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AD-A25 8 361

Research Report





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by Thomas A. Colonel, Mahr USAF





Richard Walsh
Acoa"91j F~or






AVIv "!

it? Codes


Dis Aw'~1 2and/or "Dtst 1 Sp\clal



Strategic Direction. Union have


dramatic events in United

Europe and 40-year

the old

former Soviet grand

outmoded the on containing


strategy focused


President George this way:

Bush outlined the United States'

new role in

the world in

Within the broader community of nations, we see our own role clearly. We must not only protect our citizens and our interests but help create a new world in which our fundamental values not only survive but flourish. (38:v) These fundamental values form the basis for the global

components of U.S. a.

national security strategy outlined below.

Major 'Components of National Security Strategy (1) Global Components. The global components of U.S.

national security strategy and their underlying aims are: a. The survival of the United States as a free independent nation, with its fundamental values in tact and institutions and people secure. and its

b. A healthy and growing economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad. c. relations with allies d. economic freedom, (38:3-4) (2) policy Healthy, cooperative and and friendly nations. politically vigorous

A stable and secure world, where political and human rights and democratic institutions flourish. The United States pursues a the

Regional components. engagement

of peaceful

and bilateral

relationships in

Asia-Pacific region which entails: paragraph id. (a) below. (b) the region; Maintaining the military alliances outlined in

Actively promoting

free and expanding markets in

(d) like Working to expand the U. our strategy seeks Should deterrence fail. of its to this allies defeat new strategy remains and interests. (g) Fostering between Taiwan and the PRC. non-proliferation. strategic offense (b) Forward presence in key areas to promote regional response and capability for crisis and provide an initial stability escalation control. are: The fundamental military capabilities necessary to do this (a) Survivable and highly capable and defense forces to deter war. aggression on war with the Russians..S. b.Seeking to reduce the U.S.S. in for human rights respect support for civilian military-to-military Major Components of National Military Strategy (1) Global components.. August 1990 sees in The new defense strategy President the major threat facing the U. and (d) Capacity to reconstitute a larger force structure if the nation once again is faced with the threat of a massive conflict.S. terms favorable to U. to fields environment.N. to responding threatening U.. contact and consultations interchange in Cambodia constructive and peaceful (h) Seeking a resolution of the conflict under the auspices of the U. and authority relations. to deter aggression against the U. economic committed to (e) Remaining growth and security of the Republic of Korea Seeking appropriate (f) with the People's Republic of China (PRC).' $41 billion trade (c) imbalance with Japan by gaining full access to the Japanese market. The goal Bush as announced in a major regional contingency global rather than a short-warning. interests.S. of effectively forces capable Conventional (c) and contingencies regional crises short-notice interests. refugee the continued (ROK). and (i) Promoting professionalism. either Europe or the Pacific.Japanese partnership and the relief.S. (11:5) 2 .

with the missiles that deliver them. (11:5) arms control inject greater predictability into international postures in and to channel force Stopping the global weapons. relationships. agreements to reduce military threats.S. military strategy continues to stress equitable. and promote economic development. the seas is. U.S. drug cartels threaten the economy. institutions of the regions in drugs to the ecology. sea to preserve As a maritime nation dependent on the commercial interest. as well as more stabilizing directions.Our strategy demands we be able to move men and scene of a crisis at a pace and To do this. this through political.S. are security interests. the United States 3 . air and sea we must assure our space lanes and access to through maritime aerospace superiority. Alliances critical to our and other partnerships friendly nations provide stability. For these support the forward we have entered and into presence of U. freedom of legitimate security and a vital U. from abroad. in World. treaties multilateral (40:11-1) To help the Third alliances in the Asia-Pacific deter low-intensity conflicts and we support representative promote stability government. and will remain. chemical is proliferation df nuclear. various bi-lateral forces. (11:5-6) political process and social The supply of illicit which they operate. -a "peacetime engagement" economic and military coordinated combination of aimed primarily at actions counteracting Powerful local violence and promoting nation-building. and Alliances deter aggression. verifiable ties. reasons. our (38:29) in materiel to the field an to use and numbers sufficient to ability overwhelming force. integrate We do security assistance efforts. and biological a top priority. and region.

in the The principal elements have been of our forward strategy Asia-Pacific region and bilateral ensure deployed forces.S. the future. commitment to the region to our allies and demonstrate a visible and potential enemies. (3:7) Adjustments to economy of force by reducing to share in defense units required. current U. (3:5) overseas bases. :osts. as it has in to quickly incorporate the latest the field.S. to and the pose a use of national of the illegal drugs this continue security threat. production. As a result. erode the in warfare decisively technological superiority in In a related vein. Our sec-.rity our ability into a it in the future depends. a rapid and flexible Our forward deployed forces: enable significant response capability. and use of illegal drugs is high-priority (43:85) the past. the number of U. security arrangements. on national security mission of the Department of Defense.S. we have often relied on to overcome numerical shortages and to reduce the risk to American The spread of advanced technology weapons systems will surely det~rrent value of our forces -unless we act -and our competitive edge now to maintain our lives. (2) military Regional components.associated violence and within international country the instability. U. allow allies provide an effective logistics base. we must (38:30) sufficient industrial maintain capacity in to the United States to provide and sustain modern equipment expansion of our armed forces should the need support a rapid occur. technological advances been weapons systems in Technology has historically comparative advantage for American forces. force levels in the Pacific are 4 . detection and countering a trafficking.

rom Japan. apable 38:31) c. and economic a rosperity. ter- promoting free market principles. from Korea. region is we plan to maintain maritime forces forces in Korea.000 February 1990.S.eing ur made in allies as In light of reduced tensions and improved capabilities of a result of political self-confidence we announced our the region.000 5. focused on promoting and consolidating promoting peace. the Philippines is region as will depend reduced. intent to begin The first withdrawal one to forces in phase. Army troops Philippines. personnel three years.000 Air Force) and all U. hroughout the awaii. Other a National of providing Our forces will long-range air and immediate and ground crisis response. of U. Japan.S. For the foreseeable future. well as increased place a premium forces lexibility and speed of n naval capabilities. narcotics. 25:40. Sources Foreign economic of American foreign and security Our ssistance is vital instrument policy. Japan and and land-based Our joal to transition from We anticipate little a leading to change in a supporting deployment efense role in atterns in Korea. hased asting 5.000 Army and 2. consists of removing 7. backed by deterrence the region. 5 . military personnel from the be made in 24:12) Subsequent withdrawals will the 3-10 year imeframe as the situation warrants. on new As access to bases such as those in ur continued forward presence in the ccess agreements with nations in response. transnational threats such as international AIDS and environmental degradation which threaten (38:17) 11 peaceful nations. Dreign assistance program is emocratic values.000-6. rotecting against orism. and meeting urgent human needs.

New of because are strained U. Defence New Arrangement. to engage member states in (4:24). (Japan's only defense treaty. remain (Australia and the Treaty.) Treaty between the (4) ' The Mutual Defense and the Republic of the Philippines. serves The primarily to arrangement integrate air defenses of is twenty years old and 6 participating countries. Singapore. the only remaining multilateral . Two The regional organizations have important security dimensions.Security military sales. The kustralia. For the most by January 1992 "to seek avenues iew areas of cooperation in part.) of Free Association with the Free Association with the United States Treaty (which The Compact (6) the Marshall Islands.S. foreign and the international military education and training (PACOM). Singapore. Republic of Federated of (7) The Compact (57:79) States of Micronesia.S. formed in 1967 by Association of Southeast Asia Nations Malaysia. U. in Indonesia. Treaty Between the United States (3) The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan. Brunei. (ASEAN). decided Thailand and the Philippines.S. and the New Zealand between Zealand's barring of nuclear equipped or powered weapons systems. members are seeking security matters" this increased defense cooperation atrengthening the existing network of bilateral defense ties. Five Power Malaysia. (31:15) program have been effective in d. the Pacific Command Alliance or Coalition Components.'s ten mutual defense and security arrangements are in the Pacific region: (ANZUS) States Australia-New Zealand-United (1) The Relations strong allies. remains in Asia Collective Defense (5) The Southeast effect on a bilateral basis with Thailand. Zealand and consisting of Britain. Seven of the U. assistance activities such as grant aid.) The Mutual Defense (2) and the Republic of Korea.

when South The area is frequently issues: of history. and a The peace 'ietnamese have ccord was alking to withdrawn their October 1991. eploy of these countries (U. 56:1) *aiwan. South Korea.iecurity network in Southeast Asia. than 100 million and touches 40 world's surface. of the North Three remains heavily establishments Vietnam and the seven world's largest military Korea. a.S. U. (45:8) • Theater Strategic Situation. four cultures and language. 17 of the Theater. In nuclear weapons and major conventional the U. Southeast Asia. Asia consists Southeast Malaysia. perating here. of China. Indonesia. the Northeast and Japan. Japan. Asia consists of Singapore. Pith. security lortheast Asia. b.) f the Polynesian.S. iroken into sub-regions discussing Asia. The region Intelligence Estimate. Bangladesh. and the some forces in ddition. Brunei. The South Pacific region consists (34:293) armed (China.. and allies systems.S. Burma. South Korea. The (57:74) theater can be broken into various sub-regions on the basis geography. Vietnam. of the world's 24 :ountries and eight American territories. and the North and South Pacific. lients ilitary The former Soviet Union of their have provided their conventional most sophisticated area shows tangible signs of forces tension reduction. from Cambodia signed in The two Korean governments are other each other about nuclear weapons 7 inspections and . Laos. and Thailand. and Russia) the area. an PACOM's theater of operations area of more time zones. ambodia. ussia. Pakistan. South Asia is Nepal comprised of India. !overs ýquare Characteristics half the miles. Micronesian and Melanesian island chains. China. ri Lanka. 'hilippines. and Bhutan.

The is U. program should South Korea and the full Atomic part ormer Soviet nspection Union have nuclear called on facilities by North Korea to allow of its the International agreed on its nergy Agency (IAEA). the U. of its Russia recently announced an overall the size military military forces and (50:1). on the Philippines. between the Northern Islands. the (52:13) along the border in of the Although the is still outcome fragmentation of Soviet Union reduction in Lnknown. dillion and the . the potential for conflict is -everting to traditional forms: 'eninsula. Chinese.S. Vietnam and Islands which !hina over the Paracel Lre occupied by and over the Spratley Taiwanese. development program. all the nuclear weapons U. Towards this end.ension reducing activities. Territories. a result of these the intent to adopt a defensive loctrine As changes.nsurgency operations 'erritorial apan Cambodia. the disputes continue and Russia in Sino-Soviet border..n easing ethnic tensions and historic antagonisms than on diplomatic rocedures. onsensus that alted. 8 .. Vietnamese. between . and civil in wars the continuing standoff on the Korean and dissidence suppression/counterand Indonesia. The greatest immediate threat orth Korea's nuclear weapons to regional security.S. stimates the Koreans will have a nuclear device o size) CUD-C by by 1994 and the a nuclear (non deliverable due by the growing be weapon possibly deliverable (30:102) There is a mid-to-late 1990s. however. Resolution of these disputes appears to depend more .ino-Soviet 'inal China reduced its armed forces by one Soviets subsequently reduced their forces Mongolia and in Vietnam. In the North Korean the past year. Malaysian and ilipino forces.S. Japan.

France. weapons or who Argentina. The treaty Transit of forbids members to nuclear weapons is its acquire or test not prohibited. Taiwan. by Third World nations is as nine as many developing countries and ald have nuclear weapons.S. their North and This may have broken the to allow and South Korea agreed by inspections of a nuclear facilities to draw up June 1992 joint commission plans for banning nuclear the head of apons from the Korean Peninsula. (33:14A) In addition. Israel. but declined to sign them. The U. by fears that Soviet ipons experts may sell their services to the 9 highest bidder in . clear weapons. n could possess king steps to =lude: aq. China and the The concern nuclear the nmonwealth of Independent States Dut proliferation is exacerbated have nuclear weapons. the zone. India. (44:65) a biological weapons capability. The former Soviet Union or base nuclear weapons the intent of the will follow NFZT protocols. (19:9) and chemical weapons a growing The proliferation of nuclear. By the year 2000.. d the missiles to deliver them ncern. ough each merfber is permitted to determine own policy regarding ansit by ships which may be nuclear armed. it widely known the U. e North Korean delegation to the IAEA said EA inspections to begin in In clear clear 1985. d China signed protocols not to use. Brazil.make the Korean Peninsula nuclear free. tual eated In March 1992. develop nuclear Libya. dition. Free June.S. Kore". (33:14A) his country would allow fifteen South Pacific Zone Treaty (SPNFZT). states signed the South creating a formally Pacific declared free zone. South Nations them have acquired South Korea. In Iran. Britain. Africa and Pakistan. North is up to 30 could have chemical weapons. declared it test. biological. alemate.

last dynamic societies. )rmal ties )rmer )t to China opened a also began new dialogues with China Korea and began the trade office with South Singapore. erupt into armed The Asian-Pacific region is home to some of the world's The region also the face )st economically and politically icludes some 6f the the earth. A key task for the regional balances and disputes before they resolving social.rtermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union. nations will have their own ballistic 35:24) Half of these governments (15:16) rockets and will have (27:65. The AsianUnion most convincing been formal similarly ties icific has itablished former Soviet with South It Korea. (1) iture will :onomic ýnflict. kd Japan. Soviet Union played a major role view the conflict as a the Gulf War by agreeing between superpower confrontation kterests or The client states. Lssile system capabilities are 20 Third World ballistic as well. trend is the increasing tendency to see economic second 10 . -aditional regional ethnic unrest may rise. the Europe and the former Soviet evidence affected. traditional communist regimes on tensions are Although superpower diminishing. By spreading and growing. in with Indonesia and Most dramatically. of this The Vietnam and North Korea. transformation Eastern The -amatic changes trhaps. Global Implications. (58) in political alignments. c. ie year 2000. and Conditions and be maintaining territorial circumstances. while cooling relations . Union are.000 miles or more. Lssiles with a range of 5. aunchers. trends Donald Zagoria described four post-Cold War international iich are visible in First is a in the area.

Singapore. countries in to evolve toward multiparty practices and increased 11 . superpower. to know that. January 1992 muscles as an economic during the Minister Kiichi Miyazawa's comments summit of said world leaders are an example. region continue freedom. of Japan's move toward in South market Korea. say in During the meeting Miyazawa peacekeeping (2:14A) activities. The economic systems. superpower beginning area wealth to and power. second- and third- generation postrevolutionary leaders are economic development placing a higher premium on and pragmatic foreign policies than on ideology. Most recent and striking was Russian President Boris Yeltsin's appeal for economic last (2:1A) The communism. completely radically fourth trend It is a result of the spectacular collapse of aid at the recent world leaders summit: the world has "This is the opportunity to defend democracy. Related to this might. Throughout the region. be so by the transformed in the direction of capitalism that it the politics of will be the unrecognizable. U. the the leaders of the cashed-strapped The third trend has been got his message. is its at Clearly.N. I'm sure Japan should have a future U. the center recognition of this realization. or he couldn't'guarantee Japan would finance them. economic performance and status to flex Taiwan.power that as a determinant trade. economic Japan Prime is as the key to of the vibrant Thailand. or as in Eastern Europe. not territorial of military power.N. is is the fact becoming expansion international continues or military accepted structure reflecting Malaysia." seems likely now that communism will either disappear 21st century. downgrading of ideology in international affairs. (58) At the same time.

Korea. there is equipment not always feasible. The generational leadership that Singapore. (b) of bilateral The lack of a widely agreed upon threat.(2) Influences. (c) and a perception Growing of unfair U.S. and -- sustaining where expanding our investment in -- possible prepositloning will be become more important. both in terms the continues to have a profound affect anti-militarism in Japan and fear of Japanese expansionism in rest of the area. our power will able to deploy region where where and infraAs our and Logistics Estimate. underpin of the China. multilateral security agreements.S. (38:29) 12 . major changes North Korea. concern about its trade imbalance to tensions South trade practices. crisis) may not be available a (at least before a industrial they have the sealift. our strategy forces and of to project We in must be of the be more than ever. may lead between the U. the area. sustain them will substantial parts prepositioning adequate bases where. less well-developed forces once down airlift. and countries in particularly Japan. ability Vietnam and Indonesia. The following factors may influence how one or more of the nations in (a) II of this area act or react to world events: Japanese occupation of the region during World War on the region. a history and the versus proliferation of arms in the region makes comprehensive regional arms control agreements unlikely. and Taiwan. in base and arrived. structure to overall force support our levels draw theater. (d) Political uncertainties in are growing in anticipation will occur in e.

S. will be lesser degree. chemical and biological. The smaller. vulnerable jamming. and major crises.S. that are as mobile as and communications they support. highly mobile U.S. one carrier Marine Korea. systems operations to counter terrorism. forces envisioned control for the 1990s will (C3) require systems robust and flexible command. 13 however. Japan. deception. to.S. to a C3 systems insurgencies. approximately 383. As the forces will Desert Storm demonstrated. . The U. "base force" concept. a. and five Navy carrier battle groups (22:19) Strategic Concepts.f. systems wide array physical attack. the U.a control Forces. and one or two Air Force and one one Force or two fighter wings will be deployed in fighter wings. may rely on augmentation by commercial allied and of communications communications threats including to support U. Air Force Marine will Amphibious Ready be deployed in and one Expeditionary consist of Reinforcements Hawaii. an an Army division and Air Force fighter wing in Alaska. States must and will wartime escalation and deny must maintain the aggressor its goals. group. narcotics trafficking. Command. The U. and nuclear effects. attempt to control Therefore. Military Dimensions. this requirement Current C3 increasingly be met by satellite are adequate to support communications. Command. the U. Should a nuclear attack occur. and Communications Estimate. exploitation.000 men and women with the division South battle Secretary of Defense's as of March 1. Control. Group. g.S. Air Force fighter wing in homeported in 3. 1991. (1) Nuclear. seeks to the deter United nuclear conflict.S. Pacific Command contained In one accord Army Personnel Estimate. and.

if and coalition warfare. forces provide capabilities such warning. rests on U. superior not impossible. to maintain a numerically Pacific theater.S. expensive or impossible.S. forces drawing global. through Air time responsible for surveillance providing precise support to U.S.the ability The to respond U. (3) broadest forward level and navigation. chemical warfare 11-15) as chemical defensive capabilities (2) precise Space. the The warfare capability U. The face. offensive chemical shells. Defensive biological warfare capabilities equipment and a strong medical system. the ability of space forces provide or significantly enhance tactical commanders to exercise on-scene decision makers and command and control over their commanders.S. are limited.S.S. During peacetime and wartime operations. Force Space Command. positioning. reliable communications. (43:51) has no offensive biological warfare capabilities. Conventional. and forces worldwide. three interrelated principles: It presence. and to carry out forces. verifiable chemical warfare ban will maintain robust a modest retaliatory chemical warfare defensive program. forces and timely surveillance to U.S. level of military presence the nature of this maritime region and the most likely threats we 14 .S.(40:11-14.S. in would be prohibitively expensive. is concluded. include personal protective U. to communicate with thousands of routine tasks that would (43:74-75) is U. Space but effective. appropriately to any level of aggression. centers on binary chemical these weapons weapons artillery in halted production of down its binary and is process of Until a U. warfare capability and a U. production capability. for the U. otherwise be enormously Space Command. on a worldwide basis.S. warning. national military strategy at the deterrence.

drug and the prospect of a favorable outcome. should utilize departments. require air and naval forces backed by highly airlift and fast sealift mobile and to deploy flexible ground forces them. the maximum logistic functions of the military existing policies (54:3-57. for by otherwise provided agreements assignments servicing. To do this. Success in this area will depend on maintaining a strong alliance structure.3-58) Implementation and execution of logistic functions component remain the responsibility of commander. be able to couiter these threats with (44:5) The must selectivity. be used in and specially tailored military technological capabilities which can power. Logistic functions should be performed routinely as To possible throughout the entire extent possible.therefore. the past were reservcd only for the superpowers. Furthermore. superiority. and flexibility U. a rapid. of its is the services and the service each of the services is own forces in responsible for the except when or logistic support logistic support the PACOM area. or cross 15 .S. and procedures spectrum of operations. The global will spread enable of a conflict. (44:6) as conjunction with other elements of national (5) Logistics. and the Our strategy also requires a strong amphibious capability and CONUS-based reinforcement (4) Low-intensi+y military and capability. terrorism. Joint servicing. respond to as forces must trafficking be trained and and equipped to as well (44:12-13) insurgencies. peacekeeping noncombatant evacuation operations. concerning common (40:11-19) servicing. sophisticated dual-use technologies growing number of regional porers to arm themselves with capabilities that in U.S.

forces we the area of cost sharing. beginning of a seek the ROK-funded relocation in Korea's share out of Seoul and an increase of the costs We associated also seek Japan. and friends The security assistance program interests. increased the U. defend themselves against external aggression.S. and protects mutual peace and stability.S. and a revitalized security consultative process.S.. from our allies (ROK). system we continue to in stress our forces operating from the importance systems of by maintaining interoperability from weapons encouraging maximum procurement flowback.(6) assists allies Security Assistance. $2. friends and allies internal to helps maintain U. and helps advance supports subversion. Host-nation support. the fight against illegal drugs. non-complementary systems. than and training management training and program (14:177in aiding more restored in to support the Indonesian F-16 the Royal Thai Army an elected $2. million for prbfessional technical 79). terrorism. democratically values. to elected governments democratic (43:10) In and helps wage for example.3 aid projects for the Cambodian Resistance military education.S. increased financial support of U.000 refugees (14:283) (7) government was Thailand.5 million to assist when 300. promotes aids U. defense alliances. forces on the Korean Peninsula.. and narcotics trafficking. increasing technology discouraging the development of political-military (3:10) 16 dialogue. FY 1992. addition.S. . in We expect increasing assistance In the Republic of Korea of U.S. In with maintaining U. the security assistance in direct funding was programmed to Cambodia and an provide: $5 $20 million assistance additional and medical million for leadership training. human rights education (14:105).

seeks a leadership role in the Pacific because our in presence here sets the stage of our economic involvement With a total two-way transPacific trade the region. Diplomatic Dimensions. is committed to maintaining a visible. a shared progressive trade human rights. of developing The U. (44:13) The United States is Economic Dimensions. peacekeeping through operations. c. disaster nation-building assistance.S. The U. environment.S.b. (3:5) 17 . military tasks. expand strengthens market economies efforts to among open major This requires trade. these heritages. goals and security cooperation. credible presence in the Asia-Pacific region security arrangements. the effectiveness contribution hinges on operational clearly translating foreign policy objectives into clear. exceeding $320 it is and billion annually. strategy which world. own best interests to help preserve peace the region. to international strengthen cooperation financial problems countries and with international imaginative (38:19) military solutions to the institutions. military-to-military In each 4nstance. commitment to democracy and innovation. expands and committed to a around the markets and industrial and to apply countries. clearly stability in in our almost 50% more than our transAtlantic trade. respect for the educational and scientific an appreciation for (6:841) our DoD distinct cultural supports relief. contacts and the security of DoD's assistance program. humanitarian assistance. through (28:1A) forward deployed forces and bilateral The Bush Administration has identified peacet" in the region: "six keys to promoting lasting liberalization.

to these countries and independent research. Specific Courses of Action. national a manner favorable to As with or as to other objectives.S. the world. activities.4-29) e. region. Courses of Action. the U. I'll begin this section will be for the rest with several courses of action the should pursue which affect most or all of the nations in I'll then outline a series of specific courses of action for on the first-hand experience I gained from my Japan and Korea based February 1992 trip a. part of other PSYOP may be on used independently a theaterwide an integral operations basis attain mission objectives. (54:4-28. Other Dimensions. Sociopsychological Dimensions. weapons on dimensions.S. the and encourage wider participation in measures agreed Korea) and wider 18 to in Vienna in in encourage participation Nuclear Non . The Sociopsychological aspect of national diplomatic. (PSYOP) is and effects of military one of the forms of the attitudes and the achievement activity used by military commanders in to influence behavior of foreign groups of U.S. The 1990s as it will be a decade of of transition for the Asia-Pacific region. must continue it efforts The U. 4 N/A 4. strategy deals with the combined psychological political. at (CSCE) the encourage follow-on and Helsinki Conference on increased control agreements Europe Security and Cooperation in for this spring. a global basis. security-building adherence (North Review Conference scheduled the confidence 1990. The following courses Multilateral of action have regional or multi-national (1) to ban chemical arms Arms control. military operations.d. Psychological economic. operations ideological.

sold Iraq prior to these five billions its of dollars worth of of Kuwait.) proliferation of dual use (military and civilian) space. and on continue sales of armed its 1991 consultation tension or conventional conflict". demand last good news for American defense contractors who $3. Washington buildup to: booming in Asia-Pacific Malaysia. and an increase and regional Europe. (51:1. conventional weapons to At U. and Myanmar.S. On the finds its6lf for weapons a dilemma. fears North Korea. France. 1990 invasion (who countries coincidently also are are in the five permanent members of the UN Security Council) listings China's of the midst of negotiations to exchange The talks are prior to stalled by shipment insistence weapons export to disclose contracts. initiative. the that "increases DISCUSSION: region. and Britain-. the former Soviet Union. arms weapons sales are in Thailand. Jeffrey instability Singapore. called for restraint in On the other hand. fears about a power in vacuum created (51:1) The the reductions of US forces on the horns of is Japan and Korea. Post Taiwan. weapons refusal contracts (presumably the any because of fears of ballistic interdiction) and by its sale of short range more stringently missiles should not be regulated The than fighter aircraft.Proliferation initiative weaponry (21:8) to Treaty facilitate (India) (44:12).S. arms sales international recognition of the fact the world's five primary arms merchants-US.2 billion in arms to the region and are President Bush last Fall in the year sold roughly hoping for strong sales this year.and missile- 19 . one hand. Brunei Smith in correspondent of future attributes the China.10. and aggravates Conventional especially Indonesia. China.15. in supply as declining prices for a result of reduced advanced weapons tensions in by announced U.

Navy may be Malaysian Defense Minister NaJib Razak said the U. presence interested in cooperation with the providing U. use during In to create a network airfields. states in ASEAN members agreed to "seek avenues to new areas of cooperation in security have ever member (4:24) matters".S. of components weapons of and mass technologies destruction 27:65. ships to use repair facilities fighters to make (45:8.S. (46:31) The United States and should seek to expand combined training the U. (2). Increase Access to Overseas Facilities.S.critical systems.S. contingency 1990. maintain frigates and smaller warships. the region and are (4:25) For (4:24) Most ASEAN nations favor increased U. In addition. 23:9) The U.S. the Paya Lebar Airport. in U. are going similar access rights officials on with Thailand are hopeful they will produce accords. must continue negotiations to Asian-Pacific for ports. naval operations and periods DISCUSSION: November Singapore agreed to permit US at its Sembawang Port and U. (3) Broaden ASEAN's Security Role. nuclear proliferation DISCUSSION: engage January 1992. U.S. limiting exchanges. storage of access agreements areas and repair of facilities crisis. This was the first time ASEAN members explicitly discussed security matters either among themselves or with non-member countries.S. some are considering to their ports scope and forces increased access (see above) "They may also be willing to increase the 20 . complexity of these reasons. to allowed to use Malaysia's Lumut naval base (1:25) Negotiations for and Brunei. and in the expected add proliferation the region special urgency to the problem. in exercises ASEAN's with. (39:91. ASEAN support in In should seek the region.S. 55:2) month-long deployments to In January 1992. and airfields. military nations.

should continue to the region a oppose the nuclear U. most likely to Because the U.S. and The U. nations together stated likely proliferation region.S.their participation David E. interests worldwide.S. North free ability SPNFZ treaty zone because to effectively other attempts to make it of the restrictions operate in would put on the The the region. biological and nuclear (4) Continue to refuse to sign the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZT). a regional the Asia-Pacific respond to 21 . hamper U.S. Joint according Chiefs to Admiral of Staff. Doing so. maritime power. Jeremiah.S.S. and/or of the also said will follow the provide for nuclear-armed SPNFZT even (19:9) though the treaty limitations in the does not on U. and deterrent capability (5) oppose naval arms Naval arms control. in should continue to the Asian-Pacific. control continues The U. dependent on discussions to be a DISCUSSION: The U. its ability to use the seas and international waterways for access to markets in and to move its forces quickly and without overseas restriction forces in support of U. and to it Korean reunification intent verification.S.S. Additional aircraft powered ships or military region would significantly in the region.S." region nuclear make the nations free makes efforts to will support prevent weapons in of chemical. in joint military exercises. DISCUSSION: free agreed to make the Korea not to Korean Peninsula nuclear weapons to encourage encourage the develop nuclear process. vice chairman of the U.'s U.S. the would increase by in desire member helping to the event that to interoperability ensure they it would between participating to work ASEAN's extremely the the "understand how (46:32) it was ever required.S. The U.

and percentage of its aid is GNP to foreign aid to other Asian October than does the nations. equal partner The U.5 billion in aid to Russia in in (10:37) and are evaluating participation 22 the $24 billion aid . interest (49:15) in (20.S. naval restrictions limit protect our ability to obligations and to otherwise our national b. more than any other Japan devotes a larger U. are already Japan of the playing pledged (and The U. in should do True Global Japan as an all it can to treat international affairs and to draw Japan system. Japanese military and civilian officials an expanded role Japanese Diet would authorize (JSDF) in UN Japanese Self the future. should a leadership paid) a total role in international billion (10:33) in of $13 nation. into positions of greater responsibility in DISCUSSION: world affairs Japan sees an increasing role (16:10) and would like to be expressed for the in In a the international for the United Nations in a part of hope the it. U. treaty (3:15) forces. national and support these goals.S. Defense Force Cambodia has was peacekeeping activities specifically. (8:38) The following courses of action the U.S.41) becoming mentioned addition.S. Japan expressed growing permanent member of the UN Security Council. actively support this goal. 1991 (5:6) 60% of that devoted They pledged $2. U.contingency are naval meet interests. Country Recommendations.S. The Japanese affairs. support Gulf War.S. in is their crucial and Japanese belief military and civilian relationship stability and are officials between prosperity in are unambiguous the security the two countries in the region. (1) Japan. Partnership. interest (a) to future peace.

one machine -"merely an automatic teller been exposed as Not only cash. Japan's image Samurai warriors business suits. policy of "global partn3rship" The U. fulfill unilaterally determined objectives. Affairs Ozawa of the Japanese Ministry $2.S. but it seemed to the Japanese that few Americans seemed function in a legitimate cash-dispensing was to admit that even as they demanded large amounts of cash to world affairs. (b) U. (9) should give it can substance to its to ensure and do all peace Japan's contributions to international receive the recognition they deserve. 23 .S.package being discussed by G-7 nations now. should actively DISCUSSION: (MOFA) Support Northern Territories Return. President Boris Yeltsin's summer to Japan. superpower Japan. Calder sums the problem up in the context of Japan's contributions to finance the Gulf War: Japan's huge contributions were going unrecognized. The U. contributing as billion.5 billion aid package to expressed hope further of Foreign Russia to progress 1992 linked Japan's return of the would be visit its Northern Islands and made during Russian (41) The U.S. The to support return of Toshi the Northern Territories Japan. (10:36) The Japanese have a legitimate complaint.S.S. in support of the UN's to of the Kent consider They pledged $25 million effort $1 in (29) and were (49:15) Cambodian peacekeeping a total of asked Because however. for these Japanese rarely receive public appreciation efforts. trans-Atlantic by a revitalized had as Yoichi Funabashi succinctly put it. Presence on Okinawa." dispensing the that needed a kick before that. the G-7 aid (c) Decrease U. and Japan remained an outsider in a New World Order dominated once again The economic alliance. should privately and publicly declare islands to Japan and be willing to program for Russia to this support for the return of the participation in link its action.

S. Toshi auch land to the Okinawans as soon as possible. save the program and Major Japanese participation in is plausible for five reasons.rogram out of iPALS 'irst. (41) of its Facilities In its April on 1992. constitution (JDA) Agency officials involvement said Japan in studying the Third.S. central added it for the . with the process and do something meaningful for 1992 anniversary. (20) Japan's 24 .ongress. (d) Japanese Participation in GPALS. DoD noted consolidation the bilateral 1990 report to Okinawa were Process and facilities proceeding through stated its Adjustment aiL was the return of "property to improve civil-military (3:10-11) Contrary to USFJ expectations (37).S. the 20th Uigh that some facilities knniversary of Okinawan reversion. defensive" lefense Second. Japanese U. MOFA's )zawa said there was strong sentiment to return facilities knd limit ie night-landing and low-level was becoming increasingly flying by U. program.S. should get on lay 20. the U. IISCUSSION: eed defense budget and an election year may put the $41 billion GPALS to shore economy .should consolidate its military activities on Okinawa and DISCUSSION: (37) return as The U.S.S. . the .elations". 986 in could reach for the U. difficult on Okinawa forces there. in ihould actively he Global campaign for significant Japanese participation Limited Strikes (GPALS) Protection Declines in up the Against the U. ias 47 installations on the Island of Okinawa. U.overnment to put off these requests and indicated expectations were would be returned on May 20.S. the Japanese have been participating in areas such as superconductivity the SDI program since and magnetic field echnology.S. The U. the GPALS program seems tailor-made for Japan's and foreign policy. was In fact. equest for Japanese GPALS now.

U. (20) (2) Korea.(3:10) includes naval Although the current and air forces to by Japanese Defense Plan (53:6). Transition the U. belief. following courses interests in reflect this while protecting U. Finally.S. Encourage Japanese Force Improvements. Powell. The must continue to press the Japanese for force improvements which their ability to perform agreed upon roles.S. in in the according Embassy in GPALS Defense Attache's major participation would avoid several of the stumbling blocks encountered FSX program. Japan to ability DISCUSSION: territorial sea lanes The enhance U. perform this mission the U. (a) the region. "the voice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. must ensure they do not fall the way side as a result of defense cuts reflecting people". has the human.S. Japan's technical and financial to Colonel Office. resources Ed Hind to devote to of the U. to a Supporting Role. of the Republic of (42:77) testified (ROK) 1991 he believes the people lot more of action for their own Korea The "can do a defense".S. forces should continue to identify 25 military roles and missions . General Colin in March L. project. notably in it would be a program both countries were actively interested pursuing and it would be one which lent itself to sharing technology. Japan attack from neighboring states in and support for the system.S. must continue to encourage increase its to defend its defense to capabilities and enhance its nautical a distance of 1. (e) U.S. since both countries have unique technological strengths needed to field the system.000 Five Year miles.aversion to nuclear attack and growing to ballistic Japanese clearly the missile interest awareness of it (18) vulnerability may increase Fourth.S.

nuclear ambitions.S. U. much room for increased ROK contributions. maintaining (7:477) be U. billion). assumed responsibility for guarding the in October to 1991 (26:23). and South Korea from U. (b) continue to press maintaining U. This act. Korea a greater share DISCUSSION: is estimated The of the costs annual cost to be $20 billion.S. estimated to year to 5:8) The (The cost of the 2nd Infantry Division alone is The ROK pledged $180 $2. 1995 amount represents one-half of the won-based costs of maintaining U. Host Nation Support.S. (48) by 1995. Japan currently pays $3 billion annually and. perhaps UN Combined Forces more than any other.currently performed by the U.S. North Korea agrees or perhaps as an incentive to do so. The U.S.S.) million this (44:16. offset these costs. rising to $450 million by 1995. forces have begun the process of transitioning from a leading to a supporting role by transferring greater responsibility to the South Koreans for combined operations. 26 .4 billion a year. forces in country. though. should seriously consider transferring the leadership of the Command to a Korean general. to agreed transfer 279-mile Trans-Korea (32) If Pipeline military to renounce the U. which can be assumed by ROK forces. In contrast. A ROK General has been appointed to head the UN side of the Armistice commission.S. the and in March ROK troops PanmunJom armistice compound 1992 the U.S. would visibly demonstrate U. should of of Korea to assume forces forces in in Korea.S. DISCUSSION: U. its ROK military control. (5:8) will pay 100 percent of the yen-based The South Koreans have agreed to pay $3 billion to move (the value of the land is there is estimated at *10 forces out of Seoul (48) Clearly. (7) intent to assume a supporting role on the Korean Peninsula.S.S. costs.

might within 35 miles of the South Koreans. encourage and Affairs. each to notify other of military This advance and invite observers to attend.000 artillery last tubes and rocket decade (47:36) structure during the troops are "still recently these (36:23) Seoul does Second. (24:22) seemingly small measure would bring military forces into regular contact dialogue. with each other and offer of these nations for another avenue 27 . of State for DISCUSSION: East Asian Richard Solomon. the forced problem. Russia and the U. Forces Korea. demilitarized zone Commhnder. Japan. the process U. China. U. The U. and Pacific Assistant Secretary asserts the process Koreans themselves. approach come to mind. the two exercises Koreas could in all Finally. agree Russia. (52:247) building measures consistent with this Japan. the of building At the same the confidence must be time he says the created by major powers can Three confidence First. to support dialogue. General RisCassi.S. says the North Koreans have launchers to and testified added 1.000 troops Robert W. and loved ones for even a brief which would also inspire period of time is confidence in the between the two Koreas. This amount of offensive military little to inspire confidence among National ROK Ministry of Unification states is an important separation of ten (39) million Korean families Encouraging the negotiation of some way for families to visit a humanitarian gesture negotiation China.(c) Encourage Confidence Building Measures.S. can use their of the influence encourage along the North Korea to pullback some/all (DMZ). the arrayed unequivocally for attack". (19:15) 650. should continue to encourage confidence building measures the between North and South Korea.000 tanks and their force 6.S.S.

" (28:14A) 28 .S. must continue its in policies of peacetime engagement region. Troop Cuts.S. with should continue the Nuclear Non Halt the North Korean Nuclear seek North Treaty and Program. to halt DISCUSSION: the North Korean agreed to step to major policy aim weapons nuclear program. This assessment presents a variety of reasons why the and forward U.000 announced it in end of 1992 and planned to cut an additional people as part of phase two during 1993 and 1995.S. of forces from its forces U.'s second phase troop cuts reiterated not to during RisCassi intention recent Congressional testimony remove nuclear additional troops until questions (36) about the North Korean weapons program are answered. by the withdrawal would cut the Asian-Pacific.S. by June In The North 10th.S.S. credible presence in the Asia-Pacific region with our forward deployed forces.(d) U. President presence the Asian-Pacific Bush acknowledged this during his January 1992 visit to Singapore when he said: We will maintain a visible. has been and was facilities.000 to 36. (e) its the phased withdrawal of North Korean threat. and through bilateral defense arrangements with nations of the region. (33:14A) announce (33:14A) a major addition. to the North Koreans are expected their willingness allow IAEA inspections this month. The U. should continue diminution of troops from Korea subject to DISCUSSION: DoD is pursuing a three-phased The U.(13) on hold in November Secretary Cheney put the 1991 (13) and General the U. The to aggressively Proliferation Korean compliance insist on IAEA inspections of A known and suspected nuclear of the U. which South Koreans seen as mutual inspections forward. Korea 6. 5. Decisions.S.

remain static. force structure and national policies can be made. that US policy in Adjustments to the Asia-Pacific our bi-lateral The region must or. more prosperous world. 29 .should agreements. in the region: growth will enable our friends to assume a larger responsibilOur presence protects the sea lanes ity for their defense. as a honest our role reinforces vital to expanding trade.He added: presence as The United States does not maintain our security Your security and your prosperity serve some act of charity. while acknowledging growth and transformations the region.S. (55:7) Thus. simple truth is the United States can no longer do it The courses of action outlined in offer a realistic way for this paper recognize this truth and to protect its in vital interests the U. presence. allies' a continued US presence in the region serves both our and our own interests. Admiral Larson sums it up this way: Two key factors are needed to maintain security and stability Economic economic growth and U. the need tensions and reduces broker to help avoid regional their military capability in to expand Asian countries for ways which might be destabilizing. (31:4) This does not mean. however. all by itself.S. our interests because you can better help build a more stable.

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