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Two Conceptions of Citizenship Author(s): Angus Stewart Reviewed work(s): Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol.

46, No. 1 (Mar., 1995), pp. 63-78 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science Stable URL: . Accessed: 30/11/2011 21:19
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Angus Stewart

Two conceptionsof citizenship


With the collapseof the Leninistprojectin the Soviet Union and EasternEurope and the fluid relationsbetween marketand state consequent upon the New Right project of the Reagan and hasassumeda central analysis Thatchererasin the West,citizenship place in the politicalsociologyof democraticsocieties. However, by a varietyof divergent such analysisis presentlycharacterized positions.This articleproposesthat and, on occasion,contradictory the debatesaround citizenshipcan be clarifiedby recognizingthe existenceof two conceptionsof citizenship.The firstof these, state citizenship, involves the identification of citizenship with the elaborationof a formallegal status,co-terminouswith the emergence of nation-statesand their diverse lineages. The article discussesthe two main forms in whichthis conceptionappearsin the of a nation-state thatof full formalmembership relevantliterature: of version.Some limitations and that of a distinctivewelfare-rights the status conception of citizenship are considered and recent politicaldevelopmentsin relationto itsuse in the Britishcontextare discussed. A second conception, that of democraticcitizenship, is then proposed which involves the elaborationof citizenship around sharedmembershipof a politicalcommunity,in whichconception citizens are political actors constituting political spaces. Some implications of this alternative conception are discussed and exemplified with reference to the possibilitiesfor a European politicalcommunity. The discussionof citizenshiphas become an increasinglyimportant aspectof the politicalsociologyof democraticsocieties(Turner 1986 and 1990; Brubaker1989 and 1992; Bottomore 1992; Roche 1992.) The reasonsfor thisdevelopmentare doubtlesscomplexbut twoseem of particularimportance: the collapse of the Leninist project of
PSJvSVolumeno. 46 I.ssueno. I March 1995 [.S.SNO()07-Z315 )I.orldon.SchoolofA:conomics 1995


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state-centred socialchange in the East,and a renewedfocusupon the nature and conditionsof politicalmembershipas a source of social integrationin the context of changing state-market relationsin the West. Withinthe reneweddiscussionof citizenshipthere are inevitably a diversityof positions.Thus, for example, Mann has proposed that citizenshipis most fruitfullyviewedas offering a rangeof possibilities withina repertoireof ruling-class strategies,while Turner, although positivelyassessingMann'sargumentas a general advanceupon the work of T.H. Marshall,nevertheless criticizes that argument as economically reductionist and analyticallyrestricted. Seeking to negotiatethese shortcomings, Turner outlinesa theoryof citizenship organized around a twofold matrix, public/private,active/passive (Mann 1987; Turner 1990). Alternatively, Roche has implicitly criticizedboth such positions as excessivelystate-centredand has argued for the necessityof disconnectingthe discussionof circuitsof citizenshipfrom one particular politicalform (Roche 1992). Even this small selectionfrom the range of variationsaround the theme of citizenship becomes less problematicif one adopts the position advocatedby van Gunsterenand Leca, that citizenshipis a contestableconcept, lackinga fixed meaning and requiringspecificationin termsof itsuse by 'historical participants' in varyinghistorical contexts (van Gunsteren 1978; Leca 1991). Such a stanceis strongly supported by Derek Heater's extensive survey of the historically variable usagesof the conceptof citizenship, leadingto the conclusion that from veryearlyin its historythe termalreadycontaineda clusterof meanings related to a defined legal or social status, a means of politicalidentity, a focus of loyalty, a requirementof duties, an expectationof rightsand a yardstick of good behaviour.... (Heater 1990: 163) This argumentleadsto the furtherconclusionthatwe mayreasonably question the modern assumptionthat the status (of citizenship)necessarily adheresto the sovereign nation-state (Emphasismine) [It] can be associatedwith any geographicalunit from a small town to the whole globe itself. (p. 163) The significance of this propositionwillbecomeclearin due course. As a contributionto clarifyingthe central issues at stake in the emerging body of citizenshipanalysisand to removing confusions whichobstructits development,I wantto argue thatthere is a tension at the centre of the contemporary discussionof citizenshipwhichon occasion amounts to a contradiction.This tension arises from the

Twoconceptions of citizenship
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Juxtaposltlonot two eltterent conceptlonsot cltlzenszlp, one statecentredand emmanent,the other democratic,non-state-centred and imminent. The former conception involves the identificationof citizenshipwith the elaborationof a distinctive,formal legal status, whichelaboration is co-terminous withthe emergenceof nation-states and theirdiverselineages.We mayidentifythisas state citizenship. The second conception involves the elaborationof citizenship around shared membership ofa political community and requiresthe non-identification of such politicalcommunitiesand states. In this conception, citizensare politicalactorsconstituting politicalcommunitiesas public spaces.We mayidentifythisas democratic citizenship. The first conception, state-centredmodern national citizenship, was,as Brubaker notes, an inventionof the FrenchRevolution.The formaldelimitation of the citizenry;the establishmentof civil equality,entailing shared rights and shared obligations;the institutionalisation of political rights;the legal rationalisation and ideologicalaccentuation of the distinctionbetweencitizensand foreigners;the articulation of the doctrineof nationalsovereignty and of the linkbetweencitizenship and nationhood; the substitutionof immediate, direct relations betweenthe citizenand the statefor the mediated,indirectrelations characteristic of the ancient regime - the Revolutionbrought all these developmentstogether on a nationallevel for the first time. (Brubaker1992:35) Central to this conception is the idea of citizenship as a general membership status. The definition of citizenship is abstract and formal, not concrete and substantive (Brubaker 1992: 40). The contextof thisdefinitionis the diversestruggleswherebycentralizing, rationalizing territorial monarchiesgraduallysubordinated the liberties, immunitiesand privilegesof feudal lords and corporatebodies (see Poggi 1978and Bendix 1964).This statusof citizenis thusabinitio the correlateof emerging modern state power, that is, of a distinct form of political administrationand control and the legitimation thereof. As Brubakerargues further, pace the classicalWeberian definitionof the state,statesare not only territorial but also membership organizations,in which the capacityto determine membership and to enforce the resultantdecision has been fundamentalto state power. This is clearlythe conceptionof citizenshipwhich Mannutilizesin his discussionof ruling-class strategies.Here citizenship is merelyone of a number of such regime strategiesidentified in the course of comparativeanalysis. In this overwhelminglyclass-reductionist account, the possibilitiesfor and the institutionalization of different dimensions of citizenship are essayed purely as the function of ruling-classpower. In such an argument, any connection between


Angus Stewart

citizenshipand power relations is severed and citizenshipbecomes merely a function of relations of domination. This leads to the treatmentof the dubious concept of 'socialcitizenship' as if it were separable from any conception of civil and political freedom and therebyto the treatmentof Nazi Germanyand the Soviet Union as the examplarsof ruling-classstrategiesin which such social citizenship was maximized.The wisdom of hindsight alwaysconveys an unfair advantagebut one can not help but wonder if there is not some connection between Mann's unfortunate statement that authoritarian socialism'appearsno less stable than other enduring types of regime'(Mann 1987: 350) and the unproblematic treatment of welfare as social citizenship.T.H. Marshallwas more accurate when he tellinglyobservedthat the provisionof welfarewithoutcivil and politicalcitizenshipstuntedthe growthof liberty(Marshall 1981: 170). In contrast, Brubakerargues that much of the significanceof citizenshipin the modern world flows from itsformal propertiesas a specification of membership(andnon-membership) in a worldwhich is universally dividedinto a systemof bounded states,bounded both territorially and alsoin membership terms.He furtherproposesthat, within this context, the politics of citizenship have been shaped arounda numberof 'distinctive traditionsof nationhood- by deeply rooted understandings of whatconstitutesa nation'(Brubaker1989: 7). Thus, in France, the politics of citizenship have historically reflected the fact that the nation has been conceived of mainly in relation to the institutionaland territorialframeworkof the state. Politicalunity, and not shared culture, has been the basisof nationhood and the universalist, inclusivetheoryand practiceof citizenship have depended on confidence in the assimilatory workingsof the majorinstitutions.By contrast,becausenationalfeeling developedin Germanybefore the nation-state, 'the Germanidea of the nation was not a political one, nor was it linked with the abstract idea of citizenship.' Over time, this produceda politicsof formalcitizenship whichfocused upon exclusionratherthan inclusion. Both these specificvariantsof nationalcitizenshipcan be further contrasted with the case of Britain. Here, Brubaker argues, the absence of a clear conception of British nationhood has been paralled until recently by the absence of a clear conception of
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The concept of citizenshipas membershipof a legal and political community was foreign to British thinking. Legal and political statuswereconceivedinsteadin termsof allegiance - in termsof the verticalties between individualsubjectsand the king. The ties of allegianceknit togetherthe Britishempire, not the Britishnation. (Brubaker1989: 10)

of citizenship Twoconceptions


With the end of the empire, Britain had to redefine itself as a and seek to createa nationalcitizenship.The absenceof nation-state both of these has and contributedto the confused and bitterpoliticsof immigration citizenshipduring the last quartercentury.... While other counBritainwas statusof immigrants, triesweredebatingthe citizenship statusof citizens.(Brubaker1989: 11) debatingthe immigration With this perspective,therefore, the institutionof citizenship is inextricablybound up with the formationof the modern state and state system.But as Brubakerrightlypoints out, the converseis also true. The formationof the modern state and state systemcannot be of understood apart from the emergence and institutionalization statesare membership organization, citizenship.As well as territorial constitutingthemselvesand delimitingthe field of their associations on citizenship The literature jurisdictionby constituting theircitizenry. has frequentlyemphasizeduniversalityand inclusivenessbut Brubaker is clearly right to emphasizethe inherent duality of modern citizenship, nation-state internally inclusiveand and particularistic, a statusat once universal externallyexclusive . . . (Such)citizenshipis inherentlybounded. Exclusionis essentialbothto the ideologyof nationalcitizenship. . . and to the legal institution.(Brubaker1992:72) We should be quite clear that in the contemporaryworld this one. is not an undifferentiated definingprocessof inclusion/exclusion It is not the case that all those subjectto the authorityof a given state thoughtof as occupyingthe samestatus,as being can be meaningfully 'included'to the same extent. A simple distinctionbetween Auslanand useful distinction ders and Inlanderswillnot do. A moreaccurate is betweenforeign nationals,denizensand citizens:foreign nationals are thosewho are citizensof anotherstate,who havenot been granted full residentialrightsin the statein whichthey are domiciledand who therefore should be thought as occupyingonly a temporarystatus; denizens,in contrast,are those who, althoughthey are not citizensof the countryin whichthey have their domicile,neverthelessdo have a legal and a permanent resident status (Hammar 1990: 12 seq.). Followingthe large-scalemigration patterns consequent upon the recruitmentof foreign labour,there were by the late 1980s some 12 states, million foreign citizensresident in the westernindustrialized some 50 per cent of whom have been estimated to be denizens (Hammar1990: 19 and 23). From a state-centredperspective,therefore, citizenshipshould be seen as the pinnacleof a hierarchyof legallydefined statuseswhich (Brubaker1989). together comprehend internal state-membership Such citizenshipstatusconfers full rights, privilegesand obligations


Angus Stewart

upon some members, several rights upon denizens and virtually no rights upon short-term visitors. Within this perspective, citizenship questions concern the basic rules for decisions and judgments about who are citizens and who are not. Questions as to precisely what rights flow from being a citizen are on the whole not addressed and neither are questions regarding the relationship between such rights. The main qualification to this generalization concerns the matter of political rights which have usually been thought of as central to the idea of full citizenship. Hence, as Hammar proposes, two types of questions are generated within this perspective: those concerning the extent to which political rights should be given to those who are not formal citizens and those regarding the extent to which and the conditions upon which formal citizenship should be given to foreign residents with a long period of residence (Hammar 1992: 3). To these we may reasonably, and I would propose necessarily, add a third type of question: with the emergence of both supra-national and sub-national forms of political organization of actual or potential great significance, this third type of question concerns the relationship between citizenship as full formal membership of a nation-state and membership of other forms of political organization at the level of the international community or the


A seminal contribution to the discussion of citizenship was made by T.H. Marshall.In his initial exploration of the topic which has become a sociological classic, Marshalldefines citizenship as follows Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of the community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed. There is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed. (Marshall 1963: 87) He further proposes that citizenship requires a particular kind of social bond involving a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilisation which is a common possession. It is a loyalty of free men endowed with rights and protected by a common law. Its growth is stimulated both by the struggle to win those rights and by their enjoyment when won. (Marshall 1963: 96) As is well known, Marshall argues that the analysis of citizenship in the modern world would be greatly facilitated if we were to

Twoconceptions of citizenship


differentiate citizenship rights into three types. These are civil, politicaland socialrightsrespectively, each type being associated with a particular institutional sphere. Marshall uses this typologyof rights to advancean accountof the developmentof citizenshipin Britain, focusing,in particular, upon the impactof the institutionalization of citizenshipupon classinequality. Having been absorbedinto the conventionalsociologicalwisdom concerning the institutionalization of class conflict, Marshall's discussionwassubstantially neglectedfor sometimebutin the lastdecade has received an increasingamount of attentionand criticalanalysis (Dahrendorf1988;Giddens 1982 and 1985;Turner 1986 and 1990; Lockwood1992).Partof such analysis(a relatively smallpart,it has to be said) concerns Marshall's treatmentof the role of the state in the development of modern citizenship.Giddens speaks of Marshall's depiction of the evolutionarydevelopment of citizenshipas being helpedalongby the 'beneficent handof the state'(Giddens1982: 171). Turner also sees Marshallas taking the British nation-state for granted, thereby neglecting the important question of the link between'thenotionof nationalcitizenship' and 'theconstitution of the nation-state' (Turner 1987:46). Such criticisms,however, have failed to identify the central deficiencyin this area of Marshall's discussion.As far as a state-centred discussionof citizenshipis concerned, Marshall's elaborationof his argument in relation to Britain was singularly inappropriate.As Brubaker makes clear in his instructivecomparativeanalysis, the strikingcharacteristic of the Britishcase is theabsence of a state-derived conception of citizenship. (See also Hammar 1990: 23.)1 Within this perspective,Marshall's analysisin Citizenship and SocialClassis most usefully thought of as contributingto our understandingof the changing relationsbetween legally defined statusand other dimensions of social structure,most notably class inequality(see Turner 1988).Such changingrelationsin the Britishcase, however,must be seen as taking place alongside a high degree of continuity in the constitutionof politicalactors as subjects of political sovereignty, first exclusivelymonarchical,then in the form of parliamentary sovereignty. In spite of this limitation,Marshalldoes neverthelesshave a real contributionto make to our understandingof differing conceptions of citizenship.In order to explicatethis contribution, we have to take note of his account of the transitionto market society in England whichpresentsus witha fruitfulparadox(Marshall 1963).On the one hand, it is central to that account that there is a fundamental incompatibilitybetween citizenship as a universal status within a community of rights and a market society. On the other hand, citizenship(using the indices Marshallspecifies)and marketsociety did co-existuntil the time of Marshall's offering of his accountin the


Angus Stewart

mid-twentieth century.Marshall's explanationof this apparentparadox is that 'thecore of citizenshipat this stage (thatof marketsociety) wascomposedof civil rights'.Such civil rightswere an indispensable partof a competitivemarketeconomy,allowingeachmanto engage in economicstruggleand denying him socialprotectionon the grounds that he wasableto protecthimself. The content of such legal citizenship in market society was extremelyconstrained.In practicetlle righttojustice,to true equality before the law,did not exist due to the existenceof obstacles between formal rightsand possibleremedies.Such obstacleswere principally of two types: one subjective,that is, class prejudice,which Marshall consideredto have been substantially eroded by culturalchange and socialmobility; the other,objective in the senseof material obstacles to legal equality.The latter Marshallconsideredto have been ameliorated by such measuresas the LegalAid provisionsadvancedby the Labourgovernmentin Britainafterthe SecondWorldWar.Contrasting a commitmentto 'equalsocialworth'with that to 'equalnatural rights', Marshallsaw these post-warchanges as stemming directly from the former. I propose that such a commitmentto 'equalsocial worth'is fundamentalto an emancipatory conceptionof democratic citizenshipand thatsucha conceptionis distinctfrom, in tensionwith and frequently in contradictionwith a state-centredconception of
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Implicitin Marshall's argument,therefore,are distinctiveconceptionsof citizenship.The first,elaborated aroundthe conceptof equal natural rights,is formaland individualistic andwhollycompatible with the premises of market society. Such a conception, however, as Durkheimargued, is incapableof supplying an adequatebasis for social integration.(See Lockwood 1992.) Marshallimplicitlyrecognizes this when he invokes a second emancipatoryconception of citizenship articulated aroundthe conceptof equalsocial worth as being necessaryfor social integrationin an otherwise fissiparousmarket


GivenMarshall's concernwiththe impactof stateintervention upon socialinequality,the particularfocus of his analysiswas upon 'social citizenship',which, although viewed as distinctive,is nevertheless treated as both continuous with and complementaryto civil and politicalcitizenship.Further,the relationshipbetweenthe provision throughcentralizedstate mechanisms of those welfarerightsseen as definitiveof socialcitizenshipand the enhancementof individual and group autonomy is viewed unproblematically. Marshalldoes not considerthe possibilitythat there may be at the very least a tension betweena welfare-rights versionof (social)citizenshipand a conception of citizenship focusing on emancipationand autonomy.3As Rocheargues,Marshall 'impliesthat the citizen 'world' orcommunity is a sphere in whichrights-claiming citizenshave their claimsservicedby

of citizenship Twoconceptions


democracyand institutionsof the law, parliamentary the state-based the welfare state' (Roche 1992: 21). The consequenceof this instihasbeen of the socialcitizenas mainlya rights-claimer tutionalization to erode the distinction between citizen and client. Such erosion and de-politicization carrieswith it a dual danger: de-moralization (Roche 1992: 31-2; 3G7). In the case of the former, the moral characterof social participation(for example, in the welfare state) involving notions of interactional reciprocity and a logical and andduties is lost, with a consequent rights connectionbetween practical loss of freedomand moreautonomyfor dependentclients.4 havean obviousrelevanceto a seconddanger, These considerations As Rochenotes thatof depoliticization. The status of citizen is essentiallya legal and political status of membershipin a civil and politicalcommunitywhich both makes and also abidesby its own laws. It thus impliespoliticalrightsand duties.In the lightof thisthe ideaof socialcitizenship. . . is not at all or in principle.(Roche clearand wellgrounded,whetherin practice 1992:35) Consequently,I would argue, a state-basedoperationalizationof of democratic institutionalization particularsocialrights requiresa prtor politicalstatusto enable the effective maintenance of citizenship. individualsare unlikelyto be able to see themselvesas 'De-moralised powers,the identityand beingcrediblebearersof the civiland political (p. 35).5 status,of full citizenship'

Both the formal membership and the welfare-rightsversions of rights Whileinstitutionalizing citizenshipare thereforestate-centred. in the form of passive claims, both tend equally to institutionalize hierarchy and dependency. These limitations significantlyderive whichlies at the heartof conceptionof citizenship from the particular both the foregoing versions:a conceptionof citizenshipas status.As an Oldfieldargues, the emphasison statusin what is fundamentally conceptionof citizenship'gives rise to a language of individualistic which are required both for human "needs" and "entitlements" of individualsbeing effective agentsin dignityand for the possibility the world' (Oldfield 1990a: 178). The status 'citizen'involves such entitlementsas 'rights'defined by collectivedefinition,i.e., the state, and supplied by collective provision. Parallel duties are strictly of military to the paymentof taxes and the possibility circumscribed servicein defence of the state.Withinthis conception,socialrelations activityin the publicrealmis a matter Consequently, are contractual. Sucha conception of choicefor, in principle,autonomousindividuals.


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'generatesno socialbond . . . (and) neither creates nor sustainsany social solidarity or cohesion, or any sense of common purpose' (Oldfield1990a:180). Marshalland many others have charted the historicalstruggles whichled to the establishment of suchcitizenship rights.A numberof such accounts, including Marshall's own, have been criticizedfor castingtheirnarrative in an evolutionary framework, therebygivinga strong sense of irreversibility to the institutionalization of rights, which recent developments in Britain and elsewhere have made highly questionable.Perhapsmore fundamentally, there has been a continuousdiscussionas to the meaningfulnessof particular combinationsof citizenship rightsin relationto the empowerment of equally autonomousindividuals.The centralthrustof much of the study of socialstratification, for example,hasbeen to demonstrate the manner in whichpatternsof socialinequality in the form of class,sex and race serveto give manyformalrightsonly a literalmeaning. From a very different standpoint,the re-affirmation by the New Rightof the necessityof re-establishing the unregulatedmarketas the centralinstitutionof capitalist societieshas led to a directchallengeto Marshallian arguments regardingcitizenshipin general and social citizenship in its welfare-staterights version in particular.Thus, typically,PeterSaundersarguesthatonly . . . a liberalsocialorder of market capitalismcan generate the conditions for full citizenship (and) that (the) pursuit of egalitarianismand the constructionof socialistpoliticalinstitutionstend necessarily to undermineit' (Saunders 1993:57). Suchargumentsform partof the framework withinwhichone must view the recent incoherent,not to say contradictory, attemptson the partof successive Conservative administrations in Britainto appropriate the concept of citizenship.These attemptsbegan in 1988 with a critique of Labour'scommitment to a 'passive'interpretationof citizenshipin the form of rights and entitlementsfrom the state. Senior ministers(DouglasHurd in particular) contrastedthis interpretationwith the Conservatives' advocacyof an activecitizenshipof altruistic communityinvolvement,describedby one commentator as richesse oblige.Central to the rhetorical flourishes of these initial attempts at appropriationwas a linkage between citizenship and community.When subsequentlyan actualpolicy for citizenshipwas actually legislatedby the Conservative administration in 1991,its form wasdistinctly at odds withsucha linkage.Citizenship as statusbecame once again the basis of what was proposed. But with the Citizen's Charter, the status enshrined in legislation was that of consumer: contractualmarket relations and not social or community bonds becamethe contextof empowerment. As ColinCrouchhas noted, the Charter'provedto be entirelyindividualand non-political: a seriesof devices wherebyindividualcomplainantscould seek redressagainst

of citizenship Twoconceptions


in casesof inadequateservicedelivery' publicservants,not politicians, (Crouch1992:71). and of its formal conceptionof the status'citizen' A quitedistinctive implicationsis advancedby the organizationCharter88. The UK is in not having aloneamongthe membersof the EuropeanCommunity a formally written constitution and Bill of Rights. Although the common law has been argued to offer parallelsafeguardsto those embodied in writtenconstitutions,the view has become increasingly widespreadthat there are inadequatemeansto controlpublicpower and to protectindividualrightsin the UK. (See,for example,Johnson 1977 and Harden and Lewis 1986.) Arguing therefore that the no longer arrangements constitutional customarynatureof Britain's providesan adequatedefence of civiland politicallibertiesagainstthe Charter88 promotesthe necessity powerof an 'electivedictatorship', statusin a formalBillof Rightsand a written of embodyingcitizenship

Whateverthe merits of this particularproposal,it does have the potential limitationof securing politicalcitizenshipwithin a single political context, that of the nation-state,preciselyat an historical moment when that context is seen to be of diminishingsignificance. Meehan (See Hall and Held 1989: 183.)Thus, for example,Elizabeth arguedthat has persuasively a new kind of citizenshipis emerging that is neither nationalnor cosmopolitanbut that is multiple (emphasismine) in the sense that the identities,rightsand obligationsassociated. . . with citizenship of complexconfiguration . . . areexpressedthroughan increasingly states,nationaland transnational institutions, commonCommunity voluntaryassociations,regions and alliancesof regions. (Meehan 1993: 1)


upon for and the limitations The necessityof relatingthe possibilities identified was meaning them gave which citizenshipto the context(s) discussionof citizenship to the contemporary in an earlycontribution in Britain. Writing of the reconstitution of status that had accompaniedthe rise of citizenshipin Britain,A.H. Halseynoted how for citizenshiphave been importantit has been that the possibilities defined in the context of the nation-state(Halsey 1986: 62). In pursuing the goal of creating a national political community, the situation.In its emergence Labourpartyfound itself in a paradoxical as a serious political force, the Labour party was significantly dependent upon the solidarityof local classcommunities.To a very realextent, communitywasthe resourcebase for the developmentof


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particularforms of citizenship.However,the welfare-rights conception of citizenshipwhichhas been so centralto Labourpartythinking and institutionalization was crucially dependent upon continuing economicgrowthanxlchange.Apartfromthe depoliticizing effectsof the statist model, economic change also produced changes in the occupational structurewhichhave steadilydiminishedthe size of the traditional working class and eroded working-classcommunities. Recallingthe argumentadvancedby Brubakerto which I referred earlier, it seems reasonableto conclude that with respect to both citizenshipas formalmembership and citizenshipas a sourceof social solidaritythrough the deliveryof formal and substantive rights, the taskof constructing a nationalpoliticalcommunityin Britainremains to be achieved.


One conclusion from the foregoing discussion of state-centred conceptions of citizenship of both the formal membership and welfare-rights versionsseems inescapable,certainlyas far Britainis concerned. The possibilities for the creationof politicalcommunity (or communities)remain unfulfilled. Behind formal legalismsand politicalrhetoric,the sociological realitiesare thoseof subjects, clients and consumers, not those of citizens of equal social worth and decision-making capacity.The constructionof politicalcommunities clearly requires an alternativeconception of citizenship. Such an alternativeconception of citizenshipinvolves politicalactors, rights and duties and a conception of political forms as subordinate and adaptive to a varietyof citizenries,rooted in the divisionsand diverse purposes of civil society.6Such democraticcitizenshipsare created and reproducedthroughthe constitution of substantive communities of reciprocity andbalancedrightsand duties,involving conceptions of 'equalsocialworth'. In contradistinction, therefore,to conceptionsand specifications of citizenship centred upon nation-states,the political communities which providethe contextsof democraticcitizenshipare, as Michael Walzerhas argued, 'phenomenological and imminent'(Walzer1983: 26). Forthis reason,such politicalcommunities are ableto encompass group as well as individual citizenship and their social sites are potentiallywidespread,both subnationaland transnational, the city and the region as well as the communityand the federation. Such politicalcommunitiesneed not, indeed should not, be thought of as embodyingsomeanteriororganicidentityof territory or blood.Thus, for example, exploring the possibility for the emergence of a Europeanpoliticalcommunity,Tassinarguesthatjust

conceptions orcitizenship Two


cannotfall under the statistlogic community as the institutionalised parts of the monopoly of legitimateviolence, so its constituent of cannotestablishthemselvesagainsteach other in a relationship domination.Whatis requiredratheris a principleof 'participation public in government' ... which can only be guaranteed by a for a space.... (Therefore, instead) of being the precondition it is a publicspace, the Europeancommunityis actuallyits result: of interests,feelings communityrestingnot upon an amalgamation constitutedpublic and wills,but on the contraryupon a politically standface to face. of politicalinitiatives spacein whichthe plurality (Tassin1992: 188) Tassin's further explication of this conception of a non-statecitizenship demonstrates its implications for our earlier centred of a formalmembershipapproachto citizenship.Arguing discussion he case for the development of a European fellow-citizenship, the a on based is notesthat the nation-stateprinciple of citizenship will national and will conflationof the conceptsof general deliberate of nationalityand citizenship.The construcamalgamation on an or however,requirescitizenship community, of a Europeanpolitical tion be brokenawayfrom nationality. to is an The rightof foreign residents. . . to vote in localelections. . .comnew this of essential and obligatorystep in the formation in the life of public It indicatesthatparticipation munitycitizenship. whateverthe that, institutionstakes precedenceover nationality; in public insertion her or citizen'sculturalor nationalidentity,his from a derives it that politicalspace is elective and not 'native'; on by passed identity an or choiceand not frombirth(natio) political history.. . . (Tassin1992: 189) Withinthe imminentconceptionof democraticcitizenship,therepractice. fore, politicalcommunitiesare the product of citizenship the vis-a-vis conception a such of The distinctive characteristics by clarified further be may state-centredconception of citizenship and interests political between the divergentrelationships recognizing conception contextsimpliedby each.Withinthe state-centred political identities and interests preferences, of citizenship,it is assumedthat deliberation, and discourse public of in advance are given exogenously or implicitstate prioritization whether by explicit state-specification containedwithincivilsociety. amongthe manycompetingpossibilities does not make or require citizenship The conceptionof democratic that preferences,interrather, such an assumption.It 'appreciates, of publicdeliberantecedents as outcomes much as ests, and identitiesare it' (Fraser through and in constituted discursively ation;indeed, they 1992: 130 emphasismine).7 is thus The crucialcontextual referent of democraticcitizenship In community. that membershipof a sharedand imminent common


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specificsense,suchdemocratic citizenship requiresus to acknowledge the other membersas being of equalsocialworth.Withinthiscontext, 'citizenshipis an explicitlypoliticalactivity,in which people who are equals address collective and general concerns' (Phillips 1991: 82 emphasismine). The case for the 'absoluteprimacyof politics'in the elaboration of a conception of democratic citizenship has been forcefully argued by Anne Phillips (Phillips 1991: 82-7). Drawing upon the contributionsof two US feminists, Phillipselaboratesthe case that a democraticcitizenshipis necessarilyimplicatedwith the political,publicsphere.Thus, suchcitizenship requires - if you will- a movement, certainly symbolic and phenomenological,frequently literal,from the privateworldof familyand workto an involvement in more general,publicconcerns.Equally,however,democratic citizenship does not require a false dissociationfrom the realityof group identities. Rather, political organizationin a democraticcitizenry occursaroundsuch group identitiesbut is only fully realizedthrough interaction with others, in which interaction we are necessarily remindedof others'claims.Thus diversity andcontingency areinbuilt conditionsof genuinelydemocratic citizenship there is no way to know in advance whether the outcome of a deliberativeprocess will be the discoveryof a common good in which conflicts of interest evaporate as merely apparent or the discoverythatconflictsof interestare realand the commongood is chimerical. (Fraser1992: 130) The combination of the structural andorganizational dimensionsof globalization andthe political uncertainties and possibilities characteristicof an emergingpost-national era is certainto accelerate theoretical debateand practical conflictaround the meaningand implementationof citizenship.I believethat both the termsof such debateand the natureof such conflictwillbe constructively clarifiedby recognizing the importance and distinctivenessof the two conceptions of citizenshipidentifiedhere. (Dateaccepted: January1994)
AngusStewart, Department of Sociology, LondonSchoolof Economics

NO I i:S 1. Turner potentially recognized this particularly in his 1990 article but failed to draw the appropriate conclusions: A more important point is that the constitutional settlement of 1688 created the British citizen as the British .subject (emphasis mine), that is a legal personality whose indelible social rights are constituted by a monarch sitting in parliament. The notion of citizen-assubject indicate.s clearly therelative exten.sive notion of .socialright.s but atso the pos.sive character of civil in.stitution.s. (Turner 1990: 207) [emphasis mine]


Twoconceptions of citizenship


2. It should be noted that Marshall BIBLIOGRAPHY further compoundsthe confusionsand complexities surrounding these con- Bendix, R. 1964 Nation-Building and flicting conceptions of citizenship by Citizen.ship,London: John Wiley and additionally invoking national con- Sons. sciousness as an additional source of Bottomore, T. 1992 '(itizenship and social integration,placingat the centre Social (lass, 40 years on' in T. H. Marshall Ot t ze mtegratlveprocessesot cltlzen- and T. Bottomore Citizenship and Social ship 'a direct sense of community Cla.s.s, London: Pluto Press. membershipbased on loyaltyto a civil- Brubaker, W.R. (ed.) 1989 Immigration zatlon w zlcz ls a common possession.' and the Politic.s of Citizen.ship in Europeand (Marshall1963). NorthAmerica,London: University Press 3. For an interestingattemptto con- of America. sider the normative justification for Brubaker, W.R. 1992 Citizen.shipand treatmg we tare provlslon and cltlzen- Nationhoodin France and Germany,Lonship as intrinsicallylinked, see King don: Harvard University Press. and Waldron1988. The authorsdo not Crouch, C. 1992 '(iti7enship and (omconsider,however,the degree to which munity' in (j. (rouch and A. Heath (eds), different dimensionsof citizenshipmay and SocialReform,Oxford: be in tension with one another. (larendon Press. 4. In addition to Roche's illuminat- Dahrendorf, R. 1988 The ModernS(vcial ing discussion and the references Confict, London: Weidenfeld and Nicotherein, see also Habermas1987. lson. 5. For a parallel discussion of the Fraser, N. 1992 'Rethinking the Public depoliticizing effects of the welfare- Sphere: a (ontribution to the (ritique of state mstltutlona lzatlon ot economlc Actually Existing Democracy', in (j. (alrights, see Sheldon Wolin 1992: houn (ed.) Haberma.s and thePublicSphere, 245-46. Thus, 'Economic rights,or, . .. London: MIT Press, 10942. "entitlements"do empower people. Giddens, A. 1982 '(lass Division, (lass Lzere ls a gam m dlgnlty, autonomy (onflict and (itizenship Rights' in his and well-being, and no democrat Profile.sand Critique.sin Social Theory, should believe otherwise.But this must London: Macmillan. not blind one to the anti-political conse- Giddens, A. 1985 The Nation-Stateand quences resulting from the preoccu- Violence, Oxford: Polity Press. pationwith economicrights' Habermas, J. 1987 The Theoryof Com6. AdrianOldfieldhas elaboratedan municative Action, Vol. 2, Boston: Beacon a ternatlveconceptlonot cltlzens zlp to Press. that embodiedin the liberal-individual- Hall, S. and Held, D. 1989 '(itizens and ist conception of citizenshipas status, (itizenship' in S. Hall and M. Jacques the civic-republican conception. (eds) New Time.s:The Changing Face of Thoughtful and stimulatingthough his Politic.sin the 1990.s, London: Lawrence discussion is, however, he does not and Wishart. addressthe contextualdimensionwhich Halsey, A.H. 1986 Chs4nge in Sois central to the present article. For a ciety,Oxford: Oxford University Press. consideration of the limitations of a Hammar, T. 1990 Democracyand the communitarian approach to political Nation State, Aldershot: (Jower Publishpractice, which I believe the present lng tjompany. argumentavoids, see the discussionby Harden, I. and Lewis, N. 1986 TheNoble Michael Walzer. Oldfield 1990b and Lie: Constitution s4nd theRule of Walzer1992: 89-107. Law, London: Hutchison. 7. My argumenthere is an adaption Heater, D. 1990 Citizen.ship: TheCivicIdeal of Nancy Fraser'sargument which is in World Hi.story,Politic.sand Education, directly concerned with developing a London: Longman. contrast between competing views of Johnson, N. 1977 In Searchof the C0n.stithe publicarena.See Fraser1992. tution,Oxford: Pergamon Press.
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King,D.S.andWaldron,J. 1988'(itizenship, social citizenship and the defense of welfare provision Briti.shJournal of Political Science18: 41543. Leca, J. 1991 'Immigration, nationality and citizenship in Western Europe', paper presented to conference on Social Justice, DemocraticCitizenshipand Public Policy in the New Europe, E(PR/Erasmus University, Rotterdam. Lockwood, D. 1992 Solidarity and, Oxford: (larendon Press. Mann, M. 1987 'Ruling (lass Strategies and (itizenship', Sociology 21: 339-54. Marshall, T.H. 1963 '(itizenship and Social (lass' in his Sociologyat the Cros.sroad.s, London: Heinemann. Marshall, T.H. 1981 The Right to Welfare and Other E.s.says, London: Heinemann. Meehan, E. 1993 Citizen.ship and theEuropean Community, London: Sage. Oldfield, A. l990a '(iti7enship: an unnatural practice?', Political Quarterly 61(2): 177-87. Oldfield, A. l990b Citizenship and Community,London: Routledge. Phillips, A. 1991 '(itizenship and Feminist Politics'in (J. Andrews (ed.) Citizenship, London: Lawrence and Wishart. Poggi, G. 1978 The Development of the ModernState,London: Hutchinson.

Angus Stewart Roche, M. 1992 Rethinking Citizenship, Oxford: Polity Press. Saunders, P. 1993 '(itizenship in a LiberalSociety' in B. Turner (ed.) Citizen.ship and SocialTheory, London: Sage. Tassin, E. 1992 'Europe: a Political (ommunity?' in (j. Mouffe (ed.) Dimensions of Radical Democracy:,Citizen.ship, Community, London: Verso. Turner, B.S. 1986 Citizen.ship and Capztalism: the debate over, London: Allen and Unwin. Turner, B.S. 1988 Status,Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Turner, B.S. 1990 'Outline of a Theory of (itizenship', Sociology 24: 189-217. van Gusteren, H. 1978 'Notes on a Theory of (itizenship' in P. Birnbaum,J. Lively and (J. Parry (eds) Democracy, Con.sen.sus and SocialContract, London: Sage. Walzer, M. 1983 Sphere.sof Justice: a Defense of Plurali.smand Equality., New York: Basic Books. Walzer, M. 1992 'The (ivil Society Argument' in (j. Mouffe (ed.) Dimension.s of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizen.ship, Community, London: Verso. Wolin, S. 1992 'What Revolutionary Action Means Today?' in (j. Mouffe (ed.) Dimen.sion.s of RadicalDemocracy:, Citizen.ship, Community, London: Verso.