Soft Power in the EU Enlargement Strategy

8th Semester Project 2011

Soft Power in the EU Enlargement Strategy
A liberalist analysis of the speech 99/130 on Enlargement, ISPA and SAPARD

Jesper Blaabjerg Holm, Julie Hvilshøj Ovadja and Kristina Presis

Table of Contents
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 1 1. 2 Background ............................................................................................................................................. 2 2. Methodology ................................................................................................................................................. 4 2. 1 Problem Formulation.............................................................................................................................. 4 2. 2 Empirical Data ......................................................................................................................................... 4 2. 3 Theory ..................................................................................................................................................... 6 2. 4 Approach ................................................................................................................................................ 6 2. 5 Delimitation ............................................................................................................................................ 7 2. 6 Definition ................................................................................................................................................ 8 2. 6. 1 Soft Power ...................................................................................................................................... 8 3. Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................................................. 9 3. 1 Liberalism................................................................................................................................................ 9 3. 2 The EU as a unitary actor ...................................................................................................................... 10 3. 3 Soft power and the EU.......................................................................................................................... 11 3. 4 Soft Power: A (Neo)liberal Perspective ................................................................................................ 15 3. 5 Operationalisation of soft power ......................................................................................................... 17 4. Historical Background .................................................................................................................................. 21 5. Empirical Data.............................................................................................................................................. 23 5. 1 Speech/99/130 on Enlargement........................................................................................................... 23 5. 2 ISPA ....................................................................................................................................................... 25 5. 3 SAPARD ................................................................................................................................................. 28 6. Analytical part.............................................................................................................................................. 31 6. 1 Analysis of Speech/99/130 on Enlargement ........................................................................................ 31 6. 2 Analysis of ISPA ..................................................................................................................................... 33 6. 3 Analysis of SAPARD ............................................................................................................................... 34 7. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................... 37 8. Proposal for Further Research..................................................................................................................... 40 9. Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................. 42

Soft Power in the EU Enlargement Strategy

1. Introduction
In the contemporary world order, some scholars argue that the nature of power is changing (Heywood, 2007). The argument, which generally is associated with the liberal, but also the constructivist, school of thought (Gallarotti, 2011), circles around the assumption that in international politics of today soft power is increasingly becoming as important as hard power (Heywood, 2007), if not more important (Gallarotti, 2011) : “Military power, the traditional currency of world politics, has certainly not become irrelevant, but its use is greatly undermined when it is not matched by „hearts and minds‟ strategies” ( Heywood, 2007, 142). Liberalist scholars argue that this change derives from various factors, such as economic interdependence, the process of globalisation (which further strengthens the economic links between states) , the obsolescence of war due to the deterrent character of nuclear weapons, the spread of democracies and finally the growth of cooperative networks between states (e.g. international organisations and regimes) (Gallarotti, 2011). The European Union (EU), in this context, has a great potential for obtaining a vast influence on the global stage. Without resting on hard power, it has already managed to deepen and expand itself from the Atlantic Ocean up to the borders with Russia (Moravscik, 2010). Moreover, it has created a positive image and gained credibility abroad in comparison to other states (Krastev & Leonard, 2007). In fact the creation and continuing expansion of the EU is considered to be “the most successful peace project in the world history” (Tuomioja, 2009). In addition to this, according to Andrew Moravscik (2010), professor of Political Science at Princeton University, the success of the EU enlargement has been due to the soft power strategy exercised by the EU (Moravscik, 2010). Since the first enlargement of the EU in 1973 where Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the original members of the European Coal and Steel Community, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the EU has been in a constant process of enlargement. This process has for a large part been following political changes on the European continent, such as the fall of the totalitarian regimes in Portugal and Spain that around a decade later led the way for those two countries to join the EU or the reunification of Germany that welcomed East Germany into the EU in 1990. Eventually the end of the Cold War and the fall the Iron Curtain also opened up for accession for some of the former East Bloc countries to enter the European Union in 2004 and 2007 (European Commission, 2009a).


Therefore, because of the importance of soft power in the world today and the fact that the EU enlargement has played such an important role in the history of the EU while at the same time being considered one of the greatest achievements obtained with the use of soft power (Moravscik, 2010), it is relevant to study the enlargement strategy more in detail. This paper seeks to find out how soft power is applied in the strategy and if soft power is focused more on structural changes in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) or if the measures in the strategy are meant to influence the view on the EU in the eyes of the public in these countries. It is interesting because it may have a broader validity that can be applied in other contexts as well.

1. 2 Background
With the collapse of Communism in 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe, the thought of a wider integration of the CEECs into the EU became realistic (Glenn, 2001). Nevertheless, scholars argue that the gap 1 between the EU and the applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe had never, in comparison to previous enlargements, been so wide (2001). The process of enlargement was therefore not only about preparing the new economies to enter the European markets, but also about narrowing this gap. Scholars, such as Moravscik (2010), argue that soft power plays a large role in “projecting regional influence” (Moravscik, 2010, 159) in response to the security threat that many scholars in the period after the end of the cold war thought would be brought about with the collapse of the Soviet Union (Mearsheimer, 1990). The enlargement process which integrated the CEECs into the EU began in 1989 with the launch of PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies) (European Commission, 2010a) and culminated with the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. In the addition to the extension of PHARE to all of the countries applying for membership, the EU also created a number of policies and regulations. These included the Copenhagen Criteria, a number of standards that had to be fulfilled by the applicant countries prior to membership, a National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) individually constructed for each applicant country, and the two pre-accession instruments in addition to PHARE, the Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD) and the Instrument for


Glenn (2001) argues that the gap between the CEECs and the EU was wider than it had been in the case of previous enlargements. Glenn (2001) links this to the ideological division between East and West that ruled the bipolar world order during the Cold War. This division can be understood to include political, economic, cultural and social dimensions.


Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), both created in 1999 (European Commission, 2010a). By linking the growing importance of soft power in international relations and the EU enlargement being the most suitable example of expansion through measures of soft power, this project proposes following problem formulation:


2. Methodology
2. 1 Problem Formulation
From a liberalist perspective, based on the 1999 EU pre-accession tools, SAPARD and ISPA, and a public statement of the European Commission from the same year, this project aims to analyse to what extent soft power was part of the EU‟s enlargement strategy and if soft power was mainly focused on reform of the political and/or economic structure and/or public opinion in the CEECs. In order to address the problem formulation, one must attempt to answer the following core questions: What is soft power and how is it operationalised in the project? What is liberalism in IR theory? Can the EU be seen as soft power and if so, in what ways? What are the most determinant policies in the EU enlargement strategy and does soft power have a place in them? These questions will be dealt with in the project.

2. 2 Empirical Data
This study hopes to contribute and stimulate further interest and research in the changing nature of power and the growing importance of soft power in the current world order. Despite the fact that the project is only focusing on one world region and a specific time framework, we believe that it has broader implications and can be applied to other regions as well. It assumes so by coming from the current debate in international relations on the changing nature and sources of state power. One of the driving forces behind this project was to find validation for the argument that in the contemporary world international prestige and diplomacy often play an important role, and are in some cases perhaps even more significant than economic power and extensive military might. The study of soft power and the measures through which they are applied give an insight to both small and big nations how to successfully conduct foreign relations and diplomacy with their counterparts. Thus, the research of what has been called the most successful project of an expansion ever realised in the world history through soft power measures (Tuomioja,


2009), will present the best example for ways through which other states can be able to further national interests and goals more effectively. The methodology of this project is based on a qualitative analysis as a quantitative analysis cannot be applied due to the non-material nature of soft power. Therefore this study is going to be founded on the ideas and observations grounded in theory rather than on the examination of hard scientific data. The conduct of the research is based on the use of primary sources, such as official publications and government documents. This is mainly due to the fact that the empirical data that we are using is very specific and it has not been widely discussed among the scholars. There is furthermore awareness that relying on primary sources helps us as researchers to avoid the pitfall of relying on information that could be biased, misinterpreted or falsely cited by others. For the basis of the empirical data the two official EU policies, ISPA and SAPARD, are chosen. They put forward the pre-accession strategy of the EU towards the CEECs in the areas of agriculture and transport and environment. Furthermore, a publication of a speech on enlargement from October 1999 by the former President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, is also included. The public statement presents the vision of enlargement strategy as well as the perception of the EU towards the CEECs in the enlargement process. The sources which are used for the analysis are all official and acquired from the web-site of the European Commission. The descriptive overview of ISPA, SAPARD and the speech will be the basis for the analysis and will therefore be used to observe to what extent and how soft power was present in the pre-accession strategy towards the CEECs. The speech by Prodi has been chosen because it presents an overview of the enlargement strategy as a whole from the perspective of the EU. The reason for choosing SAPARD and ISPA as the empirical background for the analysis is that they can be considered such an integral part of the EU enlargement strategy. SAPARD plays a particularly important role in the enlargement process as it covers one of the most sensitive sectors of the economy of the CEEC‟s - agriculture. Agricultural share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was roughly twice that of existing EU members and trade in agricultural goods had a larger share in their total trade (World Bank, 1999, 128). Therefore it is assumed that SAPARD aimed to contribute significantly in the reconstruction of the CEECs.


ISPA, in turn, aims at facilitating the implementation of the acquis communautaire in the fields of transport and environment which are also important areas in the EU. Especially environment is considered to be a central issue that for instance was reflected in the negotiation proposal presented by the EU at the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP15). The EU was committed to reduce CO2 emissions by thirty per cent if other developed nations would be committed to cut comparable parts (European Commission, 2009b). central part of the pre-accession strategy. Altogether, SAPARD, ISPA and the speech present an overview of the enlargement strategy and they are therefore considered important for the analysis. Considering the importance of the environment on the EU agenda, ISPA can therefore also be considered a

2. 3 Theory
This project will be done from a liberalist school of international relations (IR) point of view. This is done mainly because of the view of soft power in liberalism. From a liberal perspective the importance of soft power in international affairs has been growing since the Cold War (Moravscik, 2010, 156). Liberalists argue that with the end of the Cold War the rise of democratic regimes, deepening economic interdependence, spreading of the social democratic idea and a reduction of interstate war have reduced the level of conflict between the great powers of the world (Moravscik, 2010, 156). Liberalism presupposes that if a state wants to be a great power in a world that has been changed in the direction of modern democracy, then soft power is fundamental. It is, furthermore, believed that influence in the current world order cannot be obtained through a traditional hard power approach (Moravscik, 2010, 156). This idea that the importance of soft power had increased corresponds with the idea that the EU has actively been using soft power tactics in its strategies towards the CEECs. Because of the importance of soft power in liberalism the idea of soft power in this project will also be derived from the liberalist school of thought, relying mainly, but not exclusively, on the work by scholars, such as Andrew Moravscik, Andrew Heywood and Joseph Nye. On the basis of the works of these scholars this project presents its own operationalisation of the term soft power in order to make it possible to search for soft power and the variants of soft power that has been part of the enlargement strategy of the EU.

2. 4 Approach
In order to meet the objectives set forth by the problem formulation, the project will start with an introduction to the IR theory of liberalism with a special emphasis on soft power. Then it


continues with a description of how liberalists see the use of soft power in connection with the EU. The idea is to give a theoretical standpoint for further analysis in the paper as well as an introduction to the presentation of the different definitions of soft power that lay the ground for our operationalisation of the term. Thereafter we will be giving a thorough description of two significant parts of the EU preaccession strategy; SAPARD and ISPA and the related statements of the Commission, given in October 1999 speech on enlargement by the President of the Commission at the time, Romano Prodi. This is done in order to afterwards be able to analyse these on the basis of our operationalisation of soft power. Finally, on the basis of the analysis we will seek to find out to what extent the EU focused its strategy of soft power to affect and reform the political and economic structure and public opinion in the CEECs by deriving in what form soft power has had the most emphasis in the pre-accession strategy. By doing so it should be possible to answer if there is more focus on changing public opinion, if it is more a matter of structural changes or if these weight equally.

2. 5 Delimitation
In this project it has been necessary to make some delimitations which means that there are aspects of the problem that are not touched upon. First of all, it leaves out the concept of hard power that could also play a role in the pre-accession strategies. This can be justified by the theoretic approach applied in this project, liberalism, which does not define hard power as an overly important factor in IR. Nor the actual implementation of the enlargement strategy is used. It is recognised that the implementation of the strategies might not fully comply with the intended strategy but since the focus is directed to how the EU originally intended to use soft power, a further assessment of the implementation process is not presented. Furthermore, we do not look at the utilisation of soft power in the enlargement strategy from before or after 1999. This is done firstly because we find that 1999 is a crucial year as SAPARD and ISPA added a new focus to the enlargement strategy. Secondly, we believe that analysing these two important strategies as well as the speech made by the Commission will be able to give us a good overview on how the EU focused its attempt to use of soft power in the enlargement strategy.


2. 6 Definition
2. 6. 1 Soft Power In the literature there are different characterisations of what soft power is, among them are; soft power – the preference of non-military instruments, civilian power – a power that is aimed rather that expanding its interests aimed at changing the international environment, a normative power - that is a model of terms and values for others, a transformative power – a power that is aimed at exporting its own economic, political or social model and a tranquil power – that is averse to power projection (Biscop, 2007, 10). In this project the definition of soft power embraces all the above-mentioned variations.


3. Theoretical Framework
3. 1 Liberalism
Since the renaissance international relations theory has been dominated by realism. Realism is though not without critics. From the classical liberal tradition, there has in the past two centuries sounded criticism from scholars, such as Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, Richard Cobden, Woodrow Wilson, Norman Angell, Joseph Schumpeter and John Maynard Keynes. Classical liberal thought has found its way into different liberal schools of international relations theory, such as republican liberalism, pluralist liberalism, commercial liberalism, regulatory liberalism, etc. Even though these are all liberal based they are often treated as different hypotheses or separate criticisms of realism (Moravscik, 1992, 1). According to Moravscik liberalism can be expressed in three core assumptions; the essential social actors and their motivations, the relationship between state and civil society and the circumstances under which the state develops its strategies and makes choices in the international system (Moravscik, 1992, 6). The first assumption of liberalism is that the most important political actors are members of the domestic society, which refers to individuals and privately-constituted groups seeking to promote independent interests in the political system. This is because the Liberalists have the conception that society is pluralistic. According to the liberalists, society is comprised of individuals with different identities and interests and they seek, through the formation of groups, organisations and arrangements, to further their political and social goals. This means that the interest of the state is the aggregated result of the individuals that make up society (Moravscik, 1992, 6-7). The second assumption is that all governments represent some segment of the domestic society, whose interests are reflected in state policy. According to liberalists, not all governments represent the entire population. The relative size of the represented population is determined by the type of governmental system. The extreme types of governmental systems in relation to the representation of the interests of the population are pure tyranny that represents the interests of one person and pure or direct democracy which represents the interests of all citizens (Moravscik, 1992, 9). The third assumption is that the behaviour of the states reflects the nature and configuration of state preferences and thereby the levels of international conflict and cooperation. Liberalism


is based on the assumption that state actions are determined by the demanded outcome. In order to understand what might seem obvious it is necessary to know the opposite point of view posed by the realists. The realists believe that power politics can prevent states from achieving the real intentions of the state. In other words, according to the realists, state behaviour is determined by what the state can get and not necessarily what it wants (Moravscik 1992, 10).

3. 2 The EU as a unitary actor
The EU is sometimes considered a non-unified international institution and it is then argued that the EU must be a unified actor to become or remain a superpower. This can only be achieved if the EU expands the use of majority voting, elects a centralised spokesperson, establishes a common military force and defence policy, etc.. This argument is, however, not accepted by scholars, such as Moravscik, who believes that one of the reasons why the EU is a superpower is exactly because of its decentralised state, and that the flexibility that the EU gains from the decentralisation is making it more efficient (Moravscik, 2010, 170). In this project the EU enlargement pre-accession strategy is being treated as a unified strategy for the whole of the EU. This is considered possible first of all because EU enlargement is considered by scholars, such as Moravscik, as one of the few parts of EU policy that is highly centralised (Moravscik, 2010, 170). Secondly the EU can be seen as one actor because this project does not look at the decision-making process behind the enlargement strategy, but solely analyses the finished product. Therefore, any disagreements that might have been between the different actors in the decision-making process are not considered relevant for this analysis. Finally, the EU enlargement pre-accession strategy is considered a unified strategy, because of the way that EU law works. Both SAPARD and ISPA are Council Regulations. This means that they are directly and immediately enforceable law in all member countries simultaneously. According to the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union Article 288: “To exercise the Union's competences, the institutions shall adopt regula tions, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions. A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.


A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed. Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force” (European Union, 2006). Since a regulation is binding in its entirety for all member states, it must be assumed that the pre-accession measures that are part of the programmes in SAPARD and ISPA are important components of an EU-strategy that all the different actors in the EU by law have to commit to. All the arguments mentioned above prove that there is a unity of the EU policies and actions which provides support for the argument that the EU can be considered a unitary actor in the case of the enlargement strategy.

3. 3 Soft power and the EU
From a liberalist point of view the EU can be considered a great power or even a super power. This is evident in works by scholars, such as Mitchell P. Smith, Andrew Moravscik, Sven Biscop and Joseph Nye. Moravscik argues that the world is bipolar and will continue to be so (Moravscik, 2009). The EU and the United States (US) are the only superpowers and the EU is a much greater power than people usually think (Moravscik, 2009). The reason why the EU is so strong is not because of hard power which is not so strange since the annual U.S military expenditures exceeds those of all the EU member states combined (Smith, 2006). However, this does not mean that the EU is insignificant when it comes to military power, because if the numbers of EU military spending are put in another context then they actually look quite impressive: the EU accounts for twenty-one per cent of the world‟s military spending, whereas China‟s is five per cent, Russia‟s three per cent, India‟s two per cent and Brazil‟s one and a half per cent (Moravscik , 2010, 157). Nevertheless, even though the EU does have a strong military power and does use military intervention, it is still considered a last resort (Biscop, 2007, 5 and 7). However, if it is not the reliance on hard power that shapes the assumption that the EU is a powerful actor in international politics, then what is it? According to the scholars mentioned above, it is soft power, but where does this soft power originate from? Smith (2006) argues that the EU is a strong economic power. This power is shared with the US and China and also increasingly with the rising regional economies, such as Brazil, India and South Africa. At the


same time Smith also points out that the EU is a world leader when it comes to global humanitarian aid and development assistance (Smith, 2006, 21). Moravscik is a bit more specific when it comes to exact evidence of what makes the EU a soft power. He claims that this assumption mainly stems from different instruments, such as the EU enlargement, The Neighbourhood Policy and diplomatic engagement, multilateralism, international law, trade, investment and finance, aid, political and social values (Moravscik, 2010, 159-163). The most powerful policy instrument of the EU is the accession the CEECs into the EU. The EU‟s power of attraction is so strong that for the last two decades it has been a stabilising force in the institutions and economies of many of EU‟s neighbouring countries. The effect of the EU enlargement is not only seen in the dozen countries that have recently joined the EU but also in other countries that aspire to become members in the future (Moravscik, 2010, 159). In comparison to the enlargement of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the enlargement of the EU can be seen as having way more impact while still being less provocative to other states such as Russia. Even after the latest enlargement of the EU the European leaders still continue to work towards enlarging the union even further, although this policy has very low public support (Moravscik, 2010, 159). Moravscik asserts that such an efficient tool as the EU enlargement cannot be found in any of the other great powers: the US, China and Japan, for example, do not have any comparable tool for projecting regional influence (Moravscik, 2010, 159). The EU also gains a lot of power from its neighbourhood policy and diplomatic engagement. The EU‟s neighbourhood policy is considered to be very active, as there is a lot of evidence of the EU intervening diplomatically in other countries to resolve conflicts and promote political and economic reform backed by the economic, financial, legal and military might of the EU. The EU is also disposed to sign association and free trade agreements and does not limit itself to only dealing with the state that are candidates for membership. It also reaches out and makes agreements with other countries, such as Libya, Morocco and Israel. Some might argue that the EU neighbourhood policies are a bit slow but more proactive and realistic. This is in comparison to US “‟shock and awe‟ tactics” (Heywood, 2007, 142) in the foreign policy, which, for example, can be associated with the extension of NATO membership to Georgia and the democratisation of Iraq (Moravscik, 2010, 159-160). Soft power for the EU is also gained from the fact that the EU is a strong and consistent supporter of international law and institutions. The EU is the largest financial contributor to the United Nations (UN) where the EU funding accounts for thirty-eight per cent of the regular


budget, two-fifths of all UN peacekeeping operations, and nearly half of all contributions to UN funds and programmes. On top of that the EU members have also signed nearly all international treaties that are currently in force and the EU countries are also overrepresented and very active in most international organisations (Moravscik, 2010, 160). As a genuine superpower in the global economy much of EU‟s soft power also stems from its trade and investments in this area. The EU is larger than the US and far ahead of countries such as China and India. In trade the EU is very dominant especially in the Middle East and Africa where the EU is the largest trading partner for all countries, except Jordan (Moravscik 2010, 162). The EU is also the largest importer and exporter of the world (Germany alone exports as much as China). Furthermore, the EU trades more with China than the US and has a stronger bilateral trade balance. Also in investment the EU is very important. From 2000 to 2007 fifty-eight per cent of all US foreign direct investment was in Europe compared to fourteen per cent in all of the BRICs (in the same period the US invested more than twice as much in Ireland than in China. European companies accounted in 2007 for seventy-one per cent of all foreign investments in the US (Moravscik, 2010, 162). Soft power is also accumulated from aid. The EU grants fifty per cent of the world‟s foreign aid compared to twenty per cent of the US. Even private aid from the EU exceeds that of the US (170 million dollars from Europe compared to 105 million dollars from the US in 2007) (Moravscik, 2010, 162-163). Last but not least, Moravscik argues that political and social values are very important. Even though the US is often seen as the symbol of freedom, democracy and a free market economy, both polling and practice suggest that European political and social models are more attractive than the models used in the US. This, according to Moravscik proofs to be true because people around the world “favor generous social welfare and health policies, parliamentary government, adherence to international human rights standards and a smaller role for money in politics all associated with Europe, rather than libertarian social policies and incomplete health coverage, the separation of powers, idiosyncratic national human rights definitions without international oversight, and large role for money in politics all of which are associated with the United States” (Moravscik, 2010, 163). Not many of the recently democratised countries have chosen to copy the US political system. Instead they have chosen a model more like the German, South African or Canadian one. In his description of what makes the EU a soft power, much of the argumentation falls under what Moravscik defines as social and political values. Joseph Nye (2004), the dean of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government argues that the EU‟s soft power stems from e.g. the


fact that European countries are amongst the countries in the world that have the most Nobel Prizes in literature and chemistry and that the three countries with the highest music sales are after the US and Japan are European. Also in book sales and internet web hosts European counties score high, and the country that attracts the most tourists is also Europe. Nye also points out that European football is much more popular internationally than both American Football and baseball. Furthermore, even though Britain and France are much smaller than the US, they each spend about the same amount of money on public diplomacy. Some of the sources for soft power that both Moravscik and Nye points out are the high levels of development of the EU as being a source of soft power, the attractiveness of the European political system and the economic power of the EU. Moravscik and Nye also agree on the attractiveness of the European values. Nye mentions that the European views on capital punishment, gun control, climate change and the rights of homosexuals are probably more similar to the views of the majority of young people and rich people around the world than the views of the US government (Nye, 2004). As showed above it can be argued that the EU has a very strong soft power base. However, being a great- or super power is only relevant if you can translate your power into actual results. Smith mentions different achievements that the EU has realised with the use of its soft power. The primary example he mentions is the transition of the CEECs into democracies and market economies in a very short period of time. Moreover, the EU approach towards such countries as Turkey and Ukraine is mentioned as another example of great soft power achievements. These are massive countries with a combined population of more than 100 million that have been altered by the attraction of eventual membership. This, for instance, is seen in a speech before the European Parliament by Viktor Yuschenko from February 2005 where he said: “the new president and government of Ukraine have clearly defined the ingredients and forms for future decisions. These are the norms and standards of the European Union, its legislation, legal, political, economic, and social culture. European integration is the most effective and, in fact, the only programme of reforms for contemporary Ukra ine” (Smith, 2006, 22). In Turkey one of the most important changes that can be attributed to the soft power of the EU is the change of the role of the military in the political system: It went from a system where The National Security Council was a tool of the military‟s power excise over the executive branch to a system where the National Security Council is now an advisory board with a majority of civilians. Additionally, the Turkish parliament has got oversight over the defence budget and has brought corrupt officers to justice (Smith, 2006, 22). As a result, Moravscik sees the changes that have happened in the CEECs as a product of EU‟s soft power. He puts emphasis on the stabilisation of the polities and economies that has been


brought about in these countries since 1989 due to the EU‟s power of attraction. EU has been seen.

Also in

countries that have not achieved the status of membership, the result of the soft power of the An example is the successful attempt to avert war between Serbia and Montenegro. As Nye, Moravscik also mentions the changes in Turkey as a great result originating from the soft power of the EU. Also the successful diplomatic initiatives, in membership countries, countries with a distant possibility of achieving membership (as Nye, Moravscik mentions Ukraine) or countries that essentially have no chance of achieving membership, are accredited to soft power. Morocco is highlighted by Moravscik as one of the countries where EU soft power has encouraged political and economic reform.

3. 4 Soft Power: A (Neo)liberal Perspective
To understand the place of soft power in liberalism it is important to understand how liberalists asses global power. Liberalists do not assume that conflicts between nations are determined by a zero-sum game. Neither do they assume that every issue is contentious and that governments will mobilise all their power resources including military to try to come out victorious in every conflict. Instead they believe that most conflicts can have a positive-sum outcome that could be achieved through negotiation with concessions made by both parties. This means that the nature of power varies from issue to issue and does not necessarily have to be militaristic, but it can also take an economic and/or cultural form (Moravscik, 2010, 156). This adds to the discussions of Steven Lukes (2005) in his latest research on the power relations. He refers to the idea of Thomas Wartenberg (1990) who distinguishes power between “domination” and “beneficent”. Lukes (2005) argues that p ower can be exercised in a way that can be “productive, transformative, authoritative and compatible with dignity” (Lukes, 2005, 109). To cite an example, he is comparing the role of beneficent power with the role of a mother or a teacher in relation to a child or student. Hence, Lukes comes up with a conclusion that actors can also benefit from the power of others. It consequently leads to the conclusion that exercising power or influence on others does not necessarily mean that there is a conflict or imposition. This is in fact fits very well with one of Kenneth Boulding‟s concept of soft power- integrative power meaning when both parties can do what is better for both of them (Boulding, 1989). The term of soft power was first applied by Joseph Nye in 1990 in his book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. He defines the concept of soft power as “the ability to get others want what you want” without resting on military force and coercion (Chouliaraki, 2007, 1). In his view, this power resides on the ability to attract, induce and persuade; something


that can be achieved through building alliances, cooperation and diplomacy. This view is also supported by Andrew Heywood (2007). In his words “[s ]oft power is the ability to influence other actors by persuading them to follow or agree to norms and aspirations that produce the desired behavior”. It relies on attraction rather than coercion” (Heywood, 2007, 142). These views are by some seen as quite abstract as they do not mention any measures through which soft power can be exercised, but merely what it is supposed to do (Gallarotti, 2011). Later in his research Nye is becoming more precise using the term. He sees soft power as “an ability to set agenda for others, determining their preferences...thus controlling the values and norms which guide proceeding and actions of others” (Nye, 2004, 5). According to his observations, soft power can also derive from the great economic achievements with the capacity for innovation and regulation and also extensive international presence like in the case of providing humanitarian aid or peacekeeping operations in conflict zones (Nye, 2004). Moravscik‟s vision of soft power is similar to what Joseph Nye proposed. He sees soft power in terms of high income per capita, investments, a central position in trade networks, an important role in international institutions and the attractiveness of social and political values (Moravscik, 2010, 156). Thus, both Nye and Moravscik believe that the emphasis on military force, conquest and coercion is losing its relevance to a more positive image of modern world affairs managed by law and international institutions. In his view this approach would result in a more favourable public support and credibility abroad (Gallarotti G, 2011, 11). Finally they conclude that a nonviolent soft power approach leads to the establishment of a more balanced and stable relationship between states based on multilateral cooperation and coordination. There are no methodological methods to measure and assess soft power. It is not visible or quantified and has long term effects (McClory, 2010). There is academic literature however which presents constituent parts or sources of soft power that can lead to its creation. Systematically, soft power could be derived from two general sources: international sources and domestic sources based on the evaluation of its foreign policies and actions. Both sources tend to shape a positive image among other nations which would in turn help the soft power nation to influence world politics and to create a sense of legitimacy in its course of actions (Gallarotti, 2011). International source of soft power derives from showing the respect for international law, norms and institutions, disposition against violence as well as the multilateral posture in its


foreign policy. Tending to behave as a unilateral actor can be costly. Nations that do not participate in multilateral fora which focus on addressing world threats and/or problems are taking a risk of being marginalised from the Community. This in turn would mean diminishing the possibility to influence a decision-making process or at worst not to be taken into account (Gallarotti, 2011). Building alliances and respect for treaties are principles that furthermore are considered to be crucial for the creation of soft power. By withdrawing from alliances and international commitments in favour of unilateral solutions, a nation would create an image of a square peg in a round hole that relies on traditional sources of power embedded in multilateral support networks. Moreover a nation must be willing to sacrifice its own national short term interests for the sake of achieving a collective goal or solution. By being consistent with international norms of conduct and commitment a nation would gain a considerable respect or even endearment among other nations (Gallarotti, 2011). From the liberalist perspective, a nation must pursue liberal foreign economic policies such as economic openness, transparency and free trade. These policies represent a commitment to give a chance and hope for other nations for economic growth and development. The greater this commitment is, the more elevated the national image will be (Gallarotti, 2011). With regards to domestic sources of soft power, Joseph Nye distinguishes between two areas: the power inherent in political institutions and the power derived from culture. He suggests that the political system must be democratic and deliver pluralism, liberalism and constitutionalism while culturally deriving from the principles of freedom, human rights, tolerance, equal opportunities for individuals and an elevated quality of life (Nye, 2002). Both international and domestic sources of power reflect the emphasis on policies and actions that originate from the principles of fairness, justice and collective concern. In this regard it could be clearly observed how the principles of political liberalism can contribute to the capacity of a nation to use and increase its reliance on soft power.

3. 5 Operationalisation of soft power
In order to be able to analyse the EU enlargement strategy and find indications of the use of soft power in them, a clear definition of soft power is needed. In this project it is not possible to simply rely on the definitions of Moravscik and Nye presented above, as Moravscik deals mostly with soft power as something a state has and not as measures that can be observed in


the policies of an actor. Nye‟s definition of soft power is similar to this , but he adds that soft power is also the ability of a state to make other states do something. However, as Moravscik, he does not mention the specific measures used to do this. A combination of the definitions of soft power provided by Moravscik and Nye will serve as a foundation for the operationalisation of soft power in this project. This project accepts the assumption that soft power is derived from “high income per capita, investments, a central position in trade networks, an important role in international institutions and the attractiveness of social and political values”. The project also accepts the ass umption that soft power is the “ability to get others to follow by virtue of attraction rather than coercion. Soft power enables the possessor to achieve desired outcomes at minimal cost by avoiding the use of military force and sharing the bu rden of enforcement with allies” (Smith, 2009, 21). Finally it accepts that “[s]oft power is the ability to influence other actors by persuading them to follow or agree to norms and aspirations that p roduce the desired behaviour” (Heywood, 2007, 142). If this is accurate, then it means that soft power as a measure is derived directly from having a high income per capita, a central position in trade networks, an important role in international institutions, and the attractiveness of social and political values, etc. This is transformed into an instrument to make other states voluntarily do what you want them to do, to agree to norms that produce the desired behaviour and/or to improve the image of a state in the eyes of others. In this project there will be a distinction between two kinds of soft power measures. The first measure seeks to transform the view of the state that uses soft power in the eyes of the population in the state on to which the strategy of soft power is targeted. The other kind of soft power measures directly seeks to change the political, democratic or economic structure of another country. Among the examples of soft power measures that seek to change the view of the population, one can mention aid. Aid is a measure of power that has a direct influence on the lives of the recipients without necessarily having any influence on the political structure of the country. The force of such a measure can then be increased by actively making the recipients aware of the origin of the aid, e.g. by labelling the aid as aid from the actor who made use of this measure. An example of a measure that seeks to make structural change in another country could be derived from the choice made by one actor to promise market access and/or to help build up institutions in this country in order to help it establish a free market. This might have, as a secondary effect, some influence on the public opinion in this country, but the main outcome


will be that the actor that uses soft power will have influence on the structure of the market in another country. In this project the definition of soft power will be based on the idea that soft power, which is derived from economic prosperity, attractiveness of political and social values and influence in the international sphere, is the ability to influence others to voluntarily do what you want them to do without the use of coercion. As an effect this can bring about change to the structure of the political and/or economic system and/or it can change the image in the eyes of the population of the country you wish to influence. In the analysis we will therefore be looking for measures that, as an effect of a soft power strategy, are bringing about changes in another country without the use of coercion, while at the same time looking whether these measures are focused on changing the structure, the image or both. The illustration below presents a systematic picture of the use of soft power, from the sources of it to the goals it aims to achieve.


Sources Sources for the creation of soft power: Domestic Sources: Culture Literature Media (Movies, Music etc.) Education (Exchange programmers) Sport Tourism Freedom Equal Opportunities Tolerance High Income Per Capita Elevated Quality of Life Political Institutions Democracy Constitutionalism Liberalism Pluralism International Sources Respect for: International Laws Norms Institutions Treaties Alliance Commitments Liberal foreign economic policies

Means Means to use soft power: Supporting Facilitating Helping Supervising

Goals Goals of the use of soft power: Favour public opinion Cause Structural Changes o Political System  Institutional and legislative framework  Bureaucracy o Economic System  Free Trade  Free Market  Open Barriers  Fair Competition

...desired changes through technical and financial assistance.


4. Historical Background
In 1989, after the breakdown of Communism in the CEECs and the fall the Berlin Wall it became clear that the European region was subject to change (Dingdale, 1999). Realist scholars, such as Mearsheimer (1990), predicted the eruption of war on the European continent. Yet others saw this as an opportunity to increase peace and prosperity in Europe by opening up for the integration of new countries into the EU (Glenn, 2001). Thus, the process of enlargement and integration of some of post-socialist CEECs into the Union began in 1989. It began with the launch of PHARE, which initially was created to assist Poland and Hungary in their aims to restructure their political and economic spheres. Since then PHARE was expanded to include the other candidate countries of the 2004 and 2007 enlargement: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania2 (European Commission, 2010a). Initially it focused on providing knowhow to the countries whereas later on it centred more on aid, investment and assistance, especially in areas where the criteria set by the EU are extra demanding, such as transport, environment and working standards (2010a). After the 1993 Copenhagen Councils invitation to the Central and Eastern European countries to apply for membership PHARE was reshaped towards preparing candidate countries for accession (2010a). The Copenhagen Criteria were created at the European Council meeting in Copenhagen in 1993 (Marktler, 2006). Countries that wish to enter into the Union have to fulfil following conditions: First of all they have to have “stable institutions that guarantee democracy; the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (European Commission, 2010b). Second of all, they need “a functioning market economy, as well as the ability to cope with the pressure of competition and the market forces at work inside the Union” (2010b) . Finally, they must have “the ability to assume the obligations of membership, in particular adherence to the objectives of political, economic and monetary union” (2010b). After 1993, with the deepening of the Union through the Maastricht Treaty, the enlargement process started to take off. From 1994 to 1995 the EU received membership applications from Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (Andrews, 2000). The Copenhagen European Council had, besides from setting up the criteria for accession, also made a commitment to absorb those countries that wished to


“Until 2000 the countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia -Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) were also beneficiaries of Phare” (2010a)


become members (2000). In 1997 the European Commission published a report, Agenda 2000, which, among other things, addressed the enlargement process. The report assessed candidates and pointed out the countries that were ready to begin bilateral negotiations with the EU and the ones that needed more preparation (2000). However, negotiations with these “second wave” (2000, 8) countries, which comprised of Slovakia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, were initiated in February 2000 following the Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999 (2000). Furthermore, in 1999 PHARE was complemented with two other pre-accession policies (European Commission, 2010b), ISPA, which would allocate around one billion Euros to assist the reforms in the environment and transport sectors of the candidate countries (Andrews, 2000) and SAPARD, which would allocate around “€500 million for agricultural modernisation and restructuring” (2000, 14). In addition to the pre-accession policies, the accession process also consisted of the construction of a bilateral NPAA between each candidate country and the EU. This involves the commitment of the country to the “adoption, implementation and enforcement of all the EU rules already in force” (European Commission, 2010b). Out of the 31 chapters in the acquis, some examples that are relevant to this project are the chapters concerning environment, transport and agriculture, which ISPA and SAPARD address (2010). It can be argued that the enlargement process accelerated towards the end of the 1990s when the EU, in two waves, invited the candidate countries to commence bilate ral negotiations: “The breaking point was 2000 when Phare became accession oriented and two more financial programmes, Ispa and Sapard, were added as part of the Union‟s enhanced strategy for preparing CEECs for membership” (Neklova, 2005, 1), especially i n the agriculture, environment and transport sectors of these countries. Thereafter the goal of EU membership was finally obtained in 2004 in the case of “Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia” (European Commission, 2007b, 5), and 2007 in the case of Bulgaria and Romania (2007).


5. Empirical Data
5. 1 Speech/99/130 on Enlargement
In order to detect a soft power strategy in the outwards attitude of the EU in 1999, an examination of the speech on enlargement, given by the President of the Commission of that time, Romano Prodi, in the European Parliament on the 13th of October 1999 (Prodi, 1999), will be made. The speech was given after a Commission meeting earlier the same day. It presents the views of the Commission on the enlargement process, particularly relating to the absorption of the CEECs into the EU in the years to follow 1999 (1999) and gives recommendations before the meeting of the European Council in Helsinki later that year. In the speech Prodi argues that the enlargement process can be seen as a great opportunity that arose from the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the breakdown of the Soviet Union. He sees it as a prospect to unite Europe in a way that it had not been united “ since the fall of the Roman Empire” (1999). In connection to this unity he adds the principles of “peace, security, freedom, justice and equality” (1999), which are the principles that in his opinion should dominate the new European order. He also emphasises the importance of democracy, the respect for human rights, the rule of law and the single market that “offers growth and prosperity” (1999). These are all the aspects mentioned in the Copenhagen Criteria, which were defined in 1993 as the criteria to be fulfilled by the candidate countries prior to accession into the Union (European Commission, 2010b). However, according to Prodi it is not all mere opportunities. Although the candidate countries are making attempts to comply with the criteria of membersh ip and showing their “capacity for change” (1999), there are also some challenges involved with the process. This, defined by the Commission is, in particular, the conflict between “speed and quality” (1999). Prodi states that the integration of the CEECs into the Union should be as fast as possible, but not at the expense of the compliance with the criteria set up by the EU. He holds that the “Copenhagen criteria are so fundamental that the European Council meeting in Luxembourg and Cologne recommended further accession negotiations only with countries which meet them” (1999). This is what he labels as the “hard line” approach of the EU (1999). At the same time he stresses that the “efforts of the candidate countries “must be rewarded in such a way as to encourage further progress while dispelling complacency” (1999). Prodi mentions that it is all about finding the right balance between these two approaches.


In order to create this balance, Prodi finds that an enlargement strategy is needed. The preaccession strategy is part of this framework. This includes “screening and setting priorities for the candidate countries, providing them with financial and expert assistance, involving them in Community programmes and agencies, and closely monitoring their progress toward meeting the membership requirements” (1999), which mostly refer to the fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria. Prodi makes clear that the process of adapting to the criteria for membership is different from candidate country to candidate country. The countries that at the time of the speech had complied with these criteria were already negotiating with the EU, whereas the “European Council meeting in Luxembourg and Cologne recommended opening further accession negotiations only with countries which meet them” (1999). Prodi argues in his speech that the reason the EU is so strict with the importance of the fulfilment of the criteria for membership is for the sake of the people in the candidate countries. Prodi emphasises that the EU feels a responsibility towards these people in terms of the rights to democracy and protection of human rights. The Commission furthermore makes a recommendation to the European Council to begin negotiations in 2000 with countries that have fulfilled the political dimension of the criteria for membership and uttered that they are prepared to do what is necessary to fulfil the economic dimension as well. However, this recommendation is under four conditions, which all imply concessions that the applicant countries need to make, such as dismantling of unsafe nuclear power stations and progress in the implementation process of economic reform in the case of Bulgaria, and reforms of child care institutions and macroeconomic situation in the case of Romania. Prodi also recommends that the “principle of differentiation” should be applied in the individual negotiation process between the candidate countries and the EU. Each country shall negotiate one-on-one with the EU and the process of integration into the Union should match the capacity of each country. He also recommends that a transition period for implementing the criteria is put forth by the EU in fields, “such as energy, infrastructure and the environment, where a great deal of work still has to be done at considerable cos t” (1999). The reforms needed in these areas are very high if the candidate countries want to live up to the demands of the EU. On, the side of the EU, Prodi puts emphasis on the need for institutional reform in order to be able to absorb the new members: “Institutions designed for six members, and which are already inadequate now, will certainly not be able to manage a Union of 25 or 30 countries” (1999). If the EU manages to make the institutional reforms by the end of 2002, Prodi argues


that it is only up to the applicant countries to meet the criteria of membership. If they do, he states that the first accessions can take place as from the 1st of January 2003. In the speech it is made obvious that any aspiring member state can become member if it complies with the EU‟s criteria and show that they have a “capacity to change and adapt their economic, social, environmental and legal systems” (1999). With regards to Turkey, which Prodi also devotes some time to in his speech, he explains that it requires special treatment. Although, the relationship between Turkey and the EU is becoming more positive, he maintains that accession negotiations cannot be opened until Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen Criteria. In order to help ease this process, Prodi suggests that an “Accession Partnership” is set up between the two parties. With regards to the neighbourhood policy of the EU, Prodi argues that the enlargement will expand the European market, and non-EU members will have to comply with the EU standards in order to sell their goods and services in this market. This, in general as he describes it, will lead to “increased prospects of prosperity to the wider Europe. In addition to this, he claims that the enlargement of the EU can lead to stability and peace in the rest of Europe through the incentives they get to join the Union by seeing their neighbours joining. This is what he identifies as “virtual membership” (1999), something that also calls for more cooperation between the EU and these countries. Towards the end of the speech, Prodi sends out a message to Albania and the countries of the former Yugoslavia making clear that the EU sees them as members of the European family and that there is a possibility for membership if they live up to the criteria put forth by the Union. He also emphasises that it is important not to create a dividing line between prosperity and poverty in Europe, especially with regards to countries such as “Russia, Ukraine and the Caucasus and Maghreb countries” (1999) This all in all is the strategy for enlargement proposed by the European Commission. He stresses that the enlargement process is not necessarily easy, but it “is a grand and worthwhile project” (1999) which he calls “the construction of Europe” (1999).

5. 2 ISPA
ISPA, the Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession, which was created in 1999 and commenced in 2000, is one of the pre-accession strategies (together with PHARE and SAPARD) to assist countries that are applying for EU membership (European Commission, 2008). It


came about after the Luxembourg European Council meeting in December 1997, which concluded that an enhanced pre-accession strategy was needed in the case of the CEECs (The Council of the European Union, 1999a). ISPA assists in infrastructure projects, provides aid and helps facilitate the implementation of the acquis communautaire3 in the fields of transport and environment (European Commission, 2008). According to the Regulation and the conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council meeting of December 1997, the aid allocated in through ISPA will be distributed according to the principle of equality and with focus on the countries that need it the most (The Council of the European Union, 1999a). The main objective of the policy is, as expressed in ISPA (1999a): to “provide assistance to contribute to the preparation for accession to the European Union of the following applicant countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, hereinafter referred to as the beneficiary countries‟, in the area of economic and social cohesion, concerning environment and transport policies in accordance with the provisions of this Regulation” (1999a, Article 1). Another objective as defined by the Regulation is to make a national programme with each beneficiary country to ensure the “improvement of the environment and of infrastructure networks” (1999a, Article 2). The measures stated in the Regulation to fulfil the objectives are divided into two main measures: environmental measures and transport infrastructure measures. The Regulation states that as a standard each measure shall have a cost of at least five million euros (1999a, Article 2.2). Assistance can be granted to studies made prior to and necessary for the implementation of the policies in the fields of environment and transport infrastructure as well as to “technical support measures, including information and publicity actions” (1999 a, Article 2.4 (b)). The technical support measures include the following three measures:


L’acquis communautaire or acquis communautaire originates from French and means “that which has been acquired by the community”. It is an umbrella term that is used to describe all of the legislation made in the EU including everything from treaties and directives to legal practice from the Court of Justice, declaration, international agreements, etc. This all amounted in to around 30.000 legal acts or more than 100.000 pages in 2009. When a member country joins the EU is has to fulfil the acquis communautaire from day one (Folketinget EU-Oplysningen 2007).


1. “horizontal measures such as comparative studies to assess the impact of Community assistance” (1999a, Article 2.4 (b) (i)). 2. “measures and studies which contribute to the appraisal, monitoring, evaluation or control of projects and to strengthening and ensuring the coordination and consistency of projects with the Accession Partnerships” (1999a, Article 2.4 (b) (ii)). 3. “measures and studies to ensure effective project management and implementation and to make any necessary adjustments” (1999a, Article 2.4 (b) (iii)). The allocation of the assistance provided to the candidate countries by the EU is in the Regulation characterised as indicative allocation, which refers to the fact that it is made by the Commission “on the basis of the criteria of population, per capita GDP in purchasing power parities and surface area” (1999a, Article 4). Account will be held over how well the candidate countries have performed in the previous years in their attempts to comply with the membership criteria in order to keep track of the relative success of the reforms in the areas of transport infrastructure and environment. The aid can take any form, including repayable as well as non-repayable direct assistance (1999, Article 6.1). With regards to repayable assistance the Regulation stresses that following aspects should be kept in mind:”(a) the availability of co -financing; (b) the measure‟s capacity to generate revenues, and (c) an appropriate application of the polluter pays principle” (1999 a, Article 6.2). In return to the assistance the “[b]eneficiary countries shall ensure, in particular, that directly visible display panels are erected showing that the measures are being cofinanced by the Community4, together with the Community logo, and that representatives of the Community institutions are duly involved in the most important public activities connected with Community assistance granted under ISPA” (1999a, Article 13.1). According to Article 8.2 of the Regulation, the assistance can be cancelled if the candidate country has not yet begun to make reform and structural changes under the contractual conditions of this Regulation (1999a, Article 8.2). Requirements from the Commission to the countries receiving the assistance according to ISPA, include the assurance to properly implement the assistance received by the EU, division between the management and control functions and clear documentation showing how the assistance has been implemented in practice. This should all occur in the time between


The EU


January 2000 and January 2002 (1999a, Article 9.1 (a)). This Article also gives the EU the right to supervise that the measures are being rightly implemented in the beneficiary countries. With regards to publicity, Article 13 of the Regulation emphasises that the beneficiary countries ensure that the public is conscious of the role of the EU in providing the assistance and aid to the country (1999a). Finally, it is important to stress that the assistance given through ISPA is given merely in the pre-accession stage. Upon entrance into the EU, a country loses its right to support under the Council Regulation (EC) No. 1267/1999 (1999a, Article 15). Thus, ISPA is a financial instrument with the intention of assisting an applicant country in preparing for entry into the EU, specifically in the fields of environment and transport.

As PHARE and ISPA, SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development) is a part of the pre-accession policy package. Its main objective was to reduce an excessive reliance of the ten applicant CEECs on agriculture and combat their major sociostructural problems in this sector before entering the EU in 2004 (The Council of the European Union, 1999b). The programme itself was established in 1999 by the Council of the European Union (European Commission, 2007a). Broadly this policy was a part of the pre-accession strategy to support the CEECs‟ current economic and social reforms as well as the integration of their economies into the Community economy (The Council of the European Union, 1999b). More specifically it meant assisting these countries to adopt the EU structural adjustment programmes in rural areas and agriculture sector as well as helping them to implement the acquis communautaire, Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)5 and related polices in their national legislative framework (European Commission, 2007a). To accelerate and facilitate the process of adaption for the CEECs, through SAPARD the EU initiated and took measures to provide technical, advisory and financial assistance of overall €560 million, available for the applicant countries between 2000 and 2006 (European Commission, 2007a).


Common Agricultural Policy has since the founding of the European Economic Community been one of the most central policies of the EU. CAP consists of rules and mechanisms that regulate the production, sale and treatment of agricultural products in the EU (Folketinget EU-Oplysningen 2011)


The measures through which the money was allocated for building development strategies were listed in the Article 2 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 1268/1999: 1. reconstructing and modernising production along with processing and marketing of agricultural and fishery products 2. ensuring the protection of the environment in these processes as well as maintaining the countryside 3. improving the structures of quality, veterinary and plant-health of foodstuff control for consumer protection to meet the EU health and quality standards 4. developing and diversifying employment activities in rural areas for alternative income in case of unemployment 5. setting up farm relief and farm management services 6. assembling producer groups 7. managing agriculture water resources 8. improving vocational training 9. establishing and updating land registers 10. renovating and developing villages as well as protecting and conserving rural heritage 11. improving land and reparcelling 12. attracting and supporting investment for agriculture enterprises and forestry in particular The total eligible cost of implementing these measures may be fully covered by the Community, while for revenue generating investments it may only amount up to seventy-five per cent out of fifty per cent contributed by the state aid (The Council of the European Union, 1999b, Article 8). Apart from financial aid, two per cent of the budget was going to be spent on the technical assistance provision which focuses on preparation, monitoring, control and evaluation of the Programme as well as information and publicity campaigns designed to inform beneficiaries and the general public in the CEECs of the aid delivered by the EU (1999b, Article 6.4). These measures sponsored and supported by the EU were oriented to prepare the large-scale farmers of the CEECs to the market economy-oriented competition in the EU and also adapt a new legislation which had to be consistent with CAP and other provisions of the Europe Agreement (European Commission, 2007a).


The allocation of financial resources was according to national prosperity which was determined by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the percentage of agricultural force involved, territory and land features (The Council of the European Union, 1999b, Article 6.3). As the EU grants financial assistance to the CEECs it also claims to have a legitimate right to assess and monitor each country‟s process of implementing reform s and its further performance (European Commission, 2007a). Therefore the assistance is expected to be decided and provided in close collaboration between the Commission, the applicant country, expertise groups and the economic and social partners (1999b, Article 3.1). After consultations each applicant country has to submit its own National Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development to the Commission for further appraisal and approval. Each national plan has to comply with the specific Structural Fund rules, correspond to the principles and guidelines of the agricultural and rural development policy and finally be consistent with acquis communitaire and the Common Agricultural Policy (1999b, Article 4). In return, the Commission has to present an annual plan of the support granted to the CEECs to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (1999b, Article 13). Furthermore, as it is the case in ISPA, SAPARD also emphasises that in case that the applicant countries do not comply with the criteria and do not take enough measures to adopt a structural programme, the European Commission may reduce, suspend or cancel aid for the measures concerned (1999b, Article 10).


6. Analytical part
6. 1 Analysis of Speech/99/130 on Enlargement
Based on the definition of soft power set forth in the project as being the ability to influence others to voluntarily do what you want them to do without the use of coercion, the speech will be analysed in order to see if the EU is using a soft power strategy in the process of enlargement and if so then to what extent this is focused to bring about a structural change in the CEECs and/or change the image of the EU in the eyes of the population of the CEECs. Furthermore, upon the commencement of this analysis, one must also remember that this project maintains while soft power in practice is the ability of one actor to produce a desired behaviour in another actor, soft power is not something you have. Soft power is derived from economic prosperity, attractiveness of political and social values and influence in the international sphere. In this view, it is clear that the EU is a wielder of soft power, first of all, because it is one of the largest economies in the world. Second of all the attractiveness of its political and social values can be seen in the wishes of the CEECs to join the Union. Finally, the EU has a large influence in the international sphere, both in international institutions and non-institutional activities around the globe 6 . While the pre-accession strategies can be seen as measures to change something, specifically the sectors they refer to, then perhaps the EU‟s use of soft power can be seen as an attempt to bring about a structural change in the CEECs. The speech, on the other hand, is not directly changing anything, but rather it focuses on promoting the image of the EU and the enlargement process. Nevertheless, it cannot be verified whether the speech, in addition to presenting some

recommendations to the European Council prior to their meeting later that year in Helsinki, was also directly focusing at amending and promoting the image of the EU and the enlargement process in the eyes of the population of the CEECs. This speech is therefore mainly analysed to detect to what extent soft power was a part of the EU‟s enlargement strategy and not addressing the changes, whether in structure and/or in public opinion, that this may or may not bring about. The enlargement process can be seen as a measure of soft power through the virtue of attraction. If you employ this project‟s operationalisation of soft power, the ability to influence

See Chapter 3.3


others to voluntarily do what you want them to do, then Prodi‟s illustration of the enlargement process as a way to construct a wider European area of peace, stability and prosperity 7 can be described as an attempt to influence the CEECs through the virtue of attraction of social and political values. In the speech, Prodi talks about the enlargement process as a way to unite Europe again. This can be seen as the objective behind the process of expanding to include the CEECs as well. However, the method used is attractiveness of social and political values. As examples of these values, Prodi mentions peace, security, freedom, justice, equality, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law as well as growth and prosperity seen in connection to the single market. It can be speculated that the candidate countries wish to become members of the EU, because they were attracted by these principles. Many of these principles are factors included in the Copenhagen Criteria which have to be adopted and complied with prior to accession into the Union. Though, the EU is not forcing the candidate countries to comply with the criteria and join the Union. Rather, the criteria function as a mechanism of integrative power: the candidate countries are actually convinced that it is genuinely beneficial for them to comply with the criteria. For instance, the political elements, such as democracy, the respect for human rights and the rule of law, are seen as fundamental for maintenance of peace and stability in the region. The economic elements, especially the single market, are seen as essential to prosperity and growth. Soft power, thus, lies in the mechanism of attracting the CEECs through the principles advocated by the EU Another aspect of soft power, supported by the operationalisation of the concept in this project, is found in Prodi‟s reference to the pre -accession strategy, which is a part of the enlargement strategy as a whole. Investments are the soft power measures that are mentioned in order to ease the process of accession of the CEECs into the Union. In the preaccession strategy the EU is investing in the CEECs through for example providing them with financial and expert assistance. This can be seen as a means of soft power, because if the EU, through investment and aid, can exercise influence over this countries and make them want to adapt to the main principles of the Union, it will ease the process of absorption into the Union. The process of shaping the CEECs, both structurally but also normatively, can be argued to lead the way for a European unity, guided by peace and stability. When Prodi argues that the candidate countries are making attempts to comply with the criteria of membership and actually showing their capacity to change, it further supports this argument. The EU has managed to make the CEECs want to change. Whether this change is merely triggered by the

See Chapter 5. 1


economic incentives given by the EU is less relevant than the fact that the majority of the countries are showing that they are willing to change. Furthermore, in the speech, soft power is used, not only as a measure to influence the candidate countries, but also to countries that aspire to become members of the EU. Prodi makes clear that any aspiring member state can become member of the Union if it complies with the EU‟s criteria and also, as mentioned above, show that they have the capacity to adapt their economic, social, environmental and legal systems to fit the principles of the EU. Another way of using soft power, is through providing a chance and prospect for other countries, besides from the candidate countries, to become a part of this process as well and thereby get a share of the economic prosperity, stability and peace. According to Prodi the countries that are not yet part of the enlargement process get incentives to adapt their political and economic structures to that of the EU be seeing their neighbours joining. Prodi directly appeals to countries, such as Albania and the countries of the former Yugoslavia, to make efforts to adapt the criteria for membership. If they manage to do so successfully the EU might be able to open up membership negotiations with these countries. Thus he offers a prospect to these potential candidates that also they can become members if they want it enough. All in all, the speech by Romano Prodi shows clear indications supporting the argument that the EU is using soft power in its enlargement strategy. In the speech different measures of soft power can be identified. These include the power of attraction, investments and signals to the countries, the candidate countries as well as their neighbours, that there are prospects for membership if they adapt to the Criteria set forth by the EU.

6. 2 Analysis of ISPA
When looking at ISPA from a soft power perspective the first thing that is noticed is the fact that the whole strategy in itself can be considered an act of soft power. This is evident by the fact that ISPA is supposed to assist in projects, provide aid and help facilitate the implementation of the acquis communautaire. ISPA can be considered a measure of soft power because soft power in this project has been defined as using, among other things, economic prosperity in order to make changes to the structure of for example the political system. Since the acquis communautaire is all the EU legislation that has been implemented in the EU countries it will no doubt be bringing about changes to the political system of a country that chooses to implement it.


If ISPA is examined on a more detailed level there are also other indications of soft power measures used in the EU pre-accession strategy. Among them can be mentioned the objective to provide assistance to contribute to the preparation for accession of the CEECs in the areas of economic and social cohesion, concerning environment and transport policies. For such an objective to be reached, it can be argued that it is necessary to make changes to the structure of the recipient states‟ political system. The same argument can also be made for the second objective of ISPA improving the environment and the infrastructure will mean that structural changes will have to be made to the political system as well. At the same time, this objective also has the potential of changing the image of the EU in the eyes of the citizens of the CEECs as an improved environment might be viewed positively by the citizens. This, however, is not a given and will very much depend on the exact measures used for the improvement. The three technical support measures mentioned in ISPA might not by themselves be considered soft power measures, as they change neither the political or economic structure nor the image of the EU. However, it can be argued that such measures are used to facilitate soft power measures, especially the technical support measure number two and three that are aiming to ensure the effectiveness of projects in the CEECs. It is, nevertheless, not the technical support measures but the projects they support that have can be considered soft power measures. One of the clearest forms of soft power measures that is seen in ISPA is the aid. It is clearly defined in ISPA that wherever aid is given directly, visible display panels are put up. These panels, among other things, bear the logo of the EU. This can be considered a soft power measure as the obvious reason for doing so would be to change the image of the EU in the eyes of the citizens of the CEECs. The strategy of making the citizens aware of the fact that the EU is sponsoring or co-sponsoring initiatives that are hopefully considered positive, gives a strong indication that the EU seeks to improve its image among the citizens. This is even more evident in Article 13 where it is emphasised that the CEECs most ensure that the public is aware of the role of the EU in the provided aid and assistance.

6. 3 Analysis of SAPARD
Following the analysis of ISPA in this project, SAPARD is also seen as an act of soft power. This assumption derives from the fact that this policy is designed to help new potential member states to reconstruct and modernise their agricultural sector to be able to adjust and integrate the EU legislation system and common policies, such as CAP.


Agriculture plays an important role in the economy, especially in the case of the CEECs which are, to a large extent, relying on this sector. Hence, it could be suggested that by initiating and introducing agricultural reforms, SAPARD promotes a structural change in the political as well as economic system in these countries. This can be considered to be a clear sign of EU soft power core measures directed to transform new potential EU member states by exporting its own economic and political model. Although the acquis communitaire does not in general dictate the CEECs, through the use of specific approaches the EU‟s financing and technical measures implicitly or explicitly predetermine the solution. This approach shows the indirect nature of soft power which avoids a sign of direct influence on other nations. By giving the CEECs a prospect of EU membership, the EU in fact manages to get these states to be eager to act in accordance with the will of the EU. However at the same time, by giving the new potential member states a theoretical choice of following or not following the pre-accession policies, as they are not mandatory, the EU is making these states believe that they still hold a certain degree of power and control over the actions and decisions they take. By looking at the political level where, according to our operationalisation, soft power could be exercised, it is assumed that the precondition of some of the changes in agriculture and rural areas is the institutional system change. This, in turn, requires a creation and development of new necessary legal provisions. According to SAPARD, it could include development and improvement of infrastructure, water resources management and farm management, protection of environment, establishment of land registers and setting up producer groups (Article 2). These can be seen as soft power measures that lead to the change of the political system in the CEECs which according to EU norms and values needs to be more democratic and decentralised. Despite the fact that SAPARD does not directly attempt to shape an economic structure of the CEECs, it nevertheless helps these states to cope with the changes that they will face when they enter the European Economic Community. The policy commits to provide technical and financial aid in order to improve the efficiency of production and the marketing strategy of agricultural and fishery products, as they have to be competitive enough to survive in the open market of the EU (Article 2). Coming from the operationalisation of the concept of soft power and the levels it could be exercised on, the public support aspect should also not be neglected as SAPARD clearly indicates the intentions to use its soft power strategy there.


As the policies wielded on the CEECs are supposed to be implemented under the condition of a democratic regime, the role of public opinion and support is crucial. From the above discussion about the concept of soft power, our operationalisation outlines that this power rests on the ability to attract and induce people through building a good image and reputation domestically as well as internationally. SAPARD is clearly set in this direction. The soft power strategy avoids a vision of using direct power and imposition on others. Therefore, it is of great interest to note that SAPARD does not actually aim to dictate or impose the structural changes in the CEECs, but assists, facilitates and supports these changes as these states have already willingly and independently decided to implement them to be able to adjust its policies to the ones of the EU. Furthermore, through the analysis of the objectives and measures in SAPARD one could see that the EU is trying to gain favour in the eyes of the public by making an emphasis on the sustainability and the protection of the environment. In Article 1 and 2 it is stated that the Regulation supports sustainable agriculture and sustainable development as well as renovation of villages, conservation of rural areas, afforestation and the protection of environment. In other words the EU is promoting a positive image through advocating green and sustainable development. These goals are usually associated with the good will and intentions which, according to SAPARD, the EU must also have. Finally, through SAPARD, the EU is trying to create a positive image through information and publicity campaigns (Article 2). It is assumed that the awareness of the Central and Eastern European citizens of the contribution to financial aid and assistance provided to their countries would result in a positive attitude and support of the structural changes, which might not even directly be beneficial for them. However, economic prosperity and respect for human dignity, often associated with the EU, allow people from the new member states to sacrifice and bear losses for the sake of achieving the same level of economic development and political stability in the future as their Western neighbours already have. Overall it can be summed up that soft power measures in ISPA and SAPARD are apparent to be implemented on both levels, structural and public support which consequently supports the argument that the EU has excessively exercised its soft power strategy targeting both levels in the CEECs prior to the accession in 2004 and 2007.


7. Conclusion
The aim of this project was to shed light on the soft power aspects in the enlargement strategy of the European Union in order to find out to what extent soft power is part of this strategy. Through the analysis of SAPARD, ISPA and the 1999 speech by Romano Prodi it has become clear that the use of soft power is evident in the enlargement process. In the analysis of ISPA we found indications of soft power both in the objectives of the programme, where the EU will provide assistance in areas such as transport policies, as well as in the measures where aid will be given. Meanwhile the recipient countries have to make sure that the EU‟s contribution will be made clear to the public. Furthermore, we found that ISPA in itself is a soft power measure as it is a tool for the implementation of the acquis communautaire in the CEECs. The same argument is made in connection to SAPARD which is also seen as a tool for implementing the EU legislative framework and therefore can be seen as a soft power measure in itself. Furthermore, the analysis of SAPARD shows that soft power is being used through measures, such as development and improvement of infrastructure, protection of the environment and the improvement of the efficiency of the production of fishery and agricultural products. In the analysis of the speech we also find clear indications that soft power is used in the enlargement strategy for example when Romano Prodi recommends the European Council, prior to their meeting in Helsinki in December 1999, to employ a soft power strategy in future negotiations with the candidate countries. These negotiations can, according to Prodi, begin on a bilateral level between the EU and each country that at the time of the speech has fulfilled the political criteria for membership and are prepared to do what is necessary to fulfil the economic dimension as well. Besides from this recommendation, different measures of soft power can be detected in the speech, supporting the argument that soft power to a large extent is a part of the EU‟s enlargement strategy. As seen in the examples above it is clear that soft power was apparent to a very large extent in the enlargement strategy in 1999, the analysis of ISPA, SAPARD and the speech by Prodi shows that both the objectives and the measures of these were heavily influenced by soft power. The second part of the objective of this project is to analyse at what level soft power is applied in the enlargement strategy, whether the soft power measures are mainly focused on achieving structural changes or whether they mainly aimed at changing the image of the EU in the eyes of the citizens of the CEECs. In ISPA both measures that indicate an aim to make structural as well as image changes can be found. An indication of the focus of achieving


structural changes is the second objective of ISPA that aims to improve the environment and the infrastructure, but on top of that ISPA itself, as argued in the analysis, can be seen as a measure to achieve structural change. On the other hand there are also clear indications that an improvement of the image of the EU is being pursued. This can be seen in the fact that it is specified in ISPA that there should be visible signs of the EU contribution wherever the EU gives aid. Also in SAPARD both indications of the goal to change structure as well as the goal to improve image are found. The aim to improve the image of the EU is seen, like in ISPA, in the fact that the EU feels it is necessary to make it aware to the citizens of the CEECs whenever the EU contributed with aid or financial support or even structural changes that can be seen as beneficial to them. An aim to use soft power to make structural changes is also seen in SAPARD especially in the fact that SAPARD is designed to facilitate the implementation of the acquis communautaire. In the speech by Prodi the measures of soft power detected can be defined as the power of attraction which is found in the social and political values of the EU, for example in the principles of peace, security, freedom, justice and equality, which Prodi argues should dominate the European region. Another measure of soft power used in the enlargement process is aid and investments directed to the CEECs in the pre-accession strategy. By investing in these countries, the EU is not only restructuring the political and economic systems in the CEECs but also improving its image in the eyes of the population of these countries. It can also be argued that through investment and aid the EU is influencing the candidate countries to genuinely want to become members of the Union and adapt to the criteria set forth by the Union. Thereby they add to the, in Prodi‟s eyes desired, peace and stability in the region. Finally, the act of offering prospects for membership can be described as a soft power measure expressed in the speech. Through showing, not only the candidate countries but also their neighbours, that there are prospects for them to become members as well someday, the EU can influence these countries to adopt and fulfil the criteria for membership. The speech can therefore be seen as an instrument to promote the image of the EU in the eyes of the candidate countries and countries aspiring to become members someday as well as an instrument to endorse the future employment of a soft power strategy in the later negotiations between the EU and the applicants. There are therefore no doubts that in the analyses of ISPA, SAPARD and the speech by Romano Prodi on enlargement the indications of the aim to achieve structural changes and


image improvement can be seen. However, overall in ISPA and SAPARD the goal seems to be to achieve structural changes as both of them are supposed to facilitate the implementation of the acquis communitaire. This could be seen as an indication that the image changes are subordinate to the structural changes as the measures to change the image are just part of an overall strategy to change the structure. Finally, it can be concluded that even though the goal of the EU‟s enlargement strategy appears to be mainly structural changes in the CEECs, this goal may also have broader implications, such as peace and stability in Europe based on a common ground of shared norms, values, agendas and policies.


8. Proposal for Further Research
In this project it has been analysed how the EU has been using soft power in its foreign relations, specifically in the enlargement strategy. In chapter 3.3 “Soft power and the EU” it has been presented that the EU is a great power even when it comes to military power. For further research it could be interesting to look at what changes the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 has meant for the foreign policy of the EU and for the EU as an international actor. The EES is the first strategic document covering the whole of the EU‟s foreign policy. Every part of the strategy from diplomacy and trade to aid and military is described in this document. Therefore it can be argued that EU‟s ambitions as an international actor can be derived from this document. The ESS describes the EU in this way: “a union of twenty-five states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world‟s Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal” (Biscop, 2007, 5). According to the ESS “the European Union is inevitably a global player” (Biscop, 2007, 5). The ambition of the EU is further illustrated in the statement: “ Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world” (Biscop, 2007, 5). This interestingly enough shows that the EU has very clear ambitions, including in the military and security part of its foreign policy. However, this does not mean that the EU has forgotten its soft power approach, which is also well presented in the ESS by this statemen t: ”The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order” (Biscop, 2007, 5). In a historical perspective the writing of the ESS can be seen as an obvious step in the development that has happened since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening of the Iron Curtain. European security had until then been protected by NATO. After the Cold War the EU that had only marginally been involved in the security of Europe had to involve itself. With the Balkan war in the 1990s is was obvious that the EU was not able to manage conflicts even on its own continent and this eventually led to the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that came into force with the Amsterdam Treaty. After Javier Solana came into office as the High Representative of the CFSP the further institutional improvements, such as the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, the EU Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management and the EU Military Staff, were created. These improvements made the management of the foreign and security policy even more efficient. It


also gave the EU the capabilities that were needed to act for example in Macedonia and in Yugoslavia as well as to engage itself in the Middle East. Additionally, this eventually led to military involvement in places such as Congo and Darfur as well as the civilian mission in Iraq (Heusgen, 2004). Because of this development, the EU had no other choice but to procure a common strategy to be able to undertake its, increasingly important, global position, which therefore led to the creation of the ESS in 2003 (2004). According to Biscop the foreign policy objective of the EU with the ESS is conceptualised through the notion of global public goods (GPG). He describes GPG as “[p]hysical security or freedom from fear; economic prosperity or freedom from want; political freedom or democracy, human rights and the rule of law; and social wellbeing or education, health services, a clean environment etc.” (Biscop, 2007, 5). These four dimensions are, in the view of the EU, universal and therefore everybody is entitled to them. On top of this the GPG is public, which means that it is the responsibility of the public authorities to provide the citizens with access to them. These are important because “econom ic instability, mass migration, frustration, extremism and conflict” (Biscop, 2007, 5) are results of the gap between the people who have and the people how do not have access to these. Because the world has become globalised the EU cannot insulate itself from this consequence and this has therefore been acknowledged in the part of the ESS called A Secure Europe in a Better World (Biscop, 2007, 5). In the ESS it is recognised that the core principles are inextricably related. This means that a person enjoys one of them if he has access to all of them. All policies that are part of the foreign policy of the EU must therefore address all four abovementioned dimensions simultaneously in order to achieve durable results. As the EU does not want to impose these, its foreign policy is thus focused on introducing them through partnerships and multilateral institutions (Biscop, 2007, 6). In perspective to our project, when the EU chooses to introduce its foreign policy through partnerships and multilateral institutions, it can be seen a conscious choice to use soft power in its strategies. in the ESS. A proposal for further research is to see if the use of soft power in the enlargement strategy has been influenced by the focus on the four dimensions of GPG present


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