sectious. Sergeants are placctj ou the flanks o & c h section, the remaining ayes, in the line of tile closep,

.-

cloeers Supeniumernry officers are placet1 i n froirt of sectioti-, i t e w r i n 3 w line of file Closers.

C'uviilry i- never to attack without a reserve. C'uvulry iiiii3t rcform r u l d l y :tfier :I charge. A t i m t . t h t has o v e r t h r o w the enemy by a succesfiil uliurgc is not liermittc(1 to 1:tke part iu tho pursuit till it htu reformed. Tllr ehirge ia alaays made iu line. 111 rvtiritig, i n no c l t ~ e is the pace to be faster than a trot. 111 :icring ;Igaiit>t cavalry the front of the attacking force rliould hc a t Ie:i>t c t l i ~ : t l to the cucmy's. I n advaucing the attacking fwce trots to. uithiii ;ilriut IiOO or 8.00 y:urls, then bmllops for about 400 or 500 yurt13 i i i i t l c.lt;irxes \\lieu within PO0 paces of the eueniy. Aguiiist infantry a rnpid pace must be maiutained tliniughout, in cinlvr to rctl~ice casualties.; hence, the gallop is commenced 1WJO y n d from ~ tlic ctirwy. Large bodies of cavalry generally attack in ;d&n of q u a d runs, the rewrve lwing kept in column. Another formatioe is double t'crhcioti of squadrons on the center, the attack being macle b the center squadnms, aud the Rank q u a i r o n s in column of sections for a reservc ou either flank. A n unsiicceesful charge against infantry 4 no1 to be repeated lnorc than three tilneS, on account of the iiicre&iug confidence of iufmtry aiid of the eocurn11ereJ condition of tlic g r w n d , a u s e d by the thlleii iiieii aut1 horses. Charge8 o n artillery w e to be made when it is in motionj or \vhen it i s limbering o r u ~ i l i n t l ~ r i n g .A brittery may be charged iu 1 flank with iiii~iuitity, eveti nlien i u action, if the charge is niaile iu ope order. I iiuugirie t l ~ uticr t HuJriau cavalry has tried this once or twic the eiieiiiy will defeml the flanks of batteries with niachine guns. Ca turecl guns are to be turnecl against tlie eneiny. and, for this purpose, ti n men per q u a d r o n are tnuglit g u n drill. Extended order is to be &d against skirmishers or scattercd psrtias of cavalry or infautry.

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I
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p"--I

7
7,

THE RUSSIAN REGULAR C . ~ V L ~ I ~ I ~ ~mi ~.


The attack formation- of a divisioii i. in t h e forming the first line and one each the other two.
FIOIITISG OS FOOT.

Iiiivs, t W l J

rvgiiueiits

Such then is Rusia's cavalry. The changes made are radical, and ora
natiire tai n e e old-fashioned cavalrymen of the continentdl schools 110ld

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Nos. 1 and 3 dismount; No. 2 Iii)lds the Iiorsed. IKtyiiitvb :ire tixeil at once. Every tlismountecl officer haw a trimpeter w i t h l i i i i i . ' I h only formations nre half sqydron column; line ant1 opcn iiriler. 0 1 l e w i - t i i i i i is kept niourited as a gua* for the horse,s, 9o that oiily tlirec-l;iurtlis o r two-thirds i$ the squadron dismounts that is, eu:ic*tly 50 per cetit. Every jfear au,officer and n !letachnient of men lire * - f l i t !'ri)tii c>nclt cavalry regiment to the camp of iu~triictio~i of a wlilier IwigaiIc to In, trained as pioneers: The instruction is for two nioittlis. Six pairs of hlnclders for use in swininiiug rivem art! carrictl w i t h i * : i d i nlunclron. The men become very expert iu this ererc*iw. I lie ( '(is-:icli regiment of the 4th Cavalry Division swam a stre:tw 1:W k e t \vi&, IC-II feet d&p ani1 with a current of eightyeight feet a iiiiiiutc, iii twenty+ v q minutes. The men are trained in heliographing and telegrnpligd! All the= lesons are taught and practiced in siiniiiic-r cnnip of i l l -struction, i q which. in addition to pnrticipating i n ~itiriortac.tic:il e w r c k with , t h e . other arms, the cavalry practice iii:mwii-ri*s niitl marches, in 'which the problems to be solved are i w uenrly :I* ~i~issii~le similar to those they will meet with i n actual warfare.

,.

up their li~1111s in horror. Other nations persist iii tlistegnrding the nchievementa of the cavalry on both sides during the rebellion. When a Europeaii writer other than Russian, is forced by the stern logic of events to give snnie fiiiut praise to our cavalry, he always coupleq to it the conteniptuoue addition, " but they uever had to oppose good vnlry." The Kussiniis are wiser and seem to think that the cavalry corn ata of our war were'soniething niore than the collisions of irregular horse. They believe that the :nethods of fighting then introduced, and shown it1 every a u k quent war to 1 ~ Iinwcl 2 0 1 1 siutid principles, are worth adoptiu ' and improviiig. They call give no stronger proof of their faith; r these same nietliods nre the ones o i l which they depend for succem in the war iiow i nipencliii(r.*

DISCUSSION.

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I do not propose t o say anythiiig ?bout the Co.uncks ;is such. One regiment of them is part of every line division. There nre RILIO Ctiwckr; of the guard. They are to all intents and purposes reyiilor trocipir. Russian policy is% incorporate at. once, n11 inhabitnnts of rcccntly ncquired territory into her system, nnd any a h r p t i o i i of Asiatic niil is speedily followed by the appearance of a body of irregulnr Iiorse recruited from the inhabitaute of this acquisition. After Europcaii resources have been exhauated, Rueeia has a n almost limitless supply of iueu a i d 1 1 ~ ~ t . s . in the Nomadic t r k of Asia,ranging from the C q h n to Chiua nucl from Persia and Afghaniatan northward to the Arctic. Although H distance from Russian civilization 'and short service as soltlieru will detr:ict from the value of this irregular horse, still, taken as it is to-ilny, its usefulnem is not to h-despieed. . Ax~y c a d r y Russia niay bring into the field in the uext European war, he they Coseacks or dragoons, will be to all iiitent ant1 purposes "regular" y d it is to such my remarks apply. The giiarild tire werely IS favored bra' ch of mounted men, with better liorse~.stiiartcr tiiiif~~rnis, increased p$ and greater privileges.

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COSSACKS.
*

Kusia and Turkey;

i . .

r.-

1
210

THE RUSSIAS

REQCLAR C A VALE I:

211

L &. *.

Bv

.S.

C. ltOl3~l<TStlS
( ' . t <. l l . l : \ .

:'Et O S l , Llt:I'TEE.\ST. 1-.c

our' last meeting it was resolved thnt this i\ssiwiatioii consitlcr in q q e n c e the neerls of revision of the c\iitereiit 1)ortioiw of oiir ea\-. 3 d r y tactica, formulate its individual or collective ideas c o ~ ~ c e r n i ntlielil. g and submit the result to the W a ~ h i n g t o ~ Uowil l n t n v engaged in the reviaion of our general tactics. This resolutiou I J ~the hsnciation woultl B e e m to be a w i s e one. It is in conipliance with the rccluest of the mctics . board itself, which seeks information and suggestion from any and all quarters of the military- service; and it caunot fail to ~ w s s e s value to thc , n developing the views of the niany cavalry cavalry service if. it succeeds i officers of experience, from different regiments, who are present at this, our largeat military post. The subject is certainly one meriting any ettbrt ' that may contribute in even the smallest degree to the efficiency nud ini.-prcivementof the new tactica. None are more directly interested i n thew tactics than the younger oflicers of our cavalry service, for these tactics . m a y be the Inw and gospel of their prof&ional career for the n e s t twenty paare, and it iuust 1K-to every officer of the arm a painful p r o p t to be bound for such a length of time by D code for which he call find neither , pve&nce nor belief. Although not as prone to Lqke up the pcn to clefeiitl 02 advance their ideas on tsictical points as the officers of fkeigii armies, and although often apparently indifferent to these sul,jects-an iniprcssion . that would certainly be given, for inshnce, by their silence for fifteen yeam under the system imposed on us by the assimilated tactics of 18i3none are quiclieq than our own officers to detect the weak points of Rliy code of instruction they may be required to follow, or more apt to treat n eJrstem in which they have no confidence, with iiidifference and contenipt. .* The fatal results of such a f d i n g to any service are apparent from its a during recent years, and i t is surely the desire, effeot in our own c m it ahould be the mm;?f every cavalryman interested in his nrm to see the weak pinta ehminated from the tactica now being devised for our um.

AT

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L 4
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1
214

SCHO (1 I,

)F T H E so r, I ) I EI;

-if(> i1-v~

fim

him t o make tlie longest riales k i t h the Icmt 1iilhiIit.v of bringing bark il hmken.clo\v~r, or sorc.Iuicketl Iicirse : which sh:ill trvich him at neet1 to I I W his weapons, whatever tlicy alar he, with safety ail41 e r e c t frnni the &die, 89 well as on foot, rhich i n sliort shall niiike h i n i i n his relation ti) his horse :is mnch like the Tnclk~lo r (hiss:~ck:w training at the age 0 1 nlailhtnwl ctntlcl niuke hini. : \ cavalryiuali thus fiirrukd is a cavalryniali arclent, inilic*tuour, self ~onficlent,and cilli:ilde i i f getting the greatest effort pis~ihle out of the aninin\ he rides. Such a solJier, no nistter how he be :irnietl and mnnu?u,vrecl,is far, cerg Far renicivctl, it w n i s to rile, from the I ni~iunteclinfantryman we hear so much of-a 111811 devoid of the espnf of the inountetl bmneh,untrained i n h o r ~ e r u ; r ~ ~ s ltinlid ~ i p . i n liir unaccuatonied perch, the snddle, mid fstul in his :hility to use 111) the horaetlvzh which carries him frnin point t t i poilit. \Ve nre, 1inwevc.r. prohalily all agreed, without the necesity of argunieiit, thnt Iiorseniauship shr,ulclhe the d i d base an which the whole education of our recruit shotild reat.and that the tactics should impart it to tlie degree necemry to turn him out the efficient trooper outliued above. Does the instruction coutained in our present School of tlie solclicr hlounted, sufice for this? All of -us will probably atiswer * DO. Let U B first consider its defecta nnd afterwards suggest the remedy. l y b r :I* p i l l l i : n t i i l l l ~)ra;lit.r Our first ohjccticin is its In-cvity, c q ~ r c i ~ l :I* is concerned. Out of 514 pages in our cavalrj. tactics the iiurnlier t l t . v i i t ~ . d t o the Iiy iiistriictii)ils mldier mounted is hut forty and niucli of this i* CIIII.-III~ICI~ for folding the blanket, saddling, use of the e:irI)intb nioiiute~l, all,\ co 0 1 1 . In other NOT&. ahout a little le% than one-thirteenth of i i i i r rntirc clrill I m k is deynted to this mnst iiiiportal1t of all tlw scIu)ol. of trailling through which the recruit passes. It is sifrnificant to sUtc that iii thew ~ d tactics y the School of the Soldier Di.~rno~ir~tecl emlirnccs &xty+ix out of the 511 pages, or a little less than tute-eiyhthof the whole. In the old tactics of 41 the School of the Soldier Jlountal COIIIseventy one out of the 4.50 pages, or ninre thnu one-sixth of the

whole. L a the present Euglisli tactics ninety-tive out of 500 pages, or nearly one-fifth of the whole In the present French manual 102 out of 472, or
more than bne fifth of the whole. The nwmnenta given in the few pages of our present tsctics i n the echo01 we ate discuaeing are, as far as either horse or man is concerned, limited to the following: To mount in line with intervals, (horse unsatltlledJ : to clisrnoont i n (horse unsaddled) : to march ; to halt; to march hy intervals; to march to the rear; to &lique; to change direction in column of tilea; to rein back; to mount in line, (horse un-

c,

Li

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216
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I
217

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SCIIOOI. OF T R E S O l d D I E I i JIOU.YTED.

hekngeireow matter in the back portioii o f o u r tactics. I t Weltis to be meutitmetl there 4incidentdly imly. a t i d is uui~cc~)lnlmtiie~l ntty coinmpud for imparting it i n the way of instruction. The pruning of the'tdtl tactics by which our preseut school was evolved i Illlist surely h a r e hem tltnie hy rery injudicious haiicls when siiclt tirst principles are omitted. I, however. almut a year ago, talked with one of' the cavalry iticnihets of the '73 Iward o n this sullject, and it is but fair to the cavalry arm to sa\-that thisofficer w u r e d nie that the voice of the cavalry ottieew i t f the Iwartl had very littlc to i l o with the formution of the xiew ntanual., I will c l w my observations as to the I)rerity of our instruction in this school liy reharking that at the Military hcadeiny it is fnuiid entirely inadccluate to the riding-hall traiiiiug of cadets, and that i L ling hecii supplantetl there hy additional exercises introduced by varioiis instructors in riding. Mouutiug and disniounting a t various gaits, reacliiiig for heads . on the ground at tbe gallop, riding without reins, and various gyninmtics mounted, nrq aniong the niaug iniportuiit exercises siipplie$ hy such instruction, aud uoue have, in niy belief, proved more valual~leto the graJluate of tlie Acaclemy'scliool of ridipg. Thwe exercises, though tlicy for the most part'come rathe i der the head o f calistheiiies tiiouptcil . than of q t i i t a t i m proprr, shnitlt Pllrrl?. hilve their p1ac.e i i i t l i s , ' * S C ~ I I ~ U V I the Sddier Jlountctl." lricfly coitdiiler the cor2. Next to the brevity of this xhool we rectness of the principles of tlie seIio4d as it i i o w *t.iiids. Fraiikly. I :wi, . after something of ai1 acquaint:iiice with foreign ~ ~ 1 i i ) oolfs riding. 1ia)t ~ I I I d v e m critic of our o w i , s t r e in soitie iiiiiior respects. III other w r i t s : I should say that the principles shoulil s;tiinrl :IS they :ire. tire ccrtainly not trained to any knowletlge of :ill ec.ct~inplislieclcross-country Wt, DOC do we know from West Point, or thc tnctics, anytliiiig t)f tlic \ tlic risiiig-atp l w u r e s of the jockey style of riding ( I cli)it't iiic':iii siiiiI ) I -. the-trnt, h u t the flat seat, short stirrup a i n d l o w 1i:ttids of' tlic jockey :w *' well). I think the cxperieuce of the cavnlry otiicers liere will l)e:ir nie out in saying that nur ofticers rrttl meti ('vel) riiltl :rith n Ioiizer stirrtip t h u that prcscrii\)ecl by the tactic.', which & s alli>\v fuur or tive iiicties ! (to lluote ita exact language) between the crotch atid ddille, the trooper standing erect in the stirrup. This length of stirrup, tlic position i n which . I it is hung and the slope of our cantle, give the distiuctive type to our style of riding. I should say that ita main d e f k t is that we ritle too ttrrtdc the balance seat. O u r s t i r r u p being long and huug well to the rear, as they are on the majority of our saddles, and the cautlea of tlie snddles k i n g extremely vertical, out seat is uot flat enough for the majority of men. The bnck of the trooper in this saddle is too often concave, and the line of hie body from cap to stirrup too perpendicular, either for the greatest

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ea& or the greatest solidity of seat. In eucli :i po&ion we have tlie evtreiue of tlie l~tlauce seat. The pl&ioti is gnceful sild ercct, h u t to the practiccd eye of an old cnvnlryiiiaii, or any experienced horseman, it tloes i i i b t I I H ns ~ ~iiuch ~ like 1)usiiiess x u :I ?;eat with n soruedint s h o r k r stirrup--\vu? . tlic Imrk alriios I)owctl uut rather thnu in. down in the ~ t l t l l e with of the stirrup and the slope of the Thew defects of the Ii:ingi~ippl~cr eaiitle, tendingto this ex:iggentc~l p)oitioit, lire lwitig now rernrdid i n tlic trees supplied I)y the Ortlnnnce Dcpnrtttirnt i n the last year or two. the stirrup loop in them being pluced farther to the front Rud tlic cmitIG lwiiix nintle Hatter. The.- diaiiges are very 1ieccs:iry if we wiali to 1t:ivc :i Ratter sent, for no systerii of riding can lw ttiiiglit i n a s:rtltlle whow coiistruetioii io not i n nrcortl-with tlic principles of tliiit +-steiii. I w o i i l i l sly, tneri, that our military w:it with thew niodifie:itiorls : L * to lcrigth of stirrup, positiwi nf stirrup t i n t 1 *Iiqw t)f cantle, 1s :I very escclleiit tnie -as good :is :iuy niilitary oite i t i the w d d . Cnw-colitltqy ridIwIonEing to another iniiiiiil jirkey rialing are deIigIitfuI acr~~tapIisIi~ncttto schwl of riding. They cwcertt the officer r:ither th:in die recruit, anti Iwiiig fidaiiiwenietif rattier tliatt niilitmy iist', perhaps hare no place i i i :my such paper as this. h . to a proper length of stirrup it seems to mc that the Inngriagt 1 1 1 ' the predent Erigli3h tactic**is very g w l : "The ftWt should IK. kept iii it* plare Iiy the play of ankle ~ i i diuskep. the stirrup lwing under the MI of the foot. The instrwtor niust nemeniber, how. ever. that though lie o h s l l foIlt1w the geiicnil nile i i i fitting the stirrulw, ;r great deal depends O I I whether the rider has :I tliiii Hat leg, or the reverse;
toan with a thick thigh requires sli&tly shorter s t i r r u p , or, wlicri, tll6 tiorse is in motion and t b niuwles are broright into play, he will not have a proper hold of the stirrup. The title shoiil~l lw slowly trotted roui!cl and if :I man is then seen to be well dowu ill hi; the proper position, with his heel down, ant1 yet
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of his stirrup, the stirrup requires shortening." ahout the perfection of the h u g t h coiitemand 1should adopt it almost verhtim: for our uew tactics. Before leaviug this subject let me say a word ou the Eiiglisli trot! iy iii tliia countryj This trot is coudenined iguorautly by a great ~ ~ a rpeople uot BO much on the very reasmablc ground of ungracefulness as OII the charge of its being au atfectatioii-of being in reality niorc fatiguing than the close trot. To these critics it.seems that wme extra etfort m i & uecessary to ratise the lmdy from the saddle a t each alternate hoof-heat of the horn. Such people have never learned this trot. but have by a few trials only, convinced the-meelves of ita impracticability. j They should take u p their stirrup l e a t h k . ahnut t w o hol& a t least, sit +ell da-~wiion a flat (preferably English ) a d d l e and then spend a week! or two in a n

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honest effbrt to learn it. They will tlieu fiiid that the e s t r a effort requiml is only a seeiuing one and that having caught the niotioti they niuy t ~ i k e off their s t i r r u p and still be prolielled from the saddle by it. It will be fouutl, wheb thus thoroughly learued, surprisingly e u y , the Iileusure of tltr .motiou increasing with the roughues~ of the trot. \Vliether this style of ridiiig Iw etLsier to the anininl, it has uever yet been proven. The Frcnrh entirely aiitlopted it in -1876 anti &vera1 other European w w l r i e s liave prtia1l.y :iecepted it, the Cterntans, I believe, usiuy i t for field work. But: I would not be ;in advocate of this system for our owti service. I~Y cxtretite uiiniilitury appc:iraucc sticl oppositiun to nll tnutitiotts of military ridiug SIMJIII(I, I think, cci~idenilii t i u spite of i b c i ~ I v u ~ t t a p to s the rider. I have wen ronie thoiimids of Frcm;h crnralry itt tltt. 1:iris .reviews ricliitg, eacll rcginreiit. nt A l i i m l r o i i frotit at this trot. llic :11)sun1 aplwar;ttice of these troopem risiiig a r i t l titlliiry (But of time tititst c*crt;iittly have . Ixeii very clniii:yiitg t ( J any troops iu tlic c*tirtiatioii ipf the 1)uIdiv observing theni. Whether, though, it would uot be a very good itlen to instruct our t r q w r s that .they ;]light be alli~weclin crtniliuigii, wlterc Iotiy t1iat:ulces ;it the trot are c o u t e n i p h t d , to slightly shorten the stirrup atit1 Ie:iti t b r w r c l tu , a very geiitle-rise iu +e&uId~e is auotlier aliiestivti. InicticaHy tuauy of us who Jiave had to make such long dijtniices :it the trot, 11:ivc touiitl the comfort of changiug to this style after sonic miles of tlic cloic tn& Leavity: the question of the seat, 1 cvoultl dtrell 011 a few mitior poiilk iu the 8clpo1 we are discussiug as ones mliicli might hied revision.
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otlier words, sit as Ilitt : L S posilile. 111 the csplauatious; of the reusolls filr this positit~tiwhiclr f t J ~ ~ I J wthe , object o f tlie espressiou biittc~ks 01) far fi)r\var(I ILY po*uitile, id givcn to h a : h t the thighs 111ay -lily clnsp the Itorse. Tliij c:iu IIIC:III very lit&., :is the buttocks k i n g tlirijwil fiirw:trct. wortltl tciitl i n t i t i t.spci:iI wiy t i l thin rnd. This esplauatiou ektittls to-tl:iy i u ottr tactics Iirohibly 1 ~ e c : i i i s i~ t existed i n the old Freitcli tactics . t i o i t t wliicli our o w t i w t w t:ikcw. T l i c ~trui. i i t t i l corrected explaurttiini o f this pwitiott is given i n the prczicwt Freiicli i i i n i i u n l which JOYS that it is i u order th:it tltr I)uttock* riiny stvk tltc 1)t)ttoiti t r f the s~utlcllc ( the ) e s:itltlled or uuw~ltlletl J. 1irittcii)Ies Iieing tlic sanic wlietlic.r tlic Iiorsc. I I woiiltl theti sulistitute for this pragniph it1 our own tactics, ;L* it . ttow st:tti(l-, tlie f i ) l l ~ ~ w i t t g : llie Iiuttcwku 1w;tritig c~qudlyitpciti tlic Iiiirs(*s h c k , the *,:it lwiiig :is H a t :IS~ i o s i l i l t ~ . 111 p:ir:igrqili 420, p,rt:iiiiiity t o t l i c p~sitiott~ t i o u i i t c ~ ~ l , I l o w wtl(llet1, I w o i i h l itiwrt for \rltitt, iiow :qq)t*:irs, the fiJlmvittg: **Cl~c 1)utti)cks Iwtriitg ealii:illy tipoii the s u l d l t ~ :I* , ruiic-li (if the troolicrs back : L < p ) 4 I ) l e lwitig in tlic antlllle.
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6 TO I.EX(iTBES A W ) ?;llOtiLEN REINH.

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T O MOUNT.

P a L m p h -37.3, explaining how to mount, horse urisatlclletl, s:iys. at the eoniniancl : Prepare to niount. take two side steps to tlic right, sliding the h a d alottg the left rein, etc. This \roultl simply place the recruit twelve iuchcs to the right,the side step 1)eing six inches. I t diould read: Step two full paces to the right, etc. SRIIIC for horse mdtlled. It has heen suggested by :in otticer preseut and I have heard it argued elsewhere, that this paragrap11 ought itleo to contain provision for titountiog 011 the uff, as well UJ the mar, sjde. The possilile atlvuutages to the . . trooper are obvious and I shoiild so modify the parsgraph.
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Iamgmphs 37.5 s i l d 351; prewrilw :I lwig :iwI roliiplicat+tl, n1;iiiiler of Icngtlieniiig a d shairteiiitig reins. 1 The reins being it! Iwth hands the instructor wnimaiids: Leugthcll. 2. Left reiu. Paragraph S i 5 says: A t the .seci~iid coiiiniaud 1)riOg the Iiauclu , toward each other without turning them in, g r : q the left rein with tllctliunih and fiirefitiper of the right hatid one inch from the left thunll), ( t w o ) half opcn the left hand and. allow the left rein to rlip utitil the thrinibs touch ; close the l e f t hand :u~cirepl;ice the hands. Iamgmph :?7(iprescribes a similar t~ietliodh r shortenill$ reins;I would suggest the doing nway with h t h these pa%raphs as 1111necessary. The recruit c:in readily lengthen atid shorten rciiia without presribiug a tactical method for doing it.

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TO FILE OFF.

POSITlOS OF *OLDIER MOVNTEI).

Panrgruph 374, prescribing pi)-itiou for sriltlier niouutetl, 1 1 0 1 ~ UUaddled, says: buttock3 hearitig rqii-~llp upon the horses back a i d as far It, to lily owu I til pernicious one. forward ne p~esible. Thi:. ~ i ; i r ~ ~ r : t pis knowltdge, has given iuuny iiieit ii very err(iueous idea of the ohjeet ainied at by it. They have interpreteil it to iiienu that it NUII ahould :ictually sit as fnt firward as p i b l c . his is by n o ritenns d i n t is ititended The intention of the paragraph is that the trooper shall find his seat, or in

Parngniph 380 prescribes that the h o r n are returned the stnble or picket line by the comnlaud: 1. By the right file o f f ; 2. March, at which it says, each recruit leads his horse four gnnls to the front, etc. Iwou~ niake tliis two yanls instead of four ~a i t is, recrbits mounted i n line very frequently confuse the movettient 1. By fil 4 . By the right f a u k ; 3. Jfarch ; .with this ai111 take ftiur yards i tend of two, I> the fmnt is in moving to the riglit.., t \YO (1 seem that two yards $ enough distance ill leading off nil the confusion now cau;.e/l by the two distances would thus be removed. A t the suggestiou of aadther officer I

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would also n&rnmeud that this movenieiit be perforrued by hot11 11a11ks s i ~ u l t a n e o u d yby , the cornmad: 1. By t w o right ant1 left file off :2. March. . Pttragraph 382, in tliwiissiiig the use of the reins, says : 111 rictiiig the hand should be kept steady snd ought not to move with the hotly. I cannot oinceive the mimn tlctre of this sentence. . Surely every hniid which i s . l k h t nrrtst oscillate gently with the niotioii (if the horse. A hand entirely nWiticiu1w is iuevitahly awkward and stitf in apiwardiice : L well as fatiguin9 to the rider. 111 the same pangraph, in ciiwilsiiig the use of the, lcg I woultl prcscribe that every i n i p l s e of the leg lie given hp iipplying gently t l i r inlier aiclelof the calf or. h i t , the heelciiily very dightly, if at :ill, turiitvl in for this~purpow. Marly recruits when tolcl t o givt. thr horse the right or left legiturn the toe ollt uiid give tlie.ziiiiiii:il H suiltkn 1 ) h with c.itlivr the back df the leg, air the spur itself. I woulil eiiiitharizc. this poiiit irs one of great iniprtoiice.
DIPMOUNTIN(;, AOKSE SADI)I.El).
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I n parkgralih $22, inetructioii fix tlisinorlnting, ~ I J I - W s~~~illett, I \vciriltl prescribe @at the coiiiniaud : * lrcpare to (lis~iioi~~lt, the left tirjt sliorlltl he withtl+wn from the stirrup, h i v i n g it inserted (iiily to siieli a Iciigtli as to bei ~ to e support the tmiy ns it is ciiniiiiy to ttie g r o i i i i f i . ~ e ,. frequently neglect to do chi?, ant1 :ifter reaching the grouuil u.se this left hand to d i e e n m e the foot, with ol)vioiis ct:u)ger til themselves eh~iiiltl the . horse start; forward at this iuonierit with the foot i i i the stirrup. T b r e are points open tn sl,ight criticisni i n paragraph 42*, espl:iliiiiig the principles of the gallop, and also ii! puriqppli 431, relating to leaping, which I will uot go into here. 3 . . The thiid ohjentiou which present? itself is the position of this -. school in the cavalry tactics anti the separatioii n f i t 4 diferent principles throughout the tactics. I noultl make Ithe * Scliool of the Soldier Mounted, as it is i n the English iiianunl, the first ECIIOOI to 1w learned 1)y the recruit, a d therefure give it the flrst place in our new t:ictics. The few principks of clisriiouotcd clrill necessary to tc:icli the rccriiit i n order to fit him tibr roll culls, inarc*liing to aud from rtaliles, and tlie riiourltcal drill ground, can be very easily tiikeii from the * School of thc Soltlier Die mounted, following that of thc. Stildier inountecl. The result of the positions of thew t w i i schools is that a recruit who joins, full or winter, is i n the cpriiig put f i n t through several and miinuiil w i t h the carhilie, aud if ortierect into the this tinie, as frequently happens in the west, finds himH c s had to of the nicist iniportiirit thing he redly h viz : how to ritle. The result can be testified

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SC'IKOOL OF T H E SOLDIER MOClXTlCD.


coat. These details :ire of t h i s Iiigliest iinlwrtmtw t o tlic efticivricy of our soltliew i u the tieltl, i i i i i l tlic twtics - J V ~g ~ ~ i itwtlt-rs ~ ~ ~ -i ;w l o n l ~ l wein the proper place to tiual tlttvtt. The ritlrs iuclit~le~l uiidc.r.tlic t l i i n l l i t w l i t i ; - - k ~ rtr:tiiiiiig t l i t . rviiioiiiit Iior~e-wouIcI siiiipty i i i c ~ u ~ the t t ~IBrict' iitst r i i c t i * t i t i i c . ( - e s . s i r j tiir ttic- troolwr to adapt to his use m y greeii Iiorsv w i t h wliic-ti lie iii:iy lie lijrcetl to wpply the loss of a traiiieil aniiual i n the tidtl. Uuder the fourtli I ~ t ~ ~ i ~ l i i i ~ - ~ ~ ~ i1irIq)t'r ~ i t i ~t i I~ ' ~11:ivc~ i t iiiclutled tuouuted gyntrt:wtiic~i. I wulcl refer tii the cst*t~lleiit little ( i i : i i i i i ; i I of ,such gyiiiiiastics c~eviset~ i)y C*:ipt:iitis ( ; ~ I > F R I . : Y i i i i 1 1 .\L.(;I*I:. o f i aiiir c*;iv:tIry,ilJ coittaiuiiig ererytliiiip iicccwiry tli i i t w r p m t e i n t1ii.i 'portion ( i t * the instruction. T o clo~e, I will pay tltilt two tliiiip :ire iiwewirv for the +iitv-e** o f this, or any other rysteni of instructiciit ot' tlie s11111ieriiiciiiittc!d. Tlie first is the preseitce g ~ ridiug ~ l track$ or Ii:illi i u all o u r c*nr:ilry g:irri*;c)iis. That tliere should be iio ritliiig halls or ritliitg slic~ils,i i t :!iiy ot* y i r iuili- . t3ry pirriwit3 escept \Vest l'oiut, seeiiis hsnl t o u i t i l r n t a r ~ t l . 111 every post, fall r e m i i p , arid iiieii w h I I Ii:irc. I~ceii tlrprivtvl Iiy' Iielcl service of proper initructiort during tlie iiitritttis when i t l i t oor ilrill \v:is pr:ictic-iil)le, could be p i i t i n excellent sli:ipe for t l w s : t t l ( l l t ~ I)! riiliiiy Iiall exercises t o u r westerri c:irri.+iiiis ni present these througii the winter. Iu n i o ~ of montlis are necewriIy iJIe oiirs, lieittier o I r 1 .si)ItIier n o r rk:ruit ieiitg at1 vancell :I lwg i i t iuouutetl iii~triictic~ii cluriitg the iiitcv-vd. I iieerl not refer to the niyiy ailvtiiitaLp to officers, inen. :intl horst$:, i i i tlic way of exercise, \yliich would be atfmtled by sucli riding halls. ~'l'heyneed uot uecessnrily be very large or e s p u s i v e , ~ n d coiisi(leriitg tlieir gratt value to the wliole c ~ ~ i i i i u a i i tit l , would seem stlviwlde that ihey ~liou1~1 be the j ~ Ptrurtures t erectecl at every large post :it wliicli cavalry may be . stationed. ,. 1 he secoii~lthing iieces..ry for the sucre* of this systlern is that it Ln: enjoined I)II post coinitiamleM by au irou-clad rule -such: as iiow ol)taiua ' in the nistter of target practice -that a certain portion of each spriufi Iw set aside for titis iudih-lunl instructioii rnountecl, iiothiiig h i t the imperative tleniantls of fieltl scrvice Ixiiig nllowed to iuterferc with it. This rule should be inilwsed iti thc tactics itself. 111 the present French M e this individual iiistruction 1:ista alwut six montlis of tlic year. I n our own this Iwrian! of iiistructioii rarely covew rucm t h m two or three weeks -a period abunlly inatlequiite Fir the purpose of rnakiiig horsenteii out of raw recruits. This tcnilency to ahridge this school of individual instruction resiilb from varioiis c:iiises; from the lack of interest, o r expertlie-, ot* ntaiiy tnwp cotuiiiaiitier~io ilie principIes of equitaticm ; frorti the fear that if too LTr proloitged, tiel11 service or sorue other accident will eutirely deprive- thetu of troop and battalion drill ; :and, from the
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H E IACPOI~TANCE OE' PROPER HI'ITIS(;.

Iwfort~tlit' :Issoc-i:ltion has siiggestcd a n rqua~ty or niore iiiiportmit sihject, that id p r o p ' r I)ittiiig. I yny iiioro imprttiiit, for, f w h a t ust. is it to Iiovc a ~ d c l l iii;ialc> c~ niul ii~ljiistivl so :is t u atfort1 winfort and safety of stsat to thc riiler ani1 Iwrfect irtv-iloiii of motion t o tlir horn,, i f the Iiorsc u]wn whic.11 it is placet1 I ) e not only u11t1iarwntrcil, but LO nianagv&lc t a l l bait*, a n d under all i.irculn*tatic.cn tlint tlic will of t h - riilcr is conveyed to ntl enforced upon liini witliout d l o r t . Tlie s u l ~'ct j of proper bitting is seconilary in importance to no othcr wit11 which t h e c vnlrynian has to tlcal in coari<lcbringthe 4liitastion linw to ol)tnin are 1)asc-d not only ttie great& aniount of work from t h . :iiiiiiial upon wliii~li liis hopes o f success, but to oljtain it in the iiiost ilircc.t, eflwtivc- and wtisfwtory manlit' .ConsiiIe ng .iiie ~argcbproportion which t t i i s c.nv:~~ry in o u r :iriny lwars t o t l ~ otllcv c a r b s , the constant tic111si-rvirr it has 1 i c . c i i ciig:igt.il in for tlic. iiiiarof our otlicers, ter of a c c n h r y sinre thc i*loscof ttw war, tlie pr:it,timl iiiinil~

The prpbr on ~ d i l l i n g r i w n t l y rcail

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EXTRA C'TS.

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are theu W M account nf th mrlly halted

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E-YTRACTS.

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useful to tlx 11 iIalarm rcnilczvour.fiir Inrgr Under certain cireumstancen I t may bodla a; r h k h on an a k r m reglmentr brlga&s. &c. ,mFc witllout fiirllier ontern. llut l c b uivlrble'to'limlt thlr to ihose -'In which I t r i n with wine rerhinty he kwt'sreu that tho nlaof amemblv aelecct.d ore such ad will meet the objwr in viey;.

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260

RECEIVED.
1lanlrurrc.s for Infan$?. Principles and, Foriiis. By Major E R. LIVERcwps of twgincac- ,Uii1tc.d States r\mly. ( C I I A R L P ,$RIBSgR'S ~ &an, S e w York. I
YORE,
'

ament.

EXCHANGES.

to Fcecl the h h 1 i c ~ - Svsteins of &fen= -- of the Priitcil)al l'owew of Europe- 1 ~ p and d Tactic-alConeideratlons Affwting tlw Ei~~ploymrnt of the Militarv in the *ripprewsion of Mob#. froemlings o f tht l-nitrd & & a Xavd In&titr.\'nl. SI\*., No. 45. Three Considered BR n 'hctiral Unit - Vcl0citic.s nnd J ' t m u m in Guns.
Our Nortlicrn Frontier-Hnw

Thr Guarctmmn, May I%% The R+k. Roeton.

Chicago.

r-262

I
i PRESS NO TICES.

263

m Illual
Military

quest of the

PRESS NOTICES.

nr.

IIp,Lbarr*ra

If the P seem (0 be commendat4 A m y Ond N "THEJ appeared. is berof a per

o f M Wrrrll TUP F & V A l J sttdnmentl


'c

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L,

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I
OFFICERS OF T H E ASSOCIATION.

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1sss.
LIST OF MEMBERS.'
____I'RFSIDEST.
11..

.j

I
iI

GES'I,

W. YERKITT. IivT.

>IA,i. GES'I.

t.. .<. A

REI iVI..\ I<. .\Sq H'I ATE . \ X I ) 1.1 FE 21 I 3 1 IIEIL<.

B R A N C H E St:
% l

WEST POIST.S. T.
TICE-PRE8IDEST.

F i m LIEU. 0 . B .DAVIS. ~

T H CAVALRS

CORREBPOSDISG UECCRETARS.

F i m I.IELT. W. C. BKO\VS, l a CAVALKY.


FORT REXO, ISDIAS TERRITORY.
\ICE-PBEllnE?FT,
OOLOXSL. J.

F.WADE,

CAVALRY.

,
F

rORBElPONDINO SECREIARY,

I L I~ E~T F. . BlICaER.

CAVALRY.

~~.\~,~.4..i'~~I.~thl Mnj.(;eii.l'.s..\. 'a~..Bvt. . <'.\KII. (', ('. I ' ......... ,..l'aptaiu 1st ('avalry .\ . . . . . . .1st I . i ~ ~ i 1 1 .\c. llilh C'avalrp .. I. ....... ....r n p m x 10th ('avnlry 21.. ........... .l'aplalll !Ill1 f'svalry .. S . ............:[I 1.ieut. :11 Cuvalry ~ ' , w l * n ~ : l . l , 1.. . E ..............ckptnluq. 31. 11. 1 iiEt:vRH. Ii. 11. .Irt l . 1 6th ~ ~ ('p ~ry ( ' \ K I U ~ I . I . . 11.. B~lu-i~~)c..l.~..~'npt.~tli~'n\-..Hvt.3laj.I~ fkll'c;llTo%. D.1 1 . . . . . . .lst ~,ieilt. : ' d ('a t'~i:*ts. J . >I.. ........ .?(I I.leiil.5Ch Cavalry t H l W X C S R l l M ~ E J. . 1' .............l'<bl. 1115.( ; e l l ' l ('~~~i.~s..I.\v ('.-. v . -.. . I n w l'upt. .Xh IrvnIry n i . 3 n a s ~ ~A w . ,I,., ...... st I.ieut. I;Ih c'nvnlry V'III~IIN~I.~, 11.. Is1 ('levelaud Truop.0. N.G. * J. Y. F... . . . . . .Is1 I.letit. C,th c'nrnlry ( ' I I . & F F ~ : S.\. , ll..t~n]~t.~ Chv.. t h Rvt Yaj. 1'S.A. ' \V. ( ' ........... . . l s t Liviit. 1st l'nvnlry i ~ . ~ i i i ~ ~ s r ~ i i , l . . ~ l . , 3 l a l~vC.('bl.1'S.A. j.~~th~~av., 0. J . . .......... . I N Lieul. lwt t'nvnlr\('asi,E, J. .\.. ............. A I I.ieut. Gth C s W n F. 11 ...........201 Llcwt.i'tth (iivnlry tc'(m,u.1;. Y ..............a1 I.leut.l:tth IIilantry HR.AI,F.S. C . . ................ l ~ lt, i w t . t.. G , .\, ( ~ ~ p u I ~ . ~ E.. t ......... ~ x . t'olonel 4th cavalry R i s ~ ; l i a w t. i . I...........211 L l ~ i i l!Nh . ('qalry ~ i u i - r P.S . .................. ('aj,t. ~ s < d ? n ~ r y t ' . t i : i . ~ * ~ ~ . C11.. ' . ......... ..JInjor 3d Orrvalry I'HIw:. T I I I B M...... . ~ ~ . . ) s t L l e u t 6th Cavalry HAWS. .\. E . . ...........:. .Ynjor Pay Drp't 1u0 KISUIS. w . 21.. ..... 1st I.ieut. 4th a v a l r y BAIHIB \V. ........... 1st I.kiit.Gth ( b v n l r y W . I). ...........1st Lleut. :;d ('avalry I).\vI(;. H.. 1st Lleiit.5ttl Cavalry I ~ B K U T . J . 11.. ............Capmln 4th Cavalry . R. H.. . . . . . . ...:?d Lieut.2d c'avalry A. H . . . . . . . . . .: 2 d I.kii1. 4th t'avulry t l h n z . \V. l)................... I s 1 Lleut. M. D. I P A Y . 31. \ V . . ......... .lst I.Ieut. 10th C+valry BAI'oS.J . >I.. .............. Hujar Xh t'a\.alry . \ V . , ..... ..ldtc(ien'l I ; . Y. Cavalry tll!.l'sr.S . .E...rol. .\. I). 1'. to (ien'l I ' o m n i i d * ~ 1 ) i . a ~11. 11.. ..... ,,..2d Lleut. 18th I o f a n t ~ HIHA ................. Y. 211 ~ l e u t 1st . (.uvslry . .\....('npt. t-. H. .L Hvt. LleuL.Col. tBI'KTO?I. 1;. 11.. ...............?daj. IllSp. GCll'l S. A . 31.. . ~ o l o n e 1st l Cavalry tBco K. Ii. 11.............a 1 I.ieut. I6ih Infnutry J I i i . l . i s G k x . J . H.. . . . . . . 2d I.icul.:,th c'avnlry ;. ....CapIalll I ( h c S V a l l 3 . t l b t si..\i-..l.3l,('upt3 t. ('av. T r w p . Han.Clty 1 k 1 . 1 . .J . F .............31 Lieut.ith l'nvnlry h P l ' T 6 l . l & F.A . . . . . . . . . . I'Uplaill 191 C'uvairy FA.~.I.F--TIIS. 31. F.. ..Is1 Lleitt. 10th Cavalry . I). I.. . . . . . . . .2d Lleut. 2d l'avalry EI.I.I.. E. A . . . . . . . . ; . . . ] s t Lleut.Rth Usalry 4 ' I I A E I....................... ~:i.i.i~,~ ..('~ll.*nd . \ ~ , I .B t l . N a J . G e n . ~ . E . A . Ei.i.iiwr. I;. El. ......... .?d Lleut. 5th (hvalry II-.Lt. I l o sqnadron.\V.S. ~ ( i . EVASS.E.\ V . . ,211 Lleul. 8lh'Cavalry t H I K ) i ) l . \ E I ' L E K . T . R .I.[. I f . .Squadron.\ \ . S . ( 1 . t l i . \ i T m t . H.11.. Enw.\Kra. F. A.. ..._. ...la1 LiOu1. 1st Cavslry 21i I.lcn1. 1st Clevelnnd T m p , 0. X . G . EH\I.IS, . l . R . . .... . I d Lieut.. Adj. 4lh CAVUIV EIM;EKI.Y. W.p.. .........Capwin 7th C a n l r y tHis*.ii.tw. Hc,i.l.ls*. 1.t.I'avalryTmop.Man.f:. B E S T U S . F. \ V . . l l a j . ~ h r a s . , f ) v t . ~ Z'.P.A. l. FISLEY. L . . . .lit Lleut. 10th Cavalry
A I Y V . \V. I. ............ .21l Llriil. .Xh c'nvnlry I . , ............ . . I r t Lieiit. :id c'svalry .\nxo~.n, A . K .......... . I . i t w t . c'ol. 1st ('nvnlry A S I W *, E. :'.:.. ...... 1st 11ei11. ;tli c'nvnlry A i ' a . i ' i i . J ............... .('a latni n i t h t k v a l rg . \ I . E S A S ~ K I : , .I. I!. ......:'I 1.Ieut. !Nh c'nvqlry Ai.i.rabu. J. S .......... . I r t I.leul.::tl clavnlr? .\I.I \ S . l I . T .............201 I.1eut. 2d ( ' R V n l r y t.\i'm.I . . 1st Liwit. 1.1. I I ~ n ~ e s ~ u n d \V. 'n

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266 LIST Ob' MEAlBEKS.

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No. 3.

O F TIIE

wnitci
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I. EA \ EN WORT t 1 , K A \ . .
S l E A M i P R E S S O F KETCHESON & R E W h
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JOURNAL
4sF
TIIb

CSITEI) ST.'
VOI.. I

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household words"? \ m a t
"

campaign of the Shento Bppomattox? It ia the seuse of incwnipc*liice -tlie drcaai of total failure to treat the subject with lialf itJ ju3t &?rt tlitit (XIIMY pen to h d t uiicl toiigue tr, falter. ' It had heen ret to sing the praises of the nightini s a s though the strength and valor of the lion. lowered sahre in salute to that keeneyed either peace or war, can withhold hi tribube to the soldier of all &her3 betweeu whom and the cavalry there throbbed

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SHERIDA 3 7
whose lips are seldom regiment*, and old
to the potency

S H E R IDA &Y.

n. sit in silence whetl comrades, hid him speak of


ere mine to the writer a letter from an accomplished Academy ut Berlin in which, speaking of ince -it said : He nlsvays kept iu p u r great raider, and \vas wont to at+ canilry general of modern day3 timnte to cause surprise, conling m it does from one of FXESZOLI~ERXS, reared in the triitlitions of the Prussian and SEIDI.IT% ; ued with the teaching3 of ZIETMEY h1 only by the whilom lemler of the oltl I~LWORFER -and cheriihed na gopel truth throughout the hard canipairnitlg lint1 taught the .\rmy of the evt for the pliiriicil csvsiier wlio led the Southern id around its H:i:lk* aiid rear; cuttiiig its conimim. Mowing akywartl its reserve atnniunition, we, G + e l h g in its generals uniforms, playre anti a l w i y ~ gettiug back unscathed Sixty-Three weut by -year after year of humiliation the resolute stand a t Gettyaburg dong ati almost pertaiitl made posihle, by the way, only by Jolts BUFORD trooper3 \vlio. barred the \vestward pikes niid held 0 1 1 devil, iiideect, iigaiust the throngiug adrauce of LEE, d infantry coultl come u p and reach i t uuclisturbed. un through d l the c a m p i g l l j that followed -the Pcuederick-burg. Chancellorsville, )I ine Kuu 011 our part that I m e not itJ fruit in d i s a p hat were Autietam and Gettysburg but stubhts-superb indeed iii courage and devotiou, yet inefat quality, as battles fro111 which th4foe retired unpurleaders to thank Ciou fiir that much luck und content to What was the sentiment of the NW of the &ne? )mat but an echo of the sneer which HOOKER levelled how to use: Who ever saw a dead cavalryJ

What w a s the status of the mounted foree of the army in Virginia, despite its dashing charges at Beverly Fwcl, itJ heroic stand a t Seminary Ridge? I t was well uigh friendlrs. with all its c.aprnes* aud daring. It had to suffer though, pear after year that cruelest of soldier woee-the consciousness of being utterly niisuii~lerstocd, if not of being utterly sacrificed. Small wonder that it heard with apathy of the two new men, called from western helds to lead the hitherto unlucky Army of the POt(JmaC. Smail wtnder that the yotillger of the two, he who hlld been chosen as the new boinmander of the c-aralry..should hear in answer to his questiou of General MEADE the wortis, Well, never mind a b u t STUART; hell do pretty mucn as he p1ea-s anyway. With this as the ruling faith at hea(l(lu:iricrs, with the commander of the Arnly of the Potmac entertaining and expreuing the v i e a that it was w l e s for the r n i o u cavalry to hope til thwart their opponents, i t was but a natural cooclequeoce that, throughout the great array of fmtthanks to HOOKER'^ sneering epigram : thanks, partially, to the lsek of independent leadershap L : thanks, too, to the lack of faith a t headquartera -there had grown up that deeply-rooted theory that the cavalry WBB of no account. There dropped a pull upou the corps wheu. BVFORD did and the man had not et come to lift it. Whosoever may [ave beeu nt f d t , whatever may haveheen the cause, certain it is th& the troopem ot the e;i.*terii army had enjoyed but little luck in those three years; certaiti it i- thiit tlin>u,ohout the Army of the Potonlac, despite Brandy Station :in11 lhverly Ford. despite Oettysraid, deqlite UAYAKL) ant1 C i R I J l M D A ~ Iand S burg aud STOXEMAXS FARXIWORTH and C L R ~DAJ~IXJREN, C there w w still afoot that covert sueer: Who ever saw n tlesd cavalrynian? I want a nian to organire and conillland the cavalry of this army, was one of the first things GHASTmid to the Iresideiit after reaching Virginia. I t denial& energy, viw, t l d l , enthusiasm, he m n t on to explain, and H A L L E iianied C ~ the nian. the very one I was thinkiog of, eaid the new Genhl-in-Chief, and co it happened that the little, black-eyed mldier, whose divisiuti wns foremost in the rush on Miesion Ridge, waa summoned to quit the men who had learned to love and follow him, to c u t loose from the plucky westernew, who had long since sized him u p after t t e i r own fashiou,and report for duty with the Army of the Potomac. I Soldiers would not be hum n if they observed without comment that+ the two most inlportant posta qere now to be filled, not hy selections from their own generala but by strangern from the west. No wonder, therefore, that SHERIDAX should have felt refuctance at leaving hie fighting diviaion and the proepect of speedy command of the corp, to take up tbe eword among strangers who might resent hie promotion over the leadere

I SHi?RlD.4,...
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SHERIDAN. B u t misgiving implied no hesitancy, he obeyed a t s the turning of the title. From the day af r guidons fluttering ever i n the foremost eir standards. HOOKERS slur mournful prnpliecy turned to naught, again had circled our hosts, laughed at our through our bewildered lines - & T A R T first fierce grapple at T ~ ~ l dTavern s the met his match a t last and recoiled stunned then when the glad order came to c u t loose and make e horsemen of the Army of the Potomnc leaped to the er whose soul was in his work. Iu two day3 he had them u p for miles I n vain STUART e him turu from his purpose; in vain he ichmond, and still more in vain, with n. When the sun went down to the winds, the Union guidons were cavalier rried Rshmond, aud STCART. e pleased for three long years had
ree &ort weeks of SHERIDAN. rs t&e cause of the nation ahd o the deeds that was but prelude t

they had kaown.

Fr

mphs in the Valley of walls of Washingtou, then, at last, 11 and fought and handled Cavdry of the Army of the Potomac, a separate and a n

horn du combat in the series o f desJames, and still between GRANT


g for summary stop to the gold soaringto2.90; the Secrereasury resigning in dismay; the white-haired b u t weak!7rhne pleading for concession ; a presidential elec-

throw of a Union loving administration. One more disaater to the national arms might mean the death-blow of the Republic. The trium@ of the South meant the dissolution of the Union -a divorce that is b t the prelude to speedy disintegration. I t was in this crisis that SHERIDAN, despite his youth, despite the timorous proteste of STANTOW and HALLECE -who thought he might bandle cavalry but couldnt command a department, forsooth - it wag in this was ordered to go iu and win on a field supreme moment that SHERIDAN where hitherto none had gone i n but to lose FREXOXT, BANKS, l f t L R O Y , h h E s aud HUNTER, all had tempted their fate and come out worsted. l h e \alley of the %enandoah u p to the valley of humiliation for the Union arms-a thoroughfare for the p a w g e of the soldiers of the and JLTBAL EARLY. STUART pleased them to tramp that way. JACKYON and ASHBY, marched hither and thither m they pleased, but JACKSON had met his soldier death in the moment of supreme triumph at Chancellorsville; STUART, who rode monarch of all he,surveyed until that western trooper came, had found his grave the guidons of the w a s time for JIJBAL heed: a man of Uuion cavalry. T mettle such aa the Shermndoah had not yet wen had come to try conclusions with him. Why dwell upon it? W h o w n describe the thrill of hape, of almoet incredulous delight, with which all loyal hearts r a k e d from their despond a t the tide of triumph that came surgiug u p with the news from the Shenandoah? Hardly had the nation dried ita teare--tearJ of gratitude over h i m ! u A N s ca$ure of Atlauta-- when there cnme that marvelous despatch from Virgioia We were used to news of victory from the West. W e looked for i t ; expected it. It was here-here in frontof our ever.threatened c a p i d we craved success and had ever been denied it. Wait till they tackle LEE and STUART, croaked our cynics, then youll see how your western generals will go under. Wait till old JUBAL EARLY gete his grip on SEERIDAX and youll see how hell drop his tail. There had been a few weeks of suspense; there was strained watching and waiting in hope and fear and fervent prayer, and then, audden aa the leap of panther, the furious blow ; then that marvelous despatch, electric in effect, vivid, pulsing with soldier spirit, telling of glorious victory on the very tielda where all before had been dieaster, telling-wonder of wonders! -of EARLY driven back whirling through Winchester, with our sabres at his heela How the joy bells rang and cannon thundered! How that new name flew from lip to lip. SEERIDAN SEERIDAN -Cavalry SEERIDAN everywhere! How loyal men and loving women joined in praiae and bleseing and thanks#ving! No laggard he! No general such aa we had.

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SHE R IDAN.
a ot success where success was somertial victory to receive cougmtula-

SHERIDA .\-. were the troopers of J f E R R t n and e to order, ancl almve all itupire the t l mt \vhelmed all b&re it, retrieviug all that \vv89 lost, .wizcouirterstr~~ke in& guns, battla Hags arid whde battnliI)ll?, trirnitlq natiooal d i w t e r into glorious victory,,sll iust in the nick of tinif, Soveniher hrouglit t t ) the ycnlng general the tlrrii1,le +tnB in the regular service-- the natinus tribute to the trooper WIWI in thirty days had won three pitclietl hattlt+. sixty .cuiis in aq)erl field. h d f a h\lIlctred h t i l e is t o lw Iwlitve(1, that1 EARLY had flags ant1 niore priwnem, if EAHLY nim. M o s t effiec-t~inllyhatl he employed the little tiltie he took to settle this n i w ciirnlry geueral. STIAHT, honored iu his soldier p a w , F1am.v. reliered and degraded by hir o w i i government, the Souther~icavdry watffered nnd dispirited, the S h e u a n d ~ a hfreed a t l i s t iind for all tirile, h l J p arltl faith retored to the U,nion. respect and confidence r~tal~lirl~e~l brtiveee the cavalry and so much of the arnry a t least IIZ served iritlie Shellandoah, thwere 901116: of the fruits of ~ t I : i t I I J . i S * *nchicvelllellt~ill tire \alley where victory hatl Iwrched only on eoutherrr flags IJefiJre he cape. Ollce more the nations heart leaped high with hope, and then with prayer and patience awaited the lap= of the slow dMggiilg winter, the conlirlg of the glad and budding spring-the rmning of the end. But if SHEHIDAN hatl been q u a 1 to every eiwrgebcy Iwforc.. what can Y Things one say (Jf the part he played i n the great and fi11:11 c*arnpnig~l had not bee11going blithe1)- in t h e hmill-proofr:: I I I I ~tranches kfiJr6 Ietem- . burg through the black ant1 drenry Iiioiitlis of winter. .Just HJ l ~ l ~ l c k y , just as skillful N .ever were tho* half-starred fijernen in the tattered butternut or gray. Let a head but show i t 4 f above the l o p nut1 there came a shot. . i l l through the besieging liiies the tendency t l J stalk erect and carry hi;:\ the martial front seenletl to have faller] irlto disuse ; a slouching gait w w be,ecoining prevalent as hetter befittingthe peculiarities of the situation. Men consumed their rations, went ou picket, a l k e d about the niine fiasco and strolled over and paid curious visits t<J the fro111SIIERIDAN and the ShenandoaI1. and the11 rettrrned Sixth C o r p ~Iinck , to their o w n camp fires aud stirred up the latent cynicism of tlleir como say about Little rades by repetition of what \vRIOIITS fellows had t PmL and the cavalry. All the long winter they had been hugging those breastworks, learning to set rather too much store o t r shelter and probably getting soft and bilioue, and out of condition. for lack of exercise; and so when the end of March drew nigh and thehews flashed from camp to mmp that PrrrL. S l i E R I D A N with all his bold t@per3 hk(1 ridden down the Jarnes from the upper valley, ripping and te+ritlg thin@ as he came, and was now crossing at City Point, was it not uatural that there should be some a p p a z n t jealousy an the whole army 7UBea up to have a
~ ~~

cnlom;. hold mid ready and eager a . 3 VZ.STEH, there \va.* uone uutil he c m

4 !

f the salvos had not died away before there came

eir tunes! How the Copperheads ing hands of old fossils a t Washon of this young general. of whom ble, Too inexperienced ; ,too imthe counsellors who would have accusation of being a drinkiug struck them dumb with the unere he got his whiskey. and the
1

Brook, where our troopers on their foe, chasing them on the j u m p full twenty
ver would have happened if 11 lick them yet! Where aiiniila of modern war was ever victory snatched from grave? W h a t can parallel that sunset triumph following beaten back from the walls of u t at dawn? SAPOLEOX, by the welcome voice of rian flank. strung out in panic and won the day. division that marched from early dawn to save the wreck the banks of the Bormida. Marengo was NAPOLEONS AIXR great victory, b u t the tide at Cedar Creek was turned

checked ita course there, because compelled it to pause.

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SHERIDAN.
t a ride that was when the cavalry corps, bronzed,
ythiog after three months in the saddle, trotted ircling infantry, following the lead of thnt red uidoo! How the woods rang with chaff and e Second s o d Fifth Corps whooped and cat.called ! to their feetand cheered and shouted welcome and favorite otlicer or regiment! H o w full of fight, self-reliance they looked as they jogged along, m from the trenches! O h , weve got a feller that you mud crushers, was the reply of a Michigan at detractor ; Come out of your rat holes and well d indeed changed. Ttk horsemen had fuuud n and fight under a born cavalryn~au and it the Army of the Potoyac. the gloom and ill omen that attended the opening t followed-the march by the left flank into the wherein lay Dinwiddie and Five Forks and the ide Railway? Roads a l l deep with mud and uriog, peltiug rain, clouds hanging in chillvery light of heaven, horses flounderiog to their to the roota of their ears in quicksand, wagons ,officere rind men wet, bedraggled and ominously re rro.und headquarters that first disrnd night to say cheer to the grave, indomitable General-in-Chief? division commanders who hung around, disaster. urging Back to the trenches, nder looked to his second as though for some ence. is i t not history that even l u y d hfEkDE hat gleam ot light, what word of soldierly illa of encouragement did GRANT find in all his u t front, covered with mud, dripping with rain, b u t bubhlidg over with energy and fight, bristling with eagerness and enthusiasm, 1 came SHEBIDAN -SHERIDAX to protest that all was going well; to beg for ordem t o p u s h ahead; to urge that we should end this thing right here? W h a t wonder GRANT could never forget the snagnetic force df hie great subordinate! All headquarters seemed illumed -dl Bthr@ with the tmopere glowing spirit. I f ever for an instant thought of giviog up obtained it vanished then and there at the soldier voice of SERIUD~LN. On was the word; on the deed, and with the early, had plunged boldly into the unknown wildernesa the sbuth Side rails, and LEE had hurried forth to surround and crush the man who had downed
*

SHERIDAIY

11

--

Even then LEE failed. Where were troopem ever better handled? Where were horsemen ever more skillfully, pluckily. daringly, fought than in that long day* grapple with the giins, the carbines. the rifles of thronging Confederates, while SIIERIDAS \vas slowly slipping out of the meshes they had woven for bim, falling etendily hack towards Dinwiddie and luring the Southern left into itu counter snare? How the guidons clung to every copse and thicket, stiogiug like hornets thb charging fw! HOW every ridge, every fence, every ditch and tree and stump and fallen log was tiianned and held by plucky skirmi~her,d d e thk trumpet calls rang through the misty forest aisles and the s n ~ o k e wreath4 veiled the tree. tops, and the supporting lines trotted hither and yoo, giving ground only when ordeFcarne and dashing in with whirling sabelg a t every open glade! How MERRITTJ tried regulars a i d CLSTERJ~ I Wolverines battled all day long agniost corubinir~garms of a g d l b o t he! How CROOKaod GREGG and DEVINbacked thein in every bush or cheered with every charge ! When at last the s u n w e n t down behind the veiling clouds every standard, every guidon, was io ita place, mho~ghmany a gallant bearer had fallen. SIIERIDAS bivouacked his men around Dinwiddie and sel his trap to spring with dawn upon the 6outhern force, whose efforts had been all unsuccesfiil. *Then came the glad morrow with suoshine and supporte. F o t as he hoped-not as he deserved, tis true-hut even in his rlisappointment that a night march had been too much for foot t r o o p wbo had done no marching in 50 long a time -even tboiigh he chafed **er the escnpe ofr PICKETT from the snare he planned. there was *till time before the sun went down to plan and fight a m t h e r battle. Then came the crowning proof of his skill and hrillishcy in the field. The Shenandoah had demonstrated hi* ability to handle foot as well as horse, but herr:ngainst the veteran infantry of LEE, intrenched io the heart of a Virginia forwt. he dared to assault the front d h long linea of dismounted troopers, while to the Fifth Carps was m i g o d the easier task of turning the flank. Tactically no more brilliant battle bad been planned or fought on the soil of Virginia, and for the cavalry twas a glory greater even than Winchester. MERRITTS impetuouscchargeg from the south, CUSTERJ headlong dash a t FITZ LEE on the wejtern flank-these and all their work that April a h r o o o n he left to hi+ skilled subordinate. He and the cavalry k w w each other thoroughly and with them he had hut to order-they obeyed. It was the infantry that neecled the inspiration of his presence and with them he rode into battle. Who that mw him dashing N that memorable day mill ever forget the picture? S R E B ~ A in among the foremost tanks o f the wavering footmen, his f l a g gleaming in his hand, ahouting, cheering, swearing in wrath at the skulkers, raging at the nerveless advance, reckless of hissing lead or bunting shell, furiou8

12

SHERIDAX.

SHERIDA,\-.

13

at th$ needless delay, and finally, the incarnation of battle, by the ver!. ce of his nature, hurling the iiieii of h s ~ c ~ divisi1)11 n' parapet and cloubling.up the S~nithernleft even ns leaping over the breastworks alo~ig the frciut. mowiiiilg tight a d tlie tleath-l)low of the ,

Confederacy . And still h : was not done! ~ h c a l lthe matchleiz energy of the pursuit-the race oq parallel lines fg pponiattor, the rearchilig rnitls of hie every lane aq,t?%v-path, the incessaii t dogging of the foremost brigutles ncros the front ,the daring stand ?f $g aud clesperiitg.&, the wild d:uh a t Farniville and Sailor's Creek, the cnpture i b f dl $u;ppliea. the sleeples vigilance, the re. \Vho - ivho in all our army froni Chieftain d o w n

erd vias greeted with accloiuations cumstances that tempered the uuiforget-coultl not but mi-' the ce of him whom GODlintl q)ared

features of the greatest cavalry

en are we to see him ? "

"

Why

him while stern duty called him from afnr. Even as er and hie c o r n d e s of the East and West were receirashington, turning was ent, SHERIDAS

..

!1

1
14
men bow their h& ter, i sorrowing w hero and h e r j r i d t lees, movem8Bt, t b &r gun the bat1 A few low-spoken to the very crest; broken square, say thoee ridges of ne the trees and the1 volley shoots alofi drifting slowly U F appears at the her in the f d l dress I echo of the final the trumpet to hii many a time in w in the old campai and pulselees a i r ; thrills through e to cherished cool and alk is done., Age, though I their part in the near were gathen paid by the hand the cavalry bade

7 -- -- -- _-Jf

SHERIDAN.
or turn aside 88, with tepder care, a soldiers daughan, is led away from the grave of him who was her Down beyond the trees there is a qaick, yet noicethe earth trembles with the sudden concuaion ; guu r booms its parting ealute to the tieneral-in-Chief. )rds from the aidesde-camp and the throng falls back ! smooth greeu carpet of the dope is now one great un. for that narrow cleft in its ftiir surface. h r d e r e d by ;urned cltds. Another stir and rattle do<.r~ bey-ot~d I suddenly the leaves all leap apd quiver i w a tlsslriirg ,another -another, and the pale blue clouds come mote the foliage, and then -last scene of all - there 3f the grave one silent, statuesque, solitary form. clatl form of the trooper. A moments pause until the ley has died away in the distance an 1 then he raises pa. Soft, tremulous and low as we have heard it ly uighta on the far frontier, aud in tnountalu bivouac st the first notes of ** tupsfloat out uptm the husheil ien louder, throbbing, wailing, well-nigli pwionate, it y heart-a sobbing requiem, the troopers one atlieu le, then, sinking, fading, falling. it slciwly dies away
:esmen, soldiers, priests and delegates thronged to take urnful ceremonies of* the day; though froni far and the nations highest names, the closing rite of all is f tliose whwe sabres he had led to fwue atid victory : e last good night to SIXRIDAS. .b c. li

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ARTILLERY GUS.
*I

Itr FtKzT C I F I T n \ST \ I #

Iffi%ch
/
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2d C

,C A l l T l l I ERI

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ful animate obstacles. little use for artillery.

ared an afiicle under the nd Carriage, in which it iq snitable though ea that any gun not utposes is auitable therefor, must tices of every niilitary nation, be d of home and fjelcl 1)atteries am their clinnicter. I t neecl Iirvdly ita1 importnnce. \iithout which cavalry leader ;. in the other, field batteries haye less trouble ments of iufantr while power more poweranimate tu well this virtue the infantry c rnrnander has both of these elebents can be, 1 nrtions a sing1 gun is made ns the function of both light signed to do 1 the same gun erpphere the owe artillery

i
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f 6,
7

nd constructed for this parmander. His all importa reasonable circumstatrce i re perfectly obvious. The to the demands of the cavalry comis, that a h o w battery &all under no and manoeuvring abilities, the horses of the artillery cavalry. In other r o d s , artillery its mobility ahall e power of the gun as celerity pf movement ins hi8 position, and parI

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2a4

A HORSE ARTILLERY GP-V

ticularly requiies of his artillery that it shall get there with him, leaving gun and the method of tightiqg i b t o the artilleryman. kry.;then, the matter for first consideration is nianifertly What its niewure should be is not a matter of doubt, s considerably in different armies, o w i n g to the couclitions adsJmrses. and the mauifold specinl requirements of the service in' g e n c d ; each country Iwing governed by what particularly exists therein. In general the iiiea.pnre of mobility for horse artillery purposes is dete -mined by the uwal!y conceded power of a liorse.:s
. ,

;OAIJS

PER FiOFiYE FOR HORSE A R T I L L E R S .

Gun.

. ' Caireon.
SSO
*'

-Yo.

.................
. Russia

..

..
..

I;

7s;

'I

!I

-~

..

deeniecl newswry for our owu. That our predecesderstood. our requireiiients, and atloptetl wise meas.

i n . Afost certaiiily is h i s true if we are to accept ns the ies of cavalry, those fixed by Genernl 1 I E R R I T T in the

ility of

n good horse under fiivoriible circuniohuces as

u\v a load of 1,100 pounds tweuty-three I l i i k 3 a day at s the General with the very poritive assertion that

rching cavalry commands in this country establishes

in the future the necessity for at least maiutllining

286
which from num-

A R Q R S E A R T I L L E R Y QUX.
necessity for perfect mo ility.

287

Such raids will be made by small bodies to move by unfrequented a s d generally any-

when it comes i during the advi three more u p tpttery comma] guns and men 4 The horse b or c o r p 'Bervice to not only ret alao, in order tc disabling of th necedtatee fre where the onl! indid. The two m thus reduce t t pounds, or 52( conkition that ie seen that the more rigidly re restriction ie IN ciency ia the ! pears with fift aible, but i t do the 1?500yarc insure effective It thus be MCXRITT'e re( army cornman( field, the meso in fmt that i n d c i e n c y au b , P"'poSes,

ce, two cannoneers are carried upon the g u n h i b e r s and the off horees, and with all of these precautions the ler who promptly gets j n t o action with four or tive of his ough.to efficiently serve them, will be in good luck. .teriea of advance o r rear guards, whether of t h e cavalry meet with numberless circumstances when it is advisable e m of the caiwns. but the horses of the cannoneers m u r e reasonable safety from lose through the killing or h p e a . The character of this most importaut service lent. and often sudden and rapid changes of position, way to transport the gun detachment is by the means

o action, and to aid in quickly replacing didbled h o & a

9ow

as to the s

'

hsrreanyusei held to be ope


brings upon 8 1 ing bridges, co bemme abeoli covered by hlc guns, could bil powerful form

upon the gun-limbera weigh at least 300 pounds, and weight for a gun carriage equipped for service to :<,I20 per horse, and this too under the further uiifarorable 'very horse in the team has to carry a mau. Hexice it iorse batteries serving with the iufaotry are, if :uiytliing, ricted as to mobility than those with the cavalry. l'his so constant ,in its application.. But the nieiisyre of ettipreme test of-battle. The haftery may go fur ttventy pounds per home le= weight than is ordinarily permisthis in order that, at the decisiye monieut, i t may cover within the few niomenb necessary nud in a mailtier to ervice. lmes apparent that, whether we are to meet Gerieral irements aa to marching abilities, or those of n corps or I for celerity of movemert and efficiency ulwn the battlee of mobility is rendered exceedingly stringent, so much it be not perfect, the result is inevitable and absolute consequently the battery will b;e worthless for horse artilid neither the cavalry nor the infantry commander will it. Both will be deprived of what is nom everywhere If the most valuable communds which a modern army ttlefield. To the cavalry assigned te the duty of destroy munications. eta.. i t has, since the advent of machine guurr, e without it a bridge, for instance, sly indiepeneable, a s, haueea or other slight defences and protected l y machine defiance to h y cavalry unaccompanied by a much more f artillery. B u t here again comes u p the ever present
I I

the requirements are to be a fnilure. From the Reports, f the Chief of Ordnance it'appenrs that the gun weighs 800-804 p u n , ax$ the carriage complete 1,800, of which latter s i h y are for'the &ts yhich are not required for a horse artillery gun. PrQm the Report of 883, the limber-body weighs 405 pounds, wh&h 200, old gooden chest 185. projectile (proposed but doubtful as this would .be in the line of decid d improvement ) 13 3,charge 5 5 pounds. aud witb thirty rounds in the I., ber we will have:
- Liiiiber, roiiiplet ...................................... ........._ !W .i~iiiiiuiiition, tlii ty rountls ............................... 5111
Eqriipniciits, wa *r buckets, etc .................

the natural consequence will be to put the e severeat test. Its failure will mean that of will be that they may have just cauee for generation to come. of the 3".2 gun for horse drtillery purposes. the question df mobility is one tion with the efiiciency of a ree as been the intention. I n +e article all ded n, no mention is made as'to weight. other it of its use for horse artillery purposes. It t to kuow npou what authority this states of the gun and carriage are incorrectly of foreign guns. But t h e weight of the -the mobility, does not appear, and ia fact that thi3 gun was not especially w possibly may have been seen, rigid iu their nature, would at m c e prove t

Gun ................................................................. G u n carriage, i-o plete ........................................

i
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<SMlp o y d n ,

1;Wl

+'

Paulin.

........._ 2% ............................................................. - ~. 2 .........................................................

"
"

"

Total

8,ti?:! poun@,

or 604 per horse, eig ty-four more than the limit. In fact, it.$ within sixty-two pounds of t e 3,684 fixed in the light artillery tactica' aa the weight permissible fo a light field gun. and to which weight the old 3" rifle was only brough after adding 106 pounds for the eeats for cannoneers, and not oply inc easing the wcight of the shrapnel to 10.5 pounds, but increasing the n u be-r of rounds in the limber to the enormow sum of seventy-two, a n u ber never heard of for a light field gun of the date, but of coiiree quite p cticable if a home artillery gun haa to be used a n a light field gun. The eame practice if followed in any Eumpean eervice would result in aboutjdoubling the preaent number of rounds carried in

1:

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\+4 HORSE ARTILLERY GUN.

A BORSE A R T I L L E R Y -GUA\*.

"89

be carried therein, serving as a very forcible illus1 value of this g u n for horse artillery p l y p o S e S . ntly in excew of what has heretofore existed for le or can be tolerated, is simply absurd. 11. The caisson has also to' be considered, and its in the Report of the Chief of Orduance for 1885,
1,ti:C poundb. " e, packet1 ( 30 rounds I ...................1.782
I

no ammunition

..........................

...............................................

3,414 pounds.

have reached. the limit -of 570 pounds per horse, d in the caisson body. With nine caissons to carry ill nfceasitate packing fifty nine ( i t is coustructed ich imagine the load) rounds in each caipson body, e weight up to 4,417 pounds, or 600 more than our d over 900 pounds more than that ecially designed for horse artillery purill be found as cited -before

home batteries for infa try must be the same as those for cavalry, even if the conditions of their servSqe shpuld not prnctically reach the asme end. 'I'he reasons fur th se 1arneniiGIy' unsntidactory reeults for the 3".2 gun are plainly to be en. First of all it m a y be iterated that no gun for h o k e artillery will r can be expected to give such results, unless it be especially aud car #fully designed and constructed for this purpose alone. With an exce ive chnrge of powder, cdiber anti length of bore, . wi 11 great presiire iu the bore. give3 an excessive the new g u : ~ fired \ Grecnil, to coutrol whic that most pernicious " iiovelty," the roecoil brake mtis introtluced and y200 pouud wheel resulted. The inertia of such a ;wheel, coupleti wi'cB& .lkc~.thst the brake uliuost instantly brings it% a dead-lock and atltls he friction agahist the ground, of course bent any reaeonnble axle that c uld be m d e . Thus, instead of bringing into play

i i

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inuin strength with another '' iiovelty "

weight) ju$t tlie reverse obtained and by sprcidiiig boiler-plate along the

General

ceut. less than the carriage. be rioted as a matter of

thing to do with such horse artillery. rnobility -the artillery cannot hope ler any circurustiliices however firvor 11 might p w i b l y , for a time, keep in

to

a range of &500

'

guiis

\ ~ o t i l dh a \ e

y do so; while over poor roads or to be d n t to the rear as utterly


old-it cau be g wheel could stand bore which it tern
, t ~ rbrass-thee tirnes u strong as the improved in these respectj. B u t uh reasonable train of this recoil-brake and the pressure in the.

11 well known and thoroughly underSo far from the conditions k i n g

General 3fmuttm has given in his orse battery commander

90

doing.

That this cannot be done out wheela 1,032, the old o m ; 1 0 s

t 'than that heretofore obtaining in

eclared by the accepted rules from requirea no demonstration. The

d pattern there will be Peventy-seven ounds have been added. in view of the improved eel: This involves -the lnss of 1,540 pounds outThe new limber-body weighs 405 as against 335 The caisson-hody equipped bot withloss 639 pounde. T h e without wheels weighs. 840,as against 598 f i r nds. To off& this eiioriiious total we have

P'''
the reduction of
I1 : total 180, leav. ual to the weight of 265 rounds, or remembered. in face of the fact that only the best inaterial but the best mment is unnecewry, in fact no one

1
2!4 1

A RORSE ARTILLERI' G~'.LV.

o criticise. but not alwavs so easy to r defects. I n this case, however, the remedies rat of all and as a matter of course, it.is again artillery gun, far more than any other, must meet service, restricted within very narrow though ditions, i t must be especially and carefully

.'

k e must be banished absolutely n natural conditions will have to obtain as with

1 begins to compare in i n w r t hi3 clear to any mind it is Only t of these in a battery. First of a new wheel. The Archibald Wheel Co.

once. sgvea to

enty-seven wheels, or 3,800, imber-chwt in the shape of ammunition and not rous wheels to carry almost

mvw to us t lent of 315 roun

d we gain 1,050 pounds for d, say 4 5 5 for the discarded spare axles. I n in the weight and number of this single item total of 5,355 pounds for a battery, the equiva- ' -two per gun, which is now hauled around in

'

Unquestionn1)ly the objection will a t once he tnised thnt such a wheel will not hold the gun, neitlier corild any seniblance of a man short of a graven iniage witli3tarid the shock of the present Springfield rifle fired with 120 grain?;of pi)\v(l+ ai141 i t s 50O-grain 1,ullet. Recoil-brakes could not be clapped u p i n the rail, aud the charge aud pressur8 in the bnre had to be regulated accorcfing v. Now that the inag.wioe gun is recognized aa - , a necessity and c o n s q u e itly the soldier must carry a greatly increased number of routids to meel'it.i increiwed expenditure of anmunition, not bnly must the weight o f tlie iiidivi<lu4 round be reduced but some of the weight must conie o u t ot' tlie musket and go into the cartridge-box in the shape of cartritlyee. A t the .srlnie time, p o ~ l ) l ya, much higher pressure in the bore inuot obtain, and thio with a liglitcr gull, which means simply that the caliber ruuat of hecessity he reduced uiitil, for the desired prea'sure, the work of recoil i3 re-luceil to the limit of the entlurance of the solJier; precisely what niwt be done in the w e of a suitable and necessary wheel or cdrriaqe-I, )(I?. Such :I wheel probihlg will not ho1.l this Y . 2 guii with ZL.5 pwiids of powder and 34,000 pounds pressuw per q u a r e inch i u the hore, and with the pcruicious recoil brake applied. That such a wheel is of paramount necessity i3 beyond question, and to Becure i t j use requires that the present conditions he modified accordingly, just as i n the case of the new rifle. With the old *'lirutal powde;" the maximum pressure in the bore of the 3" rifle is given in the Light Artillery Tactics as 50,000 pounde per square inch, with which t e strain up6n the carriage waa 88 tous. Thanks ' to the powder maker-tc whom. by the way, more than anyone else is due the great improveme t in modern guns--we call regulate the prea- . &re at will. \\'ith ' 4.0 pounds presure tlie :3".2 gun gives a strain of 75 tons, due to the xtreme calibre and length of the gun, and the preposterous weight of the c riagcas compared with that of the gun. Why L 1240 pound tee1 carriage to standca lesj strain than a 958 it r e q u i r e : pound irou and wooden one stood. is because of theae conditions. and s enfutther because the whee s are locked down and the lighter gun i abled to play the part o a hammer iu knocking the almost immovable carriage to pieces. h 3' gun weighing 800 pounds mounted on a car-riage similar to that for he old 3" rifle, but with 1.50 pound wheels and a.suitahle brake, with a r e s u r e of 30,000, svould give a strain upon the 33 lw thau the old carriage could withstand. carriage of only 51 tons, When this 3" rifle was d+igned to replace the old 6 pirunder, the weight of the carriage w w left udchanged, and this notwithstanding the fact that the problem involved an enormously irureazecf pressure in the bore, and greater length of the % q e , and further also that to insure a sufficient number of the much hea ier elongated projectiles, the weight of the gun had to be diminished, which meant more unfavorable conditione for the

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292

A ,HORSE A R T I L L E K Y OUX.

d HORSE ARTILLERY GUAV.

carriage, a w the h?aoikr the gun the greater its inertia and the less the stinin transmitted to {he carriage. To insure the safety of the latter the .calibre of the gun hhd to be reduced from 3".67. The new coiiditiuns determined that .he b l i b r e required to insure safety to the carriage should be about 3". . We have very similar though much niore favorable condition3 for the convervion of the 3" rifle i O t 0 a modern breech-loading horse artillery gun. First and KOSt important of all we can reduce the rnasirnurn pre3sure in the bore to 30,000 or a t most 32,000 pounds per square inch. .AI. though increased Iimgth of bore i3 necessary, the le= the better tbr the arto, general conditions ot service and m to the recoil. criable a considerable reduction in t h e weight of the procti!les required, but the less of t h is redaction the I already lighter than the c a d g e , and well k u ~ ~ w u e $ tiiqs require that the g u u should be a t lemt rn Iie.tvy J much heavier as pwible. Uy suitahly regul:ttiu,o ?I to secure proper traction upon soft grountI--ou Po trouble 4 b d i a r i i c t e r can be reduced :it least t w o d by the aid of aluminum bronze. or brass; three old metals, we can construct a wheefweighiug 15U will be stronger and better in every wag thau the 90 slightly shorten the trail, and thus secure ins weight. The calibre remaining the same. three avier charge, weight of projectile alid /length of o much increawd that it a n no louger be negin the change from the six pounder b J the 3" rifle, n, the strain upon the carriage will be reduced of some kind becomes necessary-not the presgooJ for nothing'elw, save to increase the an nder' a good gun an impossibility-but instant and constant use upon the road o r Ita application when the gun is fired will for a certaiu amount of itrength to meet this conx c w of strength to ita credit. This
1

to compensate for the inceased evil, but we cannot afford to put 235 pouuds adtlitional weight into the carriage for the sak'e of. a 13.5 pound projectile, and to limit the ecoil to seveu feet after the method used with thc 3".2 gun. The artillerynian does dot expect to eat his cake and have it. A reduced charge, calibre, leri th of bore aud au ordinary brake, may not o the lii,iit secured with the 3".2 gun, but i t will be reduce the recoil t brought within reawn, that we willhave to rest content. and weight, and energy of projectile,, will w do if the

!
ngth and the conditions must be mod-

alaing velocity and energy are sufficieut

pounds, qf which 3.5 is weight of projectile, or taking 2.75 pounds ss artillery gun, and the maiiiing 14.2.; pouiids for a projectile, good b:ifRstic resdta are or a t IeaJt t'ur better than for the precediilg caw. Allawing twenty per cent. for the 10- of poirer hy the al)si)rption of heat by the gun, etc., a charge of 2.7.5 pounds will t o this prnjectile 1,482 f. 4,300yard3 T4tj f. r., with t. of energy. The 3".2 1,670 f. s. and a 13.5 pound projectile gives a t the saine and 45 f. t. The shrapnel for the IatLer is to contain 157 two to the pound. That for the former, with-the reduced pressure to which it is to be subjected ( and if m wll n i d e as the Gernian and Italian shrapnel ), will contain 5 6 pounds of bullets. \Vith the iiicreawd velocity at the maximum range this could be reduced in size to about forty-four to the pound s effective as t h e larger oue3 for the present gun, while the and still be a shrapnel ~vouldcontaiu 2Y6 bullets. O u r shrapnel is siniply the wirecartridge or other form of concentration which the sportsman u p to secure at lung ranges game of less dangerous character than t h e d 8 d e r n soldier. Like the sports-n we first determine the size of our bird, the bullet necessary to bag him ; then regulate our " pattern " accordingly. If we take the size of almatl in raukr at eight square fee) and require say t w o hits to disable or kill him. then t!ie pattern for the v . 2 gun must be regulated so as to cover at. mean range a circle whose i r e a is 628 squfeet, with a diameter of twenty-eight. equal to fifteen files of infantry, which is the measure of the dangerous space along the front of a body of men, the crest of a parapet, eic. ' h this, of course. must be added ?he distance from the point of shell b u k t in the direction of fire, at which a bullet will inflict a-dangerous wound This latter is generally under modern conditions, of much less importance than t h e former. I n the case of the other projectile the area of the pattern required at mean range will be 984 q u a r e feet +nd ita diameter a h u t thirty-five, equal to

I
RSE ARTILLERY GUN.
A HORSE ARTILLER2 C: UX.
29.5

three kinds of projectiles, biit our old tirue batteries

out which we cannot obtain the

to have a n elevating screw of sufficient weight to ave it fitted with a gear as coniplicated a~ that of a

ch can be used at any moment upon the road or k the recoil, is a sine qua tioti. Without one, any emned at once The members of this A m i s t i o n of their good condition a t all times. Not one of tdamster or freighter in America, start upon a cam-

nor ia it the wei

paally thrown upon the pole straps. but the con9

stnntlv recurring little pitcher along the road which tlo nut csll for-will not admit of the use of the lock-chain. These, frir more than all other -causes. ~ f o t l u c e this evil and the only preventiaiii ir a rriitnlde ant1 PMC-. ticalde h k e , siniilar in i t j nature tn that foulid U ~ I > I :IJ! I work wagon in iricl i i i egraceful apthis country. I t nlav not comport w i t h the h : t i ~ i l ~ ~ ~ pearance of tlie carriage, may require a slight aalilitiiiiiid weight, aid it may be winiewhat in the way of the cxnnonerrs: litit thu caiiiioneers can . 1~ triwtetl to take care of theniselves, a i d tii gibt : I I * I I I ~ :I?wt.11 as tho* of i other iiatioris: while the niiitter o f weight will he i!eleiiip troiii that of the recoil-hrakej and the lock-chain9 etc. For etjltecidty bteep or tlificult descents the proloiige is allrays a t hand, and one or both rlteelr can readl brake prove to he insiitfiily a i d quickly bee,wurely locked, ~ l t o i 1 1 r tlie cient in power. \Vith a horse a r t i l m guIi the I)nike wbultl have to be iised by the wheel driver, in the same niui;ner as with the freight teerneter; the line to the brake lever woultl, however, Iinve to be provided or other with 3 rnnp-hasp, to be cletachhd and fsteneal to the ches~hantlle For LIS i i p i i ~ tthe road convenient place when the piece is uiilimberetl. the recoil hrake is utterly inipraeticable. I t will securely Iiick a whwl. hut tliat wheel cannot ~ ~ ~ s i he l ~ unlockril l y without 1i:iIting tlie teain and riiiiriing Iiack the carriage iu order to releass the h i k e , atid as we are _c--_ tliir iiece4tateu the dismounting of here dealing w i t h horse artillc~y, some of the ca.nni)neers. I t is desira1)le to secure tlie i i l i i i i i o t i of General NERNIT or ~ aiiy , other cavalry coninlander a r tu the utility ot a hattery ftir rq)i,l iii:ircliiitg, (110 tuatter how perfect it may be in every other respect 1 when haiiilicapped by such a state of atlhirs a* this recoil h i k e iiisures. It ni;ry I)e cIainied that a t least one niaii Iiad to tlisniouiit to,relelue the old lock-chain. aufficie~it answer is that the ciirrittge dill ni)t geiierally have to be halted even theu ; a u t t that all old time freight wagoiis had to use the lock.chain, whereas all are tiow provii1c.d with the ntotlern h k e . It is.hcue reiterated that there is nothing coiiiirctetl with the 3 2 gun carriage eo pernicious as the recoil-brake ; not even esceptiiig the method .if stren;rtheiiiii~the axle by rprea lin; a Itit o f 1)~iler-plate along ita length. So long as these t w i n evils are periiiittetl t o eukt, we will never have Q satisfactory field carriage, itor one at all t o lie ciiitiparecl with tlie best results obtained by foreigii artillery engineers. Undoubtedly we sliall have a novelty, as this combinstimi has been aptly designated, but this novelty will remain a mechanicd absurdity a:+ a nieans to a n end where lightness of weight i s undoubtedly the greatest factor. If any one doubt this f&, let him state the conditions a n d suhtnit the deto any mechanical ensigneof this carriage, together with one of KRCPPS. gineer in this country and secure his professional opinion. Ii irr no plea in extenuation to claim that the tie-rods would be io the \ray nf the cannoneer. This mould not hold, even if the rods served only the aiugle purI

-.-

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A HORSE ARTILLERY GU-\:

A HORSE ARTILLERY GU.V.

9 7

h a r e had a gml gun, but whether$ horse or fielil giin it wcwltl h%vebeen a very (liferent one from t h e present one. S I )licttcr illustntiou can he cited th:\n the one nlready alluded to. the change friirn t l i c r h l t i pounder to the 3" ritle. IIere we have the fact that i n t l i i g clinrige the constructor not only had to face the difficulties of a longer lwre h i t the vi~etly greater tine of the enormous iucrease of l.j,OOO i)r ?O,IMO p o i i n d ~per square inch pressure in the bore, atid nt the s:me tinw sewre II grenter zlvantage weight of metal in the liniber. He derived t i o siicli sul)~t:ittti:il as n o w exists by the use of nn .\rcliihnltl wliet!l, w i t h wliieli gwnter strenptli. if iiecessury, is insured with a con4tler;d)le r<xnluction i i i wei;rlit. ' He could n o t p i l i fortysix pounds l>y a reduction in the w i g h t t i f the inildementa atid equipmetits, 11s can now he ( I I P I I ~ . l l c 1 1 ~ 4 1 'not the adviintages no^ atforded by rntdenl niaterial nnd mcc-hnliic:d skill, whereby not only is greater strength inrured brit w i t h n sii1wt:intid reiluatioti i n w i g h t all of these tfism1rarit:iges. his git~i. with liwtp a]%). \-et, no~\vithetiindinp rouritls iii the limlwr, weighed just twenty-fire p i ) i i 1 1 1 1 + i t i l m th:in tlie old one. This;.with sixty pounds greater weight i ) f niet:il in the linilwr, tit'ty per cent. greater weight o f prd$ectile, an(l the etbctive range inore th:\n clou\)lecl, to say nntliing of gre:iter accllracy. 1 lie weiglit of the carri;\!:e-i)o<ly wns not changed by a sillfile p o i i i i d . while tlie wviylit of the ' paillin, e(liiil)nients, etc., \viis fiwty pounds greater t1i:m t:)r the old gun The reroil of the new gnn was ,uiiqiti,sti[)ii~i~l? grc:itc-r t11:tti for tlie old otic, awi i10 t.ffiJrt W I S made ti) control it, but i t s virtuta were so inany aucl s o great :la to entirely overdiaclo'w the evil of recoil. -It is iiisistd, nnd it ir Iwlie\-ed. with ,iusticc, that ; I t , the o)nversinti of the :;" ride iuto ;L tiidern Imech-loatler fibr Iti)rse artiilrry, t1i:it thi-. exaniple o f titost succewful conversion be fiillo\wil. 1.f :isteel wrringe cannot he ca!netriictetl of the same weight, hut greater dreiigttt, theti the old o~ie ~)ugI~ to c Iw retained. A brake will requirc ii weight i j f fifty-tive p~titt~ls, I)ut an an offet there is a reductiou of forty-sis piiiintls in the wei+$t o f itnpleruents DO longer required, atid about twetity itlore in the lock-cliaiii. eponge-hooks. hnodrpike rings, etc.. leaving :in ncttial net gain of eleven pountls for a new carriage. The dianieter of the wlicc4 can \)e reduced tn fiIty-fire inchep, t u iu the (;erntan and I:II&:~II Austrian fiity-fiiur, French fifty-six and une.half. a i d Italian fifty inchc:,,, aud the weight reduced to 150 pounds or even less. The Ru4air wheel of the same cliameter weighs 151 pounds,and serves for nll field carriages, whether the 3".G horse and field gam, or the 4".19 position gull, and for the caissons, weiehing, without cannoneers 4,722 pouuctr. The Archibald \VheeI Ci)., with the aid of aluminum bronze. or brass, can make a stronger and better wheel of thia diameter and weight than a n ? Rumian ever saw, and one moreover that will be stronger than the old pattern wheel of 180 pounds which was used for the old horn. artillery guns.

..

i "
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1
A HORSE ARTILLERY GULT
coaceded, and it must he if we are to have what we given-we need go no further, though it is but 3 that some further reduction 40 weight can be ser, dnd caisson hodies, chests. etc.. and by discarding the are not required for home artillery i*srringes, aud in dj-wrded if for uo other reawn than to prevent the ? them harboring places for unarithorirerl weighh. But g these, or changing the weight of the p i i from that of wing .seventeen pountlj fi)r the weight o f :I round as ,'we should have:
A HORSE A K T I L I X H I* ( i U.V.

- 1
29!)

.-1

298
Such a wbee want and ought reaeonable to su cured in the liml foot-boards whic fact ought t d n men from makin without consider the 3".P, and a1 fixed for that gri
.Brake ...... Two wliec.1

pounds, and for the best li ht field about eighteeu, the nieaii being about fifteen pounds. Thus the ct established by the calibre, tv uld be enipliaL proper pri~jectild; the 3 ' 2 is siniply a '* mesa gun between sized by : horse and light field, 1w c mpared with those i n use h v qlie military nations of the world. That t was not especially designed fur I i o r s e artillery purposes. and can ne er under any circumstances be made to meet the contlitioiis mluired for uch aguu, is a fact so obvious a to be beyond questiou or douln.

I
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Gun I calili . three ini.livai ....................... Carriage-h y.......... ............................... Prolonge, i


4

...... . 5411
::1io

.....

SIkI

]"""I'lS.
1.

.................................
.................................

.............................
lilti

?I

.. (. ..
I .
I

................. :::: .. . i Limber-lioi ....... ,_..._. :;IN1 .. Two wlir.el .............................................. 1G .. 1 Clrewt ...... .................................................... .. Aniniiinitic p w k t . l l :thirty 1.411111~1- ................... :)?: 25 .. hquipiiiriit water t,iit.kets, rtc. ............................. .i4 .. Pauli n ...... .......................... ! .............................
~

145
W Z........................... Old l i } ~ O l I l ~:r. tifty ~ ) I I I I ~ I .... :I" ritiv, k ) i . rounds.. ........... ..:.............................

::11::

:;I*>

..

.,., LO:;

..
:3W, : l i d the

IVeight of I above +Y7 pounc With nine I weight of wheel per gun, the \w within 3,-120 po T h a t such a practictible, adn Rigned for artillc for. When the CI foreign guns, it intended LO, v u a home. and% lij falls to the g r o u A stdable 7 teen pounds, wi The projectiles

!tal in limber, 6
4

fiiiiiniler,
.

300; 3'' ritle.

the old caissons hut priivi~le~l with brakes the :thove two oidy carrying spare-wheel and axle :in11 160 rounds ;ht of a caisson frilly ecluipiieti ftJr service will come Ids, or -the limiting load of 5 i O per horse. gun and conditic)ns, or others very similar, are eiitirely s of no reasoliable c1tiul)t. I t w i i u l t l be especially. cley service and \Fourid meet the couditiour re4luire'I there.

iber of the 3".2 gun, its weight, etc., are compared with tound to fall, not as the Ordnance Boaril w e r t e d i t was
between a horse artillery and position gun, but between field g u n , and between these two stools i t naturally d, u o t good for either purpose. hie for $ would give a projectile weighing ahout fifI which this gbn would be a very g i d one--of its kind. r the best horse artillery guns weigh a little over twelve
I t

.. . .

' I

*' HHERII \ N 'S EX PEDITIOS A ROVL'SD KIC H J I O S I)


>!AT !L25, 186-1."
'

1 % .\IAJOR ~ L o t . 1 ~11. ('.\RI'ESTFI<


iTll ('AV.\I.HY,
RHEVET l't#l.tn>Fl. 1'.

-.

A.

croesing the Rapidap May 4th, commenced the campaign of 1 W in Virginic The battles of the \Vilcleriiess followed on >lay 5th , and 6th, and on he :night of hIay 7th, the army marched arouiicl the right q a n k of L :'e line a n d pwherl for Spottsylvania Court 11)use, only .-to-findthat the mfederates,had beateu in the race and were i n ~ w s w s necesitatii movemenla our in severe contlic )he 6th. at the I On the 8th loose from the attack hi cava11 James River aiic Bermuda Hund Asaprelimii road t o , F r e d e r
noti,

THE

; a.'derperate contest in that vicinity. Duritig these valry had encouuteretl the mounted force nt' the eneniy : 00 the .Ab, a t Todtl'e Tnrern and the Fiiriiiices; on irnaces nnd on the 7th. a t Todd's Ttiyertt, : i pecoiicl time. ' Nay Geiieral' HIIILRIDAN received instructions to cut rtuy of the Potonlac, pas aroutrd the enemy's flank, a i d . if necessary, go t t b the and line of~commuuirations, \olio was then a t Dbtain supplies from General BUTLER,

I
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El.

'

measure the cavalry was cobcentrated near the plank sburg at SILVERS' am1 ALURIC~I'S plantations on the

of three I)iririons,'a~~regatiii::about !),:3@ ef-

Colonel ALFHEI) GIBBS. I This Iriyaalr wnsisteil oi irnd 5th Regular Cavdry, the tith Pvnnsylvaiiia Cav$e 1st Sew Tork Dragoons, and waq known
as

"The
- 1

!
I

i
SYTH i

now Colon Aidade4'amy. .

'S EXPEDITIOX AHOU-VD RIC'H.5fO.D.


t duty, and
a 9

SHEttID.4 S ' S E S ED1 TI0-V d RO t*A-D RICHMOXD.


v i .

3 0 . 7

the regimenb were filled with a

later iu the same year a t Lkep Bottom, on the Jnmes River n e a r l y - q p p MERRITTand GREQQwith their cavalry site Petersburg, when G defented an attack of 's division of LONOSTREET'S corps, made

thie section. being heavily wooded in many places, nd intersecte.1 by streams with steep banks, atfortled

rs were compelled to resort to dismounting from

foot.

It must be admitted that we followed


e horse artillery w as of the ndid conditiou. I n &-

d 3 of each set of fours, both f r y t and rear rank, their horses, similar to the p r b e n t method, No. 3
e available for the work in hand. The men then line, and were deployed in extended order upon the r. the right or left skirmisher, by each man obliquinp

galloping to a new positiod, harassiug the enemy with excellent practice, checking his adoauce and diocouraging his efiwts, ita services in the retreat were invaluable, as it was under many other circumstances. The guns used were the well-known @-inch rifled field pieces of the Ordnance Deauy in the world, and a x were the com-

eers. How steadily i t could aclvance uuder re. flexible, bending, Iiut rarely breaking,

'

m a equal to any exigency t h a t am presented to us T h e mldier becoming accustomed to losing the tonch of 9 more self-reliant and dependent nu his own resources, of all the cover and shelter pssihle, and more, ditiicult t b t he was whipped. Here was developed the true
llowing the adoption of the breech-loading
dry long before the system waa followed by the in-

were generally weak wards the number of ably reduced. In rai two to a brigade. \Vith the exceptio

no means u p to the full strength. Aftern by us on long expeditions was conmderv E'oitxmT. he uaually had with him about tery of the S e w York Volunteers, comall of the horae bntteriea in the Army of

The horses were in duty required of the continued e o long i n allow the animals t o

ed under SEERWAN. upon the arduous picket winter, which had been
Thecommand waa rupplied with one
7

tions, the latter being carried in tlie harer-

out with the brigades i n each divi4on. and the ait was the walk, any other being the

ed on one road, niakiiip II columri eight obviously ditiicult a t titiirs to kuow the
n the Commanding ( h ~ e r n lnrttl his

lie

coiriiiiaiid

hefore

rocured, aiid \rlletice, if riot he army, switigiiig IIroutid Ile and Orange Court House." Coritiituinp our nisrch h road m e stopped for a time a t a place ki i o wt i hy the n pawed the Masqmnax ith high hill*, and cro.;sed u t oppo$itioii, i n n1iic.h we ny advantageow positione ommanding ground ms, and the country near colunin finally reached for a short time. Resuming the march we a, and ~ ~ E R R I Twith T his division c r o w d a t o and WILSOX encamp-

countering in our advance only a few outlying pickets. The latter must, however, have 90011 informed the Confederates of the mooemeut that was going on, as about 4 in the afteriioon the rear guard, consiating of D A ~ I E ~ brigade of G H E o c J divisbn, w& attacked by \ V X C K H A M brigade ~ after the pasage ot the Tu,near Tarralds Mills, and in the conflict that ensued the enemy was ergntually repulsed. The 6th Ohio Cavalry, l e t ?rfa~achuseits Cavalry, l e t Pennsylvania Cavalry aud h t New Jeraey Cavalry were all engaged in the affair a t times during its progrese and several handwme chargw were made on Iwth sides. Captain ABELL, of the 6th Ohio was killed, two officers wounded and seventy-three men of the Union troops were killed, wounded ailid mising. These attacks were kept u p until after dark, I ~ ~ H A X brigade J assisting \VICKEAMlater in the afternoon. Immedidtely after >II.:RHITTJ division had crossed the North Anna, CUSTERS brigade was detached and d e r a d to proceed to the Ueaver Dam station bn tlie Virginia Central Railroad. a short dietance beyond iu the directiod that the column had k e n traveling. Major BREHEH, of the 1 s t Mic&pii Cavalry, with II battalion of his regiment, having the advance, captured a train of ambulances soon after leaving the river, and then moved on to tlie station, the remainder of the brigade considerable force of tlie enemy wa9mcountere.d following in support. and defeated, a numbel captured and Xi5 Union prisoners taken from them. Of the latter, oqe was a colonel, t w o were lieutenant colonels and many were otiicers of lo er raak, kLmgiiig ti, regimen& of infantry that had participated in the attles of the \Vildernew. The puor fellows were overjoyed at their unl -ed for good fortune arid e x p r e d their gratitude in unmeasured terms. 4 s there WIW no other way of dlsposing of them they had to accompany us OD our journey and share our fortune, getting mounted in every im iiiable manner mid style or traveiing with the train. The station K dstroyed two Iocotniitiver, three trains, consist ing of 100 cars, iiiiiet? wagons, s e r m l huritlred stauds of arms, a large number of hospital ten ,200.UW poui!ds ofbacon. tiour, meal, sugar and molasses, making abo t 1.500,OOO rations, and a great portion of the medical supplies for L ~ E army. s I n additiau, eight or ten milea of railroad track w a s thoroughly brokeit u p and the culverydestroyed. This station was directly in rear of LERS army at Spottsylv(nia, and Imetwesu that place and Richmcpd, and on his line of communications. The loee must have been a eeriqus blow to the Confederates BY i t was estimated at $1O,OOO,O0O.OO by the Sichmond Dirpcltdr, in a copy which afterwards fell into our p s e s s i o n Forage was found and the a n i m a b were well fed, m n d we prepared as far aa +ssible for the lighting that we knew w a s in store for us. The enemys cav/alry was gathering and t r o o p were collecting in front to protect the Confederate Capital. About daybreak on the l o t h ,

-F 5

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1 :

nnonading as a reveille, arid o u r camps o n

some of the Confederate bavalry who made their appearance on the north

still on the
to the ford to keep the t r o o p moving and

ed there until the reaf had passed. The


lling large trees across it from our side.
a squadron of the 1st Xew York Dragoons

in the morning a short diatance u p the X'orth Anna to the th instructions to remain there uutil the rear of the

for some tlistauce. While o u r troops. cavalry WLLS disujvered in the di-

eeu Daveuport bridge detachment aud the In withdrawing, the Confederates were-encountered, but n the 5th Cavalry, with Captain ARSOLD a t its head, heir way through the en in killed, wounded iear Beaver Dam star again. I n making

Cieueml S:~ERIDAX

The 6th Pennsylcadia Cavalry, meeting the enemy in force, H'W reinforced by the Keservi Brigade, who rapidly dismounted, seut thei,r engaged near the junction of these roads. Iiorses ti) the rear, a d w u dimoiiuted, placed on the right, The Pd Brigade of the aud the wliole line iou of the Brook road leading directly to gnve to J I a m r n . the Richmond. The partly wooded and part1 open, the line crowing the Telegraph road, following it t;)r sotlie 4 s nce and facing nearly west, being w p p r t e d by artillery, arhl threatenin SHERID.W'S Hauk if au ~ltlvauoeIVM continued. The C'onfc'tierates were ;dismounted behirid temlwrary breast Ivorkq. ex-

W.H. F. LEE'Sdivision

to continue the attack upon

, obtaining some

the killed was the gallant . enemy from his position, the 2d Brigade engaged aloug the whole line. On

I .

1
i:IsPEDI TI1)S A K O U,VI) K I C I I J I O S I ) .
.OER

SHI.-KIDAXS E X f i ~ D I T I O S . II : O C: .VI) KICH.UOND.

3 W

is position, which they (lit1 i n the iiis).it g:ill:iiit ntiiiiiier. of tbeStIi ant1 Mnjor KIUII(Jf thr 1;[11 lllr.se ordered to holtl this positioii tititil furtl1c.r iii-trIictigniis his a s a u l t the reginleiits wece :usistc~~l by 1 I ~ a ~ r o s n

takyn hp a mounted cliargtx, ket.pilig r\t.ll t o Michigan Cavalry, coinmandetl hy Lieuteii;uit-Ci,lc)tiel

*
the regiment. The 7th MicIiipui C,avnlry

During the engagement. the 6th S e w \-wk (avalry ndvnnced o u the nrook road as far as the Br IC bridge, antl heltl it. \VILI.I~TO?IB battery \v posted with one section nt the croJs.roails. and the other conimandin the Kicliminid road, mid tiiatle some p d practice. disnounting one f the enemys g u i w atit1 t l e ~ ~ r o y i n one g ot tlleir c:&ed)n+. GORDOSS oiitderate briptle of ctlrlrlry attacked the rear of the colunin heltl by REGC;, just us it W:IS 1e:iviul;r UrountI Squirrel briclge, a t i t 1 kept u p ;I cciitrt l i t couHict duriug rlre entire day, uiid during w w w goiii:: on, anti1 tinally dethe time that the fight at \ ~ ~ l l o Tavern feated and coinpelled to ret te, thus forming p i r t of the geueral engagemeut. In this part of the ction the Confederate brigde lost its coniB. ORDON, of Georgia, who waa killed in front ruaiider, General JAMES of GREWSliues. I

3
P

)ops moveci fiwivani; nicwiiiteaI, t*rt)iii tlic (*ov(>r of emy opened an artillery fire w i t h stiell auql c i i i i i i i + t e r . to be torn down on grouiitl swept hy t h e .(.~~iiti~+lvl:ite

e i t h >Iichigan was cnmpelled to retire, but not RASGER had fallen, pierced through the heat1 t)y the . 111this conflict the *federate diiriiouuted troops iounted charge of the 1st \%ginis Cavalry.

. Gelrend SHEHIDAY s h i e s iir hie report : * The enem] made an error in uctics by sending a larg fork to attnck illy rear, thue ncakeniiig his force in front, enahling ni tc, throw all of the Itrengtlr on that which opposed my front, ant1 fi t the other with a small rear guard. The Confederate loses in this igagewent are adiiiitted to have been severe, but i t is iinpossible to dete iiiie the number witti accuraay. The Union re %42 otficers antl men killed. wounde? and casualties ou >lay 1 l l l i niisiiig. Froit1 the trust\\ )rthy account of a Southern writer it appears tlivi oii of cavalry conlpcwerl all of the force that that Vrrnivt;ii LEES oppoecl US 011 the froiit a t -ellow Tavern aut1 tlint ~ ~ O R D O S brigade S of I V . ti. F. LKES tlivisioii gaged tlie rear, ni;d that this fbrw auiininted to between 4,000 and .5,0$0 nien. This leaved over 4,cH)o of the Confetlerate cavalry to ted 1i)r. tis tlie rrtiirus of the Ariiiy of Sorthern Yirgiiiia, 64, just before the caiiipaigii ccmnenced. h present of tlie cavalry corps cotniiiauded sliow 9,iOO iiieii w the e of uver 16,000 prewiit 8ild atmot. I n Generid HAMPTOX states that he \v& a t a recent letter to the f L E E S army with I~OS~ESLJ brigade and thi3 time on the left includiirg C ( H A M B I . I J ~ brigade of \V. H. F. some other cavalry [ p

-.

$-

t
wliich place he had gc placed by others of g that the divisiou of not returned from South Caroliua, to cting to returu with his d d regimeiitu reeugth. -\t d l ereuts i t is unquestioiiable t i LEE occupied u strong position in this r by temporary slirlter Iiaritilp thrown up. osetl to them, usisted by a h r i p d e of alone \vas engaged to of casualties Show8 only oue nian did ntit fire a slitit, nor on the front. WiLh men and

Ashlaud and part towards

amount to anything, as

Richmond.

w t w either of

I .

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I
311, SEER

?>

A X S EXPEDITION d ROCAVD RICHMOSD.


tion and fighting qualities of FrTzrrv~aLEXand his
er the direction of STUART, and with tli; advantage
In ian t ry :

-I I<ichniontl Mt.iiccs .....}..............


?,I 21:iryliitic\ I nf:iri t r y . .............. t iiirristtti CIiapin* BIII (i:irrisoii I>rvwry*sBlu ....

.&FECTIt

E IHF-*EST.

.............................

their t r o o p are entitled to great cretlit f i ~ r

[%art4 bn.5 Ikigaile C;r:it.ic.s I%rig:ialv .......


i

._._.... 4%;

DEVIN, with tlie 2d f3rigatlt. of tlie 1st k creek and went forward througli the
Emniauuel c w r c h , where he halted And

.-

-,,.I.,S -..

...........
.\rtillery :

............

................. ..........

li!Wi

.......................................

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iny to Fair O;ik?iet:~tion, d then support BL.TLER, that he had crossed the !James and was adruucing e.capita1. Some have thought i t strange that e an attempt to take R i ~ h m o n d a t this time, but I the city ci)iiltl possibly of several hundred nien, ny length of time. ITZIICGII ~ I E E , O f viron the eneral STCART d was undoubtetlly M of some fire hours to side of the city to be

GRACIES Brigade had juet arrived. Deduct from the infant y the garrisons of Cliapins Bluff a i d Drewrys BluH-8:;O men, ani1 w e 11 \ e present effective the day hefiye the battle at lellow Tavern :

It is noted on the returT that

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10, 1864, ap

ughly alarmed and its soldiers were on the alert. chmond. dated May the following:

J1e;iclow Bridge. sta 3 in The Campaips of S t u ~ t s Cavalry, M:itir ~ICCIXI,IAX about 1 0 oclock wi the mornthat he was sent to Itichmgnd by STUARI interview with General B R A ~ who G wai in ing of tlie 1 Ith. mid l i d there were troops to the number of 4,O00, the city, and who told anJ three hrigtles were h urly expected from the arrny at Ieteruburg. By the returns, these 1)rigades seem to have arrived, including GRAClE6. .\ftcr pwsing Eninran\el church the colunin took the toad to the left. \\ILSOS k i n g in frdnt with the 3d Division, ~IERRPIT and GREGG p l d e d i n the Brook rim1 under the cdunin, . i n rear. deveraf torpe hut (lid not do much da Virginia Central railroad aud reached t h e The :itlvanca cro

4.

evidenw ef a great stir. and locomotives wbiatling d near the Mechanicarille , concluded to wait for a tly after the enemy , corn-

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312 SKER

IP

d N ' S EXPEDITI0.V ALKOI~VDRICHMOND.

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4

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advanced from

ailroad bridge a little farther 1111wn t h r river. of the euenly w r e then conipellctl to rctreat, thick wood tor shelter. were able to keep the nce. Our men lion worked rapidly s t i d under rs every efliwt was n d t * to make thr cros-inp e Iewt possible delay. line to protect the right and (iwxw the rear rt.her back fram the positi~moccupied early i n along the Virginia Central railroad 011 the Icti with his riglit. h etrong line i,f infantry nces of Richmond against ( ; R t m ; end \ ~ r r - w ~ e Same time attttcked the right of GHC(;~;'J nt became general, the batteries O I I both eitles of musketry and roar of artiller!. \ v w h c p l o n waa undoubtedly a ' . ~ e r i o u i ontl. We h:ld an the intrenchmeilk and fortitications t , P Hicllfantry and cavalry on our right H I I ~rear.
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315

ed hy the p o c l judgment of his geneT1-P and the


and men. There is evidence that there were over array near Richmond on the 12th of M a y , 1864, and emplilyes who were enrolled and organized for ' Confederate authorities in the city (lid not take ion ai111send all of their arnilnhle troop3 against rious mistake, in regnrd to their own interwts w many were in the fowes opposed to u* hut we 1 Ide body of infmtry r~ttackedo,{r lines. 'Geoirs, says in dercrihing the situntion of General position, in thirr affair that he \\mu i n a peril~~uz neralz coiilcl hare extricated thriiist~lveo. have been inspired with the gravity of the s i t u a t h ~

r not to provitle for such a posihle colltirlgency twidge, ZMhe stater; : "The enemy considered us

s linci we were iiot molested

Kichmontl. and the ('onfederate cnvalry withdivision nioved to Mechanicsville :ind , ~voundedan11 dead were provided for and the whole es' Mills and encamped for the night: anicsville to Gaines' Jlills the Reserve Brigade . as sharply attacked bv a force of cavalry on the left repulsed without difficulty and the ener~iydisapral a t Gaines' Mills we had an opportunity to enjoy wae thoroughly appreciated by bnth men and . exception of a few hours on the previous night w, a little after noon of May J l t h , when the e n g a z t commenced. We hnve no record qf the Confedgrate On the Union side Lieutenants THOMAS R. EDK-, 6th
[ERRITT'S

with MCCLELIAN'B eeven From Malvern we won and Shirley's. Several from Haxall's down the stream we could see quite( a fleet of ressel8, abnrrt two miles dietaot, marking the position of Berdrida Hundred, where General BUTLER eprd his command were located. On making our appearance on the banke of the river some excitement w h caused among the gunboats. with hoatile preparations, but this was changed to a friendly greeting from the when the character of the command WIW officers and men of the discovered. W e were covered and begrimed with dust and dirt, 80 that a close inspection waa n e c e d r y to. tell the color of the uniform. a n d in addition t o bearing the marks of travel over the bot and duety roads of Virginia, the nien and horses were hungry and half famished. The t h , m days' rations that we had started with had been made to last six, and the h o r n had eaten very littld but gras since the morning of the 11th. . Kations and supplies were 9 n obtained and the men were refreshed by bathing in the waters of thelJames. A party. consisting of an officer of P. LACY (;ODDARD, of General SAERIone of the horse batteries, on board of one of the gunboats and .DAN'S star, and the the Papmaeter, who treated US made the very kindly and hospitably. had formerly served aa a ferry-boat, W e found that this runuing between and provided with a forGovernment to the river with books and passing over gmund days fighting while reached the Jaines

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In some cases their presen were attached to piec had discovered one taking our leave we p and full naval rigs, taking a bath in the arrayed ourselves in the have been '&recherche" h a g k e wagons since

division, where thirty men were killed and wounded.

we proceeded leisurely down the c'hickahominy

tdj

aking a short march, went into camp near the Chickahominy a t Bottom's next dny the Corps CM rough White O a k swamp to Malvern Hill.

d trees. -1day or two previous they bout 276 pounds of powder. Before t h e Paymaster some underclothing Ilars. wide troueera and all, and after ed our old clothing to t h e deep and presenting a n appearance that must W e had been ~epamtedfrom our and had .been BO constantly that ft had h e n impossito wash properly. O n continuing without intermission for sereral/hours, in the direction of G m d RUTLER'R line. I

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N'S EXPEDITION AROUND K I C H M O S D .
g mme of hb officers crossed the riger and informed us
had attacked our forces, and at first gained some advanIsed, leaving the L'nion troops in posthat they held before the fight. O u r d been able to carry with us were cared for in Gennd, and our prisoners, amounting to over 200, were er in transports. Here, a h , we bade adieu tl) the we had released from captivity at Bearer 1)ani lieved from all impedimenta posible. Sothitie to the 17th except to send a few scouting parties cbmond. MERRXTT'Wdivision wns kept i n the Hill, and a rest waa taken, reutlerecl iiecz.+sary the animals. On the evening of the l i t h I rodr n Hill to darry some directions to Geiieral . \ l m w r . r . one at he should get his alirision in rcatIiiie$s to sent me to see that a portion o f the rty of pioneers a t work upon it. :ind a t mps broke camp and nmred nu the e,ou the Chickatioininp, bv way of St. .\[nry's C'lirirc-h. h t and, after many delays. arrived in the inorniiig :it W ~ deetroyed, Y but a good ford having been dincove command passed safely a w n s the Chickahoininy, arth works 11ad1,een colithis poiut, but we fonntl us. After halting for two haursye pushed on, h i t rather of bad roads. the rain having commenced etirly in the ry hard for several hours, made the traveling s evening we arrived a t Battiinore Crtm b a d : , where we ace being said to'be twenty-four miles from Itictlniontt. g to Dr. TYLER, and n building known as the '' Old h l place. Both \yere (ler =me tiilie. 'rile rnale ir homes as we approached, but t h e country h small parties of mounted meu, whom we regirdetl u.4
EERIDAN

I n carryiiig out the details of this usrtermaster of the c o r d , was .sent all ewort to Fortrew Mohroe to ob-

and a quantity of c brigade then retired

satisfactorily demo withdrew w-ith his

stores were captiired a t the station. The annvertowi nnd enramped for 1 the night. ertainetl that 'a large f h e of Cony were at the railroad bridge over reiiikmernentJ for LEF. Having resence by a rec.onnoiss...ance,CUZTER ined the c o r p at the Whit4 House on

he White House on the "1st. ringers snd the flooriag had been

as to the whereabouts of the arniy, and the be taken, and upon this point, General SHEHIIBAN ;.aye : happened to the h r m y of the I't~tom:ic* m of how to get back and wherc t o larlg so,as I knew that reiufi,ri.t?inenti Richniontl. I t1ierefi)re clcterrninc(l t o ey river a t the White Houje,aud scut tt) For.1rc.s.- JIOII-

the 6th Pennsylvania C

been Bent

to We4t Poi

officer to bring the r e

and the supplies were issued t o the troop


I

Id Harbor a number of dispatches were taken to the time that we remained at Baltimore C r o s use. This was8 dangerous mission. as the country lled by small partiea of mounted meti who mere without regular uniform. left with a n escort of' ,about three men front Geii-

marched through Lainis about ten miles Erom

measuring with the eye our relative tlistmtces I

ad, I concluded that mine \nu the nearest a d rd, which I did, taking a faster gait. soot1 M on the other road urged their horses to a run. \\'e
ort and myself being well mounteii reachell the ompetitom, and went on dowit the ninii~ r o d t as we could, saluted hy a volley of climes tinct race continued for a distance but the eueniy j - o ~ i ngave re delivered safely to Geneml C+REI;I;. lie same day r e did uot see nnytfiing of' nitr the morning, and arrived tit IteticIqu~irters r a d v e n t u m During the Z'lst and '>&I our headquarters Chstis mansion. In times past the place m u s t hare been ts old shade trees, situated on the \):inks of a inguished and charniing society, h i t when we and in sad want of repair. The briclxe aced in condition to bear artillery and w~igoiis,the 1st I)iof the 22d, a n d h n the moriling of the 2:kl h e wagon train The striicture IF& ahout -five feet high, made of trestle ~)lattked side, and was rather a terrifying lookiag and mules, and we liad grent trouhle in petting sonit. o rnules fell from the bridge into the river. :lilt1 beiiig in harness, were drowtietl. IVIiile the g over, a small boat .mme d o m the river with t w o rd. O n e of them waa energetically wsvittg a white to a stick, and as the boat npprnnchetl neeitled niore regard to the charwter of the craft. s i n e s of this novel flag of truce, arid '.seemed to hc i l r conanmid. h:ul come t t ) ed under guard by us tlie day b e t h e

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of Kichmond with moderate marches,

little attention to the repeated

Fighting dismounted, when practicable, and the ground


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evinced in a command confident in its ability to take to meet euccessfully any effort that the enemy was neral STEPEEN D. LEE arys in a letter quoted in of Cavalry": "A large body of cavalry 89 now alhost a n y emergency; it is an army in motion and is terrible, and against coinmunications, magazines,
I

nce to be observed between expeditions of the dashes by cavalry into the enemy's country constiTRENCH'S, " Cavalry in Modern W a r " ie ious that caval& bodies of such strength enness, secrecy and rapidity which are the ristica of a cnvalry raid."
d eluding him by feiuta and doing all

my would have ended


the Wilderness and this expedition w q the first valrg corps of the Army of the Potomac under their been thus far successful and all were favorably imh his untiring energy, and ability as a soldier, which had been shown clearly in every emergency. and dence was inaugurated betweela General SHERIIJAN ,which continued, never to be broken, gaining strength a n aggregate of 623 killed, wounded and e to find among the Confederate arcbives by the generals concerned, of the part here are but few data

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subjected to the test of practical experience. I shall treat the subject somewhat I)roatlly, from :he point of view of the etrafegic use of the arm. I shall irot go into the details of the several cavalry engagements, interesting-c~ad.ingtrrictiveas I know them to be, but shall leave them to be made'& subject of separate tactical studies. On @ e . morning of. J u n e 1, 1863. the armies of the Potomac and Korrheru Virginia still confronted each other, in the lines which they had reoccupird at t h e close o ?the Chancellorsville campaign. That cnmpaign had terpinated so decisively in favor of the Confederates that au enrly movement, in the nature of an offensive, might have been and was daily expectgd by Generals H AI.I.ECE and HOOKER. I t \vas alm, if not knoyn, a t least shrewdly suspecjed by the latter that the Confederate niovemeiit

326

CA ~ A L R Y IN THE GETTYSBURG C A J I P A I G ~ V .

P A VALRI I N W E GETTYSBURG CAMPAIG.I1.

327

to the intent/ons of h b antagonist, for before any movement of the .\rnry of the Pot0 ac had been fully determined upon, LEEhimself assumed the initiativ , by putting his .army in motion towards the Valley of Virginia. Suchladvantage, whether political or military a . goes \ \ i t h the oflensive h a .ng been gained by his adversary, the more diiiicult task remained to OOKER of ascertaining the. moveinen ta of his euerii\ , ant1 of 80 regulat ng his owr as to keep hiJ force, a t any cwt, between that enemy and the city of Washington. The cou ry lying in the triangle between the Pot+nac, IZnpliahannock and S nandoah rivers was to be the immediate theatre of operations of the contending armies. The area thus i n c l u d e nap, in sonre reepects, faeopble and in others decidedly uufavorable to military operations. Acrose its western border run two ranges of iiiciuntairis: the Blue Ridge and the Bull Run or Catoctin range. They lie about titteen miles apart; their @ne& course is from northeast to aoutliwest, nutl they are of gaps or pwses, which were destirietl to play an

F
3

ock rivers. The country is generally wooded, with growth standing ?10 closely as to constitute - nearly to the movement of the troops-and a t times, to pre-

I t is importapt to remember this, for it was chiefly upon these narrow roads that thg Army of the Potomac was required to move. The o r g a b t i o n of both armies had been subject to important modifications. T C infantry of the Army of the Potornac was organized into e v e n army ckrps: the 1st. 2d, 3d, 5 t h , 6 t h , 11th and 12th; having a strength pr+nt for d u t y on J u n e YO, 1863. of ii,fW mhn. Each of these corps contained three divisions of infantry and a brigade of artillery. T h e artillery ,was composed of sixty-five batteries ( 3 i O guns ). Of these, thitty-five batteries (212 guns) were attached, in brigades of five batteriea each, to tde infantry corps. Kine horse batteries, (fifty guns), were attached to t e cavalry corps, and twbnty-one batteries, ( 108 guns), were i n the Gene Artillery Reserve. The personnel of the artillery consisted of 7,18 officers and men. The cavalsy was organized into a corps of three divis us. Ita strength at any particular moment is very difficult P to determine,lowing to the p t loss of horses during the campaign. The mounted on J u n e 1. 1863, was less than 8,000 men: late in Jline, by the abeorption of General STAHELS , .

i
i

command, but was never able to muster, at any time, more than 9,ooO inoiirited men. The infantry of the Army of Sorthern Virginia w a s organized into three corps, coninlanded by Generals EWELL,I,OXCHTREET and A. P. HILL. Its erective total on M a y 21, 1863, was .54,:3.56 men. The Confederate artillery was coni poseit of fifteen battalions, of four batteries each, aggregating 2-57 gulls an114,461) men ; and of one battalion of horse artillery. ( six hatteric.5 of thirty gun6 I , which was attached to the cavalry. The cavalry retained, i b divi&n organization, and WLJ composed of five liri. pades, aggregating. on JIay;:<lst,!1,536men The strength of the cavalry division, like- that of the Federal cavalry corps. was subject to coiistant fluctiiation, due to the same cause - 1 ~ s of horses i n campaiglr.* On J u n e 3, 1563, the t h e e corps of infantry composing tlre Army of Northern Virginia were encamped along the south hank of the Kappahannnck, on a line ertendiog from the fortitied position of Fredericksburg, to the east antl southeast as far as Hamiltons crossing. From that point, the fords of the upper Ibppaharinock were observed and held by STVARTP cavalry, the rqain part of which was hirouacked in the open air hetween Culpeper Cour/ House and Brandy Station. The Federal irrfantry still t)ccul)ietl i@ cdntounieyts a t Fa1mout.h. To the right and somewhat tt) the rear. the civalry cokps, under (;enera1 ILLASANTON, was massed a t Warrenton Junc.&m, charged with the duty of,maintailIin~a line of nutpiists. e r t e n d i n ~ f r o ~a n point on the north bank of the Rappahannock. :i few miles west of Falmouth, to the west and northwest as f g as \Varrenton. From iime to time, sniall bodies of the Federal cava l ; ~were pushed ink-e ~ w w . t x ybetween :the Orange & -4lexandria railway :in11tlre upper KH tlau, to check the-operationsof partisan corps. and to give timely iiifornia ion of any iiioveiirents of the enemy in that quarter. + J>EEP first ohjective d e Culpeper Court House, a center from which two syfitelns i i f road d i r e r e - o n e to the northeast, leading to J l a n a s w , Fairfax antl Alesandria: tlie other to the north and northwest, leading to the Slicuandoah Valley. Leaving HILLS corps to occupy the lines at Fretlerickebiirg. tlie corps ,of EWELL and LOXO-REETwere put in niotion towarils Ciilpeper, whkh was reached by 1 ~ 0 S 4 ; s ~ R E t i T advance S on was the evening of .June 7th.; By nightfall of the 8th, LONGSTREET joined liy EWELI,. The bovement to that point was tu be covered by STCARTS cavalry, and w to be dimuered, if possible, bj- the Federal cavalry under !I.EAs.isTn . LEES intentione were accurately suspected wht), on .iund 6@1, directed PLEASANTON t n make H reconby HOOFER,

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32R

CA V e L R Y I N THE G E T n * S B U R C C64MPAIGAV.

noiseance in f rce iu the direction of Culpeper, to ascertain whether a n y Confederate igfantry had yet ariived i n that vicinity. To increase PLEASANTON'U forc t4e mistake was made of attaching two brigades of in. fantry to his ommand .Just how these infantry b r i e d e s were to aerist General PLE BANTON, who was engaged i n ' a n undertakinp in which celerity of m vement, rather than force, \vm eswntial to succes, does not appear. . The prob in before General PLEARANTOS \vm td awertain whether the (:otifetler te army or auy considerahle portion of it was moving upon the roiitl Iiet\ ectt Fretlerickr;l)urg aucl CuIpelwr. It' iucli a indiiwurre was i n progr w he was to ascert:iin snmethitig :I+ to its state of fiwwardlati c # e corps o r niore reaclied C'iilpept:r:' \V:is any force i n motion IIW. to the west o , that town, and if so. i n what i l i r e c t i i ) ~ ~ ? H e knew that STU.4I:T'J co inland wad biroiiackkd somewhere i n the yicinity of I h n d y Station, and his kiiiiwledge would be of avail i t t tletrriniiiiitg the otreogth and coiiiposi on of his rectiunoiteriitg c ~ ~ l u n i ~ i s - i t sonie point (ju the north bank of tlie Xapp:iliannork PLEASANTON divided his t:gtnm:ind into three columns. One, which lie accompanied, corupose~l of BL'FORD'Y division and .ISIE:-' brigatle of infantry. was to crl)sq a t everly ford aud nuive, by St. .lunie..i church and Gee's house, to 13 andy Station. The secotttl, conilicm,ai of ~ + R E G G ' * and DUFFIK'S diyisions and KUSEI.I.'S brigade of iiifiiotry, \vas to cross at Kelly'a fort1.l and move. by Shscklefiml'r, to the m ) ~ s i t i gnf Mountain conirnatiti '\vas to sepaRun, uear +(lone's house. -It that point GREGC'R rate. his ':."a, division moving by the direct rnatl past Jlodnt Dumpling to h a n d y S t h i o n , while DUFFIE'S division was to take the left hand road by C . DOGG+T'S, MADDEN and I)oG(;ETT'* houses t o Stevensburg and beyond. E a .h of the three columns eiicouotered the enemy. attacking him ducces4 IIy, in p i i n t of time 'frotii right to left. the rigbt column under BVFOD being the first to engage, followe~la t short intervals hy 1 ahall not enter into the details of this remarkGREW and ~ UFFIE able engage e n t which is worthy of beiug made the suk),ject of a separate tactical stud- , for it is with the operations of tlies; column? RJ gatherers of informati n as to LEE'Smovements that I propose to deal. After a hattle lastiu nearly all day, in which the fortune of war rested first with one and th n wit9 m o t h e r of-* contestan-. the Federal caralry returiied un olested to the north bank of the Rnppahannock.'and there \ v b an oppottunity to ascertain what had been gained during the day in the y a p of i/iformation 8e to the enemy'w morements BITFORD hnd GREW had encountered the cavalry of the enemy, which 7 ' had been s u d p o r t d . a n d relieved hy his infantry towards the close of the day. T o what e x G n t or in what force that infantry had appeared on tho .therefore, to iufer from field \vm nc$ accurately k t t ( b ~ t ~ .I t \ r ~ ~ fair.

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these operatioils that there ww an infantry force of the eueniy i n tlie who must h a r e crossed and recross4 the vicinity of ('ulpeper. DUFFH':, and EWM,I, had entered Culroad by wliich the corps of IASGPTRCXT peper, di<l iiot exailline the road to ascertain that fact. or if lie did, m n d e no report of thc result of' his exatitiiiition. It is c1:iinicd i n Iwhalf of General I ' I . E A r A x m > s that :I part of STI-ART'S hent1cliiartc.r btipcage \vas captured early i n thc, thy, i n which certain papers were t i ) i i i i ~ I ,disclosing the p i i r p t i . ~of tlic. (:orttivlt~tiite movemeut. at111provitic h.y(ittd clouht t1i:it I d ~ ~ :;Iriity ' s W:I< on its to the ?;heiiaiidosli Valley. This daiini, thi~ph a c c c p t d by the COX@TE I ) E PARI*, is stoutly Ilenitvl liy .C;n?At:T's friend$. I t wouttl have beeti certainly a reniark1ildt, cirt~unwtaticc~ if 80 prudent a I I I H I I RZ Gtbtierd LEE liacl forntulsted his ititeritilm at so c:irly a period of the catii1,aigii; i t is still m w e remnrk:ible tliiit lie sltou111h a r e etitrusteil them i t t writing to even Y trusted +uliorclin:ite. ::: If' such tleq)atclies or incnii,raii(l:i were t'ouiid anti tratimitted to Geiirral HOOKER, the-. certainly itid not c-lcar his mind of doul)t :I* to LEE'Spurpose$,siiltce lie :id ? b it3 that there was great uncertainty as t o the erieitty's intention on the 12t11,:itid evcn so late a~ the ?let of J u t i t . . It niu-t IN, :i~lniitte~l therefire that the ni1)rernent of the Fecler~l r:iv:tlry 011 1htid.v Siatioit hat1 not Ijecn fruitful of results i n the shape of nittlicuti~~ itifortn:itia)ti :is tt) the m o v r i n e n t ~of tlte rneniy. It had . h ~ w i i liiiwevcar, , t h t nu(-ti irifurtpiatioti \ v a s tc~ Iw oimined by a hoI(l. wcllclirrcte(1 :iiii1 energetic quwt. I t \VL+ R I I ol,jec~tlesson, ho\vever. i i i a t i e w dtratcpicsl cmploynieiit of the arni, wliich the leaders of the Fetterti1 q r u l r y were not slow i n learning. The h t t l e of 13mnlIy Station illrwtnites t w i tnethrid- of etnplliying ca v d ry , w l i i c * h have 1)ceti slowly making their way into general recognit i o n i n nto~lrrtiw i r : l i t Its *Pp:irate rniplc~vrnettt against the cavalry I ut' the enemy. 211. It?; eniployment. in siifficient tiirre to I w wlfpiistitiiiitig. h r tht. purpose: t n I of chtaining intlmtiation of the encniy's movement; ( I/ 1 ot' p r e v e i i t i n ~the enemy's cavalry front ohtaininp similar iiifiJrnintio3. )f the I.'cvlcr:il c:iv:ilry, this engagenlent niap 1)t~ saitl tal have been :I succe~iful i1Iustr:itiott of the t;irtiier use, but n n ilt).;liwediIl esutnple l i t ' the latter. In so thr :as t h e Confederate cavalry \viis concerned, it i- a tiiatter ot'surpriic--u~ the attack? upon it were timed-that it escaped 4lcstrurtion ; tbr, under the circuniPtances. to h a r e escnl)etl de*truction, \vas, i u itself, n h r i l l i : ~ ~ success. t I t is nlso not n little reniarkt iible that $ ( I :il)lt. and wary a qetierat 11s .CjTI-AR.r \vas-a v t * p niaater of the m t ciutpwt clut.v--shmld have been so taken l y surprise >IS he \raa o n this ocm-iott. IImI the Federal c ~ ~ t i i n i : ~ n ~ weti I e r his opptirtiinities
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'71

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1bttn.r trn
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r*,ittry - ) I D I N , \ g l : t f < v l I t ~ t i e . 6 i w t : ; . fssrnwll\ rpaliit..!tql rt.trtr> n i I , I , < ~ \ ' - r t . i n l > , ; I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ,1 1 V~ .,14r~nj~.,.t, I I ~ IN.IIM iLifr;e. a i i , l I,t~irilt.r.'.vi ihe < i \ l l \ \ : ~ r , ' l , ~ , :tY,. .
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330

C A V L R Y I N THE GETTYSRC-RRG (.'AMPAIG.\-.


with the oig& and skill that STUART displayed in the conduct of an obstinate and d8sperat.e defense, the Confkdevte cavalry woul~lhave been One result dealt a blow from which i t would hardly have recovered. of incalculabk importance certainly did follow this battle-it t m d e the Federal cavalry. Up to this time confessedly inferior to the S~)utliern horsemen, they gained on this day that confidence in theniselver :tiid their cbmrnanders which enabled them to contest so tierccly the s t i l i ~ e ~ ~ i t e n t battle-fields o f dune, J u l y and October. '% W e hare seen that the corps of EWELL and h s ( ; + T K E E T h;ul .surceedecl in rewhiug Culpeper on J u n e 8th and ! ) t h . f I r I . I A ' s carp, which had heen left in the lines at E'retler&ksl)urg, to ni:L*k this niovemeilt. \ w s withdrawn o n J u n e 14th and reached Crilpeper on the fullowing d:iy. HOOKER, in nrder to conform to the movement$ lit' hi5 atlversitry. o n juti it^ . 11th established the 3d Corps on the north bank ot' the 1~:iplialt:ittril)c.k. hetween Bevdrly Ford and RappShaahock Station. 0 1 1 the fi)lltbwiiig 1Ith Corps were ordered, the former t i t 13ealvtim. : i t i d the . latter day the to let Cot1 t's Station on the Orange & , Alexan~lri:ir:tilw:iy, 'These . I three corps copstituted the right wing of the Army of the 1'otoni:ic. atid General RE\. -OLDY was asignetl to contninttd the whnle. 'Tlle.;e i i w v e men& were de with the douhle purpose of confronting LF:Ei n hi+ new position, and of covering \Vashinytot: from 11 rcpetitbiu lit' .J.I(-K*os's 'maneuvre of j the preceding year. ! . , The initia ive in the next niovemeut rested with General LEE. Hi3 first objective had been Culpeper, his eecond mas to be the fijrc1.s of the reference I to the mapawill show two ranges nt' ntt)unupper Pot6m c. . tains, croain the theater of operations from nortli to south. nit11~1iet:iitt from each o t e r upon an average fifteen miles. Between t h e rnnzez: livs the Loudon v a l l e y ; to the west of the Blue Ridge lies the v:tlltay ~ ) tthe ' Shenandoah. The eaitern range c r o w s the Potnntar :it the I'tlitit t i t Rocks-the estern at Harper's Ferry. Below the Point ot' I L B I . tlic ~~ Potomac is rely fordable; above Harper's Ferry the f1)nIs :in\ 1 1 1 1 rnerous and practicable. especially in the summer. h t h r;ingw : m a pierced by frfquent gaps'or passes, most of which, though practic:il)le 1i)r Lroops of all arms, are easily defended and are thus suxc1-tcibIe # i f being converted into efficient military obstacles. The north and w i i t l i nmls in the Sheuandoah Valley are very good, especially in suninier: t h ( J . i C of the Loudou Valley are less good, while those in the area hetmwr the Bull Run-Catoctin mountains and the Potomac are extremely had. For thcse reasons, LEi..determined to p a s the larger part of his infantry and artillery through the valley of the Shenandoah. The rangcs of' niountains on thk righti of his column would thus constitute R wrecn. concealing his movements from the obserratioti of the enemy. Rut t h ,
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Cd V A L R Y IN THE BETTYSBC-RG CAJfPAIGN.


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331

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mountain ranges alone, however well they may h k e heen situated for that purpose, were not to be his sole reliance in screeuing hk march, for, as we eliall presently see, the Loudon Valley and the passss connecti n g it with the region to the east. were to be watched and held by STUART, supported, if need be, by LONOBTREET'S corps of Confederate infantry. F r o m his left flank, in his northward march, I J t E had little ' to fear. H e therefore disposed hi4 marchiug columns in the fnllowing order: On the morning of .June 10th EWEIL'S corps was pili in ntntioit fibr the Shenandoah, ria Springrille, Gaines crossroads and Flint hill, HILL and LONGSTREET were to follow Inter; the latter by the I m h n Valley, partly. as I have said, to support STCART, and partly to lend t h r eitemy 1 1 the to believe that J l a n s s w and C'entreville were the real objectives. 0 column passed through ('liestrr Grip and 12th the head of EWEIL'S reached the Shenandoah a t Cedarville. .JENKINS' brigntle i,f carnlry had accompanied E ~ T E I and . ~ . IJIHODEN'Sbrigade had joined hini i n the ralley : the former covering the advance ancl the latter the left flank t i t ' the advancing c ~ o l i t m n . -\ftcr passing the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap R o I ) ~ ' division. prccedetl I)? JESRISF' cavalry, was detached to iittiic-k and destroy ,\IClZEYsoLDs' brigade of Federal infantry, whic4t wiis I i l i s t e t l a t Thr. rest of I~~WI~:I,L's Berryrille, nl)ciitt twelve ittiles east of \\'inchester. corps cotititiited, vi(( Stevensburg and Kernstown, to \Vitichcster. 'l'he niilitiiry tlistrict of which \Vinchester i+ the centre \\:is O ) I I I ntanded by General JIILKOI.. His conititand was indepetii~mt of t h a t 111' General HOOKER, and he was not informed by either H O O K E~I.\LI,P:CK I~, or his o w i cavalry. of the rapid advance of EWEI.I.*S colrirriii, r l t i d it \VIIS not until late on the 11th that he wm made aware'of his dnngrr. l h e r a u l t need hardly he stated. I : con~manderwho expects the ('oniniatlding Genernl of the -4rniy to do hi3 out-post \Fork for him. is tint likely t o find that personage a sufficient substitute fo\ n vigilant atid erlter+rising cavalry -indeed, it may perhaps be questidned, whether II.iI.I.Ec);. in as etticieitt scbrvirr in his office in Washington, was able to render MILROY this respect as he might hare gotten from some of hi:: raw levies of \Vest Virginia H o F ~ who , wore plug haw and called their otticerrr l y their Christian names LEE'S columns were now stretched out to a dangerous length. inviting irretrievable disaster had he been opposed by a general less hnnipered O n .Jiint? 14th with inctrrtctions from Washington than was HOOKER. EWEI,L. having inflicted a crushing defeat upon MII.Rns -- whont he had compelletl to ahandon his artillery and trains auci to retire j n great cimfusion upon HASCOCK and H a r p e f s Ferry - reeumed hi3 route, with JESKISS' iind INBODES'S cavalry i n front and flank, toward Willianie'

>I(.<'I.EI.I.As's "('ampaignso f *tunrt's ~ ' t t \ a I r y . pnm' '' 3 t

332

CAVALRY IN THE QETTYSBURG C.4JlPAIGiY

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C A V A L R Y IN THE GETTYSBURG CAJfP.iIGN.

333

port, the place appointed by the Confederate commander for the crossing
of the Potomac.

While General LEEhad no intention of entering the region between Warrelton and Fairfax, in which he had operated PO successfully the
to helieve that an previous summer, he was not unwilliug to lead HOOKER invasion of that territory was among the possibilities of the near future. To that end LONOSTREET was moved from Culpeper on ,June 15th, w i t h orderij to enter the, Loudon Valley and appear to'threnten Ideesl)nrg,

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retur$ng when t h i t purpose had been accomplished. by :\shl)y's and Snickbr's G a p s A 3 this rnaneuvre would bring hini within easy striking dista&e of t h s Federal advance under' REYNOLDS, STUART \vas directed Z ROBERTSON and IV. H. F. L E E , to ninsk with the brigades of F ~ TLEE, the movement of LOSGSTREET by moving his cavalry in front and on the right flank of the infantry column. .To perforn~ this task efkctirely it waa n e c e m r y to occupy ani1 hohl hldie and Thoroughfare Gaps. These are tde'two central pasws through the Bull Kun m o u n t a i n s : through the ormer runs tbe main road fro'm \Vinchester to Alexandria; by the latterfthe JIauassas G a p IZail\vny,gains nn entrance into tlie IAou- ' don Valley. STUART. bn June 15th. pushetl forward to occupy 'Thoroughhre ancl Aldie Gape. assigning to CITA3IRI.IrJ. tenipnrarily corninsuding the brigd e of W. d . F. LRE, the task of occupying the fornier, nntl to Colonel MUXFORD, mho a t tbe moment comn1;irIcled the hrigallr. i i f F:rzrir.c;~r LEE, that of occppyiug the latter. HOI~ERTSOY'S hrigailc w w clirected to Rectortown,:a point in tbe Loudon Valley, from which he ci)ulil reinforce either f?rxA>iI3LtPs or NUSFORD should occasion arise. l l i c I)ri,oadei of J o r ~ s sip1 Hairt"rox were left t o guard the fiirdii of the h p p a h a n nock and co' er the inarch of HILL :i'ri)iii-Fn?tleric.ksI)ur;: t o the Shenandoah. ~ I U N F O + moving , by Salein, Piedmont and Upperville, rt.nched >liddleburg on June l i t h , a n d halted hetweeu that town ancl Aldie, I w h i n g hie pickets. 'however, through the pass tn the eastern slope of the I I I O I I I I bin. As there seemed to bc no prospect of a Federal admuce, by way of Warrenton and the upper courses of the h p i c l a n , ~COBFXTSOS was moved. on +e l i t h , froni Kectortoen to Middleburg. On the suile dny C~AB~L 1 y C a aSwithdrawu E from Thoroughfare Gap. nnd, on tlie l H t l i , he, too, arriped at Middleburg. W e ha s e n that the three corps mnstituting the advance of the Army of t e Potomac, under RESNOLDS, were moved, o n J u n e I3th, to Bealeton a d Catlett's Station. On the same da\-the cavalry wa.u m a s 4 at Warren n Junctiou. EwF.~.~. attack on >IILROY, at Winchester. proved that a very considemblc hirce o t Coilfederate infantry was on its way to I'enneylvania,

and it now became necessary for HOOKER to dispcrae his force to conform to the probalile intentions of the enemy. .So, twtween . 6 n e 14th and 1 Tth, the several corps were moved to their right and r m r , nnd arrnngert in two lines: the first. c o r n p o d of the lst, l l t h , :hi arid 5th, nccupying tlie line between Herndon's $tation, on the Loiitlon d Hanipshire railway, nntl ,\Iann%ws Junction ; the second, compowl of the I5th, 6th and -!d clirps,occupying a line extending from Fnirfax C'ourt House due south to the Occoquan. This niovement of the Federal iirfniitry was covered by I'LEA~ASTON. and it had hardly k e n completed, \vhen HOOKER lieterniiiicd to eniploybis cavalry in n bold attempt to push thrnugh to the Shenandonh, if need be, to obtain snme definite inforniution I L ~to the atrength and purposes of the enemy. On the 17th I'LEASASTOS war directed to the vicinity t)f Aldit., with orders t o p&s the gap and ascertain what the enemy \vas doing in the Loudim Vnlley and tLeyontl. t i e was supported i n this undertaking hy I<.IRsE~' division of the 5th Corps. He tnok with him BUFORD'.* and ( ; R ~ : I ; G ' s divisions of the Cavalry Corps-detaching I)UFFI$, with a single regiment. to make n ddoitr, by Thoroughfare (;ap and the wster:i slope of the Hull R u n mountains, to Niddlebiirg, R movement which \vi11 he de.scribed a little farther on. It IVHS Pi.E-\s.is.ros'* purpose to force his way. a c r o s thc Loudon Valley, to hshliy'a ( k i p i i i the I3Iiie Ridge; for i t was nnly I)y rea(-hinp that point thnt he v o i i l i l oI)tiiiii any relinhle inforr~iationof the Confederate forces in the rnllt~yof the Slienan(lonli.

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'The di.upo.4tioii of STUART'S force, on the niorniiig of' .I line lTth, 1 1 % ~ . alreatly been ilescribed. ML-SFORDwar a t Dover llills, a short ali$tmic.e to the west of Aldie, with outposts. on the road to the giip to tlie east iif tht. t o w n . CIIAMBLISS w a s between Thoroughfare Gap and .Ilil~llchurg; I<OBEKrSON between k c t o r t o a n and JIiddleburg ; both converyin:: II])I)II that point, which they reached, the lnttef on the e w i n g of the I i t h , the fornier OII the morning of the 18th of .June. 1 1 1 advancing upon Ahlie, GREGli'B division w:i$ phced H t the head of oiitlioste 's werv enthe Federnl cnlrinin, antl. a t about 2 r. >I.. J ~ ~ - S F O R D counterctl and driven hack through the town. 11: the enpgetiient that ensued. iri which there was much brilliant fighting o n h n t l i .&IcJ-- Iroth inounted and on timt -the advantage rerunined w i t h (;enaxl (;HEC:O, who held the field at the cl1)ee of'the day. ~ I L - X F O R DI)rigntlt. '~ withclrew troni2 the tield a t about dark, in obedience to orders to that e H k t froin General SrrART Its retirement was effected in good order and w i t h o i t t rnolestaitiuin t'roni the enemy. \Vith a view to axertairi wliether any conriderahle force of the enemy was moving in the uppcr Liiiidori Valley, Colonel I ) V F F I I , with the 1st Rhotle Island Cavalry, directwl I I (;enem1 ~ ~'I.L.:A~ANTONto paw through 'rhl,l;otighfare (;ap a n t 1 esailiiiie the counK L Q

334

CAVALRY

THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGAY;t

C A V A L R Y IAV THE GETTI*SBt-RG C~AJf1AIG.Y.


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far to the north HY 3fiddleburg. There it was expected that he would rejoin.th+ body after i t had passed Aldie Gap, and specific passed Thoroughfare Gap given him to that effect. DIJFFIE 3n the 17th: a t 4 P. 31. he encountered the outposts of HTUuarter guard i n - t h e outskirts of the town of Middleburg. uickly clriven in, hut disclosed the fact that the place was held by the e n e q . I ) I * F F I ~ orders, Y moot unwisely, required him to encamp at Middleti!rg on the night of the 17th. I say unwist?ly, for PLEAFAXTON was no then in possession of the town, nor was he certain of his ability to occupy i even hy nightfall of the 17th. D r ~ ~ ~ k ~ . , r e c o n n o i s ~ ~ n c e WBB for the (purpose of ckhtaiuiug information ; when waa obtaineb, hie orders should have required or it to the libes of his own army, wherever they nation of ridays march, in the face of the e n e m y e point within that resulted in defeat. and enemys lin$e, is not sound. strategy. In this into a comconverted 9 h a t might hare been a succ

+ize i)f I k F f I k S command. however. wns soon

hurried foTvartl with :I view to surround and capture DI-FFILS entire command. i A t +even oclock iu the morning he wa3 attacked by RORERTSONS briga4e. His men fought bravely and repellet1 innre t h i i u one charge by the same road by

Centreville earl? in tlic afternoon twenty seven men. no important movements were undertaken nit either and STUART in preparing passed hy both PLEASANTOX

( GREOOR division of Jlitlcllehurg and town. From this were dislodged by a surcemfiil rlimiounted and obliged to take up a positiou about half a

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~ ~ ~ ; ~ i . ~ . i . ~ ~ ~pi>. . . ;~ ~ ~.. : ~ I I I~ : - ,~ ~ , i r l ,

b i l e th their rear. On the evening of this clay STL-ART was reinforced by the arrival of JOXEY brigade, which \vas ptwted at V n b n . On the arrived and \viis: statitntctl on the Vppermorning of the 20th HAYITOX who \ v u niovcd over to the left of the ville road, replacing CHAMBLISS, h e . in front o f Union. STrraRT now had w i t h Iiini five Iriqades of cavalry aiid occupied a line extentling froiu ~liddlel~rirg, clue uorth. to L-nion. Opposed to him were the six b r i p l e ~ c~ilnpnsing the divisions of , supported by B a ~ s ~ dirisioii a ~ j t betleral infantry. BuFoRmand GREGO. On the 31st the initiative was a p i u taken hy Pr.r.:AsAs.roa. A t 8 A. 31. BUFORD advanced on the L-nion road, with instructions to t u r n the left flank of the Confederate cavalry. C;RF:(;G nilriincrll, simultaneously with RI.FORI),with orders to engage the attention of the enemys right. A s is often the case i n war, the parts to be played by Gixim and BUFORD were reversed, OREGOS feint becoming the priiicipil attack. STUART \vas steadily pushed back, through Upperrille. kJiv:ird the eastern elopes of the Blue Ridge fie retired ~lo\vly, s t u b h r n l y eonteatiug every inch of ground, and a t Iiightfall formed line of 1i:ittle :icraw the L-pperville pike about two niiles west of the t o w n . Here. after tighting for the day reiuforced by a hriptle of LOSOBTREBTS had entirely ceased, he W ~ J infantry. On the morniiig of J u n e 12d PLEAS.L.STON retired and rejoined e s t d i s h e d hie headthe ,4rn1y of the Potomac; ou the Same clay STLAKT quarters a t Rectors cross roads, on the A l ~ l i e and \Vinchester pike, between Upperrille and Middleburg. PLEABANTOSS success in the engagelneuts i t Iltlie, J1iddIel)urg and Upperville had beeu nioet encouraging; the niore iis t1ic.y were calculsted to inspire both officers and men of his commiin(1 w i t h vamfidence in their atlvewary. In a capacity to cope, on equal terms, with their retloui~t;il)lc series of encounters covering a period of five 11:iy.- - IIrtween .June 17th and sr-he had succeeded in reaching the 1 ) : ~of the I3liic Ridge at Snickers Gap. Partly fro111 the obserratioua of hi5 wouts and partly from the etubboru character of STUARTS resi..it;ittce, he had ascertained infantry was rnoviug northward the gencra-act that the mass of LEES through the Shenandoah Valley. H e does not went to have learned, however, that LOSOSTREETS corps had entered the Loudon Valley, or that i t had passed through Ashbys and ,Snickers Chips into the valley of Virginia. General LEEhad now fully conlniitte 1 his army to the scheme W H Y sufficiently well inof invading Pennsylvania; Geberal HOOKEX formed of the plans of his adversary to enable hint tn conform his movementa to those of the enemy. Both generals, for the next few days, stood leas in need of their cavalry than a t a n y t h e since the ciimpai.qo began. The cavalry, which had been employed almost without intermission ,for more than two weeks in the performance of arclriour Rad unfamiliar duties, stood milch in need of rest. But this it waa not to have. The

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('-4 V A L H Y

I L \ . THE QE'TTZ3BL'KG C'AJfPA1G.V.

337

e right, between l-ork and H a r r i h i r g , in Petinp~ of the Army of the Potonlac p a s 4 i u t o Maryrear guard crossed into une 2dth - tnat LEE'S

to the extreme point reached in iu iuvasiuu 11f Pentisyl-

brigade covering the advance until the river \vas passed, x e d to Chambersburg to gain inforniatiou and collect with the main body of his infautry moved by S h a r p -

on J u n e 2 8 4 On the 29th LEE,becoming satisfied tli:tt HOOKER \vas following hi , recalled EWELL, directin!: him to concentrate at Cashtowit, about ten m lea northwest of Gettysburg on the Charnbersburg road. LONGSTREET after his detoiir through the Loudou valley. turned to the west and en+red the valley of the Sheurndoah through h s h l y ' i atid Snicker's Cia& He c r o w d the Potomac a t Williamsport 011 .Tunc 25th and 26th an({ passed through Chambersburg to Fayetteville, where he arrived on J ne 27th; On the following day tie was tlirectetl t o Cash. leaving town, which as reached by his advance on J u n e 29th. HILI., Culpeper on he 18th, reached Shepherdstown ou J u n e 2Rd; there he -crossed into laryland and marched, by Boouesborough, to Fayetteville, which he rea lied i t i t 71 uue 27th. mqvemeiit of the Confederate army down the Hhenanacmw the Pommac into lfarylantl and Peunsylv@ia, it should maintain his position hn the that STUART I n the performance of this duty STCABT, OSTREET'S command, was left a wide discreis shduld be SO, for the task to which he himself was altogether new and untried ; it WBJ also ifficulty and danger. To understand this difficulty *+ r fpr a moment the theatre of opektions. tci keep to the right of the Confederate was marching in a long column, the head of the rear in the lower courses of the ShenanCstoctin range, aud separated from LEE = toctin Valleys, the countrp w a s occupied The for& of p e Potomac, from Harper's

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Ferry to the west, were reserved for the pnsage of the artillery and infantry: frqm the I'oiu? of Rocks to the south they were controlled by the eiieiity. Between Harper'? Ferry and the Point of h c k a the mountain ranges c r t w the river: thvre are few practicable fords; the roads are narrow awl difficult atid the general surface of the country is broken, irre,qul;tr a d full of obstacles. There were then but two c o u m ~ open to S ~ c a w r :to cross at Shepherclsto\vll. keeping to the right and rear of' L o s w m u x , or to cross the Potomnc b e h H O O K E R aud join the right i n Peunsylvatiia. The latter of the Confederate advance, uutler EWELL, course w a s the out. which lie favored and advucatecl. iu at lesat three communications to General LEE. X glance a t the map will yhow that this route tt) Ylwk or liarrisburg wrn a t least :sehort ay thzit taken by EWELI., LOswrwxT aud HILL. The Marylattd roads were certainly better than I authorities in those used by the infautry, nod the iiivrsl tatfect U ~ I the \Va.hinr[taiti could be contidelltly reckoliecl iipo~t. 'rllero WHJ nu time during the progrew o f ' t h e war wheri tli+ iippronch o f ' even au iosignificant partiriau force t o the vicinity of. tltr ~lcti.i~wee of the Capital did ltot fully engage the attelltion and excite the alttrnl of' the distinguished lawyer who then coiiitiiandetl the .lrniiez of the Utiitt4 States. If such an effect f~llowetl the incumioit o f a partisan force of less than a hundred iitcIi, w h y titight n o t STCAKT c i ) i i i i t i t l i o i i I corrrporidiigly increased eHect t o follow the u e w that Iic hrtd i u t r r p g i ~ d the gre:tbt'r part of hi9 contmati~l I)et\vcen the Arnty of' tlie l'otontac and.Washington. In this he \ v u not niijtakeit, a i d (;enera1 LEE w firr corirurred with him as tdl twice give Itin1 a w i t t e l l order to w r r y the scheme iuto erect. The sound ntilitary objections to the 'project were either U l J t aptiarent to General . STCART, ur were uut\vttiglietl, iu his nti~id. I)? the apparent brilliaucy of the undertaking. To the scccess of his entleavor. time ant1 ttic utmwt celerity o f nilwlilent were abJcdutely ueceswry. b u t these wem the uncerteitl rleriteuts i n the problem befure Itirn. He would have to pass through o r evade the columlns of Federal infautry which were then ccnverging 011 Frederick, and his recent experiences with the Federal cavalry had not j enterprisiog or lesv aMy commanded warranted the belief that i t i v ~ le% or handled than his own. u t proved these elements entered ae caudes of delay, preventing th uction with LEEa t Gettyeburg, ahich the latter YO ardently desired, d the failure of which he 80 bitterly regretted. Iu the execution of this niovernent. Y r u A w selected to accompwy and CIIAMBLIr)S, leaving thoee him the brigada of FITZLEE,HAMITON and JON= to replace him on the right a d rear of the of ROBERTSON infautry corps. Salem wlLB selected as the point of departure of the expeditionary column, and the three b r i p d e s were newmhled there on the night of J u n e '24th. A t 1 A. Y. of tlie 25th the co1tinianiI moved via GI-

&T

j. .

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C.4 V A I , R Y

I S T H E QETTYSRI'RQ CA.1fPAIG-Y

339

Fairfax Court House,and on the 2 i t h reached Dranes. night of the S i t h , he accompliAetl the tlitficult pas-

believing that he had gained sufficient ground to the 11 t o the right of the Army of the l'otoniac, turned a point about six xqiles east of Hockrille, and, by a rapid night @arch, reached the Baltimore 6 Ohio railway. a t Hood's mill, m n aft.+ daybreak on the morning of the 29th. The railway and telegraph lines were destroyed, and the railroad bridge a t Sykesville was burned. S T ~ A R then T pressed on, reaching Westminster at 3 I,. 31. of the same day, a n here he determined to give to his tired men and horses the rest of whic they stood 80 greatly in need. cavalry of the Army of the Potoniac had not been x, on retiring from the Loudon Valley, on J u n e 22d,

ille. It becoming apparent to HOOKER that the army was now north of the Potornac, and that all

On the 27th. the advance under REYNOLDS occupied he divisions of BUFORD and GREGO crossed, in the rear

i
I

era1 KII.PATRICK. On J u n e 28th General HOOKER wns relieved froin the . command of the Arm\. of the Potomac by General MEADE. On the night of the day that General MEADEsucceeded to the c m mand. the Confederate i n v ~ ~ s i ounknown n, to hini had spent its force, and Geuernl LEE signalized the beginning of his retrogade movement, by ordering a concentration nt' hie three corpr a t C'aditown. ~ I E A U E ,still unaware of LEE'S position, o n the 28th deteriiiine~l upon Frederick as his tirrt ohjectire. His line of niarch to that p h i t ran i n a northeasterly on the left, KII,direction. a i d the cavalry clivisiona were placed, BKFORU PATRICK in advance aud G R E G G on the right of the aclvanciug army. ~Il,I~ATllICK w'9~ detached from the column o i i the 'LRtli and turned to the east with a view of intercepting STCART. This tmk should properlv have fallen to Generill Gmxxi, n n d such would have been the case had that officer not heen dehyetl froin pursuing - or even froru starting in pursuit -by an unfiJrtuii;ite encounter with a column of infantry, which blocked his \vu\. t;w sunie hours on the nicmiiitg of the 28th. I t therefore fell to K i I . i B a T R i c K , who pushed forward to the viduity of Littlestown, seven miles from h i o v e r , where he encamped on the night of the 2!1th. STUART, i l ' we have seen, had halted that night'st-iVestniinstr, ten miles from Hanover. STCART seems to h a r e beeu aware of K U P A T R I ~ K ' Spresence, but KILPATHICK does not seem to have been so well informed as to his adversary's niovenients; for, early on the morning of the 30th. he pushed on through Hanover, where his rear was attacked by STUART'S advance aa it entered the town. KILPATRICK thus failed to take advantage of art opportunity that is rarely offered to a general in war to strike a n STUA~'S opponent a t a decided and demoustrabte disadvantage. . command, worn out with six days and nights of hard kork, was stretched out i n a long ccilunin, endeavoring to protect a train of' captured wagons over a mile iu length. It can~it)tbe said, in K I L P A T R I C K defense, '~ that he was not aware of the near prosirnit? of the enemy, for it was his first duty to know, befiwe he ericanipetl on the night of the 2!lth, whether STurwr had yet paved the point on the HauoFer-\~ertminaterroad, which his o s n line of niarch would intersect. Had he known his eueniy'a position, auy attack, however deficient in energy, would have compelled STUART to abandon his captured wngnna - R well directed attack upor! STUART'S long h i e would have resulted in his disastrous defeat. from which he could only have escaped with the loss of a considerable portion of his coinmand. I regret to say that neither course commended itself to General

KILPATRICK.

winter and a b g .

ngton, on outpost duty, during the preceding The command of the new division waa given to Gen-

His a d r e w r y , however, waa niore enterprisibg. H e was awnre, as we have seen, of KILPATRICK'S presence, and he made his dispositions accordiugly. His first endeavor w a s to =ape annihilation ; should he be

U
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340

CAPILRY

in that, his desire was to save a portion, at lea'$t, O n the n i o r i n g of the 3Oth, Sn..*irr p u t liis order: CHAMBLISS took the iitlvauc-e, i n t u r n was ~ ~ J I I O W C Iby I I.*arr*,run,us on the left Hauk lit' the C(J~UI1111 -the d e f+m \vhich &LPATRIcP was expected to qqwar. b r t l such an attack bepn uiatle, this tiisposition \ ~ o u l d have heen il ~ O ( N Ione, a s it laced Lee in an atlvaiicetl line, with the other Iiriptles i n But this was not to bt.. K I L P A T R I ~ut Y riglit and left. X daybreak, prksed nu through Hanorer, where his rear was attuckt.cI by CHAMIBLIJS. I .&.or this particular eucouuter - which W:I* the 1:ist that

rx

THE GETTYSBUKG cAwArc3s.

hid brigad& into liiie of' hattle.

:I

little

tnI

the

he expected some tidings of EWIXL. Focge, to Dover. whence, after he preset1 ou towiird (Isrli5le. of the Federals. :mI, Ilearing

llirection

with the b ' p i e s of LEEand CHAMBLISS, reached Gettysburg 0 1 1 the evening of uly 2d,and took post in the rear of the Confederate left. has been much discuwd. In the opinion This bo1 ride of STUART'S of military leu i t baa always G d e d aa a useles a d uurvarrautable, thoug brilliantly executed undertaking. H e eluded .iuccessfuIIy the numero s detachmenb that were set in motiou to intercept hini ; he created sue consternatiou in the minds of the authorities in \\'nrhinptnii BS, to cause e klegraph wires to ftlirly hurn with the orders a i d appeals that were s t i n every'direction, to fall upon hini or drive him nut of Xaryland. H e ptured a riuniber of wagoms and a quantity of supplies, the lm of hich$nas uot felt in the Federal arniy. But lie esliaurtetl

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342

Y V A L R Y IN THE OETTYSBURQ CAMP.+IIQAI.

T h e s e Orders fired ROBERTSONS responsibility, subject only to the superior o b e r s of LEE or LONOSTREET. They imposed upon Caeneral important duty, which it is necesssry to undemtand, te his responsibility. When STUART left 011 hi&trilir forces were maswed lit Edwards Potomac, HOOKERS
ylvania I t was still possible, however. for HOOKER to p a s west, enter the Shenandoah Valley. aod place biniself across To prevent this by giving timely n o t i t i c a t i ~ ,of ~~ HOOKERS part, STUART directed KOBEHT~OS tq

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CA VA L R Y IN FHE CJETTYSBURG CAMPAIGa\.

843

edettes nearly thirty miles i i i length. ..\. strict ould have. and probably did, carry KOBEKTJOS

have given orders accordingly. Failing to do this, the the failure to make proper use of these two brigades but with General LEE ene$ ROBERTSOX. w r e t u h to the divisions of BUFORD and GREW, which we

easterly direction.

-1fter paesiug

coum was changed to one more nearly due north. This changed, someion, and the detachment of KILPATRICK,
and GREW,bringing the former duties of BUFORD, o the right rear, of the advancing columns. latter t that theconfederate infantry w a s in Pennrylvnnia, aryland to the northwest, but whether the main Pennsylvania or to the west, in the viciuity of w; and it was necessary to ascertain this fact

n. on the Frederick aud Hagerstown road ;

enemy.

ard his infantry to the was neceaeary, as we have seen, that e Cumberland Valley, below Hagerstown, was Thia duty waa entrueted to BUFORD.

On the morning of /June 29th that officer detached the Reserve Brigade, under M E R R I ~to , occupy Mechanicatown and protect the and E division trains. H V F O R ~himself, with the brigades of G A M I ~ L I)mrx, then passed rapid y through Turners Gap into the Cumberland Valley. Turning to the! uorth he skirted the western b w of the lllue nwn and Ringold, encamped at Foiriitnin h l e . Ridge and passing puehed on through Fairfield and approtdled -4t dawn on the I who had bivouacked near Fairtield (iettysburg at about 10 hi M. HILL on the night of the 29tb on his way to the point of ctmcentratioii at Caqhtown, d e t p h e d P E ~ I G R E W brigade S of Hmiis division to tici-~~py the town of Oettysburg, vut IhmI(;REW withdrew a t the approach ot the whose D , duty it w s to observe rather t h : i i i to Federal cavalry. I ~ V F O ~ engage the enemys inianjr?, withdrew in the direction of Etiiiiiittsburg and reported the presence of n force of C?nfderate infantry to Geiicral RESSOLDI;..it Ernmibyburg lie was directed by General LI.I.:ASASTON to advance and occupy Fettyshurg. This he did oh the afteruoou of J u n e 30th. Sppreciatinp a t once the importance of the position nncl the necessity nf securing it. be advaticed about a mile and (L half beyond the town and tleployed his di$isioa : placing GAMi%LEsbrigade 011 thc left, across the Chanibershurg toid, and DEVISS on the right, to cover those threw E out his scouting leading to .\lumnisOurg +nd Carlisle. * G A ~ I B L -- p a r t b towards Castitown bud DEVIN towards Hunterstown, which scoiitetl the country, capturing st+gglers from the enemy, from whom ilup>rtclut now became satistied that the n1aw informatiam w;w obtainecl. BVFORD of the rebel army was cbnverging towards Geuysburg and that Iieavy columns were in close pr@mity.* The honor of being t$e first to discover the strategic dvnntage9 that combined to determine the viciuity of Gettysburg. as the E i t e of ail important battle has r e s t 4 t i n t with one and then with another of the nor corps commanders of thd Arniy of the Potornac Keither J l n 1 . b ~ IZE seeni to have had allything approaching an exact knowledge of its great strategic value, and it is altogether probable that on the mcmiirig of theJst of .July neither general knew more than that it was a plarc tioni w h c h ten roads diverged, and that it was for that reason an iniliortant point to occupy. Each $enera1 was conducting his operatious with but little accurate informatiqn as to the rnovementa of the others. LEEhad \i k:~ ~ ~ s e e n i s (letermined upon Cashtotvn as a point of concentration, a d I to have looked upon thejline of Pipe Creek BJ a position having insny claims to consideration. j In the light of what is now kpown i t seems to me tllitt there can he n o b p e from the conclusion. that General BITOKT, is full!. completely, anb beyond all manner of d credit of the selection. ;It is fortunate that we

n the suhject. It will be found a t page 55 of BATE"' yeburg," and is 50 pertinent and importdint as to he

e says General BCFORD spent some hnurs with Colonel hile conimenting upon the inforniatioli Iirou=ht iu by arked ' t h a t the battle would lie fbiizht a t th:it point,' frriid that it would he comnienced i l l tile niornitig oiild get up.' These are his o s v n wor(ls. D ~ r r s arly a n advance of the enemy and remarket1 tli:it urs
care of all that would attack his front cliiriiy the eii*uing BUFORD ancwered ' S o , ytrii w o n ' t : they wit1 :itt:irk d they will come hootnitig - s;kiriiii.shwa tlirw r1ct.p. t like the tlevil to hold yoiir o\vn iiiltil siippnrt,*

to seek out t& milst prominent p<iints:in11 \v:itc.h 1 to look out fi)r camp-fires, ancl in t h e iiioriiiilg Frorai R until I O A . JI. iiis two srnnll hattery of the fd -\rtilIery, held their grliiinil et energetic and well directed attacks of' HETII'* tlivisioii
D
AI,EF'S

wm not rnistake;i.

e follon-ing morning, the divisioii wvss I i c i e t d , fi)r :I t i i i i t l . st and rear of tlie Union line. . I littlz 1:itc.r i l l B withdrawn and directed to \Vemniiinter, thiii iiiicv~vt*rilig my of the Potomac. t , which seems to!hnve been a niirtnken one. dtsprivetl the cavalr?! T o remetly tht. error, Kii,i-.\.ri<ic K. his tiivision,* and the Reserve I i r i p t l e iiilcler inorning of the % I . and took post :It I,itile onuecting with the left of the 'Ltl C<irps. Here I i c i t h N E K RNSWORTH were heavily engaged O I I the afteriitiliii of the e r the repulse of I ' r ( * K r r T ' s chargc. Gciic~rnl ORTH to attack an angle of the (:iinti.ller:itv r. corered with hiiilder?. and interrvt-tct! hy ree as to make it extremely unhvonihle t o the arm, hut vARNH\VORTFI, having d ~ i w n

d.-.

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CAVALRY IX T H E QETTYSBURG P.4JiPAIG.Y.

346

CA ALRY IN THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.


le left of the Confederate infantry. 111 arranging the attack *as to be the central feature, which PICKETT'S corps and STUART'S cavalry, to with EWELL'S in PICRETT'J favor. by a sin~ultane~iu?; adr:ince upon of the Union line. General G R E G ( ; ' $ fortunate presin eGented the execution of this nimwiivre, for STTART ace from which on the afternoon of .July :Jd he was to intered GREW;, nnd. after an obstinately contested I 2 P. x. until dark, w&* obliged to retire to the cupied in the morning befure the battle hepan. noissauce to develop the pt)eition or niovenient of with him the niain strength and the flower of let1 by their most distingui~hedconininlld,ers. ised f o u r b r i p d e s with twenty regimen0 arid h:tttalions es. Eis avowed object was to strike the rear of the Fedith PIVKETT'S grand attack i t l w t l tlie centre." *: 1 encounter 011 the right. t h q three d a y of to an end. I shall Imt, a t this time, fi)llow during the retreat and pursuit nt'the Coney I I Virgillia ~ : the campenetrable forest groaths pnhnnnock and Kapidno. as to the leswns t:iught hy thid campaign. called the " science of outpost$," was denot been before in the history of war. t-1~ to this time in a chain of infantry outposts along the the vicinity of the eiierl1y. Cavalry had sed,and outpost tliity had, as a rule, heen ed. Within the lines all wit? believeti ly was it '' enemy's territory." h i i . tile esitmed and believed to be actually filled with the t.WJ)Q In the two grent wars just preceding cwr i n 11, i the tdy, this state of the case W S I true to a reni:irkablc delargely due to the fact that the caviilry hail beeti fractioned )f infantry. 'rhc wnie thiug Potomac, but after x i year's experience abandoned ; the cavalry \vas withdrawl fronl rhe infantry of three divisiotls, vision. then a c~irps niandinggeneral. In a word the %%me ization and employnlent that General ntroduce into the organization of the rn Yirginia, t h - cavalry had beell iyo!

311

latedfmrn the first, and

mas trained in outpost work-minetimes to the neglect of its proper c a r a l p instruction. This course wns p r h n p s necesxwy, but it impaired the ekcieiicy of the Coufetleratc r:ivalry whenever it w a callcd upon to niect the Federal cavalry r i i ~ ~ t i i c ! c ~ r l .The result \vm that the latter steadily improved, while the furnicr reniaiucd stationnry, if, indeed. it did not decrease in effectiveness to\vnrds the closc of tlw war. I n this campaigu we have the first example of tlie olglioit work of an army being done '* by whuleslzle " by the arni hest tirtetl fin the tnsk. The o f the enemy, cavalry of one army was qinployed to locate tlie main 1 ) o i I ~ and incidentally to eraiiiije the coontry between the contencliiig armies. The cavalry of the other brmy endeavored to prevellt this information from being obtained, by interposing ituelt' as n screen between ite own main body and that of tli+ enemy. I u the pert'ortiln:lc.c of these ditties I f tlie tictic:ll tletnils we have seen that there niere frequent c o l l i h n s ot these encountem Iw c.:iiefully and thoroughly 5tuiliell. I think tlie fact will appear, that while tliere was rnucli B$ititig 011 foot, it w i s uot so geutile i fact will a ~ s nppear i eraIIy successful as 11as I&II supposeci. 1 t ~ i i n ~ that that comniand \vas nhst tiequeutly arid iIniTortnly zucccs5f'ul wliich cm t l e - Ji>inouiiting oirly to was n w t skillfully lxiiihled ud u ~ ~ ~ o t r u t$ acconipiish a temporary Iiiiriwse, or, as in BVFORI)'S CILG'C at (iettysliurg, when it mm necesary tab oppnse inf.intry, or to hold n point o f great arrive. strategic importsuce uuti! the iufautry c o u l ~

I
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I

I
I
I

!i
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I

II
I
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348

CA' CRY IN THE QETTYSBURG CANPAIGN.


Brio. Gc
5
181

I!

II

I
bPf
0 1 GI

B
Y

Third DirOion.-Brigadler General J. KILPATRICK. d Brigado. :stcolui nl-jade. .J. FARSSWOETE. Brig. Cen. G E O . A . ( ' u r n Y. Cavdrp. l a t ltichignn Cavalry. L. 5 t h 3Iichigon " .Vo. " 6th llichigna I' I . '' 7th Mlchignn '' IIad A r l p b y . l iBrigade. Samnd Brigade. J. Y. RoBEnzsoa. Captain J . C. TIDBII.L ich. h t t c r y . E and G . 1st L ' . S . Artillery. Y. R,1st U. S. Artillery, A . ?d .* L. ?d C. S. Artillcry. U. S. Anlllery. c. 2d .' **

I.

T p A A'SLATIONS. !

. .-

i -

LETTERS OS CAVALRY, BY PRINCE KRAFT ZC HOREN .LOHE LVGELFINGES.


ORGAN

PIOX OF THE C A V A L R Y DIVISIOS OF T H E ARMY OF h'ORTIIEI1S VIRGISI.4.


AJOn

BY WLOSEL R. P. HCCHES.

ISSPECTOE

CESERALC. S. A .

3
GESERAL J. E. I ) . STUART, COMMASDEU.
Brlg. Cen. W A D EHAVPTOS'S Brig. l i e n . \Y.U.F.LE'S Drigude. UrigaJc. 1st ?i. C. Ctivnlry, 241 S . C. Cuvnlry.
1sts.c.
"

I TRST L W E R . - - O

E S ERALITIES.

Brig. Gen. FIT


Brlmde. 1st Btltt. Ca1 Ut Vu. Cuvulry. 2d vu.

;n LEE'S
1,

xi.

I '

& Vn. I 4th Va. 5th V a

'a

2d S. c. *. Cobb's &:5ioo ( G 8 . ) . Jeff Dnvis' Legion. I'hcllips LcgLon ( G o . ) .


LSKIaS'

!hllV,l. 10111 vn.

.'
"

13th vu.

Brlg. Ccn. A. Brfsndc. 14th Vn.Cavalq 16th Vn. *' 17th Va.
6'

Brlg. Cen. B. ROBERISOY'S I .


BrigndC. 4Ih.S. C. Cavulrg. 5th S . C . ''

a t h Vn. (Britt.), J.cLan'n V a B


Ere

Brig. Gen. \V. E. Josm' Urigndc. 6th 1.8. Cavalry. 7th Vn. 11th Vn. .' 9 1 h Va. ( Batt.).
'I

5.
n O r s C AHi[lerY Boua(h.-MUajor R. F. B E C l i I I A > l . 1's Va. Battery, Hnrt's 5.C . mttc?, VIA '* ZlcCrrgor's Vn. Battery. s Ud. Moormnii'r Va. "

Chc
Gri

I8
c1

rmb,fcn'r Cqmmnd.-Brlgadier n. CiivnIry ( 1 ) . h ( Yd. I d . ) ,

General J. D. IaeooEs.

Vu. Ptirtison Rangen.


Vu. Battery.

myself n good deal cmbnrmssetl by your question concerning the value of cnvnlry, upon wliicli military writers hnvo given such different opitiioiis since our lael war. 1 f e d that being an nrtillerist I ~ b l not l be ncknowletlged by either the cavalry or infantry as II cornpetent judge. You think. and I must acknowledge t h a t your opiniou has some foundation, tlint ns an artillerist I will be able to e s p r e s no unbiased opinion, ndd that I hnve seen so much of cavalry in pence t i t i d war, (haviug comniniided n division for screu years a i t h cavnlry iu my command which I had to inspect a d criticise in detail) thnt my experience must hnvc given ine a thorough knowledge of its chnracter. I hnve a good deal of hesitation in giviug written expression to my views, and will consider the question from a birdseye perspective os it presents itself to a division coniniander who has all arms under hiin. and I will enter iuto cavalry detail3 only so far as may be nbsolutely necessary. I mudc tirst remnrk that I regret from the bottom of my heart the intemperate contention which lias esisted a t times upou t l i i j siibject; be. cause, ~ u c l i hostility betweer c o m r a d e of the same nrmy, ~ h are o called upon to help and strengtheq one another *lien i t concerns the attaining the great purpose, the defedding of the fatherland, cannot lead to profitable results. I n war time6 the infantryman feels himself comfortably i l e s in front, and will secure when he knows his cavalry is four or five m bring him timely and reliable information ; he knows that he can sleep quietly that night under shelter besaua the enemy is 80 distant that a

I FIND

TRANSLATIOA-S.

TR4nSLA TIONS.

351

is not possible.

On the other hand in mar the

n sigh of relief when he we9 his infantry in possession

wliich he is being driveu by a numerical19 superior Such exth n friendship nnd coinradeship wliich not unfrequentlp te brotherhood between the tlitferent arms of the service.

will fiud protection and safety hehind it.

uot know that the Hussars antl J i x e r s of the (iunrcl in o.tlier Couleur, although their coats are of different

the personal impressions.

The most objectivc his-

gth of the annihilation of one of the I I ~ I I ~ E soon , deood fellowship between the ditfereut ariiis, to the
to consider things in their gretltest objecavoid extreme statements whidi niay occa.zionnlly . Many have gone eo far as to d m y the u v u l r y e have also seen that n writer wa3 ready to estub nmlrymnn costs more than ten infantrymen, mid that CIIARLES army on the Loire, in 1870, would h n w icli sooner if lie liad had LU0,UOO iufmitry inetentl he did have. As though the army were tlie ransaction and \vas to be bought or hired * * o n rmics of the Itnlinn Coiidottieri i u the hitter part . But without ol~jectil~g to the foregoing calciilnpossibly correct ), he wlio niakes that assertinn erntion the fact that mheu an army is creiited hy 1, and every serviceable niau takes p-irt i n tlie e to obtain 200,000 infantry for the 20,000 cavalry, ble men are not to be Iind. The 20,000 cu\:dry could and thereby leave some muney in enemy would soon relieve us, as his Id enable him to keep himself much better innta than we of his, and thus give hiiii a great siratwould result in the deatruction of our army. nded themeelves against attacks of this kind imes, have shown justifiable indignatiou, and e r great provocation they have occasionally

we are nut

gone too far, and have represented the capabilities nnd worth of the cavalry in too l)ri$it colors. S o n e of them hare yet arrived n t the conclusion (froni tlie statement made bp SAeoxxos 111 on the %I & k t e m b e r , 1850, t o our kirrg, Your cavalry ant1 your artillery have alone securcd this great restilt) that the iufautry must be tlouc away with. but they suggest, with a tone o t sadness, that the cavalry slioiild be organized sepnrntcly from the infantry, antl t h a t Q e n the most brilliant results might be . froin tlie raid$ and attacks of this independent cavolrj. . expected A t the beginning of a war these controversies between extremists as to tlie relations and duties of the different arnis of the service are productive of Inneful results. If our iufiintry comnimtler accepts the claims ant1 stntenicnts o f the caralrr and fosters expectatioiis of it which are not sensibly fulfillctl when the time for action come$, lie is 11i~:ig,.1.~~aLIy~~ni1tl surprisetl, and a CommantJer mho is surprised in a cxrnpdign i3 already half beaten. If he shares the unfavorable opiiiioii of the capabilities of cavalry as represented by soole writer whom he tins rcat1, ivho \vas iuimi c d to.that arm. then lie will not apply it, is not i n linriiiony with it, and unity of action is rentlercd impossible, nnd f:iilure is the natural result. Controver.~~ caii only cause niiscliief. Tlic best results are only ~ e cured l). both arms acting i:i entire liarmony: they must become so thoroughly ncqu:lintcd with oue mother on the drill tielJ as to g 3 i i i n clear understanding of liow each call make npplicntioii of its specid and cliaracteristic rtrengtb to re-enforce the characteristic wenkneis and compensate for the deficiencies of the sister arni. The views upon the value of and tlie manner in wliicli to npply the cavalry are much more at variance tliau they are upou the work and application of the other arms. This is probahlp tlie result of suggestive compnri~nns betaeen victoriea gained Ily the cavalry in earlier wars aud the small number of attacks of cavalry niases in late wars. In the three Silesian \Vars of the eighteenth century there \vns scarcely a battle in rvliich the final and deciding thrust a n s not given by the cavalry, or, at lenst, die terrne,fe& (it swept the field). One very decisive battle (Rosbacli) was fought almost cntirely by cavalry on the Eide of the victors. The history of tlic war of 1870-il gives account of more thnn twenty great decisive battles, and of n great number of actions and affairs in which the number of t r o o p e n s g e d mne greater thnn in the great battles of tlie Seven \ears War, and iu a l l these struggles of powerful niasses, attacks of great ninssee of cnvalry have only occurred on four occasions: O n the part of the Prossians a t nInm La-Tour; on the part of the F r e9ch at Woerth, 3IarsL%-lour and Sedan, and escepting these instances there mns but one n t k c k (Loigny) which amounted to the strength of a full brigade. These fiicta have caused many writere to represent the csvdry as worthlees a8 a rule, and the cav-

TRAXSLA1IOXS.
their longing for the glorious days of Hohenfriedberg. e n , , Hnynon. Liebertnolkwitz nncl Laon, nre disposed lire in the late wars rather tn fault3 i n lending of the service than to griiiit that the olste of glo-

TRAXSLA TIOIVS.

353

c resiilt obtiiiuetl by prepared to provc tlib ase, regiment returned from an attack with sixtpr3 as nt Holienfriedkrg. because tlic cavalry ia not I I O W rior to the other n r n ns ~ i t was a t tlic time tit' I+'KEDER-

require swiftnes of movement iu their accnm-. true that the pursuit of tlie enemy by tlic cavalry nftcr s has failed in its results. The enemy firuntl sliclter bes, and no one espects cnralry to take fortresaw. \Vlien

it from making an effective pur, Iiowever, nn energetic pursuit \ma made and rvcst reaped. I nm fur From mniutainiug that the applid performnnces of the cavalry were nt nll times what

he seat of their past faults nnd to apply the that one who does not belong to the cavalry should

lime tiow reached ritdi a height that cavalry o&en rniurt in tinu o f peaa m k e greater xtcr;fica i i i m ~ a i i s a i d Irealli~, a i d do inwe Jttcilyiiig (Iraii Uie o mo f . L're otJrer w i l t < , i i t'tey icill suti.$actody accoi~iplis.~~ tlie wark whidr now I c l o i i g to their ariii ' j tlre service. In enrlicr tiiiies it sufficed to have a strong nrm, n g,ml sword, o. stout heart, to Le : igiod rider, and to linre a noble horae. to nnko n capable ravnlrynisu. Tiicse are. iu our d ~ y elerueutsp, . self untlerstod conditions. The improreiueiits in fire arms have so increased the cl~lticultics with wliicli the cnwlry has to contend in instruction aud Ic;idinE tliat it constautly dem.iiids iiicrensed exertioii and talcnt to overcome them nnd to meet the requircnienb of the cavalry of the present day. The t:isk~of the cavalry of tlie present day are the mme as those of the past. X few of the most brillinut have fallen somewhnt into the shade, whilc sonic of the less conspicuous but equally.impurtant duties, of m!iich litilc mention is made, hnve come to the front The mnnner of executing their tnskn lins become more difficult. IVc know lidm zealously the cnvnlry hnrc worked to fit themselves for these heightcned requirements. The new cavalry tactic3, the new instriic. ti& in q u i t a t i o n ; tlic cavalry prncticc mnrcIic3 are proots of it. I only nieiitioii these three thing3 becauJe they can be cousidered aa the latent aud ni%t trorib\es?nie hbors of the cavalry. I \vould not be iindewtood t u acknowledging t1ir.t the entire develop 1 s been accomplishell. I nm of the opiuion tlintmuch ment of cavalry 1 can Fet be tliiue iii the \vny of trniniug, instruction, lentling, applicntion, arrnngemeut aud method of exercises. with fewer denim& upon the pliysical force, mliich will more surely secure the rejulu souglit. I u my opiuion the posible modifications and improvements do not lie in the hand3 of the cavalry itself; they relate to the applicJtion of it, tlie plan and direction of the erercies, which, as a rule, are e j h b h h e d and ordered by noncavnlryists. I also doubt whether a complete organic separation of the cavalry from the infantry, and organizing i t into permanent, independent divisions, (these divisions to be grouped into cavalry inspections, with nn inspector general of cavalry 3t its head, which L 80 etrmgly' recommended Gy some writers), mould give salutary re3ultJ. Besides, the duties which the cavnlry has to perform, result from the demands of the nrmy m n whole, nnd the work L rendered ensier wheu there ij an intimate union of all arms. There would he greater danger that the cavalry would full into the habit of taking a one-sided view of the situation if i t should he entirely separated from the other arms. By itself, the cavalry cannot always eecure satisfactory results. The time has passed when whole armies could be made u p of mounted men. The cavnlry, likewise the artillery, cau only obtain the beet results BO long aa they
3

354
. B

TRANSLA TIOAlS.

TKAh-SLATIOhS.

365

remain const intlp conscious that they are only arisiliaries to the infantry. The inJantry 8 tho army and m a k s i~wof c a o u h j a8 i c d a.3 arlillery. The cavalry m u s ~ act for tlie infantry, and it can oiily npprecinte the duties which the ii fautry reqiiires of it. by being thrown iu constant contact with it, whil on the other hand, it is oniy I)? constnrit uiiion with the cavnlry tha t he i t i f h t r y is enabled to itndcr~tauclj u s t mliat services can be demauded of it, and what i t is capable of doing. Ilitli 113 the general inspector of avnlry is only sent to the great cnvnlry exercises for the purpose of i i ;p$ctitig them, a i d submits his report to the geoernl Iiendquarters, and in my opinion. this i j the wiscst nrraiigenieiit. Ierhnps they niiglit I lake n few cavalry iiispectors who woulll be sul!ject to his orders, n i i d I 110, iiiitler his iiistructiluis, woultl superiiiterill tlic instructions of the c valry orgmizatioiis, a d wlio woultl becuiiic tile coiiiruauders of cavnlry di ;isious in case of war. Without ;oing to the extreme of wieliing to nboliah the cavnlrp it is not unusual to Iienr, or see it nrgued that the strength of this arm should be rc luced becnuse it has becoriie less importatit than it was in earlier times. Tlicrp lias bc6ti milch Enid nnd written as to the proportion wliicli should exist between tlie cavalry and iufiiiitry. Tlii3 -numerical I V & t & l lips 1 ?en diffcrcnt at all tinies and i l l at1 armies. I hold the fixiug of such , tlicorciical iiormnl ratio ns one of the most nncieiit of theories. JY :icii service is gencrd and obligatory the only correct rille in orgmiznti ti is conditioned upon the bciiig able to apply the whole strength of t ie nation with promptness a t the riglit nionient ; nod the ratio i3 deter] lined by the condition of the fatherland. Tlie duties of the cavalry ore i I comprehensive, and so specially important at the first moment of h stilities that one cannot have too much of it iu readiuesa for uctioti. <very serviceable horse ns well ns every serviceable man must be avail M e for the d&nse of tlic fatherland, and the iiidustry of horse breediu : in some m e s u r e determines the number of cavalry in the army. i n organization which tvould render it uecesary for u9 to purchnse nbr ad m y appreciable number of horns could not k niaiu. tained for an: cousiderable time.
i?

THE PART TFIE C A V A t q a D I S THE RESULTS O F 1870-il.


SECOSD LtTTER.-RECOXSOISSAXCES.

r*F _. ..

it seem9 to you that the assertion in my last lettcr. that our carnlry hud ns great a share in the successes of our army in tlia campaign of 1870 nntl 71, ns the other arms, i j in need of nuy substnntiatiou, I will try and provide you with the proofs. I could ci,iifiiie iiiyself to the quotin= of a single sentence from the , it: The iiunierous history publi-licd by tlie Great Genernl Sr ~ F Fto-u Gerrnnn cnrillry upoil whose clenr and reli.ible reports the decisive resolu* tions of thearmy coniiiiniiilers w r c based. The results ~howetlh o s securely these tlecieions were groiin?TRt But the iiiformntion o1)tuineil by the cavalry constituted only a portion of their work and applicatiou on the front of the arm?. They iuundated the enemys territory for miles; pes, even several marches, in front of the main hotly of iufautry. Everyone finds that quite natural now. Of course, that is what the cavalry is for, and pet in 18i0, such An application nt the grent mass of cavalry was e d r e l y new. Yet, nfter i t has been once done, it i3 qiiite eesy to copy. I n earlier days the great mass of mvalry was held back ns reserve cavalry for some special nttack, and only the light cavalry was sent in admnce. I n those tlays the Prussian cavalry was not numerically superior to that of other armies. I n the THE GREAT found himself surroanded first two Silesian wnrs FREDERICK everywhere by the enemys husars, who reconnoitered him and blindfolded him ; ant1 in the Seven Years War the light cavalry of Austria yaa All, in miuor affair+, superior to the hussars which the king had orgnnized in the meantime. I n the wars at the beginning of this century even the g w t NAPOLEOX never mnde euch use of hie c a r d r y ns did o u j army comtbnndera in tlw Isst war, and, notwithshnclinp; the great erperience of the Freuch, we have ofteii seen infantry carelessly marching a t the h a d of their great armies. The surprise of HAYNAC is a good exnmple of this experience. I n our W a r F o r Freedom individual leaders made extensive use of light KATZLER, but cavalry, aa is shown by the acts and dispositions of VON the grent m a s of the cavalry w& left io the rear. T h e idea of keeping a heavy cavalry mass in reserve for the purpose of breaking the cneniya line at the opportune moment continued in force until after the close of the war of 1866, in which both sides are Been to have held a mnss of cavalry in reserve, which, as has been well said, was intended to act sa a sort of torpedo and give the deciaion at the h t moment.

336

TRAKSLB TIOXS.

TRAXSLATIONS.

357

, j u s t as thc uatue Reserve Artillery was clanged iuto opening of hostilities in IS70 we do not see the cavalry emfirst d:ijs of the campaign as it \vas a little later wlien all

s wcre macle itiiril tile first parr of Ategust.

0 1 1

the

t the 4th Cavalry Diviiioii was sent forward 011 an cstcnded


e toward Hngennu and Reiclishofen. and i t was tlirougli fiict was est.dlislied that the enemy lint1 coiicen-

forcc Jeliiittl the Sauer.

Severtlteles, during the battle

y wnitld employ that dny iii closing up and clange right. Gmuting that the line of tbe Sauer was strongly

yed in froqt of the nrniy. soon found general u g h is like a spark of fire, small in its incepthe 7th of August, as the Guard Corps eiler, that as it neared the
n as far as W e h l i e i m , iu front of cvhich stood tlie,entire

The First Infantry of the Gunrdwas in

\ ,

fantry were found. The lieutenant threatened to bombard the town with h i s y p s (four men). and by verbal agreement the mayor dismissed the compaiiies from the town and then surrendered 5t. I n this wny that very impnrtnnt defile fell illlo our hands without firing R shot. After we c r o w d the French border on the 8th of August the Guard Corps threw its caralry to the front for the first tiiue, but only from four to five niiles (to Great Iienercliin,Ren-.~cIien.while the corps remained nt Jforanville). To be sure, our corps only succeeded in coming into the front line IJU the 7th ; up to that time we had been moving to the front in long marclies o n the main road mil iu rear of nuother corpe, nnd even ou the i t h the Guard Cavalry Division could not be developed in front of the corps, I)ecmise the fielil in front of tlie first anel secoud nrniies \ v u already coniplctcly occupied by thc 6th and Gtli Cavalry Divisions.* From tlie 8th of August on, with the csception of such ititerrupwere occ.wioned hy our fro?t Ii:iving been entirely occupied by tions ( ~ 9 other cnvalry tliririofls i n their development, the distanco a t wlijcli our cavalry s p e n d itself acrop the frout of tile guard i n c r c w d frotfi day to day. The Guard Corps rcnchecl Oron on the-13tli of Aitgitst, but the drngoon brigade of tlie Guard was sent fornnrcl to Dieuloo:d, two ntarclies further to the front, where it secured possesion of the crossing of the river Moselle and of tlie milway nIetz.Xaucy, and forced a railway train to put back. which was corning up with infnutry intended for the defeuse of the crossings of the Moselle. Tiitis tlie communication between JIetz and Nancy waa interrupted at this point. The 5th Cavalry Division crossed the Moselle on the same dny and scouted the country still further to the front. U p to this tinie I have not seen any military or other writer. who has made it appear of what vitnl importaiice this celerity, by which our cavalry surprised nnd seized the crossings of the JIoselle on the 13th of August, was in our operations. XIPOLEOX mas not wrong in using the language which lie employed in eending a dispatch to Paris a short tinw previous, to-wit: lhe unattacknble positions of the Moselle iuto wltieh he would withdraw the army. When we reached the Moselle from the east we M W a river vnl ey almost two miles in width, which could only be crossed on long, open bridges, which were just wide enough to aacommodate vehicles in single column (single track). Upon the opposite side the dominating heights rose fortress-like. and we involuuhrily th;uglit of the ditticulties with which we should have to contend if the enem1 awaited us iii R well-chosen position on those heights with this wide depression on his front. But lie bad not succeeded in reaching these un-he

. Guard . C o r p formed p u t of the seeond .rmy.--B

P .E .

I TRANSLATIOA-S.
359 ,

TRANSLATIONS.
r, notwithstanding tbe fact that he had entiw ing through the Moselle Valley, our cavalry had g forced marches, which have uever been exed. We nsk whether our results would liave gust if our cavalry had let the enemy roy all the crosings of the Moselle between JIetz and e opposed us with infantry and artillery :it all poiuts ahng heights on the left banks of that river? H e had the 13th of August to have done so if' lie had cfeterurse on the 7th, on which ilny it must have become commanders how very significnnt the disasters of ere. He would doul,tles hare decided upon wn what mnsses of Gcrrnnn troops 11adk e n put i n 3 of the Nosellc above JIetz. But our caci all directioris a d preceided him from g a i i l i q any ieritx or o w mawed. Bazars~ n n ~ l SAPnLFos llare our thick veil of cavalry kept them in complcte movements of our main armies. 011 the night from the our cavalry patrols cut tlie telegrnpllic conNancy and had also reached Moselle a t Pont

er lind neglected until the 13th of August ings of the Moselle above mentioned, and, tllrough ng whctlier to strike a blow on the east bnnk or to the occupation of those " unattnckable u r cavalry that after the 13th it was no Lose positions, and, that the crossings
ritics who have charged o'ur cavalry with B mant of j n the pursuit of the enemy after the battle of twentysix ,quadrotis engaged in the evening of the battle nineteen officers, teen guns and one standard, while the 4th Cavto the front in the morning of tbe i t h of August hich, in air line, is seventy-five (75) reached through numerous de6les of

y ia totally defeated and routed, when he has no more to offer effective resistance, then it is the duty of the c nud direct pursuit, to collect the wreckage of the thus destroy his army. If, however, the victory baa the 6th of August, and whole arm& tand behind the beaten t r o o p , a s a t

Spicheren, then a destructive punsuit of the enemy. hy cavalry alone. ia not possible. I n such cases it is better that the cavalry break through the e p s made in the enemy's position and cause him anxiety for his flanks, because he 110 longer knows what is in rear o f this advancing CBValrv. This indirect pursuit, as ~AOPFSLH culls it, \vas erccuted with note\vForti>y energy on this occasion, and by i d work p~ncedtlie commander of the nrmies in position to give directious to tlie grcnt massed of tllearmy. which had for their ol)jective the,entire destructiol, o f the armies of the enemy. If we would be impartial we must acknowledge that our cavalry from the 6th to the 13th of August, and at the op@~&gof the armpnign. disp ' played decinled and effective activlt). before the-innia bodies of the " posing armies had measured their strength, and tlrat the emnlry Usisted the day of in no small degree in eecuring the victory to our colors b+e battle. The role of our cavalry became far gmntler, more imposing and decisive from the moment it crossed tllc J l m l l e . Althollgh knowing that tliey must be in the immediate vicinity of the main h d y 4 the enemy's arm>-.and althougli infantry clehchme~lts of the euenly had been discovercd in the mountainous and wooded country on the l e n bnnk .of the Xoselle, t s o cavalry divisious ( 5th and Guard ), rnnking n force of eixty sqrioclroi:e, crossed the river nt Pont i Jlouswoll and Dieulouard and push'ed into the very heart of the cnemy's base of operntions, and there deployed, iu order to secure defiuite and reliable information concerning the situation and couditioo of the main body of the enemy's forces. On the 14th of A u g h t , while t h e battle of Colombcy-Souillp wan going on on \he mst of the Moselle, a squadron of the dragoons of the Guard Trotha), while pursuing some French c h a w u m , lrnd ptlshed forward to T d and had. with assumnce which is natural to the cavalry, demanded the surrender of that fortress. Iu the course of the 15th of hugust the Guard Corps received orders transferring, tempomrilp, the Dragoon Brigade to the 30th Corps, nnd on the lGth of August these troops took an active part in the battle of Mars-La-Tour. One could not well demand greater speed or greater ability of the cnralry, for l \ b - L a Tour lies in an air line almost thirty-three miles from TouL The rnovcnlentJ of the 5th Cavalry Division on the 15th of Auguat were strategically decisive. I t moved forward in n northerly direction and located the enemy at Mars-La-Tour. It deployed itself betaeea Jarny and Rezonville, upon the dirkct line of retreat of the enemy's army, which was 200,000 strong. and boldly bivouacked at zemont, Purieua and Xonville, a'fter a light skirmish with the eeemy?cavdry. although they were at least liine miles in frout of Thioncourt, to which

1
360
ii

TRAABLATIONS.

TRANSLA TI0,IS.

361

division had been pushed forward as their ~upp01-t. hnt had yet c r d the Moselle. emeuts of the cavalry division were strategically decisive, hed the fact that a great part, if uot the whole, of the still aboiit Metz, and that there was a large force of nville. O u r commanders based their ordem n this information. cavalry? I t trotted in force around the + threatened the line of retreat of a n enemy, the greater se forces had not yet been defeated, and, through surprises , caused uneasiness in the ranks of the enemy, d indefiniteness in his plans; and camped over night rnhelming strength, and so close to it that the try rifles struck in their bivouacke. Many writers of the German cavalry, the raids of the American type; a n d ot(e of h e most dhtipguished of our cavnirymeu grants that our caval diould have accomplished more in this may in 1850. In what way o d d such a raid have accomplished more than the 5th Cavalry divis on &d upon 'the occasion o f which we speak? A raid simply as such, ud 'without a n oliective purpose, should not be permitted. Well ma- it cause the heart of many a cavalryman to swell with delight when he ads of the great cavalry masses of America, that, wheu set in molion, I uld r i d s for weeks at a time over wide expanses of country, d mountains and blooming valleys, across deep rivers nud cleuse in nll movements there must be a purpose. If this purpose n the enehiy's flanks and rear, to disturb his base antl plan of give reliable information of hi3 streugth nod position, and s i i c c e a l ~in ita object iu a ride of t w o day3, has it not coml i l d ib taJ! The work of the Gitard C.ivalry Division q u d strategic imporbnce on the 15th of August, although of n purely negative character, &: The determiuilig o force of the enemy between us nod the JIeuse. This Germans to direct. in their dispositions for the l(ith, that all oselle s h o d 1 swiug to the north n p i n s t the eiiemy onville, without running any risks of beiug nttacked It could attack the enemy who wished to withdraw un, and, by engaging him, so delay his movements Id be made that would render escape impossible.

SERVICES RESDERED BY THE


BATTLES
*

C A V A L R Y I 3 THE

BEPQRE a ~ ~ z .

TIIIRD LETTER.

great cavalry contests in the last war. The cavalry, on the side of the Germans which p k i c i p a t e d i n t h e ,battles of that day, mas as follows: The 5th Cavalry Division ...................................... 3 sqoncirona. The G t h Cavalry Divisioh ...................................... 18 sqimtlrons. The Driigoon Bripnde of the Guard ....................... B squudrons. The Division Cavalry of tlie 3d and 10th A r m y
Corps..... ........................... ............................
Total.. .......................................................... i t 3 squadrons. The deed3 of tltis cavalry mnss will fill any iinpartisnn mid irtipartial reader with admiration, and much that is profitable cau be learued thcrefrom. First, twentyfour guns which accompanied thirty-srveii eqiintlrrma startled the eneniy in hi3 supposed security aud causcd n pnrtitll pnuic, a t least i n the bivouacks of the camlry. They then advanced upon the iiifautry antl nintle n tlirentetiing turning movement, supported by the eiglitceii squadroils atill sir git~is of tlie 6th C a r d r y Division, which had just arrivctl. lrlic iiibirtry stood to arms untl fortnet1 u p to defend themselves agaitist tliis iarnlry. Six nncI a Iialf infantry divisions were employed in fbrcing it to witlitlrnw iipou the s u p port of its own infantry. Thus, nccortling to the etreiigth reported on the. ficltl, n force of 8,250 cavalry held a force of 65,000 infiiatry in check, tlireatening their flank and liue of retreat, until tlic adrnnciiig infiintry could come up and take u p the action. The course pursued by the mvalry ou this occsion in avoiding any objectless nttackj must be fully apprwed, for they obtained their object, the observation and deteution of the enemy, without 1 0 s . I n the d:iys of Holienfriedherg, Rossbach nnd Leutlien these fifty.five squadrons would have attnckeg and ridden down this i u t u t r y . It i3 due to the iinprorement and increased effect i n firenrms that the irresistible superiority of the cavalry over the other nrms no longer exista, but has been reduced bo a state of equality with them. After our cavalry had been reliered of its unequal struggle with the enemy's main body, by the infantry, for the uext tw hours i t formed the secoud linc in support of the very thin line of our en aged infantry, which from 10 until 12 o'clock pushed the enemy by bo d attacks, notwithstnuding the fact that he outnumbered it more than two to one.
Iti squadrons. -

Y last letter brought us up to tlie lGth of hugudt. the dag of the

I'
I

i l l

/
362

1
TRANSLATIONS.
by the detachment.
The ndvauce of the ch a superior force w t u eo decided thnt BAto check the advance of the Prussians, and irected the 6th Cavalry Division to pursue victory. Then cavalry attacks of g r a t e r h prescribed practically tlie limit of against infantry. Attacks were mnde by dvancing infantry was brought to a standrridden, and guns were captured. B u t y intact. especially when i t \vas somewhat terraiu, the cavalry could nccornplijh of tlie rauge of the enemys rifles. infantry had increased to such an rps c iuld think o r do their utmost to of tlie 10th Corps. rhe P r u s i a n s ry in order to form a second line in s u p already engaged to the last man. cavalry was, however, sent forward to g , to observe and occupy the attention of two French b had been deployed in that direction. A t this mocorps to the decisiye attnck. is attack, tlirough superiority of numd there were 110 guns aud n o iufantry l far to the t h e nearest support (20th Division) w a ~ still rdered the Brigade Bredow to attack e 6th Infuntry Divisiou. The brigade and attacked around the left wing e enemy was overridden, the artillery en through, and men and horses c u t down. These horsemen lo of the enemy and c o n t i o u d their cacolry in erior force of the eue~uys ij. it again rode through the ene a b u t the same point from which it begnn its d in numbers. u has been sevqrely censured by many writers. + g useless. purposeless and resultless; as a purcost the country much mouey. a moment the sacrifice made, and the result a financial transaction. The entire loss of both yiindrnns of cach were engaged in this attack, urse a b f the 16th of August. Calcu-

T R A N S W TIONS.

363
.

.-_

I
!

lating that this entire loss occurred in this oue attack (which is not p r o b able, for the brigade uudoubtedly suffered some losses i:i previous attacks of the day), yet the brigade had saved a whole corps datnied with a loas of 409 cavalry. \\it11 scarcely 800 cavalry it ch:argrd u whole curps darinei. of the eueniy. rode down hi3 fint line of inf;iutry aiid cut dawn the horses of the artillery. I t thus crippled for tlie rest of the day this entire cairps ciarmei. of the enemy, and this occurretl lietween 2 and 8 P. M.; the nioreineut uf the 6th Corps was hrought to R itaridatill aud was finally abandoned ; :it lenst the Frerrch undertook i i o new attack from Rerourille on this day. Thus consiclerd, the attack t i t t1ie.e 800 cavalryineii u p u 40,(100 iiieii a p p n uot only to hare h e n an act of heroism of the tirst order. \Thich equiils the niost celel)rated i i i i i l glorious deeds of all ancient mi? modern w:m, b u t it ohtaiued a result t i t rnrc niagiiificence with c~iniparntively sni:dl loss, s l i t 1 was not. n 1)uqiosele- death-ride which attack a t Balaclava, 1s many critics could he comparetl to CARDIGASS are pleased -to do. .\q~in, the cavalry ia reproached with harino made the attack on thip occa+ion without pr8)vidirig any support; aiitl it is get forth tliat it would hare been much iiiore etfective if the line of attack hac1 been followctl hy a secoud aiitl third line. That ie perfectly true, but i t does iiot justify any reproachbeinp heaped uliou the i3rig:ide Bredow. The result woiiltl have been very iiiucli more rubetuiitial if the Brignil e Bredow had beell fdlowed by 100 $quadrons. But there \vas I I I ) more caviilry on hantl. Time pressed, mid something must be done ininietliately, aiid the commanding general ariiled himself of what he hail in 1i:ind ant1 on the spot During the c o n t e t the Hussar RRgiment, So. 11, cliiiie up just iu tiine to give the news:try protection to permit the wreck of the Brigade Brealo\v t t i assenible. .\Ietliiiiks I hear the critic of tlic green tahle ask : \Vliert> were the seventy-eight mluadrons of iliicti iiiention has previomly I)een iiiade? W e know that a t about this time thc :id hrid 4th Frciich Cgirps came i n t o line nenr the 6th Army Corps and threatened the of cavalry left f l i ~ i i kof tlie :hi Prufrian Corps. A part ot this great ~ n a w trotted forward, in order to observe the niorenients of tlie enemy and to delay his ~ ( I r a n c e .Even the Brigade Rrerlom IVW cciiiipellrcl to detnch two squatlroris in that direction in order to secure their left fl:iiik. Beidea, itisteail of holding the cavalry as a second line it \YRG fount1 iiecessary to distribute it in rear of the very thin fighting line of the Sd Corps, which exteutletl from Vionville to the Bois de 8 t hrnould, :L distance of hetween three and four miles, and upon which i t WM aevewirp to be prepared a t all points for kiuiilar critical moments. A critic will then sententiously annnunce t h i t a good tactician must understand how tQ secure the svperinrity on the decisive point. -49 a genecd. rule this is corract; but i n special cases it is not p i b l e ; for instance, in a battle where you

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364

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t

TRANSLA1 IO*VS.

865

s to offer an effective resistid not allow itself to fail in

on1 one threatened point to

nch Gorp both pushell forwan1 against

rtillery by great evertiou was able to oinent the 10th Corps arrived The Tronville wood from the enemy, and e h u c h e d froni Mars-La-Tour and at-

Guards threw theniselves upon the try eollecte(1 about it.- e:igles. drelv
IU.

our much end:ingeretl gun.; were sei., aiitl the pursuen wittidrew teau. By this attack the 1st Brigade esactly : i s the brig:de ol11y nfantry Divi-it~i. I sli11u1~1 ks. The 10cl.t.s wcre heavy, but 11. The half carnlrp regimeut r e a brigade). Colonel V. ded, collected rind fiirnied the for the king and (1ro)pped f the heroism rekted by the
eveloped ikwlf northwest of Prussian cavalry were here 9 hIOXTAIGU, LFflRANDend

DEFRAXC.The cavalry was p;operly applied on both sides and rode into action with resolution. Echelon after echelon entered the conteat and caused a hither and thither a w i n g of the battle. .4fter the most violent struggle with sabre and lance the Freuch cavalry n i a s \vas driven back ant1 sought shelter under the protect.ion of the tive regiments, twenty but niude no further ofiensquadrons strong, of General CLEKAMBALIT, sive niovenients. The Prussian cavalry formed up on the contested plateau a d then withdrew to the infantry line of hattle which had been reforiued at Tronville, and was i i o w prepared to offer furthc~rresistanceA t thiP poiiit night and darkness fell upon the field. . Critics have spoken disipprovingly of this cavalry action and have a useles cavalry duel. But if both sides :ire in the.habit desiglmtetl it of using their vavalry on such fields as are suitable to its nature and on which the coiifiguration of the terrain admits of its eniployriient. then cavalry duel^ are neceswry preludes to the ohtaining of the proposed reeulu. I n the foregoing case it niust be granted thnt the cavalry on both sides was opportunely ani1 properly employed. Upon the P r u s i n n right and the French left the terqiin did not adinit the eniplopment of cavalry masses. Upon the other wing the P r u s i a n infantry had suffered a check. It \vm (luite reasouablc t l n t the French cavalry should then admnce upon this wiug in order to fall upoll the flauk of the yielding iufnntry and th:i.; seize the nionieritary result to secure a complete victory. I t am cclii:dly reasonable that the P r u s i a n s upon their part should eniplop all tlit.ir di4poeable cavalry upon this wing, i n order to pri)tect the tlreateiietl tlauk. Thus developed a cavalry duel. It wm far from resultless. The P r u s i a n cavalry gained the advantage. Owing to the fine quality and nunibem of the eucniys cavalry he suffered a striking clefeat, but he was finally pushed back arid the Prussians reniailied in possewion of the battle field. The result was that they accomplislied nll that they had uudert:ikeri to do. Their orvn infautry \vas again i u condition to re-enter the action. The fight was again restored when night caine on without P the eneniys venturing to make a further advance. If any reproach is allowal)le to this cavalry, it belongs to the fiJe regiments of General CLERAYBATLT, which tcpk no part iu the at&. It could have reverRBd tlie.forftiirea o j the day a i d haw turued tJz Priuiaii victonJ iwto defeat. \\hen one of our great military authorities aiinnuiices ( ride MilitarWochenblatt, 1881). that the services of our cavalry divisions would have been greater at Vionville if they had been held in hand as divisions, he certainly makes no reproach against the c a r a l q . From the General Staff history it appears that the divisions could not be held in hand 88 units on the field because it was necessary to distribute them along 3 the rev long and attenuated line of battle, in support of the struggl~ogipfantry, which WS greatly outnumbered. It so happened that to the left

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TRANSLA3IONS.

of Mars La Tour a collective cavalrydivision could not be assemblfd (poesibly at one I time the 5th with thirtysix squadrons might have been collected), but in that part of the field all the cavalry that w a y accidentally in that v i c g t y had to be collected in haste by squadrons, regirnenta and brigades. Upon the other wing of the Prussian line the battle was alw ended by a great cavalry p a c k . After the attack of the Brigade Bretlow the tillery, u n t i l the Irusian tack by the arrival of reinps put in on the right wing. There n aud succewtully executed 011 the erful reserves of the eneniy always

THANSLATIONS.

36 7

went?-one quadrous. i t was The Brigade Griiter which the enemys infantry had raw. The Brigade SchmitlL rode a few groups and tiuolly returned staading its uumericdl weakneh-, had of holding possescion of the heights e possession of which the contending
to the attack.

declare that it reeaona

The

attack of the 6th Cariilry Diri-ion, anrl It and condernu its having becm perniittetl. should not be undertaken without -I)cciuI p of BI.rciiEK- a t Gross-(;oral. which the! I l m l na)t w x I i iu

any earlier on thk next daj,even if this night attack had not been niaile, for they have n&er been linclined to very early starts But the. great night attaok of &e cavalr at Laon decided the battle. If one kno\\s the ground exacfly a nigh attack of cavalry is l e s ohjection:ihle t e d a y than it waa formerly, b e c a w the darkness prevents the enemy from deriving the full benefit of the &ng range of modern fire-arms. So far aa the pmdt of this cavalry attack at Vionville is concerned. i t was quits impcjrtant. It( is true that but little infantry w w overridden and brtbken u p , hut thia night attack of all three arms seems t o have had n very imposing eHect upop the enemy, and his infantry would not face a

second attack. The enemy withdrew to Rezonville and abandoned the battle-field along the entire front of the 3d Corps, i . e., the plateau to tlw south uf the chatissee, Vionville, Rezonville, for which they had fought the entire day. The enemys commander could not expkwysuch boldness exoept upon the theory that t h e Prussian troops had received impmtant ternforcements, and he determined to wittrrtraw under cover of the night. The undecided battle tliur bccaine a victory. and for this victory the army ie indebted as much to the bolilnees and audacity of ita cavalry 88 to the heroic eudurance of the inthutry anti artillery. The infmtry h a d fought all day against an odds of one to four, or one to three, and in their heroic but murderous attacks they had lost nearly all their leaders: they were , brokeu up into smsll groups, a n d notwithstanding the rec;nforcerndnts which came tip in the eve ing they were still not half as strong as the enemy, and the latter still had at his disposal, that had not yet fired a shot, more troops than the whole of the shattered and weary Prussian 3d Corps numbered. The extent of the result of the battle w m scarcely a victory for the 1rusaianF. They had rriaintaiued possewion of Vionville in their center, liich the!. had taken a t the opening of the action, and had won J one mile of territory on the right wing, b u t they had lost a n equal amount on the leti. There hail b e e b a change of front pivoted upon Vionville 80 that the Prussian line, which a t the beginning faced northeaet, at the close faced to the north. If BAZAIXE had made a deterinined and heavy attack at daybr&k 011 the morning of the 17th with the heavy reserves which he still held intact, the result of an attack by these intact reserves upon the numerically weaker and exhausted PruJsian army can scarcely be doubted That he did not do SI) is due perhaps as much to the boldness and resolutinn of the lrusriau cavalry as to the bravery with which the other arnij continued the offensive over a wide front with a light line, sg that he wtw deluded iuto believing that the entire German army w a s united on his front. had ma& this Think what the result would have been if BAZAINE thrust with his reserves and had attacked the Prussian t r o o p whioh had been engaged on the 16th a t daybreak ( 4 A. SI.) of the l i t h , and had thrown them iuto the defiles upon the line G o n e Thiaucourt It must be conceded that the shutting up of UAZAISE in J l e t z and the capture of his eutire army later on would hardly have been pomible W h a t can be said of the losees suffered by the cavalry on this,day, which were quite severe, in comparison with the part they took in bringing about such a result? The collective cavalry regimen& which hared

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in the lest nights attack df the right wing lost in the c o u w of the whole day 360 horses. Ameptibg that this whole 10% occurred i i i the night attack; it must be grantedlthat this loss is not worthy of rnenti(>n,in view of the great results obtainqd. Who can speak of it a useless sacrifice? . . *

PROTECTION TO THE ISFAXTRY.


1 FOURTH LLTTER. Y O U reproach me withlhaving h n partial in my last letter and with having written a p h e g y r i c upon the cavalry. I have no interest to serve in taking u p tbe hudgels for the cavalry. I only earnestly endeavor to give expression to the truth, or better said, to the feeling with which I became possessed lfor our cavalry during our last c a m p n i p . In reflecting upon the furthet course of the events of the mar, I cnnnot help bringing forward ndditiodal proofs in support of the a s kertion which I cavalry had had j u s t a3 great a share in t u had the other arms. Oh the 17th of t t h r Uhlan Brigade of the Guard Cavalry marched tu St. the Jleuse, and recounoitred, nr scouted, the place. All the German cnrps were enabled with great WcurSty to chabge their line of march lioln the west to the n o r t h a n d hwten to the of the corps which had fought the battle of the letih, since had beeu pushed 90 far to the west
the cavalry division of the 12th Corps%\vas and secured the army agniust Verdun a small detachment of the French in the west, and that the The Saxon cavalry scouted work of the cavalry just make in entire security in order to unite it for a and to cut off hi3 retreat.
tion.

On the 18th of August the gigantic struggle between the two armies took place. Ou this day the cavalry divisions, as such, did uot n ~ k e themselves very proniinent in reconnoitering the enemy. Before rlie opening of the battle the two ariuim stood facing one another a t such shprt distance that o n the right w i n g it was not possible to employ great masses of cavalry in frout Therefore the cavalry divisions which were still with the arniy were placeal in rear of the line of battle a3 reserves. Upon the left tiaiik the h s t m Cnvnlry IXrision recounoiteretl in the direction of Etain and Vertluii atid covered tne rear of the army. Although tlie part takeu by the cavalry division in this battle w a s lew brilliant than on other occnsiow, yet it \vas none the l e s active and faithful in tlie perform:ince of its d u t y . I cnii tliductly renienibr that the advancitig hussars of Couiit ~ I < O l l E Ssent word tn the Guard Corps, aa it was forming a t DtJncourt, thnt au :dv:iiice guard ot the enemy, consisting of all amis aud of nlwut thc strength of n brigade, was inarching upou Ste. Jlarie aux Chenes from St. lrirat-la-.\loiitugue. This report established the incorrectnes ( J f the tiriginid suppn~ition,that the enemys right wing only eutendetl to A1iimvilliem aud enabled the commander of the Guard Corps t a p set things right by sending his infantry by the shortest road over Hatmurille to St. Ail, ill order to take possesion of Ste. Narie. s in the secure and well Under the protectiou of the& h u ~ r and fhin~letl confitletice that they would receive timely uotioe of aup movenieuts niiide by the eiieiiiy iu their lront, the Guard Corps moved u p in c l o s ~k)rrnatinii, which troops, ns a rule, do not v b t u r e to (lo in close proximity to n u enemy. I t i j true that, through habit, au advance guard of four hnttalioiis aud a battery was fbrrned, but the body of the corps followecl so closely that the whole corps came up iu one great column, hnving a front of three battalions formed i n line of battalion massee, doubled o n the centre, well close? up and the ytillery in columns by tmtteries i n the iutetvals. This imposing mass moved a c r w the country along the ridge uutil it came into the danger zone of the enemys shells, when it was found uecesary to assume the fighting formation. Equally clear in my memory is the moment when I had placed the artillery of the 1st Guard Division and the Corps Artillery on ita left, t . the right resting on the Bois de la Cusse and the left on the village of S A i l ,for the purpose of opening the battle, and far in front of the infantry. The right s i n g was secured by troops of the 9th Corps. which occupied Bois de l a cusse; in front of my position the Hewian cavalry had reconnoitred the ground up to the enemys position on the heighta Amonvillea -St. P r i n t ; and now unniasked my front by withdrawing through the intervals between my guns, b u t upon m y left there did not seem to be any protection a t hand. The enemys skirmishers were pushing forward from Ste. Marie against St. Ail and gave me much anxiety for the left of my
./

PRAN8LA TION8.
relief I MW the entire the griiungi and corermy position r i r i t i l the

TRANSLA TIONS.

37 1

cavalry divisions, undertook the scnirting and in our renr. The Division Cavalry the bittle through ib nrti\-emezit.v in attacks by masqes of cavalry as did the ravine liet\veeii Gravethe enemy's fire, prevented in their norind f h ~ ~ i ~ i t i ~ n , Therefore, the attempt of the Firzt Cary two husswr reginients, to advance on that te failure. Upon the left flank the wjrk in Privat and manri rill em, aud in d u r h action.* king part. There reniairiecl nothing iuore hold itself in rear ready fbr any opportuliity e battle might monientarily present for its lry pursuit after the battle of St. Pkivat. oint du J o u r to Arnarivillier a l l possibility by the enemy , m h i n t i n i a g his main position. trating into Amonvilliers ju9t as night iug o t St. Privai there \vas notliing W' ntry as had not rvithtlraan belii~ldthe storming of the place was destroyed killed and the balance captured. During ook u p itJ position under the protection of' uit by cavalry WIW impossible. ness with great violence and it w&s neceaeary to eatafilish how ( t h e enemy stood a t daybreak on the morning of the 19th. We see seveial cavalry squadrons trotting forward before the break of daJt and the complete evacuation of the position by the enemy was soon @nBrmed. That portion of the Saxon Chvalry Division which was still hbd a t Aubou6 (while the main body way recsniloitering and scouting towqrds the M e w ) i . e., one brigade hastened to Sfoizieres in the Moselle vtlley and completed the blockade of the enemy cloee under the cannoqiof the fortreea.

Let u9 cast a glance upon the activity of our carair). betweeu the battle of St. h i v a t and the catastrophe of Sedan. After the +(linewhat diwrganized condition of some of the troops, which had heen cnusecl hy the loss of ILO mnny of their learlers of the higher grades, had \*en overcome, the army of the was \vithtltam from the district of the Second Arrny and I)rori$lt i n line w i t h the . Third Army. After this i v w dime, a day's rest was givon to thest: +cirely August r these twc) :irnrics I e p i i i their fortriecl trc,t>lw, allt\ on the '13d < ~ w:lrd Iliovement towards Paris. and erpected to meet the t.iieniy i n t h e vicinity of C'halons, where > L c > I A H o s , in the yreseiice of the Emperur, was nesemblitrg a uew ariuy. The haw from which this march wm begun was with the Third Amiy (which \VIIS +till a little ftirther to the front than the -4rmy of the h 1 t . 1 ~ ) tlie lirle Jfi.nil.]lc Horgue 'I'reveray Hui~delai~ico~~rt-(;ondrecr,urt :III~ i n nii air line ah)iit sevt'iity riiiles from (Ihnlons. ' T ~ Q cavalry pti-.lied rapidly fortvnrtl, ant\ on the evening of the 24tli our cavalry patrols Ira11already discorerctl that t h carlip ~ l i t Chalone had been quitted. These cavalry cietachinrirts riirist linve rid[len 1)etween ninety awl one hundred niilcr in for they had :to go hither and thither, nnd the roails ate the two ~Iny+, muc11 lollper tli;iii an air line. On the 5 t h the reports [if this c:ivalry calue iu td) coutirru the supposition, grounded u p i n iutellipeilc-e received fronl other sourree. thnt > I c > l a H O Y ' s army hstl moved nurtliwvnrrl in who order to turn our right flank and extent1 ahnntl to Slarshal B.%~.\ISE, was shut u p in Yetz. (\Vhile puabing thesecaralrvdi\.i..ions to the f h r t , they ncconil)li&ec\ all that could be expected of great raids. They cnpturetl Wh,,lc battalions of' Jlohile Guards in process of forruation that 11nd h e n arnletl, \)ut \\-ere not y e t uniformed. 1 w w uiie SUC.II battdicw broilglit i t i 4 1 1 1 tlre eveniug of the 25th of August.) '111~.rep)rt.e refkrrcd to, reaclied the great headquarters OJI the nights of the 53th a d .Ltitl\ (if a u g u s t , and duringthe 26th of .Xuguet we were stopped iu our inarch toaarcls the west and irnnrediately turued towards the uorth. In t \ w cavalry divisions of t h e Army of the Jleuse, the *Guard and * Saxon L)ivieions, which, up to this time had been hcld well in hand, n o w undertook the reconnoitering and scouting on the new front. C'iiusual forced niarches were demanded of both these divisioiis. T h e cuvalq of
the guard niaile a right turn upon our frout and reached Hichicourt, and the S a l o u cavalry reached I h n on the hleuJe, with its lerditig bripatk OD the =me day, and established the fact that tlre eocmy had not y e t reached the niniu road leadiug from ILeiins tn JIetz. \Vhile the 12th and Guard Corps were heing.puuhed fiirwnrd to the north by long marches, in order to obstruct the euemy's movement
c _

. A division of t.avalry i s part of the Guard C o w otgsnlrstion.

372

TRANSLA TIOhX

TRAhSLATIONS.

373

towards bletz! the cavalry divisions pushed further forward in order to locate the e n e p y with certainty-. On the 27(b of dugnut, some of our daring cavalry officers turned the that they were locatedat an(l about Vouziers. t. V. ZIEGLEK,of the 3d Keginelit of L-lanu of riddeu about niuety miles on tliat ( h y . rile caradvanced to Stenay and pushed patrols as far as found the enemys cavalry. August, the first meeting with the enemys cavalry ncy, in which .the Saxons orerthresy the eneniy. On st, our Ulaus of the- Guard captured a general *tnf officer of the Iutendauce wlio wasfihllocently from one corps to another in a carriage. The re no longer safe against the bold attacks of our of their own corps. This catch W R S one of r upon the general staff officer IVM R ~ i i n t lthe mys army for the followillg day. ,This COIIcoiijectures of our commander elver the movemeuts of this ma9 the victory of Beaumont. where the cnrethe clear light of day and two corps (1:irmei. It would be n e c e w r y for one to he presellt nl)d before the battle of Beaumont. the iiinilller i n uuded the moving column of the eueniy, w bees disturbed in t h 4 r hive, in order to appreciate their work. I s n a~corps darmeb, of which I estimated the number of battalions a t about forty, constautip aiinoyed and delayed in i t s miirch by our troublesome UIans. Occasionally whole companies would quit the column aut1 deliver a v.olley upon a siugle patrol, which would immediately disappenr in ortler t n aroid 10s. U speakable fatigue was the result of this kind of thing. They reached t eir destination extremely tired, and a t nightfidl and frON - weariness negl ted takiug the usual precautious for the protection of their inhospitab bivouaeks; while our infantry, quite near them, but of which they we entirely ignorant, slept comfortahly in the villages. he two divisions of cavalry last mentioned on the day a u m m t , did not produce any direct result in the , but had an indirect result in relation to ing on the right in such a way . 1 to ~ bar as far as the Belgian border. The cavalry of the ision train moving from Carigum by breaking up us with their artillery. This train furnished rations for

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! rse

By the close of the 31st o t August, these cavalry divisions had completed their work tas reconnoitering and scouting cavalry against the army of Marshal ~ I C > I A R O N . The infantry of the two arniies had The net which the cavalry had heretofore entered the tiglitiup &e. thrown around the enemy was now strengthened hy the other nriiis, and the $ n e had come for these to .reap the harvest which the cavalry had prepared. I n the battle of Sedan our cavalry did not take any conspicuous part. The annoying feeiing of inactivity while the battle raged, drove wine of the cavalry to take part in the struggle. Yes, w e see isolated attacks of small m m s of cavalry. rasulting fmm such restlessness, which probably had just as well been d i s p n w d with entirely. There \FILS no pursuit after the. battle. But that was as it should hsve I)een. \Vhile the fire-arms are doing the rough work, the cavnlry belongs io the rexrve in rear, coverinn the flauks aiitl renr by observatiou. 111 this case there wii* nothing to p u r h e , for the whole army capitulatetl. The cavalry attached to the infantrv divisions were constantly attack, and patrolling duriug the COUEC of the ing by q i i n ~ l r o n s reconnoiteri~g hattle, a i d if I were willing to run the risk of tiring my readers, I could relate I I I : U I ~ inltances where, while the opposiug lines of artillery were engaged, the cavalry niored ahout betneen the two linea of fire i n order to bring iiifi)rmation concerning the enemy and the terrain. 111 like manner the tlivirion cavalry took part i n all the later actioos a t w11ic.h I a e i ~ t e t l . \\ith great audacity the a v a l r y patrols woultl ride 1) to) the villages \\Iiich were to be attacked, and ascertaiu whether they were lirld by t h e eiieniy or not, and if so. in what force nod manner. The services whicli thr divi.ion cavalry reuclered, was so importaut tha: tlurii~gthe long positiim-wnr ahout Paris, every conipany, when waigiietl to tIic &ecution of some duty, aoulh beg for a f e n mounted men m ~~irssc~rgers and patrols. After the battle of Sedan, I received the order on the 5th of Septeniber, to make an attempt to bring about the surrender of the fortress of Jlontmedy I)? n bombardment with field artillery. I appeared h f t J r ethe fortre= before daybreak, and the cavalry had alrencly encircled and reconnoiteretl the place 80 carefully upon the previibus evening, t h a t I wns enabled to iiiake my dispositions a t once. The collective i~rf;n~natiou of the candry w a s Euhsequently estab\ished to be t i b d u t e l y rorrert. h gltioce at the mnrrh or the troops from the battle field of S c h i to Ibris demonstrates sufficieutly, how, during this fi)rward nioverncnt of our army, the cavalry divisions reconnoitered several days march i u front. The cavalry divisions arrived in front of Paris tito days march ahead of the i n f a t r y (for esample, before Gouesse and Etnins on the 17th of

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TRANS LA TIOXS.

375

September ), then croseed the Seine and undertook alone the blockading of the west 4ide. covering themselves a g a i n s t the fortress and the west side until th blockade was completed by the arrival o f the infantry two n this m a s i o n things were executed by our cavalry which days later. are now cons dered ils quite natural and have never been prebeoted as being worthy of special mention. B u t the history publishell hy the General Star 11.4 given due credit for these actioua. Our c.ivatry cro*d rivers where the bridges had been destroyed, rode i n t o cities, vit1ngi.s. and forests. in which the iuhabitanb : i d franc-tireurs of'red re,siatar,c.e. They sufered frequent losses in such attack and occasiongllp eutire patrols dvere captured, but upon the other side we see \teak cavalry detachruetits scattering whole companies o f the eueruy'a national p a r & and carryingoff their (dficers as prisonem. \i-e w e that where the infantry is disheartened or, as militia. has not yet gained the requisite COIItideuce and cohesion, the old superiority of the cavalry agltiii makes ib appeara nce . So snon as the blockading o f Paris was conipleted, the cavalry iiuder took imruediakly, and almost alone. the covering of the retir. But one infantry corpslwas deta hed and that was sent to Orleaus, am1 the cavalry. which was bp$ratitlg fa to the rear of the besieging army, coultl get uo additional support until our infantry could be retinforced frotii home by sufficient numbers to ing the combatant strength up to the Iinrninl, U one-third hy the ,tinle which, in some of o u r c rps. had melted ~ ~ O W to they arrived before Pari . The cavalrj. advance to Compeigne and Beauwis i n the north : Etrrpagny and Le+ Andelyr ou the northwest; Dreux aud E v r e u s 011 the west, ahout fopy miles, and their patrols were pushed to the tates of Roueu Chartrqs, until tl ey met w c h resistance that it could not be overcome without the asista ce of the infantry The cavalry attached to the pushed out to &bri3, nl)otrt command whi$ had bedn sent to Orleans w . 1 ~ her south, and reconnoitered ill the direction of Blois aud actions, oue must read with great astonishlate publication, that the great mases of were inactive and useless. In fhct we but could have made use of more

'

too, who have ex-

cavalry than we had, o r had we detached we would not have had sufficient service and cover the rear of the that we were i n a civilized

L, .'

376
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TRANSLATIONS.

TRANSLATIONS.

377

L.

I - .

I
378

I
TRANSLATIONS.

TRA,.SLA TIOXS.

8'19

h .

k.

380

TRA .iWLA TIOXS.

381

. FRO\l
l
0

la.\ (;I-E:RRE .\l(~)DF,RSF..

BY L)EHH~C.WAJS.
Fim L i .S . CAVALRY.

BY LIEPT. COLOXEL A,. E. A R X O L I i ,

lect c:in cause irreptlralile t in multiplying the niini-

to KELLERMAN. I t contaius upon the unity ofcommand 111 the


UARTERS

LODI, 25th

FmRmr.,

YEAR I\-.

If you enfeeble pour means hy dividing your forreg, if you break the ltrtily 9 .the military tlroughlli, I tell you w i t h sorrt)\v, you% will h a r e lost ,the fillest opportunity to impose laws up)t~ Itiily. In the situation of affairs o f the K t y l ) l i i . i n Itnly, i t i n iui\iepenable that you have a peiierul who lias eiit1rel.v your cimhleiwv. 5 I f I ani not the one I will nut cotnpIiii11 ; I i u t I \vi11 elnpliiy Iriy.;rlf ill r&uhled zeal to merit your esteem iii the p r t ~ I I I Im:ly c l ~ ~ ~ t to i ( ltoe. c 3 Each has his own way of making war. General KICLLKIOIAS h w more experieiice. aud will d i ~ i t better thau I. but tu uiiitc: us would ruin everythiug. rllia letter vias gupplemeated the saiue J a y by ii~iother 1v11ic;li BONAP.SRTE addressed to CAHHOT, a i d whic!h is wit lesi explicit : 1 \ n o t e to the Directory relative ti) the idetr ot tlivitliny the arnip. I s\vear t , you that I have only consi(1eretI i i i t h t the jqd 1 4the country. Beditles, you will always f i i i d ine in the right way. I owe to the liepublic the slcrifice of nll niy ideas. If any oiie W Z ~ Rt i ) Iirejil(1ice you AS it may agaiust me, my answer is in my heart an41 io iiiy coii&iice. possible that the letter to the Directory niight not \IC W C ~ Iinterpreted. a11t1 : I S you have k e u trieutily to me, I take tire li\)clrry ot srltlrrisiug ttda ts) you, pruyiog you to niake use of i t i n any w u y yibur prualellce and attachnient to nie niay ruggcst. KH.LIX>~.IS will ro)riini:iud the m n y a 3 well i19 I, for oo one is more convinced than I nni. tliirt vit%iries tiretlue to the courage aod-dacity of the soldiers ; but I lwlirvz thnt uiiitiiig KELIXK>s.\s and niyself in Italy would ruin everythillg. I c:uti1oti serve voluutarily with ti niau who believes himself the tird gerienil i l l Elirope, and bsitles, I believe it is better to hnve one Iiml genwil t h i n two piiid cines. \Var is like goreruruent, decided i n a great degrec. Iiy tnct. I I I 1812, however, SAPOLEOX himself, forgettillg the priiicililes wliicli he hurl so clearly enii-uciatetl, committed the iault of ordvri1ig the iiorthern tirnry of Spain. commanded by I<C:SSI&M, t o go ant1 sustiiitl that of Portugal, under the order3 of > I A R Y U > r, witbiut tleciding which of the two mnrshnls would command iu Chief. hi d became 811 This situatioll of atfairs created grave e r u t ~ ~ r r a s r n i e ua .- obstacle to the operation. I \ f A R x o s T thought it was his d u t y to protest w e r t e r m to >liiJ(ir
4

d.
*,

I
I

11
j
TRd LVS L A TIOhs.
my orders.
es I F o r those that are not, wh..t slowWhat time lost !

382

TRA S S L A TIOXS.

:383

result of the habit takeu fi)r 9i)ntetinie nart by d all himself. H e considered hiniself w e n a t

that not only the unity of cwiiniarid shoulc alwriyr a t it should be also exercised ~ i p o uthe thcriitre ot

energetic character, wit0 k i d - h e a r t e d and a little enfeebled by his long service. H e did i l i b t reply. SEYwrote a second letter the same day a t ti t 11.. i n whicli hr aunouucerl his resolution to set out the uext day with his c-iirps (1 arrnei. iu ai:other direction froill that which had been prc.xribed t o him. J1.ili~ks.1 lieitatell no longer; however, through a feeling of frientlship ti)r his old conili:inioli in :win*, he informed him that if he persisted i i i liii disol~ediencehe w i ) r i l d be fi)rced to take ineawree to cause his ailthority to be respccteil. S E Y hail gone tno far t o recede. H e believed he&te$ ?tiat J I A w ~ s . ~wai iiic:ipable of taking an energetic decision npaiwt h i m nncl ha)ped t t ) :iw)ci:ite the t r - ) o p o f the 6th Corps in his cli.ail)cdieoce. Hc litAr$i+tetl i n hi* refw:il. M A w E s . ~ took the c v ) m t t i : i i i i l of hi? (-4)rpG troni h i m :in11 s i v e i t t t ) the olllelit clivi ion comni:uitler. kie f o r h I e thv ilit-iiion ccticrdr t o ohey SEY, enjoinel t h a n to voitti)rtii t o tlit. in+triic.tion::einan:itingdi rcctly from the (hiefo Staff aud reuilereal them 1wr+~iii:illyrcsponsihle ti)r all infr:it!tia)ns o f his ders nnd sigiiitietl tt) J1:irsIi:il SEYto p ) i o Spain r i i i i l await there the ill of the tlitti wrotv to hi.* chief the fidlowiiig insribordin te letter : k:iiiper#)r. S K Y

. Ihe Emperor 1i:iviug confitled to nie the comnland of the th Corps, persoii ot1it.r th:iii His h j e s t y ha-3 t h e right to relieve m from the C ~ I I I I I I ~ ; I I I ~ I it. I protest then still against this new disposi on; however. if tlit. gviicr:iI- of the tlivisioua of the tith Corps obey yo , I will go
1141

tab Spaiii..

T h e gcner.ils ~)l):.yc.nl. On hi+ did!! i n Fpitc ot two n e w p testations a~itl i i i spite o f the ch:igriii \vliich lie esperiroced by it. MAS- SA mainY tlie artily a110wrnt to Spain. T w o years triiiied his tleciaim. S ~ . left after, S EY hintself heing i n coriiniautl of three corps darmei. , i i Lusauia, the cliic.fr nf which were very nearly liis rank, he corild uot make theni recopize liis authl)rity, :ind he coniplainetl of it to the Jlajor General to ahoiu lie wrote the fdli)wing letter:
hie tn t b ) niuch with the 4th, 7th and 12th Corps clarmri. i n the present.

.. I t is m y

iluty to tlec]are to your Serene Higliiieu. that it is impoaai-

the Tagus. H e gave iitinietlinte I)nitJr+i i i obatiou of his lieutenants inaiiit&t(:d itscblt

etate of their organizatioii. Thew corps are united by order biit not in fact. Each of the geiierals in chief do very riearly what they judge conveiiieut for their own safety. Things are a t such a p i u t that it is very diffirult to ohtniii a position. The morale of the generals and in general of the officer? is singularly shaken. T o coinmantl thus is only to command half, and I would like better to be a grenadier. I pray you tc obtaiu from the Emperor. either that I be general i n chief done; having under iue uulp division generals of wings or that His Mtijesybe kindenough to relieve me frnm thb I d . I have IN) need o f speaking of IUY devotion ; I ani ready to spill all m y blood hut I desire to do it wefiilly. In the l d establish present state of afairs the presence of the Emperor a ~ ) i ~alone proper relations between the officew. twc:iuw all wills cede to his geiiiue and the pett? vaiiitiea tIisap1)ear I ) c 4 m the .\Iajesiy of the tlirori.e.

IZRBXS LA'TIOSS. 38.5


qualities. the union of d i i c h , ofteii nitticult to find iu the same man, is uot less for artiiiezi, one o t the surest guarantees of succea. . . O l i ~ ~ iutcllipeiice ti aut1 c a p c i t y we regardeal & + the firemost qualities of a niilit:irj- rhicf. This is grneriilly nu error. First: Thereare uo foremost quttlities. 'rlir c1ii:ilitiee necesary for a comniandsut of t r o o p vary :icciir(ling to the circritn,stallces iii ivhich lie i p pluced. What is true, is, thut with great s o l ~ l i v r the ~ t1unlitit.z; of cliarsctcr surpass all others. 'I'litlr(% art. t w o whic.11 thy Gornims :ippreciiite h i v e d l others, namely : ik~-i..Lut :itit1 ~ m .wme l TI, ttike ii talenr resoliitit~uwitliout hesitatiug and puttiiig i t prsctically into execution, is, in fact, with u chief, especially an :iriiiy chirf, an cniitictit virtue. I t is what VEKDYDV k r E R S 0 l J calls the r/m,./it.s* of ruilt-eptiwt :tiid etiergy i f t ert*etctiott. These qualities are itr oriliiiary men, when t h y have acquired by study iuet witti ~~)iiietiiiirs : i t i t 1 rvflac.tii,ri the nie:itt* d i f di$c.ertiiiig cleiirl! the situation. Oui. ot' the tiiilst rettiarkahlc csamples t)f the ctxijioq of an army diie!'~a tli:it ~ wlricl, l'riii(8t. E ' R I>KIUCK ~ CH.\I~I.W gave on the t'tl of July. N I X , i l l tlit. rvetiitig. wlicn lie rewlvetl ti) attack %he Austrian army. .\t t l i i i (late the ualv:iiice gii:irils i ) t the P r u s i a u ccud Austrian armies e~ta\)li~lictl upon thc right hank of the Elbe, were le- thaii four mid otie-li:ilf iiiilcs fmni eoch ijther, but the former did not suspect t h a t tlir hitter was st) near and w coucentratetl On the side of the l'riirriiitir it was believctl that the ireatest part of the euemy's army nccupie,I :I positit~ii1)cyoiicl tlic Ell)c, the wing3 of which were supported upoii the t)rtitieil places ~ t.loseplistadt ' and Ktinniggrcetz. T h e great henilrlurlrtem I I R ~theti 111) alternativt. than to attack the position or eiivre i n order to oblige its detenders to leave it. Howc-ver, the ('hiet' ot' Stntf of the first army, which was most advnucetl. realizetl dtiritlg tlie day that it was inclispenseble t o h a v e iuforma- . tion more ci)mplete. For this purpnse, he caused sniull detachmenu to be sent (JUCon different sides, which were principally directed toward Kiiuiiiggrztz. 1'iitrtiIs of ofticcrs well mounted were charged to gather derails upon the fixces aud poaitiou of the emmy. One of these penetrated beyond the curtaiu formed by the outposts of mvalry, and found the height of Dub, near Bistritz, strongly occupied. It learned t h a t the Brigade Brohaska was established there. Prionars made known that four Austrian corps d'arrnee were near hy. . i n o!iicer of hussars perceived great Iiivouacks and \VU able to note the presence of a corps tl'armecx at Sndowa. This important news reached the headquartem of t h e first army between 6 and 7 o'clock in the evening. It could have tried to trammit i t to h e great headquarters and await orders, but thanks to the decision of ! b e t h e Geueral-in-Chief, it was otherwise.

Rivalry n cnhmna does not result alone from equality of grac e hut also from seijtinients ilf egotism which exist in all armies, either 11 the

--&

I
386

I
TRAiYSLd TIOXS.

hlthoughlthe d a y ~ w a s advanced, although the great heatlquarte had instructioris for a general flank march toward Par( abitr, CHARLES took inimetliately contrary nirasurea. ;re:it necessrry t eii to were in hi* neighborhood. It r n ! ~ in~iiiediatelyin a n t i c i p a t i ~of ) ~ w l i i i t WINJIII tuk I h c e 311. Consequently, without taking i l l t o 111 -ouiit the Prince diq)atchetl t u his tlitketrt cf&s a t positi#ln a t L' A . JI. uear the line o t tlie UibtritL, and ready to ittack the Austriau P O . " . l t l l' )lI. cirilers to he (li+p:itc*lic(i, hia C'hicf'.ol-St:iff great Iiea&lusrters of tlie King tvi15. He 1 1 P nc. g i v e air nccoutlt ot'the iituatitm aril1 ~d t 1 1 i~l k askg1 the advice of the King. H e 1ieiit;itctl n o iiilire dritl resolved to attack itriiric~li:~tely w i t h iIll l i i i himself to knciw if he h a c 1 hefiwc l i i h tlie
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TRA XSLA TI0A-S.

387

;rent part tlJ the e1icr.g s i i t t for result the taking <)fdie i l l -

arrival at a opporturtei time the eiieiuy's fiirces. co1itril)lites the Iul)st ofconrbat, after a pro the general w h o has tbie enupon the fix fre.4 :rl>op This is particulurly the the runst renia .kablr " 1 have heard (;en. dearly cou ested,

CeBBeB.

In this mpect, moredwer, there exists i n their army traditions, of vhicli they are prou and all try to perpetuate. Marshal B UCHEH 8 tell of hi3 tenacrty. and wrote in
"Parisis i niy powe capital is detiv red UJ m . energy of our roops a a Lamentations j u p n the . pouring upon me, but f

i i

; t h e French army . It i s to the iudonlicnble ell as my owu iron wifl exhaustion of the ave remained deaf

that one sliould, and can only reap the fruitsof victoq by pursuing the vanquished without truce or respite." A t more recent epochs the Prmsinns have been citml 88 retiiarkrrble exalnplrs ~ j this f qwility. That of Geoeriil F R ~ S S E C I E chief I . of the 1 7th tliviait,n ~ ) iiifhutry f a t the battle of Satliiw;i nierite ntteiition. I'Iacrtl at the estrenle left of the line ot' Imttle of the tiwt ermy iu the \\-,,,.,,I o f >1nsi11weil,citgagecl from 8 A . 11.tlik tlivision f~iouclitself to\vartls 1 1 A . JI. iii presence ot' the eneniy's ma.we, aliicli iiiiceasingly iricrenw1. 'The init<ses belonged to t w o huntrian c i i r p tl'arinei.. the 211nut1 I t h , \ v l i i ~ - l i[1:1([ allowed theinselvcls tu be draaii iii little I)y little atii1 lint1 finislrtrtl b y Iiriiicing into line tifty-oue hattdii)iis: ~ n d taure th:in uiie Iiuudred pieces 4 ) t :irtillery. 1 1 1 t,r,\rr to re-ist this powerftil eK)rt. the 7th Divizion roul~l coulit ,itiIv I I ~ O I I it- o \ v n t r ~ , ~ Its ~ ! ceriterat ~ . tirat fell IIM-kami i t WVRPfcaretl that tile two \viiig.< w ~ , u l t l bt. sep:irated. SVNI ctinipa1iit>s were iiiixeil and divided irlto g r o i t I ) p . which un,lrr the leaiIer+liip iBt' their (itticerawere forced to hold ciiH>rent 1,oinLe of the borcler ; sorue f;iuniI tlienisclvea direatenet1 in front. 1111 tilt. tl,illk.; an11 i l l rear. Tliey siicc d e t l however i i i niaintaioiug tllcriiz~elvra i n the northeril part of the \vood. 111 tlir iiii(1at of d t e r n s t e Y U c ~ e j s earid ~ revc.r*er, says' the Prussilru :lC~~,)ilnt, ,nipanies \vhich fiiupht in the thick wood had finished by i1lterniii)zlitig wnipletely. IL&les, nothing coliltl be ?;eel1in front of one ; it \vas itii~)a,4l>le the11 to give to the struggle . . II single directioii and the chief* \\'ere obliged t i ) l i m i t theinselres i n gtvttig persotid1y the csaniple. cp,n :I\; points the ofticem nsetiihled arouiitl them men \vlioiu they 1i:itl at h:iricl. uo matter to what reginlent they belt~iigetl,antl 1)rought then1 ta, the front. Troops which had beeii driven back fnini the woods \yere i r . 1 1 ~l ) , ~ uguiu k and those which were completely clrnimdizecl were gathered :inti placed in reserve. A . great number of Aujtriau prisoners were selit tq the rear ant1 there iirrived at t h e rear 1t large n u i i i b r of f'rusaiau woutlde(1 ant1 troop \vlio hail Iimt their chiefs. Already more than 2,000 me11 \yere /,ora de coiidat. General FHAXSI~CCKI had vainly asked for aid, but ct)niprehelidiug the importance of the pi>irrthe occupied. he -by his exaniple--cnuJed to pnss into the NJUIS nf all those who were arouiid him the dogged resolution of defendingto the tart extrernity the g r o u n upon which they had spilled so much blood. The resistance continued. Soon happily the approach of the second army was announced and the the l'ririce Itoval arrives " ruiining through the thinned ranks of the clefenders of the wood, tenuiinated the exhausted troops. ' But this help \vw still L r 11tf. The 7th Division found itself at a most cjtical tncimeut. . It ICI+ uece5snry to send an officer towards the colurnns of t& second army to mk ilillllediate a d urgent support. Thisoficer should, to accomplish hb.

'

I*

This principle, far from being inhumao, hns for result the avoidauce of new wrritices. ' . l % e f ~ r c cellinp . victory, wait until i t i3 snatche 1 from you," said SAroi.i:os, I)efiire retiring, wait until you are forced." H i 4 personal t)piuion of the qualities of a conriuander should not be
6 6

uine months of di.scussic)tis of ct)litrarv opinions i\tl(l opinion in Enplarid varied a8 tlie & ~ l , aut1 \- 111 will count only upon myself."

ii,

390

TRANSLA TIONS.

EXPERIMENTS I\fADE
I

IN C A M P KKASSNOE &EI,O,

I<I'$*I.\.
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Fmm I L R w i a n Ium(id. 3'0. 12:.

TKANI'I.ATE0 FROM TIIE '' . \ I I L I T . \ E K \ l ' ~ t < ' l I ~ ~ S f i I . A' ~1.1, r7 , :

BY

.*ciiSL~

I.IFK.1.. ('AH(. t i t n t l * ,

l:;lli l X p . b > r ~ ~ .

I T is well~knownthat H ~ W O H U greatly W r:tlued tlre so-c-iille~lpenetrating charges of cavalry as a R I ~ : I I I S of instructioll, :in11 ;iJrva~.. W I deavored to have there charges resenlble tis I I I U C ~ Icis pt)s.sible, tl1o.s I i i I v l e in actual warfitre. This result he partly ohtaiuetl 0.v re(1uiritIg opposiog through each others lines. .-h u 1;itely revivrtl S ~ \ v o ~ o t tir1t.n '.~ General DRAGOXIHOW charges. Although there are rmny ntlverse t t ) this Iliethotl, and pronounce it autiquated. DH.mmrrIw\v tins succeetle(l i l l convinring the highest authorities of the correctne- of his 1)rincil)lr. Tile soldier must prnctice in time of peace, all that he is requiretl tc) perfi>rltI i ~ ] time of war, and t h a t only. r h e RuFmian tactics prewribe that each rnanczurre of a demchrllerlt sh I conclude with a penetrating charge. B u t as nol)otly kliew esacbtly h w toexecute them, that paragraph had heell fur a I O I I ~d l i l t - 8 tieall letter. Last ruinmer, however, Granll Prince \VI..\i)IZrrK. :I* ~ ~ J I I I I I I ~ I I I ~ ~ I I , : officer of all troops in Camp Krasznoe Sselo, nlntle pelletratillg c.I~argr.s R part of the progranirne of e s e r c i w Tho* charged \yere succt~+*fi~lly executed in the presence of the highest nuthorities md a g e l i t riia119 other , officers. The troohs detailed for this exercise w e e a Ixittnlion of iiifhlltry, 21 battery, and a regimeut of raralry. 111 the coniilielicerllelit 4 J f t h e rxercise, the troc!p were in line of battle . First line, the inf:intry, ~ I relir I t)f them the baatery, and eight hunched paces iu rear of it, the cavdiry. in column of squadrons, dismounted and standing to horse. T h e progamme,was as follows : 1. The eardry to ride through the infantry at a walk amd to 'imnr-.-, a t a trot. 2. The nfantrp to paca through the cavalry. first w i t h the froiit rank in front, the with the rear rank in front. 3 . The cavalry 'to ride through the infantry and artillery while they are firing. XI to the above, the following exerciwe were executed 1 . The @fantry were mounted on the croups of the c l i r H r F p s .

i
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TRANSLA ?IOXS.

TRAA~SLA TI O S S .

tion of the third part of the programme, the ca


e formation ; the artjllery waa still i n their the infantry rnarchd386paces to the rear aucl an interval of six paces between files. men, had its first man at order arms, et. The cavalry now charged at full lines of infantry. The trol)ps att:~ckecltired \ + ~ I I the had arrived quite near tlienr. The reporter I J ~ the does not state how the horses behavc.tl 011 tlils fJCcan w of a similhr experiment made by the en the srnoke disappearecl, quite a khout riders, coultl be seen galloping :tlw)ut inrear of fantry also had received tile ch:trg,.uirot \vithcausetl l)y tlie tiru <lc-livfed anal carresserl itlirlleiiiocint the he fourth part of the programole. TOJ rooper, the latter lets go the left stirrup. The inthe left h:ui(l, iiiwrta bid left :kiwi tlreli with his right Iiau~l, , betiiiill the p c k 01 \vl!ic.h tlc esecutetl, wliicti were clitirt.1)men\seemed to enjoy t h e e eSTrci5es. rog+mme was also succesfulty esecute~i; TIie witp the cavalry, by holding O I I to the :! irrup or manes of nhe honks. Copeiderable distances coultl he p a ~ ( dver 1 iu thie manner !without: much trouble to horse or rider. I t w : t;JUud ~ hest for the infantryman to conform to the movemeuts of the horse. The experiment +vas also made of using cavalry horses 8s horses +r thq a r t i l l e r ~ . Most of the ho-s dit1 the williogly; neberthelea, it W l u considered bwt to have solue iraiiiell dmught h o w in each equadron.. on t h y exerci-s?s lays stress ou the thct that the I I iiner T h e repo~z and means ofexecuti+ were entirely in accordance with the tliirtl pyrt ? of
\
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an article hy Adjutant General DRAGOJIIROW, * :\u httenrpt :tt ~tl e s t in this Book to P r e b r e Troops for Actual Warfare. DKAGOMIIHOIV,
#lit: article, dwelldwith great emphasis on the uecewity that trnops ~ t tlw ferent branch+ of the, service should be accustn~nedt o mutual PII port, and should cotwider themselves members of one bo~ly. S o w this educational tendenay finds Eilll application in the above described eser(.i-es, which could \equally well be called making frieuds of the d i g r e n t arnie of the Yrvicc. Disreparding tHe existing antagonism betwe& the ditiersut ariirri/antI even re.@iiieiii$ the $;tine: arm, and whicli is ti,uli(l

~ j t

i
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EXTRA CTS.

EXTRACTS.

in support

of

thrrnaxir.1.;. t h n r

396

9'

EXTRACTS.

EXTRACTS.

397

trlal. The.tIm0 loot a t o gather thelr l o m a

n and on the Chlckahominy gave the Rebeb an OpLrtunlty mitted In placlug thearmy on
to retreat

flnt our left wing a t Fair 0.La vllle and Caines' JIIII. and by to James river. Them apg the entire army Into action os an gas to effert the neccmary mncert of nsequence. the b a t t l a that t o o k place Rsslng heavier f o m on our detached corpa. which retreat. It hea been rlaimed that mom purpose of fnklng Rlchmoud; but the onpl that were in the a r m r were never rt of each other. as should have been materlal change i n the manner of flghting them from been adopted. would not hare changed thr u l t i u k result f r o m what it WM. an ve only added to the embarrassments which already e x l t e d . u r a ,a1 ioned, there were numerous overnights and negiech bearing Emidea the a npon dIsclpllnaand had a serious influence upon the siirre~~l of the campaign. Very little WIW done the energy. emulatinn. aud enlhuriasm of the troop%. while -me meamxres wete nciopc*d that had a decided teudency to diminish these uecessary qusli. tien In a marked degree. At Torktown an order from headquarten prohlblted all music h\. not r e y m e d until after the army f men which composed the Army kahumlny.without anyof theen-

Another opportunity forsui c l y oRered whcn the army w a at Warren ' u. In the 1.11 and A. P. 1111.1.. wit their corps. o f 1862. The Rebel force was then divided: LO?IU.*TRECF beins at Cuipeper. whlle STUPEWALL JACILWSand D.If. HILLwere in the .<hen cloah valley. a t ('ulpeper the army would rripp that of the at Fmnt Royal. By crushing LOS~;.TKRFT Rebels and would cut I t offfrom Richmond, ('ulpeper should have heen oCcUp ed. It W M at thlr tlme that tieoeral ~ S I U pssumed U command o f .the army. and unfurtu tcly decided t o marchon Frederleksburg. The detail8 of that campaign have alreudy h,.cS thoroughly eramined by your honorable wmmittee M to leave nothing 10 be sald in n l e e to it except p e r h a p . that the cavalq' bore uo promluent part In It. < . . s n v h ; s CBF C'HASI'U.U~R?IVILI.E. I n this campaign my command we0 the tirut cavalry dlvislou of the Armso the FolomPc. the 1st Brigade of which during the battle was wlth Cirncral STUSEMAS on h mid towards Richmond. i n rear of LEE'S army. \Vith ouc brigade I preceded the 11th and I t ' h c'orp p6 far ppahmnwk M Chmcellonviile. The movements of the ith. 11th aud 12th ('orpsacros the r a d Rapidan rivem were very flne and masterlg.and were executed with such crew that the enemy were not aware of them. for on the :PXh of .ipril, I&:. I c u p t u r d a CUP ier lrom GC.0. em1 U s . commanding the Keh4 army. bearing a dispatch from General LEE General A S D m S . and written only one hour tcfore. stating to ticiicral . i s u c ~ % ~ he S Pad jiE.1 k'cn inlormed we had e-l in force. WFhcU. In fnut,ourjhree corpshail been w u l h Q f the Kapldan the night previou. and were then only fire miles from ('hancrllonville. Tlieb illiautsucceo of these preparatory movements. I was under the lmpresbiou. gave tiencml liufncn au undue confidenceM to hls being mmter of the oituation. and ail the neceaary step Were not taken on hls arrlval a t Chancellorsrille to insure roinplete sucveu. The eountr\' a d u n d Chanwllornville WM too cramped to admit o f our whole army Mug pmperly devclbbd them. aud of April to lwo corps, the 11th and 12th. should have Leeo thrown o n the uiyht of tho Spottsglmnia ('our1 House, with orden to iutrench. while the remainder of Qp army should have been dispared 80 u 10 support them, This would have rumpeiled tieuerbl Lnc tu attack our whole force or retlre with his flank exposed. a dangerous oyt.ration In wat.:or else remaln i n positloo and receive the attack of ~ E W W I ( % in renr and Iioonm i n front. a still worm dlleama. In the third dag's light at c'hancellorsrlilc liencral H ~ ~ t u i C was n badly stunued by the he did not concussion of n shell against a post uear \\ hic h he was stnndiug. and from w ~ l c l i recover sutilclentlp during the battle to resume the InropCr command 01 the aim?. The plan of thin campaign was a hold ouc and was more judicious than wna pcnerul1)- buypomA Irum the large force tieneml tirwonert had at his command. There is al\r.a?.sunedi&vanlsge, hoaever, attending the sending off o f I&e detncbmenLu near the dns of battlt*. uncertain @me it can scarcely be expected that a11 the drtuils in the l e t de meet wlth ~ucces), and unlene a geueml Is prepared and expects to replace combinations. such paru of his plans (w fail. he w i l l he defeated i n hls c a m p a l p . a d M Lhm

i
i
1.

he campaign had been badly selected. and there were numerl . % several ocra$ons woo by their valor r hopes. there were a te commander could have forced the result to a aucrasfui
CAYI*AI~?; 0F.ASTIETAW.

nded the ca\.alry di\-lsion of the army. and rook the advance

at of the Peninsula. The army wad not moved with sumcient la or throueh Maryland. and the enemy WM w a i n given Wben the battle wos dellvered It w s s fought by detached be unable to give or recelve ssrlstanrc from each other.

F i n J ~ H ~SU T R R ' S corps w m behind my positioll a mile he creek 88 a reserve. but It wss never brought into action.
our army labored under from these arrangementa. a de-' a t 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the lilh of .sepWmber. if

. .

.he wm with It. and which \in3 b e t Wo.them in hla death. I n a very short tlm he double.! u p the 11th C o r p into a disordered m w . that won -ugh( safety In lliyht. Jly co$maud of three cavalry regimen& and one battery of $11. g u w bappencbto be uear thls wen and perceiving a t a glance that If thls rout waa not checked the ruin of t h e H hole army wo& be Involved. I Irnmedia(ely ordered one nf my regimeom lo charge the wondr frum which the rebeb were . Issuing and hold them until I could bring mme guns into iasltiou : then'~harulngm3eml oquadrnm Intoour flying mamen to clear ground for my hatter?. I1 w g l h m l g h t up a t a run. while stad otecem and troops were despatched t o seize from the rout ail the guns posible. The brilliant charge of the regiment into the woodsdetalned the Heheiaeometen minutem. but i n that short tlme such W M the enewy dlrplayed by my couimanrt. I placed I llne twenty4wo pieces of artillery. douhleshotted with canlater. and a l m d lnw. with the q m a i n d e r of tbe cavalry supporting them. Dusk was now rapidly apfronching. w i t h an a p g r e n t l u l l in the flght. when heavy maaes of men rould be 8een in the edge of the woods, havl?g a single flag-

398

EXTRACTS.
out.
''

EXTRACTS.
I i m ' t *hoot

399

and that the tfag of the d b l t e d States-whileat t h e same time thvy cried

466
h o n o n of chat erm ~=w*p.pLo(Lm
I

EXTRA CTS.

EXTRdCTS.

4 0 1

r wlth hln army about the mlddle of Jep

latter took np a panition near that place. Lrt contented hlmsell wlth destroying the radroad we had left behind und retlred on Culpeper.

BEpOBT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE COSDUCT OF THE W A R


BSFOBT OB OP&ATFI&B

more by the conrlousnea of a want of appreclaslon on tbe part of lnfaaclycommaaden Y to the power of a large and well managed body of hone, but M I t WM dlmenlt to ovepcome f tralna. and lor the a t a h l l b the atpblished custom 01 WMtlng cardry for the protection o ment of cordons around a deeplog l n f r n t v force:we had to blde our t h e . On Yay Itb the army moved: GREQG'Rdlrlrlon t r t l n g t h advance 0 By's ford on tbe Rapldan : H'ILSOS*R the advance to Germanlalord on themme stream: T o ~ M ' sm v e r h g the tralns of the army In rear. boldlng from Yltcbell'a Statlon to Culpeper. an& murid Stevebum. and stronglv plcketlng the lords fmm Germanla ford to Hapldan Y t a t l W l . AB m n M the 'Ld Corps reached Ely's ford, GBECG moved to Chancellodffflle; and. upon the 5th C o r p reachlog Germanla lord. WILSOS made the crcrslng of the. Eapldan. moved through Old Wlldernee. and a d v a n e d to Parker's store. On the 5th TORBERT jolned me at (:hanellonvllle. and General MEADE ardered W~ldObl a the dl+ctloo of CRAIG'S mqetlng house.where he WM atucked.and. alter a a l W P en-ment, drlven hack. r l a Shady tirove church, to Todd's Tavern. It WM neeegprg for hlm to take tblr route. M the enemy'a infantry had a d r a n d from the d l m t l o n 01 Orange Court H o m . an8 had m u p l e d Parker's store and the dlrect mad hack to our army. war cut o r , be sent word to me. near CbanWhen General MEADEd l m r e r e d that W~wnr cellonvllle. to go to hla rellel. and I Immediately despntched General G.F.;c;'P dlrlrlon in the d l m t l o n of Todd's Tavern, where he met WILSOY, who war stlll belnu fdlowed U p . The enemg'.s punulng lorce W*UI a t m k e d by GRUX at thl. place. defeated. and drlven to Rh-qy Grove chiirch. a d l r u n c e of t h w or four mllea. It WM now well understood that the enemy's cavalry a t Hamllton's CmBlng had lolDcd G e n e d Lee3 forces, and the 0-lty for my movlng to that polnt, M o r d d . W M obviated. A s I WRI held respooslble for the left flank o f our army and tbe tralnr. I made such dbposltlon of the twopa under m y command M to hold the llne of the Brock mad beyond the Purnaces.and thence around I o Todd's tavern and Piney Branch church, b u t h n e n l MCADC. on iabe report. became alarmed about hls left. aud notified me In the follVWlng no02 that H l s w K ' a left bad been turned.and dlrected me to draw In mg forces to prokct the h.lnr:
May 6. 1864-1 o'clock r. 1. Xajor ( 7 m d SAcridan. Commanding Cn~nlw Corpr: d and Your des tch of 1l:J.i A. Y received. General IIAI(CWK har been bcallly p hls left t u r n e r The major general commandlnp thinks that you had hetUr draw In 'your cnvalry 80 M to m u r e the protectloo 01 the trains: The order requirlng an w o n for the wagons to-nlght hM heen reeelnded;
H E A U Q C A H T E R P ARmY OF TRC P m O M A C .

OF TEP CAVALRY CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, PROM UBT 4, 1864, BY YAJOR OILNERAL P. H. SHORIDAN. L ' . 8. A.,

-_

. HEADQUARTER9JdILITABY DIVISIOX O F THE GL'LP SEW ORLEAXS. LA.. ~ a 13, v iw. GmPW.:e (he honor to make the followlng report of the operntions 01 the $avSW a r p . A m y of (he Potomse. from Aprfl6,1861. to A w a t 4. l e a : I
WtIDLRIPIJ.

A. A. HUMPHREYS. Xsfm GcncmL, Chi@o/.%ff. I obeyed thls order, and the enemy took porePlon of the Furnaces. Todd's Tavern. and Plney Branch Church. the regDInlng of whlcL coet much lightlng on the 6th m d 7th.and very many gallant offIcers and men. \ On the 6th CCSTERfought at the Furnaces. and deleated the enemy, who left hb dead and wounded In our hand.%
IrODD'S TAVLRS.

On the 7th the Iralns of the army. under dlrectlon from headquarten A r m y 01 the Potomu., were put In motlou
to go Into park a t PIney Branch Church. A m thlr polnt w u held by the enemy I WM m o d d e n t that the order must have been glveu altbout h11y ondmtmding the condition of affairs. and therefore thonght the heat way to remedy tha trouble w u to ball the tmloa $ 0tbe viciolty of Aldrich's. attack the enemy and regain the gmund. Tbh l e d V, the b t t l e o f Todd'a Tarern. In whlch the enemy WM defeated. CWG attacked wlth one of h b brigden on the Catharpen mad. and drove'lhe enemy over CorMn'a b?ldge: Y . who WM In command of the flnt dlrlalon during the temporary absence of TOSEmCT.atbckd wlth bls dlvblon. on the Spott6ylvanIa nmd. drivlng hlm towards Spott#slvuk. and D A ' brigade of Gnccio's dlrlrloc made a handsome attack on the Plney h n c h Chnrch rod.unlt The p u n u l t WM kept n p untll dark. Q a r eo'B Ing wlth YEnRm on the Epottsylvanla nmd. and Y E n R r n ' s dlvlrlona errcamped in open Eel& In the vlclnlty o f Todd's Tatnwn.rlth orden to move In the morning. at dayllght. for the p u r p a e o f galnlng pamelon Of Enell'# bridge. orer the Po rlver. To ruuampllah thb, W r m N . who W M at ALop'a b o w , WM dlreeted to take pogegllon o l Spottnylvanla early on the mornlng of the 8th.and thence move Into prriG MEwere ordered t op to the BUBO polnt; the tlon at Snell's bridge. C R ~ and former via the crossing at Corhln'n brldge. th- mtter by the Bloc=. H a d these movements been carrled ont s u a e l l y . i t wonld prohablj b v e snfBdently delaycd the march of the enemy m Spottsylvanla Court Honsc to enable w r LnfAuPI to reach that polnt first. and the battles fought them would have probably occWmd e l a r h s r e .

. .

ik

!a

EXTRACTEL
EXTRACTS.
403

EXTRA CT.S.
T h e e n e m r eonsialerpd u completelr cornered. hut s u r h not the case. foC R h l k we were engaged. scouting pariles were sent ~ I U U K the <'hickah*min)-. a n d scvernl f m l q fourid by them. ' Tbls a t t a d t a n d r e p u k ended t h e battle: the balauce o f the day w e cnl cted o u r Rounded. burfedour dead.gra/led our horscs. rind rend the Riulinion~lp n ~ w r s , t w SI ~ all n e u s bop h.viog,wfth commendable enterprise.enfered our linea a n d h n l d IO the oiiircm,and m e n . Between S a n d 4 o'chrt in the nfternwm the remnining portion u f thc comilindd cra the Chichhomlny. at And hetireen Walnut Grnve nnd i;aiiies' Mill-. On t h e 13th t h e march u-tu rcaunieai, eui.anipiny at h i t o m ' s Hriclgv tm' the l i t h we marehed through WhIteOak 5uamp.and went into ennip In?t!vc.t.n Ilaxnll', Imiidingnnd i h i r . ley, on t h e Jam- river. Our crsualtles on the niarch were 1 5 . A l l transportable ivnuudecl nn4l II InrPe nllmlkr ad p r i s # m ucrp 1,rought altinp. t o this point. a n d t h e fnrmer. through t h e kindot% of l;enernl IiI'Tl. 'i meclinil otlicem. aiuickly
\

EXTRACTS.

4 05

foi

1
F

enred for on
Fromth%ktiI tbe 17th.wr rentegl in thiscamp.wuoling , l i l t w > i i t i n gpnrti(.b n - far n e Sew Market, I n t h e dlrectlon of Kichrnun(l. On t h e night of t h e 17th we commenced the returu march. e r n s i u u the I'hicknbominy at Jones' Bridge, a n d u e n t Into camp. on the 15th. at Ilnltiriinru l ' r o s r o a h a n d vicinitr, The uncermlnty of what hnd hnppened to the Arwy nf the I'ntomnr during o u t ahscn?e. act hnct nud wherv to rind it somen-hnt difficult. partiiiilnrly 81) made t h e problem of how IO aa I knew that rei.nforcemnw had come u p frum the Snuth to l < i e h i n ~ m , l I . therefore determhed t o errws t h e h i n u n k e y Rit-er at t h r \Vhitr Ilouse. nud sent tu Fnrtress JIonrOe for n . pontoon hridge to be ilwl for that purpose. While walling, I ordered CI'mER with hi4 b r i w l e f o ~ ) r o ~ 1~ , )e Hnnovcr ~d I'ourt 1louse.and. ,~ \\ ii.-qtx were seutat i@fblble.destroy t h e railkond hridprrovt-r lhv .+outh .\uiin: I ~ I : E # .atnrl the =me tlme to Cnld IIartmr. to demonstrnte in the directialu # i f Ria 1 1 1 1 1 ~ ~ ia 1 s ~1 tar n*,Zlechan. s to cover ('CrTElt'r movement : Z I ~ I : ~ I r r . \ v i tthe h reiiiniiiiiig t,rigadc,y of his divizICdYille,So a ion. held fast at Raltiniorc (:mssroada. britlae l nt Alter (iRF*'.Q,and CcsiER stnrted it WIL< famnd on cnniniilatimm 11111f the' r n i l r o ~ ~ t h e Whlte llouee had been hiit pnrtially h r n e d . H i i d wulal Iw rcpnircsl H I I I I i;merti; \ I t R H l r r wna at onre put on this duty. 11s m x l l n g ninnnted pnrties thnrurh t h e .iirruirndiny coiintry. each mnn bringing hack 8 boanl. It was niadv peL~utole i l l ~ I I V,In?. : I I I # ~ o n thc -'ai, tr11t.11 ' +? CC~Ea Rn d C R I C G returntd. we c r u s e d . m w n p i n g that nizht ; L I .\?.!,.ti'.;. < > I I the Z r ( t t r i 1 8 8 ) ~ ~ j Aver. CLWER encountered a fawe force of tbr. w e m y sppnrvntly int)rinu frt,iii t11e<!ir ,.tion of ~ ini,*ig>ii. Richmond t o LEE'S army. a n d wa* unnl,le to a c c o r n p l i ~ lIlir CREW;occupled Cold *arbor and leut w$mtin: parties. which t.ncz~~iiitcrt~ai s111ti1 s(lunds of mOUtIted men. to t h e vioinltr of \Ierhnnicsville. but uothiiia $ ~ prtwt f iiul..vrtrinct, curreal. A t AyletVs we learned lr& citizt!ns. nncl r;xptiver ttelnnfiiny 10 1,t t:'. nrui!-. t h a t I e \rm! of t h e Potomecwas a t S o r t b A n u s river. in tLe viviuitv o f ~'hcatertiei~i ;tation. On t h e .?3dt h e march wm rrsumed. encnmpirig ut Itcetly - 1 v t t n i 1 t On t h e 24th r e rejoined t h e Army of thr Pammnr in tile vit,init? a b f Chestcrfielol. This t n d e d the flrst raid. *leh nccupiral s i s t r e n drip. We lost h u t lew horses.considering th& rondition a h e n u e starte8l. The nverkqe #lieULnce traveled per day did not exceed eighteen luiler: the Iwwcrt I I I ~ I ~ t,t,in< ~ ~ I I thirrr milen. s they w u l d h a r e been , . K P ~ T wcI1. The homeawhich failed were shyt by t h e resr.gliartl. a prated a n d madeservkeahle to t h e enemy. I t h i n k the nctunl numher l l w \r,>uicipot CX. ceed 300.perhap6 u o t more than -3. .

i
i

~ ' o ~ w rTRE sc

ARMY OF TKE Pr)TnW.tr'q rRneqsG; # I F T M E I ~ \ Y I ' S R F I .

On t b e 2 j t h General \Yrmns with hie division un- transferred to the riqhl o f t h t army. a n d made a rcconnoiglance south of the Sorrh .\nnn RS f a r m Little river. the nrher t q o di\.i. atons remalned eocemped from t h e 24th until t h e 26th in t h e vicinity c , f Polemt Statibn On t h e 26th a movement of t h e army commenced in order to make the crossin4 of t h e Fkmunkey river at O r near aanovertown. TORBERT'.: and GREW'? divisions. with Hu..w.I.'.~ division 01 t h e 6th Corps. took t h e advance t o secnre t h e cros.ings. with directions to demonstrate on M todeceive the enemy aa much (u potdble in t h e movement. T o amomplldt thia end. jTORBERT u'n- w l e r e d tn mow? to Tnvlor's Ford on t h e Pamiinkey. and demonatrate UO!ll after dark a s if thP r r w s i n a u n a to he made nt that point. then tp leeve nsmrll guard. q u l t t l s withdraw. a n d march to Hanovrrtoun f w i . u h e r e t h e real ctosying R.I. 11, 1,c iii **'? e-:t '. I ( . K F J . * . w a r nrde rc.! tn 1.lrtlepaqc's ('roming on fbe Pamunlrer to

EXTRACIS.
On J u n e

EX1 KACTS.

407

I
I

I
EXTRACTS.

EX TRACTS.

On the lath we e n

ncllnlpecl at Shady Iirove C'hurch.

ablad arin u.ere usiiig On the S l h we dlrectlon ot t h e White

r to whip u p the a n i u l s .

General & m R c ' n t , ) r m ~

On the-motning of

On the motu1
b the traln
The train w u not for the nlght.
waY

moring. a n d on Its right Bank.

88

it

R ~ Y the

h u t waa d e l y parked on the south i l d r 01 the 1lhlckChominy

I
410

I
EXTRA CTS.
411

U.\ HBYTI I \VS.

'

from our repeating c a r b followed over the plain bale beaiden killi Thk counter attack

On the 2.U uothing oc G-enernl Kacrra command.

DISCUSSIONS.

.
I

. DIS.

G e l l e d MEHH~IT: I c nho! will1 the time at m? 8lislooual for the study of t h e subject, uudertake toenter into the u-aioiiof the q u e s t i w c<mtciuplutecl by I.ieuteoarit s r i [ E s c ) i ' c paper, t h e reading o f which h a w listened Io with grea! iuter~~,f.Tnis di.-cusi<jn ali#,uld be made by artllkr).I,fliCt?rs. Vf One thiuc I ('nu lasure the iiieinban uf this .\wwiatiou, a n d tliat b . t h . c t h e batterycoluman rsduririytlie wartif the relwlliatn. *ii~.Ii&. I ; ~ . $ I I$>I, \\it.i.~q,,~, \VWDRI'FF and T . $ Y i . ~ % wh vi.r didiculties t l w niny huvreri~uiiuterrd. never faile<lIO krel, pace wlth t h e q q a l r p in the longed aual most rapiql inarvhes. and nIu.av?~ fl,iiiid t h e <v!alry wllllng to lend a helping ha d in tight p l a ~ * ~ There . l ~ a t t r r i mwerr e*fiiilqn.I wit11 t b c Sa-

. . -

!SIOS OS LIEI..T. SC'HESI'E'G PAPER.

I thlnk it was tho that I w a i t a dewrile LI'

Lome artillery 6un.and s h e d that a more.su_its be iupplled by the Ordi

idemtood. H brn l was abketl I n preynre aii#lread ni? paptsr. bt lleld yiiu with which I \vas known t o be fvmilinr. A S it u u in the service. it wnn urcvwarily liable t o be iiae*i u ,I e n t it was so r r f e r r d 111 i u niy paper. twt i t $4 : I* IIW~tiere

i
I

. the Roar11 of Liglit

uses in his calculations. were experlArtillery orlieen.

L -

. .

I-

R E VIE US.

415

R E VI E \\'S.

416
Dismniinted aervice.

RE VIEW8.
SLCOSD WEER.

I.

1
YISC'EL LANEOCTS.
1

MISCELLANEOUS.
I

Lieutenant ~ I m x . a r e r r i r i n r tof c luwwiate m e m h r n b i p in t h e I'nired S m t a t'eralry Asmelalion. I be# lo ynvent you my thank- f i b , the honor thus conferred upon me. k t me wid that 1 am very anxious t o make msnelf uneful royour m i a t - . a n d you nil1 * place m e un ler obllgstio4s any time you alvc me the npportunity to now. Very re*pectfuily.Sir. your mfmt tibeclit.nt -rrvant.
S.IR
I'

- I have Just r e c e l r e d u u g h

..

\
420
CA

~ I S C E LANFO L US.
LLKY SM'ILTY O F T I l E .\K>IIk:4-5ation
:

O F T H E L-SITED *TAT=:.

THEACUREH*S C)FFI< F:,

~tei n acknowledginp t h e m e i p t of t h e . l * ~ ' t t x * iof . )-our Arm8 e n t me. b u t I wailled IO and tlrur in the InIdJt of m y huoiuru dation. whlch you so kind 'engagern om to reail 11 can lly. which I have d u n e \t ilh great pleasure an11 Im,tit. pt of t h e tdessingu t h a t f o l l w e d o u r o a r n f twent!.live ?.Cam It 16 not our of t h e 1 . a result we h a w your .\s@atiim which ago t h a t It e t t h e army ' Lhiokiog. and n is a u y inilicntivn . a p p e u n to h e d o i n g good w :.if Ita published Jc,l'x?;.&i. .\ly sen'iee wlth the CB Iry in o u r war has gire IC. great interest 111 all tndt relates 1 1 , .O J.o u r ,\ ~ ,o ( '.l n t . i o n i..f 11 . I.Y pernil . 3 I should like therefvre ( I J.O I t h a t b n n c h o f t h e wrvire. ,115. siblr to take In thcrpe of ill ho w p w l i n the volunteer cavalry: a n d I forward eoi~hise~l fee. I'wun Yimt 1.ieutrnant i n th* iith Penur)lvnnia I'nviiIr! 3 plieatloo and NuU entrsni h.u t d u r i u g the greater pnrt which W M oganlzed by 1'1 oel R r w , M U redlmeot of I . a n c y ~ ) ~ .amp on th? Cavalry C'orps StnC of the .\mix of the P o t m w . of my service I \vas an aide with (ieueral I H E H I I IAS. afterwarda r l t h 4;qnera.l PI.SASASTO.U.

m t a r y rnitcd ~tnic. cardl DEAR R I H : 1 a m per:

216H R O . ~ l , H ' . \ Y . SEW Ya,mY. October ZB. I N .

"p

Respectfully.
CiEnK.\w I R Y I S E
IIITEHE.\II.

enemF'a infantry advanrv dbuiuililted cava:ry made at t h e start an a d v a h l w e 5


'

hanvever- that iipuu which R I ' F ~ I H I )coiitrsttvl 111,. io$ of the llrst d a y an4 by his rnarlerly Iisnillillw o i r the .\rmy of the I'otomnc to wlec,ta w s i t i i i l i aiiol w i i i mainmincd throuutiuilr t h H t hercitleali *trugqle - i- ! t a r

surely t h e w u n d of the i only regardlog t b e aiogle

As ever)-tblng cvmoecie

if

daily and bloodyeilwiuulc.rs w i t h the enem! ', man's steel - in which the lox9es uf tlic K c m .

Rerw Yilrraim E +

re oft h e rontlict. The mobility of the mi11 pnvv


ular hrigade which t i m e under 11112g e n t y l h<.n*l

pmpriety of placing n suitable mi,ui~incnt I\ here I { C P * , K I I crack o f carbine and shriek of uhell. and 11w w l d scem n eur o f t h e C.d. caval^ . \ m i a t i t ) n . i f only f8,r t h e rea*oli large wale. o n e of t h e tioldert and a h l n t iist-s 111 .4merirsii perhaps t h e regular ubvalrr mivlir w n t r i b u l e f the marches. hivouarr and ctvtuhars which led ttle-fleldr uf history. .,rid neld-marks. hut let t h e otiirinys he iiieryecl ooed. st, that n trifle fraiin etwh intlividiul cnv

OFFICE

OF THE ASSOCIATION
1888.
____
PRLLQIDSST.

L:ST OF MEMBERS
A

EY JIERRITT.BTT. MAJ. Grv't. r :.


I E T A R I A S D TREAZI'RLR.

I
I

Ftni

; T T . ' > . L. H E I S . 1ST CAYALRV


EXECUTIVE C O V S C I I . .

rT. B m . M A J . ( i L N ' I . U. *. A jm I ' A V A BVT. LR LlECT. Y . ('OL. C.S.A. RTY.6in C A V A L R Y .


1s-r C A V A L R Y .

r. im CAVALRY. icz-omiu.

..

I
\

BRANCHES:

Firv

t.4uer. L.. let Lieut. I:t I l ~ , r s t . ~ i i a d r ' n . \ Y . S . G . Augur. J . . . . . . . . . . i'ap:. 31h ('nvalrg Babcock,J. H. ('npt.:sth ( h v . H i t . HIIJ.,I' $ \ . Racon. J. 1 1 . . . . . ..Major 7th (lnvalry Baird. \V . . . . . . . . . . I b t l,ieitt.a;th c'avalry Baten. A . E. ..........JIajc,r Pay I J r ~ w r l l n e r l t 1st Lirut. ?I. 11. tBanlster. \V. ti. . . . . . . . . . . . . . t h r t e r . 1. H.2d 1.t. 1st c'levrl'd Troop. 11. S . C . . Bench. Y. H . . . . . . . . . . . J d I.leut.iith ('aYnlry e a c h . \V. D.. . . . . . . . . let Lirut.:;d <'avnlry Rell. J . F.. . . . . . .. J d Lieut. ith l'avalry Becteeo. F . \ V . . Mnj.".lth c'av. Bvt. ('01. V . S . A. Bernard. K. F... Jlnj.8th ('a\.. Bvt.('oL l..S. A . Blprlow. John. jr.. . 1st I.leut.lilth c'avalry Helliuger, J . 11.. . . . . . .1 1 1 l.ieut. fith Ca\alrg tBingham. E . H.. .\I. I: .................. tlorton Hinghnm.1;. S . . . . . . . .'J I.ieut.910 Cavalr?. tHlnghnm. Rollins. IAeut. ( ' n v . Troop Eau. ( ' . tl3irkhwuser.T. E.I.ieut.H.Sqioadmo. \V.S.G. Hlake.J. Y. t ' . .. . . . . . 181 Llrut. 6th Cavalry Hloclsoni. A. P.. . . . . . . . let Lieut.6th Cavalry Kluur. J. S.Y.. . . . . . .A i I.leut.Sth c'aralry tHlunt. S. E... .Captain Ordnance Deymrtment tlbland. Mlchael . . . . . . . . . . Eaneaa ('It) t*)muII. P.S . . ................ .CapL 181 Cavalry Houghmn. D. H .......... 1st I.1eut.M Ca~alry Boutelle. F. A . . . . . . cap^. 1st Cnvalry Hraden. (-,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1mt Lieut. [*. S. A . :Bralnard. D. L.. ......... .2d Lleut. 2d Cavalry TBreckeurldge. J.C.Co1.lnepectorCen.C.S.A. Brenzeer.C. li.. Lieut. L. H.Sqnadron.W.S. G. Brown, A. H.. ....... ....A Lieut. 4th Cavalry Bruwn.0. J . . ........... .lst Lleut. l i t Cavalry
~

lair.%. D l ' . l ' a . . l ' ~ ~ r p r A r m )P. -~~I l h r r . C. c' ( ' . . . . . . . . . . . .('apt IstCavalry ('nrr. E. A.. ( ' s * l . oth ('a, .. Ilvt. Maj.Cen. C.S.A. rarroll. 11. . . . . . . . h j o r 1.t Cavalv ('atwm. .I. \I. . . . 3 1 I.leu1. IBth Ca\-alry C'huHre. .\. II . . . .Jlajor 9th Cavalry ''('hmZ. ('Iifhrd. Lt. ilone Sqiuidron. \V. K.C . I'heevr . 11. 11. . . . . . . . . 1st I.Ieut.6th l'aralry t~'hlsholm. 8 II . 1st ('lewlaud Troop.0. S. C. Clwkc. 1'. I I . . . . 3 1 I.leut 10th ckvalry ('lluch. 1 ' . S . . . . . . . . Jd I . l ~ t ~ t . : d C ~ v a l r y c'ole, J . A . . . . . 24 I.ieut. 6th (hvalry Conipton. 1'. E.. . . . .~:uIonel 4 t h Cavalry t l ' w k . G. t ' . . . . ,241 I.iwi. I:)th Inlantry < w i n e ? . JI. . . . . . . . . . . .l'ept.!lth C'avrlry C'ooley. .lamer f ' . . . . . . . hitr I'ept. :neb (!avalry c.wiwr.c'. 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ('apt. 10th cavalry C'ruig. L. A . . .... ..Is1 I.iuut. .\dji.c;th Cavalry C n w d e r . E. 11.. . . . . . . ..2d Lieut. 8 t h Cavalry ('ruse. T h o m w . . . . . . .I d Lleut. 6th Cavnlry Curry. \F. I.. ..late C a p b i n 1 s t Ohlo c'avalry Ilnvia. ti. 11. . . . . . . . . . . . . .lhyt. 3th Cavalry Davls. \Vlrt.('apt. 4th CHV.. I h t . Major L'.*.A. Day. \Y. 11.. . . . . . . . . . . , 1 6 1 Lleut. 10th Qvalw Dlckinson. \V. 31.. . . . .Ist I.leut. 4th Cnvalry tDletz. \Y. IJ ..................1st Lleut. Y.D. t h d g e . T. A.. r a p t . 1'. S . A.. Brt. Lleut. ('01.
I-. $. A.

Dooaldeuo. T. (2.. ....: ..'d Lleut. i t h Cavalry4 Ibont. J . H.. ......... __.. . . .l'apt. 4th Cavalry Dmvo. E.E.. ..let Lleut. K. U. X B t h Cavalry Drew. ti. A , . ................ . a p t . Sd C a v d q Dudley. S . A. 51.. . . . . . . .C'olOtIel Ut U V W

t,

621
Duff,It. J . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LIST OF ME.VBEKS.
c'aralrl-

LIST OE XEJIREHS.

425

h m m m i . A . G . . . . . Id Lieut. 4th Cavalrv Ilirnnn. K n b e r t . . . . . . . . . ( ' , i p m i n IXII Cavalry t l l r m l i l l . ('. B . . . . . ...2d 1.ieuI. 13th I n f a n t r v Ilnrc. I.. R. . . . . . . . . . . 1st I.it.ut.7th ('avalry H a r m o n . .John .\. .. , . . ' , I I.icut. 7th c'avalry IIarris. 2 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . ( ' a p t a i u 1st c'avalry . . . \lnjor Ith Artillery t l h b r < J U i k 11. . 1'. tll~skl~ i . I. . . . . . . . . . . . Major 1.t . i r t i l l e r y \V. I l ~ h ~E hd . w a r d . ('01. !'th c'uv.. H v t J l a j . c;en'l 1. . : .\., lute 1't)ruuiander i ' a r a l r y 111vision. Ilntfiel~l. 1'. . \ . I > . . . . . i ' n p t u i n i t h i'nvalry llayw. E. 3 1 . . . . . . . . .I'nptniii ith c'aralry t r h p ~\V. . ( ' . ....hi c ' k v e ~ t i : ~T dr # w p . ( i . S . I;. tFIazletoii. \V. 1 ' L n t e l ~ n p i u i i i*th l l l . i ' n v a l r ~ I I e d t ~ k l I l .e'. \ . . . . . ..',I l , l t ~ l l ~ .3t . c'uvrlry 1lein.O. I... . . . . . . . . . 1.t l.ieiit. 1st t'avnlry t l l e i r m n t i . 1'. I.. . . . . . . . . . . .. > I t i j ~ ? .\I. r 11. t k u i s e e . .\. 1;. . . . . . ~'nptrun 1:tb I ' h r a l r y Henry. 1;uy \.. ?Iaja-r "ill l'uvulry, hi I'OI.
I' s. A . 1 1 e y I . E J I . . . . . . . . . 1.ieiit. <'<)I. Inep. tienernl Ilotlmin. T. t i . . . . . . . l a [ 1.ieiit. i;th c'n\nlry tlI#sff..l. V s n K... . . . . . . . . . . . l ' a p r a i n 11. 11. IIolhrtnik. \V. .!. . . . . . . Id I . i ~ * u 1st i c'uvalr!Ilawze. R. I............. AI Ueut. a h c'svalry Hgty1e.i; . S .............. 1st I.ieur. 1st i ' u v a l r y tlIoyt.1;. S ............ 1st Licut. 18th l u f a n t r y IIiighe~. 21. 1 3 . . . . . . . . . . .c'npulin Wi c'avalry ....... . ~ ' o I ~ n e 1 n l . p .. ~ e ~ e r a l tIIcighes. H. P.. t l I i i p h t % \V. S. . . . . . .2d Lieu[. Lith I l l r a n t r y IIiirit. I,. I'.. . . . . . . . . . . I z t I.ieut. l o t h ('avalry t l l i i i ~ l i u g t r ~ ('. n . I'.. C a p t a i n I.. 11. S q i i a d r o u \V. S . e , . - ~- I l l l n t t . 1;. 1 ; . . . . ..I.ieiit. I'uloiiel IlNh cC'avalry Ilslt.?-. 1 ' . S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ('apt. 7th ('avalry t l r n n s . J. A , . . . . . . . ..I*[ I.ient. 31th I n r a u t r j I r w i n , F. . I . . ............ ,211 1.ieut.Ld t a v a l r y H.. . . . . . . .31 I.ieut.9th c'avalr) J a i h o n . J.. Capt. 1st c'av.. Uvt Mujnr. C . S . .\. Jackwu. I t . . . . . . . . . . . . .( ' w i n 7th ( ' a v a l r y tl,ivk:eon. J. B ......... l i t Lieu:. ;th I n f a n t r y t.lair\is, S . S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 s t Lieut. >I. 11. J e n k i n s . J . 21 . . . . .111 l.ieiit. ; t h t ' a v a l r y J~I.IIMJI 1'. I . 1'. . . . . . 24 1.icwI. 141th c'ava!ry Jchiiwn. J. 13. . . . . . . . i'aptaki :UCuvalry J c , I i n s t o i i . J .\. . . . . . . .1st I.ir*ut. 8th C'nvalry :.Ime~ J . 11. . . . . L u W 1st L i c u t . 4th c'avalry Joriw. R o g e r . . Brig.lien'l. I n s p e r t o r General J a n e . T. \V.. ........ . A t Lieut. loth c'avalry Ksirtr. A. V., (.'ol. 3th l u f . Bvt Maj. Gen'l. U. d. .\.. l a t e d ' m n m u n d e r c'av. Dlvision A r m y

Freeman. E. I). ........2d

G d e , ti. \V
ginera.

....; ......,2

t 1 ~ o h a n ~ m . Q. S.

. . . . . . . . . .('apt. U.D.

Troop. X.. 1 Gresham.J.C .........

Guest. J ................

tGurovlU. 0 tHaden. J . J. ........... Ha1nw.J.T ............ K3all.T. 6.............. HalI. W.P

.........

Llth l u f a n i r y

tHnbey. I.. W . . .....

...........

Iiunilron.8. I . . ......... H-mrnnmd 1- ............. ... -, C - . -.


I _

__

.......

-----

Janies. Krllopg. S.-C.. (:apt. 5th ('av..Bvt Lieut. ('ol., [ . . S .A. Kelly. J... ............. .l'apIniai lllth c a v a l r y tKellou. J. ('.,('dotiel. As'; .idjt. Geu'l. Bvt Iirig. 1:en.l. t.. +. A . Leudall. tI. F.. . . . . . . . I s t Lieut. 8 t h C a v a I n Keudall. 11. > I . . .........Captain 6 t h c'avalry tlieiiuedy. J. .\. .... L't 11. Squadron. \V. S . 1 ; .
l i e n u e d y . \V. El.. ...... .l'aytain 10th Cavalry tKennon,L. W. V.. .?d LlcuI. ljth Inf. A. IJ. C.

tlodeii~mgh. T.F.. ( ' 0 1 . Ilvt. l{rig.l;eu., I'S A. I u ~ l o n e lhtll l I'R ('avirlry Rodpern. Alex. . . . . . . . .: ,.('apt..Ith Cnvalry KW. 4 . F . . .......... Idle 1st Lieu[. 2d ('avnlry tRou.se. 1 I . c ' , . _ .1stCIi.velaodTroop.O.S.l;. . t l l u c k c r . \V. A , . ...............Lieut. t'o1.I'. D. K u w l l . F. \V. . . . . . . . .l a t e Lieu[. 6th Cavalry tltussell. (i.Ii..('apt. ?NIi [of. U v t Zlaj. I ' . R . A. Huaerll. 1;erald.. . . . . . . .(.apt. :Id i'avalry t%trd,l. 21. I4 ........ 1st Lleut. 13th I n f a n t r y %rids. i ;. 11.. . . . . . . .. l o t Lieut. Gtb Cnvdry

4 ' 2 6 .
C.J.A.
.

H S T OF MEMBERS.
\-room. P. D ................ ('apt.3d Cavalr? Wade. J. F . . . . . . . . . . . . . .c'olonel i t h l ' a ~ a l r y
Volkmar. W. J . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Major. A . I;. I,.

Sayre. F e m n d . . ...... 2d Lleut. 8th Cavalry tSchenck. A. D.. .......... l i t Lleut. 2d A r t ' s tSehoetPel. Ceo.J.. CayL In L't Hone Squadmn:\V. ?J: G . .* Schotlel&C;-&: . 4 b t I. eut. Adjt. ?dc'avalry Captain 5th Cavalry gehayler. \V.9 . . .,. ' I d Lleut. 1st Cavalry Scott, W.?i tSenmm. C . B..L't Hor e Squadron.W. S. G .

t3nnger. J. P..Copt. lit 1 rt..Bvt UaJor. 1'. S. A. tSntcerla. C .B............ .:st Lleut. : I dA r t ' s

... ............

Brnlth. W.E ..... Spsalding. E.J . .

Bmnlon; W m . . ........

Bomner. E V,

swjgert.s..

.......... Thayer. A ................


Taylor. F. B..
Thomm. E . D.

Tapper.T. ( ' ......... Upbam. F. K


U p h m . J. J

..........
..

Wagner. A. L.. . . . . . . . 1st I.ieut iith I u f n i i t r ~ Wagner. H . . ............... ('aotaln 1st ('avaky \Vainright. R. P. t'.. 1st Lieut. AdJt. 1st Cavalry (Valte. H. De I I . . . . . . . I s 1 Lleut. 5th ('as-alr! \\alcutt. C. (' ......... ..:W Lieuc. *th Cavalry Wnllaee. K.JI ............ . t ' ~ p t a i i iith i Cavalry Ward. F. k.. ............ .Caprain 1st Cavalry Waterman. .J. I ' . ........2d Lieut. 7th Cavalr) \Vatta,I'. 11.. ......1st I.lcut. Adj. :,th c'avalry t\Velwter. H . . . . . . h a. \ s t . Englneer. C. S. S . W e e k 11. d . . . . . . . . . . .('aptain *tb r'nvalry . . . . . . . . . . . . .c'autalu 8th (Bvalry Wells, A , . t\Vetherlll. A . 21.. l i t Lieut. K 0. \I.. iith I n fantry. \Vesendorff;11.. . . . . . . . .i'aptain 1st ('avalry *\Vetmore. \V.Il. . . ...l,nte l.ieiit. lith i'nvnlr\ t\\ettlanp.I. ........I.ipht l'avnlry 'Tro<,p.E. ( ' . tIVhnrcnu. J . S.. ... . I , . I I . kliinolroii. \ \ . S . t ; , Wheelen. J. S . . . . . . . . .Captnin 5 i ('avalry fWhIpple. 1'. W.. _. . _ . ~ ' n p t a i nOrd. Curp, t\Vhlpple. 1'. 11. .................. .Major P. I). Whlpple. H . S... . . . . . : 2 d Lieut. loth c'avnlm whitehead. G . w.. late 1st L i e d e n n s y i %.aula c'aralry and additional .\. D. c., Cavalry ('orps. .Army Potomar. \VhGeside. 9. >I. ...........Major 7111 i'nvalr: \VIIklnson. J. \\.. . . _ , l s I.ieut t 7th ( ' a r a l r y \Vlllmx. E. F.. .........lst Lieut. tith l'nralry \Villlams.R. .\. . . . . . . . . , . . ( ' n p t , Sth I'avalry Willlarnson.(i.>IcK ... .2d Lieut.Gth CnvuIry Wllson..I. H.. late JIaj. Gen. (iimmnndiny Cavalry Corps .Sherman's Army. t\VIlmn. Joa.Ispsley. I r t Lieiit. 1st Philn. CIty Troop. t\Vil.wn. T. H ...........2d Lleut. 2d Infantry . I . . 11. Squadron. \V. S. ci. tWiudlnR. Geo. I .._. Winn. J. S . . .:.. . . . . . . ..2d I.leut. 2d Ca\-alry t\Vio.wr. H.. ..........late ('apt. Gth I'a.('nvalry Wlnt. T. J. ................('apt 4th ('avalry tWl=ner. J. P. ........... 1st Lielit. 1st Artillery \\oocl. .%. E.. ............ ..('apt. 4th Cavalry ..... .....('apt. %h Cavalry ZIaj. 21. D. Bvt. Lieut. Col.

Vlele. I*. D.. .............. tVLrmy. R W..

tVance. F. L

\VoOnsclu. A . E.. ............Capt. T,th Cavalry Wrlght. E.S., ......... . : 2 d LieiiI.9th Cavalry Young.$. 3. >I.. Maj. :kl Cav.. Bvt. CUI. C . *. A. late Cnl. 4th Pa.Cavalry. S ~ b a u r n K. . F.. ..............Sen Tork City

c. S. A.

DECEASED JIEYBERB.

-_-

t broelate member.' .Life member.