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Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation: John Dewey and the Theory of Democracy Today Author(s): Axel Honneth and John

M. M. Farrell Reviewed work(s): Source: Political Theory, Vol. 26, No. 6 (Dec., 1998), pp. 763-783 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: . Accessed: 30/08/2012 05:55
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DEMOCRACY AS REFLEXIVE COOPERATION JohnDeweyand theTheoryofDemocracyToday

AXELHONNETH GoetheUniversity Johann Wolfgang

theSovietempire andtheWestern debateon communitarianism, efforts to ofdemocracy the normative foundations haveincreased elucidate worldwide an attempt inrecent wherever wasmadetolinkup with years. However, the ofradical from tradition theliberal understanddemocracy-asdemarcated ingof politics-thediscussion track of quickly goton theconfrontational versus these republicanism desproceduralism.1 Today, keyterms ordinarily ofdemocracy ignate twonormative models whosecommon goalitis togive willformation a greater rolethan is usualinpolitical democratic liberalism. Instead oflimiting the ofcitizens tothe function ofperiparticipatory activity thestate's exercise ofpower, their is tobe a perodically legitimating activity in thedemocratic embodied manent matter publicsphereand shouldbe understood as thesource ofall political decision-making processes.2 For all thecommon in their of liberalism, ground critique differences nonetheless existbetween thetwomodels. Thesefollow from thedifferent theprinciple ofthedemocratic is normatively waysin which publicsphere in each case. Whereasrepublicanism takesits orientation justified from idealofa citizenry for antiquity's whosemembers theintersubjective negoofcommon tiation affairs hasbecomean essential oftheir part lives, proceduralism is needed to reactivate insists that what theprocess ofdemocratic willformation is not citizens' virtues but simply morally justified procedures. In the the is thus democratic former, public sphere as the regarded medium of a self-governing inthe itis regarded as the political community; latter, procedurewith whosehelpsociety tosolvepolitical attempts problems rationally in a legitimate manner.'
AUTHOR'S NOTE: Forcritical I wouldliketo remarks, useful advice,and helpful comments, thank Peter Niesenand,as always, Hans Joas.
POLITICAL THEORY,Vol.26 No. 6, December 1998 763-783 ? 1998Sage Publications, Inc.

OT LEASTAS A RESULTofthe coincidence ofthe fall of temporal




Habermas hasmadeclear, this central difference intheconcept As Jiirgen is accompanied differences ofthepolitical concernpublic sphere byfurther between thestate andlaw.4 ofrepublicanism The tradition ingtherelation there is a solidary that assumes is in a position toorganize citizenry society of communicative consultation and negotiation; itself through processes state itself canbe grasped here as theimplementation therefore, politics only ofpublicly Thegovernment andtheparliament negotiated programs. areno institutions ofthestate longer autonomous tospecific but subject guidelines, theinstitutional oftheprogressively spearhead communication rejuvenating inthecitizens' process that hasitsrealcenter democratic publicsphere.' By totheproceduralist state contrast, institutions haveto according conception, form a legally bound but becausethewidely branchindependent subsystem structures ofthepublicsphere do notat all possessthe ingcommunication ofpolitical kind decisions canbe made. power bywhich universally binding Rather, here,in preparliamentary space, publicopinionis to be formed theexchange of arguments and convictions. Publicopinion through proin those ofthestate grams institutions decision-making administration that onthestrength ofdemocratic havetoguarantee thesocialpresupprocedures for thecontinued ofthedemocratic existence positions publicsphere.6 Despitetheir fragmentary these quality, references also indicate thenecdifference between the twoapproaches intheir essary respective conceptions oflaw.Political hasbynature a certain republicanism tounderstand tendency as thesocialinstrument legalnorms which through thepolitical community topreserve itsownidentity. attempts totheproceduralist convicAccording basicrights a kind ofguarantee for tion, thecontinued represent of existence theinterplay of thedemocratic and political publicsphere administration. For the former, law is the crystallized expression of theparticular selfof a solidary understanding citizenry; forthe latter, it represents statesanctioned butmorally legitimated precautionary measures to protect the democratic in itsentire procedure complexity.7 Now,this plump contrast oftwomodelsofradical democracy hasdominatedthepolitical-philosophical in recent discussion years, butforall its ithasalso hada negative fruitfulness, Itfrequently effect: appears that these twoconcepts exhaust thespectrum of alternatives that present themselves in theattempt to renew andexpand today democratic principles. However, more than tworadically merely democratic alternatives topolitical liberalism canbe found, as I would liketoshowbyreconstructing John Dewey'stheory of democracy.8 it is Deweywho presents My claimthat a third pathmay appear surprising. Dewey is claimed by both sides as a theoretical



Itis notdifficult for predecessor. torefer toelements political republicanism ofdemocracy becauseitis similarly ofDewey'stheory basedon theidea of in a self-organizing an integration ofall citizens Nordoes the community.9 ofdemocracy haveanydifficulties inrelying proceduralist theory onDewey, for onrational ofproblem-solving is far hisemphasis more procedures extensivethanin other modelsof thepolitical publicsphere.'? Accordingly, my ofdemocracy contains a third claim that alternative tothe libDewey'stheory eralunderstanding ofpolitics must demonstrate theinappropriateness ofthe I willshowindirectly other twoclaims. that eachtouches oneofthetwo only thus missDewey'ssynthesis sidesofDewey'stheory. into a single conThey realpoint which constitutes the ofhisposition. Ofcourse, tobe able ception, howDeweysimultaneously conceives ofreflexive tounderstand procedures andhowhecombines theideaofdemocratic andpolitical delibcommunity with thenotion ofcommunity eration to elucidate the ends,I willneedfirst his from that others' versions premise sharply distinguishes of a theory of In hisendeavor tojustify ofan expanded democracy. principles democracy, incontrast torepublicanism andtodemocratic Dewey, takes proceduralism, hisorientation notfrom themodelofcommunicative consultation butfrom In brief: themodelof socialcooperation. becauseDeweywishesto underform stand as a reflexive ofcommunity he is ableto democracy cooperation, thetwoopposing ofcurrent democratic bring together positions theory. In part thetheory ofdemocracy 1,I present oftheearly in which Dewey, theideaofproceeding from thesphere ofsocialcooperation is already beginwhilestilldepending ningto becomeevident. on Hegel However, largely theearly with theidea ofdemocratic and,in surprising concordance, Marx, self-administration hereis so immediately derived from thepremise of a division oflabor that the central cooperative ofpolitically sphere establishing communicative freedom is strangely Inpart excluded. liketoshow II, I would in thewakeofhisepistemological howDewey, studies, gradually arrives at theproceduralist of thedemocratic conception thatcan be publicsphere ina more found mature form inhisbookThePublicandItsProblems. What is primarily ofinterest inthis today mature modelis thefact that theproceduresof democratic willformation are grasped as therational meanswith which a cooperatively integrated society attempts tosolveitsownproblems. inpart Finally, theinternal III, byelaborating connection between cooperaI can introduce tionand democracy, intothecurrent Dewey'sconception debate. I wouldtherefore liketoconclude that byshowing Dewey'smature modelofdemocracy not butis superior represents just an alternative to the approaches predominating today.



I democratic leveled objections The coreofall radical liberalism's against to its of has individualist referred conunderstandingdemocracy negative, Whether in Marx and the socialist or tradition ofpersonal freedom."' ception the of heirs and adherents the central in Tocqueville's republicanism, arguinthe liberal oftheformation beenthat ofthe ment hasalways understanding willcouldbe reduced to thefunction of periodically democratic, political Herethesubject stateaction. is understood as previously furlegitimating of individual nishedwitha certain amount and if thepersonal freedom; oftheindividual is understood as independent oftheprocesses autonomy of thisentailsthe following normative The social integration, conclusion: intheregular ofcitizens must consist political control ofa activity primarily whoseessential taskmust, foritspart, be theprotection stateapparatus of In contrast their individual liberties. to thisreductionist of understanding thevarious traditions that havedeveloped democratic as alterparticipation, inthepast200 years with a different, a communinatives toliberalism begin ofhuman Fromtheevidence freedom. that theindividual's cative, concept freedom is dependent thesetraditions uponcommunicative have relations, of democratic inferred an expandedunderstanding will formation. Each citizen is nowunderstood as attaining individual in personal autonomy only with all others. ofall citizens association inpolitical Thus,theparticipation is notmerely themeansby whicheach individual decision-making can for secure her freedom herself what personal itarticulates alone;rather, is the itis onlyinthemedium ofan interaction fact that free from domination that eachindividual's freedom is tobe attained andprotected. In sucha counterprogram, a detailed answer to thequestion of howthe mechanism ofdemocratic willformation is constituted depends on entirely the character ofthe ofcommunicative freedom specific concept employed. In thetwodrafts ofdemocracy we haveso far as alternatives toliberalgotten freedom of human in thesame ism,thecommunicative beingsis grasped to themodelof intersubjective manner, namely, according speech.In both Hannah Arendt andJiirgen theideaofdemocratic Habermas, willformation inthenotion that thesingle individual can attain originates freedom onlyin that realm public constituted byreaching agreement inlanguage.'2 However, evenatthis where itisjusta matter oftheunderlying early point, concept of communicative ofdemocracy freedom, Dewey'stheory differs already from thetwoapproaches IfDeweyshares mentioned. with Arendt andHabermas theintention ofcriticizing theindividualist offreedom, understanding then he sees theincarnation ofall communicative freedom notas intersubjective speechbutas thecommunal (gemeinschaftlich) of individual employment



from suchan idea ofvolunforces to cope with a problem. By proceeding tarycooperation, Dewey-obligated here more to Marx thanto Tocto draft an alternative to theliberalcomprehension queville-attempts of democracy. in "The Ethicsof Democracy"'3-the first Already very essayin which of thetheory Dewey dealtwiththequestion of democracy-heoutlines theinternal connection between briefly anddemoccooperation, freedom, Theproblem hetakes ofthethen racy. thetendency updealswith contemposocialphilosophy toseeindemocracy rary form of justa mere organizational state government. Whatthen remains from democratic to ideals,according understood as a "numerical" for Dewey,is justmajority directive rule, the procedure towhich themembers oftheinstitutions according ofrepresentaInjusta fewpages,Deweyfirst tionareelected. does awaywith thecentral premise ofthis instrumentalist ofdemocracy. He makes concept clearthat to willformation reducetheidea of democratic to thenumerical of principle rulemeansassuming tobe anunorganized majority society massofisolated individuals whoseendsareso incongruous with one another that theintentionoropinion heldbythemajority must be discovered To arithmetically.'4 thisextent, thequantitative modelof democracy shareswiththeclassical theories ofcontract thenotion totheformation ofthestate, indithat, prior exist without viduals intotal anycommunicative isolation. relationship Only ifunorganized orruptured is taken as thestarting canoneconsociality point ofdemocracy sider this as thesolution tothe concept ofsocialorder problem (much as Hobbeshasdone).To present sucha connection inDewey's means, that view,proving democracy maynotbe understood as a instrumentally numerical the for ofstate formation order. Forhim principle itis toounrealisto believethat tic,too mucha merefiction, sociallifeunfolds without any association between the individuals tothe formation prior ofa political unit.'5 Thus,in thesecondpartofhis essay,Deweyturns thequestion around to the ofdemocracy explore that understanding necessarily onthe emerges condition ofan antecedent ofsociallife. intersubjectivity As in all hisearly theconcept writings, ofsociety bywhich Deweylets himself in this be guided draft ofan alternative theory ofdemocracy is still heavilyinfluenced by Hegel. Hence,the intersubjectivity within whose framework social lifehas alwaysunfolded is presented according to the modelof a "social organism" in whicheach individual contributes to the ofthe wholethrough her ownactivity.16 reproduction Thefirst fact characteristicof everykindof sociality is theexistence of cooperation. However orcontingent, individuals do relate tooneanother unguided on bypursuing, thebasisofa division oflabor, activities that contribute tothemaintogether ofsociety. tenance Given sucha model ofsociallife, for Deweyboth personal



ofas related toone havetobe conceived andpolitical autonomy government of social cooperation consists in a typeofjointly forthereality another, individual freedom andstate havetobe conshared good,whereby politics conBecauseeachmember ofsociety embodiments. ceivedofas itsopposite oflabor, herownactivities tothe on thebasisofa division tributes, through oftheendsof sherepresents a "vital ofsociety, embodiment"'7 maintenance made not ofthefreedom sheis entitled Forthat society. reason, justtoa part sovshealways the entire as anindividual socially possible; rather, possesses which alljointly as a peoplebecome thesovereign bearer of ereignty through of an power.It is notwithout pridethatDeweydeclaresthatthisnotion ineachindividual citizen ofpopular the embodiment sovereignty represents madebythe American revolution tothehistory ofpoliticentral contribution is thetheory, often butnonetheless cal ideas:"Andthis crudely expressed, that citizen is a sovereign, theAmerican a true in substance, every theory, which in grandeur has butone equal in history, andthat itsfellow, doctrine manis a priest that ofGod."'8 namely, every in thisalmost theChristian Marxist manHavingappropriated heritage eachcitizen is completely as an individtowhich ner-according sovereign on thebasis of a division of labor,thecommon ual because she serves, thestate as theopposite good-Dewey can understand pole oftherelation will"is articulated outlined. Because a "common alwaysmoreor less coninthemere fact thestate ofsocialcooperation, has tobe sciously apparatus as the institution ofthis will."9 determined Thatis why the political, executing is tobe conceived ofnot as a separate towhich government sphere public reparedelegated resentatives under theapplication ofthemajority rulebutonly as a "living ofthecombined effort tohelpimplement expression" thecoopendsmoreeffectively, that eratively pursued is, by concentrating reflexive forces. theorganism evenfurther Here,Deweytakes analogy bydesignating thegovernment as the"eye"ofthepolitical "Theeye apparatus community: is the for bodyorganized seeing, and justso government is the state organized fordeclaring andexecuting itsjudgments. Government is to thestate what itnot is tothought; language only communicates the purposes ofthestate, but in so doinggivesthem for thefirst time articulation andgenerality."20 in his argument he has only Now,Deweyis awarethat up to thispoint different version ofPlatoorAristotle. given a slightly Theclassicalpolitical oftherelation also conceived between philosophers individual freedom and as an organic in thesensethat political community interaction, thesingle the her individual, bydeveloping appropriate virtues, experiences freedom in inturn therealization ofa common is justan expression ofthe good,which ofall individuals-endeavors, endeavors that arecoordinated on the is,that basisofa division oflabor. To that extent, Deweyconcedes, antiquity's ideal



differ in substance from thedemocratic does notessentially of aristocracy selfideal. In bothideals, citizensare said to attainfreedom through withtheethical endsthat constitute in conformity the realization together of thepolity.2" between the ethical life(Sittlichkeit) Hence,anydifference inthe ofthe not inthe endsbut means consticonsist twoidealsmust political a smallgroup thearistocratic idealbelieves ofvery talWhereas tution: only such arecapableofethically individuals ented appropriate self-realization, of thepopulation has to be urged that themajority paternalistically bythe thedemocratic idealis confident that a virtuous eliteto conduct life, every herself in the of society singlemember can,of herownfreewill,perfect direction ofthegoodthat is pursued onthe basisofa division oflabor. desired thecommunal virtues areimposed or If,in theformer, through persuasion then in thelatter, in from on theuneducated force above,as itwere, citizen, there a reciprocal confidence in an unconstrained democracy, persists that, her ofpersonality, eachindividual canfind function development appropriate ofcooperation. inthe within confidence society's complex Deweycallsthis of a all members a to constitute the "indiof capability society community ofdemocracy: vidualism"
Thisuniversal, this this ofpurpose, differs as toitsmeans. this fulDemocracy law, unity indevotion offunction totheinterests ofthesocialorganism, is not tobe put into a filling inthe man however much the manfrom without. Itmustbegin wise himself, goodandthe Personal ofsociety contribute. individual these arethenotes of responsibility, initiation, in democracy which is notin aristocthere democracy.... Thereis an individualism nota numerical itis an individualism racy;butitis an ethical, individualism; offreeofinitiative to andfor theethical of dom,ofresponsibility, ideal,notan individualism lawlessness.22

ofa democratic Thislatter notion individualism indicates ina sufficiently howtheyoung clearmanner John theinternal Deweyvisualized connection anddemocracy. between He perceives the existence cooperation, freedom, of oflaboras evidence a socialdivision for thefact that theindividual owesher freedom tocommunication with theother ofa socipersonal solely members for Freedom the ofunconstrained ety. Deweyis primarily positive experience theindividual self-realization that teaches inherself todiscover those talents andcapabilities which shecaninthe endcontribute, the through on basisofa division oflabor, tothemaintenance ofthesocialwhole.23 Ifthis natural-like of individual processof a communal employment forces on thepartof all members is raisedto consciousness society's andviewedas a cooperative then that ideal that bears the project, evolves name"democracy": Itis the free association ofall citizens for thepurpose ofrealizing, onthebasisofa divisionoflabor, inso doing, the endsshared bythem; members society's expect



that their owncapabilities inthe ofeachother direction they perfect precisely serves thecommon that good.Itis easyfor Deweyattheendofhisessayto rediscover in thisnotion ofdemocracy as an ethical idealthethree guiding which hadbecome thenormaandfraternity, offreedom, principles equality, a democratic constitution French Revolution: ofthe tive embodiment presupfreedom inthesenseofanunconstrained develposesindividual personality of opportunity, of institutionalized on thecondition opment that, equality ofsociety todevelop thecapabilities andstrengths that allowsall members tocontribute with all others or in association enablethem fraternally, better, ends.24 to thepursuit ofjointly shared solidarily,

II Itis easytorecognize inthis condensed what theweaknesses of synopsis ofdemocracy are.IfDeweyhad theyoung Dewey'sconception necessarily in thetheoretical lefthis modelof cooperative statedescribed democracy itwouldbe difficult tosee why hisreflections tobe understood above, ought ofconceptions toorevenas a competitor ofdemocracy as analternative curfrom rent thesocial division of labor,Dewey does today. By proceeding to a prepolitical of socialcommunication indeeddrawattention dimension that is notas suchsufficiently taken intoconsideration byrepublicanism or the proceduralist theoryof democracytoday. However,the way he allows-in accordance with his organismanalogy-democraticselfadministration toemerge directly from voluntary cooperation resembles the ideal oftheyoung Marxto sucha degree that he must democracy inadvershareall ofitsweaknesses too.The great tently that thecooperative insight ofnature can represent-under processing certain, normatively constituted conditions-aprimary form ofcommunicative freedom was whatinspired Marxto theidea ofunderstanding a true as nothing butthefree democracy association ofproducers; andinhismodeltoo,sucha prepolitical institution ofdirect, cooperative self-administration would only be possible becausethe self-realization ofpeoplegoes automatically, as it were, in a direction that motivates them to develop useful socially capabilities.25 All ofthese honorableillusions, which owetheir existence toa synthesis basically ofAristotle andRousseau, return inanalmost form inthe unchanged young Dewey. They him from induce toswitch the levelofsocialcooperation tothesphere ofcollective in sucha direct self-administration waythat he is forced to occlude ofa political completely theproblem institutionalization ofcommunicative



which vis-a-vis sucha modelofdemocracy, knows neifreedom. However, forms ofa separation ofpowers norintermediary associather elementary in thepolitical thetwoconcepts ofradicaldemocracy tions publicsphere, havea clearadvantage. discussed Becausethey from anidea today proceed freedom to whichindividual of communicative is according autonomy inthe bond tointersubjectively reaching agreement public realm, they beginas itwere-withthesocialmechanism atthelevelofbasicconcepts, already is based.Thus, willformation as a normative onwhich democratic principle of Dewey's theory of democracywhatfirst appearedas an advantage oflaborincluded inthesocialdivision namely, that itsstarting point already for aneconomic inthepremises demands atthis democracy-appears point weakness ofhiswholeapproach.26 tobe an all tooevident andeager tolearn, Now,John Dewey, always opentonewinsights didnot leavehistheory intheembryonic form he gaveitinhisearly ofdemocracy theideathat Hegelian individual freedom period. Though depends primarily onself-realization ina division oflabor understood as cooperation is retained inthe later this notion is nowpursued onthe basisofa theory phase, ofaction suchthatan independent of thepublicsphere concept beginsto become Inthealmost lie between hisearly that ofdemocapparent. fifty years theory racyandthepublication of ThePublicand ItsProblems,27 there is a whole series of intermediate further his maturing stages thattogether clarify conception. inhispsychological which claima large ofhisintelThus, studies, portion inthe heattempts lectual first ofthe newcentury, tojustifyenergies quarter time forthefirst thesis on which his original explicitly-atacitly Hegelian is based. He had assumedrather ideal of democracy optimistically that human self-realization wouldstrive andwithout external byitself constraint ina direction that leadsintheendtothevoluntary orinfluence of acceptance socialobligations. Inthis ifallmembers view, ofsociety couldactualize their owndevelopmental on thebasis ofequal opportunity, potential would they ownfree willtobecomegoodcooperative want oftheir inthesocial partners oflabor. onceDeweyovercomes division hisinitial he However, Hegelism, has torealizethat thisthesis an untenable presupposes teleology ofhuman nature. Forthat henowendeavors inhisvarious inpsychology reason, studies to work outthesocialmechanism that couldexplain, without metaphysical thesocial compatibility ofhuman self-realization.28 This new borrowings, solution can be understood interms ofan intersubjectivist ofhuman theory socialization: Fromtheir whichat first completely opendrives, consist of other thana multitude of undirected nothing and thusformable impulses, candevelop human those andneedsas stable beings only capabilities habits



with theapproval andesteem oftheir referhavemet that ofaction particular thata subjecthas in realizing certain action ence group;thesatisfaction itcanbe sureoftherecognition of tothedegree towhich impulses increases as member of Insofar ininteraction. itspartners every society always belongs thesuperimposed ofexpectations see toit reference tovarious groups, layers ofa personality, useful in thecourseofthedevelopment that, onlysocially this model ofhuman areformed.29 habits ofaction Deweydoesnot relinquish Italso shapes in the rest ofhislife. theidealofdemocracy for self-realization Itassumes the function ofbringing outthe the bookonthe connection public. of personality and a democratic combetween theindividual development as a relation offree between which is presented munity, exchange cooperatinggroups:
hispowers ina wayconsonant A member ofa robber bandmay with to express belonging common toitsmembers. Buthedoesso only that andbe directed at group bytheinterest ofthose ofhispotentialities canberealized the costofrepression that memonly through inother Therobber interact with other itcan bandcannot bership groups. flexibly groups; Itmust actonlythrough itself. theoperation ofall interests savethose isolating prevent itinitsseparateness. Buta goodcitizen finds hisconduct as a memwhich circumscribe andenriched infamily berofa political indusgroup enriching byhisparticipation life, scientific and artistic associations. Thereis a freegive-and-take: fullness of intetry, is therefore ofachievement, sincethepullsandresponses of grated personality possible reenforce one another andtheir valuesaccord.3() different groups

If thesereflections on themutual of self-realization and a dependence lifeform canbe understood as theoutcome ofhisyears democratic ofstudy ofhuman thesameperiod butin a second personality development, during a further of the premises clarification of his discipline Dewey attained As a supplement tohispsychological democracy theory. studies, Deweywas with alsoconcerned ofthe research. heproquestions logicofscientific Here, the thesis that we havetobe abletograsp ceededfrom pragmatist every kind as a methodologically of scientific practice organized extension of those intellectual activities with which we,inoureveryday action, attempt toinvesandsolvetheproblem a disruption. tigate causing Guided bytheexample of in thenatural research experimental sciences, Deweycouldquickly recognize that thechancesof finding clever solutions to problems rosewith the ofthecooperation on thepart ofresearchers quality involved; themorethe scientists could introduce, without participating constraint, theirown orintuitions into theinvestigation hypotheses, beliefs, process, the more baland thusintelligent wouldbe thehypothesis anced,comprehensive, they inthe formed end.31 Itis this conclusion that jointly Deweybegan gradually to tosociallearning transfer over processes as a whole. In socialcooperation-



soon claim-the intelligence of thesolution to he could correspondingly to the to which all increases those involved emerging problems degree could, information and introwithout constraint andwith equal rights, exchange his research in thelogic of sciduce reflections. Thus,in theend,from an epistemological that ence,Deweydeveloped argument proposed regardforincreasing therationality ingdemocracy as a condition of solutions to which Without democratic all memsocialproblems: procedures, guarantee likecommunication free from social bersofsociety something domination, wouldnotbe resolved in intelligent challenges ways.In thissense,Dewey claiminThePublicandItsProblems that couldultimately democracy reprein which humanintelligence sents the politicalformof organization forit is onlywhere methods of publicly achievescomplete development; have assumedinstitutional form individual convictions in debating that, can be character ofrational social life, thecommunicative problem solving as this is doneinthenatural sciences setfree inthesamemanner byexperioutthe thedifmental inlaboratories: "Theretort research only brings point: tothink ofandbydifferent incirference madebydifferent objects meanings of social affairs, one moreinformed a moreintelligent state with culation, wouldnotimprove one moredirected knowledge, byintelligence, original itwould the onewhit, but raise levelupon which the endowments intelligence ofall operates."32 notion In contrast to hisoriginal, ofdemocracy, this organism-theoretic for allowedhimto see for thefirst time argument openeda path Deweythat It was nowpossible for himto therational valueofdemocratic procedures. of unconstrained and will formation to procedures a much grant opinion A newproblem however: howmight roleina true greater democracy. arose, ofdemocracy this into the character bereconciled with the insight procedural claimthat individual self-realization was only previously presented possible in a community ofcooperation? In what focus waywas theepistemological to be harmonized on democratic withthenotion of a jointly procedures shared ideaofthegood,ofa democratic valuecommunity? Theintroduction ofthe which oftheconcept outinhisbookThePublic public, Deweycarries and ItsProblems, an initial, butstill an eminently represents hesitant, today tothis Before tothequestion ofthe challenging response problem. returning extent towhich ofdemocracy contains a superior alternative Dewey'stheory ofa radical discussed I would tothe twoapproaches liketo democracy today, in thestudy. thearguments sketch broadly weakness ofthe found inDewey's Themost significant democracy theory ofa political tobe theabsence dimension tocommunicawork early proved Like Marx, Dewey also moved fromcooperativeselftive freedom. realization to collective self-administration so directly that in theendthere



was noplaceatall for anydiscursive, exercise ofindividual procedural freedominjointwillformation. redresses this in Dewey deficiency already the onthepublic first stepofhisstudy toreconstruct-while byattempting profrom socialcooperation ceeding andonthebasisofaction state theory-the as a sphere Interms ofjointproblem ofa history oftheory, solving. theargumentfulfills the function of fending offmetaphysical and teleological notions of thestate;systematically, it provides however, Dewey withthe to introduce thepublicas a discursive opportunity medium ofcooperative problem under democratic Thebasicideais very solving conditions. simple, eveniftheaction-theoretic implementation us today: Social might surprise informs action ofinteraction unfolds whose inthesimple case consequences affect only those butas soonas those immediately involved; not involved see themselves affected ofsuchinteraction, bytheconsequences there emerges from theneedfor their perspective ofthe jointcontrol actions corresponding either cessationor by their by their This articulation of the promotion. demand for jointproblem-solving for constitutes which already Deweythat hewillhenceforth call "public": Theterm is attributed "public" tothat sphere ofsocialaction that a socialgroup cansuccessfully tobe inneedofgenprove eralregulation becauseencroaching arebeing consequences generated; and, accordingly, a "public" consists ofthe circle ofcitizens onthebasisofa who, jointly experienced share the conviction that havetoturn concern, tothe they restof society forthepurposes of administratively controlling therelevant interaction.: Of course, thisproposed determination of theconcept in turn raisesa seriesofproblems that Deweycannot alwayssatisfactorily solveinhistext. There is thus aboveall the ofwhat question is tobeunderstood bythose "indirect consequences oftransactions" that can "affect" thosebeyond thecircle oftheimmediately involved, whether especially thiscomprises onlythose consequences thatare objective, interpretation-independent, or also those consequences that arerelative tocertain interpretations ormoral sensibilities. ofthese However, irrespective internal which problems, Deweywouldhave hadtoresolve in favor ofthesecondalternative, probably thegreat accomof hisapproach plishment hereconsists in theproposal to assumea proceduralist differentiation between and"public" "private" instead of an essentialist distinction: "namely, that thelinebetween private andpublicis tobe drawn onthebasisoftheextent andscopeoftheconsequences ofactswhich areso important as toneedcontrol."34 Now,itis notdifficult to see howthis action-theoretic ofthe"public" concept risetoa notion gives ofthestate that, inthesenseofexperimental problem solving, is tailored tothesteering needs ofa cooperating From theperspective society: oftheinteracting members of thevarious state society, institutions perform thetask ofensuring thegeneral



ofaction, a regulation invariot indirect regulation calledfor consequences is why that thestate ous public spheres hastobe bythose indirectly affected; as Deweysays,as a "secondary form ofassociation" regarded, with which to solve connected publicsattempt ofthe rationally encroaching problems ofsocialaction. thestate coordination so conceived Conversely, has,vis-a-vis as thesovereign, thefunction ofsecuring thehelp cooperating society (with which all citizens can articulate oflegalnorms) thesocialconditions under without constraint and with Stateinstitutheir interests equal opportunity. ofthe havetoenable, whoseofficials are"officers tions, public," Deweysays, all members ofsociety "tocount with reasonable others certainty uponwhat for one's self."35 willdo"; they create others andfor "respect stated what rolehe wants to give Up to thispoint, Deweyhas primarily inreference orpolitical action tothecooperating Thepolitipolitics society. cal sphereis not-as HannahArendt Habermas and,to a lesserdegree, believe-theplacefor a communicative offreedom the exercise but cognitive mediumwithwhose help societyattempts, to explore, experimentally, andsolveitsownproblems with thecoordination ofsocialaction. process, Because therationality ofsuchproblem increases solutions tothedegree to which all thoseaffected areequallyincluded inthe"research itis process," for the ofsociety hastobe beyond question Deweythat political self-steering themoreactively, themoresensitively thecondemocratically organized; nected to socialproblems, themore rational theexperimental publicsreact which thestate can reachuniversally processwith approved problem solufor tions. Buthow, doesthetransition tothenecessity ofdemocratic Dewey, ethical follow from thisepistemological life,of a cooperating community, ofdemocratic Hereagain, justification hisanswer is very procedures? simbe surprising inviewofthecurrent ple,evenifthesolution might discussion on democracy. Thediagnosis ofthetimes that forms thestarting point ofDewey'sstudy is-as is generally known-the observation as a result that, ofindustrializaof complexity, and individualization, tion,growth modern societiesfind in a state themselves ofdisintegration that makesideasofa participation of in democratic all citizens publicspheres Thatis whyhe appearillusionary. takesseriously thereservations ofthepolitical thinkers ofhistime who,in viewofthedifferentiation ofexpert knowledge, can only regard theidea of democratic self-administration as a pure fiction. Ifallcitizens aretotake their from orientation democratic of political procedures problem solving, it is forDeweythat a form ofprepolitical beyond question association must be suchas thosethat presupposed, existed originally onlyin thesmall,easily observed communities of American townships: Society'smembers must havebeenabletosee inadvance that, their through cooperative actions, they



arepursuing a common then tobe abletounderstand the goal,inorder estabof self-organization lishment of democratic institutions as themeansfora political solution to their of social coordination. problems To that extent, Dewey concedesdispassionately, the"greatsociety" mustfirst be transformed into a "great before democratic canbe comcommunity" procedures as a function of cooperative prehended generally problem Theresolving. fore, under theconditions ofcomplex industrialized therevival of societies, democratic a reintegration publics ofsociety that presupposes can only consistinthedevelopment ofa common consciousness for the assoprepolitical ciation ofall citizens. After all we haveso far discovered about Dewey'spolitical-philosophical itis nownolonger development, difficult toidentify the mechanism inwhich he attempts to anchor sucha prepolitical lifeofdemocratic ethical society: Like Durkheim in his book on thesocial division of labor,36 Dewey also assumes that a fair only and justform ofa division oflabor cangiveeachindividual member ofsociety a consciousness ofcooperatively contributing with all others tothe realization ofcommon theexperience goals.Itis only ofparofan individual ticipating, bymeans intheparticular contribution, tasks ofa group that canconvince thesingle individual ofthe ofa democratic necessity for public:"In a search theconditions under which theinchoate publicnow extant mayfunction we mayproceed from democratically, a statement ofthe nature ofthedemocratic ideainitsgeneric socialsense.From thestandpoint ofthe itconsists inhaving a responsible individual, share tocapacaccording informing ity anddirecting theactivities ofthegroups towhich onebelongs andinparticipating toneedinthevalueswhich according thegroups sustain. From thestandpoint ofthegroups, itdemands liberation ofthepotentialities ofmembers of a group in harmony theinterests with andgoodswhich are common."37 one'sorientation Taking from democratic procedures presupposes a form of democratic ethical lifeanchored notin political virtues butin theconsciousness ofsocialcooperation. In thissense,Deweycan claimthat in the endthethree maxims oftheFrench guiding Revolution normatively express ideals,which, democratic through andfair forms ofthedivision oflabor, are locatedin a prepolitical association:
In its justconnection with communal experience, is another fraternity namefor theconsciously appreciated an association goods whichaccruefrom in whichall share, and which totheconduct ofeach.Liberty givedirection is that secure release andfulfillment of personal which takeplace onlyin richandmanifold potentialities association with others: thepowerto be an individualized selfmaking a distinctive contribution and initsownwaythefruits enjoying ofassociation. denotes theunhampered Equality share which eachindividual member ofthecommunity hasintheconsequences ofassociated



becauseitis measured toutilize, action. Itis equitable notby only byneedandcapacity which one inorder that another factors extraneous deprive maytakeandhave.38


ofdemocracy toovercome-inthesense thetheories Among attempting liberal ofpolitics, democratization-the ofa further understanding Dewey's Marx'slegacy, without overhis mismature conception represents taking takes. for a revitalization ofdemocratic Deweyseesthepresupposition pubinthe ofthesocialdivision licslocated oflabor, which has prepolitical sphere insucha fair andjustmanner that eachmember ofsociety tobe regulated can as an active ina cooperative understand herself Withparticipant enterprise. of shared andcooperation, outsucha consciousness responsibility Dewey willnever the individual toseeindemocratic correctly assumes, manage profor To that cedures themeans democratic jointproblem-solving. extent, proofthedivision cedures of willformation andthe oflabor justorganization oflaborthat refer to one another: ofthedivision each Onlya form grants ofsociety, to member discovered abilities and talaccording autonomously a fair chance to assume desirable allows ents, that consocially occupations sciousness ofcommunal to emerge. willdemocratic cooperation Onlythus havea valueas the best for procedures necessarily instrument solvrationally shared To elaborate ing jointly this ofDewey'sconception problems. insight in a little of democracy letus nowreturn, in a comparative greater detail, tothetwonormative models mode, atthebeginning presented as contempotopolitical rary alternatives liberalism. As we haveseen,Deweyshares with republicanism andwith oftheliberal proceduralism thecritique understandingof democracy. he proceeds However, from a modelof communicative freedom that enablesthedevelopment ofa stronger, moredemanding conwill formation. ceptof democratic But Dewey'snotion of how individual freedom from springs communication is gleanednotfrom intersubjective communal speechbutfrom cooperation. As a consequence, thisdifference leads to a very different ofdemocracy, theory one that has twoadvantages overrepublicanism andtwoovertheproceduralist theory ofdemocracy. Inthe tradition ofrepublicanism, citizens areexpected todevelop political which aresaidtorepresent virtues, anessential presupposition for participainthe tion ofopinion intersubjective practice andwillformation; for itis only theextent towhich itself hasbecomea central political participation part of the livesofall society's members that the democratic public sphere canmaintainitself as an endfor itself. Sucha strong ethicization ofpolitics, scarcely with theactual valuepluralism compatible ofmodern societies, couldnotbe



in his bookon thepublic, from themature further he Dewey.At thispoint if as to avert a cultural of consumerism in Hanwrites, polemically, critique and sportive sense:"Man is a consuming animal as well as a nahArendt's so nonchalantly one."39 becausein political Deweycan makethisstatement fora dynamic his viewtherealization ofthetypeofcommunity necessary notwithin thepoliticalsphere mustunfold butprepolitically democracy within oflabor as cooperation. structures ofa division Andhere, experienced within networks ofgroups andassociations to one another that relate along thelinesofa division oflabor, thefactual ofvalueorientations is pluralism of functional naturally becauseit sees to thedevelopment advantage of an abundance of completely different interests and abilities. Forhis idea of a cooperative community, however, Deweyhastobe abletopresuppose-ata level-an individual orientation toward second, higher shared ajointly good; but canbe understood as that endtowhich eachindividual this must be ableto inthesenseofa higher-order relate individual is tounderstand value,ifthis heractivity as a contribution to a cooperative process.40 thestrict limits settorepublicanism Deweygoesbeyond toarrive ata procedural modelofthedemocratic for with publicsphere. Whereas, instance, Hannah itis never clearaccording towhat Arendt, standard entirely theinstitutional form ofintersubjective is tobe gauged formation as itis neiopinion ther a means noraninstrument but anendinitself, with theanswer is Dewey, evident:Because the democratic public sphereconstitutes the medium which toprocess andsolveitsproblems, through society itsestabattempts lishment andcomposition depend completely uponcriteria ofrational problemsolving. as toconceive ofthe Indeed, Deweygoesso far process ofpublic willformation as a large-scale in which, experimental process according to thecriteria oftherationality ofpastdecisions, we continually decideanew how stateinstitutions are to be specifically and howthey are to organized interms oftheir relate to one another With jurisdiction.4' sucha rationalitytheoretic of democratic determination procedures, Dewey undoubtedly drawsnearto themodelofdemocracy that Habermas has developed in the form ofa discourse inrecent butagain, theory years; Dewey'smodeldiffers from that oneintworespects, both ofwhich I canonly interpret as advantages ofhisapproach. Habermas also allowsdemocracy to beginat that pointwhereHannah Arendt locatesitslegitimate atthethreshold place;namely, where-beyond therealmof social labor-the domain of an intersubjective compractice mencesthrough which haveto discussandregulate citizens their publicly common affairs. Within this constituted politically public sphere, democratic see to itthat eachindividual procedures canmakeuse ofherlegally guaranteedautonomy with all others andwith byparticipating injoint equalrights



Arendt's toHannah theprepolitical willformation. Thus,incontrast model, aretaken intoconsidrelations of socioeconomic inequality systematically democratic there is supposed becauseinliberal tobe a eration, constitutions, normative that orrepressed thechance principle givesmarginalized groups all forms of a legallylegitimated of social disadvantage.42 struggle against which theperspective from the"social question" becomesa Nonetheless, inHabermas's ofdemocracy normative reference is ofa kind problem theory from ofDewey'sconception. different that Becauseofthefunccompletely conditions ofdemocratic andaltogether ofthe tional publics, independently ofrecognition theestablishment ofjust, state struggles, Deweyhastoregard forms ofthedivision oflaboras a normative is cooperative that requirement in principle validandthusan internal ofevery idea of component genuine demand for cannot allowthe socialequality democracy. Habermas, however, over the ofdemocratic willformation; hehasto conceptual priority principle makeitdependent state ofpolitically uponthecontingent articulated goals.43 Because of thisone-sided restriction of democracy to thepolitical sphere, ofthefact however, onelosessight that a democratic public sphere canfunction only onthetacit ofaninclusion ofall members premise ofsociety inthe socialreproduction The idea ofthedemocratic process. publicsphere lives socialpresuppositions that canbe secured off this idea itself; it onlyoutside must each citizen to shareso muchcommon expect with all others ground can emerge in involving that at leastan interest oneself in political actively affairs. sucha degree ofcommon canevolve However, ground in only where, ithasalready theprepolitical beenpossible toexperience domain, communicativerelatedness; andthisvacant spotin a politically one-sided of theory inmyview, is filled, democracy byDewey'sidea ofsocialcooperation, that oflaborunder conditions ofjustice. is, ofa division Whathasjustbeensaid also suggests thepossible response to a further in Habermasian problem discourse ofdemocracy. As has beenfretheory in recent remarked quently Habermas years, also has to be able to assume more than establishment ofdemocratic justthe procedures for thesuccessof democratic willformation. Forcitizens tohavemotives andinterests toparinpublicopinion andwillformation, ticipate havetohavemadedemothey cratic as sucha normative procedures of their element dailyhabits.44 But becauseHabermas is afraid that suchanideaofdemocratic ethical lifecould lead himontothetrack ofan ethical understanding ofpolitics, he shifts the hereintothe domainof sociologicalfunctionalism: problems emerging ofconceptualizing Instead thehabitualized attitudes ofthedemocratic citizenas political inthesensethat virtues constitute the they normative epitome ofa desirable culture ofdemocracy, heattempts tograsp them as features ofa whose "accommodating politicalculture quality"(Entgegenkommen) we



In duetofunctional requirements.45 sociologically havetobe able to expect ofdemocracy Dewey'stheory too,itseemstomethat ofthis problem respect thefalseoptions ofan avenue between that opensa third an answer contains to grasp andan empty namely, proceduralism; republicanism overethicized of oftheexperience that all members lifeas theoutcome ethical democratic through ajust related tooneanother cooperatively couldhaveifthey society oflabor. ofthedivision organizing in which we in thehighly developed in thepresent situation Of course, suchanideacan coming gradually, society cansee theendofwork countries of ofa normatively restructuring inspired assume theform no longer simply of theproject of a farlabormarket; rather, one is to think thecapitalist ofwhat infuture has tocount as a cooperative radical redefinition reaching, of adult member every in thesensethat to socialreproduction contribution toparticipate incooperation basedona division the chance againgets society ofthis itis not difficult tosee why the outcome, oflabor. From the perspective a serious alternamodelofthemature Deweycanbe considered democracy model tivein the current debate:because-to put it in a nutshell-this and butfirst as a political, notonly idea ofdemocracy thenormative regards as a socialideal.46 foremost M. M. Farrell byJohn Translated

of thesituation, I am linking 1. Withthischaracterization up, to a certain extent, with inwhich liberalism arepresented Habermas's diagnosis, andrepublicanism as the twoprevailing paradigms ina theory ofthedemocratic constitutional state today (Jurgen Habermas, Between FactsandNorms: Contributions toa DiscourseTheory ofLaw andDemocracy, trans. William MA: MIT Press, Rehg[Cambridge, 1996],chap.6,esp.pp.267-86).Ifweaddtothese twoalternatives theprocedural concept ofdemocracy developed byHabermas, follows the there conceptionI assumed oftworadically democratic approaches that aretoday from attempting contrary todefend a normatively standpoints more substantive ideaofdemocratic willformation vis-a-vis theliberal understanding ofpolitics. Such standardized concepts-liberalism, republicanism, proceduralism-are alwaysindanger ofoversimplifying; we caneasilylose sight ofthose difandrestrictions with the todemobilize ferentiations which various positions attempt precipitous stereotypes. Moreover, thedifficulty in ascribing to specific consciously stylized positions authors is madeespecially clear Maus'soriginal here from byIngeborg approach. Byproceeding in theliberal a normative ofsubjective which areunderstood senseofnegative concept rights, freedom an idea ofradical democratic that does (staatsabwehrend), shedevelops participation indeedsharewithrepublicanism consideration of direct butdoes not, emphatic participation wishtocouplethis with individual toparhowever, ethical expectations concerning willingness Menschenrecht und politische ticipate(see, for instance,IngeborgMaus, "Naturrecht,



undVolkssouveranitat," Dialektik Rechtstheo1 [1994]:9-18; "Freiheitsrechte Gerechtigkeit," I develop with thehelpofDewey'smature rie26.4 [1995]: 507-62).The modelofdemocracy of theposition defended does of courseincludean indirect conception critique by Ingeborg Maus. in whatfollows of the"proceduralist" modelof democracy, I am of 2. Whenspeaking to theconcept Between Factsand Norms; coursereferring primarily developed byHabermas, a Deliberative "Toward butsee also,bywayofa continuation, ModelofDemoSeylaBenhabib, inDemocracy the cratic Boundaries Legitimacy," andDifference: Contesting ed. ofthe Political, NJ:Princeton inwhat S. Benhabib (Princeton, University Press, 1996),67-94.Whenspeaking I haveinmind, model ofdemocracy, ofcourse, follows ofthe"republican" themodel primarily OnRevolution developed indirectly of byHannah Arendt, (NewYork: Penguin, 1973);as a kind see also MichaelSandel, Liberalism and the continuation, Limits CamofJustice (Cambridge: the of"civilsociety" here as anindebridge University Press, 1982).ThatI do not present theory models ofradical is duetothefact inmyview, itsreppendent approach among democracy that, fortheir between and republicanism; resentatives are notorious on oscillating proceduralism in Desintegration: this,see the allusionsin Axel Honneth, "Fragender Zivilgesellschaft," Bruchstucke einersoziologischen am Main:Fischer, Zeitdiagnose (Frankfurt 1994),80-9. see SeylaBenhabib, "ModelsofPublic the 3. On these differences, Space:Hannah Arendt, andJuirgen in Habermas LiberalTradition, and thePublicSphere, ed. CraigCalHabermas," houn(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1992),73-98. 4. Habermas, Between Factsand Norms. Kontexte derGerechtigkeit: Politische 5. Rainer vonLiberalisForst, Philosophie jenseits am Main:Suhrkamp, musundKommunitarismus (Frankfurt 1994),chap.111.2. Between Factsand Norms, 6. Habermas, 287-328. see Forst, Kontexte derGerechtigkeit, 7. On thesedifferences, chap.11.3. 8. On thebiographical, andtheoretical see thetwonewstandard works: historical, context, John Robert B. Westbrook, NY: Cornell DeweyandAmerican Democracy (Ithaca, University C. Rockefeller, John Faithand Democratic Press,1991); Steven Dewey, Religious Humanism (New York:Columbia University Press,1991). thereflections inAlanRyan, 9. See, for John andthe instance, Dewey HighTideofAmerican Liberalism (New York: Norton, 1995),358-9. 10. See, forinstance, thedifferent references to Deweyin Habermas, Between Factsand Norms, 171,304. 11. On this ofindividualist contrasting andcommunicative models ofpersonal freedom, see "ModelsofFreedom in theModern Albrecht World," in Hermeneutics Wellmer, and Critical inEthics andPolitics, ed.Michael MA: MIT Press, Theory Kelly(Cambridge, 1990),227-52. 12. See Hannah "What Is Freedom?" inBetween Pastand Future Arendt, (New York: Penguin,1977),173-96;TheHumanCondition ofChicagoPress, (Chicago:University 1958),esp. chaps.II andV; Jurgen Habermas, "Popular Sovereignty as Procedure," in Between Factsand Norms, appendix I, pp. 463-90;Between Factsand Norms, chap.3. 13.John "TheEthics ofDemocracy," inTheEarlyWorks Dewey, ofJohn Dewey, 1882-1898, vol. 1,ed. JoAnnBoydston Southern Illinois (Carbondale: University Press,1969),227-49.If I shallciteDeweyinthenotes nototherwise stated, that follow according tothecollected works in Carbondale andshalluse thefollowing EW forTheEarlyWorks, abbreviations: published MWforTheMiddleWorks, andLWforTheLaterWorks, 1882-1898; 1899-1924; 1925-1953. 14. Ibid.,229 ff. 15. Ibid.,231. 16.On thetheoretical see theexcellent inWestbrook, context, presentation John Dewey and American Democracy, John part1, chap.2; see also Ryan, Deweyand theHighTide, chap.3.



17. John 237. Dewey,"TheEthicsofDemocracy," 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid.,239. 20. Ibid.,238. 21. Ibid.,240-1. 22. Ibid.,243-4. ofthe ofdemocracy tothis element is thepositive 23. Corresponding of early theory concept to develop as an ideal ofself-realization in his freedom that Deweyattempted simultaneously John "Outline ofa Critical which was influenced ofEthethics, byT. H. Green: Theory Dewey, vol.3,pp.239-388; onthis, seeJennifer Ethical ics" [1891 ], inEW, Welchman, Dewey's Thought NY: Cornell "Between Pro(Ithaca, University Press, 1995),esp.chaps.1 and3; AxelHonneth, Conflict in The Moral Theory of John and Teleology:An Unresolved ceduralism Dewey," forthcoming. 244 ff. 24. Dewey, "TheEthicsofDemocracy,' inErnst oftheyoung see thecritical account Michael 25. On theidealofdemocracy Marx, inEthik undMarx:Moralkritik freier Lange,"Verein Menschen, Demokratie, Kommunismus," der Marxschen im Taunus:Hain, 1986), und normative Theorie(Konigstein Grundlagen ofMarx'sconcept ofdemocracy as a wholeis given 102-24;a very convincing critique byRolf Zu Kritik, Rekonstruktion und Systematik einer Zimmermann, Utopie-Ratinalitat-Politik beiMarxund Habermas 1. emanzipatorischen Gesellschaftstheorie (Freiburg: Albert, 1985), part ofDewey'searly ofdemocracy, 26. On this deficiency theory see,for instance, Ryan, John Deweyand theHighTide, chap.3. ThePublicandItsProblems vol.2,pp.235-372;here, 27. John howDewey, [1927],inLW, I shallcitethefollowing edition: John ThePublicand ItsProblems: AnEssayin ever, Dewey, Political Inquiry (Chicago:Gateway Books,1946). ofJohn Human Nature andConduct 28. HereI amthinking inMW, primarily Dewey, [ 1922], III andIV; but vol. 14,aboveallparts seealsoJohn andEducation Dewey, Democracy [1916],in MW,vol.9. 29. See Dewey,HumanNature and Conduct, see also J.E. Tiles, partIV (Conclusion); Dewey(London:Routledge, 1988),210 ff. ThePublicand ItsProblems, 147-8. 30. Dewey, How WeThink 31. See, for John instance, Dewey, [1910],inMW,vol.6; "Philosophy and inMW,vol. 11,pp.41-53. Democracy," ThePublicandItsProblems, 32. Dewey, 210. Following these Deweyan reflections, Hilary an "epistemological Putnam hasevendeveloped ofdemocracy"; see "A Reconsidjustification ofDeweyan inRenewing eration MA: Harvard Philosophy (Cambridge, UniverDemocracy," sity Press,1992),180-200. 33.Forfurtherelaboration, see HansJoas, "Die politische Ideedesamerikanischen PragmainPipers Handbuch derPolitischen vol.5 (Munich: tismus," Ideen, Piper, 1987),611-20;Rainer Die demokratische Demokratie: Schmalz-Bruns, Reflexive Transformation moderner Politik (Baden-Baden: Nomos,1995),214 ff. 34. Dewey,ThePublicand ItsProblems, 15. 35. Ibid.,72. TheDivision intro. LewisA. Coser, W. D. 36. EmileDurkheim, trans. ofLaborinSociety, FreePress, ofDeweytoDurkheim Halls(NewYork: 1984),esp.BookIII. Theevident proximity on thispoint has-to myknowledge-been in thesecondary considered literature so scarcely far. Durkheim is notmentioned at all byWestbrook; Rockefeller refers onlyto his book on inRyan, John theoccasional references andthe religious forms; Dewey HighTide(for instance, On the internal difficulties of Durkheim's pp. 112, 359), are a commendable exception.



normative approach inhisbookonthedivision oflabor, which arealso ofinterest inrespect to see C. Sirrianni, Dewey'ssolution, "Justice andtheDivisionofLabour:A Reconsideration of Durkheim's Division ofLabourin Society," Review 17 (1984): 449-70. Sociological 37. Dewey, ThePublicandItsProblems, 147.Thisargument clear againmakes particularly theproximity to Durkheim's of professional as intermediary concept groups on associations; Durkheim's seeTheDivision LaborinSociety, concept, tothe of second xxxi-lix. preface edition, 38. Dewey,ThePublicand ItsProblems, 150. 39. Ibid.,139. 40. A helpful ofthenormative analysis ofcooperative presuppositions activities is provided E. Bratman, "Shared byMichael ThePhilosophical Review Cooperative 101.2(1992): Activity," 327-41. 41. Dewey,ThePublicand ItsProblems, 73-4. 42. See Habermas, Between FactsandNorms, chaps.3,4, and9; "Struggles for Recognition intheDemocratic Constitutional trans. inMulticulturalism: State," S. W.Nicholsen, Examining thePolitics ofRecognition, ed. A. Gutmann NJ:Princeton (Princeton, University Press,1994), 107-48. 43. See Habermas, Between FactsandNorms, chap.9.2. 44. See, forinstance, Albrecht einerdemokratischen Wellmer, "Bedingungen in Kultur," Endspiele: Die unversohnliche Moderne amMain:Suhrkamp, (Frankfurt 1993),54-80;Richard Bernstein, "The Retrieval of the Democratic Ethos,"Cardozo Law Review17.4/5(1996): 1127-46. 45. Habermas, Between FactsandNorms, chap.7; seealso"Reply," LawReview Cardozo 17 (1996): 1477-1558. 46. 1 see tendencies to revive sucha "social" idea of radicaldemocracy todayin Joshua CohenandJoel Rogers "Secondary Associations andDemocratic Governance" Politics & Soci20.4 (1992): 393-472. ety

AxelHonneth, born1949 inEssen(Germany), studied philosophy, sociology and Germanliterature inBonn, Bochum, andBerlin; today he isprofessorfor socialphilosophy at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University inFrankfurt/Main. His main publications are Social Actionand HumanNature(Cambridge University Press, 1988); Critique of Power (MITPress,1990); TheStruggle for Recognition (Polity Press,1994); TheFragmented World oftheSocial,EssaysinSocialandPolitical Philosophy (StateUniversity ofNew York Press,1995).