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37. Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997) Facts: - April 15, 1994: Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Sec.

of the Department of Trade and Industry, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act). - On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines (Fidel V. Ramos) of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. - The WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the Agreement Proper and the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof. - The Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. - Instant petition was filed: nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement. Issue: Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive. Held: The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et al., this Court held that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow

such presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senates processes, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senates exercise of its power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the Constitution. That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. What the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.


FACTS OF THE CASE PETRON was originally registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1966 under the corporate name "Esso Philippines, Inc." .ESSO became a wholly-owned company of the government under the corporate name PETRON and as a subsidiary of PNOC.P E T R O N o w n s t h e l a r g e s t , m o s t m o d e r n c o m p l e x refinery in the Philippines. It is listed as the No. 1c o r p o r a t i o n i n t e r m s o f a s s e t s a n d i n c o m e i n t h e Philippines in 1993.President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 50 in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom Constitution. Implicit in the Proclamation is the need to raise revenue for the Government and the ideal of leaving business to the private sector by creating the committee on privatization. The Government can then concentrate on the delivery of basic services and the performance e of vital public functions. The Presidential Cabinet of President Ramos approved t h e p r i v a t i z a t i o n o f P E T R O N a s p a r t o f t h e E n e r g y Sector Action Plan. PNOC Board of Directors passed a resolution authorizing the company to negotiate and conclude a contract with the consortium of Salomon Brothers of Hongkong Limited and PCI Capital C o r p o r a t i o n f o r f i n a n c i a l a d v i s o r y s e r v i c e s t o b e rendered to PETRON. The Petron Privatization Working Committee (PWC) was thus formed. It finalized a privatization strategy with 40% of the shares to be sold to a strategic partner and 20% to the general public T h e P r e s i d e n t a p p r o v e d t h e 4 0 % 4 0 % 2 0 % privatization strategy of PETRON. T h e i n v i t a t i o n t o b i d w a s p u b l i s h e d i n s e v e r a l n e w s p a p e r s o f g e n e r a l c i r c u l a t i o n , b o t h l o c a l a n d foreign. The PNOC Board of Directors then passed Resolution No. 866, S. 1993, declaring ARAMCO the winning bidder. PNOC and ARAMCO signed the Stock Purchase Agreement, the two companies signed the Shareholders' Agreement. The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 112399 sought:(1) to nullify the bidding conducted for the sale of a block of shares constituting 40% of the capital stock(40% block) of Petron Corporation (PET RON) and the award made to Aramco Overseas Company, B. V .(ARAMCO) as the highest bidder and (2) to stop the sale of said block of shares to ARAMCO. The petition for prohibition and Certiorari in G.R. No. 115994 sought to a n n u l t h e s a l e o f t h e s a m e b l o c k o f P e t r o n s h a r e s subject of the petition in G.R. No. 112399.ARAMCO entered a limited appearance to question the jurisdiction over its person, alleging that it is a foreign company organized under the laws of the Netherlands, that it is not doing nor licensed to do business in the Philippines, and that it does not maintain an office or a business address in and has not appointed a resident agent for the Philippines P e t i t i o n e r s h o w e v e r , c o u n t e r e d t h a t t h e y f i l e d t h e action in their capacity as members of Congress. ISSUE: WON Petitioners have a locus standi

DECISION: Petition is dismissed. LOCUS STANDI In Philippine Constitution Association v.Hon. Salvador Enriquez , G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994, we held that the members of Congress have the legal standing to question the validity of acts of the Executive which i n j u r e s t h e m i n t h e i r p e r s o n o r t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f Congress to which they belong. In the latter case, the acts cause derivative but nonetheless substantial i n j u r y w h i c h c a n b e q u e s t i o n e d b y m e m b e r s o f Congress (Kennedy v. James, 412 F. Supp. 353 [1976]).In the absence of a claim that the contract in question v i o l a t e d t h e r i g h t s o f p e t i t i o n e r s o r i m p e r m i s s i b l y intruded into the domain of the Legislature, petitioners have no legal standing to institute the instant action in their capacity as members of Congress. H o w e v e r , p e t i t i o n e r s c a n b r i n g t h e a c t i o n i n t h e i r capacity as taxpayers under the doctrine laid down in Kilosbayan, Inc. v Guingona , 232 SCRA 110 (1994).Under said ruling, taxpayers may question contracts entered into by the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations alleged to be in contravention of the law. As long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standing o f p e t i t i o n e r s a s t a x p a y e r s t o i n s t i t u t e t h e p r e s e n t action. PRIVATIZATION The only requirement under R.A. No. 7181 in order to p r i v a t i z e a s t r a t e g i c i n d u s t r y l i k e P E T R O N i s t h e approval o f t h e P r e s i d e n t . I n t h e c a s e o f P E T R O N ' s privatization, the President gave his approval not only once but twice. PETRON's privatization is also in line with and is part of the Philippine Energy Program under R.A. No. 7638.Section 5(b) of the law provides that the Philippine Energy Program shall include a policy direction towards the privatization of government agencies related to energy.

54. Enrique Garcia vs Executive Secretary Political Law Congress Authorizing the President to Tax On 27 November 1990, Cory issued Executive Order 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of Art 6 of the Constitution which provides: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional. HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within specific limits tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .