J

THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"

X

\

F.

INNOCENTIUS APAP,

O.P., S.T.M..

Censor Theol.
tnij)

imalur.

EDUS. CANONICUS SURMONT.
ViCARIUS Generalis.
WESTyoKASTEKll.

APPROBATIO ORDINIS,
J^itil ®bstit.

F. F.

RAPHAEL

MOSS.

O.P..

STL.

LEO MOORE.

O.P., S.T.L.

Empvimatur.
F.

BEDA JARRETT,

O.P.. S.T.L., A.M.,

Prior Provincialis Angu.b.
LOSDINJ, D,^ 7 Mar.ii. 10J2.

THE
oL^mivIA
ST.

THEOLOGICA
OF

THOMAS AQUINAS
PART
"^
I.

QQ. LXXV.— CII.
(4)

LITERALLY TRANSLATED BY

FATHERS OF THE ENGLISH DOMINICAN PROVINCE

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which.' because to translate into the language of one's country the immortal works of St. Prior Provincial of the English Dominican Province. Father. and earnestly prays that your task may have a successful result and produce abundant fruit. Thomas Aquinas. without doubt. R. And for myself I extend to you the right Iiand of fellowship. not only the method sacred of reasoning in truths. In token of his appreciation. Merry del Val. Card. Therefore. you have undertaken a task worthy of religious men worth). O. 2i\th. Yours devotedly. you have most wisely determined to your mother-tongue. in graciously accepting your gift. remain.LETTER FROM THE CARDINAL SECRETARY OF STATE.P. I say most wisely. but also the unfolding and elucidating most efficacious means of combating heresies. Reverend Father. with the assistance of your beloved brethren of the English Province. The Venerable Pontiff. . Rev. The Vatican. and to translate into ' afford those best who are desirous of obtaining it. To the Very Reverend Father Huynberl Everest. Dominic. he most lovingly imparts to you and your fellow-workers the — Apostolic Benediction. I am desired to inform you that the Holy Father has been pleased to express his gratitude on receiving from you the first volume of the Summa of St.. returns you most cordial thanks.of the sons of St. and thank you for the special volume of the translation which you presented I to me. Thomas is to give to its people a great treasure of human and Divine knowledge. February 1912.

St. will be acceptable even to the laity. Cormier. and ask the help of your prayers for the Order and for myself. how profitable for our guidance. May ! Fr. which are within the grasp of all. how salutary it is to the mind. but. 191 1. Thomas appeals to the light of reason. To the English Translators of the Suinma Thcologica Si. Dominic. and dear Fathers. for of the great doctor by his contemporaries is true for all time that everybody can gather fruit from his which.P. St. As a matter of fact. May zjsi. by reason of its diffusion and duration more fruitful than that preached by word of mouth. Thus it will be your work contribute to this end a sermon. CoLi. ' ' of Very Rev.. Thomas. you undertake a work which will bring profit the Church and honour to the Dominican Order. on the contrary. Roma. preached through the press.LETTER FROM THE MASTER-GENERAL OF THE FRIAR PREACHERS. in order to increase the merit of faith by making us adhere more firmly to His revelation. infinitely surpassing the reason of man. O. how joyful to the heart. . wliat was said — writings. and I hope. which is the Divine Reason. Master-General.uoio Angelico. Hyacinth M. St. I bless you in our Holy Father. not in order to weaken the ground of faith. For we see thereby how reasonable is our submission. to In translating into English the ^Mmjna Theologica of Thomas.

how the human soul KNOWS what ABOVE ITSELF - LXXXIX. •/ -... OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL - - - LXXVU. OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL XC. OF THE WILL LXXXIII. OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL sj - 55 75 LXXIX. XCII. OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING LXXXVI. APPETITIVE LXXXI. WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS LXXXVII. HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF ..CONTENTS TREATISE ON MAN QwEjTlON PAOL LXXV.- POWERS GENERAL 122 '-/ - - - I35 147 OF FRFC-WILL - - - - - - LXXXIV. OF Tin.!. OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN's SOUL THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN vii .. OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWKRS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL LXXVHI. CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE CONCfiRNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF THE SUUL -----: 3 22 LXXVI.-. OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY LXXXII. OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS IN - - - -91 - LXXX. is IN MATERIAL THINGS - 207 216 226 LXXXV... XCI. OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A AND IN THE FIRST PLAi' li. HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY INUKRSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH IT - 156 182 ^ LXXXV. XCIII.

GRACE AND RIGHTEOUSNESS I'ERTAINING THINGS MAN'S - WILL - XCVI. OF THE CONDITION RIGHTEOUSNESS CI.CONTENTS QUESTION viii PACK XCIV. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE C. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE -. IN - 316 THE STATE j)(..) XCIX.\RADISE - - - .. THE - PRIMITIVE STATE XCVIII.-. THE - MAN AS - 305 XCV.. OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS 355 360 364 CII.^^ .... XCVII. CODY - 3l5 ".. OF THE PRESERVATION - OK - INDIXIDL'AL - IN ..15.. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES ..----. OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST REGARDS HIS INinLLECT . OF man's ABODE WHICH IS P. OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN OK INNOCENCE --. OF TO THE FIRST NAMELY.

TREATISE ON MAN .

.

) says that three things are first to be — 04iej:alioa we thirdly. except in so far as the body has relation to the soul. of what belongs to the what belongs to its power. posed of a spiritual and of a corporeal substance. Concerning the first. but not in relation to the body. power. CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF : THE Having SOUL. and^ essence of the soul secondly. and secondly we now proceed spiritual and of the corporeal to treat of man. TREATISE ON MAN.) treated of the creature. OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE AND IN THE FIRST PLACE. Hence the object of our consideration will be the soul. is a body ? (2) Whether the (i) Whether the soul soul is the nature of the soul considered in itself. —essence. QUESTION LXXV. of found in spiritual substances shall treat first of . And since Dionysius {Ang. two points have first is be considered . who is com- We shall of his Now the theologian considers the nature of man origin. Hier. in relation to the soul.THE "SUMMA rHEOLOGIGA" FIRST PART. to what belongs to its operation. the the union of the soul with the body. treat first of the nature of man. xi. Under the human a subsistence? (3) Whether 3 the souls of brute . {In Seven Articles. the second is first head there are seven points of inquiry.

<x soul soul man composed composed o'f and body ? matter and form ? of soul (5) (6) Whether the Whether tlic is (7) incorruptible? species as an angel ? Whether the soul of the Same First Article. Therefore the soul is a mover moved. viii. it must be the cause of eternal. To seek the nature of the soul. But contact is only between bodies. the soul moves the body. Further.. what is not hot does not give heat. On the contrary. therefore. whether the soul is a body? We proceed Objection the soul is 1.* and those things which have no life. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA (4) '^ 4 animals are subsistent? is is is Whether the soul is man. between the mover and the moved there must be contact. unchanging movement. inasmuch as it does not occupy space by its bulk. Since. 2. . the soul were not a body. Therefore the soul is a body.. therefore. : • I. that the soul a body. we must premise that the soul is defined as the first principle of life for we call living things in those things which live animate. 6) that the soul is simple in comparison ii<ith the body. which is caused by the soul. Secondly. as we find proved Phys. Nor does move move because seemingly nothing can unless it is itself moved. inanimate. having a soul. because if there be anything that moves and is not moved. Further. since nothing gives what it has not. Obj. for instance. For it the moving principle of the body. vi. unless moved. Augustine says {De Trin. and this does not appear to be the case in the movement of an animal.e. it seems that the it soul must be a body. all knowledge is caused by means of a But there can be no likeness of a body to an likeness.. incorporeal thing. 75. AkT. But every mover moved is a body. I answer that. could not have knowledge of corporeal things. If. 3. thus to the First Article: It — is would seem First. 6. Obj.

for then the eye would be a soul. since to be moved is to pass from potentiality to actuality. to Now that it is owes some Therefore the soul. as the heart is a principle of life in an animal. For. This opinion can be proved to be false in many ways but we shall make use of only one based on universal and certain principles. viii. another kind of mover. But. inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. though a it is clear that to be a principle of life. It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul. though not moved essentially. that only bodies were real things is : . a process which cannot be prolonged indefinitely. as it is a principle of vision and the same might be applied to the other . which proof. does not I^elong to a body as such since. life. if that were the case. or to be a living thing. the mover gives what it has to the thing moved. but an act of a body. 75 Art. 6. The philosophers of knowledge and that what is not that the soul hence maintained corporeal nothing they is something corporeal. the principle of calefaction. ciple of which is not a body. we must allow that not every mover is moved. . i old. which. or accidentally and such a mover can cause an in\ ariable movement. Reply Obj. shows clearly that the soul is not a body. every body would be a living thing.. . however. yet nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life. but the act of a body th^is heat. there is a mover which is altogether immovable. . For call the soul. is moved accidentally and for this . as is shown in Phys. principle which is which is the first prin. There is. which we body may be a principle of life. is life. supposed that the principle of these actions was something corporeal : for they asserted Now life is shown principally by two and movement. is not a body. i.5 THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL actions. Now. or a principle of life. As everything which is in motion must be moved by something else. instruments of the soul : but it is the first principle of life. it as such a body. and not moved either essentially. Therefore a body is competent to be a living thing . or even a principle of actually such a body. called its act. not being able to rise above their imagination. Q.

2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " . but of that which is composed of soul Therefore the soul is not something subsistent. 75 Art. By the former a touched only by a body by the latter touched by an incorporeal thing. Hence it is necessary. to say that the soul feels or understands is . likeness of the thing is and known . thing necessity actually in the nature of the nature of the knower. For that which subsists is said to be is Now this particular thing this particular thing. for. And because the philosophers of old believed that nothing existed but bodies. everything subsistent operates. 4). but that there be a potentiality in the soul for such a likeness. Further. Obj. The a body. they maintained that every mover is moved and that the . 3. again. soul is moved directly. 6 reason it does not cause an invariable movement such a mover is the soul. body can be a body can be Second Article. another mover. but only potentially thus colour is not actually in the pupil of the eye. not that the likeness potentially. whether the human soul is something subsistent? proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection 1. It would seem that the human soul We — is not something subsistent. of quantity. of the soul. Reply Obj. is not of knower but given a which knows and afterwards knows thing potentially. and of power. of corporeal things should be actually in the nature of the soul. But the ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between actuality and potentiality. 2. the body. as the Philosopher says (De Anima i. . and so they held that the soul must be a body in order to have knowledge of a body and that it must be composed of the principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know .Q. Reply Obj. but only . 2. But the soul does not operate. the likeness of the known must be in the actually. which moves that body. said not and body. There is. all bodies. There are two kinds of contact. which is moved essentially^— namely. not actually.

i Therefore the soul not subsistent. it would Obj. It means that of a bodily likewise impossible for it to understand hy organ since the determinate nature of . its Now fore every body has it own determinate nature. — human intellect is not only incorporeal. if it the intellectual principle contained the would be unable to know all bodies. the liquid in the vase seems organ would impede knowledge of to be of that same colour.. nature of a body it.Art. tongue being vitiated by a feverish and bitter humour. not even that of understanding for the act of understanding does not talve place without a phantasm. but also in a glass vase. Further. On the contrary. because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of anything else. There- is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a is body. but it is also a something subsistent. that is. / answer that. 3. 75. which cannot exist apart from the body. x. . is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent. Thus we observe that a sick man's substance. But it has no operation apart from the body.e. are led astray through associating with the soul those things ivithoutwhich they are unable to think of any nature i. Now whatever knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature. Therefore the human soul is not something sub: sistent. It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul. is insensible to anything sweet. have some operation apart from the body. 7) Whoever understands that the nature of the soul is that of a : substance and not that of a body. For it is clear that by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. . will see that those who maintain the corporeal nature of the soul. Augustine says (De Trin.7 like THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL saying that the soul weaves or builds. imaginary Therefore the nature of the -pictures of corporeal things. and everything seems bitter to Therefore. is Q. if the soul were subsistent. all bodies as when a certain determinate colour is not only in the pupil of the eye.

as the eye sees We . We must conclude. fo. is something in: corporeal senses. opinion to understand is to be moved. words as expressing but the those who said that of opinion. as is clear from the context. Nevertheless.Q. as the human soul is a part of human nature. Reply Obj.Art. so that a hand can be called this particular thing ia the first sense. and not in the same that what is hot gives heat by its heat. it suffices it material form . for . nor part of anything In this sense. which is called the intellect or the mind. else. therefore. that the human soul. nor can it for that reason be said to operate per se. as being something subsistent. Aristotle wrote those not his own Or we may exists per se. as an accident or a even though it be part of something. . what is composed of bod}' and soul is said to be this called this particular thing. 2 THE " SUMM. particular thing. Hence the operation of the parts is through each For we say that man sees part attributed to the whole. does not give heat. which is neither inherent in the above sense. theJatter excludes also the imperfection of the part. . for that which subsists. but not in the second.~but not tn-the second. sometimes that reply that to operate per se belongs to what But for a thing to exist per se. and is complete in a specific nature.A THEOLOGICA " 8 Tlierefore the intellectual principle which we' call the mind or the intellect has an operation per se apart from the body. but that what is hot gives heat. Firstly. Therefore. Now only that which subsists can have an operation per se. For nothing can operate but what is actual wherefore a thing operates according as it is. 75. may therefore say that tlie soul understands. i. The former sense excludes the inherence of an accident or of a ijiaterial form. and feels sense as when we say with the hand. that is rightly said to subsist per se. 2. for which reason we do not say that heat imparts heat. for in this sense. heat. This particular thing can be taken in two anything subsistent secondly. be not inherent. subsist per se wil. it can indeed be Reply Obj. strictly speaking.h the eye. and subsistent. in the first sense. the eye or the hand cannot be said to .

75. apprehends intelligible objects. It would seem that the souls of brute animals are subsistent. body prove the intellect to be non-subsistent otherwise it would follow that an animal is non-subsistent. apart . 3 but more correct to say that man understands through the soul. apart from the body. Dogm. for the phantasm is to the intellect what colour "is to the sight. and. Is (xvi. follows that they are subsistent just as the human inteltive faculty. since the souls of brute animals are sensitive. the soul of man is subsistent. xvii. We — Obj. 2). On the contrary. Third Article. Therefore the sensi- from the body. Neither does such a dependence on the . not as its organ of action. it Therefore. The body is necessary for the action of the intellect. since it requires external objects of the senses in order to perform its act of perception. and referred both to a sistent soul: .. whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent? proceed thus to the Third Article: Objection i. but is moved. I Man alone we believe to have a sub- whereas the souls of animals are not subsistent. as we have just shown (A. But the body Further.) : what is written in the Book De Eccl. lectual soul is subsistent. but on the part of the object. The ancient philosophers made no distinction between sense and intellect. the soul of brute animals moves the is not a mover. perceives sensible objects. Reply Obj. body. There- fore the soul of brute animals has an operation apart from the body.9 THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL it is g. But the intellect.Art. the relation of the sensitive faculty to sensible objects is like the relation of the intellectual faculty to intelligible objects. 2. For man is of the same genus as other animals. Therefore the souls of other animals are subsistent. answer that. 3. 3. Further. Obj.

the pupil of the eye is affected and so with the other senses. maintaining that sensing. this result is accidental. excessive strength of the sensible corrupts sense that never occurs in the case of the intellect. But Aristotle held that of the understanding alone is performed without a corporeal organ. Wherefore we conclude that as the souls of brute animals have no per se operations they are not subsistent. I. in the process of intellectual operation the body intellect requires the weary. sensation and the consequent operations of the sensitive soul are evidently accompanied with change in the body thus in . From this it follows that even the souls df brute animals are subsistent. drew a distinction between intellect and sense he referred both to an incorporeal principle. is If. Reply Obj. Reply Obj. he is of a different species. 2. the sense is inasmuch as the impression of the object on accompanied with change in the body.Q. the appetitive power. The operation of . as has been said (A. Plato. however. Motive power is of two kinds. no corporeal principle. Reply Obj. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " . belongs to the soul as such. The relation of the sensitive faculty to the is in sensible object one way the same as that of the intel- Jectual faculty to the intelligible object. One. and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to the composite. in so far as each is in potentiality to its object. the act of vision. Although man is of the same genus as Specific differ. operations of the soul. 75. other animals. But in another way their rela- tions differ. For the operation of anything follows is clear that the sensitive soul has per se operation of its the mode of its being. On the other hand. intellect that a thing For an — is understands the highest of intelligible objects more able afterwards to understand those that are lower. flexion of colour : by a reit Hence no own. inasmuch as the operation of the sensitive powers in 3. just as understanding. the production of the phantasms. ence is derived from the difference of form nor does every difference of form necessarily imply a diversity of genus. howyet ever. commands motion. so that . Art. i).

II

THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL
power
in the sensitive soul

Q. 7S- Art. 4

is not apart from the body and passions of a like nature are accompanied by a change in the body. The other motive power is that which executes motion in adapting the members for obeying the appetite; and the act of this power does not consist in moving, but in being moved. Whence it is clear

this

;

for anger, joy,

that to

move

is

not an act of the sensitive soul without the

body.

pouRTH Article. WHETHER THE SOUL IS MAN?
/

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: Objection 1. It would seem that the soul is man. For it is written (2 Cor. iv. 16) Though our outward man is corinward man the is renewed day by day. But rupted, yet is man is the soul. Therefore the soul within that which is the inward man. Obj. 2. Further, the human soul is a substance. But it Therefore it is a particular is not a universal substance. substance. Therefore it is a hypostasis or a person and it can only be a human person. Therefore the soul is man;
: ;

We

for a

human

person

is

a

man.

the contrary, Augustine {De Civ. Dei xix. 3) commends Varro as holding that man is not a mere soul, nor a mere body; but bo'.h soul and body. I

On

taken

answer that, The assertion, the soul is man, can be in two senses. First, that man is a soul; though this

man, Socrates, for instance, is not a soul, but composed of soul and body. I say this, forasmuch as some held that the form alone belongs to the species while matter is part of the individual, and not of the species. This cannot be true for to the nature of the species belongs what the definition signifies; and in natural things the definition does not signify the form only, but tlie form and
particular
;

;

Hence in natural things the matter is part of the species not, indeed, signate matter, which is the For of principle individuality but the common matter.
the matter.
; ;

as

it

belongs

,to

the notion of this particular

man

to be

Q.7SAET.4

THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA "
of this soul, of this flesh, to the notion of man
;

12

composed
so
it

belongs

soul, flesh, and bones to the substance of all

of these bones; be composed of for whatever belongs in common the individuals contained under
to

and

a given species, must belong also to the substance of the
species.
It

this

may also be understood man and this could be
; ;

in this sense, that this soul is

held

if

it

were supposed that

the operation of the sensitive soul were proper to it, apart from the body because in that case all the operations which are attributed to man would belong to the soul only
;

and whatever performs
is

that thing

;

the operations proper to a thing, wherefore that which performs the operations

But it has been shown above (A. 3) that not the operation of the soul only. Since, then, sensation is an operation of man, but not proper to him, it is clear that man is not a soul only, but something composed of soul and body. Plato, through supposing that sensation was proper to the soul, could maintain man
of a
is

man

man.

sensation

is

be a soul making use of the body. Reply Obj. 1. According to the Philosopher {Ethic, ix. thus 8), a thing seems to be chiefly what is principle in it
to
;

what the governor of a state does, the state is said to do. In this way sometimes what is principle in man is said to be man sometimes, indeed, the intellectual part which, in accordance with truth, is called the inward man and some;
;

times the sensitive part with the body is called opinion of those whose observation does not go
senses.

man

in the

beyond the

Reply Obj.
tasis

is called the outward man. Not every particular substance is a hyposor a person, but that which has the complete nature

And

this
2.

of

its

species.

Hence

a hand, or a foot,
;

is

not called a

nor, likewise, is the soul alone hvpostasis, or a person so called, since it is a part of the human species.

13

THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL
Fifth Article.

Q.

t.'^-

Avt^

whether the soul

is

composed of matter and FORM ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:— Objection i. It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and form. For potentiality is opposed to actuality.
are in actuality participate of the First Act, which is God all by participation of are are and are as is things good, beings, living things, clear from the teaching of Dionysius (Div. Nom. v.).
;

Now, whatsoever things

Whom,

Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality participate of the first potentiality. But the first potentiality is primary matter. Therefore, since the human soul is, after a manner, in potentiality which appears from the fact that sometimes a man is potentially understanding; it seems that the human
;

must participate of primary matter, as a part of itself. Obj. 2. Further, wherever the properties of matter are But the properties of matter are found, there matter is. in the soul found namely, to be a subject, and to be changed; for it is subject to science, and virtue; and it changes from ignorance to knenvledge and from vice to
soul

Therefore matter is in the soul. Obj. 3. Further, things which have no matter, have no as the cause of their existence, Philosopher says has a cause of viii. vii. But the soul 6). (Did. Metaph. Therefore the its existence, since it is created by God.
virtue.

soul has matter.

Obj. 4. Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, a pure act, and is infinite. But this belongs to God alone. Therefore the soul has matter. On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii. 7, 8, 9)
is

proves that the soul was nor of spiritual matter.
/

made

neither of corporeal matter,

answer

that.

this question in in general; for

The soul has no matter. We may consider two ways. First, from the notion of a soiil it belongs to the notion of a soul to be the

Q.

75.

Art. 5

THE

"

SUMMA THEOLOGICA "
either
it is

14
itself,

form of a body.

Now,

a form by virtue of

impossible any part of it should be matter, if by matter we understand something purely potential for a form, as such, is an act and that which is purely potential cannot be part of an act,
:

in its entirety, or by virtue of some If part of itself. virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is that

by

;

since potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto. If, however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that part the soul and that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the primary animate.
:

Secondly, we

may proceed from
it

human

soul,

inasmuch as
is

is

the specific notion of the intellectual. For it is clear
is

that whatever

received into something

received accord-

ing to the condition of the recipient. in as far as its form is in the knower.

Now a
:

thing

is

known

But the

intellectual

soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely for instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and therefore the

form of a stone absolutely, as
in

the intellectual soul.

to its proper formal idea, is Therefore the intellectual soul

itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and form. For if the intellectual soul were

of matter into
it

composed and form, the forms of things would be received as individuals, and so it would only know the indi;

every substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form. Reply Obj. i. The First Act is the universal principle of all acts; because It is infinite, virtually precontaining all Wherefore things, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v.). things participate of It not as a part of themselves, but bv
diffusion of Its processions.
tive of act,
it

just as it happens with the sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ since matter is the which forms are individualized. It follows, principle by the that intellectual and therefore, intellectual soul,
:

vidual

Now

as potentiality

is

recep-

must be proportionate to act. But the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite Act, and are
participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot be one potentiality which receives all acts, as there is one act.

15

[THE

ESSENCE OF THE SOUL
;

Q.

75-

Art. 5

participated acts are derived for then the receptive potentiality would equal the active potentiality of the Eirst Act. Now the receptive potentiality in the intelall
is other than the receptive potentiality of first as matter, appears from the diversity of the things received each. For primary matter receives individual forms; by

from which

lectual soul

whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms. Hence the existence of such a potentiality in the intellectual soul does not prove that the soul is composed of matter and
form.

Reply Obj. 2. To be a subject and to matter by reason of its being

to in

be changed belong As, potentiality.

and the
is

therefore, the potentiality of the intelligence is one thing potentiality of primary matter another, so in each

there a different reason of subjection
is

the intelligence

subject to knowledge,

and change. For and is changed
its

from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of

being

in

potentiality with regard to the intelligible species. Reply Obj. 3. The form causes matter to be, and so does

as

the agent wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far it actualizes it by transmuting it to the act of a form.
;

A

however, does not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a cause transmuting it
subsistent form,

from potentiality to act. So after the words quoted above, the Philosopher concludes, that in things composed of matter and form there is no other cause but that which

moves jrom

potentiality

to

act; while whatsoever things
is

have no matter are simply beings at once* Reply Obj. 4. Everything participated

compared

to

the participator as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to subsist per se, must have existence by partici-

pation

;

for

even

life,

or anything of that sort,

is

a parv.).

ticipator of existence, as

Dionysius says {Div.

Nom.

participated existence is limited by the capacity of the is His own existence, participator; so that God alone,

Now

Who

• The Leonine edition has, simpliciier sunt quod vere eniia aliquid. The Parma edition of S. Thomas's Commentary on Aristotle has, statim

per

se

unum quiddam

est

,

,

,

et

ens quiddam.

Q. 75- Art. 6
is

THE

"

SUMMA THEOLOGICA "

i6

there

But in intellectual substances, pure act and infinite. is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and form, but of form and participated
that

Wherefore some say that they are composed of whereby they are and that which they are; for existence itself is that by which a thing is.
existence.

SIXTH Article.

WHETHER THE HUMAN SOUL

IS

INCORRUPTIBLE?

proceed thus to the Sixth Article: Objection i. It would seem that the human soul is corruptible. For those things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have a like end. But the beginning, by
generation, of men is like that of animals, for they are made from the earth. And the process of life is alike in both; because all things breathe alike, and man hath

We

nothing more than the beast, as

it is

written (Eccles.

iii.

19).

Therefore, as the same text concludes, the death of beast is one, and the condition of both is equal.
souls of brute animals are corruptible. human soul is corruptible.

man and
But the

Therefore, also, the

Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to nothingness; because the end should correspond to the

Obj.

2.

beginning. But as it is written (Wisd. ii. 2), We are born of nothing; which is true, not only of the body, but also of the soul. Therefore, as is concluded in the same passage. After this we shall be as if we had not been, even as to our soul. Obj. 3. Further, nothing is without its own proper operation. But the operation proper to the soul, which is to understand through a phantasm, cannot be without the body. For the soul understands nothing without a phantasm and there is no phantasm without the body as the Philosopher says (De Anima i. i). Therefore the soul
;

cannot survive the dissolution of the body. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv.) that human souls owe to Divine goodness that they are intel-

17
lectual,
life.

THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL
and
that

Q. 75- Art. 6

they have an incorruptible substantial

answer that, We must assert that the intellectual principle which we call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted in two ways per se and
I

,

impossible for any substance to be accidentally or corrupted .accidentally, that is, by the generagenerated tion or corriipiion of something else. For generation and
.

Now

it

is

corruption belong to a thing, just as existence belongs to

it,

acquired by generation and lost by corruption. Therefore, whatever has existence per s£ cannot be generated or corrupted except per se ; while things which

which

is

do not
acquire

subsist,

such as accidents and material
or
lose
it

forms,

through the generation or corruption of composite things. Now it was shown above (A .A. 2, 3) that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human soul is so that the souls of brutes are
existence
;

while the corrupted, when their bodies are corrupted human soul could not be corrupted unless it were corrupted
;

per se.

This, indeed,

is

impossible, not only as regards the

human
a form

soul, but also as regards anything subsistent that is alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing

by virtue
belongs
the form

of itself

is

inseparable from
is

it;

but existence

to a form,

Wherefore
;

by virtue of itself. matter acquires actual existence as it acquires while it is corrupted so far as the form is
act,

which

an

it. But it is impossible for a form to be from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a separated subsistent form to cease to exist. Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and form, as some pretend, we should nevertheless have to maintain that it is incorruptible. For corruption is found only where there is contrariety since generation and corruption are from contraries and into contraries. Wherefore the heavenly bodies, since they have no matter subject to Now there can be no concontrariety, are incorruptible.
;

separated from

trariety in the intellectual soul; for it receives according to the manner of its existence, and those things which it
1.

4

2

Therefore every intellectual substance is incorruptible. iii. 7) it is concluded (Before) the dust return into its earth from whence it was. we do not imply in the creature a potentiality to non- As Who . 2. process 2). it is Let the earth bring forth the written as to other animals But it is made not true of the soul. 24) And ii. Therefore it is impossible be corruptible. concerning which it of life process Who written (Eccles. 75. : whereas animals are not. but not as to the soul. of the Creator. so that everything that has an intellect naturally desires always to exist. to Now. : and is the spirit return to God gave it. not of a passive potentiality. Again the is alike as to the body. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " . since contraries for the intellectual soul to belong to the same knowledge. for is not alike of the soul man is intelligent. The breath in our nostrils . Reply Obj. except under the conditions of here and now.Art. has nothing more than Reply Obj. so when we say that a thing can be reduced to nothing. i8 contraries are for the notions even of receives are without contrariety not themselves contrary. alike as to the body. desire ensues upon knowledge. The senses indeed do not know existence. Moreover we this from a of the fact that everything take may sign existence after its own manner. i. but only of the active potentiality can produce something out of nothing. Therefore the saying that man and animals have a like beginning in generation of earth. is true of the body . 7) that He breathed into his face the breath of life. whereas the intellect apprehends existence absolutely. for all animals alike are For the souls produced by some power of the body whereas the human soul is produced by God. and for all time. living soul (Gen. and But the is smoke. a thing can be created by reason. naturally aspires in things that have knowledge. : while of man it is written {ibid. as expressed in the words of Wisd. To signify this.Q. All things breathe alike. But a natural desire cannot be in vain. i. ii. 19) : (Wisd. ii. Hence it is false to say Man Thus death comes to both beasts. : so in the last chapter of Ecclesiastes (xii. Solomon reasons thus in the person of the foolish. of brutes are .

To understand through a phantasm its union with the of virtue the soul of by proper operation it will have another body. Nam. the contrary. It would seem that the soul is of the is ordained to its each For an as thing angel. We — — Therefore they are of the same species. Further. since. as will appear later on (Q. But there is nothing nobler either in an angel or in the soul than their intellectual nature. Obj. A. Angelic their knownot blessed and gathering intelligence. But a thing is said to be corruptible because there a potentiality to non-existence. After separation from the body mode of understanding. 75. the body is outside the essence of the soul. whether the soul is of the same species as an ANGEL ? proceed thtis to the Seventh Article: same Objection i. 7 of ceasing to susexistence. things from ledge of . Therefore the soul and an : therefore angel are of the same species.Art.).. but in the Creator the power tain existence. it seems that the soul does not as But from an angel except in its union with the body. vii. of the soul is the end the But end. Therefore the soul and the angel agree in the ultimate specific difference they belong to the same species. the uUimate specific difference is the noblest. But tions of the soul and of an angel are different. because it completes the nature of the species. 2. differ Obj. i). LXXXIX. it seems that it does not belong to its species. 3. species whence is derived proper end by the nature of its species. is the Reply Obj. 3. same as angel namely.19 THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL Q. Things which have different natural the natural operaoperations are of different species. for that inclination its eternal an of that happiness. Seventh Article. similar to other substances separated is in it from bodies. simple visible Divine Subsequently things. as On minds have Dionysius says {Div. Further.

as they are not composed of matter and form. So that it is not possible : for the angel and the soul to be of the it is that there can be many souls of same i). LXXVL. whiteness to exist. because. because differences which divide a genus are contrary to one another. 20 he says the contrary to this of the soul. ix. The same would follow if the aforesaid substances were and form. however. such as an angel and the soul. For if composed of matter the matter of one be distinct from the it matter of another. and even then there would result a difference of or else the matter is the species and inequality of nature But one matter principle of the distinction of forms. For a separate form cannot be understood otherwise than as one of a single species thus. A. it is clear that there is necessarily among them a diversity in species. since the principle of contrariety is habit. thus in species of colours one is more perfect than another and the same applies to other species. Therefore the soul and an angel / are not of the Origen {Peri Archon iii. ad . (Did.. cannot be distinct from another. and privation thereof. Contraries. is always accompanied with a diversity of nature. 2. and this because he supposed that in these substances the difference of degree was accidental. 2). which has no place in these incorporeal substances. 5) held that and angels are all of the same species.Art. for in incorporeal substances there cannot be diversity of number without diversity of species and this inequality of nature.Q. But that. that relation to divers is forms. x. A. except by a distinction of quantity. as resulting from their free-will as we have seen above (O. supposing a separate . Melaph. but are subsistent forms. follows that either the form principle of the distinction of matter the matter is distinct on account of — that its is the to say. as is written. XLVII. are comto one another as the pared perfect to the imperfect. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " same species. 4). How will one species be explained later (Q. But diversity of species . whiteness does not that subject. species. 75. answer human souls : cannot be. it could only be one forasmuch as one differ from another except as in this or .

not the soul alone. Hence. however. Eternal happiness is the ultimate and supernatural end. as actuality is nobler than potentiality. in the same way as the sensible faculty is common to many degrees in the sensible nature. is endowed with a grade of intellectusoul that the proves alitv inferior to that of an angel. so neither are species.75. the intellectual faculty is not the noblest. as all sensible things are not of one species. Reply Obj. because it is indeterminate and common to many degrees of intellectuality . And the very fact that . . 7 Reply Obj. the soul in a certain way requires the body for its operation. who is not united to a body. The body is not of the essence of the soul but the soul by the nature of its essence can be united to the body. i.Art. ultimate specific difference is the the most determinate. but the composite. This argument proceeds from the proximate and natural end. all intellectual things of one Reply Obj.21 THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL 0. is the species. properly speaking. it The is noblest because Thus. 2. so that. 3.

and that it is not the act of any body.) We as now consider the union of the soul with the body this . For the Philosopher says 1 . 4) that the intellect is separate. Therefore if the intellect were united to the body as its . (In Eight Articles. otherwise no proportion would be required between matter and form. OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL. Further. We — {De Anima iii. its form. and concerning (i) Whether the its there are eight poinds for inquiry : intellectual principle is united to the body (2) form ? Whether the intellectual to the ? principle is . multiplied numerically according or is there one intelligence for all men number of bodies (3) Whether in the body the form of which is an intellectual principle. Therefore it is not united to the body as Obj. whether the intellectual body as principle its is united to the form ? proceed thus to the First Article: It seems that the intellectual principle is not Objection united to the body as its form. there is some other soul ? (4) Whether in the body there is any other substantial form ? (5) Of the qualities required in body of which the intellectual principle is the form ? Whether it be united to such a body by means of another body ? (7) Whether by means of an accident ? (8) Whether the soul is wholly in each part of the body ? the (6) First Article. 2. every form is determined according to the natuie of the matter of which it is the form.QUESTION LXXVI.

universal objects. . whatever receptive power is an act of a body. intellect received must be received according to the condition of the receiver.. Obj. not by any accidental quality. 2). LXXV. Art. 5. Further. But the intellectual action not the action of from above (Q. is have the same suband does. but only of individuals. like the senses. is not united to the body as its Obj. 6.23 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q. intellectual LXXV. But virtue or cannot be more abstract or more simple than the power essence from which the faculty or power is derived. as was said Therefore it is not united to the and . Further. LXXV.3 6.. a. but rather immaterially and universally otherwise the intellect would not be capable of the knowledge of immaterial and : Therefore the Obj. ject . body as its form*. body. subsistent. would not be capable of knowing all things. trary to the nature of the intellect. but by own essence otherwise matter and form would not make a thing substantially one. 2). whatever has per se existence is not united to the body as its form because a form is that by which a thing exists so that the very existence of a form . But to be united to matter to the form belongs by reason of its nature. intellect is not united to the bodv as its form. But the form of the thing understood is not is received into the intellect materially and individually. act. as is clear from what has been said (Q. whatever exists in a thing by reason of its nature exists in it always.. Obj. Therefore a form cannot be without its own proper matter. it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature and thus. A. is But the intellectual above (Q. 4. Therefore neither is faculty a the substance of the intellect the form of a body. because form the act of matter. Further. i form. Further. 3. : does not belong to the form by principle has per se existence itself. receives a form materially and individually for what . But is its . A. but only accidentally one. as appears Therefore neither is the power of the body. A. Therefore the form. 2) which is conit . power and action for the same subject is what can. since every body has a determinate nature.

is the form of the body. LXXV. shown above (O. difference is derived from the form. after the dissolution of the body.. This is the demonstration used by Aristotle (De Aniina ii. And as life action of understanding is the action of this particular man for each one is conscious that it is himself who understands. clear from the Philosopher {Phys. According to the Philosopher. as a man sees by his eye. which is account of his intellectual principle. Art. A. applied Therefore the intellectual principle is the form of man. But the difference which constitutes to man is rational. 6). Therefore the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form. the contrary. primarily understand. (Did. 76. sensation. whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul. vii. 2). that whereby operations we primarily perform each of all these vital actions is the soul. 2). as a physician heals. as was remains separate from the body. Now . that of the soul. in act reason is because nothing acts except so wherefore a thing acts by that whereby it clear that the first thing by which the appears through various body in different of degrees living things. The . since is incorruptible. and knowledge is a form instance. Metaph. because as is . . for instance. For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment. far as it is . i) for a thing is said to move or act. I is man on that. On viii. and likewise of our Therefore this principle by which we understanding. For that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be attributed for whereby a body is primarily healed is health. answer We must assert that the intellect is the principle of intellectual operation which form the of the : human body. or through an accidental quality. it is Now lives is the soul. i THE " SU.MMA THEOLOGICA it " 24 the intellectual principle. and that whereby the soul knows primarily is knowledge hence health is a form of the body. as when we say that something that is white builds. v. either by virtue of its whole self. an action may be attributed to anyone in three ways.Q. or by virtue of a part. and local movement. But if anyone say that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body he must first explain how it is that this is in act.

: Therefore. it does not follow that Socrates. in the possible intellect. in whom are the phantasms. 7. 5. and that he senses. and hence that the intellect and body form one thing so that the act of the . 4). We must therefore say either that Socrates understands by virtue of his whole self. as he says De Anima iii. A. it is clear that this is not attributed to him accidentally since it is ascribed to . . however. from the fact that the species of phantasms are in the possible intellect. the images of which are in the sight. but that he or his phantasms are understood. as was shown above (Q. for this reason. him as man. Art. the intelligible species the possible of this or that particular man.. it is clear that because Now the colours. are on a for wall. intellect is linked to the Thus through body that the act of the intellect is the act of Socrates.25 it is UNION OF BODY AND SOUL accidental to the builder to be white. For the relation of phantasms to is like the relation of colours to the sense of Therefore. LXXV. an intellectual soul first as Plato maintained. species of phantasms in the possible intellect. i So when we say that Socrates or Plato understands. 76. Q. : so that in some way it is united to the body of Socrates. Some. But one cannot sense without a body therefore the body must be some part of man. It follows therefore that the intellect by which Socrates understands is a part of Socrates. from which Aristotle proceeds to consider things the intellect relating to the intellect. tried to maintain that the intellect is united to the body as its motor. This can be clearly seen from comparison with the sensitive faculty. holding that man is or that intelligence is a part of Socrates. and in the phantasms which are in the corporeal organs. But this link or union does not sufficiently explain the fact. as the sight. that it is one and the same man who is conscious both that he understands. The cannot stand. understands. the action of seeing is not attributed to the wall we do not say that the wall sees. The Commentator held that this union is through the in- telligible species. as having a double subject. of colours in the are so are the species sight. but rather that it is seen. which is predicated of him essentially.

except as to an instrument as the action of a carpenter to a saw. 4). and consequently neither a being absolutely. he is moved by his intellect because he understands. and still the intellect be united to those other things only as a motor. it follows that Socrates is not one absolutely. Therefore if understanding is attributed to Socrates. 26 intellect could be attributed absurd for many reasons. although the action of a part be attributed to the whole. attributed to Socrates for the cannot be understanding his intellect. Secondly. Socrates be a whole composed of a union of the intellect with whatever else belongs to Socrates. the action of the intellect cannot be attributed to Socrates. This is. it follows that it must be outside the essence. 76. because. Art. The reason therefore why Socrates understands is not because he is moved by his intellect. therefore. whole. because. as the action of tributed to what moves him. for a thing is a being according as it is one. if the intellect be not the form. except perhaps indirectly for we do not say that the hand sees . If. reason that he is moved by is the action of a motor . This is contrary is at- to the teaching of the Philosopher. since Socrates is an individual in a nature of one essence composed of matter and form. Therefore if the intellect and Socrates are united in the above manner. Therefore the action of as does the action of heating. it follows that it him as to an instrument. that There remains. Thus . because the intellect does not move of ment the body except through the appetite. . I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " to the First.Q. who holds that understanding is not possible through a corporeal instrument (De A7iima iii. however. the movewhich presupposes the operation of the intellect. as the action of the eye is attributed to a man yet it is never attributed to another part. however. no other explanation than that this particular is man under- stands. Whereas the act of intellect remains in the agent. but rather. Thirdly. contrariwise. because never attributed to the thing moved. Fourthly. and then the intellect is to the whole Socrates as a motor to the thing moved. — given by Aristotle namely. because the eye sees. and does not pass into something else. because the intellectual principle his form.

and the sensitive soul excels the vegetative soul. This power is called the intellect.. i. x. another operation not caused by its elemental qualities. potentiality. 5). ii. properly belonging to Man must consist in this operation as therefore derive his this operation. to which the consideration of the directed is natural philosopher is indeed separate. an Reply Obj.27 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL intellect it is Q. and the more it excels matter by its power and its operation hence we find that the form of a mixed body has . it would follow that in no way could form is For since the in is and matter act. the more we find that the power of the form excels the elementhe tary matter as the vegetative soul excels the form of . that which only is composed of matter and form cannot be the form of another by virtue of itself as a whole. metal. As the ultimate natural form the Philosopher says {Phys. to Now .76ART. Wherefore it excels corporeal matter in its power by the fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has no share whatever. species from that which is the principle of But the species of anything is derived from its form. It follows therefore that the intellectual principle is the proper form of man. i from the very operation of the is made clear that united to the body as its form. But we must observe that the nobler a form is. 7) that the all ultimate happiness of man must him. of each thing the proper operation of is shown by as man man other understand animals. Whence because he thereby surpasses Aristotle concludes {Ethic. and that of which it is the form we call the primary animate. the soul be the form of the body. It is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul is composed of matter and form. 2). And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms. Now the human soul is the highest and noblest of forms. LXXV. as was said above (Q. the less it is merged in it matter. But if it is a form by virtue of some part of itself. For the nature operation. A. then that part which is the form we call the soul. the more rises above corporeal matter. yet it . the intellectual principle The same can be clearly shown from the nature of the human its is species.

tion. 5. For this reason the human soul retains its own it existence after the dissolution of the body . This is not the case with other non-subsistent forms. out of which and . when removed from its proper meanwhile an aptitude and an inclination ing remains place. He man and the sun generate man from matter. From this it is clear how to answer the Second and Third objections : since. because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ. 6. to which power belongs.) {De of separate. and the term Philosopher says human generation. intellectual power does not belong to a corporeal organ. in order that man may be able to under- stand things by means of his intellect. as the power of seeing is the act of the eye. separate because the is But this it exists in matter so far as is the soul itself. as it belongs to a light body by reason of itself to be raised up. it is sufficient that the intellectual power be not the act ot all the body. It indeed according to its intellectual power. To be united to the body belongs to the soul by reason of itself. Reply Obj. which it subsists The form of the body. like the act of seeing. by reason of its perfec- not a form merged in matter. 76. And so the that the intellect is Anima iii. or entirely embraced matter. soul communicates that existence in the corporeal matter. place. for understanding is an act which cannot be performed by a corporeal organ. Art. And as a light body light. Therefore there is nothing to prevent some by thereof not being the act of the body. although the power soul is essentially the to Reply Obj. so the . having an aptitude and a natural separated inclination to be united to the body. the intellectual soul there results unity of existence so that the existence of the whole composite is also the existence of the soul. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " proves this from the fact that 28 exists in matter.Q. and that his intellect may understand immaterial things and universals. Reply Obj. retainfor its proper human soul retains its proper existence when from the body. whereas is not so with other forms. the form of the body. is 4. The human soul.

Now whatever is received into anything must be received according to the condition of the receiver. what is understood by me must be distinct from what is understood by you and consequently it will be reckoned as something individual. LXXV. and so is yours. If. the thing understood is in the intellect which understands. and the also into yours intellect which which knows : Obj. 2 whether the intellectual principle is multiplied according to the number of bodies ? proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection i. But all men are of one species. since from things . 5). as was shown above (Q. my intellect is an individual. but For an immaterial that there is one intellect in all men. since it is not composed of matter and form. Further. . the number of souls would not remain but from all the souls tliere would be Ijut a single remainder. if my intellect is distinct from your intellect. It would seem that the intellectual principle is not multiplied according to the number of bodies. 2. is contrary to the nature of universals. But the human soul is an immaterial substance. Therefore there is but one intellect in all men. Therefore there are not many human souls in one species. 4. .. therefore. Art. and be only potenti. Obj. Q. if human souls were multiplied according to the number of bodies. We — individually into my intellect. A. for individuals are things which differ in number but agree in one species. Obj. Therefore the species of things would be received . ally will something understood so that the common intention have to be abstracted from both. This is heretical for it would do away with the distinction of rewards and punishments. 76. when the cause is removed. Further. the effect is also removed. it follows that the bodies being removed. Therefore. my intellect is distinct from yours. 3.ig UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Second Article. Further. substance is not multiplied in number within one species.

The distinction between Socrates and Plato would be no other than that of one man with a tunic and another with a cloak which is quite absurd. . 6. // / Obj. says : Augustine (De Quant. man is the intellect itself. This is clear if. to . But it is imthat in should a soul. for then the intellect It to be distinct from the imagination. active form. therefore. belong to animals of different species. because then also when knowledge would be an is clearly false. that the same indi- vidual knowledge which is in the master is communicated to the disciple which cannot be. 2). except by something outside the essence of each. as Plato maintained. Therefore it is impossible that On one individual individuals. one possible species. such as heat is. according to the opinion of Aristotle {De Anima ii.Q. The Philosopher says {Phys. 76. to all men. 30 diverse something intelligible common to them may be abstracted. from the master. there is one intellect in seems. Further. the same applies in both. to follow that all the disciple receives knowledge Obj. For it would follow that Socrates and Plato are one man and that they are not distinct from each other. It is absolutely impossible for one intellect belong to all men. and. I should laugh at myself. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " would seem not men. therefore. therefore. it cannot be said that the master's knowledge begets knowledge in the disciple. is impossible if. Further. which It seems. unless there is one intellect . Animce say that there are intellect. ii. Art. chiefly on account of the intellect of all But the soul seems to be one Therefore there is one men.) souls. 3) that the relation of universal causes to universals is like the relation of particular causes to individuals. the contrary. the intellect of the disciple and master is but one. it is supposed that the intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is It is likewise clear that this . were to many human xxxii. But this is contrary to the nature of the intellect . 5. I intellectual soul should belong to several answer that. consequently. Seemingly.

If. we can say . we example. would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action from yours by the distinction of the phantasms that is to say. there will be one who touches.31 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL man. But if eye. but one sight. supposing there agent. but several actions as when one man touches several things with his two hands. is. however. Art. and another in you if the phantasm itself. it — — . and one instrument. there is one intellect. many drawing a ship by means of a rope. as when the smith strikes with one hammer. all for the sensitive the other things which appertain to man powers obey the intellect. 2 the form of is impossible for many distinct individuals to have one form. as to the manner it is this is clearly impossible. is one printhat there is one agent absolutely. is lect itself. on the contrary. for instance. "we suppose one instrument and several principal agents. if we suppose two men to have several and one sense. there will be many drawing. If. For it Q. there is one striker and one stroke. the intellect has the precedence of service. intellects — — not affected by any organ other than the intelwill further follow that there is but one agent and one action : that is to say that all men are but one intellect. Now it is clear that no matter how the intellect is united or coupled to this or that man. as it is in regard. but two contacts. in no way is it possible to say that Socrates and Plato are otherwise than one understanding man. if there be say that there is one agent and one action. And if to this we add that to understand. no matter how diverse may be all those things of which the intellect makes use as instruments. and two instruments. but one pull. it " understander. for the form is the principle of existence. of one intelligible object. as it is impossible for them to have one existence. whatever one may hold of the union of the intellect to this or that man. which is the act of the Therefore. but one act for . were there one phantasm of a stone in me. we might say that there are several agents. Again. that However. and are at its ." and have but one act of understanding. cipal For manifest that. if two men had one there would be several seers. there is one principal agent. 76.

Q. is is the intelligible species abstracted from a form. by virtue of its very being. 3. notwith- standing the diversity of phantasms. does not exclude the understanding of universals otherwise. the diversity of phantasms which are in this one and that one would not cause a diversity of intellectual operation in this man and that man. yet. 2 THE in . has no matter from which form of a certain matter. consequently we must judge of the multiNow it is plicity of a thing as we judge of its being. the souls retain their multiplied being. yet it is the which it is unlike an angel. is united to the body as its form yet. according to divers forms of things with regard to the same eye. by which the intellect of that one man. that it is altogether impossible and unreasonable to maintain that there exists one intellect for all men. or of the species whereby it understands. Now in one intellect. yet from all of them only one intelligible species of a stone is ligible species abstracted. In like manner Individuality of the intelligent being. produced. Therefore. after the dissolution . in whom there may be different phantasms of a stone. there are divers visions. 2. Although the intellectual it soul. 76. only one intel- abstracted. understands the nature of a stone. were a form of the same agent according to divers forms produces divers actions as. Art. there are many souls of one species. since separate in- Reply Obj. is many clear that the intellectual soul. Reply Obj. It follows. Everything has unity in the same way that it has being. while it is quite impossible for angels to be of one species. me and possible intellect it the phantasm that . i. . after the dissolution of the bodies. according to the division of matter. the intellectual soul retains its own being. from of the different phantasms is same species. of the body. as appears in one man. if there were one intellect for all men. by one operation. . like an angel. the multiplicity of souls is in proportion to the multiplicity of bodies. therefore. But the phantasm itself is not a form of the possible intellect since the . Reply Obj. " SUMMA THEOLOGICA' 32 one thing another in you. in Therefore.

except by a reflection of the intellect on itself otherwise. according to species. as is apmay happen in regard to the senses. not abstracted its conditions of individual matter. substances. for several see the same parent I. but only intelligible it happens that different things. For as every action is according to the mode of the form by which the agent acts. there will be a likeness of the nature without those things which make it distinct and multiplied. material likeness to the nature of a species or genus will be according to the distinction and multiplication of that nature by means of individuating principles. Therefore is if principles which the form. which knowledge. an individual species. Art. 4. 8. impedes the knowledge of the universal. different forms. 2 tellects are subsistent vidual. the objects of sciences would not be things. Whether the intellect be one or many. are likened to the same thing. so that knowledge of the nature of a thing in general will be But if the species be abstracted from the impossible. 4 3 . Now it is clear that . not according to its own nature.33 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q. it would necessarily be an individual intellect. as heating is according to the mode of the heat so knowledge is according to the mode of the species by which the knower knows. thus there will be knowledge of the universal. common of nature becomes distinct and multiplied by reason the individuating matter. could they it the and of of the knower. Nor does it matter. but according its is. and consequently indiBut the not understand universals. as to this particular point. likeness . the species whereby it understands. Reply what is understood is one. even if there were but one. species whereby materiality knows. Yet : it is the stone which is understood. for the stone is not in the soul. And since is according to the assimilation of the Now begotten knowledge knower to the thing known. material conditions — —that is come from the the means of from is. but its likeness as is said De Anima iii. for what is understood is in the to intellect. 76. whether there be one intellect or many because. and . to it follows that the same thing be known by several knowers. not the likeness of the stone. Obj.

We — whereas the other souls. One knowledge exists in the disciple and another in the master. For corruptible and incorruptible are not of the same But the intellectual soul is incorruptible. For the common nature is understood as apart from the indiwhereas such is not its mode of viduating principles — — . Obj. and the nutritive if it the essence of the intellectual soul. CXVII. Reply Obj. in its individuality whereas the nature of the thing understood is indeed outside the soul. 76. But. Augustine denies a plurality of souls. according to the opinion of Plato. Art. A. . Therefore in man sensitive soul. the thing understood exists outside the soul in the same conditions as those under which it is understood existence outside the soul. whether besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one ANOTHER ? proceed thus to the Third Article: Objection 1. as was shown above (Q. Third Article. But there is this difference. In the same way several intellects understand one object understood. 2. How it is caused will be shown later on (Q. LXXV. i). 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 34 colour. Reply Obj. 5. Further. be said that the sensitive soul in . It would seem that besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another. between the sense and the intelligence that a thing is perceived by the sense according to the disposition which it has outside the soul that is.. according to different likenesses. for he . are corruptible. but the mode according to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode according to which it is understood. 6). 6. cannot be the same. such as the sensitive soul and the nutritive soul.. A. the soul. that would involve a plurality of species. according to the opinion of Aristotle. as the sensitive and the nutritive. substance. supposed that the natures of things exist separate from matter.Q.

answer one body. the lion. Metaph. which is absurd. But this would be impossible if the essence of the sensitive soul were the same as that of the intellectual soul for an animal is such by its sensitive soul. 3 man incorruptible differ .76. but presupposes it as a material subject. the . in But the sensitive soul and other brute animals. Plato held that there were several he souls to which to even as distinct organs. souls in that. the other. . and which is mingled with the blood. itself by its life to the body by being own I reasoning. If. saying that the nutri- . ix. and (Did. animal. 2). therefore. the Philosopher says. X. that and orders to united it. is not the same as the essence of the Further. Nor do we say that there are two souls in lectual soul is : Dogmatibus one man. the matter. vii. as James and other Syrians write . that the genus is taken from difference from the form. animals brute and in man from its having a sensitive so called is Now. is taken from the intellectual soul. corruptible. Philosopher. but we both gives say that it is one and the same soul in man. while he is called animal by reason of his having a body animated by a sensitive soul. It is said in the Book De Ecclesiasticis xv. on the contrary. generically. by which the body is animated. one. (Did. the sensitive soul will not be of the same genus. in- corruptible horse. Therefore in man the essence Obj. therefore. which is the difference constituting man. not essentially the same as the sensitive soul. while a man is a man by the intellectual soul. corruptible and says the 10). an animal it man soul and. ii. common Philosopher says (De Gener. in the is Metapli.35 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL is Q. animal will not be one genus to man and other animals. But rational. be incorruptible. On the contrary. Therefore the intellectual soul may be compared to the body animated by a sensitive Therefore in man the intelsoul. 3. 3) that the embryo is an animal before it is a man. Art. viii. of the sensitive soul intellectual soul. which obeys the reason. Animal. referred the different vital actions. spiritual. 4. Further. as form to matter. Obj.

6). with regard to those parts of the soul which use corporeal organs. a biped animal is not absolutely one. fir tjf pLnrp. For nothing is absolutely one except by one form. But with regard to the intellectual part. that in those animals which continue to live when they have been divided. who hold that there are several souls in the Anima i. as he held. what co7itains them? — that It what makes them one? cannot be said that they are . Metaph. For it involves nothing unreason- able that the motors. the concupiscible in the heart. 2). again:. not as its form. the soul were supposed to be united to the body. the intellectual soul. and animal by another form. against Plato. the vegetative soul. viii. he seems to leave it in doubt whether it be only logically distinct from the other parts of the soul. it would follow that man is not absolutely one. therefore. and still various parts. 5).C. it is quite impossible for several essentially different souls to be in one body. however. (Did. The opinion of Plato might be maintained if. a white man. nn animn lvvnuld not he nhsn lntely one.! those body.ART. but as its motor. Thus Aristotle ^n thp in : argues. that if the idea of an animal is distinct from the idea of a biped.76. man were living by one form. in each part are observed the operations of the soul. or also locally. the sensitive soul. Which opinion is rejected by Aristotle (De Anima ii. as. then For this reason. by which a tiling has existence because a thing has from the same source both existence and unity.13 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 36 live power is in the liver. for this reason. that the soul is its form. This can be made clear by three reasons. and man by anotiier form. vii. Now this would not be the case tions if the various principles of the soul's opera- were essentially different. he asks (De is. and therefore things which are denominated by various forms are not absolutely one. for instance. which there were several souls. and distributed in the various parts of the body. united to the body as same movable thing be moved by several less if it be moved according to its If we suppose. and the power of knowledge in the brain. as sense and appetite. If.

which could never be the case unless . bodv with a surface is coloured. or essentially. because rather does the soul it one. (if the forms are ordered manner one of essential to another.37 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL . Therefore. or that one would be predicated of the other according it is — second manner of essential predication. animate the things. and another form by which a man. the subject belonging to the definition of the predicate. 76. if we have one form by which a thing is an animal. this is shown to be impossible by when one operation of the soul is intense it impedes the principle another. (if the forms are not ordered to another. . 3 united by the one body contain the body and make . it follows either that one of these two things could not be predicated of the other. Q. in the second predication. if we numerically one soul. . so that animal can be essentially predicated of man.\yLhickJiiie. one as when we say that something white is sweet). But both of these conseof quences are clearly false because animal is predicated to the : man is not part essentially and not accidentally and of the definition of an animal. must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive intellectual soul. we For forms. except accidentally. the fact that Thirdly. Secondljj this is proved to be impossible bX-^llfi-fflanner thLagis predicate d of another Those things which are derived from various forms are predicated of one another. Therefore of necessity by the same form a thing is animal man . supposing these two forms not to be ordered to one another. This can easily be explained. either accidentally. and of differences the consider species one from differ of forms and the that things observe species the in the order of another. and the nutritive soul are soul. We . as the perfect and the imperfect as are more perfect than the inanimate. but the other way about.in. we have the second manner of essential predication). of action were essentially one. as a surface is presupposed to colour so that if we say that a . and man otherwise man would not really be the thing which is an animal. if one soul be presupposed to the other. than the reverse. Art.

The sensitive soul is incorruptible. but by reason of its being intellectual. differ in species And (De Anima ii. Art. 3). by the addition or subtraction of unity. is not tetragonal by one shape. one of which contains another a Thus intelcontains and exceeds the pentagon tetragon. like other animals. Reply Obj. therefore. Not forms. but composites. as a surface which is of a pentagonal shape. natural 4. Now man and the other Reply Obj. The embryo has first of all a soul which is and when this is removed. For although sensibility does not give incorruptibility. which . We must not consider the diversity of things as proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions. compares the species of things to numbers. And so the difference of corruptible and incorruptible which is on the part of the forms does not involve a generic difference between animals. as will be shown farther on (Q. CXVIII.. both sensitive and intel2. 2. which flow from our manner of understanding. Metaph. 3. lectuality. (Did. Reply Obj. merely sensitive. and man than brute animals and in each of these genera there are various For this reason Aristotle. yet it cannot deprive intellectuality of its incorruptibility. is When. . but by one is both animal and man. it is supplanted which is by a more lectual : perfect soul. and pentagonal by another since a tetragonal shape would be superfluous — as contained in the pentagonal —so neither is Socrates a man by one and the soul. 3) he compares the various souls to the as a species of figures. vii. degrees. A. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 38 and animals more perfect than plants. Therefore. not by reason of its being sensitive. lectual soul contains virtually tive soul of brute animals. 76. whatever belongs to the sensi- and to the nutritive soul of plants. but when with sensitive only. viii. i. ad 2). because reason can apprehend one and the .Q. Reply Obj. it sensibility it has also intelis it is incorruptible. a soul corruptible. same soul he and an animal by another. are classified man is corruptible either generically or specifically.

himself as every animal everything that moves itself is divided into two parts. It would seem that in man there — is another form besides the intellectual soul. i). Further. as it cause sensitive soul. Therefore the other part must be such But primary matter cannot be it is a being only potentially. . as we nave said. iouRTH WHETHER IN Article. by which the body is constituted. But the body has a substantial form by which it is a body. and if this were to inhere immediately to primary that it can be moved. it forms thence the notion of the genus: while that wherein the intellectual soul exceeds the tive soul. Therefore in man and in every animal there must be another substantial form. that the soul is the act of a physical body which has life potentially. Further. reason can consider separately what belongs to the power of the sensi- same thing something imperfect and material. MAN THERE IS ANOTHER FORM BESIDES THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL ? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: Objection i. v. the intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs to the sensitive soul. But the part which moves is the soul.39 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL in various g. Obj. 2. Therefore since.AKT. 5). Therefore the soul is to the body as a form to matter. For the Philosopher says (De Aninia ii. i). and the other is moved. it it takes as formal and perfecting. moved (ibid. and something more. and thence gathers the difjerence of man. And beobserves that this is something common to man and to other animals.70. indeed everything that is moved is a body. Therefore some other substantial form in the body precedes the soul.4 ways. man moves does. Now the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii. Therefore if there were not in man some other substantial form besides the rational soul. since . as Obj. the order of forms depends on their relation to primary matter for before and after apply by comparison to some beginning. of which one moves. 3.

Q. or something of that sort— maintained . Therefore of one thing there is but one substantial form. who held that primary matter was some actual being for instance. it would necessarily follow that in man there is another substantial form. and these are substantial forms. On the contrary. as we have said above (A. simply. If. 4. . Of one thing there is but one subBut the substantial form gives substantial stantial being. Now its by being simply and by its removal to be corrupted generated simply For this reason. it THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 40 would follow that it ranks among the most which inhere to matter immediately. the intellectual soul be united to the body as substantial form. it impossible for another substantial lectual soul to be found in man. If we suppose that the intellectual soul is not united to the body as its form. therefore the substantial form gives coming a thing is said to be — . a thing is said to be corrupted. but to be such. But the soul is the substantial form of man. being. forms imperfect Obj. Therefore the forms of the elements must remain in a mixed body. as heat does not make a thing to be simply. but only as its motor. but relatively. and in like manner. fire or air. Therefore it is impossible for there to be in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul. In order to its is form besides the intel- make this evident.76. however. not simply. by which the body is established in its being as movable by the soul.ART. but only to be hot. that the accidental form does not make a thing to be simply. but to be made such. as the Platonists maintain. the human body is a mixed body. I ansiver that. or to be in some particular condition. when an accidental form is removed. we must consider that the substantial form differs from the accidental form in this. the old natural philosophers. .4 matter. Therefore by the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or generated simply. Therefore in the human body there are other substantial forms besides the intellectual soul. Now mingling does not result from matter alone for then we should have mere corruption. 1). Furtiier.

but the act of a physical organic body which has life potentially . the soul is said to be the act of a body. we read Phys. which is operation for such a potentiality does not reject that is. like — 2. i. — Reply Obj. . because by the soul it is a body. and of the nutritive soul in plants. 4. the soul itself is included as when we say . The soul does not move the body by its essence. and itself alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other things. and the animate body is the part moved. 76. not as though lucid and light were two separate things. and light of what is lucid. false. that there is no other subbesides the intellectual soul and that . Art. Yet the first act is said to be in potentiality to the second act. as . etc. Reply Obj.. . Therefore. the act of which presupposes the body to be already actualized by the soul so that the soul bv its motive power : is the part which moves. The same is to be said of the sensitive soul in brute animals. as it virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive souls. or corrupted simply and stated that every becoming is nothing but aii alteration. as the form of the body. and that this potentiality does act of a not reject the soul. so does it virtually contain all inferior forms. and universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the imperfect. 4 that nothing is generated simply. stantial Whence we must form in man conclude. does not exclude the soul. . that heat is the act of what is hot. but by the motive power. and is organic. if besides the intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial form bv which the subject of the soul were made an actual being. the soul.41 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q. consequently that it is not the substantial form and so at the advent of the soul there would not be simple generation nor at its removal simple corruption. all of which is clearly : . and has life potentially. In manner. Whence it is clear that when the soul is called the act. Aristotle does not say that the soul is the body only. it would follow that the soul does not give being simply and i. but because a thing is made lucid by the light.

Nor is it less impossible for anything be a medium between substance and accident. as existence. and so on. viii. . bv reason of their imperfection.Q. sensing. Whence it follows that elements in the mixed body would be distinct as to situation. But this is imbecause the various of the elements must forms possible. mixture is made by the contrary qualities of the elements being reduced to an average. as stated in Metaph. We observe in matter various degrees 42 of perfection. though modireceive to fied. not actually but virtually. second. in accordance with the Philosopher {De Gener. apparent to sense. and every addition and subtraction varies the species. that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body. 4 Reply THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " Obj. : Reply Obj. Art. But For the substantial this is even still more impossible. For the proper qualities of the elements remain. are a medium between accidental and substantial forms. of the elements remain entire in the Avicenna held that the substantial forms mixed body and that . and understand- ing. (Did. and third degree. Therefore that form which gives matter only the first degree of perfection is the most imperfect. 76. and in them is the power of the elementary forms. and so can be more or less. living. 3. vii. while that form which gives the first. without which matter cannot be divisible. And then there would not be a real mixture which is in respect of the whole but only a mixture of . Now what is added is always more perfect. the 4. as in numbers. Averroes maintained that the forms of elements. Therefore we must say. But various bodies cannot be in the same place. by the juxtaposition of particles. 10). and therefore in the mixture they are modified and reduced to an average. i. 3). is the most perfect and yet it inheres to matter immediately. being of each thing consists in something indivisible. Now matter subject to dimension is not to be found except in a body. which we must suppose dimensions. be in of matter various for the distinction parts necessarily . so that one form emerges from them. and consequently it is impossible for any substantial form to more or less.

Further. the form of a stone. teeth. and hoofs instead of shoes. is composed of parts belonging Obj. moreover. bodies of other animals are naturally provided with a covering. be united to a most subtle body. susceptible of a more perfect But the intellectual Therefore since the is the most perfect of souls. or of any sort of soul. that the soul life is the act of a physical organic body having potentially. improperly united soul is intellectual the But form. Further. . as claws. 5 This quality of the mixture is the proper disposition for the substantial form of the mixed body. since the form is the principle of the species. Further. soul 4. it should not be united to a body which to various species. a variety of species. one form cannot produce the intellectual soul is one form. for instance. the less has it of matter. of protection. with hair instead of clothes. ^ Fifth Article.43 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q. 2. and are. Therefore the soul should . the intellectual soul is a perfectly which in is its material form a proof whereof operation But the more subtle is the corporeal matter does not share. to fire. body. It would seem that the matter must be For a such to body. the proportionate to Therefore it is not properly united to a incorruptible. what itself is form should be more perfect. imObj. 76 Art. We — corruptible body. which is imperfect as being deprived of the above means ii. for instance. and horns it seems that the intellectual soul should not have been united to a body . Obj. On The Philosopher says (De Anima 1). for instance. the contrary. IS WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL PROPERLY UNITED TO SUCH A BODY? proceed thus to the Fifth Article: intellectual soul is Objection 1. naturally provided with arms. But Therefore. still less to a terrestrial body. and not to a mixed body. 3.

2) in the order of nature. v. But the organ of touch requires to be a medium between contraries.. vii. conversely. is Nom. For this reason . such as hot and cold. before sin the human body was immortal not by nature. but rather the matter for the form. of which the sense of touch has the perception thus it is in potentiality with regard to contraries. and the like. A. Reply Obj. Now not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth. as Dionysius says {Div. A'om.). i.). as stated in De Anima ii. because ruptible. but has to gather knowledge from individual things by way of the senses. as Dionysius says {Div. wet and dry. as we have seen above (Q. 76. Since the form is not for the matter. holds the lowest place among intellectual substances inasmuch as it . 9. among animals. And among men. those who have the best sense of touch have the best intelligence. Therefore it behoved the intellectual soul to be united to a body fitted to be a con- venient organ of sense.s THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 44 / answer that. . A sign of which is that we observe those who are refined in body are well endowed in mind. Therefore the more the organ of touch is reduced to an equable complexion. above others reduced to the most equable complexion. But the intellectual soul has the power of sense in all its completeness because what belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists more perfectly in the superior. LV. Now all the other senses are based on the sense of touch.Q. the intellectual soul. ART. man has the best sense of touch. as the angels are. we must gather from the form the reason why the matter is such as it is and not . Now the action of the senses is not performed without a corporeal instrument. Perhaps someone might attempt to answer by saying that before sin the human body was incorThis answer does not seem sufficient. but also with the power of feeling. Therefore the body to which the intellectual soul is united should be a mixed body. the more sensitive will be the touch. this . therefore the intellectual soul But nature never fails in necessary things had to be endowed not only : with the power of understanding. and is able to perceive them.

Therefore we answer otherwise by observing that in matter two conditions are to be found one which is chosen . and bones. and therefore. as Augustine says {Gen. which. The artisan. i). it be said that God could we answer that in the formation of natural not consider what we do God might do . order that the matter be suitable to the form. although it be one in its . but that they are of various dispositions. hand. in form of the saw chooses iron adapted through hard material but that the teeth of the saw may become blunt and rusted. or to a mixed body. for the tor cutting . provided in this case by applying remedy against death in the gift of grace. in which fire was in excess. which requires a . however. So the intellectual soul requires a body of equable complexion. And this body of an equable temperament has a dignity of its own by reason of its being remote from contraries. thereby resembling in a way a heavenly body. yet on account of its perfection. Art. we cannot say that these are of different species. 76. 2. God. If. Therefore the intellectual soul had to be united to such a body. Reply Obj. is corruptible by matter. is manifold in it power : and therefore. Reply Obj. the other which follows by forceof the first disposition. This is suitable to the intellectual soul. and not to a simple element. the eye. for its various operations requires various dispositions in the parts of the body to which it is united. as neither was the immortality of the devil. follows by force of the tor instance. however. otherwise its immortality would not be forfeited through sin. 5 but by a gift of Divine grace. do not make the species but the whole does. however. flesh. and so forth. matter itself. essence. properly speaking. ii. For this reason we observe that there is a greater . which. The parts of an animal. A body is not necessary to the intellectual soul by reason of its intellectual operation considered as such but on account of the sensitive power. but what is suitable to the nature of things. force of its avoid things this.45 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q. an organ of equable temperament. because otherwise there could not be an equability of temperament. 3. for instance. ad lit.

Further. the souls of which are endowed with knowledge and power in regard to fixed particular things. Therefore it seems that the soul is united to the body by means of a power. and for any number of purposes. 76. Art. On the contrary. which are the organs of organs (De Anima iii. Accident is posterior to substance. The intellectual soul as comprehending universals. as the Philosopher says. vi. 3. But dispositions to a form are accidents. as is the case with other animals. Metaph. Instead of all these. Further. 2. is its . what is spiritual is connected with what But the virtue of the soul power. whether the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article: — Objection i. Therefore we must presuppose accidents to be . man has by nature his reason and his hands. (Did. Obj. since by their means man can make for himself instruments of an infinite variety. Therefore it is corporeal by virtual contact. unintelligible without division in measurable quantities. various forms of one species require But various parts of matter are various parts of matter. substantial forms. has a power extending to the infinite. which is an accident. or even to certain fixed means whether of defence or of clothing. It would seem that the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dis- For every form exists in its proper disposed positions. therefore nature to certain fixed natural it cannot be limited by notions. vii. since the soul is a substantial form. i). 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " .). both in the order of time and in the order of reason. in matter before the substantial form and therefore before the soul.Q. 46 variety of parts in perfect than in imperfect animals and in these a greater variety than in plants. matter. which are Therefore we must suppose dimensions in matter before the many belonging to one species. Sixth Article. 4. Obj. Reply Obj.

and so on so those accidents which belong to existence are understood to exist before in matter corporeity and thus dispositions are understood before the form. is impossible for between the bodv form whatever and matter order. merely as a motor. there would be nothing to prevent the existence of certain dispositions mediating between the soul and the body on the contrary. not as regards all its effects. Now the first among all acts is existence. before it what apprehended But matter has actual existence by the substantial form. as we have said above (A. soul is united to the body as If. or between any substantial its matter.47 is UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q. it is impossible for matter as to be hot. and consequently before the soul. an animal. which makes it to exist absolutely. 4). as it we have already said above (A. i. 4). or as having quantity. a living being. they would be necessary. a body. for on the part of the soul would be required the power to move the body. If the soul were united to the body. Now it is clear that to every genus Therefore as matter is follow its own proper accidents. The reason is because since in potentiality to all manner of acts in a certain is absolutely first among the acts must be as understood being first in matter. As appears from what has been already said (A. but as regards . I answer that. therefore while remainone and the same. Art. is any accidental disposition to come and the soul. and on the part of the body. which is the substantial form. For the same essential form makes man an actual being. apprehended as perfected in its existence. Wherefore it is impossible for any accidental is actual. and a man. Therefore. a certain aptitude to be moved by the soul. it perfects matter according to the ing various degrees of perfection. . i). 76. however. the more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior forms. 6 form exist in matter unintelligible that any accidental before the soul. Reply Obj. before it is understood as corporeal. substantial dispositions to pre-exist in matter before the form. the subsequent effect. the intellectual . . the substantial form.

^vhich are most akin to a But fire and air are bodies. For although it is essentially the same form which gives matter the various degrees of perfection. that the soul administers the body by light. and as receptive of different forms according to the further degrees of perfection. Therefore the breath. is the means of union between soul and body. by fire. Therefore the soul is spirit. Seventh Article. and such would be some heavenly is incorporeal. vii. Reply Obj. because it Therefore and because it is incorruptible. But the intellectual soul is united by its very being to the body as a form and yet it guides and moves the body by its power and virtue. 7 THE 2. the soul is their union. A spiritual substance which is united to a body as its motor only. 2. things which are very distant from one not united except by something between them. But the intellectual soul is very distant from the body.Q. to it seems . be united to the body by means of an incorruptible body. whether the soul is united to the animal body ? by means of a body proceed thus to the Seventh Article: Objection i. Obj. are another. Wherefore matter. and by air. Reply Obj. that is. ad lit. Further. separated from the body. is united thereto by power or virtue. Obj. 76. . yet it is considered as different when brought under the observation of reason. 3. Art. can be understood as distinct in its various parts. a link between two things seems to be that thing the removal of which involves the cessation of But when breathing ceases. once understood as corporeal and measurable. Further. which is a subtle body. united to the We — human body by means of a body. both 3. For Augustine says {Gen. " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 48 Dimensions of quantity are accidents consequent to the corporeity which belongs to the whole matter. as we ha\e said {ad i). It seems that the soul is united to the animal body by means of a bidy. 19).

is (Did. it is impossible for it to be united by means of another body. 76. a being. by means of the light of the crystal heaven . the soul is united to the body as its form. which causes matter to be in act. i) We need not ask if the soul and body are one. Platonists said that the intellectual soul has an incorfrom which it is ruptible body naturally united to it. they body and of the nature of the fifth essence so that say. says. according as it is . which. and unite them together. posed of matter and form. is by virtue of the which by reason of its very nature is united to matter as its Nor is there any other cause of union except the act. it would be wax without a body is intervene between right to say that some other bodies must animal or of and whatever. / answer that. any body from it by means of distant what is moves motor naturally something nearer. the vegetative soul would be united to the body by means it is is a . The Philosopher says (De . Wherefore the unity of a thing comform itself. 7 which would harmonize the elements. and the intellectual 4 I. UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q. and by means of which it is united to the Others said that the soul is corruptible body of man. But the shape is : united to the also the soul intervening. From clear how never separated. Art. as we have said above (A. If the soul. united to the body by means of a corporeal spirit. this it viii. makes a thing to be actual since it is itself essentially an act nor does it give existence by means that a thing is one. The reason of this is If. On the contrary. false are the opinions of those maintained the existence of some mediate bodies' Of these certain between the soul and body of man. 4 . j\'ho Metaph. Others said united to the body by means of light. of the light of the sidereal heaven . however. Therefore thus united to the body.4ni7na ii. according to the Platonists. as neither do we ask if wax and its shape are one. for a the soul man. 6). as the Philosopher agent. of something else. Now the form. i). through itself.49 lieht. the sensible soul. vii. were united to the body merely as a motor.

And the first instrument of the motive . causa Philosopher says It is not necessary x. Eighth Article. if which is considered as an act. It is true that it moves the grosser parts of the body by the more subtle parts. many means of connection would have to intervene. — is not in for the motus animalium (De mot. Objection each part of the body thus to the Eighth Article: It would seem that the whole soul . Nevertheless the breath is a means of moving. as the Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium {De mot. not because this is the means of union. 76. i. The soul is indeed very distant from the so body.) in : De for the soul to be in each part of the body . svhether the whole soul is in each part of the BODY? We proceed i. Reply Obj. but by its own existence is united to the body immediately. it has not an existence apart from power : the existence of the body. it suffices that it . 3. : 50 soul Dv means fifth all this is fictitious of the light of the and ridiculous Now and the essence does for light is not a body . not enter materially into the composition of a mixed body (since it is unchangeable).). but only virtually and lastly. Art. is a kind of spirit. but because of the removal of that disposition by which the body is disposed for such a union. a being only in potentiality. animal. 2. as the first instrument of motion.y. 8 THE " SUM MA THEOLOGICA" empyrean heaven. because the soul is immeunited to the diately body as the form to matter. animal. if we consider the condition of each separately that if each had a separate existence. This is the case with every form which. is very distant from matter. Augustine speaks there of the soul as it moves the body whence he uses the word administration. : Reply Obj. Reply Obj. The union of soul and body ceases at the cessation of breath. x. But inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body.

If. and this is absurd. Therefore the whole soul is not in each part. Augustine each body the whole soul is in the whole body. Now the form. says {De Trin. Thus one part would not depend on another nor Obj. . but only in one part through which the But since the soul is united to must form. 8 principle of the body causing the other parts to each for part has a natural movement of its own. it follows that all the powers of the soul are in each part of the body thus the sight will be in . follows that each part of the body is an animal. On clearly not in each part of the body. But it is the act of an organic body. If. 2. the soul is in the body of which it is the Obj. would one part be nobler than another untrue. the whole soul be in Obj. such as the sight to the pupil of the eye. Therefore the soul is the contrary. the whole soul is in each part of the body. 4. the but substantial form of the body. i) that the relation of a part of the soul to a part of the body. each part of the body. be in live. each part of the body is immediately dependent on the soul. necessarily be in the whole in and each For it is not an accidental thereof. Therefore it act. that. we might say that it is not in each part of the body. Further. answer As we have said. Further. such as the form of a house and such a form is it would move the its others. 6). therefore. if the soul were united to body merely as its motor. a form of the whole which does not give existence to each of the parts of the body. the Philosopher says {De Anima ii. therefore.51 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL some Q. part body. and hearing 5. if the whole soul is in each part of the body. that in . exists only in an organic body. 76 Art. the ear. Obj. is a form consisting in composition and order. all the powers of the soul are rooted in the essence of the soul. form substantial perfects not only the whole. but each part of the whole. it the body as : . which is and in each part I is entire. But each part of the human body is not an organic body. is the same as the relation of the soul to the whole body of an animal. in the eye. 3. vi. For since a whole consists of parts. it Further. Further.

such as a soul. That it is entire in each part thereof. There is. as we speak of a painted animal or a stone so is it with the hand. that since a whole is that which is divided into parts. . or a whole body. which have an indifferent relationship to a quantitative whole and its parts. but also of each part. no part of the body retains its proper action although that which retains animal . i). a third kind of whole which is potential. . as far as its essence is concerned. But a form which requires variety in the parts. that on the withdrawal of the soul. is not equally related to the whole and the parts hence it is not divided accidentally wlien the whole is divided So therefore quantitative totality cannot be attributed to the : soul. divided into virtual parts. The first kind of totalitv does not apply to forms. properly and essentially belongs to forms : and likewise the virtual totality. that which it actuates wherefore the soul must be in the its : whole body. and a composite into matter and form. divided. there are three kinds of totality. retains the action of the species. not only of the whole. is also a whole which is divided into logical and : There essential parts as a thing defined is divided into the parts of a definition. But the second kind of totality. A . either essentially or accidentally. and in each part thereof. There is a whole which is divided into parts of quantity. Therefore. fore it But the soul is a substantial form. as a whole line. 76. and theremust be the form and the act. proof of which is. as we do not speak of an animal or a man unless equivocally. the surface being divided. is equally disposed to be in the whole surface. corresponding to three kinds of division. as whiteness. may be concluded from this. as the Philosopher says {De Aniina ii. and in each part of the surface and. on" the withdrawal of the soul. the flesh and bones. except perhaps accidentally and then only to those forms. the whiteness is accidentally . the eye. therefore.Q. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 52 accidental. Art. and specially the soul of perfect animals. because a form is the principle of operation. further. which depends on logical and essential perfection. But act is in species.

as we have seen. but to the parts. then the whole whiteness surface. If we mean quantitative totality which whiteness has accidentally. then the whole whiteness is not in the each part of the surface. it is enough to say that the whole soul is in each part of the body. as its primary and proportionate perfectible. it is in the eye. nor accidentally. the intellect and the will whence these powers are not said to be in any part of the body. its relation to the whole not the same as its relation to the parts for to the whole . Reply Obj. is compared primarily and Reply Obj. Reply Obj. with regard to each of its powers. that since the We soul requires variety of parts. I. is in each part of a Since. inasmuch as they are ordained to the whole. The Philosopher is speaking there of the motive power of the soul. it is in the ear. but with regard to sight. 4. as to its proper and proportionate perfectible. 2. Thus the soul is not in a part. neither essentially. Other powers are common to the soul and body wherefore each . Whence it does not follow that a part of an animal is an animal. The soul is the act of an organic body. Reply Obj. must observe. Some of the powers of the soul are . but only in that . 3. and so forth. But if we mean totality of species in totality of : and essence. which is the soul's primary and of proportionate perfectible. namely. For it is and of essence.53 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Therefore Q. in it according as it exceeds the entire capacity of the body. The same is to be said of power since the whiteness which is in the whole surface moves the sight more than the whiteness which is in a small part thereof. however. 76. Art. and with regard to hearing. by totality of perfection totality of power. secondarily. it is necessary to distinguish. of these powers need not be wherever the soul is. if it be asked whether the whole whiteness is whole surface and in each part thereof. however. but not by not in each part of the body. the soul has not quantitative totality. is it essentially. An animal is that which is composed of a soul and a whole body.

which adapted to the operation of such a power. 76. is a nobler part of the body : as also is that part which serves the same power in a nobler manner. . Art. of which the parts of the body are the organs. For that part which is the organ of a nobler power. on account of the various powers.Q. Reply Obj. One part of the body is said to be nobler than another. 5. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " is 54 part of the body.

2. one essence. one to another. whether the essence of the soul is its power ? proceed thus to the First Article: Objection i. that mind. things which belong to the general. the substantial form is simpler than the Obj. powers ticular. and love are in the soul substantially. and will are one life. knowledge. But primary matter is its own potentiality. or several ? (2) How of the soul are distinguished from one the powers (3) of the powers. : Further. 4). (In Eight Articles. OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL. essentially and {ibid. the soul is nobler than primary matter. one mind.QUESTION LXXVII. its power. the order another? (4) Of (5) Whether Whether (6) ? subject ? the soul (8) the powers of the soul are in it as in their Whether the powers flow from the essence of (7) all Whether one power Whether from another ? the powers of the soul remain in the soul rises after death ? First Article. 11). Much more therefore is the soul its own power. Under the in secondly. ix. which same thing. accidental form. the soul. that memory. is the We — or. is its in par- first head there are eight points of inquiry : (i) Whether there is the essence of the soul power? one power of the soul. Further. understanding. Obj.) We proceed of to consider those first. a sign of which 55 is that the substantial . 3. It would seem that the essence of the soul is For Augustine says {De Trin. x.

Much more. or quantity. But sensitive and rational are sub- and they are taken from sense and which are powers of the soul. then. understand by the intellectual power.) says that heavenly spirits are divided into essence. are in a body . 6.. and operastantial differences . which is contrary to Augustine. Much more is therefore form which the soul. 4). or any other quality. but is its indivisible. Dionysius {Ccel. 5. Therefore the power of the soul cannot be in it as in a subject. for whatever is so. Therefore. Further. a simple form cannot be a subject. if the act be not in the genus of substance. because. Therefore the soul is its sense by the sensitive power and we own power. i) are not in the soul as in a subject. it is an accident. reason. we Obj. according to the Philosopher {De Aniina ii. is the soul Further. 5). we must refer a power and its act to the same genus. Further. 77. as colour or shape. But the accidental form that substantial own power. as we have said above (Q. Obj. although For the present purpose this may be proved in two ways. power. I THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" is 56 form is is not intensified or relaxed. Therefore the of the soul are not accidents it would seem and so powers that the power of the soul is its own essence. 7. Obj. whatever does not belong to the essence an accident. 4. First. Further. On the contrary. LXXV.Q. A. in the soul is the essence distinct from the virtue or power. But that by which we first sense and understand is the soul. is Obj. . Hier. tion. xi. But a simple form since it is not composed of matter . an accident is not the principle of a substantial difference. Therefore if the power of the soul is some- thing else beside the essence thereof. since power and act divide being and every kind of being. does not exceed tlie subject in which it is: whereas the mind can love and know other things {De Trin. • I answer that. who says that the foregoing {see Obj. and form. ix. the power directed to that act cannot be in the .Art. 2). It is impossible of the soul is its essence. to admit that the power some have maintained it.

whose operation is His own substance. Augustine is speaking of the mind as it knows and loves itself. the definition of the soul. Therefore if the very essence of the soul were the immediate principle of operation. For not an act ordained to a further act. and therefore it But the integral whole is properly predicated of each part. that those Or. it is the act of a body having potentiality. its very essence is an act. but according to its which has a soul is as a form the soul is power. for the very substance or essence of the soul is known and loved. this may be also shown to be impossible in the soul.57 POWERS OF THE SOUL . A. i genus of substance. as act. Now the operation of the soul is not in the genus of substance for this belongs to God alone. does not belong to it according to its essence. as the subject of its power. For the universal whole is in each part according to its entire essence and power. as animal in a man and in a horse. Reply Obj. are substantially or essentially in the soul. say. Wherefore the Divine power which is the principle of His operation is the Divine Essence itself. does not exTherefore it follows that the essence of the which soul is not its power. whatever has a soul would always have actual vital actions.. as a form. For the soul by . this passage true in the sense in . life . is with a further relation to the second act. So the soul called the first act. In the same way are we to understand what he says in the other passage. as that always an actually living thing. i. Now we observe that what has a soul is not always actual with respect to its vital operations whence also it is said in . being midway between the universal whole. Wherefore. one essence. This cannot be true either of the soul. however. or of any creature as we have said above when speaking of the angels (Q. For nothing is in potentiality by reason of an act. as some which the potential whole is predicated of its parts. and the integral whole. things are one life. 77- Art. Secondly. that potentially clude the soul. is one mind. but the ultimate term of generation. 3). Q. LIV. Thus knowledge and love as referred to the soul as known and loved. itself. for it to be in potentiality to another act.

but not so properly as the universal whole. 3. not. in a subject. The act to which primary matter is in potentiality is the substantial form. Action belongs to the composite. Reply Obj. 5. stance and accident. though improperly. neither according to its whole essence.Q. to the substantial . composite has substantial existence through the substantial form and it operates by the power which results from the substantial form. to the essence of a thing whereas whatever is beyond the . of all the parts together as if we were to say that the wall. according to existence In this sense. roof. But if we take accident as one of the five . Reply Obj. That the accidental form form. understanding. it must be an accident and it belongs to the second species of accident. Philosopher says that the soul is that whereby we understand and sense. Therefore in no way can it be predicated of each part. 2. in this sense there is a medium between subFor the substance is all that belongs . heat compared to the form of fire) as the power of the soul is to the soul. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 58 not in each part. is a principle of Therefore the subis the first principle of action but not the In tliis sense the proximate principle. and will are the one essence of the soul. yet in a way it is predicated. by affirmation and negation. then there can be no medium between substance and accident because they are divided . If we take accident as meaning what is divided against substance. . that is. In this sense. as does Now the existence. But the potential whole is in each part according to its whole essence. is 77- Art. for to act belongs to what exists. that of quality. and non-existence in a subject. and foundations are a house. Reply Obj. nor according to its whole power. according to its whole power. as the power of the soul is not its essence. Therefore the potentiality of matter is nothing else but its essence. Therefore in a way it can be predicated of each part. Reply Obj. however. Augustine says that the memory. the substantial form of the agent (for instance. universals. is due stantial form action 4. Hence an active accidental form is to .

It would seem that there are not several powers of the soul. soul..). For the proper does not belong to the essence of a thing. Who is the Pure Act in treating which subject Boethius employs that phrase {De Trin. it would follow that an accident soul. higher Obj. but only what is not caused by the essential principle of the species. power is. whether there are several powers of the soul? proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection i. : We — . Although the soul is not composed of transcends matter and form. 2 essence of a thing cannot be called accident in this sense. 6. For the intellectual soul approaches But in God there is one nearest to the likeness of God. since even other things are loved the soul. we have said above (Q. of quoted is verified in God. are not taken from the powers of sense and reason. as . 5. yet it has an admixture of potentiality. Art. stantial forms. 7. for if love were in the soul loved as in a subject. i. In this sense the powers of the soul may be said to be a medium between substance and When accident. The statement . but from But because subthe sensitive and rational soul itself. through Reply Obj. Further. A. Rational and sensitive. not as loving its subject. but as loved and known. as differences. ad 4) and for this reason it can be the subject of an accident. this must be understood in the sense given above. Augustine says that knowledge and love are not in the soul as accidents in a subject. LXXV.59 POWERS OF THE SOUL Q. their accidents Second Article. 77. is caused by the essential principles of the it is a medium between the essence and wherefore species accident thus understood. are known by nothing prevents us from sometimes substituting accidents for substantial differences. unknown to us. but . Reply Obj. inasmuch as they are compared to the and knowing. His argument proceeds in this sense. as being natural properties of the soul. which in themselves are . simple power and therefore also in the intellectual unified more the a the 2.

we must place several powers we observe that. power. of those to whom beatitude is possible. but they acquire a certain imperfect goodness. because he can acquire beatitude.i it THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " all 60 is. 3. according to his nature. . by few movements and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect goodness by many . Further. movements.Q. 3.. and therefore the powers .77. We conclude. 4). Thus he is least of all disposed to health. But by the one essence of the soul. LXXVI. of both meet together in the soul. 3). therefore the human soul requires many and But to angels a smaller various operations and powers. and those yet higher acquire perfect goodness by few movements and the highest perfection is found in those things which acquire perfect goodness without any . therefore. . who can only acquire imperfect health by means of a few remedies better disposed is he who can acquire perfect of many remedies and better still. and so they have a few determinate operations and powers. On the contrary. The Philosopher places several powers in the soul (De Anima ii. variety of powers is sufficient. that things which are below man acquire a certain limited goodness. to operate belongs to what is in act. AA. Yet he is in the last health by means . In action beyond His own Essence. as we have seen above (Q. Therefore by the one power of the soul he performs operations of various degrees.ART. as the Philosopher says {De Coelo ii. Of necessity in the soul. man has actual existence in the different degrees of perfection. 2. But man can acquire universal and perfect goodness. a variety of powers why — because human is soul abounds on the confines of spiritual and corporeal creatures. degree. But the intellectual soul excels all other power. he who can by few remedies best of all is he who has perfect health without any remedies. I Therefore above others it forms in has one virtue or answer that. Obj. movement whatever. To make this evident. God the it there is no power or *There in is yet another reason . 12). the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect goodness.

belong also to . the effect is removed. : A unified perfect creatures. is the cognitive power. Further. it is extrinsic to subsequent to the power. object not specifically distinct by acts and objects. contraries are what differ most from each other. 3. more than inferior creatures. But various objects which belong to various powers. and Therefore the soul's powers are follows that the same power could not have contrary objects. clearly false in almost all the for the of vision extends to white and black. 4. means and . whether the powers are distinguished acts and objects ? by their proceed thus to the Third Article: Objection 1. if the cause be removed. superior if it extends to Third Article. wherever the cause of anyis. 77. This is clearly false. if it is over many things. We — But the act is it. Therefore if the powers are distinguished bv their objects. Obj. that which of itself the cause thereof. power equal things but a multiform power is superior to it. and desired by the is it appetitive. This and the power of taste to sweet and bitter. in being able to acquire perfect goodness although by many and various . Further. Hence if the difference of powers came from the difference of objects. the same object would not come under different powers.61 POWERS OF THE SOUL Q. for the same thing is known by Obj. So there is one essence of the soul. with several powers. The intellectual soul approaches to the Divine likeness. in this 2. For nothing is determined to its species by what is subsequent and extrinsic to tlie it.Art. but may have several operations. it falls short of is more Reply Obj. 3. 3 Reply Obj. thing. i. Reply Obj. Obj. 2. One thing has one substantial existence. Further. It would seem that the powers of the soul are not distinguished by acts and objects. powers power is .

4) that acts to the are distinguished according to their acts and objects. Hence rational that and its various species. we must observe that things which are For since to be accidental do not change the species. and consequently the nature of a power is diversified. 77. Now the nature of an act is diversified according to the various natures of the objects. But the Philosopher says {De Anima according and operations precede the powers reason. namely. that is to say. but by a difference in which belongs to the nature of an animal. its species is not . which is the active principle. . yet they come under hearing. as sound and colour belong to sight and which are different powers. which is the end of growth. or from its end or term for the act of heating differs from the act of cooling. A Wherefore we seek to know the nature of a power from the act to which it is directed. to cold. Now. from these two things an act receives its species. Things that are subsequent are distinguished by what precedes. not any . as the principle and moving cause for colour is the principle of vision. that the former proceeds from something hot. the object is to the act of a passive power. Now. inasmuch as it : moves power power the sight.Art. to heat the latter from something cold. by a difference in the sensitive soul. therefore. Therefore the powers are of necessity distinguished by their acts and objects. in this. Therefore the powers are not distinguished according to the difference of their objects. / answer that. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 62 some one power. "hanged by a difference of colour. Therefore the powers ii. irrational are differences dividing animal. that is their objects. which is sometimes rational. to the act of an active and end as the object of the . from its principle. the object of On is a term the other hand. For every act is either of an active power or of a passive power.Q. "^ growth is perfect quantity. and sometimes otherwise. which is the active principle. coloured is accidental to an animal. as the nature of the act is diversified. power as such is directed to an act. and these again are preceded by their opposites. Nevertheless. On the contrary. the one power of common sense. constituting In like manner.

are proportionate to its principle and end. hearing. . This is two contraries one. Act. 3 of the soul. which the higher power considers of itself. sight.Art. for instance. although extrinsic. thing. a man or a stone. to be a musician or a grammarian. because the higher a power is. and therefore there is one sensitive sound. Therefore many things are combined in the one formality of the object. 77. Reply Obj. . with regard to colour. as sight does not because of regard white as such. is. But it is accidental to a passive quality. to something coloured. have one of two Reply Obj. but rather Reply Obj. Thus it is which various objects belong to various lower powers objects. prior to it in intention and logically i. while they differ in the formalities that regarded by the lower powers of themselves. but a variety of objects diversifies the powers its very nature is of the to which in that difference power directed. includes the idea of the other. power. however. . Reply Obj. and the like. to a greater number of things does it extend. the other contrary would But the power of the soul does to another power. in a manner. the nature of the contrary as such. are subject to one higher power. object. in subject. but as colour. the principle or end of and those conditions which are intrinsic to a the action is with regard to the agent. Thus the senses of their very nature are directed which of itself is divided into colour. and another power to the passive quality with regard to sound. The higher power of itself regards a more universal formality of the object than the lower power. is. 3. Nothing prevents things which coincide from being considered under different aspects . namely. great or small. nevertheless. since they are to one another as perfect and imperfect. belong 2. therefore they can belong to various powers of the soul. And . as the end the object.63 POWERS OF THE SOUL Q. 4. If any power were its to contraries as such for not regard the common aspect of both contraries. though subsequent in existence to nevertheless. namely. Therefore by reason of such differences the powers of the soul are not distinct.

many . Further. Since the soul is one. colour and sound. Accordingly we may observe a triple order among them. naturally simultaneous. Further. by their nature prior to imperfect things . 77. The Philosopher (De Anima ii. In like manner the objects are various and dissimilar. that of another. there is no before and after. there is not order among them. but all are But the powers of the soul are from one another. and the powers are and since a number of things that proceed from one must proceed in a certain order there must be some / answer . Therefore also the powers of the soul have order.Q. On the part of the soul. we find that the operation of one depends on the operation of another. and to the soul itself. among the powers of the soul. because the soul is one. as Therefore there is no order an^ong the of the soul. while the third taken from the order of the objects. where there is order among powers. 3) compares the parts or powers of the soul to figures. Therefore there is no order the powers of the soul. that. 3. two of which correspond order dependence of one power on another. Therefore there is contradistinguished no order among them. Art. forasmuch as perfect things are to the is . and according to . among On the contrary. 2. whether among the powers of the soul there ORDER ? is proceed thus to the Fourth Article: Objection i. It would seem that there is no order We — among For in those things which come the powers of the soul. under one division. But the action of one power of the soul does not depend on of hearing. But figures have an order among themselves. Obj. the powers of the soul are referred to their objects. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA'i 64 Fourth Article. powers Obj. for sight can act independently and conversely. Now the dependence of one power on another can be taken in two ways according to the order of nature.

action the are such that !• 4 . sound is audible But bodies. lower and common to higher . namely. of which smell is the result. wherefore they Likewise the sensitive direct them and command them.65 POWERS OF THE SOUL Q. among powers are prior soul. 4 the order of generation the first and time. hearing. But in the third kind of order. 77- art. Thus. it is the other way about. generation to the powers of the the body. another as before and after. For the powers of the nutritive soul are prior by way of sensitive soul for which. which is Reply Obj. Those order which powers among the two other kinds of order exist powers among which of one depends on another. above. i. they prepare of the sensitive powers with regard to the intellectual. The same is to be said therefore. naturally prior to the mingling of elements. This argument is of the third kind exists. in this order to the powers of the nutritive In the second kind of order. The species of a given genus are to one in the air. forasmuch as from being to imperfect. 3. is of the soul Reply Obf. 2. has a and acts in a certain order) and on the part of the objects. if considered in their nature although they may be said to be simultaneous. For the visible naturally comes first. like numbers and figures. though it be one certain aptitude to various according to its essence. furthermore part verified as regards those Reply Obj. a thing comes to be perfect. This order among the powers both on the part of the soul (which. according kind of order the powers. said have we as the of the on acts. of the common genus. sight. the intellectual powers are prior to the sensitive powers. according as they receive the predication . certain sensitive powers are ordered among themselves. and since it is smelling.

it is clear 2. as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii. We — to the body so are the powers of the soul to the But the body is the subject of the corporeal powers. A. . Art. ad lit. Obj. Therefore the soul is the subject of the powers of the soul. as fear and suchlike.) that sensation belongs neither to the soul. 2). LXXV. The soid is that by ivhich we sense and understand primarily. from what we have said above (Q. principles of the operations of the soul are the powers. and that which does operate. 77. I. and some things through the body. Therefore the powers are primarily in the soul. 24) that the soul senses certain things. For as the powers of the . without the body. that some operations of . the operations of the powers of the soul are attributed to the body by reason of the soul because. as again the Philosopher says in the beginning of De Somno et Vigilia. Wherefore the subject of power is of operative answer The subject of necessity the subject of operation. nor to the body. not through the body. Therefore the soul not the subject of all the powers.Q. On but to the composite. power is that which able to operate. and for a similar reason. xii. But if the sensitive powers were not in the soul alone as their subject. Q. Now the same is that which is able to operate. for every accident denominates its proper subject. 7. The Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigilia i. AA. LXXVI. Further. Augustine says {Gen. 3. that. Now. ad i). Therefore the soul is the all subject of the sensitive powers the other powers. the soul could not sense anything without the body. 3. Obj. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA Fifth Article. 2. Further. in fact.. Therefore the sensitive power alone / is is in is the composite as its subject.. But the natural body are . of the contrary. soul. . '^ 66 whether all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject? 'proceed thus to the Fifth Article : Objection i It would seem that all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject.

as understanding and will. as when it feels a wound or something that the without is. when it is said that the souj senses some the body. but as in their principle. i. the words with the body or without the body may determine the act of sense in its mode Thus the soul senses of proceeding from the sentient.67 POWERS OF THE SOUL y. All the powers are said to belong to the their not as soul. as when it feels sad or joyful on hearing in the . and hearing by the ear. things existing senses some things body. as compared to the composite. only sion of the soul. because the action of sensation nothing cannot proceed from the soul except by a corporeal organ. just as understanding Now in many things relating to Philosophy Augustine makes use of the opinions of Plato. the act Secondly. Reply Obj. Firstly. such operations. Therefore the powers which are the principles of these operations have their subject in the composite. of the the of sense on object part that the with is. without the body. and not in the soul alone. sort while it senses some things body. not asserting them as true. . the other operations of the nutritive and sensitive parts. but as their principle. And so it is with all . However. 2. this can things with the body. Reply Obj. 77 Art. because that the composite has the power to perform it is the soul by Reply Obj. as far as the present question is concerned. something. 5 the soul are performed without a corporeal organ. of that body. not as in their subject. in the but apprehenwhich do not exist in the body. they may be understood as determining the soul Thus sensed. but relating them. subject. and some without be taken in two ways. All such powers are primarily in the soul. operation proper to the soul. Plato's opinion was that sensation is an is. soul are performed by means of corporeal organs as sight by the eye. 3. Hence the powers of these operations are But some operations of the in the soul as their subject.

ART. because the substantial form makes a thing spects. . But nothing is moved by itself. Obj. that partly agree and partly differ. as is clear from Metaph. Further. particular condition after . or so great. emanation involves some sort of movement. Therefore the powers of the soul proceed from its essence as their cause. each is an act. as is clear if one considers the different kinds of causes. accidents. to exist absolutely. whence also it is included in the definition of accident. vii.Q. . or in some for its subject is an actual being. They differ. in two reFirst. perhaps. 68 whether the powers of the soul flow from ESSENCE? its proceed thus to the Sixth Article: Objection i. vii. (Did. i. Further. that from which a thing proceeds is its But the essence of the soul cannot be said to be cause. 2. The powers of the soul are its natural But the subject is the cause of its proper properties. the cause of the powers. the soul moved. Obj. because one part thereof moves and another is moved. Neither is . 3. Therefore the soul does not produce its powers within itself. On the contrary. / answer that.77. 4). as an animal is said to be moved by itself. But the essence of the soul is We — one and simple. therefore. Therefore the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence. vi. It would seem that the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence. Since. as the Philosopher proves {Phys. the powers of the soul are many and various. 2) except. however. The substantial and the accidental form They agree in this. and that by each of them something is a manner actual. and its subject is something purely But the accidental form does not make a thing potential. For different things do not proceed from one simple thing. 4). they cannot proceed from its essence. to exist absolutely but to be such. as the Philosopher proves {De Anima i.6 JHE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" Sixth Article. by reason of a part of itself.

the accidental form exists on account of the completeness of the subject. I. forasmuch as it has something of potentiality. recipients. or else this subject the composite is actual by the soul. thing many things may or again if there be order. 2. The is both the final cause. is received into it according as it is in potentiality. that either the subject of the soul's powers is the soul itself alone. the accident being caused by an extrinsic agent. 6 is observed in the substantial being observed in the subject and since first in a genus is the cause in that genus. because it has already been said that the accident is caused by the subject according as powers of the soul. in a certain . or the composite. that all the the composite. 5). among powers. diversity soul many and various powers proceed both because order and also by reason of the these exists Reply Obj. the subject is receptive only. is : since that which that is which is the more the less principal exists for the sake of principal. caused by the actuality of the subject. while on the contrary. because. is receptive of the but forasmuch as it is in act. Secondly. proceed the one essence of the from of Thus. it produces accidental form it.Art. the substantial form causes existence in its subject. forasmuch as it is in potentiality. flow from the essence of the soul. as is we have said above (A. which can be the subject of an accident. and in . From one simple naturally. Reply Obj. 77. and i.69 POWERS OF THE SOUL it is Q. matter therefore exists on account of the substantial form. actuality is observed in the subject of the accidental form prior to its being observed in the accidental form wherefore the actuality of the accidental form Hence clear that actuality its form prior to that which is : . from what has been said (A. subject diversity of the corporeal organs. for with regard to the extraneous accident. ad 6). Now clear Whence it is whether their subject be the soul alone. On the other hand. So the subject. substantial and accidental forms differ. as from their principle. it is actual. This I say of the proper and per se accident. Now it is clear.

Further. 7 THE " SUM MA THEOLOGICA " 70 the active cause. in a way. But one power of the soul cannot be the subject of another.Art. of its proper accident. Powers are known by their actions. but everything arises from that which is like it in species. Obj. proceed from another.Q. as their end. For if several things arise together. one of them does not arise from another. Further. as colour from light. whether one power of the soul arises from another ? froceed thus to the Seventh Article: Objection 1. From this we may gather that the essence of a way the soul is the cause of all its powers. the power of the soul arises from the soul as an accident from the subject. Obj. Therefore one of them does not On the contrary. Therefore one of them does not arise from another. 4) that among the powers of the soul there are several . cause of those which are more remote. and of some as Reply Obj. of proper accidents from their active principle. But the action of one power is caused by the action of another power. according to a natural order. It is also as it were the material cause. first it nearer to the is. their subject is transmutation. 2. / answer that. But all the powers of the soul are created at the same time with the soul. It would seem that one power of the soul does not arise from another. but by a certain natural resultance. Now the powers of the soul are oppositely divided. 77. and as receptive thereof. as various species. thus one thing results naturally from another. Therefore one power of the soul is caused by another. Therefore one power does not arise We — from another. Now has been shown above (A. as the so that which is In those things which proceed from one first is the cause of all. one opposite does not arise from the other opposite. 3. because nothing is the accident of an accident. The emanation not by way of Seventh Article. as the action of the imagination by the action of the senses. 3. inasmuch as it is receptive of the accident.

more imperfect powers precede the others in the order of generation. Therefore one power of the soul proceeds from the essence of the soul by the medium of another. as such. of The powers of the soul are opposed to one another. it follows that those powers of the soul which precede the others.71 POWERS OF THE SOUL Q. power. animal is As the case with one power as regards another. things figures. Reply Obj. body.Art. more imperfect powers are principles with regard to the others. thus the soul. The same thing sense one accident is . An accident cannot of itself be the subject of an accident but one accident is received prior to another In this into substance. after the manner of the end for the sake of the senses are see that For we principle. is less perfect. according to they proceed from the intelligence as the imperfect from But considered as receptive principles. because imperfect from naturally proceed perfect things. Reply Obj. and not the other way about. 7 kinds of order. or together with the the and since agent and the end are more perfect. as also are the species But this opposition does not from another. 77. essence. but by a certain natural not a transmutation. 2. power of the soul flows from the Reply Obj. wherefore. moreover. are the prin- and active ciples of the others. as quantity prior to quality. are a certain imperfect participation of the intheir natural origin. But since the essence of the soul both as a principle active and principle. generated before the man. said to be the subject of another as surface is of colour. while the receptive principle. the intelligence. may be said of the powers of the soul. so is it the with simultaneous is and resultance. the is according as it has the sensitive considered as the subject. and as something material with regard to the intelligence. by the soul. as perfect and imperfect. telligence. inasmuch as substance receives an accident through the means of another. . On this account. of one the origin prevent numbers and . the the perfect. The senses. either separately is final. compared to the powers and as a receptive by itself. for the 1. 3. in the order of perfection and nature.

the Philosopher says (De Anima i.Art. Obj. reason and intelligence. Obj. Therefore the powers of the soul are not corrupted when the body is corrupted. and con- sequently the other powers of the sensitive part. 25). Further. 3. Therefore the powers of the soul are in it even after death. 32) when the body lies senseless. Remember that thou the rich glutton whose soul was in hell didst receive good things during thy lifetime (Luke xvi. Therefore the concupiscible power remains Obj. If an old man were given the eye of a young man. i. For we read in the book De Spiritu et Atiima that the soul withdraws from the body. et Remin. But weakness Obj. 6. a is young man. the powers' even of the sensitive soul are not weakened when the body becomes weak because.). xii. as . It would seem that all the powers of the soul remain in the soul separated from the body. 4. Further.77. in the separate soul.§. but remain in the separated soul. he would see even as well as the road to corruption. which is a power of the sensitive soul. dead. Further. joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible But it is clear part. concupiscibility and irascibility . 4). taking with itself sense and imagination. as the soul. Further. properties. Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 5. Further. memoi-y is a power of the sensitive soul. But memory remains in the separated soul for it was said to . sees some things by imaginary vision so also when . : Therefore memory remains in the separated soul . whether all the powers remain in the soul when separated from the body ? proceed thus to the Eighth Article: Objection i. as the Philosopher proves {De Memor. and are never separated from it. the powers of the soul are its natural But properties are always in that to which thev belong. that. We — Obj. that separate souls grieve or rejoice at the pains or rewards which they receive. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 72 Eighth Article. yet not quite . 2.

It is said {De Eccl. Trin. as the intelligence and the will. xix.) that of two substances only does man consist. Therefore the body being dead. 5. not as 4. as remain actually but they virtually . These powers are said not to be weakened Reply when body becomes weak. because the soul remains of these powers. as some remain in the separate soul. and is the virtual principle the Reply Obj. i. by death the soul On the contrary. Obj. these powers remain in the soul even after the corruption of the body. and so there written can be despised with the same facility as it said. not actually but virtually. what Reply Obj. The recollection spoken of same way as Augustine (De memory in the mind. such powers in the remain soul. all the powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their But some powers belong to the soul alone as principle. 7). 77. 7) places sensitive soul. in their principle or root. unchangeable. These powers in the soul. and consequently all the other powers. taken in the xiv. because these powers have no act apart is from the corporeal orgair. Dogm. 8 But is quite separate from the body. Now accidents cannot remain after the destruction of the subject.\. the imagination is a power of the sensitive part. and the body iL'ith its senses. Therefore the power of the sensitive part remains in the separate soul. which we say do not 2. although we may say that the soul takes with these powers.73 POWERS OF THE SOUL Q. as they say also. x. their subject . there is to be 11. must remain body. As we have said already {A. a part of the . These was itself Reply Obj. It is much more false that. the soul ivith its reason. after the destruction of the . That book has no authority. But other powers are subjected in the composite as all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts. / answer that. 3. Art. Wheredo not fore. the acts of these powers So it is false that. the composite being destroyed. powers. are not the properties actually remain in the separate soul. the but of soul of the alone. composite. say. the sensitive powers do not remain. 6.

. " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 74 In the separate soul. the angels. 77.Q. Reply Obj. passage is speaking as Wherefore he retracted some ii. sorrow and joy are not in the sensitive. things which he had said there {Retract. Augustine in that inquiring. not as asserting. 8 JUE 5. 6. Art. but in the intellectual appetite. as in Reply Obj. 24).

and For the powers of the soul are called its intel- parts. the vegetative soul. OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL. whether there are to be distinguished of powers in the soul? five genera proceed thus to the First Article: Objection 1. But only three parts of the soul are commonly assigned namely. the appetitive . And since the depends to a certain extent knowledge of these powers on the other powers. Therefore th'ere are only three genera of — powers Obj. the powers of the soul are the principles 75 ^ . (In Four Articles. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry : of the soul considered generally. 2. has only to inquire specifically con- We cerning the intellectual and appetitive powers. a powers. It would seem that there are not to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul namely. and the rational soul. appetitive. locomotive. the intellectual preamble to the intellect powers. thirdly. we shall consider those powers which are secondly. Further. however. the sensitive soul. our : consideration of the powers of the soul taken specifically will be divided into three parts first.QUESTION LXXVIII. The theologian. The powers First Article.) next treat of the powers of the soul specifically. lectual. in the soul. (4) The interior senses. We — — vegetative. and not five. (2) The (i) various species of the vegetative part. in which the virtues reside. sensitive. (3) The exterior senses.

78. viovement of nourishment. as the iii. as above numbered. but In the same way every other power desires its appropriate object. the appetitive. The eye desireth favour (Ecclus. answer that. . is another operation of the soul. as intellect and movement and decrease and increase due to rest. powers are the vegetative. therefore. local said to live. The reason of this diversity the various souls being distinguished accordingly as the operation of the soul transcends the operation of the four are called lies in corporeal nature in various ways. the moving principle in animals is sense. 2) In several ways a thing is said to live. Art. a special kind of soul ought not to be assigned as regards what is common to all the powers. and this is the operation of the sensitive . I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " Now. lastly. powers Obj. Therefore there and are only four genera of powers of the soul. 10). the operation of the rational soul. Further. whence we read and beauty. three are called souls. above as and the intellectual. xl. 3. Of these. the sensitive. intellect. There are five genera of powers of the soul. or appetite. Therefore the should not be made a appetitive power special genus of the of the soul. 3). 22) : more than these green soivn fields. an operation of the soul that it is such there is which so far exceeds the corporeal nature not even performed by any corporeal organ and Below this. Now desire is common to each power of the soul. There exists. and even if only one of is these is present. as the appetitive is excluded. and the locomotive. 4. but not through a corporeal quality. modes of living. sight desires an appropriate visible object. Further. Philosopher says (De Anima Therefore the motive power should not be added to the On The I a special genus of soul. the thing sense. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii. the contrary. and is related to it as its matter and instrument. For Obj. ways is a thing said : to live.Q. which is indeed performed through a corporeal organ. in four 76 of its vital operations. The Philosopher says {De Anima ii. for the whole corporeal nature is subject to the soul.

ad 4). i soul. for digestion. LXXVTI. And there is yet another genus in the powers of the soul. wet and dry. But the object of the soul's operation may be considered in a triple order. yet they are not required in such a way that the operation of the senses takes place by virtue of such qualities but only for the proper disposition of the organ. which genus regards a more universal object namely. First. 3. Now. 78. and by virtue of a corporeal quality. Now by versal the powers of the soul are distinguished generically their objects. for the vegetative power acts only on There is another the body to which the soul is united. for this is common to all the operations of the soul. and what follows. moves itself. genus in the powers of the soul. 4). since every animate thing. this transcends the operation of the corporeal nature because the movements of bodies are caused by an extrinsic principle. in some way. for though hot and cold. Art. Such is the operation of the vegetative soul. it operates.77 THE SOUL'S SPECIFIC POWERS Q. while these operations are from an intrinsic Yet . is caused instrumentally by the action of heat. not only the body to which the soul is united. of the operations of the soul is that which is performed by a corporeal organ. the more uniis extends. as the Philosopher says {De Anima ii. being have soul's of the two latter evident that the powers genera an operation in regard not merely to that which is united — — them. it inasmuch as this something extrinsic has a natural aptitude . since whatever operates must in some way be united to the object to about which follows of necessity that this something extrinsic. For the object to which it in the soul there is body that is united to that soul a power the object of which is only the the powers of this genus . but also to something extrinsic. every sensible body. A. For the higher a power is.. must be related to the soul in a twofold manner. as we have said above (Q. which is the object of the soul's operation. The lowest . which genus not only the regards a still more universal object namely. it is Wherefore universal all in but sensible body. are called vegetative. and other such corporeal qualities are required for the work of the senses. principle.

forasmuch as to the the soul itself has an inclination and tendency some- thing extrinsic. 78. from the form apprehended this sort of appetite requires mere apprehension does not a special power of the soul as it exists in its own nature. The natural appetite is that inclination which each thing has. — common object — universal being. which is motive power is something movement. these have But the appetitive power does living things because wherever Reply Obj. The modes of living are distinguished according to the degrees of living things. And intel- power — namely. There are others in which with the vegetative there exists also the sensitive. to its it is own nature. thing in the apprehensive power it exists not according whereas — . 3. Whence clear that sight desires naturally a visible object for the . which require many things for their life. men. In this way there are two kinds of powers namely. and consequently movement to seek necessaries of life from there are some living things which with lectual a distance.Q. 3). is desired For a suffice. realizing its respect of which the soul is referred to extrinsic as to the term of its operation and for every animal is moved for the purpose of desires — in in respect of appetitive referred to something extrinsic as to first in the intention. There are some living things in which there exists only vegetative power. of its own nature. : Secondly. And in this one of powers in the soul which the soul an end. There are others which besides this have locomotive powers. there not constitute a degree of is sense there is also appetite {De Anima ii. for something. as shellfish. wherefore by its natural appetite each power desires someBut the animal appetite results thing suitable to itself. but not the locomotive power. but according to its likeness. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 78 to be united to the soul. . the other the loco- way — the there are again two kinds — — and intentions. Art. as perfect animals. — the sensitive in regard to the less common object the sensible body and the intellectual. Thus the first two objections are hereby solved. in regard to the most . as the plants. and to be by its likeness in the soul. such are immovable animals.

— seen. generative. appetite. there for a special genus of appetitive powers. It would seem that the parts of the vegetative soul are not fittingly described namely. yet sense and . Now this motive power is not only in the appetite and sense as commanding the movement. the senses. they do not move in are deprived of their natural obedience to the appetite. powers of the soul. not merely for the purpose of seeing it. purpose of its act only namely. as such. . whether the parts of the vegetative soul are described as generative ? fittingly the nutritive. Second Article. Art. augmentative. would be no need Reply Obj. to make them obey the appetite of the soul which moves them. 78. but also for But if the soul did not require things other purposes. and yet they have not the power of motion. Further.79 THE SOUL'S SPECIFIC POWERS Q. Of this we have a sign in the fact that when the members disposition. and proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection i. whether living or not Therefore the generative force should not be 4iving. ciples of 4. But generation common to is common living and non- to all things that can be generated and corrupted. but also in the parts of the body. that is. for the purpose of seeing but the animal by the appetitive power desires the thing . natural since the appetite of the powers would suffice. But the powers of the soul are above the natural Therefore we should not class the above forces as 2. we should which is not assign a particular power of the soul to that living things. forces. classed as a power of the soul. are not sufficient to cause movement. We — — forces. movement Although sense and appetite are prinin perfect animals. Obj. except on account of the actions perceived by of the senses. the nutritive. unless another power be added to them for immovable animals have sense and appetite. for the purpose of sensing them . and For these are called natural augmentative.

3. as we have said (A. 9) growth. to this is directed We nutritive power. the soul is more powerful than the body.Q. therefore. has for its object the body itself. Further. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 80 Obj. m a way. 4). not in one and the same body but in another for a thing cannot generate powers. and to this is directed the generative One which body is whereby power. does the soul. which has an operation extending to extrinsic things. however. i). On the contrary. iii. Another is whereby the living body acquires its due quantity. Therefore the augmentative power of the soul is not distinct from the generative power. Further. 4. The For the vegetative vegetative part has three powers. for required. Therefore the generative power. 4) that the operations of this soul are generation. But the generative power is that a Therefore by the same whereby living things exists. I and (c/. But the body by the same force gives species and quantity much more. nutritive . answer that. Art. acquires existence. Now the nutritive directed to the preservation of the living thing {De Anima ii. since the body itself united to the soul grows and is preserved by the augmentative and nutritive powers which exist in one and the same soul. part.78. being a power which is capable of preTherefore we should not serving whatever receives it. the use of food. The Philosopher says {De Anima ii. to this is directed the augmentative power Another is whereby the body of a living thing is preserved in its tlie existence and in its due quantity. . power the living thing force is distinguish the nutritive power from the generative. ap- proaches to the dignity of the sensitive soul. Obj. everything is preserved in being by that whereby it exists. But the generative power has its effect. ibid. although in a more excellent and more universal manner. The itself. is preserved. 2. living a triple operation of the soul it by the soul is . observe a difference among these and the augmentative have their effect where they exist. for that to that highest in an inferior nature approaches which which is is . must.

through the active and passive qualities. Nom. semen containing the principle Therefore there must be in the living thing a power that prepares this semen. as made clear by Dionysius {Div. Reply Obj. which are the principles of natural actions. 4. 2. and because those forces perform their actions instrumentally. and perfection. and preservation (although the above forces accomplish these things in a more perfect way) . the nutritive power is required. from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent therefore it receives at once its nature and its quantity. a thing which is already perfect to produce another like unto itself. through something in the living tiling itself. whereby the food is changed into the substance of the body. the condition of the matter. in performed by means of consume humidity. And the generative power is served by the augmentative and nutritive powers. and this is the generative power. 4). Reply Obj.). Therefore. which is tlie productive of tlie body. There- order to restore the humidity thus lost. the opera- tion of the vegetative principle heat. of these three powers. Such forces are called cause they produce an effect like that natural. For this reason it must have a power in the soul. for it belongs to vii. the generative has the greater finality. 2 lowest in the higher nature. 78. i. and the augmentative power by the nutritive. the property of which is to fore. nobility. is i). which also gives existence. quantity. Ari. Reply Obj. as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii. whereby it is brought to its But the inanimate body is generated appropriate size. < 4 .Hi THE SOUL'S SPECIFIC POWERS is Q. Reply Obj. Since the generation of living things is from a semen. according to . whereas the generation of living things is in a higher way. As we have said above (A. Generation of inanimate things is entirely from an extrinsic source. both beof nature. it is necessary that in the beginning an animal of small size be generated. 3. This is also necessary for the action of the augmentative and generative powers.

1 answer that. and is medium. and other things which are called common seiisibles. and are further from colour than sound is. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " Third Article. Further. as But the sense of touch sight regards white and black. But taste is a kind of touch.0-78. The Philosopher says {De Anima iii. 6). . Now the diversity of diversifies as the powers. i) There is no other besides the five senses. according . it We — seems that the senses number of the kinds of Obj. Further. Therefore it is not a single sense but several. are muhipHed according to the accidents. that can grasp magnitude or shape than for that On the contrary. a species is not divided against its genus. 3. But there are many kinds 'of accidents. grasps several contrarieties such as hot or cold. 82 whether the five exterior senses are properly distinguished ? proceed thus to the Third Article: Objection i. one sense regards one contrariety. 2. Since. By others it has been assigned to the which is either in conjunction or extrinsic. For sense can know accidents. shape magnitude Philosopher {De it seems that there is much more need for another sensitive power which grasps colour or sound. as powers are distinguished by their objects. Others have ascribed it either -. The reason of the distinction and number of the senses has been assigned by some to the organs in which one or other of the elements preponderate. It would seem inaccurate to distinguish five exterior senses. Therefore there are more than five senses.vater or air. as water. magnitude and shape. : to the various natures of the sensible qualities. or the like. and suchlike. Obj. damp or dry. are not sensibles by accident. such. Apt. therefore. but are contradistinguished from them by the Anima ii. or suchlike. Therefore it should not be classed as a distinct sense from touch. objects. Further. 4. Therefore. air. Obj.

and is is Wherefore the naturally immuted by the exterior sensible. sense is a passive power. Now. convenience of the acts of the powers. but the organs for the powers wherefore there are not various powers for . the reason that there are various organs on the contrary. immutation is of ence. In the same way . as the which does not thereby become coloured. as heat is received into the thing heated. but to the intellect. all natural bodies they undergo alteration. according And to be cognizant of the natures of sensible qualities does not pertain to the senses. the object we find natural immutation.83 THE SOUL'S SPECIFIC POWERS Q. the other Natural immutation takes place by the form of spiritual. if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the sense's action. according to a spiritual mode of existence. 78. Whereas spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received. and according to the diversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive powers diversified. into the thing immuted. nature provided various to the mediums for the various senses. 3 as such quality belongs to a simple body or results from complexity. immuter the being received. or likewise on the part of the organ. But none of these explanations is apt. in sound But in some senses we in sight: while in others . Now. For the powers are not for the organs. . two kinds. Otherwise. a spiritual immutation intention of the sensible form required. into the thing form of colour is received into the pupil immuted. Art. one natural. is for the operation of the is senses. exterior cause of such immutation is what per se perceived by the sense. for this has nature provided a variety of organs. according to its natural exist- Now. would feel when find spiritual immutation only. The reason of the number and distinction of the exterior senses must therefore be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses properly and per se. effected in whereby an the sensile organ. that they might be adapted to various powers. as to place. as we find not only a spiritual but also a natural immutation either on the part of the object On the part of only.

a body must be in On the part of the organ. and number. as stated in Phys. and the common are alteration. these two senses. either in the sight. 4). smelling.3 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" : 84 which is the object of hearing. while the moistened by the humidity of the flavoured But the organs of smelling and hearing are not affected in their respective operations by any natural im- tongue is morsel. Reply Obj. it is clear that they are Shape is a quality about quantity.Q. which are the principles of alteration therefore only suchlike qualities are the objects of the senses because Reply Obj. natural immutation takes place in touch and taste. mutation unless indirectly. shape. and naturally prior . which are called between accidental sensensibles. like. is the most spiritual. its which is without natural immutation organ or in its object. and of their very senses. 7). Now. nature. the motion of alteration. . Hence it is that the three other senses are not exercised through a medium united to them. all : of the distinction of which we shall speak later on (ad 3. which require a natural immutation on the part of the object while local motion is more perfect than. for sound is caused by perand we find natural cussion and commotion of the air immutation by alteration. odour which is the object of exhale an odour. As to size species of quantity. as the Philosopher proves {Phys. which are the objects of the For the proper sensibles first. Not every accident has in itself a power immutation. and the most universal of all the senses. the senses are affected by the same things whereby inanimate bodies are affected. vii. Size. of : . quantity. for in order to in a measure affected by heat. the most perfect. for the hand that touches something hot becomes hot. but only qualities of the third species. 2.78. affect the senses since they are qualities that cause But the common sensibles are all reducible to . viii.ART. to obviate any natural immutation in their organ as happens as regards . 2. i. midway sibles and proper sensibles. After this comes the hearing and then the smell. Touch and taste are the most material of to.

however. but by reason of the sensible quality. which Such common is the common and formal object of touch. to proximate subject of the qualities that cause alteration. species only of the account on sense is one touch if But the body. for they produce a certain variety in the immutation of the senses. but is divided into several specific senses. accompanies touch in the tongue. and all in a common genus. Reply Obj. Movement and rest are sensed according as the subject is affected in one or more ways in the magni- tude of the subject or of its local distance. just as the proximate genus is and cold unnamed. only. as the surface by reason of colour. 11). in a sense one thing and many. Now quantity is the in . 9). As the Philosopher seems to say {De Anima ii. Reply Obj. sense of taste. existing in touch distributed of the from but in general. as in the movement and thus to sense movement and rest is. But taste. Yet they are not accidental sensibles. is a kind of touch from distinct not It is the in tongue only. according as it is afifected of alteration way. the sense of touch is generically one. For sense is immuted differently by a large and by a small since whiteness itself is said to be great or small. touch the of Philosopher {De Anima ii. the bitter. Therefore the common sensibles some sensible qualities. some proximate genus. genus of hot is. as surface is of colour. unnamed. We each in might also say that all those contrarieties agree. The common we must say that taste is formality of its object touch by reason of a different formality from distinguished : .55 THE SOUL'S SPECIFIC POWERS Q. -. distinction whole body so it is easily distinguished from touch. however. according to a saying 4. are not separate from one another in their organ. but not in the . do not move the senses first and of their own nature. which senses. or again. 7»-\Rr. 3. surface : and therefore divided according to its proper subject. and for this reason it is extends to various contrarieties. as in the movement of growth or of locomotion. since the notion of shape consists in fixing the bounds of magnitude. which perceives the sweet and is not evident. but are so that their spread throughout the whole body.

In like manner they seem to suffice for the power of suffices. than the colour and in Therefore for this the other senses. to assign an interior power. own like manner with is vision. whether the interior senses are suitably distinguished? proceed thus to the Fourth Article: Objection i. the flavour. Further. . there no need sense. But the intellect . 2- Further. 2. Art. according to the Philosopher (De Memor. Obj. For the common is not divided against the proper. : Fourth Article. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 8b For touch involves a natural. by reason of the quality which is its proper object. in addition to the proper exterior senses. between the power and its object. as being nearer to it. not be assigned as powers distinct from the senses.Q 78. . a spiritual. it seems that sight must be much more able to perceive its . in a way. which quality is moisture. and on which is based. the object of touch. of immutation. i.). It would seem that the interior senses are not suitably distinguished. the imagination and the memory are passions But passion is not divided against of the first sensitive. perception of their own actions for since the action of the sense is. so that the tongue itself becomes sweet or bitter but by reason of a quality which is a preamble to. called the common Obj. But the organ of taste is not necessarily immuted by a natural immutation by reason of the quality which is its proper object. and not only immutation in its organ. Further. the intellect depends on the senses less than any power of the sensitive part. 4. et Remin. Obj. Therefore the common sense should the interior sensitive powers. its Therefore memory and imagination should subject. there is no need to assign an interior We — not be numbered among apprehension when the proper and exterior sense But the proper and exterior senses suffice for us to judge of sensible things for each sense judges of its proper object.

corporeal. 8). 4 knows nothing but what it receives from the senses whence we read (Poster. than the action of the estimative is from the action of the imagination. but also wlien it is absent. cogitative power. which is an action of the sense. an animal would not be moved to seek something absent the contrary of which we may observe specially in perfect since animal motion : . and dividing. comparing. 6. Therefore much less should we . Therefore there is no interior power . Obj. they must be assigned to diverse powers since a power . or the estimative and memorative powers should not be made distinct from the imagination. ad lit. . Art. the animal should apprehend a thing not only at the actual time of sensation. and action follow apprehension. 7. which is an action of the intellect. . Otherwise. which they call the estimative power. and the estimative and memorative powers. which consists in the use of a kind of syllogism for the sake of inquiry. i. On the contrary. If any of these actions cannot be reduced to the same one principle.87 THE SOUL'S SPECIFIC POWERS Q. 24) describes three kinds of vision namely. I answer that. between the sense and intellect. which is an action of the imagination or phantasy and intellectual. common sense. As nature does not fail in necessary things. adding. that those who lack one sense lack one kind of knowledge. Augustine {Gen. of the soul is nothing else than the proximate principle of the soul's operation. Obj. phantasy. besides the imagination. for the perception of intentions which the sense does not perceive. Further. there must needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice for the life of a perfect animal. Therefore either we must add the 5. i) assigns five interior sensitive powers namely. and the action of the reminiscence. Further. xii. Avicenna (De Anima iv. 6. imagination. Now we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal. spiritual. is not less distant from the actions of the estimative and memorative powers. in the action of the which consists cogitative tive and reminiscitive to the estimative and memora- powers. 78. assign to the sensitive part a power.

which are the same. reduced . it follows that the power which receives the species of sensible things must be distinct from the power which preserves them. Therean animal through the sensitive soul must not only receive the species of sensible things. the phantasy or imagination is appointed. Animals. but as a natural enemy and again a bird : gathers together straws. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 88 animals. while it is the reverse with dry Wherefore. need to perceive such intentions. sensible forms sensible. Furthermore. for the . therefore. and in which the animal takes pleasure. for they are moved towards something apprehended and absent. But the animal needs avoid certain things. of a corporeal organ. there would be no need to suppose that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of those forms which the senses perceive. but also on account of pleasing other advantages and uses. since the sensitive power is the act things. in corporeal things. or disadvantages just as the to seek or to : sheep runs away when it sees a wolf. comes by an immutation caused by the is not the case with the perception of those for the reception of sensible forms. to diverse principles for moist things are apt to receive.78. but because they are useful for building its nest. But forms received through the senses. or from which it shrinks with horror. Art. is for this since the perception of principle necessary . but retain with difficulty. and of Thus. 2). therefore. but it must also retain when it is actually and preserve them. not on account of its colour or shape. Now to receive and retain are. their distinction proper sense and the we forms. which are fore moved by progression. for phantasy or imagination is as it were a storehouse of for the retention and preservation shall speak farther of on (ad these i. not because they are pleasant to the sense. Again we must observe that if an animal were moved by pleasing and disagreeable things only as affecting the sense. not only because they are or otherwise to the senses. the common sense are appointed. which intentions. which And some distinct the exterior sense does not perceive. affected by them.Q.

the common sense. : by some fore it sort of collation discovers these intentions. as other animals have in the sudden recollection of the past. for other animals a difference as to the above intentions perceive these intentions only by some natural instinct. which we have never seen. 78. is to be reckoned among these intentions. for instance. and the imaginary form of a mountain. But this operation is not to be found in animals other than man. So there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the intentions. assigns between the estimative and the imaginative. 4 appreliension of intentions which are not received through and for the the senses. in whom the imaginative power suffices thereto. — . and the estimative and memorative powers. man has not only memory. that something And the very formality of the is harmful or otherwise. while man perceives them by means of collation of ideas. Now. which combines and divides imaginary forms as when from the imaginary form of gold. : sensitive part namely. but also reminiscence by syllogistically. which past.Art. to which medical assign a certain particular organ. To man also does Averroes attribute this action in his book De sensu et sensibilibus (viii. the estimative power is appointed the memorative power. seeking for a recollection of the past by the application of individual Avicenna. Where- men also called the particular reason. we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference between man and other animals for they are But there is similarly immuted by the extrinsic sensible. namely. in man is called the cogitative.8q THE SOUL'S SPECIFIC POWERS : Q. which . however. just as the intellectual reason compares universal intentions. A have in the fact that the principle of memory in animals is found in some such intention. the middle is : part of the head for it compares individual intentions. Therefore the power which in other animals is called the natural estimative. which is a preservation storehouse of such-like intentions. as it were. As to the memorative power. we compose the one form of a golden mountain. memory observes. sign of which we thereof.). a fifth power. the imagination.

as when someone sees that he sees. Although the operation of the intellect has its origin in the senses yet. but as the common root and principle of the exterior senses. but the same. The interior sense is called cotnmon not by predication. For this cannot be done by the proper sense. Therefore they are not distinct powers. Art. LXXVII. as to a common term. is Whence hensions. but to a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason. so to speak. so also the soul is the subject of one power through another. as if it were a genus. Reply Obj. In like manner does the estimative power. 5. I. A.Augustine is in other animals. But neither sight nor taste can discern white from sweet because what discerns between two things must know both. which. In this way the imagination and the memory are sensible : . The cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their excellence not to that which is proper to the : sensitive part. As one power arises from the soul by means of another.Q. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 90 Reply Obj. by discerning white from black or green. in the thing apprehended through the senses. Reply Obj. in which immutation the action of sight is completed. 78. yet more perfect than Reply Obj.. though in a less perfect manner. and from which immutation follows another in the common sense which perceives the act of vision. 4. 6. it clear that it common to all interior appre- . Wherefore the discerning judgment must be assigned to the common sense to which. the intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. The proper sense judges of the propei by discerning it from other things which come under the same sense. 3. 7). which only knows the form of the sensible by which it is immuted. for instance. 2. : called passions of the first sensitive. . again. as we have seen above (Q. overflows into them. Reply Obj. Reply Obj. all the intentions of the senses are perceived. effected by the images is calls that vision spiritual which of bodies in the absence of bodies. all apprehensions of the senses must be referred and by which.

but denominate the essence. OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. For the Now the mind intellect seems to be the same as the mind. but the essence of the soul. for Augustine is not a power of the soul. different genera of the soul's powers are not united in some one power. 2.) The next question concerns the intellectual powers. Therefore the intellect : We — : is the essence of the soul. or its essence ? (?. Obj.QUESTION LXXIX. whether there is an active intellect ? : (4) Whether it is the active intellect in the intellect? something in the soul? (5) Whether one in all ? (6) Whether memory is Whether the memory be distinct from (7) is Whether the reason is a distinct power (9) Whether the superior and inferior reason are distinct powers? (10) Whether the intelligence is distinct from the intellect ? (i 1) Whether the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers? (12) Whether synderesis is a power of the intellectual part ? (13) Whether the intellect ? (8) from the intellect ? the conscience is a power of the intellectual part ? First Article. under which head there are thirteen points of inquiry (i) Whether the intellect is a power of the soul. Further. It would seem that the intellect is not a power of the soul. whether it is a passive power? (3) If it is a passive power. 2) things. whether the intellect is a power of the soul? proceed thus to the First Article: Objection i. but the essence Mind and spirit are not relative says (De Trin.) If it be a power. ix. {Ill Thirteen Articles. but only in the essence of the 91 .

the intellect is a power. different . 3). 79. Obj. according to Gregory. Obj. as from its chief power. 3. a substance is intellectual by the fact immaterial. but the soul itself. And is in this sense also Augustine says that the essence {De Trin. But in God iilone His action of understanding is His very Being. but they are united in the mind. In accordance v/ith shown (Q. Reply Obj. the contrary. LIV. x. Q. On what has been already 3. Reply Obj. Further. LXXVII. and sometimes for the sensitive soul for the sensitive soul takes its name from its chief power. But the soul is immaterial through essence. so is the essence to being. in Ev. / answer that. i) it is necessary to say that the intellect is a power of the soul. and not the very essence of the soul. Therefore the mind and intellect of man are not a power of the soul. is Further. that its it 4. The Philosopher assigns the intellectual faculty as a power of the soul {De Anima ii. Sense is sometimes taken for the power.Q. i. 2 . which is sense. Therefore it seems that the soul must be intellectual through its essence. A. Now {De Trin. 2. for Augustine soul.Art. And in like manner the intellectual soul is sometimes called intellect. man understands with the angels. 16). ix. A. Wherefore in God alone is His intellect His essence while : : in other intellectual creatures. Therefore the mind and of the soul man the very essence and not a power thereof. when for as power is to operation itself is its being operation as its act. For then alone the essence of that which operates is the immediate principle of operation. But angels are called mmds and infe/lects. I THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 92 the appetitive and the intellectual are different of the soul's powers as the Philosopher says {De genera Aninia ii.). 1 1) places the intelligence intellect of and is will in the mind. and thus we read {De .. that the intellect is a substance. 4). in a homily for the Ascension (xxix.. 3). mind spirit and xiv. Anima i. The appetitive and intellectual powers are of powers in the soul. by reason of the genera But the appetitive different formalities of their objects.

Therefore the intellectual power is not passive. Obj. the agent is nobler than the patient. But the intellectual power results from the immateriality of the intelligent substance. Obj. Augustine {Gen ad lit. 2 power agrees partly with the intellectual power and partly with the sensitive in its mode of operation either through a corporeal organ or without it for appetite follows appre: hension. but that it is substance it its virtue and power. whether the intellect is a passive power? proceed thus to the Second Article: a Objection i.) But all the powers of the vegetative part are active: say. 6).93 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS n. In the angels there is no other power in this And besides the intellect. are active. It would seem that the intellect is not For everything is passive by its matter. .. it is corruptible (De Anima iii. Wherefore it follows not that the intellect is the substance of the soul. highest. iii. the powers of the soul. The immateriality of the created intelligent many is not its intellect. art. and therefore the comparison fails. therefore. Thereintellect is not a passive power. intellect is passive. that to understand is The Philosopher says {De Anima in a way to be passive. -<. LXXIX. such as the sensitive and nutritive powers. mind and Reply way Augustine puts the will in the the Philosopher. 4) . in the reason (De Anima iii. I. Second Article..e. Much yet they are the lowest among all the intellectual powers. 16) and Aristotle (De Anima. as We — fore it seems that the 2. but through its immateriality has the power of intelligence. On the contrary. because his whole power consists in this. Reply Obj. Further. passive power. But the soul has other powers. But ij the as we have said above (Q. 4. A. which follows the intellect. and acts by its form. Obj. . xii. 5). and the will. And for this reason an angel is called a vt ind or an intellect . the Further. 3. 3. which are the more. 9). intellectual power is incorruptible.

And therefore the Divine intellect is is not in potentiality. " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 94 To be passive may be taken in three ways. otherwise it would needs be an infinite being. Wherefore every created intellect is not the act of all things intelligible. all being pre-exists cause. / answer F^irstly. We may the intellect. For we find an is intellect whose : relation to universal being and such is God. And accordingly. And in this way not only he who is ill is saifi to be passive. Thirdly. 2 THE that.. This is clear For we have seen above (Q. when from a thing is taken something which belongs to it by virtue either of its nature. whatever passes may be said to be passive. LVIII. 79. which is the Essence of originally and virtually. most strict sense. from . the very fact that what is in potentiality to something receives that to which it was in potentiality.Q. but pure act. or of its proper inclination as when water loses coolness by heating. but also he who is healed not only he that is sad. when something. Secondly. but from to act as we observe in things proceeds potentiality that are corrupted and generated. There : is a potentiality which is always perfected by matter of the heavenly bodies (Q. potentiality has a double relation to act. i). in which as in its first that of the act of all being the Divine intellect. even And thus witli us to understand is to from the following reason. Now. has an operation extending to universal being. whether suitable or unsuitable.. is taken away from it. LXXVIII. A. a thing is said to be passive. but also he that is joyful or whatev-er way he be altered or moved. be passive. in its : less strictly. act as the And there not always in act. another potentiality which . intelligible things as a potentiality to act. is its i). without being deprived of anything. Wherefore the angelic is . as therefore see whether the intellect be in act or potentiality by observing first of all the nature of the relation of the intellect to universal being. A. from potentiality to act. But no created intellect can be an act in relation to the whole universal being. and as when a man becomes ill or sad. when it is perfected. by reason of its very existence but is compared to these . in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive. .Art.

Hence incorruptible. which belong to primary matter. And so it is evident that with us to understand is in a way to he passive . reason (Ethic. i. The agent is nobler than the patient. Now the a passive power in regard to the whole universal while the vegetative power is active in regard to particular thing. Obj. the action intellect is if : and the passion are referred to the if same thing but not always. 2. as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii. nobler being being : some . and is at first like a clean tablet on which nothing is written. Obj. This is made clear from the fact. 79- Art. But in the third sense passion is in anything which is reduced from potentiality to act. . 2 intellect is always in act as regards those things which it can understand. is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible. the body as united to the Wherefore nothing prevents such a passive force soul. than such an active one. 13). is in 4) is not passive except in the third sense it is : for it is not an act of a corporeal organ. and which for this reason Aristotle calls the possible intellect (De Anima which iii. as we have said above. taking passion in the And consequently the intellect is a passive power. But the intellect potentiality to things intelligible. This objection is verified of passion in the first and second senses. which is pure act. I. which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote from the perfection of the Divine intellect. they refer to different things. which is called the particular reason.95 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q. the sensitive appetite. 4). and afterwards we are made to understand actually. namely. intellect is the act of a corporeal organ. it obeys the. the human intellect. And in each case passive may be taken in the two first senses forasmuch as this so-called because name . Passive intellect is the name given by some to third sense. by reason of its proximity to the first But intellect. that at first we are only in potentiality to understand. in which are the passions of the soul which appetite is also called rational by participation. 3. Others give the of passive intellect to the cogitative power. Reply Obj.

so in the soul is there something by it which becomes things. is is : required for sight. agent is received into the patient according to the nature of the patient. but perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to the intellect. intellect. . as will be explained farther on 4). Further. in every nature. but only that it is passive. makes the medium to be its own nature moves the Obj. Now it a form to is intelligible in act very fact that for an active telligible. and consequently that they are (.g. but only passive. 3.act. Further. Therefore. But because sense is in potentiality to things sensible. We — if we say that also in the senses there such as on the contrary. . the likeness of the. since our intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible. it seems that we cannot say that the intellect is active. The Philosopher says (De 'Anima iii. " 96 whether there is an active intellect? proceed thus to the Third Article: Objection i It would seem that there is no active intellect. the sense is not said to be active. so is our intellect to things intelligible. According to the opinion of Plato. 79. But in the operation of the intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be brought into Therefore there is no necessity for an active intellect. But the Therefore its passive intellect is an immaterial power. 2. inasmuch as it actually luminous. there is no need for an active intellect in order to make things actually intelligible. is immaterial. Therefore there the is from the no need in- intellect make species actually On As the contrary. immaterial nature suffices for forms to be received into it immaterially.'\. Art. for colour of luminous medium. light Obj. light something active. 5). For Plato supposed that the forms of natural things subsisted apart from matter. For as the senses are to things sensible. answer that. 3 THE " SUMM A THEOLOGICA Third Article. all makes / all and something by which it Therefore we must admit an active things. .

required for sight. i. But in the opinion of others. in like manner and for the same reason as light is required for seeing. their in proper genera and might be naturally established formed was and that our intellect by such particispecies and species pation in order to have knowledge of the genera forms of allow that But since Aristotle did not of things. that as it is required for the same reason. as the senses are made actual by what is actually sensible. by the And such is tion of the species from material conditions. there is something active and some- Wherefore : thing passive. it is clear that in the nutritive part all the powers are active. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act. Reply Obj. is actually intelligible from the intelligible : since a thing he called such forms immaterial. There are two opinions as say that light is to the effect of light. If the agent pre-exist. the necessity for an active intellect. light is required for sight. We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some abstracpower to make things actually intelligible. existas forms natural things exist apart from matter. Reply Obj. And according to this. 2. Sensible things are found in act outside the soul and hence there is no need for an active sense. but not it may well happen Reply Obj. whereas in the sensitive part all are passive but in the intellectual part.Art. medium may become actually luminous. that individuals in order was even corporeal matter formed. so verified in this. the natures or forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible. it is very fact that he said that species or ideas . For some to make colours actually visible. . 7Q. in order And according to this the active intellect required for understanding. from a participation of which. the intellect to light is for understanding. and : it follows that ing in matter are not actually intelligible. on that its likeness is received variously into various things.97 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS And Q. is light required for seeing. not for the colours to become actually visible but in order that is . Aristotle's comparison of the active .4 ' . as the Commentator says on De Anima ii. 3.

therefore. Fourth Article. whether the active intellect THE SOUL? is something in proceed thus to the Fourth Article : Objection i. 9. But this done by something higher than the soul according to Jo. 2. an active power it follows that man would always be able to understand when he wished. thing lect. i. the that the active intellect nothing can be in Philosopher (De Anima iii. and someunderstand always times it does not understand. in our soul. is something belonging to the soul and also the active intel- Obj. the Philosopher {De Ani7na iii. Further. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 98 account of their dispositions. Further. But if the agent does not prethe the of exist. therefore in order to understand them. Further. But potentiality and in act with regard to the is . the passive intellect. Therefore the active intellect is not something in the soul. which makes things actually intelligible by way of abstraction. It would seem that the active We — intellect is not something is in the soul. that it does not sometimes understand and sometimes not understand. which is : Obj. If. the immaterial existing in nature.Q. : But our soul does not sometimes it understands. agent and patient suffice for action. if we consider nature of the passive intellect would not suffice but for the presence of the active intellect. Now the intelligible in act is not something the nature of things And sensible. He was the true light that enlighteneth every man to give light for the is : coming into this world. recipient has nothing to do with disposition the matter. Art. Obj. 3. 5) says of the active intellect. 79. 5) says a substance in actual being. which is Therefore the active intellect is not someclearly false. . Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul. which is a passive power. For the effect of the active intellect purpose of understanding. 4. which do not subsist apart from matter.

the passive intellect.).. a sign of which in part. thing. intellectual but Moreover reaches to the Wherefore some held separate. is that this intellect. is The active intellect. which is in potentiality to all things intelligible. things which it does underfrom it Therefore there stand. But every power flows from the essence of the soul. and what is mobile. is something which results from acts. from which the soul acquires the power of understanding. 79. namely. we must observe that above the intellectual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior intellect. and what is imperfect always requires the pre-existence of something essentially such. in those and because. Further. For what is such by participation.e. it must be a power. the iii. therefore. It would therefore follow that the active intellect flows from the essence of the soul. by helped to understand. if the active intellect is something in the For it is neither a passion nor soul. In order to make this evident. substantially the active intellect. 4 same soul. Now the pher speaks. needs be some which the soul is must higher intellect. 5. Again it has an imperfect both because it does not understand everyunderstanding. to be in the soul. contrary. which by lighting up the . I answer that. agents in regard to the passivity of the soul but rather passion is the very action of the passive power while habit . If. immovable and perfect. the passive and active intellect. Obj. thing. And thus it would not be in the soul : by way of participation from some higher intellect which is unfitting. of which the Philoso- something in the soul. The Philosopher says (De Anima that it is necessary for these differences. is something in the seems impossible for the active intellect to be also something in our soul. human soul is called intellectual by reason is of a participation it is in intellectual power . a habit since habits and passions are not in the nature of it .99 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q. On I. with a certain amount of reasoning and movement.Art. . Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul. passes potentiality to act. that it not wholly only understanding of truth by arguing.

besides the universal active causes. it would still be necessary to assign to the human some power participating in that superior intellect. But. A. XC. Now no action belongs to anything except through some principle formally inherent as we have said above of the passive intellect therein (Q.-H. The light of Thy countenance. which is something received into . and only beatitude as will be . the air while Plato compared the separate intellect impressing the soul to the sun. it is able to And we light up the phantasms. I. i). 5) compared the active intellect to light. even supposing the existence of such a separate active intellect. 4 THE " SUM MA THEOLOGICA " loo phantasms as it were. since we perceive that we abstract universal forms from their particular conditions. : alone does not generate begetting animals. A.. 7). as Themistius says in his : commentary on De Anima according to the Who is iii. each one is endowed with its proper powers derived from those universal causes for the sun ligible. as we have explained. iv.Q. but of the intellect in act of which he : had already said : Knowledge in act is the same as the I . according to Ps.. is God Himself. by which power the human soul makes things actually intelsoul Just as in other perfect natural things. 7. from which tlie human soul derives a particular power. Reply Obj. HI. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii. the soul's Creator. whereby know this by experience. But the separate intellect. O Lord. 2. 79- Art. man man : and in like Now among human is these soul. which is to make them actually intelligible. makes them to be actually intelligible.. A. Therefore the power which is the principle of this action must be something in the soul. Reply Obj. 3.. shown later on (O. LXXVI. perfect than the in the soul the power of manner with other perfect lower things nothing is more Wherefore we must say that . The Philosopher says those words not of the active intellect. Wherefore the human soul derives its intellectual light from Him. is signed upon us. Q. i. That true light enlightens as a universal cause. teaching of our faith. but in man is some power derived from a higher intellect.

and whereby it abstracts from matter. 3. the good disposition of the sensitive powers. The intellectual soul is indeed actually intellect is immaterial. . Since the essence of the soul immaterial. we require the presence of phantasms. by reason of its being in is potentiality to such species. as it is inasmuch same one and the soul. it would act). : whether the active something belonging to the soul. as. If the relation of the active intellect to the passive intellect were that of the active object to a power. Or. other things come to be understood. the contrary. follow that we could understand is all things instantly. as from terms are made propositions.loi THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q. if we refer those words to the active intellect. nothing prevents that power which it derives from the supreme intellect. and sometimes we do not understand. Reply Obj. then they are said because it is not owing to the active intellect that sometimes we do. but it is in potentiality to determinate species. having one power by which it makes things actually immaterial. and another power. phantasms are actual images of certain Wherefore species. since all the active intellect that which makes is not an active intellect now the But that things (in : whereby the objects are made object. Reply Obj. flowing from the essence of the soul. created by the supreme intellect. of the visible in act to the sight. but to the intellect which is in potentiality. 5. to be in act besides the presence of the active intellect. prevents nothing On actually immaterial. for instance. which is called the passive intellect receptive of such species. and from first prinFrom this point of view it matters not ciples. but are immaterial in potentiality. 79- Art 4 thing. Reply Obj. in the same way as its other powers. by abstraction from the conwhich power is called the ditions of individual matter : active intellect . 4. or something separate from the soul. conclusions. rather is it for which. and practice in this sort of operation since through one thing understood.

3. For it is impossible that one same power belong to intellects as there are souls. For if the active intellect were not something belonging to the soul.y. all men agree in the first intellectual But to these they assent by the active intellect. multiplied according to the active intellect is We the Fifth Article: — number of bodies. there would be one active intellect for all men. And this is what they mean who hold that there is one active intellect for all.) that the active intellect is as a light. But if the active intellect is something belonging to the soul. is one for in all men. The Philosopher proves by the that the active intellect is separate. answer that. as one of its / On same powers. but 2. Reply Obj. Therefore the active same in all. we are bound to say that there are as many active which are multiplied according to the number of men. 5). separate. which one many. Therefore the active intellect is not in various men. It would seem that there is one active inFor what is separate from the body is not tellect in all. : i. various substances. But the Anima human Obj. 79.ne in all? proceed thus to Objection i.e. LXXVI. the same in the various things enlightened.. Now the passive intellect is said to .. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " Fifth Article. as he says (loc. 2). the contrary. the active intellect the cause of the is universal. Obj. Further. The Philosopher says {De Anima iii. is Further. the agent is more noble than the patient. 102 whether the active intellect is o. The truth about this question depends on what we have already said (A. iii. concepts. but were some separate substance. But light is not I.). cit. as the Philosopher says {De Therefore it is not multiplied in the many is bodies. itself But that which the cause of unity intellect is the is still more one. A. as we have said above (Q. fact that the passive intellect is sepa'-ate because.Art. all Therefore agree in one active intellect. 4).

Reply Obj. because And in the . the Sixth Article that : — is It would seem memory not in the intellectual part of the soul. Yet it must be derived by all thus the possession by all men in principles proves the unity of the which Plato compares to the sun but separate intellect. All things which are of one species enjoy in common the action which accompanies the nature of the species. which Aristotle com- from one principle. For Augustine says {De Trin. not need be the same intellect in all purpose intelligent beings. for he says {ibid. 3. but it must be one in its relationship to all those things from which it abstracts the universal. pares to light. Wherefore all men enjoy is the principle of this action : and for to power is the active intellect. 3. But there is no need be identical in all. 79. same sense not the act of any corporeal organ. 2. and commit them to memory. 2. xii. And this befits the active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial. not the unity of the active intellect. 8) that to the higher part of the soul belong those Buf things which are not common to man and beast. Reply Obj. The active intellect is the cause of the it But for this by abstracting it from matter. . Now in to know the the first intelligible principles is the action belonging to the human common this it power which species. . Sixth Article. with respect to which things the universal is one. Therefore memory memory does not belong to the intellectual part of the soul.whether memory is in the intellectual part of the soul? We proceed thus to Objection i. universal.103 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS it is Q. 2) that beasts can sense corporeal things through the senses of the body. And common of the first . the active intellect is also called separate but not as a separate substance. 6 be separate. is common to man and beast. and consequently the power which is the principle of such action but not so as that power be identical in all. .Art.

Further. apprehension. exists in intellect of which the likeness the must every thing be actually understood. as soon as we cease to understand something actually. Thus. but of the sense. On intelligible species can thus be preserved in the intellect because Avicenna held that this was impossible. Therefore memory is not in the intellectual part. Augustine says (De Trin. p certain aptitude in the passive intellect for turning which aptitude he calls the habit to the active intellect . Memory. 6 THI- "SU. I answer that. x. which involves knowledge under the conditions of here and now. Further. 2. in which certain species may be preserved apart from actual : which has no corporeal Wherefore intelligible exists. as to some powers. received into Now the intellect in act implies under- and therefore the intellect actuallv understanding stands all things of which it has the species. Therefore the in act memory is not in the intellectual part. But in the intellect. 79. Obj. Art. understanding and will are one tnind. Since it is of the nature of the memory to preserve the species of those things which are not actually apprehended. But this cannot happen in the intellect. For he admitted that this could happen in the sensitive part. because the intellect is reduced to act by the fact that the intelligible species are it. according to him. memory is of the past. we must turn to the active intellect. we must first of all consider whether the the Contrary. therefore. But this is not the province of the intellect. which he held to be a separate substance. . inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal organs. But the past is said of something with regard to a fixed time. is organ. according in to him. .Q. the species of that thing ceases to be in our intellect. 11) that memory. and if we wish to understand that thing anew. And from the practice and habit of turning to the active intellect there is formed. therefore. but only in the sensitive part. nothing but what order that the intelligible species may thence flow again into our passive intellect. 3. knows a thing under a condition of a fixed time. in the memory are preserved the species of those things of which we are not actually thinking.MMA THEOLOGICA" 104 Obj. .

is said to be in act. though otherwise than before : the act of understanding namely. much more cogent reason is there for the intellect to receive therefore. Thus. But this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of Aristotle. Memory. it is in potentiality. through them. then the memory is not in the intellectual. only while it actually does something but also after ceasing to act through them. preserved in the intellectual part that is not nothing understood wherefore it would not be possible actually to admit memory in the intellectual part. when the : of knowledge. therefore. But the intellect is of a more which stable nature. But if in the notion of memory we object as something past. not in the same And. 79ART. as past. it matter. but only in the sensitive part. Now. we must say that it is in the intellectual part. the species unchangeably and lastinglv. therefore. whether it receive them from things sensible. even way fact. which include its apprehends individual things. if considered as retentive of . to tliis supposition. is something individual. To the operate of itself. or derive them from some superior intellect. therefore. I. If. inasmuch as it receives the intelligible species of each thing.I05 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS fs Q. and is more immovable than corporeal corporeal matter holds the forms not receives. that it receives the species of intelligible things it owes its being able to operate when it wills. and that this happens when it can then. the passive intellect is said to be each thing. 4) that. For past. Reply Obj. For received into something is received according to the conditions of the recipient.6 According. it passive intellect is identified with each thing as knowing it. if we take memory only for the power of retaining species. but not so that it be always operating for even then is it in potentiality in a certain sense. The foregoing opinion what is is also opposed to reason. in the sense that whoever has habitual knowledge is in potentiality to actual — consideration. but as before learning and discovering. For he says {De Anitna iii. since it signifies being under a condition of fixed time.

is not common to us and other animals. : And nature for such In this way. the past is accidental. the notion of memory. is preserved in the intellect. its : But as concerns the intellectual part. and to have sensed some past sensible thing. forasmuch as it understands that it previously understood but not in the sense that it understands the past as something here : and now. and then the intellect is said 3. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii. as man and to man. or to- incompatible with the intellectual an act of understanding. or future. as well as in the senses. But on the part of the act. but the intellect. existing in this or that time. which apprehends something from the fact — of being immuted by a present sensible wherefore at same time an animal remembers to have sensed before the in the past. and therefore. though something individual. 4) that the soul is the seat of the species. is yet an immaterial act. in the past. and to the act of knowledge. For the intellect understands man. These two are found together in the sensitive part. For species are not retained in tlie sensitive part of the soul only. then. Reply Obj. may be understood to be in the intellect. as the intellect understands itself. : accidental that he exist in the present. to the object which is known. as we have said above of the intellect (Q. though it be itself an individual intellect. . LXXVI. which is an individual act. The condition of past may be referred to two things namely. intellect only The intelligible species is sometimes in the in potentiality. Because our soul's act of understanding is an individual act.Q. without the association of any corporeal organ. A.. or yesterday. as man. this is not morrow. 2. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " io6 species. Reply Obj. in as far as it regards past events. But the intellect in itself : retentive of species.Art. and is not in itself a part of the object of the intellect. inasmuch as a man is said to understand now. so also it understands its act of understanding. even as it is such. not the whole soul. i). past. but rather in the power is is the act of body and soul united since the memorative some organ. or future. the condition of past. 79. present.

part.I07 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q. : . between potentiality and act and then we have habitual knowledge. part is A. x.. understanding. understanding. the reason of distinction among the powers in the sensitive part is the same as in the intellectual But memory in the sensitive part is distinct from sense. 79. Obj. 7). another not is said (A. From nature the memory the But the Philosopher treasury or storehouse of species. 3. and then : it understand in act. clear that the memory is a distinct power from the Therefore 2. Further. And sometimes the intelligible species is in a middle state. memory. As has been said above (Q. 6 ad i). 11 xi. as we have in said (Q. 1) But will. In this way the intellect retains the species. the intellectual distinct Therefore from the according to Augustine {De Trin. Sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect as regards the ultimate completion of the understands in act. as we have {De Anima iii. distinct from the intellect. / answer that. It would seem that the intellectual memory For Augustine {De Trin. 7 to be in potentiality. and will are equal to one not another.Art. LXXVII. 4). LXXVIIL. even when it does not act. Therefore the memory power from the intellect. On the contrary. be if memory and intellect were the same power. and one flows from the other. 3). But this could Obj. it is and will. 1 We — is X. Seventh Article. it is also distinct from the intellect. its Therefore is they are not the same power. whether the intellectual memory is a power distinct from the intellect? proceed thus to the Seventh Article : Objection 1. the powers of the soul are distinguished by the since each power different formal aspects of their objects it is directed is defined in reverence to that thing to which A. memory intellect. assigns to the soul memory. Further. .) attributes this to the intellect.

Nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the active intellect and of the passive intellect because as regards the same object. Reply Obj. Reply Obj. not differentiated by differences of black and white. And by intelligence I mean that by which we understand when actually thinking . 2. AUhough it is said (3 Sent. intelligence. whether we actually attend to them or not. A. xiv. an to object according to the common ratio of the object.) that memory. ferentiated by : by the object existing in act.. Now. intellect. being in potentiality is to a can be no other difference of being in act. 79. D.Art. Therefore there powers in the intellect. this is not in accordance with the meaning of Augustine.) that if we take memory. who says expressly (De Trin.Q. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " io8 and which It has also been said above is its object. which regards is object under the common ratio of colour. . the act of the will. LIX. they seem to pertain to the memory only. which is moved potentiality. but that of passive and active. if that 4) any power by its nature be directed (Q. Wherefore it is clear that Augustine does not take the above three for three powers . and by will I mean that love or affection which unites the child and its parent. but by . i. and will are three powers.. and will as always present in the soul. Past and present may differentiate the . Thus the active power is compared to its object as a being in act is to a being in potentiality whereas the passive power. on the contrary. that power will not be differentiated according to the indi: vidual differences of that object just as the power of sight. the active power which makes the object to be in act must be distinct from the passive power. i. the act of the intellect and bv will. memory he understands the soul's : habit of retention by intelligence. Wherefore it is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the intellect for it belongs to the nature of a passive is compared to its object as a : power to retain as well as to receive. its the intellect regards its object under the common ratio of being since the passive intellect is that in which all are in : Wherefore the passive intellect is not difany difference of being.

But it does not belong to the same power to be in eternity and to be in time. 6). but not the intellectual powers. power. which is proper to man. then reason. and sense in common with the brutes. Art. Reply Obj.log THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q. Obj. first the sense comes to our aid. to the angel whence they are lit. as intellect is compared to reason. But reason. or intelligence. that intellect. 8 sensitive powers. imagination is from sense. Further. but not as a power to a power. or whatever appropriate name we like Therefore reason. Reason and intellect in man cannot be we is is shall understand this clearly if distinct powers. On the contrary. For to understand consider their respective actions. man has intellect in common with the angels. iv. distinct Therefore the reason is from the 2. whence he is called a rational animal. Augustine says (Gen. which properly belongs called intellectual. We simply to apprehend intelligible truth : and to reason . or mind. 3. intellect. then imagination. Intelligence arises from memory. iii. then the intellect. Boethius says {De Consol. and mind are one to give it. ad that in which man excels irrational animals is 20) that reason. as act from habit and in this way it is equal to it. for the reason given above. as eternity to time. 3. It would seem that the reason We — is a distinct power from the For it is stated in De Spiritu et Anima that when we wish to rise from lower things to higher. is a power distinct from sense. 79. Further. Obj. Eighth Article. / answer that. Therefore is it equall)- true to say that it is distinct : from the intellect. whether the reason is distinct from the intellect ? proceed thus to the Eighth Article: Objection 1. intellect. Therefore reason and intellect are not the same power. .

as Dionysius says {Div. Reply Obj. so as And therefore angels who. which angels know. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " no to to know an advance from one thing understood to another. advances from certain stood namely. movement always proceeds from something immovable. not according to the distinction of powers. intelligible truth. knowledge of intelligible truth by advancthing to another. therefore. said. That enumeration is made according to the : : order of actions. But man arrives at the ing from one rational. and ends in something at rest. Moreover. to the knowledge of intelligible truth. that rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers. vii. therefore. since And discovery. have no need to advance from one thing to another but apprehend the truth simply and without . compared to under- standing. Nom. in the light Now it is clear of which it examines what it has found. which reason seeks. by way of inquiry and imperfect. mental discussion. according to their nature. even in natural things since by the same nature a thing is moved towards a certain Much more. by place. by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles. i. as movement is to rest.Q. hence it is that human reasoning. that book is not of great authority. Reply Obj. But man attains. Reply Obj. 2. things simply underand. again. although imperfectly. movable. and therefore he is called is Reasoning. Therefore in the angels the power of knowledge is not of a different genus from that which is in the human reason. 3. and rests in that place. but to one and the same. . Other animals are so much lower than man that they cannot attain to the knowledge of truth.). or acquisition to possession of which one belongs to the perfect. the other to the . The answer is For eternity is compared clear to time as from what we have immovable to And thus Boethius compared the intellect to and reason to time. possess perfect knowledge of intelligible truth. but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect. 79 Art. the first principles — . the same power do we understand and reason and so it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power. eternity.

is another principle. Obj. the Philosopher says {Ethic. the lower reason flows from the higher. We — that the of the reason. which.) that opinion rises from imagination : then the mind by judging the truth: of the truth or error of the opinion discovers whence mens (mind) is derived from metiendo (measuring). 7) is intent on the consideration and consultation of things eternal: and that what the Philosopher calls the reasoning or opinionative part is the same as it the lower reason. Therefore the higher is another power than the lower. therefore. Orth. i) that by which the soul knows necessary things. is intent on the disposal of temporal things. as corSince.Ill THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Ninth Article. 4. Further. Q. the same as eternal. generically different parts of the soul are ordained. For Augustine says {De Trin. Art. and temporal the same as contingent. Further. power from the lower. Damascene says (De Fid. ii. according to Augustine. nothing flows from itself. But the parts of the powers. Obj. cit. Therefore the higher and lower reason are two powers. according to Augustine {loc. and another part from the opinionative and reasoning part by which it knows contingent things. the scientific part of the soul. 4. xii. 7). Obj. Further. and is ruled and Therefore the higher reason is another directed by it. soul are its image of the Trinity is in the higher part and not in the lower. 2. reason . vi. Now contingent and necessary are generically different. 9 whether the higher and lower reason are distinct POWERS ? proceed thus to the Ninth Article: Objection i. Now. seems that what the Philosopher calls the scientific part must be the same as the higher reason. And he proves this from the principle that for those things which are generically different. It would seem that the higher and lower reason are distinct powers. necessary is ruptible and incorruptible. 3. which. 79.

Augustine says (De Trin. the contrary. 4) that higher and lo%ver reason are only distijict by their functions. But the same movable thing passes through the medium and reaches the end. indemonwhereas habit of science. For he says that the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal: forasmuch as in contemplation it sees them in On themselves. eternal and temporal are related to our knowledge in this way. and in consultation it takes its rules of action from them. from eternal things already known. a movement from one thing to another. we come through know- — — ledge of temporal things to that of things eternal. according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. But it may happen that the medium and what : is attained thereby belong to different habits as the first strable principles belong to the habit of intellect the conclusions which we draw from them belong to the . by which we may under- stand the higher reason. For the act of the reason is. xii. But he calls the lower reason that which is intent on the disposal of temporal things. being understood by the things that are made: while by way of judgment. For by way of discovery. 20). can in no way be two powers of the soul.79ART. and according to laws of things eternal we dispose of temporal things. we judge of temporal things. that one of them is the means of knowing the other.Q. Wherefore the higher and lower reasons are one and the same power. Therefore they are not two powers. But according to . Now these two namely.9 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 112 therefore the intellect regards those things which are already subject to jiidgment and true decision. i. the / answer that. is distinct from the mind and the intellect. The invisible things of God are clearly seen. as they are understood by Augustine. Therefore And the opinionative power. of And so geometry we draw it happens that from the principles a conclusion in another science for — example. But the power of the reason is such that both medium and term belong to it. which is the lower reason. as it were. perspective. The higher and lower reason.

Now perfect and imperfect in the action do not vary the power. pher speaks. science to the 1. is attributed to the higher reason. but not because they are different powers. On the other hand. by . is We can And speak of parts. from which it demonstrates their proper accidents. Wherefore it perfectly knows necessary things which have perfect being in truth. without any qualification. And the opinionative and ratiocinative part is more limited than the lower reason for it regards only things contingent. concerning the variety of which he inquires. nevertheless agree in the common distinct . is The scientific part. but because they are — according to a different aptitude for receiving various habits. and consequently the principles of the actions and the habits themselves. that a power. 79 Art. the scientific and the ratiocinative. but they vary the actions as to the mode of acting. 01 to be ruled by it. tis in whatever way a divided according thing to its various acts. though differing according to their proper genera. Reply Obj. of which the Philoso: not the same as the higher reason for necessary truths are found even among temporal things. Neither must we say. they have but imperfect being and truth. is distinct from because it it knows contingent things knows both under the same objective aspect namely. For contingent and necessary. forasmuch as it knows contingent things. to their various habits : for wisdom lower. 9 Augustine they are distinguished by the functions of their actions. 3. as far as the principles use of by the lower reason are drawn from and directed by the principles of the higher reason. so far reason is made higher. And of the soul therefore the Philosopher postulates two lesser parts namely. The lower reason is said to flow from the divided. Reply Obj.113 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS and according Q. but imperfectly it . which the intellect a power by which : — since penetrates to their very essence. the higher and lower reason are called parts. 2. under the aspect of being and truth. of which natural science and mathematics treat. not because they are two powers..4 8 . Reply Obj. knows necessary things.

is called phronesis (that is.Q. 3. intelligence in another. examining and judging of itself. Boethius says (De Consol.IO THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 114 aspect of being. imagination in another. then imagination. Reply Obj. to that which is understood is called and invention when it remains in the same man. not according to the variety For opinion signifies an act of the intellect of powers. then reason. . Further.79. 4.ART. is Lastly. reason in another. Therefore also . then intellect. applying certain principles to examine From this is taken the word mens (mind). to understand to adhere to the formed judgment with approval. whilst in fear of the other. that which remains and conforms the soul invention. Obj. but that intelligence which is about a certain thing is called intention. propositions. actions come before powers. Orth. is that the first movement called intelligence . seemingly. We — intellect and intelligence are distinct. For we read in De Spiritu et Anima that when we wish to rise from lower to higher things. But imagination and sense are distinct powers. which leans to one side of a contradiction. which the intellect considers. While to judge or measure (mensurare) is an act of the intellect. as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense. Further. Obj. v.) But intelligence to the intellect. as the the Philosopher says (De act separate Anima ii. But intellect is same power as reason. 4) that sense considers man in one way. whether intelligence is a power distinct from ? intellect proceed thus to the Tenth Article: Objection i It would seem that the intelligence is another power than the intellect. is an For Damascene says (De Fid. That distinction given by Damascene is according to the variety of acts. from others attributed ii. 4). 2. and to which they are variously compared as perfect and imperfect. Tenth Article. and afterwards intelligence. Therefore. first the sense comes to our aid. intelligence is a distinct power from intellect.

as intelligence alone belongs to God. which is to consider. as three states of the passive intellect. is to the intellect. but as act is from power. which is to understand. 6) that intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is On nothing false. four intellects are different all things the active power is distinct But three of these are distinct. the contrary. that is. Wherefore he also says that reason alone belongs to the human race. and thus it is called intellect in habit sometimes it is in the second act. they say. not another power than the / answer that. the active and and passive the actual intellect. as power is from power. and phronesis if dilated makes thought. means the act of the intellect. the separate substances which we call angels are called intelligences. If this authority is accepted. and perhaps for this reason. sometimes it is in the first act. But the knowledge of these things belongs Therefore the intelligence intellect.79ART.115 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q. that such substances are always actually understanding. lo wisdom). The Philosopher says {De Anima iii. as in powers just from the passive. For sometimes they assign four intellects namely. This word intelligence properly signifies the intellect's very act. and . the — intellect in habit. they are called intellects or minds. Thus intelligence is not distinct from intellect. for it belongs to God to understand all things without any against intellect as act against Reply Obj. divided power. which and is knowledge. thus there it is called intellect in act. the active and passive intellects. and thus it is called passive. i. And such a division is recognized even by the philosophers. Therefore it seems that intelli- gence is some special power. Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the intellect which transcends the act of the reason. in some works translated from the Arabic. orderly internal speech. Of which . However. from which. which is sometimes in potentiality only. . comes speech expressed by the tongue. intelligence it is Reply Obj. or actual intellect. investigation. But in works translated from the Greek. And thus 2.

in the intellectual part. And what it some operation. the practical intellect is compared to the speculative. certain. For this power first of all only apprehends some- — thing. It would seem that the speculative and We — For the apprepractical intellects are distinct powers. and of the practical is good. 2). the different nature of the object difpower. Secondly. 3. ferentiates the intellect is Further. Therefore thev are distinct powers. as is clear from is But the speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power while the practical intellect ii.Q. A. which belongs to phronesis or wisdom. Further. i. as but only what cannot be reduced to the one same principle. or to called intelligence. F. . 79. LXXVIIL. and this is called when it goes on in search of what it intends. it is called invention. Obj. Art. All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong to one power namely. by or to be wise. for it belongs to the wise man to judge. means of making known to others and this is the order- ing of interior speech. which differ Therefore the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers. 2. whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers ? proceed thus to the Eleventh Article: Objection i. the intellectual power. we have said above (O. Obj. as the Philosopher says (Metaph. But the object of the speculative truth. it reference to something known for examines what it has found. Eleventh Article. it apprehends to the knowledge of something is intention. as being fully examined.OT every difference of acts does not make the powers vary. as the estimative in nature. has obtained something it thinks about the . . and this act directs else. De Anima 3. a motive power. ii THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " n5 Reply Obj. it is said to know When. 3. And when it once it for certain. 4). hensive and motive are different kinds of powers. from which proceeds external speech.

. as power from power. Therefore the speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers. as having the aspect of good. A. so the object of the practical intellect is good directed to operation. this is Aniina iii. to operation. as we have said above (Q. But the estimative differs from the imaginative. Now. The practical intellect is operative. does not differentiate that power for it is accidental to a thing coloured to be . Truth and good include one another. not as executing movement. But one power is not changed into another. The speculative intellect by extension becomes practical (De Anima iii. Therefore also the speculative intellect differs from the practical. man. On the contrary. it . and this i. 10).iginative power in tiie sensitive part. a motive power. speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends. for truth is something good. as we LXXVIL. to operation. speculative and practical intellects are The reason of which is that. just as the speculative.. when some one desires to know the truth. Art. 79. Therefore as the object of the appetite may be something true. 3). but it directs the known truth to operation. not . A. cit. Reply Obj.e.). Reply Obj. or to be great or small hence all such things are apprehended by the same power of sight. for example. but to the consideration of truth while the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends . loc. have said above (Q. that the speculative differs its practical in what the Philosopher says (De from the Whence each is named from its end the one speculative. 2. otherwise it would not be desirable and good is something true. For the practical intellect knows truth. otherwise it would not . . The not distinct powers. and under the aspect of truth. what is accidental to the nature of the object of a power. the other practical — : i. but as directing towards belongs to itaccording to its mode of apprehension. / answer that. and according to this the For it is the speculative and practical intellects differ.117 is THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q. 4). LXXVIIL. to a thing apprehended by the intellect. it is accidental whether it be directed to operation or not. n to the im. And end. be intelligible.

ad 2.Q. Therefore synderesis is not a power. 12 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " ii8 Reply Obj. I answer that. though some held that it is a power higher than reason . Art. but inclines to good only. It would seem that sy7ideresis • We — is a special power. which do not differentiate the intellectual powers. Further. 12. therefore. . the concupiscible. xii. 2). the unchangeable rules which guide our judgment belong to the reason as to its higher part. the contrary. xii. It is. and the rational. 7. Synderesis is not a power but a habit. ii. rational powers regard opposite things. But synderesis and sensuality seem to be opposed to one another because synderesis always incites to good while whence it is signified by sensuality always incites to evil . Q. Arb. distinct from the others. A. is clear seems. Therefore synderesis is a power. since it is not found in brute animals. synderesis does not regard opposites. as we have said above (A. ad 4). both true and unchangeable. which are powers. it seems that synderesis is the same as reason and thus it is a power. According to the Philosopher {Metaph. For those things which fall under one division seem to be of the same genus. from Augustine (De Trin. therefore. LXXVII. 2. Since. Obj. i. as Augustine says {De Trin. 3. And this is what we call synderesis. Twelfth Article. 6 synderesis is divided against the irascible. 79. as 13). Augustine says {De Lib. : the serpent. is a power just as sensuality Further. that synderesis 3. opposite thingsare of the same genus. : On viii.. Obj. But in the gloss of Jerome on Ezech. For if it were a power it would be a rational power. But 2). 10) that in the natural power of judgment there are certain rules and seeds of virtue. whether synderesis is a special power of the soul distinct from the others ? proceed thus to the Twelfth Article: Objection i. 3. Many differences differentiate the sensitive powers.

so the practical reason argues about practical things. proceeds from the underof certain things namely. 6). Q. 2. not as reason. as while others* said that it is reason itself. but In order to make this clear we must observe we have is since it standing said above (A. inasmuch as by means of those prin- — known. Theol. man's act of reasoning. but to a special habit. bestowed on us by nature. a kind of movement. Sum. as from an immovable principle. Wherefore we judge naturally both by our reason and by synderesis. that. 8). not only speculaciples naturally tive principles. . 3. Reply Obj. to good. Therefore we must have. those which are — naturally known without any investigation on the part of reason. the opposition of sensunot of the ality to synderesis is an opposition of acts. but also practical principles. . but a natural habit. and Whence murmur at synderesis is said to incite to principles we proceed to have discovered. Wherefore the first practical principles. concerning which no one errs they are attributed to reason as to a power. and ends also at the understanding. Now it is clear that. The division given by Jerome is taken from the variety of acts.Art. vi. as the speculative reason argues about speculative things.. and not from the variety of powers and various acts can belong to one power. It is therefore clear that synderesis a power. 12 as a nature. and Reply Obj. inasmuch as through first discover. evil. In like manner. II. bestowed on us by nature. do not belong to a special power. which we call synderesis. LXXIII. which is called the understanding of principles. and judge of what we is not Reply Obj. different species of one genus. * Cf. I. 79. Alexander of Hales. we judge of those things which we have discovered by reasoning. and to synderesis as to a habit. . Those unchangeable notions are the first and practical principles. as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power. but to a special natural habit.119 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q.

it is Therefore conscience said of i.Art. On power the contrary. Nor is it a habit. according to the very nature of the word. . ad lit. 79. 15. except a Obj. But it is not an act for thus it would not always exist in man. a habit.Q. some that their it mind and conscience are defiled seems that conscience is a power. (Titus 15). speaking are attributed to conscience. But the application of knowledge to something is done by some act. xii. implies the relafor conscience may be tion of knowledge to something : resolved into cum alio scientia. since we are directed Therefore in our actions by many habits of knowledge. Further. whether conscience be a power? proceed thus to the Thirteenth Article: Objection 1. spirit designates a power — either the ing to the text your mind is —or (Eph.. mind itself. as 2. the imagination. i. Properly speaking conscience is not a power. Therefore conscience But a is not a power. • Commentary on Rom. cannot be laid aside. by which it is led away from evil and made to cling to good. This is evident both from the very name and from those things which in the common way of For conscience. Further. a power. nothing of the soul. It would seem that conscience is a power. whence imaginary vision Augustine says {Gen. knowledge applied to an individual case. for power 24). for Origen says* that conscience is a correcting and We — guiding spirit accompanying the soul. Obj. 13). accordBe ye renewed in the spirit of called spiritual. Conscience can be laid aside. Wherefore from this explanation of the name it is clear that conscience is an act. / answer that. But in the soul. for conscience is not one thing but many. or a power. conscience is a power. ii. is is iv. But conscience is a subject of sin. 7. a subject of sin. Therefore . but an act.e. conscience must of necessity be either an act. 3. 13 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 120 Thirteenth Article.

. And all these follow the application of knowledge or science The same what we do w-hich application is made in three ways. judge done. and in this sense conscience is said to excuse. i. is * Horn. Now the habits And for this special reason. so far as by conto incite or to bind. 23. conscience is a because mind as same the is spirit . For is — customary for causes and effects to be called after one far as another.* the natural power of judgment. or incite. i. called sometimes conscience. in princ. sometimes the name knowledge to conscience is given to the first natural habit namely. Wheredenominates an act. Conscience is called a spirit. so far as through the conscience we judge that something should be done or not done and in this sense. f De Fide Orthod. 6). manifest from those things which are atFor conscience is said to witness. so is Reply Obj. it is clear that all these things follow the actual application of what we do. conscience is said to witness. and also to accuse. Reply Obj. to bind. habit. 2. or rebuke. although many. that something done is well done or ill science we . yet it 3. The conscience as a subject. said to be defiled. or torment. 79. which is always remains in its cause. as we have said above. conscience But since habit is a principle of act. vii. Now. One way in so far as we recognize that we have done or not done something. 13 tributed to conscience. so Reply Obj. not known is in knowledge. certain pronouncement of the mind. and according to In another way. Ezech.121 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS is Q. iv. this. conscience is said In the third way. Proverb. 23). from one first habit. torment. this habit called synderesis. in itself. properly speaking. and it Damascene! says that it is the law of our intellect.Art. accuse. Although an all act does not always remain and which is power conscience is which by their efficacy have nevertheless formed. synderesis: thus Jerome calls synderesis conscience (Gloss. the habit of first principles. Thy conscience knoweth that thou hast to : often spoken evil of others (Eccles. fore. Basil. but as the thing far as someone knows he is defiled.

powers ? First Article. It would seem that the appetite is not a special power of the soul. apprehensive power. — . But each power of the soul desires some particular desirable thing namely. the will second. For no power of the soul is to be assigned for those things which are common to animate and to inanimate things.) Next we powers consider the appetitive powers. Therefore. powers are differentiated by their But what we desire is the same as what we know. we should not assign some particular power distinct f. But appetite is common to animate and inanimate things since all desire good. with regard to this object which is the desirable in general. whether the appetite is a special power of the soul ? proceed thus to the First Article: Objection i. sensuality general first the there are two points free-will. Obj. Further.om the others. i. Two Articles. concerning which there are four heads of consideration first. called the appetitive power. i) not a special power of the soul. as the Therefore the appetite is Philosopher says (Ethic. . 2. : We — Further. Under the fourth. should the be considered of inquiry. the appetitive : third. OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS {In IN GENERAL. its own suitable object. Therefore the appetitive power is not distinct from the Obj.QUESTION LXXX. . the common is not divided from the proper. (i) Whether appetite a special power of the soul ? (2) Whether the appetite should be divided into intellectual and sensitive as distinct in . objects. 3.

Pvpry example. v.). the form is found to determine each thing only to natural form is that is. Damas- cene also (De Fid. ap: all proach to a likeness to God. form. as Dionysius says {Div. passing the natural inclination. so that the soul of man is. to its nature. ii. Therefore this followed by a natural inclination. in such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive of the species of other things : for example. The Philosopher distinguishes (De 3) the appetitive from the other powers. Therefore. as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a higher manner and above the manner of natural forms so must there be in them an inclination sur. in a way. the form is found to have a more perfect existence in those things which participate knowledge than in those which lack knowledge. we power • that some inclination fnllQwc for fnrgi / answer an appetitive must observe by its Now. and to generate its like. it is it is found neces- Reply Obj. Nom. those things that have knowledge. that. To make this evident. Appetite is found in things which have knowledge. It is necessary to assign the to soul. 2. i On Anima contrary. What is apprehended and what is desired . is inclined to rise. in Whom all things pre-exist. Therefore sary to assign to the soul a particular power. Reply Obj. Q. which is called the natural And this superior inclination belongs to the appetite. Orth. above the common manner in which in all things. each one is determined to its own natural being by its natural form. which called the natural appetite.Art. And $0 it is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul.133 THE APPETITIVE POWERS the ii.So. appetitive power of the soul. sense receives the species of things sensible. as we have said above. For in those which lack knowledge. I. through which the animal is able to desire what it which it is inclined apprehends. all things by sense and intellect and thereby. fire. and the intellect. and not only that to by its natural form. of all things intelligible. in a way. But in those things which its is own being — have knowledge. 22) distinguishes the appetitive from the cognitive powers.

3. as under the apprehensive power. seemingly every act of the appetite regards an individual thing. and not material diversity. 2. Further. it is diversity of aspect in the objects.8o. A. the appetitive is subordinate as a lower power. : 124 but differ in aspect for a thing is apprehended as something sensible or intelligible. Therefore the intel: individual things.i THE "SUMMA THEOLOGiCA" in reality. and has a natural inclination to something. Each power of the soul is a form or nature. But the motive power which in man follows Obj. LXXVII.Q. For powers are not differentiated by accidental differences. which is of But there is no place for this distinction lectual appetite is not distinguished from the sensitive. Reply Obj. or sound for hearing. and so distinct for since the appetite is a movement of the soul to individual things. whereas it is desired as suitable or good. and desired not as suitable to this or that by which something power. It would seem that the sensitive and intellectual appetites are not distinct powers.. it Further. We — Obj. Wherefore each power desires which is is suitable to itself. intellectual knowledge is is of universals. so also is the motive power. the intellect is not distinct from the motive power which in . in the appetitive part from sensitive knowledge. Second Article. is by the natural appetite that object Above which natural appetite which follows the apprehension. But it is accidental to the appetible object whether it be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. but simply as suitable to the animal. whether the sensitive and intellectual appetites are distinct powers ? proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection i. 3). Now. 3. Therefore the sensitive and intellectual appetites are not distinct powers. ARt. which are the same demands a diversity of powers. such as sight for seeing. as we have seen above (Q. the animal appetite.

appetite For the appetitive power is a passive power. as their proper objects. and the active to the passive iii. The Philosopher {De Anima iii. for a like reason. and says {ibid. the passive power itself has its very nature from its relation to its active principle. though it tends to individual things which exist outside the soul. and Metaph. virtue. On the contrary. sensitive. 7). 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower. xii. a distinct power from the sensitive appetite. is apprehended by the intel- sense are generically different consequently. Therefore. 9) dis- tinguishes a double appetite. i. to. must needs say that the intellectual that. since what is apprehended by the intellect and what . lectual appetite is distinct from the Reply Obj. (Did. which and suchlike. which is wherefore naturally moved by the thing apprehended the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved. Reply Obj. De Anima : indeed. differences of the appetible. ii. for the appetible does not move the appetite except as it is apprehended. Wherefore the Philosopher says {Rhetoric. yet tends to them as standing under the universal as when it desires something because it is good. and movable are differentiated accordNow things passive the distinction of the corresponding active and ing to motive principles because the motive must be proportionate to the movable. neither there distinction in the appetitive part. . such as knowledge. In the same way by the . 4) that hatred can regard a universal. as the Philosopher / answer is We : says in 10. while the appetite is a mover moved. Wherefore differences in the thing apprehended are of themselves . as when we hate every kind of thief. And so the appetitive powers are distinct according to the distinction of the things apprehended. this belongs to it by its nature. It is not accidental to the thing desired to be apprehended by the sense or the intellect on the contrary. 2. not apprehended by sense. Art. xi. intellectual appetite is we may desire the immaterial good. The intellectual appetite.125 THE APPETITIVE POWERS Q. is Therefore. 2 animals follows sense. .

AKT. . As the Philosopher says (De Anima iii. opinion does not move except by means of a particular opinion and in like manner the higher appetite moves by means of the lower and therefore there are not two distinct motive powers following the intellect and the Reply Obj.So. : sense.Q. universal a 11). .a THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '• 1126 3.

Further. But Augustine (De Trin. which belong to the cognitive power. also is apprehensive. Further. which belong to knowledge. the contrary. 12) that the sensual movement of the soul which proceed thus to the First Article: Objection 1. 2. cognitive. cit. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power. xii. {In Three Articles. things which come under one division seem to be of one genus. Obj.. in the place of the serpent. the serpent presented himself as one giving information and proposing sin.) to consider the power of sensuality. first 3. OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY. 127 On is defined as the appetite of .) divides sensuality against the higher and lower But the bodily senses belong reason. loc. to the apprehensive powers. Therefore sensuality Obj. Sensuality things belonging to the body. concernwhich are three points of inquiry: (i) Whether there ing is sensuality only an appetitive power ? (2) Whether it is divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers? (3) Next we have Whether ? the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason First Article. It would seem that sensuality We — is directed to the bodily senses is common to us and beasts. in man's temptations sensuality stands But in the temptation of our parents. xii. whether sensuality is only appetitive? is not only but also For appetitive.QUESTION LXXXI. Augustine says {De Trin. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power.

since we desire things which are apprehended through the bodily senses. Now the sensual movement is an appetite following sensitive apprehension. Reply Obj. For the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly / ansTx-cr that. Art. By saying that the sensual movement of directed to the bodily senses. . but also incited to the commission of sin. 2. a certain inclination to the bodily senses. sight from seeing. just as the name of a power is taken from its act. : so that sensuality is the name of the Reply Obj. And in this. The serpent not only showed and proposed sin. Sensuality lower reason. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 128 The name sensuality seems to be taken from the sensual movement. xii. is a motive power as is appetite. to which appertains sensuality. sensuality is signified by the serpent.8i. for instance. the soul is i. as having in divided against higher and common with them the act of is for the apprehensive power. as the act of the appetite since the of the is operation apprehensive power completed in the fact that the in the one that is very thing apprehended : called a movement apprehends while the operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that he who desires is borne towards : the thing desirable. And thus the bodily senses appertain to sensuality as a preamble. Therefore the operation of the apprehensive power is likened to rest : whereas the operation of the appetitive power is rather likened to movement. to which belong and lower reason.Q. Augustine does not that the bodily senses are included in us to understand give rather that the movement of sensuality is but sensuality. 3. 12. Reply Obj. of which Augustine speaks {De Trin. Wherefore by sensual movement we understand tlie operation of the appetitive power sensitive appetite. 13). movement : the higher .

Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius. hatred is in the irascible part : for Jerome says on Matt. is appetite differing from the concupiscible. On the contrary. the concupiscible. 33 ought to have the hatred : We But hatred is contrary of vice in the irascible power. Further. / and the con- answer that. Orth. We — For the same power of the soul regards both sides of a contrariety. then. and are producFor example. The sensitive . Since. 3. appetite it and is called sensuality which are species of the but is is one generic power. It would seem that the sensitive appetite is not divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers. Art. divided into two powers. 2 whether the sensitive appetite is divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers? proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection 1. it seems that and concupiscible are the same power in the soul. xiii. and to the ••4 9 . fire has a natural inclination. Therefore the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers. while the is concerned with what is harmful. But such is the object of the concupiscible power. 12) assign two parts to the sensitive appetite. but also to resistance against corruptive and contrary agencies which are a hindrance to the acquisition of what is suitable. the conirascible irascible cupiscible power regards what is suitable. and is in the concupiscible part. Further. tive of harm. observe that in natural corruptible things there is needed an inclination not only to the acquisition of what is suitable sensitive appetite the irascible and In order to make this clear. the sensitive appetite regards only \vhat suitable according to the senses. we must — avoiding of what is harmful. But suit- able and harmful are contraries. ii). 2. Therefore there is no sensitive Ohj. ii.129 THE SENSITIVE APPETITE Second Article. 8i. to love. according to the Philosopher {De Anima ii. Q. Ohj. as sight regards both black and white. De Natura Hominis) and Damascene {De Fid. the irascible cupiscible.

and this is called the concupiscible and another. Now these two are not one principle for sometimes the soul with unpleasant things. But the object of the . 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '* 130 not only to rise from a lower position. from which the conagainst irascible is. towards a higher position which is suitable. in order that.Q. diminishes concupiscence in many cases. And for this reason all the passions of the from the passions of the concupiscible and terminate in them for instance. on being roused. whereby an animal resists : — these attacks that hinder what is suitable. terminates in joy. viii. irascible power is to resist the * onslaught of the unsuitable. anger rises appetite from sadness. there must needs be in the sensi- tive part two appetitive powers one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is suitable.).ART. : champion and defender of the concupiscible. diminishes anger. . is Whence we its say that object something arduous.8I. but also to resist whatever destroys or hinders its action. harm. its is and this is called the irascible. as it Vvcre. For this reason also the quarrels of animals are about things concupiscible namel)'. and inflict harm. Dc Animal. it may fight against Wherefore also the passions of the irascible appetite counteract the passions of the concupiscible appetite since concupiscence. because rise : overcome and busies itself to be reduced to to tendency above obstacles. and having wrought vengeance.* irascible appetite rise . as the Philosopher says {De Animal. Hislor. as natural appetite is an inclination following the natural form. i The concupiscible power regards both what suitable and what is unsuitable. according to the senses. the it when rises cupiscible flies. Therefore. against the inclination of the concupiscible appetite. This is clear also from the fact that the obstacles. and anger being roused. which is unsuitable to it. up against what iiinders the of suitable the acquisition things which the concupiscible or what inflicts desires. and to fly from what is hurtful. following the impulse of the irascible appetite. since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive apprehension. food and sex. — is Reply Obj.

2). 12. cupiscible appetites does But sensuality concupiscible are parts of sensuality. As is : is the irascible power. Further. rational part soul. which perceives those things which do not impress the senses. what obeys a certain thing does not Obj. m like manner. ii. appetite hatred.81. We — Augustine 2.3 sensitive part there in the apprehensive powers of the an estimative power. xii. Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appe- do not obey reason. obey reason. 12) to that the part of the soul which is obedient and amenable and anger.ART. WHETHER THE IRASCIBLE AND CONCUPISCIBLE APPETITES OBEY REASON ? : proceed thus to the Third Article and conObjection 1. LXXVIIL. vii. wherefore it is signified by the serpent. neither do the powers of the sensitive appetite.131 THE SENSITIVE APPETITE 2. Orth. But the irascible and concupiscible appetites resist it. irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. Third Article. something because it is useful to the animal for self-defence and this Reply Obj. the Further. as we have said above (Q. 3. Therefore. as the appetitive power is inferior to sensitive is the so also the of power. Q. But the sensitive part of the soul does not obey reason for Obj. On the contrary. reason is divided into concupiscence . 3. : it Hatred belongs simply to the concupiscible but by reason of the strife which arises from may belong to the irascible appetite. 23) : / see another law in my members fighting against the law of my tites mind. but not because as suitable. resist reason : according to the Apostle (Rom. Therefore the as says {De Trin. A. the irascible and concupiscible. so also in the sensitive which regards appetite there is a certain appetitive power it pleases the senses. It would seem that the irascible and irascible For do not obey reason. Damascene says {De Fid. 13). not obey reason. : we neither hear nor see just when we wish. Reply Obj.

For in is other animals movement : follows at once the concupiscible and for instance. And this is what the Philosopher says {De Anima. but of the reason hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible are said to obey : the reason rather than to obey the intellect. because it has no superior counteracting appetite. as we have said above (Q. of motive powers. may be modified or To tion. iii. 4). 132 answer In two ways the . as to the reason. man is not moved at once. fearing the irascible appetites wolf. anger or fear or the like excited.. that the . Anyone can experience this in himself for by applying certain universal : considerations. which is called by some the particular reason. A.Q. But because to draw particular conclusions from universal principles is not the work of the intellect. esteeming the estimative power. They obey the reason in their own acts. because in other animals the sensitive appetite . n). But this same reason is naturally guided and moved according particular wherefore in syllogistic matters particular conclusions are drawn from universal propositions.8I. Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite is moved naturally by this particular reason. irascible and concu- piscible powers obey the higher part. Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs to the universal reason : moved by the estimative the sensitive appetite.3 / THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" that. a naturally the an wolf as enemy. in w-hich are the intellect or reason. unless the higher appetite consents. is replaced by the cogitative power. and the will first. is afraid. the sheep.ART. the will also which is the sensitive appetite subject in execuaccomplished by the motive power. and this appetite obeys it. In man sheep. flies at once. the second only moves by virtue of the to the irascible first : wherefore the lower appetite is not sufficient to cause movement. secondly as to the will. which is divided into concupiscible and irascible. On the contrary. LXXVIII. which is the superior For wherever there is order among a number appetite. : and concupiscible appetites but according he awaits the command of the will. because it compares individual intentions. is power for instance. as such.

because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul. cible Reply Obj. For rule the irascible the sensitive appetite is naturally moved. But the irascible and concupiscible powers denominate the sensitive appetite rather on the part of the act.133 THE SENSITIVE APPETITE Q. by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason. as the higher sphere moves the lower. i. and in man by the cogi- power which the universal reason guides. Art. the iras- and concupiscible are subject to reason. which reason commands. which reason forbids. who have not the right to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them. But the intellect or reason is said to : and concupiscible by a politic power because the sensitive appetite has something of its own. For a power is called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves. but at the soul's command both hand and foot. though subject to the government of the ruler. 1. and whatever are member moved at is naturally moved by voluntary movement. tative . we must not conclude that they do not obey. since they have nothing of their own. who. 3 higher appetite moves the lower appetite. therefore. As the Philosopher says {Polit. But that power is called politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects.2): We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for body by a despotic power. have nevertheless something of their own. And so from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something. but also by the imagination and sense. not only by the estimative power in other animals. In this way. inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant. And so. Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason. as we have said. the soul is said body by a despotic power. once. 2. to which they are led by the reason. by reason of which they can resist intellect the soul dominates the the orders of to rule the him who commands. in what is proper to it as a sensitive power. Sensuality is signified by the serpent. Reply Obj. but the dominates the appetite by a politic and royal power. or unpleasant. 8x.

ART. both appetitive and apprehensive. But the interior powers. " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 134 exterior senses require for action exterior sensible things. whereby they are affected. The presence of which is not ruled by reason. which can not only incite or affections of the appetitive power.3 THE 3. but can also phantasms of the imagination. do not require Therefore they are subject to the comexterior things. and the Reply Obj.Q. mand of reason.81. modify the form the .

because. viii. 9). We — Obj. Augustine says (De Trin. least be a few but there would at contingent. Obj. But whatever the will desires is voluntary. the rational powers. Further. according to the is nothing of necessity. all the contrary. Further. xiii. Philosopher {Metaph. It would seem that the will desires nothing of necessit}'. Therefore nothing that the will desires 2. Dei v.) Under this head there are five Whether the will desires something of necessity ? (2) Whether it desires everything of neces? Whether it is a (3) sity higher power than the intellect ? Whether the will moves the intellect ? (5) Whether the (4) will is divided into irascible and conciipiscible ? next consider the will. 10) that if anything is necessary. extend to opposite things. Therefore the act of the will cannot be necessitated. as he says {De \Anima iii. it is not voluntary. whether the will desires something of necessity? proceed thus to the First Article: Objection i. 4) that if this were not desire happiness witli one will. (i) We points ^f inquiry: First "(^ Article. Therefore the will extends to opposite things. the ivill is in the reason. and therefore it is determined to desired of necessity. (/» Five Articles. But we are not masters of that which is of necessity. necesssary. 2). by the will we are masters of our own actions. But the W'ill is a rational power. For Augustine says {De Civ. On Now 135 . 3. OF THE WILL.QUESTION LXXXII.

it is according as it just is impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural. Therefore. so it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or violent. that a by reason of something On the extrinsic. arises in the will the necessity to : wish for a ship. belongs to it necessary for the three angles of a And this is to two right angles. But the very movement of the will an inclination to something. as when we say that everything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible or formal. to do the attained or so well attained : On contrary. This is called necessity of coercion.82. as when without it the end is not to be for instance. / answer that. more than this. when thus from the end cannot be attained except in one way the will to cross the sea. as . part of the end. In like the will. Now thing must be may belong to it by an intrinsic principle. Therefore. food is said to be for horse is necessary for a and a life. which is either the end or the agent. manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to Indeed. thing must be. for as the intellect of to the first principles. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " the will 136 of exceptions. a thing must be. But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will. and sometimes also tdility. — — when we say that it is triangle to be equal natural and absolute necessity. . which is happiness adhere since necessity matters what in the is the end practical principle is in : . necessary journey. Art. Now inclination of a thing. Therefore desires something in necessity. so a thing is called voluntary because to the inclination of the will.j the part of the agent. For that The word necessity is is employed many that a which must be necessary. This is called necessity of end.^ this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to For we call that violent which is against the the will..Q. ways. either material.» \ v/Vvtj . and voluntary. as a thing is called natural because it is according to the inclination of is nature. the will must of adheres necessity to the last end. so that he is not able.. when someoffe is forced by some agent. In another way.

to it. the object of the will is compared to the mover to the thing movable. iii. But choice We regards not the end.137 THE WILL Q. I. ? whether the will desires of DESIRES whatever it proceed thus to the Second Article : Objection i. — Nom. but the means to the end. which extends to opposite things. Reply Obj. corresponds rather to the intellect as regards natural principles than to the reason. The will. But natural necessity of the will. it is rather an are masters of our own actions by Reply Obj. so the thing apprehended by the intellect is the object of the intellectual appetite. whatever it desires. Wherefore in this respect intellectual than a rational power. 3. Obj. Therefore it Obj. 7Second We Article.) that evil is outside the scope of the will. 2. 2 speculative matters. as the Philosopher says (Ethic. The words of Augustine are to be understood of the necessity of coercion. 82. 2. as the thing apprehended by sense is the object of the sensitive appetite. reason of our being able to choose this or that. For what befits a thing naturally and the root and principle of all else appermust be immovably is taining thereto. so far as desires a thing naturally. will as the seems that the will's object moves it of necessity. since the nature of a thing the first in everything. There- fore the will tends of necessity to the good which is proposed Further. 9). iv. It would seem that the will desires all things of necessity. For Dionysius says (Div. Wherefore the desire of the ultimate end does not regard those actions of which we are masters. and every movement arises from something immovable. Further. /" doesjiotjahe'tcayiry-'thejiberty ~~~~~ '^ aTTie'saysTrTmself it (ibid^^ Reply Obj. 3. Art. . necessity. But the movement of the movable necessarily follows the mover.

The will does not desire of necessity whatIn order to make this evident we must desires. as we have said already (A. so the will adheres to the Now there are last end. some things intelligible which have not a necessary confirst principles such as contingent proposiof which does not involve a denial of the denial tions. : denial of the first principles. j. until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the necessity of such connection be shown. Augustine says {Retract. in Whom alone true happiness consists. nor to those things which are of God.Q. when once it is aware of the necessary connection of these conclusions with the principles but it . But there are some same with : things whicli have a necessary connection with happiness. by means of which things man adheres to God. 1). ad lit. and to such because without them a man can be happy the will does not adhere of necessity. and so the will extends to opposite things. 9) that it is the will by which we sin and live well. And to these the intellect assents of necessity. nection with the . things whatsoever it desires. Art. But there are some propositions which have such as a necessary connection with the first principles involves a demonstrable conclusions. things seen. For there are certain individual goods which have not a necessary connection with happiness. just as now we desire of necessity to be . a denial of which of necessity. 82. Nevertheless. the And to such the intellect does not assent first principles. does not assent of necessity until through the demonstration it recognizes the necessity of such connection. Therefore it does not desire of On necessity / all answer soever it observe that as the intellect naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles. the will does not adhere to God of But the necessity. hended by the intellect moves the will of necessity. It is the the will. But what is apprehended by the sense moves the sensitive appetite of necessity for Augus- tine says (Gen. will of the man who sees God in His Essence of necessity adheres to God. 14) that animals are moved by Therefore it seems that whatever is appre- the contrary. ix. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " : 138 which is called the will. that.

Further. Obj. Further. it moves the sensitive appetite in a deter- minate way. Third Article. The sensitive power does not compare : but it things with each other. And this also appears in the powers of the soul for sense precedes the Obj.139 THE WILL It is Q. according to that one thing. i. 3. when mover exceeds the thing movable. therefore clear that the will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires. But entire capacity as the capacity of the will its regards the universal and perfect good. 2. in the order of natural things intellect. Art. 3 happy. so that is the its power of the subject to the mover. : is the first and highest power. habits are proportioned to their powers. 2. For the object of the will is good and the end. follows the act of the intellect. as reason does simply apprehends some one thing. But the reason is a power that compares several things together therefore from several tilings the intellectual appetite that is. Therei . Reply Obj. Reply Obj. Reply Obj. Therefore the will is a more noble and perfect power than the intellect. Therefore. The will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of good. for this reason the will is not of necessity determined to one. subjected to any individual good. 82. But the end is the first and highest cause. which is more noble. in the natural order. but — : — not of necessity from one thing. whether the will is a higher intellect ? power than the proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that the will is a higher power Objection than the intellect. We — fore the will we observe a progress from imperfect things to perfect. 3. then. But because good is of many kinds. of necessity different And capacity therefore it is is not not moved by it. The mover. of necessity causes movement in the thing movable. . the will may be moved. Now the act of the will.

Q. For the object of the respective objects to one another. and if I 2) all faith. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 140 as perfections to what they make perfect. since the proper nature of a power is in its order to its object. while the act of the will consists the will inclined to the thing itself in this —that itself. i . intellect is more simple and more absolute than the higher it is in itself and therefore the object of the intellect is higher than the object of the will. Art. Therefore. The in superiority of one thing over another : can be considered two ways absolutely and relatively. Therefore the will is a higher power than the intellect. xiii. which perfects the will namely. for instance. then the intellect Now : is the higher power. it . XXVII. is the object of the will. —that the idea of the thing understood is 4). (i Cor. XVI. Thus. itself and absolutely is higher But relatively and by comparison with something else. . as existing in .. the idea of which is in the intellect. charity than the habits which perfect the intellect — — is But the habit more noble it is : for written should know all mysteries. x. And this is clear if we compare their object since the object of the intellect is the very idea of appetible good and the appetible good. the nobler and of the will . from the fact that the object of the will occurs in something higher than that in which occurs follows that the intellect in and nobler than the will. is Q. I might say that hearing is relatively nobler than sight. inasmuch as something in which there is sound is nobler than something in which there than sound. this colour. On the contrary. though colour is nobler and simpler For. A. If therefore the intellect and will regard something be considered with regard to themselves. and have not charity. a thing is considered to be such absolutely which is considered such in itself but relatively as it is such with to else. 82. A. the action of the intellect consists in is in the one who understands. the object of the intellect.. Now the more simple and the more abstract a thing is. as we have said above (Q. should have : // / / ansiver that. The Philosopher holds the intellect to be the highest power of the soul {Ethic. I am nothing. 7). we find that the will is sometimes higher than the intellect.

the thing in which there nobler than the soul itself. then even in comparison with that thing the intellect is higher than the will. 3. as the motive power precedes the thing movable. and truth its end. but. in which is the idea When. good is therefore. the intellect is nobler than the will. And in perfect for in tiality precedes : act. . are in things. is and error. This reason is verified of the will as compared with what is above the soul. And among other ends this is the most excellent as also is the intellect among the other : : : : powers. . which are objects of he intellect. and in such a comparison the idea of good is found to be nobler but truth signifies something more absolute. vi. but truth are in the ntind. on the contrary. way the intellect precedes the will. Reply Obj. The aspect of causality is perceived by comparing one thing to another. 82. But. 2) that therefore the Philosopher says in Melaph. and as the active precedes the passive. understood by comparison with such a thing. But what precedes absolutely and in the order of nature is more perfect for thus act precedes potentiality. What : precedes in order of generation and one and the same thing potenand imperfection precedes perfection. For charity is the virtue by which we love God. for good which is understood moves the will. however. But when the thing which is good is less noble than the soul.141 THE WILL Q. and extends to the idea of good itself wherefore even good is something true. this Reply Obj. i. the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the love thereof. the will is higher than the intellect. good and evil. Wherefore the love of God is better than the knowledge of God . Reply Obj. 3 And V. is truth something good forasmuch as the intellect is a thing. (Did. which are objects of the will. Art. again. time is less 2. Absolutely.

In this way the intellect because the good understood is the object of the will. as we have said above the intellect. and the agent is nobler than the patient. as what alters moves what is altered. and the Philosopher {De Anima iii. and all the powers of the soul. whether the will moves the intellect? We proceed Objection 1. is Obj. thing is said to for instance. will. moves the will. 3).Q. because . the will moves by willing to understand. we can will nothing but what we under- therefore. The reason is. Damascene says {De Fid. a thing is said to move as an agent. and this act of the intellect by another impossible. act of the will. Therefore the will does not move the 2. ii. 26) But a It is in our power to learn an art or not. what moves is not moved by what But the intellect moved. / Therefore the will moves the intellect. : answer that. because the good apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved whereas the appetite moves and is moved. xii. Secondly. But the intellect excels and precedes the will. Therefore the intellect is not moved . thing is in our power by the will. Further. by the Obj. and what impels moves what is impelled. Orth. 82. 5). If. First. in order to understand. as we list. move in two ways when we say that the end moves the will. that act of the will must be preceded by another act of the intellect. 16). Art. In this way the will moves the intellect. the contrary. 3. which is Therefore the will does not move the intellect. and so on indefinitely. moves the agent. and moves it as an end. as an end A . because what moves is an agent. stand. intellect. ad lit. Further. and we learn art by the : On intellect. as Augustine says {Gen. thus to the Fourth Article : — It would seem that the will does not move For what moves excels and precedes what is moved. as Anselm says (Eadmer. (A. except perhaps accidentally. De Similitudinibus). 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 142 Fourth Article.

3). that power which regards the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends. Now it. higher and nobler than the will. as sight the powers of the soul to their respective acts. each of which aims at the preservation of its of the individual. which are contained the common notion of being and truth. as stone or wood. because under the notion of being and truth is contained both the will itself. we simply higher of its object the nature common as intellect take the regards then a determinate will as and the again the intellect power. as we have said above (A. end in general. therefore. just as it understands other is in species of things. who aims own species or at the common all good of the of whole kingdom. But if we consider the will as regards the common nature of its object. and its object. and its act. Art. as appetitive of universal minate power of the soul having a determinate act. Wherefore the intellect understands the will. The intellect may be considered in two ways as apprehensive of universal being and truth. vegetative part. The king also. and the intellect as a thing and a special power . will. and its act. and the fore the will as directed to the perception of Thereintellect to the knowledge of truth. and each power the object of the will is is directed to is good and the some suitable good proper to colour. the intellect and will be compared with one another according to the universality of their respective the intellect is objects. In like manner also the will may be considered in two : ways is : according to the common nature of to say. . — that object — good and as a deterits If. which are not subject to our all an agent moves Reply Ohj. which is good. 4 wherever we have order among a number of active powers. however. by his rule moves cities. then. For the heaven. and its object. 1. except the natural powers of the will. moves all inferior bodies. and as a thing and a particular power having a determinate act. 82. than the and nobler If. And we may observe this both in nature and in things politic.143 THE WILL Q. the governors each of whom rules over his own particular city. which aims at the universal preservation of things subject to generation and corruption.

It would seem that we ought to distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite. each of which and its act. and the will moves the intellect in another. whether we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite? proceed thus to the Fifth Article: Objection i. 3.ART. 14). but only to the as the concupiscence of intellectual. are contained under the will is this we notion of good. which is some species of good. as we have said above. inasmuch as it is a desired good. vii. and in this way he explains that there is no need — to proceed indefinitely. From can easily understand why these powers include one common another in their acts. In the same way good is contained in truth. And in this way the higher than the intellect. wisdom. inasmuch as it is an understood truth. There is no need to go on indefinitely. God—as also Aristotle says {Eth. Endemic. Reply Obj. but we must stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. which cannot belong to the vi. and truth in good. Fifth Article.Q. is 144 then the intellect truth.82. which is the will. because the intellect understands that the will wills. Reply Obj. For the concupiscible power is so called from concupiscere (to desire).5 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" itself. 2. and its object. The intellect moves the will in one sense. por every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension. to cupiscenre of wisdom bringeth There is also a certain anger kingdom. and the irascible part from But there is a concupiscence which irasci {to be angry). of which it is said (Wisd. We — cannot belong to the sensitive appetite. and can move it. but the principle of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher than our intellect namely. whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will. 21): the eternal The con- . and the will wills the intellect to understand. which is the will .

and not as coloured. Because. I answer that. parts of the intellectual appetite. LXXIX. it would be distinct from a power : something regarding black as black. LXXVIIL. 2. the united irascible.ART. it is said {De Spiritu et Anima) that the soul has these powers and rational — before — namely. and concupiscible parts Further.145 THE WILL Q. Further. irascible xiii. 3. For instance. The irascible and concupiscible are not is called the will. And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii. as (Q. 82. On the contrary. some common notion not differentiated by special differences which are contained under that common notion. but intellectual. while in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger.. charity is in the But they the irascible part. Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius. 12). But no power of the sensitive part belongs soul and body united. it is to the body. cannot be in the sensitive appetite. Q. and Damascene says the same {De Fid. which A. because sight regards the visible thing under the is common notion of something coloured. or desire and animus. ii. because their objects are Obj. irascible Therefore we must assign an and a concupiscible power to the intellectual part. Wherefore Jerome 33 warns us to have the hatred of vice in the irascible part. Obj. LIX.4 the sensitive appetite does not consider the common » . was said above 4. Horn. Therefore the irascible above (Q. concupiscible. the visual power is not multiplied according to the different kinds of colour but if there were a power regarding white as white. power 7). Now 1. as is in the intellectual soul as well as in the sensitive. Orth. but only to the intellectual. De Nat. 9) that the ivill is in the reason. 8). commonly in not sensible. Therefore we should distinguish menting on Matt.S sensitive appetite. concupiscible. which is the intellectual appetite. but to the AA. and concupiscible powers are in the will. as we have said to the soul alone. which is directed to an object according to a A.. and hope said. as when our comanger is directed against vice.) says that the irrational part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and irascible. 5.

and they And in this sense. because neither do tlie senses apprehend . are attributed to the angels and to God. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 146 notion of good. which is the intelhurtful. Art. not from any sudden move- ment of a passion. Reply Obj. concupiscence. as far as they are simple affections without passion or thus they are acts of the will.And therefore the parts of the sensitive the universal. appetite. however. Love. they do not belong to different powers. i. we may Anima) that . although there is no need to have faith in what that book says.Q. and the like can be Sometimes they are taken as understood in two ways. that with a certain commotion of the is. as far as it 2. Reply Obj. Whence the answer to the third objection is clear. and not of time). And in the same way the will may be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good. and therefore in the will. but from a judgment of the reason. so that there be in the intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from a concupiscible power just as neither on the part of the intellect are the apprehensive lectual : powers multiplied. which is called the will. although they are on the part of the senses. as something pleasant to the senses and ticular good : suitable to nature : of good as something whereas the irascible regards the notion that wards off and repels what is But the will regards good according to the common notion of good. there is no differentiation of appetitive powers. appetite are differentiated by the different notions of parfor the concupiscible regards as proper to it the notion of good. But if taken in this sense. They may. but onlv to one pow-er. 82. And thus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope that — is. understand the words quoted (De Spiritu et the irascible it is the soul before and concupiscible powers are in united to the body (as long as we under- stand priority of nature. And in this way. The will itself may be said to be irascible. And thus they are commonly understood. . — soul. wills to repel evil. in the will as too. ordered to such acts. and in this sense they are only in the sensitive appetite. be taken in another way. commotion of the soul. too. passions arising.

whoever has free-will is master of his 147 . Further. xxi. to : accomplish. 2). is it the same power If it is it First Article. Obj. for it is written (Rom. It would seem that man has For whoever has free-will does what he wills. to do or not to do. Therefore man has not free-will. the moves will. for it is by another is not free. — — : Therefore is man is The heart of the king is in the hand written (Prov. what what is moved Therefore i. cause of itself. 19): For the good which I will I do not. OF FREE-WILL. — namely. but the evil which I will not. power runthat him nor to will willeth that him of namely. {In Four A rticles.QUESTION LXXXIII. that I do. i) will He shall turn it. : We — of neth has not free-will. But man does not what he wills. man has freeWhether there are four points of inquiry (i) an act. vii. will ? now (2) — : a power. 3. whithersoever He It is God Who worketh in you both to will ii 13) : and _(Bhil. Further. is it appetitive or cognitive? (4) If as the will. whether man has free-will? proceed thus to the First Article: not free-will.) We (3) is Under this head inquire concerning free-will. Obj. whoever has free-will has in his power But this is not to will or not to will. Philosopher says {Metaph. /( is not ix. and of the Lord. 4. Therefore man has not free-will. Objection i. or a habit ? What is free-will a power. But God to run. 2. or distinct ? appetitive. as the pee Obj. Further. is written for it man's 16) in (Rom.

Q. 83. Art.

i

THE

"

SUMM A THEOLOGICA "
is

148
:

own
for
it

actions.
is

But man

not master of his
:

own

actions

neither
will.

is it

written (Jer. x. 23) in a man to walk.

The way

of a

Therefore

man is not his: man has not free-

Further, the Philosopher says {Ethic, iii. 5) : According as each one is, such does the end seem to him. But it is not in our power to be of one quality or another;

Obj.

5.

for this

comes

to

us from nature. Therefore

it

is

natural

to us to follow

some

particular end, and therefore

we

are

not free in so doing.

On the contrary, It is written man from the beginning, and
own
I

(Ecclus. xv. 14) left him in the
:

:

God made
of his

hand

counsel; and the gloss adds
that,

That
:

is

of his free-will.

otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards and punishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident,

answer

Man

has free-will

we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards and in like manner all And some act from things which lack knowledge.
;

judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in rnntingen t
matters

may

fo llow opposite rnnrsp';, ng

mp

gpp in Hialprtlc

Now particular Syllogisms and rhetorical—argumeota. operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not
determinate to one.
it

And

forasmuch as man
free-will.

is

rational

is

necessary that

Reply Obj.

1.

man have a As we have

said above (Q.

LXXXI., A. 3,

149

FREE-WILL
2),

Q. 83- Art.

i

ad

the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, a given case can resist by desiring what the reason This is therefore the good which man does not forbids. when he wishes namely, not to desire against reason, as
yet in

Augustine says (ibid.). Reply Obj. 2. Those words of the Apostle are not to be taken as though man does not wish or does not run of
his
free-will,

but because the free-will
it

is

not sufficient

be moved and helped by God. Reply Obj. 3. Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one
thereto unless

thing to be cause of another need
therefore,
is

it

be the

first

cause.

God,

the

first

cause,

Who moves causes both

natural

just as their acts does not prevent

and voluntary.

And

by moving natural causes He being natural, so by moving

voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them for He operates in each thing according to its own
: ;

nature.

Reply Obj. 4. Ma7i's way is said not to be his in the execution of his choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he will or not. The choice itself, however, is in
us, but

presupposes the help of God. Reply Obj. 5. Quality in man is of two kinds

:

natural

and adventitious.
very

the natural quality may be in the From the intellectual part, or in the body and =ts powers. a natural of virtue that man is such by fact, therefore,
desires quality which is in the intellectual part, he naturally his last end, which is happiness. Which desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not subject to free-will, as is clear

Now

from what we have said abo^-e (Q. LXXXH., AA. i, 2). But on the part of the body and its powers man may be such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a temperament or disposition due to any impression whatever produced by corporeal causes, which cannot
affect

the intellectual part, since

it

is

not the act of a

Q. 83. Art. 2

THE

"

SUMMA THEOLOGICA "

150

And such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal organ. corporeal quality, such also does his end seem to him, because from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose
or reject something. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as

we have said (Q. LXXXI., A. 3). Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to free-will. The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which a man is inclined to one thing rather than
to another.

the

yet even these inclinations are subject to of reason. Such qualities, too, are subject judgment to reason, as it is in our power either to acquire them,

And

whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, or to reject them. And so^ere is nothing in this that is

repugnant

to free-will.

Second Article,

whether free-will

is

a

power?

proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection i. It would seem that free-will is not a power. For free-will is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an act, not a power. Therefore free-will it not a power.

We

Obj.
iL'ill

2.

Further, free-will

is

defined as the faculty of the

and reason. But faculty denominates a facility of Therefore free-will is power, which is due to a habit. a habit. Moreover Bernard says {De Gratia et Lib. Arb.
I,

2) that free-will is the soul's habit of

disposing of
forfeited

itself.

Therefore
sin.

through through sin; for Augustine says that rnan, by abusing free-will, loses both it and himself. Therefore free-will is not a power. On the contrary, Nothing but a power, seemingly, is the subject of a habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, by the help of which it chooses what is good. Therefore free-will is a power.

not a power. Obj. 3. Further, no natural power
it

is

is

But

free-will

is

forfeited

151
/

FREE-WILL

Q. 83. Art. 2

answer that, Although free-will* in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of speaking we call of the act by which free-will, that which is the principle the Now in us man principle of an act is

judges freely. both power and habit; for we say that we know something both by knowledge and by the intellectual power. Therefore free-will must be either a power or a habit, or a power with a habit. That it is neither a habit nor a power toin two ways. gether with a habit, can be clearly proved First of all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural But habit; for it is natural to man to have a free-will. there is no natural habit in us with respect to those things

which come under
to

free-will

:

for

we
:

are naturally inclined

for things those first while assent to to things to instance, principles which we are naturally inclined are not subject to free-will,

those

of

which we have natural habits

as

we have
1,2).
it

AA.

said of the desire of happiness (Q. LXXXIL, Wherefore it is against the very notion of free-

will that

should be a natural habit.
is

And

that

be a non-natural habit no sense is it a habit.

against

its

nature.

it should Therefore in

.

Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that by reason of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to actions aiid passions (Ethic, ii. 5); for by temperance we are well-disposed as regards concupiscences, and by intemperance ill-disposed and by knowledge we are well:

disposed

to the act of the intellect

when we know

the truth,

and by

the contrary habit ill-disposed. But the free-will is indifferent to good or evil choice wherefore it is impossible
:

for free-will to be a habit.

Reply Obj. from its act.
ment,
act.
is

I.

It

And
if

Therefore it is a power. is not unusual for a power to be named so from this act, which is a free judgfree-will

power which is the principle of this denominated an act, it would Otherwise, not always remain in man. Reply Obj. 2. Faculty sometimes denominates a power ready for operation, and in this sense faculty is used in
the
Liberurn arbilri^in— !.«., free judgment.

named

Q. 83. Art. 3

THE

"

SUMMA THEOLOGICA "

152

the definition of free-will. But Bernard takes habit, not as divided against power, but as signifying a certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of relation to an act. And this may be both by a power and by a habit for by
:

a power

man is, as it were, empowered to do the action, and by the habit he is apt to act well or ill. Reply Obj. 3. Man is said to have lost free-will by
which from coercion, but as regards freedom from
falling into sin, not as to natural libert}^
is

freedom

fault

and

unhappiness. Of tliis we shall treat later in the treatise on Morals in the second part of this v.'ork (I .-II. Q.

LXXXV.

se^q./Q.CIX.).

Third Article.

Whether free-will

is

an appetitive power?

proceed thus to the Third Article: Objection 1. It would seem that free-will is not an appetiFor Damascene (De Fid. Orth. tive, but a cognitive power.
ii. 27) says that free-ivill straightway accompanies the But reason is a cognitive power. Thererational nature.

We

a cognitive power. Obj. 2. Further, free-will is so called as though it were a free judgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.
fore free-will
is

Obj. 3. Further, the principal function of the free-willBut choice seems to belong to knowledge, to choose. because it implies a certain comparison of one thing to another, which belongs to the cognitive power. Therefore
is

free-will is a cognitive

power.

the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iii. 3) that choice is the desire of those things which are in -us. But

On

an act of the appetitive power therefore choice is also. But free-will is that by which we choose. Therefore free-will is an appetitive power.
desire
is
:

/ answer that,

The proper
;

act of free-will

is

choice

:

for

we say that we have a free-will because we can take one this is to choose. Therething while refusing another and

153
fore

FREE-WILL
we must

Q. 83. Art. 3

consider the nature of free-will, by considering Now two things concur in choice one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the of the cognitive part of the appetitive power. On the part one thing we which is counsel judge by required, power, to be preferred to another and on the part of the appetitive the power, it is required that the appetite should accept vi. Aristotle Therefore 2) of counsel. {Ethic, judgment leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally to since he says that the appetitive or the cognitive power
the nature of choice.
:
:

:

choice

is

either

an appetitive
iii.,

intellect

appetite.

But {Ethic,

loc. cit.)

or an intellectual he inclines to its being

an

intellectual appetite

when he

describes choice as a desire
the reason of this

is because proceeding from counsel. And the end and to the means the proper object of choice is
:

this, as

such,
it

is

in

the nature of that good which
is
is

is

called

useful

:

wherefore since good, as such,
follows that choice

appetite,

the object of the principally an act of the

And thus free-will is an appetitive appetitive power. power. Reply Obj. 1. The appetitive powers accompany the apthat freeprehensive, and in this sense Damascene says will straightway accompanies the rational power. Reply Obj. 2. Judgment, as it were, concludes and ter'

Now counsel is terminated, first, by minates counsel. of reason secondly, by the acceptation of the judgment the whence Philosopher {Ethic, iii., ibid.) says appetite a judgment by counsel, we desire iti that, having formed And in this sense choice counsel. that with accordance takes its name. free-will from which itself is a judgment
the
;

:

This comparison which is implied in the choice belongs to the preceding counsel, which is an act For though the appetite does not make comof reason. moved by the apprehensive parisons, yet forasmuch as it is power which does compare, it has some likeness of comto another. parison by choosing one in preference

Reply Obj.

3.

Q. 83. Art. 4

THE

"

SUMMA THEOLOGICA "

154

Fourth Article,

whether free-will

is

a

power distinct from the
?

WILL

proceed thus to the Fourth Article : Objection 1. It would seem that free-will is a power disFor Damascene says {De Fid. Orlh. tinct from the will. ii. 22) that 0e\7/(rf? is one thing and ^ov\7iai<; another. But 0eX),o-(? is the will, while ^ovXtjo-i^ seems to be the
because ^ov\r]ai<;, according to him, is the will as concerning an object by way of comparison between two
free-will,

We

things. Therefore from the will.

it

seems that

free-will

is

a distinct

power

Obj.
choice,

2.

which

Further, powers are known by their acts. But is the act of free-will, is distinct from the act

of willing,

because the act of the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the means to the end {Ethic, iii. 2). Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will. Obj. 3. Further, the will is the intellectual appetite. But the active and the in the intellect there are two powers on the also of the intellectual appart passive. Therefore, there must be another besides the will. And power petite, can be free-will. Therefore free-will this, seemingly, only from will. a distinct the is power

On

the contrary,
is

Damascene says (De Fid. Orth.
will.

iii.

14)

free-will

nothing else than the

/ answer that, The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above (Q. LXIV., A. 2). Now, as on the part of the intellectual

apprehension

we have

intellect

and reason, so on the part

of the intellectual appetite we have will, and free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear

from their relations to their respective objects and acts. For the act of understanding implies the simple acceptation of something; whence we say that we understand first principles, which are known of themselves without any comparison. But to reason, properly speaking, is to

in is related to the means. that 8) belongs (Q. as we have said. are known from the principles. 1. . The intellect is compared to the will as moving the will. 2. Now. Choice and will that is. so free-will. LXXIX. properly speaking. but of acts. the principles are related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the principles just as. which is is Wherefore is it it is evident that to reason. it regards the means to the end. the act of willing are different acts yet they belong to the same power. Reply Obj. Art. 3. in matters else of knowledge.. 4 come from one thing knowledge of another : where- reason about conclusions. even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement. as — — : also to understand and to reason. which fore. But to choose is to desire : something for the sake of obtaining something wherefore. not of powers. appetitive : desired on account of the end. Reply Obj. properly speaking. which is the end matters. : desired for itself. to understand and to reason. Reply Obj. In like manner on the part we of the appetite to will implies the simple appetite for somewhich is thing wherefore the will is said to regard the end. the will to the power of has been shown above the same power both it to A. as the intellect choice. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose and But : on this account the will and the free-will are not two powers. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an active and a passive will.155 FREE-WILL to the Q. /3ou\t/o-(? is distinct from OeXrjcn^ on account of a distinction. 83. but one.

QUESTION LXXXIV. matters belongs. (In Eight Articles. But of the acts of the intellectual part to second which the consideration of moral we shall treat now. The former of these inquiries will be threefold (i) How order : we shall inquire : the soul understands bodies which are beneath it it.) We now have to consider the acts of the soul in regard to the intellectual of the and the appetitive powers for the other powers soul do not come directly under the consideration of : the theologian. shall proceed in the following how the soul understands First. (3) understands immaterial substances. when united to the body secondly. (2) it understands itself and things contained in itself. the acts of the appetitive of the science in the come under the consideration morals wherefore we shall treat of them tiiis part of work. or through any species ? (3) If through some species. whether the soul the species of all things intelligible are naturally innate in the soul? (4) Whether these species are derived by the 156 . Furthermore. In treating of these acts we . In treating of the Icnowledge of corporeal things there are three points to be considered (i) Through what does the soul know them ? ? (2) How it and in in them (3) What first does know what order does them ? it know : Under the (i) Whether (2) Whether head there are eight points of inquiry knows bodies through the intellect? it understands them through its essence. part of the soul of . HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH (T. which are above : How How it. how it understands when separated therefrom.

so the But the soul can by no means. Therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect. bodies. Therefore the soul cannot is know is bodies through the intellect. But such are not bodies. 84. . If. who inquired into the natures of things. the understand senses. science. through the species possessed. Further. spiritual things. which are through means can it. Obj. intellect. . the intellect does not know bodies. ii. that the early philosophers. i our soul sees (6) soul from certain separate immaterial forms? (5) Whether in the eternal ideas all that it understands? it senses of (7) it Whether is acquires intellectual knowledge from the the intellect can. the intellect is concerned with things that are necessary and unchangeable. whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect ? proceed thus to the First Article : Objection 1. as sense intellect to the sensible. Science is in the intellect. 4) that bodies cannot be understood by the intellect: nor indeed anything corporeal unless it can be perceived by the senses. On the contrary. But all bodies are mobile and changeable. therefore.157 KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES Whether ? Q. actually which understand. know which are sensible. 2. it follows that there is no science of bodies and thus perishes natural which treats of mobile bodies. Art. to the intelligible. through the Therefore no by intelligible. the without turning to the phantasms ? (8) the intellect is hindered by an Whether judgment of obstacle in the sensitive powers ? First Article. Further. It would seem that the soul does not know bodies through the intellect. thought there was nothing in the world save bodies. xii. He says also {Gen. And I answer. For Augustine says {Soliloq. 24) that intellectual vision is We — of those things that are in the soul by their essence. 3. In order to elucidate this question. ad lit. Obj.

After these iv. separate from matter and movement. to introduce other beings. when we manifest. Wherefore he said that sciences and definitions. seek for knowledge of things which are to us which cannot be the substance of those others. iii. that it is not possible flux. who. act of the intellect. Did. 84. knowledge of movement and matter would be excluded from science (which knowledge is proper to natural science). and considered them to be ever in a state of flux. are not referred to these sensible bodies. First. he thought that tlie form of the thing known must of necessity be in the knower in the same manner as in the thing known. or the like. I THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 158 because they observed that all bodies are mobile. since they differ from them so that granted that we have a knowledge of essentially those separate substances. they were of opinion that we can have no certain knowledge of the true nature of things. 5). Secondly. for it passes away ere the mind can form a judgment thereon according to the saying of Heraclitus.y. having observed that all knowledge takes place through some kind of similitude. which beings he called species or ideas. maintained that.. or a horse. : twice to touch a drop of water in a passing torrent. Art. Now it seems that Plato strayed from the truth because. For what is in a continual state of cannot be grasped with any degree of certitude. but to those beings immaterial and separate so that accord: came ing to this the soul does not understand these corporeal to be false for things. besides these things corporeal. but the separate species thereof. because it seems ridiculous. Now this may be shown two reasons. and likewise all demonstration through moving and material causes. by participation of which each one of these singular and sensible things is said to be either a man. as the Philosopher relates {Metaph. Then he observed . there is another genus of beings. since those species are immaterial and immovable. we cannot for that reason claim : to form a judgment concerning these sensible things. because. wishing to save the certitude of our knowledge of truth through the intellect. and whatever appertains to the Plato.

not correct to say that as the sense knows only bodies so the intellect knows only spiritual things. Dei xxii. but through immaterial and intelligible species. As Augustine says (De Civ. i form of the thing understood is in the intellect under conditions of universality. the species the receiver. receives under conditions of immateriality and immobility. 29). 2. . in another without sweetness. Reply Obj. H Art.159 that the KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES Q. and the mode for subject to a certain amount of necessity of action corresponds to the mode of the agent's form. that through the intellect the soul knows bodies by a knowledge which is immaterial. of material and mobile bodies to the : for the received is in the receiver must conclude. for it follows that God and the angels would not know corporeal things. Wherefore he concluded that the things which we understand must have in themselves an existence under the same conditions of immateriality and immobility. Reply Obj. For evenlin sensible things it is to sensible than in another be observed that the form is otherwise in one for instance. and not to its object. knows bodies by understanding them. immateriality. and necessary. it is The reason of this diversity is that the lower power does not extend to those things that belong to the higher power . according to its own mode. In the same way the sensible form is con- ditioned differently in the thing which is external to the soul. whose is act of understanding has a universal exten: sion. therefore. and in the senses which receive the forms of sensible things without receiving matter. not indeed through bodies. So also the intellect. universal. which can be in the soul by their own essence. such as the colour of gold without receiving gold. These words of Augustine are to be understood as referring to the We according mode of medium For the of intellectual intellect knowledge. i. nor through material and corporeal species. whiteness may be of : great intensity in one. and of a less intensity in another : in one we find whiteness with sweetness. and immobility which is apparent from the very operation of the : intellect. But there is no necessity for this.

Further. as Dionysius says (Coel. it seems that the soul knows corporeal things through itself. Further. ix. like is known by like. though Socrates be not always sit.84. an immovable truth that whenever he does sit he remains in one place. yet it is Second Article. Augustine says {De Trin. the substance remains unmoved. Every movement presupposes something immovable for when a change of quality occurs. 8) that the soul. Hier. the soul is superior to corporeal creatures. 5) that the soul collects and lays hold of the We — images of bodies which are formed in the soul and of the soul: for in forming them it gives them something of its own substance. x. Obj. essence. therefore. Reply Obj. Therefore know corporeal creatures through its essence. 3. in Therefore themselves. all corporeal creatures exist in a more excellent way in the soul than in themselves. 2. 3) that . Obj. the Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " i6o whereas the higher power operates in a more excellent manner those things which belong to the lower power. can the soul On the contrary.). of bodies. Moreover the : various conditions of mutable things are themselves immovable for instance. 3. matter remains unmoved. is everything. whether the soul understands corporeal things through its essence? proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection i. For this reason there is nothing to hinder our having an immovable science of movable things. after a fashion.Q. It would seem that the soul understands corporeal things through its essence. and from which it forms them. and when there is a change of substantial form. Since. ting. For Augustine says {De Trin. But the soul understands bodies by images Therefore the soul knows bodies through its which it employs for the formation of such images. Art. Now lower things are in higher things in a more eminent way than xii.

It is therefore insufficient to ascribe to the soul the nature of the principles in order to explain the fact that it unless we further admit in the soul the natures of each individual result. For it was universally like is The admitted that known by like. held that the forms of things While the earlier natural known subsist immaterially. Q. having observed that the intellectual soul has an immaterial nature. Art. but only according as it is in act. Consequently. as is shown Metaph. so that those as to air who thought fire to be the principle of fire . because in the material principle of which they spoke. movement. Therefore through the cannot be known through does not know corporeal things through / ansiver that. for instance. The Platonists however were . (Did. For Plato. knows ancient philosophers held that the soul bodies through its essence. But this opinion will not hold. Empedocles. observing material of mode and even that material. result is determined nature of a the because by its a the soul nature of to the prinprinciples. flesh.I6ti KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES mind gathers knowledge But the soul itself. held that things known must exist materially in the soul that knows them. in order to ascribe to the soul a it knowledge of all things. But they thought that the form of the thing known is in the knower in the same mode as in the thing known. And therefore. who held the existence of four material elements and two principles manner of and water. thus failing to discern intellect from sense. said that the soul was composed of these. 2 the of corporeal things itself it bodily senses. of a contrary opinion. they maintained that all the soul's knowledge is material. knows all. they ascribed ciple all. and ft 4 . g) : wherefore neither is a power known except through its act. But a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality. First. held that the soul had the nature of and in like Lastly. the bodily senses. 84. the various results do not exist save in potentiality. and an im- knowledge. since they held that things exist in the soul materially. that things known are corporeal philosophers. they held And has the same nature in common with all. ix. of I. . viii. and forms bone.

3) : while we have remarked above (Q. because the act of knowledge : extends to things outside the knower for we know things even that are external to us. Therefore the which abstracts the species not only from matter. then things immaterially. that all there be its which knows essence must needs have an intellect things by its essence. must be actually composed all in itself of the principles of all material things. there would be no reason why things which have a material existence outside the soul should be devoid of knowledge why. but immais. therefore.. is if by fire the soul knows fire. that His Essence comprise all things immaterially. : Now but . has more perfect knowledge than the senses. the more perfect is its knowledge. as A. which receive the intellect form of the thing known. understands all things through His Essence neither the human soul nor the angels can do so. because if it were necessary for the thing known to exist materially in the knower. but also from the individuating conditions of matter. as the Philosopher says {De Anima ii. power of knowledge whatever such as clear that — plants. The reason of this knower. but subject to material conditions. thus does Aristotle argue against Empedocles {De Anima i. that it may know all things. But the more immaterially a thing receives the form of the thing known. Secondly. not materially. Art. this is proper to God. Moreover. instance. that fire also which We outside the soul should not have knowledge of fire. LXXVIII. among the senses. thus the early philosophers held that the essence of the soul.84. And knowledge that are not receptive of forms save consequently things have no materially. without matter indeed.Q. 5). 12). must conclude. therefore. for . as effects pre-exist virtually in their cause. that material things known exist in the must needs terially. God alone. among intellects the more perfect is the more if immaterial. because it is the least material. Now by matter the form of a thing is determined to some one thing. It is therefore clear from the foregoing. sight has the most perfect knowledge. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 162 the like. is in Wherefore it is inverse ratio to materiality.

in things created. but just as we' part of its . substance. forasmuch as they have something in common generically. is in potentiality to all to all things sensible —through things. with such image which informed not something namely. is F"or he says that the soul keeps clear from what follows. Reply Obj. through the senses. Reply Obj. which takes place through the image of bodies. just as a subject is given in order to be informed by some form. 2 Augustine in that passage is speaking of an imaginary vision. In this way the soul makes such images from itself not that the soul or some part of the soul be turned into this or that image. the common to tis and beasts. — — is able freely to judge of the species of these images: and And he says that the that this is the mind or intellect. . 3. But the Divine Essence is a perfect likeness it of all. Aristotle did not hold that the soul is actually composed of all things. q- h art. 2. Every creature has a finite and determinate Wherefore although the essence of the higher creature has a certain likeness to the lower creature. That this is the sense. is informed with these images is —namely. whatsoever may be found to exist being the universal principle of all. — the intellect. yet has not a complete likeness thereof.1-63 Knowledge of bodies i. because it is determined to a certain species other than the species of the lower creature. as did the earlier philosohe said that the soul it is all forasmuch as intelligible. part which — imagination phers . coloured because say that a body is made into something of its being informed with colour. after a fashion. to all things essence. To the formation of such images the soul gives Reply Obj.

164 whether the soul understands all things through innate species ? proceed thus to the Third Article: Objection 1. Since form is the principle of action. speaking of the iniii. as we find related Obj. Therefore the soul underin the Meno vidual. (xv. 3. The Philosopher. in a things through innate species. 84. Therefore much more is Further. which would not be the case unless we had innate species. of things. Art. if upward motion is from lightness.). 2. answers the truth to every question if put to him in orderly fashion. the intellectual soul created by God under intelligible species. But even a person untaught and devoid of acquired knowledge. And so the soul understands corporeal things through innate species. But primary matter was created by God under the forms to which it has potentiality. by means of which it understands corporeal : things. Further. then that which only potentially moves upwards must needs be only potentially light. no one can answer the truth except concerning what he knows. but : . Obj. 4) that it is like a tablet on Anivia tellect. in Ev. stands corporeal things through innate species. I answer that.) of Plato. as it is to that action for instance. that man has for the Ascension (xxix. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " Third Article. the intellectual soul is more excellent than corporeal primary matter. But angels whereunderstand all things through innate species fore in the book De Causis it is said that every intelligence Therefore the soul also has innate species is ftdl of forms. says {De which nothing is written.Q. homily understanding in common ivith the angels. On an action. It would seem that the soul understands We — all For Gregory says. a thing must be related to the form which is the principle of the contrary. seqq. concerning a certain indiTherefore we have some knowledge of things even before we acquire knowledge.

Art. intellect by which the soul understands has no innate species. i) for it is un- whole is : reasonable that the natural operation of a thing be totally hindered by that which belongs to it naturally. as a light thing may be hindered from moving hold that naturally upwards. the soul does not know corporeal things through innatel We the soul had innate images of must therefore conclude that species. and to those which are the principles of underFor this reason Aristotle (ibid. Secondly. the larger than the part. the falseness of this opinion is clearly proved from the fact that a sense be wanting. to the act of under- that the cognitive soul standing. A. : .) held that the standing. LXXVI. First.— by instruction or discovery. for this reason did [Plato man's intellect is filled with all intelligible species. by being united tion of its act. Man indeed has intelligence in common . to sense and as to intellect..i65 that KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES Q. 1. 3 which actually moves upwards must needs be actually Now we observe that man sometimes is only a light. it is hindered from the realizaBut this seems to be unreasonable. if to the body. as we have established above (Q. the soul has a natural knowledge of all things. both as he is reduced from such potentiality to act . but is at first in potentiality to all such species. And potential knower. But since that which has a form actually. but that. Reply Obj. Wherefore we must say are the principles which to the both in is images potentiality of sensing. a man who is born blind can have no knowledge of colours. And especially unreasonable does this seem if we suppose that it is natural to the soul to be united to the body. it seems impossible for the soul so far to forget the existence of such knowledge as not to know itself to be possessed thereof for no man forgets what he knows naturally that. because. and suchlike. to the act of sensation . is sometimes unable to act according to that form on account of some hindrance. if : This would not be the case all if intelligible things.— through the action of sensible objects on his senses. for instance. the knowledge of what is apprehended through that sense is wanting also for instance. 84.

Reply Obj. Reply Obj. according to Gregory {loc. Art. But when once it exists under one form it is in potentiality to others. have not the same degree of perfection as the higher bodies. whereas the human intelligible species. 4 THE " SUMM A THEOLOGICA " 166 : with the angels. On the other hand. 3. duced in the mind of the learner. as we have said above (Q. is by questioning or by of the listener is asserting . whatever is such by participation is caused by what is such We the Fourth Article: — . consequently it had need to be created under some form else it would not be in act. Fourth Article.Q. the intellect does not receive sub: stantial there being through the intelligible species and therefore no comparison. but is in to forms which it has not whereas the matter potentiality of heavenly bodies is totally completed by its form. If questions be put in an orderly fashion they proceed from universal self-evident principles to what Now by such a process knowledge is prois particular. this is not because he had knowledge previously. in accordance intellect is in potenti- ality to ( such species. Wherefore when he answers the truth to a subsequent question. 2). For the matter of the : not totally completed by its form. but because he thus For it matters not whether the learns for the first time. In the same way the angelic lower bodies is intellect is perfected by with its nature . but not in the same degree of perfection just as the lower crades of bodies.). whether the intelligible species are derived by ? the soul from certain separate forms proceed thus to Objection i. teacher proceed from universal principles to conclusions . Primary matter has substantial being through its form. 84. 2. It would seem that the intelligible species For are derived by the soul from some separate forms. so that it is not in potentiality to any other form. which merely exist.. cit. LXVI. A. for in either case the mind assured of what follows by that which preceded.

sensible we sense. Further. by sensible caused by some things actually intelthe soul. 4 for instance. object which exists actually outside intellect our which Therefore the intelligible species. But these can be nothing ligible. by something If. by Obj. whatever actual. For Plato. soul understands. are caused by some separate forms. and the form or idea . are caused by On the contrary. Therefore what in itself and in its essence is understood in act. that which is on fire is reduced essentially But the intellectual soul forto fire as the cause thereof. essence is actually understood is a form existing without Therefore the intelligible species. And this in two ways. the intellect in act is the thing thine understood in act. existing outside else than forms separate from matter. are substances. stand. is the cause that the intelNow that which in its lectual soul actually understands. is in potentiality therefore. to act 3. participates the understood: for. asmuch Further. Some have held that the intelligible species of our intellect are derived from certain separate forms or substances. are caused by the and which in the senses. And this is proved to be from the fact that if a man be wanting in a sense. is reduced intellect. . Art. false especially by which we actually undersome separate substances. If this were true we should not need the senses in order to understand. he cannot have any knowledge of the sensibles corresponding to that sense. as it is actually understanding. the intelligible is to the intellect. this must needs be caused by some intellect which But this is a separate intellect. i). in a way. the form of a man which he called per se man. KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES Q. 84. previously fore the intelligible species. Obj.i67 . / answer that. held that the forms of sensible things subsist by themselves without matter for instance. as we have said (A. as the But the sensible species which are to the sense. is the soul. Therefore the intelfrom some separate ligible forms of our intellect are derived understands. 2. by which the matter. our afterwards actually underin potentiality. Thereis always in act. stands.

. and so forth. from which. too. that the intelligible intellect are derived from certain separate our of species forms but these Plato held to subsist of themselves. is made understand a stone. in this respect. by our soul. the sensible forms. instead of subsisting in them- selves without matter. derived therefrom. said he. Avicenna placed them ligible species in differ. to the effect of knowledge thereof.). And so and sensible species into corporeal matter. to so our intellect. They Avicenna held that the intelin it has turn needs to ceased (to the active intellect) in order to receive them anew. vi. that the active intelligence. such species intellects : are derived lect by a second. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 168 of a horse which he called per se horse. according to him. intelligible species flow into our souls. just as So just as he held that is participated by a copy. contrary to the nature of sensible things should subsist without matter. Consehold that the soul has innate knowquently he does not ledo-e. who held that the participated ideas remain do not remain our intellect after it actually to understand. by participating the idea of a stone. as Plato. Art.Q. and so on to the last separate intelwhich he called the active intelligence. becomes an individual stone. Avicenna {De Anima setting this opinion aside. which are in corporeal matter. He said therefore that these forms are participated both by our soul and by corporeal matter. Now participation of an idea takes place by some image of the idea in the participator. And for this reason. pre-exist immaterially in the separate from the first of which. : and by corporeal matter to the effect so that. 84. in this. held that the intelligible species of all sensible things. just as corporeal matter by particiof existence pating the idea of a stone. he referred sciences and definitions to those ideas. as Aristotle that their forms it But since is proves in V. while Avicenna agrees with Plato . and that immovably in the soul. i).) many ways {Metaph. are so he derived from the ideas as certain images thereof held that the intelligible species of our intellect are images a model : of the ideas. as we have said above (A.

Consequently the reason of the union of the soul with the body still remains to be sought. 4 But for tlie no sufficient reason can be assigned For it cannot be soul being united to the body. except in as far as it is overcome by sluggishness. And thus a . For this awakening does not seem necessary to the soul. natural for the soul to understand through species derived from the active intelligence.i69 KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES in this opinion Q. said that the intellectual soul is united to the body for for neither is form for the sake of the sake of the body : matter. the intelligible species of which this receives from the separate principles insufficient seems an explanation. 84. : had an inborn aptitude for receiving intelligible species through the influence of only certain separate principles. Art. as the Platonists expressed it. But if the soul by its very nature rather the reverse. it follows that at times the soul of an individual wanting in one of the senses can turn to And if it : the active intelligence. But if it be said that our soul needs the senses in order : to understand. and were not to receive them from the senses. that the senses are necessary to the soul. it would not wherefore to no need the body in order to understand purpose w ould it be united to the body. be said with Avicenna. for the latter's proper operation which is to understand since as to its being the soul does not depend on the body. nor is the mover for the sake of the moved. but Especially does the body seem necessary to the intellectual soul. through being it in some way awakened by : them even to the consideration of those things. either from the inclination of its very nature. because by them it is roused to turn to the active intelligence from which it receives the species Because if it is neither is this a sufficient explanation. or through being roused by another sense. and by forgetfulness. through its union with and thus the senses would be of no use to the the body : intellectual soul except for the purpose of removing the obstacle which the soul encounters through its union with the body. to the effect of receiving the intelligible species of which the corresponding sensible species are wanting.

although perchance as remote cause. Fifth Article.). i. 4). visible things of God are clearly seen by the things . Wherefore there is no comparison Reply Obj. between sense and intellect.5 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 170 man born clearly untrue. which is must therefore conclude that the intel- We ligible species.\terial the eternal types ? proceed thus to the Fifth Article: Objection i. i. in the present the eternal types for it does the eternal types exist. power and not by a separate act. Reply Obj. vii. . from which we gather knowledge. blind could have knowledge of colours. as to the being which they have outside the soul. that is. But the intellectual soul of know : Whom Theolog. does not We — man. which is by its essence intelligible God. by which our soul understands. 3. Our passive intellect in is reduced from potentiality to act by some being active intellect. A. as Dionysius says (Myst.). is written (Rom. they proceed from that principle by means of the sensible forms and material things. The intelligible species which are participated by our intellect are reduced. to a first principle — Xotn. as Dionysius says (Div. 2. state of life. by the of the soul as we have intel- ligence. but not actually intelligible. are not derived from separate forms. But namely. 20) that the in. LXXIX.84. It would seem that the intellectual soul does not know material things in the eternal types. as to their first cause. For that in which anything is known must itself be known more and previously. whether the intellectual soul knows things in m. I. Therefore the soul does not know it all in the eternal types. Obj.. Material things. as proximate cause. may be actually sensible. Reply Obj. 2. .Q. Further. but is not know God in united la God as to the unknoicn. which is a said (Q.ART.

he adopted it and those things which he found contrary to faith he amended. Christ.171 KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES made. found in their teaching anything consistent with faith. the eternal types are nothing else but that ideas. knows all answer 11) : that. qu. Consequently whenever Augustine. that the forms of things and these he subsist of themselves apart from matter called ideas. where do we see this. we must claim it from them as from unjust possessors. I pray? Neither do I see it in you. as the Platonists held. by participating the same idea. asserting that per se life or per se wisdom are creative . by participation of which he said that our : . Obj.. has knowintellect all : knows ledge of a stone. nor do you see it in me: but we both see it in the unchangeable truth whicli is above our minds. who was imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists. For some of the doctrines of the heathcjis are spurious imitations or superstitious iyiventio^is. for Augustine says (OQ. LXXXIII. and if we both see : what I say is true. Augustine says {Confess. On we that the contrary. 84. which we must be careful to avoid when we renounce the society of the heathens. Art. 5 that arc tlie But among the eternal types. true things in the eternal types. / ii. said by chance anything that was true and consistent with our faith. // those As Augustine says {De who are called philosophers Doctr. 4). as we have said above (A. 25) // both see that what you say is true. Divine the in ideas are permanent types existing If therefore we say that the intellectual soul knows all to the opinion things in the eternal types. Further. Q. 46) mind. things so that just as corporeal matter the idea of a stone becomes a stone. 3. invisible things of God are Therefore the eternal types are known through creatures and not the converse. so by participating our intellect. we come back of Plato who said that all knowledge is derived from them. Now the unchangeable truth is contained in the Therefore the intellectual soul eternal types. xii. But since it seems contrary to faith that forms of things should subsist of themselves outside the things themselves and apart from matter. Now Plato held.

Many say. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " Nom. In this way : . is signed upon us. LXXXIII. O Lord. When. knowledge.. which are derived from things. according to which types all things are Augustine (QQ. maintaining that the mere participation of ideas sufficed Wherefore Augustine says {De Trin. is else than a participated likeness of the uncreated by For the participation of these types intellectual light itself we know is in all which which are contained the eternal types. cannot see all things in the eternal types. as though he were to say B)' the seal of the Divine light in us. as the Platonists held.). Whence it 7). made in themselves. But since besides the intellectual light which is in us. types of all creatures existing in the Divine mind. are required in order for us to have knowledge of material things. : things are made known to us. in is us. The light of Thy countenance. And thus we must needs : say that the types. as Dionysius relates {Div. the question is asked Does the human soul know all things in the eternal types ? we must reply that one thing is said to be known in another in two wa\ s. in the present state of life. for they see God. 16) Although the philosophers prove by convincing arguments that all things occur in time according to the eternal types. were they able to see in the eternal types. nothing light. 6. one thing is said to be known in another as in a thus we might say that we see in principle of knowledge the sun what we see by the sun. iv. Secondly. since human soul knows all things in the eternal things.ioT the ideas defended the substituted by Plato. therefore this same knowledge is not due merely to a participation of the eternal types. as one may see in a First. therefore loc. or for : from them how ma7iy kinds of animals there are Did they not seek for this inthe origin of each? the story of times and places? formation from to find out and . and are known to the human soul.Art. as in an object itself known mirror the images of things reflected therein. xi. 172 substances. who showeth us good which things? question the Psalmist answers. the soul. all written (Ps.Q. 84.). intelligible species.cit. and all things in Him. therefore. iv.

namely. 2. Sixth Article. Whence he concludes that the body does not cause its must not think . even when not present to the senses. intellectual intellectual knowledge appreknowledge cannot lit. Obj. p-irst.. truth from the senses. ad that the xii. is clear from what he says (QQ. or the deceptive image thereof. of the eternal types.. Now nothing can be per- senses reach. Art. LXXXIII. From what has been said the objections are easily solved. as though the eternal types themselves were seen. 9) that we cannot expect to learn the This he fulness of truth from the senses of the body. ceived which cannot be distinguished from its counterfeit.. because. And so he concludes that we cannot expect to learn the But hends the truth. as when we are asleep or angry: yet we cannot discern by the senses. whether what we perceive be the sensible object. Further. because. loc.173 KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES Q. whatever we perceive by the body. and what is never the same cannot be perceived. 16) : We body can make any impression the on the spirit. such as the souls of the blessed. for that which of matter in regard excellent than that which it acts acts is in every way more on. For Augustine says qu. may be present to the imagination. as though spirit were to supply the place to the body's action. It would seem that intellectual knowledge not derived from sensible things. Augustine says (Gen.)—viz. whether intellectual knowledge sensible things ? is derived from We proceed is thus to the Sixth Article: — Objection i. Secondly. 84. cit. but only those that are holy and pure. is continually being changed. whatever the bodily (OQ. that not each and every rational soul can be said to be worthy of that vision. proves in two ways. LXXXIII. Therefore be conveyed by the senses'. 6 But that Augustine did not understand all things to be known in their eternal types or in the unchangeable truth.

There- fore intellectual knowledge effect is not derived from sensible things. they thought that all our know^ledge is affected by this mere impression brought about by sensible things.) that Democritus held that knowledge is caused by a discharge of images. an cause. the contrary. The Philosopher says {Metaph. does not surpass the power of knowledge extends beyond sensible things for we understand some things which cannot be perceived by the senses. 3. 84. 3). affected by the sensible but the sensible organs are affected by the sensible. as Aristotle relates {De Anima iii. since the sense is affected by the sensible. as Augustine says in his letter to Dioscorus (cxviii. But intellectual : is not derived from sensible things. Moreover he held that sense : is a power operating of itself. Plato. And since the incorporeal cannot be affected by the corporeal. the result being that the soul is in a way roused to form within itself the species of the sensible. i. xii. 24) Augustine seems to touch where he says that the . Poster. 5).Q. he held that intellectual knowledge is not brought about by sensible things affecting the intellect. but the spirit causes in itself. but by separate intelligible forms being participated by the intellect. Consequently. 4. held that the intellect is disand that it is an immaterial power tinct from the senses use of not making a corporeal organ for its action. Which impression Democritus held to be caused by a discharge of images. ad lit. Further. Aftt. on this opinion {Ge7i. 4). Therefore intellectual its Obj. et Vigil. And the reason for this opinion was that both Democritus and the other early philosophers did not distinguish between intellect and sense. on the other hand. And Aristotle says (De Som7i. For Democritus held that knowledge is caused by images issiiing from the bodies we thiiik of and entering into our sottls. ii. 6 THE ' ' SUMM A TH EOLOGIC A it ' ' {Tr4 image in the spirit. 15) that the principle of knowledge is in the senses. i. since it is a spiritual power. Consequently neither is : sense. On this point the philosophers held three all opinions. as we have said above (A A. knowledge On / answer that.

3. Aristotle agreed with Democritus in this. but of the composite. as he is says {ibid. And therefore in order to cause the intellectual operation. Since. the impression caused by the sensible does not suffice. indeed. as we gather fom De Gener. 84.175 KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES not. LXXIX. causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible. nor these rouse the but from sensible things exclusively sensible soul to the sentient act. AA. Not. in the sense that the intel- lectual operation is elTected in us by the mere impression of some superior beings. For Democritus maintained that every operation is by way of a discharge of atoms. of which we have spoken above (Q. Q. But he held that the sense has not its proper operation without the cooperation of the body so that to feel is not an act of the soul alone. by a process of abstraction. But Aristotle held tlmt the intellect has an operation which independent of the body's co-operation. For with Piato he agreed that intellect and sense are different. 6 it body feels makes use within but the soul through the body. on the part of the phantasms. And he held the same in regard to all the operations of the sensitive part. intellect to the act of understanding. that the operations of the sensitive part are caused by the impression of the sensible on the sense: not by a discharge. 5). while the senses rouse the . which of as a kind of messenger. According to this opinion. for reproducing announced from without. intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. as Democritus said. . but something more noble is required. Now nothing corporeal can make an impression on the incorporeal. therefore. as Plato held but that the higher . neither does intellectual knowledge sensible knowledge proceed from sensible knowledge.. i. But since the phantasms cannot of themselves affect the . then. for the agent is more noble than the patient. but by some kind of operation. and more noble agent which he calls the active intellect. according to Aristotle. Thus itself what is according to Plato. Aristotle chose a middle course. 8. 4). it is not unreasonable that the sensible objects which are outside the soul should produce some effect in the composite. Art.

in so far as it is compared to it as a being in act to a being in potentiality even .6 the "SUMMA THEOLOGICA'* 176 passive intellect. because the agent is miore noble than the patient. Those words of Augustine mean that we must not expect the entire truth from the senses. and discern things themselves from their likeness. according to the opinion of Aristotle. Augustine. And without doubt. i. Sensitive knowledge is of intellectual knowledge. however.84. as the object actually coloured is which is potentially coloured. uses the same iimagination. the imagination has an belongs to the soul only. But if we hold. there is no difficulty because the sensible body is more noble than the organ of the animal.sensitive not the entire cause is not strange further than knowledge. Art. even of things not perceived by the senses. the agency of the sensible. as Aristotle does in proving that the active •argument •order to :intellect show must be separate. be said. in the imagination there must needs be not only a passive but also an active power. it cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge. is although the first impression of the imagination is through prothat 3). but rather that it is in a way the material cause. It compared to the pupil may. And therefore it that intellectual knowledge should extend . through which we achieve the unchangeable truth of changeable things. And Augustine's words may be taken in this sense. that the action of the imagination is an action of the composite. and require to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect. . in that corporeal images are impressed on the not by bodies but by the soul. iintellectual 2. In this passage Augustine speaks not of of but imaginary knowledge. 3. • according operation which to the opinion of Plato. Anima synthesis there by operation and analysis forms images of various things. nevertheless is in man an which Reply Obj. For the light of the active intellect is needed. namely. Reply Obj. since jancy duced in accordance with sensation (De movement iii.-1^. Reply Obj. And since. according to the above opinion. .

our intellect cannot understand ally without turning to the anything actuit phantasms. the imagination is more dependent on the senses than the intellect on the imagination. : On I the contrary. And of this there are two indications. Art. it is impossible for our understand anything actually. / whether the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed. Which is clearly false for we understand truth. it understands. and the angels. 2. therefore. 3. t. being a power that does not make use of a corporeal organ. answer is soul that. First of all because the intellect. if for its act there were not required the act of some power that does make use of a corporeal organ. The Philosopher says {De Anima iii. But if the intellect in act. follows that If. without turning to the phantasms ? proceed thus to the Seventh Article: Objection i. Now sense. would in no way be hindered in its act through the lesion of a corporeal organ. But the in can the absence of the imagination actually imagine sensible. Further. and God. There are no phantasms of incorporeal things : for the imagination does not transcend time and space. Therefore the intelligible species suffices for the intellect to understand actually. without turning to the phantasms. 7) that the soul understands nothing without a phantasm. 4 imagination and the other powers belonging to the sensimake use of a corporeal organ. Obj. Obj. it cannot understand anything incorporeal. Therefore much more can the intellect understand without turning to the phantasms.iTi KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES Seventh Article. Q. except by turning phantasms. 84. without turning to the phantasms. It would seem that the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed. Wherefore it is la . In the present state of life in which the united to a passible body. intellect to to the tive part. For the intellect is is We — made actual by the intelligible species is by which it informed.

Wherefore the proper proportioned thing of the which is entirely separate object angelic intellect. Now we and senses as existing in the indithe individual through the apprehend the imagination. we examples before him. and through such natures of visible Now a certain knowledge of things invisible. we see that a man is hindered from actually understanding things of which he had a previous knowledge. And. but also when it applies knowledge already accjuired. from a body. the Platonists say. intellect were a form our or if.Q. Art. for the init much as is known tellect to understand actually its proper object. 84. and so forth. and this cannot be apart from corporeal matter for instance. For when the act of hindered by a lesion of the corporeal organ. not only it acquires fresh knowledge. as of separate proper object . anyone can experience this of himself. the reason of this to the is that the power of knowledge is known. there is need for the act of the imagination and of the other powers. in which as it were he examines what he lay is when we wish for the For this reason it is that someone to understand something. therefore. Wherefore the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly. things it rises to : belongs to the nature of a stone to be stone. from which he forms phantasms desirous of understanding. Now it belongs to such a nature to exist in an individual. that when he tries to understand something. Secondly. is an intelligible substance separate from a body. it must of necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the But if the universal nature existing in the individual. memory is hindered. and to the nature of a horse to be it in in an individual an individual horse. as in the case of lethargy. he forms certain phantasms to serve him by way of examples. which is united to a body. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 178 when clear that for the intellect to understand actually. for instance. to help purpose of understanding. in a case of frenzy or when the act of the imagination the is . Whereas the proper object of the human intellect. the natures of sensible things subsisted . is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter. . except in as vidual.

which things are natures existing individuals. we know as cause. therefore. 2. bodies of which there are phantasms. Incorporeal things. It would seem that the judgment of the intellect is not hindered by suspension of the sensitive powers. .. 6).A. Wherefore for us to understand actually. by way of excess and by way of remotion. Even the phantasm is the likeness of an individual thing. Reply Obj. Reply Obj. The species preserved in the passive in-' habitually when it does not understand them actually. whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered through suspension of the sensitive powers? Eighth Article: Objection 1. art. wherefore the imagination does not need any further likeness of the individual. Q.).179 KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES . LXXIX. themselves. And. incorporeal substances we know. i. thus to the We proceed — But the judgment of the intellect is higher than the senses. truth by considering a thing of which we possess the truth and God. Eighth Article. as we have said above (Q. of which there are no known to us by comparison with sensible are phantasms. whereas the intellect' does. the fact that the further to species' are preserved does not suffice we need tellect exist there . For the superior does not depend on the inferior. 84. although there are no phantasms of the things . i. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through suspension of the senses. 8 apart from the individual there would be no need for the intellect to turn to the phantasms whenever it understands. Other of life. in the present state to corsome or of remotion comparison by only by way somewhen we understand poreal things. as Dionysius says {Div. make use of them in a manner befitting the things of which irt they are the species. we need to turn to phantasms of bodies. Thus we understand Reply Obj. thing about these things. 3. Norn.

and its i. that as the end of a practical science is end so the action. 15).) and yet it sometimes happens to us to syllogize while asleep. What a man does while asleep. save for essential properties of those it is clear things which he perceives with his senses. Now a perfect judgment concerning anytellect's thing cannot be formed. 84. nevertheless in a first and receives from the senses. As we have said above (A.). to us. On the contrary. our in- proper and proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing. through which sensible things are known life natural sensible things. iii. while asleep. unless all that pertains to that thing's nature be known especially if that be ignored which Now the Philosopher is the term and end of judgment. if man. seek to and of a horse. against the moral law. is not imputed to him as a sin as Augustine says {Gen. xii. et Vig. unless he knows sensible things.Q. for the smith does says (De Gael. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " i8o Obj. 2. Reply Obj. 7). (i. not seek knowledge of a knife except for the purpose of action. while the senses are suspended. of natural science is that ivhich is perceived principally through the senses. Art. Further. in order that he may produce a certain individual knife and in like manner the natural philosopher does not . . But during sleep the senses are suspended. that a smith cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he the nature of a stone the purpose of know knowing the Now knows the action of the knife : and in like manner the natural philosopher cannot judge perfectly of natural things. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is hindered by suspension of the senses. as is said in De Somn. had free use of his reason and intellect. ad lit. we know by comparison to Consequently it is not possible for our intellect to form a perfect judgment. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through suspension of the senses. But this would not be the case . / answer that. But in the present state of whatever we understand. principal objects are founded in sensible manner . Although the intellect is superior to the it senses. to syllogize is an act of the intellect.

). but also the imagination. however. especially when a man falls asleep after eating and drinking copiously. yet is it always deceived in some Therefore. but also the common sense is partly freed so that sometimes while asleep a man may judge that what he sees is a dream. through certain evaporations halations. in sober men and those who are If the evaporation be gifted with a strong imagination. et Vig. sense and imagination are free. not only are the senses suspended. the common sense remains partly it : .i8i KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES The Q. though not entirely. while man is asleep. For when the amount is . according senses are more or less to the senses are suspended in the sleeper and the escape of certain ex- Somn. between things and their images. according as particular. Art. suspended and therefore. And. although it discriminates some images from the reality. phantasms appear. very slight. if a man syllogizes while asleep. the phantasms will thus especially does it happen have a certain sequence towards the end of sleep. as it were. 84. variably recognizes a flaw in some respect. And if the evaporation be still more attenuated. when he wakes up he in. Consequently. discerning. Reply Obj. as we read in De therefore. 8 things. thus it happens in a case of fever. (iii. . amount of such evaporation. 2. so that there are no phantasms thus does happen. Nevertheless. the evaporation be somewhat less. If. the not does only imagination retain its freedom. And therefore suspension of the senses necessarily involves a hindrance to the judgment of the intellect. so is the judgment of his intellect unfettered. considerable. the suspended. but distorted and without sequence.

or that whereby it understands ? (3) Whether our understands the more universal ? at the same (4) Whether our intellect can know many things time ? (5) Whether our intellect understands by the prointellect naturally first cess of composition tellect and division ? (6) Whether the in- can err ? (7) Whether one intellect can understand better than another? (8) Whether our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible ? First Article. whether our intellect understands corporeal and material things by abstraction from phantasms? We proceed thus to the First Article : — Objection i. OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING. Further.QUESTION LXXXV. (In Eight Articles. Therefore. Obj. For the intellect is false if it understands an object otherwise than as it real l y is. material things are those natural things 182 . : species abstracted from the phantasms are what our intellect understands. -.) We come now to consider the mode and order of understandUnder this head there are eight points of inquiry our intellect understands by abstracting the Whether (i) from the phantasms ? (2) Whether the intelligible species ing. Now the forms of material things do not exist as abstracted from the particular things represented by the phantasms. It would seem that our intellect does not understand corporeal and material things by abstraction from the phantasms. if we understand material things by abstraction of the species from the phantasm. there will be error in the intellect.

And therefore the object of every _sensi- .says (He Annua iii. I ansiver that. 4) that things arc intelligible in proportion as they are s^epar- On able from uiattcr.ni::_ Therefore material things_carinot be understood apart. »5 Art.. tion from matter. but place by abstraction of something on the intellect. phantasms. the Phili. For one power. . Obj. the Philosopher says {De Anima iii. Further._ object of knowledge is proportionate to there are three grades of the cognitive powers. _ Obj. but by rnlour impressing itself on the species neither does the act of understanding take Therefore sight. abstraction of the universal from the particular. namely. thai w^ich_enters into '^s defi. 5) there are two things in the intellectual soul— the passive But it does not belong intellect and the active intellect. 5. i which include matter But nothing can _ in their definition. is the act of a Now cognitive corporeal organ. Neither does it seem to be the function of the active intfillect.i83 HOW THE . by abstraction. the Philosopher {De Anima iii. namely. LXXXIV.^opher . 7) phantasm is to the intellectual soul what colour is But se eing is not caused by abstraction of from colour. be understood apart from. 7) says that the intellect understands the species in the phantasm. but to receive them when abstracted.^ anything light streams on to it. Therefore in no way do we understand by is abstraction from phantasms. Therefore material things must needs be understiKid according as they are abstracted from matter and from material images. which since is to colour related to the _2Jhantasmj_asU^ rather but co from not abstract does lour. therefore. ledge. that the Further. to the passive intellect to abstract the intelligible species from the phantasm. A.^ and not. As stated above (Q. The Philosopher says {De Anima iii. 7). ". the sense. 3. the the power of know. itself by the phantasm impressing to the sight. which is the process whereby the intelligible species is abstracted from the phantasm. Obj. SOUL KNOWS y. the contrary.. — Now matter is the principle of individualiza- Tliercfurc material things cannot be understood by tion. from the phantasm. Further. 4.

as is clear from what we have said above (Q. in mode mode of abstrac- of abstrac- . But the human intellect holds a middle place for it is not the act of an organ yet it is a power of the soul which is the form of the body. But. LXXVI. i.. angels know material things through the immaterial. but by participateing things abstract. Art. A. And since such matter is the principle of individuality. either in themselves or in God. the object of whose cognitive power is therefore a form existing apart from matter for though angels know mater-^1 things. i). : : . the act of a corporeal organ. body. know a form existing individually in corporeal matter. by way of simple and absolute consideration thus we understand one thing . : by way . But to know what is in indivitlual matter.But Plato. or that it is separate therefrom. imply falsehood. but not as existing in this individual matter.. Abstraction may occur in tw o ways thus we may of com20srUon_and^jy[sion First. yet they do not know them save in something immaterial. on the contrary. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 184 tive_power is a form as existing in corporeal matter. without considering the other. A. as stated above J^Q. does. And therefore it is proper to it to . not as existi ng in such matter. understand that one thing does not exist in some other. 8s. we acquire some knowledge of immaterial thingSj^ just as. therefore every power of the sensitive part can only have knowledge There is another grade of cognitive of the individual. . held that the objects of the intellect are separate ideas and that we understand not by abstraction. LXXXIV. considering only the immateriality of the human intellect. is to abstract the funii fruni iiulivid ual matter which is repre- sented by the phant asms^ Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms and through material things thus considered . i). Thus for the intellect to abstract one from another things which are not really abstract ^'rom one another. namely.Q. Reply Obj. in the first the second tion. Secondly. and not its being in a way united to the . nor m whi'-h is neither power any way connected with corporeal matter such is theangelic intellect.

it understands a thing otherwise than as the is. without reference to the apple which is coloured.i tion.' Therefore it must be said otherwise.Ss. mode of a material thing. according to the mode of the intellect. But it is not so. such as a stone. the intellect is said to be it when is so. This is what we mean by abstracting the universal from the particular. Some have thought that the species of a natural thing is a form only. as Plato held.Art. or a horse. such flesh and bone. because an apple is not essential to colour. that is. or the intelligible species. therefore. belong to the species of a material thing. as common. is not the same as the mode of a thing in in the existing since the thing understood is : one who understands. and therefore colour can be understood if Likewise. for the intellect is otherwise than as it is. Reply Obj. But it is it. matter would not enter into the definition of natural things. common. For if we under- stood or said that colour separate from or assertion.. for the intellect to abstractjhings which are not really abstract from one another. or if we express in word what we thus understand. can be thought of apart from the individualizing principles which do not belong to the notion of the species. from the phant asm. that if word othenvise stood. does not involve falsehood. and . that matt er is twofol d. if the word otherwise be taken as referring to the one who understands. and that matter is not part of the species. or a man. 2. in one who understands. there is no error in such an opinion or assertion. and signate or individual. and so the intellect would be false if it abstracted the species of a stone form its matter in such refers to the thing under-_ false when it understands a thing a way as to regard the species as not existing in matter.i85 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. the things which independently of the apple. If that were so. as clearly appears in the case of the senses. or that there would be error in this opinion is we consider colour and its properties. by con sidering the nature of the species apart from its individual qualities represented by the phantasms^ false If. For it is quite true that the mode of understanding. according immaterially to the and not materially. not in a coloured body.

^^olours. and the like while intelligible matter is substance as subject to quantity. Art. for example. act. not from cunmion intelligible matter. s. but not from the commoa. but to the individual (Metaph.sen=_ sible matter. vi. for that is to abstract them from individual intelligible matter. exist in corporeal organs. can be abstracted by the intellect from sensible matter. not only from individual. as this flesh and these bones..Q. Reply Obj. are abstract in reality. can be considered apart from sensible qualitiesj_ and this js^ to abstract them from sensible matter. hard or soft. : . whereas man cannot be abstracted by the intellect from flesh and bones. however. Yet they can be considered apart from this or that substance. : Did. Now it is manifest that quantity is in substance before other sensible qualities are. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " i86 The intellect individual. Mathematical species. but they cannot be c onsidered without understanding the su bstance which is subject to the quantity for that would be to . he held that all those things which we have stated to be abstracted by the intellect. which do not belong to the species as such. such like. abstract them from common intelligible matter. and figures. as above explained (ad i). and need not be considered in the species vii. unity.. which are the terminations of quantity. But some things can be abstracted even from common in-_ as being. twofold kind of abstraction. : dimension. and the lelligible matter. it abstracts the species of man from this flesh arid these bonet. but also from common matter. but only from individual matter^ For sensible the species of matter is corporeal matter as subject to sensible qualities. such as being cold or hot. lo). have not the same and viduals. therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing from t he individual sensible matter. can exist without matter. as being in individual corporeal matter. ^ence quantities. such as number. 8s. since they are images of indithe eye. all these _. power. as is plain regarding Because Plato failed to consider the immaterial things.. have the same mode of existence as the power of and therefore they can impress their own image on sight But phantasms.

. nevertheless.. 85. LXXXIV. SOUL KNOWS human intellect. Q. Our intellect both abstracts the it in^tel- from the phantasms. t mode and therefore^ have not the power on the passive intellect. since it cannot understand even the things of which it abstracts the species. inasmuch as con- siders the natures of things in universal. 4. and. A. ligible species 5. This is_done_b^ tjiepower of the active intellect which by turning towards the phantasm produces in the passive intellect a certain likeness which conditions only. _ It abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm. tasm is subsequently in the passive intellect. because. by its own power it . Art. Reply Obj. so by the power of the active intellect the phantasms are made more from of intelligible intentions.i87 HOW THE of existence as the _. 7). fit for the abstraction there- Furthermore. as we have said above (Q. forasmuch as by the power of the active intellect we are tellect abstracts the intelligible species able to disregard the conditions of individuality. Reply Obj. the active in- from the phantasm. as a body transferred from one place to another. just as the sensi- tive part acquires a greater power by its conjunction with the intellectual part. without turning to the phantasms. It is . the image of which informs the passive intellect. Not onjy does the active intellect throw _ light on the phantasm it does more. the thing thus that the intelligible not species is said to be abstracted from the phantasm that the identical form which previously was in the phanrepresents. understands these natures in the phantasms. and to take into our consideration the specific nature. throws liglit on the phantasm. of themselves to make an impression as to its specific reflected in the phantasm.

The intelligible species is to the intellect what the sensible image is to the sense. answer faculties that. nothing therein can be actually under-_ Therefore what is actually understood is in the stood. what we understand. Art. is But nothing of what is underis stood in the intellect actually understanding. viz. On the contrary. what is actually understood must be in something. 3. the . since the understood in act is in the one who understands : We — is the intellect itself in act. intellect. Further. else it would be nothing. Therefore the intelligible species is not what I is actually understood. 'igS whether the phantasm intelligible species abstracted is from the related to our intellect as that which ^N is understood ? proceed th%is to the Second Article: Objection i. It would seem that the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect For the understood in act as that which is understood. are what is actually underfor we stood. for example. the intelligible species. but that by which the intellect understands. i. But words _ signify the things understood. what is actually understood.) that words are signs of the passioiis in the soul. But it is not in something outside the soul for. 2. express by word Therefore these passions of the soul.Q. Consequently it can be nothing else than the : aforesaid intelligible species.. Obj. - Therefore this species Obj. Some have asserted that our intellectual know only the impression made on thenr. that sense is cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. the Philosopher says (i Peri Herm. But the sens ible image is not what is perceived. as. Further. According to this theory.85. 2 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA'i Second Article. save the abstracted intelligible species. but rather that by which_ sense perceives. since what is outside the soul is material.

8). however. if every sort of apprehension.iSg intellect HOW THE understands only species which it SOUL KNOWS its Q. Consequently the cognitive faculty will always judge of its own impresfor sion as such and so every judgment will be true . Meiaph. Did. is tTue. according to the teaching of the Platonists all science is about ideas. because it would lead to the opinion of the ancients who maintained that whatever seems. one whicli remains in the agent. to something external . which they held to be actually understood. the has received. ix. it would follow that every science would nof be concerned with objects outside the soul. Thus every opinion would be equally true. I. Arist. anyone he would judge truly and if anyone with a corrupt taste perceives that honey is bitter. And as the form from which proceeds an act tending : . according to the impression made on the cognitive faculty. untrue. in fact. 2 intelligible is own impression. namely. _No\v a thing seems. with the intelligible species within the soul thus. is action. it . iii. : instance. Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related to the intellect as that by which it understands which is proved thus.* Secondly.f and that consequently contracTictorfes are true simultaneously. viii.. manifestly false for two_ reasons. when with a healthy taste perceives that honey is sweet. Q. as heat in the heater the likeness of the object of the is a likeness of the thing heated • so the form from which proceeds an action remainC/. taste perceived only its own impression. . . is For if the faculty knows its own impression only.. but only .. to see and to understand. .. LXXXIV. it can judge of that only. for instance. Art. so that this species what is understood. to heat and to cut and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form. This is. First. for each would judge according to the impression on his taste. this would be equally true. 5. and another which "paises fnto an external object for instance. 85. There is a twofold action (Metaph. t Cf. A. because the things we understand are the objects of science therefore if what we understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul.

its and it is in this sense that we say that the thing actually understood is the intellect in act. In these words the thing actually underthe thing which is stood there is a double implication In like that it is understood.ART. we 8). is intelligible the form by which the intellect But since the intellect reflects upon itself^ understands. The thing understood is in the intellect by own likeness . of which the species the likeness. and the species by which it understands. itself by the earth within itself . from apart apple as universal is in the intellect. If therefore it be asked where its smell. it is quite . the species. who said that like For they said that the soul knows the is known by like. 8S. Hence it a sensible thing is the form of does not follow that the intel- ligible species abstracted is but rather that it is what is actually understood. tliat is. instead of the earth. i. fact and the understood. earth outside the rest. — the words abstract universal imply two things. ?- The "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"' is igd ing in the agent which the sight sees and the the likeness of the object. There- manner fore the nature itself to which it occurs to be understood. : Reply Obj. who says that a stone is not in the soul. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily. 2. because_ the likeness of the thing understood is the form of the intellect. Reply Obj. the likeness thereof. Hence that by is the likeness of the visible thing. and so of take the species of the earth If.e. as the likeness of the sense in act. the nature of a thing and its abstraction or universality. likeness of the thing understood. This also appears from the opinion of the ancient philosophers. according to Aristotle {De Anima iii. is but that which is primarily understood is the object. it understands both its own act of intellisuch reflection by gence. see something similar For the sight sees the colour of the to this in the senses. but only the likeness of the stone. abstracted or considered as universal is only in individuals but that it is understood. abstracted or considered . therefore. We is the colour which is seen apart from the smell. it follows that the soul knows external things by means of its intelligible species.

^ that is. For what is first and We — more known in its known in relation to ourselves. occurs to humanity inasmuch as it is brought under the consideration of the intellect. The other isforniation. Art. or a division. . and then the passive intellect thus informed forms a definition. there is a likeness of the specific nature. Words do . whether the more universal is first in ? our ^ i intellectual cognition proceed thus to the Third Article: Objection i. that ]t be abstracted considered as universal. Thiud Article. forasmuch as the faculty of sight receives the In like manner likeness of colour and not of smell. conveyed by a word is its definition and a proposition conveys the intellect's division or composition. or a comWherefore theconcept position. but not of the principles of individuality. in which . 3 : clear that the colour that which is seen is only in the apple but be perceived apart from the smell. not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves. humanity understood is only in this or that man but that humanity be apprehended without conditions of indiviand consequently duality. this is owing to the sight. 85. Both of much these operations are found in the intellect. or even of something never seen. operation of the senses takes place by tiie senses being impressed by the sensible. in regard of impression only. as regards their is secondarily and less But universals come first nature. Reply Obj. because that is first which does own nature. but that which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose of judging of external things. For in the first place there is the passion of the passive intellect as informed by the intelligible species. inasas the imagination forms for itself an image of an absent thing. 3.igi HOW THE it SOUL KNOWS Q. and thus the part. There are two o perations in the sensitive One. expressed by a word. It would seem that the more universal is not first in our intellectual cognition.

Art. it follows that our_ knowledge of the former comes before our knowledge of_ the latter. Now it is evident that to know an object that . and intellect has the universal for its object. I answer that. afterwards we know it by distinguishing its principles and elements. i). A thing imperfectly known. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 192 not involve the existence of its corrclative^{Categor. perfect and as knowledge. i. Further.Q. ibid. ibid. Further. and hence the Philosopher says (Phys. 4. effects. is known partly in act and partly in potentiality. fore they are known secondarily by us. that the object defined comes in our knowledge before the parts But the more universal is part of the of its definition. ix. Therefore the universals are secondarily known as regards our intellect. Obj. There- Obj. we must consider that our intellect from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality proceeds and every power thus proceeding from potentiality to actuality comes first to an incomplete act. which is the medium between potentiality and actuality.). In our knowledge there are two things to be considered. were confusedly. when the object is distinctly and determinately known whereas the incomplete act is im. must proceed from the universal to and individual (Phys. 85. i. as animaT is pa rt of th e definition of man. First. 2. us. Further._ But universals are the more simple. that intellectual knowledge in some degree arises from sensible knowledge and. when it the object is known thus indistinctly. because sense has singular and individual things for its object. the singular We by us. complishing the perfect act. that what is manifest and certain is known to us at first confusedly .). Therefore the universals are secondarily known by Obj. before ac: . i. The perfect act of the intellect is complete knowledge. we know causes and principles by their But universals are principles^ Therefore universals are secondarily known On the contrary. the Philosopher says {Phys. definition of the less universal. the composite precedes the simple in relation to us. Secondly.). 3.

85. The universal can be consid ered " " i" two 4 »r . like the intellect. as sense. proceeds from knowledge appears For by sense we judge of the more common in the senses. The reason of this is is clear : because he who knows a thing its principle of in a state of potentiality as regards indistinctly of distinction . the common of more precedes the knowledge of knowledge the less ' We and ac^ common.ge. without proper knowledge of each jhing contained in it. 1. 3 comprises many things. 1. for a child can distinguish from not man before he distinguishes this man from is and therefore children at first call all men fathers. In this way we can have knowledge not only of the universal whole. Thus it is knowled^eis midway between potentiality must therefore conclude that knowledge of the singular and individual is prior.). and the same man that. it know know man or Moreover. and on distinguish each one from the others {Phys. is seen to be a body before it is seen to be an animal and to be an animal before it is seen to be a man. as he who knows genus is in a state evident potentiality as that indistinct regards difference. fusedly. ibid. to the knowledge of the universal. potentiality to act. the same order of a man before it is seen to be Socrates or Plato . But to know discontained in the universal whole is to know its know animal indistinctly is to is as ani7nal. but also of the integral whole for each whole can be known con. as regards us. i. which contains parts potentially. and to be it . in reference both to place and time. when a thing is seen afar off. later true as regards time. without tinctly what is the je ss common. as to it parts being known. in reference to place. is to know that thing confusedly. before the less common. whereas to^know animal distinctly : to as rational or i^JS^tijonaL^illlSiL tli^' '^1 t" know a therefore our intellect knows animal before it a lion knows manj and the same reason holds in comparing any more universal idea with the less universal. art. as sensible knowledge is prior to But in both sense and intellect the intellectual knowled. Reply Obj.193 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS g.

rfect_and the potential come first. who held that universals are subsistent. intention of universality same to many — — And since the viz. but man comes before animal considered as part of the as man same idea.. the universal considered thus would be prior to the particular. Animal. by way of generation and time and thus its elf- — . the impe. First. is due to is intellectual abstraction. the relation of one and the the. as in animal is contained not only man but As also horse. as the whole. In this way the. For^the intention of nature does not stop at the generation of animal. Reply Obj. : . secondary consideration. . but more contains not only animal but also rational. the universal nature considered to- gether with the intention of universaHty. The other order is the order of perfor instance. Therefore animal in itself comes into our knowledge before man . and thus the less common comes the perfect to the imperfect naturally before the more common as man comes before is : .. and as the part^ the whole. i. 2. generated before man. As part. tains in its idea not only the more common. but goes on to the generation animal. 3). 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " may be 194 ways. . pared to the less The more common universal may be comcommon. act fection or of the intention of nature is : considered absolutely naturally prior to potentiality. but alsq_ other things. ii. more common comes first in the order of nature as appears clearly in the generation of man and animal for the animal . according to him..^^K^d. Art. considering that in the more universal is potentially contained not only the less universal. it is Anima Hence said {De i) that the universal animal But according is either nothing or something secondary. are mere participations of the subsistent universals which he called ideas. as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Plato. considering that the less common also con. 85. to universal thus considered a for the latter. of man.Q. the universal can be considered in the nature for instance. animality or humanity as existing in the individual. Secondly. And thus we must distinguish two orders of nature one.

ac- know cording to the opinion of Aristotle. Secondly. So likewise principles before the thing defined is known otherwise the thing defined would not be known at all.. First. while the idea of thus the notion species is taken from that which is formal : of animal taken from the sensitive part. indeed. is a principle of knowledge is not of necessity a since at times we of existence. and substance through accidents. nor a substance. Reply Obj. 3 Reply Obj. Thus it is is that the ultimate intention of nature : is to the species and not to the individual. _But if we consider the generic or specific nature itself as existing in the singular. or the genus the end of generation. because the generic nature is taken from that which is material in a thing. in a way. But the generic nature is compared to the specific nature rather after the fashion of a material principle. as stones are known. absolutely considered the parts being in two ways. is neither a principle of existence. is.IQ5 HOW THE 3. whereas the notion of man is taken from the intellectual part. and thus we must needs know the whole before its parts. we know man vaguely man before we know how distinguish all that belongs to human nature. as Plato thought principle But what : a cause through its effect. as regards us. Did. 85. Wherefore the universal thus considered. For of definition are known . A part can be in itself. 4. 13). and thus nothing prevents known is known to before a house before the whole. Art. as understood with the as to in- tention of universality. as he makes clear {Metaph. vi. thus in a way it is in the nature of a formal principle in regard to the singulars ^or the singular is the result of matter. The universal. in as far as the intention of universality results from the mode of understanding by way of abstraction. SOUL KNOWS known O. knowcause or principle should be secondary since any : . But as parts of the definition they are known after. while the idea of sp^cjes_jsjfrom the form. For we know a house vaguely before we know its different parts. Neither ledge of is it necessary that. a principle of knowledge. vii. as belonging a certain whole. while matter because the form is is for the sake of the form.

the intellect understands a whole at the time. that. Therefore whatever things the intellect can . Further. ii. 10) that understand- of one thing only. colour and smell are in the apple.Q. It would seem that we can understand many For intellect is above time. we cannot know the difference between two things unless we know both at the same time (De Aninia iii. Obj. things at the same time. 2). understand as but not as many that is to say one. same Further. said (Topic. and thus it can understand many things at the same time. and the same is to said of any other comparison. many things Obj. whereas the succession of before and after belongs to time. On ing I is the contrary. 2. at the Therefore the intellect understands many same time. 8s. there is nothing to prevent different forms not opposed to each other from actually being in the same subject. other. : The intellect can. many things one not but by many intelligible species. 4. parts. For the mode by answer of every action follows the form which is the principle of that action. whether we c. but at the same time.\n understand many things xt the same time? proceed thus to the Fourth Article: Objection i. Further. such as a man or a house. for instance. Obj. But a whole contains 3. 4 at THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 196 times through sensible causes we become acquainted with u n Icnow n^ffea Sj_^n d^ sometjjm^^ Fourth Article. Art. knows many things at the It is same time. But our intellect knows the difference and comTherefore it parison between one thing and another. as. We — But intelligible species are not opposed to each Therefore there is nothing to prevent the same intellect being in act as regards different intelligible species. knowledge is of many. indeed. Therefore the intellect does not understand different things in succession.

. because He sees all in one. 85. it does not understand at the same time. in a : . viii. The intellect is above that time. it can understand at the same time hence it is that God sees all things at the same time. according as one succeeds another. i. in His Essence. 3. who says (Gen. 22). 2. First. forms to exist at the same time in the same subject. . that is. although they be not opposed to one another. which is the measure of the movement of corporeal things. as it knows the parts in the whole. Parts can be understood in two ways. confused way. In another way they are known disthus each is known by its species and so they are tinctly not understood at the same time. 20. as existing in the whole. as is clear from the examples of colours and shapes. Therefore it is impossible for one and the same intellect to be perfected at the same time by different intelligible species so as actually to understand different things. that God moves the spiritual creature through time. If the intellect sees the difference or com- parison between one thing and another. Reply Obj. Not only is it impossible for opposite Reply Obj. 4 understand under one species. But whatever things the intellect understands under different species. and thus they are known through the one form of the whole. as we have said above (ad 3). and so are known together. Art. ad lit. And this vicissitude is called operation time by Augustine. Reply Obj. The reason of this is that it is impossible for one and the be perfected at the same time by many forms of one genus and diverse species. Now all intelligible species belong to one genus. because they are the perfections of one intellectual faculty although the things which the species represent belong to different genera. but neither can any forms belonging to the same genus. just a^ it is impossible for one and the same body at the same time to have different colours or different shapes. Reply Obj.197 HOW THE : SOUL KNOWS Q. it knows both in relation to their difference or comparison just. But same subject to : the multitude vicissitude of itself of intelligible species causes a certain intelligible operations. 4.

For composition and division are only of many. Obj. first act of apprehension . Further. from time. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " Fifth Article. for nothing is in things but what is signified by the predicate and the subject. Tiierefore it cannot understand by composition and division. accidents.O. I answer that. For since the find composition intellect passes from potentiality to act. Further. Therefore the intellect does not act by composition and division. division are not in things. and this is its first such as object. provided that the composition be true. as the Philosopher says {Peri Herm. 3. as also from other individual conditions. Art. Thus . and which is one and the same. Therefore the intellect acts by composition and division. for man is truly what animal is. present. 8s. as appears in and negative propositions. There- Obj. It would seem that our intellect does not understand by composition and division. or future time. Words signify the conceptions of the But in intellect. whereas the intellect cannot understand many things at the same time. about its .). fore the intellect does not understand by composition and division. and proper object and then it understands the properties. it has a likeness to things which are generated. 2. 19S whether our intellect understands by composition and division TT'V ? proceed thus to the Fifth Article: — Objectio7i I. the contrary. the intellect understands things by a But composition and process of assimilation to them. and the various relations of the essence. every composition and division implies But the intellect abstracts past. i. which do not attain to perfecso likewise the tion all at once but acquire it by degrees human intellect does not acquire perfect knowledge by the : words we but it first apprehends something its quiddity. The human intellect must of necessity understand by composition and division. On affirmative and division.

Now in a material thing there is a twofold composition. while part : the difference that completes the species is derived from the The form. 85. and the particular from individual matter. Reply Obj. as we have said (A. have the entire knowledge of a thing at once and perfectly . Wherefore something on the part of the thing corresponds to the composition and division of the intellect but it does not exist in the same . and to this corresponds that composition of the intellect whereby the universal whole is predicated of its for the genus is derived from common matter. which comes under the action of the senses and the imagination. Therefore the human intellect knows by composition. 7). LXXXIV. Reply Obj. Although the intellect abstracts from it as by the does not understand actually without turning phantasms. 5 tion or division by composiand from one composition and division it proceeds to another. composition. not accord- For the proper object quiddity of a material thing. Composition and division of the are intellect made by differentiating and comparing. to the phantasms. and Q. like all in- necessarily compares one thing with another corruptible things. to the likeness of a thing is received into the mode of the intellect. of the human intellect is the matter. 1. there is the composition of form with way in the intellect and in the thing. division. A. But the Divine and the angelic intellect know. And forasmuch as it turns to the phantasms. 2. and reasoning. not by the process itself. of the intellect involve time. have their perfection at once from the Hence the angelic and the Divine intellect beginning. But the angehc and the Divine intellect. Hence the intellect knows many things by composition and division. composition intellect and division 3. knowing the quiddity of a thing they know at once whatever we can know by composition. SOUL KNOWS Q. The according ing to the mode of the thing. . division. Reply Obj. which is the process of reasoning. and reasoning.199 it HOW THE . knowing the difference and comparison of things.. i. indeed. division. but by underalso in and hence standing the simple essence. F"irst. Art. and reasoning.

that evil (Prov. deceived. Did. means that the ma»i is something having whiteness: and the subject. And the Philosopher is says {De Anima iii. ... that the intellect always true. man. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " : 200 second composition is of accident with subject and to this real composition corresponds that composition of the intelsay the predicated of subject. Sixth Article. 3. the man is white. sin sin involves falsehood in the intellectual faculty. LXXIX. Therefore falsein the intellect. that which has animal signifies that which has a which has an intellectual both. of is It : a man. and Socrates that . as when we Nevertheless composition of the intellect differs from composition of things for in the latter the things are diverse. Therefore falsehood may be in the mind. that nature. Art. But falsehood Further. intellect. for the Philosopher says (Metaph. rational. 2. Ohj. is : hood can be Ohj. 32). which has all these things together with individual matter to this and according kind of identity our intellect predicates the composition of one thing with another. . whereas composition of the intellect lect. whether the intellect can be false? proceed thus to the Sixth Article: Objection i. 10). 22). as is shown above (Q. v. Augustine says (QQ.Q. is the is identified with a subject same with the composition form and matter for sensitive nature. are the same. which having whiteness. work everyone who stand that wherein he is is LXXXIII. A. Therefore falsehood can be On the contrary. 85. in the intellect. opinion and reasoning belong to the exists in both. qu. whereby accident is man is white. does not rightly underdeceived.. For the above intellect does not imply that man and •whiteness are identical. Further. But the mind and intellect i). But for those err that xiv. vi. but the assertion. is composition of the a sign of the identity of the components. It would seem that the intellect can be false. 4) that truth We — and falsehood are in the mind.

Hence as regards simple objects not subject to . . the definition of a the definition as false in relation to something else. applied as involving the composition of things incompatible a ratiorial winged as. as regards quiddity. to describe anything as animal. faculty long Now the proper fail. it judges the sun to be only a foot in the earth in size. for the the an organ but on part of the composition affecting The intellect. 6 intel- The Philosopher this point. the this intellect is not at fault as quiddity. as when it judges The of the colour being the same. or also in the process those propositions. also in regard to are understood as soon as the terms thereof are understood. properly speaking. the intellect cannot err. as size or figure. as such. as sight in regard to colour. not by the defect of its is a faculty that is independent of intellect the organ. Hence. sensile to the hindrance occurring dentally through some organ—for example. 6) is Q. in false is a definition or when to a circle itself . may be deceived as sensible objects. for every faculty. which ing. diameter. for instance. whereas it may go astray concerning its essence or in the of the thing surroundings regards to another. triangle. of a thing is definition. through vitiated by ill humours. when. intellect of the object proper object and things . for instance. in referring one thing composition or division. when. as in the case of first principles from which arises infallible truth in the certitude of scientific of reason- conclusions. the taste of a fever-stricken person his tongue being judges a sweet thing to be bitter. SOUL KNOWS {ibid. Therefore. not does its own proper object ing is the quiddity of a material thing. Sense. whereas in reality it exceeds sensible accidental Much more is sense deceived concerning regards common that vinegar objects. of this and hence. is per se directed to its kind are always the same. compares with sense on For sense not deceived in save acciproper object. 85. for example. is honey by reason of this is reason evident. however. Art. may be accidentally deceived in of the quiddity composite things.20I I lect its HOW THE answer that. however. its judgment concernthe as so exists.

as one who carries a conif that they . Further. we understand nothing whatever about them. i. Reply Obj. qu. In this sense are to be understood the authorities quoted in proof of the opposite conclusion. the intellect is the most formal of all that is in man. It would seem that one person cannot understand one and the same thing better than another can. concern- who errs in the practical But in the absolute of the appetible object. whether one person can understand one and the same thing better than another can ? proceed thus to Objection i. Hence it is clear that there is a perfect understand- ing. . ing the error of the sinner. Whoever understands a thing otherivise than as it it is. LXXXIIL. than which none other is more perfect: and therefore there are not infinite degrees of understanding a thing: nor can one person understand a thing better than another can. We the Seventh Article: — does not understand at all. 32). Obj. it do not belong to the same species. ix. and of those things which are known thereby. But different forms cause different species. Therefore Obj. is not subject to more or less for a thought thing cannot be said to be more or less equal. and to the third objection.Q. (Did. Experience shows that some understand more profoundly than do others. judgment consideration of the quiddity of a thing. 10). viii. Art. The Philosopher says that falsehood is in The the intellect in regard to composition and division. Therefore would seem one man understands better than another. a thing cannot be more or less understood. 2. On the contrary. Seventh Article. the intellect is never deceived. as Metaph. being a certain equality between standing. is said composite definitions we cannot be deceived unless. and thing. 8s. For Augustine says (QQ. the intellect is true in its act of underBut truth. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 202 indeed. same answer applies to the second objection concerning opinion and reasoning. 3. Further.

and such a one would not understand it. : : disposition. Art. would entail being deceived. are better disposed to understand.). for the truth of the intellect which the whom consists in the intellect understanding a thing as it is. this occurs in regard to the lower powers of li'ho : have intellect has need in its operation for those in the imaginative. likewise the reply to the second. thing being understood more by one may be taken in two senses. diversified according to the difference of matter. understanding : just as a man may see a thing better with whose power is greater. . in things of different species and the reason thereof is that act and form are received into matter according to matter's thus because some men have bodies of better capacity his bodily sight. soft flesh are of apt mind. The same applies to the intellect in two ways. First. and thus. through having a greater power of stands . causes not a specific but only a numerical difference : for different individuals have dif- ferent forms. as regards the intellect itself. that it is to be observed that those Secondly. g). 3. cogitative and memorative powers are of better disposition. because to understand it otherwise than as it is. cit. either better or worse. one cannot understand the same thing more than another. wherefore it is said (De Anima power of understandii. so that the word ynore be taken as determining the act of under/ answer that. The reply to the first objection is clear from the above. their souls have a greater ing. Reply Obj. as Augustine argues {loc. . 7 principles better than the and ultimate causes understands one who reduces it only to its proximate causes. In another sense the word more can be taken as determining the act of understanding on the part of him who underand so one may understand the same thing better than someone else.203 elusion to it HOW THE its first SOUL KNOWS Q. the better the soul allotted to it which clearly appears body. First. and whose siglit is more perfect. The difference of form which is due only to the different disposition of matter. which is more For it is plain that the better the disposition of a perfect. 85. A than by another standing as regards the thing understood.

as is said Metaph. since actually undivided. as is is known. 3. Like is known by like. 6) that the indivisible But privation is known expressed as a privation. Therefore the indivisible 2. also unity comes into the definition of number. 7). for a definition proceeds from the first and more known. in- divisible part of the definition of the divisible as a point comes into the definition of a line for as Euclid says. iii. for number is multitude measured by one. / On answer that. Therefore our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible. which present abstracts from the phantasms.Q. it Now 6. the continuous indivisible. Therefore is the contrary. A. the definition of a thing contains what is Obj. as above stated (Q. But principles are indivisible. is known to us before the divisible. vi. Obj. as is is said Topic. although poten- . thus to the Eighth Article: It would seem that the intellect understands — the indivisible before the divisible. (Did. iii. we must consider its relationship to that quiddity in order to discover in what order the indivisible threefold. The object of our intellect in its it state is the quiddity of a material thing. and elements are of divisible things. points. 4. ix. divisible more like to the intellect than the divisible because the intellect is simple (De Anima our intellect first knows the indivisible. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 204 Eighth Article. 1. LXXXIV.. Further. Therefore likewise is the indivisible. x. It is said {ibid. i. And since that which is known first and of itself by our cognitive power is its proper object. Art. the indivisible is is said De Anima is First. is But the 4). a line is length without breadth. 8s. secondarily. is Further. whether the intellect understands the before the divisible? indivisible We proceed Objection says {Phys. 6). i) For the Philosopher the that we understand and know from knoivledge of principles and elements. the extremities of which are . But the . in. known previously.

there is no point. which cannot And this indivisible is known secondarily. : : can resolve principles into their causes. Secondly. principles and elements are not always (known) first for sometimes : from sensible effects we arrive at the knowledge of principles and intelligible causes. separate it would follow that a like indivisible is understood pri- But if our marily : for according to the Platonists what is first is first participated by things. be unity. Art. also. as we have said above (ibid. the knowledge of effects always depends on the knowledge of in the principles and elements for as the Philosopher says we when we we that Then do consider same passage know. as a point and divided either actually or potentially. 3). A point is not included in the definition of for it is manifest that in a line of ina line in general definite length. Euclid defines a finite straight line : and there- . The reason of this is that both of indivisible are understood by the intellect of kinds these The third kind of initself. Reply Obj. save : potentially. In the acquisition of knowledge. through the Wherefore a point is defined by privation of divisibility. its and this indivisible is known to us before which is a division into parts because confused knowledge is prior to distinct knowledge. x. as being its proper object. the indivisible is so called in relation to species.). and again before the intellect composes and divides by affirmation and negation. as the Platonists maintained.205 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS division. the quiddity of which the intellect. ix. as we have said above (A. 1. 85. : Q. (Did. the indivisible is understood before its division into logical parts. 1). 2. way of privation as that ivhich has no parts: and in like manner the notion of one is that it is indivisible. as stated in Metaph. This way. Reply Obj. But in perfect knowledge. as man's reason is something indivisible. 8 tially divisible. is the primary and proper object of intellect understood by participation of certain indivisible (forms). is divisible is what altogether indivisible. And the reason of this is that this indivisible has a certain opposition to a corporeal being. and in a circular line.

the species of The likeness through which we understand the known in the knower. 8. not on account of natural likeness to the cognitive power. . Unity is the measure of — number : wherefore it is it measured number. but on account of the power's aptitude for otherwise sight would perceive hearing rather the object : than colour. Reply Obj. is 3. therefore a thing its is known first. as the limit in the definition of that which is Hmited. 85. Art. but rather conversely. But included in the definition of a is not included in the definition of the divisible.Q. THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 206 fore he mentions a point in the definition.

can the intellect know it. Obj. a superior power can do whatever is an inferior power. But action has intellect Further. therefore. otherwise it would have no action of its intellect knows own. for knows 4. that knoit'ii is universal the by reason. the practical intellect directs to action. Therefore the the singular. i. knows singulars? (2) Whether it inquiry: (i) Whether it knows the infinite? (3) Whether it knows contingent knows future things? it things? (4) Whether We now have to First Article. terms of composition. 3. 207 . But sense knows the singular. and the singular is Much On the contrary. relation to singular things. Therefore our Obj. Further. The Philosopher says (Phys.QUESTION LXXX\I. 'WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS {lit IN MATERIAL THINGS. 2. k^iown by sense. more.) consider what our intellect knows in this head there are four points of Under material things. whether our intellect knows singulars? proceed thus to the First Article: Objection 1. 5). itself it is a singular. Socrates. knows the singulars. belongs to the intellect Therefore our intellect knows this for it singular. our intellect understands itself. It would seem that our intellect knows For whoever knows composition. Socrates to is We — a man: form a proposition. Obj. done by singulars. actions belong to singulars. But our intellect knows this composition. Four Articles. But in Further.

Therefore it understands the universal 7). 3. 7. there is no reason why it should not be intelligible. 86. but in a more eminent way. directly through the intelligible species. is tion cannot be directly concluded from a universal proof a singular proposithe medium position. as we have said above (Q. for nothing can be singular than immaterially. as is said De Anima iii. Therefore if there otherwise understood be an immaterial singular such as the intellect. .. 2. but as material. the proposition. Socrates is Wherefore the reply to the first objection is clear. Hence LXXXV. except through tion. the intellect knows immaterially and in *he abstract. abstracted from individual matter is the universal. Wherefore what the sense knows materially and concretely. Reply Obj. Reply Obj. Intelligibility is incompatible with the not as such. A. understands by abstracting the Now what is species from such matter. The choice of a particular thing to be done as the conclusion of a syllogism formed by the practical But a singular proposiintellect. the intellect. and indirectly the thus it forms the And phantasm. as is said Ethic. because. intelligible our knows directly the universal only.. as we have said is and primarily. wiiich is to know the universal. in material Our cannot this things directly that the principle of singularity in material things is individual matter. the singular. 1 1. it can know directly. which is to know the singular directly. Art. in order to understand. whereas our intellect. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " intellect 208 I aiisiver that. LXXXV. But inas it were and by a kind of reflexion. as is said De Anima iii.Q. needs to turn to the phantasms in which it understands the species. i). A. 3. Therefore the universal principle of the practical intellect does not move save through the medium of the particular apprehension of the sensitive part. know the singular The reason of above (Q. intellect even after abstracting the intelligible species. 4. vii. singular represented by a man. Reply Obj. The higher power can do what the lower power can.

ceeding another. Therefore our intellect can know the infinite. Therefore our intellect can have an habitual knowledge of an infinite number of things. if one body can coexist with another in the same place. Obj. as in number. Further. It is said {Phys. But our the infinite. Much more. It would seem that our intellect can know For God excels all infinite things. I. On the contrary. as is its object. 4 »4 . i). intelligible for many things can be habitually known at the same time. 3. as we have said (Q.t whether our intellect can know the infinite? Second Article : Objection i. the intellect infinite. and figure. considered as such.209 WHAT THE SOUL KNOWS Second Article. Further. proportion. Q. which is Now in material is sively mind through its considering succesbecause never does out one thing after another intellect understand so many things. there is nothing to prevent an infinite intellect of bodies being in one place. A. Since a faculty and portional to each other. our intellect can naturally know genera and species. is unknown.. intellect can know God. Obj. XII. as we have said above (Q. 2. Therefore our can know the infinite. therefore. can our intellect know all thus to the We proceed — other infinite things.. that it cannot underpotentially in our : stand more. 4) that the infinite. I answer that. Obj. as iii.Hb. species can exist with another in the number But one same intellect. Further. A. but only potentially. in the sense of one sucactually. 4. But there is an infinity of species in some genera. an infinite object. its must be related object are proto the the quiddity of a material infinite does not exist the things thing. it appears to be an But an infinite power has a capacity for mfinite power. i. Therefore infinity is said ibid. LXXVI. 6. as the intellect is not a corporeal faculty.Mec. i).

Himself known feeble intellect. but He unknown to us God. . But the formal is infinite. in itself follows that the material infinite unknowable. . because He is a form unlimited by matter. And God is form being known in it itself. i. cannot understand the infinite either actually or habitually. Wherefore would not be possible for us to have a habit of an infinity of things distinctly known. not be known actually. unless we had already considered the entire infinity thereof. for our intellect cannot know actually at Not actually. Reply Obj. Art. In the future life this defect of intellect will removed by the state of glory. i). but without being able to comprehend Him. unless all is impossible. know God in our present life except through material effects. whereas matter cannot be is known without form.Q. the term infinite is applied to that which is deprived of any formal term. were counted which parts For the same reason we cannot have habitual knowbecause in us habitual knowledge ledge of the infinite since by understanding results from actual consideration : : we it acquire knowledge. called infinite. counting them according to the succession of our impossible. 2 THE other " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " our intellect 210 On the hand. VII. whereas in material things. 86. 1. as explained : knowledge which is And above. ii. the same time. we may lake. when we shall be be able to see the Essence of God Himself. by reason of our is of which in its present state has a natural material Therefore we cannot aptitude for objects only. Thus the infinite could its : from which. as is said Ethic. except what knows through one species. but only potentially. therefore neither actually or habitually can our intellect know the infinite.. As we have said above (Q. for if it were it would be something whole and complete. 6) for the infinite : is is clear that from its definition {ibid. But the infinite is not represented by one species. as iii. however viuch there always remains something to be taken. A. Consequently it cannot be it understood except by a successive consideration of one part after another.

Moreover it can know the universal. it seems that con- conditions. the objects of understanding. . counted according to this succession of occupation. 6). but. and which consequently is not limited to one individual. Reply Obj. 2. does 4. is measured by time. and from other material Therefore. On the other hand. Further. therefore it cannot know or figures that actually or habitually species of numbers are not in the imagination. so indeed infinite Third Article. as to it is proper to a contingent thing be and sometime not to be. the intelligible species enter into our intellect successively. 3 Reply Obj. since many things cannot be' actually place successively. Art. inasmuch as it is not terminated by corporeal matter. except in a general way and in and this is to know them their universal principles potentially and confusedly. extends to an infinite number of individuals. there would be no need . but necessary things. 12. 3. Now from time. sometime tingent things are not known by the intellect.211 WHAT THE SOUL KNOWS Q. which is abstracted from individual matter. as the Philosopher says contingent things : We — {Ethic. 2. as stated in Phys. Obj. It would seem that the intellect cannot know because. what sometimes is the intellect abstracts and sometimes is not. wisdom and knowledge are not contingent. If two or more bodies were in the same for them to occupy the place. Reply Obj. The nature of our mind is to know species abstracted from phantasms. 86. As our intellect is infinite in is For its power it know the infinite. iv. considered in itself. power. in order for the things placed to be and therefore there must understood at the same time number of species in our infinite an not be a definite and : intellect. vi. whether our intellect can know contingent things ? proceed thus to the Third Article : Objection i.

for it . since every contingent thing has in it two ways. something necessary in itself contingent is necessary. is known directly by sense and indirectly by the intellect. again.Q. But some sciences are of contingent things. the replies to the objections are clear.r Now is tingency whereas necessity results from tiality belongs to matter is form. in / answer Contingent things can be considered either as contingent. the objects of which are human actions subject to free-will. then all science is of necessary things. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 212 the contrary.). i) that the intellect of itself and is directly has the universal for sense object its object. some From which of contingent things. intellect On knows contingent that. . and. while the universal are known only by and necessary principles of contingent things the intellect. or as containing some element of necessity. Art. which in a certain way is the indirect of the intellect. contingency arises from matter. while the object of the singular. But if we consider the thus some sciences are of necessary things themselves.'^But matter is the individualizing prin. All knowledge is in die intellect. Moreover it was down above (A. considered as such. as the moral sciences. for cona potentiality to be or not to be. things. and poten- ciple of the : laid whereas the universal comes from the abstraction form from the particular matter. things. as we have said above (ibid. Hence if we consider the objects of science in their universal principles. is but the relation of running to motion is necessary that Socrates move if he runs. that Socrates runs. Therefore the contingent. 86. because whatever consequent on form is of necessity in the subject. the natural sciences in as far as they Therefore the relate to things generated and corruptible. : for example.

Therefore much more can the intellect know the future. 6. as in sleep. 3. There by is great affliction for man. man. of the knowledge of the future in a the future may be general way. The intellectual any knowledge of knowledge of man is superior But some animals know the brutes. as we applied above (A. while his senses are in suspense.213 WHAT THE SOUL KNOWS Fourth Article. Obj. Q. But it can fore it We — and now. Whom save by God alone to even that is present which in the course of events is future. Therefore the intellect of its own nature can know to the future. or in its cause. thus and they may enter the things may be universal the domain of the intellect and become objects of science. Art. and the But principles of future only. itself The . It is written (Eccles. 7). But the intellect is freer and more vigorous when removed from sense. future. thus crows by their frequent cawing foretell rain. and things to come he cannot know of things any to messenger. . because he is ignorant past. however. 3) to contingent to time arc things. XIV. 2. forasmuch as from eternity His glance embraces the whole course of time. i). we must observe that known two ways either future cannot be known in in : in itself. 4 whether our intellect can know the future? proceed thus to the Fourth Article: Objection i.. For future things considered as subject them knows intellect the human by reflexion singular. Further. But for- . 13). as stated above (A. A. species abstracted from the here differently to all time. On the contrary. Obj. 86. There- can know the future. We must apply the same distinction future things. viii. I answer that. and in frenzy. and related in- know the present. can know some future things. Speaking. as we have said above when treating of God's knowledge (Q. It would seem that our intellect knows the For our intellect knows by means of intelligible future.

not thus.* the by its very hence when withdrawn from corporeal sense. then the future is known with scientific certitude. concentrated on itself. more or less inclined to produce Reply Obj. 4 THE it " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 214 asmuch by us its cause. This argument considers that knowledge which is drawn from universal causal principles. from these the future may be known. Reply Obj. and would only be impeded in its knowledge by the body . 13. also. when the imagination is moved regarding the future known to the demons.Q. and. the cause be such more frequently than not. As Augustine power the future . And foresees the future eclipse. .. A. Such an opinion would be reasonable if we were to admit that tiie soul can soul has a certain of forecasting. 86.). when by Divine power the human intellect is enlightened through the ministry of angels. by the influence of demons. Art. as explained above (Q. If. The soul is naturally more inclined to receive these impressions of spiritual . according as the effect. according to the order of the effects to the cause. 3). the cause be such as to have a necessary connection with its future result. because in that case the soul by its nature would know the universal causes of all effects. xii. but by receiving its knowledge from the senses . i. the impression of superior spiritual and corporeal causes of spiritual causes. * Gen. the future can be known indeed. as to produce a certain result then can the future be known however. nature it 2. so that know knowledge by participating the ideas as the Platonists maintained. receives and hence when withdrawn from the corporeal senses it would know the future. ad HI. LVII. But since it is connatural to our intellect to know things. as it were. and the phantasms are directed to the knowledge of future events or. it is not natural for the soul to : know the future it when witli- drawn from the senses rather does know the future by . just as the astronomer as exists in if. its cause is more or less conjecturally. says (Confess. it shares in the knowledge of the future. xii.

moving of -whatever is brought to bear on it. and so. 86. et Vig. at their intelligence is not but is as it were barren and bare of all anxiety. rather than from human movements directed by reason. when when silence reigns. per somii. — being acts of corporeal organs. Hence the Philosopher says (ibid. imagination 3. * the caprice De Divinat. as man has his reason.* impressions made by day are evanescent. for burdened -with cares. The night air is calmer.215 WHAT THE SOUL KNOWS when it Q. as is then nearer to the spiritual world. Brute animals have no power above tlie wherewith to regulate it. and freer from external dis- The same may also come from superior corFor it is clear that superior bodies influence causes. as stated in De Somn. 4 it causes is withdrawn from the senses. while we These images are perceived more at night and sleep than in the daytime and while we are awake. hence bodily i^npressiotis are slight internal movements are felt made in sleep. such as rain and the like. more than in wakefulness. and such movements produce in the imagination images from ivhich the future may be foreseen.. as the heavenly bodies cause many future events. ii. and therefore their imagination follows entirely the influence of the heavenly bodies. Art. Thus from such animals' movements some may that be known future things. the influence of the heavenly bodies causes the imagination to be affected. ii. some ivlio are most imprudent are most far-seeing . Reply Obj. Hence. faculties the imagination receives certain images of some such events. because. poreal inferior bodies. in consequence of the sensitive tractions.). .

Therefore likewise does Obj. the intellect and that which is understood are the same (De Anima iii. But an angel understands itself by its own essence. It would seem that the intellectual soul We — knows Trin. LXXVI. in things void of matter.QUESTION LXXXVII. end therefore the human mind understands itself by its own essence. Therefore the intellect and its object are the same in the human mind. as stated above (Q. is itself by its ix.. Further.4). 2. HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF. both angels and human souls belong to the genus of intellectual substance.) We itself have now to consider how the and all within : points of inquiry its own essence ? (3) How it does the intellectual soul knows Under this head there are four (i) Whether the soul knows itself by (2) Whether it knows its own habits ? intellect know its own act? (4) How itself. 3). because it incorporeal. For Augustine says {De mind knows itself by itself. not being the act of a body. that the own essence. Obj. (/« Four Articles. 216 . Further. whether the intellectual soul knows its itself by essence? proceed thus to the First Article: Objection i. the human soul. 3. does know the act of the will ? First Article. But the human mind is void of matter. A. i).

* Possibilis. except as it is made For even the Platonists asserted that an order of intelligible in its essence the human mind forasmuch as the beings existed above the order of intellects. Consequently im- material substances are intelligible by their own essence. Q. but by their similitudes. / answer that. and hence the angel's act of For although is not completed by his essence. an angel by for essence own his all other understand cannot things by intelligence . Therefore it is that the Essence of God. Art. and in act : is save what know not material things. Therefore it does not understand itself by its own essence. to the act.) that the way as it under- stands other things. .. and thereThis is quite fore knowable. but not to be understood. 87. and hence it is called possible. still he his own himself understands essence. The angelic essence belongs. perfect act. But it understands other things. but what as it knows so far the that it is clear manner intellect. just primary matter is a potentiality as regards sensible beings. according as it is actual. genus of intelligible things as act. and not. Hence it has in itself actual. i. only a potentiality in the genus as of intelligible beings. t said {De Anima intellect understands itself in the same On ibid. does is it hence does not know primary is tionate to form. but not as a pure nor as a complete act. — elsewhere in this translation rendered 'passive. stand. g) is what In like is actually coloured. intellect understands only by participation of the intelligible . Everything is knowable so far as it is in act. and all other things also. viii. It is SOUL KNOWS iii. : so far as for a thing it is in potentiality {Metaph. potentially.. he knows things other than himself intellect is by their likenesses. as matter except as proporstated Phys. 7. ix.217 HOW THE the contrary. clear as regards sensible things. and is true. is simply and hence God by His own Essence knows Himself. for the eye does not see Did. a being. the pure and and perfectly in itself intelligible.' — Ed. not by their essence. indeed. according as each one is actual by its own essence.* the Now human Therefore is potentially the power to underunderstanding.

Art. x. the mere presence of the mind does not suffice. 87. 6) We gaze on the inviolable truth whence ive can as perfectly as possible define. perceives that he has an intellectual soul because he perIn the second place. uniceives that he understands. concerning such mental Let the mind strive not to see itself as if it were inquiry : absent. intellect actuates the passive Therefore the by its essence. and there is further required a Hence many are ignorant of careful and subtle inquiry. Hence Augustine says {De Trin. singularly. ix. that the judgment and force of this knowledge. 9). as the Platonists held. a difference between these two kinds of knowledge. to know how . it would understand itself by such participation of But as in this life our intellect has incorporeal beings. A. versally. There is. however. became actual by participating separate intelligible forms. A.Q. and many have erred about it.. therefore. hut to discern itself as present — i. it understands itself according as it is made actual by the species abstracted from sensible things. but also. It is true. comes to us according to the derivation of our intellectual light from the Divine Truth which contains the types of all things as above stated (Q. material and sensible things for its proper natural object. as In the knows itself not This happens in two ways as when Socrates or Plato : when we consider the nature of the human mind from knowledge of the intellectual act. as stated above (Q. by their instrumentality. which not only actuates the intelligible things them- selves. intellect. and it consists in this that the mere presence : of the mind suffices for the first. LXXXIV. If. the human intellect. I THE " SUM MA THEOLOGICA" is 218 partici- for they said that the participator below what it pates.. and hence it own presence. however. whereby we know the nature of the soul. but first by its act. hut what it ought to he in the light of the eternal types. So the soul's nature. principle of action whereby is said to know itself by its Augustine says (De Trin.e.. 7). 5). place. through the light of the active intellect. not what each inan's mind is. the it mind itself being the perceives itself. LXXXIV. But as regards the second kind of knowledge.

either because we can know it by nothing else except itself. it is both inteland therefore of intelligible things. is as an act in the Reply Obj. because at length it acquires knowledge of itself. Reply Obj. as substance is visible by its accident. so likewise the intellect in act is the object understood in act. The essence of an angel his own is essence through either is itself : not so the human mind. equal to saying that as regards things the intellect and what is understood essences of are immaterial. as the separate is understood and each of which called substances angels. but only the abstract likenesses Hence the Commentator says {De Aninia iii. to which things. Now to say that in things without matter the intellect and what is is under- stood are the same.219 it HOW THE SOUL KNOWS is Q. ligible things abstracted from —as in — — active intellect. actually understood are the same. which becomes actual by by the species of the object understood. is itself understood the same species as by its own form. which is the form of the intel- which is lect in act. For a thing is actually understood in that it But a distinction must be drawn since the is immaterial. . its i differs from other things. as or because it is not first principles are called self-evident of itself. wherevisible is colour as accidentally knowable.) thereof. This saying of the Philosopher is unievery kind of intellect. For as sense in act by reason of the sensible likeness the form of sense in act. essences there are other whose whereas understands. though because it is itself that it led thereto by its own act knows. as is the the phantasms. : — For a thing can be called self-evident in two ways. by reason of the likeness of the thing understood. which to know essence and nature. Reply Obj. since it loves itself. as he says in the same passage. 2. things some things — : are not wholly immaterial. genus Hence an angel apprehends lect and the thing understood. 87. 3. Art. The mind knows itself by means of itself. intelligible potentiality altogether or is the act of intelthe passive intellect. So the human intellect. . versally true in is the sensible in act. 1.

material things outside the soul are their likeness known by soul's being present in the soul.A. On acts. habits are Obj. Therefore in the same way they are prior to habits and thus habits. xiii. and are But the present by their essence in the soul. has been said (A. are known by their acts. because in a sense in is true only of separate subverified in their regard. and conscience proclaims its existence . . whether our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence? proceed thus to the Second Article : Objection i. a kind of it medium between i) : Now. Obj. 3. is / answer that.2 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" is it 220 that the proposition quoted stances . whatever is the cause of a thing being such is still more so. Habits like powers are the principles of But as is said (De Anima ii. it falls short in being of itself knowable. and principle applies to the other habits of the soul.T. But habits and intelligible species cause things to be known by the soul. like the powers. as already stated 2). A habit mere power and mere act. acts and operations are logically prior to powers. Second Article.87. (Reply Obj. as the soul of a man may be seen by another from the movement of the body. Therefore the habits of the soul are known by their essence. is (De Trin. but we know most certainly that it is there. 4). and can be known only by its . It would seem that our intellect knows the habits of the soul We — by their essence. Therefore the habits of the soul are not known by their acts. therefore so that nothing is known but as it is actual far as a habit fails in being a perfect act. Therefore they are still more known by the soul in themselves. Further. i) : Faith For Augustine says not seen in the heart wherein it abides. said therefore to be known by their likenesses. 2. the contrary. Further. and not regard of other substances. the same but by themselves.Q.

2. Reply Obj.22 i HOW THE . kind of knowledge of the habit arises from its being present.— since. not as its object. still more the cause of a thing true of things that are . : .. we may say that health is desirable on account of life. Habits are present in our intellect. our intellect's the nature of a material thing as stated above 7). anyone knows he has a habit from the fact that he can produce the act proper to that habit. of the same kind of cause for example. whereas medicine belongs to the order of efficient causes.87. and therefore life is more desirable still. as on account of an object known. but as on account of a disposition or form whereby the subject knows and therefore the argument does not prove. the one which is the cause of the other being health as principles are more known than conclusions. is object in the present state of life. i. (Q. being such. for : belongs to the order of final causes. i). 3. nor are things known on known. Although faith is not known by external movement of the body. Reply Obj. for instance. first The as explained above of the mind (A. for example. But habit as such does not belong to the order of objects of knowledge. is is it understands. for the very fact of its known. The second presence causes the act whereby it is kind of knowledge of the habit arises from a careful inquiry. For no one in it resides. knows that he has faith unless he knows that he believes. A. but it does not follow that medicine is more desirable than health. is of the The axiom. into the nature and idea of the habit by or he may inquire considering the act. LXXXIV. 2 act thus. account of the habit. —but as that by which -whatever so. it is perceived by the subject whereis Reply Obj. order. But if we same take things of different orders the axiom is not true for we may say that health is caused by medicine. is the more known. SOUL KNOWS Q. by the interior act of the heart. Art. So of two things belonging essentially to the order of the objects of knowledge.

namely. i. . But there is another intellect. whether our intellect knows its own act ? proceed thus to Objection i. the angelic. which seems impossible. as building is the perfection of the thing built. faculty.'er that. 87. understand. feel its own stated De On the contrary. and yet the first object of Wherefore although there that act is is the angelic essence. act. for this belongs to the common sense. it knows it by knows that act by some other act is to act. a logical distinction between . is known is known by some whatever Further. Therefore the 2. which is not its own act of understanding. stated above x. LXXIX. knowing Obj. viii. ix. This occurs in different wars with different intellects. the intellect some this and again proceed indefinitely. Art. (Did. the intellect has the same relation to its act as sense has to its act. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 222 Third Article. Therefore neither does the intellect understand its own act. because His Essence is His act of understanding. and the under- standing of His Essence. intellect it then. so that in God the understanding of His intelligence. as Aiiima iii.Q. 8). If. But the proper sense does not act. does not know its own act. For what is known is the object of the But the act differs from the object. i). I Augustine says {De Trin. 11). are one and the same act. Therefore the first the Divine. 3. thing understood of the intellect is its act of own understanding. as we have said above (O. Obj. as is said Metaph. Further. For there is an intellect. 2) a thing is intel- Now the ultimate perfecligible according as it is in act. It would seem that our We the Third Article: — intellect does not know its own act. 2. knows its own act. but it remains in the agent as is its perfection and act. A. As (A A. / understand that I ans-d. which is Its own act of intelligence. tion of the intellect consists in its own operation for this : not an act tending to something else in which lies the perfection of the work accomplished.

Reply Obj. 3 whereby he understands that he understands. the human intellect. nor is its own essence the first object of its act of understanding. as considered in said above (Q. and so on. 87. together with its perfection. for this object is the nature of a And therefore that which is first known by human intellect is an object of this kind. 2. understoody And there is yet another. being but being and true. material thing. however. Nor is being thus potentially there any difficulty in the intellect infinite. is not every first and everything A. is true. 4). The understand its own act. object of the intellect is something universal. LXXXVL. as explained above (Q. we have LXXXIV. stand his own essence is the proper perfection of his essence. as 7). and acts before powers (De Anima ii. object of our intellect. the . the perfection of which is this act of understanding. The intelligent act of the human intellect not the act and perfection of the material nature under- from which it stood. in But not primarily. Wherefore the intellect can Reply Obj. For this reason did the Philosopher assert that objects are known before acts. The proper sense feels by reason of the immutation in the material organ caused by the external sensible. since the this state of life. and by one and the same act is a thing. material things. Art. acquires knowledge of all other things. A material object. and therefore the act of . and the intelli- understood by one act just as a thing and its perfection are understood by one act. which neither is its own act of understanding. in which the act also of understanding is comprised. yet he understands both by one and the same act because to under..223 the act HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. as if the nature of the material thing . 3. namely. Reply Obj. but one is immuted by another. and that whereby he understands his essence. namely. A. i. being and the true. Hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone is distinct from the act whereby it understands that it understands a gent act could be stone . and that which is known secondarily is the act by which that object is known and through the act the intellect itself is known. cannot immute itself. 2).

But Obj. but by does not seem that there can be in the soul any other notions of things. Augustine says (De Trin. the act of the will is nothing but an inclination consequent on the form understood. does not perform the act of understanding by the material immutation of an organ. We — is not known by 2. the act is specified by the object. Obj.ice the natural inclination resides in a natural thing naturally. Therefore the act of the will . and he. i). x. I answer that. unless it be in some present in the intellect. just as the natural appetite is an inclination consequent on the natural form. 11). the intellect. the object of the will is not the same as the object of the Therefore the act of the will is specifically intellect. On the contrary. It would seem that the intellect does not understand the act of the will. whether the intellect understands the act of the will? proceed thus to the Fourth Article: Objection i. and the inclination called the sensible appetite . Now the inclination of a thing resides in it according to its mode of existence.Q. says of the soul's neither by images as bodies 17) like the arts. Further. affections that they are known are known. 3. but either the essences Therefore it of things known or the likenesses thereof. distinct from the object of the is intellect.87. The intellect. For nothing is known by the intellect.. certain notions.AR1. A. LIX. nor by their presence. But the act of the will is not in the intellect since the will and the intellect are distinct. Fourth Article. on the contrary.4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 224 the proper sense is perceived by the common sense. 1 understand that I will. x. it Now seems impossible for the intellect to know such affections of the soul as the acts of the will. Augustine (Confess. As stated above (Q. and therefore the act of the will not known by the intellect. and so there is no comparison.

contained LXXXn. 4. the nature of its principle which intelligibly in . and those of the intellect can fall under the will. both inasmuch as one knows that one wills and inasmuch as one knows the nature of this act. one is The good and and the true which are the objects of the will of the intellect. is understood by that subject. is the habit or power. consequently what is in the will . and consequently. in the intellect. ad i. as in its principle and proper Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus subject. is. as the arts but as the thing caused is in its principle. i. This argument would hold good if the will and the intellect were in different subjects. 9). 4 intelli- in the sensible thing sensibly and likewise the the act of the will. differ logically. A. But as both are rooted in the same substance of the soul. for the true is good. A. The affections of the soul are in the intelnot by similitude only. like bodies.. are in the And so Augustine says that the soul's affections memory by certain notions. —that the will is in the reason. Therefore the act of the will is understood by the intellect. gible inclination.. 4. present in their subject. ad i). as they are distinct powers for then whatever was in the will would not be in the intellect. Now an intelligent subject. nor by being . as we have said above (Q. XVI. is in the intelligent subject intelligibly. 15 . 87. which contains some notion of the thing caused. Q. but in the other. Q. Therefore the objects of the will fall under the intellect. in a certain way. Art. Reply Obj. and the good is true. and since one is in a certain way the principle of the other. {De Anima whatever is iii.225 is HOW THE which is SOUL KNOWS . also 2. 3. lect Reply Obj. Reply Obj.

own nature is immaterial. We is must now consider how the human soul knows what above itself. to immaterial than to material things. But these are the immaterial substances. Since mind understands material things. 3) says -.'\terial the present state of life substances in them- proced thus to the First Article: Objection 1. 226 able to . It would seem that the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial substances in themselves. HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE {In Three Articles. i). so it gains from itself the knowledge of incorporeal things. Therefore the human mind understands immaterial substances. like is known by like. mind since is more akin its But the human Further. A. Obj.QUESTION LXXXVIII. LXXVL. For Augustine {De Trin. Under this head there are three points of inquiry (i) Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand the : immaterial substances called angels. viz.. 2.As the We — mind itself acquires the knoivledge of corporeal things by means of the corporeal senses. whether the human soul can understand SELVES ? in ixim. ix. much more is understand immaterial things. in themselves ? (2) Whether it can arrive at the knowledge thereof by the knowledge first of material things ? ? (3) Whether God is the object of our knowledge First Article. as is clear from what then our it we have said above (Q.) ITSELF. immaterial substances.

intelligible substances.227 HOW THE 3. the fact that objects which are in themselves most sensible are not most felt by us. 16) heaven who shall search out? But these substances are said to be in heaven. comes from But the sense being corrupted by their very excellence. as sense is to the sensible. because it would have made what in itself is naturally intelligible not to be underBut in nature nothing is idle or purposestood at all. ii. intellect is not subject to things. by us. i Further. ix. which he called Ideas. nature would be frustrated in its end were we unable to understand abstract substances. immaterial subby us. further. / answer that. 4. according to Matthew Therefore imxviii. even the superior and The things It is written (Wisd. which are in themselves in the highest degree of intelliAs material gibility. are intelligible only so far as we make them actually so by abstracting them from material conditions. material substances cannot be known by human investiga- On the contrary. SOUL KNOWS Q. Further. immaterial. Therefore they much more known to us than are material things. are the se proper objects of our intellect. 10. Further. Art. : that are in tion. and poreal. Their angels in heaven. For Plato taught that im- material subsisting forms. however. In the stances are not only understood we understand first opinion of Plato. and are thus first and per are material that understood objects us. are likewise to us most intelligible. Obj. Obj. Hence the purer the intellect is. or lower Therefore our intellect can understand all corruptible. 4. it is clear that those substances are more intelligible in are themselves whose nature is immaterial. so is intellect But our sight can see all things corto the intelligible. . 5. by known by the soul inasmuch as phantasy and sense are mixed up with the mind. such a corrupting influence from Therefore things its object as is stated De Anima iii. whether superior and incorruptible. the Commentator says {Metaph. Obj. and. 88. but are the objects of all.) that. etc. immaterial substances can be understood Therefore less.

of both the active intellect and intelligible for instance. 7). principal agent is to the instrument. we also shall be able understand separate substances. Thus it clearly appears that immaterial substances which do not fall under sense and imagination. either as the as form to matter. of actually visible synchronizes with the reception of light in the eye. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 228 much the more clearly does it perceive the intelligible truth of immaterial things. which he calls the active intellect. cannot first and therefore it can per se be known by us. as. as cutting to the workman and the saw to a form and its In both these ways fire. thus. as we have said above (Q. LXXXIV. Now he said that the For since we underactive intellect is united to us. its perfection at one and the same time. and which. we understand conclusions by is principles understood it clear that the active intellect must be compared to the objects understood. to a principal agent and to an instrument.. Nevertheless Averroes {Comment. we can understand material things. as in the present life through the medium of the passive intellect united to us. which experience corroborates. De Anima iii. when it is perfectly united to us so that by its means we are able to to understand perfectly. being a separate substance can naturally understand separate substances. according to the mode of knowledge which experience proves us to have. — stand by means objects.) teaches that in this present life man can in the end arrive at the knowledge of separate substances by being coupled or united to some separate substance. made Now a subject is perfect and receives potentiality. or For an action is ascribed to two principles in one of these two ways. Therefore the passive intellect receives what is . itself. as heating to heat and the active intellect can be compared to the intelligible and as act is to object as perfection is to the perfectible. as the reception . subject. .Q so 88. our intellect in its present state of life has a natural relationship to the natures of material things. and only understand by turning to the phantasms. But in Aristotle's opinion. Art. A. Hence.

the active intellect were united to us in substance. this Secondly. i the intelligible object and the active intellect together. but man understands separate substances by means of the active intellect. opinion is untrue. be a separate substance. we could not formally understand by its instrumentality. because granted that.229 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. A. but see the colours. 88. as was passive intellect (Q. so much the nearer do we come to the point of perfect union between ourselves and the active intellect. that we may Thirdly. as it is a much greater thing to understand separate sub- . does it matter whether the passive intellect in that state of happiness understands separate substances by the instrumentality of the active intellect. would not be joined to us in its subact. In this he makes the ultimate happiness of man to consist. supposing it to be a explanation. Nor.. First. or whether (as he says Alexander holds) the passive intellect can never understand separate substances (because according to him it is corruptible). still it is not said that it is wholly so united in regard to one intelligible object. because in the above the active intellect. as regards the present inquiry. we are not united to the substance of the sun so as to act its light only is united to us. the active intellect becomes one with us. LXX. since said of the but only in its light. . sup- and every agent acts according to its actuality. this opinion is untrue. i). for the medium of an agent's formal action consists in its form to This opinion. like the sun. so much so that when we understand all the intelligible objects. as above explained. and the more numerous the intelligible objects received. or two. separate substance. Art. stance. as participated in things understood. But all such objects together do not equal the force of the active intellect. and would not extend to the other acts of the active intellect so as to enable us to understand immaterial substances just as when we see colours set off by the sun. posing the active intellect is untrue. and by its instrumentality we can understand all things material and immaterial. because. but rather in regard to all intelligible objects. however. as he himself maintains.

1. he concludes (ch. : felicity. of the species. or the intellect. 88. coinmunicis unreasonable that only the few of any species attain to the end i. active either by the passive by Reply Obj. which are made actually intelligible by the passive intellect. could reach to perfect which is against what the Philosopher says {Ethic. is that happiness all a kind of common able to capable of virtue. Hence active intellect. 7) that ultimate happiness consisting in the knowledge of the highest things intelligible is attained through the virtue of wisdom. Therefore both intellects. Sixthly. because it is hardly things i. Hence Aristotle clearly places the ultimate felicity of man in the knowledge of separate substances.Q. Further. as is stated (De Anima iii. Augustine may be taken to mean that the knowledge of incorporeal things in the mind can be ga/ned . the passive intellect is all things . according to the present state of life. which in the sixth chapter he had named as the chief of speculative sciences. Fourthly. or very few. extending itself actively to the same objects to which the passive intellect extends receptively because. A. 9). obtainable by speculative science and not by being united to the active intellect. it good. Hence it follows of all that the material clearly knowledge things would not make the active intellect to be so united to us as stances than to understand to enable us by its instrumentality to understand separate is substances. as was shown above (Q. anyone in this world to understand all material and thus no one. this opinion possible for untrue. some imagined. the active intellect is not a separate substance but a faculty of . Art. potentially. 4). the soul. is 10). and the active intellect is all things in act. that an operation according to perfect virtue. as . and are received in the in the present state of life we cannot understand separate immaterial substances in themselves. and happiness after enumerating many virtues in the tenth book. the Philosopher expressly says (Ethic. extend to material things only. 5).. Fifthly. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 230 all material things. LXXIX.

such as is within its compass not that the knowledge of itself gives it a perfect and absolute knowledge of them. that is.23t HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. it attains to some knowledge of . Sense knows bodies. and by one another. in the the organ. to be understood by us is not the end of while only that is vain and purposeseparate substances It does not follow. This argument of the Commentator fails in several ways. Reply Obj. which fails to attain its end. but also to their being improportionate to the sensitive power. incorporeal sub- stances. Reply Obj. is such that it can be informed with similitudes abstracted from phantasms and therefore things rather than immaterial substances. The likeness of nature is not a sufficient otherwise what Empedocles said of knowledge would be true that the soul needs to have the nature of all But knowledge requires that the in order to know all. it does not follow that they are not understood by any intellect for they are understood by life. And thus it is that immaterial substances by are improportionate to our intellect. is due not merely to the fact that they corrupt the organ. For by knowing itself. by the sensible acting on But we do not understand material and im- . that immaterial substances are purposeless. themselves. in the present state of life. Art. even if they are not understood by us at all. Now our passive intellect. 3. fore. the active to the passive. — . because if separate substances are not understood by us. as a kind of form thereof. 5. : it knows material Reply Obj. Secondly. This is so true that philosophers also say that the knowledge concerning the soul is a principle for the knowledge of separate substances. 2. whether superior or : inferior. so that it . Hence that sensible objects of great power are not grasped the senses. in our present state of cannot understand them. cause Reply Obj. i by the mind itself. 88. and of perfection to the perfectible. First. There must needs be some proportion between the object and the faculty of knowledge such as of . same way. thereless. 4. likeness of the thing known be in the knower.

by us through material things. For Dionysius says {Cael. Therefore we can be led We — by material things 2. Therefore immaterial substances can be understood by us. Obj. 4. i. unless it is led thereto by material guidance according to its own nature. for Damascene defines an angel we find angels treated of both in theology {De Fid. which is impossible in the case of the latter. Further. and this belongs to God alone. Averroes says {De Anima iii. 88. through its act by which it understands material things Therefore also other material substances can be understood through their material effects. On poreal through corporeal. But Obj. Second Article. THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " for there are 232 The former we material substances in the same way. Further. and and philosophy.) that the human mind cannot be raised up to immaterial contemplation of the heavenly hierarchies. It would seem that our intellect can know immaterial substances through the knowledge of material things. no phantasms 0/ what is immaterial. to know immaterial substances. nor incorthe contrary. composite things through simple. the human soul belongs to the genus of But it can be understood by us immaterial substances. 3). Nom.) that be understood through sensible cannot intelligible things nor things. ii.) that a philo- . i. :. Orth. there are sciences and definitions of immaterial substances. Art. Obj. whether our intellect can understand immaterial substances through its knowledge of material THINGS ? proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection i. Therefore other created immaterial substances can be understood by us. Dionysius says {Div. 3. the only cause which cannot be comprehended through its effects is that which is infinitely distant from them. science resides in the intellect. understand by a process of abstraction. Further.Q. 1 answer that. Hier.

Science treats of higher things principally by way of negation.). From material things we can rise to some kind of knowledge of immaterial things. 2 sopher named Avempace* taught that by the understanding of natural substances we can be led. the heavenly bodies Thus Aristotle {De Gael. Art. go on for ever. showing power and nature. 2. Arabian Philosopher. the underthe likenesses drawn from material things for fect . as Dionysius says {Cael. differ altogether from the quidsubstances immaterial that it follows that. Therefore we are not able perfectly to understand immaterial substances through material substances. its perfecdy itself through which is proper to it. Hier. be the understanding of immaterial substance. i. Reply Obj. ob. But supposing. but not to the permatter. . to the knowledge For since the nature of our intellect is to substances. were immaterial suband species of these material things as . Reply Obj. dity intellect abstract the quiddity of material things from could never arrive at anything akin to immaterial substance. standing of immaterial things are very dissimilar therefrom. substances be known by us in such a way as to make us know their quiddity but we may have a scientific knowtheir relation to ledge of them by way of negation and by . But the power and nature 3. opinion would be true. its own act of understanding. on the contrary. anything material residing in that abstracted quiddity can again be made subject straction cannot to abstraction .233 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. abstract the quiddity of material things from matter. Reply Obj. i. 1138. 88. Now this stances the forms the Platonists supposed. according to true of immaterial philosophical principles. it knowledge thereof for there is no proper and adequate and proportion between material and immaterial things. material things. 3) explains by denying to them inferior corporeal it follows that much less can immaterial Hence properties. however much our of material things. ii. absolutely without matter. The human soul understands * Ibn-Badja. it and as must the process of abarrive at length at some immaterial this would and quiddity.

whether god is the first object known by the human MIND ? proceed thus to the Third Article: Objection i. 2. act. xii.. as light is to the eye. Therefore God is the first object known to us. Therefore God is our first and most known object.Q. i . Third Article. De Vera Rel. Art. are in the predicament of substance. and principles to the intellect.*). xii. (Q. whatever causes a thing to be such is But God is the cause of all our knowledge. i. as their essence is But God has no connection distinct from their existence. for the true light which enlighteneth every man that Cometh into this world (Jo. III. Further. for they do not agree in power or in matter but they belong to the same logical genus. as regards either natural genus or logical genus because God is in no genus. Obj. Further. is the first thing known us . Hence through the likeness derived from material things we can know something positive concerning the angels. xxxi. It would seem that God is the first object known by the human mind. with material things. as Augustine says (De Trin. because there is no proportion between the latter and the power of the former. We — others are known. 2. first and by which we judge to others. A. . because even immaterial substances the . as stated above . Obj. 3. Created immaterial substances are not in same natural genus as material substances. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 234 of immaterial substances cannot be perfectly known through such nor through any other material thing. more so. though not according to the specific nature whereas we cannot acquire any such knowledge at all about God. But we know all things in the light of the first truth. 4. and thereby judge of all things. 9). what is first known in the image is the is He I * Confess. 88. 5). Reply Obj. For that object in which all . 25. according to some common notion.

Therefore God is the first object known to our mind. i). Hence . not as if He were the first known object. A.. ad 3). as stated above. i. it (Q.. 8 Q. our mind would know God at once. substances (A. 2. . But in our mind image of God.. A. If there existed in our souls a perfect image of God. 2. The axiom. A..235 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 3. 7 Q. 20). as the Son is the perfect image of the Father. forasmuch as the light itself of our mind. A. 18). 2). the invisible things of God are clearly seen. 88. but because He is the first cause of our faculty of knowledge. Art. Other things than God are known because of God.. as explained above (Q. much less can it of the uncreated substance. LXXXVH. as the light itself of our intellect Reply Obj. xii. We see and judge of all first things in the light of the first truth. much less can it be said that God is the first object known by our intellect. ad 2). natural whether or gratuitous. / i. 3 is exemplar to which it is made. being understood by the things that are made: while the first object of our knowledge in this life is the quiddity of a material thing. . understands. which is the proper object of our intellect. A. as appears above in many passages (Q. i. Since the human intellect in the present state of life cannot understand even immaterial created answer understand the essence it must be said simply that God is not the first object of our knowledge. Reply Obj. LXXXVH. Whatever causes a thing to be such is more so. Reply Obj. . 4. the contrarv. as Augustine says (De Trin. On (Jo. must be understood of things belonging to one and the same order. the 7). But the image in our mind is imperfect hence the argument does not prove. but the medium whereby it understands. according to the Apostle (Rom. Rather do we know God through creatures. LXXXIV. Xn. No man hath seen God at any time that. 2. is nothing else than the impression of the truth upon it. LXXXV. is not the object Hence.

OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL. LXXXIV. It would seem that the soul separated from the body can understand nothing at all. A. For the Philoso- We — pher says {De Anima i.. But death destroys the senses and imagination. Therefore the soul understands nothing. whether the separated soul can understand anything? proceed thus to the First Article : Objection i. Further. (/« Eight Articles.) We must now consider the knowledge of the separated soul. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry (i) Whether the soul separated from the body can understand? (2) Whether it understands separate substances? (3) Whether it understands all natural things ? (4) Whether it understands individuals and singulars? (5) Whether : the habits of knowledge acquired in this life remain ? (6) Whether the soul can use the habit of knowledge here acquired? (7) Whether local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge? (8) Whether souls separated from the body know what happens here? First Article.QUESTION LXXXIX. But by death all human interior principles are corrupted.. 2. 8). LXXVU. as explained above (O. Therefore also itself is corrupted. shown above (Q. AA. that the understanding is corrupted together with tts interior principle. 236 as we have death after . 4). 7. 8). and by a distracted imagination. the human soul is hindered from understanding when the senses are tied. the intellect Obj.

but the effect of grace. if the separated soul can understand. for it does not then possess organs of sense and imagination which are necessary for the abstraction of species nor does it understand by means of species. and not the form for the sake of the matter. that which consists in intelligence. In that case. nature. but accidentally through its being bound up with the body. But the soul is separated from the body therefore it has a proper operation. and would intelligible things simply. for in that case when the the soul would at once return to its body was once removed. as experience shows. Q. Therefore the soul car understand when it is apart from the body. for such knowledge would not be natural. / answer that. Did this not proceed from the soul's very . On the contrary. which would be unreasonable. The difficulty in solving this question arises from the fact that the soul united to the body can understand only by turning to the phantasms. as the Platonists said. however. this Further. that it it to . as is exemplified in the case of other separate substances. for evidently it would understand worse in the body than out of it but for the good of the body. must be by means of some species.237 SEPARATE SOUL'S KNOWLEDGE 3. such as we treat of now. since death does not change its nature. But if we admit that the nature of the . : . the difficulty would vanish . But it does not understand by means of innate species. i). : . 89. Art. The Philosopher says (De Anima i. seem. // the sotil had no proper operation. the union of soul understand and body would not be for the soul's good. Therefore the soul apart from the body understands nothing. it could not be separated from the body. a child's soul would have no means of understanding at all nor does it understand by means of intelligible species divinely infused. own nature. since matter exists on account of the form. soul requires it will understand by turning to the phantasms. without turning to the phantasms. 1 Obj. and above all. formerly abstracted and retained in the soul for if that were so. because it has none such being at first like a tablet on which nothing is "written: nor does it understand by species abstracted from things.

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"

SUMMA THEOLOGICA "
;

238

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in corporeal it has a

mode of understanding, by turning to simply intelligible Hence objects, as is proper to other separate substances. it is as natural for the soul to understand by turning to
it is for it to be joined to the body; but be separated from the body is not in accordance with its nature, and likewise to understand without turning to the phantasms is not natural to it and hence it is united to the body in order that it may have an existence and an operation suitable to its nature. But here again a difficulty arises. For since nature is always ordered to what is best, and since it is better to understand by turning to simply intelligible objects than by turning to the phantasms; God

the phantasms as
to

;

should have ordered the soul's nature so that the nobler way of understanding would have been natural to it, and it would not have needed the body for that purpose.

understand by to than understand to by turning turning something higher to phantasms, nevertheless such a mode of understanding was not so perfect as regards what was possible to the soul.
while
itself to

In order to resolve this difficulty it is true that it is nobler in

we must consider

that

This will appear if we consider that every intellectual substance possesses intellective power by the influence of the

J

239

SEPARATE SOUL'S KNOWLEDGE

Q.

89.

Art.

i

Divine light, which is one and simple in its first principle, and the farther off intellectual creatures are from the first diversiprinciple so much the more is the light divided and the centre of from lines the case with as is radiating fied, a circle. Hence it is that God by His one Essence understands
all things; while the superior intellectual substances understand by means of a number of species, which nevertheless are fewer and more universal and bestow a deeper comprehension of things, because of the efficaciousness of the intellectual power of such natures whereas the inferior
:

intellectual natures possess a greater number of species, which are less universal, and bestow a lower degree of comprehension, in proportion as they recede from the intel-

the higher natures. therefore, the If, same in the inferior substances received species degree of since they are universality as the superior substances,
lectual

power

of

not so strong in understanding, the they would derive through them would of a general and confused nature. certain extent in man, for those who are

knowledge which be imperfect, and
of

can see this to a weaker intellect fail to acquire perfect knowledge through the universal conceptions of those who have a better understanding, unless
things are explained to them singly and in detail. Now it is clear that in the natural order human souls hold the

We

But the perlowest place among intellectual substances. fection of the universe required various grades of being. If, therefore, God had willed human souls to understand

same way as separate substances, it would follow human knowledge, so far from being perfect, would be confused and general. Therefore to make it possible for human souls to possess perfect and proper knowledge, they were so made that their nature required them to be joined
in the

that

and thus to receive the proper and adequate knowledge of sensible things from the sensible things themselves thus we see in the case of uneducated men that they have to be taught by sensible examples. It is clear then that it was for the soul's good that it was united to a body, and that it understands by turning to the
to bodies,
;

Q.

Sg.

Art.

2

THE

"

SUMMA THEOLOGICA "

240

phantasms. Nevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart from the body, and also to understand in another waj'. Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher's words carefully examined will show that he said this on the previous supposition that understanding is a movement of body and soul as united, just as sensation is, for he had not as yet explained the difference between intellect and sense. We may also
say that he
is

referring to the

way

turning to phantasms. second objection.

This

is

also the

of understanding by meaning of the

Reply Obj.

3.

The

way

of innate species, nor

separated soul does not understand by by species abstracted then, nor

only by species retained, and this the objection proves; but the soul in that state understands by means of participated species arising from the influence of the Divine light, shared by the soul as by other separate substances though
;

in a lesser degree.

Hence
;

as soon as

it

ceases to act

by

turning to corporeal (phantasms), the soul turns at once to the superior things nor is this way of knowledge unnatural, for God is the author of the influx both of the light of grace and of the light of nature.

Second Article.

whether the separated soul understands separate
substances
?

proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection i. It would seem that the separated soul does not understand separate substances. For the soul is more perfect when joined to the body than when existing apart from it, being an essential part of human nature and every part of a whole is more perfect when it exists in that whole. But the soul in the body does not understand separate substances, as shown above (Q. LXXXVHI., A. i). Therefore much less is it able to do so when apart from the body. Obj. 2. Further, whatever is known is known either by But separate substances its presence or by its species.
;

We

241

SEPARATE SOUL'S KNOWLEDGE
;

Q.

89.

Art.

2

cannot be known to the soul by their presence, for God alone can enter into the soul nor by means of species abstracted by the soul from an angel, for an angel is more simple than a soul. Therefore the separated soul cannot
at all

understand separate substances. Obj. 3. Further, some philosophers said that the ultimate

happiness of
substances.

man
If,

consists in the

therefore,

knowledge of separate the separated soul can under-

by

stand separate substances, its happiness would be secured its separation alone which cannot reasonably be said. On the contrary, Souls apart from the body know other
;

separated souls
hell,

as we see in the case of the rich man in who saw Lazarus and Abraham (Luke xvi. 23).
;

Therefore separated souls see the devils and the angels. / answer that, As Augustine says {De Trin. ix. 3), our mind acquires the knowledge of incorporeal things by itself— i.e., by knowing itself (Q. LXXXVIIL, A. i, ad i). Therefore from the knowledge which the separated soul has

we can judge how it knows other separate things. was said above (A. i), that as long as it is united to the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms, and therefore it does not understand itself save through becoming actually intelligent by means of ideas abstracted from phantasms for thus it understands itself through its own act, as shown above (Q. LXXXVIL, A. i). When, however, it is separated from the body, it understands no
of
itself,
it

Now

;

longer by turning to phantasms, but by turning to simply intelligible objects hence in that state it understands itself through itself. Now, every separate substance understands
;

what
the

is

above
of
its

itself

and what
it

is

below

itself,
:

according
for a thing

to

mode

substajice

understood according as
while one thing
is

is {De Causis, viii.) in is the one who understands
;

another according to the nature of that in which it is. And the mode of existence of a separated soul is inferior to that of an angel, but is the same as that of other separated souls. Therefore the soul apart from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls, but it
in

has an imperfect and defective knowledge of the angels so
1.

4

16

Q.

89.

Art. 3
its

THE

"

SUM MA THEOLOGICA "
is

242

far as

i. The separated soul is, indeed, less perfect considering its nature in wliich it communicates with the nature of the body but it has a greater freedom of intelligence, since the weight and care of the body is a clog upon
:

ledge of glory Reply Obj.

natural knowledge is otherwise.

concerned.

But the know-

the clearness of

intelligence in the present life. Reply Obj, separated soul understands the angels means of by divinely impressed ideas which, however, fail
its

2.

The

;

to give perfect knowledge of them, forasmuch as the nature of the soul is inferior to that of an angel.

Reply Obj.

3.

Man's ultimate happiness
;

consists not in

the knowledge of any separate substances but in the knowis seen only by grace. The knowledge ledge of God,

Who

of other separate substances

if perfectly understood gives not final and ultimate happiness happiness. But the great soul does not understand them separated perfectly, as was shown above in this article.

Third Article,

whether the separated soul knows all natural
THINGS
?

proceed thus to the Third Article: Objection i. It would seem that the separated soul knows all natural things. For the types of all natural things exist
in separate substances. Therefore, as separated souls know separate substances, they also know all natural things. Obj. 2. P'urther, whoever understands the greater intelligible,

We

will

intelligible.

be able much more to understand the lesser But the separated soul understands immaterial

substances, which are in the highest degree of intelligibility. Therefore much more can it understand all natural things

which are

in a

lower degree of intelligibility.

The devils have greater natural knowthe than separated soul yet they do not know all ledge natural things, but have to learn many things by long.
the contrary,
;

On

243

SEPARATE SOUL'S KNOWLEDGE

Q.

89.

Art.

3

Bono i.). Therefore experience, as Isidore says {De Summo neither can the separated soul know all natural things. Further, if the soul as soon as separated gained knowledge of
able.
all

natural things, the efforts of
profitless.

men

to

know
all

would be vain and
natural things.

But

this

would be unreason-

Therefore the separated soul does not
thai,

know

above (A. 1), the separated soul, like the angels, understands by means of species received from the influence of the Divine light. Nevertheless, as the soul by nature is inferior to an angel, to whom this kind of knowledge is natural, the soul apart from the body
/

answer

As

slated

through such species does not receive perfect knowledge, but only a general and confused kind of knowledge. Separated souls, therefore, have the same relation through such of natural species to imperfect and confused knowledge thereof. the have to the as knowledge perfect angels things Now angels through such species know all natural things in the respecperfectly because all that God has produced tive natures of natural things has been produced by Him in the angelic intelligence, as Augustine says {Gen. ad lit.
;

Hence it follows that separated souls know all 8). natural things not with a certain and proper knowledge, but in a general and confused manner. Reply Obj. i. Even an angel does not understand all
ii.

natural things through his substance, but through certain A. i). So it does species, as stated above (O. LXXXVH., not follow that the soul knows all natural things because
it

knows separate substances after a fashion. Reply Obj. 2. As the soul separated from the body does
;

not perfectly understand separate substances, so neither does it know all natural things perfectly but it knows them confusedly, as above explained in this article. Reply Obj. 3. Isidore speaks of the knowledge of the
future which neither angels, nor demons, nor separated souls, know except so far as future things pre-exist in their causes or are known by Divine revelation. But we are here
treating of the

knowledge

of natural things.

Q.

8q.

Art. 4

THE
;

"

SUMMA THEOLOGICA "

244

Reply Qbj. 4. Knowledge acquired here by study is proper and perfect the knowledge of which we speak is confused. Hence it does not follow that to study in order
to learn
!s

useless.

Fourth Article,

whether the separated soul knows singulars

?

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: Objection i. It would seem that the separated soul does
singulars. For no cognitive power besides the inremains in the separated soul, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. LXXVIL, A. 8). But the intellect cannot know singulars, as we have shown (Q. LXXXVI., A. i). Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars.

We

not

know

tellect

Obj. 2. Further, the knowledge of the singular is more determinate than knowledge of the universal. But the
separated soul has no determinate knowledge of the species of natural things, therefore much less can it know singulars.
Further, if it knew the singulars, yet not by sense, for the same reason it would know all singulars. But it does not know all singulars. Therefore it knows none.

Obj.

3.

On the contrary, The rich man in hell said / have five brethren (Luke xvi. 28). / answer th-at, Separated souls know some singulars, but not all, not even all present singulars. To understand this,
:

we must

consider that there

is

a twofold

way

of

knowing

things, one by means of abstraction from phantasms, and in this way singulars cannot be directly known by the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above (Q. LXXXVI., A. i). The other way of understanding is by the infusion
of species by God, and in intellect to know singulars.
tliat

way

it

is

possible for the

For as God knows all things, universal and singular, by His Essence, as the cause of universal and individual principles (Q. XIV., A. 2), so likewise separate substances can know singulars by species which are a kind of participated similitude of the Divine Essence. There is a difference, however, between angels

excel some who are better. . 2. If. because is whatever to the mode received into anything of the recipient. but also the singulars contained in those species whereas separated souls by these species know only those . therefore. it would follow that some who are less good would. Reply Obj. by reason of their perfect intellect. xiii. knowsingulars to which they are determined by former or natural or some affection. it thus . The knowledge of the separated soul is confined to those species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of determinate relation. but as explained above. some in this world who are less good enjoy knowledge denied to others who are better. Hence the angels. whether the habit of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul? proceed thus to the Fifth Article: Objection i. even in the future life. 3. Therefore there is not the same reason why it should know all singulars. Obj. Fifth Article. Reply Obj. through these species. Further. i. the habit of knowledge remained in the soul after death. as we have said. The intellect does not know the singular by way of abstraction neither does the separated soul know . which seems unreasonable. tude. conditioned according Reply Obj. : : . know not only the specific natures of things. 8). aptiby by ledge in this life.245 SEPARATE SOUL'S KNOWLEDGE Q- 89- Art. but one relation to some. or by the disposition is of the Divine order. 2. The separated soul has not the same rela- tion to all singulars. s and separated souls in the fact that through these species the angels have a perfect and proper knowledge of things whereas separated souls have only a confused knowledge. It would seem that the habit of knowledge acquired in this life does not remain in the soul separated We — from the body for the Apostle says Knowledge shall be destroyed (i Cor. and another to others.

Art. liii. exist in the would follow that two forms of the same species would same subject. But in this is sickness by destroyed knowledge Therefore it life there is no change so thorough as death. actions of the intellect. the same distinction is to be applied to habit. it Obj. actions whereby they are acquired (Ethic. 4. which cannot be. 5). the imaginative. Obj. cogitative. which is the abode of species. But. and memorative. as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii. remove: yet sometimes or the like. i). ii. 4. I . 5 3. is vi. knowledge here acquired would also be entirely destroyed. since knowledge resides in the intellect. and sides not in the intellect that the intelligible species are not kept in the passive intelIf this were true. Supposing. 4). whilst it resides materially and dispositively in the inferior powers. separated souls will possess knowledge by influence of the Divine light. are performed by the mind turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers. intellect. therefore. I answer that. ad Paulinum). resides chiefly and formally in the intellect itself. seems that the habit of knowledge is destroyed by death. Let us learn on earth that kind of knowledge which will remain with us in heaven. Hence through I such acts the passive in intellect sensitive considering the species powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding the action of the intellect when it turns to them to con: acquires a certain facility received and the aforesaid But as the intellectual act sider the intelligible object.Q. Jerome says {Ep. but in the sensitive powers. it would follow that when the bodv lect. namely. Some say that the habit of knowledge rethat a habit a quality hard to itself. the habit of knowledge here acquired must be and partly in the This can be seen by considering the very actions from which knowledge arises. is destroyed by death. that knowledge here acquired remained in the separated soul. the Philosopher says (PrcBdic. 89. co- Further. THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 246 Further. by which knowledge Now is the here acquired. For habits are like the partly in the aforesaid sensitive powers. On the contrary.

but as to the act of knowing and hence he says. This objection considers the corruption of knowledge on the part of the sensitive powers. its is by cold . when corrupted by . Therefore we must conclude it is that the habit of knowledge. the same species. The Apostle is not speaking of knowledge . 2. it is evident that human knowledge species in the passive intellect be corrupted by their confor there is no contrary to intelligible intentions. trary . 89. LXXIX. But contrariety may exist in the intellect as regards mental composition and division. so there is no impossibility. is false in statement or argument is contrary to truth. incorruptible faculty. Reply Obj. and deception on the part of a false argument. But these have no place in the separated soul. Vitce ii. however. Neither can the intelligible when Now and. 4. As a less good man may exceed a better bodily stature. therefore. subject corrupted. forgetfuhiess on the part of the memorative power. acquired in the present life does not remain in the separated soul. indirectly. These two kinds of knowledge are not of Reply Obj. pher says {De Long. a form may be corrupted in two ways first. 3. in proof of the assertion quoted. 2. et Brev. directly. as the Philoso. 5 Knowledge. . For this reason the Philosopher in the above when work mentions two ways : in which knowledge is corrupted directly namely. Reply Obj. ad 2). so the same kind of man may a habit of knowledge in the future life which a better in man have man Such knowledge.). cannot be commay with the other pared prerogatives enjoyed by the better man. as heat. I know in part. And thus knowledge may be corrupted by its contrary a false argument seduces anyone from the knowledge of truth. Now. remains in the separated soul. it must remain because. . not have. Reply Obj. Art. secondly. as regards what belongs to the sensitive powers but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself.. as above stated (Q. its contrary. A. i. or also reasoning so far as what . is not corrupted through corruption of the subfor the intellect is an ject. above all as regards simple intelligence of what a thing is. so far as in the intellect.247 SEPARATE SOUL'S KNOWLEDGE Q. as a habit.

is Its species is comes from the directed object. Therefore the soul in the state of separation cannot acquired in this life. It would seem that the act of knowledge here acquired does not remain in the separated soul. i). For the Philosopher says {De Anima i. Obj. thou didst receive good things in thy life- time.Q. produce any act of knowledge On 25) I : the contrary. whether the act of knowledge acquired here remains in the separated soul? IVe proceed thus to the Sixth Article: Objection :. 7). in his of the stone eye. that habits produce acts similar to those whereby they are acBut the habit of knowledge is acquired here by quired. But to consider what is previously known is an act of memory. that when the body — corrupted. intelligible species cannot have greater power in the separated soul than they have in the soul united to the body. how'ever. ii. and thus it cannot understand at all by intelligible species acquired in this life. acts of the intellect turning to phantasms : therefore it can- not produce any other acts. is which the object's similitude gathered from the power of the Thus that a person see a stone is due to the species agent. Remember that. These acts. as shown above (Q. Further. 2. 4). the soul neither remembers nor loves. But in this life we cannot understand by intelligible species without turning to phantasms. A. tion — answer its Action offers tw-o things for our consideraits species and mode. the Philosopher says (Ethic. LXXXIV. whereto the faculty of knowledge (intelligible) by the . It was said to Dives in hell (Luke xvi. Therefore the separated soul cannot do so. Obj. Further. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 248 Sixth Article. is due whereas the mode . but that he see it clearly. species. 89. Art.. 3. is Therefore the separated soul cannot retain an act of knowledge here acquired. are not adapted to the separated soul.

to do just things. xiii. Art. but not as belonging in a way to the intellect. Thus the act of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul. but in a different way. 6). The acts which produce a habit are like the acts caused by that habit. Moral. 2. 8 pleasurably. But they know what Therefore local distance done among themselves. it since the state of the separated soul is not the same as it follows that through the intelligible species acquired in this life the soul apart from the body can understand what it understood formerly. but in a different way. species and is in this life. 34-) Seventh Article. in species. The Philosopher speaks of remembrance. that is. Reply Obj. whether local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul? proceed thus to the Seventh Article: Objection i.. LXXIX. . Arist. act •• 3. but by a mode suited to a soul existing apart from tlie body. 5). Augustine says (De Divin.). Further. Reply Obj. according as memory belongs to the sensitive part. i. but not in mode. 7 Therefore as the intelligible to the eye's visual power. as stated above (A. demons' rapidity of movement enables them iii. For Augustine says {De Cura pro Mort. but not justly. A. Dcemon. is We — impedes the knowledge in the separated soul. not by turning to phantasms. that the But agility of movement to tell things unknown to us. The different mode of intelligence is produced by the different state of the intelligent soul not by .).249 SEPARATE SOUL'S KNOWLEDGE Q. : pleasurably. in the remain separated soul. Reply Obj. It would seem that local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge. 89. as explained above (Q. diversity of species. For example. Eth. causes the habit of political justice. v. (C/. Obj. whereby we Magn. 2. that the souls of the dead are where they cannot know what is done here.

89. by might be abstraction from the sensible. or the soul upon the sensible. But distance of time impedes knowledge Obj. would impede need to act the would for either sensible its knowledge in either and upon the soul. . 8). " 250 would be useless in that respect unless their knowledge was which. Augustine speaks there in accordance with the opinion that demons have bodies naturally united to them. shall explain (A. ledge in the answer Some have held that the separated soul If knows the singular it that were so. which is indifferent to what is near or distant. saw Abraham afar / off. because abstraction of the species from the sensible is done through the senses and other sensible faculties which do not remain actually in the soul apart from the body. as we may gather from De Civ. other cause. 10. 3. case a determinate distance would be necessary. though apparently rather by way of narration than of assertion. Therefore it seems that distance of place also impedes its knowledge. 7 THE local " SUMMA THEOLOGICA . This is. as if impeded by local distance but for some Reply Obj. and so have sensitive powers. which require local In the same book he expressly sets down this opinion. Therefore local distance does not impede knowseparated soul. that local distance . for the soul is ignorant of the future. It is up his eyes when written (Luke xvi. Augustine says that the souls of the cannot see what is done here. not because they departed are there. impossible. so is there distance of time. is a much the hindrance to knowledge of the separated soul. impeded by distance Further. . But the soul when separated understands singulars by species derived from the Divine light. as we 2. that Dives. greater to whose nature is inferior the demon's. that. he was in torment. xxi. Reply Obj. Hence knowledge in the separated soul is not hindered by local distance. Art. On lifting the contrary.Q. as there is distance of place. in the separated soul. Dei distance. 23). i. therefore. however.

and therefore is not knowable in itself. We — (Luke he may testify xvi. Further. If. 8 Reply Obj. The future. both by Divine order and by . and is knowable in itself. 2. from distance argue exists actually. 3. It would seem that separated souls know what takes place on earth for otherwise they would have no care for it. 89.25r SEPARATE SOUL'S KNOWLEDGE 3. whether separated souls know what takes place ON EARTH ? proceed thus to the Eighth Article: Objection 1. they do not know what takes place among us. asleep or awake. But this (i Kings takes knew what could not be unless they place here. takes place here. by being in a way determined some or by the vestige of previous knowledge or affection. 7). I have five brethren the into come also lest unto them. By natural knowledge. Obj. place of torments. since the separated soul has knowledge of to them. because so far as a thing falls short of being. Divine order. they know what souls Therefore passes on earth. as they have. I answer that. of which we are not know what treating now. therefore. Now the souls departed are in a state of separation from the living. Q. 28). separated Further. Art. does not actually exist. it must be by reason of local distance. Saul as Samuel appeared to 11). either by singulars. according to what Dives said . . Hence we cannot of time to distance of place. and tell them of what xxviii. 4). . Eighth Article. It is written (Job xiv. Obj. so far does it But what is locally distant fall short of being knowable. the souls of the dead do has been laid what from This follows earth. Therefore they know what takes place on earth. On the contrary. on passes down (A. separated souls know what happens among themselves. which has been shown to be false (A. which is distant in time. 21) He will not : understand whether his children come to honour or dishonour. . the dead often appear to the living. 27.

The souls of the departed may care for tlie living. Gregory. i.Q. seem to be divided : in heaven. Let every one take. nor consoled in sorrow by his mother. the souls of the dead have no concern in the they are distinct in knowledge (Moral. and so. But as the souls of the blessed are most perfectly united to Divine justice.) expressly says : the souls of the blessed in done by the living or by their own children.). for opinion as regards Gregory continues the passage above quoted The case of the holy souls is different. Art. alive. nor do they interfere in mundane except in accordance with Divine justice. for since they see the light of Almighty God. so of the spirit xii. whilst they are joined to the world of incorporeal spiritual substances and hence they are ignorant of what goes on among us. Gregory and Augustine. We cannot believe. Ixiii. . But Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. that the souls of the blessed who see God do know all that passes here. however. Whereof Gregory gives the reason thus the as The dead do not know how the is far from the life of the life corporeal things differ from incorporeal : living act. since he says. for flesh. affairs of the living. Reply Obj. when he asserts that. indeed. he was not visited. of whom Augustine says that they know what — happens among those living on earth. For they are equal to the angels. as a gloss quotes on the text. 252 their mode of existence. . and premises. in genus. 16). His opinion.). we cannot believe that external things are unknown to them. know what is as when she was was die. even the saints. Abraham hath not known us He confirms this opinion by saying that (Isa. is positive. they do not suffer from sorrow. do not xiii. Augustine seems to say the same {De Cura pro Mort. seems to be the more probable one. and again by the should (4 fact that the lest Lord promised to king Josias that he he should see his people's afflictions Kings xxii. 89. even if ignorant of their state just as we care affairs. and he could not think in it possible that she less kind when a happier state . what I say. as he pleases. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " . xiii. 20). Yet Augustine says this in doubt. The dead. on the other hand.

but from the cause mentioned above. That the dead appear to the living in any way whatever is either by the special dispensation of God . Art. but souls who pass hence thither. the affairs of the living can be made known to them not imfor the mediately. as Augustine says in the same book. Reply Obj. or by angels and demons. Reply Obj. 8 dead by pouring forth prayer on their behalf. . and told the king the end of his life. again. Or of else such apparitions occur through the instrumentality bad or good angels. as Augustine says in the same book. 23. though we are ignorant of their state. 3. to others living. Moreover. 89. This kind of ignorance does not proceed from the obstacle of local distance. without the knowledge of the departed as may likewise happen when the living appear. Or. in order that the souls of the dead of the living. And so it may be said of Samuel that he appeared through Divine revelation iccording to Ecclus. he slept. indeed. . —and may interfere in affairs this is to be accounted as miraculous. 2. xlvi. . without their own knowledge. canonical Scripture.253 SEPARATE SOUL'S KNOWLEDGE Q. the authority of Ecclesiasticus be set aside through not being received by the Jews as . or even by the revelation of the Holy Ghost. this apparition was procured by the demons unless.

and man ivas made a living soul. It would seem that the soul was not made. a simple form. IS Further. (4) The place of his abode. Therefore the soul. is of the Obj. For it is written (Gen. (In Four Articles. whereby Divine substance. made it was created ? Whether by angelic instru(3) made before the body ? was mentality ? (4) Whether it : First Article. WHETHER THE SOUL WAS MADE. of Under the first head there are four points of inquiry or was of (i) Whether man's soul was something made. it was (2) Whether. if the Divine substance? made. But he who breathes sends forth something of himself. man lives. (2) The end of first this production. (3) The state and condition of the man. concerning which there are four subjects of treatment (i) The production of man himself.. But a form is an act. but was of God's substance. A. there are three things to be considered (i) : The production of (3) man's soul. OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL. The production of the The production woman.) After the foregoing we must consider the first production of man. ii. as above explained (Q. LXXV. Therefore 254 . 7) God formed man of the slime of the earth. and breathed : We — into his face the breath of life.QUESTION XC. Concerning the pro: duction of man. OR WAS OF GOD'S SUBSTANCE ? proceed thus to the First Article: Objection 1. the soul 2. 5). (2) man's body.

the contrary. proved (Q. III. not apart from the body. 15) mentions certain opinions which he calls exceedingly and evidently perverse. I answer that. variety in itself. i. Therefore they said that God was a body. God is a soul governing the world by movement and reason. as we have AA. and in no way the same. According to this supposition.. nature of things.255 PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL is Q- 90. being unable to rise above their imaginaall of — Which — tion. i). There- Obj. Further. IX. certain differ. things that exist and do not differ are But God and the mind exist. the human soul is sometimes Q. supposed that nothing but bodies existed. LXXXIV. w-hich they considered to be the principle of other bodies. the ing that God was a corporeal light. for they could only be differentiated by God Therefore be composite. On among which the first is the opinion that God made the soul not out of nothing.' 2 Q. 3. as is stated De Anima i. to God alone. of no admits and other. This error seems to have originated from two statements For those who first began to observe the of the ancients. thinkwas Then a further step in advance was made.. For. and some surmised the existence of something incorporeal. and contrary to the Catholic Faith. as is clear from what has been said (Q. Q. And since they held that the soul was of the same nature as that body which they regarded as the first principle. 6). Manich^ans. LXXVIL. but from Himself. held that the soul part of that light. A. — — powers. 2. which are incompatible with the Divine receives nothing from any is a pure act. also. but the form of a body so that Varro said. . 2 . Augustine {De Orig. A.. A. . differences. in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence. LXXIX. Art. A. 7. Nature. .. To say that the soul is of the Divine substance involves a manifest improbability. bound up with the body. acquires and has various its knowledge somehow from things. it followed that the soul was of the nature of God Himself. 1 the soul a pure act is fore the soul of which applies God's substance. and thus would and the human mind are the same. . Animce iii.

AA.Q. but a being by 5. forth anything of his man by breathing does not send own substance. For that which has in itself something proceed Objection i. i. III. 8. LXXV. I. a man and a horse differ by the difference of rational and irrational but are diverse do not differ. but as breathe (spirare). Dei vii. as . For this reason things which differ must in some way be compound since they differ in something. whether the soul was produced by creation? Second Article: would seem that the soul was not produced by creation. that these again differ by some further Second Article. ad 4). i). except according to the distinction of bodies. 90. is Although the soul not its a simple is form in its own existence. to as to make a spirit. Reply Obj. all these theories are impossible. 31. f/iws to the It We — • The words as quoted are to be found iv. A. as man is a part of the whole world for they were unable to go so far as to understand the different degrees of spiritual substance. in the material sense. and in something resemble each other. 6). . participation. sense. Reply Obj. Art. although all that differ are diverse. essence. For instance. A. 3. and Q. In this . yet it 2. as proved above (Q. as Therefore differs in it is above explained (Q. . properly speaking.. yet all things that For simple things are diverse. not a pure art like God. wherefore it is evidently false that the soul is of the substance of God.. . Moreover. something wherefore we seek for difference where we find also resemblance. That which differs. the same regards the act of God. we cannot say difference. but an extraneous is thing.. But. LXXV.* supposed man's soul to be part of that one soul. The term is " breathe" is not to be taken in the material sense. Reply Obj. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 256 So some Augustine relates (De Civ. not from do differ one another by differences which yet enter into their composition.

however. all other forms also are created. as were. properly speaking. which would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance 1. vii. / ansiver that. Obj. But the 30ul is in part Therefore the soul was is not a pure act. not true of other forms. 27) to God created God in his soul. soul is 3. truly called beings whereas an accident has not existence. an accident should be described as of something rather than as something. form. 2 material material. Further. : The rational soul can be is creation . or spiritual. for since matter poten- But in matter potentially. forms would come into existence by generation Thus no . whether corporeal. produced from matter. but something is (modified) by it. A. for instance. 90.. 2. which to — would render it a corporeal being. And since it cannot competent be made of pre-existing matter. every actuality of matter is educed from is in the potentiality of that matter. i. whiteness is called a being. and hence it was not created. it does not belong to any non-existing form to be made but such are said to be made through the composite substances being made.4 »7 — . Wherefore be and to be made.'3/ PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL is Q. since it made of matter . The same is to be said of all non. since to be made is the way a thing must be made it in mode of existence. the soul is is educed from the potenTherefore. Now such a way as is suitable that properly exists which in its has existence. On the other hand. Obj. to its itself reason is because. It is written (Gen. the created. tiality of Therefore the soul Further. Art. which is not true. Wherefore only substances are properly and . 2). definition. because by it something that Hence it is said Metaph. and so far is it called a being. a form. man to His own image. But man is like Therefore the soul was created. vi. as above explained (Q. made only by The to existence. subsisting own existence. i) is white. it is LXXV. which. tiality to act. if matter. Therefore. On the contrary. any act pre-exists from its as is clear the soul is the act of corporeal matter. the rational soul is a subsistent subsistent forms. (Did.

in Wherefore the soul cannot any way be made of pre-existent matter. Art. Third Article. Obj. Reply Obj. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " that it 25S into another.). for God is the beginning and end of all.whether the r. 2. We — means of the superior. iv. But inferior bodies are produced by corporeal things. as Dionysius says (Div. but by the instrumentality of For spiritual things have more order than the angels. Therefore the issue of things from their beginning corresponds to the . The soul's its simple essence as the material element. Therefore also the inferior spirits. as we have seen (O. The production of act from the potentiality of matter is nothing else but something becoming But since the actual that previously was in potentiality. the angels. we must conclude i . 2). because existence naturally follows the form. Further. who are the rational souls. as neither is the matter of a celestial body otherwise . As we have said. Nom. It would seem that the rational soul is not immediately made by God. LXXV. . cannot exi^ except is Reply Obj. and is subsistent. the soul would be corruptible. are produced by means of the superior spirits. The same reason holds if the soul is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter. which participated existence is its formal eleparticipated existence necessarily co-exists with the soul's essence. rational soul does not depend in its existence on corporeal matter. while ment . and exceeds the capacity of corporeal matter.^tional soul is produced bx god immediately ? proceed thus to the Third Article : Objection i. go. by creation. . there is no comparison between the rational soul and other forms. 2.Q. it is not educed from the potentiality of matter. 3. the end corresponds to the beginning of things. A. Reply Obj. as some maintain because the said matter is not in potentiality to another form..

and souls by angels. acts by making a change therein. LXXV.. . the rational soul cannot be produced by a : for the first agent alone can act the existence of anything while the . as is stated Metaph. Further. 90. For the work of creation preceded . produce rational power impossible. change in matter. all these things are effected through a certain transmu- tation. It is Him- breathed into the face of I answer of that. Obj. Now. the higher. much more are angels able to produce themselves. than much more perfect corporeal. whereas God alone acts by creation. Some have held that angels. therefore also the inferior are produced into existence by . 3. written (Gen. Therefore. But inferior things are Hier. since bodies produce their like in their own species. by God. It would seem that the human soul was We — made before the body. therefore. Art. and such is something specifically inferior to the rational soul. perfect is that which can produce its But spiritual substances are like. 3) and every agent. Fourth Article. souls. as Dionysius says {Eccl. Therefore everything else acts by producing a change. it cannot be produced. On self the contrary. v.259 PRODUCTION OF iMAN'S SOUL Q. 4 forwarding of them to their end. that presupposes something to its act. For that bodies produce their like or something inferior to themselves. save immediately — Thus the replies to the objections are clear. whether the human soul was produced before THE BODY? proceed thus to the Fourth Article: Objection 1. God alone can create without presupposing second cause always presupposes something derived from the first cause. as above explained (Q. Since. A. and is against faith. 7) that God man the breath of life. ii. acting by the God. and that the higher things lead forward the inferior. that the rational soul cannot be But it this is quite For has been proved produced except by creation. v) for-ivarded by the higher.

during the work of the six days. 2). But angels were created before bodies. or at least.. seems that the soul itself. not actually. 4 THE . but also the souls of all men were created at the same time as the angels. A. Q. matter. Therefore the soul of man was made the work of distinction . Obj. Augustine. because neither was it made of any pre-existing corporeal or spiritual Therefore it be produced from any created virtue.Q. Therefore the soul of man was created before the body. to bodies while others remain in their different orders and differ — — from matter. Therefore in the beginning it was created before the body. however (Gen. but only as to some causal virtues. 7. the angels. the soul was produced in the body. at the beginning whereas the body of man was corporeal matter formed on the sixth day. as shown above I A. Further. LXX. before the body. 90. 2. when all things were made. Of this opinion we have already spoken (Q. A. On the contrary. and so we need say nothing about it here. the end is proportionate to the beginning. before their because he thought that all spiritual substances. Further. But the soul was made (Q. when also the animals were made. before the body. was created.. nor could it . The proper act is produced in its proper potentiality. are equal in their natural con: dition. Origen {Peri Archon i. which cannot be said of the soul. Therefore. ad lit. LXVI. vii. Obj. for another reason because he supposes that the body of man. so that some of them of men or of heavenly bodies are united souls the namely. bodies whether souls or angels. the rational soul has rhore in common with the angels than with the brute animals. with . i). Art. since the soul is the proper act of the body. But in the end the soul outlasts the body. says that the entirely free soul of the first man was created at the same time as . was produced. / answer that. XLVII. only by merit. 3. " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 260 and adornment. the body was made at the end of the whereas by Creation work of adornment. during the work of the six days. 24). 8) held that not only the soul of the first man..

. But as the soul is naturally the form of the body. but that the soul was already created. the both body and soul of the first man were produced in the work of the six days. Which defect was not due when the soul was first created. has its required. if we admit the opinion of Augustine about the work of the six days (Q. we may say that the human soul preceded in the work of the six days by a nature in at the certain generic similitude. it belongs to the animal Reply Obj. and is naturally a part of quite impossible. 90. if neither Scripture nor says {loc. Q. human For it nature. is due to a defect of the body.. 2. Reply Obj. 2). The same observation applies to the second objection. as a part of human nature. 29) reason fofbid. Therefore it in their Now would have been the body. But if the soul is united to the body as its form. cit. 1. as the form of the body. it was necessarily created. That the soul remains after tlie body. it has intellectual itself was created same time as the body. 3. Art. If the soul by its nature were a complete species. natural perfection only as united to the body. A. death. in the . unfitting for the soul to be created without Therefore. but as its administrator. For if the soul had a species of itself it would have something still more in common with the angels. by its own was joined to the service of the body. LXXIV. not separately. Reply Obj. But. as a formal principle. together with the angels and that afterwards. that man "ivas made on the sixth day. 4 will. the above supposition is is clear that God made the first things perfect natural state. and that it is not united to the body as its form. so that it might be created as to itself. According to other saints. so far as common with the angels but . namely. But he does not say this by way of assertion as his words prove. genus. this reason would prove that the soul was created by itself in the begin- ning. but in the body.26i PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL . Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the soul has of itself a complete species and nature. : sense that his body ivas created as to its causal virtue in the elements of the ivorld. For he We may beli-eve. as their species the soul.

which is Therefore it should not be made of an earthly body. (2) The author (i) whom The it was produced. Further. but out of nothing. Obj.QUESTION (In XCI. and water. it was fitting man's body. For it is an act of greater power to make something out of nothing than out because not being is farther off from actual something. as is clear from their subtlety. Therefore it should not have been made of the slime of the earth. (4) to consider the this have now Under : First Article.) We production of the first man's there head are four points of inquiry body. that in the production of nobility . It would seem that the body of the We — first man was not made of of the slime of the earth. existence than being in potentiality. the heavenly bodies are nobler than But the human body has the greatest earthly bodies. it was from which The matter produced. fire and air are nobler bodies than earth the rational soul. Obj. THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY. 2. Four Articles. the power of God should be most clearly shown. but of a heavenly body. (3) disposition it received by and of its production. since 262 . since it is perfected by the noblest form. Therefore. But since man is the most honourable of God's lower creatures. 3. whether the body of the first man was made of the slime of the earth? proceed thus to the First Article: Objection i. The mode order in its production. Further.

as Dionysius says (Div. predominate in him by their power. ii. But on man this perfection is bestowed in an inferior way. fire and air. predominated in quantity. v. which is of the air. of the slime of the earth. i. Therefore the body of man is said to have been formed from the slime of the earth. : pre-contained in Him. yet in such a way that the higher elements. and in likeness to the heavenly bodies he is removed from contraries by an equable temperament. 7) : God made As God is perfect in His works. Further. 4. unless the inferior elements. For he does not possess a natural knowledge of all natural things.). Therefore it was not made of the slime of the earth. since he has in himself a rational their cause. and where there is the inferior elements abound in power. i it should rather have been than of the slime of the earth. He bestowed perfection on all of them according to their God's works are perfect (Deut. The power of the Divme Creator was . he has them in their very substance. for life is mostly found where there is heat. according to soul of the genus of spiritual substances. otherwise the mingling of elements would not be evenly balanced. not as component parts. Obj. Nom. because earth and water mingled are called slime. which is from humour. This perfection is bestowed on the angels. but of the four elements. but as united in one simple whole. He capacity Himself is simply perfect by the fact that all things are I ansiver that.263 the PRODUCTION OF MAN'S BODY is Q- 9'- «RT. which have the less fire . inasmuch as all things which are produced by God in nature through various forms come under their knowledge. xxxii. but is in a manner composed of all things. It is written (Gen. But man by their substance. in the same way as various effects pre-exist in its one virtue. because all creatures of the world are in a way to be found in him. the human body is composed of the four elements. 4). human body made of fire and most noble. air On man the contrary. and for this reason man is called a little world. As to the elements. Reply Obj.

it is impossible for something to be taken from the fifth essence. nobler than the earthly body. the organs of which cannot be formed of a heavenly body which is impassible. the or so that which are of perceived by that sense qualities . predominated also in quantity in the human body. In the slime of the earth are earth. between spiritual is in itself Reply Obj. a light body. whose action is of greater power. is united to the body by is what they say false —that means of light. as must with to touch for the medium is the case needs be regard in potentiality to the extremes. For the organ of any particular sense must not actually have the contraries of which that sense has the perception. or from a heavenly body. wherefore it since a heavenly body is does not enter into the composition mixed bodies. and . Art. genus of such the eye is contraries. 91. so as to be in potentiality as which is not possible in the organ of all colours regards it is since touch. which is the foundation of the other senses. Reply Obj. they would entirely draw the rest into themselves. Reply Obj. Secondly. as being something 2. If fire and air. and there would be no equality in the mingling. for the sense of touch. is a medium between two . such as is required in the composition of man. Nor is it true that something of the fifth essence enters materially into the composition of the human body. impassible of . and to be of all. for instance. is mingled with the elements. — thus. For the rational soul receives the knowledge of truth in a certain way and corporeal substances. the pupil of without colour.g. Although the heavenly body through the senses. : — the organ contraries. 4. matter was produced by made in fitting that the of the four elements. I THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" its it 264 manifested in man's body when creation. 3. that man But was human body should be common might have something with the inferior bodies. but only potentially either in such a way that it is entirely void of the whole . who suppose that the soul first For. except as in the effects of its power. as some say. composed of the very elements. yet for the acts of the rational soul the heavenly body is less adapted.

9' Art. 24) that man's body was made during the work of the six days. But the human body can be produced by tlie created power of a heavenlv body. Further. that corporeal things are disposed by God We — through the angels. 4). Scripture makes no mention. 3. which is the first movement. which are not perceived by senses of uncultured . Further. . : water binding the earth together. iii. Therefore the human body was not necessarily produced immediately by God. But all corporeal change is caused by a movement of a heavenly body. Whether the human body was immediately produced by god? proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection i. . for even certain animals are produced from putrefaction by the active power of a heavenly body and Albumazar says that man is not generated where heat and cold are extreme. ad lit. nothing is made of corporeal matter some material change. it seems that a heavenly Obj. men such addressed. 2. is not necessarily produced immediately by God. i). Of the other elements. whatever can be made by a created power. as we have said and because also in the account of the Creation no mention is made of fire and air. But the human body was made of corporeal matter. 4. It would seem that the human body was not produced by God immediately. since the human body was Obj. Therefore it was produced by the instrumentality of the angels. For Augustine says (De Trin. as those to whom the Scripture was immediately Second Article. as stated above (A. and not immediately by God. Augustine says {Gen. vii.265 PRODUCTION OF MAN'S BODY Q. Therefore. Further. Obj. except by produced from corporeal matter. according to the causal virtues which God inserted in corporeal creatures and that afterwards it was actually pro. because they are less in quantity in the human body. body had part in its production. but only in temperate regions.

Reply Obj. 91. not existing in matter. Although the angels are the ministers of God. supposed that the forms which are in corporeal matter are derived from some immaterial forms this . without the aid of any preceding material form. . Therefore as no pre-existing body had been formed whereby another body of the same species could be generated. For this reason the angels cannot transform a body except by making use of something in the nature of a seed. and not immediately by God. indeed. created man out of the earth. 19). Therefore the human body was produced by some i). So a form which is in matter can only be the cause of another form that is in matter. iii.Q. should produce a form which is in matter. i. 4). as. Now God. and because the agent must be like its effect. cannot be made in themselves.. by collecting the dust. the Nevertheless the angels could act as ministers in the formation of the body of the first man. as Augustine says {De Trin. though can alone by His own power immaterial. On the contrary. for human body was instance. it is not fitting that a pure form. It is written (Ecclus. accord- but the Philosopher refutes for the reason that forms made by composite. opinion (Metaph. I God answer that. Art. in same way as they will do at the last resurrection. A.:' created power.). or giving sight to the blind and by this power He formed the body of the first man from : the slime of the earth. as regards what He does in bodies. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 266 duced. vii. The first formation of the human body could not be by the instrumentality of any created power. yet God does something in bodies beyond the angels' power. but was immediately from God. but only in the composite. the first of necessity made immediately by God. absolutely creation wherefore He alone can promatter by produce ing as composite is He is : duce a form in matter. and which form is only made by the fact that the composite is made. xvii. as we have explained (Q. raising the dead. But what pre-exists in the corporeal creature by reason of causal virtues can be produced by some corporeal body. LXV. Some.

and are caused by the Divine Power alone. or the blind to see : which also is the 4. both in active and in passive potentiality. not be made by Perfect animals. in sense and movement. may be said to pre-exist in the causal virtues of creatures. whether the body of man was given an apt disposition ? proceed thus to the Third Article : Objection i. in two ways. but also that some pre-existing creature can produce it. although the power of a heavenly body may assist bv co-operation in the work of natural generation. as for like to the dead to be raised to life. produced from seed. It would seem that the body of man was not given an apt disposition. making of Reply Obj. Reply Obj. canthe sole power of a heavenly body. For this reason. in passive potentiality only it . . First. as the Philosopher says {Phys. can be produced by God. An effect man from the slime of the earth. PRODUCTION OF MAN'S BODY 2. according to Augustine. so that not only can it be produced out of pre-existing matter. Q. 26). ii. that is. his body ought to be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal.26. thus dogs have a keener smell. The movement of the heavens causes natural changes but not changes that surpass the order of nature. a place of is required for the production of man But the power of heavenly animals. that out of pre-existing matter In this sense. Secondly. as Avicenna imagined. For since man is the noblest of animals. man and the sun beget man from matter. the human body pre-existed in the previous works in their causal virtues. Third Article. and birds a . But some animals have sharper senses and quicker movement We — than man . 3. that is. 91- Art. 3 Reply Obj. and other perfect bodies suffices for the production of some imperfect animals moderate temperature from properly disposed matter for it is clear that more conditions are required to produce a perfect than an : imperfect thing.

for instance. he makes it of iron. perfect is what lacks nothing. as most suited to such a form and such operations. and so may be called God's works of art. Therefore God gave to each natural being the it make best disposition . which is suitable for the object in view and he does not prefer to not : . but in view of its proper : end. not be On man I the contrary. not absolutely.Q. though this be a more beautiful material. I soul . Art. Further. Obj. ii. in order to make it suitably proporto tioned to the soul and its operations. 7) And because it is better so. 3. that God fashioned the human body in that disposition which was best. but the best as regards the proposed end and even if this entails some defect. But the body lacks more than the body of other animals. Therefore man should vii. answer that. and natural arms Therefore the of human body is is very imperfectly disposed. and instruments are for the action of the agent. in which man is lacking. All natural things were produced by the Divine art. 30) : God made right. is more distant from plants than he But plants are erect in stature. not absolutely so. while brutes are prone in stature. . Obj. therefore. 91. these are provided with covering defence. . It is written (Eccles. for 2. of glass. the artist cares . of erect stature. but for each one's substance. This is what the Philosopher says (Phys. human Further. from the conditions required in the body. man from the brutes. Now every artist intends to give to his work the best disposition not absolutely the best. it is well to observe that such defect arises as a necessary result of the matter. the proximate end of the human body is the rational and its operations since matter is for the sake of the form. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 268 swifter flight. when a man makes himself a saw for the purpose of cutting. Therefore man's body was not aptly dis- posed. thus. because this very beauty would be an obstacle to the end he has in view. Now say. If defect exists in the disposition of the human body.

instruments. Aristotle {De Anima iii. A. since this excellence inconsistent with the equability of the human temperament. as is clear VI 1 1. the this was more becoming to called by Moreover organ of organs. LXXXIV. number of make for itself an infinite . are signs of . Reply Obj. as we have seen above (Q. we may suggest a reason why some animals have a keener sight.. Wherefore the hand 8). 3 The sense of touch.. which are the weapons of some animals.269 PRODUCTION OF MAN'S BODY 1 . the rational nature. for his greater largest brain as compared to the body. the size of the brain. an abundance of the earthly element which does not agree with the equability and softness of the human temperament. 7) . and in order that the low temperature of the brain able in may modify man the heat of the heart. and other necessaries of life. 2. equable temperament Reply Obj. man falls all LXX some of the exterior senses. which is the foundation is more perfect in man than in any this reason man must have the most and for other animal. In the same way. on account of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the perfect equability of his temperament. other animals in the interior sensitive powers. the other animals in short of a kind of necessity. thus of all animals he has the For man of all animals needs the least sense of smell. But by from what we have said above (Q. namely. which is is so as to capable of conceiving an infinite number of things. of infinite variety. of the other senses. or feathers. Horns and claws. Instead of these. 9«- Art. Therefore such things do not suit the nature of man. Moreover man excels of all animals. is an impediment to the smell. which requires dryness. and a more acute hearing than man. by reason of its humidity. Q. which has to be considerSo that for him to be able to stand up erect. he has reason and hands whereby he can make himself arms and clothes. and toughness of hide and quantity of hair which are the clothing of animals. both freedom of action in the interior powers required for the intellectual operations. 4). A. The same reason suffices to explain why some animals are more rapid of speed is in movement than man.

such an attiMoreover. Fourthly. . . other animals have the face turned to the ground. Nevertheless. his head. he may freely survey the sensible around both him. as it were for the purpose of seeking food and procuring a livelihood whereas man beauty of sensible objects for . and he used his hands as fore-feet. plants. because if man's stature were prone to the ground. and chiefly into by sight. objects heavenly and earthly. with thick and hard lips.g. purposes would cease. " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 270 Reply Obj. not being low down. tude would quite hinder speech. upright stature was becoming to First. Plants . gather intelligible Secondly. An man to of for four reasons. so as to truth from all things. Hence. performed. though of erect stature. Therefore. as we see in other animals. For man's superior man is far above part. because if man's stature were prone to the ground he would need to use his hands as fore-feet and thus their . since their roots correspond to the mouth and their inferior But brute animals have a part tcvards the upper world. as the senses are situated chiefly in the face. have the superior part turned towards the lower world. which more subtle and penetrates further the differences of things. has his face erect. whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses as ordered to food and sex. which is reason's proper utility for other operation. and also a hard tongue. Thus he would have a protruding mouth. he would be obliged to take hold of his food with his mouth. in is order that by the senses. is turned towards the superior part of the world. Thirdly. so as to keep it from being hurt by exterior things. 3 THE 3. but only alone takes pleasure in the also for the purpose of knowledge. Art. man its own sake. and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior world and therefore he is perfectly disposed as to the general situation of his body. but lifted up above other parts of the body. . 91. in a way. for which they are bestowed on other animals. wherein these actions are. because the senses are given man. not only for the purpose of procuring the necessaries life. for the greater freedom of the acts of the interior powers the brain.

as though He did not make other things. ad lit. the human body was made by God immediately. Obj. Therefore. vi. 12). which the whole body. Further. 5. and the breath of life. He breathed into his face the breath of Obj. whether the production of the human body fittingly described in scripture? is [Ve proceed thus to the Fourth Article: of the Objection 1. Is the Reply Obj. To His Therefore having said made them. and the inferior part that by which it rids itself of the surplus.271 PRODUCTION OF MAN'S BODY Q. 26). the male and female sex belong to the body. ci. Therefore was not fittingly said: life. male and : authority of Scripture. 4. the form of the human body is the soul Ohj. 9' Art. according to Augustine (Gen. 4 middle disposition. six days. Let us make man. Let it be made. Therefore the same should have been said of man. (Ge?i. surpasses other things. 24). God made man added And of the slime of the earth. God said. while the image of God belongs to the soul. But the soul. 2). image He female He created the^n. so also were the other works of the But in the other works it is written. On the contrary. As Augustine observes ad H<. itself which : is the breath of life. Further. and it -was made. 3. is in it chiefly in the heart. Further. Therefore it was not fittingly said. Further. The work of Thy hands is the man . Fourth Article. i. For. as — body fittingly the human body was made by God. since it is written (Ps. he should not have added. not in the fact that God Himself made man. It would seem that the production in described is not human Scripture. having said. vii. for the superior part 6f the animal is that by which it takes food. 2. the soul. as explained above (A. he should not have He breathed iiito him the breath of life. is Obj. was made before the body.

and breathed into his face the breath of life. God made man.Gen. He spoke to the angels. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGIGA " 272 heaven. xciv. is explanation. Scripture uses a special way of speaking. and elsewhere (Ps. A7td man ivas made a living soul. but to animal life. . Art. but in this. Reply Obj. 3. saying. Some have thought that man's body was formed first in priority of time. This especially unfitting as regards the body. Dei excluded by the very words of Scripture. should be understood of the Holy Ghost as the Lord breathed on His Apostles.y. But it is inconsistent man's sake. so that the words. or the soul without the body. 2. 4. for the depends on the soul. Whose image is more clearly expressed in man. He . According to Augustine (. which words the Apostle (i Cor. ad lit. For farther on. His hands laid down the dry land. Since vital operations are more clearly seen in man's face. is body To remove the difficulty some have said that the words. to show that other things were made for For we are accustomed to do with more and care what we have chiefly in mind. that man is made to God's image. 45) refers not to spiritual life. therefore Scripture says that the breath of was breathed into man's face. the body with the soul . Reply Obj. 24). and that afterwards the soul was infused into the formed body. But by these words is signified the plurality of the Divine Person. We must not imagine that w'hen God said Let us make man. what goes before for the soul is the form of the body. as some were perverse enough to think. But this xiii. on account of the senses which are there expressed. deliberation with the perfection of the production of things. Reply Obj. must be understood of the production of and that the subsequent words. and not the soul on the body. Receive ye the Holy Ghost (Jo. He breathed into we read his face the breath of life. since each is a part of human nature. 91. are a sort of exposition of . 5). by breath of life we must understand the soul. as Augustine says {De Civ. Therefore. Yet in describing man's production. 22). 5. xv. that God should have made either the body without the soul. xx. life Reply Obj.

was not made before the sixth day but on the sixth day both the soul of the first . . 91. man was made I- 4 18 . 34). But other doctors hold that on the sixth day both body and soul of man were actually made. 4 iv. which he holds to have been made with the angels. Art. the works of the six days were done all at one time wherefore according to him man's soul.273 PRODUCTION OF MAN'S BODY Q. actually. and his body in its causal elements.

) We must next consider the production of the woman. 2. But . But . Therefore woman should not have been made in the first production of things before sin. Obj. there is no inequality. THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN. For the Philosopher says {De Gener. It would seem that the woman should not have been made in the first production of things.QUESTION (In XCII. tive should have been in the first production of things. 16). Further. that the female But nothing misbegotten or defecis a misbegotten male. whether the woman should have been made first production of things? in the proceed thus to the First Article: Objection i. ad lit. woman is naturally of less strength and dignity than man for the agent is always more honourable than the patient. ii. xii. subjection and limitation were a result of sin. 16) Thou shall be under the man's power. Four Articles. 3. Further. Obj. this : head there are four points of inquiry (i) should have been made in that first production of things? (2) Whether the woman should have been made from man? (3) Whether of man's rib? (4) Whether the Under Whether the woman woman was made immediately by God ? First Article. Animal. iii. and Gregory says : that. Therefore We — woman should not have been made at that first production. 3). for to the woman was it said after sin (Gen. Where there is no s/«. as Augustine says (Gen. occasions of sin should be cut 274 off.

principally union with the female in perfect animals. let us make him a helper . as some say. . 92- Art. Wherefore we observe that in . but time of coition so that we may consider that by the at only male and female are one.275 PRODUCTION OF WOMAN Q. Therefore And it was said directly after the formation of woman. although in in some cases one some the other. and the passive power And as among animals there is a vital to the female. to which their male sex the is not found therefore directed. It was necessary for woman to be made. as a helper to man not. I answer that. This can be made observe the mode of generation carried out in work various living things. : It is not good like to himself. for the active force in the male . indeed. Therefore He should not have made woman. as a helper in the clear if we of generation. As regards the individual nature. It is written (Gen. and of them But man is yet further ordered to a still nobler vital action. ii. : Reply Obj. since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in other works but . as a helpmate in other works. God sin to On the contrary. as the Scripture says. such as some plants and animals by the influence of the heavenly bodies. is defective i. woman and misbegotten. are always united preponderates. Some living things do not possess in themselves the power of generation. although they are carnally united for generation. i foresaw that the woman would be an occasion of man. but are generated by some other specific agent. Therefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two forces in man so that the female should be produced separately from the male . and that is intellectual operation. these the active power of generation invariably accompanies the passive power. Among perfect animals the active power of generation belongs to the male sex. 24). 18) for man to be alone. . as in plants they the means this in continual . as we see funcvital which are generated from seed for the noblest tion in plants is generation. ii. life is operation nobler than generation. they shall be two iti one flesh (Gen. from some fitting others possess the active and matter and not from seed : in plants passive generative power together.

Reply Obj. Nor is inequality men excluded the state of innocence. as we shall among by prove (Q. XCVI. For good order would have been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others wiser than themselves. On the other hand. or indisposi- even from some external influence. the universe would have been imperfect. but is included in nature's intention as directed to the work of generation. A. Reply Obj. Second Article. such as that of a south wind. and this kind of subjection began after sin. whereby the superior makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good. by which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit. 2).Q. whether woman should have been made from man? proceed thus to the Second Article : Objection i. 2. in producing nature. 3. If God had deprived the world of all those things which proved an occasion of sin. For sex belongs both to man and We — . 3 THE . It would seem that woman should not have been made from man. and this kind of subjection existed even before sin. which is moist. as regards nature in general. Art. " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " some material 276 seed tends to the production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex while the production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from tion. because in man virtue of the discretion of reason predominates. Subjection is twofold. 3).. Nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in order that individual evil might be avoided especially as God is so powerful that He can . woman is not misbegotten. Animal. Therefore. So by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally subject to man. One is servile. There is another kind of subjection. direct any evil to a good end. 92. Now the general intention of nature depends on human God. iv. which is called economic or civil. as the Philosopher observes (De Gener. God formed not only the male but also the female. Who is the universal Author of nature.

Therefore woman should not have been made from man. woman. so the first man. wherefore a man shall leave father and mother. out of man. as the Philosopher 12). knowing her to be fashioned from himself. When all things were first formed. Fourthly. in order thus to give the first man a certain dignity consisting in this. that is. Further. 92 Art. are debarred from intermarriage. in which the male and female live together for life which is not the case . : On the contrary. Further. a helpmate like to himself. as out of her principle. and in which the man is the head of the woman. that as God is the principle of the whole universe. with other animals. It is written (Ecclus. xvii. 23. Oh]. / answer that. should have been made of the same. ii. it was more suitable for the woman to be made from the man than (for the female to be from the male) in other animals. was the principle of the whole human race. united. viii. Wherefore it was suitable for the woman to be made out of man. as is written (Lev. and not from 3. But male and female are of the same species. Oh). says {Ethic. but also for the purpose of domestic life. and cleave to her more closely. so woman man. Hence it is written (Gen. But in the other animals the female was not made from the male. 26). Wherefore Paul says that God made the whole human race from one (Acts xvii. . as man was made of the slime of the earth. same 2. that man might love woman all the more. 24) She was taken out of man. and shall cleave to his wife. xviii. a animals. because. the human male and female are or her particular duty. 5) He created oj him. things of the same species are of the matter. as with other animals. Therefore. not only for generation. in which each has his Thirdly. in likeness to God. 6). This was : most necessary as regards the human race.i^^ PRODUCTION OF WOMAN Q. But close relationship makes a person unfit for that office hence near relations . that is. Secondly. woman was made to be a helpmate to man in the work of generation. First. Therefore neither should it have been so with man.

than man's — because.0. 1 is clear from the foregoing. Art. but I speak in Christ and in the Church.92. Wherefore from determinate produces something in a determinate species. rather than out of the rib by {Gen. rarefaction. For the rib was much smaller than the woman's body. Wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. this signified that the Church takes her origin from Christ. being infinite. was not produced from man by natural Wherefore generation. . but by the Divine Power alone. Eve is not called the daughter ment does not prove. of Adam. Reply Obj. and since it is determined to one thing. Woman. and A this certain is affinity arises to from natural an impediment matrimony. ad lit. —or was added. man. it has also a determinate mode of proceeding. v. 32) This is a great sacrament . not in the proportion of a rib to rib of Eve's body. 3. Matter is that from which something is made. and a woman from a matter it the other hand. such as a man from the slime of the earth. whether the woman was rib of fittingly made from the man? proceed thus to the Third Article : Objection 1. On the Divine Power. however. 2. and so this argu- Third Article. Therefore Eve was not formed from a Adam. generation. Now from a smaller thing a larger thing can be made only either by addition (and then the woman ought to have been described as made We — — out of that which itself) . as Augustine says A body cannot increase in bulk except by x. Reply Obj. Reply Obj. It would seem that the woman should not have been formed from the rib of man.) But the woman's body is not more rarefied rarefaction. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " For by : 278 is there is a sacramental reason for this. can produce things of the same species out of any matter. : at least. Now created nature has a determinate principle.

is both because matter. On rib. 92- Art. For such an increase of matter would either be by a change of the very substance of the matter itself. ii. unless it rarefaction. it. Further. and so she was not made from his head. To say. that Eve might be made from it. for the sacramental signification. But this is quite impossible. I answer that. itself. without being rarefied. which is for the same matter to receive greater dimensions. Reply Obj. Q. Not by change of the substance of the matter. and because quantity and size are extraneous to Wherefore multiplication 'of the essence of matter itself. a rib cannot be removed from man without pain.). considered in has a potential existence. Obj. since it has nothing but the nature of remains the same without anything added to This implies receives greater dimensions. matter is quite unintelligible.279 PRODUCTION OF WOMAN 2. Further. 3 Obj. Some say that the woman's body was formed by a material increase. is . So. as long as the matter itself quite unchangeable. there was nothing superfluous. iv. that the same matter is enlarged. therefore. or by a change of its dimensions. which is unreasonable to suppose. First. It is written (Gen. to signify the social union of man and woman. 1. 3. It was right for the woman to be made from a rib of man. 22) : God built the which He took from Adani. Secondly. without anything being added. nor was it right for her to be subject to man's contempt as his slave. for from the side of Christ sleeping on the Cross the Sacraments flowed namelv. in those things which were first created Therefore a rib of Adam belonged to the integrity of his body. his body remained imperfect. the contrary. for the woman should neither use authority over man. into a woman. if a rib was removed. in the same way as our Lord multiplied the five loaves. and a subject. Therefore it was not right for a rib to be taken from the man. and so she was not made from his feet. blood and water on which the Church was — — established. as the Philosopher says (Phys. But there was no pain before sin.

— Nevertheless..Q. as no rarefaction is apparent in such multiplication of matter. It would seem that the We — woman was not formed immediately by God. God. by con: — Hence Augustine says {Tract. Obj. whether the woman was formed immediately BY GOD? proceed thus to the Fourth Article: Objection i. because an addition was made 2. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 280 combine contradictories viz. Therefore she was not made imof the same species. in Joan. therefore. iii. which is more probable. released Much Fourth Article. not as an individual. to 92. Reply Obj. and not immediately bv God.. by transformation of the nourishment. . the Divine power the body of the woman should be produced from the man's rib. Therefore it was made through the ministry of the angels. of . we must admit an addition of matter either by creation or. For no individual is produced immediately by God from another individual alike But the woman was made from a man who is in species. Wherefore. the definition with the absence of the thing defined. version. Augustine {De Trin. but as the principle of the human race just as the semen belongs to the perfection of the begetter. or that woman was made from the rib. in the same "way as from a few seeds He produces the harvest of corn that is. Art. xxiv. The belonged to the integral perfection Adam. But the woman's body was formed from corporeal matter. From this it is clear how to answer the third objection. to the already existing matter of the rib loaves and of the rib. 4) says that corporeal things are governed by God through the angels. we say that the crowds were fed with five loaves. mediately by Further. was it possible that by operation.) that Christ filled five thousand men with five loaves. and is by a natural and pleasurable more. 2.

as Augustine says (Gen. in the same work : God form alone. Q. by natural generation. Now the matter of whence man naturally begotten is the human semen man or woman. ad it was not produced immediately by God. As Augustine says (ibid. As Augustine says {Gen. 2. Further. i. could rib. But the woman's body was produced in its causal virtues the among lit. first ix. 92- Art. Therefore the body of the woman did indeed pre-exist in not as these causal virtues. Therefore God alone could ordinary the earth.28ii PRODUCTION OF WOMAN 3. 4 in Obj. On the contrary. those things which pre-exist creatures as to their causal virtues are produced by power of some creature. 15). Wherefore from any other matter an individual of the human species cannot Now God alone. but it is certain that. Reply Obj. all nature owes the its existence. the Author of naturally be generated. 18) The first : creation of things did not demand that woman should be made thus. Therefore created works. 3. as the body of man was not formed by the angels from the slime of the earth. the 15). an effect into existence outside the can nature. it made it possible for her to be thus made. is generation of every species 2. or a either a man from slime of the produce woman from vidual is the rib of man. to or build up the I Whom that. from that which the same species. the natural from some determinate matter. . ad lit. passive in relation to the active potentiality of the Creator. so neither was the body of the woman formed them from the man's rib. Reply Obj. and riot immediately by God. ix. Augustine says. ad 2). in the things first created a but active as potentiality. is like it in This argument is verified when an indibegotten. woman from As was is man's answer said above (A. regards potentiality regards . by Reply Obj. produce course of nature. we do not know whether the angels were employed by God in the formation of the woman .

QUESTION {In XCIII. whether the image of god is in man ? proceed thus to the First Article: Objection i. Synod. Ancyr. Nine Articles. of is the image of the invisible God. of the First-Begotten. Persons. Hilary says i.*) that an • Super can. 3. Therefore the image of God is not : Whom Who to be found in man. There are under this head nine points of inquiry (i) Whether the image of God is in man? (2) Whether the image of God is in irrational creatures ? (3) Whether the image of God is in the angels more than in man ? (4) Whether the image of God is in every man ? (5) Whether the : We image (6) of God all is in man by comparison or with the Divine with the Essence. For it is written (Isa. Further. 282 . xl. or with one of them ? Whether the image of God is in man. It would seem that the image of in We — God is not To whom have you likened God? or what image ivill you make for Him? Obj. as to his mind only? (7) Whether the image of God is in man's power or in his habits and acts ? (8) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with every object ? (9) Of the difference between image and likeness. Obj. inasmuch as he is said to be made to the image and likeness of God. Further. the Firsti.) now treat of the end or term of man's production. 18) : the Apostle says (Col. THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN. First Article. 2. to be the image of God is the property man. 15) Born of every creature. (De Synod.

But equality does not belong to the essence of an image Where there is an image for. Where an image exists. for in a perfect image nothing is wanting it is that is to be found in that of which it is a copy. to is but where there likeiiess. — from something else. an egg. On the contrary. there is image Now manifest that in man there is some likeness to from God as from an exemplar. that it is copied image is so called because . for such an exemplar infinitely excels Therefore there is God. i. in man a likeness to God . Yet this is of the essence of a perfect image . however much like and equal to another egg. a perfect likeness. . . is not called an image of the other egg. and wiited likeness of one thing adequately representing another. answer that. as Augustine says {ihid. there forthwith is likeness . as we see in a person's reflected in a glass. reflecting perfectly that of which He is the . there is not necessarily an image. i image is of the same species as and he also says that an image is which the U7idivided represents . Hence it is clear that likeness is essential to an image and that an image adds something to likeness . : Reply Obj. As Augustine says (QQ. 2.) namely. Therefore he says pointedly Him? But made a God make spiritual image to for you Himself in man. the preposition to signifies a certain approach. 1 The Prophet speaks of bodily images made What image ivill by man. as of something at a distance. indeed. same when it says that man was And made to Scripture implies the God's likeness for . But there is no species common to both God and man nor can there be a comparison of equahty between God and man. It is written (Gen. for instance. 26) Let : man I 74) : Us make Our own image and likeness. but imperfect. copied likeness is not one its copy. LXXXIII. because it is not copied from it. For an it is produced as an imitation of something else. Reply Obj. not. qu..283 PRODUCTION OF MAN that Qit 93- Art. : not necessarily equality. yet this of equality. Therefore there can be no image of God in man. wherefore. The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image of God.

the nearer to the nature of an image. and so He is said to be the Image. or generically. who man is of the same nature as himself : whereas it exists in as in an alien nature. as the image of the king is in a silver coin. it 2. Nom. We — Nom. or like said to be the one. It would seem that the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures.. And since the perfect Hkeness to God cannot be except in an identical nature. xcvi. Therefore the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures. ii. the ness. 93- Art. and never to the image. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 284 Image. the more distinct a likeness is. ix. approaches Further. But Dionysius says (Div. to Him . Obj.Q. Further. 3. but also of irra- tional creatures. the more it is like more perfect anything is in goodGod. . For Dionysius says (Div. Reply Obj. the image of God.) similitude to the Divine goodness.) But God is : Effects are contingent images of their causes. al. but also according to a certain analogy or proportion. the cause not only of rational. a Now a thing species is said to be one not only numerically. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness than man . As unity means absence same as far as it is of division. whether the image of god is to be found in irrational creatures? proceed thus to the Second Article : Objection i. specifically. but when Hilary says is of a thing represents another. iv. In this sense a creature is one with God. the Image of God exists in His first-born Son as the image of the king is in his son. for though each indi- . this to which adequately be understood of a perfect image. that the solar ray has a very great Therefore it is made to Obj. But man is said to be both image by reason of the likeness. is 3. as Augustine explains in De decern Chordis {Serm. and to the image by reason of the imperfect likeness. Second Article. De Tempore).

12) : made him to His own image by giving him an intellectual soul. 51). Boethius {De Consol. Nor. the world iji His mind. It is clear. / answer that. and forming it into His Therefore the whole world is to the image of God. God's image. though from man it may originate. ad Man's excellence consists in the fact that God On vi. we speak specific accident. Whence shape Hilary . and not only the the contrary. lit. Obj. not even what is copied from something else. Therefore the whole universe image of God. because they live and thirdly because they know or understand . so far as it possesses any sort of like- . which raises him above the beasts of the field. : . so near to God in likeness.285 vidual ^hing PRODUCTION OF MAN is Q. for whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. rational creature. in some thus. things together are called very is to the Further. 4. . Therefore things w-ithout intellect are not made to God's image. as Augustine says (QQ. at least. and not only man. 2 good. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image. i. properly speaking. iii. merely . Not every likeness.) says of God : Holding image. that comes nothing creatures intellectual alone. cannot be called man's image. qu. . therefore. are made to and these . or existing by virtue of some common accident. this does not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. says pointedly that an image is of the same species. 93- Art. For instance. is sufficient to make an image for if the likeness be only generic. 31). Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate difference. Augustine says (Gen. if anything is made white like something else. But some things are like to God first and most commonly because they exist secondly. But the nature of an image requires likeness in species thus the image of the king exists in his son or. Everything imperfect is a participation of what is perfect. and chiefly in the of a man's image in copper. because of the generic likeness. a worm. Reply Obj. LXXXIII. last. can we say that it is the image of that thing. that among all creatures approach nearer to Him. all good (Gen. i.

Q.) that God granted to no other creature besides man to be to His image. The universe is more perfect in goodness intellectual creature as regards extension and but intensively and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is found rather in the intellectual Or creature. . its causality not as regards its natural involved in the idea of an image. and as intelligent. as living. 93- Art. 2. all like to the First Life things. as regards is than the . Thus every creature an image of the exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. are like to the First Being. that effects are contitigent images as much as they happen {contingit) Reply Oh]. For Augustine says in a sermon de Imagine xliii. Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine . goodness. like to the Supreme . participates in the nature of an image. {de verbis Apost. Boethius here uses the word image to express the likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species in the mind of the artist. 4. as being. however. but only against another part. So Dionysius says of their causes. that is. to Reply Obj. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " some degree 286 ness to God. when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of God. that is. but not absolutely. to be so. Therefore it is not true to say that the angels are We — more than man to the image of God. It would seem that the angels are not more to the image of God than man is. xxvii. 3. using the word itnage in this sense but as it implies a likeness in nature. whether the angels are more to the image of god than man is? proceed thus to the Third Article: Objection i. inasmuch as is We are . but that the other parts are excluded. diffusion else we may say that a part is not rightly divided against the whole. dignity which Reply Obj. we do not mean that the universe in any part is not God's image. which has a capacity for the highest good. Wherefore. Third Article. not. Wisdom.

. but that man is. is more perfect in the angels than in man. LVIII. which is in the intellectual nature. But a creature is called akin to God. Obj. Gregory says {Horn. Further. 3. in every part. Therefore. in Evang. we must grant to the that. that is. unless we presuppose the first likeness.) " " seal of resemblance is called a (Ezech. LXXXIII. according to Augustine (QQ. is so much to God's image that God did not qu. of God image because their Intellectual nature is more perfect. Reply Obj. We may speak in it of ways. the is. some respects man is image more of God than man like to God. Q. the intellectual nature.Art. as God is in regard to the whole world.93. as God from God and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body. But these do in that . not of themselves belong to the nature of the Divine image in man. A. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God than man. First. Secondly. man fore nothing is more akin it to is Him. as in their intel- lectual nature. since it is a substance. In these and the like things the image of God is more perfect in man than it is in the angels. Therefore the God's image so far as angels are not more to the image of God than man. 0. we may consider that in God's image in two which the image Thus the chiefly consists. On 12) The angel the contrary. the angels are more to the image of God speaking. so far as to observe man a certain imitation of God. as is clear from what has been said (Q. 3. : because in him the resemblance of the Divine image •wrought with greater expression. 8). But the intellectual . LXXIX..287 PRODUCTION OF MAN 2. consisting in the fact man proceeds from man. A. we may consider the image of God in man as regards its accidental qualities. . xxviii. make any creature to be between Him and man: and there- Obj. 3 Further. 51). nature does not admit of intensity or remissness for it is not an accidental thing.xxx'iv. Augustine excludes the inferior creatures . and again. otherwise even brute animals would be than in to God's image. a creature is said to be to God's image so far as it is of an intellectual nature. I is answer that. absolutely angels are more i.

Therefore he loses the image of God. : Obj. 288 bereft of reason from the image of 2. but woman is the image (Vulg. Reply Obj. 93- Art. that a species of substance is shared viduals in a greater or lesser degree. When we say that substance does not admit of more or less.. while. is written (Ps. i). Further. 3. 29) Whofu God foreknew. . He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son. among different indi- Fourth Article. But by sin man becomes unlike God. we do not mean that one species of substance is not more perfect than another but that one and the same individual does not participate in its specific nature at one time more than at another nor do we mean . clear that every individual not an image of God. Further. It would seem that the image of found in the Fourth Article: — God is not every man. because as generic and intelhad said previously. Obj. For the Apostle says that man is the image of God. Therefore all men have not the conformity of image. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " God . xi. 2. As fire is said to be specifically the most subtle of bodies. Therefore.Q. the Apostle says (Rom. whether the image of god is found in every man? We proceed thus to Objection i. Augustine soul in its things wliich have knoii'ledge. like to God than the human lectual nature. Reply Obj. Wherefore this does not mean that the angels are not more to God's image. as above explained (A. But all men are not predestinated. xxxviii. glory) of man (i Cor. likeness belongs to the nature of the image. nevertheless. 3. one kind of fire is more subtle than another so we say that nothing is more . are so near to Him in likeness that of all creatures none are nearer. 7) : Surely man . 7). as it is woman is an individual is of the human species. viii. but not the angels. On the contrary. it passeth as an image.

The image of God. perfectly and Thirdly. iii. 27). of creation. Reply Obj. man actually or habitually . Male and female He created them (Gen. found in man. the gloss distinguishes a threefold image. but woman is the glory of image his reason for saying this For man is not of adds he man. i. 7). ad lit. lest it should be thought that both sexes were united in one indiBut in a secondary sense the image of God is vidual. consisting in the conformity of grace and glory. it is added. and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the which is common to all men.4 19 . image consists in the conformity of inasmuch as man knows and loves God this and this image consists in the likeness of glory. for man. the So when the Apostle had said that ma7i is and glory of God. 2 and 3. is found both in man and in woman. Hence after the words. iv. The light of Thy countenance. of man. Moreover it is said them in the Augustine {Gen. . : 1. the third only in the blessed. Secondly. the second only in the just. O Lord. possesses a natural aptitude for God. To the image of God He created him. knows and loves God. The first is found in all men. as : every creature. These reasons refer to the image Reply Objs. 22) remarks. of re-creation. though imperfectly grace. as God is the beginning and end of plural. is signed upon us (Ps. Wherefore on the words. in its principal signification. and not in woman for man is the beginning and end of woman. and man was not created for woman but woman. and of likeness. best he can in which like God according to that Since is man said to be to the perfectly imitate God in his intellectual nature.289 I PRODUCTION OF MAN answer that. inasmuch as inasmuch as man understanding and loving First. Wherefore we see that the image of God is in man in three ways. namely the intellectual nature. i. woman but •woman. Q 93- Art. Now the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this. 4 image of the most he is God by reason of his intellectual nature. that God understands and loves Himself. mind.

but the unity of the Essence. ii. De Fide ad Petruvi.) also asserts that. Obj. if in man there were an image of of the . And Hilary {De Trin.) to image made Man is to the image of that which is common £ays essence is the : in the Trinity. Further. Dogmat. A. I). xvi. Three Persons.) that the be referred to eternity. Therefore. when Scripture the image of God. it is an image leads to the knowledge of that which image the image. vi. Now all these things belong more to the unity of the Essence than to the distinction of the Persons.. Further. the name of Image is not applicable to . it is is image of God in man to said {De Eccl. For Augustine says (Fulgentius. since of man the man can know himself by his natural reason. 93.Therefore. (Q. Further.'Art. v. Opificio. It would seem that the image of God does not exist in man as to the Trinity of Persons. as was shown above . 12) that the image of God in man belongs to him as an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 290 Fifth Article. Obj. 2. i. it follows that by his natural knowledge man could know the Trinity of the Divine Persons which is untrue. Orth. whether the image of god is in man according to the trinity of persons? proceed thus to the Fifth Article: Objection i. Therefore the image of God in man is of the Divine Essence.) One in : We — Godhead of the Holy Trinity . 4.Q. and one is the which man was made. but only to the Son for Augusany tine says {De Trin. if there is in God as to the Trinity of Persons. it means that participator of all good: for the Godhead is the fulness of goodness. XXXn. Gregory of Nyssa {De Hotnin. Damas- cene also says {De Fid. and not of the Trinity of Persons. says that man was human nature was made to made a Therefore the image of God in regards. not the Trinity of Persons. of 3. 2) that the Son alone is the image of the Father. man Obj.

Some have said that in man there is an image of the Son only. it is written. 93KRT. 6). . This argument would avail if the image of Reply Obj. . : but rather one follows from the other. therefore. Secondly. tinction of the Divine Persons Now animated things being produced in one and way.) : The the fact that plurality of the Divine Persons is proved from man is said to have been made to the image of God. there is a great difference between the trinity within ourselves and the Divine see. the mode of origin is of relations origin. On the contrary. in each but in all not the same thing is adapted to things. that he is made to the likeness of the Father. 5. for also in God Himself there is one Nature in Three Persons. 6). the disis only according to origin. 2). but only of the Son. xii. iv. Therefore. I answer that. of God. both as the there exists in man that image say We regards the Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of Persons. disthat the is manifest it plants in another. believe. Thus it is clear as Augustine says {De Trin. When. God in man represented God in a perfect manner. how to solve the first two objections. must. Reply Obj. xv. but to Thy image. because if man were made only to the image of the Son. therefore. rather than Trinity. But. because as the Son is like to the Father by a likeness of essence. as we have seen (Q. s God as regards the Person. Hilary says {De Trin. it would follow of necessity Son. this would not be an image ol the Trinity. rather.291 PRODUCTION OF MAN Q. First. 3. Let Us make man to Our own image and likeif man were made in likeness to the ness . animals in one way. XL. the trinity which rather than see that God is i^i is ourselves whereas we believe Trinity. Wherefore Divine the to is suitable Persons tinction of the Divine Nature and therefore to be to the image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does not exclude being to the same image by the representation of the Divine Persons the nature thereof .. and inanimate in another. as he there says : We . A. Augustine rejects this opinion (De Trin. or. 4. the Father would not have said.

this can be understood in two ways first. 4. according to Augustine (Gen. to the image of God He created him. . Therefore the image of God is to be observed not . 3. i. 24) there is . as when we say. Obj. Who is it. Thus the image of God is the very Essence of God. Essence is called an image because thereby one Person is imitates another. or imaginary. Obj. 2. male and female He created them. and not only in his mind. Therefore the image of God is to be seen in man's body also. of the whole Trinity. This hook is made (like) to that make man one. if in the intel7. Secondly. xi. 6 THE to the " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 292 He made him Father made man to the image of God. 7) that the man is the image of God. spiritual. Therefore. It would seem that the image of God is not only in man's mind. Further. and then the sense is. Sixth Article. the shape of a thing. only in his mind. an image seems to apply principally to But shape belongs to the body. the Divine put for the exemplar.Q 93- Art. Let Us : man When in such a way that Our image may he in him. corporeal. Therefore the image of God is also in the body. it is written (Gen. Obj. so that this preposition to points to the term of the making. Further. and not only in the mind. it is said that God m. the sense is not that the image of the Son only. Which is incorrectly called an image forasmuch as image Or.ade man to His image. xii. this preposition to may point to the exemplar cause. But man is not only mind. 27) : God created His oiini image. whether the image of god is in man as regards the mind only? proceed thus to the Sixth Article: Ohjection i. as some say. Further. man to a threefold vision in us. For the Apostle says (i Cor. But the distinction of male and female is in the body. and intellectual. God. as some explained but that the Divine Trinity made to Its image. ad lit. that is. We — .

293

PRODUCTION OF MAN

Q.

93-

Art. 6

lectual vision that

belongs to the mind there exists in us a we are made to the image of trinity by reason of which God, for the liiie reason there must be another trinity in the
the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. iv. 23, 24): Be reneived in the spirit of your viind, and put on the neiv man. Whence we are given to understand that our renewal

others.

On

which consists in putting on the new man, belongs to the mind. Now, he says (Col. iii. 10) Putting on the lu-a.' man him who is renewed unto knowledge of God, according to the image of Him that created him, where the renewal which consists in putting on the new man is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore to be to the image of God belongs to
:

;

the
/

mind

only.
that.

answer

While

in all

creatures there

is

some kind

of

God, image as we have explained above (AA. i, 2); whereas in other creatures we find a likeness by way of a Now the intellect or mind is that whereby the trace. rational creature excels other creatures wherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind; while in the other parts, which the rational
likeness of
;

likeness to

in the rational creature

alone

we

find a

creature

to possess, we find the likeness of a such trace, as in other creatures to which, in reference to

may happen

likened. may easily parts, the rational creature can be understand the reason of this if we consider the way in

We

and the way in which an image, represents image represents something by likeness in anything. have said while a trace represents something as we species, in such a of an effect, which represents the cause by way For of likeness the as not to attain to imprints species. way which are left by the movements of animals are called traces: so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of
which a
trace,

An

;

the land a trace of a hostile army. Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and others, both as to the representation of the
likeness of the Divine Nature in creatures,

and

a.s

to the

representation in

them

of the uncreated Trinity.

For as

to

0.93- Art. 6

THE

"

SUMMA THEOLOGICA "

294

the likeness of the Divine Nature, rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only in being and life,

but also in intelligence, as above explained (A. 2); whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if

we

consider their disposition. Likewise, as the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of Love from both of these, as we have
seen (Q. XXVIIL, A. 3); so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there exists

an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and love but
;

we do

see in

them a

certain trace of the existence of these in

the Cause that produced them. For the fact that a creature has a modified and finite nature, proves that it proceeds from a principle; while its species points to the (mental)

word

idea of the architect

of the maker, just as the shape of a house points to the and order points to the maker's love
;

by reason

which he directs the effect to a good end as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So we find in man a likeness to God by way of an wiage in
of
;

his

mind

;

but in the other parts of his being by
i.

way

of a

trace.

Reply Obj.
he
is

Man
;

is

called the
;

image of God; not

that

essentially an image but that the image of God is impressed on his mind as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the king. Wherefore there is no need
to consider the

image of God as existing

in every part of

man.
says {De Trin. xii. 5), some that the image of God was not in man individually, but severally. They held that the man represents the Person of the Father; those born of man denote the

Reply Obj. have thought

2.

As Augustine

person of the Son; and that the woman is a third person in likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she so proceeded from man

295

PRODUCTION OF MAN
;

Q.

93.

Art. 6

as not to be his son or daughter. All of this is manifestly absurd first, because it would follow that the Holy Ghost

the principle of the Son, as the woman is the principle of the man's offspring; secondly, because one man would be only the image of one Person thirdly, because in that case
is
;

Scripture should not have mentioned the image of God in man until after the birth of the offspring. Therefore we
that when Scripture had said, to the image created him, it added, male and female He of created them, not to imply that the image of God came through the distinction of sex, but that the image of God

must understand

God He

belongs to both sexes, since

it

is

in the

mind, wherein there

Wherefore the Apostle (Col. iii. is no sexual distinction. that 10), after saying. According to the image of Him nor male created him, added. Where there is neither female*
(Vulg., neither Gentile nor Jew). Reply Obj. 3. Although the image of
to

God

in

man

is

not

be found
alone

in his

man

among
is

bodily shape, yet because the body of terrestrial animals is not inclined frone to
to

the ground, but

reason

and

look itpivard to heaven, for this that it is made to God's image rightly say bodies rather than the of other animals, as likeness,

adapted

we may

this is .Augustine remarks (QQ. LXXXIII.; qu. 51). But not to be understood as though the image of God were in man's body; but in the sense that the very shape of the

human body represents way of a trace.
Reply Obj.
4.

the

image

of

God
and

in the soul

by

Both

in

the corporeal

in the

imaginary

vision we may find a trinity, as Augustine says (De Trin. For in corporeal vision there is first the species of xi. 2). the exterior body; secondly, the act of vision, which occurs

by the impression on

the sight of a certain likeness of the said species; thirdly, the intention of the will applying the is seen. sight to see, and to rest on what Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species in the memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is

kept

caused by the penetrative power of the soul, that
• These words are
in reality

is,

the

from Gal.

iii.

28.

Q. 93 Art. 7

THE
find

"

SUMMA THEOLOGICA "
informed
intention
of

296

faculty of
thirdly,

we

together.

by the species; and the will joining both But each of these trinities falls short of the
imagination,
the
;

Divine image. For the species of the external body is extrinsic to the essence of the soul while the species in the memory, though not extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious to
it
;

and thus

in

both cases the species

falls

short of repre-

senting the connaturality and co-eternity of the Divine Persons. The corporeal vision, too, does not proceed only

from the species of the external body, but from this, and at same time from the sense of the seer in like manner imaginary vision is not from the species only which is preserved in the mem.ory, but also from the imagination. For these reasons the procession of the Son from the Father
the
;

alone

is not suitably represented. Lastly the intention of the will joining the two together, does not proceed from them either in corporeal or spiritual vision. Wherefore the

procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son is not thus properly represented.

Seventh Article.

whether the image of god

is to be found of the soul?

in

the acts

proceed thus to the Seventh Article: Objection i. It would seem that the image of God is not found in the acts of the soul. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi. 26), that man was made to God's image, inas77iuch
as we exist and know that we exist, and love this existence But to exist does not signify an act. and knowledge. Therefore the image of God is not to be found in the soul's
acts.
2. Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix. 4) assigns God's in the soul to these three image things mind, knowledge, and love. But mind does not signify an act, but rather the

We

Obj.

power or the essence of the intellectual soul. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts of the soul. Obj. 3. Further, Augustine {De Trin. x. 11) assigns the

297

PRODUCTION OF MAN

Q.

93.

Art. 7

image of the Trinity in tiie soul to meviory, understanding, and li'ill. But these three are natural powers of the soul, as the Master of the Sentences says (i Sent., D. iii.). Therefore the image of God is in the powers, and does not extend
to the acts of the soul.

Obj. 4. Further, the image of the Trinity always remains in the soul. But an act does not always remain. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts.
the contrary, Augustine {De Trin. xi. 2 seqq.) assigns the trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the

On

actual vision, whether sensible or imaginative. Therefore, man is like also, the trinity in the mind, by reason of which to God's image, must be referred to actual vision.
/ answer that, As above explained (A. 2), a certain representation of the species belongs to the nature of an image. Hence, if the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it where the soul approaches the

nearest to a representation of the species of the Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the
in

But Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting Both. our soul word cannot exist without actual thought, as

Augustine says (De Trin. xiv. 7). Therefore, first and to be found in the acts chiefly, the image of the Trinity is of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word;

and thence break

forth into love.

But, since the principles

and powers, and everything exists in its principle, therefore, secondarily and consevirtually quently, the image of the "Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, forasof acts are the habits

much
as
it

Reply Obj.
is
is

as the acts virtually exist therein. 1. Our being bears the image of

God

so far

to say. in so far as Therefore, this trinity is the

that

proper to us, and excels that of the other animals, we are endowed with a mind.
ix.

mentions (De Trin. knowledge, and love.

4),

same as that which Augustine and which consists in mind,

Q.

93- 'Art. 7

THE
2.

"

SUMMA THEOLOGICA "
also in a

298

Reply Obj.

existing in the

Augustine observed this trinity, first, as mind. But because the mind, though it
degree, yet way — namely, as being distinct from others
itself,
;

knows

itself entirely in itself
it

a certain

— proves De
were not
in

does not know (and thus also

searches

Trin. x. 3, 4)

as Augustine subsequently therefore, as though knowledge

equal proportion to mind, he takes three things

which are proper to the mind, namely, memory, understanding, and will which everyone is conscious of possessing; and assigns the image of the Trinity prein the soul
;

eminently to these three, as though the were in part deficient.

first

assignation
7),

Reply Obj.

3.

As Augustine proves (De
and

Trin. xiv.

we

may be

said to understand, will,

to love certain things,

both when we actually consider them, and when we do not think of them. When they are not under our actual consideration, they are objects of our memory only, which, in his opinion, is nothing else than habitual retention of

But since, as he says, a ivord cannot be there without actual thought {for we think everything that we say, even if we speak with that interior word belongthis image chiefly consists in memory, understanding, and will. And by understa7iding I mean here that whereby we understand with actual thought; and by will, love, or dilection I mean

knowledge and love.*

ing

to

no nation's tongue),

these three things,

that
is

which unites

this child

with

its

parent.

From which

it

clear that he places the image of the Divine Trinity more in actual understanding and will, than in these as existing
in

the habitual retention of the

memory

;

although even

thus the image of the Trinity exists in the soul in a certain degree, as he says in the same place. Thus it is clear that

memory, understanding, and
stated in the Sentences.

will are not three

powers as

Reply Obj. 4. Someone might answer by referring to Augustine's statement (De Trin. xiv. 6), that the mind ever remembers itself, ever understands itself, ever loves itself ; which some take to mean that the soul ever actually under-

299

PRODUCTION OF MAN

Q. 03. Art. 8

But he excludes this interpretastands, and loves itself. tion by adding that it docs not always think of itself as actually distinct from other things. Thus it is clear that the
soul always understands

and loves
itself

itself,

not actually but

habitually; though

we might say
it

own

act,

it

understands
is

by perceiving its whenever it understands

that

not always actually understandanything. of as in the case sleep, we must say that these acts, ing, not always actually existing, yet ever exist in their although

But since

principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore, Augustine the says {De Trin. xiv. 4) : // the rational soul is made to

image of God in the sense that it can make use of reason and intellect to understand and consider God, then the image of God was in the soul from the beginning of its
existence.

Eighth Article.

whether the image of the divine trinity is in the soul only by comparison with god as its object?
proceed thus to the Eighth Article: Objection i. It would seem that the image of the Divine God as Trinity is in the soul not only by comparison with is to be Divine the For the image of its object. Trinity the as found in the soul, as shown above (A. 7), according from both. love word in us proceeds from the speaker; and But this is to be found in us as regards any object. Thereof the Divine Trinity is in our mind as fore the

We

image

regards any object. xii. 4) that Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says {De Trin. whole of in the it seek ive in the seek ive ivhen soul, trinity in the reasoning the soul, without separating process of eternal. consideration the of things temporal matters from

Therefore the image of the Trinity is to be found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects. that we can know and love Obj. 3. Further, it is by grace the Trinity is found in the of therefore, the image God.
If,

soul

by reason

of the

memory, understanding, and

will or

or possesses a nature that enables it to turn to God. answer means a need likeness attains to a As above explained (AA. love of God. for instance. 18) : We . Now the mind may turn towards an object in two ways directly and immediately. and understands itself . are transformed into the things are same image from glory to glory. written (2 Cor. are distinguished from each other according to the procession of the word from the speaker. Further. 93- Art. Hence we refer the Divine image of in man to the verbal concept born of the knowledge the image of turns to God. in respect of other objects. understand. however small. the saints in conformed it is to the heaven are most perfectly image of God by the beatific vision where. as. and love God by of / Whom God it was made. fore 4. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 300 grace. Augustine says {De Trin. But it is clear that diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love for in the human mind the species of a stone is specifically dif. But temporal known by the beatific vision. and to the love derived therefrom. by Obj. Therefore the : of God exists in us even according to temporal things. but can also remember. therefore. and Love proceeds from God according as He loves Himself. less. iii. 7). ferent from that of a horse. Wherefore we image to seek in the some of the Divine Trinity in the soul kind of representation of species of the Divine Per- Now the sons. as above stated (AA. 6. 12) The image of God exists in the mind. 7). Moreover tlie Word of God is born of God by the knowledge of Himself. xiv. when anyone sees a man reflected in a looking-glass he may be said to be turned towards that . Thus God is found in the soul according as the soul ately . representation of the species. and the procession of love from both. so far as this is possible to a creature. Divine Persons. or indirectly and medi: God. is the image in the soul.Q. while also the love regarding each of them is specifically different. image which in some degree. Much that. . . loves itself. the contrary. this image is not in man by nature but and thus is not common to all. 2. not because it has a re- image On membrance because it of itself.

In all the soul we may see a kind of trinity. LX. in which sense we have already said that the image 5). although a trinity may be found. not. Q. nevertheless.30I PRODUCTION OF MAN Q. This. as in those who have not the use of reason. A. XII. is concerned with temporal things. this is due to the fact. but that thereby it can furthermore turn God. LVI. Reply Obj. as appears from the authority quoted above (Arg. indeed.. 3. as almost to amount to nothing. 8). the contrary). namely. but it is also necessary to observe what proceeds and whence it proceeds. or .. Reply Obj. understands itself. 2. i. Q. not that the mind reflects on itself to absolutely. that what is Word of God proceeds from knowledge of God. is natural that the mind. but only the remembrance of faith. A. Yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love as seen above (Q. in order to understand God. A. Such is clearly the case with faith. and sometimes present only in memory even after they begin to exist in the soul. . that the 7nind remembers itself. 12 God can be in . s man. whereby temporal things are known are not always present but sometimes they are actually present. of God abides ever in the soul . On Reply Obj.. xiv. too. If we perceive this. God. as he adds But in that part of the reason which in the same passage. The meritorious knowledge and love of us only by grace. and loves itself. rightly called the image of God. not. as he says farther on forasmuch as this knowledge of temporal things is adventitious to the soul. any third thing should be required to make up the trinity. 93 Art. Moreover even the habits . as it were clouded. ive perceive a trinity. -whether this image of God be so obsolete. But but. 3. as though besides the action of temporal things and the contemplation of eternal things. For the notion of an image it is not enough that something proceed from another. however. can make use of reason. which comes to us temporally for this present life. So Augustine says (De Trin. while in the future life faith will no longer exist. yet the image of God is not to be seen there.

Therefore it is incorrectly said (ibid. D. 4. while the likeness is from innocence and righteousness. Therefore it is incorrect to say and . This is what Augustine means (ibid. or clear and beautiful.. xiv. xvi. Now. of grace and plained (A.). is : For genus is not properly not properly dislikeness is to image as LXXXHI. which two things intellect. 3. as in sinners. tinguished from species. " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 302 obscured and disfigured. the understanding. qu. 93- Art. 6). Therefore likeness is not properly to be distinguished from image. of glory.). where there is image. as above exrighteousness belong to in man is — Obj. ' threefold. whereas the image is in other things (2 Sent. Reply Obj. and the will. 74). 4. the nature of the image consists not only in the representation of the Divine Persons. to which representation belong immortality and indivisibility. But innocence and grace. are parts of the image. whether " likeness " is properly distinguished from "image"? proceed thus to the Ninth Article: Objection 1. whatever it sees it will see as tinchangeable .Q. Obj. forthwith there is likeness. when he says that in that nature to w/nc/i the mind will blissfully adhere. 4). F'urther. Further. 2. knowledge of truth belongs to the love of virtue to the will. So it is not true to say that the likeness is in the essence because it is immortal and itidivisible . Further. It would seem that likeness We — distinguished from image. Obj. but not conversely as Augustine says (QQ. By the vision of glory temporal things will be seen in God Himself.) that the image is taken from the memory. the image of God the image of nature. and such a vision of things temporal will belong to the image of God. genus to species because. for in the Uncreated Word are the types of all creatures. but also in the representation of the Divine Essence.. as in the just as Augustine says {De Trin. Ninth Article. 9 THE .

each single thing. qu. made some the in are opinion of body. and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than the intellectual properties. Now. Q. iv.' since. or even to the belonging to the soul's inferior faculties. and adapted good and the true. as signify- . wherein the image is pro- ways : first as its (QQ. so as subsequent to it. in it. In like manner. ruptible But likeness and incorruptible are may differences of universal beings. 93 Art. perly to be seen. 9 of truth. inasmuch as man is an individual good and. and compared to each individual thing both as its preamble. 51) that the spirit (namely. again. But the other parts of man. inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he is good. be considered in another way. both common to all. Did.LXXXIII. For the good is a preamble to man. the good is subsequent to man. as the good can be to virtue. what or unlike like is we say that an image it according as the representation is perfect or imperfect.) that the PRODUCTION OF MAN image consists in the the likeness in the love of virtue.) that the likeness of God is found in the soul's incorruptibility for cor. Thus likeness may be distinguished from image in two preamble and existing in more things. LXXXIIL. In this sense he says (De Quant.303 (ibid. the mind) made to the image of God. knowledge and 51) : On Some Augustine says (QQ. as signifying some perfection also in the same way there exists a kind of comparison between likeness and image. 15). again. I answer that. inasmuch as it is something preamble more general than image. just Wherefore. by reason of his perfect as the . of image. without doubt was qu. i) : and. In this sense it is stated .. as the Philosopher says {Metaph. the contrary. namely 'image' and 'likeness. since one is a transcendental. For as it inasmuch signifies a certain perfection it represents. it is v. as we have said above (A. one would have sufficed. for oneness in quality causes likeness. likeness to may be considered in the light of a image. may be considered as subsequent to image. to God's likeness. consider that these two were mentioned not without reason. if they meant the same. Likeness is a kind of unity. Animce ii.

and from another the term likeness. endowed with free-will and self-movement. indissolubility. Likeness not distinct from image in the . general notion of liketiess (for thus it is included in image) but so far as any likeness falls short of image. Love of the word. as virtue itself . Reply Obj. r. Nor is it unfitting to use the term image from one point of view. In the same sense likeness is said to belong to the love of virtue: for there is no virtue without love of virtue. 93. in their seeds. Orth. as far as this may be possible in man. The soul's essence belongs to the image. Reply Obj. 2. at least. such as simplicity and Reply Obj. is Reply Obj. loved. or again. 12) that the image implies an intelligent being. which is knowledge to the nature of image. by reason of which we may say that a natural likeness exists in the soul. as representing the Divine Essence in those things which belong to the intellectual nature.Art. In this sense Damascene says {De Fid. belongs to likeness. belongs 4. 3. Even certain virtues are natural to the soul. but not in those conditions subsequent to general notions of being. whereas likeness implies a likeness of power. ii. as it perfects the idea of image. but love of virtue belongs to likeness. 9 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 304 ing the expression and perfection of the image.Q.

first man . happy 7nust he gifted with the same tastes have been in Paradise. loc. as regards first there are two things to be considered : the Concerning of man as to his intellect. 10) how as now.) might 1. the angels be or deceived ? (4) Whether he could err First Article. whether the first man saw god through his essence ? proceed thus to the First Article: Objection i. Augustine says (De Civ. that place of ineffable happiness! Therefore the first man in Paradise saw God through His We — And : Essence. led a life of happiness in the enjoyall things. ment of If man was Augustine says {De Civ. But our good-will can obtain nothing better 2. Further. Dei xiv. ii. cit. that he could see (2) Whether he possessed all knowledge ? Whether ? (3) is.) We next consider the state or condition of the . established in Paradise. For man's happiness consists But the first man. while vision of the Divine Essence. : Under the first head there are four points of inquiry man saw the Essence of God? (i) Whether the first the separate substances. 4 305 2° . Obj. Orth. as Damascene says {De Fid. Dei xiv. (2) the con)i) The condition dition of man as to his will. OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT. It would seem that the first man saw God in the through His Essence. his soul secondly as regards his body. 1 1). (In Four Articles. first.QUESTION XCIV. his which good-will that the first man lacked nothing obtain.

Now the higher the creature is. The first man did not see God through His Essence if we consider the ordinary state of that life. as Adam did God through His Essence. On the contrary.). for eternity they can never sin. I THL " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " Therefore in 306 than the vision of the Divine Essence. and shuns unhappiness. since naturallv and necessarily he desires Wherefore no one who sees it. Thus in a sense his knowledge was midway between our knowledge in the present state. for an enigma impHes obscurity. that sin. D. and the knowledge we shall have in heaven. Further. when we see God through His Essence. Now. man cannot willingly be turned awav from beatitude. Nevertheless he knew God with a more perfect knowledge than we do now. 21). : when God reason itself. The Apostle says (i Cor.Q. 9). as Augustine says (De Trin. it is clear that he did not see Therefore. but that which is natural. 94- Art. is cast a deep sleep itpon Adam (Gen. and the more like it is to . / answer that. saw God through His Essence. man saw is Obj. we must consider that the vision of God through His Essence is contradistinguished from the vision of God through His creatures. the Essence of God can willingly turn away from God. since in the Divine Essence is beatitude the intellect of a man who sees the Divine Essence has the same relation to Now it is clear that God as a man has to beatitude. the vision of God His Essence whereby God is man in the state seen withoift a of medium or enigma.. But to see God through His Essence is most spiritual. which means to sin. i. 46) That was not first which is spiritual. perhaps. To make this clear. Therefore the first man in the primitive state of his natural life did not see God through His Essence. xv. God through His Essence. ii. The because. He also saw without an enigma. obscurity Therefore man in the primitive state resulted from sin. 3. as the Master of the Sentences asserts (4 Sent. xv. Hence all who see God through His Essence are so firmly established in the love of God. But innocence saw God immediately. it be said that he saw God in a vision. unless.

as. perhaps God used to speak to the first man as He speaks to the angels. Hence Augustine says (Gen.'Art. promised Reply Obj. Reply Obj.. is it written (Eccles. endowed with a life of happiness in a certain measure. because he by and occupied with sensible things. Therefore.^) that. at the same time. 3. 18). Wherefore the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear and steady contemplation of the intelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first truth. He was. 30) right : God made man right. vii. Reply Obj. man knew God then more clearly than we know Him now. which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. a man is seen through a mirror. the more clearly is God seen in it for instance. one through which. ad lit. A good will is a well-ordered will . 94. as Augustine says (ibid. and. And man was made by God in this sense. Q. however.307 INTELLECT OF FIRST MAN . whether by a natural or by a gratuitous knowledge. Thus God is seen in a much more perfect manner through His intelligible effects than through those which are only sensible or corporeal. had he what had been him as a reward. and the higher nature was made so as not to be impeded by the lower. i God. Man was happy in Paradise. through these intelligible effects of God. wished 2. 3. something to seen. but the will of the first to have. Now. a man is seen more clearly through a mirror in which his image is the more clearly expressed. xi. A medium (of knowledge) is twofold. yet without bestowing on him the experience of which the angels are capable in the participation of the Divine Essence. so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfection. but not with that perfect happiness to which he was destined. But in his present state man is impeded as regards the full and distracted is clear consideration of intelligible creatures. and is seen with the mirror another kind of medium is is : that whereby we attain to the knowledge of something . by shedding on his mind a ray of the unchangeable truth. man would have been ill-ordered while in the state of merit. for example. in which. that in him the lower powers were subjected to the higher. i.

Second Article. and thus Adam saw God a created effect : in an enigma. one separate substance knows another . as above explained (Q. Obj. : We — in the state of For innocence. Further. obscurity the consideration of intelligible things by being preoccupied he saw Him in with sensible things. 15. It would seem that Adam.Art. God second kind of medium. such as was seen without in a demonstration. Wherefore the separate soul can see separate substances. such as we need since he knew God this . tomed to enjoy the words of God . as is written Wisdom ix. Again. but not without the first kind. Further. 2. effects. A. Therefore he was able Obj.94. simultaneously in His effects. we must remark that the obscurity which is implied in the word enigma may be of two kinds first. saw the angels through their essence. we may take as an effect of so far as man is impeded in sin. whether adam in the state of innocence saw the angels through their essence? proceed thus to the Second Article : Objection i. For there was no need for the first man to attain to the knowledge of God by demonstration drawn from an effect. But the body of the first man was not a load upon his soul. LXXXIX. to see separate substances. because secondly. 3. so far as every creature is something obscure when compared with the immensity of the Divine : light . for the latter was not corruptible. in which sense in Adam did not see God an enigma.. especially in the intelligible according to His capacity. iv. 2 THE " the SUMMA THEOLOGICA " medium 308 unknown.0. and by purity of heart and loftiness of vision to have the company of the good angels. the soul in the present state is impeded from the knowledge of separate substances by union with a corruptible body which is a load upon the soul. 2). In Paradise man was accusi) Gregory says {Dialog.

in virtue of this mode of understanding. iv. hindering it in no way. from a diversity of mode nature as ours. But he was endowed — with integrity as to this life. soul is adapted to perfect the that since i) Q. exterior things to concentrate its powers on itself. / answer that. The state of the human soul may be disin tinguished in two ways. it should have that mode of understanding which this is by turning to phantasms. regards LXXXIV. A. i. Nom. 7. the contrary. namely the angels.). Wherefore standing was becoming to the soul of the Now. to God. But the soul of the first man knew itself. as Dionysius says {Div. in that the body was entirely subject to the soul. First. in the state of innocence. Secondly. Therefore neither could Adam's soul. there are three degrees of movement in the soul. i). the state of the soul : is dis- and corruption. was adapted to perfect and govern the body wherefore the first man is said to in relation to integrity . have been made into a living soul. is. 94- Art.. the third is the soul is led on yet further to the supreme good. of the soul has a .). as we have Now it is clear from what has been said above (A. natural existence.. namely animal life. the soul's is because the intellectual knowledge operation This perfected. it is fitting that body. LXXXIX.309 LNTELLECT OF FIRST MAN Q. Therefore it knew On separate substances. the second is by the soul ascending so as to be associated with when that the united superior powers. the state tinguished of natural existence remaining the same and thus the state of innocence is distinct from the state of man after sin. first In virtue of the movement of the soul is from exterior things to itself. by knowing itself (De Causis xiii. The first is by the soul passing from mode of underfirst man also. that is. A. 2 separate substance. a soul giving life to the body.. already said (Q. A. and in this point the state of the separate soul is distinguished from the state of the soul its joined to the body. LXXXV. The soul of Adam was of the same But our souls cannot now understand separate substances. animal as the and govern life. Q. For man's soul.

2). is the soul knows not sufficient to lead it to the know- ledge of an angel. the above-mentioned mode of knowledge. in our present state. Therefore the soul of the first man could not see the angels in their essence. . as an act through its object.Q. our intellectual operation can be known perfectly. A. by to perfect knowledge the fact that they know themselves. Much less does the third movement lead for even the angels themselves. 2.. That the soul of the first man fell short of knowledge regarding separate substances. Reply Obi. connatural object fell short of the excellence of separate substances. We. But in the second movement we do not find perfect knowledge. This makes clear the reply to the first objection. are not able to arrive at : the knowledge of the Divine Substance. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " : 310 (Q. by which itself. The soul of the first man was not able to knowledge of separate substances by means of its self-knowledge. as we have shown above for even each separate substance knows others in its own measure. 94. arrive at . by reason of its surpassing excellence. the fact that its Reply Obj. A. fall short on account of both these reasons. 3. the human intellect can be known perfectly. was not owing to the fact that the body was a load upon it but to the . natural order to external things. as we have said above (Q. as a power through its proper act. Because.. 3) and so by the knowledge thereof. LV. since the angel does not understand by turning to phantasms. And through the intellectual operation itself. but by a far more excellent process.Art. Nevertheless he had a more excellent mode of knowledge regarding the angels than we possess. because his knowledge of intelligible things within him was more certain and fixed than our knowledge. And it was on account of this excellence of knowledge that Gregory says that he enjoyed the company of the angelic spirits. as we have said above LXXXVII.

Further. . when he was in first created. the On nature of things. is like if a clean tablet on which nothing infused species. Q. perfection comes before imperfection. by acquired species. or by infused species. . 20). from the beginning. Further. as act precedes potentiality. i and the first man had not then gained . / answer that. In the natural order. For if he had such Ivnowledge it would be either by acquired species. is And his knowledge came by would have been of a different kind from ours. but their they acquire it in the course of time according to know all things Adam neither did Therefore capacity. it iii. Obj. as stated Metaph.311 LNTELLECT OF FIRST MAN Third Article.'Art. however. Obj. to the be should But names adapted animals' knew the natures. for whatever is in potentiality is made actual only by something And since God created things not only for their actual. was not endowed with knowledge the contrary. of all things. order that his soul may advance in knowledge and merit indeed. because he was of the same nature as we are and our soul. individuals of the same species have Now other men the same wav of arriving at perfection. Now man would have advanced in Therefore he also in therefore of state life. . 4). knowledge of all things. It would seem that the first man did not know all things. animals (Gen. or by connatural species. have not. i. which we acquire from things themselves. 3 whether the first man knew all things? proceed thus to the Third Article: Objection i. knowledge. and in like Therefore Adam of the manner he was possessed knowledge of all other Man named things. 3. Nor through connatural species. as Aristotle says (De Anima written. the soul seems to be united to the body for that merit in that purpose. experience of all things. ii. 2. for kind of knowledge is acquired by experience. the present state of life is given to man. this in We — Not. 94.

as is clear from what is above explained. direction of . whatever truths man is naturally able to know. . not only by generation of the body. by divinely as the eyes which Christ gave to the diflferent from ours man born blind were not different from those given by Reply Obj. Reply Obj. And such are whatever are virtually contained in the first self-evident principles. that Moreis. as for instance the number of pebbles in a stream and the like. Adam would have advanced in natural Reply Obj. 3 THE "SUMMA THKOLOGICA " 312 own existence. I. no one can instruct others unless he has knowledge. and which are not necessary for the merely human life. : just as it is necessary for us to order to direct our own lives. future contingent events. first man was produced work his body. so creatures were produced in their perfect state to be the principles as regards others. To Adam. . 3. as being the first man. man man not only those things which can be naturally but also known.0. Hence. was due a degree of perfection which was not due to other men. his in order to direct own life that and of over. but also that they might be the principles of other things. for the Now and so the first man was established by God manner as to have knowledge of all those things in such a for which has a natural aptitude. knowledge. nature. and some individual facts. others. but also by instruction and government. Art. know the truths of faith in first Wherefore the man was endowed with such a knowledge of these supernatural truths as was necessary for the direction of human life in that state. as the in his perfect state.94. but in the . things surpassing natural knowledge life of man is directed to a supernatural end because the needs to know . Now man can be the principle of another man. 2. The first man had knowledge of all things Yet his knowledge was not infused species. as regards of generation. not in the number of things known. so also was his soul established in a perfect state to instruct and govern others. were not known by the first man such as the thoughts of men. But those things which cannot be known by human effort.

Obj. Therefore before sin the woman was deceived. if they were the things themselves. It would seem that man in his primitive state could have been deceived. the Master says (2 Sent. just as he is deceived now. xxi. Moreover there is no comparison between advance in knowledge and advance in merit since one man things further revelation . Therefore this would have been the case in the state of innocence. 94- Art. Now.) that. adheres to the images of things as 2) that. adhering images as to realities. whether man in his first state could be deceived ? proceed thus to the Fourth Article: Objection 1. Fourth Article. Further. Wherefore man would have been deceived in the size of what he saw. We — Further. Therefore he would have been deceived. cannot be a principle of merit to another. 3. ad lit. by angels by further enlightenment. it is natural that the farther off anything from us. Further. 4 manner of knowing. Obj. in sleep the soul Further. 2. ii.. the smaller it seems to be. But in the state of innocence man would have eaten and consequently have slept and dreamed. to . For the Apostle says (i Tim. the woman was Obj. D. because she thought that he had received the faculty of speech from God. But this was untrue. and of future contingent events. advanced as regards the number as the of advance . 4. is Obj.313 INTELLECT OF FIRST MAN Q. the nature of the eyes is not changed by sin. although he can be to another a principle of knowledge. because what lie knew speculatively he would subsequently have known by experience. Augustine says (Gen. xii. But as regards supernatural knowledge. 5. he would also have known. 14) that the woman being seduced was in the transgression. the first man would have been ignorant of other men's thoughts. not frightened at the serpent speaking.

avoided without struggle. assent of belief. 18) is true as false. so falsehood is its evil. as the Philosopher says So that. it This opinion was held with the idea that man to entertain a false opinion in such matters. but without the assent of belief. though no evil could be therein so there could be in his intellect the absence of some knowledge. as though it were true. however. from what has preceded (O. he might have been deceived. it is clear that as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true and such as of the first . but whatever deception . no evil could exist. or it may mean a firm belief. in which one adheres to what is false. by virtue of which. as Augustine says {De Civ. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 314 as stated above (A.. namely. if we take deception in the wide sense of the term for any surmise without — extended . This is clear also from the very rectitude of the primitive state.Q. as long as the state of innocence {Ethic. 2). continued. Arb. any slight surmise. 94. he would have been deceived. On To regard what created. So if anyone had told him what was false about these things. it was impossible for the assent to falsehood as if it were truth. vi. were lacking in the bodily members man. A. he is not to be blamed. and that provided he does not assent rashly. fections. answer that. LXXXV. the lower faculties in man were subject to the And higher. is mot natural to vian as : is a punishment of man condemned. human intellect to For as some per. hence it is never deceived of itself . 6). but I the contrary. Such an opinion. Thus before sin Adam could not be deceived in either of these ways as regards those things to which his knowledge but as regards things to which his knowledge did not extend. while the soul remained subject to God. iii. but no false opinion. Dei xiv. deception may mean two things. clarity. Augustine says {De Lib. is not fitting as regards the is not derogatory to integrity of the primitive state of life because. Now it is clear that as trutli is the good of the intellect. in that state of life sin was . 3). in the opinion of some. and while it remained so. and were no impediment to their action. 10).

315 INTELLECT OF FIRST MAN Q. 5. A man is not accountable for what occurs during sleep. had she not already acquiesced in the love of of self-conceit. not in accordance with the not have been deceived. i. Reply Obj. or as regards secret thoughts. reason would have enabled him to judge the truth. to the Divine aid.Art. Reply Obj. Were anything first presented to the imagina- tion or sense of the man. but only when it is not free. that the serpent her own power. 94. such as the imagination or the like. and in a presumption Reply Obj. If anyone had said something untrue as man so : regards future contingencies. failed to have recourse It . 4 occurs must be ascribed to some lower faculty. might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from above. We in need not. The woman thought had received this faculty. opinion. as he has not then the use of his reason. Though the woman was deceived before in deed. Therefore it is clear that the rectitude of the primitive state was incompatible with deception of the intellect. 30) that. xi. as some do. we and that he reply that man had already sinned in his heart. For Augustine says {Gen. so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his knowledge did not extend. 2. still it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride. that he was not guided. not as acting in accordance with nature. however. though he was then most in need of guidance. If any object. when tempted. for his he would nature of things. Reply Obj. Reply Obj. the 11^01)1011 could not have believed the words of she sinned the serpent. ad lit. Henceweseethat when the natural power of judgment is free we are not deceived by such images. 3. but by virtue of some supernatural operation. as is the case in sleep. wherein consists man's proper action. 4. in the primitive state would not have believed it was but he might have believed that such a thing was a false possible which would not have been to entertain . follow the Master of the Sentences this point.

GRACE AND RIGHTEOUSNESS. Test. . But the spirit is quickened by grace. Therefore was made Christ alone was made in grace. Grat. 2. the last Adam into a quickening spirit. . distinguishing between Adam and Christ. et Nov.. of an Therefore et Augustine says {De Correp. among 316 the supposititious S. Further. OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN'S WILI^ NAMELY. 45) The first Adam : the First Article: — into a living soul. whether the first man was created in grace? We proceed thus to Objection i.-Xugustine says {QQ. Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost. xv. For the Apostle. Augustine. It would seem that the first man was not created in grace. • 3.QUESTION XCV. has the Holy Ghost.) works of Work anonymous author. x. qu. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry : (i) Whether the first man was created in grace ? (2) Whether in the state of innocence he had passions of the soul ? (3) Whether he had all virtues ? (4) Whether what he did would have been as meritorious as now ? . 123*) that Further. (In Four Articles. Vet. Obj. But whoever possesses grace. Obj. First Article. Adam was not created in grace.) We next consider what belongs to the will of the first mfan p concerning which there are two points for treatment : (i) The grace and righteousness of the first man (2) the use of righteousness as regards his dominion over other things. says (1 Cor.

But whoever has grace can advance by merit. from glory. . the reception of grace requires the consent of the recipient. according to Eccles. His by grace. 4. Man and angel are both ordained to grace. and the body to the soul and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third since while reason : . seems to require that. reason being Subject to God. xxiv. Therefore man also was created in grace. Therefore the first man was not God thus first created free-will only. the contrary.) When man was created he was given sufficient help to stand. but not sufficient to advance. For this rectitude consisted in his right. 9) On : their nature and endo^ved them with grace. wherewith man was endowed by God. But the very rectitude of the primitive state. De Civ. to . the lower powers remained subject to reason. as others say. the Master says (2 Sent. Dei xiii. he was created God made man in grace. Merit. / answer that.317 that first RIGHTEOUSNESS OF FIRST MAN God so ordered the life Q. but that it was bestowed on him subsequently and many authorities of the Saints declare that man sin : possessed grace in the state of innocence. Some say that man was not created in before grace. which man more distant from grace than but grace consummated. Further. : created in grace. vii. et Remiss. Obj. marriage consent presupposes existence. But the angels were created in grace. was subject God. the lower powers to reason. as Augustine says. and men. Cf. as to show then what they can do men and angels in the state of natural and afterwards bestowed grace on them. 5.. receive grace in the first Therefore man did not moment is of his creation. grace in is 6. Dei xii. But did grace precedes glory. D. since thereby a kind of spiritual But takes place between God and the soul. and by the discernment of righteousness. i of angels what they could do by free-will. Therefore much more Further. for Augustine God at the same time fashioned says {De Civ. Obj. nature is nature precede grace. 30. 13 De Pecc. 95- Art. Obj. i.* Now it is clear that such a • 16. Further.

is the Holy Ghost. Reply Obj. nakedness. Reply Obj. as soon as they disobeyed the Divine forfeited Divine grace. that there is i. Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul. but a supernatural endowment of grace. From Reply Obj. 4. Dei xiii. it not disputed that Adam. yet We may also say that.Art. therefore. but he did not possess Adam. was not a merely natural gift. we began cannot gather that Adam had no spiritual life in his soul. was in some degree gifted with the Holy Ghost. remained Hence it is after sin. Hence Augustine says {De Civ. The Apostle in these words means to show a spiritual body. it was not by virtue . as the faithful possess Him now. 13) that. who are admitted happiness directly after death. as the body's animal in life the Apostle's words. but only in a state of nature. for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh. as though it were a punishment corresponding to their and command. for it is not possible that the effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. but that he had not spiritual life as regards tiie body. were ashamed of their they oivn disobedience. The Master here speaks according to the opinion of those who held that man was not created in grace. Norn. is who the firstborn of the dead. clear that also the primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to God.Q. though man was created in grace. 95. to eternal and what they acquired afterwards by being so confirmed. we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the soul through grace existing therein. like other just souls. 2.). was not from nature otherwise it would have remained after sin since even in the demons the natural . As Augustine says in the same passage. This passage from Augustine does not assert that angels or men were created with natural free-will before they possessed grace but that God shows first what their free-will could do before being confirmed in grace. . 318 subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " . Reply Obj. if there is an animal body. gifts iv. as Dionysius declares {Div. 3. inasmuch as the spiritual life of the body began in Christ.

As the motion of the will is not continuous there is nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the first moment of his existence. of innocence. and the like. 7). Second Article. But his body was impassible.319 RIGHTEOUSNESS OF FIRST MAN was created Q. do not merit grace by an act of nature. Further. Therefore in the state of the state in happen innocence there were no passions of the soul. evil was neither present nor imminent. For by the passions of the soul the flesh But this did not lusteth against the spirit (Gal. Obj. nor was any good wanting which a good-will what is could desire to have then. 2. / ansiver that. as evil. 5. And since in the primitive state. On the contrary. whether passions existed in the soul of the first man? proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection i. others soul are directed to to what is good. merit glory by an act of grace but we Reply Obj. as fear and sorrow. But in Adam the moral virtues were Therefore the passions were entirely excluded perfect. Obj. The passions of the soul are in the sensual appetite. the object of which is good and evil. Further. v. 6. therefore Adam had no passion with evil as its object such as fear. Reply Obj. . Dei xiv. as Augustine says (ibid. Wherefore some passions of the love and joy. God. but by virtue of the grace which was added. the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral virtues. neither had he passions in . hence the comparison fails. We . 95- Art. Therefore no passions were in his soul. 3. It would seem that the first man's soul had We — no passions. Augustine says {De Civ.). sorrow. from him. 2 of the nature wherein he that he could advance by merit. Adam's soul was nobler than his body. 10) that in our first parents there was undisturbed love of and other passions of the soul.

the state of innocence. XCVII. and what he ought to desire. Therefore and immoderate fear neither did these virtues then exist. to some so that in that state to reason appetite was wholly subject as the passions of the soul existed only consequent upon : the judgment of reason. Third Article. the soul was impassible as likewise A. as stated in Ethic. at other times they follow after reason's reason judgment. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 320 as good not possessed. by fortitude. But those passions future good which or love and as regard joy present good. . 95 Art. i. whether adam had proceed Objection 1. iii.Q.. hence at times our passions forestall and hinder reason's judgment . to be had at the proper time. however. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed in the passions. regards the passions of moral virtue does not wholly Perfection Reply Obj. than as they exist in ourselves. but to be possessed then. all the virtues? We tbiis to the It Third Article: that — not all would seem Adam had the virtues. which impede the free use of reason. not down. . them for the tembut the take Reply Obj. (Q. 3. For our sensual is not entirely subject appetite. existed in . which regard burning concupiscence. accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys inferior the innocence of state in the But extent. 2). For some virtues are directed to curb the passions : thus immoderate concupiscence is restrained by temperance. The human body was impassible in the innocence as regards the passions which alter the as will be explained later on disposition of nature. which could not state of 2. otherwise. occur in the state of innocence. 11. as desire and hope that casteth respect of . wherein the passions reside. Reply Obj. away perate man regulates passions. desires as he ought to desire. The flesh lusts against the spirit by the yebellion of the passions against reason. to reason.

95- Art. however. i) that such was the rectitude of the primitive state. penance is a virtue that regards sin committed. be noted that some virtues of their verv nature do not involve imperfection. 3 Obj. innocence neither sin nor Therefore neither did those virtues is Obj. A. must. refulgent with brightness. existed. are Wherefore the man should It in a rectitude of the primitive state required that sense possess every virtue. some virtues are concerned with the . as will the Treatise on the Virtues (I. too. adorned with modesty. and the lower powers to reason. But Adam not. restrained by temperance. in the state of innocence man in a certain sense possessed all the virtues.321 RIGHTEOUSNESS OF FIRST MAN 2. in a homily (Serm. Augustine says. Mercy. Obj. Therefore stated in the state of innocence. in the state of innocence. of such a nature as to imply imperfection either in their .. and these both in habit and in act. faith is a virtue. as . Q. Further. 5.4 absolutely. The prince of sin overcame Adam who contra Judcpos) : was made from the slime of the earth to the image of God. Further. neither did those virtues exist then. above (A. Further. I answer that. and this can be proved from what precedes. as proved by his subsequent sin. But other virtues are 1. it perseverance a virtue. Q. is a virtue concerned with un- happiness. 3.-II. Further. But it did not exist Obj. On the contrary. For it was shown above (A. 4. LXIIL. and the inferior powers regulated be explained in according to the dictate of reason. for to knowledge which seems it impHes an obscurity of be incompatible with the per- fection of the primitive state. Therepossessed fore he possessed not every virtue. 2). such as charity and virtues did exist in the primitive state justice. But in the state of unhappiness exist. that reason was subject the virtues to God. Now nothing but those perfections whereby reason is directed to God. their object as meekness with passions which have evil as these passions did not exist But anger fortitude with fear. 2).

guilt. may be found in a virtuous man. If such imperfection be consistent with the perfection of the primitive state.Art. but not as to their would repent. as he could love God's goodness. sorrow for others' unhappiness. and unhappiness are incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state.Q. 95. could exist in that state as a habit. and had he seen unhappiness in his neighbour. Shavie. relating to passions . penance. he would have done his best to remedy it. It is accidental to temperance and fortitude subdue superabundant passion. first for he was so disposed that he This is in accordance with whab the Philosopher says. and the possession of God with the enjoyment of final beatitude. which regards what is ill done. 2. as being so disposed that he would be ashamed if he did wrong {Ethic. which is sorrow for sin committed. Passions which have evil for their object were incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state. THE " SUMMA JHEOLOGICA " 322 or on the part of the matter. such as fear if that evil be in the one affected by the passion in another evil and sorrow. Reply Obj. 3 act. . which is of things not seen. But any virtue which implies imperfection incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state. state . for in that state man could hate the demons' malice. as faith. habit and in act. and mercy. both as to habit and as to act. which is virtues existed as habits in the acts . if there had been a sin to repent for. in so far as they are in a subject which happens to have superabundant passions and yet those virtues are per se competent to moderate the to : passions. but not as to the act. 9). Hence faith and hope could exist in the primitive state. however. Wherefore such for instance. But passions which relate to the are not incompatible with the perfection of primitive Reply Obj. Virtues. relate to in Thus the virtues which such passions could exist in (he primitive state. and hope which is of things not yet possessed. such virtues necessarily existed in that state. For the perfection of that state did not extend to the vision of the Divine Essence. but only conditionally . man. iv. because sorrow. i.

. signifying a habit whereby a man makes a choice of persevering in good. could not exist in the primitive state in act. as moderating daring and hope. but only in habit. 95- Art. for it is written (2 Tim. as we have said above of penance and of But other virtues there are which have relation not to such passions only. ii. Thus as moderating sorrow and fear. Fourth Article. so far as it manner fortitude. 2. ii. our actions are more meritorious. 3) . In another sense taken as a circumstance of virtue. signifying a certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue in which sense Adam is . whether the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are? proceed thus to the Fourth Article: Objection 1. 4 which regard same subject. 3 appears from what has been said above. : . if relating to such passions only. Perseverance may be taken in two ways in one sense as a particular virtue. and the Philosopher The object of virtue is the difficult and says {Ethic. which relates not only to sorrow. but to others. . Reply Obj. It would seem that the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are. the act of temperance could exist in the moderates pleasure and in like primitive state. but also to daring mercy. . Who succours most those who are most in need. but not . but also to joy and fortitude. Further. 4. and hope. Reply Obj. 5): He crowned except he strive lawfully. Therefore grace is We — more copiously poured out upon us and since grace is the source of merit. . For grace is given to us through the mercy of God.323 RIGHTEOUSNESS OF FIRST MAN evil in the Q. struggle and difficulty are required for is not merit. Now we are-more in need of grace than was man in the state of innocence. which relates not only to fear. Obj. 5 appears from what has been said above. such as temperance. in : that sense it Adam possessed perseverance. did not possess perseverance. Reply Obj.

3. the good. on account of man's weakness. in its root. the more two ways. conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man's works were more meritorious than after sin was committed. i. 95- Art. formed greater works. First. which consists perfectly shall merit is . This degree is of two kinds. : . absolute and proportional. Obj. Secondly. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 324 But there is more strife and difficulty now. Therefore there is greater efficacy for merit. when he resists. Merit thus measured corresponds in degree to the essential reward. we enjoy God. if such were the case. the Master says (2 Sent. if we consider the degree of merit on the part of grace. But in proportionate degree the widow gave more. On the contrary. actions are whereas he does merit now. But we consider the proportionate degree. Therefore our more meritorious than in the primitive state. man would be may be gauged in grace and charity. would have per. D. as Our Lord said because she gave more in proporIn each of these cases the degree of tion to her means. if in rejoicing for created We : we consider as the absolute degree of the man would have had greater virtue. good. the degree of measured by the degree of the action itself. which would have been more copious as meeting with no obstacle in human nature and in like manner. than before sin but he does not need grace more things forasmuch as man even before sin required grace to obtain the capacity of one deed is .. The widow who put two mites into the treasury performed a deed of absolutely less degree than others who put great sums therein. because a small deed is more beyond who works with difficulty than a great one who beyond performs it easily. xxiv. better off after sinning. which consists in the enjoyment of God for the greater the charity whence our actions proceed. Further. a greater reason for merit exists after sin. Merit as regards degree which is .Q. After sin man requires grace for more Reply Obj.) that man ivould not have merited in resisting temptation. / answer that. merit corresponds to the accidental reward. he if work done because.

But the actual difficulty. But in this as in the primitive point there is a difference. Difficulty and struggle belong to the of merit according to the proportionate degree of degree the work done. .325 RIGHTEOUSNESS OF FIRST MAN life. by its penal character. enables the deed to satisfy for sin. . as above explained. 3. Yet it may happen that a person performs an itself : an easy deed with as prompt a will as another performs what even to do he is because arduous deed may be ready . It is also a sign of the Reply Obj. 2. temptation even without grace. 4 eternal which is But sin. required grace also for the remission of and for the support of his weakness. Reply Obj. The first man would not have gained difficult to him. after sin man the chief reason for the need of grace. according to the opinion of those who say that he did not possess grace even as now there is no merit to those who have not grace. inasmuch state there was no interior impulse to evil. as in our present Hence man was more able then than now to resist state. merit in resisting temptation. will's and promptitude striving after what is difficult to the promptitude of the will is caused by the intensity of charity. Q- 95- Art.

(In IN THE Four Articles. names from him. if man himself were master over the animals. But many animals are hostile to one another. Therefore all animals were not brouefht under the mastership of man. But the angels need not have intervened thus. it is unfitting that elements hostile to one another should be brought under the mastership of one. Further. ad animals. : man in Under this head there are four of man in the state of innoWhether points inquiry (i) cence was master over the animals ? (2) Whether he was master over all creatures? (3) Whether in the state of innocence all men were equal? (4) Whether in that state man would have been master over men ? First Article. as the sheep and the wolf. 2. ix.) We next consider the mastership which belonged to the state of innocence. OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN STATE OF INNOCENCE. whether adam in the state of innocence had mastership over the animals ? proceed thus to the First Article: Objection i. that the animals were brought to under the direction of the angels. Obj. to receive their Adam.QUESTION XCVI. 14). 326 . For Augustine lit. Therefore in the state of innocence man had no mastership of the We — says {Gen. It would seem that in the state of innocence Adam had no mastership over the animals.

Obj. and the birds of the air. Therefore. As above stated (Q.. and the imperfect (thus matter is form. 5) that the hunting of wild animals is just (Politic. . these are rightly subject to his govern• The words Thomas may quoted are not in S. have had in mind Bede. for just as in the generation of things we perceive a certain order of procession of the perfect from the imfor the sake of form. man was punished by the disobedience of those creatures which should be subject to him. 4. before man had disobeyed. that man should Hence the Philosopher says be master over animals. at least before sin. .'Art. 26) dominion over the fishes of the sea. for the sake of the perfect). this is proved from the order of Divine which always governs inferior things by the superior. it is tional animals.. Wherefore. Providence Secondly. was unfitting for man to make use of his mastership. XCV. Further. and animals make use of plants. so also is there perfect to him. thereby natural. Hexaem. command is not given rightly save to a rational Therefore man had no mastership over the irraFurther. First. is above other animals.' 3. and i. Let him have the contrary.327 FIRST MAN'S MASTERSHIP : Q. order in the use of natural things thus the imperfect are for the use of the perfect as the plants make use of the earth for their nourishment. and man makes use of both plants and animals. nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject This can be to man. But a being. i. as man. it proper to a master to command. Therefore in the state of innocence. i) for his disobedience to God. and the whole earth). as quoted in the Glossa ordinaria on Gen. i. are animals Now all naturally subject observed the order from by proved in three ways. S. A. natural a exercises man because right. 26. being made to the image of God. although before that after sin animals would of them: for God foresaw become useful to man. Jerome's works. and the beasts of the earth (Vulg. It is written (Gen.96.. nature. Therefore it . i God gave man masterObj. On : I answer that. is in keeping with the order of nature. Jerome* says sin he had no need ship over the animals.

his But man body being strong enough for that purpose. Whose Providence has ordained all this. 30. there being no inordinate motions of concupiscence. rapid gathering together of all the animals. parto certain ticipated prudence of natural instinct. Of this Providence man would have been the executor. : as appears even now in regard to domestic animals. particular acts whereas man possesses a universal prudence as regards all practical matters. Therefore certain things in regard to animals could be done by the angels. as the lion and falcon. nor for food. Now an angel is naturally higher than man. Now whatever is participated is subject to what is essential and universal. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 328 and Thirdly. nor to carry him since they fed on the trees of paradise. this is proved from a property of man certain the latter a For we see in of other animals. but to some. those animals which now are fierce and kill others. on this account have been excepted from the mastership of man as neither at present are they for that reason excepted from the mastership of God. since fowls are given by men as food to the trained falcon. not only in regard to man. which could not be done by man for instance. — — — about. but also in regard to other animals. In the opinion of some. . i. Thus there would have been a natural antipathy between some animals. in that state. have had any bodily need of animals since then they were naked and not ashamed. however. Nor does Bede's gloss on Gen. 3. 96. 2. fore the subjection of other animals to natural. They would not. A higher power can do many things that an inferior power cannot do to those which are subject to them. Reply Obj. i. For the nature of animals was not changed by man's sin. would. There. would then have lived on herbs. In the state of innocence man would not neither for clothing. Art. as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of others. say that trees and herbs were given as food to all animals and birds. needed animals in order to have experimental . Reply Obj. man is proved to be Reply Obj. in regard ment. . But this is quite unreasonable. have been tame.Q.

it have obeyed man in the state of innocence. Further. the only powers of the soul existing in Now plants are nutritive. For an angel naturally has a greater power than man. Further.329 FIRST MAN'S MASTERSHIP of their natures. So all animals would have obeyed man of their own accord. augmentative. iii. Obj. 8). whether man had mastership over all other creatures ? proceed thus to the Second Article : Objection i. as Dionysius says {Ep. Art. as Augustine says {De Trin. Therefore. these do not naturally obey reason as we can see in the case . i. Q. the heavenly bodies . it seems that in the state of innocence man had no dominion over plants. vii. Much less therefore We — would Obj. ad Polycarp. since it is by his reason that man is competent to have mastership. is signified by the fact that he might give them names expressive of their respective natures. Therefore man had no dominion over them.). Now we may consider four things in man : his reason. But man could not have changed the course of for this belongs to God alone. All animals by their natural instinct have which a certain participation of prudence and reason accounts for the fact that cranes follow their leader. But. of any one man. It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have had mastership over all other creatures. . and so according as he is master of what is within himself. 2. whosoever is master of a thing. . It is written (Gen. Man in a certain sense contains all things. 2 knowledge that This God led the animals to man. corporeal matter would not have obeyed even the holy angels. have dominion over every I answer that. 4. Reply Obj. as in the present state some : domestic animals obey him. : . 3. That he may O71 the contrary. in the same way he can have mastership over other things. 26) creature. and bees obey their queen. 96. can change it. and generative. . Second Article.

and the body itself. loveth 2. But of the natural powers and the body itself man is master not bv commanding. Wherefore man had no mastership over the angels in the primitive state: like to him so when we read all creatures. For Gregory says (Moral. and equality are the basis of Ecclus. the cause ceasing. 3 THE is " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 330 which makes him like to the whereby he liken like the angels. there is no inequality. Thus also in the state of innocence man's mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted not in commanding or in changing them. Over the sensitive powers. Therefore all were : We — equal. but by using them. but in making use of them without hindrance. Now in man reason has the position of a master and not of a subject. which some degree. the soul has mastership by So in the state of innocence man had mastercommanding. 19. wherein he is inanimate things. It would seem that in the state of innocence all would have been equal. Therefore were equal in the state of innocence. Obj. over the animals ship by commanding them. mutual love.) Where there is no sin. 'Art. from the fact that He rewards . xxi. as the irascible and concupiscible.y. which to the plants. the effect also ceases. Obj. animals. we must understand the creatures which are not made to God's image. But in the state of innocence there was no sin. 96. obey reason in The answers to the objections appear from the above. whether men were equal in the state of innocence? proceed thus to the Third Article: Objection i. so also every man him that is nearest to Now in that state there was among men an Further. which is the bond of peace. Further. xiii. his sensitive powers. Every beast like. likeness to abundance all of love. 3. Third Article. according its himself. his natural forces. But the cause of present inequality among men seems to arise on the part of God.

and more beautiful. are well ordered (Vulg. in disposes things equal and unequal : . Therefore. : So we may say that. in those who were thus surpassed. from the fact that some. there would have been For man inequality as to righteousness and knowledge. and also greater. which would not have been the case in the primitive state. so as not since indeed it was dependent on less advantage and help food wherewith to sustain life. of regards sex. in greater advance also have been bodily disparity. g. 96- Art. the result of which is that some are placed in subjection to others as a penalty. and in all ways better disposed so that. their proper place. how. We must needs admit that in the primitive state there would have been some inequality.331 FIRST MAN'S MASTERSHIP .. nor would sexual union have been sterile. or knowledge virtue and knowledge than others. because generation depends upon diversity sex: and likewise as regards age. as regards the soul. Dei xix. : But order chiefly consists in inare ordained of God). by virtue of which man can apply himself. according to the climate. I answer that. are born weak and deficient. i) The things which are of God. On the contrary. hence some would have made a desire. . . for some would have been born of others. but of his own free-will. It is written (Rom. 13) Order equality for Augustine says (De Civ. through a defect of nature. Those that are. more or less. which was most proper and orderly. etc. would have Reply Obj. 3 some and punishes others and on the part of nature. at least as Therefore in the primitive state. worked not of necessity. Moreover. or the movement of the stars. some would have been born more robust in body than others. For the There might not was human body entirely exempt from the laws of to receive from exterior sources more or nature. i. By those words Gregory means to exclude such inequality as exists between virtue and vice. there been no defect or fault either in soul or body. ever. inequality would have existed. others strong and perfect. xiii. to action.

But one of the chief blessings. where nothing was wanting that man's good-will could desire. should rule creatures. without any defect of nature. 3. 16) Thou shall be Obj. 96. exalt . but that He would so that the beauty of order Fourth Article. greater love than between equals although there be not an equal response for a father naturally loves his son more : than a brother loves his brother. Reply Obj. 10). not indeed that He would punish some and some above others would the more shine forth among men. reward others. : under thy husband's power. as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv. whether in the state of. iii. innocence man would have been master over man ? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: Objection i. 15) endo^ved with reason and over none but irrational cattle. The cause of inequality could be on the part of God. Dei xix. 2. It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have been master over man. Equality is the cause of equality in mutual Yet between those who are unequal there can be a . not over men. liberty is On the contrary. Reply Obj. — who was His image. subjection is opposed to liberty. Art. Therefore man would not have been master over man in the state of innocence. although the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by him. Further. For Augustine says (De Civ. Obj. The condition of man in the state of innocence was not more exalted than the condition of the . Therefore in the state of innocence man would not have been subject to man. what came into the world as a penalty would not have existed in the state of innocence. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 332 love. 3. Inequality might also arise on the part of nature as above described. and would not have been lacking in the state of innocence. But man was made subject to man as a penalty for after sin it was said to the woman (Gen. but over : God willed that man. for sin . 2.Q. made to Further.

Wherefore the Philosopher says. by directing either towards his proper welfare. is because life man Now a social cannot exist among a number of people unless under the presidency of one to look after the common good. as is In the state of innocence in the men. the master of a free subject. Art. in the beginning of the Politics.333 FIRST MAN'S MASTERSHIP among is Q. if one man surpassed another in knowledge and virtue. the master's use. seek many things. called that of Dominations. whereas a slave is ordered to another. This distinction is founded on the reason that a slave differs from a free man in that the latter has the disposal of himself. and Therefore it was not beneath the dignity of the state of innocence that one man should be subject to another. whereas one attends only to one. this would not have been . as such. 4 angels. in which sense a master means one to whom another is subject as a slave. so in the state of innocence he would have led a social First. to And since every man's a grievous matter to and consequently it is another what ought anyone to be one's own. and consequently proper good desirable to himself. to yield to in the state of innocence such a mastership could not have existed between man and man. / answer that. therefore such dominion implies of necessity a pain inflicted on the subject. and life. as opposed to slavery. for many. But so one order the angels some rule over others . we shall always find one at the head directing them. 96. Mastership has a twofold meaning. subject man could have been a master of former but in the latter sense. can be called a master. Secondly. that wherever many things are directed to one. First. mastership . So that one man is master of another as his slave his own — namely. or to the common good. Such a kind of mastership would have existed in is But a man him the state of innocence between man and man. for two reasons. naturally a social being. is when he refers the one whose master he is. not stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics. In another sense is referred in a general sense to any kind of and in this sense even he who has the office of governing and directing free men.

iv. Civ. Art. : of things appear the repHes to the objections which are on the founded first-mentioned mode of mastership. 96. but by the service of counsel : and this requires this. From . As every : man hath received Wherefore grace.THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " conduced 10. The natural order {ibid. according to i Pet. 15) and thus did God make man. 4 . ministering the same one to another. 334 fitting unless these gifts to the benefit of others. xix. men Dei command 14) Augustine says {De Just not by the love of domineering.Q.

Further. you take was Obj. man were immortal the state of grace. the first man was present incorruptible. if innocence.. ix.QUESTION XCVII. another. Not to have been due either to nature or to nature. But there can be no passing from one genus to Therefore if as the ically distinct. as regards the preservation of the species. Did. Therefore as long as man man he could not be immortal. away the thing defined. whether in the state of innocence man would have been immortal? We proceed thus to the First Article:— of innocence Objection i. It would seem that in the state man was not immortal.) We first next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the man : first. this would Obj. corruptible and incorruptible are gener-r Philosopher says {Metaph. : in the state of innocence was immortal? (i) Whether man was he Whether impassible ? (3) Whether he stood in (2) he would have obtained imWhether of food? need (4) mortality by the tree of life? First Article. For the term mortal belongs to the definition of man. {In IN THE Four Articles. 10). Further. 3. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL PRIMITIVE STATE. 2. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry . But if you take away the definition. x. in man could not be corruptible in the state. for since nature does not chano^e 335 . as regards the preservation of the individual secondly.

316. immortality is promised to man as a reward. his immortality . is On came sin.. 19*) as long as he did not sin . p. recovered grace by repentance. a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its DioscoT. because. Such things as these are incorSecondly. 12) By sin death man was immortal before : I answer that. ad like the . either because it possesses no matter. A thing may be incorruptible in three ways. 336 within the same species. but that he might deserve the reward. he would also have been immortal now. whereby it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so • See footnote. etNov. . as Augustine says (Ep.Q. reason of any intrinsic vigour of immortality. there redounds to the body a fulness of health. It into the world. which is clearly not man was not immortal in the state of Obj. First. in this sense man was incorruptible and in the state of innocence. Test. the contrary. qu. Therefore v. I THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" . xxi. Further. Thirdly. Therefore man was not immortal : in the state of innocence. like an angel or because it possesses matter that is in potentiality to one form only. fulness of beatitude. 2 He brought him out of his sins. Likewise neither would this be owing to grace for the first man Wisdom the case. But man was not created in the state of reward. 97- Art. written (Rom.) that : God made man's from its efficient immortal cause. according to X. as Augustine says : God made man immortal Vet. on the part of matter that is to say. inasmuch as being by nature in its form. 4. yet serves it wholly from corruption and this is called incorruptibility of glory. For. Hence he : would have regained Therefore innocence. so that he might achieve for himFor man's body was indissoluble not by self life or death. (QQ. incorruptible it has an inherent disposition which precorruptible. with the vigour of incorruption. heavenly bodies. according to Apoc. soul of such a powerful nature. a thing is ruptible by their very nature. but by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul. 4 Death shall be no more. — .

the loss of which was an effect of sin for this was reserved . the same passage goes on to say that He took a rib out of Adam. it was most properly endowed the body in a beginning with the power of preserving . O. 21. the defect of nature for Christ to accomplish. slept in the state of innocence. ad i). as we shall explain further on (P. Reply Obj. Further. 4 22 . which was bestowed Second Article. Obj. LXXVi. III. 3. This power of preserving the body was And not natural to the soul. 97- Art. i). according to Gen. by was to be restored into sometiiing better. Therefore he was passible even to the is degree of the cutting out of part of his body. man's body was soft. Obj. 2 This entirely long as it remained itself subject to God. soul rational the for since surpasses agrees with reason the capacity of corporeal matter. But in the state of innocence man would have been sensitive. A. For sensation is a kind of passion. as above explained at the (Q. Now. • We — Therefore he would have been passible.. Whom 4. manner surpassing the capacity of corporeal matter. but was the gift of grace. 2. and 2. 4.. ii. Therefore he would cast a deep sleep upon Adam. 4. .337 FIRST MAN'S IMMORTALITY Q.. Reply Obj. A. Further. 3. natural incorruptibility and immortality. It would seem that in the state of innocence man was passible. The promised reward of the immortality of glory differs from the immortality on man in the state of innocence. whether in the state of innocence man would have been passible? proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection 1. XIV. sleep is a kind of passion. Further. But a soft body naturally passible as regards a hard body therefore if a . man God have been passible. 1. These objections are founded on Reply Obj. i though man recovered grace as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory yet he did not recover immortality. Obj.

as he could avoid death. are said to be and sensation passions. Reply Obj. as the semen in man. XCII. but are ordered to his natural welfare. 97- Art. For passion is the effect of action and in nature contraries are mutually active or passive. In understanding this second sense. so long as he refrained from sin. according as one thing changes another from its natural disposition. he would have first hard body had come been also corruptible. Thus belonging to the perfecting process of nature. As already explained (Q. Therefore the first man was passible. whereby he could avoid what was harmful and partly also by Divine Providence. Reply Obj. passion can be taken in a general sense for any kind of change. sense. Man's body in the state of innocence could be preserved from suffering injury from a hard body. vi. that nothing of a harmful nature coyld come upon him unawares. On the contrary. man was passible in the state of innocence. Passion may be taken in two senses. 3) Excessive sufjering wastes the very substance. even if . and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from its natural disposition. two objections since sensation and sleep do not remove from man his it Thus is clear how to reply to the first . both in soul and body. as he . so preserving him. Secondly. the separation of the rib. . 3. man. In the first man was impassible. because. partly by the use of his reason. was likewise immortal and was passive both in soul and body. : First. I answer that. natural disposition. as the Philosopher says {Top. A. 2 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " the latter 338 in contact with the soft body of the would have suffered from the impact. 4. ad 2). for he could curb his passion. the rib was in Adam as the principle of the human race.. deterioration by seminal issue so neither did he through . who is a principle through Hence as man does not suffer any natural generation.Q. 3. Had man been passible. in its proper sense. .

It is written (Gen. But the soul is called a spirit according to what properly belongs to itself. Therefore it seems that man did not take food : in the primitive state. not require food.. the rational soul cated to the body what belonged to itself as a soul communiand so . . On the contrary. Q. ii. as pos- sessing an intellectual immaterial power. loss. food is needed for nourishment. we need food for the preservation of But Adam could preserve his life otherwise for had life. then. a soul giving life to the body. 3 whether in the state of innocence man had need of food ? proceed thus to the Third Article: Objection i.Vdam's body suffered no to restore what he has lost. Ohj. 0/ every tree I answer that. 97- Art. It is called a soul by reason possesses life to in common . man's body was impassible it does not appear how food could be needful to him. he not sinned. Therefore he had no need of food. In order to make this clear. For food is necessary for man But . as We — being incorruptible. It would seem that in the state of innocence man did not require food. But nourishment involves passibility. with other souls it is —that of what it is. ii. Therefore he did .339 FIRST MAN'S IMMORTALITY Third Article. 7) Man was made into a living soul. Further. Ohj. Further. 16) in Paradise ye shall (Vulg. Ohj. which seems unsuitable to the state of innocence. and not to other souls. 4. he would not have died. Since. Further. the consumption of food involves voiding of the surplus. we must observe that the rational soul is both soul and the spirit. . 3. as giving : body whence written (Gen. thou shall) eat. . that is. Thus in the primitive state. In the state of innocence man had an animal life requiring food but after the resurrection he will have a spiritual life needing no food. 2.

t See footnote. Reply Obj. to abstain from the tree good and evil. sinned of the . befitted and growth. p. Reply Obj. et Nov. and to eat of every other tree of Paradise. Test. after the resurrection. i. which. would have been nothing superfluous From aiiiwa. a soul. the humid qualities. the soul will. Reply Obj. 44 seqq. For we have explained (A. glory. man in the state of innocence. How could man have an immortal body. igf) which was sustained by food? Since an wimortal being needs neither food nor drink.. and to prevent the humour. the resurrection. As Augustine says {QQ. he whereas required it in the state of innocence. after : that the immortality of the primitive state was based on a supernatural force in the soul. Vet. so . Cf. man was obliged to and alteration attends into the sub- Reply Obj. 3. on stance of the thing nourished. Some say that in the state of innocence not have taken more than necessary food. to communicate to the body what properly belongs as a spirit. xv. i) So. to itself state. whose bodies will he caWed spiritual. immortality to everyone. qu. 1 Cor. and not on any intrinsic disposition of the body : so that its body might the entire consumption take food. man would that there • 4. Wherefore such operations But in the final a certain extent. certain passion the part of the food 2. 3 THE Now " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 340 the body was the soul. .Q. A changed So we cannot thence con- clude that man's body was passible. impassibility. but that the food taken was passible although this kind of passion conduced to the . same time. If man had not taken food he would have as he also sinned at the For he was told knowledge of by taking the forbidden fruit. lose part of of by the action of heat. 4) is the the operations of which are the use of vegetative soul : food. 316. man will not require food. perfection of the nature. called animal. and power to the good. 97- Art. generation. nutriment.* through having its life from the first principle of life in these inferior creatures as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii.

341 FIRST MAN'S IMMORTALITY is Q. It would seem that the tree of life could not be the cause of immortality. effects caused by the forces of plants an^i' other natural agencies are natural..ate proceed thus to the Fourth Article: Objection 1. 2. written (Gen. For nothing can act beyond as an effect does not exceed its cause. ii. To understand man pos- two remedies. {Metaph iii. the Philosopher ridicules iii. The tree of life in a certain degree was the cause of immortality.\n would have acquired immortality by the tree of life? in the st. would have been no Wherefore there was need for voiding the surplus. this would seem to be reduced to the ancient fable. we must observe that in the primitive sessed. against 316. But its own species was life of the tree corruptible. and even after sin eat of the tree to he been alloived had remained immortal. by eating a certain food. Augustine says Test. (QQ. he put forth his hand. whether of innocence m. 4 however. p. otherwise it could not be taken as food since food is changed into the substance of the thing nourished. 4). It is On the contrary. God as to Fourth Article.. 97. 22) : Lest perhaps life. 3. Art. 19*) : corruption of the body and eat. Vet. state this. but not absolutely. qu. . for the preservation of life. Obj. as implying that there faecal matter. We — give incorruptibility or immortality. that the gods. Further. . Further. Further. and take of the tree of and live for ever. unreasonable to suppose. Obj. Therefore the tree of life could not . A taste of the tree of life -warded off man would have . this would have been natural immortality. If therefore the tree of life caused immortality. became immortal which . of life. yet so disposed by be decorous and suitable to the state. et Nov. * See footnote. I ansiver that. Did.

of these defects the loss of humidity by the action of natural heat. 5). which we take for the same purpose. in old age. arises from the fact that the humour which is caused from extraneous sources. 97- Art. i. like a drug. The second defect. but only for a definite time. qu. it does not suffice even for this purpose whereupon the body declines. for its effect was to strengthen the force of the species against the weakness resulting from the admixture of extraneous nutriment. 26) : his hunger. but only replaces what is lost. nor was it of such efficiency as to give a the body disposition to immortality. as : more water is added. life. tine says {De Civ. The tree of life. as well as what suffices for growth . we may observe that at first the active force of the species is so strong that is it is able to transform so much of the food as required to replace the lost tissue. and {00.Q. bodily power is finite. then. 316. whereby it might become indissoluble which is clear from the fact that every to the tree of . however. a remedy in the tree of life. the strength of the wine is diminished. lessens the specific active power as water added to wine takes at first the taste of wine. and finally dies from natural causes. Dei xiv. 4 THE One " SUM MA THEOLOGICA " was 342 two defects. Vet. as the Philosopher savs (De Gener. Against this defect man was provided with .. being added to the humour already existing. till the wine becomes watery. et Nov. For it is manifest that the greater a force is. the more durable is its * See footnote. . the assimilated food does not suffice for growth. warded off all Test. taken from the other trees of paradise. drink to slake his thirst. Wherefore Augushad food to appease and the tree of life to banish the breaking up of old age. In like manner. p. Last of all. so the power of the tree of life could not go so far as to give the body the prerogative of living for an infinite time. 19*) Man : bodily corruption. as now we are provided with the food. which acts as the soul's instrument as a remedy against such loss man was pro: vided with food. later on. Yet it did not absolutely cause immortality for neither was the soul's intrinsic power of preserving the body due .

From For the first this the replies to the objections clearly appear.343 effect. or had need to eat once more of the tree of life. 97- Art. . according to the explanation above given. man was to be either transferred to a spiritual life. cause immortality while the others show that off it caused incorruption by warding corruption. FIRST MAN'S IMMORTALITY therefore. 4 since the power of the tree of life was man's life was to be preserved for a definite time by partaking of it once. Q. finite. and when that time had elapsed. proves that the tree of life did not absolutely .

: head there are two points ot in the state of innocence there would inquiry (i) have been generation ? (2) Whether generation would have been through coition ? the first Under Whether First Article.QUESTION (In XCVIII. 3. 2. Further. by generation man is multiplied. since man of masters requires the division of avoid confusion of mastership. the object of generation tion in is the preservathe species of that which is corruptible in the individual. was made master of the animals. SPECIES. of the state of . Obj. whether in the state of innocence generation EXISTED ? proceed thus to the First Article: Objection 1.) next consider what belongs to the preservation of the species and. Therefore. But in the state of innocence man would have lived for ever. 5. Therefore in the state of innocence there would have been no generation. We — Phys. It would seem there would have been no For. also there would have : Therefore been no corruption the state of innocence. But the multiplication to property. it would have 344 . . as stated in generation in the state of innocence. neither would there have been generation. of generation secondly. first. v. We the offspring. Further. Obj. corruption in is contraries affect the same subject But contrary to generation. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE Two Articles. Wherefore there is no generation in those indi- vidual things which last for ever.

multiply. subordinate to something else.Author of nature. 4). is established. since the original number Therefore there would have of mankind was two only. only in even the the species. It is written (Gen. his soul being naturally incorruptible. soul. but. On the contrary. This is against the natural law. incorruptible survive. otherwise man's sin would have been very necessary. Hence it belongs to man to beget offspring. On the substances not other hand. as Isidore says {Etym. for such a great blessing to be its result. i been necessary make a division of rights when the human race increased by generation. seems to be the direct purpose of nature. since in things corruptible none is everlasting . to provide for the multiplica- . when it ceased to exist. Who the human soul. But this increase could not come about save by generation. In the state of innocence there would have been generation of offspring for the multiplication of the human race. We must. observe that man. individuals are included in the chief purpose of nature. must also while his body is naturally corruptible. v. Wherefore. on the part of the naturally corruptible body. been generation in the state of innocence. by his nature. otherwise. which is invariable and perpetual while what is only for a time is seemingly not the chief purpose of nature.345 FIRST MAN'S STATE to Q. Therefore there would have been no generation in the state of innocence. Art. nature's purpose would become void. 98. We observe that nature's purpose appears to be different as For that regards corruptible and incorruptible things. it is multitude of individuals should be the direct purpose of nature. vation of which natural generation is ordained. as it were. but also in the individual wherefore . and fill i. therefore. midway between corruptible and incorruptible creatures. or alone is the Creator of rather of the . 28) : Increase and the earth. according to which all things are in common. it follows that the chief purpose of nature is the good of the species for the preser. as it were. Therefore. I answer that. and permanent except the species. But on the part of the fitting that the which is incorruptible.

98. 25). Therefore neither in Paradise would there have been generation by coition. since generation belongs to things corruptible. Reply Obj. had existed before sin. i. Obj. Second Article. In the state of innocence the human body was in itself corruption by corruptible. In our present state a division of possessions is necessary on account of the multiplicity of masters. 11 iv. xxii. they shall neither marry nor be married. Reply Obj. It would seem that generation by coition would not have existed in the state of innocence. : Therefore. Further. estabHshed the begetting of offspring even in the state of innocence. the first man in the terrestrial Paradise was like an angel.Q. But in the future state of the resurrection. when den will be like to the angels. however. those things of which they were masters a state of things to be observed — even now among many good men. ii. Therefore. ii. 30. Art. while still in Paradise iv. 3. man was not to be deprived thereof. but it could be preserved from the soul. i). Reply Obj. For. our first parents were created at the age : We — of perfect development. whether in the state of innocen'ce there would have been generation by coition? proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection i. as Damascene says {De Fid. if generation by coition they would have had intercourse which was not the case according to Scripture (Gen. as it is written Matt. inasmuch as community of possession is a source of strife. Orth. . 2. 2 THE human " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" He 346 tion of the race. Although generation in the state of innocence might not have been required for the preservation of the species. according to each one's need. 2. ordered that without any danger of strife they would have used in common. 5). In the state of as the Philosopher says (Politic. yet it would have been required for the multiplication of the individual. will of would the men have been so innocence.

/ answer that. when he was in honour. according to Psalm xlviii. Therefore there would have been such generation also in to help man the state of innocence. For what is natural to forfeited is by sin. Some of the earlier doctors. ii. there would have been no such intercourse of man and woman. generation would not have been effected Thus Gregory of Nyssa says (De Horn. xvii. But virginal integrity is corrupted by intercourse.).) that in Paradise the human race would have been multiplied by some other means. He adds that God made man male and female before sin. Obj. Further. 4. he is compared to senseless beasts. in carnal intercourse. God made man and woman But nothing is and ii. Moreover. if void in God's works. . whereby man refrains from such pleasures. even not sinned. Therefore there would have been : no such thing in the state of innocence. more than at any man becomes like the beasts. But she was not fitted man had except in generation. man was neither acquired nor able. because He foreknew the mode of generation which would take But this is unreasonplace after sin. 2 Obj. Q. which He foresaw.. Therefore. other time. XCVH. in the state of innocence there would have been no corruption. before sin On (Gen. before sin. i. Therefore. we are told that woman was made to be a help to man (Gen. But man is compared to beasts by reason of sin. 13 Man. vehement delight which he takes therein whence continency is praiseworthy. as above explained (Q. there would have been such intercourse. Further. the contrary. to which the distinction of sex is ordained. it is by coition which he possessed even before sin. Art. 98. concluded that in the state of in the same way. did not understand. Opif. because another man would have proved a more effective help in anything else. Now natural to man by clear that generation reason of his animal life. on account of the . considering the nature of concupiscence as regards generation in our innocence present state. 18. 20). and is become like to them. as the angels were multiplied without coition by the operation of the Divine Power.347 FIRST MAN'S STATE 3.

just is natural to other perfect animals. In the state of innocence nothing of this kind would have happened that was not regulated by reason. first 2. in soul and body. which in the state of innocence would not have existed. Wherefore there is no Reply Obj. with calmness of soul and body. without ardent or wanton incentive. account of sin they were ejected from Paradise shortly after the creation of the woman or because. like them in coition. 3.Q. In Paradise man would have been like an angel in his spirituality of mind. which comes from nature. having received the general Divine command relative to generation. as the corporeal members make it clear. as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight have been . two tilings to be considered. One. as it were. 98. as other members had. 2 THE as it " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 348 A. Wherefore. Art. The demands second thing to be observed is a certain deformity of excessive concupiscence. After the resurrection man will be like an angel. In this way man becomes. 26) : We must be far from supposing that offspring All the begotten without concupiscence. in the present state of life. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. 4). because he cannot moderate concupiscence. Thus. spiritualized parallel. the active principle is male and the passive is female . because on . Beasts are without reason. . our come together in Paradise. when the lower powers were entirely subject to reason. before sin. could not be Reply Obj. Dei xiv. 3). they awaited the special command relative to the time. So we cannot allow that these members would not have had a natural use. ad lit. Reply Obj. as regards generation by coition. not because delight of sense was less. parents did not As Augustine says (Gen. ix. is the union of man and woman for in every act of generation there is an active and a passive principle. yet with an animal life in his body. i. there are. bodily members would have been eqiially moved by the will. since wherever there is distinction of sex. the order of nature that for the purpose of generation there should be concurrence of male and female.

but because it excludes inordinate desire. whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state. This is what Augustine means by the words quoted. And by ivas then relieved. Reply Obj. 26) : In that state intercourse ivould have been without prejudice to virgiiial integrity. so in conceiving. not because it removes fecundity. as a sober person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the glutton. . the union was one. not just as in giving birth the mother groans of pain. but because the force of concupiscence would not have so inordinately itself into such pleasure. but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures. Therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy in the state of innocence. but to prevent the force of concupiscence from cleaving to it immoderately. but by the insti- gations of maturity. Dei xiv. In that state fecundity would have been without lust. As Augustine says {Dc Civ. Art. which do not exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of innocence.349 FIRST MAN'S STATE Q. 2 and the greater thrown the greater in proportion to the greater purity of nature sensibility of the body). 98. not of lustful desire. as it does in the menses. By immoderately I mean going beyond the bounds of reason. but the ardour of desire and restlessness of the mind. this ivould have remained intact. whose place it is not to lessen sensual pleasure. being curbed by reason. but of deliberate action. 4.

man to have strength to use his members at birth and thus it appears to be a punishment of sin that he has not that strength. Further. et Remiss. It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of the body. This Merit. must now consider the condition as regard the body .QUESTION XCIX. as of the offspring regards virtue — . points of inquiry : (i) Under the first head Whether in the state there are two of innocence children would have had full powers of the body immediately after birth ? (2) Whether all infants would have been of the male sex ? First Article. But in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of mind. 2. 350 . Pecc. as For to the use of its members. secondly. Therefore much more is it natural to .) We first. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY. immediately after birth. Therefore neither would there have been weak: We — ness of body in infants. Obj. thirdly. whether in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of body as to the use of its members immediately after birth? proceed thus to the First Article: Objection i. some animals at birth have sufficient But man is nobler than strength to use their members. i. in knowledge. 38) Augustine says {De weakness of the body befits their weakness of mind. other animals. (In Two Articles.

As. so was it impossible ior those limbs to in executing the will's . But if children had not full strength in the use of their limbs. therefore. By faith alone do we hold truths which are above nature. Now we have it on the authority of Scripture that God made man right (Eccles. on account of the considerable humidity of the brain in children. and what we believe rests on authority. in the state of innocence. Wherefore. as Augustine says (De Civ. Because in proportion to other animals man Wherefore it is natural. Therefore. has naturally a larger brain. there neither would have been no weakness of old age. consists in the perfect in the subjection of the body to the soul. the contrary. no Catholic doubts it possible for a child to have. Dei xiv. Now it is clear that it principles of human it is befitting to the not have should that children nature is as natural as sufficient strength for the use of their limbs immediately after birth. vii. 1 1). innocence children would have been On But in the state of Therefore from the first they begotten by generation. we must be guided by the nature of things. the weakness of old age seems to correspond to that of infancy. i Obj. On the other hand. they would often have been unable something pleasurable offered to them and so was not possible they would have been afflicted. that the nerves which are instruments of movement. But in the state of innocence before sin. / answer that. children would not have been deprived of the use of their limbs. and are made known to us by Divine authority. except in those things which are above nature. should not be apt for moving the limbs. limbs human in the to find state it was impossible primitive anything repugnant to man's well-ordered fail will. Everything generated is first imperfect. 3. which to procure . the use of its limbs immediately after birth. Therefore would there have been such weakness in infancy. by Divine power. in making any assertion. which rightness. Obj. would have been imperfect in bodily size and power.351 STATE OF THE OFFSPRING Q- 99- Art. 4. Further. 30). Further. inability to secure a proffered pleasure causes affliction.

but not senile defects leading to corruption. of their limbs immediately after birth. but to the dryness of the brain. ii. 99. Reply Obj. Augustine is speaking of the weakness which we observe in children even as regards those acts which befit the state of infancy as is clear from his preceding remark that even when close to the breast. must. may add that they would have desired nothing except with an ordinate will and only what was befitting to their We . yet not subject to corruption. state of life.Q. they are more apt to cry than to suckle. Art. Reply Obj. In the state of innocence man would have been born. is due. Therefore in that state there could have been certain infantile defects which result from birth. The fact that some animals have the use . 2 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " Now the 352 commands. and longing for it. in the primitive state. human will We therefore. 3) that a were outside the purpose of she as product male. befitting the state of infancy. and the like. 2. women would have been born? proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection i. But the same acts are not befitting to man at every season of life. not to their superiority. since more perfect animals are not so endowed . It would seem that in the primitive state woman would not have been born. whether. is well ordered when it tends to acts which are befitting to man. of conclude that children would not have had sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the purpose performing every kind of act but only for the acts . Reply Obj. though But in that state nothing would have been unnature. 3 is clear from what we have said above. Reply Obj. Second Article. 4. so that a small amount of strength suffices them. For the Philosopher We — woman is a misbegotten says (De Gener. and to the operations proper to such animals being imperfect. I. . Animal. such as suckling.

On the contrary. Since. Woman : is said to be a misbegotten male. sufficiently multiplied by the first the fact that they would have lived Therefore. that Obj. Reply Obj. not have been born. as it is written (Gen. which 1. XCII. But God established male and female in human nature. But the race would have been man and woman. 2 state human women would Therefore generation. Reply Obj. vi. Art. in oo. Further. both sexes would have been begotten.4 23 . as being a product outside the purpose of nature considered in the individual case but not against the purpose of universal nature. and ii. in the state of innocence defect. as above explained (Q. / answer that. Nothing belonging to the completeness of human nature would have been lacking in the state of innofore also in the state of inocence cence. And as different grades belong to the perfection of the universe. There- male and female would have been born. 2. there was no need for women to be born. so also diversity of sex belongs to the perfection of human nature. But in generation the active force is in the male. Further. 3. every agent produces its like. in the state of innocence generation is ordered to the multiplication of the human race. from for ever.353 natural STATE OF THE OFFSPRING in Q. 2. A. and the southern wind that of females: sometimes also by some impression in the soul (of the parents). iq) either .. ad 2). The northern wind favours the generation Histor. i. thus the Philosopher says (De Animal. Therefore in the state of innocence. as the objection supposes but sometimes by an extrinsic accidental cause. therefore. The generation of woman is not occasioned by a defect of the active force or by inept matter. i. in the state of innocence. nor it man's active force was not subject to was there inept matter on the part of the woman. seems that males would always have been born. Obj.). nature's process in generation have been in harmony with the manner in which it would was established by God. i. unless prevented by insufficient power or ineptness of matter: thus a small fire cannot burn green wood. : of males.

(of the child). and not only the first parents. From this it seems to follow that males and females would have been in equal numberto .99- Art. The offspring would have been begotten an animal life. 3. Reply Obj. Especially was this the case in the state of innocence. as to the use of food and generation. when the body was more subject to the soul so that by the mere will of the parent the sex of the offspring might be diversified. Hence it was fitting that all should generate. 2 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA some effect " 354 may easily have on the body .

long as man Anselm says (De Concep. Further. he would have begotten children : endowed with righteousness together witli the rational soul. Therefore neither would righteousness have been transmitted from parents to the children. for thus it would be infused by God alone. not transmitted from the parent. Obj. as grace is Apostle says (Rom. Therefore children to one would not have been born righteous.) : Before sin.) "As did not sin. i. It would seem that in the state of innocence men would not have been born in a state of righteousness. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS RIGHTEOUSNESS. Victor says (De Sacram. We — For Hugh of St. 21). the first man nvould have begotten children sinless. but not heirs to their father's righteousness.) We of to consider the condition of the offspring as Under this head there are two points of to righteousness. soul But the 3. now have : inquiry Whether men would have been born in a state righteousness ? (2) Whether they would have been born (i) confirmed in righteousness ? First Article. but is another. the 2. {In Arlicles. righteousness is in the soul. x. whether men would have been born righteousness ? in a state of proceed thus to the First Article: Objection i. Obj. is effected by grace. righteousness v. .QUESTION Two C. Now not transfused from natural . is On the contrary. Virg. Further. 16.

in which the first man was created.). This grace. 2. Reply Obj. . Akt. •' 356 I answer Man naturally begets a specific likeness to Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the species. which is not soul. original sin.. which would not have liimself. . This is clear from the fact that opposites are of the same genus and . would not have been natural. but to the execution of the act thereof. is called the sin of nature. These words of Hugh are to be understood as referring. which is opposed to original righteousness. human body is apt to From this the reply receive it. but with original righteousness. they would also have been born in grace thus we have said above that the first man was created in grace (ibid. the children would have been assimilated to their parents as regards original righteousness. however. not to the habit of righteousness. Now original righteousness. were born in original righteousness. Reply Obj. not with the righteousness of grace.Q. I THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA that. transmitted by the parent. for it would not have been transfused by virtue of the semen but would have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational In the same way the rational soul. A. unless nature fails in its operation. not as caused by the principles of the species. wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring. occurred in the state of innocence. to the third objection is clear. Some say that children would have been born. which is the But principle of merit. but as a gift conferred b}' God on the entire human nature. 100. consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God. But individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and child. and for this reason also. is infused by God as soon as the results XCV. . which subjection from sanctifying grace. we must conclude that if children plained (Q. i. as above exi). since the root of original righteousness. must be alike in parent and child. which conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made. was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species.

himself.: If no sinful corruption had infected our first parent. 3. in those born of him. Obj. 18) // our first parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation. so that with their offspring they would have been unable to sin any more. they would have been confirmed in grace. Q. Obj. Further. Therefore. the angels who remained faithful to at God. Further. Dei xiv. nor any of their race — Augustine says (De Civ. 2. while the others sinned.) on the words of Job iii. he ivould not have : We — begotten 'children of hell'. 10) ivould have been Vac whole human race if neither : — had committed any sin for which they would have been . Anselm sajs (Cur Deus Homo i. good is stronger than evil. in grace if he But he would have begotten children like Therefore they also would have been born con- man would have been confirmed firmed in righteousness. once confirmed in grace. iv. if the first man had persevered in righteousness.>"° '^"t. It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. Further.357 STATE OF THE OFFSPRING Second Article. his descendants would have derived from him the necessity of preserving righteousness. Happy they that is. In like manner. the necessity of sin. whether in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness? proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection i. On the contrary. 4. 13 For now I should have been asleep. etc. were therefore. For Gregory says (Moral. had persevered. But by the sin of the first man there resulted. Obj. no children would have been born of him but such as were destined to be saved by the Redeemer. in Therefore all would have been born confirmed : righteousness. our first parents had committed any evil to be transmitted to their descendants. so as to be unable henceforth to sin. Therefore the children would have been born confirmed in righteousness.

This argument is not conclusive. through the beatitude given by and when once it has seen God. he would not children have begotten of hell in the sense that they would contract from him sin which is the cause of hell yet by Reply Obj. Anselm does not say this by way of assertion. If Adam had not sinned. For the rational creature is confirmed it cannot but cleave to Him Who is the essence of goodness. such . as was granted to the Virgin Mother of God. Reply Obj. this would not have been owing to their being confirmed in righteousness. wherein alone there is generation. Now the parents. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 358 condemned. any of their descendants might have done evil and therefore they would not have . which is clear from his mode of expression as follows It seems that if they had : lived. as long as they begot children. 3.Q. though Anselm seems to have been influenced by it. Reply Obj. they did not become children of hell by falling into sin. loo. 1 answer that. wherefrom no one can turn away. 2. but only as an opinion. ness. Adam had attained to that happy state of in His God Essence. If. our first From which words we gather that even if parents had not sinned. Hence it is clear that children would not have been born confirmed in righteousbelieve we And as soon as . he would have become spiritual seeing in soul and bod}' and his animal life would have ceased. been born confirmed in righteousness. : sinning of their they could have become children of hell. would not have been confirmed in righteousness. etc. i. however. Art. For it is clear that at their birth they would not have had greater perfection than their parents at the time of begetting. since nothing is desired or loved but under the aspect of good. but to Divine free-will own Providence preserving them free from sin. in righteousness the clear vision of God . It does not seem possible that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. I say this according to the general law for it may be otherwise in the case of special privilege. as appears .

incurred by the descendants would not have been such that they could not return to righteousness. which is the case Wherefore neither would the only with the damned. .359 STATE OF THE OFFSPRING Q loo. Art. both before and after choice. 2). 2 from For the necessity of sin his words above quoted.. parents have transmitted to their descendants the necessity which is only in the blessed. for man's free-will is changeable. 4. There is no comparison between man and the angels. said above in treating of the angels (Q. whereas the angel's is not changeable. of not sinning. Reply Obj. as we have A. LXIV.

2. 3. Therefore children would have been born of him with pergifted with perfect fect is a result of sin. righteousness. But ignorance is privation of knowledge.QUESTION Two CI. For Adam would have begotten children like himself. LXXXV.160 soiil is naturally like a blank . ignorance (c/. 3). whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge ? proceed thus to the First Article: Objection 1. Further. children would have been gifted with But knowledge is required for righteousness from birth. innocence children would have the state of in Whether (i) been born with perfect knowledge? (2) Whether they would have had perfect use of reason at the moment of birth ? : First Article. It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge.. A. On the contrary. XCIV. Obj.) We next consider the condition of the offspring as to knoware two points of inquiry there this head Under ledge. 3). Adam was knowledge. {In Articles.. as Bede says Q. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE. Therefore before sin children would have had perfect knowledge as soon as they were born.-II. Therefore they would also have been gifted with knowledge. A. I.. since it directs our actions. Obj. Further. But We — knowledge (Q. The humnn .

as above explained (Q. when authority is wanting. not in that respect. in which Reply Obj. Reply Obj. Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some particular time and this would not have been in cliildren from their birth. we must be guided by the ordinary course of nature. The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident of our first parent. 4). no ignorance would have been in them. Therefore he begot children like himself. would not have been born with perfect knowledge. for they would have possessed the knowledge due to them at that time.. so far as he was established as the father and instructor of the whole human race. LV. angels. and this knowledge of theirs would have been much more complete than what we have now by nature. needs it the soul were for its proper operation and this would not be so if endowed at birth with knowledge not acquired . in the state of innocence. but only in those accidents which were natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature. A. Now it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses. Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness. XCIX. as likewise their know- ledge of other universal principles. as which are above nature.)..361 tablet STATE OF THE OFFSPRING Q loi- Art. 6). LXXXIV. through the sensitive powers. As above regards belief in naatters stated (Q. Hence. Therefore the souls of children would have been without knowledge at birth. that it . We that. as the Jt^liilosopher says (De Anima iii. 2 Q. and so. 1. according to Dionysius (Coel. men are guided by universal principles of right. / answer that. A. we rely on authority alone. i). Hier. but only nescience in regard to certain matters. but in course of time they would have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or learning. A. . 2. But the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been in the state of innocence. Such nescience was even in the holy . vii. i on which nothing is written.. Reply Obj. and for this reason is the soul united to the body. children must conclude then. 3.

A. perfect use of reason. and therefore. some animals at birth have the use of their natural powers. Further.Q. and likewise. Now children are hindered in the use of these powers on account of the humidity of the brain wherefore they have perfect . so long as the latter are poreal organs hindered. man has not the . as to matters regarding that particular perfect use of reason. The is a load upon the soul On the contrary. Obj. in the state of innocence. is due to the soul We — being weighed down by the body. 7). the use of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers wherefore. . it in paradise.. 15). Now . as we see in those who are asleep or the sensitive powers are situate in cordelirious. As above stated (Q. use of reason in our perfect present state. Therefore. It would seem that children would have had For that children have not perfect use of reason at birth. as the lamb at once flies from the Much more. the action of the former is of necessity hindered also. ix. 2. they would have had a more perfect use than they have now. the use of reason. LXXXIV. use neither of these powers nor of reason.Akt. while the senses are tied and the interior sensitive powers hampered. therefore. children would not have had the which the}' would have enjoyed later Yet on in life. because. 362 whether children would have had perfect use of reason at birth ? proceed thus to the Second Article : Objection i. consequently. would men in the state of wolf. which was not the case corruptible body (Wisd. In all things produced by generation nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. ioi. before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom. innocence have had perfect use of reason at birth. children would have had the perfect use of reason at birth. as is written. 2 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" Second Article. I answer that. Therefore. Therefore children would not have had the perfect use of reason from the very outset.

soul. A.XCIX.363 state. Reply Obj. 2. The because matters which belong to man at all ages. i. Reply Obj. it Q. A. This fly . Art. Moreover a special impediment exists in man from the humidity of the brain. Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on.. from the fact that birds teach their young to may be observed in other animals.. 2 explained above regarding the use of their limbs corruptible body is a load upon the hinders the use of reason even in those (Q. as we have said above (Q. loi. i). XCIX. as STATE OF THE OFFSPRING I). is clear and the like .

whether paradise is a corporeal place ? proceed thus to the First Article: Objection 1. as is clear from the Philosopher (Meteor. and because beneath the moon is the region of fire. have visible sources elsewhere. i. Obj. Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place.QUESTION (In Four CII. 3. Further. 10). Under head there are four points of inquiry (i) Whether paradise is a corporeal place ? (2) Whether it is a place : apt for human in habitation ? ? (3) For what purpose w^as man paradise placed created in paradise ? (4) Whether he should have been First Article. both because it is contrary to the nature of the earth to be raised up so high. which would consume the earth. which is paradise. Further.). * Strabus. WHICH Articles. 2. We this next consider man's abode. Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place. Scripture mentions four rivers as rising But the rivers there mentioned in paradise (Gen. IS OF MAN'S ABODE. 8. We — Obj. But no earthly place answers that description. It would seem that paradise is not a corporeal place. ii. although men have explored the entire habitable world. ii. For Bede* says that paradise reaches to the lunar circle. Gloss on Gen. 364 . place.) PARADISE. yet none have made mention of the place Therefore apparently it is not a corporeal of paradise.

. be explained to mean that paradise reaches to the moon. but figuratively. while others. It may. pleases spiritual. as the Philosopher explains (De hand is nobler than the left hence : of the heavens. viii. whose opinion. As Augustine : truth of the spiritual paradise. Augustine says {Gen. because. 21) Nothing prevents us from holding. while the planting of the trees of paradise is recorded after the work of the six days. tells us about paradise is set down as matter of history and wherever Scripture makes use of this method. 18). a I answer that. and in this respect it is like the heavenly bodies. ad lit. is a place situated in the east.365 MAN'S ABODE— PARADISE 4. for corporeal trees were produced on the third day. says {De Civ. if taken in its obvious sense. the trees also of paradise must be corporeal. 3). it hand ii. Art. i) : Some Three general opinions prevail about paradise. But it seems they were not. but a spiritual place. within proper limits. 102. hold that paradise was both corporeal and spiritual. Obj. as Isidore says (loc. in paradise. the tree of life is described as growing But the tree of life is a spiritual thing. the atmosphere there is of a continually even temperature . however. so long as we believe in the For whatever events narrated as having there occurred. me. as Isidore says (Etym. Dei xiii. Reply Obj. believed that the earth. 2). Further. and the right fitting that was God should place the earthly paradise in the east. Therefore paradise also is not a Obj. for it is written of Wisdom that She is a tree of life to them that lay hold on her (Prov. i.). i Further. On the contrary. it was situated the east is in the most excellent part of Now the right Coel. Q. Bede's assertion is untrue. for it is to be It was fitting that it should be in the east . xiv. Scripture . we must hold to the historical truth of the narrative as a foundation of whatever spiritual explanation we may offer. its name being the Greek for garden. which are devoid of opposing . 5. cit. if paradise be a corporeal place. Therefore paradise was not a corporeal place. place entirely I confess. And so paradise. iii. corporeal. not literally. a others understand a place merely corporeal.

whose sources are said to be known. tree. According Augustine (Gen. But in this sense it would not be a fit place for human dwelling. and the like arise. It may also be said to signifv spiritually the free-will. and so called because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power. lit. A. we . is made all of the moon than of other bodies.o. and yet signified Christ. where rain. Art. 3). were actually produced. which cannot be crossed. of moon nearest to us. 4. and wind. 3. of it. and is. so called in view of future events . as above stated (Q. and so people who have written about topography make no mention of it. because the moon is said to have influence on such changes. and then sprang up elsewhere. Others say that parathat is. XCVII. ad lit. by experience because. For who is not aware that such is the case with some other : streams ? situation of paradise is shut off from by mountains. and not attuned to the human temperament. . Yet it had a as the rock in the desert was of a spiritual signification material nature. I02. or some torrid region. v. viii. the most akin to the earth hence it is observed to be overshadowed by clouds so as to be almost obscured. to the middle space of dise reached to the moon the air. Augustine says {Gen. moreover. 5. the difference between the good of obedience evil of rebellion. Reply Obj.. or seas. and that the rivers. Reply Obj. viii. The the habitable world . the Mention. 2. through being uneven in temperature. as some to say. I THI- " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " is 366 rather elements. In like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a material Reply Obj. after the work of but day. The tree of life is a material tree. as is the lower atmosphere in the — neighbourhood of the earth. Reply Obj. ad . after eating of the consequent and the punishment. 4). however. because. flowed for sottie distance underground. the plants were not actually produced on the third in their seminal virtues whereas. the heavenly bodies. 5. man was to learn. the plants. 7) It is probable that 7nan has no idea where paradise was. both of paradise and others. the six days. According to other holy writers.

paradise was not of an even temperature for it is said to have been on the equator a situation of extreme heat. Therefore were adapted as a dwelling-place for man. this man's abode. 2 ought to say that all the plants were actually produced on the third day. There- We — — fore the place of also. including the trees of paradise: and what is snid of the trees of paradise being planted after the work of the six is to be understood. dwelling-place for man. by way of recapitula- days tion. since man is of an even temperament. Further. Further. It would seem that paradise was not a place adapted to be the abode of man. paradise was not occupied by man. less. there was no need for any other place than the one provided for other animals. Second Article. in the very beginning of their existence were made to dwell abode of the blessed that is. the place would be in heaven. they say. since twice in the year the sun passes vertically over the heads of its inhabitants. Further.367 MAN'S ABODE— PARADISE Q '0:^. 8). Obj. Therefore paradise was not a fit if it — . it seems that God made paradise to no purpose. Obj. For man and angels are But the angels from the similarly ordered to beatitude. which is adapted to the nature of the soul since the desire of heaven is implanted in all. Whence our text reads : The Lord God had planted ii. a place which contains nothing is useBut after sin. . 4. 2. If on the part of the soul. Obj. On the part of the body. man's habitation should have been there if some definite place were required for would be required on the part either of the soul or of the body. a paradise of pleasure from the beginning (Gen. Art. 3. Therefore paradise was not at all adapted to be the abode of man. . the empyrean heaven. whether paradise was a place adapted to be the abode of man? proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection i. a But fitting place for him should be of even temperature.

From within.. the body is corrupted by the consumption of the humours. . answer was that. By the second condition. as above explained {ibid. But it is not suited to man's nature. : corporeal places. and by old age. By the first of these two conditions. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 368 : On the contrary. i. God rtdes corporeal creatures through spiritual creatures. as presiding over it. but because in his soul there was a power preserving the body from corruption.). as a ruler over the entire corporeal creation it man in to his for abode beatitude. and exquisite atmosphere. and is outside the region of change. Among those things which corrupt the body from without. 11) Paradise ivas a divinely ordered region. as above stated (Q.. and decked with ever-flowering plants. Ortli. ii. the chief seems to be an atmosphere of unequal temperature and to such corruption a remedy In paradise is found in an atmosphere of equable nature. not because his body had a disposition to incorruptibility. Hence it is fitting that the spiritual nature should be established above the entire corporeal nature. Art. Reply Obj. A. 4). which is endowed with the highest degree of Thus the abode of beatitude was suited to the stability. as Damascene says Paradise was permeated with the all-pervading (loc. A. The empyrean heaven is the highest of . XCVII. as Augustine says (De Trin. ii. and in keeping with his original state of immortality. very nature of the angel therefore he was created there.Q.) brightness of a temperate. i). regard only : is a fitting Wherefore he was not placed from the beginning in the empyrean heaven. cit. because. pure. but was destined to be transferred thither in the state of his final beatitude. Whence it is clear that paradise was most fit to be a dwelling-place for man. Man incorruptible and immortal. I02. Damascene says {De Fid. since man is not set . Now the human body may be corrupted from within or from without. both conditions were found. it is a fitting abode for the state of beatitude. and man was able to ward off such corruption by food. it is a fitting abode for the angelic nature : for. afid worthy of him who was made I to God's image.

some particular place may have a certain fitness in was regard to spiritual substances. place though 2. 2 Reply Obj. some say that Enoch and Elias . although the sun passes over the heads of the inhabitants. because. because. Paradise did not become useless through being unoccupied by man after sin. cit. just as immortality was not conferred on man in vain.. as Damascene No irrational animal inhabited paradise. I.) : although. though he was to lose it. This seems to be more probable on account of the able. Aristotle dis- 5) that such a region is uninhabittinctly says (Meteor. However. and what man lost by sin. are extremely hot on account of the the matter. Therefore. because the sun is never too far off and never too hot. inasmuch as in his soul was the force which — preserved the human body from corruption. even those regions where the sun does not pass vertically overhead. still dwell in that paradise. it does . on account of the unvarying equality of day and night that it is never too cold there. . Art. mere proximity of the sun. the animals were brought thither by God to Adam and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the complicity of the devil. heat. Reply Obj. \ *4 . as regards both his body and his soul that is. This could not be said of the other animals. For the earthly paradise a place adapted to man. Reply Obj.369 MAN'S ABODE— PARADISE is Q. not remain long in that position. whether on the equator or elsewhere. Those who say that paradise was on the equinoctial line are of opinion that such a situation is most temperate. For thereby we learn God's kindness to man. 3. 4. Moreover. lo:. It is ridiculous to assert that any particular natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances. ii. says (loc. But whatever be the truth of we must hold that paradise was situated in a most temperate situation. by a certain dispensation.

as it did after sin but would have been pleasant on account of man's practical knowledge of the powers of nature. 3.. there is no need of a keeper when there no fear of trespass with violence. as the air . soil We — But the cultivation of the iii. striven to keep paradise for himself lest he should lose it . Therefore man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. Nor would man have but he would have kept paradise against a trespasser ness. I answer that. man at once relapses into darkin . Secondly. man and keep 2. 10).AKT. ii.Q. Obj. . viii. not placed in paradise to dress a punishment 17). Further. Further. which dressing would not have involved labour. Therefore it. . ad lit. It would seem that man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. by sanctifying work cease. in the sense that might Himself work him (for if this God placed man in paradise that He man and keep him. I02. and not contrariwise which seems to be false. For what was brought on him as a punishment of sin would not have existed in paradise in the state of innocence. whether man was placed in paradise to drlss IT ? it and KEEP proceed thus to the Third Article: Objection i. 15) The Lord God took man and placed him in the paradise of pleasure. these words of Genesis may be understood in two ways. Therefore there was no need for man to keep paradise. man would apparently have been made for the sake of paradise. 3 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " Third Article. grows dark when the light ceases to shine) and by keeping man from all corruption and evil. On the contrary. As Augustine says (Gen. if man was placed in paradise to dress and keep it. to dress and keep it. : First. 3. was was is of sin (Gen. Obj. But in paradise there was no fear of trespass with violence. It is written (Gen. that man might dress and keep paradise.

answer that. It is written (Gen.. paradise A. and not to Therefore that this might be attributed nature. the empyrean heaven. were from which on the earth they was created he after in have remained (Q. Now this regards the incorruptibility of the primitive but by a supernot was nature. to be transferred thence to heaven. Paradise was a fitting abode for man as state. and not conversely. God. and afterwards placed him there to live there to during the whole of his animal life and. 3. as the fish in water. On the contrary. But before sin paradise was a fitting abode for man. man's. human . Now man would made. 4). Further. God made man outside of paradise. woman was made in paradise. Reply Obj. for those in their nature. Therefore he was created in paradise.371 MAX'S ABODE— PARADISE sin. Fourth Akticle. ii. have been made in paradise. —namely. Further. It would seem that man was created in his dwelling-place created was the For angel paradise. were created there. The empyrean heaven was for the angels as regards their nature. a fitting abode and therefore they In the same way I places befit those animals reply to the second objection. But man Therefore much more should man is greater than woman. having attained the spiritual life. other animals remain in the place where and walking animals they are produced. Ob/. . 102. the Replies to the Objections are Whence made clear. Art. Q. whether man was created in paradise ? proceed thus to in Objection 1. XCV'II. 15) God took : man and I placed him in paradise. in paradise. wherefore was ordered to man's benefit. 4 by paradise All of which was for man's good. 2. Therefore it seems that man nv the Fourth Article: — was created Obj. by incorruptibility to natural gift of God. i.

Qio2. " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 372 was made in paradise. TIPTRRE. PRlNTEf' IN CAU** BRITAIN BY THE ANCHOR PRESS. Reply Obj. lier Woman reason of own where their parents were already. not by on account of the dignity of but dignity. . For the the principle from which her body was formed. 4 THK 3. LTB. ESSEX. Art.. same reason the children would have been born in paradise.

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