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Battle for Flight 93 At 8:41 a.m. (EDT) on September 11, 2001 United Airlines Flight 93 sped down runway Four Left at Newark (New Jersey) Liberty International Airport and rose into a cloudless late summer sky bound for San Francisco.1 Originally scheduled to take-off at 8:00 a.m.,2 the Boeing 757's departure for the west coast was delayed because of (INSERT REASON AFTER IV WITH NEWARK TOWER PEOPLE)—a 41 minute wait that would prove crucial as the day's events unfolded.3 As the plane left Newark, the flight's two pilots and five flight attendants were unaware that twenty two minutes earlier, at 8:19 a.m., a crewmember aboard another non-stop transcontinental flight, American Airlines Flight 11, had reported a security emergency aboard the Boeing 767 on its way from Boston to Los Angeles.4 Neither did they know that as Flight 93 paralleled Manhattan for a short time and then banked west toward its scheduled destination, FAA Air Traffic Control was tracking Flight 11, a declared hijacking, on its path back to the New York area. Five minutes later, at 8:46 a.m., Flight 11 would slam into the North Tower of the World Trade Center.5 (ROLL-UP ON WHETHER IT WAS APPROPRIATE TO LET UA 93 TAKE OFF UNDER THESE O^ CIRCUMSTANCES). (SEE IF THE OTHER TAKEOVERS OCCURRED WITHIN RANGE OF THE VOR THEIR DESTINATION). HAD 93 BEEN TAKEN OVER EARLIER WOULD THEY HAVE LOCKED ON TO THE DC VOR AND NOT GOTTEN LOST), f x.oO X*J&!A <rfv ?rf-Ax*>A Vrr»*X-^ A (ADD GRAPH ON~LOW PASSENGER LOAD BUT NO INDICATION OF FLIGHT PURCHASES—GET EXPERT VIEW THAT TUESDAY IS THE LOWEST OF THE WEEK)
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By all evidence and accounts, the first 47 minutes of Flight 93 's cross-country trip proceeded routinely. Radio communications from the plane were normal. Heading, speed and altitude ran according to plan.6 At 9:28:05 a.m. the situation changed. While traveling 35,000 feet above Ohio, (confirm) Flight 93 suddenly and precipitously began to lose altitude, dropping nearly 685 feet over the next half-minute.7 Eleven seconds into the descent the FAA's air traffic control center in Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions from the aircraft. During4he first broadcast the pilot or first-officer ^^could be heard declaring "mayday" amid the sounds of a physical struggle taking place in f p the cockpit. The second radio transmission, thirty five seconds later, indicated that the .^r clash was still in progress as the pilot or first officer shouted: "Hey get out of here.. .get out of here.. .get out of here." 8 The abrupt and extraordinary loss of altitude at 9:28 a.m. and the two radio broadcasts to Air Traffic Control that occurred within the same minute mark the point at which four ijjackers among the flight's 33 other passengers began their take over the jet's cockpit.

Communication records show that only four minutes earlier, at 9:24 a.m. United Airlines Flight Dispatcher Ed Ballinger had sent a text message to the cockpit of Flight 93 stating: "Beware cockpit intrusion; two a/c (aircraft) just hit WTC (World Trade Center)."9 The dispatcher's alert was sent to Flight 93 as well as United Airline's 15 other transcontinental flights that morning after a second commercial jet, United Flight 175, had hit the World Trade Center.10 The pilot of Flight 93 confirmed receipt of the message with a personalized acknowledgement two minutes later at 9:26 a.m. n One minute later the last routine voice communication from the cockpit of Flight 93 was received by Air Traffic Control. The Commission uncovered no evidence to indicate that the FAA made any effort to warn pilots of commercial aircraft in the sky on the morning of 9/11 to secure their cockpits, even after the second aircraft had struck the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m. Several FAA authorities interviewed by the Commission stated that it was the air carriers' responsibility to notify their planes of security problems. One highly placed FAA Air Traffic Control said that it was simply not the FAA's place to order the airlines what to tell their pilots.12 (LISTEN TO IV) (WHAT DID POLICY REQUIRE) The Commission notes that the United Airlines flight dispatcher who sent the warning to Flight 93 did so by his own initiative.13 A company-wide order for dispatchers to warn cockpits was not issued until (GIVE TIME).14 The Commission could find no evidence that American Airlines sent any cockpit warnings to their aircraft on 9/11 whatsoever. While the evidence points to the exact time that the hijackers invaded the cockpit, the Commission has found no conclusive evidence to indicate precisely when the terrorists took over the main cabin or moved passengers seated in the first class cabin back to coach—a tactic reported by several passengers during phone calls to parties on the ground. The Commission believes, however, that it is most likely the four hijackers breached the cockpit simultaneous to taking over the front of the plane and pushing passengers back into the coach cabin. Taking over the cabin first would likely have alerted the flight deck to a problem. However, waiting to move passengers until the cockpit was secured would have increased the risk of passenger intervention, particularly if the passengers witnessed the hijackers displaced the crew from the controls. On the morning of 9/11, 37 of Flight 93's passenger seats were occupied. The Commission notes that the occupancy rate of slightly over 20 percent was well below the norm for Tuesday mornings during the summer of 2001. No evidence exists, however, to indicate that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels to facilitate their operation. Financial records indicate that the hijackers did not purchase additional seats in order to reduce the passenger load. The number of cancellations and no-show passengers recorded for the flight were at normal levels. The Commission notes that the terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11, operated in five-man teams. They initiated their cockpit takeover operations within thirty minutes of takeoff, most likely after the seatbelt sign had been turned off and the

flight attendants were beginning cabin service. On Flight 93, however, the hijackers numbered four, and waited until approximately 47 minutes after takeoff to begin their takeover. The evidence supports no conclusion why the hijackers' takeover of Flight 93 occurred so late into the trip compared to the others flights. (SEE DIETER/HURLEY: ADD WHATEVER INFORMATION WE HAVE ABOUT THEIR DESIRE FOR SIMULTANAITY) However, the Commission would note that the flight's tardy departure could well have caused some level of uncertainty or apprehension among the four terrorists aboard. One of the key mysteries associated with Flight 93 is that Wiigm.1 passengers described the presence of three hijackers on the plane, rather than the four who were actually aboard.15 {RS^42LC&fcfcS) Some have wondered whether such reporting might suggest that one of the hijackers was positioned in the cockpit from the outset of the flight and remained unseen by the passengers. FAA rules allowed commercial air carriers to permit properly credentialed and approved individuals, usually air carrier personnel such as pilots or operational personnel to ride in the cockpit jump seat (a seat located directly behind the pilot and first officer). 16 United Airlines' policy in accordance with FAA regulations (GET COPY OF THE JUMPSEAT POLICYand FAA RULES) required that particular paperwork be submitted (GET DETAILS ON ID/PURPOSES ETC) in order to permit and document jump seat approval. 17 The Commission cannot know with certainty whether a hijacker had gained access to the cockpit prior to the violent takeover of the aircraft. Considering the following facts, however, the Commission believes it is not likely a hijacker occupied the jump seat prior to the takeover. All four of Flight 93's hijackers were issued tickets for seats in the first class cabin and used their tickets to enter the aircraft at boarding time according to the air carriers' Gate Reader information (CONFIRM).18 None of the required paperwork required by United Airlines to authorize a jump seat occupant for Flight 93 was filed.19 (SEE IF THEY EVER LET PEOPLE UP THERE AFTER THE FLIGHT HAD STARTED). One of the passengers who contacted a party on the ground to provide a situation report about the hijacking reported that 10 first class passengers were aboard the flight. This figure accounts for the four terrorists and the six non-hijackers who boarded the aircraft holding tickets for first class seats.20 J*5tirout of the six occupants of first class seats, excluding hijackers, contacted the ground by phone to share information about the hijacking. 21 These individuals would have been positioned best to observe whether a passenger among them had gotten up during the flight and entered the cockpit prior to the violent take-over of the aircraft. None of the callers reported the occurrence of such an event. Moreover, the pilot and copilot of the Flight 93 were experiejieed^weil^regarded professionals, who would be quite unlikely to allow an obsej>jefmto the cockpitpfD<jr post take-off who had not garnered

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the proper permission for such privileges prior to the flight.22 (CHECK THEIR PERSONNEL FILES FOR DISCIPLINARY PROBLEMS). Finally, the Commission would note that the hijacker-pilot was the critical link in the terrorist operation. It is reasonable to expect that the hijackers vvould take all precautions necessary to protect the terroris^mho would be required to ijy the plane. Not wishing to risk his death or injury during the takeover of the cabin, it makes sense that the hijackerpilot would remain seated and inconspicuous until he was needed, most likely after the the cockpit was ready to be taken. (SEE WHAT EVIDENCE WE HAVE THAT THE PASSENGERS WERE HERDED PRE COCKPIT TAKEOVER ON OTHER FLIGHTS). (CHECK TO SEE THE ACCURACY OF HIJACKER NUMBERS REPORTED IN THE OTHER CASES). Approximately four minutes after the cockpit takeover, Flight 93's voice recorder began to preserve sounds from the cockpit via microphones imbedded in the headsets of both the pilot and first officer, and in the roof of the flight deck.23 Flight 93's cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was the only one recovered from the crash sites of the four aircraft hijacked on 9/11. In accordance with FAA requirements, the CVR recorded in 30-minute loops.24 (CONFIRM AND SITE FAA RULE). When a thirty minute segment ended, the system would begin the loop again recording over the oldest portion of the previous recorded segment. Accordingly, only the final 30 minutes prior to the grounding of the aircraft is recorded on the CVR. The Commission notes that Flight 93 crashed at 10:03 a.m., the same time the cockpit voice recording terminated. The CVR contained the recording of cockpit sounds beginning at 9:31:57 a.m. indicating that the system captured approximately the last 31 minutes of Flight 93. 25 The Cockpit Voice Recorder and tape recordings of radio transmissions received by FAA Air Traffic Control reveals that at 9:32 a.m., most likely the hijacker-pilot, Ziad Jarrah— the only one of the four known to have received pilot training—made, or attempted to make, the following announcement to the passengers of Flight 93: "Ladies and Gentlemen: Here the captain, please sit down keep remaining seating. We have a bomb on board. So, sit." 26 This segment of the cockpit recording also indicates that a female, most likely a flight attendant, was being held captive in the flight deck by the hijackers. Although no evidence was uncovered to indicate why the hijackers' employed this tactic, the Commission believes that most likely they believed that holding a captive would reduce the chances that passengers and/or crew would fight back or storm the cockpit.

The Flight Data Recorder recovered from the Flight 93 crash site, indicates that three minutes after the hijacker-pilot made his announcement about a bomb on board, he dialed a new heading into the flight's control panel instructing the aircraft's auto-pilot to turn the aircraft 180 degrees, back toward the east.27 Later in the flight Jarrah would dial in the directional code for Washington National Airport indicating that the attack was planned for the nation's capital.28 The evidence, including intelligence intercepts and detainee information indicates that the target was either the U.S. Capitol or the White House, but the body of evidence is not sufficient to specify which of the two was the primary objective. (APPROVE WITH DIETER/HURLEY) One minute later, at 9:36 a.m. as the hijackers struggled to control the defiant hostage in the cockpit, and the aircraft reversed its course, the passengers and flight crew began a series of calls from personal cell phones and GTE air phones (installed into the aircraft's seat backs) to report what was happening aboard the plane. These phone calls between family, friends and colleagues, would take place intermittently up until the end of the flight. The calls would provide people on the ground with first hand accounts of what was transpiring on the plane. Moreover, the calls provided passengers with critical information from the ground, including that two aircraft had slammed into the World Trade Center (at 8:46 a.m. and 9:03 a.m. respectively). This information was a key factor in what would soon become the battle for Flight 93. Three minutes after the phone calls began, at 9:39 a.m., the FAA's Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center overheard a radio transmission from hijacker-pilot making the following announcement: » h \/A "ah this is the captain, I would like toat|*e"rriain seated there is a bomb aboard and we are going afl'hack to the airport and to have our demands... so^ptesSeremain quiet." 29 This transmission, together with the terrorists' earlier announcement about the presence of a bomb, indicates that the hijackers, or at a minimum, the hijacker-pilot, hoped to fool the passengers and crew into believing that the hijackers sought to take hostages in exchange for "demands." Doing so would make the passengers believe neither they nor the aircraft were in immediate and certain danger.

The Commission notes that earlier in the day FAA Air Traffic Control received a radio transmission believed to be from the hijacker-pilot of American Airlines Flight 11, Mohamed Atta, attempting to tell the passengers aboard the flight that the aircraft was "returning to the airport." No such radio transmissions were overheard from either of the other two hijacker aircraft (United 175 or American 77). The most likely reason that intercom messages intended for passengers were inadvertently broadcast over radio frequencies to the FAA was that Jarrah (Flight 93) and Atta (Flight 11) did not know how to operate properly the cockpit's radio and intercom systems. Nevertheless the transmissions demonstrate the hijackers desire to mask their murder-suicide intentions. The Commission notes that at least e§ecallerSfrom the flight reported that the hijackers knew that passengers were making calls but did not seem to care.30(€3iiffi^f) The cockpit voice recorder does not provide evidence of whether Jarrah in the cockpit was aware of these calls or why the hijackers allowed them to take place. The Commission believes that it is quite possible Jarrah knew that the attacks on the WTC had succeeded. He would have learned of this by text messages being sent by United Airlines to the cockpits of its transcontinental flights, including Flight 93 warning of cockpit intrusion and telling of the attacks in New York.31 But, even if Jarrah had not read these messages, he would certainly have understood that given Flight 93 's tardy departure from Newark, the attacks on the World Trade Center would have already unfolded. If Jarrah did know that the passengers were making calls, he simply failed to understand that that the passengers were certain to learn of the New York attacks, thereby destroying his ruse that the aircraft was simply "returning to the airport." Nevertheless, between 9:36 a.m., and the grounding of the aircraft at least 10 passengers32 and two crew33 shared vital information with family, friends, colleagues or others on the ground. Details of the information shared during the communications upon which the Commission based its analysis is derived from tape recordings of several of the calls, as well as notes and official accounts rendered by recipients of the communications. • • • • • • • ^j> /$** the plane had been hijacked, reported by at least twelve callers34 the hijackers wielded knives, reported by at least iive callers the presence of three hijackers, reported by fewr callers36 the hijackers had entered the cockpit, reported by at least four callers37 the hijackers have a bomb, reported by at least three callers38 hijackers wearing red bandanas, reported by at least two callers39 passengers were forced to the back of the aircraft, reported by two callers40 A passenger had been stabbed reported by at least two callers41 two individuals lying on the floor of the aircraft injured or dead, possibly the Captain and First Officer, reported by at least one caller 42
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The calls provided information very similar to reports received from the other aircraft hijacked on 9/11 including the hijackers' use of knives, violence, the threat of a bomb, relocation of passengers to the back of the aircraft, cockpit intrusion and announcements that the plane was returning to the airport. There is, of course, no means of ascertaining from what location cell phones were used upon the aircraft. However, the evidence shows that the calls made from GTE airphones installed in each row of seats on both sides of the aisle, came from the last nine rows of the aircraft.
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One of the callers from Flight 93 also reported that he thought the hijackers might possess a gun.43 The Commission believes this report must be measured against the following facts. None of the other reports from callers who noted the hijacker's weaponry reported the presence of a firearm. According to the recipient of a separate call from the aircraft, she specifically asked her caller whether the hijackers had guns. The passenger replied that he did not see one. 44 No firearms were found in evidence at the crash site of the aircraft. 45(FIND OUT LIKELIHOOD OF A FIREARM SURVIVING THE CRASH AND BURN). There is no indication from the cockpit voice recorder of a gun being fired or mentioned, even during the passenger rebellion. ^ Had the hijacker's possessed a firearm it is logical to believe the gun would have either been referenced by hijackers in the cockpit or used at this point. Bombs were also reported aboard United Flight 175 and American Airlines Flight II. 47 The question arises about whether the bombs were real or fake. The FBI reported to the commission that no trace of explosives was found at the crash site of Flight 93 or Flight 77.48 (DISCUSS THE LIKELIHOOD IT WOULD BE FOUND IF IT WERE PRESENT). It should be noted that given the nature of their operation, the hijackers did not need a bomb, but rather only the credible threat of an explosive in order to control the passengers and crew. One of the passengers who called to report the bomb expressed his belief that it was not real. 49 Moreover, the hijackers would have perceived an interest in avoiding the carriage of any "illegal" items the detection of which at the checkpoint would result in their arrest, rather than the item simply being confiscated. For these reasons, the Commission believes that it is most likely, though not conclusive, that the "bombs" reported aboard the flights were simulated. Among the passengers phone calls, the Commission identified at least five contacts during which information was shared about the attacks that had occurred earlier in the morning at the World Trade Center.50 During one of these calls information was received indicating that the passengers and crew took a vote on whether to rush the terrorists in an attempt to retake the plane. The Commission is awed by the power and beauty of this revelation.51 The Nation and history will record that aboard the flight that day, a band of souls from the United States and abroad,52 thrust together in the direst circumstances, defied the terrorists' hatred for America's cherished democratic principles by practicing them in the country's great moment of need.

The record shows that together, the passengers and crew of Flight 93 elected to rise-up against their captors in the face of enormous danger, answering the evil of terrorism with a devotion to one another and to the country they were determined to shield from further harm. Information to indicate that the passengers and crew were preparing to revolt against the hijackers was provided by five different callers from aboard the aircraft.53 Among these accounts were expressions of duty, resolve, determination and team work. Two passengers, who were on the phone with loved ones as the struggle began terminated their calls in order to join their brothers and sisters.54 One of the callers ended her message as follows: "I've got to go, everyone's running up to First Class.^ ccording to the evidence provided by the cockpit voice recording, the passenger's assault on the terrorists, began at 9:57 a.m.. The sounds of the revolt captured by the CVR tells the story of a great struggle against the terrorists beginning toward the back of the cabin and then to the front.56 Some family members who listened to the recording reported that they heard the voice of a loved one among the din of the uprising. The Commission is unable to make such judgments about individual voices. The evidence, however, permits the Commission to report that the struggle was collective, sustained, and powerful. Neither the CVR nor forensic evidence collected at the crash site offers evidence to indicate whether the cockpit door was breached during the uprising. The cockpit recording does provide evidence that the hijackers were at the instruments of the aircraft in the final moments of the flight.57 Nevertheless, the facts clearly demonstrate, beyond question, that the passengers and crew were responsible for stopping the terrorists from hitting their intended target. (TALK TO DIETER: ADD INFORMATION/EVIDENCE ON WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT THE TARGET), (ADD DETAILED CONSEQUENCES HAD THEY HIT EITHER OF THE TARGETS WE SUSPECT). At 9:58:01 a.m. obviously panicked by the determined passenger revolt taking place behind him, the hijacker-pilot began to shout orders and maneuver the aircraft in a desperate attempt to knock the passengers off their feet.58 For the next two minutes he rolled the plane onto one side and then the other, jerking the yoke hard left then hard right forty two times.59 He then began bobbing the nose up and down over 14 times, followed by another series of twists. During the violent turning and lurching of the aircraft, the CVR captured the sounds of dishes and glasses smashing. The aircraft's wild swings tossed anything and anyone not lashed down, yet the evidence shows that the sounds of the struggle never abated. At no time did the passengers yield in their mission. At 10:02 a.m. still descending and traveling at a high rate of speed, the terrorists knew that the passenger rebellion had succeeded. The hijacker-pilot uttered words of defeat

that were captured by the Cockpit Voice Recorder.60 Shortly thereafter, the flight data shows that the yoke was turned hard to the right. The airplane began to roll onto its back before plowing into an empty field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania at 540 miles per hour, only 20 minutes flying time from Washington DC.61 The Commission wants to make clear that before the uprising began at 9:57 a.m. the aircraft was traveling at 8,400 feet heading directly toward Washington DC at an airspeed of 292 knots.62 The flight data shows that the hijacker-pilot was firmly in command of the cockpit and flying the aircraft with purpose and control toward the terrorist's target. Not until after the beginning of the revolt by the passengers and crew did the pilot initiate his desperate tactics to counter their assault. Experts at the National Transportation Safety Board affirmed to the commission that only after 10:02 as a result of these tactics did the aircraft achieve an altitude, airspeed, position and a final manipulation of the yoke that rolled the airplane sending it to ground. 63 TIME AND POSITION AND SEND QFR TO NTSB) The facts show that the passengers, not the hijackers, were responsible for the plane failing to hit its target and instead coming to rest in an empty field. The hijackers of Flight 93 defeated every system of government designed to stop them. They defeated the U.S. immigration system which failed to prevent them from entering the country under false pretenses in order to plan, train for and execute their mission. They defeated the U.S. intelligence system which failed to detect the plot. And, they defeated the aviation security system which failed to stop them from hijacking the aircraft. What the terrorists could not defeat was American people armed with the knowledge of the terrorist's intent and the resolve to stop terror. As the Commission has noted in its hearings and reports, heroism was displayed on each of the flights hijacked on 9/11. The facts show that the passengers and crew of Flight 93 possessed something that those on the other flights hijacked that day did not—clear, timely and widespread information about the true intent of the terrorists. The information about the true nature of the plot was available by virtue of the fact that Flight 93 had taken off up to forty minutes later than the other flights hijacked that day, and that loved ones had the information and the courage to tell passengers and crew the truth. Three months later, on December 22, 2001, passengers and crew aboard a commercial flight from Europe to the United States again took action, stopping terrorist Richard Reid from igniting a shoe-bomb intended to destroy the airplane.64 The facts and circumstances of the 9/11 attacks identify many areas in which the United States government failed in its duty to protect and defend the homeland leading up to that day. These failures point to reforms the Commission believes the nation must make to protect our homeland. Specific reforms are described in later chapters. The story of Flight 93, however, and the Richard Reid incident, emphasize an important truth bearing on America's homeland security and the nation's efforts to guard against future terrorist

attack—the single, most powerful weapon against terrorism is an informed and empowered public. The Commission notes that today in the field where the aircraft and its 40 brave came to rest (DESCRIBE THE FIELD/MEMORIAL), and the (CONDITION/ACTIVITIES TODAY OF THEIR LIKELY TARGET). The facts show and history will record that on September 11, 2001 in an hour of great darkness for America, free people armed with knowledge and courage fought and defeated hate, saving the lives of an untold number of fellow human beings. They will be forever honored by a grateful nation as true heroes.

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Air Traffic Control Records (PENDING DOCUMENT NUMBER) UASSI1-00000859-00000873 3 PENDING IV WITH TOWER PERSONNEL 4 According to phone records, a tape recording of the phone call and FBI and 9/11 Commission interviews with witness accounts, at 8:19 a.m. Flight Attendant Betty Ong aboard American Airlines Flight 11 contacted the American Airlines Southeast Reservations Center in Gary, North Carolina to report a security emergency aboard the aircraft stating "The cockpit is not answering, somebody's stabbed in business class.. .1 don't know, ithink we're getting hijacked." 5 Video footage and seismic data show that American Airlines Flight 11 impacted the North Tower of the World Trade Center at this time. RE: MILES KARA 6 National Transportation Safety Board Read out of the Flight Data Recorder of United Airlines Flight 93 recovered at the crash site in Shanksville, Pennsylvania 7 Evidence derived from NTSB Animation of Flight Data Recorder readout of UAL 93 presented to the Commission 4/22/2004 at NTSB headquarters. 8 Evidence derived from audio read-out of Cockpit Voice Recorder from Flight 93. A transcript of CVR was prepared by the National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 9 (GET GUIDANCE ON HOW TO FOOTNOTE ACARS AND DOCUMENT STAMPS RE: KAPLAN). 10 Evidence derived from copies of ACARS messages produced for the Commission by United Airlines and, provided to the Commission separately by UAL Flight Dispatcher Ed Ballinger. (GET GUIDANCE ON HOW TO FOOTNOTE ACARS AND DOCUMENT STAMPS). 11 Aircraft Communication and Reporting System documents indicate time of message transmission and receipt (CONFIRM THIS RE: ED SOLIDAY ON DELTA OF TIME INDICATORS AND ACTUAL RECEIPT) 12 9/11 Commission Interview with FAA ATC official Ellen King 13 9/11 Commission Interview with UAL Flight Dispatcher Ed Ballinger, CHECK ON IV'S WITH SANDY RODGERS AND SOC GUYS 14 GET TIME OF SANDY RODGERS ORDER FROM ED BALLINGER MATERIAL 15 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Beamer , Bingham, Click, Lyles 16 14 CFR, Chapter 1, Section 121.547 17 IDENTIFY WRITTEN UAL POLICY MANUAL CITATION FOR JUMPSEAT PROCEDUE (RE: ED SOLIDAY) 18 CHECK TO SEE IF UASSI-00000859-00000873 REFLECTS THE GATEREADER BECAUSE THEY ARE TICKET PULLS (RE: ED SOLIDAY) 19 GET NUMBER AND NAME OF FORM AND WHERE IT WOULD BE FILED. (RE ED SOLIDAY) 20 UASSI1-00000859-00000873 YcflW, HiS/CUA^A H ^^-Amjot^ ^btff&Z* "] United Airlines manifest records for Flight 93 show that passengersTTiomas Burnett, Mark Bingham, Joseph DeLuca, Edward Felt, Linda Grondlund, and Mark Rothenberg were the six passengers holding first
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class cabin seats. (Note: all four hijackers also held first class cabin seats). Only passenger Mark Rothenberg is not known to have communicated with the ground from aboard the flight. 22 PENDING READOUT OF PILOT RATINGS AND PERSONNEL FILE (RE: SOLID AY) 23 PENDING INPUT OF FAA CVR REG. (RE: CHARLEY) 24 PENDING INPUT OF FAA CVR REG. (RE: CHARLEY) 25 Evidence derived from data read out of United Flight 93 Cockpit Voice Recorder. 26 Evidence derived from tape recordings of radio transmissions over FAA Air Traffic Control radio frequencies, and by the Flight 93 Cockpit Voice Recorder data. 27 Evidence derived from NTSB read-out of Flight Data Recorder from Flight 93 28 CHECK RE: PEREIRA ON PRECISE TIME. 29 Evidence derived from tape recordings of radio transmissions over FAA Air Traffic Control radio frequencies, and by the Flight 93 Cockpit Voice Recorder data. ^AA^M " *^W 30 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passenger^raMj(ajv(Z65A-NY-280350-30295686) ^ 31 Text messages warning the cockpit of Flight 93 were sent to the aircraft by United Airlines Flight Dispatcher Ed Ballinger at 9:24 a.m., (GET OTHER TIMES; SEE WHETHER THEY WERE PRINTED OR SCREEN MESSAGES AS PER ED SOLID AY). ^ 32 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Beamer(265A-NY-280350-30295630; 265A-NY-280350-302-95682), Binglfeun (265A/NY-280350-302-4069; 265A-NY-28P350-30263761), Brittbh (265A-NY-280350-302-25306), Burriett (265A-NY-280350-302-535), DeCfica (265ArNY280350-NK-444),Fett(265A-NY-280350-302-17823), Glick-(265A-NY-2803/#)-302-11722), Grafefcolas, GronluM (265A-NY-280350-302-4080; 265A-NY-280350-302-1123), WaiMo (265A-NY-280350-302-v 14895) - -. . ~ FBI Interviews with recipients of communications^firom passengers Bradshaw (T265A-NY-280350-30295686), Lyles(265A-NY-280350-302-53207; 265A^NY-280350-302-TP 419) J) 34 FBI Interviews with recipients of communjjz^tiotts from passengers Todd B^Srfwr (265 A-NY-2803 50302-95630; 265A-NY-280350-302-95682V<Bir<g&m (265A^JY-280350-302-4069; 265A-NY-280350302-63761), Bra$fow (265A-NY-280350-302-95686), Bri||y265A-NX-^0350-202-25306), BurMt^ (265A-NY-280350-302-535), Del^^ Felt(lfoA-NY-280350-3024^llg?GUc^265A-NY-280350302-11722), Gramkfelas (265A-NY-280350-302-638); Gron]^dX265A-NY-280350-302-4080; 265A-NY280359-302-1123) , Lj*WT(265A-NY-280350-302-53207; 265A-NY-280350-302-TP 419) WjM)/(265A-NY-280350-302-14895) J 35 FBI Interviews with recipients of communfcations from passengers B^fcfter(265A-NY/*80350-30295630; 265A-NY-280150-302-95682), Big^aw(265A-NY-280350-302-95686), Bui$e&(265A-NY00"'<0-302-535), GM^265A-NY-280350-302-117Z^&* 0 Merviews witn recipients of communications from passengers Bean5ei^265A-NY-280350-302-^' 95630; 255A^NY-280350-302-95682); Bir(gflJ»m (265A-NY-280350-302-4069; 265A-NY-280350-30263761); &fe$Lylespte5A-NY-280350-302-53207; 265A-NY-280350-302.TP419) 37 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Be^sjler<265A-NY-280350-30295630; 265A-NY-280350-302-95682), Bntffeaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686), Burn^<265A-NY280350-302-535), Lyles (265A-NY-280350-302-53207; 265A-NY-280350J02-TP419) 38 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Betf»Qj(265A-NY-280350-30295630; 265A=^]Y-280350-302-95682), Bm3J»t<265A-NY-280350-302-535), G1$L(265A-NY-280350302-11722)-'°^^ ^JM^pJ^ . 39 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Bra^Mw (265A-NY-280350-30295686); GligiK^265A-NY-280350-302-11722) A 40 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Bradaiaw (265A-NY-280350-30295686), G10M265A-NY-280350-302-11722) 41FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Bur^tt (265A-NY-280350-302-535), Brit)^H265A-NY-280350-302-25306) ™ 42 FBI Interviews with recipient of communications from passenger Beamer (265A-NY-280350-30295630; 265A-NY-280350-302-95682) 43 FBI Interviews with recipient of communications from passengers Call of
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''9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Call of Jeremy Glick to his wife Lyzbeth-(265A-NY-280350-302-11722); Commission Memo to File on can with Lyzbeth Glick. 45 FIND OUT HOW TO REFERENCE QFR; GET THE ID NUMBER OF THE EVIDENCE LIST AS
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PER! PER!

HALSO GET RUNDOWN OF ttow LIKELY IT 1$ FIREARM WOULD SURVIVE AS I \6 Federal Air Marshals consulted by the Commission indicate that t

aircraft would be unmistakable and would most likely be reported by passengers contacting the ground and captured on the CVR. CONFIRM AS PER TSA QUINN AND/OR JFAA PERIERA 47 Evidence derived from FBI and 9/11 Commission interviews with recipients of call from Right Attendant Amy Sweeney aboard American Airlines Flight 11 who contacted the American Airlines Flight Services Office in Boston to report, among other things, the presence; of a bomb in the cockpit; Evidence derived from FBI interview of recipient of call from passenger Lee Hanson aboard United Airlines Flight 175 who reported tot hijackers claimed to have a bomb on board (265A-NY-280350-302-9269). 48 FEND OUT HOW TO REFERENCE QFR; GET THE ID NUMBER OF THE EVIDENCE LIST AS PERdZU ALSO GET RUNDOWN OF HOW LIKELY IT IS EXPLOSIVES WOULD HAVE BEEN
HAD THEY BERN PRESENT AS PERF
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with recipient of communications from passengers Glick (265A-NY-280350-302-11722\>

of communications from passengers Braptow (265A-NY-280350-30295686), BiQ*M26SA4*t280^0-302-25306),Bu4*K (265A-NY-280350-302-535), Glick (265A-NY280350-302HH22^Gronlimdj^5A-NY-280350-302-4080;265A-NY-280350-302-1123) 51 FBI Interviews JiQthre£ip»clttof communications from passengers Glick (265A-NY-280350-302-11722) 52 Christian Adam was a German citizen, T.M Kuge was a Japanese citizen; CHECK ON BEAVEN AND MARTINEZ FROM FBI RECORDS ON PASSPORTS. 53FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Beamer (265A-NY-280350-30295630; 265A-NY-280350-302-95682); Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686), Burnett (265A-NY280350-302-535); Click (265A-NY-280350-302-11722), Wainio , CHECK ON BINGHAM AND OTHERS $+S 54 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Wainio and Br44$?w (265A-NY280350-302-95686) (CONFIRM) A N 55 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Srfldshaw (265 A-NY-280350-30295686): (CALL PHILIP TO CONFIRM) vV
56

The cockpit voice recorder clearly captures the words of a hijacker including words in Arabic from the microphone lodged in the pilot headset up to the end of the flight The hijackers statements, the clarity of the recording, the position of the microphone in the pilot headset and the corresponding manipulation of flight controls provide the evidence. 58 Evidence derived from readout produced by the National Transportation Safety Board of the Flight Data Recorder recovered from Flight 93. 59 Evidence derived from readout and animation produced by the National Transportation Safety Board of the Flight Data Recorder recovered from Flight 93. 60 CONSULT FRONT OFFICE ON HOW TO HANDLE THIS. 61 Calculated according to distance from crash site to Washington DC given the aircraft's airspeed. (AS PER CHARLEY) 62 Evidence derived from readout produced by the National Transportation Safety Board of the Flight Data Recorder recovered from Flight 93. 63 Evidence derived from readout produced by the National Transportation Safety Board of the Flight Data Recorder recovered from Flight 93. 64 FIND NEXIS STORY TO CITE
57

ASSIFICATION REVIEW Last Edited: 5/6/04 Additional Loose Ends: 79/11 Personal Privacy

1. Interview Anthony Mazza who said the person he gave the fuel manifest to was not Leroy Homer 2. Input the SAMC information fromj |Belme etc. . 3. Input the Melody Homer ACARS 4. Find of the time of the Lyles call; whether Lome ever talked to CeeCee and what about this story of "They force their way into the cockpit." We need to hear the tape. 5. Ask John Shaw if any of the Felt call wasn't recorded 6. Call Deena to see whether Tom said that the hijackers were talking about "flying it into the ground." 7. Talk to Philip Bradshaw to get the Sandy Bradshaw quote correct about "I've got to go now. 8. Interview Lisa Jefferson about "let's roll" and "two people lying on the ground." 9. Get Lisa Jefferson's 302's 10. Get no show/cancellation information for the flight. 11. Check to see where FBI got the information attributed to Beamer as per Jefferson that the pilot and first officer were on the ground possibly dead (pg. 64 Penttbom). 12. Check on SELCALLs 13. Passengers indicating plan of attack: Beamer, Bradshaw, Burnett, Glick, Wainio. 14. Listen to Gronlund tape and then make sure that Ms. Gronlund should be listed in footnote SO on calls indicating passengers were going to revolt. 15. Confirm that Belme claimed a flight attendant had been killed (CONFIRM WITH TAPE OF IV AND HIS NOTES) Battle for Flight 93 At 8:41 a.m. (EDT) on September 1 1, 2001 United Airlines Flight 93 sped down runway Four Left at Newark (New Jersey) Liberty International Airport and rose into a cloudless late summer sky bound for San Francisco.1 Scheduled to depart the gate at 8:00 a.m.,2 the Boeing 757's take-off for the west coast was delayed because of the airport's typically heavy morning traffic —a 41 minute wait that would prove crucial as the day's events unfolded.3 As the plane left Newark, the flight's two pilots and five flight attendants were unaware that twenty two minutes earlier, at 8:19 a.m., a crewmember aboard another non-stop transcontinental flight, American Airlines Flight 11, had reported a security emergency aboard the Boeing 767 on its way from Boston to Los Angeles.4 Neither did they know that as Flight 93 paralleled Manhattan for a short time and then banked west toward its scheduled destination, FAA Air Traffic Control was tracking Flight 1 1, a declared hijacking, on its path back to the New York area. Five minutes later, at 8:46 a.m., Flight 1 1 would slam into the North Tower of the World Trade Center.5

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The Newark Air Traffic Control personnel were unaware of Flight 11's return into New York airspace. FAA protocol requires that controllers be notified prior to rogue aircraft violating the airspace they control. (ROLL-UP ON WHETHER IT WAS APPROPRIATE TO LET UA 93 TAKE OFF UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES). (SEE IF THE OTHER TAKEOVERS OCCURRED WITHIN RANGE OF THE VOR FOR THEIR DESTINATION). HAD 93 BEEN TAKEN OVER EARLIER WOULD THEY HAVE LOCKED ON TO THE DC VOR AND NOT GOTTEN LOST). (ADD GRAPH ON LOW PASSENGER LOAD BUT NO INDICATION OF FLIGHT PURCHASES—GET EXPERT VIEW THAT TUESDAY IS THE LOWEST OF THE WEEK) By all evidence and accounts, the first 47 minutes of Flight 93's cross-country trip proceeded routinely. Radio communications from the plane were normal. Heading, speed and altitude ran according to plan.6 At 9:28:05 a.m. the situation changed. While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio, Flight 93 suddenly and precipitously began to lose altitude, dropping nearly 685 feet over the next half-minute.7 Eleven seconds into the descent the FAA's air traffic control center in Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions from the aircraft. During the first broadcast the pilot or first officer could be heard declaring "mayday" amid the sounds of a physical struggle taking place in the cockpit. The second radio transmission, thirty five seconds later, indicated that the clash was still in progress as the pilot or first officer shouted: "Hey get out of here.. .get out of here.. .get out of here." 8 The abrupt and extraordinary loss of altitude at 9:28 a.m. and the two radio broadcasts to Air Traffic Control that occurred within the same minute mark the point at which four hijackers among the flight's 33 other passengers began their takeover of the jet's cockpit. Communication records show that only four minutes earlier, at 9:24 a.m. United Airlines Flight Dispatcher Ed Ballinger had sent a text message to the cockpit of Flight 93 stating: "Beware cockpit intrusion; two a/c (aircraft) just hit WTC (World Trade Center)."9 The dispatcher's alert was sent to Flight 93 as well as United Airline's 15 other transcontinental flights that morning after a second commercial jet, United Flight 175, had hit the World Trade Center.10 The pilot of Flight 93 confirmed receipt of the message with a personalized acknowledgement two minutes later at 9:26 a.m.11 One minute later the last routine voice communication from the cockpit of Flight 93 was received by Air Traffic Control. We have uncovered no evidence to indicate that the FAA made any effort to warn pilots of commercial aircraft in the sky on the morning of 9/11 to secure their cockpits, even after the second aircraft had struck the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m. Several FAA authorities interviewed by the Commission stated that it was the air carriers' responsibility to notify their planes of security problems. One highly placed FAA Air

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SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW Traffic Control said that it was simply not the FAA's place to order the airlines what to tell their pilots.12 (LISTEN TO IV) (WHAT DID POLICY REQUIRE) The United Airlines flight dispatcher who sent the warning to Flight 93 did so by his own initiative.13 A company-wide order for dispatchers to warn cockpits was not issued until (GIVE TIME).14 We could find no evidence that American Airlines sent any cockpit warnings to their aircraft on 9/11 whatsoever. While the evidence points to the exact time that the hijackers invaded the cockpit, we have found no conclusive evidence to indicate precisely when the terrorists took over the main cabin or moved passengers seated in the first class cabin back to coach—a tactic reported by several passengers during phone calls to parties on the ground. The Commission believes, however, that it is most likely the four hijackers breached the cockpit simultaneous to taking over the front of the plane and pushing passengers back into the coach cabin. Taking over the cabin first would likely have alerted the flight deck to a problem. However, waiting to control and/or move passengers until the cockpit was secured would have increased the risk of passenger intervention, particularly if the passengers witnessed the hijackers displacing the crew from the controls. On the morning of 9/11, 37 of Flight 93's passenger seats were occupied representing an occupancy rate of slightly over 20 percent that was well below the norm for Tuesday mornings during the summer of 2001. No evidence exists, however, to indicate that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels to facilitate their operation. Financial records indicate that the hijackers did not purchase additional seats in order to reduce the passenger load. The number of cancellations and no-show passengers recorded for the flight were at normal levels. (PENDING UAL DATA) The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11, operated in five-man teams. They initiated their cockpit takeover operations within thirty minutes of takeoff, most likely after the seatbelt sign had been turned off and the flight attendants were beginning cabin service. On Flight 93, however, the hijackers numbered four, and waited until approximately 47 minutes after takeoff to begin their takeover. The evidence supports no conclusion as to why the hijackers' takeover of Flight 93 occurred so late into the trip compared to the others flights. (SEE DIETER/HURLEY: ADD WHATEVER INFORMATION WE HAVE ABOUT THEIR DESIRE FOR SIMULTANEITY). One of the key mysteries associated with Flight 93 is that at least five passengers described the presence of three hijackers on the plane, rather than the four who were actually aboard.15 Some have wondered whether such reporting might suggest that one of the hijackers was positioned in the cockpit from the outset of the flight and remained unseen by the passengers. FAA rules allowed commercial air carriers to permit properly credentialed and approved individuals, usually air carrier personnel such as pilots or operational personnel to ride in the cockpit jump seat (a seat located directly behind the pilot and first officer).16 United Airlines' policy in accordance with FAA regulations (GET COPY OF THE JUMPSEAT POLICYand FAA RULES) required that particular

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SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW paperwork be submitted (GET DETAILS ON ID/PURPOSES ETC) in order to permit and document jump seat approval. 17 We cannot know with certainty whether a hijacker had gained access to the cockpit prior to the violent takeover of the aircraft. We believe it is unlikely a hijacker occupied the jump seat prior to the takeover. All four of Flight 93's hijackers were issued tickets for seats in the first class cabin and used their tickets to enter the aircraft at boarding time according to the air carriers' Gate Reader information (CONFIRM).18 None of the required paperwork required by United Airlines to authorize a jump seat occupant for Flight 93 was filed.19 (SEE IF THEY EVER LET PEOPLE UP THERE AFTER THE FLIGHT HAD STARTED). One of the passengers who contacted a party on the ground to provide a situation report about the hijacking reported that 10 first class passengers were aboard the flight. This figure accounts for the four terrorists and the six non-hijackers who boarded the aircraft holding tickets for first class seats.20 Five of the six occupants of first class seats, excluding hijackers, contacted the ground by phone to share information about the hijacking.21 These individuals would have been positioned best to observe whether a passenger among them had gotten up during the flight and entered the cockpit prior to the violent takeover of the aircraft. None of the callers reported the occurrence of such an event. Moreover, the pilot and co-pilot of Flight 93 were experienced, well-regarded professionals, who would be quite unlikely to allow an observer into the cockpit pre or post take-off who had not obtained the proper permission for such privileges prior to the flight.22 (CHECK THEIR PERSONNEL FILES FOR DISCIPLINARY PROBLEMS). Finally, the hijacker-pilot was the critical link in the terrorist operation. It is reasonable to expect that the hijackers would take all precautions necessary to protect the terrorist who would be required to pilot the plane. Not wishing to risk his death or injury during the takeover of the aircraft, it made operational sense for the hijacker-pilot to remain seated and inconspicuous until he was needed, most likely after seizure of the cockpit. (SEE WHAT EVIDENCE WE HAVE THAT THE PASSENGERS WERE HERDED PRE COCKPIT TAKEOVER ON OTHER FLIGHTS). (CHECK TO SEE THE ACCURACY OF HIJACKER NUMBERS REPORTED IN THE OTHER CASES). Approximately four minutes after the cockpit takeover, Flight 93's voice recorder began to preserve sounds from the cockpit via microphones imbedded in the headsets of both the pilot and first officer, and in the roof of the flight deck.23 Flight 93's cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was the only one recovere4/#om the crash sites of the four aircraft hijacked on 9/11. In accordance with FAA requirements, the CVR recorded in 30-minute loops.24 (CONFIRM AND SITE FAA RULE). When a thirty

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SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW minute segment ended, the system would begin the loop again recording over the oldest portion of the previous recorded segment. Accordingly, only the final 30 minutes prior to the grounding of the aircraft is recorded on the CVR. The Commission notes that Flight 93 crashed at 10:03 a.m., the same time the cockpit voice recording terminated. The CVR contained the recording of cockpit sounds beginning at 9:31:57 a.m. indicating that the system captured approximately the last 31 minutes of Flight 93. 25 The Cockpit Voice Recorder and tape recordings of radio transmissions received by FAA Air Traffic Control reveals that at 9:32 a.m., most likely the hijacker-pilot, Ziad Jarrah— the only one of the four known to have received pilot training—made, or attempted to make, the following announcement to the passengers of Flight 93: "Ladies and Gentlemen: Here the captain, please sit down keep remaining seating. We have a bomb on board. So, sit." 26 This segment of the cockpit recording also indicates that a female, most likely a flight attendant, was being held captive in the cockpit by the hijackers. Although no evidence was uncovered to indicate why the hijackers' employed this tactic, we believe that most likely they believed that holding a captive would reduce the chances that passengers and/or crew would fight back or storm the cockpit. The Flight Data Recorder recovered from the Flight 93 crash site indicates that three minutes after the hijacker-pilot made his announcement about a bomb on board, while traveling westward south of Cleveland he dialed a new heading into the flight's control panel instructing the aircraft's auto-pilot to turn the aircraft 180 degrees, back toward the east.27 Later in the flight Jarrah would dial in the directional code for Washington National Airport indicating that the attack was planned for the nation's capital.2 The evidence, including intelligence intercepts and detainee information, indicates that the target was either the U.S. Capitol or the White House, but the body of evidence is not sufficient to specify which of the two was the primary objective. (APPROVE WITH DIETER/HURLEY) One minute later, at 9:36 a.m. as the hijackers struggled to control the defiant hostage in the cockpit, and the aircraft reversed its course, the passengers and flight crew began a series of calls from personal cell phones and GTE air phones (installed into the aircraft's seat backs) to report what was happening aboard the plane. These phone calls between family, friends and colleagues, would take place intermittently up until the end of the flight. The calls would provide people on the ground with first hand accounts of what was transpiring on the plane. Moreover, the calls provided passengers with critical information from the ground, including that two aircraft had slammed into the World Trade Center (at 8:46 a.m. and 9:03 a.m. respectively). This information was a key factor in what would soon become the battle for Flight 93.

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Three minutes after the phone calls began, at 9:39 a.m., the FAA's Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center overheard a radio transmission from hijacker-pilot making the following announcement: "ah this is the captain, I would like to all remain seated there is a bomb aboard and we are going go back to the airport and to have our demands.. .so please remain quiet."29 This transmission, together with the terrorists' earlier announcement about the presence of a bomb, indicates that the hijackers, or at a minimum, the hijacker-pilot, hoped to fool the passengers and crew into believing that the hijackers sought to take hostages in exchange for "demands." Doing so would make the passengers believe neither they nor the aircraft were in immediate and certain danger. Earlier in the day, FAA Air Traffic Control received a radio transmission believed to be from the hijacker-pilot of American Airlines Flight 11, Mohamed Atta, attempting to tell the passengers aboard the flight that the aircraft was "returning to the airport." No such radio transmissions were overheard from either of the other two hijacker aircraft (United 175 or American 77). The most likely reason that intercom messages intended for passengers were inadvertently broadcast over radio frequencies to the FAA was that Jarrah (Flight 93) and Atta (Flight 11) did not know how to operate properly the cockpit's radio and intercom systems. Nevertheless the transmissions demonstrate the hijackers desire to mask their intentions. At least three callers from the flight reported that the hijackers knew that passengers were making calls but did not seem to care. ° The cockpit voice recorder does not provide evidence of whether Jarrah in the cockpit was aware of these calls or why the hijackers allowed them to take place. It is quite possible Jarrah knew that the attacks on the WTC had succeeded. He could have learned of this by text messages being sent by United Airlines to the cockpits of its transcontinental flights, including Flight 93 warning of cockpit intrusion and telling of the attacks in New York.31 But, even if Jarrah had not read these messages, he would certainly have understood that given Flight 93's tardy departure from Newark, the attacks on the World Trade Center would already have unfolded. If Jarrah did know that the passengers were making calls, he simply failed to understand that that the passengers were certain to learn of the New York attacks, thereby destroying his ruse that the aircraft was simply "returning to the airport." Nevertheless, between 9:36 a.m., and the crash of the aircraft at least 10 passengers32 and two crew shared vital information with family, friends, colleagues or others on the ground. Details of the information shared during the communications upon which the

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SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW Commission based its analysis is derived from tape recordings of several of the calls, as well as notes and official accounts rendered by recipients of the communications. • • • • • • • • the plane had been hijacked, reported by at least twelve callers34 the hijackers wielded knives, reported by at least five callers35 the presence of three hijackers, reported by five callers36 the hijackers had entered the cockpit, reported by at least four callers37 •50 the hijackers have a bomb, reported by at least three callers hijackers wearing red bandanas, reported by at least two callers39 passengers were forced to the back of the aircraft, reported by two callers40 A passenger had been stabbed reported by at least two callers41 two individuals lying on the floor of the aircraft injured or dead, possibly the Captain and First Officer, reported by at least one caller 42 A flight attendant had been killed reported by at least one caller.43

The calls provided information very similar to reports received from the other aircraft hijacked on 9/11 including the hijackers' use of knives, violence, the threat of a bomb, relocation of passengers to the back of the aircraft, cockpit intrusion and announcements that the plane was returning to the airport. There is, of course, no means of ascertaining from what location cell phones were used upon the aircraft. However, the evidence shows that the calls made from GTE airphones installed in each row of seats on both sides of the aisle, came from the last nine rows of the aircraft. One of the callers from Flight 93 also reported that he thought the hijackers might possess a gun.44 The Commission believes this report must be measured against the following facts. None of the other reports from callers who noted the hijacker's weaponry reported the presence of a firearm. According to the recipient of a separate call from the aircraft, she specifically asked her caller whether the hijackers had guns. The passenger replied that he did not see one. 45 No firearms were found in evidence at the crash site of the aircraft. 46(FIND OUT LIKELIHOOD OF A FIREARM SURVIVING THE CRASH AND BURN). There is no indication from the cockpit voice recorder of a gun being fired or mentioned, even during the passenger rebellion.4 Had the hijacker's possessed a firearm it is logical to believe the gun would have either been referenced by hijackers in the cockpit or used at this point. Bombs were also reported aboard United Flight 175 and American Airlines Flight 11. The question arises about whether the bombs were real or fake. The FBI reported to the commission that no trace of explosives was found at the crash site of Flight 93 or Flight 77.49 (DISCUSS THE LIKELIHOOD IT WOULD BE FOUND IF IT WERE PRESENT). It should be noted that given the nature of their operation, the hijackers did not need a bomb, but rather only the credible threat of an explosive in order to control the passengers and crew. One of the passengers who called to report the bomb expressed his belief that it was not real.50 Moreover, the hijackers would have perceived an interest in avoiding the carriage of any "illegal" items the detection of which at the checkpoint would result in their arrest, rather than the item simply being confiscated. For these reasons, we believe that it is most likely, though not conclusive, SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW

SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW that the "bombs" reported aboard the flights were simulated. Among the passengers phone calls, there are at least five contacts during which information was shared about the attacks that had occurred earlier in the morning at the World Trade Center.51 During one of these calls information was received indicating that the passengers and crew took a vote on whether to rush the terrorists in an attempt to retake the planes.52 History will record that aboard the flight that day, passengers and crew thrust together in the most dire of circumstances, practiced America's cherished democratic principles in the country's greatest moment of need. The record shows that together, the passengers and crew of Flight 93 elected to rise-up against their captors in the face of enormous danger. Information to indicate that the passengers and crew were preparing to revolt against the hijackers was provided by five different callers from aboard the aircraft.53 Among these accounts were expressions of duty, resolve, determination and team work. Two passengers, who were on the phone with loved ones as the struggle began terminated their calls in order to join.54 One of the callers ended her message as follows: "I've got to go, everyone's running up to First Class."55 According to the evidence provided by the cockpit voice recording, the passenger's assault on the terrorists, began at 9:57 a.m. The sounds of the revolt captured by the CVR tells the story of a great struggle against the terrorists beginning toward the back of the cabin and then to the front.5 Some family members who listened to the recording reported that they heard the voice of a loved one among the din of the uprising. The Commission is unable to make judgments about individual voices. The evidence, however, permits the Commission to report that the struggle was collective, sustained, and powerful. Neither the CVR nor forensic evidence collected at the crash site offers evidence to indicate whether the cockpit door was breached during the uprising. The cockpit recording does provide evidence that the hijackers were at the instruments of the aircraft in the final moments of the flight.57 Nevertheless, the facts clearly demonstrate that the passengers and crew were responsible for stopping the terrorists from hitting their intended target. (TALK TO DIETER: ADD INFORMATION/EVIDENCE ON WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT THE TARGET), (ADD DETAILED CONSEQUENCES HAD THEY HIT EITHER OF THE TARGETS WE SUSPECT). At 9:58:01 a.m. the hijacker-pilot panicked in response to the determined passenger revolt taking place behind him. He began to shout orders and maneuver the aircraft in a desperate attempt to knock the passengers off their feet.58 For the next two minutes he rolled the plane onto one side and then the other, jerking the yoke hard left then hard right

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SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW forty two times.59 He then began bobbing the nose up and down over 14 times, followed by another series of twists. During the violent turning and lurching of the aircraft, the CVR captured the sounds of dishes and glasses smashing. The aircraft's wild swings tossed anything and anyone not lashed down, yet the evidence shows that the sounds of the struggle never abated. At 10:02 a.m., with the aircraft still descending and traveling at a high rate of speed, the terrorists knew that the passenger rebellion had succeeded. The hijacker-pilot uttered words of defeat that were captured by the Cockpit Voice Recorder.60 Shortly thereafter, the flight data shows that the yoke was turned hard to the right. The airplane began to roll onto its back before plowing into an empty field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania at 540 miles per hour, only 20 minutes flying time from Washington DC.61 Before the uprising began at 9:57 a.m. the aircraft was traveling at 8,400 feet heading directly toward Washington DC at an airspeed of 292 knots.62 The flight data shows that the hijacker-pilot was firmly in command of the cockpit and flying the aircraft with purpose and control toward the terrorists' target. Not until after the beginning of the revolt by the passengers and crew did the pilot initiate his desperate tactics to counter their assault. Experts at the National Transportation Safety Board affirmed to the Commission that only after 10:02 a.m. as a result of these tactics did the aircraft achieve an altitude, airspeed, position and a final manipulation of the yoke that rolled the airplane sending it to ground.*" TIME AND POSITION AND SEND QFR TO NTSB) The passengers, not the hijackers, were responsible for the plane failing to hit its target and instead crashing in an empty field.

The hijackers of Flight 93 defeated every system of government designed to stop them. They defeated the U.S. immigration system which failed to prevent them from entering the country in order to plan, train for and execute their mission. They defeated the U.S. intelligence system which failed to detect the plot. They defeated the aviation security system which failed to stop them from hijacking the aircraft. What the terrorists could not defeat was American people armed with the knowledge of the terrorists' intent and the resolve to stop them. As the Commission has noted in its hearings and reports, heroism was displayed on each of the flights hijacked on 9/11. The facts show that the passengers and crew of Flight 93 possessed something that those on the other flights hijacked that day did not—clear, timely and widespread information about the true intent of the terrorists. The information about the true nature of the plot was available by virtue of the fact that Flight 93 had taken off up to forty minutes later than the other flights hijacked that day, and that loved ones had the information and the courage to tell passengers and crew the truth.

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SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW Today in the field where the aircraft and its 40 brave souls came to rest (DESCRIBE THE FIELD/MEMORIAL), and the (CONDITION/ACTIVITIES TODAY OF THEIR LIKELY TARGET). The facts show and history will record that on September 11, 2001 in an hour of great darkness for America, free people armed with knowledge and courage fought and saved the lives of an untold number of fellow citizens and saved the seats of their government from destruction. They will be forever honored by a grateful nation as true heroes.
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Air Traffic Control Records (PENDING DOCUMENT NUMBER) UASSI1-00000859-00000873 3 Commission interview with Newark Tower personnel including supervisor Bob Varcadipane 4 According to phone records, a tape recording of the phone call and FBI and 9/11 Commission interviews with witness accounts, at 8:19 a.m. Flight Attendant Betty Ong aboard American Airlines Flight 11 contacted the American Airlines Southeast Reservations Center in Cary, North Carolina to report a security emergency aboard the aircraft stating "The cockpit is not answering, somebody's stabbed in business class...I don't know, ithink we're getting hijacked." 5 Video footage and seismic data show that American Airlines Flight 11 impacted the North Tower of the World Trade Center at this time. RE: MILES KARA 6 National Transportation Safety Board Read out of the Flight Data Recorder of United Airlines Flight 93 recovered at the crash site in Shanksville, Pennsylvania 7 Evidence derived from NTSB Animation of Flight Data Recorder readout of UAL 93 presented to the Commission 4/22/2004 at NTSB headquarters. 8 Evidence derived from audio read-out of Cockpit Voice Recorder from Flight 93. A transcript of CVR was prepared by the National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 9 (GET GUIDANCE ON HOW TO FOOTNOTE ACARS AND DOCUMENT STAMPS RE: KAPLAN). 10 Evidence derived from copies of ACARS messages produced for the Commission by United Airlines and, provided to the Commission separately by UAL Flight Dispatcher Ed Ballinger. (GET GUIDANCE ON HOW TO FOOTNOTE ACARS AND DOCUMENT STAMPS). 11 Aircraft Communication and Reporting System documents indicate time of message transmission and receipt (CONFIRM THIS RE: ED SOLIDAY ON DELTA OF TIME INDICATORS AND ACTUAL RECEIPT) 12 Commission Interview with FAA ATC official Ellen King 13 Commission Interview with United Airlines Flight Dispatcher Ed Ballinger, at CHECK ON IV'S WITH SANDY RODGERS AND SOC GUYS 14 GET TIME OF SANDY RODGERS ORDER FROM ED BALLINGER MATERIAL 15 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Beamer , Bingham, Glick, Lyles 16 14 CFR, Chapter 1, Section 121.547 17 IDENTIFY WRITTEN UAL POLICY MANUAL CITATION FOR JUMPSEAT PROCEDUE (RE: ED SOLIDAY) 18 CHECK TO SEE IF UASSI-00000859-00000873 REFLECTS THE GATEREADER BECAUSE THEY ARE TICKET PULLS (RE: ED SOLIDAY) 19 GET NUMBER AND NAME OF FORM AND WHERE IT WOULD BE FILED. (RE ED SOLIDAY) 20 UASSI1-00000859-00000873; FBI Interview with Lisa Jefferson (265A-NY-280350-302-95682) 21 United Airlines manifest records for Flight 93 show that passengers Thomas Burnett, Mark Bingham, Joseph DeLuca, Edward Felt, Linda Grondlund, and Mark Rothenberg were the six passengers holding first class cabin seats. (Note: all four hijackers also held first class cabin seats). Only passenger Mark Rothenberg is not known to have communicated with the ground from aboard the flight.
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22

Commission Document RUAL#030044450 PENDING READOUT OF PILOT RATINGS AND PERSONNEL FILE BY NTSBAY) 23 PENDING INPUT OF FAA CVR REG. (RE: CHARLEY) 24 PENDING INPUT OF FAA CVR REG. (RE: CHARLEY) 25 Evidence derived from data read out of United Flight 93 Cockpit Voice Recorder. 26 Evidence derived from tape recordings of radio transmissions over FAA Air Traffic Control radio frequencies, and by the Flight 93 Cockpit Voice Recorder data. 27 Evidence derived from NTSB read-out of Flight Data Recorder from Flight 93 28 CHECK RE: PEREIRA ON PRECISE TIME. 29 Evidence derived from tape recordings of radio transmissions over FAA Air Traffic Control radio frequencies, and by the Flight 93 Cockpit Voice Recorder data. 30 Commission Document RFBI #04019063-Interviews with recipients of communications from passenger Beamer(265A-NY-280350-302-95682 & 265A-NY-280350-302-95630); Commission Document RFBI#04019066»Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686) 31 Text messages warning the cockpit of Flight 93 were sent to the aircraft by United Airlines Flight Dispatcher Ed Ballinger at 9:24 a.m., (GET OTHER TIMES; SEE WHETHER THEY WERE PRINTED OR SCREEN MESSAGES AS PER ED SOLIDAY). 32 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Commission Document RFBI #04019063--Beamer(265A-NY-280350-302-95630;265A-NY-280350-302-95682), Commission Document RFBI#04019065 Bingham (265A-NY-280350-302-4069; 265A-NY-280350-302-63761), Commission Document RFBI#04019067-Britton (265A-NY-280350-302-25306), Commission Document RFBI#04019062 Burnett (265A-NY-280350-302-535), Commission Document RFBI#04019070» DeLuca (265A-NY-280350-NK-444), Commission Document RFBI#04019072»Felt (265A-NY-280350-30217823), Commission Document RFBI#04019073-Glick (265A-NY-280350-302-11722); Commission Document RFBI#04019077—Grandcolas; Commission Document RFBI#04019079-Gronlund (265A-NY280350-302-4080; 265A-NY-280350-302-1123); Commission Document RFBI#04019087- Wainio (265A-NY-280350-302-14895) 33 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers: Commission Document RFBI#04019066 -Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686), Lyles(265A-NY-280350-302-53207; 265ANY-280350-302-TP419) 34 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Commission Document RFBI #04019063-Todd Beamer (265A-NY-280350-302-95630; 265A-NY-280350-302-95682), Bingham (265A-NY-280350-302-4069; 265A-NY-280350-302-63761), Commission Document RFBI#04019066- -Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686), Commission Document RFBI#04019067-Britton (265A-NY280350-302-25306), Commission Document RFBI#04019062~Burnett (265A-NY-280350-302-535), Commission Document RFBI#04019070-DeLuca (265A-NY-280350-NK-444) Commission Document RFBI#04019072 Felt (265A-NY-280350-302-17823), Click -(265A-NY-280350-302-11722), Grandcolas (265A-NY-280350-302-638); Commission Document RFBI#04019079-Gronlund (265A-NY-280350302-4080; 265A-NY-280350-302-1123), Commission Document RFBI#04019082~Lyles (265A-NY280350-302-53207; 265A-NY-280350-302-TP 419) Wainio (265A-NY-280350-302-14895) 35 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Commission Document RFBI #04019063 Beamer(265A-NY-280350-302-95630; 265A-NY-280350-302-95682); Commission Document RFBI#04019066 Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686), Commission Document RFBI#04019062Burnett (265A-NY-280350-302-535), Commission Document RFBI#04019073-Glick-(265A-NY-280350302-11722) 36 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Commission Document RFBI #04019063~Beamer(265A-NY-280350-302-95630;265A-NY-280350-302-95682); Commission Document RFBI#04019065- Bingham (265A-NY-280350-302-4069; 265A-NY-280350-302-63761); Commission Document RFBI#04019066- Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686); Commission Document RFBI#04019073-Click (265A-NY-280350-302-11722); Commission Document RFBI#04019082- Lyles (265A-NY-280350-302-53207; 265A-NY-280350-302-TP 419) 37 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Commission Document RFBI #04019063 Beamer (265A-NY-280350-302-95630; 265A-NY-280350-302-95682), Commission Document RFBI#04019066-Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686), Commission Document

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/;9/ll Law Enforcement |Privacy
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RFBI#04019062-- Burnett (265A-NY-280350-302-535), Commission Document RFBI#04019082Lyles (265A-NY-280350-302-53207; 265A-NY-280350-302-TP 41?) j 38 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Commission Document RFBI m019063~Beamer(265A-NY-280350-302-95630;265A-NY/280350-30245682), Commission Document RFBI#04019065~Bingham (265 A-NY-2803 5Q-3Q2-4069; 265A-NY-280350-302-63761); Commission Document RFBI#04019062-Burnett (265A-NY-280350-302-535), Commission Document RFBI#04019073 Glick-(265A-NY-280350-302-l 1722); Commission Document RFBI#04019079Gronlund-(265A-NY-280350-302-4080); i 39 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Commission Document RFBI#04019066~ Bradshaw (265A-NY-28035Q>30?i95686); Commission Document RFBI#04019073 Glick (265 A-NY-280350-302-11722) / / \0 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications fro RFBI#04019066~Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350T-I02-95686), Commission pocument RFBI#04019073 Glick (265A-NY-280350-302-11722) / / I 4'FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Commission Document RFBI#04019062-Burnett (265A-NYr28035/0-302-535); Commission Document RFBI#04019067-Britton (265A-NY-280350-302-25306) / i 42 Summary of Penttbom Investigation, Department of Justice, FBI, January 31, 2003, pg. 64. »43 Commission Interview with Richard Belme. (CONFIRM WITH TAPE OF IV AND HIS NOTES) 44 Jere Longman, Among the fferoes-flfnited Flight 93 & the Passengers \& Crew Who Fought Back, (New York Harper-Collins Publishers, 2002), pg 107; Commission interview wjith Deena Burnett 45 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Calj of Jeremy Glick to his wife Lyzbeth-(265A-NY-280350-302rt 1722); Commission Memo to File on Call with Lyzbeth Glick. 46 FIND OUT HOW TO REFERENCE QFR; GET THE ID NUMBER O|F THE EVIDENCE LIST AS Federal Air Marshals consulted by the Commission indicate that the s0und of a gunshot aboard an aircraft would be unmistakable and would most likely be reported by passengers contacting the ground and captured on the CVR. CONFIRM AS PER TSA QUINN AND/OR FAA PERIERA 48 Evidence derived from FBI and 9/11 Commission interviews with recipients of call from Flight Attendant Amy Sweeney aboard American Airlines Flight 11 who contacted the American Airlines Flight Services Office in Boston to report, among other things, the presence of a bomb in the cockpit; Evidence derived from FBI interview of recipient of call from passenger Lee Hanson aboard United Airlines Flight 175 who reported that hijackers claimed to have a bomb on board (265A-NY-280350-302-9269). 49 FIND OUT HOW TO REFERENCE QFR; GET THE ID NUMBERIOF THE EVIDENCE LIST AS PF.RI t ALSO GET RUNDOWN OF HOW LIKELY IT IS EXPLOSIVES WOULD HAVE BEEN DETECTED HAD THEY BEEN PRESENT AS PERI I 50 FBI Interviews with recipient of communications from passengers Glick (265A-NY-280350-302-11722) (CONFIRM) FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-30295686), Britton (265A-NY-280350-302-25306), Burnett (265A-NY-280350-302-535), Glick (265A-NY280350-302-11722), Gronlund (265A-NY-280350-302-4080; 265A-NY-280350-302-1123); Lyles (265ANY-280350-TP-13363) 52 FBI Interviews with recipient of communications from passengers Glick (265A-NY-280350-302-11722) 53FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Commission Document RFBI #04019063-Beamer (265A-NY-280350-302-95630; 265A-NY-280350-302-95682); Bradshaw (265A-NY280350-302-95686), Burnett (265A-NY-280350-302-535); Glick (265A-NY-280350-302-11722), Wainio , CHECK ON BINGHAM AND OTHERS 54 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Wainio (265 A-NY-2803 50-30214895) and Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686) (CONFIRM) 55 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-30295686): (CALL PHILIP TO CONFIRM)
47
56

PER) PER!

I ALSO GET RUNDOWN OF HOW LIKELY IT is FIREARM WOULD SURVIVE AS i i

The cockpit voice recorder clearly captures the words of a hijacker including words in Arabic from the microphone lodged in the pilot headset up to the end of the flight The hijackers statements, the clarity of
57

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the recording, the position of the microphone in the pilot headset and the corresponding manipulation of flight controls provide the evidence. 58 Evidence derived from readout produced by the National Transportation Safety Board of the Flight Data Recorder recovered from Flight 93. 59 Evidence derived from readout and animation produced by the National Transportation Safety Board of the Flight Data Recorder recovered from Flight 93. 60 CONSULT FRONT OFFICE ON HOW TO HANDLE THIS. 61 Calculated according to distance from crash site to Washington DC given the aircraft's airspeed. (AS PER CHARLEY) 62 Evidence derived from readout produced by the National Transportation Safety Board of the Flight Data Recorder recovered from Flight 93. 63 Evidence derived from readout produced by the National Transportation Safety Board of the Flight Data Recorder recovered from Flight 93.

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1. Interview Anthony Mazza who said the person he gave the fuel manifest to was not Leroy Homer 2. Input the SAMC information from| JBelme etc.. 3. Input the Melody Homer ACARS 4. Find of the time of the Lyles call; whether Lome ever talked to CeeCee and what about this story of "They force their way into the cockpit." We need to hear the tape. 5. Ask John Shaw if any of the Felt call wasn't recorded 6. Call Deena to see whether Tom said that the hijackers were talking about "flying it into the ground." 7. Talk to Philip Bradshaw to get the Sandy Bradshaw quote correct about "I've got to go now. 8. Interview Lisa Jefferson about "let's roll" and "two people lying on the ground." 9. Get Lisa Jefferson's 302's 10. Get no show/cancellation information for the flight 11. Check to see where FBI got the information attributed to Beamer as per Jefferson that the pilot and first officer were on the ground possibly dead (pg. 64 Penttbom). 12. Check on SELCALLs 13. Passengers indicating plan of attack: Beamer, Bradshaw, Burnett, Click, Wainio. 14. Listen to Gronlund tape and then make sure that Ms. Gronlund should be listed in footnote 50 on calls indicating passengers were going to revolt. 15. Confirm that Belme claimed a flight attendant had been killed (CONFIRM WITH TAPE OF IV AND HIS NOTES) Battle for Flight 93 At 8:41 a.m. (EOT) on September 11,2001 United Airlines Flight 93 sped down runway Four Left at Newark (New Jersey) Liberty International Airport and rose into a cloudless late summer sky bound for San Francisco.1 Scheduled to depart the gate at 8:00 a.m,,2 the Boeing 75 7's take-off for the west coast was delayed because of the airport's typically heavy morning traffic—a 41-minute wait that would prove crucial as the day's events unfolded.3 As the plane left Newark, the flight's two pilots and five flight attendants were unaware that twenty two minutes earlier, at 8:19 a.m., a crewmember aboard another non-stop transcontinental flight, American Airlines Flight 11, had reported a security emergency aboard the Boeing 767 on its way from Boston to Los Angeles.4 Neither did they know that as Flight 93 paralleled Manhattan for a short time and then banked west toward its scheduled destination, FAA Air Traffic Control was tracking Flight 11, a declared hijacking, on its path back to the New York area. Five minutes later, at 8:46 a.m., Flight 11 would slam into the North Tower of the World Trade Center.5

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York airspace. FAA protocol requires that controllers be notified prior to rogue aircraft
\eviolatingAir Traffic Control personnel (ROLL-UP ON Flight 11 's return into New Newark the airspace they control. were unaware of WHETHER IT WAS

APPROPRIATE TO LET UA 93 TAKE OFF UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES). (SEE IF THE OTHER TAKEOVERS OCCURRED WITHIN RANGE OF THE VOR FOR THEIR DESTINATION). HAD 93 BEEN TAKEN OVER EARLIER WOULD THEY HAVE LOCKED ON TO THE DC VOR AND NOT GOTTEN LOST). (ADD GRAPH ON LOW PASSENGER LOAD BUT NO INDICATION OF FLIGHT PURCHASES—GET EXPERT VIEW THAT TUESDAY IS THE LOWEST OF THE WEEK) ,. By all evidence and accounts, the first 47 minutes of Flight 93's cross-country trip proceeded routinely. Radio communications from the plane were normal. Heading, speed and altitude ran according to plan.6 At 9:28:05 a.m. the situation changed. While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio, Flight 93 suddenly and precipitously began to lose altitude, dropping nearly 685 feet over the next half-minute.7 Eleven seconds into the descent the FAA's air traffic control center in Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions from the aircraft. During the first broadcast the pilot or first officer could be heard declaring "mayday" amid the sounds of a physical struggle taking place in the cockpitHrhe second radio transmission, thirty five seconds later, indicated that the clash was still in progress as the pilot or first officer shouted: "Hey get out of here...get out of here...get out of here." The abrupt and extraordinary loss of altitude at 9:28 a.m. and the two radio broadcasts to Air Traffic Control that occurred within the same minute mark the point at which four hijackers among the flight's 33 other passengers began their takeover ojptne jet's cockpit. Communication records show that only fouffninutes earlier, a't 9:24\a.m. United Airlines Flight Dispatcher Ed Ballinger had senHitext message to the ceekpit of Flight 93 stating: eware cockpit intrusion; two a/c^aircraft) just hit WTC (World Trade Center)."9 The Dispatcher's alert was sent to Fiignt 93 as well as United Airline's 15 other anscontinental flights thaj^fnorning after a second commercial jet, United Flight 175, _^ hit the World Trade-Center.10 The piloJ_Qf_Elight93 replied to the warning with a personalized message two minutes later at 9:26 a.m7^X)ne minute later the last routine vo^ice communication from the cockpit ofFtigtir9jwas received by Air Traffic Control. WvJL A*

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We have uncovered no evidence to indicate that the FAA made any effort to warn pilots of commercial aircraft in the sky on the morning of 9/11 to secure their cockpits, even after the second aircraft had struck the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m. Several FAA authorities interviewed by the Commission stated that it was the air carriers' responsibility to notify their planes of security problems. One highly placed FAA Air Traffic Control said that it was simply not the FAA's place to order the airlines what to tell their pilots.12 (LISTEN TO IV) (WHAT DID POLICY REQUIRE) The United Airlines flight dispatcher who sent the warning to Flight 93 did so by his own initiative.13 A company-wide order for dispatchers to warn cockpits was not issued until (GIVE TIME).14 We could find no evidence that American Airlines sent any cockpit warnings to their aircraft on 9/11 whatsoever. While the evidence points to the exact time that the hijackers invaded the cockpit, we have found no conclusive evidence to indicate precisely when the terrorists took over the main cabin or moved passengers seated in the first class cabin back to coach—a tactic reported by several passengers during phone calls to parties on the ground. The Commission believes, however, that it is most likely the four hijackers breached the cockpit simultaneous to taking over the front of the plane and pushing passengers back into the coach cabin. Taking over the cabin first would likely have alerted the flight deck to a problem. However, waiting to control and/or move passengers until the cockpit was secured would have increased the risk of passenger intervention, particularly if the passengers witnessed the hijackers displacing the crew from the controls. On the morning of 9/11, 37 of Flight 93's passenger seats were occupied representing an occupancy rate of slightly over 20 percent, well below the norm for Tuesday mornings during the summer of 2001. No evidence exists, however, to indicate that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels to facilitate their operation. Financial records indicate that the hijackers did not purchase additional seats in order to reduce the passenger load. The number of cancellations and no-show passengers recorded for the flight were at normal levels. (PENDING UAL DATA) The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11, operated in five-man teams. They initiated their cockpit takeover operations within thirty minutes of takeoff, most likely after the seatbelt sign had been turned off and the flight attendants were beginning cabin service. On Flight 93, however, the hijackers numbered four, and waited until approximately 47 minutes after takeoff to begin their takeover. The evidence supports no conclusion as to why the hijackers' takeover of Flight 93 occurred so late into the trip compared to the others flights. (SEE DIETER/HURLEY: ADD WHATEVER INFORMATION WE HAVE ABOUT THEIR DESIRE FOR SIMULTANEITY). One of the key mysteries associated with Flight 93 is that at least five passengers described the presence of three hijackers on the plane, rather than the four who were actually aboard.15 Some have wondered whether such reporting might suggest that one of

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SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW the hijackers was positioned in the cockpit from the outset of the flight and remained unseen by the passengers. FAA rules allowed commercial air carriers to permit properly credentialed and approved individuals, usually air carrier personnel such as pilots or operational personnel to ride in the cockpit jump seat (a seat located directly behind the pilot and first officer).16 United Airlines' policy in accordance with FAA regulations (GET COPY OF THE JUMPSEAT POLICYand FAA RULES) required that particular paperwork be submitted (GET DETAILS ON ID/PURPOSES ETC) in order to permit and document jump seat approval. 17 We cannot know with certainty whether a hijacker had gained access to the cockpit prior to the violent takeover of the aircraft. We believe it is unlikely a hijacker occupied the jump seat prior to the takeover. All four of Flight 93's hijackers were issued tickets for seats in the first class cabin and used their tickets to enter the aircraft at boarding time according to the air carriers' Gate Reader information (CONFIRM).18 None of the required paperwork required by United Airlines to authorize a jump seat occupant for Flight 93 was filed.19 (SEE IF THEY EVER LET PEOPLE UP THERE AFTER THE FLIGHT HAD STARTED). One of the passengers who contacted a party on the ground to provide a situation report about the hijacking reported that 10 first class passengers were aboard the flight. This figure accounts for the four terrorists and the six non-hijackers who boarded the aircraft holding tickets for first class seats. Five of the six occupants of first class seats, excluding hijackers, contacted the ground by phone to share information about the hijacking.21 These individuals would have been positioned best to observe whether a passenger among them had gotten up during the flight and entered the cockpit prior to the violent takeover of the aircraft. None of the callers reported the occurrence of such an event. Moreover, the pilot and co-pilot of Flight 93 were experienced, well-regarded professionals, who would be quite unlikely to allow an observer into the cockpit pre or post take-off who had not obtained the proper permission for such privileges prior to the flight.22 (CHECK THEIR PERSONNEL FILES FOR DISCIPLINARY PROBLEMS). Finally, the hijacker-pilot was the critical link in the terrorist operation. It is reasonable to expect that the hijackers would take all precautions necessary to protect the terrorist who would be required to pilot the plane. Not wishing to risk his death or injury during (\e takeover of the aircraft, it made operational sense for the hijacker-pilot to remain seated and inconspicuous until he was needed, most likely after seizure of the cockpit. (SEE WHAT EVIDENCE WE HAVE THAT THE PASSENGERS WERE HERDED PRE COCKPIT TAKEOVER ON OTHER FLIGHTS). (CHECK TO SEE THE ACCURACY OF HIJACKER NUMBERS REPORTED IN THE OTHER CASES).

ft -

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SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIE Approximately fo/r minutes after the cockpit takeo r, Flight 93's voice recorder began to preserve sounds from the cockpit via micro !es imbedded in the headsets of both the pilot and first officer, and in the roof of the'flight deck.23 Flight 93'sCockpit voice recorder (CVR; vas the omy one recovered from fas, crash sites of the four/aircraft hijacked on 9/11. L ordanee with FAA EeqtritejBents, the CVR recorded in 30-minute loops.24 (CONflR! rf AND SITE FAA4tyfeE). When a thirty minute segment ended, the system would begin the loop again recording over the oldest portion of the previous recorded segment. Accordingly, only the final 30 minutes prior to the grounding of the aircraft is recorded on the CVR. The Commission notes that Flight 93 crashed at 10:03 a.m., the same time the cockpit voice recording terminated. The CVR contained the recording of cockpit sounds beginning at 9:31:57 a.m. indicating that the system captured approximately the last 31 minutes of Flight 93. 25 The Cockpit Voice Recorder and tape recordings of radio transmissions received by F AA Air Traffic Control reveals that at 9:32 a.m., most likely the hijacker-pilot, Ziad Jarrah— the only one of the four known to have received pilot training—made, or attempted to make, the following announcement to the passengers of Flight 93: "Ladies and Gentlemen: Here the captain, please sit down keep remaining seating. We have a bomb on board. So, sit." 26 This segment of the cockpit recording also indicates that a female, most likely a flight attendant, was being held captive in the cockpit by the hijackers. Although no evidence was uncovered to indicate why the hijackers' employed this tactic, we believe that most likely they believed that holding a captive would reduce the chances that passengers and/or crew would fight back or storm the cockpit. The Flight Data Recorder recovered from the Flight 93 crash site indicates that three minutes after the hijacker-pilot made his announcement about a bomb on board, while traveling westward south of Cleveland he dialed a new heading into the flight's control panel instructing the aircraft's auto-pilot to turn the aircraft 180 degrees, back toward the
east.27

Later in the flight Jarrah would dial in the directional code for Washington National Airport indicating that the attack was planned for the nation's capital.2 The evidence, including intelligence intercepts and detainee information, indicates that the target was either the U.S. Capitol or the White House, but the body of evidence is not sufficient to specify which of the two was the primary objective. (APPROVE WITH DIETER/HURLEY) One minute later, at 9:36 a.m. as the hijackers struggled to control the defiant hostage in the cockpit, and the aircraft reversed its course, the passengers and flight crew began a series of calls from personal cell phones and GTE air phones (installed into the aircraft's seat backs) to report what was happening aboard the plane.
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These phone calls between family, friends and colleagues, would take place intermittently up until the end of the flight. The calls would provide people on the ground with first hand accounts of what was transpiring on the plane. Moreover, the calls provided passengers with critical information from the ground, including that two aircraft had slammed into the World Trade Center (at 8:46 a.m. and 9:03 a.m. respectively). This information was a key factor in what would soon become the battle for Flight 93. Three minutes after the phone calls began, at 9:39 a.m., the FAA's Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center overheard a radio transmission from hijacker-pilot making the following announcement: \. Vr "ah *ms ig *ne captain, I would like Wall remain seated there is a bomb aboard and we are going tego back to the airport and to have our demands ... so please remain quiet."29

This transmission, together with the terrorists' earlier announcement about the presence of a bomb, indicates that the hijackers, or at a minimum, the hijacker-pilot, hoped to fool the passengers and crew into believing that the hijackers sought to take hostages in exchange for "demands." Doing so would make the passengers believe neither they nor the aircraft were in immediate and certain danger. Earlier in the day, FAA Air Traffic Control received a radio transmission believed to be from the hijacker-pilot of American Airlines Flight 11, Mohamed Atta, attempting to tell the passengers aboard the flight that the aircraft was "returning to the airport." No such radio transmissions were overheard from either of the other two hijacker aircraft (United 175 or American 77). The most likely reason that intercom messages intended for passengers were inadvertently broadcast over radio frequencies to the FAA was that Jarrah (Flight 93) and Atta (Flight 11) did not know how to operate properly the cockpit's radio and intercom systems. Nevertheless the transmissions demonstrate the hijackers desire to mask their intentions. At least three callers from the flight reported that the hijackers knew that passengers were making calls but did not seem to care. The cockpit voice recorder does not provide evidence of whether Jarrah in the cockpit was aware of these calls or why the hijackers allowed them to take place. It is quite possible Jarrah knew that the attacks on the WTC had succeeded. He could have learned of this by text messages being sent by United Airlines to the cockpits of its transcontinental flights, including Flight 93 warning of cockpit intrusion and telling of the attacks in New York.31 But, even if Jarrah had not read these messages, he would certainly have understood that given Flight 93's tardy departure from Newark, the attacks on the World Trade Center would already have unfolded. If Jarrah did know that the passengers were making calls, he simply failed to understand that that the passengers

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SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW were certain to learn of the New York attacks, thereby destroying his ruse that the aircraft was simply "returning to the airport." Nevertheless, between 9:36 a.m., and the crash of the aircraft at least 10 passengers32 and two crew33 shared vital information with family, friends, colleagues or others on the ground. Details of the information shared during the communications upon which the Commission based its analysis is derived from tape recordings of several of the calls, as well as notes and official accounts rendered by recipients of the communications. • • • • • • • • • • the plane had been hijacked, reported by at least twelve callers34 the hijackers wielded knives, reported by at least five callers35 the presence of three hijackers, reported by five callers36 the hijackers had entered the cockpit, reported by at least four callers37 the hijackers have a bomb, reported by at least three callers hijackers wearing red bandanas, reported by at least two callers39 passengers were forced to the back of the aircraft, reported by two callers40 A passenger had been stabbed reported by at least two callers41 two individuals lying on the floor of the aircraft injured or dead, possibly the Captain and First Officer, reported by at least one caller 42 A flight attendant had been killed reported by at least one caller.43
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The calls provided information very similar to reports received from the other aircraft hijacked on 9/11 including the hijackers' use of knives, violence, the threat of a bomb, relocation of passengers to the back of the aircraft, cockpit intrusion and announcements that the plane was returning to the airport. There is, of course, no means of ascertaining from what location cell phones were used upon the aircraft. However, the evidence shows that the calls made from GTE airphones installed in each row of seats on both sides of the aisle, came from the last nine rows of the aircraft. One of the callers from Flight 93 also reported that he thought the hijackers might possess a gun.44 The Commission believes this report must be measured against the following facts. None of the other reports from callers who noted the hijacker's weaponry reported the presence of a firearm. According to the recipient of a separate call from the aircraft, she specifically asked her caller whether the hijackers had guns. The passenger replied that he did not see one. 45 No firearms were found in evidence at the crash site of the aircraft. 46 (FIND OUT LIKELIHOOD OF A FIREARM SURVIVING THE CRASH AND BURN). There is no indication from the cockpit voice recorder of a gun being fired or mentioned, even during the passenger rebellion.4 Had the hijacker's possessed a firearm it is logical to believe the gun would have either been referenced by hijackers in the cockpit or used at this point. Bombs were also reported aboard United Flight 175 and American Airlines Flight 11. The question arises about whether the bombs were real or fake. The FBI reported to the commission that no trace of explosives was found at the crash site of Flight 93 or Flight 77.49 (DISCUSS THE LIKELIHOOD IT WOULD BE FOUND IF IT WERE PRESENT). It should be noted that given the nature of their operation, the hijackers SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW

SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW did not need a bomb, but rather only the credible threat of an explosive in order to control the passengers and crew. One of the passengers who called to report the bomb expressed his belief that it was not real.50 Moreover, the hijackers would have perceived an interest in avoiding the carriage of any "illegal" items the detection of which at the checkpoint would result in their arrest, rather than the item simply being confiscated. For these reasons, we believe that it is most likely, though not conclusive, that the "bombs" reported aboard the flights were simulated. Among the passengers phone calls, there are at least five contacts during which information was shared about the attacks that had occurred earlier in the morning at the World Trade Center.51 During one of these calls information was received indicating that the passengers and crew took a vote on whether to rush the terrorists in an attempt to retake the planes.52 History will record that aboard the flight that day, passengers and crew thrust together in the most dire of circumstances, practiced America's cherished democratic principles in the country's greatest moment of need. The record shows that together, the passengers and crew of Flight 93 elected to rise-up against their captors in the face of enormous danger. Information to indicate that the passengers and crew were preparing to revolt against the hijackers was provided by five different callers from aboard the aircraft.53 Among these accounts were expressions of duty, resolve, determination and team work. Two passengers, who were on the phone with loved ones as the struggle began terminated their calls in order to join.54 One of the callers ended her message as follows: "I've got to go, everyone's running up to First Class."55 According to the evidence provided by the cockpit voice recording, the passenger's assault on the terrorists, began at 9:57 a.m. The sounds of the revolt captured by the CVR tells the story of a great struggle against the terrorists beginning toward the back of the cabin and then to the front.5 Some family members who listened to the recording reported that they heard the voice of a loved one among the din of the uprising. The Commission is unable to make judgments about individual voices. The evidence, however, permits the Commission to report that the struggle was collective, sustained, and powerful. Neither the CVR nor forensic evidence collected at the crash site offers evidence to indicate whether the cockpit door was breached during the uprising. The cockpit recording does provide evidence that the hijackers were at the instruments of the aircraft in the final moments of the flight.57 Nevertheless, the facts clearly demonstrate that the passengers and crew were responsible for stopping the terrorists from hitting their intended target.

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SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW (TALK TO DIETER: ADD INFORMATION/EVIDENCE ON WHAT WE KNOWABOUT THE TARGET). (ADD DETAILED CONSEQUENCES HAD THEY HIT EITHER OF THE TARGETS WE SUSPECT). At 9:58:01 a.m. the hijacker-pilot panicked in response to the determined passenger revolt taking place behind him. He began to shout orders and maneuver the aircraft in a desperate attempt to knock the passengers off their feet.58 For the next two minutes he rolled the plane onto one side and then the other, jerking the yoke hard left then hard right forty two times.59 He then began bobbing the nose up and down over 14 times, followed by another series of twists. During the violent turning and lurching of the aircraft, the CVR captured the sounds of dishes and glasses smashing. The aircraft's wild swings tossed anything and anyone not lashed down, yet the evidence shows that the sounds of ;he struggle never abated. At 10:02 a.m., with the aircraft still descending and traveling at a high rate of speed, the, terrorists knew that the passenger rebellion had succeeded. The hijacker-pilot uttered words of defeat that were captured by the Cockpit Voice Recorder.60 Shortly thereaft the flight data shows that the yoke was turned hard to the right. The airplane began onto its back before plowing into an empty field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania at miles per hour, ©afy~3tfminutes flying time from Washington DC.61 Before the uprisingoegan at 9:57Xni. the aircraft was traveling at 8,400 feet heading towarcPWashington DC/at an airspeed of 292 knots.62 The flight data shows that the hijacker-pilot was firmly in command of the cockpit and flying the aircraft with purpose and control toward the terrorists' target. Not until after the beginning of the revolt by the passengers and crew did the pilot initiate his desperate tactics to counter their assault.-fixperts^the Nfffirtnt'n'r?"^prtrMKtn Safety P^nH affirmH to the Commission that only anfcr 10:02 a.m. as a result of these tactics did the aircraft achieve an altitude, airspeed, position and a final manipulation of the yoke that rolled the airplane sending it to ground. TIME AND POSITION AND SEND QFR TO NTSB) The passengers, not the hijackers,\vere responsible for the plane failing to hit its target and instead crashing in an empty field. _jK**^^VvXfVffi' "**"' r\i V%

The hijackers of Flight 93 defeated ev^fy system of government designed to stop them. They defeated the U.S. immigration system which failed to prevent them from entering the country in order to plan, train for and execute their mission. They defeated the U.S. intelligence system which failed to detect the plot. They defeated the aviation security system which failed to stop them from hijacking the aircraft. What the terrorists could not defeat was American people armed with the knowledge of the terrorists' intent and the resolve to stop them. As the Commission has noted in its hearings and reports, heroism was displayed on each of the flights hijacked on 9/11. The facts show that the passengers and crew of Flight 93

^A^V \y

SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW

SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW possessed something that those on the other flights hijacked that day did not—clear, timely and widespread information about the true intent of the terrorists. The information about the true nature of the plot was available by virtue of the fact that Flight 93 had taken off up to forty minutes later than the other flights hijacked that day, and that loved ones had the information and the courage to tell passengers and crew the truth. Today in the field where the aircraft and its 40 brave souls came to rest (DESCRIBE THE FIELD/MEMORIAL), and the (CONDITION/ACTIVITIES TODAY OF THEIR LIKELY TARGET). The facts show and history will record that on September 11, 2001 in an hour of great darkness for America, free people armed with knowledge and courage fought and saved the lives of an untold number of fellow citizens and saved the seats of their government from destruction. They will be forever honored by a grateful nation as true heroes.
###

Air Traffic Control Records (PENDING DOCUMENT NUMBER) UASSI1-00000859-00000873 3 Commission interview with Newark Tower personnel including supervisor Bob Varcadipane 4 According to phone records, a tape recording of the phone call and FBI and 9/11 Commission interviews with witness accounts, at 8:19 a.m. Flight Attendant Betty Ong aboard American Airlines Flight 11 contacted the American Airlines Southeast Reservations Center in Gary, North Carolina to report a security emergency aboard the aircraft stating "The cockpit is not answering, somebody's stabbed in business class...! don't know, ithink we're getting hijacked." 5 Video footage and seismic data show that American Airlines Flight 11 impacted the North Tower of the World Trade Center at this time. RE: MILES KARA 6 National Transportation Safety Board Read out of the Flight Data Recorder of United Airlines Flight 93 recovered at the crash site in Shanksville, Pennsylvania 7 Evidence derived from NTSB Animation of Flight Data Recorder readout of UAL 93 presented to the Commission 4/22/2004 at NTSB headquarters. 8 Evidence derived from audio read-out of Cockpit Voice Recorder from Flight 93. A transcript of CVR was prepared by the National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 9 (GET GUIDANCE ON HOW TO FOOTNOTE ACARS AND DOCUMENT STAMPS RE: KAPLAN). 10 Evidence derived from copies of ACARS messages produced for the Commission by United Airlines and, provided to the Commission separately by UAL Flight Dispatcher Ed Ballinger. (GET GUIDANCE ON HOW TO FOOTNOTE ACARS AND DOCUMENT STAMPS). 1 ' The ACARS message sent from the cockpit of Flight 93 in reply to the dispatcher's cockpit warning stated: "Ed Confirm latest mssg plz Jason." NEED TO CONFIRM WITH ED WHY HE DIDN'T FURTHER CONFIRM OR RESPOND ; Aircraft Communication and Reporting System documents indicate time of message transmission and receipt (CONFIRM THIS RE: ED SOLID AY ON DELTA OF TIME INDICATORS AND ACTUAL RECEIPT) 12 Commission Interview with FAA ATC official Ellen King 13 Commission Interview with United Airlines Flight Dispatcher Ed Ballinger, at CHECK ON IV'S WITH SANDY RODGERS AND SOC GUYS 14 GET TIME OF SANDY RODGERS ORDER FROM ED BALLINGER MATERIAL 15 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Beamer , Bingham, Glick, Lyles 16 14 CFR, Chapter 1, Section 121.547
1 2

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SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW

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17 IDENTIFY WRITTEN UAL POLICY MANUAL CITATION FOR JUMPSEAT PROCEDUE (RE: ED SOLIDAY) 18 CHECK TO SEE IF UASSI-00000859-00000873 REFLECTS THE GATEREADER BECAUSE THEY ARE TICKET PULLS (RE: ED SOLIDAY) 19 GET NUMBER AND NAME OF FORM AND WHERE IT WOULD BE FILED. (RE ED SOLIDAY) 20 UASSI1-00000859-00000873; FBI Interview with Lisa Jefferson (265A-NY-280350-302-95682) 21 United Airlines manifest records for Flight 93 show that passengers Thomas Burnett, Mark Bingham, Joseph DeLuca, Edward Felt, Linda Grondlund, and Mark Rothenberg were the six passengers holding first class cabin seats. (Note: all four hijackers also held first class cabin seats). Only passenger Mark Rothenberg is not known to have communicated with the ground from aboard the flight. 22 Commission Document RUAL#030044450A[Employee records] PENDING READOUT OF PILOT RATINGS AND PERSONNEL FILE BY NTSBAY) 23 PENDING INPUT OF FAA CVR REG. (RE: CHARLEY) 24 PENDING INPUT OF FAA CVR REG. (RE: CHARLEY) 25 Evidence derived from data read out of United Flight 93 Cockpit Voice Recorder. 26 Evidence derived from tape recordings of radio transmissions over FAA Air Traffic Control radio frequencies, and by the Flight 93 Cockpit Voice Recorder data. 27 Evidence derived from NTSB read-out of Flight Data Recorder from Flight 93 28 CHECK RE: PEREIRA ON PRECISE TIME. 29 Evidence derived from tape recordings of radio transmissions over FAA Air Traffic Control radio frequencies, and by the Flight 93 Cockpit Voice Recorder data. 30 Commission Document RFBI #04019063-Interviews with recipients of communications from passenger Beamer(265A-NY-280350-302-95682 & 265A-NY-280350-302-95630); Commission Document RFBI#04019066~Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686) 31 Text messages warning the cockpit of Flight 93 were sent to the aircraft by United Airlines Flight Dispatcher Ed Ballinger at 9:24 a.m., (GET OTHER TIMES; SEE WHETHER THEY WERE PRINTED OR SCREEN MESSAGES AS PER ED SOLIDAY). 32 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Commission Document RFBI #04019063--Beamer(265A-NY-280350-302-95630;265A-NY-280350-302-95682), Commission Document RFBW04019065 Bingham (265A-NY-280350-302-4069; 265A-NY-280350-302-63761), Commission Document RFBI#04019067~Britton (265A-NY-280350-302-25306), Commission Document RFBI#04019062 Burnett (265A-NY-280350-302-535), Commission Document RFBI#04019070» DeLuca (265A-NY-280350-NK-444), Commission Document RFBI#04019072~Felt (265A-NY-280350-30217823), Commission Document RFBI#04019073-Glick (265A-NY-280350-302-11722); Commission Document RFBI#04019077—Grandcolas; Commission Document RFBI#04019079-Gronlund (265A-NY280350-302-4080; 265A-NY-280350-302-1123); Commission Document RFBI#04019087~ Wainio (265A-NY-280350-302-14895) 33 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers: Commission Document RFBI#04019066 -Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686), Lyles(265A-NY-280350-302-53207; 265ANY-280350-302-TP419) 34 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Commission Document RFBI #04019063~Todd Beamer (265A-NY-280350-302-95630; 265A-NY-280350-302-95682), Bingham (265A-NY-280350-302-4069; 265A-NY-280350-302-63761), Commission Document RFBI#04019066- -Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686), Commission Document RFBI#04019067~Britton (265A-NY280350-302-25306), Commission Document RFBI#04019062~Burnett (265A-NY-280350-302-535), Commission Document RFBI#04019070-DeLuca (265A-NY-280350-NK-444) Commission Document RFBI#04019072 Felt (265A-NY-280350-302-17823), Click-(265A-NY-280350-302-11722), Grandcolas (265A-NY-280350-302-638); Commission Document RFBI#04019079~Gronlund (265A-NY-280350302-4080; 265A-NY-280350-302-1123), Commission Document RFBI#04019082-Lyles (265A-NY280350-302-53207; 265A-NY-280350-302-TP 419) Wainio (265A-NY-280350-302-14895) 35 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Commission Document RFBI #04019063 Beamer(265A-NY-280350-302-95630; 265A-NY-280350-302-95682); Commission Document RFBI#04019066 Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686), Commission Document RFBI#04019062-

11

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SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW

Burnett (265A-NY-280350-302-535), Commission Document RFBI#04019073-Glick-(265A-NY-280350302-11722) 36 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Commission Document RFBI #04019063--Beamer(265A-NY-280350-302-95630;265A-NY-280350-302-95682); Commission Document RFBI#04019065- Bingham (265 A-NY-2803 50-302-4069; 265A-NY-280350-302-63761); Commission Document RFBI#04019066-- Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686); Commission Document RFBI#04019073--Glick (265 A-NY-2803 50-302-11722); Commission Document RFBI#04019082- Lyles (265A-NY-280350-302-53207; 265A-NY-280350-302-TP 419) 37 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Commission Document RFBI #04019063 Beamer (265A-NY-280350-302-95630; 265A-NY-280350-302-95682), Commission Document RFBI#04019066-Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686), Commission Document RFBI#04019062~ Burnett (265A-NY-2803 50-302-535), Commission Document RFBI#04019082Lyles (265A-NY-280350-302-53207; 265 A-NY-2803 50-3 02-TP 419) 38 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Commission Document RFBI #04019063--Beamer(265A-NY-280350-302-95630;265A-NY-280350-302-95682), Commission Document RFBI#04019065»Bingham (265A-NY-280350-302-4069; 265A-NY-280350-302-63761); Commission Document RFBI#04019062-Bumett (265A-NY-280350-302-535), Commission Document RFBW04019073 Glick-(265A-NY-280350-302-11722); Commission Document RFBI#04019079» Gronlund-(265 A-NY-2803 50-302-4080); 39 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Commission Document RFBI#04019066~ Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686); Commission Document RFBK04019073 Glick (265A-NY-280350-302-11722) 40 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Commission Document RFBI#04019066~Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686), Commission Document RFBK04019073 Glick (265A-NY-280350-302-11722) 41 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Commission Document RFBI#04019062~Bumett (265A-NY-280350-302-53S); Commission Document RFBI#04019067--Britton (265A-NY-280350-302-25306) 42 Summary of Penttbom Investigation, Department of Justice, FBI, January 31,2003, pg. 64. 43 Commission Interview with Richard Belme. (CONFIRM WITH TAPE OF IV AND HIS NOTES) 44 Jere Longman, Among the Heroes—United Flight 93 & the Passengers & Crew Who Fought Back, (New York Harper-Collins Publishers, 2002), pg 107; Commission interview with Deena Burnett 4J FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Call of Jeremy Glick to his wife Lyzbeth-(265A-NY-280350-302-l 1722); Commission Memo to File on call with Lyzbeth Glick. 46 FIND OUT HOW TO REFERENCE QFR; GET THE ID NUMBER OF THE EVIDENCE LIST AS PERJ n ALSO GET RUNDOWN OF HOW LIKELY IT IS FIREARM WOULD SURVIVE AS

PER!

r

Federal Air Marshals consulted by the Commission indicate that the sound of a gunshot aboard an aircraft would be unmistakable and would most likely be reported by passengers contacting the ground and captured on the CVR. CONFIRM AS PER TSA QUINN AND/OR FAA PERIERA 48 Evidence derived from FBI ah4 9/11 Commission interviews with recipients of call from Flight Attendant Amy Sweeney aboard American Airlines Flight 11 who contacted the American Airlines Flight Services Office in Boston to report, among other things, the presence of a bomb in the cockpit; Evidence derived from FBI interview of recipient of call from passenger Lee Hanson aboard United Airlines Flight 175 who reported that hijackers claimed to have a bomb on board (265A-NY-280350-302-9269). 49 FIND OUT HOW TO REFERENCE QFR; GET THE ID NUMBER OF THE EVIDENCE LIST AS PERI tALSO GET RUNDOWN OF HOW LIKELY IT IS EXPLOSIVES WOULD HAVE BEEN DETECTED HAD THEY BEEN PRESENT ASPERJ I 30 FBI Interviews with recipient of communications, from passengers Glick (265A-NY-280350-302-11722) (CONFIRM) . \I Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Bfadshaw (2
47

95686), Britton (265A-NY-280350-302r25306), Burnett (265A-NY-280350-302-535), Glick (265A-NY280350-302-11722), Gronlund (265 A-NY-28Q3 50-302-4080; 265A-NYi280350-302-l 123); Lyles (265ANY-280350-TP-13363) . \2 FBI Interviews with recipient of communications from

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SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW 9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW

53FBI

Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Commission Document RFBI #04019063»Beamer (265A-NY-280350-302-95630; 265A-NY-280350-302-95682); Bradshaw (265A-NY280350-302-95686), Burnett (265A-NY-280350-302-535); Glick (265A-NY-280350-302-11722), Wainio , CHECK ON BINGHAM AND OTHERS 54 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Wainio (265A-NY-280350-30214895) and Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686) (CONFIRM) 55 FBI Interviews with recipients of communications from passengers Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-30295686): (CALL PHILIP TO CONFIRM)
56

The cockpit voice recorder clearly captures the words of a hijacker including words in Arabic from the microphone lodged in the pilot headset up to the end of the flight. The hijackers statements, the clarity of the recording, the position of the microphone in the pilot headset and the corresponding manipulation of flight controls provide the evidence. 58 Evidence derived from readout produced by the National Transportation Safety Board of the Flight Data Recorder recovered from Flight 93. 59 Evidence derived from readout and animation produced by the National Transportation Safety Board of the Flight Data Recorder recovered from Flight 93. 60 CONSULT FRONT OFFICE ON HOW TO HANDLE THIS. 61 Calculated according to distance from crash site to Washington DC given the aircraft's airspeed. (AS PER CHARLEY) 62 Evidence derived from readout produced by the National Transportation Safety Board of the Flight Data Recorder recovered from Flight 93. 63 Evidence derived from readout produced by the National Transportation Safety Board of the Flight Data Recorder recovered from Flight 93.
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