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Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security Author(s): Brian Frederking Reviewed work(s): Source: The American Political Science

Review, Vol. 97, No. 3 (Aug., 2003), pp. 363-378 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: . Accessed: 25/05/2012 05:46
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ScienceReview Political American

Vol.97, No. 3 August2003


Constructing Post-Cold




McKendree College

already exeptember11 did not fundamentallychange world politics. Instead, it exacerbated isting tensions about how to implementpost-cold war collectivesecurityrules. Using a ruleoriented constructivisttheory of global security, I argue that the dominant post-cold war global security trend is the gradual constructionof collective security rules, including rules punishing human rights abuses, terrorism,and proliferationof weapons of mass destruction.Using an method called dialogical analysis, I analyze the debate about interventionin Kosovo interpretive and argue that the recent conflict over interventionin Iraq revolves around similar claims about how to implementcollective security rules. This analysis challengesargumentsthat September11 ushered in a new era of world politics that necessarilyjustifies more aggressive,preemptive U.S. policies.

The globalriftoverthe United States politics?1 invasion of Iraq hinges on this question. The United States' "waron terrorism" presumesthat new threats from terrorist groups and weapons of mass destruction have transformedthe internationalsystem. Advocates of military intervention in Iraq argue that this fundamentallychanged world justifies more aggressive,even preemptivepolicies. Criticsof the United States invasion of Iraq, however, argue that existing collective security rules are still applicable even after the events of September 11. They prefer an internationalsystem where the use of force is justified only by explicit Security Council authorization or traditionalstandardsof self-defense, neither of which applies to the U.S. intervention in commuIraq.Healingthis rift withinthe international nity will requireeventual agreementabout the extent to which September 11 changed the rules of global security. I argue that September 11 did not fundamentally change worldpolitics.Using a rule-orientedconstructivist approach,I argue that the dominant trend of the post-cold war world is the gradual institutionalization of global collective security rules. As in earlier strugglesto punish states violating human rights rules, the internationalcommunityis now struggling to punish both states and ruthless nonstate actors and weaponsproliferation that violate terrorism rules. The pre-September11 debate about interveningin Yugoslavia over human rights abuses in Kosovo is stunninglysimilar to the post-September11 debates about the use of military force in Iraq. This analysis suggeststhat September11 did not fundamentally change the rules governingglobal security;instead, it exacerbatedalreadyexistingtensionsaboutthe appropriate implementationof fledglingcollective security rules.
Brian Frederking is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, McKendree College, 701 College Road, Lebanon, IL 622541299 ( I would like to thank Karin Fierke, Yale Ferguson, Gavan Duffy, and David Ahola for comments on earlier drafts, as well as Maximo Sanchez Pagano for research assistance. Any errors are my own. 1 The final draft of this paper was written in April during the beginning of the war in Iraq.

id September 11 fundamentally changeworld

To analyzethe Kosovo debate I use an interpretive method called dialogicalanalysis (Duffy, Frederking, and Tucker1998;Frederking2000). Dialogical analysis builds on approachesthat take the constitutive nature of languageseriously,includingWittgenstein's (1968) latter philosophy of language, Habermas' and (1984, 1987) notion of communicative rationality, the speech act theories of Austin (1962) and Searle (1969). Dialogical analysis models a linguistic conception of social interaction capable of illustrating constructivistarguments.It assumes the existence of constitutivesocial rules and communicatively rational those social rules throughthe peragentsconstructing formanceof speech acts.The developmentof interpretive methodslike dialogicalanalysisis importantif we are to move beyond epistemologicaldebatesbetween advocates of Science and advocates of Anti-Science. Interpretivemethods capable of yielding theoretical and practical insights can show both the positivist defenders of Science and the postmoderndefenders of Anti-Science that one can accept the philosophical critiques of positivism and still engage in rigorous, replicable empirical research in the pursuit of knowledge. I buildon Onuf'srule-oriented constructivism to offer a tentative rule-orientedconstructivisttheory of Onuf (1989)arguesthatagentsare emglobalsecurity. bedded in "social arrangements"of intersubjective rules.I posit four social arrangements constitutingthe of worldpolitics:war,rivalry, collecsecuritystructures tive security,and securitycommunities. The dominant post-coldwartrendis movementawayfromcoldwarrivalryrulesand(slowly)towardcollectivesecurityrules. This trend is complicatedbecause some rules in these social arrangements overlap.For example,the use of force is acceptablein war,rivalry, and collectivesecuHow othersinterpret the use of force rityarrangements. will dependon a dialogicconsensusaboutwhichsocial arrangementgoverns the interaction.If others interpretforce to invokerulesof war,then they will dismiss claimsthat collective securityrules apply.I arguethat a rule-orientedconstructivistemphasis on language and rules shows the debates over Kosovo and Iraq to have tremendoussimilarities,casting doubt on argumentsthatSeptember11fundamentally changedworld politics. 363

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Constructivism2 emerged in the 1990s as internationalrelationsscholarsrealizedthatthe dominantapproaches of neorealism and neoliberalismcould not events like the end of the cold explaintransformative war. Constructivismasserts the existence of social structures-including norms,beliefs, and identities-in some constitutingworld politics.All constructivists way assertthe importanceof what Searlecalls "social facts":facts that exist because all the relevant actors agreethey exist. Socialfactslike sovereignty, property, humanrights,and collective securityare for constructivists the stuff of world politics, and human agency constructsthose social facts (Berger and Luckmann 1966;Searle 1995). Within international relations, constructivismresembles English school argumentsthat the state system is embedded in a larger society in which states agree to certainrules and institutions(e.g., Bull 1977). cite manyinfluences. However,leadingconstructivists Wendt (1999) cites Mead's symbolic interactionism and Bhaskar's scientific realism. Onuf (1989) cites latterphilosophyof language, Giddens's Wittgenstein's Habermas' theory of communicastructurationism, tive action, and Searle'sspeech act theory.Campbell of Foucaultand (1992)cites the postmodern arguments Derrida. Ruggie (1998) cites Durkheim'sstudies of the collective conscience and Weber's methods of verstehen. All emphasizethe constitutivenatureof language.Languagenot only representsthe worldbut in many ways creates the world by makingaction possible. Languageis not a neutralmediumthroughwhich we studythe world;languageis itself action.Constructivism is thus part of the postpositivist"sociological turn"(Palan2000) turn"(Guzzini2000) or "linguistic in the social sciences. assertthreecommonontologicalpoConstructivists sitions(Finnemoreand Sikkink2001;Kubalkova 2001; Wendt 1999). First, social factors primarilyinfluence human interaction.Constructivism opposes materiallike the balist ontology assertingmaterialstructures, ance of power in neorealismor marketsin neoliberalhave ism.Constructivists arguethatmaterialstructures the context of for human within agents only meaning social rules.For example,a state's militarycapability has different meanings depending on whether it belongs to an ally or an enemy.Second,social structures help constitutethe interestsandidentitiesof purposive
actors. Constructivism opposes individualist ontologies that explain social outcomes as the aggregate result of individual decisions. Human agency is enmeshed in a web of social rules that both constitute and regulate agency. Third, agents and structures construct each other. Rules make agents and agents make rules. The (social) world is made by people, who in turn are made by that (social) world. Most categorizations of constructivist arguments are epistemological. For example, Hopf (1998) distin2 For more comprehensive surveys see Checkel 1998, Farrell 2002, Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, and Hopf 1998.

guishes between conventional and critical constructivists.Conventional constructivists adhereto standard causal norms and ideas as positivist theorizing,using independentvariablesthat cause action (Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999). Criticalconstructivists, however, rejectpositivistepistemologyandmethodsandthe possibilityof objectiveknowledge(Campbell1992).Their goal is to demystifythe discursive practicesthatconstitute social rulesin orderto foster change. do not considerthemselvesin Many constructivists either of these camps.Adler (1997) and Ruggie (1998) offers an importantmiddle argue that constructivism ground between positivism and postmodernism.Into inconstructivism deed, Onuf(2002,126)introduced ternational relationsto stakeout sucha middleground:
Thisthirdwayholdsthatontologyis the key. ... Constructonly to representthe world as it is. Languagealso serves

serves ivismchallenges the positivist viewthatlanguage

a constitutive function. we makethe world By speaking, is notpostmodwhat it is .... Nevertheless, constructivism

ernbecauseit accepts,as a practical matter,the Enlightenment belief in the possibilityof sharedknowledgeabout

we livein. theworld

workwithinthismiddleground, Manyconstructivists using a wide varietyof methods to analyzethe social world (Fierke 2001). Crawford(2002) uses linguistic methods similar to the dialogical analysis presented here to analyze the ethical arguments challenging colonialism. Hopf (2002) uses a phenomenological approach of inductively analyzing texts to recover SovietandRussianforeignpolicy. identitiesinfluencing narrative strateMattern(2001) analyzes"friendship" Fierke (2000) gies in the Westernsecuritycommunity. conceptualizessocial interactionas a dialogue to analyze the interaction between Iraq and the United Nations (UN) in the 1990s.Doty (1993) uses a "discursivepractices" approachto analyzeU.S.counterinOthersnot explicitly policyin the Philippines. surgency also build suchmethods,includwithinconstructivism ing conversationanalysis(Fetzer2000) and event data analysis(Duffy 1994).Dialogicalanalysis,the method used in this article,is also intended to be within this middleground. is to foAnother way to categorizeconstructivism the type of social rulecus on ontology,emphasizing beliefs, norms,or identities-constructivists argue influences world politics.Beliefs, norms,and identities
are all types of rules that constitute the social structure of world politics. This categorization is consistent with Habermas' arguments (discussed in more detail below) for the existence of three fundamental validity claims: truth, appropriateness, and sincerity. Each type of constructivist argument emphasizes one of those fundamental validity claims. Beliefs are social rules that primarily make truth claims about the world. To criticize a belief is to say that it is untrue. Norms are social rules that primarilymake appropriateness claims about relationships. To criticize a norm is to say that it is inappropriate. Identities are social rules that primarily make sincerity claims about agents. To criticize a conveyed identity is to say that it is insincere.


American Political ScienceReview One type of constructivistargument emphasizes truth validity claims by studying the importance of beliefs, or ideas, in world politics. Beliefs are shared understandingsof the world. For example, Adler (1992) argues that "epistemic communities"create sharedinterpretations thatframeandstructure human practices.Bukovansky(2001) analyzeshow the ideas championedby the Americanand Frenchrevolutions influenceworld politics.Other examplesinclude how economic ideas influence economic policy making (Jacobsen1995)andThirdWorlddevelopmentpolicies (Sikkink1991). A secondtypeof constructivist argument emphasizes the appropriateness validityclaim by studyingthe importanceof normsin worldpolitics.Norms are shared of appropriate action.Normsguideacunderstandings tion and make actionpossible,enablingagentsto criticize assertionsand justify actions.Finnemore(1996) arguesthat states often follow a "logicof appropriateness"and adhereto existingnorms.Kratochwil (1989) demonstratedhow norms arise in rationalistenvironments to enable and guide action. Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink(1999) show the conditionsunder which "transnational advocacynetworks"diffusehumanrightsand environmental norms andinfluencedomesticinstitutional Other exchanges. include the role of norms in the of the amples collapse cold war (Kratochwiland Koslowski1994) and sanctions againstSouthAfrica (Klotz 1995). A thirdtype of constructivist argumentemphasizes the sincerityvalidityclaimby studyingthe importance of identity in world politics.Identitiestell agents who they are and who others are; they enable agents to make the actions of themselves and others intelligible. Constructivists argue that interests stem from a constructedrepresentationof the relationparticular, ship between self and other.Wendt(1995) arguesthat 500 Britishnuclearweaponsare less threatening to the United StatesthanfiveNorthKoreannuclearweapons. A social concept of structureexplainsthis, but a material concept of structure cannot. Other examples include the role of a liberal democratic identity in the NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization (Risse-Kappen 1997), the role of Arab nationalismin Middle East alliances (Barnett 1995), and the role of a friendship identity during the Suez Canal Crisis (Mattern 2001). focus on the interconnections Many constructivists among ideas, norms, and/or identities. For example, Price and Tannewald(1996) argue that the reproduction of norms is inseparablefrom the constructionof states adhereto chemicaland nuidentity:"Civilized" clearweaponsnormsbecauseonly "barbaric" statesviolate those norms.Crawford (2002) explicitlyanalyzes all three validity claims in her analysis of how ethical argumentationinfluenceddecolonization.Weldes (1999) also analyzesall three validityclaims and how they influencedU.S. national interests in the Cuban Missile Crisis.Viewed through Habermas,constructivists illustratehow agents conveyingvalidityclaims of truth, appropriateness, and sincerityconstructthe rules governingworldpolitics.

Vol.97, No. 3 The rule-oriented constructivist approach presented here also includes all three constructivist arguments. Social arrangements include all three types of rules: beliefs,norms,and identities.Global securityarrangements include beliefs about the world (e.g., the natureof security),normsaboutsocialrelationships (e.g., the appropriateness of the use of force), and identities about self and other (e.g., enemy, rival, citizen, or friend).Finally,dialogicalanalysisillustratesthese three argumentsby analyzingthe validityclaims and counterclaimsof the speech acts performedby comrationalagents. municatively

Rule-oriented constructivists make two fundamental claims (Kubalkova2001; Onuf 1989, 1998). First, social arrangements, or stablepatternsof rules,make up the structuresof world politics. Social arrangements are constitutive(they tell us what is possible) and regulative (they tell us what to do). World politics is a and overlappingsocial complex set of interdependent Rulesconstituteandregulateall aspects arrangements. of worldpolitics-even "anarchy" is a constitutivesocial arrangement. Rules make it possiblefor agents to act:Theytell us how the worldworks,Theytell us who we areandwhoothersare,theytell us whichsocialgoals are appropriate, and they tell us what we should do. Rules, like language,arenot reducibleto the meanings that individuals attachto them;they exist in the shared of their users and are reproducedthrough meanings their practices (Guzzini 2000). And, as Onuf (1989) argues,rules create rule by inherentlyprovidingmore benefitsand privilegesto some more than others. Beliefs,norms,andidentitiesare typesof socialrules that constituteand regulateworld politics.For example, beliefs aboutwhethersecurityis based on military capabilityor politicalrelationships help constitutethe range of possible armscontrolpracticesand influence armscontrolnegotiations(Frederking particular 2000). Norms about the appropriateness of weaponsof mass destructionhelp constitutethe range of possible warfightingand deterrencepracticesand influenceparticularwarand deterrencepolicies (PriceandTannewald 1996).Identitiesaboutracialsuperiority helpconstitute the range of possible colonial practicesand influence decolonization particular policiesand even humanitarian interventions(Crawford2002). For rule-oriented constructivists these rules explainworldpolitics. Onuf's concept of rules is based on Wittgenstein's (1968) critiqueof the mirrortheoryof language,which holds that languageis meaningfulto the extent that it accuratelyrepresentsthe real world. Wittgensteinarguedthatthe meaningof a termis connectedto itsuse in speech,not whetherit corresponds exactlyto thingsin the real world.Meaningresidesin the everydayuse of languageas a "formof life";that is, by context and/or convention. Shared backgroundknowledge is necessary to interpret language.Wittgensteinargues that learninga languageis like learningthe rulesof a game; theyhelpyou "goon"by actingin waysthatmakesense 365

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given the rules of the game.For example,the rules of in or to interpreta chess chessenableone to participate to This also the rules of global security. applies game. HollisandSmith(1991,179)putWittgenstein's position this way:"Socialactioncan occuronly whenthereis a rulefollowed, thus identifyingwhat is going on" (my emphasis).The task for rule-orientedconstructivists, and then, is to explicatea rangeof socialarrangements show how the rules within these social arrangements make actionintelligible. claimis that constructivist The second rule-oriented rationalagentsuse speechactsto concommunicatively structsocialrules.Thisclaimbuildson both speech act ratiotheoryand Habermas'notion of communicative with Austin's act (1962) theory begins nality.Speech that manyverbalstatementsconstitute demonstration social action. For example, saying "I do" in a marsocialact becauseit inriageceremonyis a meaningful vokes socialrulesof the institutionof marriage. Speech act theory arguesthat languageis action;speech acts declaring, apologizing,etc.) are both plen(promising, tiful and centralto sociallife. Searle(1995)arguesthat a touchdowncreates six points and a promisecreates an obligationbecauseboth are "socialfacts"based on the constitutiverules of football and promising.Onuf uses speech act theory to build his rule-orientedconKubalkova(2001,64) argues, structivism.
effortto showthatrulesderivefrom,worklike, systematic and depend on speech acts, and that languageand rules together (they can never be separated)are the medium whichagentsandstructures maybe saidto constithrough or any tute eachother.... To studyinternational relations, other aspectof humanexistence,is to studylanguageand

ishis toconstructivism contribution most Onuf's important

rules. (myemphasis)

Onufuses threetypesof speechactsto analyzeworld These andcommitments. directives, politics:assertions, speech acts invoke and/or challenge social rules that have the form of speech acts. For example,assertion rulesconvey knowledgeabout the world. Liberalism, neoclassicaleconomics,and neorealism,for example, all include assertionsabout world politics. Repeated and unchallengedassertionslike "democratic governments do not go to warwith one another,""freetrade and"unipolar economicefficiency," maximizes systems are less stable than bipolarsystems"both enable and and policies,tradeagreements, justifydemocratization
arms shipments. Directive rules tell us what we must or should do and often include consequences for disregarding them. Examples of speech acts invoking directive rules include the use of force, trade sanctions, and International Monetary Fund structural adjustment programs. Commitment rules are promises to act in a particular way. Examples of speech acts invoking commitment rules are treaties, contracts, and international trade. Habermas' notion of communicative rationality builds on speech act theory. Habermas argues that communicatively rational agents perform speech acts, convey validity claims, interpret and evaluate the claims of others, and act on the basis of mutually recognized 366

validityclaims.Rationalityrefers to linguisticcompetence;a rationalact effectivelyconveysvalidityclaims and invokes social rules so that others correctlyinterpret the speechact.Thisdialogicprocessof agentsconthe validityclaimsof eachother's veyingandevaluating speech acts constructsand reconstructssocial rules. Rule-oriented constructivistsrely on Habermas berationalactorscanachieve causeonlycommunicatively the interpretiveaccomplishments ascribedto them by constructivist arguments. Habermas argues that communicativelyrational speech actsconvey implicitvalidityclaimsof truth,apand sincerity.3 Considerthe three types propriateness, of speech acts emphasizedby Onuf.An assertion(X) conveys a truth claim (X is true), an appropriateness claim (It is rightthat I assertX), and a sincerityclaim (I believe X is true).A directive(You mustdo X) conveys a truthclaim (You can do X), an appropriateness claim (It is rightthat I directyou to do X), and a sincerityclaim (I wantyou to do X). And a commitment (I promiseto do X) conveysa truthclaim(I can do X), an appropriateness claim(It is rightthatI promiseto do claim and a (I wantto do X). Othersmay X), sincerity accept or challengethe validityclaimson the basis of a "momentof insight"to justifythe reasons,requiring All comclaim that goes beyond strategicrationality. and to test claims know how petentspeakersintuitively The bindjudgewhethercertainclaimsare warranted. ing force of languagecomes fromothers'abilityto say "yes"or "no"to the validityclaims.Whenactorsagree to the validityclaimsof a speechact, the bindingeffect of languagemotivatesthem to coordinatesubsequent actionswith the speaker.4 Focusingon the validity claims of speech acts enables constructiviststo analyze the process through which speech acts construct and/or challenge social rules. When one performsa speech act and conveys the three validityclaims,anothercan either accept all three claimsor challengeone (or all) of the claims.For example,suppose that a teacher assertsthe following to her class:"TheUnited States CivilWaroccurredin The class may not challengethe speech act the 1900s." andaddit to theirnotes(!). Orthe classcouldchallenge the sincerityclaim:The teacherwanted to see if they were payingattention.Or the classcouldchallengethe truthclaim:The CivilWarwas not foughtin the 1900s. claim: Or the classcouldchallengethe appropriateness
3 A fourth validity claim of speech acts studied by linguists, but less useful for dialogic analysis, is "grammaticality." 4 Rule-oriented constructivism does not assume that Habermas' notion of communicative action within an ideal speech situation characterizes world politics. For Habermas, communicative action is action oriented toward mutual understanding and coordinated by a consensus on all validity claims. Risse (2000) analyzes whether Habermas' conditions for communicative action (lack of power relations, noncoerced consensus, etc.) resemble interactions in world politics. I do not assert the existence of communicative action in this sense. The Kosovo debate does not illustrate communicative action; the claims about whether intervention is consistent with existing security rules are constantly disputed. What is important, though, is that the agents invoke collective security rules to justify their acts. Their action is meaningful only within the context of (albeit disputed) collective security rules.

Political American ScienceReview Teachersshould not lie to their students.In each case the studentsconstructand/orchallengethe rulesof the student-teachersocial arrangement. The samepossibilitiesstructure politicalinteraction. that one another to destroy directs Suppose country its weaponsof massdestruction withinsix months.The othercountrycouldacceptthe validityclaimsandcomply,challengethe sincerityclaim(you wanta pretextto invade), challengethe normativerightnessclaim (it is not appropriate for you to determineourmilitary capabilities), or challengethe truthclaim (we cannotcompletely disarmwithinsix months).Thisview of agency puts languageat the heartof sociallife by emphasizing a search for reasoned consensus,and argumentation, the constitutiveeffects of an argumentative consensus on agents. Using speech act theory and communicativerationality to informa conceptionof social interactionenables analysts to treat physical, nonverbal acts as if they were speech acts.Of course,somethingunspoken is not literallya speech act. However, nonverbalacts are often communicatively rational-they make validity claims and invoke and/or challenge social rules-and are thus analyzable as speech acts. The use of force is an extremelyimportant exampleof sucha nonverbal, yet communicatively rational, act. How communicativelyrational agents justify and interpretthe use of force is central to the ongoing constructionof globalsecurityrules.As the analysisbelow shows,how the world interpretedthe NATO bombingcampaign in Kosovo is centralto that interaction,as is how the worldinterpretsthe use of force in Iraq.Treating nonverbalbut communicative acts as speech acts makes a widevarietyof socialinteraction amenableto dialogical analysis. For example,duringthe cold war the superpowers understoodeach other'smissiledeploymentsto invoke the deterrencerules constitutingthe cold war rivalry 2000).Missiledeploymentsare intelligible (Frederking only if they operatedas speech acts withina particular socialarrangement. Missiledeploymentsdo not necessarilyinvokedeterrencerules;they could,for example, alter the strategicbalance or expand a sphere of influence. Indeed, the superpowerscriticizedall missile deploymentsinterpretedto invoke these latter rules. A missile deployment is understood as a deterrent only when all agree that a certain set of linguistically constructedrules govern their interaction.In this way speechacts,bothverbalandnonverbal,areconstitutive elementsof socialreality,andlinguistically constructed rules provide meaning to both verbal and nonverbal speech acts. Rule-orientedconstructivism takes the constitutive nature of language and communicativeagency seriously.Rule-orientedconstructivists analyzethe shared contextthatmakessocialactionpossibleandmeaningful. We make sense of action when there is coherence between the actions of agents (speech acts) and the meaning of their situation (existing social rules). Interpretiveapproacheslike dialogicalanalysisexplain in terms of intelligibility, not "expectability" (Dessler
1999). To explain an act is to specify the rule(s) an agent

Vol.97, No. 3 is following.Rule-orientedconstructivism does not assume, as positivistcausalargumentsdo, that language is a mirrorand we compareour statementsabout the world with the worldto see whetherthey correspond. As Kratochwiland Ruggie (1986) argue,in constructivistontologylanguageconstitutessocial interactions, while in positivistepistemologylanguage is independent of socialinteractions. Constructivists who espouse positivismignore the epistemologicalimplicationsof their ontologicalarguments (Kratochwil 2000).


Constructivism is an ontology assertingthe existence of social rules; it cannot tell us the content of those rules. This is an empirical question, and constructivists must demonstratethat their theoretical assertions about social rules cohere with the speech acts of real-worldagents.This section is a first cut at a ruleorientedconstructivist theoryof globalsecurity. Many social also constitutingworld important arrangements inpolitics-capitalism, globalization, postcolonialism, ternational law,andso on-fall outsidethe scopeof this theory but are amenableto a rule-orientedconstructivist analysis.The influenceof other social arrangements (e.g., the position of Russiain the international economy,domesticpolitics)in the disputeover Kosovo also falls outside the scope of this analysis. and securitycomcollectivesecurity, Wars,rivalries, munitiesare the "formof life" (Wittgenstein)or "lifeworld"(Habermas)or "socialfacts"(Searle) of global constitute global security.These social arrangements in the that the rules of chess constitute security way chess; participantsuse them to "go on" and act in intelligible ways. Sometimes one social arrangement is more institutionalizedthan the others; sometimes the social arrangements are contested and fluid;and sometimes social arrangements are more institutionalized in different geographicareas (e.g., war in the Middle East, rivalryin South Asia, securitycommunity in Europe). The operation of overlappingsocial arrangements constitutingglobal securityis similarto Fierke's (n.d.) argumentthat opposing "logics"may coexist withina historical context.Whatconstitutesrational action depends on which logic is governingthe interaction. particular A firstcut at statingideal-typical rulesin these social is in Table1. Each social arrangement arrangements has six fundamental rules that constituteand regulate action:(1) identity,(2) autonomy,(3) the natureof security,(4) deterrence,(5) enforcement,and (6) the use of force.The identityruleestablishesagentidentitiesas enemies,rivals,citizens,or friends.The autonomyrule establishesthe extent to which the autonomyof both state and nonstate agents is either threatenedby others or limited by mutualobligations.The securityrule establishesthe belief thatsecurityis acquiredby either relativemilitary or friendlypoliticalrelationcapability ships.The deterrencerule establishesa dominantnormative expectationeither to recognizethe autonomy 367

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TABLE 1. GlobalSecuritySocial Arrangements

Rule 1-Identity Rule 2-Autonomy CollectiveSecurity We are fellowcitizens is limitedby Autonomy obligationsto follow and enforcethe rules community's Survivalis based on Securityis based Securityis based on on relative relative(alliance) a multilateral commitment to use military (alliance)military capability capability military capability Youmust surrender Do not attackme Do not breakthe rules of our community We willattackuntil We willretaliateif We willretaliateif you breakthe rules of you surrender you violateour our community sovereignty The use of force is The use of force is The use of force is sometimes sometimes always necessary to resolve conflicts necessary necessary Rivalry We are rivals We recognizethe autonomyof others War We are enemies We do not recognize the autonomyof others SecurityCommunity We are friends is limitedby Autonomy obligationsto follow the community's rules Securityis based on political relationships Do not breakthe rules of our community We willresolve conflictspeacefully The use of force is not acceptable

Rule 3-Security

Rule 4-Deterrence Rule5-Enforcement Rule 6-Use of force

of others or to follow the rules of the community. The enforcement rule establishes the ultimate method of resolving conflict. The use of force rule establishes the extent to which force is required to resolve conflict. Variations of these rules constitute the ideal-typical social arrangements of war, rivalry,collective security and security communities. These rules are not intended to be a priori assertions of social reality. They comprise a tentative ruleoriented constructivist theory of global security. They may not cohere with future empirical research and have to be abandoned. But they are a recognizable, plausible place to start. The contents of the rules are culled from major scholars of international politics, including Alker's (1996, 370) work on security systems, Onuf's (1989) "mutual insecurity system," Schelling's (1960) theories of deterrence and arms agreements, and Deutsch's (1957) work on security communities. Wendt's (1999) three cultures of world politicsHobbesian war, Lockean rivalry, and Kantian security communities-heavily influence these rules. Wendt's characterization of Kantian culture, however, includes both collective security (in which the use of force is acceptable) and security communities (in which the use of force is not acceptable). I argue that this distinction warrants separate social arrangements; moreover, as I argue below, this distinction is essential to understand the construction of post-cold war collective security. In war, agents identify each other as enemies (rule 1), perhaps even an enemy that threatens their existence. Agents do not recognize the autonomy of others or perhaps even the right of others to exist (rule 2). Survival demands a military capability greater than one's immediate enemies (rule 3) because the military capabilities of others are interpreted as a threat to one's existence. The directive rule in war is to surrender (rule 4), supported by the commitment to attack until the other does surrender (rule 5). Because others are enemies with the military capability to threaten one's existence, the use of force is considered inevitable, necessary, and appropriate (rule 6). War orients agents to act with 368

great mistrust and hostility towards others, including interactions like traditional nation-state warfare, IsraeliPalestinian relations, imperialism, and (perhaps) the ongoing "war" on terrorism. In rivalries, agents identify each other as rivals (rule 1). They attempt to increase their security through joining alliances (rule 3) and performing classic deterrence threats (rules 4 and 5). Agents do recognize the autonomy of others (rule 2), but the rivalry constituting the system sometimes leads to violence to settle disputes (rule 6). War is thus an accepted but limited practice to end an attempt by any state to dominate world politics. Rivalry orients agents to act with mistrust and caution toward others, including interactions like power balancing, alliance systems, security dilemmas, arms races, and spheres of influence regimes. The cold war was a prototypical rivalry social arrangement. In collective security arrangements, agents identify each other as citizens (rule 1) who are obliged to uphold agreed-upon rules of behavior (rule 2) and act collectively to punish those who do not uphold those rules (rule 3). There is no presumption that actors will universally agree to the directive rules (rule 4); an enforcement mechanism that includes military force is thus needed to punish any transgressors of the rules (rule 5). A collective security arrangement may enforce only the rule of state sovereignty, or it could enforce rules regarding weapons proliferation, terrorism, human rights, and so on. The use of force is considered to be sometimes necessary and acceptable to enforce community rules (rule 6). Collective security orients agents to act with a sense of duty to generate rules of peaceful behavior and punish those who break the rules. Through the explosion of multilateral treaties, Security Council resolutions, UN peacekeeping missions, and nongovernmental organizations, agents have been slowly institutionalizing a global collective security arrangement in the post-cold war world. In security communities, agents identify each other as friends committed to the peaceful resolution of conflict (rule 1). Agents in security communities have a strong

Political American ScienceReview consensus about the obligationto follow the rules of theircommunity(rule2), and they engagein peaceful, multilateral decisionmakingto ensuresecuritythrough political relationships(rule 3). The directive rule to follow the rules of communitydoes exist in security does not include communities (rule4), butenforcement the possibilityof force (rules5 and 6). Given the lower level of threat in these social arrangements, security often refers to alternativesecurityissues like the environmentand the economy (Adler and Barnett1998, Deutsch 1957). Securitycommunitiesorient agents to act with great trust and "we-ness"toward others, as in the relations between members of the European Union. The firstthree rules-regarding the natureof identity, autonomy, and security in the world-are disTheserulesconstitute tinctacrosssocial arrangements. the core differences among the social arrangements. is governing Agentsestablishwhichsocialarrangement theirinteraction throughspeechactsimplicitly conveyingthe validityof theserules.Inwar,agentsareenemies thatdo not recognizethe autonomyof othersandmust surviveby acquiring greaterrelativemilitary capability. In rivalries,agents are rivalsthat recognizeautonomy but act to ensure securityby acquiring, or unilaterally through alliances,greater relative militarycapability. In collectivesecurityarrangements, agentsare citizens whose sovereigntyis limited by obligationsto follow communityrules and to use multilateral militaryforce to ensurecompliancewiththose rules.In securitycommunities,agents are friendswhose sovereigntyis limited by obligationsto peacefullyfollow the rulesof the community. However,rules4-6--regarding deterrence,enforcement, and the use of force-overlap across social arrangements,and this overlap can lead to conflict between agents over the applicablesocial arrangement. For example, rule 4 is identical in collective secuand securitycommunities("Do not rity arrangements breakthe rulesof ourcommunity"). Rule 5 is similarthough not identical-in collective security arrangements and rivalries.In rivalries,the only agreed-upon rule of the community is state sovereignty, and alliance mechanismsenforce that rule. Collective security arrangements representan alternativemechanismto enrulesthatoften extendbeyondstate force agreed-upon to include humanrights,etc. Most imporsovereignty tantly,rule 6 justifiesthe use of force in war,collective andrivalries. The use of forcein securityarrangements, andof itselfdoes not tell agentswhetherwar,rivalry, or collectivesecurityrulesgoverntheirinteraction; agents mustjustifyand interpretwhichrules the use of force invokes at any particulartime. Conflictsmay develop if agents disputewhich rules the use of force invokes. I argue that this overlapin the use of force rule helps explainthe disputesover Kosovo and Iraq. DIALOGICALANALYSIS Dialogical analysisposits the existence of social rules, rationalagents,and the argumentacommunicatively

Vol.97,No. 3 tion of validity claims. It is one method to illustrate constructivist argumentsabout the role of norms,beliefs, and identity in world politics. Dialogical analysis is an interpretiveapproach,explainingaction by specifyingthe rules agents follow; that is, by showing the coherencebetween speech acts and rules withina social arrangement. particular Dialogicalanalysisproceedsin foursteps(Duffy,Frederking, andTucker 1998; Frederking2000). First,one specifiesthe background knowledge necessary to understandthe interaction. Second,one accumulates explicitspeech acts that conThird,one conveyed meaningduringthe interaction. ducts a pragmaticanalysisof the speech acts,deriving the implicitly conveyedpropositions duringthe interaction.Fourth,one constructs a formalargument analysis fromthe inventoryof pragmatic propositionsto isolate consensualand disputedclaimsduringthe interaction. The analyst first specifies backgroundknowledge, most importantly a set of rules governingthe interaction. Theserulesare the theoryassertedby the analyst; dialogicalanalysisis a methodologicaltool to provide empiricalevidencefor the existenceof these rules.The of war,rivalry, social arrangements collective security, andsecuritycommunities assertedin the sectionabove are the background knowledgefor the dialogicanalysis of the veto power dispute over Kosovo. Other backgroundknowledgeused to supportinterpretiveinferences is also in the narrative below. The analyst next accumulatesexplicit speech acts during the interaction,includingnonverbalacts that convey meaning, justifyingthe speech actschosenwith defensible selection criteria. The speech acts in the analysisare not, in the statisticalsense, a randomsample of all possible speech acts duringthe interaction. Thisstepoftenrequiresa reconstruction of the dialogue from publicsources.No algorithmic coding rules exist to transformtextual data into analyzablespeech acts. Perhapssuchrulesare even impossibleto develop.The analystsimplygeneratesthe most relevantspeech acts with the same interpretiveability of all communicatively rationalagents. The bulkof dialogicalanalysisis the pragmatic analis the of field that relates the ysis.Pragmatics linguistics meaning of languageto the context of its use. In the pragmaticanalysis,one specifies the implicit propositions conveyed by speech acts given the context of the interaction.5Speakers convey and hearers infer more than utteredsentences;they make pragmatic inferences that enable them to understandone another and coordinateaction. For example, Grice (1957) argues that speakersuse rationalprinciplesof conversation in all exchanges,includingthe followingmaxims.6
5 Pragmatically conveyed propositions include reflexive intentions, implicatures, presuppositions, and logical entailments. For reasons of space, the analysis presented here includes only implicatures. See Duffy, Frederking, and Tucker (1998) and Frederking (2000) for a discussion of how to generate a full-fledged pragmatic analysis. 6 Future work on this method will explore whether these maxims apply to all political rhetoric. More generally constructivists must deal with rationalist critics who emphasize "cheap talk" and realist critics who emphasize "uncertainty" as reasons not to rely on a linguistic conception of social interaction.


ConstructingPost-Cold War Collective Security (1) The maxim ofquality-Do not say what you believe to be false, and do not say anything for which you lack adequate evidence. (2) The maxim of quantity-Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange. (3) The maxim of relevance-Make your contributions relevant. (4) The maxim of manner-Avoid obscurity, avoid ambiguity, be brief and be orderly. Actors infer conversational implicatures, or the implicit contents of speech acts, by assuming that speakers adhere to these maxims. The propositions generated by the pragmatic analysis convey validity claims of truth, appropriateness, and sincerity. When one agrees to a speech act, one concedes all three validity claims. When one disputes a speech act, one disputes (at least) one of these claims. As the interaction continues, the pragmatic analysis specifies all validity claims and counterclaims. For example, consider the following exchange between the United States and Afghanistan. UnitedStates: Extraditethe responsible partiesimmediately. Afghanistan: We will try them underIslamiclaw. The pragmatic analysis specifies truth, appropriateness, and sincerity claims conveyed by the speech acts. The United States directive toward Afghanistan conveys implicit claims of sincerity (The United States sincerely directs Afghanistan to extradite the responsible parties), normative rightness (It is appropriate that the United States direct Afghanistan to extradite the responsible parties), and truth (It is true that Afghanistan can extradite the responsible parties). The directive is coherent with collective security rules: The United States is directing Afghanistan to follow the community's rules against terrorism. When Afghanistan refuses the directive, it disputes the United States' appropriateness claim and thus rejects the applicability of collective security rules. Instead, its claims of sincerity (Afghanistan sincerely intends to try them under Islamic law), appropriateness (It is appropriate that Afghanistan try them under Islamic law), and truth (It is true that Afghanistan can try them under Islamic law) are most coherent within a rivalry social arrangement. Afghanistan invokes the stronger sovereignty norms coherent in rivalries rather than the more limited sovereignty coherent with obligations to enforce collective security rules. Different understandings about which social arrangement is relevant generate the competing propositions in this dispute. Dialogical analysis is particularly appropriate to illustrate conflicts such as this in which agents invoke different social arrangements to justify their action. The final step is an argument analysis that isolates and formalizes the disputed propositions and thus disputed social rules generated in the pragmatic analysis. The argument analysis extends Alker's (1988) approach in his dialectical analysis of the Melian Dialogue, which in turn builds on Rescher's (1977) model of argumentation. In Rescher's model, a proponent defends and an opponent challenges the truth of a thesis, and the argumentative stance is oriented toward winning the debate. In the argument analysis, agents 370

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instead negotiate the truth, appropriateness, and sincerity claims of speech acts, and the communicative stance is oriented toward constructinga valid social Eachclaimin the argument arrangement. analysis specifies (at least) one propositionin the pragmaticanalysis. Whenone challengesthe validityclaimof another, the pragmatic analysisshowsthe disputeas contradicWhenandif one "cancels" an earlier torypropositions. claimandendsa pragmatic dispute,the analystupdates the set of contestedvalidityclaims.Dialogicalanalysis can thusaccountfor the changing construction of social rules both withinand acrosssocial arrangements. Constructivists can use dialogicalanalysis to illustrate their argumentsabout the importanceof beliefs, norms, and identities in world politics. In the above interestedin beliefs wouldfoexample,constructivists cus on disputedtruth claims about whether security is based on military capability or political commitments.Constructivists interestedin normswouldfocus on the disputedappropriateness claimsaboutwhether is obligatedto followthe rulesof the interAfghanistan interestedin idennationalcommunity. Constructivists tity wouldfocus on the disputedsincerityclaimsabout whether the United States and Afghanistanare citizens or rivals.Dialogical analysisillustratesconstrucratiotivistontologyby showinghow communicatively nal agentsconvey validityclaimsthatconstructand/or challengesocial rules. turnseriously. Dialogicalanalysistakesthe linguistic It is based on linguistics, and language(like the world) is ambiguous. Other analystscould use this methodto the debate and assertdifferentglobal Kosovo analyze security rules, select different speech acts, infer differentpragmatic andreachcontradictory propositions, conclusions.But dialogicalanalysisis rigorousenough that suchdisputesare transparent and explicit:We can then argue about the greatercoherenceof competing theory(background knowledge)and evidence(speech acts andpragmatic Dialogicalanalysisis propositions). deductive,is capableof replication,and relies on logic and empiricalevidencefor its conclusions.It is consistent with the notion that a communityof interpreters can agree to the most coherent explanationand that those explanationscan help us "go on" in that world and act in intelligibleways.


The background knowledge for this analysis is the four ideal-typical global security social arrangements discussed above and more particularly a slow transition from a cold war rivalry arrangement to a post-cold war collective security arrangement. Many indicators of "global governance"-such as multilateral treaties, international organizations, Security Council resolutions, UN peacekeeping operations, nongovernmental organizations, and diffusion of human rights normshave dramatically increased in number since the end of the cold war. Within this context, the international

American Political Science Review community has struggled to agree on the appropriate implementation of the fledgling collective security rules: Under what conditions should the international community use force to punish those who violate the rules? When widespread evidence arose of human rights abuses by Serbs against Albanian Muslims in the Serbian province of Kosovo, many in the West advocated the punishment of Milosevic and the Serbs for violating the human rights rules of the international community. Russia and China, however, promised to veto any Security Council resolution that authorized the use of force. The dispute between the veto powers was whether the collective security rules emerging since the end of the cold war, together with emerging rules obligating states to limit human rights abuses, were sufficient to authorize NATO action. Critics of the use of force on the right (Waller, Drezov, and Gokay 2001), critics on the left (Chomsky 1999), and supporters (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000) all recognized the precedent-setting implications of Kosovo on the post-cold war construction of global security rules.

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Speech Acts
The six speech acts in the analysis, as well as the narrative information in this section, are reconstructed from accounts of the dispute in the New York Times. The speech acts below were included because they represent official positions (all were conveyed by either the president or the top diplomat in each country) and focus on the relevant issue of how to implement collective security rules appropriately. 1. UnitedStates: If Yugoslaviacontinues to violate the humanrightsof the KosovoAlbanians, NATO will use militaryforce against Yugoslavia.7 2. Russia/China:TheSecurityCouncilhasnot authorized the use of force.8 3. UnitedStates: Humanitarianconcerns justify NATO use of force.9 4. Russia/China:Any NATOuse of forcewouldthreaten international order.10 5. UnitedStates: NATOinitiatesa bombingcampaignin Yugoslavia. 6. Russia/China:NATO is engagingin unprovokedaggressionagainsta sovereignstate."1 The United States asserted speech act 1 when violence between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians escalated

in early 1998. In Septemberthe SecurityCouncildemandedthatYugoslavia withdraw securityforcesfrom Kosovo,enablemonitorsto returnto Kosovo,facilitate the returnof refugees,and begin politicalnegotiations withthe AlbanianMuslims. Russiavoted for both resolutionsbut arguedthattherewas no explicitauthorization of the use of forceandthatfurtherSecurity Council actionwas needed to authorizethe use of force. China abstainedon both resolutions, thatKosovowas arguing an internalmatterandYugoslavia was actingwithinits legitimaterights.RussiaandChinaabstainedon a third resolutionin October 1998 endorsingthe Holbrooke cease-fireagreement, thattheydidnot consider arguing Resolution1203sufficientto authorizethe use of force (speech act 2). When Serb abuses in Kosovo increased in March 1999, the United States (speech act 3) argued that the overwhelminghumanitarian crisis justified intervention even withoutexplicit SecurityCouncilauthorization.Clinton(1999) asserteda "moralimperative" for NATO to end the atrocities,arguingthat "if the worldcommunity has the powerto stop it, we oughtto stop genocide and ethnic cleansing."Albright (1999) arguedthat humanrightsviolations are not domestic matters but legitimate concerns of the international community;NATO has the right to defend the stability of Europe. State sovereignty in the post-cold war world is limited because "legitimate"states ensure basic human rights. States that perpetrate ethnic cleansing, thus, forfeit their right to territorial integrity. RussiaandChinacontinuedto criticizeNATOpolicy (speechact 4). YeltsinarguedthatNATOactionwould "destabilizethe situationin the Balkanswith unforeseeable consequencesfor all of Europe."Both argued that invoking a humanitarian crisis to justify unilateral armedinterventionviolatedthe UN charter.Nevertheless,NATO commencedthe bombingcampaign (speech act 5), which Russia and China denounced (speechact 6). RussianForeignMinisterIgorIvansaid, "Russiais deeply outragedby NATO'smilitaryaction an action that is nothing againstsovereignYugoslavia, shortof undisguised aggression.... Onlythe UN Security Councilhas the rightto decide (if) the use of force should be taken to maintainor restore international peace and security.... The true aims are obvious.To impose on the world the political, military,and economic dictateof the United States."

tary Threats Against the Serbs," New York Times, 7 October 1998, sec. Al. 8 Bohlen, Celestine, "Russia Vows to Block the UN from Backing Attack on Serbs," New York Times, 7 October 1998, sec. A10. 9 See Clinton 1999. 10 Gordon, Michael, "Conflict in the Balkans: Russian Anger Tempered by the Need for Cash," New York Times, 25 March 1999, sec. Al. 11 Eckholm, Eric, "Conflict in the Balkans: Bombing May Have Hardened China's Line," New York Times, 18 May 1999, sec. All.
7 Myers, Steven Lee, and Steven Erlanger, "U.S. Is Stepping Up Mili-

The pragmatic analysis generates all implicitly conveyed propositions during the interaction. These contextual propositions convey truth, appropriateness, and sincerity claims that invoke and/or challenge existing social rules. The pragmatic analysis specifies how each speech act conveyed validity claims and invoked social rules. Communicatively rational actors convey many implicit propositions during an interaction, and many are consensual and/or irrelevant to the specific issue of how to implement collective security rules. For


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2. Pragmatic TABLE over Kosovo Analysisof the GreatPowerInteraction

Speech Act 1 U.S.:If Yugoslaviacontinues to violate the human rightsof the KosovarAlbanians,NATO willuse military force against Yugoslavia. Speech act Directive Implicature: (CS4) la. Do not breakthe rules of our community. lb. The NATO directiveto Yugoslavianot to breakthe rules of ourcommunity is appropriate. (CS4N) 1c. We willretaliateif you breakthe rules of ourcommunity. (CS5) 1d. The NATO threatto retaliateagainst Yugoslaviais appropriate. (CS5N) le. The use of force is acceptable to resolve the conflict.(CS6) 2 Russia/China: The SecurityCouncilhas not authorized the use of force. Speech act: Assertion Implicatures: 2a. The NATO directiveto Yugoslavianot to breakthe rules of the international is not appropriate. community (-CS4N) 2b. The NATO threatto retaliateagainst Yugoslaviais not appropriate. (-CS5N) 2c. The use of force is not acceptable to resolve this conflict.(~CS6N) 3 U.S.:Humanitarian concerns justifyNATO use of force. Speech act:Assertion Implicatures: 3a. NATO countriesare actingas citizens in ourcommunity. (CS1) is obligatedto enforcethe rules of ourcommunity. 3b. NATO (CS2) is establishingsecuritythrougha multilateral 3c. NATO alliancecommitment. (CS3) 4 Russia/China: use of force wouldthreateninternational Any NATO security. Speech act: Assertion Implicatures: countriesare not actingas a citizenin our community. 4a. NATO (-CS1T) is not obligatedto enforce the rules of our community. 4b. NATO (-CS2T) 4c. NATO is not establishingsecuritythroughan alliancecommitment. (-CS3T) 5 U.S.:NATO initiatesa bombingcampaignin Yugoslavia. Speech act: Punishment(directive) Implicatures: is sincerelyactingas a citizen in our community. 5a. NATO (CS1S) is sincerelyenforcingthe rules of ourcommunity. 5b. NATO (CS2S) is sincerelyestablishingsecuritythroughan alliancecommitment. 5c. NATO (CS3) NATO 6 Russia/China: is engaged in unprovoked aggression against a sovereignstate. Speech Act:Assertion Implicatures: is a politicalrival(enemy?). (R1 or W1?) 6a. NATO does not recognizeYugoslavia's 6b. NATO (W2) sovereign rightsto territorial integrity. is tryingto increase its relativealliancemilitary 6c. NATO (R3) capability. in parentheses aftereach proposition Note:Thenotation the socialruleandor validity claiminvoked signifies by thatproposition: R= rivalry, W= war;1 = identity of security CS= collective rule,2= autonomy rule,4= deterrence rule,3 = nature rule, security, T= truth 5 = enforcement 6 = use of forcerule; S = sincerity N= normative orappropriateness claim. For rule, claim, claim, rightness the collective invokes enforcement meansthatthe rule,and(CS5N) example, (CS5)meansthatthe preceding proposition security thatthecollective enforcement ruleis normatively claims proposition preceding appropriate. security

reasons of space, then, the pragmatic analysis in Table 2 includes only the disputed propositions conveyed during the interaction.12 Readers should refer to Table 2 throughout the discussion in this section.
12 A more complete analysis, including reflexive intentions, implicatures, and presuppositions, as well as explanations for each reference, is at

The pragmatic analysis shows that throughout the interaction the United States invoked collective security rules, and Russia and China disputed the validity of those collective security rules. Within this overall pattern, however, each exchange in the interaction generated a set of escalated disputes. In speech acts 1 and 2, Russia and China disputed the appropriateness of United States-invoked collective security deterrence, enforcement, and use of force rules. Here all veto


American Political ScienceReview powers justified their speech acts with collective security rules, arguingthat the other is inappropriately those rules.In speech acts 3 and 4, Russia interpreting and Chinadisputedthe truthof United States-invoked collectivesecurityidentity, andthe natureof autonomy, securityrules.Here Russiaand Chinabeganto dispute whether the United States would be actually invoking collectivesecurityruleswith a use of force.And in speech acts5 and 6, Russiaand Chinadisputedthe sincollectivesecurity idencerityof UnitedStates-invoked tity, autonomy,and the nature of securityrules.Here Russiaand Chinaarguedthatthe United Statesindeed invokedwarand/orrivalry ruleswithits use of force.By the end of the interaction, the veto powershaddifferent of whichsocial arrangement understandings governed their interaction.I discusseach exchangein turn. In speech acts 1 and 2 the veto powers disagreed about whetherthe U.S. directiveto Yugoslaviaappropriatelyinvoked collective securityrules. With its directiveto Yugoslavia in speech act 1, the United States invoked the collective security deterrence rule with proposition la; it invoked the collective security enforcementrule with proposition1c;and it invokedthe collective security use of force rule with proposition le. With their assertionthat the SecurityCouncildid not authorizethe use of force in speech act 2, Russia and Chinadisputedthe appropriateness of the United States invoking collective security rules to justify its directiveto Yugoslavia. Theydisputedthe appropriateness of the United States invokingthe collectivesecurity deterrencerule with proposition2a; they disputed the appropriateness of the United States invokingthe collective securityenforcementrule with proposition of the United 2b;andtheydisputedthe appropriateness Statesinvokingthe collectivesecurityuse of force rule with proposition2c. In this first exchange,the veto powers understood collective securityrules to governtheir interaction; all invoked collective security rules to justify their acts. However, Russia and China argued that the United States andNATOwere not followingthose rulesproperly.One could interpretthe Russianand Chinesecriticism as intended to thwart the development of an emerging human rights norm that would justify humanitarianinterventiongiven internalproblemswith andTibet(Carpenter Chechnya 2000).WhileChinadid have these concerns,Russiahad previouslysupported Security Council action regardinghuman rights. Of the 32 SecurityCouncilresolutionsregarding Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and East Timor,Russia voted yes 31 times and abstained only once (Heinze and Borer 2002). Given this context, I interpretthe criticismto stem from Russia'sinsistencethat the collective security rules requireda legal process based on Security Councilaction.Russiawas preservingits role in world politicsby assertingthe primacyof the SecurityCouncil, not challengingthe validityof an emerginghuman rightsnorm. In speechacts3 and4 the veto powersdeepenedtheir imdisputeaboutwhetherNATOpolicyappropriately plements collective securityrules. The U.S. assertion in speech act 3 conveyed a substantive, moralconcep-

Vol.97,No. 3 tion of collectivesecurity. NATOintervention wasboth legallyandmorally justifiedbecauseit intendedto avert humanitarian disasterandwas consistentwith Security Council Resolutions 1199 and 1203. Withinthe context of collectivesecurity, it arguedfor a rule enabling withoutexplicitSecurityCouncil regionalenforcement authorization. Withthese arguments, the United States invokedthe collectivesecurityidentityrulewithproposition 3a; it invokes the collective securityautonomy rule with proposition3b; and it invokes the collective securitynatureof securityrule with proposition3c. RussiaandChinacounteredthe UnitedStates'moral andsubstantive conceptionof collectivesecuritywitha proceduralconceptionof collective securityin speech act 4. Any use of forcewithoutSecurityCouncilauthorization,they argued,threatenedinternationalpeace and security.With this assertion,they challengedU.S. truth claimsthat NATO was actingas a citizen in the international community(proposition4a), that NATO was enforcingthe rulesof the international community to es(proposition 4b), andthatNATOwas attempting tablishsecuritythrougha multilateral commitmentto use militarycapability(proposition4c). Here the veto powers disputedtruthclaimsabout collectivesecurity rules1-3; note thatrules1-3 are the core rulesthat differentiatethe fourglobalsecuritysocial arrangements. With this exchange,then, Russia and China disputed that NATO policy invoked collective security rules. They began to suggestthat perhapsthe NATO use of force invokeda differentsocial arrangement. In speech acts 5 and 6 the conflictbetween the veto I treatthe NATObombpowersescalateddramatically. ing campaignas speech act 5. Within the context of the earlier interaction,the use of force defended the United States truth claims conveyed in speech act 3: NATO was indeed a citizenin our community(proposition 5a);NATOwasindeed enforcingthe rulesof the community(proposition5b); and NATO was indeed establishingsecuritythroughan alliancecommitment (proposition5c). Withspeech act 6, Russia and China disputed the sincerityof U.S. claims that the NATO use of force invoked collective securityrules.Instead they arguedthat NATO use of force is actuallyunprovoked aggression,invoking the rivalry(and perhaps war?)identityrulein proposition6a, the warautonomy rule that NATOwas violatingYugoslavsovereigntyin proposition6b, and the rivalrynatureof securityrule that NATO was tryingto increaseits relativealliance militarycapability. With this exchangethe veto powers completelydisagreedaboutwhichsocialarrangement governedtheir interaction.While the United States continuedto invoke collectivesecurityrules,RussiaandChinaargued thatit wastryingto createa "NATO-centered Europe." NATO for inappropriThey were no longercriticizing collective securityrules;they now ately implementing chargedNATOwithblatantly invokingrivalryandperhaps even war rules.For example,Russiachargedthe United Stateswithviolatingthe UN Charter, andChina claimedthat the United Stateswas usingpretextslike humanrightsto begina new formof colonialismas part of a global strategyfor worldhegemony. 373

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Consistentwith rivalryrules, Russia and China responded to the NATO use of force in Kosovo by to increasetheirrelativemilitary capability. attempting Russia sent a reconnaissanceship into the Mediterranean, revised its military doctrine to reinvigorate nuclear weapons capability,signed joint defense initiatives with Belarus and others, held war games in the Balkans, expelled NATO representativesfrom for Moscow,suspendedcooperationin the Partnership its missionandstudentsfrom withdrew Peaceprogram, Brusselsand NATOcountries,and weakenedcommunicationbetweenRussianandNATOforcesin Bosnia. The Duma postponed ratificationof the START II agreement(the December 1998 bombingin Iraq also caused a postponementof that vote). Although Russia never violated UN sanctionsand sent direct military aid to Yugoslavia,the Duma voted 279 to 30 to send military aid and advisers.China suspended military ties with the United States and all negotiations with the United States over human rights issues. In June 1999,Russia and China announcedthat to offset they would foster a "strategicpartnership" the global dominance of the United States. All of the these responsesinvoked rivalryrules,particularly rule that securityis based on relativealliancemilitary capability.

Argument Analysis
The argumentanalysisin Table3 isolates and formalizes the disputesgeneratedby the pragmaticanalysis. It lists three sets of interconnecteddisputesdiscussed in the above section:disputedsocialrules,disputedvaIn speech acts lidityclaims,and disputedpropositions. 1 and 2, Russia and Chinacontestedthe appropriateHere the veto ness of NATO'sdirectiveto Yugoslavia. how to about implementthe collecpowersdisagreed tive securityrules regardingdeterrence,enforcement, and the use of force. In speech acts 3 and 4, Russia and Chinadisputedthe truthof U.S.claimsthatNATO was enforcingcollective securityrules.Here the veto powers disagreedabout the core rules of each social the identity,sovereignty,and nature of arrangement:

securityrules.In speech acts5 and 6, Russiaand China disputed NATO's sinceritythat it was enforcingcollective security.Here the agentsdisputedwhichsocial withthe United arrangement governedthe interaction, Statescitingcollectivesecurityrulesand Russia/China claimingthat the United Statesis actuallyinvokingrivalryand perhapseven warrules. Theoverlapin rulesbetweenthe socialarrangements the use of force rulefueled this conflict.Specifically, "the use of force is often necessary and acceptable to resolve conflicts"-holds in collective security arand war.NATO'suse of force was rivalry, rangements, that NATOwas consistentwith both U.S.justifications rules and Russian and collective invoking security Chinese criticismsthat NATO was invoking rivalry and/orrules.Forthe United States,NATOuse of force was the appropriate way to enforce communityrules human rights.For Russiaand China,NATO regarding use of forcewasat leastan attemptto dominatea global rivalryand at most an act of warconsistentwith impefromwithin rialism.Both were rationalinterpretations each claimedwere operative. the social arrangements methodsexplainactionby specifying If interpretive the rule(s) agents follow, then the dialogicalanalysis of the veto power conflictover Kosovoenablesone to explain U.S. acts by specifyingthe collective security one can explain rulesits speechactsinvoked.Similarly, Russianand Chineseacts by specifyingthe rivalryand war rules their speech acts invoked. Finally,one can explainthe entire conflictby specifyingthe difference and the overlapbetween the social arrangements.

Kosovo and Iraq

The debatesaboutthe use of force in Kosovoand Iraq do not seem similaron the surface.Kosovo was about humanrightsabusesand Iraqwas aboutnonproliferalevel of the rulesconstituting tion. But at the pragmatic global security,there are many stunningsimilarities. The three-stageKosovointeractionoccurredagainregardinginterventionin Iraq.First,there was a dispute about how to implementcollectivesecuritygiven noncompliancewith communityrules:The United States

TABLE 3. Argument Analysis

Speech Act will... 1. IfYugoslavia..., NATO 2. No SC authorization... concerns... 3. Humanitarian 4. Forcewouldthreatenorder... 5. NATO bombingcampaign 6. NATO bombingthreatens... DisputedSocial Rules CS4, CS5, CS6 CS1, CS2, CS3 R1(Wl?)/CS1, W2/CS2,W3/CS3

U.S. !1 N1/3 & !3 T3/!5&!5 Claim DisputedValidity N1 T3 S5

Russia/China -N1/2 & !2 -T3/4 & !4 -S5/6 &!6 DisputedPropositions 1b-2a, 1d-2b, le-2c 3a-4a, 3b-4b, 3c-4c 5a-6a, 5b-6b, 5c-6c

Anexclamation inthe argument Note:The notation pointsignifiesthe analysisshouldbe readas follows: of a speech act, S signifiesthe conveyanceof a sincerity claim,N signifiesthe conveyance performance claim,- signifies of a normative claim,T signifiesthe conveyanceof a truth rightnessorappropriateness the case... "All a ceteris paribus a negation,and/signifies thingsbeingequal,thisis normally argument,


American ScienceReview Political (and Britain) advocatedthe use of force, and Russia and China(andFrance)advocatedcontinuedweapons inspections.Second, there was further debate about whether the use of force would actually invoke collective securityrules:The United StatesandBritainargued that they wouldenforcethe SecurityCouncilresolutionsand disarmIraqif the UN was unwillingto do so, withRussia,China,andFrancearguingthatanyuse of force withoutSecurityCouncilauthorization would violate international law and undermineinternational peace and security.Finally,there was a more fundamental disagreementabout which social arrangement The United Statesbeganthe governedthe interaction: war in Iraq,and Russia,China,and Francecontended that the use of force deliberately invokedwarrulesbecause the United States never sincerelywanteda UNcenteredenforcementof communityrules. The similaritiesbetween the two interactionsalso extend to the more detaileddisputes.Table4 lists both the disputedpropositionsgeneratedby the pragmatic analysisof the Kosovodisputeandthe restatedproposi-

Vol.97,No. 3 tions replacing"NATO" with "U.S." and "Yugoslavia" with"Iraq." Thelatterdisputesreasonably characterize not only the global debate about the war in Iraq,but also the argumentative tasksfacingthe United Statesif it continuesto widen its war on terrorism.The overall coherence of these disputed propositionsregarding war in Iraq strongly suggests that the events of September11 didnot fundamentally changeworldpolitics. Instead, September 11 exacerbatedalready existing tensions prominentlyillustratedin the Kosovo interaction. The reason for the similaritiesis the overlapping nature of the social arrangements constitutingglobal the use of force rulethat exsecurityrules,particularly istsin war,rivalry, andcollectivesecurityarrangements. The United States was (again) tryingto convince the internationalcommunitythat its use of force invokes collectivesecurityrules.Manyin the international comthe use of force to inmunitywere (again)interpreting voke warrules.Wittgenstein arguesthatthe meaningof a termis definedby its use,by how speakersunderstand

4. DisputedClaimsOverthe Use of Forcein Kosovoand Iraq TABLE

Kosovo Iraq UnitedStates The U.S. is actingas a citizen in our community Criticsof Warin Iraq The U.S. is not acting as a citizenin our community The U.S. is a rival (enemy?) The U.S. is not obligatedto enforce the rules of our community The U.S. does not recognize Iraqi autonomy The U.S. is not establishing securitythroughan alliance commitment The U.S. is tryingto increase its relative alliance military capability The U.S. directiveto Iraqnot to breakthe rules of our is not community appropriate The U.S. threatto retaliateagainst Iraqis not appropriate The use of force against Iraqis not acceptable to resolve this conflict SecurityRule Identity UnitedStates NATO countriesare acting as citizens in our community NATO is sincerely acting as a citizen in our community NATO is obligatedto enforce the rules of our community Russia/China NATO countriesare not actingas a citizenin our community NATO is a rival (enemy?)

Identity Autonomy

The U.S. is sincerely actingas a citizen in our community NATO is not obligated The U.S. is obligated to enforce the rules to enforce the rules of our community of ourcommunity


NATO is sincerely enforcingthe rules of our community Natureof security NATO is establishing securitythrough an alliance commitment

Natureof security NATO is sincerely establishing securitythrough an alliance commitment Deterrence The NATO directiveto Yugoslavianot to breakthe rules of our community is appropriate Enforcement The NATO threatto retaliateagainst Yugoslaviais appropriate Use of force The use of force is acceptable to resolve this conflict

NATO does not The U.S. is sincerely recognizeYugoslav enforcingthe rules of our community autonomy NATO is not The U.S. is establishing establishing securitythrough securitythrough an alliance an alliance commitment commitment NATO is tryingto The U.S. is sincerely increase its relative establishing alliance military securitythrough an alliance capability commitment The NATO directiveto The U.S. directiveto Yugoslavianot to Iraqnot to break breakthe rules of the rules of our ourcommunity is is community not appropriate appropriate The NATO threatto The U.S. threatto retaliateagainst retaliateagainst Yugoslaviais not Iraqis appropriate appropriate The use of force is The use of force not acceptable to against Iraqis resolve this conflict acceptable to resolve this conflict


ConstructingPost-Cold War Collective Security

August 2003

and use the term.In the post-coldwar construction of collective security,the meaningof the use of force is the act.How will the definedby how agentsunderstand internationalcommunityinterpretthe use of force? Does it invoke collective securityrules or war rules? In both the Kosovo and the Iraq debates,both sides asserted the validity of collective security rules but differedon whetherU.S.use of force actuallyinvoked those rules.

This paper makes three main contributions. First, it researchprogramby contributesto the constructivist constructivist offeringa tentativerule-oriented theory of global security assertingthe existence of war, rivalry,collective security,and securitycommunitysocial arrangements. Second, it adds dialogicalanalysis to the growingtoolkit of interpretivemethods,using it to study the veto power debate over Kosovo.Third, it contributesto the policy debates about U.S. foreign policyafterSeptember11, suggestingthat preemption policies are premisedon a flawedassumptionthat the events of September11 fundamentally changedworld are consistentwith politics.These three contributions constructivism: the tasksof rule-oriented (1) assertthe how these show existence of social arrangements, (2) rules make action intelligible,and (3) help agents "go on" in the world. Within the context of constructivism,the ruleorientedtheoryof globalsecurityofferedheremodifies of worldpolitics. for "threecultures" Wendt's argument global securityas constitutedby four Conceptualizing is necessaryto sets of social arrangements overlapping the dominantsecuritytrendssince the end understand of the cold war:movementawayfrom the cold war riof collective valryand the gradualinstitutionalization securityrules.Wendt'sKantiancultureincludesboth whichare collectivesecurityandsecuritycommunities, the other differentiated rules) necessityand by (among of the use of force.As the analysisabove acceptability shows,however,the crux of the debates over Kosovo andIraqis how the international community interprets the use of force in the post-coldwar world.While the use of force is central to collective security,it is not Wendt'sKantian conceivablein securitycommunities. culturehides this importantdistinctionand thus cannot account for the argument presented here. Wendt's suggestions that world politics may be slowly moving toward a Kantian culture ignore the autonomy of collective security arrangements as an intermediate step in that process. Dialogical analysis helps make the speech acts constructing post-cold war security intelligible by showing those acts to be logically consistent with the soglobal security structures. Dialogical analysis is one interpretive method capable of illustrating constructivist arguments because it adequately captures the social ontology of constructivism. It analyzes social interaction as a dialogue between communicatively rational 376

actorswho assertvalidityclaimsand evaluateothers' validityclaims.Throughthis interaction,linguistically the rules competentagentschallengeand/orperpetuate worldpolitics.It does not assertcausalexconstituting instead,it explainsactionby specifyingthe planations; (both regulativeand constitutive)rule(s) that agents follow. It attempts to offer constructivistsa nonrationalist, nonpositivistapproachto analyze social interaction. and dialogical Finally,rule-orientedconstructivism analysis help provide practicalinsight into issues of The analysispresentedhere castsdoubt globalsecurity. on justifications thata newpost-9/11worldnecessitates more aggressive,unilateral,and even preemptiveU.S. policies. Instead, the war on terrorismis embedded withina largerpost-coldwarconstruction of globalsecurityrules.Tensionsaboutthe appropriate implementation of collective securityrules to punishthe global criminals who violateinternational rulesexistedbefore and afterSeptember11. Thatthe United Statesis now a direct victim of criminalacts does not change this largercontext;instead it exacerbatesalreadyexisting tensions because the United States is now that much more determinedto enforce communityrules against terrorismand nonproliferation. for fuThis analysissuggeststwo broadtrajectories ture global securityrules. One possibilityis that the will minimizethese tensions, international community of collective strengthenthe post-coldwarconstruction security rules, and continue the "war"on terrorism action.The otherposthroughcooperativemultilateral of in is that U.S. use force sibility Iraq, together with will on terrorism, other likely uses of force in its "war" of collective breakdownthe post-coldwarconstruction some form of a war securityrules and institutionalize social arrangement. The Bush administration is split about whichdirecare tionit prefers. Of course,manyin the administration criticalof "globalgovernance"and prefer to weaken collective securityrules because those rules limit the flexibilityof U.S. foreign policy.Indeed, the Bush administrationchallenged emerging collective security rules in many ways prior to September 11 (e.g., rejection of the Anti-BallisticMissile Treaty,the Kyoto Criminal Protocol,and the International Court).Conon terrorism and usingforce stantlydeclaringa "war" at least in IraqwithoutSecurityCouncilauthorization, on the surface,alsoweakencollectivesecurityrulesand
invoke a war social arrangement. Many in the administration continue to assert that September 11 fundamentally changed world politics, that the normal rules of collective security are no longer applicable, that a war social arrangement now governs global security, and that this new social arrangement justifies preemptive U.S. policies. However, a terrorist event, even a horrific one, cannot automatically change the rules of global security. Even U.S. foreign policy, although tremendously important, cannot unilaterally construct a war social arrangement through declarations of a "war on terrorism" or even by invading Iraq. Social rules are constantly negotiated and mediated through the actions of many

cial rules-beliefs, norms,and identities-constituting

American Political ScienceReview agents.Whetherfuture global securityrules are constituted by collective securityrules or by war rules is The analysis alwaysbeingnegotiatedandrenegotiated. presented here suggests that the post-cold war rules similarafter governing globalsecurityremainstrikingly September11. As in Kosovo,the United Statessought SecurityCouncilauthorization priorto interventionin with Iraq.And as in Kosovo,the veto powersstruggled whichrule violationsshould triggermultilateral intervention and how to appropriately implement collective securityrules.Theinternational community clearly prefers collective securityrules over a unilateralU.S. war on terrorism. The United Statesmustconsiderthisunderlying context in whichit is fightingits waron terrorism and how its use of force.Continuing to claim otherswillinterpret that September11 fundamentally world changed politics and advocatingunilateralism may eventuallyconvinceothersthatglobalsecurityis indeedconstituted by rulesof war.Sucha worldwouldonly discourage many fromcooperatingwiththe United Statesin otherareas of the waron terrorism. TheUnitedStatesis morelikely to be successfulin its war on terrorismby embracing rather than ignoringthe emergingcollective security normsand institutions.

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