You are on page 1of 31

Villanueva v. Castaneda (1987) Facts: On November 7, 1961, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No.

218 authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stags and sell in the said place. A protest was filed and the CFI decided that the land occupied by the petitioners, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy. This decision was not enforced for the petitioners were not evicted. In fact, the petitioners paid daily fees to the municipal government. On January 12, 1982, the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for the immediate implementation of Resolution No. 29, to restore the subject property "to its original and customary use as a public plaza. Vicente Macalino (officer in charge in the office of the mayor) required the municipal treasurer and engineer to demolish the stalls. Petitioners filed a prohibition with the CFI claiming that the disputed area was leased to them by the municipal government. The CFI denied the petition/ Issue: WON the petitioners have a right to the said land Held: No

Ratio: There is no question that the place occupied by the petitioners and from which they are sought to be evicted is a public plaza pursuant to the previous case. It does not appear that the decision in this case was appealed or has been reversed. A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. This is elementary. Indeed, this point was settled as early as in Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, where the Court declared as null and void the lease of a public plaza of the said municipality in favor of a private person. In Muyot vs. de la Fuente, it was held that the City of Manila could not lease a portion of a public sidewalk on Plaza Sta. Cruz, being likewise beyond the commerce of man. We rule that the petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. They should have realized and accepted this earlier, considering that even before case was decided, the municipal council already adopted Resolution No. 29, declaring the area as the parking place and public plaza of the municipality. It is the decision in Civil Case No. 2040 and the said resolution of the municipal council of San Fernando that respondent Macalino was seeking to enforce when he ordered the demolition of the stags constructed in the disputed area. As officer-in-charge of the office of the mayor, he had the duty to clear the area and restore it to its intended use as a parking place and public plaza of the municipality of San Fernando, conformably to the orders from the court and the council. It is, therefore, not correct to say that he had acted without authority or taken the law into his hands in issuing his order. Neither can it be said that he acted whimsically in exercising his authority for it has been established that he directed the demolition of the stalls only after, upon his instructions, the municipal attorney had conducted an investigation, to look into the complaint filed by the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando. There is evidence that the petitioners were notified of this hearing, which they chose to disregard. Photographs of the disputed area, which does look congested and ugly, show that the complaint was valid and that the area really needed to be cleared, as recommended by the municipal attorney. Since the occupation of the place in question, it has deteriorated increasingly to the great prejudice of the community in general. The proliferation of stags therein, most of them makeshift and of flammable materials, has converted it into a veritable fire trap, which, added to the fact that it obstructs access to and from the public market itself, has seriously endangered public safety. The filthy condition of the talipapa, where fish and other wet items are sold, has aggravated health and sanitation problems, besides pervading the place with a foul odor that has spread into the surrounding areas.

The entire place is unsightly, to the dismay and embarrassment of the inhabitants, who want it converted into a showcase of the town of which they can all be proud. The vendors in the talipapa have also spilled into the street and obstruct the flow of traffic, thereby impairing the convenience of motorists and pedestrians alike. The regular stallholders in the public market, who pay substantial rentals to the municipality, are deprived of a sizable volume of business from prospective customers who are intercepted by the talipapa vendors before they can reach the market proper. On top of all these, the people are denied the proper use of the place as a public plaza, where they may spend their leisure in a relaxed and even beautiful environment and civic and other communal activities of the town can be held. The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners are covered by the police power as delegated to the municipality under the general welfare clause. This authorizes the municipal council "to enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." This authority was validly exercised in this case through the adoption of Resolution No. 29, by the municipal council of San Fernando. Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. In fact, every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power. Republic v. Gonzalez (1991) Facts: The Republic of the Philippines is the owner of two (2) parcels of land situated in Tañong Malabon, Metro Manila. This piece of property was formerly a deep swamp until the occupants thereof, among them appellants Policarpio Gonzales and Augusta Josue, started filling it. On 14 April 1955, then President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 144, entitled "Reserving for Street Widening and Parking Space Purposes Certain Parcels of the Public Domain." Lots 1 and 2 were specifically withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for the purposes mentioned in the Proclamation. The Municipality of Malabon passed Resolution authorizing the filing of ejectment cases against appellants. Separate complaints were then filed against them. Appellants disputed the right of the Government to recover the lot as: (a) the already filed sales application with the Bureau of Lands, (b) he had a municipal permit to construct buildings thereon, (c) the lot occupied was not needed to widen the street and that the setting aside of the lots for parking space purposes does not redound to the public benefit. The trial court ordered appellants to reconvey the property to the government. Issue: WON Proclamation 144 is invalid Held: Yes

Ratio: Proclamation No. 144 was issued by then President Ramon Magsaysay in response to several resolutions passed by the Municipal Council of Malabon, Rizal, which had become particularly aware of the increasing vehicular traffic and congestion along F. Sevilla Boulevard. The Municipal Council had proposed to widen F. Sevilla Boulevard and at the same time, to reserve an area for parking space to ease up traffic problems, in anticipation of the completion of the then proposed market and slaughterhouse located to the west of F. Sevilla Boulevard. In this day and age, it is hardly open to debate that the public has much to gain from the proposed widening of F. Sevilla Boulevard and from establishment of a municipal parking area. Indiscriminate parking along F. Sevilla Boulevard and other main thoroughfares was prevalent; this, of

course, caused the build up of traffic in the surrounding area to the great discomfort and inconvenience of the public who use the streets. Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, parking in designated areas along public streets or highways is allowed which clearly indicates that provision for parking spaces serves a useful purpose. Appellants, however, allege that the benefits, if any, that may be derived from the proposed street-widening and parking space will be confined to people who have cars, hence there would be lacking the essential feature of property reserved for public use or benefit. The conception urged by appellants is both flawed and obsolete since the number of users is not the yardstick in determining whether property is properly reserved for public use or public benefit. In the first place, Section 83 above speaks not only of use by a local government but also of "quasi-public uses or purposes." To constitute public use, the public in general should have equal or common rights to use the land or facility involved on the same terms, however limited in number the people who can actually avail themselves of it at a given time. There is nothing in Proclamation No. 144 which excludes non-car-owners from using a widened street or a parking area should they in fact happen to be driving cars; the opportunity to avail of the use thereof remains open for the public in general. Besides, the benefits directly obtained by car-owners do not determine either the validity or invalidity of Proclamation No. 144. What is important are the long-term benefits which the proposed street widening and parking areas make available to the public in the form of enhanced, safe and orderly transportation on land. This is the kind of public benefit envisioned by the Municipal Council of Malabon, Rizal and which was sought to be promoted by the President in issuing Proclamation No. 144. We believe and so hold that Proclamation No. 144 was lawful and valid. Proclamation No. 144 specifically provided that the withdrawal of Lots No. 1 and 2 shall be subject to existing private rights, if any there be. Prior to the issuance of Proclamation No. 144, appellants had applied for miscellaneous sales applications over the lots respectively occupied by them. Insofar as appellant Policarpio Gonzales is concerned, it is not disputed that he had acknowledged the ownership of the National Government of the land applied for by him. The miscellaneous sales application, however, of appellant Policarpio Gonzales had not been approved by the Bureau of Lands at the time Proclamation No. 144 was issued; the land therefore retained its character as land of the public domain. Upon the other hand, the miscellaneous sales application of appellant Augusto Josue had already been rejected in an Order of the Director of Lands dated 8 January 1954. Appellants allege having built mixed residential and commercial buildings on Lot 2. The evidence of record discloses that appellants had secured the appropriate municipal permits or licenses therefor, that is, for the construction of said buildings as well as the carrying on of business therein. However, since the lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of lands of the public domain was directly under the executive control of the Director of Lands, and not of local government officials, the Malabon Municipal Mayor must be held to have exceeded his authority in allowing the use of lands of the public domain to appellants by constructing thereon commercial and residential use buildings, or any other kind of building for that matter. Patalinghug v. CA (1994) Facts: On November 17, 1982, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982 otherwise known as the "Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City." Petitioner was able to obtain a building permit for the construction of a funeral parlor. Thereafter, petitioner commenced the construction of his funeral parlor. Acting on the complaint of several residents of Barangay Agdao, Davao City that the construction of petitioner's funeral parlor violated Ordinance No. 363, since it was allegedly situated within a 50-meter radius from the Iglesia ni Kristo Chapel and several residential structures, the nearest residential structure, owned by Wilfred G. Tepoot is only 8 inches to the south.

In fact. thus paving the way for the application of Ordinance No. Ampatuan v Puno (2011) Facts: ." which is based on a taxpayer's declaration. for under Sec. Issue: WON petitioner's operation of a funeral home constitutes permissible use within a particular district or zone in Davao City. appraisal and assessment are based on the actual use irrespective of "any previous assessment or taxpayer's valuation thereon. the rights of the individual may be subordinated. the state. a tax declaration does not bind a provincial/city assessor. even if we are to examine the evidentiary value of a tax declaration under the Real Property Tax Code." as gleaned from Ordinance 363. was still a residential zone. It is our considered view. Tepoot's building is commercial and. In fact. a piece of land declared by a taxpayer as residential may be assessed by the provincial or city assessor as commercial because its actual use is commercial. and with business and occupations. 363. private respondents have failed to present convincing arguments to substantiate their claim that Cabaguio Ave. A property may have been declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation purposes but it may well be within a commercial zone. 22 of the Real Estate Tax Code. that a tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes. the operation of a funeral parlor constitutes a "commercial purpose.Private respondents filed a case for the declaration of nullity of the building permit. After conducting an inspection. where the funeral parlor was constructed. Needless to say. Unquestionably. Held: Yes Ratio: In the case at bar. once a local government has reclassified an area as commercial. While the commercial character of the questioned vicinity has been declared thru the ordinance. the CA reversed. the court dismissed the complaint holding that (a) the chapel is 55. it was a residential lot as reflected in the tax declaration. Tepoot's lessee for laundry business. The trial court's determination that Mr. persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the state and to this fundamental aim of government. Consequently. a tax declaration only enables the assessor to identify the same for assessment levels. however. the testimony of City Councilor Vergara shows that Mr. Sec. other than being declared for taxation purposes as such. It disagreed with the lower court's determination that Tepoot's building was commercial and ruled that although it was used by Mr. The reversal by the CA of the trial court's decision was based on Tepoot's building being declared for taxation purposes as residential. in order to promote the general welfare. even if Tepoot's building was declared for taxation purposes as residential. The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power to promote the good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. its use as a residence. A discrepancy may thus exist in the determination of the nature of property for real estate taxation purposes vis-a-vis the determination of a property for zoning purposes. was not fully substantiated. 8 But while its commercial aspect has been established by the presence of machineries and laundry paraphernalia. Corollary thereto.95 meters away from the funeral parlor and (b) the building owned by Mr. may interfere with personal liberty. 8 is inapplicable. with property. that determination for zoning purposes must prevail. Tepoot is being rented to Mr. therefore. is strengthened by the fact that the Sanggunian has declared the questioned area as commercial. Thus. The ordinance which regulates the location of funeral homes has been adopted as part of comprehensive zoning plans for the orderly development of the area covered thereunder. Asiaten who devotes said place to his laundry business. Tepoot's building was used for a dual purpose both as a dwelling and as a place where a laundry business was conducted. On appeal.

IBP v Zamora: clearly to the pres that the consti entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. She issued proc pursuant to her calling out power as Commanderin-Chief under the first sentence of Sec. it would generally defer to her judgment on the m atter. Art. DILG sec therefore dod not take over the operations of ARMM. Ratio: Constitutional 1) DILG did not take control of the powers of ARMM. Here petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the provinces and duty as well as presidents. and Regie Sahali Generale another official of ARMM against DILG secretary Ronaldo Puno and AFP and PNP units opertating in Maugindanao. VII. directing AFP and PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by the law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places. On the other hand. Article VI. but to restore peace and order in subject places. Both the military and the police had to prepare for and prevent . ARMM Vice gov Adiong assumed the vacant post pursuant to the rule on succession of RA 9054 who in turn appointed Generale as Acting ARMM Vice gov. Emergency powers are not involved. Pres did not proclaim a national emergency only a state of emergency. President merely delegated her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Sec who was her alter ego any way. Thereafter issued AO 273-A amending the word “transferring” with “delegating. She also issued AO 273 transferring supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG. the court will accord respect to the President’s judgment.” Pets claim that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy so they filed et for proh ibition – issuances empowered DILG Sec to take over ARMM operatons and seize the regional governmental powers in violation of the principle of local autonomy under RA 9045 – Expanded ARMM Law) and the Constitution. exercise of the calling out power had no factual basis. Ansaruddin Adiong (Vice-Governor). No factual basis for the declaration. While it is true that Court may inquire into the factual bases for the president’s exercise of the above power. 24. He calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the consti directly vests in the pres. some of whch may be classified as highly confidential or as affecting the security of the state. GMA issued Proclamation 146 placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. 2009.Pets are Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan (Governor). 2) Deployment of AFP and PNP personnel is not by itself exercise of an emergency power under Section 23 (2). And she did not act pursuant to law enacted by congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy. It is also a known fact that both families have an arsenal of armed followers who hold elective positions in various parts of the ARMM and the rest of Mindanao. OSG insisted that the President issued Proclamation 1946. If the petitioner fails by way of proof to support the assertion that Pres acted without factual basis. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion. 3) GMA’s power springs form Section 1. One day after the massacre of 57 – Nov. 18. then this court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. GMA gave DILG not merely admin supervision but control since latter could suspend ARMM officials and replace them. the pres has a vast intelligence network to gather information. After law enforcement agents took ARMM Governor into custody. Factual basis as explained by OSG: Ampatuan and Maguindanao clans are prominent families engaged in te political control of Maguindanao. Article VII.

and extinction of animal or plant species. On the other hand. for his information and guidance. its impact upon the people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological balance. The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces. or municipality shall furnish the local chief executive concerned. rangeland.It shall be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution. 2011) Aquino admin has not yet lifted the declaration of state of emergency. and through the city and municipality with respect to barangays. direct the appropriate national agency to provide financial. to consult with the local government units. the President shall exercise general supervision over local government units to ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. To date (June 7. and independent component cities. 300 for Mangudadatu. Integovernmental relations CHAPTER III Intergovernmental Relations ARTICLE I National Government and Local Government Units Section 25. Two other RAG factions are likely to support Mangudadatu – one in cotabato and one in SK. or forest cover. . RAG faction which is based in Sultan Kudarat was reported to have received three million from Datu Ampatuan for the procurement of ammunition. Mangudadatu armed forces – 100. climatic change. loss of crop land. Section 26. Prior Consultations Required.No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with. upon request of the local government unit concerned. technical. city. and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or program. (d) National agencies and offices including government-owned or controlled corporations with field units or branches in a province. in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof. monthly reports including duly certified budgetary allocations and expenditures. c. depletion of non-renewable resources. and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided. That occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided. (a) Consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. or other forms of assistance to the local government unit. through the province with respect to component cities and municipalities. nongovernmental organizations. highly urbanized cities. National Supervision over Local Government Units. Speciall Civilian Auiliary Armay: 500 for Ampatuan. One rebel armed group was reported to ahave planned an attack on the forces of Datu Andal Ampatuan Sr. They shall ensure the participation of local government units both in the planning and implementation of said national projects. . Such assistance shall be extended at no extra cost to the local government unit concerned. (c) The President may.reported retaliatory actions from the Mangudadatu clan and additional offensive measures from the Ampatuan clan. Ampatuan armed forces = 2400. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. Section 27. (b) National agencies and offices with project implementation functions shall coordinate with one another and with the local government units concerned in the discharge of these functions. to show support and sympathy for the victims. .

(b) If the governor or the city or municipal mayor fails to act on said executive orders within thirty (30) days after their submission. or coordinate their efforts. and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them. and other kinds of property and appoint or assign personnel under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by the participating local units through Memoranda of Agreement. and jail management personnel assigned in their respective jurisdictions shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred seventy-five (R. Section 30.Local government units shall promote the establishment and operation of people's and non-governmental organizations to become active partners in the pursuit of local autonomy. Review of Executive Orders. . shall exercise general supervision over component barangays to ensure that said barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. Section 32. upon approval by the sanggunian concerned after a public hearing conducted for the purpose. Highly urbanized cities and independent component cities shall be independent of the province. city. through appropriate ordinances. the municipal government may secure the opinion of the provincial legal officer. equipment. Provincial Relations with Component Cities and Municipalities. . the local chief executive concerned shall ensure that such executive orders are within the powers granted by law and in conformity with provincial. otherwise known as "The Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990". the same shall be deemed consistent with law and therefore valid. within three (3) days from their issuance. 6975). . No.Local government units may enter into joint ventures and such other cooperative arrangements with people's and non-governmental .The province. Section 33. In all instances of review. and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto.The extent of operational supervision and control of local chief executives over the police force. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of the Philippine National Police. the local government units involved may.In the absence of a municipal legal officer.Local government units may. Section 35.A. . group themselves. that of the provincial prosecutor on any legal question affecting the municipality.ARTICLE II Relations with the Philippine National Police Section 28. through the governor. ARTICLE III Inter-Local Government Relations Section 29. Linkages with People's and Non-governmental Organizations. shall ensure that every component city and municipality within its territorial jurisdiction acts within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Cooperative Undertakings Among Local Government Units. Section 31. CHAPTER IV Relations With People's and Non-Governmental Organizations Section 34. City and Municipal Supervision over Their Respective Barangays. . as the case may be. The city or municipal mayor shall review all executive orders promulgated by the punong barangay within his jurisdiction. (a) Except as otherwise provided under the Constitution and special statutes. Copies of such orders shall be forwarded to the governor or the city or municipal mayor. services. Submission of Municipal Questions to the Provincial Legal Officer or Prosecutor. contribute funds. or municipal ordinances.The city or municipality. real estate. the governor shall review all executive orders promulgated by the component city or municipal mayor within his jurisdiction. In support of such undertakings. through the city or municipal mayor concerned. consolidate. Role of People's and Non-governmental Organizations. . . and in the absence of the latter. fire protection unit.

promote ecological balance. to be designated by the local chapter of the Philippine Institute of Certified Public Accountants. General Welfare. Linkages and Assistance to People’s and Nongovernmental Organizations d. . bids and awards committees. Bids and Awards Committee (Local PBAC). socially-oriented. (a) There is hereby created a local technical committee in every province. one (1) chosen by said sanggunian from among its members. The governor or the city or municipal mayor shall act as the chairman with the following as members: (1) The chairman of the appropriations committee of the sanggunian concerned. City and Municipal Supervision over Barangays. and such other officials designated by the local prequalification. (b) The agenda and other information relevant to the meetings of such committee shall be deliberated upon by the committee at least one (1) week before the holding of such meetings. Section 38. posted at a prominent place in the provincial capitol or the city or municipal hall. and (5) Any practicing certified public accountant from the private sector. through its local chief executive and with the concurrence of the sanggunian concerned. and municipality. bids and awards have been complied with.Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted. Representatives of the Commission on Audit shall observe the proceedings of such committee and shall certify that the rules and procedures for prequalification. (4) Two (2) representatives of non-governmental organizations that are represented in the local development council concerned. spur rural industrialization. or incidental for its efficient and effective governance. appropriate. to be chosen by the organizations themselves. Role of People’s and Nongovernmental Organizations. city and municipality to provide technical assistance to the local prequalification. if any. and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. bids and awards committee in every province. bids and awards committee and shall attend its meeting in order to present the reports and recommendations of the local technical committee. provide assistance. and the recommendation of awards concerning local infrastructure projects. (b) The chairman of the local technical committee shall be designated by the local prequalification. as well as powers necessary. . Review of Executive Orders. capability-building and livelihood projects. and delivered by the most expedient means to elective local officials concerned. CHAPTER V Local Prequalification. (a) There is hereby created a local prequalification. or if there be none. to such people's and non-governmental organizations for economic. Bids and Awards Committee Section 37. if any. the local planning and development coordinator. (2) A representative of the minority party in the sanggunian concerned. (3) The local treasurer. city or municipal engineer. bidding. The minutes of such meetings of the committee and any decision made therein shall be duly recorded. financial or otherwise. Powers of local chief executive over the PNP.A local government unit may. or cultural projects to be implemented within its territorial jurisdiction. Powers of Municipal Corporations/Local Governments Section 16. city. Local Technical Committee. Within their . environmental. (c) All meetings of the committee shall be held in the provincial capitol or the city or municipal hall. It shall be composed of the provincial.organizations to engage in the delivery of certain basic services. and to develop local enterprises designed to improve productivity and income. Local Prequalification. Provincial Relations with Component Cities and Municipalites. Section 36. and enhance the economic and social well-being of the people. those necessarily implied therefrom. Assistance to People's and Non-governmental Organizations. diversity agriculture. which shall be primarily responsible for the conduct of prequalification of contractors. evaluation of bids. bids and awards committee.

or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless. the CFI sentenced the petitioners to pay one Uy certain sums of money as well as to vacate the property and surrender to the same Uy. We find the same likewise untenable. pass on the same and on appeal by petition for review to the Supreme Court in L-47603 and L-48649. neither the Supreme Court nor the Appellate Court is duty bound to discuss the pros and cons of appellant's argument. The SC denied the petition.respective territorial jurisdictions. maintain peace and order. Petitioners. . where the same issue among others was raised. Police Power Chua Huat v. exercise the power of eminent domain for public use. Eminent Domain. however. the private respondents filed a motion to execute the same. On appeal. The court granted this. the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court. promote health and safety. among other things. improve public morals. enhance economic prosperity and social justice. promote full employment among their residents. The CA denied the petition for lack of merit. After the decision in the civil case became final and executory. That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner. based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. 74634 was raised in their MR before the CA in CA-G. further. 119751) has been squarely ruled upon. through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance. petitioners contend that there is no res judicata as there is no identity of causes of action (annulment of judgment. That. The CA affirmed. . Issues raised by the parties in their brief and passed upon subsilencio by the appellate court in a decision which has become final and executory are considered closed and can no longer be revived by the parties in a subsequent litigation without doing violence to the principle of res judicata. Despite the case.R. filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC contending that the case is actually an unlawful detainer case. not only by the trial court in Civil Case No. the CFI ordered the execution of the judgment. encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities. pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided. What more. in its resolution denying said motion. That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided. The CA invoked finality of judgment and res judicata. Plaintiff-appellant further contends that since the issue of jurisdiction in Civil Case No. 74634 but also by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court. finally. local government units shall ensure and support. recovery of poseession). Issue: WON the present action is barred by res judicata Held: Yes Ratio: The records of the two cases will bear it out that the issue of lack of jurisdiction (which is the cause of action in Civil Case No. and therefore the CFI had no jurisdiction over it. the CA did not. i. 51337-R. No. Petitioner Chua Huat filed with the CFI a complaint for the annulment of judgment on the ground that the CFI has no jurisdiction over the civil case which was one for ejectment and not for recovery of possession. the High Court in its minutes' (sic) did not rule squarely on said issue. Section 19. and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. The petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA to set aside the order of execution of judgment and to prohibit the respondents from executing the judgment. CA (1991) Facts: First case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA and the second is a petition for prohibition with PI directed against the notices of condemnation and demolition orders issued by the City Engineer upon authority of the City Mayor. enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. upon payment of just compensation. and such offer was not accepted: Provided. In a civil case. except Ong Choan.A local government unit may. the preservation and enrichment of culture.

. s 1952. basically. The court ruled in favor of the municipal council and held that the ordinance was a legitimate and valid exercise of police power by the municipal council. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. 13. Petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional. Experience. The petitioner’s MR was denied. Resolution 29 was passed by the Municipal Council declaring the warehouse as a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the CC.Tatel v. will show that this is not uncommon in law making bodies in small towns where local authorities and in particular the persons charged with the drafting and preparation of municipal resolutions and ordinances lack sufficient education and training and are not well grounded even on the basic and fundamental elements of the English language commonly used throughout the country in such matters. And the purpose of the ordinance is to avoid loss of life and property in case of accidental fire which is one of the primordial and basic obligation of any government. a committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. Mun. Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code. Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the CFI enjoining them from enforcing Resolution 29 of the Council. the mere fact that the municipal authorities have not proceeded against other warehouses in the municipality 1 AN ORDINANCE STRICTLY PROHIBITING THE CONSTRUCTION OF WAREHOUSE IN ANY FORM NEAR A BLOCK OF HOUSES EITHER IN POBLACION OR BARRIO WITH NECESSARY DISTANCE TO AVOID GREAT LOSSES OF PROPERTY AND LIVES BY FIRE ACCIDENT. As to the contention. series of 1952. contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law. and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature. 131. and (6) must not be unreasonable. was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. the meaning and intent is clear that what is prohibited is the construction or maintenance of warehouses for the storage of inflammable articles at a distance within 200 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or in the barrios. that warehouses similarly situated as that of the petitioner were not prosecuted. of Virac (1992) Facts: On the basis of the complaints received from the residents of barrio Sta. s1952. Issue: WON the enactment was pursuant to a legitimate exercise of police power Held: Yes Ratio: Ordinance No. what is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored where such warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses and not the construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of the government. it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. In spite of its fractured syntax. Elena against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioner’s warehouse which emitted obnoxious odor and dust. The committee noted that the warehouse was near residential houses and that the inflammable materials inside created danger to the lives and properties of the people within the neighborhood. Ordinance No. meets these criteria. For an ordinance to be valid. 13. These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy. The municipal officials contend that the warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. The ambiguity therefore is more apparent than real and springs from simple error in grammar but otherwise. however.

without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected . "Calibrated Preemptive Response". together with freedom of speech. as guaranteed by the Constitution. No. A distinction must be made between the law itself and the manner in which said law is implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration/enforcement. The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been substantiated. No. 6. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nation’s streets and parks. the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated." "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee. Issue: Whether or not the implementation of B. Furthermore. 4. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. Three other rallyists were arrested in the case of Bayan. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. Respondents.) No. et al allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6. No. Ermita (2006) Facts: The rally was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is. is directly affected by B.allegedly violating Ordinance 13 is no reason to claim that the ordinance is discriminatory. As a content-based legislation. and of the press. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought." "opinion. Bayan v. a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. in the absence of proof that the other bodegas mentioned by him are operating in violation of the ordinance and that the complaints have been lodged against the bodegas concerned without the municipal authorities doing anything about it. no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced. there can be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal government. some of them in toto and others only Sections 4. The words "lawful cause. causing injuries on one of them. As far as public policy is concerned. of expression. in fact. They were then forcibly dispersed. of expression. 880 All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. III Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution Sec. 5. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B. have challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit. 2005 Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged. on the other hand.P. 880. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition. it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.P. and 14(a). 880 volated their rights as organizations and individuals when the rally they participated in on October 6. as well as the policy of CPR. Also. Sec. or of the press. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit. There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain.P. 12. 13(a). 4 Art. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. Bayan et al argued that B. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity.P. They have.

place and manner of assemblies.This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985.Rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and. no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution. so its use cannot be avoided. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time. B. The only requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayor’s office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities. the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country." "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based. . after that period. place and manner of the assemblies. Declaration of policy . that B. the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as provided under B. After 30 days from the finality of this Decision. No. Section 2(5) of Article IX. public convenience. therefore. If. Neither are the words "opinion. all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks. no such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law. as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional. not the government. is VOID. No. to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law.P. To this end. otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Title . and manner of holding public assemblies A fair and impartial reading of B. 880 is SUSTAINED. insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance. and Section 3 of Article XIII. Finally. the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life. public morals or public health the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR). No.P. since they can refer to any subject. In this Decision. public safety. No. "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists.P. particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights. Disposition. 880. Far from being insidious. it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time.P. liberty and equal protection of the law. BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. Petition GRANTED and respondents are DIRECTED comply with Section 15 of BP No. no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law. subject to the giving of advance notices. 880 AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES Section 1. it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time. On the other hand. maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. place. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies22 that would use public places." Section 2. Furthermore. for that matter. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes.The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. Furthermore. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution. it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the people’s exercise of these rights It is very clear. The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No.

That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed. which must be duly acknowledged in writing. road. the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building. the purpose of such public assembly. rerouting of the parade or street march. Definition of terms . demonstration. Permit when required and when not required . its implementing rules and regulations.A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. public convenience.All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines: (a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers. parade. Section 4. square. police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. (d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public assembly. public safety.Section 3. said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed. Section 5. or petitioning the government for redress of grievances. or expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular issue. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act. no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property. However. park. The processions. procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause. (c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held. street. Section 6. the transport and the public address systems to be used. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit. public meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances: Provided. public morals or public health. march. and/or any open space of public ownership where the people are allowed access. (b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof. in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. avenue. and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227. (b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed. or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. (c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military. or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political. bridge or other thoroughfare. rallies.For purposes of this Act: (a) "Public assembly" means any rally. and the probable number of persons participating. plaza. the date. time and duration thereof. however. Action to be taken on the application (a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order. failing which. the permit shall be deemed granted. Application requirements . . economic or social. (d) Upon receipt of the application. demonstrations. parades. The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code. at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly. the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and similar changes. and place or streets to be used for the intended activity. boulevard. (b) "Public place" shall include any highway.

Responsibility of applicant . (c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the public assembly may be held peacefully. to the next in rank. for an appreciable length of time.Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public assembly. Section 7. Section 9. (d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the permit. of any public highway. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities . avenue. be immediately executory. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall. and (e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly interfering with the rights of other persons not participating in the public assembly.It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the permit. However.Should the proposed public assembly involve the use. (f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court. These shall include but not be limited to the following: (a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit. the mayor or any official acting in his behalf may. (g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial. law enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines: . (b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly. Police assistance when requested . any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court. the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. the Regional Trial Court. when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers. its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter. a law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meter away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times. the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law. Use of public thoroughfare . in his absence. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or. Towards this end. (i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed. (e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit. Section 8. to prevent grave public inconvenience. the Municipal Trial Court. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. to adequately ensure public safety. (h) In all cases. (d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application within twenty-four hours. designate the route thereof which is convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce and trade. or the Intermediate Appellate Court. Section 10.It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies.(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit. boulevard. road or street.

statute. however. when an assembly becomes violent. and after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse. the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance. smoke grenades. or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence. 3 the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares. disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly.No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. (b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks. organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law. Dispersal of public assembly with permit . the police may disperse such public assembly as follows: (a) At the first sign of impending violence. impeding. the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed. (d) No arrest of any leader.(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined. Section 12. shields. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. bomb. or deliberate destruction of property. (c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf. the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly. (f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof. 2. and the like. crash helmets with visor. (e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public assembly. Section 13. (b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf. pillbox. Section 11. That no person can be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly. water cannons.When the public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is required. boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards.The following shall constitute violations of this Act: (a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without having first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office concerned. Dispersal of public assembly without permit . or at any property causing damage to such property. gas masks. as amended: (e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or branch of the peace during the public assembly shall not constitute a group for dispersal. (c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate. (d) Obstructing. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like. the public assembly will be dispersed. the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists. Prohibited acts . (b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants. or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than those set out in said permit: Provided. However. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm. . shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse. ordinance or any provision of this Act. (c) Tear gas. (g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof. 1.

the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity of this Act. (d). The RTC granted said motion to intervene. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. Likewise. Inns. ordinances or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed. decrees. item 3. and item 4.This Act shall take effect upon its approval. MTDC prayed that the ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Repealing clause . amended. Short-Time Admission rates.4. In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila. lodging houses. letters of instructions. Motels. petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC). or modified accordingly. (c) violation of item 1.Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or unconstitutional. resolutions. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit. Pursuant to said ordinance. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 459 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate the . (c). Section 16. 1985.Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the immediately preceding Section shall be punished as follows: (a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one day to six months. or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of one day to thirty days. Freedom parks . the validity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected thereby. Constitutionality .Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which. Approved. Penalties . A petition for review on certiorari was file with the Supreme Court by the City of Manila which was referred to the Court of Appeals. as far as practicable. Lodging Houses. pension houses and similar establishments in Manila to protect the best interest. Pension Houses and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila” was enacted prohibiting short time admission and admission rates in hotels. Section 15. (b) violations of subparagraphs (b). Section 18. Section 17. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle.All laws. Effectivity . 5. Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. 1866. health and welfare. its horns and loud sound systems. (e). the Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. (d) violations of item 2. Section 14. orders. and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth in particular. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short -Time Admission. subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years. The RTC declared the ordinance as unconstitutional for it “strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution. and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels. October 22. shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit. White Light v City of Manila Facts: Manila City Ordinance No. subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. motels. (f).

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy. The Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement. Issue: Whether or not the Ordiance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement. beerhouses. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments “have gained notoriety as venue of ‘prostitution. namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. and. The virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade. and (6) must not be unreasonable. drug use and alike.establishment. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. sometimes even.’ The right to privacy is a constitutional right and the invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state interest. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid. but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator. hotels. restaurants. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex. (2) must not be unfair or oppressive. it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute. Those means must align with the Constitution. by themselves. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen. the political majorities animated by his cynicism. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli. as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. The test of a valid ordinance is well established. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause. Third. motels. inns. The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices. Hence. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. These goals. The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. It must appear that the interests of the public generally. prostitution. That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. Held: YES. it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law. presence and exit and thus became the ‘ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill -seekers. pension houses. and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. (3) must not be partial or discriminatory. including tourist guides and transports. lodging houses and other similar establishments. are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. adulte ry and fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry. operation and maintenance of cafes. The primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative. as distinguished from those of . subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare. this petition. the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.

familial. unable to transfer to another jurisdiction to secure abortion. exept procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Doe and intervenor Hallford appealed to SC regarding denial of injunction. but the Does did not for failing to allege facts sufficient to present a controversy. a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment. Hallford. require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. and that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face because they were both unconstitutionally vague and constituted an overbroad infringement of the P’s Ninth Am endment rights. it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. instituted federal action against District Atty if the county – sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes are unconstitutional on their face. and dismissed the application for injunctive relief. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. John and Mary Doe filed a companion complaint to that of Roe. or in personal. Further. a license physician. Jane Roe. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be. for even under the guise of protecting the public interest. Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. also naming the DA as defendant – claiming unconstitutionality. ot to attempt one. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions. Siilar statutes are in existence in a majority of the States. declared the abortion statutes void. Ordinance No. marital. Texas. contends that the statutes invade upon the right of a pregnant woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy. it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover. drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments. and . Roe. Two actions were consolidated. Roe v Wade Facts: Texas State Penal Code Arts: 1191-1194 make it a crime to procure an abortion. as therein defined. grounded on the concept of personal liberty embodied in the 14th Amendment’s DP clause. personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. The District Court held that the fundamental right of single women. It therefore dismissed the Doe’s complaint. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. Pets: 1) Jane Roe unmarried and pregnant wishes to terminate her pregnancy but is prevented by Texas Law. while defendant DA cross appealed regarding grant of declaratory relief.a particular class. and marrie persons to choose whether to have children is protected by the 9th amendment. a single woman who was residing in Dallas County. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. Decision: The Petition is Granted. 7774 is declared Unconstitutional. More importantly. sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe’s action. through the 14th amendment. The court then held that abstention was warranted with respect to the requests for an injunction. This court found that Roe and Halford had standing. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification.

Theis claim is that sometime in the future. Phrasing it another way. was found by the court to be at the beginning acceptable to only a small number of people. and whenever performed. 2 it provided lesser penalties. The bare allegation of so indirect an injury us insufficient to present an actual case or controversy. but the SC sees no distinction and applies the rule to him. which the SC finds as very speculative. :Pcapalae of repetition. as a consequence the statutes were vague and uncertain. Doe might become pregnant because of possible failure of contraceptive measures.sexual privacy said to be protected by the BOR or its penumbras or among those rights reserved to the people by the 9th Amendment. England’s first criminal abortion statute. Does – he asserted as their only immediate and present injury an alleged detrimental effect on ther marital happiness. It made abortion of a quick fetus a capital crime. Held: 1) Roe – During trial. Because of the uncertainty of the law. that if ever she became pregnant. she wishes to have legal abortion under safe. came in 1803. discontinued use of birth control pills. The case of Rex v Bourne apparently answered in the affirmative the question whether an abortion necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman was excepted from the criminal penalties of the 1861 act. for the felony of abortion before quickening. and at that time in the future she might not want an abortion that might then be illegal under the Texas statutes. abortion was for the most part accepted or tolerated. and throughout the major portion of the 19th century. 2) SC first took a look at the historical perspective on abortion. but in Sec. which is important since usual rule in federal cases is athat an actuak cinrtoversy must exist at stages of appellate and certiorari review. logical nexus test in Flast net as her status as a pregnant woman was logically connecte to the claim that she sought. appellee notes that the records do not disclose whteher she was pregnant at the time of the hearing of the case or when the TC decision was handed down. a defendant in a pending state criminal cse sannot affirmatively challenge in Federal Court the statutes under which the State is prosecuting him. a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy than she does in most States today. Mrs. However. Doe had a neuro-chemical disorder and was advice to avoid pregnancy. In English statutory law. or even a lesser crime is still disputed. she has standing. reversing the finding of the TC on the Doctor’s standing. in violation of the 14th amendment. Issues: 1) WON Pets have standing to bring suit 2) WON Texas laws regarding abortions are unconstitutional for invading a constitutionally protected right. 2) Hallford had twice been arrested in Texas for violation of abortion laws. At least with respect to the early .” Halford-has two pending cases with State Court. abortion was viewed with less disfavour than under most American statutes currently in effect. unless done to save or preserve the life of the mother. and thus preserved the quickening distinction. however. yet evading review. Common law provided that abortion before quickening (the 1st recognizable movement of the foetus in utero) was not an indictable offense. reason that pregnancy provides for classic conclusion of non-mootness. Whether abortion of a quick foetus was a felony at common law. it was difficult to tell whether his patients’ particular situation fell within or outside the exception recognized by A1196. Ths trend of thinking was carried over to the US to the extent that only as recently as the end of 1950s a large majority of the jurisdictions banned abortion. at the time of the adoption of the consti. clinical conditions. that the law be struck down as unconstitutional for her to have an abortion. 4th. which is significant because absent harassment and BF. and that they violated his own and his patient’s rights to privacy in the doctor-patient relationship and his own right to practice medicine. Mrs. It is thus apparent that. rights he claimed were guaranteed by the 1st. The delivery of the baby would have rendered the case moot. 9th and 14th amendment 3) Does – childless couple. He tries to distinguish his status as present state defendant. and not smply at the date the action is initiated. reasoning that most of the law criminalizing abortion are of relatively recent vintage. But SC relaxed this rule. that is. at common law. Even the Hippocratic Oath which said that a doctor should not provide drugs to induce an abortion. 5th.

and very possibly without such a limitation. 1196 of the Texas Penal Code. and that the unborn is a person. carries embryo. The unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense. marriage. While there is a contention nthat the protection of prenatal life is a compelling state interest. They gave information. The court concludes that the right of personal privacy includes abortion decision. Where certain fundamental rights are involved. facility whereit will be performed. without regulation from the state. that of mother’s health and that of potential human life. education. and its medical director. Thus state retains a definite interest in the woman’s own health and safety when an abortion is proposed at late stage of pregnancy. The statute makes no distinction between abortions perfoirmed early in pregnancy and those preformed later. won to proceed with abortion b) Become compelling at point of viability – foetus is presumed to have capability of meaningful life outside mother’s womb – can proscribe abortion. 3) Consti does not define person in so many words – none indicates that t has any possible pre-natal application 4) Pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her pregnancy. But this right of privacy whether it be founded in the 14th Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state actions. physician in consultation with patient is free to determine. Prior to the compelling period. The statute therefore cannot survive the constitutional attack made upon it here. in restricting legal abortions to those procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother sweeps to broadly. b)abortion is medical procedure hazardous for women – overtaken by medical advances.stage of the pregnancy. Griswold v Connecticut Facts: Appellants are the Executive Director of the Palnned Parenthood League of Connecticut (Griswold). The SC recognizes that the debate now is between the States’ right/duty to protect pre-natal life versus the contention that the laws were passed to protect the woman from placing herself in potentially life threatening situation (as abortion techniques were initially unrefined and presented a threat to the woman’s health) Right of privacy is not explicitly found in the consti. and the 9th amendment’s reservation of the rights to the people. is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision WON to terminate her pregnancy. the Court has held the regulation limiting these rights may be justified pnly by a compelling state interest. the legal justification for the procedure. licensure.ife. the court has held that regulation limiting these roghts may be justified only by a compelling state interest and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake. and b) potentiality of human life a) Becomes compelling – approximately at the start of the 1st trimester until the end of the 2nd trimester mortality in abortion may be less than the mortality in normal childbirth. Add’l notes: 1) Three reasons to justify anti-abortion: a) to discourage illicit sexual conduct – texas does not advance this justification. and it limits to a single reason. State may regulate – req’ts as to qualification of bortionist. Art. Situation is therefore different from marital intimacy. the court held that the use of the word is such that it has application only post-natally. 5) Two interests protected by state: a) health of mother. the opportunity to make this choice was present in this country well into the 19th century. but that this right is not unqualified. instruction and medical advice . saving the mother’s . 2) When certain fundamental rights are involved. a license physician (Buxton). therefore appropriate for state to decide at some point in time another interest. None indicates with any assurance that it has any possible pre-natal application. Measured against these standards. and must be considered against important state interest on regulation. c) protecting prenatal life – a new human life is protected from moment of conception. abortion on early pregnancy prior to the end of the first trimester is now relatively safe.

Ratio: The standards of case or controversy should be less strict by reason of the appellant’s conviction for serving married couples in violation of an aiding and abetting statute. prescribing contraceptive device or material for the wife’s use. . Such taxes. constitutionally be a crime. This law which in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather regulating their manufactyure or sale. Certainly the accessory should have standing to assert that the offense which he is charged with assisting is not or cannot. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes. These constitutional guarantees include: Freedom of speech and press including the right to distribute. Fees were useually charged although some couples were serviced free. medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be filed not less than 50 dollars or imprisoned not less than 60 days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned. A Connecticut statute makes it a crime for any person to use any drug or article to prevent conception. Appellants claimed that the accessory statute as applied violated the 14 th amendment. seeks to achieve goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship. causes. Such a las=w cannit stand in light of the familiar principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent actvivties constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved y means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. ii. fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide. The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship. 54-196 provides: Any person who assists. An intermediate appellate court and the State. fees. Section 5. the first amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from government intrusion.s highest court affirmed the judgment. the concept of liberty embraces the right of marital privacy though that right is not mentioned explicitly in the constitution the due process clause protects those liberties that are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked so fundamental. Statutes involved in this appeal are 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut. Issues: a) WON appellants have standing to asser the constitutional rights of the married people. They examined the wife and prescribed the best contraceptive device or material for her use. hires. Sec. Both are convicted as accessories for giving married persons information and medical advice on how to prevent conception and. receive read and teach and freedom and inquiry and thought. b) WON Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contraceptives violated the right of marital privacy which is within the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights Held: 1) Appellants have standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married people 2) Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contraceptives violates the right of marital privacy. abets counsels. Power of Taxation Article X. consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. The former provides: Any person who uses any drug.to married persons as to the means of preventing conception. and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments. The primary issue in this case concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privact created by several constitutional guarantees. or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender. following examination.

amended or modified. inconsistent therewith.  The states have no power by taxation or otherwise. therefore. 3. Otherwise.  LGs have no power to tax instrumentalities of the NG. its operation might be burdened. LCG Real property tax: Sec 197-283. RA 7160. PD 1869. It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" which has the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative powers. As early as 1975. including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits. Facts: PAGCOR was created under PD 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Local government units shall have a just share. impeded or subjected to control by a mere LG. Necessarily. RA 7160. as determined by law. PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers. the power of LGs to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise. PAGCOR has a dual role. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter. NO  The City of Manila. WON PD 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees.  The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling." Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax"  The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. 128-196. executive orders. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas. Only the NG has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling. Thus. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. minimize evils prevalent in conduct and operation of gambling clubs) PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power. has the power of control over LGs. to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the NG. in the manner provided by law. Issues: 1. . the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila. "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters. The latter role is governmental. PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Title II. decrees. in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. generate additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic project.--> "supremacy" of the NG over LGs. Local Taxes and Real Property Tax Local Taxation Sec. to retard. Article XSection 7. has long been revoked. rules and regulations. which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. To attain its objectives (centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance. burden or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government. being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. LGC Special Education Fund Tax (LGC) Basco v Philippine Gaming and Amusement Corp. impede. Section 6. all laws. licenses or permits" was withdrawn by PD 771 and was vested exclusively on the NG. are accordingly repealed." Congress. Being an instrumentality of the Government. expand tourism. Under its Charter's repealing clause.Article X.

Pililla." It does not make LGs sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio. city and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting any local tax imposed in old or new tax ordinances in the business of manufacturing. 1. distilled spirits and/or wines in accordance with the schedule found in the Local Tax Code. XVIII. fees or charges . it cannot be an imperium in imperio. . Provincial Circular No. Consti: Each LG unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes. rectifiers. distillers.  principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization. distillers. PPC owns and maintains an oil refinery including 49 storage tanks for its petroleum products in Malaya. WON the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by PD 1869. repackers. consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended. S-1974 otherwise known as "The Pililla Tax Code of 1974" which took effect on July 1. including brewers. Holmes: absence of power on the part of the States to touch. or dealing in. importers or producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide. Sections 19 and 19 (a) provide that the municipality may impose taxes on business. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy. repackers. On June 28. Respondent enacted Municipal Tax Ordinance No. except for those for which fixed taxes are provided in the Local Tax Code on manufacturers. The Secretary of Finance issued Provincial Circular No. distilled spirits and/or wines in accordance with the schedule listed therein. PD 231 (Local Tax Code) was issued enacted. wholesaling. 1973)was also issued instructing all City Treasurers to refrain from collecting any local tax imposed in tax ordinances enacted before or after the effectivity of the Local Tax Code. on the businesses of manufacturing. or dealing in petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the NIRC. 1973) directed to all provincial. combustible or explosive substances. manufactured oils and other fuels are subject to specific tax. Sections 9 and 10 of the said ordinance imposed a tax on business. Rizal. while Section 139 of the disputed ordinance imposed surcharges and interests on unpaid taxes. Rizal. except on those for which fixed taxes are provided on manufacturers. retailing. its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of LGs to impose taxes and fees. rectifiers. and compounders of liquors. Pililla. as well as mayor's permit. 26 A-73 (January 9. fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the LG. including brewers. Phil Petroleum Corp vs Mun of Pililia 1991 Facts: Petitioner is a business enterprise engaged in the manufacture of lubricated oil basestock which is a petroleum product.  power of LG to "impose taxes and fees" is subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law. importers. such as the government under the Philippine Constitution. NO. 3. LG in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. Such taxes. retailing. petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the NIRC."  LG: political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. the instrumentalities of the United States  mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation" 2. or producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. 1974. with its refinery plant situated at Malaya. fees. repealed or revoked" (Sec. LGs can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation. 1973. Under Section 142 of the NIRC of 1939. 26-73 (December 27. in that way (taxation) at least. sanitary inspection fee and storage permit fee for flammable.  Art x Sec 5. wholesaling. Art. In a unitary system of government. 1987 Constitution). and compounders of liquors.

PPC. 1 imposing the assailed taxes.D. mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees from 1975 to 1984. 144 and 145 of the NIRC. with regard to manufacturers. etc. There is no question that Pililla's Municipal Tax Ordinance No. The RTC rendered a decision against petitioner. in view of Section 22 (b) of the Code regarding non-imposition by municipalities of taxes on articles. 26-73 (1) would be tantamount to restricting their . 26-73 and 26 A-73. A tax on business is distinct from a tax on the article itself.D. 1 was reviewed and approved by the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal. PC No. 426 and no exemptions were given to manufacturers. P. producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. Thus. The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is ordained by the present Constitution. 426. Furthermore. the former prevails. wholesalers. The questioned Municipal Tax Ordinance No. But P. 26-73 and 26 A-73 issued by the Secretary of Finance when Sections 19 and 19 (a). 231 as amended by P. based on Municipal Ordinance No.D. 26 A-73 suspended the effectivity of local tax ordinances imposing a tax on business under Section 19 (a) of the Local Tax Code. 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes on petroleum products. considering Provincial Circular No. is still liable to pay (a) tax on business and (b) storage fees. hence.D. No. 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes on petroleum products. and granting provinces. Well-settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. have already paid the last-named fees starting 1985. however. (c) both Provincial Circulars (PC) 26-73 and 26 A-73 are still effective. in petroleum products contravenes a declared national policy. 1158 otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 was enacted. To allow the continuous effectivity of the prohibition set forth in PC No. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation. No. but was not implemented and/or enforced by the Municipality of Pililla because of its having been suspended up to now in view of Provincial Circular Nos. as well as those which may be enacted in the future. 1977.D. any effort on the part of the respondent to collect the suspended tax on business from the petitioner would be illegal and unauthorized. the respondent filed a complaint against PPC for the collection of the business tax from 1979 to 1986. and (d) Section 2 of P. retailers. Issue: WON PPC whose oil products are subject to specific tax under the NIRC.D. 436. 6-77. wholesalers or dealers in petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the NIRC. diesel fuel oil and other similar petroleum products levied under Sections 142. fees and charges is valid especially Section 9 (A) which according to the trial court "was lifted in toto and/or is a literal reproduction of Section 19 (a) of the Local Tax Code as amended by P. 26-73 and PC No. 1974. wherein the municipality is granted the right to levy taxes on business of manufacturers. storage permit fees from 1975 to 1986. Enforcing the provisions of the ordinance. cities and municipalities certain shares in the specific tax on such products in lieu of local taxes imposed on petroleum products.D.D.D. Section 153 of which specifically imposes specific tax on refined and manufactured mineral oils and motor fuels. or dealers in petroleum products. No. bunker fuel oil.On April 13. 426. while Section 2 of P. importers. subject to specific tax under the provisions of the NIRC. Rizal. were carried over into P. 2673 declared as contrary to national economic policy the imposition of local taxes on the manufacture of petroleum products as they are already subject to specific tax under the National Internal Revenue Code.D. 1 Held: Yes Ratio: PPC contends that: (a) Provincial Circular No. 426 amending the Local Tax Code is deemed to have repealed Provincial Circular Nos. 436 was promulgated increasing the specific tax on lubricating oils. No. unless and until revoked. if the imposition of tax on business of manufacturers. said decree did not amend Sections 19 and 19 (a) of P. On June 3. retailers. P." It conforms with the mandate of said law. (b) the above declaration covers not only old tax ordinances but new ones. it should have been expressly stated in P. gasoline. and mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fee unto the respondent Municipality of Pililla.

Said law provides that an action upon an obligation created by law prescribes within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues. same is obviously not a charge for any service rendered by the municipality as what is envisioned in Section 37 of the same Code. fees. Tax exemptions are looked upon with disfavor. As to the authority of the mayor to waive payment of the mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees. 1974 to January 1.1969 to April 29. No. the trial court did not err in holding that "since the power to tax includes the power to exempt thereof which is essentially a legislative prerogative. the waiver cannot be recognized. combustible or explosive substances.D. shall be required before any individual or juridical entity shall engage in any business or occupation under the provisions of the Code. rentals. in the total amount of P161. the municipal ordinance mentioned in the complaint which are based on P. who can make an exemption. duties and fees except income tax. 1974 to September 30. No. royalties or charges of any kind whatsoever on defendant has been limited or withdrawn by Section 52 of PD 463. Floro Cement Corporation v Gorospe Facts: The municipality of Lugait filed with the SC a verified complaint for collection of taxes against the defendant Floro Cement Corporation. except income tax. As already stated. 1974 from payment of all taxes. Inasmuch as said storage makes use of tanks owned not by the municipality of Pililla. and which Certificate was amended on November 5." The waiver partakes of the nature of an exemption.D No. respectively. entitling defendant to exemption for a period of 5 years from April 30. 1975. It is an ancient rule that exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. but by petitioner PPC. 10 passed pursuant PD 426.875.D. as implemented by Mines Administrative Order No. and P. Article X of the 1987 Constitution.D. The Municipality of Pililla can therefore enforce the collection of the tax on business of petitioner PPC due from 1976 to 1986.power to tax by mere administrative issuances. a permit fee like the mayor's permit. are . otherwise known as the Municipal Revenue Code of 1974. 5. Thus. The taxes sought to be collected by the plaintiff refers to "manufacturers" and' exporter's "taxes for the period from January 1. However. 426. since the Local Tax Code does not provide the prescriptive period for collection of local taxes. Under Section 36 of the Code. it follows that a municipal mayor who is an executive officer may not unilaterally withdraw such an expression of a policy thru the enactment of a tax. 231 and P. 1978. and NOT the tax that had accrued prior to 1976. 463 which are the basis for the exemption granted to defendant are special laws whereas.amending PD 231. in the absence of a clear and express exemption from the payment of said fees. Petitioner set up the defense that it is not liable to pay manufacturer's and exporter's taxes alleging among others that the plaintiffs power to levy and collect taxes. which was passed pursuant to PD 231 and also Municipal Ordinance No. Plaintiff alleged that the imposition and collection of these taxes" is based on its Municipal Ordinance No. Under Section 5. Provincial Circular No. Article 1143 of the Civil Code applies. only guidelines and limitations that may be established by Congress can define and limit such power of local governments. inclusive. and not an executive like the mayor. 6-77 enjoining all city and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting the so-called storage fee on flammable or combustible materials imposed in the local tax ordinance of their respective locality frees petitioner PPC from the payment of storage permit fee. It also contended that the defendant was granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources a Certificate of Qualification for Tax Exemption.00 plus 25% thereof as surcharge. for five (5) years from the first date of actual commercial production of saleable mineral products that is from May 17. Section 10 (z) (13) of Pililla's Municipal Tax Ordinance No. The storage permit fee being imposed by Pililla's tax ordinance is a fee for the installation and keeping in storage of any flammable. 1974 CQTE P. entitling defendant to exemption from all taxes. it is the law-making body. 1 prescribing a permit fee is a permit fee allowed under Section 36 of the amended Code. V-25. and that RA 3823. 463-22).

Ordinances Nos. Furthermore. More specifically stated. calcining adding of retarder or raw gypsum In short.D. 2 of P. as lime. it is outside the scope of application of Sec. No. properly apply to petitioner. It is the result of a definite processthe crushing of minerals. shale and others. rentals.875 as manufacturer’s and exporter’s taxes and surcharges. No.D. Held: Yes Ratio: Floro Cement Corporation holds that since Ordinances Nos. mining claims and mineral products.D. barrio and municipal district from levying and collecting taxes. development nor exploitation of mineral resources as defined in Sec.D. The trial court rendered a decision ordering defendant to pay the amount of P161. this Court has held that it is not a mineral product but rather a manufactured product. as provided in Sec. respectively. 463. it cannot be allowed to exist upon a mere vague implication or inference. etc. . 231 and Sec.general laws. On the question of whether or not cement is a mineral product. 231 [(m) Taxes on mines. hence. 426. mixing. 5 and 10 were enacted pursuant to P.D. any law to the contrary notwithstanding. As such.D. development and exploitation of mineral products. equipment. 53 of the same decree. silica. It is not cement that is mined only the mineral products composing the finished product. the minerals had already undergone a chemical change through manufacturing process. No. fees. No. 5m of P. 231. which expressly prohibits the province. respectively.D.D. It must be shown indubitably to exist. including exporting of cement. CIR. On the exemption claimed by petitioner. 52 of P. and a well-founded doubt is fatal to the claim.]. No. Issue: WON Ordinances Nos. 52 of P. mining operations and mineral products and their by-products when sold domestically by the operator. No. the general rule is that any claim for exemption from the tax statute should be strictly construed against the taxpayer. while respondent municipality admits that petitioner undertakes exploration. relying on the case of Cebu Portland Cement Company vs. tools for production. 5 and 10. On other hand.D. it is admitted that Floro Cement Corporation is engaged in the manufacturing and selling. and the same must be coached in clear and unmistakable terms in order that it may be applied.D. and that it is axiomatic that a special law can not be amended and/or repealed by a general law unless there is an express intent to repeal or abrogate the provisions of the special law. 52 of P. As held by the lower court. Petitioner further contends that the partial exemption was rendered absolute by Sec. 463 refers only to machineries. before cement reaches its saleable form. He who claims an exemption must be able to point out some provision of law creating the right. Said taxes were levied on the corporation's business of manufacturing and exporting cement. No. must be strictly construed.D.. and since the taxes sought to be collected were levied on these activities pursuant to Sec. 426. 463. it is not merely an admixture or blending of raw materials. 52 of P. 19 of P. No. said ordinances do not apply to its business in view of the limitation on the taxing power of local government provided in Sec. 463. the exemption mentioned in Sec. 231 and P. 5 and 10 of Lugait apply to Floro Corporation notwithstanding the limitation on the taxing power of local government as provided for in Sec. 463. The manufacture and the export of cement does not fall under the said provision for it is not a mineral product. No. which were enacted pursuant to P. royalties or charges of any kind whatsoever on mines. by the parties' own stipulation of facts submitted before the court a quo. the relinquishment is never presumed and any reduction or diminution thereof with respect to its mode or its rate. grinding. the taxes sought to be collected were not imposed on these activities in view of the mentioned prohibition under Sec. It appears that the foregoing cases overruled the case of Cebu Portland Cement Company vs. The petitioner failed to meet this requirement. While cement is composed of 80% minerals. 231 and P. this Court has laid down the rule that as the power of taxation is a high prerogative of sovereignty. for every presumption is against it. No. 52 of said decree. 52 of P. The business of manufacturing and exporting cement does not fall under exploration.D. city municipality. CIR which was cited by petitioner. Petitioner likewise contends that cement is a mineral product.

Sec. privilege. which in pertinent part provides: Notwithstanding any exemption granted by law or other special laws. Another exemption granted by the law in line with its policy of deregulation is the exemption from the requirement of securing permits from the NTC every time a telecommunications company imports equipment. 1992. which at the same time gave local government units the power to tax businesses enjoying a franchise on the basis of income received or earned by them within their territorial jurisdiction. shall ipso facto become part of previously granted telecommunications franchises and shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the grantees of such franchises. The franchise tax was paid “in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof” pursuant to RA 7082. it enacted RA 7925. Sec. 17 provides: The Commission shall exempt any specific telecommunications service from its rate or tariff regulations if the service has sufficient competition to ensure fair and reasonable rates of tariffs.72. 23 of which provides that any advantage. a rate of seventy-five percent (75%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year based on the income receipts realized within the territorial jurisdiction of Davao City. The LGC took effect on January 1. Inc. Issue: Whether or not by virtue of RA 7925.Franchise PLDT v City of Davao 2001 Facts: PLDT paid a franchise tax equal to three percent (3%) of its gross receipts. then this runabout way of granting tax exemption to PLDT is not a direct. Sec. The exemption from “all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof” was subsequently withdrawn by RA 7160 (LGC). there is hereby imposed a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise. 23 of RA 7925 mean tax exemption. it was required to pay the local franchise tax which then had amounted to P3. 1995. In 1995. or the Public Telecommunication Policy of the Philippines. favor. (Smart) franchises which contained “in leiu of all taxes” provisos. Series of 1992. The term refers to exemption from regulations and requirements imposed by the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). PLDT challenged the power of the city government to collect the local franchise tax and demanded a refund of what had been paid as a local franchise tax for the year 1997 and for the first to the third quarters of 1998. the same grant of tax exemption must be deemed to have become ipso facto part of its previously granted telecommunications franchise. exemption. RA 7925. or may hereafter be granted. But the rule is that tax exemptions should be granted only by a clear and unequivocal provision of law “expressed in a language too plain to be mistaken” and assuming for the nonce that the charters of Globe and of Smart grant tax exemptions. Congress granted in favor of Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (Globe) and Smart Information Technologies. 23. 519. “clear and unequivocal” way of communicating the legislative intent. Tax exemptions should be granted only by clear and unequivocal provision of law on the basis of language too plain to be mistaken. For instance.985. Subsequently. or immunity granted under existing franchises. In January 1999. The law took effect on March 16.681. Held: Petitioner contends that because their existing franchises contain “in lieu of all taxes” clauses. PLDT is again entitled to the exemption from payment of the local franchise tax in view of the grant of tax exemption to Globe and Smart. when PLDT applied for a mayor’s permit to operate its Davao Metro exchange. The City of Davao enacted Ordinance No. City Government of Quezon City v Bayantel 2006 Facts: . Nor does the term “exemption” in Sec.

2002. cognizant of the nature of the questions presently involved. 7925. infra. Act No. which reads: SECTION 14. On July 20. 1999. (b) The grantee shall further pay to the Treasurer of the Philippines each year. Section 23 of the Act provides an equality clause. pursuant to the taxing power vested on local government units by Section 5. 1999.208. evidently on its firm belief of its exempt status. amending Bayantel's original franchise. . Bayantel did not pay the real property taxes assessed against it by the Quezon City government. followed by the issuance of several warrants of levy against Bayantel's properties preparatory to their sale at a public auction set on July 30. 1998. In 1993. Of relevance to this controversy is the tax provision of Rep. S-93. in relation to Section 232 of the LGC. With its request having been denied. 2002. the Court. On January 7. only legal issues are to be resolved. the Quezon City Treasurer sent out notices of delinquency for the total amount of P43. 3259. as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. On account thereof. within ten days after the audit and approval of the accounts as prescribed in this Act. under Section 5 thereof. Article X of the 1987 Constitution. the government of Quezon City. reiterating in its Section 6. 1992. (a) The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its real estate. .18. and. Although as a . Moreover. a real property tax on all real properties in Quezon City. barely few months after the LGC took effect. buildings and personal property. supra. the QCRC. Issue: WON Bayantel failed to exhaust administrative remedies Held: No Ratio: With the reality that Bayantel's real properties were already levied upon on account of its nonpayment of real estate taxes thereon. As the Court has said in Ty v. radiophone. 1995. Conformably with the City's Revenue Code. under its Section 230. as here. the withdrawal of exemption from real property tax under Section 234 of the LGC. Meanwhile. new tax declarations for Bayantel's real properties in Quezon City were issued by the City Assessor and were received by Bayantel on August 13. Act No. took effect. enacted City Ordinance No. Bayantel immediately withdrew its appeal with the LBAA and instead filed with the RTC of Quezon City a petition for prohibition with an urgent application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. much like the LGC. Bayantel wrote the office of the City Assessor seeking the exclusion of its real properties in the city from the roll of taxable real properties. exclusive of the franchise. 124-01013) which was received on July 14. one of the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion-of-administrative remedies rule is when. And. withdrew tax exemption privileges in general. gave due course to the instant petition. the Court agrees with Bayantel that an appeal to the LBAA is not a speedy and adequate remedy within the context of the aforequoted Section 2 of Rule 65.Bayantel is a legislative franchise holder under RA 3259 to establish and operate radio stations for domestic telecommunications. embodied in Section 14 thereof. Rep. except one (Tax Declaration No. on March 16. Bayantel interposed an appeal with the LBAA." envisaged to level the playing field among telecommunications companies. otherwise known as the "Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines. SP-91. .878. broadcasting and telecasting. supra. This is not to mention of the auction sale of said properties already scheduled on July 30. Trampe: . Congress enacted RA 7633. 5 imposing. The amendatory law contained an in lieu of taxes clause (3%). Threatened with the imminent loss of its properties. otherwise known as the Quezon City Revenue Code (QCRC). The RTC then rendered judgment exempting Bayantel from taxes. Furthermore. one and one-half per centum of all gross receipts from the business transacted under this franchise by the said grantee The LGC took effect and granted the LGUS within Metro Manila the power to levy on real properties. In fact.

. Act No. Section 14 of Rep. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court must be upheld." are not actually and directly used in the pursuit of its franchise. there is a well-settled exception in cases where the controversy does not involve questions of fact but only of law. namely. therefore. In a very real sense. an appeal to the LBAA may not be considered as a plain." found in Section 14. 3259 may be validly viewed as an implied delegation of power to tax. Ratio: The lower court resolved the issue in the affirmative. Q-02-47292. 3259 applies to all its real or personal properties found anywhere within the Philippine archipelago. . Act No. speedy and adequate remedy. To the mind of the Court. is limited to impositions over properties of the franchisee which are not actually. Held: No.208. owned by the franchisee. save those exclusive of its franchise. Act No. The remedy availed of by Bayantel under Section 2. however. Ultimately. all properties which. 3259 effectively works to grant or delegate to local governments of Congress' inherent power to tax the franchisee's properties belonging to the second group of properties indicated above. directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise. Absent such enabling law. that is. under its franchise. supra. other properties of Bayantel directly used in the pursuit of its business are beyond the pale of the delegated taxing power of local governments. filed its petition for prohibition with urgent application for injunctive relief in Civil Case No. administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort to judicial action can prosper. an appeal to the LBAA. be they real or personal. a figure which. Act No. the delegation under that provision. There seems to be no issue as to Bayantel's exemption from real estate taxes by virtue of the term "exclusive of the franchise" qualifying the phrase "same taxes on its real estate. The elaborate and extensive discussion devoted by the trial court on the meaning and import of said phrase. as couched. . . directly and exclusively used in the operation of its franchise are "exempted" from any property tax. Necessarily. However. are subject to realty taxes. Bayantel's franchise being national in character. The legislative intent expressed in the phrase "exclusive of this franchise" cannot be construed other than distinguishing between two (2) sets of properties. instead. exempt from real property tax. of its franchise. in the light of the then prevailing Asian financial crisis. local government units were without authority to impose and collect taxes on real properties within their respective territorial jurisdictions. with the LGC's taking effect on January 1. by force of Section 234 of the Code. Act No. to be properly considered. Act No. To petitioners. Rep. It is petitioners' thesis that Bayantel was in no time given any express exemption from the payment of real property tax under its amendatory franchise. therefore. It is worthy to note that the properties subject of the present controversy are only those which are admittedly falling under the first category. the inevitable result was that all realties which are actually. Issue: WON Bayantel's real properties in Quezon City are. buildings and personal property. Rep. the "exemption" thus granted under Section 14 of Rep. basically owing to the phrase "exclusive of this franchise" found in Section 11 of Bayantel's amended franchise. directly and exclusively used in its radio or telecommunications business. As may be recalled. 1992. Bayantel's "exemption" from real estate taxes for properties of whatever kind located within the Metro Manila area was. It is thus understandable why Bayantel opted to withdraw its earlier appeal with the LBAA and.18. "exclusive of this franchise. as originally granted. Lest it be overlooked. may have been difficult to raise up. 7633. While Section 14 of Rep.rule. real properties of Bayantel. suggests as much. they add. the language of Section 11 of Rep. and (b) those properties which are not so used. 7633 is neither clear nor unequivocal.878. (a) those actually. the taxing power of local governments under both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions solely depended upon an enabling law. 3259. required prior payment under protest of the amount of P43. Given this reality. .

the City's Revenue Code. 7633 is a virtual reenacment of the tax provision. but pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section 5. Article X of the 1987 Constitution. however. expressly withdrew. all tax exemption privileges in general. i. under Section 230 thereof. the Quezon City government enacted in 1993 its local Revenue Code. Under the latter. Moreover. Section 14." This new perspective is best articulated by Fr. Act No. it may be exercised by local legislative bodies. 7633. as amended. doubts will be resolved in favor of municipal corporations.J. supra. They no longer have to wait for a statutory grant of these powers. however. in our jurisdiction. juxtaposed with Section 232 of the LGC. 7633. thus: What is the effect of Section 5 on the fiscal position of municipal corporations? Section 5 does not change the doctrine that municipal corporations do not possess inherent powers of taxation. Joaquin G. however. 1992. himself a Commissioner of the 1986 Constitutional Commission which crafted the 1987 Constitution. What it does is to confer municipal corporations a general power to levy taxes and otherwise create sources of revenue. Article X of the Constitution. must be consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. This thus raises the question of whether or not the City's Revenue Code pursuant to which the city treasurer of Quezon City levied real property taxes against Bayantel's real properties located within the City effectively withdrew the tax exemption enjoyed by Bayantel under its franchise. Worthy of note is that Section 11 of Rep. the basic doctrine on local taxation remains essentially the same. The Court has taken stock of the fact that by virtue of Section 5. but subsequently withdrawn by force of Section 234 of the LGC. 3259 which was deemed impliedly repealed by Section 234 of the LGC was expressly revived under Section 14 of Rep. the power of local government units to tax is still limited. "the power to tax is (still) primarily vested in the Congress.. that taxes imposed by local government must be for a public purpose. Act No." Bayantel's posture is well-taken.e. however. 3259. while a new slant on the subject of local taxation now prevails in the sense that the former doctrine of local government units' delegated power to tax had been effectively modified with Article X. uniform within a locality. Clearly then. the realty tax exemption heretofore enjoyed by Bayantel under its original franchise. But. of Bayantel's original franchise under Rep. and must be within the jurisdiction of the local unit to pass." The important legal effect of Section 5 is thus to reverse the principle that doubts are resolved against municipal corporations. the exercise of the power may be subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide which. local governments are empowered to levy taxes. S. not long thereafter. expressly withdrawn. Act No. Act No. For as the Court stressed in Mactan. 7633 amending Bayantel's original franchise. imposing real property tax on all real properties found within its territorial jurisdiction. Bayantel answers the poser in the negative arguing that once again it is only "liable to pay the same taxes. in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal fiscal powers. Henceforth. The power of the legislative authority relative to the fiscal powers of local governments has been reduced to the authority to impose limitations on municipal powers. And as earlier stated. Section 14 of Rep. As we explained in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority: The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress. these limitations must be "consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. And pursuant to this constitutional empowerment. Act No. Bernas. It is understood.supra.. While the system of local government taxation has changed with the onset of the 1987 Constitution. Stated otherwise. no longer merely be virtue of a valid delegation as before. just like the LGC. has been restored by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution now in place. . supra. In concrete terms. exclusive of its franchise. must not be confiscatory. or on July 20. Congress passed Rep. as any other persons or corporations on all its real or personal properties.

. Act No. Perfectly aware that the LGC has already withdrawn Bayantel's former exemption from realty taxes. pursuant to a declared national policy.." there can really be no dispute that the power of the Quezon City Government to tax is limited by Section 232 of the LGC which expressly provides that "a province or city or municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real property such as land. building. buildings and personal property. Congress opted to pass Rep. exclusive of this franchise. and the local government's delegated power to tax under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution. the Legislature highlighted its power to thereafter exempt certain realties from the taxing power of local government units. An interpretation denying Congress such power to exempt would reduce the phrase "not hereinafter specifically exempted" as a pure jargon. As we see it. . 7633.In net effect. Act No. 7633 states that "the grantee. directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise. all of the franchisee's (Bayantel's) properties that are actually. machinery. the Court wrote: Indeed. Now to go back to the Quezon City Revenue Code which imposed real estate taxes on all real properties within the city's territory and removed exemptions theretofore "previously granted to. Act No. Admittedly. a clash between the inherent taxing power of the legislature. whether natural or juridical . City of Davao. without meaning whatsoever. exactly the same defining phrase "exclusive of this franchise" which was the basis for Bayantel's exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC. In plain language. Rep. Act No." Under this law. The more decisive question turns on whether Congress actually did exempt Bayantel's properties at all by virtue of Section 11 of Rep. For sure. The legal effect of the constitutional grant to local governments simply means that in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers. which necessarily includes the power to exempt. in PLDT v. 7633 which amended Bayantel's original franchise. Needless to state. under Section 11 thereof. the grant of taxing powers to local government units under the Constitution and the LGC does not affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons. There. at bottom. 7633 using. the controversy presently before the Court involves. as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. or presently enjoyed by all persons. . and other improvement not hereinafter specifically exempted. Section 11 of Rep. the issue in this case no longer dwells on whether Congress has the power to exempt Bayantel's properties from realty taxes by its enactment of Rep." The Court views this subsequent piece of legislation as an express and real intention on the part of Congress to once again remove from the LGC's delegated taxing power. then. 7633 was enacted subsequent to the LGC. doubts must be resolved in favor of municipal corporations. its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxes on their real estate. this Court has upheld the power of Congress to grant exemptions over the power of local government units to impose taxes. . such absurd situation is unacceptable. Act No.