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William Johnstone
FrOHl" [9/11 Personal Privacy]

Sent:
To:

Friday, January 16, 2004 2:47 PM
9/11 Personal Privacy

Cc: Subject: Here's my questions for Mr. Roehmer's consideration.
Garvey and Flynn: 1. Why was Willie Gripper, Jr., the Manager of the FAA's New England Region Security Division, allowed to choose a Manager for the Boston Civil Aviation Security Field Office at Logan Airport, who lacked aviation security expertise? Why did he fail to take action to remove her despite numerous complaints, a backlog of Enforcement Investigative Reports and poor employee morale as indicated in your own Employee Attitude Surveys? 2. Your Hotline office was provided a copy of a FOX 25 Boston television expose' regarding security at Logan in early May '01. Why was your Federal Security Manager at Logan allowed to side with the airlines to thwart attempts by MASSPORT to have the Mass State police begin undercover testing of the screening checkpoints in July '01? 3. MASSPORT, the Manager of the FAA's New England Region Security Division and the Boston CASFO Manager were all made aware of the findings of the FOX 25 report. Why were no actions taken to address the shortcomings noted? 4. The DOT OIG has reported that standard testing protocols were followed by the FAA to be fair to the airlines, yet the FAA Red Team, like terrorists soon would, defeated our in place aviation security safeguards with impunity, over 90% of the time. Do you think the terrorists were concerned with operating within your standard testing protocols? Why was it so impossible to think outside the box of standard testing protocols and instead take action to address vulnerabilities identified by your own Red Team? 5. Why was there a discrepancy between FAA guidance with regard to boxcutters on 9/11 and that promulgated in the Air Transport Association's Checkpoint Operator's Guide (COG) which was used at our screening checkpoints? Why did the FAA authorize boxcutters to be brought on board our aircraft while the COG precluded them? Since the FAA provided regulatory (FARs) oversight of the airlines, why was this disconnect allowed to persist? 6. Why were the protocols for CAPPS I procedures so convoluted on 9/11 that the focus on hijackers who were selectees would have resulted in their checked baggage warranting further examination as versus their person or carry-ons? 7. After what has been revealed over the past two years do you still stand by your statement with regard to 9/11, "How could we have foreseen this?" Would you at this time like to revise what you stated previously? Isn't the real question, "How could we not have foreseen this?" Do you mean to tell us that this wasn't one of the top ten or so potential terrorist actions which could have been envisioned prior to 9/11? Why wasn't this on your radar scope? Were you simply detached from aviation security concerns altogether? Were you aware oft threat potential presented by Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden prior to 9/11? Were you aware of the FAA warnings regarding the potential for hijackings issued to the airlines on

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April 18, June 22 and July 31, 2001? Were you aware of the two incidents in the mid '90s in which terrorists planned to use commercial aircraft to be flown into ground structures (Project Bojinka and Air France flight over Paris)? Were you aware of the threat from Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden as addressed in FAA Civil Aviation Security's annual report on threats against civil aviation? If not, why weren't you? If so, were you aware of the repeated SAO and DOT OIG reports during the decade preceding 9/11, which addressed known vulnerabilities in our aviation security system? Were you aware of the astonishing success of the FAA Red Team in penetrating our aviation security system? Were you aware of the FAA Administrator's Hotline complaint submitted by Brian Sullivan in the summer of 2001, with the accompanying television report of vulnerabilities at Boston's Logan Airport? If so what actions were taken to address those vulnerabilities? Garvey: It is our understanding that You were being directed to tell Michael Canavan, your ACS-1 on and shortly after 9/11, that he would place FAMs on flights other than those which he thought ought to be covered. Who was directing that action? Wasn't it true that Cabinet ministers who would fly to demonstrate the safety of our air transport system at that time wanted FAM protection on board and that Michael Canavan felt they should be on other flights where the threat to the traveling public was of more concern to him? Wasn't that the real reason for (General Canavan's resignation? Loy: The TSA's Deputy Director of Screener Training and Proficiency under your leadership was the very same individual relieved as the FAA's Manager of the Civil Aviation Security Field Office at Boston's Logan Airport shortly after 9/11. Is this what you call accountability? With all the shortcomings noted in screener training and proficiency, why hasn't she been replaced?

1/16/2004