Executive Department - Privileges and salary Republic v. Sandiganbayan GR. No.
152154 July 15, 2003 Facts: Republic (petitioner), through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan pursuant to RA 1379. o declaration of the aggregate amount of US$ 356M deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. In addition, the Republic sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement dated December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. o The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the conditions contained therein. The General Agreement specified in one of its premises or "whereas clauses" the fact that petitioner "obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met x x x." Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental Agreements. In a resolution dated 31 January 2002, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republic's motion for summary judgment.
"The evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks. The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have been established and our judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been without basis."
The Republic filed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379. HELD: RA 1379 raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it. o The following facts must be established in order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be effected: (1) ownership by the public officer of money or
property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his name or otherwise, and (2) the extent to which the amount of that money or
property exceeds, i. e., is grossly disproportionate to, the legitimate income of the public officer.
(3) that the said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. The Republic was able to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss funds pursuant to RA 1379. o o Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officers. Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos had acquired and owned properties during their term of office, as evidenced by their admittance regarding the ownership of the Swiss accounts. o The Swiss accounts of the Marcoses had balances amounting to US $356 million, a figure beyond the aggregate legitimate income of $304,372.43. The Petition was granted. The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002, plus interest, are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines. RATIO DECIDENDI: (1973 CONST) Article VII, Sec. 4(2) – The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold any other office except when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice any profession, participate directly or indirectly in the management of any business, or be financially interested directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government owned or controlled corporation.
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government owned or controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.
Article IX, Sec. 7 – The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or administrative body, or manage any business, or practice any profession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualification as may be provided by law.
Article VII, Sec. 11 – No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
Succession - In case of temporary disability G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001
transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent. After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several FACTS: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose’ immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20,2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against theopening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under thename “Jose Velarde.” The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts. On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving MalacanangPalace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was
cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.” ISSUE: 1. 2. Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President. Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President.
FIRST ISSUE Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President.
a.) The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. b.) The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelop to clear his name. c.) During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after transition period. d.) His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of’ the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.
“Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions.” Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75 which states: “RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION’S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.” The Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 which states: “RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO’S NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES” Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
SECOND ISSUE The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President. Section 11 of Article VII:
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. Article VII prohibiting the President. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. Section 7. They find it unconstitutional against the provision provided by Section 13. 1991
HELD: The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government for self enrichment which a betrayal of public trust. Section 7. agency or instrumentality thereof. no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision. and their
FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. secretaries and other appointive officials of the executive department to hold two positions in the government and government corporations and to receive additional compensation. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision. Art IX (b)Section 7. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not. petitioner. par. practice any other profession. They shall not.
any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices. the said Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated “unless otherwise allowed by law” which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII . unless otherwise provided in this Constitution. respondent. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. (2). 284 issued by the President allowing cabinet members. participate in any business. agency. their deputies and assistants." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor General. Section 7.R. or the Office of the Ombudsman. vs. directly or indirectly. agency or instrumentality thereof. such as in the case of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. or as Secretaries. 83896 February 22. be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions. Members of the Cabinet. no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. or be financially interested in any contract with. agency or instrumentality thereof. Article IX (B). hold any other office or employment during their tenure. Article VII cannot be construed as a broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the legislative intent of both constitutional
. the Members of the Cabinet. during said tenure.Exceptions to prohibition from holding another office: Sec. including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION. No. undersecretary or asst. section 13 of the constitution. while Section 13. Vice-President. Thus the phrase “unless otherwise provided by the Constitution” in Section 13. of Justice as member of Judicial and Bar Council G. including Government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.President. Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President. including Government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries Art VII Section 13 The President. or instrumentality thereof. Article IX-B further states that “Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries. or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision.
deputies or assistants shall not. section 13. the Vice. ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII. Article IX (B) is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees. or in any franchise. Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other office or employment. during his tenure. Undersecretaries.
.provisions. The court thereby declared E. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies only to particular instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.O 284 as null and void.
P276. COMMISSION ON AUDIT. JOSEPH FRANCIA. as members of the Board of the National Housing Authority from the period covering 1991-1996. 757 is the law "Creating the National Housing Authority and dissolving the existing housing agencies. (5) the Secretary of Industry. and to receive compensation therefor. their deputies and assistants. and to effect the refund of the same from the time of the finality of the Supreme Court En Banc Decision in the consolidated cases of Civil Liberties Union vs." The total disallowed amount of "SEC. Undersecretaries or Assistant Secretaries and that they occupy positions lower than the position of Assistant Secretary. Inc. et al. On September 19. HELENA HABULAN. TITO GENILO and OSCAR ABUNDO. which became final and executory on August 19. during their tenure. 1991. or their representatives. was clarified in the Resolution of the Court En Banc on August 1. in that the constitutional ban against dual or multiple positions applies only to the members of the Cabinet. their deputies or assistants. Facts: The 20 petitioners herein were members of the Board of Directors of the NHA Petitioners appealed from the Notice of Disallowance to the Commission on Audit arguing that the SC Decision in Civil Liberties Union and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines. provides:
. NHA Resident Auditor issued a Notice of Disallowance disallowing in audit the payment of representation allowances and per diems of "Cabinet members who were the ex. providing funds therefor. While petitioners are not among those officers. 1991. hold any other office or employment during their tenure. DEDAL. "whose acts shall be considered the acts of their principals". and (7) the General Manager of the NHA. they are "alternates" of the said officers. CESAR MEJIA.600 paid as representation allowances and per diems to each of the petitioners covering the period from August 19.G. represented by its Commissioners. Section 13. 1991 to August 31. MARY LUZ ELAINE PURACAN. 13. 138489
November 29. Inc. defining its powers and functions. in violation of the rule on multiple positions. PORFIRIO VILLENA. their deputies and assistants to hold other offices. et al. petitioners. Vice-President. (4) the Secretary of Labor. REYDELUZ CONFERIDO. Secretary of Agrarian Reform. VII of the 1987 Constitution. The President. directly or indirectly
from 1991 to 1996. the COA issued a decision denying petitioners' appeal.. They shall not. this petition. ALICE TIONGSON. Art. ISSUE: Whether or not COA erred in disallowing compensation of NHA Directors HELD: Presidential Decree No. JOB DAVID.R. declared Executive Order No. Hence. HENRY PAREL. JOEL LUSTRIA. vs. NERISSA SANCHEZ. on October 23. FEDERICO LUCHICO. Accordingly. and for other purposes." Section 7 thereof provides the composition of the Board of Directors It bears stressing that under the above provisions. Executive Secretary and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines. (3) the Secretary of Finance. On September 22. 1997. CARMELLA TORRES. It does not cover other appointive officials with equivalent rank or those lower than the position of Assistant Secretary and that the NHA Directors are not Secretaries. 1998. the Members of the Cabinet.
Development Authority. MA. JR. however. 1997.. promulgated on February 22. On this point. unless otherwise provided in this Constitution. RODOLFO QUIMBO. (6) the Executive Secretary. to immediately cause the disallowance of such additional compensation or remuneration given to and received by the concerned officials. LOURDES V. (2) the Director-General of the National Economic and The COA memo further stated that the said SC Decision. 1991. No. the COA issued a memo directing all unit heads/auditors/team leaders of the national government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations which have effected payment of any form of additional compensation or remuneration to cabinet secretaries. PHILIPPE LIM. and their deputies or assistants shall not. 1996
ELEANOR DELA CRUZ. vs. in addition to their primary offices.officio members of the NHA Board of Directors and/or their respective alternates who actually received the payments. respondents. SOLEDAD EMILIA CRUZ. 284 unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members. Transportation and Communications. the persons mandated by law to sit as members of the NHA Board are the following: (1) the Secretary of Public Works.
however. whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance. participate in any business. are
"The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions. Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned official's office.' Ex-officio likewise denotes an 'act done in an official character. including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. It refers to an 'authority derived from official character merely.. not expressly conferred upon the individual character.practice any other profession. Undersecretaries. including any government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. Article VII of the Constitution must not. or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision. or as Secretaries. Inc. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise 'any other office' within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. A contrary rule would give petitioners a better right than their principals.1âwphi1. by virtue of office' . it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. or be financially interested in any contract with. the prohibition under Section 13.10 held: "The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13.nêt
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office. The term ex-officio means 'from office. this Court. or heads of bureaus of offices. be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. Chairmen.' An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office. or some other such euphemism. and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office. agency or instrumentality thereof. but rather annexed to the official position. in Civil Liberties Union and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines. as ex-oficio members of the NHA Board. or as a consequence of office. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office Since the Executive Department Secretaries. or in any franchise." Interpreting the foregoing Constitutional provisions." it follows that petitioners who sit as their alternates cannot likewise be entitled to receive such compensation. and without further warrant or appointment"
prohibited from receiving "extra (additional) compensation. x x x "To reiterate. or the Office of Ombudsman.
NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION. COMMISSION ON AUDIT. PETITIONER. usually by law. process and review amnesty applications. An appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office. It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings. R. 1997. 156982. 1994. COMMISSION ON AUDIT. Ramos through Proclamation No. ISSUE: Whether representatives can be entitled to payment intended for ex-officio members RULING: The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere designation from the ex officio members who were themselves also designated as such. RESIDENT AUDITOR. and the Secretaries of Justice. RESPONDENTS. NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives amounting to P255. NO. However.750 for the period December 12. 1994 to June 27. The NAC is tasked to receive. DIRECTOR IV. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson. EULALIA. a designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position. NCR.
. JUANITO G. FACTS: Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25. SEPTEMBER 08.[ G. 2004 ] NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION. AND ERNESTO C. 347. VS. 1997. pursuant to COA Memorandum No.
Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position. on October 15. There is a considerable difference between an appointment and designation. a designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties. three regular members appointed by the President. 1994 by then President Fidel V. National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members. ESPINO. the three ex officio members turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria beginning December 12. Without an appointment. upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment. 97-038.
Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. MARCOS. Secretary of Justice. including his own. NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA). Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime. the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country. who has been expressly granted powers by the Constitution. independent from although related to the right to travel. the right to leave the country. PACIFICO E. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO. IRENE M. Executive power is what the president can/cannot do. Thus. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. in exercise of her executive power Issue: Whether or not. On the other hand. No. Notes • Exclusive list of powers – there are inherent limitations. MARCOS. The President. Yes. MARCOS. but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered. there is no grave abuse of discretion. TOMAS MANOTOC. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security. 1989 FERDINAND E.vs. MARCOS. 88211 October 27. However. the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country. SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ. a distinct right under international law. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". also has implied residual powers inherent to the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. respectively. CONRADO F. the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. public order. IMEE M. ESTRELLA. Executive Secretary. IMELDA R. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially. restricted by the doctrine of separation of powers. As long as there is some factual basis for the president’s decision. • Supreme court proved that Aquino can prevent Marcos from returning by defining and establishing that the president has residual powers
. in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs. FERDINAND R. and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel. She did not act in grave abuse of discretion. the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. respondents.Powers and Functions of the President: Executive Power G. has been barred by President CorazonAquino. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state. as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres.. RENATO DE VILLA. The President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution. FIDEL RAMOS. petitioners. CATALINO MACARAIG. FAST FACTS: The wish of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines. JR. GREGORIO ARANETA. in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution.R. ARANETA. public
health or morals or the separate rights of others. represented by its President. after having been exiled. Immigration Commissioner. MANOTOC.
There should be no gap in the exercise of power
. All powers that is not under judicial or legislative. derived from the oath she has taken during her inauguration.Inherent powers exercised by the President in accordance with her position.Residual powers .
as head of the Executive Department. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary. Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution. 17. bureaus. are. He may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally.DENR v.
. and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments. HELD: In said ruling. Thus. the court looked into the elementary doctrine of qualified political agency. and. the Regional director/office of DENR cannot enact said Memorandum as it is beyond its powers. unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive. August 19. However. 149725. presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. the President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time. The President shall have control of all the executive departments.
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Article VII. South Cotabato. performed and promulgated in the regular course of business. G. all executive and administrative organizations are helpers of the Executive Department. South Cotabato. as an alter ego. the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive. Under this doctrine.R. The DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal. valid 2. and offices. is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same. the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments. 2003 Fast facts: A Memorandum was issued by the Regional Director of the DENR pursuant to AO 99-14. the power of the President to reorganize
Issue(s) 1. Whether or not the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Whether or not DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum implementing the same were
the National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over a particular executive department. DENR employees that were going to be affected by the enactment of the said Memorandum filed a petition to enjoin such enactment. which recognizes the establishment of a single executive. Contention c/o DENR employees: The power to transfer the Regional Office of the DENR is executive in nature. The Memorandum set forth for the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal. which reads: Sec. except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally. Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency. DENR Region 12 Employees. No. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits. modify. review. Issue: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential control over the executive departments Held: There are generally two types of GOCCs:
offices. offices and agencies which authorized payment of productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in excess of P1. Then. bureaus.Control of executive departments Blaquera v. 21. The President can. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments. G. 19. and
Sec. In compliance therewith.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO 268. who are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies. The President shall have control of all the executive departments.000. Art. alter or nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in the executive departments. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted each official and employee of the government the productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent to 30% of the employee’s one month basic salary but which amount not be less than P2. including government boards of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions. Governmental power and authority are exercised and implemented through him. Incorporated in pursuance to State Policy. strike. 000. including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. the heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners’ salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments. 000. then Pres. then Pres. enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the President. 1998 Facts: On Feb. Section 17. o Those with Special/Original Charters which are subject to Civil Service Laws. His/her power includes control which means the power to alter what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. are strictly prohibited from granting productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and future years pending the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office of the Pres. Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1. all heads of agencies.
. Accordingly. Functions are mainly proprietary. His power includes the control of executive departments as provided under Sec. on Jan. and other such remedies available to workers of private corporations. 17. VII of the Constitution. enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without approval from him and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount. Alcala.00. The President of the Head of Government. The President is the head of the government. Said AO provided that the productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for the year 1991. Art IX Sec 5 . 1992. was just exercising his power of control over executive departments.Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees. the Pres.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. 109406. by virtue of his power of control.R. When the Pres. September 11. 1993.
o Those incorporated under the General Corporation Law are covered by Labor Laws and have the right to bargain collectively. The petitioners. have no right to bargain. bureau or offices under him.
was only exercising his power of control by modifying the acts of the heads of the government agencies who granted incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres.. dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel by committing limited resources of government for the equal payment of incentives and awards.
. thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources. too. is his control of executive departments.The Pres. The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits and to prevent discontent. The Pres.
unless it is apparent that such exercise of discretion is used to shield unfairness or injustice. is of such wide latitude that the courts will not generally interfere with the exercise thereof by the executive department. Issue: Can the President set aside the award made by SBMA in favor of HPPL? If so. awarded through public bidding or negotiation.Hutchison Ports vs. said award is not final and unassailable. G. agencies and instrumentalities including GOCCS involving P2M and above. within his authority. Petitioner filed action for specific performance. the same was within authority of the President and was a valid exercise of his prerogative. • When the President issued the memorandum setting aside the award previously
declared by SBMA in favor of HPPL. within his authority.R. It awarded the contract to
The President may. The Office of the President set aside the award and ordered a new bidding. 620 mandates that the approval of the President is
required in all contracts of the national government offices. or even recall the award thereof. It is well-established that the discretion to accept or reject any bid. No. 620 • Letters of Instruction No. SBMA.
petitioner. Aug. 131367. overturn or reverse any award made by
the SBMA Board of Directors for justifiable reasons.
the Office of the President direct SBMA to conduct rebidding of the proposed project? Held: • • Yes HPPL has not sufficiently shown that it has a clear and unmistakable right to be
declared the winning bidder. 2000 FACTS: The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority conducted a bidding for the development and operation of a modern marine container terminal. 31. overturn or reverse any award made by the SBMA Board of Directors for justifiable reasons. • The SBMA Board of Directors are subject to the control and supervision of the
President. All projects undertaken by SBMA require the approval of the President under Letters of Instruction No. • The President may. Though SBMA Board of Directors may have declared them as winner.
It provided. COA resident auditor issued a notice of suspension requiring the submission of the legal basis for the full implementation of the new salary schedule. RA 6758 took effect. This is necessary to provide order. Held: Budgetary appropriations under the GAA do not constitute unbridled authority to government agencies to spend the appropriated amounts as they may wish. policies and programs of the executive branch. No. respondent.[G. COA resident auditor issued a notice of disallowance. among others. Executive officials who are subordinate to the President should not trifle with the President’s constitutional power of control over the executive branch. The constitutional vesture of this power in the President is self-executing and does not require statutory implementation. This case would not have arisen had NEA complied in good faith with the directives and orders of the President in the implementation of the last phase of the Salary Standardization
. 143481. appointive or elective.” The presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends to all
NEA implemented the salary increase but it did not do so in two trenches. the Senate and the HR urged the President. and the need to levitate the plight of government personnel. much less withdrawn. vs. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. COA sustained the decision made by the resident auditor. Under our system of government all executive departments. 1 in TWO TRENCHES. NEA argues that it may accelerate the implementation of the salary increases due to the availability of funds. 2002] NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION. In response to pressing economic difficulties. COMMISSION ON AUDIT. February 15. The President shall have control of all the executive departments. by the legislature. Chapter 7. nor may its exercise be limited.
Section 60. including positions in GOCCs. Section 17 of the Constitution which provides as follows: “Sec. There is only one Chief Executive who directs and controls the entire executive branch. efficiency and coherence in carrying out the plans. petitioner. financing and regulating electric cooperatives throughout the country.
executive employees from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. And thus. Book VI of the Administrative Code provides that no portion of the appropriations in the GAA shall be used for payment of any salary increase or adjustment unless specifically authorized by law or appropriate budget circular Section 33 of the 1997 GAA itself expressly provides that the salary increase authorized by
Facts: The National Electrification Administration is a GOCC with the responsibility of organizing. and all other executive officials must implement in good faith his directives and orders. bureaus and offices. expressly or impliedly. through a joint resolution to increase the salary of government employees. R. 17.
the Senate-HR Joint Resolution or the salary standardization law are subject to the approval by the President Section 10 of EO 289 does not authorize. This precept is embodied in Article VII. the advance implementation of the salary increases just because the GOCC has the available funds. President Ramos acted on the joint resolution and issued EO 389 which directed payment of the fourth and final salary increases authorized under Joint Resolution No. a salary schedule for all government positions. bureaus and offices are under the control of the President of the Philippines.
The reasons advanced by NEA in disregarding the President’s directives and orders are patently flimsy. even ill-conceived.
.Law II. The directives and orders are clearly and manifestly in accordance with all relevant laws.
The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over
local governments. Sec. insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent is a valid exercise of the President's power of general supervision over local governments. ". withholding 10% of the IRA is in
"SECTION 4. which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue allotments. supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. ISSUES:
284 (c) of the Local Government Code. Interior and Local Government. 4) The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. HELD: consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues. "Supervisory power. Aguirre. . In administrative law. 372. on the other hand. Petitioner contends that by issuing AO 372. WON Section 1 of AO 372. it does not include any restraining authority over such body. any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one. when contrasted with control." Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments.
." 1. Moreover. (Art. insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order. are valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local governments. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them. G. YES. the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body. X. Sec. (Art. and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance. July 19. WON Section 4 of AO 372. means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. (2) 1. 16) Pimentel v. 2.
contravention of Sec 286 LGC and of Sec 6 Article X of the Constitution.General supervision over local governments/autonomous regions The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Control. . Furthermore." This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. There are several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government. issued by the President. which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments. . 132988. 2000 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order No. and Budget and Management. . X. . so long as they act within the scope of their authority. the President exercised the power of control over LGUs in contravention of law. providing for the automatic release to each of these units its share in the national internal revenue.
which orders the withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law . and (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues. This is mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code.
The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters. it still holds that the President’s directive in AO 372 is in conformity with law.Although the Supreme Court agrees with the Petitioner that the requisites were not complied with. Therefore. Any retention is prohibited.
**HELD: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. in order to ensure that local programs. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision. Therefore. fiscal and otherwise.
2. Interior and Local Government.
withholding of 10% of the LGU’s IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Section 4 of AO 372. and does constitute interference to local autonomy. Hence. The Local Government Code. are consistent with national goals. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. the "temporary" nature of the retention by the national government does not matter. provided that certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue as mandated by the Constitution. often temporarily”. Although temporary. The use of the term "shall" shows that the provision is imperative. Section 4 which orders the (4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one. and Budget and Management. A directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control. it is equivalent to a holdback. the President clearly overstepped the bounds of his lawful authority when he issued Section 4 of AO 372. AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his powers of supervision over local governments. specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose.
. which means "something held back or withheld. The AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country. It does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. NO.
but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the An "appointment" to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. and ATTY. petitioners. other public ministers and consuls. CONRADO QUIAOIT. 1999 one having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust.. appoint the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. of Justice Guingona for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Book IV of the Revised heads of the executive departments. HELD: The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress.16 In the exercise of the power of appointment. 131429 August 4.
subordinate officer. agencies. or officers ofAdministrative Code provides that “all provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain. BUDGET SECRETARY SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ. DAYAON. whether voluntary or compulsory.15 Indeed. or in the heads of departments. No. OSCAR BERMUDEZ. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. Control means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify. Title III. commissions. vs. deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. and those whom he may be authorized by law to ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the appoint. respondents. ambassadors. discretion is an integral part thereof.."
. JR. Ramos to the office. . what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties.” are vested in him in this Constitution. discretionary. G. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective. LLOBRERA and CLAUDIO L. It is a prerogative of the appointing power . or boards. Quiaoit was appointed by Pres. the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-in-Charge of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor. Section 9. or even nullify or set aside. Chap.R. and other officers whose appointments shall be appointed by the Pres. It should be here pertinent to state that the President is the head of government whose authority includes the power of control over all "executive departments. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN TORRES. with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The Congress may. II. such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. Facts: Petitioner Oscar Bermudez. by law. in essence. JUSTICE SECRETARY TEOFISTO GUINGONA. . Of Justice prescribed under the
The President shall nominate and. as well as
The power to appoint is. JR. was a recommendee of then Sec. it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Quiaoit took his oath and assumed office. upon the recommendation of the Secretary. vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the PresidentPresident can be held fatal to the appointment of Quiaoit alone. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment. bureaus and offices. in the courts.Power of Appointment
Petitioner Bermudez challenged the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Sec. Conrado Quiaoit had the support of then Representative Yap of the Second District of Tarlac. When the Constitution or the lawclothes the President with the power to appoint a Private respondent Atty. ARTURO A.
In the instant case. Book IV. in the appointment of a Provincial Budget Officer. of the Revised Administrative Code. could very well disregard or do away with the action of the departments. In the San Juan Case. The phrase "upon recommendation of the Secretary.to substitute the judgment of the latter. he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority. as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. Expressed in another way. bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority. The recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature.
. the Court there has explained that the President merely exercises general supervision over local government units and local officials. the President has the power to assume directly the functions of an executive department. and there is no sharing of power to speak of. exhortation or indorsement. It can accordingly be inferred therefrom that the President can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations. Title III. which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made . being the head of the Executive Department. should be interpreted. as it is normally so understood. bureau and office. to be a mere advise. indeed had to share the questioned power with the local government. through the Secretary of Budget and Management." found in Section 9. the latter being deemed for all intents and purposes as being merely an extension of the personality of the President. The President. hence. Chapter II. the executive department. the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice and the appointment of the President are acts of the Executive Department itself. and in so opting.
the 1987 Constitution on the other hand. The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. agencies. Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The President shall nominate and. other public ministers and consuls. These four (4) groups are: First. third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. appoint the heads of the executive departments. all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison’s appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. in the courts. FACTS: In this petition for prohibition. ISSUE: W/N all appointments made by the president require approval of the Commission on Appointments to be valid?
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress. other public ministers and consuls. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and. from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison’s salaries and emoluments. on the ground that Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. while the 1935 Constitution includes “heads of bureaus” among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments. ARCILLA. the President appoints. who are taxpayers. AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE. or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. Second. By
HELD: NO. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. The respondents.
following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated. that there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague. the heads of the executive departments. officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain. intervenor. with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. as Secretary of the Department of Budget. on the other hand. Section 16. and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
. if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Third. ambassadors. the petitioners. it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. No. The Congress may. but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The second. and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. or in the heads of the departments. As a matter of fact. 1987 ULPIANO P. vs.G. as already pointed out. SALVADOR MISON. Fourth. members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law. 79974 December 17. commissions or boards. lawyers. and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. petitioners. respondents. whether voluntary or compulsory. It is apparent. ambassadors. in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS. vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.R. in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET. by law.
He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison. Consequently.deliberately excluded the position of “heads of bureaus” from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
. Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
it follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of the CoA .R. Art.” And Sec 2(c). petitioner. SENATOR JOVITO R. vs. On the other hand. Cory made the designation of Bautista permanent. EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT MAY VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS AN APPOINTMENT THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION SOLELY BELONGS TO HER. the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself. 1989 MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA. The Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the president for it is constitutionally guaranteed that they must have a term of office. STILL. the CoE and the COA. respondents. without the confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers of government “whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint. Cory designated Bautista as the Acting Chairwoman of CHR. HELD: Since the position of Chairman of the CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the CoA. FACTS: On 27 Aug 1987. The provisions of EO 163-A is unconstitutional and cannot be invoked by Mallillin. averred that Bautista cannot take her seat w/o their confirmation.
. There can be no ad interim appointments in the CHR for the appointment thereto is not subject to CoA’s confirmation.G. In December of the same year. THERE WAS NO VACANCY TO WHICH AN APPOINTMENT COULD BE MADE ON 14 JANUARY 1989. Further. EO 163-A provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR should be at the pleasure of the President. that is. No. The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16. MALLILLIN. Art. unlike the Chairmen and Members of the CSC. whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the CoA. The CoA. To be more precise.
The exercise of political options that finds no support in the Constitution cannot be sustained. Appointments to the CHR is always permanent in nature. EO 163 authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the CHR. ignoring the decision in the Mison case. Mallillin invoked EO 163-A stating that since CoA refused Bautista’s appointment. Bautista should be removed . 16. 86439 April 13. 7 of the 1987 Constitution. filed with the CoA communications about Bautista’s appointment on 14 Jan 1989. Cory. 7. Bautista refused to be placed under the CoA’s review hence she filed a petition before the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista’s appointment is subject to CoA’s confirmation. SALONGA. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND HESIQUIO R. through the Exec Sec.
G.R. No. 91636 April 23, 1992 PETER JOHN D. CALDERON, petitioner, vs. BARTOLOME CARALE, in his capacity as Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission, EDNA BONTO PEREZ, LOURDES C. JAVIER, ERNESTO G. LADRIDO III, MUSIB M. BUAT, DOMINGO H. ZAPANTA, VICENTE S.E. VELOSO III, IRENEO B. BERNARDO, IRENEA E. CENIZA, LEON G. GONZAGA, JR., ROMEO B. PUTONG, ROGELIO I. RAYALA, RUSTICO L. DIOKNO, BERNABE S. BATUHAN and OSCAR N. ABELLA, in their capacity as Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission, and GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents. 1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election). 2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.
Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners of NLRC shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments . President Aquino appointed respondents as the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC. Carale filed a petition for prohibition questioning the constitutionality and legality of respondents permanent appointments. Calderon insists that the appointments must be submitted to the CA for confirmation. Issue: Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of appointments extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments Held: No. In Sarmiento III vs. Mison case, the Court stated that there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of the government whose appointment are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.
3. The Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Facts: Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was approved. Section 13 thereof provides that the Chairman, the Division
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of
appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because: 1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and 2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President. It cannot be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution was deliberately, not unconsciously, intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to be a departure from the system embodied in the 1935 Constitution where the Commission on Appointments exercised the power of confirmation over almost all presidential appointments, leading to may cases of abuse of such power of confirmation. Subsection 3, Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution provided that the President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureau, officers of the Army from the rank of the colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint..
Constitution, has undoubtedly evoked the displeasure and disapproval of members of the Congress. The solution to the apparent problem, if indeed a problem, is not judicial or legislative but constitutional.
The deliberate limitation on the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over presidential appointments, embodied in Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987
G.R. No. 107369
August 11, 1999
appointments is acting without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
JESULITO A. MANALO, petitioner, vs. PEDRO G. SISTOZA, REGINO ARO III, NICASIO MA. CUSTODIO, GUILLERMO DOMONDON, RAYMUNDO L. LOGAN, WILFREDO R. REOTUTAR, FELINO C. PACHECO, JR., RUBEN J. CRUZ, GERONIMO B. VALDERRAMA, MERARDO G. ABAYA, EVERLINO B. NARTATEZ, ENRIQUE T. BULAN, PEDRO J. NAVARRO, DOMINADOR M. MANGUBAT, RODOLFO M. GARCIA and HONORABLE SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ II In His Capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents. The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Facts: On December 13, 1990, former President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Republic Act 6975, creating the Department of Interior and Local Government. The said Act states that the PNP Chief, Chief Superintendent and Director General shall be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Pursuant thereto, Pres. Aquino, through Executive Secretary Franklin S. Drilon, promoted 15 police officers to permanent positions in the Philippine National Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The said police officers took their oath of office and assumed their respective positions. Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of subject appointments and disbursements made therefor. He contents that: 1) RA 6975 requires confirmation of the appointments of officers from the rank of senior superintendent and higher by the CA; 2) The PNP is akin to the Armed Forces where the Constitution specifically requires confirmation by the CA, and 3) Respondent Secretary in allowing and/or effecting disbursements in favor of respondent officers despite the unconstitutionality and illegality of their It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; 2) Whether or not the PNP is akin to the AFP 3) Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 are constitutional Held: 1. Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to be appointed by the President: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 1) Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation Issues:
of appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. 2. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. Under Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, “The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and service, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of the State.” On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of the Constitution ordains that: “The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.” The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. 3. Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the Commission on Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments are not required by the Constitution to be confirmed are unconstitutional. The rest of Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that when provisions of law declared void are severable from the main statute and the removal of the unconstitutional provisions would not affect the validity and enforceability of the other provisions, the statute remains valid without its voided sections.
Naval Captain. filed a petition with the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of their assumption of office. G. Rear Admiral. No. which requires confirmation of the COA. 153881. the PCG is under DOTC not the Philippine Navy. the appointments of the respondents need not be subjected for confirmation by the CA.ATTY. ET AL. REUBEN LISTA. Commodore. The clause “officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain” refers to military officers alone. Petitioner. Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution is exclusive. Since it is not included in the first group. Moreover.R. ELPIDIO SORIANO III VS. as a taxpayer. March 24. Held: The appointments are legal and constitutional.
. The enumeration of appointments subject to confirmation by the CA under Article 7. 2003 Facts: Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by the President to Vice Admiral. and they assumed office without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA).
In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President. October 13. Issue: Whether or not President Arroyo’s appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session is constitutional. maintain that the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session. holds a position of great trust and confidence. whether regular or The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. such as the office of a Respondent secretaries. intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the without first having obtained its consent. 164978. whether regular or acting. The scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint is limited to department secretary. The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Congress cannot appoint a person to
However. Facts: While Congress is in their regular session. and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office. Congress.” office. It is a stop-gap measureallows it to interfere. the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. because "in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary. The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential appointments. 2005)
The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature. It is a stop-gap measure acting. the exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. on the other hand. issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Neither may Congress impose on the secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. President Arroyo. even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress. Petitioners senators filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued. An alter ego. whether temporary or permanent. to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Constitutionality of President Arroyo’s issuance of appointments to respondents as acting secretaries President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita. it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary." Petitioners further assert that "while Congress is in session. Held: On the Nature of the Power to Appoint
department secretary. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President. there can be no appointments. the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.(Aquilino Pimentel vs. G.
office. through Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita. No. through a law. the acting appointee to the office must
. President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondentsPetitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents as acting secretaries as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity . Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the
intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to thelegislature. such as the office of a the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Thus:
After the Congress had adjourned."
They assert that “while Congress is in session.R. Congress. there can be no appointments. cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be. without first having obtained its consent. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President. to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego.
by the very nature of the office of a department secretary. as long as the President deems that person competent. 17 apply to appointments vested in the President by the Constitution? Petitioners assert that it only applies to appointments vested in the President by law. Title I. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. Ad-interim appointments vs. the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. Moreover adinterim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection. whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Book III of EO 292. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but. appointments in an acting capacity Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Thus. Chap. the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service. Express provision of law allows President to make acting appointment Sec. 5. Book III. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee. Title I. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress. but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee. But does Sec. 17. they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.” Thus. like the use of acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Chapter 5.necessarily have the President’s confidence. Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in Section 17(3). The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses. EO 292 states that “[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse.
. if abused. acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments.
whether he can make appointments to the judiciary during the period of the ban in the interest of public service. Article VII: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end “midnight” appointments. at least. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and For the lower courts.
. five. 1998 Facts: Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30.Sec. 15.
safety. Article VII offrames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. respectively. viz. It may sit en banc or in its discretion. Article VIII : The members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed November 9. Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII. 4 (1). There may well be appointments to important positions which have to be appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service orand so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need endanger public safety. Article VIII : The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. Such appointments. 1998 of Hon. except temporary made even after the proclamations of a new President. Held: The provisions of the Constitution material to the inquiry at bar read as follows: Sec.M. and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time Issue: whether. Obviously. VII of the Constitution. to be expresslysubmission of the list. The exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public
those made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their number and the time of their making — but also appointments of the Presidential election.In Re Appointments of Hon. 9.
Section 15. 15. or seven Members. Placido Vallarta A. Constitution.” can be made by the outgoing President. Such appointments need no confirmation.
elections and up to the end of his term. No. every vacancy. 98-5-01-SC. It is not noteworthy that the the. so long as they are “few
Section 15 may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only “midnight” appointments — Sec. except temporary appointments to executive positions when before the next presidential elections and up to the end his term” — the President is neither continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. in divisions of three. These appointments appear prima facie. during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any appointments two months immediately before the next presidentialDuring the period stated in Section 15. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. for the appointment and the appointee’s qualifications. Article VI is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15. prohibited by Sec.: by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for. the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during the period of the ban. the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. a President or Acting President shall not make appointments. in view of prohibition on appointments comes into effect only once every six years. Art. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared elections offenses in the Omnibus Election Code. Article VII of the Constitution — “(t)wo months immediately required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so. and (2) those made for partisan considerations. the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the Cabanatuan City. Article VII consist of the so-called
of his term.
. there is a strong public policy for the prohibition against appointments made within the period of the ban. On the other hand. Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII.While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban.
Petitioner justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of said employees were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor. The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the 14 employees for lack of merit. ARISTEO CATALLA. DIVINO DE JESUS. VII. 131136
February 28. ELADIO MARTINEZ. Sec. Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao. petitoner Conrado De Rama wrote a letter to the CSC seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal employees. applies only to the President or Acting President. No. BERNARDITA MENDOZA. FELECIDAD ORINDA Y. 2001
CONRADO L. JANE MACATANGA y ADELFO GLODOVIZA and FLORENIO RAMOS.
. MORELL AYALA. MA.” specifically those made within 2 months immediately prior to the next presidential elections.R. respondents. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. DE RAMA. pointing out that the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to local elective officials. 15 of the Constitution
Held: The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-called “midnight appointments. ELSA MARINO. PETRA MUFFET LUCE. FLORDELIZA ORIASEL. THE COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION. petitioner. The CSC dismissed petitioner’s allegation that these were “midnight” appointments. Sec. DAISY PORTA. GRACIELA GLORY. VII. done in violation of Art. Quezon. 15 of the Constitution. vs. The CSC opined that the appointing authority can validly issue appointments until his term has expired. as long as the appointee meets the qualification standards for the position.
Issue: Whether or not the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor are forbidden under Art. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION).G.
PGMA renewed the ad interim appointments. Art. The term. The fact that is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. Later. 1(2). Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman. ad interim. 1(2). IX-C
.VII of the Constitution provides as follows:
FACTS: COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as “Acting Director IV” of the EID.
Rights of an Ad Interim Appointee An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that moment a government employee and therefore part of the civil service.Matibag vs. first by Chairperson Demetrio and then by Commissioner Javier. whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Sec. Benipayo. How Ad Interim Appointment is Terminated
.. He can only be removed for cause. PGMA appointed. and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office. IX-C (2) Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo. 149036 .. each for a term of 7 yrs. consistent with the requirements of due process. It does not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. No. He enjoys the constitution protection that “[n]o officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.
“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress. and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners. the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment. 2002
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The three took their oaths of office and assumed their positions. has acquired a definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence. whether voluntary or compulsory. The second paragraph of Sec. Art. although not found in the text of the Constitution. signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President.” Thus. xxx
ISSUES: (1)Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo.the term “ad interim appointment”… means a permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. Art. G. an ad interim appointment becomes complete and
irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office. Such appointment was renewed in “temporary” capacity twice. However. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on
moment he qualifies. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the
Nature of an Ad Interim Appointment An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office.R. after notice and hearing. Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Sec.”
Thus.. April 2. since the Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments. he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but also by the Constitution. Borra and Tuason are legal. but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.16. Once an appointee has qualified.
These resolutory conditions constitute. the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee xxx
The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2). These two causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all ad interim appointments. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under Section 16. Article VII of the Constitution. can complain because it is the Constitution itself that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad interim appointees. an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. but because of a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment.An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Ad Interim Appointment vs. Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16. In this instance. The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President. the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. No one. in effect. and such new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years. Article VII of the Constitution. A by-passed appointment is one
that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. including the COMELEC xxx Was the renewal of appointment valid? There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. no matter how briefly. Article IX-C of the Constitution. The first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions. the President can no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment. Since the Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision. Absent such decision. a Sword of Damocles over the heads of ad interim appointees. The disapproval is a decision on the merits. The second cause is the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment. however. and not because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2).
. Temporary Appointment While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law.
the basis for his removal was his conviction in the Sandiganbayan – this is not one of those grounds enumerated in the Administrative Code. As a career service officer. the Sandiganbayan convicted Larin for grave misconduct. Larin is a presidential appointee who belongs to the career service of the Civil Service. the Supreme Court notes that when Larin’s conviction was appealed to the Supreme Court.Aquilino Larin vs The Executive Secretary Law on Public Officers – Career Service Appointees Must Be Removed for Valid Reasons Aquilino Larin was an Assistant Commissioner in the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the employment was made. as contra-distinguished from noncareer service whose tenure is co-terminus with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure. the Supreme Court actually absolved Larin. at the same time.
. an administrative complaint was filed with the same office. Larin’s removal was recommended. HELD: No. In the case at bar. His conviction was reported to the Office of the President. He can only be removed from his office on grounds enumerated in the Administrative Code of 1987. Although it is a general rule that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint. He was in charge of the office of the Excise Tax Service. such officers who fall under career service are characterized by the existence of security of tenure. created a committee to investigate Larin. The President then. such power to remove it with limitations. based on the Sandiganbayan conviction. Larin enjoys the right to security of tenure. In the case at bar. Further. ISSUE: Whether or not Larin was removed from office properly. the limitation can be found in the fact that Larin is a career service officer and under the Administrative Code of 1987. In 1992. Eventually. The President dismissed Larin.
Amnesty is a public act by the President and Congress. even before service. there must be a final judgement of conviction. he is not really free
because he must submit to periodic examination by the Board of Parole. Pardon and Amnesty . Pardon and Parole – Pardon may be granted by the Chief Executive under the Constitution at any time
security of the state.
. proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of laws which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. where there was no previous conviction of an offense punished by arresto mayor. after conviction bywhere the penalty imposed does not exceed 6 years and 1 day. Pardon can only be granted after conviction. amnesty. It is a remission of guilt. In pardon the convict becomes a free man. Object of Pardon – the object of pardon is to afford relief from undue harshness or evident mistake in the operation and enforcement of the criminal law. rebellion. that is. in parole. the
restoration of the probationer to his civil rights take place only after his final discharge afte the period of his probation. the President may crime. and so must be pleaded in court. amnesty may be granted even before trial. and pardons. by authority of law. while probation is granted by the court after investigation by a probation officer only for cases grant reprieves. In probation. that is. granted by the the ofender from the consequence of an offense of which he has been convicted. Pardon looks forward and relieves
Amnesty – a sovereign act granting oblivion or general pardon for past acts. where the crime is not against the final judgment. the sentence and its effects including the accessory penalties.Executive clemency The Pardoning Power
Distinctions: Pardon and Probation – in both cases. amnesty for political crimes. commutations. are abolished upon grant of pardon. is President. without granting a pardon. Pardon is a private act of the Probation – a disposition under which a defendant. and remit fines and forfeitures. and may be imposed on the convict without his acceptance and against his consent. and released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to supervisión of a probation officer. prescribing the terms upon which sentence will be suspended and the convict temporarilu released. he still remains in custody. Pardon is given by the Chief Executive for any
Except in cases of impeachment. Commutation – the substitution for a less greater punishment. sedition) itself. to a group.forgives the punishment. and where there was no pevious availment of probation. Reprieve – is the withholding of a sentence for an interval of time. or as otherwise provided in this Constitution. In absolute pardon. Amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense usually of political offenses (treason. after conviction and before serving sentence. Pardon – is an act of grace. it overlooks and obliterates the offense with which the convict is charged and the person
released stands precisely as though he had committed no offense. Thus a parole does not pardon the convict. and the convict must be exempted from the service of the sentence.
so the court is enjoined to take judicial notice of it. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. while parole is granted by the Board of Pardons and Parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law only after the convict has served the mínimum term f his sentence. Parole – the suspensión of the sentence of a convict granted after serving the mínimum term of the indeterminate sentence penalti.
Pardon is given to individuals.Pardon is usually granted for common crimes. it abolishes or government generally to a class of persons who are subject to trial and have not been convicted. class or community generally.
after final judgement of conviction.
The GAC remanded the same to the CFI without rendering a decision on WON the petitioners are entitled to amnesty. It is enough that the
. must take cognizance of. • Issued by the then president Manuel Roxas. conduct summary hearings of witnesses both for the complainant and the accused Barrioquinto vs.R.circumstances surrounding each case and. to the date when each particular area of the country where he offense was actually committed confession on the part of the accused. Petitioners filed an action to mandate the GAC to proceed with presiding over their application for amnesty. the GAC shall examine the facts and
Petitioners were charged with murder. Fernandez. with concurrence of Congress • Provides among others that in order to determine if the persons who have been charged or will be charged. and committed during December 8. As such. respondents. 1946. come within the terms of this proclamation.proclamation. G. which grants amnestyfor the GAC to preside over their case and ultimately qualify for amnesty. 8. 1949
Held & Ratio Fast facts It is not necessary for the petitioners to admit having committed the felony charged to them in order in favor of all persons who may be charged with a felony in furtherance of the resistance to the evidence shows that the offense committed is a felony that qualifies for amnesty as provided in the enemy or against persons aiding the war efforts of the enemy. it must be held that the petitioners (those who have applied for amnesty) have admitted having committed the offense. petitioners cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty. Petitioners submitted their case to the Guerilla Amnesty Commission (GAC). January 21. The GAC must conduct these hearings regardless of confession. including the GAC. Contention of Respondents In order for GAC to be able to preside over such cases. L-1278. was liberated from enemy control and occupation. Amnesty is a public act which the courts. 8 • Amnesty Proclamation of September 7. Proclamation No. presided by the in pursuance of theprovisions of the proclamation. if necessary. The performance of the summary hearings by the GAC is not dependent on the 1941. Jimenez learned of Proclamation No.
(b) the pardoning power here would amount to an unlawful exercise by the President of a legislative function. Despite his conviction and imprisonment. Miguel Cristobal (pet) filed an action on controlled by legislative action November 16.” respondent from voting for having been ‘declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against Right of suffrage is expressly restored by the pardon. That the power be exercised after conviction 2. pardon in the case at bar is conditional in the sense that it limits the positions he may occupy or be He applied for pardon in view of a newly promulgated Election Code which “disqualifies the eligible for. The pardoning power cannot be restricted or property. That such power does not extend to cases of impeachment
Santos cannot be excluded for the list of voters since he has already been granted pardon. Limitations on pardoning power of the Chief Executive 1. He was imprisoned from March 14 to August 18. except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment. it is still absolute insofar as it “restores the respondent to full civil and political rights. but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. Santos continued to be aHeld & Ratio registered voter in his municipality and was.’” He was granted pardon on December 24. People.Vera v. he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility. the municipal president of that municipality.” Contention of Cristobal The pardon extended by the President to Santos did not restore the full enjoyment of respondent’s political rights because: (a) the pardoning power of the President does not apply to legislative prohibitions. While the
. (c) the respondent having served his sentence and all the accessory penalties imposed by law. 1932 and paid the corresponding costs of trial. it removes all that is left of the
Teofilo Santos (resp) was found guilty of estafa and sentenced to six (6) months of arresto mayor and consequences of conviction. 1940 to exclude the name of Santos from the list of voters in their municipality. Effect of pardon granted to Santos Restored his “full civil and political rights. 7 SCRA 152 (1963) Fast facts
Nature and extent of absolute pardon It not only blots out the crime committed. the accessories provided by law. and. there was nothing to pardon. 1939. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired. between 1934 and 1937.
and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. He was given pardon by the president but even prior to his pardon he was already holding the position as the municipality president of Malabon notwithstanding his conviction. but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. while the pardon extended to
power of the president. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command. In the present case. does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the president. In the present case. the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. This is pursuant to CA 357 of the New Election Code. HELD: It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive. The lower court presided by Labrador ruled that Santos is exempt from the provision of the law by virtue of the pardon restoring the respondent to his “full civil and political rights. the
suggestion that the disqualification imposed in par (b) of sec 94 of CA 357. averred that Santos should be excluded from the list of electors in Malabon because he was already convicted of final judgment “for any crime against property”. There are accessory and resultant disabilities.” ISSUE: Whether or not Santos should not be excluded as an elector.” it is
absolute insofar as it “restores the respondent to full civil and political rights. namely: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction. not contemplated in the Constitution.Miguel Cristobal vs Alejo Labrador & Teofilo Santos On November 29. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed. 2010
respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that “he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility. the disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for disqualification from voting. would lead to the impairment of the pardoning Pardon – Restoration of Civil & Political Rights Santos was convicted of the crime of estafa. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired. on the other hand. he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility.
. and would lead furthermore to the result that there would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative action. Cristobal. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted. and (b) that such power does not extend cases of impeachment. absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. Upon other hand. except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Palatino is eligible for public office. Because of such conviction and imprisonment. sec 94 of the Election Code which supports his contention. Palatino also invoked par (a).
. The SC then held that since there is an absolute pardon. Peleobello averred that Palatino is already barred from voting and being voted upon. The pardon was already after Palatino’s election but prior to him assuming office. all the former disabilities imposed and attached to the prior conviction had been removed and that Palatino is therefore eligible for the public office in question. Marinduque. Pelobello filed a quo warranto proceeding alleging that Palatino is no longer qualified to hold office because he was already convicted before and was even imprisoned. HELD: Yes. Palatino was granted a conditional pardon by the then Gov-Gen but such pardon was converted into an absolute pardon by President Quezon who succeeded the Gov-Gen.Florencio Pelobello vs Gregorio Palatino Absolute Pardon Palatino was the mayor elect of Torrijos.
It is as if the convict.” he was not constitutionally entitled to another judicial determination of whether he had breached the condition of his parole by committing a
It was held that to exclude the petitioner from the practice of law for the offense would be to subsequent offense. On February 9. etc. 10 February 27 1918. pardon is to relieve him of the penal consequences of his act. been confronted by his accusers and the witnesses against him -. 9 mos and 1 day. grave coercion. he was not given the opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison. was convicted of bigamy and sentenced to 8 years imprisonment onWilfredo Torres was convicted of a crime in 1979 and sentenced to serve a prison term of 11 years. and depend alone. One of these is that the governor may withdraw his grace in a certain contingency. 1919. having found out that Torres has been charged with 20 counts of estafa at the Quezon City A case was filed by the Attorney General to have him disbarred because he has convicted of a crimeTrial Court. it does not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding.” On May 21 1986. and he accepts it upon those conditions. mos and 22 days to 38 years. 152 SCRA 273
Marcelino Lontok. and another is that the governor shall himself determine when that contingency has arisen. the Court however said that the since the pardon was extended by the Executive. This was confirmed by the Supreme Court on September 18. the Board of Pardons and parole resolve the recommend the cancellation of the pardon. a lawyer. on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment. when he has already been pardoned for it . This the court had no right to do. been convicted of license to practice law. he said he was denied his right to due process as of the attorney after the pardon has been granted. 43 Phil 293
Torres vs Gonzales. At the same time. illegal possession of firearms.
crimes such as swindling. Lontok however argued that pardon “reaches the offense and blots it out so that he may not be looked upon as guilty of it. enforce a punishment for the offense. that. The executive clemency under it is extended upon the conditions named in it. whenever the governor should conclude that he had violated the conditions of his
Where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on the professional misconduct involved in a Citing Tesoro. HELD: Petition of the Attorney General cannot be granted.In Re Lontok. and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
crime and been sentenced to punishment therefor. inasmuch as the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof that the This Court in effect held that since the petitioner was a c onvict “who had already been seized in a attorney does not possess a good moral character and is not a fit or proper person to retain his constitutional way. it has been held that while the effect of the determination of whether or not it has been breached is up to the Executive. grave threats. had expressly contracted and agreed. he was pardoned by the Governor General “on the condition that he shall not again be guilty of any misconduct. with full competency to bind himself in the premises. convicted of sedition by the QC Trial Court on June 26 1985 and had been accused of other involving moral turpitude. 1921. He was given a conditional pardon on April 18 1979 on the condition that he would not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. and the proceedings must be dismissed.” Issue: Whether or not a conviction is necessary to revoke a conditional pardon Ratio: When proceedings to strike an attorney’s name from the rolls are founded on. the transaction which has culminated in a conviction of felony. not to the Courts. He was arrested and recommitted on October 10 1986. i t has been heldRatio: Torres argued that he has not violated the conditional pardon given him because he has not that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment been convicted by final judgment.
159. no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary. shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. Succinctly put. upon a convict who “having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive. Other Cases of Evasion of Service of Sentence. subject to such conditions as he conclusive upon him. or suspension The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in the following of sentence.parole. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon. if the penalty remitted by the granting of such pardon be higher than six years. RPC. or unconditional. or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. may impose. and be fines. propositions: 1. and order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole. in his judgment. much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court. shall fail to comply with the condition. not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional. the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. conditional. either plenary or partial. in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon minimum period shall be imposed upon the convict who. may be either a purely executive act. the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. The penalty of prision correccional in its
the Chief Executive. shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.
. and to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any such person who. However. ** Sec 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code: To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons.” Here. 2. in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. to suspend sentences without pardon. or conditions of his pardon. the convict shall then suffer the unexpired portion of his original sentence. That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. an executive order for his arrest and remandment to prison should at once issue. minimum period. remit
ART. having been granted conditional pardon by are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. The Court however noted that Torres must still be convicted by final judgment of the crimes with which he was charged before the criminal penalty can be imposed upon him. and the proper consequences of such breach. parole.
the Congress may. invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies. in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen. nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function. any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days. nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension. voting jointly. if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution. shall. invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion.
. The Congress. in the same manner. or directly connected with. may revoke such proclamation or suspension. suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress. The Supreme Court may review. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. if not in session. The Congress. he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in. he may.Commander-in Chief The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary. otherwise he shall be released. the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. Upon the initiative of the President. by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session. when the public safety requires it. for a period not exceeding sixty days. and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. It is enough that there is sufficient basis to support such a proclamation. the following must be present:
. Zamora. To maintain peace and order 2. Calling out of armed forces v Martial Law To validly proclaim Martial Law. To suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus 4. 2000 Authority of Commander-in-Chief 1. or rebellion 3. invasion. To call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Role of Congress (limitation) .IBP v. Thus. There must be an actual invasion or rebellion 2. should not be subjected to judicial review. 141284. Public safety must require it These conditions need not be present in order to validly call out the armed forces.R. To place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law Presidential mandate • Deployment of PNP and Marines in malls • Joint visibility patrols • For crime prevention and suppression Nature of authority of Commander-in-Chief
1. or rebellion. August 15.It may revoke a presidential proclamation or suspension on the matter and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. There is textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. invasion. No. G.
The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President. Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. The only criterion to adjudge the calling out is that whenever such calling out becomes necessary. Executive Secretary 421 SCRA 656 G. 2003. vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. A person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion WON there is
such a proclamation. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. based on IBP v Zamora. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code. 4 are constitutional. 2004 Facts: During the wee hours of July 27. Article VII. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP.
. 435. both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. Section 18.SANLAKAS Vs. by way of proof.R. The warrantless arrest feared by the petitioners is not exclusive to the declaration of state of rebellion. Article VI. No. The mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionality of protected rights. 427 and General Order No. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government. and by virtue of Proclamation No. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. however. in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the
armed forces. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. 4 are constitutional? Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. These are purely executive powers. 427 and General Order No. and Proclamation No. acting upon instigation. 159085 February 3. the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. In the interim. 4. demanding the resignation of the President. declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued. the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. It is
reiterated. and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present. that the calling out power does not necessitate the same conditions required for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the proclamation of martial law. command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable. 2003. so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present . On August 1. Publicly. supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. none of the petitioners here have.
as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2). some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP. and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. petitioners contending that Sec. 427 and General Order No.
The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the President’s order. In the case at bar. Enrile’s answer contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos’ declaration of Martial Law. the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. therefore. there is a clear and imminent danger against the state. ISSUE: Whether or not Aquino’s detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law. the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared. pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them. HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion.
.Aquino vs Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile
Martial Law – Habeas Corpus – Power of the President to Order Arrests Enrile (then Minister of National Defense). insurrection or rebellion. or imminent danger against the state. when public safety requires it. Hence. Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile.
Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. even during the period of martial law. They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices. ISSUE: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning.
. Arturo Tangco. 1980. On August 19. and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned. Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno. and inciting to rebellion.Olaguer vs Military Commission Habeas Corpus In 1979. (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Logauer and his group are all civilians. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction. the petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus. (5) arson of nine buildings. (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Leonardo Perez. and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion. Marcos. Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver. HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals during the period of martial law in all cases involving civilian defendants. Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus. (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile. over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning.
03-2784 are no longer binding on 1Lt. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued to prevent it from exercising its jurisdiction. October 25.36 As earlier discussed. 1Lt. 1LT. 7055. SGT. As a general rule. ESPORO. COLON. no further relief could be granted to them. Reaso. JULIUS R. JULIUS W. the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the
Forces of the Philippines (AFP). (GR 162318) and those who are subject of the petition for habeas corpus Capt. 162318) and habeas corpus (G. RYAN H. 1Lt.. as Judge Advocate General person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by (JAG) of the AFP. Navales. as Chief of Staff of the Armed petitioners must perforce fail.34 Facts: Under the Information dated 1 August 2003 filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati The term court necessarily includes the General Court-Martial.. the office of the writ of prohibition is to prevent inferior courts. et al. GEN.. Navales. JR. No. therefore. 2004] 1LT.20 any rulings made by the trial court in Criminal Case No. and Capt. (GR 162341).33 Further. TSG. respondents. Reaso. 2003 issued by Incident” with violation of Article 134-A (coup d’etat) of the Revised Penal Code. NARCISO ABAYA. 162318. GIL P.R. QUISAI. City. the Department of Justice (DOJ) charged 321 of those soldiers who took part in the “Oakwoodas they are under detention pursuant to the Commitment Order dated August 2. et al. could be properly considered as strangers to the proceeding s in Criminal Case No. under Rep.
Martial against them were not service-connected. et al. 032784. Insofar as those whose case against them was dismissed. vs. SGT. can no longer assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the military courts and this Court cannot undo nor reverse the Order of November 14. Reaso. SARMIENTO. et al. Among those chargedrespondent Chief of Staff of the AFP pursuant to Article 7035 of the Articles of War. The same is a superfluity and cannot be given effect for having been made by the RTC (Branch 148) without or in excess of its jurisdiction. cannot find solace in the declaration of the RTC (Branch 148) that the charges filed before the General Courtboards or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been
vested by law. NOLI FORONDA. who are no longer charged with coup detat. Navales.. et al. MARIANO M.R.
the court which has jurisdiction to do so. Navales. LOZADA. These rules apply to Capt. The case. et al. there was nothing else left to resolve after the Omnibus Motion was considered moot and academic. quoted earlier. Milo Maestrecampo.
CAPT. MARGATE. as they were no longer parties to the case. 2LT. Indeed. that in view of the Order of Judge Barza dated November 14. 162341) prayed for by the PFC. were 1Lt. Held: No. was On the other hand. REGIE A. SGT. ALAGABAN. Reaso. Navales. docketed as Criminal Case 03-2784 and raffled to Branch 61 presided by Judge Romeo F. 2003 of Judge Barza there being no motion filed by the prosecution to reconsider the order or by any of the accused. the General Court-Martial has jurisdiction over the charges filed against petitioners 1Lt. EMERSON L.GEN. et al. petitioners. and OTHER PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR AUTHORITY.R. et al. B. the Court. Reaso. et al. et al.
. ELMER D. Barza Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus. corporations. the writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed
after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court or quasi-judicial body. Capt. Act No. The RTC (Branch 148) itself recognized this as it made the statement. and Capt. entitled People v. et al. No. 2003 dismissing the case against aforesaid accused.[G. NAVALES. And in the same manner that strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. RAYMUND DUMAGO and The writs of prohibition (G. and Capt.21 Thus. No.
LANSANG VS. President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to call out the armed forces." and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh. already. L-33964. 889-A. 1971. Herein petitioners were apprehended by members of the Philippine Constabular. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine major labor organizations. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who have been arrested without a warrant. about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP. insurrection. Thus. 11 Dec 1971] Facts: On the evening of August 21. Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability. that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila Area in 1970. Two conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion. two grenades were thrown at the miting the avance of the Liberal Party killing 8 persons and injuring many. and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. has exploited the (11) major student or youth organizations. proved inadequate. the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
. (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. GARCIA [42 SCRA 448. (2) Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus decreed in Proclamation No. called out the armed forces. 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police. Held: The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. He had. In effect the proclamation implies that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension of the writ belongs to the President and it expressly states that such declaration is deemed “final and conclusive upon the courts and all other persons” Issues: (1) Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons. Of the two other alternatives. on August 23 then President Marcos issued proclamation 889. or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof. is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors.
2. cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal which. the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ. iii. 3. Her pregnancy prompted the filing of charges by her parents against de Villa. individual is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint b.
Feria v. 158802. On the issue of writ of habeas corpus as proper remedy: a. therefore. The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ. sentenced to death.
It is the nullity of an assailed judgment of conviction due to said lack of jurisdiction which makes it susceptible to collateral attack through HC
d. is voided
e. however. Reynaldo de Villa in her home in Pasig. If an individual's liberty is restrained via some legal process. however. ii. was not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction
June did not allege any of the three conditions in Feria to avail of HC
RTC: de Villa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape. Issue: WON writ of habeas corpus a proper remedy in the instant case. G. having duly acquired jurisdiction.R. sickness.In Re De Villa. November 17. was raped by her uncle. thus filed petition for writ of habeas corpus for his father. is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment. No. Held:NO Ratio of the Court. deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint court had no jurisdiction penalty being excessive. 2004 Plainly stated. old age of 67 rendered me incapable of erection Mendozas bear a grudge against me Alibi: in hometown of San Luis. the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing Aileen Mendoza. De Villa: 1. Laguna at time of crime
c. 1. CA doctrine allowed HC as post-conviction remedy only when there exists: i.
whether or not PP 1017 and G. Art. lifting PP 1017. thereby. Art. Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. the
President. Article XII of the Constitution. 5 are unconstitutional HELD: This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the “Take-Care” Power This refers to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.O. Therefore. are ultra vires and laws and decrees If so. No. Article VII of the Constitution. he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17.") emergency) and General Order No. (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1. However. in effect. No. 2006) FACTS: These 7 consolidated petitions question the validity of PP 1017 (declaring a state of national "Take Care" Power of the President Powers of the Chief Executive The power to promulgate decrees belongs to the Legislature
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18. the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. if needed. 17.
unconstitutional. 5 arrogated upon the President the power to enact(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press. declaring that the state of national emergency has as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result ceased to exist. While the cases(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well are pending. Macapagal-Arroyo (G. in the absence of legislative legislation. bureaus and offices. there were extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power
(A) To issue decrees. No. based on Sec. he will. 5 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military]. President Arroyo issued PP 1021. the PP No. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. Before assuming office. including the Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior and Local Government. the President. Sec. “execute its laws. may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country.” As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested. VII: “The President shall have control of all the executive departments. 1. among others. cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest.O.
authority to promulgate “decrees.David vs. VI categorically states that “the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.” In the exercise of such function. 171396 May 3. and
ISSUES: Whether or not PP 1017 and G.R.
validly bind the country. but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.Board. by their very nature. flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. Exception
ratification by the President. together w/ FFDC averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes are onerous and they do not constitute the loan “contract” or “guarantee” contemplated in Sec. On the other hand. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is submit to the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or irrelevant. would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms. and
more often than not. achieve its risk and cost
country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activities–the propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans. No. Such. Three restructuring programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts – they are basically buyback programs & bond-conversion programs). 20. Cuisia. The guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would haveevident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the effect of increasing the foreign debt. or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. Hence. studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end. and if exercised. 106064. in person of the President.Contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans
ISSUE: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents. the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the authority. They argue that the the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy). bills of local application. The declaration of
. meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate. There are certain acts which. The Monetary Board shall. requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitution –the Monetary Board–reinforces the submission that not respondents but the President “alone and personally” canThere are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief And assuming that the President has such power unlike other powers which may be validly delegated Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or by the President. for instance. within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year. the president can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be madeobjectives. they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme. G. cannot be validated by subsequent approval or exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power. Constantino v.
The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with HELD: There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the president may the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. 7 of the Constitution . This sort of
constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the government. explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public. Art. and containing other matters as may be provided by law. and private bills. bills authorizing increase of the public debt. her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce the country’s external debt. They argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law and the exercise by him of Filipino nation requires that the President alone must exercise this power. shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. October 13. 2005 During the Aquino regime. and subject to such limitations as may be provided by contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country w/ prior concurrence of the Monetary law. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor children who are Filipino citizens. All appropriation. The act of the respondents are not unconstitutional. obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board. primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding.R. revenue or tariff bills. he/she would have to pause from running the
Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of the monetary Department of Finance. If the President were to personally available to the public.
The list is by no means exclusive. and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused. the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
. all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power.martial law.
Hundreds of executive agreements. It would seem to be sufficient. were concluded independently of any legislation. . Commissioner Of Customs vs. income tax on shipping profits. other than those entered into under the trade. Eastern Sea Trading Constitutional Law – Treaties vs Executive Agreements EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of onion and garlic into the Philippines. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the said EO was never concurred upon by the Senate. the
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-admission of civil aircraft. have been negotiated with foreign governments. to refer to certain classes of
postal matters. and commercial relations generally. The said circulars were pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a Trade and Financial Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan then). Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter. in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character. may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels. executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. customs matters. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’. etc. navigation dues. that they are not treaties. concluded from time to time. . Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments — treaties and conventions. The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin.Foreign affairs
agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments. international claims.
. The Commissioner appealed. and that they have abundant precedent in our history. HELD: No. ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate. In 1956. while still others. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such. such as tariff acts. the registration of trade-marks and copyrights. thirds of all the Members of the Senate. the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. .agreements act.
Is prior conviction of the offense imputed to Go Tek necessary to allow the board to continue its investigation? – NO. 1964 the chief prosecutor of the Deportation Board filed a complaint against Go Tek.
RATIONALE FACTS On March 3. It held that Sec. the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of the President. The CFI granted the petition by upholding the obiter in the Qua Chee Gan case. it is fundamental that an executive order for deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a case. When deportation is effected by the President in the exercise of his powers. Deportation Board | Aquino
Can the Deportation Board entertain a deportation proceeding based on a ground which is not specified in section 37 of the Immigration Law? – YES. such a requirement is relevant only when the deportation is effect by the Commissioner of Immigration.Go Tek vs. a chinaman. o After all. Deportation Board Go Tek vs. pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration upon
recommendation of the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation.
The Board appealed the decision to the SC. 168. praying that the board recommend his immediate deportation to the President because he was an undesirable alien on the basis of these allegations: o Go Tek was a sector commander and intelligence and record officer of a guerilla unit of the “Emergency Intelligence Section. it need not be under any ground specified in Sec. Army of the United States. creating the Deportation Board.
Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss.” o And he was in possession of fake dollar checks in violation of Art.
. 37 of the Immigration Law. o Sec. under Sec. 37(3) of the Immigration Law requires conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude and. the complaint was premature since mere possession of forged dollar checks is not a ground for deportation under the Immigration Law. as charged against the alien. do not specify the grounds for deportation o There is no legal nor constitutional provision defining the power to deport aliens because the intention of the law is to grant the Chief Executive full discretion to determine whether an alien's residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security welfare or interest of the state. after due investigation. the inherent right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is rental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified. 69 of the RAC and E. o The board had no jurisdiction over the case because the board may only deport aliens on the grounds expressly specified by law citing an obiter in Qua Chee Gan.
The Board denied the motion ruling that a conviction is not required before the State may deport an undesirable alien and that the Board is only a fact finding body whose function is to make a report and recommendation to the President. 37 of the Immigration Law. As the President is granted full discretion as regards deportation. 69 of the RAC. o The Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of facts which warrant the deportation of aliens as disclosed in an investigation conducted in accordance with Sec. 398. o The complaint was premature as he had a pending case in the city fiscal’s office for violation of Art. No. 168 of the RPC.
Go Tek filed an action for prohibition with the CFI. Under existing law.O. thus.
if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court’s jurisdiction. she may not be prevented from instituting suit. pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office. there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. also demands undivided attention. Thus. ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran. Moreover. not by any ot her person in the President’s behalf. aside from requiring all of the officeholder’s time. He together with others was charged for libel by the president. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. Also. the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt. in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused. HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction. not by any other person in the President's behalf. an accused like Beltran et al. considering the functions of a president. Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person. The privilege of immunity from suit.Soliven vs Makasiar Constitutional Law – President’s Immunity From Suit – Must Be Invoked by the President ● While the President is immune from suit. if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit.
. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s prerogative. However. Thus. considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that. But this privilege of immunity from suit. a person other than the president.
Icasiano was reassigned as Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent in 1994. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President. in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit. Moreover. The Court of Appeals granted the petition holding that the indefinite reassignment is violative of Icasiano’s right to security of tenure. presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City in 1989. The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper because the same attacks an act of the President. Issue: Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential immunity from suit. Gloria.
● Indefinite reassignment is definitely violative of the security of tenure. Upon recommendation of DECS Secretary Ricardo T.GLORIA v COURT of APPEALS ● Even if the DECS Secretary is an alter ego of the president. Furthermore. presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injuction enjoining the implementation of his reassignment. he cannot invoke the President’s immunity from suit in a case filed against him because the questioned acts are not the acts of the President but merely those of a department secretary. Held: Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against petitioners and not against the President.
Facts: Private respondent Dr.
. 147465. orders. Contentions c/o MMDA • The resort to certiorari was proper • There was no valid contract as it never passed the negotiation stage
• The case should be heard by the Court en banc Held & Ratio on cognizance of SC en banc • The case should not be referred to the SC en banc. which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc. proclamations. international or executive agreement. 2002 Fast facts The case at bar relates with an assailment of a waste management contract between the Republic of the Philippines and JANCOM Environmental Corporation. • The division did refer the case en consulta to the Court en banc. or law. and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty. ordinances. suggesting or inquiring if the Court en banc should take over and whether the case should be re-raffled courtwide due to the inhibition of Justice Carpio. G. or seven Members. • Circular 2-89 further pertinently provides that “no motion for reconsideration of the action of the Court en banc declining to take cognizance of a referral by a Division. that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc MMDA v. and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc. April 10. including those involving the constitutionality. declined to take over the case and returned it to the Third Division with instructions that it be re-raffled among the other members of the Division. instructions. shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. in division of three. application. the case shall be decided en banc: Provided. It may sit en banc or in its discretion. The Court en banc. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. and other regulations. When the required number is not obtained. • The Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be appealed.The Supreme Court Mode of Sitting The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. five. shall be entertained. • A decision of a Division of the Court is a decision of the Supreme Court. Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. however. or operation of presidential decrees. Jancom.
000. arguments. He was reprimanded a fine of P10. is the only body which can administratively punish him. Section 11 of the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that even divisions can preside over administrative and disciplinary cases of judges.00 for gross ignorance of the law. • Gacott somehow suggests that the administrative case against him was unfairly raffled to Justice Bidin in the Third Division Contention c/o Gacott The full court. 116049. Held & Ratio Article 8. 1995 Fast facts • Eustaquio Gacott (resp) is charged of grave abuse of discretion for erroneously dismissing a case. • He asks for his “erroneous” decision to not be included in his permanent records as it would be detrimental to his career.People v. information of which will be included in his permanent records. No. It was never intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity and inefficiency. SC en banc.
. Gacott. and even his insinuations for that matter. The divisions of the SC cannot preside over his case. July 13. G. • Gacott wants the Court to pass upon his other supplications.R.
It was a newly organized branch which had to establish its operations from scratch. 1970. despite knowing that he has not been fulfilling his duties as judge. Jr.. 57 Phil. Issue Concerns the legal right of the members of the SC. gross incompetence. • Macaraig took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City on June 29. Pasay Trans Co. sitting as a board of arbitrators the decision of a majority of whom shall be final.. as amended. the decision of a majority of whom shall be final. 600 (1932) Fast facts The case at bar relates with a petition of the Manila Electric Company (MEC. 30 SCRA 106 (1971) • Administrative charge filed against Judge Catalino Macaraig.No non-judicial work for judges the members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative function. informed the respondent that the province was not in a position to do so). 1970 to February 28. Held & Ratio
Garcia vs. to act on the petition of the MEC. period of July 1. requesting the members of the SC. violation of Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948. During the period in question. all these items must be furnished by the provincial government The provincial officials of Laguna. . Section 11 Relates with the legal act of the members of the SC. (particularly) Sections 5. sitting as a board of arbitrators. sitting as a board or arbitrators. Act NO. The Municipal Government of Calamba offered to supply the space for the courtroom and offices of the court. pet). violation of his oath of office as judge . The SC cannot sit as members of the Board of Arbitration because it is not within their jurisdiction to decided on cases on purely contractual situations. He did not violate his oath of office as judge. Macaraig. to act on the petition. Held & Ratio Act 1446. still received salaries for the period in question
Macaraig is not guilty of dishonesty and gross incompetence. certificate of service. to act in that capacity. (resp) for alleged dishonesty. to utilize the financial assistance promised by the Laguna provincial government for the purchase of the necessary supplies and materials and to rely on the national government for the equipment needed by the court (Under Section 190 of the Revised Administrative Code. Meralco vs. The decisions of the Board of Arbitration shall go through the regular court system (Trial Courts – Court of Appeals – SC). They will be reviewed by the lower courts and will ultimately be reviewed by themselves. The respondent took it upon himself to
. and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the SC. 55 and 58 thereof. • It took so much time for the branch to become established as it experienced diffic ulties in finding a place to hold its office and finally use the amount appropriated for its expenses Contentions c/o Paz Garcia (pet) • Macaraig has not submitted any monthly reports. 1446.. he simply could not carry out his duties for the simple reason that he had no sala yet. sitting as a board of arbitrators. Section 11 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government constitutionally established. however. committed (allegedly). 1971 • Macaraig. to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the MEC and the compensation to be paid to the MEC by such transportation companies.
far from being dishonesty. having worked therein for sixteen years.
. since he was receiving salaries. to his credit. Judicial work encompasses only what is mentioned as judicial power in the Constitution. In the circumstances. made himself available to the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary. Judges cannot be appointed to positions in other bodies. unless it is provided by the Constitution or created by the SC.personally work for early action on the part of the corresponding officials in this direction and. while being unable to perform his regular duties as judge without any fault on his part. in his spare time. it was certainly not improper that he rendered some kind of service to the government. what with his vast experience. is.
their salary shall not be decreased. Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that
. of Internal Revenue. the provision of 1973 was specifically deleted Contention c/o Pet Any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries.
Nitafan vs. their salary shall not be decreased.Salary The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court. and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. 152 SCRA 284 (1987) 1935 v 1973 v 1987 1935 – jurisprudence says that deduction of withholding taxes erodes independence of judiciary.
the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office. The 1987 provision should be interpreted the same way 1935 was interpreted. Comm. exempt from taxation 1973 – judges are not exempt 1987 – silent WON judges’ salaries are exempt from taxation. contrary to the provision of Section 10. During their continuance in office. Held & Ratio • The declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary are not exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office.
There is fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. and conviction of. cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Can judges be disbarred during their term? Yes. bribery. • As will be shown hereinafter. Tanodbayan – special prosecutor like a fiscal. the Vice-President. Members of the SC would be vulnerable to all manner of charges which might be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who. ombudsman. otherwise. 160 SCRA 771 (1988) Fast facts Raul Gonzales forwarded an anonymous letter by “Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court” to Justice Fernan. Administrative Case No. Reason for ruling.
. It is just that. to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an offense that carries the penalty of removal from office. the Members of the Supreme Court. The only ones who could not be disbarred are the impeachable officers. for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court. 3135 Resolution dated February 1988 entitled “Miguel Cuenco v Honorable Marcelo B. but were not able to follow through on that. and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for. Fernan” in which Resolution. Impeachment first. so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches of Government" in the words of Commissioner Rigos (uniformity of taxation). Without the rule. The Court resolved to require Cuenco to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against Fernan. would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law. he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any misbehavior that may be proven against him. the Members of the Constitutional Commissions. the Court resolved to dismiss the charges made by Cuenco against Fernan for utter lack of merit. The letter was addressed to Gonzales referring to charges for disbarment brought by Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan and asking “to do something about this. • The framers actually intended to include an express provision regarding the nonexemption of judges from taxation. Important principles of AC 3135 Article 8. treason. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law. Section 7 (1987 Constitution). culpable violation of the Constitution.Removal The President. A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment. Proscribes the removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method. the clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary.
The Court is not saying that a Member of the SC is absolutely immune from disbarment and criminal actions against him. before criminal and other actions. but not by impeachment. other high crimes. In Re Gonzales. graft and corruption. or betrayal of public trust.” The action against Fernan was filed in the Tanodbayan. this member must first be removed from office via impeachment proceedings before other actions will prosper against him. They intended to put it in a separate item. Should the tenure of the SC Justice be thus terminated by impeachment. Lecaroz v Sandiganbayan.
Contentions c/o Teodoro • It must be the exercise of discretion and judgment within that subdivision of the • He has been prejudiced in that Socorro Medina was tutored by one of their teachers. board. in violation of the rule that the committee must be composed of teachers from both Grades 5 and 6. he acts judicially. That there must be a specific controversy involving rights of person or property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal. Requisites for a valid action of certiorari 1. Santiago vs. or at least which does not belong to the legislative or executive department. CFI Decision The petition states no cause of action and should be dismissed. The tribunal. belongs to either of the other branches. Teodoro was awarded the third honor. Jurisdiction of courts
sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary. (pet) was a student of Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City. Bautista.
Only with regard those actual cases and controversies that require the interpretation of the law. with Socorro Medina and Patricia Lingat as first and second honors. The final list of awardees was deliberated by a board composed of Grade 6 teachers. The tribunal. board. and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. board. 3. or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end. or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary. thus giving her an edge in the judgment of awarding of honors • The committee which adjudged the awarding of honors were composed of only Grade 6 teachers. prescribe. it is not judicial. board. which does not belong to the legislative or executive department. Issue (WON) • SC has the jurisdiction over the issue. and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority and undertakes to determine those questions.Jurisdiction The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. 32 SCRA 188 (1970) Fast facts Teodoro Santiago. at least. or officer for hearing and determination of their respective rights and obligations (Judicial action) 2. or. • The committee on the rating of students for honor exercised judicial or quasi -judicial functions in the performance of its assigned task. and what the legal rights of parties are.
. During graduation. One of the grounds is that the committee on the ratings of students for honor whose actions are being condemned in the case at bar is not the tribunal. or officer exercising judicial functions against which an action for certiorari may lie under Section 1 of Rule 65. If the matter in respect to which it is exercised. The Congress shall have the power to define. The issue must be justiciable. • Involves the determination of what the law is.
with respect to a matter in controversy. respectively. Must call for the application of the law. Jr.
There is no mention that when teachers do sit down as a committee and adjudge the awarding of honors to their students.Held & Ratio No actual case or controversy.
. The committee composed of the teachers was not engaged in judicial functions. their acts as such relate with the determination of what the law is.
Emma Imperial (resp). The other judges refuse to alter their verdict. beauty contests. Issue (WON) The Courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest. Jr. one of the judges (pet) confesses he made a mistake. There were 8 contestants. Days after the contest has been conducted and the winners announced. The decision of the board in such contests. 482 (1952)
Fast facts The case at bar relates with alleged erroneous results of an oratorical contest held in Naga City.
. 91 Phil. No jurisdiction. Error is contemplated by law as a misapplication of a statute or provision. Held & Ratio The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest. Leuterio. There could be error in the computation of final scores. although only implied. that the ratings he gave the second placer should have been such as would entitle her to first place. The Court would not interfere in literary contests. The issue arose when it was found out that there was an arithmetical error in the final scores.Felipe vs. but it is not error in context of law. and Luis General. is final and unappealable. and similar contests. among them were: Nestor Nosce.
Gonzaga-Reyes. Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. after redeliberation. the Consings submitted a revised subdivision plan. 2000 sign of vindictiveness much less any attempt to exact vengeance for past affront against Grecia. not in administrative Fast facts cases. Held & Ratio Held & Ratio The absence of certification does not invalidate a decision. December 6. he may not be disqualified from participating in the proceedings because a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of k. Requirements as to decisions
. like a disbarment proceeding. subdivision road. the case was redeliberated upon. 135385. Consing demanded for her payment and had The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for the decision en banc or in division planned to resort to court litigation. In the process. there is no ponente. The assumption is the law is constitutional. and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Santos expressed her willingness to settle her obligation. It is only evidence for failure to observe the As to CJ Teehankee’s voluntary inhibition. After a requirement. Prudential Bank v. the voting remained the same. must state facts and law Consing v. Bellosillo. Seven (7) voted to grant petition.Castro. Petition denied for lack of legal and factual basis. Court of Appeals. shall be reached in consultation before the case the case assigned to a Member for the writing of the However. Voting the Court and raise an objection of this sort after decision has already been rendered.
or dissented. or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. CJ was or division. Deliberations
Merlin Consing (pet) sold a house and lot to Caridad Santos. Santos defaulted in her payments. It should be made of record that at no time during the deliberations on the case did the CJ show any ill will nor any Cruz v. Per curiam decision – opinion of the court as a whole. Buena. Any Member who took no part. Panganiban. Pardo. and concurrence of conclusions of the Court were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to a member for majority vote the writing of the opinion of the Court. Santos was fully justified in refusing to pay further her monthly amortizations because although Consing submitted a revised plan and may have corrected irregularities and/or have complied with the legal requirements for the operation of their subdivision. dismissal of a case for lack of merit Decision – when the court has given due course. plus interest). member has given an opinion on the merits of a given case. For cases where the court does not want to expose the identity of the ponente. Quisumbing. CJ. i. In response. Provided in their contract of sale were particular terms of payment in which the purchase price shall be paid (installment basis. Resolution v Decision Resolution – does not decide the case.
As the votes were equally divide and the necessary majority was not obtained. This requirement is only present in judicial decisions. Santiago. this is upon the condition that the Consings comply with all the laws and regulations on opinion of the Court. not merely by a member of the same • The Court’s decision violates the Constitution in that it lacks certificatio n by the CJ that the • To ensure that decisions are arrived only after deliberation. DENR. otherwise known as the conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at after consultation and deliberations and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). G.j. Accordingly. pursuant to Rule 56. No. 158 SCRA 646 (1988) Fast facts The case at bar relates with the disbarment of Atty.
Purpose of certification requirement Contentions c/o Resp • To ensure that all court decisions are reached after consultation with members of the court en banc • CJ Claudio Teehankee should have voluntary inhibited himself from the proceedings. as the case may be prejudicial against Grecia that he rendered a decision against Grecia (disbarment). The same CFI Decision requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate court.e. voted attest to that. and De Leon. Melo.R. l. exchange of ideas. However. • To ensure that the decision is rendered by a court as a whole. Grecia (resp). dilatory. Kapunan. 177SCRA 14 (1989) Fast facts
Results of voting Seven (7) voted to dismiss petition. Even if such certification were required. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy subdivision and after payment to her damages as a consequence of the use of a portion of her lot as a thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. There could be an administrative case on the ground of lack of certification. and Mendoza (not justiciable). it is beyond doubt that The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 8371. Vitug. he cannot escape liability to Santos for having sold to her portions of the roads or streets denominated as right-of-way. Puno (separate opinion). the petition is DISMISSED. Contention c/o Consing CA did not comply with the certification requirement. As to the lack of certification.
Inciong. in a succinct Order. 1979) Marcelino Bugarin (resp) is found by the RTC guilty of raping his daughter. 121 SCRA 205 (1992)
Held & Ratio Constitutional. Provides. However. Valladolid vs. The two hotels became direct competitors. contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon Held & Ratio which The fact that the Order of the Deputy Minister of Labor issued on December 26. However. among others. but it is not encouraged. that judgment shall Not prohibited. Contention c/o Bugarin The decision of the RTC does not state facts ad law upon which it was based. Facts and law must be clearly distinguished Reasons for the requirement • To inform the parties of the basis for the decision so that if any of them appeals. dismissed bothRTC Decision appeals after finding “no sufficient justification or valid reason to alter. still valid. the assailedHeld & Ratio order is not a decision of a court of record. RicardoResolution does state the legal basis for the dismissal of the Petition and thus complies with the Valladolid (pet) was employed by JRM in 1977 as a telephone switchboard operator. 1979 lacks a statementsuch judgment is based. given due course JRM owned Tropicana and Copacabana hotels. 1998 is not in accordance with Article 8..and after the filing of Briefs or Memoranda and/or other pleadings. the judge did so through the processes of Contention c/o pet legal The Resolution of the SC under date of May 11. Section 14 of reasoning. Bugarin. as the case may be.No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts No decision shall be rendered by any Court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. it only had controlling interest in Tropicana. there was no necessity of discussing anew the issues not raised therein. 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure Only dispositive portion is authored by the SC.and the law on which it is based. 169 SCRA 356 (1989) the appellate court the findings of facts or the ruling on points of law with which he disagrees. applicable to an Order or Resolution refusing due course to a Petition for certiorari. It disrespects the judicial function. He wasConstitutional provision. COA. People v. The assailed Resolution was not a “Decision” within the m eaning of the Constitutional Fast facts requirement. Section 15 of the Constitution. • An assurance to the parties that. Amado Inciong (resp) failed to state the facts and conclusion of law upon which it is based. quasi-judicial functions. In response to the application for clearance and Valladolid’s complaint for Illegal Dismissal.e. which is required of decisions or courts of record. 273 SCRA 384 (1996) Order of May 2. The Ministry of Labor is an administrative agency with • The decision of the RTC falls short of the requirement. The assailed Pertinent financial and business information was being leaked from Copacabana to Tropicana. preventing him from deciding by ipse dixit (a bare assertion resting on the authority of the individual). the Constitution. • A safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge. He was suspected to be the leak who sends important information to the competitor. instead of 6 (there were 6 informations Notes in class filed against him)…the dispositive further adding to the confusion indicating just 3 counts Only cases that are submitted for decision shall require a full-blown decision.” i. Memorandum decision Rule 120. and non-• There was no evaluation of evidence and discussion of legal questions technical. with rules of procedure mandated to be non-litigious. thus unconstitutional. Reiterates Article 8. in reaching judgment. the Regional director issued this order. remember the time of the day when she was allegedly raped • Decision found him guilty on 4 counts of consummated rape. The rest is copied from the decision of the lower court. Article 8. The Deputy Minister of Labor. Maryjane. This mandate is applicable only in cases “submitted for decision. of facts and conclusions of law does not equate to the violation of the constitutional requirement set forth in Article 8. Section 14
. 1979 (December 26. modify. • Four counts of consummated rape • One count of attempted rape Contention c/o JRM • Sentence (dispositive) indicates “3” counts instead of “4” The order of Hon. he can point out to Nunal vs. subsequently transferred to the position of clerk-collector. much less reverse the • Guilty beyond reasonable doubt Order appealed from”. summary. It is not as Copacabana was managed by its owners (siblings Yu). section 14. As the Deputy Minister was in full accord with the findings of fact and the conclusions of law • Does not explain why RTC considered Maryjane’s testimony credible despite the fact that she could drawn from shoes facts by the Regional director.
In its decision. The RTC confirmed his conviction.Yao v.
. CA GR. HELD: The decision of the RTC fell short of the constitutional requirement. with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusion of the court. 132428 (October 24. The decision in question should be struck close as a nullity. it stated that it found no cogent reason to disturb the finding of fact of the MTC. Parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided. 2000) FACTS: The MTC convicted petitioner of unfair competition. No. Petitioner appealed to RTC.
respondent. VIII. 1993 was a “sin perjuicio” judgment which was incomplete and needed a statement of the facts and law upon which the judgment was based. inefficiency.M. Lopez of the Regional Trial Court. There would be no more reason to keep the dispositive portion a secret at the stage of promulgation of judgment. . the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. serious misconduct. personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based. §15 of the Constitution. Dizon.The term judgment as used in this Rule means the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or is not guilty of the offense charged. When the judge is absent or outside of the province or city. DIZON. What must be promulgated must be the complete decision. with violation of the Constitution. Judgment defined. vs. VIII. the fact is that only the dispositive portion was read at such promulgation. the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
§2. and falsification in connection with her decision in Criminal Case No. What respondent did in this case was to render what is known as a “sin perjuicio” judgment.[A. Promulgation of judgment. . Regional Trial Court. Since this was done only on December 16. It is clear that merely reading the dispositive portion of the decision to the accused is not sufficient. However. which is a judgment without a statement of the facts in support of its conclusion to be later supplemented by the final judgment. LOPEZ. September 5. No. §15(1) of the Constitution which provides: All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court. 1994 when a copy of the complete decision was served on complainant. . Sr. if the conviction is for a light offense.. Pasay City.The judgment must be written in the official language.The judgment is promulgated by reading the same in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. Branch 109. JUDGE LILIA C.
§6. and. 91-0716 entitled “People of the Philippines v.” The Court finds that respondent violated Art. complainant. RTJ-96-1338. Engineer Fernando S. Garcia. This is a complaint charging Judge Lilia C. and the imposition of the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by law on the accused. it is obvious that the respondent failed to render her decision within three months as required by Art. Form and contents of judgment. Respondent only succeeds in showing that the judgment promulgated on April 22.
. As respondent judge states. Branch 109. unless reduced by the Supreme Court. §1. because the decision was not complete it could be modified and cites in support of her contention the case of Abay. stating the facts and the law on which such judgment is based. It is the judgment that must be read to him. v. 1997] ENGINEER FERNANDO S. Although respondent judge promulgated her decision within three months of the submission of the case for decision. Pasay City. twelve months for all lower collegiate courts and three months for all other lower courts.
Ruling: Yes. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in denying recognition and enforcement to the Malaysian Court judgment. the petitioner contended that the High Court of Malaya acquired jurisdiction over the person of private respondent by its voluntary submission the court’s jurisdiction through its appointed counsel. Asiavest CDCP Sdn.ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD vs. No. however. want of notice to private respondent. a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction.
waived any and all objections to the High Court’s jurisdiction in a pleading filed before the court.” Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor of private respondent to guarantee the completion of the Felda Project and the nonpayment of the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Metro Manila. denied by the trial court considering that the grounds relied upon are not the proper grounds in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes. Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In its Reply filed. and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment. which was the governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court and respondent appellate court. the trial court rendered its decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint. collusion and/or fraud. and there is a clear mistake of law or fact. petitioner initiated the complaint before RTC of Pasig. in the absence of a special compact. Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from private respondent under the judgment. CA and PNCC G. July 20. Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to Dismiss. that the trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted. to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya. however. Bhd. it is tainted with want of jurisdiction. of a tribunal of a foreign
. a judgment. for the completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By Pass. Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. but the appellate court dismissed the same and affirmed the decision of the trial court. In this jurisdiction. contending that the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya should be denied recognition or enforcement since on in face. and Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines. before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur entitled “Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v. private respondent’s counsel
until a contrary showing. against a person.R. In due time. Furthermore. 2001 Facts: Petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation organized under the laws of Malaysia while private respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation is a corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws. Petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent. utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries. no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country. the rules of comity. Bhd. Generally. 110263. Project. Dismissal was. The High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the private respondent. following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice. then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines. on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum Under Section 50(b).
Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad. petitioner filed an application for summary judgment and submitted affidavits and documentary evidence in support of its claim. Advocates and Solicitors. entered their conditional appearance for private respondent questioning the regularity of the service of the writ of summons but subsequently withdrew the same when it realized that the writ was properly served. Kuala Lumpur. UMBC Building. Petitioner’s sole witness. that because private respondent failed to file a statement of defense within two (2) weeks. that the matter was then heard before the High Court of Kuala Lumpur in a series of dates where private respondent was represented by counsel. testified to the effect that he is in active practice of the law profession in Malaysia. with address at 24th Floor. then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines. 1983 on Cora S. 1983 at the registered office of private respondent and on March 21. that the writ of summons were served on March 17. collusion. a financial planning officer of private respondent for Southeast Asia operations. The judgment may. or clear mistake of law or fact.
. that private respondent. however. Allen and Gledhill. in Kuala Lumpur. Messrs. petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered . In the instant case. was sued by his client.country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. Deala. Jalan Sulaiman. fraud. that upon the filing of the case. want of notice to the party. be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction. that he was connected with Skrine and Company as Legal Assistant up to 1981.
the Court of Appeals did not make its own "independent judicial opinion" by such act of adopting the statement of facts made by the advance party (Rollo. 116. Sec.P. A consolidation of trails.
. Rule 119. Even had he signified his opposition to the joint trail. 798248 and ASB Check No. 798247 and 798250 were drawn against insufficient funds. Petitioner paid in cash the several pieces of jewelry which he bought from de Leon. 11). Blg. 798246. in the absence of a consolidation of the two cases. he issued several checks payable to "cash" in the said amount and post-dated them Petitioner told de Leon that the check was funded and that she could even withdraw the amount on that day. Petitioner was charged an convicted in nine informations with estafa and violation of B. sec. we held that the trial court improperly rendered a single judgment for two offenses in one of the two criminal cases. In Tanjuatco. In this petition. 14). the denial of his motion of reconsideration on the basis of a comparison of said motion with the "comment thereon" (Rollo. petitioner was introduced to Remedios de Leon by his aunt. pp.
The case of United States v. 10-12). 1987. respondents. 18. inasmuch as he is entitled. 245964 were drawn against a closed account. De Leon did not encash the check for the bank was closed (TSN. as one engaged in the business of buying and selling jewelry (TSN. 14. 20). and upon the allegations set forth in each information. VIII. 19). Petitioner told de Leon that he was interested in buying some more pieces of jewelry. This contention is untenable. 1). pp. VIII. Petitioner next questions: (i) as violative of the constitutional mandate that decisions shall contain the facts and the law on which they are based (1987 Constitution. pp.G. This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in It appears that sometime in August 1986. relied upon by petitioner. and (ii) as violative of the constitutional mandate requiring that any denial of a motion for reconsideration must state the legal basis thereof (1987 Constitution. albeit in the same decision. It is not permissible to take into account or consider in one case the facts proved in the other. March 31. and vice versa" (at pp. Sec. the trial court rendered a judgment for each of the nine separate informations. petitioner claims that his conviction of nine distinct offenses subject of nine separate informations in a single judgment is reversible error. although accused of two offenses. 16. or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character" (1985 Rules on Criminal procedure. to a trial in each of the two cases upon the proofs adduced in each individual case. 1993 DANILO HERNANDEZ. 22. is allowed in "charges for offenses founded on the same facts. In the case at bench. No. 104874 December 14. According to petitioner. March 17. the decision of the Court of Appeals which merely adopted the statement of facts of the Solicitor general in the appellee's brief.R. 1 Phil. par. Tanjuatco. 117-118). 14. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. is distinguishable from the instant case. Art. 1987. The trial of the nine criminal cases was conducted jointly without any objection from petitioner. BPI Checks Nos. at the court's discretion. vs. Art. while BPI Check no. We further stated in Tanjuatco that the trial court violated "an essential right of the accused. petitioner. such opposition would have been unavailing. par. 2). p.
said was that it found the facts as presented by the Solicitor General as supported by the evidence. There is no proscription made.
. in effect.What the Court of Appeals. The constitutional mandate only requires that the decision should state the facts on which it is based.
June 30. Tichangco v. Indeed. G. in denying reconsideration of its SC decision.M.
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court. 6 Contention c/o Pet The resolution of the CA denying his motion for reconsideration was rendered in violation of the months from the date of submission. decides to deny a motion. Nov. unless otherwise reduced by the Held & Ratio The Constitutional requirement was fully complied with when the CA. 150629. Martinez v. after deliberation. The CA Decision contains the necessaryFast facts antecedents to warrant its conclusions.” within its jurisdiction? Notes in class Contentions c/o IBP Resolution – disposition of merits upon due course. or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself. but merely a statement of the “legal basis” for denying due course. 28. 3. or at the most. 123547.appeal
. stated in its resolution that it found no reason to change its ruling because petitioner had not • 12 months for all lower collegiate courts • 3 months for all other lower courts raised anything new. without further delay. • Presupposes that case is deemed submitted for decision • Last pleading Notes in class SC reversed the decision of the CA. • 3 months – original • 12 months .” What the law insists on is that a decision state the “essential ultimate facts. the “mere failure to specify the contentions of the petitioner and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provision of law Issue What is the reglementary period within which the Sandiganbayan must decide/resolve cases falling and the Constitution. 2001 There is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement when a collegiate appellate court. Enriquez.R. however the Sandiganbayan. In appellate courts. is required to resolve and decide cases within a reduced period of 3 months like RTCs. Article 8. brief. and. A. Article 8 Section 14 Deals with the disposition of petitions for review and motions for reconsideration. \A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading. • Must be resolved within 24 months from date of submission to the SC. shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination. the court. “Dismissed for lack of merit” – sufficient as to the constitutional Contention c/o Solicitor General requirement SC is not required to give due course to ALL decisions. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period. 00-8-05-SC. No. as a trial court. Section 15 Constitution because it does not state the legal basis thereof. May 21. 1905. and served upon the parties. 2001 before it within 12 months “from date of submission”. the appellate court cannot be said to have withheld “any IBP filed a resolution (administrative complaint) for “serious delays in the decision of cases and in the specific finding of facts. a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter. states that the questions raised are factual or have already been passed upon. Issue (WON) The CA complied with Section 14 Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution. 1. CA. G. the rule does not require any comprehensive statement of facts or mention of the applicable law. Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period.m. without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof.
Held & Ratio Re: Delays in the Sandiganbayan. “all lower collegiate courts” must decide or resolve cases or matters Fr. does not contain decision • The Sandiganbayan is a trial court.” resolution of motions and other pending incidents before the different divisions of the Sandiganbayan.R. and three months for all other lower courts. a fact that they perceive to be crucial to the determination of the case. unless reduced by the Supreme Court. • The Constitution states that. or cites some other legal basis. Periods for deciding cases No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor. twelve months for all lower collegiate courts. No.
4. it is required to submit the same reports required of the RTC. Upon the expiration of the corresponding period. 2004 The CA’s Decision is invalid because it failed to mention that a magnetic survey was completed only on November 15. Petition for Review/Motion for Reconsideration n. 2.
if not overwhelming and damning” that respondent did intercede for suspected Sandiganbayan Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai. or instrumentality. Presidential Electoral Tribunal p. including GOCCs or institutions. No. 00-7-09-CA. Section 11. Absent any showing of bias. Held & Ratio All his benefits were ordered forfeited. Article 8. with Justice Griño-Aquino. Temporarily assign judges to other stations in public interest If court exceeds mandatory periods = administrative sanctions o. flaw or grave abuse of discretion. Demetria. Demetria was found guilty on March 27. with Demetria commenting. court of Quezon City where it should be redocketed and raffled to any Judge. The usual precautions and security measures should be adopted in bringing Crisologo to Resolution Crame on the occasion of the hearing.
1. March 27.The evidence is clear. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. I would suppose. reappointment to any government office. possession all the inherent powers of a court of justice. partiality. 2. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.” Demetria Dispositive The municipal court of Vigan is directed to transfer the record of Crisologo’s Criminal Case to the city then called Zuño and requested the CSP to order Formaran to withdraw the MFI. i. the unsigned letter of would be imperiled. where it is mentioned that the SC has the power to dismiss the Held & Ratio judges of the lower courts. 2001
The Supreme Court shall have the power to assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require.e. No. then an His life would be in jeopardy if he were to be confined in the Vigan municipal jail during the trial Associate Justice of the CA. 2001 of interceding in behalf of suspected Contention c/o Crisologo drug queen Yu Yuk Lai.
. Demetria accompanied a certain Go Teng Kok and Atty. that it is about Article 8.M. 9. The decision to dismiss Demetria. Supervision of lower courts The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts. 1. The Sandiganbayan promulgated its own rules providing that the maximum period to decide cases is within 3 months from the date the case was submitted for decision. or order their dismissal. The Constitution expressly empowers the Court to “order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a Among other events. Pilotin. Section 5 provides that Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by theIn re Letter of PJ Vasquez.
People v. Sept. It would be absurd to compel him to undergo trial in a place where his life Teng Kok readily asked the prosecutor to withdraw his motion for inhibition. though.
Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid miscarriage of justice
Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. the public prosecutor handling the Yu Yuk Lai case. In re Demetria. The case may be tried at Camp Crame. Reinerio Paas to themiscarriage of justice”. not disturb the findings of the respected Justice. Formaran declined the request and simply said that he would bring the matter to CSP Jovencito Zuño. we shall functions of a trial court. A. was dismissed from service with prejudice to his appointment orbecause there are many political enemies of the Crisologo family in that vicinity. Demetria being in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 08-8-11-CA. as promulgated by the retired SC Sepcial court of the same level as the CA. Section 14 does not apply to the Sandiganbayan. Administrative powers The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. Go personal safety of Crisologo. Maximum period of determination of cases for the Sandiganbayan =Did not find a discussion within the case of the exact Constitutional provision that relates to the 3 months “Supervision of lower courts” which this case is supposed to be illustrative of. by a vote of a majority of its Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. Upon meeting Formaran. What is involved in the case at bar is not merely a miscarriage of justice but the office of SP Formaran. PD 1606 Personal Note Law creating the Sandiganbayan.M. Article 8. A. 65 SCRA 635 (1975)
Fast facts Justice Demetrio G. 2008 SC.” was “not strong”. agency. “concerned court employees. “Iyon pala.
the case proceeds with this discussion: To compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) pending before the Sandiganbayan.Notes in class Applies to criminal cases (civil cases – inhibition venue can be transferred but not jurisdiction. where he committed his crime”. or modify substantive rights. it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue. as Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The witnesses in the case are fearful of their lives. Basis of change of venue A change of place of trial in criminal cases should not be granted for whimsical or flimsy reason. and shall not diminish. Promulgate rules concerning the enforcement and protection of constitutional rights 6. and procedure in all courts. most of the accused Contention c/o Zaldivar remained at large. Appointment of officials and employees of entire judiciary Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law. 103 SCRA 393 (1981) Fast facts CFI Negros Occidental issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the deceased bodies of 7 persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta.
4. Negros Occidental. Held & Ratio Change of venue has become moot and academic. 5. 68 SCRA 14 (1975) Contentions c/o Mondiquing • They could not expect a fair and impartial trial in Lagawe. “the interests of the public require the. Kabankalan. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. increase. their safety could be jeopardized. and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established. Issue (WON) Mondiguing’s plea for a change of venue is justified. Practice and Procedure
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases. At least 2 of the accused are official with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. the Supreme Court administers examinations in eight bar subjects for the purpose of determining who should be admitted to the practice of law. the integrated bar. Held & Ratio Petition for change of venue is meritorious. pleading. Isabel. 7.) Jurisdiction • Subject matter • Person • Territory Mondiguing v. former Congressman Romulo Lumaig • Their witnesses would be afraid to testify for fear of harassment and reprisals • Their lives and the lives of their witnesses and lawyers would be in grave danger in Ifugao because of the tensions and antagonisms spawned by the case and the political rivalry beteen the Lumauig and Mondiguing factions. vested with power and authority independently to investigate and to institute cases for graft and
. was no longer of the witnesses.
General rule The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. Ifugao because Judge Francisco Men Abad of the CFI of that province is a protégé of Governor Lumauig and his brother. In case of doubt. it is necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place. as near as may be. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Sola. Because of this fear.
Zaldivar vs. In addition. Abad. practice. Kabankalan. to secure the best results and effects in the punishment of crime. they may either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives. 166 SCRA 316 (1988)
Fast facts Zaldivar (pet) is one of several defedants in Criminal Cases Nos. Promulgate Rules Concerning Pleading. There have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the families Gonzales (resp). The Office of Contentions c/o witnesses in the murder cases the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation and filed the criminal informations in those They were in fear that if the trial is held at the CFI branch in Himamaylan which is but 10km fromcases. Gonzales. and legal assistance to the under-privileged. the admission to the practice of law. People v. Admission to the Practice of Law Each year. A change of venue is granted as it was shown that the accused might be liquidated by his enemies in the place where the trial was originally scheduled to be held. However. shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade.
. To approve officially of those inadequately authority of the SC. that the SC has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. and hence that the informations filed in the debase and degrade the SC and. Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers and functions of the Ombudsman. like that involving Zaldivar. The SC. “canAtty. In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar exams of 1946 to 1952. Held & Ratio Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the past Discussion of the issue penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary sanctions. The enactment of the RA will Order Gonzales too cease and desist from conducting investigations and filing criminal cases with the result in the admittance of additional 1. disbarment. An adequate legal preparations one of • Members of the court should inhibit themselves as they were biased and prejudiced agai nst him the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. 1988 Admission to the practice of law • That decision was rendered in retaliation by the SC against him for the position he had taken “that The admission. precisely more so Contentions c/o Gonzales as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. of law. and civil liberties. Raul M. from the SC. alter. the SC holds that the The law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1. has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. • The issues of the proceeding should be passed upon the IBP because he does not expect due process To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property. constitute the grossest disrespect for the Court. life. which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itselfRA 972 is constitutional. 1988 1. That in several instances. and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the the SC Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors”. result in the passage and admittance to the April 27. Those who disbursements in the SC because “it will embarrass this Court” deemed to have passed by virtue of the RA shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding 3. 1988 SC Decision practice of law of people who have previously flunked the bar exams. Fast facts The case at bar deals with an RA that. it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course. especially the one which mentions that the SC made a deliberately prepared individual to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social erroneous decision. when effected. Such statements very clearlydanger. from the SC. 534 (1954) been supposedly been assigned by President Aquino to preside over graft cases as Tanodbayan. That he was approached and asked to “refrain” from investigating the COA report on illegal An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955. • The SC deliberately rendered an erroneous decision when it re ndered it Decision on April 27. order to stop respondent from investigating cases against “some of the protégés or friends of some SC Justices”. Requirement of legal profession The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency. responsibility over the admission.corruption against public officials and employees. and was asked to dismiss cases against 2 members of the Court OBJECTIVE: to admit to the bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials Authority to discipline and inadequate preparation.
Philippine Daily Globe article Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case Gonzales is quoted in many Dispositive occasions saying that stopping him from investigating graft cases. Gonzales is suspended from the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from aggravate the thought that affluent persons can prevent the progress of trial…What I am afraid of (with the the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich and influential persons get favorable actionsSC.” He continues to accuse that this issue will promote further lack of confidence in the judiciary. the entire system of administration of justice in the aforementioned Criminal Cases were all null and void. The statements. disbarment. Role of Congress • The members of the SC have improperly “pressured him to render decisions favorable to their May repeal. but the authority and “colleagues and friends”.094 law graduates who confessedly had statements made by Gonzales clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession. That he had been approached by a leading member fo the SC and he was asked to “go slow” on Zaldivar and “not be too hard on him” RA 972 2. and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the SC. honor. including dismissal of “cases” against 2 of its own members. While he has In re : Cunanan. through the SC. and in profession their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. the suspensions to take effect immediately. the respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the SC oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar. Statements in MFR filed by Gonzales on April 28. and supplement the rules promulgated by the Court. suspension. 94 Phil. the SC has been continually preventing him to do so. as regulator and guardian of the legal profession.094 candidates. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court’s constitutional mandate toIssue (WON) regulate admission to the practice of law. suspension. country.
Rana’sReason for the collection of fees In order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services. Practice of law Any activity. Section 10 Court Rule Provides. Roman Ozaeta training. Passing the bar is not the only qualification toresponsibilities. that the effect of the nonpayment of dues shall warrant suspension of Contentions c/o Aguirre (pet) membership in the IBP and continued default for one year shall be a ground for removal of the name • Rana is guilty of unauthorized practice of law. 84 SCRA 554 (1978) the presiding justices. violation of law. it is no less certain that only the Court.. Fast facts Notes in class Marcial Edillon is subject to an action for his name to be removed from the Roll of Attorneys. property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Generally. after the passing of the bar exams: (1) taking oath and (2) Created by the SC. and not the legislative (by virtue of RA) or executive (EO) department may do so. It was judgment revoking those promulgated by the Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar proven that he represented himself as counsel even before he had taken his oath. They are. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually The integration of the Philippine Bar is perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable. Bar Matter No. and graveof the delinquent from the Roll. and experience. knowledge. among others. which requires the application of law. Aguirre v.average of 70%. subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar. decision for the charges filed against him. legal procedure. that continued delinquency in payment of the fees shall authorize the IBP to Edwin Rana (resp) was among those who passed the 2000 bar exams. Geo rge Bunan andviolative of his right to freedom of association. therefore. Affirmed findings of OBC. 2003 Section 24. OBC found Rana to be guilty of misconduct. Article 3 IBP By-laws Fast facts Provides. candidates concerned.. signing in the Roll. Edillon should be disbarred and whose name should be stricken out of the Roll because of stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP. to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. Although the Court can certainly revoke these judgments. ****Please read the notes given by Atty.
. performed by members of the legal profession. Effectively. there are two (2) requisites. Contention c/o Edillon Masbate The abovementioned provisions in the IBP by-laws and Court Rule are null and void as they are • Rana represented himself as counsel for and behalf of Vice Mayoralty candidate. among others. 1036. misrepresentation • Rana appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the MBEC of Mandaon. grave misconduct. it will be a usurpation of functions. It is the signing in the Roll that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. Pendingdelinquent member’s name from the Roll. June 10.members. he was allowed to take his oath but was enjoined from signing in the roll of attorneys until judgment has finally been rendered. Integrated Bar and Integration of the bar Integration of the bar is a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do Requisites for the admittance to the practice his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its It is not enough that a candidate passes the bar exams. the latter being caused by lack of unanimity among In re : Edillon. A law enacted in 1953 (It revoked the judgments the SC has made before as regards the lawyers they have admitted). as the regulator of the practice of law. in or out of court. His behavior casts serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. He is being deprived of the rights to liberty and signed the pleading as Counsel for Bunan. applied retroactively will in effect give the Congress the power that should have been Contentions c/o IBP vested solely in the judiciary: violates separation of powers. including a recommendation to the SC for the removal of the when a petition was filed against him. He was about to take his oath resort to all appropriate actions. An integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be become an attorney-at-law. Rana is denied admission to the Philippine Bar. 8. Integration of the Bar Otherwise. Angeles for the topics of admission to the Resolution practice of law and Integration of the Bar The RA is partly unconstitutional and constitutional. Rana. requesting for the denial of his admission to the bar. the disputed law is not a legislation. In re: Petition for the IBP.be admitted in mass to the practice of law. it is a unauthorized practice of law is a sufficient ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. Integration provides an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and Held & Ratio incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
and of the IBP officers. unless appointed to the On Edillon’s constitutional right of freedom to association. prescribe. mandates that Justices and Judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal courts. Issue (WON) In re : IBP Elections Bar Matter No. Ramon The abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from Nisce. The changes included. the Secretary of Justice. those which pertain to the campaign of the 3 candidates proving to be overly extravagant and unreasonable. a representative of the Integrated Bar. and the representative of the private sector for one year. He. the retired Justice for two years. national. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court proceedings composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the inferior courts established by such Act. Report on the Judciary 2. of any group of which he is not already a member. On Edillon’s name and the Roll. Tenure De La Llana vs. the professor of law for three years. 491 (October 6. the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the commonAn Act Reorganizing the Judiciary. the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years. except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals. together with other colleagues. the shift of the voter participation in the elections from all the delegates of the IBP per region to simply the members of the Board of Governors. Integration does not make a lawyer a memberof this act is to promote expediency in decisions and avoid accumulation of pending cases. BP 129 good. The Constitution vests in the National Assembly the IBP power to define. filed Held & Ratio an action to enjoin the enactment of BP 129. The practice of law being clothed BP 129 with public interest. 9 Legal Assistance to the Underprivileged q. 5.
. The Court has power to amend the by-laws as part of their power to promulgate rules under Article 8. Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other Purposes". The purpose IBP is not violative his constitutional right to associate. All the practices. among others. courts inferior to the SC and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitation new appointments and commissions. The SC has the plenary power over all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Fast facts Held & Ratio There were 3 candidates for the position of IBP President in 1989: Attorneys Nereo Paculdo. There is no undue delegation of legislative power if the law is choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates.De La Llana was a Judge and was allegedly affected by BP 129. Alba. All legislation directing the integration of the Bar has been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. Lower courts a.
The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Section 5(5). However. Drilon won the elections. This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish candidates resorted to unorthodox campaigning practices that further investigation was conducted. to the extent of the interest he has created. would be considered separated from the Judiciary. complete and provides for a standard. and a representative of the private sector. or regional.
3. a retired Member of the Supreme Court. Of the Members first appointed. Qualifications and appointment b. and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts. and a and tainted the whole elections process. representative of the Congress as ex officio Members. The Judicial and Bar Council Resolution Elections of 1989 are null and void. and Violeta Drilon. a professor of law.
The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings. 1989) BP 129 is constitutional. 122 SCRA 291 (1983) Fast facts
3. or chapter. Edillon is barred and his name is removed from the Roll. made a political circus of the 1. subject to certain The IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in thelimitations in the case of the SC. Integratio n of the Bar in the Philippines is valid as there is a power expressly vested in the SC by the Constitution. In addition the Court amended the by-laws of the IBP. there were allegations that the no infirmity.
Clerk of the Supreme Court
6.4. 4. 3.
Ex-officio Members: 1. 3.
The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court.
The Council shall have the principal function of reobserved by all lower collegiate courts. 2. Representatives of the Integrated Bar Professor of Law Retired member of the Supreme Court Representatives of private sectors
Secretary ex-officio 1. Automatic release of appropriation for the judiciary
. Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman Secretary of Justice Representatives of Congress
Regular Members 1. 2. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.