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UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM
Undergraduate Division School of Government & Society (College of Social Sciences) 1. STUDENT ID No. (srn): 3. YEAR OF STUDY: 3 4. MODULE TITLE: Public Domain 5. MODULE BANNER CODE: Soc 307 6. MODULE LEADERs NAME: Dr Andrew Knopps 7. SEMINAR TEACHERS NAME (IF DIFFERENT TO ABOVE): 8. SUBMISSION DATE: 7/01/2013 ASSIGNMENT TITLE: "... the public/private distinction stands out as one of the 'grand dichotomies' of Western thought." Must we conceive of the public and the private as a dichotomy? Should we? 9. EXTENSION: Yes 1117509 2. PROGRAMME OF STUDY: Sociology

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"... the public/private distinction stands out as one of the 'grand dichotomies' of Western thought." Must we conceive of the public and the private as a dichotomy? Should we? The concepts public and private are deeply contested between varying perspectives. They may appear as a dualism, like the two opposing sides of a coin in that one cannot exist without the other, however, the manner in which they are applied is not as clear-cut as the analogy implies. This paper is concerned with assessing whether it is correct to consider the public and private as a dichotomous pair, or whether issues that pertain to such a conceptual framework would lead us to consider it an overly limiting manner (both analytically and normatively) for understanding the complexities of social reality. We will begin by defining 'grand dichotomy' before briefly surveying a number of standpoints on the question of public and private; observing what they denote to respective standpoints in order to compare their conceptual frameworks and assess the validity of the title's claim. Upon completion we will be forced to consider the public/private distinction (henceforth 'the distinction') when considered in dichotomous terms, while not without its merits, should not be the sole lens through which we observe society. Bobbio (1997) explains 'grand dichotomy' as a framework that is

comprehensive in demarcating the social world into two, wherein all complexities are reduced to a simple binary opposition. In the case of the public and private, the public domain reaches to where the private begins (Bobbio, 1997; see figure 1). Before a brief elaboration of contending accounts of public and private, it is important to recognise that varying accounts "are rarely innocent analytical exercises" (Weintraub, 1997:3), but also carry normative implications. This can be understood as the result of two underlying conceptions of how private can be contrasted with public; which Weintraub categorises 'visibility' and 'collectivity' (Ibid.:5). Visibility can be understood as what is hidden or secret ('private'), versus what is open ('public'). Collectivity understands the distinction in terms of particular versus general interests, pertaining only to the individual (or 'special interest' group), or to a wider 'public' interest (Ibid.). We begin with the liberal individualist approach, identifiable in enlightenment thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, and Smith (Weintraub, 1997). In this tradition the distinction is held primarily in terms of 'collectivity' - within this framework that notions of a public and private sector "usually fit" (Wientraub, 1997:8). The starting point for this argument is a deification of rational 'man' (Hindess, 1996) - seen in Locke's (1946) Second Treatise - who therefore, should be afforded as much freedom as possible to pursue his own rational ('private') interests (Locke, 1946; Hindess, 1996). Smith like Locke, advocated a laissez faire

approach to 'public' (state) intervention, believing in a natural harmonization of selfish interests would enable the 'hidden hand' to bring about the greatest welfare to the wider public (Heilbroner, 1987; Wientraub, 1997). From a different (utilitarian) standpoint within liberal thought, Bentham cast doubt on the notion of a 'public' interest. For Bentham, the market represented the greatest realisation of individual utility, and the moral imperative of utilitarianism (to provide the greatest good, for the greatest number) was therefore how government could realise this utilitarian felicity (Harrison, 1983). However, he essentially viewed activities as private; "[T]he idea of community is a fiction" (Bentham, 1983:41). Consequently, 'public' interest is in fact, a contrite representation of particular interests reified as 'public' interest - a suspicion similarly shared by Locke (Hindess, 1996). Bentham believed in 'special interests' (a collective of individuals unified by a shared common interest), but felt appeals to a 'public' interest are always false (Benn and Gaus, 1983) - a viewpoint one can observe pervades in public choice theorists such as Buchanan and Tuchman (Page, 2005). We observe this approach has a clear distinction between the public, as simply an aggregate of individuals (and therefore 'public' interest is only ever a particular or 'special interest), and the private as being the realm of individual . This creates a clear dividing line, between "governmental and nongovernmental, with the implication that this distinction should be as clearly and sharply dichotomised as possible" (Weintraub, 1997:8). Consequently, the distinction is concerning collectivity - it is a tension between the individual's 'private' interests, and the interests of contractually created organizations interests, not to be confused with a public interest (Ibid.). Ultimately, in drawing a 'firm' distinction, providing autonomy of intellectual, economic and religious pursuits, the public sphere is reduced to formal institutions in which the conflicts among the 'interests' of civil society were umpired and negotiated, draining public life of intrinsic morality and significance Sullivan, 1982:13. In Rousseau we see a different concern to that of liberal views. For Rousseau the rise of individualism, predicated upon private property, occasioned the collapse of our natural sympathy towards others, transforming us into narcissistic practitioners of amour de soi (Rousseau, 1987). For Rousseau, 'private' interests were an example of a particular will, and sought to combat the decaying impact upon society through the conception of a higher 'public' interest, which he explained as the general will (Boucher, 2009). Rousseau believed freedom was not attained through individualism, rather, was a social condition attainable through a

citizenship-based democratic practice of regulating all particular wills to a wider general will (public interest) (Boucher, 2009). Unlike the sovereign of Hobbes and Locke, who saw it as an agent tasked with fulfilling certain base requirements which could possess different interests to those it represents (Hindess, 1996), Rousseau saw the sovereign as the entire body of citizens. The implication being sovereign interest could only be a reflection of the will of the citizenry: upon entering civil union whereby one relinquished their rights to the wider community, liberty was realised through active citizenship (Boucher, 2009). In this account we observe the primacy of the collective in understanding the distinction. While liberal individualists see the public only as a necessary evil in ensuring liberty to pursue private interests, in Rousseau we see an opposing championing of public against private interests. While it can still be thought of in terms of the dichotomy as in liberal accounts, it affords much greater importance to the public realm on normative grounds; for it is through action as a public citizen that the interests of all are best attained. Hegel's more nuanced account of the distinction raises questions about conceiving it in binary terms. Hegel sought to overcome limitations of what Benn and Gaus (1983) describe as the 'individualist' (seen in the liberal exposition above) and 'organic' (seen in Rousseau's account) model of public and private. However for Hegel, these two models were: mutually dependent perspectives which, when adequately integrated, provide the key to a coherent and comprehensive grasp of society in general and public interest in particular Walton, 1983:249. As Hegel saw both the individual and society-at-large as mutually irreducible, he proposed a dialectical relationship (Ibid.). Key to understanding Hegel's account is recognition of a normative viewpoint largely lacking from liberal individualism. Hegel saw an ethical life being of primary importance to any society, but that a primary concern with private property and individual freedom had a tendency towards polarizing society into rich and poor (Walton, 1983). The notion of civil society is key for Hegel's account, seeing society as comprising a trichotomous (see figure 3) configuration of the family, civil society and the state (Gordon and White, 1979; Westphal, 1993). In a similar sense to Durkheim's proposal for occupational associations (Giddens, 1972), Hegel saw civil society as providing a wider sense of public interest than the individual or familial could provide for the state. He felt that the state was "an expression of ethical life" (Walton, 1983:260); it embodied the

norms and values of the community and through the active participation of individuals in civil society, a greater reflection of the communal ethical concerns could be represented. In this sense his view of the public interest is more complex than those detailed above, however, it is best understood in terms of 'collectivity'. While the participatory nature of a universal civil citizenry arguably places his account more in keeping with republican notions of society (Bohman, 2010; Westphal, 1993), unlike Rousseau, a dichotomous model of public and private is insufficient to represent the complexities of social reality, seeing an intermediary in civil society that could not be satisfactorily placed on either side of the 'grand dichotomy'. We have observed the limitations of both liberal and republican approaches to the distinction; there is a lack of accommodation for an arena of communication in deliberating what constitutes 'public' interest. While Hegel goes beyond the narrow strictures of the dichotomous model, he, along with Rousseau and liberal accounts, renders 'invisible' (Weintraub, 1997:10) the importance of citizen-based deliberation on issues of public interest. In Arendt and Habermas, we locate two thinkers who seek to expand conceptions into a consideration of an arena for debate amongst citizenry. Habermas' draws attention to the rise in the 18th century of a bourgeois sphere of rational-critical debate from which matters of public interest could be authentically identified. This realm was an emergent feature of bourgeois society: [t]he bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public (Habermas 1989: 27). Central to Habermas' approach is a normative concern with realising the unfinished nature of modernity; an attempt to consolidate the achievements of the "project of modernity" (Habermas, 1985:8). This was of critical importance for Habermas, who foresaw a slippage back into feudalism in contemporary society (Calhoun, 1992); structural transformations spawning from the capitalist system "turn both the private and public into hollow shells of what they were at the height of the bourgeois culture" (Wolfe, 1997:185). Central to this contention is the idea that the bourgeois public sphere was an arena for debate, within which the power of the better argument would emerge through use of communicative rationality (Habermas, 1991), rather than an instrumental rationality, whose means-end motive would eschew out substantive attempts through reason to realise the superior argument in the interest of the public. However, with the rise of the mass-media culture, publicity has mutated from "a function of public opinion ... [to] whatever attracts public opinion" (Habermas, 1991:2). In Habermas' account we see the importance of a communicative realm of debate (and his appeal to recover this declining realm), different to the notion of civil society seen in Hegel and moving it away from a

'private' self-interested rationale, to one of progressive debate and decisionmaking. Consequently, his framework cannot be accommodated within a dichotomous model, because of the communicative realm of the bourgeois sphere was an emergent feature coming about because of the interplay between two spheres of the dichotomy, therefore sits in and between both. In that sense, it may be better considered as a tripartite rather than trichotomous approach, as one could argue there to be a degree of flux between the three realms articulated (see figure 3). In Hannah Arendt (1958), we find a similar advocacy of communication in the formulation of public interest. For Arendt, the distinction is somewhat similar to Hegel in seeing the private as the realm of the family, and the public as the political realm. For Arendt, the atomization that ensues from liberalism vitiates our moral capacity, and therefore our very capacity to be human. For her (much like Durkheim), only through the interpersonal coming-together of a millieu of individuals can a shared morality emerge, humanizing us in the process (Arendt, 1958; Haugaard, 2002). For this to occur, we need a much more proactive public sphere in similar fashion to Rousseau's contention. Moreover, just as Durkheim and Hegel saw a necessity for an intermediary between the private and public (Kumar, 1997), Arendt proposed a notion of the social in presenting a more complex viewpoint. In so doing, Weintraub (1997) refers to this 'social', as part of a 'tripartite' schema, situated in and across both boundaries (see figure 3). Questioning the utility of the 'grand dichotomy' in this example is obvious for the same reasons as Habermas' view: the lacuna that such binary thinking entails omits important social considerations. While Arendt concedes that in less contemporary times society could be conceptualised in dichotomous terms, the rise of the social has blurred the frontiers, necessitating a tripartite schema (Wolfe, 1997). The suggestion held by Arendt, is to look beyond the strictures of dichotomous thinking when conceptualising the social, as it is overly restrictive in understanding the complexities of contemporary social life. We now turn to another manner in conceptualising the distinction; a social rather than political dichotomy, in what might be considered a dramaturgical account of the two concepts (Weintraub, 1997). In Sennett, we observe the distinction, not in any manner adumbrated above, rather, based upon the social interactions that ensue within each realm. Goffman's (1990) notion of the front stage/back stage of social interaction is instructive here; with one assuming varying personal guises for specific roles. For Sennett, with the rise of the urban life and the increasing turn from the closely-knit personal life of communities to the more

instrumental life of cities (as evinced by the likes of Simmel and Tonnies), public life came to represent the spontaneous realm of sociability (Sennett, 1978). Within this, 'front stage' dramaturgy was important in maintaining a degree of distance between respective 'strangers' we meet in public, enabling us to conceal our "cabinet of horrors" (Sennett, 1978:5), exposable in the private realm away from public interactions and functions necessary in 'public' life. However, it is important to note that the requirements for behaviour in the respective public and private realms did not require insincerity, rather, "we can be honest and 'authentic' in both realms" (Cox, 1978:xvii). We can see from this adumbration that the approach would best be understood in terms of 'visibility' rather than 'collectivity', and therefore offers a distinct and noteworthy alternative conception to the distinction than observed in liberal accounts. In addition to the question this form of distinction raises for this paper, is the notion that this realm of sociability is not a fixed, but a fluid distinction. Sennett (1978) demonstrates how the dynamic boundaries of these two have blurred and altered - verging on collapse - in contemporary social life. The implication is twofold; firstly, this viewpoint is not compatible with the fixity of a 'grand dichotomy' in the manner it fits the liberal framework. Secondly, Sennett (1978) in expounding the changing nature of this forms of the distinction (and the 'retreat' from public life), highlights how imposing an rigid conceptual framework would have dire consequences. It is axiomatic that an unreflexive conceptual framework in this area of fluidity would lead to conceptual autism, enabling potentially important omission and oversight. In this context, a dichotomy might not be as desirable as a continuum (see figure 4) in understanding the complex nature of the social. Last (but certainly, not least) we turn to a feminist account of the distinction. Feminists problematize the liberal notion of the dichotomy by highlighting how the domestic sphere of the household has been marginalised within the private domain (Weintraub, 1997; Pateman, 1997). It has obscured conjugal oppression present within the nuclear family - thus making 'visibility' a key component in feminist critiques of the distinction. The liberal view of the dichotomy is argued to be patriarchal and thus inherently coercive; the liberal notions of individualism and egalitarianism obscure the patriarchal reality of conjugal oppression (Pateman, 1997). For example, Locke saw women as subordinate to men, and that this was a "foundation in nature" (quoted in Pateman, 1997:284). Therefore, it follows that women cannot be free individuals within this oppressively patriarchal mindset but are considered just as children to him. However, Locke saw the rights of (presumably male) children only temporary subsumed, in awaiting an age of rationality (Hindess, 1996), whereas women are granted no such accord. Moreover,

subjugation within this dichotomy runs deeper; the oppression that exists within the 'private' sphere also applies in the public. In the liberal view the individual (male) owns property privately, but exercising his rights depends upon a 'public' sphere to guarantee these rights under law. However, this public sphere is equally exclusionary, making both public and private two sides of the same coercive coin (Pateman, 1997; Pateman, 1989). However, the ontogenetic foundationalism which structures the distinction is problematized within feminist literature. Susan Ostrander argues: what we have defined as 'natural' public and private spheres of social life are in fact socially and historically constructed, and are representations of of gender quoted in Hansen, 1997:296. Indeed, these enforced patterns of gender which restrict women's rights of individual liberty can be seen in the current heated debate around abortion in America; with the right (normally a champion of individual liberty) largely resisting a woman's entitlement to choose. Pateman (1989; 1997) argues that we should not view social life in terms of the grand dichotomy as it masks the domestic realm within the liberal concept of masculine propriety - again, an example of the importance of 'visibilty' within this conceptual framework. Our brief foray into a feminist perspective of the distinction has highlighted the need to recognize the domestic as being distinct from the liberal conception of private, in the interests of emancipating the largest subjugated group in the contemporary western world. Consequently, we find yet more grounds on which to query the notion that the public and private is a grand dichotomy (in the liberal sense) and crucially, we should not consider it in this manner, as to do so is to be complicit in women's continuing oppression. In surveying these contrasting accounts, the various ways of conceptualising the distinction has been noted, raising doubts to the status distinction as a grand dichotomy in a manner conducive to liberal accounts. Doing so would likely lead to omitting important considerations both of an analytical and normative nature. While there are merits to each of the respective frameworks addressed they are better understood, as Weintraub (1997) suggests, as a useful tools for approaching social and political analysis. However, normative concerns seen in feminist critiques of the liberal model should make us extremely cautious of accepting the distinction evinced in liberal accounts, which reproduce social inequalities. Moreover, the ethical/moral considerations of Hegel, Habermas and Arendt highlight a normative socially enforced patterns

mode of social life that is largely lacking in liberal accounts. Furthermore, the sophisticated recognition of a civil/social/communicative sphere distinct from the binary pillars of public and private provide a more convincing framework for accounting for the infinitely complex nature of social reality. Lastly, in Sennett, we see a wholly different manner of conceptualising the distinction which is novel and distinct from the other approaches outlined, and therefore should make us mindful of what might be omitted through committing to a singular conceptualisation. As Weintraub (1997:2) notes, the distinction "is not unitary, but protean". The problem comes from attempting to 'force' social reality to conform to the strictures of a conceptual framework which can lead to omission of important features of social life, or "one side of the dichotomy is expanded into a vague and overly broad residual category .. [in either case] signigicant distinctions are lost" (Hansen, 1997:292). In that sense, these frameworks are all attempts at 'mapping' the realms of human reality. However, as Korzybski famously notes "the map is not the territory" (1994;xvii), that is to say, that no map is capable of encapsulating the terrain it signifies: it is a simplification that serves a specific purpose. In the same way, the respective frameworks could be used as means to surveying the 'territory', but with a humble recognition that it is a model of reality and reality lies not in the model. Therefore in concluding, it is recommended that we should not consider the distinction as a 'grand dichotomy', rather, a protean question which could benefit from a dialectical consideration of numerous conceptual frameworks similar to those expounded above.

WORD COUNT: 3295 Bibiolgraphy Arendt, H. (1958) The Human Condition. University of Chicago Press: London. Benn, S. and Gaus, G. (1983) The Liberal Conception of the Public and the Private in Benn, S. and Gaus, G. (eds) Public and Private in Social Life, pp. 31-65. Bobbio, N, (1997) Democracy and Dictatorship, Polity Press: Cambridge. Bohman, J. (2010) 'Is Hegel a Republican? Pippin, Recognition, and Domination in the "Philosophy of Right"', Inquiry: An interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy , 53:5, pp. 435-449. Boucher, D (2009) Rousseau in Boucher, D and Kelly, P (ed.) Political Thinkers: From Socrates to the Present, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp.263-281. Calhoun, C (1992) Habermas and the Public Sphere in Calhoun, C (ed.) Habermas and the Public Sphere, Cambridge: The MIT Press, pp. 1-50. Cooper, (2003) 'The Public Private Continuum'. Public Budgeting & Finance, 5:3, pp. 99115 . Cox, H. (1978) Sociology and the meaning of history, in Sennett, R. The Fall of public man, Penguin Group: London, pp. xv-xxi. Giddens, A. (1971) Capitalism and Modern Social Theory Cambridge University Press: Cambridge Goffman, E. (1990) Presentations of Self in Everyday Life. Penguin: London Gordon, P. and White, J. (1979) Philosophers as Educational Reformers. Routledge and Keegan Paul: London. Habermas, J. (1991) The Structure and Transformation of the Public Sphere . MIT Press: Boston. Habermas, J. (1985) 'Modernity - An Incomplete Project' in Foster, H. (ed) Postmodern Culture. Pluto Press: London. Hansen, K. (1997) 'Rediscovering the Social: Visiting Practices in Antelbaum New England and the Limits of the Public/Private Dichotomy' in Weintraub, J. and Kumar, K. (eds) Public and Private in Thought and Practice. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, pp. 268-302. Haugaard, M. (2002) (ed) Power: A Reader. Manchester University Press: Manchester. Heilbroner, R. (1987) The Essential Adam Smith. WW Norton & Co: London. Hindess, B. (1996) Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault. Blackwell: London. Korzybski, A. (1994) [Fifth Edition] Science and Sanity: An Introduction to NonAristotelian Systems and General Semantics. Institute of General Semantics: New York. Kumar, K. 'Home: The Promise and Predicatment of Private Life at tje End of the Twentieth Century' in Weintraub, J. and Kumar, K. (eds) Public and

Private in Thought and Practice. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, pp 204-237. Locke, J. A Second Treatise on Government and, a Letter Concerning Toleration Page (2005) The new right: neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism. In Bochel et al: Social Policy: Issues and Developments. Pearson: Essex. Pateman, C. (1983) 'Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy' in Benn, S. and Gaus G. (eds) Public and Private in Social Life. St Martins Press: New York. Pateman, C (1989) The Disorder of Women, Polity Press: Cambridge. Rousseau, J. J. (1987) 'Discourse on the Origin of Inequality' in A. Cress (ed) JeanJacques Rousseau: The Basic Political Writings, Hackett: Cambridge pp.25-82. Sennett, R. (1978) The Fall of Public Man. Penguin Group: London. Sullivan, W. (1982) Reconstructing Public Philosophy University of California Press: London. Walton, A. (1983) 'Public and Private Interests: Hegel on Civil Society and the State' in Benn, S. and Gaus, G. (eds) Public and Private in Social Life. St Martins Press: New York, pp. 249-266. Weintraub (1997) 'The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private DIstinction' in Weintraub, J. and Kumar, K. (eds) Public and Private in Thought and Practice. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, pp. 142. Westphal, K (1993) The basic context and structures of Hegels Philosophy of right in Beiser, F.C (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 234- 269. Wolfe, A. (1997) 'Public and Private in Theory and Practice: Some Implications on an Uncertain Boundary' in Weintraub, J. and Kumar, K. (eds) Public and Private in Thought and Practice University of Chicago Press: Chicago, pp. 182-203.

APPENDIX

Figure 1: Example of the public/private viewed as a grand dichotomy. In this illustration, we see, as Bobbio (1997) insists, that neither elements of the public or private can be in both spheres, so are mutually exclusive. However, as evinced in this paper, the contention that such a dualism could contain the myriad complexities of the social within a binary opposition should be considered of dubious validity.

Figure 2: Example of a trichotomy, where each sphere is clearly demarcated and there is no slippage from one sphere to another. Such an example would be Hegel's trichotomy; of the state (public), the family (private) and between, civil society. One might also consider Durkheim's conception of occupational associations to be in accordance with this view, seeing as he does, occupational associations (such as guilds) to be an intermediary which helps to articulate the interest of its members to the state.

Figure 3: This example demonstrates the tripartite conception of the public/private approach. We see, intersecting both spheres of public and private, an intermediary sphere. In the case of Arendt, this intermediary in the tripartite model, represents the social sphere vital for a functioning democratic society. Moreover, Habermas' conception the bourgeois public sphere should be considered tripartite, as both the public and private, are ostensibly necessary conditions for it. Indeed, as Habermas himself declares, "a sphere between civil society and the state, in which critical public discussion of matters of general public interest was institutionally guaranteed" (Habermas 1991:xi). It is important to note in this quotation, that Habermas is conceiving civil society in the manner liberal individualists did (as within the private sphere). Moreover, the manner in which he details this intermediary sphere's 'hollowing out' in contemporary social life suggests it is better not considered in the manner of clear demarcation that a trichotomy would insist upon. It is better conceived as a contingent feature of emergence, which could better be imagined within a tripartite model, whereby the social sphere's protean nature could be envisioned through it expanding and contracting. After all, in stating [t]he bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public, Habermas (1989: 27) himself intimates its contingency and less precise nature.

Figure 4: Example of a continuum (taken from Cooper, 2003:105). In this example, we are not interested in the specificity of Cooper's placement of varying forms of social relationships that can be construed as public and private. Rather, it is intended to illustrate how one might make use of a continuum conceptual framework, in displaying the nuances of social life, witnessed in the question concerning the public/private distinction. If we imagine a protean continuum under which shifting conceptions of public and private abound, we find a compelling manner for accounting for the changes in the distinction that Sennett (1978) is primarily concerned with.