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SHARED AGENCY

International Masterclass with

Michael Bratman
University of Antwerp 24 & 25 August 2013

SCHEDULE

August 24 10:00 10:05 Opening remarks (Angelica Kaufmann & Jens van't Klooster) 10:05 10:45 Chiara Brozzo (University of Warwick): Motor Intentions: Connecting Intentions with Actions 10:45 11:25 Olle Blomberg (University of Edinburgh): Common Knowledge and Genuine Joint Action 11:25 12:05 Nicolas Lindner (Heinrich-Heine-Universitt Dsseldorf): Bratman's account of shared intention and children's joint action 12:05 13:45 Lunch Break

13:45 14:25 Aurelien Darbellay University of Barcelona): Collective Intentionality and Social Ontology 14:25 15:05 Oier Imaz (VuB and UPV-EHU): Group are Relations: a Topological Exploration of the Social as Political 15:05 15:45 Coffee Break 15:45 17:15 Keynote Lecture: Michael Bratman: Shared Agency

19:00 Conference Dinner at Bon Bini, Paardenmarkt 72, 2000 Antwerpen

August 25 10:30 11:10 Eylem Ozaltun (Harvard University): Knowledge in Action as Knowledge of What Happens 11:10 11:50 Siwing Tsoi (The University of Texas at Austin): Two Kinds of Composite Agents 11:50 12:30 Marco Meyer (Oxford University): Markets and Agency 12:30 13:45 Lunch Break

13:45 14:25 Marianna Ginocchietti (University of Trieste): Agency Between Responsibility and Planning 14:25 15:05 Tom Poljansek (Universitt Stuttgart): Large Scale Cases of Shared Agency 15:05 15:45 Coffee Break

15:45 17:15 Keynote Lecture: Michael Bratman: Shared Deliberation

20:00 Dinner

ABSTRACTS

OLLE BLOMBERG University of Edinburgh olle.blomberg@gmail.com Title: Common Knowledge and Genuine Joint Action Abstract: According to most philosophical accounts of joint activity, for two or more agents to be acting together, they must have common knowledge (Lewis 1969) of each others goals or intentions concerning the activity (e.g. Tuomela & K. Miller 1988; Cohen & Levesque 1991; Bratman 1992; 1993; S. Miller 2001; Pettit & Schweikard 2006; Alonso 2009). But while this requirement is common, it is almost never explained or motivated. In this talk, I suggest that there are two reasons for thinking that common knowledge might be a constitutive element of genuine joint action. Common knowledge seems to be needed to (i) rule out certain class of casesconcealment casesthat would only counterintuitively be categorized as cases of genuine joint action, and (ii) to make sense of the idea that a genuine joint action ought to be non-accidentally coordinated in the right way. However, I argue that both (i) and (ii) can be achieved without common knowledge, and hence, common knowledge cannot be a constitutive element of genuine joint action. One reason why this conclusion may be important is that it allows us to make sense of the possibility of genuine joint action involving agents who lack the concept of belief (such as, perhaps, young children (see Wellman et al. 2000).

CHIARA BROZZO University of Warwick chiara.brozzo@gmail.com Title: Motor Intentions: Connecting Intentions with Actions Abstract: By building up on the notion that intentions are mental states that represent action outcomes, I rely on Bratmans (1987) planning theory to maintain that intentions are distinctive propositional attitudes inserted in a specifc web of norms, and I agree with Bratmans idea that the connection between intentions and intentional actions is given by the

so-called Single Phenomenon View: whenever one intentionally As, one has the intention to B, and its not necessarily the case that A = B. I then raise the challenge proposed by Velleman (2007) to this view: what purpose serves an intention once an intentional action is being performed? I consider the hypothesis that, during the unfolding of an intentional action, the relevant intention may play no role at all in behaviour production. In response to this challenge, I introduce the idea that an action may be intentional by virtue of being appropriately connected to the relevant intention. But just how does this connection work? In order to account for that, along the lines of Pacherie (2000, 2003, 2006) I resort to the notion of motor representation (see Jeannerod, 1994, 2006). A motor representation consists in the representation of the effects of a possible action (Jeannerod, 2006) that has the following characteristics: it represents the self in action as a generator of forces (Jeannerod, 1994) and thus determines the pattern of movements that are going to be executed, thereby driving action execution. Insofar as motor representations play a key role in the production of behaviour, they are obvious candidates for fulflling the connection between intentions and actions (something that is suggested by Pacherie, 2000, but see also 2003, 2006, 2008). At this point, the question arises as to whether any motor representations are actually intentions. I argue for the idea that those intentions that I term motor intentions can have a content thats relevantly similar to that of the corresponding motor representations. In particular, a motor intention has either the same content as the corresponding motor representation, or refers to an action outcome by deferring to a motor representation representing that outcome (see Butterfll & Sinigaglia, 2012). My stance leaves open the possibility that some motor representations could be intentions, but doesnt commit to this idea. I develop the notion that the content of a motor intention crucially involves one of a limited set of bodily parts, which has to undergo a specifc changeone, for instance, that brings it into a specifc relation to a certain object (examples are the intention to grasp, or to tear). Given their bodily content, which is relevantly similar to that of a motor representation, and their special relation to motor representations (consisting in either identity or deferral), I contend that these intentions are the best candidates for explaining the way in which intentions connect with actions, thus meeting Vellemans challenge to Bratmans theory.

AURELIEN DARBELLAY University of Barcelona Aurelien.darbellay@gmail.com Title: Collective Intentionality and Social Ontology

Abstract: It is often claimed that social entities - like judges, students, money, laws, churches, etc. are those entities whose existence depends on collective intentionality. Under this type of views, someone is a judge in virtue of it being collectively accepted that she possesses the status judge refers to and some piece of paper is money because it is collectively regarded as such, where both collectively accepted and collectively regarded designate specifc instances of collective intentionality. In this paper, I look for an account of collective intentionality that would serve the purposes of social ontology, understood as the study of the conditions of existence of social objects. In doing so, I draw on the literature on collective action/intention to fnd suggestions of candidate accounts. My discussion takes place in the framework of one assumption: facts involving collective intentionality are fully constituted by facts about individual agents (crucially: facts about their intentional states, the relations in which they stand to one another and some rules governing their organization). Although substantive, this is a common ground assumption in the feld. This said and for present concerns, my question can be formulated as follows: given a set of individual agents, what conditions do they have to meet for it to be true that they collectively accept that someone is a judge or that something is money, thereby bringing judges and money into existence? The discussion comes in two parts. In the frst part, I present Bratmans account of shared intention in some detail. I then go on to show that this account cannot be straightforwardly extended to generate an account of collective intentionality ft to be the ground of social objects. The reason why is quite simple: a crucial element of the Bratmanian account of shared intention is that each individual agent who shares in the collective intention is the host of an individual intention with an irreducibly collective content thus the famous formula, I intend that we J. This feature is made necessary by the acknowledged fact that, in general, individual intentions supplemented with mutual beliefs do not add-up to shared or collective intention. But, I argue, there is no reason to impose such a requirement on the individual intentional states which constitute collective acceptance/belief, i.e. the instances of collective intentionality that ground the existence of social objects. Rather the opposite: such a requirement would make the account too demanding. In order to further substantiate that last contention, I suggest a fairly individualistic and minimalist account of collective intentionality, which roughly implies that we collectively regard something as money iff each of us regards it as such and this is commonly believed among us. I then consider the objection that such an account fails because individual acceptance supplemented with common belief doesnt add up to collective acceptance, and argue that, insofar as we are concerned with the grounding of social entities, the objection misfres.

MARIANNA GINOCCHIETTI University of Trieste marianna.ginocchietti@phd.units.it Title: Agency between responsibility and planning Abstract: In Responsibility and Planning, Bratman investigates the relation between planning agency and deeply responsible agency. In Bratman's view, adult human agents are engaged in shared activities that need shared intentions to structure and support agents' planning and actions. In this perspective, actions are typically understood as elements in planned activities. At the same time, human agents are responsible for their actions and for the upshots of their actions. The form of this responsibility is quite diffcult to defne. Bratman starts from Strawson's idea in Freedom and Resentment that we suppose we are appropriate targets for moral praise and blame, for resentment and gratitude, pride, guilt and shame. Although an agent can be responsible for non-planned acts and not responsible for planned acts, it seems to Bratman that these two kinds of agency are signifcantly related. If an intended action is embedded in a larger plan, our judgment of culpability can be affected in different ways. Bratman's primary claim is that we ordinary adult human agents in a broadly modern social world are responsible agents in part in virtue of our planning agency. In this perspective, responsibility seems to be a feature of human agency among other features and not the relevant one. The relevant aspect of human agency seems to concern planning, coordination and organization in achieving whished (individual or shared) aims. I take the matter of attribution of responsibility to the agent as central for an account of human agency: it could be an inter-subjective criterion to qualify the agent's role and his action. In my proposal, I intend to argue about the relation Bratman establishes between planning agency and responsible agency by referring to two essays by John L. Austin A Plea for Excuses and Three Ways of Spilling Ink. Although Austin did not systematize his refections on action, he provided an interesting point of view that allows us to refect on the possibility that the attribution of responsibility to an agent plays an important role in individuating what an agent did. Specifcally, I intend 1) to consider Austin's indication to split up what might be named as one action into different stretches or phases or stages, in order to make an issue of what it is to be considered to be part of the idea of action. In this view, planning becomes just one stage among others (such as decision, intelligence, appreciation, execution), one of the departments into which the business of doing actions is organized; 2) to discuss Austin's analysis of a possible dissociated use of adverbial expressions

intentionally, deliberately, on purpose, as aggravating expressions that intensify in different ways the attribution of responsibility to the agent. This analysis allows us to distinguish between acting intentionally, acting deliberately and acting on purpose.

EMANUEL JOHN Universitt Potsdam em.j.john@gmail.com Title: Unconditional Norms and Shared Agency Abstracts: In my paper I inquiry into the forms of shared agency that actualize norms persons respect as unconditional and general values. Rousseau's notion of a general will or Kant's notion of a rational will persons share qua rational beings provide historical examples of shared unconditional rational principles. The goal of my paper is to explore the logical features of how to understand shared agency corresponding to such notions of unconditionally shared norms. The scope of this inquires comprises following aspects: On one hand it requires to discern two notions of sharing: (1) Persons share unconditional values, which presupposes the assumption of a common rational nature. (2) Persons share forms of agency, which presupposes that there are ways of acting a group of people inherited, institutionalized or agreed upon. On the other hand this inquiry requires to explain the interrelation between both notions of sharing: (1) They are asymmetrically interrelated when people are not sharing forms of agency. (2) A symmetrical interrelation can be established, when persons cooperate in exploring the forms of agency, which function as means for actualizing unconditionally shared norms. Within the scope of these aspects, I especially draw on the aspect of the cooperation in exploring forms of shared agency that function as means for actualizing shared values. I develop my argument in following steps: In the frst section of my paper I provide an outline of the theoretical assumptions fguring in the background by drawing on the two notions of sharing: sharing unconditional norms and sharing forms of agency. Regarding the relation between both notions of sharing I furthermore explain the difference between contingently shared forms of agency and those necessitated by shared unconditional norms. In the second section of my paper I argue that forms of shared agency cannot just be deduced from the idea of a shared unconditional value, but requires cooperation and justifcation. The former would imply to develop a blueprint of forms of agency that supposedly ft all rational persons. Differently I argue that from the point of view of different individuals, ways of

addressing and knowing other persons are required. Instead of applying a blueprint this enables cooperation for the sake of realizing a shared end; i.e. exploring shared forms of agency that function as means for actualizing shared values. In the third section I draw on two crucial features of cooperation. The frst grounds in joint intention. Persons must conceive of states of affairs in the same way. Justifcation is the second crucial aspect of cooperation. In exploring shared forms of agency persons must give justifcation to others, which forms of agency may function as means of shared unconditional norms. In the end it will be depicted as the process of enfolding and developing good forms of shared agency as means of shared unconditional norms.

NICOLAS LINDNER nicolas.lindner@uni-duesseldorf.de Heinrich-Heine-Universitt Dsseldorf Title: Bratman's account of shared intention and children's joint action Abstract: Joint intentional action is oftentimes explained in terms of joint or shared intentions. One of the leading approaches to this matter has been introduced by Michael Bratman (Bratman 1993, 2009). The starting point for his approach is the planning theory of individual intentions. On this basis, he develops a constructivist account of shared intentions that gives particular weight to their functional role. According to Bratman, shared intentions are thus to be understood as a set of interrelated and correlating intentional states. An important feature of his description of shared intentions is the fact that these intentional states should be common knowledge between the participants of joint action. This common knowledge presupposes a highly sophisticated understanding of others mental states. Moreover, this aspect of Bratmans account implies that the participants in joint activities have the ability to ascribe complex mental states to others. This results from the fact that in this account the intentions of the individual build on the intentions of the other persons engaged in the joint action. Young children lack such sophisticated mindreading capacities as they have no fullblown theory of mind. Still, there is much evidence that they engage in proper joint action. Notably, they engage in exactly those kinds of small-scale joint activities with few partakers that are a starting point for Bratmans concept of shared intentions. Starting from the criticisms introduced by Tollefsen (Tollefsen 2005) and Butterfll (Butterfll 2012), I will show that Bratmans account of shared intentions is not suited to explain joint activities of young children as he sets the cognitive standards too high. Related to this, I will argue that this defcit is due to the fact that he develops his approach of shared intentions within the framework of

his planning theory, which focuses on cognitively mature planning agents (Bratman 1987). Still, while showing these defcits, Bratmans account is a suitable explanation of one kind of joint intentional action. This kind of joint action, which is characteristic for older children and adults, involves planning on future-directed intentions, deliberation and bargaining. Thus, it is plausible to assume two different strategies to explain shared intentions of younger children and adults. Hence, the aim of this talk is to show that another approach of shared intention has to be developed with a focus on joint activities of young children. This is particularly relevant as many regard these activities as the cradle of mindreading capacities in child development. Following the ideas presented in this talk, an account of shared intentions at an early stage of life should therefore not rest upon elaborate capacities of mental state ascription. Otherwise, it would presuppose what should actually be explained.

MARCO MEYER marco.meyer@jpberlin.de Oxford University Title: Markets and Agency Abstract: When we say that a market produced some result, such as fxing a price, or that the fnancial market reacted favourably or unfavourably to some piece of regulation, it looks like we attribute agency to markets. I explore three ways to analyse such statements. According to the frst reading, such attributions are meant to be literally true. This requires that the markets in question are collective agents. Building on the work of Pettit and List, I argue that paradigmatic markets fail to qualify as group agents. According to the second analysis, attributions of agency to markets should be understood as attributions of shared agency to all or some of the participants in that market. Building on Bratman and Del Mar, I argue that if market participants in oligopolistic markets collude or cooperate, they sometimes act together to achieve certain aims that none of the participants could achieve on their own. Thus, there is a clear if somewhat metaphorical way in which we can say that such markets act, namely by way of (some of) the oligopolists in that market acting together. However, it often looks like we attribute agency to markets that are polypolistic in structure, or to markets where no collusion or co-operation takes place. For instance, how should we interpret the statement that the market for Greek government bonds reacts unfavourably to a proposed debt re-structuring? On the second analysis, such statements attribute shared agency to holders of Greek government bonds. Are such attributions plausible? One challenge in

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evaluating such claims is that we do not have a clear idea of what it is for large numbers of agents to act together, since accounts of shared agency such as Bratman's focus on the analysis of small adult groups. I offer some ideas of how to extend his framework to cases with large numbers of actors. On my analysis, it seems doubtful that market participants in polypolistic markets can be said to act together. This leaves us with the third way of analyzing attributions of agency to markets, namely as descriptions of processes that involve no intentional agency at all, as in the statement "The rain washed away the sand." Such an interpretation likens markets in some respects to natural phenomena. Specifcally, it makes it inappropriate to blame or criticise the agents participating in the respective markets. Rather, markets appear as a part of the environment that needs to be reckoned with. The question of whether attributions of agency to markets are true on the frst, second or third analysis matters morally. For instance, if the Greek government claims that fnancial markets resist certain policies which the government would like to implement, then this appears to be morally more problematic if fnancial markets have agency with respect to resisting these outcomes in the sense of the frst or the second analysis, but less so if the third analysis is appropriate, according to which fnancial market (participants) have no intentional agency in this case at all.

OIER IMAZ VuB and UPV-EHU imaz.oier@gmail.com Title: Groups are relations: a topological exploration of the social as political Abstract: It is often claimed that social entities - like judges, students, money, laws, churches, etc. are those entities whose existence depends on collective intentionality. Under this type of views, someone is a judge in virtue of it being collectively accepted that she possesses the status judge refers to and some piece of paper is money because it is collectively regarded as such, where both collectively accepted and collectively regarded designate specifc instances of collective intentionality. In this paper, I look for an account of collective intentionality that would serve the purposes of social ontology, understood as the study of the conditions of existence of social objects. In doing so, I draw on the literature on collective action/intention to fnd suggestions of candidate accounts. My discussion takes place in the framework of one assumption: facts involving collective intentionality are fully constituted by facts about individual agents (crucially: facts about their

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intentional states, the relations in which they stand to one another and some rules governing their organization). Although substantive, this is a common ground assumption in the feld. This said and for present concerns, my question can be formulated as follows: given a set of individual agents, what conditions do they have to meet for it to be true that they collectively accept that someone is a judge or that something is money, thereby bringing judges and money into existence? The discussion comes in two parts. In the frst part, I present Bratmans account of shared intention in some detail. I then go on to show that this account cannot be straightforwardly extended to generate an account of collective intentionality ft to be the ground of social objects. The reason why is quite simple: a crucial element of the Bratmanian account of shared intention is that each individual agent who shares in the collective intention is the host of an individual intention with an irreducibly collective content thus the famous formula, I intend that we J. This feature is made necessary by the acknowledged fact that, in general, individual intentions supplemented with mutual beliefs do not add-up to shared or collective intention. But, I argue, there is no reason to impose such a requirement on the individual intentional states which constitute collective acceptance/belief, i.e. the instances of collective intentionality that ground the existence of social objects. Rather the opposite: such a requirement would make the account too demanding. In order to further substantiate that last contention, I suggest a fairly individualistic and minimalist account of collective intentionality, which roughly implies that we collectively regard something as money iff each of us regards it as such and this is commonly believed among us. I then consider the objection that such an account fails because individual acceptance supplemented with common belief doesnt add up to collective acceptance, and argue that, insofar as we are concerned with the grounding of social entities, the objection misfres.

EYLEM OZALTUN Harvard University ozaltun@fas.harvard.edu Title: Knowledge in Action as Knowledge of What Happens Abstract: This paper defends the view that an agents knowledge of her own actions is a nonevidential way of knowing what happens, that is, a way of knowing the external world outside the agents mind and body. As with any way of knowing contingent facts, an agents way of knowing her own actions must be a fallible way of knowing the world. The task of the

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paper is to show how these two features can go together, that is, how it is possible for an agent to have fallible and yet non-evidential knowledge of her own actions. Contemporary philosophy of action is dominated with two-factor theories of knowledge in action that deny there is such a possibility. The main motivation behind two-factor theories is their ability to account for the fallibility of the agents knowledge of her own actions. According to this type of view, the agents fallibility and the non-evidential character of her knowledge can be accounted for only by realizing that what we call the agents knowledge in action is a hybrid of two kinds of knowledge with two distinct objects. The agents non-evidential knowledge is the knowledge of her intention, whereas what happens is known by observation or inference, and that is why the agent can be wrong about what happens. In this paper I will undermine the basic appeal of two-factor theories by showing that the two seemingly conficting features of knowledge in action can be accounted for in a unifed way, and that the agents nonevidential knowledge extends to what happens. Accounting for fallibility is not an issue that comes up only for knowing by acting; it is a burden that any account of any way of knowing the contingent objective reality must shoulder. Therefore I will turn to theories of our paradigmatic way of knowing the external world perception to extract some insights. I will abstract from the structure of consciousness in perception a general conception of what it is to be in a direct and yet fallible relationship with the world. By asking the question What is the general form of an agents awareness by virtue of which she knows contingent facts about objective reality? I will arrive at a conception of a way of knowing the world in general that will constitute the genus of knowing, where knowing by perception and knowing by action fall under it as species. I will characterize a way in which the agent must be authoritative over her own epistemic states without postulating direct objects of awareness other than what these states are about, so that by having these states she can be in a direct and yet fallible epistemic relationship with the world. Using this conception of awareness of ones own epistemic states, I will argue that the agents awareness of her own actions must be understood in the same way, and that it constitutes a direct, non-evidential way of knowing what happens in its own right, without mediation of any other direct objects of knowledge, such as intentions.

TOM POLJANSEK Universitt Stuttgart tom.poljansek@gmx.de Title: Large Scale Cases of Shared Agency Abstract: Since the late 1980s shared intentionality and collective agency have attracted

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growing attention from philosophers. The focus of the philosophical discussion of collective agency has so far been related to the question of how it is that different agents share intentional attitudes (e.g. beliefs, emotions or intentions in the sense of Michael Bratman's planning theory of agency). Sharing such attitudes (in particular intentions) is often considered to be an aspect unique to human interaction (cf. Carpenter/Tomasello). Take for example two scholars working on the same project together: they coordinate their activities and plans to put into effect the intended results, while intending their shared goal as a shared goal together. This seemingly unique aspect of human interaction is currently discussed by John Searle, Michael Bratman, Margaret Gilbert among others. Many of these approaches assume that collective agency and decision processes have features which cannot be explained just by referring to the intentional states of the individuals involved. Some philosophers even consider that there may be something like genuine group agents (List/Pettit) or plural agents (Helm). An important problem is, then, whether these shared intentions or weintentions are reducible to the personal intentions of the individuals involved in cooperative activity. Searle and others have argued that we-intentions are non-reducible in a strong sense of the term, while Bratman seems to be more open towards the idea that some sort of reduction is possible based on his planning theory of agency. According to Bratman, shared intentionality is to be described by the particular intentions of the agents involved in shared cooperative activity and the specifc way these intentional states semantically interlock. However, philosophers have so far focused mainly on small scale cases of shared intentional agency with only a few agents involved (Bratman). As Shapiro has suggested, it is still a desideratum to apply these ideas to cases of massively shared agency of virtual and actual multitudes involving many agents. This step is relevant because it is not at all clear whether the same sort of we-intentions involved in small-scale cooperative agency apply to larger systems as well. While two agents cooperating with each other face-to-face have the possibility of direct visual feedback and respective extrapolation of their particular mental states, it does not seem to be obvious that the performance of an orchestra, a soccer team or a demonstrating crowd can be coordinated in the same way. Recently, Barry Smith suggested that documents like a musical score coordinate and enable massively shared agency in large scale cases of cooperative agency. I want to argue not only that shared intentional agency is non-reducible to the intentional states of the agents involved in shared intentional agency, but also that it is not possible to explain cases of massively shared agency by referring to small scale cases of cooperative behavior.

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SIWING TSOI The University of Texas at Austin ivytsoi@utexas.edu Title: Two Kinds of Composite Agents Abstract: A composite agent is an acting subject constituted by multiple acting subjects. Paradigmatic examples include corporations, nonprofts, academic departments in universities, youth soccer teams, two people going for a walk together, three people moving a stone together, etc. Philosophers who believe that there are composite agents typically think that there can be a general account for all of them. For instance, Christian List and Philip Pettit believe that their theory of group agency accounts for (alleged) composite agents that are as different as Greenpeace and generation X. Margaret Gilbert believes that her theory about two people going for a walk together can be generalized to account for actions of a state. However, their assumption is problematic. Even the paradigmatic examples listed above do not naturally ft into one mold. Corporations, nonprofts, academic departments and youth soccer teams seem to fall under one category while two people going for a walk and three people moving a stone seem to fall under another one. In light of this division, I argue that there are two kinds of composite agent; each has a different criterion of individuation. The criteria that I am proposing are non-reductive, but I will argue that they are distinct: a composite agent can satisfy one of them without satisfying the other. One of these criteria is the Metaphysical Criterion (Met): Several agents constitute a composite agent CA and CA is a composite agent_(Met) if, and only if, 1.some relation(s) between members of CA defne their practical roles, 2. their actions can be regarded as realizing the functional roles of various information states (beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.) of CA when they act on the duties associated with the practical roles mentioned in 1, and 3. each member is aware that there are other member(s) who may act on the duties associated with their practical roles. A practical role is a relational property possessed by an individual agent. Some social relations are defned by duties (e.g. the hiring relation between an employer and an employee). What duties means here is entirely positivistic. The other criterion is the Normative Criterion (Norm): Several agents constitute a composite agent CA and CA is a composite agent_(Norm) if, and only if, there exists some consideration R and action such that 1. each member m of CA has or believes that she has R as her reason for _m-ing, where _ming is an action that may vary with m,

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2. CA -s, and CA -s if and only if some members _m-s, where -ing is an action distinct from any _m-ing, and 3. each member is aware that there are other member(s) who may act on R. A reason for action is a consideration that favors the performance of an action (type). It need not be something that actually motivates someone to act. I will give examples to illustrate how (Met) and (Norm) work. Then, I will give cases in which a composite agent satisfes (Met) without satisfying (Norm) and vice versa.

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