Emil Körner and the Prussianization of the Chilean Army: Origins, Process, and Consequences, 1885-1920 Author

(s): Frederick M. Nunn Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 50, No. 2 (May, 1970), pp. 300-322 Published by: Duke University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2513028 . Accessed: 19/08/2013 17:33
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Emil Korner and the Prussianization of the Chilean Army: Origins, Process, and Consequences, 1885-1920
FREDERICK M. NUNN*

IN1885 the ChileangovernmentappointedCaptainEmil
K6rner of the Imperial German Army to train its officers. When K6rner arrived in Chile he found an experienced officer corps composed of veterans from the War of the Pacific and the Indian campaigns in Araucania. They were men who took pride in being the heirs of Bernardo O'Higgins and Manuel Bulnes, but they had little experience in the rigors of the classroom. Chile wanted a modern professional army; K6rner molded one; and when he retired in 1910, he left behind the best equipped land fighting force and the best educated officer corps in Latin America. But by the time K6rner died, ten years later, that same army found itself enmeshed in politics, a professional organization within an anachronistic political and social order and almost a distinct political institution. Only two years before obtaining Kiirner's services, Chile emerged victorious from the War of the Pacific. Established as the dominant state on the Pacific coast of South America, she faced potential enemies on each of her three borders. To the north and northeast Peru smarted from the loss of Tarapaca, Tacna, and Arica; Bolivia became a land-locked nation with the Chilean annexation of Antofagasta; and across the Andes, Argentina, always suspicious, viewed the territorial cessions with envious concern.' Chile 's victory in the War of the Pacific merely heightened the need for a modern, powerful fighting machine and for increased sea power. But South American "-power politics" was not the sole reason
*The author is Associate Professor of History at Portland State University. Grants from the Henry L. and Grace Doherty Foundation and the Portland State University Faculty Committee on Research and Publication made possible the research for this article. ' See Robert N. Burr, By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830-1905 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965), Chapter 10, "Toward an Armed Peace," 167-192; and Arturo Ahumada, El ej6rcito y la revoluci6n del 5 de septiembre, 1924: Reminiscencias (Santiago, 1931), 1.

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Mon, 19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1917). A prop6sito de nuestra politica militar (Santiago.4 Sotomayor was then director of the military school. and he was convinced that the army needed drastic reforms if it were to remain capable of defending the nation's interests. El ejercito de Chile: Impresiones y apuntes (Santiago.6 2 Gerardo ZAiiga Montfifar. 19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . The blood bath of 18791883 sharply reduced the number of professional officers. 20-29. the oldest such national institution in Latin America. During the nineteenth century. 12. Chilean military men had great prestige. may have obscured the true role of the army and (to a lesser extent) the navy in Chilean history. war created and maintained the national identity.94.3 High-ranking Chilean army officers pressed the government for extensive reforms in organization and training soon after hostilities ceased.5 Further. La guerra civil de 1891: Relaci6n hist6rica militar.2 Despite the relegation of the armed forces to a nonpolitical role after 1831. 52-53. 171. and then eliminated the confederation of Peru and Bolivia in 1837. it did not function effectively during the troubled times between the fall of O 'Higgins in 1823 and the Battle of Lircay seven years later.155. endemic to Chile. 'Chile: Estado Mayor Jeneral del Ejercito. However.33 on Mon. in which the Conservatives defeated the Liberals and assumed complete control of polities. war made her preeminent on the west coast of South America. even before that time General Emilio Sotomayor proposed to the government that it obtain an instructor in Germany. he had served in the battles of Chorrillos and Miraflores. military might (for external use) was traditional in Chile. Estudios militates (Santiago. Historians. when it closed for lack This content downloaded from 146. "In the smoke of battle" their places were taken by new men. 6 See Francisco Javier Diaz Valderrama. 6 The original Military School functioned until 1819. Added to international exigencies and national tradition. In the beginning. s Gustavo Walker Martinez. 1901). KORNER AND THE PRUSSIANIZATION OF ToE CHILEAN ARMY 301 for the Chilean military build-up of the late nineteenth century.EMIL. many of them trained only in the field and lacking an esprit de corps. educated army was an established if poorly observed tradition. practical necessity required further militarization. which should be carefully considered when viewing the Prussianization of the Chilean army. Vol. they earned it. When Chile's position and integrity were menaced again in 1879. as the Chileans defeated the Spaniards. 1904). overemphasizing this factor. 1938). by 1885 the existence of a professional. In 1904 a Costa Rican major studying in Santiago cited certain factors. carried the campaign to Peru. I: La campana del norte (Santiago. In 1817 Bernardo O'Higgins founded the Military School. In fact.

1940-1952). except for short-lived revolts in 1851 and 1859. 10 See Indalicio Tellez. After Portales' assassination in 1837 the exclusion of the army from politics continued. Fabio Galdamez Lastra. These manuals and Chilean attempts to write others were soundly criticized in Jorge Boonen Rivera. Kept busy externally by the war of 1837-1839 and by sporadic Indian uprisings on the southern frontier. A prop6sito. Participaci6n del ejercito en el desarrollo y progress del pais (Santiago. therefore.10 The government. and experience were not enough for Chile's needs.94. 680-682. Bistoria militar de Chile: Estudio critics de la campaiia de 1838-1839 (Santiago. 5-10.33 on Mon. 37-40. and paraded in uniform with the group on festive occasions. but like the Military School it proved inoperable.8 Portales himself commanded a militia infantry batallion quartered in La Moneda.155. 1910).. Estudio sobre el reglamento para la maniobra de infanteria. By 1885 tradition. Jistoria de Chile desde la prehistoria hasta 1891 (20 vols. For a succinct description of the army and militia before O 'Higgins see Diaz. A new militia was created in 1825. turned for inspiration to Germany. adoptado por decreto det 1? de julio de 1890 (Santiago. IX. He purged or exiled officers who had sided with the Liberal faction in the civil conflict of 1830 and some Conservatives whose loyalty to the new government of President Joaquin Prieto was questionable. existed from 1810 to 1814. undertook to remove the military organization from politics. 13-14. 1842. Portales also set up a civil militia as a counterpoise to ambitious officers. This content downloaded from 146. the militia performed this function. military education was antiquated. the military titan of Europe. Santiago. discipline. the presidential palace. President Domingo Santa Maria instructed Guillermo Matta.9 organization and ordinances had changed little since the days of O 'Higgins. Galdamez. 37-40. 31. the Civil Guard. 1917). Las fuerzas armadas de Chile: Album Historic (Santiago. organically the Chilean Army was essentially the same as the forces which had struggled for independence. The forty-year period between the death of Portales and the final confrontation with Peru and Bolivia was one of great progress in Chile. At the end of the War of the Pacific. NUNN Diego Portales. 7 A form of militia. Jorge Boonen Rivera. Recuerdos militares (Santiago. 'Francisco Antonio Encina. 549-550. Historia militar. The Military School continued to function. as did the militia. the eminence grise of Chilean conservatism in the 1830s. the army eschewed political activities. Thereafter it operated intermittently until President Manuel Bulnes rechartered it by decree on October 6. 1930). 1890). however.302 HAHR MAY FREDERICK M. By 1887 translations of current French infantry and cavalry manuals were used. 19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . to find a qualified officer who of funds. 1949). Well aware of the army's potential threat to civilian control of politics. head of the Chilean legation in Germany.7 While he directed Chilean affairs. 9 At that time Spanish translations of 1817 French manuals were still in use.

19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . 1870) and in the final advance on Paris. Korner taught military history and tactics.'4 Emil K6rner. 372. cartography. and educated in Halle an der Saale. payable in Chilean gold. One year later he entered the military school in Hanover.EMIL KORNER AND THE PRUSSIANIZATION OF THE CHILEAN ARMY 303 might be engaged as military instructor. and Africa. for his first selection. the man who remade the Chilean Army. General Boonen told Donoso that several days later the Japanese government offered KRrner ?2000 yearly and 'muchas gangas ' to come to Japan. 71. Cuarenta anos. 372. In all official Chilean military sources K6rner 's name is Castilianized. 1. was born in Wegwitz. "The Japanese Army. 1947). Army of Chile. 1931).1 Actually Kbrner was Matta 's second choice. Western Influences in Modern Japan: A Series of Papers on Cultural Relations (Chicago. At the end of the war K6rner reentered the Artillery and Engineer School. During the Franco-Prussian War Kbrner participated in the key battles of W6rth (August 4. and weapons science at Charlottenburg. and Matta selected K6rner. "13 The salary agreed upon was 12. 35-36. Karner. " General de division Emilio Korner Henze" (memorandum prepared for the writer by the Chief of the Historical Section. K6rner assumed his new duties early in 1886 with the rank of lieutenant colonel and the title of instructor and subdirector of the " Armando Donoso.000 marks a year. Recuerdos de cincuenta aiios (Santiago. This content downloaded from 146. infantry. 1962). Donoso obtained information on K6rner from General Boonen. " in Inazo Nitobe (ed.155. on October 10. 12 See Major General Tsunekichi Kono. 18 Edmundo Gonzalez Salinas. General Staff. Recuerdos. 1846. as professor in artillery.'2 In August 1885 K6rner agreed "to serve in the Military School . El ejercito de Chile. . Diaz.15 a post which he still held when he was approached by the Chilean government. 14 Donoso. He received a degree in humanities in 1866 and entered an infantry regiment during the Austrian campaign of that year. Donoso. 1926). 15 Zfiiiiga. 1.33 on Mon. During 1877 and 1878 Kbrner served in Italy. In 1875 he was promoted to lieutenant and the following year graduated from the War Academy (Kriegsakademie). Saxony. 393. For his actions he received the Iron Cross. Santiago.94. Spain. Gonza'lez. 25. See also Francisco Javier Diaz Valderrama. 1870) and Sedan (September 1. In 1881 he was promoted to captain and one year later joined the faculty at Charlottenburg. .). Major Clemens Meckl had already accepted a position with the Japanese army. Cuarenta aios de instruction military alemana en Chile (Santiago. K6rner refused the offer because Chile 's military proficiency in the War of the Pacific had impressed him greatly. He was promoted to second lieutenant in 1868 and then entered the German Artillery and Engineer School in Berlin (Charlottenburg). and military history and tactics. 372. Recuerdos. Second Class.

geography. and German. military science. he lamented the lack of resources available for the older Military School which necessitated " an exaggerated economy in expenses for maintenance of the personnel. because students prepared for the infantry.304 HAHR I MAY I FREDERICK M. as well as books and teaching material. military history. which he blamed on inadequate facilities and equipment. as much as possible. cited in Ziiffiga. either mathematics or world history. but as early as 1889 K6rner advocated further reforms in military training. Emilio Kerner en febrero de 1889 (Santiago. military science. don. The second-year curriculum consisted of further training in tactics. This content downloaded from 146. 18 Emilio Kirner. hygiene. in case of war. 7-12. artillery. mathematics or world history. The third year consisted of Chilean military history. fortification. Informe pasado por el primer sub-director de la escuela militar sr. cartography. After graduation in 1890 five of its members went to Europe for further study.33 on Mon. He immediately began to plan the organization of Chile's own Kriegsakademie. ballistics. fortification. When he prepared a statement that year for the government. 1887. the level of technical and scientific instruction of army officers. in order that they may be able.94. general staff service. He further criticized the curriculum of the military school because it was not integratedi. 1904). NUNN Military School. Brigidier General Marco A. physics. 9-10. This was an auspicious beginning. and German. See also Reglamento orgdnico de la Academia de Guerra. geography. "'16 In its first years the War Academy offered a three-year program. and German. physics. or cavalry did not learn enough about the other branches to provide the proper coordination in time of war.e.. 1886. 1936). plus topography and war games. only thirteen months after Kdrner had agreed to serve in Chile. 17 Reselia hist6rica. 167-177. chemistry. international law. Arriagada. sciences. a choice of either mathematics or world history.155. Even the examination schedule received 16 See the Decreto Orgdnico of September 9. and natural history. cited in Reselia hist6rica de la academia de guerra. 19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . inorganic chemistry. The Chilean government officially founded the War Academy on September 9. 1886. war games. The first-year class studied tactics. under the supervision of the Academy's first director. cartography. 4. El ejercito de Chile. The government created the Academy for the purpose of "elevating.17 The first class (originally limited to fifteen select officers) began its courses on June 15. 1886-1936 (Santiago. Latin American military geography."'18 He deplored the poor training in languages. to utilize the advantages of new methods of combat and modern armaments in use today.

a Diaz. ' the creation of a powerful navy. needed reform before it could turn out the sort of cadets qualified for the new War Academy. but to open new military horizons and to lead those who had been his students. in which he served the revolutionary cause and rose to the rank of brigadier general. 60.22 Though the bulk of the army remained loyal to Balmaceda. According to General Francisco Diaz.24 In less than six months 19 20 21 K6rner. 1891. pronounced against Santa Maria's successor. Influencia del poder naval en la historia de Chile.33 on Mon. On this last point see Luis Langlois. 1891. the revolutionary capital. 53. " Combate (San Jose. not because of political ideas. Chile's political convulsion of 1891 opened a new era in which the political system set up by Portales in the Constitution of 1833 was replaced by a poor copy of the British parliamentary system. 1929). Costa Rica). 1911). and the German. Cuarenta aijos.EMIL KORNER AND THE PRUSSIANIZATION OF THE CHILEAN ARMY 305 Kbrner's scrutiny. 23 (July-August 1962). then. 37. See Alberto Lara E. "2 Burr notes Balmaceda 's interest in a powerful army. By Reason or Force. to join the congressional forces in Iquique. no.2' What enabled him to pursue his goal unfettered was the civil war of 1891.. On January 1. Kbrner and his followers did not. Jobet states that Korner objected to Balmaceda 's drive to limit the size of the standing army.'9 The Military School.94. accompanied by other dissenting officers. He wrote that year-end examinations were not enough.23 Balmaceda formally dismissed Korner from his position. Los oficiales alemanes en Chile: Influencia que ejercieron con sus lecciones en la instrucci6n.155. K6rner fully appreciated that a congressional victory would facilitate the reform of the army and joined the revolutionary forces. desde 1810 a 1910 (Valparaiso. Estudio sobre la reorganizaci6n i planta del eje'rcito (Santiago. 230. 8-9. but significantly emphasizes Balmaceda 's " overriding interest. 1888). supported by conservative navy chiefs. 19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . According to another writer Kirner also realized This content downloaded from 146. y alto prestigio que el ejercito de Chile hla alcanzado (Santiago. See Ibid. 3-4. for they proved only the students' ability to apply themselves during the several weeks prior to exams and not during the rest of the year. 176-178. See also Jorge Boonen Rivera. A pr6posito. The strong chief executive of 1833 had given way to a balance between executive and legislature during the second half of the nineteenth century and would not be restored constitutionally until 1925.20 By 1889 K6rner was planning wide-ranging programs to Prussianize the Chilean Army. President Jose Manual Balmaceda. 5-7. See also Diaz. parliamentary leaders challenged the executive branch and. sailed north on May 9. IV. The conflict of 1891 also created a situation more favorable to the Prussianization of the Chilean army. Informe.. 28 One explanation for K6rner 's action is that put forth by Chilean socialist Julio Cesar Jobet in " El nacionalismo creador de Jose Manuel Balmaceda.

1. Revolucion de 1891: Mi actuaei6n (Santiago. See also Gonzalez. 1891.33 on Mon. 3-5. 649-650.000 officers and troops which ultimately defeated the regular army. NUNN K6rner trained an army of 10. 1891 (#143). who defected from the government. 1950). reported to Washington on German sympathy with the rebel cause. This problem was resolved in several ways. and his vast knowledge of modern military science made him the key to victory in the civil war. between those who subscribed to K6rner's ideas and those who did not. The congressional Junta of Government established its base of operations at Iquique. 25 Ahumada.27 On the cessation of hostilities in 1891 K6rner set out to implement Prussianization as he conceived it. 72. gave to Colonel Estanislao del Canto. conscripts. as well as conservative senior officers whose social and political ideas were more in keeping with those of the congressional leaders. 26 Estado Mayor. Zfifiga. La guerra civil. Carlos Rojas Arancibia (ed. Department of State.26 The rebel army attracted many recently Prussianized junior officers. commander in that he could better apply modern tactics and strategy to an army of his own making by joining the congressional forces. 27 Kbrner assumed the role of chief of staff during the final southern expedition. now a lieutenant colonel and chief of staff. Arturo Alessandri Palma. which culminated with the battles of Concon (August 21) and Placilla (August 28) and the fall of the central government. directed the campaign. See the letter of Dccember 1890 from Gutschmidt to Chancellor Leo von Caprivi in Los acontecimientos en Chile: Documentos publicados por la cancilleria alemana (Santiago. This content downloaded from 146. United States minister to Chile during the 1891 conflict and a Balmaceda defender. El ejercito de Chile. 37. The immediate problem facing the victors was what to do with officers of the defeated Balmaceda's army. and a number of Bolivian mercenaries. 289. Egan to Blaine. March 17. A decree of September 14. 19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . and here K6rner assumed full responsibility for the training of recruits. 1892).306 HAHR MAY I FREDERICK M. Memordndum de la guerra civil de 1891 (Santiago. and exercised the real power in the army. The German envoy Baron von Gutschinidt expressed views most favorable to the congressional party.155. K6rner. 2. The fact that K6rner was a German and that the German government tacitly supported the congressional rebels is of significance. April 23.94. Kirner.).25 K6rner served as secretary general of the congressional general staff under its chief. Cuarenta aflos. the efficiency of his training methods. 1892). 1891 (#154). El ejercito y la revoluci6n. The much maligned Patrick Egan. Colonel Adolfo Holley. Thus in 1891 the Chilean army was split between the old and the new. Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Ministers to Chile (1823-1906). By August the junta and its army staff had decided to strike at Valparaiso. and Diaz. 183. and Egan to Blaine. The devotion of his students.

"La evolucion del ej6rcito de Chile desde la occupaci6n del territorio araucano hasta nuestros dias. if not harsher punishment.94. In October.155. Memoria del ministerio de guerra presentada al congreso national en 1892 (Santiago. Ano XXVIII.3' Some who escaped this harsh verdict at first were retried later and found guilty. lieutenant colonels. " Memorial del Ejercito de Chile. Balmacedista officers were divided into four groups: 1) those who were guilty of nothing more than having served in the army. 1891). but they were not allowed to testify or to obtain legal advice. 31 Algunas piezas. and generals received similar. failing to appear. and 4) those who. were allowed to retire with pensions. 367-368. See Jose M.28 That same day Canto named a four-man court martial to try the accused. Nevertheless.. 19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . ler Semestre (March-April 1935). 118 Balmacedista captains went on trial for treason by virtue of the fact that they had obeyed commands of a man who had ceased to be president for his violations of the constitution. some senior Balmacedista officers. 296. 30 This content downloaded from 146.32 The following year he returned to his original mission and served as professor of applied tactics and military geography in the War Academy as well as heading the General Staff.. He filled both positions until April 1894. when he went to Europe to supervise completion and shipment of coastal artillery batteries being built by the Krupp armaments factory in Essen. 202. All but two were removed from service for a period of six years and were denied the right to hold public office as citizens for an equal period. clearing the path for K6rner 's Prussianized professionals. See Para la 7historia: Algunas piezas del proceso seguido a 118 capitanes del ejercito de Chile por el tribunal militar. 2) those accused of war crimes or breaches of civil law. Ibid. 35. Barcelo Lira. At the end of 1891 Brigidier General Emil KCrner became chief of the General Staff. were tried in absentia.EMIL KORNER AND THE PRUSSIANIZATION OF THE CHILEAN ARMY 307 chief of the congressional army. colonels. 3) those who had committed war crimes under orders. the power to prosecute any officers from captains to generals who had served the Balmaceda government at any time during 1891.29 In this way. 369.33 on Mon. 1892). 28 29 Ibid. 2 de noviembre de 1891 (Santiago.30 The accused based their defense on loyalty to the president as commander in chief and on the apolitical nature of the army. A second official decree of September 14 stated that only those who had joined the congressional army or who had at least refused to serve under Balmaceda would be allowed to continue in service. high-ranking Balmacedista officers were to be purged. 32 Korner was promoted on November 12. Majors. established by the constitution. particularly those near the end of their careers. 6.

All important military positions and many political positions during that time were held by graduates of the War Academy or by Prussianized officers. " Lara. 1895-1896. Led by General Carlos Ibaniez del Campo (who attended the Academy but did not study in Europe). 57-60. served in the War Ministry's Fortification Section. As the German officers began to arrive in Chile. Robert O'Grady. becoming the nucleus of a Chilean army elite.34 Lieutenant Colonel Wilhelm Ekdahl directed the War Academy from 1904 to 1907 after having served on its faculty for nine years. Until the end of World War I these men studied with distinction at Charlottenburg and served with the elite Imperial Guard. General Juan Pablo Bennett Argandofia. Two had staff positions in provincial garrisons.33 on Mon. in 1906 Lieutenant Juan Carlos P6rez Ruiz Tagle entered 84 8 Memoria del ministerio This content downloaded from 146. Majors Edward Banza and Carl Zimmermann taught at the War Academy.33 With him came thirty-six German officers. Austria. three served in cavalry regiments. 14-16. One German was a member of the presidential cavalry escort.35 Two years later twenty-seven more Germans came to Chile. two served on the Chilean armaments commission and one on the General Staff.308 HAHR I MAY I FREDERICK M. Several Chileans spent the World War I years as "unofficial observers" in Germany and France. four in infantry regiments. France. and one in the engineers. NUNN Korner returned to Chile in October 1895. the first of many Chilean officers went to Germany for further training. Los oficiales alemanes. Three Germans and an Irish colonel. Captain Gunther von Below taught at the Military School. General Bartolome Blanche Espejo. 19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . this elite involved the army in politics from 1924 until 1932. and on November 1 was promoted to division general. Belgium. Prominent among these foreign-trained soldiers were Colonel Arturo Ahumada Bascunan.155. During the first thirty years of this century Chilean army officers also studied in Italy. an institution for the training of non-commissioned officers. resumed his post as chief of staff. two Germans served in the Technical Section. three in the artillery. Four were of non-German origin. 306. El ej6rcito de Chile.36 After returning to Chile many of these Prussianized Chileans distinguished themselves in military and other government service. who were to play key roles in the Prussianization of the Chilean army. and Spain37 and de guerra. "7 For example. four served in the Escuela de Clases. and Colonel Marmaduke Grove Vallejo. 85 A list of officers and their regiments is given in Zuifiiga. Two Germans were instructors in ballistics at the Artillery School.94. A majority of the officers who came to Chile with K6rner in 1895 rereturned to Germany after two years of service. as did Majors Alfred Schdnmeyer and Herman von Bieberstein.

K6rner himself was immensely popular. "Barcel6. According to one alumnus of the War Academy. "La evolution del ejercito de Chile." 203-209. 1967). educated at the War Academy. 3-4. passim. This content downloaded from 146.94. Similarly those who studied in Europe were profoundly impressed with what they saw outside Chile and away from the classroom. This. In 1895 he wrote: "The role of these schools is quite important when one takes into consideration the large number of individuals who arrive at the barracks without knowing the Spanish General Staff School. Ecuador.40 He met little resistance in his attempt. Madrid. Bolivia. Estudios.4' Obviously he gained support for his programs from the junior officers. especially while the government was anxious about the possibility of border conflict with Argentina. But complaints from senior officers went unheard. Until the end of World War I the vast majority went to Germany.EMIL KORNER AND THE PRUSSIANIZATION OF THE CHILEAN ARMY 309 served as advisers or observers in Argentina. Brazil. From 1895 to 1910 some fifty Chileans went abroad to study. Escuela del Estado Mayor. Los oficiales alemanes. the German government had supported the congressional forces in the recent civil war. 53. 19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . and German trade and investment were important. and appointed to staff or instructional positions. Paraguay. In the past century German immigrants had contributed much to Chilean economic expansion. November 2.39 It was K6rner's hope. and a third class of hangers-on who owed their position to seniority or influence and nothing more. Furthermore. S T6lez. both with the people and with the government. sent abroad. the German instructors stressed etiquette and proper conduct to their students. The chief resistance to K6rner's plans after the civil war came from senior and older officers who feared for their prestige and position or who simply objected to outside influence in the army. One of Kbrner 's primary concerns was the education of conscripts in army-run schools.38 Army officers at the War Academy learned more than pure military science from German instructors. and during the next two decades that number was nearly doubled.33 on Mon. and El Salvador. 48-49. an older more conservative bloc. he thought. Jecuerdos. Colombia. 174-175. Walker Martinez said that Prussianization had divided the officer corps into three distinct groups by the end of the century: a young progressive group. In 1918 Lieutenant Aquiles Vergara Vicufia studied at the same institution (in a letter to the writer from Major Juan Gomez Trujillo. 44-322. to mold the Chilean army as far as possible into a replica of the Prussian army. for Germans were popular in Chile. in fact. O Lara. 38 Reseia hist6rica. helped to raise the Chilean army from a simple fighting force to a distinguished institution with elan and esprit de corps.155.

33 on Mon. and to learn thrift by saving a portion of their pay. del ministerio de guerra. In 1897. has made new contracts with some of them [and with others] which will assure for a few more years the availability of their services. Diaz ' figure of 100. to participate in its political. vi. NUNN how to read or write. 1895-1896.000 man militia in 1792. Memoria del ministerio de guerra. . most literate. K6rner wrote in his preface to the Memoria del ministerio de guerra :45 I must not forget here the part played by foreign instructor-officers. legajo 206.000 in 1907). 42Memoria 4 This content downloaded from 146.000 reserve-militia in 1835 or a 15. social.desirous of consolidating and strengtheningtheir teachings in our army. 19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . In little more than a century.310 HAH I MAY I FREDERICK M. Between his return to Chile in 1895 and a second trip to Europe in 1900 Kb~rnerdeveloped the instructional programs and formalized the theories that made Chilean officers and troops the best trained. and generally the most prestigious in Latin America.000 man reserve force in 1899 was really a smaller percentage of men than a 25. Cuarenta aiios. The Portalian reserve-militia force contained 25. Basic to these programs was the continued presence of a European instructional staff-primarily German. 13-14. 2-3. Yet the official War Ministry publication claimed only 49.618 trained officers and troops in pleading its case for obligatory military service.000 men in active service and reputedly had a trained reserve force of 100. K:rner.279 trained members. Reyno de Chile: Estado inilitar en el aio 1792. and the difficulty of making a good soldier out of a man who is illiterate. Reserve strength on the eve of the War of the Pacific was roughly half of the 1899 figure. and when a law for universal military training was passed in 1900. 1899. .000 to nearly 50. of course.000. This was the largest number of reserves ever available in Chile. At the height of its strength the colonial militia had 14. or are preparing to do so. Audiencia de Chile.000 men in the 1830s.000 is too high for trained reserves. his goal was within reach. "42 He believed that soldiers and officers should be well educated. reserve-militia strength increased from less than 15. The desire and the intention of the governmentin soliciting their participationhave been realized. In the opinion of General Boonen.155. and economic life in a more meaningful way. The majority of these officershave completedtheir contracts and have returned.94. 44 Diaz. In relation to total male population a 50. military education provided lower class Chilean men with a reason to love their country. but the government. Brackets mine.000. Archivo General de Indias. then. who in the space of little more than a year have resided among us and have cooperatedeffectively and intelligently in this work of progress. 1896-1897. Cited in Gonzalez.43 By the end of the nine teenth century the Chilean army numbered 6. when the second German mission arrived.000 in 1800 to 3.44 This late century military build-up was partially responsible for peaceful resolution of the frontier question with Argentina in 1899. . Total population increase during the same period was over 500% (from approximately 500. to their homeland. 18.250. " Memoria del ministerio de guerra.

members of congress. 3. " Gonzalez. government officials. Kbrner wanted each branch to have a separate staff. 4M1emoria del ministerio de guerra. the first since about 1839.. accompanied by the army and navy high command. Kgrner. 47 48 This content downloaded from 146. who had more responsibilities than line officers of the same rank but received less. 11-17. sanitary service.EMIL KORNER AND THE PRUSSIANIZATION OF THE CHLEAN ARMY 311 Kirner also stated his belief that German language instruction was prerequisite to the study of military science and to the preparation of staff officers for advanced study in Germany."49 Further testimony to K6rner's prestige was the reception he received when he returned from Europe. ix. a personal tribute to [his] talent. loved and admired.33 on Mon. study systems of obligatory military service. 1900. artillery. 1901. As if K6rner's authority were not wide enough. Memoria del ininisterio de guerra. and prepare military ordinance reforms. Zuiiiga. and approximately ten thousand citizens. Under his plan the inspector general would be directly under the War Minister and would assume tighter control of all army branches through the staff of each service-infantry. On February 7 the government commissioned him to go to Europe.. he did not limit his comments to the instructional sphere.903. 19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . instruction.48 This reorganization scheme was the model for the army reforms of 1906 discussed below. On returning to Chile in 1901 K6rner reassumed duties as chief of the General Staff. 40-41. cavalry. closely supervised by the general staff in an efficient patterned administration. On April 8. quartermaster corps. He was also charged with the elaboration of a plan for the distribution and colonization of government-owned lands in the Lake Villa Rica area. El ejercito de Chile.155. 51 See Memoria del ministerio de guerra.51 46 Ibid.47 Clearly Kirner was championing the cause of the incipient modern army elite. Ibid.46 Enjoying almost boundless prestige. especially in the case of staff officers. 1899. He constantly reminded the government that salaries were neither high enough nor equitable. 23. in 1900 he was given two new projects. he was "dragged along through the streets almost violently in the arms of that crowd that acclaimed him as a favorite son. this time to study the comparative administration of European armies. ix. and armories. 1.. engineers.. "a measure destined to foment national progress and."50 Following his return Kbrner spent only nineteen months in Chile before he received a new commission in Europe. 73. In 1899 he proposed a scheme to streamline the army's administration. clergymen.94.

" Carlos Saez Morales.33 on Mon. and 1907.52 At about this point the consequences of Prussianization began to manifest themselves. 27-28. 10. 3. Memoria del ministerio de guerra. Only lower-class Chileans actually saw compulsory military service. Divisions functioned with skeleton staffs. For one thing.55 Younger officers. K6rner had proposed this reform seven years earlier. 7. Alberto Lara E.56 Zuiniga. funcionamiento y metodos de trabajo. 1933). 6. Recuerdos. doctrina. and the education which they received did them little good upon their return to civilian life.155. and to provide masses of trained fighting men while educating and "civilizing" lower-class men in the ranks. because it was too easy for young Chileans of means and influence to avoid conscription. 43-64. the highest post in the army hierarchy. 1907. I: El ejdrcito y la politica (Santiago. 1905. clashed with superiors whom they considered unfit to serve because they lacked German training. the Chilean obligatory military service law left much to be desired. Memoria del ministerio de guerra. See "'Memoria de la inspecci6n general del ejercito. 13. K6rner himself made this point in the pivotal year 1906. Vol. " Tellez. 1924). Kbrner himself criticized this situation in his capacity as Inspector General. El ejercito de Chile. Consequently the administration of the War Ministry was also decentralized and a German-style general staff created for planning and coordination. "In Memoria del ministerio de guerra. 20. The administrative reorganization reduced the powers of the inspector general and increased those held by division commanders. " Memoria del ministerio de guerra. El estado mayor general del ejercito chileno: Su actual organizaci6n. but it soon proved disappointing to him and his followers. passim. 9-10. 19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . NUNN In May 1904 he returned to become inspector general. 5 This content downloaded from 146. lacking experience but pressed into higher administrative ranks. 1906.94. A further criticism of the obligatory military service system was that because of social and political prejudices many veterans who had the right to equal opportunity in public employment could not secure a position on leaving the army.312 HAIIR I MAY I FREDERICK M.54 The government might create new administrative units on the order of the German army. In theory it was designed to prevent a professional soldier class which might lead to praetorianism. 1906. but it soon found that there were not enough qualified officers to serve as administrators.53 On May 12 of that year Chile adopted a reform program intended to make the military organization a creole copy of the Imperial German Army. 1908. servicio. Recuerdos de un soldado. 225. The practice was a disappointing failure.. This decentralization was supposed to make administration more efficient and flexible but did not." Memoria del ministerio de guerra. Responden todas esas condiciones a las similares de los estados mayores de ejereitos modelos? I Cual serd la forma que convendria efectuar? (Santiago.

29-30. 1939). Recuerdos.33 on Mon. The 1910 report called for changes in the promotion system (which was still based on 1890 legislation) as a solution to the problem of unfit or " political" officers in key positions. 4.155. Francisco Javier Diaz Valderrama.58 One officer later wrote that the changeover of 1906 was outright adoption when it should have adaptation and that the government was at fault for basing a peacetime reform on extreme wartime needs. In the haste to fill up the skeleton divisions. untrained troops. This content downloaded from 146. 4.57 In the crush to fill all administrative positions. 1908.94. 223-224. 6 T1llez. they bombarded the Ministry with requests for solutions. 217. I. 1910.62 Even from the standpoint of the German trained professional officer the reforms of 1906 were singularly unsuccessful. 19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . During the last four years before his retirement in 1910 he was no longer overseer of Prussianization. Memoria del ministerio de guerra. for when division commanders found that they could not deal with all problems. Becuerdos.6' Two years later the Ministry 's report repeated this view and disapproved outright adoption of the German model for Chilean army organization."60 In 1910 the War Ministry's official report to congress supported K6rner's complaint that there were not enough trained and experienced officers to fill posts created by the 1906 reforms. 29. Las escuelas militares de Francia i Alemania en relaci6n con la reorganizaci6n de las nuestras (Santiago. 62 Memoria del ministerio de guerra. he continued to be an influence on the officers who had trained under him or in his system. 68 See Te'llez. Recuerdos. 1912. Nevertheless. I. rather than on the country's financial and manpower capabilities. 1909. 8. 60 Memoria del ministerio de guerra. 9. his energy and his enthusiasm diminish. Despite a 57 Saez. 13. no doubt justifiably. In his 1908 report to congress he pointed out that politically influential but poorly trained officers in important positions would endanger discipline and morale: "The ease of jumping in rank predisposes the favored one to become restless in a short time.EMIL KORNER AND THE PRUSSIANIZATION OF THE CHILEAN ARMY 313 The hasty reorganization also created havoc in the War Ministry. 46. too many untrained subalterns commanded new. political pressure was used. Saez. so that friends of high-ranking civilians or officers got coveted posts. 61 Memoria del ministerio de guerra. while those without connections did not. and if his aspirations to be promoted even further are not satisfied. for the reforms of 1906 had limited his power as inspector general. Recuerdos. 220.59 Twenty years after he had begun the task of Prussianization K6rner saw it carried to the extreme in 1906.

1957). The Chilean mission stayed in El Salvador for six years. the president of Colombia. For a personal account of Carlos Ibdfiez' career in El Salvador see Luis Correa Prieto. as the government with its anachronistic parliamentary system creaked on. This document included a dramatic plea for non-interference by civilians in army matters. Reyes wanted the Colombian army to be led by apolitical professional officers and chose the Chilean army as his model because of its reputed success with German training. Ernesto Medina. In the latter two cases the Chilean government was motivated by a desire for friends in the power structure of the Pacific coast. Bravo. Luis A. This content downloaded from 146. Three Chilean army captains had already been acting as advisors in Ecuador for nearly a year and helped an Ecuadoran officer. the complaints of military men became a blend of professional grievances and political interest. and the Chilean army carried "second generation" Prussianization directly to El Salvador. On September 4 Chile designated Captains Juan Pablo Bennett (as chief) and Francisco Lagreze and Lieutenants Julio Salinas. 73-74. " Misiones chilenas en el extranjero'" (unpublished article in possession of the author. 6 See 1907-1957: 50 anlos de la escuela military (Bogota.94. From the official point of view these were structural and administrative. and Colombia.314 HAHR I MAY I FREDERICK M. passim. Captain Estanislao Garcia Huidobro and Lieutenants Arturo Montecinos and Luis Negrete. El president Ibainez. reopened the military school which had been closed during the civil war of 1899-1902 and on six other occasions in the past century. 64 Luis Cabrera. Ecuador. Major Luis Cabrera. Captains Arturo Ahumada and Diego Guillen composed the first Chilean mission to Colombia as director and subdirector of that country's Military School. 1962). 1960). the Chilean army was Prussianized beyond the capacities of the nation and suffered from serious internal problems.155.63 At the same time.65 Little information exists in Chile on the first experiment. 19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . NUNN superficial glitter. three Chilean officers were also sent to Ecuador as army instructors. la politico y los politicos: Apuntes para la historia (Santiago. 45-52. and Carlos Ibafiez to staff the mission. Santiago.33 on Mon. They extended to officers of other Latin American armies trained at the Military School at Santiago. Biblioteca del Estado Mayor del Ej6rcito. Armando Llanos. 1902). Even before K6rner retired the army had become a "state within the state.64 In 1907 General Rafael Reyes. Misi6n military chilena en el Ecuador: Proyecto de ley orgdnica military (Quito. 42-43." But German influences did not stop with Chile. since the 63 Edcmundo Gonzalez Salinas. and Julio Franzani. In 1903 the government of El Salvador requested a Chilean military mission to improve army instruction. to write a new military code in 1902.

.67 In 1912 a third Chilean mission was organized. 104. retirement. The work of Chilean army officers serving in Colombia was no less thorough. Medina. applied their training in all spheres. shows the same thoroughness with which Kbrner and his subordinates went about their duties in Chile. extending to 263 pages. pensions. " swore under "See especially 1-18. and the government's inability to find long-range solutions to social and economic problems. In 1907 a group of army officers in Santiago organized a secret lodge. exasperated at a government which they considered " disorganized and undisciplined. the cumbersome parliamentarism. Liga members. 44-46. but concentrated on the professionalization of cadets and the creation of courses to build a modern officer corps from the bottom up. looked to the Chileans as Chileans had looked to the Germans years before. then. 101.68 Salvadorans. as when it used force in putting down numerous strikes during the first twenty years of this century. The next year Captain Carlos Saez Morales began a twoyear tour of duty in Bogota. While some of the Prussianized Chilean army officers went abroad to train other Latin American armies. wartime mobilization. and frontier defense. instruction. 1902. administration.155. Bravo. both of whom had studied in Germany. and Colombians. This second Chilean mission to Colombia opened a new staff and specialty school.66 True to Chilean form.33 on Mon. the Escuela Superior de Guerra. it dealt with organization of all branches and auxiliary services.EMIL KORNER AND THE PRUSSIANIZATION OF TU CHILEAN ARMY 315 personal account of Carlos Ibaiiez does not deal with the actual workings of the mission. In 1909 Majors Pedro Charpin and Francisco Javier Diaz replaced Ahumada and Guillen. Ecuadorans. Submitted to War Minister Flavio Alfaro on June 27. which graduated thirty-seven Colombian officers within a year. The army had long resented meddling politicians. and Franzani. others stayed home to form pressure groups and influence the Chilean government. " 50 aios de la escuela military.94. This inability forced the army to improvise short-range solutions. 19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . promotion. OB Ibid. Ahumada and Guillen. The project for an Ecuadoran military code submitted by Cabrera. it stressed the army's separation from politics and personal control. Model groups of artillery and infantry were created to function as cadres for the new Colombian army. the Liga Militar. This content downloaded from 146. consisting of Colonel Washington Montero (who organized the first large-scale army maneuvers in Colombia) and Captains Pedro Vignola and Manuel Aguirre.

This content downloaded from 146. but See Slez.6n Barros Luco. Their hopes were not met. 19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . the Liga blamed civilian political disorganization for the army's problems70 By 1910 the Liga was nationwide. Como si fuera ahora (Santiago. helped engineer the political rise of Carlos Ibalfiez del Campo. El ej6rcito y la revoluci6n. 1929). This national social center for army officers became the seat of Liga activities and made Santiago the preferred location for politically minded officers during the next two decades. 235-248.94. 72 Ahumada.71 Liga leaders had expected an extraordinary number of promotions in 1910. According to a contemporary member of Chile's officer corps. made up of army elite members.316 HAHR I MAY I FREDERICK M. and more coordination with the navy. knew of its existence. In the same year the Club Militar opened its doors in Santiago. Emilio Rodriguez Mendoza. I. 1910 the Liga Militar had refined its objectives in the promotion. Ahumada.72 Secret meetings of the Liga continued into 1911. At a private banquet held by Liga members during the independence festivities in September 1911 Bulnes was the only civilian present.73 Late in the year the Liga began to plan a coup d'e'tat for the coming year. but did nothing about it. Rodriguez refused. Como si fuera ahora. 70 By salary. but Bulnes met with Liga members during the second half of 1911. marking the first step of the modern Chilean Army toward political deliberation. 221. El ej6rcito y la revoluci6n. The Liga sounded out two influential civilians on the idea of heading a military movement. Ram. and members throughout the country were regularly informed by word of mouth on the discussions in Santiago. "69 Their primary objectives were professional-new promotion. who assumed the presidency on the death of Pedro Montt in that year. Chile's centennial year. and Gonzalo Bulnes. in addition to normal service promotions only a few extra naval officers rose in rank. 37.33 on Mon. " Rodriguez. organizational. 71 During the 1924-1927 period its board of directors. salary. Emilio Rodriguez Mendoza. Recuerdos. son of President Manuel Bulnes and historian of the War of the Pacific. and retirement systems for army officers-and the Liga undoubtedly owed its creation to the effects of Prussianization. and retirement sphere to make them "in keeping with the times" and expanded its interests to include administrative. the diplomat and author. The frustrated army leaders planned a demonstration during the September 1910 centennial celebration and cancelled it only because they feared that foreign representatives present for the festivities would leave Chile with bad impressions. and instructoral changes.155. especially the reforms of 1906. NUNN oath "to work for the progress of the army. passim. 21-23. At this time the Liga began overt contacts with civilians. 23-24.

IV: La repitblica (Santiago. labor legislation. Rodriguez made a special point of speculating on the socio-political attitudes of young Chilean officers who studied in European army schools then returned to Chile. These men recognized the Chilean civil-military relationship for what it was: a dichotomy between a modern military organization and "a political system that had become the negation of the harmonious and progressive movement of a society. Francisco Frias Valenzuela. however. Disorderly polities in the face of serious national problems was not consistent with the orderly conduct of army affairs. El ejercito y la revoluci6n. 112-113. but it did not end the army's concern over politics. health and sanitation. At the last minute. Although the coup failed. 10-14. 213-214. social and economic problems. Ricardo Donoso. 7 Encouraged no doubt by strong civilian opposition to the Barros Luco government and unsubstantiated rumors of a politically oriented Liga Naval based in Valparaiso. crime. and the Liga dissolved soon after. Historia de Chile.94. "Rodriguez. *Thesewere corruption (which army officers blamed on the oligarchy). Tres cartas. At this time Major Ahumada was second in command at the Military School. The dissolution of the Liga Militar ended overt political action by army officers for the next seven years. Vol. the plotting demonstrated that parliamentary government and Prussianization did not mix. 333-334. "77 But not until 1919 would this civil-military dichotomy present a serious problem to the parliamentary regime. This content downloaded from 146. 250-251. Tres cartas con un pr6logo y un epilogo (Santiago.75 The plot called for commanders of the Santiago garrison and Bulnes to inform Barros Luco that he would be deposed unless he named a new independent cabinet and took action in a number of areas. a country that did not "live in the present. economic cooperation with other Latin American countries. See Renato Valdes. 216-217.76 The Liga was prepared to impose Bulnes as provisional president. Desarrollo politico y social de Chile desde la constituci6n de 1833 (Santiago. 8. but did not contemplate a military cabinet or dictatorship. and what certain 7' Ahumada.74 Nevertheless the Liga went ahead with plans for a golpe in January 1912. the court system. 1932). Interference in army affairs by influential politicians-an ever-changing group because of ministerial instability and electoral irregularities-angered young Prussianized professionals. 8-9. 1942). 19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . 76 Valde's. the Tacna-Arica question. and new congressional elections based on revised electoral registries. Bulnes refused to be a party to a coup d'e'tat. public education.155. Como si fuera ahora. 24-25." See also Vald6s. Tres cartas. 1949).33 on Mon.EMIL KORNER AND TE PRUSSIANIZATION OF TH CHLEAN ARMY 317 this clear violation of professional canons caused many troop commanders to withdraw their support. He refused to lead the cadet corps in any coup.

Recuerdos. 10-60. passim. 1914). 107-108." Memorial del estado mayor del ejercito de Chile. He closed by calling for a more powerful presidency-a clear application of military values to civilian problems. 1914). Too many lazy would-be aristocrats entered the army. This content downloaded from 146.155. 7 El problerma de nuestra educaci6n militar 80 Ibid. In 1917 General Manuel Moore Bravo of the high command chided the government of President Juan Luis Sanfuentes (1915-1920) for political meddling with the army's promotion system and for failing to ameliorate the conditions of the Chilean masses.044 troops and 833 officers. Moore referred specifically to the use of political influence by incompetent officers to get promotions83 A prizewinning essay written by Captain Domingo Teran in 1917 blamed antiquated promotion and salary scales on the government's habit of 78 Te1lez stated.79 He called Prussianization an impossibility for Chile because of extreme social stratification and ignorance on the part of the lower classes. 10-11. however. (Santiago.33 on Mon. Chile (Santiago. from which recruits and conscripts were drawn.82 This increase created many problems.94.318 HAKES I MAY I FREDERICKM. NUNN officers considered to be national backwardness. passim. He instructed his officers to judge subordinates and leaders only on intellectual and moral grounds. by the latter date it numbered 17. since other criteria such as family background or connections would be unjust. 1915). 83 Manuel Moore Brava. 1917). In an official monograph of 1914 Captain Alberto Munfoz Figueroa scored Chilean society as anachronistic and regressive. In essence Munioz believed that if the state could not educate its citizens. that the Liga continued to exist for at least three more years. he wrote. 81 Anibal Riquelme. 245. the army should do so. but went further when he placed direct blame for national problems on the unstable parliamentary system.78 During this period army men did not hesitate to express their opinions on civil-military relations and national issues in writing. Major Anibal Riquelme agreed with Munoz. Chile's economic difficulties after World War I heightened army interest in social conditions and politics. Afno IX (September 10. Cuaderno IX. Instrucciones para el desarrollo de las virtudes militares del cuerpo de oficiales de la IV division del ej6rcito (Valdivia. 6-24.. 82 Government of Chile. 19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .81 Between 1900 and 1915 the Chilean Army tripled. Riquelme argued that the government should consult the high command of the armed forces not only on national defense and foreign relations but on all other matters of importance. IIRelacion que debe existir entre la politica de un estado i el alto comando del ejercito. so they would not have to work hard to make a living.80 In another article of the same year. He devoted nearly half of the 104-page study to a call for better education of the common Chilean by military teachers. 638-650.

153. He criticized obligatory military service as prejudicial to the lower classes. Chileans did not respect their army. 1919). President Sanfuentes ordered Armstrong and Moore placed under surveillance. September 3. " 84 The developing army hostility toward parliamentary democracy crystallized in 1919. Walker Valdez. and the Sociedad did not offer its services. For this reason.86 They explained that there had been no true plot and that the army only wished to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate in avoiding civil strife. he wrote. and May 14. 1917). and the so-called Conspiracy of 1919 was afoot. But order was maintained. 5-11. 825. Hereafter cited as DSF.. Teran was hypersensitive. The average Chilean still had great respect for the army because of its role in territorial expansion and because of its advanced status in Latin America. inflation. "The object of the exchange of ideas between various high ranking officers. rising unemployment. April 29. Chile faced its worst crisis since 1891. At that time the government was paralyzed by the collapse of Chile's nitrate industry. See especially articles in the editions of April 27. General Guillermo Armstrong Ramirez held several meetings with officers of the Santiago garrison to discuss the legislative needs of the army. Los secrets que divulga en secretario privado de los ministros de guerra (Santiago. Nevertheless. This content downloaded from 146. 1919. Teran. because sons of influential families could escape it. Terdn 's essay betrayed a growing feeling among officers that government and society were "antimilitary.EMIL KORNER AND TUE PRUSSIANIZATION OF TUE CHILEAN ARMY 319 taking the army for granted. The crisis came to involve the military in March 1919. "consisted solely in ascertaining how. the two generals were asked for their resignations on the grounds that they had planned to overthrow the government. 1918. in a given moment of Coin84 Domingo L.155. and several colonels and lieutenant colonels decided to form a secret organization which would offer its services to maintain order and prevent social upheaval.00/117. 87 Columbano Millas R.33 on Mon. Before the month was out. for he expected an uprising on May Day. Armstrong. if necessary. General Manuel Moore. 1923). 1919. March 4. and widespread labor agitation. In early 1919 the editors of El Mercurio 85 El Mercurio. 19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Tema militar: Trabajo premiado en el concurso literario del club military (Santiago. 18. Shea to Lansing. By mid-April the Sociedad del Eje'rcito de Regeneracion was a functioning secret lodge. See Department of State Files.87 On May 10 Armstrong answered accusations of treason in a declaration to the press." he said.85 At the same time. through force. supported new promotion and salary laws for the military. when four admirals were removed from service because of alleged plotting against the government. jdevoluci6n? La verdad sobre el motim military 88 Alejandro (Santiago.94. May 1.

The constitution of the Junta Militar written by Lieutenant Colonel Julio CUsar del Canto stressed reinforcement of presidential power and production of legislation. Through their testimony the extent of the conspiracy became public knowledge. Millas. was a close friend of Alessandri. and military reform.. 825. 227. Ricardo Donoso. 1919. DSF. See also Walker Valdez.94. El Motin Militar: Anotaciones del dietario de una rnosca (Santiago. Walker Valdez stated that Alessandri met frequently with junta leaders to familiarize himself with military problems. giRevoluci6n?. While both the junta and the Sociedad proposed merely to offer support to the president.d. 1954). In addition. F. The leader of the junta. 78-81. with heavy emphasis on the last. which knew of Armstrong's measures. and Roman Calvo. 1919.33 on Mon. 90 Millas. a version of the Spanish Military Defense Juntas. Los secretos. 3. 152. iRevoluci6n?. supported them. Sdez. economic. The loose-structured Sociedad led by Armstrong and Moore stressed form rather than content in its desire to fortify the chief executive. those on trial demanded legislation in the areas of social.89 Further. The government uncovered a secret Junta Militar. and May 15. n. and planned to demand congressional action on a number of pending social and economic bills. and public treated the Armstrong-Moore affair and the junta as one massive plot. Junteros stated that their ultimate alternatives were replacement of all provincial officials with army officers."88 But within days evidence of further moves by army officers deepened the crisis. 1919.. 115. I. and army officers involved in either of them went on trial for treason. press. May 10. jlevolucion?. 64-65.00/122. Alessandri. NUNN munist danger.). it was rumored that the prominent Liberal Senator Arturo Alessandri Palma had attended meetings of the junta and had agreed to act as civilian head of the movement. May 10. Armstrong consistently disavowed any personal political ambitions. Armstrong 's protestations were substantiated in Walker Valdez. 1952.9' The conspiracy of 1919 had two parts. D. The Santiago-based 88 El Mercurio. This content downloaded from 146. Mexico. 65. Major Bernardo G6mez Solar. deposition of Sanfuentes. Robbins to Lansing. 1919. we would be able to sustain the authority of the executive power and avoid revolution from below.155. Fifty army officers and four naval officers were directly implicated in the plotting. agitador y demoledor: Cincuenta aios de historia political de Chile (2 vols.90 Government. Los secretos. 35-39. 19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . El Mercurio. 8 Armstrong and Moore denied any connection with the junta. Recuerdos. but he did call publicly for currency stabilization and commodity pr-ice controls. though not all were found guilty. May 13. the public was shocked at statements and testimony on what would be done if Sanfuentes refused the offer. 45-48. I. Their interests were hardly as far reaching as those of the junteros. May 15. and proclamation of Alessandri as provisional president. El Mercurio. May 11. 157. 91 Walker Valdez.320 HAHR | MAY I FREDERICK M.

and rumors spread of Peruvian troops massed on the border. and Uruguay continued to study in Santiago. but appended a prospectus of social and economic legislation.EMIL KORNER AND THE PRUSSIANIZATION OF THE CHILEAN ARMY 321 junta was committed to the same principle. 1920. the events of 1918 proved the German army to be composed of mortals.92 During that year three events occurred which affected the Prussian influences on the Chilean army. 98 Nevertheless students from Mexico. for the governments of both countries hastily assured the Sanfuentes regime that they had no intention of making war. The creation of a modern army in Chile had serious long-range consequences. Although in retirement since 1910. only six officers were acquitted. El Diario Ilustrado. the presidential election of 1920. 19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . The mobilization was a tactical and logistical disaster. 1923). This content downloaded from 146. These events. It ceased to be the sole official model for Chilean officers. for neither group was sufficiently large or well organized to control the army. Second. Emil Kdrner died. he had continued to serve as an example and symbol for his former colleagues and students. created political tension. The mobilization of 1920 came while the results of the election were still in doubt and looked to many like an effort to disperse proAlessandri officers and troops on a trumped-up pretext. both in Santiago and in the provinces. Venezuela. Colombia. many on scholarships. critical to Chile's security. 9 For documentary information on the mobilization of 1920 see the official Llamada movilizaci6n de 1920: Antecedentes y documentos (Santiago. Paraguay. August 4. Ecuador.33 on Mon. Twenty-seven of the conspirators were retired. There was no danger of invasion from either Peru or Bolivia. contested by Arturo Alessandri of the Liberal Alliance and Luis Barros Bogonfo of the rightist National Union.93 Third. both professional and national. First. and its reverses in Europe tarnished the image of the Chilean army as Latin America 's outstanding military organization. Over a year later a special tribunal passed and imposed sentences on all those found guilty of participation in the Sociedad or the junta.155. The two groups were hindered by the refusal of numerous troop commanders to join them. The division weakened the conspiracy. This was heightened when a coup in Bolivia established an aggressive government bent on regaining access to the Pacific. had the need existed94 -a sorry climax to the extensive and highly touted program of German-style military reform. caused the Sanfuentes government to mobilize the army for defense of the Atacama frontiers. Prussianization set am92 Sentences ranged from immediate retirement to confinement or banishment for periods from ten months to four years.94. But it is not likely that the mobilized army could have defended Chile effectively.

19 Aug 2013 17:33:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . As long as that structure remained outwardly solid the army was kept in its place. NUNN bitious professional officers against their superiors. against their incompetent colleagues. even more dramatic-the outright military intervention and domination from 1924 to 1932 by those who had shared in the experience of Prussianization. But the shattering experiences of 1919 and 1920 ended one chapter in Chilean civilmilitary relations and prepared for another.322 HAHR I MAY I FREDERICK M.33 on Mon. Prussianization created an army elite which magnified its role in Chilean society and politics during the second decade of this century.94. The aping of the Prussian army became a curse for government and military alike when officers began to challenge the traditional power structure from 1907 forward.155. and against politicians who meddled in army affairs or who failed to support the military's legislative requests. This content downloaded from 146.

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