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INTRODUCTION Holyrood was announced on 9 January 1998 by then secretary of State for Scotland as the site/home of the new

parliament amidst political controversy and criticism surrounding its late entry into the site selection process to its final selection over other possible sites at Calton Hill, Hay Market and Leith Docks and the selection of the design team (Bain, 2005). Official costs changed 10 times, increasing from an initial estimate of 40million Pounds to a final 431million pounds. The original figures were largely played down as guess estimates with no substance. Asides the Holyrood building being hailed as one of the innovative designs in Britain today the project was completed behind schedule and not within budget. The original completion date for the project was autumn 2001. It has been a long tortuous story from inception to completion of the Holyrood project. It is most presumed that the key additional cost factors were not included during cost estimation thus the final cost of the Holyrood parliament proved difficult to predict, the procurement route adopted was not suitable for the project and the accompanying risk implications were not managed properly (Taylor, 2002, Fraser, 2004) This report is to attempt to; 1. Conduct an examination of the questions that should have been asked of the design team at the time the project was being designed, procured and constructed, and examine the parameters of the project that were identified as being a priority at the time those decisions were being made.

2. Outline the alternative methods of procurement that may have been considered at the time and select one which you deem could have been more suitable, explaining the reasons for your selection.

PROJECT OVERVIEW On 3 July 1998, an architectural consortium EMBT/RMJM Ltd formed by a joint venture of a Spanish architectural practice (EMBT) led by Enric Miralles with his wife Benedetta Tagliabue and the Edinburgh based (RMJM) were appointed to design the Scottish Parliament building through a designer competition process that was unduly rushed process by the Scottish architectural community (Fraser, 2004).A construction management firm Bovis Lend Lease (Scotland) Limited assumed the responsibility of coordinating the design team, managing all construction works contract and the organization of the site in general. In the summer of 1999 (June) the Scottish Office led by Donald Dewar successfully handed over the responsibility of financing and controlling the Holyrood project was to the devolved Scottish Parliament Corporate Body made up of MPs from each of the main political parties (Bain, 2005). Thus assuming the role of the client on behalf of the parliament (Taylor, 2002) The SPCB went further to inaugurate the Holyrood Progress Group (HPG) to render assistance to the corporate body in taking daily charge of managing the cost and programme of the Holyrood project to ensure its timely completion to the expected budget and the expected requirement/standard for a home fit for parliament (White & Sidhu, 2005). This happened to be the case of a group of MPs who have neither knowledge background or professional experience on building management and construction been assigned with the job to a project as complex and high profile as the parliament building. The MPs found it rather difficult to carry out the assigned task of being the client of the project, as it had nothing to do with the inception of the project instead it inherited a chosen site, architect, uncompleted designs, and a price which was by then 62million pounds with additional costs amounting to 90million pounds. In November 1999 a redesign of much of the building was announced by the SPCB, this was to effect additional requirement for extra space in the parliament. This did not lead to any material alteration on the size and layout of the building it resulted in the cost of the Holyrood project escalating enormously through to its completion (Fraser, 2004).

DESIGN TEAM Both the architects and some trade contractors seemed to have lacked the resources and commitment to deliver some critical elements of the design work resulting from the difficulties that has to do with the constructing a very complex and densely developed building against very tight timeframe. This created problems which lead to constant increase in cost and frequent changes in the programme of the Holyrood project. This prompts the question why the design team was unable to allow room for slippage in the original timetable. The design team did not take the appropriate communication route in passing information as construction was going on and concerning the design variations as the project manager (Bovis) kept on to the client this lead to time slippage and cost escalation of the project (Fraser, 2004). The risk of cost increase associated with the architectural design approved at Stage D was not managed effectively and the designs developed were not designed within a specified cost limit. Design development carries a risk of cost increases. Adequate allowances should have been catered for risk when the design and the costs at the 'Stage D' of the architectural design were approved. The risks should then be managed. In the Holyrood project, however, design development has driven up the costs. For this project, design development became a process of costing a developing design rather than developing the design within a cost limit (Spencely, 2000). The priority during the early stage of the design was to deliver a building of architectural quality fit for home for the parliament and meets the aspirations of the Scottish people to within the earliest possible time frame and minimum cost. Donald Dewar was the ministerial power behind the Holyrood project, he was enthusiastic and had a political investment in the fortunes of the project thus he was keen about building a home for the parliament without delay (Scottish Office, 1997, Fraser, 2004). The tight time limitation put on the project from the design selection process to the construction stage left insufficient time for planning ahead hence creating a vacuum for surprises and crisis to the Holyrood project. The design did not consider security to be a priority during the latter part of the design stage thought it was identified in the user brief in 1998 this is a

question that was not properly addressed it was speculated by the press to has caused a cost increase of 100million pounds (Auditor Generals Report, 2004). PROCUREMENT On 21st July 1998 the construction and control group, part of the Directorate of the administrative services made up of the design team, Mrs. Doig, Dr Gibbons, Mr. Armstrong and civil servants decided in 1998 to opt for construction management as a fast track contracting method for building the Holyrood parliament (Fraser, 2004)). Why was this decision taken without fully understanding the demands of the chosen procurement method so to ascertain its suitability with the Holyrood project considering that the client lacked the experience and expertise of construction management? They failed to ascertain the risks and challenges of the construction management method also in comparison with other procurement options that might be available and more suitable in achieving the objectives and priorities of building fit for parliament on time with minimum cost (Fortescue, 2004). The client was left at the receiving end of the construction risk of rapid cost increase resulting from insufficient risk management and failure to get the optimum balance of risk between client and contractor. Why was there was no existing legal frame work or formality or collateral warranty obtained from the joint venture of EMBT/RMJM Ltd before commencing such a major and expensive project as the parliament building (Fraser, 2004, Auditor Generals Report, 2004). It is relevant to question why the procurement department of the Scottish Office was not consulted in the course of the inquiry that saw to the adoption of construction management as the procurement method for the Holyrood project (Fortescue, 2004). This resulted in the accrual of difficulties that beset the progress and live of the project. Construction management was mostly applicable in simpler commercial building where the design risk is far lower or complex buildings where the client is experienced in the construction process, fully engaged, prepared to work closely with the supply side teams and appreciate the cost downside and accompanying risk implications which was not the case with that of the clients of the Holyrood project (kasiwagi, D., Morledge, R. & Smith, A., 2006)

The priority during the procurement stage of the project was ensure an early start and a quality building fit for the parliament however cost was left out as not too relevant. The need for getting the project designed and construction commencing was of more importance without fully considering and following the cost implications that was accumulated afterwards (Fraser, 2004, Spencely, 2000). CONSTRUCTION Construction management was adopted because it allowed the client the opportunity of compressing the duration of the Holyrood project by commencing construction work on the site while the detailed design was yet to be settled. This resulted in consistent major changes in the requirements for the area and layouts of the building. The client did not consider the risks and options involved with the chosen procurement route which should have being the right and initial step to take considering that they were not experienced in the construction industry and they had inherited a design team, site location and an increasing budget (Fraser, 2004). This resulted in a chaos that stormed the project to its completion. There was a complex interaction between the main parties responsible for completing the Holyrood project, thus the organization of the project lacked leadership and control, the decision making structure became unclear (Carter, 2004). It is not surprising to imagine why a programme was devised without sufficient incorporation for the planning and design stages of the project, putting into consideration that time was of the essence and the timeline for completing the the project had already being clearly stated (Armstrong, 2003, Fraser, 2004). The question why no other procurement method was sorted for when the situation was not getting any better as the project progressed. Instead there was continued weakness in coordinating the design work and budget control particularly with regard to design proposals received in May for the foyer roof10. Slippage in the production as result of variations in the designs and management of design information by the design team resulted to delays and constant changes on the planned programme in all areas of the project such as that of Queensberry House emerging from unforeseen structural and conservation issues which includes reconstructing the Belvedere Tower and questions that has to do with the height of a critical building element like the wallhead. Questions on how well

resources were been targeted in all areas of the project was not properly and promptly addressed. The MPs were focused at achieving quality and speed, time was of the essence because delay was seen as the main reason behind the sporadic cost increase hence the priority was to complete the project as quickly as possible with the best way of containing costs. The construction managers also became aware of the necessity of carrying out effective management of risks such as the design and construction risks which the project clients had to bear, client body decisions risks, which were within the control of the client with the assistance of HPG through swift decision making and risks out with the control of the project but could be mitigated by management (Spencely, 2000)

ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF PROCUREMENT The type of procurement method adopted in a construction project plays a key role in enabling its successful implementation. Applying the appropriate procurement method may act as the key to accomplishing the specific goals and target of the project (Ogulana, 1999). Procurement methods differ from each other in unique ways as well as their suitability for different projects. Thus, when selecting procurement method different variables should be carefully taken into consideration so as to adopting the best fit for the requirements/ purpose for a particular project. Although for some clients the method of selection are open to various options or preferences while some in the public sector are bound by rules and regulations on how the procurement process of selecting suppliers are carried out (Murdoch & Hughes, 2007).

TRADITIONAL PROCUREMENT In the traditional system the client engages the design team and contractor direct, it is often referred to as the design-bid-build method of procurement (Cooke & Williams, 2009). This method separates design from construction where the client engages in the feasibility studies, acquisition of project site, the development of programme

requirement, receipt of planning approvals and appointing a team of consultants (led by architect/designer) before commencing the schematic design of the project, by so doing the design team is not submitted to pressure. The project is fully designed before contractor tendering process is commenced. The lead architect/designer assumes control of the project from inception to handover of the completed project (Potts, 2008). A Two-Stage tender approach is used in fast tracking the traditional system of procurement in order to enable the selected contractor to have an influence on the cost efficiency at the early stage of the process (Cooke & Williams, 2009). This procurement method would have given the clients of the Holyrood project a high degree of certainty on the basis of cost, specified performance prior to commitment to build, clear accountability and control but it results in a lengthy design and construction periods and time was a priority from the inception of the Holyrood project which the MSPs led by Donald Dewar were very optimistic about.

PRIME CONTRACTING In this method a prime contractor is carefully selected from various series/stages of selection in a standing tender list of approved suppliers in a similar idea to the traditional procurement method (Cooke & Williams, 2009). The prime contractor assumes the single point of authority between the client and supply team. The prime contractor needs to be an organization with the capacity/ability to bring of providing all the project deliverables (design, planning and control) required for capital projects. In this procurement method both the client and prime contractor bear the risk of losing and gaining financial profit together. The prime contractor enters into a long term partnership with the client which involves maintenance obligations for duration of five (5) to seven (7) yrs after the completion of the project (Potts, 2008). With this procurement route the clients of the Holyrood project would have being able to reduce the risk of cost escalating and keeping the design open for any possible development. The client would have also had the opportunity of liaising from the outset with the supply teams and other consultants involved in the project to produce a strategic brief and achieve quite a lot of quality as well.

MANAGEMENT CONTRACTING This is a fast track strategy where the client is able to fully retain the design brief, splits up the project into small work packages to be undertaken by subcontractors. The client then goes on to engage a management contractor (professional) selected from a team of contractors through a tendering process to employ and the mange the work packages and the subcontractors involved in the project on the behalf of the client. The managing contractor assumes the role of planning the construction process and discuss budget issues with the quantity surveyor and also advices the client on the buildability of the design. This method is suitable for large and complex projects such as the Holyrood project because the management contractor is involved at the early design stage and he is part of the project team hence making it possible to vary the works until the work packages have been placed (Franks, 1998). DESIGN AND BUILD In the design and build method of procurement the client engages the contractor who takes overall responsibility for the design and construction process. But in some situations the client can also require a project manager or quantity surveyor be appointed to work with the contractor so as to protect their interests (Potts, 2008). The basic idea of this method is to ensure a single point of authority for the design and construction stage of the project. With the contractor ensuring that the design, cost proposal, documentation and the construction process conforms with the clients requirements as stated in the project brief. Design and build can be applied in six versions (Gidado & Arshi, 2004,). Recent research in the construction industry indicates that new ideas are never in short supply. The design and build options are; Client-Led Design and Build

In this option of design and build the client has the opportunity of retaining their original design if so desired or they can be fully involved in influencing the design development. As of the Holyrood project the client would be able to retain their influence on the design by legally transferring (novate) their design team/architect to the contractor in order to produce the detailed aspect of the design. The contractor becomes responsible for the

fees payable to the clients architect/design team, by so doing the contractor absorbs the design risk and takes responsibility for the project to completion Cooke & William, 2009). DESIGN AND MANAGE (CONTRACTOR-LED DESIGN AND BUILD)

In this option the design-management contractor is selected usually on the basis of a design and management fee. The contactor engages the construction and design team. He is fully responsible for the design and payment of work packages/subcontractors at prices approved by the client (Potts, 1998) I would select the design and build procurement method as more suitable for the Holyrood project as it offers more options that are suitable for either the early stage or as a middle of the road option in the project. The contractor-led design and build can be adopted at beginning of the project or the client-led design and build adopted after the project had commenced and things started going wrong. My other reasons being that it is a fast track approach hence it will be able to meet up the time priority of the project as the completion dates are fixed in the early design process. The design changes that plagued the Holyrood project will be more controlled as the contractor is fully responsible for the entire design except in a novation agreement. It also improves the organization of the project as a result of a better integrated and coordinated team members created during the inception of the project. Informations are promptly and adequately revealed at the early stage in the project since the contractor is involved in the early design process. The contractor bears most of the risk. Price certainty is also secured at the early stage of the project hence the client bears no risk of cost escalation as experienced on the Holyrood project. For a large and complex project where the client has no prior knowledge or professional experience the design and build procurement method is reliable as the contractor is in site to offer quick response to coordination problems, take leadership role and control of other consultants or subcontractors in order to protect the interest of the client.

CONCLUSION Asides the Holyrood building being hailed as one of the innovative designs in Britain today the project was completed behind schedule and not within budget. The MPs found it rather difficult to carry out the assigned task of being the client of the project, as it had nothing to do with the inception of the project instead it inherited a chosen site, architect, uncompleted designs, also a procurement route was adopted which was not suitable for a client that has little or no expertise in the chosen route and failure to ascertain and managing the accompanying risks. As a result the client was left at the receiving end of the construction risk of rapid cost increase resulting from insufficient risk management and failure to get the optimum balance of risk between client and contractor. This write up looked into questions that were to be asked of the design team at various stages of the project and also at other possible procurement route that should have being successfully implemented and lead to the completion of the project in a finite time and within the parameters of the project. In conclusion, there is no single method of procurement for all time, also the choice and use of an unsuitable procurement method is not only the reason for the failure of a project or an inefficient project management but rather the effectiveness of project management activities and the successful implementation of projects like that of Holyrood is to a large degree contingent upon full design integration and efficient coordination of construction and services in the various stages of the project from inception to completion and in specific task objectives.

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