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FOREWORD
1. Military Aviation Authority. With effect from 1 April 2010, the Secretary of State for Defence (SofS) established by Charter the Military Aviation Authority (MAA) as the single independent regulatory body for all Defence aviation activity. As the Regulator, Director General MAA (DG MAA) is accountable to SofS, through the 2nd Permanent Under Secretary of State (2nd PUS), for providing a regulatory framework, given effect by a certification, approvals and inspection process for the acquisition, operation and airworthiness of air systems within the Defence aviation environment. DG MAA is responsible for providing assurance to SofS that the appropriate standards of military Air Safety are maintained and is the Convening Authority for Service Inquiries into aircraft occurrences. 2. Regulatory Framework. DG MAA is the owner of the MAA Regulatory Publications (MRP) and has the authority to issue them on behalf of the SofS. There are 3 MRP documentation levels: a.
Overarching documents:
(1) (2) (3)
MAA01: MAA Regulatory Policy. MAA02: MAA Master Glossary. MAA03: MAA Regulatory Processes.
b.
Regulatory Articles (RA):

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1000 Series: General Regulations (GEN). 2000 Series: Flying Regulations (FLY). 3000 Series: Air Traffic Management Regulations (ATM). 4000 Series: Continuing Airworthiness Engineering Regulations (CAE). 5000 Series: Design and Modification Engineering Regulations (DME).
c.
MAA Manuals:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Manual of Air Safety. Manual of Post-Crash Management. Manual of Flying Orders for Contractors. Manual of Military Air Traffic Management (this document). Manual of Aerodrome Design and Safeguarding. Manual of Maintenance and Airworthiness Processes. Manual of Maintenance and Airworthiness Processes MOD Form 700 Series of Forms.
3. This document forms enhanced guidance to the ATM 3000 series of Regulatory Articles. These apply to ATM operations by any personnel, be they civilian or military, controlling civil or military registered aircraft, under MAA regulations. MMATM Issue 5 UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED Page 3 of 354
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4. Scope of Activity. The MAA has full oversight of all Defence aviation activity and undertakes the role of the single regulatory authority responsible for regulating all aspects of Air Safety across Defence. 5. Military Applicability. The Regulatory Articles within the MRP (also referred to as the Regulations) are Orders within the meaning of the Armed Forces Act. With the exception of Queens Regulations and MAA Regulatory Notifications (see below), the MRP has primacy over all other military aviation orders or instructions. 6. Equal Opportunities Statement. All reference to the masculine gender (he, him and his) is to be taken to include the feminine gender (she, her and hers). 7. Responsibilities. The Regulations contained within the MRP do not absolve any person from using their best judgement to ensure the safety of aircraft and personnel. Where safety or operational imperatives demand, the Regulations may be deviated from provided that a convincing case can be offered in retrospect. Where authorized individuals issue their own amplifying orders or instructions, they must be based on the Regulations and they cannot be less restrictive. 8. Regulatory Notifications. Where the routine amendment process for the MRP is not sufficiently agile, to effect timely communication of regulatory changes, the MAA will employ one of 3 types of notification, dependent upon the nature of the information conveyed: a.
Regulatory Notice. A Notice will notify changes in structures, procedures, regulations, or provide operational or engineering guidance. Regulatory Instruction. An Instruction will provide mandatory operational or engineering direction. Regulatory Waiver/Exemption. A Regulatory Waiver/Exemption may be employed to grant temporary waivers or permanent exemptions from extant regulations at the request of an operator and when agreed by the Regulator for specified periods.
b.
c.
Notifications will be approved at the appropriate level within the MAA dependent upon type, complexity or whether the Regulatory Notification is novel and/or contentious. They will be promulgated to those with delegated/contracted responsibility for Air Safety such as Aviation Duty Holders within the Services and Accountable Managers within DE&S and Industry. Recipients will be required to acknowledge receipt, and copies of the notifications will also be published on the MAA website (waivers or exemptions will not be published on the MAA website). Receiving organizations are responsible for cascading notifications internally in an effective way. This Regulatory Notification process will exist in addition to the routine document amendment service but will only be used where more timely notification is required.
9. Commercial Implications. The MRP will be applied through contract to those organizations designing, producing, maintaining, handling or operating aircraft on the UK Military Aircraft Register. Compliance with these Regulations will not in itself relieve any person from any legal obligations imposed upon them. These Regulations have been devised solely for the use of the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), its contractors in the execution of contracts for the MOD and those organizations that have requested to operate their ac on the UK Military Aircraft Register. To the extent permitted by law, the MOD hereby excludes all liability whatsoever and howsoever arising (including, but without limitation, liability resulting from negligence) for any loss or damage however caused when these Regulations are used for any other purpose. Where an organization has contracted to an earlier version of Military Aviation Regulations or Defence Standards, these will continue to apply unless changed through contract review. The increased risk associated with using
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legacy standards or Regulations must be monitored by MOD contracting authorities and contract changes made as required. The MAA will continue to monitor this situation through audit and inspection.
10. Sponsorship of the MRP and the authorization of amendments are the responsibility of DG MAA. Proposals for amendments to this document can be made in accordance with Chapter 3 of MAA01.
<Original signed>
C J JAMES Group Captain Deputy Head (Air Traffic Management) Military Aviation Authority 22 Feb 2012
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Intentionally left blank for print pagination ................................................................................2 FOREWORD ............................................................................................................................3 Table of Contents .....................................................................................................................7 Table of Figures......................................................................................................................19 Chapter 1: ATC Policy....................................................................................................21 Regulatory Cross-Reference ..................................................................................................21 Military ATC Policy...............................................................................................................21 Operational Considerations .................................................................................................21 Chapter 2: National and International ATC Organization and Responsibilities .......22 Regulatory Cross-Reference ..................................................................................................22 General ................................................................................................................................22 International Civil Aviation Organization ..............................................................................22 Chapter 3: Responsibilities of ATC Personnel............................................................23 Regulatory Cross-Reference ..................................................................................................23 Responsibilities of ATC Staff Equipment ..........................................................................23 Responsibilities and Duties of Area Radar Staff ..................................................................23 The Handover of a Control Position.....................................................................................23 Bandboxing/Splitting of Control Positions ............................................................................23 Medical Employment Standards ..........................................................................................24 Blood Donation ....................................................................................................................24 Alcohol Consumption ...........................................................................................................24 Controlling Following Vaccination ........................................................................................24 Chapter 4: Division of Airspace and Rules of the Air .................................................25 Regulatory Cross-Reference ..................................................................................................25 Flight and Upper Flight Information Regions (FIRs/UIRs) ...................................................25 ICAO Airspace Classifications General ............................................................................25 Controlled Airspace (ICAO Classes A to E).........................................................................25 Uncontrolled Airspace (ICAO Classes F and G)..................................................................26 Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA)............................................................................................26 Aerodrome Traffic Zones (ATZs) .........................................................................................26 Military Aerodrome Traffic Zones (MATZs)..........................................................................27 Airspace Reservations .........................................................................................................27 Flight Notification .................................................................................................................30 Operational and General Air Traffic .....................................................................................30 Flight Rules and Flight Conditions .......................................................................................30 VFR......................................................................................................................................30 IFR .......................................................................................................................................32
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Applicability of VFR and IFR ............................................................................................... 32 Instrument Flight Rules and Safety Altitude ........................................................................ 33 Duties and Responsibilities of ATCOs With Regard to Pilots Instrument Ratings.............. 35 Special Visual Flight Rules (SVFR)..................................................................................... 36 Selection of Cruising Levels................................................................................................ 36 Safety Altitude ..................................................................................................................... 38 Minimum Safe Flight Levels ................................................................................................ 39 Rules of the Air and Avoidance of Collisions ...................................................................... 40 Chapter 5: Altimetry ...................................................................................................... 42 Regulatory Cross-Reference ................................................................................................. 42 Altimeter Settings ................................................................................................................ 42 Aerodrome QNH ................................................................................................................. 42 Regional Pressure Setting .................................................................................................. 42 QFE..................................................................................................................................... 43 Standard Altimeter Settings ................................................................................................ 43 Force QNH .......................................................................................................................... 43 Landing Altimeter Setting (QNE) ......................................................................................... 44 Transition Level and Transition Altitude .............................................................................. 44 Chapter 6: Notification and Conduct of Flights .......................................................... 45 Regulatory Cross-Reference ................................................................................................. 45 Notification of Aircraft Movements on the Ground .............................................................. 45 Flight as GAT Within Controlled Airspace Clearance ...................................................... 45 Airways Crossing ................................................................................................................ 46 Penetration of MATZ ........................................................................................................... 46 Flight In the Vicinity of Aerodrome and Glider Sites............................................................ 47 Chapter 7: Unusual Aerial Activities............................................................................ 48 Regulatory Cross-Reference ................................................................................................. 48 Procedures for the Notification of Unusual Aerial Activities ................................................ 48 Balloons Kites and Airships................................................................................................. 51 Display of Pyrotechnics, Flares or Unusual Lights .............................................................. 51 Annex 7A: Annex 7B: Annex 7C: Warning of Unusual Aerial Activities Minimum Warning Times ......... 53 Unusual Air Activities (Air Exercises) Submission by Sponsor ......... 54 Unusual Aerial Activities (Generic) Submission by Sponsor.............. 55
Annex 7D: Civil Legislation Relating to Operation of Balloons Kites Airships and Small (Model) Aircraft.......................................................................................................... 56 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 56 Balloons, Kites, Airships, Gliders and Parascending Parachutes ....................................... 56 Article 98 ............................................................................................................................. 58
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Chapter 8:
Methods of Identification ............................................................................59
Regulatory Cross-Reference ..................................................................................................59 Identification General ........................................................................................................59 Methods of Identification ......................................................................................................59 Failure to Locate an Aircraft.................................................................................................60 Chapter 9: Radar Handover Procedures ......................................................................61 Regulatory cross-reference ....................................................................................................61 Radar Handover Landline Communication Available .......................................................61 Handovers No Landline Communication Available...........................................................61 Handovers to Continental Agencies.....................................................................................61 Handover Procedures ..........................................................................................................62 Transfer of Radar Identity ....................................................................................................62 Radar Handovers Standard Message Format/Landline Procedure ..................................64 Chapter 10: Traffic Information and Traffic Coordination ............................................66 Regulatory Cross-Reference ..................................................................................................66 Traffic Information Between ATS Personnel........................................................................66 Traffic Coordination General.............................................................................................66 Methods of Coordination......................................................................................................66 Coordination Procedures .....................................................................................................67 Coordination Outside Controlled Airspace...........................................................................68 Chapter 11: Types of Service and Separation Standards ............................................70 Regulatory Cross-Reference ..................................................................................................70 Types of Service ..................................................................................................................70 Radar Control.......................................................................................................................70 Deconfliction Service ...........................................................................................................70 Traffic Service ......................................................................................................................70 Procedural Service...............................................................................................................71 Basic Service .......................................................................................................................71 Application of Services.........................................................................................................71 Provision of Service .............................................................................................................72 Reduced Traffic Information/Deconfliction Advice ...............................................................72 Provision of Traffic Information to Pilots ..............................................................................73 Standard Separation/Deconfliction Minima General .........................................................73 Standard Separation/Deconfliction Minima Lateral...........................................................73 Standard Separation/Deconfliction Minima Vertical..........................................................74 Formation Procedures .........................................................................................................78 Military Formations Routeing as GAT ..................................................................................82 Formation Flights Exiting the UK to Fly as GAT in Europe ..................................................82
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Formation Flights Inbound to the UK Arriving as GAT from Europe ................................... 83 Reporting of Hazardous Flying Conditions.......................................................................... 83 Clutter on the Situational Display ........................................................................................ 83 Annex 11A: Annex 11B: Annex 11C: Annex 11D: Annex 11E: Chapter 12: ATC Procedures in Class A Airspace ....................................................... 86 ATC Procedures in Class C Airspace ....................................................... 88 ATC Procedures in Class D Airspace ....................................................... 95 ATC Procedures in Class E Airspace ....................................................... 98 Procedures at RN Air Stations and Ships .............................................. 101 General Operating Procedures................................................................ 102
Regulatory Cross-Reference ............................................................................................... 102 Compliance with ATC Instructions .................................................................................... 102 RT Procedures .................................................................................................................. 102 Terrain Clearance ............................................................................................................. 103 Descent to Low Level........................................................................................................ 103 Multiple Instrument Approaches........................................................................................ 103 Operations with HM Ships................................................................................................. 103 Failure of Navigation Lights............................................................................................... 103 Crossing and Passing Close to Airfields ........................................................................... 103 Aircraft Endurance General............................................................................................ 104 Aircraft Endurance Reporting RN................................................................................... 104 Aircraft Endurance Reporting RAF................................................................................. 106 Communications Safety Division of Responsibility Operations with HM Ships ........ 106 Wake Turbulence Military Advisory Separation RAF Airfields........................................ 107 Restriction of Rate of Climb and Descent (ROCD) in Controlled Airspace ....................... 109 Chapter 13: Airborne Collision Avoidance System: Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System Regulatory Cross-Reference ........................................................... 113 General ............................................................................................................................. 113 TCAS ll Warnings.............................................................................................................. 113 Effects on ATC Operations ............................................................................................... 114 Nuisance Advisories.......................................................................................................... 114 Departure From ATC Clearance ....................................................................................... 114 TCAS Phraseology............................................................................................................ 115 Use of TCAS ll in TA Only Mode ....................................................................................... 116 ACAS RA Reporting.......................................................................................................... 116 Annex 13A: Annex 13B: Annex 13C: Chapter 14: TCAS II Event Pilot Report Form .......................................................... 117 Specimen TCAS Evaluation Form ........................................................... 119 TCAS Phraseology ................................................................................... 120 Meteorological Information...................................................................... 121
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Regulatory Cross-Reference ................................................................................................121 Meteorological Briefing ......................................................................................................121 Supply of Meteorological Information to ATC ....................................................................121 Supply of Meteorological Information to Aerodrome ATC..................................................121 Airfield Availability/Weather State Colour Code..............................................................122 Met Warnings.....................................................................................................................124 Measurement of Horizontal Visibility, Other Than Runway Visual Range .........................125 Runway Visual Range (RVR).............................................................................................125 Minimum RVR Rule ...........................................................................................................125 Annex 14A: Annex 14B: Measurement of Human Observed Runway Visual Range....................126 Measurement of Instrumented Runway Visual Range...........................129
Transmission to Aircraft .....................................................................................................129 Transmission Unserviceability ...........................................................................................130 Chapter 15: Royal Flights ..............................................................................................131 Regulatory Cross-Reference ................................................................................................131 ROYAL FLIGHTS WITHIN THE UK .....................................................................................131 Definition ............................................................................................................................131 Flight Priorities ...................................................................................................................131 Flight Notification ...............................................................................................................131 Airspace and Air Traffic Service Arrangements .................................................................133 Closure of Danger Areas ...................................................................................................138 Closure of the East Anglian Military Training Area (EAMTA) and the North Wales Military Training Area (NWMTA) ....................................................................................................139 ROYAL FLIGHTS ABROAD .................................................................................................140 Definition ............................................................................................................................140 Notification .........................................................................................................................140 Danger Areas.....................................................................................................................141 ROYAL FLIGHT SUPPLEMENTARY RADAR SERVICES ..................................................141 Introduction ........................................................................................................................141 Notification .........................................................................................................................142 LATCC (Mil) Briefing Room Supplementary Radar Services Tasking ............................142 Action in the Event of an Inability at Supplementary Radar Units......................................143 Royal Flight Plans and Delay Signals ATCC Action .......................................................143 Supplementary Radar Service Procecdures......................................................................143 Violation of CAS-T .............................................................................................................144 Annex 15A: Annex 15B: Annex 15C: Notification of Royal Flights in Fixed Wing Aircraft...............................145 Notification of Royal/Selected Helicopter Flight ....................................146 Notification of Royal Flights Fixed-Wing Aircraft................................147
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MMATM Annex 15D: Annex 15E: Annex 15F: Annex 15G: Annex 15H: Annex 15I: Chapter 16:
Specimen Temporary Controlled Airspace NOTAM .............................. 148 Specimen Royal Flight Notification Message (Fixed-Wing).................. 149 Specimen Royal Flight Notification Message (Helicopter) ................... 150 Specimen Royal Flight Signal (Helicopter)............................................. 151 Specimen Royal Flight Signal (Fixed Wing) ........................................... 152 Specimen Routeing Signal - Selected Helicopter Flight ....................... 153 Classification of Aerodromes .................................................................. 154
Regulatory Cross-Reference ............................................................................................... 154 ATC Aerodrome Classification .......................................................................................... 154 Prior Permission Required (PPR) Classifications of Aerodromes ..................................... 154 Military Aerodromes Construction and Safeguarding Criteria ........................................... 154 MEDAs .............................................................................................................................. 154 Extended Hours Aerodromes............................................................................................ 156 Chapter 17: Aerodrome Vehicles ................................................................................. 157 Regulatory Cross-Reference ............................................................................................... 157 Marking of Vehicles in Movement Areas ........................................................................... 157 Lighting of Vehicles in Movement Areas ........................................................................... 158 Chapter 18: Aerodrome Control ................................................................................... 159 Regulatory cross reference.................................................................................................. 159 Responsibilities Aerodrome Controller........................................................................... 159 Responsibilities Ground Controller................................................................................. 159 Aerodrome Control Requirements .................................................................................... 159 Lamp and Pyrotechnic Signals used in the Control of Aircraft .......................................... 161 Control of Vehicles and Pedestrians ................................................................................. 162 Control of Working Parties ................................................................................................ 166 Responsibility for Aerodrome Surfaces and Surface Inspections ..................................... 167 Snow Clearance................................................................................................................ 168 MOD Aerodrome Bird Control ........................................................................................... 168 ATC Pyrotechnics and Firearms ....................................................................................... 168 Use of MOD Airfields by Civil Aircraft................................................................................ 169 Brake Parachute Recovery ............................................................................................... 169 Responsibilities and Equipment Runway Controller....................................................... 169 Removal of TRC ATC Unmanned .................................................................................. 172 Annex 18A: Annex 18B: Annex 18C: Chapter 19: Runway Friction Meter Operations ......................................................... 173 Aerodrome Low Visibility Procedures .................................................... 175 MOD Birdstrike Risk Management .......................................................... 178 Aerodrome Lighting ................................................................................. 187
Regulatory Cross-Reference ............................................................................................... 187
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Aerodrome Lighting General Requirements ...................................................................187 Aerodrome Identification Beacons .....................................................................................188 Aerodrome Lighting Inspections .....................................................................................188 Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) .........................................................................188 Chapter 20: NATO Standard Aerodrome Procedures.................................................189 Regulatory Cross-Reference ................................................................................................189 NATO Standard Taxiing and Take-Off Procedures Fixed-Wing Aircraft.........................189 NATO Standard Visual Circuit and Landing Procedures Fixed-Wing Aircraft.................189 NATO Aerodrome and Heliport Traffic Procedures Helicopters .....................................192 NATO Aerodrome Helicopter Landing Traffic Pattern.....................................................192 NATO Heliport Landing Traffic Patter .............................................................................193 NATO Standard Visual Circuit and Landing Procedure UK Variations ...........................194 NATO Studs and Common VHF Channels........................................................................195 Annex 20A: Chapter 21: DESIGNATION OF NATO STUDS .............................................................196 Aircraft Arresting Systems .......................................................................197
Regulatory Cross-Reference ................................................................................................197 Aircraft Arresting Systems .................................................................................................197 Aircraft Arresting Barriers...................................................................................................197 Aircraft Arresting Gears .....................................................................................................198 Chapter 22: Helicopter Landing Sites ..........................................................................201 Regulatory Cross Reference ................................................................................................201 General ..............................................................................................................................201 Notification of Movements..................................................................................................201 Reconnaissance ................................................................................................................201 Approach and Take-off ......................................................................................................201 Landing Sites for Special Events .......................................................................................201 Chapter 23: Terminal Procedures General ...............................................................203 Regulatory Cross-Reference ................................................................................................203 Terminal Procedures..........................................................................................................203 Standard Instrument Departures........................................................................................203 Approach Procedures Internal Aids ................................................................................203 Precision Approaches ........................................................................................................203 Non-Precision Approaches ................................................................................................204 Circling Approaches...........................................................................................................204 Missed Approach ...............................................................................................................204 Visual Approaches .............................................................................................................204 Aircraft Categories .............................................................................................................204 Instrument Approach Minima .............................................................................................205
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Pilot Calculation of Decision Height (Altitude)/Minimum Descent Height (Altitude) .......... 207 Operation of PAR No Break Power Supply and Fault Override Facility ............................ 210 Chapter 24: Surveillance Directing and Ground Controlled Approach .................... 211 Regulatory Cross Reference................................................................................................ 211 The Director ...................................................................................................................... 211 Responsibilities Surveillance Director ............................................................................ 211 Directing Procedures General........................................................................................ 211 Terminal Radar (Ground-Controlled Approach (GCA) (STANAG 3817))....................... 212 Short Pattern Circuit.......................................................................................................... 215 Surveillance Radar Approaches........................................................................................ 216 Responsibilities PAR Controller ..................................................................................... 218 The Talkdown.................................................................................................................... 218 Chapter 25: Surveillance Approach Control ............................................................... 225 Regulatory Cross-Reference ............................................................................................... 225 The Approach Controller ................................................................................................... 225 Responsibilities Surveillance Controllers ....................................................................... 225 Services Provided by the Surveillance Approach Controller ............................................. 225 Chapter 26: Approach Control Procedures ................................................................ 227 Regulatory Cross-Reference ............................................................................................... 227 Holding Procedures........................................................................................................... 227 Approach Procedures QGH ........................................................................................... 227 Approach TACAN........................................................................................................... 231 Approach Procedure ILS................................................................................................ 231 Approach Procedure NDB.............................................................................................. 233 Circling Approach Procedure ............................................................................................ 234 Single Frequency Approach Procedure ............................................................................ 234 Non-Standard Approach Procedures ................................................................................ 235 Chapter 27: Chapter 28: Lower Airspace Radar Service ................................................................ 236 Air Traffic Control Equipment ................................................................. 237 Regulatory Cross-Reference ............................................................................................... 236 Regulatory Cross-Reference ............................................................................................... 237 Daily Servicing Policy........................................................................................................ 237 Basic Principles of Radar and Ancillary Circuits ............................................................... 237 Secondary Surveillance Radar.......................................................................................... 239 Controller SSR Equipment Checks ................................................................................... 240 Watchman Primary Radar................................................................................................. 241 Watchman Equipment Checks.......................................................................................... 245 Precision Approach Radar (PAR) Equipment ................................................................... 247
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PAR Controller Electronic Equipment Checks ...................................................................249 PAR Runway Change ........................................................................................................251 High Resolution Direction Finder (HRDF) Equipment and Controllers Checks .................251 Instrument Landing System (ILS) Thales 420 and DME 415 Equipment .......................252 ILS Controller Electronic Equipment Checks .....................................................................253 Modular Control System (MCS) Equipment and Controllers Checks ................................253 UK MOD Flight Checking Policy ........................................................................................254 Chapter 29: Air Traffic Control Centres .......................................................................256 Regulatory Cross-Reference ................................................................................................256 General ..............................................................................................................................256 Military ATCCs ...................................................................................................................256 Airspace Management Cell (AMC) ....................................................................................256 Chapter 30: Air Traffic Radar Units ..............................................................................258 Regulatory Cross-Reference ................................................................................................258 Units Providing Area Radar Services.................................................................................258 Unit Tasks ..........................................................................................................................258 Provision of Area Radar Services Qualifications ............................................................258 Types of Service ................................................................................................................259 Communications Procedures.............................................................................................259 Use of SSR ........................................................................................................................259 Reporting of Hazardous Flying Conditions ........................................................................259 RT Callsign 3 Figure Suffix for Student Pilots.................................................................260 Investigation and Handling of Airprox Reports...................................................................260 Chapter 31: Area Radar Procedures Above FL195 ..................................................261 Regulatory Cross-Reference ................................................................................................261 Airspace Above FL195 General Operating Procedures..................................................261 Special Operating Procedures ...........................................................................................263 North Wales Military Training Area (NWMTA) and East Anglian Military Training Area (EAMTA) Operating Procedures .....................................................................................264 Glider Operations Class C Airspace ...............................................................................264 UAS Above FL660 .............................................................................................................264 Annex 31A: Glider Operations Above FL195...............................................................265 Access Requirements ........................................................................................................265 TRA(G) Operations ............................................................................................................266 Glider Operations Outside TRA/TRA(G)............................................................................266 Chapter 32: Area Radar Procedures Below FL195...................................................267 Regulatory Cross-Reference ................................................................................................267 Provision of ATSOCAS ......................................................................................................267
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Services in CAS General ............................................................................................... 267 Radar Control Basic Procedures.................................................................................... 267 Radar Control Cleared Flight Path (CFP) and Radar Corridor Procedures ................... 268 Controller Initiated Procedural Crossing Clearance .......................................................... 269 Glider Corridors in Class A Airspace................................................................................. 269 Centralised Approach Control (CAC) ................................................................................ 269 Chapter 33: Special Air Activities ................................................................................ 270 Regulatory Cross-Reference ............................................................................................... 270 EMBELLISH Aircraft.......................................................................................................... 270 Supersonic Flights............................................................................................................. 270 Non-Deviating Status (NDS) ............................................................................................. 270 Research and Development (R&D) Flights ....................................................................... 271 Special Flights................................................................................................................... 272 Air-to-Air Refuelling Procedures........................................................................................ 273 Chapter 34: Air Surveillance and Control System...................................................... 274 Regulatory Cross-Reference ............................................................................................... 274 Air Surveillance and Control System Control Responsibilities ....................................... 274 Provision of Radar Services.............................................................................................. 274 Types of Service ............................................................................................................... 275 Provision of Service .......................................................................................................... 275 Chapter 35: Secondary Surveillance Radar ................................................................ 277 Regulatory Cross-Reference ............................................................................................... 277 OPERATIONAL USE OF SSR............................................................................................. 277 SSR Policy ........................................................................................................................ 277 Code Allocation Plan......................................................................................................... 277 Operational Use of SSR Mode 3/A ................................................................................... 277 Operational Use of SSR Mode C ...................................................................................... 280 Operational Use of Mode S............................................................................................... 280 SSR CODE ASSIGNMENTS ............................................................................................... 282 Originating Region Code Assignment Method (ORCAM) ................................................. 282 Special Code Assignment ................................................................................................. 282 Applications for Code Allocations...................................................................................... 284 Local Special Purpose or Conspicuity Codes ................................................................... 285 Use of Codes for Exercises............................................................................................... 285 Chapter 36: Emergency Organizations ....................................................................... 286 Regulatory Cross-Reference ............................................................................................... 286 Aeronautical Emergency Services .................................................................................... 286 ATC Crash Rescue Organization...................................................................................... 286
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Aerodrome and Heliport Safety Services...........................................................................292 UK Emergency Organization ATC Action in the Event of an Aircraft Emergency...........293 UK Emergency Organization Training Fixes...................................................................294 UK Emergency Organization Practise Urgency Calls .....................................................294 States of Readiness for Aircraft Emergencies and the Standard Format for Aircraft Emergency Messages .......................................................................................................294 Aerodrome Crash/Rescue Fire Service at MOD Aerodromes ...........................................295 Chapter 37: ATC Emergency Procedures and Responsibilities ................................296 Regulatory Cross-Reference ................................................................................................296 Types of Emergency Control .............................................................................................296 Emergency Actions by D&D Sections................................................................................296 Temporary Danger Area (TDA)/Search and Rescue Operations (SAROPS) Notification System ...............................................................................................................................298 Emergency Actions By ATC at Aerodromes ......................................................................300 Military Emergency Procedure...........................................................................................300 Civil Emergency Procedures..............................................................................................301 Safety Signal......................................................................................................................302 Reporting and Actions on Distress Incidents .....................................................................302 Breakaway Balloons ..........................................................................................................302 Aircraft Subject to Bomb Warnings ....................................................................................303 Military Air Accident Investigation Board (MAAIB)/Air Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) Procedures.........................................................................................................................305 Chapter 38: Aircraft Diversions ....................................................................................307 Regulatory Cross-Reference ................................................................................................307 Originating Authority ..........................................................................................................307 Responsibilities ..................................................................................................................307 Booking ..............................................................................................................................308 Procedures.........................................................................................................................308 Chapter 39: Overdue Action..........................................................................................311 Regulatory Cross-Reference ................................................................................................311 Definition of Aircraft Overdue.............................................................................................311 Overdue Action by ATC .....................................................................................................311 Naval Authorities to be Informed........................................................................................312 Chapter 40: Search and Rescue ...................................................................................313 Regulatory Cross-Reference ................................................................................................313 Responsibilities of the Search and Rescue (SAR) Organization .......................................313 ARCC.................................................................................................................................313 Detailed Working and Organization of SAR.......................................................................313 Chapter 41: Controllers Emergency Actions Terminal ATC ..................................314
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Regulatory Cross-Reference ............................................................................................... 314 Terminal ATC Emergency Actions General ................................................................ 314 Speechless Procedures General ................................................................................... 314 Aircraft Transmitter Unserviceable.................................................................................... 315 Approach Procedures Flame-Out Procedures ............................................................... 316 Approach Procedures Hawk and Tucano Radar Actual and Practise Forced Landing.. 317 Approach Procedures No Compass No Gyro Procedures ............................................. 318 Missed Approach and Communications Failure (MA&CF) Procedures ............................ 318 Aircraft with Radio or Total Electrics Failure ..................................................................... 319 Chapter 42: Controllers Emergency Actions Area Radar ...................................... 320 Regulatory Cross-Reference ............................................................................................... 320 Emergencies ..................................................................................................................... 320 Radar Failure .................................................................................................................... 320 Loss of Communications................................................................................................... 320 Chapter 43: Administration - General.......................................................................... 322 Regulatory Cross-Reference ............................................................................................... 322 ATC Log Books ................................................................................................................. 322 Closure of Aerodromes ..................................................................................................... 322 Proposals for Establishment Cancellation or Change....................................................... 323 Chapter 44: Civil Aircraft Use of Military Airfields ..................................................... 325 Regulatory Cross-Reference ............................................................................................... 325 Accommodation for Civil Aircraft, Aircrew and Passengers .............................................. 325 Refuelling and Maintenance of Civil Aircraft ..................................................................... 325 Chapter 45: Responsibilities and Task of the Radar Analysis Cell and the Low Flying Operations Squadron ........................................................................................................ 326 Regulatory Cross-Reference ............................................................................................... 326 Responsibilities and Task of the Radar Analysis Cell ....................................................... 326 Responsibilities and Task of the Low Flying Operations Squadron .................................. 326 Chapter 46: Aeronautical Information ......................................................................... 328 Regulatory Cross-Reference ............................................................................................... 328 Aeronautical Information ................................................................................................... 328 UK AIP Supplements and Notices to Airmen (NOTAM).................................................... 329 SNOWTAM ....................................................................................................................... 330 Reporting Aeronautical Information................................................................................... 330 Chapter 47: Air Traffic Service Messages................................................................... 332 Regulatory Cross-Reference ................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. Air Traffic Services Messages General .............................. Error! Bookmark not defined. XFlightW Plans ............................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.
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To File a Flight Plan ...............................................................Error! Bookmark not defined. Addressing Flight Plans .........................................................Error! Bookmark not defined. Administrative Responsibility .................................................Error! Bookmark not defined. Chapter 48: Communications .......................................................................................344 Regulatory Cross-Reference ................................................................................................344 Telecommunications General .........................................................................................344 Air-Ground Communications (UK) Aerodromes..............................................................344 Point-to-Point Communications (UK) Aerodrome ...........................................................345 Air-Ground Communications (UK) ATCCs......................................................................346 Communications Security Measures .................................................................................346 RVSM Liaison Phraseology ...............................................................................................347 Chapter 49: Aerodrome and ATM Considerations for Non-Front Line Command Supporting Organizations..................................................................................................348 Regulatory cross-reference ..................................................................................................348 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL .....................................................................................................348 Policy .................................................................................................................................348 General ..............................................................................................................................348 Amendments To ATC Procedures .....................................................................................349 Radar Procedures..............................................................................................................349 Concurrent, Parallel Runway Operations...........................................................................350 ATC Controller - Licensing, Certificates of Competency and Endorsements ....................350 Equipment..........................................................................................................................351 Staffing...............................................................................................................................351 Airfield SUPERVISION .........................................................................................................351 Policy .................................................................................................................................351 Airfield Supervisor Qualification .........................................................................................352 Airfield Supervisor Function ...............................................................................................352 Airfield Supervisors ensure that no equipment, either permanent or temporary, is installed or removed from the airfields site without prior approval from the MAA. ..................................352 Annex 49A: Application for Airfield Supervisor Approval .........................................353 Extracts from stanags ...........................................................................................................354
TABLE OF FIGURES Figure 4-1 UK VMC Minima for VFR Flight.............................................................................31 Figure 4-2 Quadrantal Rule ....................................................................................................36 Figure 4-3 Single Alternate Flight Level Orientation Scheme.................................................37 Figure 4-4 Flight Level Orientation Scheme ...........................................................................37 Figure 4-5 Sectors For Minimum Safe Flight Level Calculations............................................39
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Figure 11-1 Application of Vertical Separation....................................................................... 77 Figure 12-1 Wake Turbulence Military Advisory Separation ................................................ 108 Figure 12-2 Air Transport and Civil Aircraft Separation ....................................................... 109 Figure 12-3 ROCD Phraseology .......................................................................................... 111 Figure 14-1 Colour Codes.................................................................................................... 122 Figure 14-2 RVR Correction Table ...................................................................................... 127 Figure 14-3 RVR Conversion Table Sample Calculations ................................................ 127 Figure 17-1 Vehicle Paint Specifications ............................................................................. 158 Figure 18-1 Lamp and Pyrotechnic Signals ......................................................................... 161 Figure 18-2 Signals Used for Control of Vehicles and Pedestrians ..................................... 165 Figure 18-3 Deleted at Issue 4............................................................................................. 173 Figure 19-1 Airfield Lighting Brilliancy Guide ....................................................................... 188 Figure 20-1 NATO Standard VFR Traffic Landing Pattern Fixed Wing............................. 190 Figure 20-2 NATO Standard Rectangular Traffic Landing Pattern Fixed-Wing ................ 191 Figure 20-3 NATO Aerodrome Helicopter Landing Traffic Pattern ................................... 193 Figure 20-4 NATO Heliport Landing Traffic Pattern .......................................................... 194 Figure 20-5 NATO Studs ..................................................................................................... 196 Figure 23-1 RVR Conversion Table..................................................................................... 206 Figure 24-1 Director Procedures - Radar Circuit ................................................................. 214 Figure24-2 Director Procedure - Short Pattern Circuit......................................................... 216 Figure 24-3 Surveillance Radar Approach - Relationship to the Centreline ........................ 217 Figure 24-4 PAR Azimuth Interpretation .............................................................................. 220 Figure 24-5 PAR Glidepath Interpretation............................................................................ 221 Figure 24-6 PAR Other Track Guidance.............................................................................. 224 Figure 26-1 Approach Procedure - QGH - High Level ......................................................... 229 Figure 26-2 Approach Procedure - QGH - Low Level .......................................................... 230 Figure 26-3 Approach Procedure ILS ............................................................................... 232 Figure 28-1 Watchman Processed Channel Selection ........................................................ 241 Figure 28-2 Watchman Display Interface Controls .............................................................. 242 Figure 28-3 MPC Indicator Lamp - Definitions/Controller Actions ....................................... 248 Figure 37-1 TDA/SAROPS Cascade System ...................................................................... 299 Figure 41-1 Speechless Procedure ..................................................................................... 315 Figure 47-1 ICAO Messages in Military Use ............................ Error! Bookmark not defined. Figure 47-2 Composition of ATS Messages ............................ Error! Bookmark not defined. Figure 47-3 IFPS and CFMU Related Messages .................... Error! Bookmark not defined. Figure 48-1 RVSM Liaison Phraseology.............................................................................. 347
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Chapter 1: ATC Policy

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3001(1). Military ATC Policy 1. Military ATC should, in time of peace and war provide, aeronautical facilities and a ground organization which can: a. Enable pilots of military aircraft to operate safely and effectively with tactical freedom in all weather conditions. The objectives being to: (1) Prevent collisions between aircraft or, on the manoeuvring area, between aircraft and obstructions. (2) Expedite and maintain an orderly flow of air traffic. b. c. Provide a suite of Air Traffic Services. Alert emergency services and initiate search and rescue activity when required.
d. Meet the requirements of the air defence organization for the notification of aircraft movements. 2. Unless in receipt of a service from a British military controller, military aircraft should conform to the civil national ATC system of all foreign countries over which they fly. In the UK, the system of air traffic control is based on a joint civil/military scheme in which the military aviation authorities observe such ICAO regulations as have been accepted by the Civil Aviation Authority, provided they do not impair the operational freedom of military aircraft. Operational Considerations 3. The following aspects of aircraft operations should be taken into consideration at all times by air traffic controllers during the performance of their duties: a. b. c. d. e. Complexity of missions/sorties. High psychological and physical strain on crews. Airborne equipment related to the military mission. High probability of emergencies with high-performance aircraft. Limited fuel reserve.
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Chapter 2: National and International ATC Organization and Responsibilities

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE No current MAA regulatory cross-reference. General 1. Detailed information on the structure and responsibilities of HQ ATM Force, the Joint Air Navigation Services Council (JANSC) and National Air Traffic Services (NATS) will be provided by HQ AIR in due course. 2. Users of this document who require information on the structure and responsibilities of HQ ATM Force should contact HQ AIR, Attn ATM Force Commander, RAF High Wycombe, HP14 4UE. International Civil Aviation Organization 3. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) exists to regulate the purely civilian aspects of international aviation. It promulgates standards and recommended practices which member states agree to observe whenever possible. The Ministry of Defence has no direct link with ICAO but by policy it conforms to ICAO standards and practices provided that they do not conflict with military requirements. Amongst the tasks of ICAO is airspace classification which UK military aircraft recognise.
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Chapter 3: Responsibilities of ATC Personnel

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3003(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7). Responsibilities of ATC Staff Equipment 1. ATC staff are responsible to the SATCO/Sqn Cdr for ensuring that all equipment used in the normal performance of their duties is serviceable and, where applicable, set up in accordance with extant guidance and local orders. Any unserviceability should be reported to the appropriate authority without undue delay. Responsibilities and Duties of Area Radar Staff 2. Area radar controllers are responsible for providing an ATS to military and civil aircraft in the UAS and LAS and for providing CAS crossing services in their respective areas of operation. They are also responsible for providing CAC services to nominated airfields and other special tasks as required. Further detail of the responsibilities and duties of area radar staff is in Area Radar SOPs and RAF ATM Force Orders. The Handover of a Control Position 3. When handing-over a control position to another controller the off-going controller should brief his relief on: a. b. c. d. 4. The state of all surveillance and instrument aids. Serviceability state of communication equipment. The traffic situation. Any other relevant information.
A change of controller should not to be attempted until: a. A suitable point is reached during the recovery of aircraft under control.
b. Any emergency incident has been completed or the aircraft has been handedover to another control position. c. The on-coming controller signifies his acceptance of the control position.
Bandboxing/Splitting of Control Positions 5. Whenever Sector/Control positions are bandboxed or split, controllers ensure, by carrying out mandatory checks, that the position has been correctly configured and that relevant parties have been notified, before a control service is provided from the bandboxed or split Sector/Control position. 6. Unit Cdrs/SATCOs should ensure that checklists are readily available to controllers to enable them to confirm that all necessary action has been completed. The checklists, which should be specific to every Sector/Control position that could be bandboxed or split, should include the following:
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RT frequencies that should be selected or de-selected as appropriate.
b. Selection or de-selection of the landline connections relevant to the responsibility of the bandboxed/split Sector/position. c. d. Surveillance selection, if appropriate. Frequency and landline confidence checks.
e. List of parties that should be notified of the new Sector/Control position configuration. Medical Employment Standards 7. The MES limitations for Air Traffic Controllers should be as follows: a. b. c. Fit controller duties. Fit controller duties in the proximity of another controller. Unfit controller duties.
8. Personnel graded as fit controller duties in the proximity of another controller do not require a dedicated screen controller. The limitation is defined as authorized for working within an environment where other controllers are in immediate proximity, either as a member of the controlling team or as a supervisor rostered for the duration of the subject controllers watch. Blood Donation 9. Air traffic controllers, including Runway Controllers, should not give blood if they are scheduled to control in the 12 hrs immediately following the blood donation. While many air traffic controllers donate blood and while there is no medical evidence that the giving of blood under medically-controlled conditions affects controlling performance adversely, it remains possible that some individuals might feel drowsy or faint immediately after giving blood. Alcohol Consumption
10.
All ATC staff should ensure that they are not suffering from the effects or after-effects of alcohol when they report for duty. During the 24 hrs prior to duty, ATC staff should only consume modest amounts of alcohol (as a guide, 2 pints of ordinary strength beer or the equivalent); however, no alcohol should be consumed in the 10 hrs immediately prior to duty. Controlling Following Vaccination
Air Traffic Controllers, including Runway Controllers, should not control aircraft within 12 hours of receiving a vaccination. Exceptions may only be made where the individual has received the same vaccination previously and suffered no side-effects.
11.
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Chapter 4: Division of Airspace and Rules of the Air

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3004(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12) Flight and Upper Flight Information Regions (FIRs/UIRs) 1. UK airspace, including that over the surrounding waters, is divided into 2 FIRs. Above each of these FIRs is a UIR. These 4 regions are collectively termed the London and Scottish FIRs/UIRs. The airspace boundaries are detailed in RAF FLIPs. 2. The London and Scottish FlRs/UIRs are divided vertically into the following bands: a. b. UIR. Upper Airspace (UAS) from FL245 to unlimited. FIR. Lower Airspace (LAS) from surface level to below FL245.
ICAO Airspace Classifications General 3. International Categorization. UK airspace is subdivided into various classes and functional areas in order to meet national or international airspace management requirements. For the purposes of international standardization, certain of these subdivisions are classified according to an ICAO system within which minimum ATS are specified. The 7 airspace classifications (Classes A to G) agreed within ICAO have been adopted by the UK and are described in the following paragraphs. 4. Scope. Controlled Airspace is a generic term which is normally abbreviated to CAS and is used to describe airspace which is notified as such in the UK AIP; within this airspace, civil pilots are required to comply with ATC and other regulations forming part of the UK Air Navigation Order (ANO) and Rules of the Air Regulations. In essence, CAS comprises different types of control zone and control area to which are assigned one of the ICAO Airspace Classifications A to E. Classes F and G are reserved for uncontrolled airspace. Controlled Airspace (ICAO Classes A to E) 5. Class A. In the UK, Class A airspace comprises all airways below FL195 (except where they pass through a Terminal Control Area (TMA or CTA) or CTR of lower status), the London TMA, the Manchester TMA, the Daventry, Cotswold and Worthing CTAs and the London CTR. 6. Class B. Not allocated in the UK.
7. Class C. Within the London and Scottish FIR/UIRs, Class C airspace extends from FL195 to FL660. The UIR contains, inter alia, the HUTA and a network of domestic and international routes for use by GAT. Military upper airspace routes, based on TACAN beacons, are available to OAT operating above FL245. 8. Class D. Class D CAS comprises CTAs and/or CTRs surrounding notified aerodromes, including some military aerodromes, together with part of the Scottish TMA. 9. Class E. Class E CAS comprises the Scottish TMA at and below 6000 ft AMSL and the Belfast TMA.
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Uncontrolled Airspace (ICAO Classes F and G) 10. Class F. Class F airspace consists of Advisory Routes (ADRs) along which a civil air traffic advisory service is available to participating aircraft. ADRs in the FIR may pass through, originate from or terminate in CAS. Within CAS, ADRs acquire the status of the surrounding airspace. The UK AIP and RAF FLIPs provide details. 11. Class G. The remainder of UK airspace falls within Class G.
Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) 12. Under the auspices of European Air Traffic Management Programme (EATMP), the Concept of FUA has been evolved whereby European airspace will no longer be designated military or civil within national boundaries but will be considered as an entity to be allocated according to user requirements. Fundamental to this policy is the introduction of an Airspace Management Cell (AMC), which will conduct day-to-day airspace allocation and management in co-operation with the EUROCONTROL Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU). There are 4 airspace features specific to this concept: a. Conditional Route (CDR). CDRs are non-permanent ATS routes, or portions thereof, (including levels) which can be planned and used under specified conditions. b. Temporary Segregated Areas (TAS). TSAs are reserved exclusively for specific operations during set periods to ensure the safety of all. These might include Danger and Restricted Areas, according to the nature of the activity taking place, or MTAs. c. Cross-Border Area (CBA). CBAs are TSAs established across national boundaries, where operations will be subject to procedures agreed by participating states. d. Reduced Coordination Airspace (RCA). RCA is a specific portion of airspace within which GAT is permitted off-route without requiring controllers to initiate coordination against OAT. This procedure is applicable at times when OAT activity is minimal or non-existent. Aerodrome Traffic Zones (ATZs) 13. Status. ATZs are established at those civil and Government aerodromes, which are notified for the purposes of the Rules of the Air Regulations. ATZs may be situated within airspace of any class. When the requirements for a particular class of airspace are more stringent than the normal rules for an ATZ then the more stringent rules apply. 14. Dimensions. Except for any part of the airspace within the ATZ of another aerodrome which is notified as being the controlling aerodrome of a Combined ATZ, the airspace extends from the surface to 2000 ft above aerodrome level and: a. Where the length of the longest runway is notified as greater than 1850 m, within the area bounded by a circle centred on the notified mid-point of the longest runway and having a radius of 2.5 nm. b. Where the length of the longest runway is 1850 m or less, the radius is 2nm. Where this is notified as producing an ATZ extending less than 1.5 nm beyond the end of any runway, the radius is increased to 2.5 nm.
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Military Aerodrome Traffic Zones (MATZs) 15. Status. At certain military aerodromes, Military Aerodrome Traffic Zones (MATZ) have been established to provide a volume of airspace within which increased protection may be given to aircraft in the critical stages of circuit, approach and climb-out. A MATZ acquires the status of the airspace classification within which it lies; however, additional mandatory ATC requirements are invariably specified for military pilots. In the airspace outside the Aerodrome Traffic Zone (ATZ), observation of MATZ procedures is not compulsory for civil pilots. 16. Dimensions. The dimensions of a MATZ are as follows: a. The airspace within 5 nm radius of the mid-point of the longest runway, from the surface to 3000 ft above aerodrome level. b. The airspace within a stub or stubs projected from the above airspace, having a length of 5 nm along the centreline(s) aligned with the selected final approach path(s), and a width of 4 nm (2 nm either side of the centreline) from 1000 ft above aerodrome level to 3000 ft above aerodrome level. In some cases, the stub or stubs may be absent or reduced in size. 17. Combined Zones. CMATZs are occasionally established as the means of integrating and coordinating traffic patterns and specified control services. Selected aerodromes, in addition to providing ATC services to meet their own requirements, are responsible for providing ATC services to other aerodromes within the CMATZ. The former are designated Controlling Aerodromes. Where 2 or more MATZs are grouped together and one aerodrome is designated the Controlling Aerodrome, the upper limit of each MATZ within the Combined MATZ (CMATZ) is determined with reference to the elevation of the higher (or highest) aerodrome in the CMATZ. 18. Operating Hours. A MATZ is operative when the aerodrome concerned, or in the case of a CMATZ, any one of the aerodromes, is open. Normally, a Controlling Aerodrome ATC unit for the CMATZ should remain open while any one of the aerodromes in the CMATZ is open for flying. Alternatively, the Controlling Aerodrome should delegate overall responsibility to the aerodrome remaining open, including arrangements for operating the CMATZ frequency. Airspace Reservations 19. General. An Airspace Reservation in the UK is an airspace of defined dimensions above a designated land or water area through which flight can be prohibited or restricted and within which specific activities may be encountered. These areas are notified in the UK AIP (ENR 5.1 including the associated Chart of United Kingdom Airspace Restrictions and Hazardous Areas in ENR 6), Series GSGS 5201 and other civil aeronautical charts, RAF FLIPs and the Mil AIP (ENR 5.1). The status of airspace reservations, in ICAO terms, depends upon the classification of the airspace within which they lie. They include Prohibited Areas, PMP Areas, Restricted Areas, PMR Areas, Danger Areas, AIAAs, ATAs, HIRTAs, MTAs, TRAs and AARAs. In addition to the foregoing safety measures, full use should be made of radar services, ashore and afloat, to aid pilots of aircraft in keeping clear of prohibited, restricted and danger areas, particularly in conditions of poor visibility. 20. Prohibited Areas. Aircraft, other than those specifically permitted to enter for operational reasons, should not be flown through UK Prohibited Areas. 21. Provost Marshals Prohibited Areas. Military aircraft should not be flown through the RAF Provost Marshals Prohibited Areas (PMPAs).
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22. Provost Marshals Restricted Areas. Military aircraft should only to be flown through the RAF Provost Marshals Restricted Areas (PMRAs) in accordance with specified procedures. 23. Danger Areas General. Scheduled Danger Areas (DAs) have fixed, published hours of operation and are depicted differently on charts from Notified DAs which are characterised by variable times of activation by NOTAM. Either type of DA can have a variable upper limit. When NOTAM activation of an authorized time or height extension is appropriate, as much warning as possible should be provided by the DA manager to AIS (Heathrow). By-laws made under the Military Lands Acts and associated legislation provide for the prohibition of unauthorized access to certain UK DAs, not just by military but also by civil pilots. 24. Restricted and Danger Areas Flights Within. Flight in UK Restricted or active UK Danger Areas should only be permitted: a. When such flights are necessary to enable pilots to perform in the restricted area or danger area, the duty for which the flight was authorized. The operations of participating aircraft within active danger areas are often incompatible with normal ATC procedures. Participating pilots can therefore operate within active danger areas without radar service, or can be provided with a service as previously agreed with both the area controlling authority and the ATSU or ADGE unit concerned. b. When the aircraft is being flown in accordance with air traffic control procedures approved for the penetration of the area. 25. Danger Area Services. A Danger Area Crossing Service (DACS) or a Danger Area Activity Information Service (DAAIS) can be available for certain UK Danger Areas from a nominated unit to pilots of non-participating aircraft as follows: a. DACS. The appropriate nominated unit should, whenever the danger area activity permits, provide a clearance to cross the danger area. Unless the nominated unit is already providing the pilot requiring a DACS with an appropriate radar service, the DACS clearance should be in relation to the danger area activity only, and will not, in traffic management terms, constitute separation from other aircraft, which might be operating in the vicinity. b. DAAIS. On request, the appropriate nominated unit should pass to the pilot information on relevant known activity in the danger area. Such information is provided in order to assist the pilot to decide whether it would be prudent to penetrate the danger area. A DAAIS does not constitute a clearance to a pilot to cross a danger area. The dangers of flight in any active area are real and, if there is any doubt about the activity status or the safety of the aircraft proposing to enter, pilots should plan or conduct their flights to avoid such areas. For UK danger areas activated by NOTAM as much advance warning as possible is given to the appropriate ATCC by the danger area sponsor/manager, but activation can be initiated or altered at short notice. 26. Ranges (Small Arms). Many outdoor ranges are established for small arms firing or similar activities in excess of 1000 ft horizontally across open areas and these can present an occasional hazard to aircraft flying at or below 500 ft. The criterion used to determine whether or not a range should be promulgated in the UK AIP and RAF FLIPs as an aeronautical danger area is a safety zone upper limit in excess of 500 ft AGL. Details of appropriate small arms ranges are published in the Mil AIP Vol 3 Pt 1 and in the ENR section of the UK Air Pilot (AIP).
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27. Restricted Area (Temporary) (RA(T)) and Temporary Danger Areas (TDA). RA(T) and TDAs can be established in accordance with promulgated DAP instructions at short notice in the event of an incident occurring on land or at sea when it may be necessary to inhibit flight in the vicinity of the incident. Initial action by the Emergency Controlling Authority (ECA) of an incident can include the establishment of a TDA by NOTAM. If the TDA fails to achieve the objective or is inappropriate, temporary Restriction of Flying Regulations can be enacted. Military aircraft should not be flown in or around the scene of an incident or disaster which has been designated a Temporary Danger Area or is the subject of Restriction of Flying Regulations which thereby introduces a RA(T) without the permission of the Emergency Controlling Authority. The introduction and subsequent cancellation of any Restriction of Flying associated with an incident or disaster will be promulgated by NOTAM RA(T)s are, in the interest of flight safety, also established to provide protection to participating aircraft and spectators at certain special events. RA(T)s are also established to protect jet aircraft formation teams carrying out aerobatics displays at venues throughout the UK. 28. Military Training Area (MTA). MTAs are established within an MRSA to afford freedom of operation to pilots engaged in flying activities which are incompatible with the provision of Radar Control. 29. Temporary Reserved Airspace (TRA). A TRA is a defined volume of airspace normally under the jurisdiction of one aviation authority and temporarily reserved, by common agreement, for the specific use by another aviation authority and through which other traffic can be allowed to transit under an ATS authority. TRAs 001-008 are established in the UK FIRs to allow the various VFR and autonomous operational requirements of UK airspace users in the block FL195-245. Notified access and operating rules apply during their hours of activation. 30. Royal Flights. Aircraft should not to be flown in notified CAS (T) airspace unless ATC clearance has been obtained from the specified controlling authority. 31. High Intensity Radio Transmission Area (HIRTA). A HIRTA is an airspace of defined dimensions within which there is radio energy at intensity levels which can affect weapon systems and interfere with or, on occasion, cause damage to communications and navigation equipment. Only the most significant sources are listed in the UK AIP and RAF FLIPs; however, it should be noted that electronic emissions can be present elsewhere, not just over land but also near surface vessels, oil/gas platforms and AEW or other aircraft. While the avoidance of these areas is a pilots responsibility, controllers should be aware of the possible need for some types of aircraft to deviate from track in order to avoid HIRTA exclusion zones (different dimensions depending upon susceptibility of the platform, its systems and weapons fit). In order to assist the pilot in meeting his avoidance responsibilities, controllers should advise pilots of the proximity of HIRTAs and ask if a reroute for avoidance is required. Controllers should then to act in accordance with the pilots response. 32. Areas of Intense Aerial Activity (AIAA). An AIAA is an airspace of defined dimensions within which the intensity of civil and/or military flying is exceptionally high or where aircraft, singly or in combination with others, regularly participate in unusual manoeuvres. Pilots of non-participating aircraft who are unable to avoid AIAAs are advised to make use of a radar service. 33. Aerial Tactics Areas (ATA). An ATA is an airspace of defined dimensions designated for air combat training within which high-energy manoeuvres are performed by aircraft singly and in formations. Pilots of non-participating aircraft who are unable to avoid ATAs are advised to make use of a radar service.
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34. Air Refuelling Areas. An Air Refuelling (AR) Area is an airspace of defined dimensions within which aircraft carry out in-flight Refuelling at levels which do not necessarily conform with the Quadrantal or Semi Circular flight rules, under the supervision of a co-ordinating control agency. Flight Notification 35. Pilots of aircraft remaining wholly within a UK FIR throughout the flight will be permitted to operate without an ATC clearance or, indeed, notification to the ATC organization, except in airspace which is notified as requiring such reference in the UK AIP or RAF FLIPs. Operational and General Air Traffic 36. There are differences between the ATS rules and procedures applicable to OAT and GAT. However, in principle, a flight may be conducted as OAT or GAT irrespective of whether the aircraft operating authority is civil or military. The decision to fly as OAT or GAT will be made by the pilot according to the availability of ATS and the nature of the flight. A military pilot crossing CAS in the FIR usually proceeds as OAT. Conversely, a military pilot wishing to make use of the CAS route structure and services must proceed as GAT. 37. Access to CAS by pilots of aircraft operating as OAT is permissible provided that the pilot conforms with the associated regulations and procedures concerning ATC clearance and ATS; such details may be found in RAF FLIPs. Aircraft operating under ASACS control, must conduct their flights in accordance with the rules laid down for access to CAS in the instructions issued by parent HQs. 38. Pilots of military aircraft operating as GAT must conduct their flights in accordance with the ATC rules applicable to the airspace. The rules are described in the UK AIP and RAF FLIPs. However, there are differences between the rules applying to civil GAT and those applying to military GAT. Military pilots are not subject to the speed limit of 250 kt specified for civil flights below FL100 and the VMC criteria applicable to military aircraft are those specified in Figure 4-1 UK VMC Minima for VFR Flight. Flight Rules and Flight Conditions 39. Flights by military pilots are required to be conducted under IFR, VFR or SVFR as appropriate. VMC and IMC refer to the weather conditions encountered during flight. These terms are used to denote actual weather conditions, as distinct from the flight rules under which the flight is being conducted. VMC exist when the weather permits flight in accordance with the VFR; IMC exist when weather conditions are below the minima for VFR flight. VFR 40. UK. Within the UK, VFR are as follows: a. Avoidance of Collision. Pilots should maintain safe separation from other traffic. b. Flight Conditions. The aircraft should remain in weather conditions which satisfy the VMC minima specified in the table below. 41. Outside the UK. Outside the UK, pilots should comply with the VFR of the country over which they are flying. Flag Officers, Theatre Commanders, Army Air Corps and Air Officers Commanding-in-Chief can issue supplementary instructions for VFR flights provided they are not below the national or UK minimum, whichever imposes the greater limitation.
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UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED Figure 4-2 UK VMC Minima for VFR Flight Airspace Class Level At or above FL100 Below FL100 to above 3000 ft amsl or above 1000 ft above terrain, whichever is the higher Any More than 250 kt 250 kt or less More than 250 kt 250 kt to above 140 kt C1, D, E At or below 3000 ft amsl or 1000 ft above terrain, whichever is the higher Helicopters 140 kt or less IAS Distance from Cloud 1500 m horizontally 1000 ft vertically 1500 m horizontally 1000 ft vertically 1500 m horizontally 1000 ft vertically 1500m horizontally 1000 ft vertically 1500 m horizontally 1000 ft vertically 1500 m horizontally 1000 ft vertically or Clear of cloud and in sight of the surface 1500 m horizontally 1000 ft vertically or Clear of cloud and in sight of the surface 1500 m horizontally 1000 ft vertically 1500 m horizontally 1000 ft vertically 1500 m horizontally 1000 ft vertically 1500 m horizontally 1000 ft vertically2 1500m horizontally 1000ft vertically2 Or Clear of cloud and in sight of the surface 1500 m horizontally 1000 ft vertically2 Or Clear of cloud and in sight of the surface
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Flight Visibility 8 km 8 km 5 km 8 km 5 km 5 km
1500 m
5 km
Other than helicopters 140 kt or less
5 km
At or above FL100 Below FL100 to above 3000 ft amsl or above 1000 ft above terrain, whichever is the higher
Any More than 250 kt 250 kt or less More than 140 kt
8 km 8 km 5 km 5 km 5 km
F, G At or below 3000 ft amsl or 1000 ft above terrain, whichever is the higher (see note) Helicopters 140 kt or less
1500 m3 5 km
Other than helicopters 140 kt or less
1500 m
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Class C airspace extends vertically from FL195 to FL660.
2. In the UKLFS, at or below 2000ft agl, the vertical distance from cloud is 500 ft. Additional information can be found in the UK Mil Low Flying Handbook. 3. Helicopters can be permitted to operate in less than 1500 m flight visibility, if manoeuvred at a speed that will give adequate opportunity to observe other traffic or any obstacles in time to avoid collision. IFR 42. UK. Within the UK, IFR are as follows: a. Outside CAS. Above 3000 ft amsl, pilots should select cruising levels according to the quadrantal or semi-circular rule as applicable, based on the standard altimeter setting 1013.2 hPa, unless they are flying in conformity with instructions from ATC, HM Ships or an ASACS Unit. Note: Throughout any period of level flight above the transition altitude, other than at a Flight Level, the aircraft should be in receipt of a surveillance radar service or carrying out a holding procedure established in relation to an airfield. b. Inside CAS. Inside CAS, the following conditions should be complied with when the flight is proceeding as GAT: (1) (2) (3) A flight plan should be submitted to the appropriate ATCC. Clearance for the flight should be obtained from the appropriate ATCC. A pilot should have a valid instrument rating.
(4) The aircraft should carry appropriate radio equipment operating on the notified radio frequencies. (5) The aircraft should carry radio-navigation equipment as specified in FLIPs.
(6) The flight should be conducted in accordance with the ATC clearance and instructions received. 43. Outside the UK. Outside the UK, IFR flights should be conducted in accordance with the national procedures detailed in the appropriate FLIPs. Applicability of VFR and IFR 44. Flight Under IFR. A flight may be conducted under IFR as follows: a. Within the UK, flight under IFR is mandatory: (1) (2) (3) b. In IMC. In Class A airspace, except where SVFR is permitted. In Class C airspace when VFR operations are not permitted.
A pilot can elect to fly under IFR although VMC prevail.

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c. Civil aircraft flying at night may proceed under VFR in accordance with General Exemption No 903 to the Air Navigation Order 2009, other than where the commander is required to comply with IFR. 45. Flight Under VFR. A flight may be conducted under VFR except in the circumstances specified in Paragraph 44. Instrument Flight Rules and Safety Altitude 46. Under normal flying conditions the Instrument Flight Rules do not allow flight below 3000 ft in IMC unless conforming with those exceptions stated in Paragraphs 51-53, which includes special dispensation from the MOD. Additionally, military exercises can necessitate operations above the transition altitude with flight profiles that do not conform to the standard IFR. 47. The following paragraphs specify the dispensations and exemptions which allow UK Military aircraft to deviate from the standard IFR. 48. Flight above the Transition Altitude. Standard IFR procedures should be observed as amplified in the following paragraphs: a. Any UK Military aircraft operating in IMC over the sea outside airspace classified A to F, above the transition altitude (to be taken as 3000 ft where no other transition altitude is specified) will comply with published IFR procedures for the FIR concerned except when: (1) (2) In airspace NOTAMed for flight not in accordance with the IFR. In a Danger Area which is notified as active and allocated to the flying unit.
(3) In accordance with operation orders for specific exercises where allocated operating levels preclude flight at the appropriate IFR level - in the normal course the operational sponsor for the exercise is responsible for ensuring that any necessary NOTAM action is taken. (4) Flying in conformity with instructions by Air Traffic Control, an HM Ship or an Air Defence unit (see note). Note: Other than for reasons of safety, or as directed by Paragraph 48 a. (1) to. (3) above, a controlling unit should not direct an aircraft in level cruising flight to fly at non quadrantal/semicircular level unless the aircraft is in receipt of a recognised radar service. If provided by a ship, only an air warning or air control radar should be used and the service should be provided from a dedicated console where the appropriate radar is available at all times. b. Where an aircraft is flying an operational pattern (eg on a Combat Air Patrol station or monitoring a Joint Engagement Zone barrier) and cannot maintain VMC, it will seldom be practicable to fly at appropriate cruising levels. In such cases, the aircraft will be deprived of even the limited protection afforded by quadrantal/semicircular system. In these circumstances and when the EMCON policy permits, it is recommended that a radar service be sought wherever possible. 49. Tactical Maritime and Non-Tactical Maritime Operations. The following paragraphs refer to Tactical Maritime and Non-Tactical Maritime operations. These sorties are defined as follows.
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a. Non-Tactical Maritime. Sorties that do not involve flight in a tactical profile such as HDS, SOOTAX, NAVEX, embarkation etc. b. Tactical Maritime. Sorties involving operations/training that are constrained in selection of operating levels/altitudes by a need to achieve a specific sortie aim such as ASW, AEW, ASUW, MCT and SAR. 50. Descent and Operations below 3000 ft IMC. RN aircraft and other aircraft operating in the maritime environment may be authorized to descend and operate below 3000 ft and continue below safety altitude in IMC over the sea subject to compliance with the following conditions:
RADAR SERVICE AVAILABLE (see note 2) Once 2 nm clear of the coast, (5 nm for fixed wing aircraft), and heading away from land, aircraft may descend below their Safety Altitude and continue down to the authorized operating altitude. Descent below 200 ft may only take place when visual with the surface, or with reference to a serviceable radio/radar altimeter. Once 2 nm clear of the coast, and heading away from land, aircraft may descend below their Safety Altitude and continue to 500 ft MSD. They may then remain in IMC at 500 ft MSD provided that they have been authorized to do so (and they remain greater than 5nm from the coast). Flight below 500 ft MSD in IMC is only permitted when either: a. Specifically authorized. b. Conducting a radar approach (including HCA/SCA/ELVA). NO RADAR SERVICE AVAILABLE Once 5 nm clear of the coast, and heading away from land, aircraft may descend below their Safety Altitude and continue to 500 ft MSD with reference to a serviceable barometric altimeter. If 5 nm separation from land cannot be maintained then the aircraft must climb to Safety Altitude.
TACTICAL MARITIME SORTIE CONDUCTED IN IMC BELOW 3000 FT (INCLUDING FLIGHT BELOW SAFETY ALTITUDE), OUTSIDE CONTROLLED AIRSPACE
NON-TACTICAL MARITIME SORTIE CONDUCTED IN IMC BELOW 3000 FT (INCLUDING FLIGHT BELOW SAFETY ALTITUDE), OUTSIDE CONTROLLED AIRSPACE
Once 5nm clear of the coast, and heading away from land, aircraft may descend to 500 ft MSD in an attempt to gain VMC. If still IMC at this height then the aircraft must climb to Safety Altitude. If still IMC then a further climb must be made until VMC is achieved, or until above the transition altitude where standard IFR apply.
Notes: 1. Whenever possible and consistent with the EMCON policy in force, aircraft operating IMC should be in receipt of a radar service. 2. For the purposes of this article a radar service is defined as one in which safe separation from the coast and surface contacts can be maintained iaw BR766 and Fly 2000. This does not apply to RAF ATC Units. 3. 4. Safety Altitude outside of 5 nm from the coast will be a minimum of 1000 ft AMSL. See also 101 for the provision of radar services.
51. Additional Dispensations for RN Fixed-wing Aircraft. Fixed wing aircraft may descend to 500ft MSD in IMC with reference to a barometric altimeter and 300ft with
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reference a serviceable radio/radar altimeter. Descent below 300ft is only permitted when specifically authorized and the pilot is visual with the surface, or during recovery, when use should be made of a ship's air warning/air control radar or aircraft radar to ensure safe separation from surface contacts. 52. FRADU Aircraft. FRADU aircraft can descend below 3000 ft IMC subject to: a. The aircraft being in receipt of a radar service from an ATC unit or under the control of a suitably qualified AC, FC, ATCO using ship's warning or air control radar or under the control of an AEW aircraft. b. c. The descent is conducted 5 nm clear and heading away from land. A minimum of 750 ft AMSL for multiple aircraft and 500 ft for single aircraft.
53. Specific Exceptions. Helicopters engaged in instrument flying practice or test flights can operate below 3000 ft in IMC subject to the following conditions: a. The aircraft is in receipt of a radar service and the flight is conducted within a designated training area or area which is under the control of the unit providing the radar service. b. The following restrictions apply: (1) Over land, the lower limit is fixed at an altitude/height which will ensure 1000 ft terrain clearance or at 1500 ft AMSL if higher. (2) Over the sea, helicopters can operate down to 500 ft AMSL providing that the aircraft can be kept at least 2 nm clear of the coast and/or surface contacts when below safety altitude (Annex 11E: ). 54. Use of Airspace Utilisation Section (AUS). It has to be recognised that aircraft flying at non-quadrantal levels and below 3000 ft have no protection from conflicting traffic unless in receipt of a radar service. When authorising flights to operate without radar, account must be taken of the importance of the flight and any other known air activity, especially other exercises and areas where civil offshore operations occur. To this end, use should be made of the AUS at CAA House London. Regulations for the notification of all unusual air activities including those outside the Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) are contained in Chapter 7: . Duties and Responsibilities of ATCOs With Regard to Pilots Instrument Ratings 55. ATCOs cannot query or challenge a pilot with regard to his instrument rating, or the weather conditions in which the pilot intends to fly, or the height to which the pilot descends in approach. These matters are the responsibility of the authorising officer and the pilot concerned. ATCOs can, however, request a pilot to state his instrument rating as part of the data which ATC requires for approach procedures or to assist the pilot in obtaining a suitable diversion. In addition, ATCOs observing marked weather deterioration before take-off or during approach of an aircraft should use their own initiative to advise the pilot and/or the authorising officer as appropriate. This advice is part of the ATC service. Having given such advice, the air traffic controller is in no way to question the action of the pilot or authorising officer, nor is he in any way responsible for their subsequent actions. See Fly 2000 for details of the military Pilots Instrument Rating Scheme.
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Special Visual Flight Rules (SVFR) 56. SVFR are promulgated to facilitate flight within UK CTRs by pilots unable to comply with IFR, in circumstances where VFR flight is not permitted. Details are published in the UK AIP and in the RAF FLIP Planning. Selection of Cruising Levels 57. Below FL195 outside CAS & within active TRAs between FL195-245. Within the UK, an aircraft in level flight under IFR between 3000 ft AMSL and FL195 outside CAS, or within an active TRA between FL195-245, should be flown at a level appropriate to its magnetic track in accordance with the Quadrantal Rule detailed below:
Figure 4-3 Quadrantal Rule
Magnetic Track
Cruising Level
000 089 090 179 180 269 270 359
Odd thousands of feet Odd thousands of feet + 500 ft Even thousands of feet Even thousands of feet + 500 ft } Expressed as Flight Levels
Note: Neither FL195 nor FL245 will be allocated as cruising levels. When flying above 3000 ft AMSL under VFR, pilots are advised to fly at such flight levels whenever possible in the interests of flight safety. 58. Above FL195. Within UK Class C airspace between FL195 and FL660, an aircraft under IFR in level flight will normally be expected to fly at a level appropriate to its magnetic track in accordance with the tables shown below. Notwithstanding the above, and in recognition of the need to provide the appropriate vertical separation against aircraft flying at RVSM levels, aircraft can be cleared to fly at a different level by ATC for separation purposes: a. Above FL195, below FL290. Appropriate Flight Levels above FL195 but below FL290 are as follows: Magnetic Track Cruising Level
000 179 180 359
FLs 210, 230, 250 and 270 FLs 200, 220, 240, 260 and 280
b. At or above FL290, below FL410. Within RVSM designated airspace Single Alternate Flight Levels separated by 1000 ft based on magnetic track:
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Magnetic Track
Cruising Level
000 - 179 180 - 359
Odd Numbered Flight Levels Even Numbered Flight Levels
The Single Alternate Flight Level Orientation Scheme is depicted in Figure 4-4 Single Alternate Flight Level Orientation Scheme.
Figure 4-4 Single Alternate Flight Level Orientation Scheme
SINGLE ALTERNATE FLIGHT LEVEL ORIENTATION SCHEME FL290 TO BELOW FL410

FL410 FL400 FL390 FL380 FL370 FL360 FL350 FL340 FL330 FL320 FL310 FL300 FL290 RVSM LEVELS
c. At or above FL410. Flight Levels separated by 2000 ft from FL410 to FL660 as indicated in Figure 4-5 Flight Level Orientation Scheme below: Figure 4-5 Flight Level Orientation Scheme
59. Outside the UK. Outside the UK, aircraft should comply with the instructions for the FIR/UIR in which they are flying at or above FL290, as follows:
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Cruising Level FL290 or higher at intervals of 4000 ft ie FL330, 370 etc FL310 or higher at intervals of 4000 ft ie FL350, 390 etc
Safety Altitude 60. Commands/Groups are required to issue such instructions concerning safety altitudes as they consider necessary to ensure the safe navigation of aircraft under their command. In deciding on the safety altitudes to be used, the following principles should be applied. a. En Route. The safety altitude for a particular route or exercise area should be calculated by adding 1000 ft to the elevation (ie height above mean sea level) of the highest obstacle over which there is any possibility of the aircraft passing, rounded up to the next 100 ft. If the flight is to take place over mountainous terrain - defined as terrain of 3000 ft AMSL or higher - the increment will be increased to 2000 ft. When severe turbulence is anticipated, consideration can be given to increasing the safety altitude to compensate for the hazardous conditions that are likely to occur. As a guide, where areas or turbulence associated with mountain and leewaves are forecast or known to be present, an in-flight clearance of 5000 ft is necessary above mountains which are up to 5000 ft in height or above the surrounding terrain. For higher mountains the clearance should be at least equal to their height above the terrain. b. ICAO Doc 8168-Ops/611 / AATCP-1/PANS-OPS specify the minimum safe altitude to be used within the terminal area as that altitude which provides safe obstacle clearance for emergency use within a specified distance from a navigation facility. Accordingly, safety altitude should be based on the highest obstacle within the specified area plus 1000 ft, the sum rounded up to the next 100 ft.Under the PANSOPS program, values are calculated using metric units meters and converted to feet, subsequent rounding-up can result in differences of up to 100 ft. To prevent discrepancies in safety altitudes between adjacent ATSUs, 300 m/984 ft separation from obstacles may be used with the approval of the MAA. Such altitudes should be identified as minimum sector altitudes or emergency safe altitudes and should be established as follows: (1) Minimum Sector Altitudes. Minimum sector altitudes should be established for all procedures within 25 nm of the navigation facility. A common minimum safe altitude can be established for the entire area around the facility, or sector altitudes can be established to offer relief from obstacles. Sectors should not be less than 90 in spread and should be surrounded by a buffer of 4 nm, which also provides 1000 ft of obstacle clearance. In conditions of extreme cold, it can be necessary to apply a correction to MSA to allow for altimeter temperature error and maintain adequate obstacle clearance. (2) Emergency Safe Altitude. An emergency safe altitude should be established within an area of radius 100 nm from the navigation facility. In areas of mountainous terrain the obstacle clearance will be increased to 2000 ft. 61. Unless authorized under Paragraph 62 below, an aircraft should not descend below safety altitude, except when compelled to do so in an emergency, unless the pilot is in visual contact with the surface, is using a serviceable terrain-following radar equipment or can let down by means of an approved radio or radar terminal approach procedure provided by
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aircraft ATC units. Instructions for aircraft equipped with terrain-following radar, both in IMC and at night, should be issued by Group Commanders. 62. Unless special dispensation has been granted by the Ministry of Defence and subject to any more stringent regulations that Commands/Groups may impose, when descending over the sea more than 3 nm from the coast, aircraft may only descend below safety altitude in IMC to a minimum of 500 ft above authorized MSD in an attempt to achieve VMC below cloud. If cloud is not cleared by 500 ft above authorized MSD, or VMC cannot be achieved from this position, aircraft will climb to safety altitude and, if still IMC, climb until VMC is achieved or until above 3000 ft AMSL. Whenever possible, descents will be planned so that, if made in IMC, they will occur in areas clear of known airborne activity (for example, civil helicopter offshore operations) or where such activity can be determined and avoided. Minimum Safe Flight Levels 63. Introduction. The minimum safe flight level designated for use by ATC to aircraft on initial homing is the lowest level, which provides the required obstruction and terrain clearance, ie in relation to the safety altitude, within 25 nm of a navigation facility or airfield. The lowest usable flight level, however, should be at least 500 ft above the transition level to ensure sufficient separation from aircraft flying at 3000 ft AMSL or at the transition altitude if it is higher. 64. Terminal Approach Procedures. As an aid to approach controllers in assigning initial homing flight levels to aircraft, the minimum safe flight level should be calculated each day (and as necessitated by changes in the airfield QNH) in accordance with the instructions below and prominently displayed in the approach control room. 65. Reminders to Pilots. Where a pilot is in visual contact with the ground and is flying at or has requested a lower level, a reminder of the safety altitude should be given. This rule does not apply to a Special VFR clearance. Figure 4-6 Sectors For Minimum Safe Flight Level Calculations
66. Calculation. The minimum safe flight level for the initial homing should be calculated as follows:
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a. On a topographical map draw a circle with radius 25 nm centred on the approach/airfield. b. Divide the circle into 4 equal sectors with reference to 000 (see Figure 4-5)
c. Determine the elevation of the highest obstacle/terrain within each of the 4 sectors and in the adjacent sectors or periphery areas within 4nm of the sector division or the periphery boundary line. d. Add 1000 ft to the figure so found and round up to the nearest 100 ft.
e. Convert each safety altitude to a minimum safe flight level for the prevailing airfield QNH in accordance with the Quadrantal Rule. f. Increase this flight level as necessary to satisfy any other air traffic control requirement. Note: The phrase vicinity of an airfield as applied to the definition of transition altitude is generally to be within a circle radius 25nm centred on that airfield. Rules of the Air and Avoidance of Collisions 67. The Rules of the Air for the United Kingdom are set out in the current The Rules of the Air Regulations made under the power of the appropriate Article in the current national Air Navigation Order (ANO), both of which appear in CAA CAP 393. The Rules of the Air are in line with those included in Annex 2 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, to which the United Kingdom is a signatory. Military aircraft are required to comply with the Rules of the Air specifically in relation to the manner in which aircraft may move or fly unless this would be inconsistent with military requirements. The most relevant Rules of the Air are set out in Fly 2000 and immediately below. 68. For the purposes of the Rules of the Air as published in the ANO, a glider and an aircraft which is towing it should be considered to be a single aircraft under the command of the captain of the towing aircraft. Furthermore, the attention of pilots is drawn to the fact that formations are normally less manoeuvrable than single aircraft and are unable to take sudden avoiding action. Pilots of single aircraft are therefore advised to keep well clear of formations. 69. The Rules of the Air require that notwithstanding a flight is being made with ATC clearance it remains the duty of the captain of an aircraft to take all possible measures to ensure that his aircraft does not collide with other aircraft. Aircraft are not to be flown in proximity to other aircraft so as to create a danger of collision. Aircraft obliged by the Rules of the Air to give way to another aircraft shall avoid passing over or under the other aircraft, or crossing ahead of it, unless passing well clear of it. An aircraft that has right of way under the Rules of the Air this rule shall maintain its course and speed. The specific Rules are as follows: a. Aircraft Converging. Subject to the provisions of b and c below, aircraft in the air should give way to other converging aircraft as follows: (1) (2) (3) Flying machines should give way to airships, gliders and balloons. Airships should give way to gliders and balloons. Gliders should give way to balloons.
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Subject to these conditions, when 2 aircraft are converging in the air at approximately the same altitude, the aircraft that has the other on its right should give way, provided that powered aircraft should give way to aircraft towing other aircraft or objects. b. Aircraft Approaching Head-on. When 2 aircraft are approaching head-on or approximately so and there is a danger of collision, each should alter its course to the right. c. Aircraft Overtaking. An aircraft that is being overtaken in the air should have the right of way, and the overtaking aircraft, whether climbing, descending or in horizontal flight, should keep out of the way of the other aircraft by altering course to the right, and shall not cease to keep out of the way of the other aircraft until that other aircraft has been passed and is clear, notwithstanding any change in the relative positions of the 2 aircraft. A glider, however, overtaking another glider in the UK can alter its course to the right or to the left. d. Aircraft Landing. An aircraft while landing, or on the final approach to land, should have the right of way over other aircraft in flight or on the ground or water. e. Two or More Aircraft Landing. When 2 or more flying machines or gliders are approaching any place for the purpose of landing, the aircraft at the lower altitude should have the right of way, but it should not cut in front of another aircraft that is on final approach to land or overtake that aircraft, provided that: (1) When an ATC unit has communicated to any aircraft an order of priority of landing, the aircraft should approach to land in that order. (2) When the commander of an aircraft is aware that another aircraft is making an emergency landing, he should give way to that aircraft, and at night, notwithstanding that he may have received permission to land, should not attempt to land until he has received further permission so to do. f. Right-hand Traffic Rule. An aircraft flying within the UK in sight of the ground and following a road, railway, canal or coastline, or any other line of landmarks, should keep such line of landmarks on its left. Occasional exceptions to this rule exist; they should be included in local orders when appropriate. g. Right of Way on the Ground. Vehicles and aircraft being taxied should give way to aircraft being towed; vehicles not towing aircraft should give way to taxiing aircraft.
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Chapter 5: Altimetry
REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3005(1)(2)(3)(4). Altimeter Settings 1. The altimeter settings detailed below are used as appropriate by aircraft in the UK: a. b. c. d. e. Aerodrome QNH. Regional Pressure Setting (RPS). QFE pressure setting. Standard Altimeter Setting. Force QNH.
2. Hectopascals (hPa) are the notified units for measurement of pressure for flying within UK airspace. Altimeter setting values should normally to be expressed in hPa, rounded down to the nearest whole hPa, but they can be given in inches of mercury (to the nearest hundredth of an inch) either on request or when it is known that the aircraft type is one in which the altimeter sub-scale is calibrated in inches (for conversion table see FIH). When giving an altimeter setting below 1000 hPa, or in cases where confusion or ambiguity may result, Hectopascals should be appended to the figures passed. Aerodrome QNH 3. QNH is the observed pressure at an aerodrome elevation corrected for temperature and reduced to mean sea level, using the ICAO formula. When Aerodrome QNH is passed to aircraft, the message should include aerodrome elevation or touchdown/threshold elevation as determined by local orders. When Aerodrome QNH is set on an altimeter subscale, the altimeter will indicate the vertical distance relative to mean sea level (altitude). 4. Aerodrome QNH is used: a. b. For calculating the Transition Level in the vicinity of an airfield. For calculating Minimum Safe Flight Levels (MSFLs).
c. For flights in the vicinity of some civil aerodromes, although QFE is normally used for landing. d. e. As a landing datum for some foreign and civil aircraft. On request, it can be passed to military pilots for internal use within the aircraft.
Regional Pressure Setting 5. The RPS is the lowest forecast QNH within a designated altimeter setting region, and is used as an altitude pressure datum for aircraft flying at or below the transition altitude, away from aerodrome circuit and approach patterns. It is available hourly for the period H+0 to H+1 and ATC units should maintain a record of the current pressure setting for their local and
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adjoining regions. The value for the period H+1 to H+2 is available on request from the meteorological office. The RPS is also used to calculate the MSFL for en-route flying. When RPS is set on an altimeter sub-scale, the altimeter will indicate the vertical distance relative to the RPS datum (altitude). 6. Altimeter Setting Regions. The UK and its surrounding sea area are divided into a number of Altimeter Setting Regions (ASR), the boundaries of which, where possible, cut airways at 90 and at reporting points. The boundaries and names of UK ASRs are shown in RAF FLIPs. QFE 7. QFE is the corrected barometric pressure for a specified datum. When QFE is set on an altimeter sub-scale, the altimeter will indicate the vertical distance relative to the QFE datum (height). QFE is used by British Service aircraft when landing and taking off or flying in the visual circuit, as follows: a. On an airfield without a designated runway the QFE datum for all procedures should be the airfield elevation (Airfield QFE). b. In all other circumstance the QFE datum for all procedures should be the touchdown zone elevation for the runway in use (Runway QFE). Where more than one runway is in use for simultaneous instrument and visual procedures, the QFE relevant to the instrument runway will be used. The mixed use of QFEs is not permitted. Standard Altimeter Settings 8. Standard Altimeter Setting assumes a mean sea level pressure of 1013.2 hPa (29.92 inches). It is used for all flying above the transition altitude and when flying above 3000 ft AMSL in the UK outside CAS, except when: a. Flying in conformity with instructions given by ATC, HM Ships or an ASACS radar unit. b. Completing manoeuvres requiring rapid changes of altitude or heading (eg. aerobatics, spinning and air combat training. Force QNH 9. Definition. Force QNH is the lowest QNH forecast for an Operation/Exercise area for a defined time-period. It is calculated by a suitably qualified MetO/Forecaster and promulgated to all participating units as directed by the Airspace Control Authority (ACA). The Force QNH area can contain more than one RPS area, bisect others or be a portion thereof: hence discrepancies between Force QNH and RPS can be apparent. Therefore, the area within which the Force QNH will be utilised should be clearly defined in appropriate Op/Ex Orders (eg ACO/SPINS/ACN). 10. More than one Force QNH can be employed for a specific Exercise/Operation where these would otherwise span vast areas or contain significantly diverse meteorological regions. In such circumstances, the areas and relevant Force QNH should be clearly named and geographically defined in the appropriate Op/Ex Order. 11. Use of Force QNH. a. Validity of Force QNH should be for as long a period of time as possible (up to 6hr periods), preferably covering likely flying waves. As a minimum - and only for
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Operations with a C2 agency in communication with all participants - Force QNH can be issued and promulgated at least an hour in advance, valid for one hour (akin to current RPS procedures). b. Where its use is appropriate for the general conduct of the Op/Ex, Force QNH should be used at all times whilst clear of non-segregated Controlled Airspace. However, if a Force QNH is required for lower level flight but airspace structure dictates that flight on SAS at higher altitudes is also necessary, a Force Transition Altitude and Level (providing adequate terrain and airspace separation) should be set and promulgated within the same Op/Ex Orders. c. Force QNH should be promulgated through Met Office channels (as agreed by Op/Ex planners), by the Met Guard or other nominated authority. A list of recipients to be notified to the appropriate MetO by the ACA for the Op/Ex. The MetO role can be in the form of a Met Element on larger Ops/Exs or a qualified Forecaster. Otherwise, tasking should be through DMC, HQ AIR. Landing Altimeter Setting (QNE) 12. A QFE/QNE conversion table as shown in the FIH is maintained by ATC. QNE is the indication which the altimeter will give on landing, at a particular time and place, when the Mb scale is set to 1013.2 hPa. QNE information can be used by pilots of aircraft whose altimeters cannot be set to below 950 hPa. Transition Level and Transition Altitude 13. ATC sections at aerodromes are required to establish the transition level on the basis of the relationship between the standard pressure datum (1013.2 hPa) and the airfield QNH. The flight level graph for use in calculating the transition level is contained in FLIPs. ATC should maintain an up to date readout of the transition level and be prepared to pass it on request or in accordance with local orders. 14. Where 2 or more aerodromes are in close proximity, a common transition level should be established. 15. Pilots of aircraft descending to fly at or below the transition altitude should change from the standard altimeter setting to the appropriate pressure datum when passing the transition level. An exception to this rule has been made for military aircraft making a continuous descent for entry into an established instrument pattern. In this case the appropriate QFE should be set before descent, providing that level flight will not be recommenced above the transition altitude unless in conformity with instructions given by ATC. 16. When climbing away from an aerodrome or from flight below the transition altitude, pilots should reset the altimeter datum to the standard setting (1013.2 hPa) when passing the transition altitude. Within the UK the transition altitude is 3000 ft except in or beneath the airspace listed in the FLIP Planning.
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Chapter 6: Notification and Conduct of Flights

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3006(1)(2)(3)(4). Notification of Aircraft Movements on the Ground 1. All aircraft movements on the ground within the manoeuvring area will be notified to the aerodrome controller. 2. Commanding Officers Responsibilities. Commanding Officers of RN air stations, Army Corps Regimental Commanders and Commanding Officers of RAF flying stations should issue orders covering the movement of aircraft within the aircraft manoeuvring area on aerodromes under their command. Flight as GAT Within Controlled Airspace Clearance 3. ATC clearance for GAT flights in CAS can be given only by the ATC authority operating the relevant CAS. The air traffic service staff at the departure aerodrome should obtain the clearance and ensure that the captain of the aircraft has been informed of any ATC requirements applicable to the initial stage of the intended flight. 4. When a flight plan is submitted to the air traffic service the recipient should determine whether pre-flight or in-flight clearance is required, by checking the flight time from take-off to the first point of entry into CAS: a. Pre-flight Clearance. When the point of entry is within 10 minutes flying time from the aerodrome of departure, pre-flight clearance should be requested. b. In-flight Clearance. When the point of entry is more than 10 minutes flying time from the aerodrome of departure, in-flight clearance should be requested by the pilot either direct from the controlling authority of the airspace on the appropriate RT frequency or through another air traffic service agency, eg ATCC or ATCRU. Note: During the issue of any pre-flight Clearance, the phrases Take off or After Take-off should not to be used. The Phrase After Departure may be used but the aircraft is not to proceed beyond the Holding Position until ATC has issued the clearance to Line up or Take off as a separate message. 5. If pre-flight clearance is required the air traffic service at the departure aerodrome should obtain the clearance in the following manner: a. When the aircraft taxies, ATC should telephone the appropriate CAS ATSU (Airways Sector or Zone Control) and request a Pre-Flight ATC clearance; the ETD of the aircraft and the basic flight details should be passed. b. The clearance should be written down and then read back to the CAS ATSU.
c. The full clearance message should be passed to the pilot on RT and a correct read-back obtained. d. When the aircraft is airborne, ATC should pass the ATD of the aircraft to the civil controller concerned.
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e. If a delay of 3 minutes or more beyond the ETD given at Sub-paragraph a occurs, confirmation should be obtained from the CAS ATSU that the clearance is still valid; if not, a new clearance should be obtained. 6. Entry/Exit Lanes. Certain control zones have entry/exit lanes to facilitate flights to and from airfields within the zone in IMC but not under IFR. Aircraft using these lanes must remain clear of cloud, in sight of the surface and below a given altitude. A minimum flight visibility may also be specified (see UK AIP). ATC permission to use such routes may or may not be required dependant on the status of the relevant airspace notified in the UK AIP. Details of some entry/exit lanes are to be found in the Mil AIP Vol 1 Pt 2 ENR 1.1-7. Airways Crossing 7. Military aircraft crossing airways will cross by one of the following methods: a. Radar Crossing. When a radar crossing is required, including crossing through an established radar corridor, the initial call for service requesting radar control through the airway should be made to the appropriate ATCRU at least 5 minutes before entry. In the event of RT failure when crossing under radar control, the last assigned heading and flight level should be maintained. Details of radar corridors and the units providing an airways crossing service are in the BINA ERS. b. Procedural Crossing. When a procedural crossing is required, a flight plan should be filed and clearance to cross should be obtained from the airspace controlling authority at least 10 minutes before the intended crossing point. The request should contain: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Identification and type. Position and heading. Level and flight conditions. Point of crossing. Desired crossing level. Estimated time of crossing.
c. In Emergency. When neither a radar nor a procedural crossing can be obtained and the aircraft is experiencing an emergency, an airway can be crossed at an intermediate 500 ft level ie levels of whole thousands of feet plus 500 ft. Aircraft flying at quadrantal levels of whole thousands of feet should in all cases climb 500 ft before entering the airway; after crossing, quadrantal levels must be resumed. The circumstances of such crossings must be reported to the parent ATCC on landing. Penetration of MATZ 8. Captains of military aircraft who intend to fly in a MATZ must obtain the permission of the controlling ATC as soon as possible before reaching the zone boundary and maintain a continuous listening watch with the controlling ATC. If it is intended to land at an aerodrome in a MATZ which is not the controlling ATC, captains are required contact the destination airfield prior to entering the zone.
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Flight In the Vicinity of Aerodrome and Glider Sites 9. Aircraft authorized to low-fly are required to avoid all aerodromes and gliding sites by the margins specified in the UK Mil Low Flying Handbook. 10. Helicopters and light propeller-driven aircraft are required to avoid all ATZs unless permission to penetrate this airspace is obtained on the appropriate aerodrome RT frequency or, in the absence of such a ground facility, the airspace can be penetrated if it is clear of aircraft activity, or clearance from the traffic pattern formed by other aircraft can be maintained. 11. Gliding sites, although classified as aerodromes, should be avoided by 2 nm radius horizontally, or 2000 ft vertically at all times, except as specified in the UK Mil Low Flying Handbook.
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Chapter 7: Unusual Aerial Activities

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA3007(1)(2)(3). Procedures for the Notification of Unusual Aerial Activities 1. Airspace Utilisation Section (AUS). The AUS is the national airspace co-ordinating agency for the UK and is the central authority for allocation of GAT Flight Priorities and NonDeviating Status. Manned by civilian and military ATC personnel, the AUS is responsible for the de-confliction, co-ordination and notification of all known unusual aerial activities which take place within the UK FIR/UIR and certain Oceanic routes. The primary function of the AUS is not to clear or approve such activities; rather, it will act as an impartial broker between affected parties, and notify results of that interaction to the aviation community. 2. Unusual Aerial Activity (UAA). A UAA is an event such as an air exercise, trial, display, formation, balloon or kite flight which could adversely affect the normal operations of other airspace users. 3. UAA Characteristics. A UAA may include one or more of the following: a. A concentration of events in time or airspace, significantly greater than normal.
b. An inability to observe conventions such as VFR/IFR, Quadrantal or SemiCircular Rules, or Rights of Way. c. A captive balloon or kite flown in a manner which does not comply with Annex 7D: . d. A free balloon more than 2 m in any linear dimension (excluding Meteorological Office radiosonde balloons). e. Flypasts, low-level formation flights to a set route or programme, and weapons or attack technique demonstrations. f. The dropping of articles or parachutists.
4. Related Regulations. Military UAA in the UK or NATO European airspace should be conducted in accordance with Fly 2000, single Service regulations and NATO Air Traffic Management Committee (NATMC) guidelines as applicable. Sponsors of air exercises, displays and demonstrations should refer also to STANAG when other NATO forces are involved. The means of applying for flying display resources and obtaining authority for mounting such events are described in single Service regulations and DCI (RAF). 5. Participating Agencies. Participating agencies are as follows: a. UK UAA. Military participants comprise aircraft operating authorities (British or foreign), ATC and ASACS agencies and their HQ, event organizers and AUS. b. Non-UK UAA. The sponsor and appropriate national authorities. Events affecting NATO European airspace involve the Secretary, NATMC, NATO HQ. 6. Sponsorship of UAA. Sponsorship of UAAs is as follows:
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a. Each UAA arranged by a member of the UK armed forces should have a sponsor appointed who will be responsible for jurisdiction over all elements of the UAA, whether individual contributors come under command of the sponsoring authority, or report to another military authority (British or foreign), unless alternative arrangements have been made and notified to AUS. b. If the sponsoring authority is a higher echelon, responsibility for submitting details of the event to AUS can be delegated to a subordinate formation, taking into account the scale of the UAA. Thus, a display involving one aerodrome and its aircraft may be delegated to unit level. c. The military sponsor of a military UAA due to take place at a civil airfield or site (eg town shows) is responsible for submitting details to the AUS. d. If the sponsor becomes aware of another UAA which may be coincident with his UAA, he should pass to the AUS details of the point of contact for the other UAA, and indicate which sponsor is lead authority for any joint or overlapping activities. 7. Compliance. In addition to any aeronautical information notified to the aviation community by the AUS, documentation issued by the sponsor about the UAA should refer to any special arrangements which have been made for airspace management, and remind participants of the need for compliance with these arrangements for the safety of other airspace users. Individual operators are responsible for compliance with Fly 2000 and ATM 3000, insofar that they have not been exempted from specific provisions. Notifications issued by the AUS do not, in themselves, constitute authority to depart from regulations, but can be used as a means of relaying such authorisation from an ATC or aircraft operating authority. 8. System Overview. A UAA could present a hazard to crews of non-participating aircraft if they are not aware that it is taking place. Consequently, prior consultation between affected agencies, and comprehensive publicity for the UAA, are vital flight safety requirements. This process takes place in 4 phases described further at Paragraph 9. They are: a. b. c. d. 9. Initial Planning (by the sponsor). Submission of Details (by the sponsor) to the AUS. Negotiation (by the AUS) with affected parties. Notification (by the AUS) to the aviation community.
Airspace Management Procedures. Procedures are set as follows: a. Initial Planning by UAA Sponsor. Initial planning should be as follows: (1) AUS Advice. UK airspace is busy, complex and subject to conflicting military, private and commercial aviation imperatives. Therefore, before committing to possible nugatory work, the sponsor carrying out initial planning of a proposed event should discuss with AUS the outline airspace requirements. AUS should be invited to planning meetings if the agenda deals with requirements for airspace changes. The AUS is available for advice to sponsors on the arrangement of temporary reservations of all classes of UK airspace. (2) Exercise Programming. At the start of planning, sponsors should consult planning staffs of other Commands and AUS to minimise any potential for the UAAs to overlap with long term plans for major events such as exercises, trials or
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air displays. Sponsors should contact the appropriate controlling authorities well in advance to obtain approval of programmed penetration of Danger Areas. (3) Approval from External Agencies. Plans for NATO or national exercises over international waters or in non-UK FIR/UIR should be submitted by sponsors to the relevant national coordination agencies as early as possible. (4) Assistance. If requested, AUS will assist sponsors in contacting foreign airspace management agencies, whenever possible. Short notice submissions can to be rejected by AUS. Even when accepted by AUS, late submissions stand less chance of approval by the controlling authorities affected, or might not allow sufficient time for the essential minimum aeronautical publicity. For major events, the normal target date for despatch of Notification by AUS is 21 days before the UAA starts, in order to give ATC and other agencies sufficient time to rearrange and publish their procedures. (5) ATS. The need for additional ATS for the UAA should be determined by the sponsor in consultation with the ATS provider(s) for the affected airspace. (6) Environmental Aspects. The sponsor should be responsible for obtaining any clearances required in conjunction with the environmental effects of a UAA. (7) Security. In his submission to the AUS, the sponsor should minimize or avoid those aspects of the UAA which require classification or special handling by ATC and other agencies. b. Submission by the Sponsor. Submissions by the sponsor should be as follows: (1) Format. Details of the UAA should be submitted by the sponsor as indicated at Annex B for air exercises and Annex C for generic UAA to AUS, Directorate of Airspace Policy, CAA House, 45-59 Kingsway, London WC2B 6TE. Telephone 020 7453 6599 Fax 020 74536593 E-mail: ausops@caa.co.uk. This submission should be in writing and is supplementary to any application procedures which may be required by, say, the RAF Participation Committee. (2) Recurring UAA. Details of a recurring UAA for which a notification or procedure has been published previously by the AUS need not be resubmitted by the sponsor in full each time; however, the timing of the event should be notified to the AUS as soon as it is known. (3) Late Changes. The sponsor should submit details to the AUS of any alterations to the UAA which modify the published Notification. Amendment to the Notification should be sought only in exceptional circumstances; effective promulgation depends on the remaining time available and the success or otherwise of negotiations over revised requirements. The difficulty of disseminating changes nationally and internationally at short notice means that substantial late alterations involving significant re-routeing of non-participating traffic are unlikely to be approved by the controlling authorities. c. Negotiations by AUS. Negotiations by AUS will be as follows: (1) Hazard Analysis. The AUS will identify the airspace and flight safety requirements of the UAA and assess its effect on other known activities. If a UAA does not present a possible hazard to other airspace users, the AUS will decide
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whether there is a need for full, limited or no promulgation of the UAA, and will inform the sponsor accordingly. (2) Consultation. When an incompatibility between airspace users is identified by the AUS, the importance or priority of overlapping activities will be established by AUS in consultation with the affected agencies. The general objective which will be pursued by the AUS will encourage participating parties to agree an allocation of airspace, priorities or resources which satisfies their minimum essential operational and organizational requirements. d. Notification by AUS. Notification by AUS will be as follows: (1) Incomplete Processing. The UAA sponsor will be informed without delay if AUS is, or will be, unable to complete the processing of a submission. It is then for the sponsor to decide whether it is safe and lawful for the UAA to proceed. (2) Systems NOTAM. During or after the Negotiation stage, the AUS will notify details of the UAA by a Systems NOTAM, the content of which will vary according to the complexity of the event. (3) Other Notification Methods. The AUS will decide whether a UAA warrants issue of an Airspace Coordination Notice (ACN), and/or other postal/electronic warning methods, to describe the procedures negotiated by the participants. Selection of the most appropriate media for Notification will be determined by the AUS on a case by case basis. Details of long term, recurring UAA are published in ACN form annually in January by the AUS and distributed to interested parties. (4) Distribution. The extent of the promulgation of UK UAA NOTAM will be decided by the AUS in consultation with the Aeronautical Information Service (AIS). The distribution list of military and civil recipients of ACN will be determined by the AUS and will be commensurate with the probable use of the UAA airspace perceived by the AUS. (5) Validity. Airspace coordination arrangements made by the AUS will take account of UAA and other normal activities known to the AUS up to the date of release of the AUS Notification. (6) Danger Area Activation (for UAA). Routine, day to day notification of Danger Area activity is regulated by separate procedures which do not involve the AUS. However, for a major UAA such as a large national/NATO exercise, the AUS can undertake to notify in an ACN or NOTAM details of special arrangements made for reservation/closure of affected Danger Areas. In this event, once the UAA is under way, responsibility for any further Notification of Danger Area activity reverts to the Danger Area authority or UAA sponsor. Balloons Kites and Airships 10. The regulations relating to the flying of balloons, kites, airships and small (model) aircraft are at Annex 7D: . Display of Pyrotechnics, Flares or Unusual Lights 11. The use of pyrotechnics etc from Service aircraft may cause disturbance to the public and needless activation of the search and rescue organizations. 12. In the UK. In the UK, the use of pyrotechnics should be notified as follows:
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a. When it is known that pyrotechnics etc are to be used, the units or formations concerned should inform the ATCC (D&D) in whose FIR they are situated and, if more than 7 days warning is available, inform AUS. b. Action by the ATCC (D&D). On receipt of the information called for in a above, the ATCC (D&D) should: (1) (2) Inform any other ATCC (D&D) in whose FIR pyrotechnics will be used. Inform the ARCC if the exercise is to take place near the UK coast.
c. Action by the ARCC. On receipt of the information called for in b.(2) above, the ARCC should inform the Coastguard district HQ concerned. 13. Overseas. Overseas formations and units planning to display pyrotechnics etc should inform the relevant authorities in accordance with national or local procedures.
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Annex 7A: Warning of Unusual Aerial Activities Minimum Warning Times

SERIAL No ACTIVITY Exercises affecting large areas of NATO Europe and/or having a major effect upon international air navigation. (See Notes (1),(2) and (3)) Exercises concerning only part of NATO Europe. (See Notes (1),(2) and (3)) Exercises contained within the UK FIR/UIR or the Shanwick OCA. (See Notes (1),(2),(3) and (4)) Other UAA within the UK FIR/UIR or Shanwick OCA. (See Notes (2) and (4)) CO-ORDINATION/ NOTIFICATION TIMESCALE a. Initial NATMC notification: 6 months b. Level One NATMC coordination and NOTAM action: 12 weeks Level Two NATMC coordination: 12 weeks Level Three NATMC coordination: 10 weeks CO-ORDINATING AGENCY NATMC NATMC
NATMC
AUS
6 weeks
AUS
Notes: 1. 2. Assistance can be sought from AUS. If the UAA includes low flying, the details should be sent also to: a. b. c. d. e. 3. 4. MOD DCC (RAF). MOD DAS (AS.DD2). MOD SEC(AS)2. OC LF Ops Sqn, RAF Wittering. HQ P&SS UK.
A NOTAM will be published by the AUS or NATMC no later than 4 weeks in advance. Exceptionally the minimum warning time can be reduced.
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Annex 7B: Unusual Air Submission by Sponsor

SERIAL DETAILS REQUIRED
Activities
(Air
Exercises)
Sponsors: a. Appointment: b. Name: c. Address: d. Telephone: e. Fax and E Mail (www, not CHOTS or DII): f. Contact details during UAA, if different: Type of UAA (Air Exercise, Trial, Display etc): Codename/designation of the UAA: a. . Details of the UAA: a. Date(s): b. Time(s) (UTC): c. Reserve Date(s) and Times (UTC): Planning Conference (Date , Time, Location): Lateral dimensions of airspace affected in Lat and Long. Provide diagram/map with sub-divisions: Vertical extent maximum/minimum of each airspace component: Individual elements (List aircraft by type, number, Squadron, Homeplate, FOB)(If nonUK based participants, state FIR entry and exit points): Controlled Airspace which may require co-ordination: Details of Danger Areas already (or to be) booked by sponsor: AEW Areas, ASTOR/NIMROD R Area (if applicable): AARAs and LFAs reserved (or to be reserved) (if applicable): Are dedicated air exercise SSR codes required (if so, how many)?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
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Annex 7C: Unusual Aerial Activities (Generic) Submission by Sponsor

SERIAL DETAILS REQUIRED Sponsors: a. Appointment: b. Name: c. Address: d. Telephone (PSTN, DFTS & Mobile): e. Fax (PSTN & DFTS) and E Mail (not CHOtS): f. Contact details during UAA, if different: Type of UAA (exercise, display, balloon, etc): Codename/designation of the UAA: a. Purpose of the UAA (brief outline): b. If recurring, previous ACN No: c. If NATMC, indicate NATMC Level required: a. Date(s): b. Time(s) (UTC): c. Reserve Date(s): d. Reserve Time(s) (UTC): e. Rehearsal Date(s): f. Rehearsal Time(s) (UTC): Location(s) (Name, Lat and Long/Grid Ref): Lateral dimensions of airspace affected. Provide diagram/map with sub-divisions: Vertical extent maximum/minimum of each airspace component: Individual elements (List aircraft by type, number, operator): Flying or ATC Regulations which may require waiver or dispensation: Danger Areas already (or to be) booked by sponsor:
2 3 4
6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13
Weather minima to be imposed by sponsor: Display Co-ordinator details:
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Annex 7D: Civil Legislation Relating to Operation of Balloons Kites Airships and Small (Model) Aircraft
Introduction The following text is a direct extract from the Air Navigation Order, Articles 97, 98, 155 and 164. Balloons, Kites, Airships, Gliders and Parascending Parachutes Article 97. (1) The provisions of this article shall apply only to or in relation to aircraft within the United Kingdom. (2) A balloon in captive or tethered flight shall not be flown within 60 m of any vessel, vehicle or structure except with the permission of the person in charge of any such vessel, vehicle or structure. (3) Without the permission of the CAA: (a) A glider or parascending parachute shall not be launched by winch and cable or by ground tow to a height of more than 60 m above ground level; (b) A balloon in captive flight shall not be flown within the aerodrome traffic zone of a notified aerodrome during the notified operating hours of that aerodrome; (c) A balloon in captive or tethered flight shall not be flown at a height measured to the top of the balloon of more than 60 m above ground level; (d) A kite shall not be flown at a height of more than 30 m above ground level within the aerodrome traffic zone of a notified aerodrome during the notified operating hours of that aerodrome; (e) A kite shall not be flown at a height of more than 60 m above ground level; and
(f) A parascending parachute shall not be launched by winch and cable or by ground tow within the aerodrome traffic zone of a notified aerodrome during the notified operating hours of that aerodrome. (4) An uncontrollable balloon in captive or released flight shall not be flown in airspace notified for the purposes of this paragraph without the permission in writing of the CAA. (5) A controllable balloon shall not be flown in free controlled flight: a. Within airspace notified for the purposes of this paragraph; or
b. Within the aerodrome traffic zone of a notified aerodrome during the notified operating hours of that aerodrome; except during the day and in visual meteorological conditions. (6) A controllable balloon shall not be flown in tethered flight: a. Within airspace notified for the purposes of this paragraph; or
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b. Within the aerodrome traffic zone of a notified aerodrome; except with the permission of the appropriate air traffic control unit. (7) A balloon when in captive flight shall be securely moored and shall not be left unattended unless it is fitted with a device which ensures its automatic deflation if it breaks free of its moorings. (8) An airship with a capacity exceeding 3000 cubic metres shall not be moored, other than at a notified aerodrome except with the permission of the CAA. (9) An airship with a capacity not exceeding 3000 cubic metres, unless it is moored on a notified aerodrome, shall not be moored: a. Within 2 km of a congested area; or
b. Within the aerodrome traffic zone of a notified aerodrome; except with the permission of the CAA. (10) An airship when moored in the open shall be securely moored and shall not be left unattended. (11) A person shall not cause or permit: (a) a group of small balloons exceeding 1000 in number to be simultaneously released at a single site wholly or partly within the aerodrome traffic zone of a notified aerodrome during the notified operating hours of that aerodrome unless that person has given the CAA not less than 28 days previous notice in writing of the release; (b). a group of small balloons exceeding 2000 but not exceeding 10 000 in number to be simultaneously released at a single site: (i) Within airspace notified for the purpose of this sub-paragraph; or
(ii) Within the aerodrome traffic zone of a notified aerodrome during the notified operating hours of that aerodrome without the permission of the CAA; (c). a group of balloons greater than 10 000 in number to be simultaneously released at a single site except with the permission of the CAA. (12) For the purposes of this article: (a) in paragraph (5) day means the time from half an hour before sunrise until half an hour after sunset (both times exclusive), sunset and sunrise being determined at surface level; (b) the notified operating hours means the times notified in respect of an aerodrome during which rule 39 of the Rules of the Air Regulations 1996 applies; (c) simultaneously released at a single site means the release of a specified number of balloons during a period not exceeding 15 minutes from within an area not exceeding 1km square.
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(1) A person shall not cause or permit any article or animal (whether or not attached to a parachute) to be dropped from a small aircraft so as to endanger persons or property. (2) The person in charge of a small aircraft which weighs more than 7kg without its fuel but including any articles or equipment installed in or attached to the aircraft at the commencement of its flight shall not fly such an aircraft: a. Unless the person in charge of the aircraft has reasonably satisfied himself that the flight can safely be made; b. In Class A, C, D and E airspace unless the permission of the appropriate air traffic control unit has been obtained; c. Within the aerodrome traffic zone during the notified hours of watch of the air traffic control unit (if any) at that aerodrome unless the permission of any such air traffic control unit has been obtained; d. At a height exceeding 400 ft above the surface unless it is flying in airspace described in sub-paragraphs (b) or (c) and in accordance with the requirements thereof; or e. For aerial work purposes other than in accordance with a permission issued by the CAA. Article 155 - Interpretation. A small balloon means a balloon not exceeding 2 m in any linear dimension at any stage of its flight, including any basket or other equipment attached to the balloon. A small aircraft means any unmanned aircraft, other than a balloon or kite, weighing not more than 20 kg without its fuel but including any articles or equipment installed in or attached to the aircraft at the commencement of its flight. Article 164 - Exceptions from Application of Provisions of the Order for Certain Classes of Aircraft. The provisions of this Order other than articles 68, 74, 96(1), 97, 98, 144(1)(b) and (c). 155(1) and (2) shall not apply to or in relation to: a. b. c. d. Any small balloon; Any kite weighing not more than 2 kg; Any small aircraft; or Any parachute, including a parascending parachute.
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Chapter 8: Methods of Identification

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3008(1). Identification General 1. Every aircraft should be identified before being given a surveillance service. Identification should be maintained so long as the aircraft is in receipt of a surveillance service and the pilot should be informed whenever identification is established or lost. 2. A turn for identification does not constitute a surveillance service. However, when turning aircraft for this purpose, controllers should take into consideration: a. b. c. d. Airspace restrictions. The terrain in the aircrafts reported, estimated or observed position. Other radar returns (including permanent echoes, clutter, etc). Surveillance coverage.
Where possible, these turns should be used as initial positioning turns to save time and fuel. 3. Positions used for identification procedures and during subsequent surveillance services should either to be precise navigational references or related to radio aids, major aerodromes or other well known geographical pin-points which a controller can relate to his radar video map. Indeterminate-sized landmarks, such as large towns, should not be used under any circumstances. Methods of Identification 4. SSR Mode 3/A Data. For identification using SSR Mode 3/A data, see Chapter 35 Paragraph 6. 5. Turn Method. In using the turn method, a controller should ascertain the aircrafts heading, and following a period of track observation, should correlate the observed movement of a particular radar return with one or more changes of heading of at least 30,as instructed by him, by another controller, or as reported by the pilot. Where only approximate position information is available a minimum of 2 turns of not less than 30 should be used. During this procedure, a controller seeking to identify an aircraft should: a. Verify that the movements of not more than one radar return correspond with those of the aircraft. b. Exercise caution, particularly when employing this method in areas where changes of aircraft heading are commonly made as a navigational routine. c. Take account of the type and characteristics of the surveillance equipment, eg raw or processed radar, rate of scan, beam width, range scale of display, when deciding the amount of turn and the period of observation required to prove identification. d. Ensure that the manoeuvre(s) will not carry the radar return outside radar display coverage, through clutter, or into airspace, which is the subject of specific clearance.
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6. Turn Method Using DF. Observing a turn of not less than 30 together with relevant DF indications and a period of track observation. Range information derived from DME, TACAN or similar equipment should be used to assist identification when it is available. 7. Position Report Method. This method of identification should consist of a period of track observation, associated with heading and position information within known radar cover based on one or more of the following: a. By correlating a particular radar return with a position report from the pilot that the aircraft is: (1) Over an exact reporting point, which should be displayed on the radar map. (2) At a particular distance not exceeding 30 nm on a particular radial from a collocated VOR/DME or TACAN. The source facility should be displayed on the radar map. (3) Over a notified visual reporting point or prominent geographical feature approved for the purpose and displayed on the radar map, provided that the flight is operating with visual reference to the surface and at a height of 3000 ft or less above the surface. b. By a DF Fix. This method should be reinforced by an alternative method if there is any doubt about the identification because of: (1) The close proximity of other radar returns.
(2) Inaccurate reporting from aircraft at high level or some distance from navigational facilities. 8. Departing Aircraft Method. An aircraft can be identified, by observing the radar response of a pre-notified departing aircraft. Identification should take place within 1 nm of the end of the runway in use at the departure aerodrome, unless otherwise authorized by HQ ATM Force/DJtCap ISTAR3/HQ AAC/MAA as appropriate. Particular care should be taken to avoid confusion with aircraft overflying, carrying out a low approach, or departing from an adjacent runway or with aircraft holding overhead the aerodrome. Failure to Locate an Aircraft 9. If a surveillance controller is unable to locate a primary radar echo or SSR response which relates to the pilots reported position, one of the following can be assumed: a. The Aircraft is Outside Radar Cover. In which case the pilot should be instructed to climb to a higher level, call later, or call another nominated radar agency. b. The Aircraft Return is Obscured by Clutter or is Presenting a Poor Aspect to the Radar Aerial. If available, an alternative radar can be selected, or the pilot should be instructed to change heading or call another nominated radar agency. c. The Pilots Reported Position is Incorrect. A further position check should be requested and, if the situation is still unresolved, the pilot should be instructed to obtain a fix from the UK Emergency Fixer Service and to pass the notified position to the controller.
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Chapter 9: Radar Handover Procedures

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction withRA 3009(1)(2)(3)(4). Radar Handover Landline Communication Available 1. A radar handover can be effected between 2 agencies provided that: a. b. c. d. e. Satisfactory 2-way speech is possible on the landline. Responsibility for the aircraft is transferred directly from controller to controller. The aircraft is clear of CAS (classes A, D and E). The aircraft is in an area of overlapping radar cover. The handover fulfils any standing agreement between the 2 agencies.
f. The releasing controller resolves any traffic conflictions before completing the handover. 2. Specific variations to the general requirements of Paragraph 1 have been authorized by NATS and where appropriate are detailed in the following paragraphs. Handovers No Landline Communication Available 3. When direct landline communication between the relevant ground agencies is not available the pilot should be given his position and should be instructed to Free Call the next agency. The frequency on which to contact this agency should be passed whenever possible. 4. An aircraft flying from one ATCRU AOR to another or climbing into a Class C airspace should normally be handed over before it reaches the boundary of the receiving units AOR. If this cannot be achieved and all possible methods of established surface communication have been exhausted, the aircraft should be held clear of the receiving units AOR and instructed to free call the appropriate unit on a specified frequency. 5. AEW Weapon Controllers (WC) can effect a handover to an ATCC or CRC of an aircraft under their control operating in the Class C airspace above FL195 provided that satisfactory 2 way RT communication has been established with the appropriate ATCC or CRC, using the UHF ICF. 6. In exceptional circumstances, WCs can effect a handover to an ATC Terminal Unit of an aircraft receiving ATSOCAS, provided that satisfactory 2 way RT communication has been established with the appropriate ATC Terminal Unit and that approval for the handover has been obtained from the receiving unit. Handovers to Continental Agencies 7. Where direct lines exist between UK and Continental radar units they should be used for handovers, in accordance with the relevant letters of agreement. When no such landlines are available, the aircraft can be released temporarily at a suitable position within UK airspace to call the appropriate agency for clearance to enter the Continental FIR/UIR. In
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this case, the pilot should be advised that service will be discontinued until RT communication is re-established. Handover Procedures 8. Area Radar Units. Area radar handover procedures are as follows: a. FOAs at ATCRUs can, at the discretion of the radar controller, carry out radar handovers to RAF, RN and USAF agencies within the UK provided that: (1) The FOA has been assessed by his unit as being competent to carry out radar handovers. (2) The handing over unit, the receiving unit and the aircraft have serviceable SSR equipment, and the aircraft is transponding the assigned code. (3) The FOA initiates a radar handover only when specifically authorized by his controller. The controller is ultimately responsible for the conduct and accuracy of the handover. (4) The FOA clearly identifies his function and operating position to the receiving agency. (5) The receiving controller retains the right to insist on a controller-to-controller handover. (6) Where an aircraft is subject to prior coordination, the controller personally passes to the receiving controller details of the coordination to which the flight is subject. b. Controllers can accept handovers within Class A and D airspace from the appropriate controlling authority subject to any conditions specified at the time of handover or prescribed in standing agreements as approved by HQ ATM Force. c. Area Radar controllers are permitted to conduct internal and external handover within Class A, C and D airspace. Controllers at MOD/Defence aerodromes should not change the level or heading/track of the aircraft, without the approval of the releasing controller, until it is clear of Class A, C or D airspace, unless they are the controlling authority for that airspace. d. Controllers are permitted to conduct internal handovers within Class A or D airspace in which they are authorized to provide a service. ScATCC (Mil) controllers are authorized to conduct internal handovers within the Scottish TMA. In addition, they can, with the approval of the appropriate TMA controller, initiate external handovers of OAT within CAS to controllers authorized to provide a service in that airspace. 9. Airfields. Terminal controllers can carry out internal handovers in Class D airspace protecting their airfields. They can carry out external handovers within Class D airspace to those units which are also authorized to provide services in that airspace. 10. Handovers General. Pilots carrying out general handling can be asked to cease such manoeuvring while the handover to or from an area radar unit is in progress. Transfer of Radar Identity 11. Controllers should use SSR Mode 3/A to identify aircraft whenever suitable equipment is available and in accordance with the procedures detailed in this Acceptable Means of
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Compliance and Chapter 35: If SSR is not available and the observed radar response is consistent with the aircrafts reported track or heading, transfer of identity can be effected by one of the following methods: a. Direct designation (ie pointing) of the radar return if the 2 radar displays are adjacent, or if a common conference type of radar display is used, provided that: (1) If the 2 radar displays are adjacent but the information is not derived from the same radar head the transferring controller should ensure that the radar returns on both displays correlate before indicating the position to the accepting controller. (2) Caution is exercised because this method can be subject to parallax errors. If these errors are large, the method at b below should be used. b. Designation of the radar return as a bearing and distance from a common reference point (navigational facility or geographical position) accurately indicated on both radar displays, provided that the position of the radar return as seen by the accepting controller is within 3 nm of the position stated by the transferring controller. The manner in which the indication of the bearing of an aircraft is determined and relayed will be subject to the following limitations on the permissible distance of the radar return from the reference point as seen by the accepting controller: (1) (2) (3) By points of the compass (eg, N; NNE; etc) 15 nm. By a bearing estimated in degrees 30 nm. By a bearing measured electronically in degrees 60 nm.
c. Designation of the radar return by reference to a GEOREF video map, provided that the position of the radar return, as seen by the accepting controller, is within 3 nm of the position stated by the transferring controller. d. Designation of the radar return by positioning an electronic marker or symbol so that only one radar return is thereby indicated and there is no possible doubt of correct identification. e. Use of a radar tracking system where procedures are in unit instructions.
12. If SSR Mode 3/A/Code Callsign Conversion is available for the transfer of radar identity, the associated position report, although to be determined in accordance with one of the methods detailed in Paragraph 11, need not comply with the requirements for accuracy in either position report or the method of expressing such position report detailed in Subparagraph 11b, provided that the position report precedes the SSR/Code Callsign Conversion information. Heading need not be passed during traffic information/coordination unless required to aid communication. In addition, the transfer of radar identity using SSR Mode 3/A should accord with the following principles of operation: a. Controller-to-controller landline (see note 1) communication should be established and the callsign (see note 2), position, heading and current SSR code (see note 3) passed. b. The following applies during a radar handover: (1) The receiving controller should state the SSR code required. The handing-over controller should instruct the pilot to select the new code. The remainder of the handover details should be passed. When the receiving
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controller agrees, the handing over controller should then pass the remaining instructions to the pilot to complete the handover. (2) If it is not possible for the handing-over controller to pass the change of SSR code, or for the pilot to accept it (because of cockpit workload or for any other reason), the taking over controller should pass the code change as soon as possible after the handover is complete. (3) To avoid confusing pilots with too much digital information, particularly during the handover sequence, SSR codes should not be included in the same RT message as changes of frequency, heading or flight level. c. In situations where the Mode 3/A code used in the transfer of identity is available for use by more than one aircraft to indicate a particular task etc, the position report should be accurately defined in accordance with one or more of the methods detailed in Paragraph 11, including the requirements for accuracy specified in Sub-paragraph 11b. Notes: 1. Two-way RT communication should be established between AEW weapons controllers and ATCCs to effect handovers in the Class C airspace above FL195. 2. Not required for the transfer of radar identity in support of coordination.
3. Use of a common Code Callsign Conversion database between transferring agencies may render this unnecessary. Radar Handovers Standard Message Format/Landline Procedure 13. Console-to-console communication should be established in sufficient time before the arrival of the aircraft at the handover point, and the following information should be given in the order shown: a. b. Console number or control position of the handing-over controller. Nature of task (eg VHF lower airspace transit) and callsign.
c. Position, heading/track or vectoring instructions; (the transferring controller should pause at this point to allow the receiving controller to locate the radar return, say contact, and pass the new SSR code for assignment by the releasing controller). d. e. f. g. Flight level/altitude and flight conditions (if significant). Type of aircraft. Intentions (eg, destination). Any other relevant information (eg type of service, RVSM approval status).
14. The handover information given by the releasing controller includes the type of service being provided. The receiving controller should confirm (or change if required) the service with the pilot on initial contact. Note: The RVSM approval status of the aircraft (either RVSM Compliant or Negative RVSM) should be included as the last element of the handover message if the aircraft is operating within or intending to enter RVSM designated airspace.
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15. The receiving controller should confirm receipt and understanding of the information by reading back; additionally, the receiving units console number or control position should be passed to the handing-over controller.
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Chapter 10: Traffic Information and Traffic Coordination

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3010(1). Traffic Information Between ATS Personnel 1. Traffic Information between ATS personnel, is information about an aircraft or its flight which is relevant to the provision of an air traffic service. 2. The purpose of traffic information between ATS personnel is to enable the recipient to determine whether or not any action is necessary to achieve or maintain the required separation between the subject aircraft. For example, after receiving traffic information, a controller may consider it necessary to issue avoiding action or may request co-ordination with respect to the traffic. Note: The RVSM approval status of the aircraft should be passed if it is operating in RVSM designated airspace. 3. The passing of traffic information does not imply a commitment to an agreed course of action and there is no undertaking to update the information that has been passed. The dynamic nature of an air traffic environment renders traffic information obsolete once passed. The passing or receiving of traffic information alone does not constitute co-ordination. 4. If, after receiving traffic information, a controller believes that co-ordination is necessary, he should use the term Request co-ordination and should follow the verbal procedure detailed at Paragraph 10 below. 5. When describing the height, level or altitude of an aircraft for the purposes of passing traffic information or agreeing coordination, the terms Not Above, Not Below or Maintaining should be used as appropriate (see also Paragraph 12 and Paragraph 13 for dynamic scenarios). Traffic Coordination General 6. Coordination is defined as the act of negotiation between two or more parties each vested with the authority to make executive decisions appropriate to the task being discharged. 7. Coordination is effected when the parties concerned, on the basis of known intelligence, agree a course of action. Responsibility for obtaining the agreement and for ensuring implementation of the agreed course of action can be vested in one of the parties involved. Where a coordination arrangement is operated on a long-term basis, it should be covered in unit orders or an inter-unit agreement, as appropriate. Methods of Coordination 8. The following methods of Traffic Coordination are approved: a. Tactical Co-ordination. Tactical Co-ordination is the temporary co-ordination of aircraft to which the co-ordinating controllers are providing, or are about to provide, an ATS. It is achieved either verbally (face-to-face or over a landline) or silently using an electronic data communications system.
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b. Standing Agreement Coordination. Standing Agreement Coordination is coordination, which is implemented automatically, on a permanent basis, without communication between the controllers involved. It is effected in accordance with a written standing agreement between the units or sub-units involved and is only valid for the aircraft and circumstances specified in the agreement. c. Tactical Coordination Aircraft Not Yet on Frequency. Controllers must be aware that coordination between parties involved can be upon aircraft that are either in receipt of, or about to be in receipt of, an air traffic service, eg aerodrome departures. In such circumstances, the releasing controller should ensure that the details of any coordination agreement are passed to the pilot in time for him to acknowledge compliance before changing frequency. This is particularly pertinent during an aerodrome departure where the pilot can change frequency shortly after getting airborne. d. Tactical Coordination by Proxy. A controller can carry out coordination on behalf of another controller, provided that the traffic situation and time available are such that the controller being represented can put in to effect any agreed manoeuvres, and the procedure is defined and authorized in unit orders. Coordination of this nature is binding upon all parties involved in the agreement. Central or combined coordination positions serving more than one controller can be established at larger units with the approval of the parent HQ. Coordination Procedures
9. Verbal Coordination Indirect Procedure. When a controller intends to initiate coordination and believes, but is not certain, that another controller has responsibility for the aircraft against which co-ordination is required, the initiating controller should:
a. Make verbal contact with the most appropriate unit/console/controller and open the dialogue with the words Request Traffic Information. b. Refer to the aircraft upon which information is required using one of the identification methods described in Paragraphs 11 and 12. c. If the responding controller confirms that he is controlling the relevant aircraft, obtain details of its intentions. d. If appropriate, request coordination in accordance with Paragraph 10 below.
10. Verbal Coordination Direct Procedure. When a radar controller seeking coordination is able to determine (eg, from SSR data) which controller is controlling the aircraft against which coordination is required, the initiating controller should:
a. Make verbal contact with the appropriate unit/console/controller and open the dialogue with the words Request coordination. b. Refer to his aircraft and the aircraft upon which coordination is requested in the order most appropriate to the situation using one of the methods set out in Paragraph 11. c. Propose a course of action upon which agreement is requested and obtain a clear decision on that proposal. To ensure clarity and avoid misunderstandings, before terminating the call, parties should explicitly state the action required of their aircraft to achieve the agreed course of action. For example, an appropriate response to a request for an aircraft to maintain FL 120 can be, My traffic maintaining FL 120. A
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response that does not reaffirm the details of the agreement, like Roger, should not be accepted. d. When coordinating aircraft that are operating or are about to be operating within RVSM designated airspace, the RVSM approval status (either RVSM Compliant or Negative RVSM) of the individual aircraft involved should be included in the coordination message, unless the status is known to be self-evident to both controllers.
11. Agreement. The proposed course of action should be expressed in unambiguous terms. A statement that no action will be taken can constitute an agreement, although there is still a requirement for both controllers to explicitly state the actions required of their aircraft. Where assistants or support controllers are involved in the coordination process using electronic data communications systems, controllers remain responsible for the accuracy of the information displayed.
Climbing or Descending Traffic. Great care must be taken when coordinating aircraft that are climbing or descending, or are expecting further climb or descent, to ensure that accurate information is given and that any agreement takes account of the actual or proposed flight profile and/or cleared level. Where aircraft are climbing or descending, controllers can include the provision of horizontal separation until a flight profile is achieved that will provide adequate vertical separation with the conflicting traffic. For example, I will take 5 miles until not below FL 210 or, I will take 5 miles until 1000 ft above/below on Charlie. In the absence of an RT report from the pilot of passing or reaching the required level, the criteria for level occupancy using Mode Charlie should be applied. Where combinations of horizontal and vertical separation are used in coordinating aircraft, controllers should closely monitor aircraft tracks and levels to ensure that standard lateral separation is maintained until the requisite vertical separation exists.
12.
Where both aircraft are climbing, or both are descending, controllers can coordinate to use Mode Charlie indications to enable an expeditious step climb/descent, which maintains the required vertical separation/deconfliction minima, eg, I will take 1000 ft above/below on Charlie or, I will maintain 1000 ft above/below on Charlie. In such circumstances the criteria for level occupancy using Mode Charlie should be applied.
13. 14. Silent Coordination. The procedure to be followed when carrying out silent coordination will vary according to the characteristics of the data communication system in use. Where such a system is authorized for this purpose, units should issue instructions governing its use which comply with the principles described in Paragraph 10.
Coordination Outside Controlled Airspace

15. Considerations for Traffic Receiving a Service Outside Controlled Airspace. Instructions issued by controllers to pilots of aircraft operating outside controlled airspace are not mandatory; however, the services rely upon pilot compliance with the specified terms and conditions so as to promote a safer operating environment for all airspace users. The specific services have varying compliance requirements relating to the maintenance of headings, levels, time and radial allocations; consequently, the occasions when controllers can coordinate the aircraft without recourse to the pilot are detailed in the following paragraphs.
Outside controlled airspace, controllers are individually responsible for deciding whether they need tactical coordination, and to initiate such requests as appropriate. Controllers should not rely on other controllers to initiate tactical coordination.
16. 17. Deconfliction Service. Unless safety is likely to be compromised, a pilot receiving a Deconfliction Service should not change heading or level without first obtaining approval
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from the controller. Consequently, such aircraft can be coordinated in both the lateral and vertical planes without the need for prior recourse to the pilot.
18. Traffic Service. Unless safety is likely to be compromised, a pilot receiving a Traffic Service should not change level, route, manoeuvring area, or deviate from an ATC heading without first advising and obtaining a response from the controller. Consequently, such aircraft may be coordinated in the vertical plane, and in the lateral plane for those aircraft that have been allocated an ATC heading, without recourse to the pilot. For manoeuvring aircraft and aircraft following a route, co-ordination in the lateral plane can take place subject to the controller agreeing with the pilot the precise horizontal limits of the aircraft's manoeuvres. 19. Basic Service. Unless the pilot has entered into an agreement with a controller to maintain a specific course of action, a pilot receiving a Basic Service can change level, heading, or route without advising the controller. Consequently, prior to such aircraft being coordinated in either the vertical or lateral planes, the following conditions should be met:
a. The aircraft receiving the Basic Service is subject to identification, and it is expected that identity will be maintained throughout the period during which coordination is requested. b. The pilot receiving a Basic Service agrees to maintain the required vertical or lateral profile for the required period or distance. c. For manoeuvring aircraft and aircraft following a route, coordination in the lateral plane can take place subject to the controller agreeing with the pilot the precise horizontal limits of the aircraft's manoeuvres. Note: Controllers can coordinate aircraft under a Basic Service through their radar overhead subject to the condition of b. above being met.
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Chapter 11: Types of Service and Separation Standards

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3011(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13). Types of Service 1. The types of service that can be provided by controllers are: a. b. c. d. e. Radar Control. Deconfliction Service. Traffic Service. Procedural Service. Basic Service.
Radar Control 2. Radar Control is an air traffic radar service in which pilots are given mandatory instructions to enable the prescribed separation minima between aircraft to be maintained. Such mandatory instructions will generally be associated with essential details of the conflicting traffic. No changes of heading or level will be made without prior approval of the radar controller. 3. In Class C Airspace. In Class C airspace standard separation between aircraft operating under VFR need not be applied; pilots operating under VFR will be passed traffic information on other VFR flights and should be given traffic avoidance advice if they request it. Deconfliction Service 4. The definition and scope of Deconfliction Service is detailed within CAP 774.
5. ATC Units with a PAR capability are authorized to provide avoiding action without an associated climb instruction, within the plan area of the PAR, in accordance with CAP 774, on the basis that the area displayed has been safeguarded during the procedure design phase. ATCOs should not provide avoiding action if the aircraft return indicates flight below the Lower Safe Limit Line Cursor (LSLLC). Traffic Service 6. The definition and scope of Traffic Service is detailed within CAP 774. The military specific exceptions are as follows: a. Controllers are authorized to provide vectors to pilots performing radar to visual recoveries to an airfield in accordance with regulation Chapter 26 Paragraph 34.a, without reference to responsibility for terrain clearance. b. When positioning aircraft for a Short Pattern Circuit (SPC), or practice SPC, controllers can provide vectors to aircraft no lower than 500 ft below levels depicted on
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the radar vector chart when within 10 nm of the airfield, without reference to responsibility for terrain clearance. Notes: 1. Controllers will avoid vectoring aircraft towards higher areas of the RVC within 10 nm of the airfield if this would result in the aircraft being lower than 500 ft below the RVC at any stage of flight. 2. Under certain circumstances controllers operating at RN shore-based ATC units are exempt from the above provisions Annex 11E: . Procedural Service 7. The definition and scope of Procedural Service, is detailed within CAP 774.
Basic Service 8. The definition and scope of Basic Service is detailed within CAP 774.
Application of Services 9. ATC Services. ATC Services should be provided to the maximum extent practicable subject only to workload, communications or equipment capability and applied in accordance with the status of the airspace within which the participating aircraft are flying. 10. Radar Services. Radar services are applied as follows: a. Radar Control. Radar Control should be applied within, or shortly before entering CAS. When aircraft complete a crossing of CAS, and in the absence of a request to the contrary, controllers should reapply the type of service being given prior to Radar Control without recourse to the pilot. b. Deconfliction Service and Traffic Service. Deconfliction Service and Traffic Service should be applied as follows: (1) Below FL195 outside CAS.
(2) At and above FL195: in NW MTA and TRAs 001-008 during published hours of activity. (3) At and above FL245 in EA MTA during published hours of activity.
(4) Within active MDAs and other DAs where appropriate agreements have been made. 11. Non-Radar Services. Non-radar services are applied as follows: a. Procedural Service. Procedural Service may be applied throughout UK airspace. b. Basic Service. Basic Service is available throughout UK Class F and G airspace.
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12. When providing radar services, controllers will take account of airspace restrictions, known high ground or obstructions and radar clutter, shadow and suppression. 13. Class C Airspace. The procedures for the provision of ATS in Class C airspace are in Annex 11A: . This includes the procedures for provision of flight in active TRAs 001-008, FL195 to FL245. 14. Class D Airspace. Except at ScATCC (Mil), where separate regulations apply, the procedures for the provision of ATS in Class D airspace are in Annex 11C: . 15. Class E Airspace. The procedures for the provision of ATS in Class E airspace are in Annex 11D: . 16. Danger Areas. When required, the type of ATS provided to participating aircraft in active Danger Areas should be in accordance with procedures agreed and published to meet the user requirements for the particular area. The ATS provided to non-participating aircraft cleared to cross a Danger Area during its published hours of activity, but clear of the hazardous activity, should, subject to any appropriate limitations, be in accordance with the UK classification of the airspace within which the area lies. Avoiding Action 17. When the projected track of an unknown aircraft appears to conflict with that of an aircraft receiving a radar service, the pilot should be given avoiding action in accordance with the type of service being provided. Reduced Traffic Information/Deconfliction Advice 18. Controllers should inform the pilot of reductions in traffic information along with the reason and the probable duration; however, it may not always be possible to provide these warnings in a timely fashion. There may be circumstances that prevent controllers from passing timely traffic information and/or deconfliction advice, e.g. high workload, areas of high traffic density, against unknown aircraft conducting high energy manoeuvres, or when traffic is not displayed to the controller or obscured by surveillance clutter. 19. High Workload. In high workload situations, which may not always be apparent from RTF loading, it may not be possible for controllers to always provide timely traffic information and/or deconfliction advice. High workload situations may not necessarily be linked to high traffic density. High traffic density can cause difficulty interpreting ATS surveillance system data and may affect RTF loading or controller workload to the extent that the controller is unable to pass timely traffic information and/or deconfliction advice on all traffic. 20. Lateral/Vertical Limits. Where aircraft are operating close to the lateral and/or vertical limits of solid ATS surveillance system cover, or close to a radar overhead, there is the potential for conflicting traffic to be detected late. Similarly, there is potential for aircraft to be undetected or detected late in known areas of poor surveillance performance, permanent echoes, weather clutter or when the controller suspects the performance of the ATS surveillance system is degraded. 21. Primary Radar (PSR) Unavailable. Where primary radar is unavailable at an SSRequipped unit non-transponding aircraft will not be detected by the radar equipment. An SSR-Alone ATS can only be provided under specific conditions or when approved by the relevant Duty Holder or the MAA. See Chapter 35 Paragraph 7 SSR-Alone Operations.
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Provision of Traffic Information to Pilots 22. The provision of accurate Traffic Information to pilots is fundamental to the provision of an effective ATC Service. This Traffic Information should be passed by RT using the phraseology in CAP 413 Chapter 6 1.17.6. Additional guidance is given in the following paragraphs. 23. Class C Traffic Information to VFR Aircraft. In Class C airspace, controllers should pass traffic information to VFR flights on other VFR flights unless notified that the flights are operating within a formation under MARSA. 24. Passing Traffic Information Additional Guidance. In addition to the normal occasions for passing Traffic Information under Deconfliction Service and Traffic Service, controllers may also consider it prudent or even necessary, to pass Traffic Information in other circumstances. In all cases however, the information passed to the pilot must be relevant to his situation and circumstances at the time; the transmission must also contain sufficient information to accurately paint the traffic picture, as available to the controller. Pressure Datum. When radar consoles are set to display SSR mode C information against a pressure datum of 1013 hPa at all levels (eg. at some terminal units), controllers must be fully aware of the difference between the displayed mode C (based on 1013 hPa) and the actual altitude (based on RPS/QNH) or height (based on QFE) of aircraft operating close to or below the Transition Level. In such cases, particularly when there is a significant pressure difference from 1013 hPa, extreme caution must be used when referring to an aircrafts indicated level whilst passing Traffic Information. 25. Approximate Level Information. When the prevailing circumstances suit the use of only approximate level information (ie slightly above/below, above/below, well above/below), the following may be used as guidance: a. b. Slightly above/below - vertical difference up to 1000 ft. Above/below - vertical difference of between 1000 ft and 3000 ft.
c. Well above/below - vertical difference exceeding 3000 ft (such information would normally be irrelevant but could be of importance, eg, if a high rate of climb or descent is involved). Standard Separation/Deconfliction Minima General 26. Correlation of Displayed Primary and SSR Data. When making routine checks of their radar displays, controllers should ensure that the correlation of displayed primary and SSR data is maintained. Standard Separation/Deconfliction Minima Lateral 27. Normal radar lateral separation should be 5 nm, except when the radar source is provided by NATS and NATS has specified otherwise. Horizontal separation based on radar exists when the distance between the centres of radar returns does not represent less than the prescribed minimum, provided that the returns do not touch or overlap. The separation criteria to be applied when providing a radar service are dependent upon the source of the radar data. When the radar source is provided by NATS and beyond a range specified by NATS horizontal separation should be increased to 10 nm, although 5 nm separation can be applied for aircraft flying on the same radial from a specific radar source. 28. Reduced Lateral Separation Terminal Radar. As specified within CAP774, horizontal separation can be reduced to 3 nm (subject to surveillance capability and
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regulatory approval), between identified aircraft that are under the control of the same controller, or that have been subject to co-ordination. This order authorises military controllers to apply reduced lateral separation (internal and external), subject to the following surveillance requirements being met: a. Both aircraft are in solid radar cover and within 40 nm of the radar head.
b. The radar equipments in use provide a data update rate of 10 rpm or better (See Note). c. Both aircraft are outside CAS other than Class D and active TRAs.
Note: Due to the update rate of SSR (generally 8 rpm), Reduced Lateral Separation is not to be applied while operating SSR-only. 29. Application of Standard Separation/Deconfliction Minima. When applying radar separation, controllers should note the following: a. Where primary radar data is displayed, horizontal separation should be applied using the primary radar returns. b. Horizontal separation should not be used between aircraft holding over the same point. However, descent clearance can be given to aircraft departing the holding point as soon as standard radar separation is seen to be established. 30. Horizontal Separation SSR. SSR shall not be used to provide horizontal separation if a controller has any doubt about the accuracy of the position of radar returns for any reason. Standard Separation/Deconfliction Minima Vertical 31. Use of Vertical Separation. Vertical separation can be used in lieu of horizontal separation in the following circumstances: a. b. c. d. e. Following coordination. By application of Reduced Vertical Separation (RVS). By use of SSR Mode C. By use of Class A and D deeming conventions. By use of Class C deeming conventions.
32. Coordination. Following co-ordination, the following vertical separation minima should be applied: a. Between subsonic aircraft: (1) (2) b. Up to FL290 1000 ft. Above FL290 2000 ft.
When one or both aircraft are supersonic: (1) Up to FL450 2000 ft.
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(2)
Above FL450 4000 ft.
33. Reduced Vertical Separation Terminal Radar. With the exception of civil aircraft in receipt of a Deconfliction Service, terminal controllers can apply Reduced Vertical Separation (RVS) of 500 ft between aircraft provided that: a. Both aircraft are within 40 nm of the radar head.
b. Both aircraft are in receipt of a service from the same controller or are the subject of military to military coordination. c. Both aircraft are below FL100 and outside CAS other than Class D.
Civilian pilots, subject to their agreement, in receipt of Deconfliction Service, or operating in Class D airspace of RAF Brize Norton , may be provided with reduced vertical separation. The application of RVS to civil aircraft should be exceptional rather than routine and then only when a re-route is impracticable. 34. Reduced Vertical Separation Area Radar. Area radar controllers can apply RVSM of 1000 ft within the vertical and lateral limits of airspace notified as RVSM or RVSM transition airspace provided that: a. Both aircraft are RVSM approved.
b. The radar display system shows the RVSM approval status of all aircraft involved to the respective controllers and the aircraft are subject to Standing Agreement Coordination Procedures, or verbal coordination has been effected. Note: Formation flights are considered as being non-RVSM approved, regardless of the approval status of the individual aircraft concerned. In order to ensure that RVSM is applied correctly, the RVSM approval status of the aircraft should be included in all forms of liaison phraseology (pre-notification, handover, cleared flight path requests and co-ordination). 35. SSR Mode C. When SSR is used to assess vertical separation, the Mode C responses should be continuously monitored to ensure that the vertical distance is never less than the prescribed minimum. An aircraft in receipt of a radar service, whether transponding in Mode C or not, can be separated from other aircraft which are transponding in Mode C subject to the following: a. When the Mode C of the conflicting aircraft has been verified, the following minimum vertical separation should be maintained: (1) Inside CAS. 5000 ft
(2) Outside CAS. 3000 ft (Unless the SSR Mode 3A indicates that the Mode C data has been verified, the surveillance returns, however presented, should not merge). b. Mode 3/A Code 0000. Vertical separation using Mode C should not to be applied against conflicting traffic with Mode 3/A code 0000. 36. Class A and D Deeming Conventions. a. Mode C. If an aircraft under control is within Class A or D airspace, the following deeming conventions can be employed:
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(1) When Mode C indicates a conflicting aircraft to be outside the vertical limits of CAS, radar responses can be allowed to merge provided that the Mode 3/A is not that of a unit with approval to penetrate CAS and at least 1000 ft vertical separation exists. Controllers should exercise caution when controlling aircraft crossing CAS with lateral variations in base levels to ensure separation is not eroded against traffic which is subsequently cleared by the controlling authority to cross a lower portion of CAS. (2) When the aircraft under control is at or above FL110, any traffic transponding Mode 3/A code 7000, 7001 or 7002 without Mode C can be deemed to be outside the vertical confines of CAS and radar returns can be allowed to merge. (3) Standard separation should be provided if it is known or suspected that an unknown aircraft: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Is lost or has experienced radio failure. Has inadvertently penetrated CAS. Is not squawking. Is squawking Mode 3/A code 0000. Is joining CAS.
b. Primary Contacts within the Lateral Limits of Class A CAS. When providing an airways crossing service within Class A, Area Radar controllers at LATCC(Mil) and ScATCC(Mil) are authorized to deem primary contacts within the lateral limits of CAS provided that: (1) The aircraft receiving the crossing service is 1000 ft above the base of CAS. (2) The primary contact has not been notified as operating in CAS by the relevant Civil Sector. (3) The Operating Authority of the CAS has not delegated control of that airspace to another unit. (4) Standard separation will be provided if it is known or suspected that the primary contact: (a) (b) (c) Is lost or has experienced radio failure. Has inadvertently penetrated CAS. Is joining CAS.
37. Class C Deeming Conventions. When an aircraft in receipt of a radar service is within Class C above FL195 (outwith active TRAs 001-008), the following deeming conventions can be employed: a. Within the vertical and lateral limits of Class C, separation is deemed to exist between aircraft under control and either known traffic whose Mode 3/A is not that of a unit with approval to penetrate Class C or unknown traffic. Controllers are not required to give aircraft under their control within Class C instructions to maintain standard
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separation from such traffic with or without Mode C. However, aircraft under control at FL200, or FL250 above an active TRA, should be passed traffic information regarding conflicting unknown traffic; the radar returns may be allowed to merge. This dispensation does not apply to aircraft within 5 nm of the Class C boundary in respect of unknown traffic operating within MTAs and active TRAs. b. Standard separation should be provided if it is known, or suspected, that an aircraft: (1) (2) Is lost or has experienced radio failure. Has inadvertently penetrated Class C or appears likely to.
(3) Is squawking Mode 3/A code 0000 and has not been the subject of coordination. 38. Application of Vertical Separation. The conditions for the application of vertical separation as detailed in this regulation are summarized in the following table: Figure 11-1 Application of Vertical Separation
Conflicting Traffic Known Traffic in Known Traffic in Class A & D Class C above FL195 excluding active TRAs. a. 1000 ft by coordination b. 5000 ft by use of Mode C a. 1000 ft by coordination b. 5000 ft by use of Mode C Known Traffic outside CAS below FL195 or within active TRAs a. 1000 ft by coordination b. 5000 ft by use of Mode C c. 1000 ft by CAS deeming. a. 1000 ft by coordination b. 5000 ft by use of Mode C c. 1000ft by Class C deeming. a. 1000 ft by coordination b. 3000 ft by use of Mode C c. 500 ft by RVS below FL100 (see note) Unknown traffic outside CAS below FL195 or within active TRAs a. 1000 ft by CAS deeming
In Class A&D
In Class ordination C above b. 5000 ft by use FL195 of Mode C Own excluding Traffic active TRAs Outside CAS below FL195 or below FL 245 within active TRA
a. 1000 ft by coordination b. 3000 ft by use of Mode C
a. 1000 ft by co-
a. 1000 ft (2000ft above FL290) by coordination b. 5000 ft by use of Mode C a. 1000 ft by coordination b. 3000 ft by use of Mode C
a. 1000 ft by Class C deeming.
a. 3000 ft and a gap by use of Mode C
Note: see Chapter 11 Paragraph 33. 39. Application of Vertical Separation During Climb/Descent. An aircraft can be instructed to climb or descend to, or through a level previously occupied by another aircraft provided that:
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a. Vertical separation, as prescribed above already exists, and is maintained throughout. b. The vacating aircraft is proceeding to a level that will maintain vertical separation.
c. The controller has ascertained, in accordance with Chapter 35 Paragraph 13 or from the pilot that the vacating aircraft has left the level to be vacated. The practice whereby a controller undertakes, through use of Mode C alone, to follow the climb or descent of another aircraft is potentially hazardous. Therefore when coordinating against climbing or descending traffic using either verbal or silent coordination procedures, controllers should impose on their own traffic an intermediate stop-off level to ensure maintenance of the criteria prescribed above. In order to safeguard separation criteria, any stop-off level should be based upon a level already vacated by the other aircraft and not on a level expected to be reached. 40. Severe Turbulence. If severe turbulence is known to exist, the instruction to climb or descend to the vacated level should not be given until the vacating aircraft is vertically displaced from that level by at least 1000 ft (2000 ft above FL290) in the anticipated direction. 41. Vertical Separation Standards for Typhoon. Due to possible altimeter inaccuracies at certain airspeeds and/or when manoeuvring above specified parameters at all speeds, controllers may be requested by pilots of Typhoon aircraft to provide increased vertical separation against other aircraft. At all times the onus for providing increased terrain clearance and requesting the increased vertical separation against other aircraft rests entirely with the pilot. If a controller is unable to provide the increased separation, the pilot should be advised and will either delay acceleration or reduce speed and/or manoeuvre to comply with standard separation. This proviso is reflected in the Typhoon Release-toService. Controllers should apply the following vertical separation standards to Typhoon aircraft when requested by the Typhoon pilot: a. Pilot Not Requesting Increased Vertical Separation. Where a pilot does not request increased vertical separation, standard separation should be applied; note that the Typhoon is non-RVSM approved. b. Pilot Requesting Increased Vertical Separation. Where a pilot requests increased vertical separation the following separation should be provided, subject to the controllers agreement: (1) (2) c. Typhoon v Typhoon aircraft: 3000 ft. Typhoon v other aircraft: 2000 ft.
Supersonic. Standard separation will be applied.
Formation Procedures 42. Introduction. Within a formation of aircraft the formation leader is responsible for separation between units comprising the formation. This is known as MARSA - military accepts responsibility for separation of aircraft. 43. Formation Flights in Receipt of an ATS - Specific Requirements. a. Formations should be considered as a single unit for separation purposes provided that:
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(1) The formation elements are contained within 1 nm laterally and longitudinally, and at the same level or altitude. Within Class F and G airspace only, at the controllers discretion, these limitations may be increased to 3 nm and/or up to 1000 ft vertically. (2) The formation, although operating outside the parameters given above, has been the subject of an AUS ACN in accordance with Chapter 7: or tactical negotiation between appropriate military supervisors and civilian watch managers. b. When first checking in on a control frequency, formation leaders are required to clearly state the number of aircraft in the formation. Controllers should ensure that this information is obtained prior to establishing an ATS. c. Where traffic under service comprises a formation or stream of 2 or more aircraft, controllers should include this information during radar handovers, requests for Cleared Flight Path, verbal coordination or when passing traffic information on landline or RT. Similarly, traffic information passed on RT should include the composition of any coordinated formation or stream. d. Controllers working traffic comprising a formation or stream of 2 or more aircraft should ensure that the composition of the formation or stream is entered on the Electronic Flight Strip (EFS) or data line. e. During internal coordination established under unit silent procedures, controllers should check the EFS or electronic data line of the traffic against which coordination is required to ascertain whether it is a formation or stream of 2 or more aircraft. f. When crossing CAS all aircraft in the formation are required to monitor the relevant ATC frequency. 44. Formation Flights Within CAS (Classes A-E). When flying within CAS (Classes A-D) and when under a radar service within Class E, the following procedures should be applied: a. All aircraft should fly within 1 nm laterally and longitudinally of each other at the same level or altitude by visual means or by use of airborne radar. Where this not possible for any reason, formations should be split into elements separated by the prescribed ATC separation minima before entering CAS. Such elements may be either individual aircraft or smaller formations that can fly within 1 nm laterally and longitudinally and at the same level or altitude, each of which should be assigned a discrete SSR code with Mode C. b. Prior to a formation entering CAS, controllers should obtain a confirmation on RT that all aircraft within elements are within 1 nm of each other. c. When formations are within level flight, controllers should obtain confirmation that all elements are at their assigned level prior to the formation entering CAS. When a formation has been cleared to climb or descend in CAS controllers should obtain confirmation that all elements have reached the new assigned level. If the vacation of a level is relevant for the purposes of coordination, controllers should obtain confirmation that all elements have vacated the level in question. d. Controllers can permit a formation to join up in CAS under the following circumstances: (1) When an aircraft is in emergency and a formation join up is essential.
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(2) Formations commencing a join-up prior to entering CAS are permitted to complete their join within CAS, when conditions allow, subject to maintaining standard separation from other aircraft. Controllers should also to give appropriate consideration to the formations proximity to other airspace users. (3) Within Class C airspace, controllers can allow formations to join up; however, they should give appropriate consideration to the formations proximity to UARs and other airspace users. Additionally, all elements involved in the formation join up should transpond Mode 3A plus C until established in formation. Once established in formation individual elements, except the lead aircraft, should be instructed to squawk standby. e. Formations can require to split on a planned (eg, prior to descent) or unplanned (eg, approaching deteriorating weather or in emergency) basis. Early notification to controllers of the formations requirements will ensure that any change in configuration takes place in a controlled, orderly and safe manner. Controllers can permit formation splits, planned or unplanned, in CAS giving due regard to other airspace users and coordination requirements. f. C130 station keeping equipment (SKE) formations may be exempted from the requirements of Sub-paragraphs 45a and b provided that: (1) (2) Lead and tail aircraft are squawking (with Mode C). The flight is operating in accordance with a relevant ACN.
(3) Prior to the formation entering CAS, the controller has obtained a confirmation on RT that all elements are at the assigned level. g. With the exception of Paragraph 45f, formations that are subject to ACN action (eg, Coronet Flights) or tactical negotiation between appropriate military supervisors and civilian watch managers should use best practice (eg, first and last aircraft squawking), together with positive confirmation to ATC that all aircraft are established in the assigned level block. 45. Radar Services to Formations Outside CAS. A formation, with elements keeping station visually or by radar, of more than 1 nm length can receive a radar service outside CAS as follows: a. The lead aircraft should squawk Mode 3A and C. If the stream extends for 3 nm or more, the last aircraft should also squawk. For longer streams, intermediate aircraft should squawk as appropriate. b. Radar service should be given to the lead aircraft only.
c. Controllers should identify the full extent of the stream formation during radar handovers, when effecting coordination and passing traffic information to other controllers. 46. Formation Join-up Procedures. Formation join-up procedures should be as follows: a. VMC. Individual aircraft can rendezvous, either by ground controlled vectors, or by internal aids, with the final join-up being made visually. The initial minimum vertical separation should be 2000 ft below the formation, but if the pilot is not visual with the formation when established in trail, vertical separation can be reduced to 1000 ft below with the agreement of both the formation leader and the pilot of the joining aircraft.
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From this position, with the consent of the formation leader, the aircraft can be cleared to climb visually and join the formation, adhering to the parameters at Paragraph 43. From this point the formation leader is responsible for separation (MARSA) between the units comprising the formation until the completion of formation break-up procedures, and the controller should address his instructions only to the formation leader. b. IMC. Training formation join-ups will not normally be attempted in IMC. However, when for operational reasons IMC join-ups are essential, the following procedures should be applied. The initial phase of the join-up can be achieved either by ground controlled vectors or by use of aircraft internal aids to a point 5 nm horizontally from the formation leader and within 2000 ft vertically. At this point the position of the joining aircraft should be passed to the formation leader and confirmation obtained that he is willing to assume responsibility for separation between his aircraft, the aircraft comprising the formation and the joining aircraft. On receipt of this confirmation, the joining aircraft should be transferred to the formation leaders discrete frequency. From this point MARSA applies. The final join-up will be completed using aircraft internal aids under the direction of the formation leader. The joining aircraft should squawk standby when join-up is complete. 47. In-flight Procedures. When formation join-up is complete the formation should be regarded as a single unit for separation purposes, provided it falls within the parameters laid down at Paragraphs 43-52. RAF formations and most USAFE formations, with the exception of tanker formations, can be stepped-down vertically from the leader and can occupy more than one flight level. It is essential that the controller providing the service is aware of the flight levels blocked by the formation and ensures that, where applicable, it falls within the Altitude Reservation (ALTRV) authorized in the AUS ACN. USAFE tanker formations use a different procedure. Should the climb to cruising level be stopped at an intermediate level, the formation will step-down at 500 ft levels from the leader. However, once cruising level is achieved, the formation will stack-up at 500 ft levels from the leader. Each element of the formation will be separated horizontally from the leader by 1 nm. 48. Formation Break-up Procedures. The controller should determine from the formation leader when the break-up procedures should commence, the procedures to be followed and the order that aircraft will depart. The controller should indicate to the formation leader when the break-up procedure may commence. There are 3 methods for departing formation: a. b. c. Differential airspeed (USAFE preferred). Achieving vertical separation. Applying vectors.
Formation break-up procedures should be carried out by one controlling agency only. The formation leader is responsible for separation (MARSA) between the aircraft comprising the formation until standard separation has been achieved between individual aircraft and each aircraft has been identified and placed under service. Handover of control to another ATS unit should not to be made until these actions have been completed. 49. Differential Airspeed (USAFE Preferred). Provided sufficient time is available, initial break-up should be achieved by using differential airspeed to at least 5 nm longitudinal spacing. The formation leader will inform the controller when 5 nm separation has been achieved and request individual control of aircraft within the formation. Individual aircraft should be identified and placed under the appropriate service when separation has been notified.
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Note: Approximately 140 nm are required at a 10 kt differential airspeed to achieve 5 nm spacing (the actual distance is dependent upon airspeed and headwind component and could vary considerably from this figure). Thus, if differential airspeed is not practical, the alternatives are either achieving vertical separation or applying radar vectors. 50. Achieving Vertical Separation. The controller should determine from the formation leader whether individual aircraft will be climbing to a flight level above, or descending to a flight level below, the formation level to achieve standard vertical separation. With the approval of the controller, individual aircraft can depart the formation visually in the prenotified sequence on the instructions of the formation leader, and climb or descend to the assigned flight level. The controller should confirm that an aircraft is established at its assigned flight level, identified and placed under service, before authorising the formation leader to instruct the next aircraft to depart the formation. 51. Applying Vectors. The controller should determine from the formation leader the vectors that individual aircraft will follow when departing the formation to achieve standard horizontal separation. With the approval of the controller, individual aircraft can depart the formation visually, in the pre-notified sequence, on the instructions of the formation leader, maintaining the assigned flight level and flying the agreed vector. When standard separation has been achieved, the controller should identify the aircraft and place it under service before authorising the formation leader to instruct the next aircraft to depart the formation. Military Formations Routeing as GAT 52. It has been agreed between NATS Ltd and MOD that formation flights will normally fly as OAT and not GAT. Exceptionally, when this is not possible or practicable, a formation may file as GAT; however, crews have been made aware that this can lead to delay or rerouteing. 53. Where ATS has been delegated to NATS from an adjacent state, the military will not be able to provide a service. Civil sectors will therefore be responsible for providing a service through this area. Civil ATC can also opt to work the formation flight if it deems appropriate for reasons of safety. In such a case, the formation will be handed over to the military at soon as practicable. All procedures will be subject to specific local requirements. Formation Flights Exiting the UK to Fly as GAT in Europe 54. Although flights will normally be OAT to the UK FIR/UIR boundary, a flight plan to join CAS at the last fix prior to the exit fix of the UK boundary will be filed and an appropriate Air Traffic Flow Management slot obtained for the civil sector containing the boundary fix. This will generate a civil flight plan that will enable continuation of GAT flight beyond the UK boundary. Where possible, the military controller should pre-note the formation flight to the civil sector concerned at least 20 minutes before the flight's estimate for the boundary fix. 55. The military controller should treat the formation as an OAT crosser and obtain appropriate co-ordination in order that the flight can reach the boundary fix. The military controller should identify the flight to the civil sector as a formation and confirm its intentions; where practicable the flight should remain clear of the centreline of GAT routes for as long as possible. A request for a joining clearance at the boundary fix should be obtained by the military controller; the civil sector will then activate the civil flight plan and pass an estimate to the adjoining ACC. The civil sector will provide a joining clearance to the military controller, along with the position at which the flight should be transferred; the military controller will then transfer the flight directly to the adjacent ACC.
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Formation Flights Inbound to the UK Arriving as GAT from Europe 56. On first receipt of the inbound estimate, the civil sector will pre-note the appropriate military agency, including the squawk and time at the FIR/UIR boundary fix; the military will then provide a new squawk and frequency. The adjacent ACC will be asked to transfer the formation flight directly to the military frequency; it will not be required to change the squawk. Military ATC should change the squawk once the flight is within UK airspace. Appropriate co-ordination should be agreed to enable the formation to clear CAS as soon as practicable. Reporting of Hazardous Flying Conditions 57. Reports of hazardous flying conditions received from aircraft under control of an ATSU are required to be disseminated as quickly as possible in accordance with the following instructions: a. Action by Controllers Receiving Reports. Controllers receiving reports of hazardous flying conditions from aircraft under their control will note all relevant details passed by the reporting aircraft. They should read back the information to ensure accuracy, pass details received to the watch supervisor and relay the information to other aircraft under service which are approaching the area concerned, offering rerouteing if possible. b. Action by Watch Supervisors. On receipt of reports of hazardous flying conditions, watch supervisors should: (1) Arrange for the display of details regarding the conditions reported and the area concerned so that, controllers are aware of the hazards involved. (2) Notify watch supervisors at adjacent ATSUs and, at units with a civilian element, the senior civil controller on duty, if it appears that aircraft under their control are likely to be affected. 58. Subsequent Actions. Watch Supervisors should issue updated reports where necessary and should cancel the warning when it can be confirmed that hazardous flying conditions no longer affect the ATSUs area of operation. Clutter on the Situational Display 59. Specific tactical procedures that should be applied by controllers in response to clutter observed on the situation display are provided at Paragraph 64 and Paragraph 65 below. 60. There are many potential causes of spurious primary returns (clutter), including: weather; anomalous propagation; ground/sea returns; birds; wind turbine effects; and radar countermeasures such as chaff. Whilst it may be possible for some forms of clutter to be distinguishable from aircraft surveillance returns, this may not always be possible, especially where processed radar systems are employed. 61. Clutter on the situation display has the potential to create the following impacts on the ATS provided: a. b. Increased risk of the controller not detecting conflicting traffic. Aircraft position symbols, track histories; data blocks may be hidden or obscured.
c. Spurious track(s) may be generated, which may be indistinguishable from genuine aircraft returns.
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There may be a delay in aircraft being identified and placed under an ATS. Increased controller workload.
62. The impacts listed above are likely to affect the degree, accuracy and timeliness of the instructions, advice, and information that controllers are able to provide to pilots, with consequent impacts on safety and expedition. Additionally, the existence of clutter may necessitate aircraft being rerouted, or air traffic services reduced below the level requested by the pilot. However, where clutter of a long term or permanent nature is generated in a particular area, the impacts and potential mitigations should additionally be assessed locally, utilising extant SM processes; any procedures developed should be approved by higher authority and detailed in local order books. 63. Wind Turbines. In addition to observable clutter, wind turbines also have the potential to generate a variety of other negative effects on ATS systems and these should also be considered by ATS providers when developing impact statements as part of the wind turbine application planning process. CAP764 (CAA Policy and Guidelines on Wind Turbines) provides specific information. 64. Clutter Outside Controlled Airspace. In the event of clutter being present on the situational display, outside controlled airspace, controllers should consider the nature and extent of the clutter and if necessary take the following actions: a. For aircraft in receipt of a Deconfliction Service, controllers should inform the pilot of the extent of the clutter and where practicable offer a reroute. However, this may not be possible due to traffic density, airspace availability and/or the requirement to follow specific arrival or departure tracks. The extent of such a reroute should where possible aim to achieve the planned lateral deconfliction minima from the observed clutter. However, it may still be necessary to reduce traffic information/deconfliction advice from the direction of the clutter. b. For aircraft in receipt of a Traffic Service, and those aircraft under a Deconfliction Service that are not rerouted as above, controllers should inform pilots of a reduction in traffic information/deconfliction advice as detailed at Paragraphs 18-21. If the controller cannot maintain aircraft identity, the service should be terminated. c. For all surveillance services, in order to maintain track identity on aircraft being vectored to final approach, if re-routing around the clutter is not practicable for the reasons specified above, an alternative type of approach may need to be conducted. 65. Clutter Inside Controlled Airspace. In the event of clutter being present on the situational display, inside controlled airspace, the radar service should not be limited or the air traffic service terminated. Controllers should consider the extent of the clutter and if necessary take the following actions: a. The controller can vector the aircraft around the clutter; however, this might not be practicable due to traffic density, airspace availability and/or the requirement to follow specific arrival or departure tracks. b. If the intensity of the clutter is such that the controller is not able to clearly see the aircrafts PSR or SSR position symbol, radar separation should not be used to separate it and other controlled aircraft. The controller remains responsible for providing separation between controlled aircraft and aircraft that are considered to be infringing controlled airspace. Therefore, the controller should consider the nature of the clutter including any observed movement, relative speed
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and track consistency, and take appropriate action if it is considered to be an unknown aircraft. 66. Radar Approaches Experiencing Clutter in all Classes of Airspace. In addition to the procedures at Paragraphs 64 and 65, in all classes of airspace, for aircraft intending to make a radar approach, the controller should decide whether: a. A radar approach is not possible owing to clutter, in which case the controller should inform the pilot. b. A radar approach could be carried out, but there may be a possibility of radar contact being lost. In this case the controller should inform the pilot as early as possible that clutter is affecting his display and that missed approach instructions will be passed in good time if it becomes necessary to terminate the approach.
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Annex 11A: ATC Procedures in Class A Airspace

Introduction 1. Class A will normally only be applied to airspace where the complexity of the ATM task justifies a permanent IFR-only environment. Within the UK FIRs, Class A is normally specified for airways, major Terminal Control Areas (TMAs) and Control Areas (CTAs). In the case of TMAs and CTAs the application of Class A will be based upon the complexity of the route structure and interface procedures (particularly interaction with en-route services) together with associated ATC operations. Class A may also be specified for certain Control Zones (CTRs), based upon the historic and future mix of traffic, complexity of IFR operations and the density of operations. In the UK Class A airspace can be established up to FL195. 2. Class A airspace is a known traffic environment where flights are provided with an ATS with their intentions known to ATC. Only units that are authorised will provide an ATS in Class A airspace. UK National Rules and Requirements for Flight in Class A Airspace 3. General Rules. The basic rules for use of Class A airspace, irrespective of meteorological conditions, are: a. b. c. d. e. A flight plan should be filed. A clearance should be obtained to fly within the airspace. Radio contact should be maintained on the appropriate frequency. The flight should be conducted in accordance with ATC instructions. Pilots must fly according to the IFR.
4. Separation Requirements. Standard vertical or horizontal separation should be provided, unless otherwise specified, between all flights in Class A airspace. 5. Terrain Clearance. Controllers should ensure that levels assigned to IFR flights in receipt of a Radar Control Service provide adequate terrain clearance for the phase of flight as follows: a. Final Approach. Levels in accordance with the approved procedure.
b. Within the Surveillance Minimum Altitude Area (SMAA)/Radar Vector Chart (RVC). Levels allocated must be in accordance with the information published on the Surveillance Minimum Altitude Chart (SMAC)/RVC. c. Within 30 Miles of the Surveillance Antenna. The antenna should be that which is being used to provide the service. Levels 1000 ft above any fixed obstacle within: (1) (2) 5 miles of the aircraft and, 15 miles ahead and 20 either side of the aircrafts track.
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When the aircraft is within 15 miles of the antenna, and provided a SMAC or approved procedure has been notified, the 5 miles in (1) and the 15 miles in (2) may be reduced to 3 and 10 miles respectively. d. Outside the Above Phases. Levels 1000 ft above any fixed obstacle: (1) Which lies within 15 miles of the centreline of any airway or advisory route (for flights on airways and advisory routes); or (2) Within 30 miles of the aircraft (for all other flights).
Note: In sections of airways where the base is defined as a flight level, the lowest useable level normally provides not less than 1500 ft terrain clearance. Controllers have no responsibility for the terrain clearance of, and should not assign levels to, aircraft operating Special VFR or VFR within controlled airspace which accept vectors. 6. Formations. Formations are to be considered as a single unit for separation/deconfliction purposes provided that the formation remains within the following parameters: a. 1 nm laterally and longitudinally, and at the same level or;
b. As agreed following prior tactical negotiation between appropriate civilian and military supervisors or; c. As detailed in an Airspace Co-ordination Notice (ACN) specific to the formation flight. 7. Balloons. Balloon flights are not permitted in Class A airspace, other than on a Special VFR clearance. 8. Special VFR Flight. A flight made at any time in a control zone which is Class A airspace or made in any other control zone in IMC or at night; in respect of which the appropriate air traffic control unit has given permission for the flight to be made in accordance with special instructions given by that unit instead of in accordance with the Instrument Flight Rules; and in the course of which the aircraft complies with any instructions given by that unit and remains clear of cloud and with the surface in sight. 9. Transition to Special VFR. Where a military aircraft is required to transition from IFR to Special VFR, and the pilot becomes responsible for terrain clearance, the change of responsibility must be clearly stated. This change of responsibility should be stated at the time or for specific Operations may be defined in orders for that Operation which should be signed to confirm understanding by participating aircrew and controllers. 10. Unknown Traffic. A position symbol which cannot be associated with an aircraft known by the controller to be operating within the airspace concerned should be considered to represent an unknown aircraft. If surveillance derived, or other information, indicates that an aircraft is making an unauthorised penetration of the airspace, is lost, or has experienced radio failure avoiding action should be given and traffic information must be passed.
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Annex 11B: ATC Procedures in Class C Airspace

Introduction 1. The Single European Sky Airspace Classification Regulation required EU Member States to implement Class C airspace above FL195 by 1 Jul 07. The UK complied with the regulation in 2 phases: Phase 1 Class C above FL245 was introduced on 16 Mar 06 and Phase 2 Class C airspace above FL195 was introduced on 15 Mar 07. 2. Class C airspace replaced any Class A, D, F and G airspace above FL195 in the London and Scottish FIRs. However, in order to accommodate the various VFR and autonomous operational requirements of UK airspace users, Temporary Reserved Areas (TRA) were introduced with notified access and operating rules applying during their hours of activation. The general rules that apply to these TRAs are detailed within this section. 3. Class C airspace is an environment where flights are provided with an air traffic control service with their intentions known to ATC. All aircraft are provided with a Radar Control Service (RCS), even whilst operating under VFR and separation against aircraft operating under IFR will always be maintained. In VFR/VFR operations, IFR separation minima need not be maintained under a RCS. 4. The classification between FL195 and FL660 within the UK FIRs / UIRs is Class C. However, the UK FIR / UIR boundary remains at FL245.
Upper ATS Routes Airways Advisory Routes (ADR) Routes above FL245 continue to be depicted as upper ATS routes within Class C airspace. Existing Class A and D airways between FL195 and FL245 were re-designated as Class C airways. ADRs were notified with an upper vertical limit of FL195. Where connectivity between an ADR and the ATS route structure above FL245 was required, Class C airways between FL195 and FL245 were introduced.
Definitions 5. En-Route Operations. ICAO defines these as operations conducted on published air routes, direct point-to-point operations between defined waypoints (see note 1), or along great circle routes, which are other than take-off, landing, departure, arrival or terminal operations. This includes all transit flights outside published ATS routes in receipt of an ATS from either a civil or military ATS provider. Note: Direct point-to-point operations include transit to/from airspace reservations and other operating areas. 6. On-Route (ATS). This term is used routinely by ATC for co-ordination purposes within the UK. Civil/military aircraft are considered to be On-route (ATS) when flying along the alignment and within 5nm of the centre-line of published parameters of an upper ATS route (UAR) and other areas defined for the application of reduced co-ordination procedures. 7. Off-Route (ATS). This term is used routinely by ATC for co-ordination purposes within the UK; aircraft are considered to be off-route (ATS) when not complying with the conditions at Paragraph 6.
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UK National Rules and Requirements for Flight in Class C Airspace 8. General Rules. The basic rules for use of Class C airspace, irrespective of meteorological conditions, are: a. A flight plan should be filed (see note). Abbreviated Flight Plans will only be acceptable for military aircraft operating under the control of a military ATS or ASACS unit. b. c. d. A clearance should be obtained to fly within the airspace. Radio contact should be maintained on the appropriate frequency. The flight should be conducted in accordance with ATC instructions.
e. Mandatory carriage of 8.33 kHz capable VHF radio equipment is required in controlled airspace above FL195. However, localised VFR activity within a TRA may be permitted to operate with a 25 kHz channel spaced radio. VFR operations seeking access to airspace where the controlling agencies require 8.33 kHz will need to be suitably equipped. Full details of 8.33 kHz requirement are published in AIC110/2006 (Yellow 221). Military aircraft operations are largely unaffected and specific arrangements for their operations in 8.33 kHz airspace will be detailed separately in the Military AIP. Note: Abbreviated flight plans are permissible in accordance with AIP ENR 1-10 and CAP 493, MATS Pt 1 Section 1 Chapter 2 Paragraph 9. 9. Separation Requirements. In Class C airspace, a controller should provide separation between aircraft as follows: a. b. IFR flights. IFR flights and VFR flights.
10. For separation purposes, controllers should to treat VFR flights as IFR until such time as the flight rules are ascertained. 11. The separation and handling of VFR/VFR flights are subject to the following conditions: a. The VFR/VFR status between aircraft should be established; pilots are required to inform controllers when they wish to operate under VFR and when VFR operations are complete. b. Military aircraft formations, in accordance with extant procedures, are responsible for separation within their formation (MARSA). UK National Rules for the Conduct of VFR Flight in Class C Airspace Above FL195 12. Detailed VFR access criteria are published in the UK AIP.
13. The VFR status of the flight should be notified on first R/T contact. En-route (as defined at Paragraph 5 above) VFR flights above FL245 are not permitted unless they have been accorded specific arrangements by the ATS authority. VFR flights should only be authorized as follows: a. In reserved airspace (see note);
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b. Outside of reserved airspace, flights authorized by the responsible ATSU in accordance with the procedures established and published in the UK AIP and Military AIP. Note: Civil air traffic above FL285 will only be permitted to operate VFR in an airspace reservation. 14. Traffic Information. Controllers should pass traffic information to VFR flights on other VFR flights and give traffic avoidance advice if requested. 15. Pilot Qualification. VFR flight in Class C airspace does not require an instrument rating. However, as VFR aircraft will be in receipt of a Radar Control Service (RCS) within Class C airspace, pilots are required to be able to comply with ATC instructions in order to ensure standard separation. Pilots who are either not suitably qualified or their aircraft is not suitably equipped to fly under IFR are required to ensure that: a. The flight does not commence unless current meteorological reports or a combination of current reports and forecasts indicate that the meteorological conditions along the route to be flown under the visual flight rules will be such as to render compliance with these rules possible; and b. In the event of a deterioration of weather en-route and the pilot is unable to comply with IFR, an amended clearance should be requested to enable the flight to continue in VMC to destination or alternative airfield. 16. VFR Weather Minima. The MOD apply the criteria specified in the MMATM, Rules of the Air, 201.155.2 for military aircraft (see note 1). The following weather criteria apply for civil VFR flight within Class C airspace above FL195 (see note 2).
Distance from Cloud 1500 m Horizontally 1000 ft Vertically Flight Visibility 8 km
Notes: 1. MoD aircraft operate to the same criteria except for when operating at 250 kt or more below FL100. In this circumstance, the MoD applies enhanced VMC criteria. 2. ANO (CAP 393) Section 2 Rules of the Air Section V Paragraph 25 (2) refers.
ATC Procedures 17. Within Class C airspace, above FL195, units should adopt the same procedures for co-ordination and application of service that apply above FL245. Civil controllers providing a service to off-route (ATS) flights are required to comply with off-route notification and coordination procedure defined in JOI 3/92. Arrangement between civil and military ACC units to declare off-route status should also be specified in the unit order books. All aircraft should be provided with a radar control service, even whilst operating VFR, and separation against aircraft operating IFR should be applied. 18. Procedures for operators of civil aircraft requiring VFR access to Class C airspace above FL195 are detailed in the UK AIP and for military aircraft in the Mil AIP and the MMATM.
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Temporary Reserved Area (TRA) 19. Temporary Reserved Area (TRA). A TRA is a defined volume of airspace normally under the jurisdiction of one aviation authority and temporary reserved, by common agreement, for the specific use by another aviation authority and through which other traffic may be allowed to transit under an ATS authority. 20. Detailed access arrangements for TRAs will be notified in civil and military AIPs. ATS in UK TRAs will be provided in accordance with UK ATSOCAS rules and aircraft in receipt of a radar service should be provided with advice or information appropriate to the service being given. 21. The dimensions and activation times of the TRAs are defined in the Mil AIP. Charts of the airspace structure arrangements between FL195 and FL245 are also notified in the Mil AIP. A diagram of TRAs is at Figure 11-2 TRAs 001-008. 22. TRAs may overlap other airspace structures such as Danger Areas. In such circumstances, the airspace structure with the more restrictive access criteria or rules will take precedence. UK National Procedures and Requirements for Flight in TRA 23. Operations within a TRA should normally be conducted on SAS (1013.2 hPa).
24. IFR flights within a TRA should conform to the Quadrantal Rule within an active TRA, in accordance with Chapter 4 Paragraph 57. 25. Within an active TRA, the airspace should be treated as uncontrolled and ATS should be provided on the basis of ATSOCAS. Whilst the background classification of the airspace within an activated TRA will remain Class C, the Class C requirements for provision of ATS do not apply. 26. Controllers must be aware that aircraft operating autonomously in an activated TRA will squawk 7006. Where TRA is contiguous with controlled airspace pilots operating autonomously are requested to aim to operate no closer to the lateral boundary than 3 nm or within 500 ft of the vertical limit of that TRA. Collision Avoidance 27. The pilots of aircraft operating within an activated TRA are responsible for avoiding collisions in accordance with the rules of the air. An ATSOCAS will be available on request. 28. Civil controllers must be aware of the potential for conflictions with aircraft in TRAs adjacent to the boundaries of their airspace, particularly if circumstances have made it necessary to vector an aircraft to be less than 2 nm from the boundary. In such circumstances, controllers should give consideration to co-ordinating with the appropriate controlling agency. When this cannot be achieved, aircraft should be vectored to be at least 2 nm from the boundary. 29. Aircraft operating within an active TRA, in receipt of a Deconfliction Service or Traffic Service will be advised of the proximity of aircraft operating within adjacent Class C airspace and offered appropriate advice or information as required.
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Provision of ATS Above FL195 30. Mil ATCCs, approved military ATS and ASACS units, CAA approved radar units and autonomous radar units will be authorized to provide ATS above FL195 within Class C airspace in accordance with current specified operating limitations. 31. Specified approved military ATS units may be authorized by the CAA to provide ATS within an activated TRA to below FL245 in accordance with the conditions of the approval. 32. Authorized Radar Units. Unless specified by the CAA, the provision of ATS by Military Terminal units shall only be permitted below FL195. DAP have granted Authorized Radar status to a limited number of units. These units are permitted to provide radar services, within the dimensions of active TRAs up to the limits of their radar/radio cover. However, these units are neither authorized to enter/cross Class C routes that may be established during TRA activation hours nor control in Class C out of TRA activation times. Authorized Radar units are: a. b. c. d. RAF Lossiemouth RAF Leuchars MoD Boscombe Down RN Maritime Ship-borne ATC
33. SSR. When SSR is unavailable at an Authorized Radar unit and a pilot requests an ATS within an active TRA, the Authorized Radar unit should: a. Handover/freecall the ac to the appropriate mil ATCC, or
b. Instruct the pilot to squawk a unit code which should then be immediately validated and verified by another controlling agency. The use of Mode 3A 7000 whilst providing an ATS is not permitted within active TRAs. 34. FL195 should not be allocated as a cruising level.
35. The Basic Service provided by London Information will be limited to below FL195. Within the London Information area, the Mil ATCCs will provide both a Basic Service and an airways crossing service to aircraft operating between FL195 and FL245. An airways crossing service may also be provided by civil controllers as described in the MATS Part 2. 36. Within the Scottish AOR, existing arrangements for the provision of Basic Service and airways crossing service will continue to apply. Principle of Operations 37. The following principles apply for provision of ATS: a. Civil ACC controllers are responsible for all aircraft operating on an ATS route.
b. Mil controllers are responsible for military aircraft not operating on an ATS route and may be responsible for civil aircraft operating off-route including within active TRAs, as detailed in the MMATM and unit order books.
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Gliders 38. Some TRAs have been established for sole use by gliders, see Annex 31A: . These are identified by the acronym TRA(G). Access arrangements to TRA(G) will be detailed in the UK AIP and flights will be conducted in accordance with LoA arrangements as appropriate. Gliders without transponders shall only operate above FL195 when within an activated TRA(G). Specific rules for non-SSR equipped gliders operating in a TRA(G) will be detailed in LoA. 39. Except for Air Defence Priority Flights and aircraft in emergency, IFR traffic shall not be cleared to transit through an activated TRA(G).
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Figure 11-2 TRAs 001-008
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Annex 11C: ATC Procedures in Class D Airspace

General 1. Flight Rules. Pilots are responsible for determining the Flight Rules under which they conduct their flights based on the prevailing in-flight meteorological conditions, airspace classification and the limitation of their licence/qualifications. Controllers should ascertain the Flight Rules under which an aircraft is flying before the aircraft enters Class D airspace. 2. Statement of Type of Service. Pilots require ATC clearance to fly within Class D airspace, and it is implicit that they subsequently receive an Air Traffic Control Service. When applying this service, controllers will issue mandatory instructions using a variety of radar and non-radar control techniques. There is no requirement for controllers to specify the type of service provided in Class D airspace. IFR Flights 3. ATC Service. Within Class D airspace, ATC meets its responsibilities for preventing collisions between aircraft by separating IFR flights from other IFR flights and from Special VFR flights. In addition, IFR flights are passed Traffic Information on VFR flights and traffic avoidance on request. 4. Instructions. ATC instructions to IFR flights are mandatory and comprise routeing instructions, holding instructions or level restrictions to establish a safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air traffic. 5. Avoidance of Unknown Traffic. Class D airspace is a known traffic environment in which aircraft require an ATC clearance to fly. In this context, an unknown aircraft is defined as a radar return which cannot be associated with an aircraft known by the radar controller either through direct communication or co-ordination. When providing a radar service to IFR aircraft within Class D airspace, controllers should comply with the following regulations concerning unknown traffic: a. Pass traffic information and, if requested, provide avoiding action.
b. Give avoiding action if radar derived or other information indicates that a particular unknown aircraft is lost or has experienced radio failure. c. When taking lateral avoiding action, the controller should achieve standard lateral separation of 5 nm whenever possible. d. When SSR Mode C derived information indicates that the unknown traffic is outside the vertical limits of the airspace and provided that at least 1000 ft separation is evident, the radar responses can be allowed to merge; traffic information need not be passed. Where 1000 ft separation does not exist, controllers should ensure that the contacts do not merge. 6. Separation. Lateral and vertical separation should be applied between IFR flights as follows: a. Lateral Separation. Should the prescribed vertical separation not exist, controllers should maintain a minimum lateral separation of 5 nm. Reduced lateral separation can be applied in circumstances specified in Chapter 11 Paragraph 28.
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b. Vertical Separation. Standard vertical separation should be applied to IFR flights except that reduced vertical separation of 500 ft can be applied in circumstances specified in Chapter 11 Paragraph 33. 7. Terrain Clearance. Responsibility for terrain clearance for IFR flights is as follows: a. Controllers using radar to provide a service to IFR flights are responsible for terrain clearance through the use of the relevant RVC. b. When radar is not available the pilot remains responsible for terrain clearance, but controllers should not assign a level to the pilot below the relevant sector safe altitude. The pilot should be advised that the radar is not available and that he is responsible for terrain clearance. 8. Standard Calls. Controllers should inform pilots that they are entering and leaving controlled airspace. VFR Flights 9. ATC Service. ATC are responsible for passing information to pilots operating under VFR to assist them to see and avoid other aircraft. However, when issuing instructions to VFR flights, controllers should be aware that pilot qualifications and experience, allied to the over-riding requirement for the pilot to remain VMC and avoid obstacles, may preclude compliance to the accuracy expected of IFR flights. 10. Instructions. When passing instructions to VFR flights, the preferred method is through the use of geographical routeing instructions. Radar vectors to VFR aircraft can be used in exceptional circumstances and the pilot reminded of his terrain clearance responsibilities if vectors are accepted below the RVC. Similarly, whenever possible, level restrictions should be based on an instruction to fly not above a particular level rather than at a specified level. Moreover, aircraft that have accepted radar vectors should not, under normal circumstances, be instructed to fly at specified levels. 11. Separation. Responsibility for the separation of VFR flights from IFR flights and other VFR flights rests entirely with the VFR pilot. Nevertheless, controllers should provide VFR pilots with sufficient information about other aircraft in Class D airspace to assist them to achieve their own separation. 12. Terrain Clearance. Pilots of VFR flights are responsible for terrain clearance. In addition, the pilot of a VFR flight who accepts radar vectors remains responsible for terrain clearance; however the controller should remind the pilot of his responsibilities if vectors are accepted below the RVC. 13. Standard Calls. Controllers should inform VFR pilots that: a. b. They are entering and leaving controlled airspace. They will maintain VMC whilst in controlled airspace.
Special VFR Flights 14. ATC Service. Within Class D airspace, pilots will request to fly Special VFR when they are unable to comply with IFR, in circumstances where VFR flight is not permitted. Civilian pilots will fly Special VFR at night if they are not able to fly IFR. Controllers will separate Special VFR flights from IFR flights and other Special VFR flights. In addition, Special VFR flights are passed traffic information on VFR flights and traffic avoidance on request.
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15. Instructions. ATC instructions to Special VFR flights comprise routeing instructions, holding instructions or level restrictions to establish a safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air traffic. Aircraft are not normally given a height to fly at but vertical separation from aircraft flying above can be achieved by requiring the Special VFR flight to fly not above a specified height. When issuing instructions to Special VFR flights, controllers should be aware that pilot qualifications and experience, allied to the over-riding requirement for the pilot to remain clear of the cloud and in sight of the surface, may preclude compliance to the accuracy expected of IFR flights. 16. Avoidance of Unknown Traffic. When providing a radar service to Special VFR aircraft within Class D airspace, controllers should avoid unknown traffic as detailed in Annex 11A: 17. Separation. Lateral and vertical separation should be applied between Special VFR flights as follows: a. Lateral Separation. If the prescribed vertical separation does not exist, controllers should maintain a minimum lateral separation of 5 nm. Reduced lateral separation may be applied in circumstances specified in Chapter 11. b. Vertical Separation. Standard vertical separation should be applied to Special VFR flights except that reduced vertical separation of 500 ft can be applied in circumstances specified in Chapter 11. 18. Terrain Clearance. Pilots of Special VFR flights are responsible for terrain clearance. In addition, the pilot of a Special VFR flight who accepts radar vectors remains responsible for terrain clearance; however the controller should remind the pilot of his responsibilities if vectors are accepted below the RVC. 19. Standard Calls. Controllers should inform Special VFR pilots that: a. b. They are entering and leaving controlled airspace. They will maintain VMC whilst in controlled airspace.
Limitations of Service 20. In the known traffic environment of Class D airspace, controllers are not required to notify any limitations on the service being provided. However, controllers should warn pilots operating IFR if any of the following situations should arise: a. When radar is not available.
b. There is reason to believe that the prescribed separation minima may not be maintained between all known traffic. c. Information has been received that unknown traffic may be operating in the airspace.
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Annex 11D: ATC Procedures in Class E Airspace

General Heading 1. Flight Rules. Pilots are responsible for determining the Flight Rules under which they conduct their flights based on the prevailing in-flight meteorological conditions, airspace classification and the limitation of their licence/qualifications. Controllers should ascertain the Flight Rules under which an aircraft is flying before the aircraft enters Class E airspace. IFR Flights 2. Clearances. IFR flights require ATC clearance to enter Class E airspace.
3. ATC Service. Within Class E airspace, ATC meets its responsibilities for preventing collisions between aircraft by separating IFR flights from other IFR flights. In addition, IFR flights are passed Traffic Information on VFR flights as far as practical. Advisory avoiding action can be given to IFR flights against VFR flights on request. 4. Instructions. ATC instructions to IFR flights are mandatory and comprise routeing instructions, holding instructions or level restrictions to establish a safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air traffic. 5. Statement of Type of Service. Pilots require ATC clearance to fly IFR within Class E airspace, and it is implicit that they subsequently receive an ATS. There is no requirement for controllers to specify the type of service provided in Class E airspace. 6. Avoidance of Unknown Traffic. An unknown aircraft is defined as a surveillance return which cannot be associated with an aircraft known by the surveillance controller either through direct communication or coordination. When providing a service utilising surveillance-derived data to IFR aircraft within Class E airspace, controllers should comply with the following regulations concerning unknown traffic: a. Pass traffic information and, if requested, provide avoiding action.
b. When taking lateral avoiding action, the controller will pass instructions aimed at achieving planned deconfliction minima of 5 nm. 7. Separation. Lateral and vertical separation should be applied between IFR flights as follows: a. Lateral Separation. Should the prescribed vertical separation not exist, controllers should maintain a minimum lateral separation of 5nm. Reduced lateral separation is not permitted. b. Vertical Separation. If prescribed lateral separation does not exist, controllers should maintain a minimum vertical separation of 5000 ft against conflicting traffic that has not been co-ordinated. If co-ordination has been achieved, the minimum vertical separation to be employed can be reduced to 1000 ft. 8. Terrain Clearance. Responsibility for terrain clearance for IFR flights is as follows: a. Controllers utilising surveillance-derived data to provide a service to IFR flights are responsible for terrain clearance through the use of the relevant RVC. b. When surveillance-derived data is not available, the pilot remains responsible for terrain clearance, but controllers are not to assign a level to the pilot below the relevant
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sector safe altitude. The pilot should be advised that surveillance-derived data is not available and that he is responsible for terrain clearance. 9. Standard Calls. Controllers should inform pilots that they are entering controlled airspace. VFR Flights 10. Clearances. VFR flights can operate within Class E airspace without an ATC clearance. 11. ATC Service. ATC instructions can be passed to VFR flights; however, pilots of VFR flights are not bound to comply with such instructions. Therefore, ATC are responsible, as far as practical, for passing information to pilots operating under VFR to assist them to see and avoid other aircraft. It is recognised that pilot qualifications and experience, allied to the over-riding requirement for the pilot to remain VMC and avoid obstacles, may preclude compliance to the same degree expected of IFR flights. 12. Instructions. When passing instructions to VFR flights, the preferred method is through the use of geographical routeing instructions. Surveillance vectors to VFR aircraft can be used as a last resort, used with extreme caution and with special attention paid to the RVC and terrain clearance. Similarly, whenever possible, level restrictions should be based on an instruction to fly not above a particular level rather than at a specified level. However, aircraft that have accepted Surveillance vectors should not be subjected to level restrictions. When Surveillance is used to monitor the conduct of a VFR flight, there is no requirement for the controller to advise the pilot that his aircraft has been identified unless, or until, the controller provides the pilot with Surveillance vectors. 13. Statement of Type of Service. There is no requirement for controllers to specify the type of service. Controllers in 2-way contact with VFR aircraft in Class E airspace will provide an air traffic service in accordance with this order. 14. Separation. Responsibility for the separation of VFR flights from IFR flights and other VFR flights rests entirely with the VFR pilot. Nevertheless, controllers should, as far as practical, provide VFR pilots with information about other aircraft in Class E airspace to assist them to achieve their own separation. 15. Terrain Clearance. Pilots of VFR flights are responsible for terrain clearance. In addition, the pilot of a VFR flight who accepts radar vectors remains responsible for terrain clearance. 16. Standard Calls. Controllers should inform VFR pilots that: a. b. c. They are entering controlled airspace. They are responsible for maintaining separation from all other aircraft. They are responsible for terrain clearance.
Limitations of Service 17. Despite being controlled airspace, Class E airspace is not a known environment so controllers are required to notify any limitations on the service being provided. Furthermore, controllers should warn pilots operating IFR if any of the following situations should arise: a. When surveillance is not available.
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b. There is reason to believe that the separation minima may not be maintained between all known traffic. c. Information has been received that unknown traffic may be operating in the airspace.
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Annex 11E: Procedures at RN Air Stations and Ships

Radar Services Below 3000 Ft 1. There are many instances when Naval aircraft (including civil aircraft under contract to the FRADU) are required and authorized to fly in VMC and IMC below the altitude at which ATC radar services are normally terminated (see also Chapter 4). Dispensation is granted in order to allow suitably equipped RN ATC Units to provide a radar service under these circumstances, subject to the following conditions: a. The service can only be provided to RN, RM or civil aircraft under contract to the FRADU and other aircraft operating within the maritime environment, operating within the Units AIAA or DA under the control of that Unit. b. The aircraft remains in solid radar cover at all times.
c. Over the sea, helicopters remaining 2 nm clear of land, and fixed wing aircraft remaining 5 nm clear of land may be provided with a Deconfliction Service or Traffic Service when at 500 ft amsl or above. d. Over the sea below 500 ft amsl and over land below the Safety Altitude or, where they apply, the Radar Vector Chart Heights, a Deconfliction Service is not normally to be provided. 2. Where a pilot operating under a Traffic Service is unable to accept responsibility for maintaining separation from other aircraft he is required to request a Deconfliction Service. At the individual controllers discretion, the requirement to advise all changes of height and heading can be waived providing the aircraft remains within the notified height band. Air Safety Cells (ASC) 3. During maritime exercises, ATCOs are embarked in HM and foreign ships for ASC duties under the direction of the Staff Air Safety Cell Officer (SASCO) to ACOS(Av). ASCs are established to provide an air safety service which will, as far as practicable, ensure the separation of exercise aircraft while allowing such aircraft and participating ships to operate with the greatest degree of tactical freedom commensurate with the published Air Safety Rules. The ASC Terms of Reference and Air Safety Rules for each exercise are contained in the relevant Exercise Operation Order. Officers and Senior Rates/SNCOs may be considered for ASC duties provided they hold a TC(RA) or AC(L) endorsement and are considered by SASCO to be suitably experienced for the specific task. In cases where only one ASC controller is embarked, that controller should have participated in at least one other exercise under supervision of an experienced ASC controller.
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Chapter 12: General Operating Procedures

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3012(1)(2)(3)(4)(5). Compliance with ATC Instructions 1. Mandatory Instructions. Controllers (Note 1) instructions to pilots are mandatory in the following circumstances: a. Flights in controlled airspace within which IFR apply at all times, or within controlled airspace in IMC or at night. b. c. Flights under a Radar Control Service (Note 2). Military aircraft flying within a MATZ.
d. Taxiing on the apron or manoeuvring area anywhere on a military aerodrome unless local aerodrome orders make specific provision. Controllers cannot normally originate mandatory instructions other than the ATC instructions in the circumstances above; however, they may relay instructions of an operational nature on behalf of an operating authority when ordered or authorized to do so. In such cases controllers should, if time permits, specify the authority. Notes: 1. 2. Military or civil. Types of air traffic control service are specified in Chapter 11.
2. Advisory Instructions. Advisory ATC instructions are issued by controllers to pilots whenever mandatory instructions do not apply. Nevertheless, where compliance with ATC instructions is optional, a controller can assume that a pilot receiving an ATS will comply with such instructions unless he states otherwise. RT Procedures 3. Pilots requiring radar service are required to establish RT communication with the appropriate ATSU on the notified frequency. The pilot is then to pass the following information: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. Callsign and type of aircraft. Estimated position. Heading. Level (or level band for traffic wishing to carry out general handling). Intention (next reporting/turning point, destination, etc). The flight rules under which he is operating. The type of service required.
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Terrain Clearance 4. When a pilot is receiving a radar service, the responsibility for terrain clearance rests with: a. b. The controller, if Radar Control is being provided. The pilot, if a Deconfliction Service or Traffic Service is being provided.
c. The controller or the pilot, depending on the flight rules under which the flight of an aircraft in Class D airspace is conducted, and in accordance with the instructions in Annex 11C: . Descent to Low Level 5. When a pilot receiving a radar service requests descent to operate low level the controller should: a. At Area Radar Units. Pass the relevant RPS in hPa /ins and clear the pilot to descend to the Area Safety Altitude. b. At Terminal Units. Pass the QFE in hPa /ins and clear the pilot to descend to a height that accords with the Radar Vector Chart (RVC). Beyond the lateral limits of the RVC, pilots should be passed the RPS and descended to a level not below the Area Safety Altitude pertinent to the aircraft's position and track. The appropriate service may be provided down to the level specified in local orders. On completion of the procedure, the controller will pass the relevant RPS if not already set. Multiple Instrument Approaches 6. If successive radar approaches to an airfield are required, the pilot should be informed of the type of service on the first approach only. For subsequent circuits the notified service will be deemed to exist and the pilot need only be told that he is identified. Operations with HM Ships 7. Flying operations in UK FIRs/UIRs should be conducted in accordance with National ATC regulations whether or not they take place within territorial airspace. Failure of Navigation Lights 8. In the event of a navigation-light failure in flight, the aircraft will be landed as soon as practicable, unless authorized by the appropriate air traffic control unit to continue its flight. Crossing and Passing Close to Airfields 9. Airfields with a Designated Zone. An aircraft captain who intends to fly within the airspace of an airfield with a designated zone is required to comply with the rules of entry published in the current edition of the RAF Flight Information Publication, Planning or national flight information publications. Airfields with designated zones are defined as those having one or the following characteristics: a. b. Military airfields with control zones. Airfields with military airfield traffic zones (MATZs).
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Airfields with temporary control zones/areas. Airfields with special rules zones/areas. Airfields with control zones in which IFR are mandatory in all weather conditions.
10. Other Airfields in the United Kingdom. A number of other airfields are established with airfield traffic zones (ATZ) the size and shape of which is defined in relation to runway length. See Chapter 4: Paragraph14 a. Airfields which have ATZs. During the published or NOTAMed hours of operation of an ATZ, aircraft should not enter the ATZ unless clearance to do so has been obtained from the airfield Air Traffic Service Unit (ATSU) on the appropriate R/T frequency or with the prior agreement of the ATSU obtained before take-off. b. Airfields which do not have ATZs. Airfields not having an ATZ should be avoided as follows: (1) Fixed-wing aircraft other than helicopters and light propeller-driven aircraft should avoid such airfields by the margins specified in the UK Military Low Flying Handbook unless approval to overfly has been obtained from the airfield operating authority either on an appropriate R/T frequency or by prior agreement. (2) Helicopters and light propeller-driven aircraft should avoid airfields by the margins specified in the UK Military Low Flying Handbook. 11. Airfields Outside the United Kingdom Without Designated Zones. Outside the UK, pilots are required to comply with national procedures for flight in the vicinity of airfields without designated zones. Where appropriate, Flag Officers, Commander Aviation and Air Officers Commanding-in-Chief may issue orders to supplement national procedures. Aircraft Endurance General 12. An aircrafts remaining endurance should be reported in terms of time, and will be the total endurance, eg at the expiry of this time all usable fuel will have been expended. 13. Gallons, pounds or kilograms of fuel should be used only to report fuel states. Note: There are single-Service regulations covering endurance reporting within Operating authorities. Aircraft Endurance Reporting RN 14. Reports of aircraft endurance are required by air traffic control to assist in planning recovery patterns and in allocating priorities. Endurance should always be asked for at the start of a recovery and at other times as circumstances may warrant. 15. On other occasions, the Command may require the actual fuel state in which case fuel state will be demanded and answered in pounds or kilograms remaining. 16. The codewords Tiger, Lamb and Chicken may be used at Command discretion for particular exercises. They will be used in accordance with ATP-34 definitions. 17. Definitions. Definitions relating to aircraft endurance reporting are as follows:
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a. Endurance. The time remaining until the fuel minima for landing will be reached, assuming that the sortie will continue as planned. It should be reported in minutes or hours and minutes as appropriate. Fuel minima are as follows: (1) (2) Embarked: Ramp Fuel. Ashore: Minimum Landing Allowance.
b. Ramp Fuel. Ramp Fuel is the minimum fuel state by which aircraft (both fixed and rotary wing) will be back on deck. Aircraft either airborne below Ramp Fuel, or likely to be airborne below Ramp Fuel, should declare an emergency. (1) Ramp Fuel is determined by the Command and is calculated by adding additional fuel to the Minimum Landing Allowance for the aircraft type as a safety factor. The safety factor is determined by taking into account prevailing conditions, nature of the sortie, crew composition and experience, operating range etc. In situations where no additional fuel is considered necessary the Ramp Fuel state will be equivalent to the MLA for that aircraft type. (2) The Command may change an aircrafts ramp fuel while it is airborne if it is considered that the factors governing the safety factor fuel have changed. The aircraft captain must acknowledge this change before it becomes effective. c. Minimum Landing Allowance (MLA). MLA is calculated from the minimum useable fuel for a particular aircraft type plus additional margins as detailed below. Aircraft either airborne below MLA, or likely to be airborne below MLA, should declare an emergency. (1) MLA Fixed Wing. Minimum useable fuel for flight plus sufficient fuel to climb to height to abandon the aircraft. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) Hawk T Mkl/1A Jetstream T2/3 Chipmunk Firefly Sea Fury Seahawk Swordfish 130 kgs 100 kgs (see note) 5 galls (2 galls per side) 30 galls 30 galls 800 lbs 30 galls
Note: Unable to abandon: fuel sufficient for a Missed Approach Procedure plus a further approach to land. (2) MLA Rotary Wing. Minimum useable fuel for flight plus sufficient fuel to carry out a Missed Approach Procedure plus a further approach to land is as follows: (a) (b) (c) (d) Merlin HM Mkl Sea King (All marks) Lynx (All marks) Gazelle AH1 400 kgs 400 lbs 100 kgs 40 kgs
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d. Time to Diversion. The time remaining to the predetermined diversion fuel state, which includes the appropriate fuel minima for landing, for the nominated diversion. This also assumes that the sortie will continue as planned and should be reported in minutes or hours and minutes. e. f. Total Endurance. See Paragraph12. Fuel State. Total remaining fuel to be reported in lbs/kgs.
Aircraft Endurance Reporting RAF 18. Units of time are invariably to be used when aircraft are in communication with the emergency or flight information services, or when visiting or diverted to another airfield. 19. Commanders-in-Chief may authorise the use of units 'gallons', 'pounds' or kilograms for aircraft of their Command when in communication with airfields within their command. Communications Safety Division of Responsibility Operations with HM Ships 20. Aircraft not in receipt of a recognized ATC service are required to make routine radio reports to the base or ship from which they are operating. These reports are required at intervals of not more than 20 mins (but see Paragraph 23). If, 5 mins after the routine time, no report has been received from the aircraft, and radar contact cannot be made, the aircraft should be called by the ship/air traffic control. If, after a further 5 mins, no contact has been made, the ship or station concerned should enlist the aid of other units/authorities who may be able to provide assistance in the manning of radio aids. In peacetime, aircraft safety is of prime importance and other considerations such as tactical realism should take second place. 21. Exercises with HM Ships. Responsibilities during exercises with HM ships are as follows: a. General responsibility for the direction of the movements of aircraft carrying out exercises with HM ships is automatically transferred to the ship when 2-way communication is established. Responsibility is relinquished when the necessary departure signal has been passed at the conclusion of the exercise and the aircraft is in 2-way communication with the station or ship to which it is returning, or with a station en route. b. HM ships that are capable of aircraft control and which carry a qualified controller should provide an ATS to co-operating aircraft. The controller, having first identified an aircraft by radar and intending to assume control, should first inform the aircraft of that intention, unless prior arrangements have been made. c. The parent ship or station retains responsibility for recalling the aircraft should that be desirable. d. This paragraph also applies to UK controllers employed in foreign military vessels and those vessels whose controllers have either been briefed by SASO to COS(Avn) (See Annex 11E: ) or their delegated representative, or are operating under the supervision of a qualified UK controller. 22. Multiple Aircraft Operations. Where 2 or more aircraft are co-operating in the same area, the communications and position-check calls may be made by one co-ordinating aircraft on behalf of the others provided that this is pre-briefed and that the co-ordinating aircraft holds the others on his radar or is in 2-way radio communication with them. This
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does not obviate the need for all aircraft when outbound to establish with their ships the proper functioning of their own radios. 23. Aircraft in Transit. Regulations for aircraft in transit are as follows: a. The responsibility for the safety of aircraft on a transit flight form a ship to an airfield lies with the ship until the airfield is in touch with the aircraft or has received the departure message, when the responsibility is automatically transferred to the airfield. The reverse applies when the aircraft is on a transit flight from an airfield to a ship. b. The responsibility for the safety of an aircraft on a transit flight from one Naval airfield to another lies with the airfield of departure until the departure message has been received by the airfield of destination, or until the aircraft is in 2-way communication with it, when responsibility is automatically transferred to the latter. Wake Turbulence Military Advisory Separation RAF Airfields 24. When wind speed is indicating a mean of 6 kt or less and the point of aircraft confliction is likely to be below 250 ft, the wake turbulence spacing detailed at Figure 12-1 should be applied to military aircraft using RAF airfields, as follows: a. IFR. When the conditions specified above exist, enhanced separation in accordance with Figure 12-1 should be applied. Under most circumstances, normal IFR separation provides adequate wake turbulence separation. b. VFR. Under VFR, the responsibility for separation rests with the pilot. When it appears that the separation at Figure 12-1 is likely to be infringed, the pilot should be advised Caution, wake turbulence and provided with details of the conflicting aircraft, eg Heavy aircraft 3 miles final. When appropriate, the airfield controller should provide warnings with the PAR final clearance or in response to the downwind call. 25. Air Transport aircraft and, when possible, civil aircraft using RAF airfields should be given separation as detailed in CAA Aeronautical Information Circulars, the RAF Flight Information Handbook, and copied at Figure 12-2. 26. Foreign military aircraft will be provided with the separation shown in Figure 12-1.
27. Aircraft of the same grade need not be given wake turbulence warnings. Formations employ formation flying techniques and need not be given wake turbulence warnings. Note: The wake turbulence group of an aircraft should be indicated on the flight plan (item 9) as H, M or L according to the ICAO specifications.
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UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED Figure 12-1 Wake Turbulence Military Advisory Separation
APPROACH SEPARATION (nm) Lead ac H ac H=1 M = 1 S=3 L=6 M=1 S = 1 L=2 Lead ac M Following ac M=1 S = 1 L=3 Lead ac S Following ac S=1 L=1 Lead ac L Following ac No Restriction
TAKE OFF SEPARATION (mins) H M S=1 L = 1 S L=1
WEIGHT GRADES (kg) H (136 000 +) TRISTAR E3D SENTRY C17 M (35 000 +) BAe 146 BAC 1-11 HERCULES NIMROD VC 10 VC 10K S (5000 +) ANDOVER APACHE CHINOOK DOMINIE GRIFFIN (all mks) HARRIER HS 125 ISLANDER JAGUAR JETSTREAM MERLIN PUMA SEA KING TORNADO (all mks) TYPHOON L (up to 5000) HAWK GAZELLE FIREFLY T67 LYNX SQUIRREL (all mks) TUCANO TUTOR
Notes: 1. Formation or stream take-offs and landings excepted.
2. Although the weight of the VC10 is generally above 136 000 kg, experience has shown that it conforms more to the medium weight group. This aligns with the civil categorisation of the VC10. 3. The above lists of ac types are not exhaustive.
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UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED Figure 12-2 Air Transport and Civil Aircraft Separation APPROACH SEPARATION (nm) Lead ac H Following ac H=4 M=5 S=6 L=8 Lead ac M Following ac M=3 S=4 L=6 Lead ac S
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Following ac M=3 S=3 L=4
TAKE OFF SEPARATION (mins) Lead ac H Departing from same position M=2 S=2 L=2 Lead ac M, S Departing from same position L=2 Lead ac H Departing from intermediate position M=3 S=3 L=3 Lead ac M, S Departing from intermediate position L=3
WEIGHT GRADES (kg) H (136 000 +) 747 767 777 DC10 EA30 EA31 EA33 EA34 L101 M (40 000 +) 707 B72S 727 737 757 BA11 DC8 DC9 EA32 IL18 IL62 L382 TU34 TU54 S (17 000 +) BA46 DH7 FK27 FK28 G2 HS74 L329 CHINOOK SK61N L (up to 17 000) BE90 BN2 BN3 C310 C500 DA20 DC3 E110 HS25 LR25 PA31 PA5E SHD3
Notes: 1. 2. All wind speeds. The above lists of ac types are not exhaustive.
Restriction of Rate of Climb and Descent (ROCD) in Controlled Airspace 28. In order to comply with CAA regulations put in place to support the safety nets of TCAS and Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) a ROCD restriction of 8000 fpm was imposed within UK controlled airspace on 5 Jul 07. Notwithstanding this restriction it is understood that there remains a requirement for military aircraft - that have the ability to operate in ROCD that exceed the 8000 fpm limit - to utilise this aspect of their performance to enhance operational flexibility where to do so will not invalidate the safety nets in place. Equally there may be occasions when to increase an aircrafts ROCD beyond the 8000 fpm limit would have beneficial consequences for other aircraft operators by more efficiently releasing airspace/levels that would otherwise have been occupied. 29. The conditions under which higher ROCD, exceeding the 8000 fpm restriction, can be used when operating inside CAS (Classes A, C, D & E) are set out below: a. Aircraft in emergency.
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b. Aircraft responding to Operation ADANA or an air defence priority flight where a high rate of climb is essential to the successful outcome of the mission. c. Aircraft in receipt of avoiding action instructions to resolve an impending loss of standard separation or to avert a potential collision. d. e. Aircraft under special arrangements made for research or test flying. Aircraft participating in exercise activity notified/coordinated via an ACN.
f. MOD ATC/ASACS controllers can release pilots from the 8000 fpm climb/descent restriction providing that there is no likelihood of interaction between the ac under their control and GAT. The interpretation of interaction is as follows: A situation where co-ordination of OAT against GAT will be necessary, by the application of either vertical or lateral separation, or in any situation where the controllers involved are likely to be concerned by the presence of conflicting traffic. (1) Individual controllers should use their inherent spatial and situational awareness in deciding whether co-ordination is or would be necessary between their own traffic and GAT before authorising the pilot to climb/descend at rates in excess of 8000 fpm. However, if there is any doubt as to whether the civil controller may be concerned by an ac manoeuvring in excess of 8000 fpm (ie the SSR label disappearing due to the ROCD exceeding NATS radars capacity to track the ac) then the ROCD restriction should not be lifted. Controllers should initially plan to operate within CAS using ROCD not exceeding 8000 fpm until they are certain that no interaction will take place before the ROCD restriction is lifted. (2) Where MOD ATC/ASACS controllers remove the ROCD restriction, it should be understood by them that aircraft under their control are operating outside the normal requirements and that, as a consequence, established safety nets may not operate. Under these circumstances, consideration should be given to the potential workload implications that this may have for both civil and military controllers. g. Under those circumstances where military aircraft are manoeuvring within a block of CAS above FL195 and co-ordination is required (ie an interaction is, or is likely to occur, with GAT traffic on an ATS route above) the ROCD restriction should only be removed when the following conditions are applied: (1) There is at least 2000 ft between the vertical limits of the allocated manoeuvring block and GAT tracks transiting above or below. (2) The controller reminds the traffic under their control of the vertical limit of the block in which they are operating when it is likely civil traffic will come into plan confliction. (3) The controller monitors the situation closely to prevent a vertical level bust.
30. Controllers should be aware that pilots may exceed the 8000 fpm ROCD without prior approval of the controller when operating under the conditions of Sub-paragraphs a - e above. However, to instruct a pilot to exceed the ROCD restriction under the conditions of Sub-paragraphs f and g, the phraseology detailed below should be adhered to. 31. Occasionally, for traffic reasons and for an advantageous use of an aircrafts performance, a higher than normal rate of climb or descent may be required. However, due
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to the rate of climb/descent (ROCD) restriction within CAS there are variances in the meaning of phraseology dependent on the airspace classification that the aircraft is operating within. See table below:
Figure 12-3 ROCD Phraseology PHRASEOLOGY CLASSIFICATION OF AIRSPACE F&G Climb/Descend A-E F&G Expedite AE Expedite no restriction (at end of transmission) No restriction (at end of transmission) Climb/descent restricted at 8000 feet per minute acknowledge AE To require a pilot to climb/descend at best rate but not exceeding 8000 fpm To require a pilot to climb/descend at best rate and without any restriction to his ROCD To inform a pilot that he may, at his own discretion, climb/descend at best rate and without any restriction to his ROCD To instruct the pilot to climb/descend at a rate not exceeding 8000 fpm. Pilots must acknowledge the ROCD restriction. To require a pilot to climb/descend but at a rate not exceeding 8000 fpm To require a pilot to climb/descend at best rate (with no restriction of ROCD) DEFINITION To require a pilot to climb/descend (no restriction on ROCD)
AE
All
32. Phraseology should be used as follows when ac are, or about to be, operating within CAS: a. Pilots Discretion. When instructing a pilot to climb/descend at his own discretion but releasing him from the ROCD restriction the controller should use the following: Callsign climb/descend FLxxx no restriction (report level) b. Controllers Instruction to Climb/Descend at Best Rate. The term expedite expresses 2 distinct ROCD dependent on whether the ac is operating in or outside CAS. Whilst operating inside CAS it instructs the pilot to climb/descent at his best rate but not exceeding 8000 fpm. Therefore, the following phrases will be used as appropriate: (1) The phraseology to be used to instruct pilots to climb/descend at best rate but not exceeding 8000 fpm is: Callsign climb/descend FLxxx expedite (report level). (2) The phraseology to be used to instruct pilots to manoeuvre at best rate within CAS and without any restriction on his ROCD is: Callsign climb/descend FLxxx expedite no restriction (report level). The cadence of the voice should be raised on the words expedite no restriction to emphasise to the pilot that he will manoeuvre at the acs best rate.
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c. Manoeuvring Flights. The phraseology for ATC to inform pilots that they can manoeuvre vertically at rates in excess of 8000 fpm is as follows: (1) For ATC Controllers. Callsign(s), manoeuvre as required FLxxx FLxxx no restriction report one minute to completion. (2) For ASACS Controllers. Callsign(s), you are clear to operate (area), from FLxxx to FLxxx, no restriction. Controllers can vertically expand the block of co-ordinated airspace to higher levels on a tactical basis once conflicting GAT is clear of the area. However, controllers should ensure all ac under their control are confined within the co-ordinated block before further GAT transits the area or will re-impose the ROCD restriction on the ac. d. Re-imposing ROCD Restriction. If a controller needs to re-impose the ROCD restriction for any reason they should transmit the following instruction: Callsign, climb/descend restricted at 8000 feet per minute acknowledge. An acknowledgement from the pilot is required to ensure that the pilot is fully aware that he must not exceed 8000 fpm ROCD. This instruction can be passed to a pilot if at any stage the controller becomes aware the pilot is manoeuvring in excess of 8000 fpm within CAS without authority of the controller.
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Chapter 13: Airborne Collision Avoidance System: Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System Regulatory Cross-Reference
This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3013(1)(2)(3). General 1. Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) is an aircraft system based on SSR transponder signals, which operates independently of ground-based equipment to provide advice to the pilot on potential conflicting aircraft that are equipped with SSR transponders. 2. All civil turbine-engine aircraft having a maximum take-off mass (MTOM) exceeding 5700 kg or a maximum approved seating configuration of more than 19 are mandated to carry and operate ICAO SARPs-compliant Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) equipment. The only equipment currently able to meet the ACAS II mandate requirements is the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS II) software version 7. NATO member states have undertaken to voluntarily equip large transport-type aircraft (turbine fixed-wing aircraft having a maximum take-off mass exceeding 15 000 kg or a maximum approved passenger seating configuration of more than 30) with TCAS II. Such types include Hercules, Tristar and VC-10 aircraft. Smaller types such as communications and training aircraft may also be equipped. Civil registered historical and ex-military turbineengine aircraft are exempted from this requirement. 3. Civil Aircraft Operators experiencing ACAS equipment failure may request permission to operate in UK airspace for up to 10 days in accordance with current TCAS II Minimum Equipment List provisions. Due to the safety benefits arising from TCAS operations and the collaborative way in which it arrives at collision avoidance solutions any civil aeroplane with an unserviceable transponder as well as an unserviceable TCAS will not be permitted in UK airspace for which mandatory carriage of a transponder is required. Some countries (eg Germany) apply similar restrictions to military aircraft and crews are expected to be aware of any such restrictions for the countries they are flying in. 4. The carriage and use of TCAS II acts only as a safety net, and does not in any way alter the respective responsibilities of pilots and controllers for the safe operation of aircraft. TCAS ll Warnings 5. TCAS II encounters may take place within all classifications of airspace. TCAS II equipment reacts to the transponders of other aircraft to determine whether or not there is a potential risk of collision. The warning, based on the time to predicted Closest Point of Approach (CPA) of vertical distance between 600-800 ft, enables the pilot to identify the conflicting traffic and, if necessary, take avoiding action. 6. Warnings for aircraft equipped with TCAS II are given in two steps:
20 to 45 seconds before the predicted CPA* - Traffic Advisory (TA) warning. Pilots are advised not to take avoiding action on the basis of TA information alone but may ask for traffic information. Pilot looks for conflicting aircraft visually. Does NOT manoeuvre.
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UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED - Resolution Advisory (RA) warning. Pilot receives instruction to climb, descend or maintain their existing flight profile. Rate of climb or descent may also be given. Pilots are expected to respond immediately (within 5 seconds) but will restrict manoeuvres to the minimum necessary to resolve the confliction, advise the ATC unit as soon as is practical thereafter and return to their original flight path as soon as it is safe to do so.
When host aircraft altitude is greater than 1000 feet AMSL, 15 to 30 seconds before the predicted CPA (see note)*
Note: The times quoted vary with altitude. The lower the host aircrafts altitude, the less warning time is provided. 7. If a conflicting aircraft is not reporting altitude, a TA may be given, but not an RA. RAs will be presented only if the conflicting aircraft is transponding on Mode C or Mode S. Where both aircraft in an encounter are fitted with TCAS II, the transponders will communicate with each other to agree complementary Resolution Advisories. If the conflicting aircraft is not transponding, no warnings are given. TCAS II is programmed to take account of the host aircrafts performance characteristics and level when issuing RAs. 8. It should also be noted that if an instruction to manoeuvre is received from a RA and from ATC simultaneously, and the instructions conflict, the RA will be followed. Effects on ATC Operations 9. The procedures to be applied for the provision of air traffic services to aircraft equipped with ACAS should be identical to those applicable to non-ACAS equipped aircraft. In particular, the prevention of collisions, the establishment of appropriate separation, and the information, which might be provided in relation to conflicting traffic and to possible avoiding action, should conform with the normal ATS procedures and should exclude consideration of aircraft capabilities dependent on ACAS equipment. Nuisance Advisories 10. TAs and RAs can occur even though standard separation exists. Therefore, a controller should not immediately assume that separation has been lost, or that he is at fault, when a pilot reports they are manoeuvring in response to an RA. 11. One cause of an unnecessary RA is high vertical speed (>1500 ft per minute), particularly at low level and in congested airspace. Pilots have been asked to avoid these manoeuvres, particularly in the final stages of climb or descent (ie, within 1000 ft of the assigned level), unless they are justified, for example, a request to expedite a climb, emergency descent etc. 12. It has been reported that ground testing of transponder equipment may generate advisories in TCAS II-equipped aircraft. CAP 562 Civil Aircraft Airworthiness Information and Procedures, provides general guidance to aircraft maintenance organizations on precautions to be considered when ground testing transponder equipment. Departure From ATC Clearance 13. On being informed that an aircraft is manoeuvring in accordance with a RA, a controller should not issue control instructions to that aircraft which are contrary to the RA communicated by the pilot. Once an aircraft departs from an ATC clearance in response to a RA, the controller ceases to be responsible for providing standard separation between that
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aircraft and other aircraft affected as a direct consequence of the RA manoeuvre. However, where possible, controllers should provide traffic information to aircraft affected by the manoeuvre. 14. The commander of an aircraft is permitted to depart from an ATC clearance for the purposes of avoiding immediate danger (ANO 2009, Article 160(3)(a)). Response to an RA comes under this heading and is not, therefore, a breach of Rules of the Air 2007 Rule 36(1)(a) which requires conformity with the clearance. The commander is required to notify ATC as soon as possible (Rule 36(3)) and submit a written report within 10 days (ANO 2009 Article 160(5)). The completion of an Operators Air Safety Report satisfies the last requirement. 15. When a pilot reports an ACAS RA, controllers should not attempt to modify the aircraft flight path until the pilot reports Clear of Conflict. Once an aircraft departs from an ATC clearance in compliance with an RA, or a pilot reports an RA, the controller ceases to be responsible for providing separation between that aircraft and any other aircraft affected as a direct consequence of the manoeuvre induced by the RA. The controller should resume responsibility for providing separation for all the aircraft affected when: a. The controller acknowledges a report from the flight crew that the aircraft has resumed the current clearance; or b. The controller acknowledges a report from the flight crew that the aircraft is resuming the current clearance and issues an alternative clearance which is acknowledged by the flight crew. 16. The passing of traffic information by controllers to aircraft conducting, or affected by a TCAS RA, is not proscribed, but such information has, if provided inappropriately, the potential be misheard or to distract flight crews during a period of very high workload. Consequently, controllers should not routinely pass traffic information to aircraft conducting RA manoeuvres, or other aircraft affected by such manoeuvres. Nevertheless, there may be circumstances where the passing of traffic information is justified; consequently, controllers can provide traffic information under the following circumstances: a. To aircraft conducting an RA manoeuvre if it is considered essential for flight safety (eg information on aircraft which are known to be in close proximity that are not transponding Mode C information). b. To other aircraft affected by an RA manoeuvre if judged necessary by the controller (eg in airspace where the carriage and operation of TCAS and/or SSR transponders is not mandatory). TCAS Phraseology 17. Specific ICAO TCAS phraseology has been adopted. The phraseology is clear, simple, concise and to the maximum extent devoid of ambiguity and potential to cause operational confusion. The phraseology provides: a. The means to ensure that the pilot and controller have, wherever possible, a clear mutual understanding of the progression of an RA manoeuvre; and b. The means to delineate the point at which the responsibility for the separation of aircraft directly affected by the manoeuvre is transferred from the controller to the pilot and, at the completion of the manoeuvre, from the pilot back to the controller.
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18. There is no requirement for the pilot to notify the controller prior to responding to an RA. There are four cases for which communication is necessary between pilot and controller. The phraseology to be used is reproduced below: a. Notification after a flight crew starts to deviate from any ATC clearance or instruction to comply with a RA: Pilot: (C/S) TCAS RA Controller: (C/S) ROGER b. Notification after the RA response is completed and a return to the ATC clearance or instruction is initiated: Pilot: (C/S) CLEAR OF CONFLICT RETURNING TO (assigned clearance) Controller: (C/S) ROGER (or alternative instructions) c. Notification after the response to a RA is completed and the assigned ATC clearance or instruction has been resumed: Pilot: (C/S) CLEAR OF CONFLICT (assigned clearance) RESUMED
Controller: (C/S) ROGER (or alternative instructions) d. Notification after an ATC clearance or instruction contradictory to the ACAS RA is received, the flight crew will follow the RA and inform ATC directly: Pilot: (C/S) UNABLE, TCAS RA Controller: (C/S) ROGER Use of TCAS ll in TA Only Mode 19. At those airfields where simultaneous parallel approaches are permitted, or when it is envisaged that inappropriate RAs or nuisance TA warnings may occur (in the circuit, formation flying or AAR for example), the aircraft captain may, operate ACAS II using the TA ONLY Mode or deselect ACAS, subject to approval by the relevant Aviation Duty Holder. ACAS RA Reporting 20. Controllers are required to report ACAS RAs using the ATCOR scheme. Pilots should use the form at Annex 13A: to file reports. If there is good reason to believe that the appropriate details of the occurrence have already been, or will be, reported under by someone else (eg, pilot or other controller, military or civil), then there is no need to file a duplicate report. 21. The filing of the report does not absolve the controller from additionally reporting an AIRPROX or other report about the same incident, if appropriate.
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Annex 13A: TCAS II Event Pilot Report Form

1.Type of Event RA: Y/N Preceded by TA: Y/N 3. Date of Event: dd mm yy 8. A/C Type Other : Route: From To
2. Reporting Pilot:
4. Time (UTC). Day/Night
6. Flight ID
7. Registration
9. SSR Code On/Off
13.Significant Wx. Mod/Severe
10. Frequency in use. . ATC Name. ..

14. Flight Phase
Actual Alt.
12. Cleared Alt.
Icing/Fog/Turbulenc e/ Wind shear
FL/Alt
FL/Alt 15. Position Lat Reporting Point Long
Take off Initial climb climb cruise Descent Holding Approach Final
Radial
Range
nm
Description of the Event. Include RA sequence and any ATC instructions
Other aircraft Callsign: Cleared level if known:
Type:
Visual contact: Y/N
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UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED Vertical Plan (Elevation)
Horizontal Plan (view from above)
Own aircraft Level/Climbing/Descent
Vertical deviation ft. UP/DOWN
Min vertical separation:
Min horizontal separation: Heading Own: Intruder: Intruder Clearance if known: Ft CFL
19. RA Followed Y/N
20. Was TCAS Alert useful?
Useful Reported to ATC Y/N Name: ATC Instructions Y/N
1 2
NUISANCE
Signature:
Note: Additional remarks, if necessary, overleaf.
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Annex 13B: Specimen TCAS Evaluation Form

TCAS EVALUATION REPORT Name of Reporting Unit: Date and Time of Occurrence: Sector/Position: Workload: Low Normal TA High RA Is the occurrence related to a TA or a RA? Position and FL/Altitude of the Occurrence: Description of the Occurrence:
INVOLVED AIRCRAFT No 1 (under service) Callsign: TCAS equipped: Yes No SSR Code: VFR IFR
No 2 (other aircraft involved in the occurrence) Callsign: TCAS equipped: RT with ac No 1 RT with ac No 2 Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes or after manoeuvring Yes No No No No No SSR Code: VFR IFR
Did either pilot report an Airprox? Did either pilot ask for traffic information? If yes was it before manoeuvring (If yes comment under remarks) Will recorded radar data become available? Did the occurrence disrupt your activities? (If yes comment under remarks)
In your view, was the action taken by the pilot justified? Yes Yes
REMARKS
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Annex 13C: TCAS Phraseology

Standard use of aircraft and unit callsign should be applied to each transmission as appropriate.
Serial REPORT OR ACTION PHRASEOLOGY TO BE USED
Report of manoeuvre by pilot
TCAS CLIMB or TCAS DESCENT
ATC Response
ROGER
Termination of conflict reported by pilot
TCAS CLEAR OF CONFLICT RETURNING TO (assigned clearance) It is expected that controllers will either acknowledge this report or issue a revised clearance using existing phraseology.
Report of manoeuvre by pilot when it has not been possible to notify the controller that a RA has occurred
TCAS CLIMB or TCAS DESCENT, CLEAR OF CONFLICT (assigned clearance) RESUMED. It is expected that controllers will either acknowledge this report or issue a revised clearance using existing phraseology.
If a pilot is unable to comply with a clearance as a result of a TCAS alert
UNABLE TO COMPLY, TCAS RA
ATC response
ROGER The pilot should report when clear of the TCAS conflict.
Note: In the use of phraseology, ACAS is an acceptable alternative to TCAS
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Chapter 14: Meteorological Information

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA3014(1)(2)(3)(4)(5). Meteorological Briefing 1. The DATCO(RN)/ATCO IC (RAF) and, where necessary, the duty aeronautical information section officer, is required to visit the meteorological office for briefing before taking over or opening watch. Only when direct facilities are not available can this briefing be made over the telephone. Meteorological information derived from unofficial sources should not be used by air traffic control staffs without first being referred to the meteorological office. Supply of Meteorological Information to ATC 2. The Supervisor (Mil) should arrange for the following meteorological information to be supplied for ATCC use: a. Weather reports at intervals of not greater than one hour from specified aerodromes within the FIR and, where necessary, aerodromes adjacent to the region. b. Special weather reports (SPECIs) at these aerodromes as soon as they are received. c. Forecasts for designated aerodromes within the FIR.
d. Forecasts of meteorological conditions, including details of cloud, icing, high-level winds, and so on, over the FIR, and amended forecasts when necessary. e. In the UK regional pressure setting values for altimeter setting regions within the FIR, and, as required, for altimeter setting regions within adjacent FIR. These values are passed hourly to the air traffic control officer for transmission to aircraft, either on a routine broadcast or on request. f. Warning of weather elements specified in Paragraph 9.a.
Supply of Meteorological Information to Aerodrome ATC 3. At all aerodromes the SATCO is required to arrange for the following meteorological information to be kept available in both the ACR and VCR: a. Actual weather reports for the aerodrome at hourly intervals (or at such lesser intervals as may be required) during the period that flying is in progress or the aerodrome is likely to receive diverted aircraft. Note: These reports should include cloud coverage and heights (to be specified as FEW, SCT, BKN, OVC and feet above aerodrome level respectively, beginning with the lowest layer), surface visibility, aerodrome QFE and QNH and any other relevant information. The surface wind speed and direction can be read direct from the wind dials in the VCR but must be displayed in the ACR. Definitions and uses of pressure settings are contained in Chapter 5. b. Special deterioration or improvement reports, additional to above, when significant changes to wind, visibility, weather or cloud occur. SATCOs should liaise with
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their senior meteorological officers to define the critical values which will determine when the meteorological office will make these reports to air traffic control. A change of a QNH/QFE value of half a hectopascal (0.5 hPa ) or greater since the previous report should be considered a significant weather change at aerodromes where this is deemed operationally desirable. Otherwise changes of one hectopascal or greater will be considered as significant weather calling for a special report. c. Forecasts of meteorological conditions over a specified area surrounding the aerodrome. The extent of the area, the frequency of issue and the content of forecasts should be decided by the SATCO, or as shown in single-Service regulations. d. Forecasts for nominated aerodromes as required for possible diversion action and the most recent meteorological reports from selected aerodromes in the vicinity. e. In the UK, regional pressure setting values for appropriate Altimeter Setting Regions. f. Warnings of reported or forecast weather considered to be hazardous to the safety of aircraft, either in flight or on the ground. g. Advice on meteorological factors likely to affect the diversion of aircraft.
Note: Whenever meteorological information is transcribed from METFORM 2309 the accuracy of the transcription should be checked by an ATCO who should then sign the METFORM 2309 to this effect. 4. Where there are no Meteorological Office College trained staff at an aerodrome, the aerodrome QFE and QNH should to be determined through the use of correction tables by the DATCO(RN)/ATCO IC (RAF), using 2 properly sited and calibrated barometers supplied by the Meteorological Office. The SATCO should ensure that the controllers are proficient in the calculation of these values and should ensure that a daily comparison between the station barometer and spare barometer is carried out. The meteorological office responsible for serving the ATC unit can provide barometers, correction tables and advice on correct siting and daily comparison procedure. 5. Weather reports received from aircraft should be passed immediately to the meteorological office serving the ATC unit. Airfield Availability/Weather State Colour Code 6. All RN and RAF airfields should maintain a colour code. It should be used for transmitting and displaying actual and forecast weather, which influences landing at RN and RAF airfields, as laid down below:
Figure 14-1 Colour Codes MINIMUM WEATHER CONDITIONS COLOUR Base of lowest cloud layer of Surface Visibility 3/8 (SCT) or more Blue White 2500 ft AGL 1500 ft AGL 8 km (4.3 nm) 5 km (2.7 nm)
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UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED MINIMUM WEATHER CONDITIONS COLOUR Base of lowest cloud layer of Surface Visibility 3/8 (SCT) or more Green Yellow 1 Yellow 2 Amber Red 700 ft AGL 500 ft AGL 300 ft AGL 200 ft AGL Below 200 ft AGL or sky obscured 3.7 km (2 nm) 2.5 km (1.3) 1.6 km (0.9 nm) 0.8 km (0.4 nm) Less than 0.8 km (0.4 nm)
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Black
Airfield not usable for other reasons than cloud and/or visibility minima. Black will precede actual colour state.
Notes: 1. The weather criteria in the above table are effective from 1 Jul 94.
2. Met codes (TAF, METAR and SPECI) for UK military airfields define FEW to mean one to 2 octas of cloud and SCT to mean 3 to 4 octas. Codes for some civilian and overseas military airfields use SCT to cover any cloud amount from one to 4 octas. Full details are given in RAF FLIPS. 7. Abbreviations. The following colour abbreviations should be used: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. Blue. BLU. White. WHT. Green. GRN. Yellow. YLO. Amber. AMB. Red. RED. Black. BLACK should not be abbreviated.
8. Airfield Availability/Weather State Colour Code RNAS. The colour code should be piped by ATC before each period of flying and on every occasion of a change. Squadrons and units should, in addition, be informed by telephone. It is emphasised that colour codes do not take into account the following factors: a. b. c. Crosswind. Effect of rain on vision. State of landing surface.
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Diversion availability. Aircraft configuration. Serviceability of recovery aids.
The colour code relates only to current and not forecast weather conditions unless a separate forecast code has been advised. Authorizing officers should be aware that the weather state itself does not necessarily indicate that conditions are suitable for any particular pilot to recover. Met Warnings 9. An aviation meteorological warning is defined as a notification of the occurrence or expected occurrence, not previously notified, of specified meteorological conditions which may affect the safety of aircraft, and are of 2 types, as follows: a. Warnings (SIGMETs) relating to the occurrence or expected occurrence of one or more of the following phenomena in FIRs: (1) Thunderstorm. (a) (b) (c) (d) Obscured (with heavy hail*). Embedded (with heavy hail*). Frequent (with heavy hail*). Line squall (with heavy hail*).
* included as necessary. (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Tropical cyclone. Severe turbulence. Severe icing. Severe mountain wave. Heavy duststorms/sandstorms. Volcanic ash.
b. Aerodrome warnings issued in accordance with local requirements which may include gales, strong winds, squalls, thunderstorms, hail, fog, frost, snow, icy runways, freezing precipitation, thaw after snow, sandstorms and duststorms. 10. The warnings in Sub-paragraph 9.a will be issued by the meteorological officer to addressees on a distribution list agreed by the Station Commander. 11. When a warning broadcast is justified, the DATCO(RN)/ATCO IC(RAF) should ensure that it is passed (subject to radio communication facilities) to all aircraft flying or about to fly in the airspace affected by the warning.
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12. 13.
All warnings will be cancelled or amended as appropriate. See also Joint Queen's Regulations and single-Service regulations.
Measurement of Horizontal Visibility, Other Than Runway Visual Range 14. Visibility reports and plain-language forecasts to aerodromes and air traffic control units should be expressed in metric units. 15. Visibilities should be reported to ATC as follows: a. Less than 100 m will be reported as 'LESS THAN 100 METRES', or 'ZERO' on some electronic displays. If required, SATCO can request that visibilities less than 100m, rounded down to the nearest 10 m, are reported. b. m. 100 m to 5000 m will be expressed in metres rounded down to the nearest 100
c. Visibilities greater than 5000 m will be given in kilometres rounded down to the nearest kilometre. Runway Visual Range (RVR) 16. RVR has evolved to make available a more localised assessment of visual range in relation to a particular runway when the meteorological report gives a visibility of less than 1500 metres. The RVR indicates the range over which the pilot of an aircraft on the centreline of a runway can expect to see the runway surface markings, the lights delineating the runway or identifying its centreline. 17. RVR should be recorded during aerodrome opening hours whenever the reported meteorological visibility falls to 1500 m, the Instrumented RVR (IRVR) displays a value equal to or less than 1500 m, or whenever shallow fog is being reported or during a period for which it is forecast. Observations should be repeated at intervals during all stages of an instrument approach and landing and the RVR passed to the pilot within 30 seconds of each observation. 18. The two methods of RVR assessment available at suitably equipped aerodromes are: a. Instrumented RVR. The method used to compute Instrumented RVR values is detailed in Annex 14B: . b. Human Observer Method. The method used to compute Human Observed RVR values is detailed in Annex 14A: . 19. The UK standard for reporting RVR extends from zero to 1500 metres.
20. In the absence of a formal RVR assessment, the conversion of meteorological visibility to RVR is detailed at Chapter 23 Paragraph 13.e. RVR values should not be forecast. Minimum RVR Rule 21. The minimum RVR rule is detailed at Chapter 23 Paragraph 13.c.
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Annex 14A: Measurement of Human Observed Runway Visual Range

1. The following paragraphs detail the standard military Human Observed Runway Visual Range (RVR) measurement procedure. 2. RVR Lighting. Periodic checks should be conducted of RVR lights looking for failure, damage, misalignment and land subsidence, and for regular mowing of grass around the lamps. In particular, monthly visual checks in daylight from the observation tower (where installed) should be undertaken. 3. Observations. The observer, who should have satisfactory eyesight, will count the number of RVR installation lights that he can see and pass this figure to the aerodrome controller. The controller should convert the reported figure to a distance in metres by reference to the relevant conversion table, and pass this distance to the radar controller for transmission to the pilot. 4. Conversion Tables. Conversion tables should be available to aerodrome controllers at all times. SATCO is responsible for preparing and ensuring the accuracy of conversion tables after initial installation and thereafter, whenever doubt exists that the following criteria are being met: a. The layout of the RVR system should comply with the standard siting plan as detailed in the Manual of Aerodrome Design and Safeguarding b. The height and position of the observation point should comply with specification detailed in the Manual of Aerodrome Design and Safeguarding. 5. Conversion tables should be prepared in the following manner: a. Obtain the actual distance of each RVR light measured from the observation point (as provided during detailed installation survey). b. Round the corrected distances down to the next 50 m increment (up to 800 m) or to the next 100 m increment (beyond 800 m) to obtain the converted RVR to be passed to aircrew. c. The RVR conversion table consists of the RVR light number and the converted RVR distance in metres (see Figure 14-3 RVR Conversion Table Sample Calculations). 6. Where the above procedures cannot be complied with, MAA-Reg-ATM2-ADInfra should be consulted through normal channels. 7. The following corrections will be applied to RVR light distances to avoid an overestimate of the RVR:
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UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED Figure 14-2 RVR Correction Table CORRECTION TO BE SUBTRACTED (METRES) 20 25 25 30 35 40 40 45 45 50 55 55 60 65 75 85 90 90
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RVR LIGHT NO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Figure 14-3 RVR Conversion Table Sample Calculations RVR LIGHT No (a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ACTUAL DISTANCE OF RVR LIGHT (metres) (b) 210 268 326 385 445 504 564 623 CORRECTION TO BE SUBTRACTED (metres) (c) 20 25 25 30 35 40 40 45 CORRECTED DISTANCE (metres) (b-c) 190 243 301 355 410 464 524 578 CONVERTED RVR DISTANCE (metres) (d) 150 200 300 350 400 450 500 550
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RVR LIGHT No (a) 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED ACTUAL DISTANCE OF RVR LIGHT (metres) (b) 683 743 803 902 1002 1102 1202 1301 1401 1501 CORRECTION TO BE SUBTRACTED (metres) (c) 45 50 55 55 60 65 75 85 90 90
CORRECTED DISTANCE (metres) (b-c) 638 693 748 847 942 1037 1127 1226 1311 1401
CONVERTED RVR DISTANCE (metres) (d) 600 650 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400
Notes: 1. Obtain the corrected RVR light distances (b-c) by subtracting the corrections given in Figure 14-2 RVR Correction Table from actual RVR light distance (b). 2. Round down the corrected distances (b-c) to the next lower 50 m increment (up to 800 m) or next lower 100 m increment (beyond 800 m) to obtain the converted RVR distances (d). 3. The final RVR conversion table for the aerodrome used in this example would consist of columns (a) and (d).
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Annex 14B: Measurement of Instrumented Runway Visual Range

1. Instrumented Runway Visual Range (IRVR) gives an automatic and continuous display of RVR values to ATC. Transmissometers are used to measure atmospheric opacity from fixed points alongside a runway, the number of units in any system being determined by the category of the ILS or MLS installation and runway length. In a three transmissometer system the units are linked by an associated data transfer system to a central processor. The processor computes the RVR for each transmissometer position and displays it in digital form to ATC. The three transmissometers are located one at each end of the runway adjacent to the touchdown zone and the third near the runway midpoint area. For RTF transmission purposes the locations will be known as Touchdown, Mid-Point and Stop End and RVR values will relate to these positions. 2. IRVR readings extend from 25 m to 1500 m in the following steps: a. b. c. 0 to 400 metres in 25 metre steps. 400 to 800 metres in 50 metre steps. 800 to 1500 metres in 100 metre steps.
3. IRVR Indications. A number of different IRVR systems are installed at UK military and civil aerodromes. The processors in some systems are programmed to automatically reduce in intensity, or suppress, the display of the mid-point and/or stop-end readings when the values are not operationally significant. 4. Unless a suppressed value is specifically requested by a pilot, the RVR reports transmitted should contain only those values that are displayed at full intensity. The value of the touchdown position is always displayed at full intensity and if no other values are at full intensity this is the only value which needs to be passed. Transmission to Aircraft 5. IRVR values should be passed to aircraft at the beginning of each approach for landing and, thereafter, whenever there is a significant change in the RVR until the aircraft have landed. A significant change is defined as a change in value of one increment or more. The current RVR value is also to be passed to aircraft before take-off. 6. When all three positions are to be reported to the pilot, they should be passed as three numbers relating to touchdown, mid-point and stop end respectively, eg, RVR 650 500 550. 7. If only two values are to be passed, they should be individually identified, eg, Touchdown 650 Stop End 550. 8. A high degree of priority should be given to such broadcasts to ensure that current RVR information is provided to pilots with the minimum delay. 9. With some IRVR equipment, because of the design of the system, transmissometer readings may only be displayed when the runway lights are set at an intensity of 10% or more. Settings less than 10% may result in all three readings being replaced by zeros. If, during RVR conditions, a pilot requests a reduced runway edge light setting of less than 10%, he should be advised that an RVR reading may not be available at this setting.
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Transmission Unserviceability 10. If the touchdown transmission meter fails, the IRVR system may still be serviceable provided that confirmation is received from GRMS to this effect. In such circumstances the mid-point value will be used to determine the ATC procedure and should be passed to the pilot together with the stop end value, if this is available. It is imperative that the pilot should be informed that the touchdown transmissometer has failed, eg, Touchdown RVR not available Mid-Point 600 Stop End 400. 11. If two transmissometers become unserviceable the RVR value for the remaining instrument provided that it is not the stop end value, may be used. If the RVR value for the stop end is the only one available, the system will be regarded as unserviceable for that runway. By changing the direction of use of the runway it may become serviceable again with the single available value representing the touchdown reading. 12. When the IRVR system is unserviceable, controllers should revert to Human Observer RVR where provided, or to the conversion of meteorological visibility to RVR as detailed at Chapter 23 Paragraph 13.c.
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Chapter 15: Royal Flights

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3015(1)(2)(3)(4) ROYAL FLIGHTS WITHIN THE UK Definition 1. A Royal Flight within UK airspace is defined as the movement of an aircraft specifically tasked to carry one or more members of The Royal Family afforded such status by the Head of Royal Travel, The Royal Household. 2. When so directed by the Directorate of Airspace Policy (DAP) Assistant Director Airspace Policy 1, certain flights within UK airspace by other reigning Sovereigns, Heads of State, and Prime Ministers of Commonwealth countries, may also be afforded Royal Flight status. Flight Priorities 3. Aircraft carrying a member of The Royal Family listed in Paragraph One above, will be accorded CAA Category C priority. Aircraft carrying other members of The Royal Family will be accorded Category D priority and as such will require an Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) slot time. These categories, used to afford Air Traffic Control tactical management, also attract an ATFM priority. Flight Notification 4. Aircraft of No 32 Sqn. For Royal Flights in aircraft of No 32 Sqn, the Communications Fleet Tasking Agency (CFTA) is responsible for the notification of details, by signal (see Paragraph 11), in the form shown at Annex 15A: (extract from the Transflight Signal) for all aircraft. This notification should be made as soon as possible in advance of the flight. 5. The Queens (Helicopter) Flight (TQHF). TQHF undertakes to pass details of Royal Flights in helicopters to the Airspace Utilisation Section (AUS) at DAP, Civil Aviation Authority using the proforma at Annex 15B: . 6. Flights in Other Aircraft. For Royal Flights in civil aircraft (other than scheduled services), or foreign military aircraft, the aircraft operator is required to obtain approval for release of details of the flight from the Royal Travel Office before passing flight details to AUS using the proforma at Annex 15A: . 7. Promulgation. AUS, LATCC(Mil) Briefing Facility, CFTA and TQHF are jointly responsible for promulgating details relating to Royal Flights, the establishment of Temporary Controlled Airspace (CAS-T) or Royal Low Level Corridors (RLLCs). On receipt of details of a planned Royal Flight the following action should be taken: a. AUS. AUS, the DAP authority for the establishment of CAS-T, should prepare, in consultation with CFTA and/or LATCC (Mil) Briefing Facility, the Royal Flight notification giving details of the Royal Flight and/or the establishment of CAS-T, including any arrangements for supplementary radar services or RLLCs. AUS will arrange for the issue of relevant NOTAMs through AIS as appropriate. The Notification
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Message for such flights will be in the form of Annex 15D: . The Notification Message for Royal Helicopter Flights will be in the form of Annex 15F: . AUS will signal details of the Royal Helicopter Flights (see Paragraph 11) as soon as they are available. b. CFTA. For fixed-wing flights, CFTA, RAF Northolt Ops or the chartered operator should pass details of the flight to AUS in the format laid down in Annex 15I: . AUS will promulgate the Royal Flight signal and appropriate NOTAMs. If there is insufficient time to allow AUS to promulgate details of the flight, the aircraft operating authority should transmit the signal on its own volition; informing AUS of the action. If having released the signal AUS should require it to be amended then the aircraft operating authority should re-submit an amended signal in a format suitable to the content (see Paragraph 11). 8. Action by AIS Heathrow on Receipt of Subsequent Notification. AUS will request that AIS Heathrow promulgate relevant NOTAM(s) to give recipients at least 48 hrs notice whenever possible. A Freephone service (0500 354802) is also available at AIS Heathrow which provides abbreviated information on CAS-T; the service is updated daily. 9. Subsequent Actions by Addressees. On receipt of the promulgated AUS signal, CINCFLEET, HQ DAAvn and RAF Commands/Group HQs should arrange for the signal to be passed to any flying units, air defence radar stations (ADRS) or other units under their command at home or abroad which might be involved, that are not able to receive it through normal means. 10. Short Notice Royal Flights or Late Changes. A Short Notice Royal Flight is defined as one in which the timescale between the Initial Notification and the Royal Flight is too short to allow one clear working days notice to the recipients of Royal Flight CAS-T NOTAMs or Notification Messages. In the event of a Short Notice Royal Flight or late change in Royal Flight details, the following procedures should be complied with: a. Normal Working Hours. The CFTA or chartered operator is required to notify the Civil Watch Supervisor at the ATCC responsible for the UK Flight Information Region from which the Royal Flight will depart. Additionally, the procedures detailed in Paragraph 7-9 should be followed when time permits. b. Outside Normal Working Hours. When AUS is closed, the initiator of a Royal Flight, or the person wishing to change an existing Royal Flight, is required to contact RAF Northolt Operations. In the case of a new Royal Flight (either fixed-wing or helicopter) RAF Northolt Operations will alert CFTA who will then carry out the actions listed in Sub-sub-paragraphs (1) to (6) below. In the case of amendments to an existing Royal Flight which has already been promulgated by the procedures detailed in Paragraphs 7-9, RAF Northolt Operations will carry out these actions itself: (1) Notify the Civil Watch Supervisor at the ATCC responsible for the UK FIR from which the Royal Flight will depart. (2) (3) Notify the supervisor of the appropriate CAS-T controlling authority. Arrange for the closure of any relevant Danger Areas.
(4) Contact the Briefing Room at LATCC (Mil), or if closed, the D&D Cell, to arrange, as required, a supplementary radar service (see Paragraph 18) and/or to implement the Safeguard System for a Royal Helicopter Flight (see Paragraph 23). Also inform the LATCC (Mil) Briefing Room, or if closed, the D&D Cell that a Short Notice Royal Flight or late change is on the way.
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(5) Pass the CAS-T NOTAM via Mil-EAMS/AFTN to Duty Briefing Officer at AIS Heathrow (if Mil-EAMS/AFTN is unserviceable, use Fax) and, if time permits, to the other addressees in Annex 15A: . (6) Pass the Notification Message via Mil-EAMS to the Royal Flight Collective addressees (EGZZRFLA). 11. Message Precedence and Subject Indicator Code (SIC). Royal Flight signal messages and CAS-T NOTAMs should be given a transmission precedence appropriate to the degree of imminence of the proposed flight (see notes). For NOTAMs, AIS Heathrow is responsible for awarding the appropriate precedence to meet the notification requirements in Paragraph 8. Units receiving Royal Flight signal messages should make local arrangements to ensure distribution to the appropriate authorities. The SIC K2A (Royal Flight) should be used on all Royal Flight signal messages filed for transmission through a communications terminal. Notes: 1. Routine messages originated after 1500 hours on Friday may not reach the action authority of some addresses until the following Monday morning owing to the restricted working hours of the communications terminal. 2. Signal messages should carry the ICAO priority indicators GG for PRIORITY or DD/FF for IMMEDIATE. 12. CAS-T NOTAM Promulgation for Return Flights. Irrespective of the interval between the estimated time of arrival (ETA) of a Royal Flight at an airfield and the estimated time of departure (ETD), a separate CAS-T NOTAM and signal should be promulgated. This is applicable to Royal Flights both at home and abroad. Airspace and Air Traffic Service Arrangements 13. General. Royal Flights in fixed-wing aircraft should, whenever possible, take place within the national ATS route structure. Standard ATC procedures should be applied to Royal Flights when operating in Class A-D airspace (Airways, CTZs and CTAs). In all other instances, including flight within existing Class E airspace, and subject to the conditions specified in Paragraphs 14-18, the airspace around the route will be designated CAS-T, which will consist of Temporary Control Zones, Temporary Control Areas and Temporary Controlled Airways. CAS-T is designated Class D airspace. 14. Establishment of CAS-T. CAS-T, of appropriate height/width bands and levels should be established to encompass any portions of the track and flight levels of the Royal aircraft that lie outside permanent Class AD airspace. Temporary Control Zones and Temporary Control Areas (where appropriate) should be established around all airfields (with appropriate ATS provision) used for the departure or arrival of a Royal Flight. The aircraft operating authority will construct the CAS-T requirements and draft a signal in the format shown in Annex 15I: and pass it to AUS to promulgate. AUS will concur with or amend the signal as required, release it and arrange, via AIS, for appropriate NOTAM(s) to be issued. When a Royal Flight is running more than 15 minutes before or 30 minutes after the promulgated times, or diverts outside CAS or CAS-T, the Supervisor at the ATCC providing the ATC service, whilst retaining executive responsibility, may delegate operational control of the Royal Flight to another ATS agency better placed to provide a service. The aim is to ensure maximum protection to the Royal aircraft under these changed circumstances and can include a Deconfliction Service outside of controlled airspace.
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15. Special Rules for the Control of Flights Within CAS-T Established for Royal Flights. Regardless of the prevailing meteorological conditions, aircraft can only fly within CAS-T when ATC clearance has been obtained from the controlling authorities specified in the following sub-paragraphs: a. Temporary Control Zones. Temporary Control Zones will be established around airfields of departure and destination (that retain appropriate ATS provision) where no permanent control zone exist. Control Zones for Royal Flights will normally extend for 10 nm radius from the centre of the airfield from ground level to an upper level designated for each Royal Flight but may be tailored taking into account surrounding airspace and the aircrafts performance. The Control Zone will be established for a period (for outbound flights) of 15 minutes before, until 30 minutes after, the ETD of the Royal aircraft or (for inbound flights) for a period of 15 minutes before, until 30 minutes after, the ETA of the Royal aircraft at the airfield concerned. Overall control of these Control Zones should be exercised, as appropriate, by the Commanding Officer of a military airfield or the ATS authority of a civil airfield. b. Temporary Control Areas. Temporary Control Areas (Class D) can be established to meet the specific requirements of a Royal Flight. The lateral and vertical limits, the duration and the controlling authority of such areas will be promulgated in the Royal Flight signal and by NOTAM. The controlling authority will be the appropriate civil or military ATCC. c. Permanent Control Zones and Areas. The controlling authority will be the designated controlling authority for the Permanent Zone or Area and the duration will be as laid down in Paragraph 15. Where an airfield has its own Control Zone, then the requirement to establish a Temporary Control Zone of the dimensions specified in Subparagraph 15a can be waived. d. Temporary Controlled Airways. Temporary Controlled Airways (Class D) will be established to join temporary or permanent Control Zones or Control Areas, as appropriate, for 15 minutes before ETA at start point of the temporary airway until 30 minutes after ETD from the end/departure point of the temporary airway. The lateral dimensions of such airways will be 5 nm each side of the intended track of the Royal Flight and vertical limits will be designated. The controlling authority will be the appropriate civil or military ATCC. 16. Authority to Cancel Temporary Control Zones, Areas and Airways. A Temporary Control Zone, Area or airway can be cancelled at the discretion of the Military Commander or Civil ATC Supervisor, as appropriate, when the Royal aircraft has left the zone or area and is established en-route in permanent Class AD airspace, or has landed. 17. Airways Joining Clearance for Royal Aircraft. When a Royal aircraft is expected to enter a Temporary Control Area / Temporary Controlled Airway from a Temporary Control Zone, the Duty Air Traffic Control Officer at the departure airfield should take the following action, by telephone, directly with the Civil Watch Supervisor at the ATCC responsible for the UK FIR from which the Royal Flight will depart: a. Immediately on receipt of the written flight plan, and not less than 30 minutes before ETD, pass short details of the Royal flight. b. c. d. Request airways clearance when departure is imminent. Pass amendments to the ETD. Immediately pass Actual Time of Departure (ATD).
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18. Supplementary Radar Services. LATCC (Mil) Briefing Room is responsible for tasking those military ATC Radar Units and Aerodromes in the UK which should provide a Supplementary Radar Service for Royal Flights in CAS-T outside of the national ATS route structure or cover of Civil ATCCs. This service should be provided in accordance with Paragraphs 37-56 Royal Flight Supplementary Radar Services. LATCC (Mil) Briefing Room should ensure that AUS is notified of any arrangements made for a supplementary radar service and the information should be included in the subsequent notification detailed in Paragraph 7. 19. Royal Continuation Training Flights. Training Flights, including parachute training flights, by any member of The Royal Family planned and carried out under VFR or IFR, and under the control of an ATCRU or aerodrome radar, are normally to be classified as Royal Flights. When a member of The Royal Family intends to carry out flying training at MOD or civil airfields, CAS-T, if required (or alternatively an SSR conspicuity code), should be established as agreed by the aircraft operating organization and AUS, to cover the activity. AUS is required to promulgate the CAS-T in accordance with Paragraphs 7 and 8. 20. Royal Flights in Helicopters. CAS-T is not normally established for Royal Flights in helicopters. A service for the notification and provision of en-route procedures for Royal Helicopter Flights in the FIRs outside CAS is provided under the Military/Civil Safeguard System. Royal Helicopter Flights should be planned by TQHF so as to minimize, whenever possible, disruption to the UK Low Flying System (LFS), en-route airfields, Danger Areas and military small arms ranges, and will be subject only to such routing being compatible with the provision of an efficient ATC service. For Royal Helicopter Flights, RLLCs marked by a series of check-points will be promulgated by Royal Flight Notification Message. These checkpoints will be approximately 20 mins flying time apart. Within a RLLC, protected zones will be established extending 5 nm radius of the departure and destination points, and 5 nm each side of the Royal Helicopter's intended track, and from ground level to 1000 ft above maximum planned cruise altitude. The protected zone will be active for a period from 15 minutes before ETA at the sector entry check-point or departure point until 30 minutes after the ETD at the sector exit check-point or destination point, based on planned times. The authority to cancel a RLLC protected zone may be given, at the discretion of the Safeguard Area Supervisor, when the aircraft is known to have passed the exit check-point and entered the next protected zone or phase of flight, as appropriate. Military flying is prohibited within the Protected Zone unless the aircraft involved is receiving an ATSOCAS, either VFR or IFR, from the same agency that is controlling the Royal Helicopter or from another ATC unit that has established radar contact with the Royal Helicopter. Planned deconfliction minima should be applied in accordance with CAP774 with the following exceptions: a. Light aeroplanes and helicopters operating under VFR with an IAS of 140 kt or less should keep well clear of the Royal Helicopter. b. Other traffic operating under VFR, with the approval of the Royal Helicopter Commander, can reduce separation to below planned deconfliction minima. After verification that the Royal Helicopter has landed, the Safeguard Area Supervisor for the destination unit can cancel the RLLC. SSR Mode 3/A code 0037 has been allocated for the exclusive use of helicopters engaged on Royal Flights. This code will be displayed from take-off to landing, whether or not a radar service is being provided. 21. Closure of the UK LFS for Royal Helicopter Flights. Where RLLCs cross any part of the LFS, Low Flying Operations Squadron (LF Ops Sqn), RAF Wittering should close that part of the LFS to military aircraft, with the exception of those at Paragraph 20.a, extending 5 nm radius of the departure and destination points, and 5 nm each side of the Royal Helicopter's intended track, from 15 minutes before ETA at the check-point prior to entry until 30 minutes after the check-point leaving the area. When any section of the LFS to be
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crossed is the responsibility of an autonomous co-ordinating authority, LF Ops Sqn should inform that authority of the route details and the required closure times. 22. Selected Helicopter Flights. Selected Helicopter Flights are flights carrying members of The Royal Family other than those listed in Paragraph 1 of this instruction. The route and timings of these flights, together with preferred Delegated Units in each of the Safeguard Areas affected by the helicopter's route, will be faxed to AUS by TQHF using the proforma at Annex 15B: which will then be faxed to LATCC (Mil) briefing room by AUS. On receipt of the notification, LATCC (Mil) should promulgate the information, in the form detailed in Annex 15I: , to all Safeguard Units, Delegated Units, military flying units and AUS (who will in turn promulgate to other military and civilian ATC agencies). Military pilots are required to avoid flying near the promulgated route during all notified times. SSR Mode 3/A code 0035 has been allocated for Selected Helicopter Flights. This code will be displayed from take-off to landing, whether or not a radar service is being provided. 23. Safeguard System. The Safeguard System coordinates civil and military en route facilities and air traffic services for the protection of Royal and Selected Helicopter Flights. For this purpose most of the UK is sub-divided into Safeguard Areas, each of which has an associated Safeguard Unit. 24. Safeguard Units. Safeguard Units are responsible for providing air traffic services within their Safeguard Area to Royal and Selected helicopter flights using all available facilities. Responsibility for service provision can be passed to a Delegated Unit, whose location, relative to the route of the helicopter, is more appropriate. Additionally, Safeguard Units will provide other operators within the Safeguard Area with relevant details of the flight, such as tactical updates on the progress of the Royal or Selected flight. Where appropriate, pilots are advised to maintain RT contact with the appropriate Safeguard or Delegated Units. 25. Royal Flight Callsigns. The flight plan aircraft identification and the radio telephony designators for flights flown in aircraft of No 32 Sqn, TQHF or in civilian chartered aircraft are as follows: a. Royal Flights. Royal flight callsigns are as follows: (1) No 32 Sqn (see Note 1). The 3-letter operator designator KRF followed by an identification number and the letter R, eg KRF 1R, and the radio telephony callsign "KITTYHAWK" followed by an identification number and the letter R. (2) TQHF. The 3-letter designator TQF followed by an identification number and the letter R, eg TQF 1R, and the radio telephony callsign RAINBOW followed by an identification number and the letter R. (3) Civilian Chartered Aircraft. The 3-letter designator KRH followed by an identification number and the letter R, eg KRH 1R, and the radio telephony callsign SPARROWHAWK followed by an identification number and the letter R. b. Flights by Passengers Entitled to CAA Priority. Callsigns for flights by aircraft carrying passengers entitled to CAA priority are as follows: (1) No 32 Sqn (see Note 1). The 3-letter operator designator KRF and the radio telephony callsign KITTYHAWK or ASCOT followed by an identification number. (2) TQHF. The 3-letter operator designator TQF and the radio telephony callsign RAINBOW followed by an identification number and the letter S.
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(3) Civilian Chartered Fixed-Wing Aircraft. The 3-letter operator designator KRH and the radio telephony callsign SPARROWHAWK followed by an identification number. (4) Civilian Chartered Rotary-Wing Aircraft. The 3-letter operator designator KRH and the radio telephony callsign SPARROWHAWK followed by an identification number and the letter S. c. Positioning Flights. Callsigns for positioning flights are as follows: (1) No 32 Sqn (see Note 1). The 3-letter operator designator RRF and the radio telephony callsign KITTY followed by an identification number. (2) TQHF. The 3-letter operator designator will be TQF and the radio telephony callsign RAINBOW followed by an identification number. (3) Civil Chartered Fixed-Wing Aircraft. The normal aircraft callsign will be used. (4) Civil Chartered Rotary-Wing Aircraft. The 3-letter operator designator KRH and the radio telephony callsign SPARROWHAWK followed by an identification number. d. Other Flights by Aircraft of No 32 Sqn (see Note 1). Other communications flights carried out by No 32 Sqn will normally use the 3-letter designator RRR and the radio telephony callsign ASCOT followed by the required identification number. e. Helicopters Flown by HRH The Duke of York. For helicopters of TQHF flown by HRH The Duke of York, the 3-letter operator designator will be LPD and the radio telephony callsign will be LEOPARD. Notes: 1. The rule also applies whenever No 10 Squadron, or No 216 Squadron, aircraft are being utilised for Royal/VIP flights. 26. Royal Flights - ATC and Search and Rescue Procedures. ATC and Search and Rescue Procedures for Royal Flights within UK airspace and within Commanded areas abroad are detailed in current RAF GAIs(J). Additional air traffic service procedures for Royal Flights within UK airspace and for British Military airfields abroad are also contained within current RAF GAIs(J). Additional air traffic service procedures for the provision of enroute services to Royal and selected helicopter flights in the UK, are contained in the RAF FLIP and Flight Information Handbook (Safeguard System). 27. Royal Flights - Airfield Safety Services. Irrespective of a dispensation for flights to Below-Category stations laid down in the Air Staff Standard, the airfield crash category should not to be reduced for Royal Flights as defined in the relevant GAI. The safety services available for Royal Flights will be at least equal to the crash category appropriate to the aircraft involved. The whole of the safety services should be at STATE 3 READINESS whenever the aircraft is landing, taxiing, or taking off. There is no requirement for a medical officer/civilian medical practitioner to be on station but he/she must be immediately contactable by phone or pager to provide urgent aviation medicine and specialist advice to the emergency medical services: he/she will be able to attend the airfield within 2 hours. In circumstances where the cover would otherwise be inadequate, prior reference should be made to the parent headquarters for the necessary augmentation. Full details pertaining to Airfield Safety Services are detailed in JSP 426.
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28. Where the RLLC or CAS-T infringes a Danger Area then that Danger Area can be closed as follows: a. Royal Helicopter Flights. AUS is responsible for ordering the closure of Danger Areas as follows: (1) At the request of The Queens Helicopter Flight a Danger Area penetrated by a RLLC can be closed for the period of the transit. Significant operational penalties incurred by such closures should be brought to the attention of AUS/TQHF to allow renegotiation of route if possible. (2) A Danger Area penetrated by a RLLC can remain active at the discretion of The Queens Helicopter Flight. Details of such penetrations will be notified to the relevant Danger Area operating authority. Where a Danger Area operating authority believes that the Danger Area is unable to accommodate concurrent scheduled activity and the portion of RLLC to support the Royal Helicopter transit it can initiate closure of the Danger Area at its own discretion by means of confirmatory e-mail to AUS. b. Fixed-Wing Flights. The agency which has constructed the CAS-T is also responsible for ordering the closure of the Danger Area. This agency will normally be the CFTA for military aircraft. c. Flights Generated Out-of-Hours. All Royal Flights generated outside the working hours of AUS are processed by the CFTA (having been alerted by RAF Northolt Operations where necessary); the same staff are responsible for ordering the closure of Danger Areas if required. d. Late Changes Out-of-Hours. All promulgated Royal Flights which subsequently undergo amendment outside the working hours of AUS are processed by RAF Northolt Operations, which is also responsible for the closure of Danger Areas if required. 29. E-mails (or telephone calls in urgent cases) ordering the closure of Danger Areas should be addressed to the operating authority of the Danger Area as follows: a. b. Royal Navy. ACOS(Av) with a copy to DJtCap ISTAR3. Army. HQ ATE LWC.
c. Royal Air Force. HQ AIR (SO2 1 Gp Ranges) Air to Ground Ranges. DAS LA Ops all other Danger Areas. d. MOD (DE&S). MFTR ATC.
The Danger Area authority should e-mail confirmation to the AUS or RAF Northolt Ops for out of hours closures - that the pertinent Danger Area(s) will be closed during the times stated. Such e-mails should include the telephone number of a responsible contact for each Danger Area. Notes: 1. The Captain of the Royal Flight can, on his own authority, waive the requirement to close a Danger Area.
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2. The addressees above are available only during normal working hours. A request for the closure of a Danger Area after 1500 hours (local) on a Friday is unlikely to reach the range staff until the afternoon of the following Monday (or correspondingly later in the case of public holidays). In this event, the agency having the responsibility for closing the Danger Area should advise the captain of the aircraft, via its operating authority, that he/she should consider the Danger Area to be active until confirmed otherwise. 3. The Danger Areas and their controlling authorities are listed in the UK AIP ENR5 and Military AIP ENR4. 30. Closure means that all firing, including that of small arms (except on 25 yard ranges), should cease in Danger Areas that infringe CAS-T or RLLCs and should be for the period specified in the closure signal. However, after the passage of the Royal aircraft, if the Range Control Authorities request the reopening of the Danger Areas, Safeguard or Delegated units can authorize the reopening of the Danger Area once the Royal aircraft has been observed on radar to be at least 5 nm clear and moving away from the Danger Area in question. 31. Closure of Military Small Arms Ranges Outside Danger Areas for Royal Helicopter Flights. All military small arms ranges, with the exception of RMAS Sandhurst for which special arrangements are in place, located outside established Danger Areas (excluding 25 yard ranges), any parts of which infringe the area within 5 nm of the intended take-off or landing site of a Royal Helicopter Flight, should be closed under arrangements detailed in Paragraphs 29 and 30, direct with the HQ responsible for the small arms range, as follows: a. Defence Estates. The relevant Defence Training Estate (DTE) with copy of signal to HQ DTE. b. c. Royal Navy. HQ NAVY COS AVN SO1 Ops Spt. Royal Marines. CTCRM (attn: Lympstone for SO2 Trg Resources).
d. Army. For Army small arms ranges not directly overseen by DTE signals are sent direct to, and acknowledged by, the relevant Range Administering Unit as follows: (1) (2) (3) (4) EG D145 9 Sup Regt RLC, Buckley Bks, Hullavington (Tel: 94387 8845). EG D146 Royal School of Mechanical Engineering (Tel: 94661 2225). EG D147 Troops Hereford (Tel: 94475 3235). EG D213 Army School of Ammunition (Tel: 94248 3638).
(5) EG D215 16 Regt RA, St Georges Bks, North Luffenham (Tel: 95361 7800). (6) e. EG D216 Troops Hereford (Tel: 94475 3235).
RAF. HQ AIR or appropriate Group HQ.
Confirmatory signals are required as at Paragraph 29 Closure of the East Anglian Military Training Area (EAMTA) and the North Wales Military Training Area (NWMTA) 32. Whenever possible Royal Flights should be routed to avoid the airspace occupied by the EAMTA and NWMTA. When this is not possible, CFTA should alert AUS to the airspace
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penetration by adding a suitable note to the notification signal at Annex 15H: . AUS is then required to consult with the LATCC (Mil) Unit Operations Officer (U Ops O) to arrange for closure of the relevant airspace and, thereafter, promulgate details in the Royal Flight NOTAM under arrangements detailed in Paragraph 7. The airspace should be notified as closed 15 mins before ETA airspace entry until 30 mins after ETD of airspace exit. After the passage of the Royal Flight aircraft the LATCC (Mil) U Ops O may authorise the opening of the EAMTRA/NWMTA, provided the Royal Flight aircraft is at least 5 nm clear and moving away from the area. ROYAL FLIGHTS ABROAD Definition 33. For the purpose of flight planning, a Royal Flight abroad is defined as the movement of an aircraft specifically tasked to fly HM The Queen or HRH The Prince of Wales outside of UK airspace. Notwithstanding accepted practice in the UK, by international agreement, only an aircraft carrying a Head of State is afforded Royal Flight status. Nevertheless, the rules governing the avoidance of Royal Flights in the UK should be applied to military aircraft under the control of RAF elements abroad when a flight carrying any member of The Royal Family listed in Paragraph 1 takes place within their areas of responsibility. Notification 34. The Royal Travel Office is requested to advise AUS and CFTA of any Royal Flight abroad, civil or military, carrying any member of The Royal Family listed in Paragraph 1. The CFTA, through the medium of the TRANSFLIGHT or DIPCLEAR signal, should inform foreign Directors of Civil Aviation and/or British Representatives abroad, as appropriate, of details of Royal Flights through their areas, and should request that flights by HM The Queen be afforded Head of State status. 35. On receipt of notification of a Royal Flight abroad, the following action should be taken: a. Royal Flights Leaving or Arriving Within the UK FIRs/UIRs. The following action should be taken for Royal Flights leaving or arriving within the UK FIRs/UIRs: (1) CFTA. CFTA should notify the addressees at Annex 15A: at least 14 days in advance, if possible, of the Royal Flight and take action as required by Paragraph 10 where appropriate. (2) AUS. AUS should prepare the Royal Flight notification in the form detailed at Annex 15D: , for that part of the Royal Flight within UK airspace. (3) AIS Heathrow. AIS Heathrow should take action as required in Paragraph 8 and Paragraph 10 as appropriate. (4) RAF Northolt Operations. When circumstances dictate, RAF Northolt Operations should carry out the actions detailed in Paragraph10.b. (5) CINCFLEET, HQ DAAvn and HQ AIR/Group HQs. CINCFLEET, HQ DAAvn and HQ AIR/Group HQs will take action as required in Paragraph 9 with respect to those parts of the Royal Flight which are within the UK FIRs/UIRs of Royal Flights abroad. b. Flights Within Foreign Airspace. Upon receipt of notification of a Royal Flight within their area of responsibility:
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(1) Attaches/UK representatives should notify Civil and Military authorities of the Host Nation, of the route and itinerary of the Royal Flight. Arrangements should be made with the appropriate authorities in respect of Danger Areas (Paragraph 36). (2) When applicable, HQ AIR or RAF elements abroad should notify all British Military airfields within their areas of responsibility of the Royal Flight itinerary, in order that flights by aircraft of these agencies can apply the required separation standards as defined for CAS-T in the UK. c. Flights Taking Place Abroad by Aircraft of No 32 Sqn and Royal Flights in Locally Based Aircraft. When applicable, HQ AIR or independent RAF elements abroad should introduce procedures to ensure adequate separation for the Royal Flight within the Air Traffic Control area around those airfields for which they are responsible. For flights originating at a British Military airfield a Navigation Warning designated "SPECIAL NOTICE" should be promulgated and addressed to: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Other RAF HQs or RAF elements if appropriate. LATCC (Mil). CFTA Northolt. No 32 Sqn. British Attache/Representative.
(6) Any Other Interested Authorities. HQ AIR and independent RAF elements abroad should re-promulgate the Navigation Warning to those airfields from which aircraft may stage direct to the area of the Royal Flight. Danger Areas 36. HQ AIR and independent RAF elements abroad should close, as appropriate, those Danger Areas under their control to ensure that there is no possible hazard to the Royal Flight. Royal Flights over foreign countries will normally be routed to avoid Danger Areas but where necessary, British Representatives may be required to seek assurance from the appropriate authorities that a hazard does not exist. ROYAL FLIGHT SUPPLEMENTARY RADAR SERVICES Introduction 37. All Royal Flights in fixed-wing aircraft are, whenever possible, to take place within the national ATS route structure. In all other instances the airspace around the route will be designated Temporary Controlled Airspace (CAS-T). 38. The overall responsibility for providing an ATS is vested in the Civil Supervisor at the ATCC responsible for the FIR/UIR within which the Royal Flight is taking place. 39. The civil ATCC will designate the civil Unit responsible for providing an Air Traffic Control Service when the Royal Flight aircraft is within civil radar cover. 40. Supplementary Radar Services are provided by military ATCCs, ASACS units or military airfields with suitable radar cover when the flight profile of the Royal Flight aircraft takes it outside the radar cover of the Civil ATCC.
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41. The need for Supplementary Radar Services for a Royal Flight is decided by the Civil Supervisor of the appropriate ATCC in consultation with AUS. Following discussion between AUS and LATCC (Mil) Briefing Room, details of the route and requisite frequencies are confirmed. LATCC (Mil) Briefing Room should then pass this information (in the form of a tasking signal) to AUS, No 1 AIDU and those Units required to provide a Supplementary Radar Service (see Paragraph 43). LATCC (Mil) Briefing Room Supplementary Radar Services Tasking 42. On receipt of a request for a Royal Flight Supplementary Radar Service from AUS, LATCC (Mil) Briefing Room should take the following action: a. Plot the trace to be followed by the Royal aircraft to decide which ATCC, Air Defence or other Unit, or combination of these, will provide the Supplementary Radar Service. The following order or priority in choosing units to provide Supplementary Radar Service will normally be used: (1) (2) (3) ATCCs. ASACS units. Military airfields.
If any doubt exists concerning radar cover, advice should be sought from the Supervisor or SATCO at the Unit concerned. b. Arrange with the Civil Supervisor, at the ATCC responsible for the FIR/UIR in which the Royal Flight is planned, the transfer points from which the Supplementary Radar Service is required. c. Determine the civil VHF channels to be used.
d. When ATCCs, ASACS units or airfields are involved, determine the UHF or VHF channel to be used from the Supervisor or SATCO. 43. When these facts have been ascertained, LATCC (Mil) Briefing Room should originate a Royal Flight Supplementary Radar Service tasking Signal to the appropriate Units. The signal will be copied to HQ AIR (for Air Defence Units and Airfields), Gp HQ of the ATC/ASACS Unit concerned, HQ AIR ATM Dep Force Commander, AUS, RAF and civil ATCCs in whose FIR/UIR the service will take place and No 32 Squadron. The tasking signal should be tabulated as follows: a. b. c. d. Title/rank of passenger. Type of aircraft and callsign. Airfield of departure and ETD. Units detailed to provide Supplementary Radar Service, in sequence: (1) (2) (3)
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First agency: frequency, point of transfer, estimated time of transfer. Second agency: frequency, point of transfer, estimated time of transfer. Further agencies in sequence..
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e.
Destination and ETA.
Action in the Event of an Inability at Supplementary Radar Units 44. If unable to provide a service in accordance with a Royal Flight Supplementary Radar Service Tasking Signal, units should inform LATCC (Mil) Briefing Room immediately. The unit tasking should then be reviewed and, if service cannot be provided on any allocated section of the route, the relevant signal addressees listed in Paragraph 43 should be informed. Royal Flight Plans and Delay Signals ATCC Action 45. All Royal Flight plans, delay signals and Supplementary Radar Service Tasking Signals should be brought to the attention of the Duty AISO at LATCC (Mil) Briefing Room and the Duty D&D Controller , who should immediately to pass the following information to any assigned Supplementary Radar Service Unit within their FIR: a. b. Flight level details from Royal Flight Plan. Details of departure or delay signal.
Supplementary Radar Service Procecdures 46. General Outline. Radar units and airfields tasked by LATCC (Mil) Briefing Room should provide Supplementary Radar Service for Royal Flights within the areas assigned in the Tasking Signal. These areas can be extended or contracted in accordance with Paragraph 48. The assigned areas will be CAS-T outwith the national airways system. Military Units should provide Supplementary Radar Service in accordance with the following procedures. 47. Provision of Radar Service. When providing radar service to Royal Flights in the Class D environment of CAS-T, controllers will provide an Air Traffic Control Service as detailed in Annex 11C: . This service takes priority over all other tasks except actual distress incidents and Air Defence operational tasks. 48. Transfer of Control. Provisional transfer points between control agencies will be detailed in the Royal Flight Supplementary Radar Service Tasking Signal(s). Transfer points can be adjusted between assigned radar and radar approach agencies, but the appropriate procedural controller should be informed prior to initiating transfer. When transfer is complete, the radar agency assuming responsibility will inform the Royal Flight aircraft. Normally, the procedural controller will issue communications instructions to the Royal Flight aircraft to transfer to a Zone Controlling Authority; these instructions can, however, be passed by the Supplementary Radar service Unit if agreed by the procedural controller. 49. Fifteen minutes prior to transfer, controller-to-controller landline communication should be established, using either direct lines or the ATC or BT networks. The initial call should be prefixed Royal Flight. Communications with civil authorities may be made through the PBX of the nearest ATCC. Transfer communication routing should be checked prior to the flight and, if necessary, permanent uninterrupted BT trunk calls can be booked for this purpose. 50. When responsibility is being transferred between military units, the transferring unit should identify the Royal Flight aircraft to the receiving unit. Whenever possible, this procedure will apply to transfer between civil and military agencies; however, if identification by landline is impracticable, the receiving military unit should assume Supplementary Radar Service responsibility at the transfer point assigned in the Royal Flight Supplementary Radar Service Tasking Signal.
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51. Identification. Identification of the Royal Flight aircraft will be by position information passed by landlines from controller to controller on transfer, by a position report from the aircraft, or by secondary radar. Turns for identification should be used if any doubt exists concerning the accuracy of position information; however, this procedure can be refused at the discretion of the aircraft captain. 52. Loss of Radar Contact. If radar contact with the Royal Flight aircraft is lost, Supplementary Radar Service Units should take the following action: a. Inform the aircraft captain.
b. Inform the next assigned radar agency. If the Royal Flight aircraft has been identified by the next assigned radar agency, responsibility should be assumed immediately by that agency. c. Inform the appropriate civil controller that responsibility has been transferred.
53. RT Procedures. Supplementary Radar Service can be provided on any frequency, either VHF or UHF, but the Royal Flight aircraft is required maintain radio contact with the civil ATCC on the designated VHF channel. 54. Radar controllers should maintain a listening watch on the designated radio frequency from 30 mins prior to estimated time of entry into the Supplementary Radar Service Units radar coverage until 30 mins after the Royal Flight aircraft has been transferred to another control agency. RT messages to the aircraft should be confined to: a. b. c. Replying to a call from the Royal Flight aircraft. Passing control instructions as required. Warning of loss of radar contact.
d. Warning of bad weather showing on the radar and likely to affect the track of the Royal Flight aircraft. e. Transfer of control information.
55. If RT contact is lost with the Royal Flight aircraft, the unit providing the Supplementary Radar Service should inform the appropriate procedural controller and will monitor the Royal Flight aircrafts track, passing any information requested by the civil procedural controller. If the Royal Flight aircraft has been identified by the next assigned radar agency, responsibility should be assumed by that agency; the appropriate civil controller should be informed that responsibility has been transferred. Violation of CAS-T 56. Aircraft which appear to violate the regulations applicable to CAS-T should be tracked; if practicable height, heading and position information should be passed to the military element of the appropriate ATCC, which should pass this information to LATCC (Mil) Radar Analysis Cell (RAC) to assist with tracing action.
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Annex 15A: Notification of Royal Flights in Fixed Wing Aircraft

(Specimen transflight extract) FROM: CFTA, RAF Northolt TO: LATCC (Mil) SWANWICK 32 SQN NORTHOLT MODUK DAP AUS LONDON ROYAL TRANSFLIGHT a. b. c. Itinerary: d. e. A member of The Royal Family plus number in party _________ (1) (2) Requested Royal Route BAe 146/ 125________________________ Handling Requirements ________________________ BAe 146/125 task number _________ callsign _________ Captain ____________ plus crew______ (number) c. Doors (UTC) __________________(month)
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Annex 15B: Notification of Royal/Selected Helicopter Flight

ALL TIMES LOCAL
FROM: The Queens Helicopter Flight Business Aviation Centre Blackbushe Airport Camberley Surrey GU17 9LG Tel. 01252 864330 Fax. 01252 864335 Date: To: (for Royal Flights) TO: DAP AUS Fax: 0207 453 6593 Outside AUS Operating Hours: Ascot Operations (01844) 274482 or (01494)497505 (see note below) From: (for Selected Flights) TO: DAP AUS Fax: 0207 453 6593
Type: Speed: Danger Areas To Be Closed:
Callsign: Altitude Band:
Task No:
CP
Place
Position
Time
Delegated Safeguard Units:
Note: The working hours of DAP AUS, excluding Public Holidays, are:0830-1630 (local) Monday Friday Outside these hours, the initial point of contact is Ascot Operations which will process the notification.
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Annex 15C: Notification of Royal Flights Fixed-Wing Aircraft

ALL TIMES ZULU/UTC
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Callsign or Registration Aircraft Type (common name or ICAO code):.. Flight Date... DepartingETD.(Doors) Significant Waypoints: (See Note 3):
a. b. c. d. e. f.
ETA ETA ETA ETA ETA ETA ETA FL (Doors)
6. 7.
Arriving Intended Cruising Level: Notes: 1. 2.
Add ICAO codes to airfields of departure and destination. Actual times of departure and arrival are not required, the Doors times suffice.
3. Paragraph 5. Omit non-navaid reporting points on airways unless they denote a change of airway. For overseas flights, Paragraph 5 requires only that part of the itinerary which lies within the UK FIR. 4. 5. Flights of more than a single stage require a separate proforma for each stage. Do not indicate the identity of the passengers.
6. Subsequent changes to the above should be forwarded asap to addressees at para 8

8.
On completion, send proforma by FAX to:
DAP AUS 0207 453 6593 (0830-1630 (local) Mon-Fri) OR, outside these hours and during public holidays, telephone: RAF Northolt Operations 020 88338915/6.
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Annex 15D: Specimen Temporary Controlled Airspace NOTAM

Q) FIR/Supplementary Information A) FIR/Airfield ICAO B) YY/MM/DD/TT C) YY/MM/DD/TT E) Supplementary Information TEMPORARY CONTROLLED AIRSPACE (CLASS A/C) ESTABLISHED AS FOLLOWS The details of the temporary establishment of airspace including controlling authority/heights/widths/levels and timings F) MINIMUM HEIGHT G) MAXIMUM HEIGHT
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Annex 15E: Specimen (Fixed-Wing)
Royal
Flight
Notification
Message
IMPORTANT ROYAL FLIGHT INFORMATION 1. A FLIGHT IN A _________ (Aircraft type), CALLSIGN _________
TASK NO _______ FROM _______ (Departure airfield), TO _______ (Destination airfield) ON _________ (Date). 2. ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS: ETD (doors) ETA
(Departure Airfield)
(Reporting/turning points) (Destination airfield)
ETA (doors) (FL)
(Intended cruising levels)
4. ALL FLIGHTS IN THE FOLLOWING TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT CONTROLLED AIRSPACE (NOTIFIED CLASS A/C) ARE SUBJECT TO ATC CLEARANCE FROM THE DESIGNATED CONTROLLING AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATED PERIODS AND LEVEL/WIDTH BANDS. (CIVIL UK AIP ENR 1 AND 1-1-4 AND MANUAL OF MILITARY ATM CHAP 15 REFER). AIRSPACE DETAILS AS FOLLOWS TEMPORARY CONTROLLED AIRSPACE (CLASS A/C) Including controlling authorities/heights/widths/levels and timings PERMANENT ATS ROUTES Including controlling authorities AUS CONTINUITY NUMBER
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Annex 15F: Specimen (Helicopter)

AUS CONTINUITY NUMBER
Royal
Flight
Notification
Message
1. A FLIGHT IN A _________ (Aircraft Type), CALLSIGN __________ TASK NO ________ FROM _________ (Departure airfield), TO __________ (Destination airfield) ON _________ (Date). 2. A ROYAL FLIGHT LOW LEVEL CORRIDOR (RLLC) WILL BE ESTABLISHED AS FOLLOWS: (Location) DEPARTURE: CP1 CP2 CP3 (etc) DESTINATION: (as req) OPERATING ALTITUDES ___________ FT AMSL 3. PILOTS FLYING NEAR THE ROUTE SHOULD KEEP A GOOD LOOKOUT AND MAINTAIN ADEQUATE SEPARATION FROM THE ROYAL HELICOPTER. 4. MILITARY AIRCRAFT ARE NOT TO BE FLOWN BELOW ________ FT AMSL WITHIN 5NM OF THE TRACK OF THE ROYAL AIRCRAFT UNLESS EXEMPTED UNDER CONDITIONS STIPULATED IN MANUAL OF MILITARY ATM CHAPTER 15. 5. INFORMATION ON THE PROGRESS OF THIS FLIGHT MAY BE OBTAINED FROM LONDON MIL OR SCOTTISH MIL ICF AND FROM THE FOLLOWING ATC UNITS: _________. AUS CONTINUITY NUMBER (Lat/Long) (ETA/ETD)
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Annex 15G: Specimen Royal Flight Signal (Helicopter)

FROM: DAP AUS LONDON
TO: AIG 1401 The HQs Groups of the airfields of departure and destination except HQ AIR. Commandants or Officers Commanding the airfields of departure and destination. 1. A FLIGHT WILL TAKE PLACE IN A ____________ (aircraft type) [of The Queens Helicopter Flight] (callsign) ____________ FROM ____________ (departure airfield) TO _________ (destination airfield) ON _________ (date). 2. A ROYAL LOW LEVEL CORRIDOR (RLLC) IS ESTABLISHED AS FOLLOWS: ETD (departure point) (lat/long) ETA (check point) (lat/long) ETA (destination) (lat/long)
OPERATING ALTITUDES
3. PILOTS FLYING NEAR THE ROUTE SHOULD KEEP A GOOD LOOK OUT AND MAINTAIN ADEQUATE SEPARATION FROM THE ROYAL HELICOPTER. 4. MILITARY AIRCRAFT ARE NOT TO BE FLOWN BELOW _________ FT AMSL WITHIN 5 NMS OF THE TRACK OF THE ROYAL AIRCRAFT FROM 15 MIN BEFORE ETA AT A CHECK-POINT TO 30 MIN AFTER DEPARTURE FROM NEXT CHECK-POINT, UNLESS EXEMPTED UNDER CONDITIONS STIPULATED IN MANUAL OF MILITARY ATM CHAPTER 15. 5. INFORMATION ON PROGRESS OF THIS FLIGHT MAY BE OBTAINED FROM LONDON MIL OR SCOTTISH MIL ICF AND FROM THE FOLLOWING ATS UNITS: _______________. Safeguard and delegated ATS units
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Annex 15H: Specimen Royal Flight Signal (Fixed Wing)

FROM: CFTA, RAF Northolt TO: AIG 1401 The HQs of Groups of the airfields of departure and destination except HQ AIR. Commandants or Officers Commanding the airfields of departure and destination. 1. A FLIGHT WILL TAKE PLACE IN A _________ (aircraft type)
(Callsign) _________ FROM _________ (departure airfield) TO _________ (destination airfield) ON _________ (date). 2. ITINERARY __________ ETD __________ (departure airfield) ETA ___________ (reporting/turning points) __________ ETA __________ (destination airfield) 3. ALL FLIGHTS IN THE FOLLOWING TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT CONTROLLED AIRSPACE (NOTIFIED CAS-T/CLASS A/C) ARE SUBJECT TO ATC CLEARANCE FROM THE DESIGNATED CONTROLLING AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATED PERIODS AND LEVEL BANDS. (CIVIL UK AIP ENR 1.1 AND MIL MANUAL OF MILITARY ATM CHAPTER 15 REFERS). AIRSPACE DETAILS AS FOLLOWS: TEMPORARY CONTROLLED AIRSPACE (CLASS A/C) Including controlling authorities/heights/widths/levels and timings PERMANENT ATS ROUTES (CLASS A/C) Including controlling authorities.
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Annex 15I: Flight
Specimen Routeing Signal - Selected Helicopter
LATCC (Mil) Briefing Room ___________________ /SHF (number) A. A SELECTED HELICOPTER FLIGHT WILL TAKE PLACE IN A ________ (aircraft type) [of The Queens Helicopter Flight] (callsign) _________ FROM _________ (departure airfield) TO _________ (destination airfield) ON _________ (date). B. C. D. E. F. G. H. AIRCRAFT _______________________________ CALLSIGN _______________________________ TASK NUMBER ___________________________ ROUTE AND TIMINGS _____________________ OPERATING ALTITUDES ____________ AMSL SAFEGUARD AREAS ______________________ DELEGATED AIRFIELDS ___________________
London Air Traffic Control Centre (Mil) Swanwick Centre Sopwith Way Southampton SO31 7AY
Telephone: 01489 612417 (MOM/Sup/ATCO I/C)
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Chapter 16: Classification of Aerodromes

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3016(1)(2)(3)(4). ATC Aerodrome Classification 1. ATC classifications are as follows: a. Military Emergency Diversion Aerodrome (MEDAs). MEDAs should be operated on a continuous basis and provide facilities for the handling of all types of aircraft. They should be equipped with the appropriate radio and radar approach aids, provide VHF/UHF emergency services and have a minimum runway length of 7000 ft. b. Extended Hours Aerodromes. Extended Hours Aerodromes, in addition to operating to a Command requirement, have extended operating hours to meet additional military pre-booked diversion commitments. They should be equipped with VHF/UHF communications and radio and/or radar approach aids to meet their operational role. c. Standard Aerodromes. Standard Aerodromes should be operated to a Command requirement. They should be equipped with VHF/UHF communications and radio and/or radar approach aids to meet their operational role. d. Miscellaneous Aerodromes. Miscellaneous Aerodromes are those at which the flying role requires a lesser scale of VHF/UHF communications and approach aids than is specified for standard aerodromes, eg relief landing grounds. 2. Aerodromes Abroad. While following the general classifications given in Paragraph 1 above, aerodromes abroad will be provided with emergency and other services according to Aviation Duty Holders and Commanders policy. Prior Permission Required (PPR) Classifications of Aerodromes 3. The authority to classify aerodromes as PPR to all visiting aircraft should be vested in Command and Theatre Headquarters only; it is not to be delegated. The restriction should be applied to visiting military aircraft only after consideration of all possible alternatives. Military Aerodromes Construction and Safeguarding Criteria 4. Military aerodrome design and safeguarding criteria are contained in the Manual of Aerodrome Design and Safeguarding. MEDAs 5. MEDAs are annotated in the BINA ERS. Facilities at MEDAs during normal operating hours are as published but will be reduced during the periods shown below: a. b. From 0200 (local) to 0730 (local) on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday. From 1730 (local) on Friday until 0730 (local) Monday.
Any changes to these times required by operational need will be specified in FLIPs.
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6.
The reduced facilities will consist of: a. ATC. A minimum handling capacity of 6 aircraft per hour, ie one aircraft every 10 mins. b. Fire and Crash Rescue. A minimum of CAT 4A services available.
c. Medical Cover. An airfield ambulance, driver and medical orderly at immediate readiness on station. An aviation medicine trained medical officer/civilian medical practitioner should be immediately contactable by phone or pager to provide urgent aviation medicine and specialist advice in support of the emergency medical services: he/she should be able to attend the airfield within 2 hours. d. Engineering Support. Aircraft marshalling and parking only. There will be no facilities for turn round or rectification of diverted aircraft. e. Basic Service and LARS. These services may not be immediately available.
7. Selection. The main operational consideration in the selection of a MEDA is that it should have a runway or runways suitable for any type of operation. A runway length of 7000ft is the minimum distance for the operations under consideration and a cable for hookequipped aircraft is highly desirable. 8. Facilities. A MEDA is provided with a range of navigation and approach aids to serve the requirements of all types of aircraft. In addition it is equipped with ground facilities, engineering systems and safety services to cater for a wide variety of landing techniques and ground handling procedures. 9. Temporary Transfer of MEDA Commitment. It may become necessary to transfer a MEDA commitment from one aerodrome to another. Such arrangements are usually the result of some temporary but major unserviceability at the permanent MEDA (eg runway resurfacing). The procedure for transfer, which is a Command responsibility, is as follows: a. Nomination of a suitable replacement MEDA that is equipped with facilities for the MEDA role. b. Attachment of necessary staff and facilities to augment the establishment of the replacement MEDA. c. Notification to HQ AIR, ATM Dep Force Commander, of the requirement to transfer a MEDA, giving dates and times. 10. NOTAM Action for Transfer of MEDA. Upon acceptance of the MEDA role the station concerned should be responsible for issuing the NOTAM announcing the transfer and acceptance of the role. The NOTAM should be issued sufficiently in advance of the transfer to enable civil and military operations to adjust to the change within the MEDA system. 11. Difficulty Arising From Transfer of MEDA. Where difficulty or doubt exists during the transfer of the MEDA role, the matter should be referred to HQ AIR ATM Dep Force Commander in the first instance. In the unlikely event of a major conflict of interests arising between the interested parties, HQ AIR ATM Dep Force Commander will refer the matter to MOD (DAS Ops AD) for resolution.
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12. Extended Hours Aerodromes are annotated in the BINA ERS. Facilities at Extended Hours Aerodromes during normal operating hours are as published. 13. Extended operating hours are as follows: a. b. From 0800 (local) to 2359 (local) Monday to Thursday. From 0800 (local) to 1800 (local) Friday.
14. Extended Hours Aerodromes should be available on a pre-booked diversion basis when other station/command commitments have ceased. The reduced facilities will consist of: a. ATC. A minimum handling capacity to meet the pre-booked diversion commitment. b. Fire and Crash Rescue. Should be maintained at the published station level throughout. c. Medical Cover. An airfield ambulance, driver and medical orderly should be at immediate readiness on station. An aviation medicine trained medical officer/civilian medical practitioner should be immediately contactable by phone or pager to provide urgent aviation medicine and specialist advice in support of the emergency medical services: he/she should be able to attend the airfield within 2 hours. d. Engineering Support. Aircraft marshalling and parking only. There will be no additional facilities, ie, forward-firing weapon slots, HAS parking, hangarage, turn round or rectification of diverted aircraft unless previously agreed. 15. Temporary Reduction in Extended Hours Capability. In exceptional circumstances, Extended Hours Aerodromes can apply for a temporary cessation of Extended Hours status. In such cases, the aerodrome concerned should apply, in writing, to HQ AIR, ATM Dep Force Commander, outlining the reasons for, and the required period of cessation of Extended Hours status, at least 2 months in advance. HQ AIR, ATM Dep Force Commander, having coordinated the request with the various group representatives, will inform the aerodrome concerned whether their request has been approved.
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Chapter 17: Aerodrome Vehicles

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction withRA 3017(1)(2). Marking of Vehicles in Movement Areas 1. With the exception of emergency vehicles and ambulances, all vehicles operating regularly within the movement area of an aerodrome should be painted yellow so as to be clearly seen from the air and from the ground. Vehicles that should be painted yellow are as follows: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. Dedicated ATC vehicles (including BCU) and associated servicing trailers. Aircraft refuelling vehicles. Aircraft towing vehicles Aircraft servicing vehicles. Weapon transporters, including bomb-loading vehicles. Glider retrieving trucks, carrying trailers and launching trailers. Snow-clearance vehicles. Runway sweepers.
Note: Any new colour scheme for MT vehicles will take effect from either the vehicle replacement or routine vehicle repaint, whichever is the sooner. 2. Tactical Operations Vehicles. Vehicles earmarked for tactical operations are exempt from the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs. However, where these vehicles are used on the manoeuvring area they should be clearly marked in yellow so as to be clearly visible from the ground and the air. 3. Emergency Vehicles. Fire/crash trucks will be painted signal red (UK only).
4. Overseas. At airfields outside the UK, the use of a bright colour other than yellow may be authorized in order to obtain the maximum contrast against local terrain. 5. Vehicular Obstructions. Vehicles which are obstructions within the runway, approach funnel or taxiway clearance areas (eg runway control caravans) should have their external vertical planes painted with a uniform red-and-white chequered pattern. The sides of the squares or near squares are not to be less than 1m (3ft); the corners being in red, and the whole top surface yellow. 6. Painting of Vehicles. Painting of vehicles is an operators responsibility. The specification of the paint to be used is:
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UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED Figure 17-1 Vehicle Paint Specifications
Golden Yellow:
NATO Part Nos
8010-99-2202091 8010-99-2202092
(brushing) (spraying)
Signal Red: White:
DTD 5580 BSC 537 DEF 1044A
Lighting of Vehicles in Movement Areas 7. Certain vehicles regularly employed within the aerodrome manoeuvring area should carry obstruction lighting as follows: a. Occulting Blue: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) b. Ambulances (all types). Trucks, fire crash. Trucks, fire convoy. Police cars. Police motor cycles. Trucks fire, domestic, fitted with approved 2-tone horns.
Occulting Green: Medical officers vehicle.
c.
Flashing Amber: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Aircraft maintenance/towing (see also Chapter 18 Sub-paragraph 9.b). Snow clearance. Bulk gritter. ATC vehicle (prime movers). Brake parachute recovery (various GS types). Trucks, runway sweeper.
(7) Vehicles used in maintenance of aerodrome navigation aids and arrestor gear. (8) (9) Refuelling vehicles. Vehicles used in the maintenance of aerodrome lighting.
(10) Self-propelled trolleys Weapon Loading.
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Chapter 18: Aerodrome Control

REGULATORY CROSS REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3018(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14). Responsibilities Aerodrome Controller 1. The duties of the aerodrome controller can only be undertaken by controllers who hold a Aerodrome Control (Visual) Rating and current Terminal Control Aerodrome Control, TC(ADC), Local Operating Endorsement on their Certificates of Competency. The aerodrome controller should be responsible to the DATCO/ATCO IC or Supervisor for the following: a. Control of VFR traffic flying in the circuit and all movements of aircraft on the manoeuvring area. b. c. d. Sequencing the mixed arrival and departure of visual and instrument traffic. Alerting and dispatch of the safety services (Chapter 36). Control of vehicles and pedestrians on the manoeuvring area.
e. Aerodrome and lighting inspections and the notification of any irregularities to the Supervisor for onward dissemination. f. For monitoring the wind speed and direction.
g. Overseeing the application of unit Low Visibility Procedures (LVP) when the weather conditions dictate. Considerations that should be addressed within unit LVP are contained at Annex 18B: . Responsibilities Ground Controller 2. The duties of the ground controller can only to be undertaken by controllers who hold a Aerodrome Control (Visual) Rating and current Terminal Control Ground, TC(Grd), Local Operating Endorsement on their Certificates of Competency. The ground controller should be responsible to the aerodrome controller for those duties delegated to him by the aerodrome controller as contained in local orders. Aerodrome Control Requirements 3. Aerodrome Control Function. Aerodrome control is established to deal with VFR traffic flying in the circuit and all movements on the manoeuvring area. Information and instructions will be given to pilots by the aerodrome controller to achieve a safe, orderly and expeditious flow of traffic and to assist pilots in preventing collision between: a. b. c. Aircraft, and aircraft and obstructions on the manoeuvring area. Aircraft landing and taking off. Aircraft flying within the circuit area.
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4. Safety Information. Local orders will dictate information required by aircrew and controllers. In addition, the following are essential requirements: a. Persons On Board (POB). To ensure that accurate information is available in the event of an incident, the aerodrome controller should ascertain the POB an aircraft before issuing a clearance for it to take-off or to commence a final approach. POB is required to be passed to ATC at the initial request for taxi clearance or on first contact with a destination aerodrome. b. If the aerodrome controller is aware of a potential hazard to an aircraft about to start its take off run, the controller should instruct or signal the aircraft to hold. If the aircraft has already started its take-off run, the controller should inform the aircraft of the hazard; it is then the captains responsibility to decide the best course of action as it may be more dangerous to abort than to proceed. Controllers will exercise caution when passing warnings or information to taxiing aircraft to avoid confusion or distraction to the crew on the take off run. 5. Essential Aerodrome Information. Essential information on aerodrome conditions should be given to every pilot concerned, in sufficient time for him to make use of the information. The following examples are given for guidance: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. Construction or maintenance work on the manoeuvring area. Failure or malfunction of the aerodrome lighting. Serviceability of the arrestor gear. Obstacles close to runways or taxiways. Presence of snow, ice, slush or water on the pavements and the braking action. In snow and ice conditions, information concerning the clearance operation. Surface wind/gusting/crosswind. Runway change in progress. Airfield sweeping in progress.
j. Where meteorological information has not previously been given by ATC, the following should be given in this order: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Surface wind direction (magnetic) and speed. Visibility. Present weather. Cloud base and amount. Altimeter pressure setting. Risk of turbulence from jet-engine noise attenuator.
6. Surface Wind Direction and Speed. The aerodrome controller should monitor the wind speed and direction and report variations to the Supervisor who should ensure that pilots are suitably informed. In checking weather reports (Met Form 2309), controllers
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should note any gusting of the surface wind. Aerodrome controllers are also responsible for ensuring that FOAs who prepare the ATC weather information displays from the Form 2309 also transfer any gust observations. Although the aerodrome controller should warn pilots of gusts or crosswind, it is the responsibility of the pilot or operating authority to decide whether an aircraft may take-off or land in the conditions. Controllers should pass crosswind information to pilots as wind direction in degrees magnetic and strength in knots and/or as an evaluated crosswind component. 7. Hi-Brite VCR Radar Display (VRD). Provided that appropriate training directives have been defined and met within the training syllabus for ADC at the unit concerned and aircraft have been identified, a controller can use the Hi-Brite VRD for the tasks detailed below: a. Determining the landing order, spacing and distance from touchdown of arriving aircraft. b. Providing information on the position of aircraft within the circuit (eg one in downwind). However, such information should normally be derived from lookout or normal circuit management techniques. c. Monitoring the position of notified transit traffic and, subject to prior agreement with appropriate radar controllers, applying or cancelling climb-out restrictions accordingly. d. Exceptionally, passing traffic information with reference to the relative position of one aircraft to another (eg clock code and distance) when the controller considers that doing so would aid the integration of traffic. Where necessary, aircraft should be identified using a recognised method of identification although aircraft performing an instrument approach can be identified from final approach liaison calls. There is no requirement to inform a pilot that he/she has been identified, or to place him/her under any form of service, prior to passing VRD-derived traffic information. Lamp and Pyrotechnic Signals used in the Control of Aircraft 8. All authorized ground personnel, aircrew and other personnel who are required to fly regularly as supernumerary crew members should keep themselves proficient in the assembly and operation of signalling devices, which can only be used for authorized purposes and in accordance with the normal definitions in Rules of the Air and ATM Regulations. The basic signals, also used by NATO forces, are shown in the table below. The use of lamp and pyrotechnic signals for specific purposes at units should be covered by verbal briefings and local orders.
Figure 18-1 Lamp and Pyrotechnic Signals CHARACTERISTIC AND COLOUR OF LIGHT BEAM OR PYROTECHNIC Steady Red Light Red Flashes Steady Green Light White Flashes (not pyrotechnic) FROM AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL To an aircraft in flight Give way to other aircraft and continue circling Total refusal of permission to land You may land Land at this aerodrome after receiving steady green light To an aircraft on the ground Stop Move clear of landing area You may take off Return to starting point
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Control of Vehicles and Pedestrians 9. The SATCO is required to draw up traffic rules for the aerodrome Movement Area (which includes the Manoeuvring Area and Apron Areas) and should make arrangements for all drivers to be briefed on these rules, a copy of which should be readily available in the control tower and also in the MT station. He should make arrangements for promulgating certain pertinent rules from time to time in station orders. Control should be exercised as follows: a. Manoeuvring Area. Commanders or drivers of vehicles within the manoeuvring area should comply with the driving conditions specified in individual station regulations and should obey any warranted additional instructions which may be issued by the air traffic controller, whether directly or through delegated authority. b. Apron Area. Commanders or drivers of vehicles within an apron area should comply with the driving conditions specified in individual station regulations and should obey any warranted additional instructions which may be issued by the officer responsible for the apron, whether directly or through delegated authority. All such arrangements, whether for the Manoeuvring Area or for an apron, will include adequate safeguards to minimize local operating difficulty on any part of the movement area which is accessible to vehicular or pedestrian traffic. Additional single-Service regulations should be observed where applicable. Joint Service regulations for the requirement to hold an Airfield Driving Permit (applicable for access to any part of the movement area) are published in JSP 800, Volume 5, Defence Movements and Transport Regulations. 10. Colour Blindness. All drivers employed within the Movement Area are required to have a colour perception standard of CP2 (normal) or CP3 (defective safe). A drivers colour perception should be entered on the Airfield Driving Permit; drivers who do not meet the required colour perception standard should not be employed on Manoeuvring Areas. At airfields where there is no established Air Traffic Control presence, and where there are no vehicular traffic lights, pyrotechnics, lamp signals or other red/green system employed to signal/control vehicles on the Aircraft Manoeuvring Area, a minimum CP standard is not required for the issue of an Airfield Driving Permit. 11. Issue of Permits. Permits are issued as follows: a. Drivers of Service and privately owned vehicles (including civilian contractors) who, in the course of their duties, require access to the Movement Area should be in possession of an Airfield Driving Permit in accordance with JSP 800, Volume 5, Defence Movements and Transport Regulations (Chapter 15, 15.046 15.048). Following confirmation of the requirement to hold an Airfield Driving Permit, all drivers should be briefed on the regulations for the driving of vehicles on the aerodrome and pass a written (tick test) exam on the content of this brief. This exam will be a minimum of 20 questions, evenly balanced between general and airfield specific regulations, and the pass mark should be 100%. Upon completion of the theoretical training, drivers will undertake both practical airfield driving familiarisation and communications training to the satisfaction of the SATCO or SATCOs nominated representative, before being issued with the Airfield Driving Permit, which should be signed by the SATCO or SATCOs nominated representative. At aerodromes where drivers will only require limited access onto specific areas of the Movement Area (HAS sites, Aprons, MT access routes, etc), the SATCO or SATCOs nominated representative can issue a limited Airfield Driving Permit, tailoring the required brief, exam and practical training as appropriate. b. Individual station orders should detail the following information:
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
The method of ground control. The method of marshalling in force. The layout of the Movement Area and vehicular routes. Where aircraft are normally to be encountered. Action to be taken in an emergency or in the event of a breakdown. Visual signals employed on the aerodrome. Method of identifying the runway in use. Radio R/T procedures and phraseology (CAP413).
(9) Any additional information specific to the issue of a limited Aerodrome Driving Permit. c. Arrangements should be made for all drivers in possession of an Airfield Driving Permit (full and limited) to be kept informed of any changes in the regulations. Additionally, the Airfield Driving Permit should be renewed at intervals not exceeding 12 months; following confirmation of continued requirement, a refresher briefing should be given. 12. Control of Vehicular Traffic by Day. In addition to the items detailed in Paragraphs 10 and 11, the following standard rules should be promulgated: a. All vehicles should give way to aircraft. There is only one exception to this rule, namely vehicles towing an aircraft are not bound to give way to taxiing aircraft. b. All drivers should report to ATC as specified in local orders before proceeding on to the Manoeuvring Area (RAF aerodromes only). c. On receiving permission, vehicles should not to proceed onto the Manoeuvring Area until the driver has made sure that no aircraft or vehicle is moving, or is likely to move, near the point of entry. d. Vehicles being driven on aerodromes should conform to the normal rules of the road for the country in which the aerodrome is situated. Vehicles should always give way to aircraft, by clearing the taxiway in such a manner as to afford maximum clearance to the aircraft, even at the risk of damage to the vehicles, which does not, however, absolve aircrews and ATC staff from taking necessary precautions for prevention of collisions. e. Vehicles should be kept at least 50 m behind taxiing aircraft.
f. While on the Movements Area, vehicles should not be driven in reverse gear unless they are being directed by a marshaller, vehicles should not overtake moving vehicles, and they will be halted as infrequently as possible. g. Vehicles should not be parked on or near the taxiway.
h. Vehicles should be driven at speeds not in excess of 30 mph or locally - lower speed limits may be enforced.
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i. Engines should not be run unnecessarily in the vicinity of the control tower or radio transmitter/receiver stations. j. In the event of breakdown, a driver should not leave his vehicle unattended and should indicate by suitable signals to approaching aircraft that his vehicle constitutes an obstruction. The driver should notify ATC (direct or through the Runway Controller) by pre-arranged signals or by contacting a passing vehicle. k. Vehicles should not be driven on any runway without specific permission from the Aerodrome Controller. l. Notwithstanding Sub-paragraph k above, vehicles and pedestrians should stop at the holding position or other designated point and should not proceed unless the traffic lights show green or a green lamp signal is received from the runway control caravan or the control tower. m. A driver of a vehicle is to define the planned route on the aerodrome, to the Aerodrome Controller, using agreed points. The Aerodrome Controller will restrict the progress of a vehicle as necessary, utilising Clearance Limits to minimise the chances of a vehicle operating outwith the bounds of their clearance. Unrestricted access on any part of the Manoeuvring Area is prohibited at all times. 13. Control of Vehicular Traffic by Night. Vehicles moving within an aerodrome manoeuvring area by night are subject to all rules laid down in Paragraph 12 plus the following additional regulations: a. Vehicles should be equipped with serviceable hazard warning lights or drivers should carry a serviceable red torch for use in the event of breakdown. Drivers should warn pilots of taxiing aircraft by shining a steady red torch beam at the cockpit if it is evident that the broken down vehicle constitutes an immediate hazard to the aircraft. b. The headlights of the vehicle should be fully serviceable and properly set in focus. When the vehicle is in motion the headlights should be on and dipped. Sidelights can be used when a vehicle is stationary, or when halted to allow an aircraft to pass, or when standing at a runway holding position. Sidelights should also be used when directed by an aircraft marshaller. c. Vehicles towing aircraft during the hours of darkness should display the correct illuminated triangle sign on the front of the vehicle; and a spotlight at the rear of the towing vehicle should be used to illuminate the aircraft wing on the offside of the vehicle. d. Vehicles should not be driven at speeds in excess of 20 mph or such other speed limits laid down locally. 14. Briefing of Drivers. As part of the aerodrome familiarisation and communications training, or when specific ATC briefings are required, the SATCO or SATCOs nominated representative should brief all drivers on the following details: a. b. The layout of the aerodrome lighting. The configuration of the airfield, including runways, taxiways, dispersals, etc.
c. The runway configuration and where appropriate, the runway in use, as well as direction of taxiing aircraft and dispersals/aprons being used.
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d. e. f.
Lamp signals in use. Red torch signals. Use of vehicle headlights.
g. The occasions when it is necessary for a driver of a vehicle to report direct to ATC before proceeding on to the manoeuvring area. h. Radio R/T procedures and phraseology.
15. Torches. A supply of red torches should be held on the ATC inventory for use by drivers of vehicles used occasionally on the aerodrome and those not belonging to MT. ATC is responsible for arranging the loan of red torches as required. 16. Exception to Speed Limits. Drivers of fire tenders, crash/rescue trucks and ambulances proceeding to the scene of an incident can exceed Movement Area speed limits. Wherever possible, the Aerodrome Controller will specify the route to be followed. 17. Control of Vehicles Crossing Runways. Vehicle movements across runways should be controlled by traffic lights or other means, including the employment of personnel properly briefed and supervised by the DATCO(RN)/ATCO IC (RAF). Vehicles on public roads adjacent to runway ends may be controlled in a similar manner when authorized by the Department of the Environment. When vehicles are halted on a public road, vehicles on the taxiway should also be stopped. Controllers should beware of slow-moving vehicles or pedestrians that might obstruct the take-off or landing path of an aircraft. 18. Signals to be Used in the Control of Vehicles and Pedestrians (STANAG 3758). Signals that should be used in the control of vehicles and pedestrians are as follows:
Figure 18-2 Signals Used for Control of Vehicles and Pedestrians TYPE OF SIGNAL Green Flashing Light Steady Red Light Red Flashing Light White Flashing Light MEANING OF SIGNAL Cleared to Proceed Stop Clear the runway or taxiway immediately Return to starting point or do as briefed In cases of emergency a red pyrotechnic may be fired horizontally REMARKS
19. Vehicles and Pedestrians Display of Notice Boards. Notice boards for vehicles and pedestrians should be displayed as follows: a. Drivers should be warned by standard notice boards erected in prominent positions at all points where roads join the Manoeuvring Area. These notices should read: STOP. MANOEUVRING AREA. VEHICLES ARE NOT TO BE DRIVEN PAST THIS POINT WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL. b. In addition to the manoeuvring area boards, drivers will be given a general warning by other notice boards prominently displayed at all entrances to the station. These notices will read:
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VEHICLES MUST GIVE WAY TO AIRCRAFT. ALL VISITING DRIVERS ARE TO REPORT TO AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL BEFORE PROCEEDING ON TO THE MANOEUVRING AREA. c. At stations where it is not possible to proceed to ATC without entering the Manoeuvring Area, this notice should be suitably amended to show how permission can be obtained. Examples of alternative wordings are: (1) Drivers are to report to the Guardroom and obtain permission from Air Traffic Control before proceeding (2) Drivers are to report to Air Traffic Control by telephone (ext ) before proceeding d. SATCO is responsible for ensuring that these boards are properly sited and in good condition with bold and brightly painted lettering and for taking immediate action to have them repaired or restored should they deteriorate. e. Responsibility for the positioning, wording and condition of signs for the apron area rests with the Aviation Duty Holder. Where, from outside the movement area, the authorized access to the manoeuvring area is through an apron area, SATCO should ensure that the notice board at the entry point to the apron area gives due warning of the conditions for entry to the manoeuvring area. 20. Breaches of Regulation / Runway Incursions. Due to the potential serious consequences of breaching Movement Area driving regulations, offenders should report to ATC to be debriefed and to have their ADP suspended until the next available brief. Additionally, the SATCO or SATCOs nominated representative should report the occurrence to the offenders line management. Persistent offenders should have their ADP permanently revoked. Control of Working Parties 21. Work in Progress Records. A plan of the aerodrome should be kept prominently displayed in the ATC tower for the purpose of marking all obstacles, nature of obstruction marking, work in progress, and so on. It is the responsibility of the DATCO (RN)/ATCO IC (RAF) to ensure that the information displayed on the plan is always fully up to date. 22. Work in Progress Book. In addition to an aerodrome plan, a Work in Progress book should be maintained in the control tower, in which the DATCO(RN)/ATCO IC (RAF) should enter details of all work in progress. Each entry should be signed by the DATCO(RN)/ATCO IC (RAF) and also by the foreman of the working party to certify that the extent of the work area and the necessary ATC briefing have been fully understood before the work has started. 23. Work in Progress Briefings. The DATCO(RN)/ATCO IC (RAF) is responsible for ensuring that the foreman of the working party is properly briefed. The briefing should include the following details: a. b. c. d. Limits of the work area. Direction of aircraft movements. Route to be taken by works vehicles. Parking area for works vehicles and equipment.
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e. f. g.
Control to be exercised over works vehicles and workmen. Signals to be employed. FOD prevention.
24. Control When Work in Progress is Within the Landing Area. When work is to be carried out within the prescribed approach area or the landing area of the runway in use, and it is not possible to stop flying, special control rules should be enforced to safeguard the working party. When a party is to work within the limits of the runway in use it may be necessary to detail personnel to act as look-outs. The SATCO is responsible for producing orders and instructions for the working party look-out and for providing him with any equipment that may be needed. Responsibility for Aerodrome Surfaces and Surface Inspections 25. Responsibility. The Commanding Officer is responsible for the upkeep of the grassed surfaces throughout the station after their construction has been completed and they have been handed over to his charge. 26. Surface Inspections. Surface inspections should be carried out by ATCOs as detailed by the ATCO IC. Instructions regarding such inspections should be included in station orders. One regular inspection should be made daily. At stations where a 24-hour watch is maintained, this should be made as soon after first light as practicable. On stations where a limited watch is maintained the inspection should be completed before the aerodrome is opened. Additional inspections can be made whenever the ATCO IC considers it necessary. At aerodromes where rotary hydraulic arrester gear (RHAG) is installed SATCOs should ensure that runway inspections are routinely carried out in order to identify discontinuities or imperfections of the runway surface that could cause an arrester hook to skip into the air and result in a missed cable engagement; such imperfections should be removed from the approach and overrun areas. Personnel who undertake daily inspections of the airfield are to be reminded of the hazard that imperfections on a runway surface can present to RHAG operations. A report of the inspection should be entered into an aerodrome inspection log, which should be kept in ATC. 27. Dangerous or Unusual Conditions. If dangerous or unusual conditions exist the information should be passed to the flight planning section and to squadrons as appropriate. NOTAM signal reports should be made to all appropriate military and civil authorities if the aerodrome or any substantial part of it becomes unserviceable, or if any temporary obstruction, not clearly discernible from the air, cannot be effectively indicated by the standard methods. The report should state: a. b. c. Nature and position of the unserviceable area or obstruction. Nature of markings by day and night. Approximate period for which the area will remain unserviceable.
28. The DATCO (RN)/ATCO IC (RAF) should inform the appropriate ATCC (D&D) by telephone of any serious defect or obstruction which requires immediate promulgation. 29. All squadrons and dispersals should be provided with a large-scale plan of the aerodrome and the SATCO is responsible for issuing warnings of all changes of serviceability of the aerodrome and its associated aids. 30. Runway Friction Meter. At those aerodromes provided with runway friction meters, the SATCO is required to ensure that runway friction meter operations are carried out in
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accordance with the instructions outlined in Annex 18A: . The equipment should only be operated by personnel who have been trained by a nominated officer. Snow Clearance 31. The responsibilities of ATC in respect of snow clearance at aerodromes are in AP 3380. 32. The SATCO should maintain a close liaison with the officer in charge of snow clearance. An up-to-date record of the state of snow-clearance operations and the disposition of any snow hazards should be kept in ATC. 33. The SATCO is responsible for ensuring that adequate precautions are taken to prevent damage to aerodrome light fittings during snow-clearance operations. All light fittings on the movement area should be marked and the aerodrome lighting switched on, as soon as snow starts to fall. MOD Aerodrome Bird Control 34. For details concerning RAF aerodrome bird control policy see ATM Force Orders check for Bird Control. RN bird control policy is contained at BR 767 Order 500.10. RAF at Annex 18C: . ATC Pyrotechnics and Firearms 35. Responsibilities - SATCO. The SATCO should ensure that members of the ATC staff (and associated contract BCU staff, if established) do not use any pyrotechnic device or firearm provided for ATC purposes unless they have first received proper instruction in its use and have carried out firing and handling practice in a satisfactory manner. The SATCO should ensure that all pyrotechnics, firearms and ammunition are stored in the approved fashion. 36. Responsibilities ATCO IC/DATCO. The DATCO (RN)/ATCO IC (RAF) should ensure that ATC staff use pyrotechnics and firearms provided for ATC purposes only for the purposes which they have been designed, handle them in accordance with the appropriate instructions and safety precautions and take the proper action in the event of misfires or unserviceability. 37. Responsibilities Station Armament Officer. The Station Armament Officer is responsible for the periodic inspection of all firearms, pyrotechnics and ammunition held by ATC, the replacement of expended pyrotechnics and ammunition to maintain the correct scale, and the daily inspection of all associated pistols, shotguns and projectiles. 38. Safety Precautions for Pyrotechnics and ATC Use Firearms. The following precautions should be observed when handling pyrotechnics, firearms and ammunition: a. Firearms and pyrotechnics should only be used by personnel who have been trained in their use. b. Firearms should be empty at all times when being transported within vehicles. Firearms should not be fired from within a vehicle, other than the Truck Runway Control (TRC). c. Firearms should only be fired from inside the airfield boundary, and then only when there is a clear line of fire.
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d. Pyrotechnics, firearms and ammunition should not be left unattended at any time. e. Subject to any over-riding reasons established by SATCOs for flight safety, ear protection should be worn by all persons in the immediate vicinity of the discharge of bird-scaring pyrotechnics and ATC use firearms. A face screen/mask should also be worn by the firer when shell crackers are being fired from pistols. f. During periods when thunderstorm level High, as defined within the UK Mil AIP Gen 3-5-6, is in force, extra care should be taken when handling pyrotechnics within the TRC. In particular, cartridges should only be loaded when it is anticipated that their use will be imminently required. g. Whatever ammunition is being used, pyrotechnic pistols should be discharged with the firing arm fully extended and with the face averted. Use of MOD Airfields by Civil Aircraft 39. Regulations for the use of MOD airfields by civil aircraft are in JSP 360 and QRs.
Brake Parachute Recovery 40. Brake parachute recovery should not be undertaken in vehicles where there is a danger of acid contamination or other damage being caused to the parachute. For example, the ATC vehicle cannot be used if that vehicle is used for the transportation of batteryoperated lights. Responsibilities and Equipment Runway Controller 41. The Runway Controller, where established, is required to be a suitably trained and qualified TG9 airman or equivalent detailed to perform runway control duties. The Runway Controller comes under the overall supervision of the SATCO and, when on duty, under the direct and sole control of the Aerodrome Controller. In particular, the Runway Controller should ensure that safety is given the highest priority and be proactive in highlighting safety concerns, observations or suggestions either through the normal command chain or using the ATC Safety Management System. 42. The Runway Controller is responsible for the Truck Runway Control (TRC) which should be positioned as follows: a. On Runway Aerodromes. To the left or right of the runway, 45 m (150 ft) from the runway edge and 70 m (225 ft) from the threshold. Units which cannot meet these measurement criteria should seek guidance and, if necessary, dispensation from HQ ATM Force for an alternative location. b. On Non-runway Aerodromes. At the down-wind side of the airfield, and so positioned that 2 or more aircraft may land simultaneously to the right of the truck with sufficient space available to the left of the truck to enable aircraft to take off (left/right as seen by a pilot in the approach). 43. The TRC should be provided with the following equipment: a. b. Mains electric power lead. Lighting. (1)
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Normal internal electric lighting.

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Red and green signal lamps (with spare bulbs). Red obstruction light at the highest point of the TRC. Flashing amber light on roof.
Telecommunications. (1) (2) CCICs for RT monitoring and telephone link with tower. Teletalk equipment to the control tower.
d. e.
Heating. A suitably protected electric heater. Miscellaneous Equipment. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) TRC wind-sock. Binoculars. Clock (synchronized with clock in control tower). Plan of aerodrome, with crash reference grid. Log-books. Two pyrotechnic pistols and cartridges as required. Steel pyrotechnic box. Fire extinguisher. Torch.
44.
The duties of the Runway Controller are as follows: a. Refusals of Permission to Land. The Runway Controller should refuse aircraft permission to land in the following circumstances: (1) (2) (3) (4) Aircraft landing gear not appearing fully down. If there is a danger of collision. If the path of the oncoming aircraft is obstructed. On instruction from the Aerodrome Controller.
b. Refusal of Permission to Move from the Holding Position. The Runway Controller should refuse permission for aircraft to move from the holding position in the following circumstances: (1) (2) (3) If to do so would obstruct an aircraft approaching to land. If to do so would obstruct an aircraft about to take off. On instructions from the Aerodrome Controller.
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c. Refusal of Permission to Take Off. The Runway Controller should refuse aircraft permission to take off in the following circumstances: (1) If to do so might obstruct an aircraft approaching to land or to take off. This applies particularly if more than one runway is in use. (2) (3) d. When a defect in an aircraft is noticed. On instructions from the Aerodrome Controller.
Vehicular Traffic. The Runway Controller should: (1) Liaise when required with any other vehicular traffic controller within his field of vision. (2) Liaise when required with any working party lookout within his field of vision, where work is in progress within the limits of the runway in use or its approach.
e. Reporting. The Runway Controller should report to the Aerodrome Controller, with the least possible delay, incidents of the following nature: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Non-standard or unusual signals from aircraft. Unusual appearance or movement of aircraft. Breaches of flying discipline by pilots or aircraft. Significant changes in wind direction. Breaches of discipline by vehicles. The presence of flocks of birds in the approaches to or on the runway.
f. Lamp and Pyrotechnic Signals. The Runway Controller should use and interpret all lamp and pyrotechnic signals by day and night. g. Log Keeping. As far as is consistent with the efficient execution of his duties, the Runway Controller should maintain a log, in which he will record take-off and landing times, unusual incidents, and action taken. h. Checking of Equipment. The Runway Controller will check all his equipment, and report any defects or unserviceability to the Aerodrome Controller without delay. i. Night Flying Additional Responsibilities. During night flying, the Runway Controller should: (1) Report failure of aircraft navigation lights or identification lights to the Aerodrome Controller. (2) Report failure of any lighting, within his field of vision, to the Aerodrome Controller. 45. At aerodromes where runway controllers are established, the duty Runway Controller should be in the TRC whenever known aircraft movements are taking place, except when:
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a. The TRC is withdrawn from its standard position at the discretion of the Aerodrome Controller when instrument approaches are taking place in visibility of less than 800 m. b. The time interval between known aircraft movements permits; then, at the discretion of the Aerodrome Controller, the TRC need not be manned provided that a runway controller is immediately available at ATC and able to return to the TRC when required. c. At MEDAs, ATC is manned solely to meet MEDA commitments.
Removal of TRC ATC Unmanned 46. When the aerodrome ATC is not manned, the TRC, where established, should be removed from the runway.
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Annex 18A: Runway Friction Meter Operations

Runway Friction Measurements and Reporting 1. Pavement friction characteristics, measurements and reporting requirements are detailed in the Manual of Aerodrome Design and Safeguarding (MADS) Chapter 15. 2. Deleted at Issue 4
Routine Measuring 3. Routine tests should be made before flying operations commence if any doubt exists as to the braking conditions of the runway. One run should be made over the usable length of the runway on a line between 2 m and 10 m each side of the centreline. If it is considered necessary, e.g. where poor areas are known to exist, or to cover aircraft formation operations, additional runs should be made at varying distances from the centreline. Mean values should be taken for each third of the runway length available, but the braking condition for the total runway length should be passed to the pilot unless significant surface differences occur, ie where the Braking Code has changed between thirds. Additional routine tests should be made when the surface state of the runway may be changing due to weather. 4. A plan of the runway(s) should be maintained by ATC showing where pooling occurs and where areas of low friction caused by rubber deposits, runway markings, etc. exist, especially if a recurring equivalent coefficient reading of 0.35 or below is recorded. In which case DIO should be advised. In addition, known adverse braking conditions should be promulgated, e.g. runway braking action poor during heavy rain due to flooding. Contaminated Runway 5. Where runways are contaminated with wet snow, slush or water (greater than 3 mm depth) Continuous Friction Measuring Equipment (CFME), such as Gripster and Mu-meter are considered unreliable and may indicate a higher than actual friction measurement. In these contaminated conditions controllers should not pass runway co-efficient of friction measurements to pilots. Runway conditions should be reported detailing the contamination for each third of the runway as detailed in MADS Chapter 15 Paragraph 18 Reporting Methods. Runway Evaluation Monitoring 6. SATCOs should ensure that Runway Friction Monitoring Surveys and reporting of conditions, including Wet Runway Braking Action are conducted as detailed in MADS Chapter 15. 7. A log should be kept by ATC of all Evaluation Monitoring runs. A copy of the rainfall trace for the day should be attached to the record. If the rainfall trace is not available a full rain report for the day should be requested and attached to the record.
Figure 18-3 Deleted at Issue 4
Runway Friction Meter Use After an Aircraft Incident/Accident on the Runway 8. Whenever there is an aircraft incident/accident on the runway, where a possibility exists that the surface conditions may have been a contributing factor, a full evaluation of those sections of the runway considered to be associated with the incident/accident should be carried out, and records of readings and traces should be retained. The MAAIB or the
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President of a Service Inquiry which is convened to investigate the incident/accident may require a more detailed investigation of the runway surface in accordance with the Post Crash Management procedures contained in the Manual of Post Crash Management. Should such runs be required when the unit runway friction meter is unserviceable, another meter should be made available from Command resources. Equivalent Braking Action 9. Information on equivalent braking action including ATC transmissions is in the FIH. However, it should be noted that the table describing friction values is only valid for compacted snow and/or ice covered runways. The description Good is used in the comparative sense, ie good for an icy surface, as clearly a surface affected by ice or snow is not as good as a dry or wet runway. Conversion of Mu Reading to Runway Condition Report (RCR) Readings 10. To convert Mu readings to RCR readings, units should multiply the Mu figure by 32.1522 and then round down to the nearest whole number, for example: Mu Reading = 0.77 RCR = 0.77 x 32.1522 = 24.757 = 24
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Annex 18B: Aerodrome Low Visibility Procedures

Introduction 1. Aircraft operations at aerodromes during reduced visibility or low cloud conditions present additional hazards to the aircraft and to other aerodrome users. An aircraft on the ground is most vulnerable during the landing and take-off phases of flight, when the pilot is severely restricted in the avoiding action that can be taken. As visibility reduces, the ability of ATC staff, aircrew, vehicle drivers and personnel to identify hazards and take remedial action in a timely manner becomes further limited. Furthermore, in conditions of low cloud, the time available for the pilot of an approaching aircraft to visually assess the aerodrome environment is reduced. 2. Units that operate in weather conditions where ATC are not always able to maintain full visual control of the manoeuvring area should produce Low Visibility Procedures (LVP). It is not possible to lay down specific procedures that will be applied due to varying local conditions, layout, operational requirement, and equipment. Consequently, units should determine the movement rate that they wish to sustain, and develop LVP that will adequately support this rate, through risk assessment and consideration of the low visibility control measures below. Hazards 3. The following hazards should be addressed to ensure that the risks of low visibility operations are managed appropriately: a. Human error leads to an aircraft using the runway whilst it is occupied by another aircraft, vehicle/pedestrian, unsighted due to low visibility. b. Aircraft uses the runway whilst animal or FOD is undetected on the surface due to low visibility. c. Aircraft operating on taxiways/dispersals are unable to apply adequate separation from other aircraft and/or vehicles due to low visibility. d. Inadvertent approach barrier selection whilst an aircraft is on final approach, undetected due to low visibility. e. Delayed fire/rescue vehicle response to an aircraft incident or accident due to low visibility. Low Visibility Control Measures 4. Routine procedures and measures to reduce runway incursions will also benefit procedures in low visibility. However, in low visibility operations further measures are highly likely to be necessary, with their applicability and timing of instigation dependant on local peculiarities and need. 5. Visibility Conditions. The point at which LVP are initiated will vary from aerodrome to aerodrome and should be clearly defined in relation to RVR/visibility conditions; however, the guidelines below can be adapted to suit the unit need. a. Visibility Condition 1. This is defined as visibility sufficient for the pilot to taxi and to avoid collision with other traffic on taxiways by visual reference and for ATC personnel to exercise control over all traffic on the basis of visual surveillance. No additional requirements for the protection of ground operations by aircraft are required.
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b. Visibility Condition 2. This is defined as sufficient visibility for Pilot to taxi and avoid collision by visual reference, but insufficient visibility for ATC to control traffic by visual surveillance. The actions taken will be dependent on the dimensions of the airfield and position of the VCR. However, measures will need to be put in place to limit the potential for undetected aerodrome incursions. c. Visibility Condition 3. More restrictive and stringent control measures are initiated in response to the individual unit requirement. Further Visibility Conditions may be deemed necessary for units employing a wide variety of control measures. 6. Vehicular and Aircraft Controls. The following controls should be considered: a. Reducing vehicular access and use of the manoeuvring area. This could be introduced in stages as weather conditions deteriorate, and should include the suspension of non essential working parties on the airfield at an appropriate point. b. Temporarily closing defined parts or all of the movement area to vehicular traffic.
c. For those vehicles that have high priority requirements, positive RT clearances before entry onto the airfield surfaces, and subsequent separation of vehicles and aircraft movements through positive control, either by informing vehicles/aircraft of each others presence, or in lower visibility conditions, only allowing one aircraft or vehicle on segmented sections of the manoeuvring area at a time. d. The enforcement of vehicles to use dipped headlights when low visibility procedures are declared and the application of appropriate reduced speed limits. e. Applying a simplified taxi pattern where possible, restricting the use of crossing or converging active taxiways, back-tracking of runways etc. f. Reducing the number of aircraft on the manoeuvring area at the same time, which could vary from only one aircraft at a time when separation measures are difficult to apply, increasing to a defined flow restriction. This could be achieved by holding aircraft in dispersal and/or by applying enhanced lateral separation between multiple inbound aircraft. Alternatively, the manoeuvring area could be segmented with only one aircraft/vehicle allowed into each segment at a time, using clearance limits. g. The use of a follow me vehicle to guide aircraft to or from the runway to reduce the potential for aircrew to take incorrect routings. This could be applied to all aircraft movements or limited only to unfamiliar visiting aircraft. This measure is particularly relevant at airfields with complicated taxi patterns and increased potential for error. h. Increased vehicular inspections of the runway to reduce the potential for unknown obstructions or FOD to be on the surface. i. Bird control operations should not be restricted during LVPs, but procedures should ensure that adequate time between movements is afforded to permit bird control measures to be implemented. j. Vehicles positioned at the runway thresholds and key crossing points to help prevent runway incursions, and to promptly report those that do occur to ATC. 7. Surface Movement Radar (SMR). SMR shall be provided at airfields with instrument approach aids that enable operations in RVR conditions below 550 m, unless procedures have been agreed with the appropriate military authority that: limit the number of aircraft either on the manoeuvring area or on final approach within 5 nm to one at any given time; and robust physical and procedural measures are in place to control the access of vehicles
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onto the movement area. At other airfields that are limited by instrument approaches with minimum RVR conditions of 550 m, SMR may still be required and should be considered where traffic density and operating conditions are such that acceptable levels of safety cannot be provided by alternative procedures and physical measures. 8. Stop Bar Lighting Systems. The requirement for stop bar lighting systems is detailed in JSP554 and follows the same conditions as for the fitment of SMR detailed above. Nevertheless, airfields with instrument approaches limited to no lower than 550 m RVR may consider the benefits of installing such systems to enhance the effectiveness of their low visibility procedures. 9. Approach Barrier. In low visibility conditions, the ability of aircrew or ATC to recognise that the approach barrier has been inadvertently raised is significantly diminished. Consequently, and despite the presence of alarm systems, when low visibility conditions are declared the approach barrier should be isolated. 10. Crash and Disaster Response. The main difficulty concerning emergency response in low visibility conditions is the delay in reaching known locations or finding aircraft or personnel in distress. In low visibility, emergency response vehicles will also have a reduced ability to take evasive action against taxiing aircraft. Consequently, ATC should be prepared to take an enhanced role in instructing rescue vehicles on the position of conflicting aircraft, and holding taxiing aircraft clear of the emergency response vehicle route. Aircraft post crash management procedures are defined within the Manual of Post Crash Management.
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Annex 18C: MOD Birdstrike Risk Management

Introduction 1. The Ministry of Defence, by policy, conforms to ICAO standards and practices provided that they do not conflict with military requirements. ICAO Annex 14 states that when a birdstrike hazard is identified at an aerodrome, the appropriate authority will take action to decrease the number of birds constituting a potential hazard to aircraft operations by adopting measures for discouraging their presence on, or in the vicinity of, an aerodrome1. The appropriate authority at Government aerodromes within the UK is the MOD. 2. In the UK the Air Navigation Order requires that the aerodrome license holder take all reasonable steps to secure that the aerodrome and the airspace within which its visual pattern is normally contained are safe at all times for use by aircraft. For the purposes of the ANO, the aerodrome license holder at Government aerodromes is the MOD. The MOD is therefore responsible for the development and implementation of birdstrike risk control measures at its aerodromes2. Principles and Objectives 3. As with other forms of aviation risk, the management of the risk of a birdstrike involves specialist knowledge and specific measures. These measures are aimed at deterring birds from flying on and in the lower flight paths in the vicinity of the aerodrome and primarily include the use of risk assessment, aerodrome habitat management, bird control procedures and safeguarding. However, the birdstrike risk is not uniform across all types of aerodromes and flight operations, and therefore it is essential that the most appropriate measures are identified and adopted to suit the local situation. Effective techniques in risk assessment, bird control, habitat management and safeguarding exist that can reduce the presence of birds on aerodromes and the risk of a birdstrike. 4. The basis of all birdstrike risk management policy and action is the planning and the effective use of human resources, procedures and diligence which reflects the principles of safety management that the MOD is required to apply to aspects of aircraft operations within its responsibility. 5. The objective of birdstrike risk management is to implement those measures necessary to reduce the birdstrike risk to a level which accords to the ALARP principles within MOD Risk Management. Policy 6. At all flying stations a Bird Control Officer should be appointed to oversee the Station's bird control activities. Certain stations are established with Service bird control units (BCU), equipped to patrol the airfield in order to reduce the presence of birds, on the airfield and on land immediately adjacent to the airfield, which pose a risk to aircraft. The BCU should, by means of observation and survey, assess the local bird population, its habits and the effect of aircraft flying at or near that station and take appropriate action to remove as far as possible the risk to aircraft. Some aerodromes also employ contractors to provide bird control at many UK stations. In addition to carrying out BCU tasks these companies are able to give Unit/Station Commanders expert advice on bird problems and to identify other suitable
In the vicinity of is internationally taken to be land or water within 13 km of the aerodrome reference point. An Aerodrome is defined as an area prepared for accommodation (including any buildings, installations and equipments) landing and take-off of aircraft.
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measures to control birds. Guidance on all environmental and airfield grassland management advice, may be found in the Manual of Aerodrome Design and Safeguarding. 7. All flying stations are required to develop a Bird Control Management Plan (BCMP) to assess the potential birdstrike risk, and to define and implement the appropriate bird control measures to reduce or mitigate the risk. The BCMP should aim to reduce bird infestation on the aerodrome as much as possible, monitor and assess birdstrike events and strive to improve the effect of bird control measures. 8. Air Weapons Ranges (AWRs) are predominantly large expanses of ground/water similar to aerodromes but much larger. Being a food rich area, relatively undisturbed by human surface activity, areas on and around AWRs are attractive to birds. Aircraft operating along prescriptive Lines of Attack at high speed and low altitude within this background are vulnerable to birdstrike. Whilst the guidance provided within this document is primarily aimed at aerodrome activity it is valid for all flying facilities, including AWRs. However, the mitigation methods identified as reasonable will be reduced due to nature of task and/or topography. It is expected therefore that mitigation will predominantly focus on habitat management and effecting levels of control over background bird activity/numbers through Safeguarding. Bird Control Management Plan 9. The BCMP should record the results of birdstrike risk assessments that are conducted and specify the birdstrike risk mitigation measures that are in place. The measures should relate to the threat posed by each identified risk and, due to the relative unpredictability of bird activities, should be responsive to changes as the risk rises or falls. Those measures should include the bird control techniques detailed in this and other authoritative documents. 10. The emphasis should be to minimise the presence of flocks of birds on, or in the vicinity of, the aerodrome as much as possible. However, this may be difficult outside the aerodrome boundary. Nevertheless, an awareness of bird attractant activities taking place, such as farmers ploughing fields, and constructive dialogue with the landowner should permit timely and effective action to be carried out. 11. of: A BCMP should aim to assess the potential birdstrike risk, at minimum, include details a. b. The roles and responsibilities of the station executive and bird control personnel. The policies and procedures for: (1) (2) (3) (4) Risk identification and assessment. On-aerodrome bird control. The recording of bird control activities and bird control issues. Personnel training and appraisal.
(5) Bird control performance monitoring, measurement and improvement systems. (6) The logging of bird species, data analysis and the recording and analysis of birdstrike reports. (7) Obtaining permissions for control measures, as necessary, including rookery culls, hangar clearance and rabbit removal etc.
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(8) The periodic assessment and review of the birdstrike risk recording and information system, bird control procedures and associated activities. c. Recording the detail and results of the birdstrike risk assessments that are conducted and the birdstrike risk mitigation measures that are in place. d. The means to ensure that flocks of birds, whether resident or visiting, do not habituate3 on the aerodrome, achieved through the deployment of effective habitat management and bird dispersal and control measures to reduce bird activity on the aerodrome. e. The measures employed by Defence Estates (Safeguarding) on behalf of the station to control or influence areas in the vicinity of the aerodrome to minimise the attraction to birds, including: (1) Confirming the correct level of safeguarding appropriate to the station flying task for consultation with Local Planning Authorities on proposed developments that have the potential to be bird attractant in the vicinity of the aerodrome. (2) The means to influence land use and development surrounding the aerodrome so that the birdstrike risk does not increase and, wherever possible, is reduced. (3) The means to help encourage landowners to adopt bird control measures and support landowners' efforts to reduce birdstrike risks. (4) The procedures to conduct, and record the results of, site monitoring visits.
12. The BCMP should be referred to or included in the relevant Flying/ATC Orders and made available for audit. Roles and Responsibilities 13. Clearly defined roles and responsibilities of all personnel are important elements of the effectiveness of the BCMP. All personnel should have a thorough understanding of their roles within the plan and be able to collaborate actively with other organizations on and off the aerodrome, such as air traffic control and local landowners. The roles and responsibilities of personnel associated with bird control duties undertaken on a typical aerodrome are described in this Annex but responsibilities may be adjusted to suit an aerodrome's specific bird control circumstances. 14. Many of the species which are common on aerodromes are successful and numerous because they are adaptable generalists and quick to exploit opportunities and changes in the environment, especially those unwittingly provided by man. Therefore, bird problems can never be considered to be 'solved' or overcome. Environmental and weather changes, the adaptive behaviour of the birds, and many unpredictable factors may cause major problems to arise very quickly. There must, therefore, be a sustained awareness of the potential dangers and an efficient system to detect and respond to changes, not only by those immediately involved in bird control, but also by management and air traffic control. This highlights again the crucial importance of organization and management. Unit Commander
Cease to react to meaningless stimuli. Habituation is one of the simplest forms of learning shown by all animals.
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15. Although the Unit Commander has overall accountability for bird control at each aerodrome, responsibility for bird control and the implementation of the BCMP may be delegated, usually to the SATCO, Aerodrome Manager or another senior person in the air operations function. The core responsibilities of such a person, with respect to the BCMP, should be to: a. b. Assess the birdstrike risk level. Determine policy, produce and implement the BCMP.
c. Ensure that the BCMP reference or inclusion in the relevant Flying and/or ATC Order Books is correct. 16. Further responsibilities should include the: a. Monitoring and acting on habitat changes on and in the vicinity of the aerodrome and development of appropriate management and control activities. b. Implementation of habitat management/long grass policy maintenance programmes in accordance with the BCMP, and to introduce modifications to the maintenance programmes as necessary. c. Analysis and interpretation of log records of bird control activities, birdstrike reports and bird count data. d. Regular survey of bird concentrations and movements in the local area and liaison with local bird watchers for additional information. e. Liaison with local landowners, farmers and gamekeepers to obtain intelligence on farming plans, game conservation, etc and on mitigation action. f. Monitoring of the effectiveness of any mitigation measures in place.
g. Identification of potential birdstrike risks by collating local ornithological and other data. h. Seeking of advice and assistance from outside specialists on matters requiring expertise not available at the aerodrome. i. Production and promulgation of reports on the development of BCMP and on specific topics, safety briefs and birdstrike risk warnings as required. Bird control Officer/Manager 17. Whilst a senior person within the air operations function may have overall responsibility for bird control delegated from the Unit Commander, a technical specialist, such as a Bird Control Officer or the BCU Manager, may undertake day-to-day management and efficient implementation of the BMCP. In more detail, this role will involve key duties such as to: a. Advise on all matters relating to birds and birdstrike prevention, and to assist with the production and development of the BCMP. b. Plan and organize bird control operations in accordance with the BCMP.
c. Supervise and monitor bird control operations to ensure that BCMP is implemented correctly.
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d. Supervise bird control record keeping (log, bird counts, birdstrike recording and reporting, bird dispersal, culling and habitat management diaries, etc.). e. Provide technical supervision of bird control operators, intelligence gathering, and planning. f. g. Facilitate the active surveillance, bird dispersal, culling and other field tasks. Ensure that all necessary licenses, insurances, passes and permits are current.
h. Ensure the effective supply, safe keeping and correct maintenance of bird control equipment and consumables. i. Provide a communications channel between the aerodrome policy makers/providers, bird control operators and other interested parties, such as the flying sqns/units and air traffic control. Bird Control Officer 18. A bird control operator performs the front line role and can be any suitably trained member of aerodrome staff. This role will involve key duties such as to: a. Maintain surveillance of bird activity on the aerodrome and beyond, to the limit of visibility. b. Implement active bird control measures in accordance with the BCMP to counter any detected birdstrike risk. c. Provide the air traffic service, where applicable, with details of a potential birdstrike risk. d. e. f. g. Record bird and bird control activity. Record actual, potential or suspected birdstrikes. Advise senior personnel on improvements to the bird control task. Assist with surveys, etc.
Risk Identification 19. This chapter describes those significant factors that should be considered in an assessment of the birdstrike risk at a flying facility. 20. Risk assessments should be undertaken whenever changes in the environment, in operating procedures, in aircraft types, etc. are likely to affect safety. Characteristically, bird hazards at aerodromes are continuously changing and, therefore, continuous reassessment is necessary. Assessment of the Birdstrike Risk 21. In order to manage the risk of a birdstrike, the Unit should develop a systematic method of obtaining information regarding potential birdstrike risks on and in the vicinity of the aerodrome/AWR on a regular basis and: a. Assess those risks, in the context of aircraft operations.
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b. Analyse bird strike records to identify how many birds have been struck and which species. c. Identify and target those birds more likely to cause damage to aircraft, such as flocking and/or larger species. d. Develop a structured approach to bird control.
22. Before any risk assessment can be conducted with any degree of accuracy, it is necessary to establish the background risk level4 to demonstrate the need for a bird hazard control programme and against which to assess the changing hazard. This level also provides a measure against which to assess the effectiveness of the plan. Details of existing bird locations and bird movements relative to those locations and the aerodrome will need to be ascertained, both to establish an accurate database and to keep the information flow current. A risk assessment should therefore be conducted initially to provide a quantifiable benchmark and repeated thereafter on a periodic basis such that: a. Each potential birdstrike risk can be assessed in detail.
b. Each risk can be quantified in the short and long term, dependent upon bird population and habitat seasonal changes. c. d. e. 23. The potential risks can be assessed on a comparable basis. The continuing risk can be monitored. Control actions can be focused in a structured manner.
A typical risk assessment process should therefore involve: a. A detailed hazard description, identifying bird species and associated habitats that influence the size and behaviour of bird populations in the area. b. An assessment of the probability of a birdstrike with a particular species, taking into consideration the current mitigation procedures in place and seasonal factors. c. Consideration of the species involved including size and numbers (eg solitary or in flocks), an assessment of the likely severity of the outcome of a birdstrike. d. An assessment of the frequency of serious multiple birdstrikes5.
e. The determination of the acceptability of the level of risk by summing the probability and severity, based on a probability/severity matrix. f. The identification of further risk management options available.
g. The development and implementation of an action plan to eliminate reduce or mitigate unacceptable risks. Applying the Assessment to Bird Hazards
The level and type of bird activity that would occur in the absence of any monitoring or control measures. Where more than 2 birds are struck and more than 10 birds are seen, or when more than 10 birds are struck. Allan J. A Heuristic Risk Assessment Technique for Birdstrike Management at Airports, Society for Risk Assessment Journal, Vol 26 No 3, 2006.
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24. Accidents from all causes should occur at a frequency of 1 x 10-7, or lower. Thus, individual hazards must pose a lower level of risk. However, because of the low frequency of accidents, it is not possible to quantify accurately risks from individual causes, such as birdstrikes. Individual UK aerodromes all have different local conditions and hazard levels, and there are not sufficient aircraft movements to provide statistically valid samples. All categories of aircraft have suffered catastrophic accidents (the worst case on the severity scale) following strikes with common birds and strikes with the potential for catastrophic results occur relatively frequently. Therefore, the probability level is, at best, extremely remote and may even be as high as remote. Also, serious incidents such as loss of an engine on takeoff, (severity classification hazardous and major) occur sufficiently frequently to fall into the reasonably probable category. 25. Because of the small but real risk of catastrophic accidents, the risk must be reduced to a lower tolerability level. Even the middle ground review risk level requires action to reduce it to as low as reasonably practical. To minimize the risk of the very rare catastrophic incidents, the only practical approach is to minimize the opportunities for any birdstrikes to occur. 26. Following on from this, it is useful to produce a baseline statement describing the aerodromes particular bird hazards: species; concentration sites (roosts, breeding colonies, etc.); movements; and seasonal and temporal changes. All flying stations will then be able to develop a comprehensive and sustainable BCMP from the risk assessment process above. However, further review of bird movements and changes in populations, including the effect of mitigation action, and the environment is necessary to re-assess the residual risk once the BCMP is in place. Intelligence Gathering 27. Intelligence gathering is an essential component of the birdstrike risk assessment process and involves the monitoring of all potential bird attractants, concentrations and movement patterns, both on and in the vicinity of the aerodrome. In addition to field observations by aerodrome personnel or other specialists who understand the importance of such monitoring, liaison with local landowners and land users such as local bird watchers and ornithological societies, nature reserve wardens, water bailiffs, gamekeepers, farmers and pigeon fanciers may yield useful information. 28. Awareness and understanding of bird concentrations and movements can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of bird control on the aerodrome and will determine the amount of effort required to manage the risk and the type of control actions. When assessing attractants, a clear understanding is needed of the direct impact each potential bird attractant site and its proximity to the aerodrome is likely to have on the potential birdstrike risk, having identified and taken into account the bird species involved. 29. Surveys should be conducted in the local area in different seasons to identify attractants, concentrations and regular movement patterns. Each potential bird attractant feature or development on the aerodrome and in its vicinity should be assessed. Having identified the potential bird attractants the possible impact should be assessed so that the level of risk presented to flights at the aerodrome can be determined. Specialist advice should be sought from BCU experts or CSL regarding the factors to be considered within this assessment. 30. Defence Estates (Safeguarding) coordinate the appropriate action on behalf of flying stations which may include legal proceedings. Individual units should not engage in consultations with Local Planning Authorities or with local landowners/developers beyond that necessary to facilitate access iaw the BCMP.
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Bird Attractant Habitats 31. The differing landscapes on the aerodrome may create a variety of attractants that need to be identified and assessed, to determine the appropriate prevention or control actions required. The following paragraphs also apply to sites in the vicinity of the aerodrome. Food 32. Birds require high-energy foods and many species depend on earthworms, snails, slugs, spiders, millipedes, and insects (especially larvae) present in grassland and the underlying soil. Fieldfares, redwings and starlings may occur in large flocks to feed on soil invertebrates on aerodromes. Carnivorous birds may feed on small mammals, such as rodents. 33. Very few birds eat grass. Only Geese and some other Wildfowl graze grass and, then, only when it is short and in vigorous growth. Therefore, the grass itself is not a bird attractant but other plants among it can attract large numbers of birds. The leaves, flowers and seeds of weeds, such as clovers, dandelion, chickweeds and vetches are food for Pigeons, Game birds, Finches and other small birds. Therefore, consideration should be given to the need to minimize or eliminate such attractants through, for example, the use of herbicides. 34. Parts of an aerodrome are sometimes let for growing crops. Although tall crops are mostly unattractive to birds, they have the potential to cause a variety of problems immediately adjacent to the movement areas. Activities like ploughing, harrowing and cropping which disturb the soil, and also sludge spraying, manure spreading, seed drilling, ripe crops, harvesting, and hay and silage cutting create feeding opportunities for Gulls, Lapwings, Corvids, Starlings and Pigeons. Such activities inevitably attract birds and will increase the resources required for bird control. Having fed, birds such as Gulls and Lapwings will rest in the vicinity for many hours. 35. Wastes from litterbins etc. attract Gulls, Feral pigeons, Corvids, Starlings and other Passerines (perching birds). Refuse bins associated with food preparation and consumption ie kitchen and catering areas, is a particular attractant. Open Terrain 36. Flat, open terrain is an inherent characteristic of an aerodrome, which cannot be modified. Expanses of grassland covering large areas between runways, taxiways and aprons and paved surfaces create bird attractions on aerodromes, as do buildings and other installations such as radar towers. The unobstructed view and open space provides security (plus, for flocking species, mutual protection from many pairs of eyes) and affords a warning of potential danger for large flocks. Open terrain attracts all species except those which avoid danger by living in trees or dense cover. However, maintaining the grass sward at an appropriate height can eliminate the open aspect on the grassed areas. The bird attractant aspects of open terrain are relatively simple and well understood, and effective countermeasures are available. 37. The presence of other, less prominent features such as open drainage ditches, ponds, scrub, bushes and trees, earth banks, and waste food also provide more habitats, for larger numbers of birds and additional species, to exploit. 38. Attention should be paid to grass reinstatement in areas after aerodrome works.
Landscaping
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39. Landscaping developments include grass, tree and shrub planting and may involve the creation or enhancement of a water feature. Landscaping schemes have the potential to: a. Create dense vegetation that may become a roost.
b. Provide an abundant autumn and winter food supply in the form of fruits and berries. c. Create standing water or watercourses which attract Gulls and waterfowl.
40. Landscapes commonly include trees and shrubs, which may provide food and shelter for nesting and roosting. Finches, Thrushes, Pigeons and Starlings commonly feed on fruits and berries. Finch flocks will only move onto aerodromes where there is a weed seed food source, and native thrushes do not form flocks or visit the open spaces of aerodromes to a significant extent. Thus in the autumn, masses of berries may attract large flocks to the aerodrome and, once the berries are all eaten, the flocks move onto the aerodrome to hunt earthworms, etc. Numerous fruit- and berry-bearing trees and shrubs have the potential to attract birds. 41. Oak and Beech in particular provide food for Wood pigeons, which feed on acorns and beechmast extensively in autumn. They also eat the flowers of Ash in spring. Rooks eat acorns and sometimes plant them in the aerodrome grass. Nests and Roosts 42. Many birds nest in trees and bushes. Rooks nest colonially in traditional rookeries in small woods and lines of mature trees but recently they have expanded into a wider variety of smaller trees and man-made structures, such as aerodrome lighting gantries and electricity distribution pylons. Wood pigeons nest in dense bushes, hedgerows and woods. 43. From late summer through the winter, starlings form large communal roosts in dense vegetation such as thorn thickets, game coverts, young unthinned conifer plantations, shelter and screening belts and reed beds. Less dense cover may be used where there is artificial shelter from nearby large buildings. 44. Buildings and structures with access holes and crevices provide nest sites and roosts, especially for Feral pigeons and Starlings. Pigeons roost and nest on ledges on the exteriors of buildings and inside them. Water 45. Open standing water and watercourses attract Waterfowl that are nearly all large birds and may also occur in large flocks. Waterfowl resort to water for security and it is usually impossible to evict them with scaring devices. The more open water sites there are on and around an aerodrome, the more complex and frequent will be the movements of Waterfowl between them. There may be more activity at night than during the day. 46. Wet and waterlogged grass attracts feeding Ducks (especially at night) and nesting Waders, and drainage should be installed or improved, wherever possible. Flooding flushes soil invertebrates to the surface making them very accessible to birds, attracting Ducks, Gulls and Waders. Larger, permanent waters, such as ponds, balancing reservoirs, etc, attract Ducks, Geese, Swans, Herons, Coot, Moorhen and Cormorants.
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Chapter 19: Aerodrome Lighting

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3019(1)(2)(3). Aerodrome Lighting General Requirements 1. The MOD authorizes the standards of lighting to be provided at aerodromes. These standards vary according to the role of the station but should be in accordance with: a. b. STANAG 3316 Aerodrome Lighting. STANAG 3534 Portable Aerodrome Lighting.
2. When it is necessary to establish or modify visual aids to navigation or aerodrome lighting, including changes of identification beacon coding, at UK aerodromes near the coast, which may result in lights being visible to shipping at sea or in inland waters, details of such proposals should first be forwarded to Trinity House, MOD(Navy) and the Department of Trade for approval. Copies of all correspondence should be sent to MOD(Air), DNO and HQ AAC. 3. Operating Requirements All Aerodromes. Aerodrome, threshold, approach, and obstruction lighting and the identification beacon should be displayed from 15mins before any ETA and until 15mins after any ATD of an aircraft as follows: a. By Day. Whenever the visibility is less than 8 km and/or the cloud base is less than 700 ft. b. By Night. Irrespective of weather conditions, unless operational or exercise requirements dictate otherwise. Notes: 1. Sodium lamps require 10 to 15 mins to reach full brilliancy and should therefore be switched on 30 mins before any ETA. 2. Night is taken as 30 mins after sunset to 30 mins before sunrise.
3. Lighting can also be displayed as requested by the ATCC, as required by unit instructions or as considered necessary by the aerodrome controller. 4. MEDAs. In addition to the above, the minimum lighting that should be switched on at MEDAs on a standby basis at night when there are no planned or actual movements is the aerodrome identification beacon and obstruction lighting. 5. Recommended Aerodrome Lighting Brilliancy Settings MOD. To provide some guidance and uniformity throughout the MOD, the following table contains the minimum recommended brilliancy settings for Approach/Runway Lights and PAPIs, to be used for varying surface visibilities in daylight, twilight and at night. The table, which is based on the visibilities which determine airfield weather states, is only a guide and actual local conditions or operations may require minor alterations to the recommended settings. The guide should be displayed on, or immediately adjacent to, the airfield lighting console.
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Figure 19-1 Airfield Lighting Brilliancy Guide

AIRFIELD LIGHTING BRILLIANCY SETTING GUIDE VISIBILITY APP/RWY PAPIs 0 3700M MAX MAX/2 3700M 8 KM MAX 2 8 KM + OFF 2 0 1600M 2 4 1600M 3700M 3 5 3700M 5 KM 4 5 5 KM + 5 MIN 0 1600M 3 4 1600M 5 KM 4 5 5 KM + 5 MIN
DAYLIGHT
TWILIGHT
NIGHT
Notes: 1. Settings may be raised by one stage when any of the following conditions exist: a. b. c. Cloud base below 1000 ft. Moderate to heavy rain. 3/4 moon or more at night.
2. Settings may be adjusted at the request of the pilot. Lighting settings should not be altered when an aircraft is on final approach unless the pilot requests the alteration. Aerodrome Identification Beacons 6. Aerodrome identification beacons should be lit in accordance with Paragraph 3 above. The unserviceability of aerodrome identification beacons should be the subject of NOTAM action. Aerodrome Lighting Inspections 7. Before the start of night flying, the DATCO(RN)/ATCO IC (RAF) is responsible for detailing an aerodrome inspection and for satisfying himself that all elements of the aerodrome lighting are fully serviceable. A watch-log entry should be made outlining the extent of the inspection with notes on unserviceability and action taken to remedy defects in accordance with local orders. 8. The DATCO(RN)/ATCO IC (RAF) should check that all standby and/or portable lighting is serviceable and correctly positioned. He is also responsible for informing the officer in charge of night flying of any unusual or additional lighting arrangements in force, and for stressing such points at the briefing of night-flying crews. Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) 9. ATC should conduct a daily inspection of units for damage, gross misalignment and lamp outages.
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Chapter 20: NATO Standard Aerodrome Procedures

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3020(1). 1. UK military aerodromes are required to be prepared to implement NATO standard patterns when called upon to operate NATO forces; authorized variations to the standard procedures are at Paragraphs 29 - 39 Pilots must be prepared to fly NATO patterns when visiting NATO aerodromes. NATO Standard Taxiing and Take-Off Procedures Fixed-Wing Aircraft 2. Where there is an ATC service, aircraft captains are required to open and maintain radio watch on the appropriate frequency before leaving dispersal. If RT silence has been stipulated, the frequency needs to be selected in order to receive urgent messages from ATC but there is no requirement to check in on the frequency. 3. Permission to taxi and take-off should be given by ATC and should include precise instructions and warning of obstructions on or near taxiing routes. 4. Captains of aircraft are required to proceed to the holding position and taxi onto the runway in use according to ATC instructions. Aircraft should not be permitted to use the runway in use for taxiing if it is at all possible to provide other taxiing routes. No aircraft will hold on the runway in use after another aircraft has been cleared to land. 5. Unless authorized by Command or Local Orders an aircraft should not be permitted to commence its take-off run until a preceding aircraft is seen to be airborne or has reported airborne by RT, or before a landed aircraft is seen to be clear of the runway in use. 6. If IMC exist, the climb-out should be under a radar service when possible, or on climb headings which will keep the aircraft clear of other known traffic or traffic patterns. 7. Permission to taxi should be withheld as necessary to ensure adequate spacing between aircraft on taxiways; if an aircraft is obliged to stop at other than the holding position, ATC requires to be informed immediately. 8. Requirements for additional RT calls for instructions or information to be passed during the sequencing of aircraft from engine start to aerodrome circuit clearance should be specified in the relevant instruction/order books. NATO Standard Visual Circuit and Landing Procedures Fixed-Wing Aircraft 9. The NATO standard visual aerodrome circuit and landing patterns are promulgated in STANAG 3817 (see Figure 20-1) and should be implemented, except for the authorized single-Service variations detailed in the appropriate Service sections of this Manual. Additional modifications to single-Service procedures to suit individual local circumstances should be approved by administrative authorities and, where such local rules are applicable to visiting aircraft, will be adequately promulgated in RAF FLIPs or by NOTAM action. 10. Circuit patterns should be left-hand unless otherwise authorized. Straight-in approaches are permitted to expedite traffic. The overhead pattern is normally used for the recovery of fighter-type aircraft, and the rectangular pattern by other aircraft.
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11. A request for instructions and permission to join a circuit pattern is required to be made by the pilot when approximately 3 to 5 mins away from the aerodrome. On the first call, a formation leader is required to state the number of aircraft in his formation. Clearance from ATC for the aircraft to enter the pattern should include items of essential information regarding the circuit direction, runway in use and number and position of all aircraft ahead which have not touched down. It is the responsibility of the pilot to avoid bunching in the circuit.
Figure 20-1 NATO Standard VFR Traffic Landing Pattern Fixed Wing
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Figure 20-2 NATO Standard Rectangular Traffic Landing Pattern Fixed-Wing
12. When a pilot intends to carry out a non-standard circuit, eg asymmetric, flapless, glide etc, this is required to be stated in the initial request to join or on completion of the previous circuit; it is also to be included in the downwind call eg M01, downwind, flapless, land. 13. The pilot is required to call final, gear down on leaving the downwind leg. ATC will then pass cleared to land, continue or go around as appropriate. The pilot is required to acknowledge these calls. Pilots flying on asymmetric power are responsible for making the final call at a height which will enable them to execute a safe overshoot procedure if it becomes necessary. If a pilot fails to state the position of the landing gear, ATC should remind the pilot to recheck and confirm Gear Down; not applicable to aircraft with fixed undercarriage. 14. If an aircraft enters a traffic circuit without permission, the existence of an emergency will be considered and the aircraft should be permitted to land. If necessary, other aircraft will be instructed to give way. 15. The following overshooting procedures should be complied with: a. When instructed to go around pilots are required to climb and rejoin the circuit. If it is not safe to do this, ATC is required to be informed instantly. b. When overshooting, pilots are required to do so to the dead side of the runway in use. c. When aircraft are instructed to go around the aerodrome controller should inform the runway controller accordingly. 16. Because of the steep climbing take-off profiles of some aircraft, it is essential that strict circuit coordination be maintained to avoid possible confliction with aircraft that may already be in the rectangular circuit pattern or have been instructed to go round again. A pilot approaching an aerodrome for landing is required to give way to all aircraft at a lower height. The latter are, however, to be prepared to give way if necessary.
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17. On landing, a pilot is required to clear the runway in use as soon as possible maintaining a radio watch on the appropriate frequency, if possible. On a non-runway aerodrome the pilot is required to bring the aircraft to rest and turn 90 left if a left-hand circuit is in force, or 90 right in the case of a right-hand circuit. The aircraft is not to be moved until the pilot has ensured by visual observation that he will not cut across the path of any aircraft which is landing or taking-off or is about to do so. When the path is clear the pilot is required to taxi to the aerodrome perimeter with the least possible delay, complying with local orders as necessary. 18. Essential information on aerodrome conditions should be given to all aircraft in sufficient time for pilots to make use of the information. NATO Aerodrome and Heliport Traffic Procedures Helicopters 19. Except as provided for in Fly 2000 and single-Service regulations, the NATO aerodrome and heliport traffic landing patterns and associated take-off, approach and landing RT procedures (VFR), promulgated in STANAG 3817, should be implemented. Additional modifications to single-Service procedures to suit individual local circumstances should be approved by Aviation Duty Holders and, where such local rules are applicable to visiting aircraft, should be adequately promulgated in RAF FLIPs or by NOTAM action. 20. To avoid the possibility of error, complete aircraft callsigns should be used. The patterns should be right-hand unless otherwise authorized. On the first call, a formation leader is required to state the number of aircraft in his formation. NATO Aerodrome Helicopter Landing Traffic Pattern 21. Pattern Entry. A 45 entry into the pattern direction of flow is required to be made unless otherwise approved or authorized. Entry is required to be made on the downwind leg unless otherwise instructed or authorized. 22. Downwind Leg. Should be flown on the opposite side of the runway centre line from jet and/or conventional patterns (see Figure 20-3). Required to be flown at least 150 m (500 ft) but not more than 250 m (700 ft) above the elevation unless specific local or meteorological conditions require otherwise. Ground track is required to be not nearer than 200 m (600 ft) nor greater than 400 m (1200 ft) from abeam the centre line of the applicable runway unless otherwise instructed or authorized. 23. Turn to Base Leg and Final. A turn at line D not more than 1000 m (0.5 nm) beyond abeam the approach threshold of the applicable runway, is required to be completed at line E not lower than 60 m (200 ft) above aerodrome elevation unless otherwise instructed or authorized. 24. Circuit Direction. When a helicopter landing area is located on an aerodrome the helicopter circuit pattern may be variable and the direction should be notified by ATC. Whenever possible, the circuit pattern for helicopters and light aircraft will be flown on the opposite side to that for tactical and conventional patterns. ATC should notify pilots as necessary.
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Figure 20-3 NATO Aerodrome Helicopter Landing Traffic Pattern
NATO Heliport Landing Traffic Patter 25. Pattern Entry. A 45 entry into the pattern direction of flow is required to be made unless otherwise approved or authorized. Entry will be made on the downwind leg unless otherwise instructed or authorized. 26. Downwind Leg. Required to be flown right-hand traffic and 155-250 m (500-700 ft) above the heliport elevation unless specific local or meteorological conditions require otherwise (see Figure 20-4). Ground track is required to be not nearer than 200 m (600 ft) or farther than 400 m (1200 ft) from abeam the point of intended landing unless otherwise instructed or authorized. 27. Turn to Base Leg and Final. A turn at line D not more than 1000 m (0.5 nm) beyond abeam the point of intended landing is required to be completed at Line E not normally lower than 60 m (200 ft) above aerodrome elevation unless otherwise instructed or authorized. 28. Final Approach. As necessary to effect initial hover, touchdown or landing within the designated area unless otherwise instructed or authorized.
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Figure 20-4 NATO Heliport Landing Traffic Pattern
NATO Standard Visual Circuit and Landing Procedure UK Variations 29. The circuit pattern of an aerodrome is influenced by the type of aircraft involved and the prevailing weather conditions. Authorized variations at UK military aerodromes to the NATO standard patterns are detailed in the following paragraphs. 30. Aircraft are normally required to join the circuit parallel to the runway in use at 2000 ft AGL, adjusting to normal circuit height on the dead side before reaching a line approximately 100 ft to the right of the runway or not below 500 ft AGL for an overhead circuit. 31. If an aircraft cannot be cleared to land and is required to orbit the aerodrome the phrase orbit left/right of (point) at ft should be used. 32. When it is desired to clear an aircraft to join a circuit which is not a conventional left hand circuit, or where more than one circuit exists or for special operations in the circuit, the following phrases may be used: a. b. c. d. Join right-hand circuit. Make right turn. Land at (aerodrome). Bad weather circuits, runway length surface wind .
Note: In performing an instrument bad weather circuit, the pilot must know the runway lengths to calculate the timing within the field of vision of pilots rectangular circuits. 33. An overhead circuit is made inside and below the rectangular circuit so that aircraft in the overhead circuit remain within the field of vision of pilots rectangular circuits.
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34. The downwind call is required to be made when abeam the upwind threshold of the runway in use. When it is necessary to lengthen the downwind leg the phrase Extend downwind leg is used together with a short explanation why it is necessary. When there is a likelihood of confusion on the part of a pilot in the traffic pattern as to which aircraft he will follow, the standard RT call should be suitably amplified, eg follow Tornado ahead and to left of you. 35. When an aircraft is given permission to make a straight-in approach, although it cannot yet be cleared to land, the following phrase should be used: straight-in approach approved. The controller should also request the pilot to make a check call at a specified range, at which time the instruction: cleared to land, continue approach or go around can be given. 36. An aircraft on final approach may be permitted to land, touch and go or carry out a low approach while other ac have not yet cleared the runway provided that it is authorized by a local order. The order should specify the minimum spacing, ac types and conditions that will apply. Furthermore, the pilot should be warned about the ac ahead. 37. In emergency, or in certain cases when locally authorized, light aircraft may be cleared to land on the right- or left-hand side of the runway in use. The pilot is then responsible for avoiding collision with aircraft which have not yet cleared the runway. 38. If for any reason it is necessary to clear the aerodrome circuit for a period, a general call should be made, eg Shawbury Combine, all aircraft stand off for minutes. All aircraft should then clear the circuit. The reason for such an instruction should be given. 39. If an aircraft has landing gear difficulty, the following phrases should be used: a. If the landing gear appears to be normal: Landing gear appears to be fully down.
b. If it does not appear to be normal, a description of its appearance, wheel by wheel, should be given. NATO Studs and Common VHF Channels 40. Pilots may request the use of NATO studs rather than the discrete frequencies when making approaches to, or flying in the vicinity of, military airfields. The table below lists the first 5 NATO UHF studs; these should be displayed in the VCR and ACR to enable controllers to equate stud numbers to frequency when so requested by aircrew. Two NATO common VHF channels are also allocated for use by ATC agencies: 122.10 MHz for Tower and 123.30 MHz for Talkdown.
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Figure 20-5 NATO Studs
Annex 20A: DESIGNATION OF NATO STUDS

NATO Stud 1 2 3 4 5 Frequency (MHz) 317.5 257.8 385.4 344.0 362.3 Designation NATO Combined Navigational/Fixer/Guard Combined Tower Combined GCA/Talkdown Combined GCA/Marshall/Search Combined Approach Control
41. Given the common nature of these NATO UHF and VHF channels, controllers should listen to the frequency before transmitting in order to avoid interfering with transmissions from other units or aircraft.
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Chapter 21: Aircraft Arresting Systems

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3021(1)(2)(3). Aircraft Arresting Systems 1. When an aerodrome is equipped with aircraft arresting systems, the SATCO is required to ensure that details of the installation, together with the standard configuration of the installation, for normal flying are promulgated in En-Route supplements and terminal approach charts. 2. Aircraft arresting systems are of 2 main types: aircraft arresting barriers fitted with nets and aircraft arresting gears fitted with hook cables. Operational characteristics of the systems in use are contained in AP119J-1400-1. 3. Clearance for particular types or marks of aircraft to engage arrestor devices or to trample cables is promulgated in individual aircraft Release to Service documents and in Aircrew Manuals. Should amplifying instructions be required, these will be issued by Aviation Duty Holders and Commanders. Aircraft Arresting Barriers 4. The various types of aircraft arresting barriers in use are the RAF Mk 6 and 12A, Type A and Type B. Details of their performance are contained in AP119J-1400-1. 5. Barrier stanchions are raised and lowered by remote control from ATC; during servicing an isolation switch can be used to protect personnel. The Mk 12A and Type B barriers are fitted with a dual brake pressure system with a Light or Heavy setting which is selected remotely from ATC. In the Light setting the Mk 12 and Type B barriers provide a retardation equivalent to those of the Mk 6 and Type A. 6. Operating Procedures. The operating procedures are as follows: a. The up-wind barrier should be in the state of readiness and brake setting dictated by the individual Command policy. Where during normal flying operations the up-wind barrier is maintained, as a standard configuration, in the UP or DOWN position, normally no reference will be made in RT messages to unit aircraft, unless the barrier is a non-standard configuration or unserviceable. b. With the exception given in Sub-paragraph a above the appropriate ATC authority should include the readiness state of the barrier in all messages giving takeoff, landing or rolling clearances. The last phrase of such messages should include the relevant expression: barrier up, barrier down or barrier unserviceable. In the case of the Mk 12A and Type B barriers this should be followed by Light or Heavy as appropriate. c. Authority to have the barrier raised from the fully down or standby position to the up position is vested in the pilot, the officer in charge of flying or his deputy on duty in the control tower, and, exceptionally, the controller. The pilot is required to make the call Barrier! Barrier! Barrier! if he requires it during take-off or landing and it is not already in the fully raised position. On receipt of this executive instruction the controller should immediately raise the barrier and pass the message Barrier up to the pilot. If
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the pilot subsequently wishes to have the barrier lowered he is required to make this request on RT by message Barrier down. d. The officer in charge of flying or his deputy on duty in the control tower can at his discretion order the barrier to be raised if he considers circumstances warrant its erection. This action is always to be accompanied by the message Barrier up. e. In the absence of the officer in charge of flying or his authorized deputy, the ATC officer can at his discretion raise the barrier if it is obvious to him that an aircraft, which is cleared to use the barrier, is in danger of running off the end of the runway but the pilot is too occupied to give the executive order Barrier! Barrier! Barrier!, or the aircraft is without serviceable RT. Such action should always be accompanied by the message Barrier up, in case the aircraft receiver is operating. f. The aerodrome controller should ensure that the approach barrier is down, and indicating down on the display, before clearing aircraft for a landing, touch and go or low approach. Where the aerodrome controller is unsighted from the approach barrier and the display panel is unserviceable, suitable local arrangements will be enforced to ensure that the approach barrier state is known to the aerodrome controller before the issue of any aforesaid clearance. Note: Unless demanded by operational circumstances, the barrier should not be left up when the wind component along the runway is either a steady 30 knots or gusts above 35 knots. Experience has shown that high winds, especially when the net is wet, may cause the net to break free of the suspension cables. Aircraft Arresting Gears 7. Aircraft arresting gears at aerodromes provide a means of stopping suitably modified aircraft in short distances. The aircraft must be equipped with a hook which can be lowered to engage in cables stretched across the runway. The cables terminate in energy-dissipating devices, eg rotary hydraulic friction units, chains or water sprays, which bring the aircraft quickly to a halt. With some types of arresting gear the cables can be engaged at either the approach or overrun ends of the runway. 8. The cables can be in one of three states: a. Up. The cable is stretched across the runway and raised three inches above it by means of doughnuts/grommets or bowsprings, ready for engagement. b. Down. The doughnuts/grommets are slid clear of the runway or the bowsprings are retracted leaving the cable lying on the surface. c. 9. Derigged. The cable is removed altogether from the runway.
Operating Procedures. The operating procedures are as follows a. The positions of the cables should be specified by the aerodrome operating authority. The location of an arrestor-gear cable should be indicated by vertical runway arrestor-gear markers on either side of the runway. Unless the cables are in a non-standard configuration, reference to their positions will normally be omitted in RT messages to unit aircraft, and to visiting aircraft when pilots, on early interrogation, indicate they are familiar with the aerodrome. When a cable is in a non-standard configuration, and unit aircraft are carrying out a series of approaches, warning of its position is only required once rather than on each approach.
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b. Some aircraft are cleared to trample the cables when they are up and others when they are down. Speed is also a factor which affects trampling clearance. It is a pilots responsibility to notify ATC whether or not the aircraft is cleared to trample the cables in the position notified. c. Recovery of aircraft and arresting cables after an engagement can be hazardous to those personnel employed. Control executives should avoid applying pressure to expedite runway clearance which may lead to the omission of some essential safety procedures. Medical cover should remain in the vicinity of the arresting cable until the rewind procedure is completed. Furthermore, although only qualified ground engineers may declare an arresting cable serviceable for use, if such personnel be absent during a disengagement and rewind, the fire personnel will visually check the equipment for obvious unserviceability during the rewind. Once ATC have ascertained that the engagement weight and speed were within limits and that the equipment appears fit for use, the arresting cable can be used for one further emergency arrest. On completion of the emergency arrest, the equipment should be declared unserviceable until the appropriate maintenance has been carried out by GEF personnel. The ATCO IC should advise the ground engineers as soon as possible that the equipment has been used and pass the relevant aircraft details. 10. ATC has the following responsibilities in regard to cables: a. SATCO. The SATCO should ensure that appropriate entries are made in: (1) En-Route Supplements, using approved abbreviations specifying: (a) (b) (c) (2) Specific type of arresting gear. State of arresting gear cables for normal flying operations. Distance of cables from thresholds.
Terminal Approach Charts showing: (a) (b) (c) The location of cables. The direction of pull-out in relation to runway ends. The specific type of arresting gear.
b. Approach or Aerodrome Controller. Where the state of the cable at both ends of the runway conforms to the standard configuration as published for that aerodrome it is permissible to omit in RT messages to locally based aircraft, any reference to the cable state unless requested by the pilot. On all other occasions the approach or aerodrome controller, as appropriate, should inform all aircraft approaching to land, take-off, or carrying out a touch and go, the state of the cable at both ends of the runway. This will be included in the message giving the readiness state of the barriers mentioned in Paragraph 6. c. DATCO (RN)/ATCO IC (RAF). The DATCO(RN)/ATCO IC (RAF) should: (1) Inform civil operating authorities which seek pre-flight clearances for aircraft not cleared to trample the cable that landing permission may be refused or delayed, depending on circumstances. (2) Instruct the fire crews/engineers salvage party to remove/replace the supports or rig/derig the cables, as appropriate.
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(3) Confirm with the fire crews/engineers salvage party that the retractable runway edge sheaves (RRES) have been correctly set following a cable rigging or derigging operation.
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Chapter 22: Helicopter Landing Sites

REGULATORY CROSS REFERENCE No current MAA regulatory cross-reference. General 1. For safety and environmental reasons it is important that the number of permanent landing sites in barrack locations is limited. In barrack areas covered by Helicopter Landing Site Flight Information Publications (HLS FLIPs), only the landing sites listed in those publications should be used, except for emergency life-saving sorties or when a site is designated for a specific function. 2. Applications by formations for additional landing sites or for landing sites for special events should be forwarded by the unit supporting the formation to J3, JHC. 3. Unless specially authorized, no landing site should be closer than 3000 m to any other. When reduced separation is authorized, special procedures for traffic patterns etc, will be detailed. 4. Units should ensure that only approved agents are used to clear ice from dispersals and helicopter landing sites. Additionally, where possible, they should brief all other units on the hazards of using salt to clear helicopter landing sites. Notification of Movements 5. When a landing is to be made at a manned landing site, pilots are responsible for notifying to the destination their ETA, passenger details, fuel requirements, flight details and details of their departure airfield/landing site. 6. When a landing is to be made at an unmanned landing site, within a barrack area, pilots are responsible for notifying the resident unit of ETA, purpose of flight, passengers and period during which the landing site will be active. Reconnaissance 7. Except when landing at an airfield or a landing site where a specific traffic pattern has been established pilots are required to carry out reconnaissance of the landing site, from a safe height, before approaching to land. The reconnaissance is required to be carried out even when radio contact has been established. 8. Pilots must be aware that aircraft from other nations may use the landing site. They should operate in accordance with HLS FLIP. Approach and Take-off 9. Approach and take-off routes will be planned to provide the safest flight path and reduce noise nuisance to the minimum. Landing Sites for Special Events 10. All applications for landing sites, including field landing sites, should be used for special events (eg, demonstrations, study periods, etc) will be submitted to J3, JHC for
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approval. When approved, a unit should be nominated as being responsible for the operation of the landing site. 11. The following principles should be observed in the selection and operation of landing sites for special events: a. Only one landing site should be used.
b. Whenever possible, the landing site should be such that normal airfield approach and circuit procedures can be adopted. c. An ATC detachment, manned by a pilot or a qualified controller, should be provided by the Unit supporting the formation concerned. d. If a normal circuit pattern cannot be used, a system of IPs and reporting points should be used. e. The unit operating the landing site should arrange for a NOTAM to be issued covering the following points: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Location. Traffic pattern - IPs, circuits, heights, etc. Frequencies and radio reporting procedures. Ground facilities - fuel, meteorological, telephone numbers, etc. Any special procedures for aircraft carrying PSI.
f. If aircraft are being provided by other agencies every attempt should be made to contact them by telephone to ensure that they are in possession of all the necessary information. g. Units providing aircraft should inform the controlling unit of aircraft and passenger details. h. Fire and crash arrangements should be co-ordinated with the local authorities.
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Chapter 23: Terminal Procedures General

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3023(1)(2)(3)(4). Terminal Procedures 1. Terminal units are only authorized to control aircraft below FL195 within Class F & G airspace unless specifically authorized otherwise (see Annex 11A: Paragraph 32). Controllers are required to handover aircraft that require an ATS above FL195 to an appropriate unit permitted to provide ATS. Standard Instrument Departures 2. A standard instrument departure (SID) is an approved procedure for departing safely from a runway and climbing into the en route or airways structure. Routeing for a SID will be designed to ensure that major obstructions, prohibited and restricted airspace are avoided. The climb gradient assumed should be 3.3% (200 ft/nm). Minimum climb gradient tables should be published when the required gradient exceeds 200 ft/nm. If the required climb gradient exceeds 200 ft/nm, a caution and explanation should be included on the departure chart and the controlling obstacle depicted thereon. 3. SIDs are applicable to all aircraft types. However, it is not mandatory to carry out a SID, although, if one is flown, the laid down procedure should be followed to ensure safe operation unless dispensation has been obtained from air traffic control. Captains of aircraft unable to achieve the climb gradient specified for a particular SID are required to ensure that meteorological conditions are adequate to allow obstacles to be seen and avoided up to the altitude, height or flight level stated on the departure chart. Approach Procedures Internal Aids 4. Internal aids approaches can be used only by aircraft equipment combinations so cleared in Aircrew Manuals. The following regulations should apply: a. Internal aids approaches can be used only at airfields with authorized airfield surveillance radar procedures; approaches need not be radar monitored. b. The procedures are non-precision and the MDH/MDA should be based on the procedure minimum for the surveillance radar procedure. c. Using an airborne aid independent of the one in use for the approach, or a ground radar fix, the aircraft crew is required to ensure that the aircraft is within the correct final approach segment before initiating the descent on final approach. Subsequently, if any doubt should arise about the aircrafts position within the final approach segment, the approach should be abandoned. Precision Approaches 5. An aircraft is permitted to descend on the glidepath to the declared DH/DA; the options at this point are either to continue the approach visually or to overshoot. The visual references required in order to convert from an instrument to a visual approach are defined in Paragraph 20.d. If an overshoot is carried out, the aircraft is only permitted to descend below DH/DA during the transition from descent to climb using the minimum height loss technique.
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6. A descent to MDH/MDA can be permitted at any stage during the final approach, and it therefore remains a matter of personal preference or SOP philosophy whether an immediate descent is carried out at the final approach fix (FAF) or whether a notional glideslope is flown. However, other factors (such as limited radar cover, aircraft separation requirements or local population considerations) may mean that only a notional glidepath technique is approved. Where such a limit applies, a note will be included in the remarks column of the relevant TAP chart. Should the immediate descent technique be used, the maximum rate of descent allowed is 800 ft/nm (2400 ft/min zero wind at 180 KIAS). 7. As the name implies, MDH/MDA is a height/altitude below which an aircraft must not descend whilst carrying out an instrument approach or a circling approach. Descent below MDH/MDA is only permitted when the required visual references to accomplish a visual approach are obtained. Circling Approaches 8. Some instrument procedures do not meet the criteria for straight-in approaches in that the runway heading and the final approach heading differ by more than 30. When this happens, the instrument procedure will end in a circle to land manoeuvre - a circling approach. The procedure minimum for this indicates the lowest height/altitude to which an aircraft can safely descend within a specified area yet still maintain the required obstacle clearance (Paragraph 21). British military TAPs show the circling MDH/MDA using different aids, even to the same runway. Missed Approach 9. All instrument procedures have a specific missed approach point (MAP) which defines the last point at which overshoot action should be initiated and the missed approach procedure followed if safe obstacle clearance is to be ensured. For precision approaches, the MAP taken into account by the procedure is normally the intersection of the electronic glidepath with the published procedure minimum; however, UK regulations state that all pilots should overshoot at their personal DH/DA even though this may occur before the facility in use, a particular fix point or a specific distance form the FAF. The TAP for the relevant approach will always indicate the MAP as the point where the descent/level portion is shown to change to a climb. Alternatively, the information can be obtained from ATC. All procedures assume a climb gradient of not less than 2.5% during the missed approach. Visual Approaches 10. At some stage during a flight, a pilot must decide whether he can continue his approach using external cues as the primary reference for flying. This decision may be made at any stage during the instrument approach but, once it is made, the approach converts from an instrument to a visual one. All current approach procedures ultimately end with a visual approach when the required visual references are acquired (Paragraph 20.d) or when a missed approach is begun; however, when the RVR is below that specified in Paragraph 13, irrespective of the visual references held, the pilot is not allowed to attempt to land. Aircraft Categories 11. All British military aircraft are categorized according to their approach speed. Where a range of speeds is possible, an aircraft may be capable of operating in more than one category. For simplicity the basis for categorization is the normal approach speed at
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DH/MDH (DA/MDA) or Vat + 15 knots, where Vat is the target threshold speed. Helicopters are category A. Fixed-wing aircraft categories are: a. b. c. d. e. Cat A - Speed less than 91 knots. Cat B - Speed 91-120 knots. Cat C - Speed 121-140 knots. Cat D - Speed 141-165 knots. Cat E - Speed over 165 knots.
12. Aircraft captains have discretion to move the aircraft into a higher or lower category when circumstances dictate a significantly higher or lower approach speed than normal. Instrument Approach Minima 13. The policy determining the applicability of the published minima stated on Terminal Approach Charts and whether this overrules the following minima will be promulgated by appropriate Aviation Duty Holders and Commanders. The lowest minima to which British military aircraft are authorized to make instrument approaches land are: a. Fixed-wing. (1) (2) (3) (4) b. DH Category I MDH DA Category I MDA +200 ft true +250 ft true TDZE +200 ft true TDZE +250 ft true 550 m RVR. 800 m RVR. 550 m RVR. 800 m RVR.
Helicopter. (1) (2) (3) (4) DH MDH DA MDA +150 ft true +250 ft true TDZE +150 ft true TDZE +250 ft true 300 m RVR. 300 m RVR. 300 m RVR. 300 m RVR.
c. Certain appropriately equipped and cleared aircraft can fly precision approaches to Category II and III minima at suitably equipped and cleared aerodromes. (1) For Category II approaches, the lowest minima are a DH of plus 100 ft true and an RVR of no less than 300 m or a DA of TDZE plus 100 ft true and an RVR or no less than 300 m. (2) For Category IIIA approaches, the lowest minima are a DH of less than plus 100 ft true, or with no DH, and an RVR not less than 200 m or a DA lower than TDZE plus 100 ft true, or no DA, and an RVR not less than 200 m. (3) For Category IIIB approaches, the lowest minima are a DH lower than plus 50 ft, or with no DH, and an RVR of less than 200 m but not less than 75 m, or a
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DA lower than TDZE plus 50 ft true, or no DA, an RVR or less than 200 m but not less than 75 m. d. Commencement and Continuation of Approach. An instrument approach can be commenced regardless of the reported RVR/visibility, but an approach to land or touch and go should not be continued beyond the higher of 1000 ft above the aerodrome level or the Final Approach Fix if the reported RVR/visibility is less than the applicable approach minima. If after passing the higher of 1000 ft above the aerodrome level or the Final Approach Fix, the reported RVR/visibility falls below the applicable approach minima, the approach can be continued to the DH/DA or MDH/MDA. The approach can be continued below DH/DA or MDH/MDA and the landing completed provided that the required visual reference is established at the DH/DA or MDH/MDA and is maintained. The TDZE RVR is always controlling. If reported and relevant, the mid-point and stop-end RVR are also controlling. The minimum RVR value for the mid-point is 125 m or the RVR required for the TDZ if less, and 75 m for the stop-end. For aircraft equipped with a rollout guidance or control system, the minimum RVR value for the mid-point is 75 m. Note: Relevant in this context, means that part of the runway used during the high speed phase of the landing down to a speed of approximately 60 kt. e. Conversion of Meteorological Visibility to RVR. Where RVR is not available, RVR values may be derived by converting the reported visibility in accordance with the following table. RVR conversion should not be used for calculating take-off minima, Category II or III minima or when a reported RVR is available.
Figure 23-1 RVR Conversion Table Lighting Elements Available at the Airfield High Intensity Approach & Runway Lighting Any Type of Lighting other than Above No Lighting Available RVR = Reported Met Visibility Multiplied By: Day Night 2.0 1.5 N/A
1.5 1.0 1.0
f.
Circling. The lowest MDH for circling is as follows: (1) For Units Operating to APATC-1 Minima. 350 ft for category A aircraft, 450 ft category B and C aircraft and 550 ft for category D and E aircraft. Circling does not apply to helicopters. (Lowest MDA is TDZE plus figures quoted for aircraft categories.) (2) For Units Operating to PANS-Ops / AATCP-1 Minima. 400 ft for category A aircraft, 500 ft for category B aircraft, 600 ft for category C aircraft, 700 ft for category D aircraft and 800 ft for category E aircraft. Circling does not apply to helicopters. (Lowest MDA is TDZE plus figures quoted for aircraft categories.)
14. Aviation Duty Holders and Commanders should lay down minimum values of RVR or meteorological visibility below which their aircraft are not permitted to carry out circling approaches, and are at liberty to increase any of the minima shown above as they see fit. 15. Minimum RVR Value RN Pilots/Air Stations. When the visibility is less than the RVR minima specified in Paragraph 13, Master Green and Green rated pilots recovering to RNAS may be authorized to make an approach to land, exceptionally, and only at the discretion of Lieutenant Commander (Flying), or DLC(f).
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Pilot Calculation of Decision Height (Altitude)/Minimum Descent Height (Altitude) 16. The following terms and abbreviations are applicable to this regulation: a. Decision Height (DH)/Decision Altitude (DA). The instrument minimum used by a particular pilot for a precision approach. The appropriate procedure minimum should be passed to the pilot by ATC as early in the procedure as practicable. The pilot is required to inform the controller of the minimum he will use, after allowance has been made for any additions. b. Engine Out Allowance (EOA). EOA values, applicable to precision approaches only, are quoted in Aircrew Manuals/Pilots Notes for those current multi-engine Service aircraft for which they are appropriate. c. Additional Allowances. The following additional allowances may need to be added to the procedure minimum before DH/MDH (DA/MDA) is declared: (1) (2) (3) Instrument rating. Engine(s) out allowance. Command allowance.
d. Allowances Specific to Aircraft Type. Allowances specific to aircraft type will also be taken into account. Where appropriate, they are laid down in the Aircrew Manual/Pilots Notes (or FIH for temperature error correction) and may consist of: (1) (2) (3) (4) Pressure error correction (PEC). Temperature error correction (TEC). Helicopter type allowance (HTA). Standby pressure instrument allowance.
17. Procedure for Calculating DH/DA - Precision Approaches. The procedure for calculating DH/DA for precision approaches is as follows: a. Fixed-wing Aircraft. Procedures for fixed-wing aircraft are as follows: (1) Full Power Available. Pilots are required to obtain the procedure minimum from air traffic control or FLIPs. Master Green and Green rated pilots will add to this figure any Command allowance to obtain the minimum, White and Amber rated pilots will further add the appropriate ratings allowance to this minimum. (2) One or More Engines Inoperative. To the minimum height (altitude) calculated in accordance with Sub-paragraph a.(1) above, pilots will add the appropriate aircraft EOA to obtain their minimum height (altitude) for an engine(s)-out instrument approach. b. Helicopters. All instrument procedures published by AIDU are fixed-wing procedures. All helicopters may operate down to 50 ft below the published minimum for fixed-wing category A aircraft as a baseline. Pilots will add any Command or rating allowance to this baseline in order to obtain the actual minimum for the approach.
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18. Procedure for Calculating MDH/MDA - Non-Precision Approaches. The procedure for calculating MDH/MDA for non-precision approaches is as follows: a. Fixed-wing Aircraft, Full Power Available or One or More Engines Inoperative. The procedure minimum for fixed-wing aircraft carrying out non-precision approaches will be calculated in accordance with the procedure detailed in Paragraph 17. EOA is not added directly to MDH/MDA but will be taken into account to avoid descending below this height/altitude. While a stepfix is employed in the final approach, any rating allowance is ignored in calculating the minimum height/altitude at the fix point. b. Helicopters. The procedure minima for helicopters carrying out non-precision approaches will be calculated in accordance with the procedure detailed in Paragraph 17.b, excepting that the dispensation to subtract 50 ft from the minimum for category A fixed-wing aircraft does not apply to non-precision approaches. 19. Allowances Specific to Aircraft Type. Pilots need to take the allowances specific to aircraft type listed in Paragraph 16.d into consideration in order to convert the true height/altitude of DH/DA or MDH/MDA into an indicated cockpit value. Because these allowances have no bearing on the true value of DH/DA or MDH/MDA they will not be declared to ATC. Although TEC is not, strictly speaking, specific to an aircraft type it is treated as such for simplicity. Where the sum of these allowances is 20ft or less it may be ignored. 20. Application of DH/DA and MDH/MDA. DH/DA and MDH/MDA are applied as follows: a. Decision Height/Altitude. If, during a precision approach, the required visual reference has not been established when the DH/DA is reached, a missed approach should be initiated using the minimum height loss technique. b. Minimum Descent Height/Altitude. A visual straight-in approach to land can be attempted only when the final approach track is within a maximum of 30 of the runway to be used for landing. When the final approach-track differs by more than 30 from the runway heading, the MDH/MDA will not be less than the circling minimum. Descent can only be continued below the MDH/MDA if the required visual reference defined in Sub-paragraph d, below, is available. Otherwise the aircraft should be levelled at or above MDH/NMA and descent can only be resumed if the visual reference becomes available in time to permit a visual approach. The aircraft may be circled for landing only if the conditions for a circling approach, in Chapter 26 Paragraph 26, can be met. If these conditions for descent below MDH/MDA cannot be met, a missed approach should be initiated on reaching the approach facility (or other designated point). c. DH(DA)/MDH(MDA) and Procedure Minimum. If the DH(DA) /MDH(MDA) is well above the procedure minimum, due to allowances added, pilots will, in effect, be overshooting early. If a planned turn is required early in the missed approach, this could result in the aircraft turning inside the planned climb-out segment. The same situation could occur during an intentional early overshoot before MAP. In these circumstances it is the pilots responsibility to delay initiating the turn until the MAP is reached. d. Required Visual References. No approach can be continued below the approach DH/DA or MDH/MDA unless at least one of the following visual references for the intended runway is distinctly visible to, and identifiable, by the pilot: (1) Category I Precision Approach, PAR or Non-Precision Approach.
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Elements of the approach light system. The threshold, or its markings, lights or identification lights. The visual glide slope indicator(s). The touchdown zone, zone markings or zone lights. The runway edge lights.
(2) Circling Approach. As for non-precision approach except that for circling approaches pilots must maintain visual references to the runway environment at all times, ie with features such as runway threshold, approach lighting aids or other features identifiable with the intended runway. (3) Category II Approach. A segment of at least 3 consecutive lights being the centre line of the approach lights, or touchdown zone lights, or runway centre line lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of these. The visual reference must include a lateral element of the ground pattern ie an approach lighting crossbar or the landing threshold or a barrette of the touchdown zone lighting. (4) Category III Approach. (a) Category IIIA Approach. A segment of at least 3 consecutive lights being the centre line of the approach lights, or touchdown zone lights, or runway centre line lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of these is attained and can be maintained. (b) Category IIIB Approach with a Decision Height. At least one centre line light. (c) Category IIIB Approach with no Decision Height. There is no requirement for visual contact with the runway prior to touchdown. 21. Application of Circling Approach Minima. The circling approach height ensures adequate vertical separation from obstacles on the ground during manoeuvring flight. When circling is intended following a precision or non-precision approach the instrument minimum adopted should be treated as an MDH/MDA and should not be lower than the circling MDH/MDA. Circling approach minima will not normally be applied to helicopters. 22. Calculation of Approach Minima AAC. Calculation of approach minima for AAC aircraft is as follows: a. Pilots will calculate their approach minima in accordance with the instructions in the RAF FIH. b. The instrument approach minima will be calculated using the instrument rating of the Aircraft Commander. c. d. Instrument Rating Categories. See Fly 2000. Instrument Rating Allowances are as follows: (1) (2) Green. None. White. A safety factor of 200 ft will be added to the calculated minima.
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Amber. A safety factor of 300 ft will be added to the calculated minima.
Operation of PAR No Break Power Supply and Fault Override Facility 23. The no-break power supply should be operated ON when instrument approaches are essential for the recovery of aircraft. 24. The fault override facility should be switched on for the recovery of aircraft in emergency. Otherwise, use of the fault override facility should be confined to periods when it is essential for the recovery of aircraft even if irreparable damage to the no-break set occurs.
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Chapter 24: Surveillance Directing and Ground Controlled Approach

REGULATORY CROSS REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3024(1)(2)(3)(4)(5). The Director 1. The duties of the surveillance director can only be undertaken by controllers who hold an Aerodrome Control (Surveillance) Rating and a current Terminal Control Director, TC (Dir), Local Operating Endorsement on their Certificate of Competency. Responsibilities Surveillance Director 2. The Surveillance Director is responsible to the DATCO/ATCO IC or supervisor for: a. Control and sequencing of aircraft in the radar circuit.
b. Control of aircraft handed over to him on either an internal handover or from an outside agency (ie CAC). c. d. Services to aircraft as dictated by circumstances or laid down in local orders. Surveillance radar approaches when required and if endorsed TC(SRA).
Directing Procedures General 3. In controlling radar recoveries, the Surveillance Director will sequence aircraft in both normal pattern radar circuits and short pattern circuits to establish on the final approach of an instrument approach as follows: a. Normal Pattern. The main elements of a normal pattern are a base leg, a converging heading and final approach. For multiple circuits, a downwind leg will also be included. b. Short Pattern Circuit. An aircraft overshooting from an instrument approach and precluded by weather conditions or other reasons from carrying out a visual circuit or normal pattern radar circuit can be repositioned on final approach using the short pattern circuit procedure with the minimum expenditure of fuel (see Paragraph 13). 4. In directing the aircraft towards the final approach, the Director should take account of: a. b. c. d. Known high ground or obstructions. Areas of radar shadow. Danger, Prohibited and Restricted Areas. Radar Clutter and Suppression.
If surveillance radar is not be available, DF may be used to position aircraft in PAR coverage. 5. Monitored Approaches. Monitored approaches should be given at the request of the pilot or as laid down in local orders or other instructions. Monitoring should be carried out by the Director or Talkdown controller who should:
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Advise distances from touchdown if required. Be prepared to take over control. Give warning of other traffic.
d. Give warning if the aircraft is going well below the glidepath or if for any other reason the approach is becoming hazardous. e. Obtain, and pass to the pilot, clearances, surface wind and circuit information normally associated with a PAR approach. Note: If the ILS localizer is offset from the runway, the precision radar centreline will not coincide with the centreline of an ILS approach as interpreted by the pilot. Terminal Radar (Ground-Controlled Approach (GCA) (STANAG 3817)) 6. Terminal radar equipments can be categorized as precision systems (PAR) and surveillance systems (Watchman). The performance characteristics of these equipments are given in operating manuals. PAR is classed as a precision approach aid by which it is possible for the pilot, on receiving instructions and information from the controller, to place the aircraft in a position from which he can land visually. The required visual reference consists of at least two bars of a standard centreline and cross-bar lighting system, or PAPIs. If these visual aids are not available, the runway threshold must be visible. 7. Whilst civil pilots who hold an Instrument Rating should be able to safely carry out a PAR, the CAA do not currently have any policy relating to its use. Military ATCOs should therefore never assume that a civil pilot has been authorized and trained, or is indeed current and competent to carry out this type of approach. Consequently, Military ATCOs should not offer this type of approach to civil pilots. However, following the passing of weather and serviceability state at an aerodrome, if the captain of a civil aircraft specifically requests a PAR, the approach can be provided. Military ATCOs should not question the aircraft captains decision, but provide whatever support is required to complete a safe approach. 8. The typical circuit pattern and procedures are illustrated in Figure 24-1, and are based upon STANAG 3817. Standard voice phraseology, as laid down in the CAP 413/STANAG, should be used. The identification of the aircraft should be completed before it is accepted for entry into the procedure. When identified, the aircraft should be given relevant procedural information together with radio frequency instructions for contact with the Surveillance Director. 9. The Radar Circuit. The radar circuit is divided into four parts (see Figure 24-1): a. The Downwind Leg. This is the leg extending from a point abeam the threshold of the runway concerned to a point A situated 25 from the reciprocal of the runway QDM depending on the circuit direction, at a range of 10 nm (this range may be varied to suit the aircraft type and adjacent traffic patterns). When an aircraft enters the pattern from the overhead, eg, on climb-out, procedural separation should be applied until surveillance identification and separation can be effected by the Director. b. Base Leg. That leg of the pattern from point A to point B, a position on the base leg where a line of bearing 10 from the reciprocal of the runway QDM intercepts the base leg. The heading of this leg, in still air, is equal to the runway QDM 90 depending on the circuit direction. c. Converging Heading. This serves conveniently to split the 90 turn between base leg and final approach to the advantage of the controller and the pilot.
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d. Final Approach. From the converging heading, the aircraft is turned to close with the extended centre-line of the runway. This phase of the procedure should not be hurried and the manoeuvre should be arranged such that the aircraft is established inbound, with the handover to the Talkdown controller complete, prior to arrival at the descent point. If, at this stage, the Talkdown controller is unable to accept control, the aircraft should be descended successively to pre-determined lower heights to avoid penetration of the glidepath. Headings should be passed to direct the aircraft along the extended centreline. This procedure should continue until either, the Talkdown controller assumes control, the aircraft reaches the decision height/minimum descent height appropriate to the type of surveillance radar in use or the approach can be completed visually. 10. Cockpit Checks. On radar assisted procedures cockpit checks are instigated by controllers. If the Talkdown controller assumes control before cockpit checks are complete, the Director should ensure that this fact is understood before he hands over the aircraft. A handover in such circumstances should not restrict the actions of the Talkdown controller. Pilots usually instigate their own cockpit checks on pilot interpreted non-radar assisted procedures but the controller can initiate them and may also introduce speed control measures to assist sequencing.
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Figure 24-1 Director Procedures - Radar Circuit
11. Handover to the Talkdown Controller. The Director should ensure that the following information is passed to the Talkdown controller prior to handover: a. Aircraft callsign.
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b. c. d. e. f. g.
Frequency to be used. Distance from touchdown. Heading of the aircraft. Height/altitude of the aircraft. Pilots DH/MDH and intentions. Any other information relevant to his task or required in local or other orders.
On receipt of the information, and when the Talkdown controller has signified his readiness to accept the handover, the pilot should be instructed to contact Talkdown. 12. Variation of Radar Circuit and Information. To accommodate differences in aircraft performance or approach procedures, the basic radar circuit and sequence of information can be adjusted as required prior to the final leg. The information need not be passed by the same controller but certain items of information (clearances) are closely connected and should be given/obtained in the correct order. The down-wind leg, base leg and converging heading may be varied as a means of delay to ensure adequate separation between successive aircraft is maintained and to prevent overloading the Talkdown controller. When the Director retains control of the aircraft for the final approach, he is responsible for giving/obtaining the clearances annotated for the Talkdown controller. Short Pattern Circuit 13. The direction and height of the short pattern circuit for a particular runway should be laid down in local orders. Factors that should be considered in deciding the circuit direction include high ground, traffic patterns, relative position of neighbouring aerodromes, Restricted Areas, type of approach control radar, etc. With certain surveillance equipment it may be possible to derive advantage from precision radar coverage of the final approach area by turning the aircraft in a particular direction. The procedure illustrated in Figure24-2 is designed for use by short endurance jets which have been unable to land from their previous approach and require a further radar approach with the minimum expenditure of fuel. 14. Normally, an aircraft committed to a short pattern circuit will be instructed by the Talkdown controller to contact the Director, as it will cease to be in precision radar coverage. The aircraft will be controlled thus until it is once again in precision radar coverage, when the Talkdown controller will resume control and complete the approach. Whenever possible, the short pattern circuit and subsequent approach should be completed on a single frequency. The Director should adjust the flow of other traffic so that the aircraft on a short pattern circuit is not delayed but is given the priority the situation warrants. 15. In the interests of efficiency and safety, each controller in the control team should be made aware that a short pattern circuit has been initiated. Clearances to integrate the aircraft into the traffic pattern should be requested and given anew without delay. 16. When the Talkdown controller possesses the requisite operating endorsement and has access to a surveillance radar element in addition to precision radar, he may retain control of an aircraft on a short pattern circuit throughout the procedure. The Talkdown controller should keep other members of the team informed so that they can adjust their traffic patterns to assist the short pattern circuit.
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Figure24-2 Director Procedure - Short Pattern Circuit
Surveillance Radar Approaches 17. Introduction. When PAR is not available, the surveillance radar can be used to carry out a non-precision surveillance radar approach (SRA). Using this procedure the controller passes instructions and information to the pilot to enable him to follow a pre-determined
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approach path to a position from which a visual landing or circuit can be made. This type of approach is not as accurate as a precision approach in that no electronic glidepath information is available, nor is there a similar degree of accuracy in azimuth. 18. Distance From Touchdown and Height. Before an SRA can be carried out the surveillance radar PPI should be annotated with data relating range to height for the direction of the approach. The setting up procedures for SRAs will vary depending on the equipment in use but in general, distances from touchdown should be annotated to the left of the line of approach, related heights to the right. 19. Azimuth Control. Azimuth instructions should be given in the same manner as for a precision approach; however, centreline information should be passed as per Figure 24-3 below. However, controllers will bear in mind that the slower update rate of the surveillance radar equipment and the fact that the picture, unlike PAR, is not distorted for ease of interpretation, both mask the effectiveness of smaller (2 or 3) heading corrections. Controllers should therefore consider carefully the size of their corrective headings and, in general, reserve 2 and 3 heading changes to maintain aircraft that have already been established on the centreline.
Figure 24-3 Surveillance Radar Approach - Relationship to the Centreline
Slightly Right of Centreline
Well Right of Centreline
On Centreline
Right of Centreline
20. Elevation Control. When the final approach is carried out by means of a nonprecision radar equipment the pilot should be instructed to achieve a rate of descent for an equivalent glidepath (GP) angle (300 ft per mile approximates to a 3 GP and 250 ft per mile approximates to a 2 GP). The descent should be commenced at a range from touchdown and at a height above the relevant datum which corresponds to the required rate of descent. Advisory heights should be passed with range information to assist the aircraft to maintain a rate of descent for an equivalent GP angle. 21. Actions. Unless the pilot has declared an emergency and requested direction to touchdown, the controller, in carrying out a normal SRA, should: a. Instruct the pilot to set QFE before commencing final approach.
b. Pass to the pilot, distances from touchdown together with pre-computed advisory heights at intervals of nm until the aircraft reaches a range equivalent to the pilots minimum descent height and heading instructions to intercept, and maintain, the centreline until the aircraft reaches the missed approach point; thereafter6 to pass advice related to the aircrafts position from the projected runway centreline.
Where the radar equipment has been appropriately flight checked for SRA approaches.
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Note: At RN aerodromes, ranges will normally be passed at 1/2 nm intervals and heights at 1/3 nm intervals. c. To advise the pilot that he is approaching his MDH.
d. To advise the pilot that he is approaching Missed Approach Point (MAP). When the MDH is within nm of the MAP the phrase approaching MDH is not included. 22. Clutter. If the aircraft response enters an area of continuous clutter and a radar service cannot be maintained, the approach should be terminated, the pilot should be informed of the loss of the radar contact, and a missed approach procedure initiated if the pilot cannot continue his approach visually. Responsibilities PAR Controller 23. A PAR is an instrument approach with the aim of enabling the pilot to obtain at least one of the required visual references at or before decision height, and be in a position to continue the approach to land, touch and go or carry out a low approach. The PAR controller is responsible to the Supervisor or DATCO/ATCO IC for the interpretation of the information presented by the PAR equipment. The controller should pass precise heading and glidepath/height information/instructions to enable the pilot to effect a safe landing, touch and go or low approach. The Talkdown 24. R/T Phraseology. R/T Phraseology should be standard and must be delivered in a calm, confident and unhurried manner, without error. Transmissions are normally to be interrupted by short regular breaks in order to provide the pilot with an opportunity, where necessary, to pass a short message to the controller without detracting from the limits of the procedure; however, exchanges of R/T should be kept to the absolute minimum. A continuous talkdown may be used when operationally necessary but a controller observing an unusual reaction from the aircraft return on his display or finding a pilot not reacting to his instructions should break transmission immediately to determine the reason. R/T phraseology for clearances is contained in CAP413 and Paragraph 33 below. 25. PAR Considerations. As with all radars, the primary method of control using PAR is by reference to the displayed radar contacts, and their relative movement. In particular, controllers should be aware of the following: a. Size of PAR Radar Returns. The size of the radar return remains constant throughout and is not dependent on the size of the aircraft being controlled. The widths of the radar contacts, centreline and glidepath, as displayed by the PAR system, are very similar in size and as such, even very slight deviations from the indicated centreline or glidepath can give an illusion of being more significant than they actually are. Therefore, there can be a temptation to apply an excessive number of corrective turns/height adjustments to aircraft that have, in real terms, moved only a small distance from the desired flightpath and controllers should take this into account when providing GP/CL correction advice to pilots. b. PAR Radar Coverage. Due to the volume of airspace covered by the PAR, it is highly likely that a number of other radar contacts will be seen. The azimuth element of the radar system is, in effect, a search radar that radiates in a specific sector, and its vertical coverage is significantly greater than the displayed elevation sector; the effect of this is that high altitude tracks (possibly up to 30 000 ft), may well be detected and displayed on the azimuth picture.
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c. Additional Radar Returns. On some runways, additional radar returns or clutter may be evident on a semi-permanent basis due to the presence of busy roadways passing over high ground within PAR coverage. In situations where 2 radar contacts cross tracks in azimuth or elevation at the same range, the appropriate PAR element (ie. azimuth or elevation) will only see, and thus be able to display, one radar contact during the period that the tracks are merged. The PAR will display only one radar contact until the 2 aircraft have diverged beyond the PAR elements resolution bubble (eg. an over-flying aircraft passing directly over an aircraft on PAR may result in only one radar contact being displayed in the azimuth picture until the tracks have diverged sufficiently for PAR to distinguish and display both aircraft). Once the radar contacts are outside the PAR resolution bubble, both contacts will be displayed; this should normally take no longer than 2 or 3 secs. 26. Data Block. A Data Block, designated by the controller, provides additional information and assists the controller in confirming that the correct contact has been correlated in both azimuth and elevation. Unlike SSR labels, Data Blocks are not universally tied to the contact aircraft. Temporary loss of the Data Block, or an observed jump to another contact, is not an indication of a radar fault. In cases where 2 aircraft diverge from each other (eg. a formation split, or a track crossing above or below) it will take a finite amount of time, dependent on the relative speed of the separation, for the radar to be able to distinguish and display separate radar contacts for each element; once the second contact is displayed it is possible for the Data Block to become attached to the detaching contact, rather than the contact of the aircraft that is being controlled (see Paragraph 39). 27. Takeover of Control - Preparation. PAR controllers should ideally listen in to the Directors frequency until the aircraft is transferred to Talkdown. The PAR controller should signify his readiness to take over control of an aircraft from the Director in an appropriate manner. Before accepting control, the PAR controller should ensure that all the information necessary for the successful fulfilment of his duties is in his possession (see Paragraphs10 and 11 above) and that a correlated (white) radar track is displayed in both (AZ & EL) pictures; finally, the aircraft Data Block should be displayed. 28. Takeover of Control - Actions. When the PAR controller signifies his willingness to accept control of an aircraft, the Director should instruct the pilot to contact the Talkdown controller on a specified frequency. The PAR controller should listen out and wait for the pilots initial call. In circumstances where, after allowing sufficient time to establish RT contact, none is made, the controller should transmit instructions to the pilot which involve a change of attitude in azimuth or elevation, or if it can be checked, a specific operation of the aircrafts transponder. Visual evidence of compliance will confirm that the pilot is receiving his instructions and will enable the controller to continue the talkdown after informing the pilot of his intention to do so. For recovery procedure with aircraft transmitter unserviceable see Chapter 41: 29. Distance from Touchdown. The PAR controller should select an appropriate range scale that will allow optimal accuracy to be maintained throughout the approach. In order to maintain the appropriate accuracy when reporting elevation positions, the final portion of the approach (ie. within 4 nm) should be conducted using the 5 nm range selection; the 3 nm and 1 nm range scales should not be used. Provided that the aircraft return and Data Block can be clearly seen, lower range scales can be selected as soon as the aircraft reaches the relevant range from touchdown (ie. at 10 nm from touchdown, the 10 nm range scale can be selected, at 5 nm, the 5 nm range can be selected). If the PAR controller observes another radar contact, whose position and/or track is likely to affect the PAR close to the point where the range would normally be reduced, then the range change should be delayed until the controller is satisfied that he can monitor the situation on the lower range setting. The PAR controller should provide range information at nm intervals to aircraft within 15 nm, and 1 nm intervals for aircraft 15-18 nm on final approach. Range information can be derived by
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reference to the range lines on the AZ/EL display, or from the displayed Data Block information. Note: Range lines provide more accurate range information and should be the preferred method of deriving range information when the aircraft is within 5 of the centreline. 30. Azimuth Control. Adjustments to heading in order to maintain the aircraft on the centreline should decrease as range decreases during the approach. Controllers should consider this when judging the size of heading corrections and avoid using small heading changes at range unless a finely tuned adjustment is required. The aim is to guide the aircraft smoothly onto the centreline 1 to 2 nms before Decision Height and to maintain it in that position. Controllers should also avoid increasing the pilots workload by instructing him to fly a series of small heading corrections when one or more, larger turns (5, 10 or 15) would suffice. An early appreciation of the effect of wind on the aircrafts track is vital if corrections will be timely and sufficient to correct any tendency for the aircraft to drift away from the extended centreline. When the aircraft passes Decision Height, the information the controller passes becomes advisory, and the controller should only pass the direction of turn and the number of degrees. The 2 and 5 azimuth lines (marked in blue) diverge either side of the centreline from touchdown, to assist the controller in determining the azimuth position. Heading changes should be assessed using the trend information gained from monitoring the track history trail. Track histories also show the rate of correction to the centreline (rapidly, nicely, slowly, not correcting). The aircrafts position in relation to the centreline should be described as follows:
Figure 24-4 PAR Azimuth Interpretation Azimuth Position On Centreline Slightly Right/Left of Centreline Interpretation When the radar return is on, or touching, the orange centreline. Note: The orange centreline marked on the display is 50 ft wide. When the radar return is between the centreline and the 2 azimuth line, but not touching either.
Right/Left of Centreline
When the radar return is between the 2 and 5 azimuth lines, or touching either.
Well Right/Left of Centreline
When the radar return is outside the 5 azimuth lines.
31. Elevation Control. The PAR controller should obtain a correct readback of the appropriate altimeter setting from the pilot prior to initiating descent. In circumstances where a late handover has taken place, it is permissible for the PAR controller to initiate descent followed immediately by a request to readback the appropriate altimeter setting. A warning that the aircraft is approaching the glidepath should be relayed to the pilot, as well as an instruction to begin descent. Accepting that allowances have to be made for the type of aircraft and approach speed, this warning will normally be issued as the aircraft reaches 200 ft below the glidepath . The instruction to begin descent should be given at a range commesurate with the performance of the aircraft. As the aircraft descends, the pilot should be advised of his aircrafts position in relation to the glidepath and its rate of correction (trend), to which he will apply his own adjustments to the aircrafts rate of descent. This rate of correction (rapidly, nicely, slowly, not correcting) can be estimated by monitoring the movements of the track history trail. There can be large fluctuations in the height
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information provided by PAR Data Block (particularly with larger aircraft or formations), therefore, controllers should concentrate on interpreting the overall trend of the descent, rather than report snapshots based on single height indications. Where possible, glidepath information should be given down to 50 ft below the published Procedure Minimum. The aircrafts position in relation to the glidepath is described as follows:
Figure 24-5 PAR Glidepath Interpretation
Glidepath Position
Interpretation When the radar return is on, or touching, the glidepath cursor. Note: To ensure the appropriate reporting accuracy, the final 4 nm of the approach should be controlled using the 5 nm range scale. When the radar return is no longer touching the glidepath, but the height information on the Data Block indicates that it is within 60 ft. When the height information on the Data Block indicates that the aircraft is between 61 ft and 100 ft from the glidepath. When the height information on the Data Block is greater than 100 ft from the glidepath. When the radar return touches, or is considered to be descending rapidly towards, the Lower Safe Limit Line Cursor (see Paragraph 32 below). An acknowledgement is required from the pilot.
On Glidepath
Slightly Above/Below Glidepath
Above/Below Glidepath
Well Above/Below Glidepath Dangerously Below Glidepath Acknowledge
Notes: 1. Where possible, controllers should avoid passing instructions which result in coincident capture of centreline and glidepath. 2. Aircraft approaching Decision Height below glidepath may approach the Lower Safe Limit Line Cursor before the criteria for Below/Well Below are met. In this situation, advice on proximity to the LSLLC should take priority as aircraft will be operating close to the limits of the PAR procedure. 32. Lower Safe Limit Line Cursor (LSLLC). An LSLLC is provided on the elevation display to assist the controller in determining when an aircraft is approaching the lower limits of the PAR procedure. The position of LSLLC is determined for each runway and is calculated on figures provided by No1 AIDU based on the Obstacle Clearance Surface for the lowest approved glidepath angle of the runway in use. The LSLLC should only be set by ITT engineering staff. 33. Clearances. It is the responsibility of the PAR controller to ensure that a clearance appropriate to the type of approach. The clearance should be obtained and repeated verbatim to the pilot and the controller should request an acknowledgement of the clearance from the pilot. In the event of the clearance being delayed, the controller should make a further attempt to obtain a positive clearance to Land, Touch and Go or carry out a Low Approach, or an instruction to break off the approach (suitably amplified); this clearance should be passed to the pilot not less than 2 nm from touchdown, and it follows that controllers should seek the clearance before 2 nm. While 2 nm will normally suffice, the range may need to be increased for faster aircraft in order to satisfy the 2 nm clearance criteria. The normal method to be used by the PAR controller should be to obtain a clearance from ADC using the Radar Clearance Line without simultaneous use of the
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Talkdown frequency. In exceptional conditions (ie. failure of the Radar Clearance Line), the PAR controller can request a clearance on the RT if it is considered essential. The PAR controller should use the appropriate facility and the Talkdown frequency simultaneously for the readback of the clearance. If a clearance has not been passed to the pilot by 2 nms the pilot should be instructed to break-off the approach. 34. Vital R/T Actions. The Talkdown controller should ensure that the following vital R/T actions are completed during final approach: a. Prior to Descent. Obtain readback of correct altimeter setting.
b. Immediately Prior to Descent. Warn the pilot of his approach to the glide path and impending descent. c. During Descent. Before a final clearance is obtained, the controller should instruct the pilot to check gear and obtain an acknowledgement. There is no requirement to check fixed undercarriage aircraft, but if the controller is in any doubt a check gear, acknowledge instruction should be given. d. Clearance. Request an acknowledgement of the clearance (eg. Callsign, Cleared to Land/Touch and Go/Low Approach, circuit state acknowledge). e. Approaching/Passing Decision Height. Warn the pilot that he is approaching his DH. The distance from touchdown at which this warning is given should be related to the pilots DH, the approach speed of the aircraft and its position relative to the glidepath (ie. if the aircraft is below the glidepath, then the warning needs to be provided earlier than if the aircraft were on the glidepath). The pilot should also be informed when the aircrafts radar return passes through the Decision Height cursor line. 35. Late Handovers. Late handovers can be problematic for several reasons, consequently it is impossible to cover every eventuality. Controllers should consider carefully their allocation of priorities in order to resolve the situation, and should control the aircraft by issuing positive control instructions before attending to administrative matters. In some circumstances turn and descent instructions may have to be initiated in one transmission, and while it is accepted that both controller and pilot workload will be increased, controllers should take care not to unduly overload the pilot. 36. PAR Az-Only Approaches. Units may continue to provide PAR Az-Only approaches as an alternative to providing SRAs; in such instances the published SRA procedure minima should be utilised for the approach. However, due to the manner in which PAR operates, it is highly unlikely that the elevation element of the system would ever fail in isolation, or fail in such a way that the alert message indications would still permit the system to be used AzOnly. 37. Message Alerts/Radar Failure. Full details of PAR system alert messages and their interpretation are provided in Chapter 28: at Paragraph 35 to 37. In the event that an approach has to be terminated due to a radar fault/failure, the pilot should be informed and the following actions should be taken, dependent on the stage of the approach: a. Early in the Procedure. Where possible, arrange for the approach to continue as a surveillance radar approach, or resume the precision approach if the fault is rectified. b. At any Stage. Handover the aircraft to the Director/Approach controller with appropriate RT instructions.
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c. Before a Positive Final Clearance Has Been Issued. Instruct the pilot to contact the Tower controller for clearance to join the visual circuit, or break off the approach and execute the Missed Approach Procedure, or to fly-through dead-side (if local procedures permit), depending upon whether the pilot is visual with the aerodrome. d. After a Positive Final Clearance Has Been Issued. Instruct the pilot to continue in accordance with the issued clearance, or execute the Missed Approach Procedure, depending upon whether the pilot is visual with the aerodrome. The phraseology to be employed in the event of a radar failure is in CAP 413 38. Loss of Radar Contact/Merged Contacts. In the majority of cases, a loss of radar contact will be accompanied with an appropriate alert/fault message. If a PAR radar contact is lost for more than 3 secs, the pilot should be informed and further action should be taken in the same manner as for a radar fault/failure as in Paragraph 37 above. 39. If a radar contact is regained within 3 secs, control of the aircraft can be resumed provided the aircraft is within 1 nm of the position that the contact was lost, is correlated and the new contacts track can be directly matched/related to that of its history trails. 40. If a radar contact is regained after 3 secs and/or outside 1 nm of the position that the contact was lost, the Talkdown can or cannot be resumed as follows: a. Outside 4 nms. Outside 4 nms, control of the aircraft can be only be resumed once the aircraft has been formally re-identified. Identification should only take place if the controller considers there is sufficient time to do so. In order to effect identification, the aircrafts position should be confirmed to the PAR controller by the Surveillance Director, or if it can be checked, a specific operation of the aircrafts transponder. b. Inside 4 nms. If radar contact is regained within 4 nms of touchdown, reidentification should not be carried out. Further action will be taken in the same manner as for a radar fault/failure as in Paragraph 37 above. In all circumstances, if any doubt exists then the approach should be terminated as defined in Paragraph 37 above. 41. In situations where 2 aircraft cross tracks in azimuth or elevation at the same range, and the tracks merge, only one radar contact will be displayed until the tracks have diverged sufficiently for the PAR to distinguish and display both aircraft. In such cases, provided that the re-displayed track of the PAR aircraft can be directly matched/related to its history trail prior to the merge, the Talkdown can continue. If any doubt exists however, the approach should be terminated as in Paragraph 37 above. 42. Formations. Whilst aircraft are in close formation, the PAR tracks the centre of the formation rather than displaying the position of the lead and/or individual formation elements; in real terms, the effect of this is negligible and is similar to the way larger aircraft (eg. C17) are tracked. When a formation splits, the effect on the radar is similar to the Merged Contacts situation in Paragraph 38 above, where the radar will only be able to display one radar contact until individual formation elements have separated beyond the radars resolution bubble. During this portion of a formation split, controllers should be aware of, and thus ready to anticipate, a possible jump in the displayed positions as the single radar contact becomes 2 separate contacts. 43. Separation/Avoidance of Other Contacts. With regard to radar separation, there are no set requirements to be maintained by the PAR controller as it is the responsibility of the Director and/or local operating procedures to ensure that the prescribed separation
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requirements are met. In this sense therefore, the PAR controllers duties will provide the pilot with the necessary information to avoid a collision rather than to maintain any specified separation distance. In situations where the Talkdown controller observes an un-notified radar contact on one element of the PAR display (AZ or EL) which is on a conflicting track or in a conflicting position, he should immediately check the other element of the PAR display (eg. if a confliction is seen in AZ, check for related contact in EL) in order to ascertain the relevance of the apparent confliction and act in accordance with the guidance below:
Figure 24-6 PAR Other Track Guidance Conflicting Tracks Behaviour Not displayed in both elements (AZ/EL) Displayed in both elements - collision risk only apparent in one
Action
No action required. Contact may be deemed to be outside the coverage area of one PAR element and therefore, no confliction exists. No avoiding action required. Traffic Information to be provided to pilot if considered relevant (Eg. Radar to Visual joins passing overhead, circuit traffic turning ahead/behind). Advice on suitable action for collision avoidance passed to pilot together with information on conflicting traffic. Instructions for manoeuvres in a vertical plane should normally only result in stopping descent or applying a climb. Where a heading change is involved, aircraft should be climbed to the relevant RVC height if the aircraft cannot be maintained within PAR Azimuth cover.
Collision risk apparent in both elements
Note: The above actions do not apply to the appearance of buddy tracks (see Chapter 28: Paragraph 40) 44. On Completion of the Talkdown. On completion of the Talkdown, the controller should use the appropriate facility to inform Director Talkdown free. Prior to conducting the next Talkdown, the controller should select the appropriate range scale. The Reset Default button should not be used to reset the display as the OBS mapping will be automatically be selected. In the event of an aircraft painting on the display prior to the controller stating Talkdown free the controller should select the aircrafts Data Block and state Talkdown free, contact (range of the radar return).
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Chapter 25: Surveillance Approach Control

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction withRA 3025(1)(2). The Approach Controller 1. Approach control with surveillance radar can only be undertaken by controllers who hold an Aerodrome Control (Surveillance) Rating and current Terminal Control Radar Approach TC(RA) Local Operating Endorsement on their Certificate of Competency. Also, where the duties of Approach Control are performed without the aid of surveillance radar, the controller manning the position will hold a current TC(App) or TC(RA) Local Operating Endorsement on their Certificate of Competency. Responsibilities Surveillance Controllers 2. Appropriately endorsed surveillance controllers are responsible to the DATCO/ATCO IC or supervisor for providing or performing some or all of the following services and functions when appropriate: a. b. c. d. e. f. MATZ penetration - TC(Zone). LARS - TC(LARS). Control of transit traffic other than LARS. Departure Control - TC(Deps). Radar to visual recoveries - TC(RA) or TC(Dir). Service to or re-allocation of other traffic recovering to the airfield - TC(RA).
g. DF procedures (this responsibility can be delegated as laid down in local orders) TC(RA) or TC(App). h. Control of aircraft in emergency (this responsibility may be delegated to another controller depending upon the nature of the emergency and position). i. j. Handovers to outside agencies. Such other services as may be laid down in local orders.
Services Provided by the Surveillance Approach Controller 3. Departure Procedures. The Surveillance Approach Controller should control aircraft on departures in accordance with procedures published for the aerodrome. The Surveillance Approach Controller should identify the aircraft and hand them over to the next agency as appropriate. Where a Centralised Approach Control service is provided, aircraft will normally depart in accordance with published procedures. The aircraft should be identified and handed-over to the ATCRU involved in accordance with local or other orders. 4. Handovers to Director. The Surveillance Approach Controller should carry out the initial identification of aircraft calling for random radar recoveries (either for direct or overhead approaches) and aircraft performing missed approach procedures. The Surveillance
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Approach Controller should ensure that these aircraft are at a suitable altitude/height/FL and position for the Director to integrate them into the pattern. In addition, the Surveillance Approach Controller should carry out the procedures in relation to MACF in accordance with Chapter 41: Paragraph 22. 5. Radar to Visual Recoveries. Aircraft requiring radar-to-visual recoveries should be recovered in the most expeditious manner consistent with the prevailing weather and traffic conditions. If required by local orders, the surveillance controller should inform the Aerodrome Controller of the approaching aircraft when it is at a suitable distance from the aerodrome, dependent on aircraft speed and local conditions or as specified in local orders. When positioning aircraft for this type of approach the Surveillance Approach Controller should consider: a. b. c. d. e. f. Reported cloud base, visibility and weather. Approach lighting aids available. Directors patterns and conflicting traffic. Other aerodromes traffic patterns. Airspace restrictions. Terrain clearance.
Aircraft performing a straight-in approach from a radar feed are also subject to these considerations and clearance criteria. 6. MATZ Penetration Service. The Surveillance Approach Controller should coordinate a request for a MATZ crossing with the Aerodrome Controller and Director as necessary. Where possible, aircraft should be permitted to cross the MATZ so as to avoid unnecessary deviation. Where it is necessary to inform other airfields of the aircrafts passage (eg in a CMATZ), the altitude at which aircraft are permitted to cross the MATZ/CMATZ should be carefully considered so as to cause the minimum of disruption consistent with safety. If circumstances are such that it is considered unsafe for the aircraft to cross the MATZ/CMATZ, the pilot should be informed and requested to re-route his aircraft. However, controllers should note that civil pilots are only bound to recognise and avoid the ATZ. 7. When crossing a MATZ or CMATZ it is the responsibility of the pilot to ensure that clearance is obtained to transit each individual ATZ embedded therein. The pilot, in his request for approval to transit the MATZ/CMATZ, may ask the controller to obtain such clearance(s) on his behalf. When issuing any approval to cross a MATZ or CMATZ controllers are, where appropriate, to articulate clearly any clearance or otherwise to transit embedded ATZs. 8. Phraseology for the penetration of a MATZ/CMATZ and ATZ is detailed in CAP413.
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Chapter 26: Approach Control Procedures

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3025(1)(2)(3) Holding Procedures 1. Introduction. In approach control it may be necessary to hold aircraft and provide separation (horizontal and vertical). The general procedure is to hold aircraft at a given altitude or flight level in an oval orbit aligned with a given heading with radio navigation or visual reference to a given datum. 2. Standard Oval Orbit. The standard oval orbit is performed by flying on a given heading (QDM) and reciprocal (QDR) linked together by rate one turns to the left or right. The oval orbit is normally 4 nm long, or the distance given by a one-minute timed run (in still air) up to FL140 and by a 1 minute timed run (in still air) above FL140 on the QDR, depending on the aid in use, eg when holding on an aid that gives continuous range reference (DME, TACAN), the orbit will be flown between 2 predetermined ranges 4 nm apart. In the absence of continuous range reference (ILS), the aircraft will be turned over the marker beacon, and the one-minute timed run will start when the aircraft is steady on the QDR of the orbit. A timed orbit may also be flown when the reference is to a visual object such as a ground feature. 3. Vertical Separation. In low-level holding procedures, military aircraft should be given altitudes which ensure a standard minimum vertical separation of 500 ft (1000 ft in CAS). In high-level holding procedures a minimum of 1000 ft vertical separation should be provided. 4. Selection of Holding QDM. When holding on aids which provide track guidance (ILS, TACAN) the orbit will be aligned to the QDM of the beacon and its QDR. When holding on omni-directional aids (NDB, visual landmark) the pilot should be given a holding QDM by ATC. This QDM should be selected to avoid: a. b. c. d. e. Adjacent holding patterns. Other airfields. Danger and Prohibited areas. Dangerous terrain. Built-up or crowded areas.
If possible, aircraft should be held in the direction of improving weather, and at altitudes which avoid icing. Approach Procedures QGH Note: For Approach Procedure No Compass No Gyro Procedres see Chapter 41: Paragraph 20. 5. Controlled descent through cloud (QGH) procedures are designed to enable a pilot, with the assistance of a ground-interpreted DF aid, to descend through cloud to a position in the vicinity of an airfield from which he can make a visual approach and landing or be
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positioned within the operational service coverage of an additional navigation aid for continued recovery. 6. There are 2 standard controlled-descent procedures, one for jet aircraft requiring descent from high levels and the other for aircraft below FL120. High and low level QGH procedures are illustrated in Figure 26-1 and Figure 26-2 and are described in the paragraphs below. Detailed orders for high and low-level controlled descents, including the points at which ATC liaison calls will be made, should be laid down in local orders. 7. Setting of QFE. Controllers should instruct the pilot to set QFE before the aircraft is allowed to descend below the intermediate approach altitude. 8. Missed Approach. If by the time the aircraft has reached the DF facility MDH the pilot has not reported that visibility from the cockpit is sufficient to enable him to make a visual approach or circuit and landing, then the controller should immediately instruct the pilot to initiate the missed approach procedure and to climb to the safety altitude, unless in an emergency. 9. References. For standard RT and control procedures see CAP413, for obstacle clearance criteria see AATCP-1/PANS-OPS, for classes of DF bearing see Chapter 48: Paragraph 3. 10. Homing. Aircraft should be homed at quadrantal/semicircular flight levels, as appropriate, regardless of weather conditions. In addition vertical separation of 1000 ft should be maintained between homing aircraft. If 2 aircraft call on similar bearings and at the same flight level, immediate steps should be taken to separate them in both bearing and flight levels. During the homing phase, the controller should: a. Pass headings designed to home the aircraft in the most direct manner.
b. Ascertain what type of recovery is required, eg HLCD to radar/VIS/ILS (if not transmitted in the initial call). c. Instruct the pilot to fly at an appropriate flight level and obtain flight conditions, if not already passed. d. e. f. Obtain aircraft type, endurance and POB, unless already known. Pass local weather and aerodrome information, including QFE/aerodrome QNH. Obtain pilots MDH/minima.
g. Pass Missed Approach and Communication Failure procedure, if required (see Chapter 41: Paragraph 22). 11. Overhead. Two or more consecutive No bearings are required to confirm the aircrafts overhead position when using DRDF. The aircraft should be turned the shortest way onto the outbound steer unless a long way round turn or an orbit is required for separation or local circumstances or orders dictate a particular direction of turn. An aircraft may not be allowed to leave the overhead until the preceding aircraft has turned inbound. When stacking aircraft in the overhead, 1000 ft vertical separation should be maintained between aircraft in the stack and between those in the stack and those homing. Whenever possible, the direction of any orbit should conform to the direction of the visual circuit so that if an aircraft flames-out, or becomes dangerously short of fuel, a spiral descent can be initiated without the aircraft conflicting with the circuit traffic in the latter stages of the recovery.
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12. Outbound. When the aircraft is steady outbound the QFE should be given and confirmation obtained that the pilot has set the correct pressure. Descent instructions should be given separately but should follow as soon as possible, but not until the QDM/QTE of the aircraft is within 60 of the ideal QDM/QTE for this leg of the procedure. If the bearing indications fall outside this limit, correcting steers should be given to rectify the situation before descent is commenced. 13. The Inbound Turn. The inbound turning altitude is normally half the initial approach altitude plus 2000 ft, adjusted for strong tail/head-wind components if required. The inbound turn can be used as part of the identification procedure when an aircraft will be handed over to the director for radar/ILS. 14. Inbound. When inbound, the aircraft should be given headings to achieve the ideal inbound QDM/QTE. The pilot should not be allowed to descend below the intermediate approach altitude until QFE has been set. Further descent to MDH/minima or other height specified in local orders, eg. for radar/ILS, is conditional upon the aircraft being maintained within the final approach area. Where a local procedure calls for the aircraft to be taken out of this area for handover to the Director, the aircraft should be held at or above the safety altitude until it is under the Directors control. Figure 26-1 Approach Procedure - QGH - High Level
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Figure 26-2 Approach Procedure - QGH - Low Level
15. Low Level Controlled Descent. The differences between HLCD and LLCD procedures are as follows: a. Homing. Except in emergency, if the aircraft is below the minimum safe flight level or safety altitude as appropriate, the pilot should be instructed to climb to a flight level, height or altitude equal to, or above, whichever applies, and homing should not commence until this has been achieved.
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b. Outbound. When the aircraft is on the approach side of the airfield, the controller should start timing the outbound run. The time for this run should be specified in local orders and TAP charts. Aircraft should not be descended below the intermediate approach altitude on this leg. c. Inbound Turn. This should normally be a level turn. Exceptionally, however, the pilot may be instructed to descend in the turn to an altitude not below the intermediate approach altitude. d. Inbound. Before clearing an aircraft for descent below the intermediate approach altitude the controller should ensure that QFE is set and that the aircraft's track lies within the final approach area. e. Vertical Separation. A minimum of 500 ft vertical separation should be provided between aircraft homing. Whenever possible aircraft should be homed in accordance with the Quadrantal Rule. Controllers should be especially careful when homing aircraft on different pressure settings and should ensure that the required separation does in fact exist. When necessary, aircraft can be stacked in the overhead at 500 ft intervals. Approach TACAN 16. The basic procedure by pilots using a TACAN beacon as an aerodrome approach aid may be varied to suit local conditions. Details of procedures for specific aerodromes are contained in TAP charts. Appropriate phraseology is given in CAP413. 17. Final Approach. Descent is continued until the pilot is in visual contact with the airfield or has reached the MDH. Approach Procedure ILS 18. See Figure 26-3. The initial, intermediate and final approaches using ILS depend on whether the aircraft is using a radio facility or fix on, or offset from, the ILS localizer beam, or whether the approach terminates at the localizer. 19. Procedure with Radio Facility or Fix on a Localizer Beam. Procedures for use with radio facility or fix on a localizer beam are as follows: a. Initial Approach. The aircraft should be flown towards the radio facility or fix, at a safe approach quadrantal flight level. b. Intermediate Approach. On reaching the facility or fix on the localizer beam the pilot is required to orientate the aircraft on the QDM of the beam and descend on the QFE to intercept the glidepath at the height given by the approach control. c. Final Approach. The aircraft should descend on the ILS glide-path until the pilot reaches his DH or is in visual contact, whichever is earlier. A landing or missedapproach as appropriate, should to be executed. 20. Procedure With Radio Facility or Fix Offset from a Localizer Beam. Procedures for use with radio facility or fix offset from a localizer beam are as follows: a. Initial Approach. The initial approach should be made as in Sub-paragraph 19.a.
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b. Intermediate Approach. On reaching the facility or fix offset from the localizer beam, the aircraft should descend on the QFE and carry out one of the following procedures: (1) Fly from the radio facility or fix along a predetermined track to intercept the localizer beam and glide-path, with the aircraft aligned on the QDM, at a position from which the final approach can be started. (2) Fly from the radio facility or fix along a predetermined track to intercept the localizer beam, turn onto the QDM of the beam and fly to intercept the glide-path at the height given by approach control. c. Final Approach. The aircraft will descend on the glide-path as in Sub Paragraph 19.c. Figure 26-3 Approach Procedure ILS
21. Procedures Where No Suitable Facility or Fix is Available. Procedures for use where no suitable facility or fix is available are as follows:
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a. Initial Approach. In starting the reciprocal track procedure using ILS, the aircraft approaches the airfield flying at a safe quadrantal flight level. ATC should pass clearance to use ILS giving the pilot the localizer beam heading, the correct QDM of the runway and the assigned height to be reached during the next phase, ie the intermediate approach. b. Intermediate Approach. The pilot informs control when he is overhead the localizer and confirms that he is still at initial approach quadrantal flight level. The pilot then sets the QFE and starts the intermediate approach. The function of the intermediate approach is to enable the pilot to orientate the aircraft on to the outbound heading of the localizer beam and descend from the quadrantal flight level to the height assigned by ATC for the down-wind leg. c. Downwind Leg. The aircraft is flown on the QDR of the beam, maintaining the height assigned by ATC. When the outer marker is heard the pilot informs ATC that he is downwind. ATC then gives clearance to let down and the outbound heading is maintained for a period of 2 minutes beyond the outer marker or for a period of one minute beyond the point where the glide-path is intercepted. The pilot then makes a right/left-hand procedure turn on to the QDM of the beam. This completes the downwind leg. d. Final Approach. The aircraft is flown on the QDM of the beam at the briefed altitude until approaching the glidepath. On intercepting the glidepath, final approach is started. At the outer marker the pilot is required to inform ATC that he is on final approach. The controller should then pass instructions to land, continue the approach or go around. The descent can be continued until the pilot is in visual contact and a landing can be made or the pilot reaches his decision height and has to initiate a missed approach procedure. 22. ILS runway and beam headings are published in TAP charts. For standard RT procedure see CAP 413. 23. Radar to ILS. Aircraft may be recovered for positioning within the localizer beam using a radar pattern similar to the GCA pattern in Chapter 24: . Approach Procedure NDB 24. Basic Procedure. The basic procedure employed by pilots using an NDB as an aerodrome approach aid may be varied to suit local conditions. Details of procedures for specific aerodromes are contained in TAP charts. Appropriate phraseology is given in CAP413. The basic procedure is as follows: a. Initial Approach. The aircraft is homed towards the beacon at or above the minimum safe flight level. The pilot is given details of the outbound headings associated with the procedure and the MDH. The pilot reports when overhead the beacon and descent clearance is given, together with the QFE. b. Holding Procedure. The standard holding procedure is an oval orbit, employing a timed leg, or a 4-mile leg when the beacon provides range information. c. Intermediate Approach. If necessary, the aircraft descends in the holding pattern to a specified altitude at which the aircraft is turned onto the outbound heading and descent is continued for three minutes or to the intermediate approach altitude. A left/right-hand procedure turn is then made onto the inbound heading. d. Final Approach. When steady inbound, descent is continued until the pilot is in visual contact with the airfield or has reached the MDH.
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e. Missed Approach. If an aircraft reaches the facility at the MDH without the pilot acquiring the required visual references, the pilot is required to initiate a missed approach. Circling Approach Procedure 25. A Circling Approach is an approach necessitating a visual circuit or partial circuit following a cloud break descent on instruments, in order to line up with the landing runway. 26. A pilot may carry out a circling approach only if the following conditions are met: a. The visual circuit or partial circuit is carried out at or above the specified minimum circling height and within the specified circling approach area. b. The in-flight visibility assessed by the pilot is not less than the minimum value for circling approaches specified by his Command Headquarters. c. The aircrafts position relative to the airfield or approach facility in use has been established and can be continually monitored either visually or by range and bearing. 27. If an instrument approach is made with the specific intention of circling, or if the final approach track of the authorized let-down procedure differs by more than 30 from the landing runway, the MDH used should not be less than the circling minimum. 28. Aviation Duty Holders should lay down minimum RVR values or meteorological visibility below which their aircraft are not permitted to carry out circling approaches. Single Frequency Approach Procedure 29. General. This procedure, applicable to RT radio frequencies, is in support of the general principle of reducing as much as possible pilot actions that might cause spatial disorientation during the let-down/approach phases of flight. Whenever practicable, this principle should also be applied to IFF/SSR code changes. 30. Definitions. Definitions are as follows: a. Single Frequency Approach. This is an ATC approach procedure whereby pilots will not normally be required to change radio frequency from the beginning of the instrument approach to touch-down, except that pilots conducting an en-route descent may be required to change frequency when control is transferred from the ATCRU to the terminal facility. b. Single-piloted Aircraft. This is an aircraft possessing one set of flight controls, tandem cockpits, or 2 sets of controls but operated by one pilot. 31. Procedures. When single-piloted aircraft request a single frequency approach they should, whenever possible, be allocated a single radio frequency to be used from the beginning of the instrument approach to touch-down. 32. Exceptions. Exceptions are as follows: a. In daytime, when a non-surveillance approach is made, aircraft may be instructed to change to tower frequency after the pilot reports being able to proceed by visual reference to the ground. b. At night, when in level flight prior to joining the circuit for a visual circuit and landing.
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Non-Standard Approach Procedures 33. Instrument let-downs which hasten, short-cut or in some other way do not follow the full published or authorized ATC procedure, but which are carried out under ATC, may be permitted. However, the emergency safe altitude or minimum sector altitude (as appropriate depending on range) should not be infringed until the aircraft regains the normal procedure at either the initial, intermediate or final approach fix, or until ATC using diverse radar vectoring can positively establish that the aircraft has passed the outstanding obstacle. 34. Instrument Approach Minima should not be applied to let-downs or approaches which for any reason are not under air traffic control or which do not, or cannot, comply with a recognized and authorized instrument procedure. Such descents or approaches (eg. Radar to Visual, let downs to achieve VMC and heliport or SAR operations) do not form part of AATCP-1/PANS-OPS procedures and consequently should conform to the relevant safety altitudes for the area and/or comply with the appropriate Aviation Duty Holders and Commanders orders: a. Radar to Visual. For a Radar to Visual approach, the airfield surveillance radar can give course guidance and descent down to the appropriate safe height as determined by the Radar Vector Chart for each airfield. Airfields at which radar to visual approaches are used as a normal means of recovery will have a weather limit below which only authorized precision and non-precision instrument approaches are permitted. It is suggested that this limit be 1000 ft (4 nm). In all cases where such procedures are used the minimum required obstacle clearance should be 500 ft inside 10 nm from the airfield and the normal 1000 ft (as specified on the radar vector chart) outside 10 nm. Where the radar head is displaced from the airfield, particular consideration will be given to the base of radar cover when descending aircraft for radar to visual approaches. b. Spiral Descents. Spiral descent procedures are conducted as follows: (1) Practice Approaches. For practice forced landings, when DF is used initially to recover the aircraft to the overhead and subsequently to spiral in the descent, the weather minima for radar to visual approaches should be applied and used as the lowest MDH. (2) Emergency Approaches. For emergency forced landings, bearings at the cardinal points should ensure that the aircraft is kept within the Cat E airfield circling area (4.5 nm). The Cat E circling MDH can therefore be used as the basis for the procedure. 35. Radar Vector Charts (RVCs) are charts that depict the lowest IMC vectoring heights in various sectors covering the normal operating range of the search radar. The heights specified provide a minimum of 1000 ft of obstacle clearance as required by AATCP1/PANS-OPS; in mountainous terrain - defined as terrain of 3000 ft AMSL or higher RVC heights should provide a minimum of 2000 ft obstacle clearance. Charts should be developed for each radar equipped airfield and should be displayed and available for use in Approach rooms. Charts will be compiled to order by AIDU, Design Cell at RAF Northolt.
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Chapter 27: Lower Airspace Radar Service

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3027(1). 1. The determination of policy for Lower Airspace Radar Service (LARS) is exercised by the Civil Aviation Authoritys Directorate of Airspace Policy (DAP). Operational responsibilities are delegated to appropriate military and civil authorities: 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. NATS Services Ltd (NSL) Director Airport Services. Non-NATS Airports Provider of ATS. MOD and Contractors Aerodromes MAA . RN Aerodromes ACOS (Av) via SO1 ATC. RAF Aerodromes HQ AIR via AOBM.
7. LARS provides radar services to civilian and military aircraft in transit, or operating outside the boundaries of controlled airspace, below FL100. Provision of LARS is predicated on the use of existing ATC equipment and manpower in order to provide coverage of UK airspace below FL100. Participating LARS units, the periods that their services are available and their area of coverage, are listed in the United Kingdom Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) ENR 1.6.3. 8. The provision of Approach Services should take priority over the LARS task. LARS ATSUs should provide either a Deconfliction Service (DS) or a Traffic Service (TS) in accordance with procedures detailed in CAP774 UK Flight Information Services. If a LARS unit is requested to provide a radar service to an aircraft operating beyond, and particularly, above the LARS envelope7, the request should be referred to the appropriate Air Traffic Control Radar Unit (ATCRU). If the ATCRU is unable to provide a service, the LARS ATSU may do so subject to the ATCRUs agreement and capacity being available. Deconfliction minima and terrain clearance criteria should be in accordance with the procedures detailed in CAP 774 and 235. Operating procedures appropriate to an ATSUs LARS area should be detailed in local ATC orders. 9. Statistics. LARS units are responsible for collation of monthly statistics, which include details of Civil and Military DS, TS and BS movements. Additionally, units should specify the number of occasions they refuse individual aircraft a LARS (on a daily reporting basis) and the report should also include the amount of time LARS is unavailable due to, for example, equipment unserviceabilities or controller sickness. Statistics should be forwarded to DAP on a monthly basis in accordance with separate instructions issued by DAP ORA4. 10. Reducing LARS Commitments. LARS is considered a national capability under the Joint & Integrated Appoach to the provision of ATS in the UK. Units should not unilaterally alter their LARS commitments without approval from the appropriate military authority.
The LARS envelope is considered to be within the limits of radio/radar cover of the providing unit, clear of controlled airspace and from ground level to below FL100. The service radius of individual units is generally 30 nm, but variations for some units are detailed in AIP ENR 1-6-3-3.
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Chapter 28: Air Traffic Control Equipment

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with.RA 3028(1). Daily Servicing Policy 1. Modern maintenance philosophy for electronic equipment calls for the minimum of preventive maintenance. In line with this philosophy and to avoid unnecessary duplication, it has been agreed by MAA /HQ ATM Force that functional checks of certain CommunicationsElectronic (CE) installations in ATC towers should be carried out by the controllers. 2. At airfields where CE equipment is switched off (or reduced to standby) at cease flying, it is the responsibility of technical staff to restore the equipment to its normal operational configuration carry out functional checks and establish serviceability prior to the next operational period. 3. Where the equipment is used or has been set up by the technical staff, it will be necessary for the controller to satisfy himself that the equipment is serviceable. Controllers checks are detailed in this Chapter 28: . Engineering checks, which include the controllers checks, are detailed in the preventive maintenance schedules for individual equipment. Basic Principles of Radar and Ancillary Circuits 4. Introduction. The operation of primary radar is based on the echo principle for detecting objects and determining distances, or range. The word RADAR is an acronym of Radio Detection and Range. Short bursts of energy or pulses are transmitted, and portions of this transmitted energy are reflected from objects in the path of the radio wave. The returned pulse is amplified by a receiver (Rx) and displayed on a Visual Display Unit (VDU). The time interval is measured between the transmitted pulse and the receipt of the echo from the reflecting object. The time taken between transmission of the pulse and receipt of the reflected signal from an object can be accurately measured, and using this information the distance of the object from the transmitter (Tx) can be calculated. 5. Basic Essentials of a Primary Radar System. The basic essentials of a primary radar system are: a. Timing System. An electrical signal, known as a trigger, is applied simultaneously to both the transmitter and the indicator on the receiver to allow synchronization. b. Transmitter. When the trigger is applied, a short high-frequency pulse of electro-magnetic energy is fed to the antenna system via a waveguide and the Tx/Rx switch cell. c. Tx/Rx Switch Cell. The Tx/Rx switch cell is used to co-ordinate departing transmitted pulses and returning echo pulses. The switch cell connects the Tx to the antenna system during transmission, and the antenna to the Rx for the echo. It prevents Tx output being fed directly to the Rx. d. Receiver/Signal Processor. The receiver amplifies the weak echo pulses and feeds them to the signal processor which removes unwanted targets such as ground, weather and buildings and also improves the signal to noise ratio.
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e. Radar Display. The radar display (VDU) is synchronised to the receiver and displays the output from the signal processor. f. The antenna consists of a reflector, feed head and a data take-off unit which provides Aerial Change Pulses (ACPs) and Aerial Reference Pulses (ARPs) to the display system. 6. Radar Transmission. Radar transmissions are short, high-power pulses of radio wave energy with a specific interval between pulses. The number of pulses per second is known as the Pulse Recurrence Rate (PRR) or Pulse Recurrence Frequency (PRF). 7. Radar Mile. It takes 6.2 microseconds for a transmitted pulse to travel to a target one nautical mile away and a further 6.2 microseconds to return to the receiver. This interval is known as a Radar Mile, and is equal to 12.4 microseconds. 8. Bearing Measurement. Data update on the VDU can, in the case of most displays, be made to sweep through 360 in azimuth. By superimposing a compass rose on the VDU exactly relating to sweep direction, bearing information is achieved. Most airfield search radars orientate sweep and compass rose to magnetic north to tie in with runway orientation. 9. Maximum and Minimum Range. It is important to appreciate that each returning pulse must be received and timed before the succeeding pulse is transmitted. The factors that affect maximum and minimum range are: a. Maximum Range. Increased range requirements dictate a lower PRR (longer wait for each pulse to return). b. Minimum Range. Each radar pulse takes a certain time for transmission (the Pulse Width). To ensure that the Tx is disconnected and the Rx is connected to the Tx/Rx switch there is a maximum pulse width which determines the minimum range of the equipment. 10. Ancillary Circuits. In order to eliminate some of the unwanted radar returns, the following ancillary circuits are normally incorporated in the radar system: a. Linear Receiver. The linear receiver circuit produces a linear amplitude of video. Thus, a large target produces a large return, and signal strength of any echo increases as the target approaches the point of origin of the picture. b. Logarithmic Receiver. The logarithmic receiver circuit produces a uniform video gain. Distant targets appear at the same amplitude as those close to the point of origin. c. Swept Gain. Swept gain is a means of ensuring that the amount of gain applied to any signal is proportionate to its distance from the point of origin. d. Moving Target Indicator (MTI). MTI circuits, in varying forms according to the equipment in use, eliminate returns from stationary objects. In certain circumstances, when aircraft are flying directly toward or away from the antenna at a speed proportional to one whole wavelength between transmitted pulses, the MTI circuit will cancel the response, just as responses from fixed targets are cancelled. Any aircraft speed which results in this radial component of velocity will result in no display, even though the flight path may not be radial. An additional blind speed exists when an aircraft has a radial velocity of zero, when the aircraft is flying at a constant range from the antenna (known as tangential fade).
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e. Circular Polarization. Circular Polarization is a means of making an antenna insensitive to responses from rain and snow, while retaining sensitivity to other responses and is fitted as standard within the Watchman system. Secondary Surveillance Radar 11. Basic Principles. Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) is a radio location system which, basically, measures time elapsed between a transmitted and a received radio signal and hence can determine the range and bearing of a target. In contrast with normal radar techniques, which use the echo reflected from the target, SSR makes use of an active device in the target to transmit a signal on receipt of a signal from the ground transmitter. The ground transmitter is known as the interrogator and the active device in the target is known as the transponder. 12. Components of an SSR System. The major components of a typical SSR system are: a. b. The interrogator/receiver and aerial system (transmitter site equipment). The transponder (in the aircraft).
c. The video link (replies received by the interrogator/receiver are passed into a video link). d. The video processing equipment. The transponder replies pass into the video processing equipment where they are translated and presented to the controller in an easily intelligible form. e. f. The display system. The system monitor.
13. Nature of SSR Signals. The main feature of SSR is that the aircraft responds to an interrogation from a ground station, as follows: a. Ground Transmissions (Modes). The ground interrogations are composed of pairs of pulse signals. For different modes, the time interval between the pulses is varied. There modes have the following functions: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Mode 1 Mode 2 Military parentage code. Not used by ATC. Military individual code. Not used by ATC.
Mode 3/A Military/civil identity. Used by military and civil ATC. Mode 4 Mode B Mode C Mode D Mode S Secure Military individual code. Not used by ATC. Civil identification. Not used in Europe. Height information. For future system expansion. Future Military/civil identity.
b. Transponder Replies (Codes). The aircraft reply consists of a pair of pulses known as framing pulses. In order to differentiate between aircraft, a number of pulse positions are spaced between the framing pulses. The pulse positions represent a 4MMATM Issue 5 UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED Page 239 of 354
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digit number in which each digit has a value from 0 to 7; this gives a potential of 4096 codes available on each mode. The mode and the code are set up on the cockpit control unit. 14. SSR Inaccuracies. Technical inaccuracies of SSR equipment may degrade or render inaccurate the presentation of SSR information, for example: a. Fruiting. Fruiting occurs when the interrogating station receives replies from transponders replying to other ground stations. This results in SSR responses being displayed at false ranges and bearings. b. Garbling. If a second aircraft is sufficiently close to the first to be interrogated, its reply may overlap that of the first aircraft and the resulting pulses will mix together and be impossible to decode accurately. c. Sidelobe Signals. The transponder may be triggered by the SR sidelobes as well as by the interrogator beam. This causes spurious replies on the display and, at short ranges, can produce large sidelobes on the response, which may produce a complete ring around. d. Transponder Suppression. Transponders which have just replied to an interrogation are unable to respond to a subsequent interrogation for a period of up to 125 microseconds. It is therefore possible that some interrogation signals may be ignored by the transponder. 15. Monopulse SSR (MSSR). MSSR is installed at certain airfields. The advantages of MSSR over conventional SSR are reduction in the problems associated with fruiting, garbling and track wander. Controller SSR Equipment Checks 16. The following controller SSR checks should be carried out after the equipment has been set up by the engineering staff, and at least once during each day, preferably before the start of flying operations. Where checks indicate a fault and controller corrective action is not shown or where suggested corrective action is ineffective, the engineering staff will be called. For Flight Refuelling RDS 1600 Display, set the following: a. Press the Range + key on the Trackerball assembly until the 40 nm range is visible. b. c. d. Select SSR on. Allow target trails to establish and check that SSR labels are correctly displayed. At the SSR remote control equipment, check that the following lamps are lit: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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MAINS. ANTENNA OPERATING. CONTROL AVAILABLE. MODE (depends on mode selected). Tx/Rx POWER. Tx.
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(7) (8)
SMPE POWER. ACTIVE.
e. Check that the reply from the on-site SSR monitor is displayed at the relevant range and bearing and is giving height and code information. Select normal operating range on completion. Watchman Primary Radar 17. General Information. The Watchman radar is a medium range single channel primary radar system operating in frequency diversity in the E and F bands. The radar can also be operated in frequency agile mode to provide electronic countermeasure (ECM) protection. It is normally used as a terminal approach radar, with feed into an instrument recovery system, but can be used for SRA or area control. 18. Aerial. The aerial assembly consists of a base casting on which is mounted a double curvature reflector and boom arm carrying the 2 aerial feed horns. The main beam is used for transmission and reception, the auxiliary beam horn for reception only. An RF amplifier, mounted on the rear of the aerial provides amplification of the auxiliary beam signals. Both beams are circular polarised. The azimuth beam width for both beams is nominally 1.5 with the nose of the main beam at +3 and the auxiliary beam at +7. The aerial system for a standard Watchman radar rotates at 16 rpm in wind speeds up to 70kt. The survival wind speed is 120 kt. 19. Transmitter. The main element of the transmitter is an air-cooled, grid-modulated Travelling Wave Tube (TWT). The driven TWT transmitter produces a dual pulse train, comprising a short pulse for improved target discrimination at short range, and a long chirp pulse for detecting targets of small radar echoing areas at ranges of 60, 80 or 120 nm depending on the Radar configuration. RF drive for the transmitter is produced in the driver section of the Signal Processing Rack (SPR) and is amplified in the transmitter. The rest of the transmitter consists of power supplies and monitoring and control circuits for the TWT. 20. SPR. The SPR contains the transmitter driver, the receiver and the Adaptive Moving Target Detector (AMTD). The AMTD consists of processing channels and a timing system. A further, unprocessed, channel is available and fed to the console as background video. The AMTD automatically adapts to the clutter environment by generating fine resolution amplitude and velocity clutter maps, which are used to apply clutter suppression only in areas where clutter exists. The strongest signal output from any of the processed channel integrators will automatically be selected as the processed video output. 21. When considering selection/deselection of the processed channels, controllers should be aware of the purpose of each and their respective operational effects, as shown below.
Figure 28-1 Watchman Processed Channel Selection Watchman Processing Normal Radar (NR) Purpose of Processing Gives best target detection in clutter-free areas. Provides tangential target detection. Options and Operational Effect Should normally be selected (ie LED not illuminated). If inhibited (LED illuminated), targets may be lost over the entire radar range due to: Tangential fading. Doppler blind speeds. Note. Radar service should be limited if the NR is inhibited. Should normally be selected (ie LED not illuminated). Page 241 of 354
Ground Clutter MMATM Issue 5
Gives best target detection in areas of ground clutter.
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Watchman Processing Filter (GCF)
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED Purpose of Processing The GCF range is optimized on installation but is typically set to 36 nm from the radar origin. Options and Operational Effect Has little advantageous effect on anaprop (anomalous propagation of radar returns often noticed during high atmospheric pressure). Targets subject to tangential fading. If inhibited (LED illuminated): Targets may be lost within the GCF range. MTI markers may be lost. Note. Radar service should be limited if GCF is inhibited. Should normally be selected (ie LED not illuminated). If inhibited (LED illuminated), targets may be lost over the entire radar range due to lower performance in areas of moving clutter. Note. Radar service should be limited if MCF is inhibited. Should normally be deselected. Only simple on/off switch available at DIU. However, when selected to on, a ranges of different desensitisation setting are available at the radar head. The Supervisor should be aware of the settings and which channel will be affected. Any angel suppression selection can desensitise the radar enough to lose targets. Note. Radar service should be limited if angel suppression is selected. Note: Angels, often called Dot Angels because of their dot-like appearance on the radar display, could be transitory echoes associated with atmospheric phenomena or birds etc; the former moving at the prevailing wind speed and the latter at some 10-20 kt above the prevailing wind speed.
Moving Clutter Filter (MCF)
Gives best target detection in areas of moving clutter (eg heavy rainfall).
Angels Suppression
Desensitises the radar to reduce Angels. Only fitted to a limited number of radar systems.
22. Cross Site Link. Multiplexed video, fault indications and control signals are communicated between the radar head and the displays over a multi-mode fibre optic link. 23. Display Interface Unit. The display interface unit, which incorporates the radar control panel, controls the operations of the radar system. The following controls are available: Figure 28-2 Watchman Display Interface Controls
Control Radar Operation Selects which of the 2 frequencies (F1 or F2) is transmitted in the short pulse; the frequency not selected will be transmitted in the long pulse. With SINGLE selected, the system operates as described under FREQ SEL. With DIVERSITY selected, the 2 frequencies (F1 and F2) are interchanged between short and long pulse every 9th PRI. Diversity mode is usual mode of operation occasionally, interference or noise may be prevalent in either F1 or F2, when Single would be used in conjunction with Freq Sel to obtain best picture MMATM Issue 5 Remarks
FREQ SEL.
SINGLE/DIVERSITY.
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Control
Radar Operation Selects the frequencies (F1 and F2) randomly from the 16 available frequencies. Used in conjunction with the FREQUENCY AGILE SEL control. When BURST is selected, the 2 frequencies are chosen in a random sequence every 9th PRI. When PULSE is selected the 2 frequencies are changed every PRI. Selects the transmitter to transmit mode. Inhibits RF transmission on either or both of the 2 azimuth sectors predefined by switches at the radar head. Inhibits RF transmissions. Inhibit the associated channel output from the processed video output of the SPR.
Remarks Not normally used switch located behind locked cover
FREQUENCY AGILE SEL.
BURST/PULSE.
Not normally used switch located behind locked cover
RF ON. SECTOR 1 BLANK & SECTOR 2 BLANK. RADAR SILENCE. NR INHIBIT, GCF INHIBIT and MCF INHIBIT
The radar is designed to operate with all processed channels active. The effects of inhibiting each channel is detailed below. Note. If inhibited (LED illuminated), Radar service should be limited.
24. NR Inhibit. Inhibiting the output from the NR integrator leaving only the filtered channels means that there is a possibility of losing targets due to tangential fading. Targets could also be lost in the nulls of the filters velocity response, ie Doppler blind speeds. However, with PRF stagger and frequency diversity selected the depth of nulls will be very shallow. In the event of PRF stagger being deselected, the nulls will be very deep and aircraft returns will be lost. These nulls occur at approximately 1/10 of the PRF, which is, for the standard Watchman, 110 knots and multiples thereof. 25. GCF Inhibit. Inhibiting the output from the GCF integrator will cause a loss of performance in areas where there is fixed ground clutter and the MTI markers could also fade, but targets should still be detected in the MCF channel albeit with lower sensitivity. 26. MCF Inhibit. Inhibiting the output from the MCF integrator will result in reduced performance in areas of heavy moving clutter since the other channels do not provide superclutter visibility under these conditions and hence these targets will be lost by anomalous propagation or angels various combinations of inhibits should be tried to permit limited operation through clutter. However, cognisance should be taken of the various limitations imposed by these combinations. 27. False Alarms. The Watchman video is processed to provide the controller with a high contrast display without traditional background noise. The system noise is assessed during the video processing and cancelled so only targets are displayed. Occasionally, unwanted noise or interference signals will be displayed; these signals are referred to as false alarms. False alarms appear as small single points at random positions on the display and do not have the characteristic trails of targets. 28. Watchman Radar Configurations. Watchman Radar is used in the following configurations:
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System A. Standard Watchman system with a radar range of 60 nm.
b. System B. Radar range of 80 nm with Range Azimuth Gating (RAG) option fitted. c. System C. Standard Watchman system with a radar range of 80 nm.
d. System D. Dual-range Watchman system switched between long-range (120 nm) and short-range (60 nm), both modes have RAG option fitted. e. System E. Radar range of 60 nm with RAG option fitted.
29. Watchman Radar Modifications. In order to improve its performance and meet specific requirements, the Watchman may have a number of modifications fitted on installation. The following options have been utilized at a number of radar sites: a. Range and Azimuth Gating (RAG). RAG is a modification that provides the flexibility of the selection of a number of radar functions on a range and azimuth basis and controls the following Watchman parameters: Seawatch thresholds, GCF Range, NR, GCF and MCF channel inhibits, Main Beam/Auxiliary Beam switch, Swept Gain (also known as Sensitivity Time Control or STC), PRF Stagger and Frequency Selection. The current version of RAG has a 4-map sub-system, which allows selection of different functions for each of the 4 maps. Each map is set up and optimised by ADATS, Henlow, and each provides for different conditions as detailed in each site's individual RAG report. Generally, Map 1 provides the least attenuation and will be the default map for normal operations. Map 2 and Map 3 introduce increasingly greater levels of attenuation and Map 4 is for engineering use only. The RAG maps are normally selected using a 4-position thumb wheel on the front of the DIU but in cases where Remote Control Monitoring System (RCMS) is installed, software driven controls enable the ATC Supervisor to select the correct RAG map. On RAG installations the only radar controls which require setting are the RAG Map Selector and Frequency Controls. Operation of filter, frequencies or any other function would only degrade the radar performance across the entire 360 degrees of the radar display. The site dependent RAG map report should be consulted in order to select the correct RAG map for the prevailing conditions. It should be noted that the radar will be returned to RAG map 1 as soon as conditions allow. Note: For further information on RAG, see the site dependent RAG map report. b. Remote Control and Monitoring System (RCMS). The RCMS allows operators and maintainers the opportunity to display and view the current status of the radar equipment. The RCMS runs a proprietary software package, SCADACOM, which has been specially designed for applications requiring Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA). Subject to user defined password and safety restrictions, an operator can take control action. c. To change the selected RAG map using RCMS, complete the following: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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Log on to the RCMS system. Ensure that radar control is available. Check the RAG map window. Using the left-hand mouse key, click on RAG map window. Click jog up/down to select the required RAG map.
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(6) (7) (8)
Select enter. Check the RAG map window shows the selected/required setting. Log off the RCMS system.
d. Plot Extraction. The Watchman video data is processed to provide a suitable format for transmission across long distances. The Plot Extractor is connected to a MODEM, which transmits the formatted radar data over telephone lines to the user sites. e. Radar Data Combiner (RDC). The RDC combines and aligns data from 2 sources: the primary and secondary radar systems. The data is combined and aligned against the primary radar source giving combined target data with correct range and bearing. 30. Radar Display Console. The radar display is the Flight Refuelling RDS 1600 Console comprising a Display Screen, Control Panel and Trackerball Unit. The Trackerball Unit comprises a trackerball with its 3 associated switches and an array of hotkeys. These are dedicated switches allowing rapid access to the most frequently used functions. Watchman Equipment Checks 31. The following controller checks should be carried out after the equipment has been set up by the engineering staff and at least once during each day, preferably before the start of flying operations. Where checks indicate a fault and controller corrective action is not shown or where suggested corrective action is ineffective, the engineering staff should be called. Ground and Moving Clutter filters and the normal radar video should be enabled and antiangel compensation, where fitted, de-selected, ie. LEDs not lit, (if the RAG option is fitted, ensure RAG map 1 is selected) unless the prevailing conditions require otherwise. The checks are: a. Display Interface Unit. On the Display Interface Unit controllers should check that the following green LEDs are lit: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) RADAR CONTROL AVAILABLE. RADAR ON. RF ON. AERIAL AVAIL. AERIAL ON. DIVERS (if selected). DATA LINK SEND. DATA LINK RECEIVE. DC SUPPLIES + 5v.
(10) DC SUPPLIES +/ 15v. On the Display Interface Unit controllers should check that no red LEDs are lit.
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b. Flight Refuelling RDS 1600 Consoles. On the Flight Refuelling RDS 1600 Consoles controllers should carry out the following checks at each console: (1) (2) (3) (4) Press the default key. Press the Graphic User Interface (GUI) key. Use the RANGE key to select 5 nm range. Check that the display has the following characteristics: (a) (b) (c) (d) (5) The focus is correct. The picture is centred and of the correct size. The MTI Markers are visible and in their correct location. No error messages are displayed.
On the main keyboard: (a) (b) Select the BKG VID key. Ensure CLUTTER CONTROL is set fully clockwise.
(6) Select a suitable range and using the Range and Bearing Line, check the range and bearing of a known PE and that the test target is displayed due north at the correct range. Check the background picture against the most recent display photograph. (7) Check that all video overlay maps are available, are of an operational standard and are orientated correctly with respect to the radar display (eg, correlation of known PE with corresponding map position symbol). (8) Deselect all video overlay maps.
(9) Deselect BKG VID and check that the displayed video is of operational standard. (10) Allow target trails to establish and check for the following characteristics: (a) There is continuity of target trails at the short/long pulse changeover range (approx 2.5 nm). Watchman transmits 2 pulses each PRI, a short pulse of 0.4 s, followed 42 s later by the long pulse of 20 s duration. The short pulse enables close in returns to be detected that would otherwise be lost in the transmission time of a long pulse. The long pulse itself contains the power needed to enable the range of the radar. This check will check the continuity of targets as they transition over the changeover range of 2.5 - 3 nm as at this range returns from an aircraft will be comprised of part short pulse, part long pulse, and in Diversity mode each pulse is of a different frequency. (b) There is continuity of target trail at the high/low changeover range. Watchman radar has 2 radar horns pointing at the scanner, the main beam horn and the auxiliary beam horn. In transmit, only the main beam is used to propagate the radar pulses, but when the radar switches to the receive mode, the auxiliary horn is connected to the receiver for a preset time, and
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then the main beam horn is switched in. The auxiliary horn points to a different point on the scanner which has the effect of only receiving returns from the upper part of the transmitted power lobe, which reduces ground clutter close in and decreases the radar cone of silence. The main beam is switched in after approximately 18 nm to give good low level coverage at range. This check will ensure that targets transiting the switchover point paint well. If there are weak returns inside 18 nm and good returns outside this range, it suggests there is a fault with the auxiliary beam circuits. (c) Each target has a consistent trail, which does not show abnormal variation in azimuth extent. Large aircraft at range tend to paint over 2 or 3 degrees and can be up to 1 nm in length. Abnormal would be any return that is considered excessively large. (d) Absence of interference signals or ground clutter residue.
(e) Low false alarm rate. When servicing the radar, a check is made of receiver sensitivity by switching off the transmitter and noting how many noise returns appear during each sweep on the display. A figure of between 3 to 10 'noise crossings' is expected. (f) (g) Absence of consistent test target. On completion of the check, set the display to normal operation.
c. Watchman Radar Installation (non RAG). For a normal Watchman radar installation (non RAG), controllers should carry out the following checks. As they are specific to the DIU, these checks should be carried out by the controller nearest to the DIU usually the Supervisor or ATCO IC: (1) At the radar control panel, select NR INHIBIT, GCF INHIBIT and MCF INHIBIT. (2) Enable each of the channels in turn, with the other 2 inhibited, and ensure that in each case video is present on the display. (3) (4) Enable all 3 channels (associated LEDs not lit). Check that the MTI markers appear on the display at the correct positions.
d. Watchman Radar Installation (modified with RAG). For a Watchman radar installation modified with RAG, controllers should carry out the following checks. As they are specific to the DIU, these checks should be carried out by the controller nearest to the DIU usually the Supervisor or ATCO IC: (1) Select each RAG map in turn and ensure that video is present on the display. (2) Return to RAG map 1 and ensure that the MTI markers appear on the display at the correct positions. Precision Approach Radar (PAR) Equipment 32. General Information. Details of the overall PAR system, plus a detailed description of the functionality and use of the Display Subsystem (Radar Consoles) are contained within AP115E-0509-1A, the PAR Operations Manual. The following paragraphs contain additional
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information, in amplification of that contained within the PAR Operations Manual, and the functional checks to be carried out by controlling staff. 33. Remote Monitoring. The PAR includes a Remote Monitoring System, which allows the RPAR history log from each PAR to be downloaded onto a central database at Basingstoke. The ITT Defence Site Engineers and certain MOD personnel can then access this data to check the reliability of the PAR system. 34. Air Gap Switch. Because of the remote monitoring system an additional security device, an Air Gap Switch is used on the PAR. The Air Gap Switch is used to prevent any download of the system data while the PAR is being used to control aircraft. Before any PAR approaches are commenced the controller will ensure the Air Gap Switch is open (ie. the link to the remote monitoring system is disconnected). 35. The PAR has a continuous Built In Test (BIT) monitoring system, which provides the operator with an indication of a change in the radars condition. Alert messages are provided visually via the display monitor and, in the case of major alerts, an audio alarm will also sound. The alerts provided can either be of an advisory nature, or can be used to alert the operator to minor or major problems with the radar as follows: a. Advisory/Minor Alerts. Advisory and minor alerts are displayed in normal video and provide information about the system which does not adversely affect the current performance criteria of the radar. b. Major/Critical Alerts. Major/critical alerts are displayed in inverse (ie. highlighted) video and are accompanied by an audible alarm. These alerts provide warnings of radar or system malfunctions, or combination of malfunctions, which prevent the RPAR operating to specification or which could adversely affect the performance criteria. It should be noted that the receipt of a major alert in itself does not necessarily require the approach to be terminated; some alerts, such as DAS REDUNDANCY NOT AVAILABLE (ie. one of the 2 radar consoles is not available for use) simply indicate that a parallel/standby element of the system has failed or has been disconnected, but the radar can still be used. 36. When a major alert, or a maintenance type minor alert such as "RADAR WORKING WITH ALERTS" is received, the Maintenance Personal Computer (MPC) should be checked immediately, in order to assess the status of the RPAR system and its suitability for continued use. The interpretation of the MPC indications is provided in the paragraph below. 37. Maintenance Personal Computer. The MPC monitors the overall system status during a combination of on-line and off-line modes of operation. Fault detection, fault isolation and a history log of fault reports and performance data is maintained and readily accessible by maintenance staff via the MPC. The MPC top-level screen automatically provides a lamp indication for each of the 5 system equipment groups, (Ancillary Equipment, Receiver/Frequency Generator, Antenna, Processor and Display Interface). The indicator lamps display red, yellow or green colours as follows:
Figure 28-3 MPC Indicator Lamp - Definitions/Controller Actions Lamp Colour Green Yellow Description/Action Required (Normal) - Indicates that the subsystems are fully operational. No failures. (Warning) - Indicates that the subsystem where the indicator lamp colour is displayed has a redundant (N+1) failure. Inform engineering staff. THE RADAR SYSTEM IS STILL OPERATIONAL. (Failure) - Indicates that the subsystem where the indicator lamp colour is displayed has a failure that requires immediate action. Inform engineering staff. THE RADAR SYSTEM IS NON-OPERATIONAL - any approaches in progress should be terminated. UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED MMATM Issue 5
Red
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38. Display Recording. The PAR includes a display recording package, data recording is accomplished by recording data onto the display hard drives. The data capacity of hard drives is such that the last 45 days worth of data is maintained. If any data period is to be preserved then all files relating to the relevant time period can be selected and copied to CD/DVD. When recorded data is to be played back users need to know which display was being used at the time of the recording, for example, if data to be viewed was recorded from Display 2 then only Display 2 is required for playback, Display 1 remains operational. 39. Moving Target Indicator (MTI) Marker. The PAR relies on the receipt of a continuous signal from the MTI Markers to confirm the correct alignment of the radar system. If the radar is misaligned or loses sight of the MTI marker for a prolonged period of time the controller will receive a Major Alert MTI REFLECTOR OUT OF TOLERANCE message on the display. The equipment resets itself automatically as soon as the MTI signal is received again. 40. Aircraft Target Size. The PAR has 2 processing algorithms, Large A/C and Small A/C. The default algorithm for the initial detection of all aircraft is 'Small', and this is the normal setting to be used when designating (tagging) individual aircraft, irrespective of the acs actual size. In some circumstances, when controlling larger aircraft with 'Small A/C' selected, additional 'ghost' images, (also known as buddy plots) may be observed to appear behind the aircraft for a short period; the presence of these tracks does not affect the conduct of the PAR and controllers can continue to control the 'tagged' contact. Note: Use of the Large A/C setting is not currently covered by the PAR System Safety Case and, therefore, is not to be used for controlling aircraft. 41. Rain/Clear Modes. The PAR has two modes of operation, CLEAR mode and RAIN mode. The purpose of RAIN mode is to prevent heavy rainfall, or other precipitation, being displayed as correlated returns. Selection of RAIN mode reduces the maximum useable range of the radar by 5 nm (ie to 15 nm); therefore, RAIN mode should only be selected if the weather conditions are such that spurious correlated returns are present. Following any toggle of Rain/Clear Mode the system processor is reset, causing all targets to disappear from the screen. Target data will reappear within a few seconds of the toggle (typically 4-5 sec, but could be up to 10 sec). Consequently, mode changes should not be carried out during an approach. 42. Short Time Constant (STC). STC is a signal processing function, which increases the receiver gain as range increases, reducing the false alarm rate for close in detections. STC should not be adjusted by controlling staff as settings are runway/site specific. Details of these settings are held at each unit by engineering staff. 43. Obstruction Mapping. Operational experience has shown that no practical benefit is given to controllers from the use of this facility, which is accessed via the Display Control selection, followed by toggling OBS. The normal operating setting for this function should therefore be OFF. Note: Operating with OBS deselected removes the requirement to select the radar to CLEAR MODE prior to conducting a runway change. PAR Controller Electronic Equipment Checks 44. The following checks should be carried out by the control staff after setting up by the engineering staff, and at least once during every 24 hour period of continuous operation: Notes:
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1. Where checks indicate a fault and a controller corrective action is not shown, or where suggested corrective action proves ineffective, the engineering staff should be called. 2. The audible alarms should not be turned off.
3. PAR control functions can be considered Selected and/or ON when the button background is highlighted (ie. yellow). At the display Console, select Radar Control in the Main Controls menu and confirm/set. Maint. Mode Antenna Drive Radiate Rain Mode AZ Ant Elev EL Ant Azim Not selected ON ON Selected according to weather conditions. Set to default position for Runway in use. Centre.
a.
On the Display Console, select Reset Defaults in the Main Controls Menu.
b. On the Display Console, select Display Control and confirm/set the display controls as follows: WX OBS MAP WHI. (Width-Height Indication) HIST RADAR COVER SYN VIDEO BIRD AREAS Sel DBFld ON (Weather) OFF (Obstructions Mapping) ON (Geographical Maps) Operators preference. WHI should not be used for controlling but may be used to aid situational awareness ON (History Trails) AZ/EL Coverage Grid ON OFF ON Select DBFld and 'Toggle FDB' to ensure that all lines and leader are displayed Operators preference Operators preference, but Medium Text is normally sufficient for all operators Set to 15 so that trends can be more easily observed
Lead Dir TEXT SIZE SET # HIST
c. Select the required Runway by selecting Runway Select from the Main Controls Menu. d. Select the required Glidepath angle from the Glideslope/Decsn Hgt menu.
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e.
Check the Display Console and the Maintenance PC for any fault conditions.
f. Check that the MTI marker is correctly positioned in relation to the runway touchdown point. PAR Runway Change 45. The following actions should be carried out to effect a runway change: a. At the display Console, select Radar Control in the Main Controls menu and confirm that "Ant Drive" is selected. Note: If the radar is already transmitting, it is implicit that "Ant Drive" is already selected, therefore, a specific check is not required. b. At the display Console, confirm that the obstruction mapping (OBS) is OFF (normal operating position), by a visual check of the elevation picture, and/or checking via the "Display Control" menu. c. At the display Console, select Runway Select in the Main Controls menu and then click on the required runway. d. Confirm selection of the required runway approach.
e. The radar will automatically cease radiating and display a REALIGNMENT NOT OPERATIONAL alert while the antenna is rotating to the required runway. f. When the Radar is aligned to the runway, the radar display will show an ANTENNA ALIGNED TO RUNWAY alert and the radar will automatically begin to radiate. g. Once the Radar has located the MTI Marker and confirmed correct alignment the radar display will show an AVAILABLE FOR OPERATIONAL USE alert. h. The runway change process takes about 2 mins 15 sec to complete; 1 min 15 sec for the realignment and about 1 min for the post alignment checks. i. Once a runway change has been initiated, it is vital that the turning process is allowed to run its course, and that the ANTENNA ALIGNED TO RUNWAY alert has indicated, BEFORE any further change in runways is initiated. If a runway change is attempted before this, it is highly likely that the PAR will fail completely and a complete restart will be required. Engineering staff should be contacted as the restart should not be carried out by controlling staff. Once commenced, the restart takes approximately 10 mins. j. On completion of a runway change, controllers should ensure that all runway change alerts are cleared. High Resolution Direction Finder (HRDF) Equipment and Controllers Checks 46. General Information. The HRDF is a wide-aperture direction finding system operating in either the VHF (100-156 MHz) or UHF (225-400 MHz) bands (or both). As a primary aid, it provides position fixing of aircraft, and may be used as a back-up to existing airfield navigational aids and auto-triangulation systems.
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47. Operating Instructions. Detailed HRDF Operating Instructions are contained within the MOD HRDF 2030 Operating Instructions manual, which should be kept as part of the core document-set within ATC units. 48. Equipment Monitoring. The HRDF system is designed to give dependable service with the minimum of adjustment and testing, and any doubts about serviceability are more likely to be stimulated by adverse external conditions than by internal defect. Operators should monitor the equipment (Engineering Status Indicators) for ongoing serviceability and report any faults to the appropriate engineering servicing facility. 49. Engineering Status. There are 4 indicators on the touch-screen NVD that provide a summary indication of the HRDF status as follows: a. Top-level BITE Status (an icon depicting the antenna). OK = Green background, Fault = Red background. b. Maintenance Mode (an icon depicting a spanner). Normal Operation = Green background, Maintenance Operation = Red background. c. Communications Link (an icon depicting a telephone). Comms OK = Green background, Comms Warning = Yellow background, Comms Fault = Red background. d. Mode of Operation (an icon depicting a battery). Main Operation = Green background, Battery Operation = Red Background. Notes: 1. Operators should report indications other than Green to the appropriate engineering service authority. 2. Operators should cease using the HRDF equipment if any of the Engineering Status Indicators become Red. Instrument Landing System (ILS) Thales 420 and DME 415 Equipment 50. General Information. An ILS provides guidance information for suitably equipped aircraft in the landing approach phase, using in the azimuth plane a localizer indicator, and in the vertical plane a glidepath indicator. Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) is used to indicate the distance of the aircraft from the threshold. 51. Localiser and Glidepath Facilities. The localizer transmitter provides horizontal guidance during the approach and is VHF; the glidepath transmitter provides vertical guidance during the approach and is UHF; both modulated with two tones, 90 and 150 Hz. The on path condition is given when the modulation depths of the 90 and 150 Hz indications are exactly equal. If the aircraft is off-course, one of the tones is greater than the other. Thus, an aircraft below the glidepath and to the right of the centreline receives signals in which the 150 Hz tone predominates. The localizer is also modulated with a noise code identity signal, and it can carry a speech channel for emergency use. 52. DME Facilities. A DME beacon operates in the 960 MHz to 1,215 MHz band. The interrogator, in an aircraft , transmits a pulse pair. This is received by the beacon, which replies after a fixed interval. The aircraft measures the time between transmitting its request until the receipt of the signal from the beacon and hence determines the distance to the beacon. The range determined is the slant range to the beacon and hence when the aircraft overflies a beacon the range will be the aircraft height at that time.
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53. Equipment Monitoring. The localiser phased array, the glidepath phased array and the DME antenna incorporate monitors designed to identify significant changes in the parameters of the transmissions. Any significant changes will result in both: a. Automatic action to transfer operation to the standby lane or cessation of transmission if the standby lane is not available; and b. Reporting via the user interfaces to systems engineering and air traffic control for action. Hardware control circuits ensure that out of tolerance signals are not radiated. ILS Controller Electronic Equipment Checks 54. Controllers are provided with a simple electronic equipment interface, comprising a red, yellow and green light display, which should be monitored whenever the ILS has been declared available for use. Controllers should consider the following guidance, provided from the Thales 420 safety case, when interpreting the electronic equipment interface display: a. All elements Green Indicates that equipment is in normal service, with no alarms or warnings. b. c. Elements Yellow Indicates a degraded (but still serviceable) condition. Elements Red Indicates that the radiated signal cannot be guaranteed.
d. Glidepath Red, Localizer and DME Green or Yellow. Localizer and DME approach may be flown iaw TAPS. e. Localizer Red System U/S regardless of other indications.
f. DME Red, Localizer and Glidepath Green or Yellow Approach may be flown and range information may be provided from another source such as PAR or PSR. Modular Control System (MCS) Equipment and Controllers Checks 55. General Information. The MCS controls the Aeronautical Ground Lighting (AGL), the road traffic lights and at some units, the aircraft arrestor system; the MCS is therefore considered to be essential for the safe conduct of flying operations. It is equally essential that controllers are conversant with what lights are controlled, the effects of partial or total system failure, and what immediate actions are required by control staff in the event of a system failure. 56. System Description. The MCS typically consists of: a. A control panel and mimic within the visual control room, showing the disposition of AGL and which have been selected on. b. A separate set of controls for the road traffic lights and aircraft arrestor system.
c. An A Centre in the control tower that converts the signals from the control panel and sends the data to the B Centres. d. A UPS/battery combination to provide power for the MCS control system (this does not include backup power for the AGL).
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Some units have automatic backup power supplies for the AGL.
f. At least two B Centres where the signals from the A Centre are used to control the operation of the constant current regulators that provide the power to the selected AGL and road traffic lights. 57. Each unit has its own particular disposition of AGL and a control system to meet the unit needs. The typical system for a single runway (for illustration, runway 24/06) aerodrome is as follows: a. B1 Centre controls: (1) All of the approach lights for runway 24 (centre line, cross bars, threshold, wing bars and PAPIs). (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) b. Every other runway light (the others are controlled by B2). All the taxiway lighting on specific section(s) of taxiway. Obstruction lights. Dispersal lights. Undercarriage check lights. Identification beacon.
B2 Centre controls: (1) All of the approach lights for runway 06 (centre line, cross bars, threshold, wing bars and PAPIs). (2) (3) (4) (5) Every other runway light (the others are controlled by B1). All the taxiway lighting on specific section(s) of taxiway. Obstruction lights. Dispersal lights.
58. Failure Modes and Alarms. The MCS is designed to provide controllers with an assurance that the lights selected have been switched on and vice-versa. This is achieved by a tell-back feature that determines that the lights are working as selected. Should this not be the case then the alarm activates (buzzers and lights). Note that for AGL elements that use large numbers of lights such as runways and taxiways, etc, the alarms only activate for a total failure. However, the alarms sound for a single bulb failure of the road traffic lights. 59. Controller Actions. In the event of a failure of the MCS control panel, road traffic light switches and/or failure of the A Centre, the AGL and road traffic lights can be hand-switched by the engineers from the B Centres. The process of asking the engineers to carry out the hand-switching causes a delay in the switching compared to the use of the control panel(s). UK MOD Flight Checking Policy 60. The policy, organization, and responsibilities for flight checking of UK MOD radio/radar navigation and landing aids are detailed in Flight Checking Instruction (FCI) No 1 Guide to
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Flight Checking for Station Personnel. FCI No 1 is sponsored by the Airfield Operations Support Integrated Project Team.
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Chapter 29: Air Traffic Control Centres

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE No current MAA regulatory cross-reference. General 1. Within the UK, Air Traffic Control Centres (ATCCs) and Air Traffic Control Radar Units (ATCRUs) have been established to provide area air traffic services. HQ ATM Force (RAF) and Fleet ACOS (AV) (RN) are responsible for the day-to-day operation of these military agencies. Detailed information concerning the ATCRUs is contained in RAF Flight Information Publications, ATM Force Orders and Chapter 30: of this publication. Military ATCCs 2. UK airspace is divided into 2 FIRs and their associated UIRs, the limits of which are described in RAF Flight Information Publications. London Air Traffic Control Centre (Military) (LATCC (Mil)), is responsible for the London FIR/UIR and is located at Swanwick; the Scottish Air Traffic Control Centre (Military) (ScATCC(Mil)) is located at Prestwick and is responsible for the Scottish FIR/UIR, both units operate on a continuous basis. Because of the differing tasks of the Centres, there are some differences in their organizational subdivisions. 3. Responsibilities of LATCC (Mil). The major responsibilities of LATCC (Mil) are as follows: a. Radar Services. Radar Services are provided in the London FIR/UIR.
b. Distress and Diversion Section (D&D). Provision of emergency and position fixing services to aircraft on the UHF and VHF International Aeronautical Emergency frequencies, military aircraft diversion arrangements, tracing of overdue aircraft, SAR alerting and the maintenance of current meteorological data and aerodrome serviceability states. Handling of practice emergencies involving military aircraft on the PETF. c. Radar Analysis Cell (RAC). Providing detailed radar analysis and radar replay recordings to established customers. Assisting with the tracing of all aircraft involved in Air Occurrences. (See Chapter 45: for responsibilities of RAC). d. Airspace Management Cell (AMC). See Paragraph 5 below.
4. Responsibilities of ScATCC (Mil). The major responsibilities of ScATCC (Mil) are as follows: a. Airspace Management Cell (AMC) 5. The UK AMC is located at LATCC (Mil); the 2 elements of the AMC are the Military Airspace Manager (MAM) and the Civil Airspace Manager (CAM). Between them, they are responsible for the allocation of airspace and for undertaking the following tasks: Radar Services. Radar services are provided in the Scottish FIR/UIR.
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a. Receiving airspace bids from approved agencies for temporary segregated use of nominated airspace over the UK. b. Receiving airspace bids from approved agencies for TRAs (excluding Spadeadam) outside their routine operating hours. c. Resolving conflicting requirements by using an agreed list of priorities to assure the most efficient allocation of airspace, taking due account of the interests of all users. d. Publishing its decisions in a timely manner by means of a standard-format Airspace Use Plan (AUP). e. Issuing an Updated AUP as necessary to free the maximum amount of airspace from temporary restriction. 6. The approved agencies will bid for airspace by 1100 hrs on the day prior to the requirement. The MAM consolidates the bids and resolves any conflictions, then the AMC uses the information to produce the AUP which details CDR availability for a 24 hr period from 0600 hrs the following day. The priorities to be followed when resolving conflicting civil and military bids are laid down by the Joint Future Airspace Design Team (JFADT). The AUP is sent to the Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU) in Brussels. The CFMU compiles and distributes a CDR Availability Message for the Eurocontrol Area. 7. Notwithstanding the published bids, should allocated airspace become available for reasons such as changes in weather or aircraft unserviceability, the MAM is able to release airspace for civil use on a tactical basis.
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Chapter 30: Air Traffic Radar Units

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3030(1)(2). Units Providing Area Radar Services 1. Area radar services are provided by the following ATCCs/ATSUs: a. b. LATCC (Mil). ScATCC (Mil).
And by the following ASACS Units in accordance with the appropriate DAP Policy Statement: c. d. e. CRC Boulmer (including the School of Air Battlespace Management). CRC Scampton. 1 ACC (based at Kirton-in-Lindsey).
2. Autonomous Radar Status. In addition to ATCCs and ASACS Units, certain military and civil ATC radar units are designated as Autonomous Radar Units in accordance with the appropriate DAP Policy Statement. Autonomous Radar Status authorizes a unit to provide an ATS to aircraft flying in CAS for which an ATCC has specific responsibility. Certain area radar services are also available from the following autonomous radar units: a. b. c. d. e. Plymouth Military Radar. RNAS Yeovilton (ATC and the RN School of Fighter Control). BAeS Warton. MOD Aberporth. RAF Spadeadam.
f. UK land, sea or air-based ASACS (in accordance with the appropriate DAP Policy Statement). g. Unit Tasks 3. Unit tasks are detailed in ATM Force Orders and HQ AIR ASACS Orders. Non-UK AEW assets as specified within the appropriate DAP Policy Statement).
Provision of Area Radar Services Qualifications 4. Only officers, warrant officers and SNCOs who have successfully completed the Area Radar Training Course and hold an Area Control (Surveillance) Rating can give an area radar service at an ATCRU. In addition, they should be operating under a current appropriate Local Operating Endorsement as specified in ATM Force / ASACS Orders (RAF only) or they are engaged in training under the direct supervision of a qualified area radar
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controller holding the appropriate current endorsement as specified in ATM Force Orders (RAF only). 5. FOAs should not pass flight directions to aircraft or to provide any form of radar ATS, even under the supervision of a qualified area radar controller. Types of Service 6. The types of area services provided by military controllers, including their application, limitations and operating procedures, are those detailed in Chapter 11: . Communications Procedures 7. Area services will be provided on such RT frequencies as are allocated for this purpose. Both the UHF and VHF International Aeronautical Emergency Frequencies should be available on request. Use of SSR 8. During the provision of area services, the use of SSR should be in accordance with the procedures in Chapter 35: . Reporting of Hazardous Flying Conditions 9. Reports of hazardous flying conditions received from aircraft under ATCRU control should be disseminated as quickly as possible in accordance with the following instructions: a. Action by Controllers Receiving Reports. Controllers receiving reports of hazardous flying conditions from aircraft under their control should: (1) Note all relevant details passed by the reporting aircraft and readback to ensure accuracy. (2) Pass details received to the Watch Supervisor.
(3) Relay the information to other aircraft under control which are approaching the area concerned, offering re-routing if necessary. b. Action by Watch Supervisors. On receipt of reports of hazardous flying conditions, Watch Supervisors will: (1) Arrange for the display of details of the conditions reported, including the area concerned, so that controllers are aware of the hazards involved. (2) If the ATCRU has a civilian element, notify the senior civil controller on duty. (3) Relay the information to LATCC (Mil) D&D Cell for onward transmission to the CFO Exeter. (4) Notify Watch Supervisors at adjacent ATCRUs and CAC aerodromes if it appears that aircraft under their control are likely to be affected. c. Action by ATCRU Controllers. Controllers notified of the presence of hazardous flying conditions should relay the information to aircraft under their control which are approaching the area concerned, offering re-routing if necessary.
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d. Subsequent Actions. ATCRU Watch Supervisors should issue up-dated reports where necessary, and should cancel the warning when it can be confirmed that hazardous flying conditions no longer affect the ATCRUs area of operations. RT Callsign 3 Figure Suffix for Student Pilots 10. Standard, clipped RT phrases used by controllers can create problems for inexperienced basic flying students under some circumstances. Instructions passed by controllers in the standard manner, whilst being familiar to experienced pilots, may confuse a student pilot and he may be reluctant to ask that they be repeated. 11. Consequently, pilots undergoing basic flying training will be allocated a 3-figure suffix to their tri-graph in order to draw the attention of the controller to the inexperience of the pilot. Controllers should note that a 3-figure suffix does not, of itself, imply a solo pilot and, if it becomes relevant, they should confirm the POB with the aircraft captain. In addition it should be noted that the 3-figure suffixes 101-199 are reserved for SAR helicopter missions. 12. Controllers providing a service to student pilots should: a. b. c. d. Speak slowly. Avoid complex instructions. Ensure that all instructions are acknowledged. Assist the pilot as far as workload permits.
Investigation and Handling of Airprox Reports 13. If an Airprox report is made by an aircraft receiving an ATS from an ATCRU, action should be taken in accordance with the procedures specified in The Manual of Air Safety.
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Chapter 31: Area Radar Procedures Above FL195

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3031(1). Airspace Above FL195 General Operating Procedures 1. The airspace classification between Fl195 and FL660 within the UK FIRs/UIRs is Class C and is therefore a known traffic environment. However, the FIR/UIR boundary is FL245 Military aircraft are not permitted to fly within Class C without receiving a Radar Control or Procedural Service from the ATCRU except when: a. Flying as GAT.
b. Flying as OAT or DAT under the control of an Autonomous Radar Unit, ASACS Unit, HM Ship or AEW aircraft. c. Operating within the East Anglian MTA, the North Wales MTA and TRAs during their published hours of activity or within active Danger Areas. d. Taking part in exercises under conditions specified under AUS coordinated activity. The boundaries of the ATCRUs responsible for the provision of services and their respective Area of Responsibility (AOR) are shown in the British Isles and North Atlantic En-Route Supplement. 2. For the purposes of providing separation, known traffic is one of the following: a. Traffic whose SSR Mode 3/A code indicates the identity of the unit that is authorized to provide a service within Class C airspace and is capable of validating and verifying SSR. b. Traffic whose SSR Mode 3/A shows a GAT ORCAM code.
c. Non-Squawking, Mode 3/A Code 0000, or no Mode C traffic, which should be approved by the ATCRU Supervisor and be the subject of coordination with the civil sector supervisor. 3. Separation. Separation within Class C is defined in Chapter 11.
4. Handover of Control. The handover of an aircraft from one ATCRU to another should be completed in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 9: Paragraphs 1-6 and normally before the aircraft reaches the boundary of the receiving units AOR. However, where this cannot be achieved and all possible methods of establishing surface communication have been exhausted, the aircraft should be retained within the releasing units AOR and instructed to free call the next ATCRU. 5. Radar Service in Another Units AOR. Regulations governing provision of a radar service in another units AOR are as follows: a. Normally, service to aircraft should be provided by the ATCRU responsible for that area. Pilots requesting area radar assistance in selecting airspace for general handling exercises amenable to Radar Control should, if traffic activity permits, be
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directed to operate within one AOR and the aircraft should be controlled by the appropriate ATCRU. Pilots who elect to cross AOR boundaries during general handling sorties should be handed over to the appropriate ATCRU as quickly as possible and may be required to cease manoeuvring whilst handover is made. Supervisors should ensure by frequent monitoring of handovers and observation of tracks adjacent to AOR boundaries that the established procedures are effectively implemented. b. If, exceptionally, an aircraft cannot be handed over to or controlled by the unit responsible for the AOR, the adjacent ATCRU may provide the service. Such circumstances should be kept to a minimum, but when they arise: (1) The controlling unit should pass details of traffic under its control to the unit responsible for the AOR. The information passed should be sufficient to enable the other ATCRU to obtain full coordination, if required, and should include details of the unit/console controlling the aircraft. (2) Co-ordination, where required, should be effected by establishing and maintaining continuous communication between the controllers concerned until coordination is completed in accordance with the procedure in Chapter 10: . (3) The ATCRU which is providing Radar Control in another units AOR without coordination is responsible for maintaining radar separation between the traffic under control and other observed traffic. 6. Co-ordination with Autonomous Radar Units. Autonomous radar units (not including HM Ships) providing service to aircraft above FL195, should co-ordinate their activities with the ATCRU responsible for the area in accordance with agreed co-ordination procedures. HM Ships are required to comply with the procedures at Paragraph 11. Where there are no specific co-ordination procedures for an ATCRU, controllers at Autonomous radar units should comply with the following procedures: a. Notify the relevant ATCRU of the flight details of those movements likely to operate above FL195. b. Identify the aircraft to the ATCRU concerned when it climbs above FL195, and confirm the details previously notified. c. Continue to update the flight details as agreed mutually.
d. On observing a potential confliction, attempt to obtain all relevant flight details from the appropriate ATCRU. e. Advise the ATCRU when the aircraft is clear of its AOR. ATCRUs are responsible for the overall airspace management of their AOR. Autonomous radar units given a mandate to operate in Class C airspace are responsible for separating traffic under their control from all other observed traffic unless, through coordination or by use of established procedures, an alternative course of action has been agreed. 7. Air Defence Exercises. To meet the requirements of air defence exercises, the following radar services should be provided for all participating target aircraft operating within Class C airspace (see Note): a. Outbound Aircraft. Controllers should provide normal radar services to outbound target aircraft.
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b. Inbound Aircraft. Between exercise Start and Stop points, controllers should provide traffic information on exercise aircraft for target aircraft. On such aircraft anticollision advice or instructions should not be passed, but any knowledge of interceptions should be passed to the pilot of the target aircraft. Controllers should, however, ensure that standard separation is maintained from non-exercise aircraft. c. Recovering Aircraft. Controllers should provide normal radar service for target aircraft during the exercise recovery phase, ie after the planned exercise stop line has been passed. Controllers are authorized to change, momentarily, the exercise SSR code to assist in the identification of target aircraft. Note: Agreement by HQ ATM Force/DAATM is necessary where changes are proposed to the military status of UK airspace, in the services to be provided by ATCRUs and in the procedures which they will adopt. 8. Radio Failure. In the event of aircraft or ground RT failure, the controller should inform the ATCRU supervisor and the aircraft will be treated as unknown traffic. Until RT contact is restored, the Supervisor should arrange to have the aircraft tracked whilst it is within their AOR, and should warn the appropriate ATC units along the aircrafts projected track. Special Operating Procedures 9. Operations Under the Control of ASACs Units. Aircraft can operate in Class C airspace under the control of ASACs Units. ASACs controllers should comply with prescribed separation standards when providing separation. 10. Flight Test Aircraft. Because of their special type of flying, some Flight Test aircraft are required to operate under the control of Autonomous radar units. 11. HM Ships. HM Ships may provide an ATS to aircraft operating in Class C airspace. Unless prior arrangements have been made with HQ ATM Force, AUS or the ATCRU concerned, the following procedures apply: a. Each day the aircraft operating authority should signal details of the following days flying programme to the ATCRU concerned. b. Before aircraft under a ships radar service enter Class C airspace, pilots are required to call the ATCRU on the ICF for identification before reverting to operating frequency. c. The ATCRU should track the aircraft within its AOR and vector other traffic clear whenever possible. d. The pilot is required to advise the ATCRU by RT when leaving the Class C airspace. Whilst controlling aircraft within the Class C airspace, Naval controllers should comply with prescribed separation standards when providing separation between their own and other observed traffic. 12. AEW Aircraft. AEW aircraft operating in Class C airspace under the control of an ATCRU or ASACs Unit, can provide control for air defence aircraft operating in the airspace. Additionally, an AEW aircraft operating outside the Class C airspace and receiving a service from an ATCRU or ASACs Unit, can control air defence aircraft operating inside the Class C airspace. The conduct of such operations should be in accordance with ID8. While
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operating in the Class C airspace, AEW controllers should comply with prescribed separation standards. 13. RT Silence. Where special circumstances require the operation of aircraft in Class C airspace under conditions of RT silence, aircraft operating authorities are required to make the necessary arrangements directly with the ATCRU concerned. North Wales Military Training Area (NWMTA) and East Anglian Military Training Area (EAMTA) Operating Procedures 14. During notified periods of activity, service should not be provided to civil registered aircraft within the NWMTA and EAMTA except for the following categories: a. b. c. d. e. Civil aircraft in emergency for flight safety reasons. Aircraft sponsored by MAA . Test flights by UK manufacturers of military and civil aircraft. Special flights authorized by HQ ATM Force. Air tests by UK registered civil aircraft under the control of military ATCRUs.
15. Civil aircraft in the categories specified in Paragraph 14 and military aircraft flying in the NWMTA or EAMTA may be provided with Deconfliction Service, Traffic Service or Basic Service. 16. When the EAMTA is not active or booked ATSOCAS will not be available and normal Class C rules apply. Booking procedures and details of the EAMTA and the NWMTA are contained in RAF FLIPs. 17. Provision of ATS in the NWMTA by RAF Valley ATC. DAP has authorized RAF Valley ATC to provide ATS to aircraft operating in the NWMTA (N) subject to the following conditions: a. b. RAF Valley ATC is only authorized to provide an ATS up to and including FL260. RAF Valley ATC will only provide an ATS within their known solid radio cover.
c. Class C rules for the provision of ATS will not apply within activated NWMTA (N) and ATS will be provided in accordance with UK ATSOCAS rules. Note: Outside NWMTA (N) activation hours, RAF Valley ATC can only provide an ATS to the upper limit of FL190, in accordance with UK airspace policy. Glider Operations Class C Airspace 18. Glider operations in Class C airspace are detailed at Annex 31A: .
UAS Above FL660 19. When flying in the UAS above FL660, aircraft do not have to receive an ATS unless operating as GAT. However, Deconfliction Service (and any associated Procedural Service), Traffic Service and Basic Service should be provided on request to such aircraft, subject to unit control capacity and the availability of RT and radar cover.
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Annex 31A: Glider Operations Above FL195

1. The procedures for gliders operations above FL195 are detailed fully in Mil AIP and LoAs and include operations in segregated and non-segregated airspace. TRA(G) will only be activated when weather conditions permit VFR operations above FL195. Activation of TRA(G) above FL245 is considered to be very remote. All glider booking requests will be coordinated by Mil ATCC and ACC supervisors and agree initial access arrangements based on prevailing and forecast traffic. Access Requirements 2. General. Glider operations above FL195 should: a. b. Be in accordance with LoA, or by specific permission. Require the following VFR criteria: Level At and above FL195 Distance from Cloud 1500 m Horizontally 1000 ft Vertically Flight Visibility 8 km
c. d.
Operations should be conducted on the SAS (1013.2 hPa). Radio contact should be maintained on the appropriate frequency.
Note: Radio frequency requirements for VFR operations by gliders above FL195 within a TRA, TRA(G) or by specified VFR permission outside a TRA, are detailed in the respective TRA(G) LoA, or specific permission. It is anticipated that localised VFR activity within a TRA/TRA(G) will continue, in the medium term, be permitted to operate with a 25 kHz channel spaced radio. VFR operations seeking access to airspace where the ACC controlling agencies require 8.33 kHz, will require to be suitably equipped. 3. SSR Equipment. TRA(G) have been provided to accommodate non-SSR equipped gliders. Access to Class C or TRA requires gliders to be equipped with SSR transponders. 4. Gliding Operations in TRA between FL195-240. Gliders equipped with appropriate RT and SSR transponder can operate in accordance with VFR within TRAs in Class C airspace between FL195-240 provided that the pilot: a. b. c. d. Files a flight plan (abbreviated may be permitted). Obtains an ATC clearance to enter the TRA. Selects SSR Mode 3/A as directed. Monitors the ATC frequency.
e. Whilst operating within a designated area, glider pilots will be in receipt of a Flight Information Service.
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5. Non-SSR-equipped Gliding Operations in TRA(G) between FL195-240. Detailed arrangements for access into TRA(G) for non-SSR equipped gliders are contained in LoAs between the responsible Mil ATCC / ACC and nominated gliding club(s). Gliding clubs will request booking of the TRA(G) airspace 2-hours in advance on the day of operation and pass details of time of activation, number of non-SSR equipped gliders and the maximum upper flight level. Mil ATCC Supervisors/ATCOs IC should co-ordinate the booking request with civil Supervisors and agree access arrangements. Glider pilots are required to obtain a positive clearance before entering TRA(G)s (this may be by telephone or radio) and remain within the lateral boundaries of activated TRA(G)s and below the agreed upper level. Gliding clubs are required to notify the Mil ATCC when activity is complete; in addition, they are required to provide a contact telephone number to enable the closure of the TRA(G). 6. Non-SSR equipped Gliding Operations in TRA(G) above FL240. Access details for TRA(G) above FL240 are similar to those above except that: a. The pilot is required equipped with appropriate radio and navigation equipment.
b. Permission to enter the upper TRA(G) should be obtained passing FL200 in the climb and report again when passing FL240 in the descent. A listening flight watch is required to be maintained with 30 min checks on the hour and half hour. Any real or suspected loss of RT contact will require the pilot to descend below FL240 within 15 mins. Full access requirements will be detailed in the LoA. 7. Crossing of TRA(G). Controllers should not vector IFR ac within 5 nm of active TRA(G) to maintain standard separation against non-squawking gliders operating within the segregated airspace. However, IFR ac in an emergency or flights that are ADPF may be vectored to cross active TRA(G). Pilots may elect to cross active TRA(G) under VFR; in this instance controllers should apply ATSOCAS within TRA(G). Information of the crossing traffic should be made to gliders with RT contact and contact should be made to inform the gliding club as early as possible. Glider Operations Outside TRA/TRA(G) Gliding operations between FL195-285 in Class C airspace outside TRA and TRA(G). Glider operations in Class C airspace between FL195-285 should comply with the conditions stated in the LoA or specific agreement detailed for the activity. In addition, if two way RT contact be lost, pilots are required to squawk 7600 (RT Fail) and descend below controlled airspace (FL195) as expeditiously as possible.
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Chapter 32: Area Radar Procedures Below FL195

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with.RA 3032(1). Provision of ATSOCAS 1. ATCRU controllers can provide ATSOCAS in airspace detailed in Chapter 11: Paragraph 9. Services in CAS General 2. ATCRU controllers can provide Radar Control to aircraft in Class A CTAs (including airways) and CAS of Classes C, D and E, when authorized by HQ ATM Force, without prior reference to the appropriate civil sector controller, provided that separation is maintained in accordance with Paragraphs 3-8 below. ATCRU controllers cannot provide ATS to aircraft in CTRs (irrespective of CAS Class) except when authorized by the appropriate control authority. Radar Control Basic Procedures 3. Radar Control should not be provided unless solid radar cover is available 10 nm each side of the aircrafts track and, between points on the track, 10 nm from each edge of the CAS, other than as follows: a. Aircraft climbing into CAS subject to the following provisions: (1) The base of radar cover is beneath the base level of controlled airspace.
(2) Transit is not permitted at a level where 5000 ft of solid radar cover does not exist beneath an aircraft unless it is the subject of a cleared flight path or procedural clearance from the relevant Civil Sector. 4. A controller providing Radar Control to aircraft crossing civil airways should, where practicable, vector the aircraft so that it follows the shortest route, subject to the provision of the required separation (eg. a crossing of a single airway should normally be made at right angles to the centreline). 5. When providing Radar Control, the controller should vector the aircraft so that horizontal separation, as detailed in Chapter 11: Paragraph 27, is maintained from all observed traffic, except as specified in Paragraph 6 below. In lieu of horizontal separation, vertical separation as detailed in Chapter 11: may be applied when any of the following conditions is satisfied: a. The controller has positive information that conflicting aircraft are flying outside the vertical limits of CAS. b. Prior coordination has been effected with the airspace controlling authority.
c. Conflicting aircraft are being controlled by the same agency and coordination has been effected. d. SSR Mode C data is used in accordance with Chapter 35: (primary radar height finders should not be used in the provision of separation). When verified Mode C
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indicates a conflicting aircraft to be outside the vertical limits of CAS, radar responses may be allowed to merge provided that its Mode 3/A is not that of a unit with approval to penetrate CAS and at least 1000 ft vertical separation exists. Controllers should exercise caution when controlling aircraft crossing CAS with lateral variations in base levels to ensure separation is not eroded against traffic which is subsequently cleared by the controlling authority to cross a lower portion of airspace. e. Unknown traffic is traffic other than: (1) Traffic whose SSR Mode 3/A code is a GAT ORCAM code or one which indicates the identity of the unit providing it with an ATS, provided that the unit is known to be capable of validating and verifying SSR. (2) Non-squawking traffic which is the subject of co-ordination.
6. Controllers are not required to give instructions to maintain the prescribed separation minima from unknown traffic to aircraft receiving a service within controlled airspace, unless it is known or suspected that the unknown aircraft: a. b. c. d. e. Is lost or has experienced radio failure. Has inadvertently penetrated CAS. Is not squawking. Is squawking Mode 3/A code 0000. Is joining CAS.
Radar Control Cleared Flight Path (CFP) and Radar Corridor Procedures 7. CFP Procedure. A CFP may be requested from the appropriate CAS sector controller by a controller authorized to provide a radar crossing of CAS. This procedure is subject to the approval of the sector controller and other conditions as follows: a. A CFP should only be requested when the prescribed separation may not otherwise be achieved. b. The position of the crossing should be stated in terms readily assimilated by the sector controller, eg as a bearing and distance from an airway reporting point. c. Once a CFP has been obtained, the agreed track or flight level of the crossing aircraft should not be changed without the prior approval of the sector controller, or the CFP automatically becomes invalid. d. An aircraft in receipt of a CFP is deemed to be separated from CAS traffic subject to any conditions notified by the sector controller. Consequently, controllers are not required to give instructions to avoid recognised CAS traffic unless the prescribed separation minima are observed being eroded. e. Within CAS, an aircraft on a CFP need not be provided with separation from unknown traffic (see Paragraph 5.d) unless it is known or suspected that the unknown aircraft is lost, has experienced radio failure or has inadvertently penetrated CAS. f. Notwithstanding the Right of Way rules in Chapter 4: , an aircraft crossing CAS under a CFP has right of way over OAT crossing CAS under Radar Control without a CFP.
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8. Radar Corridor Procedures. Detailed procedures for the use of Radar Corridors are contained in local orders and the UK Military Aeronautical Planning Document. Controller Initiated Procedural Crossing Clearance 9. When conditions are such that a CAS crossing cannot be provided under Radar Control Service the controller may obtain a procedural crossing clearance from the CAS sector controller. In such cases: a. The clearance should be passed to the pilot as if it had been requested by him.
b. Radar service should be terminated (rather than changed to Procedural Service) before the aircraft enters CAS. c. Radar identification should be maintained, where possible, if a radar service will be provided after the aircraft leaves CAS. Glider Corridors in Class A Airspace 10. Subject to terms agreed and promulgated in Letters of Agreement between the airspace controlling authority and the British Gliding Association, corridors may be established and activated for the crossing of CAS by gliders. Since the carriage of SSR transponders is not mandatory for gliders, there is a possibility that gliders within such portions of Class A airspace will not be visible on radar. Therefore, with the exception of aircraft in emergency, controllers should not provide an airways crossing service through Class A airspace notified as active for penetration by gliders. 11. In the event that an aircraft in emergency requires penetration of Class A airspace notified as active for glider crossings, controllers should warn the captain of the aircraft in emergency of the possible presence of gliders which may not be seen on radar. This warning should be passed before the emergency aircraft enters Class A airspace. Centralised Approach Control (CAC) 12. Handover from/to Transit Service. Handovers between controllers providing CAC and transit services should be be effected as follows: a. Aircraft on Departure. Handover of an aircraft on departure from CAC to transit service should be completed before the aircraft reaches FL195 or by the end of the SID, whichever is the sooner. b. Aircraft on Recovery. Handover from transit service to CAC should be effected at a mutually agreed point when the recovering aircraft is visible on the CAC controllers radar display. 13. Altimeter Setting During Descent. The altimeter setting to be used by aircraft in descent recovering under CAC has been agreed with each aerodrome operating authority; it will be either the Standard Altimeter Setting or the aerodrome QFE/QNH. Before the commencement of a CAC recovery the ATCRU controller should instruct the pilot to set the appropriate altimeter setting. If it is necessary to level the aircraft above the Transition Level, the controller should ensure that the pilot resets the Standard Altimeter Setting and flies to a quadrantal or semi-circular FL, unless there is an overriding reason for retaining the descent altimeter setting (eg delaying orbit, short pause in descent etc). If descent is resumed while the aircraft is under the control of the ATCRU, the controller should instruct the pilot to reset the appropriate altimeter setting. If the aircraft descends on the Standard Altimeter Setting, the controller should also pass the QFE or QNH as appropriate.
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Chapter 33: Special Air Activities

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3033(1)(2)(3)(4). EMBELLISH Aircraft 1. EMBELLISH is a codeword signifying that an aircraft is prepared to act as a target for fighter interception. 2. When under the control of an ATCRU, an EMBELLISH aircraft could be placed in a potentially hazardous situation if it is given avoiding action against conflicting traffic which, unbeknown to the controller, is a fighter carrying out interceptions under the control of a ACC/CRC. Therefore, when an ISTAR 1 (AEW) or ASACS unit selects an EMBELLISH aircraft for interception, details of the flight are required to be passed to the appropriate ATCRU. The ATCRU Supervisor should brief the relevant ATCRU controller of the intended interception and the controller should notify the aircraft and take this into account when passing information on conflicting traffic or initiating avoiding action. Notification of an immediate interception and identification of the fighter involved should be passed to the ATCRU by the Fighter Marshal. Supersonic Flights 3. See Fly 2000.
Non-Deviating Status (NDS) 4. General. The successful execution of time critical or profile dependent flying tasks may require priority. NDS may be agreed for the portions of such flights which take place within UK CAS or UAS but excluding activated airspace of the North Wales Military Training Area (NW MTA) or the East Anglian Military Training Area (EAMTA) or airspace which forms part of an active Danger Area. The requirement for NDS may be expressed as all, or part, of a notified flight profile and not merely for a constant heading or flight level or both. The nature of the UK FIR outside CAS is not consonant with the application of NDS. 5. Application for NDS. The DAP AUS is the central authority for NDS flights and is the focal point for NDS applications, inter-unit negotiations and approvals. Pre-flight requests for NDS from aircraft operating authorities will be forwarded to AUS in accordance with the regulations in Chapter 7: for military aircraft or the requirements in the UK AIP (ENR) for civil aircraft. AUS normally requires 21 working days notice in order to obtain agreement from the ATSUs and/or appropriate ISTAR or ASACS units concerned. Shorter notice NDS applications may be considered on merit. If NDS applications cannot be processed in time by AUS, aircraft operating authorities will be instructed to refer their NDS requests direct to the appropriate ATSUs, ISTAR or ASACS unit(s). These units should attempt to agree short notice requests for NDS but, if insufficient notice is given, may decline or modify the requests. In any event, profile amendments may be necessary if such changes will result in less disruption to other traffic. 6. Special Flights. Certain military operational sorties, including those recurring activities for which code words, nicknames and/or operations orders have been circulated to the affected civil and military ATSUs, ISTAR or ASACS units, are eligible for NDS without the need for 21 days pre-notification to AUS. These requirements are infrequent and, where sensitive topics are involved, are promulgated on a Need to Know basis.
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7. Approvals. After consultation with the ATSUs, ISTAR or ASACS units affected by a proposed NDS flight, AUS will notify details of the agreement reached by issue of an ACN covering the flight. If negotiations by AUS do not culminate in agreement, AUS will notify the operating authority of the refusal and/or recommended amendments which may permit agreement. ACNs will be issued in sufficient time to permit dissemination within the units concerned. Unless, exceptionally, there are overriding flight safety or operational requirements, the assignment of NDS should be recognised by the ATSUs, ISTAR or ASACS units affected by the flight. 8. Precedence. NDS affords priority of passage over all other OAT and GAT, except for aircraft in emergency, Royal Flights, Air Defence Priority Flights, GAT with higher UK civil priority category and Special Flights deemed to have a higher priority and which are described in separate publications which are issued to NATS and ISTAR units. The granting of NDS does not confer GAT flight priority in terms of ATC clearance or flow control. For flights of national importance in airspace that is subject to these factors and which would be aborted if deviated or delayed, AUS may authorise a GAT flight priority Category E or, exceptionally Category B, in conjunction with NDS. 9. Short Notice Military Requests. When the nature of an impending military operational sortie demands priority handling, in-flight or short notice pre-flight requests for NDS can be addressed by telephone or radio to the supervisory staff at the appropriate ATSU/ISTAR unit(s) who should consider the effect of the proposed profile, in consultation with adjacent affected agencies, and endeavour to approve the request. If an initial NDS request proves to be incompatible with the airspace management situation, the affected unit should seek and propose compromise/alternative arrangements which will enable the task to be met. 10. Tactical Notification and Co-ordination After NDS Agreed. Watch Supervisors/controllers at units controlling aircraft afforded NDS should ensure that all their own affected controllers and supervisors/controllers at adjacent units are informed of the activation of the flight, the details of the agreed NDS flight profile and the radar identity of the NDS aircraft at the earliest opportunity. Affected controllers should acknowledge their receipt of the NDS information to the appropriate supervisory staff. Once an aircraft afforded NDS has been identified with details to other units/controllers, other controllers should avoid the NDS flight or seek further coordination with the controller of the NDS aircraft. 11. Radar Services. Where NDS is being provided the aircraft should be under Radar Control or Procedural Service and in Class C airspace the aircraft should be considered to be operating under IFR. If, despite the prior coordination, it is necessary to issue an NDS aircraft with avoiding action instructions to resolve a confliction, such instructions should be passed without delay. A brief explanation for the avoiding action should be given to the Captain when the operational situation permits. When the flight profile takes an NDS aircraft outside CAS, it will be necessary for the controller to revoke NDS and apply the appropriate radar service; nevertheless, other controllers on the unit should continue to afford that aircraft precedence and do everything possible and reasonable to minimise deviation from the requested flight profile. Research and Development (R&D) Flights 12. Some aircraft engaged in R&D flying require special handling whilst undergoing performance and test flights. The majority of these specialized flights emanate from aerodromes south of 55 N and they are normally handled by the Special Tasks Section at LATCC (Mil). For controlling purposes, these flights should be categorized as follows: a. Category A Flights. Cat A Flts are those R&D flights which are amenable to normal ATC procedures. Air Traffic Service to Category A flights may be provided by
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ATCRUs or by Establishments and Contractors ATSUs. The procedures applied are those for Radar Control, Deconfliction Service and Traffic Service, as published in Manual of Military ATM, CAP 774, the FIH and by the MAA. b. Category B Flights. Cat B Flts are those R&D flights for which autonomous control by an R&D authority is not essential, but which require special handling to allow them the freedom of operation necessary to achieve the objective of the flight. Air Traffic Services to Category B flights will be provided by the appropriate ATCC. Pilots will ensure that the relevant supervisor is sufficiently briefed on the proposed flight profiles; the Supervisor will in turn brief the controllers handling the flight. When mutually agreed between the pilot and the Supervisor before take off, the surveillance service may be limited to monitoring the aircraft position in relation to CAS, Upper Air Routes and Danger Areas and to providing only such traffic information as considered necessary by the controller. In these circumstances it is essential that the parameters, both vertical and horizontal, within which the Category B flight will operate, are ascertained and displayed for information to all control staff. c. Category C Flights. Cat C Flts are those R&D flights for which autonomous control by an R&D authority is essential to either ensure the objectives of the flight are achieved or to meet the specific aircraft flight safety criteria. Air Traffic Service to Category C flights will be provided by Establishments and Contractors ATSUs. 13. Notification: a. Category A and B Flights. All Category A and B R&D Flights should be prenotified to the appropriate ATCC in accordance with current procedures. b. Category C Flights. All Category C R&D Flights should be pre-notified to the appropriate ATCC passing the following information: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Special Flights 14. On certain flights, such as photographic surveys and navigational aid calibration, aircraft frequently require to make repeated penetrations of CAS, Danger or Restricted Areas, or otherwise affect the operations of other airspace users (see Chapter 7: ). 15. Flights entering such airspace are subject to agreed procedures and clearance well in advance of each sortie. The sponsoring authority is required to submit details of the flight to AUS. AUS should then negotiate the appropriate clearances. Once agreement has been reached on all aspects of the flight, brief details are circulated to the units concerned and controllers are required to adhere to the brief with regard to route, flight level, coordination and clearance procedures. Type of Flight. Operating Area. Flight Levels to be used. Duration and nature of the flight. SSR code allocated. Other information.
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Air-to-Air Refuelling Procedures 16. Most air-to-air refuelling (AAR) in UK airspace takes place under service from ATCRUs, ISTAR or ASACS units. Most training refuelling is conducted on designated towlines, which are racetrack patterns some 60 to 100 nm long, usually between FL100 and FL290. Tanking exercises are normally advised in advance and the relevant airspace notified as active to other interested agencies. Detailed airspace utilisation procedures for individual towlines and ATC procedures for the control of AAR are contained in UK ARNIs. AAR operations in areas other than those designated for the purpose should be conducted in accordance with these procedures; when time permits, all such flights should be the subject of AUS Coordination procedures to facilitate, when applicable, the provision of NDS. All aircraft involved in refuelling operations in above FL195 should be under Radar Control. In airspace where Radar Control is not mandatory, any applicable ATS may be provided.
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Chapter 34: Air Surveillance and Control System

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3034(1)(2). Air Surveillance and Control System Control Responsibilities 1. The Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Air Command has a national responsibility to preserve the integrity of UK airspace. This task is discharged on his behalf by the Air Surveillance and Control System (ASACS), which is part of the Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) organization. The RAF element of ASACS comprises ground environment Control and Reporting Centres (CRCs), Remote Radar Heads, (RRHs) mobile radar units, and E-3D Sentry aircraft. To achieve the air-policing task, air defence aircraft, often together with AAR aircraft, automatic radio relay (AUTOCAT) and E3 support aircraft, undertake intercept missions under the direction of UK elements of the ASACS. These missions may be afforded the status of Air Defence Priority Flights (ADPF) and conducted in accordance with the rules governing ADPF as detailed in relevant JOIs/Interface Documents. 2. Routine AD missions can take place in any part of the UK airspace except: a. CAS (T).
b. The main UK south-north airway and upper air route complex, from the London/Paris FIR boundary to the northern boundary of the Scottish Terminal Control Area (TMA). Transit through the Hebrides Upper Control Area (HUTA) should only be carried out in consultation/co-ordination with ScATCC (Mil). c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. London TMA, from the north border southwards to the FIR boundary. Clacton Airspace from London TMA to the FIR boundaries to the east and south. All other airways except for the purpose of transit. Control Areas, including TMAs. Control Zones. Aerodrome Traffic Zones. Military Aerodrome Traffic Zones. Helicopter Protected Zones.
k. Helicopter Corridors (controllers providing vertical separation to aircraft overflying corridors should take account of the fact that helicopters operate up to the upper limit of overseas corridors). Provision of Radar Services 3. The only controllers permitted to give a radar service at an ASACS unit are:
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a. Officers, SNCOs and controllers on exchange duties who a Weapons Controllers Certificate of Qualification (or equivalent) and hold a current Operational Endorsement as specified in the C2 Spt Training Directive. b. Students engaged in controller training under the direct supervision of a qualified controller who holds a current Operational Endorsement as specified in the C2 Spt Training Directive. 4. Staff of the Royal Navy School of Fighter Control and students under their supervision can control aircraft in Class A and C airspace within the limitations of the Autonomous Radar Status granted to RNAS Yeovilton. 5. Controllers in HM Ships. RN controllers (Air Traffic Controllers, Aircraft Controllers, Fighter Controllers, Sea King ASaC Observers, and students under their supervision) are authorized to provide ATS in accordance with BRd766 and BRd767. Types of Service 6. The types of ATS provided by ASACS controllers are Radar Control, Deconfliction Service, Traffic Service and Basic Service. Provision of Service 7. The provision of services by ASACS/AWACS Weapons Controllers (WCs) and RN Fighter Controllers (FCs) should be in accordance with Chapter 11: of this document and CAP774. However, due to the requirement for ASACS/AWACS WCs and RN FCs to apply ATSOCAS whilst also providing tactical information to military aircraft iaw specified NATO procedures, the following exemptions apply: a. NATO documentation8requires unidentified traffic not a participant with the action in process to be known as a strangers. This is important when providing tactical, picture building information because of the need to classify individual contacts as targets9, friendly10 or stranger. This allows the military aircraft under control to take appropriate action against the correct aircraft whilst maintaining situational awareness on all non-participating aircraft. Use of the term traffic would introduce another variable and add confusion. Therefore, ASACS/AWACS WCs and RN FCs should use the word 'stranger' instead of the word 'traffic' when passing information on conflicting, non-participating aircraft. b. CAP774, Chapter 6, Paragraph 5 states that the relative bearing of a conflicting aircraft should be passed using 12-hour clock or, if the aircraft is established in a turn, cardinal points. However, aircraft under ASACS/AWACS control manoeuvre regularly such that the use of 12-hour clock would be inaccurate and, therefore, unsafe. Moreover, the use of cardinal points would conflict with the terminology laid down for the passing of threat warnings to aircraft. Consequently, ASACS/AWACS controllers should pass the relative bearing of conflicting aircraft by using Bearing, Range and Altitude (BRA) rather than 12-hour clock or cardinal points. 8. The following examples of authorized phraseology, at variance to CAP774, can be used by WCs, where a military aircraft is being provided with both an ATSOCAS and Tactical Control concurrently:
CC-AIR HQ Ramstein Manual 80-6 Tactical Employment of Air Power dated 2 Apr 09. AFTTP 3.1-1 USAF Comm Standard. 9 Target IDs such as Bandit,Bogey etc would be used rather than the word target. 10 A friendly aircraft taking part in the action in process.
8
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a. Traffic Information. (Aircraft identity), stranger BRA 230, 6, 21 thousand, heading 270. b. Deconfliction Advice. (Aircraft identity), avoiding action, turn right immediately heading 340, stranger BRA 230, 6, 21 thousand, heading 270.
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Chapter 35: Secondary Surveillance Radar

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3035(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7). OPERATIONAL USE OF SSR SSR Policy 1. DAP is responsible for formulating policy for the joint use of SSR by air traffic services within the UK. The policy is based on international agreements and no variations are permitted unless authorized by DAP. Code Allocation Plan 2. Controllers should assign discrete codes to aircraft according to the Code Allocation Plan (UK AIP ENR 1-6) which lists the codes allocated to individual air traffic service units for assignment to aircraft. The code allocation plan comprises: a. Domestic codes which are assigned to aircraft flying within the area of responsibility of the unit. b. ORCAM codes (see Paragraph 23) which are assigned to international flights and will be retained beyond the area of responsibility of the assigning unit. c. Codes allocated for special purposes.
3. Unless otherwise directed by an air traffic service unit, Mode C should be selected in conjunction with Mode 3/A. Operational Use of SSR Mode 3/A 4. Function of Mode 3/A. Mode 3/A can be used to: a. b. c. d. e. Establish and maintain the identity of an aircraft. Establish the position of an aircraft. Facilitate the transfer of an aircraft between ATS units. Supplement primary radar information. Provide navigational assistance when requested by the pilot.
f. Provide radar service in the absence of primary radar under conditions specified in Paragraph 7 of this Chapter. g. Detect aircraft which are subject to emergency, radio failure or unlawful interference. 5. Validation of Mode 3/A Codes. Mode 3/A codes should be validated as follows: a. A controller assigning any Mode 3/A code should validate the code by checking as soon as possible, either by direct reference to his display or with the assistance of
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another controlling agency, that the data displayed corresponds with the code which has been assigned. If this is not the case, the pilot should be instructed to recycle the assigned code. Where this fails to achieve display of the assigned code, then he should be instructed to select 3/A 0000. If a corrupt code still exists, the pilot should normally be instructed to switch off the transponder. However, where approved by local procedures and provided the Mode C has been verified, the corrupt code may be retained to assist identification and tracking. Associated ATS units should be informed of the retention of corrupt data. b. At units where code callsign conversion equipment is in use, procedures to ensure the correct correlation of the callsign with the assigned code should be applied. c. Where a controller can ascertain from the Code Allocation Plan that a discrete Mode 3/A code has been assigned by a unit capable of validating the code, and has not been notified that the code is corrupt, then that code can be deemed validated. 6. Identification by Use of Mode 3/A. When secondary radar is used, aircraft should be identified by one or more of the following methods: a. By observing compliance with a 4-digit code setting instruction.
b. By recognising a 4-digit code assigned to the aircraft callsign. When code callsign conversion procedures are in use, and the code/callsign pairing can be confirmed, then the callsign displayed in the data block can be used to establish and maintain identity. c. By observing an IDENT feature when its operation has been requested. Controllers should guard against the risk of misidentification which might result from simultaneous requests for different aircraft to IDENT when flying in close proximity. 7. SSR-Alone Operations. Primary surveillance radar (PSR) is the minimum level of equipment necessary to provide Radar Control, Deconfliction Service or Traffic Service. The planned temporary or permanent withdrawal of a surveillance system should be considered a significant safety related change and as such subject to appropriate Safety Management in accordance with the FLC (or equivalent for non-FLC organizations) Safety Management Plan (SMP). SSR-Alone operations will require approval of the appropriate level Duty Holder or the MAA and should be staffed through the relevant FLC Duty Facing organization (ASACS or ATM) except under the following conditions: a. Within Class A Airspace, Class C Airspace, Class C Airways, TMAs (TCAs), CTAs, TMZs and Danger Areas. SSR-Alone operations can be used as follows: (1) When specifically authorized by DAP and included in the Standard Operating Procedures for the Unit, or the Unit Order Book as appropriate. Authorization to be sought in the first instance through the relevant FLC Duty Holder Facing organization (ASACS or ATM). (2) To aircraft in emergency.
b. Airspace Without Specific DAP Approval to Operate SSR-Alone. SSR-Alone operations can be used as follows: (1) Following an unexpected failure, unless pre-approved and detailed in the Unit Contingency Plan, SSR-Alone should only be used as follows:
(a)
Establish procedural separation.
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UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED (b)
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Handover aircraft to adjacent ATS units with appropriate surveillance capability. Recover aircraft already established on recovery to the unit.
(c)
(2) To overcome temporary deficiencies within PSR cover, such as fading or clutter, the SSR return only of one aircraft may be used to provide separation from the primary or secondary return of another aircraft provided the PSR and SSR situation displays are correctly aligned. In this context unexpected PSR failure or maintenance does not constitute a temporary deficiency. (3) 8. To aircraft in emergency.
When providing an ATS using SSR-Alone, units should ensure that: a. NOTAM action is taken informing that the unit is limited to an SSR-Alone ATS and liaison with the parent ATCC and adjacent units is undertaken. b. The pilot should be made fully aware of the limitations of service as per CAP 413. c. d. Deleted at Change 4. Traffic is transferred (where possible) to units with overlapping PSR coverage.
e. Reduced Radar Separation (as detailed in Chapter 11: Paragraph 29) is not applied between Terminal Radar units. 9. Approval for SSR-Alone Operations. SSR-Alone operations, other than those specified in Paragraph 7 above, will require prior approval of the appropriate level of Duty Holder or the MAA and should be staffed through the relevant FLC Duty Holder Facing organization (ASACS or ATM), as follows: a. Planned PSR Outage. Where a unit requires to provide a higher level than a Basic Service, including during periods of planned PSR maintenance and prolonged periods of unserviceable PSR, prior approval should be obtained. b. Unplanned PSR Outage. Where a unit requires to provide a higher level of service than Basic Service, beyond that detailed in Paragraph 7b, this should be detailed in the Unit Contingency Plan and pre-approved. 10. Approval Process. In all cases safety management supporting the requirement should be provided in accordance with the FLC (or equivalent for non-FLC organizations) SMP which should interface with Duty Holders ASMS. While not an exhaustive list the following factors should be considered: a. b. c. d. e. Unit operational outputs. PSR coverage of adjacent units. Type of airspace, ie known traffic environment or not. Local airspace activities, ie gliding, parachuting and GA. Type of traffic, ie civil, military and LARS.
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f. Management of IFR training, ie aircrew lookout requirements, and practice diversions. g. Level of serviced to be provided, ie Traffic Service.
Operational Use of SSR Mode C 11. Mode C provides information on the vertical position of an aircraft in flight. This information is normally displayed as a flight level, but information transmitted by an aircraft flying below a pre-determined datum may be converted to an altitude by use of ATC data processing equipment. Mode C information may be used to determine whether an aircraft has reached, is maintaining, has vacated, or is passing a level or altitude, and accordingly the vertical displacement between aircraft and/or rate of change may be deduced. 12. Verification of Mode C Data. Controllers should verify Mode C data transmitted by an aircraft for accuracy on initial contact once the aircraft has been positively identified. Mode C data should be verified by one of the following methods: a. By a visual check of the data readout immediately on receipt of a pilots report giving his present or passing level. Particular care must be exercised when assessing the accuracy of the Mode C readout if the aircraft is climbing or descending. b. By co-ordination with another unit.
There is no requirement to monitor Mode C readouts for possible discrepancies once verification has been effected nor is it necessary to notify a pilot whose Mode C data is within the permitted limit. However, if a controller observes a discrepancy of more than 200 ft either during initial verification or during the subsequent provision of an ATS, the pilot should be asked to confirm his altimeter setting and level. If the discrepancy remains the pilot should be instructed to switch off Mode C. If independent switching of Mode C is not possible the pilot should be instructed to select Mode 3/A code 0000 to indicate a transponder malfunction. The Mode C readout may be deemed verified if it is associated with a validated, or deemed validated, Mode 3/A code. Codes with which the associated Mode C data must be considered unvalidated and unverified are annotated accordingly in the UK SSR Code Allocation Plan. 13. Criteria for Assessing Level Occupancy. The assessment of level occupancy by use of verified Mode C should be based on the following criteria: a. In Level Flight. An aircraft can be considered to be at an assigned level provided that the Mode C readout indicates 200 ft or less from that level. b. Vacating an Assigned Level. An aircraft which is known to have been cleared to leave a level can be considered to have done so when the Mode C readout indicates a change of 400 ft or more in the anticipated direction. c. Passing a Level. An aircraft climbing or descending can be considered to have passed through a level when the Mode C readout indicates that the level has been passed by 400 ft or more in the required direction. d. Reaching a Level. An aircraft may be considered to have reached an assigned level when three successive Mode C readouts indicate 200 ft or less from that level. Operational Use of Mode S 14. General. SSR Mode S is a co-operative radar surveillance system that employs ground-based interrogators and airborne transponders that have been designed as an
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evolutionary improvement to the existing SSR system operating in Modes 3/A and C. It will provide the necessary improved surveillance capability required to overcome the limitations of existing SSR and meet future traffic demands. Both ground and airborne Mode S installations will be backward compatible and Mode S interrogators will provide surveillance of aircraft equipped with Mode S, Mode 3/A and Mode C transponders. Mode S transponders will also reply to existing Mode 3/A SSR interrogators. 15. There are two levels of Mode S: Elementary and Enhanced Surveillance. Elementary Mode S allows selective interrogation of aircraft through a limited number of Downlink Aircraft Parameters (DAPs). Enhanced Mode S additionally enables DAPs, which include Aircraft Current State Vector Information and Aircraft Intention Information that includes Selected Altitude and the Barometric Pressure Setting on which this is based. Currently, State aircraft consist of a mixed fit of Elementary and Enhanced transponders, including a number of Enhanced equipped aircraft that do not yet transmit the full suite of enhanced DAPs. 16. Selected Altitude. The Selected Altitude DAP is generated by flight crew inputs into the aircrafts auto pilot system. Subject to appropriate surveillance system capability, the Selected Altitude DAP can be displayed to controllers on situational displays. 17. Selected Altitude data will be presented as either a flight level or an altitude, depending on local surveillance system settings, which should be detailed in local orders. For ATC and RTF purposes, the generic phase Selected Level is used to encompass data presented as either an altitude or a flight level. 18. Selected Levels display intent-based information only and should not be used for the purposes of separation. 19. There are occasions where whilst the flight crew have correctly interpreted the ATC instruction, the Selected Level will be at variance. These situations will vary according to aircraft type, aircraft operator, and mode of operation, but may include the following: a. SID/STARs with vertical restrictions, where pilots may select the final cleared level, and utilise the aircraft flight management system to achieve the vertical constraints. b. Final approach, at which point pilots may pre-select the MAP altitude.
c. When the aircraft is being flown manually, in particular in response to vertical avoiding action manoeuvres. 20. Units equipped with Enhanced Mode S surveillance systems that enable DAPs should display Selected Levels on the situation display as a means of mitigating the risk of level busts. The checking of Selected Levels should not be used as a substitute for RT readback of level clearances. 21. Where the Selected Level is seen to be at variance with an ATC clearance, controllers should not state on RT the incorrect level as observed on the situation display. However, taking into account the limitations of Selected Levels detailed above, controllers can query the discrepancy using the following phraseology: (Callsign), check selected level. Cleared level is (correct cleared level).
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Originating Region Code Assignment Method (ORCAM) 22. The UK is fulfilling its part of an international agreement by the application of ORCAM, which has been developed by EUROCONTROL and conforms to principles for SSR codeassignment endorsed by ICAO. Since there are insufficient code blocks available to devise a world-wide system, it has been necessary to group countries into participating areas operating their own ORCAM systems. The ICAO EUR Region is divided into 6 participating areas, with the UK joining Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland and parts of Spain in Participating Area West (PA West). Scandinavia forms a different participating area. 23. ORCAM involves the allotment of a specific block of codes to each ATCC within a participating area, the assignment of a discrete code to an aircraft by the ATCC responsible for the airspace first entered, and the retention of that code by the aircraft during its flight within the participating area. The system is designed to reduce RT and facilitate a more economic use of SSR codes. Before ORCAM can be fully implemented, it will be necessary to rationalise differences in national procedures and overcome the limitations in the processing capabilities of the SSR ground equipments of some participating states. Use of the system is currently limited to international GAT flights, but it is envisaged that eventually the majority of aircraft will be able to retain a single SSR code from take-off to touchdown, regardless of the number of control areas which are crossed during flight within a participating area. ORCAM does not and will not affect the use of ICAO special codes 2000, 7500, 7600, and 7700. Special Code Assignment 24. Code 2000. Aircraft are required to transpond in Mode 3/A Code 2000 and Mode C when entering UK airspace from an adjacent FIR/UIR where operation of transponders has not been required. The code will be retained until other instructions are issued or the aircraft lands. 25. Code 7000. The procedures for the use of Code 7000 (SSR Conspicuity Code) apply within the UK FIRs/UIRs, including MTAs. All pilots of military aircraft are required to transpond in Mode 3/A Code 7000 and, where equipped, with Mode C at all times except as follows: a. When flying in CAS.
b. When under service from an ATS or ASACS unit which requires operation of the transponder on a different setting. c. When required to select Mode 3/A Code 2000 as in Paragraph 24.
d. When circumstances require the use of Special Purpose Codes in accordance with the UK SSR Code Allocation Plan. e. f. g. When conducting special operations. To recover an aircraft with an unserviceable transponder. When remaining within the aerodrome traffic pattern below 3000 ft agl.
h. When operating with warships where the exercise requires SSR to be switched off for tactical purposes within a notified area.
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i. When required to select an alternative code in Mode 3/A in accordance with Paragraph 26. When about to terminate service, controllers should instruct pilots to select Mode 3/A Code 7000 and Mode C, unless any of the above exceptions apply. 26. Code 7001. Except for those circumstances described in the UK Mil AIP, Volume 3, Part 1, Section 1, and when conducting special operations, all pilots of military aircraft are required to select Mode 3/A Code 7001 and where equipped, with Mode C on passing 2000 ft MSD in descent to the UK Low Flying System (UKLFS), and retain that setting whilst operating in the UKLFS. On climbout, if a radar service is required, Mode 3/A Code 7001 is required to be retained until alternative instructions are passed. If a service is not required, the squawk is required to be changed to the conspicuity code 7000 when the climb is safely established and as close to 2000 ft as safety permits. Full details of operating in the UKLFS are in the UK Mil AIP, Volume 3, Part 1. 27. Code 7002. Code 7002 is used to identify aircraft that are operating within Danger Areas. 28. Code 7003. Code 7003 is used to identify the RAF Aerobatic Team (The Red Arrows) in transit and whilst displaying. 29. Code 7004. The special purpose 3/A Code 7004 may be selected by any civil or military pilot while conducting aerobatic manoeuvres including solo or formation aerobatics, while displaying, practising or training for a display or for aerobatics training or general aerobatic practice. This will highlight the aerobatic activity of an aircraft which may not be in contact with an SSR-equipped ATSU. Pilots are required to select this code, with Mode C if available, five minutes before commencement of their practice/display session until they cease manoeuvres and resume normal operations. Pilots are encouraged to inform the ATSU of the vertical, lateral and temporal limits within which they will be operating under this special purpose code. The Mode 3/A Code 7004 should be considered as unvalidated and the associated Mode C unverified. 30. Code 7005. When operating outside controlled airspace, below FL 195 and outwith the UK low-flying system, pilots of military fixed-wing fast-jet ac who are, or about to be engaged in autonomous, sustained High Energy Manoeuvres, are required to select 7005. This will highlight to ANSPs of the nature of the flight, and to expect sudden, unpredictable and severe changes in altitude and routing. The Mode 3/A Code 7005 should be considered as unvalidated and the associate Mode C unverified, and controllers should adopt defensive controlling techniques deemed prudent to the situation (The introduction of this squawk has designed to improve the situational awareness of ANSPs and reduce the amount of unknown traffic operating outside controlled airspace). 31. Code 7006. Code 7006 is used to identify aircraft that are operating autonomously in TRAs. 32. Code 7401. Used by aircraft that are receiving a Basic Service from Scottish Information. The code is intended to assist radar controllers in resolving potential and/or actual airspace infringements through liaison with the appropriate Scottish FISO. The specific procedures associated with the use of this code are detailed in the UK AIP and CAP 493 (MATS Pt 1). Controllers should consider code 7401 and any associated Mode C to be unvalidated and unverified. 33. Code 1177. Used by aircraft that are receiving a Basic Service from London Information. The code is intended to assist radar controllers in resolving potential and/or actual airspace infringements through liaison with the appropriate London FISO. The
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specific procedures associated with the use of this code are detailed in the UK AIP and CAP 493 (MATS Pt 1). Controllers should consider code 7401 and any associated Mode C to be unvalidated and unverified. 34. Code 7500. Pilots may select Mode 3/A Code 7500 and Mode C to indicate that the progress of the flight is subject to unlawful interference, ie. hijacking. A controller observing a 7500 squawk from an aircraft under his control should authenticate the observation by reference to another radar where possible. If the response is authenticated, the controller should confirm the intentional selection of the code with the aircraft captain without specifically mentioning Code 7500 in the RT message. If it can be confirmed that the selection is intentional, or if no confirmation can be obtained, the controller should assume that unlawful interference has taken place, and will proceed in accordance with unit instructions. 35. Code 7600. A pilot who loses 2-way communication with a ground agency may operate his transponder in Mode 3/A Code 7600 and Mode C, and follow an appropriate radio communication failure procedure. A controller who suspects that an aircraft has suffered radio failure should determine whether the aircraft receiver is working by instructing the pilot to operate the IDENT feature or make code changes. If the pilot responds, the controller can continue to use this procedure to obtain acknowledgement of further messages or instructions. 36. Code 7700. A pilot experiencing an emergency whilst receiving an air traffic service would normally retain the mode and code setting required by ATC until he receives instruction to the contrary. In all other circumstances, however, the transponder should be set on Mode 3/A Code 7700 and Mode C. This is of particular relevance to operations at low level in areas where the Safety Altitude is greater than the base level of adjacent controlled airspace. Pilots would not normally plan to underfly such controlled airspace when the forecast weather is below their VMC minima. However, if in exceptional circumstances an unpremeditated climb to Safety Altitude necessitates penetration of controlled airspace, pilots are required to squawk emergency when safely established in the climb, and call on 243.0 MHz as soon as possible. Suitably equipped aircraft may operate the military emergency facility. Notes: 1. The associated Mode C data should be considered to be unverified.
2. Where Mode C is selected with codes 7500, 7600 or 7700, the Mode C should be regarded as unverified unless a controller has positive information, for example within the same unit, that the Mode C is verified. 3. Separation using unverified Mode C should be in accordance with Chapter 11: 35.b.
Applications for Code Allocations 37. Units requiring new code allocations or wishing to amend an existing allocation are required to apply to DAP (S&SM) through HQ ATM Force, for ATC and ASACS units. The application should contain the following information: a. b. Unit. Permanent or Temporary Application.
c. Effective date, or in the case of a Temporary Application (eg for air display) the period for which the codes are required.
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d. e.
ATS function for which the codes are required (eg approach, en-route). Airspace within which the codes are to be used (lateral and vertical limits).
f. Maximum number of aircraft required to have an SSR code allocation at any one time. g. h. i. Maximum number of aircraft movements in the busiest hourly period. Short description of code assignment system, eg manual, automatic. Short description of any code/callsign conversion functionality.
j. Any other relevant information eg local operating arrangements which may be a factor in code assignment. k. Number of codes required.
38. In view of the increasing demands placed on the 4096 code allocation and the need to amend other code allocations in order to meet new applications, as much notice as possible is required in respect of code applications. However, every effort will be made to satisfy short notice requirements. Local Special Purpose or Conspicuity Codes 39. In order to ensure the most effective and efficient use of Mode 3/A codes, it is necessary to avoid a proliferation of special purpose and conspicuity codes. However, units wishing to use specific codes from within their allocation for special purposes or conspicuity functions can apply to DAP (S&SM) through their respective HQ for approval. These applications will be dealt with on a case by case basis and, if approved, the Code Allocation Plan will be amended to indicate the use together with the appropriate Mode C verified/unverified details. Use of Codes for Exercises 40. Exercise planners (at HQ or unit level) wishing to use SSR codes in support of an exercise should submit such plans to DAP (S&SM) so that appropriate co-ordination can take place to avoid interference with other SSR users.
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Chapter 36: Emergency Organizations

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3036(1),(2),(3),(4),(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12). Aeronautical Emergency Services 1. International Distress, Urgency and Safety procedures are detailed in the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Radio Regulations and in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Conventions and Procedures for Air Navigation Services, Annex 10. By International agreement, the provision of an organization to deal with aircraft in emergency is the responsibility of the State within whose airspace the incident occurs. For the UK airspace, assistance on the VHF (121.500 MHz) and UHF (243.00 MHz) International Aeronautical Emergency Frequencies is provided by the RAF from a Distress and Diversion (D&D) section equipped with extensive radar coverage, communications and specialist facilities. The D&D section is located at the London Air Traffic Control Centre (LATCC) . The primary role of the D&D staff is to provide pilots with an emergency aid and position fixing service. In this the D&D staff can be assisted by suitably equipped civil and military units and certain HM Coastguard stations. Almost instantaneous aircraft position fixing by the autotriangulation of DF bearings is available to D&D Controllers on 243.00 MHz over most of the London FIR/UIR above 5000 ft and the Scottish FIR above 8500 ft, and on 121.500 MHz over most of the UK land-mass to the East and South of Manchester above 3000 ft and down to 2000 ft in the vicinity of the London Airports. The emergency service is available continuously to pilots flying within UK airspace who are in distress; in urgent need of assistance or who are experiencing difficulties which could lead to a state of emergency. The service may also be available for practices provided no actual emergency is in progress on either 121.500MHz or 243.00MHz. See Paragraph 32 and Paragraph 34 for information on Training Fixes and Practice Pans on 243.00MHz and the use of the Practice Emergency Training Facility. ATC Crash Rescue Organization 2. General Instructions. General instructions are as follows: a. Whilst Airfield Rescue Fire Fighting (ARFF) assets are established across the MOD estate to support flying operations, they should not be reserved for this sole use. The ARFF should respond to all incidents (both airfield and structural) across the MOD estate where local conditions allow, as a priority, when life may be at risk. Any consequent effect on airfield operations through a reduction or total loss of Cx Cat, should be considered secondary to the saving of life. b. The duty watch of the ARFF service should be placed under the orders of the DATCO/ATCO IC who will be responsible for its deployment and state of readiness during airfield operating hours. c. The DATCO/ATCO IC will be responsible, for authorising the duty watch of the ARFF service to attend all incidents or accidents on or near the aerodrome, whether or not an aircraft is involved. d. The SATCO should maintain a close liaison with the Station Fire Officer and should ensure that all members of the ATC staff have a general knowledge of the
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different types of emergency service vehicles and their capabilities employed on the aerodrome. e. See also single-Service regulations for further guidance on the development of local priorities and management of contingent liabilities. 3. Communications. All ATC units should be connected by adequate ground communications to safety services and station departments concerned with flying, as laid down by Aviation Duty Holders and Commanders. These communications are generally: a. Direct Telephone Communication. Direct telephone communication to: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Station telephone exchange (where applicable). Station Fire Section (if separate from the crash bay). Station Medical Centre. Crash crew bay Parent ATCC.
b. Direct Teletalk Communication. Direct teletalk communication to the crash crew bay. c. Indirect Telephone Communication. Indirect telephone communication to: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Station telephone exchange (where applicable). Station Commander. Officer in Charge of flying. All squadrons and flights. Senior engineering officer. Station Defence Works Services representatives. Local civil fire service. Local police.
Note: The Station Medical Officer is responsible for arranging a liaison system with the local civil medical services for use in the event of an accident which exceeds the handling capacity of the Stations medical services. d. RT Communication. RT communication between the ATC tower and the crash/rescue vehicles, and vehicles employed in aircraft parachute recovery role. e. Crash Alarm Bells/Telephones. Crash alarm bells/telephones (operated from the controllers position) to: (1) (2) Crash crew bay. Station Fire Section (if separate from crash bay).
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Station Medical Centre.
(4) In addition, it is desirable to have a warning alarm bell and/or lamp in the station telephone exchange (where applicable). This warning signal should be actuated from the ATC crash telephone. f. Station Broadcast System.
4. Crash Maps. The SATCO, in liaison with the Station Fire Officer, is responsible for arranging for the production and distribution of local area and aerodrome crash maps to enable the rapid location of aircraft crashes and aerodrome incidents. a. Local Area Crash Map. A local area crash map should consist of a 1:50000 scale Ordnance Survey map to a range of at least 5 nm radius from the aerodrome. The map should show: (1) (2) (3) Areas of overlapping cover with adjacent aerodromes. Areas of known poor RT communications. Any other locally required features eg rendezvous points.
b. Aerodrome Crash Map. An aerodrome crash map should be produced covering the aerodrome and its surrounds within reasonable visual range of the aerodrome controller. The map, which may be orientated to meet local requirements, eg as the aerodrome controller sees the aerodrome from his control position, will be overlaid with a simple letter-and-grid system. The grid should be of reasonable size (not too small), ideally aligned along the main instrument runway, and so arranged that significant areas are not divided by grid lines. In addition the following features should be clearly depicted: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) North orientation. Runway magnetic headings. Taxiways and dispersals. All roads and tracks fit to take safety service vehicles. Main road junctions and crossings. Hazards such as ditches and narrow or difficult areas. Areas which are not negotiable by safety vehicles: (a) (b) At all times. At certain times of the year owing to weather and/or tides.
(8) All points of exit from the aerodrome, eg hedge gaps, bridges over ditches, gateways, etc. (9) Areas of known poor RT cover.
(10) Crash exits, which will be numbered.
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c. Crash Maps Distribution. Up-to-date local area and aerodrome crash maps should be located in the following places: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Station Headquarters (Stn Cdrs and OC SSSs offices). Station telephone exchange (where applicable). ATC (VCR, ACR, switchboard filter room). Truck Runway Control. Crash Fire Section. Station Medical Centre. Local civil fire services. Crash/salvage section. SAR helicopter (where appropriate).
(10) All safety service vehicles. (11) All executive vehicles (Stn Cdr, OC Flying, OC Ops, OC Eng). (12) ATC vehicles. d. ATC staff and safety service teams should be trained to interpret the grid reference systems quickly and accurately. It is essential that all crash references are passed using the correct phonetic alphabet pronunciation to eliminate possible misunderstanding. e. Caution should be observed in the use of matt finish aerial photographs in producing crash maps, for the following reasons: (1) (2) (3) They are difficult to read in poor light. They are not marked with topographical names. They may be Security Classified.
f. In addition to local area and aerodrome crash maps, SATCO should arrange for all safety service vehicles to carry up-to-date OS maps covering a radius of 20 nm from the aerodrome. These maps should also be provided for the SAR helicopter and ATC (VCR). 5. Crash Exits. Crash exits, which should be numbered in accordance with the crash maps, should be kept clear; notice boards to this effect should be displayed. On aerodromes where gates are locked for security reasons, the crash crews should be in possession of crash exit keys suitably tagged for quick identification, and duplicate keys should be readily available in ATC. Direction signs indicating the location of less obvious crash exits should be suitably displayed. 6. Station Telephone Exchange Organization (where applicable). To relieve duty controllers of the telephone calls and queries which may have to be made or answered in the event of an accident, arrangements should be made for a crash routine telephone procedure to be carried out either by the station telephone exchange operator or other responsible
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Service personnel. Details of the system will vary with local requirements and as ordered by the Aviation Duty Holder or Commander, but in principle it should consist of a large and prominently displayed set of crash instructions for the telephone operator. The instructions should stress that crash action telephone calls take precedence over all routine station calls, and they should be listed in order of priority. 7. Crash Telephone Messages. The duty controller should ensure that his crash telephone message to the telephone exchange or his assistant is clear and concise, yet containing all the known facts likely to affect the action of the persons informed. 8. Callsigns. The following callsigns should be allocated to vehicles fitted with RT: a. b. c. d. Aerodrome crash rescue truck Crash One. Primary fire crash truck Crash 2. Crash ambulance Medic. Collective callsign (station name) Crash Combine.
9. Testing of the Crash Organization. The SATCO is responsible to the Commanding Officer for ensuring that the unit crash/rescue services are adequately prepared to cover the flying task, and that all ATC and crash/rescue staffs fully appreciate the part they have to play in the event of an emergency. The crash/rescue organization should be exercised from time to time11, with any lessons identified being recorded and actioned. Full advantage should be taken of any planned participation by the civilian emergency services. 10. Testing of Crash/Rescue Communications. The duty air traffic controller should ascertain the serviceability state of the crash/rescue vehicles, RT equipment, crash telephone, teletalk, and crash alarm systems at the start of his watch. He should take immediate action, in the event of any unserviceability, to have repairs effected, and to make temporary alterations to the disposition of vehicles if this is necessary. The crash telephone system should be tested daily as follows: a. Where applicable, depress the lamp test button and ensure that all lamps are serviceable. b. c. Inform all sections connected to the crash alarm that a test is about to be made. Activate the crash telephone and check the remote indicator lamps.
d. Check that corresponding remote indicator lamps extinguish correctly when the telephone is picked up at the far end. e. Carry out a 2-way communications check with each remote agency and ensure that they received both audible and visual alarms. f. g. Replace the handset and check that the system resets properly. Record the details of the test in the log book.
11. Crash on or in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome. When a crash is seen to take place within the boundary/vicinity of an aerodrome, the ATC officer should take immediate crash
11
The Manual of Post Crash Management recommends biennial exercise of the plan.
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action. This action should be in accordance with Aviation Duty Holder and Commanders orders, subject to approved deviation if local conditions make other methods more expedient. 12. Vehicular Traffic. During the crash activity, the DATCO(RN)/ATCO IC (RAF) is responsible for controlling the movement of all vehicular traffic associated with the incident. It is stressed that drivers of recovery/salvage vehicles, eg cranes and tractors, and crash guard and engineering parties proceeding to the scene of the crash after the initial fire precautions and medical work has been done, should not proceed onto the manoeuvring area without permission. The normal rules for the control of vehicular traffic apply. 13. Crash off the Aerodrome. When a crash takes place off an aerodrome, and is unseen, action to be taken depends on whether the exact location of the crash/ditching is known or not. When the location is known, the DATCO (RN)/ATCO IC (RAF) should take action in accordance with Aviation Duty Holder or Commanders orders, based along the following lines: a. b. Operate the crash alarm bell/telephone. Make an appropriate broadcast over the station broadcast system, if installed.
c. If the probable area is known, request local aircraft (if weather, types, and endurance are suitable) to search for the crash aircraft. Whenever possible, the search aircraft should be dispatched on orders from the Officer in Charge of flying or air operations officer; control officers should, however, use their own initiative to have local search activity started as soon as possible. d. Instruct the standby vehicles and request SAR helicopter/crash boat to come to readiness. e. Pass a crash message containing whatever information is known, or suspected, in accordance with Paragraph 7. f. Inform the D&D Section at the parent ATCC without delay if any form of local search activity has been started. Full details should be passed to the ATCC in order that additional search and rescue activity initiated by them is properly integrated. 14. Pilots Abandoning Aircraft. When a pilot intimates that he is about to abandon his aircraft, he will, if possible, pass his probable position using the distress frequency, but as this is not always possible, duty controllers should take immediate action to obtain D/F bearings on such emergency transmissions. The D&D controller at the parent ATCC should be informed without delay and the true bearing passed. 15. Search Action. The controller should initiate search and rescue activity by passing all available information regarding the incident to the ATCC for action by the ARCC; this does not, however, prevent the duty controller from taking local search action. When it is found possible to do so, it is essential that the ATCC be given full details of what has already been done in order that the ARCC may be able to plan and develop the search without duplication of effort. 16. Crash or Incident Narrative. When a crash takes place, particularly in conditions of high traffic density and/or bad weather, the controller may be too busy to do more than initiate crash action. He is, nevertheless, responsible for recording in the Air Traffic Watchkeeping Log-book a report of circumstances surrounding the emergency. To help him to do this, without prejudice to his immediate ATC tasks, the controller should order immediate log-book entries to be made by any of the appropriate members of his staff. Vital information might otherwise be lost or forgotten in the ensuing activities. The report should contain all relevant details of the incident as witnessed by the members of the control staff.
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17. Meteorological Crash Reports. When a crash takes place on, or in the vicinity of, an aerodrome, it is essential that a weather report is made without delay by an accredited observer. The meteorological section should make immediate weather observations and draw up a weather report and place it on record. The controller should inform the duty meteorological officer without delay when a crash occurs. A Watchkeeping Log-book entry will be made when this has been done. The controller should obtain a copy of the crash weather report and preserve it in the Air Traffic Watchkeeping Log-book to amplify his record of circumstances surrounding the accident. 18. Aerodrome Inspection after Crash. Inspection of the crash area after the debris has been removed should be made by a controller who holds a TC(ADC) Local Operating Endorsement. 19. Crash Discipline. Once the controller has initiated crash action he should be relieved of concern for the handling of the incident or queries regarding its nature or progress, by the SATCO or supervisor. His primary responsibility is the safety of aircraft in the air and on the manoeuvring area; all remaining crash action is subordinate to this. 20. Giving of Information. Controllers and their staffs should restrict all information about a crash to the authorized persons to whom the original crash message was passed, unless further amplifying broadcasts over the station broadcast system are approved. In no circumstances is any member of a control staff to make any statement, or offer any information, or give answers to any questions about the crash to any unauthorized person. Such inquiries should be referred to the Station Commander. 21. Persons on Board (POB). The figure for POB for each flight is required to be passed to ATC on the initial RT request for taxi clearance and on the first RT call to the destination. Control staff should record this information and incorporate it as necessary in crash messages. Aerodrome and Heliport Safety Services 22. General. The Commanding Officer of an air station or flying unit is responsible for ensuring that whenever flying is in progress or aircraft are being serviced or moved on the ground, safety services are in readiness and sufficient trained personnel available to bring them into immediate use. 23. Medical and Ambulance Services. The Commanding Officer of an air station or flying unit should ensure that, when flying is in progress, emergency medical cover is available to provide an immediate response. An assessment should be undertaken to ensure that the level of response is appropriate to the risk. Commanders of flying units operating away from established airfields, operating outside normal airfield opening hours or where emergency medical cover cannot be provided by parent unit medical staff should ensure that adequate medical cover is available using local resources. A medical officer/civilian medical practitioner will be on call to offer aviation medicine and specialist advice in support of the emergency medical services: he/she should be able to attend the airfield within 2 hours. 24. Local Orders. Local Orders should define the duties and responsibilities of the safety services in support of flying. The orders should include specific instructions to the duty ATC officer concerning: a. The operation of a crash-warning system to all safety services and to all personnel concerned. b. Calling of predetermined assistance from other fire, rescue and medical services.
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25. DATCO/ATCO IC. The DATCO/ATCO IC is responsible for the operational direction and state of readiness of safety service vehicles during aerodrome opening hours. All safety services will be provided with a gridded plan of the aerodrome and OS maps of the area so that the duty controller can direct them to the scene of the crash by reference to it. 26. Unserviceability of Safety Service Vehicles. If one or more safety service vehicles are unserviceable, the Commanding Officer should decide whether the vehicles still serviceable or a combination of these vehicles and other vehicles improvised for the purpose, will be adequate for rescue and fire-fighting operations. In making a decision the Commanding Officer will weigh the urgency of flying operations against the capacity of the vehicles available for rescue and fire-fighting. Notes: 1. The MOD regulations provide a common procedure for all MOD airfields and align with The Critical Area methodology used in the standards for civil airports by ICAO. Due to the type and number of aircraft in service with the MOD, it has been necessary to provide 10 airfield categories. 2. Current regulations regarding the provision of crash/rescue fire services at RAF airfields are in accordance with JSP 426 Leaflet 14-5-2. The standard of crash/rescue facilities for RAF Flying and Gliding and Soaring Association Clubs are in accordance with RAF GAIs. 27. Whenever a primary crash, rescue or fire-fighting vehicle is unserviceable for a period exceeding 24 hours (other than for normal routine servicing and maintenance), the Commanding Officer should inform by signal message: a. b. c. RN - ACOS (AV).
Army - Comd JHC. RAF - HQ AIR and Group HQ.
Brief details of the unserviceability should be given, stating whether a replacement is required immediately. It is the responsibility of these authorities to arrange redeployment of vehicles to provide temporary replacement. If this is impracticable, the assistance of MOD will be sought. When the vehicle is serviceable again or has been replaced, the above authorities should be notified accordingly 28. Salvage Section. A properly equipped salvage section should always be available when flying is in progress. The Air Engineer Officer (RN), Senior Aircraft Engineer (Army), Senior Engineering Officer (RAF) is responsible for the provision and maintenance of salvage crews and equipment. 29. Helicopter Support. Where SAR helicopters are used to support crash rescue operations, Commanding Officers should ensure that suitable fire-fighting and rescue equipment is readily available and also trained personnel are at readiness to bring them into immediate use. UK Emergency Organization ATC Action in the Event of an Aircraft Emergency 30. In the event of an aircraft emergency occurring within the UK FIRs/UIRs, personnel should comply with the emergency organization procedures as detailed in Chapter 37: . 31. Emergency procedures in overseas commands should be specified by the appropriate Aviation Duty Holders and Commanders.
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UK Emergency Organization Training Fixes 32. Within the London FIR/UIR, the Practise Emergency Training Facility (PETF), which operates on the NATO Emergency Training Frequency of 245.10 MHz, is used to provide a navigational service to pilots at basic and advanced flying training units. This Training Fix service should take precedence over practice emergency calls in the event of simultaneous incidents. The RT Prosign to be used to obtain this service is Training Fix (3 times). Procedures for the use of PETF are described in the RAF Flight Information Handbook. 33. Within the Scottish FIR/UIR, all calls for a Training Fix should be made on 243.00MHz. The PETF is not available in the Scottish FIR/UIR. The coverage of the 243.00MHz Emergency Fixer Service is described in the RAF Flight Information Handbook. UK Emergency Organization Practise Urgency Calls 34. Within the London FIR/UIR, Practise Urgency Calls should be initiated on the in use discrete ATC frequency or on the PETF. The RT Prosign to be used is Practise Pan (3 times). Procedures for the use of PETF are described in the RAF Flight Information Handbook. 35. Within the Scottish FIR/UIR, Practise Pans are permitted on the UHF and VHF International Aeronautical Emergency Frequencies, subject to the restrictions listed in the Flight Information Handbook. States of Readiness for Aircraft Emergencies and the Standard Format for Aircraft Emergency Messages 36. States of Readiness for Aircraft Emergencies. States of readiness for aircraft emergencies are as follows: a. State 1. A crash on or seen from an airfield.
b. State 2. An incident on the airfield where doubt exists about the safety of the aircraft or its occupants, or to anticipate a STATE 1. The fire vehicles and ambulances are deployed to the incident or to pre-arranged positions on the airfield. c. State 3. A precautionary measure to cater for a possible incident on the airfield or when an aircraft has crashed off the airfield but the position is unknown. Crash rescue services are manned with engines running at their normal locations. Note: crash rescue services may be deployed at RN airfields. 37. Standard Format for Aircraft Emergency Messages. The standard format for aircraft emergency messages is as follows: a. Pre-words as appropriate to the incident: (1) (2) (3) STATE 1, STATE 1, STATE 1 or, EMERGENCY STATE 2 or, EMERGENCY STATE 3.
b. Type of aircraft and nature of emergency (eg Hawk crashed; Typhoon left-hand utilities failure). c. Location.
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d. e. f. g.
Persons on board and whether any have ejected or baled out. Any complications (eg a crash on to buildings or vehicles). Whether the aircraft is armed and/or carrying hazardous cargo. Any additional information of use to emergency services.
Aerodrome Crash/Rescue Fire Service at MOD Aerodromes 38. General. The regulations regarding the provision of crash/rescue fire services at MOD airfields should be in accordance with JSP 426 Leaflet 14-5-2., which covers the following areas: a. b. c. d. e. Crash/Rescue and Fire Categories. Flights to Below Category Airfields (Visiting Aircraft). Unserviceability of Crash/Rescue Vehicles. Unserviceabilities Temporary Reduction in Category. Operational Necessity.
f. Royal Flights. Irrespective of the dispensation for flights to below category aerodromes, the category for Royal Flights should not be reduced. 39. The standard of crash/rescue facilities required for RAF Flying and Gliding and Soaring Association Clubs are in accordance with RAF GAIs.
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Chapter 37: ATC Emergency Procedures and Responsibilities

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3036(9)(10). Types of Emergency Control 1. Definitions. To differentiate between the degrees of responsibility of ATC agencies that may be called upon to assist in the recovery of aircraft in emergency, the terms Executive Control and Operational Control have been adopted. The terms are defined as follows: a. Executive Control. Executive Control reflects the responsibility vested in the Distress and Diversion (D&D) controller for the supervision of the ATC handling of an emergency incident. This responsibility should not be transferred, except to an emergency controller at another ATCC. b. Operational Control. Operational Control reflects the responsibility delegated by the D&D controller to one or more ATC agencies, in respect of the procedural and control instructions to be passed to the pilot in emergency. Emergency Actions by D&D 2. Initial Responsibility for Control on 243.00MHz and 121.50MHz. The responsibility for assuming Executive and Operational Control of an aircraft in the initial stages of an emergency rests with the ATCC in whose FIR/UIR the aircraft is first fixed. When it is apparent that an emergency call is not being answered the D&D controller should take whatever immediate action is necessary to assist the pilot, even if the indications are that the aircraft is outside his area of responsibility. 3. Delegation of Operational Control. Following initial contact and interrogation by the D&D Section, subsequent handling of an emergency incident may involve inter-unit coordination and/or transfer of Operational Control between ATCCs, ATCRUs, ASACS units and aerodrome ATC agencies. The D&D controller, having been notified by any agency of an aircraft accident or emergency and having delegated Operational Control, should take the following actions, as appropriate: a. If landing appears to be possible, he should: (1) Alert ATC at the destination or diversion aerodrome and give the DATCO (RN)/ATCO IC all the relevant information concerning the incident. The telephone line can be kept open throughout the incident. (2) Keep the destination aerodrome ATC informed of the progress of the recovery. (3) Transfer operational control for the let-down and final approach to an appropriate ATCRU or aerodrome, when appropriate. (4) (5) Alert the ARCC. Monitor the progress of the incident to its conclusion.
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b. If a crash appears imminent, or the crew are forced to abandon their aircraft, the D&D controller should attempt to identify the aircraft and should: (1) Take whatever immediate action is necessary to effect a rescue.
(2) Alert the ARCC and pass full details of the incident and any rescue action taken so far. (3) Co-operate with the ARCC/SAR organizations during the SAR operation.
(4) Alert those ATCRUs and aerodrome ATC agencies through whose radar coverage the incident will pass, giving them sufficient information to enable them to keep their aircraft clear of the aircraft in distress. 4. Procedures for the D&D Controller 243.00MHz and 121.50MHz. When responding to a distress or urgency call on 243.00MHz or 121.50MHz, the D&D controller should take the following actions, as appropriate: a. Pass an aircraft position report to the pilot, if it was not passed in the emergency message or if the position passed by the pilot is inaccurate. b. c. d. Instruct the pilot to select SSR emergency, if this action has not been completed. Pass to the pilot vectors and ranges to the intended recovery aerodrome. Pass to the pilot the aerodrome serviceability and weather details.
e. Alert ATC at the destination or diversion aerodrome and keep the DATCO (RN)/ATCO IC (RAF) informed of the progress of the recovery. f. Alert the ARCC.
g. Transfer operational control for the let-down and final approach to an appropriate ATCRU or aerodrome. h. Monitor the progress of the incident to its conclusion.
5. Steers. D&D Controllers Action in Respect of Steers to Aircraft below the ASA/MSFL D&D controllers are authorized to provide a steer to aircraft declaring an actual or practice emergency below the ASA/MSFL or where the controller is uncertain over the aircrafts altitude. When providing a steer in this situation the D&D controller should use the following phraseology: Practice Pan/Pan/Mayday C/S, your (indicated)position is, taking your own terrain clearance, your steer for . is .. degrees. 6. RT Phraseology for the D&D Controller. The D&D controller should take into account that aircrew will have a high cockpit workload when dealing with an aircraft emergency. RT transmissions should be kept to the minimum necessary to provide the assistance required by the pilot. D&D controllers may adapt the RT phraseology detailed in CAP413 to meet the specific requirements of providing an emergency service to aircrew. It is not practicable to give examples of phraseology to cover every conceivable situation; nevertheless, the table below details the RT phraseology to be used by D&D controllers in the initial response to distress, urgency and practise urgency calls: a. MAYDAY.
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Serial 1 2
Aircraft to Control MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY, Aircraft callsign (3 times) MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY, Aircraft callsign (3 times), STANDBY (See Note 2)
Control to Aircraft Initial Response Aircraft callsign, your position is Pass your message (see Note 1) Aircraft callsign, your MAYDAY acknowledged
b.
PAN/Practise PAN.
Serial 1 2 3 Aircraft to Control PAN PAN, PAN PAN, PAN PAN, Aircraft callsign (See Note 3) Practise PAN, Practise PAN, Practise PAN, Aircraft callsign (See Note 3) Practise PAN, Practise PAN, Practise PAN, Aircraft callsign Control to Aircraft Initial Response Aircraft callsign, your position is Pass your message (see Note 1) Aircraft callsign, your position is Pass your message (see Note 4) Aircraft callsign, negative Practise PAN, emergency in progress
Notes: 1. The D&D controller will instruct the pilot to select SSR emergency if this action has not been completed. 2. The pilot may use the phrase STANDBY at the end of the emergency call due to high cockpit workload. The emergency message can be passed by the pilot when time permits. 3. In the London FIR/UIR, PRACTISE PANS will be initiated on a discrete ATC frequency or on the Practice Emergency Training Facility (PETF) (245.10MHz). Requests for a TRAINING FIX will be made on the PETF. In the London FIR/UIR, practise emergency calls are not permitted on 243.00MHz, except where authorized by MOD(Air). 4. The D&D controller may instruct the pilot to select a discrete SSR code to aid aircraft identification. 7. Reporting Action. A full narrative report will be submitted by the Operational Control agency to HQ ATM Force (Incidents) in respect of each actual emergency incident on 243.00MHz or 121.50MHz. Temporary Danger Area (TDA)/Search and Rescue Operations (SAROPS) Notification System 8. Action by ARCC. Having determined that restriction on flight in the vicinity of an emergency incident is necessary the ARCC will notify the establishment of a TDA in accordance with DAP Instructions for Establishing Emergency Flying Restrictions within the UK FIRs. When aircraft are involved in SAROPs the ARCC will inform LATCC (Mil) D&D Section . 9. SAROPs. SAROPs codewords should be passed when SAR aircraft are being used to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea. When a TDA has been established for reasons other than SAR, the SAROPs codewords should not be used. The relevant codewords are:
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a. SAROPs On Full Restrictions. 243.00 MHz or 121.50 MHz are being used for homing; practice emergencies cannot be accepted on these frequencies. b. SAROPs On No Restrictions. Although SAROPs are in progress, practice emergencies can be accepted. 10. Action by D&D Sections. When informed that a TDA has been established or notified of SAROPs, the LATCC (Mil) D&D controllers should: a. Broadcast TDA details on 243.00MHz and 121.50MHz.
b. Attempt to get the TDA details relayed on 243.00MHz, 121.50MHz and 278.0MHz (UKLFS Frequency) by a suitable military aircraft. c. Initiate the TDA/SAROPs On telephone cascade system, detailed at Paragraph 11 using the phraseology: SAROPs On Full Restrictions or SAROPs On No Restrictions, TDA (number) established at position (lat and long or geographical reference point) dimensions are (normally 5 nm and 5000 ft amsl), valid until (DTG). 11. Cascade System. TDA/SAROPS On Telephone Cascade System is as follows: Figure 37-1 TDA/SAROPS Cascade System
LATCC(Mil) SMS, Low Flying Booking Cell (LFBC), Brize Norton, Cardiff, Leeming, Marham, ScATCC (Mil), Shawbury, Valley, Warton, Waddington, Woodvale, Wyton, Yeovilton, Plymouth Military Radar, CRC Scampton. (Also Scotia Helicopters & Anglia Radar if SAR over North Sea). Coningsby, Honington (when activated), Lakenheath, Wattisham, Wittering, Boscombe Down, Dunsfold, Farnborough, Filton, Northolt, Odiham. Linton-On-Ouse. Dishforth, Topcliffe, Church Fenton. Benson, Colerne, Fairford (when activated). ASACS Units in the London FIR including any AWACS aircraft. St Athan. Pembrey. Ternhill, Cosford. Mona, Aberporth Range Control. Cranwell, Donna Nook, Holbeach. Barkston Heath. Middle Wallop, Netheravon, Salisbury Ops. Mildenhall. UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED Page 299 of 354
LATCC (Mil) D&D to inform
LATCC(Mil) SMS to inform Leeming to inform Linton-On-Ouse to inform Brize Norton to inform CRC Scampton to inform Cardiff have agreed to inform St Athan to inform Shawbury to inform Valley to inform Waddington to inform Cranwell to inform Boscombe Down to inform Lakenheath to inform MMATM Issue 5
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UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED Aberdeen Off-Shore, Belfast/Aldergrove, LATCC (Mil) D&D, Leuchars, Lossiemouth, West Freugh, RNAS Prestwick, CRC Boulmer, Hebrides Range Air Control. Spadeadam. Kinloss, Tain. ASACS Units in the Scottish FIR including any AWACS aircraft (and Stornoway when activated for military detachments).
ScATCC (Mil) to inform Leuchars to inform Lossiemouth to inform CRC Boulmer to inform
12. Action by ATC at Aerodromes. On receipt of the TDA/SAROPs On message the Supervisor or ATCO IC (RAF)/DATCO (RN) at the aerodrome should: a. b. c. d. Warn aircraft under control. Pass the message to the next ATC agency as above, if applicable. Inform station/squadron operations personnel, in order that crews are briefed. Inform the Duty Aircrew Officer, if applicable.
13. Cancellation of the TDA/SAROPs. Cancellation of the TDA and/or termination of SAROPs should be passed via the telephone cascade system and transmitted on 243.00MHz and 121.50MHz. Whenever possible, the cancellation message should also be relayed on 243.00MHz, 121.50MHz and 300.8MHz by a suitable military aircraft. Emergency Actions By ATC at Aerodromes 14. Calls made on 243.00MHz. On hearing an emergency transmission on 243.00MHz which, apparently, is not being answered, the ATCO at the aerodrome should notify the parent ATCC D&D controller with details of the call and of any bearings (in degrees(T)) received. The aerodrome controller should not answer the call without permission from D&D. 15. Calls made on Aerodrome Discrete Frequencies. If a pilot makes an emergency call on an aerodrome discrete frequency, the controller receiving the call should answer the message and render what assistance he can. He should notify the D&D controller as soon as possible that an emergency message has been received and answered, and liaise closely with the Centre until the incident is concluded. 16. Calls made on 121.50MHz. On receiving a call from a pilot on 121.50MHz the controller at the aerodrome should note the details of the pilots message and alert the D&D controller if it is apparent that the message is not being answered. If the emergency call is directed to the aerodrome, the controller should render whatever assistance is necessary. When the incident is being controlled by the Centre, if the aerodrome is equipped with 121.50MHz VDF equipment, the controller should select that channel and notify D&D of any bearings received (in degrees (T)). At the request of the D&D Section the airfield controller should assume Operational Control of the aircraft, keeping D&D informed of the progress of the incident. Military Emergency Procedure 17. Authorities. Captains of aircraft are required to adhere to emergency procedures laid down in current RAF FLIPs, in particular the FIH. 18. International Distress and Urgency Conditions. The 2 conditions are defined as:
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a. Distress. A condition of being threatened by serious and/or imminent danger and of requiring immediate assistance. b. Urgency. A condition concerning the safety of an aircraft or other vehicle, or of some person on board or within sight, but does not require immediate assistance. 19. Emergency Transmission. An emergency transmission, as defined in ACP 135(F), consists of 2 parts: a preliminary emergency call and the emergency message. The preliminary emergency call should be followed as soon as possible by the emergency message. At the discretion of the aircraft captain the preliminary emergency call may be omitted but its use is strongly recommended in order to ensure the appropriate reaction from ground agencies. a. The emergency call is one of the following: (1) Distress.
RT MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY, Aircraft callsign (3 times) WT SOS, SOS, SOS, Aircraft callsign (3 times)
(2)
Urgency.
RT PAN PAN, PAN PAN, PAN PAN, Aircraft callsign (once) WT XXX, XXX, XXX, Aircraft callsign (once)
b. The emergency message is the appropriate emergency call as shown above with the addition of as much of the following information as is relevant and as time permits: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Position (and time if relevant). Heading. Air speed (if relevant). Altitude. Aircraft type and POB. Nature of emergency. Captains intentions and assistance required. Any other information.
20. Additional Action by Aircraft Captain. The geographically appropriate En-Route Supplement or FIH contains instructions to aircraft commanders concerning the frequencies to be used, action with secondary radar and cancellation of emergency, and detail distress, scene of search and SAR control frequencies, both RT and WT. In general, instructions provide for the first call to be made on the frequency in use. Civil Emergency Procedures 21. Civil procedures are governed by the current Rules of the Air and ATC Regulations, which are based on Annex 10 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. Relevant extracts are reproduced by the UK Civil Aviation Authority in CAP 413 Radio Telephony
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Manual for the benefit of crews operating in a civil environment. There are some differences between the ICAO procedures and those in the ACP 135(F), for example the emergency message information at Paragraph 19.b is requested in a different order by ICAO. The 2 systems are, however, sufficiently compatible to ensure adequate service to an aircraft, whether civil or military, in an emergency. Safety Signal 22. Although the safety signal does not indicate emergency within an aircraft, aircrew and controllers should be aware of its significance. The safety signal indicates that the station is about to transmit a message concerning the safety of navigation, eg a loose balloon, or providing important meteorological warnings, eg severe icing conditions. The call is preceded by the word SECURITE, said three times (RT), or by the group TTT made three times (WT). Reporting and Actions on Distress Incidents 23. Regulations concerning the reporting and action with regard to distress incidents are contained in NATO publication Search and Rescue ATP 10, British Supplement No 1. ATC Staff and other personnel as necessary should familiarise themselves with its contents. Breakaway Balloons 24. Action by Balloon Operating Unit. If a balloon breaks away from its moorings, the person in charge of the balloon site should immediately telephone the D&D Cell at LATCC(Mil) and give the following information: a. b. c. d. e. Position of balloon site. Type of balloon and whether carrying any personnel. Approximate direction and speed of drift. Length of cable attached to the balloon. Name and telephone number of the balloon unit concerned.
The local civil police should also be informed as soon as possible so that they may warn police stations in the direction of the balloons flight. The police should be requested to pass to the D&D Cell at LATCC(Mil) any reports received about the progress of the balloon. 25. Action by Units Observing the Drifting Balloon. If the subsequent progress of the balloon is observed by, or reported to, any RAF station, a report should be passed immediately to the D&D Cell at LATCC(Mil) stating the time and position, and the estimated height, track and speed of the balloon. 26. Action by LATCC (Mil) D&D Cell. On receipt of a report that a balloon has broken away, the duty AIS officer should immediately take the following action: a. Inform the appropriate ATCC Military and Civil Supervisors.
b. Inform all aerodromes known to be operating within 10nm either side of the balloon predicted track. c. d. Issue a NOTAM Class 1 Temporary Navigation Warning. Inform the Production Shift Manager, National Grid Company.
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e.
Inform Low Flying Operations Squadron, RAF Wittering.
f. Cancel the NOTAM Class 1 Temporary Navigation Warning when the danger to aircraft has passed. 27. Action by ATC at an Aerodrome. The ATCO IC at an aerodrome should take the following action on receiving information of a breakaway balloon: a. b. Warn all aircraft under his control. Inform squadron or flight commanders, in order that they may brief their crews.
c. If the balloon is sighted by an aircraft, obtain a full report from the pilot with position, time, altitude, direction of the balloons travel and any other relevant details. d. Inform LATCC (Mil) D&D unless they originated the information.
Aircraft Subject to Bomb Warnings 28. A bomb warning involving an aircraft should be treated as an emergency incident. Controllers should follow the procedures and guidance given in Unit Order Books and Station Local Orders. 29. Bomb warnings are assessed in order to determine their significance and the risk they represent. Bomb threats to military aircraft are normally categorised by the individual Operating Authority. In addition the MOD, the Department of Transport, Environment and the Regions, and Airline Operators have access to specialist risk assessors. Military procedures, aircrew actions and the categories of threat assessment are detailed in Fly 2000. 30. ATC, whilst having a responsibility for flight safety, will not normally take part in risk assessment. ATC primarily provides a vital communication and support facility. Bomb warnings are usually anonymous and communicated by telephone; written warnings are rare, but they have occurred on aircraft in flight. 31. A threat to an aircraft in flight should first be advised to the operating authority of the aircraft. The aircraft captain should only be notified first when either the time-scale precludes the use of normal channels or after attempts to communicate with the operating authority have failed. Where a decision is made to communicate directly with the aircraft captain, care will be taken to give an accurate statement of the words used in the threat so that his assessment of the risk can, as far as possible, be based on fact. 32. In addition, the ATC agency receiving a bomb warning should initiate notification as detailed below. Timely reporting is vital to ensure speedy risk assessment and co-ordination of the incident.
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Bomb Warning Received from Ground Agency. Actions on receipt of a bomb warning received from a ground agency are as follows: a. From Operating Authority.
INITIAL REPORT ACTION
Telephone Exchange
Notes:
ATSU Supervisor/ ATC Supervisor
ATCC Supervisor Mil & Civilian
1. The Supervisor ATCC Mil or Civilian as appropriate should initiate tracing action on the subject aircraft and the message should be passed to the aircraft captain by the quickest means available. (All threat messages will be in the precise words of the operating authority). 2. Civil operating authorities have been advised to have bomb warning messages for their pilots passed through the appropriate ATCC Watch Supervisor.
D&D
Controller
UK CAOC
ARCC
Aircraft
b.
From Unknown Agency. Notes: 1. The Supervisor ATCC, while awaiting assessment of the threat, should initiate tracing action on the subject aircraft. 2. If the operator is not known or cannot be contacted, pass the message to the pilot by the quickest means available, warning the pilot that the operating authority has not been contacted.

Recipient
ATSU Supervisor/ ATC Supervisor ATCC Supervisor D&D UK CAOC Mil Operating Authority ARCC Civil Operating Authority Controller
33. Bomb Warning Received from an Aircraft. Actions on receipt of a bomb warning received from an aircraft are as follows:
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Controller
Notes: 1. Supervisor at LATCC (Mil) or ScATCC (Mil) may notify Civil Watch Supervisor/Manager to reduce D&D workload. 2. Continue to provide ATS to aircraft and, where practicable, offer re-routing to clear major built-up areas.
ATSU Supervisor/ATC Supervisor
ATCC Supervisor (1)
3. Check if captain has contacted his operating authority on discrete frequency, if NOT then for: a. Mil Aircraft. The UK CAOC notified by D&D will inform the mil operating authority. b. Civilian Aircraft. ATCC Civil Watch Supervisor/ Manager will inform the civilian operating authority.
D&D
UK CAOC
ARCC
Civil Watch Supervisor /Manager
Mil Operating Authority
Civil Operating Authority
Military Air Accident Investigation Board (MAAIB)/Air Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) Procedures 34. Where a Service Inquiry is convened to investigate an ac accident, the MAAIB may be tasked to support that Inquiry. Equally the AAIB may be asked to assist through a technical investigation of the ac wreckage, the main aim of which is to establish the extent to which the ac was serviceable at point of impact. Under these circumstances, an ATCO may expect to be interviewed by the Service Inquiry panel and MAAIB, but not by the AAIB. 35. Regulations exist which permit the AAIB to investigate accidents involving both military and civil resources. Details of these Regulations may be found in the Manual of Air Safety. These Regulations would, for example, apply in the case of an accident involving a civilian ac operating under military ATC. Under these circumstances, a Service Inquiry would also be established, but proceed independently of and in parallel with the AAIB inquiry. The AAIB would conduct its own interviews of relevant personnel, which might include ATC Staff 36. The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accident) Regulations 1996 describe the objective of accident investigation by the AAIB as follows:
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the sole objective of the investigation of an accident ... shall be the prevention of accidents and incidents. It shall not be the purpose of such an investigation to apportion blame or liability Whilst the AAIB is obliged to inform the appropriate authorities if it encounters evidence of criminal activity during the course of its investigation, it will not disclose statements and other documents unless by order of a Court. 37. The rationale for this approach is laid down in the Chicago Convention, and is intended to encourage witnesses to be as frank and open as possible in order to establish the cause of the accident and prevent its recurrence. There should be no reason for anyone interviewed by an AAIB investigator to need legal representation, since nothing said to that investigator could generally ever be used against them in Court. An AAIB witness statement is not releasable to Service Authorities for the purposes of disciplinary or administrative action. 38. Notwithstanding the above, if any military personnel have questions relating to, or require clarification of the legal dimension of any AAIB/MAAIB investigation, then they should consult their relevant FLC Legal Offices.
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Chapter 38: Aircraft Diversions

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3038(1)(2)(3) Originating Authority 1. Diversions can be originated by: a. b. c. The aircraft operating authority. ATC. The aircraft Captain.
2. Diversion Grades. The officer ordering a diversion should ensure that the Captain of the aircraft is informed of the grade of, and the reason for, the diversion. a. Grade 1 Diversion. A Grade 1 diversion is MANDATORY and should only be originated by the aircraft operating authority. It can be passed to the captain of the aircraft either through ATC or on the channels of communication of the aircraft operating authority. If the Captain of the aircraft considers that he cannot comply with the instructions originated, he is required to either inform the appropriate authority of his reasons and indicate his intentions, or request other instructions. b. Grade 2 Diversion. A Grade 2 diversion is ADVISORY and may be originated by the aircraft operating authority or by ATC. When originated by an ATC officer he should, when possible, obtain the approval of the aircraft operating authority: he should in any case inform the aircraft operating authority at the earliest opportunity. A captain who decides to continue to his original destination after receiving a Grade 2 diversion is required to inform the aircraft operating authority through ATC of his intention. A captain can go on to his original destination only if, in the event of his attempt to land at the aerodrome being unsuccessful, he will subsequently be able to reach the diversion aerodrome with enough fuel to ensure a safe landing in the event of a missed instrument approach. Responsibilities 3. Diverting Officers. In deciding whether a diversion aerodrome is suitable, the officer ordering the diversion should consider the following: a. b. c. d. e. f. The range and endurance of the aircraft. The experience and qualifications of the crew. The weather. Radio and radar aids serviceable in the aircraft and at the diversion aerodrome. The aircraft requirements, eg the landing distance and servicing facilities. The administrative facilities at the diversion aerodrome.
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4. Responsibility of Aircraft Captains. Aircraft captains requesting assistance in diversion are required to pass the following: a. b. c. d. e. f. Own callsign and identity. Position. Original destination. Reason for request. Endurance. LCG of the aircraft.
5. Responsibility of Aircraft Operating Authorities. The aircraft operating authority is responsible for the safety of its aircraft unless the aircraft has been handed over to an ATCC for diversion. 6. HQ AIR Transport Aircraft. The special procedures for the diversion of HQ AIR Command Air Transport and AAR Aircraft are not affected by the regulations in Paragraph 7. Booking 7. Procedures for the booking of diversions are detailed in Group Orders, with bookings normally being carried out on a station-to-station basis. The D&D cell is not involved in diversion booking, other than the special arrangements detailed in the Letters of Agreement at Paragraph 8. 8. The aircraft diversion arrangements specified below apply to all military aerodromes including MEDAs. Special arrangements exist for the use of civil aerodromes in Scotland as military diversion aerodromes. These arrangements are detailed in Letters of Agreement. Procedures 9. ATCC. D&D controllers at ATCCs should maintain a close watch on existing and forecast weather conditions, since they must be in a position to offer immediate advice to aircraft captains and aircraft operating authorities should the need for an aircraft diversion arise. When aircraft diversion action is necessary the D&D controller should: a. Pass the appropriate type of diversion message to the aircraft by the most expedient channel or link. The message should include: (1) (2) (3) Name and callsign of diversion aerodrome. Latest weather information both en route and at the diversion aerodrome. The radio frequencies to be employed.
(4) Any special information about the state of, or facilities at, the diversion aerodrome. (5) Navigation and clearance instructions, if the route to be followed necessitates flying within CAS in IMC or at night irrespective of the weather. b. Pass to the diversion aerodrome as much of the following information as is known:
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Type of aircraft. Radio callsign(s). Radio frequencies to be employed. Air-interpreted approach aids carried. Pilots instrument rating. Approximate ETA. Remaining endurance. Details of clearance instructions given to the aircraft, if any. Details of crew and passengers, particularly important passengers
(10) Whether HM Customs action will be required. c. Inform the aerodrome of original destination from which the aircraft has been diverted. d. Alert other aerodromes/ATCRUs on the diversion route if they can help by providing navigational assistance. 10. Procedures at an ATCRU or CRC. When aircraft diversion action is necessary the controller at an ATCRU or CRC should: a. b. c. d. 11. Pass the appropriate type of diversion message to the captain of the aircraft. Inform D&D Pass any necessary instructions or appropriate advice to the aircraft captain. Inform the aircraft operating authority of action taken.
Procedures at an Aerodrome. Procedures at aerodromes are as follows: a. When the need for diversion is likely to arise for any other reason, an ATC officer at an aerodrome should maintain the closest possible liaison with: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) The aircraft operating authority. Pre-selected local diversion aerodrome. D&D. The ATCRU CAC controller, if appropriate. Relevant CRC if appropriate.
b. He should pass as often as he considers necessary the latest information on aerodrome conditions in order that diversions from and to his airfield may be anticipated. He is also to ensure that D&D is informed whenever his aerodrome is active outside the opening hours promulgated in FLIPs. When an aircraft diversion is necessary the DATCO (RN)/ATCO IC (RAF) should take the following action:
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Inform D&D .
(2) Obtain all necessary instructions for the captain of the aircraft, which will include the obtaining of clearance from controlled airspace authorities, if required. (3) Pass the appropriate type of diversion message to the captain of the aircraft. (4) Inform the aircraft operating authority of action taken.
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Chapter 39: Overdue Action

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3039(1). Definition of Aircraft Overdue 1. Definition. An aircraft is overdue when the following circumstances exist: a. Jet, Turbo-Prop and Piston Engined Fixed-Wing Aircraft. Failure to arrive or not in RT communication with the destination aerodrome at the earliest of the following: (1) (2) (3) b. ETA radar entry or other specified terminal calling point. ETA overhead. ETA landing.
Helicopters. Failure to arrive or not in RT communication with the destination: (1) (2) For flights over water at the end of notified endurance. For flights over land one hour after the end of notified endurance.
2. Nothing in Paragraph 1 should prohibit the initiation of overdue action before the time stated if there are any doubts regarding aircraft safety. The times defined above are the latest times by which overdue action should have been taken. Overdue Action by ATC 3. In the event of an aircraft becoming overdue ATC staffs should act in accordance with the following requirements: a. Action by the ATC Officer at an Aerodrome. As soon as an aircraft is considered to be overdue (as defined in Paragraph 1) all relevant details should be passed immediately by the ATC officer to: (1) (2) D&D. The appropriate unit personnel.
b. Action by the D&D controller . On receipt of information that an aircraft is overdue, the D&D controller at an ATCC should make every effort to trace the missing aircraft within his own FIR by: (1) (2) Broadcasting on 243.00MHz and 121.50MHz. Checking with the alternative aerodromes (if known).
(3) Requesting information from all aerodromes on the route of the overdue aircraft, as applicable. (4) Checking aircraft details against all current crash reports within the FIR.
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Checking LF bookings with Low Flying Booking Cell (LFBC).
(6) Requesting airfield information from ATCCs of adjoining FIRs in cases where aerodromes on the aircrafts route are within their boundaries. (7) If necessary, originating a Request News message for transmission to all flying units within the FIR. (8) Initiating SAR activity by informing the ARCC and passing all relevant details of the aircraft and its flight. (9) Co-ordinate information with reports of overdue aircraft from other sources.
(10) Instruct other ATCCs to take appropriate action within their FIRs. (11) Requesting the assistance of the civilian police if required. In the UK this may be done direct on a county basis or through the Home Office if a national police effort is considered necessary. (12) Requesting closure of Danger Areas as necessary. (13) Informing the duty press officer at the MOD in order to enlist the cooperation of the public through the national press, radio and television if the overdue aircraft has not been quickly located. (14) If the overdue aircraft is located, it is the responsibility of the D&D controller to notify all concerned. Naval Authorities to be Informed 4. If a Naval aircraft is overdue after a flight over the sea, Naval Air Stations and establishments calling for the assistance of the D&D controller or SAR organization should also inform MOD (Navy), ACOS(Av), their administrative authority, and the Naval Cin-C in whose area the aircraft has been flying. Information should be passed by telephone using MILITARY FLASH CALL to duty staff officers and also by IMMEDIATE signal message.
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Chapter 40: Search and Rescue

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3040(1). Responsibilities of the Search and Rescue (SAR) Organization 1. The responsibility for SAR in the UK and the surrounding waters rests with a joint service and civilian organization conforming to the ICAO SARPs detailed in ICAO/International Maritime Organization Manual (IAMSAR). The procedures for reporting and action on distress incidents are detailed in Chapter 37: . 2. The SAR organization is responsible for: a. British and allied military aircraft in the UK Search and Rescue Region (UK SRR) and RAF Flight Watch Areas. b. c. Foreign military aircraft under flight plan notification within the UK FIRs. Civil aircraft in the UK SRR.
d. British military aircraft on operational (including training) flights outside the UK SRR at the discretion of the national authority concerned. e. Military shipping in distress, including submarines. The controlling authority for co-ordinated search is the appropriate Naval C-in-C. ARCC 3. Rescue Co-ordination Centres provide the co-ordination authority for SAR. The UK ARCC, located at RAF Kinloss, is under the Operational Command of HQ AIR. Detailed Working and Organization of SAR 4. Details of the SAR organization within NATO and specifically in the UK are in ATP 10 (D) and ATP 10 (D) Br Supp 1. ATC staff and such other personnel as necessary should familiarise themselves with the contents of the documents and should comply with the procedures therein.
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Chapter 41: Controllers Emergency Actions Terminal ATC

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with 3041(1). Terminal ATC Emergency Actions General 1. It is not possible to detail all the actions to be taken to meet every possible type of aircraft emergency, some of which will be given in Command and Local Orders. However, the procedures laid out in this chapter should be followed whenever possible. It should be noted that at certain aerodromes, due to the nature of the flying task, controllers may not be in current practice to deal with all forms of emergency recovery involving the use of DF equipment. Speechless Procedures General 2. Should the ability to transmit speech from an aircraft be lost, pilots are required to adopt the Let-down procedure - Pilots microphone unserviceable as detailed in the RAF FLIPs: all controllers should be familiar with this procedure. Pilots hearing the callsign Speechless aircraft are, as far as possible, required to maintain R/T silence on the frequency being used. 3. Before a recovery is effected, certain information common to all types of speechless emergencies should be ascertained using the speechless code. a. On receipt of 4 short carrier-wave transmissions the controller should answer the call giving the standard callsign, ie Speechless aircraft do you require recovery to (Station name). b. If the answer is yes, then instruct the pilot to adopt callsign Speechless One (or whatever number in the speechless sequence), give a heading to the aerodrome and ask: (1) (2) Is this a practice? Do you have you any other forms of emergency?
c. If the pilot has indicated a further emergency then the main questions at Paragraph 6 should be asked in sequence. These questions are not intended to provide an answer to all possible emergencies; controllers must be prepared to adapt to any given situation. d. The controller should ascertain the type of recovery required (QGH, Radar Pickup, ILS etc). His subsequent actions depend upon the pilots requirements. For example, if the pilot wants a radar pick-up it will be necessary to ask questions and give instructions to identify the aircraft. e. In an actual emergency declared on his frequency, the controller should comply with Chapter 37: concerning liaison with the D&D controller. f. It should be assumed that the pilot is IMC, since it is not possible for changes in flight conditions to be ascertained.
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4. Speechless Procedures Radar Recovery. A pilot when calling for either an actual or practice speechless recovery may already be under the control of either the Surveillance Approach controller or Director; in this instance the controller can quickly establish identity by asking such questions as Speechless One, were you formerly J61. If the pilot is not in receipt of a radar service then the controller should use all means at his disposal to identify the aircraft, ie DF, turns, SSR etc. 5. Speechless Procedures QGH. When the controller using the procedures outlined at Paragraph 3 has confirmed that a QGH is required he should carry out the standard QGH recovery for his aerodrome. Normally, it is possible to obtain the following information during the homing phase: a. b. c. d. Type of aircraft. Endurance. Flight level Intentions feed into radar, visual etc.
6. Speechless Procedures Further Emergency Questions. If the answer to the question Do you have any other form of emergency is yes, then the pilot should be asked: Are you a fixed wing aircraft? Controllers should then proceed, as appropriate, through the following matrix to determine the nature of the emergency. If the answer to the main question shown is no, the associated supplementary questions should be asked:
Figure 41-1 Speechless Procedure Main Question Can you maintain height? Supplementary Questions Fixed Wing Rotary Wing Are you flamed out? Are you Do you have a control problem? short of oxygen? Are you affected Do you have an engine failure? Are you affected by icing? by icing? Are you short of fuel? Are you asymmetric? Are you short of fuel? Do you have an instrument failure? Do you have single engine failure? Do you have electrical failure? Do you have an instrument failure? (see note) Do you have electrical failure? Do you have hydraulic failure? Do you have hydraulic failure? (see note) Do you have an undercarriage Do you have an undercarriage problem? Do you have a brake failure? problem? Can you hover? Do you intend to engage the Do you require a running landing? cable? Do you require the barrier?
Can you carry out a normal recovery?
Can you carry out a normal landing?
Note: If it is established that the aircraft type is a Tornado, then controllers should ask if the aircraft has a wing sweep fail. Aircraft Transmitter Unserviceable 7. General Surveillance Approach/Director. If the emergency develops when an aircraft is under a terminal surveillance service then the controller must be able to confirm that the pilot is receiving instructions (the first indication of the unserviceability may be the failure of the pilot to transmit a reply to an instruction). The controller should confirm reception by giving a turn or by use of SSR J61, reply not received, turn left/right Squawk ident etc; followed by J61, turn/Squawk observed. I will continue to pass instructions.
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Whilst it is possible to use turns to gain information the delay in recovery may be unacceptable; therefore, it should always be assumed that the no transmitter aircraft is an actual emergency, is IMC, and requires an immediate recovery to land by the most precise aid available. 8. Talkdown Controller. The Talkdown controller should confirm reception by giving a turn of at least 10, if possible away from the centre line. 9. Pilots DH or MDH. The procedure minimum should be passed to the pilot, and the controller should assume the lowest DH or MDH. Approach Procedures Flame-Out Procedures 10. Although the term flame-out is used to describe the complete loss of engine thrust in jet aircraft, this procedure may be used by non-jet aircraft, and for partial power in either jet or non-jet aircraft. Flame-out procedures are not suitable for all aircraft. For this reason Aviation Duty Holders and Commanders are authorized to produce, as necessary, patterns and techniques to suit their own requirement. Likewise, they should lay down weather minima for the recovery procedure. The purpose of the procedure is to bring an aircraft into visual contact with the aerodrome at a suitable height for landing to be attempted. Appropriate RT phraseology is in CAP413. 11. Whenever an actual flame-out is notified to ATC, it should be considered and handled as an emergency condition. In all cases, the aircrafts position should be confirmed by the quickest available means so that the wisest choice of diversion aerodrome may be made. 12. It is the responsibility of the pilot-in-command to determine if a flame-out recovery will be attempted after consideration of data provided by ATC, the particular situation that exists, and procedures established by his operating authority concerning flame-outs in the type of aircraft being flown. Because of the many possible variables involved in a flame-out attempt (type of aircraft, relative location of recovery aerodrome, weather and winds, pilot experience, etc) it is not practicable to establish ATC procedures to be used for specific application. 13. Action by the Pilot. The pilot is required to carry out the following actions: a. Make a distress call as soon as possible and squawk emergency. The call will include aircraft type, altitude and position. b. Advise ATC of initial intentions and request any assistance immediately required such as determining position, heading to location of nearest suitable aerodrome or heading to reach nearest land. c. d. 14. Generally advise ATC of the progress of the recovery. Advise ATC of any change in intentions.
Actions by ATC. ATC should carry out the following actions: a. Advise other aircraft of the emergency in progress and keep them off the frequency being used by the aircraft in distress. If possible, avoid changing the frequency of the aircraft in distress once suitable contact is established. b. Inform the pilot of the most suitable aerodrome, considering weather conditions (including winds), terrain, obstructions etc. The aircraft should be homed to the selected aerodrome by the most direct route.
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c. Inform the pilot not to acknowledge transmissions for which acknowledgement is not absolutely essential. d. Coordinate actions with other ATC facilities as required and alert crash and rescue facilities. e. If the pilot intends to carry out a forced landing at an aerodrome, provide him with information regarding runway in use, wind, altimeter setting, weather, etc. Be as brief as possible and do not unnecessarily disturb the pilot, particularly in the final stages of approach. f. If the aircraft is over water, guide the pilot toward land as soon as possible. If overland, position the aircraft in the most favourable area for pilot survival. g. Do not volunteer courses for action but give the pilot in distress essential information upon which he can base his decisions. 15. Ejection. If ejection is elected and time permits, the pilot will pass to ATC, immediately prior to the ejection, aircraft heading and altitude. ATC should record this information and pass it immediately to the D&D cell. 16. Terminology. The following terms apply: a. High Key Point. This varies in position and height according to the aircraft type but generally is high dead-side of the landing runway. b. Low Key Point. Downwind, opposite the landing threshold.
Approach Procedures Hawk and Tucano Radar Actual and Practise Forced Landing 17. General. The following radar actual/practice forced landing (RA/PFL) procedure has been devised to permit recovery from above a cloud layer or in conditions of poor visibility following an engine failure. Relevant RT phraseology is in CAP413. The procedure, which is in use at Hawk and Tucano stations, is as follows: a. Following the initial request for a RA/PFL, the pilot is given a steer for the airfield corrected as necessary, to permit a homing to overhead. b. The pilot may have lost some instruments, including navigation displays, and therefore may not be able to give an accurate position report. Identification should be as expeditious as possible by whatever means are available. The pilot may be able to squawk Mode 3A 7700 in an actual emergency. c. Once identified, the pilot is given ranges from the overhead at 1 nm intervals. While gliding towards the overhead, the pilot compares his range with his height in thousands of feet and adjusts his glide such that he is able, ultimately, to achieve a 1in-1 glide slope. If the aircraft is positioned particularly high in relation to the distance to run, the aircraft captain may elect to arc or circle in order to achieve the required range/height relationship. Once the aircraft has established in the glide, range information is required at nm intervals. d. On becoming visual with the airfield (lowest altitude is the circling minimum) the pilot uses his excess speed to position for the most suitable runway at Low Key point, as for a visual A/PFL.
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Approach Procedures No Compass No Gyro Procedures 18. Aircraft with Unserviceable Compass The 90 Method. In the event of an aircraft compass failure in flight when search radar is not available, the following procedure may be used either to re-set the gyro or to carry out a homing and controlled descent. 19. Gyro Serviceable but not Correctly Set. The pilot is instructed to fly at a safe flight level on a steady heading and at a constant speed. He is then requested to make three check transmissions at 10-second intervals. The controller notes the bearings from these transmissions and proceeds as follows: a. If the bearing changes appreciably in a CLOCKWISE direction the pilot is instructed to turn 90 to the right; further heading corrections are then made until the aircraft is on a steady DF bearing. The pilot is then instructed to re-set his gyro to this heading and the aircraft controlled normally. If, on the first check, the bearings change ANTI-CLOCKWISE the 90 turn is made to the left. b. If the DF bearings do not alter appreciably the aircraft is either flying towards or directly away from the overhead. In this event the pilot is instructed to turn 90 to the right or left. If the bearings change ANTI-CLOCKWISE the pilot is instructed to turn left 105. If the bearings change CLOCKWISE the pilot is instructed to turn right 105; this will be towards the overhead. Further small heading corrections are then given as necessary to home to the overhead. 20. Compass and Gyro Unserviceable. If both compass and gyro are unserviceable the method described above is used to home the aircraft to the overhead. In this case, the pilot is instructed to make all turns standard rate one and the controller times all turns (3 per second). A standard controlled descent through cloud is then carried out with the controller timing all turns. 21. RT Procedures. Standard procedures are used where possible. The specific RT phraseology in CAP413 will be used as appropriate. Missed Approach and Communications Failure (MA&CF) Procedures 22. MA and CF procedures are should published as follows: a. MA Procedure. The MA procedure should be included on the published Terminal Approach Procedure Chart (TAPs). In the case of Ground Interpreted Aids not covered by that means the MA procedure should be published in TAPs under Special Procedures. Note: The MA procedure begins at the Missed Approach Point (MAP) but separate instructions may be issued by the controller if the pilot is unable to complete the approach to that point. b. CF Procedure. The CF procedure should be covered by rules which are set out in the Radio Communication Failure Handbook. Normally there is no need for such rules to be re-published but where a detailed CF procedure is specified by the Operating Authority, it will be included on the applicable TAPs in accordance with the arrangements given for MA procedures. For aerodromes beneath TCAs or within Special Rules Airspace, the specified detailed CF procedure is also to be published in the Radio Communication Failure Handbook. Note: The phrase If radio contact is lost and you are unable to continue your approach should precede any CF procedure message transmitted by the controller.
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23. Pilots are expected to be familiar with the MA and CF procedure, or, if not, are required to request details from the controller before the first approach. The MA or CF procedure should be transmitted separately and should be given by the controller in the following circumstances: a. To visiting aircraft in emergency, where appropriate (see Note), including practise emergency exercises. b. c. d. When requested by the pilot. When the procedure is temporarily changed from that published. When directed by the Operating Authority.
Note: During certain emergencies, e.g. Flame Out/Fuel Shortage, the giving of such procedures would be counterproductive and should be omitted. 24. Where a controller requires confirmation that a pilot is familiar with the MA and CF procedures, the phrase confirm you are familiar with the Missed Approach and Communication Failure procedures should be used. Aircraft with Radio or Total Electrics Failure 25. The presence of an aircraft with radio or total electrics failure in the visual circuit should be acknowledged by the use of a green pyrotechnic as the aircraft proceeds downwind accompanied by an RT transmission RT failure/total electrics turning downwind. 26. Landing instructions should be given to such aircraft on final using lamp or pyrotechnic signals in accordance with the guidance in Chapter 18: . 27. When an aircraft with total electrics failure requires an undercarriage status check prior to landing, the procedure should be as follows: a. A port to starboard sequence for indicating undercarriage status.
b. Green pyrotechnics to indicate undercarriage down, red to indicate position other than locked down. c. Harriers (AV8) should receive a total of 4 pyrotechnics indicating undercarriage position in order left outrigger, nosewheel, right outrigger and mainwheels. d. Hook fitted aircraft should receive a green (fourth pyrotechnic) for the hook only if it is down. e. Pyrotechnic indications should be given when the aircraft is downwind other than at those aerodromes with special requirements.
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Chapter 42: Controllers Emergency Actions Area Radar

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3042(1). Emergencies 1. An ATCRU controller alerted by D&D in connection with an emergency incident should take action in accordance with procedures specified in these Regulations and RAF ATM Force Orders. Radar Failure 2. In the event of the planned or unexpected non-availability of radar facilities at any ATCRU, units should comply with contingency arrangements detailed in RAF ATM Force Orders. Loss of Communications 3. General. If RT contact is lost with an aircraft receiving an area radar service, at least one of the following steps should be taken to establish which elements of the air and/or ground equipment are unserviceable: a. b. Call other aircraft on frequency in use. Instruct the pilot to carry out one of the following: (1) (2) (3) c. d. 4. Make an SSR code change. Operate the IDENT feature. Effect a turn of at least 30.
Carry out a ground check of the frequency in use. Call the pilot on 243.00 or 121.50 MHz having obtained approval from D&D.
Air Equipment Unserviceable. Equipment unserviceabilities are dealt with as follows: a. Total Radio Failure. If an aircraft has total radio failure, a controller should: (1) Continue to trace the aircraft to its destination or handover point or to the limits of radar cover. (2) Ensure, if possible, other traffic is vectored clear of the RT fail aircraft.
(3) Pass details of the situation to the military supervisor at the ATCRU, requesting that he co-ordinates with civil staffs where necessary. (4) (5) b. Inform the D&D cell of the action taken. Arrange any subsequent handover of control.
Transmitter Failure. If an aircraft has transmitter failure, the controller should:

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(1)
Obtain information from the pilot by instructing him to squawk Ident.
(2) Try other frequencies including VHF if practicable. However, the controller should ensure that the pilot continues to listen out on the frequency being used so that complete contact is not lost. (3) (4) Inform the ATCRU military supervisor. Advise the next ATC unit to which the aircraft is likely to be transferred.
(5) Advise D&D of the situation and, if possible, provide a service on 243.00 or 121.50 MHz. c. Receiver Failure. If a controller suspects an aircraft receiver has failed, he will: (1) Advise D&D of the situation and, if possible, provide a service on 243.00 or 121.50 MHz. (2) Take action as described in Paragraph.4.a
d. Microphone Failure. The speechless procedure is used primarily in Terminal ATC and the procedures are shown in Chapter 41: . In the area radar environment the identity and destination of an aircraft will usually be known and the speechless procedure should be adapted to fit an incident. While it is impracticable to detail the actions to be taken in all circumstances, whenever possible, area radar controllers will include the following questions during the incident: (1) Do you require recovery to (station name)? (if the destination is not known, endeavour to ascertain). (2) Do you have any further emergency?
5. Ground Equipment Unserviceable. Procedures when ground equipment is unserviceable are as follows: a. In the event of a failure of ground radio facilities, the controller should select standby facilities (if available) or, by use of 243.00 or 121.50 MHz, instruct the pilot to change to an alternative frequency. b. When landline communication between radar units, or radar units and airfields, cannot be established for the handover of aircraft, the handovers should be made via the aircraft concerned. In such circumstances, the pilot should be given his position and instructed to call the next unit on its ICF.
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Chapter 43: Administration - General

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3043(1)(2)(3). ATC Log Books 1. ATC Watch Log/Occurrence Log. A detailed ATC Watch Log (RAF Form 6658) should be maintained by each ATS unit. It should be labelled and handled as a RESTRICTED document. Only one ATC Watch Log should be maintained, to ensure that the ATCO IC is fully informed of all activities and that a single source will give a complete picture of ATC-related events. The entries required and layout of the pages of Form 6658 are contained inside the front cover of the RAF Form 6658 and in single-Service regulations. 2. Aircraft Movement Log. Aircraft movements should be recorded in RAF Form 68. All entries should be made in ink and in chronological order with times in UTC. No erasures should be made to the log and under no circumstances are pages to be removed from the log book. 3. Other Logs. Other logs should be maintained as detailed in local orders or singleService regulations. 4. Retention of Log Books. Forms 6658 and 68 should be kept for a period of 6 years after their completion and are then to be forwarded to the MOD archive through the contract with TNT (Customer Services can be contacted on 0845 6010610, Fax 01827 312515). RN Log Books will be archived in the FAA Museum at RNAS Yeovilton. Closure of Aerodromes 5. Military aerodromes are required to remain open except in the following circumstances: a. For periods or under conditions agreed by the appropriate authority and duly published in a NOTAM or in RAF FLIPs. b. When the surface of the landing area is unfit for the safe operation of aircraft.
6. When it is decided that the aerodrome must be closed, the DATCO (RN)/ATCO IC (RAF) should take the following action: a. b. Notify all aircraft under his control. Notify the following authorities by telephone: (1) (2) (3) c. D&D. The aircraft operating authorities concerned. The ATCC (CAC) controller, if appropriate.
Notify all station sections associated with flying.
d. Ensure that the ground signals displayed in the signals area indicate the correct aerodrome state.
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e.
Ensure any diversion commitments are cancelled.
7. Aerodrome Extra Availability. To enable a controller at an ATCC to know at all times which aerodromes in the FIR are available to accept aircraft in emergency, DATCOs(RN)/ATCOs IC(RAF) should ensure that the ATCC is informed by telephone whenever their aerodrome is in operation outside the times published in FLIPs. It is important that the starts and endings of periods are notified without delay. Proposals for Establishment Cancellation or Change 8. Military Aerodrome Traffic Zone. Proposals for the establishment, cancellation or changes to the dimensions of a MATZ should be submitted through Group and Command HQ for approval by the Defence Airspace Group (DAG); the latter consult DAP (ORA) before approving a non-standard MATZ. 9. Airfield Approach, Holding and Departing Patterns and Procedures. Proposals for new airfield approach, holding or departure patterns and procedures, or alteration to existing patterns and procedures, should be submitted to No 1 AIDU for co-ordination. AIDU are responsible for seeking HQ ATM Force advice to resolve possible conflictions between adjacent airfields or other published procedures, and for gaining HQ ATM Force endorsement of new patterns and procedures. 10. UK Prohibited and Restricted Areas. Proposals for the establishment, cancellation or changes to the details of UK Prohibited or Restricted Areas (EGP or EGR) should be submitted through Group and Command HQ to AUS for consideration. 11. Provost Marshals Prohibited and Restricted Areas. Proposals for the establishment, cancellation or changes to the details of Provost Marshal Prohibited or Restricted Areas (PMPor PMR) should be submitted through Group and Command HQ for consideration by HQ ATM Force, (Ops (LF) 1) and MOD AS21. 12. UK Danger Areas. Proposals for the establishment, cancellation or changes to the details of UK Danger Areas (EGD) should be submitted through Group and Command HQ for consideration by the appropriate service sponsors, as follows: a. b. RN. ACOS(Av), copy to DJtCap ISTAR3. Army. HQ LAND (G3 Trg).
c. RAF. HQ AIR (SO2 1Gp Ranges) for Air Command AWR Danger Areas and MOD (AS21) for all other RAF Danger Areas. d. Non-FLC. MAA.
13. Proposals accepted by the sponsors are forwarded to DAP (ORA) for further military and civil consultation. If agreed to, new Areas or alterations will then be notified and introduced via the AIRAC System. 14. Military Training Areas. Proposals for the establishment, cancellation or alterations to MTAs should be submitted through Group and Command HQ to HQ ATM Force, Dep Force Cdr, for consideration by the Military Users Airspace Co-ordination Team (MUACT) and formal submission to DAP through MOD AS25. 15. Areas of Intense Aerial Activity (AIAA). Proposals for the establishment, cancellation or changes to the details of an AIAA should be submitted through Group and Command HQ to HQ ATM Force, Dep Force Cdr, for consideration by the MUACT and formal submission to DAP through MOD.
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16. Aerial Tactics Area (ATA). Proposals for the establishment, cancellation or changes to the details of an ATA should be submitted through Group and Command HQ to HQ ATM Force, Dep Force Cdr, for consideration by the MUACT and formal submission to DAP through MOD. 17. Air-to-Air Refuelling Areas. Proposals for the establishment, cancellation or changes to the details of an AARA should be submitted through HQ 2 Gp to HQ ATM Force, Dep Force Cdr, for consideration by the MUACT and formal submission to DAP through MOD.
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Chapter 44: Civil Aircraft Use of Military Airfields

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction withRA 3044(1)(2) and RA 3018(12). Accommodation for Civil Aircraft, Aircrew and Passengers 1. Parking space for civil aircraft at a military aerodrome should be decided by the Commanding Officer. Hangar accommodation may be provided only if available after all Service requirements have been met, and, if provided, will be entirely at the owners risk. 2. A serving officer who wishes to keep a private aircraft at a military aerodrome should obtain the permission of the Commanding Officer. 3. Military units are not responsible for providing accommodation or messing, telephone services, transportation facilities or car parking for civil aircrew or their passengers, except in emergency at the Commanding Officers discretion, or where special arrangements have been provided by the Ministry of Defence. 4. See also JSP 360 Regulations for Civil Flying at MOD Aerodromes and Charges for Non-UK Military Aircraft using MOD Aerodromes. Refuelling and Maintenance of Civil Aircraft 5. Generally, the provision of aviation fuel or lubricating oil to civil privately owned or charter aircraft is accepted at the Commanding Officers discretion. Responsibility should be accepted for refuelling aircraft of HM Government-controlled corporations. 6. Civil pilots can make their own arrangements with commercial suppliers to refuel their aircraft at a military aerodrome provided that: a. Prior permission is obtained from the Commanding Officer.
b. The civil aircraft owner accepts full responsibility for any damage or loss arising from the presence of the suppliers equipment. c. The suppliers equipment and representatives are subject to the standard air traffic control regulations for the control of vehicular traffic on the movement area of the aerodrome. 7. Military units should not undertake aircraft maintenance, servicing, handling or loading of civil aircraft, except that, at the discretion of the Commanding Officer, or where special arrangements have been approved by the Ministry of Defence, assistance can be given to an aircraft which lands in emergency or for reasons of national importance. 8. See also JSP 360 Regulations for Civil Flying at MOD Aerodromes and Charges for Non-UK Military Aircraft using MOD Aerodromes.
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Chapter 45: Responsibilities and Task of the Radar Analysis Cell and the Low Flying Operations Squadron
REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3045(1)(2). Responsibilities and Task of the Radar Analysis Cell 1. Task. The Radar Analysis Cell (RAC) is established at LATCC(Mil) to provide detailed radar analysis and radar replay recordings to acknowledged customers which include HQ AIR, UK Airprox Board, DFCIT and HM Customs. RAC also provides assistance with tracing all aircraft involved in air occurrences. 2. Responsibilities. The major responsibilities of the RAC are as follows: a. Providing the UK Airprox Board with detailed radar analysis and radar replay recordings of aircraft involved in Airprox in the UK. b. Conduct tracing action in connection with aircraft involved in Airprox in accordance with the Manual of Air Safety. c. Taking appropriate signal action when confirmatory reports are received from military aircraft involved in Airprox. d. Assist DFCIT, HQ P&SS(UK) in their investigations of breaches of ATC regulations. Provide detailed radar analysis and radar replay recordings of all incidents and assist with tracing as requested by DFCIT. e. Assistance with tracing action in connection with aircraft involved in ATC Occurrence Reports and the provision of detailed radar analysis, radar replays and printed radar data as directed by HQ AIR,1 Gp, BM SM SO2 Occurrences. f. Impounding radar data, providing detailed radar analysis and conducting radar replays for other agencies including HM Customs and Boards of Inquiry. g. RAC is responsible for all trace action undertaken at LACC and LTCC (See CAP 493 Manual of Air Traffic Services Pt 1). Responsibilities and Task of the Low Flying Operations Squadron 3. Task. The task of the Low Flying Operations Squadron (LF Ops Sqn), RAF Wittering is to provide a coordination service for all notified military aircraft using the UKLFS. LF Ops Sqn consists of the Low Flying Booking Cell (LFBC) and Operations Low Flying (Ops LF). 4. Responsibilities of the LFBC. The major responsibilities of the LFBC are as follows: a. Providing a coordination service for all notified and authorized military aircraft using the UKLFS. b. Promulgating by Y and Z series NOTAM routine closures of elements of the UKLFS for Royal Flights and Civil Aircraft Notification Procedures (CANP). c. Compiling monthly statistical data for the F2188, HQ AIR Monthly Summary of Activity in the UKLFS.
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d. Forwarding monthly, within 7 working days, all booking details for LF in the UK to HQ P&SS (UK). e. f. 5. Passing notified exercise and verbal navigational warnings as required. Compilation and distribution of the monthly HQ AIR AWR programme.
Responsibilities of Ops LF. The major responsibilities of Ops LF are as follows: a. Coordination and notification of air exercises within the UKLFS.
b. Compilation and distribution of the monthly Night LF Sectors and Tactical Training Areas programmes. c. d. Providing advice on any aspect of the UKLFS. Amending the Mil AIP Volume 3 Part 1.
e. Promulgating Y series NOTAMs, UKLA bulletins and closures of the UKLFS as directed by MOD DAS (LA).
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Chapter 46: Aeronautical Information

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3046(1)(2). Aeronautical Information 1. Aeronautical information is published in a series of documents and charts known under the generic title of Flight Information Publications, known as FLIPs. Revised editions of most FLIPs take effect on certain predetermined dates which accord with those agreed internationally under the Aeronautical Information Regulation and Control, known as AIRAC, system and, whenever possible, changes which will affect the information in the FLIPs should be pre-planned to take effect on an AIRAC date and be notified in advance. The information published in FLIPs may be augmented or updated by Supplements to the UK AIP and NOTAM which are distributed by post or by signal respectively. Classified information is not published in either FLIPs or NOTAM. 2. FLIPs. Details concerning FLIPs are as follows: a. Responsibilities of No 1 AIDU. No 1 AIDU is responsible for the publication, distribution and amendment of RAF FLIPs, the distribution of UK AIP Amendments, UK AIP Supplements and distribution of foreign civil and military FLIPs to British forces. In addition, No 1 AIDU maintains a comprehensive library of analyzed source material for most of the world for consultation by units as required. Detailed responsibilities of No 1 AIDU are laid down in DIN (2006DIN05-038). b. Coverage and Contents of FLIPs. RAF FLIPs published by No 1 AIDU cover Europe, Africa, the Middle East, the Far East and South Asia. FLIPs for North America are available from US and Canadian military sources and for Australasia, from the RAAF. RAF FLIPs contain all current permanent unclassified information pertinent to the area of coverage and certain temporary items of major importance. Detailed information on RAF FLIPs are contained in the No1 AIDU Product and Services catalogue and is also available on their web site (www.aidu.co.uk). c. Amendment of FLIPs. FLIPs are amended by routine reprinting and by an assortment of amendment bulletins, which form an integral part of all FLIPs. The aeronautical information in FLIPs is also augmented and updated by NOTAM. d. Accuracy of FLIP Information. All users of FLIPs are responsible for notifying any errors or omissions they may discover to No 1 AIDU without delay. COs should ensure that all information concerning their airfields or installations is checked in each new issue of FLIPs and that No 1 AIDU is informed of any errors or omissions. 3. AIRAC System. To facilitate the revision of FLIPs and other aeronautical documentation, the AIRAC System is applied in the UK. Whenever possible, routine changes to facilities, procedures and regulations requiring presentation in FLIPs should be notified in advance and brought into effect on the specified AIRAC dates which occur every 28 days. At least 28 days notice of a change should be given to No 1 AIDU by post. Changes which have not been the subject of joint civil/military consultation but which will also affect civil publications have to be promulgated by AIS, Heathrow. Flight charts and documents are correct on the effective date of publication and any changes during the life of the FLIP which are sufficiently urgent to demand NOTAM action will be published in the relevant amendment bulletin.
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UK AIP Supplements and Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) 4. ICAO Definitions. ICAO definitions are as follows: a. NOTAM. A notice distributed by means of telecommunication containing information concerning the establishment, condition or change in any aeronautical facility, service, procedure or hazard, the timely knowledge of which is essential to personnel concerned with flight operations. Note: The existence of a NOTAM advising of an activity within an area does not grant the sponsor sole use of the airspace concerned but simply advises other airspace users of the activity. b. UK AIP Supplement. Temporary changes to the information in the UK AIP which are published by means of special pages. 5. NOTAM Distribution. A NOTAM is distributed to addressees to whom the information is of direct operational significance. Alternatively, information can be distributed in the form of a Supplement to the UK AIP. 6. The NOTAM Code. The NOTAM Code is provided to enable the coding of information distributed by telecommunications. Full details of the NOTAM Code and its use are in the UK Mil AIP Gen Section. 7. Applicability of UK NOTAM. NOTAM are originated and issued in accordance with ICAO procedures contained in International Standards and Recommended Practices Aeronautical Information Services Annex 15. In the UK there are 2 types of NOTAM, Civil and Military, each of which is complemented by Supplements. Civil NOTAM are not usually available at military units. UK AIP Supplements, Military NOTAM and Military Forces Aeronautical Information Supplements are distributed to military units and contain civil and military aeronautical information which will be complied with by military users. Military NOTAM and Supplements can be issued in addition to, or in amplification of, UK AIP Supplements when required for specific military operations and procedures. DAP/HQ ATM Force can take military NOTAM action if it is considered necessary to impose restrictions on military low-level operations. 8. The UK NOTAM Service. The UK International NOTAM Office is part of the AIS at Heathrow. In addition to civil commitments, AIS Heathrow is responsible for: a. Filtering incoming civil and military NOTAM information from national and international sources, and selecting relevant material for distribution to military users. Aerodrome information is distributed to military users only if the aerodrome concerned is one of the selected aerodromes nominated by MOD. b. Issuing all UK military NOTAM, including publishing details of CAS (T) airspace to protect Royal Flights in fixed wing aircraft, but excluding those relating to the military low-flying system, and distributing them in accordance with the distribution pattern authorized by MOD. Note: Low Flying Operations Squadron at RAF Wittering is responsible for all NOTAM action relating to the military low-flying system in the UK. c. Issuing the Summary of Selected UK Aerodromes and Sovereign Bases to military units on request
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9. NOTAM Services Overseas. The NOTAM office of the State concerned is generally responsible for the origination, re-promulgation and distribution of NOTAM. Additionally, some NOTAM are provided to selected overseas units by the UK AIS. 10. Military NOTAM Distribution Lists. AIS Heathrow distributes NOTAM to military units in accordance with distribution lists laid down by MOD. There are separate distributions for UK and foreign information. Low Flying Operations Squadron at RAF Wittering issue NOTAM concerning the UK low-flying system in NOTAM Series Y and Z. Formations of units wishing to be included in, or deleted from the NOTAM distribution lists, including LF Series should submit their requests to the Military Aeronautical Information Services Officer (MAISO), AIS Heathrow. 11. Pre-flight Information Bulletins. AIS provides Pre-flight Information Bulletins on the current status of facilities and services. These bulletins are available by accessing the AIS website (www.ais.org). SNOWTAM 12. SNOWTAM are a special series of NOTAM used for notifying the presence or removal of hazardous conditions due to the presence of snow, slush, ice or water on the movement area of aerodromes. The SNOWTAM proforma used is explained in detail, and instructions given on compilation, in the UK Mil AIP Gen Section. The UK Military SNOWTAM procedures for the forthcoming winter are published in about October of each year in the form of a Military Forces Aeronautical Information Supplement. 13. Information on the surface conditions of civil and military aerodromes that have reported snow is available from AIS Heathrow (Tel PSTN 020 8745 3490). Alternatively, suitably equipped units are able to access the information through the AIS CABS. Reporting Aeronautical Information 14. Information to be Notified. Information concerning a change of aerodrome facility state which would not influence a pilot or authorizing officer in deciding whether or not to use the aerodrome eg minor works services; need not be reported. All other changes, or expected changes, in the facilities provided at an aerodrome or ATC Unit, or in aids or hazards to air navigation, should be notified without delay. 15. Responsibility for Reporting Changes to Aerodrome Facilities. Aviation Duty Holders and Commanders should ensure that changes to their airfield facilities or installations are notified. 16. Procedures for Notification. Whenever possible, permanent changes to aeronautical facilities, procedures, etc will be pre-planned to take effect on AIRAC dates. The reporting action to be taken is described in Paragraph 3. Temporary changes, and also permanent changes which cannot be made under the AIRAC system, should be reported to the following agencies as appropriate: a. No 1 AIDU. All permanent changes to information contained in FLIPs should be reported to No 1 AIDU. If more than 28 days notice can be given, notification should be sent by post to No 1 AIDU. If notice is less than 28 days, the notification should be by signal in NOTAM format using the ICAO location indicator EGVCYOYX. In addition, a Service Request Form can be submitted using following link or via the MilFlip website: http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/SecurityandIntelligence/ DIS/ICG/No1AeronauticalInformationDocumentsUnitno1Aidu.htm b. AIS (Heathrow). The following changes should be reported to AIS, Heathrow:
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All changes which affect any civil publications. All permanent changes at selected aerodromes (Paragraph 8.a).
(3) All temporary changes at selected aerodromes (Paragraph 8.a), except when they are expected to last for less than 24 hours and the operating authority, having due regard to the expected inbound movements, considers that NOTAM action is not justified. Notification should be by signal in system NOTAM format using the ICAO location indicator EGGNYNYX (NOTAM Office).
c. Parent ATCC. All changes which effect the emergency services should be telephoned immediately to D&D. In addition, all changes which require to be notified but are not notifiable to No. 1 AIDU or AIS, Heathrow, under a and b above, should be notified by telephone to D&D.
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Chapter 47: Air Traffic Service Messages

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3047(1). Air Traffic Services Messages General 1. ATS messages are used for the interchange of national and international ATS data. They are designed for electronic input via systems such as Mil-EAMS for routeing into AFTN. ATS messages are divided into categories which relate to their use within the ATC System and give an indication of their importance. Figure 47-1 shows the messages in current military use; they are split into Emergency Messages and Movement and Control Messages.
MESSAGE TYPE MESSAGE DESIGNATOR MILITARY PRECEDENCE INCERFA Priority ALERFA Immediate DETRESFA Immediate Immediate Immediate ICAO PRIORITY PREFIX ORIGINAL ON RAF FORM
EMERGENCY MESSAGES Alerting Radio Comms Failure Request News ALR RCF Not Abbreviated SS FF FF or higher FF/DD FF/DD GG GG FF GG FF FF F3808 F3808 F3808
MOVEMENT AND CONTROL MESSAGES Filed Flight Plan Departure Delay Arrival Modification Flight Plan Cancellation Supplementary Flight Plan Request Supplementary Flight Plan FPL DEP DLA ARR CHG CNL SPL RQS F2919 F3808 F3808 F3808 F3808 F3808 F3808 F3808
Priority Priority Immediate Priority Immediate Immediate
Figure 47-1 ICAO Messages in Military Use
Notes: 1. Under ICAO procedure, when justified by the requirement for special handling, messages with normal ICAO priority prefix of FF or below may be assigned the higher prefix DD. 2. Originators may assign a lower message precedence to all those detailed above where it is known that a lower precedence will serve the intended purpose. 3. Messages are normally released by the ATCO IC or Operations Officer.
2. Use of F2919/F3808 or Equivalent Electronic Forms. Flight plans should be raised on RAF Form F2919 (CA48), filed via Mil-EAMS or via any other approved electronic Flight Planning System. All other messages will be on F3808 (CA R597). The electronic versions of these forms can be used in accordance with the relevant User Manuals.
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3. Precedence (F3808 Only). The appropriate military precedence should be inserted in the action section of the form. Military precedence, equivalent to ICAO priority prefixes, are detailed in Figure 47-1. 4. Priority Indicator. The ICAO priority prefixes for the type of message concerned should be inserted by the originator. The priority prefixes in Figure 47-1 should be used. 5. Date/Time Group (DTG). The DTG should be inserted in UTC. On CA48/ RAF F2919, or electronic equivalent, only the time is required. 6. Message Instructions. If manual transmission via COMMCENS is used, this section should be left blank for completion by signals staff. 7. Addressee(s) Indicator(s). The addressee section should be completed using eightletter ICAO combined location indicators and agency abbreviations. For details and encode/decode information see RAF FLIPs and ICAO Doc 7910 (Location Indicators). 8. Specific Identification of Addressee(s) and/or Originator. If the addressee or originator has no specific agency designator, the appropriate abbreviation should be used i.e. YYY (civil), YXY (military) or ZZZ (aircraft in flight). The name of the authority specified should be included on: a. F2919, or electronic equivalent, in the specific identification of addressee(s) section. b. F3808, or electronic equivalent, as the first words of the text (Paragraph 13.a).
9. Authorities. If more than one authority can be identified, the word STOP should be inserted between each authority identification. The authorities should appear in the same order as they are written in the address indicator and/or originator sections. Movement and control messages should not be addressed to RN authorities other than those directly concerned with details of aircraft movements i.e. RN Air Stations, Plymouth Military Radar, Naval Aircraft Repair Organization Fleetlands, aircraft carriers and other aviation-capable ships with embarked aircraft. 10. Originator Indicator. An ICAO combined location indicator, as described in Paragraph 7, should be inserted in this section. 11. Date and Time of Filing. For manually generated messages input via COMMCENS, the date and time of filing should be left blank for completion by signals staff. 12. Text of Message. To enable flight data to be processed by computer systems, the originators should submit ATS messages in a standard format. RAF Form F2919 (CA48) and electronic versions are designed to do this and incorporate the required symbols. Item 18 should only be for ATS information; it should not be used, for example, for copy/info addressees. 13. Pattern of Messages. Messages raised on F3808, or electronic equivalent, should conform to the following pattern: a. The text should begin and end with the open-brackets and the close-brackets symbols respectively. The one exception to this is when specific identification of addressees is incorporated (Paragraph 8.b). In this case, the open-brackets symbol should be written immediately after the addressees. b. The first word of the text is the message designator (Figure 47-1).
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c. Standard ATS messages are composed of fields of data or items, appropriate to each message type. Separation of items within the text is by means of a single hyphen. d. Further separation of data within fields is achieved by use of the oblique stroke e.g. (CHG CALLSIGN 10/A/R/F). 14. Security Measures. Security measures are as follows: a. Person of Special Interest (PSI). The name, rank and appointment of any PSI abroad should be omitted from the flight plan when the person concerned is making the flight in connection with an imminent or current exercise or operation. If necessary, a separate classified signal should be originated notifying the destination and staging airfields of the movement. b. Airframe Numbers. The airframe number should only be included on flight and movement and control messages when the requirement is specified nationally (see RAF FLIPs). It can also be used in Request News messages. 15. Retention of Flight Plans and Air Movement Messages. Copies of all flight plans and air movement messages originated or received by ATC should be preserved in chronological sequence and in a readily accessible place for one calendar month. They should then be preserved elsewhere in monthly blocks for a further 3 months after which, provided that no query has arisen regarding any of them, they can be destroyed. Messages should be identified by the eight-letter indicator of their origin and the DTG. 16. Composition of ATS Messages. The composition of the ATS messages in current military use is detailed in Figure 47-2. For details of flight plan composition see (CAP 694) the UK Flight Planning Guide and the RAF Flight Information Handbook. For full details and examples of the message types, see ICAO Doc 4444 PANS-RAC/501 Appendix 2 and 3.
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MESSAGE TYPE
PURPOSE OF MESSAGE
MILITARY PRECEDENCE
ICAO PRIORITY PREFIX
ADDRESSEES
COMPOSITION
EMERGENCY MESSAGES Type of message (ALR). Description of emergency. Ac identification. Flight rules and status. Type of aircraft. Equipment (COM, NAV, SSR). Departure aerodrome and time (UTC) expressed as 4digit group. Route. Destination Aerodrome and Total EET and alternate aerodrome. Other information. Basic SAR information. Alerting SAR information. Type of message (Request News). Ac Type and airframe identification Ac Callsign Departed(dep arture airfield). For(destinatio n airfield). At(six-figure DTG). Via(route details). Last known position. Time this position was established. Note: Place names must be in plain language.
ALR
Sent when an ATSU wishes to alert other ATSUs on account of uncertainty of the safety of an aircraft.
Priority.
SS
Whoever the originator considers requires the information, e.g. ARRC/SAR organizations.
Request News
Required in the event of an ac becoming overdue, and is originated by the parent ATCC of the destination airfield or D&D.
In the UK: a. From parent ATCC to all flying units within its FIR. b. From D&D to all ATCCs and to continental ATCCs as appropriate for redistribution to all flying units. Abroad: All ATCCs along the planned route.
Immediate.
FF
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MESSAGE TYPE PURPOSE OF MESSAGE Sent when an ATSU wishes to inform other ATSUs that an ac has had radio comms failure in flight.
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED MILITARY PRECEDENCE ICAO PRIORITY PREFIX
ADDRESSEES Whoever the originator considers requires the information, eg: destination airfield, ATSUs en route.
COMPOSITION
RCF
Immediate.
FF
Type of message (RCF). Ac identification. Radio failure information.
MOVEMENT AND CONTROL MESSAGES Sent whenever a flight for which a flight plan has been dispatched departs and a departure message has been requested in Item 18, or is stipulated in FPD Pt 4 National Procedures. Sent whenever a Flight Plan has not been filed and for all ship to shore flights.
As flight plan.
As flight plan.
DEP
Type of message (DEP). Ac identification. Departure aerodrome and time (UTC) expressed as 4digit group. Destination aerodrome and EET, alternate aerodrome.
FF
Destination.
Type of message (DEP). Ac and callsign. Actual time of departure (UTC) expressed as 4digit group. POB.
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ADDRESSEES To the authority making the request.
COMPOSITION
Required: a. When requested. b. When an ac lands at an aerodrome other than that for which it departed. ARR c. When an ac under a controlled flight has experienced radio comms failure. d. All ship-toshore landings and vice-versa. Priority. GG In cases of diverted ac and ac landing after experiencing radio comms failure: a. The original intended destination. b. Original departure airfield plus all remaining flight plan addressees through whose area the flight would have passed had it not diverted. c. The ATCC in whose area the aerodrome of landing is located. Type of message (DLA). Aircraft identification. Departure Aerodrome and revised ETD (UTC) expressed as 4digit group. Destination aerodrome and EET, alternate aerodrome.
Type of message (ARR) Aircraft identification. Departure aerodrome and time (UTC) expressed as 4digit group. Arrival aerodrome and time (UTC) expressed as 4digit group.
DLA
Required when a flight for which a flight plan has previously been sent is delayed for more than 30 mins after ETD.
Priority.
GG
As flight plan.
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MESSAGE TYPE PURPOSE OF MESSAGE
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED MILITARY PRECEDENCE ICAO PRIORITY PREFIX
ADDRESSEES
COMPOSITION Type of message (CHG). Aircraft identification. Departure aerodrome and time (UTC) expressed as 4digit group. Destination aerodrome and EET, alternate aerodrome. Whole of item being changed, including item number. Type of message (CNL) Ac identification. Departure aerodrome and time (UTC) expressed as 4digit group. Destination aerodrome and EET, alternate aerodrome.
CHG
Used when it is necessary to amend a message already dispatched.
Immediate.
FF
As on the message being changed.
CNL
Required when a flight for which a flight plan has previously been sent is cancelled.
Priority.
GG
As flight plan.
SPL
Supplements the information already available on the original flight plan. An SPL is only sent by the ATSU serving the departure airfield on request from the ATSU requiring the information and/or to comply with Command instructions.
Immediate.
FF
ATSU requesting information and/or in accordance with Command instructions.
Type of message (SPL). Aircraft identification. Departure aerodrome and time (UTC) expressed as 4digit group. Destination aerodrome and EET, alternate aerodrome. All information in Items 18 and 19.
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UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED MESSAGE TYPE PURPOSE OF MESSAGE Used when an ATSU wishes to obtain supplementar y flight plan data from the ATSU serving the airfield of departure, or in case of flight plan submitted during flight, from the ATSU specified in the flight plan message. MILITARY PRECEDENCE ICAO PRIORITY PREFIX
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ADDRESSEES
COMPOSITION
RQS
Immediate.
FF
ATSU at departure aerodrome.
Type of message (RQS). Aircraft Identification.
Figure 47-2 Composition of ATS Messages
17. Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU) and Integrated Initial Flight Plan Processing System (IFPS). The UK is a participating State in the IFPS which is an integral part of the Eurocontrol centralized Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) initiative. The aim of the CFMU and the IFPS will rationalize processing and distribution of IFR/GAT flight plan data within the area covered by the participating states, known as the IFPS Zone. Implementation of this centralized system has led to the introduction of IFPS operational reply messages (ORMs) and CFMU slot related messages. Full details can be found in the CFMU Handbook, IFPS Users Manual and AFTM Users Manual respectively; however, outline details are provided in Figure 47-3.
MESSAGE DEFINITION USE An ACK message is returned to the message originator (and/or aircraft operator (AO)) when the received message has been successfully processed either automatically or following manual intervention by an IFPS operator. In the latter case, the ACK message will be preceded by a MAN message. ACK Acknowledge Message Two differently formatted ACK messages are available. The Short ACK refers to a flight plan that has been automatically processed by IFPS without amendment. The Long ACK relates to a flight plan that has required manual amendment prior to it being accepted into IFPS. It is essential that flight crews are provided with details of the accepted route where it has been repaired (ie altered) by IFPS. The MAN message is used to indicate to the message originator that errors have been detected in the submitted message, and that it has been referred for manual processing. A MAN message will be followed, after the completion of manual processing, either by a Long ACK message if the flight plan has been successfully corrected by IFPS, or by a REJ message.
IFPS OPERATIONAL REPLY MESSAGES
MAN
Manual Message
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MESSAGE DEFINITION
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED USE The REJ message is used to indicate to the originator that the submitted message could not be processed successfully, either automatically or manually. A REJ message indicates that the message has been rejected by IFPS; no flight plan will exist and no slot time will be issued. On receipt of such a message, message originators should therefore react by amending the original message as appropriate and re-submitting it to IFPS. The SAM is used to inform the AO and ATSUs of the Calculated Takeoff Time (CTOT), to which the AO/ATC must adhere. Used to notify revisions to a previously issued SAM. Sent to the AO/ATC to advise that a flight, which has received a CTOT is no longer subject to an ATFM restriction. Used to propose a NEWCTOT to the AO. A response is expected from the AO. If none is forthcoming, the proposal expires at the respond by time and the last published CTOT remains valid. Certain conditions may lead to flights being unable to depart. IFPS sends individual FLS messages to inform the AO/ATC that a flight has been suspended ie: flight data is retained in the database, but suspended UFN. As well as Flight Suspension, the FLS message can also mean Flight Shifted, with the FLS message including a new estimated off-block time (NEWEOBT). The DES message is used to indicate that the flight is de-suspended or de-shifted and is no longer subject to ATFM measures. The RRP message is sent to an AO to offer a different CTOT or to avoid the need for a slot on a new route. A respond-by time is included. If accepted, the AO must either send a CHG message or a CNL message followed by a new Flight Plan. These should be received before the respond-by time. The ERR message is sent when a message is received but it cannot be processed as the syntax is incorrect, or the message is correct but cannot be correlated to an existing flight plan, or it is not relevant. The AO/ATSU should re-send the corrected message.
REJ
Reject Message
CFMU SLOT RELATED MESSAGES ORIGINATED BY CFMU SAM SRM SLC Slot Allocation Message Slot Revision Message Slot Requirement Cancellation Message Slot Improvement Proposal Message Flight Suspension Message De-suspension Message Re-routeing Proposal Message
SIP
FLS
DES
RRP
ERR
Error Message
CFMU SLOT RELATED MESSAGES ORIGINATED BY AO/ATSU SRR Slot Revision Request Message Slot Missed Message Slot Proposal Acceptance Message Slot Proposal Rejection Message Ready Message The SRR message is sent by the AO when the CTOT in the SAM cannot be achieved, but where a NEWEOBT can be supplied. The SMM is originated by an AO when a slot time given in the SAM cannot be achieved, but where a NEWEOBT cannot be supplied. CFMU cancels the CTOT and confirms the suspension with an FLS. AO should advise NEWEOBT via an SRR message or a CHG, DLA or replacement flight plan into IFPS. CFMU responds with an SRM or a DES. This message is a positive response to a SIP message. If received within respond-by time, CFMU responds with an SRM. Sent by an AO when the flight cannot comply with an SIP message. The AO keeps the original slot received before the SIP and the SIP slot is released back into the system for potential use elsewhere. Use by the AO to inform CFMU that a flight having already been allocated a CTOT is able to accept any NEWCTOT at short notice. Any potential improvement that can be given to the flight is transmitted via an SRM.
SMM
SPA SRJ
RDY
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UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED MESSAGE FCM RJT DEFINITION Flight Confirmation Message Re-routeing Rejection Message USE
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Used to indicate to CFMU that a flight previously suspended is now confirmed and can be re-activated at a time given in the message. Used by an AO to reject an RRP message.
Figure 47-3 IFPS and CFMU Related Messages
Flight Plans 18. Flight plans fall into 3 categories: a. Full Flight Plans. The information filed in written format on Form CA48/RAF 2919 or filed via Mil-EAMS or via any other approved electronic Flight Planning System. b. Repetitive Flight Plans. See UK AIP ENR for details.
c. Abbreviated Flight Plans. The limited information required to obtain a clearance for a portion of flight (e.g. flying in a Control Zone or crossing an Airway) and filed either by telephone prior to take-off or by RT when airborne. Abbreviated Flight Plans should be filed with the appropriate civil or military Air Traffic Service Unit (ATSU). 19. A flight plan may be filed for any flight. The circumstances when a flight plan must be filed within the UK can be found in the UK AIP ENR. 20. For OAT flights, except where specific dispensation has been granted, either a Full or an Abbreviated Flight Plan should be filed for the following: a. All flights made as OAT within Class A, C or D airspace.
b. All flights made as OAT and conducted in accordance with IFR within Class E airspace. c. All flights made as OAT which cross the UK overland boundary designated as:
N5910 W00610 N5940 W00100 N5620 W00100 N5245 E00300 along the FIR boundary N4910 W00630 N5150 W00630 along the FIR boundary N5520 W00815 N5755 W00815 N5910 W00610. Note: Flights by military aircraft overseas should be conducted in accordance with national procedures, detailed in FLIPs and orders specified by the appropriate theatre commander. 21. Exemptions from Submitting Flight Plans. Flight plans are not required for: a. Flights that cross the UK FIR boundary under the control of UK air defence, naval vessel or AEW platform. b. 22. Flights within the North Wales MTA and Lincolnshire MTRA, when active.
Notification. Flights should be notified as follows:
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a. A pilot intending to make a flight should inform ATC at the aerodrome of departure; the filing of a flight plan constitutes compliance with this regulation. b. Notwithstanding the filing of a flight plan, all flights within the UK landing at another aerodrome should be notified in advance by telephone to the destination regardless of the duration of the flight. To File a Flight Plan 23. ATC or Operations staff, where established, should provide flight planning assistance if requested and should have the necessary FLIPs available for reference. 24. IFR/GAT Flight Plans. IFR/GAT flight plans should be raised on Form CA48/RAF2919, Mil-EAMS or via any other recognised Flight planning system and should be filed with the aerodrome ATC or Operations at least 60 mins before clearance to start up or taxi is requested; however, for North Atlantic flights and flights subject to Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) measures a minimum of 3 hrs is required. Exceptionally, in cases where it is impossible to meet this requirement, crews should give as much notice as possible and never less than 30 mins. Otherwise, if this is not possible, a flight plan can be filed when airborne with the FIR Controller or with an area radar controller if the aircraft is under control of an ATCRU. 25. OAT Flight Plans. Within the UK, OAT flight plans should be filed with the aerodrome ATC or Operations at least 15 mins before departure. Addressing Flight Plans 26. The addressing requirements of flight plans differ according to whether the flight is to be conducted under OAT, GAT or a combination of both. 27. OAT Flight Plans. OAT flight plans should be addressed to: a. b. Aerodrome of Departure. Aerodrome of first intended landing.
c. ATCCs (military elements where established) within whose FIRs the flight is to take place. d. For flights abroad, those additional addresses detailed in the national AIP of the State or country flown through. 28. IFR/GAT Flight Plans. Distribution of IFR/GAT flight plans is as follows: a. IFPS is the sole source for the distribution of IFR/GAT flight plan data, and GAT portions of a mixed OAT/GAT flight, within the area covered by the participating states (IFPS Zone) and to the Eurocontrol Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU). Flight plans for IFR/GAT flights operating within the IFPS Zone should be addressed only to the IFPS addresses either the single UK collective EGZYIFPS or both EBBDZMFP (Haren, Brussels) and LFPYZMFP (Bretigny, Paris). Details of IFPS and its associated Zone are contained in the UK AIP ENR. b. For flights that enter or leave the IFPS Zone, in addition to the IFPS addresses specified above flight plans should be addressed to the following: (1) Aerodrome of first intended landing, if outside the IFPS Zone.
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(2) (3)
ATCCs outside the IFPS Zone within whose FIR the flight is to take place. Controlled airspace authority outside the IFPS Zone, where applicable.
(4) The controlling authority of any oceanic control area through which the flight is to pass. (5) Those additional addresses listed in the national AIPs, planning documentation or RAF Flight Information Handbook. c. For flights conducted entirely outside the IFPS Zone, flight plans should be addressed as per (1) to (5) above. 29. Mixed OAT/GAT Flight Plans. IFPS will not handle the OAT portion of a mixed OAT/GAT flight plan. Consequently mixed OAT/GAT flight plans should be addressed in accordance with both Paragraph 27 and Paragraph 28. Administrative Responsibility 30. When a movement and control message is received that will result in a change in the administrative arrangements required for the flight in question, e.g. a delay message affecting accommodation or transport etc, it is the responsibility of the ATC service to inform the department co-ordinating such arrangements of the change. Full follow-up action and further promulgation is then the responsibility of that department.
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Chapter 48: Communications

REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA 3048(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7). Telecommunications General 1. The air-ground-air communications procedures in CAP 413 and STANAG 3817 should be used for all air-ground-air communications. Examples of phraseology that are specific to the provision of the UK FIS are detailed within CAP 774. UK peacetime air-ground word callsign policy, instructions and allocation are detailed within JSP506. 2. Logging of RT Calls. All messages associated with an emergency should be logged by RT monitors when tape recorders are not in use. In addition, the DATCO(RN)/ATCO IC is authorized to order full RT logging on a given frequency. 3. RT DF Bearings. RT DF Bearings are classified as follows: a. b. c. Class A. Accurate to within 2. Class B. Accurate to within 5. Class C. Accurate to within 10.
The pilot should be informed of the classification of any bearing less accurate than Class A. 4. Passing of Time with Bearings or Positions. Time should not be included in DF information unless: a. b. It has been requested by the captain of the aircraft. There has been a delay in the transmission of the information.
5. Testing of RT Channels. Standby RT channels and main RT channels not in regular use should be tested at least once a week with aircraft in flight. Air-Ground Communications (UK) Aerodromes 6. Principal frequencies in use at military aerodromes are listed in En Route Supplements. Air-ground RT channels for aerodrome, approach and radar control should be provided at RAF aerodromes as follows: a. UHF. (1) Aerodrome. (a) (b) (2) Primary Discrete frequency. Secondary NATO combined tower frequency.
Approach Control. (a) Primary Discrete frequency.
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(b) (c) (3)
Secondary NATO combined approach control frequency. International aeronautical emergency frequency.
Radar Director. (a) Primary Discrete frequency.
(b) Secondary NATO combined GCA marshalling and search frequency. (4) Talkdown. (a) (b) (c) Primary Discrete frequency. Secondary NATO combined GCA talkdown frequency. International aeronautical emergency frequency.
b. VHF. Allocation of VHF channels for aerodrome control is in accordance with policy as laid down by the MAA. 7. Details of Naval air world-wide UHF and VHF communications nets are in RNCP 4.
8. Mobile ATM Equipment. Mobile ATM equipment should be provided with selfcontained air-ground UHF and VHF RT facilities. Allocation of frequencies is a MOD responsibility. Point-to-Point Communications (UK) Aerodrome 9. Direct communications links should be provided between aerodrome ATC units and the following points: a. By telephone (External). ATC should have direct communication links with the following external units: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) The parent ATCC. ATCCs of adjacent FIRs as directed by MOD. Adjacent aerodromes, as directed by MOD. The British Telecom (BT) trunk subscriber line system. Relief landing grounds.
(6) The ATC authority for any control zone containing part, or all, of the aerodrome traffic pattern. (7) ATCRUs as directed by MOD.
b. By telephone (Internal). ATC should be connected directly to the appropriate station extensions. In addition, certain points on the aerodromes should be connected by teletalk. c. By Teleprinter. The parent ATCC.
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Air-Ground Communications (UK) ATCCs 10. Air-ground communications facilities are provided at ATCCs to ensure 2-way communication between the ATCC and aircraft anywhere within its FIR. The following airground communications facilities should be available: a. b. VHF Channels. International aeronautical emergency channel. UHF Channels: (1) (2) Flight Information Service channel. International aeronautical emergency channel.
11. In addition to these Service communications facilities, military aircraft can make use of the civil air-ground VHF and HF channels provided at ATCCs for Oceanic, Area and FIR control. Particulars of these channels are available in RAF FLIPs. Communications Security Measures 12. Air-ground Channels. To achieve the required degree of security the following rules should apply: a. Strict communications discipline should be maintained and unnecessary and unauthorized transmissions should not be made. b. The following information should not to be transmitted in clear: (1) The names, ranks or appointments of passengers of special importance, senior officers or other personnel. (2) (3) Squadron numbers, and RN, Army and RAF unit names or designations. Aircraft airframe numbers.
(4) The load breakdown of transport aircraft operating in support of exercises or operations. (5) The serviceability and operational readiness states of aircraft earmarked for or engaged in exercises or operations. c. Military aircraft types should only be passed in clear on the following occasions: (1) When specifically required to do so by ATC procedures contained in RAF FLIPs and in this manual. (2) In an emergency.
(3) When failure to pass the aircraft type would be likely to cause a flight safety hazard. (4) When passing essential traffic information on ATC VHF/UHF channels.
d. The length of transmissions should be reduced to the minimum compatible with clarity.
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e. ATC frequencies published in unclassified RAF FLIPs can be transmitted in clear, but operational and training frequencies are classified CONFIDENTIAL and can only be referred to by frequency designator or channel letter. f. AD frequencies can be passed in clear; however, reference should not be made to associated TAD numbers, Channel numbers or any other form of procedural designator. RVSM Liaison Phraseology 13. The safe application of RVSM relies upon the onward transmission of the RVSM status of the ac. In addition to the RVSM phraseology detailed within CAP413, it is imperative that the RVSM status is confirmed during liaison procedures at/with Area Radar (Mil and Civil), ASACS and Autonomous Radar Units. The following phraseology format should be utilised for RVSM operations:
Figure 48-1 RVSM Liaison Phraseology LIAISON OCCURRENCE Prenote Handover Co-ordination CFP Request Airways Join Request Prenote by Civil ATC of Airways Leaver PHRASEOLOGY FORMAT AND EXAMPLES Controller Position, Prenote, Nature of Task, Callsign, SSR Code, FL, Type, Intentions RVSM Status (see Note) Controller Position, Handover, Nature of Task, Callsign, Position and Heading of ac, SSR Code, FL, Type, Intentions, RVSM Status (see Note) Controller Position, Request Co-ordination, position of ac, SSR code, FL, RVSM Status Controller Position, Request CFP, position of ac, SSR code, Direction and Position of Crossing, FL, RVSM Status Controller Position, Request Joining Clearance, Callsign, position of ac, SSR code, Airways Joining Point, FL, RVSM Status Position Leaving UAR/Airway, Callsign, Beacon and time, FL, RVSM Status
Note: Formations are non-RVSM compliant irrespective of the RVSM status of the individual ac type
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Chapter 49: Aerodrome and ATM Considerations for Non-Front Line Command Supporting Organizations12
REGULATORY CROSS-REFERENCE This chapter supports and must be read in conjunction with RA3049(1)(2) AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL Policy
1. Air traffic control (ATC) of MAA-regulated aircraft conducting flight test activities will be effected by the Organization13, or by an approved Agency on his behalf, in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter. Air Traffic Controllers should hold a valid ATC Controllers' Licence with appropriate ratings and validations. Where special procedures are required for the control of MAA-regulated aircraft conducting flight test activities, specific instructions will be issued to the Organization by the MAA.
General
2. ATC, provided by a civil contractor, is dependent upon approval by the Air Traffic Standards Department (ATSSD) of the CAA Safety Regulation Group (SRG). Where the ATC service is provided by MOD Crown Servants, this should be in accordance with the requirements laid down in ATM 3000 and MMATM. 3. The MAA issues approvals for organizations and the Senior Air Traffic Controller Officer (SATCO) providing the ATC service to undertake MAA-regulated flying operations from specified airfields. This approval is dependent on the standard of airfield facilities provided and the ATC service meeting the requirements of the MAA. Contracts and/or Service Level Agreements issued for the provision of ATC should clearly indicate both these requirements. 4. The requirements of certain flights/trials may require the provision of an ATC service outside these approvals. The additional approval is to be sought from the MAA. 5.
Where ATC is the responsibility of the Organization he should provide for the following in respect of the flying operations of MAA-regulated aircraft:
a.
The appointment of one or more qualified Air Traffic Controllers on a scale commensurate with the flying task, for duty at all times when flying is in progress. The appointment of ATC Assistants, on a scale commensurate with the Air Traffic Controllers' strength, for duty at all times when flying is in progress.
b.
c. The manning of ATC communications, navigational aids and radar facilities (as appropriate), runway caravan (if applicable), fire tenders and ambulances, during any period when Flight Test regulated aircraft are flying.
Non-Front Line Command airfields include MOD Boscombe Down, Fleetlands, St Athan and contractor-owned airfields. 13 Organization in this chapter refers to organizations that are not in support of the Front Line Commands but are operating UK military aircraft.
12
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UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED d.
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Satisfactory procedures for the on-the-job training of student Air Traffic Controllers and unqualified or unlicensed personnel.
6. Where the ATC services are provided for the organization by an Agency approved by the MAA, arrangements must be concluded between that organization and the Agency for the provision of ATC services.
Amendments To ATC Procedures

7.
SATCOs/Managers of Air Traffic Services should ensure that any changes (including temporary changes) to current unit ATC procedures are cleared by the MAA before implementation. This can be achieved by sending a copy of the proposed MATS Part 2 amendment or the new Controllers Order.
8. All requests for changes to airspace should be co-ordinated with the MAA who will collate and collect these views to ensure the correct representation at national level.
To ensure consistency in policy, units which operate under MAA-regulation should not agree changes to Memorandum of Understanding or Letters of Agreement or associated airspace without the approval of the MAA.
9.
Radar Procedures
10. When trials specifications or other local operational requirements warrant a reduction in the standard separation minima, contained in either the Manual of Military Air Traffic Management or MATS Part 1, such reductions can only be approved by the MAA. In all cases the reduction, whether temporary or permanent, should be detailed in Local Unit Orders/Instructions. 11. Radar services provided to aircraft flying outside controlled airspace will be in accordance with CAP 774, UK Flight Information Services. Radar service within an active, organization-operated Danger Area will be in accordance with policy contained in RA2325.
In the event of PRIMARY radar failure, the use of SSR data alone from a verified source is authorized for those ATSUs under MAA regulation. Procedures are to be in accordance with MMATM/MATS Part 1.
12. 13. Civil Air Traffic Control Officers at organization sites are authorised to use the Hi-Brite VCR Radar Displays in accordance with either the MMATM or as an Aerodrome Traffic Monitor as required in MATS part 1 Paragraph 18.1. The choice should be indicated in the MATS Part 2. 14. Controllers providing PAR approaches will use procedures in accordance with the basic PAR practice associated with the approved course of instructions for the Air Traffic Controllers Standards Examination conducted at the Central Air Traffic Control School, RAF Shawbury. RTF phraseology will, normally, conform to those in the MMATM. 15. Additionally, controllers providing PAR approaches at organization airfields are authorized, where required, to: a.
Use an approved Clearance To Land light signal system for communication between the Aerodrome Controller and the PAR Controller. Pass instructions and guidance in both azimuth and elevation with the object of enabling the aircraft to achieve a specified glide path and centre line to Decision Height (DH).
b.
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c.
To continue to pass, subject to equipment limitations, advisory information to the point of touchdown.
16. Civil Aircraft can normally be expected to comply with the request in the MMATM to advise their DH/altitude. Where the civil minima are not known, then instructions should not be passed beyond the Procedure Minima for the relevant approach. Advisory information may be given to the touchdown point.
Concurrent, Parallel Runway Operations

17. Concurrent, simultaneous parallel runway operations are permitted at organization airfields subject to the following: a. b.
Formal Approval by the Head of Flying.
All movements, within the concurrent operations area, are subject to ATC prior acceptance and positive ATC at all times. The issue of appropriate instructions in the Local Flying Order and Local ATC instructions. These should address, inter alia:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
c.
Circuit de-confliction procedures. Minimum, acceptable, weather conditions. Maximum number of aircraft permitted in the circuit(s). Go-around or Overshoot procedures. Wake turbulence separation procedures. Any special conditions relating to aircraft taxiing or holding. RTF failure procedures (if different from normal). Acceptance of the procedures by the MAA.
ATC Controller - Licensing, Certificates of Competency and Endorsements

18. All civil controllers undertaking air traffic and range air controlling duties at organization sites must be in possession of a valid CAA Air Traffic Controllers Licence, valid Medical Certificate and current Certificate of Competence for the task being undertaken. 19. The ATSSD is responsible for conducting local examinations for the issue/renewal of Certificates of Competency for Aerodrome Control, Approach/Approach Radar Control (including PAR) and Area Radar Control. The MAA, at their discretion, will attend such examinations either for the issue of the First Certificate of Competency for a particular rating or for subsequent renewals. SATCOs/Managers ATC must ensure that all requests for examinations are copied to the MAA in sufficient time for this requirement to be assessed. 20. Range Air Control competence is assessed against DFARC 1, Standards for Air Weapon Range Controllers. Details of the assessment process are contained in RA2325. 21.
Unless otherwise agreed, civil controllers should be in possession of a valid Certificate of Competency for all relevant functions at the unit. Where the service is provided by military controllers, SATCO should agree a minimum mix of endorsements without which the unit will not normally operate.
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Equipment
22. All equipment that is involved in any ATC (or Range Air Control) related task, must meet an appropriate military standard. Where this is not possible, because of the unique nature of the requirement, SATCOs/MATS should ensure that before any new equipment is installed and used, the MAA has been informed of the installation and has approved its use. This includes radar systems and displays. 23. All equipment related to the ATC task should be maintained IAW the procedures detailed in DE&S specifications. At units where the ATC service is provided by a civil provider, these procedures will be subject to a joint audit with a CAA SRG ATC Engineering Inspector. 24.
Radars should be flight checked iaw ATM3000 and MATS Part 1, as appropriate.
Staffing Providers of ATC Services should ensure that staffing levels are appropriate to meet the operational requirement at the unit involved. The following requirements should be met:
25. a.
SATCOs/MATS should work to an establishment figure for both ATCOs and support staff. The figure will be based upon the normal tasking on the unit and takes account of the ratings/endorsements to meet the Operational Task. SATCOs/MATS should ensure staffing levels equate to the establishment figure unless previously agreed with the MAA.
b.
c.
ATC Approvals are dependent upon the MAA being notified of any major change in tasking. Any such change should be discussed in advance with the MAA.
26.
ATSUs should ensure that controllers are not required to undertake operational duties that might cause undue fatigue. The following apply:
a. Civil ATS Providers comply with the Scheme for the Regulation of Air Traffic Controllers Hours. b. Military ATS Providers should comply with the Manual of Military Air Traffic Management.
AIRFIELD SUPERVISION Policy

27. CAP 393 Air Navigation the Order and the Regulations 2005 (as amended) defines a Government Aerodrome as any aerodrome in the United Kingdom which is in the occupation of any Government Department or visiting force. To ensure that the full implications of this definition are met legal opinion has determined that there are a number of conditions that must be fulfilled, in that the Government Department concerned must: a.
Be engaged in, and competent to oversee, any aviation activities conducted at the aerodrome. Only permit activity that is substantially in the direct interest of the said Government department. Have an acceptable aviation regulatory process in place.
b.
c.
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d.
Ensure appropriately aviation qualified, Crown personnel are in situ and responsible for the supervision of all activity on the airfield in compliance with such regulations.
28. At Government Aerodromes where flying activities are not conducted exclusively or routinely by single-Service organizations, then appropriate Crown supervision must be in place to discharge the requirements of sub-paragraph d (above). The airfield or facility may be operated on behalf of the MOD by a commercial organization who will wish to ensure best value for money. The liability of the MOD might therefore, on occasions, be compromised unless direct supervision is applied. Approvals for such sites will be conditional on the acceptance and approval of nominated individual(s) to discharge such supervision appropriately and correctly.
Airfield Supervisor Qualification

29.
Prospective Airfield Supervisors should be Crown Servants. In addition, they should demonstrate that they have experience as a military pilot, navigator or air traffic controller. Exceptionally, experience as a professional civil pilot or civil air traffic control officer may be acceptable if the individual could demonstrate substantial experience in operating in a military environment. The MOD organization responsible for the activity at the MOD Aerodrome requiring an Airfield Supervisor should submit a request for the approval of an Airfield Supervisor to the MAA. The format to be used for the approval is at Annex 49A. Airfield Supervisor Function
30. Airfield Supervisors should monitor all aviation, and aviation related activities, on the airfield to ensure such activities are in compliance with extant regulations. All requests for, or observation of, any activity which either does not, or appears not to comply with such regulations is to be stopped and advice sought from the MAA. Dispensations from the MRP may be granted only by the MAA. 31.
In assessing any requests for dispensation, Airfield Supervisors should ensure that commercial imperatives by operators of the airfield do not impact adversely on the MOD. To that end the balance of civil/military traffic usage of the airfield must be monitored and advice sought from the MAA if the civil movements are likely to exceed 40% of the total aircraft movements on the airfield.
Airfield Supervisors should ensure that the MAA is informed, either by telephone, email, post or fax, of any unusual activity (Examples: new users, air displays, military exercises or non aviation use) before any such activity is approved.
32.
AIRFIELD SUPERVISORS ENSURE THAT NO EQUIPMENT, EITHER PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY, IS INSTALLED OR REMOVED FROM THE AIRFIELDS SITE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL FROM THE MAA.
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Annex 49A: Application for Airfield Supervisor Approval

1. Sponsor Organization ______________________________________________
MOD Aerodrome requiring Airfield Supervisor _________________________________ 2. Nominated Airfield Supervisor (Full Name) ______________________________
Rank/Grade ___________________________________________________________ 3. Contact Address____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________ Telephone No __________________________ 4. 5. Place and Date of Birth _____________ Nationality ___________________ Previous Military Service (or civilian experience if no military service)
______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ 6. TO BE COMPLETED BY PROJECT TEAM LEADER
a. I consider the applicant suitable for appointment as an Airfield Supervisor for MAAregulated Operations. b. c. I understand the responsibilities of this appointment. I attach a copy of the applicants CV. Date _____________________________
Signature _____________________
Printed Name __________________Appointment _______________________
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MMATM EXTRACTS FROM STANAGS STANAG 3052 3297 3374 3530 3758
3759 3817
3970
7005 7008 7012 7025 7104 7199 7204
Title Aeronautical Briefing Facilities Flame-Out Procedures Flight Inspection of NATO Radio/Radar Navigation and Approach Aids AetP-1(D) Radio and/or Navigational Aid Failure Procedures for Operational Air Traffic (OAT) Flights Signals Used by Air Traffic Service Units For Control of Pedestrian and Vehicular Traffic in the Manoeuvring Area if Airfields NATO Supplement to ICAO Doc 8168Ops/611, Vol II for the Preparation of Instrument Approach and Departure Procedures AATCP-1(C) Standard R/T Phraseology to be Used for Air Traffic Control (AATCP-2) Content and Format of Flight Information Publication (FLIP) Terminal High/Low Instrument Approach Procedures, Instrument Departure Procedures, and Aerodrome Diagrams/Layouts Exchange of Flight Information Publications (FLIP) Data Military Aviation Radio Telephony (R/T) Callsigns Minimum Radiotelephony (R/T) Aerodrome Departure Procedures Air Traffic Management and Control of Minimum Operating Strips (MOS) Operations Airfield Aircraft Arresting System Operating Procedures NATO Supplement to ICAO Doc 8168, Vol I, Flight Procedures (AFPP-1 NATO Minimum Requirements for Personnel Providing Air Traffic Services (ATS) in NATO-Led Operations
Edition 5 5 6 6 3
Ratification Status Ratifying Ratifying Ratifying With Reservations Ratifying Ratifying
8 5
Ratifying Ratifying
Ratifying
9 1 3 3 1 1 1
Ratifying Ratifying Ratifying Ratifying Ratifying With Comments Ratifying Ratifying
Page 354 of 354
MMATM Issue 5

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Manual of Military Air Traffic Management

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Regulatory Articles (RA):

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Methods of Identification ............................................................................59

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Regulatory Cross-Reference ............................................................................................... 187

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Chapter 1: ATC Policy

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Chapter 2: National and International ATC Organization and Responsibilities

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Chapter 3: Responsibilities of ATC Personnel

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RT frequencies that should be selected or de-selected as appropriate.

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Chapter 4: Division of Airspace and Rules of the Air

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