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International Relations theory
After victory: institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order after major
wars. By G. John Ikenberry. Oxford, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. :oo+. :,¡pp.
Index. £¡;.,¡. ISBN o o,+ o¡o,o :. Pb.: £+¡.,¡. ISBN o o,+ o¡o,+ o.
This is unquestionably one of the most important books in the field of the past decade, and
anybody familiar with the series of high-profile articles written by the author will already have
a sense of the overall argument. Like Henry Kissinger, Ikenberry is interested in the nature of
historical international orders, and why some are more durable and stable than others. However,
while Kissinger assessed that stability solely in terms of the degree of acceptability of the order
to all the Great Powers, Ikenberry makes a profound theoretical statement about the ‘constitu-
tionality’ of some orders, and particularly of the one that has developed since +,¡¡.This issues in
his perhaps unique blend of realist and liberal positions. The framework sets the scene for an
intriguing analysis of the post-Cold War order, and whether it should be regarded as hegemonic
The author’s basic position is that, in any order-defining postwar settlement, the victors face a
choice of exacting by means of power, or of exercising a degree of strategic restraint in which
the returns to power are diminished. In this latter case, the order emerges as a trade-off between
victors and vanquished and, to the degree that it becomes institutionalized, the victors need to
rely less upon coercion to uphold it. The bonus for them is that the order remains stable, even
when the power of the victors begins to decline. Readers will not be surprised at the theoretical
vigour and originality of Ikenberry’s exposition.What might be less expected is the very detailed
and serious historical engagements with the +·+¡, +,+, and +,¡¡ settlements which constitute
fully one half of this book, and which are by themselves erudite historical statements, based upon
extensive scholarship.These chapters can be read, with great profit, by all international historians.
Does the argument, applied to the post-Cold War context, convince? Not quite, but if
Ikenberry is wrong, he is so for mostly the right reasons. He is surely correct to insist on the
substantial continuities between the Cold War and post-Cold War orders. Many of the charac-
teristic features of the world today were already formed in the period after +,¡¡. But one of these
characteristics was American hegemony, which has assuredly not diminished since the end of the
Cold War. It is the tension between Ikenberry’s own account of American hegemony, and his
vision of a constitutional order, that raises the key problems in this book. To be fair, the author
acknowledges as much in his remarks about the NATO bombing of Serbia in +,,, (p. :;:), but
he does not resolve that inner tension. How US unilateralism is to be contained by the new order
has, of course, become a more pressing issue since the change of presidency, and after his book
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 147
was completed. For that reason, many readers may well demur from some of Ikenberry’s conclu-
sions, but all should certainly read the book in the first place.
Ian Clark, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK
World politics: progress and its limits. By James Mayall. Cambridge: Polity Press. :ooo.
+;opp. Index. £¡o.oo. ISBN o ;¡¡o :¡·, ¡. Pb.: £++.,,. ISBN o ;¡¡o :¡,o ·.
James Mayall describes this book as short. But it is short only in length. It is not short on ideas,
and it is certainly not short on ambition. It aims no less than to take stock of the state of world
affairs at the start of the new millennium. And in doing so, Mayall ranges across the history and
philosophy of international relations over the last ¡oo years. What gives point and shape to his
discussion is the concept of international society. For Mayall, this concept opens the way to a
comparative sociology that allows us to take account of both continuity and change in the
history of international relations, but it also makes it possible to offer a narrative that exposes the
passion and drama of the past.
International society provides a framework that describes the context of international relations
in terms of institutions, such as law, diplomacy and the balance of power, on the one hand, and
principles, such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and human rights, on the other. Mayall is,
therefore, very much following in the wake left by Martin Wight and Hedley Bull. Indeed, it is
possible to see this book as an extension of Bull’s The anarchical society: re-exploring Bull’s ideas
in the light of events that have taken place over the twenty-five years since Bull produced his
influential assessment of international society. Mayall, for example, draws heavily on Bull’s
distinction between solidarist and pluralist conceptions of international society. Curiously, Bull
does not make anything of this significant distinction in The anarchical society.
Although Mayall does sketch the competing stories of how international society has developed
since its inception in the seventeenth century, the primary focus is on the twentieth century, and
in particular the putative changes that have taken place since the end of the Cold War.
International society is explored in terms of its members, its boundaries and the modifications
that have taken place in its institutions and principles. But at the heart of the book is the analysis
of sovereignty, democracy and intervention.
Somewhat disarmingly, Mayall insists that he has adopted, deliberately, an old-fashioned
approach in this book. I think he means by this that he has written in a style that is readily acces-
sible. But perhaps he is referring to the paucity of footnotes. Or, much more significantly, he
could be drawing attention to his belief that most of the fundamental issues in international
relations are moral ones. And for this reason, he wants to establish a framework that allows these
issues to be debated by both citizens and academic experts.
It is also just possible that Mayall views his profound scepticism of liberal attempts to manage
the world order in the aftermath of the Cold War as old-fashioned.This scepticism certainly gives
rise to some of the most arresting analysis in the book. He compares economic sanctions, for
example, to siege warfare, where there was a deliberate use of violence to bring about submission
through starvation. By the same token, economic sanctions are seen to perpetrate invisible
violence where the responsibility for the action is shifted onto the victims and is ‘often barely
acknowledged by the instigators’. It is this refusal to take responsibility for actions and outcomes
that Mayall finds most disturbing about the post-Cold War era. He provides telling evidence for
this line of argument from cases like East Timor and Kosovo. He calls for the restoration of a new
realism where decision-makers do take responsibility for their actions.
This is a little book that reflects long and hard thinking about difficult subjects. It will repay
more than one reading and represents an important contribution to the canon of works from the
English school of International Relations.
Richard Little, University of Bristol, UK
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 148
Identities, borders, orders: rethinking International Relations theory. Edited by
Mathias Albert, David Jacobson, and Yosef Lapid. Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press. :oo+. ¡¡,pp. Index. £¡o.oo. ISBN o ·+oo ¡oo; ,. Pb.: £+o.oo. ISBN o ·+oo
For some time now, and especially since the end of the Cold War, International Relations scholars
have been questioning whether the dominant Westphalian model of international politics, a
model that depicts the world in terms of a multiplicity of sovereign nation-states exercising
exclusive authority over a population living within the confines of a territorially demarcated
space, can continue to provide an appropriate analytical framework for understanding the
important events that are shaping the contemporary world. The tragic events of, and following,
++ September :oo+ would seem to provide additional evidence for those who have been arguing
that that we are witnessing a fundamental transformation in the basic practices and processes that
constitute the Westphalian state system. The provocative chapters in this truly interesting and
timely book, written by a network of scholars who are affiliated with the Identities, Borders,
Orders Group, all describe, in various ways, how the central categories and units of analysis that
are derived from the Westphalian model are no longer adequate when it comes to understanding,
in John Ruggie’s terms,‘what makes the world hang together in the international sense’.Yet what
differentiates this book from the many others that are attempting to convince us that the
Westphalian order is finally coming undone is the painstaking effort that is made to develop an
alternative theoretical framework that can help us to conceptualize the central factors shaping
the uncertain post-Cold War world.
The central innovation introduced in this book is referred to as the Identities, Borders, Orders
(IBO) triad that is claimed by its proponents to provide an important new heuristic tool for
rethinking familiar concepts in the field, such as the state, the international, and the political, and
for coming to grips with the transformative practices of integration and fragmentation. Yosef
Lapid explains that the book is ‘premised on the idea that the road to a better theory of inter-
national relations passes through the intersections of the IBO triad’ (p. :¡). Yet in both the
introduction and the conclusion, it is made clear that the IBO project is not another attempt to
build grand theory, but rather one that deliberately is pluralistic, cross-disciplinary, and anti-
foundationalist in its quest to comprehend a world that is argued to be in a constant state of flux.
In this sense, the IBO triad is to be considered as an analytical point of departure not only for
rethinking the key concepts that form the triad, but also for examining the interesting relations,
interactions, and meanings that can be found in various manifestations of the IBO framework. It
is shown, for example, that the same phenomenon can be situated at different intersections of the
IBO triad, such as the identities/borders nexus or the borders/orders nexus to highlight how this
tool can be employed to reorient research in previously unimagined directions.
The individual chapters succeed in showing the reader how the IBO triad offers a powerful
analytical window for critically examining many of the standard assumptions that inform tradi-
tional International Relations theory and for opening new possibilities and providing a
refreshingly new perspective on a variety of important issue areas. Some of the substantive issues
that the contributors address include nationalism, migration, human rights, democratization, war
and citizenship. The book is divided into two parts. Part I is devoted to rethinking the ‘interna-
tional’ category that Westphalia allegedly demarcated from the ‘domestic’. All of the chapters in
this section address how, if at all, the international continues to hang together in a post-
Westphalian world that is offering a radically new configuration of identities, borders and
(dis)orders. In the process, many of the authors provide a powerful account of how the
Westphalian order is being transformed. Part : follows logically and each of the chapters
undertake the task of rethinking the meaning of the political. The IBO triad is shown to be
especially insightful when it comes to understanding the politics of inclusion and exclusion.The
chapters ‘demonstrate that thinking through the political using IBO terms is currently tanta-
mount to rethinking it’ (p. +¡;).
International Relations theory
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 149
There is little doubt that this book may prove to be disconcerting to some readers, but the
authors would likely reply that this is the price that we have to pay for living in a period of
unprecedented change and transformation. The IBO Group takes it as axiomatic that the world
is in a state of flux, and is convinced that the standard categories of analysis are no longer useful
in helping us to understand the world in which we live.Yet those, particularly realists, who believe
that the continuities of international politics are more important than the changes, are not likely
to find the arguments defending the utility of the IBO triad to be particularly persuasive.Those
who are convinced that everything solid is melting into air will find this book to be extremely
insightful and useful. If the world is undergoing a fundamental change, we might have no choice
but to reorient ourselves to thinking in terms of process rather than structure, of flux instead of
stability. This book represents the very best standard of scholarship devoted to the task of
rethinking International Relations theory.
Brian Schmidt, SUNY New Paltz, USA
Gendering world politics: issues and approaches in the post-Cold War era. By J. Ann
Tickner. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. :oo+. :oopp. Index. £¡¡.oo. ISBN o :¡+
++¡oo ·. Pb.: £+:.oo. ISBN o :¡+ ++¡o; o.
In re-assessing the conventional categories of IR theorists and practitioners, from a feminist
viewpoint, this in-depth study explores new ways of understanding world politics.Tickner illus-
trates how IR feminists ask questions based on different realities and normative agendas and use
various methodologies to gain answers. Rather than rationalistic theories ‘feminist IR is
grounded in humanistic accounts of social relations, particularly gender relations’ (p. ¡). Debates
on how connected feminism should be to the IR discipline are central. Differences between
realists and feminists are clear in considerations of war, peace and security, with feminist analyses
of wartime rape cutting across conventional emphases on interstate politics or domestic deter-
minants of foreign policy. Finally, feminist claims that reducing/eliminating unfavourable gender
hierarchies is necessary for reducing conflict are perhaps being listened to in UN circles.
A focus on populations at the margins of the world economy in chapter ¡ shows that, despite
differences among them, women are disproportionately situated at the lowest levels of socio-
economic scales in all societies. Both devaluation of women’s work and splits between
reproductive and productive labour underlie this feminization of poverty. Tickner extends the
study of globalization beyond gendered structural adjustment programmes to consider the spread
of Western-centred definitions of human rights and democracy. Post-colonial feminists highlight
the complicity of Western feminisms in imposing such views. Unpacking gendered notions of
‘democracy’ is vital, as new democracies are not all women-friendly, and focus on state institutions
by scholars can miss the various ways in which women are participating outside formal politics.
In considering global perspectives, Tickner analyses some feminist literature that is rethinking
‘both the importance of the state and models for a more genuine democracy’ (p. ,·). If these
models could assist in conceptualizing a global politics that could lessen gender hierarchies and
other oppressive relations they might promote international security and peace. As within
feminist political theory, with the exposure of gender-neutral citizens as male, so IR feminists
explain that universal claims within human rights norms are based on male definitions of rights.
In order to maintain their investigations through the kinds of questions they seek to answer, IR
feminists will continue to go outside political science using varying methodologies. In so doing
new research agendas are being established and new ways of knowing developed. There are
consequences in pushing the boundaries: ‘Power differences between conventional and critical
approaches ... will continue to render judgment of feminist approaches as less than adequate, and
frustration with strategies of cooptation or attempted exclusion will persist’ (p. +¡;). Despite
these obstacles the directions developed will continue to be forged and IR feminists will
continue their questioning of the founding assumptions of IR, towards a means of developing a
more peaceful and just world. In tapping these deep veins of knowledge, Tickner’s tightly
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 150
analytical study will prove invaluable to a broad range of political and social theorists seeking
ways to explore progressive changes in societies from local to global levels.
Chris Corrin, University of Glasgow, UK
Contending liberalisms in world politics: ideology and power. By James L.
Richardson. London, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. :oo+. :¡,pp. Index. Pb.: £+o.¡o. ISBN +
¡¡¡·; ,¡, X.
I had previously been aware of Jim Richardson as an orthodox (though very good) writer in the
field of strategic/security studies, so it has been interesting to discover how he has been reshaping
his lines of enquiry, in keeping with so much that has changed since the unanticipated demise of
the Cold War. He rightly points out that it is no longer plausible, if it ever was, to consider a geo-
political order independent of the socio-economic (p. +¡·).
In this book he therefore turns his attention to what he labels the ‘neo-liberal’ order in contem-
porary global politics. Against this neo-liberal order (negative rights/freedoms, free markets,
rolled-back states etc.) that ‘in practice enhances inequalities, perpetuates human deprivation, and
offers a scaled-down version of liberalism and democracy’ (p. :) Richardson seeks to explore the
prospects for the revivification of more radical, less elitist forms of liberal thought that were
manifest in the ‘embedded liberalism’ of the first three decades following the Second World War,
and that first emerged as a critique of the initial laissez-faire vision of the nineteenth century.
He draws, too, upon neo-Gramscian strands in attempting to identify the constituent compo-
nents that combine to produce the hegemony, intellectual and otherwise, that characterizes the
neo-liberal grip upon the contemporary scene. From this Gramscian tradition he is also able to
affirm that agency matters as much as structure, and that too many policies made in the Western,
and especially American, centres of power are presented as imperatives, matters of necessity rather
than normative choice. Similarly, too much of the neo-liberal order is underpinned by an ahistorical
universalism that has, for example, often been calamitous when applied to developmental schemes
outside the West.The sketch of past liberal thought that Richardson provides in the first section of
the book is precisely to provide an antidote to the ahistorical mindset of contemporary politics, a
reminder of the possibilities offered by contingency and historical change.
Having suffered three wasted years at their hands as an undergraduate it was a pleasure to read
Richardson’s polemic against the High Priests of the economics profession and the manifest
nonsense of ‘positive’ economics, even if some of his economic analysis is probably too sketchy
to satisfy many political economists, let alone economists. He is plausible too, in claiming that the
stranglehold that neo-liberal economics exerts upon policy-makers in the West is the funda-
mental intellectual pillar of the existing order. The other forces sustaining neo-liberal ideology
are structural, in the form of the changing balance of political forces in Western countries in
recent decades, and structural/cultural in the specific form of the United States and the
projection of its values—basically Lockean—through the international system (p. +¡o).
In terms of the immediate prospects for change Richardson is nevertheless—and wisely—
cautious, though his fundamental point that there is more scope for agency and the exercise of
normative judgement than our policy-makers would have us believe is persuasive.
Mitchell Rologas, University of St Andrews, UK
International law and organization
Genocide in international law. By William A. Schabas. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. :ooo. o:¡pp. Index. £++o.oo. ISBN o ¡:+ ;·:o: ;. Pb.: £¡,.,¡. ISBN o ¡:+ ;·;,o ¡.
We should be disturbed by the fact that we need another study of genocide and the Genocide
Convention of +,¡· in the opening decade of the twenty-first century, but we do. Schabas begins
by quoting Sartre’s dictum that ‘the fact of genocide is as old as humanity’, adding that ‘the law,
International law and organization
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 151
however, is considerably younger’. He provides a detailed exegesis of the articles of the
Convention, its drafting and philosophy, as well as its letter. Specific chapters on the groups
protected by the Convention, the elements of the crime, defences, the prosecution of genocide,
the role of international tribunals, etc., are offered.The research is detailed, the opinions balanced
and sensible. While the legal-interpretative approach is maintained throughout, the author is
perceptive on the broader ebb and flow of events.
Schabas notes that by the +,;os and +,·os, interest in the Convention had dissipated, relegating
it to ‘an historical curiosity, somewhat like the early treaties against the slave trade’ (p. ·). All that
was destined to change.Violent inter-ethnic conflict, including events in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, were to make the application of the Convention more urgent than ever. On
Rwanda, Schabas writes that he ‘remains marked and indeed haunted by the failure of the inter-
national community to intervene in order to prevent the Rwandan genocide’ (p. ¡¡:).This takes
the reader to the author’s principal claim: that we do not need an expansion of the scope of the
Convention (and there is little appetite among States to revise it) so much as a strengthening of
the obligations flowing from it. He is much concerned with developing the preventive elements
in the Convention, which is after all styled a convention on the prevention as well as punishment
of the crime of genocide. As he puts it, ‘if a choice must be made, it would be better to engage
States in a commitment to intervene, with force if necessary, in order to prevent the crime of
genocide, rather than to expand the definition or suggest its borders are uncertain’ (p. ¡¡:).
Whether the international community would ever gear itself up to do this in a systematic way,
in the light of frequent accusations of ‘double standards’ when forcible action is taken, is open to
question. This caveat should not detract from a frank and commendable analysis of the deeply
troubling and emblematic ‘crime of crimes’.
Patrick Thornberry, Keele University, UK
Reflections on humanitarian action: principles, ethics and contradictions. Edited by
Humanitarian Studies Unit, Transnational Institute. London, Sterling, VA: Pluto Press.
:oo+. :o¡pp. Index. £¡¡.oo. ISBN o ;¡¡¡ +;:; ·. Pb.: £+¡.,,. ISBN o ;¡¡¡ +;:o X.
This book addresses several important issues relating to humanitarian action, especially in the
+,,os. It looks at the ethical, legal, moral, economic and political aspects of humanitarianism, and
examines humanitarian assistance from the perspectives of both the donors and the recipients. It
discusses the roles of states, multilateral organizations like the UN, the media and the NGOs.Also
analysed are the links between aid, development and emergency action. In short, the eight
chapters that comprise this book touch on most aspects of humanitarian action. However, while
most of the chapters are based on solid research or long periods of observation in the field, they
appear to have been haphazardly selected.
To compensate for the random way the chapters were selected, the introduction, written by
the Humanitarian Studies Unit of the Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, successfully ties
together the various themes of the book. The first chapter by Adam Roberts on humanitarian
principles in the +,,os is comprehensive and well written. As in his previous work, Professor
Roberts addresses many of the issues that impact on humanitarian action and international
humanitarian law and does so in a style and language that are easy to understand. However,
owing to the fact that his chapter was initially written for the International Review of the Red Cross,
those looking for references will find none.
The second chapter by Joana Abrisketa on the right to humanitarian aid is well researched
and engaging. Abrisketa argues that ‘the right to humanitarian aid implies the right of the
victims of armed conflicts and other disasters to receive assistance and protection with the
purpose of satisfying their immediate needs’ (p. ¡¡). She then traces the legal basis of this right
to the Geneva Conventions of +,¡, and the additional protocols of +,;;. In chapter ¡, Xabier
Etxeberria examines the ethical framework of humanitarian action, explaining the obligations
and rights that come into play in the provision of humanitarian assistance, namely the right of
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 152
all victims to be offered aid and the corresponding obligation on the part of those who are
capable to offer assistance.
The question of how to coordinate the activities of all those involved in humanitarian
action—multilateral agencies, NGOs, governments, armed forces—is the theme of chapter ¡, by
Francisco Rey. He claims that the increase in the number of actors in humanitarian action has
contributed to confusion, dwindling enthusiasm and the squandering of resources. David Sogge
discusses the perspectives of aid recipients in chapter ¡, while Joanne Raisin and Alexander
Ramsbotham re-examine the relationships between relief assistance, development and humani-
tarian intervention in chapter o. The penultimate chapter by Mariano Aguirre discusses the role
of the media. The final chapter, by Médecins Sans Frontières, exposes the incoherence, ineffi-
ciency and politics at the heart of Operation Lifeline Sudan. MSF argues that while several
thousand children in southern Sudan died of starvation in +,,·, there was a surplus of :.¡ million
tons of sorghum in the country, +oo,ooo tons of which was exported to Eritrea.
Like most edited volumes, the quality of this book’s contributions varies from one author to
the other. However, as a whole the book provides critical and very useful perspectives on
Samuel M. Makinda, St Antony’s College, Oxford, UK
The limits of humanitarian intervention: genocide in Rwanda. By Alan J. Kuperman.
Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. :oo+. +o:pp. Index. $¡·.,¡. ISBN o ·+¡; oo·o ¡. Pb.:
$+o.,¡. ISBN o ·+¡; oo·¡ ;.
Contrary to most studies on the Rwandan genocide, Alan Kuperman argues in his work that,
once the genocide had started, there was no possibility of halting the killings. He states that
‘although some lives could have been saved by intervention at any point during the genocide,
even a large force deployed immediately upon recognizing the genocidal intent would have
arrived too late to save even half of the ultimate victims’ (p. :).This claim relies on three points.
First, the speed of killing in Rwanda was so extreme that about half of the eventual victims
perished by the end of the third week of the genocide. Second, Western press coverage did not
accept that genocide was underway in the whole of Rwanda until at least two weeks into the
massacres. Third, due to the intricacies of troop deployment—apparently underrated by high-
ranking army officials and other observers—it would have taken several weeks to establish a force
that could have stopped the genocide.
In his detailed attempt to criticize or even discredit those analysts who argue that an early
intervention could have significantly mitigated the death toll in Rwanda, Kuperman makes
several mistakes, some of which go beyond the scope of this review. First, it is dubious to base
the US government’s knowledge of the situation on newspaper coverage. The poor coverage,
especially in the anglophone press, cannot be taken as a measurement of what the US
government could or should have done. The United States’ own CIA produced a report in
January +,,¡ predicting a possible half-million deaths in Rwanda, and Kuperman also quotes a
later report produced by the DIA. However, Kuperman is at pains to justify why the gravity of
these and other warnings was underrated. Whether this information was dismissed deliberately
or whether it was underestimated, the responsibility of the US government has to be appreciated
in the light of these warnings. Even if it was not realized that genocide was underway in Rwanda,
it was certainly clear that something terrible was taking place.
Second, via a number-crunching analysis of troop deployment, Kuperman dismisses the
analyses of high-ranking military officials, some of whom were on the ground.Taking very little
notice of the French parliamentary report, the book misses the fact that even the French General
Christian Quesnot, who knew Rwanda well from France’s prior involvement, estimates that a
combined force (UNAMIR plus the evacuation forces) could have stopped the massacres.
Furthermore, Kuperman vehemently writes off diplomatic efforts to stop the genocide.Although
he states that the killings were slower in areas where there were Western observers, he then goes
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INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 153
on to say that a foreign presence would not have stopped the genocidal killers. Merging the civil
war and the genocide, he even argues that foreign intervention would have increased the number
of victims, because supporting the ‘weaker’ side would encourage more killing. However, the
civilians who were killed in the genocide were not involved in the civil war.
In addition to these problems, Kuperman loses the thread of his argument in the middle of
the book. He sets up the argument in the first chapter, and touches on it in chapter ¡, but it is
not until chapter ; that he really makes his point.The reader is bombarded with details without
really knowing where they are leading.Although Kuperman makes one or two valid points with
regard to the importance of conflict prevention and the problem of humanitarian intervention,
the book is an amazing apologist piece—a great way to make policy-makers rest easier for
Daniela Kroslak,Training for Peace Programme, Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs, Oslo
The politics and practice of United Nations peacekeeping: past, present and future.
By Indar Jit Rikhye. Clementsport, Canada: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press. :ooo. +·:pp.
Pb.: $:¡.,¡. ISBN + ·,o¡¡+ ¡: ;.
The author of this book was Chief of Staff of UNEF (+,¡·–oo) and intimately involved in UN
peacekeeping activities throughout the +,oos in the UN Secretariat. Between +,o, and +,·, he
was President of the International Peace Academy in New York, which has played a leading role
in improving UN peacekeeping, and he has authored several books and articles on the subject.
It is therefore hard to think of a person better placed to write a book that reviews the conduct
of past and present operations and suggests how future operations might be made more effective.
The book’s publication is also timely, as the UN-sponsored Brahimi Report (August :ooo) has
created political momentum for improving UN peacekeeping operations. However, the timing
also turns out to be something of a disadvantage, because the analysis in the book pales in
comparison to the Brahimi Report.The latter provides a far better examination of the problems
facing contemporary peacekeeping operations, and its reform proposals are also more detailed
and better presented. Still, Rikhye highlights the same problems and makes essentially the same
recommendations as the Brahimi Report, leading the reader to hope that this book will
contribute to sustaining the momentum that the Report has created.
Overall, the book provides a good, short introduction to the history and development of UN
peacekeeping operations. The first chapter is a general introduction to the subject, which
provides an overview of UN activities in peace and security from +,¡¡ to the present. Then
follows an assessment of four UN operations from the +,,os. Chapter ¡ analyses the evolution
of peacekeeping doctrine from the launch of the first operation in +,¡o until the present and
ends with a call for a development of an official UN doctrine, something that the organization
has never had. Chapter ¡ discusses four general types of peace operations that go beyond tradi-
tional peacekeeping, looking at their implications for the UN, and identifies a need for greater
involvement of regional organizations. Finally, chapter ¡ outlines a list of recommendations for
strengthening UN peacekeeping operations.
While the book contains many valuable insights and some excellent passages, the author is
clearly more at home in the Cold War era than in the present, and the book is thus rather disap-
pointing. Read in isolation most of the chapters are quite good, but there is no overall structure
or logic linking them together. The book is supposedly structured around eight questions
presented in the preface, but they disappear in most of the chapters. The first chapter, which is
supposed to focus on the role of the Secretary General and the Security Council, also contains
an introduction to the regional arrangements, which would have made more sense in chapter ¡,
where their weaknesses are discussed. The analysis of the four operations in chapter : is not
explicitly linked to the other chapters, and it would also have made more sense after chapter ¡,
which discusses the evolution of peacekeeping doctrine since +,¡o. Finally, the analysis of
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 154
contemporary peacekeeping is at times too superficial because the author bites off more than he
can chew, and furthermore much of it has been overtaken by events.
Peter Viggo Jakobsen, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
Russia and Europe: conflict or cooperation? Edited by Mark Webber. Basingstoke:
Macmillan. :ooo. :¡·pp. Index. £¡¡.oo. ISBN o ¡¡¡ ;¡¡·· o.
The product of a conference at Loughborough University in July +,,·, revised and updated in
August +,,,, this book explores Russia’s relations with Europe since the end of the Cold War
and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Thanks to the firm editorship of Mark Webber, the
contributions are not only concise and informative but closely focused. In short, the book
provides an excellent wide-ranging review that usefully complements the earlier SIPRI volume
on the same subject.
Since the relations between Russia and the states of Europe have been routinely conducted as
much through Europe’s multilateral institutions as through the more traditional mechanisms of
bilateral diplomacy, much of the volume focuses on Russia’s relations with these institutions.
Four of the nine chapters examine Russia’s relations with NATO, the EU, the OSCE and the
Council of Europe. Additionally, many of the concerns examined in the chapters on ‘Russia and
issues of demilitarization’ and ‘Russia and the Former Yugoslavia’ have been handled within the
dense mesh of Europe’s security institutions.
In his lively introduction, Mark Webber identifies those elements in Russia’s relations with
Europe which have generated competition and conflict and those which have made for cooper-
ation and accommodation, and concedes that the question posed in the subtitle of the book
elicits no simple answer. However, the focus on the multilateral basis of Russia’s relations with
Europe reflects a broader set of theoretical propositions set out by the editor. A persuasive case is
made for the neo-liberal institutionalist view that within the dynamism and uncertainty that has
characterized post-Cold War Europe, the multilateral institutions have provided ‘both an anchor
and a compass for Russia in Europe’ (p. +;). Consequently, the working premise of the book is
that notwithstanding the disagreements and tensions ‘cooperation has endured throughout all the
vissicitudes of Russia’s domestic political and economic upheaval and at a time of flux in the
international relations of the European continent’ (p. vii).
By contrast, the future of Russian–European relations looks uncertain. In the absence of the
prospect of Russia’s membership of the EU, the EU–Russia dialogue remains a largely bureau-
cratic exercise, but Moscow’s accommodation of EU enlargement nonetheless seems assured,
boosted by indications of EU support for Russia’s six-year-old application to join the World
Trade Organization. However, it is recognized that further NATO enlargement at the Prague
summit in December :oo:, possibly embracing the Baltic republics as the first states of the former
Soviet Union to come under the American nuclear umbrella, promises to be ‘the single most
likely cause of a wholesale deterioration in Russian–European relations’ (p. :::). Alternatively, in
the wake of the events of ++ September :oo+ and the measured participation of Russia in the
US-led coalition against international terrorism, a re-thinking of patterns of regional security
management and the evolution of NATO into a broader regional security organization may
generate some sort of triangular US–EU/NATO–Russia defence and security architecture to
deal with a wider range of international security concerns.
John Berryman, Birkbeck, University of London, UK
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Turkey’s transformation and American policy. Edited by Morton Abramowitz.
Washington DC:The Century Foundation Press. :ooo. :,·pp. Index. $:¡.,¡. ISBN o ·;o;· ¡¡¡ o.
This edited volume brings together a group of experts to provide an impressive collection, mostly
for an American audience. With their diverse backgrounds and well-established credentials in
government, journalism and academia, and with their knowledge of Turkey and the Turkish
language, the contributors are able to present lucid, well-written, easily digestible and argumen-
tative chapters on post-Cold War Turkey and Turkish–American relations.
Certain individual chapters within the book are of high quality and offer significant insight
into the nitty-gritty of different aspects of Turkish–American relations. Heath Lowry and Alan
Makovksy in particular provide useful perceptions into the past and the future of the relationship.
Their balanced analyses of opportunities for improvement of the relationship and obstacles to its
further enhancement provide useful sobering warnings as well as hope for the future.
Even those less satisfactory contributions are well structured and professionally done. Their
weaknesses stem mainly from the fact that their authors’ primary interest is not
Turkish–American relations per se. The book was commissioned by an American foundation for
an American audience, with the intention to analyse the importance of Turkey for America,
without much scholarly focus.The fact that three of the seven authors (Abramowitz,Wilkonson
and Makovsky) have worked or are still working for the US government; one author (Çandar)
is a journalist; and the main area of specialization of the remaining authors is not
Turkish–American relations (Önis is an economist; Robins is an expert on Turkey’s Middle
Eastern policy and Lowry is an Ottoman historian), is reflected in the book’s occasional flaws,
although these are not numerous.
Despite the individual quality of most of the chapters, the collection as a whole lacks a
coherent framework and fails to be a comprehensive study of all aspects of US–Turkish relations.
While domestic aspects of both countries figure predominantly in many chapters (chs :–o), only
chapter ; deals with a third-party involvement in the smooth functioning of the relationship
between the two countries. One expects to find additional chapters dealing with the
Turkish–American–Israeli triangle, or Turkish–US cooperation in the ‘Caspian Games’, though
many authors mention these in passing. In addition, Önis’s chapter is a survey of Turkey’s
economic problems, and it is not made clear how these are relevant to Turkish–US relations,
except in the rightful conclusion that there is room for improvement (pp. ++¡–+¡). Çandar, on
the other hand, being an ardent supporter and adviser/originator of the late President Özal’s
‘active foreign policy’, cannot occasionally avoid partiality and a biased approach. Finally, despite
an excellent introduction and overview by Morton Abramowitz, the book needs a concluding
chapter that could have summarized the findings of the various chapters into a coherent whole
to present guidelines for the future, though again many authors do that individually.
Another problem for the reader is the result of the dynamism that overwhelms the Turkey
specialist;Turkey is a country on the move, and change in every aspect of daily life from economics
to foreign policy is an inescapable phenomenon. The authors of individual chapters of this book
have also been caught out by this dynamism, so that detailed information is sometimes out-of-
date (see, for example, pp. ++, +¡, ++:, :¡¡, :¡·), though their overall analysis is not.
The main problem with the book is that it is an edited volume; thus, like all other such works,
it brings together some perfect and some not-so-good articles. Nevertheless, it contains good and
insightful individual papers and overall it does justice to its stated aim, that is, to offer ‘insightful
and important explanation(s) of American interests, Turkey’s domestic problems, and a likely
future agenda of bilateral relations’ (p. vii). In short, it will be useful for those engaged in Turkish
foreign policy studies and for those who wish to grasp how American foreign policy regarding
its smaller allies is made.
Mustafa Aydin, Ankara University,Turkey
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Conflict, security and armed forces
Waging modern war. By Wesley Clark. Oxford: PublicAffairs. :oo+. ¡o¡pp. Index. £+,.,,.
ISBN + ,o¡,·¡ o· o.
During NATO’s war in Kosovo, General Wesley Clark was asked by Prime Minister Tony Blair,
‘Are we going to win?’. He replied ‘Prime Minister, I have never lost anything in my life, and I
don’t intend to.’ Sadly, his brave words were not borne out by subsequent events, for NATO
proved not only incapable of winning a victory against the Serbs in the classic sense, but the
Alliance tragically failed to deliver the humanitarian, military or even political objectives set out
at the start of the war by its political leaders.The first of these objectives was, in the words of the
Secretary General, ‘to prevent more human suffering and more repression and violence against
the civilian population of Kosovo’. In the eleven weeks that followed the onset of hostilities,
thousands of people were killed and one million driven from their homes in a programme of
ethnic cleansing that actually accelerated after NATO’s bombing campaign began on :¡ March
+,,,. Nor was the second objective achieved which, in the words of General Clark, was supposed
to ‘disrupt, degrade, devastate and ultimately destroy the Serb war machine’. In fact, the bombing
campaign scarcely damaged the Serb army and it was ultimately allowed to withdraw undefeated
into Yugoslavia. Third, at a political level, the main point of disagreement at Rambouillet that
concerned freedom of movement for NATO troops in Yugoslavia was never conceded by
Milosevic in the peace discussions that ended the war.
NATO failed to achieve its war aims, quite simply, because it fought the wrong war. Its purpose
should have been the safeguarding of a human population, not the destruction of an enemy war
machine.Today, it is apparent from reading General Clark’s book that nothing much has changed.
General Clark describes how as a cadet he was taught that strategic art involved bringing an
enemy to battle ‘at a time and place of your choosing, where you can finish him off ’. As we have
seen so often since the end of the Gulf War, war does not always fit into this traditional
Clausewitzian model. It has now moved on to a new form of post-modern conflict in which
there is no clearly defined enemy, end state or victory in the classic sense. In such forms of
conflict, military power alone will seldom produce enduring solutions. Even in the Balkans, as
Biljana Plavsic reminded General Clark, the answer to Kosovo was to be found in establishing
democracy in Belgrade. By bombing Yugoslavia, NATO only served to weaken the existing Serb
opposition to Milosevic and thus further delay the start of the democratic process in that country.
In what are, at times, almost shocking revelations about the inner workings of the US admin-
istration, General Clark describes an almost total breakdown of trust between himself and his
masters in Washington. As the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and US C-in-C Europe, he
found himself without clear mandate or political support at home. Before the war had even
started, he was described by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as having ‘one foot on a
banana skin and one foot in the grave’. By the end of the book, he comes across as a lonely and
somewhat heroic figure fighting a war on three fronts simultaneously; against his own dysfunc-
tional administration, against a foot-dragging Alliance and against Milosevic, with whom he
seems to be fighting a personal vendetta. Nevertheless, one cannot help having a sneaking feeling
of sympathy for him as a commander, even though it is obvious that he was partially responsible
for his own sorry predicament. For example, by unduly pressing his case for the deployment of
Apache helicopters to Kosovo, he raised enormous political opposition against himself in
Washington for little tactical gain. Given the prevailing unhappy atmosphere, it was not surprising
that at the end of the war he was summarily dismissed by Cohen, thus adding his name to the
long list of commanders who have been similarly treated by their own ungrateful countries.
His book also raises legitimate worries about the decision-making process at the political and
military levels in NATO. Although he remained friends with the Secretary General, he had
considerable difficulty in persuading all member states that NATO’s target lists should be widened
to include bridges, electricity plants, fuel depots and TV stations.As a result, by the end of the war,
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it seemed that the credibility and cohesion of the Alliance weighed more heavily on General
Clark’s mind than the humanitarian disasters being daily visited upon the people of Kosovo.
General Clark may have done us great service in revealing the difficulties of command in
such an unhomogeneous alliance as NATO, but we must be careful not to be beguiled by the
central message in his book. For if we continue to believe that air power by itself has the ability
to solve complex human problems on the ground, then we will condemn future generations to
suffer the same dreadful fate as the people of Kosovo. Although air power undoubtedly provides
the most effective weapon systems of the battlefield, as we are seeing in Afghanistan today it is
the soldiers on the ground who are seizing territory and rescuing the Afghan people from their
Security, strategy, and critical theory. By Richard Wyn Jones. London, Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner. +,,,. +·,pp. Index. £¡,.,¡. ISBN + ¡¡¡·; ¡¡¡ ,.
Although Critical Security Studies (CSS) is starting to build up a track record of research output,
there is a great need for a book which explores directly the relationship between critical theory
and security studies. Richard Wyn Jones’s book fills that gap admirably, whether or not one agrees
with his positions and conclusions. His aim is to ‘outline and argue for an approach to security
studies based on the work of the Frankfurt school—the originators of critical theory as that term
is usually understood’ (p. ix). He also states that ‘critical security studies should be developed in
... the light of ... Frankfurt school critical theory’ (p. ix). This seems to go beyond claiming that
CSS can learn from critical theory to claiming that CSS (and perhaps even security studies
generally) should be based on the Frankfurt school. I want to consider these contentions in terms
of Wyn Jones’s rejection of ‘traditional theory’, his exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of
critical theory, and his discussion of the relationship between theory and practice.
Following critical theorist Max Horkheimer, Wyn Jones distinguishes between traditional
theory and critical theory. He rejects traditional theory and its epistemology and yet he also
embraces the Enlightenment (pp. ¡o, ¡,–oo). However, the two appear to overlap heavily in his
writing, in that both seem to involve distinctions between fact and value, and subject and object.
If what he means is that ‘traditional theory’ is some kind of distortion or perversion of the
Enlightenment, then traditional theory as he describes it appears to be simply ideology, and
ideology can be challenged not by rejecting science and rationality but by employing them.Wyn
Jones argues that the epistemology of traditional theory ‘leads to analysis that is pro-status quo and
amoral’ (p. +¡+). However, it may only appear to be that way because many traditional theorists
are themselves pro-status quo and amoral: the work of people like Noam Chomsky can hardly be
placed in either of these categories. Furthermore, Wyn Jones takes Horkeimer and Theodor
Adorno to task for criticizing rationality per se instead of following critical theory’s own stricture
to make any critique historically specific (p. ¡¡). Yet, in asserting that certain epistemological
assumptions cannot be other than pro-status quo and amoral he violates that stricture himself.
Nor is Wyn Jones’s account of the evolution of Frankfurt school critical theory and the
debates within it any more persuasive of its superiority as an approach. I would argue that, if
critical theory is about any one thing, it is about a normative commitment to emancipation
rather than a commitment to a particular meta-theory. What do critical theorists mean by
‘emancipation’? What are their grounds for believing that emancipation is possible? Wyn Jones
assesses the attempts of Horkheimer, Adorno, Jürgen Habermas, Alex Honneth and Stephen
Bronner to answer these questions. As it turns out, he criticizes all of them for their
undeveloped notions of politics and society; their neglect of interests and the workings of
capitalism; their tendency towards grand generalization rather than historically-specific analyses;
their tendency to treat their central concepts as static and independent instead of mutually
constitutive; their very unambitious ideas regarding the political role of theorists; and their
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 158
almost total lack of attention to how theory can illuminate practice. Ironically, in so doing, these
critical theorists violate what Wyn Jones sees as most of the basic precepts of critical theory.The
only critical theorists who come out of Wyn Jones’s account at all well are Andrew Feenberg
and Ulrich Beck. Nevertheless, far from being an endorsement of the Frankfurt school, his book
unintentionally reads like a rather powerful rebuttal of most of it. The next theme in his
writing—that theory stands or falls by its contribution to political practice—makes critical
theory look even more unhealthy.
Wyn Jones places great emphasis on Nancy Fraser’s statement that ‘It is in the crucible of
political practice that critical theories meet the ultimate test of vitality’ (quoted pp. ;o, ,o, +¡¡).
Unfortunately for CSS, Bronner wrote that critical theory is mostly ‘nothing more than an
academic exercise’ (quoted p. ;o): viewed from the perspective of the above survey it is difficult
to disagree. Wyn Jones accepts this and then goes on to a fairly brief discussion as a first step to
remedying the fact that, thus far, CSS has failed to explain how its theory will link to practice
and actually bring about change. The idea that those who sign up to some version of the
Frankfurt school are the ones who can best deliver emancipatory practice is unpersuasive and has
no practical political future. The most that Wyn Jones can claim for his neo-/post-Frankfurt
school approach is that, in certain specific circumstances, it will have something to contribute to
the project of emancipation. This may seem unexceptional, but it would involve Wyn Jones
dropping his assertions about the amorality and so on of traditional theory.
Those within CSS find it easy to object to traditional security studies (that is, security studies
harnessed to the service of Western states and entrenched privilege more generally) but, strik-
ingly, have been virtually silent on the much harder to dismiss and much more valuable field of
peace studies.Wyn Jones asserts that its methodology will undermine its values, so that it becomes
conformist, or that its values will undermine its methodology, so that it becomes merely pure
idealism (p. +¡:). However, this cannot be proven from first principle (and Wyn Jones’s implicit
claim that it can contradicts his own assertion that critique must be historically grounded).
Instead of arguing over claims of what counts as CSS, the aim should be to change the agenda
of security studies per se: security as emancipation of common humanity should not be the
preserve of a sub-field but should be the field itself. Instead of ever-decreasing circles of ‘real’
CSS, those in CSS need to connect more directly to an already-existing vast nexus of theory and
practice in emancipatory politics, as have Chomsky and others.
Eric Herring, University of Bristol, UK
International security in a global age: securing the twenty-first century. Edited by
Clive Jones and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe. London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass. :oo+. £¡¡.oo.
ISBN o ;+¡o ¡oo+ ;. Pb.: £+;.¡o. ISBN o ;+¡o ·+++ ¡.
In the introduction to this book Caroline Kennedy-Pipe begins by asking: ‘Is another book on
the issue of security after the end of the Cold War really necessary?’This is a fair question, consid-
ering the current volume of literature on the subject. Indeed, the question speaks to the
often-disappointing quality in the analysis, research and originality in many of the recent books
on this topic. If one can borrow two post-Cold War clichés, the debate seems to have been
infused with all the depth of the CNN ‘sound bite’ and turnaround time (and thought gestation
period) of the ‘fastest with the mostest’ tenet for the post-Cold War force deployment.The result
is all too often a rapid turnout of mostly forgettable and shallow analysis that is better suited to
the weekly format of The Economist than to scholarly works.
The editors of this work offer no such pretensions for their book, with the refreshingly frank,
if anti-climactic, assertion that this particular collection of essays will not seek to break any new
ground or delve into a big picture overview of these shifting times. Rather, International security in
a global age is designed to serve as a primer for the undergraduate audience in some of the facets
of the post-Cold War world.The topics covered come as no particular surprise: the shifting in the
most prevalent forms of warfare; US national security; Russia’s reorientation; Europe’s attempt to
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strike out on its own; security in South-East Asia; peacekeeping; environmental security; prolifer-
ation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.
Bearing in mind the target audience, the quality and utility of the chapters varies considerably,
with some being too technical and narrowly focused to serve as an introduction to the
uninitiated. There are also some rather gaping holes in the subject matter covered, the inclusion
of which may have better tied the book together. The principal topic not included is interna-
tional law and how it is increasingly impinging on armed conflict. The International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court are monumental,
indeed unique, developments in the post-Cold War paradigm. Another area completely ignored
is conflict below the threshold of arms, namely the increasing use (and misuse) of diplomatic and
economic sanctions. Furthermore, for a book that includes the phrase ‘global age’ in its title, the
impact of global economic and cultural integration as a dissuading influence against the recourse
to arms (not a panacea) ought to have been included. Finally, while perhaps not mandating a
chapter of its own, the emergence of a strong non-state based international community (NGOs,
IOs, media and the UN) certainly deserves some attention. It is these actors who are often the
first to intervene in active or burgeoning conflicts to mitigate their effects, and through their
actions and the attention they receive, force states to become involved in humanitarian inter-
vention. The cases of Somalia and Kosovo are but two where responses were forced from the
leading powers in stark disproportion to their strategic interests in the area in conflict.
Despite these faults, sections of this book would certainly complement undergraduate studies
in the field.While the editors by their own admission did not set out to produce a concise world
view, it seems that in not striving to create even the framework of a wider context and doing
more to tie the individual chapters together they have done a disservice to the subject.The result
is that the book is unfortunately not greater than the sum of its parts, which by default dimin-
ishes the contributions of each author, which are otherwise quite informative and interesting.
International security is not compartmental but interlaced and fluid, and any book looking to
broach the subject would do well not to defy its subject’s nature.
Daniel Neysmith, UNHCR
Civilians in war. Edited by Simon Chesterman. London, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
:oo+. :·,pp. Index. Pb.: £+¡.,¡. ISBN + ¡¡¡·; ,o¡ ,.
Global insecurity. Edited by Mary Kaldor. London, New York: Continuum. :ooo. :¡¡pp.
Index. Pb.: £+¡.,,. ISBN o ·¡¡o; o¡¡ +.
An edited collection of articles always presents a reviewer with the problem of assessing the overall
quality and lasting value of the volume in question. On the one hand, edited volumes, especially
if they emanate from an academic conference or workshop, are invariably of mixed quality. On
the other hand, the chances are that something of interest will be said even in the blandest of
collections or in the most boring of conferences. In the end, the one test that can and should be
applied is whether the editor or editors have succeeded in providing a measure of intellectual and
thematic coherence to the book so that the sum is greater than the individual parts.
In Civilians in war, Simon Chesterman has succeeded admirably in doing just that. Its thematic
starting point is the body of rules that already exists to protect civilians in times of war. It recog-
nizes, however, that in the contemporary context ‘more than reliance on rules is needed’ and the
book successfully manages to explore the wider implications of this basic insight.The recognition
of the need to place the discussion of civilians in war within a historical and political context is
one of the book’s virtues. So is the use of in-depth and carefully researched case-studies on
Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Colombia, and Rwanda, among others.
By contrast Global insecurity is far less focused and, ultimately, much less rewarding as a body
of research to which others can look for ideas and insights. At the outset the reader is treated to
an overview of the basis for Mary Kaldor’s claim (presented in greater detail in her other
writings) that the international community is faced with so-called ‘New Wars’, as distinct from
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‘old wars’, ‘Clausewitzean wars’ or ‘wars of classical modernity’ (these categorizations have been
used interchangeably elsewhere but, as a form of periodization, they remain deeply confusing and
highly problematic). According to Kaldor, ‘the misdiagnosis of security planners lies in their
failure to recognise the importance and character of new wars’. The difficulty is that the
‘distinctive characteristics’ of ‘New Wars’ turn out, on closer inspection, to be neither distinctive
nor very new (e.g. violence in New Wars is ‘directed mainly against civilians’). More importantly
in this context, the framework posited does not really provide a central theme around which the
subsequent chapters fit. The conclusion returns to the notion of ‘New Wars’ but without any
critical detachment. Instead, it is as if the notion represented a clear-cut and unproblematic
category of analysis that allows for specific policy recommendations to be made. Some of the
individual chapters in the book are very good. Alex de Waal’s chapter ‘Wars in Africa’ is a case in
point; wide-ranging, thought-provoking and carefully researched. On the whole, however, the
book compares unfavourably to Civilians in war, which is likely to be of interest to a wider
audience and to remain so for a much longer time.
Mats Berdal, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, UK
Justice and reconciliation: after the violence. By Andrew Rigby. London, Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner. :oo+. :o¡pp. Index. Pb.: £+o.,¡. ISBN + ¡¡¡·; ,·o +.
One of the merits of this book is the way in which the author’s previous work on non-violent
social change in general, and Palestinian experience under Israeli occupation in particular,
informs his analysis of the complex requirements of reconciliation during times of transitional
justice ‘after the violence’. A refreshing honesty and personal commitment infuse the text.
Readers coming to this topic for the first time will welcome the clarity with which the issues
are laid out in the first chapter, where four alternative approaches are adumbrated—amnesia,
punitive trials, truth commissions, and reparations—and then briefly related to classic analyses by
Arendt and Jaspers and to more recent treatments by Kritz, Huntington and Lederach.
The main substance of the text is contained in the five case-study chapters which exemplify
the first three of these ‘alternative models’ by looking at, respectively, post-Franco Spain, post-
+,¡¡ and post-+,·, Europe, and Latin America and South Africa. The chapters are informative
and do succeed in general terms in illustrating the author’s central contention: that the scope for
these varied strategies is largely a function of the politics of the transition phase, where, roughly,
the more clear-cut the transfer of power, the less the need to accommodate the interests of
former power-holders and the greater the scope for instituting ‘justice’ without a risk to ‘peace’.
Other dimensions of this large topic are not dealt with here, however, such as the influence of
different cultural settings on questions of justice and reconciliation—one reason perhaps being
that only Christianized examples are looked at in these chapters. A sixth chapter, in which the
author does look at a non-Christian example, is his Palestinian case-study, which stands out from
the others in a number of ways, not least because the violence there has not yet ended. Here his
insight into the problem of how to handle ‘collaborators’ is noteworthy.
Four broad conclusions are reached on the wider dimensions of the process of reconciliation:
that the multidimensional nature of reconciliation requires time within which the different facets
may be accommodated cumulatively as opportunity arises; that all strata of society must
eventually be involved in the healing process; that outsiders have no right to dictate if, how or
when victims are able to forgive and let go of the past; and that restitution must include an
overcoming not only of personal injustice but of structural injustice also. This well-written and
accessible book offers an excellent short introduction to one of the great issues of our day.
Oliver Ramsbotham, University of Bradford, UK
Conflict, security and armed forces
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Peace building in Northern Ireland, Israel and South Africa: transition, transfor-
mation and reconciliation. By Colin Knox and Padraic Quirk. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
:ooo. :¡;pp. £¡:.¡o. ISBN o ¡¡¡ o·+·, ¡.
Knox and Quirk’s book attempts an analysis of peace building in Northern Ireland, Israel and
South Africa viewed from a rather more holistic perspective than many other works on peace
processes. As the authors note, many academic accounts have looked at the macro level of high
politics, treaties and elite accommodation when casting an eye over peace processes in each of
the three countries.Yet this provides only a ‘restrictive framework for comparative analysis’ and
‘ignores the possibility that whilst macro level accommodation is a necessary precondition for
political progress, it may not, by itself, be sufficient to achieve the goals of building peace and
reconciliation’ (p. :¡).
The book specifically adopts the alternative conceptualization of peace building formulated by
J. P. Lederach in Remember and change (+,,o). Briefly, the three main observations in this analysis
are that +) there is an overemphasis on crisis management in peace processes, rather than an over-
arching strategic vision; :) there exists an hierarchical, and insufficient, approach to peace
building in which most attention focuses on the top level of elite accommodation, to the
detriment of the study of grassroots activity; and ¡) an organic, comprehensive approach is
needed to transform conflicts in the search for communal reconciliation, one which embraces
not merely the political, but also social, economic, socio-psychological and spiritual changes.The
structure of the book mirrors this underlining of the necessity of ‘bottom-up’ peace building
action. In each of the case-studies, one section relates to the macro level of governmental negoti-
ations, while the second explores the micro grassroots activity. The first sections provide a solid,
standard introduction to the conflicts and peace processes in each of the three countries, but it
is in the examination of the grassroots and middle-level activity, and the impact of state policy
within these sectors, that we find the real crispness and detail of the authors’ analysis. The
bottom-level peace building activity in each of the examples is insightfully picked apart, and
useful comparisons and contrasts made.
Northern Irish grassroots activity, the authors note, has been characterized by a relative lack of
spontaneous involvement by peace movements and the churches, elements which occur to a
greater or lesser extent in Israel or South Africa.Yet many of the state attempts at addressing social
imbalance have had greater success, and quasi-autonomous organizations which are largely
funded by government, such as the Community Relations Council, have also shown ability in
fostering reconciliation. The section on Israel/Palestine illuminates the rather fractured and
partially moribund nature of peace and reconciliation activity there and indeed the authors’
prognosis on peace building in this case-study is somewhat bleak. Knox and Quirk have much
to say on how structural inequality, and the widely divergent views held by Palestinians and
Israelis on what ‘peace’ is about, have done nothing to strengthen the grounding of accommo-
dation in civil society. In South Africa, the success of peace building has been mixed. While the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission has partially advanced reconciliation through a kind of
communal catharsis, this socio-psychological edging forward has not been accompanied by the
necessary narrowing of the social and economic divide, essential to the bedding down of peace
within local communities. Indeed, for many of South Africa’s whites, much of the activities of
the Commission have an irritant rather than a soothing effect anyway.
While acknowledging deficiencies in Lederach’s peace building approach, the authors make
a strong empirical case for its usefulness in charting the success of peace processes, and few
would disagree with their conclusion that ‘political agreements must be underpinned by the
active involvement of civil society’ (p. :+,). This study makes a welcome contribution to the
analysis of peace processes, given its focus on the rather neglected role of civil society in trans-
Kris Brown, Linen Hall Library, Belfast, UK
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A history of NATO: the first fifty years. Edited by Gustav Schmidt. Basingstoke:
Palgrave. :oo+. ¡ vols. +¡+¡pp. Index. £+¡o.oo. ISBN o ¡¡¡ ,o:;; X.
Ever since Lord Ismay’s résumé The first five years (+,¡¡), NATO anniversaries have triggered
numerous in-depth surveys, analysing the Alliance’s past as well as its future challenges. In this
respect, this extensive collection of articles is one among many, but it clearly towers above most.
Within an increasingly vast and disparate literature, it constitutes a firm and reliable reference point.
Almost ten years ago, Donald Watt warned that it was too early to pronounce judgement on
the history of NATO because the evidence was ‘both overwhelmingly rich and riddled with
lacunae’. Though there is much judgement in these three volumes on the first fifty years of the
Atlantic Alliance, it is neither rushed nor unaware of the remaining lacunae. The result of an
international conference to commemorate the Alliance’s fiftieth anniversary, the volumes,
comprising more than oo articles by some of the world’s most distinguished security experts, are
divided into +¡ sections. The articles cover a range of subject areas, including the origins of
NATO, member and non-member states’ approaches to NATO and intra-alliance tensions, the
Alliance’s out-of-area-problems, its enlargements, the import of the transatlantic relationship and
the European dimension of security, new forms of affiliation with former enemies, nuclear issues
and questions of military strategy and arms production. Each thematic chapter addresses the
organization’s historical record, analyses its present state, and assesses its future.What has emerged
is an important work of synthesis and original scholarship that encourages reflection and provides
the impetus for further research.
Charles Cogan’s lucid essay on the security crisis of the late +,¡os is as much an analysis of the
origins of the Cold War (in the broader sense), as of the origins and significance of the Alliance.
Alan Milward presents a thoughtful discussion on the competing interests of long-term
economic security and immediate military security in the early +,¡os, and concludes that ‘the
history of NATO is ... the history of a new stage in the history of the state’ (vol. +, p. :o).
Presenting some of the intricacies of and major turning-points in the evolution of NATO
nuclear strategy, Michael Wheeler reminds us of Lawrence Freedman’s memorable phrase that
‘nuclear deterrence worked better in practice than in theory’ (vol. ¡, p. +::). And Vojtech Mastny,
by utilizing new archival material, provides insights into the inner workings of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization, where, as other authors confirm, perception and reality increasingly drifted apart.
History suggests that once alliances succeed in their primary purpose, i.e. to contain the
common enemy, they disband. How then do we account for NATO’s post-Cold War survival?In
an attempt to reassess the evolution of the Alliance, Frédéric Bozo argues that, from its very
inception, it had a more embracing scope than was commonly believed, which was progressively
to reveal itself as the initial threat became less pervasive; that new tasks have been given priority
by NATO at least since the +,oos, and that they have played a decisive role in preserving its
cohesion and purpose throughout the second half of its Cold War existence, as well as providing
the basis for its post-Cold War persistence. Continuity, however, Bozo suggests, ‘would not have
been sufficient to ensure the successful transformation of the Alliance after the Cold War without
a second factor: relevance. Indeed NATO’s historical record of adaptability to its new missions
had to be supplemented by the actual demonstration of its ability to effectively carry out
functional change after the Cold War’ (vol. :, p. ;·). Some of these aspects of functional change
are expertly discussed in the chapters that deal with the relationship between NATO and the
United Nations in the +,,os and, more specifically, with the Alliance’s role in the Balkans crises.
Ironically, it is precisely the Alliance’s new roles and missions in a transformed strategic
environment that do not hold much attraction for those seeking to join NATO.As Sean Kay points
out, new allies did not and Alliance candidates do not seek to join a ‘new NATO’. They sought,
and respectively seek, membership for the purposes of the ‘old NATO’—‘collective defense and a
hard American security guarantee’ (vol. +, p. ::¡). Consequently, several authors have thrown into
question the strategic purpose of the Alliance’s enlargement policies. Nevertheless, Lawrence
Kaplan’s submission that ‘the best that could be expected is to convert NATO into a collective
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security organization, keeping peace among themselves, in place of a collective defense organi-
zation’ (vol. +, p. :o¡), seems to have been invalidated, at least for the time being, by recent events.
Even though the sudden re-emergence of European defence, powerfully symbolized by the
Anglo-French Joint Declaration signed in St Malo in December +,,·, could not fully be taken
into account, a number of articles trace the several policy changes in this area: from the notion
of a European pillar within NATO in the +,·os, to attempts to create purely European struc-
tures to rival NATO in the early +,,os, and back to a Europeanization of NATO. Recent
developments in this field are viewed with scepticism. It is stressed that it will be a long time
before EU countries can consistently manage collectively to formulate policies that go beyond
the lowest common denominator efforts.
In sum, this remarkable collection, which includes a useful bibliography and index, serves as a
reader in the best sense of the word. It offers invaluable insights for those engaged in interna-
tional studies, for the expert, and indeed, for today’s decision-maker.
Victor Mauer, University of Bonn, Germany
Alliance politics, Kosovo, and NATO’s war: allied force or forced allies? Edited by
Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley. New York: Palgrave. :ooo. :¡opp. £¡:.¡o. Index. ISBN
o ¡+: :¡·+; ;.
NATO’s ‘humanitarian war’ over Kosovo provoked more questions than it answered for those
interested in global politics. For some, it ushered in a new international community in which the
rights of states would be tempered in important respects by their responsibilities to individuals.
For others, Operation Allied Force represented a dangerous turn, the dawning of a new military
humanism that threatened international stability. One of the issues that has not yet received a
great deal of consideration is the question of Alliance politics. It is this issue that the authors
gathered in this volume address. The editors ask whether the NATO operation was a case of
forced allies, obliged to fall into line on the Balkans by the American hegemon. In doing so, they
allude to an interesting framework for understanding why the various states acted as they did,
encompassing realist, liberal institutionalist and social constructivist approaches to state conflict.
The volume’s first section contains four chapters on the future of the Alliance and the European
security architecture. They ably set up the remainder of the book by identifying some of the
central dilemmas that confront Euro-Atlantic relations (such as American reluctance to act and the
European Defence Initiative). However, they also reveal the extent to which the depth of the
relationship and the shared values that underpin it will continue to bind different states together.
The second section contains case-studies of the way in which different allies responded to the
violence in Kosovo, which provide an interesting overview of the interplay of domestic politics,
foreign/institutional politics and humanitarian concern. In frontline states, such as Hungary and
Italy, concern with the practical repercussions of the conflict—for Vojvodina’s Hungarians in the
former and in terms of refugees in the latter—was overcome by the perceived institutional
benefit of maintaining NATO cohesion and the question of humanitarian need. Both states were
able to shape their contribution to the Alliance effort in innovative ways. Other members faced
none of these problems.The British government, for example, was domestically secure, externally
unthreatened and morally determined, producing its hawkish stance. Many of the case-studies
appear to follow a particular framework of analysis, but a fuller extrapolation of this implied
framework could have improved what is already a very good contribution to our understanding
of the issues.
As the literature on Kosovo continues to expand, this collection provides a welcome addition.
Although the individual case-studies by themselves do not tell us much that is new, and the
approach adopted throughout is decidedly North American, its analysis of the way in which the
Alliance functioned across a variety of levels and came to a consensus despite a wide variance of
opinion provides a valuable contribution. It also points towards further research on why
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particular states acted as they did, how they related to each other, and what Kosovo might mean
for the future of NATO.
Alex J. Bellamy, King’s College London, UK
NATO in the first decade after the Cold War. By Martin A. Smith. Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. :ooo. +,;pp. Index. £¡,.oo. ISBN o ;,:¡ oo¡: ·.
In the wake of the terrible terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC on ++ September
:oo+, an oft stated sentiment is that ‘everything has changed’. As the US is still engaged in aerial
attacks against targets in Afghanistan, whether and in what way this sentiment may be true
remains to be seen. Looking back to +,·,, however, it is clear that the opening of the Berlin Wall
and the subsequent ending of the Cold War did indeed herald a significant transformation. The
resulting change was perhaps most prominent in Europe, where the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) had faced the Warsaw Pact, which had been at the core of the East–West
Cold War confrontation. Over a decade later, the Warsaw Pact is of course no more, while
NATO, in spite of early prognostications that it would wither away, remains a vital and vibrant
organization. Martin Smith’s aim is to examine ‘whether and how’ NATO maintained its viability
as a functioning security institution through the +,,os.
The basis for Smith’s investigation is the argument that NATO developed through the Cold
War into an institution with a set of core norms and rules, or regimes, that had become fairly
well entrenched by the +,,os.These norms and rules, though there is variation in the degree to
which they have been developed across issue areas as well in the degree to which there is close
adherence, are evident in the Alliance’s processes of consultation in force-planning, East–West
relations, and the out-of-area activities of individual member states. Smith’s concern, then, is to
examine the degree to which there has been a continued adherence to these regimes, or
conversely whether observation of these regimes has fallen by the wayside, as NATO has endeav-
oured to adapt to the post-Cold War security environment. He does so by examining four key
issue areas—nuclear weapons planning, conventional force planning, eastern engagement and
enlargement and out-of-area activities—starting with an examination of whether and to what
degree norms and rules evolved with respect to each of these issues during the Cold War, and
then examining whether and to what degree there was continued observance to these regimes
as NATO sought to adapt to the post-Cold War security environment. Smith’s overall contention
is that NATO does indeed embody core norms and rules that not only have remained signif-
icant and influential, but that their enduring value is a strength of the Alliance, one that, coupled
with its capacity to adapt, helps us to understand why it has persisted as the primary security
organization in Europe.
This brief exegesis of Smith’s analysis could be taken to suggest that this is a work of theory,
one concerned with the interminable debate between the neo-realists and neo-institutionalists
about whether ‘institutions matter’. But while his analysis does have a theoretical framework and
provides fodder for the ‘neo–neo’ debate, there is much more to Smith’s analysis than this would
suggest.The empirical case-studies he develops furnish interesting analyses of NATO’s post-Cold
War adaptations, and in doing so he provides considerable insight into the concerns and politics
that influenced change in the Alliance and the internal processes by which this occurred. Smith’s
analysis thus importantly complements those few empirical works that have endeavoured to
elucidate why and how NATO has changed, as well as contributing to the broader debates about
the relative merits of particular bodies of theory. One can only hope, in this time of potential
significant change, that Smith’s conclusion about NATO’s strength as an institution, and the value
of the regimes it represents, continue to serve it well in the coming years.
Terry Terriff, University of Birmingham, UK
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Politics, democracy and social affairs
The Blair effect: the Blair government, ‒. Edited by Anthony Seldon. London:
Little, Brown. :oo+. oo+pp. Index. £+¡.,,. ISBN o ¡+o ·¡o¡o ¡.
This sizeable volume, its :· chapters covering oo+ pages, is another weighty addition to the
Anthony Seldon collection of edited books on British politics. It largely succeeds in providing a
broad, at times panoramic, survey of the work of the Blair-led Labour government in its first term.
The editor has brought together an impressive number of experts who together provide clear-
sighted description and analysis of the politics and policy of the Labour government as it enters
its second term. In what is largely an even collection, it may seem invidious to select particular
chapters, but, without detracting from others, those by Ivor Crewe, Philip Norton, Brendan
O’Leary, Philip Stephens, and Christopher Hill, strike this reader as particularly insightful.
Although Dennis Kavanagh’s opening chapter usefully outlines the contemporary debate
about what the Labour government is actually doing (and how it is doing it), one feature of the
collection is that there is no sustained attempt to draw the work of the contributors together.
Each chapter tends to stand alone, and as a result the book tends to focus on micro-level rather
than macro-level analysis. In short, it chooses to look at the trees rather than at the wood. Of
course, given that a great deal of the existing literature on the New Labour phenomenon often
does precisely the opposite, this is not necessarily a bad thing. Looking at the trees is as important
as looking at the wood, and at this stage of any government’s life we need to have interim
empirical assessment of its work in a variety of policy fields. In this regard, the book solidly
delivers, and therefore provides a welcome and useful addition to the burgeoning literature on
New Labour and the Blair government.
Perhaps the defining feature of New Labour has been its willingness to accommodate its
reform agenda to the political and economic world within which it finds itself, and as Philip
Stephens’s chapter on the Treasury under Labour emphasizes, this has prompted ‘Labour’s recon-
ciliation with the market economy and with the macro-economic orthodoxy of the times’.With
contemporary mainstream politics having moved away from the nostrums of the postwar social
democratic era, Labour acknowledges that it operates within a neo-liberal policy paradigm, one
that frames and constrains government policy.The government pursues social reforms by seeking
to empower, free and liberalize the market by championing wealth creation, promoting business
and encouraging entrepreneurship. In contrast, after +,¡¡, building on a collectivist political
worldview developed in the +,¡os and +,¡os, Labour’s economic policy reflected an ideational
framework in which the role of the state was to manage the market, manipulating, controlling,
directing and taming it through the social democratic, quasi-corporatist state. Even before +,,;,
to quote Stephens again, Labour’s ‘ambition of greater social cohesion was contingent on a
demonstrable capacity to run the economy competently’, and it is this set of priorities that has
lain at the heart of the government’s domestic policy agenda since +,,;.
While not wishing to diminish the importance of the Blair government, this reader does (for
the present, at any rate) take some issue with Anthony Seldon’s assertion that the +,,; general
election will rank as a turning-point as important in British political history as the general
elections of +,oo, +,¡¡ and +,;,. For one thing, it is too soon to tell. By themselves, election
years change nothing, other than the administration of the day, and may not even change the
prevailing policy agenda. Some, of course, do manage to do precisely that. However, dramatic
political change, the exception not the rule, is the product of political events in the years
preceding and succeeding an election. Elections are only staging posts in the making of political
events, not by themselves turning-points in political affairs. Despite his many successes, and the
fact that under his leadership Labour has secured an unprecedented full second term, it is way
too soon to tell if Tony Blair is a politician able to make the weather, as it were, as did Margaret
Thatcher before him. Of course, this book does not set out to demonstrate that, nor holistically
to ‘explain’ New Labour, but merely to provide a useful and in places detailed interim record of
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what the Labour government has done within the policy fields in which it is obliged to act. In
this it succeeds admirably.
Richard Heffernan,The Open University, UK
Hard choices: social democracy in the twenty-first century. By Christopher Pierson.
Cambridge: Polity Press. :oo+. +o,pp. Index. £¡o.oo. ISBN o ;¡¡o +,·¡ ¡. Pb.: £+¡.,,. ISBN o ;¡¡o
Christopher Pierson has produced a timely book that should do much to resurrect interest in
‘traditional’ social democratic politics and discourage those who are currently seeking an elusive
‘third way’ outside the social democratic tradition.
In the first part of Hard choices Pierson provides trenchant critiques of those, such as John Gray
and Anthony Giddens, who appear to wish to bury ‘traditional’ social democracy. Writing in an
easily accessible style, Pierson demonstrates that the social democratic tradition is far richer than
many of its critics have supposed and, in particular, that the Keynesian welfare state is not
synonymous with social democracy. He also demonstrates that social democracy is ‘actually a
much more diverse and, perhaps surprisingly, interesting tradition than both its detractors and
many of its admirers have imagined’ (p. +;). It follows that ‘the route march of social democrats
was essentially to follow national roads’ (p. ¡o) and that it is misleading to take any single nation
as the exemplar of social democracy. Pierson is particularly successful in demonstrating that many
of the apparent concessions to neo-liberalism granted by the Australian Labour Party enabled it
to implement other policies that advanced broadly social democratic aims.The reader is therefore
reminded that all around the world social democratic parties are making hard choices, trading
desirable goals against one another, compromising and getting their hands dirty in government.
In the second part of Hard choices Pierson examines two developments—globalization and
demographic change—that have been thought to herald the end of social democratic politics.
He does not deny that these developments have serious implications for social democratic
parties, but argues that neither implies that any attempt to nudge, cajole or regulate the market
is impossible. Elsewhere he follows the implications of the globalization thesis to its logical
conclusion, pointing out that ‘if hyperglobalization were to be realized, we should all end up with
the social protection regime of Chad’ (p. ·o). If only more social democrats were as comfortable
in expressing moral outrage at the logic of twenty-first century capitalism!
The logic of Pierson’s argument is that social democratic parties can continue to prosper and
thrive, but the precise trajectory of those parties will depend on the precise circumstances faced
by each nation; its position in the world economy, the health of its right-wing opponents and
the personal inclinations of its leaders.The global pretensions of the ‘Third Wayers’ are therefore
exposed as hopelessly ahistorical.
Social democracy remains ‘a very diffuse set of values’ (p. ¡:). Arguably it falls short of being a
fully-fledged ideology and is merely ‘an amalgam of practice and ideas’ (p. +·). Ideologues of the
left and the right have often expressed frustration at its apparent incoherence.Yet social democrats
should take heart from this book. As long as capitalism, in any of its manifestations, produces
obscene inequalities, there will be a need for ‘a politics that tries to build wide-ranging coalitions
for the amelioration of inequality and the rectification of injustices’ (p. +¡,).
Well-written, witty and mercifully free of jargon, Hard choices represents a compelling addition
to the literature on social democracy. Most impressively of all, the word ‘project’ occurs only once
in the whole book (p. :+) and even then only to express a suitable degree of scorn for the conceit
John Bartle, University of Essex, UK
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Reshaping world politics: NGOs, the Internet, and global civil society. By Craig
Warkentin. Oxford, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. :oo+. :o;pp. Index. Pb.: $:+.,¡. ISBN
o ;¡:¡ o,;+ o.
This largely descriptive book sets out three questions of interest to international relations scholars
and policy-makers: What is global civil society? What are its origins? And what are the roles of
individuals in creating and maintaining it? After a brief literature review, the book provides a
definition: global civil society is ‘a socially constructed and transnationally defined network of
relationships that provides ideologically variable channels of opportunity for political
involvement’ (p. +,). This definition reflects the book’s grounding in ‘people-centered’
International Relations theory, drawing on the English school of Wight and Bull and paralleling
the American constructivist paradigm to focus on agency as well as structure. It then examines
eight Northern non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as exemplars of how global civil
society is creating itself with heavy reliance on the Internet. All are progressive advocacy organi-
zations: three environmental, three development-focused, and two ‘online resource networks’ that
attempt to serve the communications and information needs of large NGO networks.
Craig Warkentin evaluates the eight in terms of three characteristics he ascribes to global civil
society: dynamism (how flexible and adaptable the organization is), inclusiveness (the degree to
which it reaches out and ‘facilitates mutually respectful relations’), and self-reflection (what
Warkentin calls ‘cognizance’, or the degree to which the people in an organization see it as
having a particular role in the world). This approach provides a wealth of detail, but the
theoretical and analytical contribution is less clear. He refers to these characteristics as an
expansion of the definition, but the connection is unspecified. The case-studies are primarily
compilations of the organizations’ own documents and website materials, supplemented by inter-
views with present and former staff, rather than independent critiques. This makes it difficult to
tell whether these organizations are contributing to the development of a global civil society that
matters. ‘Dynamism’, for example, is portrayed as reflecting nimble adaptation to ensure
continued effectiveness under changing circumstances, but it could just as easily reflect mere
frenetic activity. Only Greenpeace comes in for any significant criticism for its relative lack of
adaptability in the +,,os, and even in that case Warkentin argues that there are signs of
improvement. In another case, the book praises one online network for its adaptability, but buries
in endnotes the fact that part of the adaptation consisted of slashing the budget from $¡ million
a year to less than a tenth of that amount, with associated staff cuts. It would be interesting to
have an evaluation of whether that change reflected flexibility or failure.
This book is a useful compilation for anyone interested in how such NGOs see themselves or
in the details of their operations. It would be an appropriate supplementary text for courses on
international relations and globalization.
Ann Florini, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,Washington DC, USA
Democracy beyond the state? The European dilemma and the emerging global order.
Edited by Michael Th. Greven and Louis W. Pauly. Oxford, Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield. :ooo. :o·pp. Index. £¡;.oo. ISBN o ·¡;o ,,oo ¡. Pb.: £+o.,¡. ISBN o ·¡;o ,,o+ ¡.
This is a coherent edited volume in which the authors present competing views on a central
theme: the possibility of democracy beyond the nation-state. In contrast to many multi-authored
books, this one is the result of a fruitful dialogue, offering information as well as considerable
room for reflection by the reader. Greven and Pauly start the book by placing the debate within
the globalizing process. They argue that this process, in as much as it is guided by economic
interests, is eroding democratic institutions and practices. The main argument is that the five
pillars of a relatively stable equilibrium between the forces of international economic liberalism
and the national structures of governance have been breaking down. The aim of the volume is
to reflect on this theme by examining the EU and NAFTA as two regional organizations.
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In the following chapters, Stephen Newman, after revising several conceptualizations of
democracy, calls for a redefinition of demos. Greven’s chapter provides a substantial discussion of
EU governance and the possibility of democracy within the Union. He argues that the actual
practices erode the standard democracy achieved by nation-states. He is rather pessimistic about
the emergence of a European civil society in the short run, in part because the flow of infor-
mation from important decisions taken at the EU level is inaccessible to the potential active
members of a European public space. Claus Offe presents a sociological argument, examining the
frail existing social cement in the EU, particularly in the areas of trust and solidarity within a
European society. Both elements, he explains, are preconditions for the establishment and
continued existence of state authority.The decline of trust and citizens’ sense of obligation within
the EU is caused in part by the opening of nation-state borders. Therefore some clear borders
are needed in order to develop a sense of responsible citizenship.
Michael Zürn looks at the increasing importance of transnational social space and provides
some pragmatic answers for increasing democratic participation of citizens in Europe. More
specifically, he recommends adjustments in the form of territorial representation, the promotion
of referenda, and the enhancement of the representative nature of policy networks. Edgar Grande
follows Zürn’s path and frames the discussion in the context of a ‘post-national democracy’. He
recommends a consensual mode of decision-making, as well as institutional checks and referenda.
Stephen Clarkson is the only author who examines the North American context and concludes
that outcome concerning the quality of democratic governance could vary for specific countries
within a regional organization such as NAFTA. Thus improving the quality of democracy in
Mexico may run parallel with worsening conditions in Canada.
The book concludes with a chapter by Pauly in which two key dimensions of global
capitalism’s challenge to democracy are summarized: on the one hand, the rising power of the
corporation and the weakening of solidarity, and on the other, the requirements of supranational
power institutions. Overall, the authors examine the theoretical and pragmatic scenarios of
constructing democratic governance with great detail in order to present current and future
dilemmas. This is a highly recommended book for those who are familiar with the arguments
and for those who want to be informed about them.
Soledad García, University of Barcelona, Spain
The dialogue of negation: debates on hegemony in Russia and the West. By Jeremy
Lester. London, Sterling,VA: Pluto Press. :ooo. :o·pp. Index. £¡¡.oo. ISBN o ;¡¡¡ +o¡o +.
‘Poor Gramsci’, write Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in Empire (Harvard University Press,
:ooo) ‘was given the gift of being considered the founder of a strange notion of hegemony that
leaves no place for a Marxian politics. We have to defend ourselves against such generous gifts!’
This is Jeremy Lester’s very undertaking: a defence of the emancipatory basis of a conception
of hegemony developed by Antonio Gramsci that was linked to forms of social power charac-
terized by and reproduced through conditions of modernity and thus historical processes of
capitalist development. More particularly, it is a defence against the gifts—or ‘all-consuming
boredom’ (p. :¡)—of post-Marxist mystification.Yet the book is much more than an excoriating
theoretical critique. It is also an analysis of the practice of hegemony between ‘East’ and ‘West’
and the pervasive ‘dialogue of negation’ that has affected left strategy in the relations between
The book opens with reflections on the politics of hegemony and the project of modernity.
The conceptual origins of hegemony are then traced inter alia through the writings of Vincenzo
Gioberti, the Russian labour movement, and the writings of Georgii V. Plekhanov and Vladimir
I. Lenin. Indeed, with a little over-exaggeration, Antonio Gramsci himself once referred to Lenin
as ‘the greatest modern theoretician’, who reappraised the front of cultural struggle and
constructed a notion of hegemony as a complement to a theory of the ‘state-as-force’. Yet, as
Lenin’s propositions do not really uphold this generous interpretation, it is the legacy of Antonio
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Gramsci that really highlights the struggle for hegemony across the cultural, economic and
Moreover, it is this legacy that is regarded as increasingly displaced by assimilation within
liberal theorizing (Norberto Bobbio), by attempts to disingenuously pick away at inconsistencies
(Perry Anderson), by the destruction of interpellating class (-relevant) identities in the struggle
over hegemony (Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe) and, one can add, by interpretations that
have divested Marxism of any dialectic within a flaky ‘post-liberal’ guise (Maurice Finocchiaro,
Sue Golding). The commonality across such appropriations is the ‘soft-focusing of Gramsci’
within an established liberal-capitalist form of hegemony (pp. +¡:–¡). While Lester scorns the
resignation that this represents, he also acknowledges that certain thinking within conditions of
post-modernity might have more to offer, particularly in engaging with forms of cultural politics
within the onslaught of consumerism (Zygmunt Bauman, David Harvey, Frederic Jameson).The
discussion then concludes with a return to the struggle over hegemony in Russia and the short-
comings and weaknesses of a nationalist counter-hegemonic strategy led by Gennadii Zyuganov
and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF).
Perhaps, by stretching the focus about debates on hegemony in Russia and the West, there is
a danger of not capturing dimensions of both. Such a charge, though, would be unjust, as there
is a richness of argument and detail developed throughout the book. Nearly thirty years ago, the
historian Gwyn Alf Williams remarked that one would have to brace oneself for the oncoming
explosion in the interest of Gramsci and that the assimilation of three or four different succeeding
‘Gramscis’ was yet to come. These events have unfolded in the interim. The strident views
contained in The dialogue of negation provide a necessary corrective to the ongoing palatable
appropriation of these three, four and more Gramscis. It therefore certainly merits a wide
readership by advocates and adversaries alike.
Adam David Morton, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK
Ethnicity and cultural politics
Religion and humane global governance. By Richard Falk. Basingstoke: Palgrave. :oo+.
+,+pp. Index. £¡o.oo. ISBN o ¡¡¡ ,¡;o; X.
In a previous book Richard Falk argued that the negative consequences of globalization—an
economistic view of the world, declining democratic governance, loss of commitment to the
idea of a global public good, and growing polarization—should be countered by ‘globalization
from below’. Now he takes the argument further by suggesting that discussion of change
should deliberately place value-oriented concerns at the centre of enquiry, in an effort to
ensure that what emerges is a ‘humane global governance’. In particular he argues that religious
resurgence, often seen as a very negative response to globalization, might also have something
to offer those seeking to maintain an ethically oriented vision of global futures.To this end he
joins writers such as Jose Casanova and Mark Juergensmeyer in questioning the post-
Enlightenment commitment to secularism and religion–state separation as the most
appropriate way to respond to religious issues, insofar as they seek to exclude religious organi-
zations and beliefs from the public square. Though Falk rejects the exclusiveness and
intolerance of many manifestations of religion in the contemporary world, he suggests that
religion, with its roots in popular culture, can make a positive contribution to the development
of humane governance. Thus he notes that all religions promote an appreciation of suffering,
ethos of solidarity, belief in normative horizons, acceptance of limits to human possibilities,
creation of identities beneath and beyond the declining state, and commitment to reconcili-
ation in all spheres of life.
Much of the book is devoted to exploring this question from various angles, in a way that is
sometimes rather repetitive. Here Falk is rightly critical of the flakier end of the New Age
market, with its stress on ethereal spirituality that does not also engage concretely with human
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 170
suffering.At the same time he wants to encourage a ‘reconstructive postmodernism’ that does not
repudiate the achievements of the modern world but through a ‘politically engaged spirituality
... acknowledges their radical insufficiency in relation to contemporary challenges’. Falk accepts
that the more democratic religious perspectives emerging in the +,;os have often failed to live
up to expectation, as in post-transitional societies where previous calls for justice are replaced by
the defence of vested interests. He is sympathetic to the idea of a global ethic promoted by
theologian Hans Kung, but is critical of the lack of concrete proposals for promoting this, beyond
appealing to the conscience of rulers and elites. At the same time his own, more concrete
proposals often incline to the same wishful thinking, failing to deal adequately with the realities
of the religious market. Here the conservative religious trends he dislikes are rooted in much
deeper communities than groups such as the World Parliament of Religions, led by liberal
religious elites or activists with no serious constituency.
Nonetheless Falk is to be commended for starting a discussion rooted in the belief, and
perhaps hope, that ‘our most important millennial challenge is to bring into being a balance of
equity, prudence, creativity, and humility that would engender an era of what might be called
John Anderson, University of St Andrews, UK
The Pathan unarmed: opposition and memory in the North West Frontier. By
Mukulika Banerjee. Oxford: James Currey. :ooo. :¡·pp. Index. £¡o.oo. ISBN o ·¡:¡¡ :;: o.
Pb.: £+o.,¡. ISBN o ·¡:¡¡ :;¡ ¡.
In the context of the current war in Afghanistan when stereotypes about ‘the Pathans’ and ‘Pathan
culture’ are rife, Mukulika Banerjee’s book serves as a valuable corrective to‘orientalist represen-
tations’, which portray the Pathans as invariably hotheaded and unpredictable. Firmly grounded
in anthropological research but with a keen eye for historical nuance, it provides a sober and
illuminating insight into a complex society that has long beguiled Western observers and is once
again the object of intense Western concern.
Banerjee raises two important questions that are bound to be pertinent to any analysis of
Pathan culture and its relationship to political protest. The first is whether Pathans are naturally
predisposed to violence; the second is whether they are inevitably drawn to factionalism.
Banerjee’s short answer to both questions is ‘no’. Using a combination of oral historiography and
archival material, she traces the emergence of a non-violent movement, the Khudai Khitmatgar
(lit. servants of God), among the Pathans of India’s North West Frontier Province in the +,¡os,
and shows how it successfully overcame tribal divisions to play a key role in the struggle against
British colonial rule alongside the Indian National Congress. In doing so it comprehensively
challenged prevailing assumptions about Pathans and their culture.
Banerjee is critical of earlier observers of Pathan society who conveyed the impression that
Pathan culture was immutable, timeless and inevitable. Frederick Barth, whose ethnographic
study of the Swat Pathans is a classic, was guilty of this failing but so too are some of his
successors, including the distinguished anthropologist Akbar Ahmed, who has tended to overplay
the ‘martial’ tradition among the Pathans, regarding it as ‘given’. By contrast, Banerjee emphasizes
the mutability of cultural practice. She views Pathan culture as an ‘instance of the syncretic
processes typical of frontiers’ (p. :·), which by nature are more porous and open to exchange than
politically demarcated borders with their stark boundaries of separation. Banerjee is also mindful
of historical currents; here she relies on recent trends in modern Indian historiography, which
seek to highlight changes wrought on social structures and cultures during the colonial period.
The result is a rich picture of Pathan culture that is constantly ‘subject to negotiation and
innovation’ (p. +¡).
The potential for change in Pathan culture was most convincingly demonstrated in the rise of
the Khudai Khitmatgar and its success in converting the notoriously violent Pathans to the cause
of non-violence. Much of this success lay in the charisma and organizational skills of its founder
Ethnicity and cultural politics
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 171
and leader, Abdul Gaffar Khan. Popularly known as Badshah Khan or ‘king of the khans’, he
belonged to a landed class of ‘small khans’ in the North West Frontier Province who, unlike their
wealthier counterparts, the ‘big khans’, enjoyed none of the favours bestowed by their British
colonial masters. The young Gaffar Khan showed an early awareness of the malign influence of
colonial rule and held that it could most effectively be countered through a programme of
reform based on education. However, by daring to impart value to education, which most
Pathans regarded as unmanly, Gaffar Khan consciously set the stage for a more fundamental
redefinition of Pathan cultural attitudes.
This was imperative for the implementation of his non-violent ethic. Banerjee shows how
Gaffar Khan drew on elements of the Pathan code of honour (Pukhtunwali) and Islamic
thought but also subtly refashioned them. Thus even as he appealed to Pathan notions of
honour and bravery, he reworked them so that feuding, especially in the presence of the
British, was made to appear as a sign of cowardice, and self-restraint the hallmark of courage.
As a devout Muslim Gaffar Khan was equally sensitive to the Pathan appetite for jihad (holy
war). Here too he skilfully invoked the ‘greater jihad’ (jihad-i-akbar), which emphasized the
Muslim’s inner struggle for a life based on the Quranic virtues of self-restraint and patience.
Gaffar Khan’s most telling achievement, however, was to persuade Pathans that by ‘acting in
ways which entirely confirmed the British stereotypes’, they were ‘undermining their own
dignity and worth’ (p. :+:).
It is a testament to Gaffar Khan’s legacy that when the Khudai Khitmatgar was forced finally
to concede defeat and withdraw from the Indian political scene in +,¡;, it did so not because it
renounced non-violence but because it was unable to resist the combined onslaught of an
oppressive colonial regime and the virus of communal politics. Today, as the world remains
gripped by violent confrontation in Afghanistan, the example of the Khudai Khitmatgar suggests
that the Pathans may yet surprise us by their capacity to respond creatively and peacefully to
International and global political economy, economics and development
The new World Trade Organization agreements: globalizing law through services and
intellectual property. By Christopher Arup. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. :ooo.
¡¡opp. Index. £¡¡.oo. ISBN o ¡:+ ;;¡¡¡ ¡.
Christopher Arup’s new book provides a timely contribution to the debate surrounding the
relationship between the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the domestic legal processes of
its Members.This debate has become increasingly polarized in recent years.The central critique
of globalization is that international agreements such as the WTO override, in support of a
corporate agenda, valid domestic law enacted in the public interest. The WTO, so the argument
goes, is an institution comprised of nameless, faceless and unaccountable bureaucrats that
constrains the ability of a country to adopt laws that reflect the choices of its citizens, however
different from the choices of the citizens of other countries, because such differences inhibit
trade. On the other hand, supporters of globalization contend that the WTO has a minimal
impact only: the domestic policy choices of its Members impose negative rather than positive
disciplines. In other words, Members are free to adopt any law they wish so long as those laws
are, in general, non-discriminatory. As the two sides become more entrenched in their
viewpoints, the prospect for progress diminishes.
Arup moves this debate forward by providing the reader with a deeper understanding of the
implications of the WTO agreements. Using theoretical concepts taken from the field of socio-
legal studies, Arup views the WTO agreements through the lens of ‘inter-legality’, a term that
‘conveys the sense that the plural legalities of the world encounter and interact with each other’.
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 172
Like a software interface in computer technology, the WTO functions as an interface between
different legalities, operating to connect legalities and make them work together without fully
Using this framework, Arup examines both the WTO agreement governing trade in services
(GATS) and that governing the protection of intellectual property (TRIPs). More specifically,
Arup examines the inter-legality engendered by these agreements by selecting three ‘global
carriers’: legal services, genetic codes and on-line communications media.
This book examines globalization in a novel and unconventional manner, providing the reader
with a fresh approach to the stalemate set out above. It is my hope that this book will inspire
scholars and researchers to develop and apply this promising framework to further international
agreements and the different global carriers relevant to those agreements.
Julie A. Soloway, Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP,Toronto, Canada
The international politics of biotechnology: investigating global futures. Edited by
Alan Russell and John Vogler. Manchester: Manchester University Press. :ooo. :¡,pp. Index.
£¡o.oo. ISBN o ;+,o ¡·o· o.
Before the ++ September :oo+ attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the
United States, discussions about biological weapons took place among experts but seemed an
exotic topic of remote risk to most people.To the credit of editors Alan Russell and John Vogler,
their book The international politics of biotechnology features biological warfare as one of three
analytical lenses through which to survey their subject.
This compendium of essays by a variety of distinguished experts begins with the basics—
science, ethics analyzing and altering both geopolitics and the study of international relations.
The second part describes and analyses in detail the controversial kaleidoscope of evolving
practice and policy—the role of patents; the interplay between knowledge, actors and systems; a
close look at the industry and commercial developments; and the emergence of an international
regulatory regime and its conflicts with trade policy. In the final part, the application of biotech-
nology to weapons and warfare is examined alongside the United Nations’ treaty regimes
intended to bring about international security and cooperation in this field. The penultimate
chapter by Joanna Spear hints at the terror to come—and the dire need to prepare for non-state
actors’ and transdisciplinary solutions outside the military ‘box’.
The book’s overall message, however, is not clear—if one is even intended. The general tone
is academic, with a neutral attitude often disguising profound political conclusions. What is a
reader to think about patents, for example? Owain Williams says that the patent system might
constitute ‘the most important criterion’ directing the type of research and development under-
taken by the private sector and, especially as patent cartels grow to dominate the field,
biotechnology firms will not invest in socially beneficial areas. But Francis Manning says patents
are necessary to direct economic benefits towards advancing biotechnological development,
although they may hinder the publication of scientific findings. And Robert Falkner, in his
chapter on trade conflicts, conflates the patent question to one paragraph, although he recog-
nizes that disputes pending at the World Trade Organization over genetically engineered
organisms are not a typical clash between commercial interests but between commercial
interests and societal values.
Some authors adhere to strict objectivity, while others have a clear point of view. Hugh Dyer,
for example, lays out a variety of ethical considerations to explain why there is more ‘aggravation’
than ‘confluence’ in international relations over the biotechnology question, without taking a
stand himself. Catherine Bretherton and Karen Stevenson assert that the only way to ensure
balanced and ethical development of biotechnology is through the involvement of women,
poignantly discussing the relationship between male domination of the sector and severance of
the connection between motherhood and life.
International and global political economy, economics and development
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 173
The international politics of biotechnology successfully conveys the breathtaking scope of the
subject, and reports accurately on current albeit swiftly shifting political issues.The interspersed
discussions of International Relations theory may bog some readers down in what is already a
difficult read, while others may enjoy the mix of theoretical and hot-button issues.
Kristin Dawkins with Chela Vazquez and Neil Sorensen, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, USA
The mystery of capital: why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else.
By Hernando de Soto. New York: Basic Books. :ooo. :;¡pp. $:;.¡o. ISBN o ¡o¡ o+o+¡ o.
The World Bank’s :oo: World development report states that effective property law systems would
greatly lower transaction costs in the developing world. Lower transaction costs for property
holders lead to a greater amount of capital being available to develop land and establish credit.
However, the problem for the developing world is that most of its property is held in extra-legal
arrangements that raise transaction costs and prevent millions of people from collateralizing their
land through mortgages. If more people had access to legal systems that would protect and add
value to their property, then more capital would be generated and weak financial systems could
In The mystery of capital, Hernando de Soto builds upon the World Bank’s findings by calcu-
lating that the total value of real estate held but not legally owned by the poor of the developing
world is at least $,.¡ trillion. Some critics are sceptical as to how de Soto arrived at this figure,
but his evidence is convincing. He and his research team assembled a vast array of primary
documentation from land offices throughout the developing world in both urban and rural areas.
He estimates that the total amount of land informally or illegally held is ·¡ per cent of total urban
land holdings and ¡¡ per cent of total rural land holdings. By assigning a fair market value to all
this informally held land, the grand total comes to $,.¡ trillion—more than the total value of all
the companies listed on the New York, Tokyo and London stock exchanges. Even if one takes
issue with the exact value de Soto assigns to all this land, he does show that the bulk of the devel-
oping world’s property is held informally and that this land could be worth enough to stimulate
many developing economies.
What de Soto really needs to establish is that a marketplace for all this dormant capital can be
created by overhauling existing property law systems. Compelling evidence points to how
property law that legally incorporates the titles of the majority of a nation’s people allows for
increased access to capital.The key here is to show that all those informal property arrangements
can be incorporated into a formal body of law that is enforceable. De Soto shows that this is
possible because existing informal arrangements in the developing world have distinct common-
alities based on quasi-legal precedents that could be legally standardized and codified. Even
squatters in Haiti can produce some piece of paper to show you that they have some claim to their
land.Thus, all this quasi-legal paper needs to be made legal in a fair and equitable manner.This is
a political task that would involve a tremendous reorganization of power, but the bottom line is
that the people must have more direct political control over their property.There is no reason why
this cannot be achieved. If the nineteenth-century United States government gradually recognized
squatters’ rights to land, why can’t the same process occur in the developing world?
There is no gaping rift between the key points de Soto makes in The mystery of capital and those
made in the World development report.The major difference is one of style and presentation, as de
Soto makes bolder assertions and broader prescriptions that may capture the interests of a wider
audience. This may, in turn, invite a variety of criticisms; however, de Soto defends his main
points with convincing logic and documentary evidence.
Matthew J. Rosenberg, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, USA
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 174
Taking trade to the streets: the lost history of public efforts to shape globalization.
By Susan Ariel Aaronson. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. :oo+. :o¡pp. Index.
£+,.oo. ISBN o ¡;: ++:+: o.
It is commonplace to argue that there is nothing new about globalization. Processes of global
economic and social integration can be identified not only in the second half of the twentieth
century but throughout the history of capitalism and the modern state system. Likewise, popular
protest against globalization, which has erupted so violently in recent years, has a long lineage.
Yet, the story of these protests is less well known. Susan Aaronson steps in to help fill this gap.
Her book offers a readable, if uneven, historical account of anti-free trade movements and their
changing political agendas and strategies.
To the disappointment of those readers who would expect a global history of anti-
globalization campaigns, Taking trade to the streets concentrates rather narrowly on American social
movements. The interactions between Canadian, Mexican and US campaigners are briefly
touched upon, but the increasingly transnational dimension of the anti-globalization movement
is largely ignored. The result is, nevertheless, a rich and prodigiously referenced narrative that
provides a solid introduction to the domestic debate in the United States on trade policy.
Unfortunately, however, the economic thinking that informs free trade and protectionist
arguments barely features in the book.Where economic concepts enter the narrative, as in discus-
sions of comparative advantage and strategic trade theory, it soon becomes clear that trade theory
is not the author’s forte.
The book opens with a brief historical review of protectionist tendencies from the American
Revolution to the beginnings of the GATT, and then proceeds to examine the evolving trade
debate in the US from the +,;os to the present. Aaronson details the manifold concerns that have
led consumer groups, environmentalists, trade unionists and conservative politicians to join ranks
with beleaguered industrialists in demanding protection against an ever more powerful interna-
tional trade regime. Her historical account vividly shows how the GATT’s inclusion of non-tariff
trade barriers in its trade liberalization agenda led to a broadening of the domestic trade debate
beyond the narrow confines of the Washington-based political elite. By the time NAFTA was being
negotiated, trade policy had become a hotly contested domestic issue in US election campaigns.
A perplexing—and, for free trade advocates, worrying—aspect of this new trade debate is the
often unconventional coalitions formed between different anti-globalization groups. Although
Aaronson insists that most of those lobbying for environmental and labour standards are not
protectionists, they are often found siding with economic nationalists: both Ralph Nader and Pat
Buchanan opposed NAFTA, and many on Nader’s side shared Buchanan’s distaste for interna-
tional trade and institutions. Unfortunately, it is not sufficient to claim, as the author does, that
charges of protectionism levelled against civil society activists are equivalent to guilt by associ-
ation. ‘Taking trade to the streets’ happens not only when environmentalists campaign for noble
values but also when American workers set fire to Toyota and Datsun cars. Aaronson’s book does
little to dispel the fears of those who worry about the future of the international trade system in
an age of popular protest.
Robert Falkner, University of Essex, UK
Workers without frontiers: the impact of globalization on international migration. By
Peter Stalker. London, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. :ooo. +o+pp. Index. Pb.: £+¡.¡o. ISBN
+ ¡¡¡·; ··+ ¡.
The central question put forward by Peter Stalker in this book is: What effect will the current
phase of globalization have on emerging patterns of international migration? One crucial
aspect of the present migration trends, according to the author, are the widening international
disparities in earning potentials between rich and poor countries. In this context of increasing
social inequalities, countries that export labour are likely to continue to do so. On the other
International and global political economy, economics and development
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 175
side, the receiving countries, particularly in Europe, are increasingly reluctant to admit large
numbers of immigrants.
In eleven chapters, this book examines the current patterns and possible trends of migration
and the ways in which these trends could be reversed. In three central chapters the author looks
at the possible effects of international trade and finance on migration. By looking at the effects
of trade on overall employment, in general, and on immigrants’ employment, in particular, within
industrialized countries, the author arrives at the conclusion that the pressures for international
migration could be reduced by the expansion of trade.
The second crucial question for international policy-making offered by Stalker is: Could flows
of capital help to stimulate local development that would increase employment and wages to
encourage workers to stay at home? Through the use of empirical data from the World Bank on
private capital flows during the +,,os, Stalker shows that increasing globalization of capital flows
could contribute to the migration of capital to workers, instead of the opposite, especially if
capital investment is well articulated in the wider economy.
However, there are other questions to be tackled, according to Stalker. For example, in Europe,
immigration has correlated with economic growth for some time, and therefore a continuing
demand can be expected for low-skilled labour for the jobs that nationals refuse to take. Also to
be taken into account is the future expansion of jobs at the bottom of the employment scale,
especially in the service sector. This reality and trends and the expansion of global communi-
cation are likely to enhance rather than inhibit further migration from poor to rich countries.
Globalization is, moreover, likely to reinforce and extend networking capacities among potential
migrants. As a possible policy to counteract this likely prospect the author recommends that
enterprises opt to improve salaries and working conditions at home to make jobs more attractive
to national workers in Europe.
The book is well argued. However, the data are not always up-to-date, so that for some
variables the last year taken is between +,,¡ and +,,;.The incorporation of alternative views in
the analysis is also rather thin in most chapters. The foreword is signed by the Director of the
ILO, who encourages further debate on the questions discussed in the book, which is good news
for the reader specializing in these issues.
Soledad García, University of Barcelona, Spain
World capital markets: challenge to the G-10. By Wendy Dobson and Gary Clyde
Hufbauer. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics. :oo+. :¡+pp. Index. Pb.:
$+o.oo. ISBN o ··+¡: ¡o+ :.
Dobson and Hufbauer are right to stress the role of the ‘supply-side’ in international financial
crises of the past :o years or so. Incentives in international bank lending are such that bank capital
can be insufficient to cover the risks borne by individual banks and the world banking system as
a whole.The main focus of this book—chapter ¡—is revision of ‘Basle II’ international banking
regulations. Before this, chapter + provides a useful collation on a comparable basis of data on
international capital flows that might be of use to econometricians.The authors use it mainly to
show that short-term international bank lending is the most volatile component of international
capital flow—which is already well known. Chapter + accepts both that the benefits for recip-
ients of international capital inflows dominate costs, and that the volatility of international bank
loans is only a ‘secondary’ cause of financial volatility in emerging markets.
Chapter : points out that fewer than :oo firms control the action in international capital markets.
It is not made clear exactly why this matters. When it comes to dealing with free-rider problems
in debt rescheduling the very large numbers of ‘small’ players is also important. Also, chapter :
rehearses well-known problems with bank ‘safety-nets’ (e.g. deposit insurance and bailouts) that
create the moral hazard of excessive risk-taking and ‘over-lending’. While Dobson and Hufbauer
are probably right in saying that there would be less short-term bank lending without these safety-
nets, they miss the point that this lending could be even more volatile than it in fact is.
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 176
Chapter ¡ dissects the provisions of the second Basle Accord which aims for a better match
between bank capital and loan risks. The authors stress that Basle II is flawed because, for
example, national deposit insurance encourages ‘over-lending’ to emerging markets, capital
provision alignment with risk is still imperfect, and the regulators’ goals are not properly aligned
with those of taxpayers (causing ‘regulatory forbearance’). They also recommend many detailed
reforms of Basle II that would further reduce ruinous competition for international borrowers
between banks. For example, ‘national supervisors should take more responsibility for the
systemic consequences of risk taking by the institutions they oversee, share information with
their G-+o counterparts, and coordinate corrective action on a confidential basis’ (p. +¡,).
Many of the other reforms that the authors suggest require not only increased international
supervision under a new Basle Accord, but also the international realignment of national bank
regulatory systems, and national tax systems as they relate to banks. These are enormously
complicated issues that receive little analytical treatment as to why differences between G-+o
countries exist. It is this analytical work—examining the reasons for differences and, more partic-
ularly, how the adoption of common regulatory standards would impact national financial
systems—that is missing from this book. Such an examination could reveal what further
regulatory reforms are possible, rather than the asserted reforms that are offered. It has to be the
case that existing national and international regulatory systems are created as compromises
between the different players, and that national regulatory systems differ must be because the
players in different countries themselves differ in terms of their objectives and constraints. It is in
the chapters before their key chapter on regulatory reforms that the authors should have
examined the ‘art of the possible’—rather than dawdling over what a reasonably informed reader
Paul Hallwood, University of Connecticut, USA
The politics of change: globalization, ideology and critique. Edited by Werner
Bonefeld and Kosmas Psychopedis. Basingstoke: Palgrave. :ooo. :+:pp. Index. £¡:.¡o. ISBN
o ¡¡¡ ;oo·· ¡.
For some time now, theorizing the capitalist state has been an abiding concern within the early
founding and flourishing of the Conference of Socialist Economists (CSE) through the journal
Capital and Class. This volume is the latest in a long line of collections that further the CSE
tradition of analysing the state as an aspect of the social relations of production and thus the social
class antagonism between capital and labour. Put differently, the book is also the most recent
collective statement from a group of scholars working within ‘Open Marxism’ that asserts the
openness of Marxist categories to the dialectic of subject–object and theory–practice, the
(re)constitution of categories in and through the development of a crisis-ridden social world and
thus a practical commitment to the emancipation of the social world.
These issues are initially advanced by assessing ‘change’ in terms of contemporary debates on
globalization. Hence the first main chapter by Peter Burnham asserts that ‘a return to classical
Marxist ideas on the relation between class, capital and the state in a global context’ can offer ‘a
more productive approach for mapping recent industrial, political and economic change’ (p. +o).
Through a now customary critique, predominantly ‘liberal’ approaches within International
Political Economy are charged with failing adequately to theorize the relationship between states
(politics) and markets (economics).The counterpoising of states and markets results in their reifi-
cation as ‘thing-like’ entities brought into a relationship of exteriority with one another. This
excludes a focus on dimensions of class exploitation and the state as aspects of the social relations
of production. Put most strongly, the work of Robert Cox is particularly (but unfairly?) exposed
as ‘silent on the issue of labour’ resulting in (more accurately) a ‘failure to develop a coherent
theory of the state and its relationship to class’ (p. +¡). Pushing this further, Werner Bonefeld’s
chapter asserts that such work fails to show the ‘social constitution’ of transnational processes of
consensus formation among the elites—or nébuleuse—of the global political economy. In sum this
International and global political economy, economics and development
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 177
results in fetishism: the fetishisation of social reality that takes the relationship between the
political and the economic as a relation of things. Once more the charge is that labour is theoret-
ically excluded so that the social antagonism of capital and labour, the relation of classes in and
against domination and exploitation, is ignored. Separate sections by additional contributors then
address further aspects of contemporary social theory (Kosmas Psychopedis, Helmut Reichelt) as
well as focusing on ‘change’ as an emancipatory concept (Maurice Godelier, John Holloway,
At times the overall discussion does lean towards an overly theoretical and abstract style, a
proclivity apparent throughout the ‘Open Marxism’ literature.This is not to champion, in contrast,
principles of parsimony in order to annul complexity. Far from it.After all, one person’s parsimony
is just another’s oversimplification. It could be argued, though, that the degree of abstraction does
countenance an exclusionary discussion that prevents the argument reaching as large an audience
as possible, which might then understand and judge the work. One could also debate the extent
to which a vision of labour, capital and the state is espoused that results in a certain ‘theological’
Marxism that belies claims to ‘openness’. That said, the overall criticisms developed within the
book do rightly point to the need to clarify a conceptualization of the role of labour, and thus a
theory of the state, within much critical debate in International Political Economy.
More generally, it is worth questioning why the work of ‘Open Marxism’ has been so
overlooked amid the welter of debate within (bourgeois?) critical international theory. Perhaps,
therefore, it is high time that the arguments of ‘Open Marxism’ are directly addressed. Not to do
so might mean that critical international theory (as bourgeois social science?) could paradoxi-
cally become, in the words of Max Horkheimer, simply another ‘dedicated follower of fashion’.
The issues raised in and beyond The politics of change therefore deserve to be read by all those
claiming interest in issues of state theory, emancipation and structural change within the global
Adam David Morton, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK
Energy and environment
The meaning of environmental security: ecological politics and policy in the new
security era. By Jon Barnett. London, New York: Zed Books. :oo+. +·¡pp. Index. £¡¡.oo.
ISBN + ·¡o¡, ;·¡ :. Pb.: £+¡.,¡. ISBN + ·¡o¡, ;·o o.
Environmental conflict. Edited by Paul F. Diehl and Nils Petter Gleditsch. Oxford,
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. :oo+. ¡¡¡pp. Index. Pb.: £:¡.,,. ISBN o ·+¡¡ ,;¡¡ ¡.
The main aim of Jon Barnett’s book is to rescue the concept of ‘environmental security’ (ES)
from realist political discourses and to bring it back into the arena of political ecology. Barnett
discusses how the language of ES has been co-opted and polluted by state institutions and
academics whose primary objective is to sustain the security of the North with little regard for
the insecurity of the world’s poor.
Barnett’s criticism is launched at those who have militarized environmental issues through an
ES discourse. Such a move may have shifted environment up the political agenda but, in doing
so, has linked environmental issues with external aggressors: a post-Cold War context for the
construction of enemies.
This corrupted ES discourse therefore envisions a world of conflict rather than seeking a world
of peace. It weakly defines peace as the ‘absence of physical violence’, a state that can be accom-
plished in the presence of structural violence in the form of gross inequities and injustices. For
Barnett, this violent logic is baseless. His review of research finds little empirical evidence for a
causal link between environmental degradation and violent conflict. In fact, he finds more to
suggest that environmental degradation is a catalyst for dialogue and cooperation.
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 178
Barnett explores two ways in which ES research can be reoriented towards a striving for
‘positive peace’, defined by the absence of physical and structural violence. First, he considers
replacing ‘environmental security’ with ‘ecological security’. Barnett spends a chapter describing
the merits of this alternative concept, but then rejects it. He claims that abandoning ‘environ-
mental security’ would amount to giving way to those who corrupted the term in the first place.
Barnett is presumably influenced by Foucauldian thinking about the relationship between
language, meaning and power, and has decided that controlling the meaning of this particular
piece of language is a worthy cause. By way of contrast, he gives up on ‘sustainable development’
(a concept corrupted by a narrow interpretation of ‘development’) and is apparently happy with
‘sustainability’ in its place.
Having decided to stick with ‘environmental security’, Barnett begins to sketch his preferred
meaning. He defines it as ‘the process of peacefully reducing human vulnerability to human-
induced environmental degradation by addressing the root causes of environmental degradation
and human insecurity’ (p. +:,). He therefore seeks to define environmental security as a process
in which all people’s (and especially poor people’s) vulnerabilities are reduced through greater
social and ecological resilience. One of the strengths of the book is its fundamental interest in the
environmental security of individuals. In thinking through the relationship between different
scales of security, the individual (rather than the state) is the fundamental unit of interest. He
identifies the need for new forms of multi-level, polycentric governance, which find new working
relationships between citizens, the state and global institutions. Barnett is opinionated, provocative
and occasionally rather polemical: this is his first book and it is definitely worth reading.
The essays contained in Environmental conflict aim to secure the more traditional ground of ES.
The main thrust of the volume is to assemble and evaluate empirical evidence for the link
between environmental degradation and violent conflict. Using case-study and large-N samples,
contributing authors analyse causal links and, to a lesser extent, explain causal processes. The
evidence tends to support only weak assertions of causal links and most authors seek to explain
this through reference to the obscuring nature of stronger causes of violence: such as poverty,
inequality and certain demographic trends.
It is left to Goldstone’s valuable overview to draw the most robust conclusion from the
available evidence: that there is no consistent evidence of a causal link between environmental
degradation and violent conflict. For example, contrary to popular belief, ‘no nation has ever
gone to war strictly over access to water’ (p. ,:). Goldstone does find evidence that rapid events
(floods, earthquakes, etc.) have the potential to destabilize states and also finds that, under the
conditions of low economic growth, certain demographic trends (e.g. rapid urbanization, youth
bulge) can lead to conflict. However, he also notes that the social indicator that is most closely
related to the likelihood of violence is infant mortality. This fact echoes Barnett’s statement that
ES should focus on the vulnerabilities of the poor.
Part + of the collection is completed by Lomborg’s attempt to undermine the main foundation
of ES by arguing that there is little evidence of resource degradation and no reason to predict
future resource scarcity. The argument is familiar: contrary to predictions of early environmen-
talists, we have not run out of fossil fuels, metals, etc. If Lomborg is to build a more robust defence
of his thesis he will need to address the concerns of contemporary environmentalists: to begin
with, he needs to think about the predicted impacts of climate change.
The essays in part : look at conflict management.This is an important direction for ES because
the discipline has largely focused on the tiny minority of conflicts that have led to violence,
overlooking the majority of environmental problems that are managed through non-violent
means. However, it is slightly disappointing that there are no case-studies of environmental
cooperation. Midlarsky analyses the relationship between political regime variables and environ-
mental protection variables, apparently expecting democracies to come out shining (they don’t).
Payne looks at the functioning of the Global Environment Facility, a case-study that can only be
indirectly linked to conflict management. Denoon and Brams look at a conflict over territorial
claims to the Spratly Islands in which none of the claimants (China, Vietnam, the Philippines,
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Brunei and Malaysia) have overwhelming cases for sovereignty. The solution is to arrange a ‘fair
distribution’ which involves China having ¡o per cent of the territory and the others sharing the
rest, apparently because China is bigger and stronger. Realpolitik or ‘fair division’? Conca
completes part : with a thoughtful consideration of whether cooperation over environmental
problems actually develops the kind of social capital needed to develop international peace.There
is no definitive answer, but international environmental dialogue certainly provides opportunity
to develop and practise norms of trust and reciprocity.
Part ¡ contains two stimulating essays that debate the range of appropriate methodologies for
ES research. The authors of this volume clearly find much over which to disagree. Most readers
will find likewise, but will emerge better informed from the experience.
Adrian Martin, School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia, UK
Justice, posterity and the environment. By Wilfred Beckerman and Joanna Pasek.
Oxford: Oxford University Press. :oo+. :+·pp. Index. £¡¡.oo. ISBN o +, ,:¡¡o, o. Pb.: £+o.,,.
ISBN o +, ,:¡¡o· ·.
In this iconoclastic and entertaining text,Wilfred Beckerman and Joanna Pasek confront some of
the sacred cows of contemporary environmentalism. While acknowledging our obligations to
future generations, and therefore sharing environmentalists’ concerns up to a point, they begin to
diverge in taking the moral stance that these obligations should not be pursued at the expense of
today’s poor. Their second and major departure from mainstream environmentalism, however, is
to argue that attempts to derive these obligations from an ethical requirement to promote justice
between generations—whether based on notions of rights, justice, equity or ‘sustainable devel-
opment’—are fatally flawed.Additional chapters explore issues in environmental valuation, and the
problem of how costs should be distributed between rich and poor in the areas of environmental
protection, climate change and biodiversity.The authors conclude that ‘the most valuable bequest
we can make to future generations would be decent societies characterized by just institutions and
respect for the basic human rights enumerated in international conventions’ (p. ::).
While the broad thrust of the argument is persuasive, some of its subsidiary theses are less so.
In some cases this is due to suspect argumentation.The denial of rights to future generations, for
example, appears to be gained by a sophistry that was exposed by W.V. Quine (Quiddities, +,·;,
pp. ;¡–¡). The claim is that future generations are not yet around to ‘have’ the rights that are
ascribed to them.Yet it is clearly intelligible to say that anyone who dies fighting bravely ‘has’ a
right to a decent burial, and clearly absurd to deny them this right on the ground that they are
no longer, or not yet, around to claim it. Another problem is the selective use of examples. The
dodo makes an excellent front cover, but its frequent appearances in the body of the text to
epitomize the environmentalist’s case against the demands of today’s poor for clean drinking
water are misjudged. If the authors had focused instead on the threats to life and to life-chances
of countless generations in the wake of the Bhopal disaster, then the contest would appear more
even. But then the authors’ tendency to present the issues in adversarial fashion fails properly to
engage with the environmentalist contention that human and environmental well-being go hand
in hand, and that the provision of clean drinking water in ways that will also benefit future
people, e.g. by cutting down on pollution, should be preferred to ways that do not, e.g. by the
provision of desalination plants. The authors tend also to misconstrue the ethicist’s interest in
theory, which is not to provide decisive determinants of action but rather to supply backing for
intuitions, such as those on which the authors themselves are driven to rely.
Despite these reservations, Justice, posterity and the environment provides a radical interrogation
of today’s environmental agenda and, through the unsettling rays of insight that it casts, offers an
engaging provocation to economists, ethicists and policy-makers alike.
Alan Holland, Lancaster University, UK
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Constructing sustainable development. By Neil E. Harrison. Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press. :ooo. +;¡pp. Index. $¡¡.¡o. ISBN o ;,+¡ ¡oo; o. Pb.: $+·.,¡. ISBN o ;,+¡ ¡oo· ,.
The phrase ‘sustainable development’ gained widespread appeal when the World Commission on
Environment and Development made it central to its +,·; publication, Our common future. The
Commission defined the term as a development strategy that ‘meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. This was a
watershed moment in the environmental movement.
Until the late +,·os, environmentalism meant protecting the non-human world. It entailed
safeguarding the quality of the air, water, soil and diversity of species either for human well-being
or for the well-being of other creatures. Environmentalism, as such, largely ignored the complex
relationships between social justice, economic well-being, international development and
environmental protection. It saw environmental protection as separate from these broader
challenges of political life. The concept of sustainable development changed that. It forced
environmentalists to realize that they could never safeguard the earth without attending to
human needs. It made clear that poverty alleviation, education, access to birth control, the pursuit
of social justice and other social goals go hand-in-hand with environmental protection. Short of
such a broad agenda, the earth’s air, water, soil and species will be greatly compromised, let alone
the overall quality of human life.
This insight was so powerful that it has moved to the forefront of environmental thinking and
has become the catchphrase for global environmental policy. Sustainable development was the
watchword of the +,,: United Nations Conference on Environment and Development and
remains the guiding principle of much domestic and international environmental policy
formation. One could say that we live in an age in pursuit of sustainable development.
While sustainable development has become a central focus of much thinking in the environ-
mental field, this is not to say that the phrase has realized a simple accepted definition. Like all
important ideas, sustainable development is a contested concept. Disputes over the term’s
meaning have taken on significant stakes insofar as they represent a battle over the central
conceptual orientation of contemporary environmentalism. Neil Harrison’s Constructing
sustainable development studies these arguments and seeks to clarify the lines of disagreement and
offer avenues for advancement. He is rightly concerned about the term being captured by those
who have no interest in genuinely meeting the needs of present and future generations or who
have ideas of how to meet those needs in ways that will greatly degrade the natural world or
unjustly exploit existing problems in the social one.
Harrison claims that discussion about sustainable development is animated by a set of narra-
tives that underwrites contemporary debates. Each of these narratives aims to capture the
meaning of sustainable development in an effort to turn sustainable development policy into an
instrument for furthering a particular political agenda.
According to Harrison, this set of narratives consists of three broad interpretations of social life
that seek separate ends: efficiency, equity and ethics. The first aims to reduce the amount of
throughput in productive activities, thus minimizing the use of natural resources and the creation
of waste. The second, equity, strives to use political institutions to enhance collective well-being
with the assumption that efforts directed at meeting human needs throughout the world will best
alleviate ecological stress and promote human well-being. The third, ethics, seems to be a focus
on changing the way people think about right and wrong, with attention paid to ‘darker’ green
movement politics that call for changing consciousness as a way to protect the non-human and
human worlds. For Harrison, these three narratives constitute or ‘construct’ the meaning and
operationalization of sustainable development as it is currently understood and practised.
Harrison is helpful in delineating these narratives and underlining what they contribute to
collective thinking about sustainable development. I would quibble with the conceptual bound-
aries of each— I think he caricatures positions more than accurately rendering them— but the
overall effort to analyse sustainable development in this way is useful.
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Harrison finds fault in each narrative. Each provides only a partial window into the challenge
of sustainable development and thus, alone, is insufficient to advance thought and practice.These
insufficiencies move Harrison to offer his own position. He calls for forgoing a single definition
of sustainable development and approaching specific policy problems with an open-minded,
flexible attitude that is able to appreciate the particular dimensions of the problem at hand and
thus not analyse them nor prescribe a response to them that is wedded to any one view of
sustainable development itself. Harrison calls this flexible approach a social adaptive model of
environmental policy, based on his reading of organizational dynamics in the natural world.
In my view, this position is interesting and, in an imperfect way, affirms the work of John
Dryzek and other critical environmentalist thinkers who call for more democratic, deliberative
and practical-reasoned approaches to environmental policy. The problem is that this
‘prescription’ does not follow from the book’s overall framework or analysis. Harrison’s criti-
cisms of the three narratives rest not on those narratives’ ideological blindspots or on their
tendencies to monopolize environmental thinking or on any single one of them insisting that
it is the frame for analysis and policy. Rather, as he puts it, ‘each is defective in its internal logic’
(p. +o+). I am unclear, then, why Harrison feels that a social adaptive model of environmental
policy formation will somehow improve upon the policy prescriptions embedded in the three
narratives or replace them altogether. (Harrison is ambiguous as to whether the three narratives
need replacing or can be incorporated into his policy model.) As I see it, any sustainable devel-
opment policies will draw upon the insights of the three narratives Harrison identifies. To be
sure, policy-makers may not do so in a way that reflects a sensitivity to contingencies of the
moment but that is a different (although certainly important) story. Put differently, there is, as I
see it, a disconnection between the analytical portions of the book and the overall philosophical
and policy recommendation.
This is not, of course, fundamentally damaging. Harrison has provided an insightful and well-
written meditation on sustainable development, and students will benefit from reading about the
issues he wrestles with.The overall argument may not hold together as tightly as it could, but the
parts illustrate a perceptiveness that is greatly welcomed in the field of global environmental politics.
Paul Wapner, American University,Washington DC, USA
Economics and the global environment. By Charles S. Pearson. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. :ooo. ¡·¡pp. Index. £;¡.oo. ISBN o ¡:+ ;;oo: ¡. Pb.: £:¡.,¡. ISBN o ¡:+ ;;,·· X.
Since the early +,;os the link between international trade and the environment has been
receiving wider attention from the academic, political and environmental arenas.This interest was
in part fuelled by the +,;: United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and, more
recently, by the +,,: United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio.The
fundamental question of whether international trade liberalization will increase or decrease
environmental degradation has been raised. Proponents of free trade argue that it will result in
economic growth, access to environmentally friendly products and an increased demand for
environmental quality. Opponents argue that free trade will lead to increasing pressure on natural
resources and pollution. Each case can be justified.
Environmental concerns arise due to market failure. Market prices neglect to account for
negative externalities such as the environmental costs associated with pollution or the positive
externalities associated with environmental services such as the conservation of biodiversity.
Whether positive or negative, the existence of these international externalities illustrates the
inefficiency of markets. Regulations such as emission taxes, tradable permits and quotas may, if
enforced, address this failure. However, the move towards trade liberalization through agreements
and organizations such as NAFTA,WTO/GATT, EU and OECD has led to fears that environ-
mental protection laws will be eliminated because they restrict trade.‘Are trade sanctions a useful
tool to prevent “free-riders” and enforce management of international resources?’ (p. +).
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The problems of transnational pollution and the management of natural resources such as
ocean fisheries are at the centre of the debate of international trade and environmental
economics. Until recently little effort has been made to integrate environmental issues into the
economic analysis of international trade. Yet the imminent threat of climate change and the
depletion of fish stocks, for example, has brought to a head the need for action. Essential is the
recognition that our desire for economic prosperity and ability to achieve it are intimately
connected with success in protecting the environment. This may be achieved through appro-
priate policy regulation and enforcement of those regulations. Does this need to restrict trade?
This question is of paramount importance in an era of increasing globalization of which inter-
national trade is a discernible feature.
Charles Pearson has an extensive and impressive background in the issues of international
economics, environment and development. In Economics and the global environment he develops a
theme of ‘the meshing of economic and environmental systems in an international context’
(p. +). He leads us through the basic concepts of environmental economics (part +), the theory
and policy of trade and environment (part :) and the problems associated with transnational
pollution and management of natural resources (part ¡).To illustrate these he discusses the case-
studies of global warming and ocean fisheries. He ends with the ubiquitous yet vague concept
of ‘sustainable development’ (part ¡). Recent efforts to achieve sustainable development, mainly
through government regulation, seem at odds with the global trends towards privatization,
deregulation and trade liberalization.These conflicts are analysed in some detail in the final part
of this book. In chapter +· Sitanon Jesdapipat (Director of the Centre for Ecological
Economics, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand) contributes a summary of the mixed
experience of Thailand. The case-study demonstrates the empirical evidence of economic
prosperity due to international trade at the cost of environmental degradation followed by a
movement towards mitigation. This chapter complements the theory and policy discussed in
earlier parts of the book.
Pearson has produced a timely and valuable book. Economics and the global environment is beauti-
fully presented and will appeal to a wide audience of students, researchers and practitioners in
the fields of environmental and international economics. The mathematical content is minimal.
However, the book still provides rigorous, comprehensive analyses and presentation of all relevant
issues. Pearson presents a successful fusion of theoretical, political and empirical analyses on issues
surrounding the impact of international trade on the environment.
Lynda Rodwell, University of York, UK
The emergence of ecological modernisation: integrating the environment and the
economy? Edited by Stephen C.Young. London, New York: Routledge. :ooo. :o:pp. Index.
£oo.oo. ISBN o ¡+¡ +¡;+¡ ;.
Advocates of ecological modernization assert that it is possible to reconceptualize the relationship
between the environment and economic development. It is suggested that modernizing industry
along ecological lines and other similar initiatives will result in economic growth, and that this
environmentally friendly growth is desirable.The idea has caught the attention of policy-makers
in both national and supranational organizations. Ecological modernization is a solution that
questions neither capitalism nor globalization.
In the volume under review the experiences and issues relating to ecological modernization
in the early +,·os and +,,os are discussed. The first chapter, which sets the tone for the book,
discusses the idea of ecological modernization, its origins and growth, and the relationship
between ecological modernization and sustainable development, and outlines future areas for
research.The subsequent chapters discuss, inter alia, ecotaxes in Belgium, the green movement in
Britain in the +,·os and +,,os, shifts in pollution prevention strategies in different countries,
energy and economic growth and environmental protection, approaches to ecological modern-
ization, and the Green Party and its role in sub-national coalitions in Germany.The articles help
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us to understand that there is no magic bullet as a solution. Policy styles vary across countries
and this in turn has a great deal of significance for ecological modernization. Furthermore the
influence of industry varies from country to country and as such it is difficult to conclude that
ecological modernization will inevitably result in the private sector’s greater influence. Issues like
green taxes raise fundamental questions about the regulation of economic activities and who
gains most from the trade-offs. It is clear that state–industry relationships have undergone changes
during the past two decades, and ecological modernization may be a case of old wine in a new
bottle. Thus whether the concept is part of the problem or part of the solution depends upon
the way in which it is put into practice. The idea is also a challenge for green movements and
green parties, who have to come to terms with the reality of being pragmatic even as they try to
retain their utopian green vision.
It is too early to come to a final conclusion about the relevance of ecological modernization
everywhere, as by and large it has only been tried in developed nations, particularly in Europe.
This volume provides a good understanding of ecological modernization and its applications.
The case-studies are apt and well written, although based only on the European context. Overall,
the book is a welcome addition to the literature on environmental policy and politics.
K. Ravi Srinivas, National Law School, Bangalore,India
La guerre de cinquante ans: les relations Est–Ouest ‒. By Georges-Henri
Soutou. Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard. :oo+. ;o;pp. FF+·,.oo. ISBN : :+¡ oo·¡; ¡.
As Georges-Henri Soutou affirms, +,¡¡ marked a turning-point in world history, when the
threat of German hegemony ended and the East–West conflict began. However, he prefers to call
it the fifty-years war rather than the Cold War, both because ‘Cold War’ is too eurocentric and
obscures the fact that outside Europe the conflict was frequently far from cold, and because it
bears comparison with the hundred- and the thirty-years wars in its episodic course and
enduring impact upon whole epochs of history. Unlike the wars that began in +,+¡ and +,¡,, it
was not primarily one of territory or the re-ordering of the states system, but rather a contest
for global ideological supremacy. This, he argues, rather than the alleged balance of terror,
explains why it did not erupt into a general war. It also provides the key to the West’s problems
in effectively prosecuting the conflict.
There are many single-author histories of the East–West conflict, but this is the first major study
by a French expert since André Fontaine’s two-volume work in +,o·, and it is arguably the best
account available in any language today. Soutou, an authority on Franco-German relations and
European nuclear defence, demonstrates a firm grasp of current research in the United States,
Russia, Britain and Italy as well as France and Germany. He manages to incorporate nearly all the
dimensions of the conflict, including the political, geo-political, diplomatic, military and economic,
and treats all five decades with equal thoroughness. He brilliantly avoids the matter-of-fact quality
of large-scale surveys by regularly interrogating the historiography that has accumulated over the
main episodes of the conflict.And he betrays no particular gallic bias, unless in the clarity of writing
and razor-sharp analysis. While French policy is plausibly explained, it occupies only a very
secondary place in an account that properly features the Soviet Union and the United States.
From the battle of Kursk onwards the Soviet Union posed a lethal threat to the West, Soutou
argues, not mainly on account of the Red Army but because Stalin knew what he wanted and
pursued it with single-minded determination, whereas Western leaders seemed incapable of
recognizing that the Soviet Union was driven by an ideology that left it insensitive to induce-
ments or concessions. Eventually in +,¡; Stalin over-played his hand, the Truman administration
hardened its stand and offered the Marshall Plan. But it was not until Moscow counter-attacked
later that year by creating the Cominform at Szklarska Poreba and mobilizing the European
communist movement that the Western powers finally squared up to the Soviet threat. Even then,
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 184
this marked a serious retreat, since they abandoned the universal goals espoused at the end of the
war in the Declaration on Liberation of Europe and elsewhere. Discussing the following years,
Soutou gives Eisenhower high praise for his firm and steady resistance to Soviet expansionism,
although he is marked down slightly for raising false hopes with the spirit of Camp David. His
successors receive rougher treatment.Thus, for instance, while crediting Kennedy with victory in
the Cuban missile crisis, he points out that Kennedy allowed Khrushchev to remain in possession
of Cuba as a launch pad for ideological aggression in the Caribbean basin and Latin America.
More ominously it left him fascinated with the Soviet Union and prepared to grant it equality
in a global condominium. This in turn marked a new and dangerous tendency of American
unilateralism, which shook the Western alliance and prompted de Gaulle, Brandt and other
European leaders to strike out on their own. These trends continued into the +,;os, with the
United States pursuing arms control in the mistaken belief that the process would eventually
result in détente and the normalization of East–West relations, and West European countries
repeatedly tempted towards non-alignment by spurious theories of economic, political and
ideological convergence. It was only when Reagan and Thatcher vigorously reasserted the
universal principles of the Declaration on Liberation of Europe and the +,;¡ Helsinki
agreement, while offering the Soviet Union an avenue of escape from intensified competition,
that the West finally prevailed in the fifty-years war.
Two criticisms can be made of this account. First, despite acknowledging severe gaps in Soviet
archival sources, Soutou does at times present Soviet intentions with a certainty that exceeds the
available evidence. Second, in focusing constantly upon Soviet aggression he encourages the
impression that communism alone provided the dynamism to postwar international affairs,
despite the fact that liberal capitalism usually prevailed even on the Soviet Union’s doorstep.
But these are minor qualifications to a masterful study. One can only hope that
an English-language version will soon make it available to a wider readership.
Robert Boyce, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
America and the intellectual cold wars in Europe. By Volker R. Berghahn. Oxford,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. :oo+. ¡;¡pp. Index. £:o.,¡. ISBN o o,+ o;¡;, ·.
It was perhaps inevitable, following the end of the Cold War, that most attention among histo-
rians should have been directed to the material emerging from the newly opened archives of
Russia and eastern Europe. Slowly but surely the political and diplomatic history of the Cold
War is being re-written as the implications of these materials are being digested.
Politics, diplomacy, and war, however, are not everything, and Volker Berghahn’s book is an
important reminder that ideas count too. This study represents a substantial contribution to the
small but growing body of work on the culture and ideas of the Cold War. Above all, it is a truly
international study, showing that the traffic in ideas is a worthy subject for students of interna-
tional relations. His subject is America’s efforts to fight the Cold War on the intellectual front and
his focus is on institutions and the means by which ideas were disseminated rather than on the
ideas themselves (the best study of Cold War ideas remains Abbott Gleason’s Totalitarianism: the
inner history of the Cold War, +,,¡). Berghahn uses the little known but highly influential figure of
Shepard Stone as his organizing tool. Full use is made of the large archive of Stone papers, but
Berghahn places Stone in a wide historical context. Stone was a highly educated journalist with
a doctorate from Germany who commanded the respect and friendship of intellectuals, politi-
cians and businessmen. He was successively a New York Times European correspondent, a wartime
intelligence officer, Public Affairs Director of the US High Commission in Germany (+,¡,–¡:),
Director of International Affairs for the Ford Foundation (+,¡:–o;), President of the
International Association for Cultural Freedom (+,o;–;¡) and Director of the Aspen Institute in
Berlin (+,;¡–··). He might be described as an intellectual’s bureaucrat—a man of ideas who also
had the organizational skills and contacts to make things happen.
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 185
Stone had two important missions in his role as disburser of corporate funds for international
cultural purposes. One was to bolster the culture of the ‘West’—in particular the idea of freedom
as enshrined in the best traditions of Europe and the United States—in the face of threats from
totalitarianism. The second was to enhance the cultural reputation of the United States among
those same Europeans who often looked down on the United States’ mass and supposedly trashy
popular culture. Surely Berghahn’s most important achievement is to show that, as far as the
Americans were concerned, the cultural Cold War was double-edged: it was a matter of fighting
simultaneously communism and Western anti-Americanism. Stone’s tactic was to push funds
towards projects which ideally served both ends. While with the Ford Foundation, his most
important post, he urged the funding of high quality periodicals (among them Der Monat in
Germany and Encounter in the UK), funded conferences and academic exchanges, and supported
institutes and libraries in Europe. He was perhaps the ultimate Atlanticist.
The story is one of considerable success and not a few ironies. Success in the cultural Cold
War of the +,¡os led to some confusion in the +,oos when the situation changed and the same
ideas and techniques did not work. The fate of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF)
exemplified this trajectory. As the +,oos drew on it seemed redundant when it was not a target
of vilification from the newly emergent left. Berghahn gives plenty of coverage to the furore in
the late +,oos over the revelation of CIA funding of Encounter and other periodicals produced
under the auspices of the CCF. Ironically, by the time the rumours had been confirmed, the CIA
was no longer funding Encounter. Indeed, the Ford Foundation (and Stone himself) was insistent
that it could not contribute to projects such as the CCF whose sources of funding were not fully
revealed. Berghahn gives a plausible explanation of how some US leaders could countenance
using secret CIA funds to support a project whose aim was freedom of thought. Stone himself
stood at the liberal end of the anti-communist cause, and it is one of Berghahn’s achievements
to show how many were the shades of opinion in the Cold War period which has so often been
described as one of ‘consensus’.
Berghahn sets himself the challenging task of combining institutional with intellectual and
political history.There are lengthy discussions of the ideas of Dwight MacDonald, Daniel Bell, J.
K. Galbraith, Irving Kristol and others. He shows how intertwined were sections of the Euro-
American intellectual elites. He has a detailed grasp of the workings of large philanthropic
foundations. For the most part he succeeds excellently, though there are passages where he gets
bogged down in institutional detail. Above all, though, he shows sensitivity to the different
approaches of American and European intellectual elites to the concept of culture. And within
that he shows the distinctiveness of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ (or Anglo-American) approach as
compared with the European. Surely, this is something which has not changed.
Richard Crockatt, University of East Anglia, UK
Twentieth-century Anglo-American relations. Edited by Jonathan Hollowell.
Basingstoke: Palgrave. :oo+. :oopp. Index. £¡:.¡o. ISBN o ¡¡¡ ·o¡o¡ X.
‘Relations with the United States have become the central problem of British foreign policy’,
wrote Denis Healey in +,¡: (p. ,:). This fundamental belief was shared by a succession of British
politicians after the Second World War. It helps to explain why the relationship between Britain and
the United States in the twentieth century, especially since +,¡o, is such a rich field for historical
study.This latest contribution is a collection of articles that emerged from a conference in +,,·.
Ostensibly concerned with the whole twentieth century, the volume only covers about half
that period. There are three chapters on +,+,–¡¡. Margaret MacMillan examines how the
Dominions of Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and India developed a sense of their
national interests which had to be taken into account in the framing of a peace settlement at
Paris in +,+,.The British had to adopt positions in opposition to the United States, most notably
over the disposition of German colonies. Priscilla Roberts looks at the role of the Council on
Foreign Relations, founded in +,:+, in promoting Anglo-American amity. She suggests that its
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 186
various endeavours, especially from +,¡, onwards, to minimize Anglo-American tensions and
help the British to present their case to an influential public, unquestionably eased FDR’s task in
seeking to introduce pro-Allied policies. F. M. Leventhal offers a fluent and compelling account
of the contribution of Eric Knight to Anglo-American understanding during the Second World
War. Knight’s novel, This above all (+,¡+), became a bestseller and successful film. It combined a
repudiation of Britain’s failed leadership in the +,¡os, a call to arms against the fascist dictators
and the promise of a new classless Britain.
The remaining seven essays deal with +,¡¡ to +,o·. Danilo Ardia maintains that James Byrnes’s
draft Treaty on the Disarmament and Demobilisation of Germany was welcomed by the British
as a sign of continued American commitment to Europe. Steven Fielding surveys the views of
Labour’s ‘revisionist’ figures, such as Hugh Gaitskell, Anthony Crosland and Roy Jenkins, towards
the United States in the first twenty years after +,¡¡. They possessed two main characteristics:
‘Atlanticism’, a commitment to the NATO alliance; and an enthusiasm for modernization along
lines exemplified by the United States. He concludes that for some ‘this was close to a rhetorical
tactic, one intended to cajole sceptics to support certain changes; others probably actually
believed that the “good America” was America’ (p. +oo).
Saul Kelly’s analysis of the embassy of Sir Roger Makins at Washington in +,¡¡–o is an
exemplary study. Based on a considerable knowledge of the period, it neatly summarizes the
essential issues and is judicious in judgement. Makins established good relations with both
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Kelly observes that Makins’s
‘ability to maintain Anglo-American harmony was tested to the limit over the Middle East’ (pp.
+¡¡–o). He was recalled to Britain before the fateful collapse of relations in this region over Suez.
Peter Boyle has produced an able and clear summary of the exchanges between Anthony Eden
and President Eisenhower on this issue. For Boyle, Eisenhower was more impressive. The
President ‘emerges as statesmanlike, perceptive and consistent in the exercise of very sound
judgement throughout the crisis’ (p. +;·).
Alan Dobson adeptly explores the tense relations in coordinating an economic cold war. The
application of a strategic embargo, first advanced in March +,¡·, was the Central American
proposal. The Americans always favoured more aggressive Cold War strategies than the British,
wanting a more expansive embargo. The British were more cautious, partly through conviction
and partly because of their economic vulnerability—both in general and specifically in their
trade with the Soviets. Dobson insists that the Americans were limited in what they could do to
persuade the British to adopt a sterner line.
Jussi Hanhimaki addresses the under-explored international impact of Senator Joe McCarthy’s
pursuit of alleged communist influence in America. Although McCarthy launched his campaign
in February +,¡o, Hanhimaki concentrates on the issue during Eisenhower’s presidency.
Hanhimaki suggests that Eisenhower was slow to respond, despite the damage to US global
prestige, in part because of a reluctance to ‘risk an open confrontation that might tear the
Republican Party apart soon after its historic victory in November +,¡:’ (p. +o,). Even after his
fall, McCarthy’s activities ‘left a severe stain on Eisenhower’s image in Europe’ (p. +:o). Moreover,
many concluded that the phenomenon of investigation or witch-hunting was more widespread
than the activities of one senator.
Sylvia Ellis delivers a nicely judged appraisal of the relationship between Harold Wilson and
Lyndon Johnson during the Vietnam War. She shows that Wilson over-estimated the intimacy of
their ties. Ellis concludes that, despite periods of cordiality, the prospects for a close working
relationship ended with Wilson’s dissociation in June +,oo of Britain from the US bombing of
Hanoi and Haiphong. The two leaders lacked any personal chemistry and ideological common
ground. But any prime minister would have had difficulties trying to cope with the sterling
crises, with the tensions caused by a refusal to send forces to Vietnam and the withdrawal from
East of Suez, and, not least, in dealing with the paranoia of Johnson (p. :oo).
The individual chapters of this volume are never less than interesting and some are very good.
The editing is generally competent. But there are some unfortunate lapses and errors—misspelling
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the name of the author of the foreword is unacceptable.The index is rather meagre at two pages.
Moreover, the book needs a title that more accurately reflects its concentration on foreign policy
during +,+,–o·, years that witnessed a growth in the importance of Anglo-American relations.
Michael F. Hopkins, Liverpool Hope University, UK
France, the United States and the Algerian war. By Irwin M. Wall. Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press. :oo+. ¡¡opp. Index. £:;.,¡. ISBN o ¡:o ::¡¡¡ +.
Almost forty years have passed since the end of the Algerian war in +,o:. Time, however, has
not dimmed French and wider interest in the course and conduct of the war, and the reasons
behind its conclusion. Nor has the passage of time served to temper condemnation of the means
used by France to prosecute the war. The year :oo+ saw a proliferation of literature on French
actions in Algeria, including General Aussaresses’s account of French armed forces’ use of torture
against the rebels in +,¡¡–;, and Jean-Luc Einaudi’s account of the massacre by the French
police of :oo Algerians in Paris in October +,o+. Moreover, the extent to which these
accounts—particularly the former—caused scandal in France demonstrated that the Algerian
war remains a source of contention.Wall’s assertion that the Algerian war has become a ‘dispas-
sionate matter of historical analysis’ (p. :oo) therefore invites question, but does not negate the
timely appearance of this thorough scholarly analysis of what remains a difficult episode in
recent French historical memory.
Wall’s essential thesis is that Algeria was not in fact a matter of domestic policy, notwithstanding
its status as a French département. Rather, he argues, it was a major question of foreign policy, whose
outcome was less dependent on any alleged prescience by Charles de Gaulle in advocating decol-
onization, than it was on France’s relations with the Western world in the wider Cold War context.
In this reading, France’s relations with the United States take on critical importance, as Wall argues
that Washington’s policy preferences regarding Algeria were instrumental in the fall of the Fourth
Republic, the return to power of de Gaulle, and the ultimate requirement for de Gaulle to end
the Algerian war on terms almost exclusively favourable to the former Algerian rebels.
There are a number of queries to be raised as a result of Wall’s analysis. Three in particular
stand out. First, he argues that French foreign policy under the Fourth Republic, and especially
under the Fifth, was dictated by concerns over two issues, namely Algeria and acquisition of a
national nuclear deterrent capability. True; these were critical considerations, but I find the
emphasis placed on them to verge on the reductionist. Second, Wall takes issue with what he
sees as the ‘received wisdom’ on de Gaulle’s Algerian policy, particularly the extent to which the
French leader was portrayed as having sought consistently to liberate Algeria from French
colonialism, only restricted in the timing of his efforts by the need to carry opinion with him.
Again true; this has been a feature of the French literature in particular, and indeed it is French
authors who are cited by Wall as propagating that view (including Alain Peyrefitte, who was on
de Gaulle’s staff and whose perspective might then be expected to be less than objective). In the
non-French literature, however, this impression has been open to question for some time.Third,
Wall suggests the over-riding importance of American diplomatic and political priorities in
conditioning and even controlling French initiatives on resolution of the Algerian crisis. Yet
again true; the question of French–American relations has been a crucial element of French
foreign policy since the end of the Second World War, but to view the breadth of French
considerations over Algeria through the prism of French–American relations would seem to
raise questions of emphasis.
Notwithstanding these points, it must be said that Wall’s work is thoroughly researched and
rigorous, and is highly readable. It captures both attention and imagination. It is provocative, and
even controversial in its assertions and conclusions. It finds an immediate place among the ‘must-
read’ pieces on France and Algeria, and it makes a valuable contribution to extant debate.
The Algerian war remains a source of contention in France and beyond. Wall’s work is more
likely to exacerbate than alleviate this position, but in opening new avenues and challenging
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some of the most prominent assumptions regarding France and the Algerian war in such a
scholarly yet accessible fashion, this book is to be commended.
Rachel Utley, University of York, UK
France in an age of globalization. By Hubert Védrine with Dominique Moïsi.
Translated by Philip H. Gordon. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. :oo+. +¡¡pp.
Index. Pb.: £+:.¡o. ISBN o ·+¡; ooo; ¡.
This book is a translation of Hubert Védrine’s Les cartes de la France à l’heure de la mondialisation,
published in June :ooo, on the eve of France’s presidency of the European Union. It is the result
of a series of lively dialogues with Dominique Moïsi, Deputy Director of France’s leading foreign
policy think-tank, the Institut Français des Relations Internationales. Védrine’s purpose is
twofold: to put forward a coherent aggiornamento of French foreign policy, and to examine both
Europe and the New World Order, dominated by the United States and globalization. It should
be noted that this edition has been updated to provide a discussion of recent developments,
notably the European Union Nice summit of December :ooo, with an insightful analysis of the
line adopted there by France.
Védrine’s thinking is undeniably informed by a classical conception of French foreign policy.
However, while stressing its continuity, he—who has played a central role in the way in which
France has gone about reinventing its foreign policy since +,·,—advocates a principle-centred
new ‘diplomacy of proposals’, which aims at cultivating a distinctive and stylish smartness,
befitting his idea of France’s uniqueness. The emphasis is therefore on bringing about ‘new,
dynamic, and forward-looking policies and diplomacy’.Védrine, in a statement which de Gaulle
probably would not have disavowed, proudly declares: ‘France is a great country. It is not to
dissolve into a sort of global magma, or even a European one. France has excellent cards in its
hands. If it plays them right, they can be real assets to help preserve, in the best sense of the word,
its identity and its influence. France can make a decisive contribution both to better organization
of the world and to the strengthening of Europe.’
Much has been made of Védrine’s use of the term ‘hyperpower’ with respect to the US,
sometimes deemed reminiscent of a certain French tradition of anti-Americanism, although the
French ‘hyperpuissance’ does not convey such a derogatory connotation. Védrine’s views are
clear: France is a friend and a supportive ally of the US, but no systematic alignment should be
expected from the European country, and it reserves the right to be critical on specific issues.
The idea that the New World Order requires counterweights to operate effectively is nevertheless
subtly suggested, as is the role that France can play ‘to “civilize” or “humanize” globalization, or
at least to make some rules for it, given that its savage or destructive aspects are as clear as its
enriching or liberating dimensions’.
The intelligence and the lucidity of the analysis, as well as the personal character of the view
expressed, go some way to assert the French Foreign Secretary’s stature as a statesman, befitting
the lineage of his predecessors at the Quai d’Orsay.Védrine succeeds in showing how he manages
fully to engage with the in-depth changes of the twenty-first century while staying true to the
fundamentals of the French geopolitical code.
Pascal Venier, University of Salford, UK
Germany’s new foreign policy: decision-making in an interdependent world. Edited
by Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser. Basingstoke: Palgrave. :oo+. ¡:opp. Index. £¡o.oo.
ISBN o ¡¡¡ ,+,o¡ ;.
This important book is a translation, updated, of volume ¡ of the German Council on Foreign
Relations’ comprehensive study Germany’s new foreign policy, published in +,,·. As explained in
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 189
a review of volumes + to ¡ (International Affairs ;¡: ¡, October +,,;), the first three instalments
systematically considered, in turn, the domestic foundations of united Germany’s international
situation, the challenges faced by Germany from the outside world, and the appropriate frame-
works—multilateral, bilateral or technical—for German responses to these challenges. This
concluding volume of the series, the first to appear in English, provides a comprehensive
catalogue of the ‘institutions and resources’ available for the promotion of Germany’s external
interests. The catalogue is long. It starts by considering the formal institutions of the foreign
policy-making process: first, the obvious ones at the centre—Chancellery, Foreign Ministry,
Defence Ministry—and then the many other federal ministries actively conducting foreign
relations in their own policy areas, as well as the Bundestag and the authorities of the federal
Länder. Proceeding through the institutions of politics, society, and the economy, the book
provides informative chapters on the relevant activities of Germany’s political parties, of the
well-endowed foundations linked with them, of the media and public opinion, of non-official
bodies specializing in international contacts, and of economic interest groups and policy-related
The question arises: how far will readers of this translation be able to appreciate the analysis
of all these diverse actors in Germany’s foreign policy process, when they are not told much here
about what the objectives of that policy are? In terms of ends and means, does this presentation
of the means of foreign policy go too far in excluding consideration of its ends? In fact, readers
of the volume are likely to have some understanding of Germany’s foreign policy already;
furthermore, as Gunther Hellmann points out in his short but perceptive conclusion, a state’s
objectives are only achievable (and thus worth considering) if it disposes of the necessary
resources and skills to pursue them. In foreign policy, the chosen ends are often determined by
the means available. A further answer to the question is that the book contains an important
group of chapters, mainly by distinguished practitioners, which analyse how policy is made in
specific sectors: Werner Hoyer on German policy in the EU, Lothar Rühl on security and
defence, Horst-Dieter Westerhoff on economic issues, and Wolfgang Fischer and Petra Holtrup
on ‘environmental foreign policy’, all give copious examples of the substance of policy, as well as
analysing its processes.
In approaching their very large theme, the authors have opted for breadth rather than depth.
The twenty chapters have an average length of only about +¡ pages (generally including
extensive bibliographical references, for which readers will be grateful), and this sometimes
produces a rather superficial discussion of the highly complex issues involved. (This is particu-
larly true of the chapters on economic interest groups and on advisory think-tanks, but there are
other examples.) Overall, however, the decision to go for comprehensiveness rather than depth,
in what is after all a pioneering study of a vast and neglected subject, has paid off very success-
fully. As the editors point out, to consider the range of institutions and bodies involved in
Germany’s external relations is to be aware of fundamental questions, both theoretical and
practical, about exactly how ‘foreign policy’ should now be understood and pursued. Many of
the book’s insights into the nature of present-day foreign policy-making, the international or
transnational roles of ‘home’ departments of government, and the extent of economic and social
interdependence, are directly relevant to the situation of Britain, as of Germany. Above all, the
book will be an invaluable reference-point for anyone wanting to understand how the foreign
policy processes of Germany actually work: for students considering further research on some
aspect of the subject, for instance, as well as for journalists, business people or officials needing to
know which bit of the German scene to tap into.
Roger Morgan, European University Institute, Florence, Italy
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 190
German foreign policy since unification: theories and case studies. Edited by Volker
Rittberger. Manchester: Manchester University Press. :oo+. ¡·¡pp. Index. Pb.: £+;.,,. ISBN
o ;+,o oo¡o o.
Germany as a civilian power? The foreign policy of the Berlin Republic. Edited by
Sebastian Harnisch and Hans W. Maull. Manchester: Manchester University Press. :oo+.
+;,pp. Index. Pb.: £+:.,,. ISBN o ;+,o oo¡: ;.
Ever since German re-unification in +,,o there has been a rich debate on the future course of
German foreign policy. By now, more than ten years of discussion have provided a significant
body of literature centred around the same key questions: Would post-unification Germany
remain a predictable and reliable partner of Western states? Would it break with the foreign policy
traditions of the Bonn Republic? Would Berlin fall back into the foreign policy behaviour of the
German Reich, drift towards the east, or try to set itself up as a world power? Would policy-
makers and advocates stress continuity over change? Would they promote a more assertive or a
more civilizing foreign policy? Would Germany, even if embedded in multilateral institutions,
flex its muscles within the collective decision-making bodies?
These two books, the work of research groups based at the Universities of Tübingen and Trier
respectively, are late entries to this ongoing and by no means completed debate. Compared to
the sometimes overheated contributions of the early +,,os, these two studies allow for a more
profound theoretical reflection as well as for a better empirical analysis of the significant changes
which have already shaped the new German foreign policy over the past decade. The research
team around Volker Rittberger aims to develop and test a range of alternative theories which
could explain and predict Germany’s new foreign policy. Harnisch and Maull’s edition is theoret-
ically more narrow, both by design and conviction. It focuses on one theoretical concept: ideal
type ‘civilian power’. Both volumes test the explanatory power of their theories in selected case-
studies. Rittberger’s team looks at German security policy within NATO, EU constitutional
policy, trade policy within the EU and GATT, and human rights policy within the UN. Harnisch
and Maull’s volume examines Germany’s policy towards NATO eastern enlargement, the
Maastricht negotiations, the debate on out-of-area operations between +,,o–,,, and Germany’s
policies on nuclear non-proliferation and human rights.
The two books should be read in conjunction, as their different emphases and strengths
complement each other. The team around Volker Rittberger offers the more sophisticated
research design. Its theoretical ambition and contribution is impressive. Part + offers an excellent
survey of the previous debate of Germany’s foreign policy after unification. Part : examines alter-
native foreign policy theories: neo-realism, modified realism, utilitarian liberalism and
constructivism, and develops these concepts further.The various tables and charts which contrast
the theories and schools of thought are very useful indeed. A main virtue of the study is its
original contribution to theory-building.The book requires a theoretical curiosity that might go
beyond the average interest of undergraduates, and it would therefore be most rewarding for
post-graduates and advanced political scientists specializing in foreign policy analysis. Part ¡ tests
the theories, and part ¡ compares their explanatory value. Compared to the general theoretical
sophistication and precision of the book, the case-studies are empirically disappointing. With
their obsessively functional emphasis on theory-testing, they probably stretch the tolerance of
non-specialist readers and political practitioners alike.
Harnisch and Maull’s edition provides the more readable empirical chapters and is generally
recommendable for specialist and wider audiences. The case-studies can be read independently.
For reasons of space, they do not provide full historical accounts, but they offer good and quick
overviews of the main developments in their respective areas.That is a value in itself.The book’s
core concept, civilian power, will be challenged after Germany’s recent military commitment to
the international campaign against terrorism.This, however, makes the reading even more worth-
while.The civilian power approach originated from an uneasiness with systemic explanations of
foreign policy. It holds that ‘foreign policies differ significantly from the trajectory expected by
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 191
realists and institutionalists due to country-specific foreign-policy role concepts’ (p. +¡,). Role
concepts are sets of norms expressing expected foreign policy behaviour, both by the actor and
other countries. Different from superficial popular usage, civilian power does not always mean
‘non-military’. Civilian powers are not pacifistic per se. The study therefore provides plenty of
material for those who are inclined to defend the concept as well as for those who prefer to write
it off completely. Further theoretical battles in the German IR community, never entirely non-
militant, will certainly follow.
Both studies seem to suggest that constructivist approaches provide better explanations for and
accounts of German foreign policy than do their rivals. Wolfgang Wagner and Volker Rittberger
conclude that post-unification foreign policy ‘can first and foremost be characterized as norm-
consistent foreign policy’. Germany ‘almost always adhered to the value-based expectations of
appropriate behaviour shared within the international and domestic society’. At the same time,
Germany has ‘intensified its influence-seeking policy’ and has ‘stepped up its efforts to increase its
influence on collective decision-making and collective action’. In line with its tradition as ‘an insti-
tutionally integrated trading state’, it has nevertheless ‘pursued a gain-seeking policy’ as well (p. ¡:¡).
All in all, both volumes are fine contributions to the new and important series Issues in German
Politics by Manchester University Press. The series’ editors should be congratulated for making
these prominent prototypes of German debate on foreign policy available to Britain and the
wider English-speaking world.
Hartmut Mayer, St Peter’s College, University of Oxford, UK
Die Europäische Union als Akteur der Weltpolitik. Edited by Klaus Schubert and
Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet. Opladen: Leske & Budrich. :ooo. :,opp. Index. Pb.: DM
¡·. ISBN ¡ ·+oo :;¡+ ¡.
Europe’s role in international relations has attracted a growing public and academic interest in
recent years. This well-prepared and informative volume edited by Klaus Schubert and Gisela
Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet aims to give an overview of the European Union’s main external
activities. The editors begin by sketching the analytical and conceptual framework of the EU as
an international actor. Schubert locates the EU within the overarching processes of globalization
and regionalization, and characterizes it as a fragmented actor and an expression of a new model
of statehood, while Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet thoroughly analyses the main institutional and
procedural aspects of the EU’s ‘multi-dimensional’ external relations and the dualism between
EC and CFSP activities against the background of recent developments.
The volume combines a geographic and a systematic approach. The first chapters look at the
EU’s relations with other countries or world regions, including central and eastern European
countries, the Mediterranean region, the former Yugoslavia, Russia, the United States, Asia and
Latin America. Unfortunately, the otherwise highly substantial chapter on North–South relations
and the Lomé system has already been overtaken by political developments. Any future edition
will thus have to include the Cotounou agreement. The contribution on Latin America could
have been more detailed on certain issues like recent developments in EU policy towards
Mexico, which currently represent the most advanced contractual relations with a Latin
In the chapter on transatlantic relations the main issues from the New Transatlantic Agenda to
the Transatlantic Economic Partnership are highlighted, and some elaborations are dedicated to the
security relations between the EU proper and the US.These findings can be related to the book’s
contribution on European security and defence policy, which sketches the outlines of actual devel-
opments, stressing the changed nature of the EU in international relations in recent years and the
slowly growing importance of the Union in security issues. Although this process should not be
overestimated, it reveals a major landmark in integration history still to be fully assessed.
In addition to the geographically-oriented contributions, a number of cross-cutting systematic
and policy-oriented chapters—besides the already mentioned study on security and defence
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 192
policy—touch upon the EU’s role in international environmental policy, in the WTO, and on
the impact of the euro. These contributions are highly enriching, given that the EU has gained
an enhanced role in the international monetary field through Economic and Monetary Union,
and that it also plays a major role in multilateral trade negotiations as well as in international
environmental policy with regard to the Kyoto Protocol.
In their summary of the volume, the editors provide a conceptual piece drawing conclusions
from the main findings of the chapters. The role of the EU appears generally fragmented and
multi-faceted.The editors stress the importance of a comprehensive role definition for the Union
in the world—a debate that so far has not exhaustively taken place.This volume can be regarded
as an encouraging invitation for further studies on the EU’s position in international affairs,
especially with a view to role models and more theoretical approaches.
Udo Diedrichs, University of Cologne, Germany
Russia and the former Soviet Republics
Russia and the Russians. By Geoffrey Hosking. London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press.
:oo+. ;+·pp. Index. £:¡.oo. ISBN o ;+¡ ,,¡+¡ ,.
Geoffrey Hosking has already covered some ¡¡o years of Russian history in two of his best
known books, A history of the Soviet Union (+,,:) and Russia: people and empire (+,,;). In this latest
volume he both elaborates and completes the picture, covering the period from ·oo AD to :ooo.
This is much more than a history of Russia; as the title implies, both the collective experience
of the Russian (russkii) ethnos and that of the citizens of the Russian (rossiiskii) empire, many of
them non-Russian and non-Slav, form the core of this perceptive and stimulating study. The
often contradictory relationship between russkii and rossiiskii is shown to be one of the recurrent
themes in Russian history, a history which Hosking frequently uses to highlight features of
contemporary Russia. Why, for example, do many Russians drink excessively? The answer is to
be found on page +:: the growth of the number of taverns in the sixteenth century, and the state’s
tacit condoning of a practice from which it derived huge revenues. Among many similar
examples Hosking suggests why Russians make good soldiers, why there is widespread anti-
semitism in Russia, why resentment of successful individuals was, and is, widespread, and why
Russia has been dogged by the problem of having weak states on her borders. Some statements
have a startlingly contemporary ring; both nineteenth-century members of the intelligentsia and
twentieth-century communists, neither required reading for British or American leaders,
regarded the world as a battleground between good and evil.
Hosking is perhaps at his best when writing on the Orthodox Church and the Old Believers,
and, as might be expected from a man whose doctoral dissertation was on the subject, on the four
dumas of the early twentieth century. He is, however, almost equally surefooted when dealing with
such diverse subjects as the demographic structure of the Central Asian republics, the changing
nature of Soviet architecture in the +,:os and +,¡os, the pressures brought to bear on the
composer Shostakovich, or the vicissitudes of the post-+,¡o ‘Thaw’ in literature.These latter pages
remind us that Hosking crosses the divide between history and literature and is the author of a
key work on post-Stalinist literature (Beyond socialist realism, +,·o). His judgements, while always
measured, are in several cases unfashionable, to the point of being controversial. For instance,
writing of the Crimean War, he is prepared to give credit not only to the ordinary Russian
soldiers, but also to their often reviled leader when he writes: ‘The hardness and team spirit of
Russian soldiers remained as strong as ever under good leadership, as was shown by their tenacious
defence of Sevastopol under Prince Aleksandr Menshikov’ (p. :·¡) and to paint Mikhail Katkov,
editor of the newspaper Moscow Bulletin, not as a reactionary but as a radical innovator (p. ¡¡¡).
For all its ;oo-plus pages, this book cannot mention everything and the author has clearly had
to make some hard choices.The role of the cruiser Aurora in the events of October +,+; gets no
mention, nor does Iulii Khariton, the ‘father of the Soviet nuclear bomb’ (much of the credit is
Russia and the former Soviet Republics
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 193
given to Igor Kurchatov), while Anton Chekhov is awarded but a single line. However, although
he paints with a broad brush, Hosking includes a wealth of fascinating detail, such as the fact that
there was a second ‘Bloody Sunday’ (in Riga) in January +,o¡, or the difference between the
terms hetman and ataman. He is also notably meticulous in his translations of such key Russian
concepts as volia (not ‘freedom’ but rather ‘the lack of any constraint’), narodnik (‘people
worshipper’), sobornost (Khomiakov’s ‘unity in multiplicity’ is quoted with approval), and obshch-
estvennost (‘politically aware society’), to say nothing of the often misunderstood word kultura.
Inevitably, in a book of this scope there are some slips. Natalia Goncharova is rechristened
Larissa (p. ¡¡·), Sarov is relocated from Nizhnii Novgorod province to Kursk province (p. ¡o¡),
Soviet troops appear to fight in the Spanish Civil War (p. ¡,o) and there is possibly confusion in
the text, and certainly confusion in the index, between two Konstantins, both viceroys of Poland,
one Pavlovich, the other Nikolaevich. Krasnodar is misspelled (p. ¡:·), the only mistake in the
excellent maps which, together with a long and detailed chronology and extensive notes,
accompany the text. However as this book should, and almost certainly will, appear in paperback,
these slips can soon be rectified. In no way do they detract from a book which is, without doubt,
the most authoritative work to appear on this subject since the publication of James Billington’s
The icon and the axe in +,oo.
Michael Pursglove, University of Bath, UK
My six years with Gorbachev: notes from a diary. By Anatoly S. Chernyaev. Translated
and edited by Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State
University Press. :ooo. ¡¡;pp. Index. $¡:.¡o. ISBN o :;+ o:o:, o.
Before becoming Mikhail Gorbachev’s foreign policy adviser in +,·o, Anatoly Chernyaev spent
twenty years as an ‘apparatchik’ in the Central Committee International Department of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). However, far from the stereotype this word
evokes, he is mild-mannered and self-effacing, a sharp judge of character and he has an astute
understanding of the times through which he lived. My six years with Gorbachev combines sections
of his diary and other notes that he took at the time with later memories and retroactive reflec-
tions. It has been brilliantly translated and edited by Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker who
provide footnotes to identify the characters and explain the more obscure events.A ‘new thinker’
long before the term was invented, Chernyaev provides a first-rate insider’s account of the
Chernyaev makes it clear that Gorbachev had no grand plan to reform the Soviet Union. He
knew that change was necessary, but he was shackled at first by ‘thinking within the parameters
of the old system’ (p. ¡+). He saw perestroika as a revolution from above, with the CPSU as its
vanguard. Glasnost, too, was first conceived of as enlightenment from above. It was only in +,·o
that he began to realize that more profound change was required. Chernyaev criticizes him for
giving in, from time to time, to the inertia of the existing system and for failures of nerve, but
he praises the speed with which he understood that the Soviet Union had to withdraw from
Afghanistan (he told Babrak Karmal as much in October +,·¡). He also knew that relations
within the Soviet bloc had to change. Above all, he had first-hand experience of the country’s
Chernyaev has more to say about ‘new thinking’ in foreign policy than about economic
reform, but his most interesting revelations concern Soviet domestic politics. Generally critical
of Gorbachev’s handling of the nationality issue, he exonerates him for the use of force in Tbilisi
in April +,·, (he was in London when the tragedy occurred) but has little to say about events
in Baku in January +,,o. His most severe judgement concerns Gorbachev’s response to the
separatist movements in the Baltic states. His speech after tanks killed more than a dozen
unarmed protesters in Vilnius in January +,,+ was, according to Chernyaev, ‘disorganized,
confusing ... lacking the most important element—a clear stance on the issue’ (p. ¡+,). Chernyaev
resigned in protest, but his secretary made him reconsider. He was still in post when the
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Gorbachev family went to Foros in Crimea in August and he was with them there when the
Chernyaev is particularly angry about accusations that Gorbachev conspired in the putsch.
Even in Moscow, conspiracy capital of the world, the allegation is accorded no credibility. He
excoriates unscholarly Western authors who claim to have established Gorbachev’s complicity.To
destroy this particular calumny, he appends his journal entries for +·–:+ August +,,+ in an
afterword written for the US edition. This final chapter is an unsentimental but moving
testament to the steadfastness both of Gorbachev and of Chernyaev himself.
Margot Light, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
Islam in the CIS: a threat to stability? By Yaacov Ro’i. London: Royal Institute of
International Affairs. :oo+. ·opp. Pb.: £+:.¡o. ISBN + ·o:o¡ ++¡ o.
The terrorist attacks of ++ September :oo+ and the ensuing military operation in Afghanistan
have put Central Asia firmly on the political map as one of the key regions in the Western ‘war
on terrorism’. While disputes are ranging on the nature of fundamentalist Islam and its relation
to international terrorism, the study of Islam in the post-Soviet countries of Central Asia remains
one of the most controversial and contested subjects. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union,
governments of the newly independent states of Central Asia have repeatedly alluded to Islam as
the major threat to domestic and international security and sought international support for their
attempts to curb expression of political Islam in the region. At the same time the Russian
government has pressured the West to accept its military operation in Chechnya as a campaign
against ‘world terrorism’ and presented the Chechen resistance as little more than the extension
of Bin Laden’s subversive activities.
Many scholars and human rights activists have objected to the politicization of the debate on
the role of Islam in the region and warned against confusion between opposition to the existing
governments and the expression of Islamic fundamentalism. They argue that instead of curbing
fundamentalism such policies can breed religious extremism. Amid this debate, the study of the
role of Islam in the CIS countries has become of both academic and political importance.
Arguably hardly anyone is better qualified to address the issue of the place of Islam in the CIS
than Yaacov Ro’i, who for nearly a quarter of a century has extensively studied Islam in the former
Soviet Union. In this work he draws on his in-depth knowledge of the changing nature of Islam
in the former Soviet Muslim republics and allows the reader to see both continuity and new
features in the relationship between religion and the Central Asian states.The first four chapters
are written from a ‘thematic approach’ perspective, giving a concise but comprehensive picture
of the role that Islam played in the region on the eve of independence and the ensuing rise of
the public profile of Islam. A separate chapter deals with the general process of the politicization
of Islam in the FSU, followed by case-study overviews of the role that Islam plays in individual
ex-Soviet Muslim republics.
The study of the changing nature of Islam in the region usefully discusses the official religious
policies of the Soviet and subsequent sovereign republican governments as an independent and
important factor in shaping both ‘official’ and ‘independent’ manifestations of Islam in the region.
(This discussion also features in the introduction to chapter ¡, ‘Politicisation of Islam’ and in
chapter o,‘Governments and Islam’.) In both thematic chapters on the politicization of Islam and
in the case-studies on ‘Regional attributes and differences’, the author analyses the roots of the
so-called ‘Wahhabi’ movement, the shape it has taken in the northern Caucasus and Central Asia
and its relation to secular democratic parties. A separate chapter is devoted to the discussion of
trends and limitations in the development of political Islam as a cross-border phenomenon and
puts Islamic groups and parties in the CIS in the context of Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ as it has
developed elsewhere in the Muslim world.
On the basis of the detailed study of the developments within Islam in Central Asia and parts
of the Caucasus, the author finally invites the reader to consider ‘Under what circumstances
Russia and the former Soviet Republics
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might Islam threaten stability in the region?’ (ch. ·) and discusses the issues with special reference
to the two most religiously charged countries of the FSU—Uzbekistan and Chechnya.
Although some themes and approaches sketched through the book tend to overlap, and
reference to some countries is omitted (e.g. Kyrgizstan), the book presents a coherent, well-
researched and well-argued study of the multiple trends in diverse environments of various
Muslim countries of the FSU. It can be highly recommended as essential reading both to students
of Islam and to those who are seriously interested in understanding the political and religious
situations in the former Soviet states of Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Anna Zelkina, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, UK
Middle East and North Africa
Turkey in world politics: an emerging multiregional power. Edited by Barry Rubin
and Kemal Kirisci. London, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. :oo+. :o,pp. Index. £¡o.¡o. ISBN
+ ¡¡¡·; ,¡¡ ¡.
The double-headed eagle, crest of so many countries, does not come, as you might have guessed,
from the Roman eagle, doubled to represent Constantinople and Byzantium. There is, in the
Museum of Anatolian Civilizations in Ankara, a much older version—Hittite, from :ooo BC. In
that part of the world, each and every ruler had to look for trouble in all directions.The Atatürk
period, when peace abroad and peace at home became a national motto, was a brief, blessed
interlude: today, the problems crowd in, and it is useful to have a well-edited collection of essays
on them.The writers are specialists, senior and junior, mainly Turkish but also foreign, including
Israelis (for whom Turkey is a very important ally: it is rumoured that, when Congress seemed
about to condemn Turkey for the Armenian massacres of +,+¡, high-level Israelis went into
action, claiming that any destabilization of Turkey’s relations with the West would cause the
Middle East to explode).
Turkey has indeed been growing in importance, as the title suggests, and it has also been
undergoing considerable social change. Ankara, constructed on modernistic lines between the
wars (there is some quite distinguished Bauhaus architecture) was swamped by rural migrants,
and there is some irony in emerging from the Foreign Ministry’s entertainments palace, all white
ties and ball gowns, and smelling kebabs. For educated Turks, Europe has become the lode-stone.
William Hale and Gamze Avci competently address the various issues involved in this, with their
essay on Turkey and the European Union, but they might have added that there is a certain self-
hatred involved: Turks know that joining Europe is not easy, or even likely, but think that the
effort should be made so that the politicians can be disciplined from outside. Thus, there would
be alignment with the euro to prevent the politicos from making whoopee with paper money.
The authors, unfortunately, do not discuss this, no doubt because they were writing before the
currency crash in February (itself, surely, brought about by a wrong-headed currency stabilization
plan).They do, fairly, set out the facts of the Customs Union and note that foreign investment is
astonishingly low for such a growing and important country. However, it would have been
helpful if they had discussed such imponderables as the often-heard European line that a Muslim
country cannot belong, or the Germans’ own fear of their huge and sometimes unintegrated
Turkish and Kurdish elements.
Kemal Kirisci (co-author of a very good book on the Kurdish side) writes here on the other
vital link—US–Turkish relations. He does not have space to discuss the cultural aspect of this (it
is fascinating) but he does show how far US–Turkish interdependence has gone. Russians (about
whom Duygu Sezer here contributes a well-organized essay) fear that America, using Turkey, will
set up a whole new area of influence in the oil-rich southern Caucasus and Central Asia (about
which Gareth Winrow, Kirisci’s co-author, writes). But, as Kirisci explains, there is a very difficult
problem: the Kurdish inhabitants of northern Iraq could, in the American view, be given
independence, but a colonel, quoted by Kirisci, speaks for many Turks when he says, ‘the United
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States, under the pretext of protecting human rights, is assisting the formation of a Kurdish state
in northern Iraq which eventually will demand land from Turkey’.The American expert, Graham
Fuller, made himself unpopular when he told some politicians that a Kurdish entity already
existed and that an American-backed Kurdistan would one day emerge. They answered, ipe sapa
gelmez, the equivalent of ‘bonkers’. The late Turgut Ozal suggested a Turkish protectorate in
northern Iraq, even a Turkish–Kurdish confederation, but the idea was not popular at all. The
Westernized Turks fear any further extension of the eastern half of the country (it is utterly aston-
ishing how, in a class of fifty students at Bilkent, in Ankara, I find only a small handful who have
even been east of the airport: east, for them, means demographic problems, Islam and poverty).
It may even be the case that, just as the treaties of Versailles and Saint-Germain came apart, so
the postwar treaties affecting the former Ottoman empire will also fall apart, once Saddam
Hussein eventually goes. If so, the Kurdish question will come up again, in force, and it will not
be at all easy for Turkey to manage.
Politics and economics chase each other round a switchback cycle, at the moment, and the
elements in the present troubles are very difficult to disentangle.There is a serious account, by Mine
Eder, of ‘the challenge of globalization and Turkey’s changing political economy’. In +,·o, Turkey
‘was the first developing country to enter into the world’s most competitive top-twenty list’, but
fell to fortieth in +,,·. Certainly, the very small figure for foreign direct investment—under $+,ooo
million p.a.—is striking. However, if banks can make easy money out of high-interest government
paper, why bother to do anything else? Eder gives all the relevant figures and wonders why, given
much liberalization of the investment process, there has not been more, but the lazy inflationary
profits must surely supply a good part of the answer; and, besides, there is always an imponderable,
the degree to which Turkey’s public relations affect investment. The better the country, the worse
its public relations—something to do with honesty—and has anyone ever studied this?
All in all, this is a useful volume with good guidance for further reading: not, thankfully, one
of those compilations where ‘political scientists’ aspiring to the latest North American fad just go
in for theories of theories. There is, incidentally, a new Russian book, Turtsiya mezhdu Avrupoy I
Aziyey (ed. E. Kireyev, Moscow, :ooo) which should probably be read in parallel with this one.
It is extremely detailed and goes for the essential point, again and again: and it is quite impressed
by the economy, though not by the management of public finance.
Norman Stone, Bilkent University,Turkey
Reinventing Khomeini: the struggle for reform in Iran. By Daniel Brumberg. Chicago,
IL: University of Chicago Press. :oo+. ¡oopp. £¡¡.oo. ISBN o ::o o;;¡; ·.
Dan Brumberg has acquired a strong reputation as one of North America’s most interesting
commentators on post-revolution Iran. Some of his writings on the theological and political
thought of the leader of the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, have become standard
reading in several postgraduate courses, including those run in my own Institute at the University
of Durham. He has now complemented these writings with a new study of the politics of reform
in post-Khomeini Iran, although this new study finds its roots very much in Brumberg’s earlier
research on the political thought of Khomeini.
As the title of the book suggests, in their struggles to introduce wholesale reforms in the country,
Iran’s post-Khomeini reformers are having to find ways of ‘reinventing’ the +,;, revolution. The
groups and individuals who make up the reformist camp would in any other context be known as
revisionists. For historical reasons, however, reformers themselves do what they can to avoid being
labelled ‘revisionist’, for in the Iranian leftist lexicon, which also dominated much of the revolu-
tionary language of the republic in its early years, the term usually denotes a streak of opportunism
leading to betrayal. Obviously, the reformers gathering around President Khatami want to avoid
such unfortunate associations. And herein lies their dilemma: How to reform a strongly ideological
system without being branded anti-revolutionaries and ‘liberals’, or doing so without challenging
the very foundations of the political system to which they themselves belong and by which they
Middle East and North Africa
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 197
are nourished? Also, how to reform a system practically invented by Khomeini himself and a small
group of advisers without negating his legacy? Brumberg’s study is primarily interested in exposing
these tensions, and he does so by examining the forces who want to use the principles of the +,;,
revolution to introduce reforms, and those who are so closely wedded to Khomeini’s ideals that
they see any reform as an insult and a direct threat to the entire system.
The author skilfully explores the earlier debates in the life of the Islamic republic about
political power and the constitutional nature of government as a prelude to his analysis of the
institutional crisis which engulfed the country in the late +,·os and soon after Khomeini’s death
in +,·,. The crisis, of course, was partly caused by the recognition among some of Khomeini’s
key advisers that the ‘routinization’ of Iran’s revolutionary state should begin to take place before
the death of the leader of the revolution. In view of Khomeini’s overwhelming presence in all
aspects of the administrative system of the state, his endorsement of the process of routinization
would be essential for its legitimacy.
Brumberg puts the crisis in context when he notes with regard to the role that Iran’s charismatic
leader played in the first ten years after the revolution, ‘When the storm of the charisma emanates
from the very soul of a charismatic leader, it is no easy task to transform this revolutionary aura into
doctrines and institutions that legitimize social order’ (p. +:o). Indeed, this comment captures much
of the tension surrounding the debates about reform, for it was only after the end of the eight-year
Iran–Iraq war and the patriarch’s death that the debates about the future shape of the Iranian social
order began to circulate.While in their first phase these debates were limited to matters concerning
economic development, reconstruction, foreign policy and public policy, by the mid-+,,os such
fundamental issues as political freedom, the rule of law, individual rights, transparency in the
behaviour of governmental agencies, and the need for an active civil society had thrust onto the
scene. These debates were of course encouraged by two important constituencies in Iran: its
youthful population and its increasingly vocal female electorate. Together, they helped to bring to
power in the +,,; presidential race the champion of civil rights and of an ‘Islamic civil society’,
Hojjatoleslam Mohammed Khatami.Thus, the reform movement was empowered.
But what interests Brumberg most are the intellectual and ideological continuities and discon-
tinuities which separate the period of reforms in the late +,,os from the revolutionary debates
of the early +,·os. He argues that while the reformers may have gained the upper hand, the
struggle for ‘institutionalization of competing visions’ in the Islamic Republic has continued to
complicate political processes in modern Iran. As already mentioned, much of Brumberg’s
discussion of post-Khomeini developments is still rooted in the debates which shaped the +,·os
Khomeini era. In the second half of the book the author does make some very useful observa-
tions about the reform process under Khatami, but these are far too brief and abstract to assist a
better understanding of the content of the reforms, their advocates, and the struggles between
the ‘conservative’ forces and proponents of reform. Brumberg’s new book, therefore, should be
seen as providing a superb historical backdrop to the rise of the Khatami camp. This is no
criticism of Brumberg’s work, for few studies have as yet managed to capture the essence of the
Khatami era, particularly as the process of Khatami-led reforms is still continuing. If Brumberg
provides the context, then I would say that the most detailed and analytical study of the content
of the reform process can be found in Ali Ansari’s Iran, Islam and democracy: the politics of managing
change (Royal Institute of International Affairs, :oo+). Ansari also visits the intellectual and
ideological landscape of revolutionary Iran, but his focus is less on the past and more on the
causes of what he calls the ‘tide of reform’. Read together, one can really begin to appreciate not
only the scale of the Khatami reforms but also the intellectual rivers which seem to separate the
various pro- and anti-reform forces in modern Iran.
Finally, I must register my concern that it is very unfortunate to find a book of this impor-
tance without a bibliography. Such an important university press should not publish books of this
calibre without a detailed and informative bibliography.
Anoushiravan Ehteshami, University of Durham, UK
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 198
Succession in Saudi Arabia. By Joseph Kechichian. New York, NY: Palgrave. :oo+. :·;pp.
Index. $¡¡.oo. ISBN o ¡+: :¡··o o.
This is a very welcome in-depth look at the issues and personalities in the matter of past, present
and future Saudi royal succession. Kechichian acknowledges, and makes liberal use of, the work
of Gary Samore, Alexander Bligh, and Simon Henderson, on the royal family and questions of
succession. He has also underpinned his own analysis with a wide trawl through most of the
relevant literature. Yet the book is not a rehash. The author has had very extensive access to
members of the Al Saud and other prominent Saudis, as well as to a large pool of Saudi and other
observers.This, and a painstaking effort to update and complete those previous studies, make the
book a significant contribution—and one that deserves to be read by all who have an interest in
the future of Saudi Arabia.
Although there is an overview of Islamic, Arab, and Arabian precedents and influences on the
succession question, and a review of succession patterns in the first and second Saudi state (from
the eighteenth to the nineteenth century), this is not where the book’s contribution lies (indeed,
this has been done more systematically elsewhere). Perhaps that is why the large chapter that
contains this, as well as an overview of the main succession issues today, is merely labelled
‘Introduction’. The ‘meat’ of the work comes in chapters + and :, ‘The current generation’, and
‘The next generation’. In both, the author brings out well the complexities of the unwritten
principles, and tensions and family dynamics, impinging on questions of succession. Generational
criteria (brothers, sons, and grandsons of Abdul-Aziz, the Kingdom’s founder) mix with seniority
within and across generational boundaries; character and ability; maternal descent; the dynastic
chess played among full brothers and half brothers; and a range of other factors. The continuing
expansion of the family is set against the limits on the number of available positions and on the
relatively diminishing resources. Kechichian is equivocal on whether such tensions, especially
when mixed with policy disagreements within the family, and grievances from below, are likely
to bring instability and perhaps even the demise of the regime. He outlines a number of scenarios
that would bring about the latter—but then elsewhere cuts across this message by stressing the
adaptability of the family, and the talent that it harbours. It is not clear whether this appearance
of ambivalence is intended or is the result of a rushed completion of the work. In any case, the
book’s strength lies not so much in its consideration of the stability/instability question (which
has also been covered elsewhere), as in the detailed examination of the politics, personalities and
preferences of the royals. Especially valuable, and most original, is the author’s contribution on
the next generation. Before we get there, however, there are still a number of Abdul-Aziz’s sons
to come to the throne; among them, Kechichian rightly points to Prince Salman, the governor
of Riyadh and a full brother of King Fahd and Prince Sultan, as a key figure—well situated in
terms of blood ties but also generally liked and viewed as highly capable—and as a possible
unifying future king.
It is a pity that the book does seem to have been rushed to publication: there is some
repetition, and the organization of the material across the chapters is not always as tight as might
have been the case. This is one indication, perhaps, of quick and superficial editing by the
publisher—a problem that is evident also in other ways, including the misspelling of the names
of three of the five Saudi kings and one senior prince in the photo line-up on page oo (‘Abdula
Aziz’, ‘Faybal’, ‘Kholed’, and ‘Naet’).
It is to be hoped that there will be occasion to produce a more polished second edition—the
book certainly deserves one. Indeed, these quibbles notwithstanding, Kechichian has done all
those with an interest in the Kingdom a major service by producing this book. I shall be dipping
into it often.
Gerd Nonneman, Lancaster University, UK
Middle East and North Africa
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Economic policy and performance in the Arab world. By Paul Rivlin. London, Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner. :oo+. :¡¡pp. Index. £¡:.¡o. ISBN + ¡¡¡·; ,¡: :.
For far too long,Western scholarship on the Middle East has tended to focus almost exclusively
on the fields of Islamic studies, politics and international relations. Other equally important
subjects, particularly economic development, have received far less attention. Thankfully, this
situation has recently changed; numerous studies have come out over the past few years on a
whole range of issues related to economic development in the Middle East. Some of these works
are now considered essential reading for students of the region.
Paul Rivlin’s study is one of the latest contributions to the growing literature on economic
development in the Middle East. The stated aim of the study is to explain economic policy and
performance in the Arab world during the +,,os.The first of the book’s eight chapters attempts
to place economic policies in the Arab world within the context of the wider debate on
economic development strategies. The next three chapters provide background material for the
case-studies, which are dealt with in subsequent chapters.The material examined includes socio-
economic conditions, natural resources, the role of rents and interest groups, and the agricultural
and industrial sectors.
A number of issues might be raised with respect to these chapters, but in this context I would
simply observe that they provide only a very general survey of the topics chosen. Particularly given
the aims of the study, more analysis would have been desirable. Furthermore, the organization of
the study is somewhat problematic. There is no obvious progression in the subjects addressed in
each of the chapters, or even in the different topics raised within them.
The fifth and sixth chapters deal with the case-studies. Chapter ¡ examines the stabilization
and structural adjustment programmes in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. Rivlin explains
the reasons behind the introduction of these programmes, as well as the privatization
programmes. He then proceeds to analyse the effectiveness of the policies pursued in each of the
four states. As the Syrian experience differs very much from those of these states, Rivlin devotes
the whole of chapter o to an examination of the reform programme in that country. Again, the
organization of the study is problematic. No clear connections are established between the
theoretical and background material in the early chapters and the case-studies, making a central
argument of any kind difficult to discern. In addition, I am not convinced that there is anything
new in the various case-studies (and, indeed, the two concluding chapters) which adds, theoret-
ically or empirically, to the existing literature. Far more rigorous work on the structural
adjustment and liberalization processes in the Arab world can be found elsewhere. The book
might be useful for students who are looking for a basic introduction to the subject of economic
development as it relates to the Middle East.
T. P. Najem, University of Durham, UK
Algeria ‒: a short history. By Benjamin Stora. London, Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press. :oo+. :·¡pp. Index. £:¡.¡o. ISBN o ·o+¡ ¡;+¡ o.
In July :oo: Algerians will celebrate forty years of independence. Whether they will feel in the
mood to celebrate is another matter. As Benjamin Stora remarks in his preface, ‘Algeria is a
country ravaged by two conflicts: a war waged with France between +,¡¡ and +,o: ... and a civil
war that began in +,,:’ (p. xi). In few countries is the weight of history so unbearably heavy. As
one of France’s leading historians of Algeria, and more broadly of French decolonization, Stora
is well equipped to tell the story of these two terrible conflicts and of the thirty-year period that
separates them, when the country was a one-party state struggling to create a post-colonial
identity. That it has failed to do so can be blamed on the brutality of the colonial experience
(Stora estimates that, in all, half a million people died in the seven-and-a-half-year war of
independence); on the insistence of a repressive post-colonial state to rewrite history as a one-
dimensional ‘people’s struggle’ (in the process denying the Berber component of Algerian
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 200
identity); on an uncompromising Islamist movement which emerged to challenge the state on
the basis of an appeal to a ‘mythic nation destroyed by the arrival of the French’ (p. :oo); and
finally on contemporary France, whose destiny is inextricably intertwined with Algeria’s but
which shuns the memory of its Algerian war ‘like the unbearable face of a Gorgon’ (p. ++¡).
Slowly and with difficulty, Stora suggests, Algerians are beginning to escape from the strait-
jacket of the past. In the process, their attitudes to state, religion and history are changing. In the
long run, he implies, this is healthy, but none of these problematic issues can be fully resolved as
long as the violence persists.
This little book has been adapted for an English-reading public from three short volumes in
French.There is a foreword by William Quandt, of the University of Virginia. Unfortunately, the
translating and editing leave much to be desired.There are too many un-English expressions such
as ‘alimentary goods’ (p. +·¡); there are elementary mistakes such as ‘Baas’ for ‘Baath’ (p. :o·);
Medea is south-west of Algiers not ‘in southwest Algiers’ (p. ::¡). Since Algeria’s main Islamist
groups, the FIS and the GIA, have become well known through their French initials, it makes
little sense to render them as the ISF and the AIG. Students in the United States and Britain will
find the full chronology helpful; less useful is a bibliography confined to works in French.
What is Africa’s problem? By Yoweri K. Museveni. Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press. :ooo. :o+pp. Index. Pb.: £+¡.¡o. ISBN o ·+oo ¡:;· :.
Widely hailed as the éminence grise of the (speedily thwarted) African renaissance of the +,,os,
President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda still holds the torch for Africa’s ‘new’ leaders. By dint of
the international confidence invested in Museveni, Uganda has become every donor’s favourite
recipient of aid, and the country currently leads the way in pioneering World Bank financial
reforms. But this American edition of Museveni’s political writings, first published for an East
African readership in the early +,,os, is offered as a timely exercise in public relations.
International criticism of the Ugandan army’s adventures in Congo is mounting, and Museveni’s
persistent reluctance to move Uganda towards a Western model of democracy is beginning to
look like nothing more than old-fashioned despotic obduracy.The ‘Pearl of Africa’, and its leader,
are beginning to tarnish.
The :, short essays collected here all date from the period +,·+ to +,,+, and all bar one were
written after +,·¡—the honeymoon period in Museveni’s relationship with the West, as his
victorious National Resistance Army restored order and brought rapid economic growth to the
war-ravaged region. These writings therefore have little relevance for current affairs in eastern
Africa, although they will be of interest to those who wish to learn more about Museveni’s
background and political philosophy.
Grouped in four sections under the headings ‘Ugandan politics’, ‘Military strategy in Uganda’,
‘African politics’ and ‘Africa in world politics’, the essays cover a wide and somewhat eclectic range
of topics. All were originally political speeches, delivered before remarkably diverse audiences.
Among them is a homily on the perils of ‘bad leadership’, delivered in February +,·o to a gathering
of elders at the Acholi Inn in the northern town of Gulu (pp. +o–+¡), at a time when fighting was
still raging across the northern districts. A second speech given in Gulu the next day is also
included, this one for members of the National Resistance Army on the need for good relations
with local populations in the north (pp. +¡o–¡+). The sub-text to both, only obliquely referred to
in these printed versions of these speeches, were accusations of recent military atrocities. Another
essay, on the vexed question of religion and politics in Uganda, was first heard by a conference of
bishops at Gaba in June +,·o (pp. +o–+·), while university students at Makerere were urged in June
+,,+ to play a constructive role in ‘building Uganda for the future’ (pp. ··–+o·).All of this is rather
mundane and can hardly be described as revealing of the man or his motivations.
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The majority of the remaining speeches were made to mark the rites of passage of Museveni’s
political victories (the anniversaries of the inauguration of the National Resistance Movement),
or to celebrate Uganda’s re-emergence onto the international stage (for example, speeches to
welcome to Kampala the Annual Assembly of the International African Coffee Association, and
the First African Regional Conference on Environment and Sustainable Development). Most are
well tuned to international ears. Museveni rages against the evils of corruption; condemns an
older generation of African leaders for silent complicity in the wrong-doings of their peers;
argues for improved public service and greater accountability; pledges his commitment to
North–South cooperation; advocates ‘genuine non-alignment’; and explains his understanding of
HIV/AIDS as a socio-economic disease in need of socio-economic cure. These are all the
sensible, liberal views that the West wants to hear tumbling from the mouth of its African ally.
But there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Museveni’s views on any of these topics.
All would seem a harmony of ‘shared values’ between Museveni’s Uganda and the West were
it not for the missing chord of electoral democracy, and the jarring sound of battle coming from
eastern Congo. Since the last of the essays was authored, in November +,,+, Museveni has been
implicated in the invasion of Rwanda by the RPF (assisted by former soldiers of Uganda’s
NRA), invaded Congo in the wake of the Rwanda genocide and the fall of Mobuto and then
Kabila the elder, fallen out with most of his other neighbours at one point or another, fought a
war against dissident forces in the north of the country, and quietly repressed political opposition
through his refusal to implement multi-party democracy. It is ironic, and not a little disturbing,
that despite all of this he remains one of Africa’s most important leaders.And that may be a better
measure of Africa’s problem than are the essays collected here.
David M. Anderson, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, UK
African foreign policies: power and process. Edited by Gilbert Khadiagala and
Terrence Lyons. London, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. :oo+. :¡opp. Index. £¡o.¡o. ISBN
+ ¡¡¡·; ,,o X. Pb.: £+o.,¡. ISBN + ¡¡¡·; ,oo ;.
The international politics of East Africa. By Robert Pinkney. Manchester: Manchester
University Press. :oo+. :¡:pp. Index. Pb.: £+¡.,,. ISBN o ;+,o ¡o+o o.
The end of the Cold War confronted Africa with dramatic changes in its global position which
not only affected foreign policy in the conventional sense, but reached deep into the structure of
domestic governance. These two books, ostensibly on rather similar subjects, provide very
different ways of conceptualizing the changes that resulted.
African foreign policies approaches the subject through the analysis of the ways in which foreign
policy is made. Underlying the editors’ introduction, symptomatically entitled ‘Foreign policy
making in Africa’, is the idea that changing external and domestic circumstances—notably the
growing pluralism as opposition parties, democratic elections, and a free press made their
appearance in much of the continent, together with the intensified importance of the regional
setting as outside powers withdrew—might promote new kinds of decision-making process.The
book then encompasses regional analyses, of anglophone and francophone West Africa, Central
Africa, the Great Lakes, the Horn, and the former frontline states of Southern Africa, while South
Africa has a chapter to itself, and William Reno closes with a discussion of the external relations
of weak states and stateless regions.
Inevitably, the different authors do not always sing to the same songsheet. John Clark notes
that in Central Africa (a region stretching from Gabon to Angola) there has been no pluralist
transition anyhow, and provides an excellent analysis of the ways in which the survival needs of
personalist regimes continue to drive the policy process. Ruth Iyob’s fluent survey of the Horn
is exclusively concerned with structural factors, so that the differences even between the regimes
of Saddiq al-Mahdi and the National Islamic Front in Sudan, or those of emperor Haile-Selassie,
Mengistu Haile-Mariam and Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia, go virtually unnoticed.The author who
most closely sticks to the policy process brief is Denis Venter on South Africa, who provides a
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detailed and often pungently critical account of the disarray of post-apartheid policy-making
towards Africa. Peter Schraeder on francophone West Africa also concentrates on the policy
process, though he bases his analysis heavily on Senegal, which provides the region’s strongest
case for pluralism; the view from Burkina Faso, for instance, would be very different.
The strangest chapter by some way is René Lemarchand’s on the Great Lakes, which bears
all the signs of having been written before the outbreak of the Second Congo War in August
+,,·, save for the addition of a postscript. Thus we are told (p. ·,) that what holds Museveni,
Kagame and Kabila together is ‘their sense of being heavily dependent on each other’, while by
the end of the chapter they are fighting one another. The chapter as a whole is heavily
committed to the view that recent developments in the region are the outcome of a ‘grand
design’ orchestrated by President Kagame of Rwanda, and would have benefited from consid-
eration of alternative viewpoints.
Only to a very limited extent do the authors acknowledge the irruption onto the foreign
policy-making scene of alternative actors such as opposition parties, non-governmental organi-
zations, insurgent movements, or private armies. The big exception is Reno on weak states and
stateless regions, who understandably shows not the slightest concern for the institutions of
policy-making, and deals with states only as quasi-fictitious entities that are useful for bargaining
purposes.Though he is covering the parts of Africa in which political decay is most marked, it is
disappointing that so few of the other authors take up the themes that he raises. Clement Adibe
on anglophone West Africa complements a highly conventional opening section with a
discussion of the emergence of new actors in the +,,os, including insurgents, human rights
organizations, and transnational NGOs; but Iyob does not even find space to discuss Somaliland,
a fascinating semi-state in the Horn, let alone the complex foreign policies of warlords, insur-
gents and humanitarian organizations.
The most striking feature of African foreign policies is the virtual disappearance of the super-
powers and former colonial metropoles which once dominated analysis of the international
relations of the continent. The picture that emerges is of Africans acting in the context of their
own regions, but with minimal reference to the outside world. It is very different indeed with
Pinkney’s The international politics of East Africa, which is almost exclusively preoccupied with the
attempt by Western powers and multinational institutions to impose their own conception of
desirable domestic political order on East African states, in the name of democratization and good
governance.This is an interesting and important subject, even though it is not what the title leads
the reader to expect. It turns East Africa (here strictly defined in terms of the formerly British
trio of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) into the objects rather than the subjects of policy, and its
leitmotiv is the ability or otherwise of East African governments to resist external pressure.
Original in conception, the book is nonetheless rather disappointing in execution. It lacks an
eye for the complex processes of bargaining and manipulation through which the politics of
governance is conducted, or for the personalities involved. Smith Hempstone, the remarkable
American ambassador to Kenya who publicly took on the Moi regime, does not even rate a
mention. Though it discusses NGOs (for the most part in fairly disparaging terms), it is also
preoccupied by the reaction of national governments. In a telling phrase, it asks ‘How many
points were scored by Kenya and the West, respectively, in their battle of wills?’ (p. +¡·), implicitly
equating Kenya with Daniel arap Moi. The whole point of the Western agenda, misconceived
though it may have been, was however that Kenya was more than Moi, and that by empowering
alternative voices in Kenyan society it might be possible to promote different (and better) forms
of governance. Though both of the books reviewed here seek, with some success, to tackle the
new forms that transnational politics are taking in Africa, they still remain in some degree
restricted by a conventional emphasis on the state, at the expense of the manifold other pressures
that are shaping the continent.
Christopher Clapham, Lancaster University, UK
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Sierra Leone: diamonds and the struggle for democracy. By John L. Hirsch. London,
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers/New York, NY: International Peace Academy. :oo+.
+;¡pp. Index. Pb.: £+o.¡o. ISBN + ¡¡¡·; o,· o.
In addition to its wealth of descriptive and prescriptive analysis, John Hirsch’s work speaks to
various debates in the analysis of conflicts and problems of development generally in African
states. He agrees with the recent literature that has characterized conflicts such as Sierra
Leone’s as ‘new wars’ in which groups battle for control of resources. However he goes beyond
the presentist assumptions of most of such works to provide historical analyses that give the
reader a fuller understanding of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and its roots, the
historical role of diamonds in the political economy of Sierra Leone, and the role of predatory
past governments like those of Siaka Stevens and Joseph Momoh in bringing about the present
state of affairs.
Hirsch emphasizes the role of political agency in eroding institutions like the legislature and
the judiciary that check societal actors and prevent the thievery and brutal mayhem that has
characterized the conflict in Sierra Leone.The capability of leaders like Albert Margai and Siaka
Stevens to circumvent and undermine these institutions might point to the frailty of the political
and economic institutions inherited as part of the colonial legacy, institutions that could have
acted as checks on such corrupt leadership.
In emphasizing the political and economic dimensions of the origins and perpetuation of this
conflict, Hirsch avoids the difficulties inherent in many cultural accounts. The determinism of
such accounts which locate the causes of wars like that in Sierra Leone and Liberia in cultural
characteristics that might not necessarily be amenable to change invite quietism and fail to
explain why, despite the persistence of culture over time, conflicts occur only occasionally.
Hirsch also blames geology for Sierra Leone’s misfortune. He shows the historical role that
Sierra Leone’s diamonds have played in the erosion of institutions, the polarization of Sierra
Leonean society, and the attraction of unscrupulous international attention like that of Liberia’s
warlord leader, Charles Taylor.This note of geological determinism detracts from the insight that
is gained from Hirsch’s analysis. Like other forms of physical capital, diamonds are equipotent
and, depending on the quality of human agency, institutions and incentive structures, are
amenable to either beneficial or harmful uses. The positive role of mineral wealth in states like
Gabon and South Africa show the limits of focusing on geology in explaining such conflicts.
As Hirsch points out, unlike Sierra Leone’s significance to West African regional politics, its
strategic insignificance to the great powers has starved it of attention and allowed the conflict to
drag on. Hirsch’s call for greater international involvement is appropriate and might be heeded
now, since, as the recent example of Afghanistan indicates, it might cost less to prevent the
entrenchment of such groups than to contain and prevent the harmful externalities that their
activities might have both on their societies and on the great powers.
Henry Dougan, Northwestern University, USA
The state against the peasantry: rural struggles in colonial and postcolonial
Mozambique. By Merle L. Bowen. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia. :ooo.
:¡opp. Index. £¡¡.,¡. ISBN o ·+¡, +,+o X. Pb.: £+o.¡o. ISBN o ·+¡, +,+; ;.
This is the first book on modern Mozambique to bring genuine insight into the delicate
relationship between rural producers and the state, and for this reason alone it deserves to be
taken seriously.The author has based her work on a detailed and long-term study of a particular
area of southern Mozambique in which she lived and carried out research. At the same time, she
has approached the analysis of agriculture within a firm conceptual basis and anchored her work
in the historiography of that former Portuguese colony. In short, her book is a fine example of
what local-level studies can bring to the understanding of a more general issue—here, the politics
of agricultural change in Mozambique between +,¡o and +,,¡.
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The book is organized in a logical and reader-friendly way.The first two chapters focus on the
role of the colonial and post-colonial state in shaping and implementing rural development
policies. Here Bowen shows that the sharply dichotomized views taken of the effects of the
Portuguese and Frelimo state in respect of the countryside are simplifications of a more complex
picture. In respect of colonial policy, she demonstrates that in the +,oos, the Portuguese came to
encourage some capitalist African farming while at the same time ensuring that settlers retained
a competitive edge. As for the post-independence period, she explains how Frelimo bias against
‘kulak’ or rich farmers led them to believe erroneously that collective farming would provide an
opportunity for poorer producers to take over within a cooperative framework. Just as impor-
tantly, the author is careful to illustrate the continuities between colonial and post-colonial policy.
The core of the book (chapters ¡–o) consists of a detailed case-study of an area of Maputo
Province with an interesting mix of agriculture and a relatively successful history of cooperative
farming. Here Bowen manages not just to provide a fascinating narrative of what has happened
to the local population since the early +,¡os but also to give evidence which makes it possible
properly to assess the impact of state policies since that time. The four chapters are organized
thematically and chronologically in such a way as to enable the reader to follow change from
the perspective of what has mattered to the rural dwellers concerned. There emerges a picture
of various communities struggling to ensure a decent life, often merely to survive, more rarely
to prosper, against odds that are stacked higher by the state—whether in its colonial or post-
The last chapter covers the transition from socialism to capitalism in Mozambique and shows
clearly why such a change in policy, ostensibly designed to release the ‘productive energies’ of the
rural areas, has failed to do so. In essence, the problem here is that price incentives to production
are only a small—and, the author would argue, perhaps minor—part of the complex equation
that needs to be resolved in order to spur agricultural production. Unless rural producers can
have access to the required inputs, credit and transport they need to market their produce, their
situation does not improve. Moreover, in the context of a deficient internal market, which fails
to offer rural dwellers what they wish to purchase at the right price, there is no incentive to
The greatest strength of this volume is the combination of local-level in-depth research and a
clear analytical framework—all within a proper consideration of the historical continuities
between the colonial and post-colonial period.This has enabled the author to cut through a large
amount of politically motivated literature on the evolution of Mozambique since independence.
The book undoubtedly provides the best understanding of the rural question in the country to
date. Its main weakness is a fairly rigid, and relatively uncritical, recourse to a neo-Marxist
conceptual framework.The systematic use of the word ‘peasant’ to refer to rural producers in the
African context, and the equally widespread use of a notion of class that is never properly
discussed, conspire to cloud some of the key issues. In particular, it leads the author to minimize
the relevance of socio-cultural characteristics (such as religion, or other beliefs, family issues and
kin-related constraints) in a context where it is likely that they were of considerable import.
Although the discussion of rural agriculture that is offered is sophisticated, it is singularly devoid
of any reference to the ‘traditional’, or to any other factor that cannot be explained in terms of
economic ‘rationality’. Despite this deficiency, however, this is without question a landmark in
the study of Mozambique’s rural political economy.
Patrick Chabal, King’s College London, UK
Mozambique and the great flood of . By Frances Christie and Joseph Hanlon.
Oxford: James Currey. :oo+. +;opp. £¡o.oo. ISBN o ·¡:¡¡ ·¡· ,. Pb.: £++.,¡. ISBN o ·¡:¡¡ ·¡; o.
The great floods in Mozambique (January–March :ooo) proved to be more than just a very serious
natural calamity in a country only just beginning to rebuild after thirty years of war.They also proved
a landmark in successful joint national and international efforts to rescue people in danger and to
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 205
provide assistance to those who had been displaced.The book under review is thus of relevance not
just to those interested in the events of early :ooo but also to those studying how Third World
countries, where the bulk of such disasters occur, can prepare for and cope in such emergencies.
The book is in two parts. The first is a systematic and detailed account of what happened, and
provides most of the important information about this period. The second is a series of chapters
addressing crucial questions about the floods, the response to them and the lessons that can be
drawn from the events.The authors must be praised for their clarity of presentation, and their book
will undoubtedly serve as a reference volume on the question. Equally, it will be useful for those
interested in the organization of governmental, UN, and inter-agency cooperation on the ground.
However, one wonders whether the book should not have been published as a separate
‘report’, rather than as one of the volumes in James Currey’s African Issues series with ambitions
to debate wider issues. Indeed, the book does read as a report, and in this respect does not address
the broader questions that would have been of interest to those concerned with the present
condition of Africa. For example, the authors refer on numerous occasions to the difficulties of
having contingency plans in Mozambique because corruption undermines efforts to stock
appropriate equipment and material. Why? What are the politics of assistance? This would have
been worth pursuing. Similarly, the book praises the ability of the Mozambican government in
terms of disaster coordination but does not discuss the many political issues raised by the
problems that did occur. One obvious point of interest would have been the burning question
of political opposition in some of the central regions that were flooded.
Although useful as a factual account of the floods in :ooo, the book fails sufficiently to link
these events with the present political and economic situation in the country, and thus will do
little to enhance our understanding either of present-day Mozambique or of the salient political
issues linked to disaster and assistance in Africa.
Patrick Chabal, King’s College London, UK
The politics of truth and reconciliation in South Africa: legitimising the post-
apartheid state. By Richard A. Wilson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. :oo+.
:;+pp. Index. £¡¡.oo. ISBN o ¡:+ ·o:+, ,. Pb.: £+¡.,¡. ISBN o ¡:+ oo+,¡ ¡.
After the TRC: reflections on truth and reconciliation in South Africa. Edited by
Wilmot James and Linda van de Vijver. Claremont, Cape Town: David Philip Publishers.
:oo+. ::·pp. Index. Pb.: £+:.,¡. ISBN o ·o¡·o ¡;¡ ·.
During the closing years of the twentieth century a plethora of human rights institutions
emerged, including the ‘truth commissions’ set up in over :o African and Latin American
countries emerging from authoritarian rule. Their aim was to investigate the gross violations of
human rights which had become routine features of governance in these countries. The Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), set up in South Africa (SA) in +,,o under Tutu’s chair-
manship to investigate violations in the period +,oo–,¡, is greatly admired internationally. But in
SA reactions to it are divided—as these books show.
Wilson’s impressive book provides an excellent account of the TRC’s philosophical under-
pinnings and its organization and public hearings, as well as an analysis of black reactions to its
proceedings.Wilson emphasizes the TRC’s highly politicized rather than narrowly juridical aims,
arguing that it formed part of the ANC’s ‘nation-building’ strategy to promote reconciliation and
establish legitimacy for the post-apartheid state by substituting a more broadly based civic nation-
alism for SA’s ethno-centred nationalisms. But Wilson’s anthropological fieldwork in black
townships revealed a wide gap between the ANC’s commitment to reconciliation with whites,
including agents of the former apartheid regime, and popular demands that justice must include
retribution.Wilson argues that this gap between elite and grassroots attitudes has undermined the
ANC’s nation-building project and deepened the legitimacy crisis of SA’s fragile new institu-
tions, particularly its criminal justice system. He is critical of the ‘procedural liberalism’ (new
constitutions, elections, multiparty politics) associated with the good governance agenda, arguing
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that these ‘simplistic prescriptions’ can provide only the formal conditions for a ‘minimalist liberal
... democracy’. He calls for ‘a more sociological understanding’ of how these prescriptions relate
to state formation and nation-building and for more cautious expectations about what the
human rights agenda can achieve in post-authoritarian societies trying to construct more
consensual, democratic institutions.
After the TRC is an uneven collection of conference-based essays. Some of the papers are too
slight to merit publication, but the book includes some succinct, useful pieces by leading actors
involved in setting up the TRC (Dumisa Ntsebesa, Alex Boraine, Albie Sachs, Charles Villa-
Vicencio), as well as thoughtful assessments by well-known analysts (Mahmood Mamdani,
Njabulo Ndebele, van Zyl Slabbert, Mamphela Ramphele, Heribert and Kogila Adam). Their
conflicting assessments of the TRC’s record make for a stimulating range of views, though the
collection sorely lacks an editorial essay pulling together the key issues and arguments.
In assessing the TRC’s record in revealing truth, Mamdani sets out his well-known argument
that the Commission’s narrow, legalistic terms of reference obscured the truth about the
apartheid past by focusing on a small group of perpetrators of gross human rights violations,
while allowing the much bigger group of beneficiaries of apartheid to escape responsibility.The
distinction between perpetrators and beneficiaries is worth making but, as pointed out by
Ntsebesa and Boraine, the TRC was not examining apartheid. It was examining violations, such
as politically motivated murder and torture, which were illegal even under apartheid. Moreover,
as Sachs argues, the sins of apartheid have been (and should continue to be) researched and
exposed; but these violations, especially when committed by agents of the state, have been
shrouded in secrecy and require exposure.
Slabbert ably summarizes another major criticism, viz., that truth can only emerge from the
rigorous judicial procedures of a court of law. However, judicial procedures are not infallible and
they do not, surely, exclude other, complementary routes to the truth. More persuasive is the
argument of Ntsebesa that the TRC’s quasi-legal procedures could and often did ‘approximate
In assessing the TRC’s contribution to reconciliation, many of the contributors to After the
TRC attack ‘naive ... romanticised and sentimental’ beliefs that revealing the truth will necessarily
be therapeutic or automatically lead to reconciliation. However, as Ntsebesa and Villa-Vicencio
point out, the TRC’s architects recognized that reconciliation would be a long, painful process.
Moreover, the measure of progress is not whether each victim forgives each perpetrator, but
whether a process is established which provides an alternative to violence and a basis for
increased understanding and coexistence. The critics are also over-cynical in giving so little
weight to the altruistic impulses which coexist with aggressive and cruel instincts. Both these
negative and positive features of human behaviour were dramatically illustrated during the TRC’s
hearings. The hearings also confirmed the psychological difficulty for most public figures of
accepting responsibility for the misdeeds of the regimes they led.This suggests that confession is
not just a ‘ritual’, but cuts very deep.
There are lessons for other countries from SA’s mishandling of the difficult issues of amnesty
for perpetrators and reparations for victims. While thousands of perpetrators have been
amnestied, the SA government has not yet acted on the TRC’s +,,· recommendation that it pay
modest reparations to the carefully investigated group of about :o,ooo victims of appalling viola-
tions. In the experience of Amnesty International ‘impunity is the single most important factor
leading to continued human rights violations’.Thus amnestying criminals is not only undesirable
psychologically and morally, but also pragmatically. However, as the TRC’s critics know, the
decision to grant amnesty was not due to mawkish sentimentality or the ‘religious-redemptive’
beliefs of Tutu and Mandela, but (as in Chile) to the realpolitik needs of a negotiated settlement
with a declining but undefeated regime and the limitations this imposed on criminal proceedings
against its former agents.
The reparations issue is less fully discussed in either of these books, or by the SA government.
However, both reparations and amnesty were part of SA’s post-apartheid settlement and it seems
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 207
unfair and unwise to deliver on only one part of the bargain. Moreover, this is happening in the
context of socio-economic policies which are transferring resources largely from white to black
elites and are not grappling with the problem of mass unemployment and poverty. It is these
socio-economic policies which should surely be the route for addressing Mamdani’s concerns
about the victims of wider apartheid policies. It seems likely that the failure to tackle poverty is
a major source of the disenchantment which many now attribute to disappointment with the
policy of reconciliation.
Both Wilson and the contributors to After the TRC are right to point to the Commission’s
limitations. But they reflect the current tendency to underestimate the achievements of what—
to paraphrase their own criticisms—was not just a technical, juridical exercise, but part of a highly
politicized experiment in constructing new human rights institutions that can serve as a
complement to traditional judicial mechanisms. To lumber these institutions with unrealistic,
utopian expectations will hamper this attempt to evolve more effective constraints on the horrors
humans have always inflicted on each other. In recognizing this, the framers of these evolving
institutions are more realistic than their critics give them credit for.Their steelier side is evident
in the attempt to establish an International Criminal Court with the power to penalize perpe-
trators and to provide justice in cases such as Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and soon perhaps Cambodia,
where the situation is too politically destabilizing domestically to act against or even expose the
truth about perpetrators of appalling crimes.When judged as part of this wider process of estab-
lishing minimal standards for an evolving international ‘civic culture’—which will on occasions
conflict with processes of ‘nation-building’—SA’s TRC, despite its shortcomings, is likely to be
recognized as a successful landmark.
Merle Lipton, School of African and Asian Studies, University of Sussex, UK
Theory, change and Southern Africa’s future. Edited by Peter Vale, Larry A. Satuk and
Bertil Oden. Basingstoke: Palgrave. :oo+. ¡oopp. Index. £¡¡.oo. ISBN o ¡¡¡ ;+;o· :.
Southern Africa is unique in Africa; it combines a history of a large settler population with
incredibly rich mineral resources. Although the process of de-colonization in the region began
in the sixties, this legacy of settler colonialism persists. It was only in +,,¡ that the last bastion of
white political domination was removed, with the triumph of democracy in South Africa. It was,
in the words of veteran scholar activist John Saul, the end of a thirty-year war in the region—a
counter-revolutionary war fought by apartheid South Africa and Namibia, white Rhodesia and
colonial Portugal, in defence of settler colonialism. The economic structure of the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) is founded on the historical ambitions of this white
settler community. This type of colonial structure acts as a major constraint to the development
of a diversified industrial economy in the region.
What is the future of Southern Africa in the new global economy? Currently SADC countries
are among the poorest in the world.The pandemic of HIV/AIDS is creating social disintegration
on an unprecedented scale. Life expectancy is declining in the region and is likely, over the next
decade, to decline even further. Some estimates are as low as a life expectancy of ¡o by :o+o in
certain SADC countries. Infant mortality rates are among the lowest in the world, while the Gini
co-efficients are among the highest in the world.
Theory, change and Southern Africa’s future breaks with orthodox international relations by
making a ‘call to theory’. If Southern Africans are to overcome the divisive legacy of the past,
and move towards a more prosperous and sustainable collective future, the editors argue in this
intriguing book, theory must be placed at the centre of everyday life. For it is our understanding
of the world, they suggest, that shapes both it and us.
Unsurprisingly, the eleven authors in the volume present a wide variety of theoretical
approaches ranging from ‘realist’ to ‘critical theory’ without reaching any agreement on what an
appropriate ‘theory’ for the region could be.What emerges instead is an indictment of traditional
international relations in the region for its ‘Westphalian-oriented and Euro-centric’ approach.
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 208
What is needed, Peter Vale argues in his suggestive contribution, is a tradition of theory in the
region that places suffering humanity at the centre of its project.
While such an intellectual project began to emerge in Dar es Salaam in the late sixties and
early seventies, and in the Centre of African Studies in Maputo in the seventies and eighties, little
progress seems to have been made since then. Sadly, as Bertil Oden argues in his persuasive
chapter, South Africa is not likely to play the role of ‘benign hegemon’ that many hoped would
be possible in the period of high expectations in the early nineties. Instead he concludes that a
‘market driven, spontaneous regionalisation’ is the likely outcome (p. +·,).
This theme—what Balefi Tsie calls neo-liberal regionalism—is explored by Bjorn Hettne,
Merle Holden and Balefi Tsie, through a critical international political economy approach.
Clearly the most dynamic regional force is South African capital. It is able to act faster, and tends
to have short-term goals. Indeed its retail outlets have achieved Cecil John Rhodes’s dream of
South Africa stretching from Cape to Cairo when South Africa’s leading retail outlet opened
Egypt’s first supermarket in the first half of :oo+.
The book has begun a dialogue in and about theory in the region.What is needed now is an
engagement of theory with the emerging evidence on the impact of globalization on the region.
Some of the chapters clearly need to be updated. The National Economic Forum (NEF) in
South Africa was replaced by the National Economic and Development Council (NEDLAC) in
+,,¡ (see p. +·+), and why is there no reference to the important work of Sam Nolutshungu on
international relations in the region?
Vale and his co-authors, by bringing area studies and international relations experts together,
make an important contribution to the debate on the future of Southern Africa’s new regionalism.
However, that this new regionalism ‘marks a concerted response against the forces of globalisation
in the same way that, in an earlier era, social democratic forces organised at state level in order to
rein in the worst aspects of the free market’ (p. +o) seems a rather optimistic conclusion. The
European Union, arguably the most successful social democratic region in the world, has been
crucially shaped by a historically strong labour movement.This does not yet exist in the region.
The only potential source for long-term progressive change lies, as Tsie argues, ‘in a latent
Polanyian “second movement” generated by popular civil society across the region’ (p. +¡¡).
Whether such a broad popular alliance is or is not possible in Southern Africa will not be
resolved by a ‘call to theory’ but through sustained empirical research and political practice.
E. C.Webster, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa
Communication and democratic reform in South Africa. By Robert B. Horwitz.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. :oo+. ¡o,pp. Index. £¡o.oo. ISBN o ¡:+ ;,+oo ,.
The last two decades of the twentieth century were characterized by the so-called double
transition. First southern Europe, then Latin America, and finally other emerging economies in
Asia and eastern Europe more or less simultaneously implemented political and economic
reforms aimed at opening up their society and institutions. But while authoritarian regimes and
dictatorships in all these countries may have tainted themselves with the most ignominious
crimes, none based its policies on such a heinous ideology as South Africa. For this reason the
post-apartheid transition is sui generis and requires an extension of the analytical categories used
for double transitions elsewhere. These more general issues in political transformation find a
particular relevance in the case of the reform of the communications sector, including broad-
casting, telecommunications, the state information agency, and the print media. Political
sociologist Robert Horwitz from the University of California, San Diego, has produced a very
interesting book that analyses the complex game played by the National Party (NP) and the
African National Congress (ANC) governments, business interests, and civil society organizations
in the long transition from apartheid that started with the +,,o release of Nelson Mandela.
The two initial chapters analyse the evolution of these separate industries, their institutions, and
their policies since the emergence of an independent, British Commonwealth-linked Union of
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South Africa in +,+o. If franchising the black majority was never an issue, and much less so after
the +,¡o NP electoral victory, the confrontation between English and Afrikaans interests that
marked South African history found in the media a natural ground for continuing the clash. In
the broader context of NP-mandated affirmative action policies, state-owned concerns in broad-
casting and telecoms fell under the sphere of influence of Afrikaners, while English capital
controlled the press. The whole political–economic system of apartheid started creaking in the
+,oos, although its demise only happened in the last decade of the century, and only after dramatic
changes in the world environment. In the case of communications it was a long process, as not
only did entrenched interests resist changes, but the very importance of telecommunications and
media increased in parallel with the growing insertion of South Africa into the global economy.
The bulk of the book is devoted to the reform process in broadcasting (ch. ¡), telecommunica-
tions (ch. ¡), and communication service (ch. o). Compared to other emerging economies where
leadership (at times authoritarian), technocratic skills, and bureaucratic insulation were key features
in the structural adjustment process, it is certainly peculiar to South Africa that the reform process
was by and large bottom-up. True, once in power, the ANC found its degrees of freedom in
conducting heterodox policies, especially with regard to ownership, severely constrained, not least
by the emergence of multilateral rules—those of the WTO in the specific case of telecoms.Yet,
Horwitz’s key thesis is that civil society won out over government, producing a post-social democ-
ratic outcome that seeks to use the dynamism of the market while thwarting its possible inequities.
The point is proven through a detailed analysis of the policy-making process, made at times excru-
ciatingly difficult to follow by its very detailed description, but also very rich insofar as the author
played a key role in the National Telecommunications Policy Project that led to the writings of
Green and White Papers on the subject. In the end it is clear that the final balance struck between
civil society organizations and government largely resulted through their ability to enlist the
support of third-party interests, including of course domestic business and foreign investors.
The concluding chapter on black economic empowerment (BEE) is particularly interesting.
This is a challenging topic to address, because it is the central manifestation of the power struggle
between different sections of the South African black elite. This reviewer agrees with Horwitz’s
characterization of BEE as a policy to ‘use the state for development by way of establishing
patronage for a politically loyal black bourgeoisie through selected privatizations, tenders, and
contracts’ (p. ¡¡o). If this is so, however, it is less clear why the author frames the debate on the
merits of BEE in the context of South Africa’s severe need to increase rapidly its growth rates
within the discussions about the potentialities of ‘market socialism’ in advanced industrial
economies. This part does not add much to the argument, and it is possibly detached from the
core of what is an otherwise excellent book on the political and social forces that are shaping the
future limits of a key sector in the South African economy.
Andrea Goldstein, OECD Development Centre, Paris, France
Asia and Pacific
Constructing a security community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of
regional order. By Amitav Acharya. London, New York: Routledge. :oo+. :¡¡pp. Index. Pb.:
£+;.,,. ISBN o ¡+¡ +¡;o¡ ¡.
Can constructivist analysis help us to assess whether South-East Asia is forging a collective
identity? The answer: maybe, but maybe not. Is ASEAN progressing towards a ‘security
community’? Maybe, maybe not.Will South-East Asian regionalism unravel in the face of current
security challenges? Maybe, maybe not. Such is the ambivalent tone projected in this book,
which seeks to examine the potential of regional ‘norms’ to transform behaviour among ASEAN
members towards long-term peaceful cooperation.
Acharya claims that constructivism accentuates the impact of ideational and cultural factors in
determining foreign policy interactions, enabling us to understand international relations as a
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‘social process’ capable of redefining habits of cooperation among states.There are problems with
this approach, however, that the author does not probe, or even recognize. In Acharya’s hands
constructivism does not delineate any hard set of testable hypotheses. He seldom moves beyond
vague assertions that it ‘offers a more qualitatively deeper (sic) view of how institutions may affect
and transform state interests and behaviour’ (p. ::). Thus, the work lacks theoretical grounding
by which to judge the performance of ASEAN.
ASEAN’s regulatory norms are identified as non-interference in member states, the peaceful
settlement of disputes, and an emphasis on regional solutions to regional problems. While the
author critiques the realist and liberal-institutionalist paradigms for assuming that the external
environment generates state interests, there is, surprisingly, no explanation in this book as to how
these norms are formed within local cultural practices. One might also ask why there is a skewed
focus on positive norms. What about the influence of ‘negative norms’, such as cronyism and
corruption, which are often seen to play a role in regional politics? Moreover, the ASEAN way
seems to encompass anything and everything: ‘compromise, consensus building, ambiguity,
avoidance of strict reciprocity, and rejection of legally binding obligations’ (p. ¡¡).
The analysis makes no attempt to interrogate the ‘do whateverist’ ambiguities of ASEAN
diplomacy, which leads to contradictory statements. Apparently, for example, the ‘founders of
ASEAN had little conception of regional identity’, but ‘clearly hoped to develop one through
regional cooperation’ (p. :·); the expansion of ASEAN membership ‘has both enhanced and eroded
ASEAN’s progress towards a security community’ (p. +:¡); ‘ASEAN norms’ push ‘its members to
look beyond a strict adherence to sovereignty’, while ASEAN ‘governments continue to emphasise
the salience of state sovereignty’ (p. :o¡). We are also informed that the debate over the non-
interference principle, held in the aftermath of the +,,;/,· economic crisis, ‘exposed divisions
within ASEAN over one of its most basic norms’ (p. +¡¡), the logic of which should lead one to
pose the question whether it can be called a ‘norm’ if there is such severe disagreement over it.
Overall, we are none the wiser as to what the future holds for South-East Asia.The author fails
to pursue a systematic argument that might have revealed meaningful and logically derived
empirical or theoretical observations. For instance, the assessment might have led him to suggest
that ASEAN is an unviable long-term prospect or that constructivism presents a weak theoretical
basis upon which to generalize about South-East Asia. Instead, what we get is hedging. It takes
no effort of the intellect to do this. As such the book reflects entrenched ASEAN scholarly
orthodoxy focusing on thick descriptions of ASEAN’s procedural history, covered dozens of
times already in other works. This may be sufficient to credentialize the book in international
relations and among the region’s authoritarian elites but one wonders whether it will find
resonance in more serious scholarship.
One final point: there is a degree of similarity, both in terms of approach and ambiguity of
argument, between this work and Acharya’s last book, The quest for identity: international relations
of South-East Asia, which appeared in :ooo. In some places whole passages are repeated word for
word (for example, see pages ¡,–¡: in Constructing a security community, and pages ·o–;, ,+, ,¡
and ,, in The quest for identity). For those anxious to acquaint themselves with the Acharya
oeuvre, it is advised that they obtain one or other of these works, but not both.
Michael Smith, King’s College London, UK
Singapore’s foreign policy: coping with vulnerability. By Michael Leifer. London, New
York: Routledge. :ooo. +;;pp. Index. Pb.: £+¡.,,. ISBN o ¡+¡ :¡¡¡¡ ¡.
This volume adds yet another single-country monograph to the Politics in Asia series formerly
edited by the late Michael Leifer. In this case, Leifer himself returned to South-East Asia with an
aim to examine the foreign policy of Singapore, once, as noted in the author’s preface, his ‘first
port of call in that region’. Perhaps it is some consolation then to scholars who mourn the loss
of one of the foremost experts on the international politics of South-East Asia that, some four
decades after first visiting Singapore as a young academic, Leifer had the opportunity to re-
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examine the very country which sparked his initial interest in a region that became the focus of
a life-long and distinguished career.The author of numerous articles and several books on Asian
security, conflict and foreign policy, Leifer, Professor of International Relations and Director of
the Asia Research Centre at the London School of Economics, had already published book-
length monographs on Indonesia and Cambodia before writing this volume on Singapore.
As for the volume reviewed here, it is at the same time too modest and too ambitious in its
stated focus on ‘Singapore’s foreign policy’. On the one hand, it is perhaps unsurprising that
Leifer, drawing on expertise and contacts built up during several decades, should have ventured
well beyond what may be viewed as the traditional preserve of foreign policy into the broader
social and political landscape of Singapore. As a result, this volume will prove a useful reference
for topics ranging from the role of founding prime minister Lee Kuan Yew in shaping modern
Singapore since independence in +,¡,, to the pervasive presence of the People’s Action Party
(PAP) since the island state’s expulsion from the Malaysian Federation in +,o¡, and to the history
of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) since its foundation in +,o;.
On the other hand, in as much as Leifer refers variously to the ‘international balance of power’,
‘national political culture’, ‘domestic authoritarian regime’, and ‘formidable intellectual
leadership’ as key conditions and factors shaping Singapore’s foreign policy, this study leaves a
number of important questions for further consideration. In this regard, a rigorous theoretical
framework for a more systematic investigation into the structures and dynamics of international
relations might prove especially useful for purposes of (re)examining—or ‘testing’, as it were—
some of the many propositions opened up by Leifer’s study.To that end, a structured ‘case-study’
suggests itself as an obvious approach to some of the historical crises and critical turning-points
discussed, sometimes in passing, sometimes in detail, in this volume.
In terms of the ‘three outstanding figures’—Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Foreign Minister
Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, and Defence Minister Goh Ken Swee—who played a critical role in
shaping Singaporean foreign policy from the outset, for example, Leifer’s keen observations
suggest excellent material and helpful leads for purposes of a more narrowly focused study of
individual leadership during political crisis. Whether drawing on existing scholarly literature on
cognitive psychology, bureaucratic decision-making, or (the absence of) domestic political
pressures, such an engagement with Leifer’s work might help to identify patterns in terms of the
relative significance and peculiar workings of different factors shaping the context and making
of Singapore’s foreign policy. If this volume raises more questions than it answers for scholars of
international relations, Leifer’s long-term exposure to country and region alike has clearly
allowed for an illuminating overall assessment of Singaporean foreign affairs, no doubt facilitated
by evident familiarity with, and, at times, access to, key participants in these events.
Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, UK
The post-colonial states of South Asia: democracy, identity, development and
security. Edited by Amita Shastri and A. Jeyaratnam Wilson. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon
Press. :oo+. ¡¡·pp. £¡¡.oo. ISBN o ;oo; +:,: ¡.
South Asia consists of a complex web of societies, identities, development and democracy. Given
this, it is all the more remarkable that the nation-state—a colonial imposition—has set down so
firm a set of post-colonial roots. That the state has primarily done so by imposing unity, often
using force, illustrates the challenge of mapping changing societies onto colonial geographies.
This excellent volume of essays offers a stimulating survey of South Asian statehood as it stands.
Broken down into four sections (democracy, identity, development and security) the contributors
explore how larger South Asian states have dealt with internal and external challenges. There are
depressing accounts of the relative inability of state elites to grapple with internal challenges (Samina
Ahmed on Pakistan’s declining legitimacy, A. Jeyaratnam Wilson on how Sri Lanka’s majoritarian
democracy has failed in managing its ethnic divide). But there are also compelling accounts of
progress (Hugh Evans on how the military has slowly been eased out of politics in Bangladesh, Leo
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 212
Rose on Nepal’s continuing democratization). All four essays on democracy point to the fact that
democratic principles—despite Musharraf ’s rule in Pakistan—have grown stronger roots, even if the
practice remains imperfect and bedevilled by corruption and block-voting. The very fact that
Pakistan continues to search for state legitimacy, allied to Musharraf ’s spoken commitment to return
Pakistan to democracy, reinforces the strength of the claim to democratic legitimacy.
On identity, fierce struggles between ‘secularism’ and communalism, majorities and minorities,
sustain much of the violence—both ethnic, ideological and caste-based—that prevails over distinct
parts of the region. Christophe Jaffrelot and Chandra R. de Silva, looking at India and Sri Lanka
respectively, explore how impartial the state has been in practice. Neither formal commitment to
secularism, nor a continuing commitment to state equidistance between religions, can be easily
reconciled with state practices—or the discreet linkages between the state and particular religions.
In part, the logic of majoritarian democracy may be to blame, as politicians vie for popular
approval. Tazeen Murshid assesses the effects on Bangladesh of successive state attempts to
formulate national identity, arguing that, as a result, less and less space is available for liberal voices.
And Raju Thomas critiques those who argue that post-colonial identities in South Asia can only
co-exist if international boundaries are redrawn, arguing instead that the status quo be fully recog-
nized (for example, in Kashmir). And while confederalism has faltered with SAARC, partly
because of the Kashmir dispute, faster ‘sub-regional’ cooperation carries a positive message for the
future. While interesting, Thomas’s invocation of the spectre of ‘balkanization’ were state bound-
aries to be redrawn sits uneasily with the endurance of both India and Pakistan as nation-states.
Writing on development, Ron Herring points out that the post-+,,+ Indian reforms have
been shaped by competitive politics. Of particular interest is his argument that power has not
fundamentally shifted, and that politics has redistributed reform rather than reforms redistrib-
uting power. Even so, as authors like Rob Jenkins have observed elsewhere, new alliances
emerged as a result of liberalization—alliances that helped push through reform in particular
sectors.Vanita Shastri harkens back to an earlier attempt to reform the Indian economy in the
+,·os, arguing that the bureaucratic teams it put in place helped to move the overall reform
process—while the state has also served to ensure that reforms have mostly been gradualist since.
Christopher Candland analyses Pakistan’s woeful economic state, arguing that militarism,
corruption and an early focus on private sector development have left the country without the
socio-economic infrastructure its people so badly need.
The book concludes with three pieces on national security.Vernon Hewitt writes about the
continuing strife between India and Pakistan, and wonders whether the US could now under-
write a collective security doctrine for the region. Sumit Ganguly analyses the festering Kashmir
dispute, promoting (as many do, nowadays) a solution following the Line of Control. Despite the
continuing risk of inadvertent conflict, he accepts that a quick breakthrough remains unlikely
given the extraordinary hostility between India and Pakistan. And finally Ashok Kapur examines
India’s overt nuclear status, arguing that there is still no consensus among Western powers as to
how it should be dealt with.
This is a well-written and well-edited collection, thanks to Amita Shastri and the late A.
Jeyaratnam Wilson. It deserves a wide and careful readership. Economic liberalization and the
spread of consent-based politics are two warming trends evident across South Asia today. Both
are taking place because of the state, as much as despite it.
Alexander Evans, Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College London, UK
China’s leaders: the new generation. By Cheng Li. Oxford, Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield. :oo+. :·¡pp. Index. £;¡.oo. ISBN o ·¡;o ,¡,o ·. Pb.: £:¡.,¡. ISBN o ·¡;o ,¡,; o.
Elite politics in contemporary China. By Joseph Fewsmith. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
:oo+. +o;pp. Index. £¡:.¡o. ISBN o ;o¡o oo·o o.
As China enters a period of elite transition, here are two books which attempt to answer two
important questions: who are the new leaders, and what kind of politics can we expect from them?
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Hu Jintao, currently China’s Vice President, looks assured of succeeding Jiang Zemin as General
Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the +oth Congress in October :oo:. He is
at the centre of the so-called fourth generation of leaders currently assuming key posts. Vice
Premier Wen Jiabao is tipped to succeed Zhu Rongji as Premier in :oo¡. Most of the names of
their peers will be unfamiliar to all but the most avid Pekinologist, but Li Changchun, Zeng
Qinghong, Wu Bangguo, Chen Zhili, Liu Ji and Wang Zhongyu will all play pivotal roles too.
These books by Li and Fewsmith have some success in answering the first question by supplying
the educational, career and factional backgrounds of these men. But both encounter greater diffi-
culties in responding convincingly to the second; both offer some cheerful pointers about the new
generation of leaders (it is more open-minded, more technocratic, less adverse to ideological
dogmatism than the third generation, etc.), but not much else. Perhaps they will operate through
consensus, rather than destabilizing inter-factional fighting. Or perhaps not. One cannot ask, or
expect, anything much more in terms of guidance about the future of Chinese politics.
There are at least two types of China analysts. Some journalists, such as Willy Wo Lap Lam
(now with CNN), have built their careers upon their ability to piece together scraps of infor-
mation about who is in and out of favour within elite circles, which cadres belong to whose
faction, and who is a sworn enemy of whom. Previous to reform in +,;·, this was the dominant
form of China coverage. Since then, a second, more systematic and scholarly approach has taken
root. Academics have tended to focus their attention on the institutions of the Chinese state, the
relations between central and local government, and key policy areas. Academics tend to view
the elite-watchers with a mixture of envy (for their sources and inside knowledge) and
annoyance (for their casual approach to the political process and their obsession with personal-
ities). Cheng Li has made an admirable attempt to bring these two approaches together. His
book, the more sophisticated, cohesive and informative of the two reviewed here, provides a
systematic analysis of the fourth generation leadership. He has done extensive research into their
background (education, experience abroad, age of first appointment, factional relations, etc.), as
well as analysis that compares them with members of previous leadership generations. (Some of
this becomes a little esoteric: one table shows the distribution of birthplaces of third and fourth
generation leaders.) Li shows the incredible educational transition that is taking place within the
elite. After the CCP came to power in +,¡,, many peasants took senior leadership positions; class
background and ideological purity determined promotions. Wu Guixian, a textile worker, was
appointed Vice Premier during the Cultural Revolution. One enterprising student, Zhang
Tiesheng, handed in a blank piece of paper in an examination during the same period as a
political gesture and instantly became a national hero. Rumours circulated that if the Gang of
Four had held onto power then Zhang would have been appointed Minster of Education. A
return to common sense came with Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang, both of whom reasserted
the need for technical experts to underpin economic reforms. By the +,,os, technocrats, those
with college education in a science subject, were rising fast up the government appointments
ladder. In +,·:, there were no technocrats acting as provincial party secretaries or governors, and
just one, Li Peng, as a minister. By +,,;, ;o per cent of these posts were occupied by technocrats.
Of the seven members of the current Politburo Standing Committee, six, including Jiang Zemin
and Zhu Rongji, are engineers. One, Li Ruihuan, is an architect.
In contrast to Li’s efforts at quantitative data analysis, Fewsmith’s book is ruminative and
discursive. As a collection of previously published articles and chapters, it adds up to an intel-
ligent, if again inconclusive and at times meandering, discussion of how politics in China are
developing. It is, by turns, insightful in its thinking and full of interesting historical information.
There is some optimistic recognition of how institutional constraints (retirement ages, votes, the
norm of consensus) are encroaching upon the traditional elite style of politics (where powerful
men acted without regard for rules, formal or informal). Only by extending institutions and
encouraging pluralism does Fewsmith believe China will avoid repeating the political
catastrophes of the past. Li Cheng also examines the roles of factions within contemporary
politics. Here, the personal stories (potted biographies of Hu, Zeng and Wen) and the extraor-
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 214
dinary history of Qinghua University, one of the key sites for factional activities in communist
China, are fascinating. Serving as a secretary (mishu) or close administrator to a senior leader
(Wen Jiabao served both Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang; Hu Jintao was supported by Song Ping,
a Politburo member, and Yao Yilin in his early years, before he caught Deng Xiaoping’s eye)
stands you in good stead. Having a daddy, or step-daddy, in the Party also helps; Li Peng, a senior
member of the Politburo, was fostered by former Premier Zhou Enlai.Yet, all this biographical
information, for all Li’s valiant attempts to make it fit some kind of scientific framework, always
seems little more than anecdotal. Factions, and contacts and education are important, we learn,
but so are other things. Wen Jiabao, we learn, is a ‘superb administrator and coalition builder’,
Zeng Qinghong, Jiang Zemin’s closest ally, a ‘well-rounded tactician with long-term vision’.The
abiding impression is that Li’s subject matter does not ultimately lend itself to hypothesis making;
it is too ad hoc, too bound up with personalities. His book is a treasure for the biographical data
it provides, and his knowledge of personalities throughout the Chinese state is extremely
impressive. But it is not enough upon which to make credible claims about the future.When Li
generalizes, for instance, about the fourth generation, he is optimistic. But many of his statements
are problematical. The fourth generation are, he claims, more ‘open-minded’ (though they all
adhere to CCP-style communism), more ‘diverse’ (though most are engineers—where are the
artists, the trade union leaders, the businessmen?), and more ‘flexible’ (what does this tell us?).To
his credit, Li admits the limits of his study. Despite this, his book is bound to become invaluable,
and deservedly so.
Stephen Green, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
From opposition to power:Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party. By Shelley Rigger.
London, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. :oo+. :¡:pp. Index. £¡:.¡o. ISBN + ¡¡¡·; ,o, +.
The election of Chen Shui-bian to the Presidency of the Republic of China on Taiwan on +·
March :ooo revealed a serious lack of research in Taiwan studies devoted to understanding the
victorious Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Shelley Rigger, an established authority on
Taiwan’s democratization, has already filled the gap with a comprehensive account of the
formation, establishment and growth of the DPP that marks a step in redressing the tendency to
attribute Taiwan’s democratic achievements to the Kuomintang (KMT).
One of the great virtues of this account is its even-handedness. Dealing with the emotionally
charged issue of the DPP’s China policy, for example, Rigger mercifully avoids the caricature of
a party bent on dragging the island and its allies into a war by declaring independence. Instead,
she painstakingly describes how the party has moved away from crude secessionism and towards
its highly nuanced platform on cross-strait relations. Yet this is also a ‘warts and all’ account.
Chapters covering the party’s organization, factionalism, decision-making, political platform, and
public perceptions applaud the progress made by the DPP in the face of a well-oiled KMT Party-
state.Yet the author pulls few punches in showing how much still needs to be done if the DPP
is to be part of a multi-party system in a mature democracy.
As Rigger repeatedly reminds us, Chen won his victory with a mere ¡, per cent of the vote,
representing as much a chronic failure by the KMT to prevent a division of its own support as
it does an achievement of DPP organization or policies. Moreover, victory for the DPP has
magnified the problem of maintaining discipline as it faces a massive influx of new members.
Now that the party has captured national power, the administration has also been cursed by a
constitutional division between the president and a legislature controlled by the KMT.
The first DPP government thus appears to have been left sitting powerless to do much to
revive a flagging economy or to stop its opponents taking their own initiatives in forging
relations with the PRC. As Rigger points out, the only way in which the DPP will really be
allowed to prove its abilities is if it wins control of the legislature in elections scheduled for
December :oo+. Based on past performance in similar elections and given the ability of the KMT
to organize at the grassroots level, this will be a hard hill to climb.
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Despite the fact that this work must have been compiled in record time for such a compre-
hensive account, it is written in clear and eloquent prose and makes good use of the abundant
Chinese-language sources available on the DPP. It is essential reading for anyone trying to keep
up with the rapid changes occurring in Taiwan, and should be as widely read by leaders and
think-tanks in Beijing as it will be by students elsewhere.
Christopher R. Hughes, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
Reinventing realism: Australia’s foreign and defence policy at the millennium. By
David Martin Jones and Mike Lawrence Smith. London: Royal Institute of International
Affairs. :ooo. ;:pp. Index. Pb.: £+:.¡o. ISBN + ·o:o¡ +++ ·.
The Asian financial meltdown of +,,;–· and the East Timor crisis of +,,, combined to admin-
ister a severe reality check to an Australian foreign policy elite which had been following a largely
uncritical pro-regional, pro-Asian line for a generation. Zealots in that elite such as the journalist
Greg Sheridan (here chastised as ‘a notable devotee of Asian autocrats’) had long called for ‘the
Asianization of Australian life’. More specifically, from Gough Whitlam’s tolerating the
Indonesian invasion of East Timor in +,;¡ to Paul Keating’s ill-fated defence treaty with
Indonesia in +,,¡, Australia’s leaders ‘accommodated Suharto’s oriental despotism’. This was
much to the discomfort of other member states of ASEAN, the region’s loose, gentleman’s club—
notably Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand. When tested by the eruption of East
Timor and the wider economic and political collapse of Indonesia, the ties that bound ASEAN
proved very weak indeed, and the papered over contradictions were clear for all to see.
Now, with broad international backing, Australia’s recently elected Liberal government under
John Howard has opted bravely to defy Indonesia by leading the peacekeeping force in East
Timor despite Indonesia’s tearing up of the increasingly irrelevant Keating–Suharto treaty. The
new Howard Doctrine spelled out, in the words of the Australian prime minister himself, that
Australia was in a position to act precisely because ‘we are a European,Western civilization with
strong links with North America, but we are here in Asia’. Australia represented a ‘secure South’
for East Asia and a ‘secure West’ for the South Pacific. He saw the ANZUS Treaty as reinforcing
the US strategic environment ‘which is the linchpin of regional security’. Simply being Asian,
whatever that was, would not save the position in South-East Asia.
In this lively and polemical survey, Jones and Smith identify the Howard Doctrine correctly as a
bouleversement in Australian foreign and defence policy, a return to the prudence of Menzian balance
of power realism after thirty years of flirting with the ‘frail and unstable construct’ of Whitlamite
revisionism.The revisionists of the ‘political-intellectual complex uncritically accepted the millen-
nialist “Pacific Century” presumption’.To bolster their position, they foreshortened and caricatured
Australia’s past, making Menzies ‘chief architect’ of ‘moral obsequiousness in foreign affairs’ and
creator of ‘a sociological never-never land’ at home. In fact, the authors argue, it was the Whitlamite
foreign policy that was characterized by ‘insensitivity and naivety’. Revisionist analyst Paul Dibb is
caught out describing Indonesia as Australia’s ‘shield’ in +,,o but her ‘arc of instability’ three years
later. For Jones and Smith the ultimate contradiction in ASEAN was that the only viable ASEAN
peacekeeping force for East Timor were its tormentors, the Indonesian army itself. ‘Australia’s
[current] strategic evolution may be built on a guilty conscience; but, one might add, better to have
a guilty conscience than no conscience at all.’ One does not have to agree with every element of
this brave new analysis to welcome it as timely, independent-minded and very stimulating.
Carl Bridge, Menzies Centre for Australian Studies, King’s College London, UK
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Does America need a foreign policy? Toward a diplomacy for the st century. By
Henry Kissinger. London: Simon & Schuster. :oo+. £:o.oo. ¡+·pp. Index. ISBN o o·¡ ·¡¡o; ¡.
After a respected tome on the post-Napoleonic foreign policy of Metternich and Castlereagh,
some self-serving memoirs of his own efforts in the Nixon and Ford administrations and his
genuinely worthy and provocative Diplomacy, Dr Henry Kissinger has now produced a book that
seems intended to be his epitaph and legacy. It is self-consciously reasonable and wise, even in
the delicately sculpted chapter that seeks to discredit the idea of an International Criminal Court
without ever mentioning the strenuous efforts of some critics to haul him before one. In his new
role as global sage, Kissinger recognizes a moral duty to tackle ‘Africa’s tragedy’, and even
concedes that the anti-globalization demonstrators ‘represent a warning that the international
economic system may come to face a crisis of legitimacy’. Uncharacteristically full of bromides
and balance, this is not the modern master of realpolitik we thought we knew. For every sneer at
Europeans ‘who seek identity via confrontation with America’ there is an admission that
‘overbearing American triumphalism bears its own share of responsibility’.
Amid the competent but unremarkable survey of the issues that face the American hyper-
power in Asia and Africa, Latin America and the Islamic world, there is one very tough message
for Europe. ‘The Cold War orthodoxy that European integration would lead automatically to a
strong Europe and a more vital American partnership is still dominant. But the time has come
to take another look at this core assumption of American policy.’ He warns that Germany and
Russia may resume their Bismarckian tradition of closeness, forcing America into balance of
power tactics against Europe. He dreads the prospect of an eventual Russian membership of
NATO or of the European Union.The first option would ‘turn the Atlantic alliance into a mini-
UN type of security instrument’; the second would ‘spark a revolution in Atlantic relations’ that
would ‘split the two sides of the Atlantic’.
The solution he offers brings us back to bromides. Kissinger proposes a TAFTA, a Transatlantic
Free Trade area that would eventually include associate membership for Russia.TAFTA, he urges,
‘would counter the centrifugal forces weakening North Atlantic cooperation and give a new
impetus to the sense of common destiny’. Those who have worked on the various TAFTA
committees and discussion groups and understand the thorny issues may wonder if Kissinger
knows much about the way the EU works, or comprehends the power of the steel, farm, bio-
tech and other lobbies in Washington. No matter; this economic infrastructure is but the
foundation for a new security architecture in which NATO stays as it is; the Russians are content
with an invigorated Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe upgraded to head of
state level, and the serious players like the US, Britain, Germany and France dance again the
stately minuets of the old post-+·+¡ Quadruple Alliance on which, with Metternich and
Castlereagh, Kissinger began his career.
In the end, Kissinger answers the question he sets in his title:America is ‘less in need of a specific
policy than of a long-range concept’. America should not push its luck: ‘A deliberate quest for
hegemony is the surest way to destroy the values that made America great.’ America should not
heed those strategic hawks like Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz who argue that the US
should henceforth work to ensure that no new strategic rival is permitted to emerge.‘This would
make it the policeman of the world and eventually turn most of the other nations against it’,
Kissinger counters. The nearest he comes to offering a long-range concept is to borrow Coral
Bell’s suggestion that an intelligent hyperpower should conduct its policies as if it were just one
of several great powers. But all along, there is the sense of a subliminal message that what America
really needs is less a foreign policy than a wily central European of deep historical knowledge and
silky diplomatic skills. And Metternich may not be quite the candidate he has in mind.
Martin Walker,Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,Washington DC, USA
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 217
Terrorism and US foreign policy. By Paul R. Pillar. Washington DC: Brookings Institution
Press. :oo+. :;:pp. Index. £+,.,¡. ISBN o ·+¡; ooo¡ o.
The thesis of Paul Pillar’s careful, well-balanced account of combating terrorism is that the
United States, which is the book’s focus, can deal effectively with terrorism only when it sees
terrorism in the broad perspective of its overall foreign policy. For example, Pillar declares that
the purpose of combating terrorism is saving lives. He also argues, however, that counter-
terrorism impinges on so many other important US interests that efforts to counter terrorism
‘must be judged according to not only how many lives it saves but also to how little damage it
does to those other interests’ (p. :+,). The chief virtue of the book is the solid case it makes for
this thesis, which may appear to be common sense but is often not shared or even considered by
those who study terrorism.
Pillar supports his thesis with a series of chapters that describe terrorism and its typical current
manifestations, the effect that terrorism has on the United States and its role in the world, and
the various instruments that can be used against terrorism. He follows these chapters with others
that provide more detail on the groups that use terrorism and the states that sponsor or enable
or help to suppress it.The book concludes with a chapter that discusses the role of the American
and foreign publics in the fight against terrorism and another that provides a list of recommen-
dations that summarize points made previously in the book.
Perhaps the best illustration of Pillar’s argument is his discussion of the role of lists in
countering terrorism. Mandated by the US Congress and often entailing the automatic
imposition of sanctions, lists of terrorist organizations and state sponsors are one of the
principal ways in which the United States now organizes its counter-terrorism effort. Pillar
criticizes this technique because it promotes an inflexible approach to the variety of groups
and state sponsors with which the US must deal. It also encourages a moralistic attitude that
makes it difficult for the US to reward states that make some move away from supporting or
enabling terrorism. Finally, inevitable conflicts with other foreign policy interests make
placement on the lists a political issue, raising doubts about the seriousness of the counter-
Pillar’s discussion of lists is one of the many virtues of his book. Others include his description
of the Al-Qa’ida network, his discussion of financial measures against terrorists, and his analysis
of the role of public opinion, as opposed to the usual discussion of the media.
This useful book does have some shortcomings, the most important of which is the superfi-
ciality of much of its analysis.To understand fully many of the issues that Pillar raises, the reader
will have to follow the references to works that Pillar cites. This may be as the author intended.
Yet, the power of Pillar’s arguments would have been increased by, for example, a better presen-
tation of the dynamics of clandestine organizations. This is an odd omission from an author
described as a career CIA employee. On second thought, perhaps not.
David Tucker, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, USA
Latin America and Caribbean
Mexico: the struggle for democratic development. By Daniel C. Levy and Kathleen
Bruhn, with Emilio Zebadúa. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. :oo+. ¡o:pp.
Index. £¡¡.oo. ISBN o ¡:o ::·o· +. Pb.: £+¡.,¡. ISBN o ¡:o ::·¡+ o.
The dramatic defeat of the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) in Mexico in the :ooo
elections is obviously a useful point at which to take stock. The title of Mexico: the struggle for
democratic development is therefore, to some extent, self-explanatory: it is a study of the relationship
between democratization and economic change in Mexico. Daniel Levy is Distinguished
Professor at the State University of New York at Albany, and Kathleen Bruhn is Associate
Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Both have published
previously on Mexico. They have also drawn on the collaboration of Emilio Zebadúa, the
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 218
Secretary for Political Affairs of the Mexican State of Chiapas and author of Banqueros y revolu-
cionarios (+,,¡), to reinforce the Mexican perspective. Lorenzo Meyer, one of Mexico’s most
distinguished historians and Professor of Political History at El Colegio de México, contributes
an enthusiastic preface, and the book does indeed expound many interesting themes in a way
which those new to the subject will find thought-provoking.
Few would wish to dissent from the book’s principal thesis, that the opening-up of Mexico’s
economy to the world market was causally linked to the collapse of the PRI in the +,,os.What
it does not always do as well as it might, however, is to supply the specific evidence for its claims,
taking refuge all too often in rather vague generalities. One or two examples must suffice. The
book leaves the impression that Mexico has been under authoritarian government since +,:,.
Yet as late as +,·o it was one of the most democratic states in Latin America and one of the very
few in that decade that could even be regarded as a democracy ‘with adjectives’. In short, the
structures were already in place through which the transition to multi-party democracy would
occur. On the economic side, the discussion of the +,;o–·: period (pp. +¡¡–oo) does not clearly
distinguish between the long-term effect of the first, and the short-term effect of the second ‘oil
shock’ and is unadorned by the detailed statistics on public expenditure, borrowing and debt
which would have made it much more useful to specialists. In fact, even before the oil price
began its long decline, Mexico was already insolvent, because it had borrowed too much on
short-term and had failed to schedule its repayments sensibly—as, for example, Brazil had done.
As the authors themselves point out (p. +o¡), not all oil-rich countries managed to get themselves
into such a mess, though virtually all of them found themselves unable to discover any way out
except the unscientific one of ‘muddling through’. In short, this is a lively and interesting
critique, but there is much that can be contested and a great deal more to be said.
Peter Calvert, University of Southampton, UK
Security in the Caribbean Basin: the challenge of regional cooperation. Edited by
Joseph S.Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach. London, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. :ooo. ::·pp.
Index. Pb.: £+¡.¡o. ISBN + ¡¡¡·; ··¡ ,.
On my shelves are several books on Caribbean security published during the +,·os and +,,os.
They come as a type: co-edited, derivative of a US-funded conference usually held somewhere
in the Caribbean, committed to policy relevance. My feeling about each of them has been that
they have provided a useful snap-shot of the state of the debate about Caribbean security at that
particular time. But then I have forgotten them and am now unable to distinguish one from
another in my memory. Maybe the failing is mine; maybe it reflects the genre.
This book, jointly edited by Joseph Tulchin and Ralph Espach on behalf of the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars from papers delivered at two workshops held in
Barbados and the Dominican Republic in +,,o and +,,; respectively, is the latest in this line. It
is a good example of the type.The chapters comprise overviews of the post-Cold War Caribbean
security agenda by such respected analysts as Anthony Maingot, Humberto García Muñiz and
Francisco Rojas-Aravena; more detailed analyses of non-traditional threats to Caribbean security,
especially migration and narcotics; and (something of an innovation) short statements of position
by ‘practitioners’, by which is meant representatives of such bodies as the US Immigration and
Naturalization Service, the US Coast Guard and the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security
System. Unfortunately, the publishers forgot to include in the book a set of notes identifying the
contributors and so are dependent on readers knowing who the various authors are.
Nevertheless, this is a relatively minor lapse. The end product undoubtedly constitutes a useful
collection of arguments which serves well to update those interested in these questions.
The volume also has a distinctive perspective. It rejects the adversarial character of
US–Caribbean relations which it dates back to the insights of Alfred T. Mahan at the end of the
nineteenth century; identifies instead a post-Cold War opportunity to improve regional relations
based upon ideological commonality and the general lack of coherence or sense of strategic
Latin America and Caribbean
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 219
priority in US policy towards the region; and urges Caribbean policy-makers to seize the
moment by ‘designing workable, cooperative approaches to specific problems that can be
negotiated with the United States, instead of waiting for Washington to provide leadership’
(p. ,). Such openings do indeed exist because US policies (not policy) towards the Caribbean are
made these days in a series of dispersed policy communities (one relating to bananas, another to
drugs, yet another to migration, and so on). The problem lies in enforcing linkage across these
different issue areas, especially when none really count as major policy matters for the US. The
editors do draw attention to this conundrum in their conclusion (citing as illustration
CARICOM’s recent attempt to put pressure on the US over bananas by suspending the anti-
narcotic shiprider agreements signed with the US by member states), but they do not probe in
any significant way either the theoretical or practical implications of this apparent flaw in the new
pluralist future of regional security cooperation which they otherwise espouse.
Anthony Payne, University of Sheffield, UK
Brazil’s second chance: en route towards the First World. By Lincoln Gordon.
Washington DC:The Century Foundation Press. :oo+. :¡¡pp. Index. $:·.,¡. ISBN o ·+¡; oo¡: o.
Lincoln Gordon was the US ambassador to Brazil between +,o+ and +,oo at the time when the
country changed from a semi-democratic regime to a military dictatorship. He was both a player
and an observer, as he was advising President Lyndon Johnson on the direction of US policy
during very turbulent times in Brazil.
There are advantages and disadvantages when such experience is incorporated within an
academic and scholarly publication. The author introduces much of his personal experience by
quoting from meetings and conversations he had with key participants, revealing quite clearly the
direction of his sympathies. Nevertheless, much of his research is based on sound and credible
evidence, providing a wealth of interesting and well-presented information.
The very title of the book reveals its analytical framework. The approach, as expressed in
chapter +, is that of modernization theory, whereby ‘Third World’ countries, given certain condi-
tions, could modernize and acquire ‘First World status’. For instance, Gordon writes that Brazil is
a ‘classic case of incomplete transformation from traditional stasis to modern economic growth’
(p. +¡). The basic idea is that, albeit with some rough passages, there should be a progression
through different stages towards a First World status, typified by the United States. He draws a
comparison between Brazil and the US, concluding that ‘it is tempting to suppose that Brazil’s
development is following the American trajectory, but with a lag of a few decades’ (p. :o).
Chapter : provides an examination of the first chance to achieve First World status, followed
by an account of the military republic. It is not very clear whether the first chance stopped with
the +,o¡ military coup or whether it continued in a different form under the military regime.
In chapter ¡, under the subheading ‘The military republic’s economic legacy’, Lincoln Gordon
examines the changes that had occurred between +,o¡ and +,·¡, stating that during the military
era the country moved into the category of ‘newly industrialized nation’ and that it was very
close to ‘full First World status’ (p. ,;). His conclusion is that by +,·¡ Brazil’s economic structure
‘contained most of the modernizing elements needed for a final push into the community of
advanced industrial nations’ (p. +o+). However, what kept the country from reaching that higher
status was its political structure, as the demise of the military did not assure a stable and effective
Chapters ¡–; provide an excellent account of the problems facing Brazil into the new
millennium. They examine its economic, social and political problems, with a wealth of helpful
statistics. The final chapter examines the country’s prospects, and singles out the main challenges
standing on the way towards the First World. In the author’s opinion they are: maintenance of
macroeconomic stability; major reductions in poverty and in income disparities; consolidation of
external economic relationships; and reform of political party structure and electoral mechanisms.
INTA78_1_08/Reviews 13/12/01 9:30 am Page 220
It is evident that the book is written from a distinctly American perspective assuming a
modernization approach. However, one does not have to agree with its assumptions to appre-
ciate the quality of the research and the information provided.
Rachel Barnard, University of Westminster, UK
The deadlock of democracy in Brazil. By Barry Ames. Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press. :oo+. ¡¡+pp. Index. £¡:.¡o. ISBN o ¡;: +++oo ¡.
Brazilian government today works (or does not work) much as the government of the United
States was originally intended to, so the legislature has an exceptional degree of ability to frustrate
the intentions of the executive.There are a number of obvious reasons. Brazil is a federal republic,
in which the states enjoy considerable powers, not least in revenue-raising.The Senate is at least
as powerful as the Chamber of Deputies, and has even more extreme over-representation of
sparsely populated rural areas. And, despite the attempt of the +,o¡ military government to
impose a two-party system, the return of civilian rule has been accompanied by the rapid
fragmentation of the party structure, so that recent presidents have been able to command a
majority in Congress only from time to time and for specific purposes.
Barry Ames, who is the Andrew Mellon Professor of Comparative Politics at the University of
Pittsburgh, states that one of the main sources of instability lies in the country’s electoral system.
Having established a database of electoral out-turns since the return of democracy, he has
subjected this to detailed analysis in which he relates the choice of candidates to their subsequent
performance in coalition formation, legislative negotiation, the distribution of rewards (‘pork’)
and intention to seek re-election, among other variables. From a rational choice perspective, he
concludes that it is the use of the open-list electoral system, rather than any other cause, that
‘personalises politics and weakens party control over politicians in both campaigning and
legislative behavior. The system is extremely democratic in that all potential cleavages receive
equal treatment’, he claims (p. ;¡). ‘But openness and flexibility weaken the ties between voters
and deputies, and parties have difficulty aggregating interests into anything resembling a coherent
program.’ Not everyone will agree with this thesis. However the scale of the study and the wealth
of information this book provides make it a classic study and essential reading for anyone seeking
to understand Brazilian politics.
Peter Calvert, University of Southampton, UK
Latin America and Caribbean
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